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**Guise and disguise: Rhetoric and characterization in the
Renaissance**

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City University of New York, 1991

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GUISE AND DISGUISE: RHETORIC AND
CHARACTERIZATION IN THE RENAISSANCE

by

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INTRODUCTION

DISGUISE IN THE RENAISSANCE

"...there being nothing wherein Nature
so much triumpheth as in dissimilitude."
Sir Walter Raleigh

"...in any case, what is shown, shows itself only
under a Verkleidung, a disguise, and an ill-
fitting one it often is."
Jacques Lacan

A preoccupation with characterization forms a conceptual axis through much thought and literature in the Renaissance. Many types of texts take up issues of character, its authenticity, modes of representation, the interrelations between characters. Character is seen as a literary or textual phenomenon, as a sign of personalities in the social world, and as a link between text and context that may reveal the arbitrariness of their separation. These perspectives frequently appear in the period's drama where discontinuities of character are vividly staged. Behavior fluctuates between emotional extremes, displaying conflicting and contradictory passions. The vicissitudes of Faustus's last night, from his ecstasy with Helen to his dread of God's fierce looks, exemplify this sort of discontinuity. Another expression of

character complexity comes in figures who step outside the flow of action to ponder their own behavior, as when Hamlet marvels at the player's show of grief compared to his own. In this case, character compounds into "meta-character," and the relation of surface demeanor to hidden feeling is examined. Hamlet is deeply absorbed with his varying parts, the way he acts as a son and heir, a revenger, a courtier, a lover, a scholar, and so on. Here role-playing is not simply a factor of theatrical production but is itself thematized and questioned. Such instances of discontinuity and variation acknowledge a breadth and depth in the concept of character. The range of roles a single figure presents, along with the effects of those roles for that figure and for others, reveals character as a complex function of personal and interpersonal relations.

The dimensions and functions of character are often developed in Renaissance works through the motif of disguise. Even if considered only as a plot factor, disguise can be seen quickly to initiate various types of personal interaction. In an essay on disguise in the drama, M. C. Bradbrook contends that rather than a simple change of personal appearance disguise is "the substitution, overlaying, or metamorphosis of dramatic identity, whereby one character sustains two roles" (160). Defined straightforwardly, a disguise is a calculated effort by

someone to resolve problems or realize goals in social contexts, through manipulating his or her identity. Yet Bradbrook's definition of dramatic disguise also suggests that beneath the surface significance of deception notions of identity and motivation are implicitly raised. Initiated at a certain point in time, worn and then removed, thereby revealing itself as such, disguise concentrates the processes through which character is enacted and depicted. Indeed it is the representational and dramatic aspects of characterization that are revealed most acutely by disguise, suggesting that character may not be conceived as essentially or originally present. A motivated manipulation of at least two identities, disguise registers the complexities of character mutability and interaction in early-modern thought.

Like many of the disguised characters themselves, disguise sustains unequivocal and ambiguous interpretations. The "disaraid" Duessa simultaneously reveals the truth and falsity of deception, a personified dissemblance who is falsely known as true but can be truthfully known as false: "Such is the face of falshood, such the sight / Of fowle Duessa, when her borrowed light / Is laid away, and counterfesaunce knowne" (Faerie Queene I.viii.49). A sequential temporal control over disguise is sometimes assumed, as when Iago compares himself to sinfully tempting devils, "They do suggest at first with heavenly shows, / As

I do now" (Othello II.iii.352-53). He sees his "show" as presently perfected and complete, and disposable at his will. Conceived in these terms, disguise both hides and reveals itself, is perceived and ignored as a type of semiotic paradox: Q. What sign disappears as soon as it appears? A. The sign of disguise. Within a traditional semiotics disguise might be held to refer eventually to a "real" identity. Yet if the post-disguise identity is dependent on the effacement of another, it would seem to fall short of a personal telos and instead be marked by a paradoxical concealing of the identity it "transcends." In this sense, once a disguise has been donned it can never simply be taken off for the return to an original self or to reach the ultimate one. Its effects remain in force for the wearer and for others, as Iago comes to see, "This is the night / That either makes me, or foredoes me quite" (V.i.128-29). In either case, Iago now realizes that his destiny, as well as that of the others, will be a product of the ambiguously lingering presence of his disguise.

The complexities of characterization that disguise represents in many Renaissance texts develop and recall the classical rhetorical figure of ethopoeisis, the making of character. Disguise draws out the opposition within the rhetoricians' word, whose two semantic elements coalesce and strive against each other. Character-making is problematic

since "ethos" or "poesis" may determine its meaning. A notion of character pre-exists and orders its making; or, character is always being made: ethopoesis or ethopoesis. Similarly, disguise may point to a directing character behind it or may suggest that character is not controlled but contingent. These alternatives denote an opposition between essentialist and representational notions of selfhood, a continuing conflict in rhetorical theory which can be traced back to the attacks of Socrates and Plato against the sophists. The ambiguity of disguise, either confirming or deferring an archetypal self, recalls this conflict, and in so doing suggests the conceptual thickness underlying Renaissance notions of characterization.

In sixteenth-century England disguise is one of a cluster of terms including counterfeiting, dissembling, and dissimulation that links character to concepts of representation. The interrelation between disguise and character discloses the complexities of selfhood that are implicit in "character." For the latter's ambiguous etymology conveys notions of selfhood and signification. The meaning of the Greek word charakter changes from one who engraves, imprints, or writes, through the tool used in these operations, to "the decisive shift in the word's semantic history":

from an active to a passive sense; both agent and instrument become less important than result. By the time 'charakter' first appears in Greek literature, in the Suppliants of Aeschylus, it already meant the impression stamped on a coin.

(Ginsberg 14)

Character becomes an effect--the engraved, the stamped, the perceived--that nonetheless recalls its causal process. It produces and is produced, a signifier and signified, and in addition, as emphasized by the connection to money, it is a token of social exchange and value. "Character" synchronically combines semiotic, personal, and interpersonal factors. Disguise is a figure that enables these ethopoetic notions of character to be grasped, depicted, and then related to ideas about selfhood current in the Renaissance. It signals an historicist perspective in the period whereby traditional forms and notions of characterization are related to contemporary constructions of the self. To us, such constructions may appear as "pre-Cartesian."

The OED informs that senses of the word self, such as the ego, the intrinsic person, the subject of consciousness, or one's nature--all reflecting Descartes' conclusion in the Discourse "that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking" (63)--that these senses did not emerge in English until the late-seventeenth century (references are to Traherne, Dryden, and Berkeley). In Middle English, self was used with a possessive pronoun as

either a reflexive or an emphatic personal pronoun. The usage seems to have been grammatically expedient, with little or no philosophical connotation of the intrinsic person. A figurative usage, recorded in 1605, seems more the opposite of the later intrinsic sense, for it is akin to the expressions "other self," "second self," generally implying "a counterpart of oneself," the self in another guise. Rather than signifying the self as an origin and unity--ego, intrinsic person, the subject of consciousness--the 1605 usage suggests a self-guise, an indelible trace of disguise already on the self that precludes the modern senses.

The OED gives two references from Shakespeare's plays to illustrate the meaning of disguise. Both convey the concealing of identity to deceive others: "Kent; who in disguise, / Follow'd his enemy king" (Lear V.iii.220-21); "Ned, where are our disguises?" (1HenryIV II.ii.78). The sense of premeditation in these uses implies that disguise is motivated guise, the latter's meanings in this period including usual manner, behavior, attire, and external appearance. These senses are evident in Philip Henslowe's inventory of the "playing apparel" of the deceased Edward Alleyn, where included among the "antik sutes, jerkings and dublets" are Alleyn's collections of "guises," presumably his facial masks (Diary 293). The OED notes a bad sense of guise in 1662 as assumed appearance or pretence. The meaning of

guise points, then, in two directions: to a consistent selfhood of one's usual manner, and to disguise, a changeable external appearance that might be purposefully false. Self, guise, and disguise are integrally related since guise mediates between the other two, and disguise implies not one but two opposites, an unmotivated guise and selfhood. Self dialogically relates to the forms of "non-self."

Many Renaissance texts suggest this conceptual interplay. A simple instance appears in Henslowe's note that he "Bowght a robe for to goo invisibell" (Diary 325). The stage prop presumes audience acceptance that the presence of such a guise implies its own and its wearer's visual absence. While Henslowe's managerial acumen confirms that this type of theatrical paradox was widely accepted, a more involved case emerges in The Courtier, when Frederick Fergoso advises that at a court masque "it were not meete...a prince should take upon him to bee like a prince in deede"; he should wear a "false visage" like the other courtiers. This is done, however, not to escape from the role of prince but to assert it more effectively from behind the mask:

the prince stripping himselfe of the person of a prince, and mingling him selfe equally with his underlinges (yet in such wise that hee may be known) with refusing superioritie, let him challenge a greater superioritie, namely, to passe other men, not in authoritie, but in vertue. (Castiglione 100)

The mask both hides and reveals princely virtue, and its concealing function intensifies the disclosure. Indeed, a constant task for court playwrights was "how to create a masque figure that the king can portray or, conversely, how to create a figure that will serve as an adequate representation of the monarch beneath the masque" (Orgel, Masque 22). The equivocal signs of characterization may assume an immediate social and political importance. In Shakespeare's Henry VIII, Wolsey proves his loyalty by reading the king's mask as proof of the royal person (I.iv.77-86). The masque does not simply hide a sovereign identity but signifies a domain where aspects of character and characterization--selfhood, interpersonal relations, and social hierarchy--are being tested and enacted.

Disguise in effect works as a cultural touchstone for ideas about character. Through disguise three functions of Renaissance characterization can be emphasized that contrast and relate it first, to the tradition of rhetorical ethopoesis and the burden of classical thought, and then to the break in the structure of subjectivity marked by the Cartesian cogito and registered in the modern senses of "self" noted above. These functions are: 1) Disguise foregrounds the interplay and conflicts between vision and language in the production of self and persona. It recapitulates the etymologies of character and ethopoesis,

disclosing the signifying structure of selfhood. Disguise depicts a semiotics of characterization. 2) As a process of personal palimpsest, disguise establishes ordinal and temporal hierarchies among primary, secondary, and possibly more personae. It constructs a potential dialectic between essentialist and non-essentialist selfhood. Disguise inscribes a metaphysics of characterization. 3) An early-modern form of rhetorical ethopoesis, disguise expresses character as a dialogic process between the disguiser and his or her audience. It stages the interactions of individual motives within interpersonal and cultural contexts. Disguise represents the ideology of characterization.

These functions will be studied by interpreting a number of texts that contemplate and practice characterization. The majority of these texts were written during Elizabeth's late and James's early reign; however, reference will also be made to Continental works that had been translated and become part of the cultural scene, being cited and alluded to by English texts. In addition, works from before and after this period, such as Erasmus's Praise of Folly and Hobbes's Leviathan, which seem to anticipate or review questions of character, will also be discussed. I relate these texts and notions of character to the tradition of rhetorical ethopoesis. This tradition, especially through the disputes over sophistical discourse and persona, informs conceptions of disguise and

characterization to a significant degree. The conflict between sophism and Platonism, itself denoting a fundamental shift from the admiration for dissemblance that appears in the Homeric works, endows the figure of ethopoesis with an oppositional pattern of self versus other. Differences in the signs and meanings, ideas and qualities, and social values of disguise and character are organized through this basic dyad.

Disguise is a topos of selfhood for Renaissance texts. It works thematically in poetry and fiction such as The Faerie Queene, the Arcadia, and early picaresque novels; it is a motif in philosophical, religious, and political tracts; and, as a theatrical device, it is frequently employed in Elizabethan and Jacobean plays. This wide thematic use should not, however, efface a functional and reflexive relation between disguise and discourse.¹ Like rhetoric, disguise comprises a motivated display that entreats attention. An unnoticed disguise--not the same as a disguise that, aiming not to be discerned, realizes anonymity--fails. Dis-guise suggests a doubled guise, which exceeds a "usual manner" of self-fashioning. It exemplifies a figured selfhood and styled construction of persona. At the same time, dis-guise implies the negation of guise, a disavowal of mannered demeanor analogous to an orator's open denial of effort and design. An intrinsic and ambivalent rhetoricity

thus concentrates in disguise. Disguise is not merely presented by Renaissance works but lies at the center of their participation in and representation of discourse. It is an ethopoetic trope in a cultural rhetoric that enables relations between the social and the personal to be represented.

Repeatedly these relations make manifest such key ideological forms as politics and sexuality. Disguise is frequently used in characterizations of the prince, the courtier, and the androgynous woman, figures which feature regularly in many Renaissance texts. Reflecting the self-other dyad, such characters are not conceived singly but are represented through pairs of opposed figures--king and usurper, subject and traitor, man and woman. Notions of power, subjection, sexuality, and their orthodox realization or subversion are thematized through conflicts between these paired figures. Ideally, power flows from an essentialist kingly self, subjection is the goal of the courtier's actions, and sexuality is ordered through a separation and hierarchy of male and female. Yet the doubled structure of characterization effected through disguise contextualizes these ideals within an encompassing dialogue. They are revealed as authoritative but not unquestioned ideological images of selfhood.² In the oppositions that underlie characterizations of the prince, courtier, and androgyne, the

contested and problematic processes of social orthodoxies are presented.

These issues were written about in a wide range of genres. As a dominant trope, however, disguise instils them with a distinctive ambiguity, a dialogism that suffuses the ideological debate. When conceived as figures of disguise, the king, courtier, and androgyne are characterized through three corresponding modes of dialogic discourse, each of which represents ambiguous elements of rhetorical and dramatistic disguise. While kingship is considered in numerous types of texts--from handbooks on how to rule to history plays--a dialogic satirical discourse captures the complexities of political power expressed in the conflict between usurper and king. The reference of satire to a prior unequivocal discourse parallels the usurper's deviant reference to an essentialist royal self. At an analogous rhetorical level, allegory is the genre that reflects the courtier's trials of loyalty, for its mimetic duplicities and guises mirror his or her efforts to fulfill the code of subjection. Thirdly, the trope of metonymy which, in using a part or element of something to stand for the rest is based on a kind of semiotic dissimulation, represents the sexual hierarchy where the androgynous woman stands, in part, for the male whole. These three discursive modes--satire, allegory, and metonymy--inscribe the nexus of discourse and

character in which the political and sexual implications of disguise are represented.³

As it is a dramatistic concept, concentrated and complex images of disguise appear in the theater. Satirical, allegorical, and metonymically androgynous dramatis personae are thus important cases for the critical analysis of disguise. The involved workings of such figures have often been noted in Shakespeare's work.⁴ A play like A Midsummer Night's Dream, for example, can be read as a prolonged study of dramatistic identity, ranging from the attempts of Theseus and Oberon to direct the desire of others, to the lovers' confusion of identities and relations in the forest, to the performance of "Pyramus and Thisby" by Bottom and his friends before the court. Shakespeare represents ideas of identity as they function interpersonally in "real" life and also as they are staged in theater (a distinction questioned by Puck's epilogue, in which the "real" and theatrical spheres are equated as "a dream" [V.i.430]).

A few lines from the play may suggest the complexities of the Shakespearean perception of selfhood. In Act III. Sc.i, the would-be actors have entered the forest to rehearse. First they must allocate the roles, and we note in Bottom's eagerness to play all the parts an awareness of the zeal for role-playing. A problem arises concerning how to present moonshine on the stage. Though he lacks Henslowe's

understanding of theatrical illusion, Peter Quince still spurns Bottom's suggestion that they let the real moon shine in through a window. Instead,

one must come in with a bush of thorns and a lantern, and say he comes to disfigure, or to present, the person of Moonshine. (lines 59-61)

In this instance of more or less ordinary language, there seem to be at least six notions of "self": 1) the corporeal "one," capable of physical movement and presence, coming and arriving; 2) the verbal and cognitive "one" able to enter the field of discourse "and say"; 3) the speaker's spoken self, distinguished from the initial "one" who comes and says, a "he" who is represented as acting and speaking; 4) the "he" as actor or role-player who deliberately disfigures or presents; 5) the representing "person" or dramatic character, the signifier of the role-player's disfiguring; 6) the represented being of Moonshine, the signified of the role-player's disfiguring. There is a development from the physical self, through its cognitive, discursive, and then dramatistic practices (its increasingly complex symbol-using skills), to highly socialized, symbolic behavior in the institution of the theater.

Within this schema there is scope for further complication through the ambiguity of the phrase "to disfigure, or to present." On the one hand, the two

infinitives could be rendered synonymous by the "or," and refer only to one mode of role-playing, that of disfiguring. If this is the case, matters are only slightly simplified, for the meaning of "disfigure" is itself ambiguous: has Quince mistakenly said it when he really intends "to figure" (as Clemen, the editor of the Signet edition annotates); is he (or the dramatist) making a sardonic comment, or even a serious point of dramatic theory, about the ability of actors, who always mar or deform the figure of their characters; is Quince claiming that the actor disguises (a meaning of disfigure until 1713) "the person of Moonshine," thus adding another twist to the representational screw, one which disguises--erases, defers--the representation?

If, on the other hand, "or" distinguishes "to disfigure" from "to present," is it being suggested that there are two opposed methods of representation? The first would disguise Moonshine, that is represent it through its deformed "person," semblance, or guise, always acknowledging a separateness from the "real" Moonshine. The second method--indeed, it seems to correspond to method acting--would "present" Moonshine itself, letting "the person of Moonshine" shine through the transparent actor, who for the time has no existence beyond that role. These lines seem to note the changing acting styles of the period as well as acknowledging deeper semiotic and philosophical issues of representation.⁵

Shakespeare's plays offer significant examples of the ethopoetic processes of disguise, forming a sort of historical repository of cultural notions of royal, courtly, and sexual identities. As is often the case, his work represents a paradoxical norm for critical reference--normative through the apparent centrality of its language and themes to Renaissance literature and its consequent function as a yardstick for other texts from the period, yet paradoxical by virtue of the seemingly exceptional force and extent of its representations. In this critical situation, where "Shakespeare" constitutes a compelling intertextual referent for other works, the three plays analyzed here in some detail, Marston's The Malcontent, Lyly's Campaspe, and Beaumont and Fletcher's Philaster, are chosen not simply because they reveal further instances in which disguise is written about and staged. In addition, by either exceeding or failing to fulfill the "Shakespearean"--for example, Philaster is often held to derive from Hamlet but then add a stylized Jacobean rhetoric; or, Lyly's plays are judged to prepare the way for Shakespearean comedy and romance, which is then initiated with Love's Labor's Lost; or, the Malcontent is seen to replicate the innovations of "comical satyre" in Troilus and Cressida and of "disguised ruler plays" in Measure for Measure⁶--through such "excesses" and "limitations," these plays reflect the ambivalently excessive

and negating role disguise has in relations to social and discursive norms of identity and character. Their difference and distance from Shakespeare's work seem to reinscribe the dialogic oppositions between a deviant disguise and an authentic humanist selfhood, the latter from Doctor Johnson on, frequently seen as crystallized in a Shakespearean "general nature," "common humanity," and "essential character" (Johnson 241-44).

As the titles of these three plays suggest, issues of characterization are of foremost significance in them. The ambiguous role of each protagonist--the malcontent Malevole, the beautiful slave Campaspe, and the deposed prince Philaster, first threatening and eventually resettling the cultural order in the plays' worlds--each such role suggests the conceived influence of individual identity on social stability. Each protagonist is portrayed through several binary relations with other characters, that are organized through sexual and political contrasts and oppositions and implicitly convey the dialectic of self and other. The themes of politics and sexuality are jointly represented in the licentiousness of the court that Malevole attacks, in the inverted imperial order where Alexander vies with his subject Apelles for the love of a slave girl, and in the rumors of his mistress's affair with the young Bellario that drive a distracted Philaster to princely inaction. These connected

themes disclose the personal and social interplay of desire and power. The three plays conceptualize this interplay through significant, traditional strategies of characterization. The primary focus of The Malcontent on kingship studies character as a function of archetypal origin. The concern of Campaspe with subjection suggests identity as the goal of the ethopoetic process. And finally, through its figuring of androgyny, Philaster both contemplates the impact of individual sexual identity on the surrounding social context and juxtaposes the preceding notions of selfhood as archetypal or in process. These plays thus cover three major categories of character in Renaissance thought, the essentialist, the teleological, and the interactive, while also, as will be seen, investigating the semiotic, metaphysical, and ideological presuppositions of these constructions.

Before turning to fully dramatized versions of disguise, it is necessary to unpack the effects and determinations of these presuppositions on social thought about personality and identity. How do they construct a rhetoric that can portray for the culture an "increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process?" (Greenblatt, Self-Fashioning 2). By examining, first, the notion of the sign which underlies this rhetoric, and then the ethopoetic heritage that the Renaissance takes

and develops from the classical tradition, a conceptual and historical framework of the processes and effects of self-representation can begin to be perceived. It may then be possible to turn to various political, religious, and moral tracts, as well as poetic and dramatic works, in order to investigate not the forms but the dialogic functions of selfhood in the Renaissance. For it is not unequivocally the case that the subject is "unfree...the ideological product of the relations of power" (Self-Fashioning 256). Confronting these determinant relations are processes of resistance, relations and processes both, which the discourse of disguise can represent.⁷

Notes

1. Cf. Derrida's relating of language to the notion of self-presence as the "system of 'hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak'": "It is as if the Western concept of language (in terms of what...attaches it...to language, to voice, to hearing, to sound and breadth [sic], to speech) were revealed today as the guise or disguise of a primary writing" (Grammatology 7).

2. Disguise produces hybrid characters. Stallybrass and White discuss the effects of the hybrid as structurally interrogative: "Hybridization...produces new combinations and strange instabilities in a given semiotic system. It therefore generates the possibility of shifting the very terms of the system itself, by erasing and interrogating the relationships which constitute it" (58). Disguise represents such possibilities in relation to ethopoetic conventions.

3. While it may seem unusual to consider metonymy a "discursive mode," we might recall Jakobson's thesis that the metonymic principle underlies various genres such as realism and cubism, where the displacement and condensation of signs come into play (Language 77-81). Androgyny represents a related rhetoric of sexuality, both displacing and condensing male and female parts.

4. Cf. Anne Richter's Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play, or Louis Montrose's more recent summing up, "The remarkably pervasive and sophisticated reflexivity of Shakespearean drama is not a symptom of aestheticism but the articulation of a dramatistic conception of human life, rooted in the historical circumstances of personal experience" ("Purpose" 53).

5. Hamlet's advice to the players is the best-known view on acting written by Shakespeare, though whether his or the scholarly prince's is uncertain. In either case, the second method of representation, erasing the fustian actor's presence, is preferred. This opinion seems to reflect the development of acting styles through the 1590s and after; as Alexander Leggatt surveys, "it seems fair to assume that in the period as a whole the acting would have reflected the move from a declamatory, stylized drama, such as that of Marlowe and the early Shakespeare, to the more natural, open style we associate with the mature Shakespeare and such contemporaries as Webster and Middleton--where, for all the rhetorical cunning, we hear the sound of a natural speaking voice" (115).

Edmund Gayton's remarks from 1654 seem to testify to the period's naturalistic method of acting: "some passions counterfeited long, whether of griefe or joy, have so alter'd the personaters, that players themselves ...have been forc'd to fly to Physick, for cure of the disaffection, which such high penn'd humours, and too passionately and sensibly represented, have occasion'd" (qtd. in Nagler, Source Book 127). In Elizabethan Acting, B. L. Joseph describes the method and adds that "Stanislavski would have approved wholeheartedly of this" (4).

6. See G. K. Hunter on Lyly; Eugene Waith and Arthur C. Kirsch on Beaumont and Fletcher; Kirsch, O. J. Campbell, and Leonard Tennenhouse ("Strategies") on Marston.

7. Through the dialogism of disguise would it not be possible to take up the invitation Greenblatt offers in the epilogue to Renaissance Self-Fashioning to question his notion of selfhood? The autobiographical reference seems both to express and to defer "my overwhelming need to sustain

the illusion that I am the principal maker of my own identity" (257), the book's closing sentence. This nostalgia, conscious of its own ideological production, seeks to restrain its attraction to an imaginary ethopoetic goal. Yet it's unclear whether this caution is not a last sign of self-presence, a reaction-formation to a growing belief in an ideologically determined selfhood: "the human subject began to seem remarkably unfree, the ideological product of the relations of power in a particular society" (256). May not dialogic disguise question both the "relations of power" and their antithesis, the transcendent "maker" or auto-ethopoet? Through its inevitable unveilings, disguise would preclude a nostalgia for selfhood by revealing "a 'human nature' that has never been 'nature' and never will be...[that] makes its appearance in metaphorical disguise" (Blumenberg 456). This non-existent "nature" or self-fashioned absence may be the "alternative" that, Greenblatt, though unable to utter it, asks for in the epilogue. To which disguise might answer, "I speak therefore I am not."

CHAPTER ONE

THE RHETORIC OF CHARACTERIZATION

"As soon as we say 'character,' or personnage, we are in the theater, but a theater that offers no exit, that takes in everything, that substitutes itself for a nonrepresentational reality."

Hélène Cixous

The changes to traditional notions of signification that take place through the sixteenth century are a fundamental context for the recurring images of disguise and dissimulation in Renaissance texts. In Foucault's The Order of Things, the most important recent study of the topic, the principles of the world picture described by Lovejoy and Tillyard are located within the traditional system of signification, which is seen as having been premised on the similitude or resemblance between res and verba. While allowing for the post-Babel separation of sign and object, this resemblance does not grant the sign an existential otherness to the object: "the signification of signs did not exist, because it was reabsorbed into the sovereignty of the Like" (Order 43). Signs present the world. Foucault argues that by the seventeenth century this traditional

interpretation had given way to one of signified representation: "signs were then part of things themselves, whereas in the seventeenth century they become models of representation" (Order 129). The process of change from Renaissance presentation to neoclassical representation forms the background in which disguise and its related terms feature. Indeed, these topoi are used to inscribe and contemplate the implications of these shifting semiotic conceptions.

The effects of these changes branch out in various directions and are manifest in different genres and media. For example, Jean Baudrillard sees this shift as epitomized in the Renaissance innovation of stucco as a sort of architectural disguise.¹ The plaster that is added to the basic structure is not an inert layer; rather it "imitates everything...and is prestigious theatrically because [it] is itself a representative substance, a mirror of all the others" (Simulations 88). After the rigid hierarchies of the middle ages, an era of "the obliged sign" (85), stucco marks "the era of the counterfeit (the time of the double and the mirror, of theatre and the games of mask and appearance)" (98).²

Foucault goes on to relate this change in signification to the structure of the human sciences in the ensuing neoclassical era, disciplines which presupposed the truthful,

natural accuracy of signified representation, its "transparency and neutrality" (Order 56). The split between sign and object does not, however, only produce accuracy. Rather, as Baudrillard suggests, it realizes an oppositional structure of natural and false representation, "It is in the Renaissance that the false is born along with the natural" (Simulations 87). The development of a representational model of meaning opens up the possibility of misrepresentation. It is within this opposition that disguise assumes its semiotic import.

In regard to language many of these notions are raised in sixteenth-century handbooks on rhetoric and poetics. A central topic for these texts is the dissociation of language from a natural or immediate basis and its consequent representational role. In his lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric, for example, John Rainolds construes rhetoric as a system that has no specific content or reference: "rhetoric can aptly and ornately handle any material whatsoever; it has, in fact, no subject matter particular and proper to itself" (221). The separation from the materiality of content and meaning frames rhetoric in formal terms. Rhetorical language is not viewed as a means of making things immediately present but as the "handling" or re-forming of material. The process occurs because rhetoric is not "proper to itself"--it neither refers to its own essence nor is

naturally present in itself but is representational. A language "not proper to itself" is the discursive version of the semiotic shift to representation and the counterfeit outlined above. Moreover, through implications of the "proper" that will be discussed below, such language has a particular bearing on conceptions of character and characterization.

The handbooks also consider the development of representation in terms of the ambiguous relation between ordinary and figurative language. On the one hand, figurative language is an exception to common usage, that overtly displays its representational function: "A Figure is a certaine kinde, either of sentence, Oration, or worde, vused after some new or straunge wise, much vnlike to that which men commonly vse to speake" asserts Thomas Wilson in The Arte of Rhetorique (170). In The Arte of English Poesie George Puttenham writes, "As figures be the instruments of ornament in euery language, so they be also in a sort abuses or rather trespasses in speech, because they pass the ordinary limits of common vtterance" (154). On the other hand, many authors--including Wilson, Puttenham, and Sir Philip Sidney--describe eloquence as instrumental in the founding of civilization. In this case, figurative language is the exception that proves (the) rule.³ As the basis of ordinary

social speech, it reveals and exemplifies an underlying conception of language as representational.

Sidney's Defence of Poesie celebrates language's power to refashion nature. The poet, "lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth grow in effect into an other nature" (III: 8). Poetry inscribes an alternative world through a mimeticism that changes what it reflects: "Poesie...is an Art of Imitation...a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth" (9). Poetry is not concerned with merely accurate signification, which is left for historical and philosophical works. In contrast to Rainolds' notion of a purely formal rhetoric, Sidney sees that language can intervene in the content and generate new material. Poetic representation is not a transparent mimetic process. Other writers emphasize that the key to such discursive counterfeiting is the trope. In defining it they also draw attention to its representational display. In The Arcadian Rhetoric, Abraham Fraunce observes that,

Brauerie of speach consisteth in Tropes, or turnings; and in Figures or fashionings. A Trope or turning is when a word is turned from his naturall signification, to some other, so conuenientlie, as that it seeme rather willinglie ledd, than driuen by force to that other signification. (A 2)

His definition suggests that speech works through a dialogical "naturall signification" that always implies

"some" conceptual "other." The word's artificial meaning is realized "conuenientlie" and "willinglie," and this lack of semantic pressure suggests an initially multiple signification. At times Rainolds' lectures show a similar awareness of ambiguity in a natural sign: "when one thing can be understood rightly for a second, and can be put in place of the second, we think it has the same force and possesses a similar nature" (105). The process of figural substitution here implies that nature, rather than determining the substitution is itself judged through the effects of the representation.

Fraunce's conception of language is widely shared, by proponents of plain style like Sir John Cheke and cunning rhetoricians like Puttenham. When commending Hoby on his translation of The Courtier, Cheke applauds that "our tung [doth] naturallie and praisablie utter her meaning, when she bouroweth no counterfeitness of other tungen to attire her self withall, but useth plainlie her own" (Castiglione 7). Though praising Hoby's English, Cheke acknowledges as he rejects the possibility of a less than self-sufficient language. The ambiguity of his own words implies that "our tung" is not uttered in ideal simplicity but in "her own" attire which counterfeits an English nature. Similarly, Puttenham's definition of the primary "sensable" trope, "Metaphora" (i.e., one appealing to the understanding rather

than the ear), employs a sophisticated notion of nature: "There is a kinde of wresting of a single word from his own right signification, to another not so natural, but yet of some affinity or convenience with it" (178). Presumed to be absolute, nature reveals degrees of unnaturalness once positioned within discourse.

In these discussions of natural and artificial language, which imply an interrelation rather than an opposition, a rhetorical conception of selfhood is also inscribed.⁴ The personified tongues and words, "her meaning," "his signification," reveal processes of characterization conceived within these semantic and stylistic issues. Thomas Wilson's definition of trope also suggests, through the etymology of "proper" (proprius, "one's own"; cf. Quintilian, "Words are proper [propria] when they bear their own meaning; metaphorical, when they are used in a sense different from their natural meaning" [I.v.71]), that style and meaning are intertwined with notions of unitary and non-unitary selfhood. "A trope is an alteration of a worde or sentence, from the proper signification, to that which is not proper" (Wilson 172), the second presumably being that which is not its own.⁵ This impropriety antithetically reinforces the traditional structure of language through which a self, present in and for itself, is the premise of proper, natural speech. Yet within a representational rhetoric of character, such

selfhood or speech is precluded, for neither is conceived without the other. In Fraunce's definition of Prosopoeia--"a fayning of any person, when in our speach we represent the person of anie, and make it speake as though he were there present" (G 2)--any personal presence (that of another or of oneself) is reliant upon "fayning" representation. And Puttenham, in ascribing a widespread dissimulation to speech, intimates that motives of selfhood thoroughly pervade language: "To be short euery speech wrested from his own natural signification to another not altogether so natural is a kind of dissimulation, because the words bear contrary countenance to th' intent" (186). Disguise or "contrary countenance" assumes a crucial discursive role. Dissimulation allows both the "natural signification" and the disguised one to be read; the "contrary countenance" simultaneously conceals and reveals the prior natural one. Beneath this surface play of semantic identities lies a motive that is never fully articulated except through its "contrary," an "intent" that contradicts itself, a meaning in disguise.

The representational semiotic introduced in late-sixteenth century rhetoric and poetics affords the dialogic notion of a personified language and a rhetorical selfhood. Neither refers unequivocally to an original identity or meaning through which discourse could be ordered. Instead,

language and selfhood become functions of each other. This foregrounding of a rhetoric of characterization both continues and alters certain ideas of classical rhetoric. As noted above, Wilson's view of "proper signification" is traditional; however, the subsequent work of Fraunce and Puttenham on counterfeit representation questions the grounding of signification in an authentic selfhood. The theorizing of representation in terms of figurative language and the trope thus provides a semiotic context in which disguise functions as a complex motif for selfhood. The discursive revision of the "proper" extends to the tradition of an essentialist ethos that, through the influence of Platonism, had determined a metaphysics of character. In reaccentuating the ethopoetic figure of the proper at the intersection of language and selfhood, Renaissance discourse revises sophistical conceptions of character which the dominant rhetorical and philosophical traditions had suppressed.⁶

One of the chief points in John Rainolds' rhetorical curriculum is the restricted role given to the emotions. Aristotle's Rhetoric "demonstrates that arguments are the chief supports of oratory, and that emotions are their ornaments; arguments are like the very body of oratory, and emotions are like an accessory" (117). Rainolds portrays a

rhetorical body whose corporality is logical rather than emotive. It is an ideal body, marked by an abstract steadiness that the emotions, those "disorders and diseases of the soul" (135), would undermine. The opposition between argument and emotion suggests a philosophy of character full of social implication: "let us avoid thinking that the emotions can be safely aroused in a well-governed state. They are the handmaidens of injustice and the subverters of states" (131). The emotionless body, now the body politic, circumscribes the individual and the state and, like a Platonic republic, allows only certain "virtuous" feelings and behavior: "Thus we are goaded on by the emotions, as if by spurs, to perform all honourable things. The faults which are censured we loathe, the virtues which are praised we love" (141). Guaranteed by passive verbs, the anonymity of censurer and praiser, whose pronouncements "we" echo, intimates an ethopoetic hegemony.⁷

This embodiment of oratory depicts a construction of rhetorical character that can be traced beyond Aristotle to the Platonic dialogues. The importance that Rainolds attributes to argument recalls the privileging of truth and reason over emotive persuasion that is maintained in the dialogues. Plato's Socrates exemplifies both a prediscursive selfhood, "an embodiment of essence" who "verifies the central self" (Lanham 42-46), and a selfless discourse with

no motive or emotion--"you must be careful not to let me deceive you...disregard the manner of my speech," Socrates warns his judges (Crito 17a-18a). Through this reciprocal function of selfhood and discourse, the figure of Socrates relates Platonism to the process of characterization, constructing ethopoesis in terms of a presentational rhetoric. The metaphysical opposition between essentialism and nonessentialism is applied to character in the form of the self and the nonself, Socrates and the sophist. In Plato's strictures against sophism an "antirhetoric" of characterization is valorized.⁸

The Socratic character with its related binary distinctions represents a significant break with both the earlier thinking of the Pre-Socratics and contemporary sophistic theories (cf. Moss 215). In Book III of De Oratore, Cicero's spokesman Crassus attacks Socrates for separating "the science of wise thinking from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely linked together.... This is the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain" (III.xvi.60-61). This Socratic anatomy, which will determine Rainolds' rhetoric and underlie Cartesian dualism, marks a specific conception of selfhood, a translation of ethos into the "ideology...of an 'I' who is a whole subject" (Cixous,

"Character" 385), and whose wholeness is prediscursive. The Socratic ethos, existing prior to any representation, would realize an essential truth of character. It presents an ethic ideal that both opposes sophistic notions of contingency and influences the forms of characterization which will be privileged in discursive theory leading to and beyond the Renaissance. This ethopoetic essentialism affects the dominant ideas of character across theoretical, social, and literary texts.⁹

At the same time the privileged, ideal character repeatedly displays a nonessentialist persona. The Socratic ethos paradoxically represents a selfhood whose motif is a sophist-like disguise.¹⁰ On the one hand, then, Platonism establishes paradigms of authenticity for characterization. These, in turn, influence the type of character that can be presented, a figure that, even in its falseness, can be accurately and truthfully portrayed. For example, Isocrates' Antidosis, written as a response to Socrates' Apology, aims to "show ...the truth about my character...to compose a discourse which would be, as it were, a true image of my thought and of my whole life" (II: 6-7). Isocrates' "true image" infers both the accuracy of its own presentation and the ethical validity of the life it portrays. The rhetorical means of characterization and the qualities of character are interwoven through true discourse. Indeed, in "Against the

Sophists" Isocrates claims that the value of practicing and studying authentic oratory as opposed to sophistry is primarily ethical, for "those who desire to follow the true precepts of this discipline may, if they will, be helped more speedily towards honesty of character than towards facility in oratory" (II: 21).¹¹

On the other hand, Platonism also represents the attributes of ethopoetic falseness in the figure of the sophist. This character is depicted in clear contrast to Socrates in the early works Gorgias and Phaedrus. It is, however, in the later dialogue simply titled Sophist that the most significant portrayal of this figure is attempted. Aided by a compliant Theaetetus, Plato's spokesman the Stranger works his way through to a definition of sophistry as "The art of contradiction making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that presents a shadow play of words" (268c-d). The Stranger utters this definition "with perfect truth" (268d), a presumption whose correctness emerges from the laborious dialectic and definitions earlier in the dialogue. This notion of truth is linguistic and personal. The Stranger speaks and exists "with perfect truth," in opposition to whom he finally calls "the authentic Sophist," an oxymoron according to the earlier definition.

The process of argument which the Stranger uses to guarantee his "perfect truth" is one of definition through division: "let us set to work again and, as we divide the kind proposed in two, keep to the right-hand section at each stage," he counsels Theaetetus (264d-e).¹² This binary logic subordinates the sophist ethically and fixes his "nature" negatively: "Holding fast to the characters of which the Sophist partakes until we have stripped off all that he has in common with others and left only the nature that is peculiar to him" (264e). This "peculiar" character is predefined as aberrant through the "truthful" means of argument used to realize it.

Earlier in the Sophist, the term "character" is used to distinguish between the truth and falsity of statements (262e, 263b). In regard to two propositions about Theaetetus, the Stranger says that "the true one states about you the things that are as they are.... Whereas the false statement states about you things different from the things that are" (263b). The meaning of "character" in the dialogue thus seems to alternate between linguistic and personal reference, linking them through an underlying principle of ontological truth: "what sort of character can we assign to each of these? One is false, the other true" (263b). Character is, then, neither a solely personal nor a solely rhetorical concept for Plato. As character, the sophist com-

bines these concepts into what may be called a false discursive being: "We have brought to light the real character of 'not-being,'" declares the Stranger (258d). It is the character of the sophist, which defies truthful presentation, "by this time the sophist has appeared in so many guises that for my part I am puzzled to see what description one is to maintain as truly expressing his real nature" (232b-c). The sophist exists outside an enlightened discourse, taking "refuge in the darkness of not-being" (254a), a realm of metaphysical and rhetorical falseness. There he confuses that which the Stranger seeks to order, discursive selfhood: "the Sophist possesses a sort of reputed and apparent knowledge on all subjects, but not the reality...by means of words that cheat the ear, exhibiting images of all things in a shadow play of discourse" (233c-234c).

"The shadow play of discourse" represents the sophist within a dramatistic structure of speech and selfhood which later rhetoricians will develop. Plato constructs an ethopoetic complex in which character is conceived in binary terms of truth and falseness. This "ethical-ontological" opposition can be quickly adapted to ideological contexts, as the essentialism of self versus other transforms into "us versus them." Integral to this ideological potential is the formalization of the binary ethos into the very conditions of

speech, effected by Aristotle's distinction in the Rhetoric between the characters of speaker and audience. Aristotle conceives of rhetorical character in relation to "the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word.... The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker [ethos]; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind [pathos]" (XI: 1356a). With regard to the first, Aristotle continues, "Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is spoken so as to make us think him credible...his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses" (1356a). Through the second, "persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions" (1356a). The speaker is granted verbal control over the character of his audience and himself. Discursive essentialism realizes intentionality.

Ethos and pathos are of crucial concern to the orator, "the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind...it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind" (XI: 1377b). Dialogue is precluded. The speaker's authority reiterates

that of the Socratic figure but conceals its ideological implications by locating its priority in the pragmatic conditions of rhetorical address. An ethics and politics of monologic control are naturalized as the structure of speech.

At another formal level, Aristotle explains that ethic and pathic effects are realized through style, an intentional form that implies the speaker's affective control and ideal nature: "This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of your story: their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted...this way of proving your story by displaying the signs of its genuineness expresses your personal character" (XI: 1408a). In regard to ethos, decorum expresses preverbal character: "Each class of men, each type of disposition, will have its own appropriate way of letting the truth appear.... If, then, a speaker uses the very words which are in keeping with a particular disposition, he will reproduce the corresponding character" (1408a). Both types of persuasion rely on a metonymic structure of identification, where style comprises a partial set of signs of a whole character. The referent of these metonymic signs is a prediscursive presence.¹³ Aristotle reproduces the binary ethos of the Platonic dialogues: "Words of ambiguous meaning are chiefly used to enable the sophist to mislead his hearers" (1404b). It is only with this phantom sophist, the marked speaker, that the

ideological effects of discursive control are clearly noted (though the bulk of the Rhetoric is a source-book of elementary psychological and verbal ploys through which to render the audience passive, and it is read as a psychological text throughout the middle ages).

The metaphysical and formalist conceptions of rhetoric which Plato and then Aristotle formulate comprise three steps: 1) the structuring of character into a series of oppositions based on truth and falsity; 2) the introduction of a hierarchy into the oppositions in which self and truth are ethically and metaphysically valorized; 3) the formalization of this hierarchy into the conditions of speech in the speaker's authority and control over the audience. Oratorical performance inevitably transforms the metaphysical concepts into ideological interaction. Just as the Socratic persona paradoxically defies the antirhetorical views of Platonism while envoicing them, so rhetorical essentialism questions its own ideal concepts by disclosing their motivated involvement in the interactive process of representation. Under the heading of delivery, the speaker is continually advised, as in Aristotle's words, to "disguise his art" (Rhetoric 1404b). This advice discloses the splitting of the subject at the moment of speech.¹⁴ Delivery discloses the theatricality of speech, the speaker in a verbal drama. "Orators," writes Cicero, "are the

players who act real life" (De Oratore III.lvi.214). The sophist is the histrionic foil of an essentialist ethos, inhering in the characterization of Socrates himself. As Cicero notes, either Socrates was defeated in argument by Gorgias, "and Plato's famous dialogue is untrue," or he "was more eloquent and fluent and...a fuller and better orator" (III.xxxii.129). Both results challenge the Platonic archetype of prediscursive presence.

The guises of delivery reveal the hidden character of the speaker who embodies, not a fixed identity, but motives and designs which change as the audience participates in and affects the rhetorical exchange. The ethopoetic process of character is thus closer to that which Aristotle describes in the Poetics than to the intentional construct of the Rhetoric. In the Poetics there is, so to speak, no one behind character, which is the making of choices in the face of "circumstances where the choice is not obvious" and cannot be predetermined. There is no original, causal self but only that which responds, "those speeches convey no character in which there is nothing whatever which the speaker chooses or avoids" (VI.24).¹⁵

This "poetic" perspective discloses the interpersonal function of ethopoesis and the ideological aspects of character which motivated Platonism's archetypal ethos. (Goffman's "character contests," which "allow a contestant to

pit his capacity for dissembling intentions and resources against the other's capacity to rile or cajole the secretive into readability" [Interaction 240] seem an accurate reflection of a Socratic dialogue.) Recent study of the historical context of the dialogues points to the conservative social motives which underlay opposition to the sophists.¹⁶ Rainolds' division between emotion and argument within the body politic suggests that the conservative political implications of presentational rhetoric and philosophy continued to the sixteenth century. In the later period, dramatism along with sophism becomes the target of idealist thought. The essentialist character opposes a dramatistic ethos that relates to social and theatrical selfhood and often includes the rhetorical speaker. Stephen Orgel notes that "Theater in 1605 was assumed to be a verbal medium. And acting...was a form of oratory; the Renaissance actor did not merely imitate action, he persuaded the audience through speech and gesture of the meaning of the action" (Illusion 17). These connections combine to create a representational character that functions on and off the stage, as well as in transitions between different social and theatrical spaces.

Heywood's An Apology for Actors (1612), for example, stresses that dramatic training supplements a young man's rhetorical education and,

makes him a bold sophister, to argue pro et contra, to compose his syllogisms, cathegoricke, or hypotheticke.... [W]ithout a comely and elegant gesture, a gracious and bewitching kinde of action, a naturall and familiar motion of the head, the hand, the body, and a moderate and fit countenance sutable to all the rest, I hold all the rest [of oratorical skills] as nothing. A delivery and sweet action is the gloss and beauty of any discourse that belongs to a scholler.

(Nagler 124-25)

The scholar's persona comprises a range of verbal and bodily gestures which must be acquired and practiced.¹⁷ The combining of rhetorical and dramatic signs into a general semiotics of characterization is also suggested by John Webster's definition of the "excellent actor," where "Whatsoever is commendable in the grave Orator, is most exquisitely perfect in him" (Nagler 126), and by Richard Flecknoe's eulogy of Burbage, written in 1664: "He had all the parts of an excellent Orator (animating his words with speaking, and Speech with Action) his Auditors being never more delighted then when he spoke, nor more sorry then when he held his peace" (Nagler 128). The possibly difficult transitions between one person's different self-representations were also recognized, as the remarks of Edmund Gayton observe: "I have knowne my selfe, a Tyrant coming from the Scene, not able to reduce himselfe into the knowledge of himselfe till Sack made him (which was his present Physick) forget he was an Emperour, and renew'd all his old acquaintance to him" (Nagler 127).

Even the passions could be considered in rhetorical and discursive terms. Thomas Wright underlines their signifying operation--"it cannot be doubted of but that the passions of our minds work divers effects in our faces" (Passions 109)--and that the passions are structured like a language:

For that we cannot enter into a man's heart and view the passions or inclinations which there reside and lie hidden...even so we must trace out passions and inclinations by some effects and external operations. And those be no more than two: words and deeds, speech and action...for in words as in a glass may be seen a man's life and inclination...whereupon grew that old proverb...Loquere ut te videam, "Speak, that I may know thee." (Passions 165-66)

Initially, Wright proposes the passions as the causal origin of facial and verbal expression. Yet there is also an assumption of iconicity, of resemblance between the passions and discourse. And in the case of persuading others, that is, in rhetoric, this iconicity is itself generated discursively. Before being signified externally, the passions are inscribed within:

Cicero expressly teacheth that it is almost impossible for an orator to stir up a passion in his auditors except he be first affected with the same passion himself.... If I must be moved by thy persuasions, first thou must show me by passion thy persuaded thyself...if we intend to imprint a passion in another it is requisite first it be stamped in our hearts. (Passions 211-12)

The rhetorical speaker moves his audience through passion, but the passion is already imprinted and stamped by the speaker's self-persuading. This reflexivity precludes the passions' separation from or priority to the ethopoetic process of character.¹⁸

In contrast to more recent interpretations of Renaissance theories of the passions, which construe them as either a function of the physiology of the humours (cf. Lily B. Campbell) or as moral deflections from a transcendental identity (cf. Barroll, Persons), Wright's view situates the passions within a nonessentialist schema of character, a sophistic "ethos of rhetorical self-fashioning" (Greenblatt 164). Such a schema deviates significantly from that incorporated in the traditional curricula of Tudor education which Rainolds' lectures exemplify. Nonetheless, a rhetoric of self-presence has been consistently regarded as the pedagogical base for sixteenth-century authors, audiences, and readers, and dramatistic interrogations of this essentialism have consequently tended to be ignored.¹⁹ Yet in adopting this perspective these studies remain within the ideology of presentational rhetoric. Joel Altman's Tudor Play of Mind is a recent instance. At various levels in this argument, a consciousness immediately present in and for itself is imputed. Initially, the audience of the plays is depicted in this way: "the plays functioned as media of

intellectual and emotional exploration for minds that were accustomed to examine the many sides of a given theme" (6). These minds remain above the dramatic discourse, having been "produced" by the Tudor grammar school (43). Altman then transfers this model of the already-constituted consciousness into the plays themselves "by supposing certain persons, in a certain place, at a certain time, under certain circumstances, to be confronting a general question in their own terms" (65). These predetermined characters mirror the predetermined audience. They engage in a restricted type of dramatic dialogue, envoicing already extant "positions" and "opinions": "The dialogue represents what we might call the primary stage in the hypothesization of a question. Its antithetical positions are represented by specific persons...whose function is to put forth varying opinions in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the matter at hand" (68). Accordingly, the characters themselves are constructed in restricted terms, "simply fictional hypotheses that function as the author's instruments of inquiry" (105), their functionality signifying the controlling presence of an "author" now rumored to be dead, and who may not have been conceptually born till late in the seventeenth century.²⁰

Such a conception of rhetoric isolates a transcendental ethos prior to speech. This essentialist move is precisely that which ethopoetic disguise interrogates.²¹ Through this

dialogic process, character and disguise assume diverse values within religious, political, and ethical thinking. Marlowe's The Jew of Malta offers a pointed instance: "'tis the Hebrew's guise / That maidens new betrothed should weep a while" (II.iii.326-27). "Guise" here both denotes a social custom and guesses suspiciously at ulterior designs. A background of cultural and religious division is connoted, in which one group's behavior is disparaged by the dominant social members. Disguise becomes a concentrated motif, both reflecting a broad view of "the histrionic quality of life" (Greenblatt, Self-Fashioning 253), and suggesting specific social strategies and purposes which may underlie character. Baudrillard emphasizes that "simulacra are not only a game played with signs; they imply social rapports and social power" (Simulations 88). In the cultural debate over essentialist and dramatistic character, the ideological values of disguise, through which political and sexual relations will be played out, are negotiated and defined.

The oppositions between Platonism and sophism resurface during the Renaissance in contradictions among humanist, skeptical, and pragmatic perspectives towards selfhood. All camps employ the images of guise and disguise but with contrasting attitudes towards their ethopoetic and dramatistic implications. Disguise is used to speculate on

discourse itself and to structure texts on many social issues. Furthermore, through foregrounding motive, guise and disguise often disclose the ideological purposes effaced by the artistic idealism of the metatheatrical motif.

Anticipating Sidney's defence of poetic counterfeiting, a text like Vives' "Fable about Man" celebrates human mutability and self-fashioning: "Verily, man, peering oft through the mask which hides him, almost ready to burst forth and revealing himself distinctly in many things, is divine and Jupiter-like, participating in the immortality of Jupiter himself" (Cassirer et al 388). Pomponazzi's "Immortality of the Soul" does likewise:

there is nothing in the world which because of some property cannot agree with man himself; wherefore man is not undeservedly called a microcosm, or little world. Therefore some have said that man is a great marvel, since he is the whole world and can change into every nature, since to him is given the power to follow whatever property of things he may prefer.

(Cassirer et al 376)

In the nineteenth century Burckhardt will characterize this idealism in the figure of l'uomo universale, whose "conscious object," he infers, was "the harmonious development of...spiritual and material existence," an "impulse to the highest individual development" (I: 147).

This dramatistic mutability is, however, circumscribed and ordered by a notion of personal synthesis and

transcendent unity which recalls the Platonic rhetoric of self-presence.²² For Pomponazzi, as Ernst Cassirer comments, such unity assumes the proportions of a universal philosophy in which life "means nothing but existence in an individual form and in a completely individual configuration...the basic experience of individual life has also become the key to the whole of nature" (Individual 140). In apparent contrast, at the close of the Renaissance, the Cartesian persona will be based on the cessation of such mutability. A static, formalized selfhood--"my design was singly to find the ground of assurance" (Discourse 59)--and an isolation of consciousness are afforded through the withdrawal from histrionic reality, with Descartes "desirous of being a spectator rather than an actor in the plays exhibited on the theatre of the world" (59). Yet Descartes' antitheatricality is in effect foreseen by Vives as the telos of man. In his fable, the gods, astonished at man's mutability, beg Juno to make him a god, "a spectator rather than an actor.... When the gods saw man and embraced their brother, they deemed it unworthy of him to appear on stage and practice the disreputable art of the theater" (Cassirer et al 389-91). This goal suggests the essentialist underpinnings of both Renaissance humanism and the Cartesian subject.

The skeptical views of authors like Erasmus and Montaigne reject the ethos of humanism. Written early in the sixteenth century, The Praise of Folly questions any possible control of ethopoesis in opening with Folly's self-negating portrait: "Who can better describe me than myself? Unless by chance someone knows me better than I do myself" (102). Folly has no existence independent of her embodiment in others. Her attempt at self-portrayal thus implies the illusion of others' attempts, for though thinking that they present themselves accurately they are depicting (their own) folly. Folly becomes a deceptive premise of self-awareness: "I do not belie the interior of my heart by my outward appearance. I am always myself and they who take for themselves the title and bearing of wise men are unable to disguise me even though they walk about like apes in purple robes or asses in lion skins" (102-03). In later announcing the theatricum mundi theme, Folly represents human existence as histrionic without criticizing or regretting the loss of an original authenticity: "For what else is the life of man but a kind of play in which men in various costumes perform.... Everything is done under pretence, but this play could not be performed in any other way" (119).

Montaigne struggles to realize such equanimity as he ponders the loss of an ideal selfhood. His essays move from rejecting mutable selfhood for the sake of an essential

innerness to skeptically seeing mutability threaten any self-conception. In "Of Repenting" he spurns histrionic pretense: "Every one may play the jugler, and represent an honest man upon the stage; but within, and in bosome, where all things are lawfull, where all is concealed; to keepe a due rule or formall decorum, that's the point" (III: 27). This impulse towards innerness is also expressed in the prefatory "To the Reader":

Had my intention beene to forestal and purchase the worlds opinion and favour, I would surely have adorned my selfe more quaintly, or kept a more grave and solemne march. I desire therein to be delineated in mine owne genuine, simple and ordinarie fashion, without contention, art or study; for it is my selfe that I pourtray.

(I: 15)

Yet while Montaigne conceives of this interiority, he finds it difficult to inscribe: "What hereafter I shall be, will be but halfe a being, I shall be no more my selfe. I daily escape, and still steale my selfe from my selfe" (II: 367); "I cannot settle my object; it goeth so unquietly and staggering, with a naturall drunkennesse. I take it in this plight, as it is at th' instant I amuse my selfe about it. I describe not the essence, but the passage" (III: 23). He considers that the attempt at introspection divorces him from himself: "If one were, he should either be in another or in himselfe: if he be in another, then are they two: If he be in himselfe, they are also two, the comprizing and the

comprized" (II: 233). And by pressuring "To the Reader," we note that the "selfe" portrayed remains in an "ordinarie fashion" that cannot be unequivocally "naturall." As Montaigne significantly jokes, "my naturall forme discerned, so farre-forth as publike reverence hath permitted me" (I: 15); he inevitably appears as a social persona.²³

This ambivalence towards the self is circumvented at the end of The Praise of Folly, when Folly's many costumes and personae become spiritually significant. Erasmus develops the Neoplatonic image of the lover leaving the bounds of his own body, "He who loves vehemently no longer lives in himself but in what he loves, and his joy is in proportion to his withdrawal from self and his preoccupation with what is outside himself" (172). As in Peter Bembo's paeon to love in The Courtier, this ecstatic love is crystallized by the soul's flight to God, a process comprising "in the first place of an absorption of the body by the spirit.... Then the spirit will be in a marvelous manner absorbed by the Highest Mind.... In this way the entire man will be outside of himself" (Praise 172). In Bembo's account, the soul sees its link with "Angelike beautie...(in a manner) she waxeth dronken and beside her selfe, for coveting to couple her selfe with it" (Castiglione 319). The human soul realizes its own essence by transcending itself and fusing with a divine other.

The splitting into inner and outer selves and the fluidity of the soul are based on the traditional Christian dichotomy of body and soul, a fundamental, orthodox conception of dual selfhood throughout the Renaissance (and one which also influences Descartes). Erasmus' famous version comes in The Handbook of the Militant Christian, where postlapsarian man exists as a disordered body politic of soul and body, "they can neither be separated without the greatest suffering nor live together without constant war" (43). Even for the faithful, identity is not unified or static but a continual struggle between opposing selves. In the Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin presents a similar duality but emphasizes its unity: "there is in man one person formed of two compounds...these two different natures constitute one person...a communication of properties" (I: 416).

The trinity is the model for this conception of the individual. In his discussion of the tripartite God, Calvin defines persona as subsistence or substance (I: 111), intimating some important aspects of the sixteenth-century notion of character. For through what Kenneth Burke notes as the etymological "paradox of substance" (Grammar 23), Calvin's definition implies that the substance of persona is its extrinsic guise, a conception analogous, for example, to Victor Turner's sense of persona as a "role-mask, not the

unique individual" (Dramas 237), a relative rather than absolute conception of character. It takes powerful faith or law to prevent applying this paradox to God himself in order to question his essential substance, "the three persons, in whom God alone is known, subsist in the Divine essence" (Calvin I: 124). Hooker exemplifies the doctrinal elevation of God above such questions of persona:

Our God is one, or rather very Oneness, and mere unity, having nothing but itself in itself, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things. In which essential Unity of God a Trinity personal nevertheless subsisteth, after a manner far exceeding the possibility of man's conceit. (Laws 110)

If not adhering to this religious language-game, we might question its paradoxical notion of unity or, from historical distance, admire its nearly contradictory complexity--"we do not disjoin the persons from the essence, but interpose a distinction between the persons residing in it" (Calvin I: 134).²⁴ Either response would acknowledge, incorporated within an essentialist version of selfhood, a notion of multiple and differential character.

In religious texts less encyclopedic than the Institutes, the idea of a character comprising a number of personae is seen strictly as immoral. Underlying this view is an idealism for a united prelapsarian self. Daniel Dyke's The Mystery of Selfe-Deceiving exemplifies: "Nothing more

easie than for a man to deceive himselfe; for the heart by reason of the great wickednesse thereof, is a bottomlesse and unsearchable gulfe of guile: insomuch as none can know, not only anothers, but not his owne heart" (2). Dyke vehemently affirms a human propensity to deceive others that follows the model of the great deceiver. He emphasizes the use of "Dissimulation and Simulation; in dissembling and concealing that which indeed is, and in feigning and counterfeiting that which indeed is not" (12). The dual personality may threaten moral behavior by reversing its fundamental principles and appearance, "These of all other are the most secret deceits, which are thus mantled and masked with the disguised pretences of speciall love and kindnesse" (14-15).

Dyke accuses those who dissemble evil intentions of acting "politiquely" (17). Machiavelli of course recommends the "politique" compounding of self-representation in urging the prince "to imitate the fox.... But it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler" (Prince 64). A traditional folk image, the fox is always already disguised; the prince is advised to imitate it and then to hide the imitation, i.e., disguise the disguise of a disguised character. Throughout this compounded dissembling when interacting with others, the "original" prince remains at a considerable distance in which, as we saw in the less controversial advice of Fergoso

in The Courtier, lies the key to his political success: "Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are" (Prince 66).

Dyke's attack against Machiavellian politics suggests a shift from spiritual to moral reference in the discourse of disguise. In England Machiavelli's name becomes a pejorative epithet for immoral agents, "a damn'd Machiavelian," as Marston writes in the second satire of Pygmalion's Image (III: 272, line 98). It is a synonym for hypocrisy, as used by Nashe to define the latter in Pierce Penniless: "all machiavellism, puritanism, and outward glozing with a man's enemy...all Italianate conveyances" (121). The last phrase also suggests that disguise, hypocrisy, and "machiavellism" become entwined in a rhetoric of cultural stereotypes that is reinforced by international political events such as the war with Spain. The authenticity of the English character is contrasted with the shady dissemblings of Mediterranean types. Jonson presents a comically paranoid version of this view in Sir Politick Would-be, but Thomas Wright also offers it with more serious effect, when addressing the reader in The Passions of the Mind:

Our people for most part reveal and disclose themselves very familiarly and easily. The Spaniard and Italian demurreth much, and selleth his secrets and his friendship by drams...he will show a countenance of friendship although he intendeth revenge.... In fine, he can dissemble

better his own passions, and use himself therein more circumspectly, than we can do. (84)

Built upon a general ethical censure of hypocrisy, disguise becomes an accusatory epithet to be used against foreign as well as domestic foes.

Accordingly, in Elizabethan London the theatrical representation of disguise is often regarded as a key aspect of the stage's immorality and profanity. Defenders and opponents of the theater focus on its influence on the audience. Letters from the Lord Mayor object that "shifts of cozenage" were copied by the audience (Nagler 114-15), and in The Gull's Handbook Dekker attacks the plays' supposedly edifying ends:

And whereas you say there are good Examples to be learned in them, Trulie so there are: if you will learn falsehood; if you will learn cosenage; if you will learn to deceive; if you will learn to play the Hippocrit, to cogge, lye, and falsifie.
(Nagler 129)

On the other hand, a defender of the stage such as Nashe's Pierce emphasizes that the foul ends to which deceivers come, along with their tricks of deception, "are most lively anatomized" in plays for the audience's instruction (114).

In contrast to humanist and religious idealism, which resolves compounded personae into an essential unity, and also to the skepticism about such transcendence, through the sixteenth century there emerges an increasingly pragmatic

acknowledgement of the functions of personal mutability and theatrical selfhood in different social contexts. As noted, Machiavelli's work exemplifies such pragmatism in regard to politics. In his essays Bacon extends this outlook to other activities: "a man's person hath many proper relations which he cannot put off. A man cannot speak to his son but as a father; to his wife but as a husband; to his enemy but upon terms" (Essays 144). Identity, he asserts, is dependent upon symbolic social rules, and the force of the repeated "cannot" is that these rules, while comprehensible, are beyond an individual's control and construct these "proper relations." The irony of proper is that "one's own" now implies the socially determined.

In the preface to the later Anatomy of Melancholy, Burton's justification for writing in the guise of Democritus suggests a similar awareness of the social expediencies of role-playing:

'Tis not I, but Democritus, Democritus dixit: you must consider what it is to speak in one's own or another's person, an assumed habit and name--a difference betwixt him that affects or acts a prince's, a philosopher's, a magistrate's, a fool's part, and him that is so indeed....

(I: 121)

Burton claims a persona, yet the ensuing explanation conflates the guise of Democritus with the "I." The alternative voices, "one's own or another's person," are

distinguished and linked. The "or" seems to intimate the difference of the voices; yet it also suggests that "one's own" and "another's" can be substituted for each other as synonyms. Both "one's own" and "another's person," and not merely the second, are "an assumed habit and name."

This complicated notion of "one's own person" is then applied to various social roles. Burton emphasizes the "difference betwixt" one who "acts" a "part" and one who "is so indeed." Again the difference is equivocal since being so "indeed" implies being so through one's actions or in-deed. The distinction between "him that affects or acts...and him that is so indeed" collapses. A prince, philosopher, magistrate, or fool "acts," that is, does deeds and "affects."²⁵ Although there remains an idealized "him," it can never be reached through the "difference" which separates it from its "part," a part that the "'Tis not I" rather than the "I" speaks. Acting necessarily defers the self, transforming it into an "assumed" guise or persona.

These various citations delineate a range of social issues and texts through which persona, guise, and disguise are important presuppositions. The incidental quality of many of the allusions suggests a wide implicit acknowledgement of character as a cultural process. In Leviathan Hobbes sums up many of these earlier views, underlining the connections

among representation, disguise, and character, as well as indicating their ideological function:

The word person...signifies the face, as persona in Latin signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as mask or vizard: and from the stage, hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as theatres. So that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate, is to act, or represent himself, or another; and he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name. (ch.16 168-69)

The notion of self as representation precludes an essential identity. Hobbes moves from the etymological origin of *persona* in the theater to the broader social connotations that span the institutional settings of "tribunals" and the everyday scenarios of "common conversation." The pragmatics of *persona* preclude the essentialist ethos.²⁶

These conflicting views of disguise and multiple selfhood--as ultimately transcendent, skeptically self-threatening, or contextually functional--reflect the classical philosophical and rhetorical controversies and relocate them in contemporary social situations. In this process of relocation an important change in the representation of selfhood also takes place. Renaissance discourse tends to depict the ideological values of character and characterization overtly. This is not to say that prior

to these texts character had lacked cultural significance; rather, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, character, its appearances, processes, and effects are consciously conceived as central to social practices. In essentialist, teleological, or functional versions, it captures and inscribes the complexities of political and sexual acts. If selfhood signifies connections between the social and the personal, then through the topos of disguise, Renaissance texts represent the premises and motives within these links, and question the ideals of closure which character may seem to express.

Notes

1. Cf. Ruskin's uncovering of the layered stones of Venice, exemplified by the "confessed incrustation" of St. Mark's cathedral (84).

2. A contrast between the middle ages and the Renaissance is a topos of many historical interpretations, from Burckhardt to Tillyard to Foucault and Baudrillard. Thomas M. Greene notes that this distinction was initiated by Renaissance humanism itself: "The ubiquitous imagery of disinterment, resurrection, and renascence needed a death and burial to justify itself; without the myth of medieval entombment, its imagery...had no force" (*Light* 3). Burckhardt, for instance, greets the influence of the Renaissance on his study of it with filial gratitude rather than anxiety: "in treating of a civilization which is the mother of our own, and whose influence is still at work among us, it is unavoidable that individual judgement and feeling should tell every moment on the writer and on the reader" (I: 21).

3. On the relation of eloquence to social power note Wilson's point, "such force hath the tongue, and such is the power of Eloquence and reason, that most men are forced, euen to yeeld in that which most standeth against their will" (A vii). Cf. Frank Whigham's comments on Wilson (Ambition 3).

4. Cf. Derek Attridge's claim that in these rhetorics nature is "called upon to stand for a notion of self-sufficiency, wholeness, and plenitude: that which is without self-division or self-consciousness, and without dependence on anything exterior to itself" ("Perplexity" 270).

5. Similar reflections between selfhood and discourse appear in other contexts. For example, Count Canosse remarks on the need for unity between style and meaning, "For to divide the sentences from the words, is the deviding of the soule from the bodie, which can not bee done, neither in the one nor in the other, without destruction ensue upon it" (Castiglione 56). Montaigne also observes a series of analogies between his essays and self, his lack of self-knowledge reflected in the shifting sense of the text: "There are a thousand indsicreet and causall agitations in me.... Even in my writings, I shall not at all times finde the tracke, or ayre of my first imaginations; I wot not my selfe what I would have said, and shall vex and fret my selfe in correcting and giving a new sense to them" (II: 280).

6. Cf. Altman's comments on the role of rhetoric in Renaissance thought: "discursive practices originating in the Renaissance revival of classical rhetoric deeply penetrated a wide range of intellectual, aesthetic, and political endeavors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries...the analytic, descriptive, and persuasive modes of rhetoric frequently provided the paradigms on which the imagination focused" ("Preposterous" 131-32).

7. Cf. Hooker on this social, personal circumscription through the body politic: "A law is the deed of the whole body politic, whereof if ye judge yourselves to be any part, then is the law even your deed also" (Laws 83). For Hooker. Puritan discourse exemplifies unsafe persuasive appeals to the emotions which disturb the personal and political body. He laments their "custom of inuring your ears with reproof of faults especially in your governors; an use to attribute those faults to the kind of spiritual regiment under which ye live" (78). In the Basilicon Doron, James I also attacks the puritans for their "contempt of the ciuill Magistrate ...in leaning to their owne dreames and reuelations" (16). Their "owne" religious ideas assert a selfhood extrinsic to the body politic. James similarly warns Prince Henry, "beware ye

wreast not the word to your own appetite, as ouer many doe, making it like a Bell to sound as ye please to interprete: but by the contrary, frame all your affections, to follow precisely the there set downe" (29). We might note Weber's general remark: "Every body of political officials...has been suspicious of all sorts of individual pursuits of salvation" (283).

8. For "antirhetoric," see Paolo Valesio: "a sophisticated rhetorical mechanism is employed to convey a message that attacks 'rhetoric'" (41). The dialogues are the paradigmatic example: "praise of plain speech is couched in a rhetorically sophisticated language" (42). In his essay "Limited Inc," Derrida sees that the binary structure of Platonism is imposed in two phases, whose associated values will determine the idealist hierarchy and strategy in the dispute over character: "1. The hierarchical axiology, the ethical-ontological distinctions which do not merely set up value-oppositions clustered around an ideal and unfindable limit, but moreover subordinate these values to each other...briefly: positive/negative and ideal/non-ideal.... 2. The enterprise of returning 'strategically,' ideally, to an origin or to a 'priority' held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc." (236).

9. Cf. Horace's remarks on character construction in the Ars Poetica: "if you boldly fashion a fresh character, have it kept to the end even as it came forth at the first, and have it self-consistent" (125-27). Foucault contends that the Platonic separation between true and false discourse at first undermined the sophists and then imposed a "will to knowledge [that] tends to exercise a sort of pressure, a power of constraint upon other forms of discourse.... Western literature has, for centuries, sought to base itself in nature, in the plausible, upon sincerity and science--in short, upon true discourse" ("Discourse" 219).

10. On this dialogism within Platonic thought, cf. G. B. Kerferd, "virtually every point in Plato's thought has its starting point in his reflection upon problems raised by the sophists, virtually every dialogue in one way or another has one or more sophists either visibly present at or covertly influencing its discussions" (Sophistic 173). On the paradox of the Socratic persona, cf. Kierkegaard's view that Socrates personifies an ironic disguise and embodies the denial of "physiognomic truth [which] rests upon the thesis that essence is and only is insofar as it is in appearance" (Concept, note 234). While he acknowledges the rivalry

between Socrates and the sophists, Kierkegaard also stresses that they "stood for the same position...Socrates overcame the Sophists in a certain sense precisely because he himself was the greatest of the Sophists" (168). Cf. Cicero's remark in De Oratore, "what impressed me most deeply about Plato in that book [Gorgias] was, that it was when making fun of orators that he himself seemed to me to be the consummate orator" (I.xi.47).

11. In the Institutio, Quintilian presents rhetoric as the key to the social education of the "good man" (I.Pre.9), a tradition that was maintained through the middle ages, when rhetoric was "the integrating factor of all education" (Curtius 77), and on to the Elizabethan grammar school.

12. Cf. H. D. Rankin, "Another feature of this kind of argumentation is its emphasis upon dichotomy. A proposition is seen as either true or not true...[a] binary assumption" (19). Like the notion of essentialism, this assumption suppresses dialogic reasoning by reifying the ideal of truth, which is not only the end of argument but the means of realizing that end.

13. Cf. the regulating presence at work, prior to speech, in the Rhetorica ad Herennium's definition of delivery: the "graceful regulation of voice, countenance, gesture" (I.ii.13).

14. Cf. Rhetorica Ad Herennium: "good delivery ensures that what the orator says seems to come from his heart" (III.xv.24); "one must cite examples that are draughted expressly to conform to the pattern of the art. It is afterwards, in speaking, that the orator's skill conceals his art so that it may not obtrude and be apparent to all" (IV.vii.10). Also note the endorsement of the "subtle approach," in beginning a speech "covertly, through dissimulation" (I.vii.11). Quintilian recommends concealment throughout the Institutio; on the rhythm of speaking, for example, "Above all it is necessary to conceal the care expended upon it so that our rhythms may seem to possess a spontaneous flow, not to have been the result of elaborate search or compulsion" (IX.iv.147).

15. Quotations from the Poetica are taken from the Loeb translation.

16. Cf. Poulakos, "While Isocrates regarded education as a field necessary for the acculturation of a monarch, the Sophists' successors used rhetorical training to prepare Athenian citizens to defend their interests in the court and

the assembly--the two places where propertied oligarchs could be legitimately challenged...Plato is Isocrates' rival only in a disciplinary sense...in terms of class, [they] belong on the same side.... Their disagreement as to whether philosophy or rhetoric provides the best training for the citizen notwithstanding, both agree that the institution of education should serve the interests of an oligarchic state" (159).

17. Recalling classical remarks on delivery, gesture or "action" is frequently emphasized in Renaissance rhetorics as an important supplement to "voyce." The closing section of Fraunce's Arcadian Rhetoric, for example, pays detailed attention even to the positioning of the middle finger which can "point at or shove...affirme and asseruere...[and] urgeth" (K 3). Peter Burke notes that in Jacobean social practice such gestures formed a code within different sub-cultures, such as "homosexuals, who also employed hand signals to identify each other in public" ("Culture" 33).

18. Cf. Cicero on such "method oratory" or self-persuasion, which would question the priority of the speaker's self to rhetoric: "the very quality of the diction, employed to stir the feelings of others, stirs the speaker himself even more deeply than any of his hearers" (De Oratore II.xlv.191). Montaigne suggests a similar process, where "what we speake, we must first speake it unto our selves, and before we utter and send the same forth to strangers, we make it inwardly to sound unto our eares" (II: 151).

19. For examples of this explanation of characterization, especially in the drama, see Ong, "Rhetoric"; Barish, Ben Jonson; McDonald, Rhetoric; Sackton, Rhetoric; Waith, Pattern; Altman, Tudor Frame. These accounts all construct a direct causal chain, with dramatic characterization as the effect of various rhetorical techniques practiced in the schools--controversiae in Waith (97), "antilogistic dialectic" in McDonald (138), in utramque partem in Altman (43). In each case, this chain begins with the isolation of personality as prediscursively present.

20. It is the possibility that drama is constructed in these terms that prompts Bakhtin to contrast dramatic dialogue to a fully dialogic discourse: "dramatic dialogue...is not a clash of two ultimate semantic authorities, but rather an objectified (plotted) clash of two represented positions, subordinated wholly to the higher, ultimate authority of the author" (Dostoevsky's Poetics 188; also see page 17). Critical conceptions such as Altman's restrict the dramatic text's semantic possibilities. Furthermore, many Renaissance plays do not have this controlling consciousness (or even a

single author), the individual author-function developing through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Foucault proposes in "What Is an Author?" (Language), and the plays themselves being "created before the collapse of the theater as a strong social institution," as Michael D. Bristol asserts (Carnival 24).

21. Barroll's argument in Artificial Persons against the determining influence of "'Ad Herennium' techniques" (17) on Renaissance characterization does not escape this essentialism but reinforces it. In fact, he views the "Transcendental Being" as the singular cultural paradigm for selfhood (70), providing both the positive ideals and the negative practices (pseudotranscendence, materialism).

22. Goffman's explanation of character illuminates the essentializing synthesis of the humanist outlook: "On the one hand, it refers to what is essential and unchanging about the individual--what is characteristic of him. On the other, it refers to attributes that can be generated and destroyed during fateful moments.... Thus a paradox. Character is both unchanging and changeable" (Interaction 238). The humanist image of dramatistic man seems to invoke this paradox but in fact reconciles it, by reinscribing the changeable as man's unchanging quality.

23. The self-portrait with which la Rochefoucauld prefaces his maxims is open to similar pressure. His confessed melancholy leaves him "with scarcely any conscious knowledge of what I am saying" and unable to control his facial expressions, "I think that when I have corrected myself within I shall still keep unfortunate signs without" (26). While he may be aware of this lack of control, even the categories of his objective awareness become uncertain when he tries to describe the shape of his face, "mine is either square or oval, but which of the two it would be very hard to say" (25; cf. Barish, Prejudice 213-19). Thomas Wright also speculates on the impossibility of self-knowledge, in an image that perhaps leads to the alienating Lacanian mirror: "we see other men's defects directly and our own by a certain reflection--for as no man knoweth exactly his own face because he never see it but by reflection from a glass...even so by a certain circle we wind about ourselves" (Passions 312).

24. Cf. Wright's awed admiration: "What shall I say of you three sacred persons in Trinity, distinguished really, and yet indistinct essentially; doth not his distinction cause a difference, and this admirable union an inexplicable consonance?" (Passions 230).

25. Cf. Andrew Gurr's point that "To perform, to act or to do are terms which apply equally to the reality of doing and to the pretence of it on stage" ("Elizabethan" 245), an awareness which even an Elizabethan gravedigger might have: "an act hath three branches--it is to act, to do, to perform" (Hamlet V.i.11-12). See Victor Turner's discussion of the ambiguous meanings of "acting" in From Ritual to Theatre: "The very word 'ambiguity' is derived from the Latin agere to 'act'" (102).

26. Hobbes goes on to pay close attention to the obligations between the actor and the author (169-71). The working of personation in this case illustrates a range of power relations. Cf. Greenblatt's comments on this section of Leviathan, "the 'natural person' originates in the 'artificial person.'... There is no layer deeper, more authentic, than theatrical self-representation...for Hobbes there is no person, no coherent, enduring identity, beneath the mask" ("Psychoanalysis" 222).

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL ACTS

"And while I am waiting there, in comes the King in a plain common riding-suit and velvet capp, in which he seemed a very ordinary man to one that had not known him."

Samuel Pepys, 19 August 1661

"Power of any kind must be clothed in effective means of displaying it, and will have different effects depending upon how it is dramatized."

Erving Goffman

When discussing and representing political processes many texts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focus on the role of the prince. Secrets of social rule and hierarchy seem bound up in the royal person. Works from the period--from pageants performed during Elizabeth's coronation, to plays about usurpers and restoration, and handbooks on how to rule such as Machiavelli's The Prince or King James's Basilicon Doron--frequently reflect upon this mysterious figure, concentrating the complexities of political rule and power into personal symbolism.¹ Kenneth Burke observes that such mystery envelops ruler and ruled: "A ruler, seeing himself 'from within,' might be expected to

know that he is not divine; yet he may feel the motives of 'reverence' as strongly as a lowly peasant witnessing, at a respectful distance, a royal pageant" (Rhetoric 306-07). A self-conscious usurper like Claudius is convinced of his sanctity when he spurns Laertes' assault: "Let him go, Gertrude, do not fear our person: / There's such divinity doth hedge a king / That treason can but peep to what it would" (Hamlet IV.v.123-25). Laertes' abrupt change in tone then suggests that even a fractious subject may share with his prince this "mystic participation" in the state (Rhetoric 307).

For contemporary authority, such mystery devolved to the prince from God. In the Institutes, Calvin announces the orthodox descent of the regal word from the divine: princes are "the viceregents of God [and] in themselves exhibit a kind of image of the Divine Providence" (II: 655); "the magistrate, in inflicting punishment, acts not of himself, but executes the very judgements of God" (II: 659). If God is considered as an incarnation of ideal personhood, the divine and royal mysteries can both be seen as deriving from that notion: "the self is in part a ceremonial thing, a sacred object which must be treated with proper ritual care and in turn must be presented in a proper light to others" (Goffman, Interaction 91). Since God attracts the greatest amount of "ritual care," his "viceregent" becomes another

figure for whom care and presentation assume great importance. The third book of The Basilicon Doron, for example, titled "Of A Kings Behavior In Indifferent Things," reveals James's neurotic consciousness that none of his actions is indifferent. They are all potentially significant, and James is ambivalently aware of this potential value, like Duke Vincentio in Measure for Measure, "I love the people, / But do not like to stage me to their eyes; / Though it do well" (I.i.67-69). James counsels Prince Henry on the perils of eating, sleeping, dressing, speaking, and acting in public, "where all the beholders eyes are attentiuellie, to look & pry in the least circumstance of [your] secreatest driftes" (12). The royal person represents the essence of political practice. His corporality is its very figure:

ye have two eyes, signifying great foresight and prouidence, with a narrowe looking in all things; and also two eares, signifying patient hearing, and that of both the parties: but ye have but one tongue, for pronouncing a plaine sensible, & vniforme sentence; & but one head, & one hart, for keeping a constant & vniforme resolution, according to your apprehension: having two handes and two feete, with many fingers and toes for quick execution. (203)

This anatomy marks a process which appears in many other Renaissance texts on kingship: the sequence of bodily pairs--eyes, ears, hands, feet--suggesting a doubleness of

person, resolves into a transcendent unity that signifies the royal self.

Political discourse in the period often intertwines crucially with conceptions of selfhood. The traditions of the rhetoric of characterization come into play, with the dialogue between essentialist and disguised identities being used to articulate political values and conflicts. Through a series of oppositions that derive from Aristotle's Politics, the ethics of ethopoesis assert their force in many Renaissance conceptions of politics.² In this tradition of political personae the sophisticated other appears, being covertly acknowledged even by the idealist James's admission of the ceaseless concentration needed to realize a regal demeanor. This second discourse of character supplements the archetypal order based on the royal self, revealing a disguise that both generates the political persona and conceals its own function. The process of ethopoesis represents the royal mystery and is central to the discourse of royal presence.

James's synthesis of bodily and personal doubles into a transcendent single figure reveals character-making as a major Renaissance resource for the powerful, widely used in gaining and exercising political rule. Ethopoesis frequently serves and preserves an essentialist rhetoric of royal selfhood. It is a paradoxical service, however, that may

destabilize the doctrine of political essence that it constructs. The frequently noted theatricality of power that crystallizes royal personhood, simultaneously leaves it in conflict, short of realization at the moment of characterization. This chapter will consider a range of representations of this ethopoetic paradox, from texts like James's Basilicon, that seem to portray the royal self within grasp, to satires of kingship like Marston's The Malcontent, which reveal the internal splitting of royal rhetoric.

Like any rhetoric, that of sovereign essentialism can also be challenged from without. Once enunciated, it is exposed, exposes itself, to reaccentuation and ideological contest. The elaborate machinery of censorship which was constructed under Elizabeth and continued under the Stuarts attempted to forestall this rhetorical fate. The Acts of Supremacy, of Uniformity, and the Queen's Proclamation 509, all put in motion in May of 1559, established a set of laws and restrictions over what could be legally presented in interludes, plays, song, rhymes, or other "open words" (Chambers I: 318-20, III: 159-62, IV: 263). Under the scrutiny of the Master of Revels and the ecclesiastical and political licensing authorities, nothing "heretical, seditious, or unfit for Christian ears" was to be printed or performed (Chambers III: 162).

As Annabel Patterson argues in Censorship and Interpretation, such legislation does not put a stop to reflection on or criticism of official political and religious practices. Censorship is "a joint project, a cultural bargain between writers and political leaders" (Patterson 7), a social process in which hermeneutic issues of authorial intention, reader response, and generic representation are worked through. While Chambers claims that the period's continuous proclamations and orders "suggest that no absolutely effective method of suppressing undesirable publications had as yet been attained" (III: 162), and the opposition between officialdom and texts was being constantly reinforced, in Patterson's terms a new law signified a renegotiation of "the implicit social contract between authors and authorities" (17). The "contract" was worked out by both parties, though with the passing of an act, it would appear that at least for the moment, the authorities were calling the shots in the negotiations.

Such seems to have been the case in the decree of the bishops in 1599, "That noe Satyres or Epigrams be printed hereafter: That noe English historyes be printed excepte they bee allowed by some of her maiesties privie Counsell: That noe playes be printed excepte they bee allowed by suche as haue auctoritie" (qtd. in Chambers III: 168-69, note 4). The decree focuses on specific challenges to the political

and religious order, outlawing what Rosalie Colie might call "countergenres" to the official, essentialist discourse (Resources 32). The decree's three genres, satire, history, and drama, were appropriate ones for the authorities since they could be used to represent criticisms of the status quo. Yet these targets were also impossible to hit cleanly for they were not employed exclusively by opponents of order.

In identifying these oppositions to official discourse, the bishops' decree conceives countergenres as narrowly antithetical. By doing so it attempts to limit them either to retrospective, reactionary forms, nostalgic for an archetypal republic, or to opposition within the extant order. Both limits serve to reify political essentialism as the past and present paradigm for power. These countergenres are not, however, always determined by political idealism, nor are their authors simply a discursively "vsurping Tyran" to the "lawfull good King" (Basilicon 55). Drama and history do not necessarily contradict official political discourse but are often central strategies in its representation, used both to attack opponents and to legitimize authority. As well as enabling their orthodox use, this official centrality can afford history and drama an ideological double voice, a dialogic function analogous to that more commonly attributed to satire.

Indeed during the late 1590s and early 1600s the bishops' three countergenres interact significantly in representing and questioning the mysteries of royal rule. As satire moves from verse and prose to drama, history plays about the lives of kings are generically succeeded by what Leonard Tennenhouse calls "disguised ruler plays" ("Representing" 139). Despite a frequent pattern of restoration, these plays may suggest a skeptical view of noble power.³ A work like Marston's The Malcontent adopts a satirical attitude towards the hypocrisy of princely performance, one that thematically echoes Duke Vincentio's lament over his deputy, "O, what may man within him hide, / Though angel on the outward side!" (III.ii.271-72). The transition from dramatizing historical identities to disguised royal figures revises the ethical idealism used to assert political rule. The generic shift from history to satire questions the essentialist rhetoric of political ethopoesis. The insight that develops through these transitions in characterization is less one that simply mocks or criticizes the prince than one that doesn't participate in the mystery, intimating that underneath their guises, the usurper and the prince are one.

The formal outline of this dialogic political discourse can be perceived in classical texts on politics which

retained influence for many Renaissance authors. Despite the clarity of the institutional definitions in Book III of Aristotle's Politics, for example, there is a repeated suggestion that political concepts are dualistic rather than singular. The most notable instance comes in the classification of constitutions, where each "correct" form is defined against its "perversion": aristocracy and oligarchy, polity and democracy, monarchy and tyranny (X: 1279b). Aristotle calls each of the second forms a "perversion" not because the structure of political power is different to the first form, but because the goal is different, as in the case where kingship "with a view to the common interest" (1279a) changes to "tyranny...a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only" (1279b). Aristotle concludes that none of the three perverse forms aims to profit the common interest.

The paired types of constitution are evidence of a restricted dialogism in Aristotle's political thought. Each concept presupposes an antithesis, but one that does not suggest an alternative political structure, only the possibility of a contradictory practice: "the good citizen...should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman" (1277b); "kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants over involuntary" (1285a), and so on. Every political agent implies at least

one opposite number, king:tyrant, king:subject, plus a corresponding set of opposite or perverse actions-- kingship:tyranny, obedience:rebellion. These oppositions are restricted since Aristotle's analysis is teleologically organized by an ethical idealism, clearly apparent in Book III's last section on the education of the king. We discover that the product of this education is precisely comparable to the good man: "the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a statesman or king" (X: 1288b).

Now while in the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle rejects a single definition of the good (IX: 1096a), he does define "human good" as an "activity of soul in accordance with virtue" (1098a), and virtue as the "state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well" (XI: 1106a). A strong ethical status underlies the conceptions of king and man, as it does goodness and virtue. The effect of Aristotle's analysis is to fix these ethical categories as structural principles and to orient the practice of politics towards the good "state." The Aristotelian analysis reifies ideal kingship and separates and represses its antithesis in political theory.

This repression occurs in various ways. First, there is overt differentiation, as when Aristotle contrasts the monarch to the tyrant through unexplained presumptions such

as the "common interest" and "willing subjects." Next are the covert distinctions made when an ideal king is portrayed; his actions, presumed to be for the benefit of all, implicitly contrast with those of a tyrant or an unsuccessful ruler. Such, for example, are the efforts of Cyrus in organizing his empire after conquering Babylon, described by Xenophon in the Cyropaedia, an influential portrait of kingship. The characterization of Cyrus underlines the ruler's ethical influence both in performing his own duties and as a model to subjects: "he thought that it was not possible to incite others to good and noble deeds, if he were not himself such as he ought to be...he believed that he could in no way more effectively inspire a desire for the beautiful and the good by endeavouring, as their sovereign, to set before his subjects a perfect model of virtue in his own person" (VIII.i.12-21). These sentiments, in addition to manipulating subjects' behavior,⁴ provide an ideal of regal conduct whose presumed moral value ensures good leadership and censures other modes of ruling.

A univocal ethos of kingship, deriving from such classical models, motivates official images of royal power in the Renaissance, and is echoed (though with imminent irony) in Shakespeare's image of eternal classical power, "for always I am Caesar" (Caesar I.ii.212). In The Basilicon Doron, James I signals this ethos by warning his son against

compromising kingly unity. The first book, "Of A Kings Christian Dvetie Towards God," repeats the moral imperatives of the Cyropaedia, framing them in Christian terms:

As he cannot be thought worthie to rule and command others, that cannot rule and dantone his owne proper affections and vnreasonable appetites.... Neither can any thing in gouernment succeed wel with him...as comming from a filthy spring, if his person be vnsanctified. (25)

Political success depends on self-rule and righteousness, which are later presented as involving a singular coherence between the king's inner self, "inwardly garnished with true Christian hvmilitie," and his public persona, "eschew outwardly before the worlde, the suspition of filthie pround hypocrisie and deceitfull dissimulation" (51). While "eschewing the suspicion" of hypocrisy may not mean eschewing hypocrisy itself, James's words overtly portray the king as an ideal ethical and ethopoetical union.

The second book, "Of A Kings Dvetie In His Office," echoes Xenophon and Aristotle. In so doing The Basilicon begins to reveal and suppress an increasingly dialogical ethos of royal power and personhood. Following Cyrus, James suggests to Henry "by your behauour in your own person, and with your seruantes, to teache your people by your example: for people are naturallie inclined to counterfaite (like apes) their Princes maners" (53). The irrepressible parenthetical distaste hints at the exertion of power and

social division within such "teaching." Any union between people and ruler seems threatened by this class contempt.⁵ James devalues the people's vision while acknowledging that it must always be considered. Subjects ultimately cannot perceive the mysteries of kingship, though they are to be led into believing that they can do so:

the people that see you not within, cannot judge of you, but according to the out-warde appearance of your actions and companie; which onely is subject to their sight. (109-111)

It is a true olde saying, That a King is as one set on a stage, whose smallest actions and gestures, all the people gazinglie doe beholde: and therefore although a King be neuer so praecise in the discharging of his office, the people, who seeth but the outward part, will euer judge of the substance, by the circumstances. (163)⁶

The warning that the people misinterpret royal actions implicitly commends manipulation of the king's "outward part," and acknowledges a functional split within the ideally unitary person.

This splitting of persona parallels the divorce between the king and his subjects. Indeed, in James's description the split persona is the means through which successful rule is exercised. Initially, however, separation is attributed only to the antithesis of the ideal king. Like Aristotle, James labels this figure tyrant, identifying him through the traits of sophistical disguise, hypocrisy, dissimulation, and counterfeiting. James also attempts to present a formal

opposition between the two figures, "the true difference betwixt a lawfull good King, and an vsurping Tyran":

The one acknowldegeth himselfe ordained for his people...the other thinketh his people ordayned for him...& counterfaiting the Sainte while he once creepe in credite, will then...frame the common-weale euer to advance his particulare.

(55)

In this traditional strategy, the repudiated practice is isolated and depicted in the discredited character, the "vsurping Tyran." Despite James's acknowledgement of the necessary function of royal "counterfaiting" before misperceiving subjects, the process is ethically and ideologically differentiated between kingship and tyranny. The truth of this difference guarantees archetypal kingship, rehearsing Plato's definition that "the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled" (Republic I.347d).

While we might expect The Basilicon Doron to be an idealized depiction of kingship, the reciprocity among its idealization, the categories and concepts of traditional political theorizing, and the ethopoetic oppositions descending from Platonism can also be noted. This tradition of political thought is, however, questioned by Renaissance texts which reaccentuate and reinscribe the ideology of essentialist rhetoric. The deconstruction of an ideal princely ethos occurs through dramatic, historical, and

satiric representations of the political persona. The bishops' decree discerns the generic sources but misperceives the process of this political dialogism.

Whom, or what, does Richard II see when he looks into the mirror? As he turns from the paper the Earl of Northumberland urgently thrusts forward, a confession of "accusations, and these grievous crimes / Committed by your person and your followers / Against the state and profit of this land" (IV.i.223-25), the mirror's personal, even narcissistic connotations seem to exemplify Richard's political obtuseness. At times the latter has already appeared in clumsy, simpleminded maneuvers like banishing Bullingbrook but ignoring his wooing of the "common people" (I.iv.24), or hastily siezing Gaunt's estate and then placing the protesting Duke of York in charge of England while Ireland is invaded (II.i). Yet Richard is neither evading nor oblivious to the charges. Rather he finds them irrelevant to the scene's significance, since only after the fact will they be used to justify the compelled transfer of power, "by confessing them, the souls of men / May deem that you are worthily depos'd" (IV.i.226-27). The metrically stressed "deem" ironically, and for Richard irrelevantly, implies certain judgement only within the Lancastrian manipulation of opinion.

Richard interprets his deposition in the same way that he has interpreted his kingship, as the result of his own essential, political persona: "Not all the water in the rough rude sea / Can wash the balm off from an anointed king" (III.ii.54-55). In trying to analyze his fall, he turns inwards to the role of a kingly self that would dominate all of his opponents' acts. When he says that he "can see a sort of traitors here. / Nay, if I turn mine eyes upon myself, / I find myself a traitor with the rest" (IV.i.246-48), he ponders his loss of power in reflexive terms that disclose his royal persona determining the political process, "I find myself a traitor." The conflict between soul and body at the origin of an individual's acts explains for Richard his self-defeating motive: "I have given here my soul's consent / T'undock the pompous body of a king" (249-50). He personalizes politics, implying his own conflictual causality in the paradox of un-crowning: "Give me the crown. Here, cousin, seize the crown" (IV.i.181). He alone can effect the king's fall from power.⁷

These imperatives--royal commands renouncing royal command--reveal Richard's desperate effort to control the deposition. His authoritative possession of the crown, sounding in the emphasized "me," undoes and unsays itself through the uncanny import of the order, which renounces its power as it is uttered, authorizing the loss of authority.

The belief in royal essence, "My crown I am" (IV.i.191), a Caesar-like absolutism, determines his paradoxically self-negating words: "Ay, no, no ay; for I must nothing be...Now mark me how I will undo myself" (IV.i.201-03).

Richard articulates his political dilemma through an essentialist political discourse, or more precisely, by lamenting this discourse's loss. The usurpation splits the kingly verba and res: "I have no name, no title, / No, not that name was given me at the font, / But 'tis usurp'd...know not now what name to call myself" (IV.i.255-59). The "given" names of Richard and king are rent from permanent relation to him, revealing the imaginary signification of his personhood and kingship. An enduring political semiotic, in Foucault's phrase "the sovereignty of the Like" (Order 43), is being undermined by the revelation of the contingency of kingly character. It is in this context that Richard calls for the mirror.

Recalling Corinthians and the seventh book of the Republic, gazing into a mirror at such a moment is a highly charged emblematic act, its significance oscillating between vanity and self-knowledge.⁸ A strong humanist faith in sight seems to have been prevalent. It is studied in detail in Ernst Cassirer's essay on the "subject-object problem" in Renaissance philosophy. For Cassirer, figures like Galileo and in particular Leonardo, because of his work in art as

well as science, exemplify a widespread intellectual prepossession with visible form, where "the limit of vision is also, by necessity, the limit of conception" (Individual 157). Leonardo's "ideal of science aims at nothing but the perfection of seeing," and his art insists on the "visually real.... True and objective necessity is found in vision" (158). This humanist faith in vision extends to and is deepened by the mirror; in "How the Mirror Is the Master and Guide of Painters" (written in 1492), Leonardo recommends that painters use a mirror to check the accuracy of their work and thus of their own perception: "The mirror ought to be taken as a guide" (qtd. in Goldberg, Mirror 152). For those such as Leonardo, the technologically improved mirrors of the time extend and rectify the essential power and truth of human sight.⁹

In this cultural context, Richard takes up the mirror to see the true cause of his fall, "in the very book indeed / Where all my sins are writ, and that's myself" (IV.i.274-75).¹⁰ He flings the mirror away, claiming at first that its image is falsely superficial, "O flatt'ring glass...Thou dost beguile me!" (279-81). Then, in response to Bullingbrook's dry mock, Richard construes the mirror's image as an ironic icon of his emotion, reinforcing the "structure of misrecognition" (Althusser 219) that underpins his royal ethos:

The shadow of my sorrow! Ha, let's see.
 'Tis very true, my grief all lies within,
 And these external [manners] of laments
 Are merely shadows to the unseen grief
 That swells with silence in the tortur'd soul.
 There lies the substance.... (IV.i.294-99)

The mirror image, though rejected, indeed because it is rejected, drives Richard more deeply into a floundering political essentialism, "the imaginary misrecognition of the 'ego'...in the ideological formations in which it 'recognizes' itself" (Althusser 219). To sustain the "reality" of the royal persona a revised conception of the political sign is needed.¹¹

Richard smashes the mirror since its failure to signify why he has fallen discloses the limit and end of his personal vision and power. To him it falsely shows the absence of a link between his lightly scarred face and his internal grief, a link which, in Richard's preconception, would signify him as the cause of his deposition. Moreover, he observes this mirrored absence qua absence; he trusts that he sees what is not there, just as he ultimately believes that he and not his opponent has the power to dissolve his kingly self, "Standing before the sun of Bullingbrook, / To melt myself away in water-drops!" (IV.i.261-62). Yet that very discontinuity between Richard's "external [manners] of laments" and his "tortur'd soul" represents another ethos of kingship. Where Richard sees a semiotic absence, the "flatt'ring glass"

reflects the presence of that absence, the presence of the absence of ethopoetic truth. As emerges in the subsequent histories, where Henry IV and his son see it clearly, the present absence of ethopoetic truth constitutes the entrance into the discursive order of politics.

By the time Richard II is written, the representations of the royal persona have long been acknowledged. James I considers it a commonplace in The Basilicon: "Kings being publike persons...are as it were set (as it was saide of olde) upon a publicke stage" (12). Shakespeare's play, like Hobbes's later comments on sovereignty as "personation"-- "whosoever beareth the person of the people...beareth also his own natural person" (Leviathan ch.19 188)--thus contemplates an established ethos of political guise. As Ernst Kantorowicz's study of the "king's two bodies" shows, the process of double royal characterization was systematized into official political culture through the work of Tudor jurists in the sixteenth century. Edmund Plowden's Reports, written during Elizabeth's reign, defines this concept by revising the history of kingship, disclosing a presence that is now seen as having always existed even if it were not always recognized:

the King has in him two Bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal....

But his Body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government, and constituted for the Direction of the People, and the Management of the public weal.
(qtd. in Kantorowicz 7)

A flexibly expedient symbol, used by Tudor jurists to establish, defend, and centralize the crown's powers (note Weber's remark that "in the main, it has been the work of jurists to give birth to the modern Occidental 'state'" [299]), the royal duality invents an historical myth of kingship which, despite its utility, remains within an ideal and essentialist conception of political personhood. For the key to the symbol is the paradoxical immateriality of the king's body politic, which "cannot be seen or handled." It is this mysterious corpus, a "mystic fiction" as Kantorowicz calls it (3), and not the "mortal" body natural which generates royal power.

In part the essentialism results from the king's two bodies being derived from Christ's twin nature: "Royalty, by this semi-religious terminology, was actually expounded in terms of christological definitions" (Kantorowicz 16). The Tudors institute an overarching politico-religious discourse, a "crypto-theological idiom" (Kantorowicz 19), which legitimizes their role (thematically important in light of the break with Rome), occults it, and empowers it. Essentialism becomes a strategy of disguise, the tones of religious idealism concealing its expedient practice.¹²

Hence to label Richard II "the tragedy of the King's Two Bodies" (Kantorowicz 26) clouds the important distinction between nostalgic and pragmatic notions of essential kingly identity that is depicted in the passing of power from Richard to Henry. That Richard "is stripped of every possibility of a second or super-body" (Kantorowicz 40) signals not the end of an essentialist ethos but its remolding into a manipulable, dramatistic discourse of political character. The workings of such a discourse are key topics for a number of political writers from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Machiavelli offers the best-known program for the use of dramatistic doubleness.¹³ His recommendations of fox-like disguise and deception seek to insulate the prince from the danger of possessing and actually observing virtuous qualities, thereby halving this doubleness (Prince 64-65). For Machiavelli, "The inner logic of power politics--and it is in essence, a logic of unlimited power--operates in all activities of the ruler" (Mazzeo 138-39). Feigning and dissembling, accompanied by the difficult avoidance of deception through flattery (The Prince 87), remain central to the logic of princely power.¹⁴

Bacon's Essays emphasize, and in effect demonstrate through discursive dissimulations we will soon note, the efficacy of dramatic dissembling. In "Of Simulation and

Dissimulation" he advises to "set it down, that an habit of secrecy is both moral and politic," and that "The best composition and temperature is to have openness in fame and opinion, secrecy in habit, dissimulation in seasonable use, and a power to feign, if there be no remedy" (77-78). Acknowledging dissimulation as part of political strategy--which Baudrillard recalls, "Behind the baroque of images hides the grey eminence of politics" (Simulations 10)--Bacon yet divorces such strategy from a putatively archetypal politics, full of true words and actions, that may not prevail in the human world of "arts of state and arts of life" (76). He writes that,

Dissimulation is but a faint kind of policy or wisdom, for it asketh a strong wit and a strong heart to know when to tell the truth, and to do it. Therefore it is the weaker sort of politics that are the great dissemblers. (76)

No specific examples of such strong wits and hearts are provided (despite the endorsing of this approach in The Advancement of Learning: "For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars. And it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse" [214])). Instead, a need for the strategic deployment of truth is underlined, with truth becoming a guise prefatory to dissimulation:

Certainly the ablest men that ever were have had all an openness and frankness of dealing, and a name of certainty and veracity...and at such times when they thought the case indeed required dissimulation, if they then used it, it came to pass that the former opinion spread abroad of their good faith and clearness of dealing made them almost invisible. (76-77)

The equivocal "name of certainty and veracity" unsettles the openness of "openness." The motive of such dealing becomes "former opinion," always preexisting action and realizing the mysterious invisibility which Machiavelli sees as both means and culmination of princely power: "Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are" (Prince 66).

This weighing of archetypal politics against worldly practice exemplifies the Tudor attempt to use the essentialist ethos to generate a political discourse which cannot be contradicted. The archetypal ethos can never be realized but is introduced as an "arbitrary stop" (Baudrillard, Simulations 31) to create an ideal political referent that can always be adduced to legitimize practice. In this essay it allows Bacon to describe (and use) dissimulation without appearing to condone or be implicated in it, illustrating Stanley Fish's notion of Bacon's "premorality."¹⁵ The deliberate avoidance of an immoral position is, however, a precise tactic of hegemony. The "pre" of premorality, realized through its reference to the archetypal idea, is a ploy which denies politics, while all

the time controlling the space in which political ends are pursued.¹⁶

"Of Simulation and Dissimulation" is, then, more politic than Machiavelli's treatise because it perfects the dissembling tactics Machiavelli recommends, and is inscribed through them. The essay morally distinguishes itself from its topic, avowing the ethical thematic ideal of revealing the truth about dissimulation. In contrast, The Prince admits to an intentional union with its topic, "my intention being to write something of use to those who understand" (56). This confession of intention, which contradicts every Machiavellian strategy, fixes the text within univocal ethical categories, determining the political character of the "Machiavel" in political and popular discourse during and beyond the sixteenth century.

Bacon's essay establishes "two discursive structures in a single space" (Fish 124): one which simulates the ideal it cannot present and one which dissembles the inscription of dissimulation. This ambiguous representation exemplifies a political practice whose aim is not simply "to imitate the fox...[since] it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well" (Prince 64), that is, to disguise the disguise. "Of Simulation and Dissimulation" is an acute exercise of the political ethos since it is organized through the same practice it discusses, dissimulative semiotics. In

contrast, The Prince holds up its rejection of a "classical and medieval political theory [that] had been subordinated to traditional ethics" (Mazzeo 145).¹⁷ In its effacement of any such Machiavellian figure or gesture, Bacon's essay consummates Machiavellian discourse, foreclosing reference to an "author" of deception and affording the ethopoetic political function an intense mobility.

The political ethos is thus manipulated through a strategy whereby the prince disappears and reappears in the guise of an idealized political and discursive persona. In a sense alluded to above, his concealed absence is analogous to that disappearance of the author noticeable as we move from Machiavelli to Bacon's text.¹⁸ This analogy--appropriate due to the etymology of authority, which also recalls the personal-discursive roots of "character"--is later developed by Hobbes when he considers ethopoesis in the "personation" of power, whereby people "appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person.... And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT" (Leviathan, ch.17 176-77).

Hobbes explains that in the process of personation, authority usually remains with those represented:

Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor; and he that owneth

his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: in which case the actor acteth by authority. (ch.16 169)

For that which the representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth, as author.
(ch.19 193)

In political personation, however, the authors are subjugated to the actor: "they that are subject to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy...nor transfer their person from him that bereath it" (ch.18 178).¹⁹ The cause of this reversal is the monarch's ideal representation, an ideal, Hobbes then suggests, that originates not from the archetypal essence of politics or the monarch, but from the dramatistic artifice of the covenant which establishes personation: "when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but himself" (ch.16 170). The authoritative self derives from its feigned characterization. As in the case of the royal Tudor bodies, once this character is forged its range of authority is powerfully elastic, expanding through the discourse which established it: "Reputation of power, is power...what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is power" (Leviathan, ch.10 114).²⁰

Indeed, the political character, once it has been feigned, depends on the continuing representation of its

ethos--either through simulation of the "quality," or dissimulation of "the reputation of such quality." The monarch has no single, original essence. Hobbes lists the kinds of qualities through which his character can be sustained: practical, "Good success is power"; communal, "Affability of men already in power, is increase of power"; intellectual, "Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power"; societal, "Nobility is power...where it has privileges"; rhetorical, "Eloquence is power"; aesthetic, "Form is power" (ch.10 115). Ideal power is characterized through a sequence of acts which has no initial ethos and finally no end: "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power" (ch.11 123). The telos of political acts is a ceaseless encore, "he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more" (123), in the attempt to construct an essentialist character through its archetypal absence.

This "ethopolitics" is vividly represented through the trope of disguise in the subsequent plays of the second tetralogy. Axton generally observes that "As long as men could accept as politically viable a vision of the monarch's two bodies, dramatists were perhaps best equipped to express its subtle complexity.... A dramatist could simultaneously express the ideal and the realities of political power"

(146). The suitability of the drama may be seen to derive in two ways. First, the symbolic mode of theatrical performance--"it is only through convention that the spectator takes stage events as standing for something other than themselves" (Elam 27)-- conceptually parallels the covenant between monarch and subjects. Second, as Stephen Orgel notes, "Theatrical pageantry, the miming of greatness, is highly charged because it employs precisely the same methods the crown was using to assert and validate its authority" ("Greatness" 45).²¹ Although it will be necessary to return to the ideological stakes of theater's connection with politics, we can note the likelihood that the 1599 decree against drama was based on this connection. Rather than perceiving drama as a countergenre to politics the bishops may have seen it as the discursive partner to politics. It is, then, the staging of this partnership that they sought to prevent.

Disguise pervades Henry IV, being comically introduced in both parts with Poins's plans to trick Falstaff in the woods and in the tavern. Its political usefulness is first voiced in Hal's soliloquy:

So when this loose behavior I throw off
And pay the debt I never promised,
By how much better than my word I am,
By so much shall I falsify men's hopes,
And like bright metal on a sullen ground,
My reformation, glitt'ring o'er my fault,
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes

Than that which hath no foil to set it off.
(I.ii.208-15)

Steven Mullaney notes that the speech reveals "a prince who plays at prodigality, and means to translate his rather full performance into the profession of power" (Place 81); in this sense, Hal's words are addressed to himself and outline a course of action and acting that he will follow until the eve of Agincourt. Yet within his scheme of "theatrical improvisation" (Greenblatt, Negotiations 46), and in fact determining it, lies a self-reification, inscribed by the reverberating use of the first-person pronoun, in each case a grammatical subject (lines 208-11), that evinces Hal's belief in his controlling agency. In these terms, this "loose behavior," a discursive guise that can be thrown off at will "when he please again to be himself" (I.ii.200), will purposefully misrepresent and be ordered by his princely ethos, a controlled dichotomy suggested in the opposition "my word I am." The speech discloses a political essentialism analogous to that of Elizabeth's remark, "We princes...are set on a stage in the sight of all the world" (Neale 277). Seeming to admit a histrionic dependence on the audience, the queen empowers her backstage self. An intrinsic ethos lies behind the double subject "We princes," imputing a royal essence that always precedes and determines the staged persona.

Hal's prodigality becomes a similarly equivocal confession of dependence on the audience. Such a confession is a type of reverse flattery, encouraging the people to believe in their authority over the actor. That Hal "in one quarter of an hour...can drink with any tinker in his own language" (II.iv.18-19) is, however, not a sign of his dependence on their discourse but his appropriation of it, a charismatic ploy which sees the "lads" bespeak their own subjection: "[they] tell me flatly...when I am King of England I shall command all the good lads in Eastcheap" (II.iv.11-15).

In this respect, Hal, despite the king's anxieties, is very much heir to one who transfixes the "desiring eyes" of the people (Richard II V.ii.14), and who, in response to the northern rebels' movements, echoes the prince's soliloquy, "I will from henceforth rather be myself" (1Henry IV I.iii.5). Henry's recurrent concern for Hal's demeanor thus seems misplaced, though his admonitory comments to Hal on his own use of a humble guise further reveal the efficacy of dissimulation, especially when linked to religion: "I stole all courtesy from heaven, / And dressed myself in such humility.... Thus did I keep my person fresh and new, / My presence like a robe pontifical" (1.III.ii.50-56). In effect, Hal succeeds his father long before Henry dies (twice foreshadowed, when Hal impersonates Henry at 1.II.iv.445-59,

and tries on the crown at 2.IV.v.41-43), employing a politics of disguise beyond Henry's awareness, as the Earl of Warwick notes, "The Prince but studies his companions" (2.IV.iv.68).

The two parts of Henry IV depict an increasing political exploitation of disguise. The man of action Hotspur sneeringly denounces Henry for such policy: "by this face, / This seeming brow of justice, did he win / The hearts of all that he did angle for" (1.IV.iii.82-84). Yet Henry himself accuses the rebels of having proclaimed their grievances "To face the garment of rebellion / With some fine color that may please the eye / Of fickle changelings and poor discontents" (1.V.i.74-76). Disguise is then starkly presented as the key to political survival in the battle scenes. Douglas slays Blunt, "Semblably furnish'd like the king himself" (1.V.iii.21), and later confronts "the king himself" with the bemused "Another king? they grow like Hydra's heads.... What art thou, / That counterfeit'st the person of a king?" (1.V.iv.24-29). His words echo the question of Henry's legitimacy while also suggesting the function of "counterfeiting" in the exercise of power. In 2Henry IV, Prince John equivocally manipulates his "princely word" (IV.ii.66) to deceive the rebels, his actions exemplifying Poins's sardonic phrase, "a most princely hypocrite" (II.ii.54-55), but winning a Machiavellian palm: "Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in

the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force" (Discourses, Bk.III, ch.40 526).

The figures of princely hypocrisy throughout these plays, and in the texts of Machiavelli, Bacon, and Hobbes, disclose the deployment of an equivocal ethos that aims to realize "a common power, to keep [men] in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit" (Leviathan, ch.17 176). Now while the revelations of these texts suggest that they are not absorbed within this ethos, that they stand outside it and recognize its workings, they do not formulate a political process other than that founded on the essentialist political subject. Their position is reflected by Douglas's repeated slaying, unmasking, and renewed searching for the "king himself"; he continually confronts and reveals the absence of royal selfhood but retains belief in its ultimate presence. In revealing the ethopoetic manipulation of princely essence, these authors mirror the official production of that character, and in duplicating "precisely the same methods" of realizing power, their work remains circumscribed by its own essential politicization.²²

These texts' references to history represent the semiotic presumptions of royal ethopoesis. The figures and actions from the past which fill Machiavelli, Bacon, and

Shakespeare's texts can be used to judge or analyze the present, as the bishops no doubt suspected in 1599. At the same time, however, the dramatization of history reproduces the process of "idealist mimesis" (Dollimore, Tragedy 71) crucial to political discourse. Thus when the chorus of Henry V summons "A kingdom for a stage, princes to act, / And monarchs to behold the swelling scene" (I.Pro.3-4), and later asks that the audience suspend disbelief--"For 'tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings" (I.Pro.28), "eche out our performance with your mind" (III.Cho.35)--in addition to revealing the monarch's dependence on this covenant, the play reproduces the royal tactics of flattering the audience about their creative power, beguiling them to participate in the "imaginary puissance" of the royal person (I.Pro.25). It is a participation which, as Hobbes was aware, is highly contagious: "For where a man seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him powerful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his power greater" (Leviathan, ch.31 315).

The dramatistic political ethos thus limits the possibilities of discursive opposition, anticipating and enclosing them in its structure of representation. The official use of ethopoetic alternations from essentialist to disguised character disarms the revelations of theatrical power made by the texts we have considered. It is where the ideal mimesis underlying political characterization is

deliberately not used, where history is revised and Oldcastle makes way for Falstaff, that a discourse emerges which interrogates politics in terms which are not politically circumscribed. Hal's rejection of Falstaff is motivated by the knight's parodic, satirical guise which challenges any ethopoesis. The new king's dismissal attempts to regain control of the discourse of character, by de-realizing Falstaff and recreating himself in his own essential image: "I know thee not, old man...I have long dreamt of such a kind of man...Presume not that I am the thing I was...I have turn'd away my former self" (2.V.v.47-58).

Falstaff's exaggerated performances, in which he plays both Henry IV and Hal as mouthpieces of his own worth, parody political self-enactment as a means of gaining power. On the one hand, as Terry Eagleton notes, "Falstaff is in one sense an indifferent actor, playing only himself, at ease within his own voluminous space and incapable of deferring or dissembling his appetites" (Shakespeare 16). His corporeality is apolitical, its absolute materiality precluding artificial identities. On the other hand, his language revels in its hyperbolic falseness--"sweet Jack Falstaff, kind Jack Falstaff, true Jack Falstaff, valiant Jack Falstaff" (1.II.iv.475-76)--magnifying the dissimulative process of political ethopoesis until it is impossible not to see it.

Just as he reduces honor, first to an empty verbal sign, "What is honor? A word. What is in that word honor? What is that honor? Air." (1.V.i.133-35), then to a visual sign of death, "honor is a mere scutcheon" (line 140), so Falstaff disrupts politics by revealing its dissimulations, "the impositions of stories and the insistence on their truth" (Goldberg, "Shakespearean inscriptions" 119). Where politics tries to represent itself as a discourse of archetypal character, Falstaff reveals a body politic built on the sophistic powers of "sherris-sack...deliver'd o'er to the voice, the tongue...the face...and then the vital commoners and inland petty spirits," powers which override any royal inheritance of "cold blood" (2.IV.iii.96-125). Even in the scene of his rejection, Falstaff is unable not to see Hal's words as "but a color" (2.V.v.86), a political trope that inevitably separates content from form.

The generic shift from historical representation to satirical characterization discloses this separation. Without changing the content of political acts but formally reaccentuating them, this shift challenges the politicization of discourse through the very signs and topoi it uses. Erasmus's Praise of Folly provides a model of the process. At one point Folly opines that no prince can assume the full responsibilities of his position--"he would neither be able to rest nor eat with any security or serenity" (154). Her

words anticipate Henry IV's constant complaints of power's sleeplessness (2.III.i.4-31), a topos taken up by Hal as he contemplates the crown (2.IV.v.21-31), and later condemns "idol Ceremony's" assault on "a king's repose" (Henry V IV.i.230-84). Unlike these self-justifying examples of "one of the familiar themes in the literature of the governing classes in the sixteenth century" (Greenblatt, Negotiations 54), Folly's remarks lead away from the prince's sufferings to note his compensatory actions, performed "in due form under various official titles so that even though unjust they will seem to have some appearance of justness" (154). Rather than lamenting this "hard condition / Twin-born with greatness" as does Henry V (who then jealously idealizes the "profitable labor" of the "lackey" who "Sleeps in Elysium," exemplifying "the Elizabethan pastoral of power" [Montrose, "'Eliza'" 161]), Folly suggests that the topos of the two bodies is exploited for personal satisfaction under the guise of "various official titles," an expedient fusion of ethos and power finally exemplified by the triumphant political romancing of Henry V: "for I love France so well that I will not part with a village of it; I will have it all mine. And, Kate, when France is mine and I am yours, then yours is France and you are mine" (V.ii.173-76).

Folly continues the satirical process by then reaccentuating the signs of power. She portrays the prince amidst the key emblems of rule:

Now first seat him on a golden chair, the chair symbolizing the union of all the virtues; next give him a crown adorned with precious gems, this symbolizing that he ought to surpass all others in every heroic quality. In addition to these hand him a scepter, an emblem of justice and of a devoted heart and soul; and last of all place on him a scarlet robe, symbolizing the love and fervent respect that he ought to have for the realm. If any prince would try to uphold these symbols, even if it meant giving up his life, then I am sure he would have the honor to be ashamed of his depravity. (155)

Royal presence threatens itself by introducing the impossibility of having to "uphold these symbols." The props that stage political acts reveal the reliance on representation which is the very means of interrogating royal presence. In generic terms, discursive power confronts the satirical reaccentuation of its dissimulation and disguise, an inversion which historical mimesis cannot inscribe.²³ As Folly notes, the encrowned and enthroned prince whom she has just portrayed now anxiously turns to those very adornments: "He would fear that some satirist might turn this whole solemn affair into ridicule and sarcasm" (155).

The satirist would "turn" or trope the politicized discourse by revealing its covert dialogism. The "solemn affair" is not subverted from the outside, from a perspective

external to its representations, nor from the conscious controlled perspective of a royal soliloquy, but from within the imaginary reference of its own rhetoric and display. Authority is disturbed by its own "internal dialogization" and "internally undecided and two-faced" representation (Bakhtin, Dostoevsky 198). The discontinuous semiotic which articulates and guarantees essentialist authority, surveyed above in its numerous manifestations--the king's two bodies, royal theatricality--that discontinuity simultaneously generates the potential undermining of royal selfhood. The endless quest for and representation of power, that Hobbes recognizes as the fate of the powerful, is the endless opportunity for satirical dialogism.

Hence the impossibility of banning discursive opposition through political decree. In the first place, opposition responds through generic and sub-generic transplants, from history to "disguised ruler" plays, from printed verse to drama (cf. Campbell Satyre), that skirt around the decree. Proclamations like that of 1599 are thus belated, in inception and application. They respond to texts and performances already in circulation, while the introduction of later laws suggests the failure to anticipate adaptations. Secondly, and more significantly, is that to proscribe drama, history, and satire, politics would have to outlaw its own discourse, which is interwoven with these countergenres. And

as The Praise of Folly suggests, the textual contact is concentrated at the "nodal points" of political discourse, the tropes of representation and disguise that construct the royal character.²⁴

Like drama and history, satire represents political discourse, but in doing so disrupts its monologic structure. It is, as it were, its semiotic other, repressed by authoritative discourse, thus always verging on revealing itself from within and rupturing the official line. As Ronald Paulson's definition suggests, satire quite precisely reflects power's symbolic acrobatics: "Being a rhetorical form, satire invariably engages in casuistry and inconsistency--often at the expense of the coherence of its fiction. The significant characteristic of the satiric symbol is its flexibility" (Satire 349).²⁵ Through satire the ethopoetic idealism that determines the dramatism of political speech is undermined.

The mirror stage of Richard II thus aptly symbolizes the dialogism linking power and its countergenres. The royal command which renounces authority exemplifies the self-subversion of political essentialism, a discursive process that develops and intensifies as the ideal reference to historical figures and the imaginary synthesis of dramatistic personae give way to the ideological reaccentuations of satire. It is this dialogic ethos, within the rhetorical

word of the royal persona, that John Marston's satirical play The Malcontent reveals.

Marston's career as a writer intersects repeatedly with the attempts of Elizabethan and Jacobean authorities to constrain dramatic and satirical works. He is noted for his run-ins with other writers, especially Joseph Hall and Ben Jonson, as well as with officials. His satires were publicly burnt in 1599, and he fled imprisonment for his share in the writing of Eastward Ho. On the basis of a note in the Privy Council Register for June 8 1608, "John Marston committed to Newgate," Chambers speculates that he was the author of a lost play satirizing James which caused controversy in that year (III: 428). Marston then disappears from historical record until 1616 when he reemerges as a minister in Hampshire. That his renegade career as an author ends so respectably--a little version, in the histories of English literature and religion, of Donne's life--suggests the ongoing cultural negotiations between censored and official discourses.

In a poem praising his Metamorphosis of Pygmalion's Image, Marston announces himself "a barking satirist," and then thematically turns his eye upon "This Janian bifront, Hypocrisy" (III: 268, Satire I, line 136). This focus continues in the disguised ruler plays he writes after the

decree against printed satires--Antonio and Mellida, Antonio's Revenge, The Malcontent, and The Fawn. In these plays the satire of courtly pretension and hypocrisy, "The giddy sea of humour" (Fawn II.i.590), is deepened by its relation to the ruling figures themselves, who comprise a range of incompetents, usurpers, and princes, striving to seize or retain power. The themes of political selfhood depicted through such characters are exemplified by the laments of Duke Andrugio in Antonio and Mellida, who having lost his throne to rival Piero, is bereft of country, people, and heir, and has only an impotent body natural, "There's nothing left / Unto Andrugio, but Andrugio" (III.i.59-60).

The Malcontent was registered in the first full year of James's reign. Its central character is the disguised Malevole/Altofronto, the satirist-politician. Unlike the detached observer-speaker of verse satire, here the satirist is totally involved in the action, the chief intriguer. The practical effects of satire are foregrounded, for while Malevole at times speaks as the conventional satyr satirist, "his railing now has an added function: it not only opens up moral infection but becomes the instrument which Altofronto uses to regain his dukedom" (Kernan 212). The play represents the dialogic movement between satiric and political discourses, the hinge between them being the double character Malevole/ Altofronto.

On the one hand, Malevole's doubleness illustrates the role-playing open to all speakers, who join and leave varying scenes of discourse, employing different registers in accord with social context and audience. As court malcontent, "a Lord of Misrule authorized to castigate the Duke and his courtiers" (Finkelpearl 185), Malevole has access to many different scenes, from the bawdy to the conspiratorial, and yet is anchored in none of them--"the disguised figure can gaze on the state from a position outside of the social matrix" (Tennenhouse, "Representing" 144). The character's verbal flexibility is then extended by the Altofronto persona, who speaks in tones of deep sincerity to himself and to the faithful Lord Celso.

On the other hand, Malevole's doubleness discloses a specific interaction between political and satiric discourse. Through his disguise, the theatrical ploy generating the double characterization, Malevole embodies the dissimulation through which these discourses intersect and function. He characterizes the ideological nucleus of a deep concern with both the essentialism and subversions of authority that the latter's dependence on representation entails. The play continually emphasizes the importance of language in fashioning a persona which can be used to hold and win power. In the world of The Malcontent, "satire becomes a potent political weapon" (Kernan 214).²⁶

Malevole adopts the malcontent disguise after his lack of political dissimulation brings on his deposition: "I wanted those old instruments of state / Dissemblance and suspect" (I.i.221-2), an inability to dissemble and perceive dissemblance in others.²⁷ Like Prospero's magic, disguise is then a means of asserting power while deposed:

Well, this disguise doth yet afford me that
Which kings do seldom hear, or great men use,-
Free speech: and though my state's usurp'd,
Yet this affected strain gives me a tongue
As fetterless as in an emperor's. (I.i.201-05)

This power is realized through a mode of speech whose great idiosyncrasy seems to limit its motive to an abnormal personality: "This Malevole is one of the most prodigious affections that ever conversed with nature.... The elements struggle within him; his own soul is at variance within herself" (I.i.25-36). Such discursive abnormality is a disguise within the disguise, "I may speak foolishly, ay, knavishly, / Always carelessly, yet no one thinks it fashion / To poise my breath" (I.i.206-08). Malevole's speech interconnects the personal and the political. His railing has numerous effects at once on both levels, venting frustration, deepening dissemblance, furthering political goals. His exaggerated demeanor is never apolitical but invests the princely persona all the more impenetrably with

the forces of mystery and secrecy, "the arcanum imperii of disguise" (Moretti 21).

With this politico-personal rhetoric, Malevole both upholds official power and attacks it. As in Bacon's essay, there is an archetypal realm of "pure" politics to which Malevole links himself in order to represent his righteousness. He condemns present politics and through the idealist mimesis of history depicts an earlier golden age, personified by Altofronto and his confidant Celso, "in whose hands old Ops may put her soul" (I.i.218). Altofronto's lack of temporal skills--"I could not time it, Celso" (I.i.222)--gestures towards "the ideal of every restoration culture: to abolish the irreversibility of history and render the past everlasting" (Moretti 23). Contrasted to this historical idealization is the current court with its "atmosphere of overpowering, nearly irresistible corruption" (Finkelpearl 180).

Sexual immorality exemplifies Genoa's fallen state. Mendoza "broad-horns the duke" (I.i.249); Maquerelle advises the ladies on sexual potions and allurements and organizes a new lover for the duchess Aurelia. Her lectures on the importance of appearance, "believe me, preserve and use your beauty" (II.iii.42), adapt Malevole's lessons on disguise to sexual politics. Mendoza later plans to wed Maria to consolidate his political position: "her friends might

strengthen me and my faction...wise men do love great women, to ennoble their blood and augment their revenue" (III.i.310-5).²⁸ In contrast, Altofronto's Ops, his "true-faith'd duchess" Maria (I.i.236), resists Maquerelle and Malevole's offers on behalf of Mendoza (V.ii.97-129) and is a nostalgic reminder of sexual, moral, and political constancy.

Mendoza denounces the scheming ways of women after Aurelia rejects him. He displaces his own Machiavellianism--made clear in numerous axioms such as "Who cannot feign friendship can ne'er produce the effects of hatred" (I.ii.183-84)--onto those "mistresses in dissembling, only constant in unconstancy, only perfect in counterfeiting: their words are feigned, their eyes forged, their sighs dissembled..." (I.ii.94-97). The anxieties caused by a patriarchal political system, founded on dissemblance, are transferred from that system to women's sexuality.²⁹ Men's susceptibility to female charms displaces vulnerability to the power of their own dissimulations. The political system partly preserves itself by externalizing and blaming its internal threats on women, reifying the princely persona through an essential maleness.

These internal threats are also suggested in The Malcontent through the wheel of fortune topos. Malevole introduces it as a veiled warning to Mendoza who ignores him: "No vulgar seed but once may rise and shall; / No king so

huge but 'fore he die may fall" (I.i.323-24).³⁰ He later uses it again to explain the reappearance of Altofronto before his own usurper Pietro, "He needs must rise who can no lower fall...wonder not I rise; / For who can sink that close can temporise?" (IV.ii.173-7), the final question explicitly contrasting the wheel to political skill and disguise, fortuna versus virtù. Finally, Maquerelle wryly connects the image to the play's sexual politics: "we women always note, the falling of the one is the rising of the other" (V.ii.42-3).

The fickleness of fortune and of sex figures a deeper political inconstancy. Despite their scheming, Pietro and Mendoza fall victim to Malevole, just as Altofronto had to them. The inconstancy results from the dissimulative ethos underlying political power. Malevole/Altofronto personifies and concentrates this instability in his dialogic speech and characterization, his "personal" discontinuities inscribing the always-dissolving unity of political discourse and selfhood. His characterization discloses that these contradictions derive from sovereign power's basis in essentialist ethopoesis. If "a person is always located at 'nodal points' of specific communication circuits...at a post through which various kinds of messages pass" (Lyotard 15), then Malevole/Altofronto signals the intersection of two contradictory political messages: one an historical

idealization of past politics and a denunciation of the present; the other a contemporary praxis of discursive dissembling.

In his role as satirist, Malevole attacks the second message through the first. Altofronto believes that this is all he does, that he restores the pristine message and the character it articulates for him: "And as for me, I here assume my right, / To which I hope all's pleas'd" (V.iii.210-11). Yet Malevole complicates and unmaskes this idealism, by deceptively using it to regain political power. Like the history or drama of power, the satire of power is an ambiguous genitive, revealing itself as a practice not always opposed to power but one that can also be used to win dominance.

Indeed satire shares with politics a reliance on an ethopoetic ideal, "For the satirist especially, the establishment of an authoritative ethos is imperative" (Mack 195). In both cases this "imperative" guise leads to discursive imperium. A similar dramatistic awareness is also prominent in Elizabethan satire:

The idea that poetic satire had its origin in a dramatic form [vetus comoedia] distinguished for its viciousness of attack and spoken by rough satyrs was the basis for nearly all Elizabethan theories of satire...satire was for them dramatic: it originated in the drama; attacks on vice were delivered by a man playing the part of the satyr, and his speech conformed to his character.

(Kernan 57, 63)

Malevole presents himself as the satyr-satirist, his opening words attacking the church, the court, "common actions, flattery and cozenage; common things, women and cuckolds" (I.i.61-62). Initially, he continues the satirical persona Marston used in his poetry, adopting a stance against society, fashioning himself by his opposition to immorality.³¹ Yet the Elizabethans were also aware of the satirist's attraction to his targets, manifested in his exaggerations and tormenting of them (Kernan 114-24), which Malevole exemplifies as he informs and then mocks Pietro about his cuckoldry (I.i.118ff), or urges Altofronto's duchess to marry Mendoza (V.ii.97-129).

Malevole soon reveals that the tormenting of others is part of a larger plan of vengeance; for his targets, "The heart's disquiet is revenge most deep" (I.i.198). His satiric persona does not extricate him from the political scene but is his means of engaging with it, as he manipulates his disguise--or, as the stage directions put it, "shifteth his speech" (I.i.255)--to his advantage: "I find the wind begins to come about; / I'll shift my suit of fortune" (III.i.228-29). Malevole's disguise inscribes his fortune and fate. His longest burst of satirical railing is aimed not directly against politics but the immorality of Pietro, who still has thoughts of regaining his position from Mendoza (IV.ii.139-53). Pietro's subsequent resignation of his claim

enables Malevole to use him as an ally in his own cause. The anti-political topoi--"man is the slime of this dung-pit, and princes are the governors of these men...there goes but a pair of shears betwixt an emperor and the son of a bagpiper" (IV.ii.145-49)--create political opportunities.

The frequently noted conflict between Malevole's two roles doesn't so much challenge the satirist's ethos as it discloses the dialogic ethopoesis at the center of political practice. A critical perception that "Altofronto acts the part so well that it appears natural to him; it is not all impersonation" (Ingram 108), assigning to Marston an awareness of the world as a stage, tends to efface the play's political significance, its revelations of the dissimulative ethos of power. To interpret Malevole purely in terms of self-paradox, self-dramatization, or even self-cancellation lessens the play's questioning of the tradition of political ethopoesis.³² Malevole himself seems on occasion to sense the existential emptiness which inheres in his role-playing; yet unlike many psychologically oriented critics, he promptly recalls its political usefulness: "O God, how loathsome this toying is to me! that a duke should be forced to fool it...better play the fool lord than be the fool lord" (V.ii.139-42).

The Malcontent thus represents the politicization of ethopoetic rhetoric, and the corresponding rhetorical and

theatrical means hidden within politics. In the closing scenes, Malevole regains power through intensifying his performances, deferring princely essence in order to realize it. Emphasizing his satyr-satirist role he removes any likely opposition from Pietro; pretending to die in front of Mendoza, he increases the latter's hubris. Finally, Malevole exploits Mendoza's celebratory masque to gather his allies for the deposition. The lapses in Malevole's role-playing are just as effective as these intensifications. Greenblatt notes that sovereigns' theatricality has a double effect: while displaying their power it also "draw[s] their audience toward an acceptance of that power" (Negotiations 65). When Malevole lets his disguise fall to reveal Altofronto, he legitimizes his right to power for both his audience in the play--Celso, Pietro, and Ferneze--and the audience of the play. Like those of Hal or the chorus of Henry V, his asides and soliloquies are political performances which win him the audience's support and weaken the actions of the other characters. The observation that, "Armed with the knowledge that the duke is deceiving the other characters until a moment propitious for his undisguising, the audience anticipates the punishment of the immoral characters even as they parade their folly and wickedness" (Caputi 180-81), ignores the control being exercised. It is less that the audience is "armed" or empowered by Malevole than such

admissions represent the process by which the charismatic prince gains their support. As Weber writes, "he does not derive his 'right' from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader" (246-47). These glimpses of the "real" Altofronto crystallize this recognition and suggest our interpretive "duty."

Malevole's unmasking quickly leads to his restoration. It seems to signify an end of theatricality and the reemergence of a historical politics. The absence of gruesome punishments for offenders generates a comic ending; Altofronto tells Mendoza "I scorn to hurt thee" (V.iii.176), eschewing power's symbolic modes of discipline. He subordinates theatricality to a political and moral "reality." No longer ignorant of dramatic effect--"th' inconstant people / Love many princes merely for their faces / And outward shows" (V.iii.186-88)--he controls it from the assured vantage point of legitimate authority. Having passed sentence on the chief offenders, he dismisses the other courtly flatterers, "The rest of idle actors idly part" (V.iii.209), and reclaims not his part but his "right." The resolution seems to reestablish order, removing the need for Malevole's satiric guise and replacing essentialist authority in a position of natural righteousness.

In short, Altofronto's ethopoetic power would assert itself monologically, controlling any internal disruption. This sort of interpretation dutifully echoes the ideology of restored power: "Malevole's sudden seizure of power and rapid restitution of order renders the preceding events of the play into shadowy illusions" (Colley 148). A strict dichotomy between legal authority and illusion is reimposed, one which decrees the insubstantiality of any challenge to its version of events, an official revision of history which sanctions and orders Altofronto's two bodies while publicly putting an end to the politics of dissemblance.

Although heralding the return of ideal politics, the conclusion of the play also represents the continued deployment of disguise. This occurs in two maneuvers: first, as an accusatory strategy, Altofronto locates disguise wholly within the deeds of the others; second, in his open repudiation of disguise, Malevole hides his use of it. The unmasking is quickly enacted with no further reference to it, suggesting that what was used to regain power couldn't have been disguise because now it's all revealed. The end does not only justify the means but reinterprets them, preparing for the further use of dissimulation under the guise of openness. Spurning the deceptions of disguise as ignoble and illegitimate, Altofronto reappropriates archetypal access to princely character. The words which renounce one guise, "I

here assume my right," surreptitiously whisper the donning of another--a persona based on the historical truth and essence of sovereign "right."³³

The play's rapid closure constructs the efficacy of Altofronto's action, seeming to de-satirize the political text and reify the political persona in the same way that the abrupt dismissal of Falstaff does. The ending is then supplemented by an "Imperfect Ode" which, in warning against over-ingenious interpretations--"too nice-brained cunning" (line 8)--simulates the official voice, impersonating the presence of the author Marston as a chastened function of authority. Despite this warning, the emerging concern of the ode is not that the play will be recognized as satirically critical by opponents of authority but will be interpreted so by authority itself: "Immodest censure now grows wild, / All over-running" (3-4). It ends by emphasizing the inevitable satire in the play's subject matter, beyond the intention of any author, unavoidably inherent in the most "chaste" (5) inscription by "a pen / Which still must write of fools, whiles't writes of men" (13-14). The "immodest censure" which would change "princes" to "men" now rewrites "men" as "princes," through its own rules of synonymy, impelling itself towards satire.

The Malcontent depicts a sequence of transfers of power to different members of an aristocratic class. Despite the

process of metonymic substitutions, its conclusion implies that power returns to its proper place and person. The ending is realized through an ideal figure who defines the essential relationships among the other characters, reaffirming social and sexual order. This connection between the play's structure and the restoration of official power also informs the prefatory "To the Reader," which beseeches us not to look "maliciously" for precise political criticisms. The play is aimed not against the status quo but those who would condemn "established unity." It is a social "comedy" which "may modestly pass with the freedom of a satire" (I: 198).

This generic interpretation of the play sounds ironically if satire is illegal, as after the 1599 decree, when to "pass with the freedom of a satire" means to have no social passage or circulation. In this situation, the "freedom of a satire" suggests at most an allowed liberty, a comic form that signifies hegemony. Yet the freedom of satire ambiguously suggests a discourse which, in the guise of conformity, evades restraint and questions its sanctioned form and content. The missed target of authority's censure, satire's double voice represents political acts' lack of finality.

The genre's ambiguous deference to authority is reflected by Malevole's use of disguise which disrupts as it

achieves Altofronto's restoration, revealing that it is not a final step but the beginning of an ethopolitical process that must be continually maintained. Royal disguise usurps its own authority, undermining its essentialism through a "perpetual and restless desire" for power that precludes its own fulfillment. This unending desire, concealed and disguised as the realization of rule, is recognized only after power and persona are lost: "Thus play I in one person many people, / And none contented," observes the deposed Richard II (V.v.31-32). The dualistic rhetoric of the royal person fragments the archetypal political "I." Appearing within a year of change in the English monarchy's bodies politic and natural, Marston's discourse of the satirist-king unmaskes the mysteries of princely ethos.

Notes

1. For the pageants performed before Elizabeth see "The Quene's Majestie's passage through the citie of London" in Elizabethan Backgrounds, ed. Arthur F. Kinney. Each pageant conveys a different sense for the people of the new queen's identity: "For as the first declared her grace to come out of the house of unitie, the second that she is placed in the seate of government staid with vertue to the suppression of vice, and therfore in the third the eight blessinges of almighty god might well be applied unto her: so this fourth now is, to put her grace in remembrance of the state of the commonweale" (29-30). A fifth pageant later represents Elizabeth as Deborah, the prophetess and judge of Israel (Judges 4,5).

2. Cf. Fredric Jameson, "the very presence of a dualistic structure makes it quite inevitable for the mind to assimilate that opposition to the fundamental ethical one, and to sort the opposing terms into a good and a bad one" (*Ideologies* I: 55).

3. In another essay, Tennenhouse speculates on the motives underlying this generic transition: "we find a whole set of literary genres fell out of favour with the accession of James I and a new set provided the appropriate means of setting oneself in proximity to political power...political conditions made history plays virtually unwritable" ("Strategies" 110). In line with Patterson's notions of the cultural negotiability of censorship, this generic transition seems to emerge in the work of authors who represent the self-contradictions of power in increasing detail. Political satire supplements political history as a means of doing so.

4. "It was Cyrus...who began the practice of lavish giving...by enriching men and doing them kindnesses I win with my superfluous wealth their friendship and loyalty.... And those who wished to hold the first place in the affections of Cyrus were jealous of one another...so that in most cases the one would have wished to get the other out of the way sooner than to join with him in any work to their mutual interest" (Xenophon VIII.ii.7,22,28).

5. Cf. the repeated public efforts of Henry V to efface his distaste, while urging his men onto victory at Agincourt. Though admitting to Bates, Court, and Williams that "the King is but a man" (IV.i.101), he will jealously mark his inability to "sleep so soundly as the wretched slave" (IV.i.268), repeating his father's complaints. Even when embracing each man as a brother, Henry first emphasizes the condition that he then grandly overlooks, "be he ne'er so vile" (IV.iii.62).

6. We can compare James's visual indulgence of the people, to Elizabeth allowing her subjects to see, speak to, and even instruct her about her coming role on the "passage through the citie of London to westminster the daye before her coronation." The various pageants allow her subjects to signify their insight into her past and future and consequently imply her and their mutual dependence within the common weal: "her grace by holding up her handes, and merie countenance to such as stooode farre of, and most tender and gentle language to those that stode nigh to her grace, did declare herselfe no lesse thankefullye to receive her people's good wille, than they lovingly offred it unto her...on eyther syde ther was nothing but gladnes, nothing

but prayer, nothing but comfort" (Kinney 15). See Goldberg, "Shakespearean inscriptions" 133-34, on the contrast between Elizabeth and James's self-representations before the people.

7. In orthodox Renaissance thought, postlapsarian individuals embody political and military conflict. Erasmus' Handbook of the Militant Christian sees each person as a disordered body politic (cf. Coriolanus I.i.96ff.). Thomas Wright's Passions of the Mind is also typical: "a reasonable soul...like an Empress was to govern the body, direct the senses, guide the passions as subjects and vassals by the square of prudence and rule of reason, the inferior parts were bound to yield homage and obey. Then Self-love upstarts...allured with the bait of pleasure and sensuality proclaimeth wars and rebellion..." (98). The force of this imagery is to conceive politics on the basis of human "nature" and thus foreclose ideological critique of its essential structure: "man is by nature a political animal," writes Aristotle; "the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual" (Politics X: 1253a). In contrast, when introducing Leviathan, Hobbes proposes that the Commonwealth is "but an artificial man" (59), allowing an investigation of the strategies of power by developing earlier Renaissance interrogations of political ethos.

8. Herbert Grabes comments: "The interplay of mirror-conventions enables Richard's egoism and histrionic nature to be dramatized, as well as allowing the firm delineation of other aspects external to him such as misguidance by 'flatterers,' his intimated tragic end [in the smashed mirror] under the rubric of the 'fall of princes,' and Bolingbroke's sternly ironical sense for realities, for the ultimate validity of externals [in his sardonic "The shadow of your sorrow hath destroy'd / The shadow of your face" at lines 292-3]" (Mutable Glass 216). For a general history of the mirror in the Renaissance--the period when the modern mirror was developed--see Benjamin Goldberg's The Mirror and Man.

9. Cf. the words of Cassius to Brutus: "since you know you cannot see yourself / So well as by reflection, I, your glass, / Will modestly discover to yourself / That of yourself which you yet know not of" (Julius Caesar I.ii.67-70). On the other hand, Joel Fineman's reading of Shakespeare's "perjured eye" suggests that this faith in perception is not as pervasive as Cassi(us)rer would have it. Montaigne shows a similar skepticism: "This discourse ["Sebond"] hath drawne me to the consideration of the senses, wherein consisteth the greatest foundation and triall of our ignorance" (II: 306). The staging of Richard's dislocation

from his reflected face, an episode Shakespeare adds to the historical sources, likewise contradicts an ideology of mirrors and essentialism that incorporates, as in the Mirror for Magistrates, some of the period's traditional political thinking.

10. Cf. Louis Althusser: "The humanist-religious ideological function of the human face is to be the seat of the 'soul', of subjectivity, and therefore the visible proof of the existence of the human subject with all the ideological force of the concept of the subject" (Lenin 238). Such a function is exemplified by Peter Ure's contention that the mirror figures crucially "in the transformation of Richard from self-conceit to humility, from King to Man, from a being partly assimilated to Vanitas and Superbia to a person tragically aware of his ordinary humanity" ("Looking Glass" 221).

11. Like Althusser's analysis of subjectivity, Richard's gaze into the mirror is replete with Lacanian significance. His reflection indirectly "symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination" (Ecrits 2) within the political symbolic. As we will see, political success derives from the simultaneous exploitation and denial of this alienation. On the symbolic structure of politics in Shakespeare's history plays, cf. Harry Berger, Jr.: "the problems inherent in the cultural constructions of 'natural' or jural fatherhood are carried into the wider sphere of national and dynastic politics in...forms of symbolic fatherhood" ("Psychoanalyzing" 210).

12. Cf. Volosinov's contrast of the "native word...[that] contains no mystery" with the "dictatorial and culture-creating role" of the arcane "Word" through which sociopolitical power is realized (Marxism 75). Shakespeare depicts political-religious idealism, with some skepticism it would seem, in Henry IV's repeated intention to "make a voyage to the Holy Land / To wash this blood off from my guilty hand" (Richard II V.vi.49-50). In the opening of 1Henry IV, Henry's motive has changed slightly (or simply become more apparent, "to busy giddy minds / With foreign quarrels," as he later puts it at 2Henry IV IV.v.213-14): "Therefore friends / As far as to the sepulchre of Christ...Forthwith a power of English shall we levy" (I.i.18-22). The idea becomes, of course, an obsession whose irony even Henry finally realizes, as he dies in a room called "Jerusalem" (2.IV.v.232-40).

13. On the theatricality of Machiavelli's political conceptions see Barish, Antitheatrical Prejudice 96-98, and Wayne A. Rebhorn, Foxes and Lions: "Machiavelli's princes recognize that social life is a theater, a set of manipulable fictions through which they can control others and ensure their own power" (111); "The prince's rhetorical ability extends to more than his command of words...Machiavelli sees his entire being and activities as a rhetorical performance, a calculated display in which dress and actions are joined to speech" (114).

14. The politically destructive effects of flattery are emblemized by Richard's smashing of the "flatt'ring mirror," and dramatized in Timon of Athens. It is only at his demise that Timon realizes his deception through the flattery of "Most smiling, smooth, detested parasites, / Courteous destroyers, affable wolves, meek bears" (III.vi.94-5). Yet Apemantus implies earlier that a flattered prince plays a self-deceiving part in his own fall: "He that loves to be flatter'd is worthy o' th' flatterer" (I.i.226-7). Cf. James's words to Prince Henry on "that filthy vice of Flattery, the pest of all Princes, and wracke of Republickes ...I fore-warned you to be warre with your owne inward flatterer" (Basilicon 115). The risk of flattery is that it lures the prince to relapse into an imaginary reification of his persona.

15. "Bacon is neither immoral or amoral, but premoral. He accepts the moral idea as a point of departure, and measures everything against it.... When Bacon has finished, the ideal remains; what does not remain is any illusion we may have had about the ease of living up to it" (Artifacts 118).

16. Cf. Baudrillard's point that the "arbitrary stop" is "the secret of a discourse that is no longer only ambiguous, as political discourses can be, but that conveys the impossibility of a determinate position of power, the impossibility of a determinate position of discourse," and that it produces "the 'vicious' curvature of a political space" (Simulations 34-35).

17. Similarly, Machiavelli's Discourses overtly demythologizes both the kingly ideal Cyrus--"Xenophon shows in his Life of Cyrus the necessity of deception to success.... Xenophon draws no other conclusion from it than that a prince who wishes to achieve great things must learn to deceive"--and the Romans: "We see therefore that the Romans in the early beginning of their power already employed fraud... and then it is the less censurable the more it is

concealed, as was that practised by the Romans" (Bk.I, ch.13 319-20).

18. Cf. Foucault, "What Is an Author?": "Writing [read politics] unfolds like a game that inevitably moves beyond its own rules and finally leaves them behind. Thus, the essential basis of this writing is not the exalted emotions relating to the act of composition [ruling] or the insertion of a subject into language. Rather, it is primarily concerned with creating an opening where the writing subject [the prince] endlessly disappears" (Language 116).

19. Cf. Victoria Kahn's exposition: "He is not bound to represent his subjects if representation is understood to imply correspondence to a preexisting or literal truth, or the control of the representative by the author...in accepting the fictional or hypothetical unity of author and actor in the artificial person, the subject gives up all claims to exercise his own power against the sovereign, for to do so would be to act against himself" (Rhetoric 170).

20. Cf. Marie Axton's view that the two bodies was neither fact nor orthodoxy but seemed "to express a precarious balance of power between the king and the state. This balance could be redefined with each fresh application of the theory to a contemporary situation" (Queen's Two Bodies x).

21. Cf. Goldberg, "the inherent theatricality of power and the power of theater" (James I xii); Jonathan Crewe, "Theatricality...begins in the moment of this fall into politics...drama is born as the hegemonic instrument of the ruling caste" (Designs 26); Greenblatt, "Theatricality ...is not set over against power but is one of power's essential modes"; the "Henry plays confirm the Machiavellian hypothesis that princely power originates in force and fraud" (Negotiations 46,65).

22. This point is analogous to Baudrillard's argument, which is echoed here, that "Failing to conceive of a model of social wealth other than that founded on labor and production, Marxism no longer furnishes in the long run a real alternative to capitalism.... Marxism assists the cunning power of capital" (Mirror 29-31). These Renaissance texts also assist "cunning power."

23. Folly's list of symbols echoes in Henry V's soliloquy: "and I know / 'Tis not the balm, the sceptre, and the ball, / The sword, the mace, the crown imperial, / The intertissued robe of gold and pearl, / The farced title running 'fore the king, / The throne he sits on, not the tide of pomp, / That

beats upon the high shore of this world-- / No, not all these, thrice gorgeous ceremony, / Not all these, lain in bed majestical, / Can sleep so soundly as the wretched slave" (IV.i.259-68). Richard C. McCoy remarks that in this "exposition of sovereignty's mystifications...Henry yearns to escape for a moment from ceremonial deception" ("Ceremony" 258). At least he says he does, and in so saying personalizes himself--an enduring emblem of royal England from Shakespeare's day to Olivier's World War II film--for an audience who, having been made privy to eloquent royal angst, can return home to sleep soundly.

24. In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard proposes that a person is constituted at such "nodal points" of discourse (15).

25. Cf. John Scott Colley's point that satire is a rhetorical not a mimetic form. Instead of external reality, it imitates other literary forms, using them as a false guise for its satirical thematic intent (Theatrical Drama 24-25). Also note James S. Baumlin's view that "Much of the significance of Elizabethan satire lies below the referentiality and the social concerns" ("Generic Contexts" 467), though Baumlin's intertextual focus is classical satire rather than political speech.

26. Cf. Bakhtin's notions of Dostoevskian characterization: "Dostoevsky's hero is not only a discourse about himself and his immediate environment, but also a discourse about the world.... The truth about the world...is inseparable from the truth of personality" (Dostoevsky 78). Interpreting Malevole as an "ideological nucleus" does not over-seriously ignore the play's comedy but recognizes that "Humor is part of every social system and can be analyzed as one social process affecting the system" (Martineau 103).

27. Altofronto anticipates Prospero, "neglecting worldly ends, all dedicated / To closeness and the bettering of my mind" (I.ii.89-90). Both construe their political naivety as virtue: "so slept in fearless virtue, / Suspectless, too suspectless" (Malcontent I.i.225-26); "my trust...had indeed no limit, / A confidence sans bound" (Tempest I.ii.96-97). Both blame their falls on a rival who joins with a powerful, neighboring crown to overthrow them--Pietro with Florence, Antonio with Naples; both ignore their complicity in their depositions, the situations of unrest their inattention fostered. Like the figure of complaint on the burdens of kingship, Altofronto and Prospero's complaints illustrate a topos of the rectitude of fallen power. A mixture of

political and moral senses, it typifies the displacement of Machiavellianism onto one's opponents that Bacon recommends.

28. Finkelppearl characterizes Maquerelle as a sexual Machiavel who parallels the political Malevole (190); at I.i.129 Malevole calls her his "mistress." T. F. Wharton notes that the usurpation is thematically linked to adultery, treachery, and inconstancy ("Dreams," 265-66). Michael Scott comments that "Marston links the political facade and impotence of the ruling class with the sexual activities of the old bawd" (Plays 31). Tennenhouse comments generally that "the disguised ruler plays require a magical undoing of the damage done by unregulated desire"; the ruler "reforms the social order and enforces traditional rules of courtship and marriage" ("Representing" 150,139).

29. On misogyny as a political topos cf. Machiavelli's Discourses, III.26, "How states are ruined on account of women" and Aristotle's criticisms of Spartan women (Politics X: 1269b).

30. Mendoza's ignorance reveals his failings as a Machiavel. He ignores Malevole's "simile" of the two buckets: "whilst one comes up full to be emptied another goes down empty to be filled...such is the state of all humanity" (III.i.275-77). He lacks the virtù "the power of constant adaptability to circumstances" (Mazzeo 156), to overcome fortuna. Hence his dreamlike response to his own deposition, "do I dream? or have I dreamt / This two days' space? where am I?" (V.iii.161-62), suggesting the imaginary conception of power that he held.

31. Cf. Anthony Caputi's notion of satiric self-fashioning, "In taking up the 'Satyre's knottie rod' in 1598, [Marston] assumed a stance, a voice, and a state of mind ideally suited to a vociferous declaration of his individuality" (John Marston 23). James Siemon avoids hints of intentionality when noting Altofronto's ethopoesis, "in his guise as Malevole he assumes a new personality, expressed in a characteristic point of view and a distinctive rhetorical pattern" ("Disguise" 115).

32. For interpretations of Malevole/Altofronto along these lines, see Ejner J. Jensen, John Marston, Dramatist 68,74 (a new critical focus on "tension"). For metatheatrical emphases see G. K. Hunter's Introductions to Antonio and Mellida and Antonio's Revenge; Colley 40-45,127 (who explicitly dismisses the play as a study of political reality since "there is no lasting and significant purgation of the causes of political folly and knavery" [126]); Finkelppearl

186,193; Ingram 86,100,158-59; Wharton 262,268. On themes of the lack of essential selfhood see Siemon 118; Scott 27,31. Cf. Dollimore on an ideological rather than psychological basis for the interpretation of Renaissance texts: "the materialist conception of subjectivity...invites a positive and explicit engagement with the historical, social and political realities of which both literature and criticism are inextricably a part" (Tragedy 249-50).

33. The implications of the play's conclusion did not go completely unheard by Jacobean authorities. In the third quarto, the political reference of Altofronto's lines "th' inconstant people / Love many princes merely for their faces / And outward shows" (V.iii.186-88) was generalized, "princes" being changed to "men" (Finkelpearl 192). This alteration registers effects which are recapitulated by many interpretations of The Malcontent: the ideological significance is generalized into moral philosophy; and the charismatic processes of the legitimation of the prince's power are further hidden ("further," since Altofronto's words already blame the people and not the dissembling princes). The censoring of Marston's play thus reveals both official power over discourse, to disguise it as desired, and the satiric inversion of this power, intimating Stuart concern for the English throne: the dialogism of absolutism. For details of the editorial changes to the third quarto, see G. K. Hunter's Introduction to the Methuen edition (xxxvii-xxxviii).

CHAPTER THREE
THE ALLEGORICAL SUBJECT

"There are many different forms of this ruler-ruled relationship, and the quality of the rule depends on the quality of the subjects...."

Aristotle, The Politics

In essentialist terms, an ideal self originates ethopoesis. Character traits are then signs of this origin. These traits may, however, suggest a gap between the ideal self and the role played in a social context. Even an archetype of imperial ethos may be suspect, as the prologue to Marlowe's The Jew of Malta intimates, "What right had Caesar to the empire? / Might first made kings" (Pro.14-15). If the circumstance of "might" rather than any inherent quality produces rule, the double nature of sovereignty can be adduced. During the Renaissance, kingship is often conceived as a model of essentialist selfhood and then contemplated from various angles to see what it shows about such an ethos. An underlying theme of Hamlet asks whether the royal archetype can be lost--"O, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown!... Th' expectation and rose of the fair

state, / The glass of fashion and the mould of form" (III.i.150-53)--before inferring its eventual restoration as an unrealized ideal, "he was likely, had he been put on, / To have prov'd most royal" (V.ii.397-98). Measure for Measure tests princely essence by holding Angelo up against the archetypal duke, "What figure of us think you he will bear?" (I.i.16). The Malcontent combines these two approaches, presenting a number of contenders for the throne--Altofronto, Pietro, Mendoza--who are tried, found lacking, and are superseded by Malevole/Altofronto.

The pattern of essentialist selfhood is examined by these texts in two respects. First, the original ethos is seen as ambiguously detached from a power whose exercise, through representation and dissemblance, contradicts its source. Secondly, the supposed teleology of disguise is reviewed. Within the essentialist conception, a disguise such as Malevole's is goal-directed and, like Prince Hal's "purposed noble change" (cf. 2HenryIV IV.v.154), is assumed to be reconcilable with the ultimate staging of the royal self. However, these texts raise the theme that the goal of princely disguise is never realized but continually deferred through the ethopolitical paradox of "imaginary puissance" where, "To 'master' the self, to understand it, would be to realize its falsity, and therefore the impossibility of coinciding with one's self" (Gallop 84).

This second view suggests that character is not necessarily conceived against a backdrop of archetypal ethos. A disguise may not always simply be taken off at the right revelatory moment, as Hal and Malevole believe. Instead it may be part of an uncertain process of characterization that lacks an ideal origin and end.¹ This suggests new aspects of ethopoetic disguise, with three important features: 1) While also teleologically oriented, characters may not know whether they've arrived till they're there, and they might never know. Character can't always be thought of in the past tense (Garfinkel 167). 2) Aimed at realizing a chosen social status, character is a dialogic process, "a contingent, practical accomplishment ...produced in concert with others" (Garfinkel 181-82), that uses observation and mimesis. 3) Characters develop a persona that they suppose matches their goal in order to gain that goal. It is crucial to choose models who fulfill and depict the chosen status.

In contrast to the essentialist dissimulations of sovereignty, passing is represented by many Renaissance texts in terms of subjection--a risky, ongoing practice where obedience to the king is the social norm against which character is evaluated ("The patriarch," Weber notes, "is the 'natural leader' of the daily routine" [245]). A subject can never become king, yet he or she may attain a status that signifies a socially accepted identity, or a personally

accepted one, or both. This ethic range, filled with social interaction and personal contradictions, spans the poles of obedience and rebellion. It is frequently figured in Renaissance works through disguise topoi, as subjects attempt to negotiate and improve their situations. Subjection represents a mode of selfhood that seeks to anticipate the demands of the social political order by adapting a flexible type of discourse. By first considering the structure of obedience and the ethopoetic constraints and norms it attempts to impose, the discourse of subjection and the social scope it affords can be examined. Through strategies of passing, the subject portrays images of selfhood that may mirror and distort the ideal order.

In the address to the reader in The Basilicon Doron, James I articulates a doctrine of subjection, whose key motif is the power of perception. James warns

all godlie and honest men, to be very warie in all their secretest actions...since the deepest of our secrets, can not be hid from that al-seeing eye, and penetrant light, pearcing through the bowles of verie darknesse it selfe. (12)

The king, himself subject to a higher vision, provides a model of subjection and of the empowered sight that enforces subjection. He is a figure to be both imitated and obeyed.² This double function reveals his identity with and against

the people, able to encourage or compel obedience, even to do both at once, as in the case of Cyrus who, "acquired the so-called 'king's eyes' and 'king's ears' in no other way than by bestowing presents and honours...and people are everywhere afraid to say anything to the discredit of the king, just as if he himself were listening; or to do anything to harm him, just as if he were present" (Xenophon VIII.ii.9-12). The people are led to impersonate the king, reproducing his perspective rather than practicing their own, "Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler.... The virtue of the subject[s] is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion" (Aristotle, X: 1277b). They are rewarded by attaining a social character--"he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honours of the state" (X: 1278a)--that encourages "opinion's" continued reproduction, for the honors implicate the recipients more deeply in the system that grants them. In the classical tradition as depicted by Aristotle and Xenophon, the system of obedience is structured on ethic repetition, the imitation of the royal character.

A central Elizabethan text that represents this structure is the Homily on Obedience. The homily is constructed through repetition, in its numerous citations from the Bible, its references to Tyndale's authoritative The Obedience of a Christen Man (1535), and the regularity of its pronouncement and publication (eleven Elizabethan editions).

Its rhetorical style also exploits repetition to great effect, in order to represent and realize a mimetic ideal of order as repetition. A rhetoric of obedience inscribes this ideal through the chorically recurring belief that "the high power and auctoritie of kinges, with their makynge of lawes, judgements, and officers, are the ordinaunces, not of man but of god, and therefore is this word (through me) soo manye times repeted" (Kinney 61). The prince obeys and imitates God, and both are obeyed and imitated throughout the realm, the latter practices here exemplified by the transparent, anonymous homilist who ventriloquates his superiors' words.

The textual repetition includes the syntax and grammar of individual sentences, with the doubling of verbs, modifiers, and substantives. The first sentence reads: "Almightye God hath created and appoynted all thinges, in heaven, earth, and waters, in a mooste excellent and perfecte order" (60). The importance of this opening statement informs its thematic circularity. It takes its audience quickly through the origin and end of creation, before disclosing that they are the same, that they reproduce each other. The syntactical movement from "Almightye God" to "perfecte order" anagogically signifies the repetition--order is God, God is order--that is the homily's motive.³

As the homily continues the immediate aim of its rhetoric of obedience and repetition is revealed. Tautology becomes Elizabethan ideology:

God hath sent us his hygh gyft, oure moost dere soveraygne Lady Queene Elizabeth, with godly, wyse and honorable counsaile, with other superyors and inferiors in a beautiful order and goodly. Wherefore let us subjectes do our bounden duties, gevyng harty thanks to god, and praying for the preservation of this godly order. Let us al obey even from the botome of oure heartes, all theyr godly procedinges, laws, statutes.... (61)

The duty of subjects is to obey the order and perpetuate its pattern. Obedience penetrates them internally to "the botome of [their] heartes." Yet here, as James warns in The Basilicon, obedience is also an omnipresent external sign to be read by "superyors." The awful lines, warning of disloyalty's ineluctable exposure, imply that faithful subjection is likewise always perceivable:

let noo man thinke that he can escape unpunished, that committeth treason, conspiracie, or rebellyon, agaynste his soveraigne Lord the king, though he comyt the same never so secretlye, either in thought, worde or dede.... For treason wil not be hid: treason wil out at the length.
(67)

The statement is at once ideologically descriptive and prescriptive. It conveys that what it says about the relation of king to subjects is fact, that "superyors" have this mysterious power of discernment, and that subjects, in

spite of all their efforts, unavoidably exist but to be read.⁴

The congregation learns its semiotic role as it would a language, through hearing, imitating and repeating: "Thus we learne by the worde of god, to yelde to our kyng, that is dewe to our king" (69). These dues comprise the financial, "taxes, customes, trybutes, subsedies," the respectful and moral, "honor, obedience... love and feare," and finally, the discursive. The subjects' fated role is to speak for their ruler just as she would speak for herself. Only through doing so will their worldly and eternal happiness be assured:

Let us heartely thanke God for his great and excellent benefits and provydence, concerning the state of kinges. Let us pray for them, that thei maye have god's favoure, and god's proteccion.... And let us praye for ourselves, that we may live godlye, in holy and chrystian conversation.... So we shall live in true obedience, bothe to oure most mercifull kyng in heaven, and to oure mooste Christian Quene in earth. (70)

In such prayers the subjects would precisely imitate and anticipate the sovereign's personal, political discourse.

Obedience constitutes the natural ideal which subjects are to enact.⁵ Yet as the homily's warnings against conspiracy suggest, this ideal anticipates its own antithesis in rebellion. Nature is not necessarily disrupted by this opposition, for rebellion is also conceptualized in terms of order. Loyalty or rebellion can be emphasized to reinforce

the crown: rejoicing at a royal procession reveals and inspires obedience, as does the frequent publication of accounts of seditious acts. Determined by the royal perspective, sedition is circumscribed within the official discourse. This process seeks to prevent sedition becoming a radical act by turning it into a merely deviant imitation of obedience. The persona of the rebel is likewise informed by the character of the ideal subject.

For example, the government pamphlet, "A discoverie of the treasons attempted by Francis Throckemorton" (1584), uses a number of strategies to relocate Throckemorton within the official order. This relocation is made easier since Throckemorton seeks less to subvert the social and political structure than to replace the figure at its apex with Mary Stuart.⁶ The pamphlet is narrated in a double-voiced manner; its presenter, "Q.Z.," quotes Throckemorton not to disseminate his views but to depict the official reappropriation of deviance, a process which is framed as just and natural. It occurs through the conclusive characterization of both Throckemorton and the pamphlet's readers as the queen's subjects.

The pamphlet starts by addressing and wooing the "gentle reader" with all the trappings of verisimilitude: "a true report...which comming to my handes by chance from a gentleman, to whom it was sent into the Countrey, I have

presumed to commit the same to the print" (Kinney 144). A pair of characters is introduced, an innocuous narrator and a random gentleman, who appear simply to reproduce rather than manipulate an already extant text for the benefit and edification of the readers. These common fictional tropes seem to subject the pamphlet to the order of an external reality, the readers' reality of truth, chance, city and country. Their effect, however, is the beguiling inverse--readers are lured within the official order of "discoverie." For just as much as Throckemorton's are their own words and actions cited and represented as seditious and exposed, guilty and yet known. They are made to confess their own treason and are then brought back, chastened and loyal, to order.

The pamphlet shows great sensitivity to rumors that the accused has been unjustly treated. This defensiveness becomes the means of implicating the audience since,

such as allowe of practices and treasons against her Majestie, do alwayes inteprete both of the one and the other, according to the particular affections that doe possesse them, that is, to the worst. And forasmuch as the case of Throckemorton at this time hath bene subject to their sinister constructions, and considering that lies and false bruites cast abroad are most commonly beleevd, until they be controlled by the trueth: it hath bene thought expedient in this short discourse to deliver unto your view and consideration, a true and perfect declaration of the treasons practised and attempted by the said Throckemorton against her Majestie and the Realme.... (146)

One either spreads or believes the rumors, in either case challenging the view that "her Majestie was justly and in reason perswaded to put him to his triall" (146). The implication of guilt jolts and subdues, coercing support for Q.Z.'s account or forcing an admission of treachery: the text "may in reason satisfie, though not all, yet such as are not forestalled, or rather forepoysoned and infected with the lies and untruthes alreadie spred and delivered in favour of the traitor and his treasons" (146).

After his capture, Throckemorton is continually urged to confess: "more earnestly pressed to confesse the trueth" (147), "perswaded in very milde and charitable maner, to confesse the trueth" (148), finally handed over to those who are "to assay by torture to drawe from him the trueth" (148). The parallels among earnest pressing (which in itself intimates some physicality), mild persuasion, and torture--all equally the means of disclosing truth--suggest the hegemonic molding of character being imposed. The confession is not needed to discover the truth, only to publicize and characterize it. The power of discovery belongs to Throckemorton's questioners, and the accusations have already established the truth about him. He cannot be the subject of truth but only an object whose confession is desired not to reveal knowledge but to reestablish the mimetic order of obedience, to reposition rebellion within the circle of

subjection, and to exemplify this taking place.⁷ The "submission verbatim written with his owne hand" (157) images the reassertion of ethopoetic order, providing an exemplary model of identity and self-characterization for the loyal reader, and a preview of the inevitable abjection that awaits the seditious one. Throckemorton's self-debasement reinforces the relative characters of subject and sovereign:

Most excellent Prince, and my most gracious
Soveraigne, sith to mee the most miserable of all
your Majestie's poore distressed subjects, being
justly condemned by the ordinarie and orderly
course of your Majestie's Lawes, there resteth no
further meane of defence but submission:
vouchsafe, most excellent Prince, graciously to
accept the same.... (157)⁸

The power of the official word lies in the cooptation of subjects' means of characterization. Obedience forecloses any ethopoetic discourse which might be extraneous to subjection. In his biography of Sidney, Fulke Greville epitomizes Sidney's loyalty by noting his decision to "instantly sacrificise all these selfnesses to the duty of obedience" (76). Hobbes observes in Leviathan that various "diseases of a commonwealth...proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines" that are often grounded in the assertion of individual viewpoints and character such as: "That every private man is judge of good and evil actions"; that "whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin... [which] dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge

of good and evil"; that "every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods; such, as excludeth the right of the sovereign" (ch.29 286-88). The revised depiction of the subject disturbs the civic order of identity.

The emphasis on "selfness" would culminate in asking whether the sovereign identity is itself beyond subjection, a question which would relativize the ideal ethos. As another seditious doctrine, Hobbes names the "opinion...that he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws" (288). He contests that it is the sovereign's duty, benefit, and security to ensure "the instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty" (ch.30 297) and thus forestall--through means like the Homily on Obedience--such questions. Calvin stresses that the people must not diverge from the official perception of order:

The first duty of subjects towards their rulers, is to entertain the most honourable views of their office, recognising it as a delegated jurisdiction from God, and on that account receiving and reverencing them as the ministers and ambassadors of God. (II: 668)

Similarly, John Donne, in his Christmas sermon of 1624, preaches that "Subjects are to look upon the faults of Princes, with the spectacles of obedience, and reverence, to their place, and persons, little and dark spectacles, and so their faults, and errors are to appeare little, and excusable

to them" (Sermons 95). All these orthodox pronouncements reinforce the social hierarchy of character.

Such sermons, tracts, and punishments generate a vast discourse of ethopoetic obedience which is central to the political order. It is conceived on the basis of what Hillis Miller has called "'Platonic' repetition...grounded in a solid archetypal model which is untouched by the effects of repetition" (Fiction 6). The royal word announces a model of selfhood that is to be copied by subjects according to their position in the hierarchy. Treason is the poorest of imitations, and the traitor ignores his designated identity. Yet even so he remains within a structure of repetition and obedience which would prescribe the characters of all those to whom it refers.

The monolithic effect of this ethopoetic discourse was, however, resisted and challenged in various ways during the Renaissance. Foucault notes occasions where scenes of punishment were inverted, as the crowd glorified the prisoner and attacked the authorities. These official displays became "ambiguous rituals," comprising "a whole mass of discourses" and of roles that lacked a single author (Discipline 65,68). On the basis of Elizabethan court records of those tried for slander, Louis Montrose underlines the "varied and causal ways the royal body--and the royal fiction--might be

manipulated by the queen's subjects," especially where an "oral and often scurrilous counterdiscourse carnivalized the official cult of mystical royal virginity" ("Elizabethan" 312). Lucio, in Measure for Measure, exemplifies these sorts of attacks against sovereignty, prompting the Duke's exasperated question, "What king so strong / Can tie the gall up in the slanderous tongue?" (III.i.187-88). In a sermon of 1618 John Donne warns against a tendency to subvert official discourse that emerges from a person's intrinsic ethos. To question the word is "a leaven so kneaded into the nature of man, so innate a tartar, so inherent a sting, so inseparable a venom in man...a naturall infirmity, which the strongest men, being but men, cannot deuest" (Sermons 38-40). And in "Of Coaches," Montaigne speculates on the relation between the characters of the sovereign and subjects through which the king realizes his identity: "taking the matter exactly as it is, a King hath nothing that is properly his owne; hee oweth himselfe to others. Authority is not given in favour of the authorising, but rather in favour of the authorised" (II: 134; Hobbes of course sees the king as the authorized).

In these views, the monarch lacks absolute authority but finds him or herself portrayed within an ongoing dialogue where subjects contradict as well as imitate the royal word. G. R. Elton has suggested that Elizabeth's court was less a setting of official stability than "the centre of political

power struggles" ("Tudor" 225). Applying this observation to the ideal discourse of obedience, we may note two consequences which challenge ethopoetic subjection. The first is that subjects have their own powers of characterization. They can depict the sovereign, other officials, and themselves in roles that they choose. The cast of guises and personae is not ultimately determinable from a single sovereign script. Secondly, the range of "genres" in which characters can be represented is also unfixed. Officials can be carnivalized and ordinary figures honorably represented in the "velvet life" (Shoemaker's Holiday V.i.39). The hierarchy of ethopoesis is open to revisions which may disrupt official mimetic genres.

Rather than a rigid discourse based on obedient imitation of the sovereign word, the dialogue between ruler and ruled can be conceived as "an intense interaction and struggle between one's own and another's word...a process in which they oppose or dialogically interanimate each other" (Bakhtin, Dialogic 354). Subjection expresses varying versions of official discourse which generate changing characters and roles for speaker and audience. Obedience closely imitates it, or at least is viewed as doing so, while rebellion is perceived as contradictory. Between these two poles may come a range of reaccentuations which challenge, to varying extents, both the royal word and the official powers

of surveillance. Subjection is an experimental discourse, with its speaker or author keenly attuned to audience understanding and response. As well as reviewing the consequences of previous utterances, he or she must weigh present and future options for interaction, balancing the demands of the official order against impulses of "selfness." As Richard Lanham remarks on the responsibilities of Castiglione's courtier, "Each individual must learn, in addition to a symbolic vocabulary of word and gesture, how to read his own gestures as others read them.... The self at any time comprises a series of experiences and potential experiences, a drama enacted and yet to be" (Motives 152). The discourse of subjection continually adapts the characters of its participants.

Court attendance significantly intensifies the process of subjection, increasing the stakes of characterization. The court offers the greatest rewards for obedience, and, due to the enveloping official structure, the greatest risks of being perceived as acting rebelliously.⁹ Consequently, the subject is pressured into negotiating the contradictions between obedience and "selfness" through a discourse that passes, by realizing "the ethos of submission" (McCoy, Sidney 5) and searching after changing personal goals. For the Elizabethan court, Puttenham's Arte of English Poesie is

probably the most detailed guide to constructing this discourse. Puttenham introduces his "conception of poetry as a body of changing cultural practices dialectically related to the fundamental processes of social life...his pervasive concern with the dialectic between poetry and power" (Montrose, "Gentlemen" 435-36). One of the key elements in this dialectic is the character of the subject-poet. Puttenham studies the genres of ethopoesis which are open to the courtier, and develops one that supplements mimetic identity through tropes of dissimulated selfhood. The visual and verbal means of obedient imitation are superseded by an allegorical ethos.

The geography of the court can be mapped in two ways. The first is drawn from the vantage of obedience: "The queen is imagined to occupy the center of a circular social cosmos...her central location orients or 'places' her subjects where they belong" (Whigham, 67). This map presents the queen as origin of the realm. The characters of subjects are determined through their relations to her, and through the pressure towards epideixis that she exerts upon their speech: "courtly [rhetoric] seeks primarily a stabilization of the political regime through the praise...of its leading representative" (Plett 599). Puttenham, however, suggests an alternative map, in which the queen is displaced. Instead of simply being praised as the subject of epideixis, she is

characterized and becomes the product of discourse, especially that of "a learned and a Courtly Poet" (*Arte* 158). Puttenham depicts speech as persuasive, artificial, and oriented to the speaker's goals: "Vtterance also and language is giuen by nature to man for perswasion of others, and aide of them selues.... For speech it selfe is artificiall and made by man, and the more pleasing it is, the more it preuailleth to such purpose as it is intended for" (8). Speech may deploy power over others, reworking the relationship between speaker and audience by molding their characters in new ways. Poesie's royal aim has ambivalent effects, for praise of the queen can empower or disable the courtier, resituating him in the interpersonal hierarchy.¹⁰

The courtly poet may refashion this extant hierarchy, changing a "natural" system that paradoxically includes elements of the social as well as the physical world. Puttenham describe various relations between the poet and nature, which range from him being "onely a bare immitatour of natures works," to "an ayde and coadiutor to nature," then "an alterer of [nature's actions]...a surmounter of her skill," and lastly,

an encounterer and contrary to nature, producing effects neither like to hers, nor by participation with her operations, nor by imitation of her paternes, but makes things and produceth effects altogether strange and diverse.... (303-04)

These possibilities parallel the range of actions open to the courtier within the "natural" structure of subjection, each moving further from obedience towards rebellion. Sidney's Defence celebrates this final non-mimetic possibility in terms of the poet's freedom from submission: "Onely the Poet disdeining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth grow in effect into an other nature" (III: 8). Such a change of identity, when related to the social hierarchy, would transform the status quo of character.¹¹

Puttenham develops this non-mimetic notion of discourse by conceiving of poetry as a compounded semiotic process rather than a singularly verbal or visual one, thereby allowing for the physical and linguistic factors of self-representation. Poetry is a type of behavior that signifies visually and orally. The Arte's discussion of concrete verse forms, emblems, and the synaesthetic functioning of poetry reflects a "public life at court [that] was governed by a rhetorical imperative of performance...a matter of doing, and so of showing" (Whigham 32-33). Moreover, everything can signify in more than one way:

it so falleth out most times your ocular proportion doeth declare the nature of the audible: for if it please the eare well, the same represented by delineation to the view pleaseth the eye well and è conuerso.... (85)

These reciprocal connections between the verbal and visual foreground the semiotic sensitivity in the court. Not only are the different sorts of poetic texts individually legible, but they refer to each other through different media and channels. The courtier's speech and actions must likewise interrelate decorously to be effective means of characterization.

Through this intertextual notion of discourse and its implications for self-representation, Puttenham's Arte supplements the mainly visual semiotics of character that Castiglione had treated in The Courtier, and which, as will emerge, ultimately remains within the official scheme of identity. Verbal processes are there considered in the remarks on self-praise: "all doth consiste in speaking such thinges after a sorte, that it may appeare that they are not rehearsed to that end: but that they come so to purpose, that he cannot refraine telling them, and alwaies seeming to flee his owne prayse, tell the truth" (Castiglione 38).¹² Generally, however, Castiglione's courtly tactics are visually grounded. Sprezzatura is described as a visual guise: "a certaine disgracing to cover arte withall...which we for this time terme Recklesnesse...the true fountaine from the which all grace springeth...it imprinteth in the minde of the lookers on, an opinion, that who can so sleightly doe well hath a great deale more knowledge than in deede he hath"

(46-49). The effects of "recklesnesse" must be clearly if not consciously perceived by the viewer.

The specular motif becomes stronger when Count Canosse criticizes women for breaking the rule of sprezzatura by using cosmetics and overtly flaunting their charms, "these faultes that I talke of, take this grace from you: for they proceede of nothing els, but of curiousnesse, whereby ye discover openly unto every man the over great desire that yee have to be beawtifull" (66). As such, sprezzatura is a subtle conspicuousness, a seeming absence of intention that must remain apparent to others. On the following night, Frederick Fergoso continues and develops the theme of dependent visibility. The courtier should aim to "feede the eyes of the lookers on with all the thinges that hee shall thinke may give a good grace" (96). Like Puttenham, Fergoso stresses the wide-ranging effects of appearance but ties them to sight: "all the behaviour, gestures and manners, beside wordes and deedes, are in a judgement of inclination of him in whom they are seene" (118). By exercising the judgement and power of the onlookers, the courtier reaffirms their priority and his reliance on it.

The continual reference in Castiglione to sight prescribes a character whose behavior is visually determined. Although sprezzatura allows for ambiguity, it is a defensive maneuver--"a certain warie dissimulation" as Fergoso calls it

(132)--which seeks to insulate the courtier from his observers and so acknowledges their control. It responds to and within the system of characterization ruled by a royal vision that identifies and establishes the social place of each subject: "Speech and other significations reveal not power but powerlessness, a pleading with the audience for a hearing, for recognition, for ratification" (Whigham 39). Castiglione repeatedly emphasizes that the duty of the courtier is loyal service to the prince through which his own character may be approved and formed. He should use his flexibility to "turne all his thoughts and force of mind to love, and (as it were) to reverence the prince hee serveth above all other thinges, and in his wil, manners and fashions, to bee altogether plyable to please him" (206). This visible ethos reinforces the determinate "sovereignty of the gaze" (Foucault, Birth 89). To be a subject is to be the object of that gaze, which limits the effects of disguise and dissimulation. The story commonly used to illustrate this was Alexander the Great testing his physician Philip of Acarnon. In The Passions of the Mind, Thomas Wright recounts the episode from Plutarch and concludes: "By this example superiors may learn to conjecture the affections of their subjects' minds by a silent speech pronounced in their very countenances" (110). The discourse of subjection is here constrained to that which can be perceived by "superiors."¹³

The visual imagery used by Castiglione and Wright implies the official surveillance of what subjects can say and think. The efficacy of authority's gaze structures interactions between subject and sovereign into obedience. On the one hand, unofficial "affections" are either found out or, because of the inevitability of their discovery, are not represented. On the other hand, authority remains insulated, removed from the reciprocating gaze of the subject, by a code of decorum which it institutes and manipulates. It is not

good manners that the inferior should fix his eyes upon his superior's countenance; and the reason is because it were presumption for him to attempt the entrance or privy passage into his superior's mind, as contrariwise it is lawful for the superior to attempt the knowledge of his inferior.
(Wright 111)

Within this visual submission, the subject by necessity wears Donne's "spectacles of obedience."

It is into this economy of visual control that Puttenham introduces his system of figures. Because of their verbal complexity, the figures cannot be contained within the courtly order: "so be they also in a sorte abuses or rather trespasses in speach, because they passe the ordinary limits of common vtterance, and be occupied of purpose to deceiue the eare and also the minde, drawing it from plainnesse and simplicitie to a certaine doublenesse" (154). Moreover, they specifically contest the sovereign gaze by expressing "a

duplicitie of meaning or dissimulation vnder couert and darke intendments" (154) which disrupt visual obedience. Puttenham acknowledges the surreptitious potency of the figures and anticipates official censure by including such censure in his own description and seeming to agree with it. He relates the banning of figures by Areopagites "as meere illusions to the minde, and wresters of vpright iudgement" (154).

The most important of the "sensable figures altering and affecting the mynde" is "the Courtly figure Allegoria, which is when we speake one thing and thinke another, and that our wordes and our meanings meets not" (186). Puttenham underlines its Machiavellian utility for courtiers, counsellors, and princes. The effect of allegory, "the chief ringleader and captaine of all other figures," is, however, to transform the existing hierarchy of rank, releasing the courtier from his established status. While to use allegory is to wield power, "Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare" (186), the courtier's goal is less that of absolute rule than the power to move from prescribed social positions. Allegory disrupts a mimetic structure of character by supplementing visual identity with a rhetorical ethos that generates new genres of selfhood:

we may dissemble, I meane speake otherwise then we thinke...vnder couert and darke termes...aswell when we lye as when we tell truth. To be short euery speach wrested from his owne naturall signification to another not altogether so

naturall is a kinde of dissimulation, because the
wordes beare contrary countenance to th' intent.
(Puttenham 186)

The figural disguise relates the rhetorical process of allegory to attempts at self-representation which exceed the visual limitations of "countenance," the order of identity that Wright claims is in force and within which Castiglione's courtier acts.

In closing the Arte Puttenham states that it is the "profession of a very Courtier...cunningly to be able to dissemble" (299). Indeed dissimulation is necessary to the courtier to such an extent that "the figure Allegoria...not impertinently we call the Courtier or figure of faire semblant" (299). Attesting to the affirmative possibilities of this discursive passing, the courtier, now "a living trope" (Montrose, "Gentlemen" 440), personifies allegory as "faire" rather than "false semblant" (cf. Arte 186). In so doing, he gains access to a rhetoric of characterization that is not determined by the mimetic ethos but affords figures of "selfness":

he could dissemble his conceits as well as his countenances, so as he neuer speake as he thinke, or thinke as he speaks, and that in any matter of importance his words and his meaning very seldome meete...or is it not perchance more requisite our courtly Poet do dissemble not onely his countenances & conceits, but also all his ordinary actions of behaviour, or the most part of them, whereby the better to winne his purposes & good aduantages.... (299-300)

Producing no certain character or settled corpus of thoughts, expressions, and words, Allegoria instead offers a means of manipulating "all ordinary actions of behaviour" in order to realize "purposes and good aduantages" that cannot be preset in the changeable social context of the court. The courtier's dissemblings are, then, not choreographed against a backdrop of ideal identity or in view of a definitely attainable one. They comprise a risky business of constructing a character while already participating in the context for which that character is wanted.

Allegoria inscribes the courtier's attempts to work his subjection. The meaning of gestures, speech, and demeanor may be reaccentuated for purposes of "selfness" while continuing to reproduce the official model of identity.¹⁴ Through such "beau semblant" (Puttenham 158) the courtier accepts the hierarchy of character and the concepts which inform obedience--repetition, sight, and nature. Yet while imitating this structure of roles and character, the subject also develops a persona that evades its determinations. He may question the ideal priority of the sovereign word and "impose upon the fictions whose enforced acceptance signifies his subjection the marks of his own subjectivity" (Montrose, "Elizabethan" 331). The dissimulations of the allegorical ethos disturb the mimetic order and allow the passage of subjection to commence.

The tensions within the work and life of John Lyly depict the risks and gains of the courtier's passing. Despite being a relatively successful court writer, Lyly never won the position of Master of Revels on which he had set his sights. The success of his plays seems only to have increased his expectations and hopes, and although for himself "literature [was] a kind of courtship display of general secular capacity" (Hunter, Lyly 34), it ultimately failed to translate into social goals. In an earlier and different context, the humanist ethos was to an extent attainable, and Italian humanists "as men of eloquence found a place in the society of their day" (Seigel 254). In the late-sixteenth century English court, however, eloquence could guarantee no privilege but might contribute to the "actions of behaviour" through which a subject sought personal ideals.

The prolonged failure to effect his own identity adds an ironic sharpness to Lyly's depictions of the relations between the queen and her subjects, a recurrent theme through his prose and dramatic works. It is tempting to see the fulsome praise of Euphues, Endimion, and Phao for their royal mistresses as envoicing Lyly's own anxious desire which, because of such barely veiled importunacy, drew no response. Yet in more complex ways, the euphuistic and allegorical styles of these texts establish a process of literary and

social decorum through which the subject and sovereign interact. Rather than anchoring Lyly's work wholly in imputed aims and failings, the self-conscious rhetoric reveals the courtier's attempt to use a discourse which affords a practicable identity with the possibility to change or develop, while satisfying the prevailing cultural condition of obedience to the sovereign ideal. In this ambivalent, disguised process, key concepts of the mimetic ethos of subjection are also drawn into question.

Lyly's most striking celebration of obedience and subjection appears in Euphues and His England. In the chapter "Euphues Glasse for Europe," the hero offers a "discription, the manners, the conditions, the gouvernement and entertainment" of England, "a place in my opinion...not inferiour to a Paradise" (II: 189). The glass is an epideictic reflection of Euphues' homeland and queen as edifying models to the "Ladies and Gentlewomen of Italy" and the rest of the Continent. The mirror's image displays the English hierarchy as the natural ideal, with Elizabeth its crowning glory. She crystallizes England's perfection in her own and all but transcends Euphues' attempts at description: "an other sight there is in my Glasse, which maketh me sigh for grieve I can-not shewe it...the more I go about to expresse the brightness, the more I find my eyes bleared, the neerer I desire to come to it, the farther I seme from it"

(II: 203-04). His sight is subject to a sovereign who, as the image of light, is the basis of his vision.

Euphues overcomes this near inability through the strength of his loyalty. He contrasts himself to Apelles who, on the one hand, epitomizes royal artists as the painter chosen by Alexander, yet who depicts his prince through skill rather than faith: "Let Apelles shewe his fine arte, Euphues will manifest his faythfull heart, the one can but proue his conceite to blase his cunning, the other his good will to grinde his coulours" (II: 204). Faithful imitation, which derives from the sovereign's archetypal nature rather than the artist's own talent, will present Euphues' profound ethos.¹⁵ The failure to reproduce this essence of beauty and chastity--"excelling in the one Venus, in the other Vesta" (II: 209)--is all the more testament to Elizabeth's ideal nature and the artist's humble adoration and dependent selfhood. Euphues celebrates the process of imitating an archetype whose perfection raises obedient submission to an ideal state: "Happy are they, and onely they that are vnder this glorious and gracious Sovereigntie: in-somuch that I accompt all those abiects, that be not hir subiectes" (II: 208). The pattern of the subject and sovereign's reciprocal characterization, suggested earlier by the traitor Throckemorton's confession, is again imposed.

Under such a monarch the court itself assumes an unusual righteousness, seeming "rather a Church for divine service, then a Court for Princes delight" (II: 216), and the courtiers themselves become uncharacteristically exalted. The praise is so lavish and the reflection of Elizabeth so blinding that Euphues is forced to withdraw from an epideictic display which threatens to erase him. By portraying the sovereign ideal with such devotion, the praiser reduces himself to a mere function or expression of her perfection. His "faythfull heart" seems about to expire in its own rhetoric, "being in this Laborinth, I may sooner loose my selfe, then finde the ende" (215). The mimetic ethos of obedience would here consume itself in its very realization, an ecstatic, Neoplatonic self-loss.

Euphues overtly employs the major tropes of subjection. The emphasis on vision and light, imitation, loyalty, and self-abandon recapitulates the ethopoetic motifs of submission which dominate the rhetoric of obedience. At the same time they are invested with a sublimated Petrarchan quality. The courtier's sexual submission, in his inability to approach the ideal object of desire, is an implicit theme in the Elizabethan ethos of subjection. In Lyly's work it often appears as an impassioned faithfulness which the male characters strive to suppress, as Endimion's guarded avowal to Cynthia illustrates, "Such a difference hath the Gods

sette between our states, all must be dutie, loyaltie, and reuerence; nothing (without it vouchsafe your highness) be termed loue" (V.iii.168-70). This submissive desire compels the male subject to use an indirect, allegorical address which may alter the relation to the queen, leading him away from an unambiguous identity, despite his overt servility.¹⁶

The queen's archetypal nature makes it impossible to approach her or represent her realistically. Euphues thus employs an allegorical form of praise to express her sovereign mystery. On the one hand, such allegory is in itself politically conservative, reflecting the official hierarchy of character, "allegorical works present an aesthetic surface which implies an authoritative, thematic, 'correct' reading, and which attempts to eliminate other possible readings" (Fletcher, Allegory 305). On the other hand, Euphues takes a decided chance in attempting to portray the ideal. His efforts will either fall short of the queen's celestial glory, perhaps to emerge as a sort of parody or rebellion, or, by realizing her glory, they will reveal it as earthly and perhaps subject to the imagination of others. The process of allegorically representing the queen becomes marked by a necessary denial of intentional effect. Allegorical praise aims to please both subject and sovereign yet risks disturbing the delicate relation between them. Hence Euphues feels compelled to include an explicit

"loophole" to try to tie down this erring text: "though it be not requisite that any should paynt their Prince in England, that can-not sufficiently perfect hir, yet it shall not be thought rashnesse or rudenesse for Euphues, to frame a table for Elizabeth" (II: 204). Euphues appeals to his audience to reject any rash or rude effects which his praise causes. A loss of rhetorical control menaces the author, as the allegory threatens to invert subjection, transforming loyal intentions into possible insult. Euphues' loophole signifies submission to a more powerful audience, plus an awareness that allegorical praise might inscribe a challenge to the hierarchy of character. The means of realizing the rewards of loyalty reveal to the subject a tempting "selfness" that might exploit the dissimulations of Allegoria. Although Euphues requests the audience to set the limits of his meaning within the realm of obedience, to impose a hermeneutic authority that would fix his identity, even this request might serve as a cover. The rhetoric of allegory and praise commits him to an uncertain status within the court.

Lyly uses a similarly cautious strategy in the court epilogue to Campaspe. It doesn't merely flatter the queen but asks her to establish the play's worth. The playwright and actors admit that their fate is in her hands: "As yet we cannot tell what we should tearme our labours, yron or

bullyon; only it belongeth to your Maiestie to make them fitte either for the forge, or the mint...so can there be nothing thought good in the opinion of others, vnlesse it be christened good by the iudgement of your selfe" (II: 360). They subject their discourse to hers, and in so doing submit their identity to her power of "christening" and "iudgement." The queen's part in the play, then, is more than visual, and anticipates the royal roles of the Jacobean masques, "For all the Court plays... the Queen must have appeared to the rest of the audience as practically part of the production" (Saccio 16). Surpassing this participatory role, the queen authorizes the very text of the play, assigning its place and value within the social order--"yron or bullyon"--and thus Lyly's as well.

Campaspe dramatizes a similar process of watchful obedience. There are numerous links among the themes of the play, the circumstances of its court presentation, Lyly's position as a subject, and the process of submission. Alexander emerges as "a controlling royal figure, who could end the play by rejecting the errors and re-establishing the right" (Hunter 204), reflecting Elizabeth's authorizing function. In finally making the match between Apelles and Campaspe, Alexander both contents his subjects and exercises his power over them.¹⁷ That he does not take Campaspe himself seems to depict a limit to the sovereign's power;

Alexander himself says, "I perceiue Alexander cannot subdue the affections of men, though he conquer their countries" (V.iv.127-29). Yet the lovers have remained fearfully dependent on his goodwill, disguising their love from themselves and each other and from Alexander, until he commandingly asks, "dissemble not Campaspe, do you loue Apelles?" (V.iv.121-22).

As discussed earlier, the relationship of Apelles to Alexander seems to have had an emblematic significance for many Renaissance writers. Euphues compares himself to Apelles, and doubtless to court artists such as Lyly the painter personified the goal of the sovereign favorite. Castiglione's courtiers also pay attention to this relationship. They recount the Campaspe story, seeing it as "Truely a worthie liberallitie of Alexander, not to give onely treasure and states, but also his own affections and desire, and a token of verie great love towards Apelles" (81). Campaspe is here characterized as a transferable "token" of the men's homoerotic, political relation. For Castiglione's men the political system is wholly patriarchal, and the tale exemplifies the ideally mutual love between prince and male subject. Such reciprocity reflects a system of obedience that subsumes all difference and all subjects into an imaginary politics of "the desire for the same, for the self-identical, the self (as) same" (Irigaray 26).

Castiglione's image of impassioned male loyalty binding subject to sovereign exemplifies the ideal mimesis of subjection. The sovereign's ethos is envisioned as a narcissistic goal that subsumes any personal identity, a structure of royal "autoeroticism more or less deferred or differentiated into the autological or homologous representations of a (masculine) 'subject'" (Irigaray 28). The female figure signifies heterogeneity within this mimetic system and marks the diverting of Apelles' submissive aim from the official goal. Castiglione's courtiers thus emasculate Campaspe's function, by presuming first that her desire duplicates the homoerotic model and that she "was sore agreeved to chaunge so great a king for a painter," and second that Alexander's gift is "a token of verie great love towards Appelles" (Courtier 81), which reinforces the masculinist bonds. The homogeneity of this sexual politics and the dependent desire of the subjects exemplify the orthodoxy of Castiglione's portrayal of submission.

In Lyly's Campaspe, the relationship of Alexander and Hephestion, especially as it emerges in the latter's bellicose, misogynous speeches, recalls this mimetic obedience. Alexander intimates its homoerotic subtext, "Mee thinketh, Hephestion, you are more melancholy then you were accustomed; but I perceive it is all for Alexander" (V.iii.1-2). Nonetheless, through the romantic intrigue between

Campaspe and Apelles, the play stages a movement beyond the submission to sovereign desire, yet one which is able to proceed only on the basis of this desire. This imperial model of conduct and identity looms over the lovers' clandestine romance, forming the cultural background against which they will practice their allegorical passing. Lyly picks up the "latent pun on courtship [that] conflates political and sexual submission" (McCoy, Sidney 17), and through the vicissitudes of a series of love affairs between Alexander and Hephestion, Alexander and Campaspe, Alexander and Apelles, and Campaspe and Apelles, represents the possibilities of self-realization that might evade and even subvert the sovereign demand for subjection.

It is Alexander who initiates this process, ironically providing a pattern for imitation that undermines his authority. By falling in love with Campaspe, he threatens his own imperial mastery: "I loue Campaspe, a thing farre vnfit for a Macedonian, for a king, for Alexander" (II.ii.19-20). His desire inverts the order of obedience, as Hephestion's euphuistic speech against a politically and sexually transgressive love warns: "What! is the sonne of Phillip, king of Macedon, become the subject of Campaspe, the captive of Thebes?" (II.ii.31-32). Underlying this inversion are the changes to the specular relation. First, Campaspe's vision realizes an absolute power over Alexander, who is

"drawn within the compasse of an idle alluring eie" (II.ii.33-34) by "eies...framed by arte to inamour" (43-44). Secondly, Alexander loses the sovereign power of perception due to Campaspe's beauty, which doesn't reproduce the pattern of ideal mimesis:

I, but she is bewtiful; yea, but not therefore
 chast: I, but she is comly in al parts of the
 body: yea, but she may be crooked in some part of
 the mind.... Bewty is like the blackberry, which
 seemeth red, when it is not ripe, resembling
 pretious stones that are polished with honny,
 which the smother they look, the sooner they
 breake.... Hermyns haue faire skinnes, but fowle
 liuers; Sepulchres fresh colours, but rotten
 bones; women faire faces, but false heartes.
 (II.ii.45-57)

Hephestion's misogynous topoi reveal Campaspe's double disruption of visual submission.

Campaspe does not deliberately pursue this disruption. It is a consequence of her subjection, itself epitomized by the fact that she is a slave. Hephestion jealously insists that Campaspe is trying to escape so he can relocate her all the more securely within the order of subjection. He would alert the sovereign gaze to the treacherous disjunctions she appears to embody. Alexander presents her situation more accurately with his own "definition and description of royal desire" (Saccio 59). Such desire would circumscribe Campaspe: "it is a king that loueth... Alexander doth loue, and therefore must obtaine.... I am king, and will

command...what is that which Alexander may not conquer as he list?... I am a conqueror, she a captiue" (II.ii.91-106). However, this mastery is not absolute. Campaspe's enforced obedience introduces a heterogeneous politics of desire into the homogeneous politics of power, reversing the roles of sovereign and subject, emperor and lover. Alexander's martially minded courtiers Clytus and Parmenio bemoan his fall "from his harde armour to his softe robes" (IV.iii.12). The complexities of a non-mimetic hetero-sexuality challenge the politicized system of masculine identity.

Alexander was traditionally reputed for his unconcern for sex. North's translation of Plutarch recounts, that "Even from his childhood they saw that he was given to be chaste. For though otherwise he was very hot and hasty, yet was he hardly moved with lust or pleasure of the body, and would moderately use it" (IV: 301). This chasteness seems the symbolic counterpart of his martial might and essentializes Alexander's power as a type of Platonic asexuality. It is a symbolism of intangible virginity that Elizabeth also employed to realize power over her male courtiers, "An emphasis on the virginity of that royal body transforms the problem of the monarch's gender into the very source of her potency" (Montrose, "Elizabethan" 315). Her chastity exerts an invisible control over her subjects. Alexander's subsequent loss of mastery through the stirring

of his desire, however, might additionally intimate the tenuous power of this specular symbolism. Its potency would be limited by a patriarchal system that might turn the queen "from female monarch into symbolic virtuous womanhood" (Jardine 174). The play suggests that Elizabeth's symbolic virginity might enfeeble her power, as Alexander's chasteness disarms him before Campaspe.

Indeed the tensions produced by the dramatized court's sexual politics do destabilize its hierarchy of power and identity. The extremes of obedience and "selfness" are depicted in the grumblings of Hephestion, Clytus, and Parmenio, the servility of the "humanist" philosophers led by Aristotle and Plato (some self-satire on Lyly's part?), the contempt for court and Athenian society voiced by Diogenes, and the comical unruliness of the servants Granichus, Manes, and Psyllus. These varying responses to order and authority suggest the contradictions of subjection that may emerge once the sovereign ethos is revised. In a context where the political and sexual complexities of Elizabeth's rule saw her male subjects become paternal advisors or courtly wooers, seeking to share or usurp her authority, or remaining in filial obedience, Lyly seeks to thread a delicate text, suggesting without presumption, beseeching without abjection.¹⁸ Elizabeth is ambiguously figured as the imperial Alexander and the chaste but powerful Campaspe.

Apelles, who paints both of them, is Lyly's ideal self-portrait, winning Campaspe through Alexander's beneficence, commending and exemplifying the queen's favor, while also showing her successfully wooed or mastered by the court artist. Each interpretation veils Lyly's relation to the queen, representing his efforts to please her--poets are "cunning Princepleasers" writes Puttenham (17)--to control her actions, and to attain his desired status.

The play's main dramatic action and interest represent Apelles' attempts to negotiate the vicissitudes of subjection. Within the context of Alexander's disrupted power, the courtier lacks a defined mimetic model through which he can construct himself and so is forced to begin the risky process of fashioning an identity that he cannot foresee. Apelles deceives Alexander in the very attempt to obey him through visual imitation. The process of loyalty commits him to break faith with his sovereign, and then to disguise this rebellion by visual and verbal figures that try to evade the sovereign gaze. The combination of Campaspe's beauty, Apelles' painting, and Alexander's perception allegorically represents the workings and limits of a specular subjection.

Apelles' first words emphasize the difficulty of painting perfect beauty. They are dismissed by Alexander, who now rapt with Campaspe essentializes the works of nature

against the protean efforts of Apelles, "I wil shewe you that finished by nature, that you have beene trifling about by art" (II.ii.159-61). Alexander exalts himself, his love, and the object of his love to the archetypal stratum. His Platonism establishes and is established as the sovereign ideal of desire, a model to be imitated by his subjects and a law to obey. As the object of sovereign desire, Campaspe is she whom all subjects seek and the ideal beyond their conception, while that desire itself can be copied but never fulfilled.

In the next scene in his studio, Apelles envoices the intention and inability to paint Campaspe's portrait. His efforts express his mimetic sexual aim and simultaneously subject himself to an ideal beauty that symbolizes Alexander's imperial presence: "Lady, I doubt whether there bee any colour so fresh, that may shadow a countenance so faire...but come madam, will you draw neere, for Alexander will be here anon" (III.i.1-2,17-18). In the attempt to reproduce Alexander's princely perception of Campaspe, Apelles finds his own gaze inevitably drawing him out of the field of obedience towards his own desire. The coy Campaspe notes the painter's ulterior discourse: "I am too young to vnderstand your speache, thogh old enough to withstand your deuise: you haue bin so long vsed to colours, you can do nothing but colour" (III.i.13-15). The pun on "colours"--

paints and rhetorical figures--suggests the emergence of Apelles' "selfness," an allegorical ethos that breaks his subjection to Alexander.¹⁹

Apelles falls into this conflict through the very attempt to obey and copy the ideal desire of Alexander. This imitation is figured aesthetically in the portrait he tries, as commanded, to paint. It appears sexually when he falls in love with Campaspe. The repetitive structure of obedience becomes conflictual through no deliberate effort on Apelles' part, just as Campaspe herself unwittingly disrupts Alexander's self-command. Through an imitative loyalty imposed by the sovereign, the subject inevitably challenges royal desire.²⁰ An impracticable mimeticism, a result of both the archetypal sovereign nature and the pragmatic attempt to forestall rivals, is commanded in the impossible order, "imitate me/don't imitate me" (Girard 148). The contradictory structure of submission reveals the inescapability of rebellion. In desperation the subject turns to allegorical imitation both to disguise and to realize "selfness."

Apelles' love intensifies the more he paints Campaspe, that is, the more he involves himself in the mimetic process. His servant Psyllus sardonically notes, "the better he shadowes her face, the more will he burne his own heart" (III.ii.5-6). Campaspe is no longer the object of his love

only because she incarnates sovereign desire. She herself has become his sovereign, the blinding ideal who can't be represented, "I shall neuer drawe your eies well, because they blind mine" (III.iii.1-2). This "so absolute a face" (III.iii.7) is now an archetype in a new ideal order of love: "It is not possible that a face so faire, & a wit so sharpe, both without comparison, shuld not be apt to loue" (III.iii.47-48). Like the self-constraining rebellion of Throckemorton or the Marlovian protagonist, Apelles does not question the essentialist premises of this structure of desire. He remains within its univocal hierarchy and passes from one form of mimetic subjection to another.

The painter represents his own emerging allegorical ethos through the figure of Jupiter, who in various disguises won the different maidens he has portrayed (III.iii.10-20). Jupiter is, however, an ambiguous figure for Apelles, for while suggesting the sexual success of disguise, he also represents the power of imperial desire, which the painter cannot imitate. (It is not the disguised god but the hapless maidens Apelles has painted.) Campaspe shows a greater capability of resisting Apelles' hesitant advances than Leda, Europa, and others were able to muster against Jupiter. She has an imperious air which enables her to withstand him, "fall to that you must doe, not that you would doe" (III.iii.50-51), she commands.

In the following scene Alexander visits Apelles and Campaspe in the studio. He is certain that Apelles will not have been able to portray Campaspe's beauty, the ideal corollary to his sovereignty. As the king quizzes his painter over the latter's technique, a direct clash between the sovereign's and subject's desire commences. Apelles responds by challenging the visual order of subjection through allegorical, figured speech. Initially Alexander notes that the painter cannot recreate the essential order of nature. Apelles responds with the ambiguity Puttenham recommends, neither overtly attacking nor simply echoing his sovereign. Asked where he begins a painting, Apelles suggests the face. Endorsing his own imperial vision, Alexander disagrees, "I would begin with the eie, as a light to all the rest" (III.iv.72). The painter's reply admits Alexander's sovereignty, thus following Thomas Wright's counsel that the inferior not challenge his superior. At the same time, he asserts his own identity within the order of subjection: "If you will paint, as you are a king, your Maiestie may beginne where you please; but as you wold be a painter, you must begin with the face" (73-75). Apelles continues, equivocally veiling his love for Campaspe, counting on his power to dissimulate his meanings before the king even as he expresses them:

Alex. When will you finish Campaspe?

Apel. Neuer finishe: for alwayes in absolute bewtie, there is somewhat aboue art.

Alex. Why should not I by labour bee as cunning as Apelles?

Apel. God shield you should haue cause to be so cunning as Apelles! (III.iv.80-85)

Apelles uses a discourse of "false semblant." Oriented around his own "selfness," it articulates meanings which contradict the sovereign discourse as they seem to submit to it.²¹ The image of Campaspe's inimitably "absolute bewtie" which he will "neuer finishe," while seeming to confirm Alexander's ideal desire, reflects Apelles' own boundless passion. These ulterior intentions are depicted in the ensuing soliloquy, a personal discourse through which the subject might momentarily evade official perception. Bemoaning that Campaspe is Alexander's--"alas! she is the paramor to a prince. Alexander the monarch of the earth hath both her body and affection" (III.v.28-30)--he decides furtively to disfigure the portrait so Campaspe will have to return to his studio, "wit must work, where authoritie is not...I will by deuise giue it a blemish" (56-58). The "blemish" is an allegorical trope that inscribes his desire and disrupts the mimetic order. Seeming to signify a mistake by Apelles and thus show the limit of his subjection, it is the dissimulated means for him to renounce submission, "as good it were to vtter my love, and die with deniall, as conceale it, & liue in despaire" (59-61).

In the second half of the play, Campaspe's own attempt to realize her desire for Apelles emerges, and she contradicts the disgruntled passivity which Castiglione's males attributed to her. She voices her love in a short soliloquy that also reveals her use of disguise to allegorize her visual homage to the king and escape subjection's despair, "better thy tongue wagge, then thy heart break...women that cast their eies vpon kinges, may place their hearts vpon vassals" (IV.ii.4-11). Her visual submission to the monarch disguises the aim of her desire. Apelles then enters, and a complex lovers' dialogue begins. Each cautiously passes towards their desired identity as lover and beloved but remains sharply conscious of their subjection to Alexander and their unsureness of the other's motives. They attempt to represent and dissemble their love, uttering it while leaving no trace of it. The scene is like two courtly rivals, sounding each other out through equivocations and ambiguities. Yet the dialogue has an even sharper edge, for the apparent rivalry, expressed in the witty thrusts of courtly love, disguises a mutual identity which transgresses the law of sovereign desire.²² Their words, ever mindful of the "king's eyes and ears," pay due to Alexander while allegorizing that respect:

Apel. Whom do you loue best in the world?
Camp. He that made me last in the world.
Apel. That was a God.

Camp. I had thought it had beene a man. But whome do you honour most, Apelles?

Apel. The thing that is lykest you, Campaspe.

Camp. My picture?

Apel. I dare not venture vpon your person.

(IV.ii.37-44)

Campaspe's initial reply seems to repeat the myth of Alexander's divinity. Her next veiled reference to Apelles as her maker, however, reaccentuates the surface meaning of her subjection and draws forth her desire.²³

Apelles' responses rework the hierarchy of desire by replacing the forbidden ideal, Campaspe's person, with its copy. The painting now signifies the goal of Apelles' desire, his art fashioning an allegorical nature that seems to imitate the essential order but instead subverts it:

Camp. What will you saye if Alexander perceiue your loue?

Apel. I will say it is no treason to loue.

Camp. But how if he wil not suffer thee to see my person?

Apel. Then will I gase continually on thy picture.

Camp. That will not feede thy heart.

Apel. Yet shall it fill mine eye: besides the sweete thoughtes, the sure hopes, thy protested faith, wil cause me to imbrace thy shadow continually in mine armes, of the which by strong imagination I will make a substaunce.

(IV.iv.6-14)²⁴

The subject excludes the sovereign gaze from his own visual system. The lovers' "protested faith" exceeds the mimetic order and attains fulfillment through its own imaginative power. In contrast, Alexander's love becomes artificially

imitative. It appears as a politic emotion that narcissistically seeks itself as its ideal goal, proceeding through the power of an absolute demand which permits no other response:

O Apelles, thy loue commeth from the heart, but Alexanders from the mouth.... They [kings] place affection by times, by pollicie, by appointment; if they frowne, who dares calls them vnconstant? if bewray secretes, who will tearme them vntrue? if fall to other loues, who trembles not, if he call them vnfaithfull? In kinges there can be no loue, but to Queenes: for as neere must they meete in maiestie, as they doe in affection.

(IV.iv.20-31)

The royal discourse, commanding all, compels the sovereign to a reflexive desire in which royal "affection" meets only its own "maiestie."

This dissembling subjectivity is only fleetingly experienced. In his next soliloquy Apelles recounts the renewed subjection to visual control. He has found himself relocated within the mimetic hierarchy, with the subversiveness of his allegorical discourse exposed: "I fear me Apelles, that thine eies haue blabbed that, which thy tongue durst not. What little regard hadst thou! whilst Alexander viewed the conterfeite of Campaspe, thou stoodest gazing on her countenaunce!" (V.ii.1-4). With the subject and sovereign's gazes juxtaposed, Apelles' discursive dissimulation becomes ineffectual; the system of specular power is reasserted. Although Apelles focuses on Campaspe herself while Alexander

looks at her "conterfeit," the directness of his vision and its lack of disguise, instead of realizing his love resubject him to an identity which for a time he had evaded: "O loue! I never before knewe what thou wert, and now haste thou made mee that I know not what my selfe am?" (V.ii.8-9). The desire that had led him to the point of fulfilling his "selfness" now appears only to have concealed a deeper ideological ethos that returns to enforce submission all the more powerfully for its temporary eclipse. In the structure of obedience, "selfness" is something that the subject may know only through the loss of his desire. It is an identity received rather than realized.

The play's final scene stages the restoration of sovereign vision and the order of obedience. Apelles merely replies to Alexander's questions with a defeated irony that depends on his pleasure:

Alex. Apelles, what peece of worke haue you in hand?

Apel. None in hand, if it like your maiestie: but I am deuising a platforme in my head.

Alex. Is it nothing about Venus?

Apel. No, but some thing aboue Venus.

(V.iv.75-81)

Alexander has no trouble in interpreting such remarks. Having tricked Apelles into showing frantic concern for Campaspe's portrait, he dismisses the explanation that painters get as engrossed in their works as do lovers in the beloved. The

mimetic relationship between reality and art, ideal and copy, which had been allegorically disrupted, is now reaffirmed in archetypal form, as the subject's "colours" and allegorical figures are revealed, "You lay your colours grosely; though I could not paint in your shop, I can spy into your excuse" (V.iv.94-95). The final union between Campaspe and Apelles depends on Alexander, who contemptuously dismisses the prospect of their love: "Go Apelles, take with you your Campaspe, Alexander is cloied with looking on that which thou wondrest at" (V.iv.138-40). With this command the monarch abstracts his gaze above his subjects and reasserts the mimetic order of vision, desire, and subjection.

In coming together, Campaspe and Apelles acknowledge the sovereign power and their position with "Thankes to your maiestie on bended knee" (V.iv.141). Like the playwright they have waited to be "christened good by the iudgement of your selfe" (Epi. 16).²⁵ Yet unlike Lyly, whose courtly allegory never actualized his courtly aims, the lovers find themselves "honoured" and "blessed" (V.iv.142-43), their dissemblings bringing reward and contentment within the sovereign system. The play sublimates its author's frustrations, allegorizing the realization of "selfness" despite the constraints of subjection.

By so doing, Campaspe represents the pressure which subjects may themselves exert against the sovereign system.

Rather than attempting an open defiance that anticipates and calls forth the martial power of Alexander, through their disguised romance Apelles and Campaspe compel the monarch to change the mode of rule. He is forced to face the relativity of his status and its interdependent links with those whom it commands. The ideals of power, archetypal sovereignty and perception, are demystified and revealed to the monarch: "I perceiue Alexander cannot subdue the affections of men, though he conquer their countries" (V.iv.127-29). Subjection no longer univocally confirms power but actively discloses the latter's imaginary constructions. The dissembling mimesis of obedience confronts the sovereign ethos with its own essential image, "I perceiue Alexander," an image that is as unrealized as it is desired. For the ethos of imperium either remains unfinished, with always "an other to subdue," or prescribes its own demise, that "I wil fall in loue":

It were a shame Alexander should desire to commaund the world, if he could not commaund himselfe. But come, let vs go, I wil try whether I can better beare my hand with my hart, then I could with mine eie. And good Hephestion, when al the world is woone, and euery countrey is thine and mine, either find ne out an other to subdue, or of my world I wil fall in loue. (V.iv.150-55)

Bowing before power, the subject nonetheless reveals the sovereign's own submission.

Notes

1. The contrast made here derives from the doubts that Harold Garfinkel suggests about the pervasive utility of dissembling. Though dissembling indicates the types of "impression management" used by Renaissance royalty, it is founded against a background of archetypal selfhood. Garfinkel stresses that this background and the essential confidence it affords are not always there. His example is the "intersexed" Agnes: "In the conduct of her everyday affairs she had to choose among alternative courses of action even though the goal that she was trying to achieve was most frequently not clear to her prior to her having to take the actions whereby some goal might in the end have been realized" (Garfinkel 184). Unable to aspire towards a definite goal, someone like Agnes (though not necessarily intersexed) can construct it "only over the course of the actual interaction, as a function of actual participation, and by accepting the risks involved" (Garfinkel 146). Garfinkel calls this risky participation "passing."

2. Cf. Elizabeth's last speech to parliament: "in my governing this land, I have ever set the last Judgement Day before mine eyes, and so to rule, as I shall be Judged and answer before a higher Judge" (Kinney 334-35). Goldberg writes of James that "the king sees himself being seen--by the audience without, and by one within, the eye of God, observing him as he is observed" (James I 148).

3. Doubtless the repetition also had an culturally mnemonic effect for the congregation. Cf. Marion Trousdale: "It [memory] is also an important societal need in a culture that lacks the technological means of continuance, of repeatability" (Rhetoricians 57).

4. A more positively reinforcing view of the intertwining of obedience and disloyalty comes in Elizabeth's proclamation on Essex's rebellion. The queen gratefully comments on the steadfast loyalty of the majority in contrast to the rebels: "our good Subjects of our Citie, and elsewhere, having shewed themselves so constant, and unmoveable from their duties towards us, as not any one of them of any note (that we can yet heare of) did offer to assist the said Earle and his associats; Wee have bene contented, in regard of the comfort that we take to finde by so notorious evidence, the loyall disposition of our people (whereof we never doubted)..." (Kinney 326). The corollary of this gratitude is, however, the queen's drafting of her subjects into a permanent force, always on duty, to police possible sedition: "they shall doe

well (and so wee charge them) to give diligent heede in all places, to the conversation of persons not well knownen for their good behaviour, and to the speeches of any that shall give out slanderous and unduetifull wordes or rumour against us and our government" (326).

5. From the perspective of authority, subjection is the people's natural state. The proclamation of Elizabeth's accession is addressed to "all maner peple being naturall subjectes" (Kinney 5). The queen promises her love and care in return for "the dyeuty which belongeth to naturall, good and true loving subjectes" (5). Derek Attridge notes that such nature is a motivated myth: "In maintaining its power, the ruling elite puts forward, and no doubt believes in, the idea of the 'naturalness' of its own behavior and its 'natural' self-sufficiency and primacy as a class, as little open to question as nature's own self-defining identity" ("Perplexity" 269).

6. Cf. Greenblatt's discussion of Marlowe's protagonists: "if the heart of Renaissance orthodoxy is a vast system of repetitions in which disciplinary paradigms are established and men gradually learn what to desire and what to fear, the Marlovian rebels and skeptics remain embedded within this orthodoxy: they simply reverse the paradigms and embrace what the society brands as evil... they have unwittingly accepted its crucial structural elements. For the crucial issue is not man's power to disobey, but the characteristic modes of desire and fear produced by a given society, and the rebellious heroes never depart from those modes" (Self-Fashioning 209).

7. Cf. Hobbes: "A PUNISHMENT, is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience" (Leviathan, ch.28 277). The shift from the singular "him" to the plural "men" suggests the ethic goals of punishment. It is performed less to reform the culprit than other possible offenders. That Throckemorton is tortured within the Tower prevents this sort of overt characterization; thus the advent of questioning "bruites" and the subsequent pamphlet, verbally rather than visually edifying. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault notes that "the criminal who confessed came to play the role of living truth...the role of voluntary partner in the procedure" (38-39).

8. Cf. Mullaney on the effects of the pre-execution confession: "an exemplary manifestation of the power of the

state to foster an internalized obedience even among its most retrograde subjects.... We are the rhetorically designated, directly addressed audience for the didactic proselytizing message of a last dying speech; for it to be effective, we must not only believe it to be genuine but also have already inscribed within us, at least at some dormant or latent level, the ideological strictures and values being manifested before us" (Place 112).

9. Cf. Lawrence Stone: "the peers in the sixteenth century swarmed to Court in ever-increasing numbers, for court attendance and service to State was now an ideal, a social convention, a pleasure, and a necessity" (Crisis 399); "The principal force which held the nobility in Court was the hope of office and reward, a force strengthened by the dissemination of a social theory which exalted service to the Crown as the justification of aristocratic privilege. The distribution of these favours was designed to create a community of interests in a national system of royal clientage" (464). Stone suggests that the peers serve an aristocratic ideology that manipulates them less for their sake than for the queen's. Cf. Whigham: "these myriad acts of grasping submission constituted a collective obeisance that reaffirmed the ideological power base of the royal presence. In turn the queen strove to reward, and so to control, all her servants throughout the elite" (Ambition 12); and Montrose: "Courtly forms and institutions magnified the greatness of the monarch while monitoring and harnessing to her own ends the potentially insubordinate or seditious energies of her most ambitious subjects" ("Gentlemen" 443).

10. Cf. Fineman's notion of the ambiguous referentiality of praise that inscribes the poet's identity: "The rhetoric or rhetoricity of praise...establishes, by virtue of its self-foregrounding epideixis, a kind of grammar of poetic presence that controls the way the poet can articulate himself" (Eye 7).

11. Sidney's Defence often seems idealized, especially in comparison to Puttenham's treatise. This idealism perhaps lies behind Sidney's lack of political success. His failures would seem to result in part from lacking the discursive ambivalence which Puttenham emphasizes, even if Greville turns this into praise, with Sidney restoring "amongst us the ancient Majestie of noble, and true dealing...his heart and tongue went both one way" (35).

12. By interrelating the verbal and visual, it is Bernarde Bibiena's digressive discussion of jokes which most seems to anticipate Puttenham's notions of character: "the head

spring that laughing matters arise of, consisteth in a certaine deformitie, or ill favourednesse" (Castiglione 138); "the perfect grace and very pith...is to set forth so well and without paine, not only in wordes, but in gestures, the thing a man purposeth to expresse, that unto the hearers he may appeare to doe before their eyes the thinges he speaketh of" (141). Like Puttenham, Bibiena repeatedly emphasizes the function of "diverse signification" (149), "dissimulation" (159,162,168), and deception (168,170).

13. Daniel Javitch contends that Castiglione doesn't conceive of sprezzatura as total disguise. It always leaves a trace which reconfirms the viewer's powers of perception, appreciation, and reward, i.e., the courtier's submission: "While the observer sees no evident signs of diligence or premeditation in what the courtier does, he gradually recognizes and appreciates the skill that creates his own deception.... If the courtier is encouraged to be deceptive, his dissimulation must never be so total that his authentic intentions fail to be recognized" (Poetry 57). These "authentic intentions" culminate in dutiful subjection, "the training and helping forward of the Prince to goodnesse, and the fearing him from evil" (Castiglione 261).

14. In this sense, Puttenham's conception moves beyond the notion of courtly disguise that Javitch considers: "his conduct is deemed most becoming when he disguises a particular intention, disposition, or ability by cultivating an appearance of its contrary" (Poetry 36). For Allegoria is distinguished by its resistance to being "deemed" and its deconstruction of contraries. Within a judgemental milieu it offers the courtier an out--that his intentions have been misunderstood. Allegoria represents the "word with a loophole...the retention for oneself of the possibility for altering the ultimate, final meaning of one's own words" (Bakhtin, Dostoevsky 233).

15. Cf. Gyptes comment to Cynthia: "They are thrise fortunate that liue in your Pallace, where Trueth is not in colours, but life, vertues not in imagination, but execution" (Endimion IV.iii.48-50).

16. Raymond Stephanson emphasizes the ironic gap between Lyly and his characters, noting the intentional fallacy into which readers of Lyly's euphuism may lapse. Perhaps in Euphues' words there is satire aimed against court sycophants, yet Lyly also seems to exploit an epideictic loophole by both "meaning" what is said and mocking others.

17. Alexander's control over the lovers also seems to reflect the situation at Elizabeth's court: "By feudal law the King enjoyed rights over the land and disposal in marriage of any of his tenants...Elizabeth interfered frequently, but hardly ever positively, her main ambition being to prevent the marriage of her courtiers and aristocratic young Maids of Honour" (Stone 600-05).

18. Cf. Montrose's view that the court provided "(male) subjects with a flexible medium--at once humble, elegant, and intimate--in which they could supplicate and inveigle their royal mistress, and in which they could project and symbolically master the condition of their subjection to a female ruler" ("Elizabethan" 326).

19. In The Courtier Count Canosse believes that as an artist, "Apelles conceived a farre greater joye in beholding the beautie of Campaspes than did Alexander, for a man may easily believe, that the love of them both proceeded of that beautie" (Castiglione 82). Here too is suggested the ulterior course to which Apelles' vision commits his desire.

20. Girard's concept of mimetic desire exemplifies this process of subjection which results in conflict: "by the example of his own desire...the model conveys to the subject the supreme desirability of the object...desire itself is essentially mimetic, directed toward an object desired by the model.... Two desires converging on the same object are bound to clash. Thus, mimesis coupled with desire leads automatically to conflict" (Violence 146).

21. Cf. Fulke Greville's strategy in writing his Declination of Monarchy: "a new counsell rose up in me, to take away all opinion of seriousnessse from these perplexed pedegrees; and to this end carelessly cast them into that hypocriticall figure Ironia, wherein men commonly (to keep above their workes) seeme to make toies of the utmost they can doe" (Life 153-54).

22. Cf. Lacan's comment, "It is no doubt through the mediation of masks that the masculine and the feminine meet in the most acute, most intense way" (Concepts 107).

23. This exchange between Campaspe and Apelles might exemplify what numerous critics have seen as the playful debate of Lyly's work, deriving from the in utramque partem rhetorical exercise. See Hunter 118-26, 272-79; Saccio 54; Powell. Altman perhaps crystallizes this viewpoint, seeing that Lyly "prefers to hypothesize his quaestiones by means of loosely connected deliberations and disputations which are

developed through a variety of exemplary proofs" (Tudor 196). Such interpretations restrict the ambiguity and allegory in Lyly's work to an intellectual form. Following Puttenham, it is important to emphasize that these tropes represent and resist the ideology of subjection that constructs Lyly's own work and desires and those of his characters. As Karen Newman writes of Love's Labor's Lost--a play which in its deliberate rhetoricity seems much influenced by Lyly--"The courtiers, represented by Berowne, are unable to escape from the disguise language represents" (Rhetoric 89). Allegoria speaks, as well as being spoken by, the courtier.

24. Again cf. Lacan's discussion of what "attracts and satisfies us in trompe l'oeil...captures our attention and delights us" as that which threatens Platonic (i.e., sovereign) essentialism: "The picture does not compete with appearance, it competes with what Plato designates for us beyond appearance as being the Idea. It is because the picture is the appearance that says it is that which gives the appearance that Plato attacks painting, as if it were an activity competing with his own" (Concepts 112).

25. Cf. Mullaney, "power is never merely a coercive or repressive force...it must not be limited to acting upon its subjects but must instead, to be effective, act through them as well, inducing them to participate and even to become the primary actors in the ongoing drama of their own subjection" (Place 94).

CHAPTER FOUR
THE FIGURE OF WOMAN

"Thus is she manifest and exalted, even
as she is masked and lost, in discursive
parades that set her outside her self;
ideally offered to the oratorical
disputes between men."

Luce Irigaray

Near the end of her essay on disguise in Elizabethan drama, M. C. Bradbrook asserts that after Shakespeare stopped writing for the stage the "deeper implications of disguise...did not long survive" (167), suggesting that dissembling characters could no longer aptly represent issues of selfhood and identity. Even by 1609 a certain predictability is found in the motif. The example is from Beaumont and Fletcher's Philaster: "Bellario's true sex is not revealed till the end, though by this time any theatrical page might be assumed to be a woman in disguise" (167). An audience accustomed to stage effects and plot twists, its sophistication registered in the exclusive cost of attending the new Blackfriars theater, seems to expect such reversals of appearance and persona. Many plays show the donning of transvestite garb and include complaints against the

distresses of androgynous disguise--the heroine of Lyly's Gallathea laments, "O woulde the gods had made mee as I seeme to be, or that I might safelie bee what I seeme not" (II.i.4-5), and Viola declaims, "Disguise, I see thou art a wickedness" (Twelfth Night II.i.27). With these frequent treatments of the processes and dilemmas of crossdressing, even plays like Epicoene and Philaster, where the crossdresser is disguised from the start, may have posed no great surprise for audiences. In performance a transvestite role could be exaggerated to remind the audience who's wearing the pants: Lyly has Gallathea and Phillida try to learn from each other how boys behave, Shakespeare provides the comic duel between Cesario and Aguecheek, Ganymede embarrassingly faints when hearing of Orlando's wound, and Epicoene could swagger every now and then. Yet even without such visual cues, Bradbrook infers that androgynous disguise was, if not passé, a generic commonplace that audiences anticipated and were satisfied to see again.

The period's continuing religious and moral debates over theatricality and disguise, especially in relation to sexuality and gender, challenge this perception of a pervasive acceptance of dramatic crossdressing. A well-documented exchange had pitted Rainolds against Gager and Gentili, the former arguing that "even the shortest use of women's clothing is sufficient to stir up unclean passions"

in both actors and audience (Binns 113). Rainolds combined homophobic and misogynist themes to attack a "lust" compounded by seeing boys dressed as women. This sort of antitheatrical fervor grows under the Stuarts, culminating in Prynne's Histriomastix. Though androgynous disguise may begin to lose dramatic force and be comfortably acknowledged by theater audiences, it retains a social significance that could circumscribe the throne, with Prynne being punished for slandering the queen.

These opposing evaluations of crossdressing complicate its cultural function. On the one hand, transvestism might be seen to challenge social impositions of sexual identity. Such is the view that in "inverting the offstage associations, stage illusion radically subverted the gender divisions of the Elizabethan world" (Rackin 38). The moralistic attacks against theatricality respond to these subversive gestures. On the other hand, given the changing place of the stage--which, with the opening of Blackfriars, moves from the liberties of "whatever could not be contained within the strict bounds of the community" (Mullaney 22) to a more central, fixed locus--given this shift, images of transsexual disguise seem to have been being accommodated by an urban ideology starting to fragment and limit rituals of inversion and misrule (cf. Davis 116, Haynes 645). Despite the proclivities of commentators, Renaissance crossdressing

evades univocal readings as either subversive or stabilizing. It cannot be seen as exclusively normative or transgressive but may instead represent the range of social functions that gender performs. We might expect this revelation from the hybrid personae that crossdressing visually presents. Yet these androgynous images also reveal an ambiguous context that influences many depictions of apparently straight male and female characters. Dramatic androgyny, which Bradbrook views as in itself predictable, exemplifies an equivocal discourse of gender which informs the rhetoric of characterization.

The ambiguity of crossdressing relates the paradoxical implications of ethopoetic disguise to notions of sexuality. The juxtapositioning of a "natural" and a disguised sexual ethos suggests the dialogic conflict between Platonic essentialism and sophistic notions of selfhood. The confusions among characters and the reconciliations commonly effected through the revelation of "true" gender imply the interpersonal and social stakes that are involved. Socially reviled and accepted, androgynous disguise concentrates and inscribes a contested ideology of sexual identity. In so doing it rehearses feminist and misogynous topoi from the classical and Christian canons and enables many Renaissance texts to engage them. As well as being a familiar theatrical device, crossdressing is a trope in a tradition of gendered

characterization which comprises dramatic and non-dramatic texts.

The rhetorical form of this trope is metonymic. It represents the interchange of parts and names of identities. The deep ethic reference of rhetoric, implicit in the conception of "proper" as that which is self-sufficient and self-possessed, re-emerges in the disruption to univocal meaning and identity that definitions of metonymy note:

when a word hath a proper signification of the owne, and being referred to an other thing, hath an other meaning. (Wilson, Arte 175)

Metonimia, when of things that be nigh together, wee put one name for another. (Peacham C ii)

In these views, metonymy may either exchange meanings or, by virtue of its marked rhetoricity, reaffirm "proper" meaning.¹ It represents the discursive form of androgyny, for in terms of gender, crossdressing relocates social-sexual roles, parts, and names, with similarly ambiguous effects of stabilization and subversion.

In the deeper ethopoetic logic that informs many Renaissance texts, the conventional order of gender and discourse is based on man, and woman signifies a deviation from masculine essence.² She represents an improper persona. Typically, this figural femaleness structures androgyny in one of two ways. First, it may disguise maleness and cause androgyny, as in the induction to The Taming of the Shrew:

"if the boy have not a woman's gift / To rain a shower of commanded tears, / An onion will do well for such a shift" (Ind.i.124-26); here the onion is simply an external prop for the dissembled guise of crying that a woman characteristically puts on to create certain effects upon men. Secondly, femaleness emerges through the guise of "masculine usurp'd attire" (Twelfth Night V.i.250) and is the end point of androgyny. In each case, a male ethos is disrupted by a belated femininizing that metonymically constructs androgyny.³

This discursive relation engenders the proper order of meaning, wherein a privileged "male" tenor holds an essential priority as "the underlying idea or principal subject which the vehicle or figure means" (Richards 97). This order posits the representing female figure as supplement to the "principal subject." The prior meaning of maleness is displaced into a feminized and feminizing figural discourse and acquires a consequent androgyny in its characterization. The logic intrinsic to this rhetoric may subvert the male ideal through a figural self-difference.

Such discursive androgyny underlies the motif of transvestite disguise. Through these crossdressed figures the essentialist ethopoetic tradition, imaged less in specific male characters than by an archetypal maleness, is interrogated. A play such as Philaster stages the disruption

of the notions of unequivocal gender and identity and their place in social order. Indeed, Beaumont and Fletcher's play seems a particularly significant example of discursive crossdressing. With many of the period's androgynous disguise plays it can be read "as a play about masking, about the conscious and unconscious assumption of false identities and about levels of self-knowledge and self-deception," as, for example, Coppélia Kahn observes of Twelfth Night ("Providential" 227). In contrast to such Shakespearean versions, Philaster does not conclude with social order seemingly restored even though the protagonist regains his throne and wins his love. The androgynous figure Bellario/Euphrasia remains outside the political-marriage finale, a reminder of the social limits of orthodox sexuality and proper selfhood. The character exceeds the return to the cultural norms of ethopoesis.⁴

A marked supernumary within the play's social world, Bellario also serves to focus the rhetorical excess often attributed to Beaumont and Fletcher's work onto questions of self-representation. This excess--often seen as decadent in comparison to Shakespearean discourse⁵--is not "rhetorical" in the merely patterned sense often claimed, where "we consciously follow the ebb and flow of Philaster's passion, responding to his diatribes and laments as declamatory exercises" (Kirsch 41). In this view, the text's "spatial

design" formalizes its characterization, placing "ultimate stress...less upon the nature of the participants than upon the artifice which employs them" (Kirsch 47).⁶ Rather than leading away from characterization, the intensity of such "artifice" tests the ethopoetic process through which generically standard characters, especially the heroic male protagonist, are portrayed. The rhetorical rhythms of Beaumont and Fletcher's work capture the subjective investments behind self-representation.

The play's political and sexual dilemmas, concentrated in the triangle of Philaster, Arethusa, and Bellario, rest on the last's identity. The androgynous woman is here central to ethic and social certainty. In her characterization, she reveals both the discursive presuppositions of gender and the inconsistencies of identity which these presuppositions would suppress. The inconsistencies of selfhood and gender emerge most tellingly in the impassioned speeches of the protagonist, Philaster. In their extreme fervor, his complaints against Arethusa and Bellario soar beyond the "proper" norms of the heroic male. Through her pivotal and inconstant role, Bellario both triggers this androgynous rhetoric and later restores its gendered balance, disclosing the instabilities of a masculinist discourse that pursues its ethic goals through the figure of woman. The significance of Bellario's androgynous disguise lies, then, not only in

themes of sexual self-knowledge and deception but in its revelation of the discursive means through which sexual selves can be known and deceived. Citing its dramatic and non-dramatic precursors through the over-determined trope of androgyny and a familiar storyline of usurpation and restoration, Philaster re-plays a social tradition of gendered ethopoesis.

The main features of this tradition can begin to be seen in the classic rhetorical texts of male praise for woman, Gorgias and Isocrates' encomia on Helen. Their well-wrought styles disclose a paradoxical relationship between the speaking male and the spoken-of female, the two figures which the encomia necessarily depict. The man's praise, which begins by presuming his separate perspective upon woman, gradually intertwines them, as he becomes reliant on her figure or image to portray himself.⁷ This interdependence destines the loss of a prior ethos which he understands as uttering his words of praise and as then being reinforced by them. Androgynous disguise constructs a similar ambiguity regarding a "prior" ethos, not only for the disguised figure but for others who find their own gender and identity being disturbed by his/her presence. If the paradox of praise is "not simply the negation of straightforward praise but, instead, its peculiar imitative double, a rhetorical doubling" (Fineman, Eye 65), then androgyny is, like

misogyny, an analogue of praise, as the ethopoetic doubling of straight gender. The classical encomia instigate this sexual doubling in a rhetoric of characterization that later works both imitate and revise.⁸

Gorgias' text initially reacts to the canonical dominance of a proper (heroic, male) ethos that derives from the Homeric works and which casts Helen antithetically as a perpetual "reminder of the calamities" (Gorgias 21): "I have removed by my speech a woman's infamy" (31), the orator concludes.⁹ Though excusing Helen from such blame, the Encomium characterizes her as the object of male strength, speech, and desire--"she was seized by force, or persuaded by speeches, (or captivated by love)" (23)--all of which are functions of each other:

the persuader, because he compelled, is guilty; but the persuaded, because she was compelled by his speech, is wrongly reproached.... The power of speech bears the same relation to the ordering of the mind as the ordering of drugs bears to the constitution of bodies.... Things that we see do not have the nature which we wish them to have but the nature which each of them actually has; and by seeing them the mind is moulded in its character too.... So if Helen's eye pleased by Alexander's [i.e., Paris's] body, transmitted an eagerness and striving of love to her mind, what is surprising?
(27-29)

This ancient mechanistic account of perception empowers Paris's sexuality and weakens Helen's. Her love is an effect of perception, and her perception is an effect of Paris's

presence.¹⁰ His persuasive mastery is, then, a rhetorical analogue to his pre-verbal, visual essence. Together they construct a specular discourse of desire and sexuality based on the male ideal.

Gorgias' self-congratulatory peroration consolidates this masculinist discourse. He assumes a discursive mastery analogous to Paris. Helen, the apparent topic, is overshadowed by a speaker whose own discursive pleasure emerges as the ultimate motive of the Encomium:

I have removed by my speech a woman's infamy, I have kept to the purpose which I set myself at the start of my speech; I attempted to dispel injustice of blame and ignorance of belief, I wished to write the speech as an encomium of Helen and an amusement for myself. (31)

The statement of intentions reveals a narcissistic rhetorical aim that realizes satisfaction more from words than from women and that represents itself metonymically through the figure of Helen.¹¹

In this view, she is an effect of praise that reveals the male ethos. Yet the Encomium also acknowledges Helen's causal function. Through her beauty she creates if not the Trojan war itself (caused by "great reasons"), then the discourse of the Trojan war: "In very many she created very strong amorous desires; with a single body she brought together many bodies of men who had great pride for great reasons" (Gorgias 21). The physical and martial priority of

the men seems displaced by Helen's "amorous" influence. This transposition of cause and effect also appears in Isocrates' "Encomium on Helen." Early in the text, Helen is the vehicle through which men's great deeds can be spoken of: "I think this will be the strongest assurance for those who wish to praise Helen, if we can show that those who loved and admired her were themselves more deserving of admiration than other men" (III: 22). As topos, Helen allows these male feats to be replayed in rhetorical arenas.¹² Isocrates' title echoes Gorgias, and he attacks his rivals, "They ought to give up the use of this claptrap, which pretends to prove things by verbal quibbles, which in fact have long since been refuted, and to pursue the truth" (III: 4). "Helen" figures the truth of Isocrates' speech as opposed to others' "eristic disputations" (III: 6), and he glorifies her beauty as a sign of virtue, which is "the most beautiful of ways of living" (III: 59).

As sign, Helen is precluded from a virtue won by men. She seems to serve man's utterance, "while it is partly because of Homer's art, yet it is chiefly through her that his poem has such charm and has become so famous among all men" (III: 65). Yet through both the metonymic interchange of cause for effect and the paradox of praise, Helen assumes a responsibility for male discourse (the latter exemplified here by Homer's address to "all men"). As its figurative

vehicle she allows her praisers not merely to speak of her but to speak. The linked ideals of male sexual, military, and discursive performance and pre-eminence can then be represented, as the orator aims to display his own archetypal ethos. Helen's figural function as a metonym of male virtue sets up a rhetorical process that from the start defers this ethopoetic goal. The encomia employ an androgynous rhetoric, with woman as vehicle, that undermines the imagined hierarchy of univocal gender and identity that the encomiastic structure presumes to reinforce.

This ambiguous figural relation between man and woman continues in the Renaissance reproduction of classical topoi. The subservient discursive function of woman appears in a number of texts. For example, in Cymbeline it motivates Posthumus Leonatus and Iachimo's bet on Imogen's virtue, which is in effect an "oratorical dispute" at her expense; if, Posthumus says, Iachimo wins, "I am no further your enemy; she is not worth our debate" (I.iv.165-66). On the other hand, the "heuristic" form of Renaissance imitatio, emphasizing derivation plus distance from the original (Greene, Light 40), questions woman's place and the hierarchy of gender it is used to represent in classical rhetoric. Marlowe's "interrogative text" (Dollimore 109), Doctor Faustus, uses Helen to depict the loss of the protagonist's essential Christian ethos: "Sweet Helen, make me immortal

with a kiss: / Her lips suck forth my soul, see where it flies. / Come, Helen, come, give me my soul again" (xviii.101-03). In Troilus and Cressida, the ideal of virtue, figured in the classical texts through Helen's beauty, is challenged by Thersites' cynicism. He would rewrite the Trojan war as a discourse of male jealousy, "All the argument is a whore and a cuckold" (II.iii.68).¹³

These reversals of classical plot and persona thematize an ambiguous structure of gender. The hierarchy of male and female is not simply reversed; instead the implications of their rhetorical relation are reviewed. A set of oppositions--male/female, whole/part, tenor/vehicle --is contemplated in terms of their interconnections. The essentialism that underlies the encomia is complicated as the male ethos reveals its interdependence with woman even when, as in misogynist texts, she is overtly repudiated. Within the disclaimers and criticisms of female character a discourse of androgynous ethopoesis is heard.¹⁴

Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique adopts a consistent misogynist tone which both rehearses the masculinist premises of classical rhetoric and exposes them to the paradox of ethopoetic gender. It opens with an epistle to Lord Dudley that expresses the themes of rhetorical domination and desire. The epistle itself is epideictic; yet unlike the encomia on Helen and more like a love sonnet, it seeks to woo

its addressee--to persuade Dudley to offer support and patronage. As well as stroking the noble ego, the letter reveals a conflict of desire between praiser and praised, in the request and rejection, superiority and inferiority, that underlie its address:

If pleasure maie provoke vs, what greater delite
doe wee knowe, then to see a whole multitude, with
the onely talke of man, rauished and drawne which
way he liketh best to haue them? (A iii)

Wilson makes explicit the rhetorical desire that we noted in narcissistic form in Gorgias' speech. He gives a sensual twist to the conventional description of the orator's aims--to "instruct, move and charm his hearers" (Quintilian III.v.2)--depicting the interaction between the wills and passions of speaker and audience in terms of sexual domination.¹⁵

This model of rhetorical pleasure sets up a visual and verbal hierarchy of provocation and stimulation. "Wee" watch the male orator watching the results of his words; and in each case watching is full of knowing delight. The masterful orator moves and positions the passive audience, taking them "which way he liketh best to have them." Their multitude increases his mastery and "our" specular pleasure. This appreciation connects "vs" to him within his system of pleasure, for we enjoy what he enjoys even if we don't do it ourselves. The implication is that having watched, and

entered this specular order, we could do it too. Wilson himself assumes a double role as the virile orator and the aroused observer, his company among "vs" removing any offensive hint of emasculation for Lord Dudley.

The sexually loaded description femininizes the orator's audience, subjecting their will and passion to his. The monologic rhetorical address that derives from Aristotle is sexualized. The audience's pleasure in its ravishment is dependent on the speaker's primary, causal desire. The imagery of ravishment indicates the gendered presumptions of the rhetoric: an opposed audience and speaker, with "maleness" supposedly precluded from the former and fixed within the speaking function. Yet a male presence reappears in the specular "delite" that "wee"--a second audience including the author, Lord Dudley, and other would-be rhetoricians--feel from watching and hearing the speaker's still primary verbal desire. This second male function, although it is not the addressed, feminized audience but one that observes and listens, reflects the impressed passivity and pleasure of that first audience. The resultant ambiguity of male pleasure as ravisher and ravished--the ravisher ravished--inheres most strongly in the paradoxical role of "Wilson" himself, who as the enjoyer of this rhetoric is, like Gorgias, the narcissistic object of his own discourse.

The epistle tries simultaneously to establish a conventional hierarchy of verbal gender and to suppress the androgynous ethos which also emerges. As the *Arte* continues, the system of macho rhetorical pleasure is reinforced by the metonymic transfer of the male audience's passive pleasure to woman. This stereotyping builds to a clichéd misogynist joke that would preclude woman from speech. Tracing this development through Wilson's text reveals a metonymic structure of androgyny implicit in its masculinist rhetoric.

Explaining what he calls the first kind of oratory, "praise, or dispraise" (suggesting the influence of the classical encomium), Wilson notes that when speaking about people their sex is an important topos: "To bee born a manchilde, declares a courage, grauitie, and constancie. To be borne a woman, declares weaknesse of spirit, neshnesse of body, and ficklenesse of mind" (13).¹⁶ Gender is an essential sign of one's physical, emotional, and cognitive self. The emphasis on birth suggests a pre-social fixedness to these traits. Since gender "declares" them, it becomes a discursive form which, through an apparently natural priority, presents a zero degree of social contingency. The truths of character uttered at birth by gender seem incontrovertible, and so they can function rhetorically as commonplaces.

Nature and gender reinforce each other to establish a uniform type of encomiastic speech which becomes the model for other rhetorical genres. Uniformity exerts a certain pressure upon the way that topics are represented. A predilection for similarity and consistency is a function not only of content but of rhetorical form, as Wilson demonstrates in an example from a set piece on love:

Naturall love, is an inward good will, that we beare to our parents, wife, children, or any other that be nigh of kinne to us, stirred thereunto not onely by our flesh, thinking that like as we would loue ourselues, so wee should loue them, but also by a likenesse of minde.... (33)

This homogenization of love into terms of nature and inwardness is achieved by the use of "similitude," which is later defined as "a likenesse when two thinges, or more then two, are so compared and resembled together, that they both in some one propertie seeme like" (188). In this scheme, similitude is a figure of comparison that does not deviate from proper meaning as does metonymy ("when a word hath a proper signification of the owne, and being referred to an other thing, hath an other meaning" [175]). Through the specular notion of resemblance, it revises difference as a unitary "likenesse," recalling the narcissistic ethos that would structure masculinist rhetoric. The slippage between the functions of likeness exemplifies this rhetoric's pressure on the topic of love. Likeness bases different

types of love on self-love, "like as we would loue ourselues, so wee should loue them," and then locates this "Naturall love" in an "inward good will" that preserves the culturally valued family of "parents, wife, [and] children." The narcissistic motive thus translates love into a unity based on the intrinsic identity of the self and the "inward" will. On this basis, love's place in the patriarchal order of the family and marriage is established.¹⁷

As a rhetorical form, likeness represents a number of culturally valued relationships. In its construction of love, it inscribes rules of personal interaction that seem to foster altruism and direct desire outwards. The rhetorical tenor of this orientation to the other is a self-identity, perhaps not so much assumed as sought, as the object of desire: "The ground of every man's love of himself is the Identity of a man with himself, for the lover and beloved are all one and the same thing" (Wright 242). Likeness controls the relations between self and other by structuring their difference through the essential identity of selfhood.

In this specular structure, women are conceived as complementary to male identity for the sake of social and sexual harmony. As an example of exhortation, Wilson quotes a letter by Erasmus on man's need to marry: "leauing to liue single, whiche both is barraine, and smally agreeing with the state of mans Nature...giue your selfe wholly to most holy

Wedlocke" (40). The letter's implied program is that woman is to give herself to "mans Nature," a primary "state" that determines the social and religious orthodoxy symbolized by "holy Wedlocke." Yet since man requires woman to realize this "state," his incompleteness and dependence on her are also intimated. It is woman's faithfulness to this structure that sustains society and raises marriage above other personal relationships. Erasmus distinguishes the wife by her unequivocal identity, her intrinsic opposition to any kind of dissimulation: "when others are matched together in friendship, doe we not see what dissembling they vse, what falshood they practice, & what deceitful parts they play...whereas the faithfulness of a wife is not stained with deceit, nor dusked with any dissembling" (54). Implicitly attacking traditions of male bonding, these remarks intimate the failings of the masculinist ethos. They construct a univocal role for woman in order to salvage the naturalized image of cultural continuity, and in so doing paradoxically note man's dependence upon her.

This dependence is suppressed and revealed as Wilson's text continues. At one point the male speaker is instructed on the effectiveness of contrast. The notion does not, however, suggest a heterogeneous rhetorical principle which would subvert the valued order of likeness that has been already established. Contrast is figured through woman's

appearance and morality, social indices of her sexuality which deviate from the ideal norm of a homoeostatic ethos. As likeness signifies man, contrast or inconstancy becomes the sign of woman within a cultural code of tropes. The speaker's control over contrast, its availability as a figure to be used, contrasts him to it, implying his discursive status and the fixed order in which contrast, like Spenser's *Mutabilitie* (*Faerie Queene* vii.58), is conceived, as an antithesis con/subsequent to natural likeness:

By contraries set together, things oftentimes
 appeare greater...set a faire woman against a
 foule, and she shall seeme much the fairer, and
 the other much the fouler...if any one be disposed
 to set forth chastitie, he may bring in of the
 contrary part whoredome, and shewe what a foule
 offence it is to liue so vncleanly, and then the
 deformitie of whoredome, shall much set forth
 chastitie. (125)

Once again, within a visual logic of juxtaposed appearances, contrast's possible difference is constrained by certain priorities. "Female" contrast is subject to "male" likeness, the latter personified in the speaker's verbal and rational intentionality.¹⁶ The contrasted term reinforces the patriarchally valued first term and provides the moral rationale in this rhetoric of misogyny. The orator orders character through a hierarchy of the verbally, sexually, and ethically proper.

It is a hierarchy that incorporates linguistic form. The values of the proper are perceived in a masculinist grammar which would synthesize nature and culture: "yet in speaking at the least, let vs keepe a naturall order, and set the man before the woman for maners sake" (Wilson 167). The passage from "naturall order" to "maners sake" suggests the "mythicizing" of rhetoric, as the order of gender becomes the formal order of speech.¹⁹ The limitations enforced on woman's discursive place are "naturall" conditions. At their extreme they preclude her from utterance:

What becometh a woman best, and first of all? silence. What second? silence. What third? silence. What fourth? silence. Yea, if a man should aske me till Domes daie, I would still crie silence, silence: without the which no woman hath any good gift, but hauing the same, no doubt she must have many other notable gifts, as the which of necessitie, doe euer followe such a vertue.

(202)²⁰

Silence, the lack of speech, would ideally characterize woman and, as it does for Jonson's *Morose*, denote her possession of other traits--"gifts" granted to her by man--that are socially valued.

These views reveal the silence which the encomiasts implicitly valued in the portrayal of Helen's physical beauty. It signifies a symbolic passivity. Woman's silence would restrict her to a cultural role as audience, unable to speak and act socially; or, the constraints of silence would

limit her speech to the rules of a male hermeneutic.²¹ The specular structure of rhetoric, that confirms the male ethos as the proper origin of speech, from the rules of grammar to the conventions of epideixis, is enjoined upon woman. She is to reflect male speech. A discursive ethos that might express a hidden motive is explicitly proscribed in her social discourse and demeanor, as Donne emphasizes in the Christmas sermon of 1624. Citing Saint Cyprian, he announces:

It is not enough for a virgin to bee a virgin in her owne knowledge, but she must governe her selfe so, as that others may see, that she is one, and see, that shee hath a desire, and a disposition, to continue so still.... She must appeare in such garments, in such language, and in such motions ...as they that see her, may not question, nor dispute, whether she be a maid or no. (104)

The onus on woman's utterance and action is that it be openly comprehensible to "others," circumscribing the interpersonal inconstancy of "dissembling" which Erasmus had feared. Donne's emphasis on the virgin intimates the urgency of a univocal female speech for elementary social structures. Cultural truth depends on woman's words, as Castiglione's Lord Gaspar dramatically emphasizes in describing the dangerous consequences of woman's sexuality, dangers that would lie not simply in her actions but in what she says about them: "they may apply their force to keepe themselves in this one vertue of chastitie, without the which children

were uncertain, and the bond that knitteth all the worlde together by bloud...should be loosed" (Courtier 219). "Chastitie" is a symbolic rather than natural category, applied here to woman's speech as well as her actions. It works to characterize her sexuality in the fixed and certain terms favored by masculinist rhetoric.

Paradoxically, in spite of the limits imposed on woman's speech and rhetorical role, her word assumes a central relationship to cultural truth. Though marginalized by encomiastic rhetoric, she assumes a pivotal function in a potentially unstable discourse of social and personal norms. She is the antithesis, contrast, which can anchor male speech in the truth of likeness; or, through her inconstancy, she can undermine the structure of properness she is used to shore up. As Donne and Gasper's emphasis on virginity suggests, this ambiguity radiates from woman's sexual identity within the ethopoetics of gender.

In Book III of the Institutes, Calvin also warns against this ambiguity, perceiving its effects in the connections among the truth of woman's speech, identity, and sex. He is dismissing the practice of confession as a mere show of truth-telling. Three times the commentary notes the eclipse of univocal gender through the androgynous effects of woman's confession. It seems that because of its traditional role in revealing the "truth" of sexuality, confession is also

empowered to disguise this truth, to conceal it at the supposed moment of revelation.²² Such concealment is imagined as an effect of a femininizing speech. In arguing against confession, Calvin seeks to preclude this disruption of words and gender, where confession functions as an androgynous speech act. His dicta were of course central to arguments against the stage, particularly on questions of gender and crossdressing.²³ Here in discussing the issue of confession he takes up the same theme, the relation of truth to gender. In a work as relentlessly serious as the Institutes, this section's use of sarcastic humor seems to highlight this concern and the incredulity with which Calvin contemplates the possible confusion of sexual identity.²⁴

Calvin begins his remarks on confession by typically attacking the medieval theologians. His caustic rhetoric recalls the agonistic efforts of Gorgias and Isocrates in using the figure of Helen against their rivals:

when these worthy fathers enjoin that every person of both sexes (utriusque sexus) must once a-year confess his sins to his own priest, men of wit humorously object that the precept binds hermaphrodites only, and has no application to any one who is either a male or a female. (I: 540)

Confession triggers a blurring of sexual differences in what is depicted as a wholly male ritual: the male penitent addresses a priest, according to rules that are either enjoined by "fathers" or ridiculed by "men of wit."

Confession is both the pretext of this scene of male discourse and that which disrupts it, by introducing a femininizing hermaphroditism. The spoken revelation of sexuality--"From the Christian penance to the present day, sex was a privileged theme of confession" (Foucault, History 61)--does not reinforce this masculinist order and the roles of those who enact it, but serves generally to "androgynize" them, as occurs in the ideal scene of oratory which Wilson depicts.

These traces of equivocal gender emerge only when confessional truth is represented. Calvin does not object to confession which is not verbalized but remains an unmediated disclosure to God: "the surest rule of confession is, to acknowledge and confess our sins to be an abyss so great as to exceed our comprehension" (I: 549). The unspoken confession redefines the self in its original submission to God. True confession is imaged in the "abyss," an absence of human speech and "comprehension," the pure presence of a truth beyond discourse. The uttered form of "auricular confession...a thing pestilent in its nature" (I: 550) emasculates man's submissive essence. The Roman rhetoricity and staging of confession corrupt the inner identity of man as determined by God, suggesting the pervasiveness of Calvin's antitheatricalism and its misogynist premise. For this order of unspoken confession to God is also the model

for woman's discursive relation to man, a silent subjection whose "auricular" transgression recalls her talkativeness.

Thus the signs of corruption caused by confession emerge for Calvin in a sort of feminized sexual theater: "a certain matron, while pretending to confess, was discovered to have used it as a cloak to cover her intercourse with a deacon" (I: 541). Confession becomes a sexual disguise both worn "as a cloak" and enacted by a noticeably eager woman. It then generates a larger confusion of sexuality, that ranges from the hermaphroditism noted above, to the implied passivity of the deacon's male sexuality, to the traditional prohibitions in "the innumerable acts of prostitution, adultery, and incest, which it produces in the present day" (I: 551). The voyeuristic revelation of the matron and the emphasis on her desire weight Calvin's denunciation of confession against the sexual duplicity of woman's speech. Her theatrically disguised word undermines the truth of male sexuality. It is analogous to the verbalized confession that taints the penitent male. In this scheme of penitential discourse, woman represents the corruption of the soul through speech. She embodies a sexualized rhetoricity which may threaten the intrinsic certitude of male discourse.

The figure of woman, though conceived as secondary and external to the primary ethos, suggests this internalized confusion to other authors. The passion of a heterosexual

love destabilizes essential male character. In the long section on love melancholy, Burton writes of lovers' loss of humanity and ratio, conceived as male virtues:

at last insensati, void of sense; degenerate into dogs, hogs, asses, brutes; as Jupiter into a bull, Apuleius an ass.... For what else may we think those ingenious poets to have foreshadowed ...but that a man once given over to his lust... is no better than a beast. (III: 154-55)

The divine mutability which Vives saw as epitomizing human nature here signifies the sexual loss of man's identity. The sort of "interinanimation" which Donne celebrated in "The Ecstasy" assumes a self-negating potency for Thomas Wright when "hearts were more present, in thoughts and desires, with such bodies where they liked and loved than with that wherein they sojourned and lived" (Passions 249). Donne himself preached on Easter Day 1625 that "no outward enemy is able so to macerate our body, as our owne licentiousnesse" (Sermons 151). This image of the crossover between outwardness and inwardness implies a sexual deconstruction of essentialism. The sermon's ensuing comments on the "licentious man's" self-induced ruin either suggest that the female inconstancy which threatens maleness from without is a figure for man's own inconstancy, his intrinsic androgyny, or they imply the reverse, that man's internal ruin is a metonym for the extrinsic threat of woman.

This confounding of the true relation of the sexes, and of individual identity, recalls the collapse of the imaginary structure of praise, which the narcissistic reference of the encomia had implied. The rhetorics of praise and of confession both undermine the masculinist ethos. The recognition of its collapse, however, is more overtly registered in man's switch from praise to misogyny. In Cymbeline for example, having initially boasted, as Collatine did of Lucrece, of Imogen's virtue, Posthumus denounces both himself and her in a generalized attack against the figure of woman that contaminates the male tenor, his ideal self-image, "Could I find out / The woman's part in me" (II.v.19-20), condemning this part as a synecdochic concentration of "All faults that have a name" (line 27).

The rhetorical function of woman is revealed as a process of metonymic characterization that figures man's identity amidst a process of sexual selfhood marked by an endless dissatisfaction. Montaigne bemoans this in "Sebond" in terms of,

The lustfull longing which allures us to the acquaintance of women, seekes but to expell that paine, which an earnest and burning desire doth possesse us with, and desireth but to allay it thereby to come to rest, and be exempted from this fever. (II: 193)

The sequence first of desire, then pain and fever, then "lustfull longing" that drives "us" to women, suggests a

continuing deferral of desire. It locates "woman" as the ultimate effect of this desire rather than its cause. She externalizes his dissatisfaction, giving it a verbal and personal goal, "woman," that is then construed as its external origin.

This external placement displaces cause and effect. While subjecting woman to his discourse, and making her its misogynist target, this metonymic shift also grants her a figural power. Her externalization as the goal of man's desire realizes, through "the irony of the 'peripety,'" her internalization as his motive. She functions as the "synecdochic representative" of his discursive desire, "represent[ing] the end or logic of the development as a whole" (Burke, Grammar 516-17), a key to the representation of him and her, despite her secondary function within the traditional rhetorical patterns. The metonymic logic that underlies these forms of rhetoric inscribes the splitting of the male ethos and tenor that occurs through the attempt at self-representation. The figure of woman is an ambiguous trope of masculinist ethopoesis. She unsettles his own modes of characterization, exemplified by the encomiastic inversions between himself and her, and shifts the place of her own speech in the structure of rhetoric, through the androgynous effects of confessional truth.

Theatrical versions of androgynous disguise in the Renaissance represent this ambiguity in various social dramas where the male ethos is initially idealized. A number of plays by Beaumont and Fletcher depict the androgynous process and its effects on seemingly exemplary male identities such as the brave prince and the loyal subject. In works like A King and No King and The Maid's Tragedy these topics are addressed through pairs of characters, who represent the male and female ethic principles in conflict. In Philaster the conflict is compressed within the androgynous characterization of Bellario and Philaster. As noted earlier, the heightened rhetoric of these plays serves to foreground the ethopoetic discourse through which the characters confront each other and the conflicts of gender and identity within themselves. There is a rhetorical rhythm, frequently developed through the alternation from encomium to confession, whereby male characters first represent the imaginary structure of their own identity in its relation to others (encomium), before having the presumptions of this structure undermined, and being in effect "re-characterized" (confession).

A King and No King begins with Arbaces, king of Iberia, having just defeated his Armenian foe Tigranes. The image of military virtue is immediately present. Arbaces orders Tigranes to marry his sister, and while not naming her, he

praises her highly. Her beauty is the counterpart of his martial prowess, and the encomium reflects his opinion of himself: "shee can doe as much / In peace, as I in Warre; sheele conquer too / You shall see, if you have the power to stand / The force of her swift lookes" (I.i.188-91).²⁵ These lines reiterate many of the themes of masculinist rhetoric. Arbaces reflexively praises himself and uses his sister to show his own qualities. She is unnamed since her identity is irrelevant to his self-portrait; however, it later becomes ironically apparent that she is not named because Arbaces is wholly ignorant of her, and his own, identity.

The common love-war conflation also suggests the place of woman in man's martial rhetoric. As Helen's beauty had done for the ancient heroes and orators, his sister's beauty figures Arbaces' archetypal power, which is military and discursive (equations between the latter being popularly characterized in the theater since Tamburlaine's triumphant declamations). Unlike Helen, whose passivity was strongly implied, in this play the woman is a rival to active male power. Her "swift lookes" have the physical "force" which Arbaces displayed on the battlefield, and though her character seems dependent on his report, it is soon to realize effects that will overturn his speech and thought. Nonetheless, for the moment Arbaces presumes a priority which

his sister Panthaea initially reinforces, in her first selfless words, inquiring into "My brothers health" (II.i.78), and then in her comments on the language of his letter to her, "The kindest words, Ile keepe um whilst I live / Here in my bosome; theres no art in um, / They lie disordred in this paper, Just / As hearty Nature speakes um" (II.i.201-04). Here she internalizes the natural guise with which her brother's words invest themselves. Yet as the following scenes reveal, her beauty is able to subvert his social persona and disrupt his rhetorical control.

Having returned to the court, Arbaces sets about making the match between Tigranes and Panthaea, despite his sister taking it "Something unkindly...To have her Husband chosen to her hands" (III.i.2-3). He does so by proclaiming his absolute authority, a speech act which appears to decree his univocal will: "I must have her know / My will, and not her owne must governe her.... Shee should be forcst to have him, when I know / Tis fit: I will not heare her say shee's loth" (III.i.4-20). Arbaces' illocutionary power forecloses Panthaea's opposition, subjecting her discursive will (foreseen in her spoken "lothness") to his.

This verbal power is soon undermined. On seeing Panthaea, Arbaces silently struggles against his rapid falling in love. The sight of her disrupts the specular discourse of praise he had formerly controlled. In a

confessional aside he notes his own self-loss, "Speak, am I what I was?" (III.i.80), which he then tries to counter by invoking solidly male, military imagery. In confusion at his incestuous desire, he threatens anyone who says that the woman standing before him is his sister, decreeing that "Shee is no kinne to me, nor shall shee be; / If shee were any, I create her none" (III.i.161-62). While the overt royal word strives to master the personal passion and the social order that have produced this dilemma, his further asides acknowledge the onset of deep pain similar to that emphasized by Montaigne. Though addressed to the self as a type of inner speech, these asides do not reinforce Arbaces' identity but express its social, moral, and spiritual loss:

...you are naught to me but a disease,
 Continuall torment without hope of ease;
 Such an ungodly sicknesse I have got,
 That he that undertakes my cure, must first
 Overthrow Divinity, all morall Lawes,
 And leave mankinde as unconfinde as beasts....
(III.i.190-95)

In commanding Panthaea and her supporters' silence with Lear-like obstinacy--"Let me not heare you speake againe.... No man here / Offer to speake for her" (198-201)--he indicates the failure of his command, and ironically admits her significance and power in his discourse. Panthaea becomes an externalized sign of his inner confusion, "Incest is in me / Dwelling alreadie" (III.i.330-31). She is blamed by him as

the cause of his internal distress, a female figure who concentrates the conflicts between his individual desire and social order. Panthaea becomes a synecdoche for the play's paradoxical title, whose male, political categories--king/no king--hinge on her equivocal role.

This social and personal dependence on woman occurs elsewhere in Beaumont and Fletcher's work. In The Maid's Tragedy, for example, Amintor's response to his new wife Evadne's confession of her continuing affair with the king not only challenges his self-conception--"What a strange thing am I?" he asks (II.i.318)--but also threatens the reciprocal code of honor that sustains the social hierarchy of sovereign and subject: "The thing that we call honour beares us all / headlong unto sinne" (IV.ii.316-17). Evadne's actions are seen to disrupt Amintor's conception of obedience, driving him to a confused contemplation of regicide. Similarly, in the scene where Arbaces and Panthaea meet alone, her admission of love for him brings them closest to transgression, as they alternately embrace and fly from each other (IV.iv), and in his next speech Arbaces is resigned to a life of sin and hell (V.iv.1-11).

However, in A King and No King the catastrophe is avoided by the further revelation that Arbaces and Panthaea are not brother and sister. Their love, having threatened the social order, finally restores it. The unravelling of

the secrets of identities and birthrights stabilizes a confusion of personal and social positions, in which the loss of kingship and selfhood had threatened, "the whole storie / Would be a wilderness to loose thy selfe / For ever" (V.iv.286-88). Arbaces' loss of royal preeminence translates into personal happiness, while Panthaea gains crown and husband. The characters' relations are coordinated by the benevolent social system celebrated in the final lines: "Come every one / That takes delight in goodnesse, helpe to sing / Loude thanks for me that I am prov'd no King" (V.iv.351-53).

The removal of the threat of incest and the reassertion of Arbaces and Panthaea's personal difference prepare this conclusion. Their identities are separated, and although Arbaces loses his dominant role, the order of character is reimposed in the distinction between man and woman which grants everyone their social place. Philaster, however, lacks this final and total ordering. Despite the betrothal of prince and princess and the restoration of the Sicilian crown, someone is left out. The androgynous character Bellario/Euphrasia exceeds the conventional resolution, a figure who cannot be fitted into the ideal pattern of youthful consummation and continuity: "I grieve such vertue should be laied in earth / Without an Heyre" comments Philaster (V.v.197-98).²⁶ The significance of Bellario's

exclusion may seem arbitrary, especially as she rejects the king's offer to find a noble match for her and pay her dowry. Her refusal and the plot's thematic remainder momentarily appear idiosyncratic:

Never sir will I
Marry, it is a thing within my vow,
But if I may have leave to serve the Princesse,
To see the vertues of her Lord and her,
I shall have hope to live. (V.v.187-91)

However, Bellario's personal willfulness masks a social process that relies on her metonymic role. To apply Girard's terms to this dramatic resolution, Bellario functions as a scapegoat, a "surrogate victim" (Violence 79), whose final isolation is a relatively nonviolent sacrifice in order "to restore harmony to the community, to reinforce the social fabric" (Violence 8). She rights a society disrupted by the deposition of Philaster's father from "his fruitfull Cicilie" (I.i.24). Along with her virginity, which retains a strong symbolic value, Bellario's androgyny is the crucial element that affords her her scapegoat function. She represents all the other characters, a sociosexual vehicle that works through the similarity between her doubled self and them. At the same time, her hybrid but abnormal likeness to everyone also represents the degree of difference and distance that is required in the scapegoat figure for social synthesis to take place. Bellario is alternately similar to man or woman; her

similarity to both makes her different to each; and she also signifies the hermaphroditic links between them.²⁷ This metonymic complexity makes Bellario a central figure in the text's sociosexual thematics. The symbolism of her persona is further strengthened by the mystery of her disappearance and return, which, in effect, doubly charges her identity since she returns twice, once in each gender.²⁸

The other characters come to understand Bellario's androgyny in these constructive terms, as the key to their drama's stabilizing conclusion. Although her disguise seems to them first to have created the social danger, the confession of her "true" sex restores harmony, thus exemplifying Donne's conception of the cultural centrality of woman's unequivocal persona, "as they that see her, may not question, nor dispute, whether she be a maid or no," with "maid" marked for Philaster and the others as female and virginal:

tell me why
 Thou didst conceale thy sex; it was a fault,
 A fault Bellarion, though thy other deeds
 Of truth outwaigh'd it: All these Jealousies
 Had flowne to nothing, if thou hadst discovered,
 What now we know. (V.v.146-51)

Philaster makes Bellario's disguise the pivotal factor for the events. In so doing, he conceals the social and sexual causes of her disguise, the differences between royalty and nobility and male and female that she explains prompted her

action, "I knew / My birth no match for you, I was past hope of having you" (V.v.174-76). His interpretation replays the metonymic transposition of woman's actions from social effect to social cause.

Bellarion gives what Othello would call "ocular proof" (III.iii.360) of her femaleness when she "discovers her haire," a euphemized bodily token of her sex, to her incredulous father (V.v.112 s.d.). She is thereby relocated as an object of a masculinist social gaze. Through observing her sex, the group recognizes and sorts itself out. Her revealed body, in its gender and overtness, is immediately fixed within the social hierarchy and has that hierarchy inscribed and imposed on itself.²⁹ This multiple function of the body as personal, social, and textual, recurs through the play. The subtitle, Love lies a Bleeding, connotes the social and personal disintegration which seems about to begin when Philaster turns on both Bellario and his beloved Arethusa.³⁰ As noted, the drama seems to avoid this dissolution through the adrogynous scapegoat so as to represent "the orthodoxy of selfhood" (Gurr, *Introd.* lxvi). This interpretation, the one that the characters themselves wish to accept, sacrifices Bellario's desire for the sake of social order.³¹ Her double scapegoat function as cause and effect serves finally to conceal the extremes of collapse to

which order has been stretched at the expense of her sexuality.

The ambiguous processes of gendering are not, however, restricted to this overtly androgynous character. Bellario's self-exposure serves not only to settle the dilemma explicitly but also to disrupt it, by implying the continuing ambiguity of Philaster's actions. Her confession, as the sort of androgynous speech act abhorred by Calvin, registers the confusion of his desire and identity. In announcing the truth of her own gender, Bellario reveals the androgynous truth of Philaster's, which underlies his heroic male ethos and echoes equivocally through the play and the closing scene. The apparent realization of this exemplary ethos in the betrothal to Arethusa and the restoration of the throne is undermined, as we will see, by his final muted admission of a split desire for an androgynous ideal.

Like Hamlet, Philaster opens amidst an ongoing political intrigue which seems to set the stage for a tale of brave and decisive action. The king of Calabria has usurped the Sicilian throne from Philaster's father yet remains unable to have the prince killed because of the masses' love for him. Three courtiers inform us of this and of their secret support for Philaster, whom they praise as a heroic figure. They themselves are, however, compromised by having helped the usurper: "My selfe drew some blood, in those warres, which

I would give my hand, to be washed from," admits their leader Dion (I.i.24-26). Because of this uneasy situation the king hopes to arrange his daughter Arethusa's marriage to a foreign prince, Pharamond of Spain, in order to produce a legitimate heir and, through Machiavellian policy, "to bring in the power of a forraigne Nation, to awe his owne with" (I.i.38-39). The drama concentrates key cultural ideas in a political situation that rapidly includes marriage, sex, and the fates of Arethusa, Philaster, and all of Sicily.

Philaster's confused situation is politically and personally interwoven. The object of the people's and the courtiers' admiration, he is a much eulogized figure, the model of male virtue, "the bravery of his age" (III.i.6). The paradox of this praise is its disabling effect. The fine words of others make him a passive figure, incapable of acting in the very way that his praisers envision. Like the object of the classical encomia, Philaster is used to depict masculinist ideals and, because he is so used, is cut off from them. His character is androgynized, being reduced to a traditionally feminized passivity through the praise of his ideal maleness.

This encomiastic paradox works most strongly through the words of the prince's dead father. Philaster feels possessed by his father's spirit which urges him to seize power heroically:

Why she did this, or that...never gave the world / Two things so opposite, so contrary, / As he and I am" (I.ii.23-27). Her idealizing love for him, though starting from the encomiastic perspective of others, seems to allow him to accept the image of selfhood presented in the words of others. The sense of oppositeness allows Philaster to feel a stability of self. He can then act positively for the first time, as he expediently suggests that they employ his "trustiest, lovingst, and...gentlest boy / ...To waite on you, and beare our hidden love" (I.ii.138-40; emphasis added). The boy, a sign-vehicle of secret, essential love, will ground Philaster in a reality of a signified selfhood and emotion, a process which commences through the reflexive structure of the praise of the boy that he expresses to Arethusa.

This "boy" is of course Bellario, who, from the start, is thus loaded with the meanings and intentions of others. When Philaster relates the circumstances in which they met, he casts Bellario as the object of perception and language, asserting his own status through speaking of him, "I have a boy.... Hunting the Bucke / I found him" (I.ii.111-14). Bellario's persona, however, is a complex figure. His gender seems constantly to undermine the maleness that it signifies, and Philaster is taken with this "pretty helpelesse innocence" (I.ii.123). Rather than simply feminizing the

boy, Philaster's perception suggests an interplay of gender and desire in himself through his reaction to Bellario's attention to him, "The love of boyes unto their Lords, is strange" (II.i.57).³³ While Philaster would attribute the love all to the boy, and distance himself from its homoerotic aim, his response to its strangeness intimates his own part in their androgynous rapport. Subsequently, he will love Arethusa only indirectly, through the love of a boy for himself, a love whose activeness once again casts him, Philaster, passively as its object.

This sensed androgyny in Bellario seems to make him the ideal go-between, as one who always metonymically signifies the other. At the same time, Bellario's mediation disrupts the course of desire between lover and beloved, most obviously by detouring their discourse through himself and his passion for Philaster, which makes his accounts of their love vehicles for his own wish-fulfilling romance. This role as messenger also inscribes the androgynous and narcissistic redoubling of the lovers' desire which, though seeking out the other, also chooses its own image in the hermaphroditic envoy.³⁴ When he sends Bellario to Arethusa, Philaster admits "Thy love doth plead so prettily to stay, / That (trust me) I could weepe to part with thee" (II.i.40-41). He mourns the loss of the androgynous boy and his ideal love. Arethusa learns of Philaster's affection through Bellario's

reports of his distracted behavior (II.iii.50-62). She imagines herself to be wholly reliant on these accounts, enjoying their figural representation more than the "truth" they might signify: "thou knowest, a lie / That beares this sound, is welcomer to me, / Then any truth that saies he loves me not" (II.iii.64-66).

An ambiguous process of homo, hetero, and narcissistic desire is thus in train before Megra, caught sleeping with the betrothed Spanish prince Pharamond, accuses Bellario and Arethusa of having sex. Megra's charge translates the unasked but already disruptive question of Bellario's sexuality into social effect, setting the events off on their now overtly convoluted course. At this point too, the revelation of Bellario's gender has implications for the whole social drama. The three lords, scheming for Philaster's return to power, seize upon the news, believing "Twill move him" to assail the king (III.i.35). They anticipate the sublimation of his disappointed desire into direct political action. However, Philaster's desire implodes, the cataclysmic images with which he responds to the courtiers' revelation signifying the upheaval of his own body politic (III.i.67-77, 112-18, 133-49).

Megra's accusation is immediately accepted, suggesting the social investment in woman's sexual word. Acts three and four comprise a sequence of speeches between Philaster,

Arethusa, and Bellario, through which the effects of their deceived and deceiving claims reverberate. The discursive dependence on Bellario's guise is compounded by the effects of Megra's lie. Whereas before the lovers had unwittingly responded to the redoubling of their desire through Bellario, they now react consciously, with assumptions of personal and sexual knowledge. Philaster's violent threats suggest that this knowledge reinforces his own identity, granting it a masculinist power. Yet Bellario's mysterious guise continues to call forth a response which undermines as it determines this imagined ethos: "Tell me thy thoughts; for I will know the least / That dwells within thee, or will rip thy heart / To know it; I will see thy thoughts as plaine, / As I doe now thy face" (III.i.226-29). Philaster believes that the truth of Bellario can be seen and known, as the truth of a rival that would prove the "I." Yet his misperception of Bellario's face undermines the motivated desire to see himself through this antagonist. In the face of the other he perceives not his rival but his lover's desire.

The ensuing exchanges record a chain reaction of misrecognition which spreads from one character to the next, investing each through the illusory guise of the others. Despite his vengefulness, Philaster is unable to strike Bellario, as his anger gives way to a specular homoeroticism: "I must love / Thy honest lookes, and take no revenge upon /

Thy tender youth" (III.i.273-75). Still stopping short of physical action, he derives a narcissistic pleasure from his rhetorical despair, using the misogynist topoi he fires at Arethusa to consolidate the truth of his male persona over against her falseness: "that foolish man, / That reades the story of a womans face, / And dies beleaving it, is lost for ever" (III.ii.117-19). In a bitter soliloquy, he denounces "the dissembling traines / Of womens looks" (IV.iii.3-4), and Bellario's "misbeseeming" and "dissembling trade" (IV.iii.27,33). His accusations against them seek to reaffirm his own "authentic" ethos. Arethusa, shocked by his outburst, appeals to Philaster for "constancy," and then introjects his misogyny, doubting and yet trying to rebuild her own desire through turning on Bellario as a "dissembler" (III.ii.134,136).

In his despair Philaster focuses first on one figure and then another. His passion wildly substitutes different personae, including himself, as the cause of his dilemma but is satisfied with none. He swings from asking Arethusa to slay him, to stabbing Arethusa and Bellario, to bitter self-reproach at his cowardice for doing so. In focusing first on himself, he wishes to cast himself as the victim of his own heroism, a stoic self-assertion. He then turns on Arethusa and Bellario, aiming to kill each of them to save his identity. The irony of these acts of masculinist violence is

deepened by the willingness of his female victims, who bare their bodies to his dagger. As they seek to fulfill their desire for him, their passivity precludes him from the active ethos he seeks. In these coital scenes of stabbing and of love "lying a-bleeding," the heroic persona is all but eclipsed. (As comic relief, a country naif enters and, his sense of honor shocked, tries to defend Arethusa.) It is only after this impassioned violence that Philaster begins to recognize the absence of the ethos he has been seeking. When the king asks Arethusa whether her attacker was Philaster, she answers, "Sir, if it was he, / He was disguised." This strikes Philaster as a revelation, suggesting the deeper nature of his self-confusion, "I was so: oh my stars! / That I should live still" (IV.vi.127-29). The uncovering of a disguise he has not controlled explains for him the inconstancy of selfhood through these events. At the same time, and beneath his awareness, these terms link him to the inconstant rhetorical image of woman and disclose the androgynous structure of his identity.

As Bellario had done, Philaster now functions as a surrogate victim, a crucial sign in the social system whose value is contested by others. The king wishes to kill him so as to end the political turmoil, but the courtiers foresee that Philaster's death would spark another revolt of reciprocal violence. Instead of executing him, the king

sends Philaster to quell the rioting citizens (V.iv). Social order, like his father's spiritualized word, speaks through him, seeking to determine his identity. Finally, his heroic ethos is set up in the ideal reciprocity between himself and society, symbolized in the restoration of the crown and his marriage to Arethusa, which together form an image of sociosexual completion: "enjoy Philaster / This Kingdome which is yours" (V.v.210-11). The political equation between the state and the prince seems to figure the resolution of the dilemmas of selfhood and identity that have plagued the whole community.

These forms of closure are, however, realized only when the figure of Euphrasia is revealed through Bellario's androgynous guise. Philaster's self-realization and the parallel restoration of social harmony depend on this discovery. Euphrasia is brought into the resolution by the other characters, who first threaten Bellario with death and torture if he doesn't reveal the truth, and then reconcile her androgynous disguise through their sense of the events' happy ending, inviting her participation in it. Arethusa, who alone might now find this androgynous persona a threat, herself issues the invitation: "I, Philaster, / Cannot be jealous, though you had a Lady / Drest like a Page to serve you, nor will I / Suspect her living heere: come live with me, / Live free as I do; she that loves my Lord, / Curst be

the wife that hates her" (V.v.191-96). She circumscribes the previously disruptive signs of sexual ambiguity within the heterosexual order of marriage, where Bellario's love for Philaster is simply evidence of his desirability. The power of the reordered society to absorb these signs reveals its reinforced strength and the sureness of the characters' renewed identities. The disruptions now seem to have been necessary to realize this return to political and personal ideals. Bellario has purged the system and proven its integrity and propriety, which are rehearsed in the closing maxim, "Let Princes learne / By this to rule the passions of their blood, / For what Heaven wils can never be withstood" (V.v.216-18).

The secret of the woman behind Bellario's guise seems to reassert Philaster's maleness and explain the disruptive attraction the androgynous figure had held for him. The female tenor of this figure would thus reveal the constancy of his character, which instinctively recognized in the disguised identity before him the sociosexual subjection of Euphrasia:

I was past hope
Of having you. And understanding well,
That when I made discovery of my sex,
I could not stay with you, I made a vow,
 ...never to be knowne
Whilst there was hope to hide me from men's eyes
For other then I seem'd; that I might ever
Abide with you: (V.v.175-83)

The hopeless love, a sexuality that is forsaken as it is and would be "discovered" (by herself and Philaster), the virgin's vow, and the determination of her persona by "men's eyes," all these responses comprise a chain of disguises. Euphrasia is compelled to fashion within the masculinist discourse of desire. Her final revelation continues to represent the operation of this discourse; rather than allowing her selfhood to be realized, it imposes the paradigms of gendered character upon her, in service to Philaster.

Beaumont and Fletcher's text thus dramatizes in broad social terms the subversive and the stabilizing effects of identity and gender upon the representation of selfhood. The disguise of Bellario metonymically inscribes the conflicts between recognized and suppressed dimensions of sexuality, as other characters bewilderingly respond to the ambiguous signs of her androgyny. Their confusion is expressed in the sudden reversals of knowledge and emotion triggered by a series of set rhetorical speeches, the encomium and the confession, through which characters first presume the relationship between themselves and others and then reveal the "truth" of these relationships. The formality of this rhetorical structure does not, however, efface the dramatic "personality" of the characters but suggests a conflictual discourse through which they construct themselves and

interact. The use of the encomium and the confession refers Beaumont and Fletcher's characterization to the rhetorical traditions in which relations between man and woman, and thus the process of sexual identity itself, were often depicted.

Bellarion's revelation of her true gender is, then, the confessional speech act which seems to revise the relationships between the characters, allowing the social and discursive hierarchy of proper meaning and identity to be reaffirmed. As woman, she reveals that the difference between man and woman lies in the intrinsic likeness of each to itself and in the subjection of woman to a masculinist ethos. At the same time, Bellario's confession is a revelation of androgyny, and of the ambiguous identity not only of herself but of those who perceived her as a boy and responded to her disguised love. Such a one, of course, is the heroic Philaster. He resumes his identity on the image of Bellario's femaleness, reproducing the essentialist structure of praise. Yet in realizing this character, Philaster confesses to an ethos that resides within and breaks through the proper:

But Bellarion,
For I must call thee so still) tell me why
Thou didst conceale thy sex... (V.v.145-47)

The inexplicable compulsion of his parenthetical "must call" registers the excess of androgynous disguise, an ethopoetic trope that reveals the sex it conceals.

Notes

1. Through the ethopoetic implications of the "proper," the old rhetoric initiates more recent notions of the role of metaphor and metonymy in the subject's discourse. Jakobson notes their role in Freud's work on dreams (Fundamentals 81), and Lacan develops these observations throughout his work. Derrida's essay "White Mythology" unpacks many of the connections between meaning and identity that are compressed in the "proper": "Metaphor, therefore, is determined by philosophy as a provisional loss of meaning...within the horizon of, the circular reappropriation of literal, proper meaning. This is why the philosophical evaluation of metaphor always has been ambiguous: metaphor is dangerous and foreign as concerns intuition (vision or contact), concept (the grasping or proper presence of the signified), and consciousness (proximity or self-presence); but it is in complicity with what it endangers, is necessary to it in the extent to which the de-tour is a re-turn guided by the function of resemblance (mimesis or homoiosis), under the law of the same" (270). Much of the following chapter will consider the ambiguous evaluations of gender and identity by, in effect, substituting "androgyny" and "sexuality" for the terms "metaphor" and "meaning."

2. Ian Maclean traces this order to Aristotle's Metaphysics: "In the distinction of male and female may be discerned Aristotle's general tendency to produce dualities in which one element is superior and the other inferior. The male principle in nature is associated with active, formative and perfected characteristics, while the female is passive, material and deprived, desires the male in order to become complete. The duality male/female is therefore paralleled by the dualities active/passive, form/matter, act/potency, perfection/imperfection, completion/incompletion, possession/deprivation" (Renaissance Notion 8).

3. Femaleness can thus be the cause of androgyny (as in Taming) or its effect (as in Twelfth Night or Philaster). This causal ambiguity is also metonymic in form, as one of Peacham's examples of metonymia suggests: "when the efficient cause is understood of the effect...when the effect is gathered by the efficient" (C ii). On the metonymic construction of femaleness, cf. R. Howard Bloch's view of the rhetorical place of woman in medieval discourse: "She comes into being metonymically as a part of a body more sufficient to itself because created directly by God and to whose wholeness she, as part (and this from the beginning), can only aspire" ("Misogyny" 10).

4. Bellario's exclusion underlines the questioning of the neat comedic closure that is hinted at in Orsino's final words, which register Viola's androgyny, the dependence of gender on guise, and his own ambiguous desire: "Cesario, come-- / For so you shall be while you are a man; / But when in other habits you are seen, / Orsino's mistress, and his fancy's queen" (V.i.385-88).

5. We might consider the celebration of sexual normalcy which C. L. Barber reads into Twelfth Night. Quoting at length suggests the effects which a certain sexual discourse has on the reading of Renaissance literature--Festive Comedy retains critical influence--and the way that "Shakespeare" is used to reinforce this discourse: "the disguising of a girl as a boy in Twelfth Night is exploited so as to renew in a special way our sense of the difference. Just as a saturnalian reversal of social roles need not threaten the social structure, but can serve instead to consolidate it, so a temporary, playful reversal of sexual roles can renew the meaning of the normal relation...with sexual as with other relations, it is when the normal is secure that playful aberration is benign. This basic security explains why there is so little that is queazy in all Shakespeare's handling of boy actors playing women, and playing women pretending to be men" (Barber 245). The corporeality of Barber's "queaziness" marks the deep level at which the androgynous characters might strike the critic. I might add, though it would take far longer to consider in detail, that the way that Shakespeare can be used in this sort of conservative cultural viewpoint may problematize Joel Fineman's reading of Shakespeare as an origin for modern, western subjectivity. In short, the question might be, what role does Shakespeare's "invention" of the split subject have in that subject's, i.e., our, historical development? (Cf. Fineman's own remarks: "this atavistic and sentimental allegiance to the idea and idealization of the autonomous human and humanist subject, male or female, precisely because it begs the

question of the subject, amounts to a characteristic failure of Shakespearean criticism--characteristic and Shakespearean because such criticism, whatever its explicit ideological intentions, not only responds to but also capitulates to the historical hegemony of Shakespearean characterology" ["Ear" 7].) Has the cultural veneration of "Shakespeare" worked to suppress alternative representations of subjectivity--Fletcherian excess, Jonsonian moroseness--which might transgress the ideological values of much Shakespearean criticism? For a more recent (1982) version of Barber's salutary normalcy, and one which emphasizes its roots in Platonism, see Robert Kimbrough, "Androgyny Seen through Shakespeare's Disguise," the title itself valorizing a specular identity.

6. Cf. Eugene Waith's comments: "language...supplants rather than expresses the action"; "the emphasis of the speech is not so much on the character of the speaker as on what is said" (Pattern 42,184). Also note Andrew Gurr's reading of Philaster as "a problematical situation within which a pattern of characters moves to demonstrate the implications of the situation" (Introd. xxx).

7. Cf. Fineman's notion of "the cogito of praise... 'I praise therefore I am'" (Eye 267).

8. On the interrelation of praise and misogyny cf. note 14, below.

9. The infidelity of Helen, in addition to the jealousies of the goddesses over Paris's choice, is a classical version of Eve's willful disobedience. Like Eve, the betrayer or mother of mankind, Helen could also be used to defend women. Thus, Linda Woodbridge, studying the debate for and against women in the English Renaissance, comments on Helen as "one of the frequentest exempla of both formal defenders and attackers" (Women 127). The reversibility of the exempla suggests the ambiguity of woman as figure.

10. Cf. Cressida's complaint, in Shakespeare's play, about the subjection of woman's vision: "The error of our eye directs our mind" (V.ii.106).

11. The humorous tone of Gorgias' conclusion may not mock Helen. As Maclean comments on Cornelius Agrippa's De nobilitate et praecellentia foemini sexus (1529), "the humour may indicate the impossibility of discussing in serious terms the proposition of woman's equality, and therefore represents a strategy of discourse which is subversive in intention" (91). Woodbridge, however, emphasizes that the majority of

misogynist Renaissance texts adopt a jesting tone (31 and *passim*). A remark of E. R. Curtius suggests a discursive narcissism basic to rhetoric, in the *topoi* themselves, "intellectual themes, suitable for development and modification at the orator's pleasure" (European Literature 70).

12. The links between classical rhetoric and warfare have often been noted. I. A. Richards emphasizes that the "old Rhetoric was an offspring of dispute...it was the theory of the battle of words and has always been itself dominated by the combative impulse" (24). Burke writes that "Aristotle...gives what amounts to a handbook on a manly art of self-defence" (Rhetoric 52). Cicero uses such images throughout De Oratore--at one point not just the effect of speech but its internal structure is described with military metaphors, the introduction, for instance, being the skirmishers (II.lxxx.325). Recalling Puttenham, we might note that his switch in the rhetoric of rhetoric--from warfare to diplomacy--reflects a change in late-Renaissance ideals for male aristocratic behavior; cf. Stone, Crisis: "Violence in word or deed was...regulated, codified, restricted, sterilized" (244).

13. Cf. La Rochefoucauld's seventh maxim: "Great and glorious events which dazzle the beholder are represented by politicians as the outcome of grand designs, whereas they are usually products of temperaments and passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, attributed to their ambition to seize the mastery of the world, was probably nothing more than a result of jealousy" (37-38).

14. Paolo Valesio emphasizes that "all basic kinds of discourses, including the epideictic--that is usually identified only in its encomiastic aspect--have a positive and a negative side" (note 15, 271). The paradoxes of praise are thus reproduced in misogynist texts. Cf. Bloch: "the discourse of praise...is neither the antidote to nor the opposite of the medieval discourse of misogyny but a co-complicit abstraction of woman that, as idealization, functions alongside of and not against the antifeminist strategy of possession that dominates the articulation of gender from the Early Church Fathers to the early troubadours" ("Chaucer's" 127).

15. On the relation between the passions and the will, cf. Lily B. Campbell: "The passions, then, make, so to speak, representations to the understanding, which when judged are referred to the will for action, and are by the will passed on again to the passions" (99). The will was commonly

characterized as female, despite (or because of) its powerful function; for example, in A Helpe to Discoverge (1619), W.B. and E.P. write: "Will is as free as an Emperor, cannot be limitted, barred of her liberty, or made wil by any coaction, when she is vnwilling" (119).

16. Cf. the Aristotelian view of Lord Gasper, Castiglione's "aggrieved misogynist" (Kelly 39) that "when a woman is borne, it is a slacknesse or default of nature" (196).

17. La Rochefoucauld expresses a comparable view of the narcissism of love: "There is no passion in which love of self rules so despotically as love..." (Maxim 262, 72). Thomas Wright suggests a similar specular self-identification within love, prior to the self's turning towards another, when the narcissism is projected: "The ground of every man's love of himself is the Identity of a man with himself, for the lover and beloved are all one and the same thing" (Passions 242).

18. The visual logic that discerns woman's inconstant threat to homoeostatic characterization motivates the attacks on her use of make-up, a frequent misogynist topos in the Renaissance. Hamlet's nunnery speech to Ophelia is well-known, and other instances would include Count Canosse in The Courtier (66-67); Montaigne on women who "to the open-view of all men paint and embellish themselves with counterfeit and borrowed beauties" (II: 193); Wright's vehement, "the newfangle madness or lascivious pride or vain superfluities of women's pointing, painting, adorning, and fantastical disguising" (Passions 188); Donne's denunciation of the body, "varnished with forraigne complexion.... God would not have us marre his work" (Sermons 154). See Bloch for a discussion of this motif in patristic and medieval texts ("Misogyny" 9-15).

19. Cf. Barthes: "myth has the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal...myth is depoliticized speech...it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics" (Mythologies 142-43).

20. The corollary of man's desire for her silence are the complaints about her volubility, "that endless daily talk frequented by women" (Wright 120). Wright claims that her talkativeness is produced by her inconstancy. Thus a rhetorical loop emerges whereby the trope used to signify woman, inconstancy or contrast, also generates and discounts her speech against the male norm.

21. On the first constraint cf. Kelly who notes the restrictions on woman's speech in Castiglione: "The Duchess Elisabetta and her companion, Emilia Pia, at least speak.... Yet they speak in order to moderate and 'direct' discussion.... They do not themselves contribute to the discussions.... The men, in short, do all the talking" (34-35). On the second, cf. Cixous: "woman has always functioned 'within' the discourse of man, a signifier that has always referred back to the opposite signifier which annihilates its specific energy, diminishes or stifles its very different sounds..." ("Laugh" 887).

22. Cf. Foucault: "The confession was, and still remains, the general standard governing the production of the true discourse on sex...with the rise of Protestantism, the Counter Reformation, eighteenth-century pedagogy, and nineteenth-century medicine, it gradually lost its ritualistic and exclusive localization; it spread.... A dissemination, then, of procedures of confession..." (History 61).

23. Chambers stresses the importance for antitheatrical polemicists of a 1556 sermon that expounded "the prohibition of the change of sex-costume in Deuteronomy xxii.5 as an absolute one, and as applying particularly to the wearing of men's dresses by women and of women's dresses by men in masks and mummeries. This is an exegesis which counted for a good deal in the Puritan criticism of a stage in which boys habitually took the female parts" (I: 248).

24. Derrida's discussion of woman and truth as they are positioned in "phallogocentric" discourse suggests the western context and tradition for Calvin's ideas. Derrida emphasizes the masculinist pressure on this discourse and the possibility of woman's extraneousness to it, despite its social, philosophical, and religious strictures against her: "It rather is the 'man' who has decided to believe that his discourse on woman or truth might possibly be of any concern to her.... For it is the man who believes in the truth of woman, in woman-truth" (Spurs 63).

25. All references to Beaumont and Fletcher are to Dramatic Works, ed. Bowers. A King and No King and The Maid's Tragedy are in volume two; Philaster is in volume one.

26. There is a different ending in the first quarto of Philaster (the second quarto is the copy-text), where Bellario is set to marry the courtier Trasiline, thus fulfilling the pattern of plays such as As You Like It and Twelfth Night. Bellario's isolation in the second quarto's

ending seems to recall the exclusion of troubling characters like Jacques and Malvolio from the romantic endings of those plays. Robert K. Hunter, the editor of Philaster in Bowers' Works, suggests that the first ending is either "authorial early drafts later recast into dramatically superior Q2 form" (I: 383) or "not authorial" (I: 385). These claims need to be re-examined in view of the later ending's significance in terms of the rhetorical deployment of woman and androgyny.

27. Cf. Greenblatt on the Renaissance conception of hermaphroditism: "at once a bizarre anomaly, violating the most basic of natural categories, and a sign of the natural order whose underlying structure made possible the very generativity that produced the anomaly...the persistent doubleness, the inherent twinship, of all individuals" (Negotiations 78). It is this symbolic flexibility which makes the androgynous woman suitable for the sacrificial role.

28. Cf. Mary Douglas on the mysterious value created through the "venture beyond the confines of society": "The man who comes back from these inaccessible regions brings with him a power not available to those who have stayed in control of themselves and of society" (Purity 95).

29. Cf. Douglas's notion of the body as a synecdoche for society, with "the powers and dangers credited to social structure reproduced in small on the human body" (Purity 115).

30. The publisher's address to the reader before the second quarto of 1622 uses this cultural complex of bodily imagery to justify itself as the true edition: "Courteous Reader. Philaster, and Arethusa his love, have laine so long a bleeding, by reason of some dangerous and gaping wounds, which they received in the first Impression...assuredly they will now find double favour, being reformed, and set forth suteable, to their birth, and breeding" (Bowers I: 375). John F. Danby's reading of the play emphasizes the disintegration of "people who are not, and cannot be, unified...are fragmented by the choices they have to make ...[who] are unities, but the unity they have is schizophrenic" (201-02).

31. Cf. Jardine: "the most powerful stereotypes of female heroism for the Renaissance all involve sexuality chastened in one form or another" (186).

32. Cf. Lacan's notion of "the drama of Hamlet as the man who has lost the way of his desire" ("Desire" 12).

33. Cf. Orsino's ambiguous recognition of Viola through Cesario, "thy small pipe / Is as the woman's organ, shrill and sound, / And all is semblative a woman's part" (I.iv.32-34). The courtier Valentine comments wryly to Cesario, "he [Orsino] hath known you but three days, and already you are no stranger" (I.iv.2-4).

34. Messages of doubled desires also get sent in Twelfth Night, as Viola observes, "My master loves her dearly, / And I (poor monster) fond as much on him; / And she (mistaken) seems to dote on me" (II.ii.33-35). In his contemplation of messages of desire which never arrive--"Even in arriving (always to some 'subject,'), the letter takes itself away from the arrival at arrival. It arrives elsewhere, always several times" (Postcard 123)--Derrida at one point draws particular attention to the archetypal love-messenger, Hermaphrodite, "What fascinates me now, concerning the son of Hermes and Aphrodite, is the repetition and redoubling of the story" (145), a discursive function that Shakespeare as well as Beaumont and Fletcher picked up.

CONCLUSION

"Haply you think, but bootless are your thoughts,
That this is fabulously counterfeit...."
The Spanish Tragedy

In the revenge scene of The Spanish Tragedy, Kyd presents a concatenation of dramatic disguise. The noble actors in the masque are costumed for their parts, and the princely audience recognizes them both in character and as their royal selves. On the surface, Hieronimo's script casts actors and audience in familiar roles--Balthazar, playing the part of Soliman, woos a disconsolate Perseda, played by Bel-Imperia, while the king, viceroy, and duke exchange jokes about the apparent acting out of real love. Indeed, these parts hardly seem roles at all, so natural do the actors and audience find them. They would play themselves, and this takes the acting to its violent end.

Of course there is another script running through the performance. The actors and audience are participating in plays that they don't know about--the one that Hieronimo has devised, the "acting of revenge" (IV.iii.30), and the "tragedy" that Revenge produces (I.i.91) for Andrea's sake,

comprising the "spectacles" that finally please his soul (IV.v.12). Kyd's play is the last in the sequence. The roles that are consciously adopted for the royal masque serve to hide these other parts from the characters. The personae they assume conceal their identities, and the words through which they enact their roles propel them towards parts that they are not aware of. It is a type of speech that, without their knowledge or control, characterizes them, rather than one they use to present themselves: "Each one of us must act his part / In unknown languages" (IV.i.172-73).

Dramatic disguise is expressed through a similar type of language, unknown in that, as for those in this scene of revenge, it confronts its speakers with consequences of identity that they do not always anticipate and of which they may not be aware. The language of disguise reveals the place of the speaker in personal and social contexts that have established the grounds of character before speech, and thus character, begin. As Hieronimo's actors and audience learn, the personae that they assume conceal factors that determine their personal fate. Rather than a way of controlling and manipulating the situation, their guises become the means through which they are subjected to that situation. It locates their identity.

This reversal in the effect of disguise, the way that it seems to pass out of one's control, relates to its repeated

failure. Disguise rarely works as simply as it's intended but is often ambiguous. Though it places character in context, it does so by confusing social and sexual roles, producing hybrid figures such as the usurping king, the disobedient subject, and the androgyne, who bring vision, language, and behavior into conflict, who, in short, are unable to control the cultural effects of what they've put on. Their disguise remains personally unfinishable. Through such figures, these texts would question the effects of self-representation. The historical, mimetic, and epideictic forms of characterization are examined through satirical, allegorical, and confessional genres which invert the essentialist modes of ethopoesis and in so doing, supplement the voice of the traditional rhetorical speaker in its monologic context. They show us that disguise functions less to hide those who wear it than to hide from them the implications of what they wear. The discourse of disguise unveils the social process of a Renaissance ethos.

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