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THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF OTHERS ON BYSTANDER INTERVENTION IN AN EMERGENCY

by

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CHAPTER I

FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

A burgeoning interest in the behavior of bystanders has been generated by a number of real-life situations in which a person in need of help was left to his own devices by those who witnessed his difficulty. Perhaps one of the most dramatic instances of this lack of social responsibility was the widely publicized Kitty Genovese case: she was brutally murdered while thirty-eight bystanders who watched from windows in the privacy of their apartments failed to intervene even by phoning the police (New York Times, March 12, 1964). This incident was by no means isolated. For example, on May 3, 1967, in Miami, a wounded bakery truck driver bled to death while some twenty witnesses stood by without notifying authorities (New York Times, May 4, 1967). As a result of these tragic and dramatic incidents, singers, novelists, social scientists and social practitioners have shown an increasing concern with this phenomena. Rosenthal's 1964 book, Thirty-eight Witnesses, and the movie, Incident, both deal with people's indifference to the plight of others. To be sure, many have attempted to explain this phenomenon for example, it has been suggested that people do not want to get "involved," that the urban environment fosters mass anonymity and a lack of concern for others (Mead, 1965), or that there is weakening of the American moral fiber. Explanations of this nature are interesting, parsimonious, and comprehensive but for the social scientist they leave much to be desired. Both their simplicity and tautological character decrease the possibility of an empirical test of any of them.

However, the results of one of the few laboratory experiments on bystander intervention suggests an interpretation of a very different order. Darley and Latane (1968) found that an increase in the number of other bystanders believed to be present results in a decrease in the likelihood that any single bystander will respond to the emergency situation. Thus, it is conceivable that Kitty Genovese was unaided because each bystander thought that somebody else would help.

The present investigation is an attempt to delimit the conditions which influence bystander intervention in an emergency situation. More specifically, our purpose is to establish some of the factors which affect the likelihood that someone will help a person in difficulty when others are perceived to be present.

Berkowitz and his colleagues (Berkowitz, 1966; Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Berkowitz, Klanderman & Harris, 1963) conducted a number of experiments concerning the problem of "helping behavior." In formulating their research and explaining their findings, they have assumed the existence of a "social responsibility norm" in our society that accounts for one person helping another when no tangible rewards can be gained.

Berkowitz (1966) explains the operation of this norm as follows:

> ...that the individual should help other people who are dependent upon him and need his assistance. When someone in this society learns that a person needs his help, he presumably becomes aware of the 'social responsibility norm' and feels obligated to aid this dependent person even when no direct benefits are anticipated (p. 232).

In other words, an individual comes to the aid of another because that is what society expects.

Berkowitz and his associates used essentially the same procedure

in all of their research. The Ss were told that the purpose of the experiment was to develop a test of supervisory ability based on actual work. One S (a confederate) was chosen as the supervisor and the actual S as the worker. The worker's task was to construct paper boxes or envelopes. The supervisor sent notes to the worker offering encouragement and suggestions. The degree of conformity to the social responsibility norm was the number of boxes or envelopes that the S constructed.

In a number of experiments, Berkowitz and his associates (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Daniels & Berkowitz, 1963; Berkowitz, Klanderman & Harris, 1964) have investigated the role of dependency in helping behavior. One group of Ss was told that the supervisor could win a prize based on the work output of the S. Another group was told that their work would have no effect on the supervisor's chance of winning the prize. The results were that a person will give more aid to a partner when the latter is highly dependent on him than when the partner is only minimally dependent.

Berkowitz and his associates also found that a person will aid a dependent partner more: (1) if he received help prior to being provided the opportunity to help the partner (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964); (2) if he experienced some success on a task prior to the help situation (Berkowitz & Conner, 1966); or (3) if he liked his partner (Daniels & Berkowitz, 1963).

In discussing the concept of the social responsibility norm, Berkowitz and Conner (1966) state:

> To say that many college students recognize the existence of the social responsibility norm does not mean, however, that this norm will govern their behavior to an equal extent in all situations, even assuming a constant level of dependency. The individual will adhere to the social

> responsibility norm to the extent that he is (1) aware of this behavior standard at the time, and (2) is motivated to act in accord with it. The salience of the norm can vary from one occasion to the next as can the person's desire to conform to this standard (p. 664).

Thus, Berkowitz and Conner attribute differences in helping behavior found in their experiment to situational factors that affect norm salience and/or motivation.

Hornstein and Epstein (1967) gave further credence to the notion of a norm of social responsibility. They hypothesized that a person is more likely to act selfishly when he anticipates punishment for a selfish act. The investigators assumed that a feeling of guilt should follow the violation of the social responsibility norm. An individual would, therefore, be more likely to violate the norm if he expected to be able to reduce his guilt by being punished. The authors confirmed their hypothesis using a decision-making task where both the S and his partner (a confederate) were faced with the possibility of receiving electrical shock.

However, the bulk of the above research has confined itself to studying "helping behavior" in nonemergency situations. For example, in Berkowitz's studies the S "helped" by constructing large numbers of paper envelopes. Another problem is that the Ss knew they were in an experimental situation and that helping was part of that situation. That is, they were not bystanders but participants. Patently, these studies lacked the urgency, spontaneity and reality of the real-life incidents discussed earlier. Fortunately, there is a small body of research by Darley and Latane that does explore helping behavior in a more realistic context.

Darley and Latane (1968) investigated the relationship between

bystander intervention and the number of onlookers. They felt that the presence of other bystanders would weaken norms favoring intervention. A S came to the laboratory ostensibly to take part in a discussion about personal problems. He was told that to avoid any embarrassment he was to discuss his problems with the other Ss over an intercom system. During the discussion, it appeared that one of the other Ss had a serious epileptic seizure. The S could not speak to the other Ss to find out what they were doing and he knew that the experimenter was not listening. Darley and Latane used the speed with which the S reported the emergency to the experimenter as the dependent variable.

The conditions were that there was either one other S (the victim), two others (the victim and bystander), or five others (victim and four bystanders) taking part in the discussion. The investigators found that the more bystanders believed to be present the less was the likelihood that the emergency would be reported by the S.

Latane and Darley (1966) also used another technique to study bystander intervention. In the previous study the S was isolated from the other bystanders. In their next study the onlookers were not isolated and could observe each other's reactions. Latane and Darley hypothesized that in this type of situation the behavior of the other bystanders could inhibit intervention, especially if the situation is ambiguous.

The S was seated in a small room with two other Ss (confederates of the experimenter). As they were filling out questionnaires, a stream of smoke came through the wall vent. The confederates acted as if nothing was wrong. If the S did not report the smoke after six

minutes (vision was obscured by this time), the experiment was terminated. The investigators found that within four minutes 75% of the Ss who were alone reported the smoke while only 10% of the Ss in the "together" condition did. An additional, startling, finding was that the difference between the "alone" and "together" conditions obtained even when all three bystanders were naive Ss. It is rather surprising that 90% of the Ss in the together situation did not report the smoke. It seems unlikely that people would sit quietly in a room filling up with smoke. It seems more likely that the Ss thought the smoke was part of the experiment. Latane and Darley (1966) do not report on the suspiciousness of the Ss.

It should be noted that in the first experiment by Darley and Latane (1968), the Ss were truly bystanders, but in the last experiment it is not clear if the Ss are bystanders or victims.

Bryan and Test (1968) conducted the only experiments dealing with helping behavior in a natural setting. They tested the hypothesis that viewing helping models would increase helping behavior. To test this, the authors set up a bogus Salvation Army Kettle in a shopping center.

They compared the situation in which a confederate was observed donating money with one in which there was no such model of altruism present. The results showed that the presence of a helping model increased subsequent altruistic behavior in the passersby. The authors point out that this finding is somewhat in conflict with the Darley and Latane (1968) findings. They maintain that this difference could be due to the anxiety arousing nature of the Darley and Latane procedure. However, Bryan and Test fail to realize that in Darley and Latane's

situation only one person has to help in order to end the emergency. In their situation, one person's aid is meaningless (a donation of five cents). It is only when others also help that one person's generosity takes on meaning. Thus, the difference in results can be accounted for by very basic differences in the situations.

In order to develop a broader understanding of helping behavior, the present writer investigated actual helping incidents by means of a survey. A questionnaire was developed and distributed to five hundred students at Brooklyn College. It was hoped that this pilot study would both confirm previous laboratory research and point the way toward more controlled experimental studies.

The Ss were asked to describe a situation in which they saw someone they did not know in need of help. The Ss' responses were then divided into two groups: those in which the S attempted to help the victim, and those in which the S did not try to help. One of our findings showed that a significantly greater proportion of the Ss who did not help, as compared to those who did, reported that there were other people present who could help ($X^2 = 12.23$, 1df, $p < .001$). That is, a greater proportion of those who helped were alone. In light of the Bryan and Test (1968) experiment it is important to note that there was no difference between the two groups as to whether the other bystanders tried to help. Although interesting, these findings can only be regarded as tentative in the light of the obvious limitations of a questionnaire technique for determining helping behavior.

Darley and Latane's research, supported by the questionnaire results, leads to the paradoxical prediction that the greater the number of bystanders present the less likely that any one of them will

help during an emergency. Although there have been various interpretations (Latane, 1967) to account for these findings, there has not been any systematic research conducted to test any of them. Is the mere presence of others that is responsible for the reduced likelihood of intervention, or is it their presence interacting with specific conditions which either facilitates or impedes this response? Can this finding be accounted for by the social responsibility norm suggested by Berkowitz?

Darley and Latane (1968) explain their results by using the concept of "diffusion of responsibility." According to this view, when the S is alone he realizes that he is the only one available to help. If any help is to be given, it must come from him alone. Rather than a diffusion of responsibility, he experiences a "focusing" of responsibility on himself. The person can still choose not to intervene out of regard for his own safety, but the pressure to intervene generated by the plight of the victim will focus entirely on him. However, when there are several bystanders present, pressure to intervene does not fall on any specific person. The responsibility to help another person is experienced and shared by all the bystanders.

Implicit in the diffusion of responsibility interpretation put forth by Darley and Latane (1968) are the assumptions that an individual in need of help does arouse a social responsibility norm in those who observe him, and that this norm was equally salient under all conditions tested. That is, the cues for needing help would have to have been the same; the only factor that could have varied from one condition to another was the number of potential helpers. For example, in Darley and Latane (1968), the S heard over an intercom what sounded like another

subject having a seizure. In all of the conditions, the Ss heard the same emergency situation. However, in Latane and Darley (1966), the S who was alone could have interpreted the meaning of the smoke rather differently than when there were other, non-reacting, Ss present. In the latter case, the Ss may have communicated (verbally or non-verbally) with each other and thus could have altered the salience or relevance of the social responsibility norm. This communication was not possible in the seizure study.

As pointed out earlier, there are many approaches to the study of helping behavior or social responsibility. Berkowitz (1966) has studied this phenomenon in a situation where the person who can help and the person who needs help are partners on some task. This approach is also followed by Hornstein and Epstein (1967), Lerner (1967), and Schopler and Matthews (1965). In addition, the help that the "victim" needs is usually trivial, e.g., letters for a puzzle (Schopler & Matthews, 1965) or envelopes (Berkowitz, 1966). The approach of the present research is similar to Darley and Latane's. This approach is more fully explained by the following list of criteria that describe the situation to be studied in the present research.

1. The helper and the victim are strangers.

2. There is no formal obligation between the helper and the victim (e.g., police aiding a victim).

3. There are no apparent external factors which coerce the helper into helping. The helper does not feel he will be punished if he does not help.

4. The helper does not believe that he will receive any material reward for helping.

5. The victim appears to be in some danger.

6. The choice whether or not to help occurs spontaneously. That is, helping is not required as part of the experiment.

In order to have a more workable model, we will expand the concept of diffusion of responsibility in light of Berkowitz's discussion of the social responsibility norm, to include the following assumptions:

1. A necessary condition for the occurrence of diffusion of responsibility is the arousal of the social responsibility norm. The bystanders must perceive (in some way) that the social responsibility norm applies in order for such diffusion to occur. Thus, any one bystander will be motivated to help in the presence of others only if the social responsibility norm is made salient by his perception of the appropriate or relevant cues, e.g., a person clearly in need of help.
2. The extent to which diffusion of responsibility will occur in a group of bystanders is a function of the perceived probability that all of them can intervene. The higher the perceived probability, the more likely there will be diffusion rather than a focus of responsibility. Thus, it is not the mere presence of others that causes diffusion but the perception that others are willing and/or able to intervene. For example, if a person sees someone drowning and it is clear to him that the others present cannot swim, then diffusion of responsibility should not occur. If he is aware that he is the only one present who can swim, then he should experience a focusing of responsibility not unlike what he would experience if he were the only one observing the drowning victim.
3. Diffusion of responsibility affects conformity to the social

> responsibility norm by decreasing a person's motivation to conform to that norm. Diffusion of responsibility does not affect the norm's salience. That is, diffusion does not alter the observer's awareness, belief or impression that help is needed. When diffusion occurs, the bystander recognizes and continues to believe that help is needed and should be given but also believes that this help can and will be given by others. Therefore he, himself, does not have to help.

It has been assumed here that any factor which influences the degree to which a single bystander believes that other bystanders will intervene will affect the extent to which diffusion of responsibility occurs and, consequently, the probability (degree) of intervention. The mere presence of others and the belief of each bystander that each other bystander can intervene immediately leads to a sharing or diffusion of responsibility.

Darley (1967) has attempted to limit the diffusion of responsibility by varying the type of bystander present. Darley reasoned that diffusion was more likely when one of the bystanders was, for example, a policeman. That is, the policeman's responsibility to intervene should be higher, so the S should feel less responsible for intervening himself. In Darley's experiment the S was told that the other bystander was either a male, a female or "a premedical student who worked in the emergency ward at Bellevue Hospital" (p. 4). Darley expected that a female S would be less likely to report the "fit" when the other bystander was male. The strongest diffusion should occur when the other bystander was the premedical student who was trained to deal with medical emergencies.

The results of the study did not confirm Darley's expectations. Darley tentatively explained the lack of significance of his results by pointing to the type of intervention required in the emergency he studied. In the "fit" experiment the S had to report the emergency to the E in order to intervene - not provide direct aid to the victim. Thus the medical training of one of the bystanders is irrelevant in determining the capability of that person to intervene.

But suppose that a bystander observes that others cannot intervene because they are unable to do so. As Heider (1958) points out, we act toward others in terms of how we perceive or judge them on given dimensions, an important one of which is their ability with respect to relevant behaviors. If a bystander observes another person being assaulted by a powerful male adversary, then he should experience little, if any, diffusion of responsibility if all the other bystanders are elderly men or women or very young children. It follows, therefore, that whether or not other bystanders are seen as able to intervene will have a critical influence on the extent to which diffusion of responsibility and, hence, the tendency to intervene, occurs.

> Hypothesis 1: Bystander A is more likely to intervene in a situation where another individual requires help when bystander B is perceived by him as unable to give assistance as compared to when bystander B is seen as also capable of giving help.

Berkowitz and Conner (1966) have stated that adherence to the social responsibility norm is affected by both the salience of the norm and the person's motivation to conform to it. We have assumed that diffusion of responsibility influences motivation in this respect,

leaving the salience of the norm unaffected. Employing this approach, it can be shown that some of Latane and Darley's (1966, 1967) results may be explained by their inadvertent manipulation of the salience of the norm of social responsibility. In some of their studies, they confounded the effects of diffusion and salience, so it cannot be determined what factors were operating in their situation.

For example, in a study by Latane (1967) the Ss were recruited to take part in research on the ability to market adult games. As they were filling out a questionnaire, they heard the female experimenter moving around in the next office. It sounded as if she had climbed on a chair to get something off a high shelf. They then heard a loud crash and a scream as if the chair fell over. In one condition the S was sitting with an experimental confederate who, when hearing the crash and call for help, just looked up and shrugged his shoulders and continued with his work. This action could have communicated to the S such things as: "I don't know what's going on," "Let's mind our own business and continue with our work," or "I don't think she really needs our help." It is possible that the confederate's may have defined the situation as one in which help was not needed. Therefore, he decreased the salience or the relevance of the social responsibility norm.

Berkowitz and Daniels (1964) have shown that less help is given when the salience of the norm of social responsibility is low than when it is high. Thus, it is conceivable that the presence of the confederate not only allowed diffusion of the responsibility, but also could have lowered the salience of the norm of social responsibility by virtue of his "so what" gesture and lack of action.[1]

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[1] Still another explanation is that the confederate's behavior activated

For an alternative explanation for the relationship between the number of bystanders and intervention, we can point to a similar relationship found in the conformity literature (Asch, 1952). It is possible that as Latane increased the number of persons who communicated and acted as if help was not needed, more Ss conformed to this behavior. This behavior could have either reduced the salience or importance of the social responsibility norm or provided a competing norm that reduced the motivation to act.

Thus, it is possible that the salience of the norm of social responsibility can be affected by the presence of others. The norm can be aroused immediately by the situation itself, but as information is communicated by others the relevance of the norm can change.

Suppose we witness a person who appears to be drowning. Under this circumstance, the social responsibility norm should be aroused, and we should try to save the victim. However, as we are preparing to dive into the water, we are told by one of the bystanders that the "victim" is actually part of a lifeguard's exercise. Armed with this new information, we make no attempt to save the victim.

It is also possible for other bystanders to affect the salience of the norm without actually communicating any new information. In most emergency situations, the bystanders face a situation which is ambiguous and unusual. Milgram and Hollander (1964) point out that the bystanders who witnessed the murder of Kitty Genovese did not completely understand what was happening. They faced an ambiguous, frightening and confusing situation. That is, while one person may have thought that he was wit-

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a norm which competed with the social responsibility norm. For example, the S might have believed that the woman needed help, but because the other S was not giving it, he should not either.

nessing a murder, another may have thought it was a lovers' quarrel. If both of these witnesses communicated with each other, it is possible that the person with the more violent, and thereby less likely, hypothesis may have felt less sure of his interpretation. In fact, something like the latter recently occured in Queens, New York (New York Post, December 28, 1967). Two neighbors overheard a noise. To one it sounded like a woman screaming, but to the other it sounded like an alley cat. After a short discussion, they both concluded that it must have been a cat. The next morning a woman's molested body was found in the alley.

By the same token, it is also possible that other bystanders can increase the salience of a norm by communicating that there is a real emergency, and help should be given. In short, the presence of others who communicate that a person does or does not need help should influence the salience of the norm of social responsibility and subsequent intervention.

Hypothesis 2: To the extent that bystander B defines a relatively ambiguous "help" situation as one in which a person truly needs help, bystander A is more likely to intervene.

We have hypothesized that communication between bystanders can be a major determinant of the degree of intervention. One way in which this can be determined is to compare a condition in which there is no communication with conditions containing a communication designed to either increase or decrease the salience of the social responsibility norm.

Hypothesis 2a: Bystander A's probability of helping when there is no communication should fall between the probability of help-

ing when there is a communication that increases the salience of the social responsibility norm and the probability of helping when a communication serves to decrease the norm's salience.

All of the research conducted by Darley and Latane has consistently shown that intervention was more likely when the bystander was alone than when he was with others. This was found even when the other bystander was a friend. However, it is possible that this result could, in part, be due to the lack of communication between the bystanders. Certain communications can increase the salience of the social responsibility norm beyond that obtained from the emergency itself. Therefore, if diffusion of responsibility is kept to a minimum and communication is allowed, there is a greater likelihood that help will be given under this condition than when the S is alone. Thus, it is predicted:

Hypothesis 3: Bystander A is more likely to help an individual requiring help when bystander B, who clearly is not able to help, strongly communicates that help is needed, than when bystander A is alone.

We have already noted that the degree of diffusion of responsibility was dependent, in part, on the perceived ability of other bystanders to help. If they are seen as able to help, then diffusion should occur. However, if it appears that they are not able to help then diffusion should not occur. If our assumptions are correct about the nature of the diffusion of responsibility, intervention should be equally likely when the bystander is alone as when another bystander who is not able to help is present. In both cases the diffusion of responsibility should be minimal.

Hypothesis 4: Bystander A is as likely to help an individual

requiring help when he is alone as when in the presence of a non-communicative bystander, B, who is not able to help.

One question to be raised is how the salience of the norm of social responsibility and the diffusion of responsibility interact. That is, can diffusion occur regardless of the strength of the social responsibility norm? By defining the incident in a particular way, does the bystander also affect the operation of the diffusion of responsibility?

One of the first assumptions we made was that a necessary condition for the occurrence of diffusion of responsibility is the arousal of the social responsibility norm. Therefore, if the situation is defined as one in which no help is needed, then diffusion should not occur because there would obviously be no responsibility from the beginning. Thus, under conditions of very low salience, diffusion of responsibility should not occur.

The situation where the salience of the social responsibility norm is very high can also be examined. If the social responsibility norm is sufficiently activated, the presence of others may be irrelevant. For example, suppose you witness that a child is about to be run down by a truck. The child's need and dependency, i.e., salience, would be so high that you would not bother to find out if others are present who could also help. Hence, if the social responsibility norm is sufficiently aroused by either the situation and/or the behavior of other bystanders, then what others are capable of doing may be irrelevant. In this case, the bystander's overriding concern is the victim's plight.

Diffusion of responsibility should occur minimally under conditions where the salience of the norm of social responsibility is either

very high or very low. Diffusion should, therefore, have its greatest influence at some moderate value of norm salience. In other words, the occurrence of diffusion, it is assumed, is not independent of the level of salience. Statistically, we would expect a significant interaction effect. In the present research, norm salience is manipulated via the interpretation of the emergency communicated to the S by another bystander. Thus, it is predicted:

> Hypothesis 5: The degree of diffusion of responsibility is, in part, dependent upon the definition of the situation provided by another bystander. Diffusion should be greatest when the bystander communicates that she is not sure if help is needed and least when the bystander strongly communicates that help is or is not needed.

The present research is concerned with the effects of other bystanders on bystander intervention. The experimental research to date has suggested that diffusion of responsibility may be a major factor in determining why people do not involve themselves in emergency situations. The present research is concerned with the basic process underlying the diffusion of responsibility. Does the number of bystanders present explain diffusion or just correlate with it? The present experiment tests the notion that it is not the number of bystanders that is of prime importance, but the bystanders' perceptions of each other. Do they perceive each other as equally likely to help and is this what leads to the diffusion of responsibility?

In addition to diffusion of responsibility, the way in which the bystanders define the emergency could be of great import. In real-life situations, this definition may take the form of behavior as well

as verbal statements. In sum, do other people's interpretations of an emergency determine whether we will help?

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Overview

In order to study bystander intervention the following situation was arranged: the S was made aware that another person (a confederate acting as another subject) was in distress, and it was perceived as possible for the former to come to the aid of the latter. In this study the S came to the psychological laboratory to take part in what she believed was a study on extra sensory perception (ESP).

The S was seated in a small dimly lighted room. It was explained to her that two other subjects (the victim and another bystander) were in separate rooms taking part in the experiment and that all three would communicate with each other via an intercom system. Actually, tape recordings simulated the presence of the other subjects.

In the midst of the experiment, the S, while sitting alone in her room, heard one of the other subjects cry out that a bookcase was falling on her, followed by a loud crash and no other communication from this subject. This was the emergency which, depending on some of the variables discussed earlier, might or might not have prompted assistance.

The salience of the social responsibility norm was varied by the clarity and intensity of the communication concerning the emergency which the S received from the other confederate (bystander). Diffusion of responsibility was manipulated by varying the possibility perceived by the S that the other bystander could come to the aid of the victim

by virtue of where the other bystander was located.

Helping behavior was measured by the amount of time the S took to report the emergency to the experimenter.

Subjects

The Ss were 135 Brooklyn College female undergraduates who were either freshman or sophomores, between the ages of 17 and 20. It was decided to use only female Ss in order to eliminate any male-female interaction effect which seems likely to occur in a study of bystander intervention. The Ss were all enrolled in an introductory psychology course, and through the use of class rosters each was contacted by means of a telephone call to her home. The student was asked to participate in an experiment, and if she raised the question regarding the nature of the experiment, she was told that it dealt with extra sensory perception.

Experimental Design

To test the various hypotheses, an "Alone" condition (no confederate bystander) and a 4 x 2 factorial design resulted in a total of nine conditions; in the "Together" conditions the salience of the social responsibility norm and the opportunity for diffusion of responsibility were independently varied. The order of the nine experimental conditions was randomly varied in five blocks of 27 trials each. Thus, each of the nine conditions was represented three times within a single block. Ss were assigned to conditions within this random order according to the free hours in their schedules.

The salience of the social responsibility norm was defined as the extent to which cues in a social situation indicated that another person needed and desired help from others. This factor was manipulated

by varying, in an otherwise constant situation in which the "victim" might have experienced physical injury, the nature of the definition of this situation communicated by one bystander (confederate) to another (S). In the Low Salience condition, the bystander states that the victim has not been injured at all. In the High Salience condition, she forcefully and emotionally claims that the victim, given the distress signs presented, must have been hurt. Then in the Medium Salience condition, the bystander indicates that something might have happened to the victim but she is not sure. Finally, in the No Communication condition, the bystander says nothing to the S, thereby allowing the latter to make her own interpretation of what happened to the victim.

According to our theorizing, diffusion of responsibility refers to the extent to which a bystander will see other bystanders as available to provide help for the victim. This factor was manipulated by varying the perceived ability of the bystander to intervene. In the Not Able condition it is made apparent to the S that the "other bystander" is so far away from the victim - located in another building - that she is in no position to provide immediate help. In the Able condition, on the other hand, the S believes that the other bystander is in the same building in a nearby cubicle.

Our Alone condition was comparable to the two-person group employed by Darley and Latane (1968). In this condition the S is confronted with the same emergency except that she is the only bystander, and hence the only one available to give help to the victim.

Procedure

Ss were met on the main floor of the Brooklyn College Library

and escorted to the experimental cubicle. Across the hall from the experimental cubicle, the E stopped in front of a cubicle door which had a sign on it which read "Mr. Bickman, ESP Project." The E then told the S: "Wait a second, I've got to get something from my office." The E entered the office, remained there for about thirty seconds and then rejoined the S. The purpose of the latter was to ensure that the S knew the location of the E's office. The E and S then crossed the hall and entered the cubicle in which the S was to take part in the study.

In order to disguise the nature of the experiment, Ss were told that they were participating in an ESP experiment. The Ss were given the following instructions: (The instructions were appropriately modified for the Alone condition.)

> You are going to take part in an ESP experiment. In this study, we are concerned with the effects of distance on telepathy. There has been some evidence that distance may be an important factor.
>
> There are two other subjects in this experiment. They are now waiting in their cubicles for the experiment to begin. I have given them the same instructions that you will be given. You will not meet any of the subjects before the start of the experiment. This is being done because a number of ESP experiments have been criticized because of the possibility of collusion between the subjects. We don't expect this to happen but to avoid any criticism based on this the subjects are kept apart and do not meet each other.

Actually, there were no other subjects in the experiment. Tape recordings simulated the presence of the other subjects. Thus, the S had to be given a plausible reason for not being able to meet the other Ss. The instructions continued as follows:

> Now let me explain the details of the experiment. Each subject, in turn, will act as the sender of a telepathic message while the two other subjects try to receive it. The subject who is sending will concentrate on one of these four ESP symbols (show S symbols). It will be the receivers' job to guess

> which one of the four symbols the sender is looking at. Each sender will send a symbol, get the answers from the receivers and then send another symbol and so on until she has sent four symbols. Within any one of these trials there could be repeats. For example, the sender may send a circle, a plus, and then two squares. Therefore when you guess, don't think that all four symbols have to appear within one trial and you have to name all four symbols.
>
> You will be able to communicate with the other subjects over this intercom (pointing to speaker and mike). All the subjects can hear each other over the intercom; however, only the subjects who are guessing can be heard. That is, the subject who happens to be sending will not be able to be heard since her microphone will not be working at that time. Thus, when you are the sender you cannot be heard by the other subjects but you will be able to hear them announce their guesses. This is done in order that no cues or answers be given inadvertently by the sender when she is sending a symbol.

The restriction on communication was included in the procedure so that the S, who was the sender at the time of the emergency, would not be able to communicate with the other subjects but they would be able to communicate with her. The instructions went on:

> Do not carry on any idle conversations with the other subjects. The intercom is to be used for giving answers only. The other subjects have been told to ignore any idle conversations, such as talk about the weather or the experiment, and I am asking you to do the same.

This was included in the instructions to discourage the Ss from trying to talk to the other subjects, who, of course, could not answer since they were simulated by tape recordings. In addition, if the S did ask the other subjects something and did not get an answer, there would be no reason for her to be suspicious. At this point the subjects were told:

> Now as to how the guesses are announced. This light (pointing to symbol light) shows when a symbol is being sent. That is, when you are receiving you will know that a symbol is being sent when this light goes

> on. When it goes on you are to think of which one of the four symbols the sender is thinking about. This light will automatically go on every 15 seconds and stay on for five seconds. This is not under the control of the sender.

It should be noted that the S was seated in front of a control panel pictured in Appendix A. The purpose of this control panel was to help convince the Ss that they were taking part in an ESP experiment, and that there were other subjects present. The control panel showed the S which subject was sending the ESP symbol, when the symbol was being sent, which microphones were operating, and indicated whether the S's guess as to which symbol was being sent was right or wrong. All of these operations were controlled by specially designed circuits more fully described in Appendix A.

> When you are the receiver don't expect to get any sort of overpowering feeling that someone is sending a symbol. This usually doesn't happen. You will probably feel the same when a symbol is being sent and when no symbol is sent. When the symbol light goes off you are to announce your guess.
>
> You are subject 3. Remember that. Since there are two receivers we will avoid any confusion by having the lowest number subject announce her guess first. For the first trial subject 1 will be the sender and you and subject 2 will be receivers. When the symbol light goes off, subject 2, if she paid attention to the instructions, will announce her guess first by saying "subject 2" and her guess - for example - "square." Immediately after she gives her guess you are to give yours by saying "subject 3" and your guess. When subject 2 is the sender, subject 1 will announce her guess before you since the receiver with the lowest number always goes first. Since you have the highest number you will always announce your guess after someone else. Actually you have the easiest job - you don't have to watch the symbol light - just give your answer after someone else gives theirs. Since you will hear the other subject announce her guess first, make up your mind before you hear her guess and don't change it. Remember she doesn't have any more information than you as to which card the sender is looking at. Remember to announce your subject number and answer clearly since your guesses are being recorded on tape.

Since the other subjects' responses were on tape, it was important for the timing of their responses not to be dependent on the S's timing of her response. Thus, the S had to respond after the other subjects had responded. It was also important to provide the S with a rational explanation for the order of responding. Then the subjects were told:

> These lights (point to sender lights) show which subject is sending the symbols. In this experiment, there are only three subjects, so forget about the lights for subjects four and five. The first sender will be subject one. She will send her four symbols and get the answers. Then, automatically the next subject, subject two, will become the sender. By automatically, I mean in 80 seconds, which is the time it takes to send four symbols, the sender light will change to the next subject. This is not under anybody's control but is programmed into the experiment. The next sender will be subject two; then 80 seconds later, you will be the sender.
>
> When you are the sender you will send the symbol when the symbol light goes on. You can use any method you want to send it. That is, you can just look at the card or think intensly about it. You can use any method that feels comfortable. Each subject will have three turns to be sender. Subject one will be first, then subject two, then you, then subject one, two and you, and then we repeat this order once more.
>
> There is another thing you have to do when you are the sender. It was too difficult to automate which microphones would be on and which ones would be off each time a new person became the sender. If you'll remember, the sender's mike is off. So instead all the mikes are turned off when a new subject becomes the sender. That is, 80 seconds after one person is the sender all the mikes are turned off automatically. It will be up to the new sender to reset the mikes of the receivers so they can announce their guesses. Unless this is done, no communication will be possible.

Because the emergency occurred when the S was the sender, she was not able to communicate with the other subjects. But it was also important that she not be able to talk to them after the emergency.

Thus, it appeared that the victim, who was automatically the sender after the S was the sender, did not reset the microphones and hence no one was able to speak. Therefore, the S should not have been suspicious when all communications were cut off as indicated on the ESP panel. Continuing the instructions the subjects were then told:

> These lights (pointing at mike lights) show which mikes are one. If the lights are off that means the mikes are off. There should always be two lights on - for both receivers. The sender's light should be off. This light (pointing to the light by the mike) is just to remind you if your mike is on or off. It is the same light that is on the panel. When you are the sender you will have to reset the receivers' mikes. This is very important.
>
> To help remind you to reset the mikes we have this reset light. This is a bright yellow light and it will go on when you are the sender to remind you to press the reset buttons for subjects one and two. When this light goes on immediately press these two buttons (pointing to reset buttons). When you press these buttons the reset light will go out and the green mike lights for subjects one and two will go on. There is no way for you to turn your own mike on or to turn anyone else's mike on when you are not the sender.
>
> These lights (pointing to right and wrong lights) will inform you, when you are the receiver, whether your guess was right or wrong. The subject who is sending will inform you of this by pressing the appropriate buttons on her panel. If the green light goes on then you were right, if the red goes on then you were wrong. Similarly, when you are the sender you are to inform the receivers if they were correct in their guesses. You do this by pressing these buttons (pointing to right-wrong buttons). If the receiver was right you press this button. If wrong, this button. You do this for subjects one and two. Inform them right after they give their answers.

The purpose of informing the S if she was right or wrong in her guess was to help convince her that there actually were other subjects in the experiment. That is, not only did she hear their voices but in addition they informed her it her guess was correct. Of course, since

there were no other subjects present, the apparatus was designed to provide the S with a 50% chance of being correct. The instructions continued:

> Here are three decks of cards marked deck one, two, and three. The first time you are the sender you will turn over the top card of deck one, when the symbol light goes on, and think of the symbol on that card. After the subjects give their answers inform them if they were right. You will use other decks in subsequent trials.

Able vs. Not Able Conditions

At this point in the instructions the diffusion of responsibility was manipulated. In the Able condition the subjects were told:

> If you remember, I said that we wanted to study the effects of distance on ESP. In this study all the subjects are equally distant from each other. That is, the other two subjects are located in cubicles near you. Just to help you remember this we have this sign (pointing to sign which reads: "You and the other two subjects are located in cubicles near each other."). After the experiment is over we will all get together and discuss the results.

The following instructions were given in the Not Able condition:

> If you remember, I said that we wanted to study the effects of distance of ESP. In this study you and subject one are located near each other. She is located in a cubicle near you on this floor. However subject two is located in Ingersoll Hall. As I said before, I was over there earlier and gave her the instructions. There is a sign over here to help remind you where the other subjects are located. (Point to sign which reads: "Subject 1 is located in a cubicle near you. Subject 2 is located in Ingersoll Hall.) After the experiment is over we will all go over to Ingersoll Hall and discuss the results.

In light of the instructions given in the Able condition, we maintain that the S perceived when the emergency occurred, that subject 2 (the bystander), as well as herself, would be able to tell the E about the incident. However, in the Not Able condition it was assumed that the S would realize that the other subject was not able to

inform the E because she is located in another building. Since the experiment dealt with the effects of distance on ESP, it was not expected that it would be viewed as unusual that one of the other subjects is located in another building. The subjects were then told:

> Now one other thing. I will not remain here. I will go back to my office across the hall. I do not have an intercom in my office so I will not know how the experiment is going. This again is a precaution normally taken in all ESP experiments. Because I made up the order of the symbols, I don't want, in any way, to influence the guessing. That is, since I know the order of the cards I may influence the guessing if I know the card you are guessing at. To prevent this from happening I will not be aware of the progress of the experiment.

The purpose of the previous instructions was to provide the S with a reasonable explanation for why the E did not have an intercom in his office and, thus, was not able to listen to the progress of the experiment. Thus, when the emergency occurred it was assumed that the S would believe that the E was unaware of it. In the final part of the instructions the subjects were told:

> To start the experiment you put this switch into the ready position. When all the subjects have their switches in the ready position the experiment will start. Since the other subjects have been here for some time, they should have their switches in the ready position so as soon as you put your switch into that position the experiment will start. Now this is what you should see: The red sender light should go on for subject one indicating that she is the sender; subject two's and your mike light should go on - if subject one is awake. At the same time the symbol light should go on indicating that subject one is sending a symbol. As soon as the symbol light goes off, subject two, if she paid attention to the instructions, should give her answer. Immediately after she gives her answer you should give yours. About ten seconds later one of these lights should go on to indicate if you were right or wrong. There is a pre-set time delay between when the sender presses the right-wrong buttons and when it lights up on your panel. Subject one should then send her symbols and 80 seconds after subject

one became the sender, subject two will become the sender. Again, 80 seconds after subject two became the sender you will become the sender. It is important that you remember to reset the two mikes by pressing these two buttons when the yellow reset light goes on. Then immediately turn over the top card of deck one and think of the symbol on it. You will have to do this quickly because the other subjects will give an answer even if you don't get a chance to look at the symbol. After the subjects give their answers inform them if they were correct and be prepared to send the second symbol. Again 80 seconds after you became the sender subject one will be the sender for the second time.

Are there any questions? (all questions were answered) (said informally) Well I'm going across the hall to my office and I will return for you in about 12 minutes when the experiment is over. Wait until I leave the cubicle before you begin ... OK? ... Good luck.

The Emergency

After delivering the instructions, the E left the S's cubicle and crossed the hall to his office. The experiment progressed as per instructions until the S became the sender. After the S had sent two symbols (three symbols in the Alone and No Communication conditions), which was about three and a half minutes after the start of the ESP experiment, Subject 1 (the victim) gave her guess and said: "Wait a minute, I think something is falling off the bookcase. I'd better fix it." This was followed by what sounded like the victim getting off her chair and fixing something. She then cried out, "It's falling on me!" This was followed by a scream and a loud crash. Nothing more was heard from the victim.

At this point, the salience of the social responsibility norm was manipulated.

Variation of Norm Salience Conditions[2]

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[2] The above dialogues were subjected to pilot testing. The findings of this pilot testing will be presented in the Results section.

Low Salience:

In this condition, after the crash, the bystander (subject 2) stated, in a matter of fact, unemotional tone: "Hey what happened? Subject 1? Something must've fallen on the intercom ... Hey subject 3 (the S) ... What do we do now? Oh yeah, you can't answer. Well I guess she'll tell the guy it's not working. We'd better wait for him to tell us what to do next. OK?" It was intended that this condition would minimize the salience of the norm of social responsibility. Subject 2, (the confederate bystander) defines the common experience in a way which weakens the idea that subject 1, the victim, was in trouble.

Medium Salience:

Following the crash, the bystander stated in a somewhat puzzled voice: "What happened? Hey subject 1, are you OK? Why don't you answer? It sounds like the whole bookcase fell ... Hey subject 3 what d' you think? ... Oh yeah, you can't answer ... I hope it's nothing serious, I hope she's OK." It was expected that this condition would not affect the salience of the social responsibility norm since the bystander provided no interpretation.

High Salience:

Following the crash, in this condition, the bystander stated in a very emotional, excited and concerned voice: "What happened, hey subject 1 please answer me. Are you OK? Are you alright? ... She's not answering - something must've fallen on her - she's hurt ... Hey subject 3 ... She must've gotten hurt." This condition was designed to provide the maximum degree of arousal of the social responsibility norm.

No Communication:

In this condition the bystander did not say anything to either the victim or the S after the crash. This was done by having the incident occur just before the period in which all communications were cut off. This condition is similar to Darley and Latane's (1968) three person group (S, bystander, victim). In the present study it should provide an indication of the salience of the social responsibility norm aroused by the emergency itself.

Alone Condition

The alone condition was not a part of the factorial design, since the S was told that she will be working with only one other subject (the victim). Other appropriate changes were made in the instructions to compensate for this fact. It was expected that in this condition the S would perceive that she was the only person who knew about the emergency. This condition is similar to Darley and Latane's (1968) two person group (S and victim).

After the bystander had provided her interpretation as to what happened, all communication was cut off. This was indicated to the S by all the microphone lights going off. The lights went off becuase the S had finished sending, and therefore all the microphones went off. However, the new sender, who had to reset them, was the victim. Thus, it should appear that, for some reason, the victim had failed to reset the microphones. Thirty seconds after all communications were cut off, all the panel lights (there were lights that indicated which subject was sending and when a symbol was being sent) went off. The dead lights and the lack of any communication indicated that the experiment was no longer in progress.

The E waited in his office until either the S notified him about the incident or until six minutes after all communications ceased. The E was able to hear everything that happened in the S's cubicle over an intercom system.

If the S knocked on the E's door, the E acted surprised and asked the S what was the matter. After the S told the E about the emergency, the E took the S back to her cubicle (where a tape recorder recorded their conversation) and asked her to state exactly what happened. The E then informed the S of the true nature of the experiment, assuring her that no one was hurt. The E continued to ask questions while dealing with any emotions that may have been aroused by the emergency. The E did not inform the S of the real nature of the experiment immediately because it was important to determine whether the S had any strong doubts about the reality of the situation before being told about the deception.

If the S did not leave the cubicle after the emergency, the E, after waiting six minutes, entered the S's cubicle. The E acted as if he did not know about the emergency, and it was just the end of the experiment (this time coincided with the 12 minutes the S was told the experiment would take). He then asked the S how she did on the ESP test. By this time the S usually asked what happened to subject one (the victim). The E then asked the S to state exactly what happened. The S was then informed of the true nature of the experiment, assuring her that no one was hurt. The E continued to ask questions while dealing with any emotions that may have been aroused by the emergency.

Measurement Procedures

The dependent variable in this study was the time it took the S to leave the cubicle to act on the emergency. For those conditions in which the bystander communicated with the S, the time was measured from the end of the bystander's communication to the point at which the S opened her door to seek help. For those conditions in which there was no communication (Alone and No Communication), the time was measured from the end of the crash of the bookcase to the point at which the S opened the door to get help.

In order for a response to count as a helping response, the S had to inform the E about the emergency. Just opening the door and looking outside did not count as helping. The S had to inform the E by either knocking on his office door or calling out to him for help. This definition of helping is more stringent than the one used by Darley and Latane (1968). In their experiment the S just had to open her door. Restricting helping behavior to the definition used in the present study eliminates Ss who opened the door to satisfy their curiosity.

It is possible that by restricting helping behavior in this manner Ss were eliminated who genuinely wanted to help but who were uncertain about what to do. However, it is probably more important that the indication of helping behavior be as overt as possible. In this way we are more certain that those Ss who were counted as helping were really helping and not just opening their door to find out what was happening.

Ss who did not leave the cubicle were given a time score of six minutes. This was the amount of time that the E waited (after the end of communication or crash) before entering the S's cubicle. Darley and

Latane (1968) also used six minutes as their maximum time score.

A S's response was not counted if she reported the emergency before she heard most of what the bystander said after the crash. That is, it was possible for a S to run out immediately after hearing the scream and crash and not listen to what the bystander had to say. If she did this, she was not subsequently exposed to the salience manipulation. Thus, it was decided that unless the S heard at least 85% of the communication, her data would not be included in the analysis. By the time the S had heard 85% of the communication she had been exposed to most of the informational content as well as to the emotional tone of the communication.

If the S heard 85% of the communication, she was given a time score of four seconds. This is the amount of time it takes to get up from the chair where the S was sitting and leave the cubicle after hearing the entire communication. This minimum time score made the scores in the communication condition more comparable to the ones in which there was no communication.

The time score expresses a number of things. For one, the time a person takes to help another in an emergency is directly related to the probability that the aid will be of some value. Speed is probably one of the most important factors if the person is really going to be helped. A bystander who waits too long, as in the Kitty Genovese case, may be too late to help. To use one S's own words "She could have been lying there, bleeding or unconscious, with a bookcase on top of her." Thus, the time score reflects how effective the help will be.

In addition to giving an indication of the effectiveness of help, the time score reflects the amount of help. That is, by amount,

we mean how many Ss in a particular group help. When one compares one group of Ss with another, the group which reacted faster also gave more help because more Ss from the faster group had helped than from the slower group.

It was originally decided to see if, in addition to time, another measure of helping behavior could be developed. Thus, in addition to time the extent to which the S would go to get help was measured. To accomplish this the first 24 Ss who took part in the present research were exposed to a somewhat more elaborate procedure than previously described.

When the S left her cubicle and knocked on the E's door she found that no one was there. The question was, would the S leave the area in which the research was taking place to find the E or someone else, or would she wait there until the E came back? Thus, the helping response was measured on two levels - those who left their cubicle and those who left the research area.

Of the 19 Ss who helped, 10 left the experimental area and 9 waited for the E to return. Eight of those who left the area had a time score below the median of the combined groups while only one of the Ss who stayed fell below the median. A Fisher Exact Probability test showed this to be a significant relationship ($p = .008$, 1 df, 2 tailed). Thus, the speed with which the S left the cubicle was significantly related to whether or not she sought help outside the experimental area when the E was not available. Those who left the fastest also tended to be the ones who exerted the most effort to find help for the victim.

This part of the procedure was not used with the remaining Ss

for three reasons. First, it did not provide any more information than time scores. Second, it greatly increased the amount of anxiety that the Ss suffered. When they found that the E was not in his office, some of the Ss ran through the halls shouting the E's name and pounding on doors. Third, it unnecessarily increased the complexity of the procedure. It was decided to use the data collected from these 24 Ss in the data analysis since the change in procedure occurred after the time data was collected. Thus, this change in procedure could have no effect on the time it took the S to leave the cubicle.

The previously cited research by Darley and Latane (1968) also supports the use of the time measure. They found that time taken to help was an accurate indicator of diffusion of responsibility. That is, it discriminated between various groups that the investigators expected to differ in the degree of diffusion of responsibility.

Post-Experimental Interview

The following are the questions that all Ss were asked:

1. What happened?
2. To whom?
3. Did the other subject say anything?
4. What did she say? - What did she think?
5. How did she sound?
6. Did she say she was going to do anything?

At this point the S was told that the incident was staged, and there was nothing to worry about. It was also noted, at this point, if the S spontaneously expressed any doubts about the reality of the situation and the strength of these doubts. The E then continued questioning the S.

7. Did you have any impression of subject 1 or subject 2?
8. Did you think that the other subject was going to do anything?
9. What could she do?

10. What do you think we are measuring? What's the experiment about?
11. Did you have any doubts about the reality of the situation?
12. When did you feel this? What was unreal?
13. Did you have any trouble operating the equipment?
14. What do you think about the experiment? Interesting? Valuable?
15. Did you learn anything about yourself from the experiment?
16. Do you think it was necessary for me to deceive you?
17. Do you have any comments?

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

A. Efficacy of Experimental Manipulations

1. Reality of the Emergency Situation

It will be recalled that the Ss believed that they were listening and speaking to two other "subjects" participating in the experiment. The responses of the latter were actually on tapes including the emergency of "subject 1." Every S in the study heard "subject 1" warn about the falling bookcase and scream. This event was followed by a resounding crash and then, silence.

It was decided, a priori, that not all Ss who voiced some suspicion about the reality of this emergency would be excluded from the data analysis. Ss were excluded from the data analysis if they reported to the E, with a great deal of certainty, and before he told them of the true nature of the experiment, that they knew that the whole incident was staged.

These criteria were used because doubt about the reality of an emergency appears to be a natural aspect of this phenomenon even when it does not take part in a laboratory. Milgram and Hollander (1964) point out that people even tend to reject the reality of real life emergencies because of the low probability that such an event could be happening. It is more probable and consoling to think that the disturbance in the street is due to a drunk rather than a young woman being murdered. Some witnesses to the Kitty Genovese murder were reported to have said that they did not believe that someone needed help (Rosenthal,

1964). They felt that it could have been someone "fooling around" or a lovers' quarrel. In their laboratory study, Darley and Latane (1968) found, in a post-experimental questionnaire, that 31% of the Ss thought the emergency "must be some sort of fake" (p. 381).

Thus, it would seem that this type of doubt, i.e., "It can't be happening" or "It can't be real," appears to occur naturally in an emergency. On this basis it would be a distortion to exclude all Ss who had this doubt on the grounds that a basic control of the experiment was being violated. Some people respond to an emergency by denying that there really is an emergency. However, there were other Ss who actually did not believe that the incident was real. For them, there was no truth to what was happening, and for this reason it was not desirable to include these Ss in the data analysis.

Thus, a S was rejected only if she stated that she was certain that the incident was staged before the E informed her of the true nature of the experiment. Typically, these Ss reported that they did not leave the cubicle to get help or even to find out what happened because their only interest was to tell the E that the "game was up." Only 4% or 6 out of 147 Ss tested (six other Ss' data were not included because they reacted before they heard at least 85% of the bystander's communication) stated with absolute certainty that the incident was staged. They were, therefore, excluded from the data analysis.

Of the Ss included in the data analysis, 12% (16) expressed, to some degree, their doubts about the reality of the situation before they were told by the E that the situation was staged. These Ss typically said something like "Someone got hurt but I don't know if it

was real." These Ss did not state their doubts with enough certainty to be excluded from the data analysis according to the criteria discussed above. Furthermore, they were found in nearly equal proportions in each of the experimental conditions. Thus, doubt of this kind was not systematically related to any particular experimental treatment.

Additional evidence of the reality of the situation was the Ss' reactions to being told that the emergency was staged. Of the Ss who did not voice any initial suspicion, 99 (83%) reported to be and acted surprised. Ss said things like "Oh, you're kidding! You're not serious!"; "Oh, no, It can't be!" Many Ss said they felt foolish, and one even humorously told the E "I'm going to kill you." One S refused, for a while, to believe the E because she thought he was telling her that it was not real only to calm her down. The remaining 17%, after being told that the incident was staged, stated that they were suspicious. Typically, they said things like, "I had a feeling." Or "I thought so."

The Ss who were surprised and the Ss who were suspicious were very uniformly distributed across the experimental conditions. Thus, suspiciousness did not appear to be related to any particular condition.

Orne (1961) has pointed out the importance of the demand characteristics of a laboratory experiment, suggesting that one of the major sources of influence on a S's behavior in this respect is that factor that conveys to the S the purpose of the experiment. If the S is aware of the aim of the experiment, he may provide the E with the presumably desired results becuase he wants to be "a good subject." However, Orne states: "If the purpose of the experiment is not clear, or is highly ambiguous, many different hypotheses may be formed by different subjects and the demand characteristics will not lead to clear-cut

results' (p. 17). Keeping this in mind, two of the questions the S was asked were "What do you think we are measuring?" and "What's the experiment all about?" It should be stressed that this question was asked after the S was told that the emergency was staged. In addition, the S had already been subjected to about ten minutes of intensive questioning dealing with the experimental manipulations. These Ss had already been exposed to some obvious cues suggesting the purpose of the experiment.

Following Orne's (1961) suggestion, Ss were prompted to provide an answer. The E did not accept an initial "I don't know"; he pressed the S to try to guess the nature of the experiment. Even after being told that the emergency was not real and being questioned about the bystander and subsequently prompted to give an answer, only 32% (43) of the Ss were able to reply that the experiment dealt with people's reaction to an emergency. These 32% included some of the 16 who initially reported suspicions.

The remaining 68% of the Ss either insisted that they did not know what the whole thing was about or they gave an incorrect explanation. These reasons included references to ESP, fear and emotion.

However, not one S was able to guess the specific nature of the experiment. That is, the Ss did not report that they were aware of the role of the bystander in the experiment. Thus, although some Ss were able to guess the general nature of the research, none of them realized that the bystander's behavior and location were themselves significant aspects of the experiment.

An examination of the distribution of Ss who were correct in guessing the general nature of the experiment showed that there was no

relationship between the latter and any experimental treatment.

Ss' reactions to the emergency itself may be taken as further evidence of its perceived realism. Many Ss spontaneously provided such evidence by the remarks they made after the incident which were picked up by their open microphones: "Subject 1, are you alright? Are you Alright? Oh no - Oh no!"; "Oh my God! ... Oh my God where is she? Is she the one in Ingersoll or are you?"; "No - I think it fell on her - I can't reach you - What's - Oh God!" In addition, many Ss reported that they were frightened by the incident. They said that they were shaking, upset and their hearts were pounding. In a number of cases the S actually cried out of relief when told that the incident was staged. Some Ss even refused to believe that the incident was not real.

It should be noted here that although many Ss had an upsetting experience, none of the Ss were sorry that they took part in the experiment. All of the Ss found the experiment to be an interesting experience and felt that they learned something about themselves from the situation. All of the Ss saw the necessity for deception and there were no negative feelings expressed about the experiment or the E.

2. Determination of the Effectiveness of the Salience Manipulation

It will be recalled that the salience of the norm of social responsibility was varied by manipulating how the bystander defined or reacted to the "emergency" experienced by "subject 1." Depending on what the bystander said, it was assumed that the actual S would experience a greater or lesser sense of social responsibility for the victim. That is, she would feel obligated either to help or not to help, depending on the interpretation made by the bystander.

These interpretations were varied and presented on separate tapes. In order to determine if the interpretations did, indeed, convince a listener of the presence of a greater or lesser "emergency," i.e., made the norm of social responsibility more or less salient, a pilot study was undertaken in which three groups of Ss (30 Ss in each group) listened to and evaluated the respective tape recordings.

Each group of Ss, all Brooklyn College coeds, listened to a tape for only one of the salience conditions. They were told to listen carefully and to answer a questionnaire about it as honestly as possible. The questionnaire consisted of items on a seven-point scale, where 1 was "very" and 7 was "not at all." Other items required a yes or no answer. The results of the seven-point scale items are shown in Table 1. (See appendix B for the complete analysis of variance performed on these items.)

TABLE 1. -- Mean pilot Ss ratings of the behavior of the bystander in response to the emergency under three conditions of norm salience

	Salience Groups			
Question	High	Medium	Low	F
How concerned was subject 2 about subject 1	1.52	3.61	5.00	31.7**
How excited was subject 2	1.96	3.19	4.48	15.0**
How upset was subject 2	2.10	4.12	4.74	19.8**
How sincere did subject 2 sound	2.58	3.73	3.77	6.2*
How real did the tape sound	3.56	4.00	3.93	0.74

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$

The questions shown in Table 1 attempted to determine to what extent the bystander's comments (subject 2) actually conveyed concern, anxiety and similar affects on her part. To the extent that her comments did convey such feelings, it should suggest to others (Ss in the experiment) that someone needed help. With respect to "concern," for example, it can be seen that in the High Salience condition Ss thought that the bystander (subject 2) was very concerned about what happened to subject 1. In addition, the higher the salience, the more excited and upset the bystander sounded.

Thus, if salience of the social responsibility norm is defined as the awareness that someone is in trouble and needs help, and such awareness is revealed in the extent to which a bystander shows concern and is excited and upset, then it is clearly evident from the data in Table 1 that the three tapes induced variations of such salience in the intended directions.

In the High Salience condition the Ss perceived that the bystander sounded more sincere than in the Medium or Low Salience conditions. This difference could be because most of the Ss thought that it was probable that the victim got hurt (an average rating of 3). Thus, regardless of which tape the Ss were exposed to, they thought, that it was likely that the victim did indeed get hurt. Therefore, to them, any other interpretation of the emergency may have sounded less sincere. Thus, the interpretation given in the Medium and Low Salience conditions may have sounded less sincere.

The Ss in the actual study were not asked about the bystander's sincerity. However, no S spontaneously questioned the bystander's sincerity. This, plus the fact that suspiciousness was not related to

any particular condition suggests that sincerity did not play an important role in the actual experiment. In addition, while the pilot Ss did not differ in their perception of the victim's danger, the actual Ss did differ according to the salience condition they were exposed to. Thus, if this perception is the factor that accounts for the differences in sincerity found in the pilot study, we would expect no difference in sincerity in the actual study since the perceptions were different.

The Ss did not differ on their overall ratings of the reality of the tapes. That is, one tape did not sound more real than the other. This was confirmed by subsequent data obtained from Ss who actually took part in the experiment. Ss who were suspicious of the reality of the emergency did not tend to come from any particular treatment group.

Findings based on other questionnaire items give additional support to the efficacy of the salience manipulation. The pilot Ss responses to three significant questions are shown in Table 2: "Did subject 2 think that subject 1 needed help?"; "Did subject 2 think that subject 1 got hurt?"; "Do you think, from what subject 2 said, that she will try to help subject 1?"

TABLE 2. -- Percent of yes-no responses of pilot Ss to questions regarding what subject 2 believed and would do about subject 1 under the three conditions of salience

	Salience						
	High		Medium		Low		X^2
Question	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	
Believe S 1 needed help	90	10	55	45	35	65	20.3*
Believe S 1 got hurt	100	0	69	31	39	61	25.7*
Believe S 2 try to help S 1	89	11	50	50	12	88	35.3*

* $p < .001$

It can be seen in Table 2 that the Higher the salience the more subject 2 (the bystander) was perceived as thinking that subject 1 (the victim) got hurt and needed help. In addition, the pilot Ss believed that subject 2 was increasingly more likely to help as the salience of the condition increased. It also appears that the Medium Salience condition was rather ambiguous. On all three questions in Table 2, the Ss were close to being evenly split as to what subject 2 said and what her intentions were.

The responses to these questions demonstrate that the tapes effectively communicated what subject 2 thought was happening. In the High Salience condition, the pilot Ss correctly perceived that subject 2 thought help was needed. In the Medium Salience condition, the communication was more ambiguous. The Ss did not agree on what subject 2 said. In the Low Salience condition, most Ss felt that subject 2 thought no help was needed and she did not intend to help.

An important item in the questionnaire asked what subject 2 thought had happened to subject 1. The pilot Ss' responses were categorized, by the E, into three groups: (a) Those who thought that subject 2 believed that subject 1 got hurt, (b) Those who thought that subject 2 believed that subject 1 did not get hurt, and (c) Those who thought that subject 2 was sure what happened to subject 1. These findings can be seen in Table 3.

TABLE 3. -- Percent of pilot Ss under the three salience conditions who believed that subject 2 thought subject 1 was hurt, not hurt, or not sure

	Salience		
	High	Medium	Low
She got hurt	100	50	35
She was not hurt	0	10	65
Subject 2 was not sure	0	40	0

$X^2 = 66.2$, $p < .001$, 4 df, 2 tailed

The results shown in Table 3 were obtained from an open-ended question. These responses are similar to the responses to the close-ended questions in Table 2. However, in the open-ended question the S had the option of including an answer other than hurt or not hurt. The results demonstrate that 40% of the Ss who were in the Medium Salience condition thought subject 2 was not sure what happened to subject 1. In other words, many Ss felt that subject 2's response did not really clarify what was happening. However, 50% of the Ss felt that subject 2 thought subject 1 was hurt. Thus, the effect of the Medium Salience condition was not completely neutral but tended to produce results similar to the High Salience condition.

The manipulation of the High Salience condition was very effective. All of the Ss felt that subject 2 thought subject 1 was hurt. The manipulation of the Low Salience condition was not as effective but was in the intended direction. A chi square test shows that the three salience conditions do differ significantly ($X^2 = 66.2$, $p < .001$) from each other.

The findings of the pilot study, in general, provide very strong support for the effectiveness of the taped statements of the bystander, i.e., they convey a given level of crisis with respect to what was happening to the victim. Of course, the above data are based on the judgments of Ss who were not themselves involved in the actual emergency. Hence, the Ss in the actual study were also asked to describe what the other person (the bystander) thought after the bookcase fell.

The Ss were asked "Did the other subject say anything?"; "What did she say?"; "What did she thing?" The Ss' responses were classified, by the E, into five categories: (a) Subject 1 got hurt, (b) Subject 1

did not get hurt (nothing wrong), (c) Subject 2 was not sure what happened, (d) I'm (the S) not sure what she said, and (e) Subject 2 did not say. Since the last two categories accounted for only nine of the ninety subjects, they were not included in the following data analysis.

Table 4 shows the relationship between the three salience levels and the Ss' perception of what subject 2 thought happened to subject 1.

TABLE 4. -- Percent of subjects under three salience conditions who believed that subject 2 thought that subject 1 was hurt, not hurt, or not sure

	Salience		
	High	Medium	Low
She got hurt	100% (27)	26% (8)	21% (5)
She was not hurt	0	4% (1)	79% (19)
Subject 2 not sure	0	70% (21)	0

$X^2 = 97.8$, $p < .001$, 4 df, 2 tailed

It is evident that the Ss' perceptions support the salience manipulation. All of the Ss in the High Salience condition thought subject 2 said that subject 1 was hurt, and most (79%) of the Ss in the Low Salience condition perceived that subject 2 said that subject 1 was not hurt. Most (70%) of the Ss in the Medium Salience condition reported that subject 2 said she was not sure what happened, and a minority (26%) thought subject 2 said subject 1 was hurt.

A comparison of the data from the pilot Ss who just heard the tapes (Table 2), and the data of the actual Ss shows a great similarity between the two groups. In both cases, all of the Ss in the High Salience condition perceived that subject 2 thought subject 1 got hurt. In

the Low Salience condition, a higher percentage of actual than pilot Ss felt that subject 2 said subject 1 did not get hurt. In the Medium Salience condition, most (70%) of the actual Ss correctly perceived that subject 2 was not sure what happened to subject 1. It can therefore be concluded that not only did the Ss in the actual experiment correctly perceive what subject 2 said, but they were more accurate than the Ss who just heard the tapes.

Another important factor in the salience manipulation was the emotional tone that subject 2 conveyed about the emergency. In order for the bystander to affect the salience of the social responsibility norm, she not only had to verbally convey her thoughts, she also had to communicate her non-verbal emotional state. Therefore, it was important to determine not only what the S thought subject 2 said about the emergency, but "How did she sound?" It should be noted that the S was asked this before she was told that the incident was staged. Thus, she could not be asked to place her answer on a seven point scale as the pilot Ss did.

The S was asked to describe how the other person (the bystander) sounded after the bookcase fell. Their responses were classified by the E into the following three categories: (1) calm-unconcerned, e.g., "not worried," "not upset at all," (2) somewhat concerned and excited, e.g., "sort of concerned," "excited - not frantic - medium concerned - puzzled," (3) very concerned and excited, e.g., "very worried," "frightened," "very upset," "alarmed." Table 5 shows the distribution of these responses along the dimension of the salience of the norm of social responsibility.

TABLE 5. -- Degree of excitement-calm attributed to the bystander by Ss in the three salience conditions.

	Salience		
Description	High	Medium	Low
Very excited	94% (28)	23% (7)	3% (1)
Somewhat excited	6% (2)	60% (18)	7% (2)
Calm	0	17% (5)	90% (27)

$X^2 = 95.5$, $p < .001$, 4 df, 2 tailed

From Table 5, we can see that there is a strong relationship between the salience conditions and the S's perception of the bystander's emotional tone and concern. The higher the salience the more concerned and alarmed the Ss thought the bystander sounded. This analysis clearly shows that the salience of the social responsibility norm was effectively manipulated.

A comparison of the above findings with the pilot data (Table 1) shows that there is a great deal of similarity between the two. In both groups, the higher the salience the more concerned and excited subject 2 sounded.

There is other evidence that supports the effectiveness of the salience manipulation. The first question the Ss were asked was "What happened?" From the answer to this question, it was simple to determine if the S thought that subject 1 got hurt. Their responses were classified into three categories by the E: (1) she got hurt, (2) she did not get hurt, and (3) I don't know. Table 6 shows the results of this classification.

TABLE 6. -- Percent of subjects under the three salience conditions who thought that subject 1 was hurt or not hurt

	Salience		
	High	Medium	Low
She got hurt	90% (27)	64% (19)	43% (13)
She was not hurt	7% (2)	23% (7)	37% (11)
I don't know	3% (1)	13% (4)	20% (6)

$X^2 = 14.6$, $p < .01$, 4 df, 2 tailed

Table 6 shows that 90% of the Ss in the High Salience condition, 64% in the Medium Salience condition, and 43% in the Low Salience condition thought subject 1 had been hurt. The results of the chi square test show that the Ss from the three salience conditions did differ significantly in whether they thought that subject 1 got hurt. Thus, although all the Ss heard the same "emergency," the way in which the bystander interpreted the emergency influence the way the S interpreted what happened. However, it should be pointed out that the Low Salience condition was not as effective as the other conditions in this particular respect. More Ss in the Low Salience condition believed that the victim was hurt than believed she was unhurt. This suggests that it is more difficult, at least with the emergency used in the present research, to lower the perceived probability that someone got hurt, than it is to raise the probability. However, the Ss' perceptions were significantly influenced in the intended direction.

Thus, there appears to be very strong evidence for the efficacy of the salience manipulation. Not only did both the pilot Ss and the actual Ss perceive subject 2's performance as it was designed to be perceived, but the different salience levels affected the actual S's

perception as to whether subject 1 got hurt.

3. Determination of the effectiveness of the manipulation of the diffusion of responsibility

It will be recalled that the diffusion of responsibility was manipulated by varying the perceived ability of the bystander to intervene. In the Not Able condition the Ss were told that one S (the victim) was located nearby, but another subject (the bystander) was located in another building. In the Able condition the Ss were told that the two other subjects were both located nearby. Thus, in the Not Able condition the S should perceive that the bystander can not help while in the Able condition she should feel that the bystander could help.

To determine if this manipulation was successful, Ss were asked: "Did you think that the other subject was going to do anything?" The Ss responses were classified by the E as to whether they expected the bystander to help. The three categories are: (1) Expect other S to help, (2) Not expect other S to help, and (3) Didn't think whether she would help or not. Table 7 shows the results.

TABLE 7. -- Subjects' expectation that the bystander would help according to the Able-Not Able conditions

	Experimental Condition	
	Able	Not Able*
Expect	72% (43)	8% (5)
Not expect	22% (13)	58% (35)
Didn't think	6% (4)	28% (17)

$X^2 = 48.2$, $p < .001$, 2 df, 2 tailed

* Three Ss in the Not Able condition did not remember what they expected.

Table 7 shows that proportionally more Ss in the Able condition expected the bystander to help than in the Not Able condition. It also appears that many more Ss in the Not Able condition stated that they did not think about whether the bystander would or would not help. It could be that 28% did not think about the bystander because with the bystander in another building there was no reason for them to think about her; the S was the only one able to help. However 22% of the Ss in the Able condition thought that the bystander would not help. But, it is expected that the Able-Not Able manipulation should account for only part of the response to this question. For example, 10 of the 13 Ss in the Able condition, who did not expect the bystander to help, were from the Low Salience condition. These Ss had this expectation, not because the bystander was unable to help, but because she said she was not going to help. Thus, factors other than ability can influence expectation.

Better evidence for the diffusion of responsibility manipulation is provided by the response to the question "What could she do?" - meaning what could the bystander to do help the victim. Those Ss who thought that the bystander could help the victim by informing the E were classified as perceiving that the bystander was able to help. Table 8 shows the relationship between the experimental Able-Not Able conditions and Able-Not Able as perceived by the Ss.

TABLE 8. -- Perception of bystander's ability to help as a function of the experimental instructions of ability

	Experimental Condition	
Perceived Ability	Able	Not Able
Able	98% (59)	18% (11)
Not Able	2% (1)	82% (49)

$X^2 = 79.0$, $p < .001$, 1 df, 2 tailed

Table 8 shows that there is a significant relationship between the perceived ability of the bystander to help and the experimental instructions. However, eleven (18%) of the Ss in the Not Able condition perceived that the bystander was able to help. These Ss were confused as to the location of the victim and the bystander; they thought the victim was located in another building and the bystander was near them. However, all the Ss knew the location of the bystander and the victim before the emergency. Thus, we cannot be certain that these Ss did not know the correct location of the bystander during the emergency. It is possible that after the emergency they got confused and could not recall what happened. It is also possible that these Ss reported that the bystander was also able to help as a means of removing the responsibility for helping from themselves. However, since these Ss may have not correctly perceived the ability of the bystander to intervene, we will examine our primary data by both including and excluding their responses to determine if there is any differential effect.

B. Test of Hypotheses

1. Statistical Methods

An inspection of the data showed that the time scores were not normally distributed. Thus, we could not meet the assumptions required in the use of parametric methods. Therefore, all analyses were made by means of non-parametric statistical methods. The hypotheses were tested with either the chi square test or the Mann Whitney U test, whichever was appropriate.

Following the suggestion of Siegel (1956), hypotheses which specify the direction of the result were tested with a one-tailed test.

In analyses in which no prediction of direction was made, tests of significance were evaluated by means of a two-tailed test.

2. Effect of Diffusion of Responsibility

Hypothesis 1 stated that more help would occur when the bystander was perceived as not being able to help as compared to when she was perceived as able to help. We have already noted that the time it took for help to occur was used to test all the hypotheses. In order to demonstrate the relationship between time taken to help and diffusion the distribution of time scores of the Able and Not Able conditions were divided into thirds. Table 9 shows this distribution.

TABLE 9. -- Relationship between time taken to help and the bystander's ability to help

	Condition	
Time taken to help	Able	Not Able
Lower 1/3 (0 to 20 secs.)	23% (14)	43% (26)
Middle 1/3 (21 to 90 secs.)	32% (19)	35% (21)
Upper 1/3 (91 to 360 secs.)	45% (27)	22% (13)

$X^2 = 8.6$, $p < .01$, 2 df, 1 tailed

As we can see from Table 9, the time scores are distributed in the predicted direction. While 43% of the Not Able scores were in the fastest third of the distribution, only 23% of the Able scores were found in this third. A chi square test performed on these data show that the time scores are significantly related to the ability of the bystander to help in the predicted direction.

We may also ask it the relationship between the time taken to

help and the ability of the bystander still remains when the Ss who did not help (those given the time score of six minutes) are excluded from the above analysis. A chi square performed on these data show that the relationship remains the same ($X^2 = 6.23$, $p < .025$, 2 df, 1 tailed).

Table 10 shows the analysis of time scores for the Able and Not Able conditions excluding those eleven Ss in the Not Able condition who believed that the bystander was able to help.

TABLE 10. -- Relationship between time taken to help and the bystander's ability to help. (Excluding 11 Ss who did not perceive the bystander's inability in the Not Able condition.)

	Condition	
Time taken to help	Able	Not Able
Lower 1/3 (0 to 20 secs.)	23% (14)	47% (23)
Middle 1/3 (21 to 99 secs.)	32% (19)	33% (16)
Upper 1/3 (100 to 360 secs.)	45% (27)	20% (10)

$X^2 = 9.24$, $p < .005$, 2 df, 1 tailed

From the above table we can see that by excluding the Ss who did not correctly perceive that the bystander could not help, the relationship between the degree of diffusion and the time taken to help becomes even stronger. A comparison of Table 9 with Table 10 shows that, on the whole, the Ss who wrongly thought that the bystander was able to help tended to be those who reacted the slowest. That is, they tended to come from the upper or slower two thirds of the distribution of time scores. In this sense they responded more like the Ss in the Able condition than in the Not Able condition thereby adding further confirmation to Hypothesis 1.

Figure 1 shows the cumulative response times for the Able and Not Able conditions (including all 120 Ss). This figure was constructed by determining what percentage of Ss had helped at a particular point in time (every 20 seconds). These percentages were then cumulated. For example, Figure 1 shows that by sixty seconds, 50% of the Ss in the Able condition had helped but 72% of the Ss in the Not Able condition had helped by that time. By 240 seconds all the Ss in the Not Able condition who were going to help had done so but it was not until 345 seconds that all the Ss in the Able condition who were going to help had done so.

Figure 1 also shows that at any point in time, more Ss from the Not Able condition had helped than in the Able condition. In addition, while only 10% (6) of the Ss in the Not Able condition did not leave the cubicle to help, 23% (14) of the Ss in the Able condition did not help.

Another way to look at the data is to determine at what point most of the Ss who were going to help, had helped. If we define "most" as 90%, then 90% of the Able condition Ss who helped (69% of the total number of Ss) did so by 200 seconds after the incident. But 90% of the Ss in the Not Able condition who helped (81% of the total) did so by 120 seconds. Thus, not only did more Ss help in the Not Able condition, but most of them did so much sooner than the Ss in the Able condition.

The results of these analyses support Hypothesis 1. More Ss actually helped, and helped sooner, in the Not Able condition than in the Able condition. Thus, the perceived ability of another bystander to help and not simply his presence alone determines whether or not others will help.

3. Effect of Salience

Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be a positive relation-



Fig. 1: Cumulative response times for the Able and Not Able conditions

ship between helping behavior and the salience of the social responsibility norm; the more the bystander defined the situation as one in which help was needed, the more likely it is that the S would help.

To test this hypothesis, the distribution of the response times for the three salience conditions were compared. Table 11 shows a median chi square test of the time scores according to the degree of salience of the norm of social responsibility.

TABLE 11. -- The relationship between the salience of the norm of social responsibility and the time taken to help

	Salience		
Time Score	High	Medium	Low
Below Median (42 sec.)	77% (23)	47% (14)	27% (8)
Above Median	23% (7)	53% (16)	73% (22)

$X^2 = 15.2$, $p < .0005$, 2 df, 1 tailed

Table 11 shows that there is a strong relationship between the time taken to help and the salience of the norm of social responsibility. Seventy-seven percent of the High Salience Ss helped within 42 seconds, while only 27% of the Low Salience Ss acted within this time. The Medium Salience Ss fell between the two other Salience conditions with 47% helping within 42 seconds. A chi square test showed that the medians of the three groups are significantly different from each other at a very low level of probability, $p < .0005$.

We may also ask if the relationship between the time taken to help and the salience of the social responsibility norm still remains when the Ss who did not help (those given the time score of six minutes) are excluded from the above analysis. That is, is the time taken to help, counting only those Ss who did help, related to the salience of

the social responsibility norm. A chi square test performed on these data show that the relationship remains the same ($X^2 = 10.79$, $p < .005$, 2 df, 1 tailed).

Figure 2 shows the cumulative response times for the three salience conditions. At any point in time, more Ss from the High Salience condition helped than from the Medium Salience condition and more from the Medium Salience than from the Low Salience condition. For example, 20 seconds after the end of the communication 60% of the Ss in the High Salience condition had helped and 33% from the Medium Salience condition but only 17% of the Ss in the Low Salience condition had helped.

Additional evidence for support of Hypothesis 2 comes from the relationship between the salience conditions and the total number of Ss who helped. As shown in Figure 2, 77% of the Ss in the Low Salience condition helped and 80% in the Medium Salience condition, but 87% of the Ss in the High Salience condition helped the victim.

It can also be determined when most of the Ss who were going to help had helped. Again, taking 90% as the definition of "most," we have the following striking findings. Most of the High Salience Ss who were going to help (78% of the total Ss) did so within 50 seconds. The Medium Salience Ss (72% of total Ss) took 100 seconds to reach this point and the Low Salience Ss (66% of the total Ss) took 200 seconds. Thus, the higher the salience the more the Ss helped and the less time it took for most of the Ss who were going to help, to help.

Taken together, the results of these analyses strongly confirm Hypothesis 2. The more the bystander defined the situation as one in



Fig. 2: Cumulative response times for the Low, Medium and High Salience conditions

which help was needed the more likely it was that the S helped.

4. Comparison of helping behavior in the No Communication with the three salience conditions

Hypothesis 2A predicted that the likelihood of help in the No Communication condition would be higher than that found in the Low Salience condition but less than that found in the High Salience condition. It was reasoned that the salience of the social responsibility can be affected by communication between bystanders. Thus, a communication designed to raise the salience should produce more helping than no communication and one that lowers the salience should produce less helping. This was tested with a Mann Whitney U test.

The results of the U test showed that the High Salience and No Communication condition differed significantly ($z = 2.83$, $p = .002$, 1 tailed) from each other in the predicted direction. A similar test carried out between the Low Salience and No Communication conditions showed that the difference between the two groups approaches significance ($z = 1.53$, $p = .06$, 1 tailed).

TABLE 12. -- The relationship between the three salience conditions and the No Communication condition and the time taken to help

Time Score	High Salience	Medium Salience	No Communication	Low Salience
Below Median (42 seconds)	77% (23)	47% (14)	43% (13)	27% (8)
Above Median	23% (7)	53% (16)	57% (17)	73% (22)

Table 12 shows the relationship between the three salience conditions and the No Communication condition. It is evident that there does not appear to be much difference in time taken to help between the No Communication condition and the Medium Salience condition. In addition, as predicted in Hypothesis 2a the helping behavior in the No Communication

condition lies between the helping behavior found in the Low and High Salience conditions.

Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the three salience conditions and the No Communication condition. Until approximately 230 seconds the relationship between the salience conditions and the No Communication condition is as predicted in Hypothesis 2a; there is more help given in the High Salience condition than in the No Communication condition and less help given in the Low Salience condition than in the No Communication condition. However, after almost four minutes after the incident, 18% (5) of the Ss in the No Communication condition who do help, decide to help.

It can be concluded that there is evidence to support Hypothesis 2a. In addition there does not appear to be any difference between the No Communication condition and the Medium Salience condition. Therefore, it can be concluded that the content of the communication is the important factor in determining the likelihood of help and not the presence of absence of communication.

5. Comparison of helping behavior in the Alone with the High Salience - Not Able conditions

In Hypothesis 3 it was predicted that the presence of another bystander can, under certain conditions, increase helping behavior over that obtained when there was a single observer present. That is, even though all the previous research on bystander intervention (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane, 1967; Darley, 1967) has found that more help is given when there was only one bystander present, it was predicted in the present research that when there are two bystanders present, and it is clear that one of them cannot help, and the latter communicates that



Fig. 3: Cumulative response times for the three salience and No Communication conditions

help is needed, then more help should be forthcoming. The salience of the social responsibility norm can be increased without increasing the diffusion of responsibility.

This hypothesis was tested by comparing the Alone and the High Salience - Not Able conditions using a Mann Whitney U test. The results of this comparison ($z = 1.95$, $p = .026$, 1 tailed) shows that the Ss in the High Salience - Not Able condition helped significantly sooner than those in the Alone condition. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.

Figure 4 shows the cumulative response curves for the Alone and High Salience - Not Able conditions. It is clear that there is no overlap between the two curves. At any point in time, more Ss from the High Salience - Not Able condition had helped than from the Alone condition. Although both of the groups have very fast response times, the High Salience - Not Able Ss react much faster than the Ss in the Alone condition. For example, by 20 seconds 80% of the High Salience - Not Able Ss had helped, compared to 48% for the Alone condition.

6. Comparison of helping behavior in the Alone with the No Communication - Not Able conditions

One of the basic assumptions made about the nature of the diffusion of responsibility was that it is dependent upon how the other bystander is perceived. If the bystander is perceived as not being able to help, then there should be no diffusion of responsibility and therefore no difference in helping behavior. Thus, it is not the mere presence of the other bystander, but the perceived ability of that bystander to help that is important in the diffusion of responsibility.

Hypothesis 4 predicted, therefore, that there should be no difference between the Alone condition and the No Communication - Not



Fig. 4: Cumulative response times for the Alone and High Salience - Not Able conditions

Able condition. These two conditions differ only in the presence of the second witness. Using a Mann Whitney U test it was found that the two groups are not significantly different ($z = 0.6$, $p = .55$, 2 tailed). Thus, there is no evidence that suggests the rejection of Hypothesis 4.

Figure 5 shows the cumulative response times for the Alone and No Communication - Not Able groups. There does not appear to be a great difference between the two curves and they crossover at about 70 seconds.

As a further check on the assumption made about the nature of the diffusion process, the Alone condition can be compared with the No Communication - Able condition. These conditions differ only in that the No Communication - Able condition has another person (bystander) who is also able to help. Therefore, diffusion of responsibility should take place in the No Communication - Able condition but not in the Alone condition. Thus, there should be more helping in the Alone condition.

A Mann Whitney U test shows that the two groups do differ significantly from each other in the predicted direction ($z = 2.03$, $p = .02$, 1 tailed).

Figure 6 shows the cumulative response times for both groups. Except for one point in time (300 seconds) where both groups are equal, more Ss from the Alone condition than those from the No Communication - Able condition had helped. This clearly illustrates the effect of diffusion of responsibility on helping behavior.

7. Interaction of diffusion of responsibility and the salience of the norm of social responsibility



Fig. 5: Cumulative response times for the Alone and No Communication - Not Able conditions



Fig. 6: Cumulative response times for the Alone and No Communication - Able conditions

Evidence has been presented which demonstrates that both the salience of the social responsibility norm and the diffusion of responsibility influence the extent to which helping behavior will occur. However, Hypothesis 5 has predicted that these two processes are not independent and should therefore interact with each other. When the salience of an emergency situation is very high there should be little diffusion of responsibility. If the bystander is very motivated to help - for example, if speed in acting is crucial or the person in need is a loved one - then one will probably not be concerned about the presence of others or whether they can also help. On the other hand, when the salience of the norm of social responsibility is very low, the S will probably not be concerned about the presence of others since help does not appear to be needed. However, when the salience is at some median value then the person should be in maximum conflict about helping. Help may be needed, but since the other person can also help, she does not have to.

This hypothesis was formulated with the assumption that it could be tested by means of analysis of variance. A significant interaction effect would provide evidence to support this hypothesis. But an analysis of variance could not be performed because the time scores were not normally distributed. However, Wilson (1956) has developed a distribution - free test that allows determination of the interaction effect. Wilson proposes that the chi square table can be broken down into components similar to the method employed in analysis of variance. Table 13 shows the distribution of time responses of the Salience by Diffusion conditions in relation to the median time (42 seconds) of the group.

TABLE 13. -- Distribution of time responses for determination of the Salience x Diffusion interaction

	Below the Median Salience		
Diffusion	High	Medium	Low
Able	9	5	5
Not Able	14	9	3
	Above the Median Salience		
Diffusion	High	Medium	Low
Able	6	10	10
Not Able	1	6	12

X^2 interaction = 3.82, $p < .10$, 2 df, 1 tailed

Using the Wilson test a chi square of 3.82 was obtained for the interaction effect. With 2 df, this is only marginally significant ($p < .10$). Thus, based on the Wilson test there is not strong support for Hypothesis 5. However, Sutcliff (1967) points out that the Wilson test is not a sensitive one. It is possible, therefore, that we are rejecting Hypothesis 6 because of the insensitivity of the test applied rather than a true lack of effect.

Evidence to support Hypothesis 5 may be inferred from an inspection of the cumulative response curves of the conditions involved.

Figure 7 shows the cumulative response time for the Low Salience - Able and Low Salience - Not Able conditions. According to our reasoning, we should expect little difference between the two groups since the S should have perceived that there was no emergency and, therefore, it did not matter if the bystander was able to help or not.



Fig. 7: Cumulative response times for the Low Salience - Not Able and Low Salience - Able conditions

An inspection of Figure 7 shows that the two curves overlap at one time, and for the first 50 seconds more Ss from the Able condition than from the Not Able condition help. The difference between the two groups does not appear to be large.

Figure 8 shows the cumulative response time for the Able and Not Able Medium Salience conditions. Here it is evident that there is a great difference between the Able and Not Able conditions, especially when compared to the difference found in the Low Salience condition. There is no overlap between the two curves and five times as many Ss in the Able condition than in the Not Able condition do not help.

The Able and Not Able High Salience response times are shown in Figure 9. At any point in time more Ss in the Not Able condition had helped than in the Able condition.

Thus, diffusion has a strong effect in the High Salience condition as well as the Medium Salience condition. In order to support Hypothesis 5 at a minimum level, it must be shown that this effect is stronger in the Medium Salience condition than in the High Salience condition. Comparison of Figures 8 and 9 suggest that the effect of diffusion of responsibility is greater in the Medium than in the High Salience condition. The difference between the Able and Not Able scores appears to be greater in the Medium Salience condition (Fig. 8) than in the High Salience condition (Fig. 9). Thus, there appears to be some tentative support for Hypothesis 5. A complete interpretation of this data will be provided in a latter section.

C. Summary of results

Hypothesis 1 predicted that help was more likely when the



Fig. 8: Cumulative response times for the Medium Salience - Not Able and Medium Salience - Able conditions



Fig. 9: Cumulative response times for the High Salience - Not Able and High Salience - Able conditions

"bystander" was not able to help as compared to when this other person was able to help. The results clearly confirmed this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that to the extent that the bystander defines the situation for the S as one in which someone needs help, thereby increasing the salience of the norm of social responsibility, the more likely it is that help would be given. This hypothesis was strongly confirmed by a chi square test.

Hypothesis 2a predicted that the likelihood of helping in the No Communication condition would be higher than in the Low Salience condition but lower than in the High Salience condition. This hypothesis was confirmed. It was also demonstrated that there did not appear to be any difference in helping behavior between the No Communication condition and the Medium Salience condition.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be a higher likelihood of helping when the bystander, who could not help, communicates strongly that help is needed, than when the S is alone. This hypothesis was confirmed.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that an equal amount of help would be given when the S was alone and when there was another person present who could not help and did not communicate with the S. This hypothesis was not rejected. In addition, it was found that more help was given when the S was alone than when the other person could help.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that there would be a significant interaction between salience and diffusion. Specifically, the Medium Salience condition would show the strongest effect of diffusion. A Wilson Chi Square test provided some suggestive evidence that supported this hypothesis. In addition, an inspection of the cumulative response times partially supported the hypothesis.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The focus of attention in the present investigation was on how the presence of others influence bystander intervention in an emergency situation. Contrary to many popular explanations of non-intervention, it was assumed that various characteristics of the emergency situation rather than a decline in humanistic values were responsible for this lack of intervention. Thus, the apparent ignoring of a victim's pleas for help may not be a sign of moral decay but rather an indication of the degree to which others influence a person's action without his awareness. A basic assumption in the present study was that the behavior of other bystanders plays an important role in determining what a single bystander will do in an emergency.

Using the social responsibility norm as a model, it was hypothesized that helping behavior could be influenced in one of two ways: (1) by varying the salience or importance of the norm and (2) by varying the motivation to conform to the norm. The salience of the norm could be affected by the way in which the other bystanders interpret the emergency. If they think and assert that there is no emergency, it is likely that the single bystander, too, will arrive at the same conclusion. Thus, it was hypothesized that the definition of the situation, as provided by another bystander, should influence intervention.

The motivation to conform to the social responsibility norm can be varied in a number of ways. For example, Schopler and Bateson (1965) increased the cost of helping, and there was indeed less helping. We have reasoned that the motivation to conform to the social responsibility

norm can also be influenced by other bystanders. Darley and Latane (1968) have shown that as the number of bystanders perceived to be present increases, help from any single bystander is less likely to occur. Their interpretation of this finding is that as the number of bystanders increased, each individual bystander's sense of responsibility to help is decreased. They described this phenomenon as the diffusion of responsibility. The present research has hypothesized that the diffusion of responsibility is caused not simply by the presence or numbers of other bystanders but more significantly by how any single bystander perceives the ability of these others to provide such help. Therefore, it was reasoned that the perception that other bystanders can help should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of the perceiver himself coming to the aid of the victim.

The next three sections, respectively, will discuss the diffusion of responsibility, the salience of the norm of social responsibility, and the relationship between the two.

Diffusion of Responsibility

It has been hypothesized that one of the factors that determine the likelihood of intervention in an emergency is the degree of diffusion of responsibility. If a bystander perceives that he, among other bystanders, is the only one able to help then he should feel solely responsible for providing such help. However, if the bystander feels that others can help as well, then the responsibility for helping, from the perceiver's point of view, falls on them as well as himself. Therefore, less intervention would be expected when the responsibility is seen as shared than when it is not seen as shared. The present research has assumed that it is not just the presence of others that

caused diffusion of responsibility but the perception that these bystanders were actually capable of helping.

The results of the present research lend support to the view that diffusion of responsibility occurs when other bystanders are present, but it is a function not simply of their presence but of their perceived ability to help. On the other hand, Darley (1967) has reasoned that the results obtained by Darley and Latane (1968) can be explained as being the results of something other than diffusion of responsibility.

Darley (1967) believes that diffusion of blame can account for the results of the Darley and Latane (1968) study as well as diffusion of responsibility. If a group is responsible for the lack of action, then blame can be shared by all the members of the group. On the other hand, if there is only one bystander, then he will suffer all the blame for not helping the victim. Thus, the S can expect relatively less blame in a group situation than when he is alone. Darley says that this explanation and the diffusion of responsibility apply equally well to the data he has collected.

The diffusion of blame explanation is of questionable value. If diffusion of blame is to operate, the bystander must assume that the victim will not be helped by the other bystanders. That is, the bystander must feel that he is going to share the blame for not helping with other bystanders who also did not help. However, if the bystander feels that the victim is going to be helped then diffusion of responsibility, not blame, explains the lack of intervention. From his interviews of the witnesses of the Genovese murder Rosenthal (1964) found that most persons felt that Miss Genovese was going to be helped

by someone rather than not helped. Thus, there is some evidence that bystanders feel that help will be given by others.

However, if diffusion of blame is a factor in the present research, then this would be evident in the behavior of the Ss who did not leave the cubicle to report the emergency. If these Ss are concerned about sharing the blame, then they should be pleased when the E entered their cubicle evidently unaware of the emergency. If the E was unaware, then it would mean that the other bystander did not report the emergency either, and thus shared the blame with the S for not reporting the emergency. This, however, was not the case. The Ss were upset that the E was ignorant of the emergency and that the victim was not being helped. Instead of feeling relieved that the other bystander did not report the emergency the Ss felt guilty about their lack of action.

Additional evidence does not support the diffusion of blame explanation. The Ss who did not help were asked why they did not report the incident. Table 14 shows the distribution of those reasons according to diffusion of responsibility condition.

TABLE 14. -- Reasons given for not helping according to the Able and Not Able conditions

Reason	Able	Not Able
Ruin experiment	7	3
Other S (bystander) would tell E	6	0
Didn't think anything wrong	0	2
Lazy	0	1
Didn't know what to do	1	0

As shown in Table 14 none of the reasons dealt with diffusion of blame. No S said that she felt the other S was not going to help

so she did not have to help either. Instead, six (43%) of the Ss in the Able condition who did not help felt that the bystander was going to help, thus supporting the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis.

One question that can be raised from the present research is: Other than ability what can affect the diffusion of responsibility? Would diffusion occur if the bystander was able to help but she said, for some reason, she did not want to help?

This question cannot be answered directly from the present research. However, there is some indirect evidence supporting the view that if the other bystander communicates that she does not want to help, diffusion of responsibility will be reduced.

Six (40%) Ss in the Low Salience - Able condition felt that the bystander was not going to help, so if any help was to be given they would have to give it. In other words, the bystander's statement that she was not going to do anything to help was sufficient to reduce the diffusion of responsibility. Evidence that there was in fact a focusing of responsibility is provided by the response times of these six Ss. These Ss had the fastest response times for the entire Low Salience - Able condition. This difference has a probability of $p < .005$.

However there is an alternative interpretation possible. If these six Ss are the only Ss in the Low Salience - Able condition who thought that the victim needed help then this could account for the speed with which they responded. However, there were two other Ss who thought that the victim needed help but who also thought that the bystander was going to give it. Thus, for these two Ss we would expect no focusing of responsibility. These two Ss had response times of 125 and 140 seconds (mean = 132.5). The mean of the six Ss who

thought that the bystander would not help was 24.6 seconds. A Mann-Whitney U test was performed to determine if the two groups were significantly different from each other. The results of this test showed that the two groups do differ from each other ($U = 0$, $p = .036$, 1 tailed).

Thus, we can conclude that the relatively high speed with which the six Ss who thought that the victim needed help and that the bystander was not going to give it is due the reduction of the diffusion of responsibility. It appears that diffusion of responsibility can be influenced by whether the bystander wants to help as well as if she can. Of course, further research is needed to confirm this analysis.

On the basis of the present findings, it can be tentatively concluded that diffusion of responsibility is an important factor in determining the likelihood that a bystander will help. It also appears that anything that reduces the perceived probability that others will intervene increases the probability of intervention by the perceiver.

There is some evidence that the witnesses of an emergency may be motivated to diffuse the responsibility in order not to feel that they have to act. As long as there are others present who may help they do not have to. For example, it may be asked if the eleven Ss in the Not Able condition who thought that the bystander was able to help may have been reacting to more than just the excitement of the emergency. That is, each S may not have correctly perceived or reported that the bystander was not able to help because consciously or unconsciously she wanted the responsibility for acting to fall on others beside herself. She might not have wanted to assume the entire responsibility for helping, and as a result may have distorted what actually happened for just this purpose.

Further evidence for this viewpoint is provided by the reactions of the two Ss in the Alone condition who did not help. According to the experimental design, there should be no diffusion of responsibility in the Alone condition. After all, the S knew that she was the only person aware of the emergency. However, in spite of this both of the Alone Ss who did not help expressed the belief that they thought the E knew about the emergency. When asked how the E would know, one S reported "Someone could have told you - there were other experiments going on." Or, as the other S said, "I thought she (the victim) would tell you if she was able, or maybe if somebody heard the loud crash." Thus, it appears that in the condition in which diffusion was not supposed to occur there is evidence that it did for a few Ss. These Ss apparently rationalized their non-intervention to themselves and the E by saying that they expected someone else to tell the E about the emergency. Thus, diffusion of responsibility may occur even when there are no apparent reasons to expect it. It appears that some people will actively attempt to diffuse responsibility, and thereby avoid the behavior which follows from being fully responsible for helping another.

One of the basic assumptions made about the nature of the diffusion of responsibility was that it does not affect the salience of the social responsibility norm. Earlier, it was pointed out that diffusion should reduce the motivation to conform to the norm but should not change the impression, awareness or belief that help is needed. Table 15 shows the distrivution of Ss who thought that subject 1 (the victim) did or did not get hurt according to the two diffusion of responsibility conditions. Thus, although it was established that diffusion of responsibility occurred to a far greater extent in the Able

as compared to the Not Able condition, if the assumption is correct, there should be no difference in the perception that the victim did or did not get hurt between these two conditions.

TABLE 15. -- Percent of Ss in the two diffusion of responsibility conditions who thought that subject 1 was hurt or not hurt

	Able	Not Able
Hurt	65% (39)	75% (45)
Not hurt	20% (12)	17% (10)
Don't know	15% (9)	8% (5)

$X^2 = 1.75$, $p < .30$, 2 df, 2 tailed

Table 15 shows that there is no significant difference between the Able and Not Able conditions in the perception that the victim was hurt. However, diffusion of responsibility did occur in the Able condition, and there was a significant difference in helping behavior between the two conditions. It appears that this difference in helping behavior can not be attributed to differences in the salience of the norm of social responsibility. Therefore, it can be tentatively concluded that the diffusion of responsibility affects the motivation to conform to the social responsibility norm and does not affect the salience of the norm. The conclusion is only tentative since it is not certain that the Ss in the Able condition, while recognizing that the victim might have been hurt, may not have held this view with the same conviction that the Ss in the Not Able condition did. Thus, there still may be a difference in the salience of the social responsibility norm that is not reflected by the answer to the question, "Did subject 1 get hurt?" The Ss in the two conditions may differ in the certainty that the victim did get hurt.

What, then, is the implications of these findings? It is felt that people are not aware enough of the effect the presence of others can have on their behavior during some emergency. If one witnesses an accident, and there are others standing around and watching, the primary observer would probably not be aware that the others' presence and ability to help is affecting the likelihood of his helping. It is important to realize that people may not help others, not because of total apathy or indifference but because of the subtle operation of diffusion of responsibility. Without being fully aware of it, the observer may be thinking "Of course the police have been called - someone must have done it." It would seem therefore, that this knowledge can play an important role in educating people as to some of the causes of non-intervention. If people are made more aware of the diffusion of responsibility then maybe there would be fewer murder victims like Kitty Genovese.

Salience of the norm of social responsibility

In Hypothesis 2 it was predicted that the more the bystander communicates to the S that the victim is truly in need of help, the more likely the S is to help. The results of the present research strongly confirmed this hypothesis. Intervention was directly related to the degree of need as communicated by the bystander.

The manipulation of the communication has been interpreted, in the present research, as influencing the salience of the social responsibility norm. That is, the cues associated with an emergency were made more or less prominent depending upon the communication. It follows, therefore, that if the cues for needing help increase, the awareness that help is needed should likewise increase. Thus,

the salience of the social responsibility norm should increase.

There have been other attempts to manipulate the salience of the social responsibility norm. Berkowitz and Daniels (1964) have shown that more help was given when the subject himself had been given help in some task prior to the experiment. However, as a check on this finding, Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) found that there was strong evidence that the norm of reciprocity was operating rather than the norm of social responsibility. Gouldner (1960) states that there is a moral norm of reciprocity that specifies that "(1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped them" (p. 171).

Thus, the results of the Berkowitz and Daniels (1964) experiment can be explained on the basis of the norm of reciprocity. The reason why the S helped more when he was given help was because he was paying back the previous help.

In the present experiment the norm of reciprocity does not play a role in determining the helping behavior of the S. Helping behavior was influenced by providing cues that help was needed. This could not affect the importance of the reciprocity norm.

Hornstein and Epstein (1967) attempted to manipulate the salience of the social responsibility norm by varying the salience of the victim's suffering. This was accomplished by letting the Ss in the "High Salience Condition" see a questionnaire that the "victim" filled out in which he blamed the S for the intensity of his suffering. In the "Low Salience Condition" the S did not see this questionnaire. The results of this study showed there were no effects of salience. The authors explain these results by stating that the high degree of

helping responses in all conditions was evidence that the norm of social responsibility was already very salient and therefore the questionnaire did not add much to it.

The only study that approximates the present one in the success of the salience manipulation is the first study Berkowitz conducted in helping behavior (Berkowitz and Daniels, 1963). Berkowitz and Daniels found that more help was given when the "supervisor" was dependent upon the "worker" than when there was no relationship between them. Thus, the only evidence for the effectiveness of manipulating the salience of the social responsibility norm, before the present research, is the relatively simple and basic manipulation of the latter investigators. In what Berkowitz calls the "Low Dependency" condition the S was told that his work output would have no effect on the supervisor's rating. It would, perhaps, be more accurate to call this no dependency rather than Low Dependency. In the High Dependency condition the S was told that the supervisor's rating would depend on his work output. Thus, simply put, the Ss were told that in one case there was a need for help and in another case there was no need for help. The results strongly confirmed the authors' hypothesis. More help was given in the High Dependency condition than in the Low Dependency condition or when the norm of social responsibility was aroused as compared to when it was not stimulated in this way.

However, an alternative interpretation of the dependency manipulation may be made. The two groups of Ss may have perceived their task very differently. In the Low Dependency condition the Ss may not have felt motivated to make paper boxes, not because of the low salience of the social responsibility norm but because the task was irrel-

evant to the stated purpose of the experiment. All Ss were told that the purpose of the experiment was to "develop a test of supervisory ability based upon work samples" (p. 431). Thus, to the Ss in the Low Dependency condition, their work, since it would not be counted in judging the supervisor, was irrelevant. In effect, following the experimental instructions was the only reason for a subject to construct paper boxes in the Low Dependency condition.

If the High Dependency group made more boxes in comparison to the Low Dependency group, it may not be due to the arousal of the social responsibility norm, as Berkowitz contends, but to the relevancy of the task and the Ss' attitude toward the task. More "help" was given in the High Dependency condition not necessarily because there was higher salience of the social responsibility norm but because the task, since it had a purpose in the High Dependency condition, could have been perceived as more interesting and relevant. It could be expected that although the task itself was the same, Ss would be more motivated to work harder when they feel they are accomplishing something (fulfilling the aims of the experiment) than when the task has no relevance. In other words, the salience of the social responsibility norm was the same in both the High Dependency and the Low Dependency conditions. In both conditions it is possible that the S did not perceive the box construction as "helping behavior" but as "developing a test of supervisory ability based upon work samples" (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963, p. 431). Therefore in both conditions the salience was equally low. More boxes were produced in the High Dependency condition because it was more relevant to the experiment. Thus, it would appear that this explanation, as well as the salience

of the social responsibility norm, can account for the results Berkowitz and his associates obtained.

It appears that the attempts of previous research to manipulate salience has not met with much success. Hornstein and Epstein (1967) found no effect and Berkowitz's research (Berkowitz and Daniels, 1963; Goranson and Berkowitz, 1966) is open to different interpretations. However, the present research has established that the salience of the social responsibility norm does influence helping behavior. In addition, it has been shown that this can be accomplished in a fairly realistic emergency situation.

All of the previous research by Darley and Latane (1968) has shown that help was more likely when the S was alone than when there were other Ss present. In the present experiment, it was hypothesized that this might not always be the case. If diffusion is kept to a minimum, then another bystander may actually be able to increase the likelihood of help. The appropriate comparison is the Alone condition with the High Salience - Not Able. If the bystander is not able to help then there should not be any diffusion of responsibility. Therefore, the only factor that should be operating is the increase in the salience of the social responsibility norm. The results of the present research support this reasoning. Help was more likely in the High Salience - Not Able condition than in the Alone condition. Thus, the only thing special about facing an emergency alone is the lack of diffusion of responsibility.

This reasoning suggests that if the bystanders of the Kitty Genovese murder would have seen someone in the street who could have helped, and shouted at him to do something, it is more likely that he

would have helped, than if he had come across the incident alone.

The interaction between the salience of the norm of social responsibility and the diffusion of responsibility.

In Hypothesis 5 it was predicted that there would be a significant interaction between the salience of the social responsibility norm and the diffusion of responsibility. It was reasoned that under conditions of very high salience the observer would not be concerned about others. She would be so highly motivated to help (whatever its basis) that others' presence would be irrelevant; thus, there would be no diffusion of responsibility. At the other extreme, if the salience is very low and it is perceived that no help is needed, others' ability to help is also irrelevant. Thus, it is expected that the Medium Salience condition should show the strongest effect of diffusion of responsibility.

The analysis of the data showed some support for Hypothesis 5. A Wilson Chi Square test provided some evidence that there was an interaction effect. Further evidence was provided by an inspection of the cumulative response times for the three salience conditions. The largest difference between the Able and Not Able conditions appeared in the Medium Salience condition.

In addition, there is some evidence that there was no effect of diffusion of responsibility in the Low Salience condition, thereby confirming part of Hypothesis 5.

There are two questions raised by these data. Firstly, could this suggestive finding of an interaction effect be caused by factors other than those discussed? Secondly, why was the interaction effect not stronger?

The strongest confirmation of Hypothesis 5 was the finding of no difference between the Able and Not Able conditions under Low Salience. It was reasoned that this lack of difference is due to the fact that the S did not care whether the bystander could or could not help since no help was needed. This reasoning is supported by the fact that of all the conditions, the least help was given by the Ss in the Low Salience condition. Further evidence is provided by the finding that most (57%) of the Ss thought that the victim was not hurt.

However there could be another reason for the lack of diffusion of responsibility in the Low Salience condition. Forty three per cent of the Ss in the Low Salience condition thought that the victim was hurt despite what the bystander said. This means, in effect, that for these Ss the bystander's claim that help is not needed means the bystander is not going to help. However, these Ss believe help is needed and, what is more, it is up to the S to give it. These is no diffusion of responsibility but a focusing of responsibility on the S in the Able as well as the Not Able condition.

Two sources support this reasoning. Table 2 (p. 46) shows that only 12% of the pilot Ss who listened to the Low Salience tape thought that the bystander (subject 2) was going to try to help. In addition, the Ss who were exposed to the actual emergency were asked if they thought that the bystander was going to help. Table 16 shows the response to this question from the Ss in the Able condition only. Ss from the Not Able condition were not included in the analysis since their expectation would be confounded by the fact that the bystander was in another building and thus could not help.

TABLE 16. -- Subject's (Able condition) expectation that the bystander would help according to the three conditions of salience

	Salience		
	High*	Medium*	Low
Expect	82% (11)	92% (13)	33% (5)
Not Expect	18% (2)	8% (1)	67% (10)

$X^2 = 14.4$, $p < .01$, 2 df, 2 tailed

* Ss who were not sure were not included

Table 16 shows that two-thirds of the Ss in the Low Salience - Able condition did not think that the bystander would help. However, two factors contribute to this perception. First, as pointed out earlier, since the bystander said she did not think that help was needed, it would appear that she was not going to help. Second, if the S thought that there was indeed no emergency (i.e., accepted the bystander's interpretation) then she should not expect the bystander to help since no help was needed. Six of the 15 Ss in the Low Salience - Able condition thought that the victim needed help and that the bystander was not going to give it. Thus, for only these Ss was diffusion reduced by the Low Salience communication.

Hence, for the majority of Ss in the Low Salience - Able condition the lack of diffusion of responsibility can be attributed to the perception that no help was needed so it did not matter if the bystander was able to help. For the remaining Ss, the bystander's communication appears to have reduced the diffusion of responsibility. She said she was not going to help, thus focusing the responsibility on the S, since the S believed help was needed.

This analysis raises the problem of a methodological "confounding." It appears, for some Ss, that salience and diffusion were not

independently manipulated. That is, in the Low Salience condition the bystander not only lowered the norm of social responsibility but, in addition, because she said she was not going to help, she could have decreased the diffusion of responsibility. It is possible that the opposite effect could happen in the High Salience condition. Here, the bystander not only raised the salience of the norm of social responsibility but could have increased the diffusion of responsibility. That is, the S could have perceived that the bystander was very concerned; thus, the S was certain that the bystander was going to help and she did not have to.

If there is a confounding effect there are two factors that reduce its importance. First, if this "confounding" were operating, then it should produce results opposite to those predicted. Less help would be expected to be given in the High Salience condition since diffusion of responsibility was increased, and more help in the Low Salience condition since diffusion was decreased. This, however, was not the finding of the present research. The results strongly confirmed the predictions. Therefore, if this "confounding" effect is operating, it is operating at a rather low level or not at all.

The second factor that lessens the importance of this confounding effect is the original aim of this research. In the present research it was important that the salience and diffusion both be manipulated by a bystander. However, the norm of social responsibility can be manipulated differently. Low Salience could be accomplished, for example, by just having the noise of the bookcase falling without the victim shouting that it was falling on her. The emergency could produce High Salience by having the victim scream and call out that

someone should help her because she is hurt.

However, it is possible that the salience of the norm of social responsibility and the diffusion of responsibility could be studied by having two confederate bystanders. One bystander, who is always in the position of not being able to help, would provide the manipulation of the salience of the norm of social responsibility. The other bystander would not communicate any interpretation but would just be used to manipulate the diffusion of responsibility.

The second question that was raised above (p. 91) was why there was not stronger evidence of an interaction between the salience of the norm of social responsibility and the diffusion of responsibility. In effect, why did diffusion of responsibility occur in the High Salience condition. One methodological problem that could account for this concerns the absolute rather than relative levels of salience. Evidence has been presented showing that the three levels of salience used in the present experiment produce different levels of helping behavior. However, there have been no claims made that the Low Salience condition is equivalent to no salience and the High Salience condition equivalent to the highest salience possible. Hypothesis 5 was based on the prediction that a <u>specific</u> interaction should occur when the salience of the social responsibility norm is <u>very</u> high and <u>very</u> low. When the salience of the norm is very high, then no diffusion should be expected. Thus, it may be that diffusion of responsibility occurred in the High Salience condition because the salience was not high enough.

Support for the above reasoning is provided by a comparison of the results of the present research with the results of the experiment conducted by Darley and Latane (1968). Darley and Latane found that

there was no diffusion of responsibility between their two-person group (victim and subject) and their three person group (victim, subject and bystander) as measured by the speed of responding. The only evidence for diffusion of responsibility was found between the above groups and the six-person group (subject, victim and four bystanders). The authors did not attempt to explain this discrepancy.

In contrast to the Darley and Latane (1968) results, the findings of the present research show that diffusion of responsibility did occur between the two and three person group. A comparison of the Alone with the No Communication - Able condition showed that it was likely that the S would help in the Alone condition. Thus, in the present experiment there is evidence of diffusion of responsibility in the three-person group.

The discrepancy between the results in the present experiment and the results found by Darley and Latane (1968) may be explained by taking into account the level of salience of the social responsibility norm. We have reasoned that if the norm is very salient then the S should not be concerned about the presence of others. This was not supported in the present research and it was explained that this could be due to the fact that the salience was not high enough. A comparison between the salience of the norm in the present experiment and the salience in the Darley and Latane's experiment can be used to support this reasoning.

In the present investigation, it may be recalled, the victim said that something was falling off a bookcase. As she was fixing it, she shouted "It's falling on me!" This was followed by a large crash and silence. The S could not really be sure that the victim did indeed

get hurt. The victim did not cry out in pain nor call out for help. The situation was somewhat ambiguous and it was entirely possible, as suggested in the Low Salience condition, that the victim did not get hurt and the intercom was not working. Thus, it seems that the salience of the norm of social responsibility created by this situation was not extremely high.

However, let us compare the emergency presented in the present experiment with the one Darley and Latane's Ss faced. In their experiment the S heard, over an intercom system, what seemed like another subject suffering a seizure. A full appreciation of the extremity of the emergency can only be had by listening to the actual recording of the victim. But reading the dialogue should provide some indication of the salience of the norm of social responsibility aroused by this emergency.

> I-er-um-I think I-I need-er-if-if-could-er-er-somebody er-er-er-er-er-er-er-give me a little-er-give me a little help here because-er-I-I'm-er-er-h-h-having a-a-a real problem-er-right now and I-er-if somebody could help me out it would-it would-er-er s-s-sure be-sure be good...because-er-there-er-er-a cause I-er-I-uh-I've got a-a one of the-er-sei----- er-er-things coming on and-and-and I could really-er-use some help so if somebody would-er-give me a little h-help-uh-er-er-er-er-er c-could somebody-er-er-help-er-uh-uh-uh (choking sound) ... I'm gonna die-er-help-er-er-seizure-er (chokes, then quiet) (p. 379).

It seems obvious, from the above passage, that the salience of the norm of social responsibility was higher in Darley and Latane's experiment than in the present research. There is no question that the victim needed help and was in a serious condition. In fact, the victim thinks that he is going to die if help is not forthcoming.

Thus, when the salience of the norm of social responsibility is very high, as in the Darley and Latane (1968) research, diffusion does not occur when there is just one other bystander present. However, when the salience of the norm is not that high, as in the present research, diffusion does occur when there is only one other bystander present. This comparison therefore supports the reasoning behind Hypothesis 5. The degree of salience does affect the operation of the diffusion of responsibility. This comparison also provides some indirect support for stating that the diffusion found in the High Salience condition could be due to the High Salience condition not being extreme enough.

IV. Conclusion

The purpose of the present research was to determine some of the factors that influence bystander intervention. Interest in this area was aroused by a number of real-life incidents in which a person was in need of help but was unaided by witnesses. Thus, it was important that the situation investigated in the present research include the elements of an actual emergency. Evidence has been presented showing that Ss did perceive the "experimental" emergency as real.

Using the norm of social responsibility as a model, it was hypothesized that two factors could account for the lack of intervention on the part of the bystanders. The salience of the norm and the motivation to conform to it could affect helping behavior. It was reasoned that other bystanders could affect both the salience and the motivation to conform to the social responsibility norm. Thus, it was decided to investigate how the presence of others could affect adherence to the social responsibility norm.

From descriptions of actual emergencies and previous research, it was reasoned that other bystanders could affect the salience of the social responsibility norm by the manner of communicating what they thought was happening. Thus, in the present experiment, the salience of the norm was varied on three levels by having one bystander (confederate) communicate to another bystander (subject) that either she thought there was no emergency, there could be one, or she was certain that there was an emergency. The results showed that the salience significantly affected helping behavior. Thus, although, the confederate and the S witnessed the same incident, and neither one was privy to any special information, the confederate's interpretation was a strong factor in determing what the S was going to do.

Hence, it appears that in an emergency what bystanders communicate to each other can play a critical role. If others communicate that some incident does not require any intervention, there will probabily be no intervention. On the other hand, if a bystander thinks that help is needed, and communicates this to other bystanders, help is more likely. It would be interesting to determine what would occur if a bystander was faced with two contradictory interpretations. This probably occurs very often in real-life.

The other factor that could affect bystander intervention was the motivation to conform to the social responsibility norm. Darley and Latane (1968) have shown that the diffusion of responsibility is an important factor in determining intervention. It was reasoned that diffusion of responsibility affects the motivation to conform to the social responsibility norm but not the salience of the norm. Since Darley and Latane had already established that the number of bystanders

present was directly related to the diffusion of responsibility, the present research investigated one way in which diffusion may occur. It was hypothesized that diffusion was dependent upon perceiving that the other bystanders were able to help. That is, it was not just their presence that was important but the way in which their presence was defined. The results of the present research show that if the other bystander is perceived as not being able to help, diffusion of responsibility will not occur. Diffusion, and consequently less help, occurs only when the other bystander is seen as being able to help.

The ability of the bystander to help is just one factor that contributes to the diffusion of responsibility. Some of the findings of the present research suggest that diffusion will not occur if the other bystander does not want to help. An interesting area of exploration would be just what the limits of diffusion are. If the other bystander states that he does not want to help, and the reason is a good one, would the S also use this reason in order not to help or will he feel that the responsibility is now focused on him?

The present research was originally formulated to try to answer the question why people do not aid each other and was prompted by incidents such as the Kitty Genovese murder. What, then, is the relevance of the Kitty Genovese case to the results of the present experiment? For one, it is clear that the lack of intervention can be explained on the basis of diffusion of responsibility. All of the witnesses must have perceived that the others were as able to help as themselves. Under this condition, it has been shown, help is less likely.

The relationship between the salience of the norm of social

responsibility and the Genovese case is not as obvious. If people tend to deny the reality of an emergency, which is suggested in the present research, then communication of this among the bystanders could have lowered the salience of the norm. However, an incident in Queens, New York, described earlier seems very appropriate to an analysis along the lines of the salience of the social responsibility norm. The scream of the victim was interpreted by one bystander to be an alley cat but the other bystander thought it was a woman's scream. Here, it appears that when faced with two contradictory points of view the bystander accepted the less violent, and perhaps most probable, explanation. In doing so, the salience of the social responsibility norm was reduced.

The importance of non-intervention goes beyond just the fate of the victim. It is possible that all of the current concern over "crime in the streets" could be due not only to the perception of increasing crime rates but the feeling that "If something happened to me, no one would come to my aid." Thus the importance of bystander intervention goes beyond the present research.

What practical recommendations can be made from the findings of the present research? It should be realized that most people do not help because they do not care. Most of the Ss in the present experiment were concerned about what happened to the victim. Even those Ss who did not help were upset by the situation. Most of the Ss did not realize what forces were operating on them. They were not aware of the bystander's invluence. It has been observed that if people are aware of the factors that are influencing them during an emergency they will usually act. People have told of situations where they probably never would have helped except for the fact that they were aware of

the type of research that the E was involved in. That is, the awareness of factors that were influencing them was enough for them to act. Thus, it is recommended that an educational campaign may be effective in helping to reduce the lack of bystander intervention.

APPENDIX A

Apparatus

Ss were seated in front of the panel (19" by 28") pictured in Fig. 1A. The purpose of the panel was to convince the S that she was taking part in an ESP experiment and that there were other subjects in the experiment.

In order to start the experiment the S was told that she would have to put her "ready switch" on. When the S put the ready switch on she started a number of devices: (1) A remote-controlled Tandberg tape recorder which provided the voices of the other "subjects." (2) A seven switch cam timer. One of the cam switches was set so that four minutes and thirty seconds after the S started the experiment all the lights on the panel went off. This occurred thirty seconds after all communications ceased. An additional cam switch shut off the motor to the cam timer thirty seconds later so that the timer would go through only one cycle. (3) A series of Hunter times. Eight Hunter times were used to time the following: (a) the symbol light which was programmed to go on every 15 seconds and stay on for 5 seconds; (b) the sender light showing which S was sending, was timed to change every 80 seconds; (c) the lights which show which microphones were on were programmed to go on, with a 0.3 second delay, after the appropriate sender light went on. The delay was included so that it would appear to the S that when one of the other subjects was the sender that it took this other subject enough time to reset the microphones.

An eight-position stepping switch was used to provide the proper configuration of lights on the panel. When the switch was in position one, the sender light for subject 1 was on, and the mike lights for subjects 2 and 3 were also on. Thus, when the S put her ready switch on, the panel lights showed that subject 1 was the sender and



Fig. 1A: "ESP" Panel

that both she and subject 2 could use the microphones. In addition, the symbol light was oing on and off at the prescribed intervals.

On the lower left corner of the panel were two lights labeled "right" and "wrong." When the S was a receiver, these lights went on 13 seconds after the symbol light went off. They were used to give the S the impression that the sender was informing her whether her guess was right or wrong. The lights were programmed to give the S a 50% probability of being correct in her guesses.

Eighty seconds after the S started the experiment the stepping switch moved into the second position. In this position it appeared that subject 2 was the sender and subject 1 and the S were receivers.

Eighty seconds after the stepping switch was in position 2, it automatically moved into position 3. In this position the S was the sender, so subject 3's sender light went on and so did the microphone reset light. This light reminded the S to reset the microphones so that subjects 1 and 2 could respond. This step also activated certain latching relays which, when the S pressed the correct reset buttons, allowed the microphone lights for subjects 1 and 2 to stay on and shut off the reset light. In addition this step did not allow the right-wrong lights to operate. At this point in the procedure a clock was automatically started which stopped only when the S opened her cubicle door. This provided an accurate measure of how long the S stayed in her cubicle.

Eighty seconds after the stepping switch was in step 3, it went to step 4. At this point in the procedure, the emergency had occurred and all communications were cut off. In this step the only light that went on, in addition to the symbol light, was the light

indicating that subject 1 was the sender. The microphone lights did not go on so that the S should have realized that subject 1 did not reset the microphones. The right-wrong lights did not go on either, indicating that subject 1 was not providing any feedback even if the S tried to respond.

Thirty seconds after the switch was in step 4, the cam timer came to the point at which it shut off all the equipment and the remaining panel lights.

The S's microphone was connected to a Sony tape recorder so that there was a sound record of everything that went on in the S's cubicle.

Only the major parts of the apparatus have been described. For the purpose of this appendix it was decided that it was too complex and unnecessary to explain the purpose of all the latching relays, innumerable diodes and transistors, relays, stepping switches and wires used to operate the ESP panel. All of the apparatus, except of course, the panel itself, was housed in a metal cabinet outside the experimental cubicle. A 32-conductor cable connected the panel to the programming apparatus.

APPENDIX B

Analysis of variance tables of pilot Ss response to questionnaire dealing with tape recordings of the three salience conditions.

TABLE B1. -- Questionnaire item: "How concerned was subject 2 about subject 1?"

	Salience		
	High	Medium	Low
N	30	30	30
Mean	1.52	3.61	5.00

score of 1 = very concerned to score of 7 = not at all concerned.

Analysis of variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between	183	2	91.7	31.7*
Within	254	88	2.9	
Total	438	90		

* $p < .01$

The three means differ from each other at the .005 level according to a Duncan Multiple Range Test.

TABLE B2. -- Questionnaire item: "How excited was subject 2?"

	Salience		
	High	Medium	Low
N	30	30	30
Mean	1.96	3.19	4.48

score of 1 = very excited to a score of 7 = not at all excited

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between	95	2	47.5	15.0*
Within	280	88	3.1	
Total	375	90		

* $p < .01$

The three means differ from each other at the .01 level according to a Duncan Multiple Range Test

TABLE B3. -- Questionnaire item: "How upset was subject 2?"

	Salience		
	High	Medium	Low
N	30	30	30
Mean	2.10	4.12	4.74

score of 1 = very upset to a score of 7 = not upset at all

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between	113	2	26.6	19.8*
Within	252	88	2.8	
Total	365	90		

* $p < .01$

A Duncan Multiple Range Test shows that both the Medium and Low Salience conditions differ significantly ($p < .001$) from the High Salience condition but do not differ significantly from each other.

TABLE B4. -- Questionnaire item: "How sincere did subject 2 sound?"

	Salience		
	High	Medium	Low
N	30	30	30
Mean	2.58	3.73	3.77

score of 1 = very sincere to score of 7 = not sincere at all

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between	41	2	20.7	6.2*
Within	287	88	3.3	
Total	329	90		

* $p < .01$

A Duncan Multiple Range Test shows that both the Medium and Low Salience conditions differ significantly ($p < .05$) from the High Salience condition but do not differ significantly from each other.

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