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DISSENT AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE: THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION

City University of New York PH.D. 1980

DISSENT AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE: THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION

By

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1980

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

9/5/80
date

Chairman of Examining Committee

9/11/80
date

Executive Officer

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The City University of New York

TO MY MOTHER

AND THE MEMORY

OF MY FATHER

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to my parents for having given me the motivation, encouragement and support that have made this dissertation a reality. Their kindness and generosity will always be remembered. I wish to thank my sisters, Maria and Anna, who in many ways supplemented the encouragement and support of my parents. I am grateful to my wife, Judith Ann, for her sacrifices and dedication over the past year when this work took final shape; she was a true inspiration.

Professors Howard Lentner and Henry Morton exhibited a great degree of dedication in supervising the writing of this dissertation and I am thankful for their efforts.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study in United States foreign policy revolving around the topic of Soviet domestic dissent. Before proceeding with an examination of the hypotheses this study will deal with, it is necessary to examine the existing literature relevant to this topic and a number of terms and concepts that have a bearing on this study.

Literature

Much of the literature dealing with human rights revolves around one of three basic themes. These are: the study of the historical evolution of human rights declarations and the attempts at implementing them, the comparative study of human rights, and the philosophical study of human rights.

An example of the first type of theme is the study edited by A. H. Robertson.[1] The main thrust of the book is the examination of the application of international agreements on human rights to national law, that is, what are the obligations of states in applying international law into national law and how do national institutions, such as the courts, deal with the implementation of these international agreements. The study focuses on the European Convention on Human Rights but also examines other regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and also the United Nations.

Indeed, much of the first type of literature has been written in the context of the United Nations' role in human rights affairs.[2] Three such studies are those by Egon Schwelb, Moses Moskowitz, and Vernon Van

Dyke.[3] Schwelb's study deals with the growth in importance of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. He traces the historical roots of the Declaration, its gradual incorporation into the context of international law and how it has served as the basis for other declarations and conventions, such as the Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.

In his work, Moskowitz briefly traces the historical development of human rights and concentrates on the role of the United Nations in promoting human rights. In this regard he outlines the various agreements drawn up by the United Nations concerning human rights, the United Nations machinery available for the promotion of human rights and examines the legal aspects of the United Nations Charter pertaining to human rights. He also examines two cases of intervention by the United Nations on behalf of human rights principles. One deals with the issue of forced labor and the other with racial discrimination in South Africa. Indeed, much of the literature pertaining to the United Nations role in human rights is concerned mostly with racial discrimination and colonialism. The reason for this may be the result of the fact that "the movement in the United Nations has come under the very substantial influence, if not the control, of those whose concern for human rights stops with the problems of racism and self-determination."[4]

In his book, Van Dyke examines the United States' role regarding human rights in the international arena with a major focus on the United Nations. Specifically, he examines American views of various human rights provisions passed by the United Nations, such as the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights, and the views regarding methods of implementing human rights in the United Nations. He also examines the American role with respect to human rights in the Organization of American States.

The second type of human rights literature deals with the comparative study of human rights. Two studies of this nature are those by Ivo D. Duchacek and Richard P. Claude.[5] In his book, Claude traces the historical development of human rights but concentrates on comparing various rights in different states. For example, there are sections regarding the freedom of expression in Japan and the United States, the status of women in the United States and the Scandinavian states, and the right of privacy in the United States, Great Britain, and India. In his book, Duchacek comparatively examines political, social and economic rights and liberties by studying the national constitutions of various states. He draws on constitutions from Western, Communist and Third World states.

A third type of human rights literature deals with the philosophical aspects of human rights. Included in this are the works by Maurice Cranston and Christopher R. Hill. These works, basically, deal with the question of defining human rights and examining the moral and philosophical impacts of the issue.[6]

All the above literature on human rights has a common shortcoming. The literature is mainly concerned with outlining the various international agreements concerning human rights and tracing state adherence to them or in examining a state's domestic law in reference to human rights. The literature has focused mainly on the end product, the rights themselves. What is needed is a study of the political nature of the issue. Specifically, there is a gap in the literature pertaining to the political study of human rights on the international level, studies that

deal with why and how human rights can become a foreign policy issue between two states, how states can interact over the issue, and what the political consequences of interaction are. These are the aspects of the issue that this dissertation will address.

With regard to the literature dealing specifically with Soviet dissidents, there is a failure to examine the international repercussions of this dissent. Some of the literature which has appeared on Soviet dissent includes books by Albert Axelbank, Harry G. Shaffer, Michael Browne, George Saunders, Peter Reddaway, and Rudolf Tokes.[7] This literature basically deals with all or some of the following general themes: the historical role of dissent in the Soviet Union, an examination of the views of some of the more prominent dissidents, an examination of the harassment and imprisonment of dissidents, and an examination of dissident writings.

When an international aspect of Soviet dissent is examined, it deals mostly with the dissidents' views of various international questions. Frederick Barghoorn, for example, examines the dissidents' views of detente and China, among other issues, but falls short of examining the impact of the dissident issue on state relations. His book seeks "to construct a collective profile of democratic dissenters' perception of Kremlin world policy, focusing on a number of significant themes and attitudes common to the utterances of several leading dissenters."[8]

In short, most of the literature dealing specifically with the dissidents in the Soviet Union is concerned mainly with the domestic functioning of such dissent. Any mention of the dissidents' international role is sparse and lacks detail. Indeed, all aspects of

Soviet dissent seem to have escaped careful scholarly scrutiny. Rudolf Tokes states that "the study of dissent in the USSR still seems to be the domain of political journalists rather than that of the community of scholars with proper qualifications for objective study of Soviet society and politics."[9] A typical comment regarding the analytical base of much of this literature is John Armstrong's view of Browne's book. Armstrong states: "This book is not in any sense a social science analysis. The lengthy introduction and the editorial notes are purely historical and descriptive."[10]

To address this gap in the literature this dissertation investigates the role of Soviet dissent on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Definition of Dissent

In the literature on Soviet dissent, some scholars, such as Peter Reddaway, tend to draw a distinction between dissent and opposition. Reddaway defines dissent as "objection to certain of the rulers' actions or policies" with no desire on the part of the dissidents to rule.[11] He defines opposition, in turn, as the desire "to rule in place of the existing rulers."[12] Frederick Barghoorn, however, regards the terms as interchangeable since, basically, both seek the same goals. He writes:

> The ultimate objective of rational dissent and opposition is to correct mistakes, to right wrongs, or, in extreme cases, to protect against and, if possible, eradicate what is perceived as an intolerable evil. In general, its purpose is to effect changes in political structures, policies, and leadership in conformity with the dissenters' values and preferences.[13]

While Barghoorn sees no major difference in the objectives of dissent and opposition, they can be distinguished on the basis of methods employed.

Dissent, unlike opposition, "is primarily a symbolic rather than an organizational mode of behavior."[14]

In this dissertation dissent will be used in the manner described by Barghoorn. Dissent, therefore, is the desire to achieve a change in policy or political leadership through the utilization of largely symbolic and peaceful methods.

Dissent, therefore, does not involve violence as a means for expressing one's opposition to a regime, a policy or other political matters. Violence, such as self-immolation or breaking in to a foreign embassy to gain asylum may take place, but it is not a protracted form of violence nor is it a major vehicle for political expression.

The basic tool that dissidents have at their disposal is the written and spoken word. Whether it is through the publication of samizdat material, through personal contact with western correspondents, or the issuance of appeals and letters to the Soviet authorities the dissidents rely, for the most part, on the strength of their words and ideas for waging their battle and for gaining both domestic and international support. Their demands are usually based on Soviet laws and the constitution.

All dissidents engage in these same forms of activities for getting their messages across, even though each group of dissidents has a different goal. Thus, for example, nationalist dissidents who seek greater autonomy and liberal dissidents who seek a greater adherence by the regime to the law, nonetheless, both base their protests on the law and the constitution and engage in the same written and verbal means of expression. Thus, the distinguishing characteristics of dissent are its peaceful methods and the reliance on using verbal and written messages as the means for waging opposition to the Soviet regime.

Both Ukrainian nationalist dissent and Jewish emigration dissent fit the above definition. While Ukrainian nationalists, for the most part, seek secession from the Soviet Union, they nonetheless utilize symbolic and peaceful methods in their actions. If organized armed conflict were to arise then we would no longer be able to speak of dissent but rather of revolutionary opposition, and that would require a different mode of analysis. Jewish emigrants seeking to emigrate also use symbolic and peaceful methods. Various examples throughout the dissertation will attest to the peaceful methods of both groups of dissidents.

The Soviet View of Dissent

The Soviet Union admits to a dissident problem. Soviet editor Valentyn Berezhkov had a question on dissidents put to him at a 1976 United Nations press conference. He responded that dissent is not a serious problem and that it has been played up too much by the West. Leonid Romanov, the press counselor for the Soviet United Nations Mission, had a question addressed to him with respect to national discrimination in the Soviet Union and those who are speaking out against it. He replied: "Surely there are some people who are not content, are discontented, and surely they are demanding something. These people really exist and want something. I'm not very much acquainted with what they are demanding actually, you see. But this does not represent any movement en masse."[15]

I had an opportunity to participate in a discussion with visiting Soviet officials and posed the question of whether dissent exists. The answer was given by Ruslan Bodelan, First Secretary of the Odessa Komsomol. He stated that "we have people 'like that' [dissidents]

but they have no grass roots support."[16]

The theme that seems to run through the Soviet viewpoint is that dissidents exist, but that their role is minute, they have no popular support, and that the West exaggerates the role of Soviet dissidents. While the Soviet government admits to the existence of dissidents it does not recognize a legitimate base for their dissent. The reason for this is due to the fact that the Soviet regime regards itself as possessing and propagating the correct doctrine--Marxism-Leninism. The Communist Party is the bearer of all truth and ideas. As a result, there cannot be another source. The authorities "reserve unto themselves the right to articulate ideas; no one else may compete with them. Ideas are the threat, not a tiny band of dissidents."[17] The Soviet system, therefore, fuses both rights and duties. The result is that "a person must do what is prescribed and has a right to do only what is prescribed."[18]

In its attempts to undermine dissident activity the Soviet regime has resorted to numerous tactics. The tactics include psychiatric imprisonment, forced exile, and charges of criminal behavior among others. Charges of criminal behavior is a favorite tactic of the regime. A number of features of the Soviet legal system allow the regime to use the legal system for its own behalf and against individuals it wishes to treat as criminals.

The foremost characteristic of the Soviet legal system is that it reflects the dominant position enjoyed by the Communist Party. Throughout Soviet history the Party has manipulated the legal system to meet the political needs of the time. The Soviet legal system, therefore, has "shown itself subject to frequent changes, in line with

the Party's current preoccupations."[19] Furthermore, some crimes, such as treason and sabotage, are defined loosely. Also, the Soviet regime is prone to institute ex post facto criminal laws to punish individuals for acts that were not crimes at the time they were committed.[20] Finally, in the Soviet legal context, a defendant is considered guilty until proven innocent.[21]

The Soviet legal system exists, therefore, as a facade for the regime's control of Soviet society.[22] This facade is preserved for public opinion purposes to make the Soviet state appear to its people and the world as abiding by a system of laws and legal procedures.[23] It is evident that in the Soviet legal and political system anyone who questions the functioning of the system may become suspect and liable to criminal prosecution. Dissidents, therefore, face the prospect of being arrested as criminals and the legal system is used as an instrument of coercion against them rather than as a neutral arbiter to weigh and decide their complaints.[24]

Types of Soviet Dissent

Soviet dissent crosses a wide spectrum. There are, however, six basic categories of Soviet dissent: Neo-Marxist, liberal, Russian nationalist, religious, nationalist, and emigration dissent.[25]

Neo-Marxist dissidents, such as Roy Medvedev, feel that Marxism in the Soviet Union has fallen short of its ideals. What is needed is the institution of true Marxism and not the present deviation. Medvedev has stated:

> I am deeply convinced that for the foreseeable future, our society should be built on a combination of socialism

> and democracy, and that specifically the development of Marxism and scientific Communism will allow creation of the most just society.[26]

Medvedev further believes that open debate will help promote Marxist-Leninist ideology and help develop a more capable corps of communist leaders.

The liberal form of dissent is concerned with obtaining the political and civil rights which are now theoretically guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. The dissidents' actions consist, basically, of attending the trials of dissidents, issuing protests and calling attention to what they consider illegal procedures. They can be considered as seeking to introduce Western type of political and democratic values into the Soviet Union. The leading exponent of the liberal dissident movement has been Andrei Sakharov.[27]

Russian nationalist dissent represents what may be called the "right wing" of Soviet dissent. This dissent seeks a restoration of the traditional religious and historical beliefs of Russia. It is, therefore, an ethnic Russian movement. Overall, this movement disdains and rejects Western influences, is characterized by xenophobia, Russian patriotism, anti-Semitism, and the favor of authoritarian rule.[28] Since one of its basic themes is suspicion of external actors and beliefs, this pattern of dissent eschews any desire for external support and, therefore, in the context of this study when I speak of dissent the reference is to the dissident movements seeking external Western support unless otherwise noted.

Religious dissidents are concerned with obtaining the right for religious propagation and practice. They simply seek greater religious

freedom and are not too concerned with political questions. The Baptists are probably the most persistent religious dissidents yet simultaneously they are the most apolitical.[29] Religious dissent is widespread throughout the Soviet Union, so much so that "more religious writing is distributed in samizdat than secular literature or political material."[30]

While most religious dissidents stay away from political dissent, an important feature of religion in the Soviet Union is that it is heavily identified with certain ethnic groups. The result is that religion reinforces ethnic identity and nationalist sympathies. In Western Ukraine, for example, there is a close relationship between nationalism and the Uniate Catholic Church.

Nationalist dissent may pose the greatest threat to the Soviet regime since it threatens to dismember the Soviet state.[31] Basing its appeal on ethnic identity, nationalist dissent is more likely to attract a mass base of support thereby making the above threat a greater reality. Nationalist dissidents oppose the policy of Russification which is exhibited by the subjugation of national cultures and languages and by the political and economic domination by the Russians.

The last major form of dissent is emigration dissent. There are two types of emigration dissent. One type is composed of Soviet ethnic groups who were internally exiled and are seeking to return to their homelands inside the Soviet Union. One such group is the Crimean Tatars who were deported in 1944 to Soviet Central Asia and are now seeking to be allowed to return to the Crimea. The second type of emigration dissent involves the desire to leave the Soviet Union.

The desire to leave the Soviet Union has always been regarded as a sign of disloyalty. The opposition to emigration is also rooted in a deeper social psychology that goes beyond the present ideology. It "is rooted in the custom of obstructing the self-government of society, of obstructing the individual's departure from the hierarchy, class, or guild ordained for him."[32] Examples of such obstructions are residence permits, obstacles to changing jobs, and the difficulty of leaving collective farms. While a number of peoples have emigrated from the Soviet Union, such as Germans and Poles, the emigration phenomenon of the 1970's has been basically a Jewish movement.[33]

Human Rights and the Problems of Interpretation

The dissidents do not limit their activities to the Soviet domestic scene solely. Many of them, such as religious dissidents, Jews seeking to emigrate and Ukrainian nationalists, have appealed to external actors for support. The West, and the United States in particular, have been favorite targets of appeal.

For its part, the United States has undertaken criticism of the Soviet Union for alleged human rights violations. In addition, the United States has undertaken certain actions against the Soviet Union over the issue. These actions have included expulsion of Soviet personnel, protests to the Soviet government and passage of the Jackson Amendment, which has tied United States trade with the Soviet Union to a greater rate of Jewish emigration.[34] The issue of human rights, therefore, has become an important ingredient in United States-Soviet relations.

However, the issue of human rights is not clear-cut. There are a

number of problems with the issue which, when examined, will show the political nature of the issue and thus the difficulty of regarding it as a neutral norm applicable equally to all states.

One difficulty is the problem of defining human rights. Human rights are usually divided into two categories, civil and political rights on the one hand, and social and economic rights on the other hand. Maurice Cranston feels that only the former can be considered human rights, that is, rights that are due to all individuals.[35] His criterion is that something can be a human right only if it can be promptly transferred into realization. Civil and political rights can be so realized, but social and economic rights cannot be. The latter are merely ideals that states may strive for but that cannot be granted equally in all states because of the inequality among states due to the distribution of resources. This view, however, cannot help but seem biased. This is so not by intention but rather because of the nature of the issue. The problem is that each state may have a different interpretation as to what constitutes human rights. This is one of the problems that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, being a Marxist state, interprets events through a Marxist prism. The emphasis of Marxism is on economics and thus there is an economic base to all events. This holds true for human rights. "In the USSR the greatestimportance is attached to ensuring social and economic rights, such as the right to work, to leisure, to free education, to material security in old age and in the case of illness or disability and to the protection of health."[36]

The United States, along with other Western states, has a different viewpoint as to what constitutes human rights. For the United States, human rights involve political and civil factors. Based on a Lockean tradition, the United States' system has revolved around the idea of giving and preserving individual political freedoms. Thus, freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion, among other rights, are the cornerstone of United States human rights beliefs.

A second problem between the United States and the Soviet Union is one of application. Both states have different social and political systems and interpret the application of rights differently. The United States and the Soviet Union both claim to have freedom of speech, but the application of the right is quite different in both systems. Yet neither system feels its application is wrong. For example, the Soviet Union has a whole system of election procedures which parallels that in the United States: there are nominations, campaigns, and elections.[37] However, the actual operation of the system is quite different than in the United States.

A remaining point that complicates United States-Soviet relations over the issue of human rights is sovereignty. Sovereignty is "the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory and, in consequence, independence from the authority of any nation and equality with it under international law."[38] Since each state views its domestic structure and processes as inviolate, the question arises: on what grounds can an external actor criticize the Soviet Union for human rights violations? One may argue that human rights are natural rights and, therefore, cannot be constrained by any

laws or national boundaries. Or, one may argue that human rights in some cases are protected under international customary law, such as the right of diplomatic protection of citizens abroad. However, the greatest strength for legitimate criticism of the Soviet Union by the United States seems to be the various international agreements regarding human rights entered into by the two states. Adherence to these agreements commits a state to observe human rights, and failure to do so creates the situation for legitimate external criticism. Thus, the United Nations Charter, to which both the United States and the Soviet Union subscribe, makes it incumbent on all states to observe human rights. Under Article 56 the Charter permits action on behalf of achieving these rights. The United States, therefore, has a basis in the United Nations Charter and other international agreements, such as the Helsinki Accords, to pressure the Soviet Union on the human rights issue.

However, while states have been willing to give verbal support to the issue of human rights, they have not been willing to establish enforcement measures which will aid greater implementation of human rights. On the whole, "states have preferred to rely on more elastic limitations of territorial sovereignty in favour of human rights as, for instance, in the Articles on human rights in the Charter of the United Nations... or legally non-committal declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948."[39]

Therefore, a contradictory situation exists. On the one hand, states commit themselves to the issue of human rights. On the other hand, they limit the right of enforcement and external examination. The result is that each state can highlight that part of international

law which conforms to its own beliefs--or political purposes at the time. Therefore, while the United States may state that an international agreement gives the right to examine alleged violations of human rights in other states, the Soviet Union may interpret it from a different perspective. The Soviet Union has always presented in its arguments on human rights those parts of international agreements which support the sovereignty of the state.[40] In this regard, Leonid Brezhnev has stated with respect to human rights that

> Soviet laws afford our citizens broad political freedoms. At the same time, they protect our system and the interests of the Soviet people from any attempts to abuse these freedoms. And this is in full conformity with the International Covenants on Human Rights ratified by the Soviet Union, which say that the rights they enumerate "shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights or freedoms of others..." We subscribed to this.[41]

Given the different views regarding the definition and application of human rights and of sovereignty, it is no wonder that the Soviet regime regards United States' criticism of alleged Soviet human rights violations as interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. In this regard, Leonid Brezhnev has stated:

> Let us call a spade a spade, dear friends. With all the talk of freedom and democracy and human rights, this whole strident campaign serves only one purpose: to cover up attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries, to cover up the imperialist aims of this policy.[42]

Overall, the United States has restricted its interest in human rights to the exercise of civil and political rights as practiced in the Western democratic societies.[43] In criticizing the Soviet Union

over alleged Soviet violations of human rights, the United States is using the Western standard of human rights, and it is a standard that the Soviet regime does not recognize.

Objectives of the Dissertation

As the above categorization of dissent showed, dissent is not a single phenomenon. There are different types of dissent, each type revolving around a particular goal such as religious freedom or the right to emigrate. Furthermore, each type of dissent may have a different impact on internal and external society. To obtain a clear understanding of Soviet dissent it may be necessary to study each particular type of dissent.

This dissertation will study two types of dissent--Jewish emigration and Ukrainian nationalism--in order to determine the impact of each even when the same state actors--the United States and the Soviet Union--are involved.

Ukrainian nationalism was selected because it is probably the most threatening dissent faced by the Soviet regime.[44] Jewish emigration was selected because it has probably been the most successful form of dissent, in that the goal of emigration has been realized by many Soviet Jews and much international attention has been paid to this particular issue.[45] The dissertation will examine United States policy regarding both types of dissent and United States-Soviet behavior regarding each. In particular, the dissertation will seek to determine what factors conditioned United States policy towards the Soviet human rights issue and in particular the Jewish emigration

issue and the Ukrainian nationalism issue.

It is the thesis of this dissertation that four factors have played a role in conditioning United States behavior towards Soviet dissent. These are: the politics of detente in the United States, the rise of moralism in United States foreign policy in the 1970's, the goals of the dissidents concerned, and the Jewish and Ukrainian ethnic groups in the United States. The basis and reasoning for these assumptions will now be presented.

Under the Nixon presidency the movement toward United States-Soviet detente was beginning to grow and reaching some fruition. At the same time that detente was progressing, there was criticism brewing in the United States from various groups, mostly conservative elements in Congress, that detente was basically benefitting the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States. These critics started to demand a quid pro quo from the Soviet Union.

At the time that the politics of detente was developing in the United States, there was also a movement toward an emphasis on moralism in United States foreign policy. The debacle of the Vietnam War and the political corruption of Watergate seemed to create a backlash in Congress against the "Imperial Presidency," a presidency which had increasingly aggrandized all types of powers unto itself. In its attempts to trim the strength of the Presidency and to put its own mark on United States foreign policy, the Congress undertook a moral emphasis in foreign affairs, with its various pieces of legislation on human rights being the result.

The basic hypothesis of this dissertation is that the politics of

detente and the growth of moralism in United States foreign policy combined in such a way that the critics of detente in the United States seized upon the issue of human rights as a means to pressure the Soviet Union and to gear detente in a manner they favored. It will be shown that the Jewish emigration issue became the most convenient tool for exercising this pressure. This is posited on the belief that the critics of detente utilized a dissent that would receive widespread support in United States society for their campaign against the Soviet Union. It is my contention that Jewish emigration provided this wide base of support because of the historical tradition in the United States for speaking out against Russian persecution of Jews, because emigration is a widely recognized international right and because emigration does not pose such a major threat against the Soviet Union as another form of dissent might. Basically, the Jewish emigration issue could be supported by the critics of detente because it would not necessarily endanger the overall United States-Soviet relationship.

To substantiate this view I will contrast Ukrainian nationalism with Jewish emigration and show that support was not forthcoming from the United States for Ukrainian nationalist dissent. This dissent presents a direct threat to the stability of the Soviet Union; thus, the United States would not support it since such support might lead to great friction between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, I will show that the goals of the dissidents played a role in conditioning the United States response and behavior over the dissent issue.

I will also examine the question of whether the American-Jewish

community and the Ukrainian-American community played any decisive role in influencing American foreign policy toward the dissident movements of their respective kinsmen. The American-Jewish community has been recognized as a powerful political force in the United States. It is, therefore, relevant to examine whether the American-Jewish community played a key role in the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration. The Ukrainian-American community, on the other hand, can be considered a relatively weak political force in the United States. I will show, however, that the strength of these two groups was to a large extent irrelevant in shaping the United States attitude toward the dissidents they supported.

The Jackson Amendment will serve as a case study in my examination of the Soviet Jewish emigration issue. The Amendment was chosen because it is an actual piece of legislation against which my hypotheses can be examined.

FOOTNOTES

1. A.H. Robertson, ed., Human Rights in National and International Law (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968).

2. The emphasis in the literature on the United Nations role is probably due to the fact that the term "human rights" was mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations. By making this reference in the Charter "human rights are mentioned almost for the first time in an international treaty." See A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1963), pp. 1-2. Furthermore, the United Nations made the promotion of human rights one of its main activities. Thus, while international concern with human rights can be traced back to treaties following the Reformation, the United Nations' commitment to human rights is "more extensive than any comparable international endeavor." See Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958), p. 14.

3. Egon Schwelb, Human Rights and the International Community (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964); Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958); Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, the United States and World Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

4. Van Dyke, p. vi.

5. Richard P. Claude, ed., Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Ivo D. Duchacek, Rights and Liberties in the World Today: Constitutional Promise and Reality (Santa Barbara, California: Clio Inc., 1973).

6. Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? 2nd ed. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1973); Christopher R. Hill, Rights and Wrongs (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969).

7. Albert Axelbank, Soviet Dissent (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1975); Harry G. Shaffer, The Soviet Treatment of Jews (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); Michael Browne, ed., Ferment in the Ukraine (New York: Crisis Press, 1973); Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972); Rudolf Tokes, ed., Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

8. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Detente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 23.

9. Tokes, p. 2.

10. John Armstrong, Book Review in The American Political Science Review, 67 (March 1973): 242.

11. Peter Reddaway, "The Development of Dissent in the USSR," in The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente, ed. William E. Griffith (Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1976), p. 58.

12. Ibid.

13. Barghoorn, p. 6. Also, see p. 183.

14. Ibid., p. 7.

15. Ukrainian Weekly, 12 September 1976.

16. Interview with Ruslan Bodelan, First Secretary of the Odessa, Ukrainian SSR Komsommol, New York City, May, 1977.

17. Robert G. Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (New York: Pocket Books, 1976), p. 463.

18. Valery Chalidze, To Defend These Rights, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 23.

19. Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 308.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 304.

23. For the Soviet regime's concern regarding international public opinion over the Soviet Union's court system, see John N. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 170.

24. Kenneth Farmer, "Ukrainian Dissent: Symbolic Politics and Socio-Demographic Aspects," Part II, The Ukrainian Quarterly 34 (Summer 1978): 155.

25. For a similar categorization of dissent, with variations, see Peter Reddaway, "The Development of Dissent in the USSR," in The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente, ed. William E. Griffith (Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 63-77. There is no set standard for determining types of dissent. Reddaway, for example, speaks of "liberal" dissent while Abraham Brumberg speaks of the same dissent as "legalist" dissent. See Abraham Brumberg, "Dissent in Russia", Foreign Affairs 52 (July 1974): 781-798. Given this confusion, I have sought to sift out the main forms of dissent and their names on the basis of their goals. For example, dissidents seeking religious rights are simply referred to as "religious dissidents."

26. New York Times, 17 February 1974.

27. Reddaway, "Dissent," p. 63.

28. Brumberg, p. 784. Brumberg uses the term "Slavophilism" rather than "Russian nationalism". See footnote #25. The Soviet authorities have been somewhat sympathetic toward Russian nationalism. The regime has not cracked down on Russian nationalism too hard since it serves to strengthen the sense of Russian identity. Since Russians rule the state it is good politics to give them greater freedom to distinguish themselves from the other ethnic groups so that their support of the Soviet system may be reinforced. Thus, for example, "in what many read as a nod toward Russian consciousness, Ilya Glazunov, a painter who calls for a return to Russia's spiritual heritage, was allowed a one-man exhibition in one of Moscow's largest and most prominent halls, the Manezk, beside the Kremlin." See New York Times, 12 November 1978.

29. Reddaway, "Dissent," p. 76.

30. Kaiser, p. 442.

31. Barghoorn, Detente, p. 19.

32. Chalidze, p. 105.

33. For example, in the general atmosphere of detente, roughly 250,000 ethnic Germans have been repatriated from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to West Germany. See Washington Post, 7 April 1980.

34. The Jackson Amendment is a Congressional stipulation aimed at giving the Soviet Union economic benefits in exchange for freer Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The amendment was sponsored in the Senate by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Washington). The House version was sponsored by Representative Charles A. Vanik (D-Ohio). The amendment thus became known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, but is more popularly referred to as the Jackson Amendment since Senator Jackson was the main force behind the movement. The amendment will be examined in Chapter Six.

35. Cranston, passim.

36. Yearbook On Human Rights for 1973-1974 United Nations, 1977, p. 211.

37. For a discussion of the Soviet election system, see Meyer, pp. 269-274.

38. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 313.

39. Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law Vol. 1, 3rd ed. (London, Stevens and Sons Limited, 1957), pp. 273-274.

40. For the Soviet view on human rights and international law, see Robertson, National, pp. 299-307.

41. Leonid Brezhnev, Peace, Detente, and Soviet-American Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 62.

42. Ibid., pp. 61-62.

43. In discussing the American role in human rights in the third world Susan Shirk has written, "The American insistence on restricting the scope of human rights to the exercise of civil and political liberties is seen, at best, as an expression of postindustrial affluence with little application to the poorer countries." See Susan L. Shirk, "Human Rights: What About China?," Foreign Policy, no. 29 (Winter 1977-78), p. 110.

44. John Dornberg has written that in Ukraine "has grown the fruit of a dissident nationalism unmatched by any in the USSR. In fact, one day when Moscow must face the demand for independence from the people it rules, the first confrontation is most likely to take place in the Ukraine." See John Dornberg, The New Tsars (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 188.

45. Barghoorn, Detente, p. 110.

CHAPTER TWO

THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The past decade has witnessed an increased awareness of the issue of human rights in international politics. As Roberta Cohen, executive director of the International League for Human Rights, said: "Human rights is suddenly chic."[1] In line with Cohen's comment, David Hawk, executive director of Amnesty USA, states: "What's happened is that the public at last is learning about the growing use of torture. People want to find out what they can do about it."[2] And President Carter recognized this new development when he stated that "there has been a substantial move toward concern about human rights throughout the world."[3]

A significant development regarding this expanded concern with human rights is the important impact that the issue has come to have on state behavior.[4] Specifically, the issue has affected the relations among states and has also made them conscious of their external images on the issue. Its importance for state relations was underlined by Andrei Sakharov when he stated that human right is "one of the most important international causes, inseparable from the basic issues of peace and progress."[5] Numerous examples attest to this impact on state relations: Chile released an imprisoned Communist leader in exchange for the Soviet Union's release of a dissident and the United States has imposed limits on military aid to Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia because of political repression in those states.[6]

This chapter will address the factors that have made human rights an important issue in United States-Soviet relations and will trace the American view of the issue over the past decade.

The Rise of the Human Rights Issue in United States-Soviet Relations

The Soviet Union has always had a dissident problem in one way or another.[7] In the past, there has also been external criticism of the regime's treatment of its citizens. What makes the present era different is the combination of dissent, active external support for dissidents plus a heightened world consciousness regarding human rights. The combination of these three factors has made Soviet dissent a volatile international issue.

Jewish agitation for emigration was the dissent that came to achieve the widest attention and support. Jewish dissent, in turn, affected other Soviet dissidents in two ways. First, in calling attention to the problem of Jewish emigration, the Jews brought attention to the other dissident movements. International publicity had always been a goal of Soviet dissidents, but it was not until 1970-71, that is, the time when Jewish emigration was increasingly coming before the public eye, that the dissidents were able to gain this goal. Second, it showed the other dissidents the value of external links. Therefore, "appeals for outside support became a norm to be emulated increasingly by other dissidents as well."[8] Furthermore, Jewish emigration became a vehicle for escape for other ethnics, as Russians, Ukrainians, and others married Jews in order to be able to emigrate.

While discrimination and anti-Semitism had always been a problem in the Soviet state, it was not the initial factor that prompted emigration. Compared to Stalinist and Czarist days, anti-Semitism now is much milder. The roots of the present emigration movement go back to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Like the cultures of other Soviet nationalities, Jewish culture is stunted in the Soviet Union. The war, however, awakened a sense

of nationalism and identity in Soviet Jews. Dr. Veniamin G. Levich, a Soviet Jewish scientist who was recently allowed to emigrate, summed up this feeling thus: "As a Jew, I felt a strong sense of identity with the people who fought the six-day war."[9]

The overall dissident movement, however, would not have been so effective if it had not been for an important internal factor -- the mellowing of the Soviet political system. Numerous scholars have called attention to the changing condition of domestic Soviet politics. Terror no longer plays the role it did in Stalinist days. Robert Kaiser has written that when the Soviet government abandoned terror "the level of fear in Soviet society receded. That made the reappearance of some vocal intellectual critics inevitable."[10] The fact that dissidents are imprisoned and not shot gives them added confidence in their activities.

In turn, a variety of factors permitted the Jewish movement to gain the world's attention. First, Israel began to petition other states to protest Soviet treatment of Jews and thus brought attention to the issue. In late 1970, for example, Israel approach Romania and other governments with the request to intervene on behalf of Soviet Jews sentenced to death for an attempted hijacking in Leningrad.[11] Second, the large Jewish community in the United States provided a ready and powerful force willing to aid the Soviet Jewish emigration movement. Third, the history of anti-Semitism and the recent World War II holocaust elicited a natural sympathy on the part of world public opinion to aid the Jewish movement. Fourth, the desire to emigrate was not seen as a direct threat to the Soviet Union (as nationalist dissent would be) and thus made it easier for states to back the Jewish movement without fears of becoming embroiled in political

problems with the Soviet Union. Fifth, at the time when Jewish emigration and Soviet dissent in general were beginning to grow, the West and the Soviet Union were engaged in a process of detente and this, more than the other factors, brought the issue to international attention.

In general, the term detente refers to a change in the pattern of relations between states from one of hostile or unfriendly relations to relations which fall short of friendship but are not hostile.[12] More specifically, in the present era, detente is a term used to define a specific stage of development of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The term is synonymous with the decade of the 1970's, for it was in the early 1970's that three basic agreements of the new friendly relationship were arrived at. Specifically, these were the SALT I agreement, the Berlin Accord, and the statement of basic principles that President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev signed in 1972.[13] This is not to say that the process of United States-Soviet detente started in the 1970's. The objectives of detente had long been sought by both sides, and one can say that the present era of detente started in the early 1960's after the Cuban missile crisis.

As a result of the crisis, both sides began to realize the danger of an all out confrontation. This prompted Khrushchev to sign a partial nuclear test ban treaty with the United States and led President Kennedy to deliver a speech at American University in 1963 in which he appealed for an end to the cold war.[14] These initial steps toward detente, however, did not culminate and did not speed the process because of United States involvement in Vietnam, the United States invasion of the Dominican Republic and the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia.[15]

Ironically, the United States' military involvement in Vietnam made the American government realize it could no longer operate programs globally. This realization plus the growing Soviet arsenal both warranted a reappraisal of the Soviet Union and showed the need to reach an accommodation for peaceful coexistence. Other factors that stimulated the United States in this direction were the growing Sino-Soviet split and the economic burdens of the Vietnam War.

The Sino-Soviet split showed that Communism was not a monolith and thus the possibility of exploiting Sino-Soviet differences existed and the burdens of the Vietnam War showed that there were limits on American resources and capabilities.

On the Soviet side, the restiveness among the East European satellites, declining industrial productivity, the desire to deflect costs from military programs to economic programs and the growing fear of Chinese intentions led the Soviet regime to seek an accomodation with the United States.[16] As a result of the constellation of these factors on both sides the movement towards detente crystallized in the early part of the 1970's thereby bringing the greatest realization of the objectives both sides had when at earlier times they had also sought each other out. Presently, as a result of detente, numerous agreements exist between the United States and the Soviet Union. These include, inter alia, agreements on studying methods for conserving energy, on research to protect the environment, on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on examining new construction methods for earthquake regions, and on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.[17]

Detente, however, is not strictly a United States-Soviet phenomenon. Western Europe has also been engaged in it. The European movement for detente is most closely associated with West Germany. As West German Foreign Minister from 1966-1969, Willy Brandt had spoken for a need for an Ostpolitik and detente.[18] In the fall of 1969 he became the German Chancellor and launched his move for an Ostpolitik which culminated in a Soviet-German treaty and a Polish-German treaty recognizing the post World War II boundaries and status quo.[19] In 1970, Brandt summed up his reasoning for detente when he said: "Russia is inextricably woven into the history of Europe not only as an adversary and danger but also as a partner-historical, political, cultural, and economic."[20]

The most publicized and controversial aspect of the detente process was the Helsinki Agreement signed on August 1, 1975. The Helsinki Summit brought together both the Western and Eastern blocs for the signing of a document which, basically, reaffirmed the present borders and legitimized the status quo in Europe.[21]

Certain parts of the Helsinki Agreement deal with human rights. Specifically, the agreement makes mention of, inter alia, the right of freedom of thought, religion, self-determination and calls for the reunification of families and the freedom of information.[22] The Western feeling regarding these sections of the agreement was aptly summed up by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson when he said: "Detente means little if it is not reflected in the daily lives of our people."[23] This Western initiative for the incorporation of human rights language, however, was not meant to become a rallying point for the human rights cause against the Soviet Union. That it did become so was mainly unintentional.[24] On

the Soviet side the provisions were felt to be minor necessary evils in order to gain the greater goal of recognition of the post World War II boundaries. However, the human rights sections became a rallying cry for many Soviet dissidents and a pressure point against the regime.

The Helsinki Agreement, therefore, did much to increase the publicity surround the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and in increasing the general awareness with human rights. President Carter himself has credited the agreement as having brought publicity to the human rights issue. And Karl E. Birnbaum has written that the agreement has "served as an encouragement for the human rights movements in the East."[25] This can be witnessed by the growth of Helsinki monitoring committees throughout the Soviet bloc. There are five factors that made the Helsinki Agreement so potent.

First, it was a stipulation of the Helsinki Conference that the text of the agreement be published in the signatory states. "Thanks to the human rights provisions of the Final Act, millions of Soviet citizens became aware of their fundamental rights for the first time."[26]

Second, the agreement was signed by the top leaders of many of the states. Brezhnev signed for the Soviet Union. As a result, the agreement gives a legitimacy to action and accountability of governments that past human rights declarations did not carry.

Third, the agreement had the unusual provision for a follow up conference to be held in 1977 at which the implementation of the various articles could be assessed. It, therefore, guaranteed the continuation of the human rights issue in the public eye, unlike other agreements which had no follow-up provisions. The follow-up provision plus the fact

that Brezhnev signed the agreement gave Soviet dissidents an impetus to their activities in the hope that the Soviet regime might be more lenient or that Western scrutiny would pressure the Soviet government toward some leniency.

Fourth, the provision for a follow-up conference not only inspired dissidents but it also made it necessary for the West to maintain a human rights stand and scrutiny of the Soviet bloc in order to have a basis on which to enter the conference. All of this contributed to making the issue remain in the public's attention. An example of this is the assessment that the United States government is supposed to undertake of the Helsinki Accords as mandated by congressional law. The president is required to issue such reports every six months.[27] Furthermore, "the diplomatic missions of nearly all West European nations and the United States in Communist capitals are attempting to keep a record of Communist moves to carry out the terms of the Helsinki Agreement."[28]

Fifth, many domestic critics in the West, and especially in the United States, came to see the Helsinki Agreement as a sell-out to the Soviet Union. The point of criticism was that the agreement recognized the status quo of national boundaries and as such it was a diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union. In addition to the criticism of the Western governments for agreeing to the geographic status quo in Europe, there was criticism that the West was not receiving much in return from the Soviet Union in the detente process. The criticism of detente encompassed the issue of the lack of human rights in the Soviet Union which was now given an added impetus because of the Helsinki Agreement's provisions on human rights. United States East European ethnic groups were especially vocal regarding the Helsinki Agreement.[29] Senator Henry Jackson reflected this feeling

when he said: "Once again the United States has permitted the timetable of a complex negotiation to be determined by the Soviet Union and its allies. The predictable result is a series of Western concessions unmatched by comparable movement on the part of the East."[30]

Even before the Helsinki Agreement, United States critics of detente were feeling that the Soviet Union was gaining too much from the process and were beginning to seize upon the issue. Domestic critics stated that detente was solely benefitting the Soviet Union. An example of such criticism was that of Lev Dobriansky, who criticized the United States' increasing trade with the Soviet Union in the following manner:

> Pursuit of the present course means endowing the Red economies with intangible values of shortened time and reduced real costs of development without, in this dimension, receiving anything in return except the spurious satisfaction of believing that dispersed contracts would lead to "greater understanding" and evolution toward peace" . . . to literally aid them to undermine us in time and everywhere is the height of folly.[31]

At the same time that criticism of detente was being voiced in the United States, Soviet human rights advocates were increasingly becoming more active. Unable to effect any concrete results out of the Soviet Union, critics began to demand Soviet concessions on human rights as a signal of the Soviet government's adherence to detente.[32] Therefore, while detente was supposed to bring the United States and the Soviet Union closer together through cooperation, it actually gave birth to an issue which threatens this cooperation. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated: "Detente became a political issue in the United States."[33] Since it was the executive branch which was identified with detente and Congress contained many of the critics, it fell to Congress

to demand a human rights policy as part of detente. Congressman Robert J. Huber (R.-Mich.) summed up the feeling thus:

> Since many of our spokesmen in the Executive Branch now only speak of trade and detente, it falls to us in the Congress to speak of freedom, human rights, and self-determination for those living in the captive nations. . . . If no one appears to listen, the Congress can and should write these matters into law and forbid the President from making trade concessions to the Soviet Union until such time as we see real concessions to the Ukrainian people and others, indicating that a minimum of human rights, such as freedom of emigration, as generally conceived by most people of the world, are being accorded.[34]

Such criticism, among other things, is what led to the passage by Congress in December of 1974 of the Jackson Amendment which tied United States-Soviet economic exchanges to the levels of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, while it was the overall detente process between East and West that helped bring the Soviet human rights issue onto the international arena, it has been the United States' role in that issue that has brought widespread attention to it. Amnesty International, for example, has given the United States credit for bringing international attention to the issue. Specifically, it gives credit to "the Carter human rights policy for enhancing the visibility of the issue."[35] The reason why the United States has had such a major impact on the issue is that it is a big power and any action undertaken by such a power gains immediate international attention. But this was coupled by the fact that much of the United States' rhetoric and action was directed against the Soviet Union and international events gain or lose importance depending on the amount of attention given them by the superpowers.

The United States and Human Rights

The present United States concern with human rights is a continuation of a strong moral streak which has characterized American foreign policy since the beginning of the republic. Americans have always prided themselves on their system of democracy, economic well-being, and stability which expressed itself in a confidence that the American system was somehow morally better. This moralism has affected both periods of isolationism and interventionism in American foreign policy. Isolationism has not been characterized by a neglect of the external world but rather by a confidence that the American example could affect other states to produce the same results. American interventionism has had the same objective. While it may seem diametrically opposed to the isolationist policy, interventionism has been a liberal tradition aimed at actively introducing those conditions which would preserve and nurture democracy both at home and abroad.[36]

The present United States concern with human rights is the continuation of this moral tradition. Specifically, the United States' concern with Jewish emigration is a continuation of a long tradition. Eleven administrations, starting with President Ulysses S. Grant in 1869, have voiced their concern regarding Russian treatment of their Jewish population. Secretary of State James G. Blaine explained this policy on the basis that intervention in the internal affairs of Russia was warranted if the treatment by a country of its citizens was at "variance with the larger principles of humanity."[37] Americans have also been prone to action. In the 1890's, in response to Jewish persecution, Congress forbade the shipment of food to help a famine stricken Russia, and in 1911 the House of Representatives expressed its indignation at Russian

treatment of Jews by voting to abrogate an 1832 commercial treaty between the United States and Russia.[38]

The present United States concern with Soviet human rights, therefore, was not only an outgrowth of the politicization of detente but was also due to the reassertion of the moral streak that seems to run throughout United States history. This moralization, however, gave greater fertile ground on which the critics of detente could build their argument and presented a more receptive audience.

American moralism seems to come in waves, more so after a crisis has shaken the United States. There is almost a frenetic attempt to overthrow the policies that had led to or were identified with the bad times.[39] The present era of American moralism was best exemplified by the election of Carter as president. Carter had promised a moral government at home and abroad. With respect to foreign policy, he had specifically spoken of the need for a human rights policy.

The present American moralism grew out of the backlash that developed against the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. This was, basically, a backlash against the imperial presidency and the policies associated with it. More and more during the Vietnam era people were referring to the imperial presidency, a presidency characterized, in part, by complete power in foreign policy. Wars were waged, authoritarian regimes supported, and covert activities were undertaken. In this foreign policy process Congress was left as an onlooker rather than as a partner. The Watergate scandal only served to emphasize the strength and isolation of the presidency. In its efforts to narrow the presidency, Congress also sought to overturn the policies associated with the imperial presidency.

Congress has sought to put its own mark on United States foreign policy, and this drive has taken a moral turn in a desire to return to the values of American tradition. The congressional-presidential conflict has led to an emphasis on moral politics rather than power politics.[40] The human rights issue became an outlet for this. Congressional concern with human rights led, for example, to passage of a human rights provision in the 1976-1977 foreign economic aid bill. The law "prohibited development aid to any country engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless Congress determined that the aid benefitted needy people."[41] Congress also requires that the State Department issue an annual human rights report on the nations which receive United States economic and military aid.[42] Congress utilizes these reports in its deliberations on foreign aid requests. In some cases Congress has become more specific. For example, in 1974 it limited military assistance to South Korea for fiscal year 1975 to $145 million. "If the President reported that it had made substantial progess in the observance of human rights, the limit would be raised to $165 million."[43] It was the Congress also that, over the objections of President Ford, created the Helsinki Monitoring Committee to review the compliance of all parties to the agreement, especially the human rights provisions.

In this period of heightened concern with human rights, the United States has had three administrations, those of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. In the Nixon and Ford administrations there was a division of policy views between the executive and the Congress. The Congress favored active pursuit of a human rights policy, as expressed by the legislation it enacted, while the executive felt the issue should not be

given so much attention, lest it hinder normal state relations. Unlike Presidents Nixon and Ford, President Carter has been outspoken on human rights issues.

The basic differences of the Nixon and Ford administrations, as opposed to the Carter administration, include the following points: First, under Nixon and Ford, the emphasis had been on quiet diplomacy rather than on public confrontation. According to Secretary of State Kissinger, this policy had resulted in the successful release of "hundreds of prisoners throughout the world and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous countries."[44] All this had been achieved without publicity. A case in point, according to Kissinger, was the Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. Prior to the passage of the Jackson Amendment, the United States had been able to help hundreds of cases, but after the law passed, emigration dropped.[45]

President Carter, on the other hand, believes in a strong vocal policy. The quiet diplomacy of Kissinger is not acceptable to President Carter. He has stated that he reserves "the right to speak out strongly and forcefully whenever human rights are threatened -- not every instance, but when I think its advisable."[46] And in his 1980 State of the Union message, President Carter stated: "We will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights."[47]

Second, Nixon and Ford regarded the issue as a domestic concern and, as such, pursuit of the issue could lead to intervention in a state's internal affairs. Speaking in 1974 President Nixon stated:

> Eloquent appeals are now being made for the United States, through its foreign policy, to transform the internal as well as the international behavior of other countries, especially the Soviet Union. . . . Our foreign

> policy must reflect our ideals and purposes. We can never acquiesce in the suppression of human liberties. But there are limits to what we can do, and we must ask ourselves some hard questions: We would not welcome the intervention of other countries in our domestic affairs, and we cannot expect them to be cooperative when we seek to intervene in theirs.[48]

President Carter feels that human rights is of international concern and is not to be relegated to domestic politics. As his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated: "No member of the United Nations can claim that violations of internationally protected human rights is solely its own affair." [49]

Third, the Nixon and Ford administrations opposed the use of Congressional legislation to deal with human rights. Referring to congressional attempts to tie most favored nation status for the Soviet Union with greater Jewish emigration, President Nixon stated: "In the case of the Soviet Union, I recognize the deep concern which many in the Congress have expressed over the tax levied on Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate to new countries. However, I do not believe that a policy of denying most favored nation treatment to Soviet exports is a proper or even an effective way of dealing with this problem."[50]

While President Carter has not pushed for any human rights legislation, he has relied on the existing legislation which gives him executive authority to end aid to certain states. For example, in one case, he terminated military aid to Uruguay because of its violations of human rights.[51]

Fourth, the Nixon and Ford administrations felt that the human rights issue might impinge on and detrimentally affect state relations in other areas. The United States feared that the issue might become linked with other, more important issues at the expense of those issues.

President Carter, however, has stated that we will continue to express our concern about violations of human rights "without upsetting our efforts toward friendly relations with other countries."[52] With regard to a specific case he has said, "I see no relationship between the human rights decision . . . and matters affecting our defense of SALT negotiations."[53]

While Carter's behavior may not have jeopardized SALT, states have responded against the United States policy, thereby indicating that while Carter may not see a linkage between issues, these states do. Brazil, for example, became upset over Carter's decision to end military aid.[54]

Fifth, the Nixon and Ford administrations did not want to give the human rights issue a bureaucratic structure in United States foreign policy. Under the Ford Presidency, Congress had created a Committee on Human Rights within the State Department. Under President Ford, the committee's functions had been limited. President Carter, however, has attempted to institutionalize the issue by giving the committee and its Director, Patricia Derian, a greater role.[55]

In addition to the above differences, the Carter administration is also attempting to establish a uniform human rights policy. The aim is to establish some sort of criteria by which judgments and actions can be made. Secretary Vance outlined the directions such a policy may take:

> In pursuing a human rights policy, we must always keep in mind the limits of our power and of our wisdom. A

sure formula for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, hubristic attempt to impose our values on others. A doctrinaire plan of action would be as damaging as indifference.

We must be realistic. Our country can only achieve our objectives if we shape what we do to the case at hand. In each instance, we will consider these questions as we determine whether and how to act:

1. First, we will ask ourselves what is the nature of the case that confronts us? For example:

What kinds of violations or deprivations are there? What is their extent?

Is there a pattern to the violations? If so, is the trend toward concern for human rights or away from it?

What is the degree of control and responsibility of the government involved?

And, finally, is the government willing to permit independent outside investigation?

2. A second set of questions concerns the prospects for effective action:

Will our action be useful in promoting the overall cause of human rights?

Will it actually improve the specific conditions at hand? Or will it be likely to make things worse instead?

Is the country involved receptive to our interest and efforts?

Will others work with us, including official and private international organizations dedicated to furthering human rights?

Finally, does our sense of values and decency demand that we speak out or take action anyway, even though there is only a remote chance of making our influence felt?

3. We will ask a third set of questions in order to maintain a sense of perspective:

Have we steered away from the self-righteous and strident, remembering that our own record is not unblemished?

Have we been sensitive to genuine security interests, realizing that outbreak of armed conflict or terrorism could in itself pose a serious threat to human rights?

Have we considered <u>all</u> the rights at stake? If, for instance, we reduce aid to a government which violates the political rights of its citizens, do we not risk penalizing the hungry and poor, who bear no responsibility for the abuses of their government?

If we are determined to act, the means available range from quiet diplomacy in its main forms, through public

> pronouncements, to withholding of assistance. Whenever possible, we will use positive steps of encouragement and inducement. Our strong support will go to countries that are working to improve the human condition. We will try to act in concert with other countries, through international bodies.
>
> In the end, a decision whether and how to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer.[56]

At first glance, one may feel that the Carter administration has an approach to human rights that is antithetical to that of the Nixon and Ford administrations. A closer examination shows, however, that this is not the real case. Carter's policy is more rhetorical. He has been willing to give more overt attention to human rights, but not at the expense of United States national interests. Unlike Nixon and Ford, Carter has been more outspoken in favor of the issue, has been willing to meet with dissidents, and has also written to dissidents. This attests to a greater willingness on the part of the Carter administration to use the issue as an ideological counterpoint to the Soviet Union's propaganda and also as a means of uplifting the United States image. However, Carter's actions have not really followed his rhetoric. States that are important to United States interests have not been punished for violations.[57] Carter's decision to end funding of Uighur language broadcasts to the Soviet Union and China was criticized as being determined by a desire to maintain friendly relations with China. Such behavior is hardly in tandem with Carter's pronouncements on human rights. Overall, the Carter policy is a verbal one rather than an active one. This in itself, however, is a change from the Nixon and Ford administrations.

The divergence between rhetoric and action can be witnessed by the failure of the Carter administration to actually adopt a uniform policy on the issue. Members of the State Department spend many hours trying to determine whether a particular road in an AID project will give benefits to the poor. Such work is not indicative of a human rights policy. One official stated "There has to be a serious attempt fairly soon to decide what our human rights policy is and how serious it is and then to really communicate that down through the bureaucracy."[58] However, this has presented a serious difficulty. Other interests seem to be more important. This was best summed up by Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, when he said "No single formula can be applied with regard to human rights violations, since economic and security goals must be taken into consideration along with our great concern for each individual's case."[59] In this respect, there is no basic difference between the Nixon and Ford administrations and President Carter. By putting an ideological emphasis on human rights, however, President Carter has lined up the executive branch with Congress on the issue, while in the past there was friction between the two branches.[60]

FOOTNOTES

1. New York Times, 28 February 1977.

2. Ibid.

3. New York Times, 24 February 1977.

4. David Owen, Human Rights (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978), pp. 14-16.

5. New York Times, 18 February 1977.

6. In December 1976 Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky was exchanged for Chilean communist Corvalan Lepe. They were flown to Zurich where the exchange took place. See New York Times, 18 December 1976. While there have been political prisoner exchanges in the past, the Bukovsky-Corvalan exchange was significant for the human rights issue in that Bukovsky is a vocal proponent of Soviet human rights and upon his release eventually met with President Carter to discuss human rights issues. This meeting led the Soviet government to complain that the United States received "criminals." Bukovsky's position in the Soviet human rights struggle and the events surrounding his meeting with President Carter make this prisoner exchange a little more significant. For a report on United States termination of aid to Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia, see New York Times, 25 February 1977.

7. For pre-1965 dissent, see Roland Gaucher, Opposition in the USSR 1917-1967 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969); George Lichtheim and Walter Laqueur, eds., The Soviet Cultural Scene 1956-1957 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958).

8. Abraham Brumberg, "Dissent in Russia," Foreign Affairs 52 (July 1974): 785.

9. New York Times, 12 July 1977.

10. Robert Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (New York: Pocket Books, 1976), p. 436.

11. The two hijackers who were sentenced to death were Mark Dymshits and Eduard Kuznetsov. The other participants in the attempted hijacking were given various prison sentences. The sentences of Dymshits and Kuznetsov were eventually reduced to imprisonment. According to the testimony of the suspected hijackers, the purpose of the hijacking was to flee growing anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. For a background on this case see Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1971), pp. 24443-24444.

    Dymshits and Kuznetsov were released in April of 1979 along with three other dissidents in a United States-Soviet exchange of spies

and dissidents. The other three dissidents were Valentyn Moroz, Petro Vins and Alexander Ginsburg. For details, see New York Times, 28 April 1979.

12. Jack E. Vincent, A Handbook of International Relations (Woodbury, New York: Barron's Educations Series, Inc., 1969), p. 68.

13. Richard J. Barnet, The Giants: Russia and America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), pp. 38-39, 168.

14. For President Kennedy's speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 459-64.

15. Barnet, p. 24.

16. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

17. For then Secretary of State Kissinger's assessment of the mutual benefits of detente with the Soviet Union, see Department of State Bulletin, 14 October 1974, pp. 505-519.

18. Ostpolitik is the West German policy aimed at improving relations with the Soviet Union and the East European Communist states. Its major aim was to resolve the differences between West Germany and the Soviet Union over the questions of a divided Germany and boundaries. As such, Ostpolitik is part of the general East-West detente process. For a discussion of Ostpolitik, see Peter C. Ludz, "Ostpolitik: Detente from a European Perspective," in Detente in Historical Perspective, eds., George Schwab and Henry Friedlander (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975), pp. 80-95.

19. The two treaties were negotiated in 1970 and ratified by Bonn in 1972. The treaties "recognized existing European frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse border between Poland and East Germany, and renounced the use of force to settle disputes between the signatories." See News Dictionary 1972 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1973), pp. 168-169.

20. Barnet, p. 35.

21. The Helsinki Agreement was signed by 33 European states as well as the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada.

22. The provisions pertaining to human rights in the Helsinki Agreement appear in both baskets one and three of the agreement. In basket one, sections VII and VIII pertain to human rights. Section VII provides for "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief." Section VIII speaks of "equal rights and self-determination." Basket three, entitled "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," is devoted solely to areas concerning human contacts, such as the freedom of information and travel.

23. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1975), p. 27308.

24. While the Helsinki Agreement contains references to human rights and calls on the signatories to respect them, two features undermine the strength of the intentions and make it clear that these human rights provisions are not to be used as tools against the signatories. First, while section VIII of basket one speaks of self-determination it makes it clear that the signatories will behave "in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N. and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of states." (emphasis added). Furthermore, section VI of basket one states that "the participating states will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state, regardless of their mutual relations." It seems, therefore, that none of the states wanted to make human rights a point of contention. Statements by Western heads of state at the signing ceremony also indicate this. Giscard d'Estaing, for example, said, "There is nothing unnatural about the fact that within States and outside them a different political and philosophical choice leads to ideological struggle which must be waged without interference from outside." (emphasis added). In his statement United States President Gerald Ford sought only to emphasize the link between the United States and Europe. He said, "To our fellow participants in this conference, my presence here symbolizes my country's vital interest in Europe's future. Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well-being as well as our security is linked increasingly with yours." See Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1975), pp. 27308, 27309.

It was the West European states that had pushed for the incorporation of human rights language in the Helsinki Agreement. See New York Times, 17 July 1977. The West European move, however, may have been the result more of domestic pressure rather than a desire to pursue the issue against the Soviet Union. The domestic pressure can be seen by an article by a group of European (and American) scholars which appeared in Survey in 1974. The scholars stated that detente cannot exist without internal Soviet liberalization. See "Detente: An Evaluation by a Group of Students of Soviet and International Affairs," in Detente and Defense, ed., Robert J. Pranger (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), pp. 190-215.

Domestic criticism such as that contained in the above article may have been what prompted the Western European governments to incorporate human rights language in the Helsinki Agreement. The Western European governments, overall, however, have not been willing to forcefully pursue the human rights issue against the Soviet Union, thereby indicating that the push for the Helsinki human rights language may have been aimed at satisfying the domestic critics. See Chapter Seven regarding Western Europe's unwillingness to pursue the issue forcefully.

The United States alone among the Western states has pursued an active human rights policy against the Soviet Union. But American activity has been the result of strong domestic political forces that may not necessarily exist in Western Europe. See this chapter regarding the strong domestic forces operating in the United States on behalf of human rights and Chapter Six for the forces operating specifically with respect to Soviet Jewish emigration.

25. Karl E. Birnbaum, "Human Rights and East-West Relations," Foreign Affairs 55 (July 1977): 787.

26. Ibid.

27. In 1976 Congress created a 15 member federal commission to monitor implementation of the Helsinki Agreement and, in particular, its human rights provisions. Its membership consists of six senators, six representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1976), p. 266.

28. New York Times, 22 November 1976.

29. It seems ironic that American East European groups would criticize the Helsinki Agreement since it is the Agreement's human rights provisions which have given the issue so much international visibility and have given these groups a basis for pressuring the American government to force the issue against the Soviet Union. It is only fair to state, however, that at the time of the signing the American East European groups regarded the agreement's recognition of borders in Europe as a tacit agreement to Soviet domination of the East European states.

30. "Statement by Senator Henry M. Jackson: On the Helsinki Summit," Washington, D.C., 22 July 1975. Office of Senator Henry M. Jackson.

31. Lev E. Dobriansky, USA and the Soviet Myth (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: The Devin-Adair Company, 1971), p. 236.

32. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Human Rights and the American Tradition," Foreign Affairs, Special issue titled America and the World 1978 57 (1979): 519-20; Owen, pp. 43-44.

33. Interview with Henry Kissinger, Encounter 51 (November 1978): 12. Also, see Dmitri K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall 1978), pp. 55-59.

34. Address by Representative Robert J. Huber (R.- Mich.) at All-National Manifestation in Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1974.

35. New York Times, 12 December 1978.

36. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Policy-Makers and Critics: Conflicting Theories of American Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 34-36. For the role of morality in United States foreign policy, see James Chace, "How 'Moral' Can We Get?" New York Times Magazine, 22 May 1977; Schlesinger.

37. William Korey, "The Future of Soviet Jewry: Emigration and Assimilation," Foreign Affairs 58 (Fall 1979): 67.

38. Crabb, p. 42.

39. John Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 335.

40. Schlesinger, p. 512.

41. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1976), p. 333. Congress passed the 1976-1977 foreign economic aid bill in December 1975.

42. The 1980 State Department report contained evaluations of all countries, regardless of whether or not they receive United States assistance.

43. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1974 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975), pp. 534, 536, 544, 546. The 1975 foreign aid authorization was passed in December 1974.

Major pieces of congressional legislation pertaining to human rights includes the following: 1975- the Agency for International Development was prohibited from giving AID assistance to gross violators of human rights, unless aid directly benefits needy people; 1976- the military aid section (Section 502b) of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits aid to gross violators, unless aid is in the U.S. interest; 1977- the International Financial Institutions Act requires U.S. directors on development banks and the World Bank to oppose loans to gross violators, unless such loans serve basic human needs; 1977- PL-480 prohibits Title I loans to gross violators, unless aid directly benefits needy people; 1977- the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is prohibited from granting authorization to gross violators; 1977- the Export-Import Bank incorporates advisory human rights language; 1978- the Export-Import Bank prohibits Eximbank credits to South Africa and its agencies or corporations in South Africa which fail to implement equal employment opportunities; 1978- the military aid section (Section 502b) of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the U.S. from providing crime control and detection material to police agencies and from granting military training to gross violators, unless it is in the U.S. national interest. See Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, Human Rights: 1979-80 Action Guide (Washington, D.C.: Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, July 1979), p. 8.

44. New York Times, 20 October 1976.

45. Ibid.

46. New York Times, 9 February 1977.

47. New York Times, 24 January 1980.

48. New York Times, 6 June 1974.

49. Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 1977.

50. Special Message to the Congress Proposing Trade Reform Legislation, 10 April 1973. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 285.

51. New York Times, 25 February 1977. See footnote 57.

52. New York Times, 3 February 1977.

53. New York Times, 1 July 1977.

54. New York Times, 13 March 1977.

55. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations. Congress and Foreign Policy 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 150.

56. Department of State Bulletin, 23 May 1977, p. 506.

57. For example, while President Carter ended aid to Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia because of their alleged human rights violations, aid was not cut for South Korea. Secretary of State Vance "told the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, because of overriding security commitments, the United States would not reduce its aid to South Korea or other such strategically placed allies, whatever their violations of human rights." See New York Times, 25 February 1977.

58. Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 1977. The official was not identified.

59. Department of State Bulletin, 4 April 1977, p. 323.

60. This alignment is more rhetorical at times than actual. For example, while Congress cut assistance to South Korea for fiscal 1975 because of alleged human rights violations in South Korea President Carter refused to cut aid in 1977 even though South Korea was still being criticized for alleged human rights violations. See footnote number 57.

CHAPTER THREE

DISSIDENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

The beginning of the present era of dissent is usually taken as the mid 1960's, with the year 1965 seeming to stand out most often as the watershed. It was in this year that Sinayavsky and Daniel were arrested, foreshadowing the regime's move against intellectuals.[1] In the late 1960's dissent began to grow.

In 1969 the Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights was formed and the first program of dissent appeared with the release of the document "A Program of Soviet Democrats," signed by the "Democrats of Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic Region." The document called for a multi-party system, civil liberties, guarantees of private property and a democratic state among other features.[2] Barghoorn has called this "the first example of a comprehensive program of dissent" and states that "for the first time since the early 1920's political opposition to the established leadership had emerged in the USSR."[3] However, what makes dissent different in this period is the combined forces of international scrutiny and the support of dissidents by external actors. The present era of dissent is a highly political movement encompassing both Soviet domestic politics and international politics.

As stated in Chapter One, different dissidents have different goals, but they all use the same methods for obtaining their objectives. This chapter, therefore, will review the general patterns of dissident behavior and the problems encountered on both the domestic and international fronts, with relevant examples from the various branches of the dissident movement.

Domestic Features of Dissent[4]

Domestically, the dissident movement has not been able to generate a mass following and, thus, its impact on Soviet society has been limited. There are a number of reasons for this lack of grass roots support. First, the Soviet Union has a vast army of undercover agents and informers.[5] Such a network is capable of picking up any dissidents and thus prevents the dissidents from forming links with the population at large. Second, the government's totalitarian control of communication prevents the widespread dispersal of ideas, thus keeping the momentum and desires of the dissidents within a close circle that can be reached orally or through hand distribution of materials. Third, the dissident movement is basically composed of various elements of the intelligentsia. Historically, the intelligentsia has been unable to forge a union with the masses. "Throughout Russian history they failed to attract a mass following, and it is hard to imagine that they ever will win over their countrymen."[6] Fourth, a large majority of the people are satisfied with the system.[7] Most people, as in any other society, are concerned with immediate needs, such as employment, education, health care and other matters. These immediate needs form a concrete reality and, for the most part, are well satisfied by the Soviet government. The dissidents' concerns, mainly, are with free speech, elections, and freedom of assembly.[8] Overall, the masses do not identify with such abstract goals. If they show no interest and cannot understand them, then they cannot support them. On their part, the dissidents have not addressed themselves to issues that can touch the common people. Little attention has been paid to economic privations, exploitation of the

peasantry, or housing conditions. These issues would more than likely stimulate greater grass roots responses than many of the abstruse arguments of the dissidents. And, finally, a traditional submission to authority has characterized the Russian peoples. One does not question authority, one listens to it. The efficient extirpation of opponents both under the czars and the Soviet government no doubt serves as a reinforcement of this cultural undercurrent. It is this traditional submissiveness that also prevents a working relationship between the intelligentsia and the masses. Besides the fact that the intelligentsia's arguments are too abstruse the masses also distrust anyone seeking to question and challenge existing authority.

Already there are indications that the dissidents may be creating a backlash against their activities. Reports indicate that there is a growing nostalgia for the days of Stalin, days which were viewed as ones of "law and order." Stalin's image is one of "a just statesman and military genius who ruled with a hard hand but who maintained order -- a vivid contrast to the seeming disorderliness of 1978, when corruption and inefficiency abound, when dissidents and defilers of the motherland run loose."[9] The growth of such sentimentality can only hamper the activities and goals of the dissidents.

As a result of the Soviet regime's efficient police apparatus and the Soviet population's skepticism regarding the dissidents, the dissident circle is small. Estimates on the number of active dissidents range from under 1,000 to 10,000.[10] Whichever figure is correct, the actual number that have come to be known to the international public is small.

In addition to the problem of generating grass roots support, another problem that has affected the dissidents is the inability to organize the

dissident forces themselves. The dissidents are characterized by individualism. Chalidze describes this, and it is best to quote him at length:

> There is no organization in the movement and no one is under any obligation. Nobody is required to submit to the opinion of the majority and for that matter the opinion of the majority is not usually known. Everyone does what he considers acceptable for himself, either on his own or together with others wishing to do the same thing. In saying this I am of course not trying to deny the role of mutual moral influence on the actions of individuals, nor the influence of friendly solidarity. But this is not what is usually called organized behavior, and it does not interfere with individual freedom.[11]

What has hampered the dissidents is the lack of a single, common cause around which they could rally. This may have changed as a result of the Helsinki Agreement. The creation of Helsinki monitoring committees in the Soviet Union has probably created umbrella organizations under which all dissidents may fit. The Helsinki Agreement, with many of its vague statements on human rights may provide a rallying point for uniting different strands of dissent. By joining forces to pressure implementation of the agreement's human rights provisions the dissidents are gaining the strength that unity brings without sacrificing their individual goals. This strand of logic is perceived and supported by many dissidents. Yuri Orlov stated that "for the first time we have united in the Helsinki monitoring committee all kinds of dissidents and we have achieved some degree of coordination. Helsinki gives us a banner under which we can all stand."[12]

This is an optimistic scenario. There are many concrete obstacles to the realization of cooperation. The efficient police apparatus and the government control of communication not only prevent the dissidents from establishing contacts with the general population but also create

difficulties for the dissidents in establishing contacts among themselves. Furthermore, the ideological barriers that separate some dissidents may be too great to overcome. A Russian dissident advocating greater political freedoms may balk at supporting Ukrainian dissidents calling for greater Ukrainian economic, political and cultural rights since this may undermine the predominant position of the Russians in Soviet society. Questions of strategy also enter the picture. Organizational links may prove to be harmful in some cases. Kenneth Farmer has stated that "the Jewish movement for emigration has been more successful than have the nationalist dissidents in achieving their aims, and it is not in the interests of the Jews to compromise their own movement by association with the nationalists."[13]

Furthermore, while many dissidents have sought international support there are some internal disputes among the dissidents regarding the validity of such support. One split regards the methods to be employed by external actors on behalf of Soviet dissidents. Roy Medvedev, for example, feels that various legislative restrictions would not help dissidents, while others feel that such restrictions can be beneficial. Medvedev has stated: "It would be a gross oversimplifcation . . . to presume that only with the help of outside pressure -- and pressure, moreover, involving inter-state relations or trade -- is it possible to achieve some substantive concessions from a country such as the Soviet Union in the conduct of our domestic policy."[14] Andrei Sakharov, however, "regards Western pressures as the main hope for liberalizing Soviet society."[15] He has called on the West to use its leverage in modern technological trade as a lever to pressure the Soviet authorities to liberalize internally.

A second division on views regards the possible beneficiaries of aid. Medvedev feels that only certain individuals may be aided but that the chances of changing Soviet society are limited. Other dissidents feel that Soviet society in general can benefit.[16] Medvedev believes "that the West could influence Soviet handling of individual cases but that Sakharov and others were overestimating Western influence on the general situation in the Soviet Union. In the long run . . . Western leaders would lose interest in Soviet internal reforms and problems."[17]

While the Soviet dissidents have found it difficult to organize themselves as well as Soviet society on their behalf, they have been able to attract a vast amount of international attention and support of their beliefs. The following section will examine the international role of the dissidents.

International Features of Dissent
International Publicity and Methods of Gaining It

The dissidents have been quite successful in gaining international attention, far more than their numbers and domestic impact would warrant. Various governments and professional associations, for example, have issued protests against the Soviet regime's violations of human rights. Abraham Brumberg has enumerated a number of features of the success in generating international publicity in the following manner

> Western correspondents filed numerous stories and frequently acted as conduits for samizdat material. Various Western organizations, such as Amnesty International, began to concern themselves with the fate of individual dissenters. The International League for the Rights of Man in New York established a formal organizational bond with Sakharov's Human Rights Committee; professional organizations of psychiatrists, notoriously reluctant to delve into the

> murky waters of politics, began to evince interest in and a sense of outrage at the barbaric use of their profession in Russia; and religious groups (e.g., the Baptists) published the appeals of their persecuted co-religionists in the USSR.[18]

All this international publicity did not come automatically. While publicity had always been a goal of the dissidents the fact is that in the first few years of the dissident movement Western public opinion ignored it and was even suspicious of it. As late as 1970, for example, Andrei Amalrik was suspected of collaboring with the secret police.[19] The dissidents, however, put a great deal of emphasis on publicity. Valery Chalidze has stated "that the most important contribution that can be made to the defense of human rights in any country is publicity -- making sure that violations of rights and appeals in defense of rights become known to a wide audience."[20]

It was not until 1970-1971 that international publicity came to focus on the dissidents. At this time "Soviet political opposition ceased to be only an internal concern, and its vicissitudes and fortunes engaged the sympathetic interest of a sizeable segment of world public opinion."[21] This success was due more to external events rather than to any specific activity by the dissidents. World attention came to focus on the dissidents because of the evolving new relationship between the Soviet bloc and the West. Detente between East and West, as discussed in the previous chapter, brought not only a re-evaluation of Soviet external behavior but also brought focus and interest on Soviet internal politics.

The focus of international publicity has been mostly on what can be referred to as celebrity dissidents. These are usually individuals who

have some form of international recognition based on their achievements in the arts, science, or some other field. Prior to his expulsion, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was one such dissident.

The dissent of a Solzhenitsyn gains international recognition for himself and the human rights cause in the Soviet Union much quicker than do the activities of obscure persons. A Solzhenitsyn already possesses an international audience; it is only a matter of shifting that audience's attention from his literature to his politics, and such a shift takes place whenever he engages in political activity or becomes embroiled with the political authorities. Not only can celebrity dissidents gain world attention, but their treatment by the regime is often more lenient because of this attention. Hedrick Smith has noted that in the Soviet Union "people of prestige simply get away with actions or statements that would send unknown dissidents to their doom."[22] Even when the authorities act against a celebrity dissident the treatment is milder. Solzhenitsyn, for example, was not incarcerated or imprisoned in an insane asylum but rather was exiled to the West.[23]

Much of the activity undertaken by the dissidents is aimed at getting the attention of the Western states.[24] In their attempts to gain the support of the West, the dissidents have directed much of their activity at illustrating the discrepancy between domestic Soviet law and its actual implementation. The dissidents' activities may possibly strike a responsive chord in the West because the West, more than any other region of the world, functions according to a system of laws which observe and respect such dissident goals as freedom of speech, assembly and other civil and political rights.[25] Probably the greatest strength the dissidents have had in their goal of gaining attention and support

in the West has been the Western press for it is the press that serves as the conduit to the West regarding dissident activity. The press can be a powerful force for generating publicity in an issue. In the United States, public and congressional concern with racial discrimination in the early 1960's was spurred to a large measure because the press decided to make the issue "newsworthy." The same can be legitimately extrapolated for the foreign arena. If the press does not zero in on an issue, "it often does not receive sufficient recognition to trigger the momentum of political reform."[26] The dissidents themselves recognize the value of the press. For example, Jewish dissidents seeking to emigrate often seek publcity through the American press.[27] The Soviet authorities have realized the importance of this medium and at times have sought to neutralize it by threatening and expelling Western correspondents and by removing the more active dissidents from the metropolitan centers where Western correspondents are permitted to function.

Two ways by which the dissidents have sought to show the discrepancy between Soviet law and its actual implementation and thereby possibly gain Western support have been through "symbolic politics" and by attempts at dealing with Westerners. Because of the rigid structure of the Soviet system, dissidents seek to articulate their interests via symbolic ations and the manipulation of symbols. For example, "an appeal or a petition by a dissident to an official instance when there is no realistic hope of redress is an action intended, apparently, not so much to obtain remedy as to confront officials publicly with the discrepancy between articulated and actual policy."[28] Thus, for example, in petitioning for freedom of speech, which is a Soviet constitutional

guarantee, a dissident is seeking to challenge the regime in the international and domestic arenas by exposing how the reality departs from the theory.[29]

An example of a symbolic action to gain both international and domestic support was a letter written by dissidents Pavel Litvinov and Larisa Bograz bringing to light an unfair trial of other dissidents. The letter, along with other dissident letters, was forwarded by Litvinov to Karl van het Reve, the Moscow correspondent of the Dutch newspaper Het Parool. The letters were all eventually published in the West. In their letter, addressed "To World Public Opinion," Litvinov and Bograz wrote that the courtroom was filled with a carefully selected audience, that the judge prevented the defense attorney from presenting an argument, and that the judge made no efforts to curb the audiences' insults of the accused. They concluded the letter with the following appeal:

> We are appealing to world public opinion, and primarily to Soviet public opinion. We are appealing to everyone in whom conscience and courage are still vital forces. Demand public condemnation of this farcical trial and the punishment of those responsible for it. Demand the immediate release of the accused. Demand a retrial under the exact observation of all judicial norms and in the presence of international observers.[30]

Dissidents also seek to show the world the discrepancy between international agreements entered into by the Soviet Union and their actual implementation. An important point regarding international agreements is that dissidents view them as giving their goals a certain sense of legitimacy. In 1969 the Soviet regime ratified the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. This convention "made Jews in the Soviet Union who have relatives in Israel bolder

in their demand for exit visas for the purpose of being united with their relatives in the Jewish state."[31] Overall, Jewish dissidents seeking to emigrate "feel that their request is backed by Soviet law and by international agreements signed by the Soviet Government."[32]

An example of a dissident appeal to the international community which called attention to a Soviet violation of an international agreement it had signed was that issued by a group of Jewish women seeking to emigrate. They stated:

> Women of all countries and continents! On the eve of the International Day of Women, the 8th of March, the day of solidarity of all women in the world, we call upon you to speak out in support of your sisters fighting for their right to emigrate from the USSR, for their right to live among their own people, together with their relatives and friends. The realization of this right does not contradict any of the Soviet laws and it has been declared by the Soviet government in numerous international documents. Thus, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ratified by the Soviet Union states: "The right to emigration cannot be made subject to any restrictions except for those foreseen by the law."
>
> However, there is no law on emigration in the Soviet Union and, as it had been stated recently during a meeting of a group of women with officials of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "there will not be one in the near future." The examination of all the applications for emigration to the State of Israel is conducted in accordance with the created practice and this leaves ample ground for arbitrariness and lawlessness.[33]

Dissidents also seek to engage in activities with Westerners, such activities as academic conferences and news conferences. A government clamp-down on these activities presents the West with concrete evidence of the charges the dissidents have been leveling. For example, plans by Jewish scientists to hold a conference to which Western scientists were invited led to a KGB seizure of materials relating to the conference.[34] Another favorite technique of dissidents is to hold news conferences

with Western correspondents. Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate held a news conference in March 1979 with American correspondents in Moscow. Soviet security agents, however, prevented dissidents from Leningrad, Vilnius, Kiev, and Kharkov from attending. Such government behavior exposes the shallowness of Soviet human rights guarantees regarding freedom of speech.

In addition to the above activities, the dissidents have also engaged in more drastic activities such as hunger strikes, self-immolations, renouncing of citizenship, and efforts to enter a foreign embassy. A few examples will suffice. In June 1978, seven Pentacostalites forced their way into the United States embassy in Moscow in order to demonstrate their desire to emigrate from the Soviet Union. Ukrainian dissident Heli Snehirov renounced his citizenship. In doing so he stated: "I don't want to remain a citizen of a state that has destroyed the elite of my Ukrainian people."[35]

Overall, however, much of the dissidents' activity has been geared to having the Soviet government live up to the letter of both domestic Soviet law and international agreements signed by the Soviet Union. This gives a legitimacy to the dissidents' goals, and failure by the Soviet regime to honor these laws creates the publicity and international support the dissidents expect might pressure the regime into compliance.

In addition to these various ways of getting their own messages across to the international public, the dissidents have two external constituencies which aid in the spreading of their cause. Soviet ethnic groups in diaspora are a built in lobbying group on behalf of Soviet dissidents. The Ukrainian community in the United States, for example,

has always publicized the plight of their kinsmen in the Soviet Union. Ukrainian dissidents, therefore, have a reservoir of support in the external arena. The same is true for the Jewish emigration movement. The large Jewish community in the United States has always monitored Soviet treatment of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union and quickly mobilized itself in support of Soviet Jewry's desire for emigration.

The activities of exiled dissidents also serve as a built-in constituency. Once in exile, many dissidents continue to battle Soviet repression by seeking to inform the outside world of the continuing struggle in the Soviet Union.

Many of these exiles make their way to the United States where they have an opportunity to present their case to the news media and directly to the government by appearing before Congressional committees. In January 1977 Andrei Amalrik, an exiled Soviet dissident, appeared before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe composed of Congressional and executive branch members to monitor the Helsinki Agreement. He called upon the United States to use technology, grain, and credits as a means to pressure the Soviet Union on the human rights issue. Such actions by exiled dissidents give support to United States domestic groups striving to aid Soviet dissidents and also make the dissident situation more visible to the world.

Exiled dissidents can also aid financially those left behind to help carry on the struggle. Alexander Solzhenitsyn created a fund from his royalties in order to aid the families of Soviet political prisoners. This fund had been administered by Alexander Ginsburg before his arrest

in February 1977. Under him, $370,000 had been distributed. After his arrest, Tatiana Khodorovych became the fund's administrator. She was expelled in November 1977 and the fund's administration was passed on to her brother, Sergei, and Ginzburg's wife, Irina.[36]

It has been shown that the Soviet dissidents have been able to gain much international publicity and have undertaken a number of activities in this pursuit. What needs to be examined next is what do the dissidents expect to achieve by international publicity.

Reasons for Seeking International Support

The dissidents' attempts at gaining international publicity and support are aimed at achieving a number of goals. To a large extent the dissidents regard international support as a possible lever against the Soviet authorities. It is felt that international scrutiny may force the authorities to change some domestic policies and practices. This feeling was aptly summed up by Alexander Solzhenitsyn when he said:

> On our crowded planet there are no longer any internal affairs. The Communist leaders say, "Do not interfere in our internal affairs. Let us strangle our citizens in peace and quiet." But I tell you: Interfere more and more. Interfere as much as you can. We beg you to come and interfere.[37]

The dissidents also see international support as a means for spreading their own programs throughout the Soviet Union. The communications control the government has forbids any widespread circulation of materials. This control can be bypassed by having external sources broadcast reports of dissident activites back into the Soviet Union. In order to do this, contacts with and support by external actors are needed. Western correspondents play an important role as a transmission belt to and from the Soviet Union.

A "communications cycle", therefore, has evolved. It operates in the following manner: dissidents inform Western correspondents of the latest developments in the human rights struggle; this information is published and broadcast in the outside world; the information is then broadcast into the Soviet Union by foreign radio stations such as the BBC and Radio Liberty. The importance of this "communications cycle" is recognized by the Soviet authorities. When the Ukrainian doctor Mykola Plakhotniuk was being pressured to resign "voluntarily" from his post at the Kiev Medical Institute, his interrogator pleaded, "You have to resign voluntarily, because if we tell you we fired you for your beliefs, Radio Liberty would be screeching about it in two days!"[38] The impact of this "communicationscyle" is witnessed by Yuri Orlov's estimate that a quarter of the Soviet urban population listens to foreign broadcasts. As a result, the Soviet government has at times attempted to cut the "communications cycle" by radio jamming and by harassing and expelling Western correspondents.

Some dissidents also consider it necessary to warn the world of what they perceive to be the Soviet threat. Repressed at home, they feel it is incumbent to warn the world against becoming lax in the face of Soviet aggressiveness lest other states come to be repressed by the Soviet Union. An example of this type of warning was the statement by political prison Hryhory Prykhodko. He accused the Soviet government in the following manner:

> Externally, the Soviet Union declares itself in support of the relaxation of international tensions and for the strengthening of peace, while internally the USSR fosters in various ways the hatred towards non-socialist countries, and constantly increases its military power.[39]

The Soviet government's attempts to discredit dissidents has led to a fear among the dissidents that their image may be blemished on the international arena. Attempts at gaining world publicity, therefore, are also attempts at countering various acts by the Soviet government. Dissident activities are also an attempt to prevent the detente process from making foreign governments look benevolently on the Soviet regime at the expense of the dissidents. Dissidents fear "that the Soviet regime will use the Western impulse towards detente to influence Western public opinion in favour of the regime."[40] Dissident activities, therefore, are also aimed at maintaining their image as fighters against human repression.

A final objective is the desire on the part of some dissidents to gain access to Western materials. This objective is more limited in that it affects only certain segments of the dissident circle, such as scientists. The desire is to have the right to travel to the West for research purposes and to have access to Western research methods and intellectuals. Historically, intellectuals in the Russian empire have sought increased ties with the West. However, the government has always been wary of Western influences and its policy has fluctuated between periods of permitting contacts and periods of barring contacts.

In their attempts to realize their objectives, the dissidents have addressed themselves to a wide range of external actors. These actors will now be examined.

External Actors the Dissidents Petition

The dissidents have addressed themselves to five basic types of actors: the United Nations, international non-governmental organizations,

domestic ethnic interest groups, foreign communist parties, and foreign governments.[41] This section will examine why the dissidents may petition these actors and the types of appeals addressed to them.

The United Nations has been the focus of many appeals by dissidents. The United Nations epitomizes the goals of humanity and is also the repository of many human rights agreements, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights being the most important. Wilfred Jenks feels that the Declaration's "political and moral authority have grown with the years. . . . The Universal Declaration may still represent a goal rather than an achievement, but we have at least reached the stage at which even those who show little respect for its provisions in practice rarely question its authority in principle."[42] Overall, the United Nations is viewed as a moral force and a symbol and proponent for the defense of human rights. This may be why dissidents address many of their appeals to the United Nations. Dissidents use the human rights agreements passed by the United Nations, such as the Universal Declaration, as referents by which to call world attention to Soviet violations of human rights.[43]

An example of a dissident appeal to the United Nations was the letter by a group of Ukrainian women dissidents to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. The women wrote:

> We are being persecuted and condemned to prison solely for the fact that, as Ukrainians, we advocate the preservation and development of Ukrainian national culture and language in Ukraine. All the arrests that were conducted in Ukraine during that year [1972] constituted violations of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights by the Soviet Government.
>
> We are defenseless before the unjust Soviet court. We have been illegally convicted and now find ourselves in the Soviet political concentration camp No. 3 in Dubrovlag in Moldavia.[44]

With respect to international non-governmental organizations, favorite targets of appeal have been humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Red Cross.[45] This may be done possibly because these organizations are primarily concerned with humanitarian issues and therefore may be likely to speak up against Soviet violations of human rights. An example of an appeal was that of a group of dissidents to the International Red Cross on behalf of Ukrainian dissident Leonid Plyushch. It read:

> Leonid Plyushch is near death. We appeal to you to campaign a) for an international inspection of the Dnipropetrovsk special psychiatric hospital and also of other hospitals of the same type, b) for an international commission of psychiatrists to examine the health of Leonid Plyushch, and c) for his transfer to a hospital abroad, where his broken health could be restored.
>
> This appeal to you, and through you to world opinion, is the only means left to us to save the life of Leonid Plyushch.[46]

The Ukrainian community in the United States is an example of a domestic interest group which has taken active participation in the Soviet human rights issue.[47] As stated earlier, United States ethnic groups are a ready group willing to aid their Soviet kinsmen. Their role involves, basically, pressuring the United States government on behalf of their dissident kinsmen in the Soviet Union. Soviet dissidents, in turn, actively seek the support of their kinsmen in the United States. For example, Nina-Strokata-Karavanska and Stefania Shabatura appealed to Ukrainian Americans to aid Ukrainian dissidents: "All of us, who were and remain political prisoners in the Soviet Union, hope that our countrymen will energetically defend all Ukrainian patriots."[48]

Foreign communist parties are appealed to because they might have easier access to Soviet leaders than the other actors.[49] For example, in 1977 an Italian Communist Party delegation visited Moscow for the purpose of discussing the dissident problem, but to no avail. The delegation also represented the views of many of the other Western communist parties.[50] An example of an appeal was that of dissident Mykola Yevgrafov in which he appealed

> to all real communists and socialists, to all workers' representatives, and ask you to please take a stand against Asian and Soviet pseudo-communism, to raise your voices of protest on behalf of human rights in the USSR, and to nail to a stake of shame a Soviet totalitarianism that hides itself under Marxism.[51]

For the dissidents, it is foreign state involvement that is most important. There seem to be two reasons for this. First, a state's involvement can bring more publicity to the dissidents since it brings two governments into conflict over the issue of human rights. No event can gain as much attention as that of two states in conflict over an issue. Second, states have more resources such as trade agreements and scientific exchanges at their disposal by which they can act to pressure the Soviet Union on behalf of the dissidents.

The United States has received many appeals from the dissidents. There may be two reasons for this. First, Soviet ethnic groups, such as Jews and Ukrainians, have ethnic counterparts in the United States who may take up the cause of the dissidents with the American government and this may, in turn, prompt governmental action on behalf of the dissidents. Second, with the United States being a superpower and engaged in a process of detente with the Soviet Union many of the dissidents may

regard the United States as the only state possessing the appropriate interest and leverage to influence the Soviet government.[52] An example of petitioning the United States government was the letter by Andrei Sakharov to President Carter. Sakharov wrote:

> It's very important that the U.S. President should continue efforts for the release of those people who are already known to the American people and that these efforts not be in vain. It is important to continue the fight for the very sick and for the women- political prisoners.[53]

The dissidents' appeals to these various external actors and the actors' support in many cases has led to a number of actions by the Soviet Union to attempt to thwart international support of the dissidents. The Soviet regime's actions will be examined in the following chapter along with the efforts of one state actor, the United States, on behalf of the dissidents.

FOOTNOTES

1. Andrei Sinayavsky and Uri Daniel were two writers who used, respectively, the pseudonyms Abram Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak. In 1965 they were arrested for anti-Soviet writings, according to the court case brought by the regime. The significance of their arrests lies in two features. First, the arrest represented a shift away from the liberalization and de-Stalinization policies of the Khrushchev era. Second, the two writers declared themselves as not guilty in their court appearance. According to Gerstenmaier, this was the first time in four decades in which accused individuals pleaded innocent to charges rather than "repenting and confessing" their errors. For a background on the relevance of the case to the present era of dissent, see Cornelia Gerstenmaier, The Voices of the Silent, trans. Susan Hecker (New York: Hart Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 123-132; Howard L. Biddulph, "Protest Strategies of the Soviet Intellectual Opposition," in Dissent in the USSR, ed. Rudolf L. Tokes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 104.

2. For an analysis of the Democrats' Program, see Gerstenmaier, pp. 211-219.

3. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p. 199.

4. This section on domestic features of dissent also encompasses the Russian nationalist dissidents since they, basically, have many of the same problems of organization and appeal to the masses that the other dissidents face. See page 10. However, see also footnote 28, Chapter One, for the milder official treatment of Russian nationalist dissidents.

5. For a brief description of how "finks" operate, see Anatole Shub, The New Russian Tragedy (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 29-30; Vyacheslav Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 14-17.

6. Robert G. Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (New York: Pocket Books, 1976), p. 437.

7. Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 27; Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in a Complex Society: The Case of the Soviet Union," Problems of Communism 22 (March-April 1973): 50.

8. Abraham Brumberg, "Dissent in Russia," Foreign Affairs 52 (July 1974): 797.

9. This was reported in the New York Times, 3 December 1978.

10. Andrei Amalrik has estimated the number of dissidents in one incident at 738. See Amalrik, pp. 13-21. Andrei Sakharov has estimated the total number at 10,000. See The Soviet Union: 1975-76 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1977), p. 69. Radio Liberty reports 3,000 political arrests for the period from Stalin's death to February 1971. See Radio Liberty Research Handbook No. 78, February 1971, p. 1. Cornelia Gerstenmaier believes that no one can estimate the number of dissidents. See Gerstenmaier, pp. 17-19.

11. Valery Chalidze, To Defend These Rights, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 23.

12. Time, 21 February 1977, pp. 23-24. Orlov was the leader in forming the "Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Stipulations in the USSR." It was formed in May, 1976, in Moscow.

13. Kenneth Farmer, "Ukrainian Dissent: Symbolic Politics and Socio-Demographic Aspects," Part I The Ukrainian Quarterly, 24 (Spring 1978): 16.

14. Brumberg, p. 793.

15. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976), p. 444.

16. Andrei Amalrik, for example, feels that a toughened program of accomodation on the part of the United States can lead to a more democratic society in the Soviet Union. See New York Times, 23 December 1976.

17. Smith, p. 450. Medvedev feels that, in actuality, outsiders are not interested in truly aiding the dissidents. He writes, for example, that "in the long run, Nixon, Pompidou, and Heath defend the interests of the ruling classes of their countries, and it is not axiomatic that capitalist circles in the United States, England, France, and the FRG are so interested in the most rapid development of socialist democratization in the USSR or in speeding up economic, social, and cultural progress in the Soviet Union." See R. Medvedev, "The Problem of Democratization and the Problem of Detente," Radio Liberty Special Report, RL 359/73, 19 November 1973, p. 11.

18. Brumberg, p. 786.

19. The Soviet Union 1973 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975) p. 32.

20. Chalidze, p. VI.

21. Brumberg, p. 785.

22. Smith, p. 460.

23. Solzhenitsyn was arrested after World War II. However, at this time he did not have the recognition that he received as a result of his successful writings in the 1960's and 1970's. As a result of his celebrity status he was not arrested in 1974 but, rather, was forced into exile when the Soviet authorities flew him to West Germany in February 1974. By the time of his exile Solzhenitsyn had become a symbol of defiance against the Soviet regime. The regime, therefore, found it more convenient to exile him than to bring international criticism upon itself by imprisoning him. Solzhenitsyn's career, therefore, indicates the importance of celebrity status for a dissident.

24. Peter Reddaway, "The Development of Dissent in the USSR," in The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente, ed. William E. Griffith (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 65; The Soviet Union 1976-1977 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. 70.

25. President Carter, for example, stated in his inaugural address, "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." Howard L. Biddulph has written that Soviet dissidents address appeals to Western intellectuals because they "would be more sympathetic with the movement's values." See Howard L. Biddulph, "Protest Strategies of the Soviet Intellectual Opposition," in Dissent in the USSR, ed. Rudolf L. Tokes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 11.

26. Robert Sherill, et al., Governing America (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1978), p. 183.

27. New York Times, 11 March 1979.

28. Farmer, p. 13.

29. For examples of symbolic behavior, see Gayle Durham, "Political Communication and Dissent in the Soviet Union," in Dissent in the USSR, ed. Tokes, pp. 268-270. Biddulph says that public protest activities by the dissidents are aimed at domestic and international publics. See Biddulph in Dissent in the USSR, ed. Tokes, p. 110.

30. Gerstenmaier, p. 366.

31. Boris Smolar, Soviet Jewry Today and Tomorrow (New York: Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 176.

32. Ibid.

33. National Conference on Soviet Jewry, The Moscow Women's Group: A White Paper of Hope (And Despair) (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry), p. 6. No date.

34. New York Times, 23 December 1978.

35. Ukrainian Weekly, 2 October 1977.

36. Ukrainian Weekly, 13 November 1977.

37. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's address before the AFL-CIO in Washington, D.C. on 30 June 1975. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Publication No. 152 (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1975).

38. Howard H. Sargeant, "Radio Liberty and Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly 32 (Autumn 1976): 253.

39. Statement from political prisoner H. Prykhodko, November 17, 1975. See A Resolution with Appended Documents Concerning the Decolonization of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (New York: World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1978), p. 59.

40. Karl van het Reve, "Unofficial Russia," Encounter 42 (February 1974): 18.

41. For a different categorization of external actors appealed to by the dissidents see Biddulph in Dissent in the USSR, ed. Tokes, pp. 110-112. Biddulph identifies four external publics without giving his criteria for selecting them. The four external publics are: foreign communist and workers parties, Western intellectuals, international agencies (e.g. International Red Cross; United Nations) and "world public opinion." In obtaining my categories of external actors I made use of Biddulph's categorization and took into consideration the objective of the dissertation. Since the dissertation is concerned with state relations and the possible influence of domestic interest groups on United States policy regarding human rights two external publics that are important are states and domestic interest groups. My other three categories (United Nations, international non-governmental organizations and foreign communist parties) derive from Biddulph's categories. Foreign communist parties were selected because the Soviet Union is a Marxist state and, therefore, there may be a predilection on the part of dissidents to petition external communist parties to pressure the Soviet government. Biddulph's category "international agencies" was divided into two groups, United Nations and international non-governmental organizations. The reason why the United Nations was made a separate category is because it has a machinery for dealing with human rights questions and through its various human rights declarations it has come to epitomize the goal of attaining human rights on a world-wide basis. International non-governmental agencies were selected because many of them deal with humanitarian issues. It is difficult to determine all the external publicsdissidents petition. Just as it is difficult to categorize dissent so also it is difficult to categorize external publics. See footnote 25 in Chapter One.

42. Wilfred C. Jenks, Law in the World Community (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1967), p. 122.

43. The Soviet Union 1976-1977, p. 69.

44. Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, Women Political Prisoners in the USSR (New York: Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, 1975), p. 19.

45. An international non-governmental organization is one which, inter alia, operates in at least three states, has no government representation, and has a permanent bureaucratic structure. These criteria were developed by the Union of International Associations. See Werner J. Feld, Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 175.

46. The appeal was addressed to the International Red Cross, the International Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in the Soviet Union and the International League for the Rights of Man. It was dated Moscow, February 1974. It was signed by Elena Bonner, Tatyana Velikanova, Sergei Kovalev, Andrei Sakharov, Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Tatyana Khodorovich.

47. A domestic interest group is an organization which operates within one state and is comprised of people who share a common concern regarding a public policy or policies. See Peter Woll and Robert J. Binstock, America's Political System (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 242.

48. Ihor Dlaboha, "Helsinki Monitoring Group in Kiev: The Struggle and the Ordeal," in Almanac of the Ukrainian National Association 1979 (New York: Svoboda Press, 1979), p. 122.

49. Biddulph, p. 111.

50. New York Times, 27 February 1977.

51. News from Ukraine, Spring-Summer 1978. (Ijamsville, Maryland: American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). The News is a four-page newsletter containing information on the struggle for national independence and human rights in the Ukraine.

52. The dissidents seek "to gain support for the implementation of human rights in the USSR from international publicity and the Western governments which are the partners of the USSR in detente." See The Soviet Union 1976-1977, p. 69. The emphasis on the United States role is witnessed by Andrei Sakharov's letter urging the U.S. Congress to support the Jackson Amendment. Also, in speaking about United States-Soviet relations regarding the Jackson Amendment, Sakharov said that detente should not preclude the United States from maintaining some form of control over the Soviet Union. See Peter Dorman, "Andrei Sakharov: The Conclusions of a Liberal Scientist," in Dissent in the USSR, ed. Tokes, p. 387.

53. Excerpt from Andrei Sakharov's letter to President Carter, dated 21 January 1977. Sakharov lists fifteen dissidents for whom he is appealing. For a background on the letter and a full text, see Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, "In Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners: Andrei Sakharov's appeal to President Carter" (New York: Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, 1977).

CHAPTER FOUR

SOVIET AND UNITED STATES BEHAVIOR

This chapter will examine Soviet and United States behavior over the issue of Soviet dissent. In the case of Soviet behavior, it will examine the various methods undertaken by the Soviet regime to stymie the dissidents' international appeal. It will also examine the actions undertaken by the Soviet government to block United States' support of dissidents. With respect to United States behavior, the chapter will examine the type of activities undertaken by the American government in support of Soviet dissidents and will also study the type of actions undertaken against the Soviet government over the issue of human rights.

Soviet Behavior

The Domestic Features of Soviet Behavior

The Soviet regime is faced with two inter-related problems: one domestic and the other international. Domestically, the failure to stem dissent may lead to increased political problems. For example, a group of Ukrainian dissidents have appealed to the United Nations to recognize the Ukraine as a Russian colony and to place the issue of Ukrainian self-determination on the agenda of the General Assembly. These dissidents are calling for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.[1] Internationally, external support may further encourage dissident behavior. The later exiled dissident Vladimir Bukovsky stated in 1970 that the dissident movement expanded in proportion to the dissemination of samizdat and that this dissemination depended on the outside world, particularly radio broadcasts from western states.[2] As a result of the inter-relationship

of the domestic and international aspects of the dissent issue any examination of Soviet behavior over the issue must take into consideration the domestic actions of the Soviet government aimed at the dissidents since these actions may have just as much of an international impact as the actions more overtly directed against the United States.

On the domestic front, just as the dissidents have engaged in all forms of legal arguments and symbolism in their attempts to gain their goals, so also has the Soviet government utilized legal actions and symbolism as a means to attempt to control the dissidents. Thus, while the dissidents' strategy has been to show the discrepancy between Soviet law and its actual implementation,[3] the Soviet regime's strategy is to treat the dissidents as criminals and to manipulate the legal system against them to "reinforce the image of the dissidents as criminals, that is, pitted against society, rather than as speaking for society against the State."[4] The basic legal tool utilized by the regime is Article 70 of the Soviet Criminal Code which allows arrest for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." This is an elastic clause under which all manner of "crimes" can be put. For example, Ukrainian dissident Iryna Senyk was arrested in 1972 for violating Article 62 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code, which corresponds to Article 70 of the Soviet Criminal Code.[5] Her crime consisted of questioning the regime's nationalities policy, writing and circulating poetry which expressed "subversive" ideas and of associating with dissidents Vyacheslav Chornovil and Valentyn Moroz.[6]

Chornovil described the utility of Article 62 for the regime in the following manner:

> The currently popular Article 62 transgresses the Constitution. The Supreme Soviet should either annul the article or define it concretely. In its present formulation, this article completely negates the freedoms guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution of the USSR. Whenever someone criticizes the current nationality policy for its deviation from Lenin's standards (even if erroneously) he is fully entitled to do so by the Constitution of the USSR. But, on the strength of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR, this person can be banished to a hard-labour camp, because his criticism may be interpreted as 'propaganda for the purpose of undermining or weakening Soviet rule' . . . It seems that every assertion that is not in line with directives can be classified as one of these 'false defamatory rumours.'[7]

Such elastic legal measures, however, may help the regime manipulate the domestic and international publics' view of the dissidents.[8] By portraying them as criminals the regime may hope to undercut many of the arguments and much of the support of the dissidents. By showing adherence to legal procedures and court trials the regime also presents itself as protecting the rights of criminals and, thus, by implication, seeks to reverse the dissidents' charges that the regime does not follow the law and neglects individual freedoms. Furthermore, by putting dissidents through staged legal trials it prevents the buildup of hostilities in society that disappearance or execution could foment and may preclude external criticism of the regime as following an arbitrary method of rule.[9]

A favorite legal approach is to charge the dissident with being a foreign agent.[10] This encompasses accusing the dissident of aiding external enemies. This is also an effective technique for exploiting the xenophobic tendencies of the Soviet people in an attempt to prevent them from sympathizing with the dissident.[11] For example, Anatoly Scharansky was accused of supplying, from 1974 to 1977, state secrets to

western officials, including a western agent posing as a journalist.[12] The state involved was the United States, and the journalist was Robert C. Toth. Scharansky's sole crimes were that he has sought to emigrate to Israel and he served, prior to his arrest, as a liaison between Soviet dissidents and the western press.

In addition to the charges of criminality and espionage, the regime engages in show trials in order to show the legality of its moves against dissidents. Scharansky's espionage trial was one such carefully orchestrated event. It took place in July 1978. Observers were carefully screened, and the attendance of people who would voice opinions favorable to the regime was insured. It was a four day affair. Fifty carefully selected people were admitted. Only one relative, Scharansky's brother Leonid, was allowed to attend. His mother was not allowed to enter. Soviet spokesmen met twice each day with Western reporters and read official versions of the events and refused to answer any questions. Scharansky was finally sentenced to three years in prison and ten in a labor camp. As the sentence was read there was applause in the courtroom and one observer shouted: "Not enough." Both outside and inside the courtroom the authorities had taken precautions to exhibit an air of legality and popular opposition to Scharansky.[13]

Part of the overall legal approach also entails giving publicity to the "constitutional guarantees" in the Soviet Union. The new Soviet constitution was part of this process. For many years the Soviet Union had been working on a new constitution. It was finally ready in 1977.[14] The new constitution has incorporated some of the points of the Helsinki agreements, allowing Soviet authorities to claim that theirs is the only state that has made the Helsinki agreements part of its highest law.

Also, the ratification of the constitution was scheduled for the week of the opening of the Belgrade follow up conference in October 1977.

In addition to these direct legal measures, the authorities have sought to present the actions of dissidents as misguided by having dissidents recant on their previous beliefs in public confessions and show trials. The most drmatic recantations were those of Pyotor Yakir and Victor Krasin in 1973. Yakir had become an important contact between the dissidents and western correspondents, by supplying the latter with copies of The Chronicle of Current Events. When in late 1971 the Soviet authorities decided to crack down on the Chronicle, Yakir became a prime target. In 1972 he and his friend Krasin were arrested. They eventually broke under interrogation and "confessed" to working with emigre anti-Soviet organizations.

This public confession may have served to discredit Yakir and Krasin before the domestic and international publics and, by implication, other dissidents by showing them as admitting their wrong ways of thinking. It also put fear in other dissidents. It showed that no dissident activity was free from penetration, and thus it might frighten dissidents, leading them to abandon their activities. In their confession Yakir and Krasin implicated numerous other dissidents. The result was that many dissidents became disillusioned regarding the prospects of reforming Soviet society and of the possibility of cooperation among dissidents.[15]

The regime has relied on a number of other methods of isolating and discrediting dissidents. One of these has been psychiatric imprisonment.[16] The basis for dealing with dissidents as psychiatric cases is that under socialism there are no social conflicts. Disagreement with the existing

structure, therefore, is not political but pathological; the individual must be mentally deranged.[17] Vladimir Bukovsky described in the following manner the advantages that psychiatric imprisonment has for the regime:

> From the point of view of the authorities it is an extremely convenient method; it enables them to deprive a man of his freedom for an unlimited time, keep him in strict isolation, and use psycho-pharmacological means of "re-educating;" it hinders the campaign for open legal proceedings and for his release, since even the most impartial man will, if he is not personally acquainted with the patient, always feel a twinge of uncertainty about the patient's mental health; it deprives its victim of what few rights he would enjoy as a prisoner, and it provides an opportunity to discredit the ideas and actions of dissidents, etc.[18]

The spectre of being doomed to a psychiatric hospital also is a bargaining chip the regime tries to use to reform dissidents and thus discredit them among other dissidents. For example, after writing letters to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party in 1971 complaining about shortcomings in the Turkmen SSR, poetess Annasultan Kekilova lost her job. She then renounced her Soviet citizenship, for which act she was placed in a psychiatric hospital.

> The doctors in the psychiatric hospital told her that she was well, but added that unless she signed a statement saying that the letters to the Congress were written under stress, she would remain in the psychiatric hospital for the rest of her life.[19]

Official campaignsof libel against prominent dissidents have also been utilized in order to undercut their appeal. An example was a campaign the regime launched against Andrei Sakharov in 1973. In radio broadcasts and newspaper articles the regime accused Sakharov of being a renegade, of selling his soul to the west, and of opposing detente.[20]

The campaign took its toll. The following statement by a medical scientist summed up Sakharov's situation: "Respect for Sakharov has fallen over the past couple of years. . . . People consider him an eccentric, a bit feeble-minded, strange, emotional, unpredictable."[21]

A key ingredient of any libel campaign against an individual of Sakharov's stature is to engage as many professional people as possible. It may lend greater credence to the libel among the domestic and international publics if professional people or colleagues engage in it. It also forces these people to join either one or the other camp, to either be for or against the dissident. The choice, therefore, is between open dissent or collusion in repression. To protect themselves, many join in the slander campaigns and thus become part of the regime's apparatus against dissidents. This leaves the marked dissident in a very isolated position, both within his profession and society. After the 1973 campaign against him, hardly any of the top scientists came to visit Sakharov.

In its attempts to discredit dissidents, the regime has also engaged in manipulating symbols, especially in its attempts to undermine the appeal of nationalism.[22] The term nationalism has been portrayed as a symbol of fascism. Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, are fascists and since fascism was a Soviet enemy, Ukrainian nationalists are pictured as being anti-Soviet.[23] "Numerous books and pamphlets are published to reinforce this association."[24] By creating this association the regime may discredit Ukrainian dissidents internally by portraying them as being anti-Soviet and externally as being fascists. There may have been some success on the part of the regime since Ukrainian dissidents prefer to use the term "patriots" in order to avoid the pejorative meaning of the

term nationalism.

Another method the regime has resorted to in order to discredit dissidents has been to play on the desires of some emigrants who wish to return to the Soviet Union. While the association of nationalism with fascism has been largely an attempt to discredit Ukrainian dissent, the exploitation of the desire to return to the Soviet Union has been largely directed at Soviet Jews, who are the main emigrants. The Soviet regime has used the example of Soviet Jews who have emigrated and are seeking to return back to the Soviet Union in a propaganda campaign that seeks to get across two points. First, the regime plays on the fact that there are people who actually wish to come into the Soviet Union. Thus, implicitly the Soviet Union is not so evil as the dissidents portray it. Second, the regime utilizes this desire to return as an example to Soviet society that if anyone should desire to emigrate and then wish to come back, the return will not be allowed. The lesson to be derived is that it may be better to remain at home than to risk unhappiness overseas.

The Soviet government has published the letters of some emigrants to the Soviet government, relatives and friends. An excerpt from one such letter will give an indication of the propaganda role this technique plays for the regime. Part of the letter reads:

> Please have my open letter published in the press, if possible. I appeal to every Jew in the Soviet Union. . . .
>
> Jews! Sit tight in the USSR, kiss our Russian soil three times a day, and pray to your ancestors, thanking them you have not made my mistake, you have not left your home and your Motherland, your friends and your work, your freedom and your right to be a man, the right to an education and to medical treatment.
>
> Jews! Don't be an ass. Stay in your home and listen to the voice of Moscow and not to 'Kol Israel'.[25]

A final way of dealing with dissidents is to exile selected leaders. Exile deprives the dissidents of a moral force around which they can rally, since many of the exiled dissidents are celebrities. Another result is that the exiled dissident soon finds that he cannot attract the same form of attention that he had been able to attract while he was in the Soviet Union. While in the Soviet Union, the dissident was a human interest story. In exile he is one of millions of free people. Many exiled dissidents continue to speak out on human rights but they are not, ironically, so effective in terms of publicity as they were in the Soviet Union.[26]

The exiling of a dissident rather than imprisonment presents the Soviet regime as abiding to some standards of humanitarianism and thus may undercut some international criticism. There are two ways that the regime has expelled dissidents. One method is to revoke the citizenship of a dissident while he is overseas and thus prevent his return. This is what occurred with Valery Chalidze in 1972. A second method is forcible exile as in the case of Solzhenitsyn when he was put on a plane in 1974 and taken to West Germany. The regime has also exiled dissidents to remote Soviet cities in order to isolate them from other dissidents and the western press and, thus, prevent the press from reporting on their activities.

Much of the above activity undertaken by the Soviet regime may be considered as being aimed at creating for the international public a negative impression regarding the dissidents and at portraying the regime, in turn, in a more positive light. That is, by showing the dissidents as being mentally unfit, as criminals, fascists and as being

against detente, among other things, much of the international support they enjoy may be undermined. In turn, by showing itself as abiding by a system of law, and by exiling rather than imprisoning some dissidents, the Soviet regime may be able to present itself as acting according to legal and humanitarian principles.

However, some of the activities the regime has undertaken against dissidents would seem to work counter to the positive image it may seem to want to portray. There are a number of specific activities that would seem to present a negative impression of the regime. One is economic black-listing. By denying employment to a dissident the regime may be able to influence the dissident to give up his activities.[27] However, the use of this technique undermines the Soviet regime's contention that all Soviet citizens have a right to employment. Another activity used is that of anti-Semitism. The regime fosters anti-Semitism in order to prevent the Jewish desire for emigration from spreading to other ethnic groups. However, by fostering anti-Semitism the regime gives credence to Soviet Jewish charges of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and undermines the regime's stated view that national discrimination is forbidden in the Soviet Union.[28] The Soviet regime has also engaged in physically beating and murdering dissidents.[29] Since in some cases no investigations were undertaken, the Soviet regime's claim of following the law does not seem to stand up. Overall, the Soviet regime's claim of legality in its dealings with dissidents "is faulty because numerous civil rights campaigners are not prosecuted but persecuted by extra-legal means."[30]

It is obvious, therefore, that some of the activities undertaken by the Soviet regime against the dissidents have the effect of reinforcing

the dissidents' charges of a lack of human rights in the Soviet Union rather than in undermining those charges. The Soviet regime, therefore, seems to be engaged in cross purposes: on the one hand it undertakes activities in order to discredit the dissidents in the international arena while on the other it undertakes some activities which serve to discredit the regime and give credence to the dissidents' charges of violations of human rights by the Soviet authorities.

Soviet Behavior Directed Against the United States

The Soviet government has undertaken a number of measures to stop United States support of the dissidents. One of the simplest ways for the Soviet authorities to attempt to counter United States criticism is by denying any charges. An example is the effort to neutralize charges of anti-Semitism. The authorities have stated that "the Soviet Union is the world's first state where any manifestation of national or racial intolerance is punishable by law."[31] In denying any abuse of human rights, the regime seeks to portray itself, in turn, as the only regime under which human rights can be developed. Pravda has asserted that

> the right to work, the right to education, to social security, the right to elect and be elected to government and administrative bodies, the right to participate in discussions and in decision-making, including decisions on matters of national importance -- this is our Socialist democracy in action.[32]

The regime has also engaged itself in the human rights game by accusing the United States of violations. The Soviet authorities have described the United States in the following manner:

> As for the present state of basic human rights in the United States, it is characterized by the following eloquent facts: millions unemployed, social discrimination,

> social inequality of women, infringement of citizens' personal freedom, the growth of crime and so on.[33]

The regime has also accused the United States -- and other states -- of racial discrimination:

> It is hard for Soviet people to believe there are restrictions on Jews visiting certain golf clubs in Britain or staying at certain hotels in the United States, let alone open national and racial discrimination and segregation as practiced in the USA, the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and some other countries of the 'free' world.[34]

In July 1977, Moscow Radio broadcast a concert of protest songs by Johnny Cash, Joan Baez and other American singers. The announcer pointed out that in the United States big criminals are able to buy their way out of prison.[35]

The audience that such statements and broadcasts are supposed to reach is both domestic and international. Domestically, these statements and broadcasts paint a bleak picture of the United States and thus may offset any attraction the United States' human rights appeals may have. For the international public these statements and broadcasts may show that the United States has faults that can be criticized and, thus, the United States should not lecture the Soviet Union.[36]

The Soviet government has also sought to blunt United States' criticism by elevating the argument to the question of national sovereignty. The issue, therefore, is not one of human rights but of illegal interference in Soviet society. In 1947 when the United Nations was discussing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the question arose as to whether state sovereignty could be limited when questions of human rights arose. Rene Cassin argued for the limitation of state sovereignty. Andrei Vyshinsky of the Soviet Union argued in favor of the unlimited

sovereignty of the state. The "Vyshinsky Thesis" applies to all other human rights agreements subscribed to by the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime, therefore, upholds the principle of unlimited sovereignty of the state vis-a-vis the individual and does not recognize the right of interference in its internal problems. For example, in his letter to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarding Jewish emigration, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated that the Soviet government "emphasized that the question as such was entirely within the internal competence of our state."[37]

The Soviet government has at times undertaken more direct action in its efforts to stymie United States concern over Soviet dissidents. In this respect, the regime has resorted to harassing and discrediting United States personnel and citizens. Harassment of United States government officials may be considered a direct message to the United States government regarding the regime's displeasure over the human rights issue. The harassment of diplomat Constantine Warvariv is a case in point.[38] Such harassment seeks to discredit and pressure the United States. By accusing Warvariv of being a former Nazi collaborator in the employ of the United States government, the accusation portrays the United States government as not being reliable in its human rights policy. This seeks to undermine the United States' credibility and image on the issue. Furthermore, harassment serves as a warning that the United States' functioning in the Soviet Union can be impaired if it continues to pressure the Soviet Union on the issue.

The Soviet authorities have also taken action against United States correspondents. As stated in Chapter Three, an important link between the dissidents and international publicity are western correspondents. In order to break this link, the regime has at times expelled foreign journalists. If access is denied to correspondents, then the affected

media may censor itself regarding coverage of dissent. Expulsion of a journalist is also a stronger message to the concerned government of the Soviet government's displeasure over the human rights issue.

An example of the former case was the Soviet government's expulsion of Associated Press correspondent George A. Krimsky in February 1977. He had been very active in reporting the activities of the dissidents.[39] In turn, the detention of journalist Robert C. Toth in June 1977 was interpreted by many as an attempt to warn the United States regarding its human rights position. United States officials regarded the Soviet action "as a show of defiance against the United States' interest in human rights."[40] The fact that Toth had been accused of gathering secret information may have been a sign to the United States government from the Soviet government that it was displeased with United States behavior.

A more direct method of dealing with the United States is by meeting with government representatives. While the above methods all sought to discredit United States criticism in one way or another, meetings by Soviet representatives with United States officials attempt to persuade the United States of the disadvantages of its human rights policy. An example was the meeting Georgi Arbatov, head of the Soviet Institute for United States Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, had with members of the United States-Soviet Trade Conference in February 1973. He raised the issue of Jewish emigration and the Jackson Amendment. He warned that using legislation to pressure the Soviet government on Jewish emigration could harm United States-Soviet relations. It could also lead to heightened anti-Semitism since Soviet citizens would see this as an attempt to give Jews preferential treatment.[41] In their March 1977 meeting, Brezhnev conveyed to Secretary Vance the Soviet unhappiness with the

United States behavior on human rights. He warned that continuation of the issue could impede constructive relations between the two states.[42]

Some of the pressure exerted on the United States government on behalf of dissidents has come from domestic interest groups, especially ethnic groups. As a result, the Soviet authorities have sought to discredit these groups by portraying their concerns as being unfounded, and by defaming them.[43] If they can be discredited, then possibly their support within American society and their ability to pressure the United States government may be eroded. A look at the Ukrainian community in the United States and the Soviet regime's attitude toward it will illustrate this.

To Ukrainian-Americans, Valentyn Moroz had become a symbol of nationalism because of his refusal to buckle under to Soviet repression. The Ukrainian-American community had sought his release from prison.[44] In response, the Soviet regime had sought to discredit both the Ukrainian-American community and Moroz. In an official statement released by Soviet embassy officials in Ottawa, Canada, the Soviet government sought to discredit the Ukrainian communities throughout the free world. The release stated that all emigre information on the arrest, trial, sentence and health of Moroz was false. As for Moroz, the statement read that he had contacts with subversive groups and had distributed subversive literature and that his sentence was covered by the Ukrainian SSR's Penal Code. Furthermore, Ukrainian emigres are usually portrayed as fascists or bourgeois nationalists in the employ of the United States or West Germany intelligence organizations.[45]

At other times, the Soviet regime has been more direct regarding American ethnic groups. It has protested to the United States government.

Protests are usually lodged in response to ethnic demonstrations against the Soviet Union or because of harassment of Soviet personnel by such groups. In June 1974 Moscow complained about the activities of Ukrainian-Americans. The regime protested to the United States State Department, objecting to the All-National Manifestation in Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine, which was held in Washington, D.C. on June 22. TASS described the participants as hooligans.[46]

Overall, Soviet actions against the dissidents have encompassed a wide range, starting at one end from legal measures all the way to more drastic measures such as psychiatric imprisonment and exile. On the international level, in its actions against the United States, the Soviet pattern of behavior has basically been one of restraint, concentrating on verbal propaganda to counter United States criticism or to portray the United States in a bad image in regard to its own human rights behavior. More serious forms of action have been limited to harrasment and expulsion of American correspondents or officials but has fallen short of any imposition of conditions on the United States over the issue.

United States Behavior

Like the Soviet Union, the United States has undertaken a wide scope of activities over the issue of Soviet dissent. These activities have ranged from verbal support of the dissidents to more extreme actions aimed directly against the Soviet government, such as the Jackson Amendment.

While the Soviet Union has mainly defended its treatment of dissidents on legal grounds, the United States has, in turn, presented its

defense of Soviet dissidents on legal grounds. The United States has stated that the numerous international agreements on human rights permit one state to criticize another over the issue and remove this issue from the status as solely a domestic concern of a state. The United States' position on the legal obligations of states was succinctly outlined before the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States Ambassador stated:

> No nation in the world today can hide gross violations of human rights behind assertions of sovereignty. Where basic human rights are concerned, all governments are accountable not only to their own citizens but to the entire community of nations.
>
> Indeed, Governments are committed under the Charter and subsequent international agreements to protect their citizens' rights to liberty and security of person, to freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, to freedom of expression, to freedom from racial or religious discrimination.

The United States, therefore, has geared its criticism of alleged Soviet violations of human rights on the basis of international agreements. In this regard, the United States has made particular use of the United Nations Charter which commits member states, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, to protect and promote human rights.

In this respect, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has said that the United States is obligated under the United Nations Charter to promote human rights and that this goal is reflected in American legislation.[48] President Carter, in turn, has stated:

> All the signatories of the United Nations Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.[49]

Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the Department of State, underlined the importance of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter when she said:

> In dealings with other governments on human rights, it is the law that provides a solid point of departure. Without Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter and other important international legal commitments, human rights could be taken seriously or ignored depending upon the whim of a government.[50]

On such a basis, the United States has criticized the Soviet Union. Thus, in 1968, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg accused the Soviet government "of violating human rights in its treatment of the Soviet writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel, and those who sought to champion their cause."[51]

Not only does the United States have a foundation in the United Nations Charter for criticizing the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union has also made it clear that it gives precedence to international agreements over its domestic law and thus this may reinforce the United States' position of the right to speak out against Soviet violations of human rights. The Ukrainian SSR for example, has stated in specific reference to human rights that many of its domestic laws

> contained provisions whereby in the event of a divergence between them and an international treaty or agreement concluded by the USSR or the Ukrainian SSR the international agreement or treaty should apply.[52]

American activity on behalf of Soviet dissidents has encompassed a wide range of behavior. One of the most important forms of support has come through contacts between United States and Soviet officials. Contacts have taken place both at the Congressional and Presidential levels. In 1975, Congressman Millicent Fenwick (R.- N.J.) sought to have an

audience with Valentyn Moroz during her trip in the Soviet Union. Permission was denied, but the Congressional delegation continued to press the Soviet authorities regarding violations of human rights. The discussions became heated, and Representative Fenwick was accused by Soviet officials of damaging Soviet-American relations.[53]

At the Belgrade Conference, Senator Robert Dole (R.- Kans.) presented Yuri Vorontsov, head of the Soviet delegation, with an appeal regarding the situation of fourteen political prisoners.[54] The President himself has raised the issue. For example, President Ford inquired about Valentyn Moroz during his Vladivostok summit meeting with Brezhnev.

In another form of activity, Congressional resolutions calling upon the Soviet Union to ameliorate its treatment of dissidents have been introduced and passed. These are general statements which serve to call attention to the issue but in reality do not exert much pressure against the Soviet government. Overall, they do serve to keep the issue before the public and to remind the Soviet government that there is concern in the United States regarding the issue. An example of a typical resolution is that of March 1975, calling upon the President to act on behalf of two Ukrainian dissidents. Part of the resolution reads:

> Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), that the Congress urge President Ford to utilize every appropriate means for the transmission of a request to the Government of the Soviet Union that it release from prison Mr. Moroz and Mr. Plyushch, and that it permit them and their immediate families to emigrate from the Soviet Union to the country of their choice.[55]

The United States has also undertaken protests and appeals to indicate its concern with the Soviet government's treatment of dissidents. In January 1977 the State Department issued a warning concerning the Soviet treatment of Andrei Sakharov. The statement read:

> We have long admired Andrei Sakharov as an outspoken champion of human rights in the Soviet Union. He is, as you know, a prominent, respected scientist, a Nobel laureate, who, at considerable risk, has worked to promote respect for human rights in his native land.
>
> Any attempt by the Soviet authorities to intimidate Mr. Sakharov will not silence legitimate criticism in the Soviet Union and will conflict with accepted international standards of human rights.[56]

Another technique used by the United States -- broadcasting into the Soviet Union -- has been going on for a long time. It is not a result of the present day human rights concern. Broadcasting was a feature of the cold war that developed between the two states.

Radio Liberty (RL) and the Voice of America (VOA) are the two radio stations which broadcast into the Soviet Union. With respect to the Ukraine to which it has been transmitting since 1954, Radio Liberty broadcasts on a daily basis, 24 hours in Russian and 8 hours in Ukrainian.[57] The VOA broadcasts 14 hours in Russian and 4 in Ukrainian.[58] The programming of each of the radio stations is basically similar. Radio Liberty broadcasts "newscasts, world press reviews, news analysis and correspondents' reports from leading news centers and areas of significant developments."[59] Programming also includes cultural, historical and political material denied the domestic Soviet audience "as well as the reading of locally-censored texts of indigenous writers, round table discussions, interviews with experts on their specialties and the coverage of topical Western theater, art and music. VOA broadcasts include newscasts covering political, cultural and social issues as well as political commentary. Other regular programming includes spots on religion, music, sports, Ukrainian-American life and review of weekly events.[60]

Neither of the stations has geared its programming towards subversive activities in the Soviet Union. Radio Liberty programming is aimed at

making available to listeners "a more balanced perspective on events and trends than any single, official version can provide" and espouses "no single specific political, economic or religious creed."[61] Furthermore, the mission statement of RL states that it "should objectively report problems and setbacks, as well as achievements and maintain the critical distance from officials and official policies that is characteristic of responsible, independent and international news media."[62] The VOA, in turn, "seeks to promote understanding abroad for the United States, its people culture and policies" by "broadcasting objective, comprehensive news reports and giving a balanced view of American society."[63]

United States policy, therefore, has not been directed toward wholesale support for the dissidents. The risks such a policy entail seem to be greater than the possible gains. The United States may exacerbate relations with the Soviet Union without any appreciable gain.

The United States has also aided the dissidents by providing them with a platform from which they can criticize the Soviet regime.[64] Specifically, Congress has held hearings regarding Soviet violations of human rights and, by doing so, it indicates its displeasure with Soviet policy. One such hearing involved the appearance of exiled dissident Petro Vins before the Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in July 1979. In his testimony, Vins detailed the harrassment of other Ukrainian dissidents and stated that only the West could influence the outcome of the arrests of dissidents. President Carter carried this contact with dissidents one step further when he undertook to write a letter to a Soviet dissident still in the Soviet Union. In his letter to Andrei Sakharov, the President wrote:

> You may rest assured that the American people and our government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights not only in our own country but also abroad.[65]

United States-Soviet interaction over the issue has at times led to the United States undertaking certain measures to punish the Soviet Union. For example, the United States has resorted to cancelling trips by United States officials to the Soviet Union and has also prevented entry of Soviet officials. In the summer of 1978, irritated over the anti-American tone of dissident trials, the United States cancelled a number of official trips to the Soviet Union. The cancelled trips included those by Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Frank Press, Presidential Science Advisor, and Barbara Blum, Deputy Director of the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition, the United States has barred entry to Soviet personnel. In January, 1977, Soviet editor Aleksandr B. Chaovsky was denied entry into the United States. This was possibly done in retaliation for the Soviet Union's refusal to allow members of the Congressional Helsinki committee which was set up by Congress to monitor Soviet compliance with the agreement, including its human rights provisions, to enter the Soviet Union.[66]

The United States has also resorted to expelling Soviet personnel. An example of this was President Carter's order to expel Soviet newsmen in 1977. The action was undertaken in response to a Soviet expulsion of an American correspondent. In turn, Carter ordered the expulsion of two Soviet reporters. It was reported in the New York Times that Carter undertook this move to show the Soviet government that the Carter administration means business on human rights.[67] But this may have also been

a question of domestic politics. The new Carter administration could not show itself as giving in to Soviet pressure because detente critics might have seized upon this as a sign of American weakness toward the Soviet Union. As this example shows, it would seem that some of the United States' action may be aimed as much at placating domestic United States groups as it is at persuading the Soviet Union.[68]

The United States has also resorted to imposing certain restrictions on the Soviet Union over the issue. The most serious was the Jackson Amendment which restricted United States trade with the Soviet Union unless greater freedom for Jewish emigration was allowed. The Jackson Amendment will be examined in Chapter Six.

Except for the case of the Jackson Amendment, United States behavior has been relatively restrained. The United States has mostly been forthcoming with verbal support for the dissidents and any conflict over the issue with the Soviet Union has been limited to the expulsion of Soviet newsmen from the United States and limitations on American and Soviet officials seeking to enter each other's country. However, the United States has undertaken expulsion of Soviet personnel at other times, and therefore, this behavior cannot be considered being a peculiar outgrowth of the human rights issue.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown the wide range of actions undertaken by both the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to Soviet dissent. The behavior of each state towards the other can be basically described as being high in verbal propaganda but relatively low in actual substance.

Except for the case of the Jackson Amendment it seems that neither state has sought to make the issue a major consideration in bilateral relations and has not undertaken any actions which could exacerbate relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. News From Ukraine, Winter 1980. (Ijamsville, Maryland: American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). The News is a four page newsletter containing information on the struggle for national independence and human rights in Ukraine.

2. This was stated by Peter Reddaway. See Peter Reddaway, "The Development of Dissent in the USSR," in The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente, ed. William E. Griffith (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1976) p. 82.

3. For examples of the dissidents' methods of showing the discrepancy between Soviet law and its actual implementation see Chapter Three. For an account of this discrepancy from the perspective of a dissident, see Vyacheslav Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 2-76.

4. Kenneth C. Farmer, "Ukrainian Dissent: Symbolic Politics and Socio-Demographic Aspects," Part II The Ukrainian Quarterly 34 (Summer 1978): 156.

5. In the Soviet Union, there are All-Union laws as well as laws of the individual republics. The laws of the individual republics correspond to the All-Union laws. Thus, the Ukrainian criminal code Article 62 corresponds to the All-Union Criminal Code Article 70. The legal system's structure is, therefore, somewhat similar to that of the U.S. where there are federal and state laws. For the derivation of the Ukrainian Republic's law from the All-Union law, see Soviet Ukraine (Kiev: Editorial Office of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia), p. 246. No date. Article 70 reads: "Agitation or propaganda carried out with the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime or in order to commit particularly dangerous crimes against the state, the dissemination for the said purposes of slanderous inventions defamatory to the Soviet political and social system, as well as the dissemination or production or harboring for the said purpose of literature of similar content, are punishable by imprisonment for a period of from six months to seven years and with exile from two to five years, or without exile, or by exile from two to five years."

6. Ukrainian Women's League of America, Women Political Prisoners in the USSR (New York: Ukrainian Women's League of America, 1975), p. 7.

7. Chornovil, p. 7.

8. The scholarly opinion regarding the Soviet legal system is that it is utilized as a means of controlling Soviet society for the benefit of the state rather than in protecting or fostering any societal or individual rights. Hence, laws are arbitrarily interpreted and enforced

to suit the policy objectives of the Soviet leadership. For views of this interpretation of the Soviet legal system, see Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 301-306; John N. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government, 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 168-184. Also see Chapter One of this dissertation for a brief discussion along these lines.

9. Hazard, p. 170. Hazard writes that the Soviet legal system's use of a court system was based on the desire to positively affect world opinion.

10. Farmer, p. 156.

11. Ibid., pp. 156-160.

12. Newsweek, 28 July 1978, p. 28.

13. For descriptions of Soviet show trials, see The Economist, 15 July 1978, pp. 41-42; News Bulletin 136, 23 March 1979 (National Conference on Soviet Jewry).

14. For a text of the new Soviet constitution, see Izvestia, 8 October 1977. Also see William E. Butler, The Soviet Legal System (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1978), pp. 3-32.

15. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976), p. 461.

16. Psychiatric imprisonment for political reasons is not an invention of the Soviet state. It originated with the Czars. Czar Nicholas I had some political opponents hospitalized as being mentally unfit. See Virginia Cowles, The Russian Dagger (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 19.

17. Valery Chalidze, To Defend These Rights, trans. Guy Danials (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 146.

18. Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, The Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR (New York: Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, 1976), p. 16.

19. This statement is contained in a letter written by Kekilova's mother, O. Seydova, addressed to the Communist Party of the Soviet union. See Women Political Prisoners in the USSR, p. 7.

20. Keesings Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1973), p. 26127. By accusing Sakharov of opposing detente, the regime might have wanted to undermine the support he enjoyed in the West.

21. Smith, The Russians, p. 452. Smith does not identify the scientist whom he quotes.

22. For an examination of the Soviet regime's manipulation of symbols to discredit dissidents, see Farmer, pp. 156-165.

23. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Ukrainians welcomed the Germans as possible liberators from Soviet control. German policy, however, was aimed at squashing any Ukrainian liberation. As a result, Ukrainian guerillas fought a two front war against the Soviet Union and Germany. The struggle against Soviet control continued after the war and persisted until the early 1950's. For an in-depth account, see Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine (New York: Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army of the United States and Canada, 1972).

24. Farmer, p. 161. The Soviet regime, however, is more lenient regarding ethnic Russian nationalism. See footnote 28 in Chapter One.

25. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, The Deceived Testify (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1971), p. 7.

26. Andrei Sakharov, for example, feels he is more effective inside the Soviet Union than he would be outside. Because of his reputation Sakharov is an important link between the dissidents and the Western press. He has served as a source for relaying information on human rights violations to foreign reporters. Due to this Sakharov was sent into internal exile in early 1980 to the city of Gorky. In this way the Soviet regime hopes to break the link he enjoyed with the Western press. See Chapter Seven for a further discussion regarding the exiling of dissidents.

27. For example, when Leonid Petrovsky spoke out against anti-Stalinism he was deprived of his research post at the Institute of the Museum of Lenin in Moscow. After a year he was finally given another position but he has stopped making protests. See Smith, pp. 457-548.

28. For a brief examination of anti-Semitism, see Robert G. Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (New York: Pocket Books, 1976), pp. 447-456. See Chapter Six regarding the Soviet regime's claim that anti-Semitism does not exist and for a further discussion of anti-Semitism.

29. For a review of some cases in which the Soviet authorities have used physical force, see The Soviet Union 1976-1977 (New York: Homes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 75-76.

30. Ibid., p. 79.

31. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Soviet Jews: Fact and Fiction (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House), p. 34. No date.

32. Pravda, 12 February 1977.

33. This was reported in the New York Times, 3 March 1977.

34. Soviet Jews: Fact and Fiction, p. 35.

35. This was reported in The Economist, 16 July 1977, p. 44.

36. The domestic and international purposes of many such statements is most evident from Soviet press releases. Press releases of certain items which have appeared in the Soviet press are given wide distribution, especially via the United Nations where the news media and foreign governments can be reached quickly. One such release castigated the United States for its human rights violations. See "The USA and Human Rights," Press Release No. 223, 224, 14 November 1979, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Mission to the United Nations.

37. For a text of the letter, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1975), p. 26995. Georgi Arbatov, the Soviet government's expert on the United States, also charged the United States with interfering in Soviet internal affairs. See interview with Georgi Arbatov by Jonathan Power, The Observer (London), 12 November 1978. See this chapter and Chapter One regarding the issue of sovereignty.

38. For a detailed examination of the Warvariv case, see Chapter Five.

39. New York Times, 5 February 1977.

40. This was reported by the New York Times. The officials were not named. See New York Times, 15 June 1977.

41. William Korey, "The Story of the Jackson Amendment 1973-1975," Midstream 3 (March 1975), p. 11.

42. New York Times, 29 March 1977.

43. For example, for various criticisms of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, an international nongovernmental Ukrainian organization with an office in New York, see Pravda, 6 January 1979; Literaturnaya Ykraina, 21 November 1978.

44. Moroz, along with four other dissidents, was released in April 1979 in a Soviet-United States exchange involving dissidents and spies. The other released dissidents were Alexander Ginsburg, Mark Dymshits, Georgi Vins and Eduard Kuznetsov. For an account of the exchange, see the New York Times, 28 April 1979. For the political relevance of the exhchange see footnote 31 in Chapter Seven.

45. Farmer, p. 156.

46. This protest is recounted in "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 30 (Summer 1974): 224.

47. Statement by Ambassador William vanden Heuvel to the United Nations General Assembly Third Committee, 34th General Assembly, 24 October 1979. See United States Mission to the United Nations Press Release No. 101 (79), 24 October 1979. See Chapter One for the role of state sovereignty in this issue.

48. Speech by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on Law Day before the University of Georgia's Law School, 30 April 1977, Athens, Georgia. See Cyrus R. Vance, "Human Rights Policy," in Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, eds, Barry M. Rubin and Elizabeth P. Shapiro (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 219.

49. Ibid., pp. 218-219.

50. Contained in a statement by Patricia M. Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, before the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and Division V of the D.C. Bar Association. See Patricia M. Derian, "Human Rights: The Role of Law and Lawyers," in Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 268. Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter contain the obligations of members concerning human rights.

51. Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, the United States, and World Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 119.

52. Such a claim was made by the Ukrainian representative before the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. See United Nations, General Assembly, 34th Session, 1979, Report of the Human Rights Committee (A/34/40), p. 59. However, see Chapter One and this chapter for the Soviet government's actual support of its sovereignty when this issue arises.

53. Christian Science Monitor, 14 August 1975.

54. Ukrainian Weekly, 11 December 1977. The Belgrade Conference of 1977 was a follow up conference to the Helsinki Conference. The purpose of the Belgrade Conference was to evaluate the application by the signatories of the Helsinki Agreement. The Agreement had made it a stipulation to hold follow-up conferences. A follow-up conference is scheduled to take place in Madrid in 1980.

55. House Congressional Resolution 190, 21 March 1975.

56. New York Times, 28 January 1977.

57. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc. "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty -- A Unique Broadcaster for Thirty Years," (Washington, D.C.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., February 1980).

58. Program schedule of the Voice of America for May-October, 1980. Published by the United States International Communication Agency, Washington, D.C.

59. "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty."

60. Program schedule of the Voice of America.

61. "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty."

62. Ibid.

63. United States International Communication Agency, "Facts About VOA," (Washington, D.C.: United States International Communication Agency, April 1980).

64. The United States has also published accounts of Soviet and East European violations of human rights which serve to give publicity to the issue. See U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

65. Letter from President Carter to Andrei Sakharov, dated 5 February 1977. For a text of the letter, see New York Times, 18 February 1977.

66. New York Times, 13 January 1977.

67. New York Times, 6 February 1977.

68. For a few brief examples of the role of U.S. domestic politics in the issue of Soviet human rights, see Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER FIVE

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET BEHAVIOR

Nationalism in Ukraine

The Soviet Union presents itself as a state which has solved the nationality problem and in which any abridgement of rights based on nationality is severely punished. The basic principles of the nationality policy were laid down in November 1917 in Lenin's Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia. The Soviet government still refers to it today. The declaration's principles are:

> 1. Equality and sovereignty of all peoples of Russia.
> 2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, including secession and the formation of the independent state.
> 3. The abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions.
> 4. Free development of the national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting Russia.[1]

The Soviet constitution also guarantees the right of secession.[2]

Ukrainian dissidents claim, however, that the theory of Soviet nationality policy is different from the reality.[3] For example, Ukrainian dissident Hryhoriy Prykhodko outlined some of the discrepancies between the theory and the reality in a written statement to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in November 1975. In his statement he wrote:

> Dejure: The Constitution of the USSR proclaims the equal rights of nations and their cultures.
> Defacto: The Ukrainian culture is perishing in Ukraine under the oppression of Russian and Soviet culture, while beyond the borders of Ukraine Ukrainians in the USSR are deprived of rights to cultural-national autonomy; in Russia Ukrainians do not have even one newspaper, school, theatre, while in Ukraine Russians have all this in great quantity.
> Dejure: All languages in the USSR are equal and neither one predominates over the others.

> De facto: The government of the USSR conducts a continuous Russification of Ukrainians and persecutes the Ukrainian language, while the Russian language, more so than before the revolution, predominates in all spheres of official, public, political and economic life.[4]

The discrepancy between the theory and practice of Soviet nationality policy can be witnessed from some of the Soviet regime's behavior. The "higher educational institutions of western Ukraine have been ordered to limit their admission of local students to 25%."[5] Each institution of higher learning has a "special department." This department, which is a branch of the security forces, keeps a record of each of the professors and students. Also, "all professors who insist on lecturing in Ukrainian are on a special list and watched carefully as dangerous enemies of the Soviet state. All classrooms are connected by an inter-communication system to a central recording room. Periodically lectures are taped and carefully scrutinized for any nationalist sentiment and deviation from the prevailing ideological line."[6]

In their attempts to overcome the Soviet regime's stranglehold on Ukrainian culture, Ukrainian dissidents have developed two patterns of dissent. One pattern of dissent seeks greater cultural and economic rights from the Soviet government within the framework of the USSR. An example of this pattern of dissent is Ivan Dzyuba's Internationalism or Russification?[7] The book is a critique from a Marxist-Leninist perspective of the Soviet nationality policy. In the book Dzyuba calls for the development of the Ukraine within the Soviet federation. He criticizes, however, the Soviet educational system for eroding Ukraine's national identity, the low level accorded Ukrainian culture, and the treatment of the Ukrainian language as a peasant dialect.

The other pattern of dissent seeks outright secession. The secessionist pattern of dissent can be seen from the following statement which

appeared on a leaflet distributed throughout Ukraine: "Ukrainian Independence! Moscow plunders the national riches of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people! Centralism is coercion! The policies of Ukraine should be and will be made in Kiev, not Moscow! Ukrainians! If you want to be masters in your own house, then fight for Ukrainian Independence!"[8] And exiled Ukrainian dissident Leonid Plyushch has stated that Russification has become very severe and "this is why I am for the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. For it is only in an independent Ukraine that the building of socialism and the saving of the Ukrainian culture would be possible."[9]

The difference between the two patterns of dissent is one more of emphasis rather than of eventual goals, since either one, if successful, would change the format of the present Soviet state and undermine the centralization of power that exists now. Whether they are outright secession advocates or advocates of greater national rights as guaranteed by the Soviet and Ukrainian constitutions both groups of Ukrainian dissidents are treated equally as nationalists and opponents of the Soviet regime.[10]

While the Soviet regime has sought to Russify the other nationalities in the Soviet Union and has experienced resistance from them,[11] Ukrainian nationalist resistance seems to provide a more formidable concern. According to Klaus Mehnert, "the urge for independence is strongest among the Ukrainians."[12]

This may be why the regime puts a great emphasis on stemming Ukrainian nationalism. Exiled dissident Ludmilla Alekseeva has stated that "repressions in Ukraine are the most severe, enduring and all-embracing; sentences imposed on Ukrainian dissidents are much heavier than those imposed on Russian political prisoners. . . . My only explanation is that Moscow is very

fearful of the secession of Ukraine from the USSR."[13] Furthermore, Ukrainians comprise a disproportionate share of all political prisoners in the Soviet Union.[14]

The Soviet regime's concern with Ukrainian nationalism has both domestic and international features.

Domestically, in terms of population, the Ukraine is the largest non-Russian ethnic republic. It is also the most nationalistic. The combination may present the regime with a formidable threat. The Ukraine also occupies much of the valuable land in the Soviet Union, and is rich in raw materials.[15] Failure to stem nationalism can lead to economic dislocations. In 1972 in Dniprodzierzhynsk workers unrest led to a demonstration which resulted in damages to the regional Communist Party headquarters.[16] Economics, in turn, is an impetus toward nationalism. Ukrainian dissidents state that Ukraine's resources are being exploited for the benefit of the Russians.

Nationalism has come to affect the ruling strata of the Ukrainian party. It is believed that Peter Shelest, former First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was relieved of his post as much for his nationalist leanings as for his hard line policies toward the West.[18]

There are two theories as to Shelest's nationalism. The first is that he sympathized with the concerns expressed by the nationalists.[19] This can be seen by his book Our Soviet Ukraine, which was attacked by the Soviet regime as being nationalistic and for not giving adequate credit to the Bolshevik revolution for the progress Ukraine has made.[20]

The second posits that he had based much of his support on the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the mistaken belief that he could control them.[21] He, therefore, created a monster he could not control. Whatever

theory holds true, it still remains that Shelest had become a problem to the Soviet leadership in the growing nationalist movement in Ukraine.

In December 1971 the Party's Central Committee decreed an all-out movement to quash dissent in Ukraine.[22] Previous to this, in July 1970, Vitalyi F. Nikitchenko was removed from his post as KGB chief in Ukraine. He was a personal friend of Shelest, and it is possible that he had restrained the KGB from actively breaking the dissident movement in the late 1960's.[23] His replacement, V. V. Fedorchuk, began an offensive against the dissidents in 1971-1972. Shelest, in turn, was ousted in May of 1972. He was summoned to Moscow, and at a secret session of the Politburo he was relieved as first secretary of Ukraine. He was charged with "parochialism and nationalistic narrow-mindedness which, it was alleged, had inspired a nationalistic movement in Ukraine."[24]

On the international level, there is the possibility that a hostile state may exploit nationalist tendencies in Ukraine. Failure to stem nationalism may leave the Soviet Union open to political manipulation by foreign states. China has sought to exploit the Ukrainian situation and that of other Soviet minorities.[25] The Chinese have engaged in the distribution of leaflets on the Soviet side of the border and in broadcasting to Soviet minorities. One leaflet notes the Soviet Union's hypocritical support of secession and calls upon Ukrainians to "turn your weapons against the enslavers."[26] A "National Liberation Committee," stationed in China, broadcasts support of Ukrainian, Polish and other groups in the Soviet empire. "Peking's efforts are directed towards using the national aspirations of these captive people to dismantle the Soviet Russian empire."[27]

Furthermore, the Soviet regime also has an international image to protect. Marxist ideology states that nationalism is a characteristic of the bourgeois state of historical development. For propaganda reasons the regime cannot afford to have ethnic strife and must strive toward the elimination of such.[28]

Ukrainian Dissent and United States Support

While Ukraine is experiencing a nationalist movement, its recognition and support in the United States has been limited. Ukrainian dissidents face a number of drawbacks in gaining American support. First, Ukrainian dissidents are geographically removed from the centers of international attention. American and other Western correspondents are mostly limited to Moscow and Leningrad and, therefore, their concern with dissidents revolves around those with whom they have contact and can observe. These dissidents are mostly Jewish and Russian. Second, Ukrainian dissent threatens the structure of the Soviet Union and, therefore, the United States is more hesitant to give much support to such dissent, fearing that this would be interpreted as hostile behavior against the Soviet Union, and thus bring the United States into open conflict with the Soviet Union. Third, the type of support the Ukrainian dissidents enjoy does not add much to publicity. Support is mainly limited to the Ukrainian community in the United States.

There are many Ukrainian-American organizations which have come out in support of Ukrainian dissidents and Ukrainian independence. Some of these include the Ukrainian National Association[29] and the Ukrainian National Women's League of America. The largest and most important organization, however, is the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA).

It is the most important because it serves as the national representative body of various other Ukrainian organizations and because many of the activities undertaken in defense of Ukrainian dissidents are either initiated by it or held jointly with it by other Ukrainian groups.

The UCCA describes itself in these terms:

> As an American organization embracing over 1,200 Ukrainian American organizations, clubs, fraternal lodges, veteran and youth societies, women's and sports groups, as well as cultural, social, church and political organizations, the UCCA is a powerful advocate of the freedom and independence of Ukraine. Its overall objective is to support the aspirations of the Ukrainian people to freedom and independence and to enlist the support of the United States and the American people for Ukraine's efforts to attain these objectives."[30]

The resources available to the UCCA to affect American public opinion and policy seem to be meager. The UCCA claims to represent 2 million Ukrainian-Americans.[31] The greatest concentration of Ukrainians seems to be in the New York metropolitan area, and this estimate is about 75,000.[32] Neither nationally nor locally do the Ukrainians seem to present a formidable political voting force which could affect policy.[33]

UCCA monetary resources also seem to be small. Its monetary shortcomings can be witnessed by the fact that in its annual appeal to raise funds for UCCA activities its goal is only $150,000.[34] And, finally, the Ukrainians have no ethnic representative in the U.S. Congress who can pursue the Ukrainian cause. This may be a result of the previous two features -- the small Ukrainian population and the small UCCA finances.[35]

The overall weakness of the Ukrainian community can be witnessed from a meeting between a spokesman for the Soviet Affairs section of the U.S. State Department and Dr. Andrew Zwarun, vice president of Smoloskyp and President of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee. The meeting

concentrated on, among other things, the arrests of two Ukrainian dissidents, Rudenko and Tykhy.

> The State Department spokesman explained that President Carter's reticence in taking a strong stand on the sentencing of the two is based on the lack of interest in the case by Americans, including Ukrainian Americans.
>
> He said that in comparison with the public outcry after the arrest of Yuri Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatole Shcharansky, the reaction to the sentencing of Rudenko and Tykhy was smaller.[36]

The UCCA itself seems to realize the political weakness of the Ukrainian community since its attempts to influence United States policy concentrate mostly on an information role, that is, on informing the American public and officials regarding oppression in Ukraine. The UCCA's education role may be regarded as its strongest means on behalf of Ukrainian independence.[37]

While it may be considered a weak interest group, the UCCA has been able to elicit many pronouncements of support from American officials, even though it might not be able to affect actual policy. A main tool that the UCCA has used in pursuing the goal of Ukrainian independence is the Captive Nations Week resolution. The resolution was passed by Congress in 1959 and was signed into law by President Eisenhower. The resolution established the third week of July as Captive Nations Week and requires the President to issue a proclamation commemorating the week. The President is required to issue such a proclamation until freedom and independence are gained by all the Captive Nations.[38] The resolution was passed in response to the lobbying of the various Captive Nations' ethnic representatives and other American groups.[39]

The UCCA played an important role in the passage of the resolution. UCCA President Lev Dobriansky authored the resolution and the UCCA branches

throughout the United States played an important role in educating the public regarding the need for the resolution.[40] Mr. Dobriansky serves as the Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee and, as such, plays a leading role in organizing Captive Nations events. This puts the UCCA in a favored position for putting forth the Ukrainian cause in the captive nations framework. Mr. Dobriansky regards the Ukraine as the key to freedom for the captive nations. He has stated "that despite severe Soviet repression in Ukraine, Ukrainians are in the forefront of the captive nations' struggle for freedom and national independence."[41]

Much of the UCCA's strategy for gaining publicity and support for Ukrainian independence seems to revolve around the utilization of the Captive Nations Week resolution. A number of reatures of the resolution have aided the UCCA in pressing the Ukrainian cause. First, the resolution has a basis in law. "The future of Captive Nations Week is guaranteed by the congressional resolution itself; so long as there are the captive nations in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, the Week has its existential basis for the long and substantiating future."[42] For example, every year in the third week of July the American public's attention is brought to the plight of Ukraine and the other captive nations. Second, the resolution makes it almost incumbent on legislators to evoke some form of support since it is a piece of United States legislation. The President is mandated to issue a proclamation observing Captive Nations Week. Other public officials, in turn, might find it awkward not to follow the President's lead. Dr. Dobriansky has capitalized on the fact that the resolution is part of United States law to elicit support. In a letter to Senators and Congressmen urging them to participate in the 20th observance of

Captive Nations in 1979, Dr. Dobriansky wrote: "In accordance with the law your expressive participation in the '20th' is respectfully requested."[43] Third, it has become customary to issue a "Captive Nationsl Week Honor Roll" following the annual Captive Nations Week. It is prepared by the National Captive Nations Committee and lists all those who participated in the annual event. Speaking about the 1978 list, Congressman Edward J. Derwinski (R. -Ill.) stated: "The list is an impressive one, covering our officials, national organizations, the media and outstanding individuals who contributed markedly to the success of the 1978 Week."[44] This type of honor roll may create pressure upon legislators. Legislators having an ethnic constituency of the captive nations peoples may voice support of the week to please this constituency.[45]

One of the basic ways that the UCCA has utilized the captive nations concept for the benefit of Ukraine is by publishing materials relating to the captive nations. The publications play an important role in spreading information about the Ukraine -- as well as other captive nations. Just prior to the 1979 observance of the Captive Nations Week, 5,000 copies of a brochure entitled The Captive Nations: Continuing Exploitable Weakness of the Soviet Russian Empire[46] was published and distributed throughout the United States. In 1978, the UCCA published a brochure entitled, The Captive Nations: Responsibility of the Free World.[47]

More importantly, the Captive Nations concept is used by the UCCA when it addresses American officials. Prior to President Ford's trip to the Helsinki Conference, the Executive Board of the UCCA sent him a telegram voicing the UCCA's opposition to the Helsinki Agreement since it would legalize the status quo in Europe for the benefit of the Soviet Union. The UCCA called the agreement inconsistent with United States

foreign policy since "only a month ago you issued a Presidential Proclamation on Captive Nations, calling on the American people to dedicate themselves to the freedom and independence of all captive nations."[48] The telegram objected that the Ukraine and other captive nations in the Soviet Union would not participate at the conference.

The main effort of the UCCA is left for the actual annual observance of Captive Nations Week. The UCCA seeks to mark this week with rallies and public manifestations and issues a yearly appeal to all its branches urging them to organize and participate in these events. The UCCA's 1979 appeal stated: "The annual observances of the Week remind the American people and the United States and its allies that the enslaved peoples in the Soviet Russian empire are our true and loyal friends and supporters. By expressing our moral support for them in the ever-continuing struggle for freedom and independence, we give the Captive Nations much needed support and encouragement."[49]

The main 1979 observance took place in Washington, D.C. at the Rayburn Office Building of the United States Congress. The seeming Ukrainian bent of the event is witnessed by the fact that it was sponsored not only by the National Captive Nations Committee but also by the UCCA and the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), an affiliate of the UCCA located in Washington, D.C. Furthermore, the main speaker at the event was former Ukrainian dissident Valentyn Moroz. In his remarks, Mr. Moroz stated that the future of the West depends on the struggles of the captive nations in the Soviet Union. The event was attended by numerous Senators and Congressmen, including Majority Whip Representative John Brademas (D.- Ind.), Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D.- Mass.) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Representative Clement Zablocki (D.- Wisc).[50]

Specific UCCA effforts on behalf of Ukrainian dissidents have also sought to exploit the Ukrainian association with the captive nations concept. The UCCA seeks support on the basis that the Ukraine is a captive nation. Officials who have supported the captive nations week may thus find it difficult not to support a UCCA request to speak out specifically in defense of the Ukraine. This is one of the tactics the UCCA has used to generate support for the commemoration of Ukrainian Independence, January 22.

On this date American-Ukrainian communities throughout the United States celebrate the anniversary of the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic which existed from 1917-1920. On this occasion the UCCA sends a letter to all United States Senators and Congressmen inviting them to participate in the Washington, D.C. observance. A quote from the 1959 letter indicates how the UCCA has sought to capitalize on the captive nations concept. After outlining various Soviet oppressions in the Ukraine the letter continues:

> The 61st Anniversary of Ukraine's Independence this January 22 provides us with an excellent occasion to explore the 'why' of this sordid situation. The answer rests, of course, in the Soviet Russian domination over Ukraine and the other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR as well as Moscow's fear that the national drives which led to Ukraine's independence on January 22, 1918, may crystallize to threaten the present Soviet Russian empire.
>
> I warmly invite you to join us in this commemoration and let the 50 million captive Ukrainians know that they are not forgotten by us who enjoy the fruits of freedom.[51]

The response of UCCA's appeals to participate in the observance of Ukrainian Independence Day seems to be favorable. In 1973, Representative Joshua Eilberg (D. -Pa.) referring to oppression in Ukraine, stated:

> This state of affairs is unacceptable to lovers of liberty. Thus, while joining with our Ukrainian brothers in commemorating this melancholy anniversary of freedom so briefly enjoyed and so cruelly lost, let us resolve that the day will not be long in coming when the Ukraine will again truly be free.[52]

In 1977 Representative James Delaney (D. N.Y.) introduced an unsuccessful resolution calling on the President to designate January 22 as Ukrainian Independence Day. In 1979, the Washington, D.C., observance of Ukrainian Independence Day was held in the House of Representatives wing of the Capitol. UCCA president, Dr. Dobriansky addressed the gathering which was attended by 100 Ukrainian Americans and 45 Senators and Congressmen.[53]

In addition to the utilization of the captive nations week concept as a means to get the UCCA's message across to the American public and officials, the UCCA has also used two other methods. These have been appeals by Ukrainian constituents to their public officials and the organizing of mass demonstrations. Every elected official seeks to satisfy his constituency in the best way possible. A satisfied constituency can mean re-election. The need to satisfy a Ukrainian constituency was indicated by a letter from Representative Peter A. Peyser (R.- N.Y.) to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Representative Peyser wrote:

> I represent a large Ukrainian community in New York and they informed me about the long-standing continuous and present intolerable violations of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and this distresses me deeply. I would like to know your feelings about the present situation, and your thoughts on what can be done in order to better the situation in Ukraine.[54]

Demonstrations have become an important means for groups to get their message across to public officials. The object of demonstrations is to get support for one's cause by either getting the attention of officials or of

third parties (such as the media) which may come to support the demonstrators' cause.[55] The UCCA has undertaken the tactic of holding demonstrations. When Leonid Brezhnev was to visit the United States in 1973, the UCCA appealed to its branches and member organizations to show their opposition to the Soviet nationality policy by organizing "peaceful mass protests and demonstrations in those cities and states which will be visited by Brezhnev."[56]

An example of a demonstration was one which was organized in New York City on September 18, 1977 in conjunction with the United Ukrainian American Organization of New York. According to police estimates there were 20,000 Ukrainian-American participants. The participants, representing 30 cities, rallied at Bryant Park after a march down Fifth Avenue from 59th Street. The march and rally were followed by a demonstration at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. The event was reported on by the New York Times, the Daily News, the New York Post, and television stations WCBS, WNBC, WABC, and WNEW.[57]

And, finally, the UCCA has published various materials regarding the Ukraine. The UCCA publishes a scholarly journal, The Ukrainian Quarterly, which is devoted to a study of all aspects of the Ukraine. In addition, the UCCA publishes brochures which contain information on the Ukraine and Ukrainian dissidents. Two such brochures are Ukraine and the Ukrainian People[58] and Ukrainian Intellectuals in Shackles: Violations of Human Rights in Ukraine.[59]

The activities of the UCCA as recounted above, whether in the framework of the Captive Nations Week or specifically concentrating on the Ukrainian situation, may bring the Ukrainian issue before the American

public and American officials, but the impact that the UCCA activities have on United States policy remains to be seen. The following section will examine the direction which United States policy has taken regarding Ukrainian dissent.

United States Policy toward Ukrainian Dissent

The Ukrainian community in the United States has always been able to elicit protest statements from various American government officials regarding Soviet persecutions in the Ukraine. Probably one of the strongest supporters the Ukrainians have had was the late Representative Charles J. Kersten (R. -Wisc.). In 1953 he became chairman of the House Select Committee to investigate Communist Aggression. The Kersten Committee held many hearings in the United States and Europe pertaining to communist aggression, including aggression in the Ukraine. The Committee even issued a report on the Ukraine entitled Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine[60]

In the 1970's, with detente becoming a political issue in the United States, the Ukrainian community sought to ally itself with the critics of detente who were seeking concessions from the Soviet Union as proof of the Soviet regime's adherence to detente. Lev Dobriansky, president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, called for a quid pro quo on the part of the Soviet Union since he regarded the Soviet regime as benefitting economically at the expense of the United States. He wrote:

> Rationally, a quid pro quo is demanded in these dimensions and can only be realized through advanced bargaining for counterpart, intangible freedom values.[61]

His statement seemed to underlie the concern of many American officials. As stated in Chapter Two many members of Congress were skeptical regarding detente. At the same time the United States was entering a

period of moralism in foreign policy. The two, detente and moralism, combined so that many members of Congress began to demand Soviet concessions on human rights as a sign of the Soviet regime's adherence to detente. The Ukrainian human rights cause came to reap benefits from this. This is most evident from a statement delivered by Senator Domenici (R. -N.M.). He said:

> If detente is going to be a policy consistent with American beliefs, then under detente we should be able to ask for concessions from the Soviet Union. Russia has felt free to ask from us these things and under detente now, this nation, the leader of the free world, has the rare opportunity to ask something for mankind from the Soviets. I believe that one of our requests should be in the name of all mankind, fair treatment for those Ukrainian patriots now denied independence. And, further, we must ask recognition of the individuality of the Ukrainian people as a people.[62]

Therefore, in addition to the various methods of gaining support outlined in the previous section, the UCCA also engaged itself in the detente debate, pursuing the theme that trade with the Soviet Union be contingent on Soviet concessions on human rights. The trade reform act of 1973 and most favored nation tariff terms had become the focus of the opponents of detente who sought concessions from the Soviet Union. Opponents, such as Senator Henry Jackson (D. -Wash.) and Congressman Wilbur Mills (D.- Ark.), sought to block liberalization of trade with the Soviet Union unless Jewish emigration was allowed from the Soviet Union.[63] The UCCA sought to identify itself with this effort on behalf of Ukrainian dissidents. In a memorandum to both Jackson and Mills the UCCA appealed for assistance for Ukrainians seeking to emigrate:

> Your proposal in Congress to force the Soviet regime to ease emigration restrictions has electrified the hopes of our people for a change in the inhuman and uncivilized practices of the USSR. We fervently appeal to you, Sir, as one of America's most distinguished and influential Congressional leaders with a notable record of compassion

> for the underdog, to vigorously press for action and laws that will bring about meaningful concessions from the Soviet government in the realm of human rights.[64]

Senator Jackson was presented the memorandum in person by Joseph Lesawyer, UCCA Executive Vice President, and Dr. Walter Dushnyck, member of the UCCA Executive Committee, on March 29, 1973. The two UCCA representatives also visited the offices of Senators Jacob Javits (R.- N.Y.), Lowell Weicker (R.- Conn.), Clifford Case (R.- N.J.) and Claiborne Pell (D.- R.I.) to press their case.

On June 1, 1973, Lev Dobriansky testified before the House Committee on Ways and Means regarding the trade reform act. He charged that the Soviet Union was bolstering its economy at the expense of the West and stressed that political concessions on human rights should be demanded from the Soviet Union.[65] Mr. Dobriansky repeated similar testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on April 4, 1974.[66]

In testimony before the House Committee on Internal Security, Dobriansky, possibly realizing the focus of congressional efforts would be on Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate, sought to push forward the idea of the captive nations. He stated:

> In trade negotiations with the U.S.S.R., the Jewish emigration benefit is a relative small one compared to possible politico-economic deals involving human and political rights of the numerous captive non-Russian nations in that empire-state. The claim of interference in "the domestic affairs of the U.S.S.R." is specious from an historical viewpoint and on grounds of the international complexion of this state and the international involvement of two of its national republics.[67]

As events proved, however, Soviet Jewish dissidents received more support from the Congress than did Ukrainian dissidents. Thus, while Ukrainian dissent became a beneficiary of detente criticism, Ukrainian dissidents were not able to obtain the strong support that Jewish

dissidents received. Ukrainian dissidents have received much verbal support from American officials, but the general stand of American foreign policy on Ukrainian dissent is that it is nationalist in nature and, as such, support of it can lead to an explosive situation.[68] The support of nationalist dissent in the Soviet Union could possibly lead to greater problems than benefits.

This view may also pertain to support of Ukrainian emigration. While the Soviet Union has been willing to allow Jewish emigration, it has not been willing to allow Ukrainians to emigrate. The Soviet government may be fearful of calling any attention to or of igniting further the flames of Ukrainian nationalism by allowing many Ukrainians to emigrate.[69] In turn, the United States may not support Ukrainian emigration since it may mean getting involved in the self-determination issue in the Soviet Union. Therefore, neither the general goal of Ukrainian independence nor the desires of individual Ukrainian dissidents have obtained much support from the United States.

The United States has always defined "self-determination in such a way as to exclude secession."[70] In 1952, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt stated:

> Does self-determination mean the right of people to sever association with another power regardless of the economic effect upon both parties, regardless of the effect upon their internal stability and their external security, regardless of the effect upon their neighbors or the international community? Obviously not.[71]

And in the early 1960's a Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization affairs stated:

> There is no absolute principle of self-determination. We fought a civil war to deny it. We have recognized both at home and abroad the dangers of Balkanization.[72]

This general view on nationalism and self-determination is specifically reflected in United States policy towards the nationalities problem in the

Soviet Union. The basic United States view regarding nationalism in the Soviet empire is summarized in a report to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1962:

> Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the capability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over 200 million-odd Russians and the many additional millions in the satellite states. The break-up of the Russian Communist Empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom, but would be a good deal more catastrophic for world order than was the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918.[73]

Since 1962 nothing has been done to warrant the view that this position has changed. Actually, statements by high government officials seem to underscore the continuation of this position of non-support of nationalism in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. In his 1970 foreign policy report to the congress, President Nixon made it clear that the United States would not seek to undermine the Soviet regime's interests nor its East European empire. The President stated:

> It is not the intention of the United States to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The time is certainly past, with the development of modern technology, when any power would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. It is clearly no part of our policy.[74]

The American position of not supporting national self-determination has manifested itself in the approach the United States government has taken toward Ukrainian dissidents. Basically, it has been a rhetorical approach with no corresponding policy. This approach, however, has taken two forms. The executive branch has taken a low-keyed approach. The congressional branch has been more outspoken and critical of the Soviet government's behavior. The reason for this is that policy, unless enacted into legislation by Congress is identified as emanating from the executive

branch. Executive branch spokesmen, therefore, have to be more careful in their statements, lest they create unwanted friction with the Soviet government.[75] Two examples will attest to this.

In his first Captive Nations Proclamation, President Carter stated: "I call upon the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, demonstrating America's support for those who seek national independence, liberty and human rights."[76]

Carter's proclamation could have served as a key vehicle in propaganda moves for self-determination. However, the presidential proclamations have always been mild, aimed at satisfying domestic pressure rather than in supporting the liberation of the captive nations. This was exemplified by Carter's proclamation. Lev Dobriansky, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, said that in view of Carter's strong stand on human rights that he had expected from Carter the strongest proclamation yet. Carter's failure to be more supportive and dynamic in his proclamation, said Dobriansky, cast doubt on the president's human rights advocacy.[77]

The American government's concern regarding self-determination in the Soviet Union was also exhibited by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, the United States representative to the Helsinki follow up conference at Belgrade. He stated that the issue of self-determination is very important and is one which causes considerable friction with the Soviet government whenever it is mentioned. In turn, United States sensitivity over the issue can be seen by the fact that Ambassador Goldberg raised it only in general terms at Belgrade. In his opening speech he said: "The legitimate interests of national minorities in our 35 states require respect for unique cultural and linguistic heritages, and active policies to preserve these

traditions and achievements for future generations."[78] Upon his return, Ambassador Goldberg admitted at a State Department conference that while the remarks were general the assembled delegates knew that they were directed against the Soviet Union. This indicates, however, the American government's hesitancy to broach the issue directly lest it become a source of conflict with the Soviet Union.

At times, the American government has spoken out on behalf of individual Ukrainian dissidents. Such a case involved presently exiled Ukrainian dissident Valentyn Moroz.[79] Such support, however, has been humanitarian; it has been aimed at ameliorating the plight of an individual dissident but not at furthering the goal of Ukrainaian nationalism. Also, much of the activity on behalf of Ukrainian dissidents has been aimed at placating the Ukrainian community in the United States. With respect to the executive branch, this has been done by raising the issue of Ukrainian dissidents in general terms with the Soviet regime and by assuring the Ukrainian community that the American government is pursuing the issue. This can be witnessed from the following statements, two of which deal with Moroz. In June 1976, the White House wrote to the UCCA:

> Following the President's meeting with ethnic organizations in Milwaukee, the concern of the United States Government and the American people regarding the present situation of Mr. Moroz was once again brought to the attention of the Soviet government which, as you are aware, views the case of Mr. Moroz as a strictly internal matter. However, the Administration remains deeply concerned for those everywhere who are unable to exercise fundamental human rights.[80]

In November 1976, John Reinhardt of the State Department expressed the government's concern for Valentyn Moroz in the following manner:

> Our Embassy in Moscow recently raised Mr. Moroz's case with the Soviet authorities. In its approach to the

> Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our Embassy expressed the concern of many Americans for Mr. Moroz's situation.[81]

And United States Ambassador to the United Nations George Bush wrote to the UCCA:

> I think the United States Government has clearly shown its disapproval of the persecution going on in the Ukraine. We have considered the activities of the Soviet Government including the current wave of arrests, contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the Soviet constitution. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government rejects any attempt at official intervention.
>
> We do indeed support the just attempts of the Ukrainian people to secure their legitimate rights. Please be assured that we will continue to do so.[82]

While Ambassador Bush's closing lines in his letter may sound optimistic, the executive branch in reality seems to have drawn a line between rhetoric and actual policy. This was most explicitly stated by Matthew Nimetz, a State Department counselor. At a department conference he said that the United States will help the cause of human rights in the Ukraine as much as possible. However, he further added

> Our only methodology is diplomatic means of discussion, public dislosures, and things of that nature. Therefore, the lever that the United States and the present administration has indicated it will follow is basically and simply a discussion and not a policy of directives which would use the might and will of the U.S. to actually implement these principles of the Helsinki Accords.[83]

Unlike executive branch officials, congressional representatives are likely to be more open in their support of Ukrainian nationalism since their views do not necessarily reflect policy. Senator Dole has stated, "We must support the goals and struggle for Ukrainian freedom and self-determination since our own freedom here in America can only be strengthened by maintaining those same principles abroad."[84] Such statements, like those of the executive branch, are geared toward satisfying domestic groups rather than in implementing any policy. This is best exemplified by

President Ford.

As a congressman (R.- Mich.), Mr. Ford was a strong supporter of the Ukrainian cause. The UCCA always praised Representative Ford for his support of Ukrainian independence and in 1968 he was the guest speaker at the UCCA banquet at which he received the "Shevchanko Freedom Award." Once he became president, his concern with national policy overshadowed his previous concern with the Ukrainian cause. Although he did speak out on behalf of Valentyn Moroz at his Vladivostok meeting with Brezhnev, President Ford did not pursue the issue as much as when he was a congressman. An example will illustrate this. In August 1976, Senator John Sparkman (D. -Ala.) sponsored a resolution which passed in the Senate. The resolution requested that the President express the United States government's concern for the safety of Valentyn Moroz. President Ford took no action on the resolution.[85]

Much of the congressional activity on behalf of Ukrainian dissidents has been in sending letters of appeal to the Soviet leadership and in passing ineffectual resolutions. An example of a letter was that of Senator Dole. In part, it stated:

> We as members of the United States Senate are writing on behalf of Lev Lukyanenko. He is a member of the Kiev based Helsinki Monitoring Group and is now on trial for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda in the small town of Horodnya.
>
> We realize that you consider this an internal matter of the Ukrainian Republic. There are humanitarian considerations that we would like you to take into account, however. Lukyanenko has already suffered a great deal in the past and is in poor health. He has also applied for an exit visa. His release at this time would have a positive effect on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We urge you to act positively on our appeal on behalf of Lev Lukyanenko.[86]

An example of a resolution was that of one offered by Senator Barry Goldwater (R. -Ariz.) on behalf of Ukrainian Churches. The resolution stated, in part:

> It is the sense of Congress that the President of the United States of America shall take in the name of human rights immediate and determined steps to
> 1) call upon the Government of the Union of Socialist Republics to permit the concrete resurrection of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches and other independent religions in the largest non-Russian nation both within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in Eastern Europe; . . .[87]

Much of the activity of both the executive and legislative branches of the American government would seem to be political rhetoric. The political rhetoric of the Captive Nations Week, for example, is witnessed by comments made by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Regarding the captive nations resolution, he has stated that "the policy of this resolution, which asks the President to proclaim a Captive Nations Week in July of each year, would break the Soviet Union up into some dozen independent nations and proclaim support for this or that country which the Congress has no intention of doing anything about." He further states that "we cannot respond to the sentimental views of every group which has found refuge on our shores if we are to conduct a serious foreign policy in the interest of the nation as a whole." He characterized congressional support of the Captive Nations Week as "political stunts" and "silly maneuvers which have nothing to do with the real world in which we live."[88]

The American approach to Ukrainian nationalism was best shown by a meeting Averell Harriman had with Leonid Brezhnev in 1976. In his discussions with Brezhnev, Harriman told him that there is a distinction between United States rhetoric and actual United States policy. Mr. Harriman

elaborated on his meeting during an interview on his return to the United States.

"I was trying to make him understand what was political rhetoric and what was good, solid American determination not to have things put over on them," said Harriman.[89] As an example of political rhetoric, Mr. Harriman pointed to President Ford's meeting with Ukrainian Patriarch Josyf Slipyj. Harriman explained that the audience was granted because there are a lot of Ukrainians in the United States. But, he had reassured Brezhnev that it is "not part of the American program to join the Ukrainian Liberation Movement."[90]

Ukrainian-Americans themselves realize the limit of gaining government support for the dissidents' goal of independence. The Ukrainian community in the United States seems content with a verbal policy of support from the government, while at the same time espousing the goal of Ukrainian independence to the American public. Ukrainians and other East European groups

> seek demonstrations of congressional support for freedom for their fellow countrymen who reside in formerly independent states that are now part of the Soviet Union. Such lobbyists may ask for little more than insertions into the Congressional Record of prepared speeches supporting their cause by members of the House and the Senate. These groups are also noticeable around the State Department but they realize that they have no real chance to change American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.[91]

Soviet Policy Toward the United States

Soviet behavior has been, basically, that of portraying those who support Ukrainian dissidents as being cold warriors and opponents of better relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet regime has criticized the United States' human rights policy.

Much of the Soviet regime's criticism has been directed against the Ukrainian community in the United States since it is probably the strongest supporter of Ukrainian dissidents. The Ukrainian organization that has received the most criticism has been the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. It has been labelled "an openly reactionary organization which is headed by the known obscurantist and militant anticommunist L. Dobriansky."[92]

A press release from the Soviet United Nations Mission in November 1978 attacked the World Congress of Free Ukrainians which has an office in New York. The release called it an "assemblance of Hitlerite thugs, traitors to the Ukrainian people, whose hands are stained by the blood of many thousands of Soviet people, Poles and Czechs and Slovaks.

> Having lost a sense of reality, certain influential US quarters have been pushing the WCFU to the establishment of its "mission" at the United Nations. These quarters also lavishly finance various information centers "covering the situation in the Ukraine." These "centers" fabricate "manifestos" and "petitions" calling upon the West to act "from strength" in respect to the Soviet Union. Nationalists even threaten to murder active members of progressive emigrant organizations standing for the growth of contacts with the Soviet Ukraine.[93]

Another tactic is to label Ukrainians and others as enemies of detente whose aim is to increase friction between the United States and the Soviet Union for their own benefit. In regard to this, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, stated: "The opponents of detente are stubbornly trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, and to fan a demagogical campaign. The emigre Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist organizations and the foreign Zionist centers act as their vociferous yes-men."[94]

And Svodoba, a leading Ukrainian American daily newspaper has been criticized for its support of a stronger western defense posture against the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime characterized Svodoba in the following manner: "Emigre scribes are hoping to prove to the American people, against their own interests, the typical convictions about the course of international relations held by the one-time collaborators of the fascist aggressors."[95]

The Soviet government has also criticized the captive nations week as being anti-detente. Georgi Arbatov, head of the Soviet Union's Institute on the United States and Canada, complained to a United States exchange group in December 1977 that the continuation of the week's observance could harm detente.[96] An article by Boris Bannov played on the detente theme when it stated that "the organizers of anti-Soviet 'weeks' resort to all sorts of slander in order to save the 'cold war.'"[97]

The regime has also stated that political friction can be created by the various media in the United States and around the world that report on dissident activities. The regime has stated:

> Foreign newspapers hostile to Soviet Ukraine which are put out by nationalist outcasts, the radio station "Svoboda" (Radio Liberty) and even some bourgeois official organs such as the "New York Times" or the "London Times," have of late been actively trying to create an atmosphere of political tension and sensationalism in connection with the trials of certain Ukrainian citizens guilty of serious crimes against their homeland, their Government and people.[98]

The Soviet authorities have also criticized the United States government. Izvestia has criticized Senators Clifford Case and James Buckley (R. -N.Y.) and Representatives Edward Derwinski, Millicent Fenwick, and Larry McDonald (D.- Ga.) for their support of Soviet political prisoners. Some of these, such as Senator Buckley and Congressman Derwinski, have

spoken out on behalf of Ukrainian dissidents. The article further accused the United States of having incarcerated Indian, Puerto Rican, and Black dissidents.[99] And Pravda was critical of a meeting President Ford held with six ethnic media representatives, including a Ukrainian representative. The newspaper viewed the meeting as an unfriendly act and called it a gathering of emigre riff-raff.[100]

The Soviet attempt to discredit the Ukrainian-American community and the United States government went a step further in October 1977 when the regime sought to blackmail a United States diplomat of Ukrainian descent. The diplomat, Constantine Warvariv, was accosted by a KGB agent who accused him of being a former Nazi collaborator. The charges were made in an attempt to blackmail Mr. Warvariv into working as a Soviet spy. If he did not comply, then the information on his collaboration with the Nazis would be released.

The Soviet Union accused him of having served with the Nazi SD police and of participating in mass executions of peaceful Soviet citizens during World War II. His wife, Elena, was accused of being a translator for the German Gestapo in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.

While the Soviet Union purportedly acted in order to recruit Mr. Warvariv as an agent, the act may be seen as an attempt to discredit United States actions on behalf of Ukrainian and other dissidents. Two factors seem to point to this conclusion. First, in its news release, Novosti wrote: "The fact that a Nazi criminal holds so high a post in President Carter's Administration clearly shows how much those who capitalize politically on human rights care for them in reality."[101] Second, Novosti did not distribute its release through normal channels but sent it directly to Reuters in London via telex. This move was aimed at achieving

rapid and widespread distribution of the release.

Mr. Warvariv denied the Soviet charges and called them a smear campaign. The United States issued a protest to the Soviet government over the issue. American Ambassador Malcolm Toon had the United States protest sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on October 19. Part of the protest stated: "The Embassy of the United States strongly protests this highly provocative unacceptable treatment of a U.S. diplomat as a clear violation of the Vienna Conventions and an impermissible abuse of the norms of behavior which should govern relations between our two nations. Such violations as this can only serve to retard the growth of mutually beneficial relations."[102]

The Soviet government has played on the Warvariv event continuously. As recently as January 1979, the Soviet regime made mention of the case. The English language edition of the Soviet Ukrainian publication News From Ukraine once again accused Warvariv of Nazi collaboration and accused the American government of harboring and protecting a Nazi collaborator. In an attempt to discredit Warvariv and the United States' human rights policy, the article ends: "Now he, as an official of a U.S. government institution, preaches to us how to protect human rights."[103]

Conclusion

After examining the above process of United States-Soviet behavior the following points can be drawn.

First, the United States seems to be concerned with the nature of Ukrainian dissent. Ukrainian dissent is basically nationalist, and the United States has been hesitant to pursue support of nationalism in the

Soviet Union since such a policy might exacerbate relations with the Soviet government and possibly lead to grave international consequences.

Second, as a reflection of this policy of not supporting nationalist dissent, the basic behavior of the United States has been to issue ineffectual non-binding congressional resolutions and general statements of support of Ukrainian dissidents. Such activity has been geared toward placating the domestic Ukrainian community more than in affecting Soviet behavior over the issue. Policy has been more an exercise in "political rhetoric."

Third, the United States has at times objected to the treatment by the Soviet regime of individual Ukrainian dissidents. Such support has been humanitarian, aimed at ameliorating the treatment of an individual dissident but not at furthering the goal of Ukrainian nationalism.

Fourth, the Soviet government's behavior has paralleled that of the United States. It has basically limited itself to a policy of criticizing the United States government and the Ukrainian-American community. Neither government has sought to make the issue of Ukrainian dissent one of confrontation between the two states.

FOOTNOTES

1. History of State and Jurisprudence of the Ukrainian SSR Vol. 1 (Kiev, 1967), p. 107.

2. For a text of the new Soviet constitution, see Izvestia, 8 October 1977. Also, see William E. Butler, The Soviet Legal System (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1978), pp. 3-32. The constitution under the Stalin regime also guaranteed the right of secession as well as the right of each Union Republic to conduct its own foreign policy. On this basis, the Ukraine is a founding member of the United Nations.

3. For an analysis of Soviet nationality policy, see Peter G. Stercho, "Soviet Concept of National Self-Determination: Theory and Reality from Lenin to Brezhnev," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Part I, 29 (Spring 1973): 12-27; Part II, 29 (Summer 1973): 158-169.

4. Statement from Political Prisoner H. Prykhodko, November 17, 1975. See A Resolution with Appended Documents Concerning the Decolonization of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (New York: The World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1978), p. 60.

5. Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR, Text translated from the Ukrainian Herald, underground magazine from Ukraine, Issue VII-VIII, Spring 1974, (Toronto: World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1975), pp. 143-144.

6. John Kolasky, "In Defense of Language," The Ukrainian Quarterly 29 (Summer 1973): 132-133. For the author's eye-witness account of national discrimination in Ukraine, see Two Years in Soviet Ukraine (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Limited, 1970).

7. Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968). He partially recanted in 1969, but spoke up in defense of intellectuals in 1972 for which he was arrested.

8. News from Ukraine, Spring-Summer 1976. (Ijamsville, Maryland: American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). The News is a four page newsletter containing information on the struggle for national independence and human rights in Ukraine.

9. Interview with Leonid Plyushch. Le Monde (Paris) 4 February 1976.

10. For example, Leonid Plyushch was imprisoned in a psychiatric hospital and was finally exiled to the West. Ivan Dzyuba was criticized by the regime for his book, arrested and imprisoned.

11. Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (Archon Books, 1967).

12. Klaus Mehnert, Soviet Man and His World (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 218.

13. Quoted in a memorandum submitted by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America to the United States Government before the opening of the Belgrade Conference, July 1977, New York.

14. Exiled Ukrainian dissident Petro H. Grigorenko states that half the political prisoners in the Soviet Union are Ukrainian. Reported in "Ukrainian Human Rights Day in Washington, D.C.," in "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 34 (Winter 1978): 429.

15. According to a Soviet Ukrainian source "the Ukraine produces more steel, pig iron, rolled steel, natural gas, iron ore and diesel locomotives than any other country in Europe." See Soviet Ukraine (Kiev: Editorial Office of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia), p. 246. No date.

16. Gary Jarmin, "Increasing Unrest in Ukraine," The Rising Tide, 9 April 1973, Washington, D.C.

17. Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR, p. 40.

18. "Struggle in the Kremlin," Soviet Analyst (London), 8 June 1972.

19. Kenneth C. Farmer, "Ukrainian Dissent: Symbolic Politics and Socio-Demographic Aspects," The Ukrainian Quarterly 34 (Summer 1978): 154.

20. Washington Post, 27 April 1973.

21. Farmer, p. 154.

22. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Ukrainian Intellectuals in Shackles: Violations of Human Rights in Ukraine (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1972), p. 2.

23. Farmer, p. 155.

24. Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR, p. 118.

25. Harrison Salisbury, War Between Russia and China (New York: Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 179-180.

26. Edith Kermit Roosevelt, "Peking's Liberation Movement," The Ukrainian Quarterly 38 (Summer 1972): 178. Also, see The Peking Review, 7 September 1973; The Peking Review, 4 April 1969; The Montreal Star, 10 May 1969.

27. Roosevelt, p. 178.

28. For an example of the Soviet regime's attempts to discredit nationalism as a bourgeois vestige and to present itself to the international community as a regime which has overcome this stage of "historical development", see Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Soviet Jews: Fact and Fiction (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House), pp. 5-15.

29. The Ukrainian National Association (UNA) is a Ukrainian insurance organization which also publishes a Ukrainian daily, Svoboda, an English language weekly, the Ukrainian Weekly and supports Ukrainian dissidents.

30. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, "Ukraine and the Ukrainian People," (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1978).

31. Ibid.

32. The New York metropolitan area contains the largest Ukrainian-American concentration. The other major areas are: Chicago -- 60,000; Philadelphia -- 50,000; Detroit -- 45,000; Cleveland -- 35,000; and Pittsburgh -- 15,000. See Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainians in America (Minneapolis: Lerner Publications, 1972), p. 46.

33. The UCCA itself realizes its lack of political clout via the vote. Its president, Lev Dobriansky has written: "In the scope of U.S. population UCCA's representation is relatively small. . . . The accessibility of political levers based on mass vote-getting is low for it." See Lev E. Dobriansky, "The Non-Russian Nations Concept in U.S. Foreign Policy," The Ukrainian Quarterly 32 (Winter 1976): 364.

34. Ukrainian Weekly, 17 February 1980.

35. The political strength of an interest group has a lot to do with the size of its membership and the amount of its financial resources. For this reason these two characteristics were chosen as a barometer of the Ukrainians' strength. Financial resources can aid in helping a group get its message across, while membership can have an impact via the electoral process. The "strategic location politically" of a group can translate itself into an impact on policy. "Outstanding examples are the concentration of Jewish citizens in New York City and its environs and, in an earlier era, the strength of the Irish-American population in the Boston area." See Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 164.

36. Ukrainian Weekly, 17 July 1977. Mykola Rudenko and Oleksa Tykhy were members of the Ukrainian group to monitor the Helsinki Agreement based in Kiev. They were arrested for their activities and sentenced to imprisonment in June 1977. They were the first Helsinki monitors to be tried and sentenced in the Soviet Union.

37. Lev E. Dobriansky, U.S.A. and the Soviet Myth (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: The Devin Adair Company, 1971) pp. 244-247.

38. The captive nations are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Cossackia, Georgia, Idel-Ural, North Caucasia, Ukraine, Far Eastern Republic, Turkestan, Mongolia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Hungary, East Germany, Mainland China, Tibet, North Vietnam, Cuba, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos. In January 1980, the National Captive Nations Committee added Afghanistan to the list. The list, clearly, represents

states that have communist forms of government.

39. A number of factors aided in the passage of the resolution. The labor movement was an important factor. United States labor has had an anti-communist bent and this manifested itself in this resolution. The late George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, served for twenty years, until his death, as honorary chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee. The general cold war stand of the 1950's also played a role in facilitating the passage of the resolution as can be witnessed by the fact that all the states listed as captive nations are communist states. Thus, while the UCCA and the other ethnic groups may have played a role in the passage of the resolution they were not the main force behind it.

40. Dobriansky, p. 246.

41. "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 30 (Autumn 1974): 326. The Chronicle presents a summary of an interview of Mr. Dobriansky on the "Today Show," NBC, 2 July 1974.

42. Dobriansky, p. 143.

43. Parts of Mr. Dobriansky's letter are contained in the "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 35 (Autumn 1979): 318.

44. For the 1978 Honor Roll and comments by Congressman Edward Derwinski, see The Congressional Record, 12 March 1979, Washington, D.C.

45. For example, former Congressman Edward I. Koch had a constituency of over 10% from areas in Eastern Europe and the USSR in his 18th C.D. in Manhattan. He was a supporter of the captive nations week and it may be possible that his support was due to a need to satisfy this constituency.

46. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, The Captive Nations: Continuing Exploitable Weakness of the Soviet Russian Empire (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1979).

47. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, The Captive Nations: Responsibility of the Free World (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1978).

48. UCCA Telegram to President Ford on the Summit Meeting in Helsinki. Pertinent Documents. The Ukrainian Quarterly 21 (Autumn 1975): 308.

49. "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 35 (Autumn 1979): 103.

50. Ibid. The Ukrainian Weekly, 12 August 1979.

51. "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 35 (Spring 1979): 103.

52. The Congressional Record, 22 March 1973.

53. The Ukrainian Quarterly (Spring 1979): 104.

54. "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 30 (Spring 1974): 106. For similar statements, see Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Ukrainian Intellectuals in Shackles: Violations of Human Rights in Ukraine (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1972), pp. 14-15.

55. James Q. Wilson, American Government (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980), p. 226.

56. "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 29 (Summer 1973): 218.

57. "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 33 (Winter 1977): 430-32.

58. "Ukraine and the Ukrainian People" (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1978).

59. Ukrainian Intellectuals in Shackles: Violations of Human Rights in Ukraine (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1972).

60. U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression. Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine 83rd Congress, 31 December 1954.

61. Dobriansky, p. 236.

62. Address by Senator Peter V. Domenici at the All-National Manifestation in Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1974.

63. New York Times, 7 February 1973.

64. Appeal to Congressman Wilbur O. Mills and Senator Henry M. Jackson. "Pertinent Documents," The Ukrainian Quarterly 29 (Summer 1973): 198.

65. Ibid., p. 210.

66. "Chronicle of Current Events," The Ukrainian Quarterly 30 (Summer 1974): 216-17.

67. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Internal Security. The Theory and Practice of Communism Part 4. 1974.

68. See following section of this chapter.

69. "Soviet Emigration Policies and Ukrainians," The Ukrainian Quarterly 34 (Summer 1978): 117-24. Editorial.

70. Vernon van Dyke, Human Rights, the United States, and World Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 88.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. The Congressional Record, 23 September 1964.

74. Department of State Bulletin, 9 March 1970, p. 325. American policy was also underlined by the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine." This doctrine was outlined by Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the State Department to a conference of U.S. Ambassadors in London in December 1975. According to the doctrine, the U.S. recognizes the vital Soviet interest in Eastern Europe and it is in the interest of the US and Soviet Union for the Soviet regime to maintain control of the area. Soviet control is seen as a stabilizing factor. The two world wars started in Eastern Europe and Soviet control is seen as a possible block to the eruptions of conflicts that can precipitate in another world war. President Ford disavowed the "doctrine" once it became publicly known. For a background on the "doctrine," see New York Times, 6, 7 April 1976; Herald Tribune, 22 March 1976.

75. The central role of the President and of the executive department in general was indicated in the early years of the Republic when Thomas Jefferson stated that foreign affairs is "executive altogether." For the central role played by the President in American foreign policy, see Crabb, Jr., pp. 48-65.

76. Presidential Proclamation on Captive Nations Week, July 1977, the White House.

77. The Spotlight, 8 August 1977; Also, see the editorial in the Cincinnati Enquirer, 2 September 1977.

78. Ukrainian Weekly, 20 March 1977.

79. See footnote 44 in Chapter Four and footnote 31 in Chapter Seven regarding the exiling of Moroz.

80. Letter from Rolan L. Elliott, Director of Correspondence, the White House, to the UCCA Executive Board, dated 16 June 1976.

81. Letter from John E. Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, to Walter Sochan, Supreme Secretary of the Ukrainian National Association, New Jersey, dated 12 November 1976.

82. Letter from United States UN Ambassador George Bush to Lev E. Dobriansky, President of the UCCA, dated 22 February 1972. The letter is also contained in Ukrainian Intellectuals in Shackles: Violations of Human Rights in Ukraine.

83. Ukrainian Weekly, 3 July 1977.

84. Ukrainian Weekly, 12 February 1978.

85. The Ukrainian-American community itself became upset with the role Ford took as president as opposed to his role as a Congressman. Following his statement in a residential election debate that there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the Twelfth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent despatched a telegram of protest to the President. For a text of the telegram, see The Ukrainian Quarterly 32 (Winter 1976): 435. Taras Shevchenko was a 19th century Ukrainian poet who sparked a nationalist feeling among the Ukrainian people. In naming its freedom award after Shevchenko the UCCA pays homage to these 19th century moves toward freedom.

86. Letter from Senator Robert Dole (R. Kans.) to Volodymyr Shcherbitsky, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, dated 18 July 1978. The letter was co-signed by 32 other Senators. Lukyanenko is a founding member of the Helsinki Watch Committee based in Ukraine and in 1959 was a founder of the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union whose platform included secession from the USSR. See Time, 31 July 1978, p. 33.

87. S. Con. Res. 92, 14 June 1978. The resolution was introduced by Senator Goldwater in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

88. Milwaukee Sentinel (Wisconsin), 3 January 1979.

89. Ukrainian Weekly, 17 October 1976. The interview took place on the "Today Show," NBC Television, 8 October 1976.

90. Ibid.

91. John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 87.

92. R. H. Symonenko, Visnyk Academiyi Nauk Ukrainskoyi RSR, Kiev, Ukraine, November 1972.

93. "Who Needs the World Congress of Free Ukrainians and Why," Press Release 218, 23 November 1978, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Mission to the United Nations.

94. Shcherbytsky's speech to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Quoted in the editorial, The Ukrainian Quarterly 32 (Autumn 1976): 229.

95. Quoted in the Ukrainian Weekly, 20 November 1977.

96. This information is contained in a letter from Lev E. Dobriansky to U.S. Senators and Congressmen urging them to participate in the 1978 Captive nations observances. The letter is dated 7 July 1978.

97. Golis Rodiny (Moscow), September 1975.

98. Visti z Ukrainy, No. 16 (506) Kiev, April 1968.

99. Izvestia, 18 June 1976.

100. Pravda, 15 October 1976.

101. Quoted in the Ukrainian Weekly, 6 November 1977.

102. Ibid. For further reports on the Warvariv incident, see New York Times, 30 November 1977.

103. News from Ukraine, January 1979. (Soviet Ukrainian publication in English).

CHAPTER SIX

JEWISH EMIGRATION AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

Jews in the Soviet Union

Anti-Semitism has been a traditional problem in the Russian Empire.[1] The Soviet regime, however, claims that anti-Semitism no longer exists and that there is no form of discrimination. The regime states: "The personal success of any individual in this country, his social standing and career depend on his skill, abilities, and diligence. Nationality or race is not taken into account."[2] To support this statement, the Soviet government points to numerous areas of Jewish success. Many Jews have reached high decision making roles in the government. Eight thousand Jews hold seats as deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviets of the Republics and local Soviets.

According to Soviet sources, Jews hold a disproportionate share of research positions. Jews rank third after Russians and Ukrainians in these positions, even though they comprise slightly over one per cent of the Soviet population. About 3.15 per cent of the Jewish population are students as compared to the general population's proportion of 1.82 per cent and fourteen per cent of the Jewish population has a higher or specialized education.[3]

With respect to culture, "two hundred and ten Jewish writers, artists, actors and other cultural workers have been awarded the State Prize, and nine are Lenin Prize winners."[4] Books in Yiddish are published.

According to the regime, religious freedom is indicated by the existence of some one hundred synagogues in the major cities. In addition,

there are more than 300 minyans throughout the country.[5] With respect to assimilation, the regime pictures it as occurring naturally. As a result, the regime maintains that Jews and the other ethnic groups have a combination of the best of all Soviet cultures. In 1926, 70 per cent of the Jewish population considered Yiddish to be their native tongue. In 1970, the percentage had dropped to 17.7%.

In conclusion, the Novosti pamphlet from which the above information was drawn states: "The facts and figures about Soviet Jewry show how far from reality is the gloomy picture of Soviet Jews usually painted by bourgeois propagandists in the West. Soviet Jews actively contribute to all aspects of socialist society of which they are full-fledged members. Like the other nationalities they enjoy all rights, privileges and advantages granted to the Soviet people by the state and the Constitution irrespective of nationality, race or religion."[6]

The official version, however, is far from accurate.[7] Roy Medvedev, for example, has stated: "Access to work in the higher Party apparatus in the provincial and regional branches of the Party, in various kinds of central ideological institutions, in the higher organs of the military leadership, in the diplomatic service and in the organs of the KGB and procuratorship were in practice closed to individuals of Jewish descent."[8] Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, hereself described the anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. Referring to the 1960's she said: "Not a single Jew worked within the apparatus of the Central Committee . . . but when information was required . . . then such work was done for that same Central Committee by specialists-Jews. They merely supplied the information; they were never called in to discuss and decide. Often they signed their articles in magazines with Russian pseudonyms."[9]

In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet Union unleashed a domestic anti-Zionist campaign which was actually an anti-Semitic campaign. The official anti-Semitic campaign can be witnessed by the publication in 1977 of three monographs posing Zionism as a threat to mankind. For example, the theme of one, Dikaya polyn, equated Zionism with Nazism.[10] Another, Vtorzheniye bez oruzhya, stated that the goal of Zionism is world control.[11] The third monograph, Mezhdunarodny Sionism: Istoriya i Politika, gives a Marxist-Leninist interpretation.[12] It states that the Jewish bourgeoisie uses Zionism as a cover for the express purpose of gaining control of the world via the international banking system.

In response to the anti-Semitism that Soviet Jews have experienced, they have developed various patterns of dissent. Jewish dissidents have engaged in seeking greater Jewish religious and cultural freedom in the Soviet Union. They have also participated in the much broader dissent of seeking to gain political rights, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, among others. However, the most energy seems to have been devoted to and the most international attention seems to have focused on the desire of Soviet Jews to emigrate.[13]

The Soviet regime has allowed emigration in the past. This policy had been followed with respect to many ethnic groups, such as Poles, Greeks, and Armenians, but the only exception has been Jews. Prior to 1965 only a small number of Jews -- mostly aged at that -- were allowed to emigrate.[14] From mid 1965 to June 1967, however, some 4,000 were allowed to emigrate. From June 1967 to October 1968, no exit visas were allowed, possibly due to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ensuing

political turmoil it fomented. After this the Soviet government again opened the door, possibly to test Soviet Jewry's loyalty. This opened a floodgate of exit requests. From October 1968 to mid 1969, some 30,000 Jews sought exit permits.

Officially, the Soviet government claims that Soviet Jews with families abroad have the right to emigrate.[15] Khrushchev made such a statement in 1960.[16] This position was stated publicly also by Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1966. The official Soviet position on Jewish emigration states that two points are taken into consideration. These are the well-being of the applicants and the international situation.[17] Since most Jews wish to be reunited with relatives residing in Israel, a state in constant conflict with Soviet Arab friends, the Soviet Union ostensibly is concerned with the safety of the emigrants and the consequences emigration has on its Arab friends. The Soviet government's basic policy is summarized thus:

> The situation that has developed in that part of the world compels the Soviet emigration authorities, in considering such applications, to take into account not only the interests of the applicants but those of the Soviet state and the friendly Arab countries -- victims of continuing Israeli aggression.[18]

This does not mean that all emigration is banned. There are certain conditions under which Jews are permitted to emigrate. The basic condition is that if the "family is separated from the breadwinner," then emigration will be allowed on humanitarian grounds, even though an aggressive situation exists and the Soviet Union does not have diplomatic ties with Israel. In reality, however, the Soviet government is reluctant for Jewish emigration to take place.

The regime excuses its actions against the Jews wishing to emigrate on the basis of "Zionism." Measures are taken against applicants "not

because of the applications for emigration, but because the applicants allegedly indulged in 'Zionist propaganda,' which has been prohibited in the Soviet Union since the early years of the Communist regime."[19] The Soviet definition of Zionism is that it is "bourgeois nationalism opposed to proletarian internationalism."[20] The Soviet regime has explained its position on Zionism in the following manner:

> One's attitude to Israel as a state must not be equated with the attitude to Zionism. The Israeli working people who have turned barren deserts into fertile fields and blossoming orchards are to be commended.
>
> But what actually happened? Having created "the problem of the Palestinian Arabs" the Israel leaders now see the answer in a forced deportation of these Arabs from the country. In other words, the Israeli leaders have embarked on a rather beaten (above all, by anti-Semites) path of solving the "national question."[21]

Zionism, therefore, as a social and political force works contrary to the Marxist goal of proletarian unity across national lines.

Jewish emigration, therefore, presents a two-fold threat; it is seen as anti-Soviet behavior and support of a Soviet enemy -- Israel -- and thus puts the Soviet Union in an awkward position vis-a-vis its Arab allies that are waging war against Israel. The Soviet authorities cannot "permit any large-scale emigration of Jews to Israel while the Arab war with Israel goes on. Moscow is too much involved in this war. The Kremlin is strongly on the side of the Arabs and against Israel."[22] Israel, therefore, plays a role in the regime's attempts to deal with Jewish emigrants.

Historically, the Soviet Union favored and supported the creation of Israel since it was viewed as a further deterioration of the West's colonial empire. However, soon afterward, the regime's attitude changed and

Israel was vilified. Soviet Jews had begun to take pride in the new state and castigation of Israel may be an attempt to prevent Soviet Jewry from identifying with or seeking to emigrate to Israel. Thus, Brezhnev has stated: "The Israeli aggressors are behaving like the worst of bandits. In their atrocities against the Arab population, it seems they want to copy the crimes of the Hitler invaders."[23] The regime may also attempt to nip in the bud the desire to emigrate to Israel by exploiting the fact that there are a number of Soviet Jews who, after having emigrated to Israel, seek to return to the Soviet Union.

The anti-Israeli rhetoric can foment anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union since the comparison with Nazism brings back the memories of Hitler's aggression. By equating Israel with Nazism the implication is that Jews in general cannot be trusted. This anti-Semitism may aid the regime to block the example of Jewish emigration from spreading to other Soviet dissidents.

There are a number of specific reasons as to why the Soviet government seeks to bar Jewish emigration. These can be divided into domestic and international reasons. On the domestic front, many of the would-be emigrants have had access to or are familiar with state secrets. Their emigration may compromise the national interest of the Soviet Union once they reach the West and offer information to foreign governments. Also, many of the Jewish would-be emigrants are highly educated. Their absence from Soviet society may detrimentally affect the technological progress of the country. Boris Shumilin, Vice Minister of the Interior, expressed these concerns of the Soviet regime in the following manner: "National interest comes first. We're not holding anyone back, you understand, merely retaining those who are connected with matters of national importance."[24]

Furthermore, Jewish emigration stimulates other dissidents to undertake similar activities. Many Ukrainians and Russians, seeing the success of Jewish emigrants, are marrying Jews in order to gain the right to emigrate.

Internationally, there are two problems that Jewish emigration poses. First, priding itself as a state that has solved the nationality problem, the Soviet Union may suffer in its image if there are people who actually seek to leave. The desire to leave also indicts the Soviet system as not being the epitome of social and political systems that Marxism-Leninism claims it to be. The Soviet authorities are cognizant of this problem and, therefore, officially present their actions in permitting Jews to leave as humanitarian acts aimed at reuniting families.

Second, Jewish emigration complicates Soviet relations with its Arab friends due to the latter's aggressive stand toward Israel. Arabs regard emigration as indirect support of Israel against the Arabs. For example, Jordan has complained that such emigration helps build up Israel's military power and thereby aids Israeli aggression.[25]

Third, the Jewish emigration problem has achieved much international publicity and is a topic that is raised with Soviet officials. For example, Congressional representatives visiting the Soviet Union press the Soviet government on the issue.[26] Such external support may reinforce the Jewish dissidents and puts the Soviet government on the defensive in the international arena. The issue is also a convenient mode for pressuring the Soviet government. A case in point was the Jackson Amendment which will be discussed later in this chapter.

United States Support of Jewish Emigration

Soviet Jewish dissidents seeking to emigrate have been able to elicit much support from the United States, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment being the prime example. There are a number of reasons as to why the Jewish emigration movement had been able to gain much support and publicity in the United States and in the West in general. First, some of the Jews seeking to emigrate reside in the cities of Leningrad and Moscow and thus have access to Western correspondents who can report on the would-be emigrants' plight. Second, the right to leave one's country has become a universally acknowledged human right and the Soviet Union is a party to many of the agreements supporting this right. Thus, external support of emigration can be presented as support of a right the Soviet Union itself has accepted in international agreements.[27] Third, emigration dissent is not a very threatening form of dissent against the Soviet regime. Jewish emigrants did not seek to change the internal structure of the Soviet Union and, thus, it may be easier for external actors to support this form of dissent rather than nationalist dissent. Korey summarized the inherent advantage that emigration dissent has had in the following way:

> It was not reform within Soviet society which was sought; rather escape from that society (to Israel) was the goal. In this sense, the Jewish movement was completely different from the other national stirrings within the USSR (such as those among the Ukrainians or among the Baltic people). For the ultimate success of these stirrings might alter or at least affect the distribution of power within Soviet society.[28]

Fourth, the historical persecutions that Jews have suffered, the World War II holocaust being the most reminiscent, has led to a situation where any abridgement of Jewish rights becomes almost immediately visible and criticized. Former Soviet dissident Chalidze described this best when he

wrote that "any mass restrictions of rights affecting Jews attracts the attention of 'world public opinion' since historically any form of restrictions on the rights of Jews is a critical question for our civilization."[29] Fifth, the large Jewish population in the United States became a vocal supporter of Soviet Jewry and worked on behalf of furthering Jewish emigration, thereby bringing more attention to the issue. Sixth, Jewish dissidents seeking to emigrate became the beneficiaries, more so than other Soviet dissidents, of the criticism of detente that many were voicing in the United States. Feeling that the Soviet Union was gaining more than the United States was in the detente process, critics sought a quid pro quo from the Soviet Union and one of the issues that critics came to support in this quid pro quo was that of unhampered Jewish emigration. Jewish emigration dissent was the one more readily supported possibly because it presented the least danger to the Soviet Union and thus would not exacerbate relations with the Soviet regime. Also, the persecution of Jews seems to elicit the concern of the world as already stated above. Furthermore, the United States enjoys good relations with Israel and is Israel's principal supporter. It would seem, therefore, that support would be extended to Soviet Jewry since their avowed desire was to emigrate to Israel.

The most consistent support of Soviet Jewry comes from the American-Jewish community. The organization which spearheads the cause of Soviet Jewry is the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), an umbrella organization of the other American Jewish organizations, which has been assigned the task of keeping the plight of Soviet Jewry in the American public's eye.[30] The NCSJ represents thirty-eight national member agencies and over 200 various local councils and federations and reaches nearly every area of organized American-Jewish life.[31] The NCSJ describes

its mission as follows:

> To help all Soviet Jews who wish to emigrate leave the Soviet Union for Israel and elsewhere.
> To help Jews live in the Soviet Union as Jews with all the rights and privileges and freedoms accorded all other groups in the USSR.[32]

The American Jewish community is generally considered to be an important ethnic political force. Using the criteria of voting behavior and financial resources, it becomes understandable as to why this view is held.[33] In terms of population, American Jews number approximately six million, yet in voting their impact is greater than the number would seem to warrant. There seem to be two reasons for this. First, in comparison to other ehtnic groups in the United States, American Jews have a stronger turnout.[34] Second, the Jewish vote is heavily predominant in certain areas. The large number of Democratic Jewish voters in New York has, for example, translated itself into giving the Jewish community a powerful voice in the Democratic party.[35]

The role that the Jewish vote can play is witnessed by the impact that it can have on the course of an election. In 1948, the question of Israel was an important issue to American Jews and

> in a few local elections with a large Jewish minority, candidates of both parties were forced to outbid each other in their enthusiasm for the new state of Israel, which frequently became the major issue of the campaign.[36]

With respect to financial resources, the American-Jewish community is the highest income group in the United States.[37] As such, American Jews may be able financially to support strongly Jewish causes and have an important impact on the political process via donations. According to an estimate by the Congressional Quarterly, "Jews make at least half of the large contributions to Democratic campaigns and at least 40 per cent of the contributions to Republican campaigns."[38]

Possibly as a result of the strong Jewish voting tradition and the Jewish community's financial resources, a number of Jews have been elected to high office and, thus, may provide the Jewish community with spokesmen in the government on behalf of Jewish causes.[39]

The overall strength of the Jewish community is witnessed by the role it has played in gaining support for Israel. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is the organization charged with making United States policy supportive of Israel. It seems to perform its task very well, since "today, the AIPAC bulldozer commands three quarters of the vote in the Senate, well over half the vote in the House, and two-thirds of the whole foreign-aid bill for less than one thousandth of the world's population."[40]

The NCSJ's main activity seems to be directed at gaining the support of federal government officials on behalf of Soviet Jewry. The strong Jewish vote and the Jewish community's political contributions would seem to be assets that can open the doors to various officials. Elected officials, in turn, may be receptive to Jewish causes since they "realize the impact that can be realized by scoring with unified ethnic and religious blocs."[41] Using its strong political position, the American-Jewish community seems to be able to gain access to American officials.

The NCSJ's efforts directed at American officials on behalf of Soviet Jewry seem to have relied on four techniques: policy research and development, congressional activity, special projects, and communications/press relations.[42] The main focus of many of the above techniques is the Congress and the executive branch.

The purpose of the "policy research and development" effort is to monitor all changes in Soviet-American relations that may have an effect

on Soviet Jewry.[43] This is done by maintaining close ties to the administration and Congress and by recommending specific courses of action to any moves undertaken by the Soviet Union. In addition, the Washington office of the NCSJ conveys to the administration and Congress and any other interested officials "existing viewpoints on the part of the NCSJ leadership with regard to the general sphere of US-USSR relations, and activity on behalf of Jews in the USSR."[44]

An example of an attempt by the NCSJ to influence U.S. behavior regarding a Soviet action was when the NCSJ called attention to the Soviet regime's letter campaign aimed at discrediting Soviet Jewish dissidents and American citizens who met with them. In a message to Secretary Vance, the NCSJ stated:

> The tone, content, and intent of these letters is totally unacceptable. This campaign, which is obviously orchestrated by Soviet authorities, violates the Helsinki Final Act by attempting to curtail tourism and limit contact between the citizens of both countries.
>
> We request the United States government . . . to protest to the Soviet government about this outlandish campaign.[45]

Congressional activity is aimed at generating awareness within the Congress regarding the Soviet Jewry movement. This is done by approaching congressional offices with proposals regarding emigration problems, adopt-a-prisoner cases and "refusenik" problems. Furthermore, the Washington office of the NCSJ sponors briefings for Congressional officials and helps organize committee hearings on Soviet Jewry.[46]

Prior to the opening of the Helsinki review committee in Belgrade the NCSJ presented the U.S. delegates attending the meeting with a briefing paper entitled Soviet Jewry and the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. The report pointed out "that in regard to individual rights

as provided in Basket Three of the Helsinki Final Act, the USSR failed to adhere to numerous provisions."[47]

The NCSJ also assists in organizing meetings between constituents and their representatives in the Senate and the House. Such direct contact, as well as letters from Jewish constituents, may bring pressure on an elected official to act favorably on the issue of Soviet Jewry since failure to do so may cause him to lose Jewish support in his re-election. The NCSJ claims that its mobilization of public support was instrumental for the establishment of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor the provisions of the Helsinki Accords.[48]

A third type of effort by the NCSJ is what it labels as "special projects." These are undertakings which focus on a particular event or group of people with the attempt to gain greater recognition for the Soviet Jewry problem. One such special project was the formation in 1978 of the Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry. The NCSJ claims that "this is a significant group whose awareness of the work of the NCSJ has already strengthened our rapport with Congressional offices and raised visibility for Soviet Jews in the press. This was done by the attention engendered through meetings, appeals and public forums cohosted and coordinated with the members of the group."[49]

The communications/presss relations effort is aimed at maintaining close ties with the major newspapers and news bureaus in Washington. The representatives of the NCSJ provide various interviews and updates regarding the situation of Soviet Jewry. Part of the communications effort is also directed at maintaining contact with and informing the other national Jewish agencies of the NCSJ activities. In this way the American-Jewish community stays informed of the NCSJ efforts on behalf of

Soviet Jewry.[50]

The American-Jewish community, however, has not been unified on the question of what tactics are the best for gaining the objectives of Soviet Jewry. The NCSJ is a representative of the mainstream American Jewish community and has relied on the peaceful methods of providing information to and petitioning American government officials as the best means for obtaining an American policy favorable toward Soviet Jewry. To the left of the NCSJ is the Jewish Defense League (JDL). The JDL was formed by Rabbi Meir Kahane as an organization to help Jews in New York City to organize and protect their neighborhoods against crime and anti-Semitism. The JDL also became engaged in the Soviet Jewry issue. The JDL has followed a militant approach.

The JDL's militant activities have encompassed a wide range of methods, including the use of guns. Most of these activities have been undertaken against Soviet personnel in the United States. In 1975 members of the Jewish Defense League were arrested and charged with firing shots into the Soviet Union's United Nations Mission and the Soviet residential complex in the Bronx.

The established American-Jewish community has opposed the militant approach. It "is opposed to any violance and considers the tactics of the Jewish Defense League as being counterproductive."[51] However, this is not to say that the established American-Jewish community has opposed all forms of more dramatic presentations of Soviet Jewry's plight. Mass demonstrations have been undertaken to bring attention to Soviet Jewry. Usually,"demonstrations are not haphazardly arranged. They are timed to coincide with significant Jewish or Russian events so as to most effectively arouse public opinion."[52]

In May 1977 over 200,000 Jews and supporters gathered at Battery Park in New York City in support of Soviet Jewry. Attending the rally were presidential assistant Midge Costanza, New York Governor Hugh Carey, and Senators Jacob Javits, Daniel Moynihan and Howard Baker. Ms. Costanza addressed the crowd in the following manner: "Let me assure you that we will seek every productive way to promote the cause of human rights here and abroad."[53] The presence of so many officials guaranteed much publicity for the event.

It has been shown that the American Jewish community is a strong political force in domestic American politics and that it has used numerous methods on behalf of Soviet Jewry. The success of the Jewish community in affecting United States policy regarding Soviet Jewish dissidents will be examined in the following sections dealing with the Jackson Amendment.

The Jackson Amendment

Historical Background

The Trade Act of 1974 was passed by Congress in December.[54] Action came on the last day of the 1974 session, more than a year after the House had passed the bill on December 11, 1973. The bill had been stymied in the Senate Finance Committee because of a dispute regarding the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. However, after a Congressional-White House compromise on the question was announced on October 18, 1974, the bill moved quickly through the Senate. The Senate Finance Committee reported the bill on November 26. The full Senate

passed it on December 13. Senate-House conferees ironed out differences and filed their report on December 19. At the same time, the Congress passed a measure limiting United States Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviet Union to a total of $300 million over a four-year period without prior congressional approval. This part of the legislation, sponsored by Senator Adlai Stevenson, became known as the Stevenson Amendment.

The final version of the trade bill also contained what is now known as the Jackson Amendment. It reflected the compromise that Senator Henry Jackson reached with the White House in October regarding Jewish emigration. Senator Jackson had introduced the amendment in the Senate. The House version of the amendment had been introduced by Representative Charles Vanik. The final amendment, therefore, was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, but due to the pivotal role played by Senator Jackson in the emigration issue, the amendment has been popularly referred to as the Jackson Amendment. The Amendment "authorized the president to waive the bill's ban on granting trade concessions to Communist countries that restricted emigration if he received assurances from those countries that their policies were leading to free emigration and so informed Congress."[55] The President would be authorized for 18 months to waive this restriction.

> At the end of 18 months the waiver could be renewed if Congress adopted a concurrent resolution extending the president's authority for a year. The president must request such an extension at least 30 days before the end of the 18 months. If both houses rejected the resolution, the waiver authority would expire.
>
> If Congress did not approve or disapprove the resolution within 60 days of the expiration of the 18-month period, the waiver authority would continue unless either house, within 45 days, passed a resolution of disapproval. After the original 18-month period, the waiver could be extended at one-year intervals if the president reported to Congress that it would promote free emigration and if neither house adopted within 60 days a resolution of disapproval. If Congress did not act, the waiver would automatically be extended for another year.[56]

The basis of this compromise was an exchange of letters between Kissinger and Jackson on October 18. The letters outlined future Soviet policy regarding emigration and projected the number of emigrants. According to Jackson the rate of emigration would rise from the 1973 level of 35,000. In the future it would correspond to the number of applicants. A rate of 60,000 per year, according to Jackson, would be the minimum standard.

President Ford signed the Trade Bill into law on January 3, 1975. In signing the Trade Bill, Ford said: "Our broad negotiating objectives under this act are to obtain more open and equitable market access for traded goods and services, to assure fair access to essential supplies at reasonable prices, to provide our citizens with an increased opportunity to purchase goods produced abroad, and to seek modernization of the international trading system."[57] However, on January 14, Kissinger announced that the Soviet Union had rejected the terms of the Trade Bill and, therefore, cancelled the agreement.

In the United States there was confusion regarding whether the Soviet Union had made any assurances to the United States on the issue of emigration. According to the Kissinger letter of October 18, it would seem that assurances had been given. Excerpts from the Kissinger and Jackson letters may shed some light on this.

The Soviet assurance was conveyed to Jackson in Kissinger's letter, parts of which stated:

> I should like on behalf of the Administration to inform you that we have been assured that the following criteria and practices will henceforth govern emigration from the U.S.S.R.
>
> First, punitive actions against individuals seeking to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. would be violations of Soviet laws and regulations and will therefore not be permitted by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

> Second, no unreasonable or unlawful impediments will be placed in the way of persons desiring to make application for emigration, such as interference with travel or communications necessary to complete an application . . .
>
> Third, applications for emigration will be processed in order of receipt, including those previously filed, and on a non-discriminatory basis as regards the place of residence, race, religion, national origin and professional status of the applicant.
>
> Fourth, hardship cases will be processed sympathetically and expeditiously. . . .
>
> Fifth, the collection of the so-called emigration tax on emigrants, which was suspended last year, will remain suspended.
>
> Sixth, with respect to all the foregoing points, we will be in a position to bring to the attention of the Soviet leadership indications that we may have that these criteria and practices are not being applied.
>
> Finally, it will be our assumption that, with the application of the criteria, practices and procedures set forth in this letter, the rate of emigration from the U.S.S.R. would begin to rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants.[58]

In his letter of reply, Senator Jackson stated:

> Subject to the further understandings and interpretations outlined in this letter, I agree that we have achieved a suitable basis upon which to modify Title IV by incorporating within it a provision that would enable the President to waive [certain] subsections . . . as passed by the House in circumstances that would substantially promote the objectives of Title IV.
>
> . . . we understand that the actual number of emigrants would rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants, and may therefore exceed 60,000 per annum. We would consider a benchmark -- a minimum standard of initial compliance -- to be the issuance of visas at the rate of 60,000 per annum; and we understand that the President proposes to use the same benchmark as the minimum of initial compliance.
>
> In agreeing to provide discretionary authority to waive the provision of [the] subsections [concerned], we share your anticipation of good faith in the implementation of the assurances contained in your letter of October 18 and the understandings conveyed by this letter.[59]

While Senator Jackson and Secretary Kissinger seemed to have solved the problem, there was no word from the Soviet Union regarding this

agreement. There was skepticism whether the Soviet Union had actually accepted this agreement. Critics stated that the agreement existed solely between Jackson and Kissinger.[60] It was also reported that Kissinger's letter had been drafted by President Ford's aides at his instruction. There had been no specific consultations with the Soviet government and Kissinger signed the letter with reluctance. On October 21, President Ford made a statement that the figure of 60,000 emigrants had not been agreed to by the Soviet Union specifically. Senator Jackson himself admitted that he was not certain whether the Soviet government had seen the contents of Kissinger's letter.

Doubts existed not only on the United States side. The Soviet Union also began to send out signals questioning the validity of the Kissinger-Jackson exchange. Mr. Chervonenko, the Soviet Ambassador to France, denied on October 26 that the Soviet government had agreed to liberalize its emigration policy in return for trade benefits. As early as October 15 Brezhnev made the Soviet view known at a dinner given for the United States-Soviet Commercial and Economic Council, which was attended by United States Treasury Secretary William Simon. Brezhnev stated that "attempts to condition the development of trade and economic ties by putting demands to the Soviet Union on questions totally unconnected with the trade and domestic sphere of States are utterly irrelevant and unacceptable."[61]

Kissinger only added further doubts regarding the compromise when he testified before the Senate Finance Committee. Kissinger stated that his letter to Jackson had been based on certain assurances that he and President Ford had received from the Soviet government. He stated that due to

conversations held with Gromyko in the course of 1974, "information was obtained which subsequently formed the basis of the correspondence with Senator Jackson."[62] In addition, he stated that Jackson's response contained interpretations that had never been stated by the Soviet government. Elaborating on his own letter, Kissinger stated that the Soviet Union had made no commitments on the emigration issue. He said: "It was consistently made clear to us that Soviet explanations applied to the definition of criteria and did not represent a commitment as to numbers. If any number was used in regard to Soviet emigration this would be wholly our responsibility."[63] Furthermore, Kissinger stated: "If I were to assert here that a formal agreement on emigration from the USSR exists between our governments, that statement would immediately be repudiated by the Soviet government."[64]

Kissinger's testimony did not clarify matters much. Finally, on December 18 the Soviet government made its position clear. On that day House-Senate conferees reached agreement on the bill and the Soviet government issued a statement denying it had given the United States any specific assurances regarding emigration. It also released the text of a letter that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had given to Kissinger on October 26, when he had visited Moscow. The letter denounced the October 18 exchange of letters between Kissinger and Jackson.

The letter stated, in part:

> the correspondence between you and Senator Jackson creates a distorted picture of our position and also of what we told the American side with regard to this matter.
>
> When clarifying the actual state of affairs in response to your request, we emphasized that the question as such was entirely within the internal competence of our state. We gave a warning at the time that in this matter we had

> acted and would continue to act strictly in conformity with our present legislation on this subject.
>
> . . . when we did mention figures -- in order to inform you of the real situation -- the point was quite the contrary, namely concerning the present tendency towards a decrease in the number of persons wishing to leave the U.S.S.R. and seek permanent residence in other countries.
>
> We believe it to be important that in this whole matter, having regard to its importance in principle, no ambiguities should remain as regards the position of the Soviet Union.[65]

On January 10, 1975, the Soviet government informed the United States that it would not put the trade agreement into effect.[66] Kissinger announced the new development on January 14. He stated: "The Soviet Government has now informed us that it cannot accept a trading relationship based on the legislation recently enacted in this country. It considers this legislation as contravening both the 1972 trade agreement, which had called for an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade restrictions and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. The Soviet Government states that it does not intend to accept a trade status that is discriminatory and subject to political conditions and, accordingly, that it will not put into force the 1972 trade agreement."[67]

The issue of Jewish emigration, therefore, was an obvious impediment to the fulfillment of the trade bill. How important an ingredient the issue was will be examined in the following sections.

United States Behavior and the Jackson Amendment

The United States has a long history of protesting the persecution of Jews in the Russian empire. In addition, various actions have been undertaken to express American displeasure regarding Russian treatment of Jews.[68]

The United States also has a long history of using economic trade as a weapon against the Russians for political and military reasons. A major instrument has been the 1949 Export Control Act which gave the United States government control over exports it regarded as strategic -- defined as those that are in short supply in the United States or those which might augment the military-industrial potential of hostile states,' namely the Soviet Union. The Battle Act of 1951 enlisted the cooperation of NATO members and Japan in this United States effort to control exports to the Soviet Union. Also, in 1951 in response to the Korean War, the United States withdrew most-favored-nation (MFN) status from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe thereby making their exports to the United States expensive and thus not competitive.[69]

Many groups in the United States have argued against an expansion of trade with the Soviet Union since it could build up the Soviet Union. Some of the critics have included Conservative elements in Congress,[70] American labor[71] and East European ethnic groups like the Ukrainians.[72]

In the Nixon Presidency there was a move on the part of the Administration to grant most-favored status to the Soviet Union as part of the detente process between the two countries. Many of the critics of such trade seized upon this move and demanded that the Soviet Union give a quid pro quo to the United States as a show of the Soviet Union's adherence to detente. Given the moral turn in American foreign policy at this time, much of the argument centered around the question of the Soviet regime granting greater freedom to its people in return for trade.[73] "The episode of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to our trade bill was actually a culmination to years of argument and controversy over the linkage of the two issues."[74]

At the time that economic and political detente was developing between the United States and the Soviet Union the Jewish dissident movement was also arising in the Soviet Union. The critics of detente, therefore, used a standing American tool -- the economic weapon -- and united it with another standing American tradition -- support of Russian Jews -- to pursue their own tougher version of detente.

Senator Henry Jackson was the leader of the forces that questioned the efficacy of detente and that were skeptical of granting the Soviet Union concessions without something in return.[75] As a result, he is considered the most powerful Democratic critic of detente in the United States Congress.[76] Jackson had always been a hardliner toward the Soviet Union and had always supported increased military budgets for the United States.[77]

His skepticism regarding detente was evidenced by another amendment he successfully sponsored in relation to the Interim Offensive Agreement. Fearing that the United States would be taken advantage of, Jackson sponsored an amendment to the Interim Offensive Agreement that "would not limit the United States to levels of inter-continental strategic forces inferior" to the Soviet Union.[78] "Jackson stated this meant that the U.S. should insist on 'equality' in numbers of ICBM's, SLBM's, and long-range bombers, but omitted MIRV'd warheads where the U.S. had a significant lead and was adding an average of three warheads a day."[79]

This 1972 "Jackson Amendment" was a forerunner of the 1974 Jackson Amendment, both of which were aimed at improving the position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. His championing of Jewish emigration, therefore, may not have been done out of a primary concern for the dissidents or because of the American-Jewish community but

because it provided a convenient tool against the Soviet Union. His concern with the Soviet Union is shown by the fact that his "solicitude for Jewish emigration is not matched by his sympathy for the victims of the Greek Colonels or the captives of the junta in Chile."[80] The latter two states, being allies of the United States were exempt from pressure.

The American-Jewish community recognized the power of the anti-detente forces and sought to ride it for its own benefit. The National Conference stated: "Since there has been no economic quid pro quo for granting credits on MFN, the United States is entitled to insist on Soviet political reciprocity."[81]

Therefore, in addition to the various techniques, outlined previously, that are aimed at furthering the cause of Soviet Jewry, the NCSJ also aligned itself with the anti-detente critics who were pushing the Jackson Amendment. Stanley Lowell, Chairman of the NCSJ, appeared before the Senate Finance Committee to urge support of the Jackson Amendment. He stated:

> We think that the Jackson Amendment contains a realistic formula to employ America's economic capability and economic power to secure fundamental human rights -- especially the right to emigrate -- and to link that human right to something which the Soviet Union wants from American society.[82]

The American Jewish community realized its limits in pressuring the United States government. This can be seen in its attitude regarding the movement to repeal the amendment. In an internal memo the National Conference recognized that many groups, such as the business community and the Treasury and Commerce Departments were bent on repealing the amendment. The Conference feared repeal and recognized its own limits in affecting an outcome. The memo cautioned that the Conference should not press on the issue:

> If repeal of Jackson-Vanik is inevitable, (and it is still too early to determine), NCSJ ought at least to consider the advantages of keeping silent -- a silence preplanned with Administration officials -- in order to a) appear to reserve judgment; b) retain the friendship of Jackson and other key legislators involved in the drafting of the Amendment and 3) allow the Administration some leeway in its "private" negotiations with the Russians."[83]

This indicates that the Conference was well aware that it depended on Jackson and the anti-detente forces for the maintenance of a strong United States stand on behalf of Soviet Jewry. The power of the American-Jewish community depended on having a goal similar to that of the domestic critics of detente and in maintaining them on its side.

Furthermore, it was Senator Jackson who proposed the emigration amendment. He proposed it before the National Conference in September 1972. The Conference approved it in principle. The initiative, however, was not taken by the Conference. Nor was the American-Jewish community sure on what direction it should take. There was fear that support of the amendment would harm relations with President Nixon. The American - Jewish community was in a dilemma. Since survival and security for Israel were of paramount concern, it feared that support of the amendment might create a backlash from the Nixon administration that might create harm for Israel. As a result, after an April 19, 1973, meeting with Nixon at the White House, a group of Jewish leaders issued a statement which did not mention the amendment but which did mention President Nixon's commitment to help Soviet Jewry. This led to some confusion among the amendment's supporters and on April 26, the National Conference issued a statement aimed at placating everyone. The statement gave support to the Jackson amendment but also expressed appreciation for President Nixon's efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry.[84]

The dilemma became grave after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The war split the Jewish community on whether or not the Jackson Amendment should be backed since it might endanger United States support of Israel. In early November, Richard Maas, chairman of the National Conference, met with Senator Jackson. Jackson reassured him that there was no connection between the Jackson amendment and Israeli security. The result was that a statement was issued later in the month by the National Conference which stated its support of the Jackson Amendment.[85]

The split in the Jewish community was further evidenced by the activity of Senator Javits.[86] When Jackson broached the idea of the amendment, Javits objected. His fear was that it would harm East-West trade. Javits only became a co-sponsor after Jackson received a majority of the Senate's backing. Javits, however, was still not satisfied. In the spring of 1974 he sought to convince Kissinger to work on the emigration issue so that the Senate would be less adamant. He also let it be known to Jackson that if Jackson did not work out an agreement with Kissinger, Javits would break away and substitute a milder emigration bill. Nothing came of this. This scenario shows, however, that Jackson was the mainstay behind the amendment and that not even a key Jewish senator was willing to back it as much as Jackson.

While Jackson was the leader of the anti-detente forces, he was able to get much broad support from various sectors of American life. The list of critics of the detente process is impressive. It includes Hans J. Morgenthau, Theodore Draper, Richard Pipes, and Eugene V. Rostow. In addition, conservative Republicans like Congressman Ben B. Blackburn (R.- Ga.) and Barry Goldwater, Jr. (R.- Cal.) came to support the amendment

because they did not trust the Soviet Union's motives and feared too many trade concessions might be granted to the Soviet Union. In addition, as a result of the Soviet regime's campaign of harassment of Sakharov in September of 1973 many liberals came on board to support Jackson. Liberals became critical of the regime's activities and felt that possibly the only way to indicate their displeasure was to back a Jackson Amendment. It was feared that detente was not working in the liberal manner all had hoped.[87] Ethnic groups in the United States such as the Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Latvians came to back the amendment also. While the amendment was geared toward Jews, it made no specific references. The other ethnic groups, therefore, felt that it would be beneficial to their kinsmen also. One powerful group that had its doubts about detente was the AFL-CIO.

The AFL-CIO had its doubts both on political and economic grounds. Its President, George Meany, stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974 that detente was a "one-way street in which the Soviet Union maintains all of its basic political objectives which are fundamentally antagonistic to the West while it acquires from the West the technology it needs to help overcome the disastrous economic consequences of totalitarian planning."[88] As a result, the AFL-CIO has supported political concessions, such as "granting the right of self-determination to the satellite nations and the German people; abolition of the Berlin Wall; annulment of the Brezhnev doctrine; communications across the boundaries of the Russian empire with no interference in Western radio broadcasts, free emigration from the Soviet Union."[89]

The AFL-CIO also feared that American labor might suffer as a result of the economic benefits the Soviet Union would receive through detente.

United States opinion was already upset because of the Soviet grain deal. Many Americans felt that the United States had been shortchanged on the deal.[90] At the time of the deal, United States food prices were beginning to rise. It was felt that a similar situation might develop as a result of the trade bill. The AFL-CIO, therefore, had a fertile ground on which to base its opposition to the trade bill. It also had allies in Congress who felt that the bill "would not adequately protect American industry and workers and that the Soviet Union should not be eligible to receive preferential trading status, credits and loans."[91]

At the Senate hearing already referred to above, George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, had complained that the Export-Import Bank had loaned the Soviet Union $469 million in trade credits over a year and a half at an interest rate of only 6%. "These loans were made at a time of worsening economic conditions in the US brought on in part by high interest rates and restrictive monetary policies."[92]

The critics of detente had ample evidence to support their skepticism. One of the main concerns of critics was whether the Soviet Union had a true commitment to detente. The Soviet government itself stated that it would continue its international struggle against the West via peaceful coexistence. A Soviet editorial stated; "The Communist Party and the Soviet State have always and are now supporting peoples who stand for the right to independence and social progress. They decidedly unmask and paralyze any aggressive designs of imperialism, and at the same time they persistently develop mutual relationships with the states which have other social systems; these relationships are based on the principles of peaceful coexistence."[93]

The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 brought into vivid light what the Soviet Union meant by peaceful coexistence. While gaining political and economic benefits from the United States, the Soviet Union was arming and supporting states that waged war against a state friendly to the United States. While criticism of detente had existed before the war, it increased in its wake. "The outbreak of the war, and the events that immediately followed, added a new dimension to the criticism. For to the implied judgment that the detente policy must ultimately fail was added the judgment, most cogently expressed by Senator Jackson, that it already had proved to be a failure, that the Soviet government, by its support and encouragement of an attack on a country supported by the United States, had demonstrated that it was intent on altering the balance of power in its favor."[94]

Soviet physical and verbal behavior, therefore, only buttressed the skepticism of the critics. Such behavior only led many in the United States to wish "to make the further improvement of relations with the Soviet Union dependent on changes in Soviet society, or . . . considered real detente impossible unless such changes were made."[95] This sentiment was voiced by Senator Jackson even prior to the Arab-Israeli War. In an August 1973 news realease, he stated: "We hope for long-term U.S.-Soviet cooperation; but this effort is undermined by the continued forced isolation of the Soviet people and by the intensification of the campaign against Soviet intellectuals, writers, artists and scientists. The Soviets have refused to allow any real reciprocity in either access to information or the exchange of ideas and people."[96] The need for reciprocity was further underlined by Jackson in 1974 when he said: "No one wishes a

recurrence of military confrontation. . . . However, detente cannot be based on illusions. It must be a two-way street."[97]

When the issue of human rights was raised by critics it was not raised out of moral considerations but was raised to show that detente was actually hampering the achievement of human rights. Thus, detente was an evil on moral grounds. For example, Professor Leopold Labedz stated that "since President Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972 there has been a renewed drive by the authorities against intellectual and civic liberties. Since that time . . . the Soviet authorities have felt that because of the detente they can now disregard Western public opinion."[98] And one publication stated: "The Russification scourge of the non-Russian nations would be abetted, not alleviated by a policy of unqualified detente."[99]

In conclusion, it seems that an alliance of labor interests, conservatives, liberals, and ethnic groups, under the tutelage of the Congressional critics of detente came together as a force in support of the Jackson Amendment. The American-Jewish community, therefore, was part of a larger group but not the main instigator. The problems of detente had brought all the above groups together, each one using the detente issue for its own benefits. This congruence between the critics of detente and the American-Jewish community is what aided the Jewish community in its goal of aiding Jewish emigration. It was not the strength of the American-Jewish community but rather the combined strength of the critics that made Jewish emigration the major issue it became in United States-Soviet relations.[100]

The Soviet Union and the Jackson Amendment

The emigration issue itself did not stimulate Soviet nullification of the trade bill. There were greater economic and political reasons for its termination. When the trade agreement had been initially entered into by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, there were no sure indications that the emigration issue and credits would become part of the eventual Trade Reform Act of 1974. Economically, the Soviet Union felt the credits that would be provided were too small. The Export-Import Bank was to provide the Soviet Union with a $300 million credit ceiling over a four-year period. The Soviet government felt that this was an insultingly small amount.[101] Representative Charles A. Vanik (D.- Ohio), co-sponsor of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, himself pointed to the greater Soviet economic interest. He stated that the Jewish emigration issue was not a Soviet concern, that the Soviet termination of the agreement was due to the Soviet Union's misunderstanding that it would receive billions of dollars in credit, rather than the $300 million offered by the Export-Import Bank under the Stevenson Amendment.[102] Furthermore, the Soviet Union was upset by the fact that the trade bill granted the Soviet Union most favored nation status for only 18 months. Therefore, the Soviet government was more upset by the monetary and time limitations imposed by the bill rather than by the emigration issue.

The Soviet Union had counted on increased trade with the United States to help improve its own domestic economy. However, the government was not willing to undergo such trade if it was not substantial and its prestige was harmed as a result of the emigration stipulation. Realizing the barrier the issue was beginning to raise the Soviet government

attempted two maneuvers in order to overcome it. The regime sought to lobby with members of Congress to persuade them that no emigration stipulation should be attached to the bill. In March 1973, for example, Soviet officials met with fifteen Congressmen to explain the advantages of increased Soviet-United States trade. In the same month, the Soviet government attempted another method. It allowed 44 Jews to emigrate. These Jews had a higher education, yet they were allowed to leave without paying the higher education tax.[103] Their emigration was given much publicity. The Soviet government let it also be known that the tax would no longer be enforced. Therefore, by direct lobbying and by cancellation of the emigration tax the Soviet government was hoping to calm criticism so that the trade bill could proceed through Congress. And in December 1974 the Kremlin released the text of Gromyko's letter to Kissinger, possibly with the expectation that Congress would see this as a warning that the emigration issue could harm trade relations. Congress interpreted this as an attempt at face saving by the Soviet regime and continued to pass the bill with the various restrictions. The letter was released at this time because it was becoming clear that limits on credits would be included in the trade bill.[104] It is obvious that the Kremlin would have been willing to live with the emigration issue but once its economic interests were hurt it began to balk.

The momentum for the emigration stipulation was strong, especially after the Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The Soviet government, therefore, began to reorient its sight toward other areas of the globe for its economic interests. While it still sought the trade bill, it began to hedge its bet by cultivating other areas for foreign

trade. In addition to the emigration issue a few other things occurred that began to make the Kremlin skeptical regarding United States trade.

It was reported that in November 1974, the Coordinating Committee denied authorization for two major Soviet-United States computer deals.[105] This may have made the Kremlin wary regarding the efficacy of United States trade. As a result, the Kremlin began to lay a new ground work. Once the trade bill became a moot point, the Soviet government was able to strike a deal with other states.

Following its decision to cancel the trade bill, the Soviet government turned its attention toward Western Europe. Discussions took place between the European Commission and Comecon in February. Also, in February a major economic agreement was signed with Britain. The Kremlin also turned toward West Germany and other states for sophisticated Western technology.[106] Furthermore, "the Russians have managed rather well in the global financial market without the Export-Import Bank (running up a debt of over $14 billion to creditors in the West and Japan by 1977)."[107]

The failure to receive large-scale economic support from the United States was a major reason for cancellation of the agreement and for orienting trade to other markets. However, public disclosure of an emigration agreement was an added embarrassment.

The emigration stipulation had an impact in that it became a public issue rather than a private agreement. That is, the Soviet government had been led to believe that the emigration understanding would be a private matter between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, once it became public knowledge, the Soviet government felt its image and political interests would be harmed. The result was that the Soviet

regime had to back track in order to protect its domestic and international political interests.

Domestically, the regime may have felt that the publicity attached to the Jewish emigration issue would build up pressure for greater Jewish emigration and would also spill over to affect other minorities to seek emigration and thus ignite a growth in nationalism. C. L. Sulzberger added credence to the above view when he argued that decolonization is the strongest political force in the twentieth century and that the Soviet Union has a great fear of this. The Kremlin fears a revival of neo-nationalism among its ethnic groups.[108] Thus, the regime felt that its internal political interests would be hurt if it went through with the trade bill.

On the international level, the Kremlin may have felt that its image and strategic interests in the Middle East might be harmed as a result of the public dislosure of the emigration stipulation. The Soviet Union is a backer of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the emigration agreement may have hurt the Soviet regime's standing among them. The cancellation helped improve the image of the Soviet Union in the Arab world. The Arabs, as already discussed, had viewed Soviet Jewish emigration as an indirect means of supplementing Israel's war machine. Some Arab commentators had been critical of the Soviet policy, but with the cancellation of the trade bill, they began to express greater faith in Soviet intentions regarding the Arabs. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy had stated at one time that a freeze on immigration to Israel for 50 years was a requisite for peace in the Middle East. And the Palestine Liberation Organization press agency, WAFA, commented that the Soviet rejection was

consistent with Soviet support of the Palestinian struggle.[109] Thus, the cancellation may have scored some propaganda points among the Arabs.

Another international concern over the trade act was the Stevenson Amendment. It imposed limits on the amounts of credits that the Soviet Union could receive. For the President to lift the credit ceiling, Congressional approval would be necessary. However, according to Senator Adlai Stevenson, Congressional approval would depend not only on the Soviet government's attitude toward emigration but would also take into consideration its attitude on arms control and the Middle East. This probably concerned the Soviet government since any foreign policy act of the Kremlin would become a subject of debate in the United State Congress and would be held against the Soviet Union.[110] The Kremlin felt it would be held as a political hostage in order to gain economic benefits. No state would sacrifice its maneuverability to another state.

Another international factor was that, with the emigration agreement being made public, the Soviet Union's prestige might have suffered. Prestige is an important component of power for any state.[111] If it became overly evident that the Soviet Union was bending to the demands of the United States, then its prestige as a superpower, and hence its power, would have declined. If the agreement had been kep quiet, then the Soviet Union would probably have been more amenable to allowing Jewish emigration. The actual policy itself may not have been too objectionable, but the external perception of the policy may have worried the Soviet Union. The existence of a quiet agreement could always be denied and the increase in emigration could have been explained on humanitarian grounds. A public policy precludes this and shows the Soviet Union bending to United States' demands. Diplomats in Moscow said "that the publicity was an acute

political embarrassment to Mr. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders . . . for Mr. Brezhnev, the political conditions attached to trade concessions by the U.S. Congress proved too humiliating to swallow -- especially after they were widely publicized throughout the world."[112] And in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Secretary of State Kissinger had warned against bringing too much publicity to the agreement. Part of his testimony read: "I am convinced that additional public commentary, or continued claims that this or that protagonist has won, can only jeopardize the results we all seek."[113] The Soviet Union would not "be indifferent to constant and demonstrative efforts to picture it as yielding in the face of external pressure."[114]

Overall, Moscow had much to lose and little to benefit. Kissinger summed up Moscow's attitude in the following manner: "When the Soviet Union looked at the totality of what it had to gain from the trading relationship we were able to offer, as against what it considered intrusions in its domestic affairs, it drew the balance sheet of which we have the result today."[115]

In conclusion, for the Soviet Union, the emigration issue itself was not the stumbling block. The Soviet government was concerned with the greater questions of economics, politics and prestige. The Soviet Union, however, was caught in a squeeze between the policy of prestige and its economic interests. In order to maintain its prestige, the Soviet regime had to cancel the trade agreement rather than present the image of succumbing to United States pressure on Jewish emigration. However, in order to gain economic benefits, it had to allow emigration to satisfy United States domestic critics of detente. The result was that the Soviet policy

fluctuated between the two. The Jackson Amendment was one case in which the Soviet government sought to maintain its prestige and to also gain its economic benefits. The Soviet government was willing to accept an informal arrangement regarding emigration. However, the publicity Senator Jackson gave to this and the failure of the United States to provide adequate economic benefits led the Soviet government to believe that it was losing on both counts and thus forced the cancellation of the agreement. In this manner Soviet prestige was maintained (the Soviet government had not given "in" to another power) and its economic interests were protected by re-routing them to Western Europe and Japan.

Jewish Emigration, Legislation, and Quiet Diplomacy

The Jackson Amendment was obviously a failure. It did not secure the increase in emigration that its supporters had hoped it would. This raises the question of whether legislation or quiet diplomacy is the best instrument in dealing with this issue.

For the most part, Jewish dissidents have supported the Jackson Amendment. For example, in a letter to United States Senators Jewish dissidents wrote in support of the pending legislation when it was still only under consideration in the Congress. They wrote: "We know that soon you are to discuss and solve a question in which we are vitally interested. We are referring to the Jackson Amendment. It makes certain aspects of Soviet-American relations dependent on free emigration from the USSR. . . . That is why we are turning to you."[116] And in another letter, Jewish dissidents stated: "It is wise and prudent to demand of the Soviet Union that it discharge its international obligations on this point [emigration]."[117]

Jewish dissidents also received support from Andrei Sakharov. In his letter to the United States Congress, Sakharov stated: "I express the hope that the Congress of the United States, reflecting the will and the traditional love of freedom of the American people, will realize its historical responsibility before mankind and will find the strength to rise above temporary partisan considerations of commercialism and prestige. I hope the Congress will support the Jackson Amendment."[118]

Even though the Soviet government canceled the trade bill, Jewish dissidents hold to the notion that the Jackson Amendment is instrumental for Jewish emigration. Soviet Jewish activists caution against the repeal of the amendment. They feel that it "is the only thing which stimulates the Soviets to liberalize their emigration policy."[119]

In reality, the above assertion does not seem to hold. The collapse of the trade talks actually discouraged many Jews from seeking to emigrate, and the emigration figures show that there has been a decrease in emigration.[120] Emigration spurted prior to the Jackson Amendment. What the Soviet government may have been hoping to gain was trade and other concessions at the time. It allowed greater emigration to placate domestic American critics who could hamper the successful completion of this. Once it became obvious that the Kremlin's economic and political interests and its prestige would be hurt it canceled the agreement and cut back on emigration. In 1978, the Kremlin loosened up on emigration because of its attempts to build a better image in the triangular relationship with China and the United States.[121] Emigration for the Soviet Union, therefore, is tied to greater national interests rather than to any pressure legislation may exert.

Soviet Jewish activists seek the continuation of the legislation because it keeps their cause in the public eye, but it does not aid in emigration. It gives Soviet Jewish activists a false sense of security. According to Donald Fraser, legislation is not the way to handle the situation: "Enacting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment with its strictures both on most-favored nation treatment and on access to U.S. credits contributed to the Soviet government's decision to tighten restrictions on emigration."[122]

The Soviet Union has allowed emigration in the past. For example, Greeks, most of whom had resided in Russia since the time of the Czar, were allowed to depart for Greece. Similarly, Poles residing in the Soviet Union were permitted to return to Poland following World War II. Individuals from the Baltic republics are allowed to be reunited with their families in the United States. The common feature of all these emigrants, however, has been a low-key approach. The Soviet press, for example, does not mention the word emigration. Furthermore, these moves did not result in an air of international publicity. The emigrants left quietly, thereby not disturbing the Soviet domestic scene, nor provoking international publicity and pressure.

It would seem, therefore, that Soviet intransigence to a great extent was due to the wide attention given emigration in the international arena. In order to protect its image, the regime must seek to become opposed to emigration and in order to prevent domestic repercussions due to the international pressure, the regime must seek to block emigration. It is true that Moscow permitted wide emigration in a period of international scrutiny, but this was due more to strategic concerns. The

Soviet Union had concrete gains to achieve, namely improved trade with the United States.

The most effective means for dealing with human rights would seem to be quiet diplomacy. Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D.- Conn.) alluded to this when on a visit to the Soviet Union he stated: "I believe that the United States has learned that the Soviets prefer to talk about such matters quietly, and that, in fact, progress in a quiet manner has been realized this year."[123] The efficacy of quiet diplomacy is due to many factors. As mentioned earlier, prestige has an important role to play in determining a state's power. In the process of negotiations a state would not like to have itself viewed by the international public as having bent to the will of it adversary. Quiet diplomacy, however, omits public knowledge of the process and exchanges each state makes. Quiet diplomacy also omits much of the emotional context in which the issue may be encased. For example, while public negotiations to end the Vietnam War were being held, Secretary of State Kissinger engaged in secret negotiations. Much of the emotionalism over the war was thus riveted on the public talks, thereby allowing the secret talks to progress. Human rights is an emotional issue to many ethnic groups and by dealing with the subject openly the United States complicates relations with the Soviet Union.

Senator George McGovern (D.- S.D.) summed up the situation best: "The test of any foreign policy strategy is whether it works. In 1973, nearly 40,000 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union. By last year that figure had dropped to under 20,000. So . . . from the standpoint of Jewish emigration, the use of public ultimatums instead of diplomacy and

negotiation was a failure and represented a lack of basic understanding of the best way to accomplish our objectives."[124]

President Nixon had attributed to quiet diplomacy the credit for having mellowed Soviet controls on emigration. Nixon has stated:

> Before we started talking to the Soviets in our period of negotiation, 400 Soviet Jews a year got out. In the first year of our talks, 17,000 got out. Last year 35,000 got out.
>
> Now, they still aren't doing what we would do or what we would want them to do, but it is far better to have the voice of the President of the United States heard from within the Kremlin than the outside, because those walls are mighty thick, I can tell you.
>
> So, therefore, let us continue to talk to them, so we won't have to fight them.[125]

In conclusion, legislation aimed at furthering Jewish emigration seems to present problems of prestige and national interest for the Soviet Union and, hence, makes the Soviet regime hesitant to bend before the public demands of another state.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a historical background regarding Russian anti-Semitism, see Solomon M. Schwartz, The Jews in the Soviet Union (New York: Arno Press, 1973); Arie L. Eliav, Between Hammer and Sickle (New York: Signet Books, 1969).

2. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Soviet Jews: Fact and Fiction (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House), p. 20. No date.

3. Ibid., p. 23.

4. Ibid.

5. In reality, however, Judaism, like other religions, has been curtailed. See Southern Jewish Weekly, 23 April, 1974; National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Jewish Culture and Religion in the USSR," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry). No date.

6. Soviet Jews, p. 33. The Soviet government has attempted to give Soviet Jewry an indigenous Soviet homeland similar to the national republics and regions other Soviet ethnic groups have. This was done by creating Birobidzhan, the so-called Jewish Autonomous Region, in the Soviet Far East. Its isolated location can be seen more as an attempt to isolate Jews rather than to integrate them into Soviet society. In 1970, the Jewish population of Birobidzhan was only 6.6% of the region's total population. Soviet Jews have not flocked to Birobidzhan and have not regarded it as a real homeland.

7. For a refutation of Soviet claims, see National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Soviet Jewry--Fact Sheet," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry, January 1978).

8. William Korey, The Soviet Cage (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), p. 57.

9. Robert G. Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (New York: Pocket Books, 1976), p. 446.

10. Tsezor Solodar, Dikaya Polyn (Moscow: Sovietskaya Rossiya, 1977).

11. Vladimir Begun, Vtorzheniye bez Oruzhya (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1977).

12. V.I. Kiselev, et al., eds., Mezhdunarodny Sionizm: Istoriya i Politika (Moscow: Nauka, 1977).

13. For Jewish involvement in the overall Soviet dissident movement, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, Detente and the Democratic Movement (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 106. Barghoorn mentions that 60% to 70% of the members of the Democratic Movement (those who advocate Western democratic standards such as rule of law, freedom of information, etc.) are Jewish or are married to Jews.

14. For a breakdown of Soviet Jewish emigration figures, see National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Soviet Jews: Emigration Statistics," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry). No date.

15. For the problems entailed when a person seeks to emigrate, see National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Applying to emigrate: A Step by Step Outline for Leaving the USSR," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry, July 1978).

16. Pravda, 9 July 1960.

17. Soviet Jews, p. 41.

18. Ibid.

19. Boris Smolar, Soviet Jewry Today and Tomorrow (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 174.

20. Soviet Jews, p. 38.

21. Ibid., p. 39.

22. Smolar, p. 185.

23. Korey, p. 126.

24. Interview of Boris Shumilin with Soviet Jewish dissidents, Encounter, no. 2 (February 1973): 28-29. In order to stem the emigration of Jews, many of whom had a higher education, the Soviet regime instituted in August 1972 a tax on persons with a higher education who wished to emigrate. The tax was to affect all emigrants with a higher education, but since Jews were the ones mainly seeking to emigrate and many of them possessed a higher education, the tax was seen as an attempt to prevent Jewish emigration. Depending on the degree held, a certain fee would be charged as reimbursement to the state for the education it had provided to the emigrant. The tax was suspended in March 1973 in a Soviet attempt to mollify the critics of detente in the United States who were using the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration to stymie the course of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. For a background on the tax and a fee schedule, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1971-1972), p. 25603.

25. Korey, p. 198.

26. New York Times, 22 April 1979.

27. The right of emigration is supported by a study conducted by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The study was prepared by Judge Jose D. Ingles of the Philippines. Its main thesis is that next to the right to life the most important human right is the right to leave one's country. See The Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to His Country (New York: United Nations, 1963).

In preparing the study, Judge Ingles had solicited information from states regarding their laws on emigration. The Soviet document stated that in the Soviet Union "citizens may not be prevented, by membership in a particular racial, linguistic, political, religious or other group, from entering or leaving the USSR." See United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Conference Room Paper No. 85/Rev.1, February 7, 1963.

Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights supports the right of emigration in article 13/2. While the Soviet Union abstained on the vote for the Universal Declaration, it has supported other Declarations which embody or make reference to the Declaration. Examples are the 1960 United Nations Declaration on Colonialism, the 1963 United Nations Declaration on Racial Discrimination, and the 1977 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Thus, the Soviet Union has aligned itself with the predominant views regarding emigration as stated by world opinion and international law.

28. Korey, p. 297.

29. Valery Chalidze, To Defend These Rights, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 101.

30. Charley J. Levine, "The Jewish Electorate," Practical Politics 1 (May/June 1978): 6.

31. National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "What is the National Conference on Soviet Jewry?," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry). No date.

32. Ibid.

33. These were the criteria used to examine the Ukrainian-American community and thus they are being used also for the American-Jewish community. See Chapter Five.

34. Levine, p. 5.

35. Richard Barnet, Roots of War (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1973), p. 321.

36. Ibid.

37. American Jews scored ahead of all other groups in terms of education and income in national surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). See Andrew Greeley, Ethnicity, Denomination, and Inequality, Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences, Series No. 90-029, Vol. 4 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

38. Russel W. Howe and Sarah H. Trott, The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold America's Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1977), p. 193.

39. Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Connecticut) and Senator Jacob Javits (R-New York), for example, spoke out on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

40. Howe and Trott, p. 190.

41. Levine, p. 5.

42. National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Program of the Washington Office," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry). No date.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. News Bulletin, no. 135, 2 March 1979, pp. 4,6. (National Conference on Soviet Jewry).

46. "Program of the Washington Office." Refusenik is the term used to describe Jews desiring to emigrate but have been refused a visa by the Soviet government.

47. National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "The Helsinki Final Act: After Belgrade, Towards Madrid," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry, May 1978), p. 2. For a summary of the report, see National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Soviet Jewry and the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: A Summary," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry, 2 November 1977).

48. "Program of the Washington Office."

49. Ibid. For a report on a Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry activity, see News Bulletin, no. 136, 23 March 1979, p. 5. (National Conference on Soviet Jewry).

50. "Program of the Washington Office."

51. Smolar, p. 211.

52. Evan R. Chesler, ed. The Russian Jewry Reader (New York: Behrman House, Inc., 1974), p. 127.

53. New York Times, 2 May 1977. The demonstration was sponsored by the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry which is part of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

54. For an outline of the development of the Jackson Amendment, see "News From: Senator Henry M. Jackson," Statement by Senator Jackson on Amendment 2000 to H.R. 10710 (Trade Reform Act), Senate Floor, 13 December, 1974.

55. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975), p. 553.

56. Ibid., p. 558.

57. Department of State Bulletin, 3 February 1975, p. 137.

58. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1974), p. 26850.

59. Ibid.

60. The Guardian (London), 23 October 1974.

61. Keesing's, 1974, p. 26851.

62. Department of State Bulletin, 30 December 1974, p. 937.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Keesing's, 1975, p. 26995.

66. For a synopsis of the Jackson Amendment and the statements of President Ford on signing the trade bill and Secretary of State Kissinger's explanation of the Soviet abrogation, see American Foreign Relations 1975: A Documentary, eds. Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam (New York: New York University Press, 1977), pp. 23-29.

67. Department of State Bulletin, 3 February 1975, p. 139.

68. See Chapter Two.

69. For a review of these means and earlier United States economic actions against the Soviet Union, see Joseph S. Berliner and Franklyn D. Holzman, "The Soviet Economy: Domestic and International Issues," in The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente, ed. William E. Griffith (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 98-104.

70. For example, see Senator Everett M. Dirksen, "Needed: A Realistic East-West Trade Policy," The Readers Digest (June 1969):129-133.

71. American labor has always been skeptical of communist regimes. See Richard Barnet, The Giants (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), pp. 57-58; Berliner and Holzman, p. 137. For an account of labor's view, as represented by the AFL-CIO, see this chapter.

72. Lev E. Dobriansky, "The Non-Russian Nations Concept in U.S. Foreign Policy," The Ukrainian Quarterly 32 (Winter 1976):380.

73. For a discussion of the rise of the human rights issue in United States foreign policy in the 1970's, see Chapter Two.

74. Dobriansky, p. 380.

75. John G. Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), p. 98. Throughout the course of American history individual legislators have become the spokesmen for a significant body of opinion in Congress on foreign policy matters. See, Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 119-121. On the basis of Senator Jackson's activities -- his criticism regarding the benefits the Soviet Union was receiving from detente, his sponsorship of the Jackson Amendment, and his exchange of letters with Secretary of State Kissinger regarding Jewish emigration -- one can assume that he was the leading spokesman of the congressional attempt to tie emigration with trade benefits for the Soviet Union.

76. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976), p. 244.

77. John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made (New York: Praeger Publications, 1974), p. 84.

78. Congress and the Nation 1973-1976 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977), p. 882.

79. Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds. SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 32.

80. The Nation, 1 February 1975, p. 101.

81. National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Soviet Union Trade Agreement: Most Favored Nations Treatment (MFN)," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry, 25 September 1972).

82. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. The Trade Reform Act of 1974 Part 5, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, p. 2238.

83. Memo from Jerry Goldman, Chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, to Marina Wallach, regarding Jackson-Vanik policy, dated 1 December 1976.

84. William Korey, "The Story of the Jackson Amendment, 1973-1975," Midstream 21 (March 1975):24.

85. Ibid.

86. This is recounted in Joseph Albright, "The Pact of the Two Henry's," New York Times Magazine, 5 January 1975. Not only was the established American-Jewish community split, as witnessed by the activity of Senator Javits, but there was also a split between the Jewish Defense League and the established American-Jewish community regarding tactics. See this chapter.

In addition, there was a split regarding who would lead the movement, the JDL or the established Jewish community. Rabbi Kahane had originally used his organization as a self-protection group to help Jews organize in New York City to protect their neighborhoods. In the early 1970's two things occurred that made Kahane's movement act forcefully for the cause of Soviet Jewry. In this period the Vietnam War

was coming to an end. Many of the young college students began to move in the direction of supporting other causes since the peace movement was slowly dying out. Many moved in the direction of leftist politics. Jewish college students, for the most part did not take up this cause. At this same time Kahane's movement was being criticized as being a vigilante group and, as a result, it was losing much of its respect and support. Kahane, therefore, moved in the direction of supporting the cause of Soviet Jewry in order to gain greater respectability in the Jewish community as well as to aid a good cause. In doing so he also had a ready reservoir of liberal Jewish college students looking for a cause to defend. While the cause of Soviet Jewry had been championed prior to Kahane, it had been a quiet movement. It was not until May of 1972 that the established Jewish community made a conscious effort to go all out in support of Soviet Jewry. This may have been done to undercut Kahane's appeal. The above account of the course of events was provided by interviews with former Jewish Defense League activists in November 1978 and March 1979 in New York City.

87. The issue of human rights, therefore, was able to gain support of both the right and the left. See Paul Y. Hammond, Cold War and Detente (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1975), p. 305.

88. Labor Looks at the 93rd Congress: An AFL-CIO Legislative Report Publication No. 77P, February 1975, p. 138.

89. Ibid.

90. The Nation, 1 February 1975, p. 100. In 1972 the Soviet Union bought over 500 million bushels of U.S. grain at below market prices. This "great grain robbery" led to higher food prices. See Barnet, Giants, pp. 161-164.

91. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975), p. 562.

92. Labor Looks, p. 138.

93. Editorial in Kommunist Ukrainy (Kiev) no. 7, July 1973.

94. John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations 5th ed. (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 66.

95. Ibid.

96. "Jackson Urges Positive Stand For Free Movement of People and Ideas," News Release from Senator Henry M. Jackson, August 1973, Washington, D.C.

97. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Committee on Armed Services. Detente: An Evaluation, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 24 June 1974.

98. Leopold Labedz, "Culture and the Detente: Shadows over Helsinki," Encounter, June 1973. Also, see his testimony in US Congress, Senate,

Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Investigation. Negotiation and Statecraft 93rd Congress, 1st session, 12 July 1973.

99. Editorial, The Ukrainian Quarterly 28 (Winter 1972):346.

100. The coalition of forces seemed at times to be working at cross purposes. By seeking to limit economic incentives for the Soviet Union American labor may have actually undermined the goal of the Jackson Amendment, which sought to use economic incentives as a lure for eased Soviet emigration. The cross purposes of much of the activity of the forces involved in the issue was underlined by President Nixon when he wrote: "A fusion of forces from opposite ends of the political spectrum had resulted in a curious coalition...the liberals wanted MFN legislation to be conditioned on eased emigration policies; the conservatives wanted MFN defeated on the principle that detente was bad by definition." See Richard M. Nixon, Memoirs (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 875-876. The forces, however, were powerful enough to make the issue of Jewish emigration a major question in the detente process.

101. Izvestia, 18 January 1975; Berliner and Holzman, pp. 137-138.

102. New York Times, 17 January 1975. In announcing the Soviet abrogation, Secretary Kissinger stated that the Soviet Union informed the United States that it would not accept a trade agreement that was discriminatory and had political conditions attached. See footnote #67.

Also, the Soviet Union had already received close to half a billion dollars in credits since 1972 and, therefore, the ceiling imposed by Congress was a retrogressive act. And, according to Genrikh A. Trofimenko, head of the foreign policy department of the Soviet Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies "because of non-coordination between Administration and Congress the pledge to grant most-favored-nation treatment was not fulfilled. As a result, the Soviet Union suffered, because it had given more and received less than was implied in the course of the negotiations." Mr. Trofimenko wrote this in the New York Times, 13 July 1979.

103. Korey, p. 13. For an explanation of the education tax see footnote 24.

104. It is important to note that at no time prior to December 18, the time the letter was released, did the Soviet regime indicate its displeasure with the emigration conditions outlined in Kissinger's letter of October 18 to Senator Jackson. By mid-December, however, it was becoming clear that Congress would limit credit to the Soviet Union. The release of the letter at this time can be seen as an attempt to block this development rather than as a reaction to the emigration stipulation. See Korey.

105. Michael Kaser, "Soviet Trade Turns to Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 19 (Summer 1975): 125. The Coordinating Committee (COCOM) is composed of all the NATO members except Ireland and includes Japan. Its purpose is to make sure that products which the United States has

embargoed do not reach the Soviet Union via other states.

106. Christian Science Monitor, 2 October 1978.

107. Seyom Brown, "A Cooling-off Period for US-Soviet Relations," Foreign Policy, no. 28 (Fall 1977): 17.

108. New York Times, 22 January 1975.

109. New York Times, 16 January 1975.

110. In commenting on its rejection of the trade bill the Soviet government stated that detente could not proceed on the basis of "political extortion." See Izvestia, 18 January 1975. See also Berliner and Holzman for an economic reason for objecting to the Stevenson Amendment, pp. 137-138. The basis for this was the $300 million credit limit imposed by the amendment.

The Stevenson Amendment had been favored by many in the United States who thought that the Soviet Union would be gaining too much economically from the trade bill. The AFL-CIO, for example, was a leading critic of extending concessions to the Soviet Union. See above, Chapter Six.

111. For the importance of prestige in state relations, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).

112. US News and World Report, 27 January 1975, pp. 24, 25. Also, see Barnet, The Giants, p. 51.

113. Department of State Bulletin, 30 December 1974, p. 938.

114. Ibid.

115. Letter from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Stanley Lowell, Chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, dated 14 April 1975.

116. Trade Reform Act, Hearings, p. 2255.

117. Ibid., p. 2257.

118. Ibid., p. 2255.

119. New York Times, 13 February 1979.

120. See National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Soviet Jews: Emigration Statistics," (New York: National Conference on Soviet Jewry). No date.

121. Washington Post, 31 December 1978.

122. Donald Fraser, "Freedom and Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, no. 26 (Spring 1977):150.

123. New York Times, 16 November 1978.

124. The Nation, p. 101.

125. Question and answer session at the Executives' Club of Chicago, March 15, 1974. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 272. For a similar statement by Secretary of State Kissinger, see Department of State Bulletin, 30 December 1974, p. 936. For further support of this view see the testimony of Secretary of State William Rogers and Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, in Department of State Bulletin, 11 June 1973, pp. 837-838; 861-862.

The importance of quiet diplomacy and economic incentives is evidenced by the fact that in 1973, while receiving $469 million in government credits from the United States, the Kremlin allowed 35,000 Jews to emigrate. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Fall 1978); 72-73.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

General Conclusions

The major concern of this study has been to explain and analyze the development of the human rights issue in United States foreign policy and the impact of the issue on United States-Soviet relations as regards two specific types of dissent, namely Jewish emigration dissent and Ukrainian nationalism. In doing so, this study based itself on four hypotheses.[1] These hypotheses are: first, that the process of United States-Soviet detente became a political issue in the United States and that detente critics in the United States used the human rights issue as a pressure point against the Soviet Union; second, that the rise of moralism in United States foreign policy in the 1970's contributed to strengthening the detente critics' use of the human rights issue; third, that the goals of the dissidents might play a role in determining United States policy; and, fourth, that the American-Jewish and Ukrainian-American communities might be influential factors in determining United States policy on behalf of thier respective Soviet kinsmen. These will now be examined.

With respect to the role of the American-Jewish and Ukrainian-American communities it has been shown that they played a minimal role in implementing United States policy with respect to their dissident kinsmen in the Soviet Union. The success of the American-Jewish community was the result of the fact that it worked in tandem with other opposition forces, namely the foes of detente and powerful economic

interests that opposed greater trade with the Soviet Union. The Jackson Amendment was not due to powerful lobbying by the American-Jewish community but to the actions of a broad group of domestic critics.

The American Jewish community was congruent in its goal with the attitudes of a majority of the American people at the time. Horowitz underscores the need for congruence of goals in order for ethnic groups to be successful. "Even when there is relative solidarity in the goal orientation of such ethnic groups, only a concomitant drive by the national polity can effectuate changes in a desired way."[2] The American-Jewish community had this congruence; the Ukrainian-American community did not possess this congruence.

This brings us to the next hypothesis, that the goals of the dissidents may have an effect on whether the United States would support them. It has been shown that Jewish emigration dissent was not viewed by the American public as a direct threat to the Soviet Union and that there was a historical tradition of protesting Russian persecution of Jews. These two points made it easier for the critics of detente to utilize the Jewish emigration issue against the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian dissent, being nationalist in nature, was not able to spur much support on the part of the United States. It has been shown that the United States is hesitant to support self-determination of ethnic groups which can lead to the dissolution of a state since the results may lead to greater political and military problems. Therefore, the type of goals dissidents advocated played a role in conditioning the United States response.

While the role of the American-Jewish and Ukrainian-American communities was minimal and the goals of the dissidents conditioned the

type of American response, it was the politicization of the Soviet human rights issue in the United States that was the key to galvanizing American action against the Soviet Union, with Jewish emigrants becoming the main beneficiaries of support. The rise of moralism in American foreign policy and the rise of the politics of detente overlapped and spurred the main interest in Soviet human rights. United States human rights policy was, therefore, a reflection of political pressures, rather than a response to dissident or American ethnic appeals or moral considerations. In addition to the case studies presented in this dissertation, a number of other examples will attest to the primary importance of political pressures and namely, the politics of detente, in the human rights issue.

The State Department, for example, protested the arrest of Alexander Ginsburg because failure to do so may have led "the [Carter] Administration to lose support on Capitol Hill and increase anti-Soviet feelings there."[3] One of the key people that had to be pleased was Senator Jackson. The protest obviously accomplished the goal of placating him. Jackson, "who reflects the conservative, skeptical attitude toward Soviet intentions, took to the Senate floor...to praise the State Department for its statement in support of Mr. Ginzburg."[4]

A second example was Carter's expulsion of Soviet newsmen in February 1977. While the action was undertaken ostensibly for human rights considerations, the real motive may have been domestic politics and detente. Carter feared that critics of the Soviet Union would regard him as being soft toward the Soviet Union. Since at this time the Administration "needed Congressional support for an energetic program of arms control efforts with the Soviet Union, it could not afford to appear to be 'pushed around' by Moscow."[5] Furthermore, it was feared

that without taking some action it would have been difficult to get Senate confirmation of Paul C. Warnke as chief arms control negotiator. He is a leading arms control advocate and his confirmation would have been in jeopardy if the United States appeared to be too soft with the Soviet government.[6]

In another case, in the summer of 1978, Carter canceled the sale of an advanced computer to TASS. This was interpreted as a move to show United States displeasure with the Soviet government's trial of dissidents. However, while the action may have registered a human rights concern, the administration was more concerned with the military value of the computers.[7] President Carter had mentioned himself that technological and economic ties would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union continued its interference in Africa. Thus, the United States was more concerned with strategic goals rather than with human rights. Indeed, at the same time that the computer was banned, a $144 million sale of oil-drilling technology was permitted to be sold to the Soviet Union. The latter technology had a lesser military value and thus was permitted to be sold. If the concern had been solely humanitarian, the oil technology would probably also have been utilized as a lever.

In summary, it was the politicization of detente in the United States that gave rise to the human rights issue in United States-Soviet relations. The rise of the issue, however, was aided by the development of a climate of moralism in American foreign policy in the 1970's. The goals of dissidents, in turn, conditioned the type and extent of support the United States was willing to give dissidents as witnessed by the divergent policies on Jewish emigration and Ukrainian nationalism. The American-Jewish and Ukrainian-American communities played a minimal role in the overall process.

The Impact of the Human Rights Issue on United States-Soviet Relations

As a result of the Jewish emigration issue, United States-Soviet economic relations were hurt. The Soviet cancellation of the trade bill led to the Kremlin's reorientation of its economic activity. The Kremlin "has been diverting its purchases of technology as much as possible to non-American sources."[8] There are certain economic benefits to be realized if the United States lifted all the restrictions. It has been estimated that if the United States canceled the Jackson Amendment exports to the Soviet Union would grow by 20 to 25 percent. If the ban remains, the increase would be only half that percentage.[9]

Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that discrimination by the United States in trade and credits, an indirect reference to the Jackson Amendment, had hurt United States economic interests and overall United States-Soviet economic relations. He has said:

> The volume of our economic contacts with the USA is virtually decreasing under present conditions. In many dealings we now naturally prefer partners who trade with us on a normal, equal basis. Discrimination also impedes the sale of our goods in the USA, increases the imbalance of trade, and diminishes our interest in the American market.
>
> According to some estimates, the upshot in the last two years [1975-1976] was that American companies lost orders from this country worth a total of $1.5 billion or $2 billion. You are the best judges of whether this is much or little, but I think such amounts are not to be found in the street.[10]

The two states, however, have not allowed the issue to affect their greater political interests. Before the Scharansky trial in July 1978, many felt that the trial would cause political friction between the United States and Soviet Union. However, even while the trial proceeded, Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Geneva to discuss the nuclear arms pact. And even after the cancellation

of the trade bill, while the Soviet Union states that relations with the United States had been hurt, there was no reconsideration of the basic pattern of Soviet-United States relations.[11]

Overall, except for the Jackson Amendment, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has been willing to make the human rights issue a bone of contention in their bilateral relations. Each has, basically, adhered to a verbal policy, with the United States accusing the Soviet Union of violating human rights, while the Soviet regime has, on its part, denied the accusations and has accused the United States of violations. At times when each has resorted to some form of action, such as expulsion of each other's nationals, the action has not stymied the progress of relations between the two states. Furthermore, it seems that much of the activity undertaken in the United States had domestic political motives, rather than concern for Soviet dissidents. The Jackson Amendment was a convenient tool by which the critics of detente and the trade bill could pressure the Soviet regime and slow down the process of detente. While the human rights policy has not stymied United States-Soviet political relations, the policy has cast some shadows of doubt regarding the conduct of American foreign policy. The problems the issue raises for American foreign policy will now be examined.

United States Foreign Policy and Human Rights

Foreign policy consists of a constant interplay of various national security and other goals. At any particular time, one goal may overshadow others. Thus, while human rights may continue as part of American foreign policy, the public rhetoric and emphasis of that policy may diminish in the future as other goals and needs come to the fore. There are a number

of factors on the rise now that may lead to a diminution of the human rights issue in American foreign policy. To say that the American concern with human rights will diminish does not mean that the issue will not arise again, but that at present there are a set of factors at work that may be leading to a lower priority for this particular issue. These factors will now be examined.

By pursuing a human rights policy the United States has possibly undermined the credibility of its foreign policy in general. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed this problem most cogently:

> On human rights, I agree with the objective. But the problem in foreign policy is not simply to state an objective but to be able to carry it out over an extended period of time in such a manner that it enhances the impression of other countries that one knows how to achieve one's objective. Otherwise, even the noblest goal can wind up creating an impression of impotence.[12]

The Jackson Amendment was not able to achieve an emigration of Soviet Jews and thus showed the impotence of United States policy. Also, Seyom Brown has stated that by insisting on the Jackson Amendment, Congress "undermined future American credibility at the negotiating table."[13]

Furthermore, it is questionable whether the United States can have a credible human rights policy, in particular, because the issue is one which will be with us indefinitely. That is, it is an insoluble issue, for political criticism and opposition are intrinsic elements of any political system. Thus, it becomes highly unlikely that the United States will continue to tie its foreign policy to the support of individuals who are arrested, exiled or put on trial for criticizing their governments. As a United States official has already stated, the United

States "simply can't be expected to issue a statement every time some poor guy is arrested somewhere in the world."[14] This ongoing process of human rights problems may discourage the United States from making the issue a major concern of its foreign policy in the future.

The United States has also possibly undermined the credibility of its human rights policy by the lack of consistency in policy. The lack of consistency has been noticed in Carter's human rights policy. A White House official stated: "People want to know why we are pressuring one country about its human rights violations and not another."[15] The explanation is that strategic interests are paramount. "When human rights concerns collide with other American interests abroad, they very often take a back seat. Strategic, economic and political considerations, especially where United States military interests are involved, almost inevitably drown out the expressions of concern over human rights abuses."[16] Cases in point are South Korea and the Philippines. With respect to these two states "restraint is a result of a vigorous argument put forward by the Department of Defense, which contends that crucial American security interests are involved."[17] The United States, however, has not been restrained from punishing states in which it has no strategic interests.

Human rights is a moral issue and thus derives its strength from moral authority. In order to maintain one's credibility on the issue, one must pursue it regardless of other issues. The United States, by favoring some states over others regarding the issue, may undermine its credibility on human rights. The dual type of policy of punishing some states and ignoring the violations of human rights in others only shows the political use of the human rights issue and may backfire on the United States.

Another problem is that by espousing human rights, the United States has opened itself to scrutiny also. The United States, for example, has become the object of protests as a result of the Wilmington Ten case. The arrest was widely interpreted as an abridgement of the rights of civil rights workers. The Soviet government has participated in the protest action. Brezhnev has cited the case "as proof that justice in the United States is a sham and that American pronouncements on human rights are sheer hypocrisy."[18]

In April 1977, Amnesty International adopted the Wilmington Ten and claimed them to be political prisoners and not criminals. "The charge that there were political prisoners in the United States outraged some and embarrassed others."[19] The fear of external investigation, therefore, is just as real in the United States as it is in the Soviet Union and may be a reason for the United States to curtail its highly verbal human rights activity.[20]

United States' pursuit of the issue against the Soviet Union has not received praise from all quarters. Many of America's Western allies, such as West Germany and Canada, are upset. They feel that the use of the issue against the Soviet Union hampers the growth of more normal relations between Europe and the Soviet Union. Max Kampelman, co-chairman of the United States' delegation to the forthcoming Madrid follow-up conference on the Helsinki Agreement, has stated, for example, that America's Western European allies are not eager to take a strong stand on human rights at Madrid for fear that the issue may needlessly irritate the Soviet Union and further jeopardize detente.[21]

Furthermore, individual Western states approach the issue in a manner less vocal and overt than that of the United States. West Germany has a

concrete interest -- the release of Germans from East Germany and the Soviet Union to rejoin families and friends in West Germany. West Germany prefers quiet diplomacy because it has worked in the past. The United States' public diplomacy has irked the Soviet Union, and West Germany fears that Soviet displeasure may affect the German exchange program. And Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada has told President Carter that he prefers to keep the fight for human rights off the front pages. The United States' human rights policy, therefore, creates problems in its own camp, and this may be cause for changing policy in the future.[22]

Finally, the impact of moralism in American foreign policy seems to be on a decline. Just as moralism came to the fore in the 1970's because of various events, so now, at the dawn of the 1980's, events seem to be propelling the United States into a more forceful foreign policy. The taking of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seem to have awakened the American people to the need for greater action in the international arena. Thus, there are moves to "unleash" the CIA from the legislative constraints that were put on it in the 1970's and of increasing the visibility of American military power in the international arena. It seems that the cycle of American foreign policy seems to be turning and moving into a direction of using power rather than morality.[23]

In conclusion, a number of factors, as outlined above, seem to be at work that may lead to a diminution of the human rights issue in American foreign policy. However, just as American morality in foreign policy has come to the fore at different stages in the past, so also its ascendancy in the future cannot be precluded.

International Support and Soviet Dissent

International publicity may bring some minor benefits to the Soviet dissidents. Among these benefits are a boost in morale, help for airing their views overseas, financial assistance as in the case of the Solzhenitsyn fund, and, via foreign broadcasts, assistance in spreading their message internally. However, it seems that international publicity has not been able to help the dissidents gain their fundamental goals, be it national or religious freedom or any other goal.

The reason for this is that the issue of human rights is intricately tied to the domestic law of a state and hence its sovereignty. By seeking aid from external actors, such as states or the United Nations, a Soviet dissident, in fact, is calling for that external actor to overrule Soviet domestic law on his behalf. This raises the delicate issue of state sovereignty since a "nation loses its sovereignty when it is placed under the authority of another nation, so that it is the latter that exercises supreme authority to give and enforce the laws within the former's territory."[24] Therefore if the Soviet Union were to open itself to the demands of external actors it would be sacrificing its sovereignty and hence control of the Soviet people. No nation is willing to put itself in such a position. The issue of sovereignty, therefore, is a main block to an effective role for international support on behalf of dissidents.

It is true that the Kremlin has exiled dissidents such as Solzhenitsyn. However, it is debatable how influential international publicity was in these cases.

The Kremlin has had domestic reasons for exiling a dissident. An exiled dissident finds that he no longer is the center of attraction. He is now one of many free men in the world. The novelty of his predicament is lost and so also his ability to draw attention. The dissident

movement also loses a commanding voice. Many of the forced exiles are strong personalities willing to stand up against the Soviet authorities. Once they are lost the whole dissident movement suffers. Thus, the Kremlin has had a strong domestic reason for exiling dissidents and, therefore, one cannot say that international pressure was the prime motivating force. For example, the Soviet regime has strong domestic reasons for allowing Jewish emigration. Emigration suited the Kremlin's domestic policy. Hans Morgenthau has stated:

> Determining the Soviet emigration policy are of course considerations of domestic policy, the most important of which is that the Soviet Union does not mind getting rid of certain categories of troublemakers and unreliable elements and supposedly unreliable elements regardless of what the United States does or does not do.[25]

Motivated by the Arab-Israeli War and increased anti-Semitism, Soviet Jewry responded in an unpredictable manner. "Jews did something no other group of unhappy Soviet citizens had ever done: they fought the authorities until they won."[26]

Jewish activity was a shock to the authorities. The Jews made themselves a visible nuisance via demonstrations, hunger strikes, interviews with foreigners and sit-ins. The authorities had no experience in dealing with such activity. It, therefore, was easier to get rid of such malcontents rather than to try to contain them.

Another problem was the fear that Jewish activity would act as an example for other dissidents, thus compounding the regime's domestic problems. The fear was intensified by the fact that foreign radio rebroadcast Jewish protests and activities back into the Soviet Union, thus possibly widening the net of dissent.[27]

Also, the regime felt it would not be setting a grave precedent in

allowing Jewish emigration, since Jews are regarded as "foreigners" in the Soviet Union.[28] Furthermore, the use of emigration obviates the need to utilize Stalinist tactics which may compound the situation and lead to a societal backlash.

The Soviet regime has at times also had other reasons for allowing greater Jewish emigration. An eased emigration policy may help the Soviet regime pursue other goals. This was witnessed most recently when the United States was moving into a closer relationship with China. In the four years since the Jackson Amendment, Jewish emigration had only averaged 16,000 annually. In 1978, however, the Soviet authorities eased emigration policy to allow over 30,000 Jews to emigrate.[29] Three things seem to have prompted this Soviet move. The first was the possible ratification by the United States Senate in 1979 of the new SALT agreement and the second was the Soviet hope that the Jackson Amendment would be repealed.

However, a third point was the new relationship between the United States and China. An examination of Jewish emigration shows that prior to July of 1978 emigration averaged 1,900 per month. Starting in July, however, at the time when China began to move more openly into the international arena, emigration began to average 3,200 per month. It was believed "that the Soviet Union was trying to readjust their national image in the face of possibly uncritical Western acceptance of a seemingly liberalized China whose own restrictive emigration policies are little known or understood in the West."[30]

As the case of Jewish emigration shows, the Soviet regime may have both domestic and international reasons for being lenient towards dissidents. But such leniency is a result more of national Soviet concerns

rather than a response to international pressure.[31]

Actually, there is an indication that international publicity may have prompted the Soviet government into a tougher crackdown on the dissidents. With its domestic situation being more and more examined by the international community, the Soviet government has found it necessary to bear down on the dissidents in order to present a show of strength. Failure to act against the dissidents may have presented the Soviet government as being weak and irresolute. Thus, in a period of detente when many felt that the Soviet government would be more amenable to human rights criticism, the Soviet government has actually hardened its position. This type of dichotomy whereby the regime seeks to increase contacts with the West, yet at the same time limit its peoples' contact with Western influences has been a traditional pattern of behavior for Russian regimes, both Soviet and Czarist. It may be no coincidence, therefore, that the Soviet government began its attack on the Chronicle of Current Events in 1971, a time at which both international publicity was in the process of being given to the dissidents and detente with the United States was on its way. Professor Avtorkhanov has written that "the broader the detente, the greater the danger of ideological diversion posed by the West against the Soviet Union. Hence follow the inescapable conclusions: the need to increase the power and scope of the KGB, to expand its secret net, to isolate the Soviet citizen from foreigners, and to shut off the flow of information into and out of the USSR."[32] Roy Medvedev summed up the situation best when he said that international publicity "can only provoke those or other undesirable actions and in that way only impede the process of democratization of Soviet society."[33]

International publicity also provides the authorities with an ample

excuse for prosecuting dissidents. Dissidents are portrayed in many cases as being in the employ of foreign, anti-Soviet groups. Such charges can also separate the dissidents from the masses and thus prevent the development of a grass roots movement. Thus, in 1972, Pyotr Yakir was presented as being in the employ of reactionary anti-Soviet groups, and in 1977 Anatoly Scharansky was portrayed as being in the employ of the CIA.

The Future of Dissent

What is the future of dissent in the Soviet Union? Many Western observers feel that the regime's ability to stem dissent is limited. Frederick Barghoorn has stated that "the authorities have it in their power to destroy the movement in the short run...but they don't have the power to destroy dissent over the long run unless they return to all-out terror."[34] John Dornberg has stated that for every dissident who is prosecuted there arises a score of new dissidents or people who distrust the government because each dissident has a family and friends who can take up his cause.[35] Therefore, the dissident movement has a multiplier effect each time a dissident is arrested. Solzhenitsyn's wife, Natalya, alluded to this spontaneous growth: "The fifteen year history of the dissident movement has taught us that, miraculously, new people always appear...The movement appeared to have been shattered several times, but it has proved indestructible. I don't know where they will come from, but they will come."[36]

For the foreseeable future, dissent will continue. In addition to Dornberg's view there are a number of other reasons why dissent will continue to exist. First, dissidents are able to survive much of the economic

blacklisting the authorities use against them. They can take menial jobs or engage in tutoring, and, due to the low cost of living they are able to survive and continue their activities. Second, a potential reservoir of dissatisfied groups exists in Soviet society, such as the collective farmers who continuously receive the short end of the economic stick. Third, it seems that many groups in Soviet society are already protesting one thing or another. The list of types of dissidents is long, and if they should join forces they would present the Soviet regime with a major problem. Based on such factors, some would argue that a new Russian revolution is pending. Bernard Levin has stated that "a new Russian Revolution is inevitable, and that it may come much sooner than anyone would dare to hope."[37] Whether a revolution will develop is debatable. But continuation of dissent is a certainty.

The regime is faced with three options: the elimination of dissent, the continuation of the present policy of containment, or a do nothing policy which would allow the growth of dissent among the public. It is obvious that the Kremlin will not allow the latter alternative. The elimination of dissent is also an unrealistic alternative. The imposition of terror would create more havoc for the functioning of the technical society the Soviet Union is today than it would do good. Terror may prompt many of the covert dissidents openly to challenge the system. Many of these are highly educated personnel needed for the functioning of Soviet society.

The most realistic alternative for the regime is to continue the present policy of "containment"; that is, ostracize the dissidents from the rest of society via the various techniques already discussed with the hope that the movement will eventually peter out. The regime has

proven quite adept at doing this so far. On the basis of this it is difficult to foresee a new Russian revolution in the near future. Speaking on whether anything can be done regarding changing the system Sakharov himself seemed somewhat skeptical when he said: "It seems to me that almost nothing can be done, because the system has a very strong internal stability. The less free a system is, the greater, ordinarily, its ability to maintain itself."[38]

On the international level the Soviet Union does not seem to have much to be concerned about. As already stated, the present United States concern with human rights will diminish in importance. The issue itself can create more problems for its promoters than it can solve. As a result, the future may witness a diminution of the issue and its decline in the scope of state politics.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a presentation of the hypotheses, see Chapter One.

2. Irving Horowitz, "Ethnic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Abdul Aziz Said (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 178.

3. New York Times, 12 February 1977.

4. Ibid.

5. New York Times, 6 February 1977.

6. Ibid. Warnke was eventually confirmed by the Senate. Presently, he is no longer in this position.

7. The Economist, 26 August 1978.

8. Seyom Brown, "A Cooling-Off Period for U.S.-Soviet Relations," Foreign Policy no. 28 (Fall 1977): 17.

9. New York Times, 7 December 1978. Furthermore, not only did the Soviet Union cancel the trade bill but it also refused to carry out future payments for the Lend Lease aid it received from the United States.

10. Speech by Leonid Brezhnev at Kremlin dinner during the fourth Moscow session of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, November 30, 1976. See Leonid Brezhnev, Peace, Detente, and Soviet-American Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 141.

11. The desire of the Soviet Union to continue cooperative relations with the U.S. was indicated by Brezhnev in his message to President Ford on the occasion of the joint flight and docking of the American spaceship Apollo, with the Soviet spaceship Soyuz. In his message Brezhnev said "the Soyuz-Apollo flight is of historic significance as a symbol of the current process of relaxation of international tension and improvement of Soviet-American relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. At the same time, it is a practical contribution to the further development of mutually advantageous co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the interests of the peoples of both countries, for the benefit of world peace." See Brezhnev, Peace, Detente, and Soviet American Relations, p. 93. The spaceflight took place in July, 1975.

12. Interview with Henry Kissinger. Encounter no. 25 (November 1978): 10.

13. Brown, p. 17. The problem with the Amendment was that it undermined the promises given by the American government to the Soviet Union in 1972 regarding the desire for increased trade. As a result, the Amendment questions the credibility of an American commitment.

14. New York Times, 12 February 1977. The official was not identified.

15. New York Times, 12 December 1978. The official was not identified.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Wayne King, "The Case Against the Wilmington Ten," New York Times Magazine, 3 December 1978, p. 10.

19. Ibid.

20. For example, the United States has failed to ratify the International Genocide Convention. "Senate opposition has been led by Southern conservatives who feared that ratification might lead to intrusions upon national integrity through inspection teams made up of foreign nationals. They also argued that such a convention might supersede the United States Constitution." See New York Times, 7 December 1978.

21. This was stated by Mr. Kampelman in a public hearing regarding United States policy on human rights at the 1980 Madrid Conference, which is a follow-up conference on the Helsinki Accords. The public hearing was held in New York City in May, 1980.

22. For examinations of the friction that the American human rights policy has created between the United States and its Western allies, see New York Times, 17 July, 1977, Sections 1 and 4; Ukrainian Weekly, 3 April 1977.

23. New York Times, 14 December 1979.

24. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 313.

25. U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Finance. The Trade Reform Act of 1973, Part 5. 93rd Congress, 2nd session, p. 2258.

26. Robert G. Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (New York: Pocket Books, 1976), p. 450.

27. For example, the Voice of America broadcast the activities of 39 Soviet Jewish dissidents back into the Soviet Union. See Evan R. Chesler, ed., The Russian Jewry Reader (New York: Behrman House, Inc., 1974), p. 121.

28. The existence of an external state, Israel, and the traditional anti-Semitism combine to make many in the Soviet Union regard Jews as not being part and parcel of the Soviet society.

29. Washington Post, 31 December 1978; New York Times, 4 April 1979.

30. Washington Post, 31 December 1978.

31. This Soviet national concern was witnessed once again in April of 1979 when the Soviet Union arranged for an exchange of five dissidents for two Soviet spies held by the United States. While the action did result in the exiling of five dissidents, it is doubtful that international pressure was a precipitant of the action. The Soviet regime had a real national interest objective in the deal, namely, regaining two spies who may have obtained data in the United States relevant to Soviet interests. For the United States, the deal may have been an attempt to reinforce President Carter's public commitment to human rights. See footnote 44, Chapter Four.

32. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, "The Soviet Triangular Dictatorship: Party, Police and Army," The Ukrainian Quarterly 34 (Summer 1978): 138.

33. Arthur Brumberg, "Dissent in Russia," Foreign Affairs 52 (July 1974): 793. For a criticism of detente as helping the Soviet regime to quash dissent, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control. Detente: An Evaluation, 24 June 1974.

34. Newsweek, 24 July 1978, p. 28.

35. John Dornberg, The New Tsars (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 66-67.

36. Newsweek, 24 July 1978, p. 28. For example, when Alexander Ginsburg was jailed, six new members joined the Moscow Helsinki Group, including Sergei Polikanov, a nuclear physicist and member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. See The Economist, 22 July 1978, pp. 40, 43.

37. Ukrainian Weekly, 30 October 1977.

38. Kaiser, p. 463.

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