FREE SPACES, COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDENT ACTIVISM AND REPRESSION ON WEST JAVA, INDONESIA, 1920-1979

by

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A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
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Whereas previous studies of the Indonesian student movement have been limited to studies of single episodes of activism of student protests, this work focuses on the narratives, and repertoires that, together with crucial external events of political and economic realignments created both pressures and opportunities that produced contentious identities of Indonesian student activism.

This study reveals the development of a particular type of contentious student activism that was driven by private frustrations, grievances and intellectual concerns, and that led to particular forms of collective action that became institutionalized in two ways: 1) as a repertoire relied on by students; and 2) more generally, as a culturally acceptable mode of expressing opposition. However, the development of student's political consciousness did not reflect only political grievances and frustrations. Student activism was the result of many different resources and opportunities. To be successful, student movements required both the physical and conceptual space in which they could construct political opposition.

This dissertation challenges the assumption that free spaces must always be local, free and participated in by groups from below. Free spaces may be as important for highly-visible privileged groups as they are for an invisible subaltern. This may force activists to seek free

spaces in places far from local settings supported by transnational actors and social networks. This study finds this phenomenon in fields as different as the anti-European anti-colonial student movements of the 1920s to the post Indonesian independence movements of the 1950s down to the present.

By focusing on the claims and contentious identities of the study movement and of the student movements, this study reorients the study of Indonesian student activism from analysis of protest to the analysis of the specific spaces created through their reliance on the powerful narratives that shaped each decade of student activism.

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Chapter 1

Free Spaces, Identity and Student Activism in Indonesia

Introduction

The central dynamic of Indonesian student activism that I examine in my dissertation is the development of students' political consciousness in private spaces. While public protests of Indonesian students have been relatively well documented (Douglas 1970, Aspinall 1997, 2004, Boudreau 2005) the private spaces of the student movement (and identity-dynamics within these private-spaces) have received less scholarly treatment. Historically, student activism in Indonesia has been dependent on the existence of "free spaces"—private places characterized by intimate settings in which a group in common participates on a voluntary basis. Autobiographies of former student activists (ranging from the biographical details of Mohammad Hatta [1979] to the private journals of (former) activist and University of Indonesia student activist Soe-hok Gie [1966]) demonstrate that the formation of a cadre of leaders depended on free-spaces and on students' ability to gather, talk and organize undisturbed in such spaces.

John Ingleson (1975) showed the importance of literary societies and student journalism as free spaces for the cadre of Indonesian nationalist students in the Netherlands. Edward Aspinall (1991) documented the role student-government organizations played in this role in the 1970s. In short, a long history of free-spaces, whether they were study-clubs, literary societies, student journalism and cultural clubs have served students well as the spaces in which insurgency can be documented. Free spaces were generally abundant in the Indonesian student movement.

Theorizing about the relation of free-spaces to student activism can help us undersand issues that have been observed but theorized little about in the history of Indonesian student activism. This includes the intellectual character of much of the student movement and the role that local intellectual actors and leaders played in generating symbolic resources and solidarity of the student movement (Boudreau 2005). Following from this has been the largely-elite character of the student movement and its general reluctance to avoid broader popular alliances until quite late in its development. In fact, only in the 1980s, when the campus student organizations were under state-supervision and campus leaders faced repression by the state did the student movement seek broader alliances to engage in a larger struggle against authoritarian government. This reflects, I speculate, the shift in student activism away from its roots in intellectual activities and organizations towards an effort to organize broader challenges rooted in less (solely) intellectual efforts and activities.

The intellectual quality of the Indonesian student movement meant that student activism genereated a unique language, subculture and theory of political struggle. Whether one looks at the late-colonial period or the early anti-Sukarno movement among students in the late 1960s, Indonesian students contributed to intellectual critiques of the exercise of state power. Student activists called for leaders to rely on a common, unified language (Bahasa Indonesia) in the 1920s to unite the many ethnic and linguistic groups residing within the borders of the Dutch East Indies. Through intellectual activities—writing articles defending Indonesian sovereignty or advocating use of a new and novel language and participating in organizations that celebrated local and regional culture, student activists generated a culture of resisting Dutch rule that embraced their identities as educated youth and members of bureaucratic organizations.

In the 1960s, student activism focused on resisting the unifying ideology of national-socialism (NASAKOM) proposed by Indonesian President Sukarno to appease both the left and secular-nationalists in his cabinet. Students signed manifestos defending a secular-humanist approach to university education against the nationalist appeals that the university was an agent of foreign interests.A particular subculture of student activism was constructed around these intellectual activities. As proponents of linguistic, cultural nationalism and defenders, later, of secular-humanistic education and anti-authoritarianism, Indonesian student activists (in free-spaces) contributed to a unique development: students as intellectual figures and leaders within a social movement generally constrained by its intellectual and elitist character. This tension would characterize student activism for decades in Indonesian politics. Liberating student activism from this framework would require repressing the intellectual leaders and organizations at the forefront of its movement.

The Significance of Free Spaces for Theorizing about Student Activism in Indonesia

Free-spaces have been theorized as playing a central facilitating role in the emergence of social movement activity (Evans and Boyte 1982, Polletta 1999, Johnston 2007). Free spaces are physical places of "public or quasi-public character" (Evans and Boyte 1982, 20) where individuals can develop political consciousness and engage collectively in public life. Free spaces are spaces where individuals can rise above being "subjects" in the political sense. Evans and Boyte discuss how the black church provided an environment where slaves acquired a dignity of personhood and where, collectively, blacks developed a language of challenging power structures that were responsible for their oppression.

What makes free spaces potentially powerful places for generating social movement activity is how they are "root[ed] in the community [and in] dense, rich networks of daily life" (1982: 20). My work challenges the very assumption that free spaces must always be local, free and participated in by groups from below. Free spaces may be as important for highly-visible privileged groups, like university students in Indonesia, as they are for an invisible subaltern. Activists require private space where they can gather, talk, generate strategy and problem-solve together. Free spaces are generally free from state surveillance by authorities but are not always underground in the usual sense of the term. They may be openly supported by a number of powerful actors and social networks, sometimes transnational networks far from home, as the exile community of Indonesian students studying in the Netherlands demonstrates (Chapter One).

While the study of Indonesian students' ideology has been the subject of some scholarship (Feuer 1966, Douglas 1970, Aspinall 1995) scholars generally focused on the development of students' ideology in relation to psychological frustration or deprivation (Feuer, 1962) and external political frames (Douglas 1970). Efforts to understand student activism as strain resulting from psychological stress or parental authorities has generally meant to ignore how student activism was an organized effort to challenge political authorities. Scholarly understanding of student activism has moved beyond examining it as particular rebellions against parental authorities (as indeed Feuer [1966] has suggested we understand student activism). Efforts to understand student activism as public challenges to the legitimacy of a public leader or as criticism of the public policies of a state have dominated the field since the first studies of student activism as generational unrest in the 1960s.

A central assumption of this work is that for Indonesian students to act collectively as student activists they first had to think of themselves as a social movement, that is, as a collective group with a specific consciousness, history and identity (Melucci 1989). Indonesian student activism has always had a highly public component (Douglas 1970, Aspinall 1991 1995, Boudreau 2004). However, the public character of the student movement was one mediated by two factors: 1) the particular way in which solidarity was maintained in private spaces familiar to everyday activities common to students and 2) the particular nature of state and government repression towards student activists.

In what culturally-specific ways did Indonesian students frame their political activism? How did students frame their critiques of state authorities? These questions reflect relatively recent attention by scholars of social movements to study the influence of culture (Fantasia and Hirsch [Klandermans ed. *Culture and Social Movements*] 1988) and narrative power (Davis, 2002, Poletta, 2006) in social movements. Specific narratives of action facilitated many generations of student activists into careers of political activism. Particular narratives like the heroism of youth during the Indonesian revolution helped frame an active role for students in the post-independence period. Acting as heroic youth, students expressed opposition to Communism in the 1960s and to authoritarianism in the 1970s. Focusing on these narratives demonstrates how students interpreted limited political space in ways that facilitated their active participation.

These narrative aspects of student activism have been important but, so far, understudied aspects of Indonesian student activism. By focusing on the claims and contentious identities of the student movement, I demonstrate that students' ability to act was dependent on free-spaces and, through these free-spaces, the cultivation of particular action-frames. Powerful narratives shaped each decade of student activism I examine. Students took advantage of global and local

frames when they framed their actions as anti-colonial young nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s (at a time when many nationalist movements framed their actions as young). During the 1960s when students around the world were active in movements of social insurgency, Indonesian students framed their actions with a global action frame in mind (with important local variations).

Focusing on these narratives can contribute to a more dynamic understanding of the student movement as well as a more specific examination of the origins and impact of free spaces. First, in analyzing the collective claims and solidarity of the student movement, I locate students' ability to generate a collective identity in the particular narratives, ideas and discourses of the student movement. Second, by examining these narratives, I document the specific idioms and identities that enabled Indonesian students to act. In thinking about the relationship between students and free-spaces, I examine the kinds of spaces that are necessary for resistance to develop.

As Boudreau (2005) observed, Indonesian students rarely faced the wrath of the state reserved for the Communist left. As a result, student activists could operate more openly than their leftist or labor counterparts. The general tolerance by the state of student activists raises itself interesting questions related to the autonomy of free-spaces and student organizations in Indonesia. In what way were the state-sponsored institutions of higher-educated the same kind of free-space as the Black church in the United States? The short answer, as I shall explain, is not very similar for two reasons. First, while the Black church served as an underground cultural repository for an emerging Black culture and social-movement of insurgency, the Indonesian university was not so uniformly a cultural institution of resistance. It had been constructed with state-funding and was, by the 1960s, generally supervised by the state. Second, student activists

were limited by their generally short-tenure as students studying at a specific university. The Black church was not constrained by members serving brief periods of membership and thus could serve as a more stable site for the emergence of oppositional consciousness. What both the university and the black-church had in common, however, was how they permitted actors to see themselves in newly empowered ways.

Free spaces are believed to provide a setting in which aggrieved actors can acquire a group identity. Evans and Boyte (1982) understood free spaces as conferring a "a new self-respect" and dignity that prepared individuals for political action. The free spaces I examine in this work helped students overcome, at different times, a second-class identity (during the colonial period, for example, when youth were eager to shed the idea of 'native'In what kinds of free-spaces were students able to safely question, challenge or counter-challenge existing norms, values and beliefs?

The cultural aspects of Indonesian students' identity as social movement actors has been generally understudied or ignored by scholarly analysis. Yet how students framed their actions tells us much about how they generally saw themselves in Indonesian society. While students adapted to the external political opportunities and constraints through specific action-frames, adaptations were not infinite. Action frames were limited to students' identities and to particular influences including, but not limited to, 1)a nationalist anti-colonial narrative that had its origins in the flowering of a number of different charismatic movements on West Java and Sumatra in the late 1800s, 2) a particular mode of activism which had reflected (in the early 20th century) student organizing in groups that identified as anti-colonial nationalistic and 3) an idiom of student activists as "young" and uncorrupted actors in national politics. In the context of local politics, the idiom of youth gave students both protective cover and leverage over the political

elites they often opposed. The idiom of youth was not limited to students on Java, it was a title acquired by many young anti-colonial movements around the colonial world.

Indonesian student activism reflected a long tradition of reliance on intellectual resources (study, writing, research). The intellectual idiom students would come to identify with in the 1970s reflected the physical spaces in which they constructed political opposition: the study-club, seminars and scholarly conferences where students met, organized and developed collective ideals of solidiarty. An important shift since the 1990s has bene the extent to which students reoriented their solidarity to include workers, farmers and the poor (Aspinall, 2004). I examine student activism in Indonesia in the era prior to this development, before students saw themselves as spokesman of a subaltern. The student activists of the 1920s, 1960s and 1970s saw themselves as future leaders and elites of their country. They addressed other leaders and elites through methods and actions that were familiar to a privileged audience.

Through their political activism, Indonesian students addressed a national elite and sometimes, global, audience. This reflected, in part, students' own elite and privileged backgrounds. In the 1920s the students who attended international conferences and took part in organizations like the Anti-Colonial league were those who had studied abroad. These expatriate Javanese and Sumatran student became the international spokesmen of Indonesia—a country that did not yet exist. Their activism required nurturing in physical spaces and social networks that were familiar to a small cadre of exiles in the Netherlands and among circles of partisan activists in colonial Java. In these circles, students engaged with other activists and developed bonds of oppositional solidarity. This model of activism would inform the next two generations of activists in Indonesian student communities.

Shifting Narratives in the Indonesian Student Movement

The anti-colonial nationalist movements of the 1890s provided much of the physical and narrative space for Indonesian student activists in the 1920s. Functioning outside the legal parameters of the colonial-Indies, the student groups in the Netherlands straddled social networks of exiled activists and intellectuals who, in the private homes of professors, served as vital free-spaces for student nationalists. This pattern, of public oppositional sentiment nurtured in private space would continue through different periods of student activism after independence. After Indonesian independence in 1950 underground free spaces remained important. Faculty members from prominent universities, like the University of Indonesia shared grievances with emerging activist students like Soe Hok-Gie about the nature of Sukarno's government after independence. These grievances provided a context for understanding the anti-PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) insurgency and the rise of Suharto in 1966. Through the anti-communist political discurse students could reinterpret authoritarian political space in new ways conducive to political action.

The power of the student movement in the 1970s was its intellectual identity and idiom of youth uncorrupted by power. Part of this identity—of moral upstanding youth—had been forged in the first decade after independence during the ideologically discordant 1960s. During this period, anti-communist students and intellectuals formed a political cadre opposed to Sukarno's ideology of "Guided Democracy." This included a small but highly influential network of anti-communist thinkers and intellectuals who were ostracized by the more dogmatic Indonesian president, Sukarno. The ideological conflict of this period in Indonesian increasingly gave way to a hardening oppositional consensus that emerged opposed to Sukarno and to Indonesian Comunism. These narratives reflected their base in a complex mix of domestic

political concerns and a cultural movement that was anti-communist, pro-Western, secular and humanistic.

Student activism built on familiar cultural ideas and idioms about students in Indonesian life. The emergence of a collective identity around which a particular vocabulary of student activism—patriotic, heroic, brave, politically sincere—was a product of the revolutionary period on Java and in the Netherlands in the 1930s. These same ideas contributed to the outrage students exhibited against authoritarianism in the 1970s.

Transnational and local influences were also reflected in the narratives that were part of the student movement. Indonesian students did not operate in a vacuum. They were shaped by a diffusion of global ideas about youth and movements. For example, in the 1920s, activism built on the local experience of colonial education, of the status distinctions between native and Dutch that were reinforced by school. Alongside, this, however, was a growing awareness of nationalist agitation on Java as well as an international movement to resist colonialism and imperialism. Through participation in international conferences in Europe sponsored by the Communist International (COMINTERN), student activists who once identified as Javanese and Sumatran youth saw themselves transformed into young delegates of an emerging country. In this new role as international spokesmen for Indonesia, the independence struggle involved a personal transformation for many activists.

Narratives shape motivations to act (Poletta 2005) or provide coherence to action during periods when strategies are in flux (Davis 2008). Narratives are located in the culture and history accessible to the involved actors. Students' efforts to frame their activist campaigns tended to drawn on students' own knowledge of Indonesian history: the efforts by students in the 1960s to

remind viewers that students had been active nationalist agitators was surely an attempt to frame a local movement within a larger narrative of student activism. At times, however, students tried to appeal in terms of international events, like International Human Rights day, for example. Looking back on the student movement, former activists (and some current ones) used a narrative of that reflected American popular culture and the idea of the cowboy.[1]

Whether it was the anti-colonial nationalist movement of the 1920s, the anti-communist student movement of the 1960s, or the anti-corruption movement of the 1970s, Indonesian student activism was shaped by the diffusion of global ideas and movements like the following: 1) the anticolonial themes and repertoires of the nationalist youth movements of the 1920s, 2) the themes of anti-communist literature of literary journals like *Encounter* from the early 1960s and admiration of anti-communist dissidents and, 3) by a narrative of student and intellectual power in the 1970s. All were nurtured in free-spaces.

Rethinking Free Spaces

My work demonstrates that free spaces' freedom is tied in complex ways to the privileged character, circumstances and narratives of the actors who comprise them. Whether it is the very privilege of actors or state-sponsorship of institutions that provide the very autonomy of free spaces or the specific circumstances of the actors involved, the freedom of free spaces is relative and contingent on several factors. First, free spaces do not exist without the individuals and groups who are part of the construction of political opposition. Second, the relative autonomy of student free-spaces—the seminar room, the study-club and the conference reflected the privilieged character of students themselves.

[1] The idea that students represented a figure unique to American cowboy movies reflected both, perhaps the influence of American popular movies to students both spoke to me about the the student movement in this manner.

Students' identities as activists and claim-makers shifted in relation to groups of prominent intellectuals, political narratives and intellectual discourses. The way student activism has conventionally been studied has been to examine either the facilitating factors which "caused" students to protest or to examine the episodes of protest or demonstrations. Study of Indonesian students' participation in oppositional politics has largely emphasized public sequences of action, protests and mobilization (Bachtiar 1969, Paget 1970, Aspinall 1991) Scholarly research has focused on the large student organizations and bodies that have played key roles in generating insurgency. Work has described the mobilization of students and groups into the Anti-Communist Student Action Front (KAMI) in the 1960s (Paget 1970, Douglas 1971) and the sporadic unrest which accompanied student dissent in 1973 (Bresnan 1993). Generally ignored has been the intellectual nature of Indonesian student claims as dissidents.

As this work will demonstrate, the student movements were largely shaped by their proximity to scholarly ideas, to scholars and to study. This shaped particular strategies of the student movement away from popular forms of action—strikes, demonstrations, and rallies to more abstract thinking about problems and policies. Ideas that would become the basis of popular action and insurgency like nationalism, anti-communism and political reform, began in intellectual study circles and as abstract ideas discussed in small, exclusive circles.

Where prior research has focused on action my work largely focuses on the discourse and ideas that were a large component of student activism.A systematic identification of free spaces and analysis of their relation to a larger number of student activist movements is needed to better understand the relationship of free-spaces to shifts in terms of identities, strategies and tactics adopted by students.

The disourse of student protest in the 1970s was not only the result of a strategic partnership with the army. It was also the product of a longer repertoire of student activism that stretched beyond the 1996 Anti-Communist movement into a narrative past in which students were the inheritors of a legacy that began with the nationalist movement of the 1920s. The kinds of protest students adopted also reflected particular narratives of action that stressed particular roles for youth in Indonesian politics.

By the 1970s public protests and oppositional acts carried out by student activists, for reasons of personal safety were couched almost entirely in terms of private or individual intellectual convictions. The 1970s student movement was part of a longer shift in the student movement from the small private debating societies and clubs on Java in the early 1910s and 1920s to larger mass membership bodies of students by the 1940s and 1950s.

Understanding free spaces can draw our attention to areas previously neglected by scholars of Indonesian-specific student activism. These include 1) the generational divisions within the student movement, something which has correlated both with shifts in specific tactics and repertoires from one generation to another as well as, 2) the endurance of particular narratives in shaping the evolution of student activist techniques.

Through participation in free-spaces, or small intimate settings such as study-clubs, discussion groups, literary societies and journals, Indonesian university students maintained "boundaries" (Taylor and Whittier 1992) that helped demarcate students as a separate segment of Indonesian society.[2] Identity-defining boundaries were reinforced by the exclusive nature of

[2] Boundaries "locate persons as members of a group," (Taylor and Whittier, 1992) Boundaries range from physical places to alternative values. In both cases they function to "establish differences" between challengers and dominant groups (Klandermans 1992, Taylor and Whittier, 1992).

student clubs and their largely private membership. Whether the private spaces in question were study-clubs or Indonesian language literary societies of the Dutch colonial period, the private libraries of Western-oriented professors at the University of Indonesia or the small problem-solving "self-help" groups of the early 1970s, the identity of student activism was shaped by private spaces. These spaces are further significant for how they have facilitated, through social networks of activists, intellectual shifts in public oppositional discourse.

Explaining the role of students in Indonesian politics requires we specify both the specific parameters in which students have been able to act in addition to the unique claims made by students. Insofar as student activism has been the subject of academic scholarship, most early work on Indonesian student activism focused on the contentious organizations (Bachtiar 1966, Paget, 1970) rather than the contentious identities (Aspinall, 1991, 2004; Boudreau 2004) of student activism. This has yielded analysis that has significantly missed understanding students as unique actors with specific identities, unique claims and specific patterns of both private and public action in Indonesian politics.

From its earliest days in the 1920s, the student movement was not a populist movement. Compared to agrarian movements common in rural Java throughout the 1890s and 1920s, student activism was rarely directed around a single charismatic leader. Student activism was highly organizational in form, with student groups taking the lead, often through the leaders of student organizations, playing key leadership roles. The formation of new literary societies, journals, cultural clubs that developed around student circles in the 1920s suggested students saw their identities expressed in practices they regularly enjoyed: reading, writing, socializing, attending

movies and eating at cafes.[3] Particularly in the 1960s, students were eager to distance themselves from active identification with the Left and with what were frequently described (increasingly by the army) as the "more radical tactics," of the Communist Left (Soe hok Gie 1966). Efforts to avoid alliances with the Communist Left positioned students to a closer alliance with the faction of the Indonesian army opposed to Sukarno in the 1960s.[4]

Boundaries in the 1960s were shaped by the politicization of campus life in the Guided Democracy era. To students who opposed the politics of the "Guided Democracy" ideology of nationalist-socialism (NASAKOM) opposition was displayed by their fondness for foreign movies, books, and ideas (all banned during this period). In the 1970s, student activists formed research groups, task-forces and wrote White Papers and critiques of policies. These students' values reflected the highly intellectual character of these individuals and the new role for intellect in the student movement in the 1970s.

Whether one examines the colonial period or the period after formal independence in the 1950s, higher education on Java (and indeed, throughout the archipelago) was largely administered by the state.[5] While private schools and universities existed, activists who took part in the student movements examined in this work attended a mix of private colleges as well as prestigious and public universities, like the University of Indonesia.

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[3] This is in fact the world of the young described by Shiraishi (1991) *Age of Motion* and Rudolf Mrazek's (1994) biography of Sjahrir during his days in Bandung.

[4] As early as the 1927 massacre of the Indonesian Communist Party on Java, Indonesian students in the Netherlands (like Hatta) worried about the "recklessness" of mass organizations and techniques. Ruth McVey has argued that communism's egalitarianism did not appeal to the privileged youth. This can be seen through the efforts to form the PSI in the 1920s. The Indonesian Socialist Party and its culturally-distinctive subculture of discussion-groups, study-club, literary societies and youth associations stood in stark contrast to the kinds of mobilization of other types of student youth groups.

[5] The proliferation of private universities in the 1980s marked a new development that had begun with a few private colleges in the 1970s. See Harsja Bachtiar (1966).

A variety of places unique to the Indonesian university have served as the free-spaces. Ranging from private dormitories to study-clubs, discussion groups, the offices of student government, campus newspapers and literary societies, all have served as free spaces to Indonesian university student dissidents. Study clubs, student-associations, journals, literary-societies and discussion groups were to the Indonesian student movement what black–churches were to the mobilization of sentiment against segregationist culture and practices of the American south. They were the 'indigenous social networks' that McAdam (1982) argued were so central to the mobilization of grievances. The ability of insurgents to generate a social movement is ultimately dependent on the presence of an indigenous "infrastructure" that can be used to link members of the aggrieved population into an organized campaign of mass political action (McAdam 1982 [1991]: 44).

Through activism in free spaces students acquired experience in running political organizations, developed political skills and took part, as movement leaders and activists in a range of opposition politics. Through participation in small intimate settings such as study-clubs, discussion groups, literary societies and journals, Indonesian university students participated in public roles as activists, reformers and dissidents. In this above sense, free spaces represent unique settings to examine the interaction between private spaces, personal identity and activist strategies.

Scholarly study of Indonesian student activism has focused on public dimensions of student activism such as episodes of protest or demonstrations (Bachtiar 1969, Paget 1970, Aspinall 1997, Boudreau 2005). However, many aspects of student activism—the recruitment of activist leaders, the construction of social networks needed to generate enthusiasm and build momentum for activist campaigns---depended on activists' ability to gather, talk, and meet in

protected spaces. From these spaces students generated oppositional sentiments, developed intellectual justifications for shifts in strategy and constructed a collective identity of insurgency. When public activism was too dangerous to undertake (and this was much of the time) private spaces constituted a key resource for activists.

A long history of student activists' reliance on private or protected spaces has been documented from the biographical literature on Indonesian nationalist activists.[6] Work has yet to acknowledge two things: 1) how patterns of activism from private spaces were replicated by activists in the decades that followed the nationalist movement and, how in the process of replication, 2) a pattern of student activism evolved from study-clubs and discussion groups that served (at first) functional, instrumental purposes (to facilitate study and sharing study materials). As part of this transformation of space, a transformation of identity also took place: students became activists. In this way, free spaces underwent significant transformations as places that once served a useful utilitarian purpose into something that served a more collective space to generate solidarity, sustain enthusiasm and devise activist strategies. In the process both the space and the actors were transformed.

The Relation of Free Spaces to Identity Processes: Transformation of Space, Transformation of Identity

Free spaces were significant for a number for reasons. First, free spaces facilitated collective action especially under conditions of political repression. Working within already existing social networks, activism from free spaces emerged out of activities and groups that were part of

[6] Whether the private spaces in question were the study-clubs and Indonesian language literary societies of the Dutch colonial period (when the Indonesian language was forbidden), the private libraries of Western-oriented professors at the University of Indonesia or the small problem-solving "self-help" groups of the early 1970s, students and intellectuals exercised public influence through inherently private spaces and actions.

students' daily lives. Activists did not have to create new organizations (although many activists did alongside the free spaces). Second, collaborating in free-spaces helped activists maintain meaningful connections with one another.

Free spaces provided the social and physical space for solidarity, support, encouragement and friendship. Insofar as free spaces are believed to be physical spaces, Poletta (1999) has urged rethinking the concept of free spaces to include analysis of ideas, narratives and stories. She has argued (Poletta 1999) "the mobilizing power of [free-spaces] lies not just in their structural isolation but in their specific cultural content" ("Free Spaces in Collective Action" 19).

Free spaces and small private intimate settings were integral to the development ofIndonesian students' political consciousness and identities. New forms of solidarity ensued from participation in free-spaces. Alongside the obvious pleasures, anxieties and camaraderie of collective action developed an identity of activism that would become a central component of what it meant to be a student in Indonesia. While political repression, exile and isolation were a constant backdrop to student activism, free spaces were integrated into students' daily lives, making it difficult for outsiders to penetrate or observe. In this way activism became a natural extension of being a student.

Student's political consciousness was not suddenly activated by external circumstances but required nurturing in particular type of environment. Indonesian students had an abundance of relatively sheltered spaces from which to organize, strategize and maintain their activist commitments. Such spaces, while acknowledged by the scholarly literature on Indonesian students (Legge 1988, Ingelson 1979) have not been adequately theorized with regards to their relevance to political identities adopted by Indonesian students.

Scholarly understanding of free spaces can demonstrate the following. First, activists maintained connections with one another during dangerous, perilous periods in relatively private spaces such as dormitories and private residences (Ingleson 1978, Anderson 1979). Second, these spaces were places where activist commitments and enthusiasm were maintained (Ingleson 1978). Documentation of free-spaces has been generally limited by its scope to study of one-historical period or one community of students. As such it is hard to gauge whether the activist commitments of a specific cohort were the result of particular features unique to that cohort (the experience of exile in the Netherlands, for instance, or the experience of life under the occupation) rather than the result of specific aspects of free-spaces.

Boundaries “locate persons as members of a group,” (Taylor and Whittier, 1992) Cognitive liberation will reflect a group’s solidarity, its understanding of its of their situation” and the group’s expectations (Taylor and Whittier, 1992). [7] Boundaries range from physical places to alternative values. In both cases they function to “establish differences” between challengers and dominant groups (Klandermans, 1992, Taylor and Whittier, 1992).

Education in state-schools was an important component of students’ identities as subjects of the Dutch colonial state (Kahin, 1952, Anderson, 1991 and Shiraishi, 1996). Dutch schools have been considered responsible for creating national consciousness among those who attended. These youth

> formed their national consciousness of being natives of the Indies, and as such moving with other nations in linear open-ended time toward modernity…they did

[7] The construction of boundaries is obviously highly contingent on the particular culture of the group. Civil rights mobilization was built out of networks and groups that were part of the black-church communities (McAdam, 1982). Women’s consciousness derived from a number of activist organizations, womens’ groups, bookstores, informal networks and personal experiences of women themselves (Taylor and Whittier 1992).

> not know one another personally, but they knew for certain of othe other's existence in [cities] all over the Indies.[8]

The process by which Dutch-educated youth could imagine horizontal identities is relevant to understanding the development of "markers" and experiences that inclined youth towards activism. Imagining themselves as young nationals was a process activated by participation in proto-nationalist groups.Nationalist identity required spaces for the development of nationalist sentiment. This in turn rested on existing social networks—the groups, bookstores and community of activists in existence in major cities on Java.

Study-clubs functioned in two ways: as indigenous networks of insurgency and as boundaries between students and dominant groups. In the study-clubs students could maintain values that set them apart from dominant groups. For example, student-clubs were "concerned", "apolitical", "moral". Study-clubs were part of the cultural experiences of youth who attended Dutch universities and schools on Java. The adoption of the study-club as a central component of what it meant to be a student-activist reflected the dominant patterns of socialization among college youth. Study-clubs were places students got together to talk, to study and to relax. In the post-independence period, study-clubs helped students solve collective problems they regularly encountered at the university: students circulated readings, prepared for exams and made use of scarce university resources, inadequate numbers of instructors or libraries, through study-clubs.

Whether we focus on the study-club in the Dutch phase or in the post-independent period, the study club had similar functions. It functioned as a space highly amenable to the basic requirements of social movement organizations: a regular place to reliably meet and recruit, to share ideas and communicate with little state surveillance. Study-clubs also tended to grow to

[8] Shriashi (1990) 31-2.

include absorption of groups situated immediately outside the study-club. As such, study-clubs overlapped with informal networks and alternative-institutions and groups (literary societies, magazines, bookstores, cafes).[9]

Youths' personal experiences prior to participation in social activism were not, collectively speaking, consistent with deprivation but with specific experiences of participation in contentious activities and social movements. Within this context, one can imagine how settled patterns of authority, clear boundaries of community and hierarchy were often subject to intense change and scrutiny by youth.

For example, from Benedict Anderson's 1972 work on the *pemuda* (young nationalists) during the Japanese occupation (*Java in a Time of Revolution* 1979) we gain understanding of the way existing patterns of youth recruitment took on heightened significance under Japanese rule. As youth became politicized under the conditions of military occupation, they began to define themselves in new ways—as both opponents of colonialism and as increasingly insistent on decolonization.[10]

By the 1950s, Indonesia had achieved independence and efforts to expand schooling (particularly that at the primary and secondary level) were early priorities. National curriculum development was administered by an Education Ministry who sought to construct a model of

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[9] The recruitment of youth relied on existing networks of social organizations and sponsored activities—whether it was school, football-clubs, discussion groups, dormitories or study-clubs, these activities promoted communities built on strong solidarities that could be easily converted (in the way Doug McAdam [1982] talks about) into a basis for social action.

[10] Whereas youth in the context of the Dutch system had been defined by access to a Western model of education in the humanities, in the Japanese occupation youth found their educational institutions entirely disrupted by the Japanese authorities. Young men whose education had once meant entry into a Dutch world, found themselves after 1937 (as Anderson [1972] has described), recruited into ascetic service to the Japanese military government on Java.

schooling build on national citizenship, civic engagement and social justice (Smith 1980, Douglas 1970).

University students found themselves, however, in a world defined largely by both a Dutch-defined institution and by humanistic values that stressed rationality, inquiry and introspection. Such a model was at odds with the educational imperatives of the national government (particularly that of Sukarno's Minister of Education, Prijono,) by 1959. The anti-Communist student movement of 1965 represented specific dynamics of mobilization unique to the 1950s that included intense ideological indoctrination (Douglas 1971) and patterns of mobilization (Paget, 1970).

Student activism, in particular, the defense of traditional education (humanism, rationality, reason) also reflected an older idiom of education that was at odds with Sukarno's new reshaped national education doctrine. The re-emergence of an older idiom of higher-education in the opposition discourse of students and intellectuals in the early 1960s has not been considered of much importance to the anti-communist campaigns that would follow in the mid-1960s. Yet they were of tremendous importance in explaining the alliance behavior of students with the small circle of officers from the Armed Forces who sought out young political opponents to combat Sukarno's ideas.

Scholars who studied the formation of the anti-communist student movement, KAMI (United Action Front of Indonesian Students) captured well the dynamic of KAMI's early momentum. KAMI was no doubt relatively easy for the army to organize because a new federation could be built upon an already existing community and organization of students. KAMI, however, also built upon an entire range of oppositional sentiment that had a long lineage

stretching back to the experiences of older academics. Where KAMI has been understood as uniformly a youth movement, overlooked has been the ideas and influences of older academics who were, at one time, Sukarno's cohorts.

To the extent that researchers have studied Indonesian student activism, research has only begun to identify the contentious repertoires, free-spaces and identity processes of the student movement. Work has only started to begin to describe sequences of student activism (Aspinall 1991) or to make active comparisons between different student movements (Aspinall 2005, Boudreau 2005) and with the intra-generational networks of activism that Nancy Whittier (1997) has argued are essential to understanding movement continuity.[11]

Scholarship on Indonesian student activism has demonstrated students adopted particular modes of protest. In what way, however, were these modes of protest not only a reflection of strategically-adaptive measures but also of particular cultural and generational experiences? Where students in other countries relied on tactics like street-demonstrations, campus occupations, Indonesian students didn't simply gravitate towards intellectually-based activities because it was strategic. They did so because it made particular sense, as students, to engage in the world through intellect, reason and argument.

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[11] See her article "Political Generations, Micro-Cohorts and the Transformation of Social Movements," American Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 62 (October: 760-778). In it Whittier argues that movements are rarely continuous events involving a single generation of participants. In the same way that American feminism was divided into separate "waves" that constituted specific experiences, orientations and activist strategies, Indonesian student activism reflected events and interpretations that were by no means uniform. Whittier sees movements as indubitably shaped by age and generational differences. These differences are evident, she argues in the different collective identities that reflect "changing external context and internal conditions of the movement at their time of entry. Differences in collective identity exist between the political generations that mobilize each wave of protest and among micro-cohorts within each political generation"(Whittier 1997: 763).

Writing papers, doing research and study can be understood as a strategic identity insofar as it was an adaptation around the specific sanctions on political organizing and opposition. They permitted students a more public role that was tolerated by authorities. However, they were identities that also had personal resonance with students. For strategies to be adaptive, they must make sense in way that is personally meaningful (ie. through identifying with these practices) to the actors engaged in the collective action.

Activist responses were not infinite. They were shaped by an existing vocabulary and style of collective action that formed part of a tradition of student activism. Students' drew on particular contentious forms and styles that resonated with their own personal identities as educated youth, within a specific set of circumstances. In the late-colonial periods, student responses were as much shaped by the particular repression of the colonial police as they were by activist strategies that expressed solidarity through the values and identity- patterns of university students which reflected a mix of (in the colonial period) Dutch culture and an emerging nationalist identity.

The study-clubs, for example, emerged out of the Dutch university culture on Java. They would become, for practical reasons, part of an evolving repertoire of student activism that, in the post-Dutch period, would drew on familiar and local forms. Student activism, however, would also be shaped by the efforts students led, to create a national culture on Java that was rooted in a common language and evolving style of participation that was shaped in the context of revolutionary politics.

Two very different roles of student activists can be gleaned from the two broad scholarly literatures that informed my initial inquiry into the subject of Indonesian student activism. First,

from the study by historians of the Indonesian revolution to the study by social scientists of the 1960s in Indonesia, it is evident that youth have been a critical political group, with a distinct political identity and unique claims to make. This means that if we are to correctly understand what student activism means in the context of Indonesian politics, we must understand it ways that take this history seriously.

The significance of the student movement of the 1960s was not simply as part of a larger wave of youth revolutions, it also had significance as a movement that drew on specific identities of youth and particular political commitments of students that can only be understood through examining the history of the Indonesian revolution. Students had distinct identities as a group in Indonesian politics and had a distinct history of movement in Indonesian history.

Second, student activism was not simply triggered by external events: student activism emerged out of the everyday activities and groups that comprised their lives on and off campus. These spaces, also understood as free spaces (Evans and Boyte) have functioned both to recruit students and to sustain activism during more dangerous periods of political repression, when it was too dangerous to agitate in public.

Focusing on identity can help us understand what Vince Boudreau (2005) has articulated as "the strategic heart of contention" to demonstrate, in his words, "how state repression influences protest and resistance by changing movement organizations and oppositional cultures" (*Resisting Dictatorship*: 3). Boudreau's point is that students were deprived of the ability to employ techniques of mass-action, and therefore adapted to circumstances that permitted *certain kinds* of protest.

Students' ability to adapt to repression through "oppositional speech situations" (Johnston 2005) is clearly evident. Students relied on a range of tactics and techniques that reflected their identities as educated individuals: they wrote petitions, open letters to public officials, jokes, parables, manifestos, conducted research and engaged in "problem solving". The rise of student-intellectuals like Mohammad Hatta in the 1920s, Sutan-Sjahrir in the 1930s, Soe hok-Gie in the 1960s, Arief Budiman and Heri Akmadi in the 1970s tells us much about the identities, political opportunities[12] and oppositional culture[13] that emerged around student activism in Indonesian politics**.**

Opportunities for student activism have generally been thought to be contingent on the close alliances students enjoyed with key political elites (Bresnan 1993, Aspinall 1991) or on the particular "flexibility" of the leadership, members and organization of large student groups (Paget 1970). In fact, both the flexibility of student groups and students' alliance behavior can be better understood by shifting attention to the relation between ideas and action as they occurred in free spaces. Doing so can demonstrate that students' alliance behavior, modes of protest and

[12] The concept of political opportunities is one that is first used by Charles Tilly's (1978) *Mobilization and Revolution*. Douglas McAdam (1982) extended analysis of opportunity structures to the civil rights movement in the United States to show that participants even with unfavorable opportunity structures can, under certain conditions and working with dense social networks "indigenous" to a group can overcome unfavorable political opportunity structures. By political opportunities scholars mean the factors (often outside the formal scope of the social movement participants) that affect their ability to act. A favorable political opportunity structure is the environment outside is one that would permit action by social movement participants with relative ease. Democracies or relatively open regimes with relatively open access for all groups to participate have much more favorable opportunity structures than do authoritarian regimes, which depending on the nature of the regime might entirely close off opportunities to act. A more illiberal regime may permit some contestation under highly regulated circumstances. Indonesian politics, particularly during the late-Sukarno and early Suharto regimes (1960s and 1970s) respectively, generally permitted some political activity.

[13] Oppositional consciousness is a term that describes how social movement participants collectively identify as a group, come to collectively define their grievances and prepare for mobilization. Mansbridge and Morris (2001) define oppositional consciousness "as an empowering mental state that prepares members of an oppressed group to act to undermine, reform or overthrow a system of human domination (2001: p. 5). See Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris, *Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

cultural transformation were as dependent on interpretative processes and generational experiences.

Looking at the student movement from the perspective of free spaces is to propose a potentially new research agenda. By focusing on the claims and contentious identities of the student movement, I hope to build on work that has identified the importance of private or protected spaces for sustaining activism (Anderson 1979) or for initiating new periods of mobilization (Paget 1970, Bresnan 1993, Bachtiar 1966). This work has generally examined single case studies. As such, it has refrained from making explicit comparisons between different periods of Indonesian student activism. More recent scholarship (Aspinall 1991, 1997, Boudreau 2005) has examined student activism in a more comparative context. [14]

Aspinall (2005) compared the student dissidence campaigns of the 1970s to the participation by students in the 1990s Reform movements that were active oppositional movements in the days and months following the 1997 economic crisis. His findings built on earlier work that had studied the Student Council Movement movement of the 1970s. Aspinall (2004) argued that students' strategic positioning as allies to the New Order military regime gave students a unique license to protest. A significant part of the student-officer alliance (as Francois Raillon [1985] showed) was a shared faith in the power of social science and in the assumptions

[14] This is not to say that there was no analysis or documentation of political identities of Indonesian students only that analysis of students' ideology was not conceptualized in ways that always advanced theoretical thinking about the relationship of identity to action. Roger K. Paget's 1970 thesis, "Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government" studied the patterns of youth mobilization of anti-Communist students in the days and month after the October 1 1965 coup in Jakarta. Paget's analysis of student organizations in the months prior to the coup demonstrated that ideological identity reflected regional and class backgrounds of students. So of the tens of thousands of university students in West Java alone, there were significant ideological divisions which also happened to coincide with partisan splits and party organizations. The dominant split in the 1960s was between secular nationalists, Muslim student groups, Communist-affiliated organizations and Christian student groups, who along with the secular nationalists and Muslim groups agreed on little but were all similarly skeptical of Communism. In Central Java where the Nationalist party was both weaker and opposed traditionally by the more traditional-Muslim party, Nahdlatul Ulama, the Communist Party had a larger following, including in its youth wing, the Communist Concentration (Bachtiar 1969).

of the behavioral revolution that shaped social scientists' understanding of development and modernization.

The Relation of Student Activism to Political Discourses

The relation of student activism to more significant public discourses of opposition potentially illustrates what Jurgen Habermas (1962) identified as the process in which the "public sphere assumed political functions," (*The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* [1991] p. 29). Habermas' analysis provides a way of ultimately understanding the emergence of a public press and media. He suggests how forms of debate that were confined (at one time) to a private sphere assumed greater importance as public ideas and culture at a particular time in European history.

Capitalist development in Western Europe created a commercial aristocracy severed from feudal obligations and ties (Habermas 1962). The result was the emergence of private salons, coffee-houses and literary societies as the rise of new political forces in 17th century England, France and Germany. A key transition for Habermas was to describe how social practices—discussing politics over food and drink at taverns—became disconnected from these communal settings and ultimately professionalized. The emergence of academic societies, research organizations and specialists conversant in analysis of public issues constitutes for Habermas a significant shift.

These developments had similar (though not exactly identical) parallels in West Java, Indonesia's most populated province beginning in the late 1890s and early 1910s although under vastly different political and economic circumstances. In the *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962) Habermas documented the emergence of new powerful "opinion makers"

as a displacement of the family. The rise of private societies as places where people (once an aristocracy) discussed and debated vital issues was facilitated by capitalist development, the shifts from family (private) to public spaces. The rise of newspapers and publishing presses, scholarly societies and forum devoted to public debate of issues and concerns signified to Habermas a shift from a "culture debating" to a "culture-consuming" public (1962 [1991]: 152).

The tension between a "culture-consuming" student public and a "culture-debating" student public was evident in Indonesia in the 1970s. The rise of the Student Council movement[15] at universities across West Java was led by activists who claimed to speak on behalf of a larger public (both in the sense of a university-public and a mass-public). Their oppositional consciousness was one that was shaped within a context where opposition was couched as professional, scholarly, academic and intellectual inquiry. In a context similar to what Habermas has documented and described (1962), the rise of newspapers, professional and scholarly journals, conferences and colloquium, the student movement in the 1970s acquired a new authority to publicly oppose.

Central to the 1970s student movement was a discourse and narrative of intellectual power and student democracy.[16] With the 1966 Anti-Communist movement as its immediate backdrop, student opposition in the 1970s claimed an identity of autonomy, intellectual rigor and withdrawal from the corrupt culture of authoritarianism. Central to understanding the 1970s student movement was also the place of the Indonesian university in the nation's politics and its

[15] This student movement was known as the "Student Council" movement because it was largely mobilized by students in the governing bodies known as Student Councils. See Edward Aspinall 2004, *Opposing Suharto* (Stanford University Press, 2005).

[16] This must be understood against the history of opposing Sukarno and Communism during the 1960s. Then, the student movement was regarded an appendage to the more powerful Army officers who helped nurture student sentiment into more public insurgency against Communism.

contribution to ideas and idea-makers who attempted to influence revolutionary and post-independent politics.

The Components of Students' Collective Identity

Like Melucci (1989) and Klandermans (1992), I understand movements as built out of shared social solidarities, strategies and grievances. These components comprise a movement's 'collective identity' (Melucci, 1989). These solidarities may be the result of shared experiences or collaboration by activists acting in informal groups and formal organizations. For collective action to be accomplished, "a group must [first] define itself as a group, and its members must develop shared views of the social environment, shared goals and shared opinions about the possibilities and limits of collective action" (Klandermans 1992: 81)

How students saw themselves in Indonesian society as a distinct group with a distinct history and claims was reflected in two ways: 1) the organizations of the student movement and 2) the strategies and tactics of action utilized by students. Whether it was cultural organizations and debating societies to large mass-membership based organizations and congresses, the variety evident in organizational forms were in fact, variations of contentious identities.

For Alberto Melucci (1989) the process of constructing a collective identity was the most central task of a social movement and as an internal process which involves "negotiation" in which "the 'we' involved in collective action is elaborated and given meaning" (1989: 45). Whether identity has been construed as the intellectual themes around which student activism was mobilized (Raillon, 1985, Aspinall, 1991) or the grievances of the student movement, (Douglas, 1970) focusing on identity can help one see students as particular claim-makers in Indonesian politics with unique and purposeful patterns of claim-making. Students were a

distinct group in Indonesian politics whose motivations to act and whose "sense of self" (together I understand as a collective identity) reflected a specific set of experiences, organizational resources and cultural toolkit, in the sense of Anne Swidler's use of the term (1992).

Student activism was also shaped by students' knowledge of and familiarity with transnational narratives of youth power. Student activism was formed by exposure to ideas that were the product of social contention, such as the early pro-Indies movement of the late 1890s on Java or the appeal of transnational ideas and movements that were the product of larger ideological struggle (like the anti-communist literary journals, *Encounter*[17]) Indonesian youth absorbed a range of transnational narratives of resistance and power that (shaped to suit domestic problems and constraints) framed student activism in Indonesian politics.

Student activists faced two particular problems. While Indonesian student activists could rely on several organizations, capable leaders and cadres. They suffered from elite (but often cautious and conservative) alliances and from relatively large mass-membership organizations.[18] While these members could, in theory be mobilized, in practice, large scale mobilization was

[17] *Encounter* was cofounded by Irving Kristol and Stephen Spender in 1953 and was regarded as "an antidote to thecommunism that was still attracting many liberals as well as radicals [and] served as model for similar magazines on the Continent and abroad," wrote Gertrude Himmelfarb in her introduction to the collection of essays by Irving Kristol, *The Neoconservative Persuasion* (2010).

[18] During the Japanese occupation (1937-1945) an effort to build large organizational bodies for students was first addressed. The efforts resulted in deliberative bodies that functioned as larger congresses for students. It was not until the 1960s that students experienced large mass-membership bodies. These grew exponentially during the late 1950s in response to campus recruitment by political parties. The army would rely on the members of these bodies for students as part of the army's efforts to construct an anti-Communist student federation, KAMI.

rarely relied on by students as a mode of activism.[19] This was related to the second deficit students faced which was, often, an unfavorable political opportunities structure.

The Relation between Ideas, Identity and Action

To take seriously political identity is to examine how people collectively organize and act as one united by a common set of ideas or beliefs. Without understanding how Indonesian students saw themselves as a group rooted in a common outlook, heritage or shared community, it is difficult to understand how certain types of mobilization, alliance patterns or forms of contention made sense for students to adopt.[20] As central as this may seem to understanding the various outcomes of student activism, these processes have not been especially central to most scholarship on student activism.

The notion that social movements require a "transformation of consciousness" is widely accepted by all who study social movements. What Doug McAdam (1982) recognized as "cognitive liberation" was, in his words, "the process by which actors in a group to collectively

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[19] An important exception is the 1966 Anti-Communist Student Action Front (KAMI). For a very thorough account of the army's mobilization of anti-communist students in West Java see Roget Paget's account of KAMI (title here and date). Paget shows how the army recruited students to form an action front designed to demand action following the supposedly communist-instigated attack against the seven generals on September 30, 1965. Both Paget's (1970) description of the coup's aftermath and Benedict Anderson's account of the same period demonstrate how students could be effectively deployed by the army at strategic locations in Jakarta to demand vengeance against the alleged perpetrators of the coup, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). During a period when few other groups could protest legally, what would develop as the anti-communist student action front would become a very shrewd instrument for the army's seizure of power in the days and months following the instability and crisis of October 1, 1965 coup.

[20] For collective action to be accomplished, "a group must [first] define itself as a group, and its members must develop shared views of the social environment, shared goals and shared opinions about the possibilities and limits of collective action." Bert Klandermans, *Social Movements and Culture*, University of Minnesota Press, 1992: 81.

define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action."[21] Mc Adam (1982) understands the process of cognitive liberation as dependent on a number of factors:

> shifting political conditions supply the necessary 'cognitive cues' capable of triggering the process of cognitive liberation while existent organizations afford insurgents the stable group-settings within which that process is most likely to occur." (*Development of Black Insurgency*, 51)

Collective identity has both personal and collective aspects. It is shared by members of the group, however it is located in individuals. Notes William Gamson:

> [I]ndividuals must make it part of their personal identity. …Adopting a collective action frame involves incorporating a product of the cultural system—a particular shared understanding of the world—into the political consciousness of individuals."[22]

For Gamson this process is one that must be done by the group in a shared manner involving negotiation between personal and public forms of identities. If we understand students as claim-makers and as challengers in politics, their behavior, whether it was protesting, withdrawing or constructing organizations were all activities that expressed challenging claims and contentious identities. Where scholarly work has tended to focus on the public aspects of students' contentious identities—the public claims of student protest, the themes of student protest, my work considers the private dimensions of student activism and free spaces that have been so integral to the generating of grievances student movement.

My work assumes the following. First, episodes of student activism were shaped by changing environmental factors and students' active interpretations of shifts in opportunities, alliances, perceived threats and possible efforts of co-optation by authorities. Second, student

[21] *Development of Black Insurgency*, p. 51.

[22] Gamson "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (Eds), *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992 (74).

activism had significance within a larger context of political contention. The techniques employed by Indonesian students, how they engaged in contention and the kinds of strategies they pursued tell us much about both the political constraints students faced and their adaptation, through strategic identities, to these constraints. Through focusing on identity, my work can advance scholarly understanding of two things: 1) the relation between private spaces and activist identity and 2) the trajectory of activist careers.

Negotiating Activist Identities: Historical Legacies and Implications for Action

From the perspective of three different periods of student dissidence this process of negotiating identity is readily apparent. From study of the earliest efforts by students on Java to form national societies for university students in the 1920s (Legge 1988) university students had experienced (as a distinct generation) how to influence politics through particular types of organizations and movements. As one of a handful of indigenous students studying at the predominantly Dutch Institute of Technology, Sukarno initiated a movement organization that would become the basis of the first nationalist party, the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party.)[23]

The experience of Dutch colonialism was one that produced, for a distinct generation of young adults, a particular culture of opposition. It reflected, as Legge (1988) the preparation of privileged and educated youth for careers as future leaders, civil servants and national intellectuals. Radical forms of direct action did not particularly appeal to young nationalists who had seen the use of Dutch force against the Indonesian Communist Party in 1927. Wishing to avoid repression, Mohammad Hatta (*Indonesian Patriot*, 1981) advocated activism that would not be associated with tactics that could discredit the Nationalists. Relying on argumentation,

[23] Sukarno, *Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams* (New York: Free Press, 1965)

research and scholarship, students contributed to an idea of Indonesia prior to the nation's existence.

Studying Cultural Transformation through Indonesian Student Activism

In what way could students overcome prohibitions on their ability to act through reliance on culturally-defined expectations of the student as respected identity in Indonesia? Precisely because students were privileged, their behavior was more often tolerated than more popular movements from below. Students could act because their actions were not regarded as terribly effective. At the same time, how students acted in Indonesian politics, the forms of action they embraced and relied on, reflected Anne Swidler has called a cultural "toolkit" (1992).

Up to now, much of the scholarly understanding of Indonesian student activism has focused on the mobilization of groups[24] rather than mobilizing identities.[25] To the extent that mobilization processes among Indonesian students have been studied, they have been understood as triggered by 1) processes internal to the student movement, largely conceptualized in psychological dimensions and personal frustrations (Douglass, 1971) or, 2) in the structure of external political opportunities.[26] Neither perspective adequately explains student activism as

[24] Much of the early study of student activism focused on a single era of student activism, my work builds on the research of (Aspinall 1991, 1997, 1999, 2004) and Boudreau (2005) who have demonstrated the need to comparatively situate student activism within a wider context of contentious activity and groups.

[25] Insofar as identity has been studied, scholars have applied classical assumptions of strain-theory to their inquiry. Stephen Douglas (1970) emphasized how political restrictions on foreign movies and music removed the main source of entertainment for many college students. This, for Douglas, was one factor (among many others) that explained students' increasingly oppositional-posture in the pre-coup period. By the 1970s, high rates of unemployment among college graduates thought to be causes of student discontent

[26] Paget's (1970) work on KAMI is a useful study in this regard.

more recent work has begun to describe it in terms of activist strategies and strategic calculations.[27]

A priority of new research should be to help explain how student activism was sustained across a range of historical periods in Indonesian politics in which few movement organizations survived, but in which new activists were constantly encouraged, despite an organizational deficit. An absence of stable and continuous movement organizations did not impede activism because new cohorts of activists built on existing movement communities and innovated upon traditional contentious repertoires.

This research agenda acknowledges at least four factors that are central to understanding the Indonesian student movement. The first is its location in a network structure of movement communities, groups (formal and informal) and unique spaces, such as dormitories, bookstores, libraries and private residences. Scholarly analysis must acknowledge the network structure of the student movement and how the social networks of activists helped sustain what Douglas McAdam described in 1979 as "indigenous" network. Second, how these indigenous social networks were the basis not only for occasional insurgency, but for the transmission of a rich subculture of student activism is another factor that can contribute to our understanding of student activism.

Third, the kinds of contentious identities students routinely relied on were not infinite. Students' contentious identities were informed by a range of factors that were sometimes local and familiar and at other times, influenced by global frames and cultural references. The transmission of these frames and ideas depended on the existing of a student subculture. The

[27] Aspinall (2004) and Boudreau (2005) see student activism as a particular type of adaptive mode of protest to particularly difficult, dangerous or repressive condition.

literary, academic subculture of the 1920s and 1930s was the basis for the spread of a linguistic nationalism (Anderson, 1991). Where Anderson located in this in print-capitalism, such as newspapers and serial novels that were printed and consumed by mass audiences, I find that students often accessed their own literary subcultures: youth magazines, journals and materials which circulated (not among a reading public) so much as a small circle of activists. These functioned to establish boundaries between students and the non-student world and served to reinforce distinct subcultures and identities of the student movement.

Understanding student activism as some early analysts did, as youth unrest, generational rebellion, anxiety or frustration (Feuer 1969, Altbach 1973) does not help explain the variance in student activism that empirically exists in student movements. The student counter-cultural movements in the United States, for example, was clearly different in the ideological content, modes of protest and themes of activism occurred at the same time in Indonesia.

Not only is student activism shaped by the particularities of states and culture, student movements generate their own distinct identities, ideologies and themes. A theoretical approach which rests on an assumption that student activists generate "unrest" ignores the times that students—as they did in Indonesia— demanded order. Rather than study the issues that have supposedly frustrated students or driven them to rebel against authorities, my work focuses on the intellectual roots and ideas of student activism. By focusing on the ideas and rationales that shaped the grievances of student activism, I hope to refocus study of Indonesian student activism from study of episodes of protest to understanding the relationship between grievances and students' identity in politics as claim-makers.

Doing so situates students within a specific environment that was also continuously responding to students. Framing student activism in this way takes seriously the forms that

student activism took, but it is to also inquire into the origins of student activism as a contentious repertoire. It is also to ask why forms of contentious action initiated by students were generally better tolerated than that initiated by other organizational actors—labor activists, leftists, human-rights advocates.

And while there is strong reason to believe that activists responded to repression in strategic ways, their responses must also be understood in ways that reflected local and familiar patterns and stories that motivated and encouraged activists (Polletta 2006). While narratives about the power of youth shaped the internal dynamics of student activism, students also operated within a larger public context that had its own narratives. So far, this aspect of student activism has been both poorly understood and under-theorized.

How this Work Will Proceed

Any complete analysis of student activism must take into account a range of patterns and characteristics of students, their activist communities, movement organizations, leaders, strategies, tactics as well as the movement organizations. Both the mobilization of student organizations and collective identities of students, as they developed during periods of contentious politics and as they were influenced by local and transnational frames of action, are a central focus of my study. My work will focus on the narratives, collective identities and repertoires that, together with external shifts and opportunities combined to produce contentious identities of Indonesian student activism. I shift emphasis away from studying a single period of

student activism, to make comparisons between different periods of student activism and student participation in contentious politics. [28]

In each of the cases I examine, student activists (and all activists more generally) faced 1) prohibitions on free movement and assembly, 2) surveillance and monitoring of student groups by state security forces and authorities and 3) long periods of exile and underground following arrest and capture. The prohibitions meant that for many activists, finding ways around these prohibitions included not relying on large mass memberships but developing strategies that could evade detection and surveillance. Adopting innocuous activities into more subversive strategies was a central task for many activists.

For each period I study, I demonstrate the central components of the collective identity of student activists rooted in local and transnational narratives, contentious repertoires and changing dynamics of action. Student's collective identity did not stay the same. Shifts in the collective identity of the student movement was evident both in the shifting networks and movement communities and how these shifts were shaped in continuous interaction with elements in the movement's external dimension (shifts/changes in political opportunities), including repression. In describing the different collective identities or each period of activism, I highlight the different role that free-spaces and social network played in formation of student's collective identities.

First, I will identify the free-spaces in which student activism emerged. Second, I identify the identities promoted by students in these free-spaces. How did particular identities expand or

[28] There are, of course, important exceptions. Vincent Boudreau's Resisting Dictatorship is a comparative analysis of social movements in Burma, Indonesia and the Phillippines. His Indonesian cases, insofar as they relate directly to students and student movements, deal with the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Edward Aspinall's 1991 study of Student Dissent in the 1970s made explicit comparisons with the themes of students in the 1966 anti-communist movement, KAMI.

contract students' ability to act? From the participation by students in the nationalist movement of the 1920s, the anti-communist movement of the 1960s, and the political dissidence movement of the 1970s, student activism reflected two kinds of dynamics.

The first set of dynamics I examine was how students made claims and how, through claim-making, students relied on narratives that were influenced by local, familiar and transnational ideas and themes. The second set of dynamics involves seeing how students interacted with other actors during specific phases and episodes of contention. Focusing on episodes of contention allow us to focus on students actions in relation to other actors who were making claims. Doing so allows us to see what is distinct about student activism and also helps us understanding how claim-making was influenced by participation in contentious action.

What all three periods have in common is the following. First, ideas that became transformed into more vital public ideas and modes of attack often started as discussion points or grievances expressed in protected spaces. Through the promotion of new practices and ideas, student activism became a tool of cultural transformation rather than protest. While on rare occasions, students would take to the streets in protest, more typically, students engaged in dissidence and promoting cultural change. This included a) the promotion of a national language in the 1920s), b) the promotion of anti-communism in the 1960s and attempts to develop an anti-communist ideological agenda which transformed, by the 1970s into c) promotion, through political advocacy, of bottom-up solutions to anti-poverty efforts, rural development and legal aid. The critiques of culture in the New Order period (1967-1979) were of the pernicious effects of an authoritarian system, of a lack of transparency and desire for greater political accountability.

Analysis of Narratives

The first narrative this work examines is the nationalist narrative and how the adoption by students of a specific youth identity facilitated nationalist activism. Building on the observation that students played a central role in the making of modern Indonesia, my work examines the 1920s during a period when students were active in the anti-colonial movement on Java and overseas. Through the promotion of Indonesian nationalism, students promoted central roles for their organizations in the nationalist movement. By the late 1930s, university educated youth contributed to many aspects of the revolution: military participation (Anderson, 1991) political subterfuge and eventual leadership after independence (Kahin, 1950).

The narrative of anti-communism had several dimensions and relied on many different kinds of contentious forms.. Student would eventually rally enthusiastically behind the army's seizure of power in October, 1965. Numerous local anti-communist rallies and demonstrations that promoted support for the Armed Forces (Paget, 1970). In the 1960s, a narrative context of anti-communism and order combined with repressive force against any organizational activity not state-sponsored (Boudreau, 2005) shaped the dynamics of the student movements for the next decade. Student newspapers documented the efforts of anti-communist youth groups in Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia (as if the two anti-communist movements were the same. In theory and in practice, they were not. Indonesian anti-communist youth groups sponsored by religious political parties took part in vigilante violence directed at Indonesian Communist Party members and affiliates.

A dominant narrative of sterility and order shaped the New Order from its origins in the anti-communist violence of mid-1966 that framed the 1970s student movement. This narrative was expressed through the criminalization of mass-protest and mass-organizations, like the PKI, banned after 1966 (Boudreau 2005). It also criminalized many forms of deviant behavior and

state campaigns of violence targeted tattooed men and gangsters through the 1980s (Siegel 2000). Throughout the 1970s student dissent was the only form of opposition tolerated by the military regime (Aspinall 2005).Through the political discourse begun by students in the 1970s about corruption and abuse of power, a language of student dissidence expanded to become a movement for popular reform by the early 1990s (Aspinall, 1998; 2004, Budiman, 1998, Boudreau, 2005). The emergence of study, scholarly inquiry and intellectual activity as a form of student activism occurred in the very early 1970s. Students withdrew from politics, claiming disillusionment.

Two main dynamics make up the core of this inquiry: 1) the strategic adaptation and identity-processes as well 2) the trajectory of activist careers are examined from the perspective of free spaces. The first regards the strategic adaptation by activists to differently repressive circumstances. Free spaces played a critical role in students' ability to adapt to repression. Examined as part of his process is how activists maintained and defined 'boundaries" and integral components of activist identities, including the negotiation of specific identities.

The case studies

The late colonial period and the first two decades after independence pose different sets of constraints and opportunities for the student movement. My first case study compares the late colonial period (1910-1927) on Java and the Netherlands with the period of Japanese occupation (1937-1945) that led up to the revolution for independence (1945-1949). Comparing the two I find that youth and youth identity had two distinct meanings during the Dutch and Japanese-colonial periods. While during the Dutch phase identifying as youth provided cover to more

subversive, nationalist activities, during the Japanese phase, youth and youth groups were co-opted by Japanese military authorities.

A dominant factor of this case study is to examine the different opportunities posed by a) study abroad in the Netherlands by a small number of students with b) the developments on Java among university and high-school students. Anderson's 1979 study of the Japanese period (1937-1945) demonstrated that youth played key military roles in the Indonesian revolution the significance of youth's participation in the revolution can be better understood by contrasting this role with the constraints of the period which preceded Japanese occupation.

The political context clearly shaped students ability to act. In the first case study I compare the different opportunities represented by colonial Java and the Netherlands, where a small number of Indonesian students traveled to continue their tertiary education. Where in Europe students were freer to agitate and to participate in transnational opportunities, represented by their participation in the Anti-Colonial League's Conference against Imperialism, on Java where activism was far more dangerous, students advocated the use of a national language and encouraged others to use the new language. Students efforts complemented the political efforts to liberate Indonesia from here men like Sukarno advocated independence, university students played an integral part, through journals, student groups and conferences, in promoting a national identity for the student movement and a shared idea of Indonesia.

When students acted, they relied on unconventional tactics. During the period under Japanese occupation, students kidnapped the nationalist figures Sukarno and Hatta in Jakarta to press the men to declare independence. Through ever larger student organizations, students declared largely symbolic public positions in support for independence. Starting under colonial

occupation by the Netherlands in the 1930s, the formation of many different youth societies, Congresses, conferences, journals and advocacy groups became the main outlets for an Indonesian community of students and for propagating nationalist identity among students.

After independence in 1949, efforts to forge a national community of students continued in spite of powerful countervailing forces. Where the 1920s had been shaped by efforts to create truly national associations, congresses and identities, the 1950s saw a much larger student movement shaped by the creation of many new universities through the expansion of the University of Indonesia system. A student movement that was one largely unified around the idea of national independence was one, in the 1950s, increasingly polarized between religious, regional, partisan and ideological interests and identities. My third case-study examines the first two decades of post-independent Indonesia. Comparing the 1960s with the 1970s I demonstrate how the growing instability of the mid-1960s shaped a context in which students adapted through, at first, largely private spaces.

For each period under study, I identified the 'free spaces' where collective identities and oppositional-consciousness were generated. After that, I locate the free spaces that were central to student mobilization and then turn to a discussion of the social networks that undergirded the free-spaces, examining the connections within study group and the individual activists within them (many of whom were rooted in social networks). For each chapter, I identify both long-term activists and younger-cohorts and the cognitive frameworks that comprised the oppositional consciousness shared by particular "submerged" or "hidden" groups within the student movement and how (and when) these translated into forms of collective action that was both public and visible by student groups.

Chapter 2

Being Young, Becoming Indonesian: Nationalist Identity and Free Spaces in the Late-Colonial Era (1926-1945)

Prior to its emergence as a public and revolutionary movement, Indonesian nationalism began in free-spaces unique to students such as study-clubs, cultural societies and debating clubs. Identifying as Indonesian was the result of participation in groups that reinforced group participation in societies that were organized around ethnic, regional, cultural and linguistic communities. While student groups would become decidedly more anti-colonial, student nationalism was not, at least, at first, solely shaped by any radical political critique of Dutch power in the Indies.

A political critique of Dutch rule required the adoption of an identity that was culturally-nationalistic and anti-Dutch. The shift from an identity that was 'non-Dutch" or "native" to one more "nationalistic," that is, explicitly designed to struggle against the Dutch is the key shift described by this chapter. Students' ability to think and act as anti-colonial nationals had roots in developments on Java, but it was outside Java, in the Netherlands where a more radical critique of Dutch power took place.

This chapter describes, first, the efforts of students to agitate as Indonesian nationalists and to embrace a political identity that was consciously "Indonesian". It is basedon analysis of the emergence of an Indonesian nationalist identity through the personal experiences of key cadres and figures. From biographies of Indonesian nationalists Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir and Ali Sastroamijojo (all students in the Netherlands in the 1920s) one can see the way that an identity of Indonesian nationalism was dependent on a key set of personal experiences. These

individuals had in common an experience of 1) participating in organizations that perpetuated a common, non-Dutch identity, 2) access to a transnational network of social activism and in the Netherlands and 3) being part of struggle that was both cosmopolitan and revolutionary (anti-colonial nationalism). All were important elements in the formation of young nationals. These factors enabled these youth to not only reject Dutch power but to embrace another identity that promised liberation: Indonesian.

First, a conscious effort among youth to experience non-Dutch identities was apparent on Java by the 1920s. At this time, when students began to organize in clubs formed around youth, ethnic and regional identities. Second, part of this development was tied to the emergence of new organizations that built on an existing network of activists. Some of these individuals were active in the Indies' party, an early nationalist party, while others were part of a resurgence of Muslim identity that imagined a unified Muslim community of believers (Zuhri 2001). As students moved through this milieu in both urban Java and the Netherlands, they absorbed a language, identity and concepts that were far better attuned to fighting colonial power than was possible organizing as "young."

Developments that were central to student's identity as nationalists included, first, their participation in groups that stressed common ethnic and regional identities and, through this participation, access to a network of activists and adults who provided encouragement, material support in the form of meals, places to stay and advice (Hatta [CM Penders] 1980). Second, the social networks of activists provided access to a world of activism that included book stores, cafes, and international conferences. Groups like the Indonesian Association formed in the 1920s in the Netherlands, suggests that nationalism was not simply a political struggle that took place on Java. It was also a cultural movement that was influenced by developments outside Java.

During the colonial period, there were better opportunities for activism for Indonesian students in the Netherlands than on Java. Students in the Netherlands could openly agitate for Indonesian independence in Europe and enoyed a more favorable opportunity structure that included a) greater freedoms of speech, b) participation in international conferences like that organized by the Communist International (COMINTERN) League against Imperialism's meetings in Bierville, France in 1926.

As James Siegel (1997) recognized

> [Indonesian] nationalism began not with the nation and not with the colonial forces but with the reception of messages from Europe and Asia…independence…was the result of hearing and overhearing that went on between groups of the Indies and between the Indies and the world. (*Fetish, Recognition and Revolution* 6)

Siegel's understanding of the Indonesian revolution is to examine, through language, how an idea of Indonesia emerged. A key component of this process of "hearing and overhearing" described by Siegel (1997) were the transnational social networks and protected spaces in which students, activists and anti-colonials increasingly began to speak and hear one another. This process, importantly, was not confined to Java. Indonesian nationalism was part of a global phenomenon and the process of thinking and acting as Indonesians took place among students on Java and in the Netherlands.

While Benedict Anderson (1993) pointed to the key importance of language as both a unifying practice and one that facilitated, through consumption of newspapers and books, a common identity of being Indonesian,[1] the reality was less uniform than Anderson suggests. As

[1] Reading, using the Indonesian language, particularly in serial-novel form, or as newspapers, signified to Anderson an individual practice with significant social implications. See *Imagined Communities*, Verso Press, 1993.

Legge's (1988) study of Sutan Sjahrir suggests nationalist youth were sometimes only hesitatingly-conversant in the Indnesian language[2]. University life and, particularly, the social world of university students on Java reflected a Dutch culture. And while students were committed to trying their hand at Indonesian prose, at writing poetry and short-stories, Legge's work reminds us that for many young nationalists, speaking in Dutch, socializing and flirting felt more natural in Dutch (*Sutan Sjahrir's Circle* 1988).

Efforts to use the national language helped accomplish two things. First, it provided a common language for the political struggle to achieve independence and second, it marked the beginning of an early academic community built on Indonesian language journals and literary efforts (Alisjahbana 1966). Using the national language on a regular basis also facilitated participating in the growing social networks on Java that would help generate insurgency for the nationalists (organized increasingly around the figure of Sukarno).

The nationalist movement had come out of the political agitiation on Java. As its backdrop were the trade-union movements of the late 1890s. These had attempted to organize workers by specific trade (cloth merchants, railroad workers). While these unions had some success in organizing around a common labor identity, university students were not particularly drawn to the politics of trade-unionism. More appealing were the "native-progress" or "native-rights" organizations that began to form around communities of students (among the first to organize were medical students on Java). These groups were less organized to challenge Dutch

[2] Sjharir's circle, to use Legge's term for Sjahrir's circle of friends and contacts, may have represented a different milieu than that of Mohammad Hatta. While both men were Sumatran, they arrived in the Netherlands some years apart. Sjahrir would become a distinctive figure in the student community in the Netherlands, but Hatta's leadership of the Indonesian Association was e more pragmatic figure, Sjahrir's ambivalence a me which based on his biography, was shaped by both his study in the Netherlands as well as his contacts in the nationalist movement in Java.

power than they would to express a common identity or solidarity around a common identity. To these groups I turn to next.

The Context of Students' Political Consciousness on Java

Political repression on Java targeted political activities. In an effort, possibly to escape scrutiny by the state students created organizations that did not explicitly challenge Dutch rule. Instead, students formed communities and groups that promoted cultural awareness, regional language, dance and heritage. Second, in contrast to Java, in the relative safety of the Netherlands students could take part in more overtly oppositional activities. In comparison, free spaces on Java were relatively few. Private residences, dormitories and exile communities served as the physical spaces where activists could freely articulate their desires and anxieties. Third, compared to Java, activists in the Netherlands encountered a more tolerant atmosphere that was more open and democratic.[3] Consequently, groups in the Netherlands did not have to hide behind groups that were organized around cultural practices and identities.

Home to a community of students and political exiles from Java, the Netherlands constituted a unique free space to be an activist. In the Netherlands, Indonesian students met with more experienced exiles and political dissidents in an environment less hostile to anti-colonial sentiment (Ingleson 1975). A result was the development of a critical and cosmopolitan Indonesian nationalism that was shaped in the context of a transnational set of dynamics.

On Java, educated youth first imagined their identity as young-ethnics (young-Javanese, young-Sumatran) rather than as "Indonesian." Socializing in clubs like Jong-Java (Young Java) lay the groundwork for participation in bureaucratic organizations. Participating in these groups

[3] "[F]or these politically active young [men] the experience of living and studying in the Netherlands had a profound impact on them." Ingelson (1975) 3

also helped establish contacts with a social network of young and older nationalists. An existing pattern of political contention on Java in the late 1890s-early1910s signaled to activists appropriate strategies of action. The passage in 1908 of prohibitions against strikes and incitement affected union organizers and striking workers.

In the above context, student organizations reflected apolitical identities, either cultural or or intellectually-defined. Under the protective cover of cultural and intellectual activities, students practiced boundary-defining activities which included practicing a national language, writing academic articles, poetry and essays. The particular claims of students as patriotic, nationalistic youth facilitated an active role for student organizations and groups that was often denied to adult nationalist organizations and groups.

The formation of new literary societies, journals, cultural clubs that developed around student circles in the 1920s suggested students saw their identities expressed in practices they regularly enjoyed: reading, writing, socializing, attending movies and eating at cafes.[4] Through participation in social clubs students directly experienced modern bureaucratic organizations.[5] Individual roles in these organizations such as those of Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer also fulfilled new meaningful roles for young people. The titles conferred official status and leadership roles with some responsibility. Within these clubs, students experienced decision-making and assumed responsibility for running bureaucratic organizations. These would be roles that prepared men like Hatta for political leadership. Clubs socialized their members into

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[4] This is in fact the world of the young described by Takashi Shiraishi (1990) *An Age of Motion: Popular Radicalism on Java*, 1912-1926 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

[5] Noted Hatta, "elections took place in a general assembly. Each member had one vote. I learned a great deal about organization and also about the willingness of people to work for a common purpose." Sewing clubs served similar functions for womens' groups. See Rita Smith-Kipp, "Emancipating Each Other: Dutch Colonial Missionaries' Encounters with Karo Women in Sumatra, 1900-1942," in Gouda, ed. *Domesticating the Empire* (1998).

accepting organizational roles. Even organizations such as football clubs[6] were common in the backgrounds of nationalist figure Mohammad Hatta.[7]

Colonial Java in the 1920s

The early process by which Dutch-educated youth on Java could begin to share in an imagined community of Indonesian identity was dependent on free-spaces underlay by social networks which included movement organizations, book-stores and informal communities of activists. [8] These groups formed the basis of early social networks that included youth, more experienced (and older) activists, journalists and anti-colonial agitators, like Abdul Muis. These personal connections facilitated recruitment into the nationalist movement and became the basis of longer-term networks of solidarity, opposition and national consciousness.

The development of youth associations geared specifically around indigenous identities followed a growth in movement organizations that specifically identified as “native-progress” associations. The immediate context of student activism in the early twentieth century was a political instability generated by labor agitation,[9] the formation of Islamic unions[10] and ‘native-

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[6] Both Sukarno and Hatta were members, at different times and in different places of local soccer clubs.

[7] Hatta told his biographer, C.M. Penders, “At first I was just an ordinary member. But later on some friends persuaded me to be on the committee. I was easily elected treasurer and later on I served concurrently as secretary, *Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs*, p. 27.

[8] Study-clubs exemplifies what Alberto Melucci (1989) identified as the “submerged networks” or “latent phase of activism” (Melucci, 1989) that precedes more-public forms of activism. Within these groups, less visible, sometimes hidden processes of negotiation and ‘identity-construction’ often took place within ‘submerged’ networks of individuals and groups.

[9] ‘Generalized political instability destroys any semblance of a political status quo, thus encouraging collective action by all groups sufficiently organized to contest the structuring of a new political order. (McAdam, 1982: 42).

[10] Sarekat Islam, the Islamic Union, would become one of the biggest organizations “claiming 2 million members by 1918” Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas* (2008) 27.

progress associations. [11] Early Dutch rule of the archipelago was geared towards production of cash-crops in coffee and spices, implemented through a harsh cultivation system. During the late 19th century, Dutch reformers began to lobby for expanded public works, improvements to roads and communications infrastructure as well as expanded opportunities for education. [12]

By the late 1890s a limited number of students qualified for First Class Native Schools[13] where they were taught a curriculum that satisfied standards for entrance into Dutch tertiary institutions.[14] The universities that had been created by the Dutch served practical, company, purposes. The Dutch created a law school in Batavia, a medical college (also in Batavia) and

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[11] Among the first places to sponsor a native-rights association was the Doctor-Training College or STOVIA in the capital, Batavia Among the first "Native-Progress" was Budi Oetomo (Noble Endeavor) begun by medical students in 1908 at the STOVIA, or Native Doctor's Training College. STOVIA was formed in 1902. Instruction was in Dutch, taught by Dutch faculty (Indonesia, Ministry of Education, *50 Years of the Development of Higher Education in Indonesia*, p. 33) STOVIA was a "training college which gradually evolved from a vaccinator's school founded in Batavia in 1851. By 1900 this institution had reached university level and its graduates were eligible for a Dutch medical degree after one further year of study at a university in the Netherlands." CM Penders: *Hatta: Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, 38.

[12] Three different kinds of schools were introduced by the Dutch into the Indies which provided Western-style education. One kind of school, the HBS (*Hogere Burger School*), was a high-school for city dwellers and taught a curriculum equivalent to a five year secondary school in Holland. It did not teach the Latin and Greek classics A second kind of school was the MULO: (*Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs*): a three year secondary school giving access to various colleges of advanced education in medicine, dentistry, agricultural science and education or other secondary schools such as the HBS leading to university MULO teachers were graduates of ordinary teachers' college, offering a four-year training after the primary school (*Mohammed Hatta: Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs,* by C.W. Penders, p. 44). Frances Gouda noted that the implementation of education facilitated a backlash against the Dutch in that there were many more individuals who sought education than there were openings at schools for 'native' students and openings for Dutch-trained Indonesians in the civil service did not absorb nearly enough Indonesians trained for this work. See Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (2008).

[13] Noted Frances Gouda (2008), "[t]he growing demand for admission to First and Second Class Native schools combined with "limited openings for Dutch-trained Indonesians in government service [to] absorb even a limited number of school graduates….succeeded in alienating most of [education's] beneficiaries." *Dutch Culture Overseas*, 24.

[14] Despite the efforts to expand opportunities for secondary education, universities remained beyond limited to a small and 'highly privileged elite.Noted Bruce L. Smith (p. 12) In 1948, the faculty of Medicine [at UI] still had only 18 native Indonesian students as against 194 Chinese and 39 Dutch students…There were more native Indonesians registered at the faculty of Technology in Bandung and both faculties in Bogor (Agriculture and Veterinary Science.

technical school in Bandung.[15] Education remained something that was not within the reach of few beyond the 'highly privileged elite:[16]

As in the Dutch system, recipients of tertiary education educated were sons (and a few daughters) of well-to-do families. Families often spent significant sums to send their sons or daughters to college, as Mohammad Hatta recalled. And because university education was for the privileged, schools thought little about issues of cost or of providing affordable (or no cost) textbooks and on-campus services.[17] Most students lived off campus in rented housing, rooms or with families. Moreover, "students were regarded as a highly selective group, mature enough to determine what is good for them."[18] Educational institutions provided the bare minimum of infrastructure and relied on teachers from the Netherlands to teach undergraduates.

For the small number of indigenous students, school was described socially isolating experience. While classrooms were integrated, socializing outside the classroom was usually

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[15] There was no "liberal arts education" beyond whatever emphasis on classics, humanities and literature was offered at secondary school in the colony. The Dutch system was characterized by specialization in a field of study. There was no "all university core-curriculum' or 'basic requirements' that students were required to take. Noted Sukarno,"Our curriculum was geared to a society of Dutch rule. The science I learned was a science of capitalist technique…not how to irrigate the rice fields in the best manner [but] irrigation in the interest of imperialism and capitalism…we were taught only to plan byways along the seacoast from harbor to harbor so factories might have maximum transportation of goods (Sukarno, *As Told to Cindy Adams*, 53 and 67).

[16] Noted Bruce L. Smith (1980) 12. In 1948, the faculty of Medicine [at UI] still had only 18 native Indonesian students as against 194 Chinese and 39 Dutch students…There were more native Indonesians registered at the faculty of Technology in Bandung and both faculties in Bogor (Agriculture and Veterinary Science. By the end of Dutch rule, there were 1000 persons in the entire country who had completed their university education. By then the total Indonesian population was close to 70,000,000. In 1936-1937 60,000,000, the total number of students was only 1038, of this student body, 240 were Europeans, 269 Chinese and 529 Indonesians. Bachtiar (1969) 8

[17] "A single cheap textbook, when available, cost the student the equivalent of several months of a faculty member's salary." Roger K. Paget, "Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government," Ph.D. Thesis (1970) 262. The cost of education (and completion of degree) was considered an individual responsibility of individual students. Bruce L. Smith *Indonesian-American Cooperation In Higher Education*, East Lansing, MI: Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, (1960 :12).

[18] Bachtiar (1969) 12.

segregated.[19] Sukarno remembered "Dutch children never played with native children." [20] The isolation native students may have contributed to a heightened political awareness that became articulated in political discussions at school.[21] Associational life outside class, such as football clubs drew students like Hatta and Sukarno. Cultural organizations geared especially towards facilitating mass-membership among youth with a western-style education grew in size and number across Java and Sumatra in the early 1900s.

Many of the first cultural groups were the 'native-progress' associations like Young Java (Jong Java) and its predecessor, Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor),[22] were successful recruiters because they represented identities that were highly personal to the students and young prospective civil servants on Java. A group known as "Noble Endeavor" was one of the first attempts by students to form an organization modeled on the native-awakening (pergerakan) identity of the late 1890s. Begun by medical students at the STOVIA[23] (Doctor's Medical

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[19] Mohammed Hatta recalled to his biographer, CM Penders that he "attended the first Dutch school in Padang which taught French…there were only a few Indonesian students at this school. Only three were in my class during my time there (CM Penders, *Mohammad Hatta:Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*: p. 25).

[20] *An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams*, p. 28.

[21] Recalled Hatta, "The first Balkan war, which broke out in 1912, ended with the defeat of Turkey. This event was warmly discussed at school. The Indonesian students were supporters of Turkey, while the white students were against…At the time Turkey was caricatured in the Dutch press as a cock with a fez, bleeding and running with the flag of the crescent and the star tied to its leg. This was considered an insult by the Indonesian students, causing deep resentments." *Hatta: Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*: p. 23.

[22] A group formed in 1908, it comprised 'an alliance of Javanese aristocrats founded in 1908…sponsored a mild form of nationalism. Many among its members had been drafted into the middle-ranks of the colonial bureaucracy". Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas* (2008) 27

[23] STOVIA (School tot Opleiding voor Inische Artsen) was the Dutch name for the Sekolah Doktor Jawa or Java Medical College in Batavia (today Jakarta, and the school today comprises part of the University of Indonesia). STOVIA was formed in 1902. Instruction was in Dutch, taught by Dutch faculty (Indonesia, Ministry of Education, *50 Years of the Development of Higher Education in Indonesia,* p. 33) STOVIA was a "training college which gradually evolved from a vaccinator's school founded in Batavia in 1851. By 1900 this institution had reached university level and its graduates were eligible for a Dutch medical degree after one further year of study at a university in the Netherlands." Hatta [CM Penders] *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, p. 38.

College) in Batavia,[24] Budi Utomo's success, noted Shiraishi (1990), was rooted in its cautious and conservative leadership. While the group professed a "solidarity generated by Western-style education" (Shiraishi, 1990: 35) it was tolerated because it was 'educational' and 'cultural…devoted to "awakening" rather than outright challenging Dutch rule.[25]

Budi Utomo provided the foundation for a network of people who would, through a variety of ways, become involved in the nationalist movement.[26] From Budi Oetomo's founding in 1909 emerged a number of other Native Progress" associations, many like the Jong- "Young"- groups, geared explicitly to recruitment of youth. Also at the Medical College in Jakarta a group of 'native' doctors from Java decided to create a new group, the Jong Java, whose motto, the "Tri Koro Dharmo" (The Three Sacred Oaths) provided a Javanese-themed motif to their association.[27] Jong Java, or "Young Java" was considered the first national youth organization.[28]

Youth as a Political Identity

Like Budi Utomo, Jong Java had a journal (published in the Dutch language) and it dedicated its first issue to their creed, "the Three Noble Oaths that will help promote characteristics that will,

[24] Budi Utomo (The Noble Endeavor) founded as a cultural association in 1908…appeal[ed] in the main to the Western-education professional Indonesians, was pre-political rather than political, and only in later years did some of its founders take a leading part in political activities." (Frances Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas* 41).

[25] It no doubt also helped that Budi Oetomo also operated with the "blessing" of the Governor-General Idenberg (Takashi Shiraishi [1990] *An Age in Motion*, p. 35).

[26] Some members of Budi Utomo, such as its Secretary, Sudomo, would become involved in the youth organization started in 1915, Jong Java (Young Java).

[27] *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 31. Supposedly, The founder of Jong Java, a young aristocratic Javanese, Raden Satiman Wirjosanjojo, was at a Budi Oeotomo (BO) meeting in Jakarta when he got the idea to form a youth group that would stand autonomously from BO. (translated from the Indonesian: "Raden Satiman Wirjosandjojo, mengadakan suatu rapat digedung pertemuannja Budi Utomo, Gang Kweni di Jakarta untuk mendirikan suatu organisasi pemuda" from *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 31.

[28] Satiman Wirjo Sandjojo was its first Chairman, Sunardi Wongsonegoro was its Vice-Chair, Sutomo served as its first Secretary. *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 31.

in the future, lead the youth of Indonesia."[29] Activities the organization sponsored included 1) sport competitions; 2) arts and cultural nights promoting ethnic/regional dance or music.[30]The organization also raised scholarship funds for members.[31] While rooted in a local region (Java) and ethnicity—the Javanese, Jong Java grew to include 2,000 members. In its journal it hinted at its future as a national organization.

> With the birth of [Jong Java] and the Three Noble Truths we must keep in mind one thing: that we are committed to finding relations and friendships from other islands to strengthen the Indonesian people.[32]

Jong Java soon spread to other cities on Java. As the Jong Java gained members, it dropped the "Three Noble Truths" part of its identity to become simply "Jong Java."[33] At the demand of its members and to the consternation of some of the Jong Java leaders, a women's organization was formed.[34] By 1912 a profusion of youth-groups existed in major towns across Java, a densely populated region with a high number of educational institutions. [35]

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[29] Translated from Sedjarah Pemuda (cited as "Gedenkboek, Jong Java, page. 26"). I used the Indonesian text."Dalam Madjalah [in the magazine] Tri Koro Dharmo [Three Noble Oaths] beliau menjatakan bahwa "perkumpulan Tri Khoro Dharmo harus memakai sifat buat semantara, supaja dikemudian boleh menjadi suatu perkumpulan buat pemuda-pemuda Indoensia semuannja." (*Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 31)

[30] *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 33.

[31] *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 33.

[32] Translated from *Sedjarah Pemuda* (cited as "Gedenkboek, Jong Java, page. 43). The original reads: "bahwa dengan lahirnja perkumpulan Tri Koro Dharmo, haruslah dipikirkan suatu perkara jang penting itu: mentjari pertalian dan persaudaran dengan bangsa dari pulau lain buat memperkokoh rakyat Indonesia." *Sedjarah Pemuda* (Youth History), p. Balai Pustaka: Jakarta, 1965, 32-33.

[33] *Sedjarah Pemuda,* p. 33.

[34] *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 34.

[35] Jong Java soon spread to other cities on Java. Branches opened in Bandung, in Surabaya, in Solo and Yogya. Jong Java grew to include 2,000 members.

Jong Java soon spread to other cities on Java. Branches opened in Bandung, in Surabaya, in Solo and Yogya. Jong Java grew to include 2,000 members. As the organization gained members, it dropped the "Tri Koro Dormo" motto part of its identity to become simply "Jong Java."[36]

> We devoted ourselves to perpetuating indigenous culture such as the teaching of Javanese dances or the instruction of gamelan orchestra. Young Java also did much charity work. We traveled to nearby villages to raise funds for school or to aid victims of the volcano. We staged a show in the needy area and paid our expenses from the admissions[37]

At the demand of some of its members and to the consternation of the leaders of Jong Java leaders an organization specifically for girls was formed in 1924. [38] In December, 1917 a new young-group was created for Sumatrans in Batavia, the capital, called the Jong Sumatran Bond (JSB). It included 500 members in branches throughout West Java and Sumatra. [39]

JSB, like Jong Java, saw its identity as fulfilling civic functions for future leaders and educators, to spread knowledge of Sumatra, its "culture, language, agriculture and history." [40] The JSB also sought to strengthen relations among Sumatran students.[41] A women's organization soon followed [42]

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[36] *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 33.

[37] Sukarno, *Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams*, p. 42

[38] *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 34.

[39] *Sedjarah Pemuda*, pp. 37-38.

[40] *Hatta: Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, p. 33, see also *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 38

[41] *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, p. 33, see also *Sedjarah Pemuda*, p. 38

[42] Hatta recalled that the Sumatran-Young group had a specifically-girls' group sooner than the Javanese, reflecting perhaps the more progressive culture and strong matrilineal structure of Minangkabau society in Western Sumatra. *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, p. 36

In the JSB Mohammad Hatta was introduced to a new political world filled with meeting at which political activists attended, newspapers were disseminated and discussions that more generally socialized one into following politics. Noted Mohammad Hatta,

> My activities in the JSB caused me to become more deeply interested in social problems…I very often discussed these matters with Engku Marah Sutan or Sutan Said Ali….I also began to follow the speeches of our leaders in the Volksraad. And I became very deeply impressed by the debate between Haji Agus Salim and Sosrokardono, the secretary of the Central Sarikat Islam and a co-editor of Utusan Hindia."[43]

JSB turned out to be a key part of Hatta's formative experiences. Through JSB Hatta also met some of his first political contacts—including Haji Agus Salim[44] and Nazir Pumancak[45], who would become a close associate in the Netherlands. Through these contacts, often initiated through club- meetings or speeches, activists 'prepared' for new roles as "leaders.'[46] By 1918 Hatta was elected Treasurer of Jong Sumatren Bond.[47]

The Jong-groups were all sanctioned by the Dutch governors of Java. Nonetheless they contributed to a network of movement personnel and cadres, making them more like movement-communities and proto-nationalist organizations. Disguised as civil organizations for future leaders of a young nation, they encouraged deliberation, discussion of political issues. With their

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[43] *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*: p. 36

[44] Noted Hatta, I got carried away by Abdul Muis' captivating half-hoarse voice and became spellbound by the cadence of his words…He spoke mainly about self-government, which was the aim of the National Movement, especially his party, the Sarikat Islam." *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, p. 37.

[45] "On January 1918 Nazir Dt. Pamuncak arrived in Padang as a representative of the Jong Sumatren Bond, an association of young Sumatran students in secondary schools which had been established on the 9th of December in BataviaNazir Pamuncak's speech made us realize the new task ahead of us: to prepare ourselves to lead our still backward people into modernity." *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs,* p. 33.

[46] *Indonesian Patriot Memoir* 33, noted Hatta, '"Nazir Pamuncak's speech made us realize the new task ahead of us: to prepare ourselves to lead our still backward people into modernity."

[47] *Indonesian Patriot Memoi*r, 34

journals, youth in these organizations extended personal habits of reading literature and writing poetry into collective activities. The young clubs also celebrated cultural rituals such as dance, music and art-forms (shadow-puppetry) associated with particular regions. Young groups for girls also followed. Regular activities ranged from cultural nights to writing stories and poetry for publication in journals that were written in the new, novel lingua-franca, Bahasa Indonesia.

Despite that they continued to use the Dutch language, displaying their identities as the products of Dutch education. Belonging to the young groups represented a withdrawal from the Dutch-defined society on Java that defined natives as *inlander*, or indigenous subjects of the Dutch crown. In the young-groups, youth were “Young Javanese” or “Young Sumatran.” They socialized in the groups, participated in conferences and meetings and generally experienced first-hand bureaucratic roles and routines.

The young-groups significance was two-fold. First, they represented the emergence of an identity that was withdrawn from and opposed to the dominant culture and values of Dutch colonial society. In the young-groups, youth gathered as fellow Javanese, or Sumatrans or Madurese. This marked the first phase of an identity shift that would lead to identification with a more distinctly Indonesian national identity. Shiraishi (1990) saw the young as new consumers of a cosmopolitan life-style, whose identities were defined in new ways to spend time: drinking coffee at cafes and wearing stylish clothes. To be young was to be part of a modern, consuming lifestyle. To be young, however, was also to be subversive and seek liberation. Conditions on Java made this difficult to achieve.

Indonesian Nationalism in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, nationalist activism did not require were not distinctly bounded by being young. Student associations developed into more overtly nationalist spaces by a mix of their personnel and events. Symbolic activities, including ceremonies involving flags of Indonesia, adopting national dress and speaking the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, became more practiced in the post-1926 period. Interacting outside the politically-repressive climate on Java in a more democratic society than in the Indies was beneficial to mobilization.[48] Groups did not have to remain 'duplicitous' and could be more outwardly defined in terms of 'anti-colonial' and not simply 'nationalist'. Noted Ingleson (1975),

> "[Indonesians] took full advantage of Dutch freedoms and democratic rights and in the Netherlands they could publish pamphlets and articles that would…have landed them in a colonial prison." [49]

Nationalist mobilization in Holland was related to two broad developments: 1) Demobilization on Java following new restrictions imposed after the appointment of Governor Dick Fock in 1919 and, 2) a small but politically active exile community comprised of Indonesian students and dissidents.[50] If on Java an anti-colonial narrative was shaped by the native-awakening movements of the early 1910s, in the Netherlands activists found themselves part of an exile community removed from many of the restrictions that existed on Java. In the Netherlands, exiles were free to have political discussions that would have been banned on Java. They were also part of a European landscape that was, at least, for a small number of anti-colonial agitators

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[48] "[F]or these politically active young [men] the experience of living and studying in the Netherlands had a profound impact on them" John Ingleson,*Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1923-1928*. Clayton, Victoria (Australia): Monash University: Center of Southeast Asian Studies: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 4, 1975: 3.

[49] Sol Tas,"Souvenirs of Sjahrir," *Indonesia* 8 (1969): 137

[50] It is estimated that about 38 had political experience in organizations in Java. Among the students who had gone to the Netherlands were Sutomo, Hatta, Sartono, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Budiarto, Iwa Kusumasumantri.)" John Ingleson,*Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1923-1928*. 1975: 2

and Leftist sympathizers, openly hostile to colonial rule. Within this set of dynamics, students began to develop their sentiments towards more open support for Indonesian self-rule

Identity Dynamics in the Netherlands: The Effects of Open Political Opportunities

Different dynamics shaped the exile community including 1) proximity, through personal contacts, to a small circle of Indonesian exiles who were part of a larger social network of pro-Indonesian activists in the university-town of Leiden, 2) the proximity of young nationalists to more radical movements and activists involved in the Socialist Left throughout the 1920s and 1930s 2), 3) individual participation in the Indonesian association and its activities. The transformation in college identity in the Netherland signifies the importance of free-spaces for the ability to both think and act as Indonesians.

The Indonesian Exile Community in the Netherlands

Indonesian nationalism in Holland reflected the culture and practices of exiles far from home. As education on Java created more students qualified for tertiary education in Holland, the IV's membership grew. Its transition into a political organization reflected the arrival in Holland of different cycles of exiled nationalist agitators and political exiles. Joining this cohort in 1926 were PKI-activists Darsono, Semaun and Abdul Muis. [51] Some, like Darsono had contacts with the German Communist Party.[52]

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[51] Noted Ingleson (1975), They would shape the IV "into active concern with the political issues of Indonesia's future"Ibid. Ingleson, p. 4 Their presence deeply affected their younger compatriots, with Darsono and Semaun having a particularly strong influence in the IV." Ingleson, p. 4. The newcomers, Ingleson noted "quickly dominated the IV and channeled into active concern with the political issues of Indonesia's future." Some, like Dharsono, had contacts with the German Communist Party. Ingleson 1975, 3.

[52] *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, p. 46. It was through Darsono that Hatta was introduced to Tan Malaka, a Comintern representative, Hatta recalled. Ingleson believed that this cohort came to the Netherlands far more politically aware than previous generations of students. Some like Muis, Darsono and Semaun had political experience organizing with the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). The IV soon joined forces with an organization

Formed in 1908, the Indies Association (IV)[53] began "a social centre [in Holland] where students could relax together and keep up to date with news from home."[54] In 1917 they dropped the name "Indies Association" for the name "Indonesian Union of Students". This reflected, as Ingleson has suggested, an important shift in its identity as "Indonesian" rather than as from the "Indies.

The evolution of a specifically national identity was conveyed by the new title students gave to the Indies' Association, renamed the Perhimpunan Indonesia, or Indonesian Association, in 1923.[55] Students reserved a specifically anti-colonial identity to the association's journal, formerly named *Young Indies* (*Hindia Poetra*). The journal dated back to the association's founding in 1908 and was part of a movement of the native press in the early 1900s.[56] The Indies' Association journal's title suggested the optimism of the age: of young natives moving forward in what Shiraishi (1990) terms the modern age.

The new awareness may have also reflected the influence of professors. Students also benefited from close contacts with professors in the Netherlands. Through professors, like van Vollenhollen, a law professor at Leiden,[57] Indonesian students in the Netherlands became

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of Chinese-Indonesian students and an association of Eurasian and Dutch students intending to work in Indonesia (Ingleson, 1975: 1)

[53] "Officially it was open to all Indonesian residents in the Netherlands, but in practice it was devoted to the student population." (McVey's translator notes in Sol Tas "Souvenirs of Sjahrir," (1969: 141).

[54] Ingleson, 1975, p. 1.

[55] Mohammad Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs,* p. 72.

[56] The the passage of new press laws in 1906 helped. These laws censored after publication, rather than before (Shiraishi *An Age in Motion*, p. 32.

[57] Noted Hatta, "At that time, the words "Indonesia" and the adjective "Indonesian" were only known from the books of professor van Vollenhoven [a professor of Law at Leiden university who was well-known for his pioneering work on Indonesian adat law]. Later we found out that the term "Indonesia" had been used as early as 1850 by an English ethnologist called Logan in a work entitled: The Ethnology of the Indonesian Archipelago."

increasingly familiar with the ethnology of Indonesia as well as the concept of non-cooperation. Students adopted the geographical concept of Indonesia [58] to new political concepts of struggle, including that of "non-cooperation."[59]

In 1923, the association became more explicitly focused on independence from the Dutch. The association was renamed *Indonesia Merdeka* (Free Indonesia). Sastroamijojo recalled, "Following this pronouncement the name of the organization's journal was changed from *Hindia Putra* ("Young Indies") to *Indonesia Merdeka*."[60] It was significant that the editors had chosen the word 'merdeka" (freedom), the editors explained,

> By "merdeka" we are giving expression to our aim and aspiration, and "Indonesia Merdeka" is from now on the slogan with which Young Indonesia marches to battle. "Merdeka" is an ideal common to all humanity; in every nation the desire for freedom is strongly alive. The idea of freedom does not differ from one part of the world to another. Freedom is a human and not a western ideal; the whole earth is the temple of freedom."[61]

Named to its editorial board Mohammad Hatta played a key role in the journal's development.

In its first issue as *Indonesia Merdeka*, the journal editors released a statement, resonant

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Indonesian Patriot Memoirs, p. 72. Notes Ingleson (1979) the concept of Indonesia to signify the archiplego was one that was used in the academic circles of ethnologists in Leiden. The community of students in Leiden, where, the Indies Association was based, was shaped by the close ties between students and the Leiden academics.

[58] I am aware that this geographical concept of Indonesia that young Indonesians accepted was the product of a Dutch-university defined field of study. This, of course, raises its own problems of what kind of Indonesia students were imagining—it certainly was not one free from Dutch-scholarly defined interpretations.Ingleson notes that students adopted an essentially Dutch concept of Indonesia, but that they invested it with [new] political [and gradually anti-Dutch] meaning." (Ingleson 1975: 6)

[59] The evolution of the idea of non-cooperation reflected the workings of the movement community. Mrazek (1994) noted that non-cooperation was a concept that Hatta remembered talking about with Indonesian nationalist and fellow Sumatran, Abdul Muis. Non-cooperation, however, was also a scholarly concept that circled among Communist agitator, Tan Malaka and in, supposedly, the nationalist circles of Sukarno's in Bandung. See Mrazek's 1994 biography of Sutan Sjahrir, p. 50, fn. 118.

[60] Ali Sastroamijojo, *Milestones on my Journey*, University of Queensland Press, 1979: 24.

[61] John Ingleson, *Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1923-1928*, 1975: 16.

with anti-colonial ideas and identity. The statement articulated a concept that would become a central part of the nationalist-movement: the Indonesian people.

> The future of the Indonesian people rests solely on the formation of a government which truly responds to the people. Each Indonesian must strive to achieve this end with all his ability and talents and without dependence on "help" from foreigners. The fragmentation of Indonesian strength in whatever form must be condemned as strongly as possible, because only the resolute and strong unity of the sons of Indonesia can achieve the common objective."[62]

The journal's new title demonstrated a collective identity shift in the organization from an idenitity based on consciousness "of the Indies" to one more clearly defined with an idea of Indonesia. Through journals like *Indonesia Merdeka* (Free Indonesia) and in the 1940s, Takdir Alisjahbana's *Pujanga Baru*[63], youth contributed to a growing awareness and use of the Indonesian language among the young elite on Java. Indonesian was a language the enabled Javanese, Sundanese, Sumatrans, Madurese, etc, to experience horizontal identities as' nationals (Anderson, 1991). Nevertheless, the study of literature and poetry was an elite phenomenon not shared by most Indonesians until after independence.[64]

The publication of the association's annual yearbook and a new logo would become adopted by the nationalist movement: a red and white flag with a buffalo head in the center.[65] The symbol had originated among students in Leiden. Explained Sastroamijojo:

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[62] Ali Sastroamijojo, *Milestones on my Journey*, p. 23.

[63] *Pudjangga Baru* "was a magazine designed to promote the Indonesian language and its literature." (Alisjahbana, 1966: p. 64). It was edited by Alisjahbana, Amir Hamzah and Armijn Pane and first appeared in 1933. The title means roughly, *New Man of Letters*. The same trio were also responsible for the holding the first Indonesian Language Congress in Surakarta (Solo, Central Java) in 1938. See Alisjahbana's *Indonesia: Social and Cultural Revolution*, p. 64.

[64] Even among the elite, who spoke Dutch fluently, many did not learn Indonesian until "they were in high-school, and about a third had not learned Indonesian until they were in their earl twenties." (Mrazek [1994] p. 227).

[65] Ingleson (1975). 6.

> Our political meetings were usually held at the home of Achmad Subarjo [a founding member of PI who had studied Law at Leiden university, receiving his degree in 1933. At Subarjo's home students had fashioned a red and white flag with a picture of a buffalo in the middle of it. A type of flag-ceremony developed during the meetings at Subarjo's home with students paying their respects to the flag for good luck or for meditation before exams[66] (p. 22)

In 1926, under the association's new Chairman, Sumatran Nazir Pumancak, a more militant anti-colonial sentiment was evident. In 1926, the Perhimpunan Indonesia issued a new statement:

> "Only a united Indonesia, which has been able to put aside its internal differences, can overcome the might of colonialism. Our joint aim of freeing Indonesia requires conscious national mass action based on self-reliance. Considering there are two types of colonialism, ie.political and economic, our action is directed at achieving political freedom as well as at opposing foreign capital which is sucking Indonesia dry of its wealth."[67]

The organization also participated in a number of related activities, including protest meetings in Leiden with the Holland Section of the League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression. [68] Attendance at international events such as the Comintern's League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression (LIGA)[69] conference in Bierville France in 1926 (Ingleson, 1978) provided PI with excellent opportunities to build networks[70] and to gain international

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[66] Sastroamijojo, *Milestones on My Journey*, (1979) 22.

[67] *Indonesian Patriot Memoirs* (1980) 89

[68] *Perhimpunan Indonesia*, (1975) 67.

[69] PI 'became a member of the League and helped form a Holland Section of the League in 1927 according to Ingleson (1975: 34).

[70] There, students mingled with other anti-colonials, including Nehru and Mme. Sun yat-Sen.

support for the idea of Indonesian sovereignty and eventual independence.[71] Participation at this event reinforced student's identity as delegates of an emerging nation and as representatives of a larger, global movement, the anti-colonial movement.

Open political opportunities in the Netherlands, however, were soon changed by the dynamics of the Dutch repression of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) on Java.[72] PI's development in Holland took place within the wider context of communism's growing reach—in Europe and abroad. The repression of the PKI on Java left some members of the PI (such as Mohammad Hatta) hesitant to join forces openly with Communists.[73]

As a consequence, PI's affiliations with the Dutch Left and with Comintern-sponsored congresses began to wane.[74] PI shifted its alignments in Europe in order not to be seen as 'a Communist-dominated organization," and at Hatta's request, members of the PKI were no longer welcome as members at PI-sponsored study-clubs on Java. Repression by the Dutch of the

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[71] As Hatta observed, "now Indonesia is more known than ever and recognized in the world community." Ingleson,*Perhimpunan Indonesia* (1975) 34.

[72] The 1920s had seen gains for Communist forces on Java, acknowledged Rex Mortimer. The Indies Social Democratic Association renamed itself the Communist Association of the Indies in 1920 (Mortimer, 1974) and became one of the first Asian Communist parties to join the Comintern (Communist Internationa). It was renamed the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1924 with Semaun, the party's first Chair and Dharsono, its first secretary. Encouraged by the Comintern to unify all 'communist' forces, PKI forces planned a general strike to initiate a series of actions that would lead to the replacement of the Dutch government. The 'rebellion' failed, its architect, Comintern-agent Musso, was executed and thousands of PKI-members were exiled in Boven Digul, a concentration camp in New Guinea (Ricklefs, 1993, Mortimer, 1974, McVey, year).Not for the last time would the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) be crushed by government forces and its members exiled to the far reaches of the eastern archipelago.

[73] This would the beginning of a much longer-felt split between the Nationalists and Communists on Java. It was rooted in different organizational styles and clashing class-identities between the two parties. Particularly in the context of the communism on Java the PKI was often perceived as gaining ground, often at the nationalists' expense (McVey 1991). As a movement that mobilized 'the lower strata of the population ...the vast reservoir of Javanese villagers," Mortimer (1974) 20

[74] Rex Mortimer (1974) *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1960*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 20.

Indonesian Association in Holland[75] had led Hatta to believe that it was time to form the basis for a nationalist party on Java. Sukarno's club would become the basis of a network of movement communities across Java.

Nationalist Mobilization on Java in the late 1920s

Sukarno began his political career as a student activist at the Technical College (today ITB). As a young Engineering student, [76] he encountered a thoroughly Dutch university[77] with Dutch patterns of socializing through *corpora* or social clubs, all of which did not allow 'natives' entry. Sukarno modeled his organization on the Bandung Students Club, an organization "sponsored by the university so students might play bridge or billiards…was organized for feasting and fun. Natives were permitted in the club but after joining I learned we could not be members of board."[78] Sukarno adapted to this by forming his own study-club "the General Studie-Club." The club did not permit Dutch as members of the Board.[79] Sukarno quit the Bandung students club and persuaded the few other Indonesian students at the college to follow:

> With the five Indonesian members [Sukarno] founded a Study Club. [Sukarno] selected representative literature, such as the "Actions of the Second Chamber of the State General of Holland" from the library and each of us kept the book one

[75] Following the repression of the PKI on Java, the offices of the Indonesian Association were raided by Dutch authorites. Hatta was arrested and tried by the Dutch government (and eventually acquitted).

[76] Noted Sukarno, "Our curriculum was geared to a society of Dutch rule. The science I learned was a science of capitalist technique…not how to irrigate the rice fields in the best manner [but] irrigation in the interest of imperialism and capitalism…we were taught only to plan byways along the seacoast from harbor to harbor so factories might have maximum transportation of goods (Sukarno, *As Told to Cindy Adams,* p. 53 and 67).

[77] "When I entered the Technical Institute we were 11 Indonesian students. I was one out of 11 dark faces bobbing around in an ocean of white skin, red hair [and] freckles…" (Sukarno, *As Told to Cindy Adams* p. 43)

[78] Sukarno: *As Told to Cindy Adams*, p.76

[79] Sukarno: *As Told to Cindy Adams*, p. 76 *S*ee also Mrazek (1994) Noted Mrazek, "only natives might be members of the executive of the AlgemeeneStudieclub' or "General Study Club' that Sukarno and his friends founded in Bandung in November 1925." Mrazek (1994) *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile*, p. 50.

> week. A the close of every five-week cycle we held a meeting, usually at Sukarno's house, and sat up all night debating the merits of the strategies involved."[80]

Sukarno's study-club became the basis for the Nationalist Party (PNI).[81] It absorbed many activists returning PI members' apathy was due perhaps to a variety of reasons. Some for example sought employment in professional careers, while others found political organizations on Java 'unsatisfying' after PI in Holland. Hatta, in the Netherlands, recognized this as a serious concern for the future of the nationalist momentum.[82]

A result was the formation of the General Study Group of PI first formed in Surabaya in July 1924.[83] Soon after, PI study Group formed in Bandung in November 1925 with two former PI members---Iskaq—recently returned from Holland as the driving force as the inaugural chairman. In 1926, leadership changed: Mangunkusomo (brother of Tjipto and Delft-trained engineer—took over as Chairman)"[84]

As former members returned, study clubs began to develop, at first in major cities such as Surabaya (East Java), Batavia, Bandung (West Java)[85] Existing study clubs, like Sukarno's General Studieclub served as early prototypes for the future PNI. Noted Sukarno's biographer, JD Legge, "Though the idea of a new nationalist organization had been discussed among

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[80] Sukarno, *As Told to Cindy Adams*, p. 76

[81] Ingleson, 1975, p. 30 Hatta urged Indonesian activists who returned from the Netherlands to "join [the study clubs] when they returned from Holland to Indonesia.

[82] Ingleson, p. 27 Personal networks cultivated between Hatta and a young government clerk, Sudjadi, in the Finance Department supposedly led to the idea of cultivating contacts between returning PI-members and study-club contacts in Bandung.

[83] Ingleson, p. 29

[84] Ingleson, p. 29

[85] Ingleson, 1975; Hatta, 1988

Indonesian students in Holland, the actual formation of the PNI stemmed from work of the Study club rather than that of PI.[86] Noted Sukarno,

> Active exchanges of political ideas became our main activity. Branches of the Study Club sprang up in Solo, Surabaya and other major cities in Java. We added the slogan Suluh Indonesia Muda "Torch of the Indonesian Youth," [87]

Multiple cohorts often interacted and constructed overlapping and intergenerational social networks in the same study club.

> "In the study clubs former PI members joined in political discussions with established nationalist figures, such as Cipto Mangkunsumo and Abdul Muis and with Indonesian students, thereby contributing to the further acceptance of the PI's ideology as the basis for a new movement."[88]

Noted nationalist activist and writer, S. Takdir Alisjahbana recalled in 1966,

> I still remember vividly how, in passing [Sukarno's house on Kabupaten Street in Bandung], I felt pride, sympathy and solidarity with [the returning students from Holland], these young intellectuals [who] promised a new era for the Indonesian people.[89]

Alisjahbana's comments remind one of the secrecy and duplicity Indonesian nationalism required on Java. Secrecy was necessary as capture and exile were always imminent.

Analysis of the young on Java and in Holland

Nationalism on Java has been understood as a generational experience of the young in the late colonial phase of Dutch rule (1890-1949) in what is today the Indonesian archipelago (Shiraishi, 1992, Anderson, 1991, 1979, Kahin, 1952). A more nuanced view of the 'nationalist' youth, their

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[86] JD Legge (2007) *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, p. 103.

[87] Sukarno, *As Told to Cindy Adams*, p. 77.

[88] Ingleson, (1975) 29

[89] S. Takdir Alisjahbana (1966) *Indonesia: Social and Cultural Revolution*, p. 137-183, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

organizations, affiliations and modes of action suggests a more complex picture of youth and older, more experienced activists working together (and sometimes at odds with one another) in the nationalist movement. While youth groups played important roles in the nationalist movement, it is necessary to specify exactly *how* youth contributed to the nationalist movement, its scope and timing on Java.

Both Shirashi and Mrazek provide excellent discussion of shifts in upper-class culture and capitalism on Java. They show a 'modular' adaptation by the consuming classes to an identity that was evolving towards a 'nationalist' identity as Indonesian. While Shiraishi alludes to nationalism as a change in politics, they are more interested in explaining its cultural shifts and dimensions.[90] As a result we learn little about the kinds of collective action that are at the heart of this specific process of producing a new collective identity. Missing from accounts of Shiraishi, Mrazek is the emergence of youth as consciously-political actors, not simply as consumers of 'capitalist' culture and commodities.

We learn, however, that young privileged men and women who identified with the nationalist movement on Java did novel things. Shiraishi documents these activities and notes that were evocative of both a loosening of traditional habits of youth on Java and the acquiring by these educated youth of modern habits. They listened to Jazz, went to cafes, had romances, and men dressed like 'dandies' in tailored suits.[91] Shiraishi sees nationalism as a phenomenon that emerged as the expression of youthful and privileged individuals. Modern' and 'cosmopolitan' youth were not, perhaps, as carefree as Mrazek's connotations of them as "dandies" (page) might suggest.

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[90] This is more true of Shiraishi's *Age of Motion* and Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, than it is of Anderson's *Java in a Time of Revolution*.

[91] Mrazek (1997) *Technology in Happy Land*. Stanford University Press.

In the Netherlands students who were part of the Indonesian Association, later renamed Free Indonesia, believed that 'the creation of unity among Indonesians' was something that the young were in a unique position to accomplish (Ingleson, 1974). They also worried, Ingleson has recognized, about the growing strength of communism which "was a major reason for the formation of the PI. [It] was 'students' [realization that] the real choice of vehicle for political action to be between the Sarekat Islam and the PKI, the one increasingly stressing its Islamic base and other stressing methods and ideals not shared by most PI members."[92]

PI members stressed their obligations in particularly noble and strictly *secular* terms while simultaneously stressing their *roles as elites* to lead and to sacrifice for the good of the many. This did not seem a decision made out of angst or anxiety, but of a specific desire to unite Indonesia around secular nationalists (rather than Communism or a Muslim identity).

Youth also demanded recognition of their movement and argued they were uniquely positioned to

> be assigned the task of upbuilding. Only one answer is satisfactory: Young Indonesia takes over the task in these turbulent ties, in which the older generation has completed its life's achievements and the young willingly succeed and with complete faith unfolds its program [sic] for the future…Young Indonesia is the bearer of the future and therefore responsible for the condition of our people…Young Indonesia demands not only love, but also cool clear reflection on, and a consciousness of, the task which it has to carry out. We must first become trained in a tough school, in order make heavy demands on ourselves, for the political struggle for the freeing of our people demands men. Men who will give themselves and who are prepared to sacrifice everything for national freedom.[93]

[92] Ingleson, (1975) 25.

[93] *Hindia Poetra* (*Young Indies*), November 1923. Quoted in Ingleson, 1974, p. 16.

This language, down to the words of 'upbuilding' and imagery of 'responsible' and selfless 'youth' would be replicated by future generations of politicized youth—although with subtle differences in emphasis. During the Japanese occupation on Java, youth would frame their struggle as 'impatience' and 'sacrifice'. In the 1960s against the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and indirectly, Sukarno, youth would stress their 'devotion' to the nation and to nationalism but also articulate their 'sincerity' and in ritual-like manner, duplicate the first pledge youth made on Java to the national-language, Bahasa Indonesia.

Anderson (1972) dates the emergence of youth political organization to the Indonesian revolution and to the early resistance that developed alongside Japanese rule on Java. When Anderson does document youth's role in the nationalist movement pre-1946, he stresses their role as articulators of language—as writers and readers (1991) rather than as political activists, for whom speaking or writing or reading anything other than in Dutch was a political and subversive act.

In 1928, youth activists at the annual conference of youth organizations pledged their 'loyalty' to 'one language, one people and one nation.' This famous oath of youth, or sumpah pemuda showed youth's desire to communicate in the Indonesian language and supposedly marked the moment when youth nationalism began. As I shall show, the Sumpah Pemuda was not so much a shift as a reaffirmation of a process already begun by groups active on Java and in the Netherlands, that had begun by 1920 to define themselves as "Indonesian' rather than "of the Indies" (Indische).

Java during the Japanese Occupation, 1937-1945

The Japanese occupation of Java, as part of the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity scheme[94] generally helped the nationalist movement on Java. Exiled nationalist leaders Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir were released from prison. The Dutch language was banned and the Japanese encouraged the use of Bahasa Indonesia. On Java, the Japanese did much to heighten sentiments of an “Indonesian” national identity—the Dutch language was banned as a public language[95] and as a medium of instruction, and the Indonesian language was permitted as a ‘public’ language of instruction and government administration. The Japanese imposed upon the “Dutch” colony a new “Asian” identity:

> The Christian calendar was changed into Japanese; year 1942 became 2602. Time was moved two and half hours forward, to accord with Tokyo time. The use of Dutch, in public, in letters, and on the telephone was forbidden.[96]

More significant still, Anderson argued, was the “Japanese political style,” its reliance on fanaticism and extraordinary discipline, that “presented the youth of Java with a new mode of political life and action that by sheer contrast implied a radical critique of the values and political ideas Dutch rule had instilled in their fathers.”[97]

The main experiences for youth on Java during the Japanese occupation (1942-1946) included 1) a disruption of education except for medical students; 2) direct recruitment by

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[94] The Japanese argued it was their “intention to destroy the power of Britain and American and to create a new world order in Asia by liberating the Asian nations that inhabit Asia…While Japan continues to subjugate Britain and America, Asia will rise and stand up…It is Japan’s responsibility to advance Asia and to make it famous. It is Japan’s responsibility to defend the Asian region.” “Government News” Gunsikanbu (Japanese Military Administration”, August 8, 1942 in *The Official Gazette of Government News*, (*Kan Po Pemerintah*) published by the Japanese military Administration, reprinted in *The Indonesia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, edited by Tineke Hellwig and Eric Tagliacozzo, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009, 295-298.

[95] Noted Sukarno, ‘The Japanese forbade the use of Dutch; ‘men caught speaking [it] were subject to beatings…. (*As Told To Cindy Adams*, p. 181).

[96] Mrazek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile*, 1994: 221.

[97] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution* p. 33.

Japanese to work for the Japanese administration on Java; 3) recruitment into military/quasi military bodies; while the Japanese were welcomed at first—their increasingly harsh demands (requirements that Indonesians bow in the direction of the Japanese flag soon led to confrontations)

As youth became politicized under the conditions of occupation, they began to define themselves in new ways—as both opponents of colonialism and as increasingly insistent on decolonization. Where youth in the context of the Dutch system had been defined by access to 'western education' in the Japanese occupation, youth were the young men whose education had been disrupted and whose formative experiences were service to the Japanese military government on Java.

As Anderson (1972) has shown, the Dutch and Japanese colonial occupations differed in significant ways. [98] The Japanese occupation represented a significant shock to the system and Dutch culture on the colony. [99] The occupation disrupted education, work and family life.

> "For the Western-educated minority the initial effect of the occupation was decidedly a shock. The military government closed all facilities. Dutch was no longer permitted as the language of instruction in any type of school. Since virtually all upper-level textbooks were in Dutch, this meant that much of higher education was suspended for the duration of the war years, though the Medical Faculty was reopened on an ad hoc basis in 1943."[100]

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[98] While the Dutch ruled "in a calm, business-like, bourgeois style," writes Anderson, "The Japanese 'dethroned…old myths. In their place new myths appeared –myths of spiritual power, of the ascendant East, and of self-sacrificing valor. The style of Japanese rule derived not from the utilitarian calculus of tropical capitalism, but from the military and imperial traditions and from the violent and radical thought of the Young Officers of the 1930s, not a few of whom served in the Sixteenth Army in Java." (Anderson, (1972) *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 31).

[99] In ways that can be compared to the Sukarno era of late Guided Democracy, the Japanese employed, Anderson writes, "a profoundly theatrical style, compounded of pageantry, military discipline, public violence and inexplicable silences…it required a massive and participating audiences." Anderson, (1972) *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 31.

[100] Anderson, (1972) 19

"The most significant aspect of the experience of the elite and educated youth, who were, it should be stressed, largely confined to the cities of Djakarta and Bandung, was that it involved a break in the expected trajectory of their careers.

> "Suspension of their classes meant, in a war of unpredictable duration, a suspension of their lives. Normal routines and expectations no longer held good….it was a time for withdrawal and self-preparation. Deprived of the chance to continue their formal education, and often without means to support themselves when deteriorating conditions disrupted contact with their families, unemployed students went in various directions."[101]

Youth, we are told, went into three main directions: 1) some returned home from university; 2) Worked for military government in some official capacity; 3) Retreated into private life.[102] Many youth following university sought employment in "government service' (Legge, 1988).

The youth available for political activism during the Japanese resistance were those whose formal education had been disrupted by the Japanese arrival in 1942. Anderson tells us that out of a total of 850 Indonesians enrolled in university-level education in 1941,[103] this represented a small and 'highly-privileged' number of a larger group of 'under 5 million young people on Java between the ages of 15 and 19."[104] The Japanese also formally organized youth into work and military battalions, the Seneindan or (Youth Corps)

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[101] Anderson, (1972) 19-20

[102] Anderson (1972) 19

[103] According to Joseph Amstutz (Anderson) 1972,"Most of the students were children of the priyayi', of the small group of successful professional men in the largest urban centers, or of well-established migrant families from the outer islands. Many were also related to the more prominent nationalist politicians of the prewar nationalist movement. They were a group that sprang from those select milieu in which Dutch was the language of the home and everyday conversation, all were conscious of their elite status within native society. During the latter yeas of the Dutch era, youth politics had principally confined to this group. Its leadership was heavily concentrated in the two cities of Jakarta and Bandung, where the Medical and Law faculties and Technical institute were located igures from Amstutz "The Indonesian Youth Movement,"; quoted in *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 19.

[104] This figures Anderson estimates represented 1/2000 youth on Java who experienced "non-traditional' (ie. Western education) Anderson, p. 17-19

with about half a million members on Java, Seinendan drew its membership from all sorts of social backgrounds, but its urban branches with a relatively high proportion of educated young men, were better organized and more important as channels leading up to later revolutionary youth organizations" (Smail, 1964: 13-14).

Youth were mobilized in new more militaristic ways through four different kinds of quasi military bodies, some like the Peta (Defense of the Fatherland)[105] which was established in 1943 as an 'auxiliary guerilla force" (Anderson, p. 20, Smail, 1964) and the Seinandan[106], or "youth corps" that was also established in 1943.

Youth Responses to the Japanese Occupations

In contrast to the highly structured, regimented and disciplined life imposed by the Japanese military authorities, students withdrew to what has been described by Legge and Anderson as a "a vibrant student 'underground" and loose network of friends[107] who were connected through personal contacts. Schools were closed throughout the Japanese occupation. Mrazek noted how this development shaped the student communities and underground in Jakarta—making them

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[105] Peta was "designed by the Japanese Sixteenth Army authorities" and its ranks served under the command of Japanese-trained Indonesian officers Peta trainees spent long periods of training under the command of older teachers in monastic austere settings far removed from family and urban distractions. The Peta was designed by the Japanese Sixteenth Army authorities as a decentralized auxiliary guerilla force to be deployed in the event of an Allied invasion of Java. It was specifically stated that the new military force would be stationed in its area of recruitment, and would be used solely for local defense ….Those chosen for training as battalion commanders were not school-age youths but somewhat older men [who the Japanese believed] would have influence among and authority over the youth. Significantly enough, they were often local school teachers, officials or Islamic notables (Anderson, p. 20)

[106] The Seinendan, in contrast, was controlled by the Education Bureau of the military government designed as a militant, politicized scout organization that could be employed for mobilizing the population behind the authorities for various tasks connected with local defense, for transmitting government propaganda that could be employed for mobilizing the population behind the government.

[107] Notes Anderson, "The 'Jakarta underground, writes Anderson "consisted of little more than an informal network of contacts with university students and with friends and family outside of Jakarta…Asrama groups were not underground in the same sense of maquis in occupied France of Holland during the Second World War…the Indonesian undergrounds did not attempt to combat Imperial Japan. Many of the pemudas were closely related by family and other ties to the most prominent collaborators of the late occupation period. Moreover, the Japanese administration was generally aware of what was going on in pemuda circles." (Anderson [1972] 41 and 48-9).

much more than just social networks, but places to continue the discussion of ideas, and more importantly, to disseminate nationalist literature.

Some were organized officially in associations established by the Japanese authorities, like the Angkatan Baru (New Generation) or in more informal ways through contacts established between students at the medical college. A generational experience of living under the Japanese occupation was reinforced by the political organizations that youth belonged to:

> Students from the early forties still have a strong sense of having belonged to a particular year and to a particular group of colleagues within the two faculties. For some these relationships were accentuated and strengthened by membership in student asramas which provided accommodation for students from outside Jakarta." [108]

Some of these were 'dormitories' and 'social centers' like the Medical Students Dormitory (Legge, 1988) became "focal points for much of the typical social and intellectual life of the students of Jakarta. These dormitories were not merely places people slept in. They were 'free-spaces' in the sense of providing "a refuge from families, beds for students stranded in the capital or visiting it from the provinces, a forum for intense and reasonably private discussion, and a focus for solidarity." [109]

Of the three dormitories, the Medical Students' asrama was considered by Anderson to be 'more ideologically self-conscious than others, concerned with a perception of the dangers of world fascism as with independence from imperial rule; its members actively pro-western in

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[108] Legge (1988) 45

[109] Legge, quoting Anderson, *Java in Time of Revolution*, (1972) 39.

their sympathies, located the independence struggle within a broader, international social conflict."[110]

The medical college had been the only tertiary institution allowed to function during the Japanese occupation.[111]

> It had a small student population and 'close links of its medical faculty members with those of the law faculty were important in stimulating the activism of the former. So was the experience of working under the strict regimen of the Japanese. The medical faculty, moreover, contained some of the ablest members of the wartime student generation. In these circumstances, it was not surprising that medical students should make their own contribution to the student action of the Occupation period."[112]

Noted Anderson (1972) The medial college "catered to an extremely small group of students of high academic attainments, most of whom spoke Dutch among themselves and were intimately connected to the elite of native society….their outlook on events was conditioned by the fact that their Faculty, their asrama, and the scientific studies they were engaged in were extensions of the Dutch period that had not been markedly changed by the advent of the Japanese."[113]

Medical Student Contention

Medical students had been among the first to openly clash with Japanese authorities on two occasions. In 1943 students at the medical college walked out of classes in protest of two things: 1) the daily raising of the Japanese flag and 2) the "requirement that students shave their heads in

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[110] Legge (1988) 46

[111] Legge (1988) 47

[112] Legge (1988) 51

[113] Anderson, (1972) 40

the manner of Japanese soldiers." [114] While the strike was settled, eight students were dismissed from the college for their actions.[115] One of these students was Soedjatmoko, a man who would become a prominent critic of Sukarno in the "Guided Democracy' period.

Around the figure of Soedjatmoko and his brother in law, Sutan Sjahrir[116], a new group of youth began to be formed at the medical students' dormitory in Jakarta. Sjahrir's credentials among youth had been established by his nationalist activities in Holland and Java where he had worked closely with Hatta (prior to their exile) in training new cadres for the nationalist party, the Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI.

> "In [the medical faculty recruits] he found a ready audience for his conception of a resistance whose focus was opposition to Japanese political culture and adherence to international social-democratic values….[Sjahrir's] refusal to collaborate…marked him as a man of principle, and gave him great prestige with the opposition elements at Prapatan 10." [117]

How large the medical students' dormitory is never clear. Anderson estimates between 15-30 individuals came into contact through the medical dormitory. Legge's study of Sjahrir's circle confirms a number closer to 60, but he admits that not all would have been members of the medical student circle; "some were and some were not." (Legge, 1988: 67). More significant than the medical's size was what happened there and the conversations students may have had there with one another.

> It was a floating circle of acquaintances, not a tightly organized underground cell. There was conversation, particularly about political matters, an awareness of the

[114] Legge (1988) 51: Legge notes that "a related grievance also involved 'the slapping of the face of a student during the physical training that was required of all students," (1998: 52).

[115] Legge (1988) 51

[116] Anderson noted that Sjharir was particularly influential and attracted many who were "under his influence". See *Java in a Time of Revolution,* 40.

[117] Anderson (1972) 41

> outside world obtained from listening illegally to foreign broadcasts, a close attention to the progress of the war [which emboldened these students] to confront Sukarno, and in general, a sense of belonging to an inner circle of like-minded people rather than a structured and controlled organization.[118]

The medical students' dormitory was a free space in the sense that it was free from surveillance by authorities. While it had no official membership, it was a circle of contacts who knew each other through other members and through prominent and slightly older activists like Sjahrir whose organization, the PNI, 'was nothing but a shadow, a remnant' in the Japanese occupation.[119]

Anderson (1972) described two types of youth organizations characterized the Japanese occupation. The first were the 'smaller' and 'informal' social networks of the Jakarta underground. These revolved around networks of prominent activists (some slightly older like Sjahrir) as well as older and slightly younger age groups. Examples include the medical students' asrama[120] as well as with the social circle of activists at Menteng 31. The second type of youth organizations was more martial and better organized. In contrast to the informal, casual quality of the underground asrama in Jakarta, these served more quasi-military/propaganda purposes.

Mobilization in the Japanese period involved two kinds of youth groups (and two kinds of youth experiences). The first was the more elite and underground network of groups in Jakarta whose associations were established through friendships and shared experiences in the nationalist movement. The second was through the organized bodies of groups created by

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[118] Legge (1988) 59.

[119] Mrazek,*Sjahrir: Politics and Exile* (1994) 231

[120] The key institutional bases for the metropolitan undergrounds were asrama, or dormitories, for various types of pemuda…to an overwhelming degree, the undergrounds were pemuda phenomena. (The number of older political leaders or government officials who played a role in them was probably less than a dozen, Anderson speculates (1972) 39.

deliberate efforts by the Japanese to train and 'cultivate' a new generation of leaders for the emerging republic.

While this seems to have occurred in a more informal way with the medical students' facility, at the "New Generation" dormitory at Menteng 31, courses were actually offered.[121] This asrama was formed to "nurture 'capable leaders of the younger generation….all the top Indonesian leaders [were invited]."[122] In contrast to the medical students' asrama, the Navy's efforts to organize the asrama signified both their desire to control the youth underground and, as Anderson understood it, "to 'win some friends for Japan"[123]

Of the three asramas discussed so far, only the medical students' dormitory constituted a free space in the sense of being very 'free'. A fourth "asrama-like organization" was established by S. Takdir Alijahbana around the same time called the Indonesian Language Commission (Komisi Bahasa Indonesia). This dormitory had a more literary identity and activities at this asrama centered around the formation of a new literary journal, *Pujangga Baru* by S. Takdir Alisjahbana. [124]

The Emergence of a National Student Community and Movement in the 1920s

The emergence of a national community of students and not simply groups and organizations of students committed to an idea of national independence marked a key shift in the student

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[121] Legge (1988) 46. Noted Anderson, Most of the training received was strongly nationalist in content; the teachers summoned to give lectures at the asrama…included…well-known nationalist politicians of thirties such as Sukarno, Hatta, Yamin" (Anderson, [1972] 42).

[122] Anderson (1972) 45: In this sense, writes Anderson, its purpose was virtually identical with the AB asrama.." Sjahrir is known to have been part of this network.

[123] Anderson (1972) 48

[124] Anderson, (1972) 48.

movement and was one that was sustained throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The creation of a national student community composed of federations and congresses whose goal was to sustain an active community of students involved recognition of the existence of the nation and the role of the university in it. It is important to recognize that these were not movement organizations or free-spaces, but places where the identity of being a student and more precisely, an Indonesian student, could be sustained.

If the free spaces in the Netherlands provided the space in which students imagined themselves as Indonesian nationalists, on Java, students built organizations and congresses for continued dialogue between student groups. These appeared to be symbolically significant. There was a noticeable growth in youth organizations and congresses across Java, like Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth). These groups were not 'underground' in the same way Sukarno and his study clubs were. In contrast, they met openly and frequently across Java.

The pre-revolutionary efforts by students to create a national community on Java paved the way for the formation of national student organizations and federations. In the 1920s students liked especially to build and construct organizations that reflected their bureaucratic identities as individuals who attended meeting, engaged in parliamentary procedure, argued and debated and ran for political office. The student identity that resulted from these developments was one attuned to the future role students saw themselves playing: as the chairman and managers of the new Indonesian Republic. By the 1930s, these organizations exerted a student "voice" into national politics[125] and also formed the social networks for nationalist activity. The Japanese period (1937-1945) radicalized these groups further.[126]

[125] Student federations in the revolutionary period saw their goals as contributing to a national community. Some like the PPPI or Union of Indonesian Students, formed in 1926. The PPPI attracted the "few who were

Student federations in the revolutionary period saw their goals as contributing to a national community. Some like the PPPI or Union of Indonesian Students, formed in 1926. The PPPI attracted the "few who were enrolled in tertiary institutions on Java (the technical college in Bandung and medical college in Batavia).[127] The PPPI was one of the organizations that had participated in the Youth Congress of 1928[128] at which youth pledged "to one language, one nation and one people."[129]

Like other organizations of the student revolutionary period, the PPPI had its own journal in which 'articles critical of the colonial government' were circulated. Writers for the journal frequently were jailed for their political views.[130] PPPI's leadership supplied personnel to the nationalist movement. Its Chairman, Chaerul Saleh, became especially active during the period of the Japanese occupation and would also have a political career following independence.[131]

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enrolled in tertiary institutions on Java (the technical college in Bandung and medical college in Batavia," (Legge, 1988: 44) Foulcher noted that "The PPPI saw itself 'as activist in character and saw itself as part of the nationalist movement." The PPPI had its own journal in which 'articles critical of the colonial government' were circulated. Writers for the journal frequently were jailed for their political views In addition to PPPI was the USI, the Unitas Studiosorom Indonesiensis formed in 1933 under the encouragement by Dutch authorities. Writes J.D.Legge, "USI members saw themselves as being 'liberal' in the broad sense rather than narrowly nationalist. In any case the USI inevitably becme a vehicle for some student activism the during the occupation and formed part of the network by which student attitudes were shaped and through which communications were maintained." (Legge, 1988, *Indonesian Intellectuals,* p. 44.

[126] In 1941 PPPI and USI would merge with the Association of Indonesian Women Students to set up a joint committee, Baperpi, to enable PPPI and USI to form the Indonesian Students' Deliberative Body. This body would coordinate the various student groups in a larger more coherent body. It enabled student groups to take joint action. Legge: 1988: Indonesian Intellectuals.

[127] *Sedjarah Pemuda* (1966) 88

[128] Legge (1988) 44

[129] Legge (1988) 44, Foulcher noted that "The PPPI saw itself 'as activist in character and saw itself as part of the nationalist movement."

[130] *Sedjarah Pemuda* (1966) 89

[131] As a minister and Deputy prime Minister of the Republic. Legge (1998) 44

Members of PPPI also included TB Simatupang—who began military training under the Dutch—and who acted as Chief of Staff in the armed forces.[132]

In addition to PPPI was the USI, the Unitas Studiosorom Indonesiensis formed in 1933:

> "On the face of it was simply a society to minister to the needs of its members and it was anxious not to become embroiled in politics…it was regarded, perhaps correctly, as having been formed with Dutch encouragement as a counter to the PPPI….USI members saw themselves as being 'liberal' in the broad sense rather than narrowly nationalist. In any case the USI inevitably becme a vehicle for some student activism the during the occupation and formed part of the network by which student attitudes were shaped and through which communications were maintained."[133]

USI had a journal Usiblad; in US were to be found Hamid Algadri, editor of the Journal, Subandrio, Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Sitorus (also active in PPPI), Ismail Thaib, Soejdatmoko, Andi Zainal Abidin[134]

In 1941 PPPI and USI would merge with the Association of Indonesian Women Students to set up a joint committee, Baperpi, to enable PPPI and USI to form the Indonesian Students' Deliberative Body. This body would coordinate the various student groups in a larger more coherent body. It enabled student groups to take joint action.[135] These organizations brought together, across the Faculties of Law (1924) and Medicine (1927), students who had already close relationships. Established in 1924 and 1927, students at these universities contributed to a new nationalist cohort on Java.[136] They would be the main impetus driving the pemuda Anderson

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[132] Legge (1998) 44

[133] Legge (1998) 44

[134]Legge (1988) 45

[135] Legge (1988) 45

[136] Legge (1988) 45

(1972) documented in his study of youth mobilization during the Japanese occupation. In the 1950s, students would see their organizations and bodies increasingly shaped by the partisan conflicts of the 1950s. Federations and organizations that had once had meaning as national bodies and whose identity connoted a national-identity, increasingly found themselves defined by political ideology and partisan differences.

Conclusion

How did Indonesian nationalism survive the attacks by state authorities in both Java and the Netherlands? In part, the very survival of the nationalist movement depended on the way that nationalism became personally-identified with by the organizations and institutions of the young. Nationalist identity became part of the core-identity of what it meant to be young. [137]

Nationalist mobilization in the Dutch period had occurred in 'free-spaces' that were voluntary and generally free from authorities. In contrast, the Peta and Seneindan were overtly politicized groups supervised by military authorities. Where the first experience had produced mobilization that emphasized attachment to a cultural idea of Indonesia coupled with the demand for recognition, Anderson believes that the second experience produced among youth a more coherent identity as specifically Indonesian and anti-colonial nationalism.[138] Like the asrama (dormitory) that Anderson (1979) identified as a central part of the development of radical consciousness among youth in Japanese-occupation era Jakarta (Anderson, 1979), the cultural associations, 'native' youth groups and study-clubs played key roles in generating two things 1)

[137] Groups particularly effective at recruiting cadres to the nationalist movement were groups whose identity was highly salient to its members (McAdam and Paulsen, 1997: 148).

[138] He writes, "whereas the nationalism of the educated youth of the prewar years had been the necessary but indirect outcome of the implicit logic of the colonial educational structure, in the Peta, structure and explicit meaning coincided. It was not only the experience of being in the Peta but the specific ideological training the institution provided that created and heightened the nationalist political consciousness of its members."Anderson (1972) 24

an oppositional consciousness of national ‘awakening’ in the 1920s and 2) the social networks for the development of cadres and leaders for the nationalist movement.

Chapter 3

Student Activism and Free Spaces on Java in the 1950s and 1960s

Introduction

In the post-independence period, urban university campuses became increasingly drawn into the larger political debates of the capital. As the campus grew increasingly politicized in the "Guided Democracy" period, student activism took on dissident qualities. Most of the opposition speech in the early 1960s was not aimed at mobilizing large numbers of the public, but instead fit the definition of 'informal politicized talk…that is marked by shared understandings of the situation—specific rules of speech, that is, what is appropriate to say and how far one can go in criticism, and how to say it and to whom." [1]

> These are not political discussions of the kind that occur in the liberal democracies because partisan and tactical positions are irrelevant and actual contention for power is not practicable. Nevertheless, sustained criticism against the regime, the party and/or society is prohibited by the state, and therefore automatically politicized.[2]

Dissidence expressed through 'contentious talk' expressed in the context of authoritarian regimes, in often private settings that 'stress…their own elite…status as intellectuals and /or scientists…to strategize ways to challenge regime policies"[3] This type of dissidence, Johnston notes is markedly different from public actions of dissidence that might be undertaken by 'artists

[1] Hank Johnston, 2005: 113

[2] Hank Johnston, (2005) 113

[3]Hank Johnston, "Talking the Walk: Speech Acts and Resistance," *Repression and Mobilization*, eds. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press 2005) 115.

or folklorists" (2005: 115). It is instead characterized by 'talk' that is expressed privately among peers…to proclaim dissent and demonstrate it one way or another to compatriots."[4]

The emergence of the small-group 'free spaces' that began to occur in Jakarta in the early 1960s was documented in private journals like Soe Hok-Gie's and the memoirs of KAMI-students, as well as histories of the student movement in Indonesia. The context of this behavior was the growing contention on campus between student groups and 'Communist Concentrations" during the Guided Democracy period. This coupled with political dissidence and private sentiments of discontent key intellectuals with the government's failure to address the worsening economic situation combined to produce a politically contentious atmosphere.

The Context of Anti-Communist Political Consciousness: Guided Democracy (1957-1961)

Guided Democracy was a massive effort by Sukarno to exercise political control (using nationalist appeals and ideological persuasion). Academics at elite universities were particularly unreceptive to these initiatives and student oppositional sentiment in 1961 reflected a good deal of animosity towards the policies of the Political Manifesto, which some saw as restricting academic freedom and free-speech. Liberal arguments, however, were not used to oppose such measures. Instead, as Stephen Douglas (1970) and Roger Paget (1970) have shown, student hostility to Sukarno and the PKI were nurtured in a particular cultural context in which the adoption of oppositional sentiments began to take root. Through consuming Western culture, through identifying with figures like Saint Joan (Maxwell [2001] *Diary of Young Indonesian Intellectual*) young Indonesian college students like Soe Hok-Gie nurtured political opposition to Sukarno. How these sentiments, nurtured, in free spaces became the basis for eventually

[4] Johnson, 2005: 115, citing Medvedev 1980

supporting a program of violence that resulted in the deaths of close to a million Indonesians is the larger issue of this chapter.

The student movement that helped support the rise of the military in 1966 was one that had been organized around opposition to Sukarno and his attempt, through ideology, to unify incompatible groups—nationalists, communists, traditionalist and modernist Muslims. The origins of student opposition has been explained almost entirely in terms of Indonesian domestica politics—the patterns of partisan recruitment on campus (Bachtiar 1969), the environment of pre-coup Jakarta (Paget 1970) and the attempts by adults to socialize the young into a new ideological era of national politics Sukarno called “Guided Democracy” (Douglas 1970). In fact, student opposition war rooted in a conservative outlook that did not have neat domestic parallels but which did have roots in a transnational narratives of opposing communism. Anti-communist American and British neoconservative thought, combined with the anti-Soviet dissident movement had strong appeal to youth whose main connection to the Western world was through the lens of popular culture.

Indonesian students and intellectuals were particularly receptive to Western neo-conservatism and anti-communism. Through the UK-sponsored British Council libraries and the exposure to literature like *Encounter* magazine, sponsored by the US and UK Congress for Cultural Freedom, anti-communism’s appeal was in its promise of a rational outlook and its defense of “humanism” rather than “ideology.” These sentiments were evident among the intellectual community of writers, journalists and literature students who were among some of the first to oppose Sukarno in the 1960s.

The process of constructing an oppositional consciousness in the early 1960s grew out movement-communities that were based in the social networks of dissident intellectuals and political exiles in Jakarta and Bandung. Two primary circles of movement-communities existed: the first consisted of individual dissidents and jailed activists who had strong affiliations with political parties banned by Sukarno. Individuals who were part of these circles included Soedjatmoko, a prominent critic of Sukarno[5]. The second oppositional circle consisted of anti-Communist students in Bandung. The relation of these circles of opposition to the politics of "Guided Democracy" is the subject of the remaineder of this chapter.

Universities were at the center of contention for three primary reasons. For one thing, many of the ideological programs implemented during the Guided Democracy period involved education mandates. Second, a pattern of military recruitment on campus established a routine presence of the Armed Forces on campus. During the 1957 Crush Malaysia campaign university administrators required students' mandatory participation in drill exercises and daily marches (Douglas 1970). Indeed, the militarization of campus began in the 1960s when many university administration jobs were held by active members of the Armed Forces. Third, in an effort to eradicate foreign influence and promote national culture, Sukarno banned imports of Western music and movies.

Campus events had to meet new ideological standards determined by the new guidelines outlined in 1961 in the mandate, the Political Manifesto (Manipol-USDEK). These sanctions curtailed students' ability to enjoy Western movies and music at campus carnivals or events. At campuses like ITB and UI where students routinely enjoyed foreign movies, jazz nights and art

[5] Soedjatmoko's political activities began when he was a student at medical school in Jakarta during the Japanese occupation (1937-1945). Following his return, he had been a student in Jakarta at the Medical School at the University of Indonesia, but was one of nine students expelled by Japanese authorities for a student strike in 1941 (discussed in Chapter 3). For biographical details, see J.D. Legge (1988) *Indonesian Intellectuals and Nationalism.*

exhibitions, it became against the law to watch American cowboy movies or dramas like *The Magnificent Obsession*.

While in the West Communism was a distinctly atheistic ideology, Sukarno had tried to make Communism palatable to the millions of religiously devout Indonesians. Where secular intellectuals were generally receptive to socialist ideas in the abstract, Sukarno's lack of pragmatism and pandering to the PKI frustrated many intellectuals. To be an anti-Communist student or intellectual in Jakarta in the 1960s was to be committed to generally liberal notions of liberty of thought, speech and free-market economics. It was also to have a broadly secular humanist philosophy and to enjoy generally bourgeois practices. Students were consumers of Western culture and made it a priority to catch the latest Western (mainly American) movies, music, literature and magazines.

A complex mix of patterns of political contention and free spaces shaped students' political consciousness in Indonesia during the 1960s. While student activists would eventually become active in the anti-communist violence of 1965, the late 1950s and early 1960s was a time of some uncertainty, hesitancy and hanging back. To the extent that one can identify a clear student opposition, it was in its most nascent stage in the early to mid 1960s. Indeed, the harnessing of a student opposition in a single anti-communist movement by late 1965 marked a clear victory by the Armed Forces and anti-Sukarno Muslim parties to both tame and discipline a discordant network of student groups, organizations, individuals and dissident communities into a more organized opposition.

The late 1950s and early 1960s was a frequent test of Sukarno's ability to govern the country. The period marked the beginning of a number of dissident movements in Indonesia.

Some were openly rebellious, as in Sumatra, where entire provinces broke away from the authority of Jakarta to form their own republic. Early Muslim rebellions in West Java in 1948 were the first sign of a short-lived victory for of secular nationalists (Jackson 1980). However, by the mid-1950s it was not only traditionalist Muslim political parties who were dissatisfied with the project of secular nationalism. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had also made a significant rebound after its near total destruction in Madiun, East Java, in 1948.

The popularity of the Communists, particularly in rural East and Central Java at first posed little threat to the secular PNI-coalition governments. By 1955, however, the party began to exercise influence in West Java, long home to the nationalist party. It helped that the PKI engaged in numerous public works projects—building dams, roads, irrigation systems for agriculture throughout East and Central Java and that PKI-sponsored schools expanded efforts to teach basic literacy and arithmetic (McVey 1990). In contrast to the PNI, the PKI leadership was perceived as honest and forthright, free of the flamboyance and scandal that surrounded prominent PNI politicians, including Sukarno, the Indonesian president. Given these factors, the PKI's power soared in the early1960s and its appeal, particularly to the rural poor, was easy to understand.

The antagonism to the PKI was strongest in the nationalist stronghold of West Java and amongst educated, college-enrolled youth. On campus, the PKI-sponsored youth contingents CGMI[6] or Concentration of Indonesian Students rivaled the large nationalist youth wing, GMNI

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[6] CGMI (Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements) was formed out of three different student organizations—in Bandung, Bogor and Yogyakarta. CGMI had roots that went back to the Dutch years. It had established local student associations opposed to the Dutch inherited elitist values which dominated the student community in the major university towns or cities. By November 1956, these local student associations, called 'student concentrations,' merged to form CGMI, which became affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party. Rogert K. Paget (1970) *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government,* Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. In its first year of

(Movement of Indonesian Nationalist Students)[7]. On campuses, the student-body was generally divided between nationalists, the myriad Christian student groups (who were split between Catholic and Protestant denominations) and a splintered Muslim student community that was divided between traditionalists, modernists and the more pragmatic HMI (Islamic Student Association). The CGMI had been active in opposing vestiges of Dutch culture on campus and reached out through lively and unconventional campaigns of direct action (Bachtiar 1969). By 1964 campuses were places of contention between communist and anti-communist groups. Book burnings of foreign and imperialist tracts (in practice, this meant any book donated by Western governments or aid-initiatives) calls to boycott jazz nights and ban screenings of foreign (mainly American) films constituted some of the main issues around which anti-communist and communist students clashed.

The University Campus as Oppositional Space in the Guided Democracy Era

In the early 1960s, political opposition to Sukarno began in underground, dissident circles where both younger and older academics gathered to discuss social problems. As during the 1920s, both local grievances and intellectual narratives provided the basis for filtering anti-Sukarno sentiments. Many of the anti-Sukarno intellectuals were affiliated with parties (like PSI, the Indonesian Socialist Party) banned by Sukarno in 1961. PSI-activists, such as Soedjatmoko were not only srongly opposed to Sukarno, they had an experience of being politically active that

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existence, it reported a membership of about 1,180 students. But the organization grew rapidly. In 1960 it claimed 7000 members and in 1936 17,000 members and in mid-1964 about 32,000 members, see Bachtiar (1969: 24).

[7] The PNI was among the first to establish a student-wing in 1954: the GMNI, or Gerakan Mahasiswa National Indonesia, (Movement of Indonesian Nationalist Students). It comprised both male and female university students, and like the PNI, had traditional strength in West Java (PNI's base). With 77,000 student members by 1965, the GMNI represented the second biggest student group after the [unofficially-Masyumi backed] HMI (Muslim Students Association. From 1964 to 1965 GMNI was the biggest student organization (Hasyrul Mochtar, *Mereka Dari Bandung* 1997). GMNI students had the biggest representation in Jakarta and in Bandung (West Java) reflecting the strength of the Nationalist Party (PNI) party in West Java

went back to the Japanese occupation. The rise of anti-Sukarno dissidence illustrates the way that opposition was generationally-diverse, with multiple generational cohorts as participants. While the campus was a site of open contention, dissident activity was increasingly dependent on private or protected spaces such as professors' residents and homes.

The university was increasingly drawn into the tension between Sukarno and the growing power of the PKI because of the politicization of higher education. The national school system established in the post-independence period certainly facilitated a specific understanding of youth's political roles and obligations. Primary education texts developed in the post-independence period taught the history of the nationalist movement, emphasizing the role of young nationalist students like Sukarno and Hatta, to middle-school and junior high-school students. The doctrine of higher-education, revised continuously in the post-independence era stressed the social obligations of the educational system.

> In 1950, the goal of education was further specified by the *Tri Dharma* or "Three Pillars of service of Education." [8] The "Tri Dharma" specified that the purpose of higher education was to 1) educate; 2) research and 3) provide community service." This was aimed at creating "decent, capable human beings and democratic citizens [who will be responsible] for the welfare of society and our nation."[9]

The 1950 decree reflected a new purpose for higher education: social welfare and national service. This idiom was reflected in the themes of student activism in 1965.

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[8] "Tri Dharma Pengurran Tinggi," UUD, 1950, No. 4, Section 2, Passage 3; ["Undang-Undang No. 4, 1950, Bab II, Passage 3] See also Buchori and Malik (2005) 257

[9] Widjojo (1966)

Under Guided Democracy[10], schools were directed to "develop pupils' regard for both national *and international* morality and religious beliefs, intellectual, emotional and artistic lives, manual skills and physical health." [11] Furthermore, in addition to providing the basis for "decent human beings", the new doctrine passed in 1961 saw education's purpose "for the realization of an Indonesian socialist society…just and prosperous…materially and spiritually." [12]

Among the first to immediately object were traditional Muslim leaders.[13] Muslim leaders had been at the forefront of education reforms in the early 20th century[14] and a long tradition of Muslim-education through the Muhammadiyah movement continued to influence the programs of national education. In the 1940s, Muslims had supported the national creed, the Pancasila, in the 1940s because it spoke of faith in one god as a central tenet of the Indonesian identity. To these individuals, Manipol-USDEK[15] pandering to the growing power of the PKI, many believed and this appeared to be evidence of of greater communist political participation in Indonesian

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[10] The Regulation on Higher Education no. 22 (1961),*Fifty Years of the Development of Higher Education in Indonesia*, Ministry of Education, Indonesia.

[11] R. Thomas Murray,"Indonesian Education: Communist Strategies and Governmental Counter Strategies," *Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education* (1980) 375.

[12]Indonesia: Department of Information, *Basis and Aim of Education in Free Indonesia*, by Soegarda Poerbakawatja, at the opening of Tjendrawasih University, November 10, 1962, Kota Baru.

[13] R. Thomas Murray (1980) 375.

[14] The founding of Taman Siswa (Garden of Pupils) Schools in Central Java in 1922 was initiated by a Muslim founder, Ki Hajar Dewantara In the 1930s these schools were closed because the Dutch regarded them as illegal and operating without a lisence from the Government of the Indies.*Fifty Years of the Development of Higher Education in Indonesia*, Ministry of Education, Indonesia, p. 43.

[15] Announced during the annual celebration of independence day on August 17, 1959, the Political Manifesto, or Manipol, was declared by Sukarno to be "a new political manifesto…a revival of the spirit of the Revolution, for social justice and for 're-tooling' of the institutions and organizations of the nation in the name of on-going revolution." In 1960 USDEK was added to the political manifesto, "standing for the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, guided democracy, guided economy and Indonesian identity.

politics. [16] It did reflect a new appointment made by Sukarno to the Department of Higher Education: In 1957, after the PKI's strong showing in the 1955 elections, Sukarno replaced the PNI-backed Minister of Education Sarino with Prijono, considered a pro-Communist professor of literature[17] "Prijono sought to increase the ministry's pro-Communist direction by encouraging existing personnel to accept a pro-PKI program."[18]

Prijono's new higher education doctrine reflected, however, a genuine civic spirit and egalitarian purpose to higher education. Higher education, he mandated, should not remain as ivory towers but rather must be closely connected to contemporary realities and the communities they serve," [19] and "higher education institutions are open to all citizens" but in fact limited to those with "the necessary talents, perseverance and character." [20]

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[16] Stephen Douglas *Political Socialization and Student Activsm in Indonesia* (1970) 74.

[17] R. Thomas Murray: p. 373. Notes Douglas (1970) "nationalist and religious groups, in contrast to the communists exuberance, were indifferent or hostile to the term." (*Political Socialization and Student Activism in Indonesia* 73).

[18] R. Thomas Murray noted "…Prijono was not that successful in reshaping the Ministry of Higher Education…many of the employees had strong support from non-communist political groups such as the central wing of the PNI, the Moslems and the Military…In 1964 Prijono was demoted to position of Coordinating Minister, "an honorary position with no power and no constituency…Supardo and other PKI-ministers continued in the post until the coup." (1980: 370- 375). Douglas noted that "Prijono prescribed as the first of his five basic principles of education 'promotion of love of nation and fatherland, and of national, international and religious ideals.' (*Political Socialization and Student Activsm in Indonesia* [1970] 66.

[19] UUD No. 22, 1961, "Pendidikan Tinggi."; see Buchori and Malik (2005), p. 257. "[So] that the development of science should be accompanied by character development, to benefit Indonesian society….Higher education systems should not remain as ivory towers but rather must be closely connected to contemporary realities and the communities they serve….science and research should not be pursued merely for the sake of their own development but rather to enhance the well-being of the Community. Higher education institutions are open to all citizens with necessary talents, perseverance and character. [They] are supposed to recognize academic freedom but not to house subversive activities…Higher education institutions are called on to produce graduates with intellectual maturity, critical thinking capacity, creativity and problem-solving ability, as well as ethical and emotional maturity."

[20] UUD No. 22, 1961, "Pendidikan Tinggi."; see Buchori and Malik (2005) 257.

New curriculums mandated for primary schools (grades 1-6) mandated teaching of Social Education, that covered History and Citizenship (called "Kewargaan Negara")[21] in increasing increments of two hours a week in the first grade to five hours a week (out of a total 36 hours a week) in the sixth grade.[22] Religious instruction was reduced to two hours out of five spent on "Moral Development" (of which Study of Society) comprised three of the remaining five hours.[23] Emphasis on the national language (Bahasa Indonesia was increased to 8 hours a week out of a total of 19 hours a week divided into Regional Language (three-hours), arithmetic (6 hours) and morality (two hours). Additionally, students spent four hours in the study of Arts, another 4 in the study of skills and four hours in health and fitness.[24]

A variety of Sukarno's speeches that were required reading for students in high-school.[25] Douglas describes the imposition of Manipol-USDEK as "unwieldy" and complex, with teachers often unable to simplify instruction of complex ideological terminology. [26] Criticism of Manipol-USDEK by the Indonesian poet Rendra juxtaposed the indoctrination of Sukarno's ideology against the broader goals of the national system of education after independence.

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[21] Kewargaan Negara literally means citizenship. Douglas (1971) noted that [for grades 1 to 6] the curriculum emphasized nationalist education "acquaintance with national heroes and holidays, the national language, flag, emblem and motto (*Political Socialization and Student Activism in Indonesia*, p. 67).

[22] Planned Curriculum Sekolah Rakyat, Summary of Lesson Goals, Department of Education, summarized in Table 2.6, *Fifty Years of the Development of Higher Education*, Ministry of Education, Indonesia, (1964) 121.

[23] Planned Curriculum Sekolah Rakyat, Summary of Lesson Goals, Department of Education, summarized in Table 2.6, *Fifty Years of the Development of Higher Education*, Ministry of Education, Indonesia, (1964) 121.

[24] Planned Curriculum Sekolah Rakyat Summary of Lesson Goals, Department of Education, summarized in Table 2.6, *Fifty Years of the Development of Higher Education*, Ministry of Education, Indonesia, (1964) 121.

[25] These included the President's meassge in which he introduced the concept of the political manifesto in 1959 as well as speeches from the revolutionary period in which Sukarno elucidated the national creed, the Pancasila.

[26] "Junior high school teachers in Jakarta revealed [to Stephen Douglas] that they had little confidence in their ability to explicate the Manipol USDEK acronynms." Douglas (1970) 63

Before Manipol-USDEK, education had a “humanistic’ purpose…stressing a changing world view, developing an appreciation for objective facts…for logic…and appreciation of arts…and a teaching of compassion and charity through literature and poetry. [27]

The new ideological requirements were rejected by many as stifling. Learning was supposed to be the ‘cultivation of knowledge’ and ‘free-thought.’[28] Writers regarded the MANIPOL-USDEK campaign a restriction on free-expression and combined with new press-controls, regarded the new campaign as an affront on their ability to make a living[29] By the early 1960s all groups were required to official ideologies of NASKOM/Manipol-USDEK or be banned. This particularly affected campus activities which had to be “retooled”

> Together with the predominantly anti-Western culture trend at the time, hazing in the traditional Dutch sense [considered literally the process of maturing a freshman for a period of 10 days] was modified to become a program designed to increase students’ awareness of Manipol and other indoctrination articles. The carnivals were similarly adapted to depict current themes in the Indonesian revolutionary struggle against imperialists and neocolonialists.[30]

Against this background, student groups openly clashed over book-burnings, movie screenings and libraries (Mochtar, 1993, Beer, 1985). Students clashed over symbolic issues—libraries donated by foreign governments and screening of American films (which were banned during the NASAKOM era).

Patterns of Contention: Fighting Communism on Campus

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[27] Rendra interview, Matthew Isaac Cohen, *Inside Indonesia*, “Timely Art: An Interview with W.S. Rendra.”

[28] Hasyrul Mochtar *Mereka Dari Bandung* [*They From Bandung*] 1997.

[29] Janet Steele (2005) *Wars Within: The Story of Tempo.* Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing Press.

[30] Fisher and Sudarsono (1971) 95

With a campus that dated to the 1920, the Institute of Technology in Bandung, West Java, retained a culture that was hybrid of old Dutch traditions of 'student clubs' (known as "Corpora")[31] as well as the legacy of having been a nationalist base. It was 'considered by Communist student groups to be a henchman ["antek"] of the CIA and the United States."[32] In part, the student culture reflected some Western influences, including "jazz concerts and classical music performances."[33]

Growth of the PKI had occurred outside the urban university milieu (McVey 1994) [34] University students especially at ITB (and among somewhat PSI circles) saw themselves as more "western" and "modern". They were

> not attracted to the PKI. Moreover, the idealists among them were alienated by the corruption and hypocrisies of Guided Democracy, and the considered the PKI particularly culpable for supporting that system…as the post coup student demonstrations would show, class attitudes and anti-establishment ideals combined among them to produce a virulent anti-communism." (McVey, 1994)

[31] "Being an ex-colony of the Dutch Kingdom, the system of student organization in Indonesia is influenced by the system of student organizations in the Netherlands. The common parttern of student organization is 'corpora' or local club where any student ignoring their majoring subject or interest organization can be a member through an initiation period." The school with the oldest traditions of Dutch 'corpora' organizations was ITB. The first 'corpora' was formed at ITB with the Corpus Studiosorum Bandungense or (CSB), founded in 1920. See "Student Organizations in Indonesia, in Mahasiswa Indonesia, 3 May, 1970.

[32] Abu Rizal Bakrie, ITB activist. Interview by Mochtar Hasyrul (1997) reprinted in *Mereka Dari Bandung*.

[33] Fred Hehuwat; Abu Rizal Bakrie, both were students at ITB and both were active in the KAMI Chapter at ITB.

[34] Almost all of the PKI's efforts from 1961 to 1964 had been in areas of rural development, education for training cadres and in organizing civilian 'fronts'. While the PKI's membership grew to 2 million by 1964, its base was not, traditionally, with the intellectuals, among whom many identified with PSI and Sjahrir. An exception, of course, was Lekra, the PKI's intellectual front which had a relatively large membership of some artists and writers (among them Pramoedya Ananta Toer).

Students at ITB recounted how Sukarno's revolutionary ideology did not suit their sensibilities: try telling an engineering student that two plus two equals five—it doesn't work. That's how the NASAKOM era was."[35]

ITB students regarded the efforts to retool with outright hostility:[36]

> …we weren't allowed by Sukarno to use 'textbook thinking'[37]; we weren't allowed to use books that originated from America. Libraries were burnt down that contained these books. What books were we supposed to study from then? To give another example, we weren't allowed to enjoy foreign music or watch foreign films with the reason that they did not reflect our national identity.[38]

The Indonesian campaign of confrontation to crush Malaysia, which led, among other things, to the burning of the British embassy in Jakarta in September 1963…..there was a token book-burning in Jakarta in May 1964, books of Dutch, German and English publication were destroyed in symbolic repudiation of 'imperialism and colonialism,"[39]

Students affiliated with "Communist Concentrations" (CGMI) 'burned the university's library, donated by the University of Kentucky Contract Team." [40]

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[35] Syarief Tando, comments in *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 493

[36] Abul Rizal Bakrie, ITB Alum (1966), *Mereka Dari Bandung*, a publication about the the KAMI movement in Bandung, written by an ITB and KAMI alum, Hasyrul Mochtar (1997) 485.

[37] Sukarno, "Don't Become a Textbook Thinker," ["Janganlah Manjadi Textbook Thinker,"] a speech Sukarno gave to students in 1959, republished in *Brother Sukarno and Youth [Bung Sukarno and Youth*].Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1998.

[38] Syarief Tando (ITB Alum, 1966) from *They From Bandung [Mereka Dari Bandung*] [1997] 493)

[39] Beers*, An American Experience in Indonesia: the University of Kentucky Affiliation with the Agricultural University at Bogor,* The University Press of Kentucky, 1971 23.

[40] Muslimin Nasution, ITB KAMI Activist, interview in *Mereka Dari Bandung*, on KAMI student movement, by KAMI-Alum Hasyrul Mochtar (1997). "By September 1965 only the two University of Kentucky teams of professors at Bandung and Bogor remained of the earlier projects to serve Indonesian universities through affiliation. Sister agencies—the Peace Corps—and private groups like the Ford Foundation also withdrew….Only four contracts remained in force: the medical education affiliation of the University of California with Airlangga

> ITB at the time was affiliated with the University of Kentucky…[We] did not see anything wrong with that, we got books we needed… we weren't allowed by Sukarno to use 'textbook thinking'; we weren't allowed to use books that originated from America. Libraries were burnt down that contained these books. What books were we supposed to study from then?[41]

The CGMI formed the Action Committee to Boycott American Films (PAPFIAS) the CGMI disrupted a number of activities on campus from the March 24, 1964 film screening of John Wayne's *The Sands of Iwo Jima*[42] sponsored by ITB's Rektor Sumantri Brodjonegoro,[43] to the screening on the 18th of October of *The Magnificent Obsession* starring Rock Hudson and Jane Wyman."[44]

CGMI's actions were not well received by students used to relaxing evenings of 'jazz music" and American movies. As Douglas (1972) noted, "High school and university students in 1963-1965 actually had reason to nurture negative orientations" towards Communist student groups, like CGMI which had called to boycott US films and books at universities and at libraries' sponsored by foreign auspices, like the Ford Foundation. Faculty who returned from the US fought the labels 'Compradors" and 'counter-revolutionary.'[45]

Aligning against Communists

University at Surabaya; the engineering contract of UCLA with Gadjah Madah University [in Yogya]; and the University of Kentucky contracts one in the engineering sciences at ITB and the other in agriculture at IPB" (Beers, 1971: 7- 28).

[41] Syarief Tando, ITB KAMI Activist, interviewed in *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 493.

[42] The film screening served two purposes: 1) as entertainment and 2) as 'instructions for practice" for the battalions being organized on campus against CGMI. Mochtar, p. 58.

[43] *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 58.

[44] *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 68.

[45] *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 68

The way students described the buildup of the campaigns against the Communist student groups was remembered years later in almost military terms. One told Hasyrul Mochtar, "it felt like "psychological terror,."[46] Student Council affiliated students like Soeripto and Hehuwant grew increasingly drawn into opposition and confrontation with CGMI over student-sponsored activities and events. Not only did the CGMI disrupt the recreational activities that students enjoyed, they challenged students' basic view of themselves as a modern and technical elite, whose destiny was to provide the tools for Indonesia's 'modernization.'

Mobilization in Bandung against the CGMI was concentrated through students at Students at ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology). Years later, students recalled in terms of a military-build up. When interviewed in the 1990s, some spoke of their 'pride' in being 'the last stronghold' in the war to tame the PKI or they remembered it as "ITB was drawn into the conflict of the 1960s." Such memories seem the result of the military's attempts to draw students into more of a military-mindset.

Opposition to the CGMI was strong among students who were affiliated with religious student groups. Two of these groups were the (Association of Moslem Students) HMI **[47]** (representing Muslim students) and the PMKRI (representing Christian students). HMI was

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[46] ITB activist Soeripto. "In everyday life, the PKI unleashed "terror" toward anyone who resisted Nasakom" *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 41.

[47] The HMI or Muslim Students' Association, formed in the war-time capital, Yogya, in February 1947 by Agus Salim Sitompul, February 1947." HMI was part of a larger effort to coordinate an All Muslim Congress during the period of Dutch re-occupation of Java (1946-1949). *HMI Mengayuh di Antara Cita dan Kritik*, p. 19) HMI's biggest growth reported between 1955 and 1967, when it grew by over 80,000 members. Bachtiar, 1967: 187. Part of its growth, Bachtiar writes 'was linked to the creation of new universities…the rapid growth of Indonesia's student population…and the 1955 elections when political parties, aware of the importance of support from future members of the professional elite, took an active interest in organizing and recruiting from the student community." (1970) 187.

close to Masyumi, which like PSI was banned after 1960."[48] Mobilization of HMI in the 1960s against Sukarno was triggered by two things. The first was Sukarno's decision to ban Masyumi following the PRRI/Permesta rebellion of 1952.[49]

In the post-independence period, HMI represented youth who identified as "Muslim" first and second, as Indonesian. Based in Yogyakarta HMI appealed to students in the conservative, traditional city in Central Java, Its ability to act so effectively in those days following the coup was related to its-federation like structure. Through HMI headquarters, numerous smaller branches in towns across Java could be mobilized.[50]

> HMI's [appeal] increased in late Guided Democracy as it became difficult for citizens, especially for youth, not to participate in some organized form of political expression. HMI provided an outlet for many young Moslems, genuine and nominal, who sought an affiliation which was neither overtly political nor religiously orthodox."[51]

In addition to HMI, a number of student groups[52] also aligned against the influence of CGMI. These included groups like the Corpus Studiosorum Bandung (CSB)—Bandung Student Corps; Ikatan Mahasiswa Bandung (Imaba)—Bandung Student League; Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesian (the Association of the Indonesian Student Press, or IPMI)—which consisted of the

[48] Maxwell (2001) 139

[49] While HMI did not have official alignments with Masyumi, it appeared, as Paget put it, to 'harbor' Masyumi sympathizers, Noted Paget HMI's "official non-political stance helped to protect [it] from dissolution in the aftermath of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion when Masyumi was discredited and finally banned." See *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government,* (1970) 201.

[50] The Chain of Command of HMI was effective and accounted for the best mobilization preparedness of any major student/youth organization in the post-October 1 period." Roger K. Paget, *Youth and the Wane ofSukarno's Government* (1970) 202.

[51] Paget, *Youth and the Wane ofSukarno's Government,* (1970) 201

[52] Identified by Raillon (1985) and Paget (1970)

Bandung Branch of the Indonesian Student Press League, and a smaller group of students from West Java, the Daya Mahasiswa Sunda (Damas)—Sundanese Student Power

In 1965 several student organizations were consolidated into one student organization called SOMAL (Sekretariat Organisasi Mahasiswa Lokal (Secretariat of Local Student Organizations). SOMAL served to centralize/coordinate student actions and was designed to help coordinate student groups. SOMAL served as headquarters for some of the mobilization of students in Bandung and Jakarta in the post-coup period.

Military Recruitment

At the same time political parties were reaching out to youth groups, the army, under Army Chief of Staff, Genera Nasution began, in June 1957, to establish army-civilian cooperation bodies to detach youth from the parties.[53] There existed precedent for such involvement during the Japanese years with groups like PETA and Jawa Hokokai when you where organized, often under the leadership of older Indonesians (who were ultimately subordinate to Japanese officers) in military battalions (Anderson, 1979, Smail, 1972)

Throughout the early 1950s the army and civilians had clashed over budgetary and personnel decisions.[54] Regional rebellions in Sumatra[55] had consolidated the army's power over

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[53] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since 1300*, (1993) 259.

[54] The proposed 1952 plan to reorganize the army 'had been highly unpopular in many sections. Many bapakist local leaders, who had been given high rank in the Revolution…had been demoted. Others had been transferred from areas where their influence was established. Others again had been separated from their troops… and thus deprived of their source of power." (Feith-248-9) There 'were an attempt to bring the PNI to [support the bill]: it 'called for a reformation and reorganization of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces," for a national defense law, and for "the establishment of a special parliamentary commission to investigate administrative and financial fraud in the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces" [aimed at Budiardjo, Simatupang and Nasution] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy* (1962) 255.

key economic resources: natural-gas supply lines and shipping routes (Crouch, 1978, Robison, 1995). Guided Democracy had consolidated their political power. The army's campaign in to 'liberate' West Irian (Papua New Guinea)[56] returned 'prestige' to the army (and also led to some militarization of campuses—in particular the formation of new youth 'action fronts' and 'struggle bodies."

Starting in December 1957[57] army units from West Java looked to the universities located in that region for potential recruits (Mochtar, 1997). Efforts to do so were not entirely army driven but reflected specific commanders in West Java. Colonel Kosasih, Divisional Commander (Panglima) of the Army's West Java (Siliwangi) division in 1959 first explored the idea in an article, "Soldiers without Rank," ["Prajurit tak Berpangkat"] in the magazine Simpay Siliwangi.[58] The first attempt (which was unsuccessful) was in 1957 with the development of Youth Corps [Badan Kerja Sama Pemuda-Military]. The second more successful attempt occurred in 1963 when the West Java division formed youth regiments at various universities throughout west Java.[59]

> "Marching in formation was advocated officially…in the framework of military preparedness surrounding both the West Irian and Malaysia campaigns. During

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[55] On the 15 Feburary 1958 rebel government (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic or PRRI) established in Sumatra p. 262 when Sukarno is out of the country; he returns home and orders it crushed he is supported by generals, Djuanda, Nasution and PNI and PKI members; (Ricklefs *History of Modern Indonesia* 1993, 263).

[56] "The continuing occupation of West Irian by the Dutch had been a source of national humiliation to almost all political groups. The campaign came to be seen as a continuation of the 1945 revolution that would once again inspire the people to subordinate their immediate interests in order to fulfill the nation's destiny." (Crouch [1978] 46).

[57] At the end of November 1957, the United Nations failed to pass a resolution that called upon Dutch to negotiate settlement of Irian. MC. Ricklefs, *History of Modern Indonesia*, (Stanford University Press, 1993) 260.

[58] Quoted in Mochtar, *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 33.

[59] 24 January, 1963; see Mochtar, *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 35.

> these crises, a number of official pronouncements specified the durational and procedural requirements for drilling students and stated the political purposes of this activity explicitly...Dutch educational policy in the Indies relied heavily on the drill for its physical culture and discipline-building value." [60]

Drill instructions and exercises were also practiced in elementary schools, where Douglas (1972) reported, they seemed to be "enjoyed…so much so that young children frequently practiced marching on weekends and after school… on their own." [61] University students were less fond of the drills.[62]

Army-cooperation bodies however complemented a rapid 'build-up' in 'the number of troops to over 300,000 strong.[63] The Army's preparation for the West Irian campaign, its growing political control since the start of the Guided Democracy era and its ability to organize youth groups would be helpful in the army's longer-term struggle against another group it perceived as a menace: the Communist Party (PKI).

By the mid-1960s a pattern of military recruitment began to evolve into a shared collective identity comprised of shared ideas and sentiments that pre-dated the coup-attempts of both September 30, 1965 and October 1, 1965. [64] Underlying the student-officer alliance of 1966 was a dense social network of dissidents located in salons and discussion groups. To these I now turn.

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[60] Douglas, *Political Socialization and Indonesian Student Activism,* (1970) 76.

[61] Douglas (1970) 76.

[62] Douglas, (1970) 76. Douglas recalled that students "[found the] drill[s] humorless and annoying [and evidence of] 'political leadership [that] is stupid and incompetent.'

[63] Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 2007 [1978] Singapore: First Equinox Edition, 51.

[64] Douglas (1970) believed that students' political socialization was particularly low. This made students, in Douglas' opinion, particularly easy to "capture" by a variety of political parties, action-fronts and organizations. Simultaneously, in the post-coup atmosphere, anti-Communist sentiments could be harnessed into a movement against the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) Party's leaders and base across the archipelago.

Free-Spaces in the Guided Democracy Period

The formation of free spaces during the Guided Democracy period was the result of three things. The immediate backdrop was the organizational legacy of different movement organizations in the student movement. Many of these groups can be traced back to the 1950s and the efforts by political parties to recruit loyal youth wings. Some student federations had earlier roots in the 1920s. These groups had specific organizational identities and generally served as representative bodies to address student concerns. In the 1950s these groups increasingly were re-shaped by the party struggles of national politics.

A mix of new cohorts and in Jakarta especially through informal networks of anti-communist intellectuals, journalists, and students in Jakarta comprised the political generation of 1966. Mobilization depended on free-spaces that brought students into contact with increasingly disillusioned individuals. Using evidence from Gie's journals, student memoirs and analysis of primary and secondary sources, I document the connections between older activists, some like Soedjatmoko, active in the pre-independence period and younger activists like Soe hok-Gie, a literature student at the University of Indonesia. Gie's diary was a very private space. Yet through his entries he conveyed how more public forms of speech were taking place at private houses in Jakarta. These, as I shall show in the next section, were frequented by small circles of dissidents and intellectual communities of University of Indonesia economists in exile.

The Dissident Networks

In Jakarta there were two main 'circles' of opposition. The first was the student group, Gemsos (Movement of Socialist Students, which was a small student group aligned with the PSI and with Soe hok-Gie's circles. This circle sometimes included local federations like SOMAL (Secretariat

of Indonesian Students) and the local Jakarta branch, (IMADA). A number of members, including Soe hok-Gie's brother, Arief Budiman and literature student, Goenawan Mohammed, were active in Somal and IMADA circles[65]. Dissident settings in Jakarta, at private homes of PSI activists and intellectuals were not places of mass-audiences. And the dissidents were intellectuals talking often to like-minded intellectuals who "had been removed from decision-making circles."[66]

Gemsos was active as an "intellectual circle," Maxwell noted. "As a political organization, it was weak (*lemah*) and non-effective".[67] However, as 'free space' Gemsos discussion groups and houses provided 'network structures' of 'friendships, neighborhoods and occupational groups'[68] Students at the University of Indonesia like Goenewan Mohammed recalled how Gemsos students also frequented private residences, like Wiratmo Soekito's[69] to "use his private collection of books or to sleep…it developed into a friendly community, especially for students outside Jakarta. [70]

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[65] Continued to command influence during the following year even as SOMAL waned and larger national groups gained prominence in KAMI" See Paget, *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government,* (1970) 143.

[66]Hadiz and Chalmers, 1997, p. 14. As Gie remembers, Soedjatmoko remarked, "[Intellectuals] knew how to shout freedom in solidarity with the people—but they could not fix what needed to be fixed." See John Maxwell *Biography of a Young Indonesian Intellectual* (Jakarta: Grasindo Press, 2001)

[67] Maxwell, *Diary of a Young Indonesian Intellectual* (2001)113

[68] Johnston (2005) 115.

[69] Soekito was "head of public affairs programming at Radio Republik Indonesia…who was a well-known writer and intellectual associated with the anti-Communist Congress for Cultural Freedom." Janet Steele, *Wars Within* (Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing (2005): 29.

[70] UI "was difficult to get admitted to…if a young person was bright enough to be accepted, tuition was free…it was paying for room and board that was the barrier for many students, especially those from outside Jakarta Janet Steele, *Wars Within* (2005): 28-29.

At the center of anti-Sukarno dissidence was Soedjatmoko, a PSI-activist and founder of the socialist newspaper, Pedoman. [71] Starting in 1963 a number of discussion groups began to take place in Jakarta—often at private homes, including that of Soedjatmoko. Soedjatamoko's circle was an informal network of students that sometimes involved University of Indonesian literature student, Soe Hok Gie and other youth affiliated loosely with PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party).[72]

While PSI was banned in 1962, its student group was not. Among the Gemsos circle of contacts were young journalists as well as older dissidents like Soedjatmoko, Rosihan Anwar, economist Mohammed Sadli, Sarbini and literary critic, Wiratmo Soekito.[73] Gemsos students frequently held meetings and discussions at private houses, including Gemsos-member Zainal Zakse's house near PSI's "headquarters" in the tree-lined Jakarta neighborhood of Menteng (Maxwell, 2001). [74]

Youth who were in attendance, like Soe hok-Gie, for example, appeared to be there as much out of interest in the ideas expressed at these events in addition to to expressing fondness for particular senior members like Soedjatmoko. Soedjatmoko was more closely affiliated with faculty from University of Indonesia like Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, an economist

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[71] *Pedoman* was banned in 1962 by Sukarno for openly criticizing Manipol-USDEK. See Alisjahbana, *Indonesia: Social and Cultural Revolution* (1966) and MC Ricklefs *History of Modern Indonesia* (1993)

[72] The PSI had emerged in the 1940s out of the ideological divisions among nationalist that had emerged between nationalist leaders Sutan Sjahrir and Sukarno and between harder left, Communist aligned Tan Malaka who had his own party, Murba.

[73] Maxwell *Biography of a Young Indonesian Intellectual, (*2001) 119

[74] Soedjatmoko was a frequent guest at Gemsos talks. Maxwell identifies at least three different occasions (the 4th of Demcember 1962, the 31st of December, 1962 and the 14th of January, 1963) when Soedjatmoko spoke to Gemsos members at Zainal Abidin's house. See Maxwell, *Diary of a Young Indonesian Intellectual* (2001) 116.

> had received a Ph.D. in Economics in Rotterdam at the Economische Hogeschool in 1942. Djojoahadikusomo was 'linked" with the PSI and had been former Minister of Trade and Industry from 1950-1951 and Minister of Finance (1952-1953) and from (1955-1956) . He was forced into political wilderness and exile in the late 1950s for supporting the unsuccessful rebel government PRRI.[75]

Djojohadikusomo was an older member of this group and like Soemitro he had supported the PRRI rebellion in West Sumatra.[76] In 1951 Djojohadikusom had authored the "Economic Urgency Program" in attempt to promote 'indigenous' entrepreneurs. As part of the plan, Djojohadikusomo "had proposed a number of large scale industrial projects…in an attempt to increase the capacity of small-scale 'peoples' industries…from leather workshops to bronze smelters…the plan was abandoned in the mid-1950s."[77]

Notes Chalmers and Hadiz (1997), 'the removal of 'men like Djojohadikusomo reflected "Sukarno's version of socialism….which paid little attention to economic policy per se, and took pride in his disregard for economic planning."[78] Sukarno liked to say he "was not an economist [,] but a revolutionary."[79] Alisjahbana recognized Sukarno's "aversion to logical argument, accuracy and objectivity….was…expressed quite honestly when he accepted [an honorary doctorate] from Gadjah Mada University in 1951

[75] Chalmers and Hadiz, *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia.*1997 (London and New York: Routledge (1997) xi

[76] Wijoyo Nitisastro, Subroto, Emil Salim, Sadli became known as the "Berkeley Mafia." For use of this term see Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia* (Columbia University Press, 1993)

[77] Ian Chalmers and Vedi Hadiz (1997) Sukarno's shift in economic strategy from small-scale to industrial production is given as a reason for the shift, prompted by his trip to the Soviet Union in 1959. See *The Politics of Economic Develoment in Indonesia.* (1997): 11-14.

[78] Sukarno was fond of belittling 'textbook thinkers' and 'experts' who he argued, could not understand the revolutionary moment.

[79] JD. Legge *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (1997) 373.

> The most important thing is to inflame society and on to accumulate scientific knowledge…rules and logic of scientific thinking…sets limits to the effectiveness of an agitator who works on the assumption that his audience blindly accepts his reasoning.[80]

Sukarno's 'aversion' to logic and rationality, as Alisjahbana (1966) understands it would lead to conflicts with student groups in 1965 who cited that as a reason for their opposition to Sukarno (Mochtar, 1997).

Some intellectuals rallied around themes of "sickness" and 'renewal' (*pembahruran*)--in anonymous manuscripts—for 'reform.'[81] Reform was an idea that attracted many different adherents, from young Muslim intellectuals as well as older secular intellectuals. It also appealed to the young, who like Gie who expressed his opposition to Sukarno through private thoughts of repulsion and fascination:

> I remember meeting Brother Karno three times at the palace. I looked at the female assistants he had working for him….but I remember thinking, seeing his secretaries… I knew just looking around that I didn't care for it. Yes, they were pretty but it seemed dirty and corrupt to me. Whenever I left the palace I felt sick and disappointed." [82]

Some entries, like Gie's entry on the 19th of February, 1963 noted his attendance "on the 6th of February at one of Soedjatmoko's lectures:

> at my friend's Maruli's house…a new identity or approach or path for intellectuals was established there. 'Koko' [Gie's affectionate name for Soedjatmoko] began the evening with an anecdote of three intellectuals who went to the countryside where there were lots of problems. While they all had good intentions, none could fix any of the problems. Why? Asked Koko, Gie recalled, because they themselves did not understand the problems; they were stuck and had no konsepsi (concept) to develop. [Koko] urged everyone at the meeting that

[80] S. Takdir Alisjahbana, *Indonesia: Social and Cultural Revolution*, (1966) 167.

[81] Maxwell *Biography of a Young Indonesian Intellectual* (2001) 138

[82] Soe Hok-Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, [*Annotations of a Demonstrator*] (1983) 126

> intellectuals must be willing to find and apply solutions that are truly Indonesian..Intellectuals do not know where to focus their civic duties in the post independence period because they don't understand how to utilize the people's energies and the system failed. The failure of parliament today is a monument to the problems Indonesia faces."[83]

Soedjatmoko's lectures can be understood as dissidence in that they were not public talks, but private addresses given in private houses to a selected audience of like-minded peers (in this case PSI-intellectuals and sympathetic students).

Ideas expressed by the movement communities located in the Movement of Socialist Students (GEMSOS) and the PKI dissidence community consisted largely of abstractions. Themes such as the criticism of intellectuals, the search for spiritual 'renewal' and 'upbuilding' were abstract concepts at best. They masked more overt criticism that could not be uttered publicly. They reflected the character of the opposition as intellectuals rather than political activists trying to connect with a mass-constituency. Anti-Sukarno sentiment was the result of many inter-related developments that provided a basis for an "emerging synthesis" between students and the Army in the pre-coup period. Part of this synthesis was a sharing of ideas between student groups and young officers about the general ineffectiveness of civilian politicians and their inability to 'find and apply' technically-competent solutions to the problems of inflation.

The hyper inflation of the 1960s would provide a context in which students, the "identification with the university as the essential foundation of their shared relationship] became engaged with the officers close to Suharto on issues like "modernization and development."[84] While economic dysfunction may have become the norm in 1965 (Bresnan, 1993, Alisjahbana,

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[83] Gie, Quoted in Maxwell (2001) 113.

[84] Francois Raillon, *Les Etudiantes Indonesiens et l'Orde Neauveau* [Indonesian Students and the New Order] (1984) 106.

1966, Ricklefs, 1993), it did not become the subject of much contentious action until after the October 1 coup in 1965. As Gie noted,

> [Witono] told me he thinks that the opponents of the PKI should stick to identifying with economic issues. If people get involved in a prolonged struggle, it will be chaos. It is better to have students involved in the protests," he told me. "Students are organized and disciplined; we can take instruction.[85]

Gie's observation suggest that the economic crisis provided a set of issues that the army could rely on to generate greater elite support for the more dominant role the army would play in the New Order. Ideas that appealed to technically-trained students and young officers in the army were also, arguably, being formed in and implemented in global epistemic communities, by aid and development groups sponsored by the Ford Foundation.

Sociological concepts like 'functional differentiation' were used to explain the acute differences between both 'modern" and 'traditional societies' and formed some of the rationale for development assistance programs.[86] In contrast to a 'traditional" society, a modern society was one that was 'advanced' and characterized by high rates of technological progress and 'functional specialization' of roles. [87] These basic assumptions, Raillon's analysis suggests,

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[85] See Soe Hok-Gie, 1966, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, Original in Indonesian: Witono (dia memang orang baik, aku pernah ngobrol-ngobrol dengannya)…menerut pendapatku pengganyangan PKI harus identik dengan perbaikan ekonomi. Kalau rakyat Indonesia terlalu melarat maka secara 'natural, mereka akan terjadi chaos. 'Lebih baik kalau mahasiswa yang bergerak,' kataku." Grafiti Press, Jakarta (1996) 124

[86] Vicky Randall and Robin Theobold (1998) *Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics*, Duke University Press.

[87] Writes Raillon (1984) The ideas of Generation of '66—based on the sociological school of thought identified with modernization theory as well as Dutch social scientist H.S. Boeke—writes Raillon made the following kinds of assumptions (p. 156): 1) A modern society was one that was 'advanced'; 2) Where man exploited and was in control of nature; 3) The future did not depend on fate; but humans could control outcome; 4) There existed people of accomplishment rather than people who waited for their fate; 5) Rationality dominated and 6) Innovation was not limited. See *Les Etudiantes Indonesiens et L'Orde Neauveau* (1984) 155-156.

provided the basis for a shared set of values that lay the basis for anti-Sukarno sentiment in the days and months that followed the coup.

Identity Dynamics

Two kinds of identity-dynamics are central to understanding the development of collective-identity in this period. The first concerns that negotiated between students and the army-officers in the student-circles in Jakarta (based on observations from Gie's diary). The second concerns that of youth and older dissidents, like Soedjatmoko in the study-circles and discussion groups in Jakarta.

The elements of shared identity between students and army (as generalized from observation of a single –case (Soe hok-Gie's diary) suggest that officers like Nugroho Notosusanto [88]clearly tried to cultivate close relations with student activists. During periods when bus transportation was generally unavailable, Gie reported getting rides to and from the University of Indonesia to his Kebon Sirih (neighborhood of Jakarta) house from Notosusanto.[89]

John Maxwell, Soe hok-Gie biographer, speculated that the generation of ABRI generals (like Kemal Idris and Nasution) generally defended their actions in terms youth would admire. For example, Gie recalled the following incident:

> Nugroho is very aware. In 1958 was part of demonstrations in front of the French embassy against the colonial war in Algeria. He became very emotional about it and became very hot-tempered, banging the pencil sharpener on his desk as he

[88] Notosusanto was an army historian whose studies were based at SESKOAD (the Officer Training Academy) in Bandung. Gie knew Notosousanto through the University of Indonesia where he was employed as a lecturer. In 1964, Gie's biographer, John Maxwell (2001) writes, Notosusanto began working in 1964 at the SESKOAD in the Army's History department. (Maxwell: *Biography of a Young Indonesian Intellectual* [2001] 132)

[89] On the 7th of January 1966 Gie wrote in his diary that he had received a ride from Professor Nugroho Notosusanto who picked me up in his jeep. See *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [*Annotations of an Activist*], entry for January 7, 1966. See also Gie's entry for January 11, 1966.

> recalled shouting 'Vive l'Algerie!"…He told us, 'every time I see that picture in my head at that demonstration I become that person." We spoke for a bit but it seemed we were embarrassing him, so we changed the subject.[90]

Values emphasized through daily contact with ABRI generals in the post –coup period suggest that the officers embodied courage, professionalism and pragmatism. These were values that must be understood within the context of the Guided Democracy period.

Soe hok-Gie had strong personal sentiments that were clearly opposed to Sukarno's self-aggrandizing style of politics. Sukarno, Soe hok-Gie wrote, "only builds palaces; things that cannot be enjoyed by the people who are all hungry," [91] Soe hok-Gie, however, also displayed a personal morality that stood very much opposed to Sukarno's character flaws.[92] Soe hok-Gie's diary entry below suggests a personal revulsion with Sukarno. Implied by Soe hok-Gie are two things: 1) an intense disapproval of Sukarno's (well-known and publicized) womanizing and many wives and 2) a deep sense of disappointment in Sukarno's character:

> I remember meeting Bung Karno three times at the palace. I looked at the female assistants he had working for him. (I was a student, not one of his ass-licking ministers or colonels), but I remember thinking, seeing his secretaries in their tight tops, showing off their breasts. I knew just looking around that I didn't care

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[90] Aku banyak tahu tentang biografi Nugroho dari kawan-kawannya. Nugroho adalh seorang yang sabar. Tetapi pada tahun 1958 ia pernah jadi pemimpin demonstran ke Keduataan Perancis untuk memprotes perang kolonial Aljazair. Terbawa oleh emosi, Nugroho kemudian jadi 'beringas' dan sambil teriak-teriak "Vive L'Algerie" ia banting mesin-mesin tulis. Seorang yang begitu sabar seperti Nugroho juga terbawa oleh suasana emosi. "Dan setiap kali saya melihat foto saya dalam demonstrasi itu, saya ingat kembali bahwa orang itu…" Aku kira peristiwa ini merupakan seusuata yang membuat Nugroho embarrassed."

[91] Gie's reference was clearly made in opposition to the many criticism's Sukarno received for his construction of enormous public monuments throughout the city of Jakarta commemorating, among other things, 1) the Irian Campaign in 1957 and 2) the Jakarta monument in the Lapangan Benteng (Benteng Field) across from the National Museum in Jakarta. Maxwell *Biography of a Young Indonesian Intellectual* (2001) 12

[92] In Ben Anderson's obituary of Soe Hok-Gie (1970), Anderson observed about Gie that "more than most of his generation, he was outraged by the ruthless exploitation of the poor and the defenseless in his society: the arbitrary, illegal taxes, the land-grabbing, the casual armed brutality, and the 'insolence of office'." See "In Memoriam: Soe Hok-Gie." *Indonesia.* Vol 9 (1970): 225-227.

> for it. Yeah, they were pretty but it seemed dirty and corrupt to me. Whenever I left the palace I felt sick and disappointed."[93]

Sukarno, Soe hok-Gie reflected in another entry was liked as "a person," but "not as a leader."[94] Soe hok-Gie believed that the the first responsibility of Socialist was to be "honest" and "forthright" and act in opposition to "seeing the nation led by something as immoral as[Sukarno]. Intellectuals, Soe hok-Gie continued, "must act together." [95]

Soe hok-Gie'sentiments reflected ideas shared in evening discussions at Soedjatmoko's house in Jakarta on February 6, 1963.

> Soedjatmoko began the evening with an anecdote of three intellectuals who went to the countryside where there were lots of problems. While they all had good intentions, none could fix any of the problems. Why? Asked Koko, Gie recalled, because they themselves did not understand the problems; they were stuck and had no konsepsi (concept) to develop. This was analogous to Indonesian intellectuals; they knew how to shout freedom in solidarity with the people—but they could not fix what needed to be fixed……Intellectuals must be wiling to find and apply solutions that are truly Indonesian…Intellectuals do not know where to focus their civic duties in the post independence period because they don't understand how to utilize the people's energies and the system failed. The failure of parliament today is a monument to the problems Indonesia faces. And from this was born Sukarno's Guided Democracy…Intellectuals must be willing to find and apply solutions that are truly Indonesian."[96]

The interactions in the pre-coup period between Soe hok-Gie and Soedjatmoko suggest a strong bond or affinity constructed around a shared identity of intellectual curiosity and identification

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[93] *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [*Annotations of a Demonstration*], p. 126 (2005, 8th Edition, paperback). "Aku pernah tiga kali menemui Bung Karno dan berdiskusi dengannya. Dan aku muak melihat pembantu-pembantunya yang menjilat-jilat (aku seorang mahasiswa tidak menjilat-jilat, sendangkan Kolonel-Kolenl, Menteri-Menteri, menjilat). Aku juga melihat sekretaris pribadinya yang berkebaya ketat dan buah daad yang mengiurkan. Terus terang saja aku melirik padanya acuh tak acuh. Memang dia cantik tetapi aku dapat membayangkan betapa koruptor hidup perkelaminan di sini. Setiap aku keluar dari istana sedih dan kecewa." (p. 126)

[94] John Maxwell (2001) 112

[95] John Maxwell (2001) 112

[96] John Maxwell (2001) 113

with the national pride. If the young officers appealed to youth like Soe hok-Gie for their professionalism and competence, Soedjatmoko figures in Soe hok- Gie's sentiments as a worldly elder.

Anderson's obituary of Soe hok-Gie suggests a different interpretation for the youth's anti-Sukarno opposition than that proposed by John Maxwell (Soe hok-Gie's biographer). While Maxwell speculated that Soe hok-Gie may have admired the armed forces for their heroics and ideals of sacrifice, there is little evidence to suggest this. Instead, Anderson argued, Soe hok-Gie's fondness for the ideals for a modern democratic society were "encapsulated" by the spirit of modernization that seemed to lurk in both the ideals and values that students and the army shared in the pre-coup days. While Gie would go on to be very critical of the Army and the student-leaders in the post-coup period, the idea of 'modernization' did not mean for Gie what it meant for the military. Wrote Anderson, "Modernization…for him meant, above all liberation: liberation from hypocritical conventions and the degradation of accepted servitude. Being modern meant being able to stand up to those in power and see them for what they really are."[97]

The Components of an Emerging Anti-Communist Hostility

Students were politicized in Jakarta in an atmosphere of considerable intellectual tension, discord and anxiety. New press controls had banned several newspapers, leading intellectuals and writers, expressed their opposition to Manipol-USDEK in terms of defending 'rationality," 'humanism' and 'culture".. Within, free spaces anti-communist sentiment, opposition' and 'dissidence' continued to be framed in terms of appeals to nationalism, and and increasingly through open alignments between intellectual communities in Jakarta and in open sympathy with young ABRI officers. These alignments between older intellectuals, younger students and

[97] Ben Anderson (1970) 227

officers would eventually culminate in the New Order and could be observed in their embryonic stages among developments on campuses in Jakarta and Bandung in the pre-coup period (1964-1965).

While the development of the student-army partnership has often been articulated as the inevitable outcome of an accumulation of grievances with Sukarno[98], opposition sentiment among student groups was in fact, a great deal more complex. Students did not suddenly take sides with the military. Their alliance was one rooted in sentiments and identities they had in common, expressed through ideas they had in common about who were allies and who were 'enemies', what the ideal "Indonesian" society would be and who, among political groups openly contesting power in Indonesian politics in the early 1960s, represented 'true' nationalists and patriots. All of these factors made up students 'collective identity," which was more than a simple political stance, but a more complex, strategic sense of self (Crane 1994) that was the result of students acting 'collectively' in social networks, comprised of dissident groups and in free-spaces throughout the 1964-1965 period.

Characteristics of student activists had been the product of Indonesian state schools through primary and secondary education. Through this education, there was a high level of awareness of the nationalist era generation—even to the point that students defined themselves as an extension or continuation of the nationalist-generation of 1945. Their views were shaped by newspapers like *Harian Raya* and *Pedoman*[99], which faced continual pressure during the

[98] For example, Noted Arief Budiman that 1964 "[students] opposed Bung Karno, and he became increasingly hard line When Sukarno entered a period of crisis – economic, communist, and military – we sided with the military. Interview by Rahadian Permadi, *Inside Indonesia*, Vol. 91 (January-March 2008).

[99] Both newspapers were limited to what Karl Jackson (1978) acknowledged was an "elite reading public" and whose combined circulation did not exceed 35,000. See "The Political Implications of Structure and Culture in

Sukarno period through strict press laws. Sympathies with these newspapers and the views expressed in were shaped by world views of prominent Indonesian intellectuals like Soedjatmoko, whose views were especially influential in shaping individuals who played central roles in the KAMI movement (like Soe hok-Gie).

Student-opposition was shaped by strong identification with expertise, rationality and intellectualism. In their opinion, the country had been plunged into chaos that required intellectuals to respond. Belief in their power as intellectuals and in their moral power to act became defined as a nationalist act. Opposition to Manipol-USDEK and to Sukarno was expressed in terms that defended rationality, morality and secular humanism. These beliefs may have showed a close affinity to western philosophy and American social science, but they were also the product of specific experiences—in particular the efforts by political parties, Sukarno and the army to recruit students.

Looking at free-spaces like the dissident networks at the University of Indonesia demonstrates that dissidence was not only initiated by students. Reading the diary of Soe hok-Gie suggests that dissident talk between younger students and older, sympathetic activists made strong impressions on activists. Many of these dissidents, like Soedjatmoko, were estranged from Sukarno. Some, like PSI-founder Sutan Sjahrir were imprisoned. From these free spaces one can document an emerging set of ideas that became the basis for KAMI's oppositional identity.

Individuals, like Soedjatmoko and Sjahrir had been youth during the Japanese occupation, before Sukarno was president and before Indonesia was independent. Some of them, as Sjahrir's biographer Rudolf Mrazek noted, "were furious [with Sukarno in the 1950s. and

Indonesia," in Jackson and Pye, *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press) 25.

were] quite willing to kill Sukarno."[100] To men and youth in the PSI, a party that was banned by Sukarno in 1961, Sjahrir's view that "communists were not real revolutionaries"[101] prevailed. Sukarno's banning of PSI heightened anti-Sukarno sentiment among PSI-party members. PSI-activist and founder Sutan Sjahrir was incarcerated in 1962 after being accused of a 'plot to overthrow Sukarno.'[102] After a period of house arrest (in the former residence of the Goodyear tire Company headquarters in Jakarta), Sjahrir was moved to a prison in Madiun (East Java)[103] Sjharir turned to reading. He took an interest in Soviet Dissident circles, re-read Karl Marx, the writings of historian E.H.Carr as well as the novels of Lionel Trilling[104] From prison, he was a very active writer and wrote frequently to friends, his wife and family as well as essays that were circulated at PSI meetings.[105]

During periodic releases from prison (such as during Lebaran, the festival that follows the month of fasting called Ramadan), Sjahrir also saw friends. (Mrazek, p. 481).Ideas expressed by Sjahrir, through private talk or written correspondence was circulated at PSI meetings and recorded by Gie, who noted in his diary:

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[100]Rudolf Mrazek *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithca, NY: Cornell University Modern Southeast Asia Program (1994) 440.

[101] Mrrazek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* p. 456. According to Mrazek, Sjahrir belived that the Indonesian Communist Party "do not keep to Marxism-Leninism…they accepted that in the framework of Guided Democracy." (1994 483). Years of violence against Indonesian communists meant that the party increasingly shed its orthodoxy to adapt in ways that made it more "Indonesian" and Java-centric than when it was sponsored by the Comintern in the 1920s.

[102] Sjahrir's role was 'never proven' in this incident as there were no trials (Mrazek, p. 46). The incident involved increasing outer-Island restiveness, the explosion of hand grenades in the direction of Sukarno's presidential motorcade in Sulawesi on July 7, 1962 and public riots on Java. See Mrazek, p. 463-4. Masyumi party members were also arrested as part of the same sweep that resulted in Sjahrir's incarceration.

[103] Mrazek, p. 467. Each prisoner was detained in a private residence with access to a garden and a swimming pool. Transferred to Madiun six months later, Sjahrir was detained at what had been once a women's prison with a 'considerate jailer " and "accessible reading" and "monthly visits." (*Sjahrir: Politics and Exile*, p. 467-8).

[104] Mrazek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile* (1994) 475-7.

[105] Mrazek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile* (1994) 480.

> There two main social forces right now are the military and the PKI. Which one is more powerful is hard to see right now. Students are of course, another social force, but we have no power. At the military academy in Bandung, there is much evidence of student-military cooperation. There, academics are teaching the military. This can be the start of a closer relationship.[106]

Sjahrir's biographer, Rudolf Mrazek noted how one of Sjahrir's papers ("circulated in PSI circles") written in February 1963 conveyed the idea "there has to be some possibility for a patriotic group to emerge inside the army."[107] Sjahrir believed, Mrazek writes,

> …among educated circles, both civilian and military, there still are people with ideals, who mean well, and who are not cynical. They may gather and try to change the present structure of our state power from the inside. An effort like that has to get full support in all fields, especially in the field of education.[108]

How Sjahrir knew of these possibilities is not particularly clear, although his contacts with individuals in a wide array of circles including "PSI-sympathetic officers in the Indonesian army" like Dean Jahja,[109] "[who] had belonged to Sjahrir's wartime medical-school student circle [of which Soedjatmoko was also a member]" in Jakarta, may explain Sjahrir's thoughts.

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[106] Gie (2002), *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [*Annotations of a Demonstration*]. Entry "31 December, 1962", Jakarta: LP3ES, p. 110. Original reads, "…ada dua *social forces* yang nyata adalah militer dan PKI. Bila keduanya berkuasa maka itu merupakan jalan yang suram. Kini ada suatu *social fact* yaitu sarjana-sarjana tetapi mereka tak punya kekuasaan. Dan ada titik terang sekarang yaitu di SSKAD [SESKOAD—the Army's Training College in Bandung] ada kerja sama antara militer dan sarjana. Sarjana megajar militer dapat mengatasi situasi demikian ini. Tetapi dari pihak militer ada penentang-penentang." English words in italics in original.

[107] Mrazek *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile* (1994) 481.

[108] Ibid. Mrazek does not convey exactly how Sjahrir knew such things, but he does suggest that Sjahrir 'was reported to suggest 'supporting Nasution." (See *Sjahrir Politics and Exile* [1994] 481)

[109] Jahjah was not the only officer to be sympathetic with the PSI. Crouch (1978) also named Kemal Idris (West Java, Siliwangi Division) was also 'openly sympathetic,' writes Crouch (p. 180). Idris had also taken part in the 1952 Army demonstrations against Parliament and had his appointment to an active military post in 1956 refused by Sukarno. See Harold Crouch *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur 2007 [1978] First Equinox Edition): 181

Sjahrir's incarceration meant his connections PSI and Gemsos took place through his articles and letters 'smuggled out of prison…in the skirts and blouses of womenfolk."[110] While the PSI may have been 'leader-less" without Sjahrir and its core activists in prison, a new cadre of activists like Gie, were being formed. This group would begin to define itself through "an emerging synthesis" (Raillon, 1986) young ABRI officers. This alliance was based on a mutual hostility to Communism, to Sukarno and as it was in Bandung, as a longing for a return to "a bourgeois life." The alliance would remain embryonic the coup (which shall be discussed shortly). And not until the public seminar at the University of Indonesia in January 1966 did 'dissident talk break the surface of public life"[111]

The sources and influences of PSI Identity

A source of PSI-Modernism was publications from magazines and books students read and borrowed at British Council libraries.[112] Raillon (1986) identified Encounter magazine [113]as one of the main sources of ideas that influenced students in Bandung in the 1960s.

> [*Encounter*] was very much a product of the Cold War, Encounter—in terms of its significance for Indonesia in the 1960s was very much part of an 'anti-Communist

[110] Mrazek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (1994) 468.

[111] Johnston "Talking the Walk: Speech Acts and Resistance in Authoritarian Regimes," *Repression and Mobilization*, eds. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005): 120.

[112] The British Council maintained libraries in Bandung and Jakarta. The British Council was founded in 1934 and sponsored by the UK Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It offered English-language instruction and 'cultural programs (Source: The British Council). The British Congress for Cultural Freedom (founded in 1951) worked in tandem with British Council libraries. See Frances Stonor Saunders *The Cultural Cold War* (The New Press (1999) 103.

[113] *Encounter* was founded in 1953 as a British 'journal of ideas' addressed to the public intellectual [of whom Raillon includes] 'journalists, professors, students, professional librarians, artists and members of parliament," (Raillon, p. 153). "Until its last issue at the end of 1990, "Encounter magazine held a central position in post-war intellectual history," writes Frances Stonor Saunders (1999). "It was resolutely ideological….and linked to the intelligence world." (1999) 165.

> and pro-American' orientation. [This was evident writes Railon], in its philosophical essays, its politics, art, literature and sociology. A number of these analyses were reflections on intellectuals and their place in society. Clifford Geertz' article 'Are the Javanese Mad?" was published in it." [114]

Students accessed *Encounter* through libraries established through the anti-communist Congress for Cultural Freedom or CCF, an organization that received considerable funding from the CIA" and British intelligence agencies.[115]

> The CCF was dedicated to nurturing, building and sustaining what came to be referred to as the 'Non-Communist Left'… as it was known in Washington circles [and] was devoted to propagating the ideals of democratic socialism as an alternative to Communism….The Congress of Cultural Freedom had established one of its first libraries in Jakarta in 1956 An 'interim committee' organized by [writer/journalist] Mochtar Lubis and Sutan Takdir Alisjhabana. Indonesian intellectuals associated with the CCF included Wiratmo Soekito, Soedjatmoko, newspapers editors PK Ojong, Rosihan Anwar, Soe Hok-Gie , his brother, Arief Budiman and 'all of PSI."[116]

The CCF managed to inculcate positive sentiments among students. Students leaders remembered, Steele notes, the CCF libraries 'fondly" as "a space for books" and for their "book-translation program called Obor (Torch) under the leadership of Mochtar Lubis. The CCF It also assisted in providing scholarships [for study in Europe]."[117]

Conclusion: Anti-Communist Oppositional Consciousness

As an opposition-consciousness or collective identity, anti-communism united the older PSI-activists like Soedjatmoko and Sjahrir with young student activists and young officers in an alliance that was rooted in a common struggle and solidarity. A shared "cognitive framework'

[114]Francois Raillon *Les Etudiants Indonesien [Indonesian Students and the New Order]* (1984) 153.

[115] Steele *Wars Within: The Story of Tempo* (2005) Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War* (1999).

[116] Steele *Wars Within: The Story of Tempo* (2005) 38-39.

[117] *Wars Within: The Story of Tempo* (2005) 38-39I.

rooted in “modernist” and ‘technocratic” values (Raillon, 1985) was cultivated in the social networks both students and officers frequented from the late 1950s through the early 1960s. The emergence of the small-group ‘free spaces’ that began to occur in Jakarta in the early 1960s, documented in private journals like Soe Hok-Gie’s or culled from the memoirs of student activists—some KAMI-affiliated, others not. The context of this behavior was the growing contention on campus between student groups and ‘Communist Concentrations” as well as private sentiments of discontent among intellectuals and groups of students with the government’s failure to address the worsening economic situation.

The young army officers and intellectuals would become the leaders of an emerging regime, the “New Order”, at the center of the oppositional dynamic emerging among civilians at the University of Indonesia in the early 1960s. It would take, as Paget (1970) and Douglas (1970) have shown, the failed coup in Jakarta of September 30, 1965 and Gen. Suharto’s counter-coup offensive that followed on October 1, 1965 to facilitate policy changes desired by those in the UI and PSI-study-club circles.

An anti-communist collective identity in the immediate post-coup period was constructed out of two things. The first was a foundation of generalized hostility to Communist youth groups (based on clashes on campus between Communist and non-Communist youth). The second motivating factor was the Army’s insistent narrative of Anti-PKI sentiment and revenge-seeking as the prevailing themes in the media in the post-coup period.[118] For students within student groups that were already aggrieved, the post-coup period provided a set of favorable

[118] This fit with the general “design of the Army” response: to suppress reporting of army and air-craft units’ involvement in the coup and to place all blame on the PKI. Anderson and McVey note that this position “had the full support of the major religious political parties,” and by implication, their youth-groups. Anderson and McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia*, Cornell University: Modern Indonesia Project, p. 56.

opportunities for the mobilization of anti-PKI sentiment and activism. Mobilization of students in these early days came from those groups that, had grievances during the pre-coup period.

Independence had created new civilian rulers and political parties, whose clashing agendas and inability to form parliamentary stability put the country at risk of chaos, economic strife and disintegration. [119] Students' views were reinforced by the culture of the Indonesian university. While Indonesia had been independence since 1949, the universities remained populated by a small number of native instructors and with a high-presence of foreign personnel, capital-assistance and influence. Fiscal pressures after independence had created a high-level of support on foreign aid in tertiary education. On campuses where American contract teams were present—as at ITB and the Agrigcultural Institute in Bogor (IPB)—tensions ran especially high between Communist and anti-Communist groups. In private spaces, such as the diary of University of Indonesia student Soe hok-Gie, individuals expressed their ambivalence with a political system that seemed determined to crush any semblance of intellectual thought, rationality and free expression.

[119] McVey, "Army in Indonesian Politics," *Indonesia,* p. 151. In December 1956, "army officers in Sumatra…decided to make their stand against Jakarta with local civilian support. On December 20 the regimental commander in West Sumatra took over civil government. On 22 December Simbolon announced a take-over in North Sumatra….The army councils in Sumatra rapidly acquired popular support by introducing reforms, repairing schools and roads and cutting down corruption." MC Ricklefs (1993) 254.

Chapter 4

Oppositional Collective Identity: The Anti-Communist Student Action Front (KAMI)

Introduction

Students' anti-communist identity during the disorder of the mid-1960s has been studied through the *collective actions* of the student group, KAMI (United Action Front of Indonesian Students) but not the *collective identity* of the student movement. As I will show, KAMI's collective identity was not only realized through episodes of mobilization but through 1) the expansion of its identity to include groups not originally part of the KAMI coalition in October 1965; 2) the legitimacy KAMI acquired legitimacy on campus as it became identified as a social movement especially responsive to student demands and personal identities.

Escalation of protests and ever larger numbers of high-school recruits (KAPPI) and post-graduate members (KASI) changed KAMI from a movement that functioned reliably under the army's direction. By Ferubary 1966, especially after the accidental death of Erik Hakim, mobilization unrelated to KAMI's initial objectives was evident. Participation in KAMI had grown as the organization's stature and legitimacy as an anti-Sukarno "struggle-body" were established by episodes of mobilization through January 1966.

KAMI's rise in power eclipsed the on-campus organizations that, in the opinion of Paget (1970), were struggling to respond to the atmosphere of partisan and army recruitment on campus begun in the mid-1950s. It was not simply a student-initiated response to the chaos of politics in the 1960s. It was a response organized largely by the army and calculated to serve the army's interests rather than student objectives. KAMI also represented the discovery by the

military of source of power it had not yet used: the significant power of youth to legitimize its own counter-movement against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

KAMI's legitimacy among students was rooted in the following: 1) its evident credibility as an action front willing to stand up to the PKI and to Sukarno; 2) its rising popularity as a social movement, which was due to its inclusiveness of a wide-range of groups and identities (such as incorporating both high-school and post-graduate students). A final reason for KAMI's success was its ability to tap into both sentiments and organizations of a subculture that had existed on campuses throughout West Java and Jakarta. As McAdam and Friedman have suggested, the success of social movement mobilization is a result of the movement's integration in already established organizations, networks and groups.

By March 1966, KAMI had helped create and legitimize a new role for the 'student movement.' KAMI-affiliated newspapers, journals, art-exhibitions and radio-stations (Douglas 1970) also created a new sense of 'energy' on campus that appealed to a wide range of students eager to be part of the new 'movement'. In this way, KAMI generated a new interest in the student activism—that appealed to students' personal identities and creative-inclinations (which Douglas, has argued, found little outlet in the pre-1965 campuses, so lacking were they in extra-curricular activities). Thus, while students' antagonism to Communist-Concentrations had created (for some) an initial interest in joining KAMI, the organization, students stayed involved in the KAMI "movement" long after KAMI had ceased to function.

Having been a member of KAMI was to also acquire a new sense of status that conferred upon students in the "New Order" regime positions of some political prominence. Therefore, KAMI created both a series of short-term opportunities—initially based on its ant-communist

credentials—to act as well as longer-term commitments among activists who took part in KAMI marches and meetings. While initially KAMI was formed to 'demand a ban on the PKI In the long-term, KAMI mobilization created new opportunities for the student movement as a whole and led to the creation of a 'student movement' that attached prestige and status to membership.

KAMI's Collective Identity: Boundaries and Self-Definition

KAMI activities and marches were deliberately nationalistic and played on sentiments and actions that were associated with themes from the Indonesian revolution. Such a strategically-defined sense of self gave KAMI a sense of legitimacy that it otherwise would not have had. KAMI became a movement demanding more than simply the ban on the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). By late January 1966, it became a movement committed to the articulation of ideas of sweeping reform[1], to removing ministers from Sukarno's cabinet and to stabilizing inflation and re-orienting the Indonesian economy towards integration in the global economy.

KAMI's collective identity built on narratives, action-frames and repertoires that emphasized student's duty and patriotic spirit. At times, actions resonated with themes from nationalist history, such as the duplication, for example, of the 1927 Oath of Youth that KAMI students used as template to declare their intent to protect the country from the PKI. Other actions were designed to demonstrate a unified presence of youth on the streets. During an era when students had routinely served as an audience for Sukarno's addresses, the marches and public demonstrations around the capital city, Jakarta sought to provide a spectacle of military-directed student opposition. As when students protested outside an empty Parliament, scrawling

[1] In October, KAMI gave no indication that it supported economic reforms, only that it supported 'aggressive action' against the PKI and 'counter-revolutionary' elements. And yet, writes Paget (1970, p. 52) there were clues that suggested an emerging partnership: "Students also gave important recognition to the army leaders and 'a commitment to work with them—not only in the task of crushing the September 30 Movement but in other spheres as well. See Roger K Paget *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government* (1970) 52

on walls and defacing the building where “stupid ministers” worked, KAMI marches echoed sentiments of Army-mistrust in civilian leaders.

Through participation in marches and demonstrations in the capital city, Jakarta, in 1966, students expressed rage that they had felt the last three years against Sukarno.[2] Their actions provided cover for the more murderous actions of the army, paramilitary and vigilante-violence that spread throughout Java, Bali and Sumatra against Communists (Paget 1970, Boudreau 2005). By November 1965 anti-communism served as the basis for a murderous campaign of violence throughout Java, Sumatra and Bali. The killings were the result of a long-sequence of events that had begun in the mid-1950s when the PKI, demonstrated some of the first strong gains in the traditionally nationalist-dominated regional elections in West Java.

By the late 1950s, it became impossible for Sukarno, then president, to ignore the PKI. Politics from the late 1950s to the early 1960s involved the delicate task of balancing three competing factions in Indonesian politics: the secular nationalists, the modernist Muslim parties who opposed secularism and the Communist Left, who mobilized much of the rural public behind their agenda of rural development, social justice and education.

The formation of the Anti-Communist Action Front (KAMI) was explicitly triggered by the events of the October 1, 1965 coup in Jakarta. The coup’s effects on the country’s politics were momentous. In the days immediately following the coup there was an intense mobilization of dissident speech and opposition sentiment formerly embedded in communities that had fairly

[2] For a very thorough account of the army’s mobilization of anti-communist students in West Java see Roget Paget’s account of KAMI in Youth and the Wane of Sukarno’s Government. 1970. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Paget shows how the army recruited students to form an action front designed to demand action following the supposedly communist-instigated attack against the seven generals on September 30, 1965. Both Paget’s (1970) description of the coup’s aftermath and Benedict Anderson’s account of the same period demonstrate how students could be effectively deployed by the army at strategic locations in Jakarta to demand vengeance against the alleged perpetrators of the coup, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). During a period when few other groups could protest legally, what would develop as the anti-communist student action front would become a very shrewd instrument for the army’s seizure of power in the days and months following the instability and crisis of the post-September 30 period. Boudreau’s 2005 work demonstrates the particular value

limited room to maneuver during the Guided Democracy period. Students' ability to criticize the PKI openly was not something that they had been able to do in the Guided Democracy period. It took the coup and state-directed violence at the Left to provide a context where views once expressed as dissidence could be expressed openly.

KAMI's collective identity was the result of a longer period of incubation in more hidden social networks of social opposition. While this process has been theorized under non-violent political repression (Johnston, 2005) KAMI's formation demonstrates that violent political repression may provoke dissident speech into open forms of opposition. The opening of dissident speech took place against a backdrop of greater public violence that included vigilante killings as well as public brawls with known PKI student groups, CGMI and student "night-watch" campaigns to turn in known Communist students and sympathesirs.

The action-front reflected the general antagonism students directed towards "Communist Concentrations" (CGMI) throughout the early 1960s. KAMI's real strength was its ability to mobilize, through its social networks, a community of student organizations, action fronts and membership bodies. Its 'flexibility' in other words did not derive primarily from its status as a 'youth-group' but from its being embedded in a number of already-existing organizations and groups.[3] The KAMI federation recruited heavily from existing student organizations sponsored by religious parties and groups, like HMI (Muslim Students Association) and the Christian Youth group, PMKRI.

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[3] "While movements undoubtedly consist of participating individuals, of strings of protest events, and of organizations, it is the connections between those components that differentiate social movements from atomized, isolated instances of political behavior" Marco Diani, "Networks and Participation," T*he Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* Oxford University Press (2004) 351.

Anti-communist oppositional sentiment was realized and articulated through the individuals "embedded in" a number of underground and participatory organizations, groups, action fronts, federations, and underground 'free-spaces' where, through interactions, a collective identity was negotiated and created.[4] At first from 1963-1965, these connections were evidence of 'dissidence' sustained in local networks in Jakarta and Bandung (both university towns and both, for various reasons, as I have discussed, were increasingly opposed to Sukarno (at UI especially) and to the PKI (as in Bandung), through opposition-campaigns to 'Communist Concentrations' on campus.

KAMI protests and mobilization created a new collective identity for the student movement to put into motion a new identity for students and student organizations in national politics. While KAMI is best known for its role in the protests organized by the army against Sukarno and the Communist Party in the mid-1960s (Bachtiar 1966; Paget 1970; Douglas 1970), its embededness in social networks in Jakarta prior to mobilization in October 1965 has been less well understood. While KAMI is often presented as the inevitable outcome of students' response to the October 1, 1965 coup, KAMI was the outcome of a larger struggle within the student movement. An early victim of KAMI was the student federation, PPMI (Union of Indonesian Students) a group that existed since the 1930s as a forum and structure of governance for student leaders and the on-campus based student movement.

While KAMI and KAMI-sponsored protests appeared to represent student sentiment against Sukarno, KAMI in no way represented the full spectrum of student organizations on campus (Strassler, 2005). The KAMI federation (created by army leadership in October 1965)

[4] Diani (2004: 352) notes "The more activists get to identify with wider causes through their multiple involvements in organizations and protest events, the more we have genuine social movement dynamics in progress."

rested on the predominance of HMI members,[5] followed by students who were active in the catholic student group, (PMKRI). KAMI represented the triumph of HMI over the expense of the Student Federation, a group that had represented the ‘intra-university’ student councils—the student government associations whose members were elected representatives of the student body at colleges across the nation.[6]

Furthermore, KAMI represented, in different periods of its formation and development, differing strengths of distinct student groups. In its earliest stagtes (late-October to November 1965), KAMI’s formation empowered the HMI at the expense of the student federation PPMI (which dissolved in December 1965). By January-February 1966, a combination of Army encouragement and by late January, a more youthful contingent of high school students changed the complexion of KAMI from a ‘federation’ of undergraduate anti-communist student federation to a more ‘action’-oriented group that engaed in direct types of action (protests, marches and symbolic demonstrations).

Backdrop to the 1966 Protests against Sukarno and the PKI

Emboldened by a coup in Jakarta in early October 1965, the army sought revenge against the PKI for what was believed to have been a PKI-led attack on the Armed Forces at the Air Force base outside Jakarta. In parts of rural East Java and Bali killing would become the pretext for settling hundreds of local conflicts and disputes. Muslim youth in Central Java led scores of attacks against Communist youth groups in retaliation for the campaigns of book-burning on

[5] The Muslim Student Association formed in 1947 in Central Java.

[6] This aspect of KAMI was one that did not sit well with the students who did not belong to mass-mebership groups. Many years later, Bram Zakir would tell me that [in the 1970s] “we were against HMI.” Interview, Jakarta, June 2002.

campuses in the early1960s. Following the coup, students in West Java conducted midnight sweeps of their campus for Communist student groups. Anti-communism united a diversity of interests—secular nationalists, traditional and modernist Muslims and the armed-forces in a unified identity that had been threatened by the party's growth in popularity.

Compelled by the army and traditional Muslim parties to fight the communist forces who allegedly engineered a coup against the Indonesian armed forces, university students in the Jakarta environs helped form a large anti-communist presence on campus. To the largely Muslim, anti-communist student groups who had been angered by Sukarno's drift towards the left since the late 1950s, anti-communist sentiment was for the first time given a voice. Students formalized their presence through a federation called the Indonesian Student Action Front, or KAMI. In the capital city, Jakarta, KAMI would become the only student group allowed to march, demonstrate and hold symbolic protests.

In the rural Javanese countryside and in rural Bali, anti-communist youth recruited by the army and by the religious party NU formed the basis of vigilante attack groups. Killings begun in October 1965 carried on to December. In just under two months it is estimated that close to 1 million people were killed. By January 1966, the University of Indonesia became part of the Army's front line against the all-but-dead PKI. A forum to openly promote anti-communist economics returned to prominence academics who had felt marginalized during the Sukarno years.

The Coup and Reactions to the Coup

The events of October 1, 1965[7] marked the end of a year of rising tensions on campus. Classes were disrupted in Jakarta by Martial Law that was imposed soon after the coup. At ITB students continued to go to campus but stopped attending classes.[8] It was a time, noted Paget (1970: 219) when university student leaders met informally in private homes and in various organizational headquarters."

While the PKI's role in the coup had, in reality, been far from 'proven', the ABRI newspapers were quick to publish pictures of the generals' dead bodies under highly-suggestive headlines that suggested beyond much doubt that they were the responsible party[9].

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[7] There were two key developments around this date, which have been fairly repeated but which were articulated most clearest by Anderson and McVey's "Cornell Paper" (1970). Despite the criticism it often receives, is a frank of an assessment of the data available, including radio transmissions, interviews with key people and summaries of newspaper articles around the event. One suspects a problem some have expressed with their thesis (Hindley, 1980) has to do with their analysis which demonstrates that the PKI was the least able to conduct the coup for which it has since (and fairly automatically) been assigned responsibility.

I summarize. The first series of events took place in the very early morning hours of October 1, when the bodies of six dead generals were discovered in a dry well at the Halim Airforce base outside of Jakarta. A coup of 'left wing generals' who called themselves the "Revolutionary Council" claimed responsibility for the coup which was designed at eliminating counter-revolutionary elements in the armed forces—all of which were identified as several top ranking generals who led 'luxurious lives' contrary to the national ideology. The kidnappings had included an attempt to capture Gen. Nasution, who escaped over his garden wall into the grounds of a foreign diplomatic residence (his daughter was less lucky, she was shot in gun fire during these events). Suharto had not been home during these events but had been notified several hours later, around (we are told by Anderson and McVey) eight o'clock, the morning of October 1, 1965.

The kidnapping took place during against a backdrop of the gathering of several hundred ABRI units throughout Jakarta for celebrations in honor of Armed Forces day on October 5.(Halim AirForce base had also been one of the places where PKI-units had been training a civilian militia). T he second series of events followed the coup and were initiated by Suharto, who was both one of two senior Commanders still alive and who commanded the Army's Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD) units. Suharto issued two orders to establish rank and file control amid what seemed as obvious army restiveness: 1) troops were ordered to identify themselves and assemble under their commanding officers and 2) KOSTRAD units would assume the task of establishing control over Jakarta under martial law. Troops who did not conform to these orders would be detained. Sukarno, meanwhile, was said to have been at Halim airforce en route to the presidential palace in Bogor (south of Jakarta).

[8] Noted Abu Rizal Bakrie, "After the 30th of September we stopped coming to classes; we went only for attendance and then left. Our parents were a little concerned, when would we have time for classes if we were always demonstrating?" See *Mereka Dari Bandung,* (1997) 484.

[9] Anderson and McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia*, Cornell University: Modern Indonesia Project, (1970) 57.

> "Suharto stated bluntly …that this enemy would be crushed to absolute extinction because it had dirtied and betrayed the historical struggle of the Indonesian people…To assure [this] Suharto [proclaimed] he was launching territorial operations to clean up all attempts in the fields of ideology, politics, economics, and social-cultural activities." [10]

In the days immediately after the coup, the Army had seized the opportunity to whip up public momentum against the PKI's 'monstrous conspiracy', student groups reportedly

> used this as an opportunity not only to suppress leftist communist opponents more effectively but also as a chance to recast the overlapping structures of the student/youth world in forms more suited to their minority interests. Success, of course, depended upon the coincidence of their limited objective with those of major national forces such as the Suharto group and other sympathetic elements.[11]

Vigilantism was openly encouraged and students played prominent roles in the efforts to to destroy the private home of PKI-Chairman D.N.Aidit [12]and also ranskacked the PKI-youth (CGMI) headquarters. In the days that followed the army sactioned purges of Communist-youth groups, closing their organizations on campus and rounding up members of the PKI's women's group (GERWANI) and members of its literary organizations, LEKRA.

Outside Jakarta groups in cities like Yogyakarta, some mobilization of pro-PKI youth groups were reported by Anderson and McVey (1970). This included contingents of-anti-PKI youth congregating "in groups on street corners" outside PKI headquarters in Solo.[13] In Yogya, brawls between PKI-youth and NU-sponsored youth groups took place, while in in Bandung

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[10] Paget, *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government*, (1970) 214.

[11] Paget *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government,*(1970) 222.

[12] Aidit had been picked up in the early morning hours of the coup along with Sukarno and AirForce Colonel Omar Dhani to establish, in varying ways, the culpability of the PKI in the killings of the generals. In the hours after Suharto declared a counter-coup, Aidit and Dhani traveled by plane to Central Java.

[13] Anderson and McVey (1970) 57.

students held rallies at CGMI's headquarters the day after the big HMI rallies in Jakarta.[14] The Rektor of ITB reportedly issued orders forbidding students affiliated with any of the Leftist-organizations, CGMI, the PKI-youth group PEMUDA RAKYAT and Communist groups such as Lekra, Gerwani from attending classes, seminars, borrowing books or being physically present on campus." [15]At the Institute of Technology in Bandung, students were said to have formed night-watch contingents on campus to enforce these orders. From accounts by students at ITB, a battalion of students was ordered to assemble. Campus communication was interrupted by the closing down of the student-radio station and the daily newspaper, ITB news.[16]

Initial momentum in Jakarta came from both HMI (the Muslim Student Association) and PMKRI, the Christian Student Organization[17].

> HMI issued statements individually and in conjunction with other groups in Bandung, Bogor, Surabaya, Pontianak, Menado, Medan, Simalungan, Lampung…and urged its members to 'work closely to crush Gestapu [and all]…the September 30 movement organizationally, all communists and anyone however faintly sympathetic to either to its roots." [18]

While the PMKRI's parent party also had significant grievances with the Guided Democracy system (the Indonesian Christian party, PARKINDO had been banned by Nasution for not conforming to 'retooling' of the political party system in 1960).[19] PMKRI, like HMI, had

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[14] Mochtar Hasyrul, *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 82

[15] Fred Hehuwat interviewed in *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 409

[16] Hasyrul Mochtar, *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 83

[17] The early student reaction to the crisis evolved from the first anti-PKI incidents, which in themselves merely amounted to an extension of the pre-coup rivalry between the HMI and the principal communist student organization CGMI (Douglas (1970) 155.

[18] Paget *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government*, (1970) 204.

[19] Under the guidelines of the Commission in charge of 'retooling' the political parties, four requirements were put into place. These were: 1) an ideological requirement, that all political parties must accept and defend the

also been presidium members with significant grievances against CGMI. Compared to HMI it was much smaller, with a membership estimated at 'several thousand' compared to HMI's nearly 100,000 members (Bachtiar 1966, Paget1970).

Abdul Gaffur, a medical student and HMI member in 1965, recalled that HMI's grievances (with CGMI) had begun "as early as July 5, 1960…when the Rektor of University of Jember Prof. Utrecht declared HMI was forbidden to meet. Only at state universities after 1960 was HMI active. HMI was up against other student groups like CGMI, GMNI and Germindo. Utrecht's commands to destroy HMI lit the spark." [20]

HMI soon took the lead in being the most vocal advocate for a quick response.[21]

> "Pictures of the mutilated bodies of the slain generals were disseminated through newspapers and televisions accompanied by anti-communist propaganda from the army. For the first time in years open criticism of the PKI was legitimized, and…HMI was one of the first groups to exploit this opportunity."[22]

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official state ideology, Pancasila, 2) that parties must have an all-Indonesia character and have no foreign members or foreign chairmen; 3) that parties must have branches in at least six provinces and in every province they must have branches in at least 25% of regencies and 3) that every party must have a total of 150,000 card carrying members, while every branch must have at least 50 members sanctioned by the police." See Ruslan Abdulgani (1973) *Nationalism, Revolution and Guided Democracy in Indonesia*, Four Lectures, Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University (Clayton, Victoria: Australia), p. 49. Christian parties in Indonesia had neither the strength nor numbers to meet these requirements, despite there had been both many Catholic parties and protestant parties since the 1945 period. These parties would merge as PARKINDO in 1945.. Noted Webb (1978) "Forming a political party was hard work. Protestants did not have the numbers…nor enough people of ability to sit in cabinets. Other parties had already cadres of their own." See Rev. Father R.A.F Paul Webb, *Indonesian Christians and the Political Parties,* South East Asian Monograph Series, Number 2, James Cook University, North Queensland, Townsville, [Australia]: (1978) 48.

[20] *HMI: 50 Years Serving the Republic* (1997) 62.

[21] "The first spark of explosion occurred on October 5, 1965 when the Islamic Student's Association (HMI) organized and successfully staged a fairly sizeable student rally at which President Sukarno was urged to ban the PKI." (Douglas, *Political Socialization (*1972) 154.

[22]Douglas (1970) 55.

(HMI) and the Catholic student group (PMKRI). Leaders of both groups called a united student front against these actions.[23] A number of other student groups joined in these events. Students recalled that HMI was the first to act. It was, as Paget argues, in the position, best to act:

> "HMI's…advantage in the fall of 1965 was clear innocence of any September 30 movement involvement….[and] freedom from political party strings…This freedom which had served the group well in the aftermath of PRRI/Permesta…once again proved to be a special advantage in the post-October 1 period. HMI was not a federation or a front and therefore had no incriminating friends. It had great prominence nationally both as the enemy of PKI and a strong, relatively independent minded organization in its own right." [24]

What HMI did, others soon followed. The Muslim party, Nahdlatul Ulama and its student youth groups issued a joint statement condemning the 'coup' and '30th September movement."[25]

In the first days after the coup, protests against the PKI were allowed as were students' actions directed at ransacking and burning down the PKI Party's offices in Jakarta, PKI-chairman D.N.Aidit's house, the headquarters of the PKI-sponsored women's group Gerwani[26]

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[23] Subchan Z.E. Vice Chairman of the NU and Harry Tjan, Secretary of the Catholic Party.Interviewed by Hasyrul Mochtar (1997) *Mereka Dari Bandung* (They From Bandung).

[24] Paget, *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government*, (1970) 203.

[25] Paget, (1970) 197.

[26] Gerwani and the PKI-youth regiment Pemuda Rakyat were responsible for (or at least held responsible for) the killings at Halim Air Force base. Anderson and McVey report that their participation was predicated on orders from Army officials who told the youth (some as young as thirteen and fifteen) that the arrests were of enimes of the president. The youth were not told who the identity of those they killed. See page. 21-22 of Anderson and McVey, 1971, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* where they write "it is evident that these youths and girls were brought in the act entirely without their previous knowledge of what was [to follow]…the motive for drawing in the Gerwani and the Pemuda Rakyat was to incriminate and compromise the PKI." (1971) 22.

and SOBSI, the Federation of Labor.[27] HMI were the first to organize the first public protest on October 5, demanding that the PKI be banned.[28]

At an October 8 rally held in Jakarta

> organized by student leaders in Jakarta affiliated with the HMI student group and the Catholic Student organization PMKRI. "Posters [at the event] read "Crush the PKI! Hang Aidit!. Speakers called on the government to ban the Communist party. [29]

By the end of the first week of October, "HMI and other students demolished the headquarters of the PKI and the home of its first secretary, D.N.Aidit, while armed detachments of the Indonesian army looked on."[30] Paget's descriptions of this period suggest actions from "tracking down Communist leaders, sacking their houses, attacking the headquarters of various leftist organizations, including the PPMI building in Jakarta") were carried out by "masses of youth" in "partially-spontaneous outbursts." [31]

Paget described these events as evidence of intensifying contacts…and a mutually beneficial relationship develop[ing] between 'certain military leaders" and "young people." [32] The military did not immediately restrict all youth groups, because, as Vince Boudreau (2005) argued, the army required local youth groups to help their efforts to "organize social support

[27] See Bachtiar (1970) 191

[28] Douglass (1970) 154

[29] Bresnan (1993) 31

[30] Douglas (1970) 155

[31] Paget, *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government* (1970) 180

[32] Douglas (1970) 161

against President Sukarno. ABRI agents worked closely with students and rural Islamic institutions to build anti-communist groups."[33]

Youth were described as useful to the military in particular because they could take part in actions that would not identify perpetrators with ABRI agents:

> Youth provided a corps of vigilantes for the performance of some tasks such as night-time interrogations and seizures of property, deemed by officers to be inappropriate activities for their own troops. The army, in part, gave the students much needed protection…This political symbiosis came to called the 'partnership'; it was at the core of the movement which crushed the PKI and eventually displaced Sukarno and his guided democracy system."

Counter-mobilization, like the kind reported by pro-Sukarno group, GMNI, were heavily symbolic, stressing their group's patriotism and calls for "civic clean-up campaigns, national and regional conferences and mass-initiations.[34] To emphasize their patriotism, the youth-group affiliated with Sukarno's party, the PNI, pledged their loyalty and allegiance to the President. Present at the event was Sri Ratna Purwati Astuti Suprapto, daughter of one of the six assassinated generals, who had newly initiated. The emphasis on GMNI's ability was likely to demonstrate that Sukarno could also quickly mobilize youth in his support.[35]

KAMI and the University of Indonesia

The University of Indonesia's economic department would emerge in the New Order as the power behind the regime's economic reforms (Akmadi, 1993). In the Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) this group was clearly *opposed* to Sukarno's decisions to implement a

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[33] Boudreau (2005) 104

[34] Paget (1970) 197

[35] Paget (1970) 197-8

‘socialist Indonesian economy” (Legge 1997)[36] Their stance vis-à-vis the regime and Sukarno can be more accurately described as ‘dissidence…[a] form of contention [that] arises when individuals, many of whom come from intellectual and scientific communities, reframe what is possible, for their oppositional talk to achieve” (Johnston 2005).

KAMI had its headquarters at the University of Indonesia [where] two departments—the literature and psychology departments were central meeting spots for KAMI-affiliated activities. The medical college served as the symbolic center of the student movement of organizing and a central place for students to gather. Students, like Soe hok-Gie were especially aware of the symbolism of the occasion:

> Monday the 10th of January was the most important day in the history of the Indonesian student movement. We got to the Medical school at about eight o’clock in the morning—in the same place where students twenty three years before us protested the Japanese occupation…while in the end they lost, their spirit lives on. And forty eight years before, the students from the Java Doctor’s College (led by Sutomo) declared their allegiance to the first nationalist organization, Budi Utomo.[37]

Student demonstrations throughout the 10 days in January in Jakarta were located at strategic sites such as the Presidential palace, the Oil ministry and even outside the presidential palace in Bogor (where Sukarno would eventually be exiled until his death in 1970). While the Action Front comprised mainly university students, adults cooperated in these efforts as well. Both civilian and military adults provided students with support, planning and strategic advice. Marching alongside them on the wide boulevards outside the front gates of the University of

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[36] A number of political leaders were removed from the political scene altogether. Sumitro, for example, had sided with the a rebel government in West Sumatra in1957, and he fled the country after the rebellion was quashed…his political organization, the PSI, was later banned.”. Ian Chalmers and Vedi Hadiz, Introduction, *The Politics of Economic Develoment in Indonesia* (1997) *14.*

[37] Gie, Diary Entry 10th of January 1966 (1986) *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [*Annotations of a Demonstrator*] 110

Indonesia campus on Jl. Salemba in Jakarta in noisy celebrations, students (according to Soe Hok Gie) appeared to feel "at one" with the ABRI officers.

Student protests were carefully targeted at strategic sites (the Indonesian parliament, the Oil Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Students protested outside some of the homes of Cabinet members, but in contrast to the actions that had characterized early protests against PKI-Chairman D. N. Aidit in October 1965, students did not rampage or ransack the house of Sukarno's Cabinet-Ministers. Instead, students stood outside and shouted slogans. Their intention as more clearly to articulate specific sentiments: that policies were flawed and that reform, in specific cabinet changes, were badly needed.

By January, 1966, elements of KAMI's identity were expressed through street protests, demonstrations and symbolic protests. These protests were evidence of an expansion of themes to KAMI's earlier "anti-PKI" identity to include concern for economic matters[38] as well as criticism of Sukarno.[39] Student marches were composed almost entirely of students and professors, with protests targeted at a variety of strategic sites: the homes of government ministers in the elite neighborhoods of Jakarta, like Menteng, or at government ministries, where

[38] Noted Gie in his Diary, "[Col. Witono's] told he thinks that the opponents of the PKI should stick to identifying with economic issues. If people get involved in a prolonged struggle, it will be chaos. "It is better to have students involved in the protests," he told me. "Students are organized and disciplined; we can take instruction. And more to the point, if ABRI sides with suffering people in the street carrying bayonets…[it could get out of control]. See Gie's Diary entry, 7 January, 1966, "Witono (dia memang orang baik, aku pernah ngobrol-ngobrol dengannya)…menerut pendapatku pengganyangan PKI harus identik dengan perbaikan ekonomi. Kalau rakyat Indonesia terlalu melarat maka secara 'natural, mereka akan terjadi chaos. "Lebih baik kalau mahasiswa yang bergerak", kataku. "Memang karena discipline kita bersedia untuk mederita, tetapi….apakah ABRI akan memihak rakyat yang menderita dan bersedia menunjukkan ujung bayonetya." *Catatan Seorang Demonstran [Annotations of a Demonstrator]* 1966 (1983): 124"

[39] KAMI's first task was to issue "Three Demands of the Indonesian People," or TRITURA. These demands included 1) to dissolve the PKI, 2) to replace the existing cabinet and 3) to lower the price of goods." KAMI also called on students to 'boycott classes" and 'to protest the higher transportation fares. Douglas 1970.

few ‘regular’ people worked or frequented. When students did assemble outside the private homes of cabinet ministers, they were greeted without hostility. [40]

From descriptions of the marches we know that student marches began at the University of Indonesia with students and faculty ‘leaving the university’ in the morning[41] in long columns or ‘lines…emulating military discipline’ often in ‘silence’. While professors and students marched together,[42] professors often led the way.[43] The marches were not boisterous affairs, although students shouted specific slogans such as “DESTROY THE PKI, HANG INDECISIVE MINISTERS BRING DOWN THE PRICE OF GAS!”[44]

The KAMI marches were regimented walks through Jakarta streets to specific locations.[45] From January 10 to January 15, students marched daily from the campus in central Jakarta to various locations, including Parliament (January 13, 1966); the Hotel Indonesia (January 12, 1966); the old Jakarta neighborhood of Kota near the docks (January 14, 1966), the Presidential Palace (January 10, 1966) and the Oil Ministry Pertamina, (January 11, 1966).

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[40] Gie noted that “we stood outside of [Education Minister] Prijono’s house and yelled “Hang Indecisive Ministers”. He smiled when he saw us and waved his hand.” (*Catatan Seorang Demonstran, Demonstration Writings [1983]* 136).

[41] We know from Gie’s writings that marches left between 9 and 10 in the morning and that they left on time, as Gie arrived late one morning and worried he would not be accommodated (he was).

[42] The Literature and Psychology students marched together (Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, [1983] 136).

[43] From Gie’s Diary, January 11, 1966, “On Tuesday, the Long-March on Salemba [Road] began. About fifty people attended. Professor Sutjipto led us. I was about 5 minutes late getting there, but I managed to still be accommodated.

[44] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, (1983) 136.

[45] Among locations students marched to included the Parliament, the Oil Ministry, the Senayan sports stadium and the private houses of prominent politicians and cabinet ministers.

> Students marched down Jakarta's main thoroughfares to outside the presidential palace; "We sat down on the ground facing the [Cakrabirawa Regiment guarding the palace] and shouted "ABRI Live!"[46]

One of the first street protests KAMI sponsored took place on January 10, 1966 following the increase in gas fares from 4 to 250Rp per liter.[47] The demonstration took two days to coordinate and began at the University of Indonesia's medical school at the campus located in the Salemba area of Jakarta. The march started early with students congregating by eight o'clock in the morning [48] Gie estimated that more than 200 students were part of these marches.[49]

With the exception of protests outside the Presidential Palace, the Oil Ministery, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, students' interactions were largely against the main ministers within Sukarno's administration: Chaerul Saleh, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and Subandrio, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Along the way Soe Hok-Gie recalled that students chanted,

> Near or Far, Two Hundred [referring to the new bus fares]
>
> Lower the price of Gas
>
> DPR banci (Parliament is powerless)
>
> [Government] Ministers are Stupid
>
> Chaerul is a Stupid Minister[50]

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[46] *Demonstration Notes,* January 10, 1966; see also Soe Hok-Gie's version of events in Notes of a Demonstrator, (1983) 152.

[47] *News and Views* (No. 80) November 30, 1965.

[48] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* 1966 (1983).

[49] This figure represented a very small number. The entire population of the University of Indonesia was over 10,000 students (Bachtiar 1969).

[50] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [Annotations of a Demonstrator] (1966 [1983]): 131

KAMI protests involved ‘singing’ or ‘chanting’ another aspect of the KAMI repertoire involved the written word—either through chants like the one above or expressed through ‘hit and run’ tactics (Johnston 2005) such as wall-scribbling written in ink or with colored felt-tip pens. As an indication of the lawlessness of the early days of KAMI-protests in January 1966, the walls of government buildings, the parliament, fence posts along the gates outside parliament were filled with angry scribbles,

> We put up our posters, wildly yelling in the streets “STOP IMPORTING WIVES; ONE MINISTER, ONE WIFE, CHAERUL SALEH IS STUPID,” all of this before 10:00 clock.”[51]

Chaerul Saleh was Coordinating Minister for the Economy and his decision to raise bus fares was one that particularly angered students. As Harsjah Bachtiar noted, ‘the relationship between the students and the central government was aggravated by [Saleh’s actions] ‘who attempted to bring some order in the wide discrepancy between official and black-market prices by increasing the price of gasoline from 4 to 250 Rp a liter..Most of the students, who were already fighting a frantic struggle against the high cost of living in the urban centers, suffered severely from the increase in the price of gasoline.”[52]

Soe hok-Gie noted in his diary,

> We planned to meet Chaerul Saleh, the ‘mastermind’ of the pricing-strategy. We blocked Nusantara Road, and sat on the street facing traffic. Those among us who were Moslem started to pray as well. There we were in the hot sun, thirsty and hungry (some were even fasting). We planned to meet Chaerul Saleh, the ‘

[51] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [Annotations of a Demonstrator] (1966 [1983]) 136-7

[52] *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [*Annotations of a Demonstrator*] (1966 [1983]): 35

> mastermind' of the pricing-strategy. It was four PM before Chaerul Saleh came out to meet us."[53]

Anger over gas prices was no doubt behind the sequence of protests in which students seized gas stations in the old Jakarta neighborhood of Kota[54] (Douglas, 1970).

> In fact, the first big street demonstration sponsored by KAMI (on January 11, 1966) was held to protest increases in the cost of public transportation. Insisting that they spoke for the real interests of the people, the students demanded that bus fares be reduced and that the price of gasoline be [reduced]. At the end of three days of unprecedented defiance of warnings and disruptions of traffic the demonstrators achieved a measure of success. The municipal government announced a substantial reduction in bus fares. To a public long since resigned to uncontrollable inflation and still skeptical of this new brash and disrespectful and disharmonious behavior of the students, the government's acquiescence was bewildering. This probably was a vital turning point in KAMI's public relations, and its effect was reinforced when, on the following day, students seized many of Jakarta's service stations and enforced a new price which they had coerced the director of the state oil company to decree."[55]

This event, unlike the KAMI marches and wall scribbling did not spread throughout the city, suggesting "it was an isolated incident rather than the development of a new form of protest.[56] Its meaning was to protest the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Chaerul Saleh's 'clumsy' decision to increase fares from 4Rp to 250 Rp.[57]

> There, students [began] to block the entrances to the gas stations. I started to think that students could be perceived negatively by the public. The army could also

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[53] *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [*Annotations of a Demonstrator*] 127-128.

[54] Douglas, *Political Socialization and Indonesian Student Activism* 1970

[55] Douglas (1970) 157

[56] Bachtiar (1966) 35

[57] Bachtiar (1966) 35

> come down on us if we blocked the gas stations. It was a moot point it turned out, the plan to block the gas stations didn't happen that day."[58]

The blocking of gas stations was not repeated and whether this was because students were ordered not to repeat this action is unclear. Student marches did not return, at any rate, to the Kota neighborhood of Jakarta. Instead, the following day student marches were directed towards the Bank of Indonesia where 'students were on top of cars and borrowed bikes to form barricades. They were told not to; eventually the army threw tear gas, apologizing first to the students…from the looks of it, the military support the students[59]. The protests remained good humored throughout:

> we continued along, blocking traffic when we could. One car was refusing to stop, there was almost an accident. The driver of the car, an important person, got out and started to yell, "let us pass". There was no commando in sight, just about 15 students. We let him through." [60]

Despite student protests against 'stupid ministers' there was not much animosity between students and ministers. From Gie's journal we know that students were often greeted warmly 'with smiles' or 'waves' from ministers or were offered rides by them[61]

> In front of Ruslan Abdulgani's house we yelled "long live Mr. Ruslan!!" --he had a good name among students….he had once joined Sjahrir in the PSI, but then joined the PNI… Outside the buildings of Parliament, "we sat down on its steps in our dirty clothes…students started scribbling on the walls "Ministers Throw Money Around," "Destroy the PKI," "Ministers, don't only find out the hard

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[58] Gie, 1966 (1983) *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, [*Annotations of a Demonstrator*] 145-6.

[59] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, *Annotations of a Demonstrator*] 132

[60] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, [*Annotations of a Demonstrator*] 136

[61] Notes Gie, "From [Bank Indonesia they went to Harmoni, in fact, some got a ride from a minister's car…what did the army do? Nothing, it stayed under control." (Gie 1966 [1983] 132-3)

> way."…Indeed a lot of slogans were dirty, but this was the voice of the people. This is what people saw all the time: opportunistic politicians and empty slogans.[62]

Students' fondness for particular ministers like Ruslan Abdulgani demonstrated that students were not particularly disillusioned with *all* ministers or the civil-service (in which the majority of university students sought careers after graduation). Student protests against specific ministers, like Chaerul Saleh for example, or Subandrio, as would occur in the weeks and months ahead in 1966, reflected more strategic decisions to target *specific ministers* appointed by Sukarno.

KAMI had two distinct public identities. One was its attempt to reach the Indonesian public through what Gie (1966) acknowledge was "coarsely scribbled graffiti" which defaced public buildings in Jakarta and Bandung. A second aspect of its identity however was scholarly. KAMI sponsored an early forum of academicians who had been ostracized by Sukarno. What would become known as the KAMI Seminar on the Economy was sponsored by the Economics Department at the Univerrsity of Indonesia. Roger Paget called the conference "a thrilling spectacle."[63] Bresnan (1993) noted it was one of the most heavily anticipated events in Jakarta in 1966. The seminar began on January 10, 1966, accompanied by lively street marches and a student procession that left the University of Indonesia Medical College. The formality of the conference and the stature of invited guests and speakers suggested was described by Paget (1970) as a "was a fitting adjunct to activism in the streets…it functioned as a kind of national hearing, with magisterial overtones."[64]

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[62] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* 1966 (1983) 136.

[63] Paget *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government (1970)* 307

[64] Paget, *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government,* (1970) 308

In contrast to the graffiti campaigns and student marches that involved mainly more youthful cohorts, the KAMI Seminar brought together older dissidents, many of whom were former cabinet ministers[65] as well as 'dissident' intellectuals. Their participation was not so much to criticize Sukarno, but to articulate the need for a new direction in politics and the economy. Speakers returned to older themes of symbolic change with an emphasis on 'renewal' (*pembahuruan*) and the need for a "new state of mind"

The KAMI Seminar on the Economy was organized at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. It brought together for the first time core groups of the "New Order' coalition—the army, trained economists, students and intellectuals who were at the core of the small 'dissident' group in Jakarta during the late Guided democracy period.[66] Noted Paget (1970),

> Far and away the most interesting aspect of the seminar…was the function it played in Indonesian politics. For a number of government officials, the seminar was quite utilitarian in that it provided a traditionally protected platform from which to level criticism at government policies.[67]

As Hal Hill (1995) noted, individuals like Soedjatmoko, who had been presenting his views in private, now had their views publicly endorsed. Such seminars were not only widely attended they were treated as significant events and 'ceremony' during "which political lions once [were] again formally welcomed them to the fold." [68]

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[65] "10 out of 20 invited speakers were Sukarno-appointed Cabinet ministers," Paget (1970).

[66] "Ten out of the twenty speakers were ministers in Soekarno appointed cabinets.' Paget (1970) 305

[67] Paget, *Youth and the Wane of Sukarno's Government*, (1970) 307

[68] Paget (1970) 307

The KAMI seminar marked an emerging triumph of the economic consensus that would become the basis for economic strategizing in the New Order:

> Sponsored by the economics faculty as well as by KAMI, the Seminar attracted a remarkable list of speakers. Interspersed among Indonesia's most prestigious sociologists and economists, such as Professors Widjojo Notosisastro, Selo Soemardjun, Mohammed Sadli, Ali Wardhana, Fuad Hasan and Emil Salim were such major government officials as Generals Suharto and Nasution and Sultan Hamengkubuowono, Adam Malik and Sjarif Thayeb."[69]

Interspersed in between economists' lectures on monetary policy, interest rates and inflation were speeches made by ABRI officers. Noted, Roger Paget, "[ABRI's] sanction of the seminar, in the form of agreement by these officials to attend, is striking evidence of the seriousness with which major political figures regarded the academic community, either as focus of activist students and youth or as a source of expert knowledge."[70]

The army's role in the Seminar was designed to 'support' the 'enthusiasm of students' and to endorse the views of the academics rather than to provide unique analyses of the economic problems (Paget, 1970). TNI General Soetrisno, in attendance on the first day, noted

> The system of higher education teaches knowledge to students who will later use this knowledge as technical expertise. More important than this application, however, are the spirits of young people today—the young student challengers. I am certain, based on what I have seen so far, that students' most important characteristic is that they share the people's spirit of the revolution and continue to struggle in the spirit of the revolution.[71]

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[69] Paget (1970) 305

[70] Paget (1970) 306

[71] Suharto, (1966) *The Leader, the Man and the Gun,* p. 23, "Perguruan Tinggi akan memberkahi para mahasiswa nanti dengan ketrampilan-tehnis; tetapi djauh lebih penting dari sekadar ketrampilan-tehnis; tetapi djauh lebih penting dari sekadar ketrampilan tehnis itu, ialah watak yang akan dimiliki oleh pertjalona sardjana. Saya merasa bangga, bahwa watka yang dimiliki itu adalah watk kerakyatan, watak pedjuang Revolusi. Adalah keyakinan saya, bahwa para mahasiswa nanti akan menjadi sardjana peduang, pedjuang sardjana. Sadarilah terus tanggung-jawab perduangan dan tanggung-jawab Revolusi." (23)

Soetrisno's remarks are telling for how the army regarded students and for the direction in which higher education would be reformed in the first decade of the Suharto era.

Suharto was an invited speaker at the KAMI seminar. He spoke in generalities about students' function as 1) learners and teachers; 2) researchers and 3) public service to the nation in a time of revolution.[72] Hinting at the market reforms and investment opportunities his government would enact in 1967, Suharto exhorted:

> . KAMI is not simply engaged with the effort to establish open markets or to establish academic freedom. No, it is much more than that. The purpose of KAMI is to emphasize the importance of the Revolution at a time of Peoples' Suffering…KAMI demonstrates the sense of purpose our educated youth possess today. University students appear not only to the best of their abilities in control as critics, they also are determined –as their demonstrations show.[73]

Alongside the KAMI seminar, "each subsequent day saw marked escalation of political confrontation," (Paget 1970) The idea for a "long march' from the University of Indonesia in central Jakarta to Senayan, the site of the national parliament[74] was copied by younger students

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[72] See Soeharto (1966); "Dengan seminar ini, merupakan bukti pula bahwa para mahasiswa menjadari benar2 fungsi Perguran Tingginnya: ilala Tridharmabakti: yang berisi pertama, dharma pendidikan dan pengadjaran, kedua dharma research dan ketiga, dharma penabdian kepada Bangsa jang sedang ber revolusi."See *Leader, the Man and the Gun*, (23).

[73] Brig. General Soenarso, "With 10 Youth we transform the World," KAMI Seminar, *The Leader, the Man and the Gun, (1966)* 25-26.

[74] This was a a fifteen kilometer round trip march. The name "Long March" was, writes Paget, "aptly derivative from other "long marches" such as the Siliwangi Long March and, oddly enough, the Chinese march to Yenan" (Paget, p. 315), during which the Communist Party (over a period of almost a year) fought nationalist armies and roving warlord armies in an effort to retreat from Chiang kai-Shek and recruit a new rural base for the CCP.

in Bandung who sought a second "Long March" from Bandung to Jakarta (they were prevented by the military).[75]

In the period following the first ten days in January, 1966, the political context changed dramatically against students. Sukarno had angered students on January 15 by calling for a ban on 'public demonstrations.'[76]

> The KAMI organization throughout Indonesia is from now on forbidden to demonstrate. Students may not congregate in groups of more than five people…those who defy these orders will be ordered shot.[77]

The ban also 'declar[ed] the demonstrations to have been exploited by both imperialists and communists," (Bachtiar, 1969).The prohibitions did little to stop KAMI students from assembling. Noted Gie,

> On Saturday, the 15th of January there were meetings attended by all student leaders from KAMI, GMNI and GMKI. Everyone was talking about the president's plan to ban KAMI…the meeting was in Bogor, [a town south of Jakarta]we went in trucks, leaving campus at about 11: 00AM. On the way things were very lively. The trucks were full of our friends. We sang songs, "Students United, Students as one, Pancasila will be Victorious."[78]

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[75] "Students gathered at UI…in preparation for a 'long March' from Salemba to Senanyan, site of the national parliament. Though it would only be a fifteen kilometer round-trip [march] student/youth leaders regarded it as The next week Bandung students tried to march the 130 km to Jakarta in an attempt 'to better the Jakarta record."

[76] Sukarno's orders followed days of growing student militancy, including the seizure of gas stations in central Jakarta and a trip by students to Bogor in army-convoys. See Gie (1966) Demonstration Notes for descriptions of these events.

[77] Partial text of the radio address given by Sukarno ordering the ban of KAM: reported in Mereka Dari Bandung, p. 178; see also *ITB News*, 3 March 1966.

[78] Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* (1966) 1983.

In response to the calls to ban KAMI ‘masses of students from Jakarta, Bogor and Bandung” converged at the presidential palace in Bogor.[79]

> To the students Sukarno expressed his unhappiness with their activities, saying “I am really sad and I almost cry because you call my Ministers stupid. We have condemned the Communist way and slogans, but now you are using them…and yours are even worse.”[80]

At the first of three meetings between Sukarno and KAMI activists at the presidential palace, Sukarno released figures of the “78,000 people known to have perished in the days after the coup in East and Central Java, Bali and North Sumatra.”[81] KAMI students “assured the president that they never criticized or questioned him, only that they felt that some of his assistants had made serious mistakes. They left promising to pledge their support to Sukarno.[82]. Despite the pledge to support, students’ actions did not match their words. After the first meeting with Sukarno students “went wild, writing on walls, shouting in the streets. We returned to Jakarta in a frenzy.”[83]

Upon their return to Jakarta KAMI students continued to boycott classes and continue protesting, Sukarno marshaled his own youthful resources: contingents of students organized by GMNI-student group began to congregate in Jakarta. In what was interpreted as “direct challenge to Army leaders,” [84] Sukarno call[ed] on students to join a Barisan Sukarno or regimen of

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[79] Students from Jakarta, Bandung and Bogor arrived in a 70-truck convoy...the Cakrabirawa troops, the palace guard…fired shots in the air to prevent students from breaking into the palace. See Bachtiar, (1997) 40-1.

[80] *New York Times,* January 16, 1966.

[81] Bachtiar 1969, 40

[82] Gie, 1966, Bachtiar, 1966, 41

[83] Gie 1966 (1983) *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* 150-1

[84] Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia,* 173.

students who support Sukarno.[85] [Barisan Sukarno] students organized "a rally extolling Sukarno as the Great Leader of the Revolution" on January 19th a rally outside the KAMI headquarters at the University of Indonesia.[86]

Noted Soe hok- Gie, "We heard people were being paid Rp.100 to 'demonstrate' under the banner of the Sukarno Barisan."[87] Outside the University of Indonesia students recalled seeing the first contingents of PNI-pro-Sukarno youth groups, 'they traveled in trucks yelling "live Brother Karno!"[88] The pro-Sukarno faction utilized KAMI repertoires of wall posters "but with a different message, [t]hey declared their unfaltering allegiance to the President, their only effective protector in the struggle for existence."[89]

Sukarno's desire to establish his own loyal youth following modeled on KAMI ultimately did not succeed. Despite "numerous organizations"[90] who pledged to support the Barisan Sukarno, Major General Adjie, the West Java commander did not approve" the development of new groups behind Sukarno:

> [Adjie] issued a statement "All state bodies, citizens, political parties, and mass organizations which are permitted to carry out activities contributing to the defense and implementation of the Indonesian revolution are in fact followers and supporters of Panca Sila and the Teachings of the Great Leader of the Indonesian

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[85] Gie *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* 1966 (1983) 151

[86] Bachtiar (1966) 41

[87] Gie, *Demonstration Notes* (*1*983) 151

[88] *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 185

[89] Bachtiar (1969) 41.

[90] Writes Crouch,"There was no need for the Barisans Sukarno as a formal organization in West Java." *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (1978) 169.

> Revolution, Bung Karno, and therefore *automatically* make up barisans standing behind Bung Karno."[91]

Major General Adjie's refusal to grant Sukarno his own youth 'action fronts' was not without one compromise in Sukarno's favor. While the 'formation and every attempt to form what is called a Barisan Sukarno" was banned by the Army[92], Sukarno succeeded in having the army set up a 'physical action front in West Java" directly under the control of Army leadership.

> Adjie agreed to this. The compromise did not establish independent youth organizations [and would therefore not pose a direct threat to the army] but it also guaranteed that Adjie would permit no serious moves against [Sukarno] in West Java." [93]

Sukarno's ability to wrestle such a compromise was evidence of his ability to thwart off, at least, in late-January any further challenges to his power. It was a mere stopgap however. There was more to come. Sukarno could still rely on his formal power as President for Life/Great Commander of the Revolution and he angered students on January 15 1966, by calling for a ban on 'public demonstrations.'[94]

> The KAMI organization throughout Indonesia is from now on forbidden to demonstrate. Students may not congregate in groups of more than five people…those who defy these orders will be ordered shot.[95]

The ban also 'declar[ed] the demonstrations to have been exploited by both imperialists and communists," marking the first time the Army invoked 'communism' as a strategy used to

[91] Crouch (1978) 169. Italics added for emphasis

[92] "Adjie banned 'the formation and every attempt to form what is called the Barisan Sukarno in any form of organization whatsoever in the [West Java] region' thereby killing the proposal to set up a barisan Sukarno." Crouch (1978) 169).

[93] Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (1978) 169.

[94] Sukarno's orders followed days of growing student militancy, including the seizure of gas stations in central Jakarta and a trip by students to Bogor in army-convoys. See Gie (1966) Demonstration Notes for descriptions of these events.

[95] Partial text of the radio address given by Sukarno ordering the ban of KAM: reported in Mereka Dari Bandung, p. 178; see also *ITB News*, 3 March 1966.

undermine popular protest (Bachtiar, 1966). In the future, protests and organizing would continue be undermined by associating ‘disorder’ with ‘communists’ and continuing communist subversion (Boudreau, 2005). In the context of the January protests, this announcement marked the first time that the army invoked the ‘lingering threat of communism and subversive elements’ with student demonstrations.[96]

Recruitment to KAMI and Identity Dynamics

The student movement by the end of January had expanded beyond its initial organization and participants. To summarize so far, not only had students developed a series of ‘repertoires’ that became affiliated with the KAMI identity, they were also a repertoire used by new groups eager to exploit or continue KAMI’s popularity. Even groups opposed to KAMI utilized the public poster campaigns and wall-scribbling that KAMI “invented.”

KAMI’s activities and reputation began to create incentives for new members who were eager to join the action-front in January 1966. Students traveled to Jakarta to take part in KAMI activities. This finds empirical support for Friedman and McAdam’s (1992) hypothesis that identity in social movements may “function as powerful selective incentives motivating participation.”[97] It also confirms Friedman and McAdam’s 1992 work on ‘why networks work. KAMI’s success was not built ‘from scratch’ but ‘redefine[d] existing roles within established organizations”[98] like HMI.

KAMI Bandung’s Collective Identity and the Construction of the KAMI Pledge

[96] “Jakarta Raya Military Commander Prohibits any Form of Demonstrations,” News and Views, No. 94 (January 19, 1966) and see also *The London Times*, January 18, 1966.

[97] “Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and the Life of a Social Movement,” in Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg, *Frontiers of Social movement Theory*, (1992) 157.

[98] Friedman and McAdam (1992) 162

KAMI's base was in Jakarta where it could rely upon the mobilization of large base of students at the University of Indonesia campus (and where many of the initial PKI "targets" were also located,[99] but it soon opened branches outside Jakarta. Among the first to open was in Bandung, where KAMI made its headquarters at the PMKRI Secretariat offices on Jl. Merdeka, no. 9 on November 1, 1965.[100]

Involved in the formation of KAMI Bandung were students from IKIP (Teachers' Training College), Madjedi Syah, RAF Mully (student at Catholic college), Rohali Sani, Daim R. Rachman (Medical student at UNPAD) and HMI member (and medical student) Ta'lam Tachja.[101] The next day a KAMI branch opened on the ITB campus. Founding members were HMI student Adi Sasono, PMB member Wimar Witoelar, AShwin Effendi Harahap (MAPANCAS) and PMKRI member Lay Moek Yien. Adi Sasono joined the presidium.[102]

For Alberto Melucci (1989) the process of constructing a collective identity is the most central task of a social movement. [103]This is a "negotiated process in which the 'we' involved in collective action is elaborated and given meaning"[104] Mellucci (1989) and Mueller (1997) see these networks as 'cultural laboratories' in that within these networks emerge innovation. The

[99] The University of Indonesia campus in Jakarta was becoming a center for action group meetings, and moves were underway to set up a student action group separate or semi-autonomous from the adult action groups." Paget (1970) 180

[100] Hasryul Mochtar, *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 97

[101] Mochtar, *Mereka dari Bandung*, (1997) 97

[102] Mochtar, *Mereka dari Bandung* (1997) 97

[103] "Collective action is…the product of purposeful orientations developed within a field of opportunities and constraints. Individuals acting collectively construct their action by defining in cognitive terms these possibilities and limits, while at the same time interacting with others in order to organize their common behavior." *Nomads of the Present (1989)* p. 45

[104] Gamson in Morris/McClurg Mueller *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory* (187: 56). *Writes* Melucci, Collective actors continually negotiate and renegotiate each of these dimensions. Leadership patterns and organizational forms represent attempts to give a more durable and predictable order to these negotiations. This point is usually ignored in analyses of collective action." (1989) 27

evolution of identity-dynamics in KAMI Bandung was such a setting. A sense of competition was evident in reading students memoirs about the events. Students at the University of Indonesia were the regarded as the 'first' to respond. While students in Bandung entered the protests a day or two later than their "brothers and sisters" at the University of Indonesia—students at ITB "felt proud" they had nevertheless joined the protests in Jakarta at the true center of events.

There is a history of student pledges used by youth in the nationalist movement, the most well-known instance of this as a method was the 1928 "Oath of Youth" (Sumpah Pemuda) when youth pledged to "one nation, one language and one people."[105] Students consciously revived actions—like pledges—that had been part of the early nationalist groups like Budi Utomo from the 1920s. The writing of the KAMI pledge in Bandung appeared to demonstrate the internal process of negotiation that went on in one of the branches of the KAMI federation.

The KAMI oath was complicated to write, acknowledged its authors at KAMI-Bandung;

> We had many long discussions about the pledge, the first, occurring on January 8, 1966. ITB students could not agree on whether the statement [should be] more "Anti-Sukarno' or 'anti-communism" . After a long discussion we decided to unite under 'anti-communism' but actually there were other negative aspects of politics we could all identify at the time including 'bapakisme—or paternalistic attitudes in politics associated with Sukarno and his ministers;' these did not make as part of the pledge.[106]

[105] Keith Foulcher, "Sumpah Pemuda: The Making and Meaning of a Symbol of Indonesian Nationahood" 2008.

[106] Noted Mochtar (1997) See *Mereka Dari Bandung*, p. 114. Original in Indonesian: "Petisi ini memang panjang dan diskusi pertama untuk membicarakan konsep tersebut berlangsung tanggal 8 Januari 1966….diskusi berjalan lama…penyebabnya adalah Soekarno…ada yang menatakan terlalu keras, ada yang megatakan terlalu kasr, ada yang tiday mau mengatakan bahway Soekarno, biarpun semua yang hadir bersatu dalam soal antikomunisme."

Students' indecision over how to frame their grievances, as grievances against the Communists or against Sukarno demonstrates the following. First, Sukarno continued to wield considerable symbolic power Sukarno continued to wield as a figure of the revolution. To students in Bandung, at ITB, he was also regarded as a fellow student of Engineering and an alumn of their college. Bapakism, however, was a grievance that received some discussion in dissident speech circles.[107]

The KAMI pledge written by students at the Institute of Technology in early January 1966 resonated, in language, with the image of youth in the Oath of Youth. Students identified themselves as the authors of the Oath of Youth did, as "sons and daughters" of the nation, however, they modified this identity to represent a new identity: as university students of Bandung, and as as 'children of the people."[108] Students in Bandung framed their struggle in terms of hopes and aspirations that "the values of the 1945 Constitution and our nation's philosophy of Pancasila" would be restored.[109]

While the authors of the 1927 Oath of Youth emphasized their identity as 'young' and as tied to national identity that was "Indonesian", students in 1966 chose instead to focus on the

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[107] It was regarded by some students, like Soe hok-Gie as a phenomenon that disgusted him.

[108] "We are Bandung students, son s and daughters of Indonesia, children of the people, determined to show responsibility to god, the nation and the revolution, for what is just, right and humane in according to Pancasila principles.["Kami mahasiswa-mahasiswa Bandung, putra-putri Indonesia, anak rakyat, sadar akan tanggung jawab terhadap Tuhan, Tanah Air dan Revolusi sadar akan arti keadilan, kebenaran dan kemanusiawan seperti yang diajarkan oleh falsafah pancasila].

[109] "We are Bandung students, sons and daughters of Indonesia, children of the people. At this moment our nation's fate belongs to our struggle against the efforts, groups and individuals who wish to harm our nation …right now…we must restore the the values of the 1945 Constitution and our nation's philosophy of Pancasila."

"Kami mahasiswa-mahasiswa Bandung, putra-putri Indonesia, anak rakyat melihat bahwa nasib bangsa dan negara Indonesia saat ini dan di masa depan bergantung kepada bergantung kepada perjuangan kita untuk semua bias lepas dari usaha-usaha golongan golongan, organisasi, individu-individu yang sengaja mengarahkan kehidupan bangsa Indonesia…kehidupan politik harus benar-benar diatas landasan Undang-Undang Dasar '45 dan falsafah negara Pancasila.]

factors that distinguished them: their status as university students and as ‘children” of the people (anak rakyat). This was a very different identity than the young who assembled in Sulawesi in 1927 to pledge allegiance to a nation and national language. In the KAMI pledge, students see themselves as not only nationalist and as the bearers of a revolutionary tradition that became part of the student identity in the 1960s. While, students defined their identity in “lineage to” (De Martini 1992) values of an older generation, students also pointed out their identity as “Bandung students”.

The significance of the Bandung students’ pledge must also be seen in efforts by Bandung students to form an organization that ran counter to KAMI. A federation of student-councils called KOMII was formed by the Student Councils and Student Senates on the 24th of November. According to Hasyrul Mochtar, it included Student Senates from 20 campuses in Bandung. KOMII ‘s main tasks were to purge the Student Senates and Councils of CGMI students. [110]

The Expansion of KAMI: High School Students Join the Efforts

As pro-Sukarno youth converged on Jakarta’s streets in late January, KAMI began to expand beyond its original size and composition of college students. By the end of January 1966 the college students were joined by high-school age youths, KAPPI (The United Action Front of Secondary School Students). The entry into activism by a much larger and less disciplined contingent of youth was evidence both a new “script” and more generalized disorder permitted by the Armed Forces (ABRI) on the streets.

[110] *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 101.

By the end of January 1966 KAMI protests were attended by more than simply KAMI-organized groups; about 3,000 high school students formed KAPPI (*Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia*) and 79 instructors from universities in Bandung[111] formed KASI (*Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia*).[112] KASI soon expanded beyond its Bandung ‘contingent’ to include KASI groups at universities across Jakarta consisting mainly of about 100 University of Indonesia Instructors and their graduates.[113]

KAPPI students changed the climate of KAMI protests from demonstrations to more physical confrontations between groups of students.

> KAPPI actually had a greater impact on the general public than the students could realize. The KAPPI leaders were able to mobilize a seemingly limitless number of youngsters for their actions…their activities consciously carried out to support their elder brothers in the universities, provided tremendous impetus for students who became deeply conscious of this visible energetic support.[114]

KASI was the ‘Scholars’ Action Front”. [115] KAPPI students changed the climate of KAMI protests from demonstrations to more physical confrontations between groups of students.

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[111] *Mereka Dari Bandung,* (1997) 160.

[112] KASI members were instructors from ITB, UNPAD, IKIP (the teachers’ training College) and the Catholic University Parahyangan, *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 160.

[113] Bachtiar (1969) 50

[114] Bachtiar, 1969). 51, KAPPI members in Bandung were remembered for ‘their militancy’ and their ‘spirit of struggle.” *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 252.

[115] While KAMI represented enrolled undergraduates, KASI represented individuals who had already graduated and who were teaching at universities. KASI continued to remain active after KAMI had formally ceased.

> their elder brothers in the universities, provided tremendous impetus for students who became deeply conscious of this visible energetic support.[116]

From the end of January through March, a period when KAMI was in fact banned and classes resumed, new battle lines were drawn between groups who had begun with the first organized actions of KAMI protests in January and those who became involved as the movement developed in late January. These groups included KAPPI and KASI. When KAMI students returned to classes for a brief period of about a week in February, KAPPI students 'staged an impressive demonstration in support [of KAMI] at the university of Indonesia."[117]

At times, KAMI protests evolved at times into street confrontations between groups of students—Chinese and Indonesian students fought during protests organized in Jakarta's Kota neighborhood, home to many of the cities ethnic Chinese family-owned shops. [118] Once started the KAMI student movement seemed to gather its own momentum with student groups not only expanding beyond the initial ranks of KAMI students in Jakarta (a mix really of HMI, PMKRI and independent groups at University of Indonesia) to KAMI groups at universities in Bandung.

The student movement by the end of February had expanded beyond its initial organization and participants. To summarize so far, not only had students developed a series of 'repertoires' that became affiliated with the KAMI identity, they were also a repertoire used by

[116] Bachtiar, 1966, p. 51, KAPPI members in Bandung were remembered for 'their militancy' and their 'spirit of struggle." *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 252.

[117] Bactiar (1969) 51, who says that this event became known as the "KAMI-KAPPI" rendezvous."

[118] Gie, "Some students clashed with a Chinese shop keeper when they were charged for a whistle. I ended up paying the shop owner Rp. 5 for the whistle. They couldn't understand what people were getting so worked up about. The shop owner accused the student of being racist."

new groups eager to exploit or continue KAMI's popularity. Even groups opposed to KAMI utilized the public poster campaigns and wall-scribbling that KAMI "invented."

While initial protests in January 1966 had focused on early demands of KAMI called the 'TRITURA" or "Three Peoples' Demands,"[119] KAMI actions after February focused more specifically on Sukarno and his cabinet ministers. Student groups began to also fight each other and battle the palace guards.[120] KAMI students increasingly sought to defend their movement in the context of actions that had occurred in the past: the 'counter-revolutionary' actions of the coup leaders and the PKI that were said to benefiting from the unrest.[121]

From the end of January through March, a period when KAMI was in fact banned and classes resumed. The prohibitions did little to stop KAMI students from assembling. In response to the calls to ban KAMI 'masses of students from Jakarta, Bogor and Bandung" converged at the presidential palace in Bogor.[122]Students in Bandung had left the KAMI headquarters in Jakarta on the 31st of January with the intention to support the KAMI boycotts in Jakarta (Mochtar, 1997). Their plans were interrupted by a series of speeches and radio addresses given by the Minister of Education Syarief Thayeb in early February. In one speech on the 8th of February, Thayeb addressed students at the Christian University and urged them "to return to

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[119] The demands were 1) banning the PKI, 2) lowering prices and 3) changing Sukarno's cabinet. See Douglas, 1970 and Bachtiar, 1966. The inclusion of groups like KASI in late February brought into the KAMI protests an older group of activists who, unlike KAPPI (the high-school student contingent of KAMI) preferred a less direct and spontaneous role for action.

[120] Thugs and gangsters were used to infiltrate the Sukarno Regiments and they were not interested in peaceful protests." Gie 1966 (1983) *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [*Annotations of a Demonstrator*], p. 162.

[121] This was a complaint made by both army leaders and Sukarno—both groups who clearly had different interests in the student-movement's presence on Jakarta streets.

[122] Students from Jakarta, Bandung and Bogor arrived in a 70-truck convoy...the Cakrabirawa troops, the palace guard…fired shots in the air to prevent students from breaking into the palace. See Bachtiar, p. 40-1

classes, demonstration for now is not helping. It can easily be subverted by the 'contra-revolutionary' elements."[123]

Through a radio address on the 11th of February "aimed at Bandung and Jakarta students," Thayeb pointedly noted that 'students actions were disrupting government…and that students were no longer acting responsibly towards the nation, the people or the revolution. For this reason students are urged to return to classes."[124] Students reluctantly returned in both Bandung and Jakarta to classes on the 16th of February, but not before issuing a new pledge that restated students' commitment to KAMI principles, the Pancasila and to the TRITURA, or three peoples's demands.[125]

> KAMI held a long meeting the next day. Lots of people got up to talk. People were scared of getting shot on the streets by the army… Minister Tomo addressed the meeting; said that we should expect results in about a year. Compared to the last twenty years of mismanagement, a year is nothing. Tomo told students, "I am ready to be shot with students if necessary." Despite what Sukarno said, students vowed to continue protesting. [126]

Students reluctantly returned in both Bandung and Jakarta to classes on the 16th of February, but not before issuing a new pledge that restated students' commitment to KAMI principles, the Pancasila and to the TRITURA, or three peoples' demands.[127]

Renewal of Nationalist principles: February 16, 1966 and a return to classes

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[123] Reported in *Mereka Dari Bandung,* 142

[124] *Mereka Dari Bandung*, 143

[125] "See *Mereka Dari Bandung*, 153

[126] Gie, reported in Maxwell (2001) 152.

[127] "See *Mereka Dari Bandung,* p. 153.

Another pledge signed by KAMI students in Bandung committed students to the original three demands of KAMI (to destroy the PKI, to demand a new Cabinet and to lowering prices, (although students added a new component of commitment to 'to economic stability"—that had been absent in the first pledge). In the February 1966 pledge students committed themselves once again to 'the philosophy of the nation and the Pancasila, but also noted the "that they wanted to continue a struggle of commitment to one nation begun by the spark of the Oath of Youth."[128]

The pledge was notable for the way that nationalist sentiment and devotion to the goals of the Indonesian creed, the Pancasila, framed both sets of actors: the university students who wished to remain 'on the streets' and the army, whose instructions to students to stop protesting were framed through appeals to nationalism.

KAMI students' return to classes was mainly celebrated by students active in the growing ranks of the pro-Sukarno demonstrators. These included students from three different organizations, the nationalist "Indonesian Students Movement, GERMINDO" and the Association of Indonesian Students (PMI) and from private universities in Jakarta affiliated with Sukarno, like the Bung Karno University (Bachtiar 1966: 43). Sukarno is said to have

> criticized certain groups of students for coming under the influence of neo-colonialists, colonialists and imperialists. He urged the students to participate in the formation of Sukarno front, 'not for my sake but for the revolution.[129]

[128] "KAMI berikrar akan mendasarkan terus jerjuangan kearah persatuan kesatuan Bangsa Indonesia dengan Apinya "Sumpah Pemuda," See KAMI-BAndung Pledge, "Determination to Resolve" II (Appendix).

[129] Bachtiar, 1967, p. 43.

The call to return to classes brought some immediate calm to Jakarta, however, KAMI students returned to protest within one week following Sukarno's dismissal of General Naustion on February 21, 1966.[130] Nasution, a member of the group of the group of generals who had been targeted for assassination by the coup plotters, had survived the coup[131] and was considered an ally of the KAMI student movement since its formation in October 1965. In response to the dismissal students organized new protests—this time increasingly less disciplined than in the past and involving new levels of violence between army units and the student protestors.[132]

Nasution's dismissal by Sukarno on February 21, 1966[133] marked a new occasion on which to rally against Sukarno. Students held protests outside the presidential palace on February 23,1966[134] when students tried to prevent the first meetings of Suharto's newly announced cabinet.[135]

> Students set out to delay the installation of new ministers; KAMI students block roads and access to the presidential palace by 'flattening the tires of cars and trucks in the surrounding streets. The fourteen new ministers had to be flown by

[130] "Sukarno Removes His Defense Chief," *New York Times*, February 22, 1966. Relations between Sukarno and Nasution had been fractured since prior to the coup, when Sukarno dismissed Nasution in 1962 to be replaced by General Achmad Yani. Following Yani's death on October 1, 1965, Nasution had risen to prominence, in part because he had survived the coup attempt on his life and also because he also had the loyalty of Suharto. To students' ire Subandrio was retained. See "Jakarta Tightens Curb on Protests," *New York Times*, February 27, 1966.

[131] His daughter, Janti, however, did not. While Nasution 'jumped over the garden-wall" escaping the coup-plotters, his daughter was struck by gun-fire; images in Jakarta that followed the coup were not only of dead generals but of Nasution's daughter.

[132] At least two students were killed 'in clashes' with the Cakrabirawa troops at the palace. See Jakarta Tightens Curb on Protests," *New York Times*, February 27, 1966, but also see Bachtiar, 1966 pages 42-43.

[133] Students tried to storm the presidential palace, they were stopped by 'troops" with "bayonets [who] fired warning shots into the air to stop hundreds of students." See "Jakarta Troops Battle Students Backing Nasution, *New York Times*, February 28, 1966.

[134] Jakarta Troops Battle Students Backing Nasution, *New York Times*, February 28, 1966.

[135]Sukarno's Cabminet reshuffling was viewed within the context of the September 30 affair—Sukarno appeared to have 'reshuffled" members like Nasution and his ally Naval Vice Admiral Eddie Martadinata while keeping members who were not as pro-Army such as Air Force Commander Omar Dhani retained his position in the Cabinet, as did Subandrio and Saleh.

> helicopter to the palace where the President duly accepted them into his cabinet.[136]

Following the disruption of the ministerial cabinet, students 'managed to approach the walls of the palace by mingling with crowds of pedestrians, as they neared the palace walls troops of the palace guard rushed forward and fired shots into the air, killing one student. [137] Two days later ceremonies commemorating the death of a medical student at the University of Indonesia[138] and KAMI activist, Arief Hakim, killed by the palace guards in protests on February 23, 1966.[139]

Rallies in the wake of Hakim's death expanded to include not only street marches but also incorporated elements and symbols of recent events and the coup:

> On March 4 about 3,000 members of KAMI gathered at the University of Indonesia to establish a military-like organization to defend their university, their street demonstrations, and all other activities connected with their struggle against the established corrupt political elite…in an emotional charged ceremony, in the presence of the mother of the first student killed, members of KAMI established the "Arief Rahchman Hakim Regiment dividing themselves into seven battalions, each named significantly after one of the first seven military victims of the September 30th attempted coup d'etat.[140]

After several attempts by Sukarno to ban KAMI activities and demonstrations, student protests following Nasution's dismissal sharpened into attacks on Sukarno. Students' incorporation of the

[136] Bachtiar (1967) 43

[137] New York Times, February 28, 1966, see also *Mereka Dari Bandung,* p. 156

[138] *Mereka Dari Bandung*, p. 158

[139] Funeral celebrations for Hakim's death were held in Jakarta, at which student groups from Bandung and members of the Armed Forces, including Sukarno attended and brought wreaths. See ITB News, March 8, 1966; also see Mereka Dari Bandung, pp. 159-160 for descriptions of the event.

[140] Bachtiar, 1967, p. 49; see also "University of Indonsia Closed," *New York Times*, March 4, 1966; The *London Times,* March 3, 1966.

dead generals' names into their 'regiments' demonstrated two things. The first was that protests after January continued to be framed in support of the armed forces's general goals however, they took place against a context that was increasingly framed as specifically anti-Sukarno. Second, increasingly the military sought to expand communications between student groups. They did so through two ways: a) a student radio-station[141] (in fact, the army provided the signal) and b) student broadsheets that became the basis for pro-New Order student newspapers in the period following the transfer of formal authority from Sukarno to Suharto.

Radio Ampera[142]

With the campus of the University of Indonesia closed during the entire first week of March 1966, students were cut off from a key source of communication. The campus had been used a central place by activists to gather and to meet one another. Students responded to this new problem by relying on radio transmitters provided by the army [143](Bachtiar, 1966).[144] Radio "Ampera" got its name from another acronym, "Amanat Penderita Rakyat," or the "Peoples' Suffering. It began as an attempt by students at the University of Indonesia to get access to radio transmission lines after the University Campus was closed. Students at ITB, in sympathy with

[141] "The radio was most important as a means of coordinating student activity and providing students scattered across the city with a continuing bond with the organization… [It also] provided a medium for poems, essays, and even stories written by students." Douglas, 1970, pages 177-178

[142] Ampera was an acronynm for the "Relieve the Peoples' Suffering' (Amanat Penderita Rakyat). Suharto's first cabinet assembled after he assumed power in March 1966 was called the Ampera Cabinet or Kabinet Ampera.

[143] This was not strictly speaking new, the army had provided radio transmitters to students during the 'long-marches' first scheduled in January. What made the February radio transmissions different was that they now broadcast over high-frequency FM lines and not simply between army transmitters.

[144] The army newspaper Angkatan Bersendjata also announced the existence of the newly installed student radio station, providing information as to wave length and broadcasts, Bachtiar noted (p. 50).

the University of Indonesia students began airing their broadcasts from radio transmitters at the ITB campus in Bandung.[145]

The radio Ampera began broadcasting on February 25 1966.[146]

> Its first broadcast began from an antenna rigged out of a car-antenna connected to a transmitter in a house in Central Java near the private residence of Suharto at the residence of [future Minister of Education] Mashuri, where it could not be intercepted by the palace Cakrabirawa guards. My brother and I went every night to provide commentary on the day's news.[147]

Broadcasts began immediately. While the radio allowed students to communicate to one another during stretches when the radio receivers were not working, or subject to interference, student broadcasts provided not only news and information—but solace and encouragement.

Poems were read over the evening broadcasts, like Taufiq Ismail's "Three Children from Salemba.[148]

> Students left their lecture-halls
> High school students ran into the main roads
> Soldiers of righteousness rose to set up the truth
> Again we heard screamed
> Your name, Freedom
> As twenty years ago.[149]

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[145] See Anhar Tusin, in Mereka Dari Bandung, p. 245

[146] *Mereka Dari Bandung,* p. 246

[147] Arief Budiman in Introduction, (1999), *Pergolakan Melawan Kekuasan: Gerakan Mahasiswa Antara Aksi Moral dan Politik [Organizing to Oppose Power: The Student Movement between Moral Action and Politics]* by Arbi Sanit. See page xix of Inntroduction. Original in Indonesian. "Radio Ampera…adalah radio gelap yang dikelola oleh para mahasiswa ITB dari Bandung. Siarannya dilakaan dari sebuah kamar di atas logeng rumah Pak Mashuri SH, di Jalan Agus Salim, Jakarta. Rumah Pak Mashuri letaknya di sebelah rumah Pak Harto…karena itulah, radio ini tidak pernah kena sergap, septerti halnya Radio UI yang disergap pasukan pengawal istana cakrabirawa. Saya bersmaa adik saya Soe Hok-Gie datang setiap malam untuk menyiarkan komentar-komentar politik untuk mendukung gerakan mahasiswa ketika itu."

[148] Soe-Hok Gie, the University of Indonesia KAMI activist and literature major who read poems by the Indonesian poet Taufiq Ismail over the radio, See Mochtar (1997) *They From Bandung, (Mereka Dari Bandung*, p. 246

From February 25, 1966, Radio Ampera began to broadcast 'critiques' of prominent powerful figures including the Ministry of Oil head Ibnu Sutowo.[150] Such broadcasts were evidence of efforts to publicly taunt and humiliate public officials closely affiliated with Sukarno. Similar episodes followed a few days later, with demonstrations outside theForeign Ministry.

Collective identities were not only shaped by the context of the sentiment against Sukarno but by the context of the protests themselves. Soe hok-Gie noted the "contingent of students" who waited to meet with Subandrio, one group "read a prepared statement to Subandrio" while others outside the building yelled "Subandrio is a Dog of Peking." [151] Following the protests, some students were reportedly arrested. Gie's comments reflected a creep of demoralization ; he noted in his diary entry in late January, "We can't hope for a job as a civil servant, we are all black listed now." [152]

In contrast, Bandung students were proud of their 'effigy" Sukarno's Foreign Minister Subandrio, that hung outside the University of Indonesia medical school before being burnt by KAMI students in a symbolic ceremony.[153] Noted KAMI ITB Activist, Muslim Nasution, "We

[149] Taufiq Ismail, "Three Chidlren from Salemba" (1966). Salemba was the name of the street the Medical College of the University of Indonesia faced. Protests began each morning from the UI campus on Salemba Road.

[150] *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997) 245.

[151] Gie (1966) 152.

[152] Gie, *Demonstration Notes*, (1966) 162

[153] Gie *Demonstration Notes*, p. 152 and Mereka Dari Bandung, p. 183. Students from ITB were proud of their effigy of Subandrio with 'its big head and black eyes atop its small body, wearing a jacket and a tie and a cap that said "the Dog of Peking". The statue hung outside the Medical School at the University of Indonesia until it was burnt. See *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 183.

were different from the Jakarta students in the way we struggled. We tried to be creative[154] and to reach out to popular opinion while at the same time extending a sharp critique of the powerful."[155]

Alongside radio stations permitted by the Army were new student newspapers, *Mahasiswa Indonesia* (*Indonesian Student*). [156] While Mahasiswa Indonesia had been started in Bandung by Rahman Tolleng (a student at UNPAD, University Padjajaran), it had a license to publish granted by the Army. Under the army's guidance, it became a tool created by students to communicate the ideals and ethos of the New Order (Aspinall, 1999, Raillon, 1985). [157] The newspapers would play (at first) an important role in spreading New Order ideas and ideology.

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[154] Noted Arief Budiman, "Bandung had their own style of protests—maybe because a large number of students from there were fine-arts students, their protests had a different impact—they could reach people in different ways.' See *Mereka Dari Bandung*, p.1 47. In Indonesian, "Bandung juga mumpunyai kekhasan dalam perjuangan. Cara-cara perjuangnya adalah orisinal dan in adalah manifestasi dari dinamika kreatif yang ada. Mungkin karena adanya para mahasiswa Seni Rupa ITB yang berperan aktif. Kita ingat pawai-pawai alegorisnya dengan ide-idenya yang orisinal."

[155] *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1985) 183.

[156] The newspaper *Mahasiswa Indonesia* had been founded by Rahman Tolleng, an activist who, in his student days had been active with the Socialist Student Movements (Gem Sos) and the local student federation in Bandung, League of Bandung Students where he studied. The founders of *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, were an eclectic mix of students from Catholic backgrounds like Djoko Sudibyo who was active in the group PMKRI (Catholic Student Movement) and Awan Karmawan Burhan, a law student at the Catholic university Parahyangan in Bandung Rahman Tolleng had begun his studies at ITB in Pharmacy (1955--1960) but turned increasingly to an interest in politics and culture in the mid 1960s when he began to study at the state university UNPAD in Bandung. There, he studied sociology. *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1997, p. 296) He was encouraged to start the publication with Alex Rumondor (president of IPMI)—a notable 'anti-communist' who felt that a KAMI publication was necessary. Rumonder and Tolleng decided on the title Mahasiswa Indonesia, Jabar (Raillon, [1985] 35).Francois Raillon "considered the journal 'the journal of the student movement and…is an indispensable reference of the birth of the New Order and Indonesian history from 1966 to 1974.See *Les Etudiantes Indonesiennes*.

[157] "Our first issue marked the beginning of a period of de-Sukarno-izing students and intellectuals in Bandung. Columns like "Indonesia after Sukarno" were regular features from the first issue on. We took apart the 'myths' of the Sukarno years for everybody who read it." Rahman Tolleng, interviewed in *Mereka Dari Bandung*, p. 304; Tolleng told Raillon, " Its first issue was "8 pages and was inscribed with "Pembina Insan Pancasila' {"Promoting Humanity and the Five Principles")—an obligatory references [writes Raillon] to 'the philosophy of national independence)." (Raillon, [1985] 33)

The West Java edition student newspaper, *Mahasiswa Indonesia*[158], devoted every early issue from 1966-1968 to topics on Sukarno-era issues. In a regular column called "What next after Sukarno?" (Zaman Sesudah Sukarno), pointed commentary on Sukarnoist-ideology was routinely dissected.[159] The point of such columns was not to report anything new, but to editorialize specifically around "talking-points" of New Order propaganda,[160] and to portray the Guided Democracy era as "a particularly dark" period in national[161]

Two New-Order student newspapers, the *Harian Kami* and *Mahasiswa Indonesia*[162] were initiated during the January protests in 1966.[163] Like the Radio Ampera they operated with specific license from Army authorities and were initiated largely to aid coordination and communication in the student movement. While Mahasiswa Indonesia was considered to represent "the diversity of the student movement in Bandung," and the pait at first, largely represented a pro-New Order sentiment [164]

Noted Tolleng, "our first issue was to declare TRITURA, [The Three Peoples' Demands], the slogan widely associated with the KAMI student movement.[165] (See *Mereka from*

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[158] *Mahasiswa Indonesia's* staff of contributing writers and regularly featured columnists originated from the ranks of the KAMI and KASI-affiliates.

[159] See for example, Sumarna's essay on the 6th of October, 1968 on a discussion of the meaning of NASAKOM.

[160] To point out the illogic of NASAKOM (Sukarno's amalgamation of the Indonesian identity as rooted in Nationalism, Religion and Communism).

[161] Sumarna, "Zaman Sesuda Sukarno, *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, September 29, 1968. history ("zaman Sukarno telah menjadi bagian dalam sedjarah kehidupan jang paling gelap")

[162] *Mahasiswa Indonesia* began publishing in 1966.

[163] Nono Makarim, founder of *Harian Kami*, quoted in Janet Steele (2005) *Wars Within*

[164] Raillon, (1985) 106.

[165] *Mereka Dari Bandung*, (1997) 300.

Bandung, p. 300). The student newspaper *Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Indonesian Student) reinforced the idea that that the new order was both 'new' and committed to 'modernization' and 'development. It regularly featured serialized articles such as "De-Sukarnoization: Finally Ending the Cult of the Individual," (six-part series, beginning in July 1966) and "Era after Sukarno' (another six-part series that ran in September and October of 1968). Early columns in 1966 negatively characterized Sukarno's leadership as a 'dictator' and Sukarno-era ideologies, like NASAKOM.[166]

> The Sukarno years are a particularly dark period of our history. They will be remembered as years of extreme hardship and suffering. The generation of '66 emerged and brought new hopes to the nation, with the people, we fought against injustice and lies. The days of Sukarno were numbered. We do not wish to return to such an era…One tyrant has been enough.[167]

These articles reflected a particular aspect of the identity of the generation of '66 that hated "the arbitrary, undemocratic, unregulated and dictatorial rule of the Sukarno era, the cult of the individual which surrounded Sukarno" (Aspinall 1999).[168]

In strong contrast to the Guided Democracy era, Rachmat noted that the "New Order "plans to get rid of corruption, abuse of, authority, the abuse of power, a lack of planning and opportunism…the New Order will lead with faith and strength of character."[169]

> Character or strength of faith [*iman*] in politics is a responsible form of politics…we have seen what happens when politics is characterized by corruption, by abuse of power, the cult of the individual, lack of planning and

[166] *Mahasiwa Indonesia* (October 6, 1968) 5

[167] "Zaman Sesudah Sukarno," *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, (Septmber 29, 1968) 5.

[168] Aspinall, "Student Dissent in the 1980s (1991) 3

[169] "Character and Political Structure" ["Karakter dan Struktur Politik,"] *Mahasiswa Indonesia* (20 April 1969) 3

> rationality….the "old order' had only negative characteristics…it was built on a lack of morality and on plenty of lies.[170]

The emergence of student dissent at ITB, once the center of the New Order is a central issue to be explained by this chapter.

Students were early supporters of the regime's developmentalist ideology. Alongside articles in student newspapers like *Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Indonesian Student) that praised the new order's identity as a decisive break with the "old order", were articles that articulated a justification for the regime's goals of modernization and 'development'. The appearance in serialized form of Gunnar Myrdal's 'the Development of Backward Economies,' began in 1969.[171] In the same issue, ITB columnist Aldy Anwar (a student in Technical Engineering) introduced a new column on youth and 'development'.[172]

The newspaper had powerful supporters among the armed forces and had received its licenses to publish from KOPKAMTIB.[173] *Mahasiswa Indonesia* also provided prominent coverage of the Army seminars that had begun forming at the end of August 1966 at the Army Staff Training College in Bandung,[174] it also featured interviews with army commanders along with pictures of smiling commanders and the staff of *Mahasiswa Indonesia*.[175]

The Emerging Components of the Post-KAMI Collective Identity

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[170] Character and Political Structure" ["Karakter dan Struktur Politik," *] Mahasiswa Indonesia*, (20 April 1969) 3.

[171] *Mahasiswa Indonesia (*February 2, 1969) 3

[172] *Mahasiswa Indonesia* 27 October 1968.

[173] "We got our first permit from Major General Dharsono (Siliwangi Division) Kasdam" and we published under the KAMI name, noted Tolleng in *Mereka Dari Bandung*, p. 300.; Raillon confirms this information; *(Les Etudiantes Indonesiennes*, p. 36).

[174] *Mahasiswa Indonesia* 11 August, 1966.

[175] See "Djenderal Ton," in *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, October 1968.

Activism after KAMI was not defined by any single issue. In 1966, it was clear, there was one single issue: anti-communism. At the 1968 "Intermediate Leadership Training Course" held by the Jakarta Students Association (IMADA) in West Java from 25-38 January, 1968, one of the main speakers at this event had been Soelaeman Soemardi, a prominent PSI-intellectual from the Guided Democracy era.[176]" Soemardi concluded his remarks by calling on students to form an "independent force to act as a vehicle of modernization." [177]

Throughout the late 1960s, a process of separation from the KAMI values and orientations could be seen in the pages of *Mahasiswa Indonesia.* In this way, the function of the student newspaper also changed. No longer did it only report New Order ideology. It began to reprint for a wider reading audience, discussions and lectures presented at student-study-clubs and discussion groups. In the process, the newspaper contributed to circulating dissident activities of the student movement.

In the New Order the student movement was far less organized as during the KAMI period (Boudreau 2005). Public actions by students did not stray far from already established KAMI repertoires. For example, Bandung students who had been active in KAMI issued a third pledge on June 6, 1966.[178] This pledge expressed concerned for the political process and

[176] Soemardi returned to older, reliable PSI rhetoric. In his talk he urged students to act as "agents of modernization". He referenced older, PSI-influenced ideas, cited by Raillon (1986) that compared "progressive forces" to those "who seek modernization, a widening of opportunities for members of a society to more freely decide what is the best way to organize themselves without being merely bound by tradition. Soelaeman Soemardi, "The need for a Progressive, Independent Force," from the manuscript "Political Restructuring" presented at the IMADA Workshop; reprinted in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003) 64-65

[177] Soemardi emphasized, "to pioneer the modernization process there is a need for a new force unencumbered by the current political constellation. It needs to be independent in the sense that t it is able to stand outside and above contemporary political affiliation." Bourchier and Hadiz (2003) 64-65.

[178] Copies of the signed pledge were sent to the President, members of the MPRS, the cabinet, members of the press and political parties. The pledge was read in public on the evening of June 6, 1966. by a student from the Bandung Teachers' Training College and attended by representatives from Unpad, IKIP and ITB. KAMI representative Seogeng Sarjadi read the following statement at the event "today, people in Jakarta commemorate the

expressed sentiments that “democratization” was possible within the framework of the 1945 Constitution.[179] Students, however, continued to acknowledge sentiments widely believed by the New Order generals. There was concern expressed for “the forces who wished to break up the unity of 1966” and “the economic difficulties that have not been solved,” as well as the “guerilla tactics of the PKI.”[180] Nonetheless, an early recognition of the new regime’s power is palatable.

Students pledged to “represent the peoples’ will as long as there is Guided Democracy and Dictatorship” and hoped the president would “followed a democratic path in all public matters.”[181] The pledge hinted at a watchdog role for the student movement:

> We hereby swear that we will not move from our struggle as long as government continues to sacrifice the people, sacrifice justice, the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila. If the MPRS, the president, political parties and others don’t agree, we will not be shy in exposing you. This is why we send you this letter.[182]

Students expressed concern of the composition of the hastily assembled cabinet “containing as it does, irresponsible ministers appointed by Sukarno.” Students would find that opportunities for mobilization were sharply curtailed in the New Order. KAMI newspapers, however, remained licensed to print. [183]

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founding of this city. Before, the streets of Jakarta had provided the backdrop for the revolution of independence. Today, Jakarta’s streets remain at the forefront of another revolution: the truggle for the peoples’ suffering and to restore the 1945 Constitution.” See *Mereka Dari Bandung* (1991) 276.

[179] KAMI Pledge III, June 3, 1966 (See appendix for translated version). Source: Hasyrul Mochtar, *Mereka Dari Bandung*.

[180] KAMI Pledge III, June 3, 1966

[181] KAMI Pledge III, June 3, 1966

[182] KAMI Pledge III, June 3, 1966

[183] Rahman Tolleng, Editor, Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Student) interviewed in *Mereka Dari Bandung.(*1996)

As the military regime consolidated in the early days of March1966, a change in the character of the student movement was also underway. New less-formally aligned groups came to power, claiming not only to be above politics but to represent a new force in politics of 'moral power'. These groups represented the new face of the student movement in Indonesian politics—the secular and independent student groups, like the Student Councils and independent activists—who would play a bigger role in politics than they had in the 1950s and early 1960s. To the components of students' collective identity in the first decade of the Suharto years (1966-1978) I turn in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

Intellectual Identity and Problem solving: The Narratives of Student Activism in the 1970s

Introduction

A sense of apathy and disillusionment characterized the student movement (or what existed of it) in the post-1966 period. New restrictions on assembly off campus made techniques of mass-action difficult and dangerous. Students had once enjoyed freedom to deface public buildings and occupy the streets during the January, 1966 protests. By late 1966, the ability to march or congregate in public was severely curtailed. In this environment, free spaces on campus study clubs and discussion-groups became the "safe havens" (Fantasia and Hirsch 1999) for student activism. From there, study, scholarly-inquiry and intellectual activity became new activist techniques. Against this backdrop of political repression, apathy and withdrawal, campus leaders framed activist efforts in terms of problem solving.[1]

Students turned familiar techniques of study and intellectual inquiry into a form of social protest: *scholarly inquiry, analysis and problem-solving constituted new modes of activism and criticism of the regime*. Students attended conferences, wrote research papers, studied the effects of New Order policies and circulated 'White Papers' demanding corrections and reform. Two different narratives served as the backdrop to student activism in the 1970s. The first was a narrative of global student unrest. The second was a narrative of the student movement in Indonesia and the legacy of the anti-Communist student movement, KAMI (United Action Front of Indonesian Students). Student leaders like Heri Akmadi (ITB, 1977) appeared to work hard to overcome apathy and disinterest. Groups like the United Front against Corruption modeled

[1] As Poletta has observed, narratives may serve to encourage and inspire activists through tough times. *It Was Like a Fever,* 2006

themselves on the idea that students could recall “a time [when] universities would lead the way.”[2]

Student leaders clearly struggled to maintain a political purpose that had once made students politically relevant. In the first decade of military rule, students struggled to find agreement on central grievances and issues. An early pre-occupation was with the KAMI student movement was particularly strong and some of the first study-groups would be organized around the topic of the student movement after KAMI.

By the late 1970s, the student movement would be shaped by a more populist rhetoric. In the 1960s, students had resisted Sukarno’s ideology of nationalism for values of rationality, scientific knowledge and technical expertise (Raillon 1985). By the mid-1970s, students would be increasingly skeptical of technocratic solutions. The prestige of this rhetoric had been tied to the anti-communist movement of the 1960 and to the new role the Army had acquired in politics following 1966. Not until the mid-1970s was this discourse challenged by students who began to push for genuinely populist solutions to economic policy problems.

Research on the 1970s student movements has generally assumed students’ agency was very limited. Given the absolute constraints that existed on political organizations ability to function, the restrictions on assembly and the pretext that anti-communism justified relentless controls on activism of any kind meant that, in practice, there was little room to oppose. The oppositional identities assumed by students, as I shall show, served to give students greater agency than is generally assumed.

[2] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, 29 November, 1970

The role of young Indonesian intellectuals in the 1970s has been understood as evidence of an emerging youth "culture of criticism" (Emmerson 1987). While criticism itself was not exactly new, the justification for it and students' embrace of intellectual techniques to articulate criticism was new to the 1970s. While students' support for the Armed Forces in 1966 meant that students enjoyed a unique position to criticize the regime (Aspinall 2005) a combination of limited political opportunities and students' identities shaped their preferences to initiate intellectual strategies of action.

The adoption of a new justification for student activism called "moral force power". Moral force meant that students sought only to speak their minds, to inform policy-makers of problems and injustices and then, as in the manner of classical Javanese mythology, retreat (Budiman 1978). Moral force power permitted an active and critical role for youth that made repression of their behavior difficult. The thinking behind moral power was fairly straightforward: students did not seek political power.[3] While moral power justified an active role for students in the New Order, it did so in a way that only made sense within the cultural and political context of Indonesian politics in the 1970s.[4]

Students faced two kinds of obstacles after 1966: 1) a general monitoring of any kind of mass organization as well as 2) restrictions on free speech in public, except on campus. The regime continued to uphold restrictions on protest and mass-organizations as part of its efforts to 'restore security' and to remain 'vigilant' against the possible return of the Indonesian

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[3] Only in the context of the military regime, the New Order, which had eliminated its political opponent, the PKI, did the particular reasoning of moral power make sense.

[4] Boudreau (2005) argued that students' claims of moral power essentially undercut the power of the student movement. Moral power, observed Boudreau in *Resisting Dictatorship* ultimately fit "too conveniently" with the regime's own desire to neutralize all forms of political opposition, including that of the student movement.

Communist Party (PKI).[5] This, of course, remained highly unlikely since at least 500,000 members of the party's base, and *all* of its leaders had been killed in November 1965. In 1966, party members continued to be purged from the bureaucracy, the armed forces and air force (Crouch 1978). There was nonetheless a serious attempt through the military's "Command to Restore Security and Order" (KOPKAMTIB) and through state intelligence bodies, like BAKIN, to maintain close watch over the formation of organizations of any kind in the post-1966 era (Boudreau 2005).

The emergence of 'problem-solving' activism in the early to mid-1970s was one way students could express their opposition to reforms in a context where "opposition" was viewed as obstructing 'stability, order" and therefore, 'development." Through techniques familiar to students—doing research, writing papers, collecting data, field work students throughout the 1970s (but really after new restrictions passed after 1974) began to combine their knowledge with specific problems (rural development, education reform advocacy on behalf of landless farmers, urban workers, 'traditional' craftsmen and vendors).

The Student Councils

Compared to the landscape of the 1960s where political parties aggressively recruited students, the campus in the New Order was a more sterile environment. While groups like GMNI and HMI continued to exist and recruit student members, the emerging leaders on campus were the

[5] "The army's pre-1965 rival, the PKI, had lost most of its leadership and at least half a million cadres and supporters during the post-coup massacres and arrests…Although outwardly cowed into submission after experiencing the post-coup terror, many former PKI supporters could be drawn back into an underground party if the army relaxed its repression and new Communist leadership emerged." (Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* 2007 (1978) 220.

elected representatives of the student-body on each campus: the Student Councils and Senates.[6] The Student Councils were under the supervision of the Ministry of Education although each operated under some autonomy on campus. The Student Councils did have one advantage which was their national network of chairs who could mobilize segments on campuses. Minister of Education, Emil Salim (1954) also noticed that students active in the Student Councils tended to have close ties with faculty members on campus. [7]

Student Councils also had legitimacy on campus. Student Councils had tried to improve student life. In Bandung, the Student Council lobbied for a branch of a local bank to be built on campus for students and for canteens on campus. In Jakarta, the student council undertook surveys of students in Jakarta.[8] The appeal of the Student Councils was in their appearance of autonomy and lack of "vested interests." The same could not be said about KAMI. By the early 1970s, many former KAMI activists had entered government careers or become active in the new "Functional Group" GOLKAR. [9] The trajectory of KAMI activists was highly individual.

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[6] The Student Councils were a product of reforms passed after independence by the newly-created (in 1947) Ministry of Education, Culture and Instruction. Medical students had lobbied for a system of student councils 'to discuss the possibility of establishing a general student union for coordinating student activities and for representing the student body (resembling a structure that existed on many "Anglo-American universities"). The desire to create student councils had taken place in the 1950s out of desire to create 'indigenous' student organizations to combat the culture of "Dutch" social clubs and 'corpora" (corporate bodies). Augusdin Aminoedin, "Student Organizations in Indonesia," A paper written (in English) by the then President of the PPMI (National Union of Indonesian students), No date is given.

[7] Emil Salim's report, *Report of the Students' Council of the University of Indonesia on the living conditions of students in Jakarta*, December 1954.. Salim (Minister of Education, Culture and Instruction) noted the remarks of a Professor Stevens, professor at the Technical Faculty in Bandung who was quoted as saying there was " too strong a tie between students and their professors." Stevens' argued he felt such ties were "harmful to the students themselves since it hampers them to think independently, which is required for scientific work.." See Salim's Report.

[8] Emil Salim's report, *Report of the Students' Council of the University of Indonesia on the living conditions of students in Jakarta*, December 1954.

[9] There were exceptions. These included ITB students Wimar Witoelar and Syarief Tando who were active in the Student-Councils and who had not yet graduated in 1968. At the Universityof Indonesia, Arief Budiman, his brother Soe Hok-Gie, had both been active during the January 1966 protests.

Some shifted from anti-Communist activism to professional careers or post-graduate study,[10] others remained active. Soe hok-Gie's brother, Arief Budiman, for instance, remained active throughout the mid-1970s in dissidence life and as a prominent figure in the community of student movement organizations in Jakarta and Bandung. Others at ITB who were active as KAMI activists, including Wimar Witoelar, Syarief Tando, Rahman Tolleng remained central figures in the student-press emerging on campus.[11]

The Narratives of Student Activism: KAMI three years after: Apathy, Weakness and Despair as Themes of Activism

From evidence of study-club meeting reported in the student newspapers,[12] one can document a general sense of student withdrawal from KAMI. Some students voiced mild criticism of the organization and of those who had left the organization to become active in the New Order government, as advisors and administrators in the new state bureaucracies like BULOG (Muslimin Nasution, for example, from ITB) or as founding members of the new political party, Golkar (Mar'ie Muhammad, University of Indonesia).

This column provided some insight on the drift of KAMI from its origins as protest movement to a fragmented community of committed and formerly committed activists. in an

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[10] KAMI-ITB student Muslim Nasution, a student of Mechanical Engineering, graduated and accepted employment at BULOG, the Bureau for Logistics, a branch of the New Order that was invested in, among other things, agricultural development. KAMI-ITB student Abu Rizal Bakrie graduated but left Indonesia to pursue graduate studies in West Germany. He would eventually form an investment group known as the Bakrie Group. Source: *Mereka Dari Bandung, [They from Bandung*].

[11] Some KAMI-Alum went on to be active in their own study-groups like the one called "Diskusi Kita" or "Our Discussion", which Raillon called an "off spring of the '66 generation of students, including Harian Kami founder Nono Makarim, Marisllam Simandjuntak, Mar'ie Muhasmmad, Cosmas Batubara and David Napitupulu formed "Diskusi Kita" ("Our Discussion")

[12] A regular feature in the student newspaper, "What, Why, How: KAMI" ("Apa, Mengapa, Bagaimana KAMI") provided biographical sketches and brief interviews (summarized in the text) as part of each weekly issue provided the basis for my analysis.

article commemorating the movement's third anniversary of the 1966, Goenawan Mohamad, a student of literature, likened KAMI to an "old man…a veteran that must find a way to stay relevant."[13] The column acknowledged that most readers [of *Mahasiswa Indonesia*] were no doubt familiar with KAMI, but that perhaps they were less familiar with the processes of apathy (*kelemahan*) and disintegration of the movement," the introduction to the column noted in the issue of the February 2, 1969. [14] A week before, Soe hok-Gie, an early supporter of KAMI had noted (in the same column) that

> The longer KAMI goes on, the less relevance it has to the student-movement...KAMI was like [Shane] the cowboy who suddenly appeared on the horizon,[15] to cities that were in the middle of upheaval and strife…This is no longer the case. KAMI had become a vehicle of the elite. KAMI no longer has democratic credentials. It is has abandoned trying to find issues common to us all. I'll provide an example: KAMI is no longer brave to expose corruption. It is now the corruptor.[16]

Goenawan Mohammad and Soe hok-Gie represent two individual points of view that were influential in the student community. Both had been active in the student circles of movement-communities at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. Both studied in the literature program. Their views demonstrated that KAMI had lost its youth and innocence. Gie was more

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[13] Gunawan Mohammad, *Pedoman,* 13 January, 1969.

[14] "Bagaikan usaha meneggekan benang basah, masih bankyak orang jang berusauh untuk mempertahankan eksistensi KAMI sekalipun mereka sendiri sama megakui kelamahan jang ada dalam tubuh KAMI." *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 2 February, 1969.

[15] A favorite analogy of this time reflected student's love of foreign movies, in particular, Shane, starring Alan Ladd. References comparing Shane to the student movement are still heard from individuals active in or who were once active in the student movement. See for example, Arief Budiman's article on the student movement (*Asian Survey*, 1974) where he compares the Javanese concept of the "hermit" (the resi) to Shane. In Javanese mythology, Budiman argued, the resi stayed cloistered in the mountains, only coming down during periods of strife to demand redress of the situation. Budiman's attempt to situate the student movement in Javanese mythology drew on themes thatwere explored by his brother, Soe hok-Gie.

[16] Soe hok-Gie, "Apa,Mengapa, Bagaimana KAMI," ["What, Why, How KAMI,"] *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 12 January, 1969.

direct in his criticism of the new regime. He warned students to “be careful” and against “sell[ing] out.”[17]

The low confidence in KAMI was evident in other ways. By 1969, two main groups that had once served as its base in 1966, SOMAL and PMKRI, had stepped down from its presidium in 1969.[18] “On campus,” the article declared, “KAMI was already dead.”[19] If KAMI was dead as an organization that had significant meaning to students, what had replaced KAMI? Declaring KAMI “dead” and the partnership between students and the army, at least in theory, “irrelevant” was one way students in movement communities declared their withdrawal from sentiments sanctioned by the New Order.

A new theme of the student movement, explored in student newspapers, was to reminisce about 1966 in ways that set up specific comparisons with developments since KAMI. Occasions to remember 1966 also appeared to mark the events of many study clubs and groups in January, 1971, as I have discussed above.[20] The 10th of January loomed as a central identifier of the student-movement:

> Since ’66 every New Year we question the goals of Indonesia’s young. Well the 10th of January is this day we remember the time of Tritura which occurred under Sukarno. We don’t want to celebrate the date as a monument; we want to use the date to inventory what the student movement is doing now.”[21]

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[17] *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 29 November, 1970. Comment made by Zufluki Lubis.

[18] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, 2 February, 1969.

[19] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, February 2, 1969.

[20] The January 10, 1971 *Mahassiswa Indonesia* Issue commemorated the day with reporting on student activism from the year just passed (1970). Article noted the significance of January in the history of the student movement.

[21] *Mshasiswa Indonesia*, 1971, January 15.

Three years after KAMI's formation, students used the occasion of the 10th of January to document an increasingly active student movement community. In 1970, the Mahasiswa Indonesia newspaper used the date to document activities from 1969-1970 in a special feature titled "Generasi Muda jang Gelisah" (The Restless Youth). What follows is based on evidence gathered from that issue.

Early student activism in the post-KAMI era lacked a single focus and direction. A range of activities was inventoried by the newspaper's editors. Some entries focused on local youth groups once active in the KAMI days. For example, the article noted contingents of KAPPI-affiliated students who were active as GERAK (Gerakan Anti-Communis, or Anti-Communist Movement) held protests outside the headquarters of KAPPI Djaya (in Jakarta) on the 19th of September, 1968.[22]

New forms of activism were documented by the student newspaper. One article noted a new group called Mahasiswa Menggaguat, or "Students Oppose" formed in Jakarta on January 15, 1970. [23] Students Oppose ("Mahasiswa Menggaguat) intended to pressure on the government to speed up an investigation it was currently heading into corruption, called the Commission of Four. [24] Mahasiswa Menggaguat seemed typical of the efforts of students in the post-KAMI era. Dissidence was built around social networks of activists, student groups and pre-existing movement communities. The article also noted that KAPPI- Java supported their demonstrations

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[22] Generasi Muda Jang Gelisah" ("Restless Youth"), *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, 10 January, 1969.

[23] They formed "in response to the government's call to increase the price of kerosene in January," and began to build momentum for more public campaigns. They would lead one of the first calls for demonstrations outside Bappenas (National Planning Board) and Office of the Attorney General. Some students active in Mahasiswa Menggaguat included a young student in economics at the University of Indonesia, Sjahrir, as well as some activists who had been active in 1966 and earlier, like Arief Budiman, Victor and Julius Usman.

[24] *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 1969.

with posters to protest the high price of kerosene. Students affiliated with the group in Bandung went to the office of the Governor to protest the corruption in the region and to improve services at school.[25]

Also documented in the pages of Mahasiswa Indonesia was a protest action initiated by students in Bandung wrote a Petition for Justice, a statement signed by students in the KAPI group in Bandung. The petition expressed students' "mistrust' of government and called on government to be more socially responsible. This included, as some student groups demanded, in Jogja and Jakarta, "calls for a government-imposed ban on massage parlors and gambling dens in support of more 'socially responsible' development."[26]

The same feature documented events held on June, 1970, when a new student committee "designed to express student impatience with on-going corruption investigations" was formed at the University of Indonesia in June, 1970.[27] Calling itself, "The Anti-Corruption Committee" (KAK, Komite anti-Korupsi) its Activities carry over into July and spread into Bandung ("Bandung Bergerak" BB) and Jogja as well; students in these cities issue a "Manifesto against Corruption" and form the "Anti-Corruption Front," (FAK); ideas spread to Malang, Medan, Makassar, Bogor, Semarang.[28]In Jakarta, KAK was supported by the poet W.S. Rendra KAK relied, in fact, on some repertoires popularized in the KAMI period. [29]

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[25] *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 1969

[26] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, January 21, 1970. The KAPI-Bandung petition did not name any one specific in their petition and they stopped short of calling for investigations or resignations. Such calls would eventually come, but not until repression had been more forcefully implemented against students in the late 1970s.

[27] *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* June, 1970.

[28] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, June 1970. A month later, on July 6, 1970, students "expressed their irritation with waiting for results from the Commission of 4 to release its report, A month later, two student groups issue a public statement "We are no longer Patient!" from two student groups "MM" and "Aksi Peladjar 70"; HMI joins in, going to Parliament once more to demand the report be publicized. *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, July 6, 1970.

Ultimately, the government's investigation amounted to little. The Commission's work was suspended. Individuals affiliated with KAK (Anti-Corruption Committee) and BB (such as Arief Budiman) become 'hardened' against the regime and began to admit [reform is] 'difficult.'[30] At the same time Mahasiswa Indonesia documented more direct forms of action. For example, it documented the visit by student leaders active in the Muslim Student Association HMI Djaya (West Java) to the National parliament to demand the results of the Commission be released. The Catholic student group, PMKRI lent their support to this action.[31] Finally, to commemorate national celebrations of independence, on August 15 1970, students at the University of Indonesia sponsored a discussion on "Development and Corruption."[32]

The evidence amassed from the Mahasiswa Indonesia report documenting activism in 1970 demonstrated the inventive ways that students demonstrated their opposition. Opposition was not blatantly anti-regime or anti-Suharto. Instead, it functioned, students would believe as "pressure on the government"[33] Students defined their sentiments in terms of values that were "anti-regime" in that they embraced 1) anti-corruption, 2) justice and transparency from political officials and 3) greater transparency in the political process and 4) accountability. While students

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[29] Organized marches (*aksi-jalan*) in which students walked to outside residence of Jakarta governor Ali Sadikin; or down Jakarta's busiest thoroughfare, Jl. Thamrin to the Supreme Court (Kejaksaan Agung). KAK also requested meeting with Suharto at his residence on Jl. Cendana in Menteng. In Bandung, the group Bandung Bergerak, relies on a 'picket-line' filled with students holding up anti-corruption posters; write an open letter to Suharto and picket outside the regional parliament (DPRGR). *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, January 1971.

[30] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, January 1971.

[31] *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* July, 1970. From the special edition commemorating 1970 as a year of student "restlessness".

[32] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, July, 1970. The day was commemorated by a variety of papers presented on the topic alongside small group discussions.

[33] Tahi Simbolon was quoted as saying,"regardless of their orientation—anti-democratic, totalitaria, what matters is that we remain united and keep pressure on the government." See the article in *Mahasiswa Indonesia* reporting on the event.

occasionally engaged in forms of direct action, these actions involved petitions, pleas, visits to members of parliament or requests to meet with parliamentarians or the president. When students were gathered en masse, their actions tended to be more 'study-group'-oriented, with emphasis on discussion and academic-conferences at which scholars presented papers.

Expanding Definition of Self: New Boundaries, from Local to National Frames of Action

The documentation of these activities provides a glimpse into an expanding definition of self that characterized the student groups, individuals and movement communities who comprised the student movement of the early 1970s. As part of this expanding definition of self included the adoption of new frames of action—from localized but nationalized frames (like visits to parliament) to more internationally-located frames of reference.

In mid-May, 1970 student groups in Jakarta (IMK—Ikatan Mahasiswa Kebayoran); GMD (Gerakan Mahasiswa Djakarta and IMADA (Ikatan Mahasiswa Djakarta went to American Embassy for a protest in sympathy with American anti-war student protestors. Students met with Galbraith, then Ambassador to Indonesia to express their solidarity with American students.[34] The same week of May 19, 1970, medical students refused to attend classes over long-standing grievances at the University of Indonesia over improving student facilities.

Students at University of Indonesia in Jakarta were joined by Bandung students at the state-university UNPAD (University Padjajaran), when students in the economics department joined the Medical student strike in solidarity.[35] Increasing willingness to use such tactics was likely encouraged by the remarks given at the June 14, 1970 "Study Group of Indonesian

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[34] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, May 1970

[35] *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, January 10, 1971

Students, SOMAL" takes place in Bandung when Wiratmo Soekito, an older activist, University of Indonesia Faculty member and founder of the Radio Republic Indonesia addressed students on the American anti-war movement, the French student movement, the shootings at Kent State and the Czech dissident movement.[36]

The article also documented a symbolic sympathy strike with American anti-war students held in front of the American Embassy on the 19th of May, 1969.[37] Attended by students from Bandung, Jakarta the article mentions that the symbolic protest was followed by a brief meeting with the US Ambassador, John K.Galbraith. A follow-up news story a month later included the transcript of a lecture on the American Anti-War student movement by University of Indonesia (and Sukarno-era dissident) professor, Wiratmo Soekito, who described the student movement in the United States.[38]

The article summarized the Tet Offensive and discussed the development of consciousness of participatory democracy (with no Indonesian translation given) among American anti-war students. It made comparisons with the Czech student movement ("mahasiswa Tjekoslovwakia") and the French student movement ("mahasiswa Perancis,") and referenced for readers Herbert Marcuse as the "father of the new left" ("bapak kiri baru,").[39] Soekito's talk suggested ties between students in Indonesia and student movements elsewhere. Through the information conveyed by Soekito's talk, students got a sense of collective solidarity

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[36] Soekito's address is reprinted in *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, June 21, 1970 edition.

[37] Demonstrasi Kedubes AS, in special feature "Generasi Muda Jang Gelisah" ("Restless Youth"), *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 10 January, 1969.

[38] "Gerakan Mahasiswa Anti-Perang AS" ("American Anti-War Movement"). *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 21 June, 1970.

[39] Gerakan Mahasiswa Anti-Perang AS" ("American Anti-War Movement"). *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, 21 June, 1970.

with movements that were happening outside their home country. Reading the transcript of Soekito's talk reprinted in *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, seeing pictures of the French student-movement and the Indonesian protest outside the American embassy, Indonesian students could imagine their struggle against tyranny as part of a global struggle.

Documentation of International Dissident Activities

Increasingly, articles in *Mahasiswa Indonesia* provided evidence of student's broadening identity from one that was once framed by political currents on Java to one with more global dimensions. An international dissident community of student activists was in the early stages of documentation. When Arief Budiman traveled to Tokyo in March 1970, *Mahasiswa Indonesia* reprinted the transcript of his talk.[40] When Indonesian students published a manifesto, the "Holy Anger of a Generation," it was reprinted in the *Mahasiswa Indonesia* edition of June 19, 1967, and translated into English by Australian academic Herbert Feith. [41] Written anonymously, the authors of the manifesto depicted the country as "corrupt" and "old and broken and poor, bent down by suffering and foreign debt."[42]

The views expressed by the authors of the manifesto demonstrated a particular identification with values opposed to 'corruption", extravagance, luxury and exploitation. These themes reflected changing contexts in national politics. A changing context of politics from 1971 to 1974, demonstrate the new direction of student activism in the post-KAMI era. New dissident campaigns examined in this period compare Arief Budiman's Golput (White Group) campaign

[40] See: Arief Budiman, "Youth Movements and Mahasiswa," ("Indonesian Youth and Students") in the May 30, 1970 issue of *Mahasiswa Indonesia*.Budiman summarized the KAMI movement for the students in Japan. He was introduced in the article as having attended an international conference sponsored by the Press Foundation of Asia held in Tokyo.

[41] See David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society,* Routledge: 2003: 71-73.

[42] Holy Anger of a Generation, *Mahasiswa Indonesia,* 1970.

with that of the Malari riots in Jakarta to demonstrate the issues that were central to student-initiated protests and campaigns.

Student Dissidence in the Early 1970s: Protesting Electoral Reform

Electoral reform had been a stated goal of the New Order government.[43] When first inaugurated in March 1966, elections had been promised in two years. A year later, reforms were pushed back further. [44] New rules governing party organization and relations between political parties were implemented by the new regime in 1966:

> The rules…must be based on family principles[45]…there is no point in concentrating too much on ideological problems…Old order-style physical compartmentalization of party groupings must be discarded because it leads to a sharpening of ideological differences.. MPRS Decision no. XXII (1966) stated that parties, mass organizations and functional groups must move to simplify themselves.. ..we have to avoid any increase in the number of parties except where this was necessary to streamline the functions and tasks parties for the sake of democracy and the welfare of the people.[46]

[43] Suharto had promised in 1967 that 'the New Order would not degenerate into a military dictatorship and that the rule of law, democratic principles and human rights would be upheld." Bourchier and Hadiz, p. 12.. For text of original speech see "Further Policies of the Ampera Cabinet after the Special Session of the Provincial People's Consultative Assembly." 16 August, 1967.

" Noted Suharto, "the issue of militarization is groundless, for it is simply untrue. What's more it is a dangerous issue, especially if it used to negate the role of ABRI as a functional group." See reprint of speech in David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader,* 41.

[44] The military leadership, write David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, "had little wish to see parties play a major role in the new political system…parties had only succeeded in dividing Indonesians along religious and ideological lines, threatening national unity and leading ultimately to political and economic ruin." *:Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader,* p. 11.

[45] The notion that Indonesia could be designed around the idea of the 'family state' was one promoted by the New Order. Inherent in the [family state concept] are the principles of unity between leaders and the people, and of unity within the state." See Abdulbakir Besar, Secreatary-General, Interim Peoples' Consultative Assembly, 18 April, 1968. Translated by A. Besar, reprinted in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003)

[46] Suharto, "Interim Peoples' Representative Council" Address. 16 August, 1967,

The rules entailed no 'increases' in party numbers, but consolidation of existing political parties. While the government would permit 'one new party' (GOLKAR) it would encourage the consolidation of secular and Moslem parties into 'blocs' [47] Pains were taken to show that this was consistent with the 1945 Constitution and its grounding in the 'family-state idea." [48]

The election, when it would happen, would involve three emblems, namely two of political parties [one secular bloc and one Muslim bloc] and the Golkar [functional groups].[49]

> Political organizations should function to provide good, considered alternative concepts. [I]t is only proper that in the renewal of the political structure political organizations should simplify themselves in number as well as in organization ...In the past the people in general, particularly those in villages with their own way of thinking…always fell prey to the political and ideological interests of [the former] parties. …Such a situation should not repeat itself. [50]

As the "architect" of Suharto (and Golkar's) electoral strategy Moertopo devised further outlines that would restrict campaigns and political parties to activities *only* at the district level

> "This does not imply that people in the villages are debarred from maintaining political aspirations…they can vote for whichever political party or functional group they regard as capable…In this way people in the villages will not spend their valuable time and energy in the political struggles of parties and groups, but will be occupied wholly with developmental efforts."[51]

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[47] Suharto encouraged 'the forming of one new Islamic party that could assemble, direct and unite all non-party Islamic organizations". Suharto, 16 August, 1967, "Interim Peoples' Representative Council" Address.

[48] Noted Abdulbakir Besar (1968): "Every member of the Indonesian national family must have a place within the MPR [including] political groups (all members of the People's Representative Council..as well as regional groups and functional groups.. Functional groups comprised "people who contribute qualitatively to national life, such as intellectuals, farmers, labourers, members of the armed forces."

[49] Ali Moertopo, "The Floating Mass" in The Acceleration and Modernization of 25Years of Development (1972) in David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz (2003) 47.

[50] Ali Moertopo, "The Floating Mass" in *The Acceleration and Modernization of 25Years of Development* (1972) in David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz (2003) 47.

[51] Ali Moertopo, "The Floating Mass" in *The Acceleration and Modernization of 25Years of Development* (1972) in David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, (2003) 48.

At a meeting of GMNI (Nationalist Indonesian Student Movement) on the 25th of November, 1970, Budiman called the upcoming elections "a theatrical exercise designed to disguise rule by force," ("sandiwara penguuasa untuk mempertahakan kekuasaanja").[52] A call to boycott of the 1971 election was followed by a creative and imaginative campaign called GOLPUT, or White Group (Golongan Putih).[53]

Calling itself the White Group, or GOLPUT, the campaign urged Indonesian citizens to demonstrate opposition to the election by refusing to participate. Opposition did not have to be difficult or expensive, its proponents urged: "To show that someone identifies with the White Group, they will wear a white five-sided badge with a black border. They can make these badges themselves using a piece of card and a safety pin."[54]

The White Group called on individuals to critically evaluate the electoral reforms that had rendered "spectators" out of the "the Indonesian people.[55] The White Group denied political ambitions. Instead, it aimed at carrying out "public education for the general public, especially the younger generation….through holding discussions concerning current political issues, by

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[52] Diskusi Kader National ("National Recruitment Discussion"), Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI), West Java, 21-25 November 1970.

[53] GOLPUT was word- play on the GOLKAR (Functional Groups). GOLKAR stood for Golongan Karya (Functional Groups) a coporatist structure that consisted of over 90 different associations and groups would ensure that older parties like PNI, would be forced to compete against large electoral groupings (the army, civil servants) which were forced to pledge to support the regime and its 'developmental objectives. Douglas Ramage, Ideology and Pancasila in the New Order.

[54] The White Group (see Appendix). Source*: Indonesian Politics and Society,* eds. David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, 2003: 73-75.

[55] Italics added for emphasis. Reprinted in its entirety in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003), p.. 73-74, see page. 73.

openly sharing thoughts and so on." [56] Defining its identity against the values and culture of the New Order, the White Group noted:

> It does not aim to make people follow any particular political stream but to encourage them to think critically and creatively in confronting their environment. ..The White Group movement in itself already constitutes political education, by implanting awareness within society that in a general election every citizen has the right not to vote.[57]

GOLPUT denied being an organization,

> The White Group is not an organization. It is an *identity*, an identity for those who are not satisfied with the present situation because the rules of democracy have been trampled upon, not just by political parties (for example, when they initiated the general election regulations) but also the Golongan Karya [Golkar] who in their endeavor to win this election utilized government agencies as well as undemocratic methods."[58]

The adoption of an identity constructed around "a cultural movement" that did not 'struggl[e] for…political power, but a social tradition whereby basic rights are always protected from arbitrary power," reflected the posture of "moral force" power that students identified with. [59.]

[56] From *Golput Manifesto* ["Penjelesan Tentang Golongan Putih,"], Italics added for emphasis. Reprinted in its entirety in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003), p.. 73-74, see page. 73

[57] From *Golput Manifesto* ["Penjelesan Tentang Golongan Putih,"], Italics added for emphasis. Reprinted in its entirety in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003), p.. 73-74, see page. 73

[58] From *Golput Manifesto* ["Penjelesan Tentang Golongan Putih,"], Italics added for emphasis. Reprinted in its entirety in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003), p.. 73-74.

[59] Arief Budiman (1978) "The Student Movement in Indonesaia: A Study of the Relationship Between Culture and Structure," *Asian Survey,* Vol. No., pp. 609-625.. "The student movement, Budiman argued (1978) was modeled on "the [Javanese concept of the] *resi*, the hermits and sages [who] reside in isolated caves or on lonely mountainsides, removed or withdrawn from the society. Their typical role is to diagnose decay within the kingdom and to give warning of the impending downfall of the dynasty." Budiman argued that "the student movement can be likened to Shane, the former gun slinger in the eponymous 1953 Western, who after saving a group of farmers from gangsters…rides off alone into the dawn." David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, (2003) p. 75. See also Indro Cahyono's introduction to Edy Budiarso's 2002 book on the student movement in the 1970s. Cahyono relies on the "Shane" characterization of the student movement. At least one official, Governor (and General) Ali Sadikin, did not accept Budiman's assessment of student's moral power. He quipped, "[students] have already overstepped the mark and become politicized. As pure moralists they should keep their ideas to themselves and not try to spread them or influence others." See *Harian Kami,* June 15, 1971. In the same article, Arief Budiman responded with: 'Can

The group was careful to identify as law-abiding and to risk using overt tactics that could be labeled disruptive. The "White Group does not act outside the law," its organizers proclaimed. Its object is in fact to "strengthen obedience of the law."

The GOLPUT campaign can be considered a parody of an official event that Johnston (2005) regards as an 'event-seizure".

> Event seizures are important in the developing anti-authoritarian opposition because they give a taste of protest participation to a previously quiescent mobilization potential. A second effect is that these events often serve as as markers for reframing oppositional possibilities for the wider population…and most are planned by small groups of activists.[60]

It was part of a larger context of political jokes[61] and parodies represented by the Water Buffalo parable that was published as an open letter in the Christian newspaper, *Sinar Harapan*.[62] In an open letter from the ITB Student-Council to a Jakarta newspaper, *Sinar Harapan*:[63]

> One day a large, well-fed buffalo was speaking to a thin buffalo, "Believe me when I say we are all well-fed. We are building a new nation, so just stay quiet, everything will be alright." The little one answered, "So, if ordered, I should just stay quiet? Meanwhile, our friends get thinner as the fields of grass get bigger! How can one stay quiet in a world so corrupt?" The large buffalo replied, "It

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moralists not campaign on the basis of their morals? I think it is immoral if moralists do not try to promote their moral ideas." Reprinted in David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz (2003) 75.

[60] Hank Johnston, "Talking the Walk: Speech Acts and Resistance in Authoritarian Regimes." *Repression and Mobilization.* Eds. Christian Davenport, Carol Mueller McClurg and Hank Johnston. University of Minnesota Press (2005) 125.

[61] "Political jokes represent the first budding of contentious speech, and often mark tentative steps into oppositional speech situations. Because of their deniability, political jokes are less risky than full-blown oppositional speech." Johnston (2005) 115.

[62] The press often cooperated with students. "Many journalists were former student activists, intellectuals in their own right, and their sympathies were clear….[M]any journalists…share[d] students' criticism of government and supported their demands." Bresnan (1993) 143.

[63] Source: Tempo, 20 October, 1973, reprinted in Peristiwa 15 January 1974 (Events of January 15, 1974), Marzuki Arifin, Publishing House International: Jakarta, Indonesia, pp. 101-102.

> won't come to that, but remember little one, don't grow horns so long that you are no longer polite and become angry."[64]

This parable played on a number of themes and issues, including a) the discourse of the regime around the issue of development and stability (particularly in the wake of Suharto's speech in January, 1972, as well as 2) corruption[65], of which students had made a central focus of study-clubs and discussion group. A reference to "long horns" was a sly reference to the criminalizing of 'long-haired' men[66] that had recently occurred in 1973 during a period of much urban unrest in Bandung and Jakarta. While students had denied any involvement in the riots and violence that swept through Bandung in August, 1973, students were nonetheless singled out as instigators for the unrest.[67] Finally, the parable could be read as description of interaction between older and young activists during many student dialogues. The parable captured sentiments of *bapakism*, the paternal culture of national politics.

Increasingly new patterns of contention provided the basis for new forms of student dissidence. Riots throughout the month of August, 1973 had destroyed a number of Chinese-owned businesses and shops throughout the city. While students were not responsible for the looting, the Anti-Chinese sentiments did provide a context in which students could protest recent

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[64] "Dialog between two Water Buffaloes "Text from an open letter by ITB Student Council (1973).

[65] In newspapers, such as Mochtar Lubis' influential *Horison* newsmagazine, corruption and governmental waste or misuse of power was a common theme of editorials.

[66] Marzuk Arifin, 1975.. Police campaigns targeting long-haired men because they resembled 'gansters' and mobsters were frequent in this period. (And they would be echoed in the 1980s with the police-targeted raids and killings of tattooed men, otherwise known as:the "Petrus" killings chronicled in separate works by John Sidel and James Siegel (1998) *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta*.

[67] On August 9, 1973, following the worst of the riots in Bandung that resulted in the destruction of 1000 stores and 150 automobiles, it was noted that Bandung may have seen some of the worst of the violence because of the 'liberal attitudes' of the city's youth and because of lingering class resentments between groups of rich and poor youth." See *Indonesia Raya*, "Let this be a Lesson" ("Jadikan Bahan Pelajaran,") August 9, 1973. For an account of the riots see *Indonesia Raya*, 7 August, 1973 "300 Arrested during unrest in Bandung," ("300 orang ditangkap dalam Hura-Hura Bandung,".

economic reforms. Critiques of the economic reforms provided another opportunity to examine boundary formation in the collective-identity processes of students. Increasingly student leaders like Hariman Siregar, utilized themes of "anti-corruption," "anti-luxury" and "anti-foreign development," to justify new forms of public action. Compared to Budiman's dissident campaign against election, these actions would have the backing of some dissident elements in the regime.

Indigenous power, Indigenous capital: Nationalist Themes of Student Activism

Two new policies preceded two waves of student-activism in the mid-1970s. The first was the 1967 Foreign Investment Act.[68] The second was the first Five Year Plan for Development (REPELITA I)[69] implemented in 1969. Both policies were part of the general economic rebuilding effort Suharto assumed in 1966:

> The most controversial aspect…was not any of these general policies…but rather the specific practices they permitted. The regime was immersed in corrupt practices in the granting of licenses, lending of funds, letting of contract, and every other form of state action that had any economic value…many observers believed that Indonesian corruption was the most pervasive in the region from the late 1960s on[70]

The dominant themes of protest at this time were the control by foreign actors and influences of the national economy.[71] The criticisms reflected the ideas of two influential academics: Sarbini (an economist and member of the faculty at the University of Indonesia) and

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[68] The Foreign Investment Act in 1967 was followed by the Domestic Investment Act in 1968. The legislation provided tax incentives to foreign companies. Foreign investors were excluded from investment in specific sectors such as retail distribution, media, public infrastructure or where domestic business could provide investment and experience (Chalmers and Hadiz, 2004: 51)

[69] Repelita emphasized "the agricultural sector and the types of industry supporting it (fertilizer, machinery and equipment)…It targets what is most urgently needed by the public at large: food, clothing, improved infrastructure, people's housing, a wider field of employment and spiritual well-being" (Suharto, 1969).

[70] Bresnan *Managing Indonesia*, (1993) 292

[71] John Bresnan (1993) *Managing Indonesia,* 150

Soedjatmoko, an active dissident in the Guided Democracy period and was well regarded by students inside formerly PSI circles. He was, notes Bresnan (1993) "Much sought after by students, Soedjatmoko was a frequent visitor to the nation's campuses."[72]

> The ideas of intellectuals like Sarbini and Soedjatmoko represent the intellectual core of a critique which became widespread in certain student, press and intellectual circles in the early 1970s. Much of the criticism voiced during these years was directed towards a perceived over-reliance on foreign capital which was considered unable to meet Indonesia's real social needs."[73]

Themes that Sarbini and Soedjatmoko discussed frequently,[74] including "the danger that a form of 'enclave development' would result from development based on foreign investment," and "an alternative strategy that focused on agricultural production, small-scale industry, alternative technologies, labour-intensive manufacture and most importantly, on the effort to satisfy basic needs,"[75]

A central problem, students advocated against, was the "foreign-model of development" a phrase which referred to the development strategy in the New Order. Through discussion groups in the 1970s, students began to read and discuss books of the "*dependencia*" literature. These books were especially critical of the "Washington consensus" and view reinforced by lending institutions like the IMF. While many of these books were based on the Latin American experiences with debt and debt restructuring, Indonesian students saw parallels. Noted Bresnan

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[72]Bresnan 1993, 44

[73] Hadiz and Chalmers, *The Politics of Indonesian Economic Development,* (1997) 58

[74] Noted Chalmers and Hadiz (1997), Throughout 1973 a series of seminars and discussion groups were held by students and academics at which the ideas of Sarbini and Soedjatmoko were widely discussed." (The *Politics of Indonesian Economic Development*, 58.

[75] Hadiz and Chalmers, 1997 58

(1993), “they saw Japan as coming to play the dominant economic role in Southeast Asia, and this was a prospect they believed should be resisted.”[76]

> We saw that Japan and Korea were the biggest models for Indonesian economic development—there wasn't much in the way of popular participation in the economy other than as labor, as participation in physical terms. Rather, decision-making was made by a small group of technocrats within the state [which] provided the basis for cronyism.[77]

Protesting against Japan permitted students a new public role. Students held protests outside the Japanese-owned President Hotel in Jakarta drew attention to an urban consumer culture constructed around the acquisition of imported Japanese goods[78], like Suzuki motorcycles, or Sony transistor radios. Students noted “There are two kinds of corruption. One is to fill your stomach because your salary is too small to buy enough food. The other is to lead a luxurious life.”[79]

Conspicuous consumption was especially evident among a small group of Jakarta's wealthy, predominantly with military officers close to Suharto whose lavish lifestyles were covered by Jakarta's papers. “[80]

> Evidence of the students' cautious attitude is their indirect approach to their real targets—corrupt generals in high-places. It is dangerous to attack these generals directly and by name, so the students come at them obliquely, by say, criticizing

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[76] Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, (1993) 145.

[77] Interview with former ITB Student Leader, Yusman, April 1, 2002, Bandung.

[78] “[I]n November and December, delegations of students demonstrated at Bappenas, the Japanese embassy, and Bank Indonesia in protest of corruption, foreign capital, and “Japanese economic imperialism,” Steele, *The War Within* (2007) 80.

[79] January 22, 1974, *New York Times*, Corruption at the Top Angers Indonesian Students,” A2

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[80] Bresnan (1993) *Managing Indonesia*, (1993) 107. Noted Bresnan, “the civilian elite of Jakarta were still living in extremely modest circumstances at the time. The sudden emergence of army officers as patrons of the country's leading hotels, restaurants and resorts was widely remarked on.”

> foreign aid and investment as a symbol of something that props up the system and makes corruption possible and easy.[81]

Hariman Siregar, Chairman of the Student Council of the University of Indonesia noted these developments in the following way:

> People have become alienated from the development process, and they that think that economic development means people being forced off the land or forced to sell rice to the government, causing life in the villages to become more and more difficult. By contrast, a small group linked to the power-holders has taken advantage of the opportunities made available to them to accumulate wealth and satisfy their desire for luxury goods."[82]

Malari began as small protests outside the Japanese embassy in Jakarta and the Japanese-owned President Hotel. By the end of the second day of rioting, 144 stores had been ransacked or burnt.[83] Among the buildings destroyed was a shopping center containing 3 banks, a bowling-alley and disco. One of the buildings of the state-owned oil company, *Pertamina*, suffered damages to its exterior as well as its swimming-pool. The Coca-cola processing plant was among other buildings destroyed.[84]

In the riots nearly 1,000 motorbikes and automobiles were burnt or smashed..[85] Police reports recorded the number of stores ransacked or burnt, the numbers of those injured and of

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[81] January 2, 1974, *New York Times*, "Indonesia

[82] *Indonesia Raya*, "The Rulers go into Business," 7 January 1974.

[83] . See Marzuki Arifin, *Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974*, (Events of 15th of January, 1974) Jakarta: Publishing House Indonesia p. 339 for a summary of the damaged property.

[84] Marzuki Arifin, *Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974, (*Events of 15th of January, 1974) Jakarta: Publishing House Indonesia p. 335

[85] John Bresnan (1993), *Managing Indonesia,* New York: Columbia University Press, p. 136. Also see Richard Halloran, "Violent Crowds in Jakarta Protest the Visit by Tanaka," New York Times, January 16, 1974, page 3, section 1. Halloran's article noted "For the most part, Indonesian policemen and soldiers who were sent out to patrol the streets stood by watching, rarely making nay move to stop the rioters."

those who died. [86] According to Indonesian reports, 807 cars were burnt along with 187 motorcycles. By comparison 11 people died in the riots, 137 people were injured and another 775 detained.[87] Injuries and deaths were few in comparison to the number of cars and motorbikes burnt or thrown into the canals, suggesting the targets of the riots were not people so much as they were consumer items and the places where they were sold.

Students denied playing any role in orchestrating the chaos that ensued during the riots. Nevertheless, arrests of student leaders followed in the post-Malari period. An immediate impact after Malari was greater repression. Syarief Thayeb replaced Mashuri as Minister of Higher Education, Instruction and Culture after Malari riots in 1974. He would implement Decision number 28.

> All seminars and discussions bearing on political matters must be supervised by university officials…such student activities as demonstrations [and] parades that might disturb the peace are forbidden…Orientation week on campus must be conducted only on campus and must not include undesirable or disturbing topics."[88]

While the student movement had enjoyed what Edward Aspinall had called a "limited license" to protest in the early 1970s, after 1974 this was no longer true.[89]

Hariman Siregar told me, "From 1974 to 1976, universities changed, Suharto banned students from organizing. Students never again experienced the university in the same way. From the late 1960s to the 70s, [we] had greater freedoms.. in the university."[90]

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[86] See Marzuki Arifin, *Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974,* (Events of 15th of January, 1974) Jakarta: Publishing House Indonesia p. 339 for a summary of the damaged property.

[87] Marzuki Arifin, *Persitiwa 15 January*, 1974, p. 339.

[88] Murray, 1985: p. 388

[89] "Violence was then adopted in treating the noisy ex-partner, followed by a strong policy of campus-normalization and the closing off-altogether of any chances of campus politicization. The effect of this policy was so severe that mass student demonstrations became virtually impossible." Mahasin, 30

The restrictions after Malari signified the end of public campaigns and the retreat to new kinds of intellectual pursuits. Some efforts coincided with social networks and intellectual discussion circles with Soedjatmoko and Sarbini. [91] New foundations organized by academics also emerged. Some like Adi Sasono's Institute of Development Studies" or (LSP) [92] would become one of the first to critique the New Order's economic policy in terms of dependency theory. His work noted how development in Indonesia had

> 'created development by a process of unequal exchange, transplanting a foreign system of production and its associated social relations, while marginalizing many people from the system of production in which they had functioned and found their livelihood…This system is not pro-worker because it is capitalist intensive in nature…Studies have demonstrated a new phase in rural life, namely the phase of mass impoverishment. This process of exploitation is no different from that…during the [Dutch] Culture System…under the post-1966 administration the same system takes place in the name of modernization."[93]

In August, 1975 a panel seminar on Rural Development Strategies held in Bandung brought together Indonesian and Australian academics focused on "development of rural places [that] is stated policy, but [for which] a central strategy is yet to be developed.[94] Such forums were aimed at "undertak[ing] small scale developmental programs in fields such as irrigation,

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[90] Hariman Siregar, interview, Jakarta, 2002.

[91] Noted Bresnan (1993) in *Managing Indonesia,* "Soedatmoko had made no secret of his opinion that development was failing in Indonesia for lack of the people's involvement, especially in the villages, and for lack of rapport with the country's youth, many of whom were unemployed or underemployed—the result of government policies—he believed (p. 143).

[92] LSP stood for Lembaga Studi Pembangunan. Excerpt published in Chalmers and Hadiz, *The Politics of Indonesian Economic Development*, (1997) 127-130, quote is from page. 128.

[93] See Adi Sasono and Arief Sritua, *Indonesia: Dependent and Backwardness* (originally published as *Indonesia: Ketergantungan dan Keterbelakangan)*, Jakarta: LSP. Excerpt published in Chalmers and Hadiz, The Politics of Indonesian Economic Development, (1997) 127-13

[94] The seminar met from August 11 to 13, 1975 in Bandung at the Arjuna Plaza Hotel, Proceedings from conference on Microfilm (NYPL, Science, Industry and Business Library, New York). Around the same time, the LSM "Dian Desa" was also formed

drinking water, health centers, agriculture, animal husbandry, together with handicrafts and other income-generation programs.'[95]

These forum implied critiques of New Order policies (such as relying on new high-yield seeds based on Vietnamese and Japanese hybrids of rice and chemical fertilizer that farmers were now required purchase at great expense from international agricultural conglomerates). These began to form part of a general movement to circulate alternative ideas.[96] We know that forums continued throughout the 1970s and that these forums contributed to a more critical understanding of the development process. In November 1979 a seminar help by the "Indonesian Association for the Development of Social Sciences" in Malang focused on the issue of poverty. It was at this seminar that the there was first introduced the concept of structural poverty (Budiman 1982).[97]

Another research institute created during this period was LP3ES, the Institute of Economic and Social Education, Research and Information, formed in Jakarta by intellectuals around its director, Dawam Raharjo. LP3ES would publish a journal, Prisma, on social and economic themes.[98]Raharjo would publish a critique of New Order policy as "economic domination" in which he classified

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[95] Eldridge (1993) 37

[96] See Chalmers and Hadiz (1997) *The Politics of Indonesian Economic Development*.

[97] Noted Sulistyo (at the Bandung seminar) "farmers' use of modern seeds and cultivation practices, when accompanied by irrigation, changes the nature of farm work, more labor is needed in all phases of farm operation." *Indonesia Panel Seminar on Rural Development Strategies*, August 11 to 13, 1975 in Bandung at the Arjuna Plaza Hotel, author's copy of microfilm original.

[98] Dawam Raharjo (1981) "Strukture Dominasi dalam Process Pembangunan", a paper for the Seminar, People Against Domination, Christian Conference of Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 23-28 Februray, 1981. Reproduced in D. Rahardjo (1983) *Esai-Esai Ekonomi Politik (Political Economy Essays)* Jakarta, LP3ES. Excerpt printed in Chalmers and Hadiz, *The Politics of Indonesian Economic Development* (1997) 131.

> Indonesia…is a repressive developmentalist regime…[with] distinctive features a bureaucracy directed by the military controlled government, economic development organized by technocrats and restrictions on the freedom and activities of the institutions of a conventional democracy—although they are still tolerated. In such a situation, mass poverty and a distorted distribution of income exist alongside capitalistic economic growth and extravagant lifestyles.[99]

New magazines like *Prisma*, an economics and social science journal was part of an effort to

> Publish circulars, bulletins and magazines to disseminate their ideas and communicate with the general public….but it is unlikely that their media will reach a broader audience than immediate middle-class circles. With such activities they can hardly generate a mass popular movement. That is why they are tolerated by the government. They are too structured to facilitate…movement, being themselves by-products of developmentalism and technocraticism."[100]

Mahasin's critique may point to why institutes like LSP and LP3ES were tolerated: they were essentially 'politically powerless.'[101]

The Election of Heri Akmadi to Chairman of the ITB Student Council[102]

Elected at the end of November, 1977 as the Chairman of the ITB Student Council, Heri was Chairman at a time when, he remarked, the student body had been "asleep"[103]. Akmadi, in fact, was part of a larger longer-term development within the student movement that began after

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[99] Dawam Raharjo, Dawam Raharjo (1981) "Strukture Dominasi dalam Process Pembangunan", a paper for the Seminar, People Against Domination, Christian Conference of Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 23-28 Februray, 1981. Reproduced in D. Rahardjo (1983) *Esai-Esai Ekonomi Politik [Political Economy Essays]* Jakarta, LP3ES. Excerpt printed in Chalmers and Hadiz, The Politics of Indonesian Economic Development (1997) 131.

[100] Mahasin, p. 30-31

[101] The term is Mahasin's (p. 30).

[102] Heri Akmadi was elected Chairman on November 29, 1977 *Breaking the Chains of Oppression* (1977) 32.

[103] Rizal Ramli explained that Heri Akmadi was elected president of the Dewan Mahasiswa in November 1978, before that, there wasn't anybody in charge. The opposition from the Student Council was strong and Akmadi got elected because he raised the question of why student councils were "asleep during this time."

Malari. This development was an effort to redefine student activism in the post-KAMI period from its more intellectual identity to one organized around action.

Part of this development was evident in a panel-discussion sponsored by the Student Council Jakarta in early June, 1977, titled “What Happened to the Spirit of 1945?” This was evidence of how a collective-identity was a process of negotiation involving a number of different interests--students, partisan-groups and political parties as well as older cohorts in the student-movement.[104]. A wall poster at the discussion’s location (the Academy of Enterprise Leadership) declared, “We are not a generation of forums and consensual discussion!”[105]

In the audience were prominent Student Council Chairs and members, including Vice-Chair at the University of Indonesia, Ibrahim Zakir (University of Indonesia) and Chair, Lukman Hakim (also University of Indonesia). Both asked about how the election would affect student-initiated investigations into ‘land-cases’. Panelists drew parallels with the situation in 1955, reminding students of a time before most were born, of the failures of multiparty politics. The PDI-Chairman Zakaria Raib reminded students once more of their ‘obligation’ and ‘moral duty’ to the people to ‘participate and demand 100% transparency’ from officials.[106] Former KAMI activist (and founder of the Academy hosting the event) Aldy Anwar noted that principles of academic freedom meant students should feel free to express their political opinions about the matters they felt strongest about.[107]

[104] *Sinar Harapan*, 1 June, 1977.

[105] *Sinar Harapan*, 1 June, 1977.

[106] Laporan Panel Diskusi “Pendidikan Politik, Mahasiswa Jakarta “Back to Campus” (“A Report of the Discussion Panel “Political Education: Students of Jakarta ‘Back to Campus.”). *Sinar Harapan*, 1 June, 1977.

[107] Laporan Panel Diskusi “Pendidikan Politik, Mahasiswa Jakarta “Back to Campus” (“A Report of the Discussion Panel “Political Education: Students of Jakarta ‘Back to Campus.”). *Sinar Harapan*, 1 June, 1977.

Heri Akmadi's chairmanship of the Student Council coincided with these developments and with a turn towards greater academic criticism of the regime's policies. By mid-1977, the student movement appeared to be focused on the upcoming elections. Mobilization around the elections was preceded, however, by the issuing of a formal statement criticism of the New Order regime, known as the *White Book*. The issuing of the White Book followed a longer period of agitation that took place throughout 1977and described in the section prior to this. In contrast to pledges and petitions, the *White Book* consisted of a research position points that critiqued every aspect of the political and economic system in the New Order. The *White Book* preceded by a few months the protests and campaigns led by students as the most blatant examples of anti-regime actions that took place in the late 1970s.

It began with a simple declaration:

> Students do not want Suharto as president and do not trust him. [Studnets] demand that Parliament pick new candidates for president. Studnets declare their allegiance to the armed forces, who "do indeed stand above all groups in the interest of the nation and the state," Merdeka !!!!! (freedom!!!!)[108]

This statement was followed by a longer critique of the New Order authored by the ITB Student Council. Its formal title was "The Various Indicators of the Failure of the Suharto Government," known also as the *White Book* [109] (or Buku Putih). In it, students presented an analysis of the national development strategy under Suharto and critiqued the long-term goals of planned development during the first decade of the Suharto regime. In deference to the ideas of

[108] ITB Student Council, *White Book of Student Suffering,* republished by Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Microfilm.

[109] ITB Student Senate (1978) "Various Indicators of the Failure of the Suharto Government." Bandung, Institution of Technology Bandung (ITB), p. 172. (See Cornell's Modern Indonesia Project).

Soedjatmoko from the early1970s, the *White-Book* paid special attention to the agricultural sector of which the regime has made a centerpiece of its development strategy.[110]

In the *White Book,* students argued that government was subsidizing foreign rice-producers[111] at a rate much higher than its own domestic rice producers. Farmers who were unable to pay back their credits were subject to confiscation "of the farmers' stoves, bicycles, and household goods as collateral until the debts [were] paid off."[112] Here students were taking their cues from a variety of sources. Soedjatmoko's thinking on the matter was one source of influence. In 1975, however, rural development had also been the subject of a seminar sponsored in Bandung.[113]

Akmadi elaborated the criticism in the *White Book* in his defense oration at his trial some months later:

> "After sinking its powerful claws into this country for more than 13 years, what has the New Order regime accomplished in the agricultural sector about which it brags so much? What we can most easily see its "success" in keeping up the number of Indonesians who live below the poverty line, so that the total never

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[110] Students' criticism in the *White Book* focused on the New Order's importation of rice which began in response to the 1972-3 rice crisis. The crisis, which the regime blamed largely on persistent "drought", was largely an institutional crisis of the regime than, strictly speaking, a "food" crisis.

[111] Noted Akmadi, in his 1978 defense oration, "this regime has willfully forced the farmers to plant particular kinds of rice seed, has decreed how much fertilizer should be applied, and has even decreed how many times the farmers must plant rice each year. This ultimately has created an unhealthy atmosphere in the villages, an atmosphere which has enveloped people in fear and self-doubt.." *Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, p.124 (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project).

[112] The *White Book*, republished in *Indonesia*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, p. 170.

[113]I refer here to the *Indonesia Panel Seminar on Rural Development Strategies* held at the Bandung Arjuna Plaza Hotel from August 11-13, 1975. The conference featured Indonesian intellectuals and was aimed at critiquing rural development strategy with attention to four themes: 1) developing a coherent strategy, 2) developing program flexibility; 3) developing political wil and 4) utilizing popular involvement." Original copy of the conference program and proceedings NY Science Industry Business Library.

> dropped from being between 40% and 60% of the total population during the ten years between 1969 and 1979."[114]

Students urged "all readers of this book to unite in struggle,"[115] and explained their struggle was about the 'unsatisfactory" course that 'development was taking." The document continued, "not simply that there are mistakes but that "the development policies themselves are wrong." [116]

> "[D]evelopment strategy oriented solely towards increasing GNP is a stunted strategy. The ruinous condition of our country is precisely a consequence of this stunted development strategy… Diversion of natural resources from the people: ie, well water has been diverted to provide water for "industrial centers, luxury hotels, real estate projects … for the sake of development! [The people] have not been able to stop all this, even though they are the legitimate owners of this country !!!!!!!!!!" [117]

The White-Book struck a balance between scholarly and populist, as sentiments expressed above express. It was clearly intended to arouse. Rizal explained, "We played it on the radio station W88 FM 24 hours a day in Bandung, in Surabaya; every major city. The language, well, we were city kids, used vulgarities, but also so that people would understand; had to appeal for popular support for our movement." [118]

As Rizal Ramli told me,

> the critique of the *Buku Putih* [*White Book*] was at its most central point, a nationalist critique; And our critiques went to the heart of the Suharto regime—

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[114] Heri Akmadi, (1979) *Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, p.121

[115] Ibid.

[116]As Rizal told me, we wrote the *Buku Putih*, an analysis of the economic system—the comprador system—which undergirded Suharto's government, undergirded the New Order.

[117] White Book, p. 162.

[118]Interview, Jakarta, 2002, like Soe hok-Gie, Ramli could only imagine reaching out to the people by suspending his own cultured and educated identity.

> for the first time-- of his cronies and of his regime's corruption. We.identified a comprador class within the New Order—*Cukong*—the vulgar expression of that."[119]

The *White Book* critiqued the politics of the New Order

> "In order to safeguard this development strategy, the whole system of government, politics, culture and society is being sacrificed …. Parliament has been put to sleep. The parties are weak…..Cultural values are no longer maintained. All of this is for achieving a rapid increase in GNP"[120]

The *White Book* reverberated with themes that had been discussed in study-clubs and discussion groups since 1975. Students demanded greater political accountability of external actors like foreign lenders and banks. Students also began to insist on a greater role for local actors and solutions rather than top-down imposed solutions that tended to emphasize 'experts' and foreign consultants. These kinds of critiques became more frequently expressed in the 1980s and have since been accepted as critiques of the developmental consensus more generally (Rich, 1994).

Regarding the "adoption of the foreign model" of development, the *White Book* noted

> "[W]e have now become perfect 'copycats.' In establishing "development policy" we have swallowed hook, line and sinker the data and analyses made by foreigners, even though they obviously have interests of their own." [121]

Skeptism voiced about "foreign interests" reflected the consciousness of men like Soedjatmoko—older voices whose politicization in the 1930s was shaped by the imprint of colonial control. While Soedjatmoko would eventually distance himself from Sukarno's 'cult of leadership,' his writings and ideas in the 1970s were strongly 'nationalist' in spirit:

[119] Interview, Jakarta.2002

[120] Cornell Modern Indonesia Project: *White Book*, 165

[121] *White Book*, 162

> It is important that no foreign enclave should emerge in the Indonesian economic system. This can be avoided by the promotion of a number of linkages with the local environment. This could take the form of involving indigenous businessmen in the operations of of foreign firms…It might mean the utilization of local raw materias or help in the development of indigenous serving capabilities rather than importing services and materials.[122]

The student-council's criticisms in the *White Book* bore the imprint of Soedjatmoko's ideas and influence. The book reflected some careful research of both business-practices and patterns of foreign ownership. The *White Book* cited specific grievances, such as "The only raw material used by the Indo Milk Company, for instance, is water. The milk concentrate itself is imported from Australia."[123] It also presented critiques of the developmental process and the national goals of development financed as they were by the advanced industrial countries of the West:

> To finance development plans we have a *policy of borrowing money from abroad*." The picture becomes worse if we also take into account the loss of job opportunities in national companies that have had to close down because of the influx of foreign capital… Over the past eight ears, the industrial sector has only been able to absorb 1.2 million people. This is an absorption rate of only 12.5 percent of available manpower."[124]

By the end of the 1970s, the Student Council leaders had begun to promote criticism of development policies beyond that of the protests led by Siregar in 1973, which targeted more specifically the Japanese government's direct assistance to the regime. The *White Book* provided a glimpse into the emerging anti-regime collective identity that the Student-Council Chair and his officers were mobilizing around.

Campus Normalization: **Analysis of Repression in the 1970s**

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[122] Soedjatmoko (1970) "Problems and Prospects for Development in Indonesia," Reprinted in Chalmers and Hadiz, *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia*, Routledge, (1997) 62-64.

[123] *White Book*, *Indonesia*, p. 174

[124] *White Book, Indonesia*, p. 175.

Campus normalization represented a radical break from the regime's early alliance with the student movement in 1966. It reinforced several components of the New Order ideology of stability and order. First, "a normal campus" was one where students did not "demonstrate", where students' "engagement in politics" was permitted only at the level of "discourse" and where students' "discourse" did not strengthen or engage in mass action.[125] Students' campus activities were limited to sports, culture and art-based activities.

The NKK/BKK policy statement emphasized two things: 1) that the proper role of students was to analyze the world logically and scientifically so that accurate theory and its application could be furnished to society as bases for society's development; 2) in keeping with this role, the proper type of campus organization for students to join was the scholarly variety within the student's academic discipline."[126] Academic freedom," Suharto had maintained in 1973, "was beneficial to nation-building."[127] Insofar as 'academic freedom' actively supported the regime's overall political goals, the university community was allowed greater autonomy.

In 1977, however, against the context of student demands for an open election without intimidation and with secret balloting, the Education Minister Mashuri's 1977 'met with student leaders. Quoting Andre Malreaux, Mashuri supposedly reassured students that "it was part of the human condition to seek answers to existential questions. However, Mashuri reminded students of their role to 'educate' and their unique circumstances:

> Indeed, democracy is not the same everywhere. If you look at China, circumstances are different from the West but also different, if you consider Africa….At this moment, our democracy reflects our culture and Indonesian

[125] Yozi Anwar, UGM, Masters' Thesis, 1997

[126] Murray, 1985: p. 389.

[127] Soeharto, 1973 *End of Year Address*.

> practices….you students [future teachers] have the purpose of teaching our citizens how to participate in politics. Our development is not only physical, but mental and reprsents an 'awekning' of the system, a system that is democratic and responsive.[128]

The army's concern in monitoring the student movement was evident by examining Berita Yudha articles from late April through June, 1977. One article warned the army 'not to be quick to endorse students' demands."[129] The article mentioned a seminar attended by TNI General Soedomo (KASKOPKAMTIB) where he warned attendees that "we must still be vigilant of subversive groups outside campus who seek to sensationalize the events. These groups would say they stand for 'moral politics' when they indeed mean 'physical force."[130]

The military framed student's concerns as too close to "Western" ideas:

> Students must not keep looking abroad to liberalism to understand how democracy works. We have an indigenous culture of democracy here, in our archipelago…Students always look to the West for their ideas, but democratic concepts exist even in our culture---everywhere, from Bone [Irian], for example, there are folk stories that emphasize leaders must listen to their subjects.[131]

From late January, 1978 to early April, authorities convened upon the Student Councils, first placing campuses under the supervision of military authorities,[132] and subsequently, arresting the

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[128] *Berita Buana,* 14 April 1977

[129] *Berita Yudha*, 11 May, 1977. The article mentioned a seminar attended by TNI General Soedomo (KASKOPKAMTIB) where he warned attendees that "we must still be vigilant of subversive groups outside campus who seek to sensationalize the events. These groups would say they stand for 'moral politics' when they indeed mean'physical force." See article. "Kita harus waspada akan liku-liku politik dan subversi 'moral political' maupun 'physicalforce'" (Soedomo's remarks in Indonesian).

[130] *Berita Yudha,* 11 May, 1977. "Kita harus waspada akan liku-liku politik dan subversi 'moral political' maupun 'physicalforce'" (Soedomo's remarks in Indonesian).

[131] *Berita Yudha*, 18 April, 1977

[132] "On January 20, 1978, a massive roundup of student leaders was conducted throughout Indonesia. During the First Roundup more than 100 leaders from Student Councils and Student Senates across the country were arrested." See Akmadi, *Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, p. 27. The same day Akmadi recalled, "On January 20, 1978, almost all of the leading newspapers in the capital were muzzled as well."*Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, p. 27).

Student-Council leaders under charges of ‘insulting the head of state.”[133] Campuses were closed and bans were enacted on all political activity on campus. Office equipment was removed from the offices of the student-government associations on campus.[134]

The decision in 1978 to suspend campus activities and to arrest and detain the leaders of student government associations was a bitter end to the regime’s initial support for the student movement.

> The way [the security forces] entered the ITB campus was not the way members of the government apparatus are supposed to treat their citizens. It was not the way a civilized nation is supposed to respect its citizens’ rights! Indeed it more closely resembles a Mafia-style smash-and-grab raid!! It was more like the actions of the Dutch…These troops were lined up in rows 10 metres in front of the students, who had been herded together on the basketball court, with their rifles pointed at then. They moved in on the students, who were sitting in a group, with firm strides, closer and closer…and trampled on the women students in the front row with their jackboots, beat them with their rifle butts and dragged several of them along by the hair. The same thing happened to the men students. So chaotic and tumultuous was the atmosphere[135]

Student councils were frozen[136] and existing student associations such as HMI (Islamic Student Association), GMNI (Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement) and PMKRI (Indonesian Catholic Student Association), GMKI (Indonesian Christian Student Movement) and PMI

[133] Noted Akmadi (1979) “Those-in-power have accused the students of insulting the Head of State…with the aggravating charge that these actions have also obstructed the government’s security program to so great an extent that the students should receive the death penalty!” *Breaking the Chains* (1977) 20

[134] Noted Akmadi, “The rooms in the Student Center were smashed up and ransacked. Documents, paper, typewriters, radios, photocopy equipment, telephones…were carried off. *Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, (1977) 30.

[135] Heri Akmadi, *Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People*, (1977) 29.

[136] Noted Akmadi, “The Student Councils were forcibly disbanded, while new, upward-oriented organizations were established, also under duress. The organizations which replaced the Student Councils were not longer headed by students; but by Rectors’ Assistants instead. The Rectors’ Assistants in charge of Student Affairs automatically took office as chairmen of the Student Coordinating Bodies (BKK) which replaced the Student Councils.” Akmadi, (1979) 71.

(Indonesian Muslim Student Movemnet) were prohibited from conducting activities on university campuses[137]

> On February 9, 1978 one day after the ITB students and the Bandung students held a "night of reflection" during which they tried to assess the purity of their hearts and minds, the ITB campus was suddenly reoccupied by army units. This attack to occupy the campus for the second time was conducted, in contrast to the first, in a brutal fashion, with the troops shouting abuse as they entered the campus. In contrast to the first one, this attack claimed casualties---students who were wounded and hand to be taken to the hospital after being trampled on and beaten with rifle butts."[138]

In 1979 the biggest trial of student leaders[139] took place in Jakarta (the capital) and Bandung, the provincial capital of West Java. While the Student Councils were prominent in politics again,[140] the publicity generated by the trial nonetheless created an opportunity for the movement to seize. Heri Akmadi, represented by Legal Aid Attorney, Adnan Buyong Nasution, took three days to read his defense.[141] As Hatta had done from his trial in the Netherlands in 1928, Heri Akmadi would also rely on his court appearance to read a lengthy statement of grievances to the assembled judges and military authorities (Aspinal, 2004).

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[137] Hadiwinata, 2003: p. 63.

[138] Akmadi *Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, (1979) 28.

[139] As Akmadi admitted, "The accusation that the Students have insulted the President and his Vice-President and the Assemblies of Public Power truly took me by surprise… New Order Regime's prosecution of the students truly makes no sense, because such evaluations and declarations of position clearly fall within the bounds of propriety…Up until the very moment before the students were arrested, the Chairman of the MPR himself [Adam Malik] still regarded the plain and simple Declaration of Position by the students of ITB as something proper."

[140] "The Student Councils were forcibly disbanded, while new, upward-oriented organizations were established, also under duress. The organizations which replaced the Student Councils were not longer headed by students; but by Rectors' Assistants instead. The Rectors' Assistants in charge of Student Affairs automatically took office as chairmen of the Student Coordinating Bodies (BKK) which replaced the Student Councils. Once again the student's role is only that of an errand boy." Akmadi, *Breaking the Chains of Oppresion*, (1979) 71

[141] In a tradition that owed to the legacy of the Dutch legal system in Indonesia

Akmadi's Defense consisted of an array of charges, some of which replicated general grievances made by the *White Book*:

> We have only stated that after 13 years of the New Order being in power we cannot deny the existence of conditions which are intolerable… for too long now, elements in power have treated Indonesia, the nation's wealth, our country's resources, as their own personal possessions…the laws for those in power is not the same as the law to which the weak are subject.…today Parliament is paralyzed, since it never controls the powers that be…The Political Parties' primary concern is not genuine political representation, they are more afraid of those in power than they are of the people. They cannot provide a channel for peoples' aspirations, they are nothing more than instruments for those-in-power…We only want a wise national leader, one who will not pursue his own interests and those of his clique."[142]

Akmadi's defense statement also relied on charts and statistics regarding foreign investment,[143] business-practices,[144] the working conditions of factory-workers[145] and the dispossession of rural land[146] by corporate 'fat-cats' and cronies. More explicit critisms of the regime were made by Akmadi:

> "…the dictatorship found in Indonesia today is: a Bureaucratic Dictatorship. [The New Order] is a dictatorship by officials who occupy positions in the government. It derives from a bureaucratic style of government, that is, a political system in which power and participation in national decision making are limited entirely to

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[142] *Breaking the Chains of Oppression*,(1979) 21- 22.

[143] " 780 projects approved between 1967 and 1977, which were capitalized at US $ 6, 652, 185,000, were evidently able to absorb only 405,654 people, and even of that number 7% were foreigners." Akmadi, *Breaking the Chains,* (1979) 137

[144] "Between 1971 and 1973 alone, a total of 225, 259 small factories closed down, leaving 432,285 people without work!...Meanwhile during the 10 years following 1967, foreign investment projects were able to create jobs for only 410,897 people, some of which were filled by foreigners." *Breaking the Chains*, (1979) 20

[145] "In the Famatex Textile Mill, no notice was taken of a worker who became completely blind in one eye until 18 months later.…"In the Famatex II textile mill…the manager deliberately hired thugs and silat experts to prevent the workers from setting up a FBSI base-unit." *Breaking the Chains*, (1979) 136-137

[146]"Five million of the 8.8 million farming families on Java do not own their own land; they work as farm laborers." (1979) 127

> officials…There is no role in decision-making for individuals, groups or social groups outside these circles." [147]

Reflecting on Heri Akmadi and the Student Council-sponsored actions—the exuberant petitions against Suharto, their exhortations to wives of civil servants[148], the researched critiques that veiled in populist terms against the regime's corruption and 'foreign model of development' leads me to conclude the following about their collective identity or oppositional consciousness.

First, the Student-Council's critique of the 1970s reflected the particular role of specific schools and groups of students. The Bandung cohort was proud of their scholarly intstitution (especially at ITB, which many told me was "the best school in the country). Second, the Student Council collective identity was rooted in a certain doggedness of spirt as 'intellectuals.' This reflected (since the 1960s) the triumph of intellectuals and technocrats in the post-Sukarno era but also reflected an older PSI-influenced understanding of the intellectual in politics. Revealed by Akmadi was the idea that intellectuals have unique roles in politics.

Concerns about the election drove the first round ofstudent mobilization. The upcoming "1978 General Session of the MPR figured prominently in the student movement of late 1977 and early 1978 respectively," noted Heri Akmadi in the remarks he read at his defense statement in 1979.

> Two key issues closely connected to the upcoming First[,] the issue of National Leadership, which was closely connected with the delivery of the Presidential Accounting and with the election of a new President and, Second [,] the issue of National Upbuilding, which was closely connected with the formulation of the GBHN [Outline of State Policy]… The first theme was featured in the students' demands with regard to various defects in the Suharto regime's actions and style of leadership. The second theme was featured in [accounts of] the various

[147] Akmadi, *Breaking the Chains*, p. 51.

[148] Against lavis spending (published as compendium to the *White Book*).

> consequences of the upbuilding program and in sharp criticism of the upbuilding strategy. [149]

As I shall show, student mobilization from April to July, 1977 involved much symbolic mobilization and constructing ‘boundaries’ of their collective identity. Based on analysis (reported on in the newspapers and confirmed through interviews), mobilization relied on intellectual techniques, research projects and papers circulated on campus or read over the campus radio-stations.

New restrictions on campus political activity known formally as “Campus Normalization,” were rooted in a simple premise:

> The idea behind [it] was really that it was better for students not to engage in politics and that a campus that was “normal” was one where students’ politics took the form of discourse and policy formation. Demonstrations or students action with other social actors were not properly the realm of students’ activities.[150]

As Heri Akmadi summed up the situation in 1979, Once again the student’s role is only that of an errand boy.” [151]

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates the interaction between collective identity processes and free-spaces during the first decade of the New Order. While the early New Order provides a glimpse into how repression shaped the identity of the student movement in ways that reflected close identification with intellect and problem-solving, shifting political opportunities in the early 1970s would mean that brief periods of student protest were sometimes possible. Periods of

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[149] Akmadi,*Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, (1979) 168.

[150] Yusman, Interview, Bandung 2002

[151] Akmadi (1979) 71.

relative uncertaint, such as during the anti-Chinese riots in Bandung in 1973, provided brief periods for protest. On different occasions, as in the aftermath of the Rene Conrad killing, students demonstrated obliquely for "civil-rights" and used the official commemorations of Human Rights Day to protest the shooting of Conrad by military cadets.

Such moments were rare. Malari represented another moment of generalized disorder that students used to protest Suharto's economic reforms. Repression following the Malari riots was directed specifically at "unsupervised campus discussions. The effect of this was to push student activism into protected free-spaces where students once more engaged in dissident problem-solving activism. Not until the election anxiety of 1977/1978 would students have, once more, brief opportunities for openly dissident speech (as opposed to the disguised dissident speech of the early GOLPUT campaign during the early 1970s). And even following the openly dissident critiques of Suharto in the White Book of Student Suffering, it would take greater repression on campus to push the student movement to return to its dissident role. Heri Akmadi's trial was a classic dissident moment, standing before the court Akmadi took nine days to read his defense statement.

What had begun in 1966 as "a student movement" with a single purpose "united against Communism evolved in the late 1960s and 1970s as a movement with a much less concentrated focus. Opposition was refracted by a lack of singular purpose—for some activists, the movement represented the best hope for democratic reform, but the practical implementation of this was blunted by the sheer force of the regime and its punishing of opposition organizations. As Arief Budiman (1978) explained it, the main issue facing activists/dissidents in the Suharto years, was how to express dissent at all:

> How can social criticism exist in [an authoritarian] political culture?.… First, criticism is possible if presented in a delicate form that cannot be associated with social disorder. It should not be aggressive; it should be very polite or else be presented as a half-serious joke.[152]

As a result, opposition consciousness took shape as dissidence speech acts, parodying official events or in social networks of concerned researchers, scholars and the collective identity of the movement was one defined by "problem solving" activism. Lacking clearly defined organizations, student activism reflected a location in community of movement groups and indigenous organizations: the study-clubs.

Seeing moral power as an oppositional speech situation is to acknowledge it as a strategic identity. It allowed students a strategic advantage that they did not otherwise have: it allowed them to act. It was a way of opposing without being oppositional (Aspinall, 2004). This made some strategic sense as Boudreau (2005) recognized. Moral force power made sense only within the particular culture of military rule in Indonesia and the particular logic of rationality, scientific and technical expertise.

[152] Arief Budiman "The Student Movement in Indonesaia: A Study of the Relationship Between Culture and Structure," *Asian Survey* (1978) 609-625.

Chapter 6

Identity Dynamics and Mechanisms in Free Spaces: Tentative Conclusions

A central function of this work was to show that the ideas, narratives and free-spaces of student activism have broad significance for understanding the role of student activists in Indonesian politics. First, in terms of the political roles played by public intellectuals in national politics, it is from participation in the student movement that many public figures and leaders became familiar and visible to the Indonesian public. Second, through the student movement, ideas that began in private spaces became the basis of social movements and more visible public discourses and modes of attack.[1] Third, the student movement has been a source of movements that have shaped modern Indonesian politics.

Where study of the Indonesian student movement has often been limited to the study of single episodes of activism or analysis of student protest, my work focused on the narratives, collective identities and repertoires that, together with external shifts and opportunities combined to produce contentious identities of Indonesian student activism. In so doing, I shifted emphasis away from studying a single period of student activism, to make comparisons between different periods of student activism and student participation in contentious politics.[2]

[1] Before the independence movement was a movement espousing revolution against the Dutch and Japanese oppressors, anti-colonial resistance rested on sentiments of "native progress" and linguistic unity. These ideas were articulated first in student circles.

[2] There are, of course, important exceptions. Vincent Boudreau's *Resisting Dictatorship* is a comparative analysis of social movements in Burma, Indonesia and the Phillippines. His Indonesian cases, insofar as they relate directly to students and student movements, deal with the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Edward Aspinall's 1991 study of Student Dissent in the 1970s made explicit comparisons with the themes of students in the 1966 anti-communist movement, KAMI.

The way identity has traditionally been understood by scholars who have studied Indonesian student activism, has been to see it as synonymous with ideological orientations (Bachtiar 1969), transmission of political values or socialization (Douglas 1971). I understand identity as something potentially broader, as encompassing more than a shared system of beliefs, or ideology, but of reflecting private habits, concerns and practices. In order for students to act collectively as students they first must think of themselves as a collective group with a specific consciousness, history and identity. Public identities were a product of personal responses to politics, negotiated in both private and public.

Explaining the role of students in Indonesian politics requires we specify both the specific parameters in which students have been able to act as well as the unique claims made by students that were part of larger sequences of contention. Insofar as Indonesian student activism has been the subject of academic scholarship, most work has focused on the contentious organizations, rather than the contentious identities, that were part of each phase of student activism. This has yielded analysis that has significantly missed understanding students as unique actors with specific identities, unique claims and specific patterns of action in Indonesian politics.

Student activism has been neither as simple as “generational anger” (Feuer 1966, Huntington 1997). A long history of student participation in Indonesian politics documented by historians and political scientists demonstrates that recruitment of youth into activism was not preceded by grievances so much as it relied on existing networks of social organizations and sponsored activities. Whether it was school, football-clubs, discussion groups, dormitories or study-clubs, these activities promoted communities built on strong solidarities that could be easily converted into social movement activity, if not, insurgency.

Second, youth's personal experiences prior to participation in social activism were not one of deprivation but of specific experiences of participation in contentious activities and social movements. Within this context, settled patterns of authority, clear boundaries of community and hierarchy were often subject to intense change and re-interpretation.[3]

Some Basic Assumptions of this Work

Social movements are formally organized groups engaged in movement and may include social networks embedded in 1) a combination of formal/informal organizations, clubs and groups; 2) personal friendships or groups of individuals who share membership in similar groups and 3) whose interaction with one another as a movement is often within less-visible, semi-private settings. Indeed, I assume, that the public acts that analysts have identified as 'student protest" were the culmination of a series of less visible events, both individual and small-group initiated in which not only the issues but very idea/purpose of groups solidarity was discussed, negotiated on and decided upon through the members in these groups.

2) Social movements are series of events and interactions between challengers and authorities rather than one continuous event (2001, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly) and movements may arise or go underground depending on the level of repression/reprisal activists face, the closing of opportunities (although underground activism may thrive during this period) and sudden openings. Activists must not only calculate risks of activism, they must negotiate the very identity of their movement. I assumed that such decisions, given the high-risk setting many

[3] For example, from Benedict Anderson's 1979 work on the nationalist youth groups, or pemuda, who were recruited during the Japanese occupation (*Java in a Time of Revolution*, 1979) we gain understanding of the way existing patterns of youth recruitment took on heightened significance under Japanese rule. As youth became politicized under the conditions of occupation, they began to define themselves in new ways—as both opponents of colonialism and as increasingly insistent on decolonization. Where youth in the context of the Dutch system had been defined by access to 'western education' in the Japanese occupation, the *pemuda* were the young men whose education had been disrupted and whose formative experiences were in ascetic service to the Japanese military government on Java.

opposition activists have faced (acknowledging also that students are rarely as 'high-risk' of a category as labor/left activists in Indonesia), are nonetheless done with strategic considerations in mind.

3) Members active in one generation/time period of a social movement may stay active in successive generations. Despite the overt/public presence of new cadres/leaders, older activists stayed on often as informal 'advisors' and thus, while not officially or publicly members of particular organizations in the formal sense, continue to exercise influence (presumably) as "brokers" and unofficial "leaders" (Diani, 2003 in Diani/McAdam, ed, Social Movements and Networks).

4) Movements are also built out of shared social solidarities and common grievances that combined, make up what is understood as a movement's 'collective identity' (Melucci, 1989). These solidarities may be the result of shared experiences or shared memberships in informal or formal organizations.

5) Finally, participation as an activist or in a social movement is rarely straightforward. Why were some youth drawn towards activism? How was their participation in the student movement tied to personal connections they had or through social networks that they were recruited into (what is often conceptualized as 'ties')? How was social movement participation part of the process of political recruitment? And why do networks matter and in what ways do they matter with regard to questions about individuals with regard to social movement participation? These issues I turn to next.

6) For collective action to be accomplished, "a group must [first] define itself as a group, and its members must develop shared views of the social environment, shared goals and shared opinions

about the possibilities and limits of collective action" (Klandermans, 1992: 81).[4] While some of the earliest analysis of social movements began with analysis of the values and beliefs of a challenging group (Smelser, for example), those who call themselves "constructivists' believe that the values and beliefs of a social movement are the product of conflict internal (and shaped by external dimensions) to the movement participants. Participants 'construct' or 'actively create' an identity for the challenging group "within and between groups and social categories and within social networks." (Klandermans, 1992: 94).

Students as contentious actors

As a form of contention, student activism reflected a domestic history of violence and revolution, and the specific way that Indonesian youth had contributed to particular types of violence and revolutionary action. Student participation in the Indonesian revolution had been through 1) marshalling intellectual resources and manpower to the nationalist movement and, 2) through participation in military and paramilitary-activities to the formation of cadres who would provide leadership in the revolution.

As a form of political contention student activism relied on particular repertoires which reflected deliberate strategies to avoid triggering violent state response. From its earliest days in the 1920s, the student movement took great pains to distance itself from more populist movements that were common in rural Java throughout the 1890s and 1920s. Students distanced themselves from active identification with the Left and with the more radical tactics of the Left.

[4] See Bert Klandermans, "The Social Construction of Protest and Multiorganizational Fields," in Frontiers of Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 77-103.

Efforts to avoid alliances with the Communist Left framed much of the identity concerns of students in the early 1920s, the 1960s and the 1970s.[5]

The rise of the student in Indonesian politics was tied to the growing power of the Indonesian state (against at first the colonial machinery of Dutch and then Japanese occupation), the university and the particular power of rhetoric of scientific knowledge and technical expertise acquired in politics. To explain the prominence of the student movement in national politics means both to examine students and the institutional context in which their activities took place but also the entire system of culture, politics and domination that shaped students' opportunities to act.

The legacy of the revolutionary period was two-fold. Student groups who developed in the revolutionary years (1920-1945) identified with a national collective identity that had evolved with students' recognition of their own identities as nationals, first in the context of Dutch universities and schools and second, in the context of the revolutionary struggle on Java. In the post-independence period, students' collective-identities would be shaped by a context of partisan-strife and ideological indoctrination. Students increasingly saw their organizations embroiled in ideological struggle and co-opted by political interests.

The significance of the student movement of the 1960s was not simply as part of a larger wave of youth revolutions, it also had significance as a movement specific to Indonesian politics.

[5] As early as the 1927 massacre of the Indonesian Communist Party on Java, Indonesian students in the Netherlands (like Hatta) worried about the "recklessness" of mass organizations and techniques. Ruth McVey has argued that communism's egalitarianism did not appeal to the privileged youth. This can be seen through the efforts to form the PSI in the 1920s. The Indonesian Socialist Party and its culturally-distinctive subculture of discussion-groups, study-clubs, literary societies and youth associations stood in stark contrast to the kinds of mobilization of other types of student youth groups.

It drew on specific identities of youth and particular political commitments of students that can only be understood through examining the history of the Indonesian revolution.

The Relation of the University to Opposition Politics

From an early period (the late colonial era) the university community in Indonesia served as the main source of opposition politics. In the early 1920s on Java, those who discussed colonial politics and the problems of colonial rule were the youth who frequented private debating societies, cultural clubs and discussion circles. Identification with a non-Dutch identity, whether it was Islamic (Zuhri 2001) or young (Shiraishi 1990) or Indonesian (Anderson 1993) constituted the main components of these youths' identities. By the 1930s and 1940s, oppositional identities that were nurtured in private, protected spaces like clubs and debating societies became the basis for both nationalist insurgency and the construction of ever larger, mass-oriented membership groups capable of more public action.

Whereas in the 1920s students had identified with regional and ethnic identities to express a non-Dutch cultural identity, by the 1930s and 1940s, all traces of a Dutch identity were altered by the Japanese occupation of Java. Student-debate and activism was no longer the preserve of a small elite who had experienced education in Dutch schools for upper-class natives but activists now included a new cohort of youth conversant and educated in a new language (Indonesian, not Dutch).

In the early 20th century (while Java remained a colonial territory of the Dutch crown) the university signified the efforts of Dutch rulers to divide an indigenous population. University

education created a small professional native class[6] that enjoyed Dutch privileges in a larger society denied entry into Dutch culture and customs. The interruption of Dutch rule from 1937-1945 changed the culture of universities on Java. All universities except the Medical Faculty were closed. The emergence in 1947 during the revolutionary war of a new university, Gadjah Mada University, on the grounds of the Sultan of Yogyakarta's palace represented the first university to have an Indonesian faculty with a teaching faculty who also taught in the Indonesian language (Bachtiar 1969).

The emergence of Gadjah Mada University in the revolutionary period was the beginning of an attempt to create a distinctly national university. In 1950, a new University of Indonesia system was expanded to provinces outside Java as part of an early priority to expand higher-education. These efforts signified an early effort by Sukarno to create national unification through the expansion of university education. Expansion of teacher-training institutions also served an early effort by the new Indonesian state to create national citizens through teaching a national curriculum from primary to secondary schools (Keyfitz 1985).

The individuals at the center of revolutionary politics in the 1940s called themselves by the Indonesian word for "young person" or (*pemuda*) as Benedict Anderson (1972) has described. Compared to the 1920s the locus of students' claim-making had considerably

[6] Three main facilities for tertiary education were created by the Dutch and maintained in or close to the capital, Batavia. The Native Doctor's school, STOVIA and a Law Facility were in the capital. The Technical Institute was located in the West Java provincial capital, Bandung. For descriptions of the colonial schools, Frances Gouda's *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942,* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (2008) is an excellent source. Bruce L. Smith's *Indonesian-American Cooperation In Higher Education*, East Lansing, MI: Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, 1960 describes many of the problems of the educational system after independence, including what he calls the "critical underdevelopment" of Indonesian institutes of higher education (1960:xix). The shortage of teaching faculty fluent in Indonesian, inadequate facilities and not enough books, supplies and personnel made Indonesian universities increasingly dependent on aid from abroad. Smith describes the sources of the aid to higher education from foreign government-funded programs like . Among the leading sources were the British Council, the other Colombo Plan countries, UNESCO, the Soviet Orbit countries, and the United States." (1960: p. xix)

changed. Dutch power, Anderson describes (1972 [2006] 33) had been replaced by Japanese military rule and the institutions of Dutch colonial rule had given over to more clearly Fascist orientations.[7] In this context, Anderson described how students took part in the military organizations organized under Japanese authorities (1972). Students' willingness to embrace an identity as soldiers and fighters reflected both the Japanese efforts to train youth in paramilitary organizations and the way that military struggle became more central to students' identities as activists.

Anderson (1972) documents but does not explicitly theorize about these shifts in students' identities from previously subjects of Dutch rule (and how this shaped the contentious claims students made) to the emergence of a more vibrant nationalistic culture and identity embraced by young students in the Japanese-occupied cities and towns across Java. Early student activism reflected the politicization of youth during the early anti-colonial agitation of the 1920s. Then, the emergence of private spaces devoted to reason and critical thought emerged out of the late 19th and early twentieth century movements to reform Dutch culture on Java.[8] Dutch reformers designed new secondary schools to advance "native progress" (Gouda 2008).

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[7] More significant still, Anderson argued, was the "Japanese political style," its reliance on fanaticism and extraordinary discipline, that "presented the youth of Java with a new mode of political life and action that by sheer contrast implied a radical critique of the values and political ideas Dutch rule had instilled in their fathers." *Java in a Time of Revolution* First Equinox Edition (Singapore [Ithaca: Cornell University Press] 2006)

[8] By 1900 on Java, a lively public sphere included the emergence of a new commercial press, literary societies, journals, and cultural clubs. Some associations served the interests of particular skilled trades (labor unions) and indigenous merchants Sarekat Islam, an organization of indigenous cloth merchants was formed in 1910. Takashi Shiraishi's *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) summarizes many of these developments. Within this context of contentious politics developed small circles of university students and public intellectuals, many of whom were unaffiliated with schools or institutes but whose speeches were well known and circulated in private. For first hand descriptions of this period see C.L.M Penders' biography about Mohammad Hatta, *Mohammad Hatta: Indonesian Patriot Memoirs*, (Singapore: Gunung Agung Press, 1981).

The result, as has been described elsewhere (Anderson 1993, Shiraishi 1996, Mrazek 2007, Gouda 2008) was the development of social insurgency against the Dutch.

On Java, capitalist development created new classes (indigenous merchants, increasingly independent religious leaders and professionals, such as native-doctors) who demanded new rights and recognition of these rights (Shiraishi 1996). Out of this environment emerged a form of student activism that has much to tell us about the relationship between the Indonesian nation and the university. By the 1950s national independence had been won. Where youth had played key roles in the late colonial period as articulators of independence and freedom, by the 1950s the state no longer relied on youth in the same way. Youth served new purposes. As large mass audiences, they were present as audiences, rather than as active participants, during new ideological shifts and announcements of policy-programs (Douglas 1970, Paget 1970).

As the products of a new educational system, they had studied under the guidelines of new national curriculum (Smith 1980). Where political elites had once relied on youth for their spirit, discipline and bravery, by the 1970s a new idiom of career professionalism and work replaced civic duty and participation. Youth and older dissidents withdrew from politics through forming non-governmental organizations. Political opposition was expressed with new organizations Indonesian activists called “self-help” organizations (Chalmers and Hadiz 1997).

By the end of the first decade of the Suharto period in the 1970s the Indonesian military was given greater direction in both running the state and the economy. Alongside these changes were important shifts in the narratives that accompanied student activism. By the 1970s, an idiom of revolutionary youth (so relied on by Sukarno throughout the late 1950s “Guided Democracy” period) was replaced by new narratives of youth action that stressed intellectual and

professional obligations. The old revolutionary rhetoric, with its stress on the political obligations of the young, was no longer useful to the regime. In place of this narrative was a new doctrine of Campus Normalization imposed, by 1978, through bureaucratic and military-controls over campus. Student government associations were “neutralized” by the legislation and political activities were forbidden on campus.

Campus normalization would sever the connection between the university and politics in a way that was particularly dramatic, considering the history of the university in Indonesia. Its emergence as an institution that had been at the center of political conflict, first under Dutch rule and then in independent Indonesia, suggests that student activism reflected the particular struggles involving a rhetoric of nationalism and the political purpose of the Indonesian university.

Student Activism and Free Spaces

Student activism emerged out of activities and groups that students were engaged with daily. These spaces, also understood as free spaces (Evans and Boyte, 1982) have functioned both to recruit students and to sustain activism during more dangerous periods of political repression, when it was too dangerous to agitate in public. This work challenged some of Evans and Boyte’s (1982) basic assumptions about free-spaces and their centrality to democratic practices, their local character and function, and their ability to support democratic norms. My work suggests a possible re-thinking of free spaces in four areas identified in the theoretical literature: 1) the autonomy of free-spaces, in particular, how (defined in terms of place), the free spaces studied in this work were not as autonomous from state control and authority as Evans and Boyte suggest. Second, free-spaces local character and their centrality to democratic discourses was not

something completely supported by this work. As evidence from the 1960s demonstrates, free spaces may be just as important to anti-democratic discourses.

Some of the free spaces, like exile communities in the Netherlands, were more autonomous from the exercise of state power on Java, but not necessarily free from state control and influence. First, regarding the characteristics of free-spaces identified by Evans and Boyte (1982), my work suggests that free-spaces' spatial characteristics, in particular, their location as fixed local actors is subject to some scrutiny. The existence of exile communities in the Netherlands as free spaces suggest that free spaces may be imagined in ways that transcend national politics and borders. Mobilizing as Indonesian nationalists from 1926 to 1931 took place in dense and often interconnected social networks of university students, partisan activists and journalists based in both the Netherlands and on Java. Examining these social networks demonstrates that an emerging 'collective identity' of Indonesian nationalists resulted from the interaction between students in study-clubs and early political organizations.

For a small number of Indonesian activists in the Netherlands, free spaces unavailable on Java were created through participation in international conferences as young delegates of Indonesia. The participation by Indonesian exiles in the Netherlands in creating new activist communities and networks evolved from participation in transnational free-spaces—like the Anti-Colonial League's Conference against Imperialism demonstrates that students—through participation in international conferences—developed identities as Indonesian nationalists.

Second, regarding the relative freedom from governmental authorities possible in free spaces, my work suggests somewhat problematically that free-space' freedom was sometimes a function of direct government support. In this sense free spaces were not free of particular

influence but had the direct sanctioning of government authorities. Whether it was a function of the Dutch-government's sponsorship of tertiary education, the army's sponsorship of student study-clubs and discussion groups, the Ministry of Education[9]'s support for the Student Councils, student activism had complex ties with government authorities that made it complicated to repress and relatively easy to tolerate.

How Organizations and Free Spaces reflected Student Identities

Two main dynamics made up the core of this inquiry: 1) the strategic adaptation and identity-processes as well 2) the trajectory of activist careers are examined from the perspective of free spaces. Free spaces played a critical role in students' ability to adapt to repression. Examined as part of his process is how activists maintained and defined 'boundaries" and integral components of activist identities, including the negotiation of specific identities.

The formation of new literary societies, journals, cultural clubs that developed around student circles in the 1920s suggested students saw their identities expressed in practices they regularly enjoyed: reading, writing, socializing, attending movies and eating at cafes.[10] In the 1920s students liked especially to build and construct organizations that reflected their bureaucratic identities as individuals who attended meeting, engaged in parliamentary procedure, argued and debated and ran for political office. The student identity that resulted from these developments was one attuned to the future role students saw themselves playing: as the chairman and managers of the new Indonesian Republic.

[9] The Ministry of Higher Education and Culture was created prior to the achievement of formal independence. Its role in the newly independent republic would be overseeing the institutions of primary, secondary and tertiary education.

[10] This is in fact the world of the young described by Shiraishi, in *Age of Motion* and Mrazek's biography of Sjahrir, during his days in Bandung.

The legacy of the revolutionary period was two-fold. Student groups who developed in the revolutionary years (1920-1945) identified with a national collective identity that had evolved with students' recognition of their own identities as nationals, first in the context of Dutch universities and schools and second, in the context of the revolutionary struggle on Java. The privileged identity of students and their suspicion of mass power were connected. The suspicion of egalitarian ideologies, like Communism, was no doubt part of the highly privileged position of the educated.[11]

> By the end of Dutch rule, there were 1000 persons in the entire country who had completed their university education. By then the total Indonesian population was close to 70,000,000. In 1936-1937 60,000,000, the total number of students was only 1038, of this student body, 240 were Europeans, 269 Chinese and 529 Indonesians."[12]

Traditionally, university training did not prepare one for a career in the academy. The purpose of university education throughout the Dutch era (and also indeed during the early years after independence) was to create a new administrative elite. In the colonial era, education was tied to more specific "aspirations for government work among Indonesian Ph.D. holders rather than a career devoted to teaching and undergraduate education did not help the development of the Indonesian academy" (Van der Kroef, 1959). [13] The preference for government jobs[14] by the

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[11] Noted Bruce L. Smith (p. 12) In 1948, the faculty of Medicine [at UI] still had only 18 native Indonesian students as against 194 Chinese and 39 Dutch students…There were more native Indonesians registered at the faculty of Technology in Bandung and both faculties in Bogor (Agriculture and Veterinary Science.

[12] Bachtiar (1969) 8.

[13] Justus van der Kroef remarked that, while in the Dutch period, 25% of all Indonesians could not find jobs for which they were trained, this number was explained by the restrictions imposed of the Dutch system, and the reluctance by the Dutch to hire 'natives', the small number of Indonesians in jobs 'they were trained to do" . In the post independence era, the same trends persisted, suggesting a preference for government work and the high status administrative work conferred.

educated class was also noted by Nathan Keyfitz (1979,)[15]. In the post-independence era, the civil service had gown top heavy, employing over 1.7 million.[16]

The status conferred by a position within the civil service was one that suited the elite backgrounds of many of the university educated. However, while the civil service in the post-independence period continued to grow, it failed to absorb most university graduates by the late to early 1960s. University graduates were also increasingly alienated by the affect of Sukarno-era policies on university instruction and doctrine. The result was by 1961, a student movement that was supported by many faculty and older intellectuals against the bureaucracy.

The anger towards the civil service was evident in the 1966 marches in Jakarta:

> Who has never been on a bus?
>
> Who wants to raise the price of gas?
>
> Who likes making empty promises?
>
> Who thinks everyone should eat only corn?
> Who are the ones who like to throw money around?
>
> Who saves our national wealth in overseas accounts?
>
> MINISTERS
>
> Do you want to be ruled by people like this?[17]

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[14] "In 1940, 280,000 civil servants existed; in 1958, 2 million," van derKroef, 388. Fueling this growth was the spread of universities and educational institutions "[some] lacking all facilities or qualified staff to justify their issuance [of diplomas and degrees]." See *Population and Politics in Southeast Asia*, Wriggins and James Guyot (1974) 234.

[15] The colonial experienced impressed on Indonesians that education was the key to upward social mobility in the city, and imposed a social ranking in terms of schooling, non-manual occupation and income," (Keyfitz, in Wriggins and Guyot (1974) 234.

[16] Smith and Carpenter, *Asian Survey*, Indonesia University Students and their Career Aspirations," *Asian Survey* September, 1974, Vol. 14, No. 9: 807–826

[17] Soe Hok Gie, [*Catatan Seorang Demonstran*], Diary entry, Saturday, January 15, 1966

The national school system established in the post-independence period certainly facilitated a specific understanding of youth's political roles and obligations. Primary education texts developed in the post-independence period taught the history of the nationalist movement, emphasizing the role of young nationalist students like Sukarno and Hatta, to middle-school and junior high-school students. The doctrine of higher-education, revised continuously in the post-independence era stressed the social obligations of the educational system.

The second Higher Education Decree passed in 1950 perhaps reflected this concern.

> In 1950, the goal of education was further specified by the *Tri Dharma* or "Three Pillars of service of Education." [18] The "Tri Dharma" specified that the purpose of higher education was to 1) educate; 2) research and 3) provide community service." This was aimed at creating "decent, capable human beings and democratic citizens [who will be responsible] for the welfare of society and our nation."[19]

In the post-1965 era, Student Council Chairmen Siregar and Akmadi typified the new student activist. Students like Heri Akmadi saw the student movement in terms of the unique role they had played in nationalist history:

> There is so much evidence which testifies to the presence of students during every phase of [our] history. The students were there when the bonds of nationalism were formulated; they were there when the proclamation of independence was at hand; they were there when independence was in danger of being swallowed up by the PKI; they were there when the nation was developing…and the students will always be there when the nation is gripped by crisis!!"[20]

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[18] "Tri Dharma Pengurran Tinggi," UUD, 1950, No. 4, Section 2, Passage 3; ["Undang-Undang No. 4, 1950, Bab II, Passage 3] See also Buchori and Malik (2005) 257.

[19] Widjojo (1966)

[20] Heri Akmadi *Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People,* Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, (1979) 159.

One thing all activists had in common by 1973 would be that they were all leaders—Chairman or representatives of the student-community on their campus. In contrast to groups like HMI, the student councils were representative bodies, responsible for the day-to-day running of student affairs and elected by the student body to serve two –year terms.

In this sense, 1970s, student activism represented a counter-culture critique by the young of both the bureaucratic careers that had once been desirable (and available) but of the idea that the young and educated had new responsibilities to challenge, not merely seek to rule. The idea that intellectuals had a unique position to question and probe government officials represented a new cultural critique that was occurring among students outside Indonesia. It was one also supported by Heri Akmadi who saw students uniquely positioned to challenge the exercise of power. The failure of intellectuals to actively critique, Akamdi noted, was no surprise given the New Order:

> The Intellectuals, who are supposed to be better informed about their rights and responsibilities in society, are also affected by this climate of fear. We can detect its influence in their choice of words. Many intellectuals prefer to use veiled and sometimes confusing language to describe certain realities….They see the examples set by the many Indonesian Intellectuals who have been formerly incarcerated in prison because they openly expressed their opinions about some situation which reflected badly on the New Order."[21]

While the closeness between students and the military did not come close to approximating the levels of January 1966, some students appeared to receive support and encouragement from their traditional allies in the military, as Hariman Siregar (University of Indonesia Student Council Chairman would in early-1974). It helped enormously that students also had allies in the press. "The student press," Indro Cahyono told me, was "behind the

[21] Akmadi, *Breaking the Chains of Oppression*, (1979) 143.

promotion of the idea that students could articulate the peoples' aspirations. It was the student journalists who most distrusted the political process."[22]

Press coverage aided student mobilization efforts. Each time the press published a petition or was in attendance at Student Council seminar, the story that followed helped promote the movement's grievances raised the profile of the student movement and provided publicity of the movement's activities. The student press was a new development in the 1970s. Begun in the 1966 protests, it marked the beginning on campus of new free-spaces and movement communities.

In post 1966 period, the student newspapers began to perform another function: to produce work by students (Douglas, 1970), including investigative reporting (Steele, 2005) as well as updates on activism throughout campus across the country. From its days as mimeographed copy advertising upcoming KAMI protests and events, the newspaper Harian Kami evolved under the direction of its editor, Nono Makarim. [23] In the post-1966 period, Harian Kami provided a medium for poems, essays, and even stories written by students. Various student organizations, including KAMI itself, sponsored exhibits of paintings, photographs, artwork…and tried to promote student activity in the arts. Their new political power and social prestige gave students access to halls and theaters (including the capital city's

[22] Interview, Indro Cahyono, Jakarta, 2002.

[23] Its founder, Nono Makarim noted that "Harian Kami [did crazy things…A student activist died demonstrating in Bandung. The editorial page was black with one flower in the middle. And poetry sometimes on the editorial page." Steele, 2005, *Wars Within* (2005) 49.

prime facility in the Hotel Indonesia) where they held film festivals, plays, and musical recitals and performances."[24]

While the student newspapers served an important function for the army and the regime in that they legitimized the regime's new ideology the newspapers had significance beyond serving the regime. Student newspapers served to spread the ideology of the New Order and to challenge "myths" of the Sukarno years. They would, as Raillon put it, "became the vehicle for students who wanted to forge a new history." [25]

If the free spaces in the Netherlands provided the space in which students imagined themselves as Indonesian nationalists, on Java, students built organizations and congresses for continued dialogue between student groups. These appeared to be symbolically significant. There was a noticeable growth in youth organizations and congresses across Java, like Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth). These groups were not 'underground' in the same way Sukarno and his study clubs were. In contrast, they met openly and frequently across Java. Student federations in the revolutionary period saw their goals as constructing a national community of students.

In the Sukarno era, this identity would change. Students would see their organizations and bodies increasingly shaped by the partisan conflicts of the 1950s. Federations and organizations that had once had meaning as national bodies and whose identity connoted a national-identity, increasingly found themselves defined by political ideology and partisan

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[24] Douglas, 1970: p. 177-78

[25] Raillon, (1985) 70

differences. The shift in the 1960s was for students to increasingly identify as 'modern' and 'democratic' individuals in a society that was culturally 'backwards" or 'feudal':

> the government, the army, the political parties form a group in politics [who] do not, at all, have a modern orientation. They are not at all democratic. They are totalitarian (*totaliter*)….[students] are part of a new political force that is outside the political power of the army and political parties and which will only represent our interests and aspirations.[26]

The power of the student councils acknowledged both the role of intellect and prestige, but of the existence of the nation and the role of the university in the nation's development. The rise of the student movement in Indonesian politics particularly in the late 1960s and 1970s was tied to the particular power scientific knowledge and technical expertise acquired in the New Order. A characteristic of the student movement in the 1970s was prestige and political training. In the New Order period, students recognized the value of intellectual inquiry could be used as tools of activism. Part of this component of their identity was shaped by the repressive context of the New Order state.

Assembling in private spaces in the form of seminars and study-groups characterized many of the actions of students in the post-1966 period. This was in marked contrast to the days in January when students were free to march, congregate en-masse in the streets of Jakarta and to harass ministers at Parliament. Students believed, however, that the solution could be found in applied knowledge or science. Noted Heri Akmadi, Bandung Institute of Technology Student Council Chairman in 1977,

> the basis of the students' political stance in their struggle…is [their] natural trait…[to] seek knowledge and strive after truth…Students are trained as a matter of course to be perpetually restless and to doubt everything, so that they can then

[26] Zufluki Lubis (leader of the group "Young Generation") in his address to the group of about 30 assembled students.Reported in *Mahasiswa Indonesia.*

> use their mental capacities to analyze each phenomenon logically, systematically and objective[ly]"[27]

Applying scientific analysis of politics meant, first of all, a detached disinterest in politics. By aspiring to scientific analysis of politics, students could deny being led by ideological principles. Instead, activism was "natural" to students in a way that was personally, not politically, defined. Activism represented a search for general laws and for kind of objective truth. The scientific intellectual identity was a reflection of students' personal identity and a reaction to the New Order repression. It served both as an extension of the training they received and would implement after graduation. And for some, it seemed to indicate a particular modern road to progress: "Science provides the wherewithal to fashion great works, the means by which we can build a new prosperity, welfare and a new life in our land.'[28]

The public participation by students in the 1966 marches against communism and against Sukarno had heightened students' awareness of their own unique identity.[29] These demonstrations show a shift in the way students framed their actions in the colonial period (to connect with other students and potential cadres in the nationalist movement through study-clubs/discussion groups and education circles). Students in the early New Orrder wanted to be seen by the people.[30]

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[27] Heri Akmadi (1979) *Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People*. Cornell University: Modern Indonesian Project, 112.

[28] Holy Anger of a Generation, *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, 1970

[29] Gie's observations suggest how students who were part of these marches saw themselves. While Gie was aware that he was privileged, he did not see himself as 'rich.' As Gie noted, "near the Jakarta by-pass I met rich students in cars of their own. They drove by us. I was mad at them. I yelled at them (I must have sounded hysterical The marches also, in his opinion, would demonstrate to the Indonesian people, students' sincerity and desire to help.

[30] This was not a concern by articulated by students in the nationalist/republican era (who wanted to lead the people).

> The people will see and they will know that students don't just live in an ivory tower. I was the architect of this "Long March" , although in fact I didn't do that much. I wanted students to come and join us, to boycott class and forget about their lectures for a day….It's important to show the people that the university is patriotic.[31]

The rise of Indonesian student-intellectuals such as Mohammad Hatta in the 1920s, Sutan-Sjahrir in the 1930s, Soe hok-Gie in the 1960s, Arief Budiman and Heri Akmadi in the 1970s tells us much about the specific political opportunities[32] and oppositional cultures that emerged around student activism in Indonesian politics. To understand the anti-colonial movements, the radicalism of the years under the Japanese occupation of Java, the anti-communist movements of the mid-1960s and the efforts to promote early reforms during the military dictatorship known as the New Order is to acknowledge, in some sense, the varied roles and influence that students have exerted in Indonesian politics.

The repressive context of each era of student activism examined in this work (the late colonial period and first two decades after independence) shaped the particular free-spaces relied on by students. Free spaces were clearly contingent on places where oppositional identity and sentiment could be nourished. For example, the dependence on "young" cultural groups that developed into linguistic-solidarity groups ("Indonesian" literature societies") was an early

[31] Gie, 1966.

[32] The concept of political opportunities is one that is first used by Charles Tilly's (1979) work *Mobilization and Revolution*. Douglas McAdam (1982) extended analysis of opportunity structures to the civil rights movement in the United States to show that participants even with unfavorable opportunity structures can, under certain conditions and working with dense social networks "indigenous" to a group can overcome unfavorable political opportunity structures. By political opportunities scholars mean the factors (often outside the formal scope of the social movement participants) that affect their ability to act. A favorable political opportunity structure is the environment outside is one that would permit action by social movement participants with relative ease. Democracies or relatively open regimes with relatively open access for all groups to participate have much more favorable opportunity structures than do authoritarian regimes, which depending on the nature of the regime might entirely close off opportunities to act. A more illiberal regime may permit some contestation under highly regulated circumstances. Indonesian politics, particularly during the late-Sukarno and early Suharto regimes (1960s and 1970s) respectively, generally permitted some political activity.

example of the form that oppositional identity, organization and solidarity could take in the late Dutch period when it was dangerous (indeed, illegal) to use the Indonesian language. Efforts by students to organize reflected the particular qualities of repression. Whether repression targeted Indonesian language speaking, or enjoying foreign movies and magazines as some student groups did in the 1960s (when foreign movies and music was banned) student free-spaces generally promoted practices and solidarity that generated an oppositional consciousness. In the 1970s when open criticism was banned, students retreated into intellectual activities—holding conferences, conducting research into the impact of public policies and developing community-based organizations that would become the first non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The shared identity of students' solidarity reflected the limitations of these free-spaces. And contrary to the research that expects free-spaces to generate into more popular forms of insurgency, student free-spaces in Indonesia were not supportive of broader insurgency. The social clubs, literary-societies and student-governnment organizations that dominated the student movement by virtue of their limited membership were not helpful for wider social movement contention by non-student groups. Small private clubs open to only students and educated youth meant students sacrificied broad alliances for mobilization and generally took part in few efforts to motivate popular insurgency. As a result, by the 1970s, the label that students were an "elitist" sector was not an entirely false characterization. It reflected both the samall numbers of the college-educated in Indonesia as well as the privileged literate culture of this group.

Nevertheless, in spite of the limited opportunities to study popular insurgency from these events, student activism in Indonesia generated its own unique counter-cultural identity and public narratives. These narratives served as cultural critiques of the exercise of state power as

well as laying the basis for an identity of student-power that would become the basis for student activist campaigns in subsequent decades.

Student activists, not always free to openly oppose, turn instead to cultural activities of the kind Anne Swidler (1995) has identified as altering the exercise of state power. Such efforts did not prevent the exercise of state power, but instead serve “to alter or reinterpret the exercise of state power” (Swidler, 1995). Schools built by the Dutch during an era of progressive reforms in the late 19th century became the basis for the early nationalist movement. Courts and court-proceedings, normally used by the state to try and to convict dissidents became the forums used by dissidents to critique the state. Practices sanctioned by the state, like education, became the basis for organizations and activities whose purpose was to question and subvert the state. [33]

Where deliberate agitation as nationalists in the 1920s was dangerous and illegal, speaking and writing in Indonesian (in the 1920s, Dutch was still the language of public authorities) was subversive and modern (Anderson, 1999). In the 1960s when foreign films and music were banned by Sukarno, viewing a foreign film, like the *Magnificent Obsession*, was a subversive activity.[34] In the 1970s, when mass political organizations were banned, students formed scholarly societies and informal groups whose purpose was to study problems in policy-implementation. The promotion of less “top-down” policy gave way to new discourses that stressed local knowledge and community-solutions. Such efforts demonstrate that students did not merely oppose the exercise of power they sought to transform politics and redirect the exercise of state power.

[33] In some sense, the persistence of student activism and its attack on the state raises the question of how successful was the state project of education (if we assume that its main function was to promote loyalty to the state)? To answer this question, it may be useful to compare the experience of the 1920s with the mid-1960s.

[34] Hasyrul Mochtar, *Mereka Dari Bandung*. (1997)

By the 1970s a pattern over three decades in the making was established: student-intellectuals functioned as public critics and contributed to public discourses. As in the past, students did not openly oppose the political leadership. Instead, students publicly stated their grievances in terms of moral opposition to abuse of power (in the 1970s this would include opposition to 'lavish' spending on pet projects). While not explicitly anti-regime, their comments were pointed criticisms about the regime's policies. This activism was rooted (as in prior eras) in social networks of intellectual study-circle and older dissidents. Despite the network structure of the student movement individual activists would play key roles in issuing public criticism. Their methods would necessarily be creative. They would rely on court-testimony (Mohammad Hatta, Heri Akmadi), participation in international conferences (Mohammad Hatta), academic work (Arief Budiman, Heri Akmadi) manifestos and research.

The result described in this work was a particular type of student activism that was driven by private frustrations, grievances and intellectual concerns. Particular forms of collective action became institutionalized in two ways: 1) as a particular repertoire relied on by students and, 2) more generally as a culturally-acceptable mode of expressing opposition. The large student bodies, their mass-base and local groups would remain too big, too captured by conservative elite interest to engage in high-risk activity. Despite the mobilization of large student federations in 1966, this would prove to be a major exception rather than the norm.

Exile and silence were easily imposed on activists. The experience of activists tells us that speaking out resulted in the imposition of state-sanctions. While these sanctions were nowhere as brutal as that experienced by leftists or separatists (Boudreau, 2005), student activists experienced sanctions of exile that resulted in silence and removal from society.

Particular modes of protest and repertoires evolved as a result. Through speeches, manifestos, declarations and articles activists would generally express their private and personal disillusionment," and "criticism" of the status quo. In the same way that Chinese students relied on official state gatherings (official funerals, for example) for occasions on which they petitioned public officials, Indonesian students and intellectuals have utilized specific state-sanctioned institutions like schools and courts, to defy and "redefine…rather than rearrange state sanctions" (Swidler, 1995: 277). Semi-public methods like trials could be used to quietly question and subvert the state.

New to the 1970s was the adaptation by students to a culture and politics constructed around the myths and symbols of the military regime, the New Order. The politicization of youth by the armed forces in the aftermath of the alleged communist-coup of September 30, 1965 set in motion a series of events which shaped the foremost political experiences of the generation of activists in the 1970s. Moral power strategically identified in Indonesian politics as political opponents. While cycles of New Order contention may seem to suggest that student activism fluctuated with shifts in the alignment of elites, the patterns of student contention also reflected students's ability to generate opposition from free spaces.

Appendix

Sources

This research was based on access to Indonesian archival sources and analysis of textual materials (student newpspaers, journals, biographies, autobiographies) as well as 21 interviews with former activists in the student movement. as well as document and compile sources from the student-movement, a task that has been carried out at a number of libraries. Some like the National Archives in Jakarta I used in 2001-2002. I also relied on the Masters' Library at Gadjah Mada University and the The New York Public library for compiling a number of secondary sources (histories, theses, biographies and journals).

Documenting the tactics, strategies and grievances of students during specific episodes of collective action is a central part of this work. From the nationalist periods I relied on a mix of autobiographies of prominent figures in the nationalist movement such as Mohammed Hatta's biography (translated into English as *Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs*), Sukarno's autobiography (*As Told to Cindy Adams*), Ali Sastroamijojo's biography (written in English by CM Penders) and S. Takdir Alisahbana's work *Indonesia in a A Time of Social Revolution* provided first hand recollections of his student days in Bandung Other primary sources included documentation of pemuda (youth) organizations like Budi Oeotomo, Jong Java, Jong Sumatren Bond that were published as part of a larger retrospective of youth organizations in the 1950s.[1] Secondary

[1] Aside from the Sukarno government's obvious interest in mobilizing youth to support NASAKOM-era policies, there was a determined effort by the Ministry of Education to compile and identify history of youth organizations. These efforts document both an effort to preserve and to perhaps emulate the activities of youth. See Sedjarah Pemuda (Youth History) (author's copy, but located offsite at New York Public Library). Starting with the colonial period this publication identified the main groups, where they were active and some of their prominent activities and activists.

sources include scholarly research into the nationalist movement during the 1920s by academic historians and social scientists[2]

Some of the earliest efforts to write about the student movement in Indonesia were by activists who participated in the KAMI protests (Bachtiar, 1969) or who were observers of anti-communist mobilization at the University of Indonesia in 1966 (Gie, 1966). While these accounts are valuable first-hand accounts, they lack the necessary scholarly objectivity of the subject. Soe hok-Gie's journal of the events serves, nevertheless, can serve as a primary source which documents events in Jakarta from January 15-January 30, 1966, a period during which KAMI was an active street presence. Combined with his journal entries of the year prior to KAMI's mobilization, one can document how KAMI was the outcome of many months of anti-communist mobilization on campus.

From group publications, like the HMI (Association of Muslim Students) student newspapers histories of youth group that were compiled in the post-1966 period yield rich sources of data. Some of these are part of the archives of the Wason collection in Southeast Asian studies at Cornell University, where I visited in the summer of 2001. Primary sources I relied on for documenting this period include the recently re-published journals of Soe hok-Gie (Catatan Demonstran, or, Notes from a Demonstration) whose mimeographed-original I first located at Cornell's Wason Collection. John Maxwell's 2001 biography of Gie which I first found in a bookstore in Yogyakarta, was useful for its documentation of Gie's participation and attendance at particular events described in his journals.[3]

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[2] These include John Ingleson's 1975 study of the Indonesian students in the Netherlands who formed the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI), Benedict Anderson's Java in a Time of Revolution, John Smail's book on the pemuda movement in Bandung, Takashi Shiraishi's 1993 study of new forms of radicalism on Java, Age in Motion.

[3] Immense interest in Gie was apparent in 2005 with a film being made about Gie and the re-publishing of some of his writings by the Indonesian publishing house Gramedia.

Using evidence from private journals, student memoirs and analysis of primary and secondary sources, I document the connections between older activists, some like Soedjatmoko, active in the pre-independence period and younger activists like Soe hok-Gie, a literature student at the University of Indonesia. My work demonstrates that free-spaces and what happens in these free spaces has relevance for understanding the form mobilization takes. Within the-spaces (private homes, residences, student dorms) –going back to Poletta-not the space but what is said: what matters in this period is what is said: the way a historical experience of struggle is conveyed by individuals like Soedjatmoko—generational talk—to students too young to have lived through nationalist period—it is this enthusiasm that seems to matter—especially for young men like Soe Hok-Gie.

As I will show, drawing on Maxwell's autobiography of Gie and the biographical details of students who would become active in KAMI in Bandung and Jakarta, student mobilization was increasingly framed by young activists' identification and empathy with the sentiment of an older generation. Men like Soedjatmoko, and increasingly, army officers like Nasution, were admired for 'their ideals and for their 'sacrifice'. In Bandung, where PSI was a less formidable force, increased campus unrest and agitation against the Communist concentrations, CGMI constituted a source of significant mobilization. Student mobilization on campuses at Bandung was shaped by open conflicts on campus between PKI-affiliated student groups and 'independent' or 'non-affiliated' student organizations. In Jakarta, mobilization of students depended in large measure by the mobilization of intellectuals in Jakarta against 'cultural policies in the Sukarno era" that developed among PSI-influenced and unaffiliated groups

Scholarly interest in the 1965 period has made it possible to document the social ties and networks that comprise the central focus of my study. These networks disseminated new ideas of

the need for economic neoliberalism and served private spaces in which criticism of Sukarno and the Communist Party (PKI) could take place. Through extraordinary political shifts and crisis in which the army, not the dissident community created, oppositional consciousness once confined to small private groups began to take the form of more public calls for the banning of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and through eventually, more public forms of protest from January-March,1966. By the New Order period, a student movement was sustained through newspapers and journals that were student –oriented. Stephen Douglas (1970) observed how the military regime facilitated student creativity through liscencing student journals like Harian Kami (through Nono Makarim)[4]

My findings in the chapter on the student movement in the New Order build on research that has focused on the intellectual discourse of the movement (Francois Raillon's 1985 research on the student newspaper Indonesian student newspaper, for example) and Aspinall's work on the themes of student protest/activism in the 1970s. While this work has identified the key ideas and shifts in these ideas, I document the spaces where these ideas were generated, documenting the individuals who contributed to these ideas and the outcomes of these actions. The preservation of student newspapers from the 1970s has been facilitated by research centers, such as Cornell University's Modern Indonesia Project

Focusing on the 'discourse' or themes of the student movement, Aspinall's work showed student 'discontent' was rooted in concerns students had about the nature of political reforms undertaken by the New Order military regime and by criticism of developmental policies the

[4] Confirmed by Janet Steele's 2005 account and interviews with Makarim.

regime pursued.[5] Student criticism of politics in the 1970s was not only the expression of dissent and mobilization of more privately expressed intellectual critiques. The willingness of students to risk participation (and for some, to become minor opposition celebrities) marked a new phase for campus activism in the late 1970s.[6] This demonstrates the way in which the student movement could itself create new "opportunities" by engaging in non-disruptive and generally intellectually-centered activities, including research, study and problem-solving.

Despite its relatively small size the 1970s student movement had a large and relatively lasting impact—despite official attempts to limit their activism. I regard as one of their most important aspects their ability to serve as 'critical communities' that Thomas Rochon (1998) argued are essential to lasting and effective social activism..[7] The student movement's most lasting impact was in the way students contributed to ideas and strategies of political reform that became part of the Anti-Suharto movement in the 1990s. Many of these ideas did not become fully realized as broader social strategies for action in Indonesia until the 1980s and 1990s. By then, students who were active in the 1970s were no longer politically active or had left Indonesia to finish professional degrees. Some returned in the 1990s and continued to be

[5] Aspinall's work accounts for the role that students would eventually play in the emerging 'opposition' movement that is based around a loose-coalition of activists, social movement organizations, advocacy and self-help organizations (the NGO-movement). Aspinall's work does not focus on the study-club model per se. Rather, he shows the development among students in the early 1970s of an emerging oppositional consciousness (that grew out of the study-club model) of problem-solving.

[6] Candidate for president, Governor of Jakarta Ali Sadikin chose to frame his run against Suharto through his alliance with the student movement at ITB and University of Indonesia in 1978.

[7] Writes Thomas Rochon (1998), "the creation of new values begins with the generation of new ideas or perspectives among small groups of critical thinkers." While Rochon did not write about student movements, student groups are excellent examples of the 'critical communities' that he studies. "Movements," he writes, "mobilize thousands of people behind the ideas of the critical community…the people who join a movement do so through their affiliation of a pre-existing social group or network. Such networks are not conjured up out of the air; they stem out of some existing basis of organization, such as a church or university." (pp. 50-52)

involved in political reform. The themes student activists identified as “corruption” and “nepotism” became central to the reform movement that swept Indonesia in the late 1990s.

The data for this project was gathered from interviews I conducted with former student-leaders and activists. In 2001 I went to Indonesia to conduct research for this project. I met with many former leaders of the student movement, most of who were scattered across Indonesia in various capacities—as professors, as NGO activists, as parliamentarians, business-leaders and ex-government ministers. Exactly one-half of the former leaders who faced charges and/or were tried in 1979 agreed to speak and meet with me in 2002 to discuss their activism in the 1970s; in all I interviewed 15 individuals.

I was lucky to meet with the leaders of both groups of students in the 1970s and to talk to them on separate occasions as well as meet Indonesian researchers and activists. My overall sample size is small but it is nonetheless representative of the key figures and leaders of the students active during the 1970s.

Individuals who were willing to meet with me included 1) Hariman Siregar University of Indonesia Student Council, Chairman (1971-1974) to 2) Heri Akmadi, Institute of Technology, Student Council Chairman (1977-1978) as well as 3) Arief Budiman (active earlier, in 1969). The Bandung contingent who were close to Heri were interviewed; these included 4) Indro Cahyono (1977-78); 5) Yusman SD (ITB/1977-1978) and 6) Rizal Ramli (ITB/1977-1978). From the 1977/1978 cohort active in Jakarta, I learnt much from Student Council Secretary 6) Ibrahim Zakir (UI/1977-1978) and 7) Samuel Koto (University of Indonesia, 1977) and 8) Ridlo Eisy, ITB (1973/1974) and Dipo Alam (University of Indonesia, 1977/1978). Others I

interviewed had been based at the Agricultural Institute in Bogor, West Java (1977/78) and University of Indonesia (1973-1974). Not all gave me permission to use their names.

Archival work was supplemented with 15 interviews done in 2002 in Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta carried out with student leaders in the Bandung and Jakarta student movement from 1973 to 1977 phases of the student movement. While these interviews provided information about events and key activist themes, they should not be regarded as providing statistically reliable findings representative of a larger group of student activists. Student newspapers, interview data and activist memoirs were key sources especially in the later chapters, as they serve as a primary record to document develop strands of thought in the student movement they also serve as records of seminars and study-groups.

APPENDIX Selected Documents of the Student Movement

KAMI Oath, Bandung, 1966

Determination to Resolve [*IKRAR KEBULATAN TEKAD*]

“In the name of God, [*Dengan Nama Tuhan yang Esa*]

“We are Bandung students, son s and daughters of Indonesia, children of the people, determined to show responsibility to god, the nation and the revolution, for what is just, right and humane in according to Pancasila principles.

[“Kami mahasiswa-mahasiswa Bandung, putra-putri Indonesia, anak rakyat, sadar akan tanggung jawab terhadap Tuhan, Tanah Air dan Revolusi sadar akan arti keadilan, kebenaran dan kemanusiawan seperti yang diajarkan oleh falsafah pancasila].

“We are Bandung students, sons and daughters of Indonesia, children of the people. At this moment our nation’s fate belongs to our struggle against the efforts, groups and individuals who wish to harm our nation …right now…we must restore the the values of the 1945 Constitution and our nation’s philosophy of Pancasila.”

“*Kami mahasiswa-mahasiswa Bandung, putra-putri Indonesia, anak rakyat melihat bahwa nasib bangsa dan negara Indonesia saat ini dan di masa depan bergantung kepada bergantung kepada perjuangan kita untuk semua bias lepas dari usaha-usaha golongan golongan, organisasi, individu-individu yang sengaja mengarahkan kehidupan bangsa Indonesia…kehidupan politik harus benar-benar diatas landasan Undang-Undang Dasar ’45 dan falsafah negara Pancasila.]*

In according to our stated principles we gather tonight as KAMI…certain of justice, righteousness and above all, humanity. KAMI pledge:

“Atas dasar itu semua, maka KAMI yang malam ini berkumpul…yakin atas keadilan, kebenaran serta kemanusiaaan yang KAMI sedang bela dan bangunkan. KAMI berikrar:

I. KAMI will continue to struggle to achieve three main things:

1. The destruction of the PKI
2. The formation of new cabinet
3. The lowering of prices and economic stability

[I. Akan terus mengingkatkan perjuangan 3 tuntutan pokok KAMI:

1. *Pembubaran PKI*
2. *Perombakan Kabinet Dwikora secara Integral*
3. *Penurunan Harga/Stabilitas Ekonomi].*

II. KAMI will continue to defend our nation's philosophical basis in Pancasila. It is our nation's only philosophy.

[*II. Akan mempertahankan dengan taruhan jiwa raga KAMI falsafah Negara dan Bangsa Indonesia. Pancasila sebegain satu-satunya falsafah hidup bangsa Indonesia."].*

III. We will continue to pledge our faith to one nation, as youth did [in 1927 during the Oath of Youth].

[*III. Akan mendasarkan terus perjuangan kearah persatuan kesatuan Bangsa Indonesia dengan Apinya "SUMPAH PEMUDA*."]

[In the name of one god]

[*Semoga Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*],

Bandung

February 17, 1966

[*17 Februari 1966*]

Students from Bandung

[*Atas Nama/Wakil Mahasiswa Bandung*]

KAMI Konsulat Bandung

Chairman [*Ketua*]   Secretary [Sekretaris]

Appendix

KAMI Bandung branch still active, issued a new pledge in June called '

Our Determination to Uphold the 1945 Constitution

From Bandung Students who were united together in KAMI Bandung[8]

Regarding the situation of our nation we are representatives of Bandung students numbering 50,000 people. We pledge

1. Democratization can be discovered in the purest sentiments of the 1945 Constitution
2. There are 'forces' that wish to harm the process of democratization
3. There are groups that indeed wish to break the unity of the '66 Generation
4. There are economic difficulties that still have not been solved, including the guerilla tactics of the PKI/Gestapu elements and henchmen

Regarding these factors, we student representatives based in the KAMI Consulate Bandung, pledge to uphold the 1945 Constitution and swear

1. To keep our struggle focused on the purity and principles of the 1945 Constitution
2. To represent the peoples will as long as there is Guided Democracy and Dictatorship
3. To remain united during this time of economic, political and social hardship that our nation is currently in, especially in terms of the cabinet, containing as it does, irresponsible ministers appointed by Sukarno.
4. We continue to believe that the 1945 Constitution is the main framework for our nation and that the president must
    a. Enforce the Constitution's authority
    b. improve foreign relations with other countries
    c. improve internal political matters and form a new cabinet

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[88]Copies of the signed pledge were sent to the President, members of the MPRS, the cabinet, members of the press and political parties. The pledge was read in public on the evening of June 6, 1966. by a student from the Bandung Teachers' Training College and attended by representatives from Unpad, IKIP and ITB. KAMI representative Seogeng Sarjadi read the following statement at the event "today, people in Jakarta commemorate the founding of this city. Before, the streets of Jakarta had provided the backdrop for the revolution of independence. Today, Jakarta's streets remain at the forefront of another revolution: the truggle for the peoples' suffering and to restore the 1945 Constitution." See Mereka Dari Bandung, p. 276.

d. follow a democratic path in all public matters
e. fix the broken economy

5. We expect that the president and his cabinet ministers will act responsibly and end this era of dirty politics and replace it by the morals of the Pancasila.

We hereby swear that we will not move from our struggle as long as government continues to sacrifice the people, sacrifice justice, the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila. If the MPRS, the president, political parties and others don't agree, we will not be shy in exposing you. This is why we send you this letter. It represents the voice of the people for virtue and justice. Keep in mind our recent history, we represent the people. We are certain we are on the right side, on the side of justice and virtue, alongside the people.

Finally we forward this pledge to members of the Provincial Peoples' Consultative Assembly for consideration by all members and to President Soeharto.

We pray to god for you,

Bandung, June 3 1966, 23:30 hours

Student Representatives

KAMI Leaders Bandung Consulate

Presidium

Rohali Sani

Rotating ChairSignatures

The White Group[9]

Golput Manifesto [“Penjelesan Tentang Golongan Putih,”]

1. “The White Group is not an organization. It is an identity, an identity for those who are not satisfied with the present situation because the rules of democracy have been trampled upon, not just by political parties (for example, when they initiated the general election regulations) but also the Golongan Karya [Golkar] who in their endeavor to win this election utilized government agencies as well as undemocratic methods.”

2. “To show that someone identifies with the White Group, they will wear a white five-sided badge with a black border. They can make these badges themselves using a piece of card and a safety pin.”

3. “The White Group does not act outside the law because on of the movement’s objectives is to strengthen obedience of the law. It carries out its protest within the limits of existing laws.”

4. “The White Group carried out political education for the general public, especially the younger generation. It does not aim to make people follow any particular political stream but to encourage them to think critically and creatively in confronting their environment. One way in which this political education is carried out is by providing translations and holding discussions concerning current political issues, by openly sharing thoughts and so on. The White Group movement in itself already constitutes political education, by implanting awareness within society that in a general election every citizen has the right not to vote.”

5. “….to those who have been forced to vote for a particular political party or functional group, even though they do not want to vote, they need only complain to a legal organization in order to bring the case to court. In Jakarta this legal organization is the Legal Aid Institute headed by Adnan Buyong Nasution S.H.…complaints can be lodged with a local organization.”

[9] In Indonesian this group was called The Golongan Putih or simply GOLPUT. “It was set up prior to the 1971 elections by former student leader Arief Budiman…to protest against the government’s use of the military and the bureaucracy to ensure a Golkar victory.” (See Vedi Hadiz and David Bourchier, p.).

6. “The objective of the White Group is to safeguard the democratic tradition, that is the protection, in any situation at all, of opinions that differ from those of the rulers. Indonesian society must protect this tradition. It must not become accustomed to a situation in which the government is free to do whatever it likes.”

7. “The movement is therefore a cultural movement, in the sense that what we are struggling for is not political power but a social tradition whereby basic rights are always protected from arbitrary power.”

8. “The White Group recommends that in protest against the undemocratic 1971 general election the Indonesian people simply have become good spectators.”

9. “Not voting is the right of every citizen because it is protected by the constitution…I did not use methods outside the law, or sabotage or obstruct other people from voting. So long as my oppositionist attitude remained within the boundaries of the law, it was my basic right.”

Jakarta, 28 May 1971

The White Group

Appendix

Declaration of Position[10]

Students of the Bandung Institute of Technology [BIT]

1.1. Considering that the lives of the Indonesian people at present are still far removed from the ideals of Independence which formed basis for the founding of the State of the Republic of Indonesia;

1.2. Considering that this situation has been caused by incorrect government policies which can in fact be rectified, provided that the government has the political will to do so; considering that this situation has also been caused by deviations and abuses of power by government officials, leading to an erosion of the authority of government institutions

1.3. Considering that the above situation is an indication of the failure of national leadership in carrying out its functions; and considering that this failure is its responsibility;

11.1 Considering that democratic life must be maintained by providing the widest possible opportunity for all social groups in society to participate in determining the national leadership;

11. 2 considering that a dynamic political life in this country can not possibly develop if the presidency is occupied by the same person for more than two successive terms;

The Students of the BIT declare that

THEY DO NOT TRUST AND DO NOT WANT SUHARTO TO BE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AGAIN

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[10] **The contents of this book represent the product of discussions and collection and compilation of data conducted either by the team itself or in cooperation with other BIT students. The data are drawn from newspapers, journals, and government publications, such as the Second Five Year Plan (Repelita II) 74/75-78/79" and other materials.**

And they demand that:

1. All factions in the MPR [People's Consultative Assembly] immediately nominate prestigious figures, whose integrity is beyond any doubt, as candidates for President of the Republic of Indonesia;

2. The MPR fulfill its demands of the students as contained in the Indonesian Students' Manifesto of October 23, 1977;

3. The Armed Forces do indeed stand above all groups in the interest of the nation and the state.

Result of the deliberations of the

Student Association-Student Council,[11]

Bandung Institute of Technology,

January 14, 1978

ON BEHALF OF THE STUDENT-COMMUNITY OF THE BANDUNG INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

HERI AKMADI

GENERAL CHAIRMAN, STUDENT COUNCIL, BIT

Appendix

Kenang-kenangan dari apel kebulatan tekad Mahasiswa ITB

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[11] The White Book of the 1978 Students' Struggle has been compiled by an editorial team consisting of several students appointed by the Student Council of the BIT as authorized by the mandate of the Student Council of the BIT No. 017/MDT/DM/ITB/1978.

[Indonesian original] di kampus Ganesha, pada hari Senin, 16 Januari 1978, pukul 12:00 WIB

Walau dua puluh tahun telah berjalan,
pernyataan ini masih tetap relevan untuk kembali dinyatakan ....

PERNYATAAN SIKAP MAHASISWA

INSTITUT TEKNOLOGI BANDUNG

I.1. Bahwa kehidupan Rakyat Indonesia hingga saat ini masih jauh
dari cita-cita kemerdekaan yang menjadi landasan berdirinya
Republik Indonesia

I.2. Keadaan ini disebabkan oleh kebijaksanaan-kebijaksanaan
pemerintah yang tidak tepat yang sebenarnya dapat dirobah
jika pemerintah mempunyai itikad politik untuk memperbaikinya.
Keadaan tersebut juga disebabkan oleh adanya penyelewengan
dan penyalah-gunaan kekuasaan dari para pejabat pemerintah,
yang pada akhirnya mengakibatkan merosotnya kewibawaan
lembaga-lembaga Pemerintah.

I.3. Bahwa hal itu menunjukkan kegagalan pimpinan nasional
dalam menjalankan fungsinya, dan adalah merupakan
tanggungjawabnya.

II.1. Bahwa kehidupan demokrasi harus dilaksanakan dengan
memberi kesempatan seluas mungkin kepada kelompok-kelompok sosial di dalam masyarakat untuk menentukan
Pimpinan Nasional.

II.2. Bahwa dinamika politik di negeri ini tidak dimungkinkan
tumbuh bila jabatan presiden dijabat lebih dari dua kali
berturut-turut.

Maka dengan ini mahasiswa ITB menyatakan sikap:
TIDAK MEMPERCAYAI DAN TIDAK MENGINGINKAN SUHARTO,

KEMBALI SEBAGAI PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA.

Dan menuntut:

1. Fraksi-fraksi dalam MPR segera menampilkan tokoh-tokoh Nasional yang berprestasi dan tidak diragukan integritasnya sebagai calon Presiden Republik Indonesia.
2. Agar ITB merealisir tuntutan mahasiswa yang tercantum dalam Ikrar Mahasiswa Indonesia 28 Oktober 1977
3. Agar Abri benar-benar berdiri di atas semua golongan demi kepentingan bangsa dan negara.

Hasil Musyawarah Himpunan Mahasiswa -DM-ITB
tanggal 14 Januari 1978
ATAS NAMA KELUARGA MAHASISWA
INSTITUT TEKNOLOGI BANDUNG

cap
DM-ITB

ttd.

Heri Akhmadi
KETUA UMUM DM ITB

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