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**Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union: Japanese foreign
policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union and Japanese
foreign policy towards the Soviet Union**

Itoh, Mayumi, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1988

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JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY ELITES'
PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

by

MAYUMI ITOH

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the
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The City University of New York.

1988

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Abstract

JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY ELITES'
PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

by

Mayumi Itoh

Adviser: Professor Donald S. Zagoria

Reader: Professor W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe

This dissertation examines Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union and their relationship to Japan's foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union.

The framework for the analysis is based on a theoretical framework established by Robert Jervis that places decision-makers' perceptions of other nations and of the world as an important intervening variable between events (independent variable) and foreign policy decisions (dependent variable). Second, in order to extend Jervis' framework to broader foreign policy elites, another framework developed by W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe is combined, which identifies perceptions of "influentials" as an independent variable, affecting decision-makers' perceptions (intervening variable) and thereby foreign policy decisions (dependent variable). Thus, the incorporated framework

postulates a correlation among events (independent variable), foreign policy elites' perceptions (intervening variable), and foreign policy outputs (dependent variable).

Hypotheses on the formation, maintenance, and change in perceptions, and their effects on foreign policy are deduced from a theoretical framework for the way one nation perceives others, such as that of Robert Jervis.

On the basis of this analytical framework, the research examines Japan's foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union, their evaluation of Japan's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, and the sources of their perceptions of the Soviet Union. Data is acquired through open-ended interviews with Japanese foreign policy elites and their writings.

The data is categorized according to the spectrum of ideologies in order to ascertain patterns of perceptions for each subject entry and correlations among perceptions, foreign policy, and sources of perceptions. Then, the hypotheses on the correlations among perceptions, foreign policy, and sources of perceptions developed above are tested against results obtained from qualitative and semiquantitative analysis of the data.

Finally, prospects for Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and Japan-Soviet relations are explored.

This case study of the Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions should provide useful insight on the effects of elites' perceptions on foreign policy decision-making.

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Third, she would like to thank all the Japanese foreign policy elites who granted her interviews despite their extremely busy schedules, and gave her their extensive and in-depth perceptions of the Soviet Union and the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Indeed, she regards the information collected from the interviews as an extremely valuable asset. It is impossible to list all of their names here. However, among others, she would like to take this opportunity to thank former Minister to the United States Nagao Hyodo and Consul-General in Boston

Minoru Tamba for their special help in carrying out interviews in Japan.

Last not but least, she would like to express her gratitude to her husband, Gregory Rewoldt, who has supported her in the writing of this dissertation and has put up with a lot of inconveniences, and without whom this dissertation would not have been possible.

**Prefatory Note
on
References, Quotations, and Names**

In accordance with the decision of the dissertation oral committee, the anonymity for the interviewees is preserved in this dissertation. Their names appear only in Appendix III (List of Japanese Foreign Policy Elites with Respect to the Soviet Union), in order to acknowledge their contributions to this dissertation. Therefore, the names of interviewees are not given in the text or the notes, but the place and date of the interview only are shown in the notes. However, this does not apply to references to the Japanese literature.

Also, in accordance with the decision of the dissertation oral committee, in order to clarify the exact extent of the quotations, all the quotations from the interviews are put into quotation marks, although they are not always the exact words of the interviewees, but are translations or paraphrases by the author. For the same reason, the references to the Japanese literature are also put into quotation marks where possible, even though sometimes they are not exact translations of the original Japanese, but are paraphrases by the author, in order to maintain the logical sense in English.

All Japanese names in this dissertation will be given with the family name last in the customary Western way.

Abbreviations

COCOM:	Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Area
CSIS:	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DSP:	Democratic Socialist Party
FM:	Foreign Minister
FP:	Foreign Policy
GHQ:	General Headquarters of the Allied Powers
H.C.:	House of Councillors
H.R.:	House of Representatives
IISS:	International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
IMEMO:	Institute for World Economics and International Relations (Moscow)
INF:	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
JDA:	Japan Defense Agency
JCP:	Japan Communist Party
JIIA:	Japan Institute of International Affairs (under the MFA)
JSP:	Japan Socialist Party
LDP:	Liberal-Democratic Party
MAD:	Mutually Assured Destruction
MAFF:	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, & Fisheries
MCA:	Management & Coordination Agency (in the Prime Minister's Office)
MFA:	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MITI: Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOF: Ministry of Finance
NT: Northern Territories
NTAA: Northern Territories Affairs Administration
(in the MCA)
PM: Prime Minister
RIPS: Research Institute for Peace & Security
(under the JDA and the MFA)
SDF: Self Defense Forces
SDI: Strategic Defense Initiatives
U.N. United Nations
U.S. United States

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Chapter I. Study of Perceptions in Foreign Policy Analysis

1. Introduction

a) Theme of the Dissertation

The central themes of this dissertation are the perceptions of the Soviet Union held by the Japanese foreign policy elites and the way these perceptions are related to the Japanese foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union.

This research should also contribute to obtaining deeper insight into Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and better perspective on Japan-Soviet relations. Because of the geopolitical position of Japan in the present bipolar international system, this is a subject of interest to the United States as well.

Being Japanese, the researcher has been interested in Japan-Soviet relations. She is especially concerned with how Japan should formulate foreign policy towards this neighboring superpower in terms of preserving Japan's national security and other national interests.

However, to the researcher's knowledge, no study of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union has appeared so far in the literature on foreign policy analysis.

**b) Significance of Project: Study of Perceptions
in Foreign Policy Analysis in the Past**

The study of perceptions in foreign policy analysis is advanced in the U.S. and its literature abounds. Classic examples of these studies are those done by John Stoessinger and Harold Isaacs on American perceptions of Asia. Stoessinger examines the roles of perception in U.S.-Soviet-China relations by conducting thirteen empirical case studies.¹ He tries to determine how each nation's perceptions of itself, of the character of its adversary, of its adversary's intentions, and of the other's power and capabilities, affect its policy decisions. Isaacs studies common patterns in American images of China and India by conducting interviews with 181 informants whom he regards as representative of American leadership types.

In more recent studies, Stephen F. Cohen examines American perceptions of the Soviet Union.³ Meanwhile, Alexander L. George studies the Soviet foreign policy elites' belief systems.⁴ On this subject, Gregory Guroff, et al. make an interesting attempt to examine Soviet perceptions of the U.S. systematically.⁵ Because of the difficulties in collecting data from the Soviet elites themselves, their research employs a "surrogate" interview method through Americans who have had contact with Soviet elites.

For other areas of the world, W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe,⁶ Peter R. Baehr,⁷ and Wendell Bell and J. Williams Gibson, Jr.,⁸ examine the perceptions of foreign policy elites of Ghana, the Netherlands, and Jamaica, respectively. As for Japan, studies of Japanese perceptions of the U.S. have been made extensively.⁹ However, no study of their perceptions of the Soviet Union has been published in the literature on foreign policy analysis.

The significance of these studies is that they conduct scientific, systematic, and conceptual research on the effects of foreign policy elites' perceptions on foreign policy decision-making. Their theoretical framework, research design, and data gathering procedures, which are relevant to this research, are employed in this dissertation.

A common weakness of many studies of one nation's perceptions of other nations, with the exception of the literature reviewed above, is that they take it for granted that there are national consensus perceptions of other nations. They do not make clear whose perceptions they are talking about. They do not ask such important questions as: how perceptions are formed, how foreign policy elites' perceptions are related to those of decision-makers, and how decision-makers' perceptions are reflected in foreign policy decisions. In this sense, this dissertation may be significant as the first conceptual analysis of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union.

In addition, this research may also be significant as one of the few comprehensive studies of Japan-Soviet relations (given the paucity of the literature for such studies), for three reasons. First, most of the Western literature on Japan-Soviet relations consists of single-case studies of specific historical events.¹⁰ As one of a few exceptions to the dominance of single-case studies, Young C. Kim examines postwar Japan-Soviet relations in three dimensions—security, political, and economic—and provides a concise and perceptive account of these relations.¹¹ Roger Swearingen's work is a comprehensive volume on the contemporary relations of the two countries, with analyses of historical, political, diplomatic, strategic, and economic perspectives.¹² In addition, Rajendra Kumar Jain examines postwar Japan-Soviet relations, covering the period from 1945 to 1980.¹³ His work includes a reproduction of 108 documents on their relations.

Second, the work by Japanese political scientists in the English-language literature is predominantly on Japan-U.S. relations. An exception is Hiroshi Kimura, professor of political science at the Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University, who contributes frequently to Western journals on Japan-Soviet relations.¹⁴

Third, in Japan, there has been divisive contention on Japan-Soviet relations in general, and extremely hot debates on the Soviet military threat in particular.

However, they are largely of a journalistic nature or are ideologically dominated. Academically speaking, few comprehensive and conceptual treatments of Japan-Soviet relations have appeared so far.

Under these circumstances, this dissertation will focus on Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union—how they look at the Soviet Union and why—and their effects on actual Japanese foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union.

2. Theoretical Framework

a) Posing the Central Questions to be Examined

Before describing this research, a definition of

"perception" should be given, first of all.

"Perception" in this research refers to images of another nation held by foreign policy elites, who include both decision-makers and "influentials."¹⁵ Decision-makers are those who actually make foreign policy decisions.

Influentials are those who are not directly involved in the decision-making but who have power to influence decision-makers. It is their perceptions of that nation and the international environment that are "the decisive input of a foreign policy system,"¹⁶ and, therefore, that are relevant to this analysis.

Next, the central questions should be set up concerning the Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union and their correlations to the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. These are:

- 1) What are their perceptions of the Soviet Union?
- 2) How do they evaluate Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union?
- 3) What are the sources of their perceptions of the Soviet Union?
- 4) How do their perceptions of the Soviet Union, their opinions of Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, and the sources of their perceptions correlate with each other?

b) Establishment of A Theoretical Framework

In order to search for answers to the questions posed above, a relevant theoretical framework should be established. For this purpose, the research employs two theories as the basic analytical framework: the theories established by Robert Jervis and W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe concerning foreign policy elites' perceptions in foreign policy analysis.

First, Robert Jervis synthesized studies of perceptions in international politics in a comprehensive theory on the way one nation perceives others—how a nation's perceptions of others are formed, maintained, and altered, and why.¹⁷ Jervis' central thesis is that the

decision-maker's perception is an important intervening variable in foreign policy decision-making, between events (independent variable) and foreign policy decisions (dependent variable).¹⁸

However, it should be noted here that this does not necessarily mean that perception is the only important intervening variable in foreign policy decision-making. Other intervening variables such as "the bureaucracy, the nature of the state and the workings of domestic politics, and the international environment" also play important roles in foreign policy decision-making.¹⁹

In the case of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, other factors such as geography, the alliance with the U.S., economic and other interests with the Soviet Union, and relations with the People's Republic of China (below China) also affect that policy. However, unlike these objective factors, it is hard to determine the effects of perception *per se* on foreign policy decision-making. Perception is frequently a filter through which other factors operate. It is by nature subjective.

Second, in order to extend Jervis' theoretical framework concerning foreign policy decision-making to broader foreign policy elites that include the influentials, his framework is combined here with that of W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe. Ofuatey-Kodjoe identifies influentials' perceptions as an independent variable, that affects decision-makers' perceptions (intervening variable), and

thereby affects foreign policy decisions (dependent variable).²⁰

As a result, this combined framework postulates a correlation among events (independent variable), perceptions of foreign policy elites (intervening variable), and actual foreign policy decision outputs (dependent variable).

In addition, the following propositions of Jervis as to how perceptions are formed, maintained, and changed due to the mechanism of cognitive consistency, are employed to set up hypotheses on the following questions.

i) Formation of Perceptions

—The way the decision-maker learns lessons from history is subjective. He learns most (which does not necessarily mean best) from first hand experiences, early experiences, generational experiences, and events that are important to his state or organization.²¹

—The decision-maker tends to overgeneralize lessons learned. The impact of these lessons are so powerful that they create "perceptual predispositions" for the decision-maker.²²

ii) Maintenance of Perceptions

—The decision-maker tends to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images through the mechanism of cognitive consistency.²³

—Perception of aggressiveness "will be seen as rooted in factors such as geography and national character."²⁴

—Lessons about specific nations are overgeneralized and tend to be maintained despite changes in leadership in those nations.²⁵

—The existence of constant factors (the systemic factor, for instance) creates perceptual predispositions which make the decision-maker insensitive to the emergence of new situations.²⁶

iii) Change in Perceptions

Perception of hostility is a belief "especially resistant to discrepant information ('inherent bad faith model')."²⁷

—" [I]mages that are least central...will change first." Since the "perception of hostility is...central..., often linked to prior variables such as the other's domestic system or geographical position," to change this perception requires change in many other beliefs.²⁸

iv) Types of Common Misperceptions

(Hideo Sato's study on the causes of misperception²⁹ is combined with that of Jervis here.)

—The decision-maker tends to fail to understand the internal struggle within the bureaucracy or other political division in the other nation and to overestimate the other's "unity and planning" ("perception of

centralization").³⁰

—The decision-maker tends to see the other nation's political system "as parallel to [his] own."³¹

—The decision-maker tends to believe that the other nation understands that his own nation is not a threat.³²

—The impact of personal stakes of beholders on perception can be strongly distorting.³³

c) Statement of Hypotheses

Next, hypotheses on the correlations among Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union, their sources of perceptions, and the Japanese foreign policy are deduced from the general theoretical framework established above as follows.

- 1) On the correlations between the independent variable (events) and the intervening variable (perceptions)

i) Formation of Perceptions

Hypothesis 1: History is the predominant source of the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union. Past events between Japan and Russia-Soviet Union implanted an image of expansionist Russia-Soviet Union and Russophobia among them.

Hypothesis 2: Due to the powerful effects of the early experiences and generational experiences on the formation of perceptions, the Soviet behavior at the end of World War

II made the Japanese anti-Soviet perceptions decisive. This included the Soviet violation of the Neutrality Treaty, the massacre of the Japanese in Manchuria and Sakhaline, the occupation of the Northern Territories, and the detention of "575,000"³⁴ Japanese hostages in Siberia for eleven years.

Hypothesis 3: The reversion of the Northern Territories is so important to Japan that, unless the Soviet Union returns the islands, the Japanese will remain anti-Soviet.

Hypothesis 4: Firsthand experiences with the Soviet Union through residence in and contacts with the Soviet Union were powerful and reinforced the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union. This made their anti-Soviet perceptions irreversible.

ii) Maintenance of Perceptions

Hypothesis 5: Despite the drastic change in the political system in Russia in the Communist Revolution of 1917, the hostile image of the Soviet Union (perceptions of the Soviet Union as a threat) did not change. On the contrary, ideology was added to their fear of Russia-Soviet Union.

Hypothesis 6: More recently, despite a new leadership under Gorbachev, the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union have remained fundamentally the same.

Most of them are skeptical about Gorbachev's reforms.

iii) Change in Perceptions

Hypothesis 7: Since perception of hostility is a belief resistant to change, their perceptions of the Soviet Union have hardly changed. Quite on the contrary, the distrust and anti-Soviet perceptions were reinforced by the constant Soviet threat posed to Japan, due to the geopolitical location of Japan.

Hypothesis 8: In a nutshell, their perceptions of the Soviet Union have never been positive. The hostile perceptions have been reinforced by successive events. They are crystallized by the U.S.-Japan "alliance" under the post-war U.S.-Soviet bipolar international system.

- 2) On the relations between the intervening variable (perceptions) and the dependent variable (foreign policy decision-making)

Hypothesis 9: Their anti-Soviet perceptions are so deeply rooted that they affect the whole range of foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union. Thus it is difficult for the foreign policy decision-makers to make substantial concessions to the Soviet Union, as exemplified by the Northern Territories issue.

3. Research Design

Now, it is necessary to give a brief description of how the actual research is conducted for this dissertation.

a) Setting up Specific Questions to be Examined

The research is conducted first by setting up specific questions that are deduced from the general theoretical framework established above. For the case of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union, the questions are as follows.

1) Current Perceptions

—What are Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union?

—Are there any cleavages in perceptions among them?

2) Formation, Maintenance, and Change of Perceptions

i) Formation of Perceptions

—How did historical events influence the formation of their perceptions of the Soviet Union, such as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Russian Revolution, and the Soviet military behavior at the end of World War II?

—How did the early and generational experiences with the Soviet Union influence the formation of their perceptions of the Soviet Union, such as the Soviet violation of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty, the occupation of the

Northern Territories, and the detention of Japanese hostages in Siberia?

—How did firsthand experiences with the Soviet Union influence the formation of their perceptions of the Soviet Union?

ii) Maintenance of Perceptions

—Have their perceptions of the Soviet Union changed due to the leadership changes in Russia-Soviet Union?

—How stable are their perceptions of the Soviet Union?

iii) Change in Perceptions

—If their perceptions of the Soviet Union have changed, what Soviet behavior or what experiences with the Soviet Union have changed them and how?

3) Correlations between Perceptions and Foreign Policy

—How are their perceptions of the Soviet Union reflected in the actual policy towards the Soviet Union?

—What are other important intervening variables of the foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union?

—How are their perceptions of the Soviet Union likely to affect future Japan-Soviet relations?

b) Identification of Japanese Foreign Policy Elites

The identification of the Japanese foreign policy decision-makers towards the Soviet Union are made by "two-step institutional and reputational research."³⁵ The first step refers to the identification of the decision-makers "by virtue of their official positions," and the second to that of those who "were known to have participated in certain foreign policy decisions."³⁶ The examination of the Japanese foreign policy decision-making system and interviews with the foreign policy elites will serve this end.

The same procedures are employed for the identification of the foreign policy "influentials" for the Soviet Union. They include both those who have influence on foreign policy, ex-officio, and those "who are believed by decision-makers to have influence [on] the foreign policy."³⁷ The identification will be made from the examination of the Japanese foreign policy decision-making system and interviews with the decision-makers.

c) Data Collection Method

Data on the Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union are acquired through open-ended, in-depth interviews with the foreign policy elites, which were conducted in Japan during

October-November 1986. (For an English translation of the questionnaire sent to the Japanese foreign policy elites, see Appendix I.) In addition, writings of the Japanese foreign policy elites on their perceptions of the Soviet Union are also used for the following reasons.

First, it was not possible to interview all the foreign policy elites identified due to their extremely busy schedules. A few of them sent back their answers to the questionnaire in writing, instead of accepting an interview. (For a complete list of the interviewees, see Appendix III.)

Second, and more importantly, there is a strong tendency in Japanese academic circles to disapprove of interviews. They consider the interview method journalistic, and believe that "academic study should be based solely on the literature."³⁸ Some of them recommended studying their writings, instead of conducting interviews.

Third, some interviewees pointed out that "the authoritarianism and secrecy in Japanese society make it difficult to conduct interviews with high-ranking foreign policy elites and to obtain candid opinions, especially on the Soviet Union."³⁹ In fact, some of the foreign policy elites who did accept interviews specifically asked that their names not be revealed. Therefore, in consideration of the sensitivity of the subject the names of interviewees are kept anonymous in the text of this dissertation, and

their contribution to this dissertation credited by listing all of the interviewees in Appendix III.

d) Method to Test Hypotheses and Questions

The examination of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union and their correlations with the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is conducted by content analysis of data collected from interviews with and writings of the foreign policy elites on the questions posed above. The data are later compared for the separate categories in the spectrum of ideology among the foreign policy elites. (See Chapter II.) The hypotheses stated above are then tested by analyzing the data. Through this testing, some generalizations about Japanese foreign policy perceptions of the Soviet Union and their effects on Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union will be arrived at.

Finally, based on these generalizations, implications will be considered for future Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and for Japan-Soviet relations. Thus, this research will complete a comprehensive examination of the correlations among events, foreign policy elites' perceptions, and foreign policy decision-making in the case of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

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Chapter II. Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making System


1. Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making System

a) Japanese Decision-Making System

Before identifying the Japanese foreign policy decision-makers and influentials, it is first necessary to examine the characteristics of the Japanese decision-making system. Japan employs a parliamentary-cabinet system similar to that of England. Except for the Japan Socialist Party's Katayama coalition cabinet (with two conservative parties) for less than a year, Japan's postwar politics have been ruled by the conservative parties for more than four decades. Smaller conservative parties competed with each other in the postwar power struggle, until they merged to form the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. (See Figure 1.) Since then, the LDP has maintained its power, with 304 seats currently in the House of Representatives.¹

Among the opposition parties, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the largest opposition party with 86 seats, and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the third largest with 27 seats, are on the left. The two younger parties, the *Kōmeitō*, (the Clean Government Party), founded in 1964 by *Sōka gakkai* (one of the largest new Buddhist sects) with 57 seats, and the Democratic-Socialist Party (DSP), a splinter of the JSP in 1960 with 26 seats, are middle-of-the-road parties.²

Figure 1: Main Genealogy of the LDP and its Factions



Sources: Koichi Kishimoto, *Politics in Modern Japan*, Tokyo: Japan Echo Inc., 1982, p. 27, and *Asahi Nenkan* (Asahi Almanac), Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha, 1987.

Unlike the U.S. presidential system, Japan's executive branch is governed by the ruling LDP that forms the cabinet. The cabinet is made up of Ministers who are appointed by the Prime Minister from several factions within the LDP, in accordance with their factional power. Thus, in principle, the bureaucracy carries out the task of implementing policies that the legislature makes, rather than of formulating them.

However, in practice, the bureaucracy not only takes part in the decision-making process, but also its decision-making power is significant. Ministers, when countering the opposition parties, often merely read out what the bureaucracy has written for them at the "Diet interpellations" (question and answer sessions). As a result, it is controversial as to whether the LDP or the bureaucracy has the real decision-making power.

The difficulty in identifying the real decision-makers is complicated by the ambiguous nature of Japan's decision-making process. Some interviewees even note that "there are often no particular decision-makers."³ First, one of the characteristics of the Japanese decision-making style is the consensus building system called *nemawashi*. In order to avoid direct confrontation in public, an accommodation has already been reached with potential opponents before a formal decision-making meeting is held.⁴

Second, because of the Japanese "group consciousness," the Japanese use another consensus-building device called

gōgi sei (the "council system"). In order to avoid leaving opposition and unsatisfied groups behind, discussions are pursued until a consensus is formed, rather than taking a vote. Everybody is held responsible for the decision and assumes "group responsibility" rather than individual responsibility.⁵ Thus decision-makers remain anonymous.

Third, the Japanese policy decision-making system is characterized by a *passive* consensus rather than an *active* consensus. Policy-making elements (mainstreams in the ruling party, business leadership, and the ministries concerned) are "linked 'in series' so that the policy-making current cannot flow in the absence of a single element."⁶ In this system, "each of these elements has veto power over policy": unless it becomes clear through informal talks that "none of the elements actively opposes the policy in question" no policy will be drafted.⁷

Fourth, another characteristic of the Japanese decision-making style is called *ringi sei* (the "piling-up" system). Decisions are reached by circulating written proposals and by approving them among the bureaucrats "from the bottom to the top" in the hierarchy, rather than from the top to the bottom.⁸ In this system, the middle echelon in the bureaucracy plays a significant role because decisions are made as a result of the "piling up" of opinions from the lower ranks to the higher ranks.⁹ All these practices contribute to the complexity and ambiguity of the decision-making process in Japan.

b) Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making System

Certain characteristics of the Japanese foreign policy decision-making can be deduced from the above examination of the Japanese decision-making system in general. First, due to the preference for the consensus building system, the Japanese foreign policy decision-making establishment works in unison. "In accordance with the Prime Minister's intentions, the Cabinet Secretary-General [an LDP leader], the Cabinet Research Office, the LDP's Policy Research Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI], and the Japan Defense Agency [JDA] work out a consensus through study meetings."¹⁰ "The unity among the decision-making group leaves no power to the opposition parties in foreign policy decision-making,"¹¹ nor to the left wing in general.

Second, because of "an inclusive system of 'checks and balances'" of the *passive* consensus decision-making system, the business community controls the financial lifeline of the LDP; the LDP has the MFA under its thumb through control over foreign ministerial appointment; the MFA exerts considerable influence over business through its control of specialized knowledge and information.¹²

Third, "formally, the MFA draws up policy proposals according to the intentions of the Foreign Minister, but the Foreign Minister does not have real power. The Foreign Minister is appointed by the Prime Minister and often is a 'yes man' to the Prime Minister. His intentions are almost

identical to those of the Prime Minister."¹³

Fourth, the greater role of the middle echelon in the decision-making system gives the actual foreign policy decision-making power to the Divisions in the MFA. In fact, the Division Director is the "linchpin of the decision-making machinery," who can be seen as a "mini-foreign minister," with his Deputy as a "mini-vice-minister."¹⁴

Commenting on the ambiguous decision-making style, an influential scholar in the center said that "the Japanese foreign policy decision-making process is not modernized like that of the U.S. National Security Council system."¹⁵ In addition to this decision-making system, multiple constraints on the decision-making power of both the LDP and the MFA further complicate the identification of the real decision-makers.

i) Constraints on the Power of the LDP

There are several constraints on the LDP, by which the bureaucracy has established its power vis-à-vis the LDP.

First, because of the "factional politics" of the LDP, "each faction should be regarded as a separate political party such as the 'Nakasone Party,' the 'Takeshita Party,' the 'Miyazawa Party,' and the LDP as their coalition. The ministerial posts are determined by factional considerations in order to maintain the balance among them,"¹⁶ rather than by merit. The same factional leaders

take turns in repeatedly occupying LDP executive posts and ministerial posts at each cabinet change. As a result, LDP politicians who are not experts in foreign policy are often appointed as Foreign Minister. They are then dependent on the expertise of the bureaucrats at the MFA.

Second, politicians are absorbed not only in factional struggles, but also in domestic and local issues that are important to them in terms of acquiring support in their constituencies. They are less interested in foreign policy issues,¹⁷ or "do not have time to study foreign affairs."¹⁸

Third, a cabinet formed by the LDP is often destined to have a short life. It may be overthrown by a non-confidence vote of the opposition parties, or by a dissolution of the Diet (House of Representatives). In contrast, the unique Japanese employment system of the bureaucracy—the life-long employment and the seniority system—maintains the continuity and stability of the MFA. It enables the MFA to accumulate information and expertise.

Fourth, those outside the MFA hold that this tendency is intensified by the closed and exclusive nature of the MFA. It "monopolizes information"¹⁹ and "does not allow other bureaucracies or the private sector to anticipate the MFA."²⁰ "Japan unifies the channels of foreign affairs in the MFA, so that a Japan-Soviet economic agreement is signed by a Japanese Foreign Minister and a Soviet Trade Minister."²¹ This situation triggered criticism of the MFA by those outside the bureaucracy. "Its attitude is

authoritative and conceited."²² "It prevents the establishment of an inter-bureaucratic decision-making system, like the U.S. National Security Council system."²³ This exclusiveness however does preserve the MFA's power.

Fifth, the less frequent use of "policy brains" from outside also accounts for the decision-making power of the MFA. There is a tendency for the government to employ only "safe" and "like-minded"²⁴ scholars as its advisors, who are called *goyō gakusha*, academicians patronized by the government. An influential said that, "in the U.S., the foreign policy decision-making group includes not only officials in the State Department and the Pentagon, but also specialists in academic circles. However, in Japan, advisory councils to the Prime Minister are not given the same status. Bureaucrats (along with politicians in cases of important political decision-making) form a consensus by themselves. They only pick up opinions of the advisory councils that suit them."²⁵

All these factors enable the MFA to wield considerable power over the LDP in forming Japanese foreign policy.

ii) Constraints on the Power of the MFA

Nevertheless, the MFA is not free from constraints on its power either. The constraints that suggest the decline of the decision-making power of the MFA extend through three structural levels.

The first is the human quality level. Because of the

ichioku sō sararīman ka (the national phenomenon of workers all becoming petty salaried men), "people have lost grand aspirations and the dedication to serve national interests. They have become concerned only about their personal security and welfare. [Unfortunately,] foreign affairs bureaucrats are not exceptions to this."²⁶ This tendency is coupled with the changed reality. "In earlier days foreign affairs bureaucrats could become Foreign Minister,"²⁷ or even Prime Minister as Shigeru Yoshida did. Now the highest rank they can ascend to is the position of Permanent Vice-Minister. The position of Foreign Minister is occupied by LDP politicians. "Diplomacy used to be recognized as a recondite craft requiring grand vision and statemanship."²⁸ Foreign ministers in the pre-World War II period did have such qualities. However, "in the democratic politics of postwar Japan, the foreign minister is a member of the House of Representatives as well as a perpetual candidate in his constituency": being preoccupied with the business of party politics, factional politics, and constituents, he "has little time to deliberate on *affaires d'état*."²⁹ This reflects the decline in the power of the MFA and contributes to the lower morale among the diplomats.³⁰

The second level concerns the expansion of the bureaucracy. The phenomenon that can be called "decentralization at the center" paradoxically lowered the power of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the LDP (the predicament

of a huge bureaucracy).³¹ "The bureaucrats can no longer exert power as they did before World War II, when the Division Directors had power equal to that of the politicians in the Diet. The MFA officials at the rank of Division Director used to answer the Diet interpellations. Now the Bureau Director-Generals have to show up at the Diet and bow to Dietmen. The bureaucrats lost power around the time of the Tanaka cabinet. The LDP Diet members have gained power since then."³²

Third, the expansion of the bureaucracy has also intensified the infamous intra-bureaucratic fights among Ministries over jurisdiction. This inhibits the flow of information across the bureaucracy and makes it difficult to share expertise. This tendency, coupled with the increase in "internationalization," accelerates the decline of the relative power of the MFA within the bureaucracy. Because of "the vast expansion of technology and compartmentalization of specialized knowledge," the MFA can no longer handle international negotiations "without expert advice from the other ministries concerned."³³ "Problems that were not foreign policy matters in the past have become 'internationalized' so that Ministries other than the MFA have become more involved in foreign policy matters."³⁴ The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications became involved in foreign affairs due to the U.S. demand that Japan "buy American" communication equipment; not to mention the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry over the

long disputed "beef and orange" issue, and MITI for all sorts of trade issues. "These Ministries represent specific interest groups and domestic industries and defend their interests, whereas the MFA has no such domestic base. The MFA, which used to despise the other Ministries' negotiators as bumpkins [ignorant of protocol], no longer can make decisions alone on these issues."³⁵

The decline of power of the MFA is evident also in the area of foreign intelligence. The Ministries concerned would like to handle matters by themselves. "They use their own communication network between Tokyo and Washington D.C., bypassing the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. It has happened that MITI's information source turned out to be correct, whereas the MFA's was wrong."³⁶ For that matter, *sōgō shōsha* (general trading firms which have branches all over the world) are "larger in scale than [the MFA in foreign intelligence] and can perform this function more efficiently."³⁷

As a result, the MFA has "lost all claim to special talents and prestige just as [its] load of routine 'busy-work' has increased."³⁸ The relative power of the MFA has declined not only vis-à-vis the LDP, but also within the bureaucracy with respect to other Ministries.

iii) "Tug of War" Between the Prime Minister and the MFA

The above examinations narrow down the possibilities

to the ultimate decision-making power residing either in the Prime Minister or in the MFA. It still remains unclear whether the Prime Minister or the MFA has the real power. Then, it would be helpful to categorize decision-making into two patterns: routine (non-crisis) and non-routine (crisis) decision-making.

According to an LDP politician, "in the case of non-crisis decision-making (which does not require immediate judgement of the situation) the MFA can wield power over the Prime Minister through persuasion. Regularly the MFA's Bureau Director-General and Division Director concerned will go to the Prime Minister's Office. They brief the Cabinet Secretary-General and the Prime Minister on their judgements at the final stage and ask for their endorsement. Nakasone, before he became Prime Minister, consistently advocated an 'autonomous defense policy' and had some reservations about the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, after he became Prime Minister, he accommodated to the bureaucracy (the JDA and the MFA) and came to support Japan's 'dual defense policy' based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Self Defense Forces (SDF). This case indicates that the power of the bureaucracy is stronger than that of the Prime Minister in routine decision-making. In the case of crisis decision-making, on the other hand, the MFA alone cannot make decisions. It tends to entrust the decision-making to the Prime Minister, as in the case of the U.S. hostages in

Iran. The choice between securing Iranian oil (vital to the Japanese economy) and Japan's cooperation with the U.S. was so difficult that the MFA was unable to make a decision by itself. It entrusted the decision-making to the Prime Minister's Office. Prime Minister Ohira correctly decided to cooperate with the U.S. However, how difficult the decision-making actually was remained unrecognized because of the subsequent sudden Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It proved that Ohira's decision was right."³⁹

The LDP politician concludes that, "in essence, the foreign policy decision-making is a 'tug of war' between the Prime Minister and the MFA."⁴⁰ The relative power relations between them differ according to the nature of the foreign policy matters and the personality of the individual Prime Minister. In the case of foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, the discord between the LDP leadership and the MFA is symbolized by the Northern Territories issue. "The LDP has been enthusiastic about the return of the islands, whereas the MFA has not due to its concern with the U.S."⁴¹ Because of this "tug of war," an influential on the right thinks that "the Cabinet Research Office's International Situation Research Division is inconsistent [referring to the fluctuations in policies between cabinets depending on each Prime Minister's intentions]. In essence, Japan lacks a comprehensive foreign policy decision-making system for making short and long term strategy."⁴²

**c) Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making
System Towards the Soviet Union**

i) Special Power of the Soviet Union Division

Despite the general tendency for the decline of the power of the MFA, it is said that "this is not the case for the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. The role of the MFA is larger than foreign policy towards other nations."⁴³ In fact, there is a solid consensus that the MFA is strong in Soviet affairs. The decision-making power of the MFA's Soviet Union Division is intact for several reasons.

"Japanese foreign policy in general is characterized by 'economic diplomacy,' in which economic interests play a major role."⁴⁴ To begin with, Japan has no security policy except for a "solely defense" policy, constrained by its "peace constitution" that renounces any use of force. Also, as a typical "processing trade" nation, Japan needs suppliers of raw materials and markets for its manufactured goods. Its survival depends on trade. Thus the economic diplomacy "gives MITI and other economic related Ministries and Agencies strong decision-making power, and makes the *Keidanren* (the Federation of Economic Organizations, a federation of big business) a powerful influential."⁴⁵ Big business is a "key component of the ruling establishment," due to its huge "political contributions" to the LDP and its having the same values as the LDP.⁴⁶

Some outside the MFA label the basic nature of postwar Japanese foreign policy as *fukoku tahei* (to expand the economy and be dependent militarily), as compared to the *fukoku kyōhei* policy (to expand the economy and to strengthen the military) in the Meiji era in the late 19th Century.⁴⁷ Or, more critically, Japan's foreign policy is called "diplomacy without principle." It has no principle except to make economic profits, while depending for its security on the U.S. "The MFA merely deals with matters on a case by case basis when issues arise."⁴⁸

Meanwhile, "the Soviet Union is a unique nation in its relation to Japan. Japan has few economic interests in the country. The share of the Soviet Union in Japan's total trade has never exceeded 4%, with an average of 2-3% [equivalent to about \$4 billion]."⁴⁹ "Japan's trade with the U.S. is twenty five times that with the Soviet Union, and that with China five times."⁵⁰ "In terms of the ratio of economic relations to political relations, the Soviet Union stands the lowest,"⁵¹ to quote an MFA official. The lack of economic interests in the Soviet Union and of strong economic interest groups on that country account for the monopoly power of the MFA.

However, according to those outside the government, a more fundamental reason for the exceptional decision-making power of the Soviet Union Division of the MFA is that Japan has no specific policy towards the Soviet Union except for demanding the reversion of the Northern Territories. Even

the opposition parties are virtually united with the ruling LDP on this matter. It overshadows the usual differences between the ruling and opposition parties. The lack of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, and the absence of strong political opposition ironically help the monopoly on decision-making power of the MFA.

Furthermore, lack of interest in and knowledge about the Soviet Union among the Japanese in general contribute to the monopoly power of the MFA, making it easier for it to obtain a national consensus on foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

Because of this triple lack of interest in the Soviet Union, the MFA's Soviet Union Division enjoys a virtual monopoly on decision-making power, with few interest groups and opposition forces to stand in its way. According to a diplomat who served as the Soviet Union Division Director, "no other foreign policy making group in the MFA has more power than the Soviet Union Division. Its perceptions become the actual policy. First because the Soviet Union Division can afford no failures. Its staff members are working at the risk of their lives for Japan's national security. They do not let others argue against them. Second, since the Soviet Union is not an easy country to understand, few people are in a position to argue against the Soviet Union Division. It is relatively easier to get a national consensus on the policy towards the Soviet Union than policies towards other countries. Third, as the

Division members make decisions, they exchange views with the LDP, sense others' responses, and take public opinion into consideration."⁵² As a result, "the policies the Soviet Union Division made have never been reversed by other Bureaus within the MFA, or by other Ministries (although they send councilors to the Embassy in Moscow), or by the LDP."⁵³ "The single voice of the Eurasian Bureau Deputy Director-General discouraged the business circles from undertaking joint ventures with the Soviet Union in the 1970's."⁵⁴

In the opinion of other MFA officials, "the only two exceptional cases in which the Prime Minister took some initiative towards the Soviet Union were Prime Minister Hatoyama's signing of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration [1956], and Prime Minister Tanaka's signing of the Japan-Soviet Joint Communiqué [1973]."⁵⁵ Both cases were "political decisions." In the 1956 case, "opposition by the MFA was predicted in advance, so the conventional policy-making process in the bureaucracy was avoided. The decision was made and implemented almost solely by the ruling party itself."⁵⁶ "Even Foreign Minister Shigemitsu often was excluded from policy-making."⁵⁷ In the 1973 case, "Prime Minister Tanaka visited Moscow despite the opposition of a majority of the LDP."⁵⁸

Nevertheless, some on the right think that even the Soviet Union Division cannot override the LDP and the Prime Minister. "Soviet foreign affairs are controlled by the

LDP, which is led by the 'leftist conservatives' [moderate conservatives]. What the LDP has in mind is only the return of the Northern Territories, and the MFA has no power to override this LDP line. Thus the MFA has no set principles in its policy towards the Soviet Union. The MFA is obstructed by the politicians who are courting Gorbachev for their personal gain, and by the business circles which are concerned only with making profits."⁵⁹

This is especially so when the Prime Minister has any special enthusiasm for Soviet foreign affairs, as in the two past cases of Prime Minister Hatoyama and Prime Minister Tanaka. Prime Minister Nakasone's Soviet diplomacy is a more recent case which comes to mind.

ii) Special Power of Prime Minister Nakasone

Some foreign policy elites outside the government think that Prime Minister Nakasone had more power than the MFA did. He wanted to be an articulate and powerful "presidential Prime Minister," as compared to other politicians who prefer the traditional consensus-building decision-making style, and as the new Prime Minister Takeshita does. Also, "Nakasone regarded foreign policy as his *forte*. He wanted to achieve a major breakthrough in Japan-Soviet relations, so that he could be remembered as a great politician in Japan's postwar history like Prime Minister Yoshida."⁶⁰

Because of these personal interests, they hold that

Nakasone wanted to make his own foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and wielded power over the MFA. He appointed Kuranari, a politician from his own faction who was "not an expert in foreign affairs, as Foreign Minister."⁶¹ Others point out that "the relations between the LDP leadership and the MFA were not good."⁶² A journalist speculates that "Prime Minister Nakasone replaced the Eurasian Bureau Deputy Director-General by one to his liking in October 1986, who had been his official secretary in the MFA."⁶³ Soon, he was promoted to be the Eurasian Bureau Director-General in January 1987. This was unusual because only the Foreign Minister is the appointee of the Prime Minister. The new Foreign Minister Uno under Prime Minister Takeshita was also chosen from the Nakasone faction, in order to follow up the "Nakasone diplomacy." On the other hand, "the MFA was trying to put a brake on Nakasone's enthusiasm for a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union."⁶⁴ In the end, despite Nakasone's ambition for a Nakasone-Gorbachev summit, neither Gorbachev's visit to Japan nor Nakasone's visit to Moscow were realized during his premiership.

To sum up, it can be said that the decision-making power of the MFA is generally stronger than that of the Prime Minister in foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. There are exceptions when the Prime Minister wants to make his own decisions different from those of the MFA. Yet, it is important to remember that "all decision-making is a

result of the interaction of forces."⁶⁵ Consensus is reached not in a systematic way but in an ambiguous way. Domestic politics (party politics, factional politics, and personal stakes) play an important role in foreign policy decision-making, often a decisive one."⁶⁶ As a prime example, the 1956 peace treaty negotiations took place over the heads of the foreign affairs bureaucrats. It failed, mainly because of the factional power struggle within the conservative parties and the disparate personal interests among the political leaders.⁶⁷

**d) Japanese Economic Policy Decision-Making
System Towards the Soviet Union**

Next, the decision-making system for Japanese economic policy towards the Soviet Union should be examined, because it works in a unique way. The government does not take part in the decision-making directly. The policy is formulated by the private sector.

According to those in business circles, "the principal actor in the Japanese economic policy decision-making vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is the *Zaikai* [the big business circles]."⁶⁸ "The government only raises issues. The *Keidanren* [a federation of big business] that does not do business itself, coordinates the opinions of the business circles. Then, the three ministries concerned, MITI, the MOF (Ministry of Finance), and the MFA, make final decisions in the form of 'administrative guidance.' More

specifically, the Secretariat of the Policy Planning Committee of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee (JSEC), established at the *Keidanren*, acts as the top organ for economic policy decision-making vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Japanese full members of the JSEC are presidents of big corporations including *shōsha* [trading companies] and manufacturers. They join the JSEC on a voluntary basis, and the *Keidanren* cannot reject them. The Soviet counterpart is the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Japanese government (the three ministries concerned) only indirectly takes part in the JSEC by sending Bureau Director-General class officials to the Planning Committee as observers."⁶⁹

However, as those in the business circles recognize, although the "principal actor" in the economic policy towards the Soviet Union is the *Zaikai*, the "director" (final decision-maker) should be seen as the government. The case of "economic measures" (the word "sanction" is not officially used) against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reveals who wields the real power in Japanese economic policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union. To quote an economist, "as part of the economic measures, the government imposed restrictions on the personnel exchanges between Japan and the Soviet Union including the JSEC, as well as on trade and bank loans. In this case, the officials of the three ministries concerned met with the *Zaikai* leaders and conveyed their informal consensus to postpone the ninth session of the JSEC. The *Zaikai* leaders

cooperated with the government, judging that even they should not override the government. As a result, the ninth joint session of the JSEC was suspended for five years until 1984. This case clearly indicates the dual nature of the JSEC, which is led by the private sector but it is subject to government pressure."⁷⁰

The economic sanctions reveal not only that the government wields power over the *Zaikai*, but also that the government is not a monolith either. Although an official said that "MITI and the MOF agree with the MFA on the general framework,"⁷¹ inter-bureaucratic differences on how to formulate Japanese economic policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union do exist. The MFA regards its primary mandate as cooperation with the U.S. and supported the sanctions. MITI, on the other hand, is "reluctant about such measures. Although it is part of the government, it stands for the economic interests of the Japanese private sector. Its *raison d'être* is to expand trade."⁷² MITI perceives that, "given the stalemate of the Northern Territories issue, improving economic relations with the Soviet Union within the framework of the Prime Minister's basic policy would serve Japan's national interests better."⁷³ As for the MOF, "the *Yugin* [Japan Export and Import Bank] would like to lend more to the Soviet Union since it is a good debtor and repays on schedule."⁷⁴ For that matter, "although the *Keidanren* is not part of the government, its high-ranking officials cannot express pessimistic prospects for

Japan-Soviet economic relations either; because the Soviet Union takes their views as Japanese official views."⁷⁵

On the part of the private sector, economists note that "they have in principle no reservations about doing business with the Soviet Union. They cannot do business if they have to take national interests into consideration. Because of the intense competition for market share among themselves ('competition below the surface') they are desperate and do not have the luxury of thinking of the national interests."⁷⁶ "The big *shōshas* side with the Soviet Union because their connections with the Soviet Union last longer than those with manufacturers. Their risks involved are smaller because they are the middlemen between the manufacturers and the Soviet Union. In comparison, manufacturers have to agree to severe conditions for construction of plants and pay penalties for delays even if the fault lies with the Soviet Union. Also their contacts with the Soviet Union end with the completion of the specific contracts. Because of its centralized economic system, it is profitable for big *shōshas* to make business deals with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union ranks highest for *per capita* volume of deals for the Japanese businessmen abroad."⁷⁷ Yet, according to an economist, "big *shōshas* generally follow the 'administrative guidance' because they have the capacity to consider national interests. They also weigh the significance of their deals to the U.S. In comparison,

the 'yūkō shōsha' ['friendly trading companies' with the Soviet Union] do not always follow the guidance because they are desperate. Their businesses are small. They 'specialize' in trade with the Soviet Union and do not have deals with the U.S."⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the revelation in May 1987 of the "Toshiba Machine Company Incident" shows a different picture. The Toshiba Machine Company (one of Toshiba's subsidiaries), along with Kongsberg (a Norwegian national company), sold a milling machine to the Soviet Union in violation of the COCOM restrictions. It caused heated discussions on trade sanctions against Toshiba by the U.S., which alleged that the sales have made Soviet submarine propellers quieter and harder to detect. The fact that Toshiba (as its parent company) and C. Ito Trading Company (as its intermediary) were involved in this indicates that even the biggest *shōsha* and manufacturer violate MITI's administrative guidance. Yet, this incident is considered to be only "the tip of the iceberg."

Under these circumstances, an MFA official said that "the MFA tries to coordinate interests between the Japanese private sector and the U.S., urging on the former the importance of unity in the Western alliance. If the MFA persuades MITI and the MOF to comply, the private sector will then follow suit. Under U.S. pressure, the government dissuaded the private sector from participating in Siberian projects, as part of the economic measures against the

Soviet Afghan invasion and the Polish suppression."⁷⁹ Thus the economic sanctions revealed the "dual nature"⁸⁰ of the decision-making system, in which the MFA wields more power than the economically related bureaucracies.

Economists explain that the reasons why Japanese economic decision-making vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is done in this way is "not because the government is unable to coordinate the private sector's interests."⁸¹ It is because "it is made under unique Japan-Soviet political relations. The government does not want to get involved in the decision-making. Insofar as the government wanted to avoid direct involvement, there was no other way but to use the device [the JSEC]."⁸² In other words, the government was adopting the covert *seikei bunri* (separation of politics from economics) principle. It avoided direct involvement in the economic policy, while holding the reins on the business circles behind the scenes in the form of "administrative guidance." "Yoshinari Kawai, who led the first Japanese economic mission to the Soviet Union, went to Moscow in 1962 as a private citizen, even independent of the *Keidanren*. Since then, a number of Japanese economic missions have gone to Moscow, led by the *Zaikai* leaders. Among others, the Kawai (1962), Nagano (1965), and Uemura (1965) Missions were important because they were led by the most influential business leaders. The Soviet side received them as official Japanese decision-makers. They met top Soviet decision-makers from Khrushchev down. The

JSEC was created by the *Zaikai* in 1965 with at least the acquiescence of the three ministries concerned."⁸³

The *seikei bunri* principle was made overt "when Prime Minister Tanaka officially advocated it for the first time in the 1970's in the aftermath of the oil crises. Under this principle, the government gave the private sector virtually a free hand in negotiations with the Soviet Union."⁸⁴ The *seikei bunri* method worked well insofar as Japan-Soviet economic relations were small and do not have an impact on their political-security relations. In fact, Japan-Soviet economic relations have remained minor. "They have never exceeded 4% even in the détente period when Prime Minister Tanaka avowedly advocated the principle."⁸⁵

However, with the advent of the high-tech age, the nature of Japan-Soviet economic relations has changed. The government has come to adopt a diametrically opposite policy in the mid-1980's, called the *seikei fukabun* (indivisibility of politics from economics) principle. It claims unequivocally that no separation of politics from economics is allowed. It links political issues (the Northern Territories issue) with economic policy. "This became evident when Foreign Minister Abe and Chairman Anzai of the JSEC, for the first time in the history of the JSEC, referred to the Northern Territories issue at the ninth session of the JSEC Joint Committee held in Tokyo in 1984."⁸⁶ Now MITI also "acknowledges that no economic relations can exist without political relations. It has

guided the Japanese business circles to do business with the Soviet Union within the framework of the territorial issue."⁸⁷ Thus, the government "invisible hands" became "visible." The recent Toshiba Machine Company incident made the shift irreversible. It was a severe blow to the Japanese business circles, resulting in the suspension of the eleventh session of the Joint JSEC (scheduled to be held in Tokyo in 1987) and in a political fuss over the trade sanctions against Toshiba in the U.S. Congress.

2. Identification of Japanese Foreign Policy

Elites with Respect to the Soviet Union

a) Identification of Japanese Foreign Policy


Decision-Makers

Based upon the examination above, the following identification for the Japanese foreign policy decision-makers towards the Soviet Union can be made.

First, the Prime Minister is the formal top decision-maker, followed by the Foreign Minister and the Cabinet Secretary-General. The MFA is the actual decision-maker. Other Ministries such as MITI and the JDA work in unison with the MFA. Although the *Keidanren* formulates Japanese economic policy towards the Soviet Union, it is "not a stronghold of that policy making."⁸⁸ It is in effect held on a leash by the government.

Second, "within the MFA, the Eurasian Bureau

Figure 2: Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making Flow with regards to the Soviet Union



Sources: *Shokuinroku* (Directory of Government Personnel, 1988 ed.), Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance, 1987, pp. 465-469, and Haruhiro Fukui, "Policy-Making in the Japanese Foreign Ministry," in Robert Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, pp. 7-10.

Director-General, the Eurasian Bureau Deputy Director-General, and the Soviet Union Division Director draft policy. This then goes to the LDP's Policy Research Council and to the Prime Minister."⁸⁹ More precisely, "the central decision-maker is the Soviet Union Division Director. Only those who have resided earlier in the Soviet Union are appointed as Soviet Union Division Director. For the Eurasian Bureau Director-General, this is not necessarily so. The standing members of the decision-making group are the five officials in the Soviet Union Division from the Division Director down."⁹⁰

According to some outside the MFA, "it is an MFA policy to alternate the post of the Soviet Union Division Director between a hardliner and a moderate at every personnel change, to soften the image of the Division. Among those who served as the Soviet Union Division Director, Hiroshi Arai [Information Analysis, Research & Planning Bureau Director-General] and Minoru Tamba [Consul-General in Boston] are regarded as hardliners; Nagao Hyodo [Minister to the U.S.] and Hiroshi Shigeta [Soviet Union Division Director] are moderates."⁹¹

They also note that the Ambassador and the counselors in the Soviet Union "do not directly participate in the decision-making process at headquarters." "Their function is primary information-gathering."⁹² "The MFA sends its Ambassador to Moscow with a higher rank than that to Washington. However, it is intended to make the pretense

that the MFA is conducting foreign policy towards the Soviet Union seriously. Actually, there is no room for the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to play a role in the decision-making. He is prohibited from being interviewed by the Soviet authorities. His functions are limited to information gathering and submission of proposals made by the MFA in Tokyo."⁹³

Some foreign affairs bureaucrats on the moderate side emphasize the prime importance of the international system in foreign policy decision-making. They hold that "it is presumptuous to say that foreign affairs bureaucrats make foreign policy. The foreign policy elites can implement foreign policy, but cannot make it alone. The dynamics of the balance of power in the international system is the real determinant of foreign policy. Postwar Japan's foreign policy is determined by the relative power of Japan in the U.S.-Soviet bipolar system."⁹⁴

Some in the center and those on the left stress the influence of the U.S. and even think that "the White House is the actual decision-maker for Japan's foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union."⁹⁵ Some said that "in the postwar era, the LDP took a pragmatic course and solved urgent foreign policy issues in ways that were acceptable to the U.S. Because of President Eisenhower's pressure, Japan changed the definition of the Northern Territories from two islands to four islands in the 1950's. In 1956, Japan did not conclude a peace treaty with the

Soviet Union because the U.S. did not want Japan to solve the Northern Territories issue at that point."⁹⁶

Regarding more recent events, "after Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Japan in January 1986, Reagan sent a special envoy to Japan to complain that Japan had welcomed Shevardnadze too well. He demanded that Japan act with self-restraint and not overrun the framework of the U.S.-Soviet 'Geneva Pre-Summit' of November 1985. Foreign Minister Kuranari had to visit the U.S. in December 1986 because Japan and the U.S. had not yet worked out an agreement on Gorbachev's possible visit to Japan. In essence, the MFA is unable to make decisions without consultation with the U.S."⁹⁷

In this sense, whoever becomes the Soviet Union Division Director, the MFA's basic policy towards the Soviet Union cannot be significantly different. The framework of Japan-U.S. relations in the U.S.-Soviet bipolar system makes the MFA intrinsically a hardliner vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

b) Identification of Japanese Foreign Policy

"Influentials"

As examined earlier, there are few big pressure groups on the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in Japan because of the estranged Japan-Soviet relations and the unpopularity of the Soviet Union. Thus there are few influentials on the Japanese foreign policy towards the

Soviet Union who wield real power in the decision-making. On the contrary, the U.S. is considered a more powerful influential, if not the decision-maker. Some in the MFA admit that "the White House exerts significant influence on the Japanese foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union."⁹⁸ Providing that their influence is limited, the following identification of the influentials on the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union can be made. (For the complete list of the influentials, see Appendix III).

i) Nakasone's "Brains"

Due to his preference to be a powerful "presidential Prime Minister," "Prime Minister Nakasone strengthened the U.S. type private advisory system and used 'brains' more often than his predecessors as his immediate influentials. This shifted the decision-making power center from the LDP's Policy Research Council to the Prime Minister."⁹⁹ In security matters, "members of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) are influential."¹⁰⁰ These are:

- Kiichi Saeki, Vice-President of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and a former Director-General of the JDA's National Institute for Defense Studies, and a RIPS Director. Saeki "submits recommendations to the Prime Minister (through the Cabinet Secretary-General) as the Chairman of the Study Group on the International Situation for the Cabinet Research

Office, an advisory committee to Prime Minister Nakasone. He also frequently discusses Soviet affairs with the MFA officials."¹⁰¹

—Masataka Kosaka, Professor at Kyoto University, a Director of the IISS and the RIPS Director-General, chairs the Study Group on Peace, a private advisory committee for defense policy to Prime Minister Nakasone. .

—Seizaburo Sato, Professor at the University of Tokyo, a RIPS Director, is another leading member of various advisory committees for Prime Minister Nakasone, including those for defense and policy innovation.

Second, Ichiro Suetsugu, one of the most ardent activists of the Northern Territories reversion is referred to as a "gray eminence" for Prime Minister Nakasone in Soviet foreign affairs."¹⁰² Suetsugu organizes a Study Group on Security Issues of his own, which started out as a Study Group on the Okinawa U.S. Base in 1968. (He was a "behind-the-curtains" figure for the reversion of Okinawa Island from the U.S. on the conditions of "no nuclear weapons and the same treatment as the Japanese mainland."¹⁰³) After the realization of the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, Suetsugu shifted his interests to the reversion of the Northern Territories as the last remaining postwar settlement, and developed channels with the Soviet Union. Now, "he can make contact with the Soviet Union without the intervention of the MFA. He maintained contact with the Soviet Union even when Japan-Soviet relations were

deadlocked after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan."¹⁰⁴ He also "directly warned Prime Minister Nakasone that the attitude of the Prime Minister and the MFA, of begging Gorbachev to visit Japan, would end up in a repeat of Prime Minister Hatoyama's failure. He advised that Nakasone should just wait for Gorbachev's move."¹⁰⁵

"The Japan-Soviet Specialists Conferences that Suetsugu organizes are the highest-level academic exchanges on political and security issues between Japan and the Soviet Union. They have been held annually in Japan and the Soviet Union alternately since 1973."¹⁰⁶ "The Soviet side participants have included such high-ranking Soviet officials and scholars of the Soviet Academy of Sciences as Prime Minister Kosygin, Deputy Prime Minister Maruchuk, Inozemtzev (Director-General of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, IMEMO), Primakov (IMEMO Director-General), and Arbatov (Director-General of the Institute for American and Canadian Studies). The Japanese side has included Directors and Research Associates of the RIPS."¹⁰⁷

If Suetsugu is Nakasone's gray eminence in his Soviet diplomacy, "Ryuzo Sejima is his gray eminence in Korean foreign affairs."¹⁰⁸ "Sejima was a former Kanto Army staff officer in Manchuria and was interned in Siberia for eleven years until 1956. After being returned from Siberia, Sejima worked for and became the President of the C. Ito Trading Company, one of the largest *sōgō shōsha* in Japan,

[which was involved in the Toshiba Machine Company incident, and also was charged with trading with Vietnam]. He developed connections with the LDP leaders, as an influential business leader (currently he is Advisor Emeritus to the C. Ito Company, and Special Advisor both to the Japan Chamber of Commerce and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce). He organized the *AF kai* (Advisory Friend Group), a private advisory group on foreign policy for Prime Minister Nakasone. He is also a member of other private advisory committees for Prime Minister Nakasone, including the Study Group on Security."¹⁰⁹

ii) Influentials on the MFA

Some retired Russian service diplomats are still thought to wield influence on the MFA on Soviet foreign affairs. In particular:

—Akira Sono, former Ambassador to West Germany, and the Soviet Union Division Director under Prime Minister Yoshida, is a well known hardliner towards the Soviet Union. Sono opposed the Japanese alliance with Nazi Germany in World War II, and had consistently advocated alliance with the U.S. Sono is currently active as a foreign affairs critic.

—Shinsaku Hogen, the former Permanent Vice-Minister, Ambassador to Austria, and Eurasian Bureau Director-General, is a peer of Sono, and is known as an intellectual leader of the anti-Soviets in Japan. After

retirement from the MFA, Hogen became the President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and is currently the Secretary-General of the Research Institute for Japan's National Policy.

iii) Northern Territories Lobbyists

Lobbyists for the Northern Territories reversion should not be forgotten for the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union as special influentials on the LDP. The local government of Hokkaido (where the majority of the former islanders on the Northern Territories fled after having been forced out by the Soviet Union) "have some influence in terms of the Northern Territories reversion and fishing matters."¹¹⁰ In particular:

- the Governor of Hokkaido
- the Mayor of Nemuro City (the closest coastal city to the Northern Territories on Hokkaido). "The Habomai Island Group belonged administratively to Nemuro City before the Soviet occupation, while the other three islands were governed as villages."¹¹¹

iv) Political Parties

Among the political parties, there no longer exist such powerful influentials as Ichiro Kono, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries for Prime Minister Hatoyama. Kono was influential in the peace treaty negotiations in 1956, "to the extent that he directly

negotiated with the Soviet Union, even excluding Ambassador Niiseki. He was driven by immediate interests (the salmon catch), and was referred to as 'having sold the Northern Territories for fish'."112 Since Tatsunosuke Takasaki (the Japan Fisheries Association President, a Dietman, and MITI Minister) who wielded power in fisheries negotiations until the early 1960's, no such influentials have existed.113

In the ruling LDP:

—Yoshio Sakurauchi (H.R.), former Foreign Minister is President of the Japan-Soviet Parliamentary Friendship Association.

—Ichiro Hatoyama (H.C.), son of Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, and former Foreign Minister, is Vice-President of the Japan-Soviet Parliamentary Friendship Association and of the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society (supported by the JSP). Hatoyama regards himself as a "bridge between Japan and the Soviet Union. It is problem for the ruling party not to have any group that works for improvement of Japan-Soviet relations, while the opposition parties are doing this systematically as party policy. Hirohide Ishida was active, but it was on an individual basis [who was then ousted from the Diet as being pro-Soviet]."114

—Munenori Akagi (H.R.), former JDA Director-General and Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister "developed connections with the Soviet Union when he was the Agricultural Minister. Akagi is the President of the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society, which was founded by Prime

Minister Hatoyama in 1956. It is supported by the JSP and has a branch in Osaka, with its main activities being cultural and scientific exchanges."¹¹⁵

—Tokuma Utsunomiya (H.C.), is active in the disarmament movement and has his own research institute for disarmament.

In the opposition parties:

—Shigeyoshi Matsumae, former JSP Dietman (H.R.) is the founder of the Japanese Cultural Association. Its purpose is to promote academic exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. "Matsumae pressures the government without hesitation, due to his financial power and connections with the Soviet Union."¹¹⁶

—Daisaku Ikeda, founder of the *Sōka gakkai* and the *Kōmeitō* (the Clean Government Party), has connections with the Soviet Union.¹¹⁷

Here, it is useful to list all five Japan-Soviet friendship organizations in Japan, established for general purposes.

- 1) the Japan-Soviet Parliamentary Friendship Association
- 2) the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society (the JSP)
- 3) the Japanese Cultural Association (the JSP)
- 4) the Japan-Soviet Society (the JCP), which "has local branches in each prefecture nationwide. President Takeshige Ishiguro was a LDP Dietman [H.R., Minister of State, and Secretary-General of the Democratic Party in the 1940's], who developed ties with the Soviet Union through

trade."118

5) the Japan-Soviet Exchange Society, "a splinter of the Japan-Soviet Society, separated in order to be free from the JCP's thoughts and creeds."119

"These organizations (except for the Japan-Soviet Society because of its ties with the JCP), sponsor Japan-Soviet Roundtable Conferences, along with the Japan-Soviet Trade Association."120

Some on the right believe that these friendship organizations which prominent politicians represent are "overt agents for the KGB's disinformation operations."121

v) Business Circles

Similarly, "there were some powerful influentials in business circles in the 1970's, who promoted Japan-Soviet economic relations. They died one by one, and currently there no longer exist such powerful influentials as in the 1970's."122 "From the late 1960's to the early 1970's when Japan's economy was expanding, business circles became interested in the Soviet Union, especially Siberia, as a new market and as a new base for economic development. Along with this increased economic interest, the *Zaikai* leaders wielded some influence."123

Most influentials were:

—Yoshinari Kawai, Dietman (H.R.) and Minister of Health and Welfare. "Having being deprived of his public post in the 'public service purge' by the U.S. Occupation Army,

Kawai founded Komatsu Ltd., a bulldozer manufacturer.

Kawai and MITI Minister Takasaki were close friends and they foresaw the need to develop a new market for Japan. Since Takasaki had visited China, Kawai (although he was interested in China, too) led the first Japanese Economic Mission to the Soviet Union in 1962."¹²⁴

—Shigeo Nagano, President Emeritus of New Japan Steel, and President of both the Japan Chamber of Commerce and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, acted as the Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Joint Economic Committee.

"They were men of strong personality, so that they forced their will upon the government."¹²⁵ However, "even so, with the share of the Soviet Union in Japan's total trade never having exceeded 4%, their influence was only that much at most."¹²⁶ Furthermore, even that limited influence of the business leaders has diminished in the 1980's. This is so because of the loss of attractiveness of Siberian development projects, the imposition of the more severe COCOM restrictions, and the lack of "monstrous"¹²⁷ figures like the late Nagano in the current business circles. Also, "the current anti-Soviet sentiment makes Japanese business leaders cautious about articulating their interests in the Soviet Union."¹²⁸ They remember that Nagano's house was attacked by the ultra-rightists. The disclosure of the Toshiba Machine Company incident made Japanese business leaders even more cautious.

Under these circumstances, present influentials with limited influence are:

—Hiroki Imazato, President of Overseas Petroleum Development, and Advisor to the *Nikkeiren* (Japan Federation of Employers).

—Hiroshi Anzai, President of Tokyo Gas, and Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Joint Economic Committee.

—Ryoichi Kawai, son of Yoshinari Kawai, President of Komatsu Ltd. It has a big stake in trade with the Soviet Union, given the large-scale Japan-Soviet Forest Resources Development Project in Siberia. Komatsu exports bulldozers and other earth-moving machines to the Soviet Union, and Japan imports timber (which constitutes "40% of the total Japanese imports from the Soviet Union)."129

vi) Academic Circles

The Soviet specialists in academic circles have little influence on the foreign policy decision-makers. This is partly because they "do not want to get involved in politics."130 Thus, "certain scholars often overlap as advisory members of the Prime Minister's Cabinet Research Office and of his private advisory councils."131 Some on the right think that these *goyō gakusha* are "bandwagoning with the mainstream in the LDP."132

vii) Mass Media

"The mass media hardly influence the Japanese foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union. The mass media have influence on public opinion, but public opinion marginally influences the decision-making."¹³³ "The usual decision-making process in Japan is composed of a tripolar structure. Public opinion joins the mass media (a traditional anti-establishment force), to work as a brake against the government. However, in the case of the foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union, public opinion sides with the government because of the national consensus on the Northern Territories issue."¹³⁴

As a final remark on the influentials, there is a consensus that, although "influentials try to exert influence on the foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union, their power is limited and far from decisive."¹³⁵ This gives a virtual monopoly on the decision-making power to the Soviet Union Division of the MFA. Their limited influence is even decreasing. As examined above, economic interest in the Soviet Union, the only tangible field in Japan-Soviet relations, has declined. "Influentials, such as Munenori Akagi, Hirohide Ishida, and Shigeyoshi Matsumae have already retired from the front line."¹³⁶

3. Identification of the Spectrum of Ideologies

a) Definition of the Spectrum of Ideologies in Japan

Before identifying the spectrum of ideologies, it should be noted that objective categorization of perceptions is extremely difficult because perceptions are by nature subjective. Thus, the danger with simple categorization in the study of perceptions should be duly understood. For example, an academic Soviet specialist is "labelled as hawkish from the left wing, but as dovish from the right wing."¹³⁷ With due respect for this point, the following definitions for the spectrum of ideologies in Japan vis-à-vis the Soviet Union can tentatively be made.

i) Right

- hardliners within the conservative camp,
- extremely anti-Soviet and anti-communist,
- regarding cooperation with the U.S. as a prerequisite for the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and as sufficient,
- protagonists of the *iriguchi ron* (the entrance theory): unless the Soviet Union returns the Northern Territories, Japan will not improve the relations with the Soviet Union, the "all the Northern Territories or nothing" theory,
- seeing the Soviet military threat to Japan as real,
- regarding a substantial increase in Japan's defense

capabilities as mandatory,

- placing a defense build-up at a higher priority than the return of the Northern Territories,

- advocating revision of the constitution,

- strictly linking the economic policy towards the Soviet Union with political and security considerations: the *seikei fukabun gensoku*, the principle of indivisibility of politics from economics.

ii) Right of Center

- moderate within the conservative camp,

- moderately anti-Soviet, and anti-communist,

- regarding cooperation with the U.S. as a prerequisite for the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, but seeing a more autonomous and flexible approach with the Soviet Union as necessary,

- advocating looser application of the *iriguchi ron*,

- regarding the Soviet threat as indirect,

- considering gradual and moderate increases in Japan's defense capabilities as necessary and sufficient,

- placing the return of the Northern Territories at a higher priority than a defense build-up,

- seeing revision of the constitution as unnecessary,

- advocating a looser linkage policy in economic relations.

iii) Center

- Neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Soviet, but anti-communist
- regarding the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as necessary,
- considering the present defense budget as adequate,
- defending the constitution,
- advocating a "selective" linkage policy.

iv) Left of Center

- moderately pro-Soviet, but not pro-communist,
- accepting the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,
- regarding accommodation and coexistence with the Soviet Union as necessary,
- a proponent of the *deguchi ron* (the exit theory): if Japan-Soviet relations improve through economic cooperation and cultural exchanges, the Soviet Union might return the Northern Territories in the end, a "spill-over" theory,
- seeing the Soviet threat as minor,
- considering the SDF as a "necessary evil,"
- advocating an economic policy towards the Soviet Union separate from politics: nonlinkage policy based on the *seikei bunri gensoku*, the principle of divisibility of politics from economics.

v) Left

- anti-establishment "progressive camp,"
- pro-Soviet and pro-communist,
- advocating repealing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,

- calling for an accommodation with the Soviet Union,
- proponents of the *deguchi ron*,
- asserting an "unarmed neutrality" policy, by which Japan would disband its SDF and ally itself with neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union,
- a proponent of the nonlinkage policy.

b) Identification of Japanese Foreign Policy

Elites According to the Spectrum of Ideologies

Because of the relative conformity within each professional group for the position in the spectrum of ideologies (which does not preclude individual differences in perceptions within a certain group), the following general identification of the Japanese foreign policy elites according to the spectrum of ideologies can tentatively be made. However, with due respect for the sensitivity of categorizing individuals by the spectrum of ideologies, as mentioned earlier, a listing of individual Japanese foreign policy elites by the spectrum of ideology is not made in this dissertation.

i) Right

- hardliners in the MFA
- "uniformed" officers in the JDA
- hawkish LDP Diet members
- some military-strategic specialists
- the *Sankei Shimbun* (newspaper) and the *Fuji TV* (network)

ii) Right of Center

- moderates in the MFA
- military-strategic specialists in the JDA (civilians)
- the majority of the LDP Diet members
- the Democratic-Socialist Party
- some security specialists in academic circles
- the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (newspaper) and the *Nippon TV*

iii) Center

- MITI
- the *Kōmeitō* (the Clean Government Party)
- some Soviet specialists in academic circles
- the *NHK* (network) and the *Mainichi Shimbun* (newspaper)

iv) Left of Center

- Business circles
- the *Asahi Shimbun* (newspaper) and the *Asahi TV* (network)

v) Left

- mainstream in the JSP, and the JCP
- some Soviet scholars, and pacifist scholars
- Japan-Soviet friendship associations

Before examining the Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union, it is useful to give an overview of the history of relations between Japan and Russia-Soviet Union.

Notes

1. The numbers of seats are the results of the July 1986 bicameral election of the Diet.
2. These numbers of seats are the results of the July 1986 bicameral election of the Diet.
3. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
4. For a detailed examination of the characteristics of the Japanese decision-making style rooted in cultural values, see Hideo Sato, "Misperceptions Across the Pacific," in I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, Pricilla Clapp, and Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing An Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976, pp. 101-108.
5. Hideo Sato, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
6. Shinkichi Eto, "Foreign Policy Formation in Japan," *The Japan Interpreter*, Vol. X, Nos. 3-4, Winter 1976, pp. 255-256.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Chihiro Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan," *World Politics*, Spring 1974, p. 363.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 357-367.
10. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
11. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
12. Shinkichi Eto, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
13. Interview, October 20, 1986.
14. Haruhiro Fukui, "Policy-Making in the Japanese Foreign Ministry," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, pp. 11-12, quoting his interview with an MFA official.
15. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
16. Haruo Wada, "Kyōtsū ichiji o pasu shita Nakasone gaikō" ("Nakasone's Diplomacy that Has Passed the First National College Entrance Examination"), in "Sono Akira

no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 30, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 6, June 1986, p. 219.

17. Tadae Takubo, "'Kokueki' o wasureta gaimu kanryō tachi" ("Foreign Affairs Bureaucrats Who Have Forgotten Japan's 'National Interests'"), *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 2, November 1986, p. 53.
18. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
19. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
20. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
21. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
22. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
23. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.
24. Haruhiro Fukui and I. M. Destler, "Foreign Policymaking in Japan and the United States," in I. M. Destler, et al., *Managing An Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976, p. 57.
25. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.
26. Tadae Takubo, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
28. Shinkichi Eto, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
30. Tadae Takubo, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 38 (quoting Seizaburo Sato), and 48-49.
32. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
33. Shinkichi Eto, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
34. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Tadae Takubo, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.
37. Shinkichi Eto, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

38. *Ibid.*
39. Interview, Tokyo, November 10, 1986.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Interview, Tokyo, November 21, 1986.
42. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.
43. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
46. Haruhiro Fukui and I. M. Destler, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
47. Jun Eto, "Jizoku aru gaikō koso" ("The Importance of Consistency in Foreign Policy"), in "Sengo taisei o ikani koreruka" ("How to Overcome the Postwar System"), *Shokun*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1985, p. 41, (emphasis added).
48. Interview, October 28, 1986.
49. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
50. Interview, Japan, November 8, 1986.
51. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
52. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Interview, Tokyo, October 25, 1986.
55. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
56. Shinkichi Eto, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
58. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.
59. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
60. Kenichi Ito, "Nakasone taiso gaikō e no chūmon" ("Recommendations for Nakasone's Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union"), *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 64, No. 12, December 1986, pp. 110-111.

61. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
62. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
63. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
64. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
65. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
66. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
67. Detailed examinations of the process of negotiations are made in a memoir of Plenipotentiary Shunichi Matsumoto, *Mosukuwa ni kakeru niji: Nisso kokkō kaifuku hiwa* (*Rainbow Across Moscow: The Secret Story of the Resumption of Japan-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*), Tokyo: Asahi Shuppan sha, 1966, and in Donald Hellemann, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.
68. Interview, Tokyo, November 4, 1986.
69. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
70. Interview, Tokyo, November 4, 1986.
71. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
72. Interview, Tokyo, November 4, 1986.
73. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
74. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
75. Interview, Tokyo, November 4, 1986.
76. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
77. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
78. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
79. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
80. Interview, Tokyo, November 4, 1986.
81. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
82. Interview, Tokyo, November 4, 1986.

83. *Ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*
85. *Ibid.*
86. Kimbara, Kazuyuki, "Nisso Shiberia kaihatsu kyōryoku no kaikō to tembō" ("Retrospect and Prospect for Japan-Soviet Siberian Development Cooperation"), in JIIA, ed., *Tenkanki no Soren (Soviet Union in Transition)*, Tokyo: JIIA, 1986, p. 321.
87. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
88. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
89. Interview, Tokyo, October 25, 1986.
90. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
91. Interview, Tokyo, October 25, 1986, (incumbent posts are as of October 1986 when the interviews were conducted).
92. Haruhiro Fukui, *op. cit*, p. 14.
93. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
94. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
95. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
96. Interview, Tokyo, November 20, 1986.
97. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
98. Interviews, Tokyo, November 7 and 18, 1986.
99. Interview, Japan, October 15, 1986.
100. *Ibid.*
101. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
102. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
103. This is recounted in Ichiro Suetsugu's memoir, '*Sengo' e no chōsen (The Challenge to the 'Postwar Settlement')*', Tokyo: Ōru Shuppan, 1981.
104. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
105. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.

106. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
107. "Anzen hoshō mondai kenkyu kai ni tsuide" (Pamphlet: "History of the Study Group on Security Issues"), pp. 3-7.
108. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
109. Shioda Ushio, "'Daini no Yasuoka Masaatsu' to made tatematsurarete: Tōshindai no Sejima Ryuzo (Ito-chū sōdanyaku) kiremono densetsu no kyojitsu o hagu" ("Looked up to as a 'Second Masaatsu Yasuoka': The Life-Size Ryuzo Sejima, C. Ito's Advisor Emeritus: To Reveal the Truth of the Legend of an Able Man"), Gendai, Vol. 21, No. 1, February, 1986, pp. 80-94.
110. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
111. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
112. Interview, Tokyo, October 25, 1986.
113. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
114. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
115. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
116. Interview, Tokyo, October 27, 1986.
117. Interviews, Tokyo, October 21 and November 5, 1986.
118. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
119. *Ibid.*
120. *Ibid.*
121. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
122. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
123. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
124. Interview, Tokyo, November 12, 1986.
125. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
126. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
127. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
128. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.

129. See figures in Keisuke Suzuki, "Nisso bōeki to anzen hoshō" ("Japan-Soviet Trade and Security") in Hiroshi Kimura, Tatsuo Kaneda, and Keisuke Suzuki, (JIIA, ed.), *Gakusetsu no Soren (Soviet Union in Paradox)*, Tokyo: Ningen no kagaku sha, 1985, p. 246.
130. Interview, Japan, October 15, 1986.
131. *Ibid.*
132. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
133. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
134. Interview, Japan, October 30, 1986.
135. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
136. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
137. Interview, Tokyo, November 14, 1986.

Chapter III. History of Japan-Russia Relations and Japan-Soviet Relations

1. Japan-Russia Relations until the Russo-Japanese War

a) Unofficial Relations during the Edo Period and the Conclusion of the Shimoda Treaty: 18th Century-1855

Japan and Russia-Soviet Union have had more than 130 years of official relations, which began in 1855 when both countries signed the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation. However, the unofficial contacts with Russia date back as far as the mid-Edo period in the 18th Century. The first Japanese encounters with Russia occurred in the early 18th Century, when Russians began to appear in Japan's home waters via Siberia. This led some enlightened Japanese in the late 18th Century to foresee the need for Japanese coastal defense.¹ Most notably, Shihei Hayashi published *Kaikoku Heidan* (*A Discourse on Defense of a Sea Nation*), in which he urged the need for Japan's sea defense against the southward progress of Russian warships. Hayashi was sentenced to house imprisonment in 1792 as having falsely alarmed the people by the Tokugawa Shogunate government,² that was indulging in an "isolationist policy."

However, the prophecies of the "alarmists" proved correct.³ In the same year that Hayashi was imprisoned and

his book banned, Tsarina Catherine II's envoy Laksman called at Nemuro to demand that Japan begin trade. The Shogunate government rejected the demand, but Russia did not give up.⁴ Another envoy Rezanov visited Nagasaki with the same demand in 1804. It was rejected again. With these Russian moves, the Shogunate ordered a strengthening of the northern guard. However, Russians landed and plundered the Japanese northern colonies, including Sakhalin, Kunashiri, and Etorofu Islands in 1806, which resulted in the first armed clash between Japan and Russia.⁵ The Shogunate government prepared for war and issued a "decree to beat off Russian ships." A Japanese garrison captured Lieutenant Commander Golovnin of a Russian military ship *Diana*, which had stayed at Kunashiri Island in 1811, and detained him. With the wisdom of the merchant Kahei Takadaya who volunteered to become a hostage as a trade-off for Golovnin, this incident was settled in 1813. After the release of Golovnin, the tension between Japan and Russia subsided for the moment.⁶


However, it was not only Russia that demanded trade with Japan, but also the U.S. and England, as their whale hunting ships needed fuel and provisions from Japan.⁷ The U.S. Commodore Perry made a visit to Uraga in 1853 and threatened Japan with four "Black Ships." This was followed by the Russian envoy Putyatin's visit to Nagasaki. When Perry visited Japan again with seven Black Ships in 1854, Japan finally broke its isolation and opened

trade with the U.S. The opening of trade with Russia followed suit during the second of Putyatin's visits to Shimoda in 1855 with the conclusion of the Japan-Russia Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation (the Shimoda Treaty).⁸ Thus official relations between Japan and Russia began. The Shimoda Treaty defined the border to lie between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu; Etorofu belonged to Japan, and Uruppu and the other Kurile Islands to the north of Uruppu belonging to Russia.⁹ (See Figure 3.) Since they could not reach an agreement on Sakhalin, it was left as a joint possession.

b) Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Russo-Japanese War: 1855-1904

After the conclusion of the Shimoda Treaty, Japan-Russia relations remained relatively calm. However, the fact remains that Russia threatened Japan by stationing the Russian military ship *Posadonik* on Tsushima Island for more than half a year in 1861.¹⁰ In 1868, the feudalistic Tokugawa Shogunate government which had lasted for nearly three hundred years was overthrown. A new regime under the Emperor Meiji was established, and the capital was moved from Kyoto to Tokyo (the Meiji Restoration). The Meiji government set up two national policies: the modernization of Japan and a build-up of national defense. Vis-à-vis Russia, "how to preserve Japan's national security against

Figure 3: Map of Japan and the Northern Territories



Source: Northern Territories Association,
Japan's Northern Territories, Tokyo:
 Northern Territories Association, 1974

the Russian threat became an important foreign policy issue, as Russia was perceived as the 'archenemy at the north gate' by the Meiji political leaders."¹¹

In addition, "since neither the 1855 Shimoda Treaty nor the 'provisional regulations on Sakhalin' signed in 1867 settled the border demarcation of Sakhalin, this issue was left to the Meiji government as an important foreign policy matter."¹² "The number of Russians who immigrated to Sakhalin increased in the late 1860's, especially to the southern part of the island. The number of disputes between the Japanese and Russian inhabitants there also increased."¹³ As a result, "there was a serious danger of the Japanese population's eventually being driven out by force."¹⁴

Under these circumstances, Japan proposed a plan to divide Sakhalin into northern and southern parts. However, in the end Japan succumbed to the Russian demand for possession of Sakhalin in exchange for the Kurile Islands. Japan's Imperial Minister Buyo Enomoto in St. Petersburg concluded the Treaty of Exchange of Sakhalin Island for the Kurile Island Group in 1875 (St. Petersburg Treaty). By this Japan conceded Sakhalin and acquired all the Kuriles, defined as the eighteen islands from Uruppu northward.¹⁵ "With the Japanese concession, the border demarcation issue between Japan and Russia that had been unsettled for decades finally ended. This contributed to stabilizing their relations."¹⁶

However, when Russia began construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1891 as an avenue for expansion in the Far East, the situation changed.¹⁷ Japanese Russophobia rapidly expanded, which resulted in the "Otsu incident."¹⁸ A Japanese police officer, Sanzo Tsuda, injured the Russian heir apparent, Prince Nicholas, who happened to visit Japan in 1891, in Otsu, near Kyoto. "Japan thought a war might occur and sentenced Tsuda to capital punishment, to avoid Russian retaliation"¹⁹

"After China dropped out of the power struggle in the Far East as a result of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the rivalry between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria intensified."²⁰ Russia, along with Germany and France, intervened in the postwar settlement of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, known as the "Triple Intervention." It demanded that Japan return the Liaotung Peninsula to China ("with its important seaports of Port Arthur and Dairen, which Russia then appropriated for itself").²¹ Japan had used up all its resources in the war and had no more power to reject the intervention.

As a result, Japan was disgraced and enraged,²² and concluded an alliance with England to counter Russia in 1902. Finally, the tension between the two imperialist powers over Korea and Manchuria reached a peak, which culminated in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.²³

2. Japan-Russia and Japan-Soviet Relations until World War II

a) End of Russo-Japanese War and Russian Revolution: 1905-1917

The Russo-Japanese War ended in Japanese victory in 1905, "partly because England and the U.S., which objected to a Russian occupation of Manchuria, supported Japan, and partly because Russia was in the midst of the internal turmoil" of the First Russian Revolution.²⁴ With the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty by the good offices of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, Japan acquired command of Korea, the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, and southern Sakhalin. Japan treated the Russian hostages in the Russo-Japanese War well. The fact that the graves of those who died in Japan have been well maintained up to the present became public knowledge in 1987, as shall be examined later.

"The conclusion of the Japanese-Russian *Entente* in 1907 marked a shift in their relations from confrontation to reconciliation. They split their spheres of interest in Manchuria between the northern half and the southern half, and specified Korea as within Japan's sphere of interest, and Outer Mongolia as within Russia's."²⁵ Subsequently, Japan annexed Korea in 1907. Japan and Russia's pre-World War I cooperative relations were ensured by the conclusion of the Second *Entente* in 1907 and the Third *Entente* in

1912.²⁶

Two years after the Emperor Taisho succeeded to the Imperial reign in 1912, World War I broke out. Russia's fighting a massive war of attrition on the eastern front changed the balance of power between Japan and Russia to the advantage of Japan.²⁷ In its attempt to strengthen wartime cooperation with Japan, Russia requested that it join the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which resulted in the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916.²⁸ "However, this alliance soon collapsed without any substance at the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917."²⁹

b) Russian Revolution and Japan's Siberian

Invasion: 1917-1925

"Tsarist Russia, as Japan's ally, disappeared in the February Revolution in 1917. It was replaced by Bolshevik Russia in the October Revolution, which denied all the treaties and conventions Tsarist Russia had concluded. Thus completely new Japan-Russia relations began."³⁰ While the U.S., England, and France were dispatching armies to support anti-revolutionary regimes in Russia, Japan sent troops to Siberia along with the U.S. in 1918. Japan continued to occupy Eastern Siberia until 1922, even after the other powers had withdrawn in 1920, however, this intervention ended only with Japan's enormous losses both in money and men.³¹

**c) Recognition of the Soviet Union and the
Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty: 1925-1941**

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union by the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet Basic Treaty in 1925 did not change the fundamentally confrontational nature of their relations. On the contrary, "distrust and caution with the Soviet Union grew even stronger among the political leaders, as domestic social unrest intensified and communist activities increased in Japan."³²

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and the occupation of northern Manchuria in 1931, removed the buffer zone between Japan and the Soviet Union, and made their confrontation actual.³³ The conclusion of the Japan-German anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 intensified the tension between Japan and the Soviet Union. It was further increased by the Nomonhan battle, a large-scale border clash on the Manchurian-Outer Mongolian border. The tension reached the brink of all-out war.³⁴ In fact, the border clash "turned into full-fledged warfare, with the first large-scale tank battles in history."³⁵ It ended with total Japanese defeat, which "drove Japan closer to an alliance with Germany and Italy,"³⁶ for fear of the creation of an alliance among the Soviet Union, the U.S., England, and China against Japan.

After the Nomonhan battle, Japan-Soviet relations turned diametrically to wartime cooperation, which resulted

in the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty in 1941.³⁷ However, "the outbreak of the war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941 revealed the fragile basis on which friendly Japan-Soviet relations stood."³⁸

**d) Soviet Violation of the Neutrality Treaty
and its Invasion of the Northern
Territories: 1941-1945**

Just when Japan was about to surrender to the Allied Powers in the final stage of World War II, Stalin accepted Roosevelt's and Churchill's request to join the war against Japan at the secret Yalta Talks. He declared war against Japan on August 9, 1945 in violation of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty. Stalin, "regarding it as a reprisal for the Russo-Japanese War,"³⁹ invaded Manchuria, North Korea, and southern Sakhalin, and committed massacre and plunders there. However, the Soviet Union did not stop at just this reprisal war. "It went on to occupy the Kurile Islands (that belonged to Japan), even after the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945."⁴⁰ "It completed its occupation of the 'Northern Territories' [Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomais, and Shikotan Islands] by September 2, 1945. The Soviet Union incorporated southern Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and the Northern Territories into the Soviet territory in February 1946. Subsequently, it revised its federal constitution to make these territories part of the Sakhalin State."⁴¹

Moreover, "out of 2,720,000 Japanese in Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands, the Soviet Union took 1,070,000 Japanese, both soldiers and civilians, to Siberia, and detained them in forced labor camps."⁴² This was in violation of the Hague Convention regarding treatment of prisoners of war and of "the Potsdam Proclamation, which stipulated that 'the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.'"⁴³ In 1946, the U.S. and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement concerning the repatriation of the Japanese, by which the Soviet Union would return 50,000 Japanese per month.⁴⁴ However, the last repatriation took place in 1956 after 11 years of internment in labor camps. The testimony of the former internees in Siberia that was published by the MFA in 1980 indicated that "the Soviet Union brainwashed them to communize Japan. Some of them even shouted 'Land in the face of the enemy!' when they returned to Japan at Maizuru seaport."⁴⁵ It was Kovalenko (the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat's International Division's Deputy Director for decades) who was "the political officer in charge of the brainwashing in Khabarovsk,"⁴⁶ and who treated them with "whips and slaps."⁴⁷ He is seen as the key person for Soviet policy towards Japan, who has visited Japan 24 times since the end of the war (as of April 1984).⁴⁸ The compensation measures for the former

Siberian internees and their survivors are still on the agenda for Diet deliberations, for which the JCP is also enthusiastic.

3. Japan-Soviet Relations after World War II

a) San Francisco Peace Treaty: 1945-1951

With the surrender by the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan was occupied by the U.S. Army and was placed under the control of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (GHQ), led by General MacArthur. The GHQ enforced the demobilization and democratization of Japan, through the denial of the divinity of the Emperor, the revision of the constitution, the "public service purge," and censorship. Party cabinet government was also resumed by the first Yoshida cabinet of the Japan Liberal Party in 1946, with a coalition with the Japan Progressive Party. Meanwhile, the power of the left wing surged in Japan, as a strong reaction to Japanese militarism during the war, and in the internal turmoil and instability in the postwar period. As a result, Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama of the JSP formed a coalition cabinet with two conservative parties in May 1947. The Socialist cabinet lasted only until February 1948, when Prime Minister Ashida of the Japan Democratic Party formed another coalition cabinet. However, the Ashida cabinet did not last long either, because people were disappointed with

the middle-of-the-road politics.⁴⁹ Thus, the second Yoshida cabinet was formed by the Democratic-Liberal Party alone in January 1948, and the reign of conservative parties has lasted since then.

Prime Minister Yoshida concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and Japan regained its independence. This was with 48 allied powers excluding the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia ("partial peace"), rather than with all 51 allied powers including the three Soviet bloc nations ("general peace"). Yoshida abandoned the "general peace" because of the rejection of the U.S. peace plan by the Soviet bloc.⁵⁰ Some on the right think that "the term partial peace is a misnomer of Japan's leftist journalism. Japan made peace with the great majority of 48 out of the 51 allied powers. It should be called 'majority peace.'"⁵¹ Simultaneously, Japan concluded the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

b) Hatoyama-Bulganin Joint Declaration: 1951-1956

"After the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the problem remained as to how to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union."⁵² "Japan had to normalize relations with the Soviet Union for at least three reasons. First, the repatriation of the Japanese internees in Siberia was an urgent issue. [The Soviet Union did not keep its promise to return 50,000 per month.] Many were dying in forced labor in the harsh climate.

Second, the Soviet Union was vetoing the Japanese entry into the United Nations. Third, negotiations on fishing with the Soviet Union were demanded by the Japanese fishing lobbyists."⁵³

Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Hatoyama, who succeeded Prime Minister Yoshida in 1954, responded to Foreign Minister Molotov's statement that the Soviet Union was ready to resume relations with Japan, and initiated the peace treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1955.⁵⁴ However, they soon became deadlocked due to the territorial issue.

The first two rounds of negotiations were held between Plenipotentiary Matsumoto and Ambassador Malik in London. Malik claimed that the territorial issue was already solved and that the U.S. was obstructing their negotiations.⁵⁵ This refers to John Foster Dulles's intimation to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu "that if Japan were to give away Kunashiri and Etorofu to the Soviet Union, the U.S. would never return Okinawa to Japan."⁵⁶

The second two rounds of negotiations were held in Moscow in 1956, first between Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Foreign Minister Shapirov, and later between Matsumoto and Deputy Foreign Minister Fedorenko. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu (also a Reform Party leader) initially took a hardline position, but changed his attitude. He made concessions to the Soviet Union and accepted the return of only the two southern islands (Shikotan and Habomais).⁵⁷

However, it was amended by the dispatch of Plenipotentiary Matsumoto to the second round of Moscow negotiations, which resulted in the "Matsumoto-Gromyko Letter."⁵⁸ In the end, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Prime Minister Bulganin signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration (short of a peace treaty). Thus Japan and the Soviet Union resumed diplomatic relations eleven years after World War II.

In the Déclaration, the Soviet Union promised to "hand over" Shikotan and Habomais upon conclusion of a peace treaty. It also promised to continue to negotiate for a solution to the territorial issue (referring to the reversion of the two northern islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu) in the Matsumoto-Gromyko Letter, an attached document to the Declaration.

c) Tanaka-Brezhnev Joint Communiqué: 1956-1973

Since 1956, the Northern Territories issue has been the stumbling block for Japan-Soviet relations, to the extent that it symbolizes their stalemated relations. In retaliation for the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Foreign Minister Gromyko sent a memorandum to Japan to notify it that the Soviet Union would not "hand over" Shikotan and Habomais, unless all of the foreign troops withdrew from Japanese territories.⁵⁹ Khrushchev sent a letter to Prime Minister Ikeda in 1961, and declared that the clause in the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, in which the Soviet Union promised to "hand over" Shikotan and

Habomais, was no longer applicable, due to the change in the situation.⁶⁰ Subsequently, Khrushchev announced that the territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan had already been solved.⁶¹ Accordingly, the Soviet Union unilaterally denied the existence of the issue.

At the peak of the détente between the West and East in 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka visited Moscow and signed the Brezhnev-Tanaka Joint Communiqué. By this the two sides confirmed their intent to continue to negotiate for the conclusion of a peace treaty, and to solve the unsettled issues between the two countries. However, in contrast to the 1956 Joint Declaration, this Communiqué failed to specify that the unsolved issues included the territorial issue. Brezhnev replied "Da Da," when Prime Minister Tanaka asked if the unsolved issues included the territorial issue. Despite this existence of a verbal agreement, "the Soviet Union later denied it, insisting that Brezhnev did not say 'Da, da,' but that he was just coughing"⁶²

**d) Brezhnev's Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness
and Cooperation Treaty Proposal: 1973-1978**

In response to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972 and the negotiation for a Sino-Japanese peace treaty, Brezhnev proposed the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty in 1975, as an alternative to a

Japan-Soviet peace treaty. "Prime Minister Miki rejected it, on the basis that a peace treaty should take precedence."⁶³ "When his Foreign Minister Sonoda visited Moscow in 1978, Foreign Minister Gromyko suddenly handed him a copy of a draft proposal for a Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty without any advance notice. Sonoda said he would not take a look at it, but he brought it back to Japan and put it in a safe at the MFA."⁶⁴ "The following day, the Soviet Union unilaterally released the text of the draft without the consent of Japan."⁶⁵ Since then, the Soviet Union has repeatedly campaigned for this proposal, and "even the new Ambassador Soloviev under Gorbachev adheres to this treaty proposal."⁶⁶

Also as part of "the Soviet attempt to forestall the negotiations for the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese peace treaty, the Soviet Union abruptly demanded visas for the Japanese former islanders' visits to the ancestral graves on the Northern Territories in 1976."⁶⁷ It is an important Buddhist custom to visit ancestral graves in mid-August every year. The Soviet Union had allowed this practice with only the Japanese ID cards since 1964 and eight missions for the ancestral grave visits to the Northern Territories took place up to 1975.

"Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Japan in 1976 and threatened Prime Minister Miki that if Japan were to conclude the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, the Soviet Union would reconsider Japan-Soviet relations (meaning the

ancestral grave visits)."68 However, Japan rejected the demand (visas) on the ground that the Northern Territories were not Soviet territories. As a result, the Japanese ancestral grave visits to the Northern Territories were suspended in 1976. Also "at the end of the year, the Soviet Union suddenly established a 200 mile economic zone, and excluded Japanese fishing boats from Soviet waters."69

**e) Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and
Shevardnadze and Abe Foreign Ministerial
Reciprocal Visits in 1986: 1976-1987**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 aggravated Japan-Soviet relations. Japan joined the U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union and boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. Afterwards, a series of grave incidents ensued that made their relations worse.

Among others:

- the remilitarization of the Northern Territories (with one division of 10,000 soldiers) during 1980-1981, along with the Soviet military build up in the Far East.

- the disclosure of the Levchenko testimony by the CIA in 1982. The former KGB agent Levchenko (*Novoi Breimiya's* Tokyo Bureau Director who defected to the U.S.) testified at a closed hearing of the U.S. Congress and revealed disinformation operations in Japan by KGB agents.

- the shooting down of the Korean airliner in September 1983, in which 269 passengers (including 27 Japanese) were

killed. This became the worst event in recent Japan-Soviet relations.

With the signs of change and a political thaw under Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in January 1986 and Foreign Minister Abe's reciprocal visit to Moscow in May of that year were realized. However, the two Foreign Ministerial talks could not reach an agreement on Gorbachev's visit to Japan that Prime Minister Nakasone had requested repeatedly. The only major achievements were the resumption of the meetings of the Japan-Soviet Science and Technology Committee and the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet Cultural Agreement, "which was unsatisfactory to Japan."⁷⁰ In return, "what Japan obtained was merely resumption of the previous practice (the ancestral grave visits in the Northern Territories)."⁷¹

At any rate, the ninth mission to the Northern Territories took place in the summer of 1986, eleven years after the eighth mission. However, only visits to the two smaller southern islands were allowed, with the two larger northern islands remaining off limits. Moreover, "the Soviet Union demanded that the Japanese visitors buy coupons issued by Intourist (the Soviet National Travel Bureau), which are the equivalent of visas."⁷² It also demanded as "reciprocity" that Russians visit the graves of the war prisoners of the Russo-Japanese War in Japan without visas.

The Soviet demand came out of the blue to Japan

because the existence of such graves was buried in history, and in fact the MFA had difficulty in locating them. "The sites turned out to be in Okinoshima (Shimane), Matsuyama (Ehime) and elsewhere,"⁷³ and "have been well maintained by local residents."⁷⁴ It was also "doubtful that Soviet citizens would visit their ancestral graves in Japan, eighty years after the Russo-Japanese War."⁷⁵ At any rate, a Soviet ancestral grave visiting mission of ten members, including six descendants of Czarist Russian soldiers and two Russian Orthodox priests, came to Japan without visas in December 1986, and visited Nagasaki, Matsuyama, and Izumi-Otsu (Osaka).

Summary

Relations between Japan and Russia-Soviet Union have been basically characterized by confrontation due to the geopolitical factor. First, Japan-Russia relations began with the Russian threat to Japan to force Japan to open trade with Russia and border disputes over Japan's northern colonies including Sakhalin. Their confrontation reached a peak in their contention over spheres of interest in Korea and Manchuria, which resulted in the Russo-Japanese War.

Second, Japan-Soviet relations during the two World Wars were characterized by fragile wartime cooperations, based on the coincidence of their expansionistic national interests. This decisively collapsed due to Soviet violation of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty and its

invasion of Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands at the end of World War II.

Third, Japan-Soviet relations after World War II have been characterized by coldness and distrust, as Japan was incorporated into the U.S. alliance system in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The continued Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories aggravates their relations, blocking the conclusion of a peace treaty and any significant improvement in their relations up to the present. In a nutshell, "Japan and the Soviet Union have still not ended a war situation legally without the solution of the territorial issue and the conclusion of a peace treaty."⁷⁶

In addition, postwar Japan-Soviet relations have been characterized by asymmetrical relations. First, the Soviet Union has totally neglected Japan diplomatically, as Table 1 shows. In contrast, Japan has been anxious to improve their relations through top-level talks. This has put Japan in a disadvantageous position in terms of bargaining leverage. Second, the Soviet Union has been engaged in offensive "active measures" against Japan, while Japan has been constantly in a passive position. As a result, only with Soviet initiatives did positive events between the two countries take place, as Table 2 indicates.

**Table 1: Top Level Official Visits Between
Japan and the Soviet Union**

From Tokyo to Moscow	From Moscow to Tokyo
1. 1956, Prime Minister Hatoyama (To sign the Joint Declaration with Bulganin)	
2. 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka (To sign the Joint Communiqué with Brezhnev)	
3. 1984, Prime Minister Suzuki (To attend Andropov Funeral)	
4. 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone (To attend Chernyenko Funeral)	
Total: Four times	Total: None

**Table 2: Foreign Ministerial Level Official Visits
Between Japan and the Soviet Union**

From Tokyo to Moscow	From Moscow to Tokyo
1. 1966, Foreign Minister Shiina (Trade agreement, etc.)	1. 1966, Foreign Minister Gromyko (To sign Consulate Treaty)
2. 1967, Foreign Minister Miki (To ratify Consulate Treaty)	
3. 1969, Foreign Minister Aichi (Talks with Kosygin; Confrontation on the NT issue)	2. 1972, Foreign Minister Gromyko (Talks with Prime Minister Sato; agreed to resume peace treaty negotiations)
4. 1972, Foreign Minister Ohira (peace treaty negotiations)	
5. 1975 Foreign Minister Miyazawa (Talks with Gromyko; deadlocked)	3. 1976, Foreign Minister Gromyko (Insisted on "no peace treaty with NT reversion")
6. 1978, Foreign Minister Sonoda (Rejected Soviet proposal of the Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty)	
7. 1984, Foreign Minister Abe (To attend Andropov funeral)	4. 1986, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (Cultural Agreement, resumption of the Science and Technology Committee)
8. 1986, Foreign Minister Abe (Cultural Agreement, resumption of NT grave visits)	
Total: Eight times	Total: Four times

Notes

1. Mitsumasa Inoue, et al., *Shōsetsu nihonshi (Detailed History of Japan)*, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1977, pp. 201-202.
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3. Hayao Shimizu, *Naze Nihonjin wa Soren ga kirai ka (Why Do the Japanese Dislike the Soviet Union?)*, Tokyo: Yamate Shobō, 1979, p. 101.
4. Northern Territories Issue Association, ed., *Japan's Northern Territories*, Tokyo: Northern Territories Issue Association, 1974, pp. 17-18.
5. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p.101.
6. Northern Territories Issue Association, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.
7. Mitsumasa Inoue, et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 204.
8. Northern Territories Issue Association, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
10. Chihiro Hosoya, "Nichiro-Nisso kankei no shiteki tenkai" (The Historical Evolution of Japanese-Russian and Japanese-Soviet Relations), *Kokusai Seiji*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1969 (Tokyo: Yūhikau), p. 2.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
14. Northern Territories Issue Association, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-140.
20. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

21. John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945*, New York: Random House, 1970, pp. 6 and 124.
22. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.
23. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
24. Mitsumasa Inoue, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
25. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. Mitsumasa Inoue, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 289.
32. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
35. John Toland, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
39. Kenichi Ito, "Hoppō ryōdo henkan eno senryaku" ("A Strategy for the Reversion of the Northern Territories"), *Voice*, March 1986, p. 147.
40. Interview, Tokyo, November 19, 1986.
41. Nemuro City Government, ed., *Hoppō ryōdo (Northern Territories)*, Nemuro: Nemuro City Government, and Tokyo: Northern Territories Issue Association, 1986, p. 41.
42. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
43. Kenichi Ito, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
44. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

45. Akira Sono, "Kowarenko ga teianshita Nisso fukashin jōyaku" ("The Japan-Soviet Non-Agression Treaty That Kovalenko Proposed"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 4, *Shokun*, Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1984, p. 67.
46. Zenichiro Watanabe, "Kowarenko ga teianshita Nisso fukashin jōyaku" ("The Japan-Soviet Non-Agression Treaty That Kovalenko Proposed"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 4, *Shokun*, Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1984, p. 67.
47. Taishi Yoshinari, "Hoppō ryōdo to Soren gaikō" ("Northern Territories and Soviet Diplomacy"), *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 63, No. 12, December 1985, pp. 128-129.
48. Akira Sono, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
49. Mitsumasa Inoue, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 324.
50. Akira Sono, *Sobieto wocchingu yonjū-nen* (Soviet Watching: Forty Years), Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan sha, 1983, pp. 29-34.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
53. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
54. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.
55. The process of the negotiations is most vividly described by a memoir of Shunichi Matsumoto, *Mosukuwa ni kakeru niji: Nisso kokkō kaifuku hiwa* (Rainbow Across Moscow: The Secret Story of the Resumption of Japan-Soviet Diplomatic Relations), Tokyo: Asahi Shuppan sha, 1966, pp. 36.
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57. Shunichi Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-115 and 163-167.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.
59. Akira Sono, "Yoshida Shigeru 'taiso kyōkō gaikō' ni manabe" ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline

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 61. *Ibid.*
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 63. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), p.209.
 64. *Ibid.*
 65. *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.
 66. Ryozo Tanihata, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
 67. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
 68. *Ibid.*
 69. *Ibid.*
 70. *Ibid.*
 71. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
 72. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
 73. *Asahi Shimbun*, June 7, 1986, p. 2.
 74. Suzuki Masao, "Matsuyama bosan" ("Grave Visit to Matsuyama"), *Kami Tsubute, Chūnichī Shimbun*, December 4, 1986 (Evening Edition), p. 1.
 75. *Asahi Shimbun*, *op. cit.* (emphasis added).
 76. Kenichi Ito, "Nakasone taiso gaikō e no chūmon" ("Recommendations for Nakasone's Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union"), *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 64, No. 12, December 1986, p. 111.

Chapter IV. Japanese Foreign Policy Elites'
Perceptions of the Soviet Union

1. Internal Dimensions

**a) Nature of Internal System of the
Soviet Union**

i) Political System of the Soviet Union

There is a near consensus among the Japanese foreign policy elites on the nature of the Soviet political system. The overwhelming majority considers that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian nation ruled by a one-party dictatorship and a bureaucratic nation controlled by a privileged class system called *nomenklatura*.

Those on the right and in the center regard Russian history and political culture (the Russian need for dictatorship) rather than communist ideology as the most important determinants of the Soviet totalitarian political system. Some on the right contend that "the Soviet Union is not just a communist nation but it is an extension of Czarist Russia in that Russian geography, history, and nationality are blended with Bolshevism."¹ Others on the right argue that "the nature of the Soviet Union derives from Russian mentality more than from communist ideology. Bolshevism introduced the Russian revolutionary tradition into Marxism in order to take power, and thereby transformed 'proletarian dictatorship' into 'dictatorship by the vanguard' (Russification of Marxism). This

necessitates Soviet information control."² Some in the center think that "it was unfortunate for the world that the first socialist nation was created in Russia. Marxism, a genuine socialism, was distorted because it was built in the underdeveloped nation of Russia. Had it been established in a Western nation, it would have been a different type of socialism. However, since the Soviet Union incorporated dictatorship and dogmatism, which are intrinsically contradictory to socialism, into socialism, its system became defaced by totalitarianism and bureaucracy. As a result, the 20th Century, which opened with hope and expectation for socialism, is ending with disappointment in and despair of it."³

The majority of foreign policy elites regard bureaucracy under a party hierarchy as another characteristic of the nature of the Soviet political system. Some on the right argue that "in no nation other than the Soviet Union is the privileged class so distinctive. Favoritism and nepotism are widespread among three million 'red aristocrats.' This is so because of the Russian political culture. The Russians are unable to absorb Marxism."⁴ Some on the right even contend that "the Soviet Union is not a communist state but a class state. This supposedly 'classless society' is stratified into classes according to the party hierarchy, to the extent that the vested interests of the *nomenklatura* are hereditary."⁵

Those on the right argue that some of the most serious problems in the Soviet political system are its "secrecy" and violations of the fundamental human rights. Some stress "the importance of separating the problems inherited from Czarist Russia (as the GRU is the heritage of Russia) from those common to socialist nations."⁶

Those on the left also think that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian and bureaucratic nation. However, they hold that "the problem with the Soviet political system is not the concept of communism itself but its dogmatism. This has produced a bureaucracy characterized by cold communist technocrats, and has imposed its own ends upon other nations."⁷ Some on the left of center said that "it is wrong to attribute every problem to the Soviet Union, just because Japan is allied to the U.S. Any nation has pluses and minuses."⁸

ii) Economic System of the Soviet Union

There is also a near consensus among the foreign policy elites that the Soviet economic system does not work. The state-controlled and planned economic system deprives people of the incentive to work which goes counter to human nature, and of creativity which is essential to innovation.

A Soviet watcher on the right argues that "Marxism cannot control people, insofar as it denies intrinsic human nature (the desire for private property) as 'bourgeois

spirit.' As a result, people lost enthusiasm for the construction of a communist society, being plagued by alienation, cynicism, and delinquency. The Soviet economic system became paralyzed. The [seventy] year Soviet experiment proved that to change human nature is impossible."⁹ Another on the right said that "the Soviet system does not have the basis for economic growth. Its upside-down-pyramid structure puts priority on the military industry without the base of a commodity industry."¹⁰

An economist explains problems of the Soviet economic system from the monetary point of view, which he calls the "paradox of the ruble." Since the ruble is not a hard currency, "the decline of the dollar ironically affects the Soviet economy adversely."¹¹ He also thinks that "the Soviet autarky system is impossible with the increasing interdependence of the international economy" (in high-tech, trade, and finance). The Chernobyl disaster worsened the situation, causing significant damage to agricultural production and to the Soviet nuclear power plant program, with its repercussions outside (an anti-nuclear movement in Poland and on the Soviet plan to export power plants to China)."¹²

They consider that the impact of these structural defects on the Soviet economy have become evident with:
 —"encroaching 'bourgeois spirit' (rampant black market, corruption, and bribery, which even works as a lubricant of the Soviet planned economy),"¹³

- "food problems (subsidies for food prices and import of grains),
- decrease in export income (the decline of prices of oil and rare metals), and
- decreasing labor population."¹⁴

They conclude that all of these indicate that "the socialist planned economy was defeated by the bourgeois spirit."¹⁵ "What the Soviet Union needs is a 'bourgeois revolution.'"¹⁶ Conversely, some on the left said that "since the Soviet Union employs an autarky system, it will not be in trouble without foreign trade."¹⁷

iii) Social System of the Soviet Union

Concerning the Soviet social system, some on the right pay attention to the seriousness of the ethnic problems. First, the decreasing population in general; "the Soviet Union has too little population, while China has too much."¹⁸ Second, "the increasing population of minority ethnic groups, along with the decreasing Russian population (which only constitutes 49% of the total population)."¹⁹ "This ethnic imbalance poses an enormous difficulty to the Soviet Union in controlling the nation, with adverse implications for the military command."²⁰

b) Power of the Soviet Union

i) Nature of the Soviet Power

As an overall evaluation of the Soviet Union, there is a consensus among the foreign policy elites in regarding the characteristic nature of Soviet power as a striking imbalance between its outstanding military power and poor political, diplomatic, and economic power. Agreeing with Donald Zagoria,²¹ they think that the Soviet Union tries to convert its military power into political or economic influence by employing "threat diplomacy."

In the opinion of some on the right, "the Soviet Union respects power and judges other nations by military power. It looks down on and puts pressure on the powerless."²² Others point out that "since the Soviet Union is only a military superpower, it has exercised its military power carefully by means of limited war, war by proxy, and dispatch of troops."²³

To quote some in the center, "the Soviet power is unbalanced with extreme military power, weak economic power, and diminishing ideological and cultural influence. This is so because its supremacy in military power restricts the pattern of achieving its interests."²⁴

Even some on the left of center think that "the unbalanced military power cannot be counted as national power. National power is of a comprehensive nature and such military power tends to misguide the nation."¹⁸

ii) Military Power and its Threat

The majority of the military specialists on the right of center see the total Soviet military power as inferior to that of the U.S. and perceive no direct military threat from the Soviet Union. They judge that the Soviet military power in conventional weapons is superior to that of the U.S. numerically but it falls behind the U.S. qualitatively, while they have a rough parity in nuclear weapons. Some said that "the quality of military power is more important than its quantity. Military presence is not equal to operational capability. The real Soviet military capability is half that implied by its numerical presence, due to old hardware, poor maintenance (an overhaul that takes one month in the U.S. takes three months in the Soviet Union), and incompetent 'software' in command, communication, and control."²⁶ In comparison, those on the right emphasize the overwhelming Soviet military superiority in conventional weapons and regard the Soviet military threat as real.

Conversely, those on the left stress the overall military superiority of the U.S. to the Soviet Union and regard the Soviet military threat as nonexistent. Some think that "the U.S. overestimates Soviet military power."²⁷ "The content of the Soviet military build-up is not offensive. Its military power is incapable of invasion. Its sea power is not a big deal, merely intended for political maneuvering with the developing nations. Its

three million-man ground force is useless in the missile age, incapable even of landing in Japan."²⁸

iii) Political Power and Its Ideological Threat

There is a consensus among the foreign policy elites that Soviet political power has dwindled. The attractiveness of its ideology has waned, as the world has witnessed negative Soviet performances internally (poor economy, repression, and violation of human rights) and its expansionistic behavior externally. A Soviet watcher on the right thinks that two out of three structural deficiencies in the Soviet political system come from "Russian communism" rather than from Marxism. First, "Russian communism cannot control people except Russians themselves since it inherited the Czarist Russian feudalism as it was. Russians, who succumbed to the Czarist political system, might be able to accept the feudalistic nature of Russian communism, but those who have experienced modern democracy in Eastern Europe cannot."²⁹

Second, "Russian communism cannot control communist nations other than those in Eastern Europe since it seeks the expansion of Russia by identifying the Russian proletariat as the 'vanguard' of the international proletariat. Therefore Yugoslavia and China, which did not resist adopting feudalistic Russian communism, opposed its hegemonism."³⁰ Others add that "this is all the more so now that the Soviet Union is unable to provide economic aid

to build up a new nation, because of the impoverishment of its own economy, sacrificed for military expenses."³¹

However, the majority on the right and in the center regard the Soviet ideological threat as still existent. Only some of them think that the Soviet Union has abandoned the world revolution. "It has been transformed from an ideologically motivated challenger to a mere military power,"³² to quote one specialist. Those in the rightist faction in the JSP perceive both military and ideological threats from the Soviet Union. This is so because "it monopolizes the right of liberation and does not accept any type of socialism other than its own model."³³

Aside from its ideological threat, some think that the very existence of Russia poses a threat. They speculate that "if Russia, so abundant in natural resources, were capitalist, it would have become an economic superpower as big as the U.S. and posed a greater threat to the world. However thanks to the defects of the Soviet system, the free-world camp is saved."³⁴

Some on the left of center said that "the communist ideology waned along with the decline of Soviet economic power. The Soviet Union has no intention of overthrowing the capitalist regimes and socializing the world."³⁵

iv) Diplomatic Power

There are disagreements in the evaluations of Soviet diplomatic power among the foreign policy elites. Some on the right of center think that Soviet diplomatic power is poor. In the words of an MFA official, "the Soviet Union lacks empathy for other cultures. Its high-handed diplomacy backed by its military power evoke resentment from other nations. The poor diplomatic power enhances the dependence on military power, so it becomes a vicious cycle. Here lies the tragedy of the Soviet Union with its inferior diplomacy, as opposed to its gigantic military power. The Kremlin may have long-term foreign policy objectives (world revolution), but it does not have short-term foreign policy objectives. Thus it becomes a ruthless opportunist. In this sense, defining its foreign policy objectives is not up to them but up to us."³⁶

In comparison, others on the right find strong points in the Soviet diplomacy. They argue that "it is wrong to say that Russian diplomacy is weak, with power only but no influence,"³⁷ for the following reasons. First, "Russia has a tradition as a European power. Correspondingly, the Soviet Union is a tough negotiator and has been doing well in foreign policy, in comparison to the isolationism of the U.S. and Japan."³⁸ Second, "Soviet diplomacy is persistent because it has long-term objectives. This is intensified by the perseverant Russian character. Russian negotiators act 'as if they were playing chess games, while their U.S.

counterparts act as if they were playing video games.'"39 Third, "the monolithic Soviet system helps maintain consistency in its foreign policy, while U.S. foreign policy is characterized by inconsistency."40 Fourth, "the 'secrecy' of the Soviet diplomacy serves to its advantage in negotiations, whereas U.S. diplomacy is handicapped by its 'glass-enclosedness' and consideration for public opinion."41

A scholar puts it that the Soviet diplomatic negotiation styles are characterized "not by 'sincerity' but by 'forcefulness,' not by 'compromise' but by 'victory,' and not by 'give-and-take' but by '*fait accompli*.'" All these derive from the Russian mentality."42 Those in business circles on the left of center also think that Russians are tough negotiators. One said that "their attitude is arrogant and high-handed, despite the fact that the only weapon they have is a large market."43

v) Economic Power

Regarding Soviet economic power, there is no disagreement on the decline of its power for three reasons. One, the built-in defects of the state-controlled economic system; two, the neglect of the domestic economy since Brezhnev; and three, "the decline of both the oil prices (from which 80% of the Soviet income comes) and the prices of the primary commodities the Soviet Union exports."44

vi) Overall Evaluation of the Soviet Power

There is a consensus that the overall Soviet power is declining. First, according to a former MFA official, "the Soviet Union is only a military superpower in an age of the unwageability of all-out war. It has to prepare for peace-time diplomacy and to build confidence among other nations, along with the military race with the U.S. However, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union will be able to maintain its superpower status without military power."⁴⁵ Second, the stagnant economic system has diminished Soviet power and thereby decreased Soviet influence on developing countries. Third, the attractiveness of its ideology has waned. Negative Soviet performances both internally and externally have tarnished peoples' illusions of communist ideology.

In sum, a security specialist on the right of center concludes that "there is a gap between intention and capability in the Soviet policy objectives. Although it does not have equal power with the U.S., it intends to obtain an equal position and equal security with the U.S. In a nutshell, it is pursuing purposes beyond its ability. However, the Soviet Union has not lost its superpower status, and the U.S.-Soviet bipolar system has not collapsed yet."⁴⁶

c) Gorbachev's Domestic Reforms

Here, a relatively clear correlation is observed between the position in the spectrum of ideology of the Japanese foreign policy elites and their perceptions of Gorbachev's domestic reforms—*perestroika* (reconstruction) and *glasnost* (openness). Those on the right regard Gorbachev's reform as merely "reform within the system," intended only for a change *within* the framework of the system. In comparison, those on the left regard it as genuine "systemic reform," aiming for a change *of* the system. In addition, the farther right in the spectrum, the more skeptical the evaluation becomes. Conversely, the farther left in the spectrum, the more favorable it becomes.

As a result, three distinctive schools of thought emerge on this subject. First is the skeptical school, that holds that the reforms are merely intended for change within the system and will fail. Second is the "remains-to-be-seen" school, that considers that it remains to be seen if the reform will lead to a systemic change and will succeed or not. Third is the optimistic school, that argues that the reforms are designed for a genuine systemic change and will succeed.

**i) Skeptical School: Merely "Reform
Within the System"**

The skeptical school is the mainstream school among the foreign policy elites. Those on the right think that Gorbachev's *perestroika* will fail. It is merely "reform within the system," while "reform of the system" is necessary for the success. Some consider that "Gorbachev is trying solve the 'triple stagnation' that he inherited in economic, social, and personnel aspects, by 'reform within the system' on the assumption that the problem is not the Soviet economic system itself but the way it is managed. There are three types of measures that Gorbachev could take: a) political measures; tightening of discipline and abstinence campaigns, b) administrative and organizational measures; streamlining of bureaucracy and personnel changes, and c) economic measures; reform of the economic system itself. Although the third (economic measures) are the most important measures, Gorbachev has concentrated overwhelmingly on the first two measures. Therefore he has not achieved remarkable success."⁴⁷

In the opinion of others on the right, "Gorbachev is using a mix of carrot (decentralization: encouraging autonomous initiative) and stick (centralization: tightening discipline). He is trying to break the deadlock of autocratic socialism by a partial reform. Yet, bolder reforms are necessary for success as has been seen in the Hungarian and Chinese cases, but Gorbachev cannot override

the framework of socialism. Insofar as the party monopolizes power, economic liberalization is a contradiction, but the Soviet Union will not accept this truth. In essence, Gorbachev is trying to create an atmosphere of change."⁴⁸

Accordingly, some scholars on the right of center conclude that "Soviet reform cannot achieve as much as China has achieved. What it has done so far is merely to legalize what had been done illegally (black market). It will be less open to privatization than China since it would damage the vested interests of the *nomenclatura*."⁴⁹ In short, "the favorable perceptions that the Japanese mass media hold about Gorbachev's reforms are illusions. Gorbachev has his personal limitations in that his generation is the very legitimate heir of the Soviet system. He was born and raised under that system and does not know any other system. Therefore, what Gorbachev intends to do is only to streamline the inefficient management of the system."⁵⁰

"The forms of resistance to Gorbachev's *perestroika* that [those on the right] cite as the basis for their skeptical prognosis can be summarized as follows:

- systemic and ideological resistance; the rigidity of the Soviet system that has been forged over the seventy years,
- bureaucratic and organizational resistance; the *nomenclatura* who fear their vested interests might be lost,
- the personal constraints of Gorbachev; he has been

raised in the Soviet political culture since Stalin and he cannot override this frame of reference,"⁵¹

—"the general public's resistance (Russian mentality); while the general public has expectations for Gorbachev's reforms, they do not work without economic incentive, and —external resistance; repercussions in Eastern Europe."⁵²

Those in the center also think that what Gorbachev intends to do is to revitalize the system within the framework of socialism. A scholar points out "three environmental constraints that Gorbachev encounters,"⁵³ in addition to his own personal limitations. "First, the human environment surrounding him: his older colleagues in the politburo, *nomenclatura* in the party apparatus with vested interests, and people in general who have an ambivalent view of Gorbachev's strict policies. Second, the systemic environment: it is an almost impossible task to revitalize the Soviet economy without changing the Soviet economic system, which is the cause of the economic stagnation. Third, the international environment: domestic *perestroika* requires détente and disarmament and arms control with the U.S."⁵⁴

Another calls the Soviet *perestroika* an "unknown experiment." "Russian society lacks three prerequisites for privatization: a civil society, mercantilism [habit of entrepreneurship], and a stable social order. Hungary had the tradition of a civilized European society and a market economy. China was accustomed to business. It is

impossible to introduce only the positive elements of privatization into a controlled economic system. However, the Soviet Union has reached the point where it has to reform even if eclectically."⁵⁵

The majority of the business circles on the left of center have pessimistic prognoses for the reforms, if not skeptical ones. They think that what Gorbachev intends to do is just to straighten up the present system. Some said that "Soviet socialism is rigid and any changes will only be minor modifications of the system."⁵⁶ For instance, "unlike the decentralization and liberalization of China, the Soviet Union will not change the state monopoly of overseas trade. Although the number of authorized organs to conduct such business has expanded to 21 agencies and 70 corporations, all of them are still run by the state."⁵⁷ Others said that "Gorbachev's reforms are doomed to fail because he will not be able to override the system."⁵⁸ "The problem with the Soviet Union is that there is no one who has experienced capitalism. In China there are still people alive who tasted capitalism before 1949. In contrast, Russians have been taught since 1917 that socialism is the best system. They are led to believe that capitalism cheats socialism."⁵⁹

Those on the right also cast doubt on *glasnost* (openness), another key issue of Gorbachev's domestic reforms along with *perestroika*. A scholar of Russian literature who translated Solzhenitsyn's writings argues

that "Gorbachev's *glasnost* cannot be called a thaw as is claimed. The fact is that Solzhenitsyn is still banned in the Soviet Union. His own [Kimura's] visa application to visit the Soviet Union was denied again. Thus Solzhenitsyn's publication should be a real barometer [*sic*, thermometer] of a thaw."⁶⁰ He agrees with Soviet *émigrés*, who think that "ideology is the core of the Soviet system. It prescribes Soviet long-term strategy. Insofar as this ruling dogma denies 'peace with the class enemy,' no real *détente* can be achieved. What the Soviet leaders can decide is only how to advance along the prescribed course. Gorbachev will be another victim of the system."⁶¹

Others on the right think that "Soviet information control is directly linked with the nature of the Soviet political system (party dictatorship). Insofar as the system does not change, *glasnost* is impossible."⁶² "Even if Gorbachev encourages criticism, this does not apply to the political system; such criticism is an act of subversion in the Soviet Union."⁶³ Some on the right of center said that "the Soviet Union will fall behind in the information revolution. It cannot allow a horizontal and two-way flow of information because that is detrimental to a totalitarian system. However, Gorbachev is not aware that his *glasnost* will fail insofar as the system remains the same."⁶⁴

ii) "Remains-to-be-seen" School

Some on the right of center and on the left of center have slightly more favorable perceptions of Gorbachev's reforms. A former MFA official on the right of center notes that "Gorbachev is taking more drastic measures than were expected. He is really trying for the modernization that Khrushchev once tried; although this is difficult without accepting freedom. Gorbachev has to adopt Lenin's NEP [New Economic Plan] in the long run, since there is no other way to revitalize the communist system. China has decayed and become half capitalist."⁶⁵ Another said that "change in style should be based on a fundamental change in ideas, which could lead to a change in substance."⁶⁶ However, they hold that how much change will take place remains to be seen.

An economist on the left of center thinks that "what Gorbachev is trying is a limited reform within socialism. It is not a systemic reform. Yet, if he tries a drastic reform within that limitation, he could still succeed to some extent. This depends not only on reform of the economic mechanism, but also on that of the human factor: how to tighten discipline, and how to deal with the bureaucratic resistance and the complaints of the general public."⁶⁷

iii) Optimistic School: "Systemic Reform"

In contrast, those on the left regard Gorbachev's *perestroika* as a genuine effort for systemic change, and are optimistic about success. A specialist argues that "the Soviet system works by central order and has adopted coherent policies that have caused the current economic stalemate. In comparison, in China the Cultural Revolution lowered the party's authority, and the leaders took a more flexible course (the 'general people's course') and checked the rigidity of party policy. Despite these differences, however, common factors between the Soviet reform and the Chinese version should not be forgotten: the serious economic stalemate due to their centralized economy, and the awareness that they might fall behind the high-tech revolution of the West. Skeptics on Gorbachev's reforms are wrong, just as people were skeptical when China began to take a bold policy in 1978."⁶⁸

A scholar said that "the fact is significant that this autocratic nation has begun to accept the diversity of socialism and to show an interest in the Chinese experiment. There is wider support for the reforms. Even public opinion polls have begun to be allowed. This change was not just forced by the individual leadership. It is an irreversible change that made the birth of the Gorbachev regime inevitable. Although the Soviet Union still has problems like human rights, Afghanistan, and the possibility of repercussions from the bureaucrats, it will

proceed in the general direction of liberalization. External factors rather than internal constraints will determine the fate of Soviet reform. If the pressure from outside is too strong (like the SDI), open socialism in the Soviet Union cannot be realized. If it is faced with a further military expansion race, it will revert to dictatorship."⁶⁹

Another scholar on the left of center notes that "Gorbachev's reforms have both internal and external limitations: a) Gorbachev can open things up only in compliance with the party line. b) The resistance of the party apparatus is the hardest obstacle for him. He has to be cautious to avoid the fate of Khrushchev. c) He is trying to improve the Soviet image for its national interests. However, Gorbachev realizes that the Soviet Union cannot survive in the age of technology if it remains a closed society. In the long run, the Soviet Union has no choice but to change and become ever closer to capitalism. History has proved the victory of capitalism over socialism."⁷⁰

d) Stability of the Soviet Union

The foreign policy elites are most divided on their perceptions of the stability of the Soviet Union. No clear correlation between the position in the spectrum of ideology and their evaluation of this subject is observed. This may be so because this question is extremely difficult

to analyze since it involves predictions of the future. In fact, the Western Soviet specialists are also divided on this subject. Seweryn Bialer sees the Soviet system as stable on the ground that "its basis is solid with [seventy years'] existence. The system has acquired its legitimacy: Leninism was combined with Russian nationalism; the Soviet Union is founded on the basis of the Russian tradition; its legitimacy is reinforced by repression and terror."⁷¹ Thus he argues that "it is premature to say that the Soviet Union is becoming destabilized."⁷² In comparison, Peter Knirsch emphasizes the destabilizing factors in the Soviet system like the problem of Eastern Europe.⁷³ At any rate, their Japanese counterparts' perceptions on this subject can be categorized into three schools of thoughts.

i) Stable School

Some foreign policy elites, from the right to the left, regard the Soviet system as durable, despite the defects and malfunctions of its system. The most common reasons they cite are the vast potential resources the Soviet Union has in both natural and human aspects, and the perseverent nature of the Russians, who endured hardship under the Czarist autocracy. Among others, those on the right emphasize stabilizing factors for the Soviet Union, and are cautious about seemingly deteriorating conditions in the Soviet Union. Some said that "Russia has been and will be able to impose its will at the cost of the

livelihood of its people. It is presumptuous to think that the Soviet Union will go bankrupt."⁷⁴

Those in the center also think that "it is wrong to underestimate the Soviet Union because of its economic, political, and military defects. It has vast human and natural resources. The present situation simply means that past due debts have accumulated."⁷⁵ The opinion of those on the left is that, "given the endurance of the Russians, Gorbachev can afford military expenses. If he could allocate wasted manpower, resources, and capital to military expenditures, he could even afford both the economy and the military."⁷⁶ Others said that "although it seems as if the Soviet Union has eaten up its past legacy and the communist ideology has failed, it will survive in the long run."⁷⁷ "The Soviet Union has nothing to lose by returning to autocracy."⁷⁸

ii) "Remains-to-be-seen" School

Others on the right do not think that the Soviet Union will collapse so easily. Yet, they regard the Soviet lag in high technology as a most serious destabilizing factor. One notes that "the Soviet Union will be in increasing difficulty without sizable introduction of Western capital and technology."⁷⁹ Another thinks that "it cannot catch up with the West even with the introduction of high technology since the high-tech revolution requires a free exchange of information. The Soviet Union, which acts

as a global power owing to its military power now, will eventually shrink to a local power (providing that the Western alliance does not split)."80

Others see "secrecy" as a most destabilizing factor. In the words of a former MFA official, "it is a tragedy for the Soviet Union that it cannot tell the truth. The Soviet Union is charged with a duty to convey its image of 'what should be' and to conceal 'what is.' The word *pravda* means 'truth according to rule,' not objective truth. It distorts facts and imposes its own point of view (as in the case of the shooting down of the KAL airliner). This Soviet nature causes mistrust among other nations. Not to remove this mistrust would be suicidal for the Soviet Union."81 According to a scholar in the center, "the dilemma with Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy is that, were the Russians to have access to accurate information on what is happening inside and outside the Soviet Union, it would face a crisis leading to its collapse."82

iii) Unstable School

In contrast, others on the right have a lower opinion of the Soviet Union and pay attention to destabilizing factors in that country. A journalist thinks that "there are two fundamental causes for the collapse of the Soviet Union. One is the problem intrinsic to its system. Communism is incompatible with human nature and contains the seed of self-destruction within itself. Unless it

introduces capitalist elements substantially into its economic system, the Soviet economy will collapse. However, to do so means the collapse of the communist system itself. The second cause is the policy of the Kremlin pursuing goals beyond its national power. When a nation's leaders do that, the nation tends to collapse (as in the case of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan during World War II). In addition, what Gorbachev is trying to do in his reforms misses the point. To strengthen discipline without giving people incentive to work, and to campaign for abstinence without reducing people's frustrations, will only raise the antipathy of the people. Signs of the collapse of the Soviet Union have become evident both internally (stagnant political, economic, and social systems, and alienated and dissatisfied people) and externally (the decline of its reign over its satellites in Eastern Europe and the Third World and the increase in resistance from them). The collapse of the Soviet Union is inevitable. It is collapsing."⁸³

To quote a scholar on the right of center, "stagnation in the Soviet system should not be confused with stability. The Soviet Union can be likened to a 'dinosaur' which is gigantic but fragile. It is on the verge of extinction and will eventually petrify. The tragedy of the Soviet Union is that it has no merit but military power and that its civilization is controlled by military power. Everybody is making a fool of the Soviet Union, so it controls by

military power. However, it will no longer be able to do so in the future. The Soviet grip on Eastern Europe will loosen as well. It is an overestimate to call the Soviet Union an 'evil empire' or to regard the Soviet objective as being world revolution. It is a *status quo* nation, clinging to the status it has acquired. It is desperate not to lose its superpower status."⁸⁴

Some Soviet watchers on the right and in the center see the Chernobyl incident as a sign of the collapse of the Soviet Union. They consider that "the incident was not an accident but was a disaster caused by the Soviet system."⁸⁵ It revealed the problems intrinsic to the system—lies of Gorbachev's *glasnost*, the bankruptcy of national finance, the contamination of the "bread basket," and resistance by Eastern Europe.⁸⁶ In sum, they conclude that "the collapse of the myth of the safety of the Soviet nuclear power plant signifies the collapse of the myth of the Soviet system itself that claims infallability."⁸⁷ "The Soviet empire has entered a decisive process of long-term decline in power, without ever having reached a first-class level in international economic competitiveness."⁸⁸

2. External Dimensions

a) Nature of Soviet External Behavior

i) Historical School

A majority of the foreign policy elites from the right and to the center regard history as the most important determinant of the nature of the Soviet external behavior. First, they emphasize the importance of seeing the Soviet Union as an extension of Czarist Russia. They think that it inherited the Russian expansionism. A scholar on the right argues that Soviet external behavior is inseparable from that of Czarist Russia because of "two continuities between them: the geopolitical and natural factors, and the historical and human factors."⁸⁹ In addition, he notes that "although communist ideology is counted as a discontinuity between Russian external behavior and that of the Soviet Union, the influence of the Russian mentality on Marxism is significant (Russification of Marxism). This should not be underestimated."⁹⁰ A journalist in the center also thinks that "the Soviet Union absorbed Czarist tradition and nationalism. The Soviet Union changed socialism at its will in order to use it as an excuse for its traditional national interests."⁹¹

Second, on the roots of Russian expansionism, they think that "because of its geography and its history of constant invasions from outside (as exemplified by the Mongol-Tartar's harsh control during the 13th-15th

centuries), Russia developed a unique concept of security. It is overly sensitive to security to the extreme of having a compulsion to domination. This persecution mania is not content with merely having buffer zones,"⁹² but seeks "200% security."⁹³ In addition to this history, some point out that "the Russian inferiority complex for being a backward European nation is accountable to its security complex."⁹⁴

However, others hold that "a security complex alone cannot explain the Soviet external behavior. It is wrong to regard the nature of the Soviet external behavior as merely overly defensive. The Soviet Union is a traditional European power, which still believes in power politics. It employs an old fashioned imperialistic way of thinking and expands into a vacuum. It is an opportunistic expansionist. Its behavior is offensive."⁹⁵

According to one scholar, "the Russia-Soviet 'grand strategy' (fundamental characteristics of a nation intrinsic to its external behavior, as opposed to a specific military strategy) can be called a 'hunter' type: Russia is not only expansionist but also is cautious due to its geopolitics."⁹⁶ Another in the center thinks that "controversies in the U.S. on whether the nature of the Soviet external behavior is defensive (George F. Kennan and Dimitri K. Simes) or offensive (Richard Pipes) miss the point. Russians have dual and ambivalent characteristics and their two seemingly contradictory natures are interrelated."⁹⁷ He calls "the paradox that the overly

defensive Russian nature is the cause of its external expansion 'defensive expansionism.'"98

Finally, a scholar on the right points out two discontinuities between Russian external behavior and that of the Soviet Union. "First, technological progress: the 'nuclear stalemate' limits the traditional pattern of external behavior of Russia-Soviet Union. Progress in military technology changed the significance of buffer zones in the classical sense. Second, the rise in Soviet international status: now that the Soviet Union is conscious of its superpower status, it remains to be seen whether it will continue its 'hunter' type behavior, or conquer its suspicion and inferiority complex and choose to share international responsibility."99

The historical school tends to deemphasize the role of ideology in Soviet external behavior. It maintains that it should be judged by its past history and its conduct rather than by its party platform. For example, one thinks that "the nature of Soviet external behavior comes 80% from history and 20% from ideology."100 Another maintains that "ideology is used as a pretext to justify Russian expansionism, as George F. Kennan argues."101

ii) Ideological School

In contrast to the historical school, some on the right (far right) emphasize the role of ideology in Soviet external behavior. In fact, the ideological school regards

Marxism-Leninism as the "essence" of Soviet expansionism. Among them, a military specialist thinks that "one cannot understand the Soviet Union if one sees it as an extension of Russia, but can understand the Soviet Union only when one separates it from Russia. It is an incomprehensible country by common sense. It is composed of deception arts and military power. Marxism-Leninism is a religious constitution like the *Koran*, and is unchangeable. Due to this ideology, the Soviet Union is fighting a 'just war' to achieve world revolution according to its military doctrine. By nature it cannot disarm itself."¹⁰²

Another military specialist argues that "Soviet external behavior should be specifically understood from its military doctrine. It is intrinsically offensive, being made up of seven categories: national strategy, military doctrine, military science, military theory, military strategy, operational tactics, and tactics."¹⁰³ A politician on the right of center also thinks that "Marxism-Leninism in itself is expansionist for its ultimate purpose of world communism. Both the theory and its actual behavior prove that the Soviet Union is expansionist and dogmatically exclusionist, which does not allow co-existence with the West."¹⁰⁴

In this regard, a scholar in the center notes that "there are two pitfalls in relying solely on Soviet military doctrine for understanding the Soviet external behavior. First, the credibility of the literature of

Soviet military doctrine itself is doubtful. It is not certain to what extent it is used as deceptive propaganda internally and externally. Second, granting that it is a true description, Soviet military doctrine only prescribes general principles and does not tell us what course the Soviet Union actually will take. Therefore it should be regarded as a clue. One should not jump to conclusions about Soviet military strategic intentions from its military doctrine nor from its numerical military capability."¹⁰⁵

iii) Historical-Ideological Mix School

In comparison, some in the center think that Soviet external behavior derives from both history and ideology. Among them, a scholar argues that "it is inappropriate to explain the nature of Soviet external behavior by a black and white dichotomy of the Russian heritage (Richard Pipes and George F. Kennan) versus ideology (Wladislaw G. Krasnow and Paul H. Nitze). The two factors are not contradictory but continuous and overlapping: Marxism-Leninism was not introduced as a denial of the Russian tradition but it inherited important parts of the Russian heritage."¹⁰⁶

Similarly, another scholar thinks that "an amalgam of the two schools, that the Soviet Union inherited historical and geographical conditions of Czarist Russia and that it at the same time keeps ideological purposes in mind, better explains Soviet external behavior. There is no doubt that

Soviet external behavior follows the logic of power politics. However, this does not conceal the fact that it is conditioned by Marxist ideology. Ideology not only conditions options for Soviet policy, but also serves to justify *a posteriori* Soviet behavior taken purely in terms of power politics. [To put it differently,] the Soviet external behavior can be seen as the result of tension and conflict between two factors: the pressure of power politics (objective factor) and the constraints of ideology (subjective factor). The paradox of Soviet external behavior can be ascribed to the [irony] that, in its early period when the pressure of ideology was stronger, the Soviet Union lacked the power to realize it. As it acquired power, factors that reduce the ideological constraints have increased. As a result, the Soviet external behavior has now changed to *status quo* power politics, [as compared to] the linear expansionism of the Stalin era. No matter how strong the subjective factors might be, the objective factors limit the options for Soviet external behavior in the present day. These objective constraints are that: a) the basically cooperative relations with the U.S. not be jeopardized; b) further deterioration of relations with China be avoided; and c) the existence of the Eastern European nations has become a constraint rather than a source of freedom in Soviet external behavior. [In sum,] as a superpower, regardless of its will, the Soviet Union now

has to assume a role not of changing but of maintaining world order along with the U.S. The problem for the present Soviet leaders is not how to realize a new expansionism but how to preserve the heritage of the past expansionism. This does not mean that the Soviet Union will not try to expand its spheres of interest in the future. However, that possibility is considerably limited by the requirements of the balance of power in international politics."¹⁰⁷

iv) "Non-Expansionist" School

Finally the perceptions of the left part of the spectrum should be examined. In contrast to the right and center, those on the left do not regard the Soviet external behavior as intrinsically expansionistic but see it as basically defensive. They also think that its external behavior is not unique to the Soviet Union, but that it is merely pursuing its national interests and security as other nations do. In the opinion of a journalist, "it is true that the Soviet Union seeks '200% security,' but this should be distinguished from Czarist Russia's expansionism. It is not militant but tries to establish world peace. Were it not for the Soviet Union, the U.S. would have dominated the world by its military-industry complex. Although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should be condemned, the Soviet Union did so for its own security, fearing counter-revolution, as the U.S. did in Vietnam."¹⁰⁸

In the words of a scholar, "the Soviet Union sensitively reacts to the international environment, due to its historical fear of capitalist encirclement and due to the increasing interdependence of the world. It is not a particularly unusual nation but only a traditional nation which seeks to preserve territories it has acquired. It has never been expansionist in any of its history, but rather it is a *status quo* nation. The Soviet Union is engaged in the creation of one-nation socialism and seeks stability by creating a sphere of influence."¹⁰⁹

Similarly, some in the business circles on the left of center consider that "the central national interest of the Soviet Union is to protect itself from capitalism. It expands as a means of self-defense. Although it is expansionist in the eyes of capitalist nations, it has a right to protect its national interests. It is important to respect other countries' *raison d'être* and national interests."¹¹⁰ "The JCP does not classify the Soviet Union as expansionist but regards its external behavior as overly defensive. The JCP judges it on a case by case basis (as it criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan)."¹¹¹

b) Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives

i) Global Objectives

The majority of the foreign policy elites on the right and in the center hold that the Soviet global objectives are to expand its sphere of influence and to achieve

dominance in the world. They think that the Soviet Union still seeks interests defined by traditional power politics, and that the communist global objective of world revolution was added to the traditional Russian imperialism, or used as its pretext. Some on the right of center said that "although history proves that communism has failed and the communist thesis has lost its attraction, the Soviet Union has not given up its ultimate purpose."¹¹² Some in the center also said that "the Soviet 'national will' is world communism. Since it is in a defensive position at present, the Soviet Union intends to control the world along with the U.S. ('codominion theory'). However, its global objective would change were Soviet power to supercede U.S. power. It acts according to the rule of the balance of power."¹¹³

In contrast, those on the right maintain that the Soviet global objective is world communism defined by Marxism-Leninism, and that the Soviet Union has continued and will continue to seek this ultimate goal. A Soviet watcher argues that "the Soviet world strategy is to destroy 'U.S. Imperialism' by alienating [its allies] from the U.S. by means of military intimidation and a 'détente' mood. It avoids military confrontation with the U.S. Since the Soviet Union proclaims that 'peace' cannot come about until world revolution is completed (the Russian word *mir* means both 'peace' and 'world'), it justifies any means to achieve peace (=world revolution)."¹¹⁴

Conversely, some on the right of center and some on the left of center consider that "the Soviet Union has abandoned its ambition to overthrow the capitalist camp and to dominate the world."¹¹⁵ "It seeks merely to preserve the spheres of influence it has acquired through peaceful coexistence with the West. Its priority is to concentrate on its domestic reconstruction."¹¹⁶

ii) Foreign Policy Measures

1) Political Measures

The majority of the foreign policy elites think that the Soviet Union employs political measures to achieve its global objectives more than military measures. In the world of unwageability of nuclear war, some maintain that "superpowers have strategies for victory without waging nuclear war."¹¹⁷ "Now von Clausewitz's maxim should be reversed as 'politics is war by other means.'¹¹⁸

According to those on the right, there are five major tools for the Soviet political measures. The first tool is "paper and electric wave" (newspapers and radio) as "the most powerful psychological weapons for propaganda warfare. They are safer and cheaper than bullets. The Western mass media are the diplomatic tools [unilaterally] advantageous to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union can use the free Western mass media at its will to manipulate public opinion, while the West cannot do this towards the Soviet Union."¹¹⁹ The second tool is spies. "Although the first

tool is still a legal form of warfare, this is 'deception' warfare by sending 'Trojan horses.' Here too, the Soviet Union can make maximum use of free Western society, while Western countries cannot do this in the Soviet Union."¹²⁰ The third tool is the Soviet government itself. "The Soviet communist party sees its government merely as its tool, and uses its Embassies as bases for its deception operations."¹²¹ The fourth tool is international law and treaties. "The Soviet communist party regards them as a means for the class struggle in the international society. Thus it uses them to bind other nations, while it is not bound by the treaties its 'government' concluded."¹²² "The Soviet Union is a genius at violating treaties. As its conventional wisdom, no sooner than it concludes treaties, it violates them, while binding others."¹²³ For instance, "three Baltic nations which concluded mutual assistance treaties with the Soviet Union were annexed. Turkey, which repealed the non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union, was not invaded by that country."¹²⁴ As the fifth tool, "the Soviet Union uses even 'peaceful coexistence' and 'détente' as means of psychological war."¹²⁵

2) Military Measures

Their emphasis on political measures does not mean that the foreign policy elites dismiss military measures for the Soviet global objectives. However, the point is that here again they stress the use of Soviet military

power as a political and psychological weapon (military bluff) rather than the actual exercise of that power. Military specialists on the right of center judge that the Soviet Union will not exercise its military power against the U.S., given the overall U.S. military superiority to the Soviet Union. A former MFA official on the right argues that "the classical equation of military power with war is inapplicable in a nuclear age. A nuclear war between the superpowers will not take place."¹²⁶ "Instead, what the Soviet Union intends to do is to split the West by using the fear of nuclear war politically, and to expand its influence in the world without resorting to the exercise of armed force."¹²⁷ Therefore, "it reveals its military secrets to threaten other nations. Otherwise it would never reveal them."¹²⁸ They conclude that the Soviet military threat exists not only in its direct sense, but also in a political and psychological sense."¹²⁹

In contrast, some on the right do not neglect Soviet military measures in the sense of the actual use of force. According to a military specialist, "the Soviet Union is employing a 'war-winning strategy' even for nuclear war according to its military doctrine, while using a 'peace offensive' to deter the military build-up of the West. The Soviet Union proposes disarmament only to disarm the West, while seeking military expansion itself. It achieved its military superiority during the 1970's, taking advantage of détente and the SALT framework."¹³⁰ Another view is that

"Soviet statistics are deceptive to disguise ominous Soviet military expansion. The machinery industry means 'military industry,' in which the Middle-sized Machine Manufacturing Ministry means that of nuclear weapons; General Machines Ministry, of ballistic missiles; and Electronic Machines Ministry, of electronic weapons."¹³¹

There is a controversy among the military specialists on whether the Soviet Union has accepted the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine. Some on the right (far right) support Richard Pipes's view that the Soviet Union has never accepted the concept.¹³² One opinion is that "the Soviet military doctrine is fundamentally different from that of the U.S. It has no concept of deterrence. Moreover, the Soviet Union is the 'pioneer of the SDI.' It has preceded the U.S. in the development of a strategic defense system in space with its BMD (ballistic missile defense)."¹³³ According to another view, "the Soviet Union has never accepted the concept of MAD even tacitly. It did not conclude the SALT treaties as a recognition of the MAD doctrine, as the U.S. liberals think. Instead, the Soviet Union sought qualitative superiority within the confines of the SALT treaties. This resulted in a strategic asymmetry between the Soviet Union, excelling in 'prompt hard target kill capacity,' and the U.S., having wider 'soft target kill capacity'."¹³⁴

Conversely, some on the right of center think that the Soviet Union has accepted the MAD doctrine. A few experts

hold that "it is wrong to conclude that the Soviet Union is constantly expansionistic. The Soviet military doctrine is changing."¹³⁵ "First, it denied the 'unavoidability of war' doctrine at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and thereby adopted the concept of deterrence (Khrushchev's 'avoidability of war' doctrine). Second, it employed the 'expansion of external function' doctrine around 1973. It revived 'unavoidability of war doctrine' in 1977, under which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place."¹³⁶ Third, it changed again and "has accepted the MAD concept by Defense Minister Ustinov's Pravda Paper of July 1982 in response to the U.S. hardline policy."¹³⁷

Another scholar makes a different interpretation of Soviet acceptance of the MAD concept. The former sees a concept of deterrence in Khrushchev's "avoidability of war" doctrine, while the latter does not. In agreeing with Raymond L. Garthoff,¹³⁸ he argues that "Brezhnev's speech at Tura in 1977 was an important turning point in Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet Union, based on the fact that it achieved strategic parity with the U.S., abandoned Khrushchev's military doctrine that sought acquisition of a first strike capability for nuclear forces, military superiority, and victory in nuclear war. Thus the Soviet Union accepted the mutual deterrence doctrine."¹³⁹

Those on the left also think that the Soviet Union has accepted the MAD concept on the ground that it avowedly denied the doctrine of the inevitability of war.

c) Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Objectives

i) Merely "Change in Style" School

There is a dichotomy between the right and center, and the left on how to interpret Gorbachev's foreign policy objectives. Those on the right and center regard it merely as a change in style and find no fundamental change in the Soviet global objectives. Those on the left see it as a change in substance in the foreign policy objectives.

Those on the right and in the center maintain that Gorbachev is launching "multipolar diplomacy" and "smile diplomacy" to approach Europe, Asia, and the Pacific, in order to split them from the U.S. and to gain Soviet regional influence. A scholar on the right holds that "Gorbachev is merely thinking of how to make better use of Western Europe and Japan which Gromyko's diplomacy neglected."¹⁴⁰ He is trying to pressure the U.S. by pleasing them. In the opinion of another in the center, "Gorbachev's new style in foreign policy does not mean that the Kremlin's emphasis on its relations with the U.S. has decreased. Soviet foreign policy tactics can be categorized into two types: a) 'frontal attack' tactics which give first priority to global conflicts with the U.S. and regard relations with Europe and Japan as secondary, a direct approach to its archenemy. b) 'roundabout' tactics which make effective use of 'crevices' among the Western nations as a way to weaken the U.S., an indirect approach.

Among the two, Gorbachev is leaning toward the latter."¹⁴¹

They grasp Gorbachev's proposals for disarmament and arms control in this context. They see them as propaganda to split the West as the Soviet long-term objective, and to reduce the external burden for his domestic *perestroika* as the short-term objective: Although Gorbachev is launching a massive peace offensive, he will not make concessions to the extent that it would give the U.S. superiority. He is only trying to deter the SDI for fear that the Soviet Union might fall behind in high-tech development.

According to a Soviet watcher, "due to structural defects of the Soviet system that [he] has inherited, Gorbachev is not able to face direct confrontation with the U.S. He has no alternative but to deploy a propaganda offensive to disturb the West. Gorbachev is merely adopting Lenin's 'one step backward and two steps forward' tactics."¹⁴² "However, given the disillusionment with socialism in the West and the strengthening of unity among the Western allies, Gorbachev will not be able to achieve what the Soviet 'détente diplomacy' did in the 1970's. The West learned a lesson and will not be deceived again."¹⁴³

A military specialist holds that "the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has not abandoned its ultimate goal of world revolution but does and will continue to seek that goal. No basic change in its offensive 'national strategy' or 'military doctrine' is foreseen under Gorbachev."¹⁴⁴ Another argues that "Gorbachev's 'three-stage nuclear

weapon abolition' proposal is a rehash of Khrushchev's 'three-stage nuclear and non-nuclear weapon abolition' proposal (1959). That was nothing but Soviet deception to deter the U.S. effort to fill the 'missile gap'."145

Some in the center call "Gorbachev's policy a 'moratorium policy' on spending for the military, in order to catch up with the U.S. economically. This is based on the Soviet assumption that it has gained parity with the U.S. militarily. Recognizing the need for civilian technology for the military in an age of electronic war, Gorbachev seeks a 'dual policy' of putting equal emphasis on the military and on the economy."146

ii) "Remains-to-be-seen" School

Some on the right of center have a slightly more positive evaluation of Gorbachev's foreign policy. They think that, "given the serious need to reduce the military burden for his economic reforms, Gorbachev's proposals for disarmament cannot be interpreted just as propaganda."147 However, they add that, "although Gorbachev began to stress the economy, his basic priority remains security."148 "He is cunning. Even if nuclear disarmament is achieved, the Soviet Union has superiority in conventional weapons."149 Thus, they maintain that to what extent change in style in Gorbachev's foreign policy will lead to change in substance of Soviet global objectives remains to be seen.

iii) "Change in Substance" School

Conversely, those on the left see Gorbachev's foreign policy as a real change in Soviet global objectives. They think that the Soviet Union has abandoned world revolution. They consider that two major objectives of Gorbachev's multipolar diplomacy are to contain U.S. influence in the world and to reconstruct the Soviet economy. They also interpret his disarmament and arms control proposals as a genuine effort for disarmament.

Some, in paying attention to the changes that are taking place, state that "the seriousness that Gorbachev puts into rapid change is notable. This is shown in his proposals to join the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT, and the 'Pacific Basin scheme,' which the Soviet Union used to criticize as the Pacific version of NATO."¹⁵⁰ A scholar notes that "the Soviet Union has begun to move in the direction of external openness and to change its external awareness. The impact that Gorbachev's reforms would have on Soviet foreign policy should not be underestimated."¹⁵¹ In the words of a journalist, "Gorbachev is different from his predecessors who were preoccupied with preserving Soviet security by imposing a 'limited sovereignty' on Eastern Europe. Gorbachev has confidence in the Soviet Union as a superpower, so he makes disarmament proposals, while seeking supremacy over the U.S. In the long run, the Soviet Union will stop 'threat diplomacy' and seek coexistence with the West."¹⁵²

According to another on the left, "Gorbachev clearly dismissed the doubts of Western military specialists that the Soviet nuclear strategy differs from that of the U.S. and that the Soviet Union seeks a possibility for victory in nuclear war. Gorbachev recognizes that there is no victor in a nuclear war and seeks relations with the 'West' on the premise that nuclear war should not be fought. His external objectives are reduction in international tension and disarmament; the latter especially is his most important goal. Gorbachev is taking initiatives even in the reduction of conventional weapons. The 'Budapest proposal' that aims at reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe is just an example that his proposals cannot be interpreted merely as propaganda. The dominance of the stereotypical analysis of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev in Japan seems to suggest a crisis in Japanese international awareness. The Chinese internal and external policy changes became an important source of momentum for promoting the stability of international relations and peace, and made possible peaceful coexistence among nations of different political systems. Changes in Gorbachev's Soviet Union could be even more significant. This would also affect the very foundation of Japan's security policy that is based on the assumption of a Soviet threat."¹⁵³

3. Soviet Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Japan

a) Foreign Policy Objectives vis-à-vis Japan

The majority of the foreign policy elites, except those on the left, think that the Soviet long-term foreign policy objective vis-à-vis Japan is to split Japan from the U.S. and to neutralize Japan ("Finlandization—separation and subjugation"). Its short-term foreign policy objective is to shelve the Northern Territories dispute and to obtain Japanese economic cooperation. The Soviet Union thinks of Japan only in terms of its relationship with the U.S. It regards Japan merely as a dependent of the U.S. in the long-term perspective, and only as a tool for Soviet economic development in the short-term perspective. In essence, they regard Soviet foreign policy objectives as irreconcilable with those of Japan.

b) Foreign Policy Measures vis-à-vis Japan

i) Political Measure 1: Propaganda Offensive

Those on the right hold that the Soviet Union has been launching a propaganda offensive against Japan. To quote one, "the Soviet Union intends to take over Japan by waging propaganda warfare in three steps. First, to split Japan from the U.S. by equating national independence to anti-Americanism and deceiving Japan that it would become a nuclear theater because of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Second, to neutralize Japan by having it repeal the

Security Treaty. Third, to communize Japan. Since the Soviet objectives vis-à-vis Japan are to nullify Japan militarily and to use its economic and technological power, deception operations are the optimal war means against Japan. Military invasion of Japan would incur an all-out war with the U.S. If not, it would destroy Japanese productivity: the U.S. would not hand over the Japanese production facility unharmed to the Soviet Union."¹⁵⁴

Others on the right add that "the Soviet conventional tactics of sending spies into the locale of political power "¹⁵⁵ "are intended not only to alienate Japan from the U.S. but also to split Japan internally. The Soviet Union tries to disturb Japanese public opinion, to make the Japanese distrustful of their government, and even to split the ruling LDP."¹⁵⁶ For example, "the Soviet Union has been mobilizing massive disarmament movements in order to foster pacifism among the Japanese and to make Japan curtail its defense efforts. The well-intended pacifists are taken in by the Soviet 'peace offensive'."¹⁵⁷ In fact, "if only Kovalenko were to meet Daisaku Ikeda (founder of the *Sōka gakkai*), millions of signatures for the anti-nuclear movement would be collected."¹⁵⁸

In addition, they argue that the Soviet propaganda tries to split Japanese public opinion on the Northern Territories and to have Japan abandon them. "Pro-Soviet Japanese, manipulated by the Soviet Union, advocate the 'two islands reversion.' Even worse, the 'two islands

reversion' itself is deceptive: It looks as if the Soviet Union would return half of the Northern Territories (two out of four islands). Yet, the fact is that the two islands comprise only 7% of the whole area of the Northern Territories."¹⁵⁹ "There are spies even at the JDA's National Institute for Defense Studies, who argue that the islands are spoils of war of the Soviet Union and that it is of no use for Japan to demand their return."¹⁶⁰

They note that the "ten-point" objectives towards Japan that the former KGB agent Levchenko revealed proved the existence of Soviet "active measures" as follows:

- "to prevent development of Japan-U.S. political and military cooperation,
- to foster mutual distrust between Japan and the U.S.,
- to prevent development of Sino-Japanese friendly relations,
- to prevent a Sino-Japan-U.S. anti-Soviet alliance,
- to make new pro-Soviet 'lobbies' among influential politicians of the LDP and the JSP,
- to convince the government leaders of the need to expand economic relations with the Soviet Union,
- to publicize the importance of the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet 'Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation' Treaty,
- to exert influence on the JSP's platform in order to prevent a political monopoly by the LDP,
- to prevent the creation of a coalition government by the opposition parties in order to secure the political

stability of Japan, and

—to convince the government of the meaninglessness of demanding the Northern Territories reversion."¹⁶¹

However, Levchenko's testimony is regarded as only the tip of the iceberg. Those on the right conclude that "the Soviet Union tries to foster defeatism among the Japanese, using KGB agents, Japanese leftist journalism, and military bluff. Japanese mass media, which compete to carry the KGB's fraudulent propaganda as top news, are paying the Soviet warfare costs. Japan is invaded from within."¹⁶²

ii) Political Measure 2: Treaty-Proposing Offensive

In the deadlock of peace treaty negotiations that involve the territorial issue, the Soviet Union has proposed a number of treaties and agreements: the Asian collective security concept, the Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty, Confidence Building Measures in the Far East (CBM), and agreement on Soviet non-first use of nuclear weapons against Japan; treaty proposals on parade. The MFA maintains that Japan cannot conclude any of these treaties or agreements before it concludes a peace treaty (a peace treaty should take precedence). It also holds that true confidence between Japan and the Soviet Union can be built only by the conclusion of a peace treaty (if the Soviet Union really wants to build confidence with Japan, it should prove this

by returning the Northern Territories).

The majority of the foreign policy elites, except for those on the left, see these Soviet proposals as its tactics to nullify the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (as long-term objectives) and to shelve the territorial issue (as short-term objectives). They also consider that these proposals mean nothing but deceit and blackmail.

First, they dismiss Brezhnev's Asian collective security concept proposed in 1969, which provided for the principles of non-use of armed forces, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-intervention into internal matters, and economic cooperation on an equal and mutual basis. It was rejected by almost all of the Asian countries. A scholar in the center thinks that "it is the Asian version of the Helsinki Accord of 1975,"¹⁶³ which acknowledged the *status quo* of the national borders in Europe. Thus it is intended to legitimize the Soviet possession of the Northern Territories.

Second, they denounce the Brezhnev proposal of a Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty in 1975. Article 3 provides that the territory of neither country can be used to prejudice the security of the other partner. Article 4 says that "neither party should assist a third party in aggression against the other."¹⁶⁴ (For the full text of the draft proposal, see Appendix IV.) In the opinion of those on the right, these Articles mean that "Japan should repeal the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."¹⁶⁵

"Article 5 is a military consultation clause."¹⁶⁶

In addition, a scholar on the right argues that "the proposal is also intended to shelve the territorial issue. It has no provision for the 'principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention into internal affairs,' which are the premises of good-neighborliness. As a basic treaty to resume diplomatic relations, a peace treaty has to involve these matters. It has to include a clause defining territorial boundaries but a good-neighborliness and cooperation treaty does not have to."¹⁶⁷

The scholar also points out that "the proposed good-neighborliness and *friendship* treaty (as it is often mistakenly referred to) is correctly a good-neighborliness and *cooperation* treaty. It is impossible to have warm 'friendly relations' between Japan and the Soviet Union. It is possible only to have some improvement in their cool practical relations within the framework of the alleged peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union proposed this treaty only because it felt estranged by the Sino-Japanese *rapprochement*. Japan and the Soviet Union resumed diplomatic relations in 1956 but they still have not concluded a peace treaty. In contrast, Japan and China normalized their diplomatic relations in 1972 and were about to conclude a peace treaty in 1975."¹⁶⁸ (The Soviet Union tried to obstruct the treaty and denounced it as anti-Soviet because of its anti-hegemony clause.)

A scholar in the center considers the Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty "Brezhnev's tactic to realize *de facto* his Asian collective security concept by concluding bilateral treaties with each country in Asia, after his grand concept was aborted."¹⁶⁹

In comparison, the opinion of a military specialist on the right of center is that "it might be better to conclude a Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty in order to stabilize the relations with the Soviet Union: now Japan does not have to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union since it was only a means in 1956 to obtain the return of the Northern Territories. The MFA's insistence on a peace treaty seems to be only an excuse to reject Soviet proposals like this one."¹⁷⁰

Third, the majority of the foreign policy elites regard Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the Far East as deceptive or, at least, trivial. Brezhnev proposed to apply the CBM in Europe (advance notice of army exercises and mutual invitation of observers) to the Far East in 1981, as a centerpiece of the Asian collective security forum. Those on the right express their anger over the "Soviet 'nerve' in proposing the CMB after it had betrayed the confidence of Japan by itself violating the Joint Declaration of 1956."¹⁷¹ A scholar thinks that the CBM are not only deceptive but also meaningless: "they should be called 'Distrust Reducing Measures' rather than Confidence Building Measures. They make no mention of the Korean

Peninsula where tension is highest in Asia. In essence, the Soviet Union intends to use the Japanese 'economic card' by deceptive political proposals."¹⁷² Another notes that "by using the 'CMB in the Far East' as the pretext, the Soviet Union has expanded [the Asia collective security concept] to encompass more military aspects; such as non-use of nuclear weapons, rejection of participating in the SDI, withdrawal of foreign military bases, suspension of support for anti-government and terrorist activities. This indicates the Soviet fretfulness about the U.S. 'direct confrontation strategy' in the 1980's."¹⁷³

Fourth, those on the right denounce the Soviet proposal of an agreement on its non-use of nuclear weapons against Japan in return for Japanese observance of the "three non-nuclear principle" (not to possess, not to produce, and not to introduce nuclear weapons) as an unequal treaty and as nothing but blackmail. A scholar argues that "this agreement is unilateral because Japan does not have nuclear weapons. The 'three non-nuclear principles' is an internal policy that Japan chose voluntarily. It cannot be imposed on Japan by treaties with others."¹⁷⁴ Another adds that "a Soviet pledge not to attack Japan by nuclear weapons is not a Soviet concession at all because it has no intention of doing so."¹⁷⁵

iii) Military Measures

The foreign policy elites disagree in their evaluations of Soviet military measures. Those on the right of center, including military specialists, do not see the Soviet threat as real. They think that the Soviet Union has no intention nor capability of attacking Japan militarily, given the sufficient deterrence with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. To quote a military specialist, "Soviet military attack against Japan would incur an all-out war between the superpowers. The Soviet Union has no intention of waging nuclear war against the U.S. Second, Japan is a valuable country to make use of, not to destroy. The Soviet Union would rather get along with Japan for economic cooperation."¹⁷⁶ Instead, they regard "the Soviet military presence and maneuvers in the Far East as political and psychological threats. These include frequent Soviet violations of Japanese territorial air space by the so-called 'Tokyo Express' flights, and of its territorial waters by Soviet submarines."¹⁷⁷

They also regard the Soviet militarization of the Northern Territories in 1978, with an estimated one army division (10,000 men), as mainly intended to exert psychological pressure. A military specialist said that "the weight of the Northern Territories is insignificant in the Soviet military strategy. The Soviet ground forces on the islands have no direct connection with the 'sanctuary of the Sea of Okhotsk,' where anti-submarine capabilities

matter."¹⁷⁸. Another notes that "there are better options for keeping the strategic balance in the region and better islands for ground bases to the north in the Kuriles. The Soviet Union remilitarized them only as a reprisal for the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty."¹⁷⁹

Those on the right regard the Soviet military threat as real. Some said that "it is not just a threat; it intends to invade Japan. If conditions allow, the Soviet Union will conquer Japan."¹⁸⁰ Others said that, "since the Soviet Union could come to take over Hokkaido, the U.S. stationing of ground forces in Hokkaido is welcome."¹⁸¹

In contrast, those on the left hardly perceive a Soviet military threat and dismiss the Soviet threat as U.S. propaganda. Some think that, "with the U.S. military superiority to the Soviet Union, the Soviet military threat is unrealistic. The Soviet Union has no intention or capability of attacking Japan. Should it take over Japan, it would be in trouble trying to control the additional 110 million population of its 16th Republic."¹⁸²

iv) High-Handed Diplomacy

Finally, as general diplomatic tactics, the "high-handed diplomacy" that the Soviet Union has employed towards Japan should be mentioned. The majority of the foreign policy elites see the high-handed Soviet diplomacy as based on an assumption that Japan is a military dwarf and a dependent of the U.S. They are indignant over its

making light of Japan. In fact, MFA officials regard it as "a most critical impediment to Japan-Soviet relations."¹⁸³ One said that "the Soviet Union has consistently neglected Japan because it wrongly judges nations by their military power. No Russian or Soviet leader has ever visited Japan, whereas four Japanese Prime Ministers have visited Moscow. On the Foreign Ministerial level, only Gromyko visited Tokyo (three times) [prior to Shevardnadze], whereas seven Japanese counterparts visited Moscow."¹⁸⁴ (See Tables 1 and 2) However, he thinks that "in recent years, the Soviet Union has begun to notice this mistake and to reassess Japan owing to these factors: a) Japan's economic power and high technology, b) Japan's diplomatic presence in Asia and the Middle East, and c) Japan's gradual defense build-up. Gorbachev took power at the time of the Soviet reassessment of Japan and reshuffled the foreign ministry that had neglected Asia, from Gromyko on down. This is also reflected in Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986."¹⁸⁵ The question of to what extent the foreign policy elites perceive that Gorbachev has changed Soviet foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan will be examined next.

c) Gorbachev's Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Japan

i) Gorbachev's "Multipolar" and "Smile"
Diplomacy

The majority from the right and to the center see Gorbachev's foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis Japan as basically the same as those of his predecessors and dismiss his "multipolar" and "smile" diplomacy as tactics to create an atmosphere of change. They maintain that Gorbachev is approaching Japan only for economic interests: first, the need for Japanese capital investment and technology for his economic *perestroika*; second, the growing Soviet economic interests in the Asia-Pacific economic sphere, in which Japan is a leading nation; and third, the need for Japanese help in Siberian development. A Soviet watcher on the right argues that "it is only the Soviet Union which will benefit from this deceptive *rapprochement*, while Japan has almost nothing to gain from the Soviet Union. This is exactly what Foreign Minister Shevardnadze intends in his visit to Japan—to get Japanese economic cooperation and to disturb the LDP internally—tactics of 'killing two birds with one stone'."¹⁸⁶ A scholar in the center puts it as: "Gorbachev is a great magician. He intends to obtain Japanese capital and technology without returning the Northern Territories. He creates an illusion that improvement of Japan-Soviet relations will lead to the return of the islands."¹⁸⁷ Some in the business circles

think that "Gorbachev puts priority on the development of Western Siberia over that of Eastern Siberia and tries to have Japan develop Eastern Siberia."¹⁸⁸

The majority of the foreign policy elites also find in Gorbachev no fundamental change in the Soviet perceptions of Japan. They warn that Japan should not have illusions that the Soviet perceptions of Japan have changed. A scholar on the right holds that "the real motivation behind Gorbachev's 'making much of Japan' is to approach Japan in order to split it from the U.S. Were Japan to make friends both with the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would only think little of Japan. In order to make the Soviet Union really respect Japan, Japan should consolidate its ties with the U.S."¹⁸⁹ To quote another in the center, "the Soviet perception of Japan is changing from 'military dwarf' to 'economic giant.' Yet, insofar as the Soviet Union sees military power as the key factor in the balance of power, the importance of Japan in Soviet foreign policy will not increase. Gorbachev has not yet completely wiped out Gromyko's tactics that regard high-handed diplomacy backed by military power as the optimal policy."¹⁹⁰

In contrast, those on the left think that "the change in Gorbachev's diplomatic style reflects a change in Soviet perception of Japan. Japan is no longer regarded as a 'dependent variable' of the U.S. It is wrong to see the Soviet Union with the eyes of three years ago as the MFA is still doing."¹⁹¹

**ii) Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific Collective
Security Forum**

The majority from the right and to the center claim that Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of July 1986 "revealed nothing new for Soviet foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan."¹⁹² It merely paid lip service, in order to "use Japan, which is regarded as the easiest country to deceive, as an avenue for its entry into the Pacific Basin scheme."¹⁹³ An MFA official said that, "although Gorbachev called Japan one of the three major powers, at heart he looks down on Japan. He regards Japan merely as a dependent of the U.S. and as a tool for his economic reform. Rather, his speech was mainly intended to improve relations with China; concerned at the political and security level with China, while only at the economic level with Japan."¹⁹⁴

They also dismiss the Asia-Pacific collective security forum that Gorbachev proposed in his Vladivostok speech, as an expanded version of his earlier Pan-Asian collective security forum, and as a rehash of Brezhnev's Asian collective security concept. They hold that it is intended to weaken the U.S. military presence in the region and to secure Soviet influence in the region. The forum "highlights the reduction in the INF [intermediate nuclear forces] in the Asia-Pacific region. [It includes] a five point proposal: 1) to make regional adjustments in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Korean Peninsula; 2) to deter the expansion and increase of nuclear weapons in Asia and

the Pacific; 3) to shrink activities of fleets and nuclear weapon carriers (including those of anti-submarine forces in specific regions) in the Pacific; 4) to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons in Asia; and 5) the CBM and non-use of armed forces."¹⁹⁵ A journalist considers "the third point the most problematic. It is aimed at the reduction of U.S.-Japan joint anti-submarine activities in the region. In essence, the forum is Gorbachev's diplomatic weapon to become a 'Pacific nation.' It is hardly even worth the name 'peace offensive.'"¹⁹⁶

According to a scholar in the center, "there are similarities between Gorbachev's Pan-Asian forum and Brezhnev's Asian collective security concept. The former refers to the Helsinki accord as a model and mechanically tries to apply policies used in Europe to Asia, without considering the difference in their situations. Insofar as Japan regards Gorbachev's CBM proposal as one of the Soviet tactics to shelve a peace treaty, it will be unacceptable to Japan."¹⁹⁷ In comparison, a military specialist on the right of center thinks that "the attitude of the MFA (that the return of the Northern Territories as the only meaningful CBM) is too rigid. The CBM proposal is worth considering, although it does not mean that Japan should be deceived by Gorbachev."¹⁹⁸

Those on the left take the Asia-Pacific collective security forum at face value and see it as meaningful in terms of Japanese security and stability in Asia. Some

argue that "it should be regarded as an Asian version of the 'Budapest proposal,' which is designed to reduce the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. The negative view that denounces it as a rehash of Brezhnev's Asian collective security concept ignores new elements in Gorbachev's five point proposal, which make a decisive difference from Brezhnev's."¹⁹⁹ Others think that "Gorbachev's Asian forum is useful as a way to preserve Japanese security multilaterally."²⁰⁰

iii) Gorbachev's Policy on the Northern Territories

Although the foreign policy elites perceive differences in Gorbachev's foreign policy from that of his predecessors, either in style or in substance, the real litmus test of his *glasnost* vis-à-vis Japan is the territorial issue. The majority find no fundamental change in his policy. They hold that "Gorbachev has no intention of returning the Northern Territories, but is only creating an atmosphere of improved relations by resuming peace treaty negotiations."²⁰¹ In fact, Gorbachev told Foreign Minister Abe that Japan was raising a question that should not be raised and reiterated that the territories must not be altered. The only *glasnost* that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze revealed in Tokyo was that the Soviet Union would not object if Japan raised the issue.

A Soviet specialist on the right of center said that "the Soviet Union has begun to think about what to do with the Northern Territories only in terms of what it can get from Japan. It is hardly prepared to make concessions. Gorbachev will not change the basic policy towards Japan. He only wants to create an atmosphere of change, by making minor changes."²⁰² Another said that "the Soviet Union thinks that if it waits patiently, Japan will come to beg for the islands in return for economic cooperation."²⁰³

In comparison, some on the right of center think that Gorbachev might change the Soviet policy on the Northern Territories. A former MFA official sees in Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech a slight chance of the return. He notes that "Gorbachev made a concession in its historical border dispute with China (agreeing on the borderline in the Ussuri and Amur Rivers being the median line of the main channel). The Soviet Union finally proved to China after seventy years that it will return territory that it took wrongly. The Soviet Union has three obstacles with China, while only one with Japan (the Northern Territories issue). Gorbachev knows that he cannot avoid this issue if he wants to use Japan for his *perestroika*. However, the two islands would be his maximum concession. Yet, insofar as Japanese public opinion would not accept it, he might not use this card either."²⁰⁴ A scholar on the left of center stated that "the Soviet Union is waiting for a change of generations in Japan, so that the issue will 'wither.'"²⁰⁵

**iv) Resumption of the Northern Territories
Grave Visits**

Next, the minor change that Gorbachev made on the Northern Territories, the lifting of a ban on ancestral grave visits in the Territories in the summer of 1986, should be examined. Those on the right think that the resumption was problematic for several reasons. First, although visas were not required, "the Soviet Union demanded that the Japanese buy coupons issued by Intourist. They are equivalent to visas,"²⁰⁶ and "were not required on the earlier visits."²⁰⁷ Second, the two islands remained off limits. Third, and most importantly, the Soviet Union demanded reciprocity in the form of a Russian visit to the graves in Japan (of the POWs of the Russo-Japanese War) without visas. One holds that "this reciprocity is dubious. The Soviet visits are 'entry' into Japan proper, whereas the Japanese visits in the Northern Territories are not 'entry' into the Soviet territories proper."²⁰⁸ Another speculates that "this 'reciprocity' is intended to establish a *fait accompli* for the Soviet allegation that Japan acknowledges the islands to be Soviet territory."²⁰⁹

Those on the right criticize the MFA's acceptance of the resumption of the grave visits on these terms: "The imposition of arbitrary reciprocity incurred great loss to Japan on the reversion of the Northern Territories. It treated them in effect as Soviet territory. Although the ancestral grave visits were resumed, it was another blow to

the return of the Northern Territories in the long run. Japan should have at least demanded that the Japanese go to Sakhalin and Siberia by obtaining visas, in order to make the distinction between their visits to the Soviet territories and those to the Northern Territories."²¹⁰ In comparison, a scholar in the center said that "the Russian visit to Japan without visas was alright; the Japanese visited Sakhalin and Siberia without visas as well."²¹¹

v) Gorbachev's Visit to Japan

Finally, Gorbachev's visit to Japan, as another litmus test of his *glasnost* vis-à-vis Japan, should be briefly mentioned. The majority of the foreign policy elites consider that the sheer fact that it has not been realized proves that there is no fundamental change in Soviet perceptions of Japan. Even some on the left of center hold that "Gorbachev would not visit Japan in January 1987, contrary to the expectations of the Japanese. Although Primakov [the IMEMO Director-General] said that Gorbachev would visit Japan regardless of U.S.-Soviet relations, he would never visit Japan before he visited the U.S."²¹² Only Japan made a fuss over it, exaggerating the fact that Gorbachev merely said in July 1986 that such an occasion might come about in the near future. It was overreaction and overexpectation on the part of Prime Minister Nakasone.

Notes

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3. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
4. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
5. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
6. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
7. Interview, Tokyo, November 6, 1986.
8. Interview, Tokyo, November 12, 1986.
9. Akira Sono, *Sobieto wocchingu yonjū-nen* (Soviet Watching: Forty Years), Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan sha, 1983, pp. 69-70.
10. Interview, Tokyo, October 25, 1986.
11. Minoru Nagata, "Soren 'chōtaikoku' no tasogare" ("Twilight of Soviet Superpower"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 32, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 8, August 1986, p. 221.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 216 and 221.
13. Akira Sono, "Soren 'chōtaikoku' no tasogare" ("Twilight of Soviet Superpower"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 32, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 8, August 1986, p. 209.
14. Minoru Nagata, *op. cit.*, pp. 213 and 215-217.
15. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Twilight of Soviet Superpower"), p.223.
16. Minoru Nagata, *op. cit.*, pp. 223.
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19. *Ibid.*
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23. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
24. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
25. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
26. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
27. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
28. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
29. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* (*Soviet Watching: Forty Years*), p. 70.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-73.
31. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
32. Interview, Tokyo, November 14, 1986.
33. Interview, Tokyo, November 10, 1986.
34. Interview, Tokyo, November 21, 1986.
35. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
36. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
37. Hisahiko Okazaki, *Senryaku teki shikō to wa nanika* (*What Is Strategic Thinking*), Tokyo: Chūō Kōron sha, 1983, p. 72.
38. Interview, Tokyo, November 6, 1986.
39. Zenichiro Watanabe, "Soren to tsukiau tame no saishin 'jukukai'" ("The Latest 'Ten Commandments' on How to Associate with the Soviet Union"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 29, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 5, May 1986, p.236, (quoting the "Ten Commandments" of Edwin [sic, Edward] Rowny, the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the SALT II negotiations, on how to negotiate with the Soviet Union).

40. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
41. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
42. Kenichi Ito, "Roshia=Soren no taigai-kōdō patān no keizoku-sei" ("Continuity in the Russia=Soviet External Behavior Patterns"), in JIIA, ed., *Tenkanki no Soren* (Soviet Union in Transition), Tokyo: JIIA, 1986, p.214.
43. Interview, Tokyo, November 12, 1986.
44. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
45. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
46. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
47. "Gorubachofu no Soren: Tamba zen chūso kōshi ni kiku" ("The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: An Interview with Former Minister to the Soviet Union Tamba"), Series No. 2, *Sankei Shimbun*, May 9, 1986, p. 5.
48. Interview, Tokyo, November 10, 1986.
49. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
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52. *Sankei Shimbun*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
53. Hiroshi Kimura, "Gorubachofu-shugi" ("Gorbachevism"), in JIIA, ed., *Tenkanki no Soren* (Soviet Union in Transition), Tokyo: JIIA, 1986, pp. 47-48, (emphasis added).
54. *Ibid.*
55. Shigeki Hakamada, "Soren no perestoroika" ("Perestroika in the Soviet Union"), *Yomiuri Shimbun* (evening edition), July 11, 1987.
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57. Interview, Japan, November 8, 1986.
58. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
59. Interview, Tokyo, November 12, 1986.

60. Hiroshi Kimura, "'Gurasunosuchi' eno chōsenjō" ("Letter of Challenge to 'Glasnost'"), *Shokun*, Vol. 19, No. 6, June 1987, p. 145, (emphasis added).
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 141 and 144.
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63. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
64. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
65. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
66. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
67. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
68. Takehito Seki, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.
69. Interview, Tokyo, November 19, 1986.
70. Interview, Tokyo, November 21, 1986.
71. Seweryn Bialer, in JIIA, ed., *Tenkanki no Soren* (Soviet Union in Transition), Tokyo: JIIA, 1986, p. 111, (in Discussions for Session I).
72. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
73. Peter Knirsch, in JIIA, ed., *Tenkanki no Soren* (Soviet Union in Transition), Tokyo: JIIA, 1986, p. 113, (in Discussions for Session I).
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75. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
76. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
77. Interview, Tokyo, November 21, 1986.
78. Interview, Japan, November 8, 1986.
79. Akira Sono, "Soren shunō no 'gunshuku kōshō' jutsu" ("Soviet Leadership's 'Disarmament Negotiation' Tactics"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane." ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 15, *Shokun*, Vol. 17, No. 3, March 1985, p. 197.

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87. Subtitle of the dialogue article of Kenichi Ito and Hiroshi Kimura, *op. cit.* ("'1 in 10,000' Shock Wave from Chernobyl"), p. 64.
88. Kenichi Ito, *op. cit.* ("'1 in 10,000' Shock Wave from Chernobyl"), p. 64.
89. Kenichi Ito, *op. cit.*, in JIIA, ed., pp. 215-216.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 217-218.
91. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
92. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
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94. Interview, Tokyo, October 31, 1986.
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96. Kenichi Ito, *op. cit.*, in JIIA, ed., pp. 204-206.
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102. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
103. Hiroyuki Maruyama, *Kaku-sensō keikaku (Nuclear War Plans)*, Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 1985, p. 186.
104. Interview, Tokyo, November 29, 1986.
105. Hiroshi Kimura, *op. cit.*, in Shinkichi Eto, ed., p.70.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.
107. Hayao Shimizu, *Gendai Sobieto kokka ron (A Study of the Modern Soviet Union)*, Tokyo: Chūō Kōron sha, 1971, pp.127-133, and 136.
108. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
109. Interview, Tokyo, November 19, 1986.
110. Interview, Tokyo, November 12, 1986.
111. Interview, Tokyo, November 20, 1986.
112. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
113. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
114. Akira Sono, *op. cit. (Soviet Watching: Forty Years)*, pp. 65-66 and 82.
115. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
116. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
117. Akira Sono, *op. cit. (Soviet Watching: Forty Years)*, p. 78.
118. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.
119. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-101.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.
121. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-87.
122. *Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.
123. Akio Kimura, "Soren wa 'jōyaku yaburi' no tensai" ("The Soviet Union: A Genius at 'Violating Treaties'"), *Shokun*, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 1987, pp. 48 and 52-58.
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126. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
127. *Ibid.*, pp. 61 and 66.
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149. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
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178. Interview, Tokyo, November 4, 1986.
179. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
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Chapter V. Japanese Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union

1. General Framework

a) Nature of Japanese Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union

i) Determinant 1: 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty

According to an MFA official, "a near consensus among the foreign policy decision-makers in the MFA has been established on its policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union since 1956, with two basic objectives. First, the essence of Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. As long as the 'Japan-U.S. Security Treaty System' is sustained under the current bipolar system, it is impossible for Japan to ally itself with the Soviet Union and unrealistic for it to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union. However, Japan will not employ an antagonistic and confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union. It maintains diplomatic channels with and seeks to stabilize relations with the Soviet Union within the framework of the Security Treaty System. Second, Japan continues to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the realization of the return of the Northern Territories through the conclusion of a peace treaty."¹

There is a consensus among the foreign policy elites that there are two decisive determinants for the formation

of the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union: the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, and the signing of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in 1956. The conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, by which Prime Minister Yoshida chose the "partial peace" (or "majority peace"²) rather than a "general peace," was the "watershed of Japan's postwar foreign policy."³ The "majority peace" with 48 allied powers excluding the Soviet bloc "laid down the basic course of postwar Japanese foreign policy (the Yoshida Diplomacy)."⁴ It incorporated Japan into the Western "freedom" camp in the postwar cold-war framework through "cooperative relations" with the U.S. (The term "alliance" is avoided by the Japanese government in consideration of the left wing.)

In addition, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, signed simultaneously with the Peace Treaty, "articulated the content of Japanese postwar foreign policy."⁵ It made Japan dependent on the U.S. for its national security and made Japan-Soviet relations unfriendly. Thus, "the basic framework of postwar Japanese foreign policy was defined by the 'San Francisco Peace Treaty System' and the 'Japan-U.S. Security Treaty System' under the *Pax Americana*."⁶

The majority of the foreign policy elites, except for those on the left, regard the "partial peace" as the right choice for Japan, given the international environment (the intensification of the cold war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the midst of the Korean War) and the

internal environment (Japan had no power under the occupation of the Allied Powers under General MacArthur). With the Soviet rejection of the U.S. draft proposal of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida abandoned the "general peace." In the words of a former MFA official on the right of center, "the foreign policy elites at that time were divided between advocates of the 'general peace' and those of the 'partial peace.' However, the conclusion of the latter was the natural choice for Japan in order to obtain independence as soon as possible. The dynamics of the balance of power in the international system is the fundamental determinant of foreign policy. Postwar Japan's foreign policy was determined by the relative power of Japan in the U.S.-Soviet bipolar system. It was inevitable for powerless Japan to be incorporated into the U.S. framework and to become involved in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. With the establishment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty System and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty System, the choice left to Japan was merely 'how to walk on the track.' In essence, Japan-Soviet relations are dependent variables of U.S.-Soviet relations, and Japan's maneuverability is limited in the framework of their relations."⁷ An MFA official on the right of center feels that, "although the Japan-U.S. alliance is taken for granted now, the choice of the 'majority peace' by Prime Minister Yoshida was critical."⁸

**ii) Determinant 2: 1956 Japan-Soviet
Joint Declaration**

As the general framework of Japan's postwar foreign policy was defined by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, its foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union per se was articulated by the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956. To quote an MFA official on the right of center, "after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the problem remained as to how to normalize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Before 1956, there was a wider spectrum of public opinion and diversity within the ruling parties on the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. The governing circle was split on how to stabilize relations with the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Yoshida [of the Liberal Party] tried to achieve the goal by recognizing the Soviet Union as an antagonistic power. Prime Minister Hatoyama [of the Japan Democratic Party] tried to do so by accommodating with it."⁹

After Prime Minister Hatoyama succeeded Yoshida, he initiated peace treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union. This ended up with the Hatoyama-Bulganin Joint Declaration, short of a peace treaty. An MFA official said that "Hatoyama's failure to conclude a peace treaty proved the legitimacy of the 'Yoshida Doctrine.' Its essence is cooperation with the U.S."¹⁰

Although it was short of a peace treaty, the majority of the foreign policy elites, except for some on the right,

still evaluate the signing of the Joint Declaration as the right policy. Even a former MFA official on the right thinks that "normalization of diplomatic relations was preferable even with the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it coincided with the Polish Revolt of 1956. The Soviet leaders gathered in Warsaw, except Bulganin, so that some of the Japanese negotiation delegates argued that Japan should suspend the signing. The normalization was preferable because Japan's position was weak at that time, the release of Japanese hostages in Siberia was urgent (they were dying in forced labor), and the Soviet Union was vetoing Japan's entry into the U.N."¹¹

The deadlock of the Northern Territories issue in the peace treaty negotiations transformed the cool nature of Japan-Soviet relations to a frozen one, to the extent that it has come to symbolize their stalemate relations. Thus, the 1956 event defined the framework of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, which is characterized by distrust and frigidity.

iii) Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union Since 1956

As a result of the two diplomatic events, a consensus on Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was formed, with the two objectives mentioned earlier. This was endorsed by the continuance in power of the ruling LDP for four decades. However, the fact is that, since 1956,

Japan has formulated no significant new foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, except for the signing of the Tanaka-Brezhnev Joint Communiqué of 1973. Besides, this event is evaluated less positively than the 1956 event. To quote a former MFA official, "in the 1956 case Japan negotiated well, given its triple handicap vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (its low position in international politics, Japanese hostages in Siberia, and the Soviet veto against Japan's entry into the U.N.). Although the Soviet Union promised to return only two of the four islands in the Joint Declaration, the Matsumoto-Gromyko Letter (an attached document to the Declaration) confirmed that the future negotiations for a peace treaty shall include a solution of the territorial issue. On the other hand, in the 1973 case, Japan could not articulate in writing that the 'unresolved issues' included the territorial issue."¹²

Meanwhile, the two other major diplomatic events between Japan and the Soviet Union—Brezhnev's proposal of a Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty (1975) and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo (1986)—took place at the Soviet initiative, not at the Japanese. The Japanese lack of major foreign policy initiatives towards the Soviet Union is generally attributed to the territorial dispute, or to the MFA's insistence on the solution of the issue through the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, MFA officials on the right of center hold that the international environment

should be regarded as the basic cause: "The four major diplomatic events in postwar Japan-Soviet relations took place at the important changes in the international environment."¹³

First, "the Hatoyama-Bulganin Joint Declaration was signed during the 'peaceful coexistence' period."¹⁴ Second, "the Tanaka-Brezhnev Joint Communiqué was signed in the détente era. It was the best period for Japan-Soviet relations, such that Ambassador Niiseki could talk with Brezhnev in person. Now it is impossible for a Japanese Ambassador to talk with the Soviet General-Secretary."¹⁵ More importantly, "it occurred after the Sino-U.S. *rapprochement* and the subsequent resumption of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972."¹⁶ Third, Brezhnev's proposal of a Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty also took place "after the Sino-U.S. *rapprochement*."¹⁷ Fourth, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Tokyo, as only the second Soviet Foreign Minister after Gromyko to do so, "when there were signs of change in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev."¹⁸

In sum, according to an MFA official on the right of center, "the major changes in the international environment (the relaxation of tension between the superpowers and the Sino-U.S. *rapprochement*) were the fundamental determinants of these events. As for Japan, except for the 1956 event, it has never been forced to make foreign policy towards the Soviet Union out of necessity. In return, none of the

events happened because the Soviet Union placed importance on Japan or because it wanted to improve relations with Japan."¹⁹

The opinion of those on the right is that the Soviet Union exploited these changes in the international environment, as well as in the internal environment in Japan, and approached Japan with certain intentions in mind. First, on the 1956 event, a former MFA official argues that "the Soviet Union used Prime Minister Hatoyama, who wanted to adopt a type of diplomacy different from Prime Minister Yoshida's hardline policy towards the Soviet Union. However, Japan had no need to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Japan had already made peace with the majority of the nations and regained independence. Its national security was guaranteed by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, Japan had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it was the Soviet Union that needed diplomatic relations with Japan. Due to the Security Treaty, the Soviet Union no longer was able to use military force with Japan except for the purpose of intimidation. It had no other measures but disinformation operations to influence Japan. The establishment of diplomatic relations makes it easy to send KGB agents to Japan in the Embassy, Consulates, Commerce Representative offices, and Intourist. However, were the Soviet Union to initiate negotiations, Japan would demand the reversion of the Northern Territories, so, the Soviet

Union made Japan initiate the move. The Soviet Union grasped the chance of the leadership change in Japan from hardliner Yoshida to moderate Hatoyama, and intimated that the Soviet Union was ready to resume diplomatic relations, by which Hatoyama was taken in. The fact that Japan initiated the move adversely affected the Northern Territories issue up to the present. Were the Yoshida cabinet to have continued, he would not have visited the Soviet Union to resume diplomatic relations."²⁰ Others said that "Hatoyama was a laymen in foreign affairs, compared to Yoshida,"²¹ who had been a foreign affairs bureaucrat (and Foreign Minister) before becoming a politician. So, Hatoyama became enthusiastic about the *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, and "went to Moscow without any clear prior agreements on the territorial issue."²²

Second, regarding the 1973 event, those on the right think that "the Soviet Union intended to forestall the Sino-Japanese *rapprochement* after the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China." "It was because of the 'China card' that Brezhnev gave Tanaka at least a verbal acknowledgement that the territorial issue was 'unresolved' [which was later denied]."²³ In addition, "the Soviet Union strongly wanted Japanese cooperation in Siberian development."²⁴

Third, those on the right argue that "Brezhnev's proposal of a Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and

Cooperation Treaty was intended to forestall the negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace treaty."²⁵ The Soviet Union denounced it as anti-Soviet because of the "anti-hegemony clause" that China demanded. To quote a former MFA official, "the point is that the Soviet Union had big 'expectations' in Takeo Miki [a founder of the National Cooperative Party in 1947. (See Figure 1)] Earlier, during his visit to Moscow in 1967 as Foreign Minister, the Soviet Union proposed to Miki the conclusion of an interim treaty, as an alternative for a peace treaty. However, he did not ask about the content of the treaty. Immediately after Miki became Prime Minister in 1975, the Soviet Union proposed the Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty."²⁶ Others consider "Prime Minister Miki the 'source of all evil' today. It was his cabinet that decided on the principle of the 1% of GNP limit for the defense budget and the three principles [limitations] on weapon exports."²⁷ "No wonder when Kovalenko visited Japan, he often talked with Miki."²⁸

Fourth, they hold that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan was intended to "contain" Japan's involvement in the SDI,²⁹ "to obtain Japanese technology, and to disturb the ruling LDP internally."³⁰

A scholar in the center puts it in a different perspective. In his opinion, because of its domestic and personal constraints, Japan failed to take advantage of changes in the international environment favorable to

itself.³¹ Prime Minister Hatoyama missed the chance of peaceful coexistence,³² due to three factors. One, the factional struggle within the ruling party,³³ in which Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu (a leader of the Reform Party) were involved (See Figure 1). Two, Hatoyama's own over-ambition³⁴ "to restore relations with communist regimes, that were left over after the San Francisco Peace Treaty."³⁵ Three, "the interests of the fishing industry, given that Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Minister Kono was an influential politician and a close aide of Prime Minister Hatoyama."³⁶ "All these are the adverse influences that domestic politics inflicts on foreign policy decision-making in Japan, which can be called 'Hellmann's law'."³⁷

He also argues that "Prime Minister Tanaka misused the bargaining leverage Japan could have wielded with the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union and China were competing with each other to gain Tokyo's favor in the changing international environment: Tanaka was overanxious to normalize relations with China; Tanaka's leadership was destroyed by his involvement in the Lockheed payoff scandal; and, being economically oriented, Tanaka was oblivious to the politically strategic values of the Siberian development."³⁸ Therefore, others note, "Prime Minister Tanaka was cheated although he thought he had put the Northern Territories negotiations on track [referring to the denial of Brezhnev's verbal acknowledgement of the

existence of the territorial issues]."39

Recently, the seemingly new developments in Japan-Soviet relations were quickly shattered by the failure of the Reykjavik Summit. The reciprocal visits at the Foreign Ministerial level in 1986 could not evolve into those at the Prime Ministerial level. With the deadlock in Japan-Soviet relations, the foreign policy elites are divided on how to realize Japan's foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

**b) How to Stabilize Relations with
the Soviet Union**

i) Pro-U.S. "Dependence" School

Some on the right of center, including the mainstream in the MFA, believe that the correct objective for Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is to stabilize their relations within the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance. An MFA official said that "stable relations with the Soviet Union serve Japan's national security better than antagonistic ones."⁴⁰ Another adds "however, given that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty guarantees Japan's national security, the consolidation of the Japan-U.S. alliance is the prerequisite for stable relations with the Soviet Union. The nature of foreign policy is comprehensive. Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is inseparable from its foreign policy towards the U.S. In this sense, Japanese foreign policy towards the

U.S. should be regarded as its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. To criticize Japan's foreign policy as 'dependent on the U.S.' is to misunderstand the essence of diplomacy."⁴¹

A former MFA official on the right even thinks that "the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is the prime example of 'autonomous diplomacy' [because it was not imposed on Japan, but Japan chose to be dependent on the U.S.]."⁴² A scholar on the right of center said that "the Japan-U.S. alliance is compatible with Japan's national interests. This is not dependent diplomacy."⁴³ In brief, an MFA official concludes that "the fact that Japan's national security has been preserved for the last forty years proves that Japan's postwar foreign policy towards the Soviet Union as well as towards the U.S. was correct."⁴⁴

ii) Pro-U.S. "Independence" School

Others on the right of center, including specialists in the defense establishment, basically agree with the mainstream in the MFA. However, nonnegligible differences exist. Although they regard the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty System as the basis for Japan's national security, they think that total dependence on the U.S. is undesirable. Some of them even argue (as do those on the far right and left) that, because of the dependence on the U.S., Japan has no foreign policy towards the Soviet Union nor foreign policy *per se* to begin with.

In the opinion of a former MFA official, "Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union has not existed. Unlike Western European nations, Japan has not been able to 'wage diplomacy' towards the Soviet Union independent of the U.S., but has been in a passive position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This is because of the Northern Territories issue. Japan made diplomatic efforts to solve the issue, but the Soviet Union has rejected negotiations. Therefore, the only thing that Japan could do was to consolidate public opinion on the territorial issue. Other than that, Japan has strengthened national defense capabilities to counter Soviet military threats, but this is a defense policy, not a foreign policy. However, a more fundamental reason for the lack of a Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is the lack of a Japanese foreign policy at all. Japan was merely running on the U.S. track. Total dependence on the U.S. is not the only possible policy. It is wrong to assume that the present situation is static. The essence of diplomacy is to have many channels and to respond flexibly to changes in the international situation, as the 'omni-directional' diplomacy envisioned during détente in the 1970's [it did not outlast détente]. The U.S support of Japan is taken for granted now, but each nation has its own national interests. Japan should not believe in the U.S. blindly."⁴⁵

According to Soviet specialists in the defense establishment, "because Japan's foreign policy is too

dependent on the U.S. and too much concerned with the U.S.'s intentions, Japan is unable to negotiate with the Soviet Union on its own."⁴⁶ "If Gorbachev's visit to Japan became possible, Prime Minister Nakasone would visit the U.S. beforehand, in order to show Gorbachev that he has support from the U.S."⁴⁷ As a result, "Japan-Soviet relations are the most backward in the world. Not only Western Europe but also the U.S. have more contacts by far with the Soviet Union than Japan does. Only Japan had not lifted sanctions against the Soviet Union, when the U.S. and Western Europe had already lifted them."⁴⁸

Under these circumstances, those on the right of center advocate a more independent foreign policy and a build-up of Japan's own defense capabilities. Former MFA officials feel that, because Japan lacks defense forces even to defend itself, Japan is at the mercy of the Soviet military threat, and Japanese foreign policy is called "coward diplomacy." "Japan should not let itself be threatened by Soviet military power because it exactly falls in with the Soviet intentions. Instead, Japan should stand firm with the Soviet Union and try to convince it that it would serve Soviet interests if it stops threatening Japan."⁴⁹ Others said that "Japan should stand on its own feet and discuss issues involving Asian security with the Soviet Union from Japan's point of view, without worrying too much about the U.S. response."⁵⁰

However, they do not advocate a drastically independent

foreign policy as nationalists on the far right do, but see the cooperation with the U.S. still as the axis of Japanese foreign policy. A former MFA official on the right of center thinks that "not being a superpower makes Japan's diplomacy toward the Soviet Union different from that of the U.S."⁵¹ Therefore, another adds, "while working out deterrence against the Soviet Union, Japan should accommodate to it with more realistic perspectives and relieve frictions, as the Western European nations do."⁵² Military specialists on the right of center hold that "it is wrong to improve Japan-Soviet relations at the cost of jeopardizing Japan-U.S. relations. However, Japan should not intensify the rivalry with the Soviet Union unnecessarily, and should see to it that the U.S. does not unduly stir up the Soviet Union."⁵³ "China's intention behind the Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* was to decrease the Soviet threat."⁵⁴

iii) Anti-Soviet "Alliance" School

Those on the right agree with the mainstream in the MFA that the alliance with the U.S. is the basis of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. However, the important difference exists in that they do not see the necessity to work out stable relations with the Soviet Union at all, and even regard doing so as harmful. First, they contend that Japan should do nothing to improve Japan-Soviet relations. In the opinion of a former MFA

official, "Japan has done nothing wrong towards the Soviet Union since the battle of Nomonhan (1939)."55 "All that has happened since should be blamed on the Soviet Union: the massacre of the Japanese in Manchuria and Sakhalin, [which caused the on-going tragedy of countless Japanese orphans being left in China, who are still in search of their Japanese parents after forty years, almost always in vain]; the seizure of the Kurile Islands and the Northern Territories; the detention of Japanese in Siberia; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in the Japanese economic sanctions and boycott of the 1980 Olympics; and the Soviet shooting down of the Korean airliner, in which [twenty seven] Japanese were killed. Responsibility for all these lies with the Soviet Union."56 "Why should a victim beg to improve relations? Japan has no responsibility or ability to improve their relations."57

Second, they think that dialogue and contacts with the Soviet Union are not only useless but also harmful because the Soviet Union uses diplomatic channels as means for its disinformation operations. A military specialist said that "in addition to Soviet institutions from the Soviet Embassy down, a number of Japan-Soviet friendship associations are overt machines of KGB agents. Japan is a 'spy heaven,' where KGB agents outnumber those in the U.S., with no law to prevent their activities."58

Accordingly, those on the right see the consolidation of the free world camp as a prerequisite and sufficient

condition for the Japanese diplomacy towards the Soviet Union. A Soviet watcher maintains that "Japanese foreign policy towards communist countries should be based on wholesome Japan-U.S. relations. Insofar as Japan consolidates its alliance with the U.S. and the free world camp, there is nothing that Japan should do for the Soviet Union. However, everybody wants to flirt with the Soviet Union. When Solzenitsyn gave a talk at the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce during his visit in Japan [1985], Solzenitsyn's name was not written on the signboard in order to avoid publicity! These obsequious attitudes would jeopardize the concept of sovereignty among the Japanese."⁵⁹

In short, those on the right see Japan being resigned to 'beggar' diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union for the sake of the Northern Territories. One journalist thinks the problem with Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is that it "has no principles except for the 'Territories,' in contrast to the firm Chinese principles in the form of the 'three obstacles' with the Soviet Union. The negotiations for the resumption of the grave visits to the Northern Territories showed clearly the naiveté of Japanese diplomacy towards the Soviet Union. Japan would accept anything, if only the grave visits were allowed."⁶⁰

iv) Pro-Soviet "Non-Alliance" School

Conversely, those on the left strongly denounce Japanese postwar foreign policy as being total dependent on the U.S. A specialist argues that Japanese foreign policy is "characterized by the avoidance of independent decisions."⁶¹ Another holds that "the only exception was the peace treaty negotiations, at Prime Minister Hatoyama's initiative. It was the first and the last Japanese foreign policy ever made vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Since then, Japan has made no foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, with the Northern Territories issue at the 'entrance.' This is so because Japan-Soviet relations are determined by U.S.-Soviet relations, and the MFA is unable to determine foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by itself. However, the MFA is saved by the Northern Territories issue, using it as a pretext. This is the characteristic of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, if any. It is unfortunate that Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union begins with and ends with the Northern Territories."⁶² Others consider that "the nature of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is dual and contradictory."⁶³ "While Japan depends for its security on the U.S. and regards the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, its monopoly capitalism has economic interests in the Soviet Union, and is making profits from trade with it."⁶⁴

Under these circumstances, those on the left call for the repeal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty on the grounds that it is this treaty which made postwar Japan dependent on the U.S. and its policy towards the Soviet Union antagonistic. The JSP advocates an "unarmed neutrality" diplomacy, by which Japan would dismantle its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) gradually and replace the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with a Japan-U.S. peace and friendship treaty. Japan would also establish separate or collective security systems that would guarantee Japan's neutrality with the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and other countries concerned.⁶⁵ The JCP asserts that "Japan should restore its independence by repealing the Japan-U.S. military alliance, and become a neutral socialist country."⁶⁶

Those on the left of center have come to acquiesce in the existence of the Security Treaty as a fact of life, though still critical, given that it is unlikely to be repealed as long as the LDP rule continues. A scholar said that "Japan's national interests lie in a world of peaceful coexistence because its survival depends on foreign trade. Therefore, Japan should adopt an 'equi-distant' diplomacy and find a way to coexist with the Soviet Union, as well as with the U.S., to establish stable relations."⁶⁷

2. Political Issue: Northern Territories Issue

a) Nature of the Northern Territories Issue: Contending Theories on the Northern Territories Issue

As is clear from the foregoing, the Northern Territories issue has become the "bottleneck" of Japan-Soviet Union relations to the extent that their relations are reduced to this issue and improvement of these relations hinges upon its solution. However, the foreign policy elites disagree with each other on the nature of the Northern Territories issue as well as on ways to realize the return of these islands.

i) *Yontō Ikkatsu Henkan Ron*: "Four Islands Package Reversion" School

There is a solid consensus among the foreign policy elites, except on the left, that all four islands of the Northern Territories—Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai Group—should be returned to Japan simultaneously through the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. This position is referred to as *yontō ikkatsu henkan ron*, a package reversion of the four islands.

To begin with, they assert the legitimacy of the Japanese sovereignty over the four islands by stressing the distinction between them and the Kurile Islands that Japan renounced by the San Francisco Peace Treaty:

1) Natural and geographical differences: The four islands are separated from the Kuriles by the Kurile Channel, and "have a comparatively mild climate and are distinct from the Kuriles in respect to flora and fauna."⁶⁸

2) Historical legitimacy: The islands "were known to the Japanese well before they were first visited by the Russians,"⁶⁹ and "Japanese settled in and developed these regions over seven generations."⁷⁰ The islands have never belonged to any other country but Japan throughout their history, and thus constitute "integral parts of Japan's national territory."⁷¹

3) Legal legitimacy: Russia recognized this historical fact by the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation between Japan and Russia in 1855 and by the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands in 1875, that identified the "Kurile Islands" as the "eighteen islands stretching from Uruppu to Shimushu."⁷² [See Figure 3] Thus the distinction of the Northern Territories from the Kurile Islands is "'self-evident' in terms of international law as well as history."⁷³

In addition, Former MFA officials stress that the Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories is illegal in two critical points. First, "it was against the principle of territorial non-expansion that the 'Atlantic Charter' (1941) and 'the Declaration by the United Nations' (1942) established. The Soviet Union was a party to the latter. [Second,] the four islands were not

territories that Japan took by 'violence and greed' from which the Cairo Declaration (1943) provides that Japan should be expelled."⁷⁴

For that matter, some add that "the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin were not the territories that Japan took by 'violence and greed' either,"⁷⁵ but legitimately belonged to Japan. Japan acquired the Kurile Islands in exchange for Sakhalin Island by Russian pressure, and Southern Sakhalin as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. Thus, strictly speaking, "to confine the term 'Northern Territories' to the four islands is a misuse. It should include the Kurile Islands (aside from Southern Sakhalin), as the JCP advocates."⁷⁶

Despite these facts, they think that the government gave up Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands because:

—Japan could not claim that they were its inherent territories. They had belonged to Russia at one time in history.

—The Yalta secret agreement promised to give them to the Soviet Union as rewards for Soviet participation in World War II against Japan.

—As a powerless loser, Japan felt obliged to renounce them at the San Francisco Peace Conference.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese government has claimed only the reversion of the four islands, which have come to be known as the "Northern Territories issue."

**ii) Nitō Henkan Ron: "Two Islands
Reversion" School**

In contrast, the majority on the left advocate the *nitō henkan ron*, a two islands reversion approach. However, there are subdivisions in this school. The position held by some on the left can be called a genuine *nitō henkan ron*, while the one held by the majority on the left of center and on the left can be called a realistic *nitō henkan ron*.

Genuine advocates of the *nitō henkan ron* on the left avowedly denounce the legal arguments of the *yontō ikkatsu henkan ron*. In the opinion of one scholar, "Etorofu and Kunashiri are included in the Kurile Islands that Japan renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The MFA's Treaty-Bureau Director Nishimura admitted this fact at the 'Diet interpellation' in 1951. Japan cannot claim later that it did not renounce Etorofu and Kunashiri, but can only claim Shikotan and the Habomai Group that were interpreted as part of Hokkaido. Despite these facts, the Japanese government changed its position in 1955 at the outset of the peace treaty negotiations. It began to claim all four islands in reference to the 1875 Treaty that excluded the four islands from the extent of the Kurile Islands. However, this treaty is irrelevant. Insofar as Japan renounced the Kurile Islands by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it should be interpreted as referring to the entire 'Kuriles'."77

According to an LDP politician, "Japan does not consider the Soviet point of view at all. Japan demands the four islands despite the fact that it agreed to the return of only the two islands in the Joint Declaration of 1956."⁷⁸ A scholar thinks that "given these objective and internationally accepted facts, Japan has no course but to accept that it has renounced Etorofu and Kunashiri, and to achieve the reversion of Shikotan and the Habomai Group. As to Etorofu and Kunashiri, Japan could propose joint development of the islands with the Soviet Union, which would include demilitarization, conservation of natural resources, joint development, and free access."⁷⁹ Some on the left of center hold that "the Japanese demand for the Northern Territories is untenable in international society."⁸⁰ Others said that "the Soviet Union took the islands in the confusion of the Japanese surrender; both sides have tenable points in their claims."⁸¹

The advocates of the four island reversion on the right counter that "the Kurile Islands do not include Etorofu and Kunashiri. The definition of the Kurile Islands was settled between Japan and Russia as far back as the 1855 Treaty and the 1875 Treaty to be the eighteen islands. However, the Soviet Union took advantage of the U.S. ignorance of the extent of the Islands. As for the interpretation of Treaties Bureau Director-General Nishimura, it was denied by his successor Morishita in 1956. Besides, that was merely an answer at the 'Diet

Interpellation' which has no legal effect in international law."⁸²

The majority on the left advocate the *nitō henkan ron* from realistic viewpoints rather than legalistic ones, given that "the Soviet Union has no intention of returning the four islands, or even the two islands,"⁸³ for the following reasons:

—The nature of the Russian empire and its concept of territory: Its obsession with territorial expansion makes it impossible for Russia to return territories once acquired. The Soviet Union regards the Northern Territories as legitimate spoils of war.

—The fear that the return of the Northern Territories would incur territorial claims from other countries: The Soviet Union tries to avoid establishing precedents for the return of territories it took in the past.

—Accumulation of *fait accompli*: "A sustained non-wartime situation gives the Soviet Union an advantage. It *de facto* occupies the Northern Territories, while Japan cannot take the Northern Territories back by armed force."⁸⁴

—The significance of the Northern Territories in Soviet military strategy since their re-militarization in 1978: "Insofar as these islands are located in a strategically important position, constituting part of the 'sanctuary of the Sea of Okhotsk' and a 'forward base' against the U.S., the Soviet Union will not give up them."⁸⁵

—The increasing Russian population in the Northern

Territories: "The Soviet Union changed its policy of not increasing its residents there in 1978. Currently, 30,000 civilians and 10,000 soldiers are living there, with their third generation having been born native to the islands. To them the islands are the motherland, as well as to the former Japanese islanders."⁸⁶

Under these circumstances, those on the left consider that, although the Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories is illegal, it is wrong to stick to principle and wait in vain for the return of four islands. Realistically, Japan has no other choice but to compromise with the two islands that the Soviet Union had promised to return in 1956. One scholar argues that "it is not defeatism at all to think that the return of the two islands is one step forward. It would be beneficial if the return could be the lever to shift Japan-Soviet relations favorably for both societies."⁸⁷

The advocates of the *yontō henkan ron* on the right refute all the negative arguments made by the realistic *nitō henkan ron* advocates on the left:

—"Despite the common belief that Russia-Soviet Union has never returned the territories it took, there are such precedents. The Soviet Union returned the Port Arthur-Dairen District to China in 1954, the Porkkala base to Finland in 1955, and Bornholm Island to Denmark in 1955. Recently, it proposed the return of a number of islands, including Damansky Island on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, to

China in 1986."⁸⁸ Therefore it is just an excuse to argue that the Soviet Union will not return the Northern Territories because there is no precedent.⁸⁹

—A Soviet fear of stirring up other border disputes by the Northern Territories reversion is also untenable. "The nature of the Northern Territories issue is different from other territorial or border disputes between Russia-Soviet Union and European countries. The unique nature of the Northern Territories issue is that they have never belonged to Russia-Soviet Union at any time in history, and have been solely 'territories proper' to Japan. In the case of the border disputes in Europe, no nation is able make such a claim to the Soviet Union."⁹⁰ Therefore, "the Northern Territories reversion cannot 'spill over' to other territorial disputes."⁹¹

—"The weight of these islands in Soviet military strategy is insignificant [as examined in Chapter IV]."⁹²

—"The argument on the increase in Soviet population in the Northern Territories is also untenable. Soviet residents in the Northern Territories actually would be very happy to leave there. A Politburo order to vacate will suffice."⁹³

—Last but not least, "it is nonsense to accept the two islands reversion now, since it was already settled thirty years ago by the 1956 Joint Declaration."⁹⁴

Those on the right further argue that "the two islands reversion is out of the question. Once Japan makes a

compromise with the two islands, the rest of the Northern Territories will never be returned. This is the nature of negotiations."⁹⁵ "The *nitō henkan ron* is a Soviet trick to deceive Japan as if it were returning half of the four islands. The fact is that the two islands, the Habomai Group (40 square miles) and Shikotan (97 square miles), only constitute 7% of the total area of the Northern Territories, as compared to the northern two islands, Etorofu (1,226 square miles) and Kunashiri (586 square miles). This is one of the Soviet tactics to nullify the Japanese title to the Territories by splitting Japanese public opinion and jeopardizing the national consensus on the four islands package reversion. The problem is that the negative arguments against the four islands reversion are originated not by the Soviets but by the Japanese."⁹⁶ "The Soviets do not have the accurate historical facts on the Northern Territories issue."⁹⁷ "It is regrettable that there are Japanese who develop arguments from the Soviet point of view, and who want to use ties with the Soviet Union for their own personal gain."⁹⁸ "They have 'Japanese faces with Soviet hearts' and are, intentionally or unwittingly, giving a hand to the Soviet Union, instead of protecting Japanese national interests."⁹⁹

iii) "Entire Kurile Islands Reversion" School

In comparison to the position of the government (the LDP and the MFA) that restricts the extent of the Northern Territories to the four islands, all the opposition parties—the JSP, the *Kōmeitō*, the Democratic-Socialist Party, and the JCP—claim all the Kurile Islands. They advocate that all the Kurile Islands legitimately belong to Japan, given the historical fact that Japan acquired them peacefully by the 1875 Treaty.¹⁰⁰ In this sense, a scholar on the right of center thinks that "the LDP position is not so hawkish as the opposition parties. The reversion of the four islands became the national wish only because it was approved by the Diet."¹⁰¹ The only common claim between the ruling party and the opposition parties is that they regard Shikotan and the Habomai Group as part of Hokkaido.¹⁰²

However, a critical difference is that both the JSP and the JCP in effect take the "two islands reversion" position. The JSP claims only the two islands at the conclusion of a peace treaty, making the reversion of the other two islands a pending issue until Japan renounces the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.¹⁰³ The JCP advocates the immediate return of the two islands without the conclusion of a peace treaty and the reversion of all the Kurile Islands through the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, it maintains that "for this, it is necessary to repeal the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the San Francisco Peace

Treaty, by which Japan renounced all title to the Kuriles Islands."¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile, the *Kōmeitō* and the Democratic-Socialist Party make the return of the four islands a condition for a peace treaty, as the LDP does.

iv) "Spoils of War" School

A few people cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Japanese claim to the four islands. However, a military specialist on the right of center said that, "insofar as the Soviet Union took the Northern Territories as spoils of war, this is a reality of international politics. It was the fault of the Japanese leaders in World War II. The unfortunate point is that it was not certain how far Japan renounced the Kurile Islands. Historically, they do not include the four islands, but the U.S. accepted the Soviet claim during World War II, which changed the interpretation of the Kurile Islands. After the Korean War, the U.S. noticed the importance of Japan, and has belatedly realized the legal definition of the Kurile Islands, and has come to support Japan's position."¹⁰⁵

**b) How to Achieve the Reversion of the
Northern Territories**

**i) Minimalist Approach: *Iriguchi ron*
(Entrance Theory)**

The majority on the right of center, including the MFA, hold that, insofar as stable relations with the Soviet Union are maintained through a non-antagonistic policy, there is almost nothing that Japan can do towards the Soviet Union but wait for a Soviet move to make concessions on the Northern Territories. This approach is known as the *iriguchi ron* (entrance theory), which means that the Northern Territories are at the entrance of Japan-Soviet relations, so that the door for improving the relations will not open unless the issue is solved.

The MFA takes this "Northern Territories or nothing" approach, for several reasons. First, "the issue involves Japanese sovereignty. It is the Soviet Union that violated Japanese sovereignty by invading the Northern Territories, and sowed the seeds of distrust by breaking its promise in the 1956 Joint Declaration. Unless the islands are returned, Japanese sovereignty will not be restored and Japan-Soviet relations cannot be improved."¹⁰⁶

Second, "Japan has nothing to fear from the Soviet Union, given that its national security is preserved by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and by the steady build-up of its self-defense capability. Japan should be tough with the Soviet Union and stand firm on its position."¹⁰⁷

Third, "Japan has nothing to gain from the Soviet Union now that Japan has lost interest in natural resources in Siberia due to the 'oil glut.' The Soviet Union can no longer use fishing rights as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Japan either, in the age of '200 mile economic zones.' [After having been forced out of the Soviet and U.S. 'economic zones,' Japan has been transforming its fishery industry structure from 'ocean fishery' to 'cultivation fishery.']"108 In short, "the Soviet Union has lost its attractiveness to Japan, and Japan has nothing to lose by waiting."109 It is the Soviet Union which is anxious to obtain Japanese capital, investment, and technology.

In sum, an MFA official concludes that, "the power balance between the Soviet Union and Japan has been shifting to the advantage of Japan. Time is not on the Soviet side, and it is the Soviet turn to make a move. Japan should stand still and wait for a Soviet move."110

Further, to quote other MFA officials, "the Soviet Union is realistic, maintaining a traditional 19th Century imperialist mentality, so nothing is impossible for the Soviet Union insofar as it finds a *quid pro quo*. It is up to the Soviet Union: how it evaluates to what extent it would be advantageous for it to split Japan from the U.S., and to what extent it can manage without Japan's contribution to its domestic economy."111 In other words, "it depends on how much the Soviet Union suffers in the future. Unless the Soviet Union is made to suffer more, it

will not return the Northern Territories. Japan should wait until the Soviet Union is ready to return the Territories peacefully."¹¹² Meanwhile, "Japan should fulfill five conditions that would make the Soviet Union change its neglect of Japan: to increase economic power, to develop diplomatic power (to increase the importance of Japan in Asia, for example), to build up a realistic self defense force, to consolidate the Japan-U.S. alliance, and to unite public opinion on the issue,"¹¹³ "in order to counter the Soviet deception to nullify the reversion."¹¹⁴

ii) Absolute Minimalist Approach

In comparison to the MFA which regards negotiations with the Soviet Union as still being meaningful, those on the right (far right) do not see such a necessity at all. A former MFA official thinks that "negotiations with the Soviet Union are useless, because it has no intention of returning the islands. It is merely creating the atmosphere of such a possibility by resuming negotiations for a peace treaty."¹¹⁵ "Insofar as Japan is swayed by the friendly atmosphere, the Soviet Union would have no intention of returning them. Gorbachev even meant that Japan should forget about the issue in his Vladivostok speech. Nonetheless, Japan is still begging Gorbachev to visit Japan. This cannot be called diplomacy."¹¹⁶

Instead, he urges that "Japan should do nothing, as the lessons of history suggest."¹¹⁷ "The peace treaty

negotiations failed because Prime Minister Hatoyama wanted to accommodate to the Soviet Union."¹¹⁸ "Were Japan not to have negotiated with the Soviet Union and had it done nothing, as the 'Yoshida Diplomacy' envisioned, the Soviet Union would have approached Japan and returned the Northern Territories: It was the Soviet Union that needed to resume diplomatic relations with Japan for its disinformation operations. The Soviet Union was no longer able to use military force with Japan after the conclusion the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951."¹¹⁹ "The fact is that the Soviet Union was already in trouble without diplomatic relations with Japan as early as 1952; its army in the Northern Territories had burnt down its barracks and was ready to leave."¹²⁰ In essence, "if Japan-U.S. relations are tight enough to bother the Soviet Union, it will approach Japan by itself. Besides, it is eager to obtain economic cooperation and technology from Japan."¹²¹ "Japanese bargaining power with the Soviet Union is the strongest that it has been in the last forty years."¹²²

iii) Moderate Minimalist Approach

Some on the right and in the center maintain that Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is solely obsessed with the Northern Territories issue and that the MFA's "Northern Territories or nothing" approach is too rigid and unimaginative. Some said that adhering to principles will not bring the Northern Territories back and

that "it is doubtful that the MFA will be able to cope with Gorbachev's flexible foreign policy."¹²³ They advocate a more imaginative foreign policy and propose some practical avenues to facilitate the return of the islands.

First, some scholars on the right argue that "Japan should work out concrete options and counter-proposals for any conceivable Soviet proposals for the reversion, [rather than demanding unconditional return]. There are a number of options that are compatible with the historical and legal background of the issue such as: for the Soviet Union to acknowledge Japan's sovereignty over the Northern Territories first, and then hand them over in stages; to give the Northern Territories special legal status, like Hong Kong, as a transitional stage, and to make the Northern Territories a model district of Japan-Soviet friendship and cooperation;"¹²⁴ or "for the Soviet Union to acknowledge Japan's sovereignty over the entire Northern Territories, and for Japan to grant the Soviet Union a positive easement including free military use of ports."¹²⁵

Second, some in the center think that "Japan should work out a face-saving device and even the logic to facilitate the Soviet return of the Northern Territories. This is especially important, now that Gorbachev recognizes the need to return the Territories but does not know how to return them, and that he might suddenly offer only the two islands."¹²⁶ "It is also important to guarantee that the returned Territories would not pose a military threat to

the Soviet Union. Japan could promise that it would not militarize them nor let the U.S. army establish bases there after the reversion."¹²⁷

Third, they argue that Japan should use its economic and money cards more effectively. A scholar even feels that "Japan could do almost anything for the Soviet Union if it returned the islands, insofar as the Japan-U.S. alliance is not jeopardized. Japan could offer capital investment without compensation like that in the developing countries."¹²⁸ Another in the center proposes that, as an effective strategy, Japan should adopt a strategy of 'selective linkage,' which is not strict [like the one the MFA adopts] but loose."¹²⁹ (The linkage policy will be examined in Section 4 of this chapter.)

Fourth, some scholars consider that reduction of "the excessive influence of domestic political forces on foreign policy formation,"¹³⁰ and coordination of "diplomatic moves with changes in the international situation"¹³¹ are necessary. "Japan should not regard foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics, lest it miss a chance of change in the international environment (as Hatoyama and Tanaka did): the Soviet Union has softened its position on the Northern Territories only during periods of relaxation of international tensions."¹³²

Others draw lessons from the "Okinawa reversion": "to relax tensions between the superpowers, given that the Okinawa reversion was realized in the détente era; to

establish trustful relations (which is the hardest obstacle with the Soviet Union); to raise the public awareness and consolidate public opinion; and to create an arena between the two parties concerned for the exchange of views and the resolution of misunderstandings on the issue. However, significant differences between Okinawa and the Northern Territories exist: the livelihoods of 700,000 residents in Okinawa were at issue, versus none on the Northern Territories. The U.S. wanted Okinawa only for military purposes, whereas the Soviet Union took the islands for aquisition of territory."¹³³

In brief, one on the right of center said that "Japan should be clever like China, so that the Northern Territories could be returned secretly. Making a fuss over the Territories would make their return less likely. China made a fuss over its territorial disputes with the Soviet Union because it wanted to quarrel with the Soviet Union. China stopped making a fuss when it wanted the territories back. China shelved the Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan because it wanted a *rapprochement* with Japan."¹³⁴

In addition, they think that it is wrong for Japan to do nothing unless the Northern Territories are returned and advocate more positive improvement of Japan-Soviet relations. According to former MFA officials on the right of center "Japan has nothing to lose by shelving the Northern Territories issue. It is foolish not to do anything with the Soviet Union because of the issue. It

serves the Japanese national interests to improve economic and cultural relations with the Soviet Union, while waiting for a Soviet move on the issue."¹³⁵ It is all the more so because, "even if Japan-Soviet relations were to improve to some degree, the alleged split of Japan from the U.S. would not happen, given that the alliance with the West is strong enough to deter such Soviet policy."¹³⁶

In the opinion of some military specialists on the right of center, "the Soviet position on the territorial issue will not change unless the basic international system changes. Moreover, a trade does not pay for the Soviet Union because the things it wants badly from Japan are restricted by the COCOM lists. It does not want second-rate technology. The Soviet Union judges that it had better wait for a more advantageous time, if it will eventually have to return the Territories. Therefore, there is no alternative but to improve Japan-Soviet relations without solving the issue."¹³⁷ Another opinion is that "Japan even could use the Northern Territories as a bargaining lever for improving relations by getting a Soviet commitment that it will return them in the future. However, the MFA's position is the opposite."¹³⁸

iii) Maximalist Approach: *Deguchi ron*
(Exit Theory)

Those on the left take issue with the *iriguchi ron* more severely than those on the right of center and in the center. They refute the very nature of the territorial issue. An economist on the left of center thinks that "it is wrong to regard the Northern Territories issue as the obstacle to Japan-Soviet relations. Regardless of this issue, Japan-Soviet relations are antagonistic by nature due to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, because of the territorial issue, the MFA's hardline foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is taken for granted. Nobody asks what their relations would be were the Soviet Union to return the islands. The truth is that nothing fundamental in their relations would change by the reversion, with at most an increase in Siberian development projects."¹³⁹

Another in business circles said that "the Northern Territories issue is reduced to Japanese sentiment. It exists only as a 'thorn' [tension factor] to keep Japan-Soviet relations bad. The problem is that the MFA thinks that Japan has no need to improve relations with the Soviet Union if the Japan-U.S. alliance is solid. So, it uses the issue as a pretext for rejecting the improvement of relations and as the best tool to form anti-Soviet sentiment. Were the islands to be returned, the MFA would be in trouble, and would look for some other 'thorn'."¹⁴⁰

Others note that "the government has intensified the

reversion campaign since 1976. It is manipulating public opinion, while the LDP is using the issue domestically for elections."¹⁴¹ As a result, "there is a solid consensus for the four islands package reversion. It is 'politically suicidal' for politicians to advocate the two islands reversion in the current political climate."¹⁴²

Those on the left think that "the MFA is unrealistic, making the return of all four islands a precondition for the solution of the territorial issue. It is only concerned about 'face,' complaining that no Russian-Soviet leader has ever visited Japan. This is so because the MFA fears most the possibility of the two islands reversion: if this were to happen, the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union would improve. This would put the MFA in trouble in terms of Japan-U.S. relations."¹⁴³ Therefore, "the MFA reverses the priority of the two objectives. It places the reversion before improvement of relations. However, the truth is that the islands will not be returned unless improvement of relations comes first."¹⁴⁴

In the opinion of a specialist on the left, "the MFA's position is contradictory. Japan demands the return of the islands as proof of Soviet good faith towards Japan, while it maintains the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Soviet Union demands that Japan repeal the Security Treaty as proof of Japanese good faith towards the Soviet Union. If Japan insists on Soviet good faith, is Japan willing to show its good faith and repeal the Security Treaty? On the

contrary, Japan has been strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance to counter Soviet military power. As long as Japan is allied with the U.S., it is natural that the Soviet Union will not return the islands."¹⁴⁵

Those on the left denounce the minimalist approach for the reversion. Some in business circles said that "the MFA's rigid position will not bring the islands back nor yield anything positive. If Japan really wants them back, it should work out more concrete measures for the return. Japan could offer to pay a 'land lease fee' for the islands upon the reversion, or even 'purchase' them."¹⁴⁶ However, "the MFA has taken exactly the opposite approach in refusing to be flexible and practical."¹⁴⁷ "Japan will be isolated from the world if the MFA continues its hardline policy towards the new Soviet Union under Gorbachev."¹⁴⁸

Under these circumstances, those on the left conclude that it is wrong to put the territorial issue "at the entrance" to prevent improvement of Japan-Soviet relations. They advocate a maximalist approach, known as the *deguchi ron* (exit theory): if Japan-Soviet relations were improved through economic exchanges, it might lead to the return of the Northern Territories. Those on the right dismiss this approach as exactly falling into the Soviet trap: to obtain Japanese technology and split the LDP by creating an atmosphere of improved relations and insinuating the return of the islands: "tactics of killing two birds with one stone."¹⁴⁹

3. Japanese Defense Policy

a) Nature of Japanese Defense Policy

As a result of World War II, Japan was completely demobilized. Under the U.S. Occupation it adopted the "peace constitution" that renounced any armed force. Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951, Japanese national security has been maintained by the Security Treaty, which has been renewed with revisions every decade. Under these circumstances, Japan's own defense capability has been kept to a minimum. The Self Defense Forces (SDF) have existed only nominally, solely for defense purposes, assuming that the Soviet Union and North Korea are its only potential threats. The Ground SDF have "156,000 men (13 divisions); the Marine SDF, 264,000 tons (161 ships); and the Air SDF, 360 aircraft."¹⁵⁰

However, in order to understand fully why Japan has such a limited defense policy and why pacifism is strong in Japan, it is necessary to trace its origin in the Japanese mentality. It concerns the unique "insular character" that derives from Japan's fortunate geography and history. Because of this mentality, "the Japanese have not perceived the need for national security, regarding it as free like [air or] water,"¹⁵¹ to quote a scholar on the right. One military specialist on the right of center puts it that "the Soviet military threat is an immediate 'doorstep' matter to Europe, but it is an 'across the street' matter

to Japan, and an 'across the ocean' matter to the U.S."¹⁵²

Second, Japanese defeat in World War II and the tragic experience as the first and only victim of atomic bombs in history revived the historical Japanese isolationism. An MFA official on the right thinks that "the only thing that the Japanese learned from World War II is an aversion to war."¹⁵³ As a result, the pacifist "unarmed neutrality" school advocated by the leftist parties has obtained the support of the people. Since the leftist parties opposed Japanese militarism during the war, their political power surged after World War II. Their interests (socialism and pacifism) coincided with those of the U.S. Occupation Army, so that there was even a brief moment of "honeymoon between the JCP and the Occupation Army."¹⁵⁴

Third, this pacifism was crystallized by the "imposition by the U.S. Occupation Army of the peace constitution."¹⁵⁵ It renounced war and the possession of land, sea, and air forces as a sovereign right of the nation. Finally, owing to their mighty protector, the U.S., the Japanese did not perceive the need to work out their own defense policy.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese forged a unique concept of national peace and security. One in the center points out that "peace and security are inseparable notions in the West, but they are distinct concepts in Japan."¹⁵⁶ To the Japanese, peace is a virtue but security is a vice, a scholar on the right notes, because "they have

forgotten about the dark side of peace [the need ~~for~~ armament for defense]."157

In this political culture, a military specialist on the right of center holds that "Japan has had no defense policy. The MFA made all decisions towards the Soviet Union without military considerations. Only recently has it begun strategic studies, competing with the JDA."158 In the Diet, the controversy over how to interpret the constitution—whether it acknowledges the right of self-defense—was the focus of the defense issue.

However, due to the changes in both the external and internal environments—the perceived collapse of the *pax Americana* with the relative decline of U.S. power, and the unprecedented postwar economic growth and the regaining of confidence as a nation—a call for a more active role in the maintenance of international security has emerged. As a result, the Japanese defense policy has begun to change gradually. This was epitomized by the removal of the "ceiling" of 1% of the GNP on the defense budget, which those on the left claimed to be the symbol of the Japanese determination not to revert to militarism. Then, how do the foreign policy elites perceive the current Japanese defense policy?

b) How to Establish Deterrence Against the Soviet Union: Japanese Defense Policy in Transition

i) "Pacifist Unarmed Neutrality" School

Those on the left advocate "unarmed neutrality" and reject any armament including the SDF, while those on the left of center regard defense as a "necessary evil." First, those on the left repudiate the Japan-U.S. alliance and advocate the repeal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as the "source of all evil." A scholar thinks that, "because of the Security Treaty, Japan is inevitably involved in U.S. military strategy and in danger of attack by the Soviet Union in case of war between superpowers."¹⁵⁹ For instance, a politician said, "the '1,000 nautical mile sea lane defense' and the 'blockade of the three Straits' are defenses for the U.S., not for Japan. Without the Security Treaty, the Soviet Union would have no reason to attack Japan."¹⁶⁰ Another said that "the U.S. Army should leave Japan. The San Francisco Peace Treaty stipulates that it shall leave immediately. The Army has been stationed in Japan only by recourse to a proviso of the treaty."¹⁶¹

Second, they assert that the SDF should be disbanded because they violate the constitution. According to a scholar "Japan should seek an international role compatible with its 'peace constitution.' Because of the constitution, Japan is in a unique position to become the

first great nation in history without military power."¹⁶²

Third, they opposed the lifting of the "1% of GNP ceiling" for the defense budget. "1% of the Japanese GNP (roughly \$23 billion) is already a significant amount for a defense budget. Japan stands sixth in military power in the world."¹⁶³ Some note that "the Japanese defense budget is regarded as a 'sanctuary' [that nobody can touch] in the national budget [about a 6% share]. It has been increased steadily [with around a 6.5% increase annually] at the cost of other budgets such as welfare and education."¹⁶⁴ Others think that "once this 'brake' is removed, it would trigger unrestrained military expansion. This would lead to a revival of Japanese militarism and only provoke the Soviet Union."¹⁶⁵

Those on the right counter-argue that "exactly because Japan is 'involved in' the U.S. military strategy through the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan's national security is preserved."¹⁶⁶ They maintain that the leftists confuse neutralism with pacifism because Japan would be unable to remain neutral without self-defense forces. Thus, they dismiss "unarmed neutrality" as unrealistic.

A military specialist argues that "unarmed neutrality is hypocrisy. Neutrality presupposes armament. There are no 'unarmed neutral' countries in the world. The concept is a contradiction in itself."¹⁶⁷ A scholar adds that "the Japanese think of Switzerland as an ideal country, ignoring the fact that it is a heavily-armed nation. MacArthur may

have been responsible for implanting the notion of unarmed neutrality among the Japanese by wrongly saying that Japan should become 'the Switzerland of the Orient'."168 Others note that "it seems inevitable for an unarmed neutral Japan to become closer to the Soviet Union"169 or to be "Finlandized"170 in the current bipolar international system. In short, unarmed neutralism is fostering "defeatism" among the Japanese.171

As a matter of fact, a reflection of the unreality of unarmed neutrality came from the JSP itself, especially from its rightist faction. A former Secretary-General said that "the JCP in effect acquiesces in the existence of the SDF. Its policy is 'non-allied neutrality' rather than 'unarmed neutrality'."172 In the words of another member of the rightist faction, "unarmed neutrality is a lie of the leftist faction. Were it to take power, it would join the Warsaw Pact."173

ii) "Pro-Constitution Gradual Build-up" School

With the growing perception of the need for a realistic defense capability to cope with the increased Soviet military presence in the Far East, the position of the right of center, including the "non-uniforms" (civilians) in the defense establishment, has gained a majority recently. This shift was marked by the removal of the "1% of GNP ceiling" on the defense budget in January 1987. It made that budget for the fiscal year 1987 ¥3,517

billion ($\approx$ \$23 billion), 1.004% of the GNP.¹⁷⁴

Those on the right of center dismiss as nonsense the accusation by the left that the removal signified the revival of militarism. They think that the Japanese defense budget is unrealistically small (roughly one twentieth that of the U.S.) and that its SDF are incapable even of defending Japan. A military specialist said that "the removal of the 'ceiling' does not and cannot mean such unrestrained military expansion as the leftists charge. It is unrealistic to think that the Japanese defense budget will suddenly increase to 2% or 3% of the GNP."¹⁷⁵

Those on the right of center advocate a modest and gradual defense build-up to 1.2-1.3% of the GNP, as opposed to the substantial defense build-up that those on the right advocate. A military specialist criticizes both extremes and deplores the Japanese political culture that "lacks the concept of realism both on the right and on the left: the Tokugawa Shogunate government undertook 'utopian pacifism,' the Meiji era 'utopian militarism,' the Showa prewar era 'utopian militarism,' and the Showa postwar era 'utopian pacifism;' always utopian, not realistic. Utopian pacifism has the danger of transforming into utopian militarism, as 'Ikutaro Shimizu's transformation'¹⁷⁶ proved. The recent rise in militarism will not last because it is utopian; it lacks any geographical basis for armament, resources, or public support. There are three types of pacifism: utopian, revolutionary, and realistic. Japan should now

choose 'realistic pacifism' with the minimum defense forces necessary to maintain the balance of power, along with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."¹⁷⁷

Those on the right of center regard a modest and gradual defense build-up within the framework of the constitution as sufficient for several reasons. First, a military specialist argues that, "given the unique 'solely defense' doctrine of Japan's national security, Japan should build up its 'denial capabilities' [to deter an armed aggressor.] [It should] maintain quantitatively limited but efficient conventional forces for the purpose of self-defense, in line with the bilateral security arrangement with the U.S. [However, Japan] should not possess strategic offensive capabilities, let alone nuclear weapons, in order not to pose a threat to its neighboring countries."¹⁷⁸

Second, in the opinion of some MFA officials, "the pattern of Soviet military exercises is cowardly, avoiding direct confrontation with major powers."¹⁷⁹ "They do not move unless they have overwhelming military supremacy."¹⁸⁰ "Thus it would be as sufficient deterrent to eliminate Japan's vulnerability by a gradual defense build-up along with the consolidation of the Western alliance. Twenty Japanese aircraft (or tanks) would be sufficient to deter one hundred Soviet aircraft (or tanks)."¹⁸¹

Third, some military specialists believe that "it is also important not to drive the Soviet Union into a corner

and to show that Japan has no intention of destroying it. Japan's military build-up should remain strictly for deterrence lest it unduly frighten the Soviet Union."¹⁸²

"If Japan increases its military power, the Soviet Union will increase its military power correspondingly; so it yields no security for Japan."¹⁸³ "Since the Soviet Union wants to avoid war with the U.S. in the nuclear age, it will not attack Japan if it has deterrence."¹⁸⁴

Others consider that "it is wrong to overestimate the Soviet threat from the numerical military presence, as the JDA's officers and *bōei-zoku* (defense lobbyist) LDP politicians in the Diet do. It is understandable for them to exaggerate the Soviet threat to obtain the maximum piece of the 'pie' for the defense budget, as the U.S. Defense Department does. However, this is a layman's way of thinking. The far rightists' emotional agitation at the Soviet threat has adverse effects. It causes excessive Soviet-phobia among the Japanese, which is exactly what the Soviet Union intends. It will also blind us to subtle changes in international politics, like China, which is currently the most worrisome factor."¹⁸⁵

Fourth, according to a scholar on the right of center, "given the Japanese pledge not to become militarist again, a Japanese contribution in a non-military arena is a more desirable international role for Japan. In particular, Japan should increase foreign aid to the third world, as 'strategic economic assistance,' in order to forestall

Soviet infiltration into it. Overall, Japan should work out 'comprehensive security' rather than a simple defense policy. It is recommended that Japan use 3% of the GNP for 'comprehensive security,' each 1% of which earmarked for national defense, the ODA (overseas development aid), and improvement in the technology of food and energy. However, given that the Soviet foreign policy towards Japan involves Japan's national security, defense is also important.

Nonetheless, the current defense budget is insufficient; half of it goes to personnel expenses, giving equipment purchases lower priority. Japan should strengthen its Air SDF and Marine SDF by purchasing Lockheed P3C aircraft and Patriot ground-to-air missiles. Japan should also increase its surveillance capability by introducing Boeing AWACS (air-borne warning and control system) aircraft, OTH (over the horizon) radar, and surveillance satellites: the U.S. monopoly of surveillance systems is not desirable. For this, the defense budget should be increased to 1.2 to 1.5% of the GNP within five to ten years. Not having big Ground SDF would keep costs down and would not cause the neighboring countries to worry. The left is absurd to call this unlimited military expansion. Japan does not need such military expansion at all."¹⁸⁶

Finally, those on the right of center do not see the necessity of revising the constitution although they consider Article 9 that renounces war a problem. Some said that, "given that the 'war-renouncing' constitution has

been interpreted to accept the possession of the SDF, there is no need to revise it. A more flexible interpretation of Article 9 would suffice to allow a gradual defense build-up. It could be interpreted that Japan has the right of collective self-defense but that Japan does not exercise that right due to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."¹⁸⁷ Also "it is unrealistic to try to revise the constitution when the general public still regards revision as taboo [amendments to the constitution require the affirmative vote of a majority in a national referendum]."¹⁸⁸ "It will only cause commotion in Japan. If it were to be revised, the far right wing might try to revise other good clauses, like the protection of human rights."¹⁸⁹

iii) "Anti-Constitution Substantial Build-up" School

Those on the right, including JDA officers and *taka-ha giin* (hawkish Diet members) of the LDP, advocate a substantial defense build-up. First, they denounce the 1% of GNP ceiling. Military specialists argue that "the ceiling is groundless: It was set as a 'target,' not a limit, for the fiscal year 1976. One of the reasons why this 'ceiling' was set was that the defense budget was expected to be well below 1% of the GNP, given the rapid economic growth."¹⁹⁰ Also, "it was set 'for the time being' in 1976. This could not possibly mean years during which important changes in the world military situation

took place and economic growth decreased."¹⁹¹ Most fundamentally, "it is nonsense to use the GNP as the basis for the national defense budget."¹⁹² "Japan must presuppose defeat if an attack were more than what 1% of its GNP could defend against."¹⁹³

They further argue that "an argument that the 1% ceiling represents the Japanese determination not to become a militarist power is untenable. It is incomprehensible to regard a defense budget 'below 1%' as representing a pacifist Japan and 'above 1%' as suddenly representing a militarist Japan. The point is that the 1% was not calculated as the necessary budget for a minimum defense capability. To have such a defense capability certainly does not mean that Japan would become a militarist power."¹⁹⁴ The problem is that the ceiling was made into a myth "by the opposition parties (JSP, JCP, and the *Kōmeitō*), which in effect try to make Japan an undefendable nation."¹⁹⁵ "Japan is engaged in the first experiment in history to fix the size of the defense quantitatively regardless of the objective environment surrounding it."¹⁹⁶

Second, those on the right advocate a substantial increase in the defense budget, given that Japan's defense is a joke in the realities of international politics: Japan spends only 1% of its GNP for defense, as compared to "West Germany, 4.3% of its GNP; England, 5.1%; the U.S., 7.2%;"¹⁹⁷ and the Soviet Union, 13-18%.¹⁹⁸ A specialist likens the Japanese defense budget to a kind of "*kosai hi*

(entertainment expense) vis-à-vis the U.S., and the SDF to *hina* dolls [toy soldiers for display]."¹⁹⁹ She holds that "the responsibility lies with both the politicians who neglected serious efforts for national defense, and the mass media which are content with sentimental pacifism."²⁰⁰

The lack of a defense budget is felt more when they perceive that the need for national defense against the Soviet Union has significantly increased, due to the Soviet military build-up in the Far East. Military specialists believe that the reason for the Soviet military build-up is clear: "The Pacific coastal region of the Far Eastern Soviet Union has become a new Soviet core defense zone, which ranges from the Maritime Provinces (Vladivostok) to the Sea of Okhotsk, and to the Kamchatka Peninsula (Petropavlovsk)."²⁰¹ "Due to its proximity to the Soviet core defense zone, Japan is inevitably included in the Soviet defense zone. Because of the Soya Strait and the Tsugaru Strait (which are necessary for the Soviet fleets to advance into the Pacific) northern *Hokkaido* and the northern part of the *Tohoku* region are considered to be included in the Soviet inner defense zone."²⁰² "Since the security of the Soviet inner defense zone is given the first priority in case of war, the Soviet potential threat is regarded as strongest in northern Japan in the Pacific front region. It is the consensus opinion among the Western military specialists that the Soviet Union would occupy *Hokkaido* in case of war."²⁰³

Despite these changes in the military situation in the Far East, they note that the "Outline of the National Defense Program (laid down in 1976) has has never been revised."²⁰⁴ Some hold that "the 'Outline' presupposed the balance of power around Japan among the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China during the détente period before the Backfires and SS-20s had been deployed."²⁰⁵ Others think that it is "obsolete."²⁰⁶ Accordingly, they feel that "Japan should spend up to 3% of its GNP"²⁰⁷ and "develop credible deterrence against the Soviet Union."²⁰⁸

In this regard, they take issue with some of the arguments made by those on the right of center. An MFA official argues that "it is untenable to say that the West had better not drive the Soviet Union into a corner because it would become desperate if the West did so. Accepting such logic means Soviet domination of the world. Such a huge empire would not collapse easily. It would be the last nation to become desperate."²⁰⁹ A specialist adds that "it is also unacceptable to argue that, if Japan increased its defense capabilities, the Soviet Union would strengthen its military power, so the situation would just fall into a vicious cycle. On the contrary, the Soviet military expansion took place in the détente era and went on despite the fact that Japan restrained its armament."²¹⁰

Third, their deprecation does not stop at the lack of defense budget but it extends to the "complete lack of scenarios."²¹¹ Some point out that "the Japanese scenario

suddenly begins when an enemy actually invades its territory. It has no scenarios for the objective environment in which this would happen nor any evaluation of the enemy's capability. The Japanese defense concept is based on a one-sided idea, just thinking of the 'causes of war' from inside [subjective factors] without considering causes from outside [objective factors]."²¹² This is so because the Japanese insular geography and character make it difficult to presume the objective environment in which an enemy would attack Japan. "The Japanese think that if only they make desperate efforts, they will win. In fact, they are so insensitive to the threat from outside that their 'frigidity' to the Soviet threat paradoxically constitutes a deterrent force in a sense."²¹³

In other words, "the Japanese have not yet overcome the *kamikaze* [divine wind] and *gyokusai* [to defend Japan by death] mentalities. Currently, the dispatch of the U.S. Army is the 'divine wind' and the SDF's commitment to defend Japan (with its poor forces) is the *goykusai* spirit."²¹⁴ Also, "Japanese reflections on its militarism during World War II are so deep that they believe that only if they do nothing wrong, peace will be maintained."²¹⁵

Some state that "the problem of 'civilian-controlled' defense policy decision-making is also accountable. The JDA's officials are taken up with domestic business and are too busy to study international situations. They have to memorize the definitions of military-strategic terms and

the past answers by their predecessors at the 'Diet interpellations' to counter the opposition parties. Even after clearing that hurdle, next comes the intense fight with the Finance Ministry to 'grab' the budget. This is the reality of Japanese defense policy making."²¹⁶

They conclude that "fortunately so far, any scenario could allow the defense of Japan by the overwhelming U.S. power. However, the situation has changed considerably since 1976 after the Vietnam War."²¹⁷ Under these circumstances, they urge the need for more realistic strategic thinking based on the objective environment.²¹⁸

Fourth, some on the right believe that "military power is important in itself, given that the power of nations is still judged by that power in international politics. The Soviet Union looks down on Japan because it has no military power even to defend itself."²¹⁹ Thus, "the precondition to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a equal basis is to build up defense capabilities."²²⁰

In the opinion of some on the far right, "it is not desirable for Japan to depend for its national defense on the U.S. It is important to minimize vulnerability and to be prepared for all possible situations. Were the U.S. and the Soviet Union to become closer, it would be dangerous to Japan. Considering what happened in the Teheran and Yalta Conferences, Japan could easily become a bargaining chip between them. Now that Japan has become an economic giant, the precondition for building up its national defense has

been fulfilled. However, because of the mentality of 'group unconsciousness' the Japanese are unable to initiate action without *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure). Therefore an 'optimal *gaiatsu*,' not a fatal one, would be welcome."²²¹

Fifth, although those on the right advocate a substantial build-up of conventional weapons, they consider that Japan should not go nuclear. Some think that "nuclear weapons are unusable weapons."²²² Others think that "the U.S. would not like the Japanese going nuclear,"²²³ nor would "Asian nations, although they would accept Japan's conventional armament."²²⁴ Instead, they call for the revision of the "three non-nuclear principles" (not to possess, produce, or introduce nuclear weapons), which caused a fuss over interpretation as to whether the U.S. nuclear carriers' port calls to Japan are the introduction of nuclear weapons. One feels that "it is absurd to oppose these port calls because it is the U.S. nuclear deterrence that is preventing a third country from invading Japan. Nevertheless, not only anti-nuclear disarmament advocates but also the Japanese government oppose them."²²⁵

Finally, they unequivocally advocate the revision of the constitution, regarding it as "the litmus test for distinguishing real conservatives from false ones."²²⁶ Some said that "the constitution is hypocrisy. Article 9 denies Japan the right to defend itself. This is a violation of the UN Charter, Article 51 of which provides the inherent right of individual and collective

self-defense. Since the constitution stipulates the precedence of international law over the constitution, it should be revised to allow such a right."²²⁷

Others think that "the 'pro-constitutionists' do not understand that if Japan were invaded the constitution would disappear as well."²²⁸ "Their priorities are upside down. If they want to protect the constitution, they should understand the need for defense. The problem was that the U.S. Occupation Army imposed the 'MacArthur constitution' in order to weaken Japan physically and spiritually and to deprive the Japanese of patriotism. The Japanese liberals defended the 'MacArthur constitution' for fear that public knowledge that it was imposed by the Army would cause popular turmoil."²²⁹ "The fact is that the U.S. thought that Japan would revise the constitution after its Occupation Army left Japan. However, the Japanese were too obedient to do so. Actually, it is easy to revise the constitution; the Prime Minister can just tell the Cabinet Secretary-General. Not to do so is his negligence."²³⁰

Some point out that "the reason why the constitutional revisionists and proponents of a military build-up are labelled rightists in Japan is that Japan [in its political culture] lacks the correct concept of peace. Peace means a 'situation without war.' There are two causes of war: the presence of an aggressor, and the presence of a nation which does not have deterrence against an aggressor. Japan falls into the latter category, and would be in danger of

invasion without the alliance with U.S. Japanese pacifists are simplistic disarmament advocates. True pacifists should be concerned with the danger of invasion. From this point of view, advocates of the necessary defense build-up should be called real pacifists."²³¹ Also, "because of the constitution Japan cannot send its SDF overseas even for U.N. peacekeeping operations, despite the need for it to share responsibility in the maintenance of international security."²³² Meanwhile, criticism against Japan's free ride with the U.S. for the protection of passage of oil tankers in the middle east is mounting in the U.S.

iv) "Nuclear Armament" School

Despite the deep-rooted sentiment against nuclear armament as a result of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki tragedies, some on the right envision possibilities for Japanese nuclear armament. One group considers that "four options for Japan's nuclear armament are conceivable. 1) the French and Chinese model: for Japan to possess nuclear weapons on its own, 2) the West German model: for Japan to possess nuclear carriers on its own, while the U.S. provides the nuclear warheads, 3) to newly deploy U.S. Ground Forces that have nuclear carriers, and 4) to publicly accept that the U.S. Navy and Air Force (that are already stationed in Japan) introduce nuclear weapons into Japan."²³³

In the opinion of a scholar, "Japan should work out a nuclear coalition for deterrence along with the U.S. against the Soviet Union by deploying U.S. ground-launched longer-range INFs. Japan could deploy Pershing II's and GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles] in Hokkaido and Shikoku, as well as SLCMs [submarine-launched cruise missiles] in the Seto Inland Sea."²³⁴ He notes that it is wrong to interpret "a Japanese decision to go nuclear as an indication of a desire to come out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and follow a course independent of the U.S. and the West": This is a way to share the burden of nuclear deterrence with the U.S. Kissinger and Brzezinski supported Japan going nuclear.²³⁵

4. Japanese Economic Policy Towards the Soviet Union

a) Nature of Japan-Soviet Economic Relations

As examined in Chapter II, the Japanese economic policy towards the Soviet Union is carried out by the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee (JSEC) at the *Keidanren* (a federation of big business) under the supervision of the three ministries concerned (MITI, the MOF, and the MFA). "Since the establishment of the JSEC in 1965, ten sessions of the JSEC Joint Committee have been held alternately in Tokyo and Moscow, which have yielded eight Japan-Soviet Siberian Development Projects as follows:

- the Soviet Far East Forest Resources Development Project
- the Vlangel Port Construction Project
- the Chip and Pulp Development Project
- the South Iakutian Coking Coal Development Project
- the Second Far East Forest Resources Development Project
- the Iakutian Natural Gas Project
- the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Natural Gas Project
- the Third Far East Forest Resources Development Project."²³⁶

An economist maintains that "the projects should be regarded as governmental projects because they are organized by the JSEC."²³⁷ The *Zaikai* leaders see natural resources in Siberia as "resources for Japan that lie in the Soviet territories; the location is too remote for Moscow to make use of the resources itself."²³⁸ They think that "Siberian development cooperation projects are mutually beneficial: they provide the Soviet Union with an avenue for regional development and for earning foreign currencies, and Japan with access to natural resources and a new market for its machinery."²³⁹

In comparison, another notes, "the Japanese government is not involved in trade. It is ruled by the principle of complementarity and results from the accumulation of efforts of the individual companies. It increased gradually to a peak in 1982 of \$5.6 billion."²⁴⁰ The *seikei bunri* (the separation of politics from economics)

method worked well because Japan-Soviet economic relations were limited enough not to have political impact.²⁴¹

Several reasons are accountable for the limited economic relations. Most fundamentally, the Soviet centralized economic system is incompatible with a free market system. Commercial negotiations are extremely difficult. "The Soviet Union imposes unreasonable conditions due to the strong protectionism of the state monopoly."²⁴² Japan always has to count the risks of contracts being suddenly suspended for political reasons. The Siberian Development Projects are prime examples. The fact is that "more than twenty projects were abandoned, while only the eight [listed above] have been realized."²⁴³ Even among the eight projects, "the Yakutian Natural Gas Project has been *de facto* shelved."²⁴⁴ "The exploitation and development of natural gas as part of the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Natural Gas Project was suspended in late 1986."²⁴⁵ According to an economist, although the contract for the Second Chip and Pulp Development Project was signed in 1985, "it differs from the previous projects: Japan does not provide credits to the Soviet Union."²⁴⁶

However, the economist thinks that "the problem is economic rather than political. The only case in which a project was aborted at the political level was the Tiumen' Oil Project. Despite the enthusiasm of the *Keidanren*, it was cancelled in the mid-1970's by government intervention because of security implications of the project. First, it

concerned the special strategic value of oil per se. Second, the Soviet condition that Japan contribute to the construction of the BAM [the Baikal-Amur Main Line, the so-called Second Siberian Railroad] raised the security concern that Siberia might become a Soviet staging area for its expansion to the Pacific. This resulted in the Chinese objection to the project and in the Japanese request that the U.S. become a partner in it. The JSEC asked the Japanese government for support and requested that it play a more positive role in this project. However, the government refused to become a direct party to the negotiations. Under these circumstances, the project was cancelled. In addition, this is the only project that triggered arguments over adopting the linkage strategy with the Northern Territories within the government (although it was not adopted). No other projects were called off for political reasons; they had already had difficulties at the economic level."²⁴⁷

Thus, economists emphasize the economic constraints rather than the political ones. They point out many unfavorable economic conditions. The remote geographical location and the severe climate conditions make access to natural resources in Siberia difficult. "The Soviet Union tries to make Japan pay the huge investment cost of the infrastructure for access."²⁴⁸ "The geographical priority gap worsens the situation; the Soviet Siberian development strategy focuses on Western Siberia, whereas Japan is

interested in the area east of Lake Baikal."²⁴⁹ Worse yet, "the Soviet Union does not allow Japanese participation in management."²⁵⁰ Further, imposing the traditional approach called the "compensation method," the Soviet Union pays costs for Japanese capital and technical investment back "in kind" with the product of the development (such as timber and coal). Nevertheless, "there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union will supply them after the development is completed."²⁵¹

In essence, economists conclude that the mere fact that Siberia has an enormous potential does not in itself justify massive Japanese investment.²⁵² In fact, although the size of individual contracts is big, the number of contracts has been small. The Siberian Development Projects remained "low-key during 1976-1985."²⁵³

To put it differently, some economists think that complementarity in trade does not exist. Japan has nothing to buy from the Soviet Union. The only major Japanese interests in the Soviet Union are the natural resources in Siberia (40% of the Japanese imports from the Soviet Union are timber). To be worse, "they do not match Japanese standards. Delivery delays constantly. It is quicker to import timber from the Philippines."²⁵⁴ The geographical proximity of Siberia is no longer counted as a big advantage in the age of fast transportation.

In the case of Japanese exports, others note, "they twice outweigh Japanese imports."²⁵⁵ "This is so despite

the fact that Japanese exports are limited by the lack of purchasing power of the Soviet Union and by severe restrictions on high-tech products on the expanded COCOM list."²⁵⁶ "This is so because the Soviet Union does not have the economic basis to produce goods exportable to Japan. Unless the Soviet economy changes, this unilateral trade pattern will remain the same."²⁵⁷

According to an economist, the situation has been aggravated in the 1980's by "the change in the nature of Japan-Soviet economic relations from the 1970's when Siberian Development Projects blossomed. Both sides contributed to this. The Soviet Union is giving priority to the development of Western Russia and the Maritime Provinces. In Japan the era of *Zaikai* has ended. With the advent of 'salary-man presidents' (who do not own the company), the concept of *Zaikai* (which implied the power to influence the government) is dead. Led by influential *Zaikai* leaders such as Yoshinari Kawai and Shigeo Nagano, sizable Siberian projects materialized in the 1960's and 1970's. Current business leaders are cool to projects that are subject to government pressure; although being cool does not mean that they are indifferent."²⁵⁸

Second, and more importantly, a businessman said that "Japanese enthusiasm for Siberian projects has waned because of the shift in its industrial structure from heavy-hard-long-large industry to light-thin-short-small (high-tech) industry. To secure energy resources was an

urgent issue for Japan in the 1970's and Japan tried to reduce its dependence on 'strategic resources' after the oil crises. Now Japan has changed its industrial structure and increased oil efficiency, so that it reduced its oil consumption by more than one third. Also, the 'oil glut' and lower prices for metals have reduced the need for the natural resources from Siberia."²⁵⁹ In a nutshell, economists conclude that the era of the large-scale energy-related Japan-Soviet Siberian Development Projects of the 1970's is over.²⁶⁰

Third, with the advent of the high-tech age, a new problem has emerged. In the words of an economist, "while the earlier business with the Soviet Union were concerned with Siberian development which had nothing to do with high technology, now high-tech has become a Soviet demand. As a result, some inexperienced Japanese companies have entered the Soviet market and 'stepped out of line,' arousing complaints from the U.S."²⁶¹ The "Toshiba Machine Company incident" has become the most famous showdown recently. It became entangled with the huge trade deficit of the U.S. with Japan, and with the U.S. dissatisfaction with the lack of Japanese efforts for more burden-sharing in the Japan-U.S. alliance, as examined earlier.

It was under these circumstances that the government changed its policy from the *seikei bunri gensoku* (separation of politics from economics) to the *seikei fukabun gensoku* (indivisibility of politics from

economics). Japanese economic interests in the Soviet Union hit a low. The eleventh session of the JSEC Joint Committee scheduled in Tokyo in the spring of 1987 was suspended. Next to be examined is how the foreign policy elites evaluate the Japanese economic policy.

b) Japanese Economic Policy in Dilemma

i) *Seikei Fukabun* Principle (Linkage Policy)

There is a clear correlation between the position in the spectrum of ideology and the perceptions of how to formulate economic policy towards the Soviet Union. The farther right in the spectrum, the more the elites advocate the *seikei fukabun* principle, a linkage policy between politics and economics. The farther left in the spectrum, the more they assert the *seikei bunri* principle, a nonlinkage policy.

The MFA maintains that the linkage is necessary. MFA officials said that "Japan-Soviet relations, including economic relations, are defined by the framework of U.S.-Soviet relations. Insofar as Japan-Soviet political relations are unstable, economic relations should be limited accordingly."²⁶² "Japan adopts a linkage policy also because the Soviet Union exploits Japan's technology at will."²⁶³ "The MFA set up three principles on its trade policy towards the Soviet Union: 1) Japan shall not improve economic relations with the Soviet Union without the return of the Northern Territories through the

conclusion of a peace treaty. 2) Trade relations should be based on the principle of equality and mutual benefits. 3) Japan shall not deepen dependence for important natural resources on the Soviet Union."²⁶⁴

In the opinion of MFA officials, "private sector can do business with the Soviet Union unless it involves high technology. However, governmental transactions such as economic cooperation, long-term investment, and the provision of credits by the Yugin (Export-Import Bank) should be limited. The current level of commodity trade (a 2-3% share of the total Japanese trade) and economic cooperation on a case by case basis are sufficient."²⁶⁵

MITI and the MOF agree with the MFA about this general framework. "MITI acknowledges that no economic relations can exist without political relations. In the form of administrative guidance, it has guided the Japanese business circles to do business with the Soviet Union within the framework of the Northern Territories issue."²⁶⁶

ii) Strict Linkage Policy

Those on the right advocate a strict application of the linkage policy. They hold that Japan has no need to improve economic relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has much to gain, while Japan has nothing to gain from them. They also think that now is the best time to link the Northern Territories issue with economic policy, given Gorbachev's desperate need of Japanese

economic cooperation for his *perestroika*.

Second, as a more important point of the linkage policy, a Soviet watcher argues that, "given the fact that it is the Soviet Union which has caused international tension for the last forty years, Japan should not help it to restore its economy and to modernize its military. Were it not for the economic relations with the Western nations, the present Soviet Union could not have existed. The Soviet Union has bought and stolen high technology from the Western nations as much as it wanted, aided by *détente*."²⁶⁷ "There is a secret syndicate (Muller) in West Germany to export high-tech to the Soviet Union."²⁶⁸ "To prevent this, coordination among the Western allies is necessary. However, due to the very nature of democracy, consolidation is difficult."²⁶⁹ Meanwhile, criticism of the Japanese exports of its high-tech to the Soviet Union has been mounting.

In this regard, those on the right criticize the Japan Industrial Fair held in Moscow in October 1986 after 16 years' suspension: "400,000-550,000 Soviet citizens visited and a number of items were reported 'missing.' This exactly falls in with Lenin's remark about 'buying the rope from the capitalists to strangle them with'."²⁷⁰ They criticize both the Soviet Union and Japan for this. On the Soviet side, some argue that "the Soviet Union, using the *détente* mood, tries to get 'economic assistance' through the JSEC."²⁷¹ "It tries to tempt Japan with a sweet voice.

Gorbachev said at Vladivostok, in praising Japan, 'Japan has a means to vitalize relations with other nations called 'economic diplomacy.' Meanwhile, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Soloviev, said that, insofar as Japan adopts the 'sei-kei fukabun' principle (to link *politics* with economics), the Soviet Union would introduce the 'kei-sei fukabun' principle (to link *economics* with politics). This is as if saying that if Japan does not give economic cooperation, the Soviet Union will not return the Northern Territories."²⁷²

On the Japanese side, others note that "one of the problems with Japan is that it is the easiest country to deceive."²⁷³ "Domestic competition among Japanese companies is another problem. When one company initiates business with the Soviet Union, others follow suit, resulting in intense competition among themselves. They are only motivated by private profits, neglecting national interests. As for the politicians, they do not adopt the linkage policy because they still fear Soviet military power."²⁷⁴ "Japan should consolidate relations with the U.S. and wait for the Soviet Union to come to negotiate. Politicians do not realize that the unity of the West makes relations with the Soviet Union easier for Japan."²⁷⁵

iii) Loose "Selective Linkage" Policy

Some on the right of center and in the center consider looser application of the linkage policy to be a better policy. First, a former MFA official said that "economic relations are handled by the private sector. In principle they are a separate matter from the Northern Territories issue; although there is a limit in the governmental transactions such as Siberian development projects and credits."²⁷⁶ Others said that "it is unwise not to make profits from trade with the Soviet Union unless it jeopardizes Japanese security."²⁷⁷

Second, a scholar in the center proposes that, "as an effective linkage policy, Japan should adopt a 'selective linkage policy.' The linkage should be covert in order to induce (rather than coerce) the Soviet Union to think that bad relations with Japan are costly."²⁷⁸ To quote another, "in order to 'catch' the islands, Japan should offer a 'bait' big enough to appeal to the Soviet Union and small enough not to have an impact on the world security or economy. Small-scale economic cooperation like joint ventures on paper pulp, or supplying second-rate technology would be such a bait. If this does not work, Japan can cancel it at any time, with minor risk and cost."²⁷⁹

iv) *Seikei Bunri* Principle (Nonlinkage Policy)

Conversely, those on the left of center and on the left, specifically those in the private sector, think that the linkage policy is meaningless, and advocate the nonlinkage approach called the *seikei bunri* principle. Economists believe that "the linkage does not work because economic cooperation will not give Japan bargaining power. This is so fundamentally because the territorial issue is not the issue in Japan-Soviet relations. U.S.-Soviet relations are the real impediment. Improvement of economic relations alone cannot change Japan-Soviet relations and bring about the return of the Northern Territories."²⁸⁰

In the words of some economists, the linkage strategy is based on a doubtful assumption that economic cooperation will increase enough to exert a substantial impact on Japan's national security.²⁸¹ "The fact is that mutual benefit does not exist in Japan-Soviet economic relations. Therefore, even if the MFA did not adopt the linkage policy, economic relations would not increase. The level of the economic relations is too low for the linkage to work; they are already having difficulties on the political level. The MFA overestimates economic relations in terms of the Northern Territories."²⁸²

Others hold that "the concept of linkage is nothing new. Prime Minister Ohira had already proposed this policy in the 1970's. Yet, during these last 15 years, what the U.S. and Japan feared—an increase in Japan-Soviet economic

relations—has not occurred despite the growth of Japanese economic power. Besides, the linkage policy does not serve Japanese national interests. Foreign policy is flexible by nature. Smart nations do not take such a rigid policy as 'A or B.' If the MFA had been smart enough to use the Northern Territories as a 'thorn' (tension factor) between Japan and the Soviet Union, their relations would have been better. The fact is that, fortunately for the MFA, this tension factor happens to exist as a constraint to their relations. To the extent that the MFA takes an 'A or B' position, Japan is disqualified from negotiating with the Soviet Union and preserving its national interests."²⁸³ In a nutshell, "the linkage strategy is pointless and defunct."²⁸⁴

Second, those in the business circles on the left of center stress the separation of economic relations from political ones. They feel that "the real constraint on Japan-Soviet economic relations is the economic factor, but it is confused with a political constraint."²⁸⁵ An economist said that "even if the Northern Territories were returned, their economic relations would not improve significantly. When Sino-Japanese political relations improved, their economic relations did not work out as expected. An example is the sudden Chinese cancellation of a \$3 billion contract. In reverse, even if Japan-Soviet political relations worsened, their economic relations would continue."²⁸⁶

Another opinion is that "even if Japan-Soviet trade were to improve, it would not have political impact in the foreseeable future. Their trade has been only around \$4.1 billion on average, whereas the trade with China is five times that, and twenty five times that with the U.S. It is in the Japanese national interest to balance out this uneven trade pattern. Theoretically, Japan's trade with the Soviet Union could increase by five times. With the U.S. it could decrease to fifteen to twenty times. This much of an increase still would not affect Japan-Soviet political relations at all."²⁸⁷

However, to quote an economist, "even if their economic relations were to improve, trade would not double. This is so because of the change in the Japanese industrial structure, rapidly expanding COCOM lists, and the slow rate of Soviet eastward economic development. Even if the Soviet share in Japanese trade were to double, it would not be a vital share, nor the U.S. would intervene with such an increase so long as high-tech transfer is not involved. Yet, the MFA fears jeopardizing Japan-U.S. relations and overreacts regarding Japan-Soviet economic relations."²⁸⁸

The left of center business opinion is that Japan-Soviet economic relations do not provoke security concerns in the foreseeable future, either. An economist notes that "the level of Japanese dependence for energy resources on the Soviet Union has been constantly below 1% throughout the 1970's. It will still be just over 1% for

the rest of the 1980's,"²⁸⁹ while 18% is the estimated danger level for a nation to be dependent upon a sole supplier of energy resources.

In this regard, another considers that "the Japan Industrial Fair in Moscow was a mistake, not because of security concerns as those on the right argued, but because of the wrong timing. It is futile to show goods to the Soviet Union when it has no money to buy them. The accusation of the right about the private sector is wrong. The event was held with MITI's authorization and by its administrative guidance. A few high-tech items were exhibited on condition that they be excluded from sale and brought back to Japan. Actually only a few 'gray zone' items were shown."²⁹⁰

They see the MFA as overreacting to the Japan-Soviet joint ventures as well. Some said that "the projects that Gorbachev proposed are not attractive to Japan. They were economically so unfeasible that even pro-Soviet businessmen were amazed."²⁹¹ Others said that "the concept of a 'joint venture within socialism' itself poses a problem."²⁹² "It is intrinsically impossible to establish a joint venture law in the Soviet Union."²⁹³ According to a businessman, "although the Soviet Union has liberalized foreign trade to some extent (by enacting laws to give autonomy to its public corporations on external trade and joint venture in September 1986) this will not bring significant results. It cannot provide capital to all 20 trade-related

governmental agencies and 70 public corporations at the same time. Besides, Japan has had enough trouble with the joint ventures with China, so the business circles are cautious on those with the Soviet Union. They are going to try out minor projects that involve low risks"²⁹⁴ and counter-proposed "nine projects including fish processing, lumbering, and hotel businesses."²⁹⁵ He concludes that "because of poor economic conditions, even if all the projects were to materialize, it would not be significant enough to have political implications. This is a purely economic matter."²⁹⁶ An economist adds that "if the government wants to make a fuss over the joint ventures, it should do so when high-tech becomes involved and Japanese national interests are going to be jeopardized. At present, there is no such danger."²⁹⁷

Under these circumstances, those in the business circles on the left of center advocate the *seikei bunri* (separation of politics from economics) approach and an improvement in Japan-Soviet economic relations. An economist points out that "Western Europe and even the U.S. have much closer economic relations with the Soviet Union. Although the differences in the political systems cannot be overcome, Japan should take advantage of the complementarity of economic conditions with the Soviet Union. The MFA does not understand economics. Given the political stalemate, the significance of economic relations becomes all the greater. With the deadlock on the Northern

Territories issue, there is no other way but to consider Japan-Soviet relations separately from that issue. Economic relations are the only way to improve their relations."²⁹⁸

With these political as well as economic impediments, an economist concludes that "Japan-Soviet economic relations are currently in a dilemma. No major improvement in their economic relations as in the 1970's is expected. After the large-scale Siberian development projects in the 1970's, their relations are now entering the age of 'mini projects.' They will pose no problem to Japanese national security until the 1990's or 2000's. As for future issues, were their economic relations to increase significantly, trade friction between them would occur, with deficits for the Soviet Union."²⁹⁹

To sum up, those in the private sector on the left of center are discontented with the government linkage policy, but in reality they have to follow MITI's administrative guidance. Meanwhile, those on the left denounce the private sector as well as the government. To quote one on the left, "the dual nature of Japanese foreign policy is designed to balance two contradictory factors: to maintain its national security by consolidating the Western alliance against the Soviet Union, while approaching the Soviet Union for economic interests. This is so because the private sector exerts influence on the government as in the case of Siberian economic cooperation and fishing matters.

Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is not formulated as foreign policy but as economic policy."³⁰⁰ Another said that "Japan should abolish the COCOM restrictions in order to make trade conditions equal and mutual."³⁰¹ "Japan should promote technological cooperation in order to enhance Soviet liberalization. This will serve world peace better than the SDI."³⁰²

Finally, the fishing issue should be examined. In addition to the low profile of Japan-Soviet economic relations in the high-tech age, the Japanese private sector was further hit a severe blow to its fishing industry. With the advent of the era of "200-mile economic zones," Japan has encountered a triple punch from the Soviet Union in its fishery policy. One, exclusion from the Soviet "200 mile economic zone" after 1977. Two, a drastically reduced catch quota for trawling boats in the Soviet "economic zone": from 750,000 metric tons (from 1979 until 1983) to 600,000 metric tons (1985).³⁰³ It was further reduced to a quarter, 150,000 metric tons (1986), despite the expectation of a more lenient policy under Gorbachev.³⁰⁴ For 1987, the quota was set at 200,000 metric tons, plus an additional 100,000 metric tons, by paying ¥1.29 billion (≈\$8.6 million) to the Soviet Union as a fishing rights fee.³⁰ Three, "even salmon and trout fishing outside the Soviet economic zone is subject to Soviet restriction. The Soviet Union has home rivers of these 'retrospective fish' [fish which leave the ocean to spawn up river]. Thus, it

imposed on Japan the payment of a 'fishing cooperation fee' for the protection and growth of salmon and trout, as if it were a fishing right fee for the Soviet economic zone. Not only has the quota been reduced to 400,000 metric tons in 1984, the cooperation fee has been increased substantially to ¥4.25 billion (≈\$28.3 million)."³⁰⁶

Those outside the government are critical of the Japanese fishing policy. Some hold that "the MFA has no set principles in its fishing policy. Japan was against the creation of "200-mile exclusive economic zones" at the U.N. Conferences on the Law of the Sea. However, immediately after the Soviet Union declared a 200-mile economic zone in 1977, Japan reversed its position and followed suit. This cannot be called foreign policy."³⁰⁷ "As a result, the MFA's Treaties Bureau has lost its authority."³⁰⁸ Others think that "fishing is Japan's 'Achilles' heel' with the Soviet Union. Japan is resigned to 'beggar diplomacy' towards the Soviet Union for the sake of fishing rights."³⁰⁹ "Japan catches tuna and salmon by paying the Soviet Union more than ¥4 billion, while not catching sardines and mackerel which are abundant in the Japan Sea."³¹⁰ "Adherence to northern ocean fishing would jeopardize Japanese national interests in the age of 200-mile economic zones."³¹¹ "In the long run, there is no other way but for the Japanese northern ocean fishing industry to shift its fishing structure to coastal fishing, fish cultivation (plantations), or fish breeding."³¹²

Notes

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3. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
4. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
5. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
6. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
12. Kenichi Ito, "Nakasone taiso gaikō e no chūmon" ("Recommendations for Nakasone's Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union"), *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 64, No. 12, December 1986, p. 113.
13. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
14. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
19. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
20. Akira Sono, "Yoshida Shigeru 'taiso kyōkō gaikō' ni manabe" ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 34, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 10, October 1986, pp. 206-209.

21. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
22. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), p.206.
23. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
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26. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), pp. 209-210.
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29. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
30. Akira Sono, "'Beiso sekkin' o enshutsu suru dai-shimbun" ("The Big Newspaper that Stage-Manages the 'U.S.-Soviet Rapprochement'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 26, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 2, February, 1986, p. 251.
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32. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Shunichi Matsumoto, *Mosukuwa ni kakeru niji: Nisso kokkō kaifuku hiwa* (*Rainbow Across Moscow: The Secret Story of the Resumption of Japan-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*), Tokyo: Asahi Shuppan sha, 1966, pp. 155-156.
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37. Hiroshi Kimura, "Gorubachofu hōnichi to kōgo no Nisso kankei: Ichi Nihon jin no mikata" ("Gorbachev's Visit to Japan and Future Japan-Soviet Relations: A Japanese View"), in proceedings of the International Symposium, November 1986, Osaka, Japan, pp. 122-123, referring to a study by Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1969.
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40. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
41. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
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43. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
44. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
45. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
46. Interview, Tokyo, November 14, 1986.
47. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
48. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
49. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
50. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.
51. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
52. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
53. Interview, Tokyo, November 14, 1986.
54. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
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57. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), p.211.
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80. Interview, Tokyo, November 15, 1986.
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85. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
86. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
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91. Yunosuke Okura, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
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97. Toru Nakagawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.
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103. *Ibid.*
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105. Interview, Tokyo, October 2, 1986.
106. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
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110. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
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pp. 246-247.
118. Shunichi Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-115 and 165-166.
119. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's
'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"),
pp. 206-209.
120. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
121. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("The Big Newspaper that
Stage-Manages the 'U.S.-Soviet Rapprochement'"),
p. 248.
122. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Reagan's Card that Made the
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123. Interview, Tokyo, October 25, 1986.
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133. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.
134. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
135. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
136. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.
137. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
138. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
139. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
140. Interview, Tokyo, November 12, 1986.
141. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
142. Interview, Tokyo, October 31, 1986.
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287. Interview, Japan, November 8, 1986.
288. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
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290. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
291. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
292. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
293. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
294. Interview, Japan, November 8, 1986.
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298. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
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300. Interview, Tokyo, November 19, 1986.
301. Interview, Tokyo, November 20, 1986.
302. Interview, Tokyo, November 19, 1986.

303. Statistics are from Suzuki Keisuke, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-291.
304. Statistics are from *Asahi Shimbun*, May 21, 1986, p.4,
305. Statistics are from *Chūnichi Shimbun*, December 4, 1986, and *The Asahi Evening*, December 8, 1986, (The exchange rate is taken to be \$1=¥150, which is roughly that of January 1987).
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
Chapter VI. Sources of Perceptions of the Soviet Union

1. General Sources of Perceptions

Recent public opinion polls indicate that the Soviet Union ranks as the least favorite country with the Japanese. According to the public opinion poll released in March, 1987 by the Management & Coordination Agency in the Prime Minister's Office, 84% of the Japanese dislike the Soviet Union as a country, whereas 9% like the Soviet Union (see Figure 4). These figures have remained constant for the last several years. In addition, 71% of the Japanese do not think Japan-Soviet relations are good. 58% of these cite the reason as the "Northern Territories issue," followed by ideology, distrust, and military threat.¹ In comparison, 68% of the Japanese like China despite the fact that it is a communist country.²

Before analyzing "specific sources of perceptions" of the Soviet Union for the foreign policy elites, it is appropriate to examine "general sources of perceptions" of the Soviet Union for the Japanese in general. An MFA official recalls that "his source of perceptions of the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly 'history.' This is not personal or unique to him, but rather is the same as for Japanese in general."³ Scholars in the center think that "history is a deeper source of the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union than ideology."⁴ "When it comes to Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union, there are

Figure 4: Public Opinion Polls on the Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union



Notes:

1. Upper columns indicate those who dislike the Soviet Union, including both "definitely so" and "moderately so."
2. Lower columns indicate those who like the Soviet Union, including both "definitely so" and "moderately so."

Sources: *Asahi Shimbun*, September 16, 1983, p. 2, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 24, 1984, September 30, 1985, and March 16, 1987.

fundamentally no major differences at bottom even between the right and the left."⁵ Public opinion polls suggest that the majority of the Japanese are anti-Soviet, whereas they are extremely pro-Chinese, regardless of their position in the spectrum of ideology. In fact, less than 2% of the Japanese "definitely" like the Soviet Union, whereas 7% only "more or less" like the Soviet Union.⁶ The number of those who "definitely" like the Soviet Union is "even smaller than the number of supporters of the JSP, and only corresponds to the membership of the Socialist Association (a pro-Soviet faction within the JSP)."⁷

**a) History of Japanese Relations with Russia
and the Soviet Union: Source of Russophobia**

There is a solid consensus among the foreign policy elites, except for some on the left, that the history of Russia-Soviet Union is the predominant sources of their perceptions of the Soviet Union. As examined in Chapter IV, the majority of the foreign policy elites think that the Soviet Union inherited Czarist Russia's basic nature as a traditionally imperialistic expansionist. The accumulation of fear of the Soviet military threat rather than the fear of ideology became the major cause for the Japanese Russophobia. Then, how have past historic events between Japan and Russia-Soviet Union formed the Japanese Russophobia?

A scholar in the center holds that "the formation of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union dates back as far as the 18th Century. The eastward Russian expansion implanted Russophobia among the Japanese."⁸ It was under these circumstances that some enlightened scholars foresaw the need for the defense of northern Japan, including Shihēi Hayashi (see Chapter III). The scholar in the center describes that "the prophesies of the 'alarmists' proved correct when Russia attacked the Japanese northern colonies."⁹

In the words of a scholar on the right, "although Hayashi's concept was dismissed by the Shogunate, it has become the basis of Japan's national defense since the Meiji period: Takamori Saigo's *Seikanron* [an advocacy for the conquest of Korea (1873)], the actual annexation of Korea (1911), and the Manchurian Incident (1931), all came about as strategies to deter Russian eastward expansion."¹⁰

Another in the center notes that "the leaders of the new Meiji government perceived Russia as the 'archenemy at the north gate.' This was so despite the fact that Russian expansionism then was focused on the West, and the Far East was regarded as secondary. Besides, Russia lacked the capacity to expand into Northeast Asia; this was before the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Despite these objective environmental factors, the new Meiji leaders perceived a Russian threat. First, because of the geographical factor: Russia's huge terrain engulfing the

tiny Japanese Archipelago from the north constitutes a source of Russophobia. From the Russian point of view, the Japanese Archipelago forms an arch along the Russian eastern border, blocking its outlets for southeastern expansion. [This geopolitical factor has made the basic nature of Japan-Russia relations confrontational, rather than good-neighborly.] Second, the Russian exercise of threats endorsed their fear. The stationing of the Russian military ship *Posadonik* on Tsushima Island for more than half a year in 1861 caused the Japanese leaders to fear that Russia would occupy the island forever. It stayed vividly in their minds. Third, the role of British diplomacy in implanting and enlarging Russophobia in Japan should not be overlooked. Russia was the archenemy in Britain's world policy. The British Minister to Japan, Harry Parkes, never missed the chance to emphasize the Russian threat to the Meiji leaders. [Japan got involved in rivalries among the imperialistic powers in the 1870's]. [For these reasons,] the strategy that presupposes Russia as the primary potential enemy was formed. This has become the core strategic concept of the Japanese Army since then."¹¹ Thus Japanese Russophobia had been firmly implanted by the late-19th century.

On this basis, Japanese Russophobia rapidly expanded when Russia began construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. According to a scholar in the center "the Japanese thought that the Russians were coming on the

Railroad. This fear resulted in the Otsu incident. The victory of the political position that demanded capital punishment for the guard who injured Prince Nicholas, over the legal position that advocated the independence of justice [and lesser punishment], reflects the depth of the Japanese Russophobia in the Meiji era. It would just be hindsight to think that Russia would not have retaliated if the sentence had been only life imprisonment. The Japanese Russophobia was so grave that Japan tried to avoid Russian retaliation at the cost of the life of one person."¹²

After the Sino-Japanese War, another scholar in the center points out that "the significance of the Triple Intervention in aggravating the Japanese perception of Russia was considerable. The Japanese were disgraced and enraged by the intervention. The perception of Russia as the most hateful nation diffused into them. An old Chinese saying, *gashin-shōtan*, became the national slogan."¹³ The slogan literally means "sleep on kindling and lick gall;" to endure austerity in order to anticipate vengeance in the future.¹⁴ Another adds that, "as Foreign Minister Mutsu wrote in his memoir, the Japanese were haughty due to the victory in the Sino-Japanese War. Yet, Japan did not have the power to reject the intervention after having exhausted all its power in the war. The degree of their humiliation corresponded to that of their frustration. Foreign Minister Mutsu realized that the people's frustration has to be assuaged in some way. Thus the Japanese were already

psychologically ready for the Russo-Japanese War."¹⁵

In the opinion of a scholar on the right, "with the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese Russophobia and the perception of the need for defense against Russia decreased."¹⁶ Another in the center considers "the Russo-Japanese War to be a watershed in changing the Japanese perceptions of Russia as a 'formidable threat' to a 'lovable, romantic, and revolutionary Russia' for some people; although this does not mean that the perceptions of a threat disappeared."¹⁷

After World War II, "the outbreak of the Korean War shook Japan and renewed the Russophobia."¹⁸ However, in the words of a scholar on the right, "with the institution of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japanese did not perceive the Soviet threat as serious until the late 1970's."¹⁹

A critical shift came with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979). A scholar in the center holds that "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan revived Japanese Russophobia that had been dormant since the Russo-Japanese War."²⁰ In fact, the majority of the foreign policy elites think that the Soviet suppression of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Afghanistan were the most decisive specific events that had determined their perceptions of the Soviet Union. Some even made a sharp change from being pro-Soviet to being anti-Soviet.

A journalist on the right said that "he was not anti-Soviet until he was 'awakened' by the Czech incident."²¹ A former MFA official on the right of center said that "he was shocked by the incident because he did not think that the Soviet Union would suppress the Czech experiment of 'socialism with a human face.' However, he still believed in the Soviet Union during the 1970's détente, only to find himself awakened again by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan."²²

The magnitude of their disillusionment with the Soviet Union corresponded to the extent of the expectations they held for "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet Union. A journalist in the center, who used to be known as pro-Soviet, "felt betrayed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, because he had trusted Brezhnev."²³

Thus, the two major awakenings to the Soviet threat transformed some of the foreign policy elites decisively into being anti-Soviet. Even those on the left, including the JCP, criticized the invasion. The Soviet invasion revived the historical Japanese Russophobia, which was only amplified by the subsequent Soviet military build-up in the Far East, including Japan's Northern Territories.

Finally, according to a military specialist on the right of center, "there are co-existing in Japan now two extreme perceptions of the Soviet threat: one is to exaggerate the threat, and the other is to underestimate it."²⁴ A scholar in the center maintains that "the

Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg, Buyo Enomoto, added the latter perception in the mid-19th Century. In his effort to cure Japanese Russophobia, Enomoto diffused the image of Russia as an uncivilized and barbarian nation. He described Russia as a 'country of poverty, prisoners, and bedbugs' in *Shiberia Nikki* [Siberia Diary]. This perception [contempt of Russia] overcame the Russophobia after the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War. It gradually came to form another stream that runs into the current Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union."²⁵

As a result, the Japanese could not understand why Japan was fatally defeated by the Soviet Union in the battle of Nomonhan (1939). Reflection on this defeat "not only caused a revolution in Japanese weaponry and military tactics, but also drove Japan closer to an alliance with Germany and Italy."²⁶ According to a scholar in the center, "the perception of Russia as a barbarian country revived again in the postwar period, triggered by the disclosure of Stalin's tyranny."²⁷ However, "this perception does not appear on the surface currently."²⁸ It is overshadowed by the stronger revival of another perception, Russophobia, awakened by the invasion of Afghanistan. In sum, "the Japanese perceptions of Russia-Soviet Union that had changed once due to the Russo-Japanese War have revolved back to the original ones."²⁹

b) Soviet Behavioral Patterns: Source of Distrust

Some foreign policy elites maintain that dislike (antipathy) of the Soviet Union is a deeper source of the Japanese perception of the Soviet Union than the fear of the Soviet threat. In the words of a military specialist on the right of center "the Japanese antipathy towards the Soviet Union precedes their fear of that country. The antipathy created the fear, rather than the fear creating the antipathy."³⁰ Similarly, a scholar in the center holds that "the Japanese fear Russia-Soviet Union because they dislike the country, regardless of whether it is imperialist or communist."³¹ "These two factors, caught in a vicious circle, constitute the major components of the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union."³²

Thus, in addition to the historic events that implanted Russophobia among the Japanese in terms of the military threat, other events that hardened the Japanese perceptions in terms of antipathy and distrust should also be examined. In this case, however, it is not so much what happened but rather the way things happened that constitutes the source of perceptions.

An MFA official on the right believes that "the deepest reasons for the Japanese dislike of the Soviet Union derive from the Soviet lack of empathy for others and ruthless behavior."³³ A military specialist on the right of center stresses that "what makes him furious is not what the Soviet Union did to Japan but the way it treated

Japan."³⁴ Among other things, a scholar in the center notes that "merciless Soviet behavior at the end of World War II became the 'root' of today's anti-Soviet perceptions in Japan. This included the violation of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty, the massacre and plunder in Manchuria and Sakhalin, the seizure of the Kurile Islands and the Northern Territories, and the detention of [575,000] Japanese hostages in forced labor camps in Siberia."³⁵ Another on the right adds that "what deepened Japanese distrust is the fact that the Soviet Union did these merciless acts although Japan did not invade the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet Union that invaded Japan."³⁶

For example, the Soviet violation of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty in the final phase of the World War II (when Japan was about to surrender) was taken as a "stab in the back."³⁷ The Japanese cannot accept the Soviet "thief at a fire"³⁸ behavior either, in which it took the Northern Territories in an opportunistic way, after having confirmed that the U.S. Occupation Army was not stationed there. A scholar in the center notes that "because of the continued Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories, the forgetful Japanese still remember all that the Soviet Union did at the end of World War II, and cannot help becoming anti-Soviet."³⁹

"Hearing the announcement *damoi* (to return home), the Japanese military officers in Manchuria got on the train [expecting to go back to Japan]; instead their destination

was Siberia."⁴⁰ However, what the Japanese cannot tolerate is not the fact that the Soviet Union took originally "1,070,000"⁴¹ Japanese including civilians into Siberia, but "their inhuman and cruel treatment in labor camps for eleven years. It was in violation of the Hague Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Potsdam Declaration that provided that all POWs must immediately be returned home safely."⁴² "The Japanese hostages were even brainwashed to become agents to communize Japan."⁴³

In contrast, a journalist on the left recalls that "the Japanese treated the Russian hostages in the Russo-Japanese War extremely leniently."⁴⁴ A Japanese who recently visited the "foreigners' graves" in Matsuyama recounts that "Russian POWs who were sent to Matsuyama (nearly 1,500) were allowed to go out freely. They were even allowed theater going, spa bathing, and swimming at the beach. The invalids were treated very well in hospitals. The graves for those who died in Matsuyama (98 Russians) are cleaned by the local residents even now, and fresh flowers are arranged on the graves."⁴⁵ The journalist on the left said that "the Japanese did not know the nature of the Russians at that time. They could not dream that the Soviet Union would treat them cruelly later in the century."⁴⁶

It has become clear that "the disparities in the thinking and behavioral patterns"⁴⁷ between the Japanese and the Russians are the underlying sources of the Japanese

perceptions of the Soviet Union. The striking contrast in their treatment of the POWs epitomizes the disparities. They are also reflected in the territorial dispute. In the opinion of a scholar in the center, to the Soviet Union, a territorial boundary is "political and artificial." Thus it regards the Northern Territories as legitimate spoils of war. To Japan, it is "natural, racial, linguistic, and cultural."⁴⁸ In other words, "the main reasons for the Japanese adherence to the Northern Territories are 'psychological and even symbolic' rather than military-strategic."⁴⁹ Recently, the shooting down of the Korean airliner provoked Japanese indignation about Soviet ruthlessness and "secrecy."⁵⁰

Meanwhile, a scholar on the right of center notes that "the Japanese like the U.S. best and the Soviet Union least, despite the facts that the both were enemy states to Japan, and that the damage caused by the Soviet Union was negligible compared to that by the U.S. This is so because of the Soviet 'stab in the back' behavior at the end of World War II and the differences in the political and economic systems between Japan and the Soviet Union."⁵¹

Nonetheless, despite the differences in the political and economic systems, the Japanese like China. As MFA officials see it, primarily because China has never been perceived as a threat by the Japanese. On the contrary, "its overwhelming dominance of power and its unique way of controlling its dependent nations without conquest

maintained peace in Asia for centuries (a *Pax Sinica*)."⁵²

Second, the similarities in the ways of thinking and the behavioral patterns between the Chinese and the Japanese are accountable. To the Japanese, China is like Greece or Rome to the Westerners. China has been the mentor of Japan, from the way of thinking (Confucianism) to the language. In contrast to the ruthless Soviet behavior to Japan, "China (the Kuomintang government) soon released its Japanese POWs safely. It has recently relinquished the reparations from Japan,"⁵³ despite the fact that Japan was the aggressor in China. The territorial dispute between Japan and China (over Senkaku Island) was settled by shelving it indefinitely to a future generation. Thus, the Japanese were convinced that the Chinese have respect and empathy for others, whereas the Russians have neither.

Third, although it is a communist regime now, the Japanese think that "China is less ideological and more pragmatic than the Soviet Union."⁵⁴ If the Japanese like China despite the differences in the political and economic systems, how, and to what extent did communist ideology play a role in the formation of the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union?

**c) Communist Ideology: Rise and Fall of its
Influence and the Emergence of "Red-phobia"**

A scholar in the center maintains that "the Japanese perceptions of Russia were dichotomized in the late 19th Century when Russian literature was first introduced in Japan by the translation of Turgenev's writings in 1889. This romantic perception of Russia was widely disseminated after the Russo-Japanese War. It was combined with sympathy for socialism through the Russian Revolution of 1905, making these two perceptions twins. As a result, the image of a 'romantic and revolutionary Russia' permeated the intelligensia. Postwar leftist intellectuals inherited this dual image through the 'proletarian literature' that flourished in the 1920's."⁵⁵

Meanwhile, according to another scholar, "the Russophobia among the Japanese political leaders did not diminish with the Russian Revolution. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union (1925) did not change their fundamental perceptions of the Soviet Union, either. [On the contrary,] as the Soviet ideological threat emerged, caution regarding the Soviet Union grew even stronger."⁵⁶

Thus, in addition to the traditional military threat felt since the 18th Century, the political-ideological threat was added to the sources of Japanese Russophobia, for all except the leftists. As a result, "the dichotomy in perceptions of the Soviet Union spread among the

Japanese: the 'Cherry Orchard' for the intellectuals and leftists versus the 'Red Bear' for the political leaders and the general public."⁵⁷

After World War II, the power of the left wing surged in Japan as a strong reaction to militarism. The left wing was influential and its opposition to the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty paralyzed the Diet. The leftists' influence endured despite the Russophobia among the political leaders and the Japanese in general, because of the unique political culture in postwar Japan.

d) Socialization: Japanese Postwar Political Culture

The Japanese political culture drastically shifted toward the left as a reaction to the militarism during World War II. The demobilization of the Japanese Army, the release of political prisoners (mainly communists who had opposed the militarism), the adoption of a "peace constitution," the denial of the divinity of the Emperor, and the sweeping "purge" from public service of those who were alleged to have played roles in the militarism; all took place under General MacArthur's U.S. Occupation Army. Under these circumstances, the leftist intellectuals, who advocated pacifism and the democratization of Japan by abolishing the Imperial system, have come to reign in the academic world as well as in journalism.

Along with this, a scholar in the center notes that "the image of romantic and revolutionary Russia was literally 'resurrected' among the postwar leftist intellectuals through the 'song movement' [Russian folk songs like the *Song of Katyusha* became popular in Japan]. [However,] the perceptions of the postwar intellectuals began to deviate considerably from the reality of the Soviet Union. Their self-projection in their perceptions of the Soviet Union could not be stronger: the more they saw the stalemate in the domestic situation in Japan, the more they idealized the Soviet Union and worshiped it despite the formidable purges and tyranny. For them, the important thing was to deny and criticize the reality of Japan, not to obtain an accurate perception of the Soviet Union. Besides, they had nothing to lose. Even if they had to abandon the Soviet Union, they still had China, or if not China, then they had Vietnam. The perception of the Soviet Union as the center of international communism lasted until the Sino-Soviet split became clear."⁵⁸

According to a scholar on the right, the problem with the postwar political culture in Japan is that "influential magazines were written by certain professors from a Marxist point of view."⁵⁹ "Japanese history was divided into 'black and white' by the communist historians who treated prewar militarist Japan as sheer black and postwar Japan as sheer white. This resulted in an artificial discontinuity in Japanese history."⁶⁰ He argues that "there were too

many fanatic followers of Karl Marx and Max Weber, who combined two irreconcilable concepts in order to overthrow the Japanese Imperial system: [First], Weber's *Ethics of Protestantism and Spirit of Capitalism* was read in such a way as to interpret capitalism in Japan as deformed. They regarded Japan as being at a pre-capitalistic or even pre-feudalistic, ancient, or theocratic stage: insofar as the Emperor existed, Japan was pre-modern and ancient., [Second], the *Kōza-ha* Marxists [one of the two major sects of Marxists in Japan] were studying Japanese society according to the *Thesis on Japan* (analyses and directives on a Japanese revolution) written by the Comintern (Moscow). The Comintern identified the Meiji reign as absolutism one step earlier than that of the French *Ancien Régime*. It assigned the Japanese communists the task of overthrowing the Imperial system. Thus, Marxism and Weberism were combined to overthrow the Imperial system."⁶¹

Despite all this, he points out that "the Imperial system has not been overthrown and Japanese society has maintained stability. This was so because the traditional Japanese common sense that can be called *yamato gokoro* supported the society. Although this 'group unconsciousness' does not appear in the publications, it exists in all the Japanese minds except those of an extremely limited number of intellectuals. [In this sense,] the influential postwar Marxist magazines did not represent the real political culture of 100 million

Japanese. It is true that many things have changed due to the defeat in World War II, but the traditional Japanese common sense survived the war and has supported Japanese daily life."⁶²

A former diplomat on the right also thinks that "the majority of the Japanese have wholesome common sense despite the influence of the *Asahi Shimbun* [a popular newspaper on the left of center]. If the leftist journalism had been really influential, the reign of the LDP cabinet would have been destroyed a long time ago, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would have been repealed."⁶³

As a matter of fact, there is a consensus among the foreign policy elites that the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 became the watershed of postwar Japanese political culture. The leftists' opposition to the revision and to "U.S. imperialism" failed despite the massive demonstrations they mobilized, known as the "1960 *Ampo* conflicts." Those on the right maintain that the significance of the "1960 *Ampo*" is triple.

According to a scholar, the first significance is that "the postwar pacifism culminated in it, was defeated, and finally ended."⁶⁴ Another even puts it that "the *Ampo* demonstration was the grand funeral pageant of the 'postwar' [period]. Japan's postwar began when the U.S. liberals tried an experiment with a plan that was impracticable in the U.S.—democracy—on Japan through the U.S. Occupation Army. The U.S. Occupation Army tried to

use the Japanese leftists because their interests coincided with this, so that both had a brief honeymoon. The U.S. Occupation Army, the Japanese old leftists from the prewar period, and the 'Potsdam Marxists'—opportunists [who joined the left after Japan's surrender by its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration], united and led the people to the '*Ampo* conflicts.' The 'good age' alleged by the leftists culminated in the 1960 *Ampo*, and suddenly collapsed. The postwar era ended with the 1960 *Ampo*, and the tumult was the funeral of the postwar. After that, Japan entered an unprecedented new era of rapid economic growth."⁶⁵

In the opinion of a scholar, the second significance of the *Ampo* is that "the myth of the JCP collapsed. The mainstream in the *Zengakuren* [a National Federation of Communist Students' Groups] that led the *Ampo* conflicts was anti-JCP. The JCP that claimed to be the 'vanguard' was utterly powerless: Despite the fact that Kishi's mission was to revise [renew] the Security Treaty, the JCP was trying to calm down the *Zengakuren*'s demonstrations against the Kishi cabinet, alleging that there were opponents of the revision in the cabinet, too. The JCP even banned the slogan 'To Overthrow Prime Minister Kishi's Cabinet.' As a result, it is called 'the loss of the vanguard.'"⁶⁶

The third significance of the 1960 *Ampo*, the scholar points out, is that "a dark energy (of suppressed feelings) that had accumulated since before World War II exploded,

triggered by the Zengakuren's violent activities; an explosion of a kind that would never take place again. Why else would a number of elderly people [who had nothing to do with leftist movements] support the students who surrounded the Diet and served them rice balls?"⁶⁷

Those on the right think that the decline of communist ideology was accelerated after the 1960 *Ampo* for the following reasons: First, a scholar notes that "the 'loss of the vanguard' by the '1960 *Ampo*' deprived the JCP of its monopoly on the interpretation of Marxism. [Thus,] Trotsky was reinstated. The Trotskyist New Left was formed, as opposed to the Old Left of Stalinism. Once the monopoly on the interpretation was lost, a countless number of interpretations of Marxism emerged, which resulted in the infamous *uchi-geba* [violent intra-sectarian conflicts] among the New Left. [Moreover,] the New Left has serious problems. It lacks a national economic policy: it denies the Stalinistic centralized economy, but it cannot accept the market economy either. So, the New Left has to compromise with a mixed economy, but it hardly warrants its name. As a result, it ended up with the targeting of [local] issues like environment issues or the 'Narita conflict' [to oppose construction of the Narita Airport], and has been driven to violent behavior."⁶⁸

Second, the scholar points out that "Prime Minister Ikeda's income-doubling policy started in 1960 immediately overshadowed political thought and ideology. In the period

of rapid economic growth, political thought and ideology almost disappeared. In this sense, 1960 became the decisive watershed of postwar Japan. Since the 1960's, Japanese workers have become middle class. There are few proletarians to support communism in Japan."⁶⁹

Third, the scholar adds that, "while students were the principal actors in the 1960 *Ampo* demonstrations, the students later became non-political."⁷⁰ In fact, even some of the foreign policy elites who are on the right and are known as anti-Soviet hardliners participated in the 1960 *Ampo*.⁷¹ After the students and the opposition parties failed again in their struggle to forestall the second revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1970, the students lost interest in leftist ideology and politics. Now, the only student demonstrations are those against tuition increases.

In brief, the leftist movements were identified with the demonstrations against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and "U.S. Imperialism." As a result of the failure to repeal the Security Treaty, the left wing no longer gains support from the Japanese at large. A politician in the center said that "the fact that the JCP has not been able to increase its power [with less than half a million members] proves the failure of communism in Japan."⁷²

In addition to the failure of the *Ampo* conflicts in 1960, those on the right and in the center maintain that "de-Stalinization and the Sino-Soviet split were the

critical factors that changed the Japanese postwar political culture."⁷³ First, a scholar on the right notes that "the influential Japanese magazine editors did not know how to deal with de-Stalinization. It was as if they had lost their bearings, so they treated it ambiguously. Meanwhile, criticism of the JCP's 'small Stalin' was launched by the anti-JCP *Zengakuren* leaders [students], who left or were expelled from the JCP. This contributed to the collapse of the myth of the JCP."⁷⁴

Second, the scholar argues that "although the Sino-Soviet split belatedly revealed the common sense that national interests precede ideology, the influential magazines did not know what to do with this, either. So, they acted as if nothing had happened, when their two bosses, to whom they had pledged faithfulness, began to quarrel."⁷⁵ As another in the center puts it "postwar intellectuals were blind to Stalinism because they were daydreaming. However, their self-projection of revolutionary ideals did not last due to the Sino-Soviet split and the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In this sense, the romantic image of revolutionary Russia was ephemeral. This allowed the revival of the original perception of Russia as a nation of 'threat, poverty, and suppression.' This image has been an undercurrent of the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union for 200 years and continues up to the present."⁷⁶

In a nutshell, those on the right conclude that "after having been awakened from the postwar turbulence and from the illusions of ideology, the Japanese found their traditional and national values still alive."⁷⁷ They turned to conservatism. However, this does not mean that Japan became militarist again. It simply means that Japan regained its identity. Nonetheless, "when something characteristic of prewar Japan emerges in postwar Japan (which is natural as an emergence of the continuity of Japan) [the leftists] denounce it as 'reactionary.'"⁷⁸

This swing of the pendulum of Japanese political culture from "progressive leftism" back to nationalistic conservatism was dramatically exhibited by Ikutaro Shimizu, one of the most prominent intellectual "opinion leaders" of the left. "He abandoned ideology and has cleared out from all of these movements ever since the '1960 Ampo'."⁷⁹ In 1980 he published a booklet titled *Nihon yo kokka tare* (*Japan: Be a Sovereign Nation*) that advocated a substantial rearmament of Japan. His public "Copernican revolution" to conservatism literally shook the Japanese intellectual circles.⁸⁰

Under these circumstances, the Japanese interest in communist ideology hit a low point in the 1980's. The loss of attractiveness of communist ideology contributed to the unpopularity of the Soviet Union among the Japanese, including those on the left. In essence, the Japanese were disillusioned with communist ideology. Externally, they

witnessed the realities of the Soviet Union—its imperialistic military behavior, the violation of fundamental human rights, and the stagnant domestic economy. The leftists have suffered from "Soviet hegemonism and imposition of its own national interests upon weak communist parties in the world."⁸¹ The Soviet military behavior in Eastern Europe and the Third World convinced them that the Soviet Union uses ideology to justify its expansionism and national interests.

Internally, the Japanese lost interest in socialism, as social stability was maintained by the reign of the conservative LDP for more than three decades, and as the standard of living rose due to the unprecedented economic growth. Meanwhile, having twice failed to block the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the left wing lost power and the Japanese came to accept the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a fact of life. With the increase of the postwar generation in the forty years since World War II, the Japanese "postwar mentality"—the loss of confidence as a nation, the suppression of nationalism, and its replacement by utopian pacifism—has been withering.

The swing of the pendulum in the political culture is reflected in the arena of domestic politics. The wave of conservatism in Japanese politics became evident when the conservative LDP won a landslide victory in the bicameral general elections in 1980. Riding on this wave, anti-Soviet sentiment surged in Japan in the early 1980's.

It was in this political climate that Nakasone, who advocated nationalism and defense build-up, assumed power in November 1982. He lasted unprecedentedly long, five years, and had the third longest premiership in postwar Japanese politics after Yoshida and Sato.

Meanwhile, the JSP suffers from the decline of its power, with less than 100 seats in the Diet (House of Representatives). The JSP is in a transition: an intra-party power struggle between the mainstream leftists and the rightists became intense. It chose a female chairperson, the first female political party head in Japan's political history in order to improve the image of the party. A scholar on the left of center said that "the JSP faces a dilemma: It has to become ever more similar to the LDP if it wants to regain popularity with the people."⁸² As a final remark, it can be said that with strong support for the "peace constitution" by the Japanese in general, it is unlikely that Japan will go back to jingoistic militarism. Japan has now entered the age of "soft conservatism."⁸³

e) Postwar Education: Dominance of the Leftist Japan Teachers' Union

The swing of the pendulum from the right to the left after 1945 did not bypass the Japanese educational system. The U.S. Occupation Army enforced a drastic educational reform as part of its policy of democratization of Japan.

The teaching of ethics, history, and geography was banned, and all the textbooks that taught nationalism and militarism were censored.

With this enforcement, and the resurgence of leftist power, and as a rebound to its wartime militarism, it was inevitable for the educational system to be dominated by leftist educators in postwar Japan. The teachers formed the *Nikkyōso* (Japan Teachers' Union), which is affiliated with the *Sōhyō* (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions), the largest labor union organization and the major supporting body of the JSP.

Those on the right criticize the postwar educational system. According to a scholar, the problem with the postwar Japanese educational system is that "the *Nikkyōso*'s teachers introduced two irreconcilable things into Japanese education: Marxism which completely lacks educational theory, and American pragmatism [Deweyism] which lacks historical perspective. Education is by nature a conservative profession, which normally hands down the cultural heritage of the past to future generations. However, the Japanese postwar educators became like revolutionaries, believing in Marxism. This was a strange and unfortunate phenomenon."⁸⁴ Another notes that "nevertheless the nature of the education has not changed at all. With the same enthusiasm with which they taught militarism, had children call the U.S. and England demons, and encouraged them to become soldiers in prewar education,

teachers are now teaching peace education and telling children not to join the SDF. Both are committing the same mistake."⁸⁵

It is under this postwar political culture and educational system that those on the right denounce textbooks on Japan's history as biased to the left, as stressing pacifism and deemphasizing nationalism. Conversely, those on the left think that "Japanese education is biased to the right,"⁸⁶ being subject to censorship by the Ministry of Education. This is represented by the decades-long law suits against the censorship of a history textbook, *Shin Nihonshi* (*New History of Japan*), written by Saburo Ienaga. It concerns academic freedom and freedom of thought and is known as the Ienaga Textbook Trials.

However, the recent publication of another textbook, *Shinpen Nihonshi* (*New Edition of the History of Japan*), written by a group called the "National Convention to Protect Japan," reversed the positions of the right and the left. This time it was the leftists who demanded the censorship. This is another development ensuing from the recent shift in Japanese political culture. Those on the right assert that the leftists, by demanding the censorship of the textbook, deprived themselves of the right to denounce the censorship system.

f) International System and U.S. influence

Finally, the role of the international system and U.S. influence in the formation of the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union should be examined. A scholar on the right of center explains that "the cold war changed the postwar U.S. foreign policy towards Japan from that of a former enemy to that of a dependent partner. This impelled Japan into confrontational relations with the Soviet Union once more. With the intensification of the cold war between the superpowers, postwar Japan-Soviet relations became aggravated. On the basis of this international system, the fact that the information on the international situation was provided through the prism of the U.S. Occupation Army became another important factor in forming the anti-Soviet perceptions among the Japanese. [In fact,] as the confrontational U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has been articulated, the Japanese government's attitude towards the Soviet Union has become more severe."⁸⁷ An MFA official admits that "it is true that the White House's perceptions of the Soviet Union influence Japan."⁸⁸ In the words of an LDP politician, "Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union are 'made in the U.S.A.' Japan does not have confidence in its foreign policy because it has renounced military power, including nuclear deterrence which determines international security. The Japanese, protected by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, are not conscious of a Soviet threat. They import the U.S.

perceptions of the Soviet threat. When the U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union became moderate under the Carter administration, the Japanese followed suit."⁸⁹

According to a military specialist on the right of center, "if the general Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union are a function of the U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union, those of the foreign policy decision-makers are an inverse function of the U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union: The more the U.S. anti-Soviet sentiment decreases, the more the decision-makers' fear of the Soviet threat increases. They were at a loss in the détente period when the U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union became moderate. Conversely, while the U.S. remained hardline, they were relieved. At any rate, Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union, both of the foreign policy elites and of the general public, exist in the framework of Japan-U.S. relations."⁹⁰

Those on the left think that "the Japanese anti-Soviet perceptions are manipulated by the U.S. and Japanese governments. The Japanese Russophobia is a result of the power politics between the two superpowers, in which Japan was caught."⁹¹

2. Specific Sources of Perceptions

a) Residence in and Contacts with the Soviet Union

There is a solid consensus among the foreign policy elites that "their firsthand experiences with the Soviet Union through residence and contacts endorsed their perceptions of the Soviet Union that they had formed through the 'general sources of perceptions' (history)." ⁹² In this sense, an MFA official considers that "'specific sources of perceptions' (firsthand experiences) are stronger sources of perceptions than the 'general sources of perceptions' (indirect experiences)." ⁹³ (See Section 3)

Diplomats who have resided in the Soviet Union had their perceptions of that country reinforced. An MFA official said that "the unpleasant experiences he had encountered during his residence are countless: constantly being followed whenever going out, and being bugged so that he could not even talk about the Soviet Union with his family." ⁹⁴ According to a former MFA official, "one can understand the true nature of the Soviet Union and the Russians only after one has lived in that country. There are three stages of formation of perceptions of the Soviet Union: first, perceptions of the Soviet Union as an ideal country if one studies that country only from Soviet sources such as its newspapers and magazines; second, awareness of the reality of the rigid Soviet system

revealed through the unbearably inconvenient life, if one stays in the Soviet Union for a while; third, comprehension of the ambivalent nature of the Russians and dual nature of the Soviet system—rampant corruption and loopholes in the seemingly rigid system. This one only begins to understand only after living there more than a year."⁹⁵

A military specialist on the right of center said that "his perceptions have changed from naive and favorable ones to more severe ones through participation in the Japan-Soviet Specialists' Conferences. The more he accumulates contacts with the Russians, the more he discovers their complicated and sly nature. Despite the familiarity he feels with his Soviet counterparts who participate in the Conferences, there is a basic problem; what they say is different from actual Soviet foreign policy. In essence, the Russians have two faces: one of the party and another of the individual."⁹⁶

b) Soviet Negotiation Patterns:

High-Handed Diplomacy

Their experiences in negotiations with the Russians aggravate foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union. They see the Soviet negotiation patterns as characterized by high-handedness, monolithic implacability, persistence, insincerity, and "secrecy." Even worse, they feel that the Soviet Union looks down on Japan and treats it in a heavy-handed manner, regarding it as a 'dependent'

of the U.S. and a military dwarf. They are humiliated and are indignant over the coercive and arrogant attitudes of the Soviet Union.

In addition to the events in which Soviet behavior implanted distrust of the Soviet Union among the Japanese in general, as examined above, other issues deepened the foreign policy elites' distrust. Among other things, the foreign policy elites were astonished by the abrupt Soviet attitude changes on the Northern Territories issue. It specifically concerns Khrushchev's unilateral denial of the existence of the territorial issue in response to the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960.

According to a journalist on the right, "first of all, it is a violation of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956. The Soviet Union promised to return Shikotan and Habomais, and to continue to negotiate for a solution for the return of Kunashiri and Etorofu. The revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty cannot be any basis for repealing the clause in the Joint Declaration nor for denying the territorial issue: the 'anti-Soviet' Japan-U.S. Security Treaty had already existed at the time of the Joint Declaration. More than that, the revision increased Japan's independence in a more bilateral relationship with the U.S., so it was rather improved from the Soviet point of view. In essence, the denial of the territorial issue was an act of betrayal of confidence."⁹⁷

Others speculate that "the Soviet Union was looking

for an excuse to renege on its promise in the Joint Declaration (to return Shikotan and Habomais) and used the revision of the Security Treaty as the pretext."⁹⁸ The Soviet Union also denied the verbal agreement between Brezhnev and Prime Minister Tanaka (1973) on the existence of the territorial issue. "With this Soviet behavior, there is no way to establish trustful relations."⁹⁹

Brezhnev's Japan-Soviet Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty (see Appendix IV) made the foreign policy elites more indignant. To begin with, they were astonished by the unilateral Soviet release of the draft treaty. It was without the consent of Japan and even before Japan had agreed to negotiate for it. Even worse, to quote a former MFA official, "the content of the treaty was outrageous. It is incompatible with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It is intended to nullify the Treaty. This Soviet behavior was taken in retaliation against the Sino-Japanese *rapprochement* and was intended to forestall the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty."¹⁰⁰

The Soviet ban on the Japanese ancestral grave visits to the Northern Territories also made the foreign policy elites indignant. A journalist in the center holds that "just as it broke the promise to return the two islands as a reprisal for the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Soviet Union banned the grave visits in retaliation against the Sino-Japanese *rapprochement*. These two Soviet actions originated from the same 'root'."¹⁰¹

Although the ancestral grave visits to part of the Northern Territories were resumed in 1986, the Soviet Union imposed an arbitrary "reciprocity" to permit Russian visits to Japan without visas, as examined earlier. Those on the right think that the resumption was problematic because it put Japan in a more disadvantageous position on the territorial issue. Just to permit former islanders' ancestral grave visits to the islands where they used to live, the Soviet Union came up with this arbitrary and anachronistic reciprocity. It was beyond Japanese imagination, and indicated that the Soviet conventional wisdom with its *quid pro quo* attitude has not changed.

In an analysis of the Soviet negotiation behavior as a specific source of perceptions of the Soviet Union, there is a correlation between the length of elites' experience and their perceptions. The longer experience they have, the stronger their indignation becomes. A businessman said that "this is true regardless of whether negotiations are at the governmental or the commercial level."¹⁰²

Russian service diplomats have more unfavorable perceptions of the Soviet Union than their non-Russian service counterparts. In fact, the MFA's Soviet Union Division is known as the stronghold of the anti-Soviet hardliners. A pioneer Russian service diplomat who "spent two thirds of his career in negotiations with the Russians (including those for the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union)"¹⁰³ is regarded as an intellectual leader

of the anti-Soviet faction among the foreign policy elites. Another Russian service diplomat who dealt with the Soviet shooting down of the KAL airliner is also known as a hardliner. "He is indignant over Soviet 'secrecy' and lies. He visited Sakhalin twice as a member of the Japan-U.S. joint investigation team and collected articles of the victims left behind. The Soviets denied the charges until the team placed the evidence in front of them. Only after that did the Russians begin to reveal the truth bit by bit. Since they themselves are liars, they cannot believe others."¹⁰⁴

In comparison, MFA officials who are not in the Russian service have relatively more moderate perceptions of the Soviet Union. First, they advocate a more flexible foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and more positive improvements in Japan-Soviet relations. Second, they evaluate Gorbachev's *perestroika* more positively, regarding it as a change in substance not merely a change in style. Third, and more importantly, they emphasize that personal perceptions should not influence foreign policy decision-making. A former Ambassador to the Soviet Union looks at the Soviet Union objectively from a realistic point of view, despite the fact that "he was detained in Siberia. He was interned in a forced labor camp in the Urals for two and half years after World War II. He lost a toe from frostbite while working for the construction of railroad beds at below -20°F."¹⁰⁵ He holds that "diplomacy

[is] a means by which the realities of international relations are peacefully adjusted according to each country's national interests. [It is] unrelated to ideology, notions of good and evil, or emotions of likes or dislikes."¹⁰⁶ "Although he was not a Russian service career diplomat, he volunteered to go to the Soviet Union [as Ambassador] after he had served as the Permanent Vice-Minister [the highest career position in the MFA]. He did so because he felt the need to watch the Soviet Union objectively from the inside, in order to understand the nature of its behavior and his own experiences."¹⁰⁷

Meanwhile, those outside the MFA find the MFA too anti-Soviet. Even military specialists on the right of center think that the MFA, specifically the Soviet Union Division, is "too strongly anti-Soviet and fanatically distrustful of the Soviet Union."¹⁰⁸ "Anti-Soviet hardliners are competing with each other in the MFA."¹⁰⁹ One who shares the same perceptions of the Soviet Union as those in the MFA said that "they do not have to be that rigid."¹¹⁰ However, the military specialists are generally understanding of the MFA. One said that "it is the Soviet Union which sowed the seeds of distrust by lying and breaking promises in past negotiations. Besides, it is dangerous to exclude the MFA from decision-making, as happened when Prime Minister Hatoyama crossed this line and failed in the peace treaty negotiation."¹¹¹ Another said that "the Soviet Union is to be blamed for having made the

MFA distrustful of it, by its tough, unfair, and 'rubbing against the grain' diplomacy. However, hardliners in the MFA should deal with the Soviet Union objectively."¹¹²

c) Professional Interests and Predilections

i) Politicians: Personal and Factional Interests

In the words of a scholar on the right, "politicians, including the ruling party's old and new leaders, are 'bandwagoning' for Soviet diplomacy, not from the national interests, but from the factional or private interests."¹¹³ This is so because *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, as the only remaining major postwar settlement, would be a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough, if it were realized. Therefore, "some politicians think that their dialogues with the Soviet Union would improve their personal images."¹¹⁴ MFA officials chide the politicians that "they are driven by their personal interests and flirting with the Soviet Union."¹¹⁵

The important point here is the nature of the Nakasone diplomacy towards the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Nakasone was interested in Soviet diplomacy. He invited Gorbachev to visit Japan and also wanted to visit the Soviet Union himself. Those on the right maintain that the problem with Nakasone's Soviet diplomacy was multi-fold. First, Nakasone's intention to visit Moscow was motivated by his personal interests. According to a scholar,

"Nakasone regarded diplomacy as his forte and wanted to make a major achievement in diplomacy, something that could be remembered as 'Nakasone Diplomacy' in postwar history, comparable to the Yoshida Diplomacy."¹¹⁶

Second, it was aimed at the extension of his political life. A journalist speculates that, "given the difficulty of the peace treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Nakasone must have calculated that he could still benefit from his Soviet diplomacy, even if the negotiations themselves failed. Insofar as he was making efforts for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, the opposition parties would not criticize him. His image would improve, without causing any real loss to the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union: since the negotiations would not succeed anyway. Thus Nakasone, calculating the advantages, could pretend to be enthusiastic about Soviet diplomacy."¹¹⁷

Third, factional interests also played a role. A journalist notes that "Nakasone is a successor of Ichiro Kono, then Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister, who was a close aide of Prime Minister Hatoyama. In other words, Nakasone is a descendant of the Hatoyama-Kono line [of the Japan Democratic Party which tried to accommodate to the Soviet Union], as opposed to the Yoshida line [of the Liberal Party which took a hardline policy with the Soviet Union (See Figure 1)]. As a descendent of the Hatoyama-Kono line, Prime Minister Nakasone must have

Soviet diplomacy always in mind and wanted to achieve a major breakthrough in Japan-Soviet relations like that which Prime Minister Hatoyama dreamed of in 1956."¹¹⁸

They conclude that "Prime Minister Nakasone's enthusiasm for Soviet diplomacy is motivated by his personal and factional interests, with no consideration for the national interests. The subject was upside down."¹¹⁹ "He was a 'weather vane,' preoccupied with gaining popularity with the nation and the press."¹²⁰

Aside from Prime Minister Nakasone, those on the right add that factional interests play a part in other LDP politicians' Soviet diplomacy. According to a journalist, "Foreign Minister Abe [one of the three 'new leaders' who wanted to succeed Prime Minister Nakasone] also has enthusiasm for Soviet diplomacy. As a son-in-law of former Prime Minister Kishi, who was the Secretary-General of Prime Minister Hatoyama's Japan Democratic Party, Foreign Minister Abe also has an interest in Soviet diplomacy."¹²¹ (See Figure 1). He visited Moscow as a reciprocal courtesy visit for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan.

In contrast, the journalist points out, "Finance Minister Miyazawa [another 'new leader'] does not mention Soviet diplomacy at all; probably because he belongs to the mainstream conservative faction [the Yoshida line], and follows the postwar legitimate diplomacy [the Yoshida Diplomacy]. Nor does Takeshita [another 'new leader' who succeeded Nakasone as Prime Minister in November 1987]

mention Soviet diplomacy."¹²² Takeshita belonged to the Tanaka faction, another line of the Liberal Party, until he formed his own faction, the *Keisei kai*, as part of his campaign for election to the premiership. (See Figure 1.)

Those on the right further argue that politicians in general have naive perceptions of the Soviet Union and that "they do not know what the Soviet Union is doing."¹²³ In point of fact, a scholar in the center notes that "there is considerable diversity in the perceptions of the Soviet Union within the LDP. There are even pro-Soviet LDP Diet members, who have perceptions of the Soviet Union similar to those on the left. Tokuma Utsumoniya is on the left. Hideyuki Aizawa is a liberal, despite the fact that he was interned in Siberia. An ironical truth is that members of the JSP and the JCP who went to the Soviet Union found that they disliked it; hardliners in the LDP found that they liked the Soviet Union better when they visited it. This is so because the LDP is not an ideology-dominated political party, but a conglomerate of several factions, representing diverse interest groups."¹²⁴

In the words of those on the right, politicians in the ruling party succumbed to "humiliation diplomacy"¹²⁵ towards the Soviet Union, while those in the opposition parties are indulging in "obsequious diplomacy" towards that country. A journalist notes that "JSP Chairman Ishibashi's Talk with Gorbachev (1985) exemplifies the obsequious attitudes of the Japanese politicians towards

the Soviet Union: He just 'swallowed' what Gorbachev said. He and did not mention the human rights issue at all (the release of Sakharov, in particular), which even the Socialist French President Mitterrand demanded of Gorbachev."¹²⁶

ii) Bureaucracy: Institutional Conditioning

In principle, the government (the cabinet and the bureaucracy) work in unison for foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union. This is so mainly because the Japanese decision-making establishment (or elites in general for that matter) consists of a homogeneous group, with the overwhelming majority being graduates of the University of Tokyo.

However, certain disparities in perceptions among the foreign policy elites within the bureaucracy are observed. As to the MFA, an MFA official believes that "Russian service career diplomats take pride in their commitment to 'brinksmanship' diplomacy with the Soviet Union, with the awareness that it is their mission to preserve Japan's national security."¹²⁷ Another said that "the initial motivation for choosing a Russian service career was his recognition that diplomacy with the Soviet Union (the main potential enemy of Japan) is more important than diplomacy with friendly nations."¹²⁸ Given that "diplomacy is a peaceful means to adjust differences among nations,"¹²⁹ MFA officials stress the supreme importance of cooperation with

the U.S. Because of the constraints of its "peace constitution" they prefer "strategic foreign aid" as an indirect avenue to contribute to international security.

On the other hand, the JDA observes the Soviet Union from the military-strategic point of view, and advocates a substantial defense build-up against the increased Soviet military threat in the Far East. Some in the defense establishment do not hide their dissatisfaction with the MFA. One said that "the MFA's attitude is arrogant, claiming that it takes care of comprehensive national security, while the JDA takes care of defense only. The MFA's arrogance is reflected in the low status it gives to military attachés of the JDA in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. Their ranks are only that of first secretary or counselor."¹³⁰

On the part of MITI, although a MITI official claims that "the government acts in unison,"¹³¹ discord between MITI and the MFA loomed in the case of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, as examined earlier. After all, as an economist holds, "MITI's *raison d'être* is to expand trade. It is natural for MITI to look at the Soviet Union in terms of Japan's economic interests rather than its political and security interests."¹³²

The point here is not which ministry is more concerned with Japan's national interests than others. All are concerned with how to preserve and advance Japan's national interests. The problem is that they differ in their

perceptions of what best serves national interests. The MFA believes that cooperation with the U.S. is the essence of Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Japan does not initiate anything towards the Soviet Union unless the U.S. wants it to do so, hence the source of criticism, "dependent diplomacy." In comparison, the JDA is most concerned with Japan's national security against the Soviet military threat. It stresses a build-up of Japan's defense capabilities along with more burden-sharing under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It also holds that Japan should and could take a more autonomous and flexible policy towards the Soviet Union, were Japan to work out sufficient deterrence against the Soviet military threat. Meanwhile, MITI emphasizes Japan's economic interests in the abundant natural resources and vast potential market in the Soviet Union. Also it maintains that economic relations would improve Japan-Soviet relations, given the stalemate in their political relations.

In addition to the differences in priorities in each ministry, the "in-service training" within each ministry widens the perception gaps. At any rate, these inter-bureaucratic perception gaps between the ministries and the unity within each ministry indicate that Graham Allison's bureaucratic model—where one stands is determined by where one sits—is applicable to the case of the Japanese foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union.¹³³

**iii) Business Circles: Motivation of
Private Profits**

Business circles are, naturally, motivated by their private economic interests in trading with the Soviet Union. They emphasize the mutual benefit of Japan-Soviet economic relations: natural resources and a market for Japan; and economic, financial, and technological assistance to the Soviet Union.

The behavior of Japanese businessmen indicates a paradox for the "front-runners" of capitalism. They "do not like the Soviet state-monopoly system and find it difficult to do business with the high-handed Soviet trade officials."¹³⁴ Nevertheless, others point out that "it is exceptional for a company not to do business with the Soviet Union for ideological reasons."¹³⁵ "It is true that there is nowhere in the world that Japanese salesmen would not go to do business."¹³⁶

Businessmen believe that expanding trade with the Soviet Union not only benefits them but also serves Japan's national interests. Some said that, "since Japan is a trading nation, its survival depends on the import of natural resources and the export of manufactured goods."¹³⁷ "It is important for Japan's security to multiply its trading partners. It is in Japan's national interest to balance out the uneven trade pattern—reducing the trade surplus with the U.S. and increasing trade with the Soviet Union and China."¹³⁸ Others conclude that "Japan should

adopt the *seikei bunri* policy (nonlinkage policy), in order to increase Japan-Soviet economic relations, and thereby improve their political relations."¹³⁹

**iv) Academic Circles: Taboos in
Soviet Studies in Japan**

The academic circles present a unique and complicated pattern. This group shows the greatest diversity in their perceptions of the Soviet Union, ranging from the one extreme to the other in the spectrum of ideology. Other professional groups show a relative conformity in their perceptions within each group. This is so because those in the academic world enjoy a relative freedom from institutional predilections or conditioning that other foreign policy elites are subject to. They can be aloof from personal and factional stakes that politicians have in the Soviet Union. They can be detached from high-handed Soviet attitudes that MFA bureaucrats encounter in their daily dealings with the Soviet Union. Thus, in principle, they can take whatever position they like.

It is a unique professional category in that it includes those who stand in the center of the spectrum of ideology. Few in the other categories take this position. This is so because scholars in the center emphasize "the importance of doing objective studies, unbiased by ideology."¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, even in this group, few are free from ideology, and few are in the center. The fact is

that the majority of them are either pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet, with few in-between. How to attribute the "simplistic black and white dichotomy"¹⁴¹ in the spectrum of ideology among the Soviet specialists in Japan?

First, according to a scholar in the center, "the tragedy of Soviet studies in Japan is that, in contrast to those in the U.S., ideology overshadowed reality. Leftist political thought dominated in the postwar political culture, and most scholars believed whatever the Soviet Party said, just taking it for granted. As a result, the Japanese academic circles were divided into two extremes: the believers in Marxism-Leninism and its disbelievers."¹⁴²

Second, the scholar notes that "because of the influence of ideology, collecting correct data on the Soviet reality is important. Yet, they are simply not available. So, one has to try to generalize the Soviet reality from fragmentary data. This allows room for one's own perceptions to get in."¹⁴³ The detachment from reality tends to foster pro-Soviet perceptions.

In this regard, a certain correlation is found between their specializations and their positions in the spectrum of ideology. The more they specialize in the Soviet internal system, the more to the left their position in the spectrum tends to be. Conversely, the more they specialize in the military-strategic area, the farther right they tend to be. In fact, there are no military specialists who are in the center or on the left. A scholar on the Soviet

internal system said that "the more he studies the Soviet Union, the deeper his understanding about it becomes, and the more he likes it, even as a nation."¹⁴⁴ Conversely, a military specialist said that "the more he learns about the country, the more he dislikes it."¹⁴⁵ This is so probably because the scholars of the Soviet internal system can be apolitical and do not have to consider the external implications of the system. On the contrary, the military-strategic specialists deal with the very issue of the Soviet threat, analyzing how Soviet military and ideological threats affect Japan and the world.

Another important point to be noted here is the lack of Soviet studies in Japan. Those on the right and in the center believe that "there are too many taboos in Soviet studies in Japan."¹⁴⁶ First, the taboos derive from the political culture. A scholar on the right explains that "most of the scholars who do Soviet studies are Marxists. They cannot study the Soviet Union objectively. Because of the dominance of Marxism in academia, the sort of Soviet studies done in the U.S. [Kremlinology] are taboo in Japan. It is taboo to speak ill of the Soviet Union. People are afraid of being labeled right wing in this political culture. Even Hiroshi Kimura [of Hokkaido University], who is actually a 'leftist conservative' [moderate conservative] is labeled right wing."¹⁴⁷

Second, the taboos reflect the unpopularity of the Soviet Union and of the Russian language in Japan. A

scholar in the center thinks that "cultural remoteness and the estranged relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, despite their geographical proximity, account for the unpopularity. The financial difficulties of Soviet specialists in sustaining economic independence are the cause [and result] of the unpopularity of Soviet studies."¹⁴⁸ A journalist in the center adds that "even Russian literature, the primary attraction for the Japanese Russophiles, has decreased in popularity now that Soviet literature has become 'émigré literature.'"¹⁴⁹ In essence, the Soviet Union is a "distant neighbor"¹⁵⁰ to Japan.

Third, the taboos derive from the insular character of the Japanese. In the opinion of a journalist in the center, "Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union are sentimental, subjective, and ethnic, so they only accept being either pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet. This makes objective Soviet studies difficult. Russophobia and antipathy are so overwhelming that, unlike the Americans, the Japanese do not even feel like studying the Soviet Union. They do not accept émigrés and dislike both the Soviet establishment and the dissidents. Solzenytzin is not popular in Japan."¹⁵¹ Fourth, a scholar in the center notes that "postwar Japan was following the course of the U.S. In this sense, there was no need for Japan to advance its own Soviet studies."¹⁵²

For these reasons, they conclude that, "with the exception of Russian literature, Soviet studies are behind

in Japan. They are based on second-hand information from foreign sources. Soviet studies in the U.S. are more objective, relying on primary sources from Russian *émigrés*."153 A military specialist on the right of center notes that "the lack of Soviet studies is most evident in the area of military studies. Although U.S. academic interests have shifted from Soviet studies to Chinese studies since the détente era, Japan had no Soviet military research to begin with."154 It was not until 1978 that the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), the only major semi-governmental institution for military studies, was established under the JDA and the MFA. Its function is "to facilitate communication between the MFA and the JDA in the studies."155 Some in the center even think that "the quality of Soviet studies has gone down. The Japan Institute for International Affairs [JIIA, a center for Soviet studies under the MFA] is not doing significant research because of its poor budget. Other than that, Soviet studies are done only at individual universities, with the most notable one being Hokkaido University (the Slavic Research Center)."156

**v) Mass Media: Correspondents' Three
Levels of Constraints**

There are several national newspapers in Japan, among which the "four majors" are the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (with a circulation of 8.5 million for its morning edition), the

Asahi Shimbun (7.5 million), followed by the *Mainichi Shimbun*, and the *Sankei Shimbun*. To put them roughly in the spectrum of ideology, the *Sankei* is on the right, the *Yomiuri* on the right of center, the *Mainichi* in the center, and the *Asahi* on the left of center. Although the *Asahi Shimbun* is the second-largest in terms of circulation, it is regarded as a most intellectual paper, and its influence on the foreign policy elites as significant, as will be examined.

As to the TV networks, the *NHK* (the only public broadcasting system in Japan) is the most predominant network, covering all parts of Japan. In the private sector, the *Fuji TV* (affiliated with the *Sankei Shimbun*), the *NTV* (affiliated with the *Yomiuri Shimbun*), and the *TV Asahi* (affiliated with the *Asahi Shimbun*), are the three major national networks. The *NHK* takes a position in the center of the spectrum of ideology. The private networks take positions that are the same as those of their affiliated newspapers.

Those on the right publicly denounce the mass media as "biased and lenient towards the Soviet Union."¹⁵⁷ The reason for this criticism can be reduced to three levels of constraints that the Japanese correspondents in Moscow encounter. The first level of constraints is personal; they are Russophiles. A journalist on the right of center explains that, "since most journalists were Russian language majors at college, they have been reared with a

longing for Russian culture and the ideal of communism. This distorts their perceptions of the Soviet Union, shutting their eyes to its bad aspects."¹⁵⁸ However, their firsthand experiences with the Soviet Union covering recent events did change the perceptions of some of the pro-Soviet journalists. One in the center recalls vividly that "he was astonished by the Levchenko incident: Levchenko's defection to the U.S., his disclosure of the KGB's activities in Japan before the U.S. Congress, and the fact that Levchenko himself was a KGB agent. The journalist was shocked because he had been closely associated with Levchenko [who was Tokyo Bureau Director of *Novoe Breimiya*]. He thought Levchenko was a faithful defender of the Soviet Union. He also believed in Brezhnev and felt 'betrayed' by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, his perceptions of the Soviet Union shifted from pro-Soviet to a 'pro-Russian and anti-Soviet mix'."¹⁵⁹ Another on the right of center stated that "he is caught up in a dilemma between Russophile and Russophobic sentiments."¹⁶⁰

The second level of constraints is structural; the nature of the mass media. Japanese journalism is by nature left. It takes pride in its status as the fourth estate and regards its *raison d'être* as being critical of the government, which has been ruled by the conservative LDP. However, there are more specific reasons why those on the right criticize that "Japanese mass media flatter the Soviet Union and treat interviews with high-ranking Soviet

officials as top news."¹⁶¹ According to a journalist on the right of center, "because of the undue competition among themselves, the Japanese mass media are in a weak position before the Soviet authorities. For instance, the *TV Asahi*'s acquisition of the exclusive rights to cover the Moscow Olympics [which Japan boycotted along with the U.S.] made the *Asahi Shimbun* unable to write anything critical of the Soviet Union."¹⁶² Another points out that "there is even a custom called '*goshūgi genkō* ' [obligated articles]: after having been invited and well treated by [communist countries], journalists feel obliged to write articles favorable to them."¹⁶³ Also, "the Soviet authorities give special 'privileges' to those who write favorable articles in the form of permission for special interviews with top political leaders or for visits to special districts."¹⁶⁴

Worse yet, the limited availability of jobs in their profession encourages this tendency. Some said that "jobs which make use of the Russian language are extremely limited in Japan [due to the unpopularity of Soviet studies as examined]. Jobs as correspondents in Moscow, usually only two per company—the Moscow Branch Director and a staff member—are regarded as a best positions for Russian majors. As a result, they tend to ingratiate themselves with the Soviet Union in order to protect themselves from losing that position by expulsion. They avoid having contacts with dissidents and writing articles critical of the Soviet Union."¹⁶⁵ Another adds that, "were they to

have the courage to challenge these taboos, the Soviet authorities would send warnings in stages to them and to their headquarters [employers in Tokyo]. In such cases, the headquarters have seldom stood up for them."¹⁶⁶

The third level of constraints is governmental. A more fundamental reason for the obsequious attitudes of the mass media towards Moscow lies with those of the Japanese government itself. A journalist in the center said that, "in contrast to the U.S., when Japanese correspondents are charged with spy activities in or are expelled from the communist nations, neither the cabinet nor the MFA protests to the nations concerned. Nor do their employers (newspaper companies or news agencies in Tokyo) protect them. On the contrary, the employers have to apologize to the MFA for the troubles their correspondents caused the Japanese government."¹⁶⁷ Others note that "this submissive attitude of the government derives from the Japanese character that cannot stand up against *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure)."¹⁶⁸ "Japan is known to make concessions easily, if threatened."¹⁶⁹

Under these circumstances, journalists deplore their situation: "Nicholos Daniloff [correspondent to Moscow of *U.S. News and World Report*] became an instant hero in the U.S. when he was expelled from the Soviet Union. In contrast, his Japanese counterparts are destined to be reprimanded by their employers and to be demoted to non-political positions (such as those in cultural

divisions). This is fatal for them. It means that their careers as journalists are dead."¹⁷⁰ With the three levels of constraints combined, "the Japanese correspondents in Moscow are handicapped by too many taboos."¹⁷¹ "It is difficult to rear good journalists in Japan."¹⁷²

As a result, to quote one on the right of center, "articles on the Soviet Union of the major newspapers deviate from reality and are all alike. Nevertheless, the mass media are a kind of 'sanctuary.' They are only targeted for domestic consumption because they are in Japanese. Thus their distorted information goes throughout Japan without being corrected. The adverse effects of this distortion on the formation of the perceptions of the Soviet Union are serious, especially with decision-makers: most of the politicians form their perceptions from reading newspapers."¹⁷³

Those on the right think that "the problem is that the perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are influenced by the big newspapers [the *Asahi Shimbun*, in particular], which compete with each other in carrying articles favorable to the Soviet Union."¹⁷⁴ This attitude of the mass media drives politicians into Soviet diplomacy, because they want good coverage in the newspapers for their personal gain."¹⁷⁵ They conclude that the Soviet Union takes advantage of this situation, and manipulates Japanese journalism at its will.¹⁷⁶

d) Soviet Studies in the U.S.

Finally, the influence of Soviet studies in the U.S. upon the formation of perceptions of Japanese foreign policy elites should not be forgotten. Obviously, the U.S. influence is especially evident for the Soviet specialists, who have studied in U.S. academic institutions. They recognize that their somewhat naive perceptions of the Soviet Union, forged in Japanese political culture, have changed to more negative ones through their contacts with Soviet scholars in the U.S.

The shift in perceptions of one diplomat's perceptions of the Soviet Union shows three stages of transformation. "When he began his studies at the University of Tokyo in the late 1950's, Marxism was dominant. He was not a leftist student, but he once joined an *Ampo* demonstration against the revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Then, after he entered the MFA he went to the Russian Research Center at Harvard. At first, he found the professors too anti-Soviet, and he even argued against them. His perceptions were decisively changed by living in Moscow in the later 1960's. Now, he is labeled as hawkish in Japan, but [he feels that] his views only correspond to those of centrists in the U.S."¹⁷⁷ Another Russian service career diplomat who "was sent to the U.S. Navy's Russian Language Institute at Monterey, California, to study Russian soon after he entered the MFA, [thinks that] the U.S. influenced his perceptions of the Soviet Union."¹⁷⁸

In this way, the formation of the Russian service career diplomats' perceptions of the Soviet Union is institutionalized. Newly-recruited career diplomats who have chosen Russian service are usually sent to U.S. academic institutions (most often, to the Russian Research Center at Harvard) before they are sent to the Soviet Union. Only after they are "baptized" by the American specialists are they sent to the Soviet Union, where they encounter the reality of that country.

It is not just diplomats who have undergone a change in their perceptions of the Soviet Union during their exposure to the Soviet studies in the U.S. A journalist in the center who now regards himself as "pro-Russia and anti-Soviet" underwent a similar process of transformation. "When he went to the School of Journalism of Northwestern University in the early 1960's he found himself struggling between his 'Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union' and the perceptions of his U.S. colleagues. When he was sent to Moscow, he associated with Hedrick Smith,¹⁷⁹ and came to realize that the U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union were more correct; although it was not easy for him to change his own perceptions."¹⁸⁰

In sum, the perceptions of the Soviet specialists in the U.S. play the role of an intermediary between the naiveté of the Japanese foreign policy elites and a sudden encounter with the hard realities of the Soviet Union.

3. Interaction of General Sources and Specific Sources of Perceptions of the Soviet Union

In an overall analysis of the sources of perceptions of the Soviet Union, the following generalizations can be made on the interaction of general sources and specific sources of perceptions for the foreign policy elites.

For those on the right, their firsthand experiences with the Soviet Union have endorsed their unfavorable perceptions of the Soviet Union, formed through the general sources of perceptions. For instance, the perceptions of Soviet military and ideological threats, learned from the study of the history of Russia and the Soviet Union, were confirmed when they themselves witnessed and dealt with the more recent Soviet behavior. Similarly, their distrust of the Soviet Union, formed through the study of the history of Japan-Soviet relations, was confirmed by their firsthand experiences of living in the Soviet Union and negotiating with the Russians.

For those in the center, having been Russian majors at college, they had forged Russophile sentiments through the study of the Russian language and literature. Many of them were attracted by communist ideology. However, as they witnessed negative Soviet performances (both internal and external) through their professions, their pro-Soviet perceptions have changed. As they become to "pro-Russia and anti-Soviet"¹⁸¹ they are caught in a dilemma between Russophile and Russophobic sentiments.

Conversely, the perceptions of those on the left have not been changed by personal experiences. Quite the contrary, one thinks that "his favorable perceptions of the Soviet Union, forged through the study of communism, were endorsed by his visits to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."¹⁸² Meanwhile, he said that "'history' did not influence the formation of his perceptions of the Soviet Union."¹⁸³ It is natural for those on the left to deny the influence of history—the predominant source of anti-Soviet sentiment for the Japanese. Their primary sources of perceptions of the Soviet Union are *ideology* (in the positive sense) rather than *history*. Since they are guided by Marxism-Leninism, their perceptions are "not influenced by the phenomenally negative Soviet behavior."¹⁸⁴

In conclusion, it can be generalized that the specific sources of perceptions (firsthand experiences) are stronger sources of perceptions than general sources (indirect experience): Firsthand experiences acted as the endorsers of indirect experience for those on the right as well as on the left. Meanwhile, firsthand experiences changed the previous perceptions of those in the center.

Notes

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5. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
6. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, *op. cit.*
7. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-89.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-125.
10. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
11. Chihiro Hosoya, "Nichiro-Nisso kankei no shiteki tenkai" ("The Historical Evolution of Japanese-Russian and Japanese-Soviet Relations"), *Kokusai Seiji* (Tokyo: Yuhikau), Vol. 31, No. 2, 1969, p. 2.
12. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-145.
13. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
14. John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945*, New York: Random House, 1970, p.124.
15. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
16. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
17. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
18. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
19. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
20. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
21. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
22. Interview, Tokyo, November 5, 1986.

23. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
24. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
25. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
26. John Toland, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
27. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
28. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
29. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
30. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
31. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-26.
32. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
33. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
34. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
35. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
36. Kenichi Ito, "Nakasone taiso gaikō e no chūmon"
("Recommendations for Nakasone's Diplomacy Towards the
Soviet Union"), *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 64, No. 12,
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37. Interview, Tokyo, October 29, 1986.
38. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.
40. Akira Sono, *Sobieto wocchingu yonjū-nen* (Soviet W
atching Forty Years), Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan sha, 1983,
p. 102.
41. The number is from Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
42. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
43. Akira Sono, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
44. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
45. Masao Suzuki, "Matsuyama bosan" ("Grave Visit to
Matsuyama"), in *Kami Tsubute, Chūnichi Shimbun*,
December 4, 1986 (Evening Edition), p. 1.

46. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
47. Hiroshi Kimura, "Japan-Soviet Relations: Framework, Development, Prospects," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 7, July 1980, pp. 709.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 709-710.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 712.
50. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
51. Shinkichi Eto, "Nisso kankei hatten no hōto" ("How to Develop Japan-Soviet Relations"), *Jiyū*, Vol. 15, No. 10, October 1973, pp. 25-26.
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53. Shinji Sudo, "Nihon no gaikō seisaku" ("Japanese Foreign Policy"), in Hitoshi Hanai, ed., *Hikaku gaikō seisaku ron* (*Comparative Study of Foreign Policy*) Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1983, p. 33.
54. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
55. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-172.
56. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
57. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
58. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-173.
59. Ikutaro Shimizu, "Sengo no interi" ("Postwar Intellectuals"), in "Sengo taisei o ikani koeruka" ("How to Overcome the Postwar System"), *Shokun*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1985, p. 58.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 58 and 62.
63. Akira Sono, "Nihon yo 'dokuritsu kokka' tare" ("Japan: Be an 'Independent Nation'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 25, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1986, p. 221.
64. Ikutaro Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

65. Michiraro Tanaka, "Sengo taisei no mondai-ten" ("Problems of the Postwar System"), in "Sengo taisei o ikani koeruka" ("How to Overcome the Postwar System"), *Shokun*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1985, pp. 26-27.
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67. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 64 and 66.
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71. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
72. Interview, Tokyo, October 31, 1986.
73. Ikutaro Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
76. Hayao Shimizu, *op. cit.*, pp. 4 and 172-173.
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78. Ikutaro Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
80. *Ibid.*
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83. Title of a round-table discussion by Seizaburo Sato, Yutaka Kosai, and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki, "Yawaraka na hoshu no jidai" ("The Age of Soft Conservatism"), *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 8, August 1986.
84. Ikutaro Shimizu, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
85. Michiraro Tanaka, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
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87. Chihiro Hosoya, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
88. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
89. Interview, Tokyo, November 10, 1986.
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98. Akira Sono, "Yoshida Shigeru 'taiso kyōkō gaikō' ni manabe" ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 34, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 10, October 1986, p. 207.
99. Ryozo Tanihata, "Yoshida Shigeru 'taiso kyōkō gaikō' ni manabe" ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 34, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 10, October 1986, p. 209.
100. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* ("Lessons of Shigeru Yoshida's 'Hardline Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union'"), pp. 209-210.
101. Ryozo Tanihata, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
102. Interview, Tokyo, November 12, 1986.
103. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.

104. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
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116. Kenichi Ito, *op. cit.*, in *Bungei Shunjū*, pp. 110-111.
117. Kotaro Tawara, "Nihon yo 'dokuritsu kokka' tare" ("Japan: Be an 'Independent Nation'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 25, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1986, pp. 227-228.
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121. Kotaro Tawara, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.
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123. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
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125. Hidetake Sawa, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
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131. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
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141. *Ibid.*
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 159. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
 160. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
 161. Akira Sono, "'Bei-so sekkin' o enshutsu suru dai-shimbun" ("The Big Newspaper that Stage-Manages the 'U.S.-Soviet Rapprochement'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 26, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 2, February 1986, p. 240.
 162. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
 163. Shigeyoshi Urushiyama, "'Beiso shunō kaidan' de heiwa wa kuruno ka "Do the 'U.S.-Soviet Summit Talks' Bring Peace?"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 13, *Shokun*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1985, p. 163.
 164. Yoshiko Sakurai, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
 165. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.

166. Yoshiko Sakurai, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 and 76.
167. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
168. Minoru Shibata, "'Chūso wakai' ron no maboroshi" ("Illusions of 'Sino-Soviet Rapprochement'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 35, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 11, November 1986, p. 241.
169. Akira Sono, "'Chūso wakai' ron no maboroshi" ("Illusions of 'Sino-Soviet Rapprochement'"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 35, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 11, November 1986, p. 241.
170. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
171. Yoshiko Sakurai, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-76.
172. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
173. Interview, Tokyo, October 28, 1986.
174. Akira Sono, "Soren ga tajiroida Rēgan no kirifuda SDI" ("SDI: Reagan's Card that Made the Soviet Union Flinch"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 36, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 12, December 1986, p. 256.
175. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
176. Akira Sono, *op. cit.* (*Soviet Watching: Forty Years*), pp. 114-130
177. Interview, U.S.A., August 25, 1986.
178. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
179. Hedrick Smith, a New York Times correspondent to Moscow, who won the Pulitzer Prize in 1974 for coverage from Moscow, and the author of *The Russians*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1976.
180. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
181. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
182. Interview, Tokyo, November 20, 1986
183. *Ibid.*
184. *Ibid.*

Chapter VII. Conclusions

1. Correlations Among Perceptions, Sources of Perceptions, and Foreign Policy

a) Qualitative Analysis: Patterns of Perceptions

In order to find out the correlations among Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union, their sources of perceptions, and the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, it is first necessary to discover the patterns of their perceptions according to the spectrum of ideology on each subject. The following patterns of perceptions are deduced from the preceding chapters.

i) Nature of the Soviet Internal System

The majority of the foreign policy elites, except for some on the left, maintain that Russian history and its political culture are the most important determinants of the nature of the Soviet system. They hold that the Soviet system does not work due to its built-in structural deficiencies. Its totalitarian political system has stagnated as a result of the inertia of the bureaucracy and the vested interests of the *nomenklatura*. The planned economic system has become paralyzed because of its denial of intrinsic human nature. The social system has

encountered problems with the decreasing population and increasing ethnic imbalance.

There is also a near consensus among the foreign policy elites on their evaluation of Soviet power. Except for those on the left, they perceive that it is unbalanced with outstanding military power and poor political, diplomatic, and economic power. In addition, the majority consider that Soviet military power is inferior to that of the U.S. qualitatively, if not quantitatively. They think that its ideological influence, as well as diplomatic and economic power, have also gone down. In the overall evaluation of Soviet power, the majority perceive that the weight of Soviet power in the international balance of power is declining. They conclude that history has proved that the Soviet system is unworkable and that the Soviet Union is in transition. Unless it takes drastic measures to reconstruct its system, it may lose its superpower status. However, the foreign policy elites disagree on the nature of and the prospects for Gorbachev's domestic *perestroika* and the stability of the Soviet Union.

The majority, ranging from the right to the center, are skeptical about Gorbachev's *perestroika*, regarding it as merely "reforms *within* the system." They predict that it will fail, due to the triple constraint on the reform: the systemic constraint (ideology), the organizational constraint (vested interests), and the personal constraint

(Russian political culture). In comparison, some on the right of center consider that it "remains-to-be-seen" if it is merely reform *within* the system or the "*systemic* reforms" (reform *of* the system), and if it will succeed or not. The majority of the business circles on the left of center are pessimistic about the reform, if not skeptical. Conversely, those on the left think that the *perestroika* is genuine *systemic* reform and are optimistic about its success.

On the stability of the Soviet Union, the following sketchy generalization is what can be construed from the limited number of answers available to this question. Despite the seriousness of the problems derived from the structural defects of the Soviet system, the majority, from the right to the left, focus on the stabilizing factors for the Soviet Union. They regard the Soviet system as basically durable. Those on the right watch the Soviet Union with caution, while those on the left watch with relative optimism, and those in the center watch with a mixture of both. In contrast, some on the right and the right of center pay attention to the destabilizing factors in the Soviet Union. They regard it as on the verge of collapse.

The controversy about the stability of the Soviet Union can be boiled down to two contrasting perceptions. According to one perception, as those in the "unstable

school" hold, the Soviet Union cannot and will not be able to override its framework of ideology because ideology provides its *raison d'être*. According to the other perception, as some in the "stable school" predict, the Soviet Union will evolve to overcome the rigidity of ideology and opt for a more flexible adaptation of capitalism: No ideology can suppress intrinsic human nature and will have to succumb to it in the long run. In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union will stick to its ideology and collapse, or modify its system and survive as a more flexible socialist nation.

**ii) Soviet External Behavior and
Foreign Policy Objectives**

The overwhelming majority of the foreign policy elites, ranging from the right to the left, regard history as the determinant of Soviet external behavior. Some on the right regard ideology as the source of Soviet external conduct. Those in the center regard it as a mixture of history and ideology. However, there is a critical difference between the right and the left. The right regards Soviet external behavior as an extension of Czarist Russian offensive expansionism. The left regards it as basically defensive.

Putting it a different way, those on the right and in the center hold that the Soviet external behavior derives

from its intrinsic nature and that it is fundamentally different from that of other nations. However, the majority regard history as the "essence" of the Soviet external behavior and stress the continuity between Russia and the Soviet Union. In contrast, some on the right contend that ideology is the guiding "engine" of the Soviet Union. Conversely, those on the left maintain that the Soviet external behavior is separate from Czarist Russian expansionism and is nothing peculiar: it merely seeks to preserve its national interests and security as other nations do.

The majority of the elites except those on the left find the Soviet global objectives irreconcilable with those of the free world camp. They hold that the Soviet Union is trying to defeat the U.S. indirectly by splitting the West, avoiding military confrontation with the U.S.

They ascertain in Gorbachev's new diplomatic style no fundamental change in the Soviet global objectives. They think that it still focuses on its bilateral relations with the U.S. and on military-strategic matters. They conclude that his "multipolar diplomacy" and "smile diplomacy" are merely a change in style. Some on the right of center have "it-remains-to-be-seen" perceptions on whether his change is merely of style or of substance. Only those on the left regard them positively as a change in substance in the Soviet foreign policy objectives.

There is a consensus that the short-term objectives of Gorbachev's disarmament proposals are to reduce the external burden in order to concentrate on his *perestroika* (and to contain the SDI). However, the elites' perceptions differ on its long-term objectives. Those on the right and in the center regard them as his "peace offensive" to split the West. Those on the left regard them as a genuine effort for disarmament.

iii)\ Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives Towards Japan

The majority of the foreign policy elites on the right and in the center hold that the Soviet Union is using both its conventional tactics of a propaganda offensive and military bluff in order to split Japan from the U.S. and in the long run to "Finlandize" Japan. The short term objectives are to use Japanese economic power for its economic *perestroika* and to shelve the Northern Territories dispute. The majority perceive no direct Soviet military threat to Japan, assuming that Japan has sufficient deterrence with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Some on the right think that there is an actual threat. Furthermore, they see, in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, no fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy objectives towards Japan nor in its perceptions of Japan. They regard Gorbachev's changes only as changes in style. Conversely,

those on the left generally evaluate the Soviet proposals at their face value. They take as changes in substance Gorbachev's foreign policy objectives towards Japan and his perceptions of Japan. Next, and showing more diversity, are their opinions on how Japan should formulate foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

**iv) Japanese Foreign Policy Towards the
Soviet Union**

Although there is a consensus among the foreign policy elites that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty System laid down the foundation of the postwar Japanese foreign policy, there is a dichotomy in its evaluation. Except for those on the left, the majority evaluate it positively and regard the Japan-U.S. alliance as the essence of Japan's foreign policy in terms of its national security and its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. However, certain differences emerge. Those in the MFA on the right of center regard as correct the present foreign policy which aims at stabilizing Japan-Soviet relations in a non-antagonistic way within the framework of the Security Treaty. Conversely, those on the right hold that to stabilize relations is unnecessary and even dangerous. To those on the right consolidation of the Western alliance is the prerequisite. Others on the right of center (including military specialists) perceive that total dependence on the

U.S. is undesirable. They advocate a defense build-up of Japan's own and a more autonomous and flexible diplomacy towards the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, those on the left dismiss the Security Treaty as the cause of unstable Japan-Soviet relations, and demand its repeal. They advocate unarmed neutrality or an "omni-directional" foreign policy, instead.

To sum up: The perceptions of the right of center are based on the premise that the Soviet Union is a potential enemy, and of the right that it is a present enemy, and of the left that it is a friendly nation. The elites' evaluations also differ on the specific foreign policy issues with the Soviet Union.

v) Northern Territories Issue

The great majority of the foreign policy elites advocate the *yontō ikkaisu henkan ron* (the four islands package reversion). Some on the left advocate the *nitō henkan ron* (the two islands reversion). However, an important point here is that, although the elites are divided between the two schools, their main differences lie with the tactics for the reversion more than with the nature of the issue. In fact, except for a minority on the left, few question Japan's legal possession of the Northern Territories. The *yontō ikkatsu henkan ron* asserts that the Soviet Union should return all four islands simultaneously

at the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty. The *nitō henkan ron* advocates at least getting the two islands that the Soviet Union once promised to return, rather than waiting in vain for the return of the all four islands. It should also be recalled that the opposition parties on the left demand all of the Kurile Islands. In this sense, most of the advocates of the *nitō henkan ron* are just being practical. Few on the left are genuine advocates of the *nitō henkan ron*.

The foreign policy elites are divided on how to realize the reversion. Liked with their perceptions on how to improve Japan-Soviet relations, this issue has become the focal point of these relations. Those on the right (and including the MFA) take the minimalist approach vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, called the *iriguchi ron* (entrance theory), a "Northern Territories or nothing" position. This position has been intensified now that they perceive that the power balance has been shifting towards the Japanese advantage. They hold that Japan should do nothing but wait for a Soviet move, while consolidating the Western alliance and public opinion. Those on the left take a contrasting approach, the *deguchi ron* (exit theory). They maintain that Japan should improve relations with the Soviet Union, separately from the Northern Territories issue. They also think improvement might "spill over" to the return of the islands.

vi) Japanese Defense Policy

Those on the right of center (including the MFA) regard a gradual defense build-up within the framework of the constitution as sufficient to establish a deterrent force against the Soviet Union, along with more burden-sharing under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In comparison, those on right advocate a more substantial conventional defense build-up and revision of the constitution. However, the great majority of them perceive no necessity for nuclear armament. Conversely, those on the left renounce any armament, as they are the defenders of the "peace constitution." They advocate the disbandment of the SDF and the repeal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

vii) Japanese Economic Policy Towards the Soviet Union

There is a clear correlation between position in the spectrum of ideology and perceptions on how to formulate Japanese economic policy towards the Soviet Union. Those on the right, including the government, emphasize the political implications of Japan-Soviet economic relations and adopt a linkage policy. It is called the *seikei fukabun gensuku* (the principle of the indivisibility of economics from politics), which links politics (the Northern Territories issue) with economic policy. In

contrast, those on the left, notably in business circles, advocate a "nonlinkage" policy called the *seikei bunri gensoku* (the principle of separability of economics from politics). They de-emphasize the political impediments to Japan-Soviet economic relations, and think that the real impediments to those relations are economic. They also dismiss the government's linkage policy as pointless on the ground that Japan-Soviet economic relations are not mature enough for the linkage to work. Further, they stress the significance of economic relations as an avenue to improve their relations. They hold that the only way to improve Japan-Soviet relations is to unlink the Northern Territories issue from their economic relations, given the stalemate in this issue.

Within the government, the bureaucracy acts in unison in principle. However, inter-bureaucratic discords emerged in the case of the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The MFA supported the measures, stressing the importance of cooperation with the U.S. MITI opposed them, because it stands for the economic interests of the private sector. This striking contrast between the unity in each specific ministry and the disunity among the ministries confirms Graham Allison's bureaucratic model.¹

viii) Correlations Between Perception and Foreign Policy

There is a high correlation between the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union and Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Being on the right of center, the MFA adopts a policy that can be called "minimalist diplomacy." It is frigid, doing nothing except demanding the reversion of the Northern Territories. It is passive, not taking any countermeasures against the Soviet so-called active measures (propaganda offensives). However, it is not an antagonistic policy. It maintains diplomatic channels and tries to stabilize their relations. Those on the right criticize this as "beggar diplomacy." They also criticize it as "coward diplomacy" because the MFA fears the Soviet military threat and has been submissive. Those on the left criticize this as "dependent diplomacy," because of Japan's dependence on the U.S.

ix) Sources of Perceptions of the Soviet Union

The great majority of the foreign policy elites have anti-Soviet perceptions, characterized by fear and distrust. Even those on the left have anti-Soviet sentiments in some respects. This is so because the most important source of their perceptions of the Soviet Union is history, rather than ideology. Just as Robert Jervis

showed in his analysis of the generational effects of issues important to the nation as a whole,² ruthless Soviet behavior at the end of World War II (the eleven year detention of hostages in Siberia and the unprovoked seizure of the Northern Territories) formed anti-Soviet perceptions. These perceptions have nothing to do with ideology, but rather with national interests. Therefore, the JCP demands the reversion of all of the Kurile Islands, which is much more than the LDP demands. It also works for compensation measures for the former Siberian hostages and their families.

There are four critical turning points in the history of Japan and Russia-Soviet Union as the general sources of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. The first turning point occurred during the 18th century. Encounters with Russian eastward expansion initiated a Russophobia which was confirmed by Russian attacks on northern colonies including Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands (1806). The second turning point was in 1905. Victory in the Russo-Japanese War temporarily overshadowed the Russophobia, which was replaced by the romantic and lovable image of Russia of Russian literature. Meanwhile, the two Russian Revolutions added the influence of ideology which split into two perceptions: one of an ideological threat, and the other of sympathy for the revolution. This resulted in the two Japanese perceptions of Russia, Russophobia and

Russophilia: the military and ideological threats of the "Red Bear" for the political leaders and general public versus the romantic and revolutionary image of the "Cherry Orchard" for the leftist intellectuals. The third turning point was in 1945. The ruthless Soviet behavior at the end of World War II added distrust to the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. Then, when Japan was incorporated into the U.S. alliance system the systemic factor in international politics crystallized anti-Soviet perceptions. Finally, the fourth turning point was in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan awakened Russophobia that had been dormant since the Russo-Japanese War. Russophobia was intensified by the subsequent Soviet military build-up in the Far East, including the Japanese Northern Territories.

In brief, the Japanese have traditionally been anti-Soviet, due to the historical fear of a Soviet military threat, which derives from the geopolitical factor as well as from Russian expansionism. The fear of an ideological threat added later. To this, the differences between the Russians and the Japanese in ways of thinking and behavioral patterns deepened the distrust towards the Soviet Union: the Japanese recoil against the Soviet lack of empathy for others and its ruthless behavior. All of these factors reinforce each other, adding up to the current anti-Soviet perceptions.

In addition, recent events have played a critical role in changing perceptions of the foreign policy elites. Specifically, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the shooting down of the Korean airliner have shifted some elites from a pro-Soviet position to an anti-Soviet position. No event has taken place that has shifted perceptions in the opposite direction. Some on the left have discarded their "illusions" of communist ideology. Some even reverted to nationalist conservatism, as exemplified by Ikutaro Shimizu's "Copernican revolution."³ Thus, the Japanese political culture is in a dramatic transition in the 1980's.

In this regard, the contrast in Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union and China indicates that "ideology is not a major factor in the current anti-Soviet perceptions of the Japanese, as compared to the U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union."⁴ Those on the right regard as correct "the current Russophobia and anti-Soviet perceptions in Japan based on the Soviet military threat."⁵ Those on the right of center hold that the threat is exaggerated and criticize the emotional antipathy towards the Soviet Union. Conversely, some in the center see "the current anti-Soviet perceptions as merely a temporary reaction, which will not last."⁶ Those on the left think that "the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union are manipulated by the U.S. and Japanese governments."⁷

Finally, as an interaction between general sources of perceptions and specific sources, firsthand experience with the Soviet Union (specific sources) endorsed the elites' perceptions formed through the general sources of perceptions, both for the right and the left.

b) Semiquantitative Analysis: Continuum

A statistical summary of correlations among the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union, their sources of perceptions of the Soviet Union, their perceptions of the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, and the foreign policy orientation of Japan is given in Figure 5 for the purpose of grasping their general tendencies in a semiquantitative manner.


This figure, in the same form as the continuum of W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe,⁸ was constructed as a way of summarizing the interview results, and was deduced from the interviewees' statements. However, it should be noted that these results do not by any means represent the perceptions of all the foreign policy elites. The research did not include all of the foreign policy elites, but rather by necessity was only partial (the results were constructed from only 65 interviews). This is so first because it was not intended to make an extensive survey covering all of the Japanese foreign policy elites which would number in

Figure 5:


Correlations among Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union, their sources of perceptions of the Soviet Union, their perceptions of the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, and foreign policy orientation of Japan

1. Foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union


a) Their positions in the spectrum of ideology




b) Sentiments towards the Soviet Union



c) Sentiment towards Russia



d) Evaluations of the Soviet threat



e) Evaluations of Gorbachev's *prestroika* and *glasnost* policy

8%	13%	28%	31%	20%
Genuine systemic reform, and will succeed	Genuine and may succeed	Remains-to-be-seen if genuine or merely style	Merely reform within the system, and should fail	Merely reform within the system, and will fail

f) Changes in perceptions

9%	9%	5%	33%	44%
Favorable pereceptions will not change	Favorable perceptions slightly decreased	Neither	Unfavorable perceptions may change as the Soviet Union changes	Unfavorable perceptions will not change

2. Sources of perceptions towards the Soviet Union

2%	45%	24%	23%	6%
Ideology (pro-communism)	History of Japan and Russia-Soviet Union	History of Russia-Soviet Union	Contacts with the Soviet Union in general	Ideology (anti-communism)

3. Perceptions of the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union

a) Positions on the Northern Territories reversion

1%	2%	7%	88%	2%
Spoils of war (no reversion)	Should be only two islands	Cannot help but accept two islands	Four islands	All the Kurile Islands

b) Positions on how the Northern Territories should be returned

18%	17%	4%	26%	35%
Strict <i>deguchi ron</i> (exit theory)	Moderate <i>deguchi ron</i>	Neither	Moderate <i>iriguchi ron</i> (entrance theory)	Strict <i>iriguchi ron</i>

c) Positions on Japanese defense policy

3%	24%	63%	9%	1%
Unarmed neutrality; disband the SDF Treaty	Accept the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	Gradual defense build-up along with the Japan-U.S. Security	Substantial defense build-up	Nuclear armament

d) Positions on the constitution

11%	38%	34%	11%	6%
Absolute defender	Moderate defender	Some problems but flexible interpretations will suffice	Problematic but revision is difficult	should be revised

e) Positions on the economic policy towards the Soviet Union

27%	13%	3%	26%	31%
Strict nonlinkage from politics	Soft nonlinkage from politics	Neither	Soft linkage with politics	Strict linkage with politics

f) Evaluation of the current foreign policy towards the Soviet Union

12%	21%	17%	31%	19%
Too dependent on the U.S.; absolutely unacceptable	Too dependent on the U.S. and unacceptable	Dependent on the U.S. but marginally acceptable	Dependent on the U.S. and too rigid but acceptable	Good

g) Positions of how the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union should be

6%	16%	56%	22%	0%
Pro-Soviet non-aligned	Omni-directional	pro-U.S. but more autonomous	Strict pro-U.S.	Independent nationalist

4. Foreign policy orientation of Japan

JAPAN				
*				
Pro-Soviet non-aligned	Neutral omni-directional	Pro-U.S. but more autonomous	Strict pro-U.S.	Independent nationalist

the hundreds. Second because, even among those from whom an interview was sought (89 interviews), many (24 interviews) were simply not available (See Appendix III).

Therefore, these results cannot and should not be regarded as an exact representation of the perceptions of the Japanese foreign policy elites as a whole or necessarily as a polling sample. However, the researcher believes that, at least, this survey covered many of the important foreign policy elites in Japan, and that it is possible to grasp their general tendencies from these results. This is the aim of the analysis in this section.

i) Foreign Policy Elites' Perceptions of the Soviet Union

The results in Figure 5 indicate that the largest percentage category of Japanese foreign policy elites is to the right of center, in terms of their positions in the spectrum of ideology (47%) [1-a]. This closely corresponds to their sentiments towards the Soviet Union, being moderately anti-Soviet (44%) [1-b]. However, their sentiments towards the Soviet Union do not exactly correspond to those towards Russia: the percentage for "moderately anti-Russia" (37%) is less than that for "moderately anti-Soviet" (44%). The percentage for "moderately pro-Russia" (30%) is more than that for

"moderately pro-Soviet" (11%) [1-c]. This is so because negative aspects tend to be attributed to the rigid Soviet communist system, whereas positive aspects tend to be attributed to "romantic and lovable Russia." It is also because of their Russophile sentiments cultivated by Russian literature, which are still shared even by those to the right of center.

In turn, the majority of the elites perceive a Soviet threat in one form or another, but to many of them it is in the political and psychological sense rather than in the real military sense [1-d].

Concerning Gorbachev's reforms, the majority of them (51%) have a skeptical and pessimistic prognosis: "merely reform within the system and should fail" (31%) + "merely reform within the system and will fail" (20%). Only a minority (21%) have optimistic and positive evaluations: "genuine systemic reform and will succeed" (8%) + "genuine and may succeed" (13%) [1-e]. This result correlates relatively well with their changes in perceptions of the Soviet Union: The largest percentage thinks that their unfavorable perceptions will not change even with Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* (44%); only 9% thinks that their favorable perceptions will not change [1-f].

ii) Sources of Perceptions of the Soviet Union

The largest source of perceptions of the Soviet Union of the foreign policy elites is the "history of Japan and Russia-Soviet Union" (45%), followed by the "history of Russia-Soviet Union" (24%) [2]. With the two combined, 69% consider that history is the most important source of perceptions of the Soviet Union in the negative sense. This is even larger than the percentage of the "anti-Soviet" group (59%): "moderate anti-Soviet" (44%) + "anti-Soviet" (15%) [1-b] or that of the "anti-Russia" group (51%): "moderate anti-Russia" (37%) + "anti-Russia" (14%) [1-c]. This result suggests that the Japanese Russophobia is deeply rooted in history, and is shared even by those on the left.

Ideology as a source of perceptions of the Soviet Union is minor (8%): "pro-communism" (2%) + "anti-communism" (6%) [2]. This proves that ideology is not a major source of perceptions of the Soviet Union for the Japanese.

iii) Japanese Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union

The Figure indicates that the great majority (88%) of the foreign policy elites advocate the simultaneous four island reversion of the Northern Territories (the *yontō ikkatsu henkan ron*) regardless of their positions in the

spectrum of ideology. Political parties on the left demand more than the four islands, which proves that national interests precede ideology [3-a].

However, concerning how to achieve the Northern Territories reversion, there is a wider distribution in their positions, ranging from strict *deguchi ron* (exit theory) advocated by the left to strict *iriguchi ron* (entrance theory) by the right. Nonetheless, despite the wide distribution, the majority position (61%) is still the *iriguchi ron*: "strict *iriguchi ron*" (35%) + "moderate *iriguchi ron*" (26%) [3-b]. This corresponds well to the total of "right of center" and "right" ($47\% + 16\% = 63\%$) in the positions in the spectrum of ideology [1-a].

On defense policy, the largest category is "gradual defense build-up along with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (63%), as endorsed by the lifting of the "1% of GNP ceiling" in the defense budget. The "substantial defense build-up along with the Security Treaty" category is small (9%) [3-c]. This is even smaller than the percentage that regards the "Soviet military threat as real," which is 19% [1-d]. This suggests that, as a strong reaction to the prewar Japanese militarism, the elites still have reservations about substantial armament (only 9% advocates it), not to mention nuclear armament (only 1%) [3-c].

The aversion to armament becomes clearer on looking at the next entry. Only 6% advocate the revision of the

"peace constitution" that prohibits any armament for Japan. The great majority (83%) hold that the constitution should not be revised: "absolute defender" (11%) + "moderate defender" (38%) + "flexible interpretation suffices" (34%) [3-d]. The "peace constitution" has symbolized postwar Japanese demobilization and democratization instituted by General MacArthur's U.S. Occupation Army. It has been regarded as a "sanctuary" by the "obedient" Japanese. Now, a new awareness that Japan should graduate from the "postwar mentality" (the loss of self-confidence as a nation) and stand its own feet is emerging. Thus Japanese defense policy is in a very slow and gradual transition.

Regarding the economic policy towards the Soviet Union, there is a wide distribution in the positions. Here again however the largest category is the "strict linkage with politics" (31%), the *seikei fukabun gensoku* (principle of indivisibility of economics from politics) [3-e]. This suggests that, in the high-tech age, the nature of Japan-Soviet economic relations has to alter from the covert *seikei bunri gensoku* (principle of separability of economics from politics) to overt *seikei fukabun gensoku*. Japan-Soviet economic relations are in a serious dilemma.

Another point here is that the category which advocates "strict nonlinkage with politics" (27%) is larger than that of the "left" (pro-communist) group (5%), and even larger than that of the "pro-Soviet" group (11%).

This is so because those in the business circles on the left of center are the defenders of free trade and of capitalism. Although they are not pro-communist at all by nature and are not strongly pro-Soviet, they advocate expanding Japan-Soviet economic relations.

In an overall evaluation of the current foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, the great majority (81%) think that Japan is dependent on the U.S. and lacks autonomy and flexibility: "too dependent on the U.S." (12% + 21% = 33%) + "dependent on the U.S." (17% + 31% = 48%) [3-f]. However, 48% still regard the situation as acceptable: "acceptable" (31%) + "marginally acceptable" (17%), while 19% evaluate it positively as "good." Only 33% regard it as unacceptable: "absolutely unacceptable" (12%) + "unacceptable" (21%) [3-f].

Accordingly, 56% calls for a "pro-U.S. but more autonomous foreign policy towards the Soviet Union," followed by 22% for a "strict pro-U.S. policy," and 16% for an "omni-directional foreign policy" [3-g]. Still, the great majority (78%) supports a pro-U.S. foreign policy in general: "strict pro-U.S." (22%) + "pro-U.S. but autonomous" (56%) [3-g]. The majority hold that, although total dependence on the U.S. is not desirable, insofar as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is the basis of Japanese foreign policy, Japan cannot override the framework.

iv) Foreign policy Orientation of Japan

The above examination suggests that the current foreign policy orientation of Japan is "strict pro-U.S.," employing a "moderate minimalist" approach vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, it is not "antagonistic" to the Soviet Union, as the "absolute minimalists" on the right advocate.

In the final analysis, it can be concluded that there is a fairly high correlation among the positions in the spectrum of ideology of the Japanese foreign policy elites (the mainstream being right of center), their perceptions of the Soviet Union ("moderately anti-Soviet"), and the actual Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union ("strict pro-U.S." but "moderate minimalist" position).

In conclusion, the results obtained by this semi-quantitative method correspond well to the patterns in the perceptions of the foreign policy elites that were obtained from a qualitative analysis above.

2. Testing of the Hypotheses

From both the qualitative and semi-quantitative examinations of the correlations among the perceptions, the sources of perceptions, and foreign policy, the questions and the hypotheses on the correlations established in Chapter I, can be tested.

a) Relations Between the Independent Variable (Events) and the Intervening Variable (Perceptions)

[Formation of Perceptions]

1) History proved to be the most predominant source of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union. Past events between Japan and Russia-Soviet Union from the early encounters in the 18th Century to the Soviet behavior at the end of World War II implanted an image of expansionist Russia-Soviet Union and Russophobia among them. (Hypothesis 1)

2) As powerful early and generational experiences, the Soviet violation of the Neutrality Treaty at the end of World War II, the massacres of the Japanese in Manchuria and Sakhaline, the occupation of the Northern Territories, and the detention of "575,000" Japanese hostages in Siberia for eleven years, made the anti-Soviet perceptions of the foreign policy elites decisive. (Hypothesis 2)

3) Because of these powerful effects of the historical and generational experiences, it is difficult to find anyone who does not have anti-Soviet sentiments in some fashion, even among those on the left. Almost all of the foreign policy elites hold anti-Soviet sentiments at the "bottom of their hearts." Even the JCP is not uncritically pro-Soviet. It criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Hypotheses 1 and 2)

4) The unity of the anti-Soviet sentiments among the foreign policy elites is best symbolized by the coalition for the reversion of the Northern Territories. The fact that the JCP and the JSP demand more than the LDP does indicates that national interests precede ideology. This recalls the historical fact that the "Second International" (the International Congress of Socialists) collapsed at the outbreak of World War I. (Hypothesis 3)

5) Firsthand experiences with the Soviet Union through residence there and contacts with the Russians reconfirmed their perceptions, and made their perceptions irreversible. (Hypothesis 4)

6) In conclusion, the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union are characterized by fear and distrust. This overshadows another undercurrent of Japanese perception of Russia as a backward and contemptible nation. Only a minority on the left have strong Russophile perceptions.

[Maintenance of Perceptions]

7) Despite the drastic change in the political system in Russia during the Communist revolution of 1917, the hostile image of the Soviet Union did not change. On the contrary, ideology was added to the fear and caution towards the Soviet Union. However, the influence of ideology is minor as a source of anti-Soviet perceptions, while it became the source of pro-Soviet perceptions for those on the left. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, because of its belief in communism, the JCP has strong resentment of the Soviet monopoly over international communism. (Hypothesis 5)

8) The foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev have remained fundamentally the same, so that the majority is still cautious and skeptical about Gorbachev's reforms. (Hypothesis 6)

[Changes in Perceptions]

9) Since the perception of hostility is a belief resistant to change, the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union have hardly changed. On the contrary, the anti-Soviet perceptions were entrenched due to the constant Soviet threat posed to Japan, derived from the geopolitical factor and the systemic factor (the U.S.-Japan alliance in the postwar bipolar international system). (Hypothesis 7)

10) For those who have changed their perceptions of the

Soviet Union, they have shifted to anti-Soviet, and never to pro-Soviet. Some on the right of center and in the center, who believed in peaceful coexistence in the 1960s and in détente in the 1970's, were shocked by the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and joined the anti-Soviet camp.

11) In a nutshell, the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union have never been positive except for those on the left. The hostile perceptions have been reinforced by successive events, which was crystallized by the postwar bipolar international system. (Hypothesis 8)

**b) Relations Between the Intervening Variable
(Perceptions) and the Dependent Variable
(Foreign Policy Outputs)**

1) There is considerable diversity in the spectrum of ideology with regard to the Soviet Union among the foreign policy elites, ranging from the right to the left. However, despite this diversity, there is a striking unity in the decision-making group, converging on the right of center, while the anti-establishment group converges on the left. In other words, there are wide perception gaps between the foreign policy decision-making establishment and the anti-establishment group concerning the Soviet Union.

2) In terms of the Japanese foreign policy outputs towards the Soviet Union, the homogeneity in their perceptions among the decision-makers makes the perceptions of the influentials virtually irrelevant. This also leaves no room for the perceptions of the anti-establishment on the left.

3) The U.S. (White House) perceptions of the Soviet Union and its intentions are more important intervening variables of Japanese foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union than the perceptions of Japanese foreign policy influentials.

4) The anti-Soviet perceptions of the decision-makers at the MFA, coupled with their extreme concern with U.S. intentions, make Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union hardline. This is symbolized by its uncompromising position on the Northern Territories; the *iriguchi ron* (entrance theory). (Hypothesis 9)

5) To the degree that the decision-makers are set in their distrust and antipathy towards the Soviet Union, the basic Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union will remain the same. The power of the influentials will remain minor.

3. Prospects for Japanese Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union

There is a solid consensus among the foreign policy elites that there will be hardly any change in the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future.

a) Overall Policy

Since the basic framework of Japanese foreign policy was defined by Prime Minister Yoshida's conclusion of the "majority peace" of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union *per se* was articulated by Prime Minister Hatoyama's failure to conclude a peace treaty, Japan has not taken any major initiatives towards the Soviet Union. Its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union has been characterized by passivity and coldness. This is basically in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is prescribed by the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the bipolar international system. This systemic factor leaves so little initiative for the MFA to exercise that its decision-making towards the Soviet Union hinges only upon its maneuverability within the framework. This hobbling of Japan has provoked the criticism from outside the MFA that Japanese foreign policy is totally dependent on the U.S.

and that Japan has no foreign policy towards the Soviet Union nor foreign policy *per se* to begin with. Yet, the MFA believes that, insofar as the Security Treaty has and will continue to provide the Japanese national security, the cooperation with the U.S. is the prerequisite for its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

The emergence of the "pro-U.S. independence" school has coincided with a growing awareness that Japan can no longer get a "free ride" under the U.S. nuclear umbrella due to the changes in both the external and internal environments. These include the collapse of the *Pax Americana* and the Soviet military build-up externally, along with the growth of Japan's economic power and regaining of confidence as a nation internally. A politician on the right of center calls this the "'third *kaikoku*' (door opening), as compared to the 'first *kaikoku*' by U.S. Commodore Perry's Black Ships in 1853, and the second by General MacArthur's U.S. Occupation Army in 1945."⁹ He sees "the 'third *kaikoku*' as different from the first two: they were forced by *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure). In the 'third *kaikoku*,' Japan, for the first time in its history, is expected to play an active role and assume responsibility for the world economy and security."¹⁰

In the opinion of a scholar on the right who advocates a nationalistic independent foreign policy, "except for cooperation with the U.S., postwar Japanese diplomacy is

merely means without objectives. Prewar Japan at least had clear foreign policy objectives. Now Japan has to overcome total dependence on the U.S. in defense, and to search for a new foreign policy. However, the nature of Japanese foreign policy—*laissez faire* economic policy and dependence for its national security on the U.S.—has not changed at all. The policy is merely made up of gestures, aside from settling practical matters with the U.S."¹¹

It was under these circumstances that the "pro-U.S. independence" school has gained momentum.

Another premise of the "pro-U.S. independence" school is that Japan cannot conduct autonomous diplomacy towards the Soviet Union because it depends for its own national security on the U.S. To have credible deterrence of its own would enable Japan to stand on its own, and initiate more independent and flexible diplomacy towards the Soviet Union.

However, the advocacy still remains incipient for at least two important reasons. First, under the "war-renouncing" constitution, Japanese defense policy is severely handicapped by "three constraints: a 'solely defense' policy, no possession of nuclear weapons, and no participation in defense for foreign countries."¹² Japan cannot send its SDF overseas even for the United Nations' peacekeeping operations. Therefore, to quote a journalist, "although the advocacy calls for an active role for Japan

in the maintenance of Western security, it is not clear to what extent Japan can cooperate with the West. Given that the three constraints are unlikely to be altered, where to draw the line on the size and limits of Japan's defense capabilities remains to be articulated."¹³ With the still strong Japanese aversion to rearmament, it seems that what Japan can do, at most, would be a modest build-up of its own defense and more burden-sharing under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Second, although the advocacy calls for greater initiative and flexibility towards the Soviet Union, Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union cannot be different from the current minimalistic one. This is so, first because the monopoly on the decision-making power by the MFA's Soviet Union Division is intact. Second, it is because there is a solid consensus in the decision-making group that it is best for Japan to do nothing in order "not to be taken in either by military intimidation or 'sweet voices' of the Soviet Union."¹⁴ Thus, a call for a more independent and flexible foreign policy towards the Soviet Union seems likely to remain merely an advocacy. In essence, the advocacy was derived more as a policy towards the U.S., than as a policy towards the Soviet Union.

The fact that foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev have been basically unchanged endorses this. To the extent that the majority

perceive that Gorbachev's new diplomacy is merely a change of style, the Japanese policy towards the Soviet Union will not change. The real litmus test of Gorbachev's *glasnost* vis-à-vis Japan, on whether it is genuine or merely gesture, was his policy on the Northern Territories. It was an instant failure. With the failure of another litmus test, Gorbachev's visit to Japan, the Japanese expectations regarding Gorbachev were foiled. They learned the cool reality of Gorbachev's foreign policy objectives towards Japan. In a nutshell, the foreign policy elites are convinced that Gorbachev is "crying wolf." They conclude that "while Kovalenko (the Soviet Party Central Committee Secretariat's International Division's Deputy Director in charge of Japan) remains in the post, Soviet foreign policy towards Japan will not change."¹⁵ Thus, whether Gorbachev removes Kovalenko is the real litmus test of Gorbachev's *glasnost* towards Japan.

In essence, Japan-Soviet relations are a function of U.S.-Soviet relations. This makes Japan unable to take the initiative in improving their relations. Accordingly, a Japan-Soviet summit like the one that Prime Minister Nakasone hoped would happen, cannot take place unless a major breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet relations takes place (Nakasone visited Moscow and realized a talk with Gorbachev in July 1988 after his premiership had ended). Japan will continue to follow the U.S. lead, cautiously and a few

steps behind, as in the case of the Sino-Japanese *rapprochement* after Nixon's visit to China in 1972.

To summarize, Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is saddled with dilemmas: insofar as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides for Japan's national security, Japan has to depend on the U.S. for its policy towards the Soviet Union and cannot conduct autonomous diplomacy towards that country. In turn, if Japan wants that autonomy, it has to get out of the Security Treaty system. However, Japan has no ability or intention of doing so. Therefore, the overall Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

b) Northern Territories Issue

Another dilemma of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is the Northern Territories issue. An MFA official thinks that, "in the choice between the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Northern Territories, it is natural for the MFA to give priority to the Security Treaty over Japan's interests with the Soviet Union [reversion of the islands]: The preservation of national security is the most important national interest."¹⁶ In other words, because of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the MFA cannot improve relations with the Soviet Union for the sake of the reversion of the Northern Territories. Japan cannot help

but sacrifice the "four small islands" (the Northern Territories) for the security of the "four major islands" (the Japanese mainland). Accordingly, the MFA cannot accept the Soviet proposal of a Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty, nor of an Asian Collective Security System. The majority of the foreign policy elites hold that the Soviet Union intends thereby to nullify the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a way to neutralize Japan.

Nevertheless, the MFA cannot withdraw its demand for the return of the Northern Territories because there is a national consensus for the reversion. In fact, when it comes to the Northern Territories, the ruling party and the opposition parties, the right and the left included, are united, forming a grand coalition for the reversion. A scholar in the center argues that "this issue has nothing to do with ideology but is a matter of nationality."¹⁷

Several reasons can be cited as to why the Japanese insist on the four islands with an area of 1,952 square miles, less than half the size of the Island of Hawaii, where there are no Japanese inhabitants after all of the 17,000 islanders were forced out by the Soviet Union in 1945. The first reason, a scholar in the center argues, is "a unique Japanese concept of national territory."¹⁸ Due to its insular geography, the coastal sea has constituted the Japanese natural border. This has isolated Japan from foreign invasions for centuries, and has forged the concept

of their territorial boundary as natural and racial, as examined earlier. This fortunate geography and history make it hard for the Japanese to accept the loss of its inherent territories. Therefore, the Japanese emphasize the moral and legal points of view of the issue, rather than the realistic and political points of view.

Second, according to a scholar on the right of center, the Northern Territories issue was revived as an "offshoot" of the Okinawa reversion in 1972.¹⁹ As a result of Japan's success in regaining Okinawa after 27 years of negotiations with the U.S., the reversion of the Northern Territories has become a national wish as the last unresolved "postwar settlement." To the Japanese, "the postwar period will not end until the Northern Territories have been returned."²⁰ There are politicians who dedicate their "political lives" to lobby for the reversion.

Third, one on the right of center said that, "with the recognition that the reversion requires the enlightenment and consolidation of domestic public opinion and the support of international public opinion, the government established three bodies. They are called the 'trinity' of the Northern Territories reversion movement, as follows:

[See Figure 2]

—the Former Islanders' League which is under the supervision of the Prime Minister's Office (1958) is designed to protect former islanders. It provides

low-interest loans for their fishing and keeps the registry book records of the lands of the Northern Territories.

—the Union for the Northern Territories Reversion, under the MFA (1965), to raise international awareness of the issue.

—the Northern Territories Issue Association, under the supervision of the Management and Coordination Agency (MCA) in the Prime Minister's Office (1969), takes care of public relations to enlighten the Japanese on the issue. It also coordinates the nationwide movement for the reversion. Almost all of the local governments in Japan and more than 100 private organizations are part of this movement."²¹

At the top of these, as another points out, "the Northern Territories Affairs Administration in the MCA in the Prime Minister's Office supervises the movement, as the 'ultimate supervisory organ' of all the governmental and private bodies for the movement."²² Thus institutionalized and nationalized, this is a "movement from above,"²³ to quote a scholar in the center. One on the right of center sees it as a "mixture of movements from above and from below."²⁴

Fourth, as an internal environmental factor, one on the left of center notes that "the movement has intensified since the wave of conservatism which followed the victory of the conservative camp against the 'progressive camp' in the bi-cameral elections in 1976."²⁵ In fact, in 1981, the

Cabinet designated February 7 (the date of the signing of the 1855 Treaty) as "Northern Territories Day" to consolidate public opinion. Since then, the day has been commemorated annually with nationwide political rallies for the reversion, and led by the Prime Minister.

Fifth, as the external environmental factor, this movement gained momentum when Japan began to perceive that it had regained enough power to advance its own claims, and negotiate with the Soviet Union without worrying about the U.S. intentions too much. This is all the more so, a scholar on the right argues, "because half of the responsibility for the issue lies with the U.S. [referring to Roosevelt's secret promise at Yalta to give the Kurile Islands to Stalin, and so on]."²⁶ Besides, others add that "the U.S. now fully supports the Japanese position."²⁷

Under these circumstances, the Northern Territories reversion became a national wish, or more accurately, was made to become such a wish. However, in practice, Japan initiate no active measures with the Soviet Union for the return. Indeed, the consensus among the decision-making group is that Japan should do nothing but wait for a Soviet move to make concessions on this issue. This position becomes even more widely held as the perception grows that Japan now has the best bargaining leverage in forty years due to its money and high-tech "cards."

c) Japanese Defense Policy

The third dilemma is between the "peace constitution" that renounces any form of armament and the growing perception of the need for Japan's own defense build-up. Changes in both the external and internal environments have put the foreign policy elites' perceptions on how to preserve Japan's national security into a transitional phase. On this issue, which is the prime national interest of nation-states, the majority perceive that total dependence on the U.S. is no longer sufficient. They think that Japan should build up its own defense capabilities, along with more burden-sharing under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The transition was epitomized by the removal of the "ceiling of 1% of the GNP" for the defense budget in January 1987. However, so long as there is strong opposition to armament and solid support for the "peace constitution" among the Japanese, its defense policy will not change drastically, only very slowly.

In this regard, the fact that "the Soviet Union, while spending 13-18% of its GNP for its military, joined the opposition parties and denounced Japan's exceeding the 1% of GNP limit as Japan becoming militarist and opening an unrestrained arms race"²⁸ seems to indicate that it fears Japan's possible own militarization. It would prefer Japan to be held on the U.S. leash, as China and Southeast Asian countries do.

**d) Japanese Economic Policy Towards
the Soviet Union**

The fourth dilemma is that, because of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Japan cannot improve relations with the Soviet Union for the sake of its economic interests in the Soviet Union, either. As those on the left argue, Japan has two contradictory objectives with the Soviet Union: the political-security concern of the government and the economic interests of the private sector. The covert *seikei bunri* principle (separation of politics from economics) was a convenient device to reconcile the two objectives. It worked well insofar as the level of Japan-Soviet economic relations was small enough not to have any political-security impact. Under this policy, large-scale Siberian Economic Development Projects blossomed in the 1970's. However, the nonlinkage policy was no longer acceptable in the high-tech age of the 1980's, because of the increased military-strategic implications of the high-tech products. The Toshiba Machine Company incident is an example of this. Thus, the policy had to change to a linkage policy and the government made it official. The economic circles are now putting restraints on themselves since they cannot override the governmental administrative guidance. Japanese economic policy towards the Soviet Union is in a dilemma, inflicted with political as well as economic constraints.

4. Prospects for Japan-Soviet Relations

No major positive developments have taken place between Japan and the Soviet Union since World War II. The unlikelihood of any significant changes in Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union predicts dim prospects for Japan-Soviet relations in the future as well. There are at least three major impediments to improvements in their relations in the long term.

The first impediment is the systemic factor. Japan-Soviet relations are fundamentally determined by U.S.-Soviet relations due to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has involved Japan in the U.S. military strategy against the Soviet Union. Therefore, so long as the superpower confrontation continues and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty exists in the contemporary bipolar international system, no fundamental change in Japan-Soviet relations is likely. Because of the basic nature of their relations, an MFA official admits that "Japan-Soviet relations would be difficult even without the Northern Territories issue."²⁹

The second impediment is their very different political systems; their national interests are basically incompatible. An MFA official believes that "what Japan should do therefore is stabilize their relations in a non-antagonistic way within the framework of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system."³⁰ A scholar on the right thinks

that "theoretically, warm 'friendly relations' cannot exist between Japan and the Soviet Union. Only an improvement in cool and practical relations within the framework of the alleged peaceful coexistence is possible."³¹

The third impediment is the Northern Territories issue. Due to the national consensus for the return of the Northern Territories, unless the Soviet Union compromises on this issue, no significant improvements in Japan-Soviet relations can be expected. However, this issue should be regarded as a result rather than a cause of stalemated relations. Here it should be pointed out that both the *iriguchi ron* (the entrance theory) and the *deguchi ron* (the exit theory) miss the point in terms of the basic nature of Japan-Soviet relations. The former presupposes that if the Soviet Union were to return the territories, Japan-Soviet relations would improve substantially. The latter presumes that improvement in non-political fields would spill over into political relations. However, as a scholar in the center notes, "to regard the territorial issue as the real impediment to Japan-Soviet relations is a superficial view. The real impediment to improvement in their relations lies in the very framework of the international system. The territorial issue is one of the problems which reflects the nature of these relations."³² Therefore, a careful evaluation of the territorial issue in terms of Japan-Soviet relations is necessary. One has to ask

whether their relations would be any different from what they are, were it not for the Northern Territories dispute, or whether their relations would improve, were the Territories to be returned.

In this regard, the accusation of the MFA by the left that the MFA uses the issue as a pretext to keep the Japanese anti-Soviet should be examined. It is hard to prove this, given the deadlocked situation, in which no major development on the issue is expected even under Gorbachev. This accusation could be tested only if the Soviet Union were to make concessions on the reversion. However, in the opinion of a scholar in the center, "to regard advocates for the reversion of the Northern Territories as anti-Soviet is the biggest misunderstanding of the Soviet Union: *genuine* anti-Soviets think that the Territories had better not be returned."³³ This point can be used as a proof of the accusation by the left. On the other hand, it seems that there is no reason why the MFA should reject such a Soviet concession if it were offered. As another on the left of center maintains, "even if the Northern Territories were returned under the current international system, the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union, as well as Japan-Soviet relations, would not improve significantly."³⁴

This is so because this issue is only the tip of the iceberg of Japan-Soviet relations. The severe truth is

that Japan-Soviet relations are determined by U.S.-Soviet relations. They will remain basically the same unless the current bipolar international system changes, regardless of the territorial issue. In a nutshell, the Northern Territories issue is an unfortunate byproduct rather than a cause of the stalemated relations, symbolizing those relations.

Under these circumstances, in which the deadlock in Japan-Soviet relations seems irreversible, what can maximally be expected are only limited improvements within the basic framework of their relations. Some MFA officials argue that "the most important objective to be sought is to reduce tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union, and to stabilize relations in a non-antagonistic manner. This depends on the following factors: First, the Soviet evaluation of Japan, regarding how much the Soviet Union would gain by alienating Japan from the U.S., how well the Soviet Union could endure Japanese antagonism,"³⁵ and "how much the Soviet Union would suffer without Japanese economic cooperation."³⁶ Second, "Japan's flexibility, concerning how much Japan could increase exchanges at the non-governmental level, while developing the capability to resist Soviet propaganda, on the Japanese side."³⁷ However, even if these conditions were met, a scholar on the right thinks that "Japan-Soviet relations cannot be friendly, insofar as their political systems are

different."³⁸ This is all the more true, since the Japanese importance to the U.S. in military-strategic terms will never be smaller. In the general course of things, Japan will increase its defensive conventional forces, as a part of its effort to increase its burden-sharing under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Prospects are dim on specific issues, as well. On the Northern Territories issue, there is a near consensus that the return of the four islands is unlikely in the foreseeable future. According to one on the right of center, "to the extent that the Soviet Union thinks of Japan only in terms of its relations with the U.S., or unless Japan repeals the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Soviet Union will not change its position on the territorial issue [as already having been solved]."³⁹ In the opinion of one on the right, "this is not the kind of issue where diplomatic negotiations or bargaining can bring about a solution. It has to do with the basic nature of the international system."⁴⁰ Another on the right notes that "lesson of the Okinawa reversion in 1972, which took 27 years, is that major changes in the international environment were the preconditions for the return: the relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the change in the U.S. evaluation of Japan, from a mere dependent to an important ally."⁴¹ Thus, a former MFA official concludes that "unless the basic international

system changes or a war occurs, the return of the Northern Territories is unlikely. The only possibility is the return of the two islands, which is unacceptable to Japan."⁴²

Even in the economic field, which is the only tangible area in Japan-Soviet relations, the situation has worsened. The advent of the high-tech era has replaced the age of the large-scale Siberian development cooperation projects. It has imposed a serious constraint on their economic relations—the adoption of the linkage policy and the tightening of the COCOM restrictions. In essence, Japan-Soviet economic relations are subject to the fluctuations of the political climate of their relations.

So too with cultural relations, which, those on the right argue, are "characterized by inequality and a lack of mutuality."⁴³ A scholar on the right notes that, "while the Soviet Union imposes a number of restrictions on Japanese visitors in the Soviet Union, the Russians enjoy complete freedom in Japan, which has no closed cities. While the Soviet Union prohibits the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union from being interviewed, the Soviet counterparts in Japan are frequently interviewed. [While Japanese maps including the Northern Territories are banned from publication in the Soviet Union], the Japanese have free access to the Soviet literature in Japan."⁴⁴ Thus, the scholar asserts that "Japan should demand more

'mutuality' in cultural relations as the Soviet Union has long demanded."⁴⁵ For that matter, one on the left of center points out that "there are too few human exchanges between Japan and the Soviet Union. There are only 300 Japanese in the Soviet Union, most of whom are on a non-governmental level, such as businessmen and their families. The Japanese do not realize that the U.S. has far more human exchanges with the Soviet Union than Japan does."⁴⁶

Under these circumstances, it is predicted that there will be no major new developments in Japan-Soviet relations in the foreseeable future. According to a specialist on the right of center, "the improvement in Japan-Soviet relations would be at best back to the level of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956, either by Soviet acknowledgement of the existence of the unsolved territorial issue or by its proposal to return the two islands of the Northern Territories."⁴⁷ He points out that "the MFA fears most the latter case, because it would have an enormous impact on Japan."⁴⁸ It could cause a surge in the advocacy for the *nitō henkan ron* (the two islands reversion), and thus incline Japanese public opinion more towards the Soviet Union. This would effect the ultimate Soviet objective towards Japan, those on the right argue, to "Finlandize" Japan.

In conclusion, one on the left of center deplores the fact that "throughout history, estrangement, constant tension, and war have been the essence of Japan-Soviet relations."⁴⁹ One on the right notes that, "despite their geographical proximity, no nation is so distant as the Soviet Union to Japan."⁵⁰ Their cooperative periods have only been temporary war-time cooperation. This essence of Japan-Soviet relations was crystallized by the postwar arrangement of the international system. As a specialist on the right of center points out, "this resulted in a perception gap between the Soviet Union and Japan. It was widened by their irreconcilable national interests as well as by antipathy and mutual distrust between them."⁵¹ In the opinion of a scholar on the right, without the conclusion of a peace treaty (as a fundamental treaty to end a war among nations) "Japan and the Soviet Union have not even ended the war situation in the legal sense."⁵²

In a nutshell, "postwar Japan-Soviet relations are a 'fossil' of international politics,"⁵³ the unfortunate offspring of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, in which Japan was entangled. So long as the current bipolar international system endures, Japan and the Soviet Union will remain "distant neighbors"⁵⁴ to each other.

Notes

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4. Interview, Tokyo, October 22, 1986.
5. Interview, Nagoya, October 17, 1986.
6. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
7. Interview, Tokyo, October 27, 1986.
8. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., "A Theoretical Framework for the Research and Analysis of the Foreign Policies of African Countries," pp. 1-45, presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 18-23, 1980, pp. 33-36.
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23. Interview, Osaka, November 13, 1986.
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27. Toru Nakagawa, "Nakasone taiso gaikō e no chūmon" ("Recommendations for Nakasone's Diplomacy Towards the Soviet Union"), *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 64, No. 12, December 1986, p. 120.
28. Akira Sono, "Nihon yo 'dokuritsu kokka' tare" ("Japan: Be an 'Independent' Nation"), in "Sono Akira no Sekai nozoki megane" ("Akira Sono's Spectacles for Watching the World"), Series No. 25, *Shokun*, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1986, pp. 218-219.
29. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Akio Kimura, "Soren wa 'jōyaku yaburi' no tensai" ("The Soviet Union: A Genius at 'Violating Treaties'"), *Shokun*, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 1987, p. 48.

32. Hiroshi Kimura, "Gorubachofu shugi" ("Gorbachevism"), in JIIA, ed., *Soviet Union in Transition*, Tokyo: JIIA, 1986, p.323.
33. Hayao Shimizu, *Naze Nihonjin wa Soren ga kirai ka (Why Do the Japanese Dislike the Soviet Union?)*, Tokyo: Yamate Shobō, 1979, pp. 37-38, (emphasis added).
34. Interview, Tokyo, November 21, 1986.
35. Interview, Tokyo, November 18, 1986.
36. Interview, Tokyo, October 24, 1986.
37. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
38. Akio Kimura, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
39. Interview, Tokyo, October 23, 1986.
40. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
41. Interview, Tokyo, November 26, 1986.
42. Interview, Tokyo, November 27, 1986.
43. Akio Kimura, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
47. Interview, Tokyo, October 20, 1986.
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49. Interview, Tokyo, November 7, 1986.
50. Interview, Tokyo, October 21, 1986.
51. Interview, Tokyo, November 25, 1986.
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Appendix I. Questionnaire for Interviews

(translated from Japanese)

1. Perceptions of the Soviet Union

a) On the Nature of the Soviet System

-What do you think the nature of the Soviet political system and the determinants are?

-What do you think the nature of the Soviet economic system and the determinants are?

-What do you think the nature of the Soviet social system and the determinants are?

b) On Soviet Power

-How would you evaluate Soviet power?

i) military capability

ii) political and ideological capability

iii) diplomatic capability

iv) economic capability

c) On Gorbachev's Reforms

-How would you evaluate Gorbachev's reforms?

-What do you think their prospects and the determinants are?

d) On the Stability of the Soviet Union

-How would you evaluate the stability of the Soviet Union and what do you think the determinants are?

e) On the External Dimension

-What do you think the nature of the Soviet external behavior and the determinants are?

-What do you think the Soviet global foreign policy objectives and the determinants are?

-What do you think the Soviet foreign policy objectives towards Japan and the determinants are?

- i) security interests
- ii) political interests
- iii) economic interests

2. On Japanese Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union

-What do you think the present Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and the determinants are?

-How would you evaluate the present Japanese policy towards the Soviet Union?

- i) overall policy
- ii) political policy
- iii) defense policy
- iv) economic policy

-What do you think that policy should be?

3. Relations among Events, Perceptions, and Foreign Policy

a) On Sources of Perceptions

-What were the dominant sources of your perceptions of the Soviet Union?

- i) Education and Socialization
- ii) History books read as an adult
- iii) Contacts with the Russians

- iv) Media: Newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, etc
- v) U.S. Influence and alliance
- vi) Other?

-What aspects of the Soviet Union or the Russians do you think determined your perceptions of the Soviet Union?

-In what period of your life do you think your perceptions of the Soviet Union were dominantly formed (elementary school, high school, college, or adult life)?

b) On Relations between Events and Perceptions

-How much do you think the following events influenced your perceptions of the Soviet Union?

- i) Dispute over Korea and Manchuria in the 19th Century
- ii) The Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905
- iii) The Russian Revolution
- iv) Detention of Japanese in Siberia
- v) Dispute over the "Northern Territories"
- vi) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
- vii) Other?

-Have your perceptions of the Soviet Union been maintained since they were first formed, or have they changed?

-If your perceptions have changed, what events or general factors do you think have changed your perceptions?

c) On the Relations between Perceptions and Foreign Policy

-Do you think your perceptions of the Soviet Union are properly reflected in Japanese foreign policy decisions

toward the Soviet Union?

d) On Prospects for Future Japan-Soviet Relations

-What do you predict about future Japan-Soviet relations in general?

-What do you think are the prospects for the following specific issues?

- i) Conclusion of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty
- ii) Reversion of the "Northern Territories"
- iii) Japan's defense policy
- iv) Siberian economic development and joint ventures

4. Identification of Foreign Policy Elites

a) What do you consider to be the major foreign policy decisions made by Japan concerning the Soviet Union in the last forty years?

b) What is your usual mode of participation in the decision-making process?

c) Who do you think were the people involved in making these important decisions (within governmental organizations, or outside the government)? Please name several "decision-makers."

d) Who do you think were the most influential persons and groups on foreign policy decision-making other than the decision-makers themselves (within the government, political parties, business community, academic circles, and mass media)? Please name several "influentials."

Appendix II. Cover Letter to Foreign Policy Elites

[A Sample Letter] (translated from Japanese)

October, 1986

Dear Sir:

Please forgive me for writing to you out of the blue. I am specializing in international politics at the Graduate School of the City University of New York. I am currently preparing my Ph.D. dissertation, titled "Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union" under the supervision of Professor Donald S. Zagoria of the University. (Please refer to the attached Project Abstract).

I came back to Japan last month in order to interview foreign policy specialists in different circles in Japan. While I was in the U.S., Minister Hyodo recommended that I seek an interview with you.

Under these circumstances, I am writing to you to ask if you are willing to tell me about your perceptions of the Soviet Union and of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. I am enclosing a questionnaire which lists items that I would like to ask you about. Therefore, please let me know your candid opinions.

I am awfully sorry to make such a selfish request to you despite your busy schedule, but I would like to see you at a convenient time for you. I would appreciate it very much if you would accept my request.

Last but not least, Minister Hyodo asked me to send his best regards to you.

I will call you in a few days, to ask you about a convenient time for you. Since I am still an immature student, I humbly ask you to give me your best guidance.

Yours sincerely,

Mayumi Itoh

Tel. (052) 991-6955

Encs.

Attachment to the Cover Letter

Project abstract

This abstract has been prepared for the use of potential respondents in this research project.

A complete description is available on request.

This project is a study of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union and of their relationship to Japan's foreign policy decision-making toward the Soviet Union.

1. Framework for Analysis

The research design employed in this project is, first, based on a theoretical framework established by Robert Jervis that places decision-makers' perceptions of other nations and of the world as an important intervening variable between events (independent variable) and foreign policy decisions (dependent variable). Second, in order to extend Jervis' framework to broader foreign policy elites, this framework is combined with that of W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe which identifies "influentials'" perceptions as an independent variable, affecting decision-makers' perceptions (intervening variable) and thereby foreign policy decisions (dependent variable). Thus, this combined

framework postulates a correlation among events (independent variable), perceptions of the "influentials" and the decision-makers (intervening variable), and actual foreign policy decision outputs (dependent variable).

On the basis of this analytical framework, the research would involve an investigation of the following:

- a) Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union
- b) Japan's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, and
- c) Sources of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union.

2. Data-gathering procedures

a) Data on the Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union will be acquired through open-ended interviews and content analysis of their writings on the Soviet Union. (Questionnaire is attached.)

b) Data on Japan's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union will be collected from non-classified official sources, and the interviews with the Japanese foreign policy elites.

c) Data on Sources of Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union will be gathered through the interviews with the Japanese foreign policy elites.

Appendix III: Japanese Foreign Policy Elites with Respect to the Soviet Union

Notes:

1. This list refers to all decision-makers and influentials from whom an interview was originally sought.
2. The position listed is that at the time of the interview.
3. The positions listed in parentheses are those held previously.
4. * was not interviewed.

1. Top Decision-Makers

1. *Nakasone, Yasuhiro (1918), Prime Minister, House of Representatives (H.R.).
2. *Kuranari, Tadashi (1930), Foreign Minister, H.R. (Nakasone faction).

2. Bureaucracy

a) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

3. Hogen, Shinsaku (1910), Research Institute for Japan's National Policy Secretary-General, Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) Director, Advisor Emeritus Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), (Permanent Vice-Minister, Ambassador to Austria, Eurasian Bureau Director-General, MFA Advisor).
4. Hyodo, Nagao, Minister to the U.S., (Soviet Union Division Director).
5. Ide, Keiji, Information and Research Bureau Analysis Division.
- 6.* Matsumoto, Shunichi (1897), (LDP [H.R.], MFA Treaties Bureau Director-General, Ambassador to England and to France, Plenipotentiary to the 1955-1956 Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty Negotiations).

7. Nakagawa, Toru (1911), Northern Territories Issue Association vice-President (NTIA), Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) Vice-President, Permanent Court of International Justice (the Hague) Judge, KDD Advisor, (Ambassador to the Soviet Union).
8. Niiseki, Kinya (1916), JIIA Chairman, (Ambassador to the Soviet Union).
9. * Nomura, Kazunari, Eurasian Bureau Deputy Director-General.
- 10.* Okazaki, Hisahiko (1930), Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, (Research & Planning Department Director-General, Japan Defense Agency Senior Counselor [1979-1981]).
11. Owada, Hisashi (1932), Treaties Bureau Director-General, (Minister to the Soviet Union).
12. Shigemitsu, Akira (1916), Special Advisor to NTT Public Corporation, (Ambassador to the Soviet Union [1974-78]).
13. Shigeta Hiroshi, Soviet Union Division Director.
- 14.* Shimoda, Takezo (1907), MFA Advisor, Permanent Court of International Justice (the Hague) Judge, (Ambassador to the U.S. and to the Soviet Union, Supreme Court Judge).
15. Shinoda, Kenji, Northeast Asia Division Assistant Director.
16. Takashima, Masuo (1919), Supreme Court Judge (Permanent Vice-Minister, Ambassador to the Soviet Union [1982-84]).
17. Tamba, Minoru (1938), Boston Consul-General, (Soviet Union Division Director, Minister to the Soviet Union).

b) Defense Agency and Its Subsidiary Institutions

18. Inoki, Masamichi (1914), RIPS President, Aoyama Gakuin University Professor, (National Defense Academy President).
19. Miyauchi, Kuniko, National Institute for Defense Studies Professor.

20. Momoi, Makoto (1923), Momoi Research Institute, (National Institute for Defense Studies Official & Research Department Director).
21. Nishihara, Masashi (1937), National Defense Academy Professor, RIPS Research Associate.
22. Onishi, Seiichiro, RIPS Executive-Director, (JDA official).
23. Saeki, Kiichi (1913), Nomura Research Institute Senior Advisor, RIPS Director, (National Institute for Defense Studies Director-General).
24. Sakonjo, Naotoshi, RIPS Research Associate, (Vice-Admiral, Marine Self Defense Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman).
- 25.* Sase, Masamori (1934), National Defense Academy Professor (International Relations), RIPS Research Associate.
- 26.* Tsukamoto, Katsuichi, RIPS Research Associate, (ret. Ground Self Defense Force Lt. General).
27. Yoshio, Sawada, Colonel; Assignment Division Director, Department of Personnel, Ground Staff Office (Military Attaché to the Soviet Union).

c) MITI and Its Subsidiary Institutions

28. Ogawa, Kazuo, Japan Association for Trade with the Soviet Union and Socialist Countries of Europe (Sotōbō) Department of Economic Studies Director.
29. Ozawa, Michinari, on loan to the National Land Agency as Minister's Secretariat Counselor, (South Asia & East Europe Division Director).

d) Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries

30. Kaneda, Tatsuo, JIIA Principal Researcher, on loan from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.

e) NTAA and Its Subsidiary Institutions

31. Ikura, Toshihiko, Northern Territories Issue Association Division Director, Management & Coordination Agency.

32. Inoue, Tatsuo, Northern Territories Affairs Administration (NTAA) Counselor, Management & Coordination Agency.
33. Kodama, Yasuko (1945), Liaison Committee for Northern Territorial Reversion Movement Secretary-General, Northern Territories Issue Association.
34. Murata, Shozo, Northern Territories Issue Association Secretary-General, Management & Coordination Agency.
35. Oya, Haruyoshi, Nemuro City Mayor, Hokkaido.
36. Suetsugu, Ichiro (1922), Study Group on Security Issues Secretary-General, Organizer of Japan-Soviet Specialists Conferences.

3. Political Parties

a) Liberal-Democratic Party

37. Akagi, Munenori (1904), H.R., Komoto faction, Japan-Soviet Friendship Association President, (JDA Director-General, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries).
38. Hatoyama, Ichiro (1918), H.C., son of Hatoyama Ichiro, Japan-Soviet Parliamentary Friendship Association Vice-President, (Foreign Minister).
39. Horie, Masao (1915), House of Councillors (H.C.), Tanaka faction, Japan Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) Vice-Chairman, (Ground Self Defense Force General & Chiefs of Staff Vice-Chairman).
40. Kato, Koichi (1939), H.R., Miyazawa faction (*Kōchi kai*), LDP Policy Research Council First Deputy Chairman, (JDA Director-General).
- 41.* Machimura, Kingo (1900), Union for the Northern Territories Reversion (Sapporo) President, (H.R., H.C., Hokkaido Governor).
- 42.* Shiina, Motoo (1930), H.R., H.R. Security Committee.
43. Utsunomiya, Tokuma (1906), H.C. *Shinsei* Club President, Japan-China Association President, Utsunomiya Disarmament Research Institute.

b) Japan Socialist Party

- 44. Maruyama, Hiroyuki, Central Executive Committee's Secretariat.
- 45.* Matsumae, Shigeyoshi (1901), (H.R.), Japan Cultural Association President, Tokai University President.
- 46.* Yokomichi, Takahiro (1941), (H.R.), Hokkaido Governor.

c) Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō)

- 47. Watanabe, Ichiro (1931), H.R., Party Central Executive Committee.

d) Democratic-Socialist Party

- 48. Ouchi, Keigo (1930), Party Secretary-General, (H.R.).
- 49. Ozawa, Sadataka (1916), H.R. Party Parliamentary Affairs Committee Chairman.

e) Japan Communist Party

- 50. Nishiguchi, Hikaru, International Affairs Department, Party Central Committee.

4. Business Community

a) Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations)

- 51. Anonymous.
- 52. Anonymous.
- 53. Kimbara, Kazuyuki (1956), International Economic Affairs Department Staff Economist (Economic Cooperation Department).

b) Private Companies

- 54. Kawai, Ryoichi (1917), Komatsu Ltd. President, Japanese Economic Mission to the Soviet Union Delegation Head (1986).

- 55. Kurosawa, Shinsuke, Komatsu Ltd. U.S.S.R. & East Europe Department Overseas Division Sales Manager, (Moscow Branch).
- 56. Onda, Hisao, Tsuruga Women's Junior College Associate Professor (Sumitomo U.S.S.R. & East Europe Department's Moscow Branch Sales Manager).

5. Academic Circles

- 57.* Eto, Jun (1932), Tokyo Institute of Technology Professor (Comparative Literature).
- 58. Eto, Shinkichi (1923), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor (International Relations), University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus, RIPS Director, Japan Peace Research Group (JPRG).
- 59.* Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi (1941), Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center Professor (Strategic Studies).
- 60.* Hosoya, Chihiro (1920), International University Vice-President, Hitotsubashi University Professor Emeritus (International Law and International Relations), JPRG.
- 61. Ito, Kenichi (1938), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Tokyo Representative, (MFA Russian Service).
- 62.* Kikuchi, Masanori (1930), University of Tokyo Professor (Russian History).
- 63. Kimura, Hiroshi (1936), Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center Director and Professor (Political Science), RIPS Research Associate.
- 64.* Kosaka, Masataka (1934), Kyoto University Professor (International Politics), IISS (London) Director, RIPS Director-General.
- 65. Minagawa, Shugo (1940), Nanzan University Professor (Soviet Domestic Politics).
- 66.* Mochizuki, Kiichi, Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center Professor (Soviet Economy), (Director)
- 67. Mushakoji, Kinhide (1929), United Nations University (Tokyo) Vice-Rector, (Sophia University Professor), JPRG.

- 68.* Nagai, Yonosuke (1924), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor, (Tokyo Institute of Technology Professor) (International Politics).
- 69. Nakagawa, Yatsuhiko (1945), Tsukuba University Associate Professor (Political Science and Strategic Studies).
- 70. Nishimura, Fumio, to be Shizuoka Prefecture Women's University Professor (Soviet Sociology), (JIIA Editor for *USSR Study*).
- 71. Sato, Seizaburo (1932), University of Tokyo Professor (Japanese Politics), RIPS Director and Research Associate.
- 72.* Shimizu, Hayao (1935-1986), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Professor (Russian Studies).
- 73.* Shimizu, Ikutaro (1907), Shimizu Research Institute, (Gakushuin University Professor) (Sociology).
- 74. Teratani, Hiromi (1937), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor (Soviet Sociology).
- 75. Tsujimura, Akira (1926), to be Shizuoka Prefecture Women University Rector, University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus (Sociology).
- 76.* Yano, Toru (1936), Kyoto University Southeast Asia Research Center Professor (International Politics), RIPS Research Associate.

6. **Mass Media**

a) **Asahi Shimbun**

- 77. Chuma, Kiyofuku, Editorial Writer.
- 78. Shirai, Hisaya, Editorial Writer, Senior Staff Correspondent, (Correspondent to Moscow).

b) **Mainichi Shimbun**

- 79. Hirano, Hiroshi, Deputy Executive-General, (Foreign Correspondents Department Director-General, Correspondent to Moscow).

c) *Sankei Shimbun*

80. Sawa, Hidetake, Foreign News Section, (Correspondent to Moscow).

d) *Yomiuri Shimbun*

- 81.* Otsuki, Jinichi, JIIS Researcher.

e) *NHK*

82. Yoshinari, Taishi, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Lecturer, (Moscow Branch Director-General),

f) *Others*

83. Isoda, Sadaaki, *Jiji* News Service, Political Department Deputy Director-General, (Correspondent to Moscow).
84. Matsumura, Tadauyuki, *Nippon* Network Corporation (NTV) Cultural Projects, (Correspondent to Moscow).
85. Sakai, Kosuku, *Hokkaido Shimbun*, Foreign News Section Press, (Correspondent to Moscow).
86. Takahashi, Minoru, *Kyodo* News Service, Editorial Writer, (International Bureau Director-General, Correspondent to Moscow).

7. Japan-Soviet Friendship Associations

- (37. Akagi, Munenori, Japan-Soviet Friendship Association President.)
- 87.* Hoshino, Takeshi, Japan-Soviet Society Secretary-General.
- (45. Matsumae, Shigeyoshi, Japan Cultural Association President.)
88. Nakachi, Aki, Japan-Soviet Exchange Society Secretary-General.
89. Yochi, Tsuyoshi, Japan-Soviet Exchange Society Auditor.

**Appendix IV. Draft of the Japan-Soviet
 Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation
 Treaty Proposed by the Soviet Union**

[unilaterally released by the Soviet Union]

Preamble

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, seeking to promote the consolidation of peace and security in the Far East, in the Pacific basin and throughout the world;

Convinced that peaceful cooperation between both states on the basis of the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter accords with the aspirations of the Soviet and Japanese peoples, the broad interests of international peace;

Guided by the desire fully to overcome the elements of estrangement and distrust in their mutual relations, engendered in the past;

Prompted by solicitude for creating an atmosphere of good-neighborhood and goodwill between both countries;

Reaffirming their intention to continue talks on the conclusion of a peace treaty;

Desiring to express in contractual form their resolve to create a firm and long-term foundation for the development of all-round cooperation between them, above all, in the political sphere, and also in the sphere of the economy, science, technology and culture;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan regard the maintenance of peace, extension and strengthening of relaxation of tension and strengthening of international security as one of the main aims of their policy.

They express a desire to exert efforts for the consolidation of universal peace on the Asian Continent, in the Pacific basin and throughout the world.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake in their mutual relations to refrain from the threat of force or its use.

The high contracting parties shall develop and strengthen relations of good-neighborhood and mutually-advantageous cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

Article 3

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan undertake not to allow the use of their territories for any actions, which could prejudice the security of the other party.

Article 4

The high contracting parties undertake to refrain from any actions encouraging any third party to take aggressive actions against either of them.

Article 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall maintain and widen regular contacts and consultations on important international issues concerning the interests of both states through meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen and through diplomatic channels.

Should a situation arise, which, in the opinion of both sides is dangerous for maintaining peace, or if peace is violated, the sides shall immediately contact each other with the aim of exchanging views on the question of what can be done for improving the situation.

Article 6

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan declare their determination to continue efforts for ending the arms race, of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and attaining general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Article 7

Considering trade relations to be an important and necessary element of strengthening bilateral relations and attaching great significance to economic cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the parties shall actively promote the growth of such relations, contribute to cooperation between the appropriate organizations and enterprises of both countries and to concluding appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

Article 8

Attaching great significance to scientific and technical cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the parties will promote in every way possible an expansion of mutually beneficial and all-round cooperation in these fields on the basis of the treaties and agreements, which exist or will be concluded between them.

Article 9

Being interested in the preservation and rational use of biological resources of the world ocean, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall continue

broadening cooperation in this field on the basis of the appropriate agreements and with due regard for the legislation of the parties.

Article 10

The high contracting parties shall encourage the development of relations between government institutions and public organizations in the field of science, arts, education, television, radio, and sports, contributing to a mutual enrichment of achievements in these fields, to strengthening the feeling of respect and friendliness of the peoples of those countries for each other.

Article 11

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall strive that the relations and cooperation between them in all the above listed fields and any other fields of mutual interests be built on a durable and long-term basis. With this aim in view, the parties shall establish, where it is deemed advisable, joint commissions, or other joint bodies.

Article 12

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan do not claim and do not recognize anyone's claims to any special rights to advantages in world affairs, including

claims to domination in Asia and in the area of the Far East.

Article 13

This treaty shall not affect the bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded earlier by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, and is not directed against any third country.

Article 14

This treaty shall be subject to ratification and enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification to be done in the city of _____ done at _____ on _____ in two copies, each in the Russian and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

For Japan:

Sources: *Tass*, February 23, 1978 and *Pravda*, February 24, 1978, as translated in *Soviet Review*, March 16, 1978, pp. 46-48, as quoted in Rajendra Kuma Jain, *The USSR and Japan: 1945-1980*, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981, pp. 332-336.

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1. Sources in English

a) Books

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Stephan, John J., *The Kurile Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontiers in the Pacific*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.

Stoessinger, John G., *Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America*, New York: Random House, 3rd ed., 1981.
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