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ACCOUNTING FOR LANGUAGE PERFORMANCE;
IRRATIONAL PRODUCTION, OBJECTIVE WORLD

by

THEODORE A. YANOW

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1997

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
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Abstract**ACCOUNTING FOR LANGUAGE PERFORMANCE;
IRRATIONAL PRODUCTION, OBJECTIVE WORLD**

by

Theodore A. Yanow**Adviser: Professor Lindsay Churchill**

This thesis views language as constitutionally tied to social context and social practice and their material constraints. In normal theory language is received pattern, constituted on a neurological basis and/or through some process of privatization, rather than through continuing social practice in an objective sense. In this thesis what is examined are structures actively constructed against resistances, the evidence for which is found in falsification or irrational use. I develop tools for indicating real intention and activity on the part of concretely and objectively constrained social actors who are deemed to be in some kind of "error", their performances not being in conformity to standards of truth or logic or regularity, including the grammatical. Explanatory frameworks and models for language that is produced, faulty or not, are developed. I attempt the construction of and utilization of a model which is predictive of performance, if only in a weak sense, at the same time dealing with language which is idiosyn-

cratic as well as ordinary. What is presented as explanation are the resistances which make it unlikely that certain products will appear unscathed. We model members' work with shifter, indexical and deitic functions, which overlap theoretically. The data examined closely are from response protocols to the Three Mile Island incident and Field Research protocols from North Central Florida in the form of notes and recorded interviews. (Different relevant data include historical sources and voting behavior.) On the basis of the above I suggest a new anatomy for language treatment.

PREFACE AND OVERVIEW

This thesis proposes to examine language from the point of view of its actual production by actors who are historically specifiable, in some detailed social sense. But in point of fact one never has such data to a degree to which one will state anything with perfect clairvoyancy. It would be embarrassing to assert that one knew enough to really account for language performance, when one knows how laughable in an explanatory sense existing theories are and yet one must try.

So what is one doing? One is not producing a model of language production which conforms to either the range of social competencies implied by certain discussions of language, e.g. Hymes, Bernstein, or even Bourdieu or Habermas or for that matter Chomsky's model (which claims zero sociality.) Despite their differences, these operate on the level of rule. Rules do not make actions out of themselves and we want to have a social analysis of language which is obedient to the grain of social experience and does not merely talk about the inventoried objects which are linguistic or the set of all possible such objects under rules which can not deal with "extra-linguistic" context, partly because they radicalize rather than relativize the distinction between speech and action. Language is not a

separate domain from other forms of social action, though it is of course separable. Anything is under certain circumstances separable.

The orderliness of language products is usually taken as implying that language is a separate system, the orderliness of which is heuristically useful if one is trying to understand how it is put together. That is the scholarly interest, but all one is discovering is the orderliness which members depend upon for stable meanings and constructions in their communications. The importance of that can be exaggerated, for sometimes stable meanings are important and sometimes they are not.

An example of this is that of the notion of a language as being comprised by a mutually intelligible chain of dialects, and languages, even if closely related, being differentiated through their mutual unintelligibility. This latter is often construed to be on the basis of objective features such as phonetic structure or the peculiar mixture of subjectively ordered objects of structural linguistics. The political differences are usually taken to follow from the linguistic ones, even if it is really the other way around. However, it can be shown that socio-political history often defines the meaning of language difference. Exam-

ples: Urdu and Hindi, and dialects of French and Italian along the Italo-French border which are closer to each other in a material sense than moderate variants within their political communities. I revisit this issue by noting¹ André Martinet's now ironical statement of 1953, "It is different allegiance which makes two separate languages of Czech and Slovak more than the actual material differences between the two literary languages."

Language is erroneously deemed to be socially autonomous and theoretically uniform. The former I have talked about; the latter is related to the communicative interest, that of course being more fundamental than the related heuristic interest. The "class interest" of grammarians may impose a uniformity upon language which is not required by actual speakers, who do not need to study it but merely speak it as intelligibly as they need to. But the question of what they need and what they mean and what they can do transcends uniformitarian principles. These are social questions and questions of social practice which is always constrained, in the first instance as I have described above, but there are deeper senses of constraint as well.

¹ Preface to Weinreich, Uriel Languages in Contact; Findings and Problems, 1963 Reprint of 1953 edition, Mouton & Co, the Hague.

Constrained by what? It should be recognized that that actual language produced is like any other social act neither arbitrary, i.e. totally free, nor totally constrained as in a mathematical machine. One is never free to say anything one likes (evidence for which will be presented below), nor does any conceivable utterance appear on any occasion (The Chomskyian model, of course, does not claim to be and is not a guide to actual performance.) On the other hand, we are "choosing" what to say all the time, in some uncertain sense; it's not being dictated for us.

On the quite logical presumption that speech acts are acts which appear along side other social acts and are similarly constrained, we may ask how do we go about characterizing these constraints? Our answer depends upon how we conceive of the various levels of social reality impinging on actors and their actions.

If determinants of action / speech are objective (i.e. irreducibly limiting in some sense), and if that notion of objectivity is an ordered one encompassing all social sectors (family, community, work, social class, polity, economy etc., etc., etc.), what Hegelian influenced Marxism (e.g. Marx's own analysis) and other classical versions of sociology (e.g. Durkheimian and Weberian) recognize as a social

totality, then that totality must penetrate at every level down to the simplest (and apparently most isolated.) No act then is unmediated.

What is this analysis going to look like? It is going to be formalist or structuralist, but not based upon any notion of competence, per se. Not limiting itself to certain models such as Volinš̆inov, who does have an ad hoc theory of language production based upon a notion of every speech act exhibiting the influence of the entire social class structure as it impinges upon that act, it will also pick up certain elements of that formalist and structuralist tradition as found in Jakobson and his followers. While they were developers of sufficient system in language, they also concentrated (on the way) on the processes of production (, particularly literary and poetic,) which were original (individual) and therefore anti-systemic. (This conforms to a distinction made by Volinš̆inov in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.) While one may agree that part of the formalist legacy has been claimed by a competence oriented-language theory, there is enough left over after that claim to supplement an anti-competence oriented theory, if one thinks seriously at all about the problem of creativity.

In language studies there is a radical distinction made between creative activity as in the study of poetry and (to a lesser degree) other literary genres, which form part of literary activity, and rule-denominated verbal behavior (otherwise known as "competence" -- including the generic or definitional component of these products. Again, implicit in this usual division is the idea that the universe of such behaviors (at least the accountable ones) is exhausted by the division. It is the anti-competence element in formalist literary theory that I am going to lay claim to for ordinary speech. As summarized by Henryk Baran in his introduction to a collection by Pomorskya, Jakobson's wife and collaborator,² and justified by citations from her work and Jakobson's, the Jakobsonian notion of poetic myth can be stated as follows in terms of two logically connected passages:

"... in the life of the poet (author) the realm of external facts and the domain of his creation are merged, so that, on the one hand, the poet may interpret a fact of his life very differently from how others may see it, while on the other hand, the poetic fact -- the image, the character, the plot -- may enter his life as something real and directly shape the course of that life (xx).

"The methodology of establishing a poetic myth in Jakobsonian terms blurs the boundary between life and art, turning the former into an extension of the latter. In semiotic terms, the notion of the text is extended to its maximum and a search may be made for those equivalences, or parallels, that are a concomitant of the aesthetic function..." (xxi-xxii)

² Jakobsonian Poetics and Slavic Narrative; From Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn (ed. H. Baran)

This is suggestive of what I am proposing to do -- in this case, because I'm dealing with a nominally noncreative function, when the text is extended to its maximum, it is because a social totality is impinging willy nilly upon an actor rather than the actor attempting to impose himself or herself as contextualizer upon the social world. (We are refusing the radical distinction between specialized discourse and that of ordinary actors.)

All in all it is not surprising that the poets Jakobson³ examined ended badly, since they were taking responsibility for so much, at the time of a Revolution, but we all don't live during those kinds of emblematic times (nor take so much responsibility.) So what does one write about? "Ordinary" language and not some heroic figure's language? (This raises the possibility that it is not only poets who⁴ "end badly.")

What was I going to use as materials here, when I entered into the project? It will become apparent that what I intended to use at the beginning was highly specialized

³ See "On a Generation That Squandered its Poets" in R. Jakobson Language in Literature.

⁴ If text is understood as merely a record of what is to be analyzed, extending out to the limit of what must be explained, we find we are not dealing with anything very different, it is still a semiotic maximum, with built-in failures.

material, that almost inevitably I concluded that under "normal" principles of sociological research I must justify the selection of certain informants (and not others) and that apart from some sense that I was looking for unusual or odd locutions I had not the least idea of what I was doing.

⁵Some years earlier, I had written and published a short article on "The Structuring of Time in the Political Consciousness; the Abstract and Concrete." That article and my related language interests straddled sociology and anthropology and took most of their evidence from contemporary political discourse. The article was uncomfortably situated within the sociology of knowledge, but looked at the active processes of structuring and not the fixed forms of ideology or utopia in the Mannheimian sense, i.e. at an implicitly linguistic process.

Still as I explain in Chapter IV of the thesis below, I felt obliged to find material within specific contexts whether literary-historical or sociological (and was not wrong in this though my sense of adequate contexts was hardly complete.) What I did not propound for myself was a sense of how ubiquitous these contexts were and to what degree a suitable analyzable content would be defined by not only the

⁵ Critical Anthropology vol.2 no.1, 1971.

context, but by the active process of negotiation of context understood as some kind of social totality. In other words, I was assuming that performance was my subject, but not drawing the necessary implications of that choice -- not understanding that the problem was in discovering how context was to be negotiated and not predefined.

Overview

I sketch here the structure and content of my investigation as it is exhibited in this work.

In Chapter I - Problem and Method, I attempt to talk about what would be required for an adequate theory of language based upon the idea of performance, in terms of certain leading ideas such as objectivity, resistance, difficulty of production, a negative production principle, limit, embedding, complexity, and context.

In Chapter II - Background, an attempt is made to deal with the preceding theoretical frameworks, both adequate and inadequate for dealing with actual produced language in the social world. I examine analyses which are professedly socio-political as well as those which are not.

In Chapter III - Methodological Issues; the Framework for Analysis, I develop methods of analysis, based upon the framework for specifying relationships between code and message in Jakobson's "Shifters, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb" and his treatment of indexicals, and on some ideas on context suggested by Gregory Bateson. I utilize these in connection with an elaborated discussion of "difficulties of production" to indicate how one might understand distortions in performance i.e. in actually produced language, using the classification of shifters (or references to context) developed by Robert Austerlitz in his article "Remarks On Deixis" and materially expanding the notion of shifter to include the counterfactual.

In Chapter IV - Field Work and Other Sources of Analyzable Data, I apply the above framework to actual data obtained more-or-less systematically in the course of field work and other data obtained later and more serendipitously but with a more acute sense of its pertinence and the reasons for pertinence. I develop further the tools of analysis introduced in Part III augmenting these notions with those such as life history, social boundary, failure, and connections in discourse.

In Chapter V - Concluding Postscript, I attempt to sketch a linguistics based upon the results of my previous analyses of data. I look at these analyses in the light of existing logical frameworks. I use the preliminary results of analysis to select and suggest critical reconstructions of relevant systemics.

Acknowledgements

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I. PROBLEM AND METHOD

This dissertation will consider language from the point of view of its performance, or actual speech or utterance, and not from the viewpoint of an internalized capacity, usually termed "competence" i.e. it will try to develop an analysis of what is actually said. It will minimize the importance of analyses based on idealizations which are counterparts of their abstraction from the social.

From the point of view of theories of linguistic or communicative competence (those which consider linguistic or speech performance solely from the point of view of various internalized capacities of a member of a society) performance remains a very problematic function of the communicative situation. This is so because speech is not viewed from the point of view of the concrete historical actor, but from the point of view of a structural or transformational linguistics (i.e. from the point of view of language norm and structure.) A competence model could have as its resultant all possible sentences which are generated under some set of rules. No such model gives the criteria for the actual sentences produced or used. The set of all acceptable sentences from the point of view of syntax is much larger than the set that conforms to historical possibility, let alone probability. With any particular historical actor,

certain sentences are fairly likely and others are pretty unlikely; these latter are likely to be said with great ¹difficulty if at all. One typically is not "free" to say anything in a given situation -- except as something quoted or reported -- and the limits on this, strictly speaking, have not been investigated.

I propose here to indicate the direction of analysis of concrete historical speakers, i.e. ones who occupy specific positions in a particular historical and social structure, by asking and answering a number of questions and accumulating the answers meaningfully.

Any consideration of linguistic performance in a class-differentiated society is going to give insight into social activity as such, since such activity is permeated by speech at every turn. If linguistic performance is determined or negatively limited by what is possible for social actors, it must give insight into objective class and other aspects of objective social existence. There is no adequate analysis of language performance or production pure and simple, i.e. which is abstracted from social actuality. We must here note

¹ We will talk about this problem of "difficulty" later on, positing that it will correspond to social resistances and not merely individual ones. De Saussure categorized *la parole* with the resistances of individual physiology, which is doubly incomplete.

the historian E.P. Thompson's brave words in his "Introduction" to his pioneering study of the Making of the English Working Class that class must be understood as an "happening" and not a "thing", because that study is a model for historical analysis when it looks at what is emergent in a culture being made. Reading that study, we discover two aspects of class culture, first the on-going series of innovations on the basis of often disparate origins by which familiar organizations of that culture come into existence and of course those aspects of culture that are so accumulated. This latter may include what is usually later termed or attributed to "competence". These elements of culture may be acquired, but they are first and foremost developments of what has happened (under the auspices of historical actors on the basis of a not unlimited set of possibilities.)

If we carry that contrast over into the study of language (again "pure and simple"), we refuse (at the very least because it is unproven) to consider it as separate from other socio-cultural activity. Then meaningful language, since it appears alongside other activity which is nonverbal (but also permeated by language), must be understood as similarly rooted in real conditions of possibility. It must then be that verbal and nonverbal behavior should be similarly answerable in analytic terms, i.e. we should be

able to establish a relationship between the nonverbal and the verbal act, even though utterances can be equivocal in ways that seem unique (they may be evasive, invalid, infelicitous, insincere, or even be redolent of bad faith -- all plays on propositional truth.) The nonverbal doesn't aspire to this but again there is a relationship. It's in this social structure that we first find ourselves acting and speaking (if in the end we are going to find those things.) Others precede us in life, have gone through what we go through. One of the struggles around maturation is how much we will accept of the interpretive reality of others and how much "we work out for ourselves" and when.

Q1. How does objective social structure seem to be limiting in its several aspects to a member of society, in ways that are significant for a theory of speech?

A1. The operative word is "objective." Objective aspects of social being are discovered as limiting conditions in the field of human praxis or action. These can be disclosed as operating in various coherent contexts of action: industry, home, community, playgrounds, street life, mind and body, which are more or less strategic, as the case may be. From the point of view of an historical sociology, whether Marxist or not, these are plausible social sectors and that

additively they constitute a social totality. Whether a sociology is capable of finding some articulation between sectors depends upon its devotion to the analysis of social totalities, classically required in sociology but not usually broached in linguistic analysis where the unpacking² of a complex yet flawed statement may require operating³ across the boundaries of several contexts of action in order to understand how it is possible to say it at all. Such apparently nonsensical statement such as "I go to work daily because Newt Gingrich has told me to" or "My mother who is dead thinks it also" make some demand upon us to interpret them meaningfully, beyond the requirements of the archetypically grammatical Chomsky example, "Colorless green⁴ ideas sleep furiously."

² Of course the notion of social totality is eschewed in so-called Post-Modern discourse theory, though it is difficult to avoid it in dealing with World Economy or Global Climactic Change. A pleasant kind of market anarchy is supposed to eventuate in end-results which are global. Or maybe there is a fantasy that there is nothing that is global.

³ To discover a grammatical point of view which considers that language does navigate a real world one might have to return to the linguistics of an Otto Jespersen in his Philosophical Grammar. But any grammatical point of view is still necessarily incomplete.

⁴ The former examples and the one of Chomsky are different in that the former ones do seem to be suggesting putative though false relationships between social contexts of various kinds and the Chomskyian sentence does not, even though it may also ask for and fail interpretively. It is an easier failure. When I told my younger sister that some Monopoly money had been given to me for her by Rockefeller and she attempted to use it with the Good Humor man, expostulating with him that the money had been given to her by R., she would have (continued) giggled at Chomsky's sentence. The latter is what once would have been called analytic. One can show with dictionary meanings that such terms are inappropriately joined. One can say that such a sentence whether nonsensical or not is properly descriptive.

This is a wider notion of objectivity than that of the usual Marxism, more consistent with that found in the contemporary decentered analysis, since it takes all sets of limits seriously, not just the most strategic ones, and is therefore consistent with a complete theory of language use. But a complete theory of use has to be totalizing and will be a political economy of use besides, since it will deal with systems of domination (and limits) and the abstract counters which are exchanged meaningfully within and between every domain of use, sometimes unequally. The insistence upon a non-coordinated structuring of various social domains as is encountered in certain newly coined versions of social theory distorts the matter.

Interconnections cannot simply be denied for some claimed purpose of clarification or definition of a domain of use, for the process ends up losing sight of the purposes of doing social theory (at least as classically understood.). Connections and distinctions made by members (including those ones traditionally bound to social class), can not be assumed to be invalid because of fashion masquerading as new discovery. All "discoveries" of the wrongfulness of looking at the world in terms of objective social relationships should be suspect. Regardless of the politics of utilizers

of this objective point of view, it was seen as providing the technical means to effect change whether local or global i.e. felt to be part of our rational armamentarium as members of society. The abdication of such analysis is a symptom of disenchantment (which is not to say that the obverse is enchantment.) Connections and disconnections of domain made by all members are subject to investigation, which does not make the category suspect at all -- just investigatable and to be taken seriously.

Q1a. What is meant by "objective aspects of social being"?
What is this "objective point of view"?

A1a. Looking at all social behaviors from the objective point of view, some domains of use may turn out to be more strategic; they are (so to speak) counted more than once. The real weights in speech should be observed, and not the ones asserted or assumed. While we weight everything evenly in description, we are forced to come back to certain aspects of a situation over and over again to explain matters or rather we conceive of the existence of the possibility of an explanation because of our failures and the repetitive content of our experience. One returns to these aspects as if they were haunting a scene.

In the course of negotiating practically and keeping tabs on what one is doing, certain parts of what a linguistic corpus describes act as apparent limits on others i.e. one butts up⁵ against something which is apparently resisting. It is partly the real weight in experience and the reports on it that persuade people that one is dealing with something which is "really there" and has importance -- and offers resistance. These are the indicators of what is "objective," (which one, of course, often has to surmise.) An example comes to mind of a person going downtown for job interviews in which each time he/she goes on the trip there is some reference to color, not necessarily from the interviewer -- often quite tangential to the interview, as if it had no relationship -- perhaps out in the hallway or in a bathroom; one overhears it; and each time no offer is made. ([1] I am not trying to establish the reality of objects of experience as in a philosophical debate, only to speak of the phenomenology of what is objective. [2] Also not examined: what scientists mean by objectivity -- that which is bound to a special context, that of a technical productive system with its own class-determined history -- though in its existential character, it is similar to although narrower than what is being looked at.)

⁵ See Appendix I.

Q1b. What is the kind of appeal or claim or evaluation that members make when they call something "objective" from a particular vantage point in an historical social structure (which they may not be too conscious of)?

A1b. It would seem that they are making some claim about structure underlying or limiting their activity, something which operates in the last instance (It is likely that "limit" and "in the last instance" usually refer to much the same thing in this argument. They are not tying things up simply, as a rule. They know that something always seems to be there.)

Work is done in finding out what is "objective," that is, discovering what is or is not possible. Events or activity (events originating with members) apparently can't proceed in violation of the "effects" of objective factors which are experienced as resistances. Members posit that these are effects resulting from an underlying base or structure at the same time that they experience resistances in the form of repeated defeats. Eg. the job seeker's experience may be similar to that of others in comparable situations. Their conclusions are likely to be similar in the long run. Thus is hypothesized a self-regulation of acts of members of society according to an objective social structure collec-

tively negotiated by members, i.e. partly that of past accumulations, partly as ongoing work in the present.

Having said that, there are, obviously, a whole range of expressions which falsify or misrepresent the truth in part or in whole, which are detectable to a greater or lesser degree. We know that some lies are better than others, that liars, in elaborating their lies, often leave the clues around to be picked up. Whether they are picked up depends upon the complicity of the deceived to an extent. (An example is the case of the adulterous spouse.) Objective reality is denied (potentially) on both the side of deceiver and deceived. Language is bound up in its "realistic" or objective functions even as it is utilized in ways which attempt to deny that function. And in the end there are lies which are difficult to utter. We do not seem as creatures in a social world to be able to say anything without qualification, for the objectively real impinges on our activity including that of our speech. We suggest that there are structural prices to be paid in contradicting reality, whether deliberately or not, and that these are discoverable in the form of the language itself. This goes beyond lying.

Q2. How does a member's (correct) sense of what actions are possible affect the expressibility of utterances referring

to those actions and their likelihood of expression? It doesn't even have to be conscious under a number of interpretations of that term, so certain are we that what is objective impinges on our activity.

A2. Some Historical Data and a Possible Analysis

I start with C.B. Macpherson's Political Theory of Possessive Individualism as a source on the Seventeenth Century, when the modern class structure can be said to have first emerged, in England. I choose this period because it may be stated that from that point we can speak of a certain framework of social action, which is based objectively in capitalist property relationships and whose political meanings it was apparently rational to argue about and to fix for several centuries. We might enquire as they did whether certain Speech Acts, viz., elements of new language-permeated institutions, were also part of what he calls the ⁶possessive individual market framework. Then, as Macpherson points out, there were arguably those who were excluded a priori for reasons of class position from active participation in various legal normative transactions. As several of the political theorists of the 17th century argued: since

⁶ Although they did not call them that. We leave a discussion of the technical subject of Speech Acts to the next chapter, Background.

the propertyless did not have an "interest" in England, they ought not to have a vote, since they would be voting about matters that did not concern them. This is an objective standard, not unconnected with the present day low rates of poor or working class voters who are difficult to motivate since the issues raised in the political domain ordinarily have little to do with their real interests. The only method that has been devised that keeps rates of participation high is compulsory voting. Voting is an act but certainly not freely or equally possible at every social level or location.

The 17th-century English bourgeoisie took this problematic as an obvious reason for denying suffrage. Their representatives said (in the Putney Debates) one who does not have an interest in the commonweal through ownership of property can not vote "validly." Our case is more complicated. With universal suffrage those without a property interest take themselves "voluntarily" out of the political domain (unless they are forced to participate by law or encouraged through mobilization.) It seems that people do not vote in the main despite the fact that they are told it is their civic duty. An like any civic act, it is desired by some that it not be made too easy. Thus the "act" of voting can be taken as partaking (eternally -- i.e. over these several centuries)

of something of the character of a very problematical Speech Act. Even though an act, it may be taken as primarily verbal (i.e. "I vote for such and such"), which then leads back, admittedly, to the question of what social meaning this particular paraphrase utterance has.

I am not arguing that Macpherson gives a model which explains outright why specific utterances are unlikely to occur, but he does report on a pattern of argument as to why specific linguistic acts are unlikely to be "validly" performed by certain persons under certain circumstances. What if it is not the intention of an historical actor to be insincere, but to perform an act validly and the actor is "incompetent" to do so as is the voter above(--surely an extension of the idea of competency)? Is he or she likely to do so (except as an act of faith or assertive art)? What will that act look like if performed?

This we do not ordinarily credit for we take an entirely individualistic slant on the matter, deeming that anyone can say or think or even do anything they "want" to do, though careful consideration of this claim proves that it is somewhat tendentious. We certainly don't think any person can do anything they want, though we hedge by saying if they try hard enough or start trying soon enough they can. We model

competence (whether verbal or nonverbal) as a privatized capacity i.e as a form of property. Of course we periodically change its provenance between nature and nurture, depending upon which swing of the political pendulum we are experiencing. If we are at the nurture end, well then we speak of the confused notion of "equality of opportunity."

Q2a. All this is useless unless we can propose a principle of expressibility, based upon these observations.

A2a. What is suggested is a pragmatic rule for the production of sentences which can predict utterances in a "weak"⁷sense, as argued about above, which turns out to be negative. This negative rule of the "Macpherson type" might go like this: 'A sentence which is a plan for an action is unlikely to be said, if the action for which the sentence⁸stands as a plan is not likely to be successful.

⁷ It should be noted that accounting for everything is a theological task, which should not be rejected as a matter of principle but only as a matter of capacity. The negative task of accounting for what is not likely is more likely to be successful. That is what I would call a weak form of prediction, which is statistical in form, but determinate in content. This is promising since among other things it takes cognizance of the essentially negative character of the objective world as it impinges on subjectivity. From the point of view of idealized functioning what is given is always some limit on fantasy or desire.

⁸ It may be produced, but not with a plan structure, i.e. it will have a defective structure from point of view of planning (but this may turn out to be an adequate structure of another kind such as satire or metaphor.

Q3. How is verbal structure linked to various experiences of possibility i.e. what can be said about vehicles for the expression of plans, explanations, narratives, lies, bad faith statements, alibis, excuses, etc., which are⁹ understood as such by both speaker and hearer, in terms of experiences of possibility?

A3. We can't discuss at this point all the kinds of expression you mention but we can discuss some important expressions. One can speak of the "evidence" necessary for the¹⁰ hearer to conclude that an utterance or higher order structure is in fact planned. There should be certain rules of evidence shared by both speaker and listener that derive from their common historicity as actors and users of language which help the auditor to conclude that he is hearing an argument or a narrative or some other structure with beginnings, middles and ends. (Classically, within literary theory, this is something that indicates completion.)

In general, Hockett's discussion of the structural features of language which have cognitively meaningful characteristics from the point of view of auditors emphasizes those layered features within a sentence which notify auditors

⁹ And poetic expression as well, will it be possible to say anything about that?

¹⁰ See Charles Hockett's "Grammar for the Hearer".

that more is to come that is related in well-formed (i.e. logical, chronological, causal or explanatory) terms to what has appeared or is appearing. Not only that but the "predicted" element when uttered indicates closure of possibilities within the universe of utterances because it implies the ending of some portion of a thought or conceptualization. Narratives (excepting the most episodic sequences) generally exhibit these characteristics. So do causal sequences and plans. So do prepositioned modifiers¹¹ such as adjectives. Modifiers of any kind in the absence of apparent objects require objects to follow. On the other hand the lack of such notifying features implies a looser structure which minimizes cognitive constraints on the language product and its auditor (as well as its producer.)

All of this variety, excepting its cognitive element, is usually discussed in language theory under the heading of the kinds of layering or structuring to be found between component parts of a sentence phrases, clauses and the like but the classification applies to modifiers in general (as is suggested above.) In structural terms this sorts into left-handed and central embedding or layering, corresponding

¹¹ Dwight Bolinger has elucidated issues around prepositioning and postpositioning of adjectives which show that their potential noun-like character depends upon position and that they therefore do layer as Hockett describes.

to subordination and other endocentric constructions, and right-handed embedding, corresponding to co-ordination and ¹²conjunction and other exocentric constructions.

Q4. What is the sociological significance of these latter kinds of structures? After all this seems rather formal.

A4. This answer is not exhaustive. One should not underestimate the significance of the presence or absence of features of produced language which are cognitively active in Hockett's sense. The case that I am going to discuss was originally presented by John Fischer in 1964. I am ¹³going to take a very different position on his data than he does. His treatment while ostensibly sociolinguistic is purely formal (even dogmatic) in its treatment of language data. The two Micronesian societies considered have a separation time of about 3000 years, judging from the sharing of basic vocabulary, which is pretty much agreed upon by linguists, does not change by borrowing but through random but statistically constant processes. Truk was egalitarian and Ponape, stratified, when the data were collected.

¹² See John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics pp. 178 ff., 224 ff., 231 ff., 265 f., 311 ff.

¹³ "Syntax and Social Structure; Truk and Ponape" in William Bright (ed.) Sociolinguistics (Proceedings of the U.C.L.A. Sociolinguistics Conference, 1964).

I intend to go over the data, briefly. In general, noun modifiers in Trukese more often precede the noun than they do in Ponapean. In both languages independent substantival forms exist which correspond to the various kinds of noun modifiers, but these are phonemically differentiated in Ponape only (and then only for noun modifiers in their final position.) "In other words..., there is an overt differentiation of the adjectival and substantival use of the morpheme in addition to the differentiation provided by the structure of the sentence and context of the utterance. There are more such overt differences in Ponapean than in Trukese." I include in my text a summary of Fischer's Tables I and II:

<i>Differentiation of One-Word Noun Modifiers by Position</i>						<i>Phonemic Differentiation of Adjectival and Substantival Forms of One-Word Noun Modifiers</i>	
<i>Type of Word</i>	<i>Position</i>					<i>Same forms</i>	<i>Separate forms</i>
	1	2	3	4	5		
Demonstrative w. suffixed N.	-	-	-	-	TP	---	TP
Demonst. w. unsuffixed N.	T	-	-	-	P	T	P
Possessive Classifier	TP	-	-	-	-	T	P (partly)
Numerical Classifier	-	T	-	P	-	T	P (partly)
Regular Quantifier	-	-	T	P	-	T	P (partly)
Interrogative Quantifier	-	-	T	-	P	TP	---

Note: T = Truk; P = Ponape. Position 1 - modifier always precedes; 2 - usually precedes; 3 - may either precede or follow; 4 - usually follows; 5 - always follows.

Relative clauses in Truk can be used as complete sentences with appropriate adjustments of tonal contour, which does

not happen in Ponape, because the latter uses a relative pronoun and the former, an ordinary verbal subject pronoun.

According to Fischer, Ponapean noun phrases are constructed more tightly than those in Trukese. There is more often ambiguity in Trukese about whether modifiers are modifiers or nouns in apposition than there is in Ponapean. Because of this as well as other explicit syntactic cues there tends to be less interruption in conversations by an speakers than by Trukese speakers. The explicitness of cues ("surface structure" TGG would say) means that hesitation is less likely to be taken advantage of by an interlocutor.

Fischer's own remarks about an auditor in Trukese understanding where a statement is going by context and assuming that an adjectival form was a substantival one (referring already to the object implicated contextually which was to crop up as a noun) is a good starting point. First, there is the issue raised by Bolinger as to whether we are dealing with hard and fast grammatical classes at all, even in English -- whether we are not rather working

¹⁴out functional possibilities or specifications as we proceed. Second, if there is no error in sequencing, i.e. guessing the proper sequel from a pragmatic point of view and if that happens regularly in Truk (note I do not say "Trukese" here, because we are speaking about the way language is utilized in a society), then this a cognitively adequate use of language. A society in which failures of understanding may occur will be one in which the one interrupted will protest. One imagines that in a society where people are on pretty much the same level, there will be little misunderstanding.

On the other hand in a relatively unequal society (e.g. Ponape) there will be unshared information. Fischer suggests that "the speaker assumes the listener to be perhaps quite different from himself and liable to misinterpret fragments of the full proposition." Fischer speaks over and over again about the possibility of misinterpretation in Trukese, because of the loose structure and the cumulative use of

¹⁴ If we return to the distributional data summarized in the table above, we should note that we only have statistical data about the occurrences. Following Chomsky we observe that certainly on the level of grammar alone there is no way of distinguishing between modifier-classes. We observe, from our rather special point of view, that the statistical data rather than giving evidence for newly defined form classes sets up the problem of why a modifier should in any particular instance be where it is rather than in some other place. In brief it indicates that the data smuggle in, without confessing to it, a historical record of performances which need a sociological explanation transcending that proffered by Fischer.

context in conversation, but gives no actual examples of misinterpretation of message. What he means by "misinterpretation" must simply be one of grammatical category and that conclusion is not inevitable as stated above, because¹⁵ it is not clear what the grammatical categories are.

First we must state that it is easy to exaggerate the amount of unshared information. There is still a great deal of social transparency in a society like Ponape. It is interesting that Fischer not once speaks of the primary system of status based behavior, i.e. rules of propriety and politeness, which in stratified societies like Ponape is likely to be highly significant. Certainly in a society where everyone knows relative position, the socially inferior may be afraid to interrupt and the superior may be offended if interrupted. The superior may utilize linguistic means which make it clear to an inferior when an utterance is complete (not "factually" so but socially i.e. when, if at all the inferior may participate in the conversation.) If prepositioning can be taken to mean there is a common context, the post-positioning of modifiers can convey that the interlocutors have little in common. It may also permit the socially superior, apparently, to not provide contexts for

¹⁵ The dogma that Fischer is trying to apply is Bernstein's distinction between elaborated and restricted codes.

statements i.e. to replace reasoning based upon common experience by assertion that the bases of the superior's reasoning are in principle inaccessible and leave the providing of context to the end -- , as it were, on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. (The contrary may be the case, but it is obscured in the assertion.) A tight construction giving notification that something is to follow may be actually telling us to "shut up" in which case it may followed by something which is only loosely connected to the announced topic and therefore minimally consequent.

Once that is a speech norm (also a social norm), the door is open for everyone to assert a privatized context after-the-fact, even a social inferior, and that will be functionally no longer related to the assumptions of the social superior. Everyone will act as if the bases of social reasoning are no longer commonly available, even if that permits prevarication, and by doing so make those common forms of knowledge in shared contexts less available or admitted on the surface. In fact the syntax nominally reproduces the condition which is the supposed basis for the dominant positioning of modifiers. This is not intended as a general picture but as one possibility growing out of the development Fischer details in stratified society (Ponape). Nonetheless the denial of common context and the postposed statement of con-

text on the one hand gives what in principle must be incomplete, because what is common is denied; on the other hand it must give a false connection because it is otherwise¹⁶ immediately referable to what is actually known.

Q4a. O.K. This is certainly one example where this concept of coherence or planning within language structures makes sense. If I am not mistaken, you have connected the notion of context to it in a sneaky way I don't quite understand.

A4a. I didn't. John Fischer did. And while he seemed to think (mistakenly) that operating from shared contexts was inferior, cognitively and linguistically, I think it's worth while to look at this notion of context as it impinges on everything we are talking about, including these matters of embedding or layering that I spoke about before, for if we look at how we reworked Fischer's data, we will see that everything he tends to approve of as more complex speech behavior is describable as right-hand embedding and what is actually lacking there is any substantive notion of common

¹⁶ This hints at a modification of the idea of language indexicality (as Bar Hillel understood it.) In principle our understanding of language is based on the facticity of shared contexts, which allows members to anticipate each other's meanings and not need to have them explained. Non-glossability is based on the fact that socially non-distorted speech (communication) always assumes common social knowledge. To "need" explanation is potentially to be lied to. See the next section on Background.

context. (A formal pattern obliging a modifier may be there, but seems to be based upon the social obligation of the auditor to "accept" the relevance of the modifier.)

Q4b. This seems to be getting even more formal. Plans may not be recognized as valid ones. Narratives may be disjointed. That's what I want to know about -- not all this stuff.

A4b. Sometimes you have to indicate a framework for analysis -- I don't say we have established it yet-- before one can ask questions which appear to be useful. Otherwise, it really will be too formal.

It should be understood that acceptance of an expression as a valid plan (or narrative) and not something else depends upon a particular point having been reached in implicit negotiation between the persons concerned about what is objective (or plausible as a sequel.) Members of society may judge that the "plan" is mistaken or invalid or not a plan at all. (Likewise for a narrative.) It is precisely these structures which one can present "arguments" against that must be examined, for in them subjective and objective intent do not match. One must look for structural features which validate such expressions in the last instance (refer-

ring one suspects to real limits or contexts) or at least investigate to what degree they fail in that validation. Often the sign of that failure is incoherence or disjointedness.

Q4c. This sounds like it is assertion rather than providing a justification for a particular analysis. I can understand an impression of incoherence or disjointedness, but I do not understand what we would find ourselves looking at that gives rise to that impression. Give me an example.

A4c. Ex. 1: If we look again at the voting example above, we can note the discrepancy between objective and subjective intents. Despite the constant socio-political harangue, many who vote tend to judge it pointless, and many who abstain express guilt about that, or angry defiance (as if both were responding to to the same political injunctions which at bottom are still felt to be unreasonable). And the number voting remains small.

Ex. 2: If we examine the debates about budget reduction, we discover the same discrepancy between objective and subjective. The debate has several focii. [a] A budget balancing admendment is proposed by persons in the legislature to solve the problem in the future through disciplining that same body acting in the present, which at present

apparently is unable to act. (Future and present are in fact transposed somehow in the reasoning.) [b] People surveyed want the budget to be reduced, but preponderantly can not agree on any category to be trimmed. It is as if their real interests are being avoided in the discussion of policy -- not unlike what happens with voting as an option for those who have "no interest."

Some of these discrepancies are mapped into different time domains and thereby "resolved." Others simply are played out in an uncomfortable present. (The issue of who benefits from these acceptable confusions is worth asking, but does not¹⁷ really bear on their existence for present purposes of discussion.)

To have a principled discussion of these examples, we must have many more examples (as we will in the fourth chapter of this thesis) and the further development of a theory, which is weakly predictive as indicated above (in A2a) and which speaks to structural features in these examples. Of course,

¹⁷ My discussion of the Ponapean material implies that the means used in producing these "acceptable confusions" may not differ that much between those whose interests are being served and those whose interests are not, but they may differ on some quantitative scale. Those who are inferior are obliged to sweat it out. This is to say the circumstances of their language performances are different.

in speaking of examples we are speaking of language protocols.

In these protocols, we may speak of misreadings in which we are complicit, false connection on the one hand or invalid disconnection (a gap in discourse, a hole or silence in speech or a separation between areas or items which are or ought to be connected.)

One of the ways of learning how language is actually used in a class society is to examine where the common or dominant language games break down, where "infelicities" of various kinds occur because they are related to real capacities or incapacities. Ordinary language theory has simply taken these breakdowns for granted and interpreted them from the point of view of a highly formal rule set, never getting beyond the imposed system and its qualifications. [*For example, marriage vows as a speech act.*] In contradistinction, we would not only have to talk about an insincere "promise" but also a "promise" in which there would be the desire to fulfill the "promise" even though the "promiser" had reasons to suspect he couldn't do it. [*Ex. continued: "I want to marry you" (Already married, 'trapped', perhaps, in that he/she does not see anyway out.)*] This is a matter of something resembling bad faith rather than insincerity. This

involves the suppression of certain forms of objective knowledge, including that of the interconnection between various life sectors and the larger history. *[Ex.2: A politician makes a promise which in truth he would like to fulfill, but also knows he is in an automatic minority in his legislative body, so in one sense he runs no risk. Ex.3: Slightly different is that of a legislator who, in an minority, votes against appropriations for a war unpopular with his constituents. He is tolerated by the leadership of his party until his vote can be part of a majority. At that juncture, still protesting his opposition, he may find reasons not to vote.]* And we should see specific evidence for this suppression of knowledge in the language produced. (This is exemplified in the contemporary discourse around voting abstention.)

Q5. I understand a little of what you are saying, but what is the connection with contemporary trends in linguistic analysis? I understand that in talking about performance you are directing yourself to something very different from what linguists usually look at. Are you going to talk about any of the formal aspects of language as linguists do?

A5. Yes, but utilize them to different ends.

As an important example, embedding refers to ways of successively layering attributes on both a sentence level and above the sentence level by both grammatical and extra-grammatical means (the latter which may be in some cases called rhetorical): e.g. modifiers, predicates, clauses or other such forms on the sentence level; introduced themes or objects above the sentence level. Layers may have reference to what follows or what precedes them. Chomsky in his Syntactic Structures makes no distinction between cognitive¹⁸ functions of different kinds of embedding. We do, believing that empirical speakers make use of Left-Hand Embedded attributes for cognitive work of various kinds and not Right-Hand or Central Embedding. We argue that this is consistent with what empirical speakers and hearers experience (according to Hockett in "Grammar for the Hearer") and according to a parallel analysis of the distinction between prepositioning and postpositioning of attributes by Dwight Bolinger. We have made a case for the validity of this in our reanalysis of John Fischer's data on Truk and . (Note here the discussion on context within discourse and outside discourse, the former understood in terms of actual Left-Hand embedding, the latter understood in terms of potential Left-Hand embedding.) Likewise, above the level of a

¹⁸ Nor does he in "Three Models for the Description of a Language" 1956 reprinted in Luce, R.D., Bush, R.R., and Galanter, E. (eds.) Readings in Mathematical Psychology, vol.2.

sentence, narrative functions by producing suspense effects, i.e. by setting up conditions which must be satisfactorily explained or developed, or else these appear to be loose ends in the story. Our understanding of the assymetries of structural resource and potential failures of idealized communication must be applied to the linguistic product, itself, to be considered as products of negotiation by members.

Applicable methods, for example, will be derived from Roman Jakobson's version of formalism. The class of formalisms which explicitly deal with context, e.g. shifters, will be reinterpreted so that they can deal with a structured social world (-- see "Tools for Analysis" in Part III.) People do see or negotiate their worlds as differentially structured according to objective possibility. Possibilities are class-differentiated and also differentiated according to areas of life that are perceived as coherent by members (in our society, at least: work, home, the street, courts, etc.) Linguistic output will be regulated according to this double distinction but what is produced is done so actively and not according to strict rule of generation, though it can be judged strictly according to its failures which aren't simply grammatical.

This investigation will be pursued without an adequate social theory as it looks at language and, as we will see, without an adequate language theory as well as it deals with speech which is produced in the social world, bearing in mind that we have some idea of what the goals of a socially and historically based analysis should be, (and which have been faulted) on the one hand. On the other hand that social theory has not proved a particularly apt guide to the study of language -- at least the social theory of sociologists, economists and Marxists, which covers a good deal of the landscape.

II. BACKGROUND

Social and Political Theory

In consideration of social and political theories, a natural place to begin is with theories that treat language products in analogy with ideology as preconstructed in various dominated institutions and promulgated by them in functional concert with the dominant systems of the society. These tend to be theories of the left (e.g. Althusser), but not all (e.g. Paretian theories.) Or it may be that ideological products are generated as it were from several centers (e.g., Weber, Gramsci.)

In historical fact, the totalizing frameworks of Marxist and non-Marxist social science have both failed in predictions of political speech, merely positing the validity of certain points of view (and corresponding speech acts) for members on general grounds which are over-abstract experientially. (As an example, language which is not explicitly linked to class-defined sectors may be pulled in, but made subject to dogmatic ideological correction.) For a very long time Marxists have utilized their terminologies in profoundly different ways from Marx's own usage: "ideology" standing for "correct" (and dogmatically held) world view instead of partially revealing and partially obscuring forms in which real

antithetical interests are expressed and and are fought through. "False Consciousness" instead of being the ideologizing consciousness of those who have real interests in the present social system is now the consciousness of those suffer from it and do not rebel or resist.

In the first case, notions of dominance (which was in the tradition) and passive reception (which was not) displaced more nuanced and "practical" ones (as found in Theses on Feuerbach and other early writings) as explanations of the origin and promulgation of ideas and this reflected well-known dogmatic trends within the political movement. The second shift in meaning in part reflects that dogmatism but it also reflects the real difficulties of historically based consciousnesses (which are neither mythologizing nor ethnocentric) and the political movements which have based themselves upon them. All this helped to produce the shift. If there is falsification or distortion in actual speech, we should be able to articulate it and account for it, under the terms suggested in the beginning of this section and not merely classify it dogmatically.

Within Soviet Marxism, Stalin's own pronouncements attempted to neutralize language study and remove it from the domain of class provenance (and conflict) at exactly the moment

when the most savage regimes of coercion were being instituted. Language was declared to be the common property of the whole nation and practically eternal.

In the case of non-Marxist analysis, much of which has been defined with the rebuttal of left views of one kind or another in mind, it possesses its own dogmatisms. Programmatically but not analytically totalizing, it takes description of immediate tendencies as analysis of underlying structures, if it likes those tendencies. It takes people's opinions at face value, never assuming they have been shaped by power and privilege (or testing situation), and at the present conjuncture at least it assumes that the structural questions, which are no longer connected to global political movements with much plausibility, have finally been put to¹rest. As for accounting for what people say and say they believe, that has been replaced by the dogma of the universality of Free Market interests and the aberrant character of any alternative discourse.

Social and literary theorists have nevertheless continued many previous lines of investigation (sometimes not even

¹ The distinction between belief and representation of belief has been collapsed in normative repertorial and political discourse, in the last ten or so years, i.e. reporters do not distinguish between "he says he feels/believes" and "he feels/believes." That has not been noticed. I asked a free lance reporter about that and she replied that to make the distinction would be taking sides.

being aware of the continuities.) The old preoccupations with language (and culture), particularly in the context of poverty and class, apparently now exhausted, the same theoretical preoccupations have now been pursued in more diffuse social contexts of domination, such as those of those of culture and gender, but not in terms of an explicit language theory. On the one hand we are still in the presence (implicitly) of theories of language which are naive from a sociological point of view; not much has been learned from past debates in language theory. On the other hand we have theories of culture and socially delineated characteristics such as gender which share certain hard edged bases with the apparently outdated notions of class (including the problems with nature vs. nurture), and have hardly budged beyond the language description stage of the sociolinguistics of the seventies.

One may suggest that there is a radically different problematic in culturally oriented study at present since it is constituted by notions of gender and culture and not poverty and class, but I suggest that this is an illusion. It is still based primarily, as were the centrist considerations of Dell Hymes and William Labov, upon description and difference. In each case there is an underlying perception of domination and marginalization, respectively, of alternative

forms of expression (the preferred and the disparaged.) In both instances, those of the old and the new there is the problem of the valorization of what has been taken to be inferior, starting with its description as well as that of "justifying" it or reevaluating, i.e. disparaging, the dominant one. (Above all we see this within present debates about multi-culturalism.)

Since the relationships in the argument have not really changed (even though the subject matter has) and it is the relationships which give formal character to the argument it might be useful to briefly review that argument, which remains frozen in the position of some twenty years before. The problem seems to be a fundamental incoherency on the level of theory and method.

The "Non-Political" Theorists

Hymes, Gumperz and others created a framework for the description of linguistic behavior in a social context, and therefore an inadequate one. Articles by Hymes such as the "Ethnography of Speaking", "Introduction: Toward Ethnographies of Communication" and "Models of the Interaction of Language and the Social Setting" summarized and systematized this work, which focused on the system of lan-

guage in a society and not on the actor and his historically-to-be-understood activity of speech, sometimes called "performance." It therefore left out of consideration the real orderings of speech. Even if creating an adequate descriptive theory in the sense that Dell Hymes speaks of it in "Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Setting," that success must be rather limited; "descriptive theory" is an oxymoronic term.

Adequate descriptive theory turns out to be an inventory of items under fixed categories which themselves have no function in the processes described. But that is precisely the contrast in efficaciousness between objective and subjective theories of class in sociology in general. Linguistically productive rules in the earlier linguistics were ones which were capable of generating lists of novel terms and connecting various example of linguistic behavior. A sociologically adequate theory of language production ought equally to be as capable of creating novel characterizations of performance as readily as objective sociological theories do social behavior (even though these are subject to argument by observers.) Ideal typologies, however they are embodied in norms or rules (or schemes of difference), simply cannot provide motion to any system so described because nothing

holds it together on a theoretical level (unless accidentally -- the usual chances of empiricism.)

Hymes in his "On the Theory of Communicative Competence" does not account for performance in the above stated sense, nor should we expect him to do so. The last of his four questions for general communication theory, for example, is "whether and to what degree something is in fact done, actually performed and what its doing entails". He does see elements in performance which are "not reducible to terms of individual or standardized competence". But performance is only discussed inasmuch as it affects conclusions about rule innovation or in terms of shifts between various kinds of capacity. It is mapped into a residual category of a theory of competence, partly in order to deal with rule-violating acts which are legitimated simply by their occurrence. Thus the model is still defined through norms and not by and through describing the "real" possibility of concrete speech acts. (Hymes never ever poses a way to get at the last of his four functions of descriptive language theory in a social context as outlined in "Models.... ", explanation.)

Linguistic performance is handled by a series of interpolations extrinsic to the "speech situation" as such but the idea of language system is never considered problematical.

Hymes' sociological framework is one which does not consider how the society looks to a member. It is entirely consistent with Basil Bernstein's approach to linguistic code as well ²as Labov's contradictory treatment of the same general questions, illustrating that his descriptive approach really lacks the theoretical means to deal with the very questions he thinks important, e.g. why do certain people speak certain ways and not in others. It turns out the people he is disposed to expect to speak in one way do not do so either.

To be precise, Labov's data vitiates any notion of inferiority of response. Labov sees such responses in a testing situation (when they appear) as dictated by defensive reaction to power. He, apparently, did not elicit such defensive reactions. He presents evidence that standard English is understood even if not used. His most interesting interviews, while elicited in potentially threatening environments, refer to other milieux than the testing situation. Labov suggests a statistical model for code switching, one which is superimposed on the competence theory which is Chomsky's Transformational Generative Grammar. We may conclude that examining the rational employment of language in a particular social environment requires a more general

² See Appendix II for a discussion of Bernstein and Labov.

"take" on what is actually produced than consideration of threats in the environment or statistical models but that does go beyond even a very developed competence model.

Richard Day in a study of native Hawaiian speakers, children in a kindergarten, found that the incidence of "correct" standard speech went up in the absence of the teacher, a result not predicted by Labov, and certainly implying a far more complicated motivation for code switching than Bernstein's -- one that exceeds the limits of competence theory. Bernstein and Hymes share a concept of a single cultural currency (which Labov does only partly), a notion of a cultural or linguistic competence which one possesses or does not, much as one possesses property. Chomsky's notion of language competence even with Labov's additions do not account for actual speech or for code switching.

Hymes' notions of competence can be understood in essence as a native theory of language use, one which is ideological at the point where it encounters performance, in that it is dealing with conflict about capacity and entitlement, in ways that obscure the actual processes of production of speech. To understand some of the subterranean issues, we might look at his anti-Sapirian statement in his "Functions

of Speech: An Evolutionary Approach", where much the same point of view is confirmed within a different vocabulary:

"I want to controvert two widely accepted views; first, that all languages are functionally equivalent, and second that all languages are evolutionarily on a par. I want to maintain that the role of speech is not the same in every society, and the differences are best understood from an evolutionary point of view; that we must understand speech habits as functionally varying in their adaptations to particular social environments, and recognize that there are ways in which some languages are evolutionarily more advanced than others. Letting 'speech habits' stand for the gamut of linguistic phenomena and 'functions' for the varied roles these play, I am arguing for an evolutionary, comparative approach to functions of speech."

In this last passage we may see how easily this descriptive viewpoint adapts to a cultural Darwinian point of view.

If one has to choose between theories of deprivation and theories of difference (in Frederick Williams' terms), one simply must find for theories of difference. Nonetheless, these are still competence models as are all present-day multicultural or gender models which simply posit certain cultural forms, without explaining them. Even when these models are epicentric or polycentric as is demanded by all "postmodernist" theorizing, they still are typologically descriptive and marginally explanatory (in fact they are forced to be by such demands.) They deal with ranges of competencies, which are observed and not predictable within the Hymes-Bernstein framework. Egalitarians are empirically correct, but are forced to assert the equality, without

explaining how anything is possible in the face of structural inequities which certainly must affect the content of speech.

The gap between competence as that "possessed" individually and an actual language corpus is where we attempt to insert the underlying objective determinants of production. By that I do not mean just economic or material determinants nor do I intend to exclude human beings as determinants of that process. I simply assert the process of individual determination of act is much more complicated. Just as Marx suggested that the actual intervention of humans in the material world goes on behind the back of the part social world defined by commodity relationships, I would suggest that objective determinants are operative behind the back of whatever native theories of use exist. (If this analysis is borne out, it even makes performance to some extent an artifact of those theories, since it is defined in opposition to the competence notion.) The avoidance of native theories is not possible, but that only imposes the requirement of critical treatment.

There are additional formulations which have the earmarks of a native theory of language use, among them the conventional theory of speech acts of the ordinary language theorists,

Austin and Searle. Here we may ask the following: Are rules logically prior or are they merely descriptions of the way some of us behave, at times? How can we speak of following rules we do not know? Is it then possible to infer that from learning rules we will be able to follow them? To construct a parallel case we would have to forget them first. Rules return one to the privatized model of the possessing individual at the same time that they appear to be social. They must still be grounded objectively in common human capacity regardless of whether or not grammatical forms differ from language to language (as they do) and also in certain institutional complexes which also may vary, so that one would be forced, if one wanted to speak at all, to speak according to rules which referred to those complexes, if one could. But this raises the question as to whether speaking according to rule is merely operating in a linguistic domain, even one which is socially instituted, the same problem again.

To think of these rules, i.e., as conventional in Searle's sense, is to obfuscate the more profound sense in which they are conventional: a whole class of illocutionary speech acts are confessedly contractual (the performatives--promise, marry, vow, etc.). Searle himself speaks of one illocutionary act furnishing a theorem resembling those of welfare

economics. The universe of such performatives and the significance of their felicity conditions is substantially greater than one might assume from the bare arguments of Austin or Searle.

Austin and Searle each reach, in analysis, points where all speech acts receive an illocutionary element, not to say a performative one. Another slant is given by Ross, working within the Chomskyian framework who finds performatives in all deep structures of declarative sentences, trivially the layer "I say." That the case, performative analysis must apply very generally. As is usually the case with linguists,³ the matter has been much debated and contradicted. If one doubts Ross, one can simply use Searle's procedure of contextualizing all speech, on the one hand, and coding all acts into language, on the other, and seeing how it works, depending on the occasion. This implies that whatever difficulties there are with this analysis, it must be taken into account in a large though possibly uncertain number of cases of performance analysis. Since we have problems taking too seriously the notion of language system as embodied in the competence notion, we may be permitted to take a pragmatic

³ See Katz, Jerrold J. Katz Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force; A Study of the Contribution of Sentence Meaning to Speech Acts (1980) for a survey of the arguments.

view of methods which illuminate language production in ways which link them to institutional contexts of various kinds, as does performative analysis.

Some of the issues advanced can be clarified by applying the work of ethnomethodologists such as Harold Garfinkel, Harvey Sacks, Aaron Cicourel, Alan Blum and Peter McHugh. Garfinkel and Sacks ("On Formal Structures of Practical Actions") made an important contribution to the study of social context from the point of view of individual actors. Indexicals are linguistic particulars that are not self contained in meaning but must be understood through extralinguistic contexts. Garfinkel and Sacks show the pervasiveness of indexicals in ordinary discourse including, of course, those very interpolations which attempt to make meaning clear and definite and free of such reference. Yeshoha Bar-Hillel had shown in a 1954 paper ("On Indexical Expressions") that the attempt to change ordinary language to context-free forms was literally impossible. Nonetheless, a speaker "in the particulars of his speech" and "in concert with others" is "able to gloss these particulars." He or she, thereby, means "something different than" he or she "can say in so many words." "Gloss" therefore means much the same as an ordinary usage -- a kind of running interpretation. Those glosses

which attempt to make explicit, to formulate exactly what is being done, are themselves part of the practice of speech and are therefore pervaded by indexical usage. (One could say any piece of language has radically extralinguistic dependence and that therefore the task of saying what conversationalists are actually talking about "in so many words" is demonstrably endless. Garfinkel ("Remarks on Ethnomethodology") reports on an experiment dealing with the coding of decisions dealing with the disposition of cases in a psychiatric hospital. He discovered that strictly categorical rules for decision-making are always incomplete. Though coders were attempting to understand social organization through their coding, in fact their work (logically) presupposed that knowledge; they could not provide complete glosses on decisions. Various kinds of apparently ad hoc considerations were necessary if coders were to treat folder contents as reports of "real events".

According to ethnomethodologists, norms are not sufficient to give concrete guides to action. Situations are "negotiated" as are the norms chosen, with the aid of "deep-structural" interpretive rules shared by members of society. They are "negotiated" specifically through the use of context-bound language. Garfinkel and Sacks conclude:

1. "that the properties of indexical expressions are ordered properties.. i.e. socially organized in the sense in which" one talks "of formal structures as accomplishments".

2. "that they are ordered properties is an ongoing, practical accomplishment of every actual occasion of commonplace speech and conduct".

Cicourel, in his "Acquisition of Social Structure: Toward a Developmental Sociology of Language and Meaning", formulates the ethno-methodological problematic in terms which imply the prior existence of social structure, i.e., prior to any particular practical accomplishment: "The problem of meaning for the anthropologist-sociologist can be stated as the problem of how members of a society or culture acquire a sense of social structure that enables them to negotiate everyday life." The fundamental question is how social structure is experienced, defined and expressed (even indirectly.) Despite Cicourel's insight and despite the power of the ethnomethodological analysis, ethnomethodologists have not evolved a description of important elements in members' sense of social structure, namely their sense of the "objective" and the "possible". Can one not say that this also is indexically prior? Although Alan Blum in a series of papers dealing with theorizing has touched upon the problem, he has done so primarily in relation to the systematic norms of various thinkers, ignoring that something like systematic norms must be prior for members who

are all, perforce, "systematizers" or "theorizers" about what is objective or possible.

This lack in analysis, this limit on the indexical, partially removes actions from their grounding and results in the notion of arbitrary or ad hoc action. This from an external point of view must look like a rule with a unique application; it is even more rule-like when it applies to a shared social category, which seems implicit in the argument if not the evidence. Rules do not make actions out of themselves, nor is it quite conceivable how a "rule with a unique application could work."

Despite this underdevelopment, ethnomethodology, founded as it is on the indexical, suggests, as Gumpertz and Hymes have recognized (Introduction to Garfinkel's "Remarks on Ethnomethodology"), a more extended framework for considering social context than sociolinguists had utilized -- if one pushes further its use of indexicality.

For instance, a careful reassessment of the whole language and poverty controversy (beginning with Bernstein's theories which veer messily between normatively typological and normatively functional explanations) can be based on the more adequately sociological analysis of speech implied by

the analysis of indexicals. That solution will illuminate the special characteristic of so-called middle class speech as presented in Labov's "Logic of Nonstandard English". Already admitted by Bernstein is that so-called restricted code appears only when members have no difficulty in recognizing commonly operative contexts and do not need to spell out matters. That applies to both upper class and working class persons as members of culturally homogeneous communities sharing lived contexts. Middle class persons rather than being defined by the shared indexicality of a concrete place and time and experience often are defined by their separation from their places of origin. Their need to provide abstract glosses on their common life ways, i.e. to elaborate in a round-about way, comes from the lack of common background except in the most abstract sense and their definition through social and geographical mobility. This accounts for the features of middle class language that Bernstein, Hymes and Labov have noted, even if they seem to be contradictory. Middle class speech, which on the surface seems removed from its indexical content, is bound rather to a certain attenuated context.

Ethnomethodology undercuts the conventional theory of speech acts of Austin and Searle, in much the same way that it undercuts the claim that unmediated norms give concrete

guides to actions (See Roy Turner's "Words, Utterances and Activities".) The theory of speech acts, which attempts to deal with utterances as "doing things with words", is defective sociologically in that it does not examine the conditions under which the common or dominant "language games" (Wittgenstein's phrase) break down, i.e. at what points in ⁴the social matrix infelicities of various kinds occur, though it itemizes the kinds of failure. It is a kind of normative theory, albeit an interesting one, since it allows one to ask questions about breakdown, but not to explain them.

Bernstein's Restricted/Elaborated Code contrast turns out to be inadequate for much the same reason that speech act theory in general is inadequate in that it treats as normative something which if it exists is the result of much more complicated processes related to "extra-linguistic" context. Turner observes that one cannot "simply take for granted matters that persons in the society may have to decide, negotiate, or assert as premises for bringing off activities". Obversely, the perceived limits for particular persons in society must be explicated as they are among the matters that have to be decided, negotiated or asserted "as

⁴ Levinson's 1983 book on Pragmatics does not adduce any evidence that these important issues are pursued within philosophical grammar.

premises for bringing off activities", what we call the objectively given, including social class.

Much of what I conclude about Hymes and these other theorists of language applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to perhaps the most significant contemporary sociological theorist writing about language, Bourdieu. The simplest take on the Language of Symbolic Power is that it devises a scheme for language behavior by adding together all language competences and other socially symbolic behaviors. These may be conscious, but more often are unconscious and largely dispositional. Incremental social learning from the earliest age creates habitus, the predisposition to certain normative behaviors which may or may not remain conscious, depending upon whether they are opposed by other dispositions. This differentiation of what he calls "doxa" into heterodoxy and orthodoxy occurs with the emergence of class interests. Much of pre-existing linguistic literature has been absorbed and been commented upon, including Habermas' Theory of Communicative Competence (with its attempted subordination of material interest and power to the moral interest inherent in communicative logic itself) after being preemptively deconstructed. This process of reevaluation is one which I largely agree with, but the model remains a model of competence and its acquisition over time by individuals and

populations is understood in terms of successive and sometimes competing acquisitions. What it does not do is to explain what is acquired, the actual language objects produced. In considering Bernstein's elaborated code, Bourdieu recognizes it as a marker for upper class mobility, but does not consider its production functionally as I do above.

There is a market in linguistic acquisitions, quite literally in Bourdieu's theory, but but no explanation of the production of these "goods" which are exchanged.

To the contrary, this work posits a social analysis of language which is obedient to the grain of social experience and does not in the last instance talk about the inventoried objects which are linguistic or some set of all possible such objects under rules which are not integral with "extra-linguistic" context and actions. These previous theories talk about such entities because they radicalize the distinction between speech and action, rather than relativizing it, or because action is seen in a limited way. Language should be not be hypothesized as a separate domain from other forms of social action, though it is of course so describable.

The "template" for analysis that I propose in the subsequent chapter "answers" to the series of questions in Chapter I which deal with the problematic of performance or produc-

tion. Ethnomethodological procedures are modified to actively investigate Speech Acts as they must be defined relative to a member's "sense of social structure" as it is usually posited within an objectively oriented sociology. I sketch out kinds of arguments proposed to be useful for each of the questions posed. In doing so, a progression between the levels of analysis, proceeding from member's social structure to member's language is, hopefully, observable, ending in some kind of useful, if only weakly predictive characterization of produced speech.

III. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES; THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Above we have pointed out that the Chomskyian notion of competence does not lead, as one might hope, to any accounting for actually produced speech, nor would we expect it to under his own assumptions. It is not surprising then to see in certain sociolinguistic literature attempted uses of Chomsky's model, which aren't productive. Chomsky's own historical investigations led him to claim in his Cartesian Linguistics a theoretical ancestry in the Jansenist thinkers of Port Royal, who found the principles of language in the innate characteristics of the mind, and not tied to any social context at all. There are, however, other theoretical logics which can be teased out of seventeenth century material -- which can be related to members' adequate sense of the possibility of action.

Seventeenth Century Data and the Competence Notion

As Max Weber taught, theological thought is a rich source of material related to issues of objective freedoms and constraints -- theologically propounded in terms of free will and determination. Theologies are native theories of action reflecting actual or desired possibilities of various social groups, looked at structurally, in language and elsewhere. Such varied materials reflect debates on emergent social

class relations and what potential significance they have, that reflection developed in the historical writings of Christopher Hill. Christian theology of the period of the 17th century provably constituted a body with a greater range of justifications for social practice than that contained in Calvinism and its near neighbors. This contradicts Weber's own uses of material on sectarian thinking, much of which was far more egalitarian than he allowed to leak into the level of analysis. He was, at times, a gatekeeper keeping data out of analysis. Admittedly his principle of the ideal type might permit material, but that also allowed him to construct a notion of a ideal-typical capitalism despite the survival of rival life principles. The egalitarian theologies of the 17th century (and later) break down the idea of fixed capacity and limited election, and thus the notion of competence itself.

If logics and theologies are by implication theories of social competence, they will be intrinsically defective by the arguments in the Background section as explanations of language production. If not purely this sort of "theory", they will contain some idea of dealing with social possibilities and their transformation and will not admit the notion of fixed capacity or possession, on the model of privatized property.

There remains Chomsky's own model, apparently exempt from the weaknesses of a socially constituted model of competence because it claims capacity to be species-innate and therefore "valid" across all contexts. Still it does accept a notion of internal property, one in principle abstracted from context (including that of social class or group.) Like Jansenism, it remains egalitarian; because it finds the world of objects imperfect, it puts strict limits on its theoretical engagements, i.e. the theory remains ascetic because the world contains imperfect objects. In practice, making transformations context free and separating structure from imputed meanings and implied background has led to all sorts of difficulties for this theory. Nonetheless I do not exclude the critical (i.e. radically reinterpreted) use of this or any available formal framework, leading in this case to a downplaying of its theoretical autonomy, i.e. reintroducing social context and relativizing product to actual performance.

A Note on Linguistic Economy

Linguists have asserted that ordinary language theory did not deal with language in very great depth or complexity. It seems that when significant linguistic materials are examined in terms of a single characteristic such as its

consistency with normative pattern (which all competence-oriented analysis comes to), the confused circularity of the result casts doubt upon the very method. The competence description discussed earlier relegates speaking to modes of speaking -- everything so "cubby-holed", and actual speech produced, being an imperfect residual, on the one hand based on perfect underlying forms, on the other hand whose "imperfections" have been taken as paradoxically implying lack of underlying competence (-- another reason to reject the notion) or (going back to de Saussure) physiological difficulties of production, an example of the exceptional or idiosyncratic.

Nonetheless if we are talking about degrees of difficulty of production in some socio-historical sense (which the voting example we have spoken of above is a good example), beyond physiological difficulties of production we must adduce a number of techniques that will illuminate a significant corpus. That corpus will exhibit difficulties of production beyond those exhibited for performatives -- what Austin and

¹ This latter extension is within the familiar conservative version of the competence-centered theory, that of Bernstein-Hymes. Within Chomsky's TGG Framework, the lack of "good" speech is taken as proving the robustness of the underlying mechanisms of acquisition, since competence could never be learned from the existing imperfect language data. In a sense this second framework attempts to have it both ways. What is truly important has been banished to the realm of the non-testable and the imperfect data of speech no longer has to be accounted for (though it may be classified as "grammatical", "semi-grammatical", etc.)

Searle term "infelicities." Austin's criteria for valid performative production and the obverse ones for failure are external to any Speech Act in that they neither predict the terms of infelicity nor the concrete circumstances under which successful performance does or does not occur. One must bring certain other forms of knowledge to the task of understanding production and its failures which are not merely external or formal since the cases will be invariably modulated by circumstances which are not rule predictable. Both the elements of corpus will prove to have been more difficult to produce in relationship to each other, and the means of understanding production prove to be more linked to context the more one continues the active process of understanding. As an heuristic, one can go searching for evidence of difficulty of production and these will prove that one has, indeed, something real and these will prove to be more and more linked to context.

As a first descriptor of difficulty, we model the difficulty of production to be as linked to material difficulties as was de Saussure's version of linguistic performance (la parole) to physiology. We take this latter as a Comtean and individualistic (and non-social) metaphor for linguistic performance, just as our framework gives a social version of linguistic performance (which is clearly preferable.) Both

these versions of linguistic performance embody resistance of matter -- in the case of de Saussure (and Plato) and its gross deforming effects. In my case I would expect and desire no other (Deformation is evidence of what is real.)

We consider a speech act as materially constrained as any act must be, and approach its internal evidences of incoherence, inconsistency and the like as evidence of real difficulties of production, in the sense defined above, which we may then seek to understand structurally. Of interest earlier was the application of notions about voting as Speech Act to the societies established after the English Revolution and embodying its political-economic problematic and to any such modified society, i.e modified by proposals of remediation.

Tools for Analysis

If we are examining language performance or any other act/product of the objective social world and its relations, we are constrained to talk about what an objectively structured world looks like to a member. In the first instance some aspects of social reality are judged to be more important than others (and that judgment is thought by the member to be shared with all members.) Secondly some and (in this

society) perhaps most aspects of this reality can be ordered in terms of relative importance. Judgments of these matters are linked in members' minds to the issues of what causes what, and what aspects are linked determinatively to other aspects and which is more important in any pairing of events or activities. What we call context of some aspect of action is another aspect of totalized action which is necessarily present when we speak of that first aspect. This implies that as a matter of course all actions and speaking will take place in and refer to a series of nested aspects of human life or contexts or life sectors. Assertions about these matters are made by members in their speech as a matter of course. Some notion of hierarchical organization of contexts is implied by this and we shall discuss it further below.

Without judging what language performance is, we assert (as we did above) that it is not so easily disentangled from other actions and that it will therefore not be disentangleable from questions of whether actions themselves are performable, so we speak again of speech acts as "materially constrained" and often evidencing "real difficulties of production" in the form of "incoherence, inconsistency and the like", which it is necessary to understand structurally.

When first looking at empirical protocols, I located certain structural discrepancies or incoherencies, defining their contents informally without linking these contents to formal indexical usage. The analysis was ad hoc and descriptive, linked to my intuition that there was something wrong with it. It was, therefore, necessarily informal. It was linked² neither to a totalizing social model, which per force must have some systematic connection to an indexical analysis of language in use if language is going to be falsifiable, nor, more narrowly, to a model of indexical usage understood technically.

³We propose to sketch out such a set of linkages step by step, indicating finally how "difficulties of production" are possible.

² Not much different from the informally inscribed intuitions of linguists, which often implicitly express their social origin or reference group, but differing ultimately from those intuitions in that it is formalized below in a theory of contexts which is objective. A theory of objective explanation and context implies that one can account for the provenance of useful language.

³ These linkages turn out to be inadequate when we examine protocols in detail. The aporia imply links of speech to social practices in which actor-speakers are negotiating and denying real limits -- in doing so pushing beyond some stable set of social meanings.

First Argument: the Linkages of a Totalizing Social Model to
the Indexical Analysis of Language in Use

What we consciously experience or define (most of the time) are a series of social sectors such as mind, body, person, family, community throwing in work, entertainment, and the supernatural for good measure, and these, descriptively, do not differ from each other. Language does not on the level of vocabulary or even grammatical form make facile distinctions between subjective and objective. That is done in terms of the functions of grammar and sometimes functional grammar makes the distinctions with great difficulty. Only in analysis, we think, does one succeed in making the distinction, but all the same members are doing this work which we think, "naturally," is the work of the social scientist, and not that of the member. What we do is to document it.

Sartre in the Problem of Method comments that the objective and subjective are not different, except in terms of their point of view. By that I believe he means the data of object and subject are not data of a different kind, but they are looked at from a different vantage point. Language, descriptively speaking, does not treat the objective and subjective differently. The personal or individual or interior is usually what is taken as subjective and what is taken to be

objective is the "impersonal." That however is perhaps not a very useful distinction, since the latter lumps together a whole range of phenomena some of which seem much more resistant to individual intervention than others. Some impersonal things are more central to social life or more broadly influential than others. Any may be looked at from an individual point of view, but some more easily. An alternative would be to contrast external with interior, but that also leads to confusions. We are not prepared to extinguish these difficulties, except to note that even these terms are only relative, partaking of the ambiguity of context terminology. An item in a theoretical language of social aspect or sector may be context to a second term, but in turn take a context term, e.g. individual, family, and community. As Sartre says it is the chosen point of view that makes the term subjective or objective; it may, however, be valid to observe that one term in such series is relatively subjective and another relatively objective. Sartre states:

"The world is outside; language and culture are not inside the individual like stamps registered by his nervous system. It is the individual who is inside culture and inside language; that is, inside a special⁴ section of the field of instruments."116)

⁴ Sartre's own understanding of the matter as he develops it further in this passage is inadequate. He understands misstatements as being the result of an inadequate set of linguistic resources on the one hand and on the other, the presuppositions of a certain cultural world, the performances of an "ideologist." He assumes fixed inventory and ignores the radicalness of ideology and speech.

Abstractly, the various social sectors are ones which we live inside of, which are permeated by language, descriptively speaking, but that excludes what we actually do when we speak, which is both a true and false theorizing which goes beyond language description. There is something about language description and culture description which excludes this active process of context building and attenuation. The active process is how we speak and argue, and, in as much as language conforms to anything we know about our lives, it is how we act also. What follows from this is that even falsification is a theoretical task. This suggests that we must break from any language analysis which is tied to a descriptive model founded on a static inventory and the investigation of its limitations, i.e. a model of linguistic competence even if it is critically oriented (e.g. Sartre's; and even if at certain times the static is broken down.)

Description and Explanation

We have seen some indications that the idea of description is to be associated with the sort of inventory of items which the competence notion requires. We assert that the analysis of performance, or explanation requires us to move beyond description. That move beyond description for the ordinary member actively involves "context building and

attenuation" as discussed above, in which "mistakes" can be made. Language ordinarily moves between sectoral boundaries as it attempts those tasks of explanation, goal setting, or extenuation which persons set for themselves, and so also must a more theoretically explicit use of language which reflects upon those movements. It can also set up relationships. Raymond Williams in his volume, Keywords; a Vocabulary of Culture and Society, traces the emergence of "class" as a term for group or division to the end of the 17th century. In the "modern social sense" he traces it to ⁵the "period of the Industrial Revolution and its organization of society". The element which helped to supercede rank or order (strictly descriptive terms, if only on their face) "was not only increased individual mobility, which could be largely contained within the older terms, but the new sense of a SOCIETY...or a particular social system, which actually created social divisions, including new kinds of division." (51-52) Of course that term, class, is very nearly identical with the more modern term, set, which is not accidental, but not discussable here.


If this sense of division is fundamental to both our sense of social context and our sense of how distinctions are produced, then formal treatments of contextualized language

⁵ His indebtedness to Asa Briggs' 'The Language of "Class" in Early Nineteenth-Century England' is acknowledged. Mine also.

should use some of the systemics of classes or sets. Let's see how.


Let's perform a series of interrelated thought experiments: Consider a listed set of sectors without regard to order: (a) mind, body, person, family, community, class, social system. They are turned into a set of nested sectors in our notation by substituting a colon for a comma in their listing and the order thereby becomes significant whereas it wasn't before we did it. Initially we could have put them in any order descriptively (though to do so would have suppressed our knowledge of what they mean.)

(a) mind, body, person, family, community, class, social system.



If explanation is to be brought into play some context of causal effect or influence must be brought into play. Normally that is done by assuming the more abstract terms, the ones removed from intersubjective or interior experience are most resistant to individual action or initiative, thereby justifying the following sequence:

(b) mind:body:person:family:community:class:social system



Note that the colon ':' becomes a synonym for something like "functionally or causally implicated in". (I do not want to firm it up too fast, but another way of saying it is that "it is included in a context which is significantly related to the terms of its existence.")

We may move between the listing (a) and the set of nested sectors (b) as long as we do not change the order in (a). We may move from the graphical representation in (b) to the one in (a) merely by lifting the part of the loop which includes any items to the left of it and placing it to the right of all of these items -- regardless of the order which list (a) has, but not inversely. If the order is changed, in any sense, the system of inclusions is changed also. What includes what is what counts from an explanatory point of

view. The ordered series presented in (b) is a particular kind of series appropriate for a certain kind of explanatory framework. Leaving aside mind:body, since I shall be discussing it below, let us note that person included in family is faced on their own level with other persons and on the level of family, there are alternative families. Above the level of family, there is community and alternatively other communities; raising the question of what constitutes the basis for alternative communities, if they are different in their constitution. The answer can be in social class. If not different, it may reside in some geographical principle; from a formal point of view this is not dissimilar to the distinction between different families, linked to the same community. (One of the fall-outs of this manner of argument is that the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft contrast turns out to be a contrast of levels, if the issue of social class turns out to reside in the economic/contractual as Tonnies maintains.) The nature of social classes is explained by the including social system, and, formally speaking it becomes necessary to talk of alternatives here also (which are possible or utopian.)

We can claim here to have begun to define the difference between an ordering which is descriptive and one which is


view. The ordered series presented in (b) is a particular kind of series appropriate for a certain kind of explanatory framework. Leaving aside mind:body, since I shall be discussing it below, let us note that person included in family is faced on their own level with other persons and on the level of family, there are alternative families. Above the level of family, there is community and alternatively other communities; raising the question of what constitutes the basis for alternative communities, if they are different in their constitution. The answer can be in social class. If not different, it may reside in some geographical principle; from a formal point of view this is not dissimilar to the distinction between different families, linked to the same community. (One of the fall-outs of this manner of argument is that the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft contrast turns out to be a contrast of levels, if the issue of social class turns out to reside in the economic/contractual as Tonnies maintains.) The nature of social classes is explained by the including social system, and, formally speaking it becomes necessary to talk of alternatives here also (which are possible or utopian.)

We can claim here to have begun to define the difference between an ordering which is descriptive and one which is explanatory in terms of what each does as a social theory.


If one should lift only some of these loops, one may obtain a partial ordering or nesting, one which implies the claim that some area is independent, i.e. it can be described in isolation from the set of items which impinge upon it, i.e. which provide an immediate context for it, i.e. which is next above it in the ordered series. This we do not say is a priori false. The question of what is valid from an explanatory point of view, indeed what is a valid context nesting and, indeed, how it is interpreted validly is functionally related to what the immanent causality of the particular society is, its sense of limits, its sense of possibilities.


An example: (c) Mind, body, person, one of the most contentious series can be ordered in various ways, some of which have a philosophical or theological resonance and some of which correspond to commonsensical notions.

c)



c1)





The above is purely formal but it does give a suggestive though schematic inventory of the kinds of shifts or transformations between possible explanatory frameworks that may occur -- these frameworks being ideal-typically given in the form of context nestings and some of these shifts being distortive. Contexts are variously connected, not presuming the validity of such connection (in logical and/or causal terms). We have raised the issue previously and shall do so again.

In the absence of a model which shows how context may be linked to the totalization of social relations (that illustrated by 1c above), it is difficult to see how the materials of sociological description can be utilized to make connections between contexts, which we do when as members we attempt explanation.

Some aspects of set-theoretic logic reasoning are here necessary to the task of social explanation. One of the first to utilize this insight within the social sciences was Gregory Bateson in his "The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication." Although his psychology was behaviorist and formal, his model of context or "framework" was based upon an objectivist logic, that of Russell and Whitehead. Bateson implicitly asserts certain things to be true of contexts: that they are organized hierarchically, that communications about our behavior and about contexts to which they are bound are organized hierarchically also and that these successive levels are not collapsible, i.e. to return to Russell and Whitehead's theory of types, no set can be a member of itself. One can explain a set by its members extensionally without potential contradiction but not intensionally i.e. definitionally or implicationally. For example one may not speak, without contradiction, of "the set of all objects (sets) which are not members of themselves."

Bateson's behaviorist modeling of the learning process and his distinction between digital and analog processing is not particularly useful. In fact, elsewhere it vitiates otherwise useful discussion. He holds to somewhat loose ideas that explanation can move stepwise in both directions in a

hierarchy of contexts, perhaps because he has no theory of what the contents of these levels are and assumes that everything significant is logically founded. In an empirically constituted social science, one must distinguish between explanation from context or class to member (from higher level to lower level) and one which proceeds from lower to higher. The last is what has classically been termed inductive and must be judged as to whether it is a good induction. Thus "changes of direction" in which a concrete item is generalized to the class of such items must count as not automatically valid induction. We are sometimes faced with a rhetorical question (asked or not) with an answer by definition, e.g. "naturally this is the way a (real) man (woman) acts", justified by a subset of the class of men (women).

Bateson (a thinker about experimental behaviorism) considers contexts of learning in experiments exhibiting hierarchies for the purpose of experiment -- these being domains of successively more complex learnings in which successively higher order behavior is required. A historically motivated study of language performance must consider these "non-constructed hierarchies" that we encounter in the social world which are historically constructed or constituted before we are alive as well as one which we actively

reconstitute, e.g. mind : body : person : family : community : class : social system, and all their variations? Do we not experience here successively wider contexts in which successively higher order behavior is required (according to Bateson -- on the grounds of the successively more complex experiments which he constructs by specifying higher "typed" contexts)? Compare to this a developmental point of view such as that of Sullivan or Piaget (or even Freud), but looked at it sociologically, or that of Habermas who, building on Kohlberg, has posited a moral sequence for learned behaviors and embedded the whole matter in reconstructed systems theory. But there is something about the logic of integrated characterization, taken by itself, that dictates hierarchy.

The nature of these hierarchies would depend upon the sort of society we were speaking of, but the factuality of hierarchy and successive contexts and that there would be structured explanation and false consciousness, i.e. failures of rational process, would result understandably from the obstacles built into a culture which is not designed,⁶ regardless of the particular set of contexts. Higher order contexts are contexts for more complex learnings, but this

⁶ As it is in Bateson's account with its sequence of well formed experimental contexts, which gives an automatic and unproblematic hierarchy.

does not require that we conclude that a moral order is the foundation of society (as Kohlberg and Habermas do), but that the more complex the social order is, the more likely members are to discover significant moral issues and dilemmas, and the more likely members are to misstate some important relationships. That contexts are nested follows simply from our having to negotiate objectively stratified hierarchies.

Second Argument: Linkage to a Model of Indexical Usage

It will not begin to be clear how we can falsify or misstate or muddle matters under consideration, i.e. account for difficulties of production in the course of these negotiations, until we have actually considered what an adequate theory of indexical usage would be, i.e. how language deals with context and how it is entangled with it.

As we have noted earlier, the non-removability of context for purposes of understanding a piece of produced speech was established by Y. Bar Hillel but that does not exhaust the understanding of how context is embedded in the speech act (at the same time that it appears to be external to it.) On what basis does an auditor contradict or is the auditor persuaded in argument? Somehow both sides utilize reference to

various contexts in the course of conversation and that makes it a real conversation, embedded in the real world (which we have been trying to characterize earlier, formally, in terms of geometricized set theoretic contexts which are hierarchically arranged.) All language is embedded in various contexts and in turn contains embedded contexts as well. And movement to different levels of abstraction can always be reduced to concatenations of context boundaries. Detaching language or argument from its real context permits the use of abstraction (in the sense that context is pushed into background,) but that shift produces the possibility of false connection.

Recall in I A4 above my argument about Fischer's Truk and Ponape data, in which the shift to post-posed modifier was ⁷ tied to the emergence of class relations and, within that, the status right of making a connection and disposing of common contexts as one wished and the presumed right not to be contradicted. (We are in the territory of Hockett's "Grammar for Hearers" again, with a vengeance.)

I draw upon R. Jakobson's "Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb" [SVC] (1951, in 1960 Volume 2 of Selected

⁷ In Fischer's material, context could be understood (or represented), to any desired depth) by preposed modifiers which are connected to their objects in "determinate" ways; although until it is spoken of -- by these modifiers being spoken -- it can't be represented.

Writings) and R. Austerlitz's "Remarks on Deixis" [ROD] (written in the early '70's), and Jakobson and Pomorska's Dialogues [D] (first published in 1979), without presuming that my analysis follows any one of their's, exactly. We assume the usefulness of recognizing the aspects of utterance which Jakobson specifies as formal aspects of the speech situation: Message(M), Code(C), Channel(CH), Speaker (SP), Hearer(H) and those features of utterance summarized by Austerlitz under the heading of Deixis and those which are recognized by Jakobson and Pomorska as Shifters (these last two substantially overlapping.) It will we think, without exaggerating the newness of the point of view (it will be seen to expand the framework of Shifters and Deixis beyond their authority) to the explanation and description of real, (and imperfect,) linguistic objects in their interconnectedness.

Let us begin with [SVC], which is a comparatively early piece (1951) primarily concerned with grammar. According to Jakobson, any part of an utterance may at once be utilized or referred to(= pointed at -- this being the basic deitic parameter). This he calls the duplex functioning of language. Some piece of Code that refers the Hearer to Message (C/M) is called a "Shifter". A Shifter points implicitly at its real context (thereby conveying a Message about that

context.) On the other hand, a Message that refers the Hearer to Code (M/C) is termed an "autonomous" use of language in Jakobson's words since it sets up language as "hypostatic" or self-sufficient. This second verbal category⁸ does not point to context but to language itself, for example as appears normally in interpretation or definition as in a dictionary (He calls it elsewhere a function "closely related to quotation", "the repetition of speech.") What Jakobson does is to make a formal inventory of verbal categories on the basis of the distinctions:

"(1) speech itself (s), and its topic, the narrated matter (n);

(2) the event (E), and any of its participants (P), whether 'performer' or 'undergoer'.

"Consequently four items are to be distinguished: a narrated event (En), a speech event (Es), a participant of the narrated event (Pn), and a participant of the speech event (Ps), whether addresser or addressee.

"Any verb is concerned with a narrated event. Verbal categories may be subdivided into those which do and those which do not involve the participants of the event. Categories involving the participants may characterize either the participants themselves (Pn) or their relation to the narrated event (PnEn). Categories abstracting from the participants characterize either the narrated event itself (En) or its relation to another narrated event (EnEn).

⁸ This discussion of message-referring-to-code is entirely taken from [SVC]. Jakobson does not provide a discussion of the relationship between syncategorical terms; nor does he indicate when certain forms might be used "inappropriately." He does in this text suggest that indexical symbols are relatively late acquisitions in speech. That suggests that confusions about their use might be a recognizable reduction in functioning.

"For categories characterizing only one narrated item - either the event (En) itself or its participants (Pn) themselves - the term DESIGNATORS will be used, while those categories which characterize narrated item (En or Pn) with respect to another narrated item (EnEn or PnPn) will be called CONNECTORS.

"Designators indicate the quality or quantity of the narrated event and may be termed QUALIFIERS and QUANTIFIERS respectively.

"Both designators and connectors may characterize the narrated event (*procès de l'énoncé*) and/or its participants either without or with reference to the speech event (*procès de l'énonciation*) (../Es) or its participants (../Ps). Categories implying such a reference are to be termed SHIFTERS; those without such a reference are NONSHIFTERS.

"With regard to these basic dichotomies any generic verbal category can be defined."

...

Jakobson continues with the definition of a number of generic verbal categories, of which we only provide the summary tables (as they appear in his collection, Language.)

Verbal categories (from Table 23.1)

Reference to narrated item	Participant involved		Participant not involved	
	Designator	Connector	Designator	Connector
Nonshifter	Qualifier: Gender, Voice Quantifier: Number		Qualifier: Status, Taxis Quantifier: Aspect	
Shifter	Person	Mood	Tense	Evidential

Jakobson, "with special regard to the opposition shifters versus nonshifters", condenses "this model into a simpler" table (more revealing because not specifically grammatical):

Shifters and nonshifters (from Table 23.2)

Reference to narrated item	Participant involved		Participant not involved	
	Designator	Connector	Designator	Connector
Nonshifter:	Pn	PnEn	En	EnEn
Shifter:	Pn/Ps	PnEn/Ps	En/Es	EnEns/Es ns= <u>narrated speech</u>

In [SVC] he only applies this framework in the end to the parts of Russian Grammar (although he does speak suggestively about Shifters here and elsewhere as an important cognitive element of adult speech,) but the general point of view suggests a remediation of the de Saussurian framework.

In that framework, signifier and signified arguably remain on the level of la langue and are never sullied with the world of referents. Since we are bound to express ourselves in language regardless of the level of reference, it seems obvious as to why de Saussure came to such a conclusion: what is represented must always be talked about to be represented in discourse (and it seems therefore that we never can escape the pure language point of view and enter the object world.) The shifter notion does not automatically indicate whether the context is verbal or extra-verbal although merely to recognize that language objects are

⁹duplex in their functioning is to transcend the pure language point of view, implicitly. Recognizing that an item of speech may refer to a Speech Event, or the Participant in the Speech Event as part of a Message, begins to pose the facticity of produced language in a real world. Jakobson increasingly tended to equate parole, performance and Message, and insisted on their theoretical reality for a mature linguistics: "Without a confrontation of the code ¹⁰with the messages no insight into creative power of language can be achieved." I believe the plural of "messages" is significant. Jakobson as a critic of poetry and literature in general understood that no one shifter exhausted reference to context. Again the confusion comes in because context can be posited in language or outside the portion of it that one has already produced, but one behaves with language as if all real objects were in its domain so one is tempted to think one can use any formalism which language (and its theory) has at its disposal, legitimately enough. But one is not entitled to think that that is enough. Speech Acts or Events and the Participants in them are referred to, i.e. are part of the structured character of produced lan-

⁹ In Jakobson's [SVC], the language point of view is essentially conformed to. In Austerlitz's piece [ROD], the world of social distances and power is more than hinted at. In Jakobson and Pomorska's [D], as we will see, distinctions between Event and Speech Act designation are used smoothly in their exposition, but not with consciousness that it might be important.

¹⁰ See for example "Retrospect" in [SW] vol.2, pp.718-720, particularly.

guage. But that is not all they are since they are in the world of historical objects, produced in relationship to historically given persons (or are in the event identical to them) so the "necessary line" has been crossed and one does not remain on the level of some self-enclosed language system. The human object world is permeated with language use. Speech Acts/Events and Participants in these peculiar events are part of the world of real history and its objects. One is reminded of Walter Benjamin's essay on history in which one walks backwards into the chaos of the future while facing into the past. Still one moves into the future nevertheless. Nonetheless Jakobson's formulation of shifter above does not give us any shifter with the form (.../En) or (.../Pn) or for that matter (.../EnPn), which are certainly conceivable formally. Perhaps that is because the shifters defined are to be applied to grammatical forms only and perhaps not ([SVC] was relatively early.) The much later material in [D] and in [ROD] seem to enlarge the areas of Message and Context beyond what is grammatically given.

What is essayed in the next section is the application of the notion of shift or transformation to contextualized language. Neither Jakobson nor Austerlitz in the essays cited above distinguish clearly between a first level in which context is given in relationship to the speaker i.e. in

terms of distances in time and space, the speech act always minimally placed as a present action of the speaker (i.e. with respect to the axis of communication -- I - you -- and a second level which moves action/objects away from/ toward the speaker or alternatively moves expression between various contextualized positions (inclusive of making claims about what is context and what is not.) What is presented in Austerlitz's article [ROD] (written in the early 1970s) is an exploration of various dimensions of the themes connected with deixis (pointing) which is of course tied to context directly in Jakobson's shifter (C/M) -- in which code refers to or points to message. That they do not in fact distinguish between levels explicitly does not mean that they do not make use of its descriptive potential, even though it is conceptualized somewhat statically and unproductively. I quote from the work by Jakobson and Pomorska, [D] (76-77).

"The general meaning of the grammatical form called "shifter" is characterized by a reference back to the given speech act, the speech act that uses this form. Thus the past tense is a shifter because it literally designates an event that precedes the given act of speech. The first-person form of a verb, or the first-person pronoun involves a reference back to the author of the given act of speech. Similarly, the second-person pronoun contains a reference to the addressee to whom the speech act is directed.

If the addressers and addressees change in the course of the conversation, then the material content of the form I and you also changes. They shift."

This last word, "shift", does an interesting piece of work, in that it indicates the transformational notion of shift which is not formalized in [SVC] and is at least recognized here. And later in the passage, on the child's attainment of shifters:

"...he can speak of events that take place at a distance from him in time and space. Along with shifts of temporal and spatial points of reference, he acquires the idea of the shifting roles of the participants in the speech events. The notion of time appears in the language...., as does that of spatial proximity or distance:

I and you, here and there, mine and yours, now and then."

I term this static and unproductive even though it describes shifts in the "material content" of pronouns: not included are "shifts" between forms at the same time as reference points remain constant, or references whose specificity is modified through various shifts, whether deitic or not, and by various interruptions of the speech act which is under way already. I suggest that questions of falsity and distortion (however slight) are not readily encompassed by Jakobson's inventory of shifters, even the changes between them, since they are as he says, grammatical-in form and strictly ¹¹veridical in a naive sense, I must observe. Many of the

¹¹ I say "veridical" because it gives me a word for the naive realism which is built into "good" language. Jakobson's own discussion illustrates this. The examples are untroubled ones which exactly "reproduce" what is in fact the case without departing from "normal" common sense. What is being described is the supposed common-sensical world that children learn to live in and that we ordinarily take for granted. It is not excessive to say that grammar as a subject of study is an implicit theory of what-is-the-case, the one described in copy or correspondence theory.

distortions which we will be examining below will not be limited to the "nice" variations which are described above. We shall be examining a much more irregular and extensive set of forms, which can not be easily encompassed by the shifts of which Jakobson speaks. And yet his vocabulary of context, message, code, and reference-to is a necessary one as is Austerlitz's vocabulary of discourse axis, specificity and vagueness, boundary signals and other deixis-connected themes such as hesitation -- in his essay, shock, amazement, commiseration and surprise. I add to these the mixed collection of so-called non-grammatical elements such as interjection and intonation and the muddled losing of one's way. These have in common self-reference and/or reference to the on-going speech act itself and often signal and make possible more radical shifting.

I use a formal vocabulary below with not as much consistency as I might desire, since it is experimental:

S will stand for "shift" in the sense which Jakobson speaks of it above, when it cannot be termed "deitic," except in the most restricted sense.

D or *d* stands for "shift" in the sense that Jakobson uses it, when referring to moving between pronouns, and spatial,


social and temporal points of reference in as much as they employ notions of proximity and distance. *D* or *d* stands also for "shift" in terms of changes within most of the deitic dimensions which Austerlitz identifies. His examples are, in general more fine-grained than Jakobson's. (I don't include Austerlitz's Hesitation and other deixis-related activities, here, because they are "ungrammatical" in that they specify deitic acts which pull away from on-going syntagmatic or linear development of speech. These form a list which is significant for performance, but which has typically been excluded from grammar.)

T is a residual category of shift, which stands for all the deixis related phenomena spoken of above, including those which I have added to Austerlitz's list.

Some Examples of More Radical Domains of Shift or Transformation; Preparatory to the Analysis of Empirical Material


[Ex.1] The direction of normal reference in analytic speech is from code to message (C/M), what Jakobson calls a "Shifter". We observe again in connection with the Truk-Ponape material (and daring to suggest it more generally applicable) that language structures with prepositioned modifiers may move from code items to possible coded mes-

sages in common contexts, i.e. they give accounts which are assessable. Postpositioned modifiers on the other hand may or may not refer to the common context -- they do not have to. We may think of that as a movement of coded message to a possible context, but social norms define both the formulation and reception of such additional code items. Truth does not. In the Ponape case, contradiction of what is false may be precluded. And that also may be the case in other socially unequal situations.



The movement from (TR) to (PO) must be thought of as a shift, because the distinction between distributions of prepositioned and postpositioned modifiers is only "statistical" in each society. That implies that actual linguistic work is being done in moving between the so-called rules, to particular ends. Syntagmatic Time is also, hypothetically, the time in which Speech Acts or Speech Events are segmented in utterance.


[Ex.2] More specifically the appearance of M/C in speech normally takes place on the level of Speech itself, as an elaboration of some specific Speech Act, e.g. some one explains the meaning of a term by defining it. One may think of a formal or relatively subjective element being used to explain something more concrete or objective in so-called real life -- by that formulation we are making it clear that the boundary involved is extra-linguistic, i.e referring to Event, beyond a Speech Act.



The immediately previous example consists in a rearrangement of context assignment so that race (the example I have given here and elsewhere) is used to explain everything important in social life rather than remaining a code which itself needs explanation. The Shift can be identified as a shift between two verbal forms, C/M and M/C, because it seems to substitute a definitional reality for an empirical one. It holds content constant, while changing the form, as I have suggested above is necessary to deal with certain falsifica-

tions. (Examples follow in the next part which are similarly equipped.)


[Ex.3] At a memorial meeting for a husband and wife: "I join with all of us in expressing your feelings about Arthur and Jessie."



It seems plausible to assume something like the following as an original form: "I join with you in expressing your feelings about Arthur and Jessie," considering the circumstances. It is a large group of which the speaker is nevertheless a part, politically, regardless of his knowledge of Arthur and Jessie. He is a clergyman. There are difficulties with this form as well. Can one really join with another in expressing his or her feelings? One may sympathize with their expression or solidarize with it or share their feelings (if one has similar ones.) One may join in the formal expression of certain feelings but to say "your feelings", then, is to make plain that they are yours and not mine. One may consider that the distance is almost

unbridgeable, and yet it is what one who speaks to such a crowd must feel the need to abolish. The following maps several of the likely shifts:


I join with all of us in expressing your feelings about Arthur & Jessie.



I join with you in expressing your feelings about Arthur and Jessie.



Next follows a second version of the actual work done.



There remains a difficulty. The evidence for this is the contrast between "all of us" and "in ... your feelings.." which retains its incoherence. How can "joining with" "all of us" be necessary if "I" is contained, as "I" is, in "all of us"? Arguably the problem is not in the language, but in the obstacles to solidarity built into the social system, being denied and negotiated.

A Note on these Three Examples

Example 1 presents contexts which, whether in pre-posed or post-posed form, do not correspond obviously or necessarily to social sectors under some pattern of totalization.

Example 2 certainly operates under some paradigmatic, if partial, supposition of a social totality, which is fairly abstract.

Example 3 illustrates also a partial, although more actively engaged with and more concrete set of totalizations, in that they focus on the actor's solidarizing.

Obviously these examples represent a series of increasing usefulness of modeling social totalities, to the end of discovering the concrete work which is being done in their positing of them by the speakers and for the hearers. In a Peircian way, I am and will, in subsequent parts of this dissertation, be using the graphical representation of the member's process of positing totalities (if only partial or micrototalities) in order to think about what the member is doing (although it must be said this is not the use Peirce¹² devotes his graphs to.)

¹²To see that examine the Writings of Charles S. Peirce; A Chronological Edition vol.4 1879-1884, chapter 2-7. See pp.331-332, 341-342, 398-399.

Earlier in this chapter I spoke of the inevitability of using some set-theoretic constructs in talking about context and social membership and in the construal of any set of nested social realities (of which inevitably there must be some, unless nothing is related to anything else except on the level of the individual.) Diagramming social and linguistic relationships in terms of nested inclusions or disjunctions will represent directly grammatical and/or contextual realities in data (at the actual level of performance), extending that to include speech falsification and distortion. It will clarify what is being done with the language when it operates against normal real world resistances. It may be more narrowly regarded as a relatively neutral method of laying out argumentative or assertive structures i.e., showing in at least a minimal sense, what the work is that is being done or not done in certain kinds of assertion, which have social significances. In part the work will turn out to be loaded up with shifts which exhibit actual social structures or structurings directly or indirectly, i.e., negatively. In short, it will be indexical work.

IV. Analyzable Data: Field Work and Other Sources

The problem of finding data for this research can be defined as follows. The data can be said to be nowhere and everywhere, nowhere in the sense that much of the time it is not noticed or is taken to be some kind of oddity and everywhere in the sense that there is no reason to suppose that evidence of difficulties of production and consequent distortions should not come up under a variety of circumstances. Still, one feels obliged to start somewhere.

Some time ago, I conducted field research in North Central Florida, primarily in Alachua County. I propose to use data in part obtained during that project, much of which is in the form of recorded interviews.

My original proposal for the investigation of linguistic performance, defined much as it is above, contemplated attempts to obtain data in three directions. The first and third were field research in the strict sense. The second was philological and historical and methodologically comparable to research on any concrete set of historical materials such as the theological/logical sources mentioned above. The distinction between research based on historical transcripts and field notes is, however, not necessarily exact; one always ends up with a document which must be his-

torically analyzed. In the case of the transcript, it is a case of something finished with; in the case of field notes, one cannot take the data for granted, even if one knows its provenance, for there are always gaps to be filled and emendations to be made. Sources do not stand still. I state this partly because it is necessary to establish the validity of data, and that is not simply a case of how fresh it is.

The three proposed sources were:

"1. ... a corpus from legal processes here, perhaps from former Jurors who have been "judges of the fact" or other persons connected with the legal process such as former defendants and connoisseurs of the law like clerks and habitual bystanders.

"2. A body of letters and diaries, say from some community like Oneida, whose historical traditions are still fairly alive, and concomitant contact with people who are descendants of that community for the purposes of obtaining their¹ interpretation of past events and the written sources.

¹ Again, to move in the opposite direction than discussed several paragraphs back, a text with the traces of departed people is not inferior to contemporary interviews if the text is good enough. The object of research is not to produce a newspaper article.

"3. A political corpus from campaigns, clubhouses, speeches and canvassing etc., giving arguments, discussions, excuses, explanations and other kinds of performatives."

In line with "1" I conducted interviews in New York County Criminal Court at 100 Centre Street, mostly unrecorded. (I did record an extended interview of a juror from a notorious political/criminal case of the time, some of whose contents will prove useful.) Subsequently, I was asked to be an advisor on non-verbal behavior during the preliminary stages of a notorious conspiracy trial in Gainesville, Florida (also "political/criminal" captiously speaking.)

I conducted myself as a member of the defense team in that trial, while we assessed potential jurors in the voir dire,² using a variety of methods. Our view of the population was partly based upon an initial random telephone survey of voter attitudes and assumptions which was ex post facto stratified according to age, educational level and gender among other factors. After the trial, we interviewed the

² It is to this "variety of methods" that I wish to speak, emphasizing its interdisciplinary character. I was participating as a kind of linguist. Richard Christie of Columbia University was using an authoritarian personality model. Arthur Egendorfer, who had collaborated with Robert Lifton in his research on Vietnam war veterans, was providing psychological insights. The initial surveys were conducted by two students at the University of Florida. And the director and organizer of the project was Jay Schulman.

jurors and a number of the rejected panelists; the purpose of that was to evaluate our methods of juror evaluation.

I partly based my field research on that work. I listened to tapes of these interviews and tried to define what seemed to me to be examples of problematical replies to questions, ones which exhibited incoherent patterns of explanation or presentation. I did not start out with a clear idea of what a useful sample might be, just the intuition that certain produced speech in reply to questions was "problematical". My subsequent field research in North Central Florida, ³primarily in Alachua County, resulted in additional recorded interviews. I will have access then to as much as 200 hours of recorded interview data, including both sets of after-trial interviews.

Before I discuss that data and explain how my own research sample was extended beyond the persons on the jury panel, I should like to present 2 corpora of answers to questions about the Three Mile Island crisis which are situated geographically and historically and several years later than the last date of my field work. This will clarify what is meant by "problematical" or "incoherent" pattern and also

³ It is worth noting that during the elections of November 1995, Alachua County was the only political entity in the entire country, in which an anti-gay rights referendum passed.

the matter of provenance of data in general. (The examples will lend themselves to analysis shortly, but they also suggest something about the nature of "relevant" situation in terms of sharpness or vagueness as one propounds the matter for the purpose of inquiry.) The sources of these are a series of news interviews, the first in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania area not far from Three Mile Island, the second a series in New York City. The question was what do you think about what's happened at Three Mile Island.

I. Harrisburg:

A "It doesn't worry me because I feel // everything is in God's hands and I have no fear whatsoever.

B "I'm not happy about it but /laugh/ there's not much you can do about something like that I really don't see what they can do about it they need the energy and that's the only force that .. way they can get it, that's the way it will have to be.

C "(Uh) I just heard about it 10 minutes ago believe it or not - they interrupted the T.V. program. /throat clear/ - (uh)- I don't know I haven't had time to even think about it since I just did hear about it 10 minutes ago. I worry about it but I don't really live that close to it and , I didn't hear any noises and I didn't hear anything so apparently it never , didn't really scare me.

D "It was just an accident the way I feel about it.

E "Well to tell you the truth it doesn't bother me. I'm not. (ha,ha) If those things happen they happen. That's the way I feel about it.

II. New York:

F "Well: I thought it would come eventually because with all this nuclear (uh) age/change that we are living in I thought there would be a mishap. I felt it. I really felt it. In a scientific age you can't take a back seat to any other nation. We have to go ahead. I would like to see it taken out somewhere in the desert or something and build nuclear plants out there where it wouldn't, wouldn't hurt any civilians. So it is a military..

G "The seriousness is not that great. You can tell from the commentary on it. It's not an overt disaster, something controllable.

H "I think we need nuclear power but it should be more controlled and I'm definitely against these plants. There should be another way and if there isn't, we should spend the money and time to find out.

I. Harrisburg:

A "It doesn't worry me because I feel // everything is in God's hands and I have no fear whatsoever.

[Pause after "feel" allows a shift to another register in which there is no feeling. Everything (not I) is in God's hands. Passive voice. Denial absolute. Compare with the 23rd Psalm.]

B "I'm not happy about it but /laugh/ *[not happy?]* there's not much you can do about something like that *[not it, but something like that- not it:denial]* I really don't see what they *[change of acting person - denial of own agency]* can do about it *[whoever they are, it is attributed to them inclination to do something about it and deny ability]* they need the energy *["they" turns out to have the need-not the speaker.]* and that's the only force that ..*[who is speaking?]* way they can get it, that's the way it will have to be. *The rest is statement of policy..who is speaking?]*

C "(Uh) *[?]* I just heard about it 10 minutes ago believe it or not *[what is at stake? when does one say that? when one wishes not to be held responsible or when one knows one will not be believed]* - they interrupted the T.V. program. /throat clear/ *["I am going to make a statement"]*-(uh) *[but perhaps not]*- I don't know I haven't had time to even think about it *[- let alone done what?]* since I just did hear about it 10 minutes ago *["10 minutes ago" - and no time for a thought]*. I worry about it *[habitual: precedes the present*

(but he didn't think about it)] but I don't really live that close to it [a reason not to worry] and I didn't hear any noises [from the site, which might not have been possible] and I didn't hear anything [repetition] so apparently [from great distance] it never, didn't really scare me.

[substitution of local sound which could scare instead of the actual event.]

D "It was just an accident the way I feel about it. *[but what kind? not connected with anything else. Substitution of feeling for fact and then minimization.]*

E "Well to tell you the truth *[always a sign of a problem:- "you have reason to doubt me when I say"]* it doesn't bother me *[denial]*. I'm not. *[what?] (ha,ha) [substitution of false feeling? and embarrassment about elided predicate]* If those things *[not said - silence here, distaste]* happen they happen. *[resignation]* That's the way I feel about it. *[doesn't feel and say it]*

II. New York:

F "Well: I thought it would come eventually because with all this nuclear (uh) age/change *[mix of objectification and event]* that we are living in *[or through]* I thought there would be a mishap. I felt it. I really felt it. *[emphasis on feeling connected with event]* In a scientific

age you can't take a back seat to any other nation.

[resolved in the direction of objectified time and policy]

We have to go ahead. I would like to see it taken out somewhere in the desert or something and build nuclear plants out there where it wouldn't, wouldn't *[object of "hurt" is struggled for within the dominant framework (in which normal event and feeling are excluded)]* hurt any civilians.

[attempt to make a rational policy for "civilians."] So it is a military.. *[pops into mouth, who the present policy is for.. breaks off]*

G "The seriousness is not that great. *[nominalization - denial, indirect language: "great" but not that great.]* You can tell from the commentary on it. *[if it is accepted]* It's not an overt *[not not covert meaning it's hidden]* disaster *[still a disaster]*, something controllable. *[since a disaster is by definition not controllable - what is controllable? not events perhaps but people.]*

H "I think we need nuclear power but it should be more controlled and I'm definitely against these plants. There should be another way and if there isn't, we should spend the money and time to find out. *[more or less rational statement. Some slippage: is another way nuclear or non-nuclear. If there isn't another way, how can we find it? Confusion of choices. Feeling subordinated but not denied]*

These protocols are from a definite time and place and are controlled by reference to a particularly interesting contemporary development. The New York responses are less personal although controlled by awareness of the contemporary event as a problem and even an issue defined by relative power. Harrisburg protocols are almost equally informed by sense of powerlessness as the New York protocols. What is personal is, not surprisingly connected with the invasion of the crisis into local space and time. [See I C and I D particularly] In I C there is particularly an assertion of not being time enough to come to a conclusion about what has happened. This feels like it is a more general issue than of the moment and that the theme is of more general occurrence. It appears defensively in one of my Alachua County protocols. Then again the Harrisburg examples are more extreme, with much more irrational denial of connection and many more ruptures. They are more extreme as these examples of extremity go.

One might argue that anyone subject so directly to the invasion of crisis (as in the Harrisburg material) should be able to respond unequivocally to what is threatening, but this is obviously not the case. That suggests that there is a trigger situation for transgressions of rationality in the Harrisburg instances which is lacking to a large extent in

the New York instances. That being the case, utterances are more likely not to be produced as a "plan" validly, i.e. they are likely to exhibit structural incoherence or ⁴inconsequence from the point of view of commonsense reasoning though we were at first only prepared to discuss them in bare detail, i.e. to provide a simple descriptive analysis inclusive of certain intuitively grasped irregularities (as we do parenthetically the secondtime through the protocols,) not to meaningfully schematize structures underlying these irregularities. On the one hand, the specific resistance to production is shown in that subjects are constantly trying to say what can not be said (because it does not "follow".) On the other hand the explanation for this must be that they have few chances other than remaining since they can't really leave without unthinkable sacrifice. They have friends and property in the area and little else. They are like people who live in a regularly deluged flood plain or an area of chemical contamination under circumstances where FEEMA or the SuperFund are not prepared to buy one out. For

⁴ Umberto Eco in A Theory of Semiotics suggests "The possibility of lying is the *proprium* of semiosis just as (for the Schoolmen) the possibility of laughter was the *proprium* of Man as *animal rationale*." We are, when we speak of "structural incoherence" or "inconsequence", clearly speaking not of lying explicitly but speaking of some kind of attempt inconsistent with rationality, some kind of demand made on real structures which can not be sustained, and which is evidenced explicitly in what is said. To put a gloss on the matter and on Eco's own subsequent discussion of thresholds, what we are doing is attempting to find a threshold of expression in which misrepresentations of connection are made without the rational achievement found in a successful lie.

Three Mile Island substitute Love Canal or Missouri Beach or a riverine town which is about to be helped to be built on higher ground to find the contrasting conditions.

Thus we have unravelled two elements of situation in the case of the Three Mile Island Data which appear to be similar but which are not: (1) amount of social power in the classic sense which is a function of, or dependent upon, the present milieu and applies therefore to any social situation. (2) ability to chose other circumstances, portability or mobility: ability to start all over again (which we have suggested does not apply to the Three Mile Island material.) Something like a combined effect of (1) and (2) must operate as a constraint on affordable rationality (We may think of this as an application of the Pragmatic Rule in A2a above.) Nonetheless the amount of production which is irrational in the New York material implies someambiguity about what we mean by local or at the very least a realization that the threat is more than local.

That understood we may attempt to apply the framework which is sketched in Tools for Analysis above, which only partially existed when the crisis of Three Mile Island occurred. That framework is one which will prove to be necessary but not sufficient for the protocols, since these

do not always hinge on an objectively understood series of contexts, but also on the procedures which we use in language in which we communicate our explorations of the limits of our action in space and time, socially speaking, which may confirm those contexts but also have a kind of priority over them in as much as we are the locus of such language production as occurs. If there are limits on expression which are rational (which are consistent with the Pragmatic Rule, which is negative,) what forms of expression can we observe and characterize systematically which are found in these expressions which we have stigmatized as marked by odd shifts and transitions -- ones which vitiate their rational content? Tools For Analysis will provide the beginning of our analysis. The notion of interchange (or transformation as we will term it more generally) will be fundamental, suggesting that the framework in Tools remains valid.

We observed in Tools that if there is such a thing as objective social organization, then the contexts of action and statement must be hierarchical and this must be negotiated in speech, especially in the denial of rational connection. Likewise if something is limiting and/or refers to our individual actions or timebound observation, even if it has not "entered" into our (nominal) common consciousness, it is still the means by which these contexts are negotiated; so


we shall argue that the self-same mechanisms, which distort the explicit characterization of contexts and their influence upon each other, will also distort the more individually based portions of language. The question here is how much can we stand that "gets in our way" and how do we deal with it.


We will take the third turn with the Three Mile Island Protocols:

I. Harrisburg:

IA "It doesn't worry me because I feel // everything is in God's hands and I have no fear whatsoever.

- (i) It doesn't worry me
- (ii) because I feel
- (iii) //
- (iv) everything is in, God's hands
- (v) and
- (vi) I have no fear whatsoever






IB "I'm not happy about it but /laugh/ there's not much you can do about something like that I really don't see what they can do about it they need the energy and that's the only force that .. way they can get it, that's the way it will have to be.

- (i) I'm not happy about it but
- (ii) /laugh/
- (iii) there's not much you can do about
- (iv) something like that
- (v) I really don't see what they can do about it
- (vi) they need the energy and that's the only force that ..
- (vii) way they can get it,
- (viii) that's the way it will have to be.

Partial analysis IB-1 (i)-(v)


(i)



(i-ii)continued T1: "but /laugh/" [Shift 1],

(iii-iv) (a) {not much [Sh.2b:<=not it]
 {or (b) / (c)


you [not me] can do { little about something like that.





not know if that is correctly done. That is why question marks are placed in front of similarly placed *Neg*'s in subsequent analyses such as the next.

(v): T2, "I really don't see", seems to require a sequel, something explanatory or completing (however erroneous,) as do *Tk*'s or shifts, in general. There are indicators of transformation which are embedded in text which both signal a transformation and embody it. [Transformations of material are part of the production process and embodied in its result. They do not stand behind the material activity in an advisory or supervisory role. They are involved in the work done. In this case one senses an on-going process of trying to balance out matters, which are not quite balanceable.]

Partial Analysis IB-2 (ii)-(v)





- (1) di's are deitic shifts.
- (2) This stage is more complex than earlier stages.
- (3) Embedded are a series of deitic shifts, which move toward the more abstract.

However illogical this all is, on some some level, it does seem to move toward a kind of completion. The series of transformations have culminated in a statement (v) referring to someone else's action.


What follows is in a pseudo-syllogistic form, since several necessary steps are left out in the reasoning:

- (1) (vi) They need energy and
- (2) that is the only force that.... [T: From nuclear energy to abstract
- (3) (vii) (way they can get it)1 term referring to method in general]
- (4) (viii) that's the (way)2 (it)2 will have to be.

The shift is from "they can get it" to impersonal subject and impersonal imperative modal: "it will have to be," implying that the real subject

is "I" and its acceptance of their premisses. The form of the argument is reported speech, which in this case involves the acceptance of someone else's frame of reference (in the abstract.) The various deitic shifts itemize and accomplish a series of adjustments to that frame of reference. Through a process of complication and roundaboutness, shifts of context are obtained which are not quite reasonably claimed. These are parts of an abstract public language, in which there is no place for action for the individuals speaking.

Partial Analysis IB-3 (v)-(viii)



(a) Use of deitic shifts to undermine personal pronoun demarcated action.

(b) I {really don't see! [shift]: If I don't see, there is reason for me to assume that the domain of they is now separate from me/I/you. (It)2 is a new "it, separate from the original "it", which was my potential object. A public language, abstracted from direct activity, is established. The former language is ripped up and replaced.

In the pseudo-syllogism, (1) and (2) present an "independent" they. In (3) (it)₂ is an impersonal it which no longer has even the exact reference to nuclear energy, but is an impersonal particle referring to total situation with no personal intervention possible. One may speak likewise of shifts in the usage of way. One may speak here of a false totality, resulting cumulatively from these language changes, since they have a certain consistency and represent something of which the speaker certainly does not have direct knowledge.



It should be noted that the language is the product of the speaker. Loss of power is complicitous. One puts the gun to one's own head.

IC "(Uh) I just heard about it 10 minutes ago believe it or not - they interrupted the T.V. program. /throat clear/ - (uh)- I don't know I haven't had time to even think about it since I just did hear about it 10 minutes ago. I worry about it but I don't really live that close to it and, I didn't hear any noises and I didn't hear anything so apparently it never, didn't really scare me.



- (i) (Uh)
- (ii) I
- (iii) just
- (iv) heard about it
- (v) 10 minutes ago
- (vi) believe it or not

- (vii)- they interrupted the T.V. program.
- (viii)/throat clear/ -(uh)-
- (ix)I don't know
- (x)I haven't had time to
- (xi)even
- (xii)think about it
- (xiii)since I just did hear about it 10 minutes ago.
- (xiv)I worry about it
- (xv)but I don't really live that close to it and,
- (xvi)I didn't hear any noises
- (xvii)and I didn't hear anything
- (xviii)so apparently it never ,
- (xix)didn't really scare me.

Analysis IC-1



I didn't hear anything, so




Analysis IC-2

(i) (Uh) : T1

(iii) just (vi) believe it or not
 [impersonal self reference]
 T2


:(ii) I (iv) heard about it (v) 10 minutes ago



((a) know=> think, (b) Neg(know)=> may think, (c) Neg(think)=> Neg(know))
 [Neg(think)=> Neg(know)]

(X) (ix) I don't know (x) I haven't had time to (xi) even
 (xii) think about it [less time than needed to think]


(iii) just (iv) heard about it [?:]



Claim: I have had no time to think about it. It is a present even though ten minutes earlier.

T3: (xiv) I worry about it [*habitual, contradicts (X), (Y)*]:
 The failed action was the past, i.e. the time in which I
 have no time to think. But that is a past (up to and includ-
 ing the present) in which I worry, but that is defined as is
 not thinking.

R.H.Embedded (xv) and (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) (xix)
 └──and──┘ └──or──┘
 └──and(?)──┘ :



[T5]
 (xix) didn't really scare me. [*Directly*] [*Substitute denial of feeling of fear for impossible denial of the event (and its dangers.)*]

The argument moves in the end from a report about an event to one about feeling. Shifts, which undermine the evidential, insecurely result in a denial of of fear, which implies -- contrary to desire -- the reality of the object feared.

The issue is played out in time (and that is the heart of the process.) Shifts are temporal and are used to alibi non-judgment and non-reaction. The evidence is, "evidently lacking." How can one know if there there hasn't been time to think about it and one may even doubt that anything has happened at all if one hears nothing directly. Certainly, one can say one does not fear something even if one does not dare to be caught saying it has not occurred, but one is careful to hide this connection.

This implies a multilayered series of shifts in which perception, cognition, feeling and self-report are tossed about freely but not randomly as one attempts to minimize one's active investment in the present. This implies self-reporting which is concerned with socio-spatial and temporal contexts and also the discounting of intentional investments in them along some sliding scale, which cannot fail to be unstable.



There is a reorganization of time structure to the end that no real action is possible in the present and none on the past either (with the result that there has been no thought possible in any conceivable past, because it is virtually brought up to the present.) The future is the time of action (if action is possible at all.) There is sacrifice of

rationality to protect life as it is being lived which, as usual, involves kinds of makeshift totalizations. This process is marked by so-called "deviations" in utterance all along the way.

In what we have done with this material in I-C there is more than a little residual muddle. The analyses are not elegant in form, but there are desiderata of that analysis; we pick up something of what is lacking here. First, it is the determined structure of the layering. Somehow we do not know what form that will take in general (if indeed there is a general form.) Second, although the movement of any member toward the working through of some totality is exhibited in some sense and that is related to the principled character of a member's answer or argument, we do not yet know whether that is something or merely a direction in which the member drives. In short, we do not know if the notion, totality, has a character which is fixed (and accessible) or whether it results from the effort to hold matters together, which is certainly a rational tendency. Third, we have the same sorts of things to say about the apparent tendency of informants to be reasonable. i.e. to exhibit patterns of argument which have some of the properties of what is called "valid argument", what I have called "pseudo-syllogism". To some extent, what I am suggesting is that this muddle is


what is usual and the generally valid argument is what can be proposed under what are very special circumstances and therefore is the marked (and relatively uninteresting) case.
 ID "It was just an accident the way I feel about it."

Analysis I-D



just(i) = merely [diminished]1 , an accident (but what kind?)
 just(ii) = exactly, merely

(that's) the way I feel about it [diminished]2




The shifts move the speaker irrevocably from the sphere of causality by stages in which the importance of "it" is disavowed, by its causal status being derogated and its non-

essentiality being asserted and finally its being removed from caused sphere altogether successfully, since its status is something felt.


IE "Well to tell you the truth it doesn't bother me. I'm not. (ha,ha) If those things happen they happen. That's the way I feel about it.

- (i) Well to tell you the truth
- (ii) it doesn't bother me.
- (iii) I'm not.
- (iv) (ha,ha)
- (v) If those things happen they happen.
- (vi) That's the way I feel about it.

A(i) Well to tell you the truth




B. It doesn't bother me \Leftrightarrow I am not bothered



B and C are both sequels of A. That implies that \emptyset replaces something: C, with its period, refers to and accomplishes a movement away. "It" in B alternates between active & passive. A locates a space in what follows where truth is to be doubted.

(iv) (ha,ha) [sign of embarrassment: dis-covered:T2]:
 (v) If those things happen, they happen.


If those.... , then they



(Z)Tautologous (under D2): $U_i(e_i) \Rightarrow U_i[e_i/U_k(e_k)]$
 $k \neq i$

\neq is read as "not equal to"

(vi) That's the way I feel about it.



"That's the way I feel about it" also appeared in I-D, leading to the question of how one can "feel a way". How did one get to that point? " $U_i(e_i) \Rightarrow U_i[e_i/U_k(e_k)]$ " is the $k \neq i$ "way" the speaker feels, but it is also a stated feeling. The latter is clearly a kind of abstract disposition which is called a "feeling" but the former lays claim to our attention as a feeling also. It is however odd to call it a "feeling. It is part of the meaning of D2 and carries with it a discomfort which hints of the risk in regularizing it into tautology: D2 appears to eliminate the position of the speaker from the statement being made. The "it" (in vi) may be another kind of abstract disposition or it may be $U_i(e_i)$ or $U_i[e_i/U_k(e_k)]$ or "it" before D1 acts on it.

5 (Statements of feeling tend to be ideological.)

New York: IIF. Well: I thought it would come eventually because with all this nuclear (uh) age/change that we are living in I thought there would be a mishap. I felt it. I really felt it. In a scientific age you can't take a back seat to any other nation. We have to go ahead. I would like to see it taken out somewhere in the desert or something and build nuclear plants out there where it wouldn't, wouldn't hurt any civilians. So it is a military..

- (i) Well: I thought it would come eventually
- (ii) because with all this nuclear (uh) age/change that we are living in
- (iii) I thought there would be a mishap. I felt it. I really felt it.
- (iv) In a scientific age you can't take a back seat to any other nation.
- (v) We have to go ahead.
- (vi) I would like to see it taken out somewhere in the desert or something
- (vii) and build nuclear plants out there where it wouldn't,
- (viii) wouldn't hurt any civilians.

[Q. What do you think?] [A. I (thought)1 (I think)]

S(t1) | [the time for this kind of thing (time)]

↓ [this event] [but not yet]

(i) Well: I (thought)1 it would come eventually

[Neg(think)] ↓ [(objective pd.; Fut. of past, before present)]

(ii) because w. all this nuclear (uh) age/change that (we)1 are living in

[concrete language; Shift to abstr.] ↓ [abstract] [concrete]


(iii) I (thought)2 there would be a mishap. I felt it. I really felt it.

↓ [intensifier=?]


[a person really being there]

5 Note that I have used set-theoretic formalism, to imply speculatively and illicitly that certain contents of these abstract dispositions (which may be feelings) exhibit certain set-theoretic characteristics; this happens to be true. Examples abound in this chapter and in V. below.

As a matter of analytic emphasis one may note in this set of utterances that we have laid out an ad hoc structure. This structure which, with its contrasting levels between which shifts are performed, imposes a rhetorical unity on the argument, a kind of regularized totality. The structure is parallel.



Management of the Indefinite



The idea of dumping ("it")¹ (somewhere) turns into "something", an indefinite concrete action so that..."see ... something" (happen) should eventuate in an unknown subject /object (agent) building of "nuclear plants out there...". After "where it wouldn't" is where the difficulty is encountered, the end of the sentence "wouldn't hurt any civilians" combines a more concrete (human-centered) politi-

movements. Our model of the speaker is that these influences and movements are complimentary, so let us return to the question of regularizing of speech.

We haven't regularized it in our treatment, i.e. we have not denied the almost compulsory deviation from norms which found in this material and most other speech. Rather we have tried to discover the work of denial of rational response which is found in it (putting aside the question of a deeper rationality or coping which is implied by the very notion that it is work of denial and therefore implicitly purposive.) One should note that counterposed to this work of denial are impulses toward regularization which are part of the pattern of self-explanation and clarification: the form of a considered reply, let alone an argument, requires the use of parallelism in construction of shifts and the minimum rationality, implicated in this working out, requires that the shifts be between more-or-less coherent vantage points or frameworks, i.e. specific contextualizations.

There is often a chaotic character, but whether it is the material or the result of inadequate analysis is not always so certain. What seems to be happening is that the language is being ripped up and being replaced as replies/assertions are being manufactured by members (one might suggest that


all on-going real language work seems to be thus characterizable, so even the analyst is not exempt.)

The shifts or transformations that occur in the material are between possible partial orientations toward the world, which represent real difficulties for the speaker -- even though each might be a response to the difficulties presented by other points of view. How is it possible that a difficulty may be eschewed, even though it may embody some possibility of action (desirable in the abstract)? Precisely that the action presents too great a difficulty taken on its own terms.

IIG "The seriousness is not that great. You can tell from the commentary on it. It's not an overt disaster, something controllable.


- (i)The seriousness
- (ii)is not that great.
- (iii)You can tell
- (iv)from the commentary on it.
- (v)It's not an overt
- (vi)disaster,
- (vii)something controllable.

not
or
[Neg]




<p>t3 x (i)0</p> <p>(i)The seriousness</p> <p>d2 x (...) d3 x (...)</p> <p>(ii)is not that great.</p>	<p>(i) ["I feel " -t1-> ∅], "I feel" is repressed.</p> <p>"The seriousness" is marked as deviating from what is experienced. Nominalization has occurred: This is a composite case, since the <u>event</u> is suppressed as well, since "its" -t3-> "the".</p> <p>(i), (ii): "I feel it (this event) is serious"</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ "This event's weight upon me" ■ "This is serious"
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(seriousness=gravity)



■ "Its seriousness" ■ "the seriousness"


Its seriousness is great:



"it" is free-floating but definite. "it" is both truthful and dislocative (in the sense that it is not positioned with respect to "I").



(the or this) event D1
it <-

D2
"the", in combination with \emptyset + nominalization product -- "seriousness" -- because neither what is serious (the event) nor the experiencer ("I") are explicit.



(i)The seriousness

(d3)



(ii)is not that great.

[d2 [+] d3] works in concord with the shifts acting on (i)0.


S → (iii) + (iv)

(iii)You can tell ["I" -t1-> "∅"], ["I*" ε ((i) + (ii))] - d4-> "you"
[I can't] "tell" ■ "testify" [not I]

[D3 x D3]

[D3]

(iv)from the commentary on it. "commentary" ■ "report(s) (about it)"
[secondary, not primary, report(s); iterated "about it"]



overt ≡ open to be experienced ≡ therefore reported (disposition)
 not overt ≡ not big, obvious, so easy to overlook or hide (character)

(v) It's not an overt [action object] Therefore, hidden ≡ not revealed or reported
 reported [+
 -

(vi) disaster, ≡ a particular kind of event (not hidden or hideable)
 (see (a) below)



(vii) something controllable. A Comment on "something" :
 indefinite (non-event) (a) by construction not reportable
 (even though it has been reported on)

Shift here is an (= an attempted redefinition of the situation.

Controllable has 3 possible objects:

- (a) event
- (b) object
- (c) action (in this case reporting)

(b) by definition here, "something controllable", event though by the usual definition it is "not controllable", for it "results" from astral influence (we would say something beyond what was expected or prepared for.)

"Controllable" as it applies to event is what is being excluded by D4.

Deitic shifts may involve expansion or contraction of scope indicated, e.g. "not that great" or "not so small". Therefore, implicitly, "not so large as", "further away than", etc. Not to be located with respect to some specific pointing (with its origin) is a marked case, examples of which

are "it" and "they" as contrasted with "these"("this") and "those"("that") and "you". I'm aware that in touching on these contrasts, I am conflating a number of matters, the demonstratives, the "personal" pronouns etc., which are usually talked about under grammar. It is done deliberately to draw attention to the evidence that the deitic functioning of language is generally observable on levels above words and their meanings and therefore grammar isn't particularly exhaustive.

In reading this material it remains true that there is not the freedom to say whatever one wants. Some things cannot be said except with great difficulty (the performative principle in Part I). The resistances of members to saying whatever they would like are not overcomeable i.e. they can try to overcome the real difficulties of their situation, but their actual language will actually embody those difficulties in all sorts of ways including distancing.

The distancing which is inherent in being an ideal speaker is of course not an absolute one, nor is the position really ideal. It is, however, coincident with that of a certain class of speakers -- as they perform certain functions, for example, reading materials of this sort. It is the choice of the analyst to deal with difficulties. Real speakers must






deal directly or indirectly with those difficulties even if they want to avoid doing so.

What the speaker does is often to produce a series of adjustments, add-ons to an argument or assertion, which often muddle things, move things away from reality. The chaotic or the confused, the sense of slippage seems often to have been a residue of the analysis (I've confessed that it can be), but think again. We began with materials which felt odd, confused, sliding-all-over. We did not make that up, nor did we make up the apparent inconsistencies between the ideology and realities of voting behavior. The chaotic, the confused, the sense of slippage is at least partly the result of what the member doing when he produces language. And that is not a correctable feature of language.

If we look at the next case H, we discover someone who is trying to evaluate the technology and the events rationally. Nonetheless we still feel the slippage, the confusion -- no matter what we do -- I'm tempted to say, and you will see why..

IIH "I think we need nuclear power but it should be more controlled and I'm definitely against these plants. There should be another way and if there isn't, we should spend the money and time to find out.

- (i) I think we need nuclear power but
- (ii) it should be more controlled and
- (iii) I'm definitely against these plants.
- (iv) There should be another way and
- (v) if there isn't, we should spend the money and time to find out.





Deitic indicators:

- (i) : I → we (indef) [I + you . abstract "we".
- (iii) : I (subj.) , these (obj.).
- (iv) : impersonal particle, "there".
- (v) : impers. part. , "there"; "we" (abstract): (we)2

Modals:

- (a) "think", "but" ε (i), "should...more" ε (ii)
- (b) (If) (i) + (ii) + (iii), "am..against" ε (iii),
(then) (iv), "should...another way" ε (iv)
- (c) (v) : If there isn't (ø), we should ...

(C)



This complex locution seems designed to elide the impossibility of responding rationally, i.e., the sense of powerlessness to have a rational response. Not in an absolute sense. (A), above, indicates the possibilities of either more controlled nuclear power, the existence of which he finds difficult to speak of and other benign means of creating power, which is only hinted at in (iv) and (v), in the use of øed indefinites. But these nullings appear all over the place in H. (See (C) on the previous page, diagramming the various possibilities of which H speaks or almost speaks.) In (i), (iii) and (iv) H is relatively straight-forward, despite the confusions that abound in much of the surrounding material. (B) shows the contradictory position H is found to be in, assuming that there isn't

"another way", basing the reasoning as H does in (v) on the quickly repressed hope of (iv). The \emptyset 's and \emptyset ed indefinites represent the barely enunciated standards which take H into uncertain territory, even causing the renunciation of possibilities which are real, perhaps even rational, but whose ultimate adjudication remains unknown.

One might suggest that our analysis assumes that there must be a "rational" speaker, the one who says, in Platonic terms or in the terms of the early Wittgenstein "what is the case" ⁶or one in the terms of the late Wittgenstein plays some language game, flawlessly. We are tempted to say that H is a such an example, for the interlocutor is "on the right side," sees there are problems, wants to utilize energy and effort to find solutions. Nonetheless the case fails as exemplifying the ideally rational speaker, for we have located slippages which make assertions much more peculiar than at first glance. What is being approved by the speaker and what is being proposed as procedure and goal is unclear. Apparently our model for rational speaker is ourselves always and only. In this sort of investigations, it is the investigator who designates himself as privileged (there's the ideal case) and recognizes himself in the data at times. The better dictum is that no one in the end is rational.

⁶ People do not, however, usually play language games, flawlessly.

Everyone has reasons for that. There will always be shifts, slippages -- designate them as one likes. These slippages or transformations are the immanent means by which persons take responsibility for shaping discourse to the end of denying responsibility in various ways.

The observations that the processes are deviant from norms can be made without relegating the processes to the "completely" abnormal. If one were to call the material pathological in reference to what is considered "normal", one might call it "normal pathology", since it is so widely distributed. This material cannot be dealt with simply as a mistake. One may suggest it has the rough social function of setting up a balance between misery, reason and potential risk for persons and social groups. Lived life is apparently oxymoronic.

More On Tools and the Pictures They Provide

In these analyses, so far, the closer we come to the actual persona we are describing, not so much to their lives (though the yet to be looked at Alachua County material raises that interesting possibility), but to the dilemmas of their existence which seem to be shared, the more we seem to be operating within the same formal registers, regardless of

the precise product we are examining. A number of cases seem to illustrate this. First let us define what we mean by formal register. It is not the mechanisms of transformation alone which are widely distributed, but the structural categories also which are regularly singled out for transformation and the structural categories which are paired with them as products. I make no claim here for completeness, but some of these categories are with regard to individuals, their claims not to be worried or concerned, their manipulations of the accidental into the incidental, their tendency to lapse into a abstract public language whenever they try to deal factually with the issues of the disaster (thus absolving themselves of the responsibility to respond directly), their denials that a disaster has occurred, their attempts to remove the events from the quotidian causal regime, their transformation of judgment into wishful feeling, the substitution of media event for real event, with the collapse of real time into something not really experienced the basis for judgment disappearing, and generally the transformation of the world of events in which human beings appear into an autonomous world in which whatever is is, and does not contain concrete human beings. This does not give a detailed picture, but we may certainly read into it the horror of the disaster and the positions which undergo shifting or transformation.

Even though our principle of production or performance is claimed to be purely negative and therefore only weakly predictive, the relatively dense structural descriptors that are shared suggest more than we are prepared to claim. This goes beyond uniformity. There are two components of prediction: (1) explanation of specific formal contents (which without the second component is after the fact) and (2) a proposed (probable or determinate) occurrence. We are working with (1). In order to obtain (2) we must know those features in advance which are going to be explained and those which are likely to be explanatory. All this suggests that the cumulative itemization of shifts or transforms should give us an inventory of factors which are likely to be important in other better detailed cases.

Alachua County Examples; Field Work

The Alachua County material which is much more extensive ostensibly (comprising more than a hundred hours of interviews) was designed to be such a case. It was to be been informed by knowledge of the political trial, and some of it was. But there are other circumstances as well that a field worker would encounter. The question comes up of where one looks in the mass of recorded and recollected material for

significance. Our experience with the Harrisburg/New York material underlines that there are always specific circumstances under which we encounter distortions. But necessarily the problems of constructing the sample had to be much more explicitly confronted in the Alachua County situation because, as time went on, there was no event or set of events unifying or providing an objective measuring stick for responses (and no presenting crisis as in the later Three Mile Island protocols,) though I had hoped to provide myself with such an organizing principle when I began my research. One of the problems for me was (as time went on and awareness of the trial deteriorated as an organizing influence) to provide myself with something approximating such a measuring stick.

When I began to interview people, I first tried to see if jurors or jury panelists would allow themselves to be interviewed further - choosing initially those whose responses had seemed most interesting (in the sense of being "problematical" on review of tapes. At that point it was an intuitive judgment -- even though I already had propounded my "negative" performative principle as stated above. This casts some light on the differences between a theoretical principle and its consistent empirical application.) In general, few jurors were available, most feeling they had done

their duty as jurors. I thereupon went to the panelists and tried to match them on a socio-economic basis to jurors who had not made themselves available for reinterviewing (since I was working with a sociological model of production which was unconsciously descriptive -- even though I had already suggested the distinction between explanatory and descriptive in my proposal.) Next I went to our phone sample and did the same. In the course of establishing these individuals as informants, I began to see that I was not doing anything like strong prediction of performance, on the one hand. On the other hand, I began to establish something that was much more like the classical relationship of a participant-observer to informants, who were organized into families and community and work and gender communities and split as individuals into bodies and minds in determinate ways. (I ended up with a total of close to 100 hours of interviews on tape, both from the direct aftermath of the trial and later research.)

While one may find explicitly political and social matters are discussed, i.e. the important matters to which one assumes privileged access, the matters of family and personal history are not discussable until one has been informed of them by family members and friends. As a result one's judgments of what one hears in the end are modeled by

pictures of lives which one has had help in constructing, really life histories. But here too one ultimately makes the assumption of privileged knowledge (but based on these life histories which one has been helped to construct.) Unlike the investigator who is just interested in learning the point of view of informants, their view of the world and its various sectoral histories, this kind of research focuses on that world view in the hopes of discovering the way it leaves out matters and the way it misleads and how it does these things systematically - what its communicative structures look like, and how or why they have been chosen. How its limited freedoms have been utilized and how being involved in particular lives constitutes the means and necessity of compromising rationality.

The critical difference between this research and more classically oriented field research is that I was not trying to discover what they understood about their worlds but what they misunderstood, i.e. the ways they might be described as wrong about their social worlds (in the sense of an egged-on⁷misconstruction). It took me a long while to propound that and with a great deal of discomfort along the way. Questions from informants about my purposes in interviewing them elicited in me this formulation, which I ("dishonestly" but

⁷ Why informants should be susceptible to being egged-on is another question.

by necessity) did not share with them directly, though I did by indirection. I questioned them vigorously, not hesitating to disagree or contest some conclusion. Ultimately I concluded that they had knowledge of much of what they denied or misrecognized and identified both with me and what I abhorred, and needed to deny what they did.

Following is an account based upon my field trips to Gainesville which is used to further develop this model of language in use and its analysis. What needs to be said is that a model of language in use must treat its production alongside other acts which are apparently not verbal -- all of them forming a kind of narrative. This is a counterpart to contexts being treated as if they are verbal by members. This is the general case. The Three Mile Island Protocols above are exceptional, not merely because they are responses to a shared crisis, but because as such they permit one to abstract oneself (in the sense of "bracketing out") from the individual, except in as much as it makes its appearance in individual products. Where the general (i.e. the bracketable) occurs and to what degree, is a matter of investigation.

The Soflees

The Soflees were a family in Keystone Heights, a small town northeast of Gainesville in Clay County, who had originated in upstate New York. Saul had a junk business there, which he parlayed into a pretty good thing during and after World War II until he was forced to sell out to his partner in 1960. He came to Florida in advance of his family to buy up land and to start building a house.

I interviewed him first during the summer of 1974 at a hospital where he worked as a security man and at the time he apparently did not want me to meet the rest of his family though he originally had extended an invitation to visit him in Keystone Heights. He told me at the time that he had "checked me out" and I was "all right," but he put me off even though I had been cleared with "someone." Certainly, I was surprised to have passed muster, but it didn't seem to count the first year.

When I called him up in January of 1976 (I had missed my usual summer visit), he invited me out to his house. My first interview was of him and his wife, Lois. When I drove out to his house on the unimproved dirt road off a main highway to keep the appointment, I found myself walking around the house trying to find the front door, which was

supposedly off the car port. Imagine a paved walk coming in from the road to the house followed by no visible entrance to the house. I found nothing obvious indicating the way in. Calling out, as I remember, I was invited to enter through a door which turned out to be a panel in the sun porch which had been added to one end of the house in that part which I later discovered had been the product of the greatest amount of collective imagination or negotiation by Saul and other family members. The walk that led to nowhere had been built for a wedding reception and then simply forgotten.

I eventually did interview the seven principals in this family. Besides the two elders, there were Saul Jr. and his wife, Carol, John and Martha Dennison, and Rose Soflee. I had some casual contact with some of the grandchildren. There is also J. a family intimate and Caleb, her child, who are adjuncts to the family. She had an affair with Saul Jr., which Carol "knew nothing about", when both were working in a local government office. J. had signed papers with Saul, Jr. and Carol giving them supposed temporary custody of Caleb.

To begin with there was a discrepancy between how everyone described Saul's position and what I observed of it. He was supposedly chief of security at the hospital and according

to Martha who worked there as a nurse he "ran everything." In fact, it was a small hospital and he handled security alone at night and another man handled it during the day. If he supervised, it must have been by telephone. Certainly his assertion about his having had me checked out was consistent with this inflated picture. He had had a series of blue collar jobs since he came down to Florida, culminating in security work. These, he said, he simply done because he wanted to keep busy.

Saul Jr., had briefly gone into business for himself financed by his father (according to his sister Rose.) Like most members of the family, he thought that his father could have been rich if he had cared to. And he would be (anyway) if inflation hadn't eaten up his capital. It was very difficult for members of the family other than his wife, Lois, to keep in mind the fact that Saul's retirement had been forced. His partner had been stealing from their business and he had shown certain signs of a heart condition and his doctor had recommended retirement.

Rose, who was a psychiatric nurse, would not believe this story about her father's retirement. She stated it had happened simply because he was bored with the work, a reason her father's words (in a somewhat different context) could

have given support to. Saul Jr. shared the point of view and seemed surprised when I suggested that small business people, because they were small, might be subjected to certain sorts of stresses that would force them to quit a business.

In speaking of this family (and others) and the matter of why they allow themselves to be interviewed at all, what kind of demand they are making of you, or what kind of expectation they have of you should be considered carefully. What is said often is "I'm going to give you an interview because I want to help you out." This, with a kind of bravado. (One may call this the "kindness of strangers" explanation.) Maybe it's true for an instant, coinciding with curiosity, but it seems as a motive not sustainable. It readily evolves into a more personal purpose such a desire to convert or persuade one (which may have been there in the first place.) Matters based upon attractions or repugnances are directed at the investigator which have to do partly⁸ with what one is and partly with their own life patterns.

Rose Soflee (who lived in a trailer on the family property
[Ambiguously located with respect to the family household.])

⁸ For a complete compendium of attractions and repulsions which might be significant here, one would need a schema similar to the list of reasons for erotic investment given by Freud in his essay, "Narcissism; an Introduction."

is the person here who spoke most about motives, her motives and those of other family members. For example, she told me her father had finally decided to let me into the family *[This is a boundary, but apparently a troubled one. See the problem of finding the front door above.]* because he wanted something from me *[she didn't say what.]* and it was now time *[For what? Apparently his purpose is 'none of the above'.]* I had two interviews with her. In the first of the interviews she told me that she had agreed to the interview of herself because her father was the control person in the family system and she wanted to let him in on the secrets of the system of control *[He is a "control person" who isn't "in on the secrets of control"]* through an intermediary. I was suitable because I was not a professional *[Maybe she judges I have no independent basis of power.]* She told me a very detailed history of her relationship with her family, indicating half way through this interview that she had been lying from the start because she hadn't liked my attitude, but clearly not repudiating her originally-expressed purpose in giving me the interview --i.e.the rescue of her father. She had then indicated that she was the most powerful person from the time she was an adolescent and that she had indirectly overridden the desires of her parents and had influenced the builder in all sorts of detailed ways while the house was being built (To my knowledge, her statements

about locations of doors and other relatively objective matters didn't check out.) Her angry repudiation of what she had said earlier in the interview partly grew out of her reaction to hearing an opinion she was expressing contradicted by an earlier statement on my tape.

When she had told me she was lying, I suggested to her that I would tend to take her lies seriously, since they weren't arbitrary and seemed to follow a pattern -- and wouldn't that be reasonable on my part? She conceded that the patterns she had described in her family were ones which might have applied prior to the point she had an identity crisis in her early or mid-twenties but didn't now apply.

At the beginning of the second interview she stated that she had miscalculated with me, believing me to be an amateur analyst, but I had turned out to be too professional and she would not continue past the second interview, which she nonetheless completed.

Some of her ideas are worth reporting, considering how she earns her living: psychotherapy is simply manipulation and she is the most successfully manipulative person in the entire family, with the exception perhaps of her older sister, Martha. One of Martha's daughters had detectably a great aptitude for it.

Rose and a now-dead aunt of her mother had been allied during her teens against her mother who had been who had been "house champion" until that point. Her mother and great aunt had both been "sensitives" who intuitively grasped the feelings of most of the people around them. She, herself, had been able to make use of that sensitivity although she did not have a great deal of it. Saul Jr. believed that his sister, Rose, was manipulative, but when pressed for an example, could only tell about a time that Rose appropriated a field for her horses that father and son had plowed up more than a year before, thinking vaguely at the time of putting some crops in. Rose decided the outcome openly, though it is likely that she calculated that her father and brother would remain immured in salutary indecision until after she made her move. Still, there was no evidence that⁹ Saul Jr. understood that manipulation involves the management of knowledge.

There can be construed contrasting pictures of the moral-political universe of males and females. Lois Soflee's picture was traditional, one in which women were family cen-

⁹ Manipulation can be defined tentatively as (a) the giving of information which was not true and/or (b) the withholding of true information to effect outcome of some set of actions. At any rate it does involve the covert management of information. Hypothesis: Rose knew the difficulty the two Sauls were having. Perhaps she even added to it. But there was no evidence that Saul Jr. had the vaguest notion of what had happened except that Rose got the field.

tered and housebound and men were abroad in the world. She stated that political and social issues were defined by a special male logic which had little to do with reason but she thought, nevertheless, that one was obliged to think in certain ways about these issues. Men and women thought differently; women's thought, which legitimately was limited to the family and to the home, was characterized by considerations of cause-and-effect and probability and men's was not. As she got older she reported, she had been able to let her hair down, so to speak; she was beginning to write again and she was wearing informal lounging outfits. After questioning, it turns out that this freedom is experienced in her house, only.

She agreed that she was a psychic and told how she was able to read people's feelings very exactly. I asked for examples, encouraging her to provide examples of any kind. She provided some examples of mishaps at a shopping mall as examples of prescience, which turned out to be readily explainable through her not quite conscious exercise of memory, or ability to calculate likely outcomes. *[The issue of responsibility (for mental acts in these cases) is then a crux for reports on actions (or lack of actions.) In these cases the premonitions were reportedly validated but not as quotidian acts (but they could have been.)]*

Saul Jr. and his wife, Carol, agreed that mother Lois was a genuine psychic and Carol incidentally felt that she too had great psychic abilities which were underdeveloped. These supposed abilities played a role in the events which she related to me:

"One day I visited Lois on my motor cycle and all of a sudden Lois said, 'Carol there is going to be a storm. You really ought to go home.'

"So, I wrapped myself in my poncho and started home. Sure enough *[As in a fairy tale.]*, in the middle of the trip a storm arose and I barely got home with my life. I was almost knocked off my cycle several times. When I got home, I called up Lois to tell her how right she had been.

[Certainly there is exhibited in Carol's account both a distortion of cause and effect relations and the operation of intention. Lois's suggestion that Carol leave before a storm was a cause of Carol's endangerment (and predictably so.) If Lois was indeed aware of the storm, then her injunction was hostile (not safe-guarding.) Lois's actions were the proximate cause of Carol's "almost losing her life." Carol's interpretation ignores this latter issue. Carol's own history casts some light upon this process.]

Lois: "There is going to be a storm, [Carol]. Go home."

Re prescience, Lois' knowledge of the storm raises the usual questions: How much did she know about the storm and when (relative to its arrival) did she know what she knew? Lois' knowledge could have come from (1) a broadcast warning or (2) her own observation.

Usually broadcast warnings are of immediately impending storms or tornadoes. Go home [at this time, $t=0$] means in either case that Carol is being told to go outside during a time that is likely to be dangerous.

Carol: "I called up Lois to tell her how right she was."

Q. (a) About the storm coming?

(b) To enjoin her to go home?

(1) at a safe time i.e. enough before the storm (If so, she was mistaken.)

(2) at a time coinciding with the advent of the storm.

(a) If she was right about the storm coming (and was good-willed toward Carol, then (1) is impossible. (This precludes either Lois' complete knowledge or her good will.)

(a) continued. If Lois was right about the storm coming and (2), then she was ill-willed.

If she was wrong about the storm in terms of timing, then (1) could have been intended and (2) could have been the result and her good will is admissable.

But why in either case, would Lois have told her to leave, when alternatively she might have told her to stay until after the storm. This would have made unlikely any harm occurring to Carol. Alternatively, why would Carol have to leave unless Lois knew the storm was going to last long enough to make Carol late -- unlikely as it seems?

One must conclude that Lois wanted her to go in either case, either with the explicit wish to do her harm or with a certain indifference to harm minimization. That she wanted her to go is the only matter undeniable.

Let us regard this as a test of Lois' prescience, as Carol seems to be suggesting. If it is strongly present, then malicious intent follows. If it is partially present, then there is at least indifference to harm befalling Carol. This likelihood of ill will is what is being occluded (and unsuccessfully at that) through the attribution of psychic powers to Lois. (It should not be forgotten that Lois is not doing the occlusion.)

An impression of incoherence is left with us the more we examine the case. Lois is made more responsible for what has happened and Carol less so by the imputed framework of psychic powers. And yet Carol imputes to herself undeveloped potential as well. The report records events inappropriately in that they confuse issues of who is responsible, who is manipulating "cause and effect and probability" to produce results. An interpretation of Lois' actions as neutral anticipation is substituted for a recognition of her active participation in events and their outcomes, which cannot be maintained upon close examination. We have to conclude that Carol is not reporting accurately either her own perceptions nor her own role here. If she is a potential psychic, she can triumph over her present condition and present herself as a candidate for future victimizer; in effect she identifies with Lois.

The great "success" here is the process of occluding of the knowledge that Lois meant her harm. But she has experience of occlusion. She told me in that same interview that she was a "semi-orphan" and declared that she had almost no memory of anything that happened to her before 12 or 13. (I wish I had asked her more about about the meaning of "semi-orphan" and asked her more questions in general. My inexperience as an interviewer and my lack of knowledge is

what I encounter retrospectively. The only other person I've known with such amnesia was sexually abused by her father and I encountered her later than I did Carol. But we discussed the matter; and she remembered the abuse. Again one¹⁰ must note the specific conditions for any form of discourse, including recollection and occlusion, are the tugs and repulsions between particular persons, including the interviewer. Manipulated history, the system of omissions and mistatements about what has occurred, emerges as an important element in this family culture, and perhaps the general culture, as part of accounting for events and not simply as an idiosyncratically individual choice, even bracketing out the effects of my being there.

I asked Rose (as a person who had not entirely grown up in the area) whether people she knew rewrote history. She responded with a story. A friend had an affair with a married teacher while in High School. The latter became very involved, so much so that he wanted to divorce his wife and marry her. Whereupon she declared if he does that and we marry, everyone will know what has happened. After that declaration, she broke off with him and refused to see him

¹⁰Her mother had known about the abuse, she thought, although her mother denied that she had known and called her a "bad person." When she reproached her father about it (he had in the meanwhile been 'saved'), he replied: "Nothing like that ever happened and anyway God has forgiven me."

again. He eventually left town. Years later when she had not seen her friend for a while she brought up the events. Her response was to insist that nothing of that kind had happened.

Once when I was visiting one of the campuses in the Gainesville area, I spoke with a young couple about differences between men and women. I suggested to them that women seemed to be in better touch with feelings than men on the one hand, but on the other hand women seemed to revise their histories more. The young man seemed puzzled; the young woman furiously replied to my observation with "Everybody does that." *[I am not suggesting that this is a valid induction -- only that there are suggestive gender differences which are fairly common in the general culture of the area.]*

When I first interviewed Martha and John Dennison, Martha, who was the oldest of the Soflee children, told me she had gotten pregnant to get out of the family and spent a long time conceding and discussing the family manipulateness. She suggested that since she had been working she had much less need to control John. The latter seemed uncomfortable about the whole conversation. Lois, of course, had stated that it was perfectly natural for all women to manipulatively control their men.

These evidences of manipulativenness are not limited to relationships between men and women. Carol blurted out during the interview of her and Saul Jr. that she had been very, very happy when the papers had been signed by J. (giving them custody of Caleb) because the way was clear now for his adoption. That intention, of course, J. didn't know anything about and she thought that Carol was her best friend in the family. Some what later Martha told me that Carol had objected, to her surprise, to J.'s being invited to a family dinner at the Dennison's which would have included J.'s child since by that time the child was living with Saul Jr. and Carol.

It's clear that there are a number of guiding elements in the above account -- who feels, who does not, who thinks analytically about people and other substantive issues and who does not and even with those who do think and feel in some life-historical sense, how much and how long can they afford to. (I would on the latter issue bring up a housewife whom I interviewed in Gainesville and whom I was able with not much effort to bring gently to various political positions which I regarded as valid. When I asked her why if she saw these matters so easily, she was not able to come to

¹¹them on her own, she replied she did not have time to: "I'm too busy. I'll always be too busy." This was not a compulsory truth, but it was true in her case, one thinks as a result of accumulated "choices.") In addition one must look at these various issues as situated with respect to the locus of the family boundary (and other boundaries.) That particular boundary is equivocally identified with the house outer skin or perhaps an outer property line, but it is also distributed among the various dwelling places of the family, eg., the entry into Saul and Lois's house was peculiar, almost ambiguous. The second time I visited Saul Jr. and Carol, during an unfolding crisis over their custody of and intentions with regard to Caleb, I had real problems entering and being let in because of a chronically malfunctioning door latch and knob on their back entrance. (And recall Rose's trailer on the family property.)

Family membership is crucial as a determiner of legitimate knowledge. Although Martha was sympathetic to J. and thought that J. should be encouraged to keep her child and that it was very likely that her mother and Carol were trying to take the child away. Martha reported to me that when she was talking to J., however, she would not confirm the likelihood of the danger and limited herself to saying, "You should get

¹¹ Cf. the concept of "free" labor, with its mixture of compulsion and choice.

your child back as soon as possible." When I asked her about this, she replied that J. really wasn't a member of the family and conceded that I must be because of my knowledge of them (Remember I had been "let in", which was not so easy.) Martha, was divorced, not so incidentally, from John within a year of my last conversations with the family and subsequently upon my next visit, unwilling to speak with me. J. had decamped with the child.

More Tools II

How and under what conditions am I to take myself as putative family member? At least for a while, for the purposes of analysis, my reports of speech and/or situation or summaries of reported history can be utilized with care as part of the written protocol. My reports on troubled boundary can be taken seriously. My position is equivocal and changes over time (but is vouched for.) But so is that of Rose and Martha Soflee and Martha's position changes consciously according to her own reports and according with her own behaviors. Family membership is always being constructed and reconstructed.

The boundary is that which is constituted or understood to exist between various sectors of social existence (speaking

descriptively) -- mind, body, individual, family, "community", ethnic group, social class, world of work, political world, technical order, private and public orders, world of interpersonal relations etc. Analytically or contextually we find that they are organized in hierarchies. Boundaries may be boundaries for speech as well as boundaries in speech; evidence for this (when we are pressed for evidence) lies in how they are constituted negatively speaking, assuming that we are in the dark about them. When we ask the question in and for speech, we reply relative to case, not to some generalized one.

It seems that that boundary is constituted both in speech and for speech as a gap or lacuna or distortion. It is not only in dreams that such evidence appears. In Freud's treatment of dreams, he fills lacunae, corrects false connections (or parataxes) with connections which are thought of by the dreamer (or himself.) This is sometimes thought to be arbitrary and thereby the reality of the whole process is put into question. On the analyst's side it is supposed to flow from his knowlege, i.e. rational identification; acceptance by the patient comes from identifying the analyst with his or her own family members; the recognition of that is supposed, ultimately, to loosen the connections; alternatively or perhaps equivalently one is supposed to "work

through" the closures imposed by them. That may be therapeutic optimism. The persistence of such patterning suggests that there is a regular process, perhaps even more general, for identifications, that is pushes and pulls may be to other objects and levels of organization than family members. Why not attribute it to an actively distorting agency (or intention) which broods over all real connection? In speech not speaking about something as certainly establishes the distinctiveness and importance of missing objects more certainly than always referring to it and that applies to almost anything that is experienceable.

The very positing of false connection or omission constitutes a boundary, i.e. things become visible with recognizable distortion. Matters must be constituted as problems or questions to come to full consciousness. This justifies Marx's notion of ideology as the form in which the real (and opposing interests) of human beings are fought out. Nonetheless we are operating on a much lower level of abstraction than that -- before such debates or arguments become part of some public domain or after they have ceased to be apparently important for members as public issues. (See the discussion below ca. conflicting points of view.)

We have to deal with the same sort of processes that we examined in our Three Mile Island examples, shifts of level

or transformations, but this time without the advantages of a suppressed personal or life history (advantages since they allowed one to deal with highly abstract issues without distraction.) We must interpret and use life histories in examining data, suggesting as we did several paragraphs above, that lives place certain limits on affordable rationality and that the time in which we all live is one in which certain linguistic means are utilized, shifts, slippages or transforms (we do not have a perfect terminology for all of this), to reproduce symbolically our own inability to act. To quote our earlier formulation, "These slippages or transformations are the immanent means by which persons take responsibility for shaping discourse to the end of denying responsibility in various ways." The pulls and negations may be on other levels than family as they were certainly in the Three Mile Island data. And they may not be entirely conscious.

¹²In principle, one can locate elements of biography which make an adequately analytic consciousness undesirable for a person. That means that there is now a personal domain in which there is the possibility of failure and a type of life history in which one, in a sense which is new, is now

¹² What I am presenting here as part of my "tool kit" is a portion of a larger piece on falsification which may be appended to this work in some later version.

"dependent on one's own actions" and trapped, not in external circumstances but in the life which¹³ one has supposedly chosen "freely." The issue slips over then from dependency to responsibility and often to false and painful positing of responsibility for failure. Here responsibility has been put all the way over on one side, when we know that in reality circumstances are limited and possibilities, also and yet the onus is put on the individual, the "loser."

'Failure' results in a defective history, a life which is felt to be defective from the inside. The defective life history should give a handle on distortive reshapings of reality, but not in a simple-minded way, i.e. just descriptively. "History" has two acceptations: (1) what is recorded or constructed and (2) what happens. A life history or life's history is defective in two senses (corresponding to the dual acceptation.): (1) Erroneously constituted, but erroneous only because it is defective in sense (2): (2) That the life history is a failure. It involves some limit experienced from within, one which is an obstacle to desired action or one which has been experienced as such. Now this obstacle, severe enough to require reformulation, must be

¹³ Compare with "free labor" again. Some of the content of this is certainly discussed by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb in their Hidden Injuries of Class.

reformulated in order to obviate or abolish the obstacle or difficulty or explain it away. This constitutes a boundary which is an index of some juxtaposition of causal levels. In fact the limiting process can result in an experience of what is objectively given and not always in falsification but in this case it does result in falsification.

Obviously the process is to be understood partly as wish fulfillment, a wish that the certain difficulty, obstacle, barrier, did not exist or meant something other than it does mean. Moreover this process is not isolated from other life investments and the fact of failure, i.e. the "social fact" as we have argued above. What is implied here is a kind of waking dream, a fantasy that may be shared to a greater or lesser degree among members of a family or a larger social group. The boundary falsified or confused is a function of¹⁴the contrast between trouble and issue.

Evidence for all this can come from a number of different levels. One can find contradictions between informants' accounts, but other matters are evidential as well. Examples are inconsistencies of both formal and material nature in

¹⁴ Almost *needless to say*, we are playing along one side of the line between issue and trouble as C. Wright Mills understood it in his Sociological Imagination. Mills spoke of the need to convert trouble into issue .(8-9,129-130) That conversion is perhaps thought improper by members, and therefore not being done by them.

one account or between accounts of the same individual, including causal permutations i.e. mixing up cause and effect, the general and particular, etc. Direct evidence of the distorting intention, if not the mechanism, consists in statements such as "You have your opinion and I have mine." "Whatever you believe is true is true." and "You can believe anything you like." (i.e. truth is not truth.)

What it takes to make the difficulty or obstacle so serious that it must be subjected to the kinds of suggestive scrambling that we have been speaking of is that it is inescapable, since it is deeply embedded in our life, and so injurious that we can not speak of it using the knowledge that we have accumulated, since it would destabilize all we have. The lack of portability or mobility which we spoke of in the Three Mile Island data is related to this. We are speaking of that element of social knowledge which turns on our particular positional limitations from which we can never be free and that constitute the most important chapters of our failure. These we (as members) believe can never be shared. That calls for desperate sacrifice.

But still there are matters which are shared. That implies in the end that there will always be material analogous in its separability from more "personal" or individual matters

(as in the case of Three Mile Island.) Still, we can't prejudge it. It will peel off as a result of analysis; we may get a cumulative sense of where it is likely to be.

The following are excerpts from political discussions, the first with Saul, the second with Saul and Lois. Appended to the first, even in the first iteration, are additional pertinent data, including my observations on it and those of family members, if I deem them pertinent.

I.

S: "You can't say it don't do good. There has to be a wrong before a right otherwise there can't be a right. If everything is right, there can't be wrong."

T: "We have to do bad things?"

S: "Unconsciously. The bad things we do are steps toward good .. better things we will do. More pollution in the 1880's than in the last 30 years.

T: "This applies to foreign policy?"

S: "In a way ... we don't have to exploit them (foreign countries) anymore. The exploitation days are over. The Vietnam War was wrong for only one reason. Congress and the minorities.."

The structure of the first part of this argument is very similar to Saul's discussions of unions in Florida. (It may apply to his experience as a businessman in N.Y. State and even his earlier history -- which I was too inexperienced to ask questions about -- I guess here about his earlier history.) Florida is a very anti-union state (in terms of two measures, the administration of unemployment insurance by the State Department of Commerce and the percentage of work force unionized.) Still when Saul was working for one firm, a union came in -- which he thought was all for the good. He even became a steward for a while. (He said: "At first, people are exploited, and that's alright -- because after a while they realize it and they get a share of the good things.)

When I read to Lois the record of the above discussion, she declared that the reasoning made no sense whatsoever Rose got furious when she heard it and thought her father had no need "to be guilty."

II. (continuation of I with Lois added)

S: "Do you know after Vietnam(inc.?)//

T: "Doesn't it look it look like it?

S: "//and if we are training mercenaries there sending
a some people say its \$30 million.//

L: "Now, wait a minute. Our government doesn't have
anything to do with it."

T: "The C.I.A. is. It's been in newspaper stories."

S: "Newspaper story? (scornfully)

T: "No. But it's been admitted by the U.S. government
that they've been doing it but (sic) that they've stopped
doing it because they didn't have the funds...But they'd
already sent the whole//

S: "What did they send over there?

T: "(//)..T(or t) they sent about 300 or 400 mer-
cenaries, according to their own account.

L: "According to the account I read, they were Cubans and were independent and had nothing to do with the government.

T: But they, the Americans, trained them. They had former Green Berets in (sic) them..and trained them.//

S: "These people are people who want, ah ...to go out and do something like that.

T. "//..and paid for it.

S. "These are, ah .. what I mean, you know... they're like a guy they're experienced people. This is their livelihood

T: "But someone has to pay them and the American government has laws against that .. fight(ing) under a foreign flag.

S: "It's been illegal for, oh.. but they do it anyway. How come it was illegal during the second World War, we had Americans during the first World War, too. We had the Escadrille and then the and then the second World War.."

T: "But,..it's only acceptable..//

L: "They are Cuban Refugees, they're not Americans.

T: "//No, but they use Americans too that were being trained -- there's been a lot of recruitment of Americans, too.

S: "Mercenaries.

A More Thorough Look at These Materials

Above (in the discussion of the protocols concerning Three Mile Island) we have discussed the twin issues of regularized expression, and the deviance from norms which is actually habitual in encountered speech. What we have shown is that real performances exhibit the difficulties corresponding to defective life chances (within a corresponding failed history) and that therefore one cannot say anything one wants to and that evidence for these difficulties is to be found in the produced material.

Let us look at these two most recent sets of material. In I. I found criticism's of Saul's statements by his wife and daughter, which I would like to make more of than I have

succeeded in doing so far. I think their comments are part of running arguments about life histories, potential or actual, which are nearly always defective (although from differing points of view.) In II. I would like to understand Saul's adjustments to Lois and vice versa as well as the effects that the interviewer and informants have on each other.

(Below the material is divided up suggestively, as usual, and given parenthetically some kind of indication of what is being done at various points in the argument. Attempts are made also of a more complete analysis.)

I.

S1:(1) "You can't say it don't do good. [*"Don't" is grammatically unmarked but socially marked, the meaning of that to be inferred below.*]

(2) There has to be a wrong before a right [*righting wrongs, i.e. restitution. ("I" D₁ "you" D₂ "ø", a series of deitic shifts which go from the subject position closest to the speaker to an impersonal subject in an impersonal statement -- the speaker having disappeared.)*]

(3) otherwise there can't be a right. *[There is a causal and logical connection between wrong and right which is posited. What is suppressed in favor of an impersonal formulation is, possibly, as we will see his own history (and inner development.)]*

(4) If everything is right, there can't be wrong.
[Almost a theological point of view, the justification of evil through its capacity to be transcended.]

T1: "We have to do bad things? *[I introduce the "we", a collective personal. The way "have to" is used substitutes a personal compulsion for the logico-causal construct given above]*

S2: (1) "Unconsciously.
[Almost jarring in its departure from a "common sense" point of view. In beginning to work with the text, I was tempted for a while to think that I had not transcribed it correctly and to attribute the word to myself. It tells me about his relative sophistication: the historical process is unconscious -- the individual one as well as the collective one.]

(2) "The bad things we do are steps toward [Ø] good .. *[Q. Is Saul saying that he has changed, and he thinks for the bet-*

ter? If so, then the following shifts (also deitic) can be justified analytically:

"I" D_3 "We", "did" D_4 "do", "were" D_5 "are", "the" D_6 "ø".]

(3) "better things we will do. [And: "I" D_7 "we". This is a confirmation that he is speaking about himself. Now we can translate the previous dialogue, beginning with T1:

T'1. You had to do bad things [clearly that was my constructive meaning, confirmed by the following translation:

S'2: (1') "Unconsciously.

(2') "The bad things I did were steps toward the good ..]

(3') "better things I will do.

(4) More pollution in the 1880's than in the last 30 years.
[This moves back to the impersonal.]

T2: "This applies to foreign policy?"

S3: (1) "In a way ...

(2) we don't have to exploit them *[foreign countries]* anymore.

[("I" D₃ "we")^{} , the "we" here is not the result of a shift from an "I", since it clearly "I" is not substitutable (under the circumstances.) This then is a new general discourse which is being introduced; a break is being made in what is being reported, the "we" is actually a new one. One could speak of "We"₁ D₈ "We"₂. This implies also that, if the language is impersonal, it is impersonal in a way different than in S1, above. It is a collectivity which is being invoked, which is not simply the sum of persons like Saul.]*

(3) The exploitation days are over. *[Personal pronouns have disappeared altogether.]*

(4) The Vietnam War was wrong for only one reason.

[So it's right except for one reason:]

(5) Congress and the minorities...

[an ambiguity: (a) ethnic-racial minorities (b) political minority on the war (contrast with "silent majority"): Congress in its disloyalty too, not to be distinguished from a political minority; = 'This war had nothing to do with

exploitation and this war was right, except for one reason, the actions that shaped its outcome (, as it follows:)]

(6) Have you ever seen a war in history where one side
[Our side, painfully, congress and the "minorities".]

(7) encouraged the other,

(8) one side went over and told them what was going to happen. *[One side (ambiguity: our side, not our side), disloyalty, treason, betrayal; what is suppressed is the disagreement in a principled sense. "encouraging the other" becomes "telling them what will happen": disloyalty becomes betrayal, although telling them what was going to happen seems beyond the capacity of those being accused.]*

(9) It seems the same as in 1960. *[McCarthy era.]*

[He reasons here as perhaps he feels he should -- as is implied by the non-located impersonality which goes along with an authoritarian argument.]

The structure of the first trope of this argument is very

similar to Saul's discussions of unions in Florida. (It may apply to his experience as a businessman in N.Y. State and even his earlier history -- which I was too inexperienced to ask questions about.) Florida is a very anti-union state (in terms of two measures, the administration of unemployment insurance by the State Department of Commerce and the percentage of work force unionized.) Still when Saul was working for one firm, a union came in -- which he thought was all for the good. He even became a steward for a while. *[contradicting the supposed "to keep busy"-motivation of his job involvement. In other words his present life is real and has displaced his pre-Florida one, and that of course goes for his class identity.]*

(He [S4] said:

(1) "At first, people are exploited (ø),

["were exploited" D_t "are exploited", "by me and others" D
"ø"

The validity of this is confirmed in Rose's reaction below.]

(2) and that's alright

["was" D "is"]

(3) -- because after a while they realize it and

["realized" *D* "realize"]

(4) they (\emptyset) get a share of the good things.

["(then, \emptyset) got" *D* "(\emptyset) get" ; this is to be understood as a report on real history. This illustrates the way a historical report may be more direct than a summing up of it. But even taking this into account there is a matter occluded, namely the manner of getting, whether it just happens once they realize it or whether get is an activity word.])

When I read to Lois the record of the above discussion, she declared that the reasoning made "no sense whatsoever."

[(a) because of the implicit theory of progress, in which out of the bad comes the good, or (b) because this is one outcome of the changed life pattern; she does not have to deal with it because she is virtually housebound. There is no overt rejection here, just incomprehension, masking a deeper occlusion.]

Rose got furious when she heard it and thought her father had no need "to be guilty." [which confirms that his statements, S4 (1)-(4), are self-referential.]

[She follows the script that the younger members of the family follow in which Saul is a successful businessman who only retired because of health. He cannot be permitted to admit guilt for "exploitation", even if it is mitigated by his changed social role -- one must say especially -- for if he has changed social role and class, that would mean he has failed and they, also. If he no longer is in that position, that might imply that he has truly separated from that part of his life history, that the earlier part was was a failure. (His change of class and social role is of course a precondition for his assessment.) They wish him to be still living that history along with them (though he isn't). Indeed they fear that they cannot be a part of that history unless he is still; they may be right.]

II.

S1: "Do you know after Vietnam(inc.?)//

[This is, apparently, a reference to Angola and the last part of I.]

T1: "Doesn't it look it look like it?"

S2: (1) "//and if we are training mercenaries there

(2) sending a..[uh?, *shift*]

[<people> § <money>]

(3) some people say it's \$30 million..//

[Definite Antecedent D "some people"]

L2: (1) "Now, wait a minute.

(2) Our government doesn't have anything to do with it."

[She rushes in, with a fury which must be aimed at him more than me.]

T3: (1) "The C.I.A. is (ø).

["involved" § "(ø)"].

(2) It's been in newspaper stories.

S3: "Newspaper story? (scornfully)

[some sense of strangulation -- not much of a reply. It feels like an enforced switch of sides. Where does his previously expressed knowledge come from if not from the "scorned" media, including newspapers?]

T4: (1) "No(∅). But

[*"Not just from newspapers: it's been admitted.." § "No + (∅). Full Stop But it's been admitted..." (Passive Transformation)]:*

(2) *it's been admitted by the U.S. government that*

(3) *they've been doing it but*

(4) *that they've stopped doing it because*

[*(the U.S. government admitted that they have been doing it but, also that they've (only) stopped...because]*

(5) *they didn't have the funds...*

(6) *But [Full Stop precedes] they'd already sent the whole// [Awkward at the very least. "Whole" what? Saul's question is entirely appropriate in terms of the noun object, since "sent" does not co-occur with money under these circumstances, but see S2, in which the noun object is shifted from persons to money. Without much premeditation, I am apparently reversing Saul's work:]*

S4: "What did they send over there?"

[(*<people>* § *<money>*) ε S2]

T(4,)5: (1) "(//)..T(or t) they sent about 300 or 400 mercenaries,

(2) according(#1) to their own account(#1).

L5: (1) "According(#2) to the account(#2) I read,

["according(#1) = "according(#2);

"account(#1) <admission> § "account(#2)" <non-admission, not self-report>, fictionalization]

(2) they were Cubans

["mercenaries" D_a "they"; "Americans or non-Americans" S

"Cubans"; therefore (a) "mercenaries" S_a "Cubans"

(3) and were independent and

[mercenaries = (a) acting or serving only for pay (b) soldiers hired into a foreign service; and therefore not intrinsic to U.S. armed services;

[(b) "mercenaries" S_b "independent"]

(4) had nothing to do with the government.

[(c) "independent" \S_c "had nothing to do with U.S. government";

therefore the "mercenaries" "had nothing to do with the U.S. government".]

[(2), (3), and (4) all represent right hand embedding. (2) is logically correct enough as a transformation, (a); if true, it is empirically so. Actually there were non-Cubans, but the piece Lois read might not have said so. (3) is partly true, since they are "not intrinsic to the U.S. armed forces" if that is taken as being some kind of logical equivalent, but they are factually non-independent. Therefore (4) is logically and factually false and its constituting transformation (c) is suspicious. By definition a mercenary is "independent", but must be hired by someone to function as a mercenary. What is "forgotten" is that these chickens are not merely acting in a general capacity. What is being asserted is here that the only matter important is the potential independence of the gun slinger and not who hires, forgetting that without someone to hire them, they could not continue as mercenaries. That is more than definitional; materially a mercenary "owns" his labor power and must sell it. That Saul understands this will be shown below.]

T6: (1) But they, the Americans, trained them.

(2) They had former Green Berets in (sic) [L5(2) is contradicted.]

[among -- if S. and L. are illogical, T. is ungrammatical pretty often. It might make sense to interrogate the interrogator -- to paraphrase Marx. Considering that T. is by a previous argument at least temporarily a member of the family, what do these lapses in grammar indicate? Maybe that as a family member, he is fairly low on the totem pole, even though externally based and a "professional. But why ungrammaticality? Maybe it is that grammaticality has much to do with status and property, and a limited amount to do with meaning. I was understood.]

(3) them..

(4) and trained them..//

[Also I wanted to persuade them and the disturbance of grammar is literally my disturbance at their stubbornness or inaccessibility and a sign of my intensity and obviously inappropriate behavior (a status measure.)]

S6: (1) "These people are (ø) people [: tautologous,

mercenaries" D_1 "these people"

abstract level of discourse confirmed: "t.p" are "people"]

(2) who want,

(3) want, $[(\emptyset) \rightarrow \emptyset]$ ah $[: T]$

[repetition, partly, indirection: i.e. they are free agents;

Q. What do they want?: "ah" = "have to think of something"]

(4) ...to go out and do something like that.

[<actions described, such as in Angola> D_2 "something like that"]

[lack of specifics: "something", "like that"; the abstractness and lack of specifics dissociates the speaker from those he is speaking about at the same time that he "agrees" with L. They are on the same beam: causation is individual not social and it is the character of these people to do these things and it has nothing to do with the government.]

T(6,)7: "//..and paid for it.

[This is a continuation of the interrupted T6. It also contradicts the attempt in S6 to outline a reality which is individual only, i.e. dissociated.]

S8. (1) "These (\emptyset) are, ah .. *[<these people> D_3 <these (\emptyset) >; $D_4: T_1:inc]$*

(2) what I mean, *[$T_2 = <not to say>$],*

(3) you know... [$T_3 = \langle \text{so I do not have to say} \rangle]$

(4) they're like a guy [$\langle \text{these } (\emptyset) \rangle D_5 \langle \text{they} \rangle ; \langle \text{they} \rangle D_6$

"like a guy" ; [$T_4 = \langle \text{I do not define them} \rangle]$

(5) they're experienced people. [*individual characteristics*]

[$\langle \text{these people} \rangle D_7 \langle \text{"they"} \rangle D_8 \langle \text{"experienced people"} \rangle]$

(6) This is their livelihood. [*social character of their "experience": they need to be paid. This character is socially constituted and continues to be so. It is a function of their individual characteristics and at the same time is "social", since it is their livelihood. This extenuates their actions but at the same time concedes the point in T(6,)7, above. It is notable that Saul's trouble is not over when he switches sides after L2. He does not quite succeed in doing what he want to do. He is operating on a sliding scale a very slippery one which moves from mercenaries to livelihood. He is pulled into an ambivalently social formulation willy-nilly, after much resistance.*]

[<their experience> D₉ <this activity> D₁₀ <this (∅) >;
 <this (∅) > D₁₁ <their livelihood>]

[*Something like:* <(their) memory + activity + past> D₁₂
 <their + activity + present>! activity is one at which
 living was/is made]

T8: (1) "But [T₅ chg. direction: <it follows that>]: some-
 one has to pay them [for them to function in "their
 livelihood and for their "experience" to be used. The
 government in this case. They must be part of a work organi-
 zation set up by the government.

<livelihood> D₁₃ = "implies" <payor>]

(2) and the American government has laws against that . . [

<payor> D₁₄ <am. gov.> = so it helps violate its own laws:

<payment> ε {<illegal>}]

(3) fight(ing) under a foreign flag (∅).

[<fff> ε {<illegal>} D₁₃ <fff> (∅)

S9: (1) "It's been illegal for, oh..

[<payment> D₁₄ (∅); <fff> D₁₅ <indef. impersonal particle:

"it">; <illegal for payment or f's> *D*₁₆ <illegal for,>

"oh"= *T* = <Seeing from a different vantage point>: *Still one in which the legality (and government actions) are discussable, but on the face of it only the fighters:]*

(2)but [they]¹ [<those who are fighting under foreign flags> *D*₁₇] do it anyway [<despite its illegality> is a *T*:] [*Odd argument as if violation of law is argument against law, but the argument has turned into legalistic one and not about these specific violators of law:]*

(3) How come it was illegal during the second World War?

[*"is"....."present time" *D*₁₇ "was"....."during the second World War" Why should it be considered illegal? We had Americans doing it (acceptably) during two previous wars: so the government cannot be accused of an illegality. The state is absolved of responsibility.]*

(4) we had Americans during the first World War, too.

[*another example.]*

(5) We had the Escadrille and then the *[more]*

(6) and then the second World War.." *[So there is a continuous tradition. Same structures: (4), (5), (6): attempted induction.]*

T9: (1) "But,.. [*¶*: <Disagreement>, <attempt at rebuttal>]

(1) it's only acceptable..// *[tries to explain exact conditions under which activity is not illegal, which bears on the original question.]*

L10: "[They]1 are [*D*₁₈] Cuban Refugees, [they]1're [*D*₁₉] not Americans. [=L5] *[Interruption and shift back to original line of argument, in which government and Americans are not part of the universe of discourse and if blame is to be allocated, it is not to them. (There is discomfort on all three sides of this discussion. It might make sense to say that Lois's discomfort is most singular, since she most purely is speaking in a performative voice which is not her own, but is one she, by appearances, feels most obliged to adopt.)]*

T9,10: (1) "//No, [Disagreement with L10, parallel to that in T9, -- again not exactly "grammatical" since what is being asserted is the "use" of Americans not merely their participation:]

(2) but they use Americans too that were being trained -- [= T6:(2)]

(3) there's been a lot of recruitment of Americans, too.
S10: "Mercenaries. [Tone of disgust: even though not Cubans, not real Americans, since hired and therefore illegitimate. Back to the disavowal of the social-political sphere, but one characterized again by a certain incoherence:

<"Americans" & "mercenaries"> ^D₂₀ <not real Americans> seems to be Saul's argument: Could it also be that those who <are>/<need to be> hired are not real Americans? Fixed distortive strategies continue to be recycled even after challenge.]

A Brief Conclusion ca. Competing Failures and "Realities"

Not only do people interrupt each other here, but they disturb each other. They can not regularize speech as they come

under each other's influences; they interfere with each
15 other, moreover. They represent competing realities to
each other, one must say competing failures. It is an objec-
tive world that is being argued about, moreover, which we
may think of as impinging on arguments as much as as indi-
viduals do. (Successive and conflicting claims of structure
are represented implicitly and, sometimes, explicitly by
members.)

This not only casts a light upon the essentially tragic ele-
ment in family discussion, but also suggests the extent to
which it is embodied as is all ideological discussion. (This
discussion applies to II. primarily, since that is where
arguments really appear. The material of I. and its analy-
sis, as presented above, is utilized in the analysis of the
family which ends this proposal.) The outsider such as
myself is the center of such tugs and pulls also. (In
psychology these tugs are given specialized names such as
identification or transference; these should be generalized
to the descriptions I give here, as I suggest above.) It
also suggests a quite complex and layered structure for such
argument, which is at the least difficult to represent

15 It is impossible to represent the conversation as turn taking,
cleanly, for the various "turns" are penetrated or invaded by other
stages in the talking. For the contrary view see Sacks, H., quintessen-
tially the 1991 volumes.

graphically. The over-all space in which we might embed such representations will also prove to be complex. The way into exact representation may be separate representations of the arguments of each of the participants, within that over-all space. That is consistent with my assertion above that there are interferences between speakers, that they represent competing realities (or failures) to each other. That the speakers are each centers of production implies that it would be a mistake to assume that one could not benefit somewhat by constructing within this complex space their products as separate series and then only relating the items of the series to items of other series. (That does not mean that the series representations will be equally complex.) I will briefly sketch that over-all space in which the argument can be said to have occurred. I will not do much with the further graphing of argument, except to note that in principle it should be possible to overlay the space with deitic and other shifts -- which we have at least minimally specified above. This implies that we may have analysis for arguments, which is usually taken as so unproblematic that no particular explanation of it is ever required. I will apply the framework immediately to Saul's elaborations.

since he earns his livelihood as a mercenary does. That ambivalence frames his responses.

Saul who is the person who "invited me in" obviously felt a tug, but also counter tugs. Lois who was to a greater extent bound to the space defined by home and community, was obliged perhaps to operate with the most conventional picture of the world, one in which she could predominate. Still the boundary of family was curiously problematic for almost everyone; not only was it in several cases physically "odd" as it was marked out and maintained, but it may have been more permeable for one or the other family member at various times and may have had different locations. That would correspond to the fact that as social organization differs in a profound sense (as in moving from a culture with one dominant mode of production to another,) so too will the sense of what is relativized hierarchically to what within objective social orders, according to need to do so.

It is, nonetheless, necessary to argue that this has force beyond the observation that persons occupying differing social positions and experiencing different sorts of histories (and failures) may have also different experiences of the whole objective social domain. An inner city person may see a member of city administrative hierarchy or a school

superintendent as a member of the oppressive "upper class" of his/or her society; or alternatively that a member of the rural poor may see the Federal government land agent or the foreclosing bank or the U.N. in the same way. This may happen because such people in positions of relative power are encountered directly or seen, say, on the tube. It does, however, not explain how it is that evidence of other larger contexts and aggregates of power (i.e. other embodiments of power) are rejected. These are to be explained only through hurt and failure, which are always irremediable. The most general frameworks, potentially the most coercive, are the most difficult to deal with and the most refractory to attempts to make life's choices (What follows below with the Soflees will illustrate this.)

Competing sets of failed life histories are the frameworks in which objective social being is formulated and necessarily contested competitively to minimize failure, since differentially embodied. Thus it finds its form and is distorted at the same time. Looking back at our examples drawn from the Three Mile Island crisis, we found a remarkable uniformity of reaction to common circumstance. We could then regard, retroactively the data as separable from the more personal aspects of the life histories, which we had minimum access to. Here we find the difficulty of finding a stable

(i.e. agreed-upon) separable area aggravated by the apparent fact that imposed boundaries are much of the time being contested or, alternatively, being misinterpreted in different ways. (This suggests how exceptional the unified picture of the Three Mile Island data is.) We may suggest as programmatic the piecing together of various viewpoints into somewhat unified pictures, but only after we have worked through and understood them.

There is an aggravation of difficulty when people in apparently similar positions are embodied in radically different fashions, i.e. they are in the same family and share much of its history (but that is on the most abstract level, as if they had exactly the same access to the same ideal narrative.) But matters are opportunistically grasped by the different members; they are in different positions in that history. They crowd up to the plate in various orders, dictated by birth order, gender and apparent accident; they do not always compete -- sometimes they agree.

The father, Saul Soflee's, apparent downward mobility constitutes the common problem life history, the one which must be extenuated or contested by the others. Saul Sr. and Lois' house is isolated by its ambiguous and difficult method of entry. In a sense it preserves the way of life of members of

the business class after the history no longer is supportive of that house, except as some kind of validating survival. The various family boundaries have the same function, which is to isolate the family space from the social surround in which work occurs (which is where the new class identity -- felt to be a failure -- is defined.) If we are not talking about a class identity, it's hard to see what the fuss is. That it is a failed or defective history is clear also from a consideration of the series of shifts that family members are relying on.

Several embodiments of defective life history

In the first case, Lois indicates that a moral judgment accepting and expressing the changed class position "makes no sense at all": it is easiest to assume that this is related to her social isolation, i.e. from the current surround: [(i)a. <Class,Pr> D < \emptyset >]. Her ability to maneuver effectively in shopping centers and other parts of the surround is seen as not a matter of ordinary knowledge, but a knowledge transcending the "normal," in the direction of privatized claims to power. (i)b. [<Community> D <personal or privatised power>]. To complete the inventory of shifts: [(i)c. <Class,pa> D <Home,pr>] See i below, where it seems

natural to represent this deitic shift as a kind of subordination. This implies that these shifts do in some cases represent systematic reorderings of hierarchical organization of social space and therefore active claims about effective contexts of action and directions of social causality.

In the second case, Rose, the unmarried daughter, seemed most identified with her father. Her version of Saul's retirement is that he was "bored with the work" (as a businessman) in New York: *[There is no failure and what he did formerly was "work", so there is indifference between his former class position and his present one.]*

$$\langle \text{Cl, Pa} \rangle \overset{\{ \langle \text{Cl, Pa} \rangle}{D} \{ \langle \text{Cl, Pr} \rangle . \text{ So, " } \langle \text{Cl, Pa} \rangle \overset{D}{D} \langle \text{Cl, Pr} \rangle \text{ " } S \phi$$

& $\langle \text{Cl, Pr} \rangle \overset{D}{D} \langle \text{Cl, Pa} \rangle$

Add to this (i)c, $[\langle \text{Class, pa} \rangle \overset{D}{D} \langle \text{Home, pr} \rangle .]$

Rose has established her household on the family property, peripherally part of Lois and Saul Sr.'s household. She wishes to recalculate the relationship of the parts to each other in the family: She does not want her father to be guilty and wishes that he somehow be reinvigorated with the social power he has lost. (I was to be the instrument of

this.) Her concept of her work as a psychiatric nurse (in the surround) is that it is manipulative. She has the potential to be a psychic, and is the secret mover of things, though she must be adjudged to be a partial failure at this, being successful in her manipulation of her father and brother on the question of the field, but not on the question of the house.

The third case, is that of daughter-in law, Carol. It involves diminished personal scripts coexisting with a diminished social and natural surround. Carol sees Lois as a benign power, contrary to the latter's real actions, so dangerous potentially to herself. Lois misrepresents to her some of the dangers of this surround by making a series of shifts, which Carol assents to. Lois, the soi-disant psychic is accepted as such by all of the family members who wish to reinterpret the father's contemporary history and by Carol whose opinion on the matter is unexpressed.

[Carol has no history earlier than her 13th or 14th year, so she has no class history either: <Class,pa> D <ø>.

For the meanwhile I will not make an inventory of other shifts, since many would appear in Lois' and here we may almost speak of a parody of Lois. See iib below.]

The fourth case, that of Martha, I am only going to enun-


ciate briefly, since she is the one who has set up housekeeping (temporarily it seems) most removed from the family structures and is most easily surprised by its arbitrary inclusions and exclusions. Martha's version of her father's work (and she as a senior operating room nurse is in a position to know what is the case exactly) inflates his duties into over-all supervision of the hospital. [*<Cl,Pr>* *D* *<Cl,Pa>*] This is one of two theories advanced, the other being that he works only "to keep busy" (Saul Sr's own words.)

[So it's not needed for money's sake. Only required for its own sake or for "personal reasons". Therefore it must be understood as a leisure activity or hobby which might be conducted at home:

<Class,pa> *D* *<Home,pr>*] The first "theory" puts the old meanings on the new work. The second allows family members to disregard the work, as necessity, and it is Saul's own words which are its basis. The two theories are complementary, not contradictory. Rose's "it (*his retirement*) happened because he was bored with the work" combines both theories. *[He did not need to; he was indifferent to the possibilities.]* All of these theories falsify the work surround, the first allowing Martha to deny the changes in life, the second allowing the transformation of the work

sphere into a sphere allied to the personal (and familial.) In each version the history of the class decline is overcome, by one or more shifts, which have been added to the diagram below. Shifts can be seen, not only as reorganizations of particular meanings, but also as constructing reorganizations of causes and effects in general, i.e. the global organization of contextual hierarchy.

(i)Lois (and Saul Sr. -- when push comes to shove, as he is at times.)



The double line indicates a relative lack of checking between two sectors (what I have called "disconnection" or "silence" or "gap".) The dotted line indicates a relative merging.

Saul Jr. and Carol's language reflects the same issues, but idiosyncratically. Saul Jr. is a business failure, the project having been funded by his father, but information about that matter came only from Rose. S. Jr. said (a) his father would be rich if he had wanted to, and (b) if "his capital hadn't been eaten up by inflation," i.e. if he were not in the "state of nature", he would be rich without trying.)

[Each of these entails a denial of the reality of changes in his father's class identity, tying its security to several matters, the possession of capital (understood as money) and a willingness to act in the present to preserve or multiply it. The only erosive condition is that of inflation, which operates in the sphere of money alone, without reference to factors which deprived his father of real power over his business in New York -- almost like an economic law of entropy increase. This seems to be argued in modal terms, which can be understood in terms of a series of counterfactual shifts (this being my approximation of this series):

"<Cl,Pa> S <Cl,Pr>" D <∅>

& <Cl,Pr> D <house,Pr>.


If <Action,Pa>, then <Cl,Pr> = <house,Pr>

*Or else, if **Neg** <Nature,Pr>, then <Cl,Pr> = <house,Pr>.]*

Their house is a small box-like structure in a working class development in the outskirts of Xville, with the usual boundary problems, in terms of entry and exit. The outside

part of the property barely exists, the inside is incredibly crowded, both representing reduced possibility, doubly so when compared with Saul and Lois' circumstances. Certainly these comparisons must reinforce their illusions with respect to Saul and Lois. Boundaries have the function of isolating, to one degree or another, the family space and its various scripts from the social surround in which work occurs. In the case of Saul Jr. and Carol, the checking seems inhibited in both directions. The world of work does not exist for Carol. It does for Saul Jr., although he never speaks of it. He does not speak expressly of the outcome, nor does he speak of where he works now. I know something of his past work history only from J., his ex-lover.

(iia) Saul Jr. and Carol -- here conceptualized objectively (and therefore not as actually done by them):




(iib) Saul Jr. and Carol (--their conceptualizations)

[i, above, and iib, which follows, exhibit homologies. This suggests that they are consistent and interdependent reality reconstructions. J. is in a position in Carol's structured world similar to Carol's in Lois' world. (Recall Martha's surprise at Carol's not inviting J. to a family dinner.)

Examination of iib indicates the dependence of the impoverished world of iib upon the "non-impoverishment" of i -- literally and representationally (although that "non-impoverishment" is relative, only.)]

(ii b)



Carol's very diminished personal script is subordinated to what I term Lois' survival script. This, apparently, results from Carol and Saul Jr.'s acceptance of the systematic shift to Lois and Saul Sr.'s new house and property as giving an adequate accounting of their present class realities. A very adequate way of life, but the shift results in the distortions which one might expect when old realities are asserted at the expense of objective and newer realities. But this also allows

Saul Jr. (and Carol) to disconsider his new class realities.

Rose has to see her father as the "control person" but also (somewhat inconsistently" wants to let him in on the system of control." Having her trailer on the property puts her in the position structurally of presiding over what happens between this problematically sealed-off household and what's outside of it. She is simultaneously in the household and not. The implicit structural claim she is making is that of a gatekeeper and more: the putative influence over the contractor who was building their new home in Florida proved to be illusory. Her relation to her professional activity was largely fantasy. One suspects that for her as well as her mother, manipulation and psychic exercise (through "sensitivity") are distinguished sloppily and not entirely uniformly by a domain shift; Rose calls her familial activity the "exercise of power." When she speaks of the use of "sensitivity" separate from the household, i.e. work, she calls it "manipulation." (This shifts between the central caring yet subordinate functions of a psychiatric employee and the values of her father/family's old class position.) Her conception of her central function is that of control. What she wants for her father is that he accept his "natural" position of control, i.e. her imagined one (not be guilty, be the one to take responsibility for the normal distortions of their household which help in its effective and necessary isolation and continue to validate the old family social class position.)

16 Clouds of Unknowing

These diagrams reflect the unasserted and asserted dominance hierarchies between these people. Intuitively it is the working through one may expect from individuals who represent these competing failed histories. It is also knowledge. Rose's details falsify: her drive toward manipulation forces her toward a kind of knowledge, but one from which she cannot benefit really.

What we interpret as falsification is in the first instance produced through shifts, making what intuitively registers as unusual hierarchies. The consistent shifts away validate what is moved away from, the pictures which we experience as resistance or hardship and which the historical sciences call objective. It is this "away from" that for the analyst evokes the sense of difficulty, resistance in the "stuff" of living. In short, the various denials suggest there must be something to be denied. (Of course it is these difficulties, these resistances, which need to be overcome substantively to have real success.)

The Soflees' old class reality (and maybe every old collective reality) is like a bubble preserved in the amber of the new reality, crowding it at times out of their explicit consciousnesses. Of course, if that happens, they are the ones doing it --as victims.

16 "The Cloud of Unknowing" is a work by an English priest of the latter half of the 14th century and refers to the cloud between the soul and God. The implication of this analysis is that the cloud is a kind of reality.

What one discovers are shifts of various levels of social reality as we track the language members use to account for their position and those of their significant others and in their more general social theorizing. This brings us back to our earlier attempts to deal, hierarchically, with socially objective contexts of produced language. Through making an inventory of shifts of various kinds in two sets of data (the Three Mile Island protocols and the material from the Soflee family), we have been able to track social falsifications and to note the reorganizations of asserted social realities which are being so produced. That these, in themselves, turn out to be relatively coherent hierarchical organizations which state or misstate what we call objective social realities including that of class and do so systematically, suggests that it is these hierarchical organizations which are the objects of shifting operations and not simply empirically isolated predicates of various kinds. We must conclude that what is objective in social life is uncomfortably present to any member and effective in influencing the form and content of a large part of the member's important speech. On the other hand the inconsistencies between members' pictures indicate that the pictures are just that, important "pictures" in speech corresponding to the reputational and subjective versions of class and power. It is the matters members flee from that are most real, not their usual formulations, and the former are what we identify as objective.

V. CONCLUDING POSTSCRIPT

Think of the following chapter as a necklace placed on the neck of a statue; that with the head is all that has been found so far of the statue. That the necklace doesn't fall off means that we have enough of the body to prevent that (hopefully, it's not because it is a noose) and that allows us to think that there is more of the body to be unearthed.

The following tries to develop a relationship between the analyses of the previous chapters and a further elaboration of theory. We must ask (as usual) what is the work being done and what are the means by which it is being done. Obviously the inventory we make of shifts in context is one set of answers to these questions. Understood in terms of what is being said are those distinctive features, the means by which the hearer comprehends what is being done (as opposed to something else). But the latter is partly the work being done but may not be all of it.

If we start on the level of phoneme as in classical structural theory, distinctive features in sound are paired contrastively (with their allomorphs) to set up minimal meaning pairs. We may speak of the work done as to produce meaningful words which can not be confused with other words. But what if other work about words is done by the speaker? I

said "done", not "accomplished" or "intended," so as to move away from the classical situation. This idealized collection of words and sounds will be one sort of work being done and not the only one.

Certainly a most interesting sort of work is found in aspects of verbal activity which cannot be attributed to competence at all, since they are classified as "error" in competence terms, such as the ungrammatical and the inconsistent as well as all the other "failures" in production which we have taken as evidence of real difficulties of production. As a result work marked by its deviance from pre-existing standards or norms has a serious claim to our attention. Such performances as we have been considering which do not "rise to the level of falsehood", yet distort explicitly or implicitly various realities, do certain work with social relations as well as language.

I wish to refer to, without making a claim for completeness, summary results obtained using the shifter analysis in the previous chapter. Members' shifts recreated or refashioned the collectivities and their hierarchies which define their memberships in society. That is the first stage in understanding the speech of members, i.e. the patterns of collectivity are themselves shaped by the shifts away from

other positable patterns, and that is surety for the objectivity of the original pattern.

The second matter to notice is that in as much as positions (from which statements are made) are refashioned through shifts of various sorts, which have a certain consistency (that guaranteeing that the effect is socially coherent), a kind of reported speech is being constructed also. What is being reported as one's own speech in the statement is really the speech of someone else or a series of others, perhaps. By the nature of the act one is claiming to be someone other than the person one is, since the speech reported is "someone else's", speaking in terms of collective representation and is uttered from a series of other vantage points, at least partly. The partiality is defined by the specific hierarchy one has constructed, so the question of whose speech one is reporting at any time is a complex one, i.e. who is "really" speaking may change. One may at times feel that one is experiencing a kind of social ventriloquism in the most extreme situation. At other times there may be only a hint that something is "not quite right," in what one is hearing, but one may only define what the problem is with difficulty. We may speak, as in the previous chapter, of a kind of failed history with all sorts of inconsistent elements, those defining the structure of the "partiality."

The work one is doing when one produces some series of locutions may then be extraordinarily complicated. The work one is doing with respect to context is at the same time implicitly reflected at the level of the locutor, i.e. the person speaking, as well as at the level of the person spoken about (who often is one and the same person,) not to speak of the person spoken to who may also be shifted. The implication of this is that the fixing of the underlying subject of the sentence, as Ross attempts in his analysis of declarative sentences as performative, may itself be susceptible to shifts and that the performative analysis of language does not eventuate in a complex enough theory of its socially originating circumstances, even taking into account the context implied by a particular performative usage. It turns out that it is neither enough to consider the points at which "language games", including speech acts, "break down"; nor enough to explicate "matters that persons in the society may have to decide, negotiate, or assert as premises for bringing off activities" (as Turner implies). [See the discussion above, in Chapter II.] Matters are more complicated than that. Dare we say that both language and life are more complicated and interesting than implied by language games or the attempted exercise of desirable activities? After all the choices offered may not seem worth while, and consciously setting out to bring off activities does not exhaust the stances one can take, as we have seen.

This naturally leads to a world of actions, not governed easily by recourse to calculation, since failure is so much a part of it. If calculation is taken to be a fundamental then miscalculation is also fundamental, so where does that leave us?

Language not a single system but deeply embedded in social organization and its structures as any set of other actions. Therefore as systematic as that organization, no more no less. The only real question is how is it related to that organization by those who make it up as an ongoing process, i.e. what work does it do? Back to the original question. What failures does it register at the same time as its successes? There is too much emphasis on success. The shifters register success but they also register failures. Language is not a wooden Cigar Store Indian. It takes place around the back of as well as on the other sides of the "Indian." (Even the position of the "Indian" needs to be taken into account.)

Or rather all the so-called "wooden Indians," since observably all linguists (a subset of users) seem to have sets of examples which "grammar" is supposed to validate and which conform to their correct usage, i.e. the combination of the social circumstances and verbiage which they feel condign;

often it turns out that only an individual's evidence is being presented. Regrettably, then, one is speaking about specialized cultural domains and not theory, unless one somehow can steer away from what is arguably normative and individual. That means the theory has to be totalizing, in several senses: Certainly it mustn't limit itself in points of view considered. It must also encompass the totalizations used earlier which underlay the shifter analysis developed in the previous two chapters. It must include as well material which is neither true nor veridical in a strict propositional sense.

It behooves us then to reconstruct what we mean by a "grammar." We may say that it is "non-normative" in an exact sense in that it simply tries to account for what is spoken, without making an argument about acceptability or grammaticality. What Chomsky calls the "computational" tradition in linguistics remains within the sphere of normative grammar in that well formed forms are produced by logical means and that the usual formalist criteria of consistency and completeness are applied to them. It must be said that the empirical element always eludes formulation in formal terms.

The Account of What Is Spoken

If the center of the account is the shifter, in that that it, in Peircean terms, emphasizes the indexical element (the reference to context) and more, it does work, what is the work it does? We have argued, then, that its work is tied to its contextualization, to an ordered hierarchy, which some of the world has called "objective." Those hierarchical orders are traversed, are connected in "reasonable" and "unreasonable" ways.

In making these connections (and disconnections) shifters are a primitive and that is what we claim for them for language performance in general. When we cover the world (as in connected acts of speech), or if we assume that we account for some plausible set of speech acts -- possibly all -- actual ones under some knowable set of circumstances (perhaps a whole historical world), then we shall have a number of series of shifters, some likely, some unlikely, but usually stamped with some characteristics which relate to their degree of plausibility and that will be defined contextually. That contextual work which I have mentioned before in defining a hierarchy or attempting to abolish some aspect of it gives its characteristic formal property. That formal property is related to its reasonableness, in dealing

with resistance, which is what we experience in dealing with the objective, i.e. the ordered hierarchy (which is by definition, i.e. experienced as, unavoidable.)

I have spoken of series of shifters, but it is perhaps more useful to speak of shifter in logical terms, as if it really were a primitive in language theory, without which we would not be speaking of actually existing speech, since that seems to assume the existence of some negotiation of reality, even though it may as easily embody aversion as attraction to it. That being said, we set aside for the moment the question of whether there is anything else (which Husserl might have considered the "only".) What we will look at are bounded sets of speech actions, which embody shifts of various sorts -- "good" ones and "bad" ones, "risible" and trivial, questionable and unquestionable (i.e. viridical) -- even those shifts we find embodied descriptively in a particular grammar.

If we look at some large collection of actually existing speech, from the point of view of its structure as shift(er), we end up asking ourselves, how can speech act be effective as act. It seems obvious that it is effective as speech act, i.e., speech which is also an act, which accomplishes something. We have more or less explained that

notion further by showing that shifts do move across boundaries of hierarchical orderings, and that real work is necessary in doing it (to which we could almost, but not really attach an energetic component.) What we have not yet worked out is how the real illusion of effectiveness is possible, how there can be an idea of cause and effect or probability. In a sense that is beyond this work since it is philosophy, and that is the last thing this writing purports to deal with. One may say from a philosophical point of view, these speech actions are a virtual reality; they are like the movement of a train glimpsed from the window of one's own car which persuades one that one is actually moving.

But in truth, one may be moving and the other train may be stationary or both one's own car and the other one may be moving contrastively and variously at different times. How is one to know? What one knows is that language with its shifts accompanies and explains as well as dissimulates what is going on and what we are doing and what others are doing and the various collectivities which we recognize sum up and allow us to distinguish between their importances. If we produce speech, it is because we also produce other things.

It is not certain what a speech act is, specifically because we do not really have a theory of what the effectiveness of

speech is, what it really does as action, what its force is, how it is translatable as a productive act into other productive acts. Certainly its force and productivity lies in its effects on speakers, how it acts on them. One could say that it makes accounts to other speakers or explains to them what one is going to do in spheres which are not only or not primarily verbal.

Its sources of effectiveness, then, lie in its purchase on what is real -- never very direct; that is the obligato it keeps up in its encounter with what resists. The work done is in its accounting of shifts away from the bumped shins of the existent, which is perhaps being a little too careless with the poetry of effort, but we have no choice in a summary. And the explanatory work is to someone else.

We posited an ordered hierarchical relationship between objectively given social contexts and tried to apply that framework to language in a "state of difficulty," first in reaction to the events of Three Mile Island, second to that of the Soflees. This proved an apt framework to look at what was shifted, how it was done, how the speaker saw it.

But it looked at first as if we would never get beyond the subject matter of grammar itself, the pronouns and tenses of

point of view and temporality respectively. There was a gap between the small and the large, which like the classical one couldn't be filled up. This did not prove to be so once we got to investigation of the Soflee family. The truncated abstractions of the Three Mile Island data (primarily temporal and pronominal, but also employing others of Austerlitz's collection of deitics) were filled out in a family history, illustrating Sartre's dictum that family is the smallest unit of social class, not performing some kind of reduction a la Radcliffe-Brown. Rather it demonstrated that family fairly elucidated leads ineluctably to the most inclusive levels of the social hierarchy, because they permeate and dominate the former. What it shows is that the most "private" and "personal" is always permeable.

But that we were led to those most inclusive levels, did not mean that we thereby avoided the problematic. To the contrary, barriers to direct explanation were built into life histories; failed history was almost automatic. Falsification was then the expression of failed history. I quote from Chapter III above: " Detaching language or argument from its real context permits the use of abstraction (in the sense that context is pushed into background,) but that shift produces the possibility of false connection." To this we add other considerations.

It is the slippage or contrast between levels of abstraction which seems to implicate the relatively concrete or the context, by representation and misrepresentation (or "connection" and "misconnection". The particular duplex form, C/M (or "shifter" as termed by Jakobson) and the other forms which shift make it possible to move from level to level in argument, to slip up, as a matter of fact.

To bring up that old possibility (which is rejected), if language were really arbitrary, then one could say anything one wanted with impunity, which isn't the case. Trivially, the auditor stands as a limit to what the speaker can say, though not automatically. The auditor must be persuaded and potentially contradicts.

It is interesting that in the vernacular "to say anything one wants" is also presumptively "to tell an untruth" although we have not taken note of that previously. The creative infinity of the generativists may, then, turn out to be a "bad infinity". Somewhere in between this infinity and the excessively simple is where we all hope to reside.

Still, what we can hear when we look at our data (but not only that) are misconnections of various kinds, suppressions of context, misappropriations of relationship of objects to

context, and various false totalities. But we do not yet know how to characterize them completely, even with all our partial successes of analysis. If we take good speech as a kind of ideal -- not the grammatical but the truthful or unconfused , we can sketch what a deviation looks like and we have sufficient reason to suppose from the above that the sketch is part of the truth, that socially permeated shifter scheme, that notion of an indexicality weighted down by totality.

The Picture We Are Aiming for

Again, if we aggregate all these patterns of speech, these shifts or indexicals, some of which are clearly odd, some of which we might call "veridical" some of which maybe "vanilla," we have a very complex sphere, moving between truism and triviality to a struggle with truth, which sometimes produces real knowledge and sometimes, a distortion which cannot be separated from the knowledge denied. All those slippages, those shifts aggregated, can be thought of as moving between items on the same level of organization or moving up or down the organizational scale. The process of reversal of direction at some hierarchical boundary to be negotiated or substitution of one entity for another, the one differing from the other in, say distance or some other

distinctive feature, sets up what intuitively feels problematic, a kind of diagonalization process or game: all language of predication involves setting up certain limits past which discourse does not ordinarily flow, i.e. a finite boundary at which is located something which "explains." One can say that normally the buck is passed only to some point and the point hangs out over an abyss, which is somehow understood to be outside the realm of discourse, although in principle an arbitrary beginning context, either one's earliest given ancestor, or the person whom one bought the house from, or the neighborhood one lives in, or the way the neighborhood happened to be built, etc. etc. etc. And it does not bother a member. There are many possible contexts or beginnings but all explanation is in principle finite. It would seem that it also is economical (We may advert again to the Truk use of modifiers to indicate what a "beginning context" might be.)

As in Gödel's proof, expressions are produced which by definition are not part of the original set of intuitive

¹ The diagonalization process (of a Kantorian, Gödelian, or Turing type) can be understood as one in which a new item is produced that differs from every preexisting item that is known. Here it should be taken as a metaphor, to be utilized during the analysis of material, i.e. used to explore the meaning of roundaboutness, the falsely concrete, and overabstractness in the language of misstatement. The implication of this is that misstatement is a constructive process, one which has a kind of formal validation built in, just as "legitimate" deconstructions of the Kantorian, Gödelian, or Turing types do.

expressions. These have the property of denying some "needed" bound to discourse, if it is to be rational. Falsification rearranges context, claims that a context exists which doesn't for some communication or, alternatively, misstates relations between contexts, by mediating context by code. The result is that discourse becomes over-abstract or round-about; conversely it may become falsely concrete in places.

How are we to imagine this process? I think by looking at some collection of linguistic predications which form some kind of graphical network. Imagine a large surface slice on which there appear directional traces which are connected to each other, connections which are made at social boundaries, such as exist between contexts which are nested and juxtaposed as in the above section. These connections are in the form of normal or undistorted statements referring to context or other contextually defined determinants. The processes resulting in increased round-about-ness consist in reversals or changes in direction on this surface. Or whole areas of reality may disappear from description or be omitted.

This suggests the obverse of the point of view of psycholinguists such as Mehrabian, who suggest that indirect

or roundabout or over-elaborate expressions are indicators of lying (evidence of the lying subject.) Rather one must suggest that these are the very substance of lying. The word "prevaricate", after all, comes from a root meaning "to walk crookedly" or "collude" in a falsehood, especially on the part of an advocate. We may suggest that it is the process of lying that must be stressed and not a "result", identified as a "lie". But if the above makes sense, it is the lack of economy that is not only a sign of oddness but also its record; it is the shift or transformation of linguistic structure that is the distortion (and indicates, we would add, the difficulty being faced, which is actually being "denied.") The first of the root meanings ("walk crookedly") falls short of the second, and that is the ground to explore. We still do not know enough to put the picture together.

If we have shifts as the most primitive functions, as we have said, then we ought be able to do a useful inventory of them, i.e., try to redo in some organized way Austerlitz's very useful list so it makes some kind of social sense, so it identifies more systematically the social work being done. There are two aspects to the project, which I cannot say in any principled way are separable, even though we may presentationally distinguish them. The first is the

determinate set of shifts/indexicals which must correspond to the society itself as an object of analysis which is being spoken about (automatically) by members. The second is the consideration of shifts/indexicals as abstractions, the consideration of which separate from the first, may be both impossible (if it is to be useful) and misleading, that is to say "doubtful." This subject might be called the "indexicality of indexicals" a la Bar-Hillel. On the other side, we might formalize such a system of shifts/indexicals, though such a system would have to retain minimum "referentiality," the latter referring only to the requirement that shifts/indexicals are employed in some hierarchically ordered "world." Having said this, another element of the first aspect should be formally asserted. Each specification of totality teeters on the edge of another totality. Everything experienced which is non-trivial should contain some difficulty, some struggle. I do not talk about the problems of formalizing that. I will however venture into the matter of alternative totalizations.

This is tentatively modeled by modal logic a la Kripke and Zeman and Charles S. Peirce (as an ancestor of the two, with his 'Existential Graphs'.) But alternative totalities in the sense discovered in the above examples are not "possible worlds", since they co-exist with and are dependent on

objective totalities. They are asserted over and against them, as an active and self-interested contradiction i.e. as a determinate transformation of what is real. It is evident that there is no sense in which either the 'actual existent' is separable from its deformations nor alternative 'existent' (therefore) is separable from the actual. It is surprising that, as a matter of epistemic logic, it has not been seen that the assumption of separability leads to a classic version of the third man problem viz. "if there is nothing in the world from which the alternative takes its origin, then there must be something (an unknown) out of the world from which it derives and that 'x' must in turn have an origin in the world since we can speak of it." There then is no obvious reason to privilege our discourse about alternative totalities by calling them "possible," since this delinks them from their context of production and from their manifest truth-evaluations. "Possible objects" are, on the one hand, much too weak as objects to be much help as a matter of social description. On the other hand, they present epistemological lacunae, so they remain creatures of logic, which are at one remove from description.

If alternative totalizations can be spoken of as existing, then they coexist (for members who are involved in their creation) with strictly objective hierarchy. How is that

coexistence possible? Another way of propounding the question is by asking how a member can avoid obvious contradiction. The answer must be by isolation. The member must act and therefore speak in ways in which contradiction does not occur. Lois Soflee feels "free to be herself" as she gets older, to dress informally, etc. But it turns out the venue for this is within her own household (however pliable the boundaries of household become.) What is utilized is formally a kind of bracketing, phenomenologically speaking. In ²terms of causal relationship it is what we have termed "disconnection."

The Classification of Shif(ter)s

We have talked, in factual terms, of several kinds of truth. None of these correspond to systemic truth, that is the truth of a computational system, the result of some derivation from a set of well formed formulae according to rule. We propose, tentatively, a classification which we hope complete of various elements which are characterizable in one way or another as valid or truthful. Besides what is "veridical" in the sense that it is trivially or mechanically true(, according to some "easy" notion of copy or

² "Community" as referred to in analyses above and ubiquitous in the discourse of change is permeated by such bracketting. It is possible to examine data drawn from that so-called common ground and discover in it highly contested formulations.

correspondence,) there are several other categories. There is the kind of truth which seems to follow from accumulated experience. There are kinds of validity or truth which seem to come from more radical transformations of what has been known to be true before, i.e. they do not appear to follow simply from the accumulation of experience which we might call "evolutionary." Of course there are forms of "distruth" (not quite "untruth") which are transformations which are not serviceable since they end up not being valid. Still people accept them. In all of this there is application of the shifter notion. It should be said that in as much as shifts are systematically applied within the social domain they will be embodied in alternate totalizations. In saying this we draw upon examples of the work done by shifts and shifters in various protocols.

Earlier we iterated Robert Austerlitz's listing of deitic mechanisms in various languages. Clearly, some of these travel very well from their societies of origin. Others do not. The list he presents is heterogeneous in terms of what they stand for. The work they do is different. Their status in terms of truth is not quite as unambiguous as their status in whatever language is being cited. Nonetheless they never are neutral socially and regularly reflect in a systematic way upon social reality. Once one focuses upon

actual work being done with respect to speaker, hearer, i.e. participants in Speech Events, as well as those who are participants in Events narrated, it becomes obvious that one has made an entire inventory of what is social, though one has not yet provided a framework for considering totalities.

The notion of truth is hardly as simple as I have made it out to be. For one, the other side of it, the lie, remains unanalyzed as a kind of "outer bound" -- this does not explain anything, yet. We can look at shifters in terms that we have talked about. It is interesting that the "out there" that a scholar such as Joshua Fishman suggests is organized by normative language forms, according to Whorfian concepts, ³is what appears obvious or veridical, i.e. commonsensical.

On the one hand, the shifts which children must learn to be functioning adults, according to Jakobson and Pomorska, are deictic fundamentals such as "this" and "that", "here" and "there", to which one might add all the elements of language which exhibit similar structure such as tense, in some aspects. This and much more is illustrated above in some of the analyses of Three Mile Island data. And yet that data and that provided by the Soflee family indicates complex shifts within registers which are obviously real and which

³ One may guess that even this "common sense" may be permeated by irregularity.

the shifts falsify. The data supports that, because it can be so consistently and globally shown to be a shift away from those registers. Those registers are real and hierarchical, what sociologists have called objective structures or organizations. Can one suggest, for the sake of consistency, that learning about those structures, is comparable to the child's learning about certain classes of shifters? Then one might end up with a position resembling that of Kohlberg interpreted by Habermas. Still, the position occupied is slippery. It depends upon some concept of what a lie is and what is meant by truth, and a number of positions in between. And that is dependent upon real events and persons as subjects for speech. And we have tendency to forget that children make mistakes too.

A Defect in Jakobson's Analysis of Shifter

It may be recalled that Jakobson's formulation of shifter did not give us any shifter with the form (../En) or (../Pn) or for that matter (../EnPn), which certainly were formally conceivable. In the course of the analyses, it may have been observed that the English 3rd person pronouns, "they", "he", "she" and "it" all occupy normally Pn-positions, i.e. they refer to persons whom are being spoken about.

Let us see under what circumstances they may be said to occupy En-positions or EnPn-positions. If they are being spoken about and are aware of it, they are certainly in EnPn-position. If unaware of it, they must be thought of simply as Pn-positioned. The only condition under which the En-position could be applicable to such a person is apparently one in which a Speech Event is being narrated, one in which a third person is involved. That most certainly must be an EnPn. This fits a number of the cases we look at in the Three Mile Island materials. This puts a very special character on the "pure" (../En) case. It is a usage which denies the underlying grammatical construction in that it is an event statement which, in effect, occludes the circumstances of its production; in point of fact it corresponds to a kind of abstract usage that we have become acquainted with in our analyses above. The "someone else's" speech which is reported becomes nobody's speech (or, alternatively, a superior['s] speech.)

Legitimate Uses of the Formal

Without completely reexamining the material analyzed in Chapter IV, we can remind ourselves of the possibility of a formalism which extends Jakobson's and is based upon what we have found so far. Austerlitz's inventory showed that the

work of shifting required a more extensive formalism for the indexing of speech than Jakobson had utilized in his earlier SVC, one not coextensive with grammatical function or category, one which also pulled into focus more of the real linkages of speech. In the Dialogues, Jakobson was already moving beyond the self-imposed limit of grammatical category, although he was not allowing formalism to catch up with his intuition. In the previous chapter we document the use of formalism to indicate shifts, which radically change linkages, e.g., (../EnPn) —S→ (../En), with which we ended the last paragraph and which appeared with fair frequency in work done by respondents in the Three Mile Island data.

We noted "shifts between forms at the same time as reference points remain constant, or references whose specificity is modified through various shifts, whether deitic or not, and by various interruptions of the speech act which is under way already." (My words in Chapter III.) Falsification and distortion (however slight), approximating to what Freud called the "uncanny", are necessarily part of the picture of what one must understand in order to account for the work which is being done when one speaks. The background against which one necessarily operates when one experiences these "odd" things is our sense of the objective which under some

⁴reasonable interpretation is found organizing these verbal objects. Supplementing but not superceding what I said in Chapter III about "naive realism" being "built into good language", there is not just one naive realism, but many such realisms in contention. Of matter of course they are not contending at all; their contentiousness is our work. Our knowledge of that contentiousness is also work, that of analysis.

Let us remind ourselves of a certain vocabulary picked up from Jakobson, and Austerlitz (who owes so much to Jakobson): context, message, code, reference-to, discourse axis, specificity and vagueness, boundary signals and other deixis-connected themes such as hesitation , shock, amazement, commiseration and surprise. I add again to these the mixed collection of so-called non-grammatical elements such as interjection and intonation and the muddled losing of one's way. These have in common self-reference and/or reference to the on-going speech act itself and often signal and make possible more radical shifting. (This was asserted in Chapter III and surely was proven to be useful in Chapter IV.) All of this remains to be developed more precisely.

⁴ I do not need the word "any" here, which would be argued with. All I need is an interpretation which fits the forms which I find, which involves my literal-mindedness i.e. finding literal meanings -- which I may insist are there even if they come from a dictionary, and then refusing to refuse their social meanings.)

Even so we have the tools to revisit issues which were points of entry into the dissertation, the conceptualizations of abstract language by Basil Bernstein and others who make use of his ideas such as John Fischer. It becomes possible to apply the shifter framework to that problematic. Those interested may read further in Appendix II B.

Lastly, having begun to speak methodically about the variety of shift(er)s which may have significance in language performance and paying heed to the need to describe them formally, we should say a little about their characteristics as operators, i.e. what formal regularities we can discover in combinatorial terms, what kinds of combinatorial properties we might be interested in. Let us revisit an earlier analysis, finding a point where we may have only skimmed the surface. The following seems a good point to begin, for purposes of supplementing discussion, and ending the argument.

Saul Soflee:

S1:(1) "You can't say it don't do good. [*"Don't" is grammatically unmarked but socially marked, the meaning of that to be inferred below.*]


(2) There has to be a wrong before a right

Here I've stated that "don't" was "grammatically unmarked but socially marked." This may on the face of it seem

counterintuitive, but I had reasons: I noted that the locution seemed "folksy", in contradiction to the sophistication of the subsequent argument beginning with (2). If "don't" is marked socially, then the nominal underlying "I" of the statement, which it turned out to be the real subject of the subsequent argument (which we could have expressed as we did with much of the Three Mile Island material) was also the real subject of the statement. If so, "don't" was unmarked grammatically.

Let us assume then "I can say that I do good" as the real assertion which is being substantiated in (2) and its sequel (as I showed above.)


Cut #1



There are really three double negatives not just the two defined explicitly in the diagram. The third has an implied existence with the requirement that meaning and nominal truthfulness is preserved. The meaning of these requirements from the point of view of shift(er) structure is not so clear as yet. D1 and D2 are different in kind from the shifter D3, which may be said to preside over the subordina-

tion process itself. I am putting it this way because the transfer of information from independent or superordinate clause to dependent or subordinate clause seems to require it. The first shift changes who the statement is about, but that changes automatically the "subject" of the subordinate clause also (but it is not obvious why that should be so.)

Cut #2 (A First Sketch -- only included to indicate some defining parameters. Matters are however more complicated. The sequel shows that.)



I must remind the reader and myself that despite the fact that we may both be tempted to believe that what is operative here is some set of rules, we discover easily that no rules exist that would easily allow us to distinguish between an outcome such as we have here and "you can say that it does/do good." All we can say is that if the superordinate clause is "you can't'/can not say,"the subordinate must be "it don't/do not do good", if (1) the subordinate flavor is to be impersonal and (2) the subordinate clause is not going to outright contradict the occluded assertion.


What seems to be involved is a series of shifts which it will be easier to explain rather than graphically represent (sometimes representations have been easier.) Let us begin with the shift "I can not say." This records the occlusion literally, but only partially, since it admits the Negation to the interlocutor. D1b, then, represents the denial; D1a ascribes the denial to someone else (literally the person spoken to.) We have not explained the subordinate clause yet.

If outright lying is to be avoided, the subordinate clause must also be negative, e.g., "you [\leftarrow = D1b "I"] can not do good." However, the statement will now be "You can not say (that) you do not do good." This statement has the problem of still being immured in the personal system of the speaker and interlocutor and raises for the person spoken to the problem which the speaker has. The second "you" must be shifted "away from." "you" becomes "it," you being subjected to D3a. The issue of doing good is now relegated to an impersonal realm where neither speaker or person spoken to are responsible for whether "good is done or not."

We now see that we can remove the first condition stated in the last sentence three paragraphs previous (for we proved

it holds.) The second condition remains if we understand it to mean the avoidance of "outright lying." The only matter not explained is the continued concordance between the subjects of superordinate and subordinate clauses in the process. Obviously "I can't say it don't do good", would have been almost as serviceable as the language produced, but it would have been slightly less abstracted from the speaker's own action. The following diagram summarizes the analysis. Note that the "you" resulting is also impersonal. That "somehow" happened at the same time as the "it" was produced.

Cut #3



Starred items can not be produced for a variety of reasons attested to above. The merging in analysis of Negation ("not this") and movement to greater distance, which we discovered

in the Three Mile Island Protocol, is repeated here. What we do not know is whether, although it appears to be the case, one should regard the action of the Negation Shift(er) as "really" being distributed over both clauses. The last step indicated above, which couples the emergence of an "it" as subject of the "do not do good" with an impersonal "you" would imply obligatory parallelism in the operation of shift(ers.)

Shifting of what a sentence is about requires some kind of coherence in what is socially instituted at every level. Even what is "distorted" or vague or evasive requires it. This distributive property then probably can be thought of as applying at every step of the process (for reasons which are as of yet obscure); in this case the analysis adverted to in the diagram referred to as cut #1 in which Double Negatives, D1, D2 and D3, are posited may have something to it. Note that what is justified here is speaking of a property of Deitic shifts, not converting properties into rules. It appears as if this distinction is fundamental if one is talking about performance in a material sense.

Another matter: the quasi-parallelism which results is an important ingredient in any kind of plausible assertion or argument. It is, however, below the level of adequate argu-

ment, just as much of the distortions we discuss above do not "rise to the level of lying," as I have previously said.

This is just a downpayment on what we do when we are "shoveling dirt", figuratively speaking, and looking for the body.

APPENDICESAppendix I -- In a Different Sort of Cave;
Eratosthenes' Sieve

I

*Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones:
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones.*

II

*We milk the cow of the world and as we do
We whisper in her ear you are not true.*

"Epistemology" by Richard Wilbur

It is not Plato's Cave we are in. Nothing like that. No shadows cast on the wall, unless we imagine them. If we were to move outside the cave, we would surely discover that we were in another space like the one we had vacated. In the cave we experience its darkness despite the fact that there is light. We trip over or bump into (shall I say) "things" or obstructions and each other and as we do we vocalize to ourselves and each other, reporting to each other our progress, for we all seem mysteriously to be born on one side of the cave and be involved in a journey to the other side. There are those who are ahead of us and those who are behind, to a greater degree or lesser. Thereby social collectivities are produced, whether generational, political, economic etc. Some claim not to notice the motion but only the appearances and disappearances. As auditors of the process, we hear the sounds in a sequence, as we experience

the obstructions one after another. What they "are" is a function of the resistances they provide to our activity. Our primary motion is between life and death, if from one wall of the cave to the other, though (no one knows why exactly) some people reach death or the other wall before others who are born at the same time or later, which is why some people disagree about the walls. (Some suggest that the walls exist but have nothing whatsoever to do with life or death; without walls how could we appear to be in a cave.)

We add these matters up cheerfully, all these barrier reports so to speak, to try to account for as many of them as we can by means of a smaller subset. This we call "predictability". We string our language together temporally, which is of course the dimension in which we experience the mysterious resistances. Our language is also embedded or oriented in time (which is just another way of saying that given any two pieces of a message, one is closer to the first wall and the other is closer to the second wall (or avoiding argument, closer to our appearance and our eventual disappearance.) We both unconsciously overestimate the movement we share and disparage its importance in various other ways. There is no mystery "outside" the cave. That "mystery" is a projection or shift of the immanently limited grasp we have of what we experience in that cave to somewhere else, which must be unlike where we are.

We may accept certain versions of that experience, without direct experience of them. We may also misrepresent the barriers that we experience, though it is not clear why dwellers in darkness would choose to do such a thing. That we will have to explore, but it does seem tied to some failure of motion, which we despair of correcting and which we are ashamed to report. "Were we ever out of the cave?", this cave? one of our great novelists once asked. I do not have an answer for this except to mouth the words of Sweeney: "You have to use words when you speak."

Appendix II--On Bernstein and Labov

Part A. Code versus Language

Bernstein in a series of articles beginning in 1958 and culminating in "A Sociolinguistic Approach to Socialization; with some References to Educability" (1971) has sketched out a distinction between elaborated or formal code and restricted or public code and attempted to discuss its basis in social relations. Hymes summarizes these notions as follows:

"Elaborated codes are largely now-codings, adaptive in lexicon and syntax to the ad hoc elaboration of subjective intent, whereas restricted codes are largely then-coding, adaptive to the reinforcement of group solidarity through conventional expression, personal social control appeals to individual characteristics, role discretion and motivation. Personal social control bases itself on membership in categories of age, sex, status, etc.

Though initially these two codes were understood by Bernstein as class correlated (upper class and middle class could use both and the lower class, only the restricted), he now admits that both kinds of codes are found at all social levels. In essence, he nonetheless maintains his original thesis, because he does not consider the bases of elaboration in general, instead, considering it for one purpose only; that of validating positions within occupational

structure, i.e., "social mobility". Bernstein and those that follow him assume that linguistic behavior takes place within one cultural system and that elaboration can occur in only the context of upward mobility. Since the restricted code characterizes lower class speech, it is simply a defective form of upper class speech, regardless of supplementary paralinguistic devices it may have. William Labov in a number of publications, among the most notable of which are A Study of the Nonstandard English of Negro and Puerto Rican Speakers of English in New York City, Final Report and the "Logic of Nonstandard English", presents counter examples to Bernstein's thesis. Labov in effect maintains that for the purposes of empirical investigation Bernstein's strictures against "lower" class speech can be reduced to two points:

1. The allegedly superior means to express ideas of "middle" class speech and speakers.
2. A more explicit or complete representation of ideas in surface structure by such speakers.

Labov denies the first, but admits that the second may be true. He suggests that the latter is simply a cultural norm. How it functions or what significance it has is not clear from his writings, except as an admission card i.e. as part of a labelling process. But he observes that middle class speech often fails to be either direct or coherent in com-

parison with that of certain black interviewees particularly when abstract argument is involved.

Part B. Applications of Indexicality to the Framework

Conceptualizations of abstract language by Basil Bernstein (and others who make use of his ideas such as Fisher), can be translated into several interdependent claims: First that Message (M) is adequately representable by Code (C) if one "has", i.e. "knows" the right abstractions. Second that the results of such a formal translation are superior to any attempt to spell out meanings in terms of contexts, i.e. to articulate message by real logical or causal relations in so far as that is possible. This particular conceptualization of the abstract (Bernstein's), then, embodies the effort to undermine or devalue contextual causal and logical pattern, i.e. what is explicitly indexical in language production.

These claims set up a specious contrast, based on a set of circular assumptions, we will show. On the one hand, Bernstein admits that speakers of "restricted code" can express what they need to say within their own social sphere, adequate function in its own terms, though claimed to be inferior by Bernstein. That claim is validated through its supposed restriction on mobility, although that again is

attributed to systematic inferiority as a code. Nonetheless neither inferiority nor direct responsibility is ever shown.

Labov discovered no principled inferiority in capacity to reason or understand in speakers of so-called restricted code (nor did he discover any formal feature of lower class code that distinguished it from the standard or upper class code.) These "defective" speakers had no lack of knowledge of the so-called "standard" or elaborated code. To the contrary he found speakers of certain "superordinate" codes (speakers of standard English) might well be uselessly verbose and roundabout in argument, whereas speakers of non-standard English might well be extremely cogent. Add to this Day's observation that use of standard code (supposedly the superior means) increased in the absence of observers who were "native speakers" of standard code. This leads one to observe that the argument should hinge on (1) the variable functions of abstraction (and not its putatively intrinsic character), implying then that abstraction and its use is not primarily a matter of knowledge and (2) noting that indexicality itself can not be legitimately left out of a theory of abstraction.

First (2). Jakobson noted the duplex character of any element of speech, i.e. that it might be simultaneously code

and message. Part of what Bernstein does is to differentially forget (and remember) that. Indexicality implies that all language is context bound.

As Bernstein recognizes in some of his discussion of "restricted code", shared implicit meanings require shared contexts. Short of this there are no indexicals. No shared history or that hidden or denied, one is forced into the expedient of translating matters into the most abstract terms (one might say equidistant from what is individually understood.) Members of the so-called middle classes share mostly their mobility (social or geographic -- often the same thing) and that requires the translation of newly privatized meanings into the code. The process must produce vagueness according to the nature of such a translation. What we are speaking of is a problem in all abstraction, but usually one is aware of its trade-offs. Here the problem is accentuated by the dual functions of the abstraction, on the one hand functionally linked to problems and/or justifications of control (as a superordinate code), on the other hand functionally linked to the impossible to express relationship to shared position, imposed by the mobility demand.

¹Any privatized interest or action, as such, can be thought

¹ e.g., ambition to advance oneself (and exercise social power, the capacity to do so being nonuniformly distributed.)

of as relatively arbitrary and exists, in a relatively narrow field. The narrower field, causally or contextually subordinate according to shifter or indexical usage (and also objective analysis), is identifiable as Code (C). Message (M) will refer to a range of contexts for Code. With Bernstein's two interdependent claims, contexts are treated as if understandable in terms of code, with the consequence that the more privatized is taken as explanatory of the less privatized instead of the other way around. This shift is C/M —S→ M/C, and is very generally distributed in social scientific language among other places. It is a social artifact, nonetheless, ideology not science.

Appendix III -- Chomsky and his Followers

I propose to give a somewhat tendentious and perhaps oversimple summary history of the developments which have made it difficult to speak of the "School of Chomsky" and which have resulted in the undermining of the original project. Even Labov used the transformational grammatical framework, in ways which did not particularly advance his theoretical projects.

First let us examine the wave of theorizing, that takes one up to about 1980 and then let us examine the subsequent attempts of Chomsky to rewrite his project so that it is less vulnerable. It is true as I have hinted above that a certain invulnerability goes with the insularity of the claimed object of theorizing. So a desiderata of the later work is to purify the object.

A number of Chomsky's original followers, Ross, Lakoff, Fillmore, McCawley, among others, had made serious critiques of Chomsky's various models (as of the late 1970's). It is not very appropriate to here discuss nor easy in any case to discuss the schisms in detail.

But they center around issues which arose in considering "surface structure" (in quotes because that is the theoretic-

cal guise in which performance appears in the data, collectively the forms closest to realized speech -- minus phonetic realization.) It turns out that an exceptionally large proportion of sentences, in order to be classified as grammatical or well-formed in Chomsky's sense, require some specification of context, either in the form of situation or story. Some may require quite a bit, such as McCawley's. We don't exemplify his work here but provide a more extreme example such as Ross's "he kicked with his fist and hit with his foot," which in this time of kick-boxers may not seem so grotesque. But some story is needed which complies with the awkwardness of the first movement, maybe partial amputation, maybe transplantation of appendages.

Other constraints on surface structure which are apparently less bizarre are sentences called "presuppositions." In examining sentences such as "I dreamt last night I was a Martian," require us to sort out a number of possibilities. First the ambiguity of the placement of the implied relative, "that", and what is implied by each. Second the likelihood of each of these. And of course there is the increased possibility of that unusual identity if it is "last year" instead of "last night."

Consider "I thought yesterday I was going to get a job" and "I don't believe I can make it" or "I believe I can make

it". These shorn of their frame of thought or belief would still imply a factual assumption, <unemployed> and <haven't made it, yet> respectively. Some things said seem to require for understanding understandable situations or event descriptions impinging on the speech event, i.e. some level of factual presupposition sometimes as it is normally presented as narrative, and that may even be required to make a decision about "grammaticality." Where does this leave Transformational Generative Grammar? (Before we proceed we should point out that here we are increasingly on the level of the real utterance or something closely approaching it and that explanations of it are as necessary at a certain point in this discussion as they are in the Bernstein-Labov debate -- and as much lacking.)

Now what was done by Chomsky in the period prior to 1980 (as exemplified in Aspects of the the Theory of Syntax) was to make a series of ad hoc adjustments to theory, inserting a kind of reference to surface structure, focus, presupposition, that did not make their appearance earlier in the deep structure model, really attempting to assimilate what he needed from actual utterance to deeper structures, to borrow from semantics what he needed for syntax, but with great caution. In his 1977 compilation, Language and Responsibility, Chomsky stated that if a minimum dif-

ferentiation between semantics and syntax were not maintained, if he could not continue to maintain it, linguistics would cease to be a science, since it would no longer have a proper theoretical object of its own (very Althusserian somehow.)

Options suggested by one or more of Chomsky's critics of that period do include much more extensive modification of the relationship between semantic and syntactic structures and, in the extreme, a scrapping of the entire Base, in effect dispensing with the idea of deep structure, without any firm commitment to anything but an empiricist organization of data. That was Chomsky's somewhat exaggerated version of events which was probably right.

Howard Maclay, in his "Overview" of the "Linguistics" section in Steinberg and Jakobovits' 1971 reader, presciently laid out the differences between Chomsky and his erstwhile followers as they had developed and were to continue to develop. "The battle between Chomsky and his critics is being fought according to rules which Chomsky himself developed and is essentially a sectarian war among scholars who share a common understanding about the general goals of linguistic analysis." (178)

Maclay postulated various areas of collapse. Adverted to above was the possible merging of semantics and syntax. Since semantic considerations relate so uniformly to performance, the competence-performance distinction was itself endangered unless some other way were found to draw the line, so that syntax remained autonomous. Increasingly the distinction between linguistic knowledge and knowledge of the nonlinguistic world would be endangered.

Not coincidentally Chomsky's critics neglected the natural science foundation of the subject as posited by Chomsky. If, as his critics implied, base and surface structure distinctions went, then that would have to go also. It would be hard to see how universal grammar could continue to have any anchorage, let alone formal relevance, under those circumstances.

What this appendix will not attempt to do at this point is to recapitulate a decade and a half of work belonging to Chomsky and his various waves of collaborators. Rather, I will tease out certain aspects of his present thinking which appear in his 1995 book, the Minimalist Program. I note that he has remained curiously close to the positions he defended during the decade of the '70's; to the modifications of the Aspects model which took into account surface structure in

semantic interpretation, which he calls Extended Standard Theory (EST). However he does not choose to deal with "surface effects"; he "sweeps them under the rug", admitting that the "abstraction" he is "now pursuing may require qualification"(220) later on. The first three chapters constitute a basis for his new formulation: "Principles and Parameters" (P&P - going back to 1981), "Some Notes on Economy of Derivation and Representation", and "A Minimalist Program for Linguistic Theory". The last chapter (almost half the book) is called "Categories and Transformations" and is an attempt to take the P&P framework, which he takes as a framework for both Universal Grammar (UG) and any particular Grammar (G):

"A particular language L is an instantiation of the initial state of the cognitive system of the language faculty with options specified. We take L to be a generative procedure that constructs pairs (Π, L) that are interpreted at the articulatory-perceptual (A-P) and conceptual-intentional (C-I) interfaces, respectively, as 'instructions' to the performance systems. Π is a PF [phonetic form] representation and L an LF [logical form] representation, each consisting of "legitimate objects" that can receive an interpretation (perhaps as gibberish.).....

The language L determines a set of derivations (computations). A derivation converges at one of the interface levels if it yields a representation satisfying FI [full interpretation] at this level, and converges if it converges at both interface levels, PF and LF; otherwise it crashes." (219-220) (Note the computer terminology.)

What is construed is a computational system, with a supposedly unique character (in biological terms):

"A working hypothesis in generative grammar has been that languages are based upon simple principles that interact to form often intricate structures, and that the language faculty is nonredundant, in that particular phenomena are not 'overdetermined' by principles of language. These too are unexpected features of complex biological systems, more like what one expects to find (for unexplained reasons) in the study of the inorganic world." (168)

It seems that the strategy has been to deliberately narrow down the scope of the subject matter, so that something like syntax is what is studied, even if that means that the model developed may not be of a biologically based language at all. The principles of economy of derivation and representation do not conform to human language, nor for that matter, one supposes, to neurophysiological processes as they are usually reported. Silicon chips rather than neurons. Proof theory, not the particulars of speech. A computer-like object is imagined so that a certain model of syntax may be conformed to, and then it is assumed that it specifies a human neuro-biology.

In the middle of a discussion of the derivation of specific representations and their features from a lexical item, we find the following: "The fact that these features are present are determined (we assume) by UG, but the choice among them is not." (237)

"Choice" in the sense of parameters for particular languages (which is defensible as a descriptive strategy) is confused

with choices necessary for particular speech acts. This never is said explicitly, but operates subliminally in the argument. As if to confirm the existence of the unresolved theoretical metaphor, later on the same page, he states the following:

"One could say that there is a 'presupposed structure,' some representation of the intentions of the speaker or (possibly) shared assumptions in some interchange. But that is surely the wrong course to pursue...I will assume here the null hypothesis: Case and ϕ -features are added arbitrarily as a noun is selected for the numeration."
(237)

Finally, recalling de Saussure's notion of performance being essentially physiological:

"We tentatively assume, then, that only PF convergence forces anything beyond features to raise. If that turns out to be the case, or to the extent that it does, we have further reason to suspect that language 'imperfections' arise from the external requirement that the computational principles must adapt to the sensorimotor apparatus, which is in some sense 'extraneous' to the core systems of language as revealed in the $N \rightarrow L$ computation." (265)

There is something worrisome here which has to do with his uncertainty about what to exclude from his model, in dealing with real language, not just the computed one. His assumptions are convenient for a machine-description.

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