

THE AFFECTIVE USES OF DOGS:
PET-KEEPING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA
by
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ABSTRACT**THE AFFECTIVE USES OF DOGS:
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Adviser: Professor Carrie Hintz

By focusing on the human-dog bond, *The Affective Uses of Dogs: Pet-Keeping in Nineteenth-Century England and America* studies how gendered subjectivities are formed through the management of the interspecies intimacies. In the course of the nineteenth century, petted animals became, particularly for the middle-classes, deeply important for their affective uses, reflecting a new ethos of “humaneness” that earned the dog a central place in the affective economies of the family. In their relationships with humans, dogs elicited love, terror, and loathing, and the regulation of these powerful interspecies affects produced bourgeois Anglo-American masculinities and femininities and transformed the dynamics of domesticity itself.

The “good” dog, discursively reduced to serve as a technology for the production of affect, was instituted in the family economy to perform positive services through its relationships with humans. In pursuit of domestic harmony, such pets were employed to bind increasingly disparate and insular family members, either by serving as common love objects (in Charles Dickens’ *David Copperfield* and *Oliver Twist*) or common love projects (in Margaret Marshall Saunders’ *Beautiful Joe*). The head of household (human, male) jockeyed in a fragile web of interspecies relations that threatened, in their sincere intimacy, to disrupt his power. Anxieties deepened with the increasing awareness of human dependency on the beloved pet—a love coded as an abjection, a site of ontological annihilation. The proliferation of convincing

representations of animal interiority had the unexpected effect of producing the beloved dependent as an increasingly independent agent, and consequently, a potentially mutinous peer. Rising anxieties became entangled with fears of emasculation, especially as certain “dandy” pets were already too closely identified with women of a certain class. In Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* and Jack London’s *Call of the Wild* and *White Fang*, we see attempts to defuse this potential for mutiny; interspecies love and care were circumscribed to run their potent course along a well-defined and finite track. In the case of *Dracula*, the companion animal (and companion woman) who takes up the position of affect-producing, economically useless dependent may be loved and treasured intensely, so long as the lover develops the paranoid willingness to kill the beloved, freeing the lover from an affective tie that endangers his elite position. In London’s dog novels, domesticity can no longer contain this menace: the companion animal may be loved, but this love is painfully experienced as an externalized episode, away from the home, like a shameful yet tacitly sanctioned secret. Together, this dissertation argues that the human-dog relationship is a central site for the production of many of the central tenets of bourgeois gender and sexuality.

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INTRODUCTION

“Why Mayn’t Dogs Draw the Carts?”: The Affective Uses of Dogs

We, Dogs, in Kennel assembled, with one unanimous
 snarl, consent
 To submitting this Petition to your noble House of
 Parliament,
 Against as great an outrage, as ever yet was made
 On honest individuals pursuing their lawful trade.

 We must appeal to Prince Albert, and the Committee
 of the Fine Arts,
 And ask, if Landseer may draw the Dogs, why mayn’t
 Dogs draw the Carts.
 —“The Dog’s Petition Against the Proposed Dog’s Cart Bill,”
 J.H. Scourfield (1864)

These lyrics represent a kennel-full of dogs in organized protest of the 1854 bill banning the use of dogs to pull carts in the United Kingdom. Typically, dogs would be employed to pull small carts, carrying milk, baked goods, or other household products for local distribution. While dog-pulled carts had been prohibited within London and its fifteen-mile environs since 1839 (Vincent 167, Coren 152),¹ this proposed extension elicited much debate. In Scourfield’s lyrics, the dogs are represented as “honest individuals,” capable of both rationality (“consent”) and strong “feelings,” and “unanimous[ly]” (31) united against the elimination of a lawful avenue to “useful[ness]” (32). Conflating the body of the dog laborer with that of its human owner—a laborer who likely could not afford a donkey or horse to pull heavy loads—the lyrics beg the listener to consider “[w]hat is to become...of our children, and our wives/If we may not turn an honest penny, by taking our daily drives” (32).² In the United States, in the course of the

¹ Cf., Philip Howell dates this at 1840 (47). The U.K.-wide prohibition eventually passed.

² Hilda Kean notes that a draught dog, unlike a horse or donkey, could also provide protection against theft (84). Stanley Coren conjectures that cart dogs would likely live closely with their owners, serving as guards, sources of heat, and companions as well (151). The most well-known literary draught dog is probably Patrasche in Ouida’s *A Dog of Flanders* (1872) set in Belgium. Both in England and the U.S., dogs were also used to run in treadmill-like arrangements in order to power some mechanical device, such as a rotisserie spit at a restaurant. An 1877 article records that under Bergh, the New York SPCA arrested

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, dogs were also becoming middle-class objects of love and leisure rather than physical, masculine labor.³ In fact, a writer in an 1888 issue of the *Albany Law Journal* expressed disapproval of the “undoubted rights, privileges and duties” (Ellwanger 248) that the dog was now recognized to have, and suggested that perhaps the dog ought to be more usefully employed for physical labor: “As our country develops, and population and poverty increase, is there any good reason why...the dog should not become a recognized able and economical beast of burden[?]” (Ellwanger 350).

The transatlantic debates over the use of dogs for physical draught elicit the multiple tensions regarding the question of animal “usefulness,” marking a dramatic shift that occurred during the nineteenth-century, where dogs were used much less for material, economic uses as laborers, and much more for their affective uses—the production of sympathy, companionship, and affection.⁴ This dissertation presents an in-depth cultural history of transatlantic relationships with dogs during the nineteenth century and the turn of the twentieth century, and through this, an exploration of the role that affect plays in shaping interspecies subjects.

Looking at a range of American and English fiction, alongside images and illustrations, periodicals, pet-keeping manuals, and medical treatises, I identify the illustrative texts and contexts of human-dog relationships of this period, offering new readings of “useful” dogs in works by Charles Dickens and Margaret Marshall Sanders, and “dangerous” dogs in works by

an employee for the use of a Newfoundland “as the motive power in an apple-grinding machine” (“Mr. Bergh’s Good Work”).

³ Dog carts were decidedly more English (Mitchell, “Concerning Anglomania” 108), but the U.S. had its share (Derr 97). This writer in the *Albany Law Journal* was not the only one to urge for the greater use of dog carts: the U.S. consul reporting from Belgium, where dog carts were heavily used, described the dog as “an energy which is free, always at hand, and aching to be employed” (Smith, N. 342), in the same sentence reducing the dog to a force that paradoxically has the subjectivity to “ache.”

⁴ Harriet Ritvo, seminal researcher in Victorian animals, notes that “the relation of most Victorian fanciers to their animals, kept purely for companionship and amusement, was rather new, especially outside the highest social ranks” (85). According to John K. Walton, the number of licensed dogs (and one can only guess at the number of unlicensed dogs) rose from approximately 830,000 in 1867 to more than 1,300,000 in 1878, and most of these new dogs were likely adopted by the rising middle class (221-222). U.S. numbers are harder to come by, although dog censuses were certainly conducted regionally in the latter half of the nineteenth century. One writer estimated seven million dogs nationwide (Smith, N. 341); another conjectured that there were about three dogs to every family, and that the dog population “almost equal[ed]” the human one (“What Shall be Done” 227).

Bram Stoker and Jack London. In focusing on the changing human-animal relationship during this transitional period, this project tells the story of how animals became foundational to subject-making in the most intimate of ways: as members of our households. Exploring the genres of sentimental and children's literatures, the Gothic, and naturalism, I also bring to light the extent to which the aesthetics of various novel-forms relied on renegotiations of the human-animal relationship.

Hand-in-paw with deepening interspecies intimacies, the human-companion animal relationship came under increasing social scrutiny and proactive regulation—a human-animal biopolitics enacted and recorded in literature, periodicals, dog-keeping manuals, popular culture, and visual arts. In this project, I study dogs not as mere tropes or signifiers for human issues, but as the “companion species” (in Donna Haraway’s term) with whom we have co-evolved.⁵ Actual and imagined human-dog relationships shaped subjects through the affects transacted in domestic interspecies intimacies, as well as from the regulation of such intimacy. How did women and dogs, charged with the production of domesticity, intersect? How did men become masculine by affective negotiations with their pet animals? What transatlantic similarities and differences in the human-companion animal relationship existed, and what did they signify?

The tension between the worth/lessness of dogs during this period of transition, as illustrated by the dog cart debacle, also becomes a way to read the cultural politics (gender,

⁵ By “companion species,” historian of consciousness Donna Haraway emphasizes that a species’ evolution has not happened in isolation, but rather that humans and non-humans have always been deeply interdependent (19). Anthropologist Pat Shipman takes a more humancentric view in her more recent argument (2010). Shipman argues that what she calls the “animal connection” is a distinct human evolutionary adaptation, equipping us with the advantage of “the invention of living tools” (524) such as the adoption of cross-species pets for our emotional and physical wellness: “In essence, domestic animals are another kind of extrasomatic adaptation or tool that expands the resources humans can exploit” (525). This sentiment is not particularly novel. A 1903 study on children’s attitudes towards pets, published in controversial American psychologist G. Stanley Hall’s *Pedagogical Seminary*, noted that the “number of domesticated animals measure [the] grade of [a] civilization[,]” since “the use of any new thing of man has been an uplift to him.... No one can recount what the dog has done in the life of the race nor the child” (Bucke 508). Hall’s ideas will be further discussed in Chapters 2 and 4.

sexuality, class, race) of the nineteenth century. “[T]hese vehicles,” exclaimed Parliament member Packe during the dog-cart debates of 1852, “were daily and hourly placing the lives of persons who traveled upon the turnpike roads in jeopardy” (“Protection” 51). The bill, in fact, was in its first iteration named the “Protection from Dangerous Animals Bill,” purportedly put forth to safeguard against distractions on the road (as dogs might spook horses) and the potential for rabies arising spontaneously in an overworked dog.⁶ The body of the “dangerous animal” was, in effect, linked to that of its laboring owner, who by extension posed a danger as well. By July 1854, the same universal ban on dog carts was debated under a different name, the “Cruelty to Animals Bill” (“Cruelty” 1429). Under this new rationale—the protection of animals from dangerous humans—proponents of the ban cited expert opinions claiming the “natural” unfitness of dogs for such work. Their soft paw pads, it was said, rendered the work a cruelty that in turn bred cruelty in the owners of such misused dogs, “produc[ing] a lower and more brutalised [sic] turn of mind,” which then—slippery slope-like—created criminals (“Cruelty” 1432). The 1852 version, the Dangerous Animals bill, ostensibly aimed to protect the upper classes (those who could afford horses) from the laborer. The 1854 repackaging of the dog-cart ban as an anti-cruelty measure, in effect, sought the same prohibitions against using dogs as draught animals, but under a different guise: to protect the animal from the laborer.

The prohibition of cruelty against animals, as a barometer of refined acculturation, was a central component of the changing interspecies relationship in the nineteenth century. Just sixteen years after a humble gathering of like-minded individuals at Old Slaughter’s Coffeehouse, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals gained Queen Victoria’s charter, eventually gaining such momentum as to become firmly woven into the fabric of Englishness by the 1870s. Directly modeled after the British organization, the New York SPCA was founded by Henry Bergh in 1866, and by 1873, 25 U.S. states and territories had formed

⁶ Of course, we now know that rabies (better known than as hydrophobia) does not arise spontaneously from heat or exhaustion.

their own societies. Some, like the London Society (RSPCA) in its early period and Bergh's New York society, largely used the arm of the law, pushing through anti-cruelty legislation and aggressively prosecuting those they thought were representative offenders. Other societies placed their emphasis on humane education, like George T. Angell's Massachusetts SPCA. Claiming a more "civilized" approach to the conversion of the cruel through "moral suasion," they focused especially on the education of children, where hope for lasting change was thought to lie ("The Boston Bergh"). Eschewing legislative punishment in favor of pedagogy, Angell's Boston-based society was described as "a little better, a little more 'advanced'" than New York's, "curl[ing] its Athenian lip at [the] street fights with brutal Carmen, and [the] unseemly rows with overloading stage-drivers, and [the] sensational scenes in the Police Courts" characteristic of the New York SPCA ("The Boston Bergh"). As if in answer to this charge of the relative barbarism of its hometown society, *The New York Times* carefully described street-side arrests for animal cruelty in non-sensational terms; e.g., in an 1871 article, the *NYT* favorably contrasted the "gentlemanly-looking" aspects of the animal protectionist—a "quiet, military-looking," "mild gentleman," standing "firm and benevolent" against the profanity-spewing butcher harming the calves in his care ("A Friend of the Friendless").

As historians like Harriet Ritvo, Hilda Kean, James Turner, Kathleen Kete, Katherine Grier, and Kathryn Shevelow have noted about the transnational animal protection movement in the nineteenth century, the humane treatment of animals became a way to boast how "civilized" one was. Since "[t]he crown of modern culture, the grand result of Christianity, [was] the universal duty... of the fortunate to help the unfortunate[,] of the high to the low, of the wise to the ignorant, of the rich to the poor" ("The Society"), only the most "civilized" would humanely treat "low," "ignorant," and "poor" animals.⁷ Humaneness was, essentially, the

⁷ An exception was Japan, praised by both English and American humane societies for their kindness and mercy to animals. See, e.g., Countess Anne de Montaignu, "The Humanity of the Japanese Toward Animals," *Our Animal Friends* 22 (New York: ASPCA, 1895) 251-3 and A.L. Johnson, "The Little Japs and the Birds," *The Animals' Friend* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1897) 70. In this same English periodical,

practice of power both against the relatively powerless (the animal subjects of humaneness) and against others with power (the relatively less humane humans): a way to separate wheat from chaff, and wheat from wheat. Even though, as reported with chagrin in an 1874 *New York Times* article, the impressive proceedings of the International European Congress for the prevention of cruelty to animals suggested that perhaps “America [was] not so far advanced as Europe” (“Practical Civilization”), America and Europe were at least firmly on the same side in the valiant struggle towards moral progress, contra “barbaric” eastern and southern nations. Transatlantic humane movement membership rolls would continue to grow rapidly,⁸ and by the turn of the century, the transformation of the meaning of the word “humane”—from “the revival of drowning persons through resuscitation” to the prevention of cruelty towards animals—was complete, its early significance generally so unknown today that its rediscovery is amusing. “Humanity,” “humaneness,” humanitarian—the very definition of “the human” was changing in connection to a radical redefinition of our relationship with animals, particularly pets who were made members of the family.⁹

Dr. Edward Berdoe blasted neighboring Paris as a “dog hell” (74), further evidence of French inferiority. In a similar vein, a *New York Times* letter to the editor from 1864 maintains that “the persons engaged in [animal] cruelties are generally foreigners, and it may very well be that to foreign immigrants we are indebted for this deterioration of American character in one of its leading features” (P., J.H. “Cruelty to Animals”). Predating the first American SPCA, this writer seems to be expressing the increasing international pressure to perform humaneness, a quick willingness to externalize blame onto “foreigners,” and a desire to assert humaneness as inherently American. For more on anti-foreigner bias in animal protectionism, see David A.H. Wilson’s “Racial Prejudice and the Performing Animals Controversy in Early Twentieth-Century Britain” in *Society and Animals* 17 (2009): 149-65.

⁸ Animal protection societies modeled after England’s Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty Against Animals also sprung up in the nineteenth century in France, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden (Kete, “Animals and Ideology” 25-6).

⁹ Generally, two divergent theories exist to explain the proliferation of animal protectionism in the United States and England in the nineteenth century. One is what Lawrence Finsen and Susan Finsen call the “Displacement Thesis”: James Turner’s hypothesis that animal protectionism was an easy outlet for middle-class urbanites’ growing malaise with the many injustices of industrialism and capitalism (Finsen and Finsen 28). Keith Thomas supports this view (187). Instead of feeling compassion for the laborers whose oppression made their wealth possible, Turner says, the bourgeoisie displaced their burgeoning affect towards easy, uncontroversial subjects—animals: “Kindness to animals profaned no social taboos and upset no economic applectarts.... When other channels were blocked, the rising tide of sympathy almost inevitably flowed to animals” (Turner 37). Some of the assumptions underlying Turner’s position have since been debunked. Finsen and Finsen support the “Extension Thesis,” which takes into account evidence that animal protectionists did not limit their purview, but rather, extended their compassion

A facet of the development of the bourgeoisie, animal protection and humane pet-keeping were used to promote middle-class values and interests. One defined one's class by this new set of relationships to animals; the gentle treatment of certain animals became the measure of a man's class, his degree of acculturation. In either iteration of the dog cart bill, it is clear that protecting the dog was effectively a way to distinguish and protect the bourgeois (from the laborer, from labor).¹⁰ The dog became, by this bill and other institutional measures, a key to bourgeois leisure, and moved beyond the scope of uses by the working class and poor who were accorded more odious bestiality than the beasts they allegedly mistreated.¹¹ Under the logic of humaneness towards animals, dogs became luxury items that only the middle-class (and up) could afford to keep properly.¹² An 1843 cartoon from *Punch*, "Capital and Labour," depicting the suffering of coal miners whose labor supports the wealthy lifestyles of the bourgeoisie, illustrates class tensions at this time, using the body of the dog to criticize bourgeois consumption. **(Figure 1.)** In the upper right, prominently representing idle wealth, lays a fattened dog on a large, plump cushion, implicitly contrasted against the basketful of poor


from abolition to animal protection to child protection and so on (Finsen and Finsen 28): "In fact, the evidence suggests that those who devote themselves to the welfare of one exploited group (whether human or animal) in many cases extend concern to other groups as well" (Finsen and Finsen 28).

¹⁰ Ironically, as opponents rightly predicted, the prohibition on dog-carts would result in the inhumanity of thousands of dogs abandoned and/or killed, as they were no longer of economic use to families ill-equipped to afford their keep, particularly once the means of their livelihood became essentially outlawed. Lord Brougham noted that between three to four thousand dogs were destroyed in 1839 after the London ban ("Cruelty" 1432), and Stanley Coren, looking back, cites estimates of the killing or abandonment of 150,000-250,000 dogs in the year following this dog-cart ban and the additional imposition of a dog tax (154).

¹¹ This was an ideological change, with imperfect practice. Of course, the working class and the poor still kept dogs, but it became ideologically inappropriate ("cruel") for them to do so if they could not emulate bourgeois ways. A few voices still idealized the idea of the poor keeping pet dogs by way of emphasizing one of the dog's most vaunted qualities—its lack of concern for the wealth or status of its owner. For example, Ouida's *A Dog of Flanders* (1872) spins a woeful story centered on the relationship of a morally worthy poor boy and his dog. This kind of story leverages the wretchedness of the poor to define the dog as a natural and worshipful lover of humans (as I will discuss in more detail later).

¹² Again, it was not that only the relatively well-to-do kept pets, but that the bourgeois appropriated for themselves the exclusive power to do it "humanely" (and healthily). E.g., a 1905 Chicago *Observer* article describes the era's "too much dog" as a "sign" of "decay at the top and decay at the bottom," suggesting thereby that the remainder (the middling) was healthful (Grapho 199).

Figure 1.



“Capital and Labour,” *Punch Magazine* (1843).

laboring children below. Non-laboring dog bodies stood in for (or as an extension of) their bourgeois owners, an invective against the relatively wealthy that would fatten their unproductive dogs while laboring children starved. The human-animal divide here was levied to criticize the bourgeoisie for failing to recognize that dogs ought to be treated “like dogs,” while all human children self-evidently deserved better by virtue of their species—and in spite of their class.¹

The dog-cart ban was a double-edged move: an uplift, in the sense that the dog was now “above” having to work for “its living,” like the gentility, but also a downgrade, in the sense that this conclusion follows from restricting the dog’s ability to perform public physical work for hire. This double-edge move should resonate with our understandings of gender as well—the recategorization of certain classes of women into the domestic space, away from activities that in the public sphere are recognized as “work,” on the grounds of constitutional unfitness. As anti-cruelty arguments became delegitimized as mawkish and “sentimental,” the shifting of dogs from public to private uses would also be derided as feminine. Sir Spencer Walpole would later say, “[h]umanity [is] the offspring of sensation rather than of reason” (73), borne from the feminine impulse to pity the suffering. Women and feminized men, some accused, sought to remove masculine bodies from their rightful labor in the public sphere out of a misplaced impulse of pity, putting their soft feelings ahead of the hard practicality of work. Earl Granville, speaking against the dog-cart ban during the 1854 debates, had “no doubt the idea of using more

¹ This was a typical critique levied against Bergh, the founder of the first American SPCA: that he protected animals when he should have expended his zeal on the protection of children. In fact, he did eventually also found the New York Society for the Protection of Children in 1875 (Jones 171). Bergh is quoted as saying, “[t]he child is an animal. It shall have the rights of the stray cur in the streets” (Jones 171). Even though the two anti-cruelty were so inherently linked, Bergh was determined to keep the two organizations separate, just as many humane facilities felt the need to assign distinct doors (one for abused animals, one for abused children) even though they led to a single lobby (Zawistowski 61). For more on the contemporaneous re-valuing of children during the nineteenth century, see Viviana Zelizer’s *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Susan J. Pearson’s dissertation, *“The Rights of the Defenseless”: Animals, Children, and Sentimental Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century America* (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2004).

dogs for any useful purpose would excite the horror and indignation of all [the] female relations” of Parliament members (“Cruelty” 1434), and by aligning the repugnance of “honest” draught labor with an undesirably feminine sentiment, mocked his parliamentary interlocutors with implied emasculation.²

Moving the dog from the public to the private sphere was, in another sense, a demasculinization of a whole set of bodies to whom the masculine had been linked, and this move was experienced as a loss. Questions of national emasculation were also raised, since dogs were for so long gendered masculine and used more and more to represent the state of masculinity of their people. William Youatt, a well-known English authority on the dog, favorably quoted a *Times* article that linked the English dog’s loss of masculinity with a threat to the nation’s reputation in the world’s eye: “Is there anything in the constitution, or diseases, or propensities of the English dog, as compared to those of other nations, which makes the work [of pulling a cart] cruel here?” (“On the Dog Cart Bill” 208). In other words, marking the English dog incapable of such physical prowess might signal something deficient in the Englishman’s body. As with class, nation and gender were embroiled in the question of the dog’s shifting status from laborer to lover.

Scourfield’s lyrics portray the petitioning dogs as desiring, both rationally and passionately, the opportunity to be useful; while depriving themselves, perhaps, of the laurels of “gentility,” they were earning at least the dignity of “utility”: “Just so when a Dog is drawing bread, the thought his heart consoles/That he is quite useful, as a Master of the Rolls!” (Scourfield 32). The arguments made about the dog’s unfitness for draught—its soft paw pads, for example—contextualizes the great emotional value that dogs would be attributed with over the course of the century: a repurposing of the essential character of the animal to satisfy new affective uses. Although by the eighteenth century dogs were already serving a significant role as

² As with women, when dogs shifted into the private sphere, they became consumers of what would eventually grow to become a multi-billion dollar pet care industry. Katherine Grier details the rise of the industry in America in chapter 6 of her book.

objects of human affection, particularly for the upper classes that could afford such a luxurious use of a living being, their affective uses multiplied exponentially alongside their numbers during the nineteenth century. While Scourfield's lyrics fail to recognize value in the dog's new affective labor, over the course of the nineteenth century, reams of letters and art would be dedicated to increasing the value accorded to a dog's emotional work.

A "highly sentimentalized view of animals was uniquely developed in Western Europe and, later, in North America" (Tuan 112), which elevated (and reduced) dogs to the following:

Dogs are sympathetic. "Sympathy," along with such traits as "quietude," "obedience," "self-control," and "docility," was considered one of the qualifications of "good behavior" in a dog (Lindsay 163). Lauding "the sympathizing dog," an 1865 writer opens by describing how "delightful" it is to "think that *somebody* rejoices also" when we are happy or "is sorry" when we are pained (Josephine 112). Ouida, British author of *A Dog of Flanders*, writes in 1891 that "[t]he sympathy of your dog is unailing and unobtrusive. If you are sad, so is he; and if you are merry, none is so willing to leap and laugh with you as he" (317-8). Because of its sympathetic capacities, the pet dog now served as affective mediator, as a conduit that either amplified positive affect or dampened negative affect. In Harriet Beecher Stowe's words, in one of her earlier stories, "[a] dog [is] nothing but organized love—love on four feet, encased in fur" (322).

Dogs are grateful and faithful to their humans, even over and against members of their own species. The 1869 *Art of Training Animals* notes that "[e]ven the instinctive passion all animals have for their own kind appear to be in a measure sacrificed to human influence, for the dogs often care more for the society of man than for that of their own kind" (Sample 68).

Philadelphia publisher George William Childs remarks in his *Recollections* that the dog is "the only animal that will forsake his own kind for the sake of man and will die upon his master's grave" (209).

Dogs are affectionate and candid. The dog's "demonstrative[ness]" of affect was frequently cited as one of its most endearing qualities (Dalziel 583). As "[he] wears his feelings at the front" so one can unquestioningly "trust his expression of feeling" (Grapho 199). Moreover, the dog is incapable of deceit: "His looks and voice his inward thoughts express'd.... No human falsehood lurk'd beneath his heart" is part of a long elegy inscribed in Lord Corke's urn, in honor of his dog Hector, and one of a legion of similar examples printed in Joseph Taylor's 1806 collection, *Canine Gratitude*. According to Frances Power Cobbe, nineteenth-century British feminist and anti-vivisectionist, dogs were to be prized for "their transparent little wiles" ("Love" 102), suggesting the confidence with which she believed she could discern the genuine feelings, intentions, and motives of a dog. Her tone also suggests that the dog's inability to deceive made it charming, an affect that could not be experienced without also feeling safe.

Dogs are self-abnegating. Taylor's 1806 *Canine Gratitude* and Sarah Knowles' 1902 *Our Devoted Friend* offer just a sample of the wealth of popular testimonies to the "many well-proved cases" of dogs committing suicide, or wasting away, following their master's death (quoting Angell, in Bolton 200). In his popular and authoritative 1845 British treatise on the dog, William Youatt describes the dog as "the only animal that is capable of disinterested affection" (2), and American writer Wesley Mills, author of "How to Keep a Dog in the City" (1891), describes dogs as "always grateful, always affectionate, never selfish, pushing the abnegation of self to the utmost limits of possibility" (5). In effect, in order to allow for the dog to be redefined as pure indiscriminate affection and faithfulness, dogs were also vacated of a full and distinct self that could deviate from these expectations. Their self is, in essence, negated so that "selfishness" becomes impossible.

Dogs love unconditionally. Its emotions were considered to come from "mere instinct," because unlike a human, "the dog has *no choice*... he never thinks of rendering a reason;—he

cannot but choose but love” (Miller, H. 221-2). Moreover, the dog “loves *us*,” emphasizes one writer, “irrespective of our opinions, our worldly standing, our beauty, or our abilities,” a worshipful love that does not waver with changes in our fortunes or even “when we grow old, ugly, and stupid” (“Consciousness” 234). Many tales also laud the dog’s obstinate love even in the face of cruelty, as with Beautiful Joe’s mother, Jesse, in Margaret Marshall Saunders’ *Beautiful Joe* (discussed in Chapter 2). The dog’s love participates in making the “us” that can be symbolically distinguished (and loved)—as a distinct and constant essence—from our fortunes, class, capacities, and looks: as they erase themselves, dogs *make* us individuals by the force of their love.

These virtues were seen as linked, together comprising the essential character of the dog. One of the dog management specialists cited above summarizes the discourse as follows:

[T]ake the first dog you meet, and from the moment he adopts you as his master, you will find in him all these qualities. He will love you without calculation. His greatest happiness will be to be near you; and should you be reduced to beg your bread, not only will he aid you, but he will not abandon you to follow a king to his palace. Your friends may quit you in misfortune, but your dog will remain; he will die at your feet; or, if you depart before him on the great voyage will accompany you to your last abode. (Mills 5)

An easy and perfect lover: it is impossible to not pause, if briefly, to consider just what sort of subject would require these traits from a companion. It is not my point that dogs are not truly affectionate, sincere, gregarious, or faithful, but that these discourses put them on a pedestal and demanded nothing less. This idealized relationship offers complete security: the dog is indiscriminately and reliably sympathetic in an easily readable way; there is little risk in the relation, either of initial rejection, midway betrayal, or willful abandonment; and if we are so unlucky as to die first, we can be comforted knowing that our lover would rather perish at our

grave than take up another.³ These laudable virtues were ultimately claimed as *human* ones, even as humans were criticized for falling short in these very areas: Cobbe, for example, described the dog as being “more winning...more really and intensely *human*...than the artificial, cold and selfish characters one meets too often in the guise of ladies and gentlemen” (“Love” 102).⁴ Thus repurposed, the dog was redefined as especially constituted for the labor of producing affect—reduced to love on legs by writers of fiction and fact.

As the perfect lover, the dog was also tasked with the heavy burden of producing and maintaining positive affect in family circles: inculcating “humaneness,” diminishing anger and conflict, and producing a well-ordered middle-class family. As a member of the family, the dog now served to produce, move, and negotiate affect—in essence, a whole category of animal was redefined as especially and exclusively constituted, in its natural abundance of grateful affection towards humans, to make the home “homey.” In an 1872 American article titled “Pets and their Long Life,” Reverend Eli Hartness describes the most “remarkable” thing about the dog to be that he is “the only animal that is generally kept out of pure love. We don’t ask if he earns his living” (303), because the dog was now supposed to earn food, shelter, and protection by being an ideal love object, producing positive affect and rendering the domestic space a “home.”

Centrally, this is a question of how companion animals were taken into the very heart of the hearth and locked in intimate affective economies with the home’s human inmates. Stowe, most well-known for authoring *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, co-authored a handbook on “domestic

³ Recent studies on human-dog relationships report dog owners naming these same or similar qualities as reasons for keeping a dog, or for being attached to their dogs (Hart 163-5). Lynnette A. Hart suggests that both the dog’s unconditional love and its inability to speak may be especially important in why dogs are favored: the former trait may allow owners “to direct or redirect anger at the dog without putting the entire relationship at risk,” while the inability to speak means the dog cannot appear to criticize or judge (164). In short, these relationships may “lac[k] many of the threats associated with human friendships” (Hart 165).

⁴ Given the preference for breeding child-like features in dogs, one could also conceive of dogs as the perfect *children*. Certainly, then and now, pet owners have been accused of misusing dogs as “surrogates” for human children, wasting resources and affections on the wrong object. But while they could be treated as children, they were also seen more as “friends”—not a relation of peership, as I will be exploring in this dissertation, but not quite a parent-child degree of disparity.

science” (including a section on household pets), in which she notes that “one of the most interesting illustrations in the design of our benevolent Creator in establishing the family state is the nature of the domestic animals connected with it” (Beecher 393), emphasizing the importance of pets in creating the family. As the new affective center of the domestic circle, dogs were asked to play a role that, under the cult of domesticity, white bourgeois women were also pressured to occupy. Removed from the physical, public work of pulling dog carts and turning spits to fireplace rugs and warm laps, dogs became the “centre of attraction” of homes, “the object of a species of dog-worship” (“Dogs and their Days” 111). By 1889, an American writer could pronounce that “a home without pets is almost as incomplete as one without children” (Potter 38): the bourgeois hearth now required inclusion of an animal, in the form of a pet, to perform the affective functions expected of the wife—the selfless homemaker known as the Angel of the House.

In spite of all this mountainous cultural evidence, the centrality of pet animals in the nineteenth-century’s worship of the hearth has been sorely neglected.⁵ Another key claim of this project is that the nineteenth-century concept of the family, in fact, cannot be properly studied without attention to the animals that were actively made constitutive of it. Put to critical affective uses, dogs had myriad effects on English and American domesticity, becoming central to the changing definition of the well-run home.

The disciplinary power of the animal was brought into the home for the sake of the children, adding to their mothers’ burdens. As I will discuss in greater detail, by century’s end, the importance of keeping pets, particularly for young children, was not just a popular piece of

⁵ For example, these studies of the Victorian family make little or no mention of the increasing inclusion of pets in the household: Penny Kane, *Victorian Families in Fact and Fiction* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Andre Burguiere, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Martine Segalen, and Francoise Zonabend, eds., *A History of the Family Vol. II* (New York: Belknap, 1996); Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class 1780-1850* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Murray Baumgarten and H.M. Daleski, *Homes and Homelessness in the Victorian Imagination* (New York: AMS Press, 1998); Anthony S. Wohl, ed., *The Victorian Family: Structure and Stresses* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); and Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

folklore, but actively propped by educators and the medical establishment. “The pet thus becomes a most important factor in the child’s development,” one writer urged, “a factor that we can not [sic] afford to leave out of account” (Marsh 83). Bringing whole menageries into the household (dogs, cats, birds, rabbits, fish), alongside sheaves of rules for their meticulous rearing and training, increased the domestic burdens of mothers. The dog as pet and the bourgeois woman as Angel in the House, then, were discursively linked in the transformed affective economies of domesticity, an intimate connection that elicited a tangle of conversations regarding their proper place and treatment—their domestication, in multiple senses of the word.⁶

Like women’s domestic work, dogs’ work became amorphous, privatized, and affective. Moving from dog-cart drawing to drawing-room, dogs were increasingly valuable precisely because of their economic and material inutility. Both good wife and good dog were charged with being unconditionally affectionate, sincerely faithful, and self-abnegating. This move indoors—from the public sphere of “useful work” to the private sphere of emotions—in part reinforced the general Victorian project to distinguish the two spheres, one for masculinity and the other for femininity. The gendered separation of spheres is now academic commonplace, to be sure, but the function that human uses of dogs played in securing this divide has hardly been explored. The separation of public/private, civilized/domestic, masculine/feminine—three interrelated binary categories—was in part forged and buttressed by the human-companion animal relationship, which, as the preceding section describes, was undergoing much change in the course of the nineteenth-century, reflecting a new, juridically and institutionally managed human-dog relationship.

⁶ In focusing on the domestic sphere as a site where dogs were employed as technologies of affect, it is not my intention to argue that the domestic space is merely a site of oppression of animals, nor to suggest that women and animals were oppressed in the same way, for, as Moira Ferguson documents, women certainly participated in negotiating animal alterity to their advantage as well. In discussing dogs as technologies for affect, I am also not asserting a claim of insincerity. Yet it would be foolhardy to allow the presence of very real affection in some of these relationships to cloud an analysis of the power dynamics of these relationships.

An 1897 *Family Circle* description of the “charmed spot” that is “the family circle” waxes with unabashed sentimentality in its description of the unproductive members of the domestic space:

There sits grandfather in his deep chair, gazing at the embers, dreaming of his childhood; there grandmother opposite with her inseparable knitting, thinking of how she can make the little ones happy; there father and mother talk of by-gone days, when they were courting, and there the children play their merry games, the baby rolls on the floor and Tabby nods in the warm corner, while faithful old dog Tray watches her with sleepy, yet alert eyes, from the hearth-rug. It is a happy group. They are bound by ties not of earth. (“The Home Angel”)

In this portrait of saccharine domestic bliss, the “home angel” refers not only to the mother, who would more traditionally receive such honors, but also to the dog: the mother is textually deemphasized to make room for Tray to punctuate the family roll call. It is the dog who takes up the active role of “watching over” the family. The ideal household pet joined the intimate family circle around the hearth, then, as an affectively important addition that just sort of lies there at rest on the rug— “sleepy,” yet also “alert,” engaged and attuned to the “circle” of affect in which the dog played such a key part.⁷ The dog’s position as an economically useless being is what leads directly to its usefulness as a marker of civilization *and* as an anodyne for overstrained bourgeois nerves. This “happy group” is “bound” together, in large part by the dog, to constitute a family.

Yet the successful performance of this emotional work was not always assured.

Publications proliferated offering rules and advice on all matters of pet-keeping and training,

⁷ A satire by Walter Emanuel, titled *A Dog Day; or The Angel in the House* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1919), would later lampoon these ideas in the “diary” of a very mischievous and selfish dog, whose owners mischaracterize as angelic and well-meaning. As for the significance of Tray being “old,” his age suggests that he has been working on creating this family for some time. Further relevance might be found in the Victorian interest in old dog “memoirs,” discussed by Teresa Mangum in “Dog Years, Human Fears,” in *Representing Animals*, ed. Nigel Rothfels (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2002) 35-57.

providing painstaking instruction on how to train a well-behaved dog that would become an affective asset, rather than burden, to the family. The how-tos of humane pet-management, largely for the benefit of the masters, became a widespread concern, signaling insecurities with the new affective uses of dogs.

Interlocutors across letters as never before, human and animal were increasingly friendly, an intimacy that deranged non-pet lovers immensely. “To My Dog,” an 1838 American poem, ostensibly addresses a pet dog who is now subject to tax (“put...on the roll”), a tax levied to reduce the number of potentially rabid dogs.⁸ This poem criticizes the intentions of the legislators as follows: “the rascals meant/’Tween you and me to breed a strife,/To drive you into banishment” (“To My Dog” 284). In other words, human and dog seemed too close, and the law sought to regulate these intimate interspecies affects now grown in dangerous excess. “For all their tax, you shan’t be harmed,” the poet insists: “I love, and honor, and respect you” (“To My Dog” 284).

Both Scourfield’s lyrics and “To My Dog” suggest that there are motivations that spurred the regulation of the uses to which humans could put their dogs: intimacies between human and animal threatened to dissolve distinctions that gave the human power over the dog, and the increase in representations of dogs as sentient individuals had everything to do with this. In “To My Dog,” the dog is directly addressed as a beloved peer, while in Scourfield, the dogs talk back to powerful humans with threats and demands. Being the subject of taxation, reasons the satirical “To My Dog,” was to grant the dog some right to representation: the 1838 poem asserts that “taxes, say the constitution,/Convey the right to represent,/So dogs, by this same resolution,/May, just as well as men, be sent” to stand in Congress (“To My Dog” 284). Scourfield’s lyrics, too, envision dogs on the same plane as men, petitioning Parliament for redress. These transatlantic allusions to taxation without representation, the rallying cry of the

⁸ Like so many efforts to regulate the use of dogs, this tax tended to disproportionately affect the poor by rendering it financially impossible for them to afford to keep a dog.

American Revolution, raise the specter of violent overthrow of a sovereign power, and implicitly demanded for dogs the right to “representation.” As both of these popular poems suggest, representations did occur: more and more representations of dogs proliferated, in culture, literature, and the arts—a veritable explosion of contesting representations.⁹

Illustrating the tensions between intimacies with dogs and representations of their sentience, and increasingly forceful attempts to regulate its perceived excesses, is a 1903 comic published in the *New York Herald*. “Buster Brown Gives a Party for the Dog Catcher” features a little boy, Buster, and his American pit bull terrier, Tige. **(Figure 2.)** The strip opens with a resolution—a trademark of this popular early twentieth-century strip by R.F. Outcault—that critiques the dog-catcher’s work as detrimental to moral progress. “If you plant a weed you won’t get corn,” Buster counsels; rather, “love begets love.” The strip suggests that regulations like licenses, taxes, and muzzles, embodied by the dog-catcher who impounds errant dogs, plant the seeds of cruelty. A group of boys and a group of dogs, separately and concurrently, hold meetings planning the trap, then the boys (armed with sticks) herd the dog catcher into a whirlwind dog attack. Cowed by the violence of this interspecies rebellion, the dog-catcher quits his profession. An open copy of Margaret M. Saunders’ *Beautiful Joe* lies prominently by Tige’s doghouse, implicitly crediting the bestseller for the message of this strip. This may seem somewhat surprising, since *Beautiful Joe* presents a *very* “good” dog, but as I will show, it is precisely the powerful discourse of the “good” dog that grounds and inspires anxieties of the mutinously “bad” dog.

Because of their newly-endowed affective worth, and the related surge of cultural representations of sentient animal interiority, “useless” canines quickly came to be perceived as a deadly threat: both American and English dogs were exaggeratedly charged with the threat of rabies, their bodies marked as fatally dangerous. As a Parliament member declared, “the

⁹ Moreover, as Ivan Kreilkamp argues, the history of the (English, he says, but the argument can perhaps be fairly extended to the American) novel and the domestic pet is “deeply bound up” (“Petted Things” 87).

practice [of dog-keeping] ought to be placed under proper regulations” (“Protection” 50): this cultural moment marked not only this shift from economic uses to affective uses, but also the increased drive to regulate the human-dog relationship—not only legally, but through cultural institutions like the novel, the imaginative realm where the bourgeois produced their distinct identity and articulated key ideologies.

In *Civilized Creatures: Urban Animals, Sentimental Culture, and American Literature, 1850-1900* (2005), Jennifer Mason charges that while “[c]ompanion animals were ubiquitous” in nineteenth century America, they have remained a “critical blind spot” in American studies, an untold story submerged beneath the studies privileging so-called wild nature (2). The same could fairly be said of British literary studies. Inroads have been made by Marjorie Garber, Erica Fudge, Susan McHugh, Alice A. Kuzniar, and Mark Derr, whose path-breaking work over the last decade or so have employed the literary and visual artifacts to chart a course through the complexities of the human-companion animal relationship across histories and cultures.

Wonderful work lays the ground for my inquiry, but no book presently exists that takes a transatlantic approach to this key transitional period to investigate how interspecies relations function as a disciplinary power in the making of gendered subjects. In particular, chronologically wide-ranging scholarship like McHugh’s *Dog* (2004), Katherine Grier’s *Pets in America: A History* (2007), Fudge’s *Pets* (2008), and Derr’s *A Dog History of America* (2004) have paid long overdue attention to the human-companion animal relationship, but in the broader strokes of survey. Our discourses about dogs have exhibited the uncanny ability to pile up on each other with wanton disregard for contradiction, and this is perhaps why work in this area has tended to remain chronologically unfocused, discussing together materials across centuries and cultures. Following these surveys, my project takes a magnifying glass to a segment of the nineteenth century—starting with the 1830s, some years after the establishment of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty Against Animals in London, through just past the

turn of the century—to investigate the contradictory meanings attached to dogs and the human-dog relationship at this key transitional moment.

In cultural histories such as Harriet Ritvo's seminal *The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age* (1987) and Virginia DeJohn Anderson's *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (2006), all animals (large and small, wild and domestic, feathered and furred) are typically considered together as a category of difference for the human animal, bracketing differences between animals for strategic purposes. There has been some useful preliminary scholarly work on nineteenth-century human-animal relationships, but unlike Deborah Morse and Martin Danahay's *Victorian Animal Dreams: Representations of Animals in Victorian Literature and Culture* (2007), Jennifer Mason's *Civilized Creatures: Urban Animals, Sentimental Culture, and American Literature* (2005), and Kathleen Kete's *The Beast in the Boudoir: Petkeeping in Nineteenth-Century Paris* (1994), which discuss a range of animals with necessarily limited detail, my project delves deeply into the intimacies of the human-dog connection. To its benefit and detriment, the dog has been uniquely positioned in relation to humanity, and unlike with many other animals we may encounter indirectly, with the dog, our co-evolution happens in intimate and insular one-on-one relationship.

In terms of method, my dissertation is most like Marjorie Garber's *Dog Love* (1996) and Alice Kuzniar's *Melancholia's Dog: Reflections on Our Animal Kinship* (2006), both of which are interested in affect and intersubjectivity. Garber's trade book chips at the surface of our convoluted affect towards dogs, using contemporary and old texts to open up questions, but as Kuzniar finds, foregoing in-depth critique (Kuzniar 4). Kuzniar rightly critiques the way academia has largely eschewed taking seriously "the affective, immediate ties between man and the four-footed" (3); even as Garber asks insightful questions and makes some relevant connections, she quickly retreats into light-hearted treatment, as if human-dog relationships are

not serious enough to merit sustained exertion. Since then, affect studies has cleared new pathways for understanding human-dog intimacy. Kuzniar's more recent book on melancholia, exploring shame, intimacy, and mourning, is an example of taking human-animal studies in this new direction. Instead of focusing on the affect at the *end* of human-dog relationships, my dissertation looks at love and fear, the twin sides of the coin of *quotidian* relations with dogs. I am particularly indebted to Mason's literary study of nineteenth-century American urban animals, Kete's work on nineteenth-century bourgeois Parisian pet-keeping and Fudge's insightful discussion of twentieth-century texts, which both offer much guidance towards the development of my framework of pet studies.

In *The Affect Theory Reader* (2010), a timely overview of the variegated landscape of affect studies, Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth organize the field into eight areas ranging across the phenomenological and Spinozan, to the ground-breaking work of Eve Sedgwick on Silvan Tomkins, to the scientific turn exemplified by Brian Massumi's work and Patricia T. Clough's collection, *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social* (2007). In spite of the many different approaches, Gregg and Seigworth identify that affect may be understood to be a consideration not just of emotions, but of "*force or forces of encounter,*" and relatedly, of "bodily capacity[ies]" to be affected (to "belon[g]" or "not-belon[g]") in the "we[bs]" of interbodily relations (2, 3). "[V]ital forces insisting beyond emotion," affect "can serve to drive us toward movement[,] suspend us[, or] even leave us overwhelmed" (Gregg and Seigworth 1). My approach to affect in this dissertation shares these premises, and is in the tradition of the work of cultural theorists Sara Ahmed and Sianne Ngai, who have studied discourses of emotions beyond the realm of the subjective to understand the intersubjective. This kind of work, in Gregg and Seigworth's terms, "atten[ds] to the hard and fast materialities, as well as the fleeting and flowing ephemera, of the daily and the workaday, of everyday and every-night life, and of 'experience'" (7). Affects, in this view, are the coagulations of forces (what we generally call

emotions), but also reach further to critically acknowledge the relational nature of these binding or cleaving forces that have profound effects, aligning and severing bodies.

Thinking of affect in this way emphasizes that emotions are not internal psychological states that are then projected outwards; rather, they are forces created by encounters between bodies (human and non-human alike) that shape both (Ahmed, *Cultural* 7, 4). This project explores how human-animal relationships “make us human” through the affects born out of interspecies intimacy as well as from the regulation of such intimacy, at this transitional moment when dogs shifted from economic, material uses to affective uses. In looking at affect, the question is, which bodies are “sticky” and/or get “attached,” and which are “repulsive” to which others, and what purposes do these attachments and repulsions serve?

In a 1982 seminar, Michel Foucault broadened the scope of his work in the third volume of his history of sexuality by launching a genealogy of technologies of the self. In his unfinished essays, he began an exploration of how “taking care of oneself” has long been a central tenet of “knowing” oneself as a subject—that is, defining one’s self as an individual that is differentiated from other selves. Tracing variations of the notion in the Greco-Roman tradition to Christianity, he describes how taking care of oneself has taken the form of painstakingly verbalizing oneself (either, as with the Greco-Romans, every small detail of one’s actions and thoughts, or, as with Christians, every single sin), an introspection that became central to subject-making. His genealogy leaves off at the opening of the eighteenth century, when this meticulous verbalization becomes a way to make a *new self* (*Technologies* 49).

While certainly Foucaultian at its heart, my method is not strictly an application of Foucault to a new area. Rather, I take Foucault as a starting point to explore how the management of the affect between humans and pets serves as a *techne* for the elaboration of the subject: this human-animal relationship (as promulgated in the nineteenth century) “reflects”

(produces) one's humane self, one's affectively capable self. These intersubjective affects can be seen in pet-keeping to be a way of "taking care of oneself" in order to produce oneself.

The self emerges as a subject in relationship (real and imagined) to a petted animal, and also as an affective fusion of human and animal, a unit of self + dog, differentiated from others (me + dog and not-me; human-animal unit and society). This self + dog unit that I investigate is another kind of relational identification, where the self is produced through an intimate relationship with a chosen member of another species—a relationship that has been negotiated and re-negotiated in heated cultural politics. This "humane," civilized, and modern self is produced by practicing the proper affects toward companion animals—particularly dogs, given their discursive construction as embodiments of sympathy, affection, gratitude, and fidelity.

One of my central arguments is that the set of linked ideas exalting the dog's affective capacities, with its pronounced emphasis on fidelity, was promulgated to re-create the dog as a safe object of attachment for boys. Pet-keeping was an utopian project (an "optimistic" project, in affect theorist Lauren Berlant's terms) to attach boys to interactive objects being produced as useless dependents—the production of a man and his best friend. The attachment to dogs was supposed to, one, bind increasingly individualized family members into domesticity, and two, to discipline boys into the bourgeois model of power. To serve as this technology, the dog was supposed to remain "safe"; the attachment was supposed to be safeguarded against permeable boundaries, as compared to the forms of usage associated with women that were seen to threaten species hierarchies. The efficacy of the dog as a safe object of attachment was contingent on its abjection—the erasure of its individual agency and independent value. It was said that the dog (sympathetic, faithful, self-abnegating, and unconditionally loving) could not exist without man, when in fact the reverse was becoming painfully, worryingly obvious.

As a by-product of this relational self-making, the dog as an individuated self emerges; initially, as the perfect lover designed by our discursive practices, and then as a unique self in its

own right, empowered to gaze—perhaps critically—at one’s self. This self + dog unit, born out of a human longing to create a perfect love as a way to subjecthood, in turn created myriad anxieties—birthing, I conjecture, the monstrously intimate, intimately monstrous animal-Other. While humaneness had obtusely insisted on revaluing dogs as an undifferentiated group—as “the dog,” comprised of a specific set of affectively useful traits—its corollary practice, pet-keeping, resulted in uncontrollable individuation. Single animals, intensely loved and cherished (and frequently enough, anthropomorphized) to degrees deemed by many to be dangerously excessive, were coded as “mutinous.” As novels about dogs as individuals spread in the nineteenth century (with characterization and enplotment), the perception of the dog as an independent agent threatened men’s sense of safety in loving the pet dog.

My dissertation argues against the widely-held belief that we, in modernity, have abandoned community with animals for relationships of domination, as well as the assumption that masculinity is simply the resistance of empathy with animals. While this is, to some degree, accurate, my contextualized close reading shows that the middle-class family in itself was redefined through incorporation of the pet animal. Through the dynamics of these transformed families, masculinity was produced via a developed and measured sensibility towards the animal Other, not just in a reductive process of suppression, but as part of an ongoing and actively renegotiated interspecies relationship of connection and disconnection. In addition, I explore the ongoing linkages between “petted” women and animals, both deeply intertwined in a domestic relationship and structurally positioned to service the affective comfort of the bourgeois home. In fact, nineteenth-century humaneness and the revaluing of the pet animal was a concerted, utopian-minded effort to use the human-animal relationship as a disciplinary site.

I am also advocating for a revised methodology for reading animals in literature. The animals with which we cohabit—either intimately or less directly—are not, in practice, mere

mirrors or motifs, but rather real, live beings with whom we have both real and imagined relationships. The tendency has been too much to read the animal as a trope or symbol for something about humans, in a way that erases their actual service as living disciplinary technologies. Mark Feldman has accurately criticized the “knee-jerk reaction” of “interpreting representations of animals and animality as, fundamentally, being about something else” (163). Then there are those that refuse to acknowledge that animals can and are used figuratively to mirror the human condition: for example, James Lundquist insists in 1987 that given the plain, narrative fact that Jack London depicts a dog, “it becomes absurd to refer to Buck as completing ‘rites of passage’ or indulging in ritualistic acts” (107). Both of these responses—“knee-jerk” conflation or dissociation—are humancentric: the former for reading the represented animal as *merely* human, and the latter for refusing to read anything human in a *mere* animal. Similarly, we have a habit of paying attention to only those animals that are attached to a famous human, so that we only care about George Eliot’s Pug or Emily Dickinson’s Carlo, and only insofar as they can tell us something new about Eliot or Dickinson.

Scholarship has also tended to use the literary animal as an excuse to engage with texts with a blunted critical edge, as if the “sentimental” is a trap that we inexorably fall into once pet animals are under discussion. Nina Auerbach’s “Dorothea’s Lost Dog,” discussing Eliot’s *Middlemarch* (1874), opens with a personal anecdote about Maltese dogs, then argues that Dorothea’s rejection of Sir James Chettam’s offer of a Maltese puppy shows how Dorothea is to blame for the lack of “sympathy so needed in *Middlemarch*, yet so generally absent for it” (Auerbach 90). In “spurning the greatest prize the secular world of *Middlemarch* holds[,] the treasure of fellowship” with the Maltese, Dorothea rejects both “physicality and the body” and “the fellowship of marriage” (Auerbach 88, 90). Keeping the Maltese, this article suggests, would have taught Dorothea to “self-consciously evolve into self-awareness” so that she would not “continually tread on her less clever and more fragile husband Casaubon” (88). Like so

many nineteenth-century dog lovers insisted, this assumes that if Dorothea had accepted the little Maltese, her affective capacities would have necessarily improved, an assumption that demands critical attention as it ignores existing conversations on the topic.¹⁰ On the other end of the spectrum may be those who pounce upon the represented animal as the magic lever that has not yet been pulled, the lever that will crack open the text in a new way—and these readers might be identified by the vehemence of their disappointed expectations.

The “critical blind spot” that Mason identifies around “civilized creatures” (2) undoubtedly also hinges on the marginalization of human-animal relationship stories as “sentimental” and anthropomorphic. We may look back at our relationships with dogs as child’s play, but nineteenth-century writers were in dead earnest about the real value of the relationship. Much of the fiction and non-fiction on the subject was pedagogically front-loaded, insistently truthful and accurate, or a sincere “natural history” or scientific study, and we are tempted to look at their ardor with skepticism.¹¹ Tobias Menely’s “Zoöphilpsychosis: Why Animals are What’s Wrong with Sentimentality” (2007), a cogent genealogy of sentimentality through the eighteenth century, argues that sentimentality (towards animals, in particular) came to be devalued as a way to delegitimize affective attachments with animals that may

¹⁰ This seems like a heavy burden for a little Maltese to bear—the burden, that is, of rehabilitating a character that seems so affectively flawed that she irks Auerbach so deeply. In rejecting “one of nature’s most naïve toys,” Dorothea explains that she does not like “creatures... bred merely as pets” because they strike her as “too helpless,” “too frail,” and “parasitic” (Eliot 34). Although the narrator suggests that this opinion was formed “under the heat of irritation” (Eliot 34), her reasoning is cogent enough: she would prefer a relationship with a creature with a “sou[l] something like our own” that can “either carry on [its] own little affairs or can be companions to us” (Eliot 34)—like the burly St. Bernard, Monk, which Dorothea does engage. In rejecting the Maltese, Dorothea does not mean to reject all fellowship, animal or human. Rather, she echoes a centuries-old virulence against lapdogs that would feature more prominently by the end of the nineteenth century. It would be more fair to say, given the history of gender- and class-specific hatred against lapdogs, that Dorothea’s bias against the Maltese attests to her rejection of the traditional feminine role as, precisely, a creature bred merely to be her husband’s pet. James Chettam’s Maltese is also a token of courtship, so in rejecting the Maltese, Dorothea was likely rejecting the prospect of such a role as Chettam’s wife.

¹¹ A reviewer of the “scores” of mid-century books on dogs described the task of imagining the dog’s subjectivity as follows: “When we endeavour [sic] in such a manner to realize the consciousness of a dog by fancying ourselves circumscribed by his limitations, we are using no idle play of imagination, but pursuing our inquiry favoured [sic] by modern mathematicians, of applying one figure to another” (“Consciousness” 227).

threaten to dissolve other boundaries (gender, class) (249). We must, therefore, be suspect of anti-sentimentality. We must, at least, analyze the wrenching aversion that automatically attaches to the project of taking seriously that which smells sentimental—noticing, as Menely does, that the sentimental is deeply attached to the devaluing of certain animals (and, I add, women and children). Even Jacques Derrida, to whom animal studies is indebted, only goes so far as to critically take up the pet animal (his now-famous cat, featured in “The Animal that Therefore I Am” [1999]), then quietly walk away; as Haraway describes, “[h]e came right up to the edge of respect...but he was sidetracked by his textual canon of Western philosophy and literature and by his own linked worries about being naked in front of his cat” (20).

The literary animal deserves to be treated seriously, as more than a figure of speech or a symbol, or sentimental fodder in a personal bout of philosophizing, or something to talk about when other more “serious” topics seem exhausted. The intimacy, and resulting affects, of these human-dog relationships is and was real, and deeply intertwined with the aesthetic practices of the novel, which—read in the context of material pet-keeping practices—allows us entry into these webs of meaning and making. To the extent that these human-dog relationships are also sites of social struggle, the case studies featured in this dissertation reflect these struggles and offer insight into how these relationships might be reshaped and reconceived to different subject-making ends.

Chapter 1, “Happy Families: Animal Mediators and the Making of the Victorian Family in Charles Dickens’ *David Copperfield* and *Oliver Twist*,” posits the dog as a technology for the circulation of affect between persons living in increasingly insular domestic spaces. Through the pet dogs, Jip (*DC*, 1850) and Bull’s-Eye (*OT*, 1837), conflicts between household members—in particular, the man and woman in each co-residing heterosexual relationship—are mediated so that its members can cohabit within the confines of middle-class Victorian domesticity. As mediator, the pet animal is vacated of agency except to serve as a conduit for positive affect. By

taking both sides of any argument, the pet animal absorbs discord and creates a chain of sympathy that binds the feuding couple. Yet in his light satire of pet-keeping practices, Dickens also shows that Jip and Bull's-Eye fall short of the ideal, failing in each household to sufficiently placate their gendered inequities. In their failures we see the function each try desperately to fulfill. Through this chapter, I will show how dogs were reduced to perfect lovers to mediate the affect in the home, making bourgeois domesticity possible, and will also raise the question of dominance—the links between controlling the dog, the wife, and the home—that will continue as a thread throughout the dissertation.

By the end of the century, as my next cluster of readings show, the inclusion of animals in the domestic cauldron had many unpredictable effects. Chapter 2, “A Dog is Being Beaten: The Production of Humaneness through the Pseudo-Autobiographical Dog in Margaret Marshall Saunders’ *Beautiful Joe* and *Beautiful Joe’s Paradise*,” looks at the discourse of humaneness and how pet-keeping became a disciplinary process. Analyzing the first animal viewpoint novel published in the United States and its sequel (1893, 1902), I show how the “autobiographical” tale of canine abuse and rescue marked humaneness towards animals as a largely masculine endeavor requiring a delicate balance of affective “health” between work and play, public and private, “natural” and civilized, and passionate and disciplined. The aestheticizing of the abused dog as “beautiful,” in effect, served to make gendered women and men through both the practical and the affective roles each played vis-à-vis the “rescued” dog. Combating the marginalization of the “sentimental,” Saunders’ novels offer the oxymoron of ugly beauty—a uniquely oxymoronic aesthetic category—in order to render humaneness appropriately masculine. At the same time, these late-century texts also navigate rising anxieties surrounding dominance and mastery of the beloved domestic animal, and labor to assuage such liberal guilt.

This first section of the dissertation, featuring “useful” dogs, focuses on the positive affect in human-dog relations. In Dickens’ pair of novels, the dog performs significant affective work, both in “creating” the fictional families portrayed and circulating positive affect between readers and problematic characters. In such a use of literary dogs, neither what the dog thinks nor feels is particularly important, so the pet dog appears to be a rather flat, less-than-minor character, obscuring its part in the affective webs of reading. In Saunders, the dog’s pseudo-autobiography is at once a potential site of transgression (in that dogs are given figurative space to interpret themselves and indicate that “someone is home”) and a reduction of the dog to a means to a disciplinary end. For the novels’ pedagogical purposes, the simple, preaching writing style and negligible plot inscribes the dog with a “feeling” interiority and limited rational agency. *Beautiful Joe* carves out the ideal, representative victim who is worthy of protection but carefully devoid of strong rights.

The possibility of dog rebellion hinted at in Chapters 1 and 2 reflects how the use of the animal pet as intimate domestic technology for the production of the home and self opens up the human subject to deep vulnerability. Chapter 3, “‘You can’t trust wolves no more nor women’: Rabies in Bram Stoker’s *Dracula*,” looks at confluences between the medical management of rabies and the 1897 novel. As lapdogs and wives—both “useless” domestic dependents—performed similar offices in more and more bourgeois households, discourses surrounding pet management and wife management increasingly resonated with each other. In stark contrast to the dogs of the preceding chapters, *Dracula*’s “rabid” canines (and the women with whom they are associated) are untrustworthy, fatally dangerous in their love. This animal-focused reading investigates how the novel effectively taught readers how to manage to “love” one’s wife (or pet dog, or other similarly positioned household dependent) in spite of the terror of “madness” and contamination posed by the deceptively docile dependent (the wife, the pet). Terror and love, in effect, become linked domestic affects exercised on “useless” dependents to produce the

subjectivity of husbands comfortable with the paradox of feeling positive attachment, “love,” to that which needs to be destroyed—“euthanized”—at a moment’s notice. In a related paradigm shift, euthanasia itself became a verb, the *bringing about* of an “easy” death.

Chapter 4, “The Bare-Dog: Affects of Masculinity in Jack London’s *Call of the Wild* and *White Fang*,” synthesizes many of the strands that comprise the tumultuous turn of the century. In this reading of London’s two most famous dog stories (1903, 1906), I investigate how the discourse of canine fidelity served to produce masculinity. London’s novels represented what I am calling the “bare-dog,” the dog as imagined to be when de-coupled from human influence, in order to produce the Other with which “love-masters” could have intimate relationships that would rescue them from “dandified” masculinity. As with Saunders’ novels about Beautiful Joe, the masculine animal undergoes physical hardship and pain, trials that serve not only as a test of their masculine endurance, but also, for the reader, as an affectively interpellating experience: the abused dog hails the feeling reader as masculine. Although London’s novels eschew humaneness as a mission, they both attempt to carve out a companionate human-animal relationship that is acceptably masculine and anti-sentimental. In each case, the dog’s masculinity—its agency in the face of human commands—is carefully preserved, in spite of its feminizing victimization, refining the paradox of ugly beauty—the safe object of intimate cross-species (or cross-gender) relationship. In contrast to *Dracula*’s fear-ridden response, this American dog-keeping model addresses anxieties of eroticized interspecies dominance by constructing men and dogs in a mutually pedagogical relationship—“loving” dyads of mastery-servitude.

This second section of the dissertation, featuring “dangerous” dogs, tracks two responses to the potential transgression of dependents. Compounding its central message of distrust for useless domestic dependents, Stoker’s “rabid” novel is itself a representation of contested self-representation. The way in which the female characters’ authority to “make knowledge” is

challenged by the novel's fractured structure enacts the animal's contest for self-representational agency, fought and lost. In contrast, London's naturalist novels, claiming to represent a "natural" (essential) dog—and employing an omniscient narrator to penetrate and obscure the dog character's interiority to do so—attempts to shore up the walls of the interspecies boundary by inscribing essential species differences that can only rightly exist in a relation of love-mastery in the evanescent frontier. Much like the violently intense masculinity of the Klondike, neither the acute affective attachment between human and dog nor the dog's increasing individuation—its subjecthood—can be ensconced within the domestic enclave without a radical reduction.

Tying together this study and bringing my analyses back into conversation with contemporary animal studies conversations, my Epilogue looks to the utopian gesture of pet-keeping, closing with a foray into contemporary anxieties about our affective uses of dogs, reflecting back on the nineteenth-century moment of transition into these affective uses for how they might help us understand our present-day human-dog relations.

SECTION I.
USEFUL DOGS

CHAPTER 1

Happy Families: Animal Mediators and the Making of the Victorian Family in**Charles Dickens' *David Copperfield* and *Oliver Twist***


In walking through London, we may now and then observe a crowd of persons gathered round a large cage, containing a variety of animals usually considered as opposite and irreconcilable in their natures—such as cats, pigeons, mice, guinea-pigs, rabbits, owls, canary, birds, and other small creatures. The men who shew [sic] these collections of animals call them *Happy Families*, from the good temper and happiness in which they appear to dwell together.

—“Happy Families of Animals” (1844)

Perhaps displayed alongside pet-sellers touting their wares were these Victorian “happy families”: a cage of animals that in their “natural” state would likely be in violent relationships, but in human captivity, co-resided peacefully. In this image of Walter Potter’s taxonomical rendition of a “happy family” (dated 1850/1900) we may see an extant facsimile.¹ **(Figure 3.)** Quite literally, individual animals were trained (by “great kindness,” according to the 1844 article quoted above) to ignore that their unchosen and unnatural co-residents were not only of different species but also very likely a frightful threat or a tempting morsel. In spite of their presumed inclinations, this caged motley crew successfully “appear[ed]” “to dwell together” in “good temper and happiness” (“Happy Families of Animals” 148). In 1861, London had claim to five such “families,” exhibiting at Waterloobridge and the National Gallery, one of which contained fifty-four birds and animals of seventeen different kinds who had, at this point, lived

¹ Potter displayed his taxonomical creations in his home in Bramber, West Sussex. The sources of his animals were mixed: for example, nearby Ward’s Farm kept cats for mouse control and disposed of the unwanted kittens through him, most of the rats were killed by the dog of Potter’s friend, and other specimens were volunteered as his popularity grew (Kettelman, Kennedy). For more on Potter, see Conor Creaney’s “Paralytic Animation: The Anthropomorphic Taxidermy of Walter Potter,” in *Victorian Studies* 53.1 (Autumn 2010) 7-35.

Figure 3.



“Happy Family,” Walter Potter (c. 1900). Source: Güner, Fison. “Art Gallery: The Museum of Everything.” *The Arts Desk*. 20 Oct. 2010. Web. 8 May 2011.

harmoniously together for about eight years.² Such caged spectacles, according to another contemporary, illustrated “man’s power of so training the most unpromising animal pupils as to lead to the control...of their strong natural instincts, appetites, or passions” (Lindsay 271). A “happy family,” then, consists of co-residing inmates who are constitutively enemies, but are carefully trained to perform the spectacle of harmonious bliss for the ogling public.

Constitutive of the ideal concept of the family is, at heart, animality: figuratively, in the prescription to tame one’s “bestial” passions into domestic tranquility; materially, in the practices of producing the “happy family” for public consumption through relationships with animals; and semiotically, for how the literary animal in the domestic novel constructs the “happy family” of the domestic novel by the affective mediation of fictional relationships. This is a question that has been largely neglected by scholars of Victorian domesticity despite the great amount of literature (novels, poems, anthologies of anecdotes, household manuals, pet-keeping manuals, scientific treatises, religious tracts) that documents the unprecedented importance of pets in domestic life. The maintenance of the family was understood to involve affective work through the human-animal relationship, and I explore this key piece of Victorian domesticity through Jip in Charles Dickens’ *The Personal History of David Copperfield* (1850) and Bull’s-Eye in *Oliver Twist* (1837).

² The journalist Henry Mayhew records the story of one of the oldest keepers of “happy families” in *London Labor and the London Poor* (1861), describing the “happy families” as being “so well known as to need no further description” (Mayhew 214). Specifically, this “happy family” contained “3 cats, 2 dogs (a terrier and a spaniel), 2 monkeys, 2 magpies, 2 jackdaws, 2 jays, 10 starlings (some of them talk), 6 pigeons, 2 hawks, 2 barn fowls, 1 screech owl, 5 common-sewer rats, 5 white rats (a novelty), 8 guinea-pigs, 2 rabbits (1 wild and 1 tame), 1 hedgehog, and 1 tortoise” (quoted in Mayhew 214-5). The speaker also notes that the very first “happy family” was exhibited by his teacher in 1845 in the Coventry area of London (Mayhew 214), which casts doubt on either the speaker’s authority or Mayhew’s attention to dates in his accounts, as the *Chambers’s* article quoted in my epigraph was published in 1844. As for the U.S., Jennifer Mason notes that the theme of “happy families” of animals was circulating as well: she cites, for example, Edward Hicks’ painting, *Peaceable Kingdom* (c. 1834), a passage by Emerson in *Nature* (1836), and “Happy Family” menageries in traveling circuses and P.T. Barnum’s American Museum (1841-68) (9-10).

Dickens' inclusion of pet dogs in his fiction is not merely reflective of the changing realities of middle-class life—the profusion of middle-class pet-keeping well-documented by Harriet Ritvo, Keith Thomas, and others—but representative of the discursive production of the Victorian family through, with, and by the pet animal. Not only does examining the family from this angle recast Dickens' novels, but it also shows the central relevance of the domestic practices of affect-management in the middle-class Victorian family—an institution that increasingly required the oppressively harmonious and insulated co-residence of disparate persons in strict (gender, generational, class) hierarchies.

Serving as a common love object, the pet is at the fulcrum of a family's quotidian negotiations of affect, passing on and amplifying positive affect and dampening negative affect, thereby acting as the mediator of “happy families.” As a figure that does not have to be consistently portrayed, the mutable dog rhetorically performs multiple, often contradictory, functions in domestic human relationships—and in literature about domestic human relationships.³ Following the work of social constructionists like Judith Butler who have, in the past few decades, brought to light an understanding of how subjectivities and bodies are socially produced by the interpretation of meanings “inscribed” onto them, we have come to view that “the same holds true for ‘texts’ embedded in mineral, vegetable and animal bodies, in insignificant features of landscape,” &c. (Berger 110). In Philip Culbertson's useful conceptualization, the body is

a textless text whose meaning is read by many readers, whether they are invited to read or not. It is a text which is almost always read from the outside (the

³ As *non-human* minor characters, the pet seems to be allowed more rhetorical freedom than a human character may be allowed. This greater leniency afforded to an animal character's inconsistencies and discontinuities enables it to subtly serve multiple functions whenever it is textually included. In their non-human alterity, they are, in effect, unimportant enough to be unfixed, and therefore important in their unimportance. Kreilkamp has convincingly established another angle by which the supposed unimportance of dog characters becomes surprisingly relevant. While he explores the negative associations of “dying like a dog” (“Dying” 81-2), I suggest that there may be perks to “living like a dog”—unfixed and transitionally—that are worth exploring.

reader intrajecting meaning), but which always has the potential to be read from the inside, in that the body-bearer may at any point choose to wrest control over the text to interpret as his or her own[.] (Culbertson)

The meanings of any body (human, animal, vegetable, or mineral) are the product both of an ongoing contest between external readers and “body-bearer” agency, producing, in Butler’s words, through the “*stylized repetition of acts*,” “a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief” (“Performative” 519, 520). Animal bodies have relatively weak meaning-making agency in the human-read world, while their range of interactive, demonstrative behaviors allow for highly creative inscriptions of meaning.

This also goes some way to explaining why an expressive species such as dogs, in particular, have become crammed with our meanings. The gregarious dog even held a special place in the “happy families” of animals. In the course of the century, circuses also took up the idea to organize some of their trained wild animals as “happy families” that included large carnivores such as lions; in Carl Hagenbeck’s famous Hamburg Menagerie, a 1907 writer describes that “the greater part do not do much more than tolerate each other, but the *social cement* of the whole party is given by the dogs, large but young boarhounds, which are full of play and good humour [sic], and seem to keep the others in spirits by their example” (Cornish 164, emphasis added).⁴ Dogs, as flexibly interactive texts, can shift their position within the sacred family circle into which they have been provisionally admitted, essentially taking both sides of a quarrel alternately or at once. I call dogs “flexibly interactive texts” to acknowledge how their particular interactivity—their species’ affective demonstrativeness, further bred into their gestures and facial expressions—particularly allows their bodies to be written on with our

⁴ For more on training of carnivores for circuses, see F. Z. S.’s “Animal Actors: The Wonders of Wild Beast Training,” *Harmsworth Magazine* 6 (London: Harmsworth Bros., 1901). For more on circus animals in general, Peta Tait’s *Wild and Dangerous Performances: Animals, Emotions, Circus* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

discourses, even quite contradictorily. Dickens' Jip creates affective relationships between two co-residing characters in conflict, tying them in bonds of domesticity. Lacking strong agency and interiority as a character, Jip takes both sides of the feuding couple in turn, which unites the characters affectively into a household, making a "home" even out of tension and discord. In spite of all odds, even such an unideal dog as Bull's-Eye can form a bridge of empathy between readers, the criminal Bill, and the companion he eventually murders, Nancy.

The Comical Go-Between

I begin by juxtaposing a reading of one of the most famous representations of Queen Victoria's happy family, *Windsor Castle in Modern Times*, painted between 1841 and 1845 by Sir Edwin Landseer, against Dickens' portrait of unhappy domesticity in *David Copperfield*.⁵ **(Figure 4.)** *Windsor Castle* was recognized even in the nineteenth century as "a felicitous illustration...of that species of sovereignty which won the hearts of Queen Victoria's subjects," that which represented her daily life in her majestic homes as "what the great body of Englishmen, not the specially cultured, not the pre-eminently gifted, but the great body of well-to-do people, ordinarily educated, would like their houses to be" ("Edwin Landseer" 817). Drawing, "perhaps, the densest crowd in the exhibition," according to an 1874 article ("Edwin Landseer" 817), *Windsor Castle* captures the circulation of love in a happy, dog-filled home: an uninterrupted gaze flows between Prince Albert and Queen Victoria, and they in turn are part of a chain of gazes, connected to Albert's greyhound Eos and a pair of terriers, the young Princess Victoria, and a fourth terrier.⁶ The dogs are a key part of the affect that circulates from the open

⁵ Landseer was best known for receiving much royal patronage for painting dogs, particularly those of the Queen's preference. Dickens was described in 1877 as the "Landseer of fiction" for his representation of dogs in happy domestic scenes. This article's author credits both Landseer and Dickens for "the thorough propagation and wholesale popularisation [sic] of" dogs in their elevation into comfortable petdom ("Dickens's Dogs" 176).

⁶ Their love of dogs was also well known, and William Secord, dog art historian, has posited that it was no doubt thanks to Victoria's caninophilia that the public also shared in it (245).

Figure 4.



“Windsor Castle in Modern Times,” Sir Edwin Landseer (1841-5). Original in Royal Academy.

window to the open door, particularly in the pets' adoring gazes that so tenderly evince approval of the union.

The marriage between Victoria and Albert was complicated by the fact that she was Queen, and Parliament would not, despite her repeated requests, name her husband King. Analyzing royal portraiture in cartoons, paintings, and photographs that ambiguously depicted either Victoria or Albert as having more power over the other, Margaret Homans argues that the Queen actively engaged in both the practice and public performance of middle-class wifeliness, both to assuage fears of female rule and monarchic power, and to expand the ideological power of her office (15, 3). In *Windsor Castle*, Albert is positioned as the head of house, paired with a submissive Victoria. Though Homans argues that, in this Landseer painting, Albert is the only center of the dogs' adoring, attendant gazes (20), the emotional intensity between the royal pair feels assiduously depicted, and it seems it is precisely their *unequal union* that is the subject of canine adoration. Inequality was a prominent feature of representations of the royal pair's relations, and Landseer's painting suggests—through the dogs' approval, among other factors—that this is fine, this is what a “happy family” looks like.

Yet this carefully composed, candid-style snapshot includes a rather discordant element: a disorderly spread of dead birds. The carcasses of pheasants, mallards, a jay, and a kingfisher—which the baby Victoria holds in her hands like a toy—are strewn across the room, at the forefront of the painting, evidence of a good hunt (Secord 245).⁷ If we read this painting as a “happy family” scene, then something has gone wrong—predators and prey should be alive and well, harmoniously co-residing—but no one seems to take notice. There is patent—and patently masculine—disorder that does not seem to disrupt the peaceful bliss read in this carefully composed scene; death, at Albert's hands, is effectively sanitized. A pair of birds lay neatly on a

⁷ For more on hunting, see Ritvo's chapter entitled “The Thrill of the Chase,” and Kathleen Kete's “Animals and Human Empire” and Daniel Justin Herman's “From Farmers to Hunters: Cultural Evolution in the Nineteenth-Century United States” in *A Cultural History of Animals in the Age of Empire*, ed. Kathleen Kete (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2007) 1-24, 47-72.

fringed seat, the only corpses that seem to be intentionally arranged, and rather surprisingly on a piece of furniture that would not likely wash well. Their color scheme, white and mallard, replicate Victoria and Albert's dress, and the white bird shows a bloody wound, lending weight to Homans' reading of Victoria's lesser power in this scene.

This scene of domestic happiness persists despite death and disorder, which are placated by the chain of affect linking humans and dogs—a near-palpable surge of affective connection between bodies. The chain of love forged largely by dog bodies effectively neutralizes this evidence of violence, just as it neutralizes the ongoing power play that undergirds the royal marriage. The inclusion of the dogs mediates marital conflict and the potential of domestic violence and “private” murder; the painting's viewer is assuaged into forgetting strife and remembering only the pictured love and happiness. Thus, Landseer's domestic scene and the Copperfield household I will discuss next are not as odd a juxtaposition as might have initially appeared, for what they share are not only a representation of a heterosexual marriage where the male is expressing power over the female, with violence and death ominously nearby, but also pet dogs as submissive witnesses, producing the affect of the “happy family.”

In parallels and contrasts to *Windsor Castle*, the illustration of the Copperfield household in Chapter 44 captures crowded domestic disorder with an unapproving, if humorous, eye. **(Figure 5.)** Entitled “Our Housekeeping,” the picture depicts David struggling to carve the dinner roast under the witness of his friend, Tommy Traddles. As scholars of Victorian domesticity like Elizabeth Langland have discussed, the scene depicts a poorly-run household. Philip V. Allingham notes that most of the clutter is feminine; “all point[s] towards Dora as the source of the chaos” (2). Unlike the Landseer image, there is no window or door: “the young couple are entombed, or perhaps caged in a confined space, the constriction reinforced by the impinging clutter” (Allingham 1). Yet like Landseer's allusion to a pair of birds that mirror Albert and Victoria, this illustration features a pair of quarreling caged lovebirds in

Figure 5.



Our Housekeeping.

“Our Housekeeping,” Phiz. Source: *Our Housekeeping* by Phiz (Hablot K. Browne). July 1850. Steel etching. Illustration for chapter 44, “Our Housekeeping,” in Charles Dickens’s *David Copperfield*. Source: Centenary Edition (1911), vol. 2. Image scan and text by Philip V. Allingham.

the upper left corner reflecting the domestic discord below: a startling reproduction of the “caged” insularity that may produce combustive negative affect. Like the caged “happy families” of animals, the domestic group is composed of disparate, unequal elements that “naturally” do not get along. This analogy to the “happy family” of animals, paired with *Windsor Castle* and the *Copperfields*, suggests that man and woman, masculine and feminine—like human and animal—were seen as less like complementary pairs of binary opposites that neatly and “naturally” fit together, and more like innately different beings, not easily reconcilable without deliberate training. This juxtaposition also suggests one way in which the pet dog plays an essential role in home-making: when the animal takes its proper position—the lowest place, the adoring space—the domestic scene communicates harmony and happiness. When the animal steps out of place, it signals that the household hierarchy has broken down, to the woe of the family.⁸

Difficult and disorderly, Jip takes center stage in the domestic drama, barking at Traddles and making “short runs” at his plate (Dickens 454). Traddles sits back from the table, apparently intimidated by the little lapdog, while Dora does not even look up to notice the affective disconnection. Unlike Victoria in the Landseer painting, Dora is deeply disengaged, part of no affect chain; unlike Albert, David has eyes only for the ornery roast. It is only Traddles and Jip that may be said to be affectively engaged with one another—but in antagonism, not love or adoration. “I began to think there was something disorderly in [Jip’s] being there at all,” David muses, “even if he had not been in the habit of putting his foot in the salt or the melted-butter” (Dickens 454). This comically suggests that David did not previously consider that a dog

⁸ The frequent allusions to Christianity (for example, in the Introduction, the article in the housekeeping journal explicitly describes the harmonious family as being “are bound by ties not of earth” (“The Home Angel”), and the very concept of the *Angel* of the House clearly invokes Christian beliefs) also remind us that divine justification rationalized these species and gender hierarchies, and that such notions continued well after Darwin revolutionized human-animal relations. The fact that it was so very common to describe a human male as being every dog’s “God”—both in England and the U.S., both before and after Darwin—affirms these connections. Just to name two more famous examples, Harriet Beecher Stowe portrays a character’s effulgent pronouncement that “Man is the dog’s God” (*Writings* 322), which sentiment Rudyard Kipling also echoes in his 1883 story, “Thy Servant a Dog.” “I have Own God called Master,” the syntactically-challenged dog narrates (102).

ought not be trampling across the table with paws in the food—and that this failure to keep the dog in his place is at the root of the affective disconnection. If he does not serve to move positive affect and bind the family, there may be no place for Jip at all.

The Victorian emphasis on the well-ordered homes of the bourgeoisie, painstakingly managed by the mistress, the Angel of the House, is academic commonplace, but the use of pet animals to enable the production of this bourgeois institution is not. In his 1878 treatise on middle-class domestic life, *The Culture of Pleasure; or, The Enjoyment of Life in its Social and Religious Aspects*, William Haig Miller states that “[a]s a bird requires a cage, so does a married couple a home”—a “healthy” one, managed with the necessary “[r]egularity and method” to avoid the “sore friction...exerted on the tempers of the inmates of a house” (281). In this “cage,” according to Miller, the role of domestic animal companions is to “draw out the kindly feelings,” a “sympathy” that should “flo[w] out [from the pets] also to human beings” (250). It is the pet’s quiet inclusion that may allow the Victorian middle-class family to function where emotional bonds are strained or lacking; its work strongly resonates with the mistress’ emotional work. Through the pet dog, conflict between household members are sufficiently placated to function within the regimented confines of middle-class Victorian domesticity. Significantly, the pet may not actually conciliate them, but it acts as binding agent for the household’s “naturally” unharmonious members, and it does so largely by respecting the species hierarchy.

In joining and becoming indispensable to the family, dogs significantly contributed to the transformation of the concept of the family, which, as Catherine Waters notes, was already expanding beyond the notion of kinship—loyalty to bloodlines—to also require close co-residence, an insulating move reflecting changing middle-class values (13). Holly Furneaux’s discussion of alternative, non-kin family arrangements in Dickens would seem to concur with Waters’ point, that blood became significantly less important than co-residence in the construction of middle-class families. In this context of increased insularity, it is clear that the

concept of a “caged” environment is rife for tension: co-residing persons, increasingly individuated as per bourgeois norms, were not bound to get along swimmingly, and when closely confined in the increasingly self-contained “private” sphere, were more likely to erupt in conflict and strife. Like the caged lovebirds in the corner of “Our Housekeeping,” two beings in close, insulated quarters are not likely to get along. In the text accompanying the illustration, David muses: “I did not know how it was, but though there were only two of us, we were at once always cramped for room” (Dickens 454), and this sense of physical oppression is the physical manifestation of the lack of positive affective circulation.

While not entirely successful, Jip’s use as affective mediator in this “caged” environment—sympathetically fostering and circulating positive affect between family members—can still be clearly traced. For one, the pet animal may be actively wielded by one family member to placate the affect of the other. Dora, for example, diverts David’s annoying exhortations to be a “good wife” by asking him to “kiss Jip,” a prescription to make him “be agreeable” (Dickens 382). He finds that “[i]t was impossible to resist kissing Jip, when she held him up to me for that purpose, putting her own bright, rosy little mouth into kissing form, as she directed the operation, which she insisted should be performed symmetrically, on the centre [sic] of his nose” (Dickens 382). The fighting couple kisses in spite of their conflict, but this act of intimacy happens *through Jip*; he both brings them together for a gesture of affection—a temporary truce—while also keeping them from directly kissing.

Affect theorist Sara Ahmed’s useful discussion of the operation of happiness foregrounds how objects can be imbued with the power to produce this potent, binding affect “by association” (“Happy” 33). Pets, essentially treated like any animate object⁹ brought into the home for pleasure, are both a way to self-define by one’s “likes” and a way to bring together

⁹ Although the constraints of this Chapter do not allow for a lengthy discussion, the popularity of automata (“self-playing” pianofortes, “singing” women and birds, “smoking” Chinamen, and other varied human and animal figurines) among the middle-class during this period is clearly related to the project of home-making via animated objects.

disparate people into a household that is united in its emotional investment in the same love object, the pet. Ahmed says: “If the same objects make us happy—or if we invest in the same objects as being what should make us happy—then we would be orientated or directed in the same way” (“Happy” 35). Pre-figuring this idea, in an 1886 American housekeeping manual, Laura C. Holloway actively advocates practices to foster the household “harmony” of its constituent “separate notes”—a harmony not to be confused with “sameness”—and suggests, to this end, “some centre [sic] to which all the diversities...all can join, a pursuit in which all take an interest” (227). In this light, the bourgeois adoption of dogs as *de rigueur* household love objects can be understood to serve the function of home-making, especially given bourgeois investment in individuation. For a household increasingly seen as comprised of distinct and highly subjectified individuals, and not simply tied by kinship, more and more isolated and made “private,” the pet becomes the given common ground, shaping the affect of the shared space of co-residence and enabling the performance of indirect, easy intimacy in the midst of conflict. Suffusing the home environment as a sort of force, Jip acts as a common love object, always already uniting them affectively, just by existing as a pet. As the example above shows, Jip need not incite or invite kisses; his deployable yielding body is enough. By wielding the dog mediator, Dora transforms negative into positive affect: David remarks, she “charmed me out of my graver character for I don’t know how long” (Dickens 382). The effect is nearly magical, as if he is spellbound into levity and loses sense of time.

Although the following example features a pet cat, it is highly illustrative of the operation of a common love object where other bonds are strained or broken:

Life after that in the little farm cottage, with no one to act as mediator, was awkward and dreary for a while, but eventually a remedy was found. It was the family cat.

“Tabby, I think we must have some sugar, some molasses, and some tea,” Mrs. Stewart would say to the cat, whereupon Mr. Stewart would hitch up the team and execute the orders transmitted through Tabby.

“Tabby, I think I shall go to town tomorrow, and I ought to have a clean shirt, oughtn’t I?” Mr. Stewart would say to Tabby, whereat the clean shirt would be produced.

When Tabby died there was another to take its place. It took several pussies to span the long period of silence, but it was carefully seen to that a cat was never wanting. (W., “Organs” 57)¹⁰

Written at the culmination of a century of significantly intensified pet-keeping practices, this 1903 anecdote encapsulates many of the affective uses of pets in the middle-class Victorian household. Here, the pet animal occupies a singular position: Tabby keeps the peace between the Stewarts, acting as the essential “mediator” of a potentially acrimonious household (W., “Organs” 57). Driven asunder by their religious differences—the husband is a staunch atheist, the wife a devout Christian—the Stewarts refuse to either “harmonize” or “separate” (W., “Organs” 57). The image evoked is of two people who are stubbornly joined, albeit discordantly, each requiring services only the other can provide—in effect, forming a “family” by material (tea and clean shirts) rather than emotional transactions. In “sadness, sickness, misfortune, or joy,” “each divine[s] the other’s wants and instantly supplie[s] them” (W., “Organs” 57), so that in spite of their fundamental disagreement and staunch refusal to directly interact, they still can, through Tabby, communicate their precise needs and mutually provide for each other. The two

¹⁰ Published in the transatlantic *Phrenological Journal and Science of Health*, amidst other short articles of interest, “The Organs of Firmness and Secretiveness” was a reprint from *The Christian Work and the Evangelist* (1902). The title of this story and its original journal of publication suggest that the author was critical of the Stewarts’ inflexibility and their preferred mode of communication. It is not that the Stewarts’ use of their pet was considered an ideal one, but rather, that it is of great significance that the pet allows them to function as a family. By “functioning,” I refer to the fact that they co-reside, do not divorce, do not engage in adulterous affairs, perform within their gendered spheres, and at least on the surface behave with civility and avoid overt expressions of negative affect.

examples of its mediating functions described in the scene show that a communication to Tabby directly (“whereupon,” “whereat”) brings about the desired performance of gendered duties by one’s spouse. Tabby serves the vital function of mediating literally all intercourse between the pair, without which they could hardly run a household.

As illustrated by Tabby, it is the pet’s quiet inclusion that may allow the Victorian middle-class family to function where emotional bonds are strained or lacking. The Tabby epigraph shows how the pet may bring a family into functional (gendered) togetherness. In the role of pet, an animal weaves humans into affective webs, bringing together into domesticity even discordant partners by serving as a shared and mutually-constructed boundary that, while keeping people separate, also fundamentally unites them. Moreover, the fact that the function of common love object can also be performed with a cat—and in Tabby’s case, a cat whose sex, body, reactions, responses, agency, and interiority are completely omitted from the tale—illustrates how domestic pets were, during this period, generally not regarded as possessors of intricate interiority. The “several pussies” also emphasize the fungibility of the common love object; what mattered was not any particular cat’s personality, but rather the mere presence of a cat to speak through. While the pet fulfills this important function of mediation, it is also disposable and replaceable—one of many cats that “span the long period of silence” (W., “Organs” 57).¹¹

The petted animal’s animation (its demonstrativeness) makes it a very effective tool to improve the home’s affect, because it allows for at least the illusion of interactivity that forms the foundation of a sense of reciprocity, a mutuality that would not be as easily believed in the

¹¹ Tabby is consistently referred to as “it,” shunted into the category of things by what is now a rather unusual omission of gender in animals. This reminds us that it is only through binary gendered pronouns that some degree of individuality or personhood may be conferred. According to the *OED*, “tabby” is a generic nineteenth-century name for striped, brindled, or female cats, and none of Tabby’s sequels are referred to by proper name, further emphasizing their complete interchangeability (“Tabby”). Though the Stewarts’ Tabby was presumably replaced because it died of natural causes, it could just as easily have been disposed of for being inconvenient, just one of a long line of fungible cats.

case of a non-living or inanimate object. The way that Dora whispers in Jip's ear—holding “conversations” that rely on rhetorical questions—captures some sincerity in this meaningful human-animal relationship: “Jip can protect me a great deal better than Miss Murdstone—can't you, Jip, dear?... We are not going to confide in any such cross people, Jip and I. We mean to bestow our confidence where we like, and to find out our own friends, instead of having them found out for us—don't we, Jip?” (Dickens 278). Here, in this intimate exchange, the rhetorical apostrophes may appear to be nothing more than childish role-playing with a pretend-friend, but their relationship appears less unilateral when Jip actually answers “like a tea-kettle when it sings” (Dickens 278).¹² Their interspecies relationship exhibits a reciprocity founded on mutual confidences, rare enough in *David Copperfield* overall, and slighted because it is an interspecies relationship. Dora warmly declares them a “we”—united in opinion, sentiment, and purpose—a unity founded in a sense of reciprocally intimate relations.

The doubling of Dora and Jip runs deep, and it is easy to elide their existence as separate beings. For the bulk of the novel, Jip is little more than a stereotypical lapdog, “associated with a particular kind of femininity” (MacInnes 36) of marked small “size, delicacy, prettiness and apparent impracticality” (MacInnes 37).¹³ Like the breed that doubles her, Dora is described as “pretty” and “little” (Dickens 381), affectionate but incurably useless. By tying Dora to the breed-based discourse surrounding spaniels, not only is the justification for their strict disciplining

¹² I do not mean to suggest that Dora's relationship with Jip in this scene approaches the type of human-animal encounter that Donna Haraway would applaud. There are many questions. Does Jip understand? Not likely. But would he agree with the content of what she says, if he could? Perhaps.

¹³ Lillian C. Raymond-Mallock notes in 1907 that spaniels were most popular during the reign of James II, and then enjoyed a resurgence during Victoria's reign (8). Spaniels were one of the most popular dogs of the Queen's household, a popularity promulgated by Landseer's portraits of Victoria's Dash (1836 and 1838). It was the Victorians who created most of the dog breeds as we understand them today (Ritvo 93), and each breed had specific discourses attached to them—for example, Ian MacInnes discusses spaniels and mastiffs as archetypes of Englishness. The obsession with breeding, of course, was deeply entwined with evolving concepts of human race and national typologies.

cemented, as Grace Moore has noted,¹⁴ but also the assertion of Dora's constitutive insufficiency: her parallel uselessness.¹⁵

Just as Dora is put into the home to mistress it but rejects the seriousness of the task, so does Jip express fears of dutiful confinement in the domestic sphere. Instead of shopping for necessary kitchenware, Dora distractedly chooses a "Chinese house...with little bells on the top" for Jip: "And it takes a long time to accustom Jip to his new residence[;] whenever he goes in or out, he makes all the little bells ring, and is horribly frightened" (Dickens 444). Similarly, David buys a "little house" (Dickens 382) that Dora finds constraining. "I am so frightened!," she exclaims in odd response to his description of their future co-residence (Dickens 425). Like Jip, she goes "jingling about the house" (Dickens 459) with her useless basket of keys while Jip rings the bells in his pagoda (Dickens 444)—perhaps a noisy gesture of passive aggression. Jip generally colludes in her failed home-making, as when she tries to maintain the household accounts in a ledger, and "Jip would walk over the page, wagging his tail, and smear them all out" (Dickens 457). The pagoda itself, David notes, seems to "invariably bloc[k] up the main thoroughfare" (Dickens 454). In like terms, Dora and Jip refuse the confines of their assigned homes. Both embody the aristocratic feminine uselessness that rejects the middle-class duties of vigilant and tedious industry. Both are not only useless, but also useless in a disruptive way, figuratively blocking physical space and making disharmonious noise.

Jip's name is "short for Gypsy" (Dickens 277),¹⁶ and in this racist allusion he reflects Dora's recalcitrance to enter the domestic space as an aberration inconsistent with her racial

¹⁴ As Lisa Surridge discusses, a popular phrase ran thusly: "The spaniel, the woman and the walnut tree: the more you beat them, the better they be" ("Dogs' Bodies" 6).

¹⁵ I will further discuss the long history of misogynist virulence against lady's lapdogs in Chapter 3, which Laura Brown also raises in connection with *David Copperfield*. Brown rightly identifies Dora's relationship as an example of "an experiment in the definition of love in Dickens's [sic] novels" (85), but her discussion focuses instead on other examples in Dickens' novels where lapdogs and women are used to exemplify inappropriate female sexuality.

¹⁶ Another famous canine "gypsy" is the pet dog of George Eliot's *Adam Bede* (1859). By naming companion animals after the gypsy, the English may have been enacting the domestic consumption of the

and class identity. Jip redundantly enacts Dora's refusal to be a competent Angel of the House: "She was quite satisfied that a good deal was effected by this make-belief of housekeeping; and was as merry as if we had been keeping a baby-house, for a joke" (Dickens 459). The much-cited farce that Dora enacts when she takes "possession" of the keys, and at once forfeits their power by leaving every door unlocked, is not just literally about how her failure enables their servants' thievery, but about affect: metaphorically, controlling access to all the doors of the house is akin to controlling the flow, the circulation (of persons, of affect) in the home, and Dora fails miserably in this important task. The "cage" of their home becomes insufferable. On the one hand, positive affect needs to circulate to avoid stifling cage-like conditions; on the other, the flow is supposed to be under control, carefully managed and arranged according to the scripted household hierarchy. This failure of affect-management is represented by the "tyranny" of their servants and their disorderly pet dog, and felt daily by all inhabitants.

The alignment of Jip with Dora shows David's investment in a chain of command, which is flouted by the unruly human-dog pair. By letting every one "flow" uncontrollably and failing to keep the lower orders in "their place," both David and Dora fail to regulate the home's affect to produce "harmony." Their servants run amuck, slacking off and stealing at will, infected by the disunion of the master and mistress. Mary Anne, for example, a "remorseless woman," ignores their four o'clock dinner order with impunity. David assumes it must be his wife's job to "remonstrate" with Mary Anne, thus providing for "the establishment of [a] system of checks" (Dickens 450).¹⁷ As Leonore Davidoff and Catherina Hall put it, a wife in Dora's position has to be "firm and business-like" (395), but Dora is "such a little goose" that she cannot (Dickens

exotic Other. For more on nineteenth-century British attitudes to gypsies, see Deborah Epstein Nord's *Gypsies and the British Imagination, 1807-1930* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

¹⁷ While this hour's lateness seems meant to render the situation comical, it does also recall Jennifer Ruth's argument about Dickens' surprising endorsement of the values of organized labor—in particular, time management.

450). Just as Dora should not “spoil” her pet dog, so should she not allow her servants to rule over her as if *she* is a “little goose”—the one in the position of *animal* in the relationship to her own servants. And by the same token, the man at the head of this household should clearly not overly indulge—“make a pet of” —those beneath him on the hierarchy. This is a line David clearly crosses with Dora, whom he largely indulges and makes a “pet” of, inconsistent attempts to “mould” her aside.

If *Windsor Castle* represents the family that can run a disorderly kingdom, creating peace and bliss even over dead carcasses, then David and Dora represent the failure of rule, with the dog that is neither subject to training nor discipline, but is instead Dora’s amiable and beloved peer, her bosom buddy. In framing Dora’s failure as an unacceptable interspecies peership, the novel uses human-animal relations to explain the inappropriateness of letting one’s household servants (one’s “lesser,” the “lower orders”) challenge the household hierarchy.

This is a powerful concept that I will return to: the inextricable fusion of positive affect, love, with power. In a novel that links a “child-wife”¹⁸ with a pet dog, describing both as pets, the concept of a family with one “head” and “dependents” is produced in interspecies terms. Both Dora and Jip are treated as pets, and their powerlessness is imbued with positive affect—charm, delight, a teasing and comical tone. At one level, Jip accentuates her domestic failures, but he also softens the criticism; the (male) criticizer is absolved of the appearance of meanness by the comic affect attaching to the dog’s repetition. In this way, Jip dampens the critique of David: the message is still communicated, but the novel maintains its sprightly, teasing tone, avoiding awkward preaching. As “pets,” Dora’s and Jip’s uselessness may be the subject of light-hearted deprecation, but it is also endearing, an inferior position that is imbued with attractive charm. Pets were clearly favored in the family circle, and allowed a place, because of their dependency

¹⁸ In fact, it is this novel that the *OED* credits for the earliest use of “child-wife” to mean a very young, or child, bride, a change from its medieval definitions of midwife or woman with young child (“Child-wife”).

and need. It is central to their function in the family that dogs are a species considered inferior and dependent on human mastery and care, just as it is central to Dora's charm as feminine, as a "pretty" and "little" "pet," that she is deeply dependent.

The relationship between copious affection and an ability to be practical and industrious is a necessarily inverse one under the dichotomous logic of work vs. play articulated in *David Copperfield*. Though David claims to be frustrated by Dora's house-keeping failures, he in fact enjoys her uselessness very much, using both his "pets" for the same purposes. When he complains about the servants, she sits child-like on his knee and draws on his forehead "with a quaint little mockery of being industrious, that quite delight[s David] in spite of [him]self" (Dickens 450). Though he soberly claims that he did not treat her as a pet "too often" (Dickens 428), he is perhaps pleased enough to set himself above the other women in his life by merely "petting" Dora *less*. Dora's uselessness is "delightful"; her childish ways are "agreeable"—and not just because David is living out what Vereen Bell calls his intense adolescent urges towards Dora, but because of how well he may think of himself in relation to women—as a competent, productive adult, occupied with "serious" matters, who condescends to engage with delightful pets for his pleasure. Like a court jester, she may delight her king with satirical renditions of despotism. When John Lucas describes David's marriage to Dora as being fueled by "[t]he common passions and affections of men" (21), passions that lead David into a marriage that is "undoubtedly a trap" (21),¹⁹ he seems to be expressing a too-easy dismissal and vilification of this relationship that does not account for David's complicity in being "trapped." Not only is David lax about her uselessness, but also he finds her "more delightful than ever" when she laughingly dismisses his exhortations to learn how to cook (Dickens 428). The truth is that David finds her total dependency charming, for it makes him more masterful in relation to her,

¹⁹ And yet Dora's story still became an object lesson for girls across the Atlantic decades later. For example, on an 1880s Chautauquan program, the following is listed as a Select Reading: "Results of a Lack of Business Education for Girls shown in scenes from the life of Dora in 'David Copperfield,' by Dickens" ("Outline and Programs" 47).

and in effect, her spaniel-like femininity is a way to cement his manhood, particularly at a time in his life—an orphaned, nameless, and fortuneless youth, seeking to establish himself—when such ontological assurance may not be forthcoming in the public sphere.

While Dora and Jip are both treated as “pets,” Dora is also empowered to act as a pet-keeper, wreaking upon Jip the treatment she receives. As the subject of Dora’s dominance, Jip blurs the reader’s sympathies for Dora as the victim of David’s mastery by “sticking” sympathy to David. Since, through Jip, Dora replicates the behavior that one may deprecate of David, the reader is more likely to feel sympathetic towards David. “It was very odd to me,” David remarks unreflexively, “but they all seemed to treat Dora, in her degree, much as Dora treated Jip in his” (Dickens 427). The cookery-book that David purchases to ‘train’ Dora into being a “good wife” is in turn used by her to teach Jip to perform circus tricks: “the principal use to which the cookery-book was devoted, was being put down in the corner for Jip to stand upon” (Dickens 428).

Mimicking David’s attempts to “mould” her, Dora tries to school Jip into performing like a trick dog, enforcing her lessons with a mockery of corporal punishment. For example, when Jip “insist[s] upon barking still...she beat[s] him” (Dickens 278), or when “Jip growl[s], and wouldn’t smell” the flowers David presents, Dora tries to “make him” and then “beat[s] him” (Dickens 340) when he refuses. The words are harsh—coercion, beating—but Dora does not take discipline seriously: for example, one of these beatings involves “pats” on the bridge of Jip’s nose “while he winked his eyes, and licked her hand” (Dickens 278), and another punishment is “ringing all the little bells one after another, to punish Jip for his recent bad behaviour; [sic] while Jip lay blinking in the doorway with his head out, even too lazy to be teased” (Dickens 456). By employing tough language that is then farcically redefined, the text undercuts both Dora’s and David’s pretensions to discipline:

[Dora] loved me so much, and was so captivating, (particularly when she made Jip stand on his hind legs for toast and when she *pretended to* hold that nose of his against the hot tea-pot for punishment because he wouldn't), that I felt like a sort of Monster who had got into a Fairy's bower.... (Dickens 384, emphasis added)

Here, David becomes “captivated” by seeing Dora as a “lovely little creature”— as a petted, less-than-human plaything—and he is “particularly” “captivate[d]” when he watches Dora’s pantomime (“pretended to”) disciplining of Jip, which is as much a farce as David’s attempts to train Dora. This mention of Jip’s mock-punishment is inserted as a parenthetical remark, underscoring the layers of master-petdom in this household—or rather, the rampant failures of master-petdom, for this suggests that even as the pet enters the bourgeois home as mediator, its emotional work cannot be fully achieved without the careful maintenance of the master-pet hierarchy.

The final piece to understanding Jip’s affective use as a mediator in this household is in his death, so closely following Dora’s: his death introduces ambivalence regarding how we may interpret Dora’s death, which has been read as an inevitable and salutary occurrence. As Andrew Lang observed so matter-of-factly in 1889, “Dora conveniently died, and Agnes came to the front” (684). Another contemporary reader observes that “even from the first it is plain that Dora is to be sacrificed to Agnes,—that she must be killed out of the way either before or after marriage” (C., “Novels” 226). Jip’s death makes her death seem, in the words of Frances Armstrong, “inevitable and self-chosen” (57)—a suicide by self-waste, imbued with the pathos of the suttee of the devoted and faithful dog. Like the deaths in *Windsor Castle*, Dora’s and Jip’s deaths are sanitized of negative affect and do not mar the portrait of domestic bliss of the new-and-improved Copperfield household under Agnes. Dora—and Jip—seem to decline, in fact,

because Dickens needs them to neatly disappear to make way for Agnes, who Catherine J. Golden describes as David's "reward" (6).

In another parallel Jip and Dora are similarly situated as inspirations of an affective passion that (the text says) should have ceased to be upon maturity—"puppy love." As David waxes "full of eloquence" in declarations of love, Jip "bark[s] madly all the time" (Dickens 345): "The more I raved, the more Jip barked. Each of us, in his own way, got more mad every moment" (Dickens 345). In this rivalry, each lover incenses his rival into passionate madness; each is an echo and reinforcement of the other's affect. Just as David and Dora are joined through Jip as a common love object, so are David and Jip in their love for Dora. The intimation of "madness" suggests, however, that David's passion may be in excess; the "madness" is animalistic and therefore improper. The text suggests bluntly that David ought not to have married Dora: "I am afraid it would have been better, if we had only loved each other as a boy and girl, and forgotten it" (Dickens 543). In other words, their "puppy love" should have been discarded after it served its purpose, which was to spur David into indefatigable industry in seeking the means to support his beloved.

Under the ardent motivation of his love for Dora, David forfeits the profligate habits he had indulged in under the influence of youth, taking up two jobs to make his "frugal home...independent by [his] labor" (Dickens 382). Once these important lessons in manhood are learned and financial independence achieved, like any disposable pet of childhood, Dora's affective use is exhausted. A relationship with a "pet"—a relationship of indulgence towards a being represented as inferior or lesser—may be appropriate and even salutary in youth, but is ill-fitted to sober adult male middle-class life if the master cannot restrain his affective attachment to the pet.

It is as if "pets" like Dora and Jip are playthings on which to practice play-manhood, just as much as Dora's housekeeping is a feat of make-believe; her domestic failures are also tied to

her failure to cease loving her dog as she ages.²⁰ This sense of Dora as no more than a passing “puppy love” for David is reinforced by his pronouncements, once the requisite mourning period passes, that his love for Dora had been inclusive of his love for Agnes: “When I loved her—even then, my love would have been incomplete, without your sympathy. I had it, and it was perfected. And when I lost her, what should I have been without you, still!” (Dickens 613). Somewhat perversely, he goes on to declare that in Agnes the “spirit of [his] child-wife looked upon [him], saying it was well; and winning [him], through [Agnes], to tenderest recollections” of Dora (Dickens 613).

This makes sense only if the logic of “puppy love” requires that early loves of youth legitimately exist solely for emotional practice, unchecked deliriums for the cultivation of what will, once restrained in adulthood, deserve to be taken seriously. Yet these feelings that the novel refuses to take seriously are perhaps delegitimized precisely because of their association with pet animals, as if such intense attachments to “lesser” beings are somehow inherently inauthentic. Can the sincere ardor of their felt experience be so summarily dismissed? These master-servant, husband-wife attachments, in fact, threaten to be so disruptive to hierarchies (species, gender) that to “indulge” in them must be maligned. Perhaps herein is precisely the motivation for pejoratively dismissing David’s love for Dora, and Dora’s relationship with Jip: masters that overindulge their pets inspire contempt because an inferior (a dog, a wife) must only be loved in such a way that one’s dominance is not compromised.

David’s exclamatory pronouncements about his two wives being always-already-the-same ring absurdly, and are belied by none other than the relationship between Dora and Jip. As she muses on her own ebbing life force, she refuses to see Jip as just another fungible dog—in contrast to how she herself will shortly be treated as a fungible wife. Rather, Dora insists that Jip

²⁰ An 1856 article in *New York Times* complains that only “very young ladies” could keep pets without censure, even employing them as “diplomatic agents” during courtship, but “ladies of mature age, married or single,” lack such “apology,” and need to be “brought to a sense of shame for the rather low level at which they have arrived” (“Pets, and What They Cost” 411).

is a deeply individual, irreplaceable subject: “I couldn’t have any other dog but Jip.... It would be so unkind to Jip! Besides, I couldn’t be such friends with any other dog, but Jip; because he wouldn’t have known me before I was married, and wouldn’t have barked at Doady when he first came to our house. I couldn’t care for any other dog but Jip, I am afraid” (Dickens 496).

Perhaps, then, Dora foreshadows her impending replacement—and David’s easy and self-serving conflation of his love for them both—with more hostility than she seems to directly avow (Dickens 496).²¹ In focusing on how Jip’s replacement would not “have barked at Doady when he first came to our house” (Dickens 496), Dora also suggests that her (and Jip’s) refusal to be properly domestic is a passive-aggressive rejection of David’s rule, and that her attachment to Jip is a moment of self-preserving love. It is Dora’s relationship with Jip that presents an alternative model of relationship that is more intimate for its willingness to love beyond the confines of hierarchy, crossing taboo boundaries (of gender, of species).

The text ultimately submerges this potent transgression. By the inclusion of Jip and the affective sympathies he inspires for David, the reader can feel David’s mourning for Dora is sincere, without being overly critical about the possibility that he did not make her very happy during her short life or entertaining the suspicion that he may have hastened her death with his tyranny. At least, it is clear that Dickens endeavors to exonerate David of culpability in his “pet”

²¹ Shuli Barzilai documents Dickens’ more-than-average interest in the wife-murdering Bluebeard legend across his body of work, opening the article with a conversation that the young David has with his famously comical housekeeper, Peggotty, discussing the possibility of re-marriage upon the death of a spouse. “[I]f you marry a person, and the person dies, why then you may marry another, mayn’t you, Peggotty?,” he asks, to which she answers, “[y]ou MAY if you choose, my dear. That’s a matter of opinion” (Dickens 13). David was referring to his mother, but prefiguring his own course of action. The possible connection with Bluebeard taints Dora’s death and David’s remarriage, as if, as so many readers suggested, his second marriage was inevitably expected all along. There is also a hoarding component to Bluebeard’s killing—he could have disposed of the bodies of his murdered wives through fire or secret burial, but chooses instead to collect them at home—that resonates with David’s odd comments about Dora’s spirit being channeled through Agnes and vice versa. Maia McAleavey explores issues of Victorian remarriage and argues that, according to Victorian angelology, David could indeed expect to eventually share heaven with both Dora and Agnes as sort of wives in heaven. But the above passages also show his intention to enact a sort of spiritual bigamy while on earth. While I do not mean to suggest that Dickens’ interest in Bluebeard should lead us to the conclusion that Dickens lived out violent misogynist fantasies through his fiction, it seems to me that *David Copperfield* is working through questions of spousal death and re-marriage through the concept of “puppy love.”

Dora's death by using Jip to inspire the reader's sympathy for both of the Copperfields in conflict—effectively, bringing them to symmetrically kiss Jip's nose again and again.

The Sympathetic Criminal

Surely Victorians would have been appalled at the juxtaposition of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert against Nancy and Bill Sikes of *Oliver Twist*. While *Windsor Castle's* purebred dogs so effectively imbue Victoria's home with positive affect, Bull's-Eye reflects Nancy's home in all its horrors. In *Oliver Twist*, Dickens portrays one of the most extreme (but logical and predictable) conclusions of gender inequity—domestic murder—with a criminal dog at its domestic center.

Bull's-Eye is the canine member of one of the most tense of household arrangements: the pet dog of the housebreaker Bill Sikes, in a marriage-like relation with Nancy, his eventual murder victim. Grace Moore convincingly argues that Bull's-Eye, Sikes, and Nancy are engaged in a triangular relationship of displacements and jealousies. Each character's failings are displaced onto Bull's-Eye: in Sikes' case, abusiveness and rampant criminality, and in Nancy's case, a tendency to "stray" and a near-total submission to the abusive Sikes (Moore 201). At one level, Bull's-Eye serves as a mirror for all that is negative, but in fact, their relationships escape such easy mapping.

In her analysis of the linkages between Nancy and Bull's-Eye, Moore finds that "both are Sikes' victims and both display a frustrating complicity in their continued abuse" (205), and in an anachronistic reading, she seems to read both the dog and the woman as equally rational and reasoning creatures, able to logically deduce that receiving physical abuse is an ill that ought to be rebelled against and escaped, rather than submitted to—as if domestic abuse can only elicit neat flight or fight responses in both humans and dogs. Moore is right in identifying Bull's-Eye as "a *doppelgänger* for Nancy" (205) in that both are victims of Sikes' abuse on the same terms; Sikes treats Nancy "like a dog" (*OT* 238). When Dickens writes, "[t]here must always be two

parties to a quarrel” (OT 71), however, he intimates the complex dynamism of an abusive relationship, where abuse punctuates affection, begetting varying degrees of rebellion and complicity. In one instance that is exemplary of the relationship between Sikes and Nancy, Nancy is cajoled into luring Oliver back to the den of thieves by “dint of alternate threats, promises, and bribes” (OT 61), a *mélange* of approaches bitter and sweet. Similarly, while we most often see Bull’s-Eye subjected to curses, threats, and physical violence, Sikes occasionally mixes in, for example, an “unusually endearing form of speech” that causes the dog to “wag [his] tail” (OT 75). With Nancy and Bull’s-Eye, Dickens foreshadows our contemporary understanding of battered women’s syndrome,²² marking domestic abuse as comprising of cycles of lulls, violent eruptions, and apologies. Neither woman nor dog simply stay or go, but each is called upon by the discourses of unconditional fidelity to stay, then punished under the discourses of bourgeois individuality for staying.

By the early 1820s and 1830s, Lisa Surridge finds, Victorian newspapers featured wife abuse as an “every-day story” (“Introduction” 5), typically portraying the accused husband in terms like “surly,” “ruffian,” or “Tyrant,” in contrast to the “decent-looking” “Victim Woman” (quoted in Surridge, “Introduction” 5), but only if the abused woman did not transgress middle-class norms by offering unfeminine resistance to her abuse. In Nancy’s lack of overt resistance to her abuse, which culminates in her ghastly murder, Surridge locates the argument that Dickens was pushing middle-class values of “selfless femininity” on a working-class relationship

²² This understanding of abuse cycles, commonly referred to as Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS), is a justification or mitigation defense for otherwise criminal acts committed by an abuse victim against her or his abuser. BWS hinges on a model wherein the abuse victim experiences stretches of good or neutral treatment, punctuated with bouts of abuse. Each time, the abuser seeks and receives forgiveness and assures the victim of change, only to repeat the violence at a future date. BWS can help explain why abuse victims may act violently towards their abusers as a means of escaping the abuse. For a thorough discussion and feminist critique of BWS, see Elizabeth Schneider, *Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). For a non-feminist critique of the application of such “abuse excuses,” see James Q. Wilson, *Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal System?* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

(“Private Violence” 37).²³ Reminiscent of Dora Copperfield’s self-wasting resignation, Nancy’s lack of resistance at the final moments before Sikes’ death blow (*OT* 254) evinces an acceptance of this murder as her fate.

Surridge also argues that the conflation of dogs’ and women’s bodies eased Victorian authors’ difficulties in depicting violence against women.²⁴ Instead of showing the taboo subject of a man beating his female partner, authors would employ the pet dog’s body as the surrogate recipient of the violence, thus preserving middle-class respectability while still broaching the sensitive topic of domestic abuse. Displacements, Surridge posits, might be prompted by the ambivalent authorial desire to open up the domestic sphere’s failings for scrutiny while not inciting readership revulsion with an actual picture of a man inflicting physical violence on a woman (“Introduction” 3).

But is Surridge right in assuming that the image of a dog being abused (in this case, Bull’s-Eye) would be more acceptable to the public than that of a woman being abused? It is well-known that women’s domestic abuse has historically been concealed, occluded by the legally-sanctioned Anglo-American ideology that a husband not only may, but must, discipline his disobeying wife, corporally if necessary (Siegel 2117). But perhaps another motivation in using dog abuse to stand in for woman abuse may be that an abused dog may receive more sympathy as a victim than perhaps a woman, who might be seen as having caused or incited, and therefore be deserving of, the violence. Consider a 1912 reading of Nancy’s murder as “accidental”—“only a man who killed his mistress in the heat of passion” (quoted in “Dickens as a Criminologist”)²⁵—which seems to ignore or forget that just prior to the murder, Dickens

²³ While Surridge’s argument is convincing, the conflation of “criminal” with “working-class” is problematic.

²⁴ For more on how abuse of animals was linked to abuse of women, see Lansbury for nineteenth-century feminists doing this work and Carol J. Adams’ *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

²⁵ Writing in *Atlantic Monthly* on October 1876, Edwin Percy Whipple romanticizes Sikes as a “thoroughly hardened ruffian of the sturdy English type” and describes an incident in which Dickens read his

depicts Fagin carefully offering Sikes a myriad of logical reasons to kill Nancy, not least of which was the fear of being caught. Fagin not only imparts on Sikes the motive to kill Nancy, but also co-conspires in the murder and cover-up to follow, questioning only whether Sikes “won’t be—too—violent” (not for Nancy’s benefit, but “for safety”) (*OT* 253). The murder seems to be the pre-meditated culmination of a criminal conspiracy: “[T]here was a fire in the eyes of both which could not be mistaken” (*OT* 253). But then the text also ignores or forgets this, and Sikes is quickly represented as an unthinking killing machine, rushing “[w]ithout one pause or moment’s consideration, without once turning his head to the right or left or raising his eyes to the sky or lowering them to the ground but looking straight before him with savage resolution” (*OT* 253). This rare burst of insight into Sikes’ mind—a stream of single-minded murderous will—certainly makes it seem as if Sikes is acting in the heat of passion, in some justifiable sense of being betrayed by “his” woman. This confusing doubleness exculpates Sikes’ worst crime, and largely because this crime was against a disreputable woman. The text simultaneously tells two stories about Nancy: that she is the innocent victim of a cold-blooded conspiracy and that she is a deserving traitor.

The concept of victimhood requires “innocence,” which seems to hinge on a complete lack of agency: a status more difficult to grant to a woman than a dog. During this period, abuse against animals was increasingly brought to public light as a gross act of ignorant brutality against completely innocent and helpless creatures who were portrayed as “particularly noble

description of Nancy’s murder to his wife Catherine, who “became so affected that he describes her as being ‘in an unspeakable state’” (quoted in Lang xvii). Given the Dickens’ infamously unhappy marriage, which eventually led to a public separation in 1858, this apparently mundane episode takes on a sinister tinge when considered alongside a “Persian” story printed in Dickens’ *All the Year Round* in 1863 purporting to offer “hints for husbands” (“Persian Stories” 571). The story features a wife, “determined to assert her authority” over her husband on their wedding night. Her “whole heart seemed to be in the cat” as a way to snub her husband—an insult which was responded to thusly: “he took the cat gently but firmly from her arms, cut off his head, wiped the blade, sheathed it, and sat down, continuing to talk affectionately to his wife as if nothing had happened. After which, says tradition, she became the best and most submissive wife in the world” (Dickens, “Persian Stories” 571). For Dickens to read to his unhappy wife a grisly story about the murder of a woman by her mate, written by Dickens’ own hand, may have unsettled Catherine with a similar effect as cutting off her pet’s head in her presence.

and selfless servant[s]” (Ritvo 138): some characterizations would emphasize the animal victim’s youth, faithfulness, or good moral character to establish its initial state of grace, as it were (Ritvo 143-4). The same ascription of innocence likely did not so easily attach to women, without the risk of reducing women to lesser, and therefore morally inculpable, beings. Newspapers certainly tried where they could to portray middle-class female victims of abuse as wholly blameless, but this required a reduction of the woman to an abject, non-agential recipient of violence. As Surridge says, “even the most benign protection or service toward women tends to perpetuate their weakness, as well as the perceived superiority of the male” (Surridge, “Dogs’ Bodies” 11). In other words, the standard of victimhood was both low (in that “mere” animals were figurative representations of perfect victims) and high (because this functioned to exclude any humans that transgressed the narrowest norms of non-agential innocence). Very few could fit into such narrow stereotypes of “deserving” victimhood, a stereotype built via the representative abject animal victim vacated of agency.

If sympathy flowed more readily towards the body of the dog, as the perfect victim, could it be argued that an author wishing to critique violence against women, but reluctant to reduce women to lesser beings, might use dogs’ bodies as surrogate recipients of violence in the hopes that this sympathy for the lesser, “innocent” being would transfer and attach onto women’s bodies? If Dora Copperfield is difficult to like, Nancy is even more so. Nancy is not only a thieving prostitute, but as earlier mentioned, the decoy who lures the novel’s young hero back to danger by posing as a “good” woman (*OT* 73). There is also a disturbing suggestion that Nancy is an unfit mother, a travesty of the feminine ideal. In one of her earliest appearances, well before she moves in with Sikes, she mentions that she is “tired enough” because “[t]he young brat’s been ill and confined to the crib, and—“ (*OT* 73). She breaks off, leaving the thought unfinished, and when she moves in with Sikes, there is no “brat.” The intimation demonizes Nancy as an unwed and unfit mother, but quietly and hazily, suggesting that Dickens was consciously and

carefully managing readers' responses towards this character, resulting in a rather confusing amalgam of traits.²⁶ As Catherine Golden argues, Dickens expresses “[n]ever waning...regard for the saintly prostitute,” and attempts to inspire middle-class readers' sympathies to his troubled character by aligning her to a “saintly counterpart,” Rose Maylie (12)—and also, as I suggest, by aligning her to Bull's-Eye. Inamiable as he is, Bull's-Eye acts his part in the affective chain to connect the reader to Nancy, his suffering body allowing for sympathy that the reader may have for him as an animal (a long-mistreated, relatively blameless victim) to transfer onto Nancy.

In focusing on Nancy's and Bull's-Eye shared victimhood, however, we cannot neglect the dog's primary similarities to his master. As with *David Copperfield*, the pet dog is affectively aligned with both the abuser and the abused, complicating the reader's understanding of the relation. Virtually inseparable, the reader is first introduced to Bill Sikes and his dog Bull's-Eye together: Sikes is, in every particular, vulgarly unkempt, with his “very soiled drab breeches” and a “dirty belcher handkerchief” adorning “two scowling eyes; one of which, displayed various parti-coloured symptoms of having been recently damaged by a blow” (OT 60). The “white shaggy dog,” mirroring Sikes' external disarray, bears a “face scratched and torn in twenty different places” and with his matching “ill-looking eyes” (OT 60), is clearly Sikes' double. Indeed, when Sikes, having murdered Nancy, tries to disguise his identity, he rightly understands that he must separate himself from his dog, whose constant companionship

²⁶ Those readers like William Thackeray who express disbelief at Nancy's aspirations to saintliness—in particular in her self-immolating attachment to the man who would eventually murder her to preserve himself—seem to be expressing a familiar disdainful refusal to recognize Battered Women's Syndrome (further discussed in a preceding footnote). In his new preface, Dickens directly addressed such readers, and emphatically pronounced that his representation of Nancy “IS TRUE” (Lang edition, Dickens' preface xxxii). The debate seems on either side to be misogynistic: on one hand, for example, there is the 1839 reader who, while skeptical, still believed that “[w]oman's love, like the deep-rooted trees on the tomb of Geryon, cannot be plucked out without blood” (Review in *The Quarterly Review* 98); on the other, those who agree with Thackeray and think that, for example, “[t]he scenes between Nancy and Bill Sikes are the merest fancy pictures—grotesque distortions of fact” (Flannigan 415). Her murder scene is likely why critics like Thackeray found Nancy's character to be unbelievable—in his words, “the most unreal fantastical personage possible” (in Collins 46)—though Thackeray's disbelief may also have stemmed from his own prejudices against the criminal class, who, on his own observation, were “ugly, stunted, thick-limbed and by no means [beauties]” (in Collins 46).

unerringly signals his identity. The gang of street thieves expresses its surprise that Bull's-Eye has wandered home alone, and immediately understands Sikes' motivations in severing relations with his dog (*OT* 269). For Sikes, to be without Bull's-Eye is to not be his real self.²⁷

While master and dog are rarely seen without the other, they are also perpetually engaged in mental or physical conflict. In a running marker of their relationship, Bull's-Eye winks at his master with both eyes, a habit that Sikes interprets as disrespectful or hostile (*OT* 71). Though Dickens observes that “[d]ogs are not generally apt to revenge injuries inflicted upon them by their masters[,] Mr. Sikes's dog, having faults of temper in common with his owner,” retaliates with toothy violence (*OT* 71), evincing a great “resistance” which “infuriate[s]” his master (*OT* 71), in a protracted exchange of escalating violence between master and pet.

Sikes' uneasy mastery over his dog is reflective of his uneasy masculinity: this pet, this subordinate household member, might detract from his authority by showing before the gang that he fails to exact Bull's-Eye's total submission, like Jip's disorderly table behavior before Traddles helps signal David's failures as head of household. The very first exchange the reader sees of the master and dog evinces Sikes' concern that the dog may be “too proud to own [him] afore company”—in other words, may not be acting as a submissive, adoring dependent—and orders him to “Lie down!” (*OT* 60). This verbal order is accompanied by a careening kick to which Bull's-Eye “appeared well used” (*OT* 60). Similarly, Sikes enforces discipline on Nancy via verbal violence when “possibly feeling his personal pride and influence interested in” exacting her obedience before Fagin, one of his (male) partners in crime (*OT* 79). In both cases, the power of the head of the household is perceived to rest on his ability to inspire his dependents to

²⁷ To Phil Robinson, writing in 1893, this dog is “a work of art” precisely because it “manages in its poor maimed and battered body to keep warm a spark of affection for the scoundrel whom it owned as ‘master’” (“Some Notable” 669), which echoes the *Quarterly Review*'s description of Nancy, described in the preceding footnote.

obey without any show of resistance.²⁸ In fact, this is a more sinister reflection of the household structure that David Copperfield attempts to forge with Dora and of the basic inequality of the royal household in *Windsor Castle*, an inequality witnessed and approved by the canine witnesses made part of the scene.

Since Sikes and his dog are clearly mirroring each other externally and internally, this further complicates his abuse of the animal that figures as his double. Might Sikes' seemingly gratuitous and infinite violence against his dog also be seen as a form of self-abuse, a certain degree of self-loathing? If Bull's-Eye is also Nancy's double, this also suggests that the motivations for that abuse are grounded in self-loathing. The suggestion is that Bull's-Eye represents both Sikes' unmanliness—his inability to discipline himself or his “inner beast”—and his self-hate, both traits that lend dimensionality to his otherwise simple character.

Sikes' self-loathing is also expressed when he resolves to kill Bull's-Eye in order to be rid of the dog that marks his criminal identity so publicly (*OT* 260). Bull's-Eye runs away, but he does not run far. Reminiscent of Nancy's return to Sikes directly after betraying him to Oliver's friends, Bull's-Eye runs *back* to him, to the home space on Jacob's Island, which, vile as it is, he has long shared with Sikes, and to which Sikes himself returns three hours later (*OT* 270). This return “home” is what gets them both killed, as if the home itself rejects their sordid values.

At the same time that he transfers sympathies onto the abused Nancy and renders Sikes into a deeper character, Bull's-Eye also confers the reader's sympathy to Sikes at the moment of their deaths. At the very least, Bull's-Eye might earn the epithet of Dickens' “most complicated animal” (Moore 201-2) by the queer manner of his death, a dramatic, “almost suicide-like” (Moore 213) plunge towards his murderous and abusive master. As Sikes attempts to escape his pursuers by jumping off the roof, he accidentally hangs himself:

²⁸ If pet-keeping manuals can be indications of the norms of pet behavior, a pet ought to obey immediately and with pleasure (see Chapter 2 and 4 for further discussion).

A dog, which had lain concealed till now, ran backwards and forwards on the parapet with a dismal howl, and, collecting himself for a spring, jumped for the dead man's shoulders. Missing his aim, he fell into the ditch, turning completely over as he went; and striking his head against a stone, dashed out his brains. (*OT* 274)

The more prosaic death at the gallows befalls the Artful Dodger, and clearly a criminal mastermind and vicious murderer such as Sikes could not deserve the same death as the beguiling and youthful offender. That Sikes' death is self-wrought as he attempts escape reads like righteous retribution, more satisfying for such a criminal than a magistrate-sanctioned hanging at the Old Bailey.

Phil Robinson, writing in 1893, supports the reading that in this scene, Bull's-Eye is attempting to perform some positive service to Sikes: "perhaps, to help the dead man, [Bull's-Eye] endeavours [sic] to bite the rope through" ("Some Notable" 671). Another reader in 1898 agrees, reading this as the "pathetic and fatal endeavour [sic] of the returned and forgiving dog to succour [sic] his hanging master" in "the very consummation of the poor dog's unwavering loyalty" (Hudson 317). Yet it is not clear how biting through the rope might help the deceased. Rather, what "helps" Sikes is the dog's performance of the "dismal howl": Bull's-Eye's sympathetic expression of sorrow at a moment where readers might feel anything but. "Poor Bullseye! [sic]," exclaims Robinson, expressing more pity for the dog than his master ("Some Notable" 671). The "suicide" reading of Bull's-Eye's final moments is in line with the popular view that dogs are faithful and self-sacrificing—regardless of the quality of the master—to which Jip's death also alludes. In addition to rendering Sikes' accidental "suicide" more ghastly by repetition, the dog's death confers the scene with the necessary pathos: a scene which Surridge describes as a "suicidal self-immolation" ("Dogs' Bodies" 16) by a dog that is still easier to pity than Sikes. If the reader feels pleasure at Sikes' death, this pleasure becomes significantly

complicated by its linked canine death. At this crucial moment, Dickens uncharacteristically obscures Bull's-Eye's name, referring to him as merely "[a] dog," an abstraction that allows the reader to forget his more individual and uniquely noxious personality (*OT* 274). Here, Dickens *needs* only "a dog," a fungible figure that can easily reference the centuries of discourse on the faithful dog to inspire readers' sympathy for Sikes' death. At this moment, Bull's-Eye becomes little more than a repeat performance of the faithful dog's ultimate act of devotion.

The scene is tinged with much ambivalence, however; it is *almost* suicide-like, but it cannot be said with certainty that Bull's-Eye rationally makes the decision to kill himself. In fact, when he jumps, he is "[m]issing his aim" (*OT* 274); his "aim" was to land on Sikes' shoulders, not to fall to his death, so his death is as accidentally self-wrought as Sikes' death, as he clearly sought to escape, not to kill himself. Bull's-Eye's interpretive ambivalence is in full force here, for he has also been haunting his master with eyes reminiscent of Nancy (*OT* 273), and the text suggests Bull's-Eye becomes Nancy's avenging arm in alerting the police to Sikes' location. He is both Nancy's and Sikes' defender, full of the contradictions possible for an animal character.

Bull's-Eye, then, embodies both Sikes and Nancy, creating in the pair an affectively joined domestic unit—even though their home is a travesty of the Victorian hearth. By inhabiting both Sikes' and Nancy's positions, he becomes their common bond, making the reader sympathetically inhabit each character and feel some allegiance and investment to both and therefore not side with either too strongly. If at his last moments Bull's-Eye is both alluding to Nancy (for Sikes sees her eyes shining through the dog's) *and* Sikes (at his utmost self-loathing), the scene is fraught with emotional paradoxes that heighten the affective experience for the reader, illustrating Bull's-Eye's role as flexible interactive text in binding Nancy and Sikes together and to the reader. When Sikes (and Bull's-Eye) meet persecution and death all the way "home," the home is in effect rejecting their inclusion, and as such, rejecting the inclusion of their like. Unlike the pet dogs in *Windsor Castle* and the Copperfields', Bull's-Eye cannot

entirely sanitize straightforward murder to make a “happy family.” Instead, he witnesses the failure of the Sikes’ home—and the pet’s consummate failure to keep the peace, for the predator has killed its prey.

Conclusion

Like *Windsor Castle*’s “candid” snapshot of a day-in-the-life-of the royal family, Dickens’ families expose the ugly underbelly of “private matters.” Both of the Dickens’ households here discussed capture the operation of heterosexual power as mediated by the pet dog, a fulcrum of power inequity that is concealed in the realm of the private “happy family.” The pet character is rhetorically wielded to maximize positive affect, deployed strategically to create sympathy and attach it to particularly unsympathetic characters. Jip and Bull’s-Eye take on weighty burdens, keeping the peace with varying degrees of success. Like the dogs in *Windsor Castle*, they do their part in creating affect chains that bind feuding heterosexual partners co-residing as a family, and binding readers to these fracturing families even to their bitter ends. Unlike the dogs in *Windsor Castle*, however, Jip and Bull’s-Eye ultimately fail to erase death—both literal death and the death of positive affect.

This chapter illustrates how Victorian pets served to mediate intimacy, to create affect chains—materially, in actual families, and semiotically, in families in fiction—and lessen potential for conflict in the increasingly insular “cages” wherein “happy families” were expected to perform happiness to the exclusion of the negative (power inequity, violence, and death). In effect, an animal inserted into the family hierarchy as its pet, and the discursive machinery surrounding the practices of pet-keeping, served to home-make. Essential in their *role*—both in real households and in fiction about households—but not necessarily essential in their “individuality,” pets became central cogs in the machinery of domesticity. In this chapter, I also began a discussion of the pet animal as the representative perfect victim, the proper subject of protection. In the next chapter, I turn to Margaret Marshall Saunders’ most famous dog texts to

explore how pets served in the domestic sphere, under the discourse of humaneness towards animals, to produce gendered subjects. This pet no longer serves affectively by his mere existence; rather, he must be abused and rescued to inspire work along gendered lines. Saunders' novels also redefine the perfect victim, no longer entirely helpless and voiceless but, rather, carefully masculinized.

CHAPTER 2

A Dog is Being Beaten: The Production of Humaneness through the Pseudo-Autobiographical Dog in Margaret Marshall Saunders' *Beautiful Joe* and *Beautiful Joe's Paradise*

Human affections demand something to pet.... This instinct requires that the object of its petting shall be small, usually, and at any rate it must be more or less helpless. The larger pet the smaller, and the stronger pet the weaker.
—“Household Pets,” in *Good Housekeeping* (1888)

A dog must, after all, always be a dog,
but a boy will grow to be a man, and a girl to be a wom[a]n.
—Lucretia P. Hale, *Stories for Children* (1892)

In the year 1874, Henry Bergh, founder of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, might have strolled through the first floor business office of the Society's New York City headquarters, lingering over the visual reminders of “scenes of cruelty of everyday occurrence before the formation of the Society” (“Henry Bergh and His Work” 117). A “perfect chamber of horrors,” this gallery, dedicated to graphics of animal abuse, included “instruments of cruelty to animals, of brutal and ingenious patterns, and the effigies of bloody gamecocks and bull-dogs, and photographs of pitiable horses” (“Henry Bergh and his Work” 875). These images were expected to stir the necessary affect for humane action, suggesting that frequent exposure to revolting depictions of animal cruelty was thought, in the late nineteenth century, to be productive of moral sentiments towards animals.

Today, while still dedicated to teaching humaneness towards animals, Americans tend to consider explicit images of animal cruelty as somewhat taboo—as suspect, if not perverse and incendiary. For example, although in April 2010 the Third Circuit found unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. § 48, a federal statute banning the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal

cruelty,¹ the impetus behind the passing of the statute suggests that contemporary American society considers the consumption of depictions of animal cruelty to be potentially harmful rather than healthful. According to Arnold Arluke, today, when sensibilities over canine abuse are more acute and widespread than they were in the nineteenth-century, in choosing a “spokesperson,” animal welfare groups tend to choose images of “cute cruelty” (151) for their solicitation of support. The “spokesperson” animal “must be perceived as sufficiently ‘bad’ to elicit sympathy and perhaps even identification in the public but not be so upsetting that people turn away from the solicitation because they are appalled or grief stricken. If people are ‘horrified’ by pictures of cruelty, they might not read the material or donate” (Arluke 150). In Arluke’s analysis, the affect of horror would trigger emotional shutdown, resulting in apathy and paralysis. Today, rather than brutal representation, organizations like the ASPCA tend to employ omission and intimation to spur people to act in protection of non-human animals.²

Margaret Marshall Saunders’ bestseller, *Beautiful Joe* (1893³), the first animal viewpoint novel published in the United States, and its sequel, *Beautiful Joe’s Paradise* (1902), employ the abused dog motif to produce humaneness in gendered ways, masculinizing the affects of humaneness towards animals that had hitherto been associated with women’s allegedly natural virtue. “Humane” subjects were produced through pedagogical literature “authored” by an abused, then rescued, animal, a strategy targeting boy readers by leveraging the aesthetic of

¹ 18 U.S.C. § 48 is a federal statute criminalizing the knowing creation, sale, or possession of animal cruelty depictions for commercial gain, excepting those with “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.”

² In early 2012, the Westminster Kennel Club Dog Show broke with its long-time sponsor, Pedigree, over a disagreement regarding the sorts of dogs that Pedigree showed in advertisements during the show—baleful-eyed mixed-breed dogs seeking adoption (Nir). A spokesman for the Club insisted: “Show me an ad with a dog with a smile; don’t try to shame me” (Nir). Relatedly, in late 2011, a not-for-profit named Action Against Hunger chose to run very abstract images instead of photographs of starving children in its donation campaign advertisements (Levere). As I will discuss, the graphic animal abuse depicted in *Beautiful Joe* managed not to operate on shame.

³ First published in the U.S. as *Beautiful Joe: The Autobiography of a Dog* (Philadelphia: Charles H. Bane, 1893), republished as *Beautiful Joe: An Autobiography* (Toronto: Baptist Book Room, 1894; Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1894) (Gerson 327). These now underread books make frequent appearances in scholarship about dogs or pets—receiving some treatment by Erica Fudge and Susan McHugh, for example—but are usually denied in-depth critical analysis.

“ugly beauty.” In turn, I explore how the Saunders texts represent the “good” pet as the product of affectionate dominion, appropriating canine interiority to define the “humane” interspecies relationship as a disciplining process through pleasure, power, and control.

A Woman, a Dog, and a Prize

In *Beautiful Joe*, the legend of a real-life dog is spun. Joe is “a small, mutilated being” (Waterston 146), a dog graphically mistreated by his low brow master, Jenkins, “the cruel milkman” (Saunders, *BJ* 19).⁴ Siblings killed and ears and tail brutally hatcheted, he is heroically rescued by Harry Wood and left in the care of the Morrises. Under the nurturance of the young and gentle Laura Morris—always referred to as “Miss Laura”⁵—Joe recovers, thrives, and lives out a relatively unvaried life with the humane Morris family in Fairmont, Maine, a family that comprises a clergyman father, a wise mother, Laura, three younger sons, “[t]wo dogs, a cat, fifteen or twenty rabbits, a rat, about a dozen canaries, and two dozen goldfish, I don’t know how many pigeons, a few bantams, [and] a guinea-pig” (Saunders, *BJ* 38).⁶ Told from his own point of view, Joe’s new prosaic portside life is only broken up by Jenkins’ attempt to rob the neighbors, a visit to the Woods’ farm, and a tragic hotel fire. Mostly, Joe’s story becomes a container for the stories of other animals that Joe befriends, including other dogs (Jim, Billy, and Dandy), horses (Fleetfoot, Scamp), a cat (Malta), and a talking parrot (Bella). The sequel, *Beautiful Joe’s Paradise*, is the travelogue of a young boy named Sam Emerson whose dog Ragtime is killed by a neighborhood bully. Distraught, Sam is taken by air-ship to an other-worldly island where all the dead animals from *Beautiful Joe*, and many more exotic and

⁴ Unless otherwise noted, I will be citing the American 1894 Charles H. Bane edition.

⁵ *Beautiful Joe* relies heavily on class discourses, as the pet-keeping practices of the middle-class were the ones that became instantiated during the course of the nineteenth-century. According to Elizabeth Waterston, Saunders’ grand-niece notes that the author’s “notions essentially reflect middle-class values” (Waterston 157). In *Beautiful Joe*, the Morrises, a comfortable, property-owning middle-class family, work to reform the cruel milkman Jenkins, the wealthy and selfish Mrs. Montague, and the reckless English noble Lord Chesterfield. In effect, the bourgeoisie embodies and disseminates humane values to those stationed above and below. As the class dimensions of *Beautiful Joe* and *Paradise* are fairly straightforward, I will not discuss them at length in this chapter.

⁶ This is a literary example of the “happy families” discussed in Chapter 1.

fantastic non-human creatures, await reunion with their human masters upon their death.

Alongside Ragtime, he meets Beautiful Joe himself, the elected President of the Island. After a survey of this paradise of animals, Sam returns to the United States, where he becomes a dedicated youth member of animal protection organizations.

In claiming to furnish a dog “autobiography,” *Beautiful Joe* and its sequel were part of a contemporary transatlantic cadre of texts purporting to be written by an animal.⁷ In the nineteenth century, the affect precipitating humaneness towards animals was produced through actual pet-keeping as well as novels about pets; animals entered the intimate lives of the middle class both literally and figuratively. Animal stories of all sorts were written, and stories “by” animals also became especially popular, but Saunders’ *Beautiful Joe* was extremely well-received—an international bestseller—and so offers a particularly powerful piece of evidence of the pet-keeping ethos of the late nineteenth-century.

In the period between 1820 and 1870, middle-class Americans “became convinced of the role non-human animals could play in socializing children into the virtues of kindness and sympathy” (Grier, “Childhood” 95). Participating in the “new domestic ethic of kindness to animals” (Grier, “Childhood” 95), Saunders “develops a trenchant set of pedagogies and rhetorical strategies in support of humane education” (Harde 86). Saunders’ pair of novels,

⁷ A sampling of titles follows: E. Burrows’ *Neptune: The Autobiography of a Newfoundland Dog* (1869), Alfred Cooper Fryer’s *Vic, The Autobiography of a Pomeranian Dog* (1880), Frank Pope Humphrey’s *An American Dog Abroad, and the Foreign Dogs He Met* (1896), Miranda Eliot Swan’s *Daisy, The Autobiography of a Cat* (1899), John Sergeant Wise’s *Diomed: The Life, Travels, and Observations of a Dog* (1899), Caro Smith Serou’s *Master St. Elmo, The Autobiography of a Celebrated Dog* (1901), Esther M. Baxendale’s *Fairy, The Autobiography of a Real Dog* (1904), and Carrie G.N. Whitcomb, *The Autobiography of Jeremy L., The Actor Dog* (1910). Barbara Gates has noted that dogs as “authors” writing their own lives rose to their most popular in the 1890s (220-30). As this list implies, the number of “autobiographies” of dogs far outnumbered those of cats. As the American Baptist Publication Society (ABPS, *Beautiful Joe*’s original publishers) wrote to Saunders, in rejecting her proposal for a companion to *Beautiful Joe* featuring a cat’s narrative, “[i]t is difficult to understand why this should be the case but the dog and the horse excite very much more interest than the cat” (Letter from ABPS to Saunders, dated March 15, 1905, in the Margaret Marshall Saunders Papers, courtesy of the Acadia University Archives).

aimed to children,⁸ was intentionally prescribed as part of humane education. In her own words, “[t]he vast increase in crime in spite of our magnificent school system [and] the callousness of many of our children sho[w]...the need for humane education in America.”⁹ An 1894 issue of *Book News* described *Beautiful Joe* as a book that would cure the “thoughtlessness” that was the root cause of much cruelty by young children (“For Boys and Girls” 337). Boys were considered to be naturally more prone to the inhuman treatment of animals but still pliant and tractable enough to uplift. An 1896 issue of *North-Western Journal of Education* describes *Beautiful Joe* as “[a] book of entrancing interest” to children of either sex, but notes in particular that “fathers of their school boys” should recognize “the value of such a book” (174). The May 1894 *Methodist Review* describes the work as “a wholesome and profitable book for boys” (512), and a 1902 *Education* review notes that the “boy who has read it could hardly find it possible to throw a stone at ‘that ugly dog’” (“Tilda Jane” 326).

Heralding a utopian “millennium of kindness” to come, the reviewer echoes the approach *Beautiful Joe* takes, and reflects the direction of American animal protectionism at the time—an unobtrusive, middle class-friendly approach that attributed cruelty to “thoughtlessness” and easily corrigible ignorance (“For Boys and Girls” 337). Saunders herself stated in a 1901 letter the importance of aiming to “[t]each the little child his duty to the lower orders,” as “statistics prove that he will be more mindful of his duty to the higher” (Gerson 328). In Saunders’ own words, then, children were to be taught to care for those *beneath* them

⁸ E.g., *Beautiful Joe* is included in a 1911 “A Brief Suggestive List of Reading for Children in the Elementary School” for grade 4 children (Jessie Black and Irene Warren, *The Elementary School Teacher* 12.4 [Dec. 1911]: 145-50) and the 1933 “A Year’s Work in Fourth Grade Reading” (Julia Harris, *Peabody Journal of Education* 11.1 [Jul. 1933]: 32-8). As a letter from the London publisher Jarrold & Sons suggests, the edition that was used in schools was likely altered: “In order to make this book suitable for school use, it would have to be thoroughly revised by our educational editor, omitting certain portions, and where necessary, simplifying the language so as to make it thoroughly suitable for young people” (Letter from Jarrold & Sons, dated March 9, 1896, in the Margaret Marshall Saunders Papers, courtesy of the Acadia University Archives).

⁹ Handwritten Letter to the WCT, dated 1894, in the Margaret Marshall Saunders Papers, courtesy of the Acadia University Archives. As with all the handwritten letters consulted here, I endeavor to transcribe difficult handwriting as accurately as possible.

(animals, then called the “lower races,” and perhaps also people lower on the socioeconomic scale¹⁰) to discipline them into greater obedience towards those *above* them.

In response to a two-hundred-dollar prize offer from the expanding American Humane Education Society,¹¹ *Beautiful Joe* was explicitly written and marketed by the enterprising Saunders as the canine version of Anna Sewell’s well-known *Black Beauty*. A Nova Scotian with budding interests in authorship and one fairly successful novel, *My Spanish Sailor* (London, 1889), under her belt, Saunders saw the advertisement for a story that would emulate and accompany *Black Beauty* by addressing the “Kind and Cruel Treatment of Domestic Animals and Birds in the Northern States.” Inspired by a “big, rough-looking Airedale” she met while visiting her brother’s fiancée’s family in Meaford, Ontario,¹² she collected material and wrote the copy for her novel over a quick six months (Waterston 145), and secured the prize.

Citing *Black Beauty*’s popularity in the millions, the Humane Society advertisement rightly predicted the growing global literary market in animal-friendly stories: “[T]he even greater circulation which seems probable not only in our own but in European and Asiatic languages, have opened a new field of literature hitherto almost untrodden, [but] *they have by no means filled it*. Other books can be written in the interest of the races we call dumb which will be read as widely and with profit almost or equally great” (Angell 114), and certainly George

¹⁰ Chapter 22 of *Beautiful Joe* does contain an explicit plea for kindness towards the laboring classes: “We don’t do enough for the people that slave and toil for us” (Saunders, *BJ* 172). Considering the period’s common representation of animals as the servants of mankind, it makes sense that many animal protectionists also developed sympathy for the working class, even as the ASPCA was accused of targeting only the working classes with their restrictive legislation and prosecution (Thomas 185).

¹¹ Though called the “American” Humane Education Society, it was the Boston-based animal protection society, headed by George T. Angell, that set up this prize. There was no single national organization for animal protection at this time.

¹² Joe was the rescue dog of a Meaford miller named William Moore, Saunders’ brother’s future father-in-law. According to Gwendolyn Davies, Moore found the mutilated dog by the roadside and adopted him. Saunders was actively seeking story ideas while visiting Meaford in 1892, and quickly “gathered a diary full of potential subjects for fiction” (Davies 144). Interestingly, Lilian P. Carswell’s 2004 dissertation discussing *Beautiful Joe* conflates fiction and fact by repeatedly referring to the characters in the text, the Morrises, as the Moores.

T. Angell's prediction proved correct.¹³ *Beautiful Joe's* broader transatlantic impact is evidenced by impressive publication statistics. Although sources disagree on specific numbers, it seems that by 1900, this moralizing and largely plot-less novel became a transatlantic success: *Beautiful Joe* sold anywhere from 625,000 (Waterston 147) or over 800,000 copies ("Story Teller") in the U.S.; 40,000 in Canada ("Story Teller"); and anywhere from 100,000 ("Story Teller") and 146,000 (Waterston 147) in the United Kingdom. By the 1930s, worldwide sales numbered over seven million copies ("Story Teller"), as the novel was translated into more than fourteen languages (Davies 143), including Chinese, Japanese,¹⁴ Swedish,¹⁵ Turkish, Esperanto, and Braille. In fact, given the extensive evidence that *Beautiful Joe* was freely revised for different reading audiences, which I only partially document, this mutating novel can be seen as deeply transatlantic and unusually global.¹⁶ Likely spurred both by her first "dog story" success and her personal investment in the burgeoning humane movements of the period, Saunders

¹³ Angell, founder of the Massachusetts SPCA and the children's groups called the Bands of Mercy, coined the term "humane education" in 1868 (Harde 86).

¹⁴ *Beautiful Joe* was offered for Japanese translation to help missionaries abroad (Letter from Saunders to Fahlerantz & Co., dated Feb. 1, 1897). This Japanese translation was consciously "Japanized" for its intended audience: "We cut out all that seemed specially inappropriate for Japanese readers, and in a few places we inserted a line or so to make the connection good" (Handwritten Letter from Annie [Clageth?] to Saunders, dated January 6, 1897; both letters are in the Margaret Marshall Saunders Papers, courtesy of the Acadia University Archives).

¹⁵ This translation was pirated. Saunders encountered much trouble securing international copyright protection during a period where many countries did not have copyright agreements with each other. Letters exchanged during the period of 1895-1897 between her and the Swedish publisher of the Swedish-language translation show Saunders' frustrations with securing royalties for her original work (Letter from Saunders to Fahlerantz & Co., dated April 13, 1895; Letters from Fahlerantz & Co., dated March 18, 1895 and May 10, 1895; Handwritten Letter to Fahlerantz & Co., dated Feb 1, 1897; all letters in the Margaret Marshall Saunders Papers, courtesy of the Acadia University Archives).

¹⁶ Saunders' biography is as transatlantic as her popular products, with the amusing effect that Canadians and Americans variously claimed her as their own. A "cosmopolitan Canadian" (Waterston 138), Saunders traveled extensively in Europe and the United States. Although she "always thought of herself as a Nova Scotian," she lived much of her adult life in the United States (Gerson 329). The Beautiful Joe Foundation website claims her to be directly descended from "one of the ministers who arrived with the Pilgrim Fathers on the Mayflower" ("Story Teller"), while England recognized her with a Commander of the British Empire honor in 1934 (Davies 143), reaffirming Canada's deep ties to the colonial "mother" country it shares with the United States. Meanwhile, Canadian biographers heralded her proudly as Canada's daughter ("Page's" 35, MacMurchy 183).

went on to publish twenty-five¹⁷ books (Davies 143), ten of which feature animal protagonists and another five portray children with significant companion animals (Waterston 137).¹⁸

“A Dog is Being Beaten” and Ugly Beauty

An illustration from the 1907 American edition serves to visually highlight the difference between Joe and his fellow house-dog, Billy. **(Figure 6.)** Joe lacks ears and a tail, and Billy does not. This juxtaposition underpins the entire book: the main point of Joe’s story is that he is horribly and permanently mutilated by a “cruel” human. Joe opens the novel by suffering two violent traumas, while “the two events of [Billy’s] early life were the opening of his eyes and the swallowing of his muslin rag” (Saunders, *BJ* 48). Billy is described as “a kind of sugar candy dog...a kind of dog to be coddled and protected” (Saunders, *BJP* 123).¹⁹ This sugary sweet puppy, although submissive and by all accounts good and liked, is little more than a model for puppy care, as Joe meticulously narrates how a young pup is to be weaned, washed, fed, and trained. Telling Billy’s story would simply not suffice; Billy’s story—a good dog, raised in a humane family—would not be enough to dredge up the affect required to incite action in protection of an animal.

During this period in North American history, witnessing physical harm to animals of all kinds was likely still a daily occurrence, even in urban spaces. In the words of Henry Salt, humane advocate and author of the influential *Animals’ Rights in Relation to Social Progress* (1894), “the sights that everywhere meet the eye of a humane and thoughtful observer, whether in town or country, are a disgrace to our vaunted ‘civilization,’ and suggest the thought that, as

¹⁷ Gerson has her as publishing twenty-four (327-8).

¹⁸ Examples of Saunders’ other animal titles are “Charles and His Lamb” (1895), “Nita, the Story of an Irish Setter” (1904), “Princess Sukey: The Story of a Pigeon and Her Human Friends” (1905), “Alpatak, the Story of an Eskimo Dog” (1906) “Boy, the Wandering Dog” (also published as “The Wandering Dog: Adventures of a Fox Terrier” [1916]), “Bonnie Prince Fetlar: The Story of a Pony and His Friends” (1920) (Gerson 327).

¹⁹ Billy’s mother is poisoned, but the loss seems to have no negative impact on him, for he is quickly brought to the Morrises to live in unmarred happiness.

Figure 6.



MISS LAURA

Miss Laura, Beautiful Joe, and Billy. Illustration by Charles Copeland in 1907 American edition of *Beautiful Joe* (Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press).

far as the touch of compassion is concerned, the majority of our fellow citizens must be obtuse, not to say pachydermatous” (29).

Understandably, nineteenth-century sensitivities to the witnessing of violence were much less blunted. If humane education needed to teach aversion to what was for many a source of pleasure, curiosity, or indifference, then allowing *some* dangerous titillation, but quickly binding this with revulsion, might have proven more instructive than omitting it completely. *Beautiful Joe* incites titillating pleasure at the graphic horror of an abused dog, and then triggers disgust: the graphic depiction of animal abuse that opens *Beautiful Joe* binds pleasure to the horror and repulsion at the violence perpetrated by Jenkins, the lazy, shiftless milkman who owns him and his family.

The first formative incidence of animal abuse is the murder of all Joe’s siblings at the age of eight weeks:

I have not told what became of my brothers and sisters. One rainy day, when we were eight weeks old, Jenkins, followed by two or three of his ragged, dirty children, came into the stable and looked at us.... He took one pup after another, and right there, before his children and my poor distracted mother, put an end to their lives. Some of them he seized by the legs and knocked against the stalls, till their brains were dashed out, others he killed with a fork. It was very terrible. My mother ran up and down the stable screaming with pain, and I lay weak and trembling, and expecting every instant that my turn would come next. I don’t know why he spared me. I was the only one left. (Saunders, *BJ* 21)

Slamming of small, furry bodies against barn walls, spilt brain matter, blood and guts from skewered puppies—indeed, terrible. The focus of the scene shifts quickly to Joe’s mother’s ineffectual reaction, then to Joe’s sensations.

The effective technique of using the dog's narration allows the reader to identify more easily with the dog, especially if the reader is a child and the narrator speaks like a child: "What made animal pseudo-autobiographies different from the typical children's stories promoting kindness was that young readers were invited to assume the identity of the suffering animal through the 'I' in the story" (Grier 224). Moreover, the "autobiography" creates the "I"—the subject—that, through the reading, becomes inhabited by both the reading child and the canine character. The "I" becomes the space for a human-animal encounter. The child reader's identification with the canine narrator makes the threat posed by Jenkins very real; here, the child reader experiences the account as Joe does, "expecting every instant that [his] turn would come next" (Saunders, *BJ* 21). Throughout the text, as Lillian Carswell notes, Saunders also links children to animals (171).²⁰ Given the predominant belief of the period that "a man who, in a fit of violent temper, would ill-use his horse, would not hesitate to terrorize his wife and children at such a time" ("Philanthropist Indeed" 309), the threat posed by the animal abuser to a child reader who identifies with Joe likely felt imminent and palpable. This mass puppy murder is clearly linked to the violence he inflicts against his own "ragged, dirty children" (Saunders, *BJ* 21), both through neglect and directly. The violence towards the puppies is clearly and unflinchingly described, while the violence towards Mrs. Jenkins and the children is not: the puppies' bodies serve as surrogates for the airing of "private matters."

The murders are important not for what happens to these nameless siblings, but for the experience that this trauma has on Joe, who is rendered "weak and trembling" (Saunders, *BJ* 21). The event unempowers him, reducing him to a trembling mass. Though an "ugly cur" himself, Joe—at this point, one of six nameless puppies—is spared for no apparent reason, as Joe is as financially worthless to Jenkins as the rest of the litter. Here, the double meaning of the

²⁰ Carswell offers the following examples: a dog is "something like a child" (Saunders, *BJ* 38), a puppy is "very like a baby" (Saunders, *BJ* 49) when it is teething, colts are "like boys" (Saunders, *BJ* 201), "dumb brutes" are "pretty much like us in most ways" (Saunders, *BJ* 247), and "a flock of sheep is just like a crowd of people" (Saunders, *BJ* 238) (Carswell 171).

word litter—a swaddle of pups or refuse—serves to highlight Jenkins’ attitude toward these potential pets. Incited by the need to rid himself of waste, Jenkins slays all the “ugly” (Saunders, *BJ* 21), unsellable puppies save one: “[Jenkins] began to swear because we were so ugly, and said if we had been good-looking, he might have sold some of us” (Saunders, *BJ* 21).

The second instance of graphic, direct violence against Joe—and the climax of animal cruelty in the novel—arises quickly, in chapter 2, where Joe, as yet nameless, is mutilated of his “excess” body parts, his ears and his tail:

His face was red and furious. He seized me by the back of the neck and carried me out to the yard where a log lay on the ground. “Bill,” he called to one of his children, “bring me the hatchet.”

He laid my head on the log and pressed one hand on my struggling body. I was now a year old and a full-sized dog. There was a quick, dreadful pain, and he had cut off my ear, not in the way they cut puppies’ ears, but close to my head, so close that he cut off some of the skin beyond it. Then he cut off the other ear, and turning me swiftly round, although I struggled desperately, cut off my tail close to my body.

Then he let me go, and stood looking at me as I rolled on the ground and yelped in agony. (Saunders, *BJ* 22-3)

The action is swift and its descriptors simple and precise. In this climactic scene of animal cruelty, Jenkins is again engaged in an act of reducing Joe; first of his cohort and now of his own body. “The cruel milkman” (Saunders, *BJ* 19), ill-bred and uncultured, fails to recognize any value to dogs other than exchange value; he is entirely insensate to the *affective* uses of pet-keeping.²¹ To Jenkins, those soft, cartilaginous parts that best serve to convey canine expression

²¹ While the appeal of the “cur” to Americans is obviously grounded on anti-royal, anti-noble sentiments, this is not to suggest that Americans were not also prone to overvaluing the “pedigree” dogs that were

are disposable, emphasizing his failure to recognize the affective value of a canine pet—his rejection of the animal’s new affective uses in middle-class families.

The novel thus begins by undercutting Jenkins’ view of unpedigreed dogs as expendable garbage by making it impossible for the reader to sympathize with his point of view. By Joe’s account, Jenkins is thoroughly irredeemable. Not only is he cruel to all animals (there are also his emaciated milk-cow and work horse), but, through his own general want of industry, he is also a worthless milkman. “One reason for Jenkins’ cruelty was his idleness” (Saunders, *BJ* 15), and ironically, while he haplessly discards the litter of puppies, he is careless as to real waste: “[H]e never tidied the place at all, till his yard and stable got so littered up with things he threw down, that he could not make his way about” (Saunders, *BJ* 16).²² Jenkins’ ineffectual cruelty infects Mrs. Jenkins, who is extended some sympathy as a “poor, unhappy creature, very frightened of her husband, and not daring to speak much to him” (Saunders, *BJ* 17), a “creature” not unlike any of his other victims (Saunders, *BJ* 20).²³

The affective mechanism enabled by the story of an abused dog includes this incitement to feel intensely—to sob if necessary—especially for the targeted young male readers who might perceive weeping as an emasculation.²⁴ In *Paradise*, the young Sam may denigrate as “girl”

developed during this century. George B. Taylor warned against non-purebred dogs, arguing: “No one would plant weeds in a window box or flower garden. Why have mongrels as pets?” (7). McHugh’s chapter on “Mutts” offers a concise overview of attitudes toward mixed-breed dogs.

²² As with the Copperfields in Chapter 1, mismanagement of the home and its dog takes physical manifestation as barriers to circulation of bodies.

²³ Under her husband’s thumb, however, Mrs. Jenkins fails to keep the sacred house in order, to the extent that her house becomes a source of disease that brings about death in the community through contaminated milk: “I never saw a worse-looking house than she kept. She used to do very queer things, that I know now housekeepers should not do” (Saunders, *BJ* 17), such as wiping the milk pans with the same rag that she uses to clean her typhoid fever-stricken child (Saunders, *BJ* 18).

²⁴ Valuing affect over rationality in evaluating an animal’s rights, Jeremy Bentham famously says in 1789, “the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (quoted in Kazez, 32), and in the nineteenth century this capacity for suffering became the crux of transatlantic, progressive movements like abolition (and later, animal protection). Abolitionists inscribed empathy as the key gauge of whether non-white bodies were rights-worthy as a response to the ideologies that inscribed black bodies as impervious to pain. Not only could slave bodies feel pain, abolitionists argued, but the ability to feel pain also became the *sine qua non* of human rights. The suffering slave trope was widely deployed

behavior anything that seems “sweet” and sentimental, but becomes overwhelmed with feeling when faced with animal cruelty. Rejecting his mother’s attempts to comfort him when his dog is killed, he differentiates between a “girl” reaction and his own implacable sorrow: “She kept on smoothing my head, then she begged me to cry a little. It would make me feel better. ‘I am not a girl,’ I said, ‘and there is a great, dark pit inside me’” (Saunders, *BJP* 17). In attempting to differentiate between his “boy” grief and what he considers “girl” grief, he seems to suggest that the former is more severe, a deeply internal void that cannot be relieved by an outlet of tears as a girl’s shallower grief might. And yet, when his mother suggests burying the deceased dog’s body, he insists on sleeping with Ragtime’s corpse, and gives way to “feminine” affect: “Then I broke down. You would have thought I was a girl” (Saunders, *BJP* 17). Contradictorily, his mother retracts her earlier encouragement for him to cry (Saunders, *BJP* 17). In Saunders’ texts, depictions of animal cruelty serve to exercise readers’ moral sentiments—capacities assumed instinctive and inherent but atrophied, particularly in boys who were being encouraged to be “manly” and not “cry like a girl.”

Instead, a boy’s grief is distinguished as a constitutive lack that is exposed by its traumatic loss, a lack that is otherwise invisible and needs to be filled by this non-human love object. Beautiful Joe is that faithful and unconditional lover to whom the boy needs to attach himself, and the trauma that he suffers, I argue, produces him as the safe object of attachment that constitutes a boy.

both visually and verbally, explicitly calculated to arouse the utmost empathic reaction and to represent the black body as a feeling body.

These depictions of suffering also served another purpose: to “exercise” the affective muscles of readers of these texts. In Amit Rai’s words, “[t]hrough sympathy, subjects came to imagine themselves as *embodying* the emotions of a suffering other; doing so they partook the natural, and so divine, impulse of humanity, and one that was pleasurable even if painful” (26). William Lloyd Garrison purposefully kept a figure of a kneeling slave on his mantelpiece “to keep [his] sympathies from flagging” (Clark 476). Theodore Weld encouraged his wife Angelina Grimké Weld to “cultivate” their son Charleys’ “sympathy and compassion by showing him the poor slaves in the hold of the slave ship. Pray do it often constantly. The only way to effectually cultivate those elements in the mind of a child is to show them suffering objects” (Clark 479).

As I argued in the Introduction, one of the strategies with which the dog is made into a safe object of attachment for boys is by their reduction into affect. According to Bergh, “[w]e have voices to make our wrongs heard and respected, but these humble beings have *only* the faculties of feeling and endurance” (741, emphasis added). While the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes infamously denied dogs emotions, reducing them to automata, Bergh allowed them *only* emotions.²⁵ In focusing on canine emotions and rendering the animals’ intellectual capacity to about the level of a nine-year-old human (Gerson 329), *Beautiful Joe* also engages in representing animals as fonts for affect that might cultivate the tender sentiments of its readers, particularly the boys presumed thoughtlessly cruel by nature. Moreover, Bergh notes that “the sentiment of mercy seems all the more lovely in proportion to the humbleness and dependence of the recipient of it” (741). These reductions of Joe (from family/community of dogs, to lone survivor; from full-bodied, to ear- and tail-less) produce the affect-producing creature that could “cultivate” bourgeois emotions.²⁶ The privacy of these affective experiences seem, for males, essential.

I title this section “A Dog is Being Beaten” with intentional allusion to the 1919 essay, “A Child is Being Beaten,” where psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud describes the abstracted and unconscious mechanism that allows a child to fantasize both masochistically (about his father beating him sadistically) and sadistically (about his father beating another child) through the image of an unidentified adult beating an unidentified child. *Beautiful Joe*, I suggest, creates a similar pleasure pathway, in that a child reader may experience both masochism (in identifying with the dog being abused) and sadism (in identifying with the human abuser), with the distance

²⁵ There has been ongoing debate about Descartes’ position on animal souls. For more on this, see Rod Preece’s chapter, “The Cartesians and their Adversaries in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” in *Sins of the Flesh: A History of Ethical Vegetarian Thought* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2008) 158-87.

²⁶ In Chapter 1, I discussed the reduction of dogs to positive affect-producers to placate dysfunctional family members into domesticity; here, the “reduction” of dogs serves the purpose of increasing the experience of empathy for the “humane,” progressive individual.

provided by the experience of reading fiction supposedly written by a non-human animal (in disidentification with the abused on the basis of species). As Freud describes of the fantasizing child, sadism and masochism are bound up in shame; *Beautiful Joe* makes everything Jenkins does deeply reproachable and vile, such that any pleasure in the sadism is inextricably bound up with shame.²⁷ The dog's trauma is a complicated moment for the boy's identification with the dog, while keeping the boy "safe"; he experiences the abuse through identification with the animal, but is ontologically reassured as being above such direct abjection himself.

As Nietzsche raises in *Human, All Too Human* (1876), the act of recognizing that one is responsible for another's suffering is not simply a process of feeling shame or guilt out of personal responsibility, but rather, a pleasurable moment of recognizing one's own power to cause (or relieve) another's suffering. In his thoughts on cruelty, he says:

[I]f one did not have this knowledge [that another person is suffering because of us], one would not have that pleasure in his own superiority, which can *be discovered* only in the suffering of the other, in teasing, for example.... For in pity at least two (maybe many more) elements of personal pleasure are contained, and it is to that extent self-enjoyment: first of all, it is the pleasure of emotion (the kind of pity we find in tragedy) and second, when it drives us to act, it is the pleasure of our satisfaction in the exercise of power (Nietzsche 72).

For one, Nietzsche's keen observation suggests that humaneness allows people who might not often feel to feel intensely, and this ability to feel at another's suffering is tied to power. Less obviously, feeling pity for pain caused by another is pleasurable as an exercise of power. Causing pain is pleasurable because it makes one feel superior. In the abstraction of "a dog being

²⁷ I am grateful to Eric L. Tribunella's article that presents a Freudian reading of the boy-and-dog motif as a "disciplinary device" (152) for the forming of gender and sexuality through traumatic loss of a queer love object in twentieth-century texts. As will be evident, in Saunders' texts this loss is not required to produce "proper" gendering.

beaten,” one can enjoy a sense of superiority that can be experienced only in this way—in witnessing (e.g., through reading about) hurting and causing suffering.

The cruelty that serves this important function is, at the same time, carefully limited. Unlike its model, however, *Beautiful Joe*'s focus on cruelty is short-lived—only the first two chapters—while in *Black Beauty* only the very end of the novel allows the pathetic horse a final respite from a long life of manifold suffering.²⁸ Joe suggestively curtails his trauma narrative by saying that, in spite of the fact that he is ostensibly writing a tell-all memoir, he does not wish to say much about this: “I am very unwilling to say much about my early life” (Saunders, *BJ* 14). This is an interesting textual strategy; Beautiful Joe purposely refrains from the appearance of dwelling on his abuse and suffering. Although the graphic abuse is calculated to inspire the exercise of the “humane faculties,” there is a sense of taboo as well.

In contrast, English texts of abuse and rescue seem to protractedly emphasize the abuse portion of the rescue plot, such as in *Black Beauty*, which dwells on the abuse suffered by the horse for nearly the entire novel. Similarly, William Gordon Stables' *Sable & White: The Autobiography of a Show Dog*, published in the U.K. in the same year as *Beautiful Joe*, employs animal abuse to cultivate bourgeois emotions, using *Black Beauty*'s model of protracted abuse

²⁸ In spite of what Saunders' publishers told her in 1905 when they rejected her cat “autobiography,” in 1901 S. Louise Patteson successfully published another designated companion piece to *Black Beauty* named *Pussy Meow: The Autobiography of a Cat* (published in Philadelphia and Cleveland by Burrows Brothers), which was favorably described by Charles Chesnutt as follows:

Pussy Meow is written in the form of an autobiography, and the illusion is well sustained throughout. A kitten, who lives in a pleasant garden, ventures through the gate into the outer world. A dog chases her so far that she is unable to find her way back. This is the beginning of a varied career, in which she experiences most of the joys and sorrows incident to the life of a cat. She goes to sleep in a strange yard, from which she is driven out with stones by a bad boy. She is rescued by a kind lady, who rebukes the boy and provides the kitten with a home. Here she forms the acquaintance of other kittens, and finds herself in clover. The household includes a kind mistress, a good boy, and a friendly dog. In this ideal home, which Pussy Meow finds a sort of cat's paradise, she has many pleasant adventures which are narrated in her autobiography. (261)

I quote at length to note the similarities in plot to *Beautiful Joe*, as compared to *Black Beauty*. Chesnutt's review focuses mostly on the details of abuse and rescue, after which the cat's “paradisiacal” life can be summarized as “many pleasant adventures” (261) not worth detailing. It is the abuse-and-rescue story that takes precedence, lobbed at the reader at the onset but kept short.

and rescue. In the American dog text, abuse is physical, short, and with permanent effects, while in the British dog text the abuse is more psychological and extended. In the British texts, it seems that humane feelings are expected to spring from drawn out, difficult lives full of emotional travail, leading to a restful heaven-like conclusion, rather than quick initial trauma and a drawn-out period of recuperation. Thus, while in the British texts the canine protagonist suffers cruelty until the very end, in the American text, the protagonist animal suffers initial abuse, then quickly becomes, as I earlier termed, largely a container for other conversations and stories that he bears witness to.

Saunders' London publisher Gay & Bind strongly objected to this structure that makes Joe a main actor at the onset but then cedes the focus to the other characters:

There are parts in which the dog and the Morrises are actors in the story and there are parts where the dog is merely a reporter taking down in script phon-dog-raphy all the wise remarks he hears around him.... It is not necessary to make your story range over the whole Animal Kingdom and it spoils the "go" of the narrative.... [N]ow you have the conditions on which Gay & Bind will publish the book.²⁹

To this publisher, Joe becomes a virtual phonograph—a phon-dog-rapher, rather than a writer—who merely records and transcribes the stories that he is told, but does not personally experience. Since Gay & Bind was proposing these changes, among others,³⁰ in order to render

²⁹ Handwritten Letter from J. Blackie to Saunders, dated Feb. 28, 1894, in the Margaret Marshall Saunders Papers, courtesy of the Acadia University Archives.

³⁰ Significantly, in addition to changing the title, removing Americanisms, shortening the work, and cheapening the price, the London publisher also suggested that "[t]he chapters on 'the Englishman' might perhaps be omitted or considerably modified and he might in any case cease to be an Englishman. His nationality does not seem essential to his depravity but if he must be a foreigner you had better make him a Russian General (N.B. This last line is meant for a joke)" (Handwritten Letter from J. Blackie to Saunders, dated Feb. 28, 1894, in the Margaret Marshall Saunders Papers, courtesy of the Acadia University Archives). This statement clearly evidences a desire to distance cruelty towards animals from Englishness. While Saunders might have intentionally wished to align his "depravity" with his Englishness

Beautiful Joe more English, it is worth asking whether Saunders' choice of quickly turning the canine "autobiographer" into a mere "reporter" reflects significant differences in attitudes towards dogs, even as transatlantic similarities abounded. All the chapters that follow the traumatic opening suggest that nothing terrible could ever happen to a dog once under the humane protection of a middle-class human family. At the same time, this American dog's "good life" may be read as uneventful—boring, perhaps, or as per Gay & Bind, not part of the "story," unnecessary and excisable—suggesting that English audiences might respond negatively to stories where dogs become staid in comfortable new lives of recuperation, or perhaps that the profundity of canine affective interiority could not make up for a lack of "plot." This is also supposed by a tepid 1898 review in *Literature, the American Edition*, where *Beautiful Joe* is described as "in his own way...quite as fascinating as *Black Beauty*," but unfortunately the reviewer finds that "the chronicle of his life and adventures is somewhat longer and more elaborate" and "[t]he purpose is more obvious, the style often didactic" ("Fiction" 676). "The book is an excellent one," the reviewer says, "but we doubt whether it will be quite as popular with English children as '*Black Beauty*'" ("Fiction" 676).

In *The Animal Part: Human and Other Animals in the Poetic Imagination* (2010), Mark Payne argues that depictions of animal pain, or even death, will not create sufficient, durable sympathy unless they can be incorporated into narrative, "in some form of emplotment" (18). This is another way of saying that there may not be enough investment or belief in the narrating animal (Joe, in this case) can be produced just with an articulation of sentience in human language. This animal "I" may need to be inserted into a plot that we can recognize as a story, particularly because, as Teresa Mangum notes in her survey of nineteenth-century animal genres, this period was intensely focused on articulating individual interiority as "character-

to make a particular point or curry favor with her intended American audience, this London publisher disavows even the possibility of such a connection.

driven” and “ideologically-charged” (“Narrative” 153): “Ironically...despite growing interest in *animal* intelligence, emotions, and even souls, artists and writers sought to comprehend nonhuman species by situating them in narrative forms through which *humans* were trying to comprehend members of their own species” (154). Without the intelligibility of the conventions of a plot-based, anthropocentric narrative, Joe’s traumas fade in relevance, as does his relevance as a subject. In this fade-out, he is dangerously prone to being misrecognized as a mere sentimental object—as an inappropriate object of boys’ attachment.

Just as Sam Emerson’s tears over the loss of his dog in *Paradise* are ambivalently presented as acceptable, not acceptable—his mother “begs” in turn for him to cry and not cry—perhaps Saunders, as a woman writing under a masculinized pen-name (Marshall Saunders) about animals, worked to avoid the discrediting charge of sentimentalism by limiting the extent to which she directly employed the personal suffering of her protagonist. Salt, the prominent humane activist, rightly notes that “[t]he charge of ‘sentimentalism’ is frequently brought against those who plead for animals’ rights” (21), and argued that “[a]bove all, the sense of ridicule that at present attaches to the supposed “sentimentalism” of an advocacy of animals’ rights must be faced and swept away” (97). Authors and activists like Saunders needed to carefully avoid the taint of sentimentalism that connoted irrationality. Bergh himself, in his zealous advocacy for animal protectionism, butted against celebrity figures such as circus entrepreneur P.T. Barnum (Barnum 777), paleontologist Louis Agassiz (Lane 24), and medical scientist Louis Pasteur (“Bergh on Pasteur” 217),³¹ and in his critique of scientists as “merciless empiric[s],” Bergh attracted scathing aspersions regarding the excessive sentiment of his position: “We think Mr. Bergh has...exceeded all bounds of reason, until he is simply a fanatic without reason” (“Bergh on Pasteur” 217). Attempting, it seems, to combat this derogatory dismissal, supporters of Bergh and his cause would note how his approach was “[r]efined,

³¹ Pasteur and rabies will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

intellectual, and cold,” rather than emotionally affected: “[H]ow deceptive must be the human face, for we are apt to associate self-sacrifice, generous devotion to another’s welfare, with a certain warmth of heart, even of manner and expression” which Bergh apparently lacked (“Henry Bergh as Don Quixote” 71).

Enemies of the animal cause were particularly virulent when responding to attacks to their precious science—specifically, anti-vivisectionists who experimented and operated on live animals. Dr. Charles Dana, a specialist in nervous disorders, named in 1909 the condition of “zoophil-psychosis,” a morbidly obsessive love and concern for the suffering of animals. This wasted affection, as Tobias Menely argues in his genealogy, is linked to an anti-Jacobin reaction that linked the French Revolution’s excesses with animal compassion as “treacherous and precious, monstrous and emasculating” (253). Dana describes zoophil-psychosis as “fine feelings gone wrong” (382) in congenitally weak-minded persons, who he implicitly marks as likely to be women: “it is much easier to pet a dog or nurse a kitten, than to nurse the sick...or keep watch over the temper and make a household comfortable. Thus the kindly feelings of the indolent and the unintelligent often take this line of least resistance.... The dog is plump and overcared for; and the cat is more happy than the husband” (383).³² Thus sentimentality towards animals is ultimately selfishness masquerading as kindness, and a diversion onto unworthy cross-species subjects of the limited resources of affection that ought to be restricted to humans. Tied to other well-known “nervous disorders” like neurasthenia, hysteria, and obsessive psychosis, zoophil-psychosis is ultimately a betrayal of the tacit rule that sincere affection should be restricted to the human species.³³

³² For more on Dana’s ideas, see Craig Beuttinger’s “Antivivisection and the Charge of Zoophil-psychosis in the Early Twentieth Century,” in *Historian* 15 (Winter 1993): 277-89. One of the most well-known Victorian anti-vivisection novels is Wilkie Collins’ *Heart and Science* (1883).

³³ Coral Lansbury notes that, during this period, sexual frustration was also thought to be a cause for this misplaced and excessive compassion for animals (83).

“The true animal lover should be above sentiment,” declared Dr. Edward Bledsoe (74). Famously, it was said that Bergh did not even like or enjoy the company of animals: a friend attests that “never in his life did he see Mr. Bergh lay his hand upon a horse in caress, however slight—never saw him come to closer touch than by the taking hold of a bridle” (“Henry Bergh as Don Quixote” 77). In fact, when faced with the prospect of petting a dog, “the man’s whole body shrank away, and unmistakable repulsion showed in every feature” (“Henry Bergh as Don Quixote” 76). Bergh’s extreme refusal to have *any* degree of intimate relationship with the beings he dedicated his life to helping seems positively bizarre. One of his contemporary biographers, Clara Morris, described him as “a cool, calm man. He did not love horses; he disliked dogs. Affection, then, was not the moving cause.... [His] perfect self-control showed steady nerves that did not shrink sickeningly from sights of physical pain; therefore, he was not moved by self-pity or hysterical sympathy.... His coldness was his armour [sic]” (91). For Bergh, who was often ridiculed for his advocacy on the part of animals, and who was known to be a rather sensitive man, “of refined sensibilities and tender feelings” (Buel 593), avoiding the charge of sentimentalism was likely particularly important. For Saunders, too, as a woman writing under the pen name of a man, sensible tender feelings were likely presumed of her sex, presumed as a disability in “manly” humane work. Perhaps she relied more on didacticism (telling) than affective heavy-handedness (showing) to avoid the dismissive charge of sentimentalism.³⁴

Yet it seems that *Beautiful Joe* may not have been as preferred by its targeted audience, boys, as well as *Black Beauty*. The editor of an early twentieth-century pedagogical journal, *How to Help Boys: A Journal of Social Pedagogy*, writes that “[t]he boy reads for the sake of the action and the personality of the hero,” and seeks “not grace or style,” but rather that the book

³⁴ For more on the philosophical history of sentimentality as it relates to animal rights, see Catherine Osborne’s chapter, “On the Vice of Sentimentality: Androcles and the Lion and Some Extraordinary Adventures in the Desert Fathers” in *Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers: Humanity and the Humane in Ancient Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 135-61.

be “strong, direct, heroic, sincere, simple and tender-hearted” (Forbush 116). Accordingly, he blames *Beautiful Joe*’s failure to achieve “reality”—“the fundamental essential for children”—as successfully as *Black Beauty*, because *Beautiful Joe* engages in “overstatement...for the purpose of arousing feeling such as to lead one to think that the author is pleading instead of telling a straightforward story of things as they are” (Forbush 100). As a result, he argues, while in his surveys of boys the English *Black Beauty* was “doubly favored (reread or named after an interval of more than a year) by one hundred and one, and...maintains its place as a favorite in the eighth and ninth grades,” “its chief rival” *Beautiful Joe* “is favored by only one fourth, and doubly favored by only one eight as many” (Forbush 100). *Beautiful Joe*’s didacticism harangues and sermonizes, alienating its young male readers with instructional strictures, while *Black Beauty* relies more on an extended dosage of affective inspiration. It is very likely that these factors, which reek of the “sentimental”—then and now, reviled as an effeminizing pejorative—have also led to the dramatic decline of Saunders’ readership, so that today, *Black Beauty* still remains very popular and well-known, while Saunders’ bestsellers have become relatively obscure.

After World War I, Saunders toned down the violence of the scene where Joe’s siblings are murdered, omitting the potent sentence here underlined:

He took one pup after another, and right there, before his children and my poor distracted mother, put an end to their lives. Some of them he seized by the legs and knocked against the stalls, till their brains were dashed out, others he killed with a fork. It was very terrible. My mother ran up and down the stable screaming with pain, and I lay weak and trembling, and expecting every instant that my turn would come next. I don’t know why he spared me. I was the only one left. (Saunders, *BJ* 21, emphasis added)

The revised 1922 version, then, obscures the details needed for a reader to precisely envision the traumatic event. How many puppies were killed, and exactly how did each, in turn, meet its end?

Did Jenkins use weapons or wring each to death with his bare hands? From earlier in the novel, a reader might recall that at birth they total six, and much later Joe remembers that “[Jenkins] would have dashed out my brains against the wall, as he dashed out my poor little brothers’ against the horse’s stall” (Saunders, *BJ* [1922] 132). In other words, the details are elsewhere available, but are omitted at the key moment of trauma; here, it suffices that puppies were snuffed out like candle flames. The puppies neither bleed nor cry; their very bodies fail to narrate any trauma suffered.³⁵

Rather than represent humaneness towards animals in non-emotional terms, Saunders’ novels configure the affects of humaneness through Joe’s physical mutilation, so graphically documented at the outset. Perhaps Saunders was not as successful as *Black Beauty* in attracting and keeping readers through conventional novelistic strategies, but her novels were clearly still highly circulated bestsellers that had a profound impact: her success is grounded, I argue, in the construction of Beautiful Joe’s “ugly beauty.”

In the words of Mr. Wood, Joe, with his “missing ears and tail,” is the “standing token” for the fact that “this is a cruel world for man or beast” (Saunders, *BJ* 136). We are ever-reminded of the abuse that marks his childhood, not only by direct references, but also because we are always struck by our own readerly assumptions. In the reader’s mind’s image of Joe, we may not picture a mutilated dog: we will forget under the beauty of his personality. *Beautiful Joe* welcomes this slip by using the customary language to refer to Joe wagging his tail, then loudly self-revising, thus allowing the reader to forget, only to be quickly reminded, of Joe’s maiming: “I always wagged my tail, or rather my body, for I had no tail to wag” (Saunders, *BJ* 45); “[w]e were very proud and happy, and stood up and wagged our tails, at least Jim did, and I wagged

³⁵ Historian Gwendolyn Davies hypothesizes that Saunders did this “probably to avoid offending young sensibilities” (144, citing Waterston); however, a more likely explanation would be that as society moved further into affective uses of dogs and away from visible violent animal cruelty, and graphic violence against animals became less a daily occurrence, so sensibilities did change since the time of *Beautiful Joe*’s original publication.

what I could” (Saunders, *BJ* 107). This recurring move—*I wagged my tail; no, I have no tail*—is a textual strategy to refresh the trauma of chapter 2 without seeming to inundate the reader with relentlessly bloody detail. The remembrance of his trauma, then, becomes a sublimated message, drawing the reader back vaguely to a dog being beaten, as a repressed memory of ugliness that, unbidden, punctures the reading of a “beautiful” dog.

At the novel’s opening, Joe also discounts himself for his impure pedigree, which is visibly reflected by his physical appearance: “I know that I am not beautiful, and I know that I am not well-bred. I am only a cur” (Saunders, *BJ* 13). The addition of the feminizing epithet “Beautiful” was Saunders’; according to one of her biographers, the Ontario dog which inspired the story was simply named Joe (Davies 145).³⁶ **(Figure 7.)** In the novel’s opening, Joe says, “I am called Beautiful Joe, but not because I am a beauty. Mr. Morris...says that he thinks I must be called Beautiful Joe for the same reason that his grandfather, down South, called a very ugly colored slave lad Cupid, and his mother Venus” (Saunders, *BJ* 13). Tinged with condescending racism, this analogy seems to say that just as an ugly slave boy has no business being named after the white, cherubic angel of love, and the black slave mother who birthed him could not possibly compare to the white goddess Aphrodite, so Joe is the antithesis of beautiful. He is named beautiful, then, as a reminder that he is far from it. This oxymoronic epithet of “beautiful,” like tail-wagging that happens but does not, serves to signal the opposite of what is being named, emphasizing what is lacking, and reminding the reader of why—horrific abuse—without explicit reiteration.

In spite of—or rather because—he is going “through life worth about three-quarters of a dog” (Saunders, *BJ* 35), the ugly-yet-Beautiful Joe serves as the representative victim for whom humane sentiment may be legitimately exercised. The text even offers a model of how Joe

³⁶ In the preface, however, Saunders insists that Beautiful Joe “is a real dog, and ‘Beautiful Joe’ is his real name” (Saunders, *BJ* 5).

Figure 7.



Signed photograph of the “real” Beautiful Joe. From the website of the municipality of Meaford in Ontario, Canada, where Joe lived.



“MY NAME IS ‘BEAUTIFUL JOE.’”
Page 13.

“My Name is ‘Beautiful Joe.’” Illustration in 1894 edition of *Beautiful Joe* (Philadelphia: Charles H. Bane).



Illustrations by Charles Copeland in 1922 edition of *Beautiful Joe* (Philadelphia: Judson Press). Notice how these depictions increasingly veer from the original dog.

successfully inspires humaneness without dangerous sentimentality: the ignorant, wealthy Mrs. Montague, who first reacts with repulsion for this visibly mutilated mongrel, soon learns to appreciate the value of the ugly dog in the household. Immediately after an afternoon visit, she resolves to visit the poor, be kinder to those she employs, and adopt a dog for her children. Mrs. Morris gives much credit to Joe: “You did a good thing the other day in helping me to start that little woman out of her selfish way of living” (Saunders, *BJ* 45). It is not clear, however, what Joe does to “help” incite Mrs. Montague’s humaneness, aside from sitting quietly, looking ugly (mutilated) yet beautiful (affectionate and faithful).

It is not because during Mrs. Montague’s visit Joe exhibits any particularly endearing behavior, because the sugary, pretty Billy could easily provide that, but rather, it is his very visually striking abused body, combined with his submissiveness to humans, that tells the story of the maimed-yet-grateful dog. As Mrs. Morris says, in his submissive behavior, Joe may be “held up as an example to many a human being. He is patient, quiet, and obedient. My husband says that he reminds him of three words in the Bible—“through much tribulation”” (Saunders, *BJ* 41). In other words, it is the “tribulation”—the traumas that indelibly mark Joe’s being—joined with his ensuing patience, quietness, and obedience, that make Joe an effective catalyst of humaneness. What was particularly remarkable about Joe is not merely that he is a sagacious, affectionate, and trusting dog of humans, but that he is so *in spite of* what was done to him by humans, and he functions as a constant reminder of this very point through his beautiful ugliness. The “humane” story is continually told by his body: *I am still good to humans in spite of what humans have done to me*. It is not enough, then, to tell a story about a very good dog—not even enough to tell a story about how useful the dog is in helping one raise well-ordered, well-gendered children in an orderly home. The dog *must* be abused, and forever marked as abused, and continue yet to curl up at the feet of man.

Humaneness as Home- and Man-Making Work

Nietzsche's suggestive quote, above, also implies that the exercise of animal protection—that is, humaneness—is pleasurable, an expression of superiority and the right to dominate: “[I]n pity at least two (maybe many more) elements of personal pleasure are contained, and it is to that extent self-enjoyment: first of all, it is the pleasure of emotion (the kind of pity we find in tragedy) and second, when it drives us to act, it is the pleasure of our satisfaction in the exercise of power” (Nietzsche 72). In other words, *I do not need pity because I am better off; moreover, I am so much better off that I can help you*. As with Harry and Sam, the ability to transgressively, yet righteously, pummel a bigger opponent with one's bare hands in protection of a weaker creature is deeply empowering. There is a pleasurable power experienced in acting “humanely,” whether following one's own exercise of cruelty or another of our own species.

Given the taint that feminine “sentimentalism” could impart on the project of humaneness, *Beautiful Joe* participated in repackaging animal protectionism from an essentially feminine impulse to pity or sympathy into a masculine endeavor, creating pleasurable opportunities for “manly” action under the banner of humaneness.³⁷ Perhaps, as discussed in the preceding section, *Beautiful Joe* was not as successful at attracting and keeping male readers as a less heavy-handedly didactic novel might have been, but its highly successful gender strategies are representative of a powerful line of reasoning promoted and produced for and by the bourgeois. The sphere of humaneness made open to males is linked to power and physical work, rather than the selfish excess decried by the anti-sentimentalists. Humaneness in *Beautiful Joe* is clearly demarcated as “manly” self-making work, with a double emphasis on *work*; to Saunders, women are “naturally unselfish” (Saunders, *BJ* 39) and need, at most, to

³⁷ Though Saunders masculinized her name before writing *Beautiful Joe*, maintaining this masculinization of her name likely functioned in making the message of her book more attractive to young male readers.


toughen their constitutions to face the atrocities of animal abuse, while boys need to discipline their presumed natural impulses to animal cruelty.

Not only did boys seem prone to cruelty towards animals, but according to Grier, the assumption of an author of the period might have been that a boy might be “[p]racticing his future mastery of the world in an imperfect, thoughtless way,” and thus “a boy would be tempted to use physical abuse as ‘a trial of his skill’...or as ‘a proof of his strength’” (“Childhood” 110). What Grier identifies here is the unsurprising connection between animal cruelty and power, particularly physical power over an inferior creature. In repackaging nurturing behavior as “manly work,” *Beautiful Joe* emphasizes that humaneness requires physical prowess. Bemoaning what she considers to be an excess of what the nineteenth-century called “brain workers,” Saunders describes contemporary men as “[l]azy” (*BJ* 172): “They’ll work their brains till they haven’t got any more back-bone than a caterpillar, but as for manual labor, it’s old-timey and out of fashion” (*BJ* 173). Humane pet-keeping is invigorating manual labor rather than brain work, even in its nurturing details of building homes for the many adopted pets (Saunders, *BJ* 40). As a result of the manual labor involved in meeting the myriad material needs of these animal dependents, boys become worthy of being called “men of business” (Saunders, *BJ* 40). The power of manhood is consolidated by materially providing for dependents, with pets as a sort of practice for each boys’ future family of mouths to feed, bodies to clothe and house, and minds to break and train.³⁸

An image from an 1878 issue of *Scribner’s Monthly* depicts Henry Bergh, known to be a tall and well-dressed man, in full gentleman regalia, accosting cabdrivers for cruelty to their horses. **(Figure 8.)** Though he bears a cane, he stands erect and controlled. As Clarence Clough Buel describes Bergh,

³⁸ This recalls the discussion in Chapter 1 of how David Copperfield achieves respectable manhood when motivated by his “puppy love” for Dora.

Figure 8.



HENRY BERGH ON DUTY. (CAPTURING A BURR BIT.)

“Henry Bergh on Duty. (Capturing a Burr Bit.)” From “Henry Bergh at Work,” 1878 issue of *Scribner’s Monthly*.

[h]is commanding stature of six feet is magnified by his erect and dignified bearing. A silk hat with straight rim covers with primness the severity of his presence. A dark-brown or dark-blue frock overcoat encases his broad shoulders and spare, yet sinewy, figure. A decisive hand grasps a cane strong enough to lean upon, and competent to be a defence [sic] without looking like a standing menace. When this cane, or even his finger, is raised in warning, the cruel driver is quick to understand and heed the gesture. (594)

Buel, like the picture above, represents the gentleman's cane as an asset, a weapon in disguise. Like the cane, Bergh's very finger has the power to quell any animal abuser. In the picture above, the brutish, abusive cabdriver is also shown standing on his coach, and yet the perspective makes him appear small and insignificant, even as he menaces with a curling whip. Bergh was commonly represented patrolling the streets, doing his "manly work," out-of-doors, physically, energetically. Physical power is connected to Bergh's class status as cab driver and spirited horses alike are all arrested by his stately presence alone. A woman and a dog glance back; both woman and dog are represented in like relationship to Bergh—as mute, admiring witnesses to his prowess.

Paralleling this Berghian model but with an added splash of blood, Saunders repurposes the "sanguinary streak" that she believes is present "[e]ven in the best of" boys (Saunders, *BJP* 216). Animal protectionism becomes an opportunity for heroic rescue, as Joe's initial rescue from Jenkins is portrayed in *Beautiful Joe*:

There was a young man [Harry] going by on a bicycle. He heard my screams, and springing off his wheel, came hurrying up the path, and stood among us before Jenkins caught sight of him. In the midst of my pain, I heard him say fiercely, "What have you been doing to that dog?"

“I’ve been cutting his ears for fightin’, my young gentleman,” said Jenkins. “There’s no law to prevent that, is there?”

“And there is no law to prevent my giving you a thrashing,” said the young man angrily. In a trice, he had seized Jenkins by the throat, and was pounding him with all his might. (Saunders, *BJ* 24)

Harry’s actions here are quick, impulsive, and evidence of physical prowess—he is, in a word, virile. “[S]pringing off,” “hurrying” and approaching arm’s reach quicker than Jenkins’ eye could follow, confronting cruelty “[i]n a trice,” with a “fierc[e]” and “anгр[y]” manner, and “seiz[ing]” and “pounding...with all his might,” the young Harry overtakes a full-grown adult male bravely and masterfully—an ideal for any young male reader. There is, surely, some law preventing Harry from assaulting Jenkins; Harry saucily responds to Jenkins’ lie with a lie of his own. In effect, the scene makes Harry’s lie and assault—already shocking because he is a younger man pummeling an adult male—righteously transgressive, and therefore highly attractive to young male readers. Harry’s first impulse upon sight of the freshly-mutilated Joe is not to render first aid to the freshly amputated dog, but to punish with his fists, suggesting that for boys, humaneness is, first and foremost, a call to physical violence against the lower classes.

The apparent contradiction of melding physical violence to animal protectionism is the result of the changing gender discourses of the *fin-de-siècle*, a period when, as Gail Bederman discusses, white middle-class American men reproduced themselves by appropriating what was historically associated with men marked of a “lower” race and working-class men (17).

According to influential psychologist G. Stanley Hall, boys must be encouraged to be savage (Bederman 78) through sports and outdoor exercise to combat the enervating effects of excessive refinement: “[B]ehavior which had once appeared self-possessed and manly...now seemed overcivilized and effeminate. Indeed, the very word ‘overcivilized’ was coined during these years” (Bederman 17). According to Bederman, “[b]oys must embrace primitive violence if

they were to develop moral manliness. ‘Unless you want to make a selfish, knock-kneed weakling of him, teach him to double up his fist and strike back.... Physical courage is the foundation for moral courage in life’” (quoting Hall’s article, “Corporal Punishments,” published in November 1899, Bederman 99).³⁹ In fact, not only should they stand up to bullies, but they must also *be* bullies: “Boys must fight, bully, and dream of massive bloodshed. This juvenile savagery would ‘vaccinate’ them with a controlled dose of the “primitivism” which would allow them to retain their virility as civilized adults” (Bederman 101).⁴⁰ The fact, then, that Harry out-savages the brutish lower-class man is a mark of Harry’s positive adolescent development as he learns to exercise his power against the “right” subjects—animal abusers rather than animals.

The dog, too, is masculinized by enacting Harry’s protectionism. Joe’s spunk is favorably contrasted against his mother’s excessive devotion to Jenkins, reflecting her blind inability to differentiate between a deserving and an undeserving master.⁴¹ Readers must, in thinking of Joe and his defenseless siblings, feel some disgust at her misplaced attachments. Like Laura, who might cry and harangue and nurse, but not directly halt animal cruelty, Jess cannot stop Jenkins from murdering her puppies; she can only “r[u]n up and down the stable screaming with pain” (Saunders, *BJ* 21), a pathetic picture of feminine ineffectuality. Though Lilian Carswell argues that this moment of mother-child separation trauma, which is a common motif of sentimental literature, is a loss that is “easily imagined as transcending species” (146) and thus functions to align human sympathy with animals, the text’s insistence on portraying Jess as far from an ideal mother would seem to blunt the loss of such a mother. “Cruel and savage as he was, she yet loved [Jenkins],” and Joe “believe[s] she would have laid down her life for him” (Saunders, *BJ* 15), though she does not seem willing to lay down her life to protect her children. Jess proves to

³⁹ Clearly, the Muscular Christianity ethic, espoused by Charles Kingsley in England in the nineteenth-century—by now well-known—was part of this ethos.

⁴⁰ I will return to these “primitive” politics in my discussion of Jack London in Chapter 4.

⁴¹ The value of the ability to distinguish between different masters will be further developed in my discussion of Jack London’s novels in Chapter 4.

be equally unable to help her one surviving pup, falling into a miserable despondency until finally giving up entirely: “One day she licked me [Joe] gently, wagged her tail, and died” (Saunders, *BJ* 22). Not only is this a betrayal of her maternal duty, but worse, her death directly incites the fit of ill humor that motivates Jenkins’ atrocious mutilation of Joe’s ears and tail. Arguably, Joe is better off after Jess’ death, because it precipitates the events that bring him into the safety of the Morris fold.⁴²

When Jess dies, it is Joe who acts in righteous attack, acting where she fails: “I flew at him and gave him a savage bite on the ankle” (Saunders, *BJ* 22). Joe goes on to virtually repeat the same act of righteous savagery in chivalrous protection of another female, his adoptive mother figure Laura. Joe takes on Jenkins at Bessie Drury’s home when the vile abuser breaks in and threatens Laura’s safety. Roused from a premonitory dream, Joe springs to action (Saunders, *BJ* 102). Joe sounds the alarm and pursues the fleeing Jenkins, guaranteeing capture by the authorities. This episode of righteous violence empowers Joe, who goes from “quivering and trembling” (Saunders, *BJ* 101) to powerful protector. Here, Laura is the dependent that Joe, as a male, is empowered to physically protect. Moreover, Saunders uses Joe’s experience to say what might be inappropriate to say in the case of Harry—that exercising physical violence is quite pleasurable.

The recursiveness of *Beautiful Joe* drives home this point in yet another incident when Joe attacks a neighborhood Spitz that repeatedly harasses the family cat, Malta, a female. Again, the rescue of a creature that is relatively less able to protect herself is pleasurable and empowering: “I gave him one of the worst beatings he ever had.... I had been longing to give him a shaking for some time, and now I felt for his throat through his thick hair, and dragged him all around the street” (Saunders, *BJ* 89). The use of the term “beating” muddles species lines,

⁴² Moreover, when the puppy Billy also loses his mother, the text hardly records this as a significant emotional or material loss. As with Joe, the loss of the canine mother is what brings Laura in as a wonderful replacement mother.

outfitting Joe with a verb that better suits human action.⁴³ Yet like Harry's violent attack of Jenkins, Joe's brings about moral reform: "I let him go, and he was a civil dog ever afterward" (Saunders, *BJ* 89). Earning Malta's gratitude assuages the misgivings Joe has for Laura's sake, "for Miss Laura says dogs should never fight" (Saunders, *BJ* 89). Functioning both to mark him as a "good" dog that not only has the ability to think rationally, but also knows it is wrong to fight, as well as a "manly" dog that knows that it is *not* wrong to fight to protect a weaker creature, this lip service to Laura's mores is completely vitiated by the logic of family protection that Joe invokes: "[The Spitz] had worried Malta before, and he had no business to do it. She belonged to our family. Jim and I never worried his cat" (Saunders, *BJ* 89). Because Malta belongs, like so much property, to the males who must protect the family females, Joe's aggression is manly and righteous. There is also some ambiguous suggestion that Joe, being male and therefore prone to sanguinity, already itches for a brawl, and Malta's feminized victimization conveniently presents the opportunity to scratch that itch: "I was very angry, and wanted to fight something, so I pitched into the Spitz dog" (Saunders, *BJ* 88-9).

Joe's fits of the "savage" align him with Harry's "manly" humane work, turning him from prey to predator: "There was something savage in me that night. I think it must have been the smell of Jenkins. I felt as if I could tear him to pieces. I have never felt so wicked since. I was hunting him, as he had hunted me and my mother, and the thought gave me pleasure" (Saunders, *BJ* 104). Like Harry "stretched Jenkins on the ground and gave him a beating" (Saunders, *BJ* 200), Joe wields his natural weapons—his teeth, ready to "tear [Jenkins] to pieces"—with "pleasure" (Saunders, *BJ* 104). This incident clearly mirrors Harry's righteous attack of Jenkins, also entwining transgression with righteous spunk. In describing Joe's actions, the novel can be unabashed in citing Joe's "pleasure" at the "hunt" in a way that would

⁴³ Ear- and tail-less, Joe is a more streamlined fighting machine, having fewer flapping parts exposed to other dog's bites. This ironically recalls Jenkins' lie to Harry that he was cutting Joe's ears for "fightin'" (Saunders, *BJ* 24); indeed, Joe does much successful fighting in the course of the novel.

be unseemly in describing Harry; Joe's species allows for this, but Harry's violence must be exacted without enjoyment. But in this explicit mirroring of the two males, it is evident that Harry, too, likely experiences illicit "pleasure" in pounding Jenkins.

Humaneness takes up the affects of animal abuse—powerful, pleasurable, excessive, physical, impulsive, passionate—and becomes a negotiation of power between males, using the bodies of an "inferior," feminized creature that is marked as being in need of humane protection (in Harry's and Sam's cases, they protect male dogs; in Joe's case, he protects Miss Laura and a female cat) from a superior, a male (Jenkins, Hillington, and the Spitz)—an empowering message for young male readers indeed. Under the cover of protecting Laura and Malta, Joe's acts of revenge on Jenkins and the Spitz take on an admirable tone; it is, after all, as if he is returning the favor for Laura Morris' nurturance during his period of recuperation, twice protecting and avenging a wronged mother figure. Notably, however, Joe never does anything to "return the favor" to Harry, as if Joe could not remain beholden to a woman, but rightfully remains under Harry's "God-like" (Fudge 51) dominion. In attacking Jenkins, Joe does what he already wanted to do—fight—and Malta's possible danger is the excuse for the action that can now be coded as righteous, humane, even if against Laura's injunction against all fighting. Females are used as transactional pawns in the humane business of men.⁴⁴

The home space is not marred by such violent humaneness, but rather, creates a safe space for the humane man to exercise other practical aspects of humane work. The boys are not, Mrs. Morris insists, "deprived...of liberty": "They have their days for baseball, and football, and

⁴⁴ While it may be argued that alongside the textual instances of canine agency, the act of "autobiography" is a reason to applaud the work for "recognizing" an independent animal will, it is also possible that the impulse to locate such canine agency in our literature gives us pleasure in the same way that acting humanely does: we may, in this exercise of finding canine agency, applaud humans (and therefore ourselves) for the kind treatment of animals. As Peter Stoneley argues regarding *Black Beauty's* criticism of the bearing-rein, the use of the arguably cruel bearing-rein on horses had an ironic double function, as it "both made the horse less powerful and enhanced the uncontrollable 'maleness' of his appearance" by giving him "an air of masculinity" when he fiercely champed his bit (69). *Beautiful Joe* functions like this bearing-rein, making Joe seem more masculine at the same time as it makes him more controllable by appropriating his interiority for the author's ends.

excursions to the woods, but they have so much to do at home” (Saunders 51). While most boys’ “natural” impulse is to tear away from the feminine home, with a dog as a pet, the home may be re-fashioned to include masculinity safely in it.

In the case of Willie, one of the younger Morrisises who is “too fond of reading” indoors and exhibits too little of that presumed boyish impulse to romp out of doors, Joe’s inclusion in the family helps masculinize the bookish boy by drawing him into that “boyish freedom” associated with public, physical activity (Saunders, *BJ* 72). “[C]urled up by the window in the hall, reading a book” as usual, in spite of his mother’s entreaties to “put away his book and run about with the other boys” (Saunders, *BJ* 72), Willie is lured from his excessive reading only by the masculinizing opportunities presented by their pet dog: “[Laura] began to tell him about the dog fight. He was much interested, and the book slipped to the floor. ‘You’re a daisy every day. Go now and rest yourself.’ Then snatching the balls from her, he called us [boys] and ran down to the basement” (Saunders, *BJ* 72). The need to take care of the dog’s physical needs realigns Willie with the boys-only activity of physical play, and as the language subtly suggests, the book slips out of his hand unconsciously after hearing of the stimulating dog fight. While pet-keeping actively inspires boys to work around the home, it is not to be understood to stifle the boys into what is considered feminine inactivity; rather, the text reassures readers that pet-keeping breeds vigorous masculinity.

In the dynamic of humaneness, not only do the females function as victims, but also as sensitive barometers of moral outrage and producers of pleasant affect. They are, however, ill-equipped for men’s humane work. Laura, “a real Puritan, gentle, sweet, and good, and yet severe” (Saunders, *BJ* 221), is excluded from the worst of the graphic violence of animal cruelty, as if her feminine sensibilities could not bear the stimulus. When the freshly-maimed Joe is first brought into the Morris barn, Harry, the rescuer, takes pains to instruct his younger cousins to “[h]ush” and not “make a fuss” (Saunders, *BJ* 25). All business, he dispatches them to obtain

provisions with the caveat that the women of the house be excluded from the work at hand:

“You, Jack, go down to the kitchen and ask Mary for a basin of warm water and a sponge, and don't let your mother or Laura hear you” (Saunders, *BJ* 25). While the ladies of the house are excluded, Jack delegates to Mary, the housemaid,⁴⁵ the more menial aspects of the work. Only when the worst of the damage inflicted by Jenkins is sponged and dressed does Laura gain entry into this male workspace:

[O]ne of the boys cried out, “Here comes Laura!” “Take the rag out of the way,” said Mr. Harry, kicking aside the old apron I had been wrapped in, and that was stained with my blood. One of the boys stuffed it into a barrel, and then they all looked toward the house. A young girl, holding up one hand to shade her eyes from the sun, was coming up the walk that led from the house to the stable. I thought then, that I had never seen such a beautiful girl, and I think so still. She was tall and slender, and just to look at her was enough to make one love her. I stood in the stable door, staring at her with all my might. (Saunders, *BJ* 26)

As she descends from the house—the central site of feminine control and influence—into the stable, she shields her eyes from the sun in a figurative move that mirrors the protective shielding that the boys engage in; the sun, like the sight of a bloodied apron, would be too much for the beautiful girl, with whom males of all species seem to fall in love with at first sight. Like Adam feeling the effects of the fruit of forbidden knowledge, Joe, a dog struck with heterosexual, cross-species, love towards Laura, feels shame. Recovering from his gaping, Joe himself agrees that his wounded body should be shielded from Laura's view: “[N]ow I...saw the white bandage on my tail, and knowing I was not a fit spectacle for a pretty young lady like that, I slunk into a corner” (Saunders, *BJ* 26). The “spectacle” of his mutilation—Beautiful Joe's ugliness—exists

⁴⁵ Again, though I avoid in-depth discussion of class dimensions here, I note that the working-class Mary is deemed to not require being shielded from blood and gore as “Miss” Laura does.

only for the young men to find him an object of labor and protection. While Harry “washed and dressed my sore ears and tail every day till he went home” (Saunders, *BJ* 34), tackling the ugly wounds, it is Laura who, with her “gentle fingers,” eases his fear and loneliness (Saunders, *BJ* 30), and like a good surrogate mother, offers her milk-dipped fingers like teats for the weak dog to lick (Saunders, *BJ* 33).

The very sensitivity that enables her to coax and gentle a frightened dog is what disqualifies her from the “manly” aspects of animal protection. Much later, when they unearth the neglectful cruelties of the impoverished Lord Chesterfield, the “Englishman” in the 1894 version who abandons his chained farm animals to a slow starvation, Laura has a sort of paralyzed response: “She did not cry, as she often did over sick and suffering animals. This seemed too bad for tears. She just hovered over that poor horse with her face as white as her dress, and an expression of fright in her eyes” (Saunders, *BJ* 216). Uncle Wood dismisses her from the field of men’s work, and limits women’s work to the affective task of maintaining good cheer for the men:

“I thought I might be of some use,” said she gently.

“So you can,” said Mr. Wood. “You go into the house and sit down, and Harry and I will come to you when we want cheering up.” (Saunders, *BJ* 218)

Her “use,” given her oversensitivity, is to “go into the house,” remaining still but ever-ready to uplift the sagging spirits of the men after their work on the farm animals. Though it would seem like feeding a pig and untying a cow would not be particularly challenging tasks, Mr. Wood demarcates these acts as men’s work.

The “heart education,” of course, the job of Mrs. Morris, who is by all accounts an impeccable Angel in the House (Saunders, *BJ* 40). She is industriously vigilant of the operation of the house in which the pets play such a central part. Selflessly devoted not only to the running of an absolutely well-ordered household, but also to the minutest particulars of their children’s

education, Mrs. Morris rules the sacred space of the home. Mr. Morris “was a very busy man and rarely interfered in household affairs. Mrs. Morris was the one who said what was to be done and what was not to be done” (Saunders, *BJ* 36). As a result of her absolute but benign rule of the hearth, “[t]here was never any noise or confusion in the house, and though there was a great deal of work to be done, everything went on smoothly and pleasantly, and no one ever got angry and scolded as they did in the Jenkins family” (Saunders, *BJ* 36). Like a well-ordered factory, the affective health of the Morris family under Mrs. Morris’ rule lubricates the machinery of the Morris family as a whole. Unlike the dogs in Dickens’ novels, here the dog binds a family together both by the sympathy its dependence inspires and by the sheer labor it requires in protection.⁴⁶

Ultimately, however, while Mrs. Morris—who also gets a lot of speaking lines in this text, while Mr. Morris almost none—might seem a powerful female figure, the novel makes clear that she is the agent of husband who is “a very busy man” in the public sphere (Saunders, *BJ* 35). While attributing the goodness of the household to Mrs. Morris being “such a good woman,” Joe cites with approval that “[s]he loved her husband and children, and did everything she could to make them happy” (Saunders, *BJ* 35). Laura, of course, is expected to follow this model of the Angel in the House, to direct male interest towards the traditionally feminine affect associated with animal protectionism, and devote herself to the production of “happiness” in her family.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ During this period, periodicals exhorted parents, particularly mothers, to put aside their own convenience or dislike of animals in their homes in order to secure the use of pets as technologies for the production of properly gendered subjects. “I admit it is very inconvenient to have one’s house filled with old bird-cages, squirrel, and white mice boxes; the yard covered with rabbit-hutches or bantam rums,” etc., said one article, “[b]ut we must remember...it rests with us, in a good measure, whether they shall contract habits beneficial or injurious” (“Pets and Children” 393). The Matron of the London Hospital wrote for the American magazine, *Babyhood*, to persuade mothers to “submit to the additional inconvenience” for the sake of all the healthful benefits (Lückes 4). Another said, “[p]erhaps the mother is very busy, or...she may dislike animals.... Alas! How any mothers and fathers cherish their selfish ease and consult their convenience” (“Children’s Pets” 193).

⁴⁷ While in *Beautiful Joe*, females are at least tasked with the grave responsibility of imparting this “heart education,” in *Paradise*, Saunders seems to push the Angel in the House further into the background, seeming less invested in the idea of maternal, tender-hearted women being in charge of men’s “heart

The Good Dog

The “new theory of partnership” (Turner 124) between humans and their companion animals that Saunders expounds—one based on humans providing rescue and shelter in exchange for loyal affection—sheds much light on our understanding of the myth of dogs as “man’s best friend,” and why we as readers are torn between recognizing the value in such positive-seeming representations of interspecies relations while applying to it the critical knife.

The frontispiece photograph of the 1907 edition of *Beautiful Joe*, showing Saunders leading a terrier into a begging position, is critiqued by Tess Cosslet for its contradictory message: “The tell-tale human hand holding the ball here, making the dog sit up and beg, reveals only too clearly the human manipulation going on, while the caption seems to stress the animal’s independence” (65).⁴⁸ **(Figure 9.)** And yet, as I hope to show, the message is not entirely contradictory. The featured human here is Saunders herself, and her letters suggest that she probably furnished this photograph. Precisely as Saunders leads this pictured dog to “beg,” so she also leads Beautiful Joe to tell a rather beggarly picture of himself—abject, abused, and subservient to humans. As I have argued, his ugly abjection is absolutely necessary to produce the object of boys’ rescue, protection, and home-making labor, and to whom a boy might be safely attached. This abjection, however, is limited to Joe’s attitude toward those human

education.” Both texts emphasize the importance of industrious manual labor, but the later novel no longer allows women to serve as its inspiration: the relationship is increasingly about the male and his dog. In this animal paradise, Joe, as President of the Island, expresses “a great prejudice against magic, except for purposes of amusement. We have to do things by natural means, and obtain results by our own labour” (Saunders, *BJP* 31). This topic of men’s work in a nearly all-male island “Paradise” is repeated often in the text: “we are never idle, unless we are resting” (Saunders, *BJP* 112)—making homes, baking cakes and breads, landscaping. This bias against “magic” is also a bias against females, as one of the few females on the island is Pussy, a magical (female) cat who would “deceive anyone” (Saunders, *BJP* 108). She poorly replaces the Angel in the House so revered in *Beautiful Joe*. There are only three other significant females mentioned in *Paradise*: Bella, the bossy and unpleasant Morris parrot from *Beautiful Joe*; Jess, Joe’s weak mother; and the Widow—a female version of smelly Jenkins, naively idolized by her (male) goat until exposed as a horror. *Paradise* seems to remove women from the position of humane educator to a contemptuous irrelevancy. In Waterston’s opinion, Saunders’ move is “anti-feminist” (154).⁴⁸ Since she analyzes *Beautiful Joe* as a text representative of *English* attitudes, Cosslett uses the 1901 London edition. The image is the same, but the caption reads, “Lift up your voice for the dumb.”

Figure 9.



*"Open thy mouth for the dumb."
Marshall Saunders.*

"Open thy mouth for the dumb." Margaret Marshall Saunders, leading a terrier into a begging position. Photograph of frontispiece of 1894 edition of *Beautiful Joe* (Philadelphia: Charles H. Bane).

characters marked as kind and humane; to those that are marked as inhumane, he “opens his mouth”—to bite and tear.

According to Roxanne Harde, one of the few scholars to engage in depth with *Beautiful Joe*, Saunders “figure[s] children and animals in mutual and richly rewarding relationships. The relationships into which she brought them are her most profound arguments for animal rights because, in those close circles of mutual responsibility, there seems some equality of subject position” (105). Yet Harde quickly backpedals, pronouncing that Saunders “is unable, finally, to see the non-human animal as an equal subject” (105). The sticking point here, for Harde, is that Saunders views non-human animals “as the servants of humans. Joe emphasizes the pleasure of keeping such servants [gratitude].... In addition, Saunders conflates this ‘natural’ servitude with affection” (99).

As discussed in the previous chapter, Yi-Fu Tuan made the cutting argument that our relationship with pets are based on the couching of dominance with affection. This is a powerfully simple point. His more subtle point is that the modern pet is the *product* of dominance couched in affection. Joe’s agency cannot, I suggest, be unearthed as evidence of some equality of “subject position” (in Harde’s words, 105). His agency serves to reflect the pleasurable aspects of humane work for men in that it makes him worthy of being tamed in a non-sentimental relation. This is especially important since so much potentially hinges on the graphic depiction of Jenkins’ abuse, the effeminizing subject position of victimhood. Tellingly, it is after Joe earns himself the gift of a collar with his name on it, the quintessential marker of human ownership and dominance, that he can regard himself with self-respect, as if even to Joe his own worth hinges on the degree to which humans possess him. “Up to this time I had been a little ashamed of my cropped ears and docked tail,” Joe says, “but now that I had a fine new collar I could hold up my head with any dog” (Saunders, *BJ* 45). In effect, all his value is

externally determined by humans.⁴⁹ Human dominance *makes* the dog worthy. In fact, in the words of Mr. Wood, “[h]orse, or man, or dog aren’t much good till they learn to obey” (Saunders, *BJ* 134-5), and inversely, a failure to obey evidences an absence of “good” or worth.

Mr. Wood, the children’s uncle who is described as kind to all animals, reminds us that the worth of any pet is precisely the *product* of domination, as its worth is measured in its performance of obedience and faithful gratitude. Mr. Wood’s “favorite” horse (Saunders, *BJ* 134), Scamp, a “small, jet-black mare, with a lean head, slender legs, and a curious, restless manner” (Saunders, *BJ* 134), is “petted... a great deal” (Saunders, *BJ* 134) in spite of being, according to Joe, “a wicked-looking little thing” (Saunders, *BJ* 134). In fact, Scamp has been singled out as a “pet” rather than a work horse, being “the most interesting one we’ve got; that is, after Fleetfoot” (Saunders, *BJ* 202).⁵⁰ Scamp’s ability to excite interest comes precisely from her intractability: “Father bought her from a man who couldn’t manage her, and she came to us with a legion of bad tricks. Father has taken solid comfort, though, in breaking her of them. She is his pet among our stock” (Saunders, *BJ* 202). Not only has Mr. Wood derived “solid comfort” from “breaking” and producing her into his “pet,” but also it seems to be particularly significant that she comes second-hand from a man who has failed to “manage” her. Like with Joe, only a good owner can confer worth in an animal. Mr. Wood’s pride is patent: “‘Saucebox,’ he exclaimed, when she pretended to bite him, ‘you know if you bite me, I’ll bite back again. I think I’ve conquered you,’ he said proudly, as he stroked her glossy neck, ‘but what a dance you led me’” (Saunders, *BJ* 134).

The “dance,” of course, was part of his fun only insofar as he came out the master. The pride that he expresses is of having “conquered” this female horse that needed to be taught not to bite the male master’s hand. In the master-dog relationship that is deemed good, according to

⁴⁹ For more on torture and its connection with shame, see David Shapiro’s “The Tortured, Not the Torturers, Are Ashamed,” in *Social Research* 70.4 (Winter 2003): 1131-48.

⁵⁰ Fleetfoot is Harry’s pet horse, and it is Harry who is speaking.

Tuan, “[i]t is even desirable that a pet not be endowed with too much vigor and initiative. The pet, if it is to find acceptance in a well-run household, must learn to be immobile—to be as unobtrusive as a piece of furniture” (107). Most importantly, “[t]he dog,” or any pet, “must not be in doubt as to who is the master and as to the consequences of disobedience” (Tuan 108), as Mr. Wood here finds pleasure in playfully reminding his favorite.

Mr. Wood’s stroke of Scamp’s glossy neck reflects the type of dominance that Tuan argues pervades human/pet relationships, even those that appear suffused with affection. According to Tuan, “a relationship of dominance—of superior to inferior—is not in doubt so long as the owners feel free to bend down to pat their dog or cat on the head or run their hand down its coat. These are gestures of affection. They are bestowed by the superior on the inferior and can never be used between equals” (171).⁵¹ Perhaps he goes too far in almost suggesting that any affectionate caress is evidence of power, but Tuan does direct our attention to the sense of license the master takes in his caress. What appears (and in many sense is) a gesture of affection is also an expression of dominance in this case. For the boy, the affection is only made possible (made safe) by its linkage to dominance. The caress is an expression of the degree of security that the master needs to feel to affectively attach himself to the pet and the ontological reassurance derived from the safe relationship with an abject creature. In this we also see that

⁵¹ The gendering of this horse as an unruly female is inescapable—especially when he refers to her as “Saucebox” (Saunders, *BJ* 134)—and in this stroke, there are problematic sexual overtones that tie his domination to the idea of sexual conquest of a hard-to-get female. In her study of Englishwomen’s activism in animal protectionism, Coral Lansbury finds strong connections between pornographic depictions of “breaking” unruly women and representations of horse-breaking. “The image of woman as horse becomes one of the most powerful icons in literature,” Lansbury says, and “the language used to describe the breaking in of the horse is the special terminology of pornography” (Lansbury 108, 99). The forced bit in a horse’s mouth that represents a human penis, and the birch whips, bondage straps, and knives, make both women and horses into victims in what Lansbury terms “coitus atrox”—sadistic and violent depictions of rape of female horses (in horse-breaking manuals) or humans (in pornography) in submission to her male master. Moreover, much like *Black Beauty* has been read as a slave figure by critics such as Moira Ferguson (28), so can Scamp, “wicked-looking” and “jet-black” (Saunders, *BJ* 134), reference a female slave.

what I am calling the bourgeois “humane” model of power wherein the master exercises his elite position in webs of “affectionate” attachments rather than “cruel.”

A “good” animal *must* accept the master’s caresses—and do so with evident pleasure—or be deemed “bad.” Also, the petter is in charge, and has the power to provide (caresses or food⁵²), which the recipient cannot contravene. As per Mills’ 1891 book on city dog-keeping,

[e]very dog, at as early an age as he can comprehend what is required of him, should be taught certain things, such as to come when he is called, leave the house when told, and in general show an obedient spirit. He must recognize that not his will but that of his master is supreme. In this there must be no severity, for the dog should obey with pleasure or the training has been a failure. (29)

A good pet should be at his master’s beck and call—included and excluded at the master’s whim—and possess “an obedient spirit” (Mills 29). While having his own “will,” he must choose, “with pleasure,” to let his master’s will be “supreme” (Mills 29), in a “humane” relationship where “severity” is carefully excised.

The pleasurable process of a successful horse-breaking itself, a “dance” in which Scamp initially “led,” ends with Mr. Wood “bit[ing] back again” (Saunders, *BJ* 134) in swift reprisal from misbehavior (Saunders, *BJ* 135). He teasingly menaces her with the following warning: “I’ve thrown you down, and I’ll do it again if you bite me, so take care” (Saunders, *BJ* 135). These warnings are redundant since he also notes that Scamp has “minded” him since that first lesson (Saunders, *BJ* 135), but the repetition seems required to emphasize that Mr. Wood has earned Scamp’s obedience. The pet’s degree of obedience, as Ericka Fudge observes in *Pets* (2008), is a barometer for the master’s power: “In the realm that is the human household, the well-trained pet plays the role of the obedient and adoring subject and the owner is monarch of all he or she

⁵² This extends to feeding: the “bad dog” is finicky about food that the “good” owner provides, while the “good” dog devours with pleasure.

surveys (and the poorly trained pet, of course, reveals the limits of some people's hold on such power)" (22). Thus, in his obedience to the Morrises, Joe reflects their rightful mastery, while in his refusal to submit to the cruel Jenkins, he signals Jenkins' failures as a master of his neglected, disorderly household.

The very nature of the humane master-dog relation, paradoxically defined by both mastery and love, allows for the pleasures of dominion over beings represented less able to help or defend themselves. *Beautiful Joe*, in fact, shows that not only is dominance attached to affection, but also that it is the opportunity for dominance that makes humaneness palatable, particularly for the boys targeted by the text. *Beautiful Joe* seems to say, "do not dominate your animals *that way*; rather, *this way*"; this new form of dominion, called humaneness, may be more pleasurable than using brute force, not only because it leads to feelings of righteous superiority, but also because the more challenging animals may be more effectively conquered— hearts and minds won—by affectionate dominion rather than "cruel" battery.⁵³

In an 1896 children's reader, *Pets and Companions: A Second Reader*, by Jenny H. Stickney, six- and seven-year-old children are depicted as emotionally graduating, in a sense, from their inanimate toys, to the thrill of "live playthings" (1). Ned insists on replacing his toy soldiers because

While the play goes on we think, talk, eat, and act for our pretended living beings. So they think and do exactly as we wish, even when we pretend to have trouble making them obey. Living things are different—how? Do Ned's chickens always think and do as he expects?.... Things that are alive have minds and ways of their own. This was why Ned wanted them. Making them do as he wished would be new pleasure. (Stickney 11)

⁵³ This theme, and others, is further discussed in Chapter 4.

The enjoyment of keeping *live* animals, so that animals do what Ned wishes, is founded on the fact that animals have “minds and ways of their own” (Stickney 11). They may not “always think and do as he expects,” but the implication is that this free will will be painstakingly trained towards total obedience, and that this taming process would be the “new pleasure” (Stickney 11).

In other words, foreshadowing my discussion of Jack London in Chapter 4, humaneness also becomes a site of power in creating opportunities for affective dominion based on love. The capacity of a pet to refuse, to be discriminate about whom it grants its obedient devotion to, is valued for what pleasures it might give to the most effective tamer. Humaneness, here, is an improved method of domination, and the agency (the potential rebelliousness of any live being) is a challenge that becomes pleasurable to overcome. The importance of depicting Joe’s interiority, then, particularly an interiority capable of making rational choices and acting on its own free will, is not for Joe’s sake, but for the sake of making Joe interesting enough to be commanded (and loved).

Ultimately, the pleasure of humaneness may derive from feeling that one has not only “earned” the submission of the hard to get creature, but also its love. According to Joe, the intractable Scamp, for her part, concedes that although she acts rebelliously, no does indeed mean yes: “I think she loved him, for when he left her she whinnied shrilly, and he had to go back and stroke and caress her” (Saunders, *BJ* 135). Clearly, the pet’s obedience is more enjoyable if it comes willingly and pleurably, coated with affection. In this empire of love, it is obedience that is sought, albeit “humanely.” Pleasure in domination and pleasure in being dominated: these are the humane affects of pet-keeping in Saunders’ novels.

In turn, animals are represented as desiring the dominion of humans above all else. This, of course, is yet another fantastic restatement of the discursive thread that establishes the dog as an unconditional, and very safe, love object. According to Olive Thorne Miller, author of the 1894 *Our Home Pets*, “[l]ong years of dependence have attached him [the dog] to our race, and

made him almost incapable of doing without us” (142). In fact, in *Paradise*, dogs are considered inseparable from humans to the extent that when they die and move on to another world, a sort of purgatory where not-really-dead animals wait for their masters. Dandy, the dog that in *Beautiful Joe* offends Joe’s values by repeatedly running away from his master, repents under the influence of the “good” animals in purgatory (Saunders, *BJP* 109). “I want a master,” he avows regretfully: “I wouldn’t stick to one on earth, but I’d even stop tramping if I could have one here” (Saunders, *BJP* 109). At night, in particular, the animals pine for their humans and use Sam as an affective surrogate; “[a]bout ten thousand” animals, “not counting birds, slept within sight of [Sam’s] roof last night” (Saunders, *BJP* 184) just to be close to a human. In fact, all of the purgatory animals “lon[g]” for human beings (Saunders, *BJP* 179), and being the only one about, Sam becomes “the real President of the Island” (Saunders, *BJP* 82). “Human beings will always command where animals are concerned,” says Beautiful Joe, “and I am well pleased to have it so, dear boy” (Saunders, *BJP* 82).

The epitome of humane, “manly” dominion, Harry remarks to his own devoted horse, who Joe has “never once seen him refuse to do as his master told him” (Saunders, *BJ* 200): “We’ve been comrades, haven’t we, Fleetfoot? I’ve been almost ashamed of his devotion” (Saunders, *BJ* 198). This telling remark at once suggests the shame inherent in acknowledging his total dominion over his pet, which can be assuaged by reconfiguring their relation as a “comradeship.” Perhaps this shame in mastery is why the relationship between a man and his dog is so often recoded as a best-friendship. In *Paradise*, Sam describes his relationship with his dog Ragtime as a kind of symbiotic partnership: “We’d go up Pine Street, and down California Street, and along Bush Street, and there wasn’t a dog or a boy that dared to look cross-eyed at us when we were together” (Saunders, *BJP* 19). However aggrieved Sam is at Ragtime’s death, it is clear that when he imagines that if Ragtime “were alive and in another world, he was looking for” him (Saunders, *BJP* 18), he is indulging in the idea of the dog’s comforting and eternal love:

“I would have bet my life on that. Not all the angel dogs in creation would make up to Ragtime for one minute with me. Why, that dog hardly ever took his eyes off my face. He was more brother than dog” (Saunders, *BJP* 19). Yet the very terms of Sam’s description contradict; the relationship of a “brother,” which connotes some level of peership, does not accord with the worshipful behavior that Sam describes. Like Harry, Sam appears to conflate terms of equality with terms of inequality, reflecting the fusion of dominance and affection that Tuan describes in the human-companion animal relationship.⁵⁴

Conclusion

The trouble taken to attach affection to this new humane mastery reflects the period’s anxieties with the long-held belief in human dominion of our newfound animal relatives. With the many changes rocking the *fin-de-siècle*, including the long-reaching effects of Darwin’s theories of evolution, Americans increasingly needed to achieve what Adrian Franklin calls “ontological security” (quoted in Fudge 17) and found reestablishment of clear, fixed hierarchical boundaries between human and animal even more important in creating a stable sense of self, “the fantasy figure called the human who stands alone: dominant, controlled and powerful” (Fudge 15). And yet this need to dominate animals was incompatible with the new ethos of humaneness. Discourses of companion animals’ utter dependence and unconditional devotion, and the premises of humane pet-keeping themselves, served to quiet the guilt associated with maintaining hierarchical supremacy over pets.

Does Joe dictate? If so, to whom?⁵⁵ The text is silent as to how Joe communicates to his amanuensis and even as to the species of the “friend” who actually writes the text allegedly

⁵⁴ According to an 1983 study, while dog owners reported feeling more intimately attached (behaviorally and physically) to their dogs than cat owners, on the whole, did, a greater percentage (71%) of dog owners “regarded themselves as dominant” than cat owners (57%) (Hart 163).

⁵⁵ I will not discuss in-depth issues of epistemology or the question of representing animal realism as raised in *Beautiful Joe* or *Paradise*. Cosslett and others have ably discussed the textual strategy of animal “autobiography” to inspire human identification with animals. Cosslett convincingly argues that animal consciousness in autobiographies of the nineteenth century were largely “built up through analogies with

verbatim. Although we are told that “[a]nimals can tell each other things without saying a word” (Saunders, *BJ* 198), there is no single instance of Joe “speaking” in human speech, even if we believe that he can understand every human word and much interspecies subtlety. He notes at one point: “I was very much pleased with this talk between Mrs. Wood and Miss Laura, and kept close to them, so that I should not miss a word” (Saunders, *BJ* 145). In *Paradise*, we find that all animals gain human speech, and that they have “always partly understood” (Saunders, *BJP* 39) humans.

“I wish the Lord would give the horses voices for just one week,” Mr. Wood remarks: “I tell you they’d scare some of us” (Saunders, *BJ* 134). There seems to be a double meaning to this fear. While “[s]ometimes ... wish[ing] very much that [he] had the gift of speech” (Saunders, *BJ* 166), Joe quickly retracts this as overreaching beyond the limits of his species: “[A]t other times I see how little it would profit me, and how many foolish things I should often say” (Saunders, *BJ* 166). Why does he undercut his act of speech? The act of potentially transgressive interspecies address is itself tamed; much of what he says, we should surmise, is “foolish.” Perhaps it is because he suspects that “human beings would not love animals so well, if they could speak” (Saunders, *BJ* 166). In fact, it would be naïve to assume that the mastery of human language would secure superior regard, for as Salt says in 1894, this is patently untrue in the case of many “dumb” animals, like fish, of whom even during this boom period of literary animal heroes, few stories were written, few appeals to mercy were made: “Let those who think that men are likely to treat animals with more humanity on account of their dumbness ponder the

human types” such as children, women, slaves, and servants (65). In *Beautiful Joe*, animal minds are represented as not very different from human minds, as “[t]he project of creating identification between the human reader and the animal protagonist means that the differences between animal and human consciousness are not much explored” (Cosslett 70). Some might argue that this is a conflation of human and animal minds, presuming not only significant differences, but perhaps also assuming a certain (shall we say, childlike) simplicity to animal minds. Animal minds will likely remain unknowable, however, and what seems more interesting to literary scholars is questioning the motivations and operations of narrativizing animal minds—why are we interested in making the subaltern dog speak? What and how are we making it say?

case of the fish” (14). In the act of depicting Joe’s interiority—“giving him voice”—works like Saunders’ undoubtedly promoted animal “rights,” even if these interiorities were rather self-servingly human-centric.

What the preceding shows is that the nineteenth-century gendering of humaneness codes certain functions for women and men to allow men to participate in certain caring, nurturing behavior while not compromising virile, physically powerful masculinity. Laura, as the tender-hearted and sensitive moral bastion, is inspired to perform her woman’s work by depictions of animal cruelty, while Harry and Sam are inspired to masculine-yet-manly work by the aesthetic of ugly beauty. In *Beautiful Joe*, for females, the self-making task at hand is to reduce sentimental response in order to withstand the strain of regarding animal suffering. For males, presumed thoughtlessly cruel by nature, self-discipline requires affective awakening and exercise—a “heart education” through the physical and protective labor of pet-keeping. Boys were to recognize their constitutive lack for this abject animal, and pursue attachment to dogs to fill this need.

The dog that ostensibly narrates and appears to be empowered by such interiority and evidence of agency is ultimately a tool for the moral improvement of humans, rather than treated as an end in itself. In the words of Salt, representative of the nineteenth-century humane ethos, “it is not only, *and not primarily*, for the sake of the victims that we plead, but for the sake of mankind itself. Our true civilisation [sic], our race-progress, our humanity (in the best sense of the term) are concerned in this development; it is ourselves, our own vital instincts, that we wrong, when we trample on the rights of the fellow beings (88, emphasis added). The harm to the abused dog, ultimately, is important as harm to one’s self.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Ultimately, the affectively attuned male produced by Saunders’ novels is the focus of the work, not the animal’s capacity to suffer in itself. This use of depictions of animal cruelty to develop affectively healthier, humane humans devalues the suffering of animal beings in centering focus on human moral development. Spinning an exculpatory ending to all animal abuse at the hands of humans, *Paradise* physically reconstitutes every disabled and mutilated animal: “Could you see the condition of some

Significantly, the same kindly and humane Mr. Wood is uniquely positioned as the only human marked as “humane” in *Beautiful Joe* to consciously kill an animal, apparently to exemplify the “humane” way of killing unwanted animals during a time where this kind of work was privately, rather than professionally, done. And yet the recipient of his supposedly merciful bullet to the head is not an ailing or aged animal; rather, he shoots a perfectly healthy, but indomitable, dog. Simply put, “Joe is a good dog, and not like Bruno” (Saunders, *BJ* 129). Bruno’s crime is that he does not get along easily with other creatures, and thus needs to be “disposed of” (Saunders, *BJ* 136). If the basis for “kindness” towards a dog hinged so much on how much a dog would feel for his master, then any dog who fails to show they “love,” “like,” or “respect” their human might not deserve “kindness.” In effect, a dog that cannot produce positive affect—cannot be loved—is inveterably useless, and therefore disposable. Though Mr. Wood takes no pleasure in the deed, it remains that “bad” dogs may be neatly dispatched, and the idea of disposal invites comparison between his act of killing and Jenkins’ brutal dog murders. The killing of the “bad” dog is reduced to “disposal,” “putting out of the way,” and “an end”; Mr. Wood simply has “no use for a bad dog” (Saunders, *BJ* 126). Bruno is vilified all the way up to the moment of his death, described as “snapping and snarling as he went along, and biting at his chain, and when he saw me [Joe] he acted as if he could have torn me to pieces. He seemed full of anger and wickedness” (Saunders, *BJ* 136).⁵⁷ Represented as wicked, even a threat to the narrator himself, little sympathy could remain for Bruno. They are “sorry” to do it, but the

creatures who leave earth, you would realise [sic] how impossible it would be for us to remain happy while contemplating them. No, soon after they enter the healing atmosphere of this World of Islands they are made whole” (Saunders, *BJP* 44). This paradise, designed to “mak[e] up for the suffering on earth” (Saunders, *BJP* 91), re-presents violence towards animals as a human crime that can yet be redeemed; just as Joe’s psyche was healed, his very body is “made whole” again in *Paradise*.

⁵⁷ In the 1922, post-World War I revision, the paragraph that describes Bruno and his fate is almost completely omitted. Only the last line of the paragraph remains, although significantly revised. In 1894, it reads “I felt very sorry for him, and ran away so that I could not hear the sound of the gun” (Saunders, *BJ* 136), and in 1922 it reads “I ran away because I could not help feeling sorry for Bruno” (Saunders, *BJ* [1922] 165). As with the other instance of potentially graphic animal abuse, even this suggestion of a gunshot is omitted in the 1922 edition. The methods of “disposal” are obscured, while the killing remains.

killing seems to happen as if by inexorable necessity and in spite of their very humane feelings. Humane dominion, then, forecloses neither the use of physical violence nor killing of animals, but only doing these acts with rage, anger, and passion or against a “good” dog. Shooting a dog between the eyes can be performed “humanely,” methodically, and by being very “sorry.” In the next chapter, I turn to an analysis of *Dracula* as a text that teaches the management of “bad” dogs (and bad wives) through lessons of suspicion, surveillance, and—when necessary—disposal.

SECTION II.

DANGEROUS DOGS

CHAPTER 3

“You can’t trust wolves no more nor women”:

Canines, Women, and Deceptive Docility in Bram Stoker’s *Dracula*

[T]hose dogs which are man’s most intimate and sure friends when in health...become unwittingly, under the influence of rabies, the most dangerous of enemies.
—George Fleming

Passing almost for a comic aside in Bram Stoker’s 1897 *Dracula*, the news clippings about the London Zoo wolf’s escape actually tell an important story about a very bad wolf that has tricked its masters into believing it is a very good dog. Although the zookeeper declares that “you can’t trust wolves no more nor women” (Stoker 126), he foolishly “receiv[es] and pe[ts Bersicker] like a sort of vulpine prodigal son” (Stoker 129), fawning over the “nice well-behaved wolf” (Stoker 126) with “most tender solicitude” (Stoker 129). The more skeptical reporter expresses surprise that “neither Bilder nor his wife thought any more of the wolf than I should of a dog” (Stoker 128)—a wolf that has spent his night of freedom terrorizing London and aiding Dracula in his attacks on Lucy Westenra.

Both beloved pet and dangerous threat, Bersicker embodies an argument against the mis-management of a deceptively docile household member. Returning to the quiet comforts of the domestic space, Bersicker appears “as peaceful and well-behaved as that father of all picture-wolves—Red Riding Hood’s quondam friend, whilst moving her confidence in masquerade” (Stoker 129), a masquerade of friendly docility. While many of his contemporaries embraced dog-keeping and humaneness towards animals, Stoker crafted a novel that represents dogs and wolves as agents of Dracula, particularly susceptible to his “rabid” control. In turn, the discourse of rabies and its management linked petted canines and petted women, and their supposed

innate susceptibility to “rabidity” represents both anxieties with intimacy and how intimacy threatens gender and species hierarchy. Much emphasis in *Dracula* studies has been about desires to eradicate whatever evil *Dracula* and vampirism can be said to represent, but understanding rabies management allows us to more fully reconstruct the perceived risk to the late-Victorian family that is suggested by *Dracula*: the question is not so much about the risks of lustful dalliances with prostitutes, but the risks of love, esteem, adoration—the affects that are supposed to inhere in marriage and in the idealized home space.¹ *Dracula*, in fact, functions as a handling manual for untrustworthy canines and women, illustrating the dangers posed by prized domesticates. This reading of *Dracula* explores beyond etymology and symptomology to investigate how *Dracula* not merely fomented, but also managed, these anxieties, effectively teaching the English how to *live with* the quotidian terror of domestic intimacy at the heart of their hearths.

Unlike the texts in Chapters 1 and 2, *Dracula* signal a reactionary rejection of humaneness and its bourgeois pet-keeping values: it is a fear-ridden response to the radical premises of the affective uses of dogs. *Dracula* is a pedagogical tool to teach, through the vehicle of terror, how much to love one’s wife (or pet dog, or other similarly positioned household dependent). The logic applied to dog-keeping resonated discursively with wife management, producing husbands comfortable with the paradox of feeling positive attachment, “love,” to that which needs to be destroyed, “euthanized,” at a moment’s notice.² In rabies discourse, we see the rehearsal of this paradox of adoration-dispensability—what I call *paranoid love*—that mediated

¹ Leila S. May’s discussion of anxieties over syphilis and prostitution is very convincing. As Elaine Showalter’s seminal work shows, however, it was usually husbands who transferred syphilis from prostitutes to their wives (94), and while this may fit Jonathan’s sexually-charged episode with the vampire “sisters” in *Dracula*’s castle, it does not as aptly describe the “infection” of fiancées and wives like Lucy and Mina. There are not strong historical grounds to assume that many husbands were anxious about either giving their wives syphilis, contracting syphilis from their wives, or losing their virtuous wives to sordid prostitution.

² Of course, women kept dogs as pets too, as I discuss later, but I will focus more on the masculinities that were produced by the linking of femininity with discourses about canines and rabies.

English men's relationships with their wives as well as interspecies relationships. In "becoming with," in Donna Haraway's words, humans and their chosen canine companions have been in a mutually constructive relationship that, as I will show, has been defined by love and terror.

Rabid Dogs, Rabid Women

We are hardly pressed for choice when it comes to locating a real-life referent for Dracula's disease: readers have read it as cholera (McNally and Florescu 137), syphilis (Leila S. May), degeneration (Kathleen Spencer and Daniel Pick), onanism (Robert Mighall, Diane Mason, and Jason Sellers), and most lately, tuberculosis (Katherine Byrne).³ While many of these choices seem well-grounded, the consensus within the medical field is, according to Juan Gomèz-Alonso and Jean Theodorides, that rabies was the most likely origin for the myths of vampirism. According to encyclopedias of the period, the vampire was well-known to appear in the form of a dog, among other forms ("vampire" entries in *Chambers's* and *New International*), and the vampire bat was known as the "flying dog," a translation of the Spanish term, *perrovolador* ("Vampire Bat"). Not only is rabies the best fit for Dracula's bizarre symptomology—bloodlust, hatred of mirrors, hallucinations, periods of languidness alternating with aggression, and hypersexuality—but also *Dracula* is replete with canines, who were one of the key transmitters of rabies to humans in the nineteenth century, particularly from the viewpoint of most urbanizing English, whose main point of contact with animals were increasingly dogs and other such "civilized creatures," in Jennifer Mason's term.⁴

³ In "The Invisible Giant,' *Dracula*, and Disease" (2007), Martin Willis identifies some of these readings as "critically reductive" in their treatment of disease as a "transparent signifier of something else" (302), but his own gesture towards "historically rigorous analysis" seems limited to exploring contesting theories of disease transmission (germ, contagion, or miasmatic), and the historicism, while interesting, seems estranged from his actual reading of the text. Ultimately, it does not alter my view of Lucy or Jonathan much whether Stoker misattributed vampirism to "specks" rather than "germs."

⁴ Between 1894-1897, 1,490 dogs were recorded as infected with rabies in England, as compared to only 103 other animals (Irish Central Veterinary Association 167).

While readings of *Dracula* that focus on blood (transfers and transfusions) make much sense given the period's patent obsession with blood, race, and purity, the figure of the rabid canine also allows us to consider: Why the bite? Why the neck? We now know that rabies is a virus that uses nerve cells' "own internal mechanisms to reproduce" (Finley 5) and, "at the height of infection in the brain," spreads specifically "to highly innervated areas of the body such as the cornea, the skin (particularly at the head and neck), and the salivary glands. With insidious timing, the virus multiplies in the saliva glands in concert with the changes in the brain that cause the aggressions and biting behavior" (Finley 5). The similarities between rabid infection and vampiric infection are obvious. To Victorians, a disease that elicits seizures and nausea, mental derangement (fever, headache, malaise, confusion, hallucinations, aggressiveness), and a loss of sexual control (priapism, spontaneous ejaculation, nymphomania) (Kete, "La Rage" 89, 93), followed most certainly by death, must have been very frightening indeed.

Although a fairly successful vaccine was developed in 1885 by Louis Pasteur, Victorian apprehension regarding rabies⁵ was not significantly mitigated until its eradication from the British Isles in 1902. In 1877, seventy-nine human deaths from rabies were recorded—the highest number in the British Isles in any single year in the century (Pemberton and Worboys 91). Between 1887-8, deaths decreased, but rose again in 1889, with over half of new rabies cases in London and surrounding counties (Pemberton and Worboys 141). The aggressive, animalistic manifestations of some rabies sufferers, the disease's mysterious pathology, and the near-certainty of death for the infected, tied to the fact that rabies could be transmitted from beloved pet to human, all contributed to a great apprehension of the relatively rare disease. While an expert reassured in 1890 that "[t]he chances of being murdered are more than ten

⁵ In the nineteenth century "rabies" was inconsistently used to refer to non-human animal victims while "hydrophobia" was considered the strain that affected humans. By the time *Dracula* was written, people disagreed as to whether the fear of water was a legitimate sign of the disease. To avoid confusion, I use "rabies" in accordance with contemporary use.

times as great as those of dying from hydrophobia” (Shadwell 231), public panic fomented periodically by the cries of “mad dog” and frightening newspaper headlines inspired not only impromptu dog massacres,⁶ but also Parliamentary investigations in 1830, twice in 1887 (two years post-Pasteur), and as late as 1897 (Ritvo 168), the year of *Dracula*’s publication. Every layperson, it seemed, had some homemade—in the context of *Dracula*, we might say superstitious—cure for the elusive disease (Ritvo 168).

Canines in *Dracula* do not often take center stage, but they subtly suffuse the journals, letters, news stories, memorandums, transcripts, and telegrams that constitute this multi-voice narrative. Dogs and wolves are recurrently raised to punctuate Dracula’s threatening acts. Dog barking repeatedly precedes menacing appearances by wolves (Stoker 18), which act as extensions of Dracula’s body—retreating (Stoker 20) or consuming a troublesome woman (Stoker 49). Bersicker, the escaped zoo wolf, is directed by Dracula to break, enter, and menace Lucy Westenra’s home, causing Mrs. Westenra’s death (Stoker 131). Dracula’s first touch on Jonathan incites wolf howling (Stoker 24). “[A] ring of wolves with white teeth and lolling red tongues” bars Jonathan Harker’s escape from Dracula’s castle, a “living ring of terror” (Stoker 20) marked by the same red-upon-white color scheme that John Allen Stevenson has identified as being the essence of the vampiric “race” (141). And not only does Dracula appear as a dog (Stoker 78), but according to the self-proclaimed authority on the subject, Abraham Van Helsing, “MD, D.Ph., D. Lit., Etc., Etc.” (Stoker 106), Dracula can also turn into a wolf (Stoker 211), suggesting that Dracula is a dog and a wolf interchangeably, and that the presence of either a dog or a wolf may signal that danger is near.

⁶ George Fleming notes that in a single month, June 1864, about 1,000 dogs were destroyed in Liverpool alone, 700 of these by the police, and 300 by civilians (*Rabies* 52). Meanwhile, that whole year, the number of recorded rabies deaths in humans in England was twelve, in Ireland seven, and in Scotland zero (*Rabies* 52). Another contemporary records that in November of 1876, police killed approximately 1,200 dogs in Glasgow on suspicion of some rabies cases (Lindsay 363). Such murderous, paranoid overreaction was also not uncommon in the U.S. during the “dog days” of summer. An 1869 *New York Times* article records the slaughter of 5,733 dogs in the summer of 1868, and only one to three dogs were later found to be “mad”; in 1869 the massacres were tempered to 938 (“Lecture on Cruelty to Animals”).

Mirroring his use of Bersicker to gain entry into the Westenra household, Dracula immigrates to England disguised as an “immense dog” (Stoker 78), and in this innocent guise, he elicits sympathy from the Whitby townsfolk. According to a news article that Mina includes in the narrative, “more than a few of the members of the SPCA, which is very strong in Whitby, have tried to befriend the animal” (Stoker 80), much like the Bilders make a pet of Bersicker. Given that readers already suspect this dog to be Dracula in disguise, they must have shuddered at the foolish naïveté of the animal protectionists, suggesting that Stoker’s attitude⁷ was that the “sentimentalizing” of dogs as devoted and faithful, as so many English were doing, was at best, foolish, at worst, dangerous. The reporter notes that Whitby is in “mourning” for the lost dog, and “with public opinion in its present state, he would, I believe, be adopted by the town” (Stoker 84). Echoing the Bilders’ mistaken trust in Bersicker, not only do the unprepared English fail to recognize Dracula as a threat, but in appearing as a great big dog, an object of domestic love and protection, Dracula also secures a warm invitation⁸ to the feast. The grounds for the paranoia is that dogs invite trust, but move in masquerade that conceal their potential for “rabid” (were)wolfishness.

Suggesting the discursive link between wolfish aggression and vampiric women, the later-published prequel to *Dracula*, “Dracula’s Guest” (1914), contains a terrorizing climax where Jonathan is besieged by a wolf in an episode that suggestively mirrors the attack by the three vampire “sisters” in *Dracula*. In this most-quoted segment of *Dracula*, Jonathan is immobilized under their spell, “looking out under [his] eyelashes” at “[t]he fair girl [who] advanced and ben[ds] over [him] till [he] could feel the movement of her breath upon [him].

⁷ There are few pet dogs and no explicit mention of rabies—nor of any other “real” disease—in *Dracula*, and little to no evidence of Stoker’s personal views about dogs. Stoker does mention that the employer that he so admired, Henry Irving, thought quite highly of dogs (*Personal Reminiscences* 198). But Stoker’s personal views of canines are not terribly relevant. To borrow Stephen Arata’s point in a review of Joseph Valente’s 2002 work, “I would argue that those insights are available to be discovered whether or not Stoker tried to put them there” (538).

⁸ Much rests on this initial “invitation.” As Van Helsing notes, Dracula needs an invitation to enter any “home,” but after such an invitation is granted, “he can come and go as he please” (Stoker 211).

Sweet it was in one sense, honey-sweet...but with a bitter underlying the sweet, a bitter offensiveness, as one smells in blood” (Stoker 42). The fair vampire’s “deliberate voluptuousness” fills Jonathan with ambivalent reactions “as she arche[s] her back [and] actually lick[s] her lips like an animal,” with “scarlet lips” and a “red tongue...lap[ping] the white sharp teeth” (Stoker 42). In “Dracula’s Guest,” the foolhardy Jonathan wanders alone into the reputedly dangerous Munich forest on the most dangerous of nights, Walpurgis Night, and experiences a successive vision of dogs and wolves, followed by “a beautiful woman,” suggesting the link between the three (Stoker 355-6). In strikingly similar detail of action and affect to the scene in *Dracula*, “[a] wolf—and yet not a wolf!” (Stoker 358) menacingly approaches Jonathan as he lies on the ground in “semi-lethargy” (Stoker 357). Filled with “a sort of loathing” (Stoker 357) but entirely unresisting, Jonathan reports: “Some great animal was lying on me and now licking my throat.... Through my eye-lashes I saw above me the two great flaming eyes of a gigantic wolf. Its sharp white teeth gleamed in the gaping red mouth, and I could feel its hot breath fierce and acrid upon me” (Stoker 357). Read together, vampiric women and wolves are clearly resonant.

While vampirism in *Dracula* reflects the Victorian understanding and experience with rabies, both in the manner of transmission and in symptomatic manifestations, *Dracula* seems to deviate from Victorian reality in one key area: virtually all authorities agreed that rabies affected human males significantly more than females, which “may be explained by the less risk [women] incur by reason of their dress and their mode of life” (Fleming 150). And yet, in *Dracula*, though the risk to the men is clearly indicated, only the women seem to succumb to rabies-like symptoms. What made women like Lucy and Mina allegedly more susceptible was the discursive linkage between a certain class of women and a certain class of pets, lapdogs, which shared the suspicions cast upon domesticity in a conversation that pitted “artificial civilization” against “nature”—a discursive war read off the bodies of women and dogs. Rabies

was particularly connected to women through the discourse of domesticity—ironically, that which kept them safer from rabies.

“Natural wildness” was presumed to foment rabidity, but excessive “civilizing” restraint was also dangerous.⁹ Just as the pets of the lower classes (featured in *Dracula* as Bersicker) were marked as unrestrained sources of danger, the *chiens de luxe* were also suspicious for the “idleness” that supposedly resulted from their domestic confinement. According to Fleming, dogs at “liberty” would “lead a vagabond life” (*Rabies* 105), but dogs without such liberty have more serious problems: the development of rabies “would seem to coincide...with the degree of domestication and over-refinement, or ‘Softness,’ of the dog; the regime to which it is usually submitted being directly opposed to the conditions which nature provides for the existence of carnivorous animals” (*Rabies* 120-1). The middle class positioned itself as uniquely capable of balancing between the domesticity made possible by wealth, and the “barbarism” ensuing from lack of wealth. While the Bilders’ management of Bersicker represents the lower classes’ failures to contain the danger of “rabidity,” on the other extreme, the “soft” lapdogs that fiancées and wives like Lucy and Mina represent are also marked as susceptible to “rabidity.” Domesticity, the cornerstone of the civilizing role of white bourgeois women, paradoxically stood both for and against “rabies,” resonating with the pervasive anxieties regarding the “repressive” affects of civilization—domesticity’s discontents.

As Gail Griffin astutely notes about the female sexual aggression that results from vampiric infection, *Dracula* “is a novel about wolflike women” (461), but it is in their guise as dog (a masquerade of docility) that they fail to raise due alarm for their underlying (were)wolfishness. The mark of “rabies” affixed on *chiens de luxe* was largely grounded in the

⁹ These ideas will be further explored in my discussion of London in Chapter 4.

connection of lapdogs with their owners, typically moneyed women.¹⁰ Both the lapdog and these “idle” women were discursively subject to similar virulence on similar (and similarly spurious) grounds. As many cultural historians have established, a long history of virulence against the lapdog already existed by the nineteenth-century.¹¹ As Jodi L. Wyatt establishes, a lapdog, “by definition, belongs to a lady” (282), and these upper-class women and their canine associates have shared critical, misogynist characterizations since at least the eighteenth-century (278).

While the hatred of lapdogs certainly had centuries of discourse behind it, by the end of the nineteenth century, this hatred took more venomous expression. During the early nineteenth century, as Laura Brown identifies, dogs “c[a]me to be seen as companions to solitary male characters—wanderers, hunters, shepherds, hikers, and poets especially” (77) for the romantics. Towards century’s end, as I illustrated in Chapter 2, dogs were appropriated as more rightfully and naturally the affective companions of males. I suggest that while the eighteenth century’s vilification of lapdogs was significant, the nineteenth century saw a radical re-investment in this discourse as part of a larger project to dissociate women from their suspicious intimacies with dogs, and instead attach boys and men exclusively to these valuable affective technologies. An 1844 satire in *The New Monthly Magazine* relishes in describing the lapdog as follows: “There is nothing so spiteful as the lap dog; in no animal creation are all the bad passions so completely developed or so shockingly conspicuous” (“Social Nuisances” 511).

¹⁰ As Precious McKenzie Stearns has noted about Lady Bertram’s lapdog, Pug, in Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park* (1814), some breeds of lapdogs were also associated with imperialism and foreignness, which would be a link to the excellent thread of scholarship of Arata and others who read *Dracula* as a foreign threat.

¹¹ On the longer history of the vilification of lapdogs, see Markman Ellis’ “Suffering Things: Lapdogs, Slaves, and Counter-Sensibility,” in *The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England*, ed. Mark Blackwell (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 2007), 92-116; Laura Brown’s “Immoderate Love: The Lady and the Lapdog,” in *Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010), 65-90; and Theresa Braunschneider, “The Lady and the Lapdog: Mixed Ethnicity in Constantinople, Fashionable Pets in Britain” in *Humans and Other Animals in Eighteenth-Century Britain: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics*, ed. Frank Palmeri (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006).

The same satire represents a weak-willed rich woman as easily manipulated by the conniving affections of a greedy pet: both the owner and the dog are deeply morally culpable.¹² The lady dog-lover's crime is, in essence, an excessive and unchecked affective attachment, a fear widely echoed and particularly ascribed to women who "carry their adoration to the extreme"; "a woman falls completely under the control of this canine craze" (Gaston 29). Although men's enthusiasm for dogs was also noted, it was most frequently women's affective transgressions that were vehemently denounced and derided.

Fleming expresses the same derision, albeit tempered, for this connection between the indolent woman and useless "toy" when he chastises both the lapdogs and their human "worshipper[s]"—assumed to be mostly ladies—for resisting sanitary police measures such as licensing, muzzling, and quarantines: "[T]hose people ... go into paroxysms of rage and threaten to turn out a Government which dares to ordain that their *pampered useless* dogs shall wear an easy fitting apparatus over the mouth" (Fleming, "Suppression of Rabies" 504; emphasis added). By the mid-1880s, widespread dog muzzling orders were implemented in England, and not without little controversy: opinion on muzzling seemed fairly divided, with some arguing that it caused rabies by overly restraining dogs, and others arguing that it alleviated rabies by controlling biting behavior (Walton 229-31). After increasingly broad muzzling orders, in 1897 England implemented Long's Order of universal muzzling, considered by many to be discriminatory for its exemptions of the dogs of rich men and for targeting women's companion dogs in particular.¹³ Ladies were therefore blamed both for inciting rabies by smothering pets with stifling affection, and for spreading rabies by refusing to stifle, via muzzle, their

¹² This also suggests an intense rivalry between men and women's canines—both economic, as in this case, and, as Wyatt also records, sexual (286). This also relates to the discussion of Jip, the Copperfields' spaniel, in Chapter 1.

¹³ Long's Order exempted the sporting dogs of the rich, like his own, instead targeting poor and working dogs on farms (Pemberton and Worboys 150). Long's Order also disproportionately affected women's pets, which feminists noticed. "The links between muzzling and patriarchy were often made explicit" in articles protesting the new rules (Pemberton and Worboys 152).

dangerously cherished pets. In this quotation, Fleming also freely uses the language of rabies, “rage,” to signal that these ladies are as dangerously “pampered” as their dogs. The *chiens de luxe* marked as most likely to develop rabies were, like the useless *femmes de luxe* to whom they were linked, read as unproductive, decorative bodies at best, and obstructions to hygiene, order, and the health and safety of the body politic at worst.

In the logic of rabies management, like the *chiens de luxe* marked as more likely to develop rabies, Lucy and Mina figure as pets that risk rabidity to the extent that their lovers “pamper” them: at their most beloved, they become the most vulnerable to “rabies” and thereby endanger the men. In the first section of the novel, both women are perched on the edge of, or just past the edge of, marriage; both are on track to become beloved mistresses of their respective homes, the refining, stifling domestic spaces of idleness that Fleming believed stoked irritable tempers and triggered spontaneous rabies. Both also occupy, consecutively, the position of prized domesticated to the band of vampire hunters, each securing this intense attachment with remarkable speed.

Lucy quickly receives marriage proposals from Dr. John Seward, Quincey Morris, and Arthur Holmwood—“Just fancy! THREE proposals in one day!” (Stoker 57)—just as she receives consecutive highly sexualized blood transfusions from them all within days, including fatherly Van Helsing’s, whose transfusion is also sexualized (Stoker 158). She is the universally adored, beloved pet of the band of men, and of course, engaged to Arthur: these conditions of pampered uselessness expose her to “rabid” infection. After Lucy’s death, Mina quickly becomes the new treasured domestic “pet” of the band of brothers in the course of a rapid-fire morning of September 30th. Having secured Jonathan’s hand in marriage and Van Helsing’s devoted respect, Mina also receives pledges of brotherly devotion from John, Arthur, and Quincey. With the “something in woman’s nature that makes a man free to break down before her and express his feelings on the tender or emotional side without feeling it derogatory to his manhood”

(Stoker 203), she elicits affective outpourings from each. John finds that although “[o]f late [he has] had cause for tears, God knows! but the relief of them was denied [him],” “now the sight of [Mina’s] sweet eyes, brightened with recent tears, [goes] straight to [his] heart” (Stoker 197). A few pages later, as soon as Arthur is alone with Mina, he “g[ives] way utterly and openly.... He gr[ows] quite hysterical, and raising his open hands, beat[s] his palms together in a perfect agony of grief” (Stoker 203). Immediately after Arthur has his turn, Quincey receives an “impulsive” kiss from Mina, which causes, even in the laconic American, sudden tears and “a momentary choking in his throat” (Stoker 204). In overwhelming gratitude, Quincey pledges his life to her, completing Mina’s ascendancy as the new “pet” of the band of men.¹⁴

As the object of the band of men’s intense attachment, Lucy and Mina each face a future as domestic creatures, sparking the possibility of idle uselessness. The underlying risk is that Lucy and Mina, like lapdogs, would exist only to be petted and loved in the private sphere, rendering them dangerously “useless.” Through the discourse surrounding the lapdog as a spoiled product of aristocratic decadence, then, we may mark a key distinction between the two women that allows Mina to live while Lucy must be killed—not once, but twice. The moneyed Lucy is not only cloyingly sweet, as Carol Senf has noted, but also incurably indolent, in stark contrast to Mina and her indefatigable middle-class industry (45).

The particular gendered evils of “idleness” also reflect the gendering of “work.” Clearly Lucy does *something* with her time, but her activity does not count as work. Lucy is dismissively referred to as wasting her pre-marriage days (those which would be her last) in “planning out her dresses and how her house is to be arranged” (Stoker 72). In contrast, Mina is often praised, by other characters and readers, for her “man’s brain” tempered by her “woman’s heart” (Stoker 207); she dedicates herself to “*working* very hard” (Stoker 55, emphasis added). Lucy seems

¹⁴ The sheer speed with which each Lucy and Mina successively secure the strong, affective attachment of almost all the men (each in the course of one morning) lends weight to a reading of the Crew of Light’s homosocial dynamics. It suggests the urgency of the unspoken imperative that all the men must share the woman, or none.

intent on spending money, while Mina focuses on building Jonathan's wealth. This difference between Lucy's aristocratic consumption and Mina's middle-class production is also mirrored by Lucy's affective *taking* and Mina's affective *giving*. In contrast to how Lucy takes, in a series of highly sexualized blood transfers, Mina's function of affectively recharging the men is portrayed as carefully chaste—a sympathizing look here, a charitable kiss there—and the only bodily fluid emitted are the men's tears. In contrast to the depletion of life force experienced by Lucy's blood donors, the tear-letting inspired by Mina visibly restores the men's energies. It is as if the men vampirically feed off of Mina's "infinite pity" (Stoker 203): John Seward notes that "[p]oor Art seem[s] more cheerful than he has been since Lucy first took ill, and Quincey is more like his own bright self than he has been for many a long day" (Stoker 207).

It is also precisely when Mina is dismissed from participating in the hunt for Dracula, circumscribed by the band of men in the sphere of the Victorian bourgeois feminine, that she is attacked by Dracula, suggesting the connection between excessive feminine uselessness and "rabidity." At this point, too, she and Jonathan have inherited the kindly Mr. Hawkins' wealth, elevating her from the "sometimes trying" position of assistant schoolmistress (Stoker 55) to "now, married to Jonathan, Jonathan a solicitor, a partner, rich, master of his business" (Stoker 154)—and, significantly, the shorthand skills that hitherto marked her as smart and industrious¹⁵ are now rusty from the "unexpected wealth" (Stoker 154). In this reading, the men's attempts to make her a "pet"—reduce her to Lucy-like idleness—result in her increased exposure to "rabid" infection, which in turn increases the risk of exposure to the men.¹⁶ Unlike Lucy, Mina beats the "rabidity," perhaps because she resists the total "feminine" indolence that Lucy embraces. To the extent that Lucy approximates the negative aspersions cast on lapdogs,

¹⁵ And, to many readers like Carol Senf and Stephanie Demetrakopolous, a New Woman.

¹⁶ If to be a New Woman is to be "rabid" (if Lucy and Mina are not read as New Women before Dracula's attacks), then a possible reading is that a woman who is restricted to stereotypical feminine spheres, disallowed use of the "male" parts of her brain, may reject domesticity for radical, "dangerous" alternatives.

the fatality of her “rabid” infection makes sense, as does the fact that Mina gets “infected” when she approaches Lucy-like uselessness but then manages to survive through the return to middle-class values.

Other “useless” women in Lucy’s pre-marriage home, moreover, contribute to her downfall when, acting in “feminine” ways, they carelessly expose her to more “rabidity,” further cementing Dracula’s connection between “useless” femininity and danger. Constitutionally weak, Mrs. Westenra is not only as ineffective as Lucy, but she aids Dracula’s attack on her daughter when she removes the protective swathes of garlic placed by the men (Stoker 131). Soon after, a maid compounds this foolishness when, out of “feminine” covetousness for jewelry, she removes the protective crucifix from Lucy, ensuring that Lucy will turn into a vampire. Even Van Helsing, the undisputed authority on Dracula, does not think to restrict access to Lucy because he is fooled by the apparently innocent behavior of the maid, whom he assumes sneaks into Lucy’s room for a gender-appropriate purpose: “The sight touched me.... Here was a poor girl putting aside the terrors which she naturally had of death go to watch alone by the bier of the mistress whom she loved” (Stoker 150). Reprising Van Helsing’s failure to guard Lucy from her mother’s ineffective nursing, this incident reflects *Dracula’s* position that women too easily deceive men by their apparently docile appearances. Both Mrs. Westenra and the maids are engaged in traditionally feminine activities—nursing, tidying up, expressing sympathy—and it is this cover of femininity that deceives even Van Helsing again and again. When Mrs. Westenra enters Lucy’s room as a harbinger of Dracula’s final attack on Lucy, she acts “even more sweetly and softly than her wont,” expressing unease over her daughter in a very feminine, motherly way; soon after this deceitful entry, however, Mrs. Westenra’s dead body unwittingly aids Dracula by pinning Lucy down for his dining convenience (Stoker 131). In both instances of feminine foolhardiness, the result is that Lucy is metaphorically unmuzzled; Mrs. Westenra and the maid remove the vampire-restraining garlic and crucifix, respectively, echoing the

frustration expressed by Fleming as to women's alleged failures to properly muzzle their dogs out of a flaccid concern for their precious dogs' discomfort.

Through the discursive linkage of lapdogs, women, and rabies, femininity itself—the deceptive masquerade of docility—becomes an ominous forewarning. The three “voluptuous” vampires that accost Jonathan are also marked as rabid and dangerous precisely by their redolently attractive femininity; Jonathan vaguely recognizes that their docile appearance augurs ill when he describes their laughter as *too sweet*—the “intolerable sweetness of the water-glasses” (Stoker 317). In spite of his deep resources, Van Helsing still finds himself susceptible to their deceptive femininity. On the mission to vanquish all vampires and sterilize Dracula's lairs, Van Helsing comes face to face with the same three female vampires that so effectively mesmerize Jonathan. Stake in hand, peering at the resting fair vampire, he is almost “hypnotized”: “[T]he beautiful eyes of the fair woman open and look love, and the voluptuous mouth present to a kiss—and man is weak” (Stoker 319). In “looking love,” beautiful, alluring femininity weakens the will of any brave hero. Infected, Lucy is the same, “diabolically sweet in her tones—something of the tingling of glass when struck”; she seems to put Arthur “under a spell” (Stoker 188), seeking what Fleming describes, in the case of rabid dogs, as a “Judas' kiss” (*Rabies* 194). This incident clearly illustrates the confluence between managing rabies and vampirism: as Fleming warned, “beware, above all, of the dog which has become too fond of you” (*Rabies* 197).

Just as Lucy's sweet flirtation and Mina's feminine affection gain them the men's devotion, so their expressions of love become marked as a sign of “rabid” predisposition. Deceptively docile, the women who become increasingly loving and loved as they are poised to mistress the domestic space are therefore marked as untrustworthy in their very expressions of feminine “sweetness.” Fleming took pains to emphasize that an infected dogs' earliest symptoms would not be aggressive, but rather, such dogs would likely exhibit “an extraordinary amount of

affection” (*Rabies* 192). While “it is difficult to believe that this devoted creature—so gentle, so docile and submissive...should at the same time be the bearer of the [rabies] germs” (*Rabies* 196), Fleming’s treatise on rabies is devoted to warning readers that precisely, an apparently docile—even affectionate—pet is a carrier of “the most terrible malady known to the world” (*Rabies* 196). A rabid dog will seem

as apparently harmless as usual.... [I]f permitted, it willingly tenders its recognition of the care bestowed on [its master] by licking the hands or face. But these are *perfidious caresses*, against which every one should be warned; for, as certainly as if by a bite, they may implant the virus if the animal’s tongue, moist with the virulent saliva, chances to touch parts where the skin is very thin, excoriated, or wounded. The smallest abrasion may be... a door opened to death; and what a death! (Fleming, *Rabies* 194; emphasis added)

Here, Fleming implicitly describes rabies as a perfidy, a form of mutiny that is inconsistent with the gentle, docile, and above all submissive attachment that a petted creature should express. Femininity (in the form of docility and affection), then, triggers men’s strong attachment, and at the same time, represents irresistible danger. Even as the ultimate source of evil is located in Dracula, it is the white bourgeois women who are marked as desirably—and paradoxically, undesirably—feminine.

Like the canines of the novel, once bitten by him and infected with his “rabies,” women act out Dracula’s will. Lucy repeatedly wanders off to heed the irresistible call of Dracula, reflecting how a rabid dog would, as the disease progressed, leave its home to prowl, creating new victims: as per Fleming, a rabid dog “often flees from home when the ferocious instincts commence to gain an ascendancy” (*Rabies* 245). We know that Lucy subsequently preys on children on the heath, just as “[c]hildren, and especially the children of the poor with their exposed limbs and necessary propensity to play in the street, were seen to be most at risk” of

rabies (Walton 227). Out of all the diseases that have been linked to vampirism, only rabies explains the indomitable impulse of the infected to infect others.

It also fit in very well with the bourgeois gender conventions of the period to see the danger of betrayal by one's beloved domestic creature as one of female sexual betrayal, and this became easily conflated with the perceptions of canine rabies as well.¹⁷ An 1826 cartoon by T.L. Busby, "Mad Dog," portrays a panicked scene on a public street caused by a dog suspected of rabies. The woman in the foreground lies prostrate in a sexually susceptible position and the rabid dog—a lascivious expression on its face—approaches ready to take advantage. She has obviously tripped and fallen: an allusion to the "fallen" woman, who, by her sexual carelessness, becomes disreputable, damaged goods. **(Figure 10.)** The woman in green running indoors has escaped this fate narrowly, and we see her in the act of returning successfully into the private sphere as a good woman should—like the woman in yellow by the window. All the men in the print are variously armed against the mad dog, and significantly, armed quite ineffectively. The most visible male figure, aristocratically attired, aims a phallic umbrella that is capped off, metaphorically impotent. The scene suggests mass, ineffective panic, and that the woman—marked at the neck by a red shawl—will be bitten, sexually victimized, by the rabid dog that the men are powerless to stop.

For females attacked by Dracula, victimhood is tainted with hostile intimations that they have somehow been complicit in their sexualized victimization. In addition to what Phyllis Roth has noted as an unusual burst of aggression toward Mina, when he shames her with a public reminder that she was Dracula's "banquet" the night previous (118), Van Helsing also verbally attacks Lucy, another woman he claims to love. Respected leader of the "brave men" and steeped

¹⁷ An 1857 proclamation published in Pennsylvania ordered the confinement of dogs in an attempt to control an apparent outbreak of rabies: "I entreat all citizens, owners of *dogs and sluts*, to have them confined for the space of thirty days" ("Proclamation," emphasis added). "Dogs" tacitly refers to males of the species, while "sluts" describes all females, sexually immoral by definition.

Figure 10.



“Mad Dog,” T.L. Busby (1826). Source: Images from the History of Medicine (Web).

in “business-like” and “scientific” ways, Van Helsing breaks with character in making crass jokes about Lucy Westenra’s metaphorical polyandry (Stoker 158). These jokes may be read as laced with hostility against Lucy, for they make light of a charge that could destroy the prospects of a woman of her class. This charge is particularly troubling since polyandry might be criminal if it involves consent to knowingly marry more than one man, whereas all of Lucy’s sexualized transfusions¹⁸ occurred while she was barely conscious and entirely on the instigation and under the direction of Van Helsing himself. If the transfusions are sexual exchanges, then it is Van Helsing that prostitutes Lucy; alternatively, we may consider that he arranges her gang rape—not once, as Christopher Craft has described, but twice (128), and then laughs over it.¹⁹ Lucy’s polyandry-via-transfusion marks her as a fallen woman regardless of whether or not she actively consents to these sexualized acts.

When the infected Mina is put to bed, Jonathan describes her as “more affectionate with me than ever,” clinging to him “as though she would detain” him; however, he says, “there was much to be talked of [with the men] and I came away” (Stoker 234). He is in effect saved from her “perfidious caresses” by the inexorable urgency of men’s work. Soon after this close call with “rabid” infection, he identifies the risk she poses, as if aware that he would not be able to resist her enticing “affection” indefinitely (Stoker 259-60). “[U]nclean” (Stoker 259), Mina is reconfigured from beloved prize to her husband Jonathan’s “worst enemy, and whom he may have most cause to fear” (Stoker 249). In fact, Mina herself warns Jonathan: “I myself might be—nay! if the time ever comes, *shall be*—leagued with your enemy against you” (Stoker 288). This is deeply resonant with Fleming’s warnings on how “it is the mistaken confidence engendered by the creatures’ unusual blandishments that only too infrequently adds to the list of victims to hydrophobia those who own dogs; and particularly those dogs which are man’s

¹⁸ Craft notes the scholarly consensus on the sexual element of the blood transfusions: “[T]he text is emphatic about this substitution of medical for sexual penetration” (121).

¹⁹ Rebecca Stott describes this as “a fusion of medical operation (clitoridectomy?), rape and cathartic expulsion” (49).

most intimate and sure friends when in health, but which become unwittingly, under the influence of rabies, the most dangerous of enemies" (*Rabies* 196).

The drama of mastery over one's predictably unpredictable "pet" is also played out with R. M. Renfield, who has been welcomed into John's home, the private insane asylum into which Renfield has been committed. John's preoccupation with Renfield might be likened with the Bilders' foolishly trusting attitude towards a prized pet. To fill the "empty feeling" left since Lucy's "rebuff" of his marriage proposal, John "went down amongst the patients" and "picked out one," Renfield, with whom to occupy himself (Stoker 61). As a substitute for his desired "pet," Lucy, John singles out Renfield, who quickly becomes a favorite subject of John's private journals; in fact, John refers to him as his "*pet* lunatic" (Stoker 206; emphasis added). Significantly, John has complete control over Renfield, who plays the role of John's feminized domesticated—a role that we may read as analogous to the position of Lucy and Mina to their physicians, Van Helsing and John. At times, Renfield is an obsequiously faithful canine; for example, he "fawn[s] on [John] like a dog" (Stoker 70) and treats John with "cringing"—softness" (Stoker 102). Renfield, then, has his own version of Fleming's "perfidious caresses" when he engages in obsequious behavior towards his "master," John. When he takes up the feminine, domesticated position, Renfield expresses the proper hierarchy of dog to master that John undeniably enjoys. At other times, like the "unpredictable" lapdog and his "perfidious caresses," the prized "pet" rebels, for example in cutting John's wrist in a "rabid" attack, then most disturbingly, "on the floor licking up, like a dog, the blood which had fallen from my wounded wrist" (Stoker 129), mirroring Lucy's vampiric consumption.

Confined in his cell inside John's home/madhouse, Renfield becomes obsessed with maintaining "pets" of his own, "increasing in size and vivacity" from flies to spiders to sparrows and then "a nice, sleek, playful kitten, that I can play with, and teach, and feed—and feed—and feed" (Stoker 70). Horrifyingly, Renfield has been (vampirically) eating most of his "pets" (that

is, those he did not feed to other pets) in the belief that in so doing, he consumes their life force; John creates a “new classification” for his condition, a “zoophagus (life-eating) maniac; what he desires is to absorb as many lives as he can, and he has laid himself out to achieve it in a cumulative way” (Stoker 71). In his life-consuming mania, Renfield is analogously enacting what the Victorian bourgeoisie practiced in consuming the energizing affect produced by their pets. In Renfield’s case, total ingestion effectively obviates the risk that any of these important affect-producing pets may rebel or revolt—a revolt that takes the form of a neat reversal, where the vampirized become the vampirizers. The horror that John expresses is precisely the horror underlying the bourgeoisie’s anxieties about their vulnerability with their beloved pets. The ultimate lesson, then, is perhaps best summarized by John when he notes he “*can’t forget* how [Renfield had] prayed with almost equal fervour for a cat, and then tried to tear [his] throat out with his teeth” (Stoker 219; emphasis added).

In a complex maneuver, the beloved pet is marked as posing a risk in that its affectionate docility is utterly spell-binding—and the very femininity that makes the pet a desirable wife also becomes the mark of danger, in a move that displaces onto the beloved’s body the lover’s own sense of vulnerability.²⁰ The graphic horror of the text is to ingrain this message to the reader, to never forget that one cannot trust wolves nor women no matter how docile they may deceptively appear.

Self-Mastery, Surveillance, and Destruction

The sense was that there were “certain diseases...lurking in dogs... [that] only want the opportunity of transplanting themselves into the human subject” (C., “Curiosities” 562), an attitude that attributed to diseases like rabies an agency—a Dracula-like will to search and destroy—which in turn legitimated the band of men’s anxious and avid risk management. The

²⁰ In its logic, this is not unlike blaming a male-on-female sexual assault on the female victim for behaving in a “seductive” way.

socio-legal-medical management of Lucy's disease remarkably resembles this 1890 representation by a rabies authority in *The National Review*: "[T]he great thing is to prevent rabid dogs from being able to bite.... Suspected dogs, and those bitten by suspected dogs, [are] to be separated and confined, and notice given to the authorities. Those pronounced rabid [are] to be killed" (Shadwell 228). This was the prescription of other rabies authorities as well (Fleming, *Rabies* 379, and Dolan 209): suspicion, surveillance, imprisonment, and slaughter.

This is related to the derision of "ladies" whose excessive love for their lapdogs was supposedly spreading rabies; the denigration of such love for animals as feminine was an effective warning to men. Writers of the period counseled parents to teach their children "just how and how far to be friendly with their pets [and] that certain familiarities cannot be permitted" ("Untitled," in the American *Babyhood Magazine* 43) even as they extolled the virtues of pet-keeping on hearth and home. "It is far better never to go beyond 'good comradeship' with our pets," advises another American writer: "Why, indeed, should we wish to cultivate in what we call the lower orders, sentiments and emotions belonging to the higher?" (Miller, O.T. 40). It is a matter of self-suspicion, then: of guarding one's attachment to those beings below whose affection has been marked as so dangerous. The question is, deeply and inextricably, one of power: while the author of the *Babyhood* piece says that it would be easy enough to teach animals "to keep their place" in matters of interspecies affection ("Untitled" 43), Miller warned against allowing the dog to become not just family, but "the autocrat of the household" (142).

While many, like Andrew Smith, have identified *Dracula* as "a thinly concealed fantasy of control" of sexualized women through sexualized violence (146), the manner in which this control is legitimated for the people experiencing the fantasy has not been well explored. The novel's rationalization of constant surveillance gives new meaning to the novel's concept of being "un-dead": although the "rabid" are not dead, they must be treated as if dead (i.e., *she*

must be treated as if she is dead to me). At the moment Lucy is to be staked, pronouns denoting personhood are insistently replaced: “*The Thing* in the coffin writhed; and a...screach came from *the* opened red lips. *The* body shook...*the* sharp white teeth champed together till *the* lips were cut, and *the* mouth was smeared” (Stoker 192, emphasis added). After all the unearthly suspense, the ensuing slaughter is concise: “Arthur bent and kissed *her*.... the Professor and I sawed the top off the stake, leaving the point of it in *the* body. Then we cut off *the* head and filled *the* mouth with garlic” (Stoker 193, emphasis added). The moment where Arthur engages with her intimately— without her consent, as with the previous kiss, and the sexualized blood transfusions²¹—Lucy snaps back into female personhood as “her.” Then, immediately after the moment of stolen intimacy, she is once again “the” Thing. Within the same sentence, Lucy drifts from personhood (the subject of Arthur’s love) to thinghood (the subject of Arthur’s murderous repulsion), a status contingent on the relation that Arthur seeks to have with her. Un-deadness, then, is a conceptual limbo that classifies the beloved domesticated as both the subject of love (goodbye kisses) and the object of murder (“mercy-killing”). The “undead” is the aesthetic category of interstices, of being neither and both, signaling that which is living enough to be loved and dead enough to be killed—this, I argue, is what paranoid love requires men to feel toward the useless dependent on whom they affectively attach.

As nearly every reading of this scene has noted, the vampire murders are carried out with rather “savage delight” (Stoker 188), in the words of John Seward, whose deep love has passed in the blink of an eye into “nothing but loathing” (Stoker 190). The gendered linkages of white women to dogs—figuring variously as innocent lapdogs and rabidly contagious werewolf figures—thus participated in the evolution of the idea of euthanasia from a “gentle and easy

²¹ Lucy’s bodily responses to her staking are depicted in such a way that instead of pain, they may be read as, in George Stade’s phrasing, “the best orgasm in recorded history” (213), further complicating the “purifying” rape reading of this often-dissected scene.

death” to the *action* of bringing about such death (*OED*).²² When Seward remarks, in dreadful anticipation of the “task” of staking and beheading his former love, Lucy, that “[e]uthanasia’ is an excellent and a comforting word! I am grateful to whomever invented it” (Stoker 291), he avows both his unease at the idea of killing someone he treasures, and the way in which the idea of “mercy” killing of those classified as “un-Dead” worked to assuage this unease.

This re-reading requires that we go beyond the confining rubric of libidinal desire through which *Dracula*’s central relationships are usually read. Above, Van Helsing’s description of the fair vampire’s beautiful eyes is usually read as signaling irresistible, sordid lust; his literal words, “look love” (Stoker 319), are commonly ignored. And yet in contemporary reviews, *Dracula* was described as a book that was “strong, and at the same time healthy” (review from *Oban Times*, in advertisement in Bairdsmith 3), as if in reverse of our recent readings, the novel’s lurid content was ignored. In another contemporary review from *Liverpool Daily Post*, the novel is described as containing “[m]uch loving and happy human nature, much heroism, much faithfulness, much dauntless hope, so that as one phantasmal ghastliness follows another in horrid swift succession the reader is always accompanied by images of devotion and friendliness” (advertisement in Bairdsmith 3). In the readings of contemporaries, *Dracula* is a persistent love story. It is not merely “lust,” but also “love,” that is a danger—as well as affection, intimacy, and attachment. As Jonathan declares, what would motivate him to be willingly infected by Mina would not be the sordid desire for a one night tryst, but rather, it would take the “holiest love”—“the recruiting sergeant for their ghastly ranks” (Stoker 260)—to motivate his eternal, undying commitment into such a hell.

²² As with the canines neglected in *Dracula* scholarship, euthanasia is a key aspect of the now-canonical text that has received little scholarly attention.

Just as the band of men is repeatedly enacting its “love” for its “petted” women, the text is clearly invested in telling a *reciprocal* love story: Lucy and Mina never “consciously” choose to betray their men but rather are described throughout the text as loving, loyal, and affectionate like the most stereotypical of faithful canines. Lucy, in being bitten in a sleepwalking state, is supposedly a less fierce vampire as a result, according to Van Helsing, a concoction that Nina Auerbach and David J. Skal describe as a “chivalrous piece of hair-splitting” (Stoker 179). Mina, who displays heartfelt attempts to resist Dracula’s control and chooses euthanasia over the possibility of betraying her men (Stoker 288), also seems ultimately exonerated to the extent that her betrayal of the men seems to come unwillingly. Rabies, represented as possessing a Dracula-like destructive agency, allows danger to be externalized onto the minute intangibles (invisible specks of disease or evil), which in turn legitimate the “savage delight” (Stoker 188)—the sheer pleasure—with which danger may be destroyed through the destruction of the bodies in which it resides. In fact, given that *Dracula* marks the women as deceptively dangerous, its insistence in “excusing” the women’s “infection” seems an instance where the text doth protest too much: the women’s loyal behavior does not reflect Stoker’s chivalry, but is rather a reflection of deep reluctance to present the beloved “pets” as anything but obsequiously adoring of their masters. This ambivalent attitude lends weight to my reading of paranoid love: while the love must remain sincere (to further the utopian project of self-making via pet-keeping), the master must be ready to “euthanize” the beloved when his elite position is threatened.

In one of his few direct speeches in England, Dracula markedly avows that Mina’s “rabidity” is, in fact, a rebellion from the mastery of the “brave men,” and tantalizingly promises to her that now, thanks to his bites, she may turn the scales: “You shall be avenged in turn; for not one of them but shall minister to your needs” (Stoker 252), effectively reversing the gender hierarchy of the group of hunters. This little remarked-upon line, I suggest, contains the key to

the titillating vehemence with which beloved women and pets may be destroyed: rebellious dependents must be violently returned to their place. Even as the text seems to desperately insist that Lucy and Mina would never wish to avenge themselves. Dracula's tempting offer of female empowerment comes closest to avowing the status quo inequalities that "rabidity" challenges, and explains the hostility that undergirds the graphic mutilation of all the "rabid" women: it is a moment of recognition that the beloved pet has legitimate reasons to desire vengeance and might be motivated and empowered to seek it.

Thus, when Mina is in one of her guided hypnotic trances, most connected to Dracula's rebellious "rabidity," Van Helsing fights to reestablish mastery over the wayward "pet." While she does obey Van Helsing's commands to divulge Dracula's secrets, she complains that Van Helsing is unpleasantly "order[ing her] about, as if [she] were a bad child" (Stoker 300). To justify the imperious tone of his commandments, Van Helsing not only insists that he orders her about for her own good, but also that his need to command her actually reflects *her* mastery over *him*: Mina is "her [sic] whom I am proud to obey!" (Stoker 300). To late Victorians, the underlying crisis waiting to erupt in any master-pet relationship is that in his love, the master might lose mastery. Adoration for a pet is more than a cover for the dominance inherent in the relation that Yi-Fu Tuan has identified, as discussed in previous chapters; it poses a threat to the proper hierarchy of master and dependent, suggesting the motivation for the paradoxical need to mark the beloved pet as a threatening object when it is most lovable/loved. The master might love his dog too much, such that it is no longer clear who "obeys" whom: his love and affection is a threat to his ability to sustain his position as head of the household hierarchy, and in Van Helsing's logic, motivates his paranoid assertions of "loving" control over his subordinates. In loving a pet and being loved in return, the pet stands intimately *with* the master, dangerously close to peership—or mutiny.

Dracula as Rabid Text

As a handling manual for dogs and women, *Dracula* messily merges supernatural elements with cutting-edge technoscience to produce its modernized version of gothic horror. On one level, the many contradictions of the text are the effect of the multiple voices of the text. As Alison Case discusses, the novel's plot operates as a gendered struggle for narrative authority, and "[t]he novel's happy ending is made possible by the refeminization of her narrative voice" through Dracula's "symbolic rape" of Mina (239): "The threat of vampirism, then, serves to displace Mina from her position of narrative mastery, converting her into (alternately) someone who can provide only the raw material of a plot" (238). That narrative authority is contested, changing hands at every chapter, and giving multiple versions of the same events, causes irreconcilable fissures, as if the text itself is rabid.

The 1897 *Athenaeum's* unfavorable review of *Dracula's* craftsmanship found the novel "wanting in the constructive art as well as in the higher literary sense," reading "at times like a mere series of grotesquely incredible events" ("Review," *Athenaeum* 835), and the 1912 *Bookman* thought it wanting in revision ("Review," *Bookman* 347). These critical reviews were rare, according to David Seed (61), as other contemporary reviewers found the novel "inhumanly engrossing" ("Review," *National Magazine* 468): "it is impossible to lay it aside" (*The Lady*, quoted "Advertisement" in *Richard Baird*); "[i]t holds us enthralled" (*The Literary World*, quoted "Advertisement" in *Richard Baird*); it "keeps the reader chained" (*Western Times*, quoted "Advertisement" in *Richard Baird*). According to *The Daily Telegraph*, "[t]he reader hurries on breathless from the first page to the last, afraid to miss a single word" (quoted in "Advertisement" in *Odd Stories*). These reviewers mostly agreed that the affect produced by *Dracula* was one of spell-binding fascination, such that one rushed through the pieces that together comprise the whole. In riveting readers to a speedy consumption of its fragments, dispersing their attachments across many characters, the text itself is designed to forestall

readers' attachments to any single character. When the heroes graphically behead Lucy, readers' emotions are stoked for her death. When Mina, predictably, falls prey to Dracula, readers are unlikely to be deeply touched; though the band of men fall in love with her in the course of one morning, the reader, most likely, could not.

Not only do the characters contest whose version is heard loudest, but they also constantly struggle over the content of the final textual product, mirroring the ongoing machinations that John Seward and Van Helsing engage in to control what others outside of the project "see," by hiding documents and deceiving legal authorities. As Rebecca Stott puts it, "whilst Dracula is scrupulous about staying within the law, the 'good men' frequently transgress it, breaking into tombs and private houses, forging death-certificates, and resorting to bribery" (69). And behind all these crimes is the additional crime of conspiracy, all of which is minutely, and proudly, recorded. The eventual loss of the original documents is in fact no loss at all, because through no fault of their own, incriminating evidence has been expunged, protecting all the men in the text who, throughout the whole, make a myriad of criminal admissions.

Though it has received little scholarly note, it is significant that most of the originals were destroyed by Dracula as part of a back-and-forth dance of home invasions in which he and the band of men engaged: they break into his Carfax property and steal or destroy his paperwork (property contracts, title holdings), and he retaliates by breaking into their home to destroy their paperwork (all their original documents compiled to date). The hunt, expulsion, and extirpation of "rabies" from England occurs through the chronological compilation of their un-original text, via their wielding of technological prowess, just as much as it occurs at the points of Quincey Morris' "great bowie knife" and Jonathan Harker's "great kukri knife" (Stoker 324). Each side understands that he who controls the production of historical knowledge, wins. On the other hand, then, the lack of originals detracts from the characters' textual/sexual power. As Jonathan—the last voice in the text—says, nothing is an original: "in all the mass of material of

which the record is composed, there is hardly one authentic document; nothing [is left] but a mass of type-writing, except the later notebooks.... We could hardly ask anyone...to accept these as proofs of so wild a story” (Stoker 326-7). Echoing their incessant questioning of their own sanity (in particular, John and Jonathan), the lack of proof to substantiate so rabid a story produces incredible knowledge. With small exceptions, only copies of copies exist—copies made possible by their fantastic use of technology—and the lack of “authentic” documents undercuts the text as a presentation of “simple fact” (Stoker 5) that the preface promises.

The lack of originals signals that the authoritative legitimacy of the text has been irrevocably undercut by Dracula’s paper war; at the same time, in his blood war, his infection of Mina’s blood has produced a baby boy that is *not an original*, but a mere copy of the deceased Quincey Morris and traces of the rest of them: “His mother holds...the secret belief that some of our brave friend’s spirit has passed into him. His bundle of names links all our little band of men together; but we call him Quincey” (Stoker 326).²³ These layers of copying create distance from the (irretrievably lost) original, as if perhaps the original story is so “wild” that the reader needs this buffering—a logic that resonates with the layers of intimacy and loathing that comprise paranoid love. Significantly, only the men are linked in this act of naming, and Mina is erased except as a lap for Quincey Jr. to sit on, mimicking how, in the struggle for narrative authority, Mina has been consistently demoted to perform as support staff for the final product.

As Stott describes, Van Helsing is invested in extracting confessions from all the characters, paralleling how the vampire hunters, through the text, seek to compel the vampires to divulge all their “secrets” (67): “It is Van Helsing who articulates the text’s thirst for discourse with his insistent injunctions to confess” (Stott 69). Although he certainly demands confessions from all of them, while rarely writing anything himself, it is only from the “rabid” women (as

²³ One wonders whether this ludicrous “bundle” of names is Jonathan Quincey John Arthur Abraham Harker.

with Dracula) that he “steals” speech. When Van Helsing preemptively takes the “infected” Lucy’s last memorandum, he is appropriating from her the right to decide when to speak. Though he says, in stealing her memorandum and Mrs. Westenra’s papers, that “[i]t is not very well that her very thoughts go into the hands of strangers” (Stoker 148), it is in fact he who carefully saves the memorandum for inclusion in their public document. Lucy had tried to keep it private: “Whilst still asleep she took the paper from her breast and tore it in two. Van Helsing stepped over and took the pieces from her. All the same, however, she went on with the action of tearing, as though the material were still in her hands; finally, she lifted her hands and opened them as though scattering the fragments” (Stoker 139). By classifying her as a source of “rabid” threat, her own will can be supplanted; her insistent desire to *not speak* to strangers is taken away from her, as is the right to her own speech.

The *affective* content of the text is under contest in a gender-specific struggle. As part of negotiating narrative control, Mina attempts to control the affect that goes into the text, at times embracing, at times contesting, her role as “pet” for the little band of men. When she types out the transcript of Seward’s phonograph diaries, she is not only rendering the text of his journals searchable, but also expunging his sentiment: “That is a wonderful machine, but it is cruelly true. It told me, in its very tones, the anguish of your heart. It was like a soul crying out to almighty God. No one must hear them spoken ever again!.... I have copied out the words on my typewriter, and none other need now hear your heart beat, as I did” (Stoker 197). “[W]hat Mina is struck by,” says Jennifer Wicke, “is the latent emotional power of the recorded voice, whose spectacular emotion the typewriter can strip away” (470).²⁴ While the “simple facts” must be preserved for the text’s completeness, his rather excessive affect must not be included. Instead,

²⁴ This focus on the phonograph’s capacity to capture affect might recall the famous image of the terrier Nipper, “mascot” of RCA and other recording companies, listening attentively, head cocked, to a gramophone recording of the voice of his dead master. This 1899 painting by Francis Barraud, titled *His Master’s Voice*, was likely “perceived as a poignant longing canine subject eager, perhaps, both for the voice of his master and for a voice in which to express inarticulate, unending faithfulness and grief” (Mangum, “Dog Years” 38).

the affect is for Mina alone; she immediately proves superior to the phonograph in her ability to sympathize with John, and she attempts to cleanse the “history” of Seward’s excessive affect from the final story. Perhaps this is Mina enforcing the anti-sentimental norms of their vigorous masculinity, and in so doing, appropriating the power of producing affect in their household.

To be marked as an affect-catalyzing “pet” is, however, to immediately renounce her role as a direct participant in the planning and data-production for the great hunt, and so Mina also, at times, rejects the inclusion of her sympathizing, Angel-in-the-House affect, into the text. It is consistent with her character that in trying to use her “man’s brain” rather than her “woman’s heart,” she would be invested in resisting the role of being a “pet”—an affect-regulating tool for household’s use—by mechanical means. She can show that she is not just as good as a phonograph at transcribing, but also better than the mere machine at sympathizing, while at the same time maintain the right to produce “simple fact” like everybody else.

Mina’s palpable frustration at her own rabid effusions of affect is evident from her attempts to suppress her sudden propensity for tears. She cries “like a silly fool” (Stoker 226) when she notices Jonathan has excluded her from their planning and masculine action (which will eventually result in her total exclusion from narrative authority): “There now, crying again!.... I, who never cried on my own account” (Stoker 226). Mina also resists including her record of the morning of September 30th when she effectively secures her role as “pet,” but after an “impulsive” admission that she prepared a full chronological manuscript to date (Stoker 208), she yields to Van Helsing the right to decide whether or not to include her merely “personal” speech: “[T]here is little in this except what is personal. Must it go in?” (Stoker 208). He “pray[s] that it may,” as he assures her it will cement her role as beloved pet: “It can but make your husband love you the more, and all us, your friends, more honour [sic] you—as well as more esteem and love” (Stoker 208). After this, she naively expects that they will still together

“arrange *our* plan of battle” (Stoker 208, emphasis added), but to Jonathan and the rest of the men, “her part is finished” (Stoker 208).

Moreover, while the men’s expressions of sorrow (for themselves and their own losses) can be recorded, women are forbidden to sympathize for themselves. Mina, “who never cried on [her] own account” (Stoker 226), is in fact barred from recording, as part of this history, any other sympathy for her own pain. Determined, however, to control how she appears to the men, she says, “I shall put a bold face on, and if I do feel weepy, he shall never see it. I suppose it is one of the lessons that we poor women have to learn” (Stoker 226). The lesson, here, is to hide her self-pitying tears. When she retells the trauma of her infection (a scene also commonly read as her sexual violation, as with Lucy’s), it is Jonathan that is allowed to emit an audible groan, to express pain affectively, and she “look[s] at him pityingly, as if he were the injured one” (Stoker 251)—because, again, with the logic of rape being a crime against the male who “owns” the victimized woman, he is considered the one injured by her sexual loss, and her own injury becomes irrelevant. As Barbara Johnson says, in her essay on gender, the human, and things:

Far from being the opposite of authority, victimhood would seem to be the most effective *model* for authority, particularly literary and cultural authority. It is not that the victim always gets to speak—far from it—but that the most highly valued speaker gets to claim victimhood.... If feminism is so hotly resisted, it is perhaps less because it substitutes women’s speech for women’s silence than because, in doing so, it interferes with the official structures of self-pity that keep patriarchal power in place. (147)

The contest of who gets to speak what is no small matter. Ultimately, in spite of its characters’ attempts to construct a neatly chronological compendium, *Dracula* is fractured and contradictory—a “rabid” text running amok. The narrative seems controlled, a sober tale of “simple facts” all neatly arranged, but a struggle can be traced over whose “facts” and which

“feelings” survive in the text. It is a battle over the production of knowledge and legitimate affect, and the victor’s version wins.

Conclusion

In marking middle- and upper-class Englishwomen as predisposed to “rabies,” *Dracula* constructs a narrative that legitimates a ring of suspicious surveillance and delightful destruction over the threat of “rabid” disobedience and betrayal. This lays bare the power dynamics that are put in place by instantiating Englishwomen and domestic dogs as beloved domestic creatures *de luxe* that are, at the same time, deeply and dangerously useless. *Dracula*, then, suggests that the master-pet relationship is inherently threatened by the master’s love, his dependence on his dependents. The motivation behind the need to destroy the adored is that the master feels keenly in question of his mastery in acknowledging his great love for the pet, and navigates this vulnerability by setting precise limits to this love. It is to submerge this creeping realization that paranoid love becomes so useful, so central to the production of English masculinities.

At novel’s end, the fissured, “rabid” text disconcerts the reader by its structure as well as by the lingering suspicion that Mina—and her baby, Quincey Jr.—might still pose a threat, ever ready to erupt without warning. The reader must not forget that a pet’s perfidious affection, concealed by deceptive docility, may pose a threat to one’s life. And if “rabid”—if posing a challenge to gender or species hierarchies—the “pet” is that which, in spite of being adored, must be hunted and killed. This careful calibration of discourses allowed the master to maintain “devoted” relationships with the feminized subject, while preserving deep mistrust for said subject. *Dracula*’s blood, which flows through Mina to her child, represents the ongoing and truly quotidian nature of the threat, gesturing toward the necessary sequel to a domestic horror story that can erupt out of the everyday.

To investigate how rabies management discursively constructed both human and animal subjectivities through their intimate interspecies relationships is to call into question the practices of love. Problematic husband-wife and master-pet relations, grounded in paranoid love, are, in *Dracula*, effectively whitewashed in a rhetoric of love and devotion and an aesthetic of “rabid” menace. In both cases, affect is what hides power and also what threatens to renegotiate existing dynamics in the domestic sphere, the private realm that has so desperately resisted the critical gaze. Realignments of affect might also, I hope, be the key to changing the direction of the discourses that bear down on these companion species—to dissociate love stories from tales of horror, and recognize peer companions across gender and species. In the next chapter on Jack London’s most famous dog stories, I investigate transatlantic attempts at realigning the affect of the dog’s legendary allegiance to mankind. In London, the turn-of-the-century preoccupation with the pet dog’s fidelity is negotiated not only by reasserting the directives of pet-keeping, but also by refashioning the dog itself.

CHAPTER 4

The Bare-Dog: Affects of Masculinity in Jack London's***Call of the Wild and White Fang***

We like to see ourselves in the nature around us.
—John Burroughs, *Ways of Nature* (1905)

Ce qu'il y a de mieux dans l'homme, c'est le chien.
—Charlet, quoted in A. Toussenel's *L'Esprit des Bêtes* (1847)

In 1903, one of the key American nature writers and conservationists of the nineteenth century, John Burroughs, famously complained of “nature-faking” writers such as Ernest Thompson Seton, Charles G.D. Roberts, and William Long (Burroughs, in Lutts 129), a charge that Burroughs’ friend, the hunter-conservationist and “Rough Rider” Teddy Roosevelt, also levied at the very popular and prolific fiction writer Jack London (Clark, in Lutts 166).¹ Indeed, then and now, “[w]e like to see ourselves in the nature around us” (Burroughs, *Ways of Nature* 195), and in seeking for the-same-as-us, we may not see the human, as Theodor Adorno describes it, “as precisely what is different” (105).² Charlet’s take, “[w]hat is best in the man, is the dog,” moves in the other direction, locating the animal in the human and naming it good. In

¹ Roosevelt, for example, criticized an incident in London’s *White Fang* as the “kind of realism” that was “a closet product” (quoted in Clark, in Lutts 166) and called writers such as London “yellow journalists of the woods” (Roosevelt, in Lutts 194). This charge against London was echoed by Ambrose Bierce and Arthur Stringer (Bierce 360), among others. With some sense of injury couched in humorous condescension, London responded in 1908 that his two novels had been attempts to “protest against the ‘humanizing’ of animals” of which *other* writers were guilty (“The Other Animals,” in Lutts 200) and that his portrayal of dogs as capable of rudimentary reason was well-founded in fact. Reminding his attackers to humbly remember that “[w]e who are so very human are very animal,” London accuses Burroughs of “stiff-necked pride” in refusing to recognize his “relatives, the other animals” (210). The “nature-fakers” controversy continued for five years across the pages of prominent magazines like *Science*, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Dunlap 57). For more on the controversy, see Lutts in *The Wild Animal Story* and Perry.

² The full quote is: “The mechanism of ‘pathic projection’ determines that those in power perceive as human only their own reflected image, instead of reflecting back the human as precisely what is different” (Adorno 105).

either direction, this interspecies blurriness is and always has been happening: the animal is different (a potentially queering difference, as scholars have been exploring³), but it has also always been constitutive of us. While blurring may always have been occurring, as the two contrasting views above show, cultural attitudes towards this blurring have also differed widely, reflecting deeper cultural politics negotiated and haggled between humans and animals.

London's dogs, like so many animals in literature, have been mostly discussed in their broad category of non-human. Mark Feldman, for example, does an excellent job exploring what he calls the "metaphysics of caging" in London's novels in their post-Darwinian cultural moment, but by focusing on zoos, he seems to gloss over the particular choice of animal that London was, as Ann Upton and Jonathan Auerbach have noted, thoroughly obsessed with: the dog and the wolf.⁴ London's two famous animal stories are about (wolfish) dogs in a specific type of intimate relationships with humans. London's dogs explicitly enact multiple boundary crossings as they "evolve" from "wolf" to tame "dog" and back again. The move of situating the dog within man, or man within dog, significantly differs from that of conceiving these moves as performed by "the" (not "an") animal—or for that matter, the lion, snake, bird, or worm—because of the specificity of discourses surrounding the canine, humanity's first and most intimate animal companion.

In this reading of London's dog stories, *The Call of the Wild* (1903) and *White Fang* (1906), I explore the material-semiotic inscription of the dog within man, and man within dog, examining implications for Victorian discourses of masculinity in the context of fears of degraded masculinity. I will first explain the distinction forged in the late nineteenth century between what I am calling the "humanized" dog and the "bare-dog" constructed in London's

³ For example, Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson's collection, *Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010) and the recent conference at University of California at Berkeley in 2011 on "Why the Animal? Queer Animalities, Indigenous Naturecultures, and Critical Race Approaches to Animal Studies."

⁴ Lisa Hopkins records that London liked his wife to call him "Wolf" (100). In the context of my reading, it is particularly interesting that he identified with this "wild" identity in his marital relations.

novels—his attempts to represent a dog as-it-is, “in nature.” I bastardize Giorgio Agamben’s concept of “bare life” in part-satire of nineteenth-century attempts to represent the de-humanized, “wild” dog: the bare-dog that is thought to merely exist, outside of any human “culture.”

I also purposefully allude to Donna Haraway’s figuration of the “value-added” dog; this bare-dog is the ostensible counterpart to the figure of the dog on whom we have, over the course of centuries, lavished so much “extra” value (45). As I explored in previous chapters, dogs had been reduced from physical uses to affective ones, with a great many consequences for the domestic space and the subjects relationally formed therein. My reading of *Dracula* explores the rising tensions as dogs were stripped of “usefulness” in the public sphere, confined in the bourgeois home in droves—tensions that became reflected in a conversation about the pets’ “rabid” rebelliousness and how this was embroiled in the politics of the Angel of the House. London’s response, in the context of American “frontier” gender politics, also participates in the transatlantic conversation about a pet’s “infidelity” in overlapping ways.

To tease out the significance of London’s take, I compare another late nineteenth-century model, the evolutionary psychologist James Sully’s “vagabond” bare-dog, to London’s masculinized bare-dog, to show how London produced the bare-dog for the reinvigorating consumption by a weak, overcivilized reading public, promulgating new rules to shape the human-dog relationship. Renegotiating the terms on which the notion of the dog’s fidelity is aroused, London represents dogs as devoted to only one human owner—the “love-master.” London’s obsession with *affective* dominion represents a mode of relation that privileges the power of affect to bind bodies over the power of brutish force or “cupboard love.”⁵ In contrast to Dickens, Saunders, and Stoker, while shifting his dogs from wild to domesticated, London also

⁵ The 1891 dictionary of *Slang and its Analogies Past and Present* defines “cupboard love” as “interested affection” (Farmer 230).

shifts the focus on the human-dog relationship to the non-domestic, wild spaces of the northern frontier.⁶

The well-documented and very public feud about “nature-faking,” part of a broader reaction to Frederick Jackson Turner’s much-discussed 1893 “frontier thesis,”⁷ pivoted around the question of whether humans were representing animals accurately, an authenticity that depended on ideologies of what animals may act like in “nature” outside of any human “culture.” It was all too clear, from successful breeding practices of the nineteenth century, that humans could actively re-chart the course of the dog’s evolution, shaping each successive generation in both physical and mental traits. The transformed affective uses of the dog, discussed in earlier chapters, also indicated the radical new degrees to which humans interfered with the lives and the very being of dogs.

As the century progressed and evolutionist theories took hold, more and more voices joined in a chorus of dismay over the “humanization” of the dog, identifying the trait of fidelity as a key product of human intervention in canine character. “The idea of keeping the dog as a pet is a more modern one,” says the author of “A Doggish Anthology,” “and, indeed, it destroys many of the qualities for which the animal is most justly prized” (“Doggish Anthology” 587). An 1881 American writer exclaims that “a man-dog is always unseasonable” and demanded: “Give us the dog as he is” (Sheldon 117). Some writers complied with this request, producing different versions of what I am calling the bare-dog, the dog as it is imagined to be when dissociated from

⁶ I do not mean to suggest that this is the first time anyone entered into a conversation about nature and culture using the dog—far from it. The theme has often recurred in the human-dog relationship. Karla Ambruster and Jennifer Mason have paid particular attention to the question in different time periods. As an interesting eighteenth-century example, the poet William Cowper wrote a humorous piece, “On a Spaniel Beau, Killing a Young Bird.” Beau unapologetically attacks a wild bird against his master’s commands. “Sir,” he explains afterward, “when I flew to seize the bird/in spite of your command:/A louder voice than your’s [sic] I heard,/And harder to withstand./You cried ‘Forbear!’ but in my breast/A mightier cried ‘Proceed!’/’Twas nature, Sir” (in Taylor 165-6).

⁷ Turner’s famous thesis argued that the “closing”—the effective civilizing—of the westward frontier posed a loss of an arena for distinctly American self-making.

its long, intimate history with humans.⁸ As I will explain in greater detail, the production of this bare-dog was in part motivated by a widespread sense of loss borne out of a growing understanding of extinction—the permanent loss of whole populations—intertwined with the much-discussed fears of masculine degeneration that dominated the *fin de siècle*, the perceived closing of the frontier, as well as the craving for the comforts of a rigid human-animal divide. This fantasy of the bare-dog, decoupled from humanity, was to some extent a simple rejection of the idea that untouched nature no longer existed and an attempt to redefine the dog as an embodiment of the frontier. London's novels also participated in a conversation with much present-day currency: the debate about whether some forms of human-animal relationship destroy a distinct doggy essence that is worth protecting. In crafting the bare-dog's psychology, London's novels not only produced the bare-dog, but also provided models for dog training—the basis of human-dog relationships—that would protect the bare-dog from human intervention.

London's *Call of the Wild* opens by situating Buck, a large St. Bernard/Shepherd mix, in the comfortable environment of Judge Miller's farm in California. Buck's initial environment offers him "the life of a sated aristocrat"—a "lazy, sun-kissed life" with "nothing to do but loaf and be bored" (London 15). This civilized leisure is contrasted against his laborious descent into the "primitive" Wild. Plucked from this life and sold to dog-stealers, Buck is first introduced to "the law of club and fang" by a club-wielding man in a red sweater, then re-sold to work as a sled-dog carrying mail through Canada's Northlands.⁹ In his "hostile" (London 21) new environment, there is "neither peace, nor rest, nor a moment's safety. All was confusion and action, and every moment life and limb in peril. There was imperative need to be constantly alert" (London 15), the antithesis of "lazy" and "bored." This forced change of environment leads gradually to Buck's "devolution (or retrogression)" (London 22). Gradually and systematically,

⁸ Jennifer Mason identifies *Call of the Wild* as one of the "competing account[s] of the essential nature of domesticated animals" that rejected their "civilized traits" (159), a widespread trend of "wilding" animals and nature.

⁹ For more on dog stealing in the nineteenth century, see Philip Howell.

nature's red tooth and claw act upon the primeval animal within Buck, enabling him to adapt superbly to his brutal new conditions. Not even the "ideal master," John Thornton, can fully re-domesticate the increasingly savage dog, so that when Thornton dies, Buck becomes leader of a wolf pack and leaves human civilization once and for all. According to Mary Allen's early survey, *Animals in American Literature* (1983), "Buck is that classic American frontier hero—rugged, male, celibate, and free" (82); like London, Allen all too readily appropriates Buck's masculine, frontier ruggedness as quintessentially "American" without recognizing Buck's role in the production of the type.

Perhaps because Buck's reversion is painstakingly belabored, readers tend to ignore how even from the outset, Buck is already the bare-dog of London's conception. "[N]either house-dog nor kennel-dog" (London 6), Buck is always already out of place in the world of civilized humanity, not fitting neatly into either of the two most common models of pet-keeping of the period. The "ancestral," "primordial" elements are always already in Buck, who is exceptional from the outset. The other dogs are both necessarily present ("[t]here could not but be other dogs") but irrelevant ("they did not count" [London 5]). The "decivilization" (London 22) that Buck undergoes is akin to a dog that has been wearing human clothing and slowly strips off items as the novel progresses, revealing himself in his becomingly ferociously furry birth-suit; according to Christopher Gair, this is "a process of stripping away" (200).¹⁰ Buck's reversion is an unveiling of the bare-dog: "[t]he domesticated generations fell from him" (London 22). Out of all the dog owners he encounters on his trail north, only the recluse John Thornton approaches Buck for the affective use of companionship and love, starting with pats on the head and progressing to ambiguously sexualized heavy petting. By the end of the novel, however, Buck concludes his departure from human civilization by the savage massacre of an encampment of Yeehat Indians—those he determines killed his beloved Thornton.

¹⁰ Gair notes that Buck can also be said to grow by "a series of additions" (200).

In *White Fang*, the “prose poet” of evolution (as per a 1903 *Argonaut* review, quoted in Nuernberg 61), tells the story of a three-quarters wolf hero born in the Wild and gradually “civilized.” The process continues by steps until White Fang can be domesticated enough to one man to thrive in the kind of relatively luxurious California home that Buck himself grew up in. The “complete antithesis [and] companion piece” to *Call*, in London’s words, *White Fang* depicts “the civilization of a dog,” the “development of domesticity, faithfulness, love, morality, and all the amenities and virtues” (quoted in Labor 213). By degrees, White Fang is exposed to different humans (first Indians, then white men) who subject him to different forms of ownership and training, and like Buck, White Fang meets his own “ideal” master, his “love-master” Weedon Scott. The son of a rancher judge—figuratively, we might say, the son of Buck’s original owner, Judge Miller—Weedon represents the next generation of dog-keepers, indicating that *White Fang* is not so much a rewinding or undoing of *Call of the Wild*, but its logical, chronological sequel.

Vagabond Dandies

It will be useful to briefly recap the discourse of the dog that London was rewriting. As the Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2 explore, the dog was, particularly over the nineteenth century, endowed with a larger-than-life discourse. Panegyrics in poem, prose, fiction, and visual arts painted man’s best friend as faithful and affectionate. In 1845, the established English authority on canines, William Youatt, could comfortably describe the dog as apparently “formed expressly to administer to our comforts and to our pleasure.” To paraphrase him, as “the only animal capable of disinterested affection” (2), the dog was “our destined servant” (10). The 1862 *Hand-Book About Our Domestic Pets* says: “He [the dog] attaches himself to humanity, and is never so happy as when domesticated” (*Hand-Book* 46). Kennan Ferguson has dubbed this potent strain of dog panegyric as the “Fido/fidelity connection” (376).

This dog, lauded as the stuff of legend, is marked as masculine, a gendering specific to the dog species. “[D]ogs are masculine and cats feminine,” states an 1882 novel: “If one speaks of a gay young dog, or a nasty old cat, it is unnecessary to explain that the former refers to a man and the latter to a woman” (Addison 44). Possessed of “the supplanter’s...nature,” says Laura C. Holloway, the cat is “a purring hypocrite” who “often gets his [the dog’s] birthright by stratagem as well as her own, and the juicy bone which by divine right is Tray’s is given to Tabitha” (341).¹¹ Perhaps it should be no surprise that Holloway, a prominent author of household manuals directed towards married women, would name the desirable reward a “juicy bone,” which already marks it as constitutively “fit” for only the (male) dog—an idea that she doubly reinforces by dubbing it the male dog’s “birthright” and “divine right” (Holloway 341). In this example, the reification of gender in a species understood to closely mirror humans validates their human embodiment. The gendering of the value-added dog as masculine cements human male claims to superiority, which are then used to enforce sex-specific power imbalances; this value-added, “faithful” dog is incorporated into human-centered gender discourses to fortify and legitimate them.

At one level, the impulse to inscribe a dog within man makes easy enough sense: it is an easy form of positive self-construction and self-compliment. It is not about drawing an Other in the negative against which to positively self-define; rather, it is endowing an Other positively, then incorporating this Other to add value to oneself. This Other then becomes endowed, unwittingly, with the ability to hurt us; it becomes a site of vulnerability. As animal book author Olive Thorne Miller exclaims in an 1894 dog-keeping manual, “[s]o intimate for generations has been the dog’s relation with the human race that he is truly becoming almost painfully like us. Not only does he possess most of our virtues, but our vices, alas! are reflected in him as in a

¹¹ Kete rightly describes the nineteenth century’s attitude as seeing the cat as the “anti-pet par excellence” (*Beast* 56).

mirror” (143). Miller’s expression of *pain* at the human-dog similitude derives from the use of the dog as a mirror to mankind that reflects it unfavorably. To have this mirror in “the pet of the fireside” (Miller 143) is to have as one’s constant companion both a tool for self-compliment and critical self-excoriation—an externalized site of inscription that is at once separate (and not entirely in one’s control) but inextricably also part of one.

Towards the turn of the twentieth century, there was a perceived degradation of this idealized, masculine dog type, a degradation that humans took very personally. In an 1890 essay in *Littell’s Living Age* called “The Decay of Canine Fidelity,” English evolutionary psychologist James Sully bewails the development of the “vagabond” dog, who instead of forming intense attachments to one human master, freely shifts from one human caretaker to another, faking attachment “just as long as he is made much of” (801). By no means a quack scientist in his day, Sully, whose writings populated mainstream periodicals, produced central concepts that dominated the late nineteenth century; his interest in the double, Ed Block, Jr. argues, influenced much *fin de siècle* fiction,¹² and no doubt informs his interest in the dog as man’s double.

Unlike the faithful dog of legend, Sully’s vagabond dog is “shrewd” and calculating, seeking to “turn out to his own advantage” his relationships with humans (802). Sully exclaims, “he will even sidle up to a stranger now and again with an artful simulation of sudden and overpowering affection” (801). Dripping through his article is not only a sense of being aghast at what can be described as the dog’s affective promiscuity, but also of feeling betrayed—which is little to be wondered at when value-added dogs had been valued for both their faithfulness and candidness, an honesty that guaranteed that any dog’s apparent expression of affection could be taken at face value. Sully finds the dog’s generous relationship with humans a thing of the past,

¹² For more on Sully and his beliefs, see Block, “James Sully, Evolutionist Psychology, and Late Victorian Gothic Fiction” in *Victorian Studies* 25.4 (Summer 1982): 443-67.

replaced by a desiring—if not greedy—animal, in a message that echoes Holloway’s virulent description of the (female) cat’s theft of what is by all rights the (male) dog’s: a sense of revulsion that some natural and divine right has been infringed upon. From the generosity of “quite unlimited love,” in Frances Power Cobbe’s words (557), to a self-seeking parasite, the “vagabond” is both an expression of repulsion over the trait of infidelity and at the break in the natural order it implied (infidelity to man, the dog’s divine master). In short, what was appalling was that the dog had “lost the ancient desire of the species to be man’s loyal servant” (Sully 803). Contrasting the devoted canines of panegyric to this self-seeking vagabond, indeed, one could agree with Sully’s closing remark, that the vagabond dog “seems a very unpicturesque object by the side of the old-fashioned, *love-mastered* hound” (Sully 804, emphasis added).

To Sully, the trait of fidelity was instilled in the dog by humans, and this belief that the dog’s faithfulness was a product of unnatural emasculation is in stark contrast to the bulk of dog lore waxing poetic about the dog’s supposedly inexorable preference for human company. As the century progressed, more and more voices joined in a chorus of dismay over the “humanization” of the dog. “I think the greatest harm that is now being done to the breed in England,” the kennel editor of *Bazaar* magazine says in 1903, “is to *change the nature* of the dog” (Drury 230, emphasis added), echoing the sense of a perversion of a pure original.¹³ An 1881 dog management guide published in London notes the common belief that castration, an “emasculation” that turns dogs into “[s]laves,” would result in a more affectionate and loyal dog: “the supposed home affection and faithfulness are but the result of their unenviable state” (Hill 364). The anti-domestic, misogynist undercurrent of this seems clear. Echoing this general trend of the turn of the century, Sully describes the dog as “*by nature* unattached and vagrant,

¹³ The bare-dog was at this moment desperately sought as part of a much wider search for evolutionary forbears: the bare-dog, bare-man, and even bare-apple. In an otherwise information-focused article about apple trees published in an 1862 *Atlantic Monthly*, the author takes a poignant turn in declaring that “[t]he era of the Wild Apple will soon be past,” and “who knows but, like the dog, it will at length be no longer traceable to its wild original?” (“Wild Apples” 525, 514).

and only becomes attached and faithful by an infusion of human grace” (801, emphasis added). In describing the bare-dog as “by nature” unfaithful, Sully contradicts the long-established figure of the dog as naturally preferring man’s company, even over that of other dogs.

Yet Sully’s bare-dog (the unfaithful vagabond) is a grotesque figure: not a reversion to a pure and desirable original, but a decay linked to emasculated effeminacy and the discourse of the dandy. An 1879 children’s poem, exalting the hard-working shepherd’s dog, performs a similar equation; the poem praises the subject of the poem by what he is not (not a dandy: not beautiful, graceful, dainty, or pretty) and then marks him as “faithful” and “true” (Bark 196, emphasis added): “No dandy dog poor Rover was.../No ears of beauty graced his head/No dainty limbs had he;/No pretty tail he had to wag.../But Rover was a gentle dog,/A *faithful* dog and *true*” (Bark 196, emphasis added). The negation of the feminine is what renders Rover faithful and true. A canine’s fidelity was therefore a marker of his masculinity, and its decay was associated with effeminacy. In Margaret Marshall Saunders’ *Beautiful Joe* (1893), discussed in Chapter 2, the dog exhibiting this kind of “vagrant” affective behavior is also named Dandy. The “dandy dog” unfavorably reflected “dandy men”—the overdressed, emasculated “fops” and “metrosexuals” of their day¹⁴—and locates in dog bodies what to Sully was similarly revolting behavior.

Representative of this late-nineteenth-century thread of discourse against lapdogs, an 1896 article in *Strand* magazine excoriates the luxurious and fashionable possessions that were required to create and maintain “dandy dogs.” The “pampered” canines of “highly-placed mistresses” are “dandled in the lap of luxury” (Fitzgerald 538) and (to the author’s utmost

¹⁴ For more on dandies, see Gilbert Pham-Tranh’s “Body, Size or Dress Matters: Representation of the Dandiacal Male Body in Some Fashionable 19th-Century Novels,” in *A Full-Bodied Society*, eds. Logie Barrow and François Poirier (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, England: Cambridge Scholars, 2010: 91-109) and Elisa Glick’s *Materializing Queer Desire: Oscar Wilde to Andy Warhol* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009).

horror) participate in middle- and upper-class human civilities such as leaving visiting cards at their canine friends' homes. **(Figure 11.)** "Look at the little animal's quaint tie and collar; and his card case, sticking out of the front of his coat" (546), Fitzgerald says, mocking this dog most of all, perhaps because he is the one that is closest to both looking *and behaving* like a dandy human male, which taps into his revulsion on multiple levels: for the feminized male; the (also feminized) aristocrat; and the breach of, in the words of the author of *The Dog and His Cousins, &c.* (1876), the essential and "great gulf fixed impassably by either" species (Miller, H. 188).

This ties into the lapdog vitriol discussed in Chapter 3: dogs overcoddled by "ladies" could expect to become effeminized in body and character. Writers like George B. Taylor decried the "supply of rickety, wretched, shivering abominations," the "blue-skinned, hair-denuded little wretch[es] that among women of no uncertain class comman[d] such high price" (65). Olive Thorne Miller describes poodles' haircuts as being against nature: "One who thinks that Nature knows how to form and decorate her dogs will not admire the elaborate shaving in patterns, after diagrams laid down in a book, the 'bracelets' standing out like a stiff clothesbrush, the broomlike feet, the musta-chios, and other grotesque ornaments" (160). In this, she patently ignores the very unnatural processes by which dogs were being bred for aesthetic and other purposes. She concludes instead that "a dog thus treated has almost ceased to be a dog. He is a product of fashion, and seems hardly to belong to the race of 'doggy' dogs" (Miller, O. 143)—in effect, he becomes less dog, and too human.

The "gulf" between the species was anxiously preserved to assuage humans of their claims over animals; if the dog were to become too human-like (i.e., humanized), it could no longer serve its purposes as a master-making pet. "Humanization" was also evidence of permeable boundaries that dangerously suggested that human attachments to dogs were excessive: it was the dog that was supposed to "stick" onto men, not the other way around. By

Figure 11.



MR. BROWN AT WORK.
From a Photo. by Robinson, Regent Street, W.

“Mr. Brown at work.”



From a Photo. by] POODLE—WITH LION RAMPANT. [Robinson, Regent street, W.

“Poodle—with lion rampant.”



NO. 2.—TWEED TRAVELLING COAT, WITH POCKET FOR RAILWAY TICKET.

“Tweed traveling coat, with pocket for railway ticket.”



NO. 2.—WINTER VISITING DRESS.

“Winter visiting dress.”



NO. 1.—WEDDING COSTUME.

“Wedding costume.”



NO. 3.—MOURNING TOILET.

“Mourning toilet.”



“BEASTLY WEATHER.”

“Beastly weather.”



“MONKEY'S' CINERARY URN, WHICH COST 600 GUINEAS.”

“Monkey’s’ cinerary urn, which cost 600 guineas.”



"A MORNING CALL."

"A morning call."

Photographs from William Fitzgerald's article "Dandy Dogs," in *The Strand* (1896), showing grooming of poodles; various canine outfits for travel, winter, wedding, mourning, and rain; a six-hundred-guinea, jewel-encrusted cinerary urn for a Yorkshire named "Monkey"; and a dog dressed to pay morning calls.

coding the dog's humanization as an effeminization, writers were effectively naming the logical consequence of having "sentimental" (i.e., feminized) relations with dogs. On these grotesque, dandy dog bodies was inscribed the "excessive" affect of women, children and weak men—proof positive if the alleged unnaturalness of loving the dog more than the species deserved. As an 1888 satire in *Good Housekeeping*, purportedly written by a Poodle, denounces,

[b]etter far that the Brahmins eat bread with the poorest wretch of the lowest order of their kingdom than that this adoption of the brute creation into the human family should continue. A certain amount of affection is due us for our faithful servitude, but nothing like the overwhelming amount to which we are at present subjected. (P., C. F. "Poodle's Complaint" 209)

Speaking directly to female dog owners, the "Poodle" makes a gender-based accusation against fawning femininity. By alluding to India's rigid caste system, the "Poodle" seems to suggest that a mistress's excessive love for her dog threatens species hierarchies in as shocking a way as to imagine a Brahmin breaking bread with an Untouchable—the distance between is so inherently great, that such an intimacy is shockingly abhorrent. Along his sober counsel, the "Poodle" also issues a warning: "[Mistresses] are engendering the hatred of the whole lap-dog force" (P., C. F. "Poodle's Complaint" 209), for even the lapdog itself (according to this fiction) finds the break against species hierarchy to be loathsome.

The blame for this hierarchy-threatening excess of interspecies attachment was not solely the owner's, but also the pet's. This gendered decline to grotesque dandyism could not befall cats, which had long been conceived of as conditional, selfish lovers—the total opposite of the self-abnegating dog. Ouida, author of well-known dog tales, argues that the (feminized) cat, while so "inferior" to the dog, at least "kept for herself [sic] an extraordinary amount of personal liberty" (318) through the "egotism...of her character" (319). "She [the cat] is in civilization, but she is not of it" (318), Ouida half-applauds, half-criticizes: "[S]he will accept its satin coverlid

and its saucer of milk, but with the distinct reservation that she does not surrender the fair freedom of the housetop and the barbaric joy of the mouse's nest in the hedgerow" (319).¹⁵

Ouida's ambivalent approval of this one facet of the cat is exemplary of the fractured spirit that ambivalently praises and decries the dog's "generous, impulsive, romantic, and devoted temper"—precisely the traits that have, in Ouida's words, "hurried and harried him into captivity" (319).

The fear behind Sully's understanding of the bare-dog may also spring from the fact that one of the key aspects of the ethos of an age of international efforts to develop "humaneness" was the extension of a broader sense of duty towards "humanity," a call to be concerned beyond the self, beyond one's immediate community, race, class, or nation. And yet, there was a clear resistance to this impulse as well, as seen in the cultural politics of pet-keeping. Author of two early nineteenth-century English tomes devoted to anthologizing canine fidelity, Joseph Taylor states that his chronicles of dog fidelity are put forth "with no other view than a hope to inculcate in the rising generation a love of *humanity*" (iii, emphasis added). Taylor's words baldly suggest that the "stickiness" of the dog (i.e., its fidelity) exists to stick humans together. As discussed in the Introduction, humaneness towards animals (or at least towards these faithful animals) was in large part motivated by a desire for self-improvement on the long, teleological march of human civilization, and to love the animal was touted as a sure-fire way to inspire the affects and behaviors of greater compassion toward other humans. The conversation

¹⁵ As a counter-example, however, in 1894 Phil Robinson did share an anecdote of a cat who, being furiously chased by a dog, chooses to flee by running rather than climbing. "Had she *forgotten* the value of trees to cats?" he asks: "Had the instinct of feline self-preservation by climbing been evolved out of her by domestication?" (Robinson, "During a Stroll" 659). He goes on to suggest that it may be "moral" to "encourage our dogs to chase cats," so as to "bring the cat back to its bearings" (Robinson, "During a Stroll" 660). On the one hand, Robinson waxes poetic in the healthy prospect of the cat relearning "its wonderful climbing powers, that it now wastes" ("During a Stroll" 660). On the other hand, he seems interested in the practice as a feline performance of subservience to the dog, noting that such dog-chasing would "inculcate a becoming deference towards dogs" ("During a Stroll" 660). In light of the fact that, as earlier discussed, the dog was gendered masculine and the cat feminine, Robinson's prescriptions for enforced feline deference through the threat of canine violence seem startlingly misogynist.

regarding waning fidelity (and the decay of the dog) became enmeshed with the backlash against this potentially dangerous affect-diffusing aspect of the humaneness ethos: if the dog “sticks” indiscriminately or uncontrollably, it becomes unsafe. In his article decrying the decline of fidelity, Sully says:

[T]he highest concentration of affection in dog and man alike seems to require as its base a certain degree of savageness of disposition. As the dog grows more generally amiable he will grow less partial, and so be incapable of a heart-absorbing attachment.... [T]he dog is changing in much the same way as the man is changing, by acquiring in place of one or two narrow, intense affections a widely diffused sentiment of humanity. (Sully 804)

It is clear that Sully is more than a little self-contradictory—the bare-dog, to him, is both the affection-faking, dandified vagabond *and* the ardent savage lover just described. The dog, it seems, is being loved as a species by humanity as a whole, which to Sully is a distinct degradation and site of deep loss: the substitution of “narrow, intense affections” with “widely diffused sentiment” (804).

Vigor at the Cellular Level

London’s novels capture a moment of ambivalence, enacted upon the figure of the dog: while his obedience and fidelity are still deeply prized and desired (in the sea of faithless humans, &c.), they become alienable traits. Both London and Sully locate a bare-dog outside the sphere of human influence—a de-historified, de-companionated species. The bare-dog is thus teased out and distinguished from the companion species (humans) that has shaped the whole history of its being. According to a 1903 *Spectator* review of *Call*, London’s novels “emphasize the qualities which distinguish our four-footed friends from ourselves rather than those which endear them to us” (quoted in Nuernberg 63). As James Lundquist argues in 1987, in *Call* London “departs from the traditional depictions of dogs in fiction at almost every point. Buck is

not cute, he is not gentle, and he does not do clever tricks” (107). Like “Rover,” from the 1897 children’s poem quoted earlier, Buck is not-this, not-that, not-feminized: this is what renders him a desirable representative of the bare-dog.

But London and Sully deeply disagree on how they feel about this bare-dog. While Sully sees this decline of canine fidelity with dismay, London applauds the possibility of less diffuse, more passionate affect precisely for the possibility that Sully opens up: that it is the bare-dog’s masculinized savageness that may ground intense, narrow fidelity. An alternative bare-dog, London’s Buck and White Fang are resounding rejections of Sully’s take. That is, both Sully and London strip away the easy assumption of the dog’s constitutional fidelity to all mankind, but London presents the bare-dog as vigorously masculine rather than woefully effeminate.

In “Performing the Perfect Dog: The Reconstruction of Gender in Jack London’s *The Call of the Wild* and *White Fang*” (2009), John P. Bruni argues that *Call* “threatens to reveal that there is no gender essence behind [the] performance” of “perfect manhood” (175) because the dog is always “becoming” rather than a “fixed biological typ[e]” (196). Indeed, Buck begins as a Southland dog, used to luxury and ease, and ends the novel a rapacious, “wild” hunter. The “wild original” that is traced back, however, is a “fixed biological essence” on which the environment acts; London does not make the dog a tabula rasa, but rather “a wolf” in essence (a masculinized distillation of “vigor,” “cunning,” physical prowess, and aggressive ambition), for the consumption of what a 1906 article called “a new race of force-worshippers” (Ammen 337).¹⁶ A 1903 advertisement describes the *Call* as “strong, thrilling, brilliant” (“Advertisement”). Reviewers attest that *Call* was experienced positively as a “vigorous” reading experience; the novel was noted in a 1903 *Books of the Week* for its “vigorousness” (“Review” 764), in a 1903 *The Southern Workman*, its “vigor, insight, and dramatic power” (“Review”), and in a 1907 *The*

¹⁶ This article discusses “[t]he influence of the athletic ideal on the reading of” undergraduate men (Ammen 1906) and was published in the journal of a “Greek” fraternity.

Speaker, its “vigorous manliness and a graphic intensity” (“*The Call of the Wild* by Jack London” 131). “Even the most listless reader,” proclaims a review by *The Plain Dealer*, “will be stirred by the virile force of the story, the strong, sweeping strokes with which the pictures...are painted by the narrator” (quoted in “Advertisement” in *Love of Life*). Bruni’s reading of London’s novels may be too anachronistic to be of help in a contextual reading of the novels; any fright that may be inspired by the fluidity of gender is carefully controlled, after all, and the reviews of the period do not suggest that the novels incited unease. Buck’s reversion is painstakingly gradual, closely monitored (by the reader, for Buck is supposedly unreflective of most of these changes), and, most of all, exhilaratingly masculine. If there is a controversial, subversive gender reading in *Call*, it does not appear that readers at the time found it so. Surely concerns about dandies, aesthetes, and New Women at home and abroad served as clear and present reminders of the very real threat of gender slippage, against which the relatively mild gender fluctuation in *Call* was likely read as fairly conservative.

The sense of a loss of the authentic (and authentically masculine) dog, buried under the effeminizing trappings of “civilization,” strikes a resonant chord of gender, racial, and class anxieties, well-documented by Gail Bederman in *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* and Matthew Frye Jacobson in *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917*. Bederman and Jacobson describe the sense of imperative to absorb “barbarian virtues”—in evolutionist discourse, those “masculine” traits deemed to hearken from the “primitive” age of the Caucasian race, and embodied by every other “inferior” race and working-class men. The “back to nature” regeneration movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

was, after all, about having short love affairs with “nature,”¹⁷ and then returning to one’s regular, alienated, urbane life. As discussed in Chapter 2 on Saunders, Bederman’s insightful study establishes that late-nineteenth-century middle-class men contrasted themselves favorably against “lower” races and classes by upholding a greater claim to “manly” restraint, while also claiming to share the powerful “masculinity” attributed to those they denigrated (22). While it may ring absurdly to ears today, this imperative was very sincerely felt, particularly by men who were diagnosed as “neurasthenics,” and relieved by appropriation practices not only towards “inferior” races (through the consumptive practices detailed by Bederman and Jacobson, like “human zoo” spectacles and Boy Scouts mimicking Native American behaviors¹⁸) and the working class, but also towards nature and its associated animals.¹⁹

Perhaps by now we have well-plumbed how G. Stanley Hall’s evolutionist psychological models influenced *fin de siècle* American society. A staunch believer in racial recapitulation and the “father of child study” (Kirkpatrick 687), Hall was convinced that Caucasians repeated the evolutionary history of their race in their individual lives, such that a white child lived through “primitive” phases, thinking and behaving like the “lower races,” but progressing with age and mental development past these limitations and into its racial promise (Bederman 106).²⁰ These

¹⁷ As Anne M. Windholz notes, the Klondike gold rush and ensuing northwards scramble “was in many ways a nostalgic venture,” reminiscent of the masculine frontier-making that took place in the “Wild West” (652).

¹⁸ John Kasson’s *Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man: The White Male Body and the Challenge of Modernity in America* (2002) and John Pettegrew in *Brutes in Suits: Male Sensibility in America, 1890-1920* (2007) offers further case histories to elucidate what Pettegrew calls the “disease” of masculinity during the turn of the century, which hinged so much on the concept of “wild” nature.

¹⁹ For more on zoological gardens in the period, there is a wealth of great work, including Kurt Koenisberger’s *The Novel and the Menagerie: Totality, Englishness, and Empire* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2007), Matthew Senior’s “The Animal Witness,” in *A Cultural History of Animals in the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Matthew Senior (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2007) 1-22, and Nigel Rothfels’ “How the Caged Bird Sings: Animals and Entertainment,” in *A Cultural History of Animals in the Age of Empire*, ed. Kathleen Kete (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2007) 95-112.

²⁰ Bederman records that the theory of racial recapitulation lost favor over the turn of the century, after which Hall shifted his theories to find other avenues of expressing what remained a fundamentally hierarchical view of the races. However, recapitulation theories certainly continued to be accepted, as shown, for example, by the favorable exploration by Wesley Raymond Wells (in “The Theory of Recapitulation and the Religious and Moral Discipline of Children” in *The American Journal of*

growing pains in boys were not to be bemoaned, but rather prolonged and nourished (Bederman 106).²¹ Hall particularly pushed for pet-keeping in young children. As discussed in Chapter 2, pet animals were central to the gendering of children as “humane,” liberal masters. Joan Menefee argues that Hall’s own childhood experiences with domestic animals influenced his belief in the importance of pet-keeping to childhood development, finding that Hall believed that “[a]long with sharpening observation skills, pets taught children about power” (229) and allowed children to recapitulate the primitivism of the Caucasian’s evolutionary past as they “evolved” into restrained, manly men (233). Keeping pets became another way to exercise the desired atavisms that would fortify children and reinvigorate the race. Hall’s belief that the human-animal relationship played a pivotal role in the child’s recapitulation of his race grounds London’s logic of pet-keeping’s affective uses.

One way in which pet-keeping offered a mode of self-reinvigoration was based in part on presumed similarities between man and dog: what’s good for the dog becomes good for the man. The dog’s “call of the wild”—a phrase coined by London (Robisch 307)—quickly becomes (white, civilized) man’s in equal measure, as some early twentieth-century examples easily attest to. In Joseph P. Widney’s troubling 1907 text, *The Race Life of the Aryan Peoples* (an obvious precursor to the transnational movement that would manifest in the Holocaust), the author waxes poetic about the “call of the Wild” that rings in his ears, beseeching him to wander the “mountain pines” and “reac[h] out and touc[h] the infinite”: “Does man or race ever escape from its spell, once it is heard? It is the sound of the night in the pines that we hear as the deep undertone in the Hymns to the Maruts which our Aryan kin sang amid the mountain passes of the Hindu Kush three thousand years ago” (Widney 91-2). On a radically different side of the

Psychology 29.4 [Oct. 1918]: 371-82). Wells published *The Biological Foundations of Belief* in 1921, exploring the evolutionary bases for faith in the divine. Hall certainly continued to explore evolutionist theories of childhood development in his *Pedagogical Seminary*.

²¹ Jessica Straley discusses such childhood-specific applications in the literature of Charles Kingsley in “Of Beasts and Boys: Kingsley, Spencer, and the Theory of Recapitulation” in *Victorian Studies* 49.4 (Summer 2007): 583-609.

spectrum, a 1914 article on travel published in the *Annual Report of the American Bible Society* cited the “call of the wild” as the cause for sojourns into “[t]he great forests, festooned with vines and hung with flowers, the deep solitudes and rugged mountains and dashing cascades.... [C]ity folk must pardon us if we hear the all still singing creation’s old, old story” (“Travel” 338). These two disparate, yet resoundingly similar writings evince the clear influence of London’s ideas and their perceived applicability to men.

In addition to being, quite literally, instigation to men to go answer the call of the wild by frontier excursions, London’s novels were also a surrogate for such literal practices. Just how the ingestion of the vigorous novel was supposed to catalyze the stirring of the animal-within is a bit hazy. Some described the primordial beast as “lying hidden away in the brain” (“More Borrowed Lines” 347). As a 1903 *Book News Monthly* review said, “*The Call of the Wild* penetrates to the very marrow and flows in the blood of the veins” (quoted in Nuernberg 67), suggesting that perhaps in the bones or the blood is located the inner animal that needs nourishing by such reading. Still more pseudo-scientific in its biological claim, an article exhorting kindergarten teachers to teach *The Call of the Wild* described Buck as “the great illustration of *cellular theory* and the possibilities of native response that lie hidden in every human organism” (Earle 57, emphasis added). The belief that reading invigorating novels might have real, physical effects in the body, from a biological perspective, seemed widely accepted.

The ingestion of London’s “cure” for civilized effeteness was merely another expression of the logic grounding many similar “armchair” practices, bizarre-sounding to us today.²² A 1908 article by B.S. Arnulphy, M.D., lauds the opening of public dispensaries in Paris,²³ slated to perform as many as 700 injections of isotonic seawater a day (247), including to babies, who were supposedly cured of bowel trouble at the rate of 80% (248). Believing all cellular life to

²² Then again, we have Vitamin B-12 shots.

²³ As alluded to in the Introduction and well-researched in Kathleen Kete’s work, France was another nation swept up by similar pet-keeping practices during the nineteenth century.

have sprung from the ocean, developers and promoters of these injections attributed tangible health benefits to “the miracle [of] the magic touch of the elemental life of the ocean” (Arnulphy 247); the intake of sea water would, like “the touch of steel to flint,...quicke[n] the old abysmal life buried within [the baby’s] shrunken and depleted organism[,] wake[n] the dormant energies smothered under the countless strata of bygone evolutive [sic] processes” (Arnulphy 247-8). As this parallel practice shows, the concept of bodily absorption of “the primitive” was taken quite literally. Arnulphy goes on to describe the true meaning of the “call of the wild” to be “a return to first principles, a harking back to primordial emotions” (248), which the seawater would precipitate by changing the environment in which the primitive animal-within could operate. The Parisian seawater project is but another route to the same result that reading *Call* ought to lead. This ingestion of the “primitive”—this incorporation into the body of “the old,” through the injection of seawater or the consumption of literature—was supposed to return the animal-within to its ancestral environment, which would enable it to flourish. Just as Buck is returned to a primitive environment to trigger the development and fortification of his “dominant” inner “beast,” so is the ingestion and incorporation of *Call*, like seawater, a method of returning the animal-within to a primitive environment.

After a seawater treatment, “without effort and without hesitation the dying child comes into his own again” (Arnulphy 248), just as readers could ingest London’s representation of the process of de-humanization and gradual exposure of the “bare-dog” for fortification. London’s heroic dogs would distill vigor into an ingestible form, like a capsule. To read the dog’s vigor was to be invigorated; to consume the representation of the vigorous dog, according to these nineteenth-century readers, would catalyze a return to the primordial, *at the cellular level*. In their representations of the bare-dog, the novels were thought to act as medicinal doses of vigor, functioning as armchair substitutes for the back-to-nature excursions also promoted during this time.

If a tattoo is a surface-level mark of self-identity, this self-labeling goes further down. The impulse to locate the dog's (and therefore human) evolutionary forbears at the *cellular level* is also a proud statement of owning, to the point of deep-body self-inscription, this desirable, virile primitive. It is a move to inscribe masculine vigor *at the cellular level*—not just *within*, but at the level of the invisible and the reiterable. By instituting the primitive at the cellular level, London's novels comfortably assure every man of possessing that masculine *essence* which can be awakened by the ingestion of seawater or invigorating literature. In effect, London indelibly inscribes a homing beacon that can be used to locate the bare-man or bare-dog when it has been buried under the "artificial" trappings of civilization. As the Canadian wild-animal story writer Charles G.D. Roberts exults,²⁴ reading this new genre of animal stories "is a potent emancipator"; that is, such "realistic" animal literature has a *liberating* function that mimics the effect of the Northland environment upon Buck (213):

[This new genre] helps us to return to nature, without requiring that we at the same time return to barbarism. It leads us back to the old kinship of earth, without asking us to relinquish, by way of toll, any part of the wisdom of the ages, any fine essential of the "large result of time." The clean and candid life to which it reinitiates us, far behind though it lies in the long upward march of being, holds for us this quality. (Roberts 213)

Roberts' words also connote that reading of the "Wild" offers a much *safer* return: not only because no literary bear can eat you, but because of the safety of the reading experience itself, which somehow tethers the reader to civilization. It is a form of ingestion (like sea water) that remains controlled, like Buck's own reversion experience.

²⁴ As stated at the opening of this chapter, Roosevelt and others disagreed that either London or Roberts could really gauge the "realism" of any of these animal depictions.

The presumed ease by which this catalyzing works is contradicted by the novel, however, for London repeatedly emphasizes that Buck is unique in his ability to survive, and succeed at, the process of ingesting the Wild. “Buck was the exception,” London states. “He *alone* endured and prospered” (London 30, emphasis added). Presumably the “house-dogs” and “kennel dogs” that he is set off from at the novel’s opening would have perished like Curly, the dog that is devoured by a pack of northern dogs on day one. “The dominant primordial beast was strong in Buck” (London 24), but not necessarily everyone else; “Buck possessed a quality that made for greatness—imagination” (London 36), and so his success at the experience he undergoes, the fact that he grows stronger and stronger, is not a guaranteed result. When Mercedes’ ill-fated “nice family party” (London 47) goes through the “inexorable elimination of the superfluous” (London 50) precipitated by immersion into a Wild environment, one can only read in horror as they *inexorably* fail—as they cause the death of their dogs, then themselves. Similarly, *White Fang* begins with ill-fated men tasked with carrying the body of someone who was likely “a lord or something in his own country, and that’s never had to bother about grub nor blankets,” foolishly “a-buttin’ round the God-forsaken ends of the earth” and proving himself too fine and tender to survive the Northlands (London 97). In spite of these sad failures, in a sort of willful blindness, no review of the novel that I have read challenges a reading of the novel that virtually guarantees the possibility of fortifying reversion. Despite London’s emphasis on his uniqueness, the prevailing reading is that each and every reader could also have Buck’s fortifying experience.

By enshrining the wolf as the ancestor of the dog, London adds his two cents to an open question that had been in contention for decades.²⁵ “Naturalists are divided” on the question, records the 1883 *Farm and Home Encyclopedia*, “and the subject is unsettled,” with most favoring the wolf, but also positing the jackal, fox, and Indian wild dogs as possible progenitors

²⁵ Susan McHugh’s *Dog* (2004) offers a broader yet succinct overview of these debates.

of the domestic dog (Allen, H. 409). While some, like A.S. Packard, stake a confident claim that at least the American varieties of dog were likely derived from either the gray or the prairie wolf, domesticated by the “aborigines” long before Europeans were believed to have set foot on the continent (39), other authorities were more cautious, perhaps, in suggesting that dogs were most likely derived from multiple wild originals (wolves, jackals, wild dogs), combined and crossbred, then mixed up some more until virtually indistinguishable (Figuier 408). The 1884 *Encyclopedia Britannica* says, “the dog, in short, is neither a natural species nor yet a modified descendant of any one species which exists in nature, but a purely artificial product of domestication...and further modified to an extraordinary extent by systematic breeding and training” (Stoddart 672).

The celebrated natural historian Cuvier (author of *Animal Kingdom*, a much-cited and massive mid-century tome) argues that “a recurrence to a single wild type would be impossible. The dog is apparently a blended race” (quoted in *Dogs and Cats* 3), and Beeton’s 1871 *Dictionary of Natural History* concurs that “all agree that no trace of [the dog] is to be found in a primitive state of nature” (101). In the face of this controversy, London’s insistence on finding the dog’s wild original in the American wolf, as Packard does, evinces his deep desire to mark not just the wolf—and the wolf ideologies circulating at the time—as part of the animal that was so deeply linked to man as to serve as his mirror, but also to make the beloved animal irrefutably American. Yet attempts to exterminate the wolf wholesale during this same period²⁶ expresses

²⁶ For centuries, wolves were ascribed with the reputation that would fuel rationalizations for their extermination. Because of their real and mythic destruction of livestock, as Americans spread settlement westward, wolves seemed increasingly dangerous to civilization (Fogleman 67). The authoritative French zoologist Buffon “heavily influenced” American and English conceptions with his own hatred of wolves, which he describes in the early 1800s as “cruel murderers that smelled odious, had ferocious habits, savage aspects, and perverse dispositions” (quoted in Fogleman 70). An American naturalist in 1914 describes them as the most “despicable” of all wild animals: “There is no depth of meanness, treachery, or cruelty to which they do not cheerfully descend” (quoted in Fogleman 70). These representations led to the near-extermination of wild wolves in the United States by the turn of the twentieth century (Fogleman 67). For more about the history of American attitudes towards wolves, see S. K. Robisch, *Wolves and the Wolf Myth in American Literature* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2009); Sine Anahita and Tamara

the paradoxical need to claim and disclaim, love and revile, the canine's place in American history.

Love-Masters and Training

I wish to resist reducing the dogs to mere allegories of the human condition by considering how London's novels reflect the real practice of using the human-pet relationship to relationally form subjectivities—all operations hinging on the human-animal divide, even as they play with its proscriptions. In crafting dog psychology the way he does, London undoes the ties of man to dog and rewrites the assumption of the dog's natural fidelity to humans. Through the idea of the inexorable "call of the wild," the bare-dog is instilled with the ability to disobey mankind to some degree—to kill some humans, even—and to do so *admirably*, exhibiting a canine agency that could defy man's rule and be thought the better for his infidelity. If pet-keeping is about exercising power, this practice is only healthfully man-making if the animal who is tamed is worthy of the affectionate dominance. This takes the agency of the dog yet further than Saunders' novels in Chapter 2, conferring onto humans more power and ontological reassurance in relation to a properly redeemed subject. It is no longer useless, helpless creatures—i.e., those creatures that *Dracula* marks as deceptively docile and dangerously prone to "rabidity"—that deserve to inspire human affections.

As Buck is stripped of civilization, he kills bigger and bigger prey, culminating in a black bear, a bull moose, and a whole band of Yeehat Indians—each increasingly graphic event documented with a palpable sense of awful admiration. Here, towards the end of the novel, the "call of the wild" increasingly nags at Buck, but he is so deeply in love with his love-master John

L. Mix, "Retrofitting Frontier Masculinity for Alaska's War against Wolves" (*Gender and Society* 20.3 [Jun. 2006]: 332-53); Jon T. Coleman, "Animal Last Stands: Empathy and Extinction in the American West" (*Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 55.3 [Autumn 2005]: 2-13); Lance van Sittert, "'Keeping the Enemy at Bay': The Extermination of Wild Carnivora in the Cape Colony, 1889-1920" (*Environmental History* 3.3 [Jun. 1998]: 333-56); Peter M. Zmyj, "A Fight to the Finish': The Extermination of the Gray Wolf in Wyoming, 1890-1930" (*Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 46.1 [Spring 1996]: 14-25); and Valerie M. Fogleman, "American Attitudes Towards Wolves: A History of Misperception" (*Environmental Review: ER* 13.1 [Spring 1989]: 63-94).

Thornton that he remains attached to this last vestige of human relationship. After one of his protracted hunts for large game, he returns to find Thornton dead and deduces that a band of Yeehat Indians had committed the foul deed. In savage vengefulness, Buck nearly decimates the Yeehat population:

The Yeehats...heard a fearful roaring and saw rushing upon them an animal the like of which they had never seen before. It was Buck, a live hurricane of fury, hurling himself upon them in a frenzy to destroy. He sprang at the foremost man (it was the chief of the Yeehats), ripping the throat wide open till the rent spouted a fountain of blood. He... ripped in passing, with the next bound tearing wide the throat of a second man.... He plunged about in their very midst, tearing, rending, destroying, in constant and terrific motion which defied the arrows they discharged at him.... And truly Buck was the Fiend incarnate, raging at their heels and dragging them down like deer as they raced through the trees. It was a fateful day for the Yeehats. (London 84-5)

As garish proof of Buck's steep fall from human grace, Buck punctuates his final parting by slaughtering humans, arguably his most barbarous, disloyal act. Even if London's unquestionable racism²⁷ ranks Native American bodies and lives as less worthy than white lives, he certainly ranks them above non-human animals. This mass slaughter of "the noblest game of all," "killed in the face of the law of club and fang" (London 85), flouts the rule of human might. With the legitimization of Buck's massacre of men, the dog could no longer easily be conceived of as made, as a species, for the service of man (as Youatt and other dog-lovers had phrased it).²⁸

²⁷ London has been described as "above all things, a worshipper of the Anglo-Saxon" (Hueffer 33). Some debate arose as to whether London was Jewish. Perhaps there was "a Jewish smear... the name, London, has a Jewish smack," H.L. Mencken posited in 1919 (25). "Certainly he was not Jewish" (Hueffer 33), claimed another in 1917, perhaps wanting to reconcile the author and his desirable work with the undesirable possibility that he might be Jewish.

²⁸ This spectacular violence is an extension of the kind of violence that Beautiful Joe exhibits against Jenkins and the Spitz, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is significant to note that while for Joe the violence is

Instead of having a dog's love guaranteed, the logic of the essentially unfaithful bare-dog dictates that the dog's filial service has to be *earned*, which is a way of using the human-pet relationship to define the hierarchies among men. The question, then, returns to the production of worthy masters. Paradoxically, the more humans "dehumanized" dogs, the more the connections were reforged, but on different terms. One could no longer have the assurance that the faithful dog came readymade, but, to London, the bare-dog's "natural" infidelity could motivate masculinity-making projects. In addition to ingestion of the Wild via literature, then, London's pair of novels teach readers *how* to have relationships with dogs in a way that could carefully protect and preserve the essential "bare-dog." Indeed, Mark Feldman is right to suggest that London's novels are about "a self tensely balanced between animal and human, of the need to live an evolutionary double life" (177)—the emphasis being on balance.

Feldman does not further explore the consequences of this for understanding human-animal relationships. Dog-keeping, as I have been arguing in previous chapters, is a commitment to practice a human-animal relationship for the purposes of the affective development of humankind, and London's novels actively participate in shaping how human-animal relations were to be had, offering an alternative prescription to fix the perceived social problems of the day.

The first part of the answer is located in the word "servant," so often used to describe domesticated animals during this period. Parallels between animal and human servants were frequently drawn, making clear that instructions and advice on managing one class of servant

clearly attributed to the protection of a female (his mistress Laura and "his" cat Malta), here, Buck fights for his male master. Females increasingly become inappropriate objects of attachment to dogs. In the earlier quoted 1888 article, "The Poodle's Complaint," the angry Poodle heartily suggests that were it not for his suffocating mistress, he would "have one or two frolics in the park and ... give that pert black cat one thumping and hair pulling and convince her that I was a dog yet, in spite of appearances to the contrary" (P., C.F., "Poodle's Complaint" 209). In this response, Beautiful Joe's Malta has gone from protected possession to object of violence.

applied to the other as well.²⁹ There was also, as discussed earlier, the sense of masculine “decay”: think back to the closing remark of Sully’s article on “The Decline of Canine Fidelity”: he expresses a sense of tragic loss for the “love-mastered” hound, replaced by an affection-shifting “vagrant.” The same phrase, “love-master,” recurs in *White Fang* to describe Weedon Scott, and also aptly describes Buck’s “ideal” master, John Thornton.

As analysis of the table of contents of each novel shows, the emergence of passionate love of a dog for a male human master occurs at relatively the same point of the novel—the penultimate section. **(Figure 12.)** The novels offer startlingly mirrored timelines, even though each dog is moving in the “opposite” direction in the (inaccurately) linear evolutionist spectrum of civilized vs. primitive. The “love-master” intervenes at just about the same point in each dog’s development, whether it be de-humanization, as in Buck’s case, or humanization, as in *White Fang*’s. For both novels, then, the “love-master” is a key figure—re-entrenching the centrality of human masters as a condition to both the civilizing and decivilizing of the dog.

The human-dog relationships in both novels run a wide gamut—from abusive to functional to respectful to admiring—but only Thornton and Scott, the love-masters, can inspire passionate love from each dog. As two images from *Call* illustrate, Buck is represented in dominant relationship to dog-kind and some of mankind (in this image, the man in the red sweater that first beats Buck with a club), but as shown in the third figure, in relation to his love-master, Buck takes the lower position—even though the love between master and dog is supposedly mutually passionate. **(Figure 13.)**

For each dog, the relationship with the love-master is a moment of ambivalently feminized abjection. In an 1899 letter in which London expresses his objections to women’s suffrage, he describes women as constitutionally unable to resist an inner command to yield

²⁹ According to the 1873 *The Culture of Pleasure*, “[t]he old proverb has said that a good master makes a good servant, and a good servant a good master; and, undoubtedly, attention to these maxims would solve many of the difficulties of that Master and Servant question which has troubled society in the present day” (Miller, W.H. 250).

Figure 12.

Table comparing table of contents of *Call of the Wild* and *White Fang*.

Figure 13.



"It was to the death."

"It was to the death."



"Straight at the man he launched his one hundred and forty pounds of fury."

"Straight at the man he launched his one hundred and forty pounds of fury."



"John Thornton and Buck looked at each other."

"John Thornton and Buck looked at each other."

Three illustrations of Buck from *Call of the Wild* from 1903 Grosset & Dunlap Pubs. edition.

their autonomy to men: “[A] woman ... carries within her that which will prevent, that which will no more permit her economic and suffragal [sic] independence, than it will permit her to refrain from sacrificing herself to the uttermost to man” (London quoted in Bruni 180). In this syntactically-convoluted sentence, London articulates a fixed female essence that is prone to submission—what we may dub a *call of the tame*, the female counterpart to the male’s call of the wild. The moment when White Fang’s mother, Kiche, wilts under the call of her former human master is also White Fang’s first lesson in subservience to mankind, and the first break with the maternal body that has hitherto been the most important in his life: “And then the cub saw his mother, the she-wolf, the fearless one, crouching down till her belly touched the ground, whimpering, wagging her tail, making peace signs. The cub could not understand. He was appalled. The awe of man rushed over him again.... She, too, rendered submission to the man-animals” (London 161). After this traumatizing episode in which he loses faith in the authority of his mother, White Fang begins to tender submission to mankind, covering his fangs and sinking “submissively” to allow himself to be stroked, and even manhandled belly up in a pose “ridiculous and ungainly,” “a position of utter helplessness” (London 162). Yet in spite of the contempt for women’s alleged constitutive lack of autonomy reflected in London’s letter, this is precisely the position that London depicts his very virile Buck and White Fang in in relation to their respective love-masters: total, abject submission.

The question of dog-to-human love, then, is centrally tied to one of control (of self, of others)—in a word, fidelity. Once mastered by the affect of love, one gives up complete autonomy: this puts in stark perspective the question of why writers like Sully and London were so invested in reconfiguring fidelity as a trait that was no longer natural, but rather, trainable. While in 1870 a writer still insisted that the dog loved by uncontrollable instinct, and that “training could no more inspire feelings of affection...than it could give sight to the blind” (Miller, H. 15), London emphasizes that fidelity has to be the product of the mutually

disciplinary process of dog training. The training process can therefore be likened to the way Robert Baden-Powell, founder of the contemporaneous Boy Scouts movement, described his program for boys: a “character factory” in which as many boys as possible ought to be processed (quoted in Seltzer 153).³⁰

Under the requirements of this type of dog-training, canine love becomes proof of a desirable form of enslavement—in the words of a contemporary writer, a good dog exhibits a “loving slavery” (Bolton 21). As Youatt distinguishes, “[the] ox and sheep submit to our control...but [unlike the dog] they can rarely be said to love...us” (1). If the ox and sheep’s submission to human control is one level of compliment, it pales in comparison to the dog’s love, which by implication is the greater submission to human control. Although the love was supposedly mutual, London’s novels are palpably concerned with ensuring that the dog’s love is superior, as the position of lover is, in his view, emasculating and humiliating. As a writer of the period who favorably commented on Sully’s article on the decline of canine fidelity says, “[i]t often strikes me that it is at times poor joy to go out [on] a walk with a man who is over subservient or devoted to his dog” (Anderton 185). What is particularly fascinating about this man’s response is how he names his own affect at risk: his “joy” is impoverished by his affective attachment (in “walk[ing] with”) such a slavishly abject man. These ideas suggest that, at this time, it became urgently desirable to require of the dog that he perform greater love and devotion than its master could possibly reciprocate—not merely for its master’s sake, but for all potential (human, male) masters.

Indeed, these ideas were enforced by pet-keeping manuals as well. Regulation of the man-dog bond was more important than ever. Dog training manuals boomed as pet-keeping

³⁰ In *Bodies and Machines* (1992), Mark Seltzer talks about the paradoxical practices through which Americans endeavored to unnaturally make bodies more natural. In his chapter entitled “The Love-Master,” he singles out the importance of the concept, but considers Buck as merely a furry man, treating the dog’s experience exactly as he would have considered a human character’s instead of considering the interspecies relationship itself as a real and imagined disciplinary site.

spread among the middle-classes, producing a body of (what I would consider biopolitical) knowledge to regulate the love between human and dog—to manage the affect that was so essential to control (of themselves, of others). Biopolitical, in that they document the production and operation of power/knowledge over populations of pet-keepers and pets, regulating every aspect of their lives and the terms of their relationship: selection, feeding, shelter, grooming, physical health, exercise, mental character, breeding, and of course, training. These titles participated in the governance of the dog, and through the dog, the human masters who actually performed this intensely time-consuming, vigilant management. Increasingly minute details—from the measures of the snout to the thickness of the fur, from ideal breakfast to healthy dinner—of the dogs’ (and therefore the pet-keepers’) lives were managed, all to the supposed benefit of the lives involved.

Love-mastery, in this scheme, conceives of “fidelity” as the means to an end, not the end in itself; the affect of love becomes productive. These manuals emphasized first and foremost the need to gain the affection of the animal in order to exact total obedience. Here is a brief transatlantic selection:

Youatt, *The Dog* (1845): “The first and grand thing is to obtain the attachment of the dog.... [A]ffection must be the tie that binds him to his master” (95).

Julia Lockwood, *Instinct; or Reason? Being Tales and Anecdotes of Animal Biography* (1861):

Mark. Dear grandmamma, you promised to give me some stories about taming pet dogs, or any domestic animal, so as to make them obey me, and love me.

Gran. Yes, my boy, and I think you are quite aware that kindness and gentleness are the surest means of success. (140)

Francis Butler, *Breeding, Training, Diseases, etc., of Dogs* (1860, 1879): “The dog should learn to obey from a desire to please his master rather than from fear of punishment” (quoted in Rossignol 208).

Gordon W. Stables, *The Practical Kennel Guide* (1877): “Love and respect would teach obedience, and this obedience would of course pave the way for the dog’s training and thorough domestication” (17).

S.T. Hammond, *Practical Dog Training; or, Training vs. Breaking* (1901): “The first step to be taken in the education of your dog is to win his affection.... He is among strangers, and is very lonely. See to it therefore that you are the first new friend he makes....The first thing you should teach him is a lesson in obedience” (151-2).³¹

At one level, these pedagogies reflect the spirit of an age of humaneness and the impact of animal protectionism discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2. These echoing examples also show that to “obey” and to “love” are linked. Taken together, these texts illustrate that during the course of the mid- to late- nineteenth century it became common for dog training manuals to dictate control of the dog through the affections: the “first step” is to “win”—that is, to earn, through effort and work—the dog’s love, from which total obedience follows.

An 1879 medical book, *Mind in the Lower Animals in Health and Disease*, contrasts the fear-based method of dog training to this love-based method, finding that they “lead frequently to the same apparent result—obedience in servitude,” albeit from different motives (Lindsay 267). The dog trained by love would exhibit a “calm, steady confidence” rather than “timidity and nervousness” (Lindsay 267)—love-mastery would, in effect, inculcate a becomingly self-possessed, masculine demeanor rather than a feminine skittishness. This emphasis suggests that it became imperative that the canine servant’s subjectivity be carefully trained to preserve

³¹ What is striking about this selection is not only their remarkable redundancy as to the point at hand—training for absolute obedience through the affection of the dog—but also that the later manual, Hammond’s 1901 *Practical Dog Training*, claims to offer a *new* system in the face of all this recent and pre-existing literature.

“confidence”—some measure of independence and agency—whilst it performed servile obedience. The dog must *desire* to serve its human master, and do so with pleasure; its heart and mind must be won for service for and *by* the master, whose success would reflect on his own ability to restrain his bestial passions. The good temper of the master would be reflected by the good temper of the dog; as *Cassell’s Household Guide* (1869) instructs, in training, “a command of temper is indispensable... kindness, firmness, and indomitable patience will always succeed. No other rules can be needed, for no boy ever yet failed in training his dog to do anything he desired” (“Animals Kept for Pleasure” 108-9). In the words of *Dogs of the British Islands*, the “good-tempered sensible master...knows how to control[,]” and trains “his young ‘fellow-servant’” with “pleasure” (“Stonehenge” 176); both for the master and the canine “servant,” the training experience is supposed to elicit pleasure, and on the part of the dog, self-sacrificing love—a binding affective technology with the ultimate goal of creating hierarchical and masculinized master and servant subjectivities. The dog’s pleasure at being dominated becomes singularly important as a way to reflect the level of advancement of human society: “That is an advanced civilization, capable of great understanding and prosperity, that can make the animals which serve it sing for joy” (Bradley 17).

In London’s novels, the vital first step to obedience—the dog’s love—becomes very hard-won. We are expected to believe that, raised from puppyhood to age four, and admitted to intimacy with every member of his first family, the Millers, Buck felt no love for any of them: “Sometimes he thought of Judge Miller’s big house... but oftener he remembered the man in the red sweater... and the good things he had eaten or would like to eat. He was not homesick. The Sunland was very dim and distant, and such memories had no power over him” (London 41). According to this insistent passage, food is more memorable to Buck than the humans he spent his first four years with; essentially, London dismisses all human-dog relationships that do not follow the love-master model.

Illustrating another pet-keeping method that fails, the man with the red sweater who first clubs Buck into the semblance of submission is understood to be “a lawgiver, a master to be obeyed, though not necessarily conciliated” (London 12), and the question of conciliation is precisely the key distinction between his fear-based form of mastery and the love-master’s. Buck may “endure” “without protest” a pat on the head from the hand that just beat him (London 12), but he refuses to “love”; he refuses to surrender his autonomy, which is why, although the man in the red sweater patently conquers Buck with his club, and Buck in fact stopped resisting, the book’s illustration could still depict Buck as ferociously indomitable. In the logic of the novels, Buck remains in control so long as he does not love or become affectively attached. The fear-based form of mastery illustrated by the “man in the red sweater” was disfavored not just because it involves physical cruelty—but also, as the dog training manuals suggest, because it is not as effective as securing total obedience through love.

Another example of failed masters are London’s Indians, who serve as an important intermediary stage that says much about the novels’ reconception of canine fidelity. White Fang’s progression to being mastered by love includes, like Buck’s, the intermezzo of mastery by Indian men, as a racist midway point between the animal and the white man; the Native American men serve as his “first glimpse of mankind” and a tantalizing introduction to human capacities (London 159). This stage in the trail to love teaches White Fang many things about submission to mankind, but most significant to the process of becoming open to “love” is “[a] great awe” for the human’s sheer power over “things.”³² According to an 1884 article on “Domestic Pets” in *Lippincott’s Magazine of Popular Literature and Science*, “[w]hat, after all,

³² A 1902 hobbyman’s article on fishing tangentially describes an intimate (and masculinized, in the context of its call for back-to-nature engagements) human-dog moment as follows: “As for a dog, I am sure that his admiring love for his master is never greater than when they come in together from the hunt, wet and tired, and the man gathers a pile of wood in front of the tent, touches it with a tiny magic wand, and suddenly the clear, consoling flame springs up, saying cheerfully, ‘Here we are, at home in the forest....’ When the weary, shivering dog sees this miracle, he knows his master is a great man and a lord of things” (Van Dyke 209). The self-aggrandizement, attained through the representation of the “weary, shivering dog,” necessarily speechless at the “miracle,” is palpable.

is ‘tameless’ but a state of subjugation, a submission to superior intelligence?” (Hopley 479).

White Fang portrays this mode of human-dog relationship with Grey Beaver, his first human owner—a harsh but fair master. At first sight, White Fang is “beaten down to movelessness [sic] by an overwhelming sense of his own weakness and littleness” (London 159). This awe increases when he learns that man has power over “dead things” (tools, fire) —“their mastery over things not alive; their capacity to communicate motion to unmoving things; their capacity to change the very face of the world” (London 165)—particularly when White Fang is singed by the fire that “had grown up under Gray Beaver’s hands,” and ridiculed by men’s laughter (London 168). Admiring their “club[s] in hand,” White Fang recognizes that “[t]he man-animals [are] gods unmistakable and unescapable [sic],” gods to whom “he [is] beginning to render his allegiance” (London 170). In contrast, by the end of *Call*, Buck has nothing but contempt for the fragility of the humans who “had died so easily. It [is] harder to kill a husky dog than them” (London 85), for without their arrows, spears, and clubs—their “dead things”—they are pathetically weak, easily killable.

The white male love-masters, in becoming contrast, wield love and affection to gain obedience: the racial discourse is none too obvious, for the Indians fail to elicit a shred of affection, and it takes white men to inspire the dog’s faithful love. In the period’s ideas of racial hierarchies of sensibility, discussed by literature scholar Lucy Bending, this makes perfect sense: certain human groups were expected to display lesser sensibility to affect such as sympathy for another’s pain.³³ Certainly, this should come as little surprise to anyone familiar with the pro-slavery and colonial rhetoric of the nineteenth century. While Bending does not directly discuss love and affection, nor Native Americans, it is clear that London’s novels place Native Americans rather low on what Bending calls the “evolutionary hierarchies” (178) of affective sensibility, and

³³ Recall the discussion in the footnotes of Chapter 2 of how anti-abolitionists ascribed an incapacity for feeling in African slave bodies.

therefore constitutionally unable to achieve the level of mastery that (white, civilized) love-masters could attain.

With Buck's Thornton, the human-dog relationship is marked not just by obedience or respect, but by an exclusive and overpowering affection. The love-mastered dog is deeply faithful, but as Sully, the evolutionary psychologist, desired, renders its submissive allegiance discriminately to only one man. We are expected, then, to believe that "love that was feverish and burning, that was adoration, that was madness, it had taken John Thornton to arouse" (London 61). Once thus mastered by love, "[h]is master's voice act[s] on Buck like an electric shock" (London 178): a full-body surge of affect, which denotes how little control Buck has left, even on his own body.

The way that Buck is love-mastered is simple enough; it is really incredible that none in his life had tried it before. Known by all his domesticated animals by his "kindliness and largeness," Thornton "entice[s]" Buck "into all sorts of ridiculous games," the injured Buck being not much economic or material use during his convalescence (London 60). "This he had never experienced" at Judge Miller's farm, London dubiously insists: "With the Judge's sons, hunting and tamping, it had been a working partnership; with the Judge's grandsons, a sort of pompous guardianship; and with the Judge himself, a stately and dignified friendship" (London 61)—not the "[l]ove, genuine passionate love" (London 60) that was "feverish and burning, that was adoration" (London 61), awakened by the mode of mastery that Auerbach calls the style of the "benevolent father" ("Congested" 40). This seems even harder to believe, considering that Buck spent his vulnerable puppyhood at the Miller's.³⁴

Yet this "kindly" love takes on what may be considered a sexualized expression, punctuated by sadistic violence. Thornton would take Buck's head "roughly between his hands,

³⁴ Compared to Saunders' novels, the affective use of the dog is even more intense, even though London's novels appear in another sense a critique of the taming of the dog in novels such as Saunders'.

and resting his own head upon Buck's," "shake him back and forth, all the while calling him ill names that to Buck were love names" (London 61): "Buck kn[ows] no greater joy than that rough embrace and the sound of murmured oaths, and at each jerk back and forth it seemed that his heart would be shaken out of his body so great was its ecstasy" (London 61). In turn, "Buck ha[s] a trick of love expression that was akin to hurt. He would often seize Thornton's hand in his mouth and close so fiercely that the flesh bore the impress of his teeth for some time afterward" (London 61). By enjoining expressions of love to oaths and deathly violence, London's novels define a model of submerged masculine homoerotic relations wherein the passionate expression of love for the other (male) is only acceptable, healthy, if followed by immediate recoil—and this passion, while shockingly intense, is geographically limited to the Klondike. "For the most part," London says, "Buck's love was expressed in adoration[.]" but only "at a distance" (London 61-2), an allusion to the distance that must be maintained in human-canine homosocial passion,³⁵ and between wild and domestic.

For *White Fang*, the process of love-mastership is much more explicit, since he begins the novel as an entirely wild creature. Scott begins by talking to him "softly and soothingly, with a gentleness that somehow, somewhere, touched White Fang" (London 243), then hand-feeding him meat (London 244). Scott's kindness "aroused feelings which he had never experienced before. He was aware of a certain strange satisfaction, as though some need were being gratified, as though some void in his being were being filled" (London 245), a void that, like Buck, he did not know he had until the love-master exposed it—the dog's integral incompleteness. Scott progresses to petting and caressing him daily for extended periods, transforming "*like* into *love*" (London 249) and using the "potency" of "*love*" to "softe[n] that which had become hard and remoulding [sic] it into fairer form" (London 247). This love, however, has its own price, for instead of satisfaction it manifests as a "void in his being—a hungry, aching, yearning void that

³⁵ For more on queer love in London's novels, see Tribunella and Bruni, among others.

clamored to be filled,” and when separated from his “god” and love-master, he feels “pain” and “unrest” and “the hunger gnawed and gnawed unceasingly” (London 249). With a love that “partook of the nature of worship, dumb, inarticulate, a silent adoration,” White Fang is as selfless as the woman described in London’s 1899 letter, unable to resist the call to be tame towards his love-master. The culmination of his submission comes when, after a brief separation, Scott returns:

What of his joy, the great love in him, ever surging and struggling to express itself, succeeded in finding a new mode of expression. He suddenly thrust his head forward and nudged his way between the master’s arm and body. And here, confined...he continued to nudge and snuggle.... [W]ith the love-master, his snuggling was the deliberate act of putting himself into a position of hopeless helplessness. It was an expression of perfect confidence, of absolute self-surrender, as though he said: “I put myself into thy hands. Work thou thy will with me.” (London 253)

It is unclear why White Fang would choose such ceremonial language for his expression of total abjection, except to denote that Weedon is completely his god in some age old way. In eroticized encounter, which reflects greater questions of power, White Fang “snuggles” into the crevice of his master’s body, and in this “hopeless helplessness” he takes an ambivalently masculine (in that he penetrates) yet feminine position—the position of the woman of London’s 1899 letter.³⁶

³⁶ These evolutionist, “call of the wild” ideas are not just an embarrassing thing of the past, but presently lived practices. Periodically, we decry pet dogs as being “out of place”—for example, as recent *New York Times* articles record, pet dogs are rude, uninvited guests at human parties or recipients of human services such as “pet therapists, pet designer outfits and pet bar mitzvahs” (Wadler and Aguirre). In a December 2002 *New York Times* article, “Dog’s Best Friend,” Stephen Budiansky sardonically reverses the widely-held idea that dogs exist to serve as our best friends. As his title suggests, the argument is that the situation has been reversed, and that we humans in fact exist to serve dogs: “They’ve learned not only to fake love; they’ve managed to convince us that they are a lot smarter than they really are. In both cases they play us for the saps we are” (Budiansky). By calling us humans “saps,” the author expresses his disgust for our supposedly degraded position in relation to the pets who ought to, presumably, serve as our love saps, rather than the humiliating reverse. When he hopes to instigate our desire to disclaim this

The intensity of this narrow canine fidelity advertises the love-master model of pet-keeping: Buck and White Fang are each “tested” for their fidelity to their love-masters through violence or the threat of violence. “Nothing was too great for Buck to do, when Thornton commanded” (London 64), including a rather perverse proof: the suicide test that Auerbach describes as “downright sadistic” (“Congested” 42). Taking literally the panegyrics on dog self-sacrifice, London describes a scenario where Thornton proves the extent of Buck’s faithfulness to him unto death: making a sweep of his arm towards a precipice, he utters a single command to “Jump!” (London 64).³⁷ And Buck jumps—without hesitation, ready to commit suicide on command. Similarly, White Fang nearly loses his life saving Weedon Scott’s family from a gun-wielding housebreaker. More dramatically still, White Fang essentially nearly takes his own life by self-wasting suicide when Weedon leaves the Klondike for the season. Fulfilling the promise of narrow, intense passion for only one master, White Fang essentially ignores Matt, Weedon’s assistant, who he sees as merely “a possession of his master” (London 250), even though Matt feeds him and speaks gently to him. The same fate befalls the rest of the Scott family, who are seen as nothing but appurtenances to the love-master, the only meaningful human in that dog’s universe.

Conclusion

A piece by Olive Thorne Miller, author of animal natural histories for children, illustrates how London’s novels operate. After a litany that is characteristic of rants against dandy dogs—listing their effeminizing “baskets, tubs, toilet and table service, clothing, playthings, ribbons, and even jewelry”—Miller wonders “what cataclysm of nature or society may come to relegate

degraded position by returning our pets to the position of abject love-servant, he is unwittingly reprising turn-of-the-century anxieties and reactions.

³⁷ It is interesting that readers typically make more of the dog-sled pulling competition where Thornton wins a large wager by putting Buck to physical service, which, while also a test of Buck’s devotion (measured in physical exertion, poundage, and dollars), does not expose Buck to life-threatening danger as jumping off a cliff on command would. Perhaps this preference is given because the sled competition is a masculinized victory, while performing suicide at will is horribly abject—deeply embarrassing at some level.

the dog to his *original second place* in the animal kingdom” (“Pet-Lore” 362, emphasis added). She then remarks, however, how “really refreshing” it is to meet with a dog “with a reputation for independence of character” instead of being a mere “playthin[g] of the parlor” (364). Like London, Miller seems to want *both* an independent and interesting (i.e., masculine) dog as well as dog that takes “second place” to humans (i.e., feminine). Navigating anxieties about both the loss of the fidelity that marks the dog in its rightful “second place” and the loss of masculinity that makes the dog unattractive as a “mirror” to man, London’s bare-dogs ambivalently embody his contradictory need to dominate the animal completely, but not easily.³⁸ “Domestication,” according to one of the previously discussed dog training manuals from the turn of the century, “implies perfect resignation to man’s power and sovereignty, as well as free and full companionship or fellowship” (Lindsay 271). Somehow, both “free and full” relations of “fellowship”—terms that imply independence, parity, reciprocity, and relationality—and “perfect resignation” are contradictory affective performances that are expected in the human-pet relationship.

Praising his neighbor’s cow, the great nineteenth-century naturalist Henry David Thoreau describes the yearly ritual when this cow “breaks out of her pasture early in the Spring and boldly swims in the river” (quoted in Armbruster 367). Here, he implicitly defines animal “wildness” as a rejection of human dominion, and at the same time limits his praise to this cow’s annual ritualistic “return to the wild.” One wonders whether Thoreau would have cheered if all his neighbor’s cows—or all cows held captive for human use—“boldly” stampeded to the river not for an afternoon frolic, but forever. This brings us back to the point about Buck’s exceptionalism: while his Indian-killing savagery is clearly admired, this bare-dog is ultimately

³⁸ As early twentieth-century psychologist Carl Jung said, “nature must not win but cannot lose” (195). These are terms to a perpetual battle—an endless metaphysical frontier. In my reading, Buck cannot receive more love than he gives, but he cannot be wholly abject; Buck cannot win but cannot lose.

excluded from living in human society, and White Fang's wildness must exist only to be contained.

In this chapter, I have traced changing attitudes regarding the notion of a "bare-dog" distinct from human intervention that ought to be protected from human intervention—an uncompanionated species. If London's contextual history shows anything, it is that, historically, attempts to represent (the thoughts, feelings, likes and dislikes) of the bare-dog, the dog-as-it-is, are—to paraphrase S. K. Robisch's assessment about American discourses regarding wolves—fruitless attempts that actually function as remythologizations (4).

London's bare-dog, the denuded Buck plunged into the wild, offers a "cure" of encapsulated vigor to reenergize an "over-civilized" set of what Saunders has called "brain-workers." First disclaiming the natural fidelity of any dog to any man, London then rewrites canine fidelity to an intensely individual, one-on-one (and passionately homoerotic) relation. For the real animals involved, this move towards individuation may be read both as salutary, to the extent that the recognition of individual dog subjectivities deeply matter, and harmful, by limiting the possibilities of uniform species-wide treatment (or, as the humane movement hoped, the spread of such diffused sentiment towards greater humanity). It is, as Sully wished, an intensification of affect at the expense of a narrowing of its objects: a production of a new kind of super-fidelity, under the love-master. It is a granting of some form of (masculinized) canine agency, only to demand its renunciation in the name of "love."

Read alongside these manuals, it seems that while London's novels championed canine independence from man, they paradoxically promoted a model for human-dog relationships that manipulated affective attachments to rather sinister ends. The dog's love becomes productive, and securing the dog's love becomes the first step towards a new form of total mastery. This humane dog-training is both a model for more efficient rule and a way to preserve the dog's vigorous independence: the painstaking production of an individual animal subject

that must be re-mastered, via love, into abject submission to an individual (male) master.

These are the “narrow, intense” affections that Sully, the evolutionary psychologist, preferred to a “wider, more diffuse” sentiment. One can expect that this limiting of affect operates conservatively, bringing the focus to one-on-one relations and outside of the scope of progressive movements’ efforts to expand sympathetic affect beyond species, racial, class, and national lines.

EPILOGUE

I will not be the bridge to your womanhood
 Your manhood
 Your human-ness

I must be the bridge to nowhere
 But my true self
 And then
 I will be useful

—Donna Kate Rushin, “The Bridge Poem” (1981)

Through this series of case studies, I have investigated how the human-pet relationship has been a site of powerful affect. The affect of interspecies relationship has been actively regulated so that the relationships may serve as discursive sites of relational disciplining. The purposes these have aimed to serve are both social (the creation of the middle-class family as the “happy,” harmonious co-residence of a rigid hierarchy of members) and individual (the production of “good” masters and lovers).

As Chapters 1 and 2 discuss, the “good” dog—through the discourses heaped onto its body that reduced it to pure affect—performed positive services in its relationships with humans. In pursuit of the “happy family,” the petted animals were employed to produce and circulate the affect to bind family bodies together, either serving as common love objects (as in Dickens’ *David Copperfield* and *Oliver Twist*) or common love projects (as in Saunders’ *Beautiful Joe*). Boys in particular were asked, through strategies like the deployment of the masculine aesthetic of “ugly beauty,” to consider the dog as a safe object of attachment, and to use their intimate relationship with this animal in specific (and increasingly policed ways) ways to produce themselves as “humane” masters. Females increasingly became marginal to the project of humaneness, their relationships with dogs a marker of excess affect.

The human (male) head of household negotiated his fragile position of power in a web of relations that threatened, in their sincere intimacy, to disrupt his power. In the first set of texts, the actors (human or animal) may have playfully transgressed humanist boundaries of affective community, but these breaches might have done more to shore up the walls than to dismantle them. Their very playfulness, and their enjoyment in the transgression, was a product conditioned on the continuing existence of the human/animal divide that they challenge. As such, if they did flout the interspecies divide, they mostly did so respectfully.

As investments in human-animal relationships spread and deepened, anxieties arose around the potential threat posed by these intimacies. From the first section of the dissertation, we can identify some major anxieties of these increasingly pet-devoted cultures:

1. There was an increasing awareness of dependency on the beloved dependent, where such love becomes coded as an abjection, and therefore a site of dangerous ontological annihilation. The intimacy between human and companion animal becomes marked as dangerous whenever its binding affects are taken too “seriously” by the human lover.
2. Alongside these deepening intimacies, the proliferation of convincing representations of animal interiority as emotional and rationally sentient—increasingly palatable to the extent that readers identified themselves with these engaging animal protagonists—had the unexpected effect of presenting the beloved dependent as an independent agent, and consequently, a potentially mutinous peer.
3. These concerns about rebellion became entangled with fears of emasculation in the confines of the mistress’ domestic sphere of influence, especially as certain petted animals were already too closely identified with women of a certain class.

As the second section of the dissertation shows, marginalization was one of the key transatlantic responses to these anxieties. In *Stoker* and *London*, we see attempts to defuse this potential for mutiny; interspecies love and care are circumscribed to run their potent course

along a well-defined and finite track. In the case of *Dracula*, the companion animal (and companion woman) who takes up the position of affect-producing, economically useless dependent, may be loved and treasured intensely, so long as the lover maintains paranoia. This type of lover may love with effulgent sincerity, but must all the while carefully suspect both his beloved dependent and himself for the possibility of (gender, species) boundary-transgressing behavior, as well as be prepared to euthanize the love/the beloved if the hierarchies are threatened. If not literally killed, the beloved must be treated as if it/she is dead, freeing the lover from an affective tie that endangers his elite position. In London's *Call of the Wild* and *White Fang*, however, domesticity can no longer contain this menace. The companion animal may be loved, but this love is painfully experienced as an externalized episode, away from the home, like a shameful yet tacitly sanctioned secret.

We ought to feel some disquiet over the shamelessness with which we have used the dog, among other pets, in our centuries-old utopian project of self-improvement, but instead, dozens of contemporary titles attest to an unmitigated celebration of what the companion animal bond can do for us emotionally.¹ We are not merely "Other Victorians" (to paraphrase Michel Foucault's famous 1978 opinion); we are obtusely and profligately "Victorian" about our pets.

¹ For example, these contemporary titles promote the psychic benefits of animals to humans: Alan Beck and Aaron Katcher, *Between Pets and People: The Importance of Animal Companionship* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1996); James Serpell, *In the Company of Animals: A Study of Human-Animal Relationships* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Gail F. Melson, *Why the Wild Things Are: Animals in the Lives of Children* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Allen M. Schoen, *Kindred Spirits: How the Remarkable Bond Between Humans and Animals Can Change the Way We Live* (New York: Broadway, 2002); Diana L. Guerrero, *What Animals Can Teach Us About Spirituality: Inspiring Lessons from Wild and Tame Creatures* (Woodstock, Vermont: Skylight Paths Publishing, 2003); Temple Grandin and Catherine Johnson, *Animals Make Us Human: Creating the Best Life for Animals* (New York: Mariner Books, 2010); and Susan Chernak McElroy, *Animals as Teachers and Healers: True Stories and Reflections* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998). This approach does not exclude others' attempts to insist that animals might still be useful to humans in non-psychic ways, such as providing new foods and medicines. Other threads include the promotion of dog-keeping for exercise ("Forget the treadmill. Get a Dog," says the *New York Times* [Parker-Pope]) or youthful looks ("10 Reasons Why You Should Get a Dog Instead of a Facelift," offers a plastic surgeon [Tornambe]). This celebration of human-companion animal relations is even more suspect in light of Hal Herzog's blog post in *Psychology Today*, which performs an overview of thirty years of studies in scientific journals on the so-called healthful "pet effect" and finds that it remains an "unsubstantiated hypothesis" (Herzog).

Then as now, we have made the human-dog relationship a site of disciplinary subjectification, and there is no doubt that we use pet animals for affective purposes more than ever. James Serpell, contemporary animal advocate, claims that “keeping a dog, say, for companionship is no more outlandish or profligate than wearing an overcoat to keep out the cold” (119), paradoxically reducing the animal to a functional garment in his sincere effort to raise it in our estimation.

In this epilogue, I would like to consider how nineteenth-century notions and attitudes can shed light on the resurgent celebration of pet-keeping in the past couple of decades, as well as our increasingly affective use of pet-like technologies. Accordingly, I turn to science fiction and fantasy, a genre where technology is foregrounded. By exploring the thread of pet-keeping in Philip K. Dick’s *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968) and Philip Pullman’s *His Dark Materials* (1990s), I hope to apply some of the ideas tracked in this dissertation towards understanding contemporary pet-keeping practices as well as future directions. My dissertation has also shown, among other things, that pet-keeping was, in the nineteenth century, conceived of as a utopian project to consciously alter the course of human evolution to produce “more human(e) humans,” in their generation and ensuing ones. I consider both Dick’s *Sheep* and Pullman’s *His Dark Materials* to contain explicitly utopian themes as well; the former, in its dystopian vision of the future, offers a scathing projection of the logical consequence of our discourses, and the latter uses alternate realities to prescribe the construction of utopian “Republics of Heaven.”²

Pets (Still) Make us Human

What does it mean to be human? As part of everyday speech, we hear exhortations to “act like a human being” or comparative evaluations over who (or what) is “more human” than

² In the nineteenth century and in Dick’s and Pullman’s texts, this utopianism is explicitly Christian, but space does not allow for a deeper exploration of this aspect of pet-keeping practices.

another. Species identity, like gender, is a construct: to paraphrase Simone de Beauvoir, one is not born, but rather becomes, a human.

One of the many possible routes to an answer to the question of what it means to be human is to consider how pet-keeping is *supposed* to make us human. As I have shown, the pet is an animal in a certain relationship with its master, a relationship with centuries of discourse behind it. In the opening of her 2009 *PMLA* article, “The Android and the Animal,” Ursula Heise draws astute parallels between Dick’s *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* and two recent films, Pixar’s “Wall-E” (2008) and Mamoru Oshii’s “Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence” (2004), where protagonists are paired with animals—in the robot Wall-E’s case, a cockroach, and in the cyborg police officer Bantou’s case, a basset hound (Heise 503)—without much critical pause on the fact that in each of these, the central animal at issue serves as a *pet*.³ In the “Star Trek: The Next Generation” television series that ran from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the android character Data repeatedly attempts to acquire the capacity for human emotions, and one of his attempts is to keep an orange tabby, Spot, who thrives well under his care. In “Wall-E,” the garbage-disposal robot makes a charming pet out of a most unexpected being—a large cockroach—and each scene where he cares for the cockroach endears him as an affectively capable being, the perfect new Adam of a post-apocalyptic Earth reboot. In Marge Piercy’s engaging novel, *He, She, It* (1991), the cyborg Yod reaches a milestone in his humanization lessons when the pet cats finally show him affection. What are the underlying assumptions that support the popular ideas that both only a sufficiently “human” creature wants and can keep a pet, and that a pet will only recognize a sufficiently “human” creature as its owner? Why have we become, in recent decades, fascinated with “testing” and affirming these premises with android/cyborg characters?

³ Heise does allude to the pet-like use of electric animals in her earlier article published in Cary Wolfe’s *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal* (2003).

Consider the virally-disseminated satirical rendition of Rudolph F. Zallinger's "March of Progress," which since its debut in the 1956 book, *Early Man*, has become an iconic figure of human evolution (albeit a grossly incorrect, teleologically-minded one). The image posits the development of more advanced technologies as the cause of human bodily devolution: witness the atrophied male body slumped over its (too-)wonderful tool, the computer. Echoing these anxieties of overtechnologization, Jaron Lanier, N. Katherine Hayles, Francis Fukuyama, Bill Kibben, and many others⁴ have critiqued the effects of increasingly defining the human in terms of the machine. The tool, it is feared, has overtaken man. Our "humanity" is at stake, because what we posit as nature (our animality, animals, nature) is in danger of being obliterated by what we posit as culture (advanced technology). In part, our obsession with the theme of faithful or rebellious pets springs from the anxiety that we might be becoming so dependent on technology that we are necessarily and irrevocably losing our humanity. Margaret Saunders (discussed in Chapter 2) might have called us "brain workers" and criticized that slumped man for lacking "any more back-bone than a caterpillar" (*BJ* 173).

We have never been human, one might say in response: we have long defined ourselves in dichotomous juxtapositions to non-human Others (be they animal, vegetable, mineral, or metal). But this largely falls on deaf ears: our cultural dependency on the dichotomies of nature/culture, animal/human, and human/machine are deeply ingrained, and the slippery ideas mutate like an unfortunate virus. In recent years, as Donna Haraway has noted in *When Species Meet* (2008) and *Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (2003), biophilia (or what Haraway calls "caninophilic narcissism," as it relates to

⁴ For more on this subject, see Jaron Lanier, *You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto* (New York: Vintage, 2011); N. Katherine Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Bill Kibben, *Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2003); and Francis Fukuyama, *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (New York: Picador, 2002). This is also connected to the turn-of-the-century fear of effete, over-civilized "neurasthenics" and the need to reclaim what Matthew Frye Jacobson has called "barbarian virtues," after Teddy Roosevelt's use of the phrase (ideas also discussed in Chapters 2 and 4).

dogs) has increasingly been seen as the antithesis of technophilia (*Companion Species* 33): we still very much believe that the dog's unconditional love can *make* us human. More and more, prescriptions for affective attachments to animal companions are doled out to alleviate the alienation characteristic of the modern, technologically-saturated condition. Today, it seems that relationships with dogs are being promoted much like they were in the nineteenth century: offered as humanizing technologies in the face of organic life's alleged antithesis, technology. The more we expose ourselves to certain kinds of technology, the less human we are; the more we maintain intimacies with petted animals, the more humanity we may cultivate. This makes the focus on companion animals particularly relevant: this powerful and widespread centuries-old belief that pets have myriad psychic improving effects on the humans lucky enough⁵ to be exposed to them, perhaps enough to dampen or forestall the effects of this creeping technologization. Getting a dog has so long been an affective salve: or rather, given my discussion in this dissertation, keeping a dog has been made into an affective cure-all.

Given centuries of reducing the petted animal to a limitless font of pure affect, this animal turn makes perfect sense. Like an animal, I feel, therefore I am not a machine; I am human. As an exemplary expression of this belief, consider the decorative sign at my veterinarian's office that features a St. Bernard—the breed famous for locating and bringing warming spirits to lost, half-frozen wanderers on the tundra—with a sign around his neck that reads: “Our furry friends—We rescue their lives, they rescue our hearts.” We—the urbane, the technologically advanced—are *cold*; we are in the tundra of chilling affect. The St. Bernard comes to “our” rescue with a barrel of *heart* precisely because it is the “animal” ability to “love”

⁵ It does cost a lot of money to keep a pet, especially by middle-class standards. According to the American Pet Products Association, the total U.S. pet industry expenditures for 2010 were an estimated \$47.7 billion, up from \$17 billion in 1994, in food, supplies, medicine, veterinary care, live animal purchases, and pet services such as grooming and boarding (“Industry Statistics & Trends”). For an individual pet dog, the ASPCA estimates the annual cost to be \$580-\$875, not including “capital costs” in equipment and initial medical care ranging from \$470-\$560 (“Pet Care Costs”).

that makes us “human,” and also because “we” supposedly exercise this ability best by “rescuing” helpless animals.

In *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, Philip K. Dick describes a post-apocalyptic Earth blighted with radioactive dust and sparsely peopled with affectively disabled humans. There’s much to be remarked upon in this complex novel, but in the interests of brevity I will track just a couple of salient threads. In this dystopian context of rampant emotional disability, empathy for animal suffering becomes the most important distinction between humans and the androids (the “andys”) whose slave labor enables the colonization of Mars—not unlike the nineteenth century’s valuing of humaneness towards animals as a sign of ethical character and high acculturation. In fact, it could be said that *Sheep* takes these premises to their logical conclusion.

In the beginning of the novel, Deckard is deadly certain of a clear distinction between a live and a “mere electric animal” (Dick 4): “He wished to god he had a horse, in fact any animal” (Dick 9), instead of his electric sheep. His shame over this false sheep, alongside bitter thoughts regarding his apathetic, alienated wife, motivate him to risk his life andy-hunting in order to earn the usurious purchase price of a “real” sheep. The destruction of nature precipitates its domestic embrace; few or no live animals exist outside of direct human ownership, in the “wild.” In the post-apocalyptic world of *Sheep*, every living non-human being, from animal to insect, now only exists as a commodity for the production of affect, and this is not unlike the function that is performed by the Penfield mood organ that is featured in the novel. As with affect-producing pets, the affect-regulating mood organ allows humans to control their emotions. Like the mood organ, companion animals serve as affective technologies for the production of positive affect on a desolate, alienated Earth. Humans are encouraged to form bonds of love with certain animals, as if the preservation of the “feeling human” requires the maintenance of active relationships with pets.

Deprived of affect by design, the unfortunate andys are categorically excluded from human rights and privileges. It is Rick Deckard's job, as bounty hunter, to exterminate any andys that have escaped their enslavement, on the basis of a test that checks for the "appropriate" affect towards the suffering of animals, the Voigt-Kampff Empathy Test. In *Sheep*, the premise of the distinction—that humans have empathy while androids do not—becomes a required practice as every human feels compelled to perform this affect as a public spectacle by keeping an animal as a pet. It becomes "immoral and anti-empathic" to not keep a pet; in fact, after World War Terminus precipitated global eco-disaster, it became a crime to not take care of an animal (Dick 13). *Sheep*, like "Wall-E," is fundamentally a story about humans destroying the planet with their violent use of technologies and their unrestrained selfishness. According to feminist science historian Sherryl Vint, the "general critical consensus [is] that the novel's major concern is with alienated, modern, technologized life rendering humans increasingly cold and android-like" (112).

In the dichotomous logic of this culture, pet-keeping and andy-keeping both signify the power to have, rather than be, a servant or dependent. This is why, paradoxically, a pet-keeper's status rises with the difficulty posed by the pet. Deckard, deeply frustrated over his electric animal (a replica of his dead sheep), insists that he does not want "a domestic pet," but rather "a large animal" (Dick 14). The more difficult it is to take care of the useless dependent, the more care-taking credibility the human master can claim. The larger animals are housed on rooftops—no matter how dangerous a practice this proves to be for the animal—to be displayed to neighbors as a badge of one's care-taking prowess. As Mrs. Klugman says in her interview from Mars, the colony hewed by andy slave labor, owning an android brings "dignity" to her family: "Having a servant you can depend on in these troubled times... I find it reassuring" (Dick 18). In their loyal servitude, both "real" pet animals and slave androids confer "dignity" and bring

ontological reassurance to their masters, either on the irradiated Earth or the barren terrain of Mars.

In *Sheep*, although “real” animal pets seem to be the antitheses of electric animals and andys, they all play the role of unconditionally loyal servant to human masters. As advertised, androids “duplicat[e] the halcyon days of the pre-Civil War Southern states! Either as body servants or tireless field hands, the custom-tailored humanoid robot [is] designed specifically for YOUR UNIQUE NEEDS, FOR YOU AND YOU ALONE” (Dick 17-8). Of course, there is an allusion to American slaves, but also to an implied friendship, as the advertisement goes on to describe the andy as “[a] loyal, trouble-free companion in the greatest, boldest adventure contrived by man” (Dick 18)—a startling echo of an 1891 description of the dog as “that creature which has been to man in every age of the world, a companion, a helper, an educator, a most faithful friend” (Mills, W. 4). Andys are also confusingly like “real” and electric pets, except that their human masters are legally and socially forbidden from forming any affective attachments to their android servants. As Yi-Fu Tuan argues, virtually all human relationships to animals and nature are marked by human dominance, which in the case of pets is covered over with affection: “Dominance may be cruel and exploitative, with no hint of affection in it. What it produces is the victim. On the other hand, dominance may be combined with affection, and what it produces is the pet” (2). In Tuan’s formulation, andys are the victims, while animals are the pets—both are the products of human dominance. Each is enslaved to rigidly maintain categories of human use—the andys physical, and “real” animals emotional—and both uses are sanctioned and celebrated.

Humans may, in their obsessive need and worshipful care and devotion, appear almost in thrall of their pet animals, but this thralldom seems to be part of the shell game, just as human reliance on andys must be vehemently denied. In fact, both andy and pet must exist to justify the exploitation of the other: the exploitation of andys makes possible the reverence for

the “real” animal, and vice versa.

In fact, the revered animal is not necessarily respected. Heise describes *Sheep* society as one where “empathy and care for (‘real’ or artificial) animals” is “characterized by awe and respect for animals” (“Android” 506), but this is only part of a very contradictory story. After all, is it typical to have great “awe” and “respect” for beings that we consider as wholly dependent on human care? When Deckard’s precious “real” sheep dies because he fails to remove a tiny piece of the wiring that holds together bales of feed, is the sheep not rather pathetic? In a culture that values self-reliance, ability, and independence, to what extent can one revere a being that can only blindly munch the feed that is put in front of it, with so weak a digestive system that a bit of wiring causes it to keel over dead? At the very least, it seems clear that our culture requires a being to be marked as dependent—as in need and unable to provide for this need on its own or as unconditionally in “love”—and therefore inferior, in order for that being to hit the necessary affective register to receive care. At the same time, that being may inspire revulsion for its very dependency. This is a sensitive dialectic, and *Sheep* suggests that the reverence for “real” animals is made possible by the externalization of such revulsion onto the pet’s and pet owner’s electric counterparts by the rigid enforcement of distinctions between “real” and electric beings. Necessarily, this destroys the possibility of an affective community of *peers*, since no peer can take care of another without first demoting the Other from peership, and none can accept care without feeling degraded.

In fact, in *Sheep*, such high-maintenance (“real,” large) animals are precisely valued over those that need less human care, suggesting that what is really important here is that the chosen pet creates a lot of opportunities for the human to feel of care-taking service, so that the more dependent the animal seems to be, the more pleasurable the exercise of pet-keeping.⁶ In effect, it

⁶ This preference for dependency in a pet is, I suggest, a primary reason why in the West we say much more wonderful things about dogs as pets than cats. In essence, cats are reviled for their apparently

is not pets *per se*, but rather pet-*keeping* that has human-making effects. But what sort of humans are produced? As a subjectivizing practice, pet-keeping is the cultural practice that allows pet masters to learn, develop, and naturalize key ideologies in Western social structures—our highly fine-tuned affective hierarchies of care that distinguish so carefully between what we can exploit or love. It also naturalizes the dialectic that only that which is conceptualized as beneath us may receive our care. Consider again the link I established in this dissertation between the ideologies that place white women on a “pedestal” of care and protection on the basis of an imputation of inherent delicacy, and their resounding resonance with the ideologies that define the dog as an economically defunct font of affect for domestic usage. In *David Copperfield*, Dora Copperfield (paired with her doppelgänger spaniel, Jip), the charmingly useless wife of Chapter 1, inspires both David’s worship and contempt; in *Dracula*, the threat of the useless, lapdog-like wife is managed by suspicion, surveillance, and extermination. At the same time, this alleged delicacy inspires contempt for the weaknesses of the “fair” sex.⁷

The anxiety expressed by the motif of a humanoid machine (like andys, Data, Wall-E, Bantou, or Yod) successfully keeping a pet is much more than a desire to claim that the necessary “warmth” that a pet allegedly needs is only producible by humans—although it certainly is that—but further still, the anxiety seems to be tied to a loss of power. One, we claim as inherently “human” the right to power by the “warmth” that supposedly makes humans fit to be masters of the less capable (affectionate, not cold and unmerciful, masters). Two, it is an expression of revulsion at the idea that a machine may be allowed to be the boss of anything—

offensive degree of self-reliance. According to Leo K. Bustad, “[i]n describing a dog, people often use the words *friendly*, *loyal*, and *obedient*, while a cat may be described as *independent*, *wild*, and *unpredictable*” (235).

⁷ Another example is in international relations: the same belief that citizens of another nation cannot help themselves becomes both a motivation to aid them and a justification for disregarding their claims for self-government.

especially anything living—because the next step might be that they will be the bosses of humans, a sentiment expressed in multitudes of movies.⁸

Animals 'R' Us

The post-apocalyptic subject with his pet—this self + dog unit—is a deeply comforting pairing that allows the surviving and rare human to be represented as both care-taking and masterful. The pet defines the human as essentially, at core, a utopian subject—a community-seeking, peaceful subject—even as they stand seemingly together in the bleak and desolate terrain of a human-caused post-apocalypse. Paired with his pet, the human is also the locus of new community, and in both *Sheep* and “Wall-E” he evinces this potential by ending the novel in a loving heterosexual relationship. And yet the pet produces this by inhabiting an inferior role, both figuratively and narratively, to mark the protagonist as an empathic, social being. The beloved pet signals human goodness, and the route to redemption.⁹

Drawing heavily on John Milton’s seventeenth-century epic, *Paradise Lost*, Philip Pullman’s *His Dark Materials* trilogy (*The Golden Compass*, *The Subtle Knife*, and *The Amber Spyglass*) binds humans inextricably to animal “daemons,” soul-spirits that essentially embody the “animal” part of humanity (creativity, adaptability, agency), without which humans become tractable and soulless. The tension of the three-part epic, published in the mid-1990s, hinges on

⁸ To name a few movies of recent vintage featuring machines that seek to dominate or exterminate the human race: “Transformers” (2007), “War of the Worlds” (2005), the “Terminator” trilogy (1984, 1991, 2009), and the “Matrix” trilogy (1999 and 2003).

⁹ While the dog, for example, is constructed as “man’s best friend,” we feel compelled to tell tales of how we are good to faithful animals in return. These stories become part of the Grand Narrative of being human: the human-plus-pet in the post-apocalypse is a motif that defines the essential human, removed from the oppressions and suppressions of “civilization,” as a “natural” care-taker of lesser creatures. As Heise and Simon Cole suggest, there is certainly some element of guilty anxiety behind this need to repackage the human species as “biophilic”—as a “natural” lover of life and nature. E.O. Wilson, the sociobiologist, has argued that animal empathy is a fundamental human value; “that what he [calls] ‘biophilia,’ the love of nature, is an evolved genetic trait” (in Cole 182). Wilson’s argument posits biophilia as a sign of human advancement, and essentially human in a scientifically provable way. This mandate gives license to label and punish others for being less human—as in Simon Cole’s example, the backward Chinese who cannot resist a good tiger bone aphrodisiac, or any other group of people that is not managing nature in the way the Western world thinks it would. “We” (industrialized countries) may be negligent—in that our consumption patterns hasten habitat destruction—but “they” either possess the *mens rea* to destroy the planet or the complete inability to grasp the consequences of their superstitions.

a religious institution, the “Authority,” and its relentless mission to dispense with “Dust,” the agency to sin, by “intercision”—the severance of the connection between humans and their daemons.

The trilogy’s insistence on the deep connection between humans and their animal daemons aspires to present the human-animal connection on different terms. The spunky Lyra explains, “[m]e and Pantalaimon. Us... [Y]our daemon en’t *separate* from you. It’s you. A part of you. You’re part of each other” (SK 25). The human-daemon relationship is insistently of equals, an equality that is conveyed by the way Pullman writes noticeably different personalities for Lyra and her daemon Pantalaimon. Each does not always know what the other is thinking and they often bicker and disagree, but their affects are synced. The trilogy embraces the human-animal connection, setting up a relationship where the human does not seem to be *using* the animal or *consuming* the animal; rather the animal is always already part of humanity and cannot (without irreparable harm) be excised. Throughout the trilogy, the idea is emphasized that a human without a daemon would be grossly unnatural: “The very thought was repugnant.... A human being with no daemon was like someone without a face, or with their ribs laid open and their heart torn out” (GC 214).

Daemons, which take the form of an animal that seems to reflect the character of their human, begin life as animal changelings until after puberty, when they “settle” into the form they will have for the rest of their human’s life (GC 167). They are almost always the opposite sex of their human, as if comprising some complementary and “natural” ideal of balanced genders (GC 124). Servants, *naturally*, tend to have dog daemons, but even these are hierarchically ranked: the Jordan College Steward, for example, “was a servant, so she [his daemon] was a dog, but a superior servant, so a superior dog” (GC 7), a predominance based on her being a red setter. In stark contrast to the servile class, Lyra’s father, the imperiously heroic Lord Asriel, moves in “wild animal” ways, a bulging masculine animality reflected by his snow leopard

daemon (*GC* 13). In this way, knowing the character of another's daemon tells the character of its human, so the daemon is also a leak of information, a site of interpersonal vulnerability: throughout the story, a daemon tends to be less able to dissemble than a human, so looking attentively at a daemon can divulge affective information. This can be a point of weakness because they communicate (*SK* 267), or betray, their human's real feelings (*GC* 89). Perhaps this is why there is a strong, instinctive taboo against humans touching another's daemon (*GC* 142, 275, *SK* 260).

Though the daemon takes animal form, it is not an animal—it represents animality in humanity, and is therefore better than a mere animal. The daemon is an assertion that humanity is comprised of one-third animality; the other two-thirds are the mortal human soul and the part that can “do the thinking” [*AS* 166]. Animality, here, is the affective (and therefore vulnerable) part of the human and—after puberty—represents a fixed essence of the human's character. “There's plenty of folk as'd like to have a lion as a daemon and they end up with a poodle,” a friend explains. “Waste of feeling that is” (*GC* 167-8), for a poodle it will remain. Recalling the discussion of Chapter 4 on Jack London's dogs, the poodle here stands for a dandified dog, the embarrassing antithesis of a lion. The wiley Mrs. Coulter has a golden monkey, the vigorous Lord Asriel has a snow leopard, the gruff Gyptian lord John Faa has a crow, and all the servants have dog daemons. Pullman's use of daemons can only make sense if the represented animals embody fixed meanings—unchanging discourses of species, gender, and class—against which “their” respective humans can be produced/read.

Mirroring her fight against intercision and the Authority's anti-Dust project, Lyra vehemently rejects the notion of turning her relationship with Pantalaimon into a master-pet model. It is clear that when she rejects turning Pantalaimon into a mere “pet,” she is rejecting the Authority's larger project to surgically excise humanity's free will. She “nearly blaze[s] with hatred” at the thought that her separated daemon would instead become “like a wonderful

pet....The best pet in the world!" (GC 284). At times, however, Pullman's language undercuts the potentially powerful message of human-animal partnership: the daemon is first described as "[a] part of you," which is then revised to the more egalitarian statement, "[y]ou're a part of each other" (SK 25). Which is it? The reliably truth-telling witch, Serafina Pekkala, instructs rebellious daemons that service to their humans is their *raison d'être*: "you must help your humans, not hinder them. You must help them and guide them and encourage them toward wisdom. That's what daemons are for" (AS 473). At one point, the text even conflates daemonhood with petdom: Lyra, enthralled with the glamour of the dangerous Mrs. Coulter, goes "everywhere with Mrs. Coulter," seeming "almost as if she were a daemon herself" (GC 81), a situation that she then describes as feeling "like a universal pet" (GC 87).

Like good pets, daemons cannot but follow everywhere: they are literally bound (at least to non-witches) to remain within a certain number of yards. In fact, despite the trilogy's insistence that a daemon is not a mere pet, it is hard not to read the loyal and companionate Pantalaimon as, in essence, "[t]he best pet in the world" (GC 284)—faithful, self-abnegating, candid, unconditionally loving, and forever bound to its human. In addition to possessing all the wonderful traits that the "best pet" might, the animal daemon offers the ultimate ontological security, for she/he cannot (on their own volition) ever leave their human except in death, just like the legendary dog of the nineteenth century. It is worth reprising here Wesley Mills' 1891 description of the dog:

He will love you without calculation. His greatest happiness will be to be near you; and should you be reduced to beg your bread, not only will he aid you, but he will not abandon you to follow a king to his palace. Your friends may quit you in misfortune, but your dog will remain; he will die at your feet; or, if you depart before him on the great voyage will accompany you to your last abode (5).

This effectively describes Pantalaimon. In contrast, when Lyra, Will, and the Gallivespians embark on their journey to Hell, they each separate from their daemons (with heart-wrenching, body-convulsing pain), and at least for Lyra, this conscious separation from her animal daemon leads her to what the novel considers maturity, both emotional and sexual. While the human may (to develop greater inner resources) choose to distance oneself from one's animal daemon, animal daemons must return and follow, even after this profound betrayal, clinging insistently and comfortingly to (for) their human.

In the story, we meet only one significant set of animals¹⁰—the fighting bears of the North, and their erstwhile king, Iofur, evidences animals' constitutive lack: humans have animal daemons, but animals do not have human daemons, no matter how much they might desire it. Having a daemon, says Serafina, is “what makes us different from animals” (*GC* 316). Instead, an animal may construct a set of armor, which serves as his soul. The vicious Iofur, against whom the “good” bear Iorek is contrasted, dares to covet beyond his species and aspire for a (human) daemon: “not content with his armor, he wanted another soul as well” (*GC* 349). We are to understand that such delusions of species transcendence humiliate him (as he props a human-shaped doll on his knee, like an ersatz daemon) and cause his ultimate downfall. “He was restless while Iorek was still” (*GC* 349), and his species confusion allows him to be tricked by Lyra into the fight that ends his life. In the trilogy, the “real” animal is resolutely not-human, and animality (in the form of animal daemons) is effectively flattened into a useful trope. Animality in humanity, as it turns out, may not require relationship with “real” animals at all.

¹⁰ Pullman leaves open the question of how to classify the mulefa, who we might think of as aliens, on the human/animal/machine scale. After a mulefa invites her to ride it, Dr. Mary Malone thinks to herself: “Her steed? Her cycle? Both ideas were absurdly wrong for the bright-eyed amiability that stood beside her” (*AS* 123). The mulefa, she decides, is neither animal nor machine, though it serves as both: “She settled for—friend” (*AS* 123).

The Affective Uses of Technology

I opened this dissertation with the concept of *use*. The word itself references the idea of a “user”: someone who takes with no return; someone who uses others as a means to his own ends; or perhaps someone who, like a drug user, is addicted to the use of something pleasurable. This notion of addiction—the fear of excess, or of the loss of the addictive object—is never too far away from usage. In fact, as my genealogy of the human-dog relationship suggests, the more capable and useful the object that we rely on is, the more vulnerable we feel towards it, and the more we seem to worry about affective inequalities. We do not seem to worry about the affect of technologies with little capability, like a toaster or a watch.

According to historian Lynn Festa, “[t]he patent absurdity of entering into a close personal relationship with one’s watch issues from the implausibility of attributing emotional intent to an inanimate object” (4); the lack of reciprocity from the petted object is what would render the love affair ridiculous. Recall my discussion of *Dracula* where I draw attention to the scene where Mina competes with Seward’s phonograph to successfully monopolize the function of affect-management, and Stickney’s childhood reader quoted in Chapter 2 describing a young boy’s desire for a “live plaything” with its own independent mind and will. What is underneath this easy denigration of affective attachments to bodies that may not reciprocate? Perhaps it only seems senseless to “love” this unreciprocative body because, in so doing, one is put in the vulnerable position of the abject—unloved and unlovable. This vulnerability may also be perceived as the humiliating equivalent of being a cuckold: a male who has debased himself, renounced his claim to independence, in his idolatrous love for an unmoved, unfaithful woman. A spurning, a betrayal: everything the opposite of the ideal dog of the nineteenth century. I suggest that this may be the source of the vehemence with which we feel justified in eating, enslaving, and exterminating those animals, machines, and people that do not, or cannot, “love” us back. If, as I have shown in this dissertation, the “earning” of the pet animal’s love is also a

pleasurable exercise of power, then the watch's failure to reciprocate evidences our impotence. The watch, meanwhile, gains power for every ounce of love bestowed upon its affectively impenetrable body. We do not merely refuse to love them: we fear and hate these unreciprocative bodies.

In Dick's *Sheep*, the electric sheep with which Deckard feels saddled is, at the beginning of the novel, a source of deep contempt for this very reason:

He thought, too, about this need for a real animal; within him an actual hatred once more manifested itself towards his electric sheep, which he had to tend, had to care about, as if it lived. The tyranny of an object, he thought. It doesn't know I exist. Like the androids, it had no ability to appreciate the existence of another. (Dick 42)

The "tyranny" imposed by the electric sheep or cyborg is that it does not allow him to sustain the romance of the human/companion animal bond—that beautiful story of symbiosis between a master and his faithful pet—because the "object" "doesn't know [he] exist[s]." This language captures the pain at the heart of the "hatred" for the electric animal, which is that Deckard's care-taking "fails"; the object rejects him absolutely, denies his very existence, no matter how much love he bestows.

Yet in the course of the novel, it becomes clear that the empathy test cannot accurately distinguish between human and android, because some humans lack empathy while some androids feel it keenly. As the novel progresses, Deckard increasingly loses faith in his ability to meaningfully distinguish between "real" and electric beings. To care (do the nurture work) for the electric sheep blurs the boundary he needs to maintain in order to continue "retiring" androids who dare escape their slavery: "The electric animal, he pondered, could be considered a subform of the other, a kind of vastly inferior robot. Or, conversely, the android could be regarded as a highly developed, evolved version of the ersatz animal" (Dick 42). Though "[b]oth

viewpoints repe[l] him” (Dick 42), Deckard increasingly realizes that “the empathic gift blur[s] the boundaries between hunter and victim” (Dick 31). “In compensation” for killing a particularly difficult android, he feels an intense need for a real sheep (Dick 177) with which to realign his empathy. It is a perpetual negotiation: “I’ve begun to empathize with androids.... That’s why I bought the goat” (Dick 174). Essentially, Deckard is trying to compartmentalize the empathy to only one category of bodies to forestall its spread to another.

While Claire Molloy’s take on *Sheep*’s argument—that “the ‘real’ animal offers the human a unique experience, a reflection of the self that has specific qualities of identification that are not easily replicated” by a mere machine (118)—applies well to the bulk of the novel, it does not seem to hold so true for its ending. “I’ve put as much time and attention into caring for [my electric sheep] as I did when it was real,” Deckard discovers, and “[y]ou feel the same doing it; you have to keep your eye on it exactly as you did when it was really alive” (Dick 12). The lesson that Deckard seems to learn by novel’s end is that it is care-taking, the practices of pet-keeping—rather than the pet itself—that are essential to humanization, and such practices may be developed in relationship to people, animals, places, and things. What seems important to the humans in *Sheep* is the meaning they construct around pets, that they endow pets with the power to create community between them—even though the “pet” may not be a living being.

Do we really need “real” animals to fulfill the affective functions they do, or would any interactive sort of being suffice? That is, any item with a sufficient degree of interactivity on which we may inscribe powerful discourses of love, affection, dependency, and mutual symbiotic support?¹¹

¹¹ These questions have been raised by Claire Molloy and Heise, the latter noting that indeed “these claims would have to be rejected from an environmentalist or animal rights perspective” (“Extinction” 76). This reveals how so many environmental and animal protectionist arguments are human-centric (i.e., saving the environment or animals is a good thing because they are useful to us in some way). Indeed it is difficult to name many arguments for environmental or animal protection that do not rely on a claim that doing so will benefit humans, even if the proposed benefit is simply the need to be ethical. As *Sheep*

Sheep seems to suggest that once the distinction between living and non-living is no longer honored, one might be humanized by the act of care-taking not only “real” animals, but other humans, and perhaps even a non-living being, such as the electric toad that Deckard and his wife accept and adopt. By the pet-keeping behavior itself, empathetic affect might be inspired, even though the “pet”—the object of affective exercise—might not know that you exist.¹² The implication is that it is completely possible to feel empathy towards, even maintain some meaningful form of relationship with, an electric animal or a highly sentient android, because what is important is not the ontological status of the beloved (“real” or not, living or not), but rather the *practice* of social relationship, which can be conducted and sustained fairly unilaterally, especially with an interactive thing (being?). Ultimately, what *Sheep* argues is that, as Deckard famously says, “[t]he electric things have their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are” (Dick 241), and by “life,” I believe he means the recognition that the being in question needs care and attention in order to flourish.

The “caring” is not merely or primarily to enrich oneself, but for the other “life,” even if it is a relatively “paltry” one. The way in which uninhabited apartments burst into endlessly reproducing garbage called “kipple” mirrors the way in which the “real” animals are said to “require an environment of warmth to flourish” (Dick 130). The space, the very geography, needs to be taken care of, “tended and maintained” (Dick 15), just as some of the androids evince a need for empathy and community: species and organicity categories do not determine this need. Pet-keeping, in essence, is the willing devotion of emotional investment; by novel’s end, the objects on which one could do so are no longer limited. One’s refusal to love (on

shows, “awe and respect” for animal life might conceal the anthropocentricity of practices claimed to be pro-animal.

¹² In “The Art of Creating Subjective Reality: An Analysis of Japanese Digital Pets,” Machiko Kusahara presents a fascinating study of real-life affective relationships with A-Life, or artificial life (*Leonardo* 34.4 [2001]: 299-302).

grounds of ontology, for example) is the only meaningful determinant of whether the relationship will or will not produce a “more human” human.

If enough people believed as Deckard does by the end of the novel, *Sheep* society as they know it would cease to be: formerly enslaved andys could be intimate mates, moved from the public sphere of servitude and into the affective sphere of sympathy of the master group.¹³ In fact, while in *His Dark Materials* Lyra and Will must be split apart in separate worlds, Deckard and Iran’s embrace of the electric toad as a pet seems to herald a new chapter in their emotional lives. For the first time in a rather dark story, the married couple displays affective intimacy with each other, bound together by their choice to nurture the electric toad as lovingly as they would a non-electric pet. The radical implication is that affective community might exist on an unprecedented scale—dare I say, on a utopian scale—and that the true utopian subject rejects the bars to intersubjectivity across the boundaries of the animal and the machine. The dog, like so many animals we have charged with the onerous burden of maintaining our affective well-being, may be more than—to paraphrase Donna Kate Rushin's poem quoted in the epigraph—the bridge to our manhood, womanhood, and humanness. Instead, may they become the bridge to themselves, and thereby be useful.

¹³ But then who would be left to perform the undesirable tasks?

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¹ Although not required by the *MLA Handbook* (7th ed.), in providing bibliographic information for nineteenth-century periodicals I have included, where available, the place(s) of publication and publisher information. For a transatlantic project in this time period, the place(s) of publication may be useful and relevant.

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