

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

76-1484

LEAVENWORTH, May Belle, 1937-
DEWEY'S THEORY OF THE SELF AND ITS ROLE IN
HIS THEORY OF ETHICS.

The City University of New York, Ph.D., 1975
Philosophy

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

DEWEY'S THEORY OF THE SELF
AND ITS ROLE IN HIS THEORY OF ETHICS

by

MAY LEAVENWORTH

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University of New York

1975

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

July 15, 1975
date

Gerald Meyer
Chairman of Examining Committee

July 21, 1975
date

Marshall Cohen
Executive Officer

Abraham Edel

H. S. Thayer

Andrew McLaughlin
Supervisory Committee

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my appreciation to the Center for Dewey Studies, Carbondale, Illinois for a grant awarded by them to cover expenses associated with the production of this dissertation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
1.	INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF DEWEY'S NATURALISM.....	1
2.	THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEWEY'S THEORY OF THE SELF IN HIS NATURALISTIC METAPHYSICS.....	41
3.	THE SELF: AN INTEGRATION TO BE ACHIEVED..	65
4.	THE SELF: GROWTH AND CHANGE.....	107
5.	THE SELF AND DEWEY'S NATURALISTIC THEORY OF ETHICS.....	129
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	169

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

THE NATURE OF DEWEY'S NATURALISM

In this dissertation I shall be seeking a fresh understanding of Dewey's naturalistic ethics, utilizing a novel orientation. This new viewpoint will be to focus on Dewey's theory of the self as the framework for this theory of ethical inquiry. In other words, I am narrowing the scope of this dissertation to focus on the point of contact between Dewey's ethical naturalism and his theory of the self.

Please note that when I use the term "theory" in the phrase "theory of the self," I am not using it in the sense in which scientific theories are contrasted with laws, the former being used to explain the latter. I have nothing so rigorous in mind. By a philosophical theory of the self, I mean simply an explication of the nature of the self.

Not much work has been done on Dewey's theory of the self. Consequently, a large portion of this dissertation will be occupied with exegesis, not of the sort that merely reviews what is commonly known, but a fresh investigation into what the self is, for Dewey, and its role in his ethics. Since Dewey never gave a thoroughly worked out presentation

of his theory of the self, my task will be to construct a consistent theory using, as raw materials, the major writings in Dewey's corpus in which elements of that theory appear. In this interpretation, I shall show the foundations of Dewey's theory of the self in his naturalistic metaphysics.

Not only does Dewey's theory of the self need clarification, but so does his ethical naturalism. "Naturalism" is a term that has been applied to many diverse ethical positions, and the opponents of these naturalistic ethics have espoused equally diverse forms of antinaturalism. Therefore as a way of clarifying the term "ethical naturalism," I shall introduce some central antinaturalist conceptions of naturalism, and the strongest arguments they have given against naturalism. This discussion of the opponents of naturalism in ethics will provide the background against which I shall then show the nature of Dewey's naturalism. I shall show, in what sense Dewey may be considered an ethical naturalist, from the point of view of these anti-naturalists. There have even been some claims that Dewey is not an ethical naturalist.¹ This is the reason that it is necessary to show in what sense Dewey may properly be classified as an ethical naturalist.

¹For example, Richard Werner, "John Dewey's Ethics: Pragmatism and Justification in Ethics" (winner of the 1974 John Dewey Essay Contest).

In this introductory chapter I shall also give what I believe will be fresh responses, from Dewey's point of view, to the arguments that have traditionally been brought against ethical naturalism. Here again, my primary goal will be to give a fresh exposition of the nature of Dewey's naturalistic ethics, by contrasting it with naturalism as construed by these antinaturalists.

Some Antinaturalist Conceptions of Naturalism and their Opposing Ethical Theories

The focal point of twentieth century Anglo-American antinaturalism has been G. E. Moore's argument that naturalism commits what he called "the naturalistic fallacy." In fact, the professional literature is so full of material on this fallacy that a thorough study of it would be a dissertation in itself. No doubt, many dissertations on it have already been written. Therefore, since this dissertation is on Dewey, not the naturalistic fallacy, I shall limit my discussion of it to presenting what I take to be the standard interpretation of what Moore meant by "naturalism" and the fallacy which he argued it commits.

"Naturalism," for Moore, is any attempt to identify, by definition, value properties with descriptive properties, either natural or non-naturalistic metaphysical properties. This is the procedure which Moore argued commits "the

naturalistic fallacy."² The most famous argument that Moore gave for the claim that such definitions commit a fallacy is his open-question argument. This argument points out that whatever definition may be given of "good," in terms of descriptive properties, one may always ask of any particular object A which does have those properties, Is A good? That is, even if we know A has the properties which our definition has given as the defining characteristics of "good" we still can ask, Is A good? That is, we can ask of the very properties given as the defining characteristics of "good," Are they good? For example, if we define "good" as that which we desire to desire, we can still ask, intelligibly, of a particular object A which we desire to desire, Is A good? That is, is the property of desiring to desire good? And we do not mean by this, Do we desire to desire to desire to desire A? A parallel argument can be constructed for any definition in terms of a non-naturalistic metaphysical property such as being willed by God. Even if A has the property of being willed by God, we may always ask, But is A good? People who don't even believe in God may still use the term "good" in a meaningful way, so "good" can't mean the same thing as "willed by God."

²G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), Chapter 1.

It is this powerful argument that led many 20th century philosophers to conclude that naturalism had been laid to rest once and for all. Moore's conclusion from this argument was that any naturalistic (or non-naturalistic metaphysical) definition of good must be fallacious. He then argued that good must be a non-natural value property which may coexist with either natural properties or non-natural metaphysical properties, both of which are descriptive, but should not be confused with them. Naturalism, for Moore, is the position that takes "good" as denoting some natural property.³

R. M. Hare continued in the antinaturalist tradition which had been made popular by Moore, but rejected Moore's claim that good is a non-natural property. Hare argues that "good" is not a property at all, but a word with the function of commending. Whereas Moore had argued that the error of naturalists is to identify non-natural value properties with descriptive properties, Hare argues that the error of trying to define "good" in descriptive terms is that, in such a definition, the definiens loses the function

³It is this sense of naturalism that Werner, referred to in a previous footnote, is thinking of when he denies that Dewey is a naturalist. However, within Moore's entire ethical system this sense of naturalism is related to another sense, namely, that naturalism is the view that takes scientific method as the sole method of ethical inquiry, and it is this sense in which I shall defend the claim that Dewey is an ethical naturalist.

of commending which the definiendum (the term "good") possessed. He writes,

Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which themselves do not perform this function.⁴

C. L. Stevenson follows in the same general anti-naturalist tradition as Moore and Hare (but preceding Hare by about a decade) when he writes that "the 'goodness' of anything must not be verifiable solely by use of the scientific method."⁵ For Stevenson, a naturalist is someone who believes that the scientific method is sufficient for ethics. This conception of naturalism and its fallacy is linked to Moore's and Hare's by Stevenson's theory of scientific method, which was also held by Moore, according to which science is merely descriptive, while ethics is normative. Stevenson states his affiliation with this tradition as follows:

No matter what set of scientifically knowable properties a thing may have (says Moore, in effect), you will find, on careful introspection, that it is an open question to ask whether anything

⁴R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 91.

⁵C. L. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," in Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. by Sellars and Hospers (2nd ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 256.

having these properties is good. It is difficult to believe that this recurrent question is a totally confused one, or that it seems open only because of the ambiguity of 'good.' Rather, we must be using some sense of 'good' which is not definable, relevantly, in terms of anything scientifically knowable. That is, the scientific method is not sufficient for ethics.⁶

According to Stevenson, scientific method results only in judgments that have purely descriptive meaning, while he goes on to argue that ethical judgments contain words having "dynamic" or "affective" usage. Stevenson refers to this affective usage as an emotive component of meaning, which ethical propositions possess in addition to their cognitive or descriptive component of meaning. He writes

Doubtless there is always some element of description in ethical judgments, but this is by no means all. Their major use is not to indicate facts, but to create an influence.⁷

According to Stevenson, science cannot be the sole method for verifying ethical propositions because of the emotive component of meaning in the latter. This emotive component enables them to be used both to express feelings and to create an influence on others. Given Stevenson's conception of science as resulting only in judgments that have purely descriptive meaning, one who attempted to make science the sole method of verification for ethics

⁶Ibid., pp. 256-257.

⁷Ibid., p. 257.

would have to reduce normative terms to descriptive terms and so would lose their emotive meaning. Their fallacy would be similar to the fallacy formulated by Hare, according to which such reductions result in loss of the commending function of value terms. So because of Stevenson's conception of science, ethical judgments cannot be verified by the scientific method alone. However, for Stevenson there is no other method either for giving objective verification of such judgments. According to him, ethical judgments can only be verified to the extent that they have a descriptive or cognitive component, but the remaining emotive element of meaning places a permanent limitation on the possibility of verification. All ethical judgments contain an emotive component of meaning, and to that extent they are subjective and so unverifiable. Agreement can only be achieved by methods of persuasion, not science.

Stevenson's noncognitivism differentiates his antinaturalism from Moore's. Moore, like Stevenson, agreed that scientific method cannot be the sole method for verifying the goodness of anything, but he provided an alternate method, purporting to be objective, for verifying such judgments. According to Moore, scientific method only reveals the "natural" properties of things, while the method of verification in ethics requires, ultimately, the use of intuition as the source of knowledge of the "non-natural"

property of goodness.⁸ For Moore, the method of inquiry in ethics requires that the object being evaluated must be isolated from all other objects and its goodness intuited. So there is no continuity or system of relations between judgments of goodness. Each must be made independently of every other. Thus the property of goodness is not relative to spatio-temporal contexts. That which has the property of goodness has it in all times and places. Apparent disagreements as to whether a thing has the property of goodness are to be explained by the fact that the object being evaluated has not been properly isolated, so the disagreeing parties are not really looking at the same object. So the process of isolation must continue until a description of an object is reached such that all right-thinking rational beings, in all times and places, will agree that an object so described does or does not have the additional property of goodness. And this process of isolation must be carried out independently for every object to be evaluated. The resulting intuited knowledge of a list of objects having the timeless property of intrinsic goodness is the prerequisite for all ethical knowledge.

Dewey's Conception of Naturalism

The distinctions and similarities between the anti-naturalist conceptions of naturalism, as presented up to

⁸It should be noted that the type of goodness under discussion here is intrinsic, not instrumental goodness.

this point, and their conceptions of the fallacy it commits, are sufficient for me to show now, in what sense Dewey is a naturalist. Stevenson's formulation of naturalism comes closest to stating the nature of Dewey's naturalism. I emphasize comes closest because, as I shall show, there are important differences between Stevenson's formulation, taken in its entirety, and Dewey's naturalism. But there is a basic point of resemblance in that Dewey affirms that the same generic method of inquiry applies to ethics as to physical science. For Dewey, the goodness of anything is verifiable solely by the scientific method. That method is sufficient for ethics.

However, Dewey's conception of scientific method differs in certain crucial respects from that of Stevenson and Moore. And this is the underlying point on which Dewey's naturalism differs from naturalism as criticized by these antinaturalists. The major point of difference is that Stevenson and Moore conceived of scientific method as resulting in descriptive propositions only, while for Dewey, although inquiry using the scientific method does result in descriptive propositions, it also results in normative propositions, that is, propositions regulating human activity. In a footnote to an early essay reproduced in The Problems of Men, Dewey writes

It might check the prevalent tendency to draw sharp lines between philosophy as merely normative and the sciences as merely descriptive to realize that all generic scientific propositions, all statements of laws, all equations and formulae, are

strictly normative in character, having as their sole excuse for being, and their sole test of worth, their capacity to regulate descriptions of individual cases.⁹

So for Dewey the sciences, even physical sciences, are normative as well as descriptive. The normative factor enters in physical science as the functioning of scientific laws in regulating acts of accepting descriptions of individual cases. Scientific laws are, in this sense, normative.¹⁰

Similarly, the laws of what Dewey proposes as a science of ethics would be regulative of acts in individual cases, but here the subject matter differs from the physical sciences. Here we are concerned with, in Dewey's terms, "matters of conduct," and although the method of inquiry is still the scientific method, as Dewey interprets it, he does not advocate reduction of this subject matter to physical form. Dewey is not a materialist, a point that needs emphasizing, since materialism is often confused with naturalism. Dewey attempts to eliminate this confusion as follows:

⁹John Dewey, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," in The Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 226.

¹⁰As will be pointed out in Chapter 5, scientific conclusions are normative in other ways as well.

the term "science" is likely to suggest those bodies of knowledge which are most familiar to us in physical matters; and thus to give the impression that what is sought is reduction of matters of conduct to similarly physical or even quasi-mathematical form. It is, however, analogy with the method of inquiry, not with the final product which is intended...The point of view expressly disclaims any effort to reduce the statement of matters of conduct to forms comparable with those of physical science. But it also expressly proclaims an identity of logical procedure in the two cases.¹¹

So the distinction between physical science and a science of conduct is maintained as a difference in subject matter, although the method of inquiry in the two cases is the same in certain generic respects.

In both cases, inquiry is concerned with discovering the true value of something. Inquiries in physical science are concerned with discovering the value of alternative descriptions of the world, and with adopting those that are warranted. Ethical inquiries are concerned with discovering the value of actions, i.e., their objective is to find out which acts are desirable, or the best policy.¹² So in both

¹¹"Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," p. 213.

¹²For the time being, I am ignoring certain problems in Dewey's ethics which will be taken up later, such as the relation between prudential and moral goodness. Also, I am not giving here the details of the difference in subject matter between ethics and physical science. One important point of difference to be taken up later will be the fact that, in ethics, an important part of any evaluation is the question, What kind of self is being formed? This question is simply not relevant to inquiries in physical science.

cases the method of inquiry involves making normative judgments, although in one case we are evaluating descriptions, in the the other actions. Actually, in both cases we want to know what is best to do, but in the former case the doing that we are inquiring into is what descriptions of things to accept, that is, we want to know which descriptions are truly good.

Dewey uses the term "de jure" to refer to goods which should be desired, or beliefs which should be accepted, and this is contrasted with de facto goods, which are in fact desired or accepted, but perhaps should not be. Inquiry, as Dewey describes it, is the method for deciding which goods are de jure. It is the method for deciding which goods should be desired or accepted, and this is true whether the goods in question are actions, as in ethics, or descriptions of the world, as in science. When we describe what values a person, in fact, holds we are stating de facto goods. For example, a de facto description of the world is one which is believed to be a good description and so is accepted and valued, but perhaps should not be accepted, while a de jure description is one that should be accepted because scientific inquiry has shown it is warranted. This example may be clarified by noting that a distinction is being made between descriptions of the world and descriptions of a person's beliefs about what descriptions of the world are good. The description of creation in Genesis is one thing; a description of a person's beliefs, which lists a belief in the

description of creation in Genesis, is another. De facto descriptions of the world are those that we would give if we were asked to describe the beliefs about the world that a person does, in fact, accept, so the person's belief in the description of creation in Genesis is a de facto belief, or in other words a de facto description which he accepts. De jure descriptions of the world are those that we would give if we were asked what beliefs about the world should be accepted. And according to Dewey, the inquiries of physical science are the means by which the latter question will best be answered. So Dewey would say that, though a person has a de facto belief in the description of creation given in Genesis, he should accept the account of evolution given by scientists. The description of evolution is a de jure description; it is the description which should be accepted.

Similarly in ethics, if we were asked to describe the conduct which someone in fact does desire and so engages in, our answer would be de facto. We would give descriptions of conduct. But if we were asked what conduct they should desire our answer would be de jure. We would tell them what conduct is desirable. And according to Dewey, ethical inquiry following the same pattern as the inquiries of physical science would be the means for discovering what conduct is desirable. Although it must be remembered that the ethical inquiry would be distinguished from the inquiry

in physical science by the subject matter involved.

For Dewey, both de facto and de jure goods are involved in any inquiry, and because of the pervasiveness of de jure propositions in both the inquiries of ethics and physical science, any attempt to reduce de jure propositions to de facto ones would eliminate the human function of inquiry. Inquiry is the procedure by which de jure goods are distinguished from de facto ones. In Experience and Nature, Dewey writes

In knowledge, for example there are beliefs de facto and beliefs de jure. In morals, there are immediate goods, the desired, and reasonable goods, the desirable. In esthetics, there are the goods of an undeveloped or perverted taste and there are the goods of cultivated taste. With respect to any of these distinctions, the true, real, final, or objective good is no more good as an immediate existence than is the contrasting good, called false, specious, illusory, showy, meretricious, le faux bon. The difference in adjectives designates a difference instituted in critical judgment; the validity of the difference between good which is approved and that which is good (immediately) but is judged bad, depends therefore upon the value of reflection in general, and of a particular reflective operation in especial. Even if good of the reflective object is different from that of the good of the non-reflective object, it does not follow that it is a better good, much less that it is such a difference in goodness as makes the non-reflective good bad: -- except upon one proviso, namely, that there is something unique in the value or goodness of reflection.¹³

¹³John Dewey, Experience and Nature (2nd ed., 1929; rpt. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), pp. 402-403.

In the three areas of evaluation, science, ethics, and aesthetics we utilize normative judgments to regulate particular actions. In physical science we are seeking natural laws to regulate acceptances of particular descriptions; in ethics we are seeking principles for regulating particular actions; and in aesthetics we are cultivating tastes to regulate particular enjoyments. In each case, the thing that makes all the difference between de facto and de jure goods is the unique value of reflection, or to use the term that Dewey uses more commonly, inquiry. Reflection has unique value, because it is the means for distinguishing de jure from de facto goods. Its value is instrumental. It remains to be shown wherein lies the value of inquiry such that it produces the superiority of the de jure.

Dewey's distinction between goods which are de jure and goods which are de facto corresponds to the normative-descriptive distinction in contemporary ethics, since de jure goods are those which should be desired or accepted, while de facto goods are those which are, in fact, desired or accepted, but perhaps should not be. If I say, Jones desires to smoke, I am making a de facto statement which describes Jones. If I say, Jones should not desire to smoke, or Smoking is not desirable, I am making a de jure judgment which is normative. Since de jure judgments are normative, and as has already been indicated, scientific inquiry is the method for distinguishing goods that are de jure from de facto

goods, we may say that, for Dewey, scientific inquiry is the method for arriving at normative judgments.

A word of caution is in order at this point concerning our interpretation of de jure goods. We must not define de jure goods as "Those goods which are desired or accepted after inquiry." To do this would be to try to define normative terms in descriptive terms, or in other words to reduce the normative to the descriptive, which is not Dewey's objective. Rather than defining de jure goods as "Those goods that are desired or accepted after inquiry," we define de jure goods as those goods which should be desired or accepted, and we make inquiry, as Dewey describes it, the method for arriving at such normative judgments. Just the fact that we have engaged in inquiry, as Dewey describes it, does not mean that the good arrived at is the one that should be desired or accepted. We can always re-evaluate our decision. Our original inquiry could have erred at some point. This would not be possible if we simply defined de jure goods as "Those goods that are desired or accepted after inquiry."

Morton White has criticized Dewey's way of distinguishing de jure from de facto goods, arguing that de jure goods, as Dewey interprets them, are no more normative than are de facto goods.¹⁴ I shall take a moment here to consider

¹⁴ Morton White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," The Philosophical Review, LVIII (1949), 321-9.

White's objection and a possible response to it. The basic idea underlying White's criticism is the antinaturalist idea that one cannot get normative conclusions from descriptive premisses. At least he interprets Dewey as trying to do this and failing, though he leaves open the possibility that this feat may be accomplished in some other way. At any rate he believes that Dewey has tried and failed. I shall point out that Dewey is not trying to derive normative conclusions from descriptive premisses. He is not interested in formal derivations at all, but in practical judgment.

White refers to Dewey's distinction between desired and desirable, according to which that which is desired is a de facto good, while that which is desirable is de jure. White argues that Dewey's analogy between "desired" and "desirable" on one hand, and "appears red" and "is objectively red" on the other, shows that Dewey has not interpreted "desirable" in such a way as to show its normativeness. If "is desirable" is analogous to "is objectively red," then "is desirable" is not being interpreted normatively, since "is objectively red" is not normative.

I think Dewey can be defended against this criticism by White by pointing out that Dewey intended the analogy between "is desirable" and "is objectively red" in only a limited sense. The statements "x is desirable" and "x is

objectively red" are analogous in being judgments that make predictions about x under specific conditions. The statement "x is objectively red" means that, under standard lighting conditions, x will appear red. And "x is desirable" means that, given the conditions of a problematic situation, x will do. It will satisfy the requirements of the situation. But on Dewey's analysis of "x is desirable," this judgment differs from "x is objectively red" in being a practical judgment. Not only does it make a prediction, but it also declares a policy to be pursued, namely that of attempting to acquire or maintain x.¹⁵ The process leading to the judgment "x is desirable" starts with a problematic situation containing a self with many desires, some in conflict. And the judgment, "x is desirable" is both a prediction that x will satisfy the requirements of the situation by bringing desires into harmony, and a statement of intention to pursue or maintain x. Dewey is not interested in purely theoretical formal derivations of normative conclusions from descriptive premisses. He is interested in the actual process of decision-making

¹⁵I am indebted to H. S. Thayer for this analysis that, for Dewey, "x is desirable" implies a declaration of policy. See Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 402-409.

leading to practical judgments. The judgment, "x is desirable" is normative in the sense of being a declaration of policy.

I may now return to the foregoing discussion of the differences between Dewey's and Stevenson's conceptions of science and their consequences for ethical naturalism. Since Dewey rejects Stevenson's bifurcation between science as descriptive and ethics as normative, recognizing instead that each has both normative and descriptive components, he can make scientific method the method of ethics without having to reduce normative to descriptive propositions. If Stevenson is right in holding that normative propositions have dynamic usage, and I think Dewey can accept this, then the normative propositions of physical science have dynamic usage as well as do those of ethics. And indeed, to call a certain theory in physical science "warranted" may very well elicit an affective response in a listener with respect for scientific method. The normative propositions of both ethics and physical science have affective usage. But their affective usage forms no part of the method of verifying them. Although "is warranted" may have emotive meaning, its cognitive meaning is the only thing relevant to verification. To say that a theory is warranted, means that if the listener with respect for scientific method will follow the steps of the inquiry which led to the theory, he too will see that it is a

belief de jure, one that is better than a belief de facto because of the process of inquiry leading to it. Dewey writes that "it makes all the difference in the world in the value of a belief how its object is formed and arrived at."¹⁶ Analogously, when we say that certain conduct is desirable, that term may have affective usage, but more importantly, it implies a similar process of inquiry that has distinguished the de jure conduct from that which is only de facto. There is no reason why normative propositions in both physical science and ethics should not be fully verifiable by scientific method.

Similarly, Hare's criticism that naturalism eliminates the commending function of value words is not applicable to Dewey, either, since he does not reduce normative to descriptive terms, and so does not lose the commending function of value words. The normative terms applicable to physical science, such as, "is warranted," are just as much words of commendation as are words such as "good" and "right" in ethics, but in both cases, the commending function of such terms in no way affects the method for verifying the normative propositions in which they are contained. For Dewey, the method of inquiry and verification of normative propositions is to be distinguished from both their dynamic use and their

¹⁶Experience and Nature, p. 427.

function of commending. And because of this distinction, the goodness of a thing can be verified solely by the scientific method, and this is as true of ethical goodness (that which is desirable) as of the value of a description of physical phenomena. Dewey's naturalism does not eliminate the commending function or dynamic use of value propositions, but it does eliminate the sharp bifurcation between the inquiries of physical science and of ethics. The inquiries in both areas result in propositions that may be used to commend and to affect the actions of others. But the inquiries in both areas utilize the same generic method of verification.

Finally, Dewey can reject Moore's method of isolation and intuition as the proper method for ethics, since he rejects Moore's requirement that things which have the property of goodness must be good regardless of spatio-temporal context. Scientific method, the goal of which is to see de facto goods in the context of their relations to other de facto goods, and so to distinguish those goods that are de jure, is sufficient for ethics. For Dewey, any belief about the goodness of a thing, accepted under particular circumstances at time t , is subject to appraisal and possible rejection under different circumstances at t_1 . That is, the object that is judged correctly to be good at time t may be judged correctly to be bad at t_1 , since its relations to other things change, and for Dewey it is the

relations of a de facto good to other goods that determine its de jure worth. The sole method of appraisal, therefore, can and should be the method of science, which is the only method of inquiry which shows these relations between immediate goods.

Dewey's theory of the method for verifying goodness is the precise opposite of Moore's. Whereas, for Moore, a thing must be isolated from its spatio-temporal context in order to intuit, i.e. immediately perceive, its timeless goodness, for Dewey, an object immediately perceived to be good must be placed in the context of its relations to a spatio-temporal situation in order to judge its de jure goodness. And this method for judging is the same empirical method as is used in physical science where the objects being judged are beliefs.

I want to emphasize that, for Dewey, the empirical method of science, as he conceives it, is the method that should be used in appraising the goodness of things, since of course this is not the method that is, in fact, always used. Both descriptive and ethical beliefs are only too often formed by use of unintelligent methods. For Dewey, scientific method is the only intelligent method of inquiry. Methods such as persuasion, which is an element in Stevenson's conception of ethical method, and appeals to intuition, even in the special sense in which Moore uses that term, are not intelligent methods. In

fact, Dewey often uses the terms "scientific method" and "intelligence" interchangeably.¹⁷ Scientific method is the method by which inquiry should, or will most intelligently, be conducted. No recourse to intuition is necessary for verifying goodness, and no partial abandonment of objective processes of verification in ethical inquiry is necessary, as in the case of Stevenson's emotivism. There are no judgments about goodness not subject to appraisal and possible rejection by scientific method alone. I emphasize possible, because of course many principles of ethical value are so central within the entire system of de facto goods that they may continue to survive no matter how many times they are subjected to reappraisal. The whole point of constant reappraisal is to sort out the ethical beliefs that are worth retaining in the present situation from those that are not, just as in physical science the same thing is done for beliefs about the world. And for Dewey, scientific method is, in both cases, the best method of inquiry. As Dewey wrote in the quote on page 15, "there is something unique in the value or goodness of reflection." The difference between de facto and de jure goods, whether beliefs, conduct, or works of art, is that de jure goods are the products of inquiry, and the reason that they are better

¹⁷ However, intelligence is not to be identified with pure intellect. It involves the functioning of both habit and impulse. I shall, of course, give detailed analysis of Dewey's theory of inquiry throughout the dissertation.

than de facto goods is because of the value of inquiry.

Dewey writes

Since reflection is the instrumentality of securing freer and more enduring goods, reflection is a unique intrinsic good. Its instrumental efficacy determines it to be a candidate for a distinctive position as an immediate good, since beyond other goods it has power of replenishment and fructification. In it, apparent good and real good enormously coincide.¹⁸

In this quote we have an indication of what it is about inquiry that produces the superiority of the de jure. Inquiry is "the instrumentality of securing freer and more enduring goods." Inquiry has the "power of replenishment and fructification."

Dewey's Conception of Inquiry

I shall turn now to a brief consideration of the generic characteristics of the process of inquiry which Dewey believes should be used to distinguish de jure from de facto goods. In his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey gives the following definition of inquiry

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.¹⁹

¹⁸ Experience and Nature, p. 406.

¹⁹ John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), pp. 104-105.

The first generic characteristic of inquiry is that it starts with a disturbance of an earlier state of integrated activity. Dewey sometimes uses different terminology for this starting point -- for example, precarious situation, problematic situation, or as in the quoted definition of inquiry, indeterminate situation. But in all cases, the objective of inquiry is to solve the problem with which we started, to convert a precarious situation into a more stable one, an indeterminate situation into a determinate situation. And in all cases, the conversion is effected by observing environing conditions and predicting consequences of alternative courses of action that may be taken. These predictions of consequences may be thought of as hypotheses; the goals of the alternative courses of action are ends-in-view. A process of deliberation occurs in which we set up priorities between conflicting goals and between alternative means until one course of action is chosen as the most likely to convert the problematic situation into a less problematic one, i.e., one with greater stability or determinateness. The objective is to form a hypothesis of a course of action that will convert the conflicting elements of the original indeterminate situation into a unified whole, i.e., a system of elements that no longer conflict, but which support one another. (The elements to be brought into harmony may be beliefs, as in the case of an inquiry in physical science, or they may be desires, as in the case of an inquiry

in ethics.) Then this hypothesis is tested by overt action to see if the hypothesis when acted upon does, in fact, produce a satisfactory solution. This phase of inquiry is crucial. All inquiry, ultimately, involves overt action, so the systematization of the results of inquiry must include propositions about such matters of conduct as are involved in the inquiry.

In physical science, where the problem is to discover relations between events in the world, the precarious, indeterminate, or unsatisfactory situation is one in which we are not sure what beliefs about these relations between events are to be accepted. The process of deliberation involves setting priorities between conflicting beliefs. The more stable or determinate situation is one in which we have greater assurance or warrant that a particular theory of relations is the one to be accepted. And there are objective criteria for testing the conclusion.

In what Dewey refers to as matters of conduct, the precarious situation is one in which there is something lacking which may be described in terms of human needs and desires. The process of deliberation involves setting priorities between conflicting desires. The more stable or determinate situation is one in which the original lack has been satisfied, although this never means a return to the former situation. Here also there are objective criteria for testing the conclusion.

Remember that, at this point, I am giving only a rough outline of Dewey's theory of inquiry and overlooking many problems that will be taken up later, such as an analysis of the concepts of prudential and moral goodness. Such problems must, of course, be dealt with in filling in the details of the process of decision-making in which we set priorities among desires, and these will be taken up in Chapter 5.

The generic trait of inquiry which I want to emphasize now is that the goal of inquiry is to produce, by overt action, a more stable or determinate situation, whether the inquiry is in physical science or ethics. At this point, the antinaturalist will try to spring his trap by pointing out that Dewey has, after all, left himself vulnerable to refutation by Moore's open-question argument by smuggling in a naturalistic definition of "good," for he seems to be defining "good" as a more stable or determinate situation. Moore's open-question argument notes that we can ask of any described content, Is that good? That is, we can inquire into the goodness of any described content. So why not inquire into the goodness of more stable situations? But here we have something unique, for the process that Dewey has described is the process by which we attempt to answer the question, Is that good? He has described the process of inquiry, and this inquiry into the nature of inquiry is similar to an inquiry in physical science, where the problem

is to find a correct description. His inquiry has resulted in de facto statements about the process of inquiry -- what inquiry is. And according to Dewey's description, the process of inquiry always has for its goal more stable situations.

In the process of inquiry we find the point of contact between the normative and the descriptive. Inquiry is the means whereby de jure goods are distinguished from de facto ones. And if we include in the description of inquiry its goal, more stable situations, we may see such a description as also normative. If Dewey's description of inquiry is correct, then more stable situations are good. And a de jure good is one that is a means to, or a part of, a more stable situation. Although the descriptive and the normative must be distinguished, there is continuity between them, and inquiry is the connecting link. Dewey has given a description of inquiry which also gives us a norm for deciding what goods should be chosen -- those goods which restore stability are to be chosen.

Now a follower of G. E. Moore may still persist in asking, But are more stable situations good? He is pulling the open-question argument and asking if the characteristics defined as good are good. At this point we must ask what his question can mean. If we inquire into the goodness of more stable situations, we must be inquiring into either the goodness of inquiry itself (since on Dewey's description

inquiries always do have as their goal more stable situations) or we are inquiring into the correctness of Dewey's description of inquiry.

Now suppose we take the first alternative and ask, Is inquiry good? or in other words, Is it good to inquire? The question is not, Is it good to inquire in some particular situation, but is it ever good to inquire. There may be occasions in which we want to inquire as to whether a particular inquiry should be undertaken or not, but that is not the issue before us now. Following Moore's open-question argument we have asked, But are more stable situations good, and we are asking if this can be interpreted as meaning, Is inquiry ever good?²⁰

Now if we answer this question in the negative, we would be saying that, though we could go on asking, Is that good? of any described content, we have decided that inquiry is not good and therefore, if this decision is sincere, we must resolve to cease to inquire ever again. And as long as we adhere to this resolution we can no longer ask of any described content, including inquiry itself, Is that good? And we can never change our mind about our resolution, for

²⁰The question, Is inquiry good? could also be interpreted as the odd question, Are moral ends good? since for Dewey inquiry just is the process of seeking moral ends. So to ask of Dewey, Is inquiry good? or, Is it good to inquire? is to ask, Is it good to seek moral ends?

to do so would require initiating an inquiry, a reappraisal of our original decision that inquiry is bad. But in our present state of resolve we cannot initiate this inquiry. So we have now contradicted Moore's own premiss that we can always inquire into the goodness of any described content. When we asked originally, Is inquiry good? a negative answer led to a contradiction of that open-question premiss, so the only answer we can give that does not contradict that premiss is, Yes, inquiry is good. We must conclude, as Dewey does at the end of the quote on page 15, that "there is something unique in the value or goodness of reflection." And this uniqueness lies in the fact that reflection, or in other words, inquiry, is the instrument for answering the question, Is that good? If we eliminate reflection we can no longer ask, intelligibly, Is that good?

Now suppose that, when we originally inquired into the goodness of more stable situations, we were really inquiring into the correctness of Dewey's description of inquiry. Dewey would agree that this is a perfectly legitimate inquiry. He makes no claim to infallibilism.

In his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry he writes

The recognition of what Peirce called "fallibilism" in distinction from "infallibilism" is something more than a prudential maxim. It results of necessity from the possibility and probability of a discrepancy between means available for use and consequences that follow: between past and future conditions, not from mere weakness of mortal powers. Because we live in a world in process, the future, although continuous with the past, is not its bare

repetition. The principle applies with peculiar force to inquiry about inquiry, including, needless to say, the inquiry presented in this treatise. The very words which must be used are words that have had their meanings fixed in the past to express ideas that are unlike those which they must now convey if they are to express what is intended. To those who are naturalistically inclined, the attendant "fallibility" will be but a spur to do better the work which this volume attempts to do. The present volume is an approach not a closed treatise. The aim it hopes to fulfil is that of being a sufficiently coherent and systematic approach to move others to undertake the long cooperative work (never ending in any case as long as inquiry continues) needed to test and fill in the framework which is outlined in this book.²¹

Any attempt to give a definition of good must inquire into the nature of inquiry itself, and the acceptability of the definition of good depends on the correctness of the description of the process of inquiry, and in particular on the description of the goals of inquiry. An inquiry into the meaning of "good" must be synthetic. We cannot define "good" by arbitrary fiat.

My answer to Moore's open-question argument has not led to the conclusion that Dewey's definition of "good," as more stable situations, is infallible or necessarily correct. Quite the contrary, Dewey himself agrees that it is fallible. It is possible that someone could come up with

²¹Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 40.

a description of inquiry that does not make more stable situations the goal of inquiry and hence the meaning of good. But I do not draw the conclusion from this possibility that Moore does when he infers that "good" must be a non-natural property. Rather, my conclusion is that any attempt to define "good" must be a synthetic enterprise in which the process of inquiry is described, and "good" is whatever turns out to be the goal of inquiry. In Dewey's case the definition of "good" turns out to be more stable situations. I believe he is correct about this, but this is no fiat. A large part of the remainder of the dissertation will be devoted to exegesis of the nature of Dewey's theory of inquiry, and any attempt to refute Dewey's theory of the good as more stable situations must deal with the entire synthetic theory of inquiry.

The way in which Dewey's naturalism differs from many other naturalisms is that it seeks a description of the activity of inquiry itself as a function of man as a biological and psycho-social being, and any definition of "good" that emerges from this investigation is subject to reappraisal, just as is the case with all synthetic propositions. And the reappraisal must be of the account given of the process of inquiry. To ask, Are more stable situations good? is to ask for such a reappraisal of the description of inquiry that has been given. If we ask why

Dewey's naturalistic conception of "good," as "a more stable situation," is any better than Spencer's, for example, as "more evolved," the answer is to be found by investigating the activity of human inquiry, and especially its goals. Has man, as he evolved, been striving to become more evolved, as Spencer's definition would imply? Or has he been striving to achieve as much stability as possible in a perilous, precarious world, as Dewey's definition implies?

The characteristic differentiating inquiry into inquiry, from inquiry into other subject matter, is that the former type of inquiry seeks self-knowledge. It seeks knowledge by man, of man, and by the individual of the individual. Inquiry into inquiry is a part of inquiry into the self. Inquiry is one activity characteristic of a self.

The Dependence of Dewey's Ethical Theory on his Theory of the Self

This brings me to the focal point of this dissertation -- the point of contact between Dewey's theory of the self and his naturalistic ethics. In the foregoing pages, I have outlined Dewey's naturalistic ethics as depending on his theory of inquiry. But since this theory of inquiry is the core of his theory of the self, the broader position is that Dewey's ethical theory is dependent on his theory of the self. The theory of the self provides the framework for

the ethical theory. Dewey's naturalistic ethics and theory of the self illustrate Abraham Edel's insight expressed in his article, "The Relation of Fact and Value: A Reassessment," as follows:

I think it can be shown that every ethical theory has as part of its structure some existential perspective -- a view of the world and man's nature and conditions which acts as a kind of stage setting for the ethical theory. The conceptual framework of the theory is dependent, although not in a simple one-one relation, on the stage-setting. If this thesis about ethical theories is correct, then since the theory of the self plays a prominent part in existential perspectives, the concomitance of value-fact relations and self theories can properly be construed as a kind of dependence of the former on the latter.²²

For a fuller discussion of Edel's theory of existential perspectives, I refer the reader to his Science and the Structure of Ethics.²³ The important point being made here

²²Abraham Edel, "The Relation of Fact and Value: A Reassessment," in Experience, Existence and the Good, ed. by I. C. Lieb (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961), p. 224.

²³Abraham Edel, Science and the Structure of Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 11-44. I want to point out that the term "existential" as used here should not be confused with the philosophy of existentialism. In Science and the Structure of Ethics, Edel writes "As here used, the term 'existential' refers to a way of viewing existence. It is to be distinguished from the term 'existentialist,' which has come to designate one special theory about existence. An existentialist EP would thus be one type of EP." p. 12. (EP is used here as an abbreviation for existential perspective). The term "perspective" also lends itself to possible misinterpretations, so a clarification of this term will be given shortly.

is not the mere fact that every ethical theory makes some assumptions, however trivial, about existence and especially about the self. What is significant is the conclusion that the conceptual framework of the ethical theory is dependent on the particular way of viewing existence adopted, consciously or unconsciously, by the philosopher. And in particular, the value-fact (normative-descriptive) relations of the ethical theory are dependent on the philosopher's way of viewing the self. Edel's point is that, even if an ethical philosopher never worked out a theory of the self, but does have a theory of value-fact relations, the latter theory would, in general, be consistent with only certain types of theory of the self. In the article, Edel has shown a tendency for certain types of value-fact relations to be correlated with certain types of theories of the self. And in the quoted passage he is explaining this as being due to the fact that the existential perspective, a part of which is a theory of the self, is a component in the very structure of the ethical theory. The ethical theory depends for its coherence on this component. One cannot successfully formulate or evaluate an ethical theory independently of its existential perspective. One may fail to make the existential perspective explicit and may fail to work it out in detail, but it will nonetheless provide an unexpressed component of the structure of the ethical theory. For example, one cannot successfully evaluate a naturalistic ethics on purely

formal grounds. A fair evaluation must consider it in relation to the existential perspective, and in particular, in relation to the theory of the self, contained in its structure. As I have attempted to show in the foregoing pages, Dewey's ethics cannot be evaluated fairly, independently of the theory of inquiry which provides the framework for his theory of normative-descriptive relations. And his theory of inquiry is an important part of his theory of the self.

Criteria for Evaluating a Theory of Existence and the Self

I have started to show that recognition of the role of Dewey's theory of the self in his ethical theory is an important step in understanding his naturalistic theory of moral judgment. However, although recognition of this dependence is one step in that understanding, it is not sufficient to provide strong reasons for adopting a naturalistic ethics. An antinaturalist may respond by rejecting Dewey's naturalistic existential perspective, including his theory of the self, as well as his ethics.

The term "perspective" may suggest arbitrariness of choice. It might lead the reader to conclude that it is purely a matter of arbitrary preference which existential perspective one takes. And if it is arbitrary, the antinaturalist may choose to accept whatever existential perspective provides a coherent structure for his antinaturalistic

ethics, with its bifurcation of method for ethics and physical science. However, this interpretation of the term "existential perspective" would be contrary to Edel's meaning, since he does not make the choice of perspective an arbitrary matter, nor does Dewey. Therefore, in order to avoid the impression of arbitrariness, I shall substitute the terms "existential theory" or "theory of existence" in place of "existential perspective," since theories can be correct or incorrect, good instruments or bad. It is not an arbitrary matter which of opposing theories of existence one adopts. Therefore, we must adopt criteria for evaluating theories of existence.

Edel gives an extensive discussion of such criteria in Science and the Structure of Ethics.²⁴ But here I shall confine my attention to Dewey's own criterion. In Experience and Nature, he gives the following test of the value of any philosophy:

Thus there is here supplied, I think, a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is offered us. Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in 'reality' even the significance they had previously seemed to have? Does it yield the enrichment and

²⁴Science and the Structure of Ethics, pp. 33-44.

increase of power of ordinary things which the results of physical science afford when applied in everyday affairs? Or does it become a mystery that these ordinary things should be what they are; and are philosophic concepts left to dwell in separation in some technical realm of their own?²⁵

So if Dewey's theory of the self and naturalistic ethics is to satisfy his own criterion, it must render ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments "more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful." A philosophy, and particularly an ethical theory, must be genuinely concerned with the predicaments of ordinary life experience. It must bear fruit in dealing with questions like, How should I lead my life? What is right and wrong, good and bad? I shall attempt to show that Dewey's naturalistic ethics does, in fact, accomplish this goal.

At this point, the antinaturalist may respond by asking, But why should I accept Dewey's pragmatic criterion for evaluating any philosophy? Why must my philosophy have practical application to the things of ordinary experience? For example, why shouldn't I create a metaphysical system that may be admired for its inner consistency, even though it has no practical application? Or why not construct systems of formal logic which have no practical value, but

²⁵Experience and Nature, p. 7.

which may be admired for their simplicity and elegance?

One sort of answer that might be given to such questions would be the tolerant response that, as long as the constructors of such systems recognize them for what they are, that is, aesthetic objects, then they do, in fact, enhance ordinary experience, since aesthetic experience is a part of ordinary experience. What Dewey objects to is a failure to recognize the purely aesthetic character of such works. When a philosopher takes what is really an aesthetic object and claims for it the character of True Being, that is when he "makes the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before."

But one may still persist in asking, why must philosophy clarify the things of ordinary experience? Why must it aid in dealing with life's predicaments? Why not construct a philosophy such as Plato's, which has as its goal the transcendence of ordinary experience? Why not attribute True Being to that which transcends experience, even if this does leave ordinary experience more opaque than it was before? To answer these questions, I must turn to a consideration of Dewey's theory of existence -- to his metaphysics and theory of experience as the foundation for his theory of the self. This will be the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 2

THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEWEY'S THEORY OF THE SELF
IN HIS NATURALISTIC METAPHYSICS

In the last chapter I showed that Dewey's naturalistic ethics is dependent on his theory of inquiry and that a theory of inquiry, since it is reflexive, is a part of a theory of the self.¹ Dewey's theory of self provides a framework for his naturalistic ethics. The ethics is dependent on the theory of self. When evaluating Dewey's ethics, as is the case with evaluating any ethical theory, it is important to see the theory of existence and particularly the theory of self that provides its framework and on which the ethics depends.

As I also indicated in the last chapter, recognition of this dependence is not in itself a sufficient basis for evaluating Dewey's naturalistic ethics, for one must have a

¹In fact, not only is Dewey's ethics dependent on his theory of inquiry, but the ethics is integral to inquiry, since inquiry is an ethical activity. As I showed in the last chapter, all inquiries are evaluative, having as their objective the distinction of de jure from de facto goods. Therefore, all inquiries are ethical if we take "ethical" in its broadest sense as meaning "evaluative." Nevertheless we can still distinguish inquiries in ethics from inquiries in physical science by criteria which I shall introduce in Chapter 5.

justifiable criterion for evaluating the entire philosophy, both the ethics and the theory of self that forms its framework. Recognition of the dependence of the ethics on the framework is only one step. I then gave Dewey's criterion for evaluating any philosophy, which holds that any philosophy must clarify ordinary life-experiences and make our dealings with life's predicaments more fruitful. Satisfaction of this criterion is the test that anyone trying to evaluate a particular philosophy must achieve. But as I also indicated, Dewey's pragmatic criterion may be challenged. One may wonder why philosophy must assist in clarifying, and ultimately, in helping to solve life's problems. Is Dewey's criterion justifiable? Can it be justified? In this chapter I shall attempt to evaluate this criterion by showing its foundation in Dewey's metaphysics. Also, the metaphysical foundation of Dewey's criterion for evaluating any philosophy will provide the introduction to my more detailed exposition of Dewey's theory of the self to be given in Chapters 3 and 4. Therefore, in addition to showing the metaphysics as a foundation for Dewey's criterion for evaluating philosophies, I shall show all of the metaphysical foundations, that will be used later in developing Dewey's theory of the self.

Dewey's Theory of Experience and Existence

Experience and Nature is the main source for Dewey's mature metaphysical theory, and it is with this mature theory

that I am concerned, not with his early idealistic metaphysics. I shall put aside, momentarily, my evaluation of Dewey's criterion for evaluating any philosophy in order to place the criterion within Dewey's theory of experience and existence.

In Experience and Nature, Dewey seeks the generic characteristics of existence. He writes that "metaphysics is cognizance of the generic traits of existence."² He calls his own metaphysical inquiry "naturalistic metaphysics," which means that it is a metaphysics which is thoroughly empirical, not speculative, for it seeks the generic characteristics of existence by studying the generic characteristics of experienced things. Dewey expresses the objective of Experience and Nature as follows:

To discover some of these general features of experienced things and to interpret their significance for a philosophic theory of the universe in which we live is the aim of this volume. From the point of view adopted, the theory of empirical method in philosophy does for experienced subject-matter on a liberal scale what it does for special sciences on a technical scale.³ (my emphasis)

Just as special sciences use empirical method to clarify some aspects of the universe on a technical scale, philosophy must use empirical method to clarify and give significance to

²Experience and Nature, p. 51.

³Ibid., p. x.

the universe in which we live on a broader, more liberal scale. I have emphasized the terms "things" and "empirical method" in the foregoing quote because, by seeking the generic characteristics of experience, we learn the generic characteristics of existing things, or in other words, nature or the universe. Dewey may use the empirical method to seek the generic characteristics of existing things because, for Dewey, experience is not a veil behind which nature is hidden, as modern subjectivist philosophies suggest. Dewey writes

Experience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature.⁴

Experience is not cooped up in the mind of a passive subject which has no connection with nature, but is the product of an interaction between a complex organism and its environment. And because experience is the product of such an interaction, it is experience of the objects in the environment.

Dewey stresses the intentional characteristics of experience. We do not experience experience; rather, we experience objects in the world, including certain states of our own bodies, as in experience of pain. The generic characteristics of experience are the generic characteristics of the objects experienced. They are the generic characteristics

⁴Ibid., p. x.

of nature. Nature is not something unknowable which speculation leads us to postulate as existing independently of a passive subject, but is all of those objects in the environment which interact with the human organism in the process which produces the experience of which they are the objects. Nature of course also includes the human organism as well as the other objects with which it interacts, so the experience which is produced may be of the human organism as well as of those other objects. The generic characteristics of experience are the generic characteristics of existence or nature because experience cannot be separated, except in thought, from its objects. Experience is of the human organism and all of the objects with which it interacts.

So far in my discussion of Dewey's theory of experience I have been using the term "experience" to refer to what Dewey calls "gross" or "primary" experience, which he distinguishes from "refined" experience. Gross experience is the experience of a person not engaged in philosophical or scientific thought. It is experience which occurs with a minimum of reflective thought. Refined experience, on the other hand, occurs as a consequence of continued, systematic thought. We may interpret Dewey's criterion for evaluating any philosophy as expressing the requirement that refined experience must give increased meaning to the objects of primary experience. Refined experience enables us to go beyond primary experience, gaining experience of aspects of

nature not accessible to primary experience, but which, when brought back to primary experience, give it new meaning. Dewey writes

Theory may intervene in a long course of reasoning, many portions of which are remote from what is directly experienced. But the vine of pendant theory is attached at both ends to the pillars of observed subject-matter.⁵

Dewey goes on to give the following picturesque metaphor to illustrate the fact that refined experience, such as occurs in scientific inquiry, can extend experience beyond its primary unreflective phase, yet must always be brought back to the "surface" of primary experience:

Experience, if scientific inquiry is justified, is no infinitesimally thin layer or foreground of nature, but it penetrates into it, reaching down into its depths, and in such a way that its grasp is capable of expansion; it tunnels in all directions and in so doing brings to the surface things at first hidden -- as miners pile high on the surface of the earth treasures brought from below.⁶

Philosophy as well as science must start with problems that arise in primary experience, and though both philosophy and science proceed by a process of systematic thinking to theories which are objects of refined thought, these theories must return to primary experience, giving to the latter increased meaning as they resolve the problems that arose in primary experience and which initiated the process of

⁵Experience and Nature, p. 2a.

⁶Ibid., p. 3a.

systematic thought. Unfortunately, philosophical theories have too often obscured primary experience, rather than enriching it with new meaning. So Dewey gives his criterion for evaluating any philosophy, quoted in the last chapter, page 38. We may now interpret that criterion in terms of primary and refined experience. Any philosophy must clarify primary experience, enriching experience and its objects with new meaning, and must make our dealings with life's predicaments more fruitful. Refined experience must ultimately refer back to gross experience.

Metaphysical Foundations of Dewey's Theory of the Self:

The Precarious and the Stable

So far I have only elaborated on Dewey's criterion for evaluating any philosophy, rather than evaluating it. I have interpreted it in terms of Dewey's general theory of experience and nature. Now I must go further into the metaphysical theory that Dewey develops, in order to complete the background for evaluating the criterion itself. It is because of certain generic characteristics of existence, which are spelled out in Dewey's metaphysics, that philosophy must make primary experience more luminous and must make our dealings with life's predicaments more fruitful. Because of the generic characteristics of existence which I shall discuss now, life's predicaments cannot be avoided, although philosophers have attempted such avoidance in the past.

But as Dewey so ably shows, all such attempts must fall.

The first of the generic characteristics of existence that Dewey discussed in Experience and Nature is the precarious. And this is the most important for our present discussion. Dewey writes that "a feature of existence which is emphasized by cultural phenomena is the precarious and perilous."⁷ He gives illustrations of the ways in which various cultures have attempted to deal with the precarious. Primitive cultures utilized magic to bring good luck and ward off bad. They also performed rites and ceremonies to win the favor of capricious gods. In modern cultures such rites and ceremonies have been replaced largely by science, which has become the means of controlling the precarious. Yet the precarious remains as a generic characteristic of experience, even in post-industrial cultures. Can anyone doubt that the precarious is still with us? We can devise better ways of dealing with the precarious, but it cannot be eliminated. In fact when we consider the rapidity with which change occurs in our own society, we are forced to recognize that the variety of precarious situations has increased rather than decreased.

"The world of empirical things includes the uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and hazardous -- the world is

⁷Ibid., p. 41.

precarious and perilous."⁸ Note that the precarious is not just a characteristic of experience, but is a characteristic of the world as well. Since we do not experience experience, but rather we experience the world, if the precarious is a generic characteristic of experience, it is also a generic characteristic of the world experienced. Man is in the world and is inextricably linked to the world via experience. And experience discloses the way the world is.

Dewey then contrasts the precarious with the stable -- the sure, predictable, controllable, finished, and secure. Can we doubt that relative stability is also a generic feature of experience? We do find a certain amount of predictability and security mixed in with the precarious aspects of life. So stability is also a generic trait of experience.

Relative stability is the condition that man requires for continuation of the functions of life. It is the goal of all striving. Consequently, philosophers have tended to give it favored treatment in their systems. Dewey points out that classical philosophy has tended to identify reality with the stable and assigned to the precarious the status of mere appearance. By so doing

⁸Ibid., p. 42.

they have created a division of realms. One constitutes reality; the other appearance. The reality of the precarious is either denied completely or, as with Aristotle as Dewey interprets him, is given an inferior place on the scale of Being. The precarious cannot be gotten rid of, so the traditional metaphysical systems are forced to include it somewhere in their systems, but they deny that it is a generic trait of existence. It is not fully real and so is assigned to a realm of appearance or inferior Being.

This tearing asunder of the precarious from the stable is a major point on which Dewey's metaphysics differs from traditional metaphysics. He writes

As against this common identification of reality with what is sure, regular and finished, experience in unsophisticated forms gives evidence of a different world and points to a different metaphysics. We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet indeterminate. They are mixed not mechanically but vitally like the wheat and tares of the parable. We may recognize them separately but we cannot divide them, for unlike wheat and tares they grow from the same root.⁹

Experience in unsophisticated forms, i.e. gross experience, shows that both the stable and precarious are real. Though

⁹Experience and Nature, p. 47.

we can recognize them separately, they cannot be divided in fact. They are both generic characteristics of the world, and in that world they are inextricably mixed.

In contrast with those traditional metaphysical systems which have adopted monistic conceptions of the universe, seeing reality as all good (stable) or all evil, Dewey adopts a pluralistic conception of nature. He writes

It is precisely the peculiar intermixture of support and frustration of man by nature which constitutes experience ... nature induces and partially sustains meanings and goods, and at critical junctures withdraws assistance and flouts its own creatures.¹⁰

It is this mixture of the precarious and the stable in nature that provides the background for intelligence (or inquiry) as an active, creative function in man.

As I indicated in the last chapter, all inquiry is initiated by recognition of the precarious -- a problematic situation -- and moves toward the goal of restoration of relative stability to the situation. So the goal of relative stability would have no meaning without the precarious situation, and the precarious situation would be meaningless without the goal of restoration of a more stable situation. The stable and the precarious must coexist. They are inter-related concepts, which give meaning to each other.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 421.

Dewey's Criterion for Evaluating any Philosophy and Its
Metaphysical Justification

We now have the background for my consideration of Dewey's criterion for evaluating any philosophy. It should be apparent by now that the claim that a philosophy must assist in dealing with life's predicaments is justified because these problematic situations cannot be avoided. They force themselves on us. We can deal with them effectively or ineffectively, but we cannot eliminate the precarious once and for all. We can only devise new ways of solving problematic situations. For example, we can abandon rites and ceremonies designed to placate the gods, and adopt science as a tool for achieving relative stability. Any good philosophy will have as its goal clarification of primary experience and the assistance such luminosity brings to the task of resolving problematic situations. The products of refined experience must be useful as tools that can be brought to bear in resolving the very real problems that arise in primary experience. By keeping an eye on this ultimate goal of philosophy, we may avoid many of the puzzles and paradoxes that traditional philosophers have landed us in.

Dewey gives three arguments in support of his philosophic method, which requires that the products of reflection be brought back to, and illuminate, primary experience.

As respects method, however, it is pertinent at this point to summarize our results. Reference to the primacy and ultimacy of the material of ordinary experience protects us, in the first place, from creating artificial problems which deflect the energy and attention of philosophers from the real problems that arise out of actual subject-matter. In the second place, it provides a check or test for the conclusions of philosophic inquiry; it is a constant reminder that we must replace them, as secondary reflective products, in the experience out of which they arose, so that they may be confirmed or modified by the new significantly experienced objects for which they furnish a method. In the third place, in seeing how they thus function in further experiences, the philosophical results themselves acquire empirical value; they are what they contribute to the common experience of man, instead of being curiosities to be deposited, with appropriate labels, in a metaphysical museum.¹¹

In spite of the fact that some historical philosophies may be curiosities from our own standpoint, they often filled a need that existed in their own era and so they often had a profound influence on Western culture. In fact, as Dewey observes in the following quote, primary experience is "overlaid and saturated with the products of the reflection of past generations and by-gone ages." So one of the tasks of the philosopher seeking to clarify gross experience must be to uncover such assumptions inherited from the past, and which may distort present primary experience.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 18-19.

There is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empirically pursued it will not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means of philosophy, of life experience. But this experience is already overlaid and saturated with the products of the reflection of past generations and by-gone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classifications, due to sophisticated thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh, naive empirical material. It would take more wisdom than is possessed by the wisest historic scholar to track all of these absorbed borrowings to their original sources. If we may for the moment call these materials prejudices (even if they are true, as long as their source and authority is unknown), then philosophy is a critique of prejudices. These incorporated results of past reflection, welded into the genuine materials of first-hand experience, may become organs of enrichment if they are detected and reflected upon. If they are not detected, they often obfuscate and distort. Clarification and emancipation follow when they are detected and cast out; and one great object of philosophy is to accomplish this task.¹²

In many of Dewey's publications, he has illustrated the process of detecting and casting out assumptions from the past. He has shown how many historical philosophers have detected and cast out certain assumptions from the culture to which they belonged, while leaving behind them new assumptions (and many of the old) to overlay and saturate future cultural development. The merit of these philosophers lies in their solutions to the problems they faced in their own era. To their discredit is the way in which they often

¹²Experience and Nature, p. 37.

went to an extreme in claiming for their systems a universal application to all times and places. Dewey sees his task as that of revising and reconstructing their conclusions to show just where their merit lies in confronting the problems of their own time and place, while also showing the error of unconscious acceptance of their conclusions as applicable to all times and places. Such unconscious acceptance may occur because those conclusions have come to saturate the common experience of mankind, or at least, Western culture. The method of philosophizing that Dewey is proposing is that of studying historical philosophers for the sake of seeing clearly the products which they have bequeathed to our own culture and emancipating ourselves from those that are no longer helpful in resolving our present predicaments. He states his objective as follows:

In the chapters that follow I have undertaken a revision and reconstruction of the conclusions, the reports, of a number of historic philosophic systems, in order that they may be usable methods by which one may go to his own experience, and, discerning what is found by use of the method, come to understand better what is already within the common experience of mankind.¹³

It is important to realize that Dewey's criterion for evaluating any philosophy does not take primary experience to be an infallible starting point on which to build. Since

¹³Ibid., pp. 36-37.

primary experience is overlaid with assumptions from the past, many of which are not helpful for dealing with the precarious in our own time, primary experience has to be rectified by detecting and casting out these assumptions.

The way in which philosophers may use primary experience to test the value of any philosophy, is by asking whether the philosophy does, in fact, yield clarification of primary experience. Does it cast out assumptions from the past, which leave primary experience more opaque than it was before? If not, it cannot be a useful tool for finding solutions to problematic situations. And, as I have argued in this chapter, if a philosophy doesn't provide such a tool, it is not a good philosophy, since the precarious forces itself on us. Though philosophers have sometimes attempted to deal with the precarious by relegating it to a realm of appearance, its existence cannot be denied. We keep bumping into it in our everyday life.

An ancient philosopher such as Plato may be excused for relegating the precarious to a realm of appearance, rather than suggesting methods for dealing with it, since he did not have modern advanced sciences for controlling the material conditions of life. The only recourse open to him was to subordinate the precarious to a higher, perfectly stable realm -- the heaven of Forms. Perhaps this was, for Plato, the best means available for dealing with life's predicaments. Even if one cannot control the material

conditions of life, one can find happiness in contemplating esthetic objects. So perhaps Plato did not violate Dewey's criterion. He gave the best solution available, at that time and in that place, for dealing with the precarious.

Dewey would not agree with this defense of Plato, however, for he accuses Plato of trying to rationalize the existence of a leisure class. But I think we need not accept this interpretation. What Plato may have been doing was giving priority to immaterial values as opposed to material ones, for a good pragmatic reason: It wasn't possible to provide material comforts for everyone in his pre-industrial era.

However, if a philosopher today turns his back on the precarious, relegating it to a realm of mere appearance and advocating that his followers seek solace in an after life, we may well question his motives. Perhaps he is trying support a social system which encompasses a leisure class at the expense of the masses, by offering the masses solace, and encouraging passive acquiescence. The difference in the two cases lies in the means available for extending material comforts to all people. Dewey's criterion says that a philosophy should make our dealings with life's predicaments more fruitful, and perhaps Plato was doing the best he could, under the prevailing conditions, to achieve such a goal. One does not make actions more fruitful by setting goals for which

there are no available means. But when times change and new means are available, it is an error to retain the assumptions that had value in a by-gone age. In our own post-industrial age, the assumption that it is impossible to extend material comforts to all people may be one of the assumptions inherited from the past which obfuscates and distorts. Clarification and emancipation follow when such assumptions are detected and cast out.

The abandonment of Aristotelian astronomy and physics in the seventeenth century is a good example of detecting and casting out outworn assumptions which fail the task of clarifying and assisting dealings with life's predicaments. However, Dewey makes the point that in this case, more was thrown out than was necessary. Dewey sees the abandonment of Aristotelian science as to the merit of seventeenth century philosophers. But to their discredit was their throwing out of the Aristotelian doctrine of natural ends as well. We can see the reasons for this sweeping rejection of Aristotle in the context of problems existing at that time.

the Aristotelian metaphysics of potentiality and actuality, of objects consummatory of natural processes, was intricately entangled with an astronomy and physics which had become incredible. It was also entangled with doctrines and institutions in politics and economics which were fast getting out of relationship to current social needs. The simplest recourse was to treat tradition as the Jonah of science and throw it bodily overboard. The method was imperious and impatient, but it served a need. By a single act it

relieved scientific inquiries of notions that were hampering, even paralyzing investigation into nature and that were limiting new practices by outworn sanctions.¹⁴

So the doctrine of natural ends was swept out with the rest. The sweeping abandonment of Aristotle by seventeenth century philosophers served a useful function at that time, yet it created problems for posterity. The total abandonment of the doctrine of natural ends left a serious metaphysical problem, namely that of how to relate the mathematico-mechanical natural realm of science to ends -- to consummations of processes. The mechanical world, ruled by relations of cause and effect, became the object of scientific knowledge, replacing the old assumption that the objects of science were fixed ends, or in other words, final causes.

The new assumption of the mechanical world as scientific object was then coupled with an old assumption that was not abandoned, but should have been. This was the doctrine that only objects of scientific knowledge are real. According to the old assumption, science has as its goal contemplation of true Being. This assumption was retained, but true Being was now the mathematico-mechanical realm, devoid of ends. Consequently, a problem arose

¹⁴Ibid., p. 134.

concerning where to place ends or values in the scheme of things. Since they had been banished from the natural realm, a new subjective mental realm had to be created as a locus for ends. The dualism of mind set over against nature was adopted, and the problems of modern philosophy, concerning the relations between mind and matter, ethics and science, etc., were created. But these problems could be resolved today by taking a new look at both the assumptions rejected by seventeenth century mechanists, and those retained.

Dewey's way of resolving the problem encompasses two points. First, the assumption retained from the past, that only cognitive objects are real, should be abandoned. Simultaneously, the assumption of the reality of natural ends should be revived, although our way of conceiving such ends must be revised. They should not be thought of as fixed, eternal Forms, but as experienced consummations of histories, which are relative ends. An end terminates one historical process and initiates another. Second, the objects of science should not be thought of as esthetic, purely contemplative immediate possessions of true Being. Instead, the objects of science should be thought of as relations of cause and effect between experienced goods, which may be used as means for making values more secure and extending the enjoyment of consummations to more people.

Not all ends are human values. Those which are values must be distinguished from those which are not. Science is the means for making such distinctions and for securing the values which are distinguished as such.

Metaphysical Foundations of Dewey's Theory of the Self:
Histories, Ends, and Qualities

Dewey's theory of natural ends involves other generic characteristics of existence, in addition to the precarious and the stable. Histories, ends, and qualities are also generic characteristics, which are fundamental for an understanding of Dewey's theory of the self, so I shall explicate these now, in concluding this chapter on the metaphysical foundations of Dewey's theory of the self.

Dewey's metaphysics commits him to making events, rather than substances, primary. The precarious and the stable are characteristics of situations rather than substances, and situations are intersections of events. Similarly, histories are made up of events, not substances, and the events that compose a history are distinguished from one another by relative ends. Dewey gives the following explication of histories and ends as generic characteristics of existence.

Empirically ... there is a history which is a succession of histories, and in which any

event is at once both beginning of one course and close of another; is both transitive and static.¹⁵

Histories are the successive relations of events, and they have both beginnings and ends, but no fixed origins nor final ends. Beginnings are always ends of previous histories, and ends are beginnings of new histories. So the ends that are generic traits of existence are not final ends, but relative. They are, in Dewey's words, events which are both transitive and static. The subject-matter of science is made up of the historical relations of events being discussed here.

However, though histories have no final ends, nature does have its finalities, in the form of immediate qualities.

To the empirical thinker, immediate enjoyment and suffering are the conclusive exhibition and evidence that nature has its finalities as well as its relationships ... without immediate qualities those relationships with which science deals, would have no footing in existence.¹⁶

Knowledge, then, is of relationships between events, but the qualities of events are not the sort of things that can be objects of knowledge.

Things in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable, not because they are remote or behind some impenetrable veil of sensations

¹⁵Expereince and Nature, p. 100.

¹⁶Ibid., p.86.

or ideas, but because knowledge has no concern with them.¹⁷

So qualities of events, the histories which relate events, and the ends that provide relative differentiation of successive histories are among the generic characteristics of existence disclosed by primary experience, along with the stable and the precarious.

As Dewey indicates in the following passage, the generic characteristics of existence, as explicated in his metaphysics, namely, histories, ends, and qualities, the stable and the precarious, provide the framework for his theory of inquiry to be developed in the remaining chapters of this dissertation. The generic characteristics show why inquiry is necessary and provide the foundations on which to build in showing the nature of inquiry, which Dewey refers to in the following passage as "criticism" and "intelligence":

To note, register and define the constituent structure of nature is not then an affair neutral to the office of criticism. It is a preliminary outline of the field of criticism, whose chief import is to afford understanding of the necessity and nature of the office of intelligence.¹⁸

Dewey's theory of existence or nature provides an outline

¹⁷Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 422.

or framework for his theory of criticism, intelligence, or in other words, inquiry. And since inquiry is part of the theory of the self, Dewey's theory of existence provides a framework for his theory of the self.

Chapter 3

THE SELF:

AN INTEGRATION TO BE ACHIEVED

In this chapter and the next I shall present my interpretation of Dewey's naturalistic theory of the self. This chapter will be an analysis of Dewey's concept of the self, emphasizing the role of inquiry, habit and impulse in that theory. The next chapter will be a further development of the theory of the self, and will apply the analysis of the self to the problem of meeting the challenges of a rapidly changing society. The presentation of the theory of self to be given in these two chapters provides the background for the naturalistic analysis of the process of making judgments of 'good' and 'right' to be given in Chapter 5.

Dewey's Theory of the Self Contrasted with Theories

Rejected by Him

I shall start my presentation of Dewey's theory of the self by contrasting it with certain theories and assumptions rejected by Dewey. By contrasting Dewey with these positions, we shall get some preliminary insights into what the self is, for Dewey. I shall then go on to fill in the details,

building upon these preliminary insights.

As the title of this chapter implies, one assumption rejected by Dewey is the traditional theory of the self as a presupposed unity outside of nature. For Dewey, contrary to this traditional analysis, the integration or unity of the self is not a given datum. "Integration of the self is an achievement rather than a datum."¹

The fact that the self, for Dewey, requires integration suggests to me that the self has parts. It is not a simple entity. Dewey confirms this hypothesis as follows:

Inconsistencies and shiftings in character are the commonest things in experience. Only the hold of a traditional conception of the singleness and simplicity of soul and self blinds us to perceiving what they mean: the relative fluidity and diversity of the constituents of selfhood. There is no one ready-made self behind activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one another, and assume a certain consistency of configuration....²

This paragraph suggests that the parts of the self are such things as attitudes, habits and impulses. The self is a complex of psychological factors.

A second point emphasized by Dewey's rejection of

¹John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (1922; rpt. New York: Random House, 1930), p. 38.

²Human Nature and Conduct, p. 138.

the traditional concept of the self as a presupposed unity outside of nature is the fact that, for Dewey, the self is not outside of nature, or the universe, but is one term of a distinction within nature. Certain histories (series of causes and effects within nature) contain the self, which is both cause and effect within these histories. The fact that the self is an effect within nature as well as a cause needs stressing, since in an early essay titled "The Ego as Cause," Dewey rejected the libertarian idea of the Ego as cause. I want to make it clear that when I say that the self for Dewey is both cause and effect, I am not attributing to him the position he rejected there.

In the essay "The Ego as Cause,"³ Dewey rejected the libertarian position on freedom of the will, according to which freedom consists of choices caused by an uncaused ego outside of nature. Dewey's libertarian opponents make the ego a cause, but not an effect, while for Dewey the self is both cause and effect. Dewey, siding with determinists, agrees that there is choice, but unlike the libertarians, Dewey holds that this choice is the result of a process of deliberation within nature. The subject of such deliberation is a natural self, consisting of habits, desires, etc.

³John Dewey, "The Ego as Cause," in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston, 4 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971).

And choice of one alternative rather than another requires a difference in the deliberating self, whereas the libertarians' Ego does not seem to be differentiated according to the choice made. For Dewey, no entity, such as an ego outside of nature, is required as efficient cause of the choice. All that is necessary is that there be choice and that the choice results from the particular characteristics -- desires, interests, etc. -- of the deliberating individual self. And of course these desires and interests have evolved in a process of interaction between organism and environment. The self, for Dewey, has a developmental history. There are causes of the particular self having the characteristics that it has. The self has a place in a causal history. It is not outside of nature, or the universe, but is one term of a distinction within nature.

We distinguish the self as subject, and histories containing the self, from its objects, and histories which do not contain the self, for the practical purpose of gaining control over nature, and over our own development, but both subject and object remain within primary experience and within nature, the object of experience. The distinction between subject and object, self and world, is a product of refined experience, made for the purpose of enriching and controlling primary experience. As was brought out in the last chapter, any product of refined experience has as its sole value the clarification and controllability it gives

to primary experience. This applies significantly to the distinction of self and world, subject and object, the mental and the physical. (I take these to be, for Dewey, three formulations of the same distinction. The following quotation clearly equates the psychological or mental with the subject, and Chapter 6 of Experience and Nature suggests the equivalence of "selfhood" and "subjectivity." The self for Dewey is a psychological matter.)

To a truly naturalistic empiricism, the moot problem of the relation of subject and object is the problem of what consequences follow in and for primary experience from the distinction of the physical and the psychological or mental from each other. The answer is not far to seek. To distinguish in reflection the physical and to hold it in temporary detachment is to be set upon the road that conducts to tools and technologies to construction of mechanisms, to the arts that ensue in the wake of the sciences. That these constructions make possible a better regulation of the affairs of primary experience is evident. Engineering and medicine, all the utilities that make for expansion of life, are the answer.⁴

Philosophical problems arise when the distinction of subject and object on the secondary, reflective level of experience is seen as a fixed bifurcation on the primary level, rather than as a functional distinction made for the purpose of producing greater unification and control of primary experience.

⁴Experience and Nature, p. 10.

If physical nature is seen as finished, complete in itself, an object to be known by a passive self outside of nature, and which does not produce changes in nature, that passive self must be seen as impotent and opposed to an indifferent nature. But this picture of an impotent self outside of nature is contrary to the fact that advance in scientific knowledge has resulted in greater control over the conditions of human life.

The history of the development of the physical sciences is the story of the enlarging possession by mankind of more efficacious instrumentalities for dealing with the conditions of life and action. But when one neglects the connection of these scientific objects with the affairs of primary experience, the result is a picture of a world of things indifferent to human interests because it is wholly apart from experience. It is more than merely isolated, for it is set in opposition. Hence when it is viewed as fixed and final in itself it is a source of oppression to the heart and paralysis to imagination.⁵

This pessimistic picture, in traditional thought, of a world of things wholly apart from and indifferent to, experience and the self, was considered in the last chapter as due to the seventeenth century abandonment of the Aristotelian doctrine of natural ends, and the simultaneous retention of the assumption that only objects of knowledge are real. This led to the conclusion that only the mathematico-mechanical world of modern physical science is real. Qualities and values are thrust out of the realm of nature and come to rest

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

in the experiencing self conceived as spiritual substance, as opposed to the material substance of the realm of nature. Dewey summarizes this alienating of the self from nature as follows:

When real objects are identified, point for point, with knowledge-objects, all affectional and volitional objects are inevitably excluded from the 'real' world, and are compelled to find refuge in the privacy of an experiencing subject or mind. Thus the notion of the ubiquity of all comprehensive cognitive experience results by a necessary logic in setting up a hard and fast wall between the experiencing subject and that nature which is experienced. The self becomes not merely a pilgrim but an unnaturalized and unnaturalizable alien in the world. (my emphasis)⁶

(This passage gives further evidence that Dewey equates the subject with the self.)

As I have suggested in several articles on naturalism in ethics,^{7,8,9} this picture of the self alienated from nature leads to an antinaturalistic ethics, since values are sharply separated from facts. According to this anti-naturalistic view, the function of science is to discover pre-existent unchanging facts about the world as it exists independently of man. Science has nothing to do with value,

⁶ Ibid., p. 24.

⁷ May Leavenworth, "On Integrating Fact and Value," Zygon, 4 (March, 1969), 33-43.

⁸ May Leavenworth, "On the Impotence of Unnatural Values," Zygon, 4 (Sept., 1969), 281-5.

⁹ May Leavenworth, "A Suggestion for an Interdisciplinary Approach to Ethics," Zygon, 8 (June, 1973), 135-147.

for its concern is with the fixed, unchanging mathematico-mechanical order of nature, from which values have been excluded. Given such a conception of nature, science is purely descriptive. It seeks to describe a value-free nature, while judgments of value, acceptances and rejections, are left to non-scientific, non-natural methods of verification, such as intuition or Pure Reason, or as in the case of emotivism, are declared to be noncognitive expressions of emotion.

In order to make judgments of value once more subject to verification by scientific method, the method of intelligence, which is Dewey's objective, we must abandon this picture of the self as "an unnaturalized and unnaturalizable alien in the world." The objective of this chapter is to present Dewey's naturalistic conception of the self, which places the self within nature and sees human values, acceptances and rejections, once more as real traits of nature. As long as the self is conceived as private and cut off from the objection world, to make science a means of enhancing the values of that self would mean losing the objectivity of science. Dewey asks the question, "Why perturbation at the intimation that science is inherently an instrument of critically determining what is good and bad in the way of acceptance and rejection?" And he gives the following answer:

I can see but one answer. The realm of desire, belief, search, choice is thought of as 'subjective' in a sense which isolates it from natural existence and which makes it an inexplicable irruption. This is the reason for sharp separation of belief and knowledge. Aversion to making science a means of determining the right operation of personal factors ... is well grounded if the personal is outside of nature. Made a means to something personal conceived in this sense, sciences loses its objectivity, and becomes infected with the traits which characterize the merely private and arbitrary.¹⁰

In order to avoid loss of scientific objectivity, while also making science a means to securing human values, to guiding acceptances and rejections, the objectivity of the self must be restored. The self which accepts and rejects must be conceived as an object, a psychological process within nature. And scientific method must be seen as the method for guiding this psychological process toward better acceptances and rejections.

In order to put the self back into nature, thereby accomplishing a naturalizing of the self and its values, one premise that must be rejected is the assumption that only cognitive objects are real. That is we must reject the assumption that cognitive objects alone make up nature. I referred to this assumption in the last chapter in connection with Dewey's metaphysics in which qualities

¹⁰Experience and Nature, p. 423.

are real generic characteristics of existence. I pointed out then that Dewey rejected the assumption that only cognitive objects are real. This point bears repeating here because recognition of the reality of qualities is necessary if we are to reject the separation of self and values from nature and reality. If esthetic and ethical objects are to be thought of as real, in addition to cognitive objects, then qualities must be conceived as real. In Dewey's words,

The only way to avoid a sharp separation between the mind which is the centre of the processes of experiencing and the natural world which is experienced is to acknowledge that all modes of experiencing are ways in which some genuine traits of nature come to manifest realization.¹¹

Cognitive objects are real, but so are the objects of other modes of experiencing. Not only are the relations which are the objects of scientific inquiry real, but so are the changing qualities between which scientific relations hold.

A second assumption that must be abandoned, in addition to the assumption that only cognitive objects are real, is the idea that only that which is eternal and unchanging is real. In classical philosophy, that is Greek and Medieval philosophy, this assumption was linked with the quest for certainty, since only if the objects of

¹¹Ibid., p. 24.

knowledge are eternal and unchanging can they be known with finality. And since in classical philosophy objects of knowledge were also supreme objects of value, values too must be eternal. After the scientific revolution with its sharp split between objects of knowledge and objects of value, the principle that objects of knowledge must be unchanging was not abandoned, but was altered so that, though change occurs and is real, the order of change is unchanging. But the idea that objects of value in their own separate realm must be unchanging was retained.

It was not until the advent of Darwin that the shift of interest from the fixed to the changing was extended to the realm of human values. In his article, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," Dewey writes,

When Descartes said: "The nature of physical things is much more easily conceived when they are beheld coming gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as produced at once in a finished and perfect state," the modern world became self-conscious of the logic that was henceforth to control it, the logic of which Darwin's 'Origin of Species' is the latest scientific achievement ... But prior to Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, mind, and politics had been arrested, because between these ideal or moral interests and the inorganic world intervened the kingdom of plants and animals. The gates of the garden of life were barred to the new ideas; and only through this garden was there access to mind and politics. The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed

the new logic for application to mind and morals and life.¹²

As long as there was no continuity between man and the inorganic realm of physical science, the methods of science could not be applied to man. Although the interest of physical science could be in how changes occur, man continued to be conceived as having absolute, fixed origins, and final, eternal ends. In order for interest in man and his values to shift from final ends such as salvation of the soul to the specific generating conditions of practical values, the new logic of change had to be applied to living things. And Darwin's Origin of Species provided the connecting link, allowing the methods that had proved so effective in studying change on the physical level to be applied to changing life-forms. Dewey says the following about the transformation in intellectual interest effected by the Darwinian logic:

Interest shifts from the wholesale essence back of special changes to the question of how special changes serve and defeat concrete purposes; shifts from an intelligence that shaped things once for all to the particular intelligences which things are even now shaping; shifts from an ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice and happiness that intelligent administration of existent conditions may beget and that present carelessness or stupidity will destroy or forego.¹³

¹²John Dewey, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy: And other Essays in Contemporary Thought (1910; rpt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 8-9.

¹³Ibid., p. 15.

When man and his values are seen as evolving, and individual selves are seen as administering transitions in values, changes in our conception of the self have occurred. The self is no longer seen as a fixed unity behind all apparent changes, as in Hegel's theory of the Absolute self manifesting itself through finite selves. Rather, both society and individual selves are seen to be evolving. Individual selves are both causes and effects within developing natural histories. And human inquiry, not the Absolute self, is the moving force effecting this evolution of both individual selves and society.

I may now summarize the insights into Dewey's theory of the self gleaned from the foregoing contrast between Dewey's conception of the self and theories rejected by him. First was the insight that, for Dewey, the self is not a simple presupposed unity, but is complex. It is a complex of psychological factors such as habits and impulses. Second, the self is within nature. It is not a passive entity sharply set off against a nature complete apart from the self, but is continuous with nature and performs a role in determining nature's course.

A further point in the foregoing discussion which needs emphasizing is the role played by Dewey's theory of the self in his naturalistic ethics. Only when the self is seen as continuous with nature studied by science can a naturalistic ethics such as Dewey's be a viable position.

A naturalistic ethics must study histories of which the self is a part. It seeks to understand the conditions and consequences of the values held by selves. It must see values as really existing within nature and so as fit for study by the methods of science. And since values are qualitative, qualities must be seen as real. Finally, since qualities are in flux, the assumption that only that which is fixed and unchanging is real must be abandoned. Values are qualities between which science seeks relations, and are as real as those relations.

I shall now build upon these insights. First, what is the self? I shall give a brief summary of what I take to be Dewey's answer to this question. The remainder of the chapter will build upon this introduction.

Dewey's Theory of the Self as a System of Habits and Impulses Guided by Inquiry

Dewey's theory of the self is a study in social behaviorism. The self is a system of habits and impulses, guided in their development by inquiry, which is a social function.¹⁴ This is what is meant when Dewey places the self within nature, rather than making it a unity external to nature and experience. The self is not a simple unity at all, but a

¹⁴The self's characteristics of mind, consciousness, and reflexivity will be explained in my analysis of inquiry to come later in this chapter.

complex of habits and impulses requiring unification. Earlier in this chapter I indicated that the self for Dewey has parts, and we saw that these parts are the habits and impulses requiring unification. We can think of the self as an object in nature interacting or transacting with environmental objects. When we think of the self in this way, the self is an individual's system of habits and impulses guided by intelligence, or in other words, inquiry. When we analyze this system as I shall be doing in this chapter, and as Dewey does in Human Nature and Conduct, we make the self an object. The self becomes an object to itself. We can criticize our own habits as we would criticize the habits of others. Yet at the same time that the self is an object, it also is seen as subject. The self is the subject guiding its own experience in the process of adapting or adjusting to the environment. When we make the self an object of experience what we experience is the activity of the self adapting to the environment, and achieving integration as it adapts.

We distinguish the self as subject from its objects for the purposes of gaining greater control over the environment. We must distinguish histories which contain the self from those that do not. The physical scientist studies those histories, those causal processes, that do not contain the self. The whole object of physical science is to minimize the effects of the self upon the histories

being studied. This is what is meant by objectivity in science. But when we turn to the study of social sciences and ethics the whole object is to make selves, with their conditions and consequences, objects. We want to know what causes selves to develop the particular system of habits and impulses that they do develop. We may even want to know what makes our own character what it is. A person's particular system of habits is his character. And the reason we want to know the conditions causing our character to be what it is is because such knowledge gives control. Such knowledge enables us, to some extent, to choose our own character. When a particular history becomes an object of knowledge it is susceptible to control. This is true of social sciences and ethics, as well as psysical sciences. When we know the conditions of any effect, whether the effect be one studied by physical science, or an effect on character development studied by social sciences and ethics, the knowledge provides the possibility of control. When we gain knowledge of a history of which the self was formerly not a member, this history may be converted into one of which the self is a member and so it becomes a history over which we have the possibility of control.

As will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 5, the distinguishing characteristic of ethics is that, in ethics, the character of the self is our concern. We want to know what sort of character we are forming and to have

control over this process of formation.

By contrasting Dewey with theories of the self rejected by him, I have been trying to gain insights into what the self is, for Dewey. But care must be taken not to interpret the self as something static. Dewey's theory is that the self is always in the process of becoming. If I try to say just what the self is, the best I can do is to say that it is an organism with a dynamic set of habits and impulses, guided by intelligence (which Dewey also refers to as inquiry) toward goals that integrate the organism and its environment. Intelligence is the process of inquiry, so in other words, individual selves are organisms with dynamic sets of habits and impulses guided in their development by the process of inquiry which integrates the organism and the environment. But such a summary statement of the theory of the self needs to be supplemented by an analysis of the parts that make up the self, namely, intelligence (or in other words, inquiry), habit, and impulse.

An Analysis of the Concept of "Inquiry" in Dewey's Theory of the Self

The complex concept of "inquiry" or "intelligence" is central in the network of concepts that make up Dewey's theory of the self, so I shall start my analysis of Dewey's theory of

the self with an analysis of inquiry.¹⁵ This inquiry into inquiry will provide the starting point for an analysis of the self, since I have interpreted Dewey as holding that the self is an organism with a set of habits and impulses guided in their development by inquiry. So an analysis of the self must be an analysis of the concepts of "inquiry," "habits," and "impulses," and must show the interrelations of these components in the process by which selves come into existence and develop.

My analysis of "inquiry," the first of these components, will involve a breakdown of inquiry into the psychological capacities involved in inquiry. Capacities such as perceiving, formulating meanings, imagining, and deliberating are all capacities of the self involved in adapting to the environment. Inquiry involving these capacities is what distinguishes human selves from animals. This discussion of inquiry will be followed by an analysis of habit and impulse, the other two factors interrelated with intelligence in Dewey's theory of the self, especially as that theory appears in Human Nature and Conduct.

¹⁵In Chapter 1, I gave Dewey's definition of inquiry as "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into a determinate one." My analysis of "inquiry" here will show the psychological capacities involved in such processes of transformation.

Although inquiry distinguishes human selves from lower animals, the pattern of inquiry in man is continuous with lower life-behavior. In his major work on the theory of inquiry, Dewey writes

The structure and course of life-behavior has a definite pattern, spatial and temporal. This pattern definitely foreshadows the general pattern of inquiry. For inquiry grows out of an earlier state of settled adjustment, which, because of disturbance, is indeterminate or problematic (corresponding to the first phase of tensional activity), and then passes into inquiry proper, (corresponding to the searching and exploring activities of an organism); when the search is successful, belief or assertion is the counterpart, upon this level, of redintegration upon the organic level. (my italics)¹⁶

This passage indicates the relation between Dewey's metaphysics presented in the last chapter, and his theory of inquiry, for the generic trait of stability is exemplified by the "earlier state of settled adjustment," i.e. adjustment between the organism and its environment. The precarious is indicated by the disturbance of that adjustment; and the process of inquiry is a history relating the earlier problematic situation to the belief or assertion which brings that history to an end. This end is, of course, also a beginning of new inquiries. Although Dewey doesn't refer to quality in this passage, every event referred to on the human level has quality, from the initial disturbance, through the various phases of inquiry, to the satisfaction that

¹⁶Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 34.

characterizes the consummation of the inquiry, in belief or assertion.

The continuity discussed in the quoted passage, between the searching and exploring activities of animals and human inquiry, is a further exemplification of the fact that existence is characterized by histories with direction, and ends that are also transitive. Human inquiry is not just a repetition of animal exploration; but the new elements involved are continuous with the old.

An attempt to show the continuity between animal exploration and human inquiry would be beyond the scope of this dissertation, so I shall go directly to an exposition of the new capacities that distinguish human inquiry from the exploring activities of lower animals. The first of these that I shall consider is the capacity to perceive-a-state-of-affairs,¹⁷ where by a state of affairs Dewey means a succession of events, a history. A state of affairs is a history.

This perceiving-of-a-state-of-affairs does not require acceptance of some new kind of metaphysical existence called "mind." It is perfectly explicable in terms of the generic traits of existence already introduced, for the perceiving-of-a-state-of-affairs is itself a state of affairs. "When

¹⁷Dewey uses hyphens to connect the perceiving with the state of affairs perceived to stress the impossibility of separating, existentially, the perceiving from its object.

a state of affairs is perceived, the perceiving-of-a-state-of-affairs is a further state of affairs."¹⁸ The perceiving-of-a-state-of-affairs is a new kind of history that has evolved, and like all histories is continuous with preceding and successive histories, which are its conditions and consequences. The existence of animal searching and exploring activities is one condition of emergence in man of perceiving-of-states-of-affairs.

Dewey refers to the state of affairs perceived as a "situation" or "field of consciousness," and gross experience shows it to be a more or less loosely connected diversity of events

falling within boundaries sufficiently definite to be capable of being approximately traced ... For this reason, and not because of any unique properties of a separate kind of existence, called psychic or mental, every situation or field of consciousness is marked by initiation, direction or intent, and consequence or import.¹⁹

That is, gross experience shows every situation, or state of affairs perceived, to be a history which can be approximately marked off with beginning, direction and end. This is just an elaboration of what was said in the last chapter about histories and ends being generic characteristics of existence.

However, Dewey goes on to point out that the truly unique thing about the perceiving-of-a-state-of-affairs is

¹⁸Experience and Nature, p. 101.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 101.

not these traits of the state of affairs perceived, but is the property of perception or awareness of such histories. Because of this property, together with memory of previous similar states of affairs, human selves can get goals for themselves.

The initial stage (of a history) is capable of being judged in the light of its probable course and consequence. There is anticipation. Each successive event being a stage in a serial process is both expectant and commemorative. What is more precisely pertinent to our present theme, the terminal outcome when anticipated (as it is when a moving cause of affairs is perceived) becomes an end-in-view, an aim, purpose, a prediction usable as an plan in shaping the course of events.²⁰

This discussion of the role of perception of inquiry suggests several other psychological capacities that distinguish human selves from animals and are involved in Dewey's theory of intelligence. They are therefore crucial elements in his theory of the self, since the self is the system of habits and impulses guided by intelligence. So I shall summarize these capacities here and indicate the role of each in inquiry. They are: 1) the capacity to formulate meanings and predict consequences, a capacity made possible by imagination and memory; 2) the capacity to deliberate, made possible by the ability to inhibit response; and 3) the ability to carry out a systematic inquiry to a consummatory conclusion, a capacity

²⁰Ibid., p.101.

made possible by emotion converted into interest.

First, imagination is made possible by the capacity to perceive-a-state-of-affairs, together with the capacity of memory. Dewey gives the following definition of "imagination":

In a definite sense the only meaning that can be assigned the term 'imagination' is that things unrealized in fact come home to us and have power to stir us.²¹

When action is blocked, so that a life-process is not allowed to go to completion, an organism with the capacity to perceive histories and to recall past histories can project the idea of the completion of the history. This is the functioning of imagination. Dewey says of such a projected idea:

in itself it is a fancy which may be only a phantasy, a dream, a castle in the air. In itself it is a romantic embellishment of the present; at its best it is material for poetry or the novel. Its natural home is not in the future but in the dim past or in some distant and supposedly better part of the present world.²²

However, imagination also gives human selves the capacity to take a history or part of a history immediately present as a sign or symbol of what is not present, and so to form meanings. Such reflective imagination gives human selves the

²¹John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 43.

²²Human Nature and Conduct, p. 234.

power to learn sequences of cause and effect. It is a necessary condition for scientific inquiry. More will be said about this capacity to form meanings in my discussion of language and communication to come later in this chapter.

The capacity to form meanings provides, for Dewey, the defining characteristic of mind. Mind is present as a characteristic of events only when a psycho-physical organism has acquired the capacity to form meanings, to take a part of a history immediately present as a sign or symbol of what is not present. Mind, for Dewey, is not an entity, but is the characteristic of events in which qualities of a present act have meaning. When acts become qualified by meanings they are mental. Mind may be thought of, then, as the whole system of meanings that have been acquired by a self.

Consciousness may then be defined, for Dewey, as that subclass of meanings which are, in a present situation, undergoing change. Consciousness consists of those meanings on which attention is presently being focussed. It denotes the perception or awareness of meanings. And since to be aware of meanings is to be aware of the self, consciousness is self-awareness.

The difference between meaning where consciousness does not yet exist, and meaning involving consciousness, reflexivity, or self-awareness, may be illustrated by an infant learning the meaning of its cries. At first the infant

cries instinctively, and the cries have meaning for the mother who takes the cries as signs that the infant needs her attention. But the infant is not aware that its cries have this meaning. At this stage, the infant is not aware of the meaning of its own cries. The infant is not yet conscious. A self which is reflexive has not yet developed. But eventually the child learns that his cries have the consequence of attracting his mother's attention, and he cries with the intention of attracting his mother's attention. At this stage, the cries have acquired meaning for the infant. The infant has become conscious or self-aware. He has developed a self which is reflexive. He has acquired the capacity to form meanings for himself.

The capacity to form meanings gives man the power to learn how his own actions may become the conditions of desired consequences. He can form aims, purposes.

A fancy becomes an aim, in short, when some past sequence of known cause-and-effect is projected into the future, and when by assembling its causal conditions we strive to generate a like result. We have to fall back upon what has already happened naturally without design, and study it to see how it happened, which is what is meant by causation. This knowledge joined to wish creates a purpose.²³

In the second quote on page 86, Dewey writes that an aim, purpose, or end-in-view is a prediction usable in planning a course of action. Such planning implies the

²³Human Nature and Conduct, p. 235.

second capacity summarized above, which distinguishes man from animals, and that is the capacity to inhibit immediate responses to stimuli. Inhibition results from conflicting ends-in-view presenting themselves when action is blocked. This condition leads to deliberation, the dramatic rehearsal in imagination of alternative courses of action. The moving force of each end-in-view presented is strengthened or weakened by consideration of its consequences. This does not mean that the future consequence causes change in present attitudes, but that contemplation of a future end causes present pleasure or pain, which is the cause of the strengthening or inhibiting of the moving force of the end-in-view. Dewey writes,

Whenever a future object is thought of as an end, the thought arouses a present pleasure or discomfort. And any present enjoyment or disagreeableness strengthens or weakens the hold of its particular object upon our attention. It intensifies or reduces the moving force of the object thought of.²⁴

So deliberation goes on until one end-in-view emerges which imagination pictures as resolving the conflicting aims.

The occasion of deliberation is an excess of preferences, not natural apathy or an absence of likings. We want things that are incompatible with one another: therefore we have to make a choice of what we really want, of the course of action, that is, which most fully releases activities. Choice is not the emergence of

²⁴ John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (1932; rpt. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 41.

preference out of indifference. It is the emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences. Biases that had held one another in check now temporarily at least, reinforce one another, and constitute a unified attitude. The moment arrives when imagination pictures an objective consequence of action which supplies an adequate stimulus and releases definitive action.²⁵

This end of deliberation, however, is not the end of inquiry, for the action that deliberation has decided upon must, in fact, achieve the desired resolution before the inquiry is brought to a close. The end of deliberation is a hypothesis that is confirmed or disconfirmed by overt action.

In Art as Experience, Dewey writes of an inquiry brought to completion as an example of having an experience. The complete experience, from initial problematic situation to successful consummation, is unified by a pervading quality that is emotional as well as intellectual. This quality is emotion transformed into interest. So emotion is necessary for the third capacity involved in Dewey's theory of inquiry summarized here, namely that of carrying an inquiry to a consummatory conclusion. Emotion transformed into interest is as necessary for the abstract inquiries of scientist and philosopher as for moral inquiry or the inquiries of the artist in the process of creating a work of fine art. In all of these activities, the emotional and intellectual are unified in a single quality which pervades the inquiry and

²⁵Human Nature and Conduct, p. 193.

gives it the impetus necessary to keep it on track until the consummation, the solution of the problem is reached.

There are absorbing inquiries and speculations which a scientific man and philosopher will recall as 'experiences' in the emphatic sense. In final import they are intellectual. But in their actual occurrence they were emotional as well; they were purposive and volitional. Yet the experience was not a sum of these different characters; they were lost in it as distinctive traits. No thinker can ply his occupation save as he is lured and rewarded by total integral experiences that are intrinsically worth while. Without them he would never know what it is really to think and would be completely at a loss in distinguishing real thought from the spurious article. Thinking goes on in trains of ideas, but the ideas form a train only because they are much more than what an analytic psychology calls ideas. They are phases, emotionally and practically distinguished, of a developing underlying quality.²⁶

Intelligence (inquiry) merges emotion with intellect. One may apply intelligence passionately in the attempt to solve any kind of problem. Intelligence is not cold, dispassionate intellect. Rather, an intelligent self takes an interest in its active pursuits of ends. In the following passage from A Common Faith, Dewey contrasts his conception of intelligence with the older conception of reason opposed to emotion:

Intelligence, as distinct from the older conception of reason, is inherently involved in action. Moreover, there is no opposition between it and emotion. There is such a

²⁶ John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934; rpt. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), p. 37.

thing as passionate intelligence, as ardor in behalf of light shining into the murky places of social existence, and as zeal for its refreshing and purifying effect. The whole story of man shows that there are no objects that may not deeply stir engrossing emotion. One of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is that of devotion, so intense as to be religious, to intelligence as a force in social action ... To say that emotions which are not fused with intelligence are blind is tautology. Intense emotion may utter itself in action that destroys institutions. But the only assurance of birth of better ones is the marriage of emotion with intelligence.²⁷

The characteristics that distinguish human inquiry from animal exploration may now be summed up as the capacities to perceive histories, to formulate meanings and predict consequences, to inhibit responses, to deliberate, and to carry out a systematic inquiry to a consummatory conclusion. My analysis of inquiry as the central concept in Dewey's theory of the self has led to these capacities as characterizing inquiry. They are defining characteristics of inquiry, and it is these characteristics that are crucial for the growth and integration of the self.

But has my analysis of inquiry gone far enough? Are the capacities summarized the most basic capacities of the self engaging in inquiry? I think not, for all of these capacities depend, ultimately, on imagination; and

²⁷ A Common Faith, pp. 79-80.

language, which is communication, makes imagination possible. Since imagination does not exist until there is language, ultimately it is language that distinguishes human inquiry from animal searching and exploring activities. Dewey writes as follows, about language:

Nevertheless it (language) is a fact of such distinction that its occurrence changed dumb creatures -- as we so significantly call them -- into thinking and knowing animals and created the realm of meanings.²⁸

Because of the importance of language I shall return to give it more extensive treatment later in this chapter.

The foregoing outline of the psychological elements involved in intelligence may now be related back to Dewey's metaphysics. As I already indicated, the stable in life-behavior is illustrated by a state of adjustment between organism and environment, the precarious by a disturbance of that adjustment. Intelligence in man occurs because of such disturbances. Problematic situations arise and intelligence, involving all of the elements just outlined, is the process, the history, by which a new adjustment is accomplished -- an adjustment which is, of course, only a temporary end, for new problematic situations arise. The real finalities in nature are qualities, which pervade an entire history from the initial disturbance to the new adjustment, the consummatory outcome, of the process of inquiry.

²⁸Experience and Nature, p. 168.

The Concepts of "Habit" and "Impulse" in Dewey's Theory
of the Self

Although the theory of intelligence which I have just been analysing is the central element in Dewey's theory of the self, habit and impulse, as I have already indicated, must also be distinguished as elements inter-related with intelligence in the complex of psychological factors that make up the self. Actually, they have already been implied in the discussion of intelligence, for "habit" and "impulse" represent, respectively, the stable and the precarious elements in the self as a dynamic system of habits and impulses guided in their development by intelligence. "Habit" represents the initial, stable adjustment between organism and environment that precedes inquiry. "Impulse" represents the unstable, novel, unchanneled inclinations that are released when the smooth functioning of habit is disturbed.

In Democracy and Education, Dewey says that "any habit marks an inclination -- an active preference and choice for the conditions involved in its exercise."²⁹ So habits determine present, conventional preferences, i.e., those that are usual for a particular individual. And these preferences that are channeled by habit are bound up with the environmental conditions in their exercise.

²⁹ John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (1916); rpt. New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 48.

Habits are also abilities to perform activities well, as indicated in the following passage: "a habit is a form of executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the environment through control of the organs of action."³⁰ In other words, habits are the expressions of meanings discovered in past interactions with the environment. They represent past recognitions of ones actions as means or conditions for producing ends or consequences. So they incorporate the environmental conditions that existed when these meanings were discovered.

In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey defines the self in terms of habit as follows: "All habit are demands for certain kinds of activity: and they constitute the self."³¹ (my emphasis) Here Dewey seems to be saying that the self is constituted, that is, made up of habits alone. Yet Dewey can't mean this, for this ignores impulse, the precarious element in the self. Since habits mark preferences for the conditions involved in their exercise, a self constituted only of habits would be tied to present environmental conditions. It would be a static self.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 46.

³¹ Human Nature and Conduct, p. 25.

Since habits determine both inclination, or in other words desire for the environmental conditions involved in their exercise, and skill in using those conditions as means to ends, the path of least resistance in action, for a self constituted only of habits, always would be to act out of habit. That is, this would be so if there were no interferences with the functioning of habit, and no other factors such as impulses in the constitution of the self. In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey writes:

Fortunately nature which beckons us to this path of least resistance also puts obstacles in the way of our complete acceptance of its invitation. Success in achieving a ruthless and dull efficiency of action is thwarted by untoward circumstance.³²

Here, "untoward circumstance" represents the precarious in nature. The inevitable precariousness of nature breaks down the smooth flow of habitual interaction, and as Dewey indicates this is fortunate, since it averts a ruthless and dull efficiency of action. The stable is meaningless without the precarious. The precarious in nature releases impulse, the precarious element in the self, and in so doing initiates intelligence in the search for new meaning, which when successful yields consummation. Without specific precarious situations there would be no fulfillments.

³²Human Nature and Conduct, p. 173.

It is forgotten that success is success of a specific effort, and satisfaction the fulfillment of a specific demand, so that success and satisfaction become meaningless when severed from the wants and struggles whose consummations they are, or when taken universally.³³

Yet the practice of intelligence, though initiated and given impetus by the precarious, by impulse, is conditioned by the stable, for habits determine the nature of our perceptions-of-states-of-affairs and the imaginative projections of ends-in-view to be used in planning courses of action. Impulses, in seeking new outlets, must utilize the entire system of existing habits which constitute the character of the individual.

So when Dewey said that habits constitute the self, he must have meant that they provide the formal, stable element in the self. Habits determine character. They are the components of the self which give form to inquiry. "Habits formed in process of exercising biological aptitudes are the sole agents of observation, recollection, foresight and judgment."³⁴ Two individuals with different characters (systems of habits) will foresee different consequences, though they are placed in similar problematic situations.

³³Ibid., p. 175.

³⁴Ibid., p. 176.

A set and disposition of character leads to anticipation of certain kinds of consequences and to passing over other effects of action without notice. A careless man will not be aware of consequences that occur to a prudent man; if they do present themselves to thought, he will not attach the force to them which the careful man does. A crafty character will foresee consequences which will not occur to a frank and open man; if they should happen to come to the mind of the latter, he will be repelled by the very considerations that would attract the sly and intriguing person. Othello and Iago foresee different consequences because they have different kinds of characters.³⁵

Since impulses must utilize the entire system of existing habits as resources in seeking new outlets, i.e. in projecting ends-in-view for consideration in deliberation, a wide diversity of habits is advantageous for the practice of intelligence. "The more numerous our habits the wider the field of possible observation and foretelling."³⁶ However, mere multiplicity of habits is not sufficient for intelligent conduct. The integration of habits is necessary as well:

Character is the interpenetration of habits. If each habit existed in an insulated compartment and operated without affecting or being affected by others, character would not exist. That is, conduct would lack unity being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reactions to separated situations. But since environments overlap, since situations are continuous and those remote from one another contain like elements, a continuous modification³⁷ of habits by one another is constantly going on.

³⁵Theory of the Moral Life, p. 18.

³⁶Human Nature and Conduct, p. 175.

³⁷Ibid., p. 38.

Actually, habits interpenetrate whether we want them to or not. People sometimes try to compartmentalize their lives but succeed only to a limited degree. They keep them apart in consciousness but not in action. Dewey writes:

Character that is unable to undergo successfully the strain of thought and effort required to bring competing tendencies into a unity, builds up barriers between different systems of likes and dislikes. The emotional stress incident to conflict is avoided not by readjustment but by effort at confinement. Yet the exception proves the rule. Such persons are successful in keeping different ways of reacting apart from one another in consciousness rather than in action. Their character is marked by stigmata resulting from this division.³⁸

The strong character is one that succeeds in being conscious of conflicts among beliefs, interests, and habits, and makes adjustments as necessary to bring about a harmony. The strong character recognizes when habits are inconsistent and so is in the best possible position to achieve integration.

We all know what is meant by inconsistent beliefs, but we might wonder what is meant by inconsistency between habits. Israel Scheffler answers this question with a to-the-point quote from William James:

We are all familiar with the phenomenon of personal consistency, which makes two acts jointly valueless for us though each singly holds promise. "The philosopher and the lady-killer cannot both keep house in the same tenement of clay," said William James, and I doubt that he meant here to deny the attractiveness of either

³⁸Ibid., p. 39.

of these careers taken singly and pursued consistently.³⁹

The Role of Communication in Dewey's Theory of the Self

In the foregoing discussion I have indicated that for Dewey integration of the self means achieving consistency of beliefs and habits of an individual. Now I must add that it also means achieving harmony with other people. Integration of the self means more than inner consistency between habits. It also means achieving harmony with the environment. This is because habits require the support of environment conditions for their functioning. Habits are continuous with the environment with which they interact. And people are the most important constituent of the environment with which continuity must be achieved:

The final word about the place of the self in the moral life is, then, that the very problem of morals is to form an original body of impulsive tendencies into a voluntary self in which desires and affections center in the values which are common; in which interest focusses in objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all.⁴⁰

People are not first individuals, selves with ideas, and secondly united into a social group.⁴¹ That puts the cart before the horse. Rather, because people are social, they

³⁹Israel Scheffler, "On Justification and Commitment," Journal of Philosophy, LI (1954), p. 188.

⁴⁰Theory of the Moral Life, p. 168.

⁴¹Experience and Nature, p. 169.

create symbols, they communicate, and through communication ideas, meanings, and the self are created. Without language there would be no self.

In other words, people were first social animals. They were not isolated individuals. Then because they were social, they created symbols which, when passed down from one generation to succeeding generations became language, and in this process of language formation social animals became selves -- persons. Selves and communication developed simultaneously.

Imagination, which has played such an important role in my exposition of Dewey's theory of the self as a dynamic system of habits and impulses, guided by inquiry would not be possible without language. Language makes it possible to be stirred by things unrealized in fact, and as we saw in the quote on page 87, this capacity is imagination.

The capacity to use language is not only the capacity to use an existent thing as a sign, or evidence, from which to infer existences which are not immediately present, as smoke may be a sign from which to infer the existence of fire, but linguistic ability is the capacity to create symbols which serve the purpose of referring to existences not immediately present, and which do not provide evidence of the existence of anything. In fact, linguistic symbols may refer to objects which do not exist at any time or place. In Dewey's Logic, he writes:

I shall, accordingly, in what follows, connect sign and significance, symbol and meaning, respectively, with each other, in order to have terms to designate two different kinds of representative capacity. Linguistically, the choice of terms is more or less arbitrary, although sign and significance have a common verbal root. This consideration is of no importance, however, compared with the necessity of having some words by which to designate the two kinds of representative function. For purposes of theory the important consideration is that existent things, as signs, are evidence of the existence of something else, this something being at the time inferred rather than observed.

But words, or symbols, provide no evidence of any existence. Yet what they lack in this capacity they make up for in creation of another dimension. They make possible ordered discourse or reasoning. For this may be carried on without any of the existences to which symbols apply being actually present: without, indeed, assurance that objects to which they apply anywhere actually exist, and, as in the case of mathematical discourse, without direct reference to existence at all.⁴²

And in Experience and Nature Dewey writes

Of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful... When communication occurs ... events turn into objects, things with a meaning. They may be referred to when they do not exist, and thus be operative among things distant in space and time, through vicarious presence in a new medium ... Events when once they are named lead an independent and double life. In addition to their original existence, they are subject to ideal experimentation: their meanings may be infinitely combined and re-arranged in imagination....⁴³

Imagination is made possible by symbol formation, which

⁴²Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 52-53.

⁴³Experience and Nature, p. 166.

is the first step in creation of language. And language is first and foremost communication. So it is ultimately communication that enables us to formulate in imagination the idea of a goal not now existent, but which may be brought into existence by conjoint human action. We have no ideas of nonexistent things prior to communication. Language which is communication is the means by which ideas are created.

Dewey contrasts his position with that of the Greeks who took ideas to be the forms of things independent of man, rather than recognizing ideas as products of social intercourse carried on by means of language. "They took a work of social art to be nature independent of man."⁴⁴ For Dewey, on the other hand, language is a work of art created by people in converse with each other. But language also has an instrumental use. It is a means to human cooperation.

Language is always a form of action and in its instrumental use is always a means of concerted action for an end, while at the same time it finds in itself all the goods of its possible consequences. For there is no mode of action as fulfilling and as rewarding as is concerted consensus of action. It brings with it the sense of sharing and merging in a whole.⁴⁵

Language is intrinsically connected with community of action. When creatures possess language they can formulate conjointly

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 171.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 184.

the idea of a goal to be achieved by cooperative action. And such cooperative action is fulfilling in itself. It leads to a sense of sharing and merging in a whole.

In the following passage from A Common Faith, Dewey indicates that unification of the self cannot be achieved independently of unification with the environment, and especially without unification with other selves:

it is pertinent to note that the unification of the self throughout the ceaseless flux of what it does, suffers, and achieves, cannot be attained in terms of itself. The self is always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe.⁴⁶

Imagination made possible by language, makes it possible to conceive the self and the Universe with which it is connected, as a whole. And without power to conceive the whole as an imaginative ideal, nonexistent at any time or place, no harmonization of human action would be possible:

The connection between imagination and the harmonizing of the self is closer than is usually thought. The idea of a whole, whether of the whole personal being or of the world, is an imaginative, not a literal, idea. The limited world of our observation and reflection becomes the Universe only through imaginative extension. It cannot be apprehended in knowledge nor realized in reflection. Neither observation, thought, nor practical activity can attain that complete unification of the self which is called a whole.

⁴⁶A Common Faith, p. 19.

The whole self is an ideal, an imaginative projection. Hence the idea of a thoroughgoing and deep-seated harmonizing of the self with the Universe (as a name for the totality of conditions with which the self is connected) operates only through imagination....⁴⁷

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 18-19.

Chapter 4

THE SELF:

GROWTH AND CHANGE

In a recent address titled The Modern Consciousness and the Winged Chariot, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. discussed the psychological effect of the rapid acceleration of change in America today. A central question posed was, "How can the integrity of personality, the sense of identity, stand up to the assault of change, to the constant multiplication of pressures and of stimuli, to the infernal bombardment levelled against all by a world that won't slow down?"¹

Integration of the Self Through Change

We are confronted with a world in which change seems to be the only thing here to stay. If change is bad, then we are all doomed to face an ominous future of snowballing evils, for with every change that has already been made

¹Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Modern Consciousness and the Winged Chariot" (Address to the Tenth Anniversary Convocation, The Graduate School, The City University of New York, May 4, 1973), p. 15.

in our civilization, arises the need for multiple new changes. But is change bad? Or is it the inability to use change to create a more satisfying world that is bad? Dewey's answer is that the danger really lies in the fear of change and the attempt to halt or run away from it.

Plaintive lamentations at the prevalence of change and abstract appeals for restoration of senile authority are signs of personal feebleness, of inability to cope with change. It is a 'defense reaction.'²

And this fear of change, this "defense reaction," is a grave danger, since it stifles the innovativeness that is necessary to formulate ideas of the changes that must be made to solve current problems. And the cause of such fear is the inability to achieve integration of the self, while not only standing up to the assault of change, but while making ones own contributions to productive change as well. Dewey gives the following analysis of the problem and suggestion for its remedy:

An individual is now subjected to many conflicting schemes of education. Hence habits are divided against one another, personality is disrupted, the scheme of conduct is confused and disintegrated. But the remedy lies in the development of a new morale which can be attained only as released impulses are intelligently employed to form harmonious habits adapted to one another in a new situation.³

²Human Nature and Conduct, p. 130.

³Ibid.

Dewey's remedy is not to suppress impulse and cling to fixed habits, but to release impulses and guide them by intelligence toward a new integration of habits in a new social order. The objective must be to promote intellectual growth.

My first task then is to clarify Dewey's central concept of intellectual growth, by relating it to the system of psychological concepts which I showed in Chapter 3 are components of Dewey's theory of the self. So this chapter will expand upon the analysis of Dewey's theory of the self given in the last chapter, and will apply that theory to the problem of achieving integration and growth of the self in a rapidly changing society.

I shall attempt to show 1) the way in which the capacity for intellectual growth, which plays so large a part in Dewey's educational analysis, enables the individual to make productive use of change throughout his life. It maximizes the innovativeness of selves. 2) I shall show the nature and importance, for Dewey, of freedom as a property of the self. This second objective will require a brief analysis of the concept of freedom.

Dewey's Conception of Growth

First, what does Dewey mean by growth, and how does the capacity for growth, so defined, enable selves to make productive use of change? The problem in making use of

change is that it requires changing oneself and so creates the problem of achieving the integration of the self while one is changing. Therefore, I shall attempt to clarify Dewey's concept of growth, and to show how the capacity for continuing growth would enable an individual to achieve integration of the self through change. This exposition of "growth" will utilize the concepts of "habit" and "impulse" introduced in the last chapter.

Dewey says that "intellectual growth means constant expansion of horizons and consequent formation of new purposes and new responses."⁴ However, we need a fuller understanding of this capacity for forming new purposes and responses and its connection with integration of the self.

As we saw in the last chapter, at one point in Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey made the following statement about the self: "All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self...."⁵ Although at that point Dewey seemed to be saying that the self is just the entire system of one's habits, we saw that he couldn't mean that, since habits for Dewey are really only one element in the complex of psychological factors involved in his theory of the self. Nevertheless, it is an important

⁴Democracy and Education, p. 25.

⁵Human Nature and Conduct, p. 25.

factor, so at this point I shall give a brief review of the meaning of habit in Dewey's theory of self, and I shall indicate its connection with the growth that consists of forming new purposes and responses.

As we saw in Chapter 3, habits determine both present preferences of an individual and his present skills in using existing natural conditions as means to ends. Habits determine present purposes and responses. One connection, then, between habits and growth is that, since habits determine our purposes and responses, the way growth must occur is by a process in which new habits are formed, which determine new purposes and responses. And as we saw in the last chapter, it is because of this need for change in the system of habits that Dewey could not have meant that habits alone make up the self. This oversimplified theory of the self would be incompatible with Dewey's concept of growth, since habits are geared to present conditions. So the above statement about the self had to be amended to read, Habit is one element of the self.

Still, a word of caution is in order concerning a possible misunderstanding of Dewey's use of the term "habit." Sometimes people think of habits as blindly repetitious or routine ways of acting. And Dewey agrees that some habits are like that, but not all. These would be nonfunctional

habits. They don't promote growth. A self composed primarily of this kind of habit would be rigidly conservative and incapable of making productive use of change. Such a self would be stubborn in its pursuit of ends and incapable of altering purposes intelligently to make the best use of the conditions available as means. It would be a slave to chance environmental conditions. If the conditions that supported its habits happened to be present, it could go its merry way, but as soon as conditions changed, such a self would be at a loss as to how to deal with the problematic situations that would arise. It would be incapable of forming the new purposes and responses that characterize growth.

Dewey has indicated the crucial factor distinguishing this kind of self from one capable of growth in the following passage: "Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or degenerate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree in which intelligence is disconnected from them"⁶ So a self capable of growth, of forming new habits, new purposes and responses, is one in which habits are connected with intelligence.

But what does it mean for habits to be "connected with intelligence"? And how does intelligence make possible the formation of new purposes and responses? As we have

⁶Democracy and Education, p. 175.

seen, a self in which habits were disconnected from intelligence would be unable to solve the problems that arise in a situation in which conditions that had formerly supported those habits were removed. So what intelligence adds to habit is the ability to deal with such problematic situations. Intelligence is inquiry, the object of which is to discover the response that restores harmony between the system of habits and the new environment.

How does intelligence accomplish this objective?

When the environment changes, those habits that are blocked cannot manifest the usual response. However, the entire system of habits and impulses is available for proposing alternative responses. These habits include established beliefs about connections between elements of experience, especially ones own actions and their consequences. Beliefs, which are recollections of perceived meanings, are manifestations of an important class of habits. And the presence of this class of habits is crucial to the operation of intelligence. Those beliefs, or perceptions of meaning, that are warranted constitute knowledge. All of the knowledge, desires and skills, which are manifestations of habits may be thought of as resources which may be used, along with impulses and the new environmental conditions, in seeking the response that will be a solution to the problematic situation. When habits are blocked, impulses are released. Habits are the stable constituents of the self; impulses are the precarious

factor. But because impulses are not geared to the old conditions in the environment, they are the most innovative of responses. They are purely experimental and may or may not supply the necessary response to resolve the problematic situation. But they provide an additional resource to be utilized by the self as it attempts to resolve problematic situations. Finally, the new response that proves to be successful will be the basis for a new habit determining future purposes and responses, because perceptions of the connections between the successful response and its consequences will establish new meanings, by which future experience will be enriched. So intelligence accomplishes its objective of making possible new purposes and responses that enable the individual to cope with change, by making maximum use of the resources of both self and environment in the process of inquiry. This means making full use of ones recollections of meanings, as well as careful observations of environmental conditions, which result in the acquisition of new meanings.

The capacity for growth, then, is just this capacity for inquiry, by which new habits, new meanings, new purposes and responses, are acquired, which are the means for coping with a changing world. The better an individual's capacity for inquiry, for keen observations and perceptions of meanings, the more capable he is of growth. Consequently, if the aim of education is growth, this means that it must encourage development of the habits involved in inquiry. The goal of

education should not be some end external to itself. It is its own end. As Dewey expressed it, "In learning habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of learning."⁷ The goal of education is just education -- acquisition of the habit of learning.

Growth and the Integration of the Self

I have not yet made explicit the connection between the capacity for growth that has been outlined and the achieving of integration through change, but the key to this relationship lies in what has already been discussed. It is the fact that the growing self will continue to perceive new meanings, new connections between elements of experience, including the connections between his own habits and beliefs. This recognition of the interpenetration of habits, to use Dewey's term, is the basis for achieving integration, the wholeness or unity of the self, which Dewey calls "character."

The interpenetration of habits may be exemplified by learning a new language, which means developing new habits. The philosopher who learns German, for example, will have new habits which may profoundly affect his other habits. He may be more inclined, henceforth, to read German philosophers. And this in turn may alter his whole style of philosophizing. I say "may" since of course other habits determine ones

⁷Human Nature and Conduct, p. 105n.

style of philosophizing besides the languages he knows. So the actual effect of learning German on ones philosophical orientation will depend upon the interpenetration of this habit with many others. The point is simply that habits are not isolated; rather, they affect one another. Recognition of this fact leads to the intentional acquisition of habits that support one another. As was pointed out in the last chapter, for Dewey, integration is an achievement rather than a datum. Habits may interpenetrate, that is they may affect one another either by supporting one another or conflicting. The growing self which recognizes the connections between habits, in other words their meanings, is in the best possible position to achieve integration, which is the condition which exists when habits support one another. For example, a person with an integrated character will not learn German simply as an isolated skill because it is a requirement for a degree, but will learn the language because he wants to read German writers. His interest in particular German writers will support his interest in learning German.

Recognition of the interpenetration of habits also means integration of cognitive and value beliefs, since beliefs are expressions of habits. In the following passage, Dewey indicates the nature of the distinction that must be made between these kinds of belief, while maintaining their integration in a unified system of beliefs:

Man ... has beliefs about actual existences and the course of events, and he has beliefs about ends to be striven for, policies to be adopted, goods to be obtained and evils to be averted. The most urgent of all practical problems concerns the connection the subject-matter of these two kinds of belief sustain to each other. How shall our most dependable cognitive beliefs be used to regulate our practical beliefs? How shall the latter serve to organize and integrate our intellectual beliefs?"⁸

For Dewey, ethics, the study of value beliefs, cannot be isolated from a supposedly value-free science. The problem before me now is not to give a detailed analysis of the relation of factual and value beliefs, but to emphasize the importance for personal identity of recognizing their integration. The growing self, a self capable of utilizing change, must be able to alter its habits, and so its purposes and responses, as required to deal with changing situations in which the conditions that supported old habits no longer exist. This means it must have the capacity to change, must be able to alter its habits, and so its purposes and responses, as required to deal with changing situations in which the conditions that supported old habits no longer exist. This means it must have the capacity to alter cognitive and value beliefs. But altering particular beliefs requires altering other related ones in order to maintain consistency. This preservation of consistency

⁸John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (1929; rpt. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), p. 18.

between beliefs may be seen as just one further aspect of the general objective of achieving integration between habits so that habits support and strengthen one another. It is part and parcel of the overall achievement of integration while coping with a changing world.

Integration is preserved by making those changes throughout the entire system of habits and beliefs, as are necessary to maintain consistency at any time t , while meeting the objective requirements of the situation at that time. One cannot make random, haphazard changes in ones beliefs, since that would mean a loss of integrity. It would mean a falling apart of the self, as well as failure to meet the challenges of a changing world. By a falling apart of the self, I mean an absence of integration or harmony between the habits and impulses that make up the self. On the other hand, one cannot maintain consistency between present beliefs and all beliefs to which one was committed in the past, since that would mean a static self. Identity cannot mean sameness of the self at all times. Rather, it means continuity, the systematization of change.

One aspect of continuity is the striving to achieve a new consistency of habits and beliefs after the consistency of an older systematization has broken down. The new system will retain many of the older habits and beliefs, thereby maintaining continuity with the past, but will involve new elements and a thorough reorganization in order to maintain

continuity with the present changing environment. The continuity of the self means, then, both continuity between the present and the past, and between an individual self and its environment. The habits that make up one constituent of the self incorporate its environment.

Dewey's Conception of Freedom

This brings me finally to the question concerning freedom. What does freedom mean, for Dewey, and in what sense is an individual self, as Dewey conceives it, free? Since habits incorporate the environment that supports them, freedom cannot possibly consist of isolation of the individual from the environment. The individual, the self, is a product of an interaction between an organism's native activities and the environment in which those activities have their effects. The self's freedom, then, cannot consist of absence of causal determination. Both native activities and environmental conditions, especially social factors, are causes contributing to the nature of the self. These elements being what they were in the past and what they are in the present, the self is what it is, whether its habits are good or bad from a social point of view. As we have seen, it is these habits that determine the self's purposes and responses.

In what sense, then, is the self free? If deliberation, choice, and response are determined by one's character, together with environmental conditions, and character is

determined by past activities and conditions, how is the self free? Dewey expresses the problem and his response to it as follows:

It is assumed sometimes that if it can be shown that deliberation determines choice and deliberation is determined by character and conditions, there is no freedom. This is like saying that because a flower comes from root and stem it cannot bear fruit. The question is not what are the antecedents of deliberation and choice, but what are their consequences. What do they do that is distinctive? The answer is that they give us all the control of future possibilities which is open to us. And this control is the crux of our freedom. Without it, we are pushed from behind. With it we walk in the light.⁹

So deliberation and choice make us free, not because of their antecedents, but because of their consequences. Deliberation and choice give us control over future possibilities, and in such control lies our freedom.

But many a determinist sees the only possible freedom as submission to the necessity of nature. Dewey mentions Spinoza and Hegel as examples. For them, as Dewey saw them, freedom consists of insight into the laws of nature and willing conformity to those laws. Dewey's position differs from them, so interpreted, since for Dewey the universe is not yet finished, and the actions of individual selves play a part, even if a small part, in determining the nature of the universe. Dewey doesn't deny the fact that there are natural laws to which selves must conform, but we may use

⁹Human Nature and Conduct, p. 311.

use these laws to control the present and by controlling the present to control the future. Insight into facts is a new fact that may alter the facts that existed prior to insight into those facts. The self is not a passive observer outside of a fixed nature, but is a force in determining the course of a changing nature. Dewey writes:

When we use the law to foresee consequences and to consider how they may be averted or secured, then freedom begins. Employing knowledge of law to enforce desire in execution gives power to the engineer. Employing knowledge of law in order to submit to it without further action constitutes fatalism, no matter how it be dressed up.¹⁰

So Dewey differs from Hegel and Spinoza, as Dewey interpreted them, by emphasizing the possibility of individual selves controlling and determining the future, whereas they (Hegel and Spinoza) emphasize conformity to a pre-existing order determined in its entirety by forces beyond human control.

It may be objected that, for Hegel, finite selves do play a role in determining the course of change. But in playing their roles, finite selves are only manifesting the will of the Absolute consciousness. As long as an Absolute consciousness is retained there is a pre-existing order determined, ultimately, in its entirety by a force beyond human control.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 312-313.

Although in his early work Dewey was a Hegelian himself, and espoused the idea of an Absolute consciousness, he gradually freed himself of that concept, and the passage quoted above illustrates his mature position on the subject. The freedom of an individual self consists of his power to "foresee consequences and to consider how they may be averted or secured." The responsibility for averting and securing consequences lies with the individual self. There is no overriding Absolute consciousness on which to rest responsibility.

In another reference to freedom, this one in Theory of the Moral Life, Dewey emphasizes again that freedom consists in the possibility of control over the course of nature, but here the emphasis is explicitly on the possibility of control over ones self.

Freedom in its practical and moral sense ... is connected with possibility of growth, learning and modification of character....¹¹

Here the possibility of misunderstanding occurs. It may be thought that, when Dewey associates freedom with the possibility of modifying character, he means society modifying the character of an individual by manipulative, human engineering techniques. But this would be a grave misunderstanding, for Dewey's theory of the self leads to the conclusion that the individual can modify his own character,

¹¹Theory of the Moral Life, p. 171.

and it is such self-modification that Dewey refers to in the quoted passage.

In human engineering approaches to character modification, people are treated as objects to be manipulated by others. People are conditioned in a way that makes the self a passive recipient of changes. The self is an object to others. In contrast, Dewey's approach is to make the individual an active participant in modifying his own character. The self, for Dewey, is that which can be an object to itself. And when one makes oneself an object one can criticize ones own habits as one would criticize the habits of others.

Self-awareness is a new condition affecting states of affairs, and every new condition has the potential for radically changing a state of affairs. As we saw in the discussion of Dewey's theory of the self in Chapter 3, one capacity differentiating human selves from animals is the capacity to perceive-a-state of affairs. And a state-of-affairs perceived differs radically from a state-of-affairs unperceived. The act of perceiving is a new condition entering into the causal process determining the nature of the state-of-affairs. And when the state-of-affairs perceived is ones own self -- ones own system of habits and impulses, ones character -- that perception of ones self becomes a new factor determining the make-up of that self. The perception of ones self is a new state of affairs which can

radically change the self. It is this capacity to perceive ones self that makes possible "growth, learning and modification of character," the characteristics which Dewey has connected with freedom.

The objective of holding a person responsible for his actions is to get him to perceive his own character and its effects on others. Only when there is such perception can there be learning and growth. The important question to ask when we want to know whether or not to hold a person responsible is, not, Could he have done otherwise? but, Can he do better in the future? Dewey writes

The question of whether he might when he acted have acted differently from the way in which he did act is irrelevant. The question is whether he is capable of acting differently next time.¹²

Only because persons are capable of being objects to themselves does it make sense to hold them responsible, to approve and disapprove of their actions. Because persons can be objects to themselves they can learn from the reprimands of others and modify their own characters.

Dewey gives the following example:

The child, for example, is at first held liable for what he has done, not because he deliberately and knowingly intended such action, but in order that in the future he may take into account bearings and consequences which he has failed to consider in what he has done. Here is

¹²Ibid., p. 169.

where the human agent differs from a stone and inanimate thing, and indeed from animals lower in the scale.

It would be absurd to hold a stone responsible when it falls from a cliff and injures a person, or to blame the falling tree which crushes a passer-by. The reason for the absurdity is that such treatment would have and could have no conceivable influence on the future behavior of stone or tree.¹³

An objection might be raised to Dewey's claim that the question of whether one might have acted differently from the way he did act is irrelevant. It might be argued that the supreme test of whether or not we should hold a person responsible for something he has done is to ask, Could he have done otherwise? Then one may go on to claim that, on Dewey's view we never could have done otherwise, since all of our acts are determined by our character and environmental conditions, and our character is the result of interactions between native activities and environmental conditions. Given our native dispositions and environmental conditions, our character was what it was at the time of the act, so we could not have done otherwise. Then they will likely revert to the need of a metaphysical doctrine of free will.

I think that Dewey can be defended against such an argument by an analysis of what we mean when we say, in ordinary speech, "He could have done otherwise." Dewey

¹³Ibid., p. 169.

says that the important question is, Can he do otherwise in the future? That is, Is he reformable, Can he learn? Now I think that what we normally mean when we say, "He could have done otherwise," is that, at the time of the act he was capable of learning, and that the factor determining the act was his character, which was capable of being instructed. There were no extraneous features determining his act such as being forced at gun point or being insane in such a way that he was incapable of learning. What Dewey is emphasizing is that it makes no sense to blame a person for his act if at the time of the act or at present his acts are not capable of being changed by a learning process in which he becomes aware of himself and of the obnoxiousness of his acts. If a person is not capable of such self-awareness he is no different, in this respect, from a stone or a tree which cannot be blamed for its movements.

The whole point of praising and blaming is the effect this activity has on the person being held responsible.

Dewey says:

A man might have 'acted otherwise than he did act' if he had been a different kind of person, and the point in holding him liable for what he did do (and for being the kind of person he was in doing it) is that he may become a different kind of self and henceforth choose different sorts of ends.¹⁴

¹⁴Ibid., p. 171.

This passage illustrates the point that, for Dewey, the self is always in the process of becoming. Dewey makes the point even sharper as follows:

In the strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and becoming for the better or the worse. It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself.¹⁵

Here we recur to the theme which has been with us since the beginning of this chapter. We cannot escape change. Nature foists it upon us. The precarious is always with us. But change may be for better or for worse. The self that is changing for the better is one characterized by growth. "The end is growth itself." There are two selves, an old and a new. And our task is to liberate the new self and allow it to grow.

It follows that at each point there is a distinction between an old, an accomplished self, and a new and moving self, between the static and the dynamic self. The former aspect is constituted by habits already formed. Habit gives facility, and there is always a tendency to rest on our oars, to fall back on what we have already achieved ... In this way, we withdraw from actual conditions and their requirements and opportunities; we contract and harden the self.

The growing, enlarging, liberated self, on the other hand, goes forth to meet new demands and occasions, and readapts and remakes itself in the process. It welcomes untried situations.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 172.

The necessity for choice between the interests of the old and of the forming, moving, self is recurrent ... Indeed, we may say that the good person is precisely the one who is most conscious of the alternative, and is the most concerned to find openings for the newly formed or growing self; since no matter how 'good' he has been, he becomes 'bad' (even though acting upon a relatively high plane of attainment) as soon as he fails to respond to the demand for growth. Any other basis for judging the moral status of the self is conventional. In reality, direction of movement, not the plane of attainment and rest, determines moral quality.¹⁶

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 173-174.

Chapter 5

THE SELF AND DEWEY'S
NATURALISTIC THEORY OF ETHICS

Previous chapters of this dissertation have been concerned with showing what the self is, for Dewey. Now the time has come to focus on the point of contact between his theory of the self and his naturalistic ethical theory. In this chapter I shall not be dealing exclusively with the self nor exclusively with his ethics, but shall consider both topics in relation to one another.

The Distinction Between Ethics and Other Types of Inquiry

In Chapter 1, I showed that, for Dewey, the method of inquiry for forming de jure as distinct from de facto goods is the same in certain generic respects, whether those goods are scientific beliefs, instances of conduct, or aesthetic objects. Science is normative since it is concerned with what beliefs should be accepted, just as ethics is normative in its concern with what conduct should be engaged in. In Chapter 1, I expounded Dewey's theory of inquiry in a very general way, summarizing the aspects of the method of inquiry that are common to all

areas of criticism, whether our subject matter is physical science, ethics, or aesthetics. All of these subjects of inquiry start with de facto goods which are then subjected to criticism. Criticism starts with a problematic situation embodying the de facto goods and proceeds, by a process of deliberation, to form hypotheses to be tested in an attempt to bring about a more stable situation embodying de jure goods. Now I shall turn to specifically ethical (or in other words, moral) inquiry and show the role of Dewey's theory of the self in distinguishing ethical inquiry from inquiries involving other subject matter.

Ethics is distinguished from other kinds of evaluation by the kind of value thought about. What is at stake in ethical evaluation is the value of the kind of self being formed

Moral deliberation differs from other forms not as a process of forming a judgment and arriving at knowledge but in the kind of value which is thought about. The value is technical, professional, economic, etc., as long as one thinks of it as something which one can aim at and attain by way of having, possessing; as something to be got or to be missed. Precisely the same object will have a moral value when it is thought of as making a difference in the self, as determining what one will be, instead of what one will have. Deliberation involves doubt, hesitation, the need of making up one's mind, of arriving at a decisive choice. The choice at stake in a moral deliberation or valuation is the worth of this and that kind of character and disposition.¹

and further on Dewey writes

¹Theory of the Moral Life, p. 134.

The real moral question is what kind of a self is being furthered and formed. And this question arises with respect to both one's own self and the selves of others.²

Not only is the self of the agent to be considered, but so also are the consequences of his actions on the kinds of character and dispositions of others to be considered.

Dewey's Analysis of Virtue

But what kind of character and disposition should be aimed at in both the agent and others? If we were concerned only with customary morality we might make up a list of virtues to be aimed at. These character traits would be those approved by the customs of society at a particular time. But since our interest is in reflective, not customary morality, no such fixed list of virtues is possible. Dewey writes

In reflective morality, a list of virtues has a much more tentative status. Chastity, kindness, honesty, patriotism, modesty, toleration, bravery, etc., cannot be given a fixed meaning, because each expresses an interest in objects and institutions which are changing. In form, as interests, they may be permanent, since no community could endure in which there were not, say, fair dealing, public spirit, regard for life, faithfulness to others. But no two communities conceive the objects to which these qualities attach in quite identical ways. They can be defined, therefore, only on the basis of qualities characteristic of interest, not on the basis of permanent and uniform objects in which interest is taken.³

²Ibid., p. 159.

³Ibid., pp. 112-113.

Customs and institutions change and so do specific objects of interest, so the need for inquiry into the specific content of virtues is constant. No fixed list of virtuous objects of interest can be drawn up. Therefore, in our discussion of reflective morality we shall consider virtues as general qualities characteristic of the interests of a self capable of inquiry, not as fixed and separate objects of interests. We shall be considering the form of interests, not the content. Interests are constituents of the self, so in our consideration of virtues as qualities characteristic of the interests of an inquiring self, we are considering the kind of self that a person should develop in order to be reflective.

This discussion of the virtuous self is a continuation of our discussion in Chapter 3 of the self as an integration to be achieved, for as we shall see in the following quote, virtuous traits interpenetrate one another. They differ in emphasis only, but are all necessary and interdependent characteristics of the interests that make up a self capable of inquiry. Dewey presents the cardinal virtues of ancient thought as these characteristics of a reflective integrated self.

In fact virtuous traits interpenetrate one another; this unity is involved in the very idea of integrity of character. At one time persistence and endurance in the face of obstacles is the most prominent feature; then the attitude is the excellence called courage.

At another time, the trait of impartiality and equity is uppermost, and we call it justice. At other times, the necessity for subordinating immediate ~~satisfaction of the~~ strong appetite or desire to a comprehensive good is the conspicuous feature. Then the disposition is denominated temperance, self-control. When the prominent phase is the need for thoughtfulness, for consecutive and persistent attention, in order that these other qualities may function, the interest receives the name of moral wisdom, insight, conscientiousness. In each case the difference is one of emphasis only.⁴

The virtues of courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom are characteristics of a self which is reflective and integrated.

We may utilize the language of earlier chapters in explicating these virtues as characteristics of a self capable of inquiry and integration. For example, courage is the capacity to face and deal with the precarious. Nature places obstacles in the way of a smooth expression of interests. Courage is the persistence and endurance to inquire in the face of these obstacles. Wisdom is the characteristic which interest has when it is thoughtful or in other words when it is deliberative. A self with the characteristic of wisdom seeks solutions of problematic situations by considering consequences of alternative proposed actions on all concerned. A self with the characteristic of wisdom seeks the end-in-view, the object of interest, that will allow for the expression of interests in a unified system rather than sacrificing more comprehensive desires for the

⁴Ibid., p. 115.

sake of some short-term, short-sighted desire. Temperance is the capacity to inhibit immediate response in order to allow inquiry to take place. And it is the willingness to sacrifice gratification of a less desire for the sake of more comprehensive interests. Temperance must be encouraged by cultivating the more comprehensive interests when we are not under the sway of immediate intense desire. Dewey says the following about cultivating comprehensive interests:

There are many times when the cultivation of these interests meets with no strong obstacle. The habits which are built up and reenforced under such conditions are the best bulwarks against weakness and surrender in the moments when the reflective or 'true' good conflicts with that set up by temporary and intense desire. The proper course of action is, then, to multiply occasions for the enjoyment of these ends, to prolong and deepen the experience connected with them.⁵

Finally, justice is the willingness to be impartial in deliberation. It means, not only being concerned about our own interests, but having equitable concern for the interests of all who are affected by our actions.

Equity demands that when one has to act in relation to others, no matter whether friends or strangers, fellow citizens or foreigners, one should have an equal and even measure of value as far as the interests of others come into the reckoning. In an immediate or emotional sense it is not possible to love our enemies as we love our friends. But the maxim to love our enemies as we love ourselves signifies

⁵Theory of the Moral Life, p. 57

that in our conduct we should take into account their interests at the same rate of estimate as we rate our own. It is a principle for regulating judgment of the bearings of our acts on the happiness of others.⁶

Dewey's theory of virtue is a theory of the formation of interests, both our own interests and the interests of others into an integrated system -- a system in which all interests involved support and reinforce one another. An integrated system of interests is one in which, not only do the interests of an individual self support one another, but also his interests support the interests of others with whom he interacts.

Dewey's analysis of the Good as Object of Desire

Dewey's theory of virtue cannot be separated from his theory of the good as an object of desire. Virtuous interests are desires that have been channeled in harmonizing rather than conflicting ways. Such a theory of virtue implies a certain analysis of desire, namely it distinguishes desire from immediate and irrational impulse. Desire, unlike impulse, includes foreseen ends and ideas of the means necessary for realization of those ends-in-view, as well as of the consequences of employing those means. And Dewey's theory of virtue, which says that desires can be channeled in harmonious rather than in conflicting ways shows that

⁶Ibid., pp. 114-115.

desires, on Dewey's analysis, can be altered as a result of such foresight of consequences. Foresight of consequences enables one to distinguish between that which is desired casually, on one hand, and that which should be desired, the the desirable, on the other. And when we can distinguish between the desired and the desirable, we can alter our desires so that we come to desire that which is desirable. We can form our desires into a consistent, harmonious whole.

A virtuous self is a reflective self in which satisfactions of desires are placed as parts in conduct as a consistent harmonious whole.

The office of reflection we have seen to be the formation of a judgment of value in which particular satisfactions are placed as integral parts of conduct as a consistent harmonious whole. If values did not get in one another's way, if, that is, the realizaton of one desire were not incompatible with that of another, there would be no need of reflection. We should grasp and enjoy each thing as it comes along. Wisdom, or as it is called on the ordinary plane, prudence, sound judgment, is the ability to foresee consequences in such a way that we form ends which grow into one another and reenforce one another. Moral folly is the surrender of the greater good for the lesser; it is the snatching at one satisfaction in a way which prevents us from having others and which gets us subsequently into trouble and dissatisfaction.⁷

Moral folly is the failure to distinguish true from specious goods. It is a failure to distinguish de jure values from de facto goods. Dewey's theory of value identifies value with objects of desire or liking, but not with every liking.

⁷Ibid., p. 60.

In Quest for Certainty, Dewey writes

Values (to sum up) may be connected inherently with liking, and yet not with every liking but only with those that judgment has approved, after examination of the relation upon which the object liked depends. A casual liking is one that happens without knowledge of how it occurs nor to what effect. The difference between it and one which is sought because of a judgment that it is worth having and is to be striven for, makes just the difference between enjoyments which are accidental and enjoyments that have value and hence a claim upon our attitude and conduct.⁸

De facto goods are not to be judged in isolation, but are to be judged by a process of deliberation in which we consider them in light of their consequences on other de facto goods, when those consequences are projected in imagination. Dewey writes the following about ethical deliberation:

Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct. We give way, in our mind, to some plan. Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow: and as we then like and approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences, we find the original impulse or plan good or bad.⁹

And it must be remembered that when considering the consequences of pursuing a particular desired course of action we must consider not only the consequences for other de facto likings of our own, but the consequences for the desires

⁸Quest for Certainty, p. 264.

⁹Theory of the Moral Life, p. 135.

and affections of others as well. We must pursue objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all.

The final place of the self in the moral life is, then, that the very problem of morals is to form an original body of impulsive tendencies into a voluntary self in which desires and affections center in the values which are common; in which interest focusses in objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all.¹⁰

But now we may ask, Why seek harmony with others? Why should interests focus in objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all? Why not just enrich ones own life and forget about others? This is a large and important question not to be dispensed with easily and briefly. So I shall build up to an answer gradually, starting with a consideration of Dewey's theory of the nature of the self and its continuity with the environment.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I emphasized the continuity between habits and the environmental supports that are necessary for the continuing expression of those habits. And since habits were shown to be a major constituent of the self this meant that there is continuity of the self with its environment. The wholeness of the self requires maintenance of the environmental conditions that support its habits. Or if the supports of certain habits are removed due to the precarious element in nature, it must

¹⁰Ibid., p. 168.

be possible to form new habits utilizing both the resources, the habits and impulses, of the self, and the resources that are present in the new, changed environment. I want to re-emphasize this dependence of the self upon the environment for its unification, with a quote from Art as Experience:

The epidermis is only in the most superficial way an indication of where an organism ends and its environment begins. There are things inside the body that are foreign to it, and there are things outside of it that belong to it de jure, if not de facto; that must, that is, be taken possession of if life is to continue. On the lower scale, air and food materials are such things; on the higher, tools, whether the pen of the writer or the anvil of the blacksmith, utensils and furnishings, property, friends and institutions -- all the supports and sustenances without which a civilized life cannot be. The need that is manifest in the urgent impulses that demand completion through what the environment -- and it alone -- can supply, is a dynamic acknowledgment of this dependence of the self for wholeness upon its surroundings. (my emphasis)¹¹

Even friends and institutions are not separate from the self, but are parts of its very nature, since they are supports and sustenances without which a civilized life cannot be. They are elements in the surroundings on which the self depends for its wholeness.

All objects of interest are in the same sense constituents of the self, as Dewey indicates in the following passage:

¹¹Art as Experience, pp. 58-59.

It is a truism that all action springs from and affects a self, for interest defines the self. Whatever one is interested in is in so far a constituent of the self, whether it be collecting postage stamps, or pictures, making money, or friends, attending first nights at the theater, studying electrical phenomena, or whatever.¹²

All selves are continuous with their environments, but it takes a special kind of self to recognize its connection with the environment. When one senses his connection with the environment that supports him and on which he depends, he has developed what Dewey refers to in the following passage from A Common Faith as a "religious attitude." However, caution should be taken here in interpreting the term "religious," for Dewey does not mean by it anything having to do with supernatural or institutionalized religions. He writes

A religious attitude, however, needs the sense of connection of man, in the way of both dependence and support, with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is a universe.¹³

In order to have a religious attitude, one needs the sense of the connection of himself and ultimately mankind with the universe. And by the universe Dewey means the imaginative idea of the totality of conditions that may, in any way, affect oneself.

A certain satisfaction comes from sensing ones connections with, and dependence on, the universe, and especially

¹²Ibid., p. 159.

¹³A Common Faith, p. 53.

from sensing ones connections with other selves through shared interests. We begin to see here an answer to our original question as to why interests should focus in objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all. A greater satisfaction comes from having and sensing connections with others.

This theme of a self enriched by and achieving greater satisfaction through sensing its connections with the surrounding world, especially with other selves, deserves further attention. Although the self has connections and so is continuous, ultimately, with the universe, the connections with which I am interested now are the crucial links between the individual and other human beings. Each individual self is born in dependence on others, as Dewey indicates in the following passage:

Individuals are interdependent. No one is born except in dependence on others. Without aid and nurture from others, he would miserably perish. The material of his intellectual subsistence, as well as of his physical, comes to him from others. As he matures, he becomes more physically and economically independent; but he can carry on his calling only through cooperation and competition with others; he has needs which are satisfied only through exchange of services and commodities. His recreations as well as his achievements are dependent upon sharing with others. The idea that individuals are born separate and isolated and are brought into society only through some artificial device is a pure myth. Social ties and connections are as natural and inevitable as are physical. Even when a person is alone he thinks with language that is derived from association with others, and thinks about questions

and issues that have been born in intercourse.¹⁴ Since man is a social being, other people are the most important constituent of the environment with which the self is continuous. In fact, selfhood does not even exist apart from association and intercourse with other human beings:

Selfhood is not something which exists apart from association and intercourse. The relationships which are produced by the fact that interests are formed in this social environment are far more important than are the adjustments of isolated selves.¹⁵

We saw in Chapter 3 that people are not first individual selves and secondly united into a social group. Rather, because they are social, they create symbols which become language and through communication ideas, meanings and selves are created. Without communication there would be no self. Selves and communication develop simultaneously.

Selves develop through communication with others, and they depend for their continuing growth and wholeness upon the others with whom they communicate. It is ultimately communication that enables us to formulate in imagination the idea of a goal not now existent, but which may be brought into existence by conjoint human action. Selves are dependent on communication with others for both the formulation of common goals and for the conjoint action necessary for realization of the goals. So in returning to

¹⁴Theory of the Moral Life, pp. 79-80.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 163.

our question, Why not just enrich ones own life and forget about others? the answer comes that one cannot enrich ones own life in isolation from others. Enrichment of the self occurs through communication with others and through pursuing and achieving the common goals made possible by such communication.

One may form an interest in pursuing his own pecuniary profit at the expense of others, rather than forming interests in objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all, but he does not thereby enrich his self. By cutting his connections with others and failing to pursue common goals he loses out on the satisfaction that comes from sensing connections with the surrounding world, and especially with other selves.

At the beginning of this chapter, we saw that, for Dewey, ethical evaluation is distinguished from other kinds of evaluation by the fact that in ethical evaluation what's at stake is the kind of self being formed, and since then we have seen that the kind of self demanded by moral considerations is a self in which interests focus in the values that are common. Therefore, we may now extend our criterion for distinguishing ethical evaluation from other kinds of evaluation by including as ethical all deliberations which reveal that a proposed course of action affects the common good. Consequently, processes studied by any

science can become of interest to moral theory as soon as discoveries are made that affect the common good. For example, the physicists' studies of the composition of atoms seemed at first to be irrelevant to moral theory, but they became relevant as soon as nuclear fission was discovered, for nuclear energy has implications for the common good.

At any moment conceptions which once seemed to belong exclusively to the biological or physical realm may assume moral import. This will happen whenever they are discovered to have a bearing on the common good.¹⁶

To be a moral self requires that one have the capacity to inquire -- to engage in imaginative rehearsal so that proposed courses of action and the goods at which they aim may be seen in relation to other prized goods, both other goods within ones own system of likings and the goods prized by others, so that courses of action will be chosen that harmonize ones own interests with the interests of others. Inquiry is necessary if the self is to form its interests so that they focus in objects that contribute to the enrichment of all. Dewey's theory of the virtuous self says that such a self is one that has the capacity to engage in ethical inquiry. A part of what it is to be a moral self is to be an inquiring self. To have the characteristics of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice means to be a self

¹⁶Ibid., p. 144.

with the capacity and will to engage in ethical inquiry.

We may now see the role of growth, the theme of Chapter 4, in Dewey's ethical theory. Although we have seen that all selves are continuous with their environment, no matter how narrow and rigid or how broad and growing, we may now see that, in an environment in flux, only the broad and growing self is a virtuous self. What is meant by a broad and growing self is a self with a wide diversity of integrated habits to draw upon in adapting to a changing environment. Only such a self is capable of altering its interests so that it discovers and increases interests that focus in the values that are common. A self that is narrow and rigid may have limited interests in values that are common, but it is not capable of using change to grow and to increase such interests. If its interests are rigid it is not capable of the imaginative rehearsal of alternative courses of action which brings many facets of the self into play in search of the course of action that is really appropriate in the given situation. Dewey applauds the flexibility of interests and expression of impulse as follows:

The imagining of various plans carried out furnishes an opportunity for many impulses which at first are not in evidence at all, to get under way. Many and varied direct sensings, appreciations, take place. When many tendencies are brought into play, there is clearly much greater probability that the capacity of self which is really needed and appropriate will be brought into action,

and thus a truly reasonable happiness result.¹⁷

In fact the narrow and rigid self may lose ground, in a changing environment, clinging to interests which, though they formerly harmonized with the interests that were common, no longer do so. It loses continuity with the surrounding world and so does not achieve the satisfaction that comes from sensing its own connections with that world. I shall repeat here the end of the quote with which I terminated Chapter 4, for its meaning is even more evident in the present context. Dewey writes as follows about the self which has ceased to grow:

no matter how 'good' he has been, he becomes 'bad' (even though acting upon a relatively high plane of attainment) as soon as he fails to respond to the demand for growth. Any other basis for judging the moral status of the self is conventional. In reality, direction of movement, not the plane of attainment and rest, determines moral quality.¹⁸

Dewey's Analysis of the Right

So far in this chapter I have been discussing Dewey's theories of virtue and of the good that satisfies desires. But these theories cannot be separated from Dewey's theory of right, which I shall take up now. This is Dewey's analysis of the distinction between prudence and morality,

¹⁷Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁸Theory of the Moral Life, p. 174.

which is a distinction emphasized by the deontological type of ethical theory such as that of Immanuel Kant. This type of theory emphasizes the fact that we often have obligations which must be met, even though these claims upon us go contrary to our desires and may not be conducive to our own happiness. The concept of right arises because other people make claims upon us that we are obligated to respect. To be concerned with ones own happiness only is prudence; to fulfill ones obligations, even if these obligatory acts go against desire, is morality. There are certain acts that one has an obligation to perform because they are right even if they are not goods that satisfy desire or do not produce such goods. They are right because they respect a just claim of another or others. And there are acts that one must refrain from performing because they are wrong even if they would satisfy a desire. They are wrong because they fail to respect a just claim of another or others.

Dewey recognizes the validity of this distinction between the right and the good that satisfies desire, and he does not try to reduce the concept of the right to that of the good, but rather maintains the distinction between the two concepts. Yet for Dewey the good and the right are also interrelated concepts. The right is not cut off from the good. Ultimately, doing what is right is satisfying. Doing what is right is conducive to the true

as distinct from the specious good of the individual.

Dewey's theory of the self plays a significant role in his analysis of the right and its relation to the good as object of desire. I shall show the way that this theory of the self enables Dewey to relate the right to the good, while maintaining a distinction between the two concepts.

In this analysis we must have a correct understanding of what Dewey means by the true good of the individual. And we must remember especially that what an individual finds to be good in the sense of satisfying to desires depends on the kind of interests the individual has cultivated. It depends on the kind of self that has been developed. An individual can cultivate interests in values that contribute to the common good, and as we have seen these are the most satisfying of interests because only the self characterized by such interests can achieve a sense of his connection with the surrounding world, especially with the people and institutions that contribute to the wholeness -- the integration -- of the self.

If the claims made on an individual are just, his actions which respect those claims must in fact contribute to a good in which the individual can develop a shared interest. Not every claim made upon an individual needs to have an immediate appeal for him. But the required action should be such that the individual can find the required action good, though it may not appear to be good

prior to reflection. It may be necessary to cultivate an interest in the required conduct. Dewey writes

The essence of the claim which Right puts forth is that even if the thing exacted does not appeal as his good to the one to whom it is addressed, he should voluntarily take it to be a good; that, in short, it should become his good, even if he does not so judge it at the time. This element of the 'should' or 'ought' is what differentiates the idea of Right from that of Good. But it does not cut the idea wholly loose from that of Good, for what 'should be' is that an individual should find the required conduct good.¹⁹

This passage requires some analysis. Dewey says that it is the element of the 'should' or 'ought' that differentiates the idea of right from that of good. But this is not the categorical imperative of Kantian morality. It is not the command for obedience to an abstract moral law where this obedience is motivated by a source independent of all natural desires, such as pure respect for the moral law, as in Kantian theory. This would cut the concept of right off from the concept of good as the object of natural desire that integrates a system of other equally natural desires. In order to relate the concept of right to that of good, Dewey says that "what 'should be' is that an individual should find the required conduct good." And this means, first of all, that the required conduct should meet the criterion of a just claim. That is, it should contribute to a good in which the individual himself can share. The individual

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 82-83.

cannot find the required conduct good unless it really is good. And this brings us back to the conception of moral judgment as distinguishing between the true and the specious good. If the claim made upon the individual is indeed just, even if it conflicts with some of the individual's desires, if he inquires he can find the claim which right puts forth good, i.e., the true as distinct from the specious good. Even if a required action is contrary to present desires, if the act contributes to a social good in which the individual can share, the individual can find the act conducive to the true as distinct from the specious good. He can cultivate an interest in the required conduct. However, if the claim made by society on the individual is not a just claim, no amount of cultivation of interests on the part of the individual can lead to his finding it good. In other words, the individual can make claims on society and expect to have these claims respected in return for respecting the claims society makes upon him. He can demand that society's laws be just.

When the individual learns that others respect his just claims and that, in turn, he ought to recognize the just claims of others, he has learned what Dewey calls the principle of reciprocity. Dewey expresses this principle as follows:

Wrong consists in faithlessness to that upon which the wrongdoer counts when he is judging and seeking for what is good to him. He betrays the principles upon which he depends; he turns to his personal advantage the very values which he refuses to acknowledge in his own conduct towards others. He contradicts, not as Kant would have it, some abstract law of reason, but the principle of reciprocity when he refuses to extend to others the goods which he seeks for himself.²⁰

The principle of reciprocity is, like all principles for Dewey, a generalization from experience. Also, like all principles learned and truly accepted by an individual, it is a habit, an acquired tendency to act in the way expressed by the principle. As indicated in Chapter 3, meanings are the expressions of habits. Meanings discovered in past interactions with the environment are incorporated into our system of habits. When the individual discovers that respecting the claims of others means that his claims in turn will be respected, he develops the habit of acting on this principle of reciprocity.

But this habit of acting will only develop if the just claims of the individual are in turn honored by others and by the laws of society. The claims made by one person on another or by the laws of society upon an individual must be justified by the principle of reciprocity if the individual or society making the claim expects voluntary compliance. Willing acceptance of an obligation only comes if one recognizes that obedience results in a good

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 83-84.

in which he can share. The question we must ask when the object of our inquiry is justification of a claim is

Does the conduct alleged to be obligatory, alleged to have the authority of moral law behind it, actually contribute to a good in which the one from whom an act is demanded will share?²¹

If the laws of society do not produce goods in which all members of society may share, then these laws will have to be enforced by some form of coercion. Dewey recognizes that, unfortunately

Mankind still prefers upon the whole to rely upon force, not now exercised directly and physically as it once was, but upon covert and indirect force, rather than upon intelligence to discover and cling to what is right.²²

The practical ideal for society is to make sure that the claims by society on the individual are such that by respecting them the individual contributes to a good in which he can share. Only as this ideal is approached can the necessity for gaining obedience by force be eliminated.

As I have indicated, the principle of reciprocity when learned and truly accepted by an individual is a habit. It is a habit of fair play, which becomes an aid to temperance. As I have also indicated, temperance is the willingness to sacrifice gratification of a lesser

²¹Theory of the Moral Life, p. 83.

²²Ibid., p. 85.

desire for the sake of a more comprehensive interest. When a principle of fair play has become a part of the self it aids us in accomplishing this objective, as Dewey indicates in the following passage:

the character, the self, which has adopted fair play and equity into its own attitude will ... be protected from any temptation to disregard the principle in order to obtain some short-term specific good. A rough analogy of what is here signified is that while rules of the hygiene of eating grow out of the service which foods render to the well-being of the organism, and are not abstract ends on their own account, yet nevertheless these rules, when once understood in their relation to the end they serve, save us from using food as a mere means to a temporary enjoyment. We can fall back on the rule in case of doubt.²³

Similarly, Dewey rejects the idea of duty for duty's sake, adopting instead a functional conception of the sense of duty, which he expresses as follows:

The proper function of a general sense of duty is to make us sensitive to the relations and claims involved in particular situations, and this sensitiveness is especially needed whenever some immediate solicitation of desire tends to blind us to everything but itself. A generalized sense of right is a support in times of temptation; it gives a reinforcing impetus in carrying us over a hard place in conduct.²⁴

Dewey's theory of the right does not conclude with a list of duties, just as his theory of virtue did not present a list of specific virtues. Rather, the theory of right incorporates a theory of the self. The thing

²³Ibid., p. 106.

²⁴Ibid., p. 86.

to strive for is development of the kind of self that can successfully distinguish the true from the specious good. Dewey's theory of right points to the virtuous self, a self which can find the claim of right also good. It points to a self which has adopted the principles of reciprocity and justice and habitually utilizes those principles as a guide.

A self which has internalized the principles of reciprocity and justice, and has acquired a sense of duty will be guided by the ideal of the self as a whole. Its attitudes of fair play and equity will save it from sacrificing the comprehensive goods that are satisfying to the self as a whole for some short-term specific good.

We see here that the objective of principles is to serve as guides, as the individual makes his own judgments about what he should do in a specific case. As Dewey indicates in the following passage, it is possible to formulate principles as general guidelines because values found in various situations resemble one another.

It is clear that the various situations in which a person is called to deliberate and judge have common elements, and that values found in them resemble one another. It is also obvious that general ideas are a great aid in judging particular cases. If different situations were wholly unlike one another, nothing could be learned from one which would be of any avail in any other. But having like points, experience carries over from one to another, and experience is intellectually cumulative. Out of resembling experiences general ideas develop; through language, instruction, and

tradition this gathering together of experiences of value into generalized points of view is extended to take in a whole people and a race. Through intercommunication the experience of the entire human race is to some extent pooled and crystallized in general ideas. These ideas constitute principles. We bring them with us to deliberation on particular situations.²⁵

The process of integrating the self into a unified whole relies on principles acquired through intercommunication by which the experience of mankind is pooled and crystallized. Integration cannot be achieved by an isolated self, but only through interaction and communication with others. Principles such as justice and the Golden Rule (which is really a principle, not a rule) have been shown by experience to be good guides to achieving harmony with others. Yet they are only guides and are subject to interpretation in applying them to a particular situation. Principles alone do not tell one what is to be done in a particular situation, as Dewey points out in the following passage.

the object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself. No genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of action; rules, like cooking recipes, may tell just what to do and how to do it. A moral principle, such as that of chastity, of justice, of the Golden Rule, gives the agent a basis for looking at and examining a particular question that comes up. It holds before him certain possible aspects of the act; it warns him against taking a short or partial view of the

²⁵Ibid., p. 136.

act. (Dewey's emphasis)²⁶

Principles function as aids to the self in seeking harmony with its environment and especially with other people. They assist the self in developing an attitude that is truly religious in Dewey's sense of the religious, because it is aware of its intimate connectin with the environment. A self that has internalized principles of justice and fair play will be aware of its dependence on the enveloping world and the support which that world gives to it. And it will know the satisfaction that comes from this awareness.

Now it may be said that because the self, for Dewey, always acts from interests, and gains satisfaction from fulfilling its interests that such a self is selfish and egoistic. It is not truly a moral self. Such a critic will say that Dewey still hasn't distinguished adequately between prudence and morality. Our critic assumes that truly moral action does not involve a self gaining fulfillment, but involves only altruistic ends. Ends are separated from the self. Kant's theory of the self would exemplify such a dualism. But we have seen that this is an erroneous conception of the self. The self is continuous with its ends. The ends in which a self is interested are constituents of the self. "Whether one obtains satisfaction by assisting friends or by beating competitors at whatever

²⁶Theory of the Moral Life, p. 141.

cost, the interest of the self is involved."²⁷ So the difference between a selfish and an unselfish act is not that in one case a self is acting out of an interest and in the other case only an altruistic end free from interest is involved. In both cases the end sought is a constituent of the self and is the object of an interest. The difference is in the sort of end or object of interest. In the case of an unselfish interest, the object of the interest is a good in which others share. In the selfish case the interest is narrow and not in harmony with the interests of others. Dewey expresses the error and his solution to the problem as follows:

When it is assumed that because a person acts from an interest, in and because its fulfillment brings satisfaction and happiness, he therefore always acts selfishly, the fallacy lies in supposing that there is a separation between the self and the end pursued. If there were, the so-called end would in fact be only a means to bringing some profit or advantage to the self. Now this sort of thing does happen. A man may use his friends, for example, simply as aids to his own personal advancement in his profession. But in this case, he is not interested in them as friends or even as human beings on their own account. He is interested in what he can get out of them; calling them 'friends' is a fraudulent pretense. In short, the essence of the whole distinction between selfishness and unselfishness lies in what sort of object the self is interested.²⁸

²⁷Ibid., p. 159.

²⁸Ibid., p. 160.

In Dewey's example of the selfish man who uses his friends simply as aids to his own personal advancement in his profession, having friends on their own account is not the man's end. His real end is his own advancement in his profession. This is the end that is a constituent of his self. When he seeks to make friends there is a separation between this so-called end and his self since his true end is advancement in his profession. The friends that he seeks are only means to this true end. On the other hand, in the case of the man who seeks friends on their own account there is no separation between self and end. The end which is a constituent of the self is the desire simply to have friends because it is satisfying to have friends on their own account. The difference between the two cases is not that in one case there is no interest and no satisfaction, but the difference lies in what sort of object the self is interested, and from which he gets satisfaction. The moral, as distinct from the merely prudential self, is the self which cultivates interests in objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all concerned, not just to the enrichment of his own life. Although, of course, the moral self does contribute to the enrichment of his own life as well as to the lives of others, since achievements that contribute to the common good are the most fulfilling.

The Role of Dewey's Theory of the Self in his Naturalistic Ethics

So far in this discussion of the point of contact between Dewey's theory of the self and his naturalistic ethics I haven't covered naturalism as it was defined in Chapter 1, namely the theory that scientific method is a sufficient method for ethics. I shall turn to this methodological issue now.

In A Common Faith Dewey writes the following about scientific method:

were we to admit that there is but one method for ascertaining fact and truth -- that conveyed by the word 'scientific' in its most general and generous sense -- no discovery in any branch of knowledge and inquiry could then disturb the faith that is religious. I should describe this faith as the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices.²⁹

The faith that is religious is faith in "the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends." And knowledge acquired by scientific method supports this faith. There can be no conflict between science and the religious so long as the religious is defined in Dewey's way. In fact, science is the only method for pursuing the end that is religious, namely unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends.

²⁹A Common Faith, p. 33.

As we saw in Chapter 3, for Dewey, the unity of the self is not given. Rather, integration or unity is an achievement. The self is a complex of psychological factors -- habits and impulses, desires and interests. And these factors must be unified by intelligence, which is scientific method.

But a new terminology is introduced in the passage above, namely the terminology of ideals. Unification is to be achieved through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends. It will be worth our while to follow up the nature of ideals in Dewey's ethics, for by so doing we may get a fuller insight into the role of scientific method in ethical inquiry.

For Dewey, ideals are not ideas of remote perfection. When ideals are thought of as remote goals, they become unrealizable in conduct. They become "vague emotional inspirations which take the place of thought in directing conduct."³⁰ Contrary to such vague conceptions of the ideal, for Dewey ideals are guides to thought in choosing courses of action in concrete, specific situations.

The trouble with ideals of remote 'perfection' is that they tend to make us negligent of the significance of the special situations in which we have to act; they are thought of as trivial in comparison with the ideal of perfection. The genuine ideal, on the contrary, is the sense that each of these special situations brings

³⁰Theory of the Moral Life, p. 133.

with it its own inexhaustible meaning, that its value reaches far beyond its direct local existence.³¹

Each special situation "brings with it its own inexhaustible meaning." And Dewey goes on to indicate that the meaning of a situation is all of the consequences that would follow from alternative courses of action taken in that situation. The meaning of a present desire is the consequences that one predicts will follow from acting on that desire. And the ideal is the end-in-view that incorporates a sense of the inexhaustible meaning of the situation. The "inclusive ideal end" is the end that is approved after consideration of its diverse consequences on other ends. It is the end that includes a wide diversity of ends. It is a comprehensive object of desire rather than a narrow, short-sighted objective.

Dewey sums up what he means by ideals in the following passage, contrasting ideal values with material values.

In conclusion, we point out that the discussion enables us to give an empirically verifiable meaning to the conception of ideal values in contrast with material values. The distinction is one between goods which, when they present themselves to imagination, are approved by reflection after wide examination of their relations, and the goods which are such only because their wider connections are not looked into.³²

³¹Ibid., p. 133.

³²Ibid., p. 61. It should be noted that for Dewey "material" values are not to be associated with satisfaction of normal appetites. On the contrary, there are times and

We may now see the role of scientific method in pursuing the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends. Science is the method for discovering the consequences of alternative courses of action. Science shows relations of cause and effect between desired courses of action. We start with de facto goods -- objects of desire -- and scientific method enables us to see relations of cause and effect between these objects so that we may choose to pursue the desire that unifies the interests of the self into a system. Scientific method, the method for knowing conditions and consequences, is sufficient for deciding whether particular de facto goods are also de jure values. They are desired, but should they be? If we know certain conditions or consequences of things that had been desired, we may no longer desire them. They may turn out to be objects of desire that do not fit into our whole system of desires and interests. They turn out to be specious goods -- de facto but not de jure. And the only method we need to discover this is the method for discovering conditions and consequences: and this is scientific method.

A comparison, at this point, between Dewey and G. E. Moore on intrinsic and instrumental value will help to bring out, even more sharply, the way in which Dewey's

and places in which such physical and sensuous satisfactions take on ideal value.

theory of the self enables him to make scientific method sufficient for ethics. For Moore, in sharp contrast to Dewey, scientific method is not sufficient for ethics. For Moore, scientific method is the method for discovering instrumental values, but a distinct method is necessary for discovering intrinsic values. As we saw in Chapter 1, for Moore, intrinsic values are to be discovered by isolating the object being evaluated and intuiting its goodness, a method which is the precise opposite of Dewey's method, in which, rather than isolating the object evaluated, we must see it in its causal relations to other objects. Because of the way in which Moore distinguishes between intrinsic and instrumental value, we need distinct methods for discovering these two classes of value. Scientific method is confined to discovering instrumental value.

Moore's sharp distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value is tied to his treatment of means and ends. For Moore, intrinsic values are associated with ends, instrumental values with means. Ends that have intrinsic value are prized in themselves; whereas means are not prized in themselves, but receive their goodness secondhand, so to speak, from the ends to which they lead. Consequently, we need to discover what ends have intrinsic value quite independently of concerning ourselves with the means to realizing those values. Things that have intrinsic value have it regardless of spatio-temporal context.

So the method of isolation and intuition is brought in for discovering the ends that have intrinsic value, while science is confined to the discovery of means after our list of isolated intrinsic values has been made up. According to Moore, science can discover means for securing intrinsic values within the specific spatio-temporal contexts in which they occur. To sum up, for Moore there are two distinct kinds of value -- intrinsic and instrumental -- corresponding to the distinction of ends and means, and two corresponding methods -- isolation and intuition for discovering intrinsic values, science for discovering instrumental values.

By contrast, Dewey's treatment of means and ends saves him from having to make this distinction between methods for discovering intrinsic and instrumental values. For Dewey, the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value does not correspond to the distinction of ends and means. Rather, for Dewey, means as well as ends have their distinct intrinsic values. There is no reason for attributing intrinsic value to ends while denying it of means.

We may be interested in a thing, be concerned with it or like it, for a reason. The reason for appreciation, for an enjoyed appropriation, is often that the object in question serves as a means to something; or the reason is that it stands as the culmination of an antecedent process. But to take into account the reason for liking and enjoyment concerns the cause of the existence of a value, and has nothing to do

with the intrinsicness or nature of the value-quality, which either does or does not exist. Things that are means and things that are fulfillments have different qualities; but so do symphonies, opera and oratorios among themselves. The difference is not one that has anything to do with the immediacy or intrinsicness of value-quality; it is a difference between one affair and quality and another.

It is self-contradictory to suppose that when a fulfillment possesses immediate value, the means of attainment do not.³³

Both means and ends have their own distinct intrinsic or immediate value. There is no reason to deny that means have intrinsic value, or in other words that they can be prized in themselves. Dewey makes the point quite simply in Theory of Valuation as follows:

There is nothing in the nature of prizing or desiring to prevent their being directed to things which are means, and there is nothing in the nature of means to militate against their being desired and prized.³⁴

Since intrinsic values belong to both means and ends, we cannot separate the tasks of discovering intrinsic and instrumental values by having one method for discovering means, another for ends. In fact, the task of ethics is not to give a theory of values at all. We cannot make up a list of things that are intrinsic values in all spatio-temporal contexts, as Moore would have us do. We can only

³³Experience and Nature, p. 397.

³⁴John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 27.

criticize de facto goods -- things thought to have value, whether they be values of means or of ends. And we can only criticize such de facto goods by considering their conditions and consequences.

the important consideration and concern is not a theory of values but a theory of criticism; a method of discriminating among goods on the basis of the conditions of their appearance, and of their consequences.

Values are values, things immediately having certain intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are. All that can be said of them concerns their generative conditions and the consequences to which they give rise.³⁵

We can discover what things have intrinsic or de jure value in the context of a situation. Our task is to find what goods within specific situations are inclusive ideal ends. By considering objects of desire in the context of their conditions and consequences we may discover which fit into and unify the system of desires and interests that constitute the self. And since scientific method is the method for discovering conditions and consequences, science is the method for discovering the inclusive ideal ends that are worthy of controlling our desires and choices. Scientific method is the only method by which we may unify the self.

In a recent letter to me, Israel Scheffler has

³⁵Experience and Nature, p. 396.

compared his position to Dewey's ethics as follows: "I am, broadly speaking, close to Dewey's position though I find his general references to consequences insufficiently detailed in the matter of specifying how these consequences are brought to bear; hence my emphasis on initial commitments." The question that occurs to me now is whether or not Scheffler is correct in his claim that Dewey has not shown adequately how consequences are to be brought to bear in decision-making. I suggest that Dewey has shown how consequences are to be brought to bear, and that his theory of the self provides such guidelines. Those consequences are to be chosen which produce maximum unification of the self.

For Scheffler, choice must be made between initial commitments so that the system of commitments is chosen that maximizes commitment. For Dewey, choice must be made between de facto goods so that the system of goods is chosen that produces maximum unification of the self. Unification of the self, for Dewey, corresponds to Scheffler's concept of maximizing commitment. And for Dewey, de facto values correspond to Scheffler's initial commitments. Dewey's de facto values are the likings or desires that we bring to a situation in which de jure values are to be discovered. Wisdom is the ability to foresee consequences in such a way that we form ends or interests which grow into one another and reenforce one another, so that conduct forms a consistent, harmonious whole. Not every de facto

good is to be chosen as a value, since de facto goods often conflict. So choices must be made so that de jure values -- cultivated interests -- support one another rather than conflicting. This formation of interests into a consistent, harmonious whole is what is meant by "maximum unification of the self."

It must also be remembered that, to achieve this unification, not only must the interests of the individual support one another, but the interests of one individual must support, rather than conflicting with, the interests of others. This is what is meant by cultivating interests that contribute to the common good. The idea of the unification of the self as a guide in decision-making is to form a self which has, not only inner consistency, but is in harmony with the other selves that make up the social environment. The objective of the moral life is to form a body of impulsive tendencies into a system of interests focussing in inclusive ideal ends -- values that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all.

Bibliography

- Allport, Gordon W. "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology," The Philosophy of John Dewey. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. 2nd ed. New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1953.
- Bourdeaux, Robert M. "John Dewey's Concept of a Functional Self," Educational Theory, 22 (1972), 334-43.
- Boydston, Jo Ann, ed. Guide to the Works of John Dewey. 1970; rpt. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.
- Dewey, John. "Antinaturalism in Extremis." Naturalism and the Human Spirit. Edited by Yervant Krikorian. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944.
- _____. Art as Experience. 1934; rpt. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958.
- _____. "Body and Mind." Philosophy and Civilization. 1931; rpt. New York: Capricorn Books, 1963.
- _____. A Common Faith. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1934.
- _____. "Conduct and Experience." Philosophy and Civilization. 1931; rpt. New York: Capricorn Books, 1963.
- _____. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. 1916; rpt. New York: The Free Press, 1966.
- _____. "The Ego as Cause." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 4. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- _____. "Evolution and Ethics." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 5. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- _____. Experience and Nature. 2nd ed., 1929; rpt. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958.
- _____. Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology. 1922; rpt. New York; Random House, 1930.

- _____. Individualism Old and New. 1930; rpt. New York: Capricorn Books, 1962.
- _____. "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy." The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy: And Other Essays in Contemporary Thought. 1910; rpt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965.
- _____. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938.
- _____. "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality." The Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946.
- _____. "The New Psychology." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 1. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
- _____. "On Some Current Conceptions of the Term Self." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 3. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
- _____. "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 3. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
- _____. "The Psychological Standpoint." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 1. Carbondale and Edwardsville. Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
- _____. "Psychology." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 2. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967.
- _____. "Psychology as Philosophic Method." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 1. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
- _____. "Psychology of Effort." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 5. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.
- _____. The Public and Its Problems. 1927; rpt. Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1954.

- _____. The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action. 1929; rpt. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960.
- _____. Reconstruction in Philosophy. 1920; rpt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957.
- _____. "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 5. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.
- _____. "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 4. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- _____. "Soul and Body." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 1. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
- _____. "The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 4. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- _____. "The Theory of Emotion." The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Vol. 4. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- _____. Theory of the Moral Life. 1932; rpt. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.
- _____. Theory of Valuation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.
- _____. "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James." The Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946.
- Dewey, John and Bentley, Arthur. Knowing and the Known. Boston: Beacon Press, 1949.
- Edel, Abraham. "The Relation of Fact and Value: A Reassessment." Experience, Existence and the Good. Edited by I. C. Lieb. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- _____. Science and the Structure of Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.

- Fronzize, Risieri. The Nature of the Self: A Functional Interpretation. 1953; rpt. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- Holmes, Robert L. "The Development of John Dewey's Ethical Thought." Monist, 48 (1964), 392-406.
- Leavenworth, May. "On Integrating Fact and Value." Zygon, 4 (March, 1969), 33-43.
- _____. "On the Impotence of Unnatural Values," Zygon, 4 (Sept., 1969), 281-5.
- _____. "A Suggestion for an Interdisciplinary Approach to Ethics." Zygon, 8 (June, 1973), 135-147.
- Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self & Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.
- Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.
- Punzo, Vincent. Reflective Naturalism: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. New York: Macmillan Co., 1969. 315-68.
- Roth, Robert J. John Dewey and Self-Realization. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1963.
- Scheffler, Israel. "On Justification and Commitment." Journal of Philosophy, LI (1954).
- _____. Science and Subjectivity. Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1967.
- Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "The Modern Consciousness and the Winged Chariot." Address to the Tenth Anniversary Convocation, the Graduate School, The City University of New York, May 4, 1973.
- Stevenson, C. L. "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms." Readings in Ethical Theory. Edited by Sellars and Hospers. 2nd ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970.

Thayer, H. S. Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968.

Werner, Richard. "John Dewey's Ethics: Pragmatism and Justification in Ethics." Winner of the 1974 John Dewey Essay Contest.

White, Morton. "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis." The Philosophical Review, LVIII (1949).