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STURGES, PERRY MACKAY
SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:
CELESTIN BOUGLE AND THE DURKHEIM SCHOOL.
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PH.D., 1978

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SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:
CELESTIN BOUGLE AND THE DURKHEIM SCHOOL

by

PERRY M. STURGES

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Political
Science in partial fulfillment
of the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University
of New York.

1978

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:
CÉLESTIN BOUGLÉ AND THE DURKHEIM SCHOOL

by

Perry M. Sturges

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It is the argument of this dissertation that the sociological theory elaborated by Émile Durkheim during the twenty-five years preceding the First World War had its roots in the political and social aspirations of a wide spectrum of French society after 1870. This movement comprised elements of all classes, though it had its strongest base in those parts of the society directly involved in, or concerned for the social and political consequences of modern industry and science.

Célestin Bouglé was the most politically oriented of the group which clustered around Durkheim, a group composed for the most part of young intellectuals from lower-middle-class or minority group backgrounds. These men, urged on by Durkheim's own conception of the political implications of his sociology, saw themselves not only as the philosophers of this movement, but also as political activists whose task it was to unify the movement by giving it a solid ideological base. The effort to gain control of the education establishment was a logical extension of these goals.

Bouglé, in particular, represents an important aspect of the effort to weld a cohesive coalition capable of exercising political power.

Durkheim's social theory appeared as a consequence of a need felt throughout Western nations to describe adequately an emerging industrial society. But what is revealed through Bouglé's work is the ideological aspect of a theory which sought to discredit both Right and Left in the scientific arena they had chosen. In a century during which science seemed to many to hold the key to all human concerns, liberalism had been anchored in the methodological individualism of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham and Mill, or in the idealism of T.H. Green. By the end of the century, a variety of anthropological and biological theories were providing models and arguments for the Right; and on the Left, Proudhon and Marx had both contributed theories of history which provided a basis for syndicalism and socialism. The survival of liberalism in some progressive form required the construction of an adequate sociology, and a political ideology capable of confronting the challenge.

Bouglé's work is clearly illustrative of the political role which Durkheim's theory played in the ideological struggles which characterized the pre-World War I in France. In a series of books and articles Bouglé attacked the "science" of the elitists, the social darwinism of the classical liberals, and the sociology of the Marxists. All the while he staunchly defended Durkheim's theory against a barrage of criticism, while making modifications designed to attract a wider range of progressive liberals and liberal socialists. In two major studies he argued both the inevitability of egalitarianism and the powerful role played by ideas as obstacles to sociological processes. While pressing, with Durkheim, for the importance of intermediary associations and functional representation, he balked at abandoning the traditional representation

of the individual. Finally, Bouglé reiterated the necessity of a religion which celebrated the individual and provided the constraints necessary for the realization of the potential of each member of society.

This study of Bouglé's work reveals some of the major contributions made by Durkheimians to an understanding of the modern industrial state. At another level, it reveals the necessarily ideological component of all social theory, and illustrates the ways in which theory must be modified to meet the needs of a particular social and political context.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to thank my advisor, Professor Melvin Richter, and my reader, Professor Bernard Brown for their challenging help and their unfailing confidence in me during the preparation of this dissertation.

I should also like to thank Mme. Jeanne Bouglé who provided me access to her father's correspondence. She spent many hours in her home giving me insights into his personality and work, and made it possible for me to talk with her father's colleagues and students.

Lastly, my deepest appreciation goes to Ann Mari Buitrago, Michael Speer, Kevin Cassidy and Professor Ben Rivlin, without whose support and help this dissertation would never have been written.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>An S</u>	<u>Annales sociologiques</u>
<u>AS</u>	<u>Année sociologique</u>
<u>ASR</u>	<u>American Sociological Review</u>
<u>BSFP</u>	<u>Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie</u>
<u>CIS</u>	<u>Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie</u>
<u>EJS</u>	<u>European Journal of Sociology</u>
<u>GR</u>	<u>Grande Revue</u>
<u>RB</u>	<u>Revue Bleue</u>
<u>RFS</u>	<u>Revue française de sociologie</u>
<u>RIE</u>	<u>Revue internationale de l'enseignement</u>
<u>RMM</u>	<u>Revue de métaphysique et de morale</u>
<u>RP</u>	<u>Revue philosophique</u>
<u>RS</u>	<u>Revue Socialiste</u>
<u>REP</u>	<u>Revue d'économie politique</u>
<u>RPL</u>	<u>Revue politique et littéraire</u>
<u>RPP</u>	<u>Revue Politique et Parlementaire</u>
<u>RSH</u>	<u>Revue de synthèse historique</u>
<u>REFF</u>	<u>Revue de l'enseignement français hors de France</u>
<u>R Mois</u>	<u>Revue du Mois</u>
<u>R Par</u>	<u>Revue de Paris</u>
<u>R Ped</u>	<u>Revue Pédagogique</u>
<u>SR</u>	<u>Sociological Review</u>

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Third Republic in France was born of the defeat at Sedan in 1870, and died with the fall of Paris in 1940. That period represents not only the life-span of a constitutional regime; it represents a period of crisis for the liberal state in western society. Britain, the "dominions," Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States were the only liberal-democratic states which emerged intact; but even they underwent severe stresses with which, at times, they appeared unable to cope.

To an important degree, the ability of liberal societies to cope with the ideological challenges generated by a period of rapid social and economic change was dependent upon the emergence of both a class and an ideology capable of instituting, and justifying, major reforms in political and social structures. Classical liberal theory, both political and economic, had its origin in societies very different from those undergoing rapid industrialization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century societies, based on agriculture and commerce, were in the process of becoming what is now loosely

called "the modern industrial state." The transition was marked by advancing technology, mass production, and the emergence of an increasingly vociferous working class. In the course of this evolution, new (and old) ideologies challenged the relevance of the models advanced by Locke, Rousseau and Condorcet, and claimed to provide cures for a variety of evils with which they taxed the liberal-capitalist system. Disenchantment with the optimism of Locke, Bentham and Mill was profound both among those on the left who took "freedom" to mean exploitation, and among those on the right who either regretted the past, or resented the arrogance of the working class. The disenchantment of both the dispossessed and the excluded gave rise, in most western societies, to attacks on the foundations of the existing social order, and upon the various strains of liberal political theory which had been advanced to justify it. These attacks became, in many instances, so powerful that the liberal regime could not survive; and in France, in fact, the Second Republic did not long survive the revolution that had given it birth.

Under these conditions, it is only natural that those political, social and economic groups which identified most strongly with the liberal republic should react to the

challenges which confronted them by advancing theoretical justifications for the regimes they had set up.

Since men differ in their assessment of the dangers of the challenging groups, those in power may well differ on the advisability of taking a "hard line" or of making concessions; and the latter may follow two rather different paths. They may, without abandoning certain fundamental postulates of the older theory, reword the conclusions, as did John Stuart Mill, in order to arrive at a broader notion of liberty and representation. Or they may, as is the case of Emile Durkheim, completely rebuild the theory on new postulates which are more defensible empirically. One of the chief determinants of the choice lies, I suspect, in the nature and grounds of the challenges. For, as Karl Mannheim points out, the initiative is usually held by the challengers who take advantage of new scholarship or new science in order to build an effective case.¹ The response of those in power must, if it is to be effective, be cast in the language and idiom of the challengers. If the latter are to be disarmed rather than repressed, the argument must be understood by them. This is particularly true in the modern society where the productive elements, so functionally interdependent, are in greater communication with one another

than before. Dissident groups must not only be made to doubt the truth of their own views, whether conservative or revolutionary; they must be encouraged to accept as at least ultimately rewarding the theory of the dominant political and social forces. And of equal importance, of course, the arguments of the latter must rally the forces under attack with a language that is convincing to them; it cannot give too much ground away as it reinforces its chief lines of defense.

The period between 1870 and 1940 in France constitutes a kind of laboratory for an exploration of the clash of social forces and ideas which have been the mark of the transition of western states to their modern form. Within this context, the sociological and political theory of Emile Durkheim represents the effort not only to defend the Republic, but also to understand the origins of liberal democracy and the future form towards which it was tending. In a larger sense he was trying to understand the emergence and nature of the modern industrial state.

Emile Durkheim's social theory has evoked a number of conflicting commentaries by those who have limited themselves to examination of his writings in terms of internal consistency, logic, and empirical validity. However, by asking another kind of question I believe it may be possible

to shed some light on at least a certain number of the problems that have confronted scholars. I am proposing that more attention be paid to the political, social and ideological context in which the theory appears. For Durkheim and his collaborators, sociology was not just a social science; it was a call to action. More than that, it was a justification for action, and an instrument in the hands of social reformers intent upon changing not only the underlying morale of French society, but its political and social institutions as well.

Célestin Bouglé

In order to gain some insight into the way in which Durkheim's social theory represented a response to an external social and political environment, I have chosen to examine the writings and political activities of Célestin Charles Alfred Bouglé, born in 1870, dead in 1940, one of the members of the group which Durkheim gathered at the turn of the century to launch the Année Sociologique.

As a collaborator on that journal, as a self-confessed disciple of Durkheim, and, as Georges Davy has put it, a life-long franc-tireur in the cause, Bouglé was, in many respects, Durkheim's alter ego. Forced to choose between the demands incumbent upon the scientist, and his messianic temperament, Durkheim confined himself--with the

notable exception of the Dreyfus Affair--to his responsibilities as sociologist and teacher. Bouglé, on the other hand, forced out of his lycée post in 1897 because of his activities on behalf of Dreyfus, devoted himself more and more to the task of realizing the reforms both he and Durkheim believed necessary for the survival and recovery of the French nation. This is not to say that other members of the group--Halbwachs, Simiand, Fauconnet and Mauss, for example--were less cognizant of the political implications of the sociology they embraced. But while they, like Durkheim, concentrated largely on the sociological task they had undertaken, Bouglé, abandoning early pure research, gave himself increasingly to the political struggle for reform. He fully subscribed to Durkheim's remark:

We believe that our research is not worth an hour's effort if it were to have only a speculative interest.²

It is important, at the outset, to clarify the distinction between theory and ideology which the title of this work implies. Dante Germino has argued that political theory is that activity pursued by Plato and Aristotle, which they called epistēmē politikē. This was

not knowledge aimed in the first instance at affecting human action for a practical purpose . . . Instead they sought to "observe" the activity of politics . . . While they were

about their business they created political theory--that peculiarly hybrid study which is speculative and practical at once, because it is a theoretical examination of a practical activity.³

In a like manner, Durkheim's social theory represents an attempt to apply the scientific method to the study of social phenomena. At the same time, as Durkheim made clear, it was related to the practical politics of his time; and it is precisely this aspect of his work which absorbed Bouglé's interest and led him to fashion out of key elements of Durkheim's theory a political ideology which Carl Friedrich has defined as an "action-related system . . . which unites a party or other group for effective participation in political life."⁴

It is, then, the purpose of this dissertation to explore the political implications, or the ideological aspect, of Durkheim's theory by examining the way in which Bouglé used Durkheim's work within the social and political context of his time. In doing so, Bouglé never departed from a fundamental agreement with Durkheim. Bouglé felt that many modifications were necessary if Durkheim's social theory were to become an effective political instrument; but he never abandoned a belief in the methodological foundation of that sociology, or in the conclusions which

Durkheim drew concerning the general outlines of an emerging liberal and democratic society. In particular he emphasized the necessity of an underlying religion which must bind society together with a belief in the equality of man. As will become clear in the course of this study, Bouglé and Durkheim considered themselves to be close allies, and were clearly considered so by others, in particular, by their ideological enemies.

Bouglé concentrated on three tasks which were part and parcel of action sociale: first, the defense and enlargement of the ground won by Durkheim's earlier efforts to establish his sociology; second, the transformation of that sociology into an effective political instrument; third, the building of political influence in education, government, and professional associations.

Bouglé seems to have had a knack for the knight-errant role:

With a lucid and penetrating mind [Bouglé] excels in revealing the weak point in [other] doctrines, the spot where the structure is vague, or where metaphysics begins. He has a gift for expression which tightens up the argument, denounces sophistry, cuts through bombast, and which lands the decisive blow. In two articles he put "biological" sociology hors de combat, leaving a clear field for the new sociology.⁵

In the years around the turn of the century and until the war, he not only bore a heavy responsibility for work on the Année Sociologique, but he produced a stream of articles for the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, the Revue de Paris, and educational journals: darwinism, utilitarianism, biologism, psychologism and idealist historiography all came under attack.

Bouglé's own sociological research was directed not only toward reinforcing the theoretical and factual ground of the new sociology. Louis Dumont recently called his Essais sur le régime des castes "one of the classical works of French sociology."⁶ However, his work served a double purpose, for it was directed towards establishing the ground for political and social change. Bouglé used sociology to underline the inevitability of democracy, the emergence of the autonomous individual, and the necessity for new political and social institutions.

His studies of egalitarian values and Indian castes give evidence of Bouglé's early departures from Durkheim. His modifications tended to underline a greater complexity in the historical development of modern society than Durkheim's own pronouncements tended to admit. In addition, they pointed to a greater flexibility in interpreting the role of ideas and the individual conscience. He refused

to admit the gulf which, for Durkheim, separated the individual from society; and when he was not attacking Tarde for strategic reasons, Bouglé showed the extent he was prepared to agree with him, and with the German sociologist Simmel: he asserted that man can act to modify social forms.⁷ For Bouglé, the study was not only an implicit attack on Marxist determinism, but also a way of showing that progress is not automatic, that social forms can become frozen. As to Durkheim's own apparent dogmatism, Bouglé later explained that the rejection of psychological or biological explanations of "social facts" was to be explained by the fact that they were involved in

a meritorious effort to build sociology as an autonomous science [of which] the central principle [was]: social facts are sui generis.⁸

Bouglé felt both impelled personally, and freer to exploit the new science whose place he felt was assured. To this end he replaced expressions of "cause," unique, or sufficient, by alocutions such as "one of its conditions."⁹ He tended to underline an interdependent relationship of social forms and ideas. He appears to have had, very early, a sure sense of the political liabilities of Durkheim's theory in its more primitive positivist conception.

It is my central argument in this dissertation that Bouglé was engaged in rendering Durkheim's thought into a more effective instrument for the defense of a progressive liberalism against the laissez-faire ideologists on the one hand, and a pseudo-scientific marxism on the other. As Jean Benrubi has remarked, "Bouglé's sociology approaches political action."¹⁰

Célestin Bouglé was not content merely to defend a science or advance a political theory. Change could only be achieved through direct social and political action.¹¹ Durkheim himself, on his return from Germany in 1887 had written several articles in which he made clear that there must be an educational effort to emphasize the importance, for the French, of a sense of patriotism. Bouglé understood that goal as national strength and unity. But by "unity" they did not mean just any kind; and most particularly they rejected the goal of the Catholic and traditional right. What he and Durkheim had in mind was a radical ideological reform of liberal thought: first, among intellectual and political elites; but ultimately (and this was of surpassing importance to Bouglé) to the nation as a whole. It has been noted by commentators that Durkheim was obsessed by the themes of "differentiation" and "opposition."

Bouglé, born in 1870, thirteen years after Durkheim confessed that he, too, had been "haunted by the problem of national renewal."¹²

For Bouglé, social action involved a life-long effort at convincing people, at whatever level he encountered them, of the correctness of his view. And so he wrote enormously, varying his style to suit his audience: what he wrote for the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale appeared very differently in La Dépêche. The habit of speaking publicly, which he acquired during the Dreyfus controversy, continued through his life. Along with a number of other young professors, he took part in the organization of Universités Populaires which, before the first war, marked the zenith of the liberal reformers' attempts to win over the working classes to their cause. In addition, Bouglé joined and was active in organizations whose activities were directed toward a variety of liberal, reformist goals. The most important were the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, the Ligue de l'Enseignement, l'Union pour la Vérité, and Paix par le Droit.

Since the political task involved nothing less than the reeducation of a whole society, it is hardly surprising that both Durkheim and Bouglé led a concerted effort to gain

the kind of influence in the educational system which would permit, and require the teaching of the new morale in all the schools of the nation. Bouglé, who taught at the Sorbonne from 1907 until 1927, devoted himself to the Ecole Normale Supérieure; he established the Centre de Documentation Sociale there in 1920; and he became Directeur-Adjoint of that prestigious school in 1927, Directeur in 1935. These posts involved him directly with the highest policy-making departments of the government for education. He played a major role in the introduction of Durkheim's sociology in the Ecoles Normales d'Instituteurs where the primary school teachers were trained, and in the schools, both primary and secondary, as part of the curriculum. That this process was part of a movement is illustrated by the fact that two of his closest friends, classmates at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, held major administrative posts: Paul Lapie had become Director of Primary Education in 1909; Dominique Parodi was an inspector-general.

Education was at the very core of durkheimian thinking. Bouglé considered himself first, a moralist, and then a sociologist. With a passionate aversion to violence, Bouglé was convinced that only through a revolutionized system of education could a new, liberal consensus be built.

As Dürkheim had written,

. . . each society generates a certain ideal for man, an ideal of what he must be intellectually, physically, and morally; and this ideal, to a certain degree, is the same for all citizens. . . . Society cannot survive unless there exists among its members a certain degree of homogeneity.¹³

Quite clearly, however, durkheimians never conceived of this process as merely passing on traditional values:

If the society has arrived at a degree of development in which the old divisions into castes or classes can no longer survive, it will prescribe an education more congruous with its new basis.¹⁴

The lay teacher, Durkheim concludes,

. . . is but an organic part of the great person which stands above him: society.¹⁵

It was in terms of this prescription that Bouglé's life was patterned.

Political action, for Bouglé, involved much more than the education of every Frenchman he could reach by word or in print. It involved contributing to the creation of a political movement or party dedicated to winning power and implementing necessary reforms. Throughout his life he was an active member of the Radical Party. He worked on the assumption that the key to advancement of a progressive liberalism (or as he sometimes called it a liberal socialism) lay in an alliance of the intellectual leadership of the Radical and Socialist parties. Since that alliance

depended, he thought, at the very least, on a reconciliation of the major strands of liberal and socialist thought, it becomes evident that Bouglé's modifications of Durkheim are related to an effort to form such an alliance. Methodological differences could not be allowed to obscure common goals.

The Interpretation of Durkheim's Social Theory

While it is not a central concern of this study to explore durkheimian sociology qua sociology, an examination of Bouglé's work can shed light on issues which have been controversial in the interpretation of Durkheim's theory. Arguments have arisen not only over the political stance that is implied by the theory, but also over the validity of the central concepts and method.

Interest in Emile Durkheim as a sociologist and political theorist has undergone a notable revival in recent years both in France and in the United States. The result of this scholarly interest has been the emergence of widely differing interpretations of Durkheim's impact on French intellectual and political life, as well as on political philosophy in general. Furthermore, it has produced sharp disagreement on the ideological aspects of his social theory, and on the meaning and coherence of a number of concepts that are central to his thinking.

The problem of Durkheim's influence on French politics is starkly revealed by an examination of some of the major writers on the Third Republic. Roy Pierce, for example, in his Contemporary French Political Thought, has nothing to say about the eminent sociologist. In Pierce's estimation, the dominant currents of political thought in France, between the end of the First World War and the beginning of the depression were:

. . . a special form of liberalism, expressed and typified by the writings of Alain; a special form of traditionalism, expressed and typified by the writings of Charles Maurras; and Marxism, expressed in the divergent and rival forms of communism and socialism.¹⁶

David Thompson,¹⁷ Edward Meade Earle and his numerous collaborators,¹⁸ and Denis Brogan¹⁹ all omit virtually any reference to Durkheim. Writers on European liberalism like de Ruggiero²⁰ and Sidorsky²¹ do not appear to consider that Durkheim's theoretical system forms any part of liberal theory in France, much less in a wider sense.

On the other hand, Paul Nizan, in The Watchdogs,²² which appeared in the middle thirties, wrote as follows:

Thus Durkheim, in death, has managed to complete the task he had undertaken during his lifetime: the consolidation of the intellectual hegemony of the bourgeoisie. So much learning, so much critical analysis, so much documentation, converted into propaganda. Durkheim's success, in fact, can be directly attributed to the moral propaganda his

writings contain; that is, to the ideological ammunition for the defense of the status quo which he was the first to produce with such efficiency.²³

Nizan thus credited Durkheim and his collaborators with a major theoretical role in providing the Third Republic with an intellectual underpinning. He called them "this new clergy"²⁴ and attributed their success to the capture of the educational system, in which the University had become "the spiritual lever of the State."²⁵

Sheldon Wolin,²⁶ from a very different point of view, depicts Durkheim as having played a major role in the decline of political philosophy. Following Rousseau, de Maistre, Bonald and St. Simon, Durkheim's sociology further contributed to the "sublimation of politics" by its hostility (as Wolin sees it) to individualism, and by the apotheosis of "society." For both Nizan and Wolin, Durkheim is cast as a devil, but, for all that, a tremendously influential one.

Speculations and assertions concerning the ideological nature of Durkheim's theory confront one another from as great extremes as do opinions on its impact. On the one hand there are those who consign Durkheim to the category of "conservative," emphasizing the concerns for community, consensus, order, and solidarity. Robert Nisbet declares that

Durkheim shares with Freud a large part of the responsibility for turning contemporary social thought from the rationalist categories of volition, will, and individual consciousness to aspects which are . . . non-volitional and non-rational.²⁷

John Rex, in Discovering Sociology, believes that Durkheim's conservatism can best be understood as a reaction both to the ancien régime and the threat of proletarian insurrections.²⁸ The Catholic Church, its domination of the nineteenth century, and the Paris Commune would appear to be the most influential factors in the evolution of a conservative social philosophy which remains, for Rex, "ultimately completely deterministic"²⁹ in spite of Parsons' arguments to the contrary.³⁰ Wolin, emphasizing Durkheim's close relationship to de Maistre and Bonald, sees their social theory as a response to social disorder and anomie "which appeared a constant threat long after the Reign of Terror and Jacobinism had been forgotten."³¹ Wolin describes Durkheim as having "drawn inspiration from the medieval system of guilds . . . [and as having] pointed approvingly at the moral solidarity and the restraints on acquisitiveness that prevailed."³² For Wolin, Durkheim has turned individual man into a functional cog in the collective machine of society.

Other writers have emphasized an essentially nationalistic facet of Durkheim's theories. Harry Alpert, in his 1939

study,³³ called attention to Durkheim's visit to Germany which he undertook after receiving his agrégation. Durkheim returned convinced that the regeneration of the defeated nation could only occur if based on a national morale supported and justified by a science of society.

At the same time Alpert, and more recently Steven Lukes,³⁴ emphasize the closeness of Durkheim's relationship to Jaurès and Lucien Herr. Terry Clark, discussing the Durkheim circle, remarks that "another bond uniting them still further was that of Socialism."³⁵ J.C. Filloux, in his introduction to La Science sociale et l'action emphasizes, however, that if Durkheim says that modern society implies a socialist future

he is thinking not of collectivism, but rather a democratic socialism inspired by Saint-Simon . . . and benefiting by all the knowledge brought by sociology.³⁶

Raymond Aron seeks to explain Durkheim's thought by pointing to an intellectual climate that pervaded the 19th century: the search for ways to come to grips with the decline of religion as a source of constraint. As a French Jew, son of a rabbi but himself an agnostic, Durkheim's central concern was the establishment of a moral system capable of assuming the function formerly served by religious faith.³⁷

While this study cannot become directly involved in these controversies, I believe that by concentrating on the way Durkheim's theory was modified and put to use by Bouglé in the political arena, it will be possible to see more clearly its historical importance, and to understand more clearly just what Durkheim was recommending for western states, and particularly for France, in a period of transition from older, traditional forms to the modern, secular and industrial state. Bouglé's work, both theoretical and practical, can go a long way toward showing the sterility of arguments over Durkheim's "fascist" or "revolutionary" tendencies.

The Impact of the Durkheim School

In addition to providing insight into many methodological and conceptual problems in Durkheim's social theory, the study of Célestin Bouglé's work is important for a third reason: through his political activity we shall be able to observe the complex process of transforming a body of political theory into an active political force, and we will be better able to evaluate both the goals of the Durkheim school, and its success, both in the short and long run, in implementing them. Raymond Aron has remarked that "Durkheim's version of socialism had the ill-fortune to be rejected by

liberals and socialists alike."³⁸ Yet both Durkheim and Bouglé were highly respected among a wide reformist group of political leaders that included Herriot and Jaurès; Bouglé speaks often of "building a bridge" between radicals and socialists, and he was personally entranced by the figure of the socialist leader, whom he took to be a reformist liberal at heart. But the ties between these two parties, which seemed to hold so much promise before 1906, foundered on the intransigence of Clemenceau and Briand toward working-class demands. Yet David Thomson's tendency to see the fall of the Republic as deriving from a failure to meet these demands requires reassessment.³⁹

Bouglé's own sense of the failure to achieve a synthesis of democracy and socialism was acute in the years immediately preceding the Great War. This apparent failure was certainly not unrelated to the reception which Durkheim's theory was accorded by the French intellectual elites. They treated it politely, as a hypothesis worthy of consideration, but not sufficiently convincing to displace the positions held by philosophers and historians like Boutroux, Brunschvicg, Halévy, Coulanges, Seignobos and Rauh who maintained the metaphysical traditions of Kant and Renouvier, Maine de Biran and Lachelier. Even Bouglé's closest friends,

Elie Halévy, Paul Lapie and Dominique Parodi, while sympathetic to sociology as a fecund source of knowledge, vigorously rejected its philosophical pretensions. In the postwar years other schools of sociology launched strong attacks on the durkheimians, as had Tarde in the early 1900's. On the right and left there was a crescendo of criticism during the '20's and '30's.

The failure of the durkheimians to achieve a more permanent alliance of Radicals and Socialists in the party system must also be evaluated in terms of the continuing divisions within French society. The influence of rural attitudes, expressed by Alain's brand of liberalism, progressively dominated the Radical-Socialist Party; and the working class at the same time forced Jaurès to take more intransigent positions than he would have liked.

However, the influence both of Durkheim's social theory and of the political activism of his collaborators is underlined by the attacks launched upon them from every side. The survival of the Republic owed much to this small but dedicated base. By taking a longer view which extends to the present, there is much to suggest that the influence of Durkheim and his school has been profound.

Both Durkheim and Bouglé were clearly attempting to

come to grips with the nature and development of the modern industrial state. They were facing the crucial question of whether such a state, whose evolution they argued was natural, could be liberal and democratic, and at the same time could become socialist with regard to property relations. For Durkheim and Bouglé the Republic was the structural embodiment of an evolutionary process which they believed required the reconciliation of seemingly disparate values that had emerged over a period of several hundred years: centralized direction by public authority must be combined with the greatest feasible autonomy of the individual within a civic culture which consecrated the individual in terms of potential, and acted as a powerful moral force permeating political and economic structures.

If this is a correct interpretation of their aims, then there is considerable evidence to suggest that the conclusions which they reached have been embodied, in France, at least, in certain features of the contemporary political and economic system.

The salient features of the modern French state, in the view of Andrew Shonfield,⁴⁰ are both ideological and structural. He notes particularly a conscious dedication to the wider diffusion of prosperity, the conscious pursuit

of full employment, a preoccupation with social welfare, and the imposition of predictability on the economy. To achieve these goals, long-range planning, carried out by those who can bring an intellectual coherence to the politico-economic system, has been gradually, if haltingly institutionalized. In addition to the clearly dynamic state role which Bertrand de Jouvenel sees as the mark of a "telocracy," the role of intermediary associations has been institutionalized in the commissions de modernisation.⁴¹

The tension between planning and democracy continues to exist, and it is characteristic, in modern society, of the problem with which Durkheim and Bouglé⁴² struggled in their efforts to reconcile the autonomy of the individual, and the historical necessity of a rationalized, consensual community dedicated to humanist values. The increased involvement of parliamentary institutions in the planning process would seem to be a fulfillment of Bouglé's insistence that the modern state, while corporatist in some respects, must, if it is not to abandon its liberal heritage, retain the notion of the claims of each individual as a member of the larger community.

Although many of the features of the contemporary state did not appear until after the second world war,

substantial progress was made by those, like Bouglé and his friend Paul Lapie, in reform of the educational system. The Lois Fondamentales, passed between 1879 and 1889, laid the groundwork for a secular education system. After 1882 all French children were required to attend school until the age of 13. The lycée, however, remained the preserve of those capable of paying for it until after the second world war. Ecoles normales for the training of primary teachers were founded at Fontenay and St. Cloud in 1880.

The impulse for the movement toward secular education came, to an important degree, from Protestant idealists like Ferry, Buisson, Pécaut, and Steeg. Louis Liard's invitation to Durkheim in 1887 to occupy a chair of education at the University of Bordeaux represented the joining of two forces that continued to be closely related throughout Bouglé's life. That their philosophical premises were very different is nowhere more clear than in Buisson's book La Foi laïque, for which Bouglé wrote an introduction, or in Émile Boutroux' contribution to Les Démocraties modernes. But alliance was possible because their goals were similar. Antoine Prost describes the guiding principle of the school system as

massively patriotic until 1914: love France, detest war; condemn chauvinism and militarism; praise the defensive war; i.e. a "just" patriotism.⁴²

Durkheim was not someone to make concessions to any other body of thought, most particularly if it were a frank idealism. Bouglé, however, who found himself more directly involved in political life, sought to modify durkheimian concepts in an effort to create a more effective alliance with Protestants and socialists. He was not loath to encourage a relationship with Bergson, who had been anathema to Durkheim.

But by 1923 a reaction was setting in against the further expansion of the teaching of sociology in the school system. Bergson expressed the feelings of the philosophical community which felt that "sociologism" had to be checked:

No matter how precise the research of someone like Durkheim is, I am persuaded that his conception of the relationship between religion, on the one hand, and society and a morale system [morale] on the other, is nothing more or less than philosophy. . . . What increases the danger [of teaching Durkheim's "philosophy" to untrained minds] is that one slips imperceptibly from precise, scientific sociological research to a certain way of seeing social reality . . . which is far from having the same scientific character and presenting the same degree of certainty.⁴³

However, the main outlines of a new, secular school system were established. If hopes embodied in the universités populaires were not fulfilled, one of the institutions necessary to the needs of the modern state was in place before the second world war. During the inter-war

period the attacks upon the schools as breeders of crime and immorality betrayed the desperation of a lost cause.

Thesis and Outline of the Study

The central thesis of this study may be summed up in the following three propositions:

1. Célestin Bouglé represents an important aspect of Durkheim's social theory. The former's work is a continuation of the intention to establish an autonomous science of society; beyond that, he is a clear example of the messianic impulse in Durkheim to social and political action. Bouglé's writing and political activities, in turn, shed light on the ideological nature of the theory.

2. Durkheim's social theory, as interpreted, modified and extended by Célestin Bouglé, is revealed as neither revolutionary nor conservative; in fact, it seems clear that Durkheim and Bouglé sought to undermine and eliminate the pervasive influence of that brand of liberalism so often said to be summed up in the writings of Alain. In a scientific age, they sought to provide liberal theory with a positivist foundation far more capable than metaphysics not only of defending a progressive liberalism against its ideological opponents, but also of providing a blueprint for understanding a society whose social structures had

changed radically from those which characterized France at the time of the Revolution. Bouglé emphasized, in particular, the value and necessity of intellectual freedom. The universités populaires were, he said,

outposts to conquer and hold a new terrain for the life of the mind, threatened and pursued by the material organization of our civilization. . . .⁴⁴

Bouglé's work reveals, furthermore, the sense in which Durkheim's social theory was "socialist" in its insistence on the social nature of man and his institutions, and "conservative" in its emphasis upon the evolutionary character of that nature and those institutions. The movement that Bouglé represented was the peculiarly French version of a process that has taken place sooner or later in one form or another in western industrializing societies. When confronted by traditionalists on the one hand and revolutionaries on the other, those with the greatest stake in the emerging society have sought to transform older, individualist liberal thought by providing foundations for the defense of major values in a new context, and by rethinking the problem of institutional requirements in a new kind of society. In the course of this study it will become apparent, I think, that Bouglé was a bridge in an alliance of intellectuals, between the Protestant idealism of

Buisson, the socialist idealism of Jaurès and the positivism of the Durkheim school. Having similar goals, they sought to organize a political movement--a grand coalition of Radicals and Socialists.

Finally, there is no question that Bouglé emphasized the strongly nationalist component in Durkheim's theory. Nationalism was an extremely useful counterconcept against the Right. But it was also something deeper: it was the response of a generation to defeat and humiliation. Bouglé, however, tried to leave no doubt that nationalism, while the temporary sine qua non of social existence, was only a transitional stage in the human journey toward one world.

3. The impact of the Durkheim school of social theory was far from being as barren as historians like Brogan and Thomson imply. In fact, it may well be argued that Nizan's characterization of Durkheim's influence is close to the mark. The attacks upon Durkheim and his followers before the first world war suggest that it was this movement which was providing the major theoretical justification of the modern state so hated by the Right and the extreme Left. The failure to achieve a socially progressive alliance of Radicals and Socialists before the war, the immobilisme and conservatism which followed it

were severe disappointments to Bouglé. Yet the factors which account for the temporary and partial eclipse of durkheimian influence are not hard to find. Certain characteristics of the French experience with modernization tended to generate severe resistance to the entry of the working class into the political system. No less important was the resistance to Durkheim's sociology among the entrenched intelligentsia. The failure of the appeal to the working class is particularly clear, and is to be explained not only by the strength and appeal of the socialist parties, but also a basic distrust of middle-class appeals, and more particularly when the appeal laid such emphasis on the maintenance of a tradition. At the same time, many of the durkheimian prescriptions--both economic and political--appeared startlingly radical to the middle-class community.

Yet the failure to create a viable political movement before the first world war does not mean that a groundwork was not laid, even though some of the fruits of that effort were not to be seen until much later. An educational system was established. Bouglé's Centre de Documentation Sociale, which continued the tradition of Lucien Herr, played an important part in the formation of such men as

Georges Friedmann, Jean Stoetzel, Raymond Aron and Robert Marjolin. The Republic, in defense of which Durkheim and Bouglé had collaborated, survived the efforts of both Right and Left to overthrow it. The collapse of 1940 may be seen, with a little more perspective, to have been a temporary interruption in the formation of the French version of the modern secular and industrial state. This is the problem that Durkheim and Bouglé, perhaps earlier than anyone else, were trying to solve.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

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⁷C. Bouglé, Les Idées égalitaires (Paris, 1899), p. 239.

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¹³E. Durkheim, Education et sociologie (Paris, 1973), p. 50.

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- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 68.
- ¹⁶Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought (New York, 1966), p. 1.
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- ²⁴Ibid., p. 103.
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- ²⁸John Rex, Discovering Sociology (London, 1973), p. 92.
- ²⁹Ibid., p. 107.
- ³⁰Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York, 1949), Chapter X.
- ³¹Wolin, p. 366.
- ³²Ibid., p. 367.

³³Harry Alpert, Émile Durkheim and His Sociology (New York, 1939).

³⁴Steven Lukes, Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work (New York, 1973).

³⁵Terry Clark, "The Structure and Functions of a Research Institute," European Journal of Sociology, No. 9, p. 80.

³⁶J.C Filloux, Introduction to La Science sociale et L'ction (Paris, 1970), p. 43.

³⁷Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. II (New York, 1967), p. 5.

³⁸Aron, p. 37.

³⁹Thomson, p. 176.

⁴⁰Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York: 1965), pp. 121-150.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 231.

⁴²Antoine Prost, Histoire de l'enseignement en France 1800-1967 (Paris, 1968), p. 336.

⁴³Letter from Henri Bergson to Bouglé, n.d. (late '20's).

⁴⁴C. Bouglé, Vie spirituelle et action Sociale (Paris, 1902), p. 7.

CHAPTER II

IN DEFENSE OF SOCIOLOGY

Introduction: The sociological climate and Bouglé's identification with Émile Durkheim's sociology.

It was in the climate of defeat and liberation that modern French sociology was born. Out of the humiliation of Sedan, and the end of the Second Empire came a major shift in the social and political goals of a growing republican majority. In a recent study of the shifting values of instruction in the public school system between 1860 and 1965, Vivienne Isambert-Jamati has documented, between 1876 and 1885, a preponderant emphasis on "the common task of educating patriots and democrats."¹ It is hardly surprising that the impulse to emphasize the notion of solidarity both in philosophy and in science should have provided an atmosphere conducive to a Kantian revival (led, in particular, by Charles Renouvier) and to what Durkheim referred to as "chapter one of sociology": Alfred Espinas' Sociétés animales.² There, for the first time, the study of society had been confined to

the study of one social type in particular; then, within this type itself he distinguished between different classes and species, describing them with care, and from this painstaking observation of the facts he derived a number of laws, whose scope he

was careful to restrict to the special order of the phenomenon just studied.³

Durkheim was deeply affected also by what he found in Germany. While he strongly objected to Simon Deploige's characterization of him as influenced by German sociologists,⁴ he was impressed by the immense sociological activity in the nation whose superiority to France had been so apparent in 1870. Steven Lukes has summed up that experience:

He admired the German Universities for being "alive": there was a sense of community and corporate life, which contrasted favorably with the French "striving for individual distinction and originality." French philosophers worked apart as though they were alone in the world and as though philosophy were an art; in this respect they had much to learn from Germany.⁵

The most important conviction that Durkheim brought back from Germany was the necessity of reconstructing the French moral climate. For Durkheim, as for Espinas before him, sociology was the key to the solution of the problems of weakness and moral division which beset France.

There were also other "sociologies" which flourished during the early years of the Third Republic. Le Playists, who had found favor with the Emperor because of their "conservative Catholicism, praise of patriarchal society, and modern scientific methods"⁶ were understandably disadvantaged by the new republican atmosphere. But Paul de Rousiers, Henri de Tourville, Pierre Roux and Paul Bureau continued a tradition

which "glorified private enterprise."⁷ A number of these men taught at the newly-founded École Libre des Sciences Politiques with Bouglé's close friend Élie Halévy.

Other schools of some importance during these formative years were the statisticians and those whom Terry Clark has called "the international sociologists" because of their association with L'Institut International de Sociologie and its Revue Internationale de Sociologie. While the former group was represented in only one chaire at the University, it provided some important contributions to the work of Durkheim, Simiand and Halbwachs. The internationalists, including René Worms and Gabriel Tarde, though never constituting a "school," provided much of the most powerful methodological opposition to the durkheimians. Tarde, representing an individualism with which Durkheim was to continuously skirmish, had been engaged since the early years of the republic in what Steven Lukes has described as

a one man campaign against the various forms of biologism in sociology--Darwinian, organicism, transformism--that he found in the work of such writers as Spencer, Espinas, Worms, de Greef, Gumplowicz, Novikow, Lombroso, Lilienfeld and Roberty.⁸

Bouglé, as we shall see, was to take up the cudgel against those same theories; but while Bouglé was less adamant than Durkheim about the regions to which individualists like Tarde

should be assigned, he nevertheless took him to be an enemy of durkheimian sociology, though an honored one.⁹

It seems apparent that when Célestin Bouglé joined Durkheim in the task of building a sociology, there were already in the field a number of individuals and groups whose theories corresponded roughly with various political, social and ideological positions. A Catholic sociology was publicized by Simon Deploige and Georges Fonsegrive; methodological individualism was defended by Tarde, Palante, Espinas, Novikow and Roberty; conservative organicism found its publicist in Ammon and de la Pougé; and last but not least, Karl Marx was coming to be known in France, if only through the insistence of the socialist leader, Jules Guesde. The sociology of Émile Durkheim, soon labeled "sociologism" by its opponents, found the arena well represented by other sociological contenders representing the political and philosophical positions vis-a-vis the Republic.

The École Normale Supérieure was, in Bouglé's day, the most prestigious and exclusive educational institution in France.¹⁰ From the whole of France only about fifty places were filled each year from at least ten times as many applicants. Outstanding candidates often had to spend several additional years in the great Paris lycées before being admitted; and

even Émile Durkheim failed in his first effort to gain entry. Students spent three years at the school, the first in preparation of the licence, the third in preparation for the agrégation. Successful passage of the latter brought appointment to a lycée. Only the subsequent achievement of a doctorat-ès-lettres could make possible appointment to professorial rank in one of the universities.

Bouglé entered the École Normale Supérieure in 1890. There is no reference in his writing to those teachers under whom he studied, except for some uncomplimentary remarks on the Catholic philosopher Ollé-Laprune.

Bouglé was surrounded by classmates both ahead and behind him who were to be friends and associates throughout his life: Chartier, Halévy, Ruyssen, Brunschvicg, Berthelot, Blum, Parodi, Lapie, and Herriot. But the greatest influence on Bouglé and his generation was that of Emile Durkheim:

I was already at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, I believe, when his Sorbonne thesis on the Division of Social Labor burst upon us. It caused less scandal, doubtless, than that of Espinas on animal societies . . . But there was a lot of resistance. Spiritualism believed itself threatened once again. Boutroux, to whom the thesis was dedicated, could only accept with a grimace that demonstration of determinist behavior. . . . Paul Janet thumped the table and invoked the Lord. . . .

The appeal of Durkheim lay first in his attack upon two of the major intellectual currents of the day: mysticism, described by Bouglé as that approach to knowledge wherein "people enjoy putting their eyes out in order to see better"¹² and metaphysics, which he called "dilettantism":

Touch upon everything without going deeply into anything; on the pretext of a general culture, skim the surface of things and get out of difficulties by a trick, a pirouette. . . .¹³

Most importantly, for those times, Durkheim offered a generation athirst for some solid basis upon which to ground moral obligation, a concept which, in their divided nation, seemed so lacking:

If he paralyzed our youthful mania for constructing everything a priori, he offered us the means of avoiding another danger: microscopic studies. . . . Durkheim at least left us the hope of coordination; the discipline of sociology could appear to many as the intermediate course long dreamed of between philosophy and history.¹⁴

Durkheim's thesis provided hope for finding a basis for a new national equilibrium grounded on a moral base. Science was not, Durkheim was saying, bankrupt:

It has not fulfilled all your hopes? It cannot tell you your duty? But first, have you applied your reason, with suitable precautions, to the objective study of human societies? Who knows if this study would not furnish you, on duties and obligations, some new light? . . . Thus, what Durkheim appeared to offer was not only a discipline for intelligence, but also for the conscience. And behind the

obstinate scientist one could see standing the most convinced, the most ardent of moralists. . . .¹⁵

If very few of Bouglé's contemporaries became durkheimians in the fullest sense of the word, most took him seriously, and many were deeply influenced by his zeal, his goals. And many, though philosophically opposed, wrestled with the same problems that he raised, and often came to conclusions which helped create that alliance of intellectuals who fought for secularization of the schools, and serious, wide-reaching social reform. Why Bouglé found himself drawn directly into sociology is not entirely clear. Certainly the questions for which Durkheim seemed to propose tentative answers were in the forefront of Bouglé's mind, as is evidenced by almost every letter he ever wrote Halévy. He often repeated to his friend his distaste and lack of talent for metaphysics, though the latter may be dismissed, I think, on the evidence that he was graduated first in his class in philosophy. He often repeated that he was a moralist first; and his first publication was entitled Choix de moralistes Français.¹⁶

One cannot discount a temperament which seemed to many as typically Breton: combative, joyful, egalitarian, stubborn, generous, courageous and loyal.¹⁷ Doubtless the defeat of 1870, though not experienced directly by Bouglé,

hung like a cloud over his generation. When, in 1933, he recalled those days, he seemed to feel that the flowering of modern sociology was born of the national humiliation:

1871! I evoke that date, the date of our defeat, on purpose. For it was a defeat which caused much soul-searching, and gave birth to more than one resolution among intellectuals. One thing is curious: in order to prepare the necessary revival, it was not on the spirit of authority that most of them counted, but on the spirit of truth. . . . They became more attached than ever to science, and to the virtues which scientific research implies.¹⁸

Bouglé exaggerated, as was his optimistic wont, the degree to which the intellectual community responded with one voice. But he has doubtless put his finger on both his own deeper motives, and on those of many of his generation who, if they were not durkheimians to the letter, saw the new sociology as an ally to be welcomed in pursuit of a common goal.

Becoming a Sociologist

When Bouglé left the École Normale Supérieure his class rank was rewarded by a travel fellowship to Germany, just as Durkheim had been rewarded some eight years earlier. He was not yet certain what direction his intellectual life would take thereafter. To his friend Halévy he confided his doubts:

My helplessness with metaphysics is driving me to drink. In that reaction there is a mixture of feelings, some of which are purely personal, some, contemporary influences. . . . I am, with anxiety, searching for what I can be, and . . . I'd like to

find something this year that could occupy me until my death. Well, metaphysics is not my business. Tired? Impotence? I discover reasons for proving to myself that it is better to spend my life collecting facts, even like Letourneau, than to spend it inventing theories like Berthelot! If I decide (and I have to) I do not doubt that practice will impose convictions on me which theory refuses; and I see in the future an old Bouglé with glasses, who will have his mouth full of facts, who will speak loudly, banging my letter opener. . . .¹⁹

Bouglé completed his year observing the German social sciences and returned to take up his duties at the lycée of St. Brieuc, close to his family home in Brittany. He immediately set to work on two projects, both reports on his year abroad. The first--a book of reminiscences²⁰--is worth mentioning as it illustrates his ambivalence, not only towards the pretensions of positivist science in the realm of values, but also his own continuing indecision as to the direction of his career. His use of the pseudonym "Jean Breton" was repeated a half-dozen times during his life, apparently as an outlet to his penchant for literary expression. As he commented to Halévy later,

That is the only [form of expression] which is true. That is, it is only through literature that one can get across the truth about societies.²¹

The second report of his German studies appeared in two articles in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.²² He offered a critical analysis of four major German social

scientists: Lazarus, Jhering, Wagner, and Simmel. These articles were more reportorial, however, than critical. It seems likely that he was not yet prepared to assume a clear stance toward German sociology, or toward the acknowledged French master, Durkheim, until he wrote a "conclusion" for the articles when they appeared in book form in 1896.²³

He proclaimed himself to be in substantial agreement with Durkheim, but some major and essential exceptions were to differentiate his thinking from the orthodoxy set out in the Division du travail social²⁴ and in the Règles de la méthode sociologique.²⁵

During this period Bouglé began to work on his doctoral thesis on egalitarian values. He committed himself to a sociological approach to the problem; yet he continued to be troubled by his goals and his capacity to meet them. He was particularly troubled by the problem of "cause," a notion which played such an important part in Durkheim's own sociological approach. He expressed his concerns to Halévy:

When I go walking, I have sociological dreams. And I am vexed because they all lead me to the threshold of this question (and I do not dare enter, certain of not getting out): "the origins of the ideas which constitute Reason." Will I be a philosopher in spite of myself? When I have philosophical dreams I complain about the insufficiency of logical systems. It seems to me that one should have about as many

systems of logic as classes of objects to be known. Our idea of connections . . . ought to be specified. It is maddening that like terms (cause, function, elements, etc., etc.) are employed for phenomena as different as social ones are from physical ones. In this sense, positivism, by preventing the mind from distinguishing, as Aristotle and others have done, different kinds of causality, and by restricting it to the vague notion of necessity, antecedence, has contributed to mixing methods.²⁶

He was, however, coming to identify himself as a sociologist in spite of his doubts. In a discussion with Halévy on adultery, he remarked that "reason justifies anything--or nothing"²⁷ and cautioned him that the only way to look at marriage was as a forme sociale:

It seems to me clear that monogamy . . . presents no absolute value.²⁸

With this increasing commitment to sociology, he fretted at being able to do no "sociology" at the lycée. But he met Durkheim and was deeply impressed. It was logical, then, that he should have enthusiastically accepted an offer to join the group preparing the Année Sociologique.

Bouglé and Durkheim

Bouglé recounted many years afterwards the beginning of his association with Durkheim:

I remember having had a very clear impression of the coexistence of these two tendencies [the scientist and the moralist], of these two passions in this master, the first time we had a rather long conversation. It was about getting the Année Sociologique started. I was just back from Germany where I had

picked up the teachings of G. Simmel. . . . And what I had been able to see of the German intellectual organization had made me clearly understand how useful it would be for French sociology to engage in a collective effort, working in teams that Durkheim would guide. I was completely ready to offer my collaboration to recruit colleagues, to increase the ranks of the Bordeaux School that Durkheim had made his own.²⁹

Bouglé was drawn to the enterprise most particularly because of his concern with moral questions:

Durkheim does not refuse, like Kant, to search for the "roots of the noble stem" which is obligation. He searches for it as a good disciple of Comte . . . in social facts. . . . He is convinced, therefore, that by understanding social reality better, bringing to light, by a hundred convergent studies, the various yet related parts of human institutions, we can bring the individual to understand better what obligations he has . . . to society.³⁰

Bouglé did not share, however, nor did all the collaborators by any means, Durkheim's faith:

Were we all persuaded that a more advanced social science would clearly make any kind of "métamorale" useless? It made no difference for the moment . . . of formation. We had to go and take a look. . . . We had to start chopping some wood, build frameworks for the assembled facts, organize and give direction to research.³¹

Even looking back from 1930, Bouglé thought it too early to measure the success of the group effort. But he did think that Durkheim had accomplished something of inestimable value:

Even if only for having led in the task, as much by example as by precept, and having aided many minds to steer clear of the two reefs, apriorism and

historicism, Durkheim, in the intellectual history of our time, stands out clearly as a benefactor.³²

From its planning stage through all twelve issues of the journal, Bouglé played a major role for which Durkheim often expressed his indebtedness. Along with Lévy, Fauconnet, Hubert, Mauss and Parodi, he was a contributor to every volume.³³ In addition to Parodi, he brought his friend Paul Lapie into the group for the immense labor that went into the reading of literally hundreds of works, and the writing of dozens of reviews. Major works were given extensive critical treatment; but Durkheim insisted that even those of less importance must be commented on, even if briefly. In 1897, when the first was in preparation, Bouglé complained to Halévy that he had written 142 pages of reviews, and had translated an article of Simmel which ran to 156 pages.³⁴

Durkheim recognized that there were methodological differences between them. In many of the dozen letters which he wrote Bouglé in the eighteen months preceding publication of the first volume, Durkheim both defended his own position and took exception to Bouglé's apparent tendency to be indulgent with Tarde and Simmel.³⁵ However, he always seems to have discussed these matters as though he were addressing a collaborator of equal status.³⁶ Having criticized Bouglé's philosophical approach to the notion of equality in

his article "Anthropologie et démocratie,"³⁷ Durkheim expressed his desire to discuss the question further if they could meet. And while he recognized their disagreement, he did not seek to impose his own views, or to pretend that his own method was beyond reproach:

Above all, do not believe that I am telling you my objection in order to get you to follow the method I use in such a case. I freely admit that the way I proceed is not without difficulties; the problem is so difficult!³⁸

Each issue of the Année Sociologique included several original mémoires. To this section Bouglé contributed two articles on the Indian caste system which he began to study while writing his thesis.³⁹ In 1901 he contributed a summary of his views on the division of social labor, in which his differences with Durkheim were frankly stated.⁴⁰ Bouglé was furthermore responsible in every issue for the analyses in that section called Sociologie Générale, including methodological works and what they chose to call "social philosophy."

Bouglé's loyalty to Durkheim was unquestionable in fundamental matters such as the specificity of social facts. What he brought to his analyses has been summed up by Georges Davy as "suppleness":

From the first volume of the Année . . . Bouglé, with his native clarity, distinguished . . . biological sociology, derived from biological models--a reductionism which he was always avid to combat--from what

he called social philosophy, detached from psychology, in order that it should retain its own specificity, but without cutting its ties to sociology--a complementarity which was necessary to both.⁴¹

The questions which troubled Bouglé were no different from those which underlay all of Durkheim's work: the moral basis of a consensual democratic state. Bouglé was constantly concerned to explore the relationship between democratic values and social forms, to clarify how the constant differentiation of individuals could--and must--lead to greater equality and unity; how certain social forms could lead, on the contrary, to the emergence of elites, or the depression of the masses. Concern with these frankly ideological questions, at the expense of more circumscribed sociological research, resulted, according to Professor Davy, in a diminution in the esteem with which some of his collaborators held him.⁴² Yet it is clear from Durkheim's letters, and corroborated by Professor Davy, that Bouglé's deviation from the narrow path in no way affected the confidence that Durkheim placed in him. Durkheim openly supported his younger colleague, and was instrumental in bringing him to the Sorbonne.

What was the attraction of these two men for one another? First, obviously, was a basic agreement on the methodological assumptions of a sociology that was not an

extension of psychology; on the proposition that sociology could claim an object and a methodology not derived from, or reducible to, any other science. They disagreed about the degree to which sociology had explanatory capabilities without recourse to individualist psychology; and about the capacity of sociology to provide a basis for moral obligation. Although Bouglé tended to be less dogmatic, less assertive, and less confident than Durkheim, their goals were very much the same. Secondly, Bouglé was clearly a workhorse for the Année, shouldering an important share of the tremendous burden of bringing out each year's volume. Thirdly, if Bouglé's political activism struck other sociologists as demeaning, he was, for Durkheim, an extension into the realm of the political world which he himself did not have the time to nourish. Lastly, Bouglé's readiness to defend Durkheim's theories publicly, to take upon himself the barbs of various critics, while muting their areas of disagreement, was deeply appreciated. After Bouglé's "debate" with Charles Andler in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Durkheim wrote:

When your letter arrived I was getting ready to write you to express the pleasure I had in reading your article and to thank you for the trouble you took to defend me personally on certain essential points, as well as sociology. I am very obliged to you. When I saw, in Andler's additional note that he objected to

the manner in which you interpreted certain of my propositions, I thought for a moment to intervene briefly. But when I re-read your article I was convinced that I could add nothing to what you said. . . .43

The tie that bound these men was expressed very simply by Durkheim in 1912:

It is men like you that give friendship its meaning.⁴⁴

For Bouglé, Durkheim was always, at least publicly, the leader of French sociology which, in turn, must provide the basis for a political philosophy. In Terry Clark's terms, Durkheim was the patron to whom he became early attached.⁴⁵ And at the end of his life he paid him the same respect that he had at the beginning. University posts were few and hard to come by, and so carried enormous prestige. Appointment to a chair required the active support of a powerful patron. When Bouglé's open espousal of Dreyfus' cause brought his dismissal from the lycée at St. Brieuc, he sought Durkheim's aid in finding a post at Bordeaux. It seems more than likely that his appointment to Montpellier, in the middle of the academic year, and without his doctorat, owed much to his connection with Durkheim. In 1907, Durkheim presented Bouglé's name as a substitute in Espinas' chair at the Sorbonne;⁴⁶ Bouglé was appointed.

In Defense of Sociology

The publication, in 1896, of his article "Sociologie et démocratie"⁴⁷ launched Bouglé as a franc-tireur in the cause of Durkheim's sociology. The article was an examination of what light various sociological theories could shed on the "value" of the democratization of contemporary society.

Lebon, Sigheile and Tarde suggested, wrote Bouglé, that such a development was unfortunate, since the larger the number of individuals composing the decision-making group, the lower the level of intellectual input:

In a general way, [crowds] develop the qualities of feeling which are the oldest and commonest, the most easily transmitted. But as surely as they increase the intensity of feelings, a large group lowers the level of intelligence.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Tocqueville's convictions concerning the inevitability of the trend to democracy was supported by Spencer, Tarde, and Durkheim:

Setting out from different principles, these three sociological principles arrive at the point which concerns us . . . from a state in which individuals are unequally subordinated to authority, they must come to a condition in which individuals are equally invested with a share in authority.⁴⁹

Bouglé then left his readers with the apparent paradox of the "impotence of popular intelligence" and an "all-powerful popular will."⁵⁰

The question mark placed at the end of an inoffensive

invitation for discussion evoked a response from Charles Andler⁵¹ that amounted to nothing more or less than an all-out attack on the capacity of sociology to deal with such a question. In fact, he challenged the very right to exist of "that pretended science."⁵² He attacked the notion of the conscience collective as "a new mysticism,"⁵³ the methodological partition of society and individual, and the Marx-like fixation on the determinist character of things external to man.⁵⁴ He ended by revealing clearly his own particular socialist thinking:

A rich ruling class, which alone controlled the bureaucracy and armed forces, would defend its privileges for an almost indefinite time.⁵⁵

Democracy, he argued, was an outcome of the individual will, not of so-called sociological laws.

Bouglé suggested to Durkheim that he would like to reply to Andler, and received this response:

The fact that we diverge on certain points should not be a reason for you to abstain [from replying]; for it is sociology which has been attacked . . . and it is that which must, above all, be defended.⁵⁶

To Halévy, Bouglé expressed his elation:

After consulting with Durkheim, it is definitely I who will fight for the honor of sociology. I've just sent you a response, the vigor of which astounds me. I hardly recognize myself.⁵⁷

His reply was published as "Psychologie, Sociologie et Histoire"⁵⁸ in the "Revue de Méta" as Bouglé always abbreviated

it; its tone was, in his words, "very acrimonious,"⁵⁹ as was Andler's parting remark, printed immediately following Bouglé's defense. The argument, which we shall have occasion to take up later, left Durkheim pleased that his theory had been adequately defended.

Between 1896 and 1908, when his work on the Indian caste system was published in book form,⁶⁰ Bouglé produced a stream of articles which continued and expanded upon the reply to Andler. Bouglé obviously enjoyed the role and he was good at it.⁶¹ His main concerns--sociology, democratic values and social unity--form contrapuntal parts of a whole, and in the manner of a fugue, each, at different times, and under different circumstances, became a dominant theme, though the others were never silent.

Bouglé's defense of sociology, and of Durkheim in particular, led him gradually to clarify a sociological position that was peculiarly his own. In three areas conceptual differences with the master emerged: the specificity of social facts, the relationship of sociology and psychology, and the problem of cause. It was around these questions that controversies flared, and they represent the major areas of dispute with rival sociological systems. Two major articles--"Qu'est-ce que la Sociologie?"⁶²

and "Revue Générale des Théories sur la Division du Travail"⁶³--contain the essence of Bouglé's position. A number of other articles, though not directly concerned with these problems, also clarify his approach. Lastly, in lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in the late '20's and early '30's, Bouglé set down his considered position.

The key to Durkheim's sociology lies in the definition of its object:

A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations.⁶⁴

The key words are "external," "general," and "constraint."

Durkheim's methodology drew such loud resistance to the stated parameters of the new science that, as he stated in the preface to the second edition of La Division du travail social, "for a time it was almost impossible for us to be heard."⁶⁵ Yet, without acceptance of its basic principles, none of its findings could be taken seriously.

The main target of the opposition was the notion of externality, or specificity. Andler had charged sociology with attempting to do without psychology, without individuals; he argued that it should wait, before declaring itself a science, until the science of individual psychology had been

constituted. He had further charged that by eliminating the individual, durkheimian sociology had created nothing less than a new mythology. Most particularly he had singled out Durkheim's rule, "consider social facts as things."⁶⁶

Bouglé used two approaches in his defense. On the one hand he addressed himself to the problem of the constitution of a science, drawing analogies from the relationship of other natural sciences to one another:

Supposing, for an instant, that [sociologists] understand the need [for waiting] and agree, for example, that psychology is to sociology what mathematics is to physics: would they see themselves forced, under pain of uselessness, simply to fold their arms? . . . The history of science bears witness: however necessary chemistry may be for the perfection of biology, biology succeeded in registering discoveries before the constitution of chemistry; however necessary mechanics may be for physics and chemistry, both were able to be productive before the constitution of mechanics.⁶⁷

Bouglé then took up the salient points of the opposition, restating the principles, clarifying them, and attempting, sometimes by subtle concessions, to meet the argument, or (particularly where he was in some sympathy with his opponents) to undertake a modification of Durkheim. Focusing on the externality of sociological concerns, Bouglé stressed the common sense notion which united all sociologists: the conscience of a permanent, or even temporary group (such as a crowd) as opposed to a random collection of unrelated people,

represents something qualitatively different from the simple sum of individual states of consciousness:

Let us consider [individual] consciousness, not in and of itself in an isolated state, but in terms of connections: with these connections appear specific phenomena; individual states of consciousness cannot account for the forms of these phenomena; and these phenomena, as they are social, can account for more than one state of individual consciousness. It is necessary, therefore, to study these special facts in a special way: that will be the task of sociology.⁶⁸

And although durkheimians waged a constant war against the organic model, Bouglé was not beyond quoting a medical authority in support of his position:

Phenomena, having a specificity of their own, can be the result of the union or increasingly complex association of organized elements. That proves that these elements, although distinct and autonomous, do not, for all that, play the role of simple associated parts, and that their union expresses more than the sum of their separate properties.⁶⁹

Since Bouglé intended a great deal of his writing for the teachers in the French educational system, he wrote in a more popular vein in the Revue de Paris:

Whether it is a passing emotion or a lasting influence, an expressly formulated rule, or only sensed obligation or imitation [sic], love or hate, every situation where, from the coexistence of

individuals, however few they may be, there are born new phenomena which could not have come into existence without that co-existence, a field is open to sociology; I can study separately these phenomena which are properly social.⁷⁰

The charge of reification was explicit in Andler's criticism, and it has been repeated by Raymond Aron.⁷¹

Bouglé met this directly:

Does M. Durkheim mean by [his first rule] that things think inside of us? . . . he means simply that to observe them one must get rid of preconceived notions, subjective ideas, one must consider social facts as natural facts, and not the results of convention; . . . elsewhere, he recognizes that social things come into existence only through men, and that they conceal no motive force, that only people are the living forces in society.⁷²

Bouglé emphasized that whatever mythology they are accused of may be laid at the feet of readers, but not of the authors:

Because the latter use substantives, that does not mean that they are imagining substances. Because they describe abstractions, that does not mean they claim reality for them. . . . [Sociology] has the right, as do the other sciences, to isolate, by a purely mental act, what does not exist in an isolated state in nature; and, no more than the other sciences, it is not required to hypostasize what it has the right to abstract.⁷³

There appears little doubt that Durkheim invited an attack on sociology by the very language that he used in the Division du Travail Social and in the Règles. Had he not, by 1895, clearly rejected psychology, claiming that it could

not provide any insight into the conscience collective? Had he not written that

the individual circumstances which may have had a share in the production of the phenomenon are neutralized and, consequently do not contribute to its determination. The average, then, expresses a certain state of the group mind (l'âme collective).⁷⁴

Is it surprising that he was accused of suggesting a force that stood outside man with a creative life of its own? Bouglé sensed the danger of this kind of rhetoric, and, while he defended the sociology which he had adopted, he nevertheless first sought to correct what he understood to be clearly mistaken impressions, and secondly, to clarify the durkheimian position by a change in the language. In some cases he openly disagreed with Durkheim:

We have ourselves recognized that more than one of his expressions lends itself to doubt. It is to be regretted, for example that he said one must place the substratum of social phenomena outside individual consciousness, in the collective mind. It still remains true that the critic, if he will use, not a method involving a false philology, but one that is truly philosophical, must search beneath the words, metaphors, or formulas, if the thought of the author is in reality substantialist or mythological. The answer does not appear doubtful.⁷⁵

Bouglé was aware that enemies were being needlessly made; and from his early involvement with Durkheim he seemed to know instinctively that the goals which the latter had stated so clearly in the conclusion of the Division could not be reached if enemies were made of men like Charles Andler. In 1901,

Bouglé tried to put an end to this kind of intellectual infighting:

It seems to us that one would be wrong to attach vital importance to such general questions as "In what form does the conscience collective live? Where is it to be found? What is its subject matter?" Is it true that on the answer we give today depends the destiny--the being or non-being of sociology, and that our most urgent task is to make a precise statement of our common credo on this matter? We think, on the contrary, that sociology does itself harm before many intelligent people and rebuffs many men of good will by appearing too often to be nothing more than a more or less abstract dissertation, clothed in biological metaphors, on the way there lives, or exists separately, the collective mind, or the soul of crowds, or the volksgeist.⁷⁶

Bouglé dropped the matter in one sense by advancing his own interpretations, and his own modifications of Durkheim's methodology. He maintained that formes sociales constituted analytical constructs which could, all the same, provide the subject matter for sociology. He agreed that they represented external constraints, but that their origins were to be found in individual states of consciousness; indeed he believed that Durkheim, who was not a mythologist or a spiritualist, recognized the same truth, but that for a variety of reasons took pains to adopt a dogmatic stance.

Durkheim saw sociology and psychology contesting a primacy in the capacity to explain human society:

[Social] facts are perhaps more difficult to interpret because they are more complex, but they are easier to get at. Psychology, on the contrary, has not only great difficulty in working them out, but also in grasping them. Consequently one has every reason to believe that, from the day this sociological method is unanimously recognized and practiced, you will see sociology progress with a speed which its present development would hardly suggest, and erase the advantage that psychology owes uniquely to its historical precedence.⁷⁷

In what Durkheim certainly conceived of as a struggle for survival, he appeared to take a position which excluded any reference to human nature. He argued in the Règles that his predecessors had, in the final analysis, rested their methodology on psychology. For Comte (whatever may have been his reputation for having excluded psychology), "it is always psychology which has the last word";⁷⁸ and for Spencer, "it is in the two feelings, fear of the living and fear of the dead that he finds the origin of political and religious government."⁷⁹ As for his contemporaries, Tarde and Espinas, their opposition to Durkheim was open and vociferous. As far as the contribution of René Worms was concerned, he remarked to Bouglé that there was little to get out of it.⁸⁰ Concerning Simmel, who always remained an important influence on Bouglé, he commented:

Someone like Simmel, I think, who has a feeling about the specificity of social facts, does not follow his idea to its end because the psychological appears to him to be the ultimate form of the real.⁸¹

Durkheim wished to exclude the psychological totally. He continually stressed that a whole was not equal to the sum of its parts,⁸² that it was something other. One was justified in excluding psychology from sociological investigation:

By aggregating, by a process of inter-penetration, by fusing together, individual psychic beings give birth to a being, psychic, if you wish, but one which constitutes a psychic individuality of a new type.⁸³

But Durkheim admittedly left himself open to the charge of having postulated a group mind:

The group thinks, feels, acts, completely differently than would its members if they were isolated.⁸⁴

It is this group thinking, feeling, action, then, that is the subject matter of sociology; and its explanation must lie outside the realm of psychology:

The determining cause of a social fact must be sought among antecedent social facts, and not among the states of individual consciousness.⁸⁵

However, as intransigent as Durkheim was prepared to be publicly, he was not trying to say that psychology had nothing to add to the understanding of man and society. In the Règles he had commented:

If collective life does not derive from individual life, both are closely related; if the second cannot explain the first, it can, at least, facilitate the explanation. . . . it is incontestable that social facts are produced by an elaboration sui generis of psychic facts.⁸⁶

In several letters Durkheim tried to clarify his position to Bouglé while urging him to hold the line on the methodological exclusion of psychology:

. . . it is not by analyzing the individual conscience that sociology can be constructed. Must we not therefore follow this idea right to its conclusion? Besides the fact that we owe it to ourselves, we are better off, for it rests on a more solid base. . . . Do we not have some interest in [illegible] that morality is external to individuals?⁸⁷

What was needed was persistence in meeting the opposition, which must naturally resist a new idea for a while:

Ever since Hobbes, at least, the idea has formed the central point of interest in all sociological essays.⁸⁸

It is clear, I think, that Bouglé was able to develop his more flexible notion of a social psychology--a psychology informed by both sociology and psychology--without opposing Durkheim on the basic tenets of his methodology. In fact, it may be argued that Bouglé expressed a position more faithful to Durkheim than did many of the expressions taken out of context which have been the basis of attacks, both then and since, on durkheimian methodology. Durkheim does not appear to have been aware of the difficulties caused by some of the language that he used, and he was surprised by the reaction:

I have never meant to say that one could construct sociology without a psychological culture, or that sociology was anything other than a psychology. But only that a collective psychology cannot be deduced directly from individual psychology. . . .⁸⁹

Sometimes he thought that Bouglé went too far astray; but as he wrote him, if there is agreement on the fundamentals, "it is neither necessary nor desirable that everyone have exactly the same formula."⁹⁰

Bouglé's defense of sociology against Charles Andler provided the first opportunity to confront the critics, and at the same time to clarify Durkheim's views with respect to psychology. It is clear, however, that he wanted to mute the differences between sociologists of differing schools in order to defend a more general notion of sociology:

Whether one is preoccupied with establishing the specificity of social facts or of pointing out, at the moment of establishing them, how they can be explained, one will make a distinction between these facts and psychological facts, as does M. Durkheim; or one will consider them, as do the majority of sociologists, as a variation of these same facts. The essential point is that they will be treated as specific, and on this all sociologists are in agreement.⁹¹

In so doing, he was able to bridge a methodological gap between scholars whose political goals were remarkably similar.

When Bouglé was less conscious of defending Durkheim specifically he edged gradually toward a view which seems to express Durkheim's attitude more closely than does the determinist language of the Division du travail social. A contemporary critic of Durkheim has characterized this tension

between the determinism of the laws which emerge from his investigations, and the impulse to action as "the paradox of the sociologist,"

at one and the same time involved and remote, citizen and scholar, disinterested in the future by methodological principle but involved in the future by the very direction of his work. . . . He oscillates between the exorbitant pretension of the sociologist who would tell society what it must desire, and the rather conservative prudence of an agent of change who appears only upon demand.⁹²

What Bouglé was doing in his own methodological writings was to provide a justification for human action informed by the greatest amount of knowledge possible concerning the possibilities imposed or circumscribed by social and historical forces.

The shaping of his own position began with the conclusion to his book, Les Sciences sociales en Allemagne, where Bouglé took Durkheim to task for his rigid exclusion of psychology:

Those reactions, to which individual states of consciousness, by the very fact of their association, are subjected, are clearly psychological phenomena, realized through a physical milieu Knowledge of these special reactions can lead . . . to a notion of a social psychology distinct from individual psychology, but not to the notion of a sociology without psychology.⁹³

Bouglé reproached Durkheim for his intransigent rejection of teleological explanations. He even accused him of letting such explanations in by the back door. But mainly he reproached

Durkheim for suggesting that his sociology could establish obligations by discovering the "normal" and elevating that to an "ideal":

Would it not be inconsistent to demonstrate to us, in the name of scientific laws, that certain ends are inevitable, and at the same time advise us, in the name of morality, to seek them, as though it were possible to avoid them?⁹⁴

Here Bouglé[/] was touching the heart of the paradox of science and action:

Any improvement [in society] supposes the knowledge of two terms: a real and an ideal. . . . The ideal is a reality which is not yet realized . . . a goal. My goal is the measure of the value of things. . . . Science can ascertain these goals, but cannot confer upon them any value. . . .⁹⁵

He concluded by warning against the very notion which is implicit in Durkheim's first two major works:

If the social sciences wish, quite properly, to guard against any metaphysical approach, they would be prudent to give up any attempt to transform relations of cause and effect into rules of action, and to be wary of confusing scientific and moral laws.⁹⁶

Bouglé[/]'s own work during the period of the turn of the century emphasized further his doctrinal differences with Durkheim. After his Sciences sociales en Allemagne appeared, however, he never again publicly criticized Durkheim directly. Rather, he expressed his own interpretation of Durkheim's theory, and, in doing so, he modified its mechanistic pretensions, and constantly emphasized a greater

role for the individual will. For example, rather than accepting the inevitability of social forms, he saw the mind of man capable not only of influencing them but of blocking or reversing their development:

Are not many influences--all those of nature, on the one hand, all those of the mind on the other--capable sometimes of reinforcing, sometimes of opposing the influence of social forms? ⁹⁷

The gradual liberation of the individual conscience represented the key feature that distinguished primitive (mechanical) solidarity from its modern (organic) form. With the emergence of individuality came invention and innovation. The originality of human nature consists in the capacity to choose its own ends. ⁹⁸ He scoffed at natural laws that determined human behavior:

In fact, whatever may be the last connection between nature and thought, it is a fact that individuals who make up a society are thinking people, and, as such, capable of fitting the ends which they choose to the means at their disposal. ⁹⁹

In his own account of social morphology, Bouglé, adding to Durkheim's theories of volume and density, emphasized a number of psychological tendencies which could not be ignored. Men want to live, but far more important, they want to live well. That is, Bouglé suggested, there is an innate idealism which is not the mere product of association. In addition, he emphasized other psychological tendencies which

provided motivations without which the mechanistic explanations of Durkheim were incomplete: the material drive,¹⁰⁰ sympathy,¹⁰¹ and the drive for esteem and power¹⁰² were necessary, though not sufficient causes of change. "Man," he wrote, "is an animal which brings about transformations."¹⁰³

Bouglé's differences with Durkheim appear nowhere more clearly than when he discussed the multiple influences on human history of both ideas and material factors. At times his descriptions of the latter were almost marxian:

The effort of men to produce riches exercises a thousand pressures on the constitution of societies. Social density depends closely on modes of economic production; one form of collective property tends to augment it, whereas some forms of private property tend to diminish it. . . . Doesn't the development of an industrial regime, by insisting on the ever-increasing specialization, augment the heterogeneity of social forms?¹⁰⁴

At other times, the primacy of beliefs is equally clear:

It is particularly in its religious form that beliefs have, in other times, given the lead to society.¹⁰⁵

I believe it can be argued that Bouglé did not perceive, or at least did not admit an evolution which was occurring in Durkheim's own methodology. Whereas it had been true that Durkheim, in the Division of Labor, had tended to identify a number of social facts (such as density and volume) as anterior and causal to ideas, he began, in

the Rules to change his view, and to accord to ideas (specifically moral ideas) a far more important position as explanatory, and related functionally, but not causally, to social facts. In the Division of Labor, material and moral density were treated as being directly related. But by 1901, Durkheim wrote the following in the Rules:

The dynamic density . . . may be defined as a function of the number of individuals who are effectively related not only commercially but morally; that is, who not only exchange services or engage in competition, but live a common life.¹⁰⁶

When he wrote Suicide he argued that "essentially social life is made up of representations";¹⁰⁷ yet he also wrote that

Given a people, consisting of a certain number of individuals arranged in a certain way, there results a determinate set of collective ideas and practices, that remain constant so long as the conditions on which they depend are themselves unchanged.¹⁰⁸

Steven Lukes has summed up this evolution as follows:

From the initial position in The Division of Labor, where he had been tempted to write that "everything occurs mechanically", Durkheim had by the time of his latest writings come very close to maintaining that symbolic thought is a condition of and explains society.¹⁰⁹

Though Bouglé did not give evidence of his awareness of this change, he did, even when one accepts Durkheim's evolution, take a position which tended to reject the

search for antecedents. Bouglé stated plainly that sociology was not a mechanistic theory:

Social morphology . . . reveals a determining force, the motive cause of specialization. Does that mean that we are enclosed in a theory, both mechanistic and mystical, of social evolution . . . without regard, in particular, for either natural or psychological causes which are capable of lending their collaboration? . . . Such are not, it seems to us, the consequences of the theory we are summing up.

Cause and effect, he argued, are reciprocal:

Can a same phenomenon be, at the same time, both cause and consequence of another? . . . in social matters, nothing is more frequent than such actions and reactions.¹¹¹

Bouglé preferred such words as "favor," "modify," and "influence." He fled from any tendency to suggest "the unique cause" or "the sufficient reason." As Daniel Essertier remarked, he was satisfied to isolate a given factor as "one of the conditions."¹¹²

Conclusion

Bouglé's position changed very little after he returned from Germany. He never accepted what he took to be the mechanistic determinism of Durkheim's earlier work, nor was he persuaded by the argument of Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. He seems to have agreed with Gaston Richard's objection to the possibility of a strict positivism in the social sciences. Instead,

sociological "laws" can best be viewed as tendencies, whose effects are of variable intensity. It certainly may be argued that Durkheim, by his habit of deducing the most wide-ranging laws of evolution from a narrow range of research, violated the most essential injunctions of positivism.

Bouglé¹ also objected to Durkheim's preoccupation with "causes" which he construed in the automatic and constant sense of mechanics; and in his own work he emphasized the complexity of the evolutionary process.

Bouglé¹ refused to follow the injunction against finalism which Durkheim laid down in his rejection of any determinants in human nature. Where Durkheim tended to point to the diversity of men in an effort to eliminate any possibility that traits common to all human nature might impose ends, Bouglé¹ pointed rather to certain uniformities which could not be ignored, and which required the intervention of psychology if they were to be taken into account. In particular, Bouglé¹ argued that human idealism was not traceable to purely social origins.

In the Règles, Durkheim laid down the rule that research into the function and origin of social institutions had to be strictly separated.¹¹³ Though it was important to keep in mind that ends could not provide the only explanation,

Bouglé refused to set aside the possibility that the goals men have set for themselves have played an important role in the creation of institutions. I think it is arguable that Durkheim himself was dissatisfied with the mechanistic approach to solidarity which is so evident in La Division du travail social. In the Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse and in his writings on représentations collectives the perceptions men hold emerge as a causal factor, though he is at great pains to understand it as social, not individual, in origin.

Durkheim's objection to psychological explanations arises from his contention that a potentiality (as opposed to an act) cannot be a cause in the strict sense of the word. For Bouglé, on the other hand, psychological propensities were accepted as tendencies which could, and did, produce social effects. Durkheim could not accept this, having defined, at the outset, social facts in the way that he did. If the very object of his science was characterized by externality and constraint, then the possibility of considering any individual role was foreclosed. To challenge his fundamental postulate was tantamount to threatening the very existence of his science. Yet he might have solved the problem, as did Bouglé, by arguing that even if social facts

derived, in part, from individual states of consciousness, they could become external, exercising a pressure upon individuals which they would not recognize as their own and which would be imbued with a generalized character, having undergone a metamorphosis through association. Such social facts would be no less the object of sociological study.

There is some evidence that Bouglé¹ saw Durkheim's intransigence as almost irrational.¹¹⁴ Not only was it unnecessary, in his view, to espouse such dogmatic views, but it set Durkheim against a large number of people who were unprepared to discard so easily traditional forms of liberal idealism with its large concessions to human will. There is no evidence in Bouglé's work that he shared any of the explicit religion of a Buisson, or that he had any sympathy for the Kantism of his friends Parodi and Lapie. But Bouglé¹ was a political man who recognized the great insights of Durkheim and at the same time the dysfunctional nature of his dogmatism. The requirements of politics dictated a clear, yet widely-appealing statement of the essential elements of a modern democratic theory: liberté, égalité, fraternité must be brought into the twentieth century. But the first and most urgent task was the defense of the Third Republic which, although unsatisfactory in many ways, represented the only

governmental structure with a potential for meeting the needs of the modern state.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

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³Émile Durkheim, "Cours de Science Sociale: Leçon d'ouverture," RIE, IV, p. 38.

⁴Letter to the author, in Simon Deploige, Le Conflit de la morale et la sociologie (Paris, 1911), p. 403.

⁵Steven Lukes, Émile Durkheim (New York, 1972), pp. 86-87.

⁶Terry Clark, Prophets and Patrons (Cambridge, 1973), p. 105.

⁷Ibid., p. 108.

⁸Lukes, p. 302.

⁹See Bouglé, 1905b.

¹⁰See Clark, pp. 33-42; Lukes, pp. 44-65. A.J. Ladd, École Normale Supérieure: An Historical Sketch (Grand Forks, N.D., 1907). Roger Payrefitte, Rue d'Ulin: Chroniques de la vie normalienne (Paris, 1963).

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¹²Ibid., p. 283.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 282.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 283.

¹⁶Bouglé, 1897a.

¹⁷Georges Davy, "Célestin Bouglé," in Revue Française de Sociologie, Vol. VIII (1967), pp. 3-6.

¹⁸Bouglé, 1938a, pp. 23-24.

¹⁹Bouglé-Halévy, 1893, n.d.

²⁰Jean Breton [Bouglé pseudonym], Notes d'un étudiant français en Allemagne (Paris, 1895).

²¹Bouglé-Halévy, 1898, August.

²²Bouglé, 1894a; 1895a.

²³Bouglé, 1896a.

²⁴Emile Durkheim, 1893a.

²⁵Emile Durkheim, 1895a.

²⁶Bouglé-Halévy, 1896, n.d.

²⁷Bouglé-Halévy, 1894, n.d.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Bouglé, 1930g, p. 284.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³See Lukes, pp. 289-95.

³⁴Bouglé-Halévy, 1897, n.d.

³⁵Durkheim-Bouglé, 6 July 1897; 27 September 1897.

³⁶See Lukes, pp. 293-94.

³⁷Bouglé, 1897c.

³⁸Durkheim-Bouglé, Bordeaux, 9 Mai 1899.

³⁹Bouglé, 1900c, 1901b.

⁴⁰Bouglé, 1902c.

⁴¹Georges Davy, p. 9.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Durkheim-Bouglé, 16 Mai 1896.

⁴⁴Durkheim-Bouglé, 20 July 1912.

⁴⁵Terry Clark, p. 166.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 48.

⁴⁷Bouglé, 1896b.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 122.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 126.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Charles Andler, "Sociologie et démocratie,"
RMM (March 1896), pp. 243-56.

⁵²Ibid., p. 243.

⁵³Ibid., p. 245. Andler wrote: "The decision of all must reproduce fragments of individual opinions. Otherwise it would be born from nothing."

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 255.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Durkheim-Bouglé, 24 March 1896.

⁵⁷Bouglé-Halévy, 1896, n.d.

⁵⁸Bouglé, 1896c.

- ⁵⁹Bouglé-Halevy.
- ⁶⁰Bouglé', 1908a.
- ⁶¹Daniel Essertier, p. 80. See p. 7.
- ⁶²Bouglé, 1897b.
- ⁶³Bouglé, 1902c.
- ⁶⁴Durkheim, 1895a, p. 11.
- ⁶⁵Durkheim, 1893a, p. xli.
- ⁶⁶Durkheim, 1895a, p. 15.
- ⁶⁷Bouglé, 1896c, p. 363.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 365.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., p. 366.
- ⁷⁰1897b, p. 535.
- ⁷¹Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. II (New York, 1967), p. 88.
- ⁷²Bouglé, 1896c, p. 368.
- ⁷³Ibid., p. 369.
- ⁷⁴Durkheim, 1895a, p. 8.
- ⁷⁵Bouglé, 1896c, p. 368.
- ⁷⁶Bouglé, 1901c, pp. 144-45.
- ⁷⁷Durkheim, 1895a, p. 31.
- ⁷⁸Ibid., p. 99.

- ⁷⁹Ibid.
- ⁸⁰Durkheim-Bouglé, 20 June 1897.
- ⁸¹Durkheim-Bouglé, 6 July 1897.
- ⁸²Durkheim, 1895a, p. 102.
- ⁸³Ibid., p. 103.
- ⁸⁴Ibid.,
- ⁸⁵Ibid., p. 109.
- ⁸⁶Ibid., p. 110.
- ⁸⁷Durkheim-Bouglé, 6 July 1897.
- ⁸⁸Ibid.
- ⁸⁹Durkheim-Bouglé, undated letter.
- ⁹⁰Ibid.
- ⁹¹Bouglé, 1896c, p. 367.
- ⁹²J.C. Filloux, La Science sociale et l'action (Paris, 1970), p. 55.
- ⁹³Bouglé, 1896a, p. 151.
- ⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 168-69.
- ⁹⁵Ibid., p. 170.
- ⁹⁶Ibid.
- ⁹⁷Bouglé, 1907a, p. 22.
- ⁹⁸ Bouglé, 1902f, p. 555.
- ⁹⁹ Bouglé, 1897c, p. 460.
- ¹⁰⁰ Bouglé, 1907a, pp. 27-28.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.

- 102Bouglé, 1903c, p. 268.
- 103Ibid., p. 265.
- 104Bouglé, 1907a, p. 27.
- 105Ibid., p. 29.
- 106Durkheim, Règles, p. 112.
- 107Durkheim, Le Suicide: étude de sociologie
(Paris: Alcan, 1897), p. 352.
- 108Ibid., p. 446.
- 109Lukes, p. 235.
- 110Bouglé, 1907a, p. 151.
- 111Ibid., p. 28.
- 112Essertier, p. 81.
- 113Durkheim, 1895a, p. 95.
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CHAPTER III

CONFRONTING THE OPPOSITION

Introduction

In the battles over ideas and social policy which characterized the period following the uncertain establishment of the Third Republic, Bouglé used the term "naturalism" very generally to include those theories which drew their justifications from the natural sciences. He used the expression "materialism" to cover variants of Marxist theory which took man's economic, or productive activity, as capable of explaining idea structures, class formation, and the origins of social injustices. His articles written against the conservative social theories were most numerous during the period of the Dreyfus Affair when the threat from the right was deeply sensed.

Two major works summarized the theories of the opposition and tested them against sociological and historical evidence: La Démocratie devant les sciences,¹ which appeared in 1903, and represented a number of years of research and writing on various biological and sociological theories cited in support of monarchical, aristocratic, or a very limited and elitist democratic rule; and Essais sur le régime des castes,² published in 1903, which was a collection

of pieces which had appeared as articles since 1900. The latter was written as an empirical test of many of the theories in question; needless to say, they did not hold up.

Well before 1908, Bouglé had turned his attention increasingly to the threat from the left of two central ideas: internationalism, or the denial of the national attachment, and revolution, predicated on the incapacity of the existing society to meet the demands for justice enunciated by working class leaders. It was during this period also that Bouglé picked up the thread of Durkheim's uncompleted work on socialism. What concerns us here, however, is limited to the manner in which he attempted to refute the theoretical foundations of the left at the sociological level. In a succeeding chapter, we shall examine his more expository work.

Bouglé's effort to undermine laissez-faire liberalism was concentrated in that period which followed the Dreyfusards' decisive electoral victory of 1902, when hopes ran high that the alliance of Radicals and Socialists would not only carry through the separation of church and state, but proceed to the urgent business of a genuine social reform which would put an end to the anarchy of the economic system and its accompanying social injustices. For the followers of Durkheim, the indivisible nature of the latter conditions had been made clear in the closing pages of La Division du travail social:

If economists have believed that [the division of labor] would bring forth an abiding solidarity, in some manner of its own making, and if, accordingly, they have held that human societies could and would resolve themselves into purely economic associations, that is because they believed that it affected only individual, temporary interests. Consequently, to estimate the interests in conflict and the way they ought to achieve equilibrium, that is to say, to determine the conditions under which exchange ought to take place, is solely a matter of individual competence; and, since these interests are in a perpetual state of becoming, there is no place for permanent regulation. But such a conception is, in all ways, inadequate for the facts.³

* * * * *

The Attack on Conservative Thought

Bouglé set his sights on two branches of evolutionary theory which were popular with anti-democratic forces in France. The first had come to be called anthropo-sociologie; the second, he referred to either as organicism, or as biological sociology. The first represented a modern refinement of Gobineau. While Bouglé wasted little time on what he called the "vulgar brand" of race theory which attempted to equate nation with race,⁴ he devoted two lengthy articles⁵ to those scientists who were trying, through precise measurements and statistics, to establish constant relationships between anatomical types--usually the shape of the head--and social phenomena. They believed that they had discovered causal relationships between physical types and psychological tendencies which, in turn, could be related to fitness to

rule. In other words, men's social rank was determined by heredity; and from this they concluded that attempts at social reform were both useless and dangerous because they flew in the face of nature: men spontaneously cohere in classes.⁶ De Lapouge argued that the best in society were already being selected for destruction by war, religious celibacy and moral systems that favored the weak. Rational efforts advocated by democrats could only add to these disasters.

This scientific apology for castes was further supported by two other currents of biological theory. The first stemmed from Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The second body of theory which he attacked unrelentingly was "organicism," or that cluster of arguments which likened society to a highly differentiated organism, whose parts had become specialized and had therefore experienced, necessarily, a loss of liberty and equality. Using the analogy of the brain and the heart of higher forms of biological life, supporters of this view claimed that it was "natural" that there had emerged, in the evolution of societies, a centralized system capable of coordinating and directing all the interrelated parts. By combining the two theories, it was possible to argue that

through the inheritance of qualities which fitted them for their role, an aristocratic class had emerged which must not be diluted by the levelling schemes of social reformers. Or, by using only selected parts of the analogy, the argument for aristocracy might become simply one which justified the rule of those--the industrial magnates, for example--who had proved their special worth. While the unbending conservatives, like Charles Maurras, supported a traditionalist social policy which emphasized nation, history, family, and hierarchy, there were those who drew upon other biological evidence in arguing that the purity of the ruling groups could, unless open to beneficent transfusions from below, lead to degeneracy. But the admission of new blood must be carefully controlled.

The second of Bouglé's debates involved just such an adversary in J. Novikow, member of the Institut de Sociologie and representative of the organicist school. It began with an article which Bouglé wrote for the Revue Philosophique,⁷ in which he took issue with the claim that societies resemble organisms in fundamental ways. Bouglé admitted that societies had become increasingly divided socially:

But is one to believe that this specialization must necessarily divide societies into heterogeneous parts, each distinguished radically from others, refusing permission to the individuals within to be different from one another?

Nothing could be farther from the truth revealed by a sociological study of history: that the individual had gradually become freer because of social processes which worked against the isolation of groups, and reinforced the solidarity of the whole while emphasizing increased individual autonomy:

While in a complex organism the cell belongs to a single organ, in a complex society a man participates in several groups, one economic, another political or religious, one permanent, another ephemeral. The increasing number [of groups] augments the independence of the individual.⁹

To this complication sociale Bouglé added the tendencies of human nature toward sympathy and cooperation, and the existence of the human will, to underscore his contention that

social facts are really more complex; in one sense the general laws of biology are suitable for them, while in another sense their laws lead to error. In a word, when applied to societies, biological theories are half-truths. And that is why they are so dangerous.¹⁰

In an answer published six months later, Novikow protested that Bouglé had set up a straw man.¹¹ He denied that organicists were necessarily Lamarckians, or that his ideal involved anything more than social functions. He made a sharp distinction between political and social equality. What he was arguing for was the non-intervention of the state except where "justice" required it. Human society must be left to develop freely toward the sort of perfection that organisms had achieved. Novikow was ecstatic when he

considered the prospects:

Biological organisms, being much older, are infinitely more perfected and offer an ideal that societies are still far from attaining, and which they will perhaps never attain. Thus an association like the body of man is a veritable marvel. The division of labor is pushed to the extreme limit, the adaptation of organ to function is complete, the equilibrium between central power and the parts seems to have reached perfection. . . . If we, in society, ever succeed in imitating this model, the sum of human happiness will increase ten-fold.¹²

Such a society would not be an aristocracy, he asserted:

The higher are the qualifications required, the more oligarchic the society will be. But that in no way prevents any individual having the necessary qualifications, whatever his birth, from becoming part of the governing class. . . . The rational marking-off of class boundaries is the ideal toward which societies must develop.¹³

Espinas, on the other hand, published a defense of the organicist analogy which arrived at very different conclusions.¹⁴ First, he made it clear that sociology had arisen in response to the national catastrophe of 1370; that his own pioneering efforts had been most faithfully continued by Durkheim who, like himself, had refused to make any concessions to individualist methodology, whether "Catholic theology," "spiritualist philosophy" or Tarde's "social mirage with invincibly individual elements."¹⁵

What he wanted to argue, however, was that though there was a clear line of demarcation between the two sciences--that is, that "society" was not a special case of

biology--they are, nevertheless, "united by a close connection."¹⁶ By this he seems to have meant that societies, and the nation in particular, exhibit certain characteristics in common with biological organisms because the constituent elements--men--are biological:

Living individuals feed themselves, reproduce, are born, grow up and die; that is the whole of their destiny as organic beings. But to maintain life, to assure their replacement by others, they engage in collective efforts and carry out collective operations whose network criss-crosses above them and soon hides, through its many ramifications, the elementary activities which bound them; or rather collective activities take on, for the safety of grouped individuals, such an importance that by a necessary inversion, it is the former which become the goal; representations, resolutions, emotions and desires which tend toward the safety of the group force the convergence at a single point of all partial states of consciousness so that a new center takes shape at which all comes together. . . . This center is the collective consciousness. Each society has its own. It is this collective consciousness that must not be confused with an organ. . . .¹⁷

Though Bouglé had undoubtedly failed to distinguish Novikow's organicism from others which supported monarchy, aristocracy or castes, he seized the opportunity placed in his lap by the remarkable divergence of conclusions drawn from the biological model. The articles written in reply to his own gave evidence of a remarkable elasticity, which he summed up as follows:

One [author] is a pure individualist; as for the other, individualism is the enemy. For the first, the whole has no other goal than the interest of the elements. It is in the sacrifice of the elements to the whole that the second man looks [to establish] the principle of morality. For the latter, loyalty to the nation is the most powerful reality; for the former it is pure convention.¹⁸

Bouglé pointed out the contradiction in Novikow's argument.

On the one hand the latter emphasized an organic theory of differentiation, while on the other he proposed to retain political liberty and juridical equality. But, asked

Bouglé,

On what condition will that liberty be real? Doubtless on condition that individuals can take advantage of it. But what if some of them are imprisoned in one of the circles . . . and the mode of economic life which is imposed on them takes up all their time, all their strength, all their life, can one still maintain that they enjoy all the liberty one might desire?¹⁹

In response to Espinas, who held a prestigious position at the Sorbonne, and who was a self-proclaimed supporter of Durkheim, Bouglé was content to point out that the specificity of social facts, on which they agreed, was neither reinforced nor refuted by references to such biological "origins" as sexual contact:

The contact of skin may well be the proximate cause (occasion) of social facts, but it does not determine their form any more than it determines their essence. In other words, that organic base of society tells you little or nothing about the superstructure.²⁰

And what possible relationship could there be between biology and the nation? Bouglé claimed to be convinced that Espinas had abandoned the hypotheses of heredity that he had hinted at in his earlier work. The only proper approach was that demanded by Durkheim and his school:

. . . to look at [social phenomena] squarely and not through the simplifying prism of biological analogies. Biological sociology has been no more use in defining sociology than it has been in the²² classification and coordination of social facts.

By undermining the biological analogy, Bouglé believed that he had, in fact, undermined the arguments of all those social and political philosophies which had sought, in the natural sciences, a justification of hierarchical and anti-democratic social systems.

The Attack on Social Darwinism

A more persistent justification of laissez-faire social policies than that presented by Novikow was to be found in the Darwinian theories of competition and progress which avoided the pitfalls of the organic analogy. After the victory of the Dreyfusards in the 1902 elections, and with social reform depending upon a reduction in the influence of those who opposed government action in behalf of the working class, Bouglé turned his attention to the sociology of free enterprise.

The Darwinians accepted as a natural law the struggle for existence. As Bouglé paraphrased it in 1903, it was

a cruel law, no doubt, but at the same time, beneficent; it is, at any rate, an ineluctable law. Humanity would attempt to avoid it in vain; to do so would be to embark on the certain path of downfall; it would be to set oneself apart from life.²³

It was a pessimistic philosophy, in one sense, but the law of progress nevertheless. Drawing upon the law of evolution of all species, social darwinists concluded that the improvement of human society could occur only at the expense of the unfit. "A vulgar interpretation of evolutionary theory," cried Bouglé:

Because it states that human beings were formed in accordance with the same general laws, and out of a primitive substance, it seems that one is supposed to believe that they are thereby placed on the same plane; that the superior is "reduced," as they say, to the inferior.²⁴

Nothing, Bouglé argued, justified deducing the necessity for a human "struggle" from the historical facts of animal evolution.

Bouglé followed a pattern already familiar in his refutation of the anthropo-sociologists and the organicists: he first made a thorough critique of their theoretical position, drawing on as much written material as he could lay his hands on. His letters to Halévy are filled with requests for books, and his duties with the Année Sociologique

naturally brought hundreds of works to his attention. His arguments were made at four levels: he attacked the usefulness of the analogy; he called into question the darwinists' reading of Darwin, and cited as evidence a number of revisions made by eminent evolutionists; he sought to establish the thesis that progress was not served by unbridled competition; and lastly he urged upon his audience the assurance that Durkheim's theory was not only far more scientific, but one whose prescriptions would result in a competition far more likely to produce the beneficent results all reasonable men could wish for.

What made the analogy inappropriate was the existence in men of will. While Darwin's theory had sought to eliminate all finalism from the evolutionary process, social darwinists insisted on transplanting this mechanism to human evolution, forgetting that "man is an animal capable of transforming matter."²⁵ The struggle is not just for life, but for a particular kind of life.

Evidence was plentiful that evolution could not be characterized unilaterally as a brutal struggle. While evolution involved competition, it also involved cooperation and association. Selection was not through combat alone but through sex, wherein, Bouglé¹ argued, was to be found the

origins of love and idealism.²⁶ Certainly, while man's nature exhibited a will to power, it also gave clear evidence of a capacity for sympathy.²⁷ Competition was progressively for esteem. Even "variation" is an unsatisfactory explanation of change: during a famine it was not the giraffes with a neck shorter by a few centimeters who died, but the young.²⁸

Looking at the competitive struggle of contemporary life, Bouglé asked what it meant to say that the "best" survived. He claimed that even Darwin had warned against unilinear laws:

It is important not to apply to all civilizations the same measure of progress, and that evolutionary types can vary as do social types.²⁹

The most serious indictment of the darwinians' prescriptions must emerge from an examination of the unrelieved competition of modern industrial society. The poor, for example, who should disappear, had more children; and the rich, isolated from competition, were subject to the laws of degeneration: even in Darwin's theory, regression was a clear possibility. What was needed, Bouglé argued, was a way of making the competition fair--of providing, through interference in the social process, the means whereby each member of society might compete on an equal basis. Durkheimians recognized that competition was an inherent part of man's social evolution; it was thus

pointing the way to a society which conformed far more closely to the darwinian idea of progress than did the free enterprise system extolled by the laissez-faire advocates. Bouglé quoted his thesis advisor, Henri Michel, with approval:

So that society can bring about a truly just selection, and, by the same token, truly useful, it must call to the contest the greatest number of individuals; it must guarantee to the greatest number the physical and moral qualities which will permit individual talents to bloom wherever nature has sown them, for the prosperity of the whole society.³⁰

Summarizing Bouglé's position, it must be stated that neither Bouglé nor Durkheim wholly rejected social darwinism either as an explanation of certain aspects of social evolution, or as a prescription for social policy. First, the twin notions of density and volume contained strong implications of competitive behavior and a division of labor implying that men did what they were best fitted for. Second, Durkheim's notion of a meritocracy was fully accepted by Bouglé. However, as we have noted, Bouglé emphasized that just as competition had been only one aspect of the evolutionary process, modern society must develop institutions of cooperation, including the state. If the "best" were to survive, then those with potential must not be denied access to the roles for which they were fit. Contrary to the assertions of the extreme social

darwinists, Durkheim and Bouglé insisted that the state must play a role which assured the most progressive operation of a competitive system.

The Attack on Marxism

Because any chance of social reform during the early years of the century seemed to depend on the building of an alliance between the Radical Party and the socialists, Bouglé was intensely interested in the direction taken by the latter. He was constantly preoccupied by what was going on in Jaures' mind and in his resistance to the Guesdists and the revolutionary syndicalists led by Hervé. He sought opportunities to talk with him and agonized over his seeming weakness in the face of strident demands for violent tactics. By 1908, however, at the height of Clemenceau's confrontation with the militant unions, Bouglé launched his campaign with an extensive article on Marxism. Since, during those years, sociology had become the intellectual ground for polemical discourse, it was aptly entitled Marxisme et Sociologie.³¹

Bouglé's attitude toward Marxism was that, although it shared a number of concepts with his own and had provided many important insights, it was seriously deficient as sociology. Marx and Engels had proclaimed a philosophy

of history long before any good scientist seriously seeking to know the laws of history had a right to do so. Their claims were not supported by the evidence, and there was too much that was not explained at all. What he never failed to reiterate was that the sociology of the Année Sociologique was far more capable of giving correct answers.

In a series of lectures, Bouglé proclaimed his own "theses" on the sociology of Marxism:

- 1) Marxism, like sociology, employs notions of synthesis and projection, but it reserves application to economic values, whereas sociology would apply them to any kind of value. . . .³²

Bouglé noted that Durkheim's sociology and Marxism shared the principle "that the social whole is something other than the sum of its parts."³³ In his analysis of capitalism, Bouglé wrote,

Marx shows us, in the economic order, what new forces are born of diverse forms which human cooperation takes. He discerns in industrial production the kind of surplus value which is the product proper of the social fact.³⁴

But, retorted Bouglé, Marx was far too restrictive in the application of his theory. Other values are created than material ones. In the area of religion, for example, Bouglé criticized Marx for neglecting to explore how social forms other than the economic could produce

"projections" which are, from a materialist point of view, "illusory." Yet, on the whole, sociology and Marxism shared a rejection of an anthropo-centric approach to social facts:

Marxism poses the problem in the same terms as does objective sociology in relation to individual psychology.³⁵

A second area of agreement, Bouglé found, lay in the recognition that determinism does not exclude the will to action. This is a key point, for Durkheim's own deterministic bias disturbed Bouglé, as we noted earlier, and it seems clear that Bouglé could hardly condemn Marxism for making the same claim that durkheimians wished to advance: that their sociology was prescriptive. Bouglé pointed to the eleventh of the Theses on Feuerbach to suggest that Marxism was wrongly accused of fatalism; and one is justified in surmising that the emphasis on this point was not without purpose. In the following statement on Marx, Bouglé could, and would, substitute "Durkheim" for "Marx" and "victory" for "catastrophe":

Marx wants people to act, but in order to give strength and courage to the proletariat, he shows

it that it is the instrument of history, that evolution is working in its favor, . . . that inevitably the catastrophe will come.³⁶

Or, to quote Saint-Simon:

One must swim with the current.³⁷

Bouglé concluded by ranging Durkheim with Marx:

. . . in the preface of his book, Les Règles de la méthode sociologique he says that . . . he wants to recall that all sociology postulates the existence of a determinism yet to be discovered. . . . It seems that agreement about determinism will be easy.³⁸

The third of Bouglé's "theses" points out a basic agreement on evolutionism:

[Sociology] is hardly surprised by the place Marxism accords to evolutionism in the economic order, as well as the juridical and moral; it has long been used to relativist concepts which proclaim that change is fundamental.³⁹

Disagreement begins, however, as soon as one looks at the nature of the evolutionary process. Bouglé rejected the claims of dialectical materialism, and summoned support for his position from a number of writers for the continuity of change: Glotz, on the evolution of family rights; Pirenne, on the growth of Italian cities; and Coulanges' work in general. The difficulty arises, Bouglé asserted, from Marx' reduction of all change to economic transformations:

The causes I allege are not all material, not all economic: I allege the facts of social morphology, the forms of society. . . .⁴⁰

But most important, Bouglé was at pains to emphasize the independent force of ideas once collectively held:

. . . among the motive forces of evolution, must one refuse to give ideas their share? Are structural transformations . . . all of an economic nature and origin? This does not seem established. Collective representations, once constituted, develop their consequences, and far from being pure reflections and illusions . . . fulfill socializing functions. If collective representations, once constituted, enjoy a relative autonomy . . . many things in society are going to be able to be explained . . . by the struggle between tendencies, between beliefs, between ideas.⁴¹

Among the collectively held ideas of his age having an independent capacity to modify social forms, Bouglé pointed, of course, to egalitarianism and nationalism which were the essential values of his political theory. He was to argue that both traditions had become normal for the modern industrial society. He rejected the Marxist analysis of the rise of Protestantism as "insufficiently demonstrated." Trying to steer a course which avoided the taint of idealism, he refused to accept a materialist base of science and art:

We must point out that there subsists a life of the mind all of whose tendencies are difficult to relate to industrial or economic life.

He leaned particularly on his colleagues and fellow durkheimians for refutations of Marx' theory of the structure:

One must clearly distinguish, M. Simiand proposes, between the form and the régime of production, where the latter designates "the institution of production defined and classified according to the juridical and social relations which characterize them" and the former designates "the institutions of economic production defined and classified according to the technological or morphological relationships which characterize them." It is evident then that the variations of forms and régimes, those of the tool and the law are often independent.⁴⁴

Bouglé objected particularly to Marxist reductionism as it concerned religion. Buoyed by his own study of Indian castes, he wrote:

It is one of the most serious disadvantages of this Marxist preoccupation to attach religion to the economy; for one forgets how, even before the mode of production underwent any appreciable modification, modes of belief were already shaping the human material.⁴⁵

One major element of Marxism not touched upon in the earlier study of Marxism was the concept of class, although the critique of Marxist ideological and dialectical theory implies a rejection of class theory also. This omission may well be explained by a hesitancy on Bouglé's part to attack openly the Marxist notion of class during the pre-war period. Since the working class was the clear target of the founders of the Universités Populaires, Bouglé was concerned not so much to deny the existence of class as to urge his audience to pursue their goals by peaceful means. He therefore emphasized the durkheimian message of national unity with the assurance that

history was on their side provided they did not destroy their spiritual home and heritage in the process. To this argument he brought the tradition of French socialist thought, and avoided any abrasive attacks on Marxism other than those launched against the inevitability of revolution. In the post-war period, however, the doctrinaire Marxists had become the Communist Party; and so there was no need to consider the feelings of the lost sheep.

The argument against the Marxist concept of class was based essentially on contemporary studies--in particular those of Simiand and Maurice Halbwachs--showing (1) that there is no parallel between profession and class; (2) that class is related to income, not profession; (3) that class is related to life-style and not to income; and (4) that many people, like college professors, can find no place in a world of capitalists and proletariat. Bouglé finally concluded that it is education that ultimately determines class. He did not, however, dismiss the heuristic value of the concept as defined by Marx. He wanted to accept it as tenable to some degree, under some conditions. To this end he derived from his durkheimian colleague Halbwachs a theory of relationships which while supporting Marx, showed that economic forces were only contributory, along with other historical and

extra-economic currents.⁴⁷ He also called on contemporary statistics to attempt a refutation of the theory of the increase in the size of the proletariat.⁴⁸

The Marxist contention of growing class consciousness and revolutionary zeal was not borne out by developments both in England and in France, even though in his own country a powerful Communist party had come into existence. Many workers had come to believe, he told his students, that

If the factory collapsed they would be the worse off for it, and that little by little they can get an education in order to become governors of the great machine.⁴⁹

The conditions of revolution were far from limited to developments in the economic order; and any such developments must be supplemented by "certain common experiences and common memories."⁵⁰

The latter expression could, of course, be applied to Marx' own notion of the emergence of class consciousness, but what Bouglé meant was that it was in the nature of modern society to dampen the exclusively class experiences, and to deepen, through the process of entrecroisement, the national consciousness.

The Empirical Test: Essais sur le régime des castes

Bouglé's sociological research for his thesis on egalitarian values quite naturally led him to the classical deviant case: the caste system of India. A number of articles were published between 1900 and 1907,⁵¹ and the study appeared in book form in 1903.⁵² The study represented not only serious research of the kind required for any bona fide member of the Durkheim team, but also a testing ground for many of the theories discussed above. It was also to be a test of Durkheim's theories and his own reservations concerning the determinist optimism that pervaded La Division du travail social.

He rapidly dismissed the attempt to explain castes in terms of the machiavellianism of a priestly class:

We must leave the "artificialist" error to the 18th century which sees in most social institutions only the result of the premeditation of priests. . . . To make the organization of Hindu society dependent on the single will of the Brahmins is to exaggerate the role of wilful creation in the history of human society.⁵³

Nor was it consistent with the facts to explain the society as a simple theocracy. Its intellectual and material life was too highly developed.

Materialist theory which explained social institutions in terms of the economic division of labor, and the

value structure as a projection of Brahman rule, was not so lightly dismissed. But in arriving at the now familiar view that economic determinism is only partly explanatory, Bouglé makes exorbitant demands on the theory he is refuting:

If it is impossible to explain, by economic phenomena alone, the rule of the guild over its members, it is even more difficult to do so in the case of the caste. . . . This impossibility will be obvious if one tries to explain, one by one, as consequences of industrial evolution . . . hereditary specialization, strict hierarchy and mutual repulsion.⁵⁴

The materialist explanation therefore failed to pass the empirical test.

In rapid succession Bouglé found equally great difficulties in attempts to derive the caste system from the Aryan family, or from the lack of any political system capable of providing a counterbalance to the ambitions of a priestly class. He then took up the racial and anthropological arguments of his political adversaries which claimed either an outright racial superiority in the governing class, or argued that a variety of physical and psychological characteristics had cohered over the centuries in a ruling group. By the laws of natural selection, the Brahman caste had been constituted of these superior qualities. Bouglé knew he was challenging these theories on their home grounds:

Because India is the homeland of the castes, it will no doubt be the paradise of the anthropo-sociologists.⁵⁵

After a review of all the statistical evidence which he could lay his hands on, Bouglé penned a paragraph that must be read in its entirety to feel the obvious glee of a victor. It illustrates not only the polemical stance of the author, but also his enjoyment of the literary genre:

We have followed anthropo-sociology on the soil which seemed prepared for it. All the resources which the western world, shaken not only by the creation of nations but by the coming of democracy, denied it forever, the Hindu world, in its sacred immobility, seemed to preserve for it. The first observers, confident in the effectiveness of the Brahman laws believed that in fact they were going to discover in India the precise formulas of relationships between corporal form, mental faculties and social hierarchy. But taking a closer look, they have had to lower their pretensions. The precision of the first findings was illusion. . . . In a word, between physical differences, social differences and mental differences we continue to lack clear correlations. After, as before the study of Hindu society, the themes of racial philosophy, transformed into anthropo-sociology, remain unprovable and unlikely.⁵⁶

After exposing the weaknesses of alternative explanations, Bouglé drew his own conclusions from the evidence: the collectively-held idea--in this case religious--antedated the social forms which other theories sought to explain in economic or racial terms. He noted the resistance of this complex of ideas to the effects of the division of labor, and to the looked-for influences of the English occupation. This

conclusion clashed with Durkheim's picture of the emergence of individual autonomy under the stimulus of volume, density and social interaction between functionally diverse groups. The necessity of the evolution to a solidarity based on interdependence and having as its morale respect for the individual had been characterized as a "law"⁵⁷ and stated in the most categorical terms:

As labor is increasingly divided, the looseness [of social bonds] and [individual] liberty increase. . . .⁵⁸

And:

If the division of labor produces [organic] solidarity . . . it is because it creates a whole system of rights and duties among men which bind them to one another in a lasting way.⁵⁹

The persistence of religious forms, their capacity to resist the anticipated effects of the division of labor is only too clear in the Indian context. To Durkheim's reliance on the pressures of social density, wrote Bouglé, must be added psycho-social conditions:

Rather than a pure and simple struggle for life, the struggle for social power is responsible for [the fact that so many luxuries become needs], along with the desire it stimulates on the part of the elite for marking their superiority by all kinds of social ostentation.⁶⁰

But even these pressures, which seem drawn equally from Hobbes and Veblen, were blocked by a body of religious traditions capable of absorbing and transforming new social forms; new

divisions of social labor produced new castes and sub-castes, without the essence of the system--heredity, hierarchy and repulsion--being substantially touched. The division of labor was not spontaneous nor was it based on the diversity of natural aptitudes. Too often it was apparent that "the most demanding tasks were reserved for the weaker sex."⁶¹ And in the Indian case, Bouglé¹ concluded that

religious motives weighed the most heavily
 Spiritual power took the lead over the others, and
 represents the summit, as well as the source of all
 social power.⁶²

The inevitability of democracy was hardly assured.

One cannot, finally, avoid being struck by the concurrence of Bouglé's conclusion concerning the power of religion to block the progress of egalitarianism, and the role of Catholicism in French politics during the time that he was engaged in his study of castes. While there is no direct evidence to that effect, it seems likely that Bouglé's study was suggested by Durkheim's discussion of constraints on the emergence of organic solidarity.⁶³ The persistence of a class system which resembled, in some respects, a caste hierarchy, supported by the Catholic Church, was never far from Bouglé's mind.

The Definition of Sociology Through Confrontation

In the course of his writings explicitly aimed at confounding his ideological enemies, Bouglé came to define more clearly his own views. In La Démocratie devant la science⁶⁴ he summed up his arguments against the political right and the social darwinists while at the same time asserting his refusal to accept the Marxist call to revolution. He also elaborated his own interpretations of the sociological data from which they drew their various arguments, and there emerged a sociology which was, to a large degree, Durkheimian,¹ though with significant reservations. Three concepts--differentiation, heredity and competition--were central to all contemporary sociology, in Bouglé's opinion. Because of the way these concepts were used by the opponents of egalitarianism, it was necessary to reinterpret their conclusions, to turn the logic of his opponents against them, and to show how sociology could incorporate them in arriving at a new synthesis. The concepts must, far from denigrating democratic values, show that the latter were, in fact, historical tendencies.¹ If these tendencies were not inevitable, they were closely related to man's biological, psychological, and particularly,

social experience.

It was argued by the darwinians, for example, that differentiation of functions reflected the inequality of aptitudes. Marxists, on the other hand, accepted, in a historical sense, a hierarchical class structure closely related to differentiated functions. If it were possible to explain differentiation in such a way as to show that it reflected neither aptitudinal nor functional differences, Bouglé would meet the essential arguments of his most powerful political opponents. He emphasized, therefore, that democratic theory had never recognized the innate inequality of individuals. Inequalities appeared, then, as the consequences, rather than the cause of specialization. In the 19th century, however, biology, with its focus on differences, drew the unwarranted conclusion that social hierarchies were the natural results of the inequality of aptitudes. Against this claim to have discovered a new natural law, Bouglé marshalled facts to show that force was all too often at the root of divided labor.⁶⁵ But to remain there would have been to take a step too close to Marx. He therefore argued that differentiation, whatever its origins, did not lead to a rigid hierarchy of classes necessitating revolution for the achievement of progress. The answer lay in his theory of complication sociale which

"succeeds, in a word, in providing fortunate limits on the effects of differentiation."

Multiple associations specialize, each one pursues its own goal. But . . . has each one also its specialized workers, subjected to its goal and narrowly enclosed in its sphere of action? . . . On the contrary, individuals, far from "belonging" to one group or another, "participate" in many of them. . . . Our civilization is witness not only to the multiplication of circles, but to their intersection. And it is this incessant crossing, this universal interpenetration which constitutes the original phenomenon. . . .⁶⁶

Although evolutionary theory tended to make no distinction between specialization and differentiation, Bouglé asserted that whereas the former was a characteristic of modern society, the latter was clearly on the wane. Since this claim was the basic argument against both conservatives and Marxists, and the mode of the argument was positivist, what evidence was adduced in support of it? In fact, none. Is complication sociale determined or fortuitous, a consequence of social morphology, or a result of the prior pressure of the conscience collective? At various times he gave differing answers:

- (1) barring any obstacles expressly erected against it, the interpenetration of social circles normally follows multiplication [of social groups].⁶⁷
- (2) On the other hand, it is no less rare that the free crossing of social groups becomes the rule, the dominant fact. . . . In fact it is

only in the West that this plasticity reigns without check.⁶⁸

- (3) The pursuit of multiple ends by differentiated social groups (polytélisme) is, for civilized societies, more or less a fortuitous accident.⁶⁹
- (4) From the shock of multiple dependencies bursts independence.⁷⁰

In another context, however, Bouglé asserted that individual freedom is a legacy of

- (5) the Christian idea, showing the way in our civilization, and providing arms for the liberal idea.⁷¹

Finally, Bouglé argued, this inexorable process would see the end of ideology, in spite of the warnings of the pessimists. History, in the guise of constantly increasing multiple group memberships, was against them.⁷² Yet from this position of fatal optimism, he retreated to admit that for the working class of his time, social complication remained in a state of "pure possibility":

It cannot exercise on an increasing number of men, the liberating influence which we ascribe to it in principle.⁷³

It seems to have depended on whether he was arguing the workers out of violent actions, or trying to scare the bourgeoisie into making significant reforms. To the latter, he could have sounded like a follower of Guesde:

Class consciousness relegates all other preferences to shadows. Natural developments work to daily increase the size of the proletariat, to make it more distinct, more coherent: a process necessary for the final dissolution of classes, necessary in order that the immense majority transform the law to the advantage of the immense majority. . . . The last survival of differentiation will be swept away, and the field will be open to the free play of social complication. . . .⁷⁴

What seems clear is that Bouglé's position contained great ambivalence with regard to the relative importance of a number of factors offered, from time to time, as causes. This seeming confusion cannot, I think, be ascribed as much to fuzzy thinking as to the need to manipulate theory in terms of a political task. If, as it seems evident in Bouglé's case, sociology was a weapon in an ideological struggle, then it may be easier to see that the existential situation of reformist liberal social democrats required a theoretical flexibility capable of battling simultaneously on two fronts.

The Political and Social Context

Bouglé's defense of sociology, his use of Durkheim's theory against ideological opponents and the modifications of that theory which emerged from these concerns, all emphasize the political nature of Bouglé's sociology. What was at stake was the survival of the Republic, and the initial phase involved establishing the credentials of a sociological theory which could meet, on their own grounds,

the arguments of a sociological theory which could meet, on their own grounds, the arguments of the most serious challenges. Durkheim and Bouglé understood from the outset, however, that the defense of their sociology implied, at the same time, a political campaign, using a variety of means, to do more than simply defend the Republic. As Durkheim made clear, a political structure involved much more than its external forms. The Republic must be reshaped, and the political culture must be transformed so that it would be congruent with a society which earlier architects of liberalism could scarcely have imagined.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion of Bouglé's sociology that four major positions engaged his concern: conservatism, socialist idealism, Marxism, and laissez-faire classical liberalism. The battle was fought on two levels. First it was necessary to justify the choice of an arena in which one proposed to take a stand: at this level there was argument over methodological assumptions. Secondly, it was necessary to challenge the conclusions of opposing groups, while at the same time making an effective argument for a progressive liberal theory. Conservative thought in France was inherited from the critique of the Revolution launched by Burke, de Maistre and Bonald. It had been, in Mannheim's

words, an outlook which

relates everything to the decisive dichotomy between "construction according to calculated plan" and "allowing things to grow" . . . A mode of thought is thus created which conceives of history as the reign of pre- and super-rational forces.⁷⁵

Bonald and de Maistre attacked the individualist ideals of Enlightenment theorists, reiterated the dependence of the individual on the group, and reaffirmed the values of hierarchy and tradition as functional requisites of any social order. To this foundation were added, during the course of the nineteenth century, arguments drawn from organicist theory which Bouglé so assiduously attacked.

Certain Socialist theorists, on the other hand, began by accepting many of the methodological assumptions of eighteenth-century rationalist thought, but sought to draw radically different conclusions concerning the ills of an industrializing society and the solutions to be applied. Fourier, Owen, Blanc and Proudhon maintained the essentially ahistorical outlook of the preceding century, and it is in this sense that Engels saw them as "utopians":

They do not claim to emancipate a particular class to begin with, but all humanity at once. Like them, they wish to bring in the kingdom of reason and eternal justice, but this kingdom, as they see it, is as far as heaven from earth from that of the French philosophers.⁷⁶

The point to be made is that these reformers entered into a radical critique of a revolution which had gone wrong for lack of proper thought:

Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this on society from without by propaganda. . . .⁷⁷

Ultimately, however, the most fundamental challenge to classical liberal theory emerged in the sociology of Marxism, which combined the concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity, cloaked in new meanings, with an emphasis on group structures previously stressed by what Leon Bramson calls "the sociology of conservation":

To avoid the anarchic destruction of institutional ties which took place under liberalism and capitalism, the emphasis on the necessity of social bonds was absorbed into Marxism. . . .⁷⁸

By the end of the nineteenth century in France, Marxism had come to exercise a major, if not dominant, influence on working-class thought. Thus the effort to overthrow the Republic was grounded in sociology.

The challenges to middle-class rule were not without a sociological response. What was required was a justification of the hegemony of the industrial producer in industrial society. Saint-Simon, in France, and Herbert Spencer, in Britain, drew remarkably different conclusions on the role

of the state; but they had both abandoned the idealist methodology of classical liberalism. As Karl Mannheim remarked, this concern to meet the sociological challenge on its own grounds is natural:

The peculiar characteristic of intellectual development seems to lie precisely in the fact that the most recent challenge dictates the tempo and form of the battle. . . . The older, driven by the newer, must continuously transform itself, and must accommodate itself to the level of the most recent opponent. Thus, at present, those who have been operating with earlier modes of thought, when confronted with sociological arguments, must also have recourse to these same methods.⁷⁹

The founding of the Third Republic lowered the barriers which had existed, with the exception of brief interludes in the 1830's and between 1848 and 1851, against the full expression and influence of a rising stratum of the middle-class generated by industrialization and bureaucratization. In addition, with the pervasive influence of the Church checked by the collapse of the Empire, both Jews, who had heretofore lived on the fringes of French intellectual life, and Protestants, who had been in exile, were entering into the University system in significant numbers. They were conspicuous in new movements for social reforms which took as its banner the ideals of the Revolution, while at the same time rejecting the conclusions drawn therefrom by the upper economic strata. They were a

generation to whom science seemed to hold the key to the resolution of social, political and economic problems. Under the earlier leadership of Taine and Renan, a search had begun for a way to synthesize the rationalism of the eighteenth century and the empiricism of the nineteenth. The intellectual atmosphere of Durkheim's early teaching years was one of excitement at the opening of a new era in which, according to one writer,

philosophy itself is rendered null and void by science, for the latter is the sole instrument capable of resolving philosophical problems.⁸⁰

Charles Andler, in his biography of Lucien Herr, described those days:

We believed in the future of science . . . [but] there remained one final anxious pre-occupation: that the resources of science should not be used to assist oppression and war. We needed, therefore, in addition to science, a doctrine which would justify science through reason and prescribe for it human ends. . . . Everyone awaited a doctrine of action.⁸¹

Bouglé's own reminiscences only serve to underline the continuity of the forty years which followed the birth of the Republic. Durkheim's sociology represented an answer to the problem which was essentially ideological. As a guide to action it provided a liberal defense for what had long been its Achilles heel: a satisfactory theory of history. It provided a positivist justification of the liberal ideals

of 1789 capable of meeting conservatives, advocates of laissez-faire, and revolutionaries on their own grounds. But the rejection of metaphysics was not an unmitigated blessing. Although it firmly established the claim to enter the sociological arena, and provided a firm base for its anti-clerical stance, it could, and did, alienate a substantial portion of the reformist intellectual community which refused to abandon idealism whether neo-kantian or religious. Émile Boutroux, Ferdinand Buisson and Jean Jaurès are but three representatives of major intellectual and political schools which refused to accompany the followers of Durkheim in their methodological assumptions, yet who were no less intent upon bringing social democracy to France. From a tactical point of view, to alienate this powerful segment of the liberal community would have been politically disastrous.

The progressive liberalism of both durkheimians and idealists was both a defense of the underlying political values of liberalism, and a criticism of methodological individualism, more recently buttressed by an empirically unsound sociology. It was also a demand for entry into a political system which had excluded all but a small religious and economic oligarchy. It was, in this sense, a universal appeal, but it was aimed particularly at the working class.

When so oriented, its struggle was primarily with Marxism. The janus-stance of Emile Durkheim, his followers and colleagues, is certainly to be explained in part by the ideological requirements of the social and political situation in which they found themselves.

Terry Clark's dismissal of Bouglé as an ideologist⁸² tends to obscure what is essential to a more profound understanding of the nature and aims of the Durkheim school. Clark sees the movement in terms of an effort to transform French educational institutions, and his treatment of that period remains largely along lines of institutional resistance. His suggestion that the introduction of Durkheimian sociology filled the "void left by Catholicism after 1880"⁸³ will not hold up. The decline of Catholic influence was the result both of a shift in political power and of the creation of an ideological weapon to support it. Louis Liard, in search of the means to arm the insurgents, appointed Durkheim to Bordeaux because he was impressed by Durkheim's "republican idealism and his search for a secular morality based on science."⁸⁴ The national interest was involved:

[Louis Liard] worked in close liaison with Ferdinand Buisson, Director of Primary Education. . . . One of the problems of these two men was to make possible the application of the laws on compulsory, free education by training lay teachers for instruction of a citizen's morality.⁸⁵

It is apparent that the campaign which Bouglé led was in behalf of something far more important than securing an institutional foothold for its own sake.

Conclusion

Although, as Clark has suggested, Durkheim's sociology was directed to an important degree against the conservatism of the traditional and Catholic right, its rejection of metaphysics and idealism brought a thunderous attack on Durkheim by such ardent republicans as Charles Andler, Marcel Bernès, Alfred Fouillée and Lucien Herr, in the name of individualism.⁸⁶ Bouglé, on the other hand, admitted to Halévy that he wished to reach the widest possible audience, and that his "true profession" was that of "popularizing."⁸⁷ He set severe limits on its capacity to provide answers, and explicitly reserved a role for metaphysical thought. Sociology could only lead to greater knowledge, at least for the time being, about how society modifies individuals which it does not create. He was content to argue that sociological knowledge was a part of understanding; but, he declared,

sociology does not appear to us to be ready--if it ever will be--to substitute itself for moral law.⁸⁸

It could, however, render an inestimable service to the latter; and that service was to provide historical evidence

that the health of a society depended on the maintenance of moral ties, and that those moral ties were grounded on a respect for the relative autonomy and equality of individuals. Durkheim had made, of course, the same point in La Division du travail social and even more explicitly in his reply to Brunetière.⁸⁹ But Bouglé wished to leave room for certain aspects of liberal philosophy which appeared to have been drowned out by Durkheim's apparent mechanistic determination.

Blunting the rough edges of Durkheimian theory involved two related operations: modifying its determinist excesses, and emphasizing the importance of the individual will, while at the same time preserving a theory of history that could substantiate Tocqueville's observations on the inevitability of democracy. By proposing the existence of lois tendanciennes he could have the best of both worlds. He could make an outright denial of a historical fatalism:

Is it a necessity, purely mechanical and external, a sort of fatality, which pushed men, without their being aware of it, without their being able to resist? No . . . for if the division of labor appears as a solution to the struggle for life, it is not the only solution. . . .⁹⁰

Social solidarity was far from an automatic creation; Durkheim had clearly conceded as much in the preface to the second edition of La Division du travail social in 1902. The

achievement of a just society remained an uncompleted task calling upon men to act. Bouglé, while maintaining the Durkheimian position on social facts, refused any necessity to distinguish, in the individual psyche, two separate compartments, the individual and collective. He left room for an important contribution of the individual mind, and thus attempted to maintain a bridge between Tarde and Durkheim, and more importantly with the idealist reformers:

Because they are men . . . the elements of the social group are capable of reasoning about the outcome of differentiation as it affects them, and working to limit or change its effects if they consider them unjust.⁹¹

Bouglé did not deal satisfactorily with the origins of this notion of injustice. He seemed to suggest a psychological theory which imputed certain ideals and tendencies in individual natures:

Fraternity appears to be a prior condition of equality, and justice, which comes to terms with differences, is no more than a result of love, which thrives on similarities.⁹²

There was much here to warm the heart of any democrat steeped in the tradition of 1789.

Bouglé's tone was perceptibly different as he engaged his ideological adversaries. While on the one hand he tended to distort their claims and to reduce each to a simplistic

form more vulnerable to attack, he magnified, on the other, the prescriptive capacity of his own sociology as a viable alternative. Where victory in the competition for the minds of men depended on how effectively one could persuade them that science could furnish the grounds for action, it was necessary to emphasize the empirical and methodological shortcomings of one's opponents and the correctness of one's own. The extremes to which Bouglé went varied inversely with the sophistication of his audience. However, even in his most serious work destined for the Revue Philosophique or the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale there appeared quite categorical claims for confidence in the evolution of a modern form of solidarity grounded on egalitarianism:

The division of labor not only assures social cohesion, it modifies its nature, it stamps our morality with a new direction. To the solidarity which was founded on the annihilation of individuals it substitutes a solidarity founded on the free development of individuals.⁹³

National survival depended on hearkening to sociological findings: modern societies like France could not last or progress without adopting democratic forms:

It is permissible to say that . . . the intuition of moralists [like Buisson and Michel] are from now on confirmed by the evidence of sociologists. As far as is possible, they justify it. . . .⁹⁴

In the final analysis, then, the truths that had been propounded by eighteenth-century idealism had become the only morale fit for the stage at which France found herself at the beginning of the twentieth. The metaphysical speculation of one age was confirmed and enhanced by the science of another.

It is interesting, lastly, to note how Durkheim's sociology made effective use of what Mannheim called the "counter-concept."⁹⁵ Bouglé was at great pains to concede to the conservatives the importance, nay necessity, of social solidarity, grounded on a moral system, and realized through the national tradition. Yet how different in meaning were these words when spoken by Maurras or Brunetière. In a similar mode, sociology extolled the "individual" and "autonomy" to the idealists, and spoke of "equality" to the left. To the latter, also, the Marxist notions of "social progress," "superstructure," "dialectics" and "class" were used in ways that subtly transformed their meaning. Looked at in this way, Bouglé seemed to be speaking to conservatives, liberals and Marxists in a language that to each was familiar. What Durkheim had expressed in terms of sociological theory, Bouglé expressed in terms tailored to the exigencies of the particular political conditions of the period preceding the first World War.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

¹1903a.

²1908a.

³Durkheim, DTS, p. 407.

⁴1907a, pp. 24-25.

⁵1899d and 1901e.

⁶1897c, p. 443. See footnotes for Bouglé's bibliography, which includes in addition to De La Poughe, Ammon and P. Bourget.

⁷1900c, p. 336.

⁸Ibid., p. 342.

⁹Ibid., p. 343.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 342.

¹¹J. Novikow, "Les Castes et la Sociologie Biologique," Revue Philosophique (October 1900), pp. 361-73.

¹²Ibid., p. 370.

¹³Ibid., p. 372.

¹⁴A. Espinas, "Être ou ne pas Être," RP 51 (1901), pp. 449-80.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 453-55.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 466.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸1901c, p. 123.

- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 128
- ²⁰Ibid., p. 137.
- ²¹Ibid., p. 139.
- ²²Ibid., p. 46.
- ²³1903c, p. 262.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 264.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 265.
- ²⁶See 1903a, Part III, Chap. 1, and 1904e, pp. 260-61.
- ²⁷1903c, p. 268.
- ²⁸1904c, p. 270.
- ²⁹1910c, p. 83.
- ³⁰1902d, p. 405.
- ³¹1908e.
- ³²1929a, p. 19.
- ³³1908e, p. 724.
- ³⁴Ibid., p. 726.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 733.
- ³⁶1929a, p. 14.
- ³⁷Ibid.
- ³⁸Ibid.
- ³⁹Ibid., p. 19.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 20.

⁴²Ibid., p. 17.

⁴³Ibid., p. 26.

⁴⁴1908e, pp. 738-39.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 748.

⁴⁶1929a, pp. 30-31.

⁴⁷Maurice Halbwachs, La Classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie (Paris, 1913).

⁴⁸1929a, p. 31.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 34.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹1901b, 1907g, 1907h, 1907i, 1907k, 1907o.

⁵²1908a.

⁵³Ibid., p. 30.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 37.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 104.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 122-23.

⁵⁷Durkheim, DTS, pp. 147, 169.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 319.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 402-3.

⁶⁰1908a, p. 165.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 169.

⁶²Ibid., p. 171.

⁶³Durkheim, DTS, pp. 367-74.

⁶⁴1903a.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 167.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 155.

⁶⁷1907e, p. 595.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹1914b, p. 595.

⁷⁰1907f, p. 812.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 813.

⁷²Ibid., p. 815.

⁷³1903a, p. 178.

⁷⁴1901d, p. 179.

⁷⁵Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harvest Books, 1936), p. 121.

⁷⁶Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York, 1959), p. 71.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 73-74.

⁷⁸Leon Bramson, The Political Context of Sociology (Princeton, 1961), p. 21.

⁷⁹Mannheim, p. 231.

⁸⁰Lukes, p. 67.

⁸¹Charles Andler, La Vie de Lucien Herr (Paris, 1932), p. 35.

⁸²Terry Clark, Prophets and Patrons (Cambridge, 1973), p. 178.

⁸³Clark, p. 162.

⁸⁴Lukes, p. 95.

⁸⁵J.C. Filloux, La Science sociale et l'action (Paris, 1970), p. 17.

⁸⁶Lukes, pp. 314-315.

⁸⁷Bouglé-Halévy, n.d., 1906-6.

⁸⁸1907a, p. 143.

⁸⁹E. Durkheim, "L'Individualisme et les intellectuels," Revue Bleue, 4^e Serie, X, pp. 7-13.

⁹⁰1907a, p. 156.

⁹¹1900c, p. 344.

⁹²1907a, pp. 140-141.

⁹³Ibid., p. 136.

⁹⁴1905f, p. 587.

⁹⁵Mannheim, pp. 208, 213, 219, 230, 234-235, 239-240, 241-242, 245, 249-250, 274, 295.

CHAPTER IV
THE SOCIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
FOR EGALITARIANISM

Introduction

In the preceding chapters of this study we have focused on Bouglé's sociological foundations and an aspect of his work in which he not only defended Durkheim's sociology in its essential propositions, but used the new science to discredit the scientific claims of rival political positions. The role of franc-tireur was one which Bouglé never entirely abandoned, though the bulk of articles of that kind were written before 1908.

It was not in his nature, however, to remain on the defensive. Well before the Dreyfus Affair drew him into an advocacy role, he began a study of the emergence of egalitarian ideas which was to become his doctoral thesis. When he was fired from his post at St. Briec he moved to Montpellier where he found a number of young colleagues at the University and in the lycées who were already actively involved in speaking at rallies, conferences and meetings. His letters to Halévy during this period bear witness to his excitement with a new-found life of public-speaking, and direct involvement in the great issues of the time: the Affair, the Separation of Church and State, and the struggles

of the working class for increased political influence and for improvement in their material life.

In many ways, Bouglé's central political concerns are most clearly expressed in an article entitled La Crise du Libéralisme, which appeared in 1902. There he wrote that the essence of liberalism was

free speech, free thought, freedom for men to learn the truth from one another in universal discussion. . . . It demands for all individuals without exception the right of saying anything without restriction. It forbids the community from preventing, in any way, its members from speaking, writing or meeting to exchange or advocate their ideas.¹

He asserted, furthermore, that this formula had become, or was becoming, the accepted moral standard of the nation, for every party from left to right paid at least lip service to the ideal. It was the modern conscience collective.

Bouglé declared, however, that the exercise of these rights depended on the prior existence of certain societal conditions which turned out to be a contemporary expression of "one king, one law, one faith." He asked,

What is necessary that a society live, and that individuals . . . enjoy the benefits of social life? . . . A certain degree of unity, without which the individuals could not form a social body. --And what, in turn, does that unity suppose? A minimum of resemblance, obedience and concentration.²

By resemblance, Bouglé meant a common faith, a common set of values upon which there was agreement throughout the society.

Without this unanimity, he wrote, society

would perish as would animal life without oxygen.³

By obedience, Bouglé understood the internalized restraints upon individual caprice:

. . . they must agree . . . to give way to a certain rule, to consider a certain number of things as forbidden, to obey, quite simply, one law.⁴

By concentration, Bouglé meant that a society must have a single, sovereign center capable of organizing the movements of the parts:

If the individuals who make it up permit themselves to be governed by different centers, if they recognize antagonistic powers, if they form . . . states within the state, society risks being pulled apart, broken up and divided.⁵

It is clear from the above that no political or moral question could be considered without reference to social conditions, without reference to the existing nature of the division of labor. Every recommendation for greater or lesser freedom of speech and association had to be considered against its probable effects on the life and progress of the social whole.

If the liberal ideal were realized, if each individual thought for himself, constructing his own personal ideas, would that not be the ruin of that unanimity which alone permits individuals to reach agreement and to aid one another?⁶

Equally great dangers loomed as a result of the gradual

formation of hostile blocs, and with the deterioration of respect for a common law. As Bouglé admitted, a case could be made that France was, in 1902, in a serious state of social decay:

. . . it is not only anarchist doctrines which are responsible, but, in a more general way, the mores of our newspapers. . . . One must agree that the liberty they use has little relationship to that which used to be honored under the name of liberty of thought, for it is hardly at thought that they direct their words . . . but rather, in order to better set [their readers] against their enemies, to hypnotise them by mechanical means. . . .⁷

In a similar manner, Bouglé had recourse to historical and sociological arguments when he considered the alternative propositions of repressive action against subversive thought. First, he warned, history teaches that the tendency toward despotic rule is far greater than that which leads to anarchy:

We will then understand that 'license' is perhaps a safeguard for any real liberty, just as revolt is a condition of progress. . . . History has recorded up to the present, far more excesses by authority than by liberty.⁸

Bouglé reminded his readers that a society without intermediate associations capable of balancing a powerful state was "a veritable sociological monstrosity."⁹ Never afraid, in the proper context, of borrowing a dangerous analogy, he concluded that "an organism so strangely constituted appears incapable of any progress."¹⁰

Fundamental to Bouglé's political philosophy are

three propositions which will form, in turn, the bases for this chapter and the two which follow. First, the emergence of egalitarian ideas has been a historical necessity determined, to a large degree, by the development of the division of labor. Yet the proliferation of those values which proclaim the uniqueness and worth of the individual is not, in Bouglé's sociology, the result of a simple, mechanical process. Man is endowed with will, which has been gradually freed from the dormant state maintained by those societies characterized by mechanical solidarity. While on the one hand egalitarian ideas are powerful historical tendencies, their further progress requires the active political intervention of enlightened men who, aided primarily by the science of sociology, understand the possibilities of limitations involved. Their further advance requires not only the elimination of ignorance and prejudice, but the creation of those social and political institutions which are the necessary conditions of further progress.

The second proposition states that the emergence of egalitarian ideas must, if they are to be meaningful, be within the context of a conscience collective capable of replacing the old religions while performing the same unifying function of moral restraint. Bouglé argued that it was in the nation and culture that there inhered the

modern morale, prescribing respect for the autonomous individual and imposing the obligations which flowed therefrom.

The third proposition was that the history of the development of modern industrial society showed conclusively that a political center capable of organization, and balanced by intermediate associations, must emerge if that society was not to collapse into anarchy. But organization was not an end in itself; it must be measured by its capacity to advance the natural tendencies of democratization, and to give meaning and substance to that religion which, alone, could assure a civic virtue.

Les Idées Egalitaires

Very shortly after Bouglé returned from Germany he began to prepare his doctoral thesis, which was to be a study of the growth of democratic ideas. What Tocqueville had explained as providential, what T.H. Green sought to justify on idealist grounds, Bouglé wished to explain as a function of the division of labor. To this task he brought the methodological assumptions we have earlier discussed: the reality of ideas as social phenomena, and the possibility of finding the connecting links between ideas and other social forms in the laboratory of history.

The material did not lend itself to a wholly inductive

study, for the appearance of egalitarian ideas was historically rare; and so, from the outset, Bouglé was at pains to justify a method which was both inductive and deductive. He admitted that the development of democracy in western society was a cas unique, but he was not going to be discouraged by that:

Since when is it impossible, just because a phenomenon occurs rarely, to discover, a priori, its law of origin? Where induction fails, deduction retains its rights. . . .¹¹

If this were not true, since historical facts are never repeated in any empirical sense of the word, sociology would be reduced to explaining nothing unless it used deductive methods. What one is justified in doing, Bouglé argued, is formulating more general laws, which may then be tested against the cases one has at hand:

If history does not let us establish precisely the relationships which unite such and such a social form with the success of egalitarianism, then we shall have to try to demonstrate them.¹²

In other words, having established that in the cases where egalitarian ideas are on the rise certain social forms are found to be developing, one is justified in showing that this relationship conforms to a more general law. In fact, empirical laws are not very interesting if one goes no further:

As long as they are not deduced from more general laws, they are lois en instance rather than lois regues: empirical laws are always subject to caution, by the very fact that they cannot be explained. On the contrary, even though a relation between two phenomena is revealed in only a very few cases, with little variation, or even in one case, if I can deduce [the relationship] from a more general law, it belongs to science.¹³

What is striking is that the "more general laws" turn out to be psychological. He offers this example of his methodological procedure:

Suppose, for example, that the historical coincidence of egalitarianism and centralization is only revealed rarely: if at least we grasp clearly, in these rare examples, the process whereby individual minds (esprits) exposed to the action of a centralized regime must be brought to egalitarian ideas, it will be legitimate to judge that the coincidence in question conceals a law: psychology can make up for the inability of history to confer on sociological propositions all the "likelihood" that they are capable of today.¹⁴

If Les Idées égalitaires was designed to be a sociological study conforming to the rules laid down by Durkheim, it turned out to be largely deductive, or, a demonstration of the explanatory value of Durkheim's sociology, corrected and completed by explanations drawn from psychology. What Bouglé believed was hidden, or surreptitious, in Durkheim, he brought into the open. By drawing on Simmel and Tarde, on Renouvier and Espinas, he not only avoided the apparent dogmatism of Durkheim, but also drew together the various streams of sociological and psychological theory, showing

that they were useful to one another.

It is evident from the outset that Bouglé was searching not simply for facts, but for facts whose necessity implied prescription and imposed obligations:

Ought men be treated as equals? In that case, what sort of equality ought to be recognized for them? Must I proclaim that they have the same duties, the same rights? Do I want material or spiritual goods apportioned among them in equal shares, or according to merit, or according to their labor? All of these are moral problems which the tendency toward egalitarian ideas imposes upon our consciences.¹⁵

Bouglé rejected clearly and unequivocally both naturalist and rationalist approaches to the problem of equality:

Metaphysics establishes, through reason, moral prescriptions. Once our metaphysical system is built, not only do we declare that the demands of the mind, or of nature, are to be respected above all else; but we explain [the conclusion] by the place we assign to nature or mind in our system of the world. From that point we suspend, to a chain of philosophical deductions, those very moral maxims to which our judgments of egalitarianism were suspended.

Bouglé disavowed any effort to treat the problem in moral terms, declaring that

it appears to be a good method, if we wish to study objectively the idea of the equality of men, to set aside, as much as possible any feelings, justified or not by principle, which the subject may inspire in us.¹⁷

In a similar manner, Bouglé rejected any interest in taking up the problem of applying sociology to the means of

reaching ends chosen a priori, claiming that the task was too difficult for a science yet in the first stages of its development. For a long time to come, he wrote,

we will have to let ourselves be guided in politics by a kind of empirical tact. Life does not wait for science; and it would require nothing less than a perfect and completed science of every kind of social phenomenon to give us a formula for the proper egalitarian policies. The solution of the technical problems of egalitarianism must be reserved for the time when the social sciences are completely built.¹⁸

Meanwhile, one had to approach the question at the simplest methodological level:

With what [social] phenomena is the idea of the equality of men in a constant relationship? How is its appearance determined? What are its antecedents?--There is a strictly scientific question.¹⁹

The object of this research had, of course, to be defined. Bouglé did so in a strictly a priori manner. What he proposed to take as ideas which qualified under this rubrique involved two principal premises, and a number of corollaries he inferred from them. First,

is the assertion that humanity has a proper value, and that, as a consequence, all men have rights. . . . Beneath the differences, we have necessarily found their resemblance, owing to which we can situate them as belonging equally to the human society, to the human species.²⁰

From this premise, the following corollary is important: distinctive collectivities--classes, or groups to which is

attributed unequal value--are formally contrary to egalitarianism. The second premise is stated as follows:

The notion of the value properly due each individual appears to be an essential element of egalitarian ideas. . . . One cannot declare their equality without taking into account that they are persons, that is to say independent and original centers of activity.²¹

This premise, declared Bouglé, leads necessarily not only to the corollary stated above, but also to the conclusion that the claim to equal juridical rights does not imply a claim to the uniformity of sanctions but rather to proportionality.²² We shall return later to an assessment of the definition of equality which Bouglé takes to be the "egalitarianism" under investigation.

The central focus of the study was the relationship between the growth of egalitarian ideas and the increasingly complex division of labor in modern society. Where Durkheim, in his earlier work, emphasized the repressive nature of mechanical solidarity, Bouglé laid far more emphasis on Durkheim's notion of ressemblance. The homogeneity of the group arose from the psychological recognition of the equality of other individuals in the group. Obviously this sort of egalitarianism did not extend beyond the community in question. But homogeneity was not the true source of egalitarian attitudes. Durkheim, in his description of

the passage from mechanical to organic solidarity had stressed that the division of labor brought to the individual "a sphere of action which is his own, and therefore a personality."²³ Cohesion, or solidarity, of the organic stage became greater as the area of individual freedom from repressive social controls became wider. Durkheim wrote:

Each depends more closely upon society with the progressive increase in the division of labor.²⁴

Durkheim, therefore, explained the solidarity of modern society in rational terms. He assumed an awareness on the part of individuals of a dependence on the whole, although he emphasized that both the state and intermediary associations would be the institutional instruments whereby the individual is constantly called to his obligations to the society.²⁵

Bouglé, on the other hand, was unwilling to accept what he took to be a mechanistic account of the emergence of the egalitarian morale--that solidarity whose most profound expression was the value of each individual. He argued, instead, that with increasing contact, brought on by more concentrated populations, the quality of that density was transformed. The notion of "we" and "they" enlarged the framework of "same" in a process that saw the concept of "man" become increasingly generalized. While

differentiation increased, social complication brought a widening sense of resemblance. This, in turn, tended to break down closed groups:

It is easy to see how social complication combats directly the notion of class, the born enemy of egalitarianism.²⁶

Drawing largely on Simmel, he sought the ultimate explanation in psychology. Each individual, finding himself at the crossroads of a variety of groups, becomes increasingly aware of his own originality; and no longer oppressed by the only group to which he belongs, he becomes aware of his own individual liberty. At the same time, his horizons are enlarged and he sees resemblances among a far wider number of human beings, even to the point where the idea of the rights of humanity is born. While it may be argued that the mere increase in social groupings does not necessarily guarantee that the individual's rank within each group will vary, there is at least a better chance that continued complication will give birth to institutions which do not perpetuate earlier ranking systems. Christianity is the foremost example of this in western civilization.²⁷

Heterogeneity, then, was the key to the notion of the egalitarianism:

An increase in the variety of individuals must favor the formation of the idea of a human

type . . . [it] cannot fail to fashion in us an attitude which is less exclusive and more tolerant. . . .²⁸

The society in which solidarity was "mechanical" was homogeneous, and required the imitation of others in all things. But with the progress of the division of labor, the field of imitation is enlarged, and the reign of custom is replaced by the reign of style, or the "imitation of others in something."²⁹

To these influences, Bouglé added one more: noting that the unification and centralization of societies had varied directly with more egalitarian relations, he concluded that political power had contributed to the process by crushing the more narrowly based groups. The argument was a clear attempt to refute Spencer, and to buttress the position of those who were demanding greater state responsibilities.

In support of largely deductive arguments outlined above, Bouglé drew upon a vast amount of historical evidence to show that a variety of social and demographic forces had been at work in western society both during and since the Roman era not only to widen men's contact with one another, but also to encourage the decline of oppressive groups. Bouglé carefully steered clear of any suggestion of

"necessity." He argued that the division of labor "permits"³⁰ the liberation of the individual, and that it "prepares men to obey . . . the prescriptions of egalitarianism."³¹ Bouglé could thus suggest a certain ultimate inevitability of egalitarianism, without, at the same time, alienating idealists. This is no better illustrated than by a passage appearing at the end of Les Idées:

As long as the conquest of the western world by egalitarian ideas has been regarded as the surprising good fortune resulting from a philosophical theory falling from the sky into the brains of a few thinkers and spreading from one person to another into the hearts of the masses, it has been believed that a philosophical discussion was sufficient to check it: refute Rousseau, and egalitarianism is defeated. If, on the contrary, the triumph of egalitarianism is to be explained, not by the invention of theory, but by the very make-up of the societies where it holds sway, then the conditions of the battle are changed: chop up the political entities, destroy the cities, close the roads, set men in groups between which all imitation would be prevented and within which individual differences would not be tolerated; those are the elements of social revolution which you would have to bring about in order to check the democratic urge of our civilization.⁴¹

This argument was to be the weapon with which Bouglé was to fight the conservatives, the laissez-faire liberals and the revolutionaries for the rest of his life.

Critique of Bouglé's Theory of the
Emergence of Egalitarian Ideas

A critique of Bouglé's defense of egalitarian ideals, keystone in the arch of a progressive liberal theory scientifically grounded, falls into three parts: first, the definition which he employed for historical research; second, the adequacy of the evidence offered in defense of the thesis; and third, the ideological nature of Bouglé's theory.

Bouglé's definition of egalitarian ideas is limited, upon close examination, to equality before the law, at the very least, and to the rather vague expression, an "equality of value due each individual."³³ Bouglé had been quite explicit on what he regarded as limits to the idea he identified as the object of his research:

To claim equality of juridical rights is not to proclaim the equality of real rights. To recognize the same rights for all individuals is not to demand that, however unequal their actions may be, the same sanctions are applied, but only that those sanctions be distributed in accordance with the same weight and the same measure. The formula for the logical demands of egalitarianism is "proportionality", not "uniformity".³⁴

This statement, which lays down what Bouglé takes to be the social phenomenon "egalitarian ideas" says nothing more than equal things should be treated equally and is a point too vague to be useful. Bouglé's thesis examiners were quick to make this clear. By restricting the definition to

equality before the law, Bouglé had, said Emile Boutroux, adopted a purely Kantian position:

That is too special, it is not a present day notion. It is too rich in metaphysical principles, and yet is no longer, today, wide enough. You restrict it to legal equality. That idea would seem to be sufficient for any energetic individual who wishes to dominate his fellow men.³⁵

However, it is the limitation which Bouglé set upon the idea of equality which is more open to question; for, in accepting it, one must conclude that there is an arbitrary limitation to the rights to which all members of society might lay equal claim. According to Bouglé's formulation, before the law each individual would be judged differently, and punished in a manner proportionate to his acts. But the word "sanctions" carries with it also the notion of "reward." Thus, rewards, or goods, would necessarily be distributed in terms of acts. Bouglé confirms that this is so:

In order that the inequality of sanctions be exactly proportionate to the inequality of individual actions, it is necessary that the conditions of action be the same for all. . . . From this point of view, it is false that egalitarianism denies differences among individuals and aims to eliminate competition among them; it is true that it aims at equalizing the conditions of that competition.³⁶

It is significant that the notion of need is not included, beyond an implied need to have access to the competitive market society. If Bouglé would persuade us that he is investigating a phenomenon which has evolved, then there would be every reason for suggesting that the corollaries which might be deduced from a premise of human equality are not limited to juridical rights. It is important not to forget that men are alike, as Bernard Williams has suggested, in

. . . the capacity to feel pain, both from immediate physical causes and from various situations represented in perception and thought, and the capacity to feel affection for others. . . .³⁷

Bouglé's definition was clearly not empirical, for history affords clear evidence that men have construed the notion of equality in ever-widening terms.

Durkheim--to whom the thesis was dedicated--was quick to call Bouglé's attention to this weakness. He praised the effort to relate ideas to a definite state of society as something "very new"; but he took issue with his definition of the idea he was dealing with:

What I would criticise you for is what I find to be a kind of distraction, almost bashfulness, which results in your not daring--or so it seems--to explore fully your own idea. Thus egalitarianism comes down to a simple principle of justice: to each according to his merit. Isn't there a more radical egalitarianism which does not even

take that last inequality into consideration and which is, besides, only a form of the preceding notion? Isn't there in any kind of inequality something which shocks us? I realize that this hyper-egalitarianism is more contested, but the tendency exists and I do not think it will be without foundation.³⁸

Bouglé's use of evidence was highly, and arbitrarily, selective. He omitted from his study a large number of societies in which egalitarianism was evident: Athenian democracies, Italian, the Swiss forest cantons, Calvin's Republic, the Lollard and Leveller movements in England, and a number of others.³⁹ But more damaging, I think, is the doubt cast on the explanatory value of the variables of size, density and heterogeneity of population. Pitirim Sorokin, in 1927, pointed out a number of societies of small size, low density, and a lack of heterogeneity where one found less stratification and more self-government than in some of the societies used by Bouglé as evidence.⁴⁰

Bouglé's definition of egalitarianism was not only severely limited, and consequently historically inaccurate; he also undercut the historical determinist argument which added weight and persuasiveness to the liberal position he was asserting. On the one hand, Bouglé disclaimed any moral value in egalitarian ideas, and he argued that the individual moral conscience was free to praise or find fault with this

tendency. On the other hand, the central thrust of his work was to demonstrate the historical relationship--causal, in fact--between those ideas and the evolution of certain social conditions. It was, plainly, not accidental. Durkheim himself was quick to point out this contradiction:

You say that the [individual] moral conscience is free to praise or find fault with the egalitarian tendency even after you have demonstrated that this tendency is consistent with our whole social condition. But if our social state implies egalitarianism, what possible weight can our poor moral conscience have? Such a protest could only be platonic, unless it ends up in collective suicide. Especially if, as I believe you are trying to say, this social state has nothing accidental about it, if it is the end of a historical process, would not any revolt of moral conscience under such conditions be a revolt against the real, against life? In a word, if ideas come from social reality, they can certainly react upon that reality, but not lay down the law to it.⁴²

Durkheim concluded by stating his own belief that ultimately what is "moral" is what is "real":

What is necessary to life, what derives necessarily from the fundamental (not accidental) conditions of life in society, cannot be bad.⁴²

Bouglé seems to have wanted the best of both worlds: sociological determinism and the individual conscience.

Bouglé's advisors, Henri Michel, Emile Boutroux and Gabriel Séailles, were the major sources of criticism at the

thesis defense: they were all well known for their philosophical idealism. Bouglé was called to task for his failure to say anything about the origin of egalitarian ideas; only the spread of those ideas was dealt with. And they seized upon the occasion to attack the pretensions of sociology.⁴³ But they were also pleased with the degree to which Bouglé avoided any determinist conclusions. Boutroux remarked:

The idea of equality which is the subject of your thesis is founded on the idea of the human personality. It is of spiritualist inspiration, and that is what renders it beautiful.

Gabriel Séailles seconded Boutroux, and remarked that

the idea of equality is an ideal which does not issue necessarily from mechanical causes. . . . It is necessary to seek the answer in an ideological explanation if one is to account for the genesis and diffusion of the idea of equality.⁴⁵

The political wisdom which dictated this straddling of the methodological abyss separating the two camps and Bouglé's sense that sociology must be a political weapon is illustrated, I think, in his remarks which concluded his defense:

As I see it, the ideological explanation must be put off as long as possible. Sociology must try to determine, that is to explain, social ideas by their social antecedents, by social forms. It is a question of method which has a practical interest. . . . Is the social question a moral question? If social forms influence the development of moral ideas, it is not sufficient to preach those ideas, but, if they are to triumph,

to modify social forms. And for that task mere good will is not enough; we must have an informed intelligence which, by determining the relationship of moral ideas to social forms, gives us a measure of their power.⁴⁶

Bouglé's way of carefully walking down the middle path was continued in his later work on the social phenomena of ideas and values. In reading into the process of the division of labor certain human tendencies which he wished to establish in support of his political goals, and in order to refute his opponents, Bouglé did not, however, cross the line into rationalist modes of thought; these "sentiments" which he posited were likely instilled in men by even earlier forms of society lost in the farther reaches of history. His use of the word âme is merely an example of using an old and revered expression in a new way. He only wanted to contend that the cooperative society was natural; and because it was natural, the argument for putting an end to the anarchy of capitalism was moral and prescriptive. But he was not beyond even suggesting that the sources of fraternity lay deeply buried in the organism, whether animal or human:

The study of Sociétés animales long ago revealed to M. Espinas the embryo of more than one virtue. . . . Pelicans who see one of their own attached to a tree by Mexicans bring him fish to keep him alive; a sense of fraternity so certain that Mexicans count on it to procure fish. . . . How

can this be explained except by a budding morality where no religion exists?⁴⁷

Bouglé constantly wavered in the degree to which he would accept the inevitability of the progress of democracy. His ideological message to the working class, illustrated by the speeches and reprinted in Pour la démocratie française,⁴⁸ libéralisme et solidarisme,⁴⁹ Pour la Liberté de conscience,⁵⁰ and Vie spirituelle et action sociale,⁵¹ took the position that there was an inevitability in the progress toward greater equality which had the whole force of history behind it. In doing so he echoed⁵² Durkheim's certainty, expressed in La Division du travail social as follows:

Individualism, free thought, do not date from our own times, nor from 1789, nor from the reformation, nor scholasticism, nor from the fall of Greco-Roman polytheism, or from oriental theocracies. It is a phenomenon which begins nowhere, but which has been ceaselessly developing throughout the whole course of history.⁵³

And Durkheim had clearly proclaimed that "science can help us find the direction in which we should orient our conduct."⁵⁴

Yet Bouglé constantly cast doubt on the Durkheimian mechanism, when he was addressing the world of scholars, and emphasized, in its stead, something in man which urged cooperation, and which must be a part of any persuasive argument that any evolutionary theory existed:

Wherever animal societies have developed, one recognizes not only the material externality, but one can sense the spiritual foundations of a true civilization.⁵⁵

Man had not simply adapted to conditions; he had made conditions conform to his ideals. Man had a tendency toward sympathy and cooperation; society, representing the common urge not only to survive, but to live decently, developed a conscience commune capable of reinforcing natural inclinations and repressing natural egoism.

The ideological springs of Bouglé's work lay in what he perceived to be the threat of political ideas advanced by Marxists and advocates of a minimal governmental role. For Marxists, Bouglé argued, the values that men live for, the ends they hold sacred, are epiphenomenal, and thus illusions. Granting this contention up to a point by refusing to explain institutions by their professed goals, Bouglé nevertheless countered that human values

. . . are in no way, for us, vain shadows or St. Elmo's fire, appearances without power. . . . The true reality of societies is psychological, and ideas are, first of all, connecting links. Epiphenomenism forgets too easily that to treat a fact as merely outward appearance is in no way to show that it is non-existent, nor without effect.⁵⁶

Such a distortion of the Marxist theory of ideology is to be explained by the necessity of simplifying the distinction

between the two interpretations of the origin of values. Since Bouglé denied that they arose out of class needs, he could better argue that they represented either the consensus of a whole society, or that of diverse small groups, having postulated that Marxists took them to have no independent force. The argument that values are real is not so much, I think, an argument to justify a sociology as an effort to engage in sleight-of-hand: though values were social creations (and thus relative, contingent) they were not, for all that to be dismissed. In the first place they exercised on man an external force:

If values stand before us as realities independent of our momentary impressions and of our changing desires, the principal reason is, no doubt, that one way or another they tend to impose themselves on us.⁵⁷

In the second place their existence, being related to the evolution of the social division of labor, had a presumption of truth, which if not platonic, was at least historical. Granted this much, one could proceed to an analysis destined to identify those values which were on the decline because they no longer conformed to the modern form of the division of labor, and those which, on the contrary, were particularly congruent.

Bouglé used the study of values to attack both the labor theory of value and the law of supply and demand.

Economic activity was carried on within a wider, more pervasive value-system:

It is not enough, in order to measure values, to simply add up the work which is incorporated . . . nor to present them as resulting from the interaction of two quasi-mechanical forces; the law of supply and demand supposes . . . a certain state of the law which marks limits imposed by moral ideals upon individual appetites. In addition there are needs other than material, other interests than individual; the collectivity, through diverse systems of attraction and pressure, orients, in ways which might surprise economists, the desires of individuals.⁵⁸

If this be true, then the free enterprise system is not self-regulating, but is subject to the commands of the societal morale which, as Durkheim had extensively argued, was the true source of the obligation of contracts.

After the crisis of the Dreyfus Affair, which tended to unite republican and anti-clerical forces in French society, the gravest threat to the transformation of the nation's social policies came from that largely rural element in society which identified with the Radical party, but which stood for a minimal governmental role, and sought to impose this view on party policies, particularly with regard to the demands of the working class.

Equality and the Caste System

The fact that Bouglé['] was gathering material on both egalitarian ideas and on the Indian caste system during the same period suggests that the two studies are part of a larger investigation of the tendencies and limits of the effects of the division of labor. Bouglé[']s treatment of the Indian caste system was something more than an attack on the sociological theories which had sought to generalize about the inevitability of elite rule. It was also an assertion about the limits of egalitarianism in human societies. Bouglé['] did not argue that the caste system was unique, but rather that it was a more petrified form of a system of social hierarchy which exists in all societies:

The Hindu caste is, in our view, only the synthesis of elements present everywhere; the prolongation and even the end result of lines sketched out everywhere, the unique spread of universal tendencies.⁵⁹

What, then, was the place of egalitarian ideas in a society in which hierarchy was the rule? Bouglé['] felt that the former would not erase the latter altogether; instead, he wrote:

The system of castes in India had triumphed over all those forces [the division of labor] which should have checked or stifled it.⁶⁰

Although Bouglé did not speak directly to the question, one is warranted in concluding that human societies necessarily contained features which were both individualist and hierarchical. This insight has been restated more recently by Louis Dumont in Homo Hierarchicus where, having paid homage to Bouglé's work, he developed several of the ideas adumbrated both in the Idées and in the Essais:

From a certain moment in Western history men saw themselves as individuals. . . . But men did not cease to be social beings the day they concerned themselves in a contrary fashion. . . . It has already been remarked at the outset that this ideally autonomous man was in actual fact the most dependent of his kind, tightly enclosed in an unprecedented extension of the division of labor. Likewise we have fallen in with Tocqueville's view that individualistic democracy is only viable if it is encompassed in a more extensive ideology of a traditional sort--of a religion, or perhaps other type.⁶¹

Dumont concludes, furthermore, that

. . . it is something to know that hierarchy is a universal necessity, and that it will become manifest in some way, in covert, ignominious or pathological forms in relation to the opposed ideals in force.⁶²

Bouglé's argument for equality was, as we have seen, clearly within the context of what he took to be a sociological reality: hierarchy. Bouglé's egalitarianism, like Durkheim's, was limited to the removal of obstacles which prevented men and women from reaching that social

and economic level which their qualities merited. The social hierarchy which resulted would provide that balance which was natural. Louis Dumont has put the matter into the wider perspective of political theory. Of Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel he wrote:

These three philosophers are united . . . by the fact that, starting from an apparently or really extremely individualistic position, they reversed it as they went along in order to force the individual to make himself, or to recognize himself as, a social man--in the form of a citizen, that is, of course, on the political plane. . . . All three have the distinction of having gone beyond the modern ideology in order to harmonize it with social reality.⁶³

Dumont's recognition of Bouglé derives, in part, from his sense that Bouglé, like those earlier theorists, was groping toward a deeper understanding of modern society; and that understanding required the examination of both individualism and hierarchy.

The difficulty with the argument, particularly when it is understood in the limited terms in which Bouglé presented it, lies in his failure to recognize that political and educational equality of opportunity were, and are, insufficient to a society in which individual potential is maximized. As C.B. MacPherson has pointed out,⁶⁴ the continued existence of private ownership of productive property by a small minority of the population

requires that the vast majority give up a part of their power merely to gain access to the means whereby potential can be realized. Bouglé seemed to feel that the development of egalitarian ideas which would open the road to the equality of opportunity would result in a hierarchy based on merit. We have good reason to question this today, where the socio-economic inequalities of an extreme nature persist despite the institutionalization of "equal protection" at the political and educational levels.

Bouglé and the Liberal Tradition

If, as Steven Lukes argues, the whole sociology of Durkheim "was founded on the denial of methodological individualism,"⁶⁵ such a singleness of purpose is not to be found in Bouglé's work. For this reason, the latter seems often at odds both with himself and with his older colleague. Bouglé is much more, both for strategic reasons, and by natural predilection, a child of nineteenth-century liberalism.

Pierre Guiral has remarked that French liberalism includes some very diverse attitudes towards man and the role of the state.⁶⁶ The aristocratic liberalism fathered by Montesquieu vied with democratic and radical versions calling for a state sufficiently powerful to bring liberty

within the reach of all. Running through both these traditions are differing attitudes towards the Catholic Church and religion in general, towards nationalism and towards the economic sphere. Yet it seems possible to identify the essential themes of French liberalism, and to note the lines of fracture which, by the early twentieth century, had widened so as to produce three political forces--all "liberal"--in the French political arena: the moderates, the Radicals, and Jaures' socialists. The latter two shared so much of certain themes of the liberal tradition that it is not surprising that Durkheim and his followers were divided in their loyalty to their two parties. What, then, is this tradition which Bouglé and Durkheim sought to buttress with sociological theory?

Among the diverse strands of the liberal tradition two are particularly relevant to this discussion. The first was proclaimed by Mme. de Steel and Benjamin Constant during the Revolution, and found its nineteenth-century supporters in Guizot and Thierry. Its primary concern was the defense of the rights of the individual; and these were understood in legal and political terms. Support of the Directory and exile under Napoleon lie behind their concern to "defend the rights of the mind."⁶⁷

Constant, in his persistent opposition to the Saint-Simonians, underlined a Lockean tradition of natural rights, property and liberty. For him, organization was a form of despotism. Liberty was the triumph of the individual

. . . as much over authority which would govern through despotism as over the masses which claim the right of the majority to rule the minority.⁶⁸

To the degree that liberalism triumphed in France in 1830, 1848 and 1871, it was the ideology of the Directory, echoed later by Guizot, that

Representative government is instituted in order to concentrate and make manifest these necessary social forces and tendencies and to place power in the hands of those who can recognize and satisfy them.⁶⁹

If Constant and Guizot rejected the notion of the sovereignty of the people, and if they remained certain that the workers were adversaries,⁷⁰ Tocqueville introduced a perspective sufficiently historical as to caution that forewarned was forearmed, that the inevitable movement towards democracy could be controlled and directed.

It was in Rousseau and Condorcet, however, that are to be found the origins of the liberal tradition which most strongly influenced Bouglé. Although the idea of progress was not absent in de Staël and Constant, with the latter it was the eighteenth century rationalist notion of the

perfectibility of man's reason. In Condorcet, however, we see a precursor of sociology, for the "progress" he predicted involved changes in the social, political and economic relationships of man in society; and, like Tocqueville, "equality" represented the direction of this movement. For Condorcet, the role of the state was far from tutelary; it was the active promotion of social progress, involving

. . . aid to those who, poor, ignorant and sick, would succumb if the state did not correct inequalities through its institutions.⁷¹

The direction of history for Condorcet was moral. The state was obliged to pursue a policy of furthering equality among nations, among individuals, and the biographical perfection of man. This required analysis of the degree to which the needs and rights of the mass of the society had been respected. An idea of progress which is similarly moral appears in Saint-Simon and his followers, and most notably in Comte, for whom the third stage of progress is not only scientific and industrial, but moral.

Bouglé insisted that Benjamin Constant's vigorous defense of constitutionalism and individual rights should not obscure the fact that "his thought was guided by history."⁷² Bouglé found in Constant a man aware that changing social structures would require changing notions

of rights and liberty, and an early teacher of economic sociology. He called him "an intermediary standing astride two centuries."⁷³

If such an interpretation is exaggerated, and to be explained by Bouglé's desire to minimize contradictions within the liberal tradition, his own notion of progress owes much more to Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Ledru-Rollin and Lamennais. They would all, in spite of methodological differences, have agreed that the history of man reveals a progress towards liberty and equality. The state, also a product of a historical evolution, became the leading edge of society's quest for equality, and the guarantor of liberty--fulfillment. This was the doctrine of the "radicalism" which emerged in the 1840's, and the doctrine which, advocated by Buisson, and later Jacques Kayser, vied with Alain's brand of liberalism for control of Radical-Socialist policy. Focus shifted from the liberty of the successful to the poverty of the masses--to the social problem which French liberalism had refused to recognize.⁷⁴ Gradual reforms, carried out by a centralized state, the limitation of property rights in the name of greater political, social and economic equality: these were the themes preached by the radicals of 1841; they were the same

themes preached by Bouglé⁷⁴ seventy years later. The universités populaires were the echo of Lamennais' faith in the morality of the people:

It is my deep conviction that today the people, the real people, ignorant, on their knees, living from day to day, is the healthiest part of the population--the part where one finds the greatest common sense, the most justice and the most humane instincts.⁷⁵

Bouglé's progressive liberalism stands in sharp contrast to what is often referred to as the dominant theory of the Third Republic: Alain's doctrine radicale. Whatever the influence Alain's writings may have had, it represented a way of thinking about politics and the state which was widespread; and because it appealed to much of the same audience that the durkheimians were trying to reach, it was the target of Bouglé⁷⁶ in much of what he wrote. Alain recognized this confrontation, and was openly scornful of the sociologists.

The doctrine radicale rests on the twin assumptions of a radical distinction between state and society, and the preeminent value of individual liberty. Though necessary, since only anarchy would reign in its absence, the state tends inevitably towards tyranny. With these a priori truths asserted, the doctrine radicale becomes a series of solutions to the problem of safeguarding the liberty of the

citizen against the designs of the state. The danger arises from the corrupting influence of power, as those elected to defend the people's liberties are drawn into the world of the rich and of the entrenched bureaucracy. Through an inexorable process, the exercise of power brings a contempt for the people.⁷⁶

The role of the state is reduced to that of an enforcer of contracts; and nowhere is the close connection between the idea of the capitalist free market and the role of the state clearer than in the following passage:

What is a just price? It is the public market price . . . because the buyer and the seller are equally knowledgeable about what they want to buy and sell. . . . It is easy to see how the law will oppose the free play of force. It was to oppose inequality [in the market place] that the Law was invented.⁷⁷

The role of the citizen becomes crucial, for liberty can only be preserved by limiting the constitutional functions of the state, and by the active and continuing control exercised by citizens and their representatives. It is the duty of the citizen to obey the state exercising its just functions:

To obey while resisting, that is the whole secret.⁷⁸

Constitutional forms which largely inhibit the ability of executive and the legislature in their power to act are a

primary requirement. That, however, is not enough; eternal vigilance on the part of the citizen is also necessary if liberty is to be preserved:

Obey with your body, but not with your mind.⁷⁹

Alain's views were clearly at odds with Durkheimian sociology which he subjected to attack in a number of articles. These elements which Alain most sharply objected to were the origin of the state, and the assumption of "necessity" which he took to be implicit in sociological theory.⁸⁰ The only society of which man is a part is, he believed, "human"; and the only conscience which exists is individual.⁸¹ That conscience is certain, yet man can only judge himself.⁸² The idea of adoring one's society he found ridiculous:

Why would I adore in others, in man, what I do not adore in myself?⁸³

The refutation of the doctrine radicale required calling into question the supporting pillars of Alain's theory. The focus, therefore, of much of Bouglé's work was upon the methodological assumptions concerning society and human nature; and upon the role of the state. But Bouglé aimed also at undermining Alain's facile assumption that equality could be taken for granted; that liberty was the only value threatened. For Bouglé, not only was the demand

for equality part of a historically conditioned morale, but liberty could not be preserved unless that demand were met. What is clear today is that the Durkheimian model of society was accurate, whereas Alain could not see that the agrarian market had already ceased to be relevant as a description of social interaction in the modern industrial state.

Bouglé's purpose in refuting the absolutist claims of both opponents becomes particularly clear in his proposition that in the heterogeneous modern society, not only do the intersecting circles of groups soften, if they do not entirely eradicate class antagonisms; but more importantly, another phenomenon is at work which permits a society to change without the generation of conflicts which can only be resolved by revolutionary violence. Bouglé called this phenomenon polytélisme, or the capacity of single institutions to serve multiple ends.⁸⁴ Applying it to modern industrial society, Bouglé concluded that modern institutions, although they had their origins in some older need, could well serve new ends. But also, these institutions could accommodate groups pursuing different goals:

It is not only true that several ends, each in turn, can make use of the same means; they can use it simultaneously.⁸⁵

This insight inspired him with a burst of optimism:

Some men found a league to promote the two-day week-end. . . . This common end can, from another point of view, be considered a means: and the means to different ends . . . hasn't it been possible to witness, in a meeting, an archbishop and a C.G.T. militant support the same demands?⁸⁶

Two arguments were being advanced by Bouglé in his defense of democratic ideas: first, democratic institutions were particularly fitted to serve the multiple ends of diverse groups; and second, that the changes desired by the more advanced groups must come slowly. The survival of these institutions depends in part on the continued adhesion of the older ideas justifying the institution:

It may sometimes happen that in the eyes of a number of servants of an institution, or of those who would conserve a practice, the old end retains its value, whereas for others, the new end is more important. Thus in the same grouping one sees the centuries co-exist. . . . Young and old, those values which date from yesterday, like those which date from twenty centuries ago, tolerate one another. . . .⁸⁷

For Bouglé, the modern multi-group democratic state thus stands justified by the science of society; and the conservatives' refusal to listen to that teaching, as well as the radicals' assumption that diversity and division are irreconcilable with unity and progress, can only be

based on misguided readings of history, or a failure to appreciate the nature of man.

Bouglé and Individualism

Bouglé's denial of methodological individualism scarcely implies a denial of the individual; in fact, what I have been arguing is that Bouglé sought to rediscover the individual residing in both branches of French liberalism through the application of sociology to history. Certainly the themes central to Constant, Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte--autonomy, equality and morality--are also central to the work of Durkheim and Bouglé.

Bouglé largely echoed Durkheim's position taken in "Individualisme et les intellectuels." Durkheim's view stressed his opposition to the methodological individualism of Kant and Rousseau, who "wished to deduce their individualist ethics not from society, but from the notion of the isolated individual."⁸⁸ For Durkheim, the content of organic solidarity was a religion which sanctified the individual, teaching "sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for sufferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for justice."⁸⁹

Bouglé¹ also emphasized that the essence of egalitarianism was the notion of a respect which men owe one another.⁹⁰ He called this cult individualisme-fin, or the view that man must be taken as an end in himself, as opposed to the individualisme-moyen with which he taxed the classical economists. And he added that since this new doctrine applies to all members of the society, the latter must intervene "to correct or prevent any repercussions arising from laissez-faire."⁹¹ The most oft-repeated characteristic of respect, for Bouglé¹, was the free development of individual potential.

The problem, for both Durkheim and Bouglé¹, was the reconciliation of the apparent contradiction between the autonomy of the individual and the authority of society. Two elemental forces seemed to pull man in different directions: the desire to be distinguished from the group, and, at the same time, to be assimilated into the group. In his effort to resolve this problem, Bouglé¹ made concessions to the earlier tradition of liberal thought, characterized by Alan Ryan as the "market" or "economic" view of politics, where political activity is evaluated in terms of the capacity to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.⁹² The "negative" concept of freedom is stressed in Bouglé¹'s

remark that it was in the nature of man

. . . to distinguish himself from others . . . to mark off social distance . . . to rise above his rank.⁹³

Bouglé was devoted, as his life-long involvement with the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme attests, to what Steven Lukes has characterized as "the central idea of liberalism."⁹⁴

This concern was not, however, simply an appeal for privacy. Rather it was directed towards the establishment of the necessary conditions for self-fulfillment. The notion, for Bouglé, contained none of the mystical idealism of Mill, but, as was certainly true for the latter, the attainment of that goal was inconceivable outside society. Bouglé found man's penchant for society in his soul. He argued that men had been impelled to seek "the most gentle . . . the most social solution."⁹⁵ Furthermore, men did not want simply to live, but to live in a certain way: they were attached to an ideal. Men did not resign themselves to an existence of struggle, but had "reasons to cling to a certain communal life."⁹⁶

Bouglé departed from Durkheim not so much in the content of his concept of individualism (which he nowhere presented in any concise fashion) as in the place he made for the will. Rather than emphasize (as did Durkheim)

methodological differences with Kant and Rousseau, Bouglé stressed the development of reason. An internal discipline must develop in every individual:

An association of equals is possible only if each one of its members achieves the capacity to understand the rights of others, and to respect the face of humanity in them, just as he wants it respected in himself.⁹⁷

It may be charged that Bouglé avoided choosing between methodologically clear positions. On the one hand he sometimes stood with the individualists who argue that no defense of human rights is possible unless, as Karl Popper puts it,

all social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social institutions should always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes etc. of human individuals.⁹⁸

Generally, of course, he identified himself with Durkheim's injunction that society was sui generis, and the only unit of analysis was the "social fact." But must the theorist stand between Scylla and Charibdis? Bouglé apparently did not think so; for though he did not set down a solution to the dilemma explicitly as did Jaurès, certainly it is possible to maintain that the relationship between the individual and society is dialectical. Although each man and woman has a will, a personality and a potential that

is unique, it cannot hold back the tide. It is both formed by and reacts upon the society of which it is always a part.

Conclusion

The liberalism which Bouglé proposed represented a sociological version of a clearly developing mode of thought in nineteenth-century France. His sociology was directed towards proving a scientific underpinning for the idealism of Rousseau, Condorcet, Constant, Tocqueville, Ledrø-Rollin and Lamennais. All the essential themes are to be found in Bouglé's work. In the earlier years, when the threat was largely from the right, his major concern was the justification of egalitarianism; thereafter, as he confronted both the left and the laissez-faire center, he became increasingly preoccupied with elaborating the social requirements of liberty. He argued, essentially, that liberty cannot be preserved only by declaration. It must flow from social and political arrangements. Just as Madison sought that goal in constitutional structures, Bouglé and Durkheim were warning that social structures were necessary for the nurture of individual autonomy. Equality, liberty and social forms were functionally related, and interdependent. The division of labor had clearly encouraged a morale which commanded both egalitarianism and respect for

the individual.

Bouglé's Idées égalitaires represented a major effort to establish, on empirical grounds, that the equality of men was historically determined and thus irreversible. It has failed to be persuasive, in part because it was conceptually weak and empirically unsound. Our interest in it, however, is not so much whether it made the case successfully, but that the effort was made at all.

The formulation of a progressive liberalism was, in part, an effort to combine, in a new social and economic age, the various strands of liberalism which had emerged before the Revolution and had developed over the course of the nineteenth century. More important, however, is the understanding that Bouglé's liberalism was an attempt to create a weapon grounded in the science of his day, capable of meeting the opponents which seemed to stand in the way of the creation of a progressive republic. It is safe to say that Bouglé' and Durkheim were among the first to come to grips with what has become known today as the "modern industrial state," dedicated not only to the production of material goods, but also to the maintenance of those values of equality and liberty which had been proposed and defended in societies which were far simpler.

Bouglé's opponents were arguing, fundamentally (where they were not proposing a return to another age) that the maintenance of all of these values was impossible, and that the effort to do so would only lead to national disaster.

Bouglé played an important role in the formulation of a theory of the modern state which stoutly maintains that democracy and industrialism are not incompatible.

Bouglé's liberalism was more than a repetition of earlier themes. Durkheim's sociology and Bouglé's contribution to it were efforts to provide a way of looking at a world far different from that known by earlier theorists. The most important contribution was the proposition that modern society, with its increasing division of labor, not only contributed to greater equality but provided reinforcements for the autonomy of the individual, both in the sense of "privacy" and in the sense of providing the means for a dynamic liberty in which self-fulfillment is central. Bouglé carried forward Durkheim's ideas by making two important arguments: first, that the process whereby groups are related is not simply divisive, but because of multiple group loyalties, competition is attenuated, and accommodation is sought. Thus equality, reinforced by group defenses, are both promoted and developed. The

second contribution, less important, perhaps, was that of polytélisme, or the argument that change is facilitated by the capacity of institutions to adopt new values and functions, while guarding older ideals, thus preventing the polarization which might accompany rapid social transformation. This analysis, it seems clear, served not only to reinforce a liberalism grounded in groups, but also to refute the insistence of the Right on une foi and the prediction of the Left that institutions were incapable of gradual evolution, representing, as they must, creations of the old order which must give way. Bouglé was thus offering a justification of the modern multi-group society wherein a variety of values can exist; and furthermore, he argued that it was this very multiplicity of values and groups which reinforced both the ideal of equality and defended the autonomy of the individual.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

¹1902h, p. 636.

²Ibid., p. 639.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 640.

⁷Ibid., p. 643.

⁸Ibid., p. 648. Cf. Durkheim's notion that crime may be useful, in Les Règles de la méthode Sociologique, pp. 70-71.

⁹1902h, p. 649.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹1899a, p. 88.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 88-89.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 5-6.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 15.

²⁰Ibid., p. 24.

²¹Ibid., p. 25.

²²Ibid., p. 26.

²³Ibid., p. 27. Durkheim, DTS, p. 101.

²⁴1902h, p. 27.

²⁵Ibid., p. 207.

²⁶1899a, p. 195.

²⁷Ibid., p. 198.

²⁸Ibid., p. 138.

²⁹Ibid., p. 159.

³⁰RMM, 1899. Ibid., p. 205.

³¹1899a, p. 159.

³²Ibid., pp. 249-250.

³³Ibid., p. 25.

³⁴Ibid., p. 26.

³⁵RMM, 1899, p. 12.

³⁶1899a, p. 27.

³⁷Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Laslett and Runciman, eds. (Oxford, 1967), p. 112.

³⁸Durkheim-Bouglé / undated letter, 1899.

³⁹Pitirim Sorokin, Contemporary Social Theories (New York, 1928), p. 419.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 421.

⁴¹Durkheim-Bouglé undated letter, 1899.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³RMM, 1899, p. 12.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid. Les Idées égalitaires was reviewed by his friend, Dominique Parodi, in R.P., Tome XLIX, 1900, p. 548. Parodi raised the question as to whether Bouglé had not compromised the autonomy of sociology by resting so much of his argument on psychological speculation. He also criticized the vagueness and ambivalence of his treatment of necessary and sufficient causes.

⁴⁷1922a, p. 149.

⁴⁸1900a.

⁴⁹1902b.

⁵⁰1901a.

⁵¹1902a.

⁵²See particularly Pour la Démocratie française, 1900a, pp. 147-148.

⁵³Durkheim, DTS, p. 146.

⁵⁴Ibid. Preface to 1st ed., p. xxix.

⁵⁵1901d, p. 225.

⁵⁶1901a. 1922a, p. 79.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 110-111.

⁵⁹Bouglé, 1908a, p. 25.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 26.

⁶¹Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (Paris, 1967), p. 237.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid., p. 288.

⁶⁴C.B. MacPherson, Democratic Theory (Oxford, 1973), pp. 3-23.

⁶⁵Steven Lukes, typescript, "Individualism," prepared for the Dictionary of the History of Ideas, p. 33.

⁶⁶Pierre Guiral, "Le Libéralisme en France," in Tendances politiques dans la vie française depuis 1789 (Paris, 1960), p. 17.

⁶⁷Maxime Leroy, Histoire des idées sociales en France (Paris, 1946), p. 171.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 175.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 180.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 182.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 237.

⁷²1914a, p. 217.

⁷³Ibid., p. 220.

⁷⁴Guiral, p. 29.

⁷⁵Leroy, p. 441.

⁷⁶Alain, Eléments d'une doctrine radicale (Paris, 1933), p. 29.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 143-144.

⁷⁸Quoted in Henri Geraud, La Morale d'Alain (Toulouse, 1970), p. 78.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 146.

⁸¹Alain, Les Idées et les âges (Paris, 1928), p. 31.

⁸²Giraud, p. 220.

⁸³Ibid., p. 77.

⁸⁴1922a, p. 85.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 89.

⁸⁶1914b, p. 601.

⁸⁷1922a, p. 89.

⁸⁸Durkheim, "Individualisme et les intellectuels," p. 12 fn.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 9.

⁹⁰Bouglé, 1905f, p. 588.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Alan Ryan, "Two Concepts of Democracy: James and John Stuart Mill," in Martin Fleisher, ed., Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought (New York, 1972), p. 78.

⁹³1907a, p. 154.

⁹⁴Lukes, "Individualism," p. 23.

⁹⁵1907a, p. 156.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 157.

⁹⁷Bouglé, 1905f, p. 589.

⁹⁸Karl Popper, The Open Society, Vol. II, p. 98.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PROBLEM OF SOLIDARITY

Introduction

The progress of egalitarian ideas did not explain how a society which encouraged the autonomy of the individual could, at the same time, engender solidarity, a communal sense of unity. It could be argued that the interdependence which existed in a complex division of labor created an objective solidarity; but in addition to this, Durkheim had also had in mind, Bouglé thought, a subjective dimension:

It acts, according to him, upon the very consciousness of individuals. It not only conjoins interests, it unites feelings. Not only does it force men to aid one another, it inclines them to respect one another. From the very services which they exchange is born a whole system of moral obligations which envelops them and brings them close.¹

Bouglé felt that this optimism was, however, tempered by Durkheim's own admission, implicit in the preface to the second edition of La Division du travail social, that there were certain conditions necessary for the beneficent operation of the division of labor:

It must be recognized [that] if [the division of labor] is to produce what is expected of it, if it is to bring harmony to individual states

of consciousness, a certain social structure must already exist.²

Bouglé went even further than admitting that intermediate groups were necessary:

In an even more general way, it is not only certain institutions, but a whole system of pre-existing feelings which are supposed by the division of labor if it is to produce social harmony. . . . a certain moral atmosphere. And, in fact, complex cooperation does not create social life; it derives from it . . . fraternity appears to be a necessary condition of equality.³

Bouglé argued that this is what Durkheim meant by declaring that organic solidarity could only flourish on a terrain prepared by mechanical solidarity. He admitted that he did not know whether Durkheim implied thereby that such a moral milieu was necessary only at that point when the division of social labor began, or that "this same milieu is perpetually necessary and must be re-created every day."⁴ In the face of the divisive and anomie-producing effects of the division of labor, there seemed little to say other than to be thankful for the fact that

. . . in certain ways we resemble one another if it is true that, failing persistent resemblance, feelings of fraternity would lose that warmth . . . necessary to keep alive a concern for justice.⁵

Durkheim's theory, as Bouglé understood it in 1903, left an impression "almost as pessimistic"⁶ as that advanced by the socialists. In fact, concluded Bouglé,

Durkheim tells us less what the division of labor produces than what it ought to produce; less its necessary effect than its ideal effect.⁷

This critique would seem to suggest that the very effect which Durkheim had declared to be the product of the division of labor must exist as its precondition. That, however, would be going too far. Bouglé was trying, apparently, to remain faithful to a multi-variate approach to sociological problems, and to point out that the development in question was not a simple one-way process. There was a tendency for the division of labor to engender a solidarity both objective and subjective; but the lag between the development of new social forms and the emergence of a modern conscience collective could be so great as to create serious conflict. Appeals made to older notions of nationalism and discipline were still very powerful; and class divisions, rather than being gradually attenuated by the effect of "complication" and "intersection" could be exacerbated; likewise, the convergence of values, and the synthesis of a new moral consensus, could be checked. Political power, in the hands of representatives of the older conscience, could block the transformation of institutions and the birth of new associations which, Bouglé and Durkheim agreed, were to be an important source of both objective and subjective solidarity. Similarities were not

enough:

The fact that there are like states of mind among people different from me . . . cannot really be doubted, but does not collective mean something more? I think that this something more can be defined by pointing out that in order for there to be a collective feeling, convergence must be added to similarity. . . . For there to be a collective consciousness there must be a likeness conscious of itself, wished for. . . .⁸

An important key to Bouglé's social theory lies in his dialectical approach to the emergence of a conscience collective capable of inducing a sense of community. In his lectures, he tended to emphasize the idea advanced by Durkheim in Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: that society, by its very nature, creates this essentially emotional tie among its members. He went on to use analogies of family, class, church and nation to suggest that societies create convergence by shaping individual perceptions of a common past:

Every family which can have a dwelling place fills it with reminders which allow grand-children to communicate, in some way, with their ancestors. . . . In the working class, busts are set up, archives built . . . every church is built on a commemoration of the past. . . . Likewise for nations, a history which evokes common memories plays a role of prime importance.⁹

Yet Bouglé was not satisfied with Durkheim's theory which left too little place for man, who, as his reason developed, was emancipated from the bonds of mechanical solidarity, and

long time they have been able to depend on values for which a religious cult in the true sense of the word is not the cement. And they have been obliged to do so systematically ever since the principle of social cohesion has existed outside of an identity of religious beliefs: where dissidents become fellow-citizens, religion loses its moral monopoly. Then the conscience collective drops its prestigious veils, sown with stars, with which it has for so long enveloped itself; it no longer borrows the mouths of oracles to give its commands.¹¹

What then was to replace the old source of cohesion?

After the tragic experience where so many thousands of men, believers or atheists, made the supreme sacrifice to their fatherland with equal heroism, who can say that the voice of nations, when they speak without intermediaries, are not heard?¹²

The nation was the embodiment of the society which must have not only an awareness of its past, but also must, in its rites and ceremonies, proclaim an ideal. This ideal, in turn, had to be consonant with the state of the division of labor. The awareness had to be rationally based, yet reinforced by modern counterparts of primitive mystical symbols if it were to enjoy the force of constraint which alone could curb the centrifugal forces loosed by the division of labor. Political action entailed, in part, education of the members of the society in these values. The findings of sociology must become common knowledge. Thus, for durkheimians, the most important lever of power was the educational system itself, and particularly those posts which made possible the re-education

of the teachers. A second activity essential to the realization of unity lay in fostering the associations which Durkheim had advocated in 1902. Lastly, it was vital to exert the maximum influence on those political groups or parties at the governmental level which could effect, if they had power, the necessary changes at all levels.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to Bouglé's proposition that the nation was the only source of a viable conscience collective capable of engendering social cohesion in a divided society, and to his notion of the role of education in the propagation of a national faith. In the following chapter we shall take up the theory of history which supported those contentions.

The French Nation and La Culture Générale

Bouglé's earliest concern with patriotism and nationalism came during the Dreyfus Affair as a response to the arguments of Brunetière, Barrès and Maurras who evoked an image of the nation which embodied the ideals they defended: the army, discipline, order; the collective and organic state which took precedence over the rights of individuals. And just as Durkheim sought to turn the epithet of "individualism" to his own account, Bouglé turned the whole of Durkheim's theory to support the proposition

became a historical force in his own right. He was prepared to admit the dominant role of religion as the source of a subjectively experienced unity in the earliest stages of human history; but he added,

Is that to say that it creates everything?
It raises . . . its spiritual force
above the natural tendencies of men. Does that
mean that all their tendencies derive only from
their beliefs?¹⁰

The activities of men impose solutions which are either outside the scope of religion, or directly challenge its commands. But even more, there are moral values that arise out of men's instincts. Thus the evolution of the modern conscience collective has been a dialectical process involving group religions shaped in part by social forms, and by rational and moral man, emancipated by the increasing complexities of the division of labor. But necessary as were modern interdependence, intermediary associations, or governmental institutions to the creation of an objective solidarity, what was the modern version of the exalting, hyper-spiritual force which characterized the primitive religion?

Suddenly we realize that the commands for which the group, in order to survive, seeks to impose respect, do not remain necessarily attached to beliefs which are strictly speaking religious. While the latter are useful and almost inevitable intermediaries at a time when mental and emotional indistinction are the rule, they are not eternally indispensable. The needs, aspirations, the ideal of societies have other means of making themselves heard and obeyed. For a

that the Dreyfusards were nationalists and patriots, but with a difference: the French nation was neither an expression of race nor of irrational sentiments:

To trust systematically to mystery is to dedicate oneself to blindness; first, it amounts to taking the risk that the lowest instincts will slip in amongst the most noble in order to take advantage of the credit [due the latter].¹³

Instead, the nation, to which Dreyfusards claimed equal loyalty, was pictured as the embodiment of the "principles of 1789."¹⁴

Besides being directed at conservatives, the call for patriotism was also directed at the internationalists, who included both liberal idealists and socialists. The former were accused of falling into the "error of individualism,"¹⁵ of refusing "to concern themselves for others,"¹⁶ and of "failing to have any sociological sense":¹⁷

The individual, in fact, does nothing, is worth nothing, and is nothing outside the group.¹⁸

Socialists could not do without the nation, whatever radical elements might claim. The responsibility of the state to end economic anarchy would involve widespread use of authoritative regulations, and thus require that state power

. . . be carried, supported, aided by a nation--that is, a society where a certain community of language, habits and feelings . . . makes any collective self-reform possible.¹⁹

While Bouglé's nomination of the nationalism as the modern religion came about first as a response to the conservative challenge, it was also an extension and elaboration of Durkheim's early work. In 1898 the latter had observed that

. . . the religion of humanity was all that is required to speak to its believers in a tone that is no less imperative than the religions it replaces. . . . Now, all that societies require in order to hold together is that their members fix their eyes on the same end and come together in a single faith. . . .²⁰

Bouglé simply took "nation" for "society" and drew from Durkheim's inferences a theory of patriotism which was both sociological and psychological. The nation--France in particular--was a modern society in which democratic values had become collectively held. These values functioned both to provide limits to egoistic individualism and, more importantly, to provide an ideal. This truth was recognized the world over:

If the principles of 1789 constitute our own true patrimony it is especially because all mankind agrees to it, because universal opinion has clearly designated us as the representatives and guardians of these principles.²¹

While Bouglé was careful not to depart in principle from Durkheim's moral relativism, he did not fail to leave the impression that democratic egalitarianism was a fact, and constituted a value superior to any other. Each nation, he

said, was elected to play its role. The circumstances of history and soil, the character of its institutions, and the initiatives of great men had all conspired to produce "this or that determined shape of the ideal."²² France had her own particular mission: to save and defend the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen." Without a profound sense of loyalty to these ideals on the part of the citizenry, a nation, like any society, would be reduced to the dust of its individual particles; individuals would be like fish without water.

The ideological thrust of the argument became clearer still when he minimized the Revolution as a break in the continuity of French history. French kings had been "the most active levellers"²³ and had "conspired with the people"²⁴ to create a nation unified both materially and morally; they had brought about "a single law, the same for all, and standing above all privilege."²⁵ Christianity, even earlier, had made its contribution to the emancipation of the human being. One could say, said Bouglé,

. . . that because she was the first to declare the rights of man, France gave evidence that she was the eldest daughter of the Church.²⁶

He went so far as to declare that republican France had "borrowed the strength of [the ancien régime], and had been nourished by her milk."²⁷ Bouglé thus attempted to undermine

the nationalism of the conservatives by honoring the historical role of its heroes. He gave his audience a way of being republicans and liberals, or even socialists, while at the same time remaining loyal to its religious and monarchical past.

These kinds of arguments were directed at establishing not only the durkheimian thesis that society was a reality, a product of centuries of living together, but that France was a particular case with a national tradition which was not changeless but developing, evolving; and that the values which constituted the collective consciousness had their roots in the past. They are aimed, moreover, at those who had trouble reconciling their notion of the French tradition with republican or socialist ideals of liberty and equality.

There was another group which accepted those ideals in one way or another, but down-graded attachment to the nation, either by placing excessive emphasis on the individual, or by proclaiming loyalty to values which transcended the nation. For the internationalists, Bouglé developed his arguments in defense of patriotism. Love of one's surroundings was a natural human instinct. As the child is sentimentally attached to both family and home, as the years progress, his "surroundings" are enlarged:

Thus it is that, progressively, through the silent workings of a process of assimilation which each day takes in constantly more numerous elements, the love of home grows into the love of country.²⁸

Patriotism is natural in that it represents an instinctual attachment to one's past, both within the family and the larger community which is the nation. Memory is an inherent and inseparable part of perception; and although he admitted that it was difficult to be precise about "what society adds to our mental states"²⁹ the research of his colleague Halbwachs had established

. . . that to be part of a family is to have a certain number of common memories.³⁰

This instinctual and automatic process is one of the principal forces promoting solidarity:

Every family which wishes to preserve a home fills it with memories which permit the grandchildren to communicate with their grandparents. For noble families this is all too evident, but it is true also of peasant families, seamen, humble people: the memory of ancestors is often invoked and there too one is in the presence of an effort whose functional effect is to bring about convergences.³¹

Solidarity is not simply memory, however. It is memory charged with feeling:

One must make considerable room in collective representations for emotions, attitudes by which not only knowledge, but also feelings of attraction and repulsion, sympathy and antipathy, joy and sorrow are transmitted. And

it is beyond any doubt that what is most important for our societies is that there be communities of emotions . . . veritable fusions of sentiment.³²

And how would such emotions be manifested in a democratic nationalism?

Flags, parades, songs, everything capable of creating emotions in groups. . . . One should note that along with the heroic, satiric poetry can also play its part. Groups often become aware of themselves by their opposition to others. . . .³³

The danger inherent in this conception of nationalism is only too apparent. Yet for Bouglé, and for Durkheim, it was a nationalism which celebrated egalitarian ideas. In the Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse Durkheim was not optimistic about the emotional loyalty to them. While expressing his certainty that "there can be no society which does not feel the need to maintain and affirm the collective feelings and ideas which constitute its unity and personality,"³⁴ he felt that France was passing through "a transitional phase" of "moral mediocrity."³⁵ As to the future, he could not foresee the birth of "new gods" or what he called a "cult,"³⁶ with its rites and celebrations. His optimism lay rather in the emergence of that "system of ideas" which is modern science, and the notions of progress and the autonomy of the human individual.³⁷ But he did agree with Bouglé that the new nationalism must be expressed in the same ways as the older religions:

What essential difference is there between an assemblage of Christians celebrating the principle dates of Christ's life, or of Jews celebrating either the exodus or the promulgation of the ten commandments, and a meeting of citizens commemorating the establishment of a new moral charter or some great event in national life?³⁸

Patriotism, for Durkheim, as well as for Bouglé, was an expression of loyalty both to the principles of the regime and to the society of which one was an inseparable part.

For Bouglé, "the general culture" was another expression for the historical development of a moral climate in France which emphasized the worth of the individual. That education should become technical and utilitarian represented a most serious threat to the cohesion of a society.

"Progress," he said to an audience at Columbia University in 1938, "is a tank which crushes many flowers":³⁹

It is clear that spiritual values which we used to care about are threatened by the material conditions of a much-vaunted progress. . . .⁴⁰

"Specialization" and "standardization" threatened the "free life of the mind"; Rousseau, Marx, Comte and Proudhon were earlier spokesmen for an attitude opposed to the excesses of both, in order to save "the greatest amount of general culture for the greatest possible development of the personality."⁴¹

La Culture Générale was nothing more, in Bouglé's mind, than the historical manifestation of Durkheim's notion

of the societal morale: it was the expression of "limiting the destructive power of which the individual would be capable if he were left entirely to himself."⁴² For many centuries "nation" and "civilization" had been developing gradually into a single entity:

France gladly assumes the mission of spreading a conception of life which would bring peace among peoples, as well as assuring the liberty of individuals. . . .⁴³

This development is marked by the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the Revolution; and Bouglé pointed to Montaigne, Descartes and Condorcet as the principal advocates of "the superior value which must be recognized in the human personality."⁴⁴ He admitted that this "culture" had to make concessions to the necessities of modern life; but to give up something so fundamental to the existence of a society could only result in "narcissism."⁴⁵

The Flirtation with Solidarism

Solidarité, a word apparently used first by Pierre Leroux in 1839, was used by Comte, Fourier and Bastiat before 1848. Comte had written that

Solidarity rests on the fact that all men see each other as being responsible for one another.⁴⁶

With the establishment of the Third Republic, a number of other works appeared (including Durkheim's Division of

Social Labor) which used "solidarity" as one of the central ideas in a social theory. Charles Gide christened the group "the school of solidarity." But the doctrine which became the most widely accepted as the basis for the movement appeared in Léon Bourgeois' work La Solidarité in 1896. Gide summed up the thesis which formed the foundation of the solidarist movement as follows:

Each man is a debtor, regarding everything he owes, to his predecessors, whether individually or collectively, and he must pay off that debt [by service rendered] to his contemporaries and his successors.⁴⁷

It was only natural that durkheimians should be drawn to, or at least sympathetic to the solidarist movement, if only because it had already achieved acceptance by such powerful political figures as Léon Bourgeois and Alexandre Millerand and such eminent scholars as Charles Gide and Ferdinand Buisson. It was not a movement which could be ignored by those who, like Durkheim, had similar reformist goals. As Steven Lukes has remarked,⁴³ Durkheim was not "in the mainstream" of solidarism; while he met regularly at the philosophical society with people who were more committed, and spoke at some of their conferences, he appears never to have made any concessions to the theoretical foundations of that doctrine.

Bouglé, on the other hand, seems to have had a love-hate relationship with the movement. Committed as he was to action, to education, and to the encouragement of viable alliances, he let himself become a promoter of solidarism. Yet he could not really condone its failure to adopt the scientific base that durkheimians believed essential to any theory of political action. At times he was fulsome in his praise of the movement:

Solidarism . . . offers a meeting place, a ground for agreement among all those who now wish, by coordinating the efforts of unions, cooperatives and state institutions, to transform political democracy into social democracy.⁴⁹

In a letter to Halévy, however, he admitted that the work on solidarism "bored him terribly."⁵⁰ And when his book on the movement appeared in 1907, he wrote his friend that

. . . it inspires me with a legitimate horror.⁵¹

For the solidarists, justice was conceived of as repayment of a social debt by those who had accumulated advantages to those who had not. Postulating a mutual interdependence of all members of society, the debt incurred obliged the enactment of the means for its repayment: education, social insurance and various kinds of welfare legislation. Bouglé had hoped that the notion of the social debt could be founded on a scientific base. Instead, he

believed that the movement had become increasingly a-prioriste in the course of its life. Solidarism, at first, had found its base not in "the passing clouds" of "speculative philosophy," nor, like religion, in "some far-off star," but "in the very heart of the earth."⁵² Unfortunately, however, the doctrine, for some of its adherents, had not profited from its "voyage through scientific paths,"⁵³ but had become "spiritualist," basing its philosophy on "a sentiment concerning the eminent nobility of the life of the spirit."⁵⁴ At any rate, the movement remained trapped in an apparent paradox as long as it did not adopt a durkheimian solution to the problem of solidarity. Solidarism, Bouglé argued, was revealed as "intermediary" and "contradictory":

We can recognize, in the enterprise, one of the efforts to re-graft something of that rationalist humanitarianism which flourished at the end of the 18th century on the kind of naturalist history which the 19th century has rooted in our minds.⁵⁵

Since Bouglé himself was constantly searching for a reconciliation of nature and will, of individualism and socialism, he was indulgent towards the movement even when he recognized inherent philosophical weaknesses:

It may be paradoxical that a doctrine, which asks us to base the legitimacy of social organization on implicit contracts among individuals, should tend to impose any surveillance on the expression of free will which it confronts.⁵⁶

He concluded that in fact the contracting parties were not free to make any contract whatever, because solidarism was concerned with social equality:

It does not demand merely that the present organization [of society] be reformed as if its members had debated the conditions of the social contract in complete liberty, but as if they had debated it in equal liberty. . . . In other words, it is not to any contract whatever, but to a just contract that solidarism appeals. . . .⁵⁷

The limits within which contracts may be made are established by an ideal construct which Bouglé could not accept. At best, it was similar to Proudhon's "mutualism." For practical reasons, however, he refrained from an open attack on the difficulties of the solidarist reconciliation of society and the individual, preferring, instead, to present the durkheimian position on the question as an "analogous" explanation:

We find a similar tendency in the ideas whereby M. Durkheim explains the kind of solidarity which exists in societies where the division of labor reigns. . . . Respect for contracts is increasingly important for the whole social order. But in order that they be spontaneously respected, is it not important also that they be consented to with equal liberty on the part of the contracting parties, in other words that they be essentially just?⁵⁸

Bouglé thought that the movement was dangerously idealist:

It asks society to reform itself less in terms of what individuals may have wished than in accord

with what they ought to have wished. From which one cannot help feeling that solidarism may be led very far in its reaction against the excesses of economic liberalism.⁶⁰

In spite of its short-comings, and in spite of the danger even to liberal democracy of its idealist postulate, the theory was useful, Bouglé thought, because

. . . as a means of adapting to one another the rationalist and naturalist positions, it may be destined to serve as an intermediary between individualism and socialism.

Solidarism had the particular merit of rectifying individualism, particularly when it "allows itself to be guided by sociological theory";⁶¹ in addition, because it emphasized the national tradition, it could not slide towards socialist conclusions on either the irreconcilability of classes, or their extreme views on property rights.

Both Bouglé and Durkheim paid their respects to solidarism. As Steven Lukes points out, in terms of aspirations, durkheimians had much in common with the solidarists.⁶³ But Bouglé's contempt for their spongy idealism is probably more indicative of their considered attitude.

Education and Solidarity

Bouglé liked to quote Michelet's observation that "education is the first and the last word of politics." Since the source of both the ideals and constraint which constitute

the morale of a nation lie in the collectivity; and since the state is only an agent of the collectivity, it follows that one of the means of social reform lay in the educational system. The society must be made conscious of its own nature, and of the goals towards which it was tending though it be unaware of them. One of the features of solidarism which recommended it to reformers was that it did not share the "quietism" of socialism in moral matters. Rather, Bouglé advised,

. . . it reminds us that the reform of laws, however necessary it may be, will never be effective without a regeneration of customs.⁶³

And he reminded his readers of Léon Bourgeois' warning:

Men have conquered liberty and have believed that it would be sufficient to establish justice. It is solidarity that they must first recognize, and establish, in order to be able to enjoy, at last, liberty in justice. The social problem is, in the last analysis, a problem of education.⁶⁴

The educational task, for Durkheim and his collaborators, was that of rebuilding a nation. In his Columbia lectures, Bouglé spoke of the revival made necessary by the defeat of 1870.⁶⁵ The birth of sociology was part of a massive reaction within the intellectual community against "that spiritualism which sets the human world in opposition to the laws of nature" and against "that brand of individualism which sets the individual above society."⁶⁶ The conduct

of such a regeneration of customs involved both a strategic problem and one of content. The first evoked questions concerning the means whereby it would be possible to gain such influence as to permit a re-shaping of education at every level, but first, among the students of the primary level. Some reformers, like Bourgeois, devoted all their efforts to legislation in the Chambre des Députés; some, like Buisson, moved from university posts to the legislature; and some, like Bouglé, devoted their time to academic careers while, at the same time, taking an active part in political education outside the university; others, like Durkheim, remained content, for the most part, to continue and encourage the research which must strengthen the foundation of the message preached by others. Yet all of them were involved in the gradual assumption of control over the educational system.

When Bouglé spoke at Columbia, what he did not explain to his American audience was that, for the members of the Durkheim school, control of the educational system involved a long struggle with the Catholic Church. Anti-clericalism in France was born in the rationalist revolt against religion, and encouraged, at least for significant portions of the population, by Church resistance to revolutionary reforms. All during the nineteenth century the

enemy of republicanism was the Church. During the Second Empire, according to J.B. Bury, "more passion was aroused over clerical than over almost any other issues."⁶⁷ By 1877, Republicans were convinced that Church power was on the rise; and Gambetta's cry, "clericalism--there is the enemy"--fell upon ears ready to take action against a hated institution. Republicans, disunited on many social issues, could unite on a policy which would find support abroad, in addition to its obvious appeal at home. In addition, a peasantry, preoccupied with the Church, would give less thought to revenge against Germany. Lastly, it could be pointed out that compulsory public education had been in effect in Prussia before 1870.

The anti-clerical legislative process aimed at taking primary and secondary education out of the hands of the Church, began in 1882 and reached its climax in December 1905, with the Law of Separation. From 1902 onwards, all Church schools which were not conducted by authorized congregations were closed. Education of the masses was, thenceforth, almost entirely in the hands of the state.

Bouglé's efforts to bring about a "regeneration of customs" fell into two areas: the first involved public

speeches and lectures; the second, articles and lectures largely directed at the teachers themselves. Gabriel Séailles, who had sat on Bouglé's doctoral board, wrote an introduction to a collection of speeches addressed to mass audiences during the Dreyfus Affair. He characterized them as an attempt to refute "the partisans of dead ideas":⁶⁸

Against those who have an interest in making us believe that we no longer know what we want or what we think, it is imperative that we recall France to a consciousness of itself, to the role it has assumed in the world. . . . It is by reminding it of its mission that one reshapes the people's collective spirit.⁶⁹

Bouglé, in these addresses, was fulfilling the intellectual's role, which was

. . . to give [to the people] a clear consciousness of what they think though their thoughts are confused.⁷⁰

The subject matter of the speeches has already been alluded to in the subjects discussed in this and the preceding chapter: that egalitarian ideas are the essence of the emergent system of social beliefs; and that the nation is the symbol of the social unity which is France. Both the objective content of the belief system, and the spiritual

unity which embodies them are the product of a long historical development which is prescriptive because it is determined by both social and psychological forces; and because it is prescriptive, it imposes obligations on all members of the community. Free public education would result, for the working class, in a will "fortuitously rectified"⁷¹ by knowledge of the laws of the world of man. When speaking to his own class--the educated, if not wealthy--Bouglé warned of the effect of failing to support popular education:

Take care lest the progress of material civilization, left to itself, undermine this necessary community by the single fact that the material civilization will monopolize the life of one category of citizens, and create, within the nation, a class cut off, having no common ideas with the other classes.⁷²

The re-education of the masses was motivated by more than a desire to shake them loose from their loyalty to "dead ideas"; it was as much inspired by a struggle--of which Jules Guesde was only too well aware--for control over the destiny of the working class.

An important goal, then, was the education of the children of the masses. To this end, Bouglé published a number of articles destined for the instituteurs,⁷³ and in 1921, a book in which he addressed himself to the pedagogical problems involved in teaching which had as its goal the

inculcation of the national morale. What he wanted to impress on the teachers was that it was their task to gather the strands of the contemporary secular morality that had been developing for centuries in the French tradition:

Search for what unites, not what divides. At a given time, in a given country, men always hold more ideas in common than they believe to be the case. . . . It is these points of convergence that it is our task to discern. It is around them that we will focus our moral teaching. By the very fact that they are schools of national unity, our schools must be impregnated at the very outset with sentiments which reinforce, in a practical way, the unanimity of individual states of consciousness.⁷⁴

In such cases where no solution to differences can be found, the teacher will welcome all opinions, thus stressing that concern for individual liberty is an integral part of the principle of national unity. Thus, thought Bouglé, the cognitive requirements of an effective moral unity could be fulfilled, especially when reinforced by a thorough indoctrination in the essentially solidary nature of all human activity. He himself collaborated in a text designed to teach this lesson which was summed up in the conclusion:

All human beings who bring to their tasks the same love and courage are morally equal, whatever their social differences. . . . You will feel inseparable ties to anyone who lives in poverty as a result of the closing of a factory, with the farmer whose harvest has been damaged by bad weather, with the Annamite coolie or the black bearer who is overwhelmed by fatigue in the rice fields or in the depths of the forest. . . . The solidarity which unites dead and living . . . you

will always want to strengthen and keep alive. . . .
You will make it the law of your life.⁷⁵

The appeal to the emotions was an important aspect of the creation of a national consciousness. That the child naturally tends to affection for his milieu must be built upon, particularly in the modern complex society, by bringing to him, through history and geography, a sense of belonging to a soil and to a civilization. Through the operation of "the obscure chemistry of sentiments" the student is naturally brought to participate in "the collective imagination";⁷⁶ Bouglé even urged emphasis on the notion of the "social debt" owed to their ancestors. Since they cannot be directly repaid,

. . . there remains only for us to treat their work with the same care we should wish to show them. . . . Let us cultivate the soil they pioneered, let us raise higher the edifice whose cornerstone they laid. Let us preserve, for those coming after us, the patrimony left by those who are no more.⁷⁷

Solidarity Considered as a Response to Social and Political Divisions

The concern with solidarity and unity cannot be adequately understood without considering the ferocity of the ideological struggle taking place in France before, during and after the Dreyfus Affair. The disarray of the republicans before the threat of General Boulanger in 1889

has been described by Denis Brogan:

At the Elysée, the Ministers were bewildered and then frightened; elsewhere the leaders of the coalition so ignominiously defeated met to discuss their humiliation, Clemenceau asking the ex-prisoners of the Commune what life was like in New Caledonia. . . .⁷⁸

At that time, Durkheim was in his second year at the University of Bordeaux; Bouglé was in his next to last year at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris, where he must have heard the mob which was ready to follow any move led by the General to seize power. What was particularly evident was the readiness with which elements of the working class rallied to the banners of the demagogue of the right. To the middle classes, the ability of the conservative forces--church, army and the upper echelons of the bourgeoisie--to gather support among the workers was a commentary both on the disorganization of the left, as well as a reminder of the effectiveness of Louis Napoléon in 1851.

The defeat of 1870 impressed upon a whole generation of Frenchmen a sense of humiliation and bitterness, and provoked widespread introspection. There is no doubt in Durkheim's earliest work that there existed a concern for French solidarity, so evidently lacking in the war with Prussia. Steven Lukes has written that

. . . his experience of the French defeat may have contributed to a strong (though in no way militant) patriotism, a defensive sense of national decadence and a consequent desire to contribute to the regeneration of France--sentiments that were, in different forms, prevalent among intellectuals of his time.⁷⁹

And the articles which he published upon his return from Germany in 1386 emphasize a concern which has strong nationalist overtones.⁸⁰ And Bouglé, too, seems to have shared a similar sense of humiliation. His family had taken refuge in Brittany during the German invasion, shortly after his birth. Yet he does not appear, when one considers the preoccupations which engrossed his scholarly life, to have been touched so much by that defeat as he was by the threats, from both right and left, to the liberal republic. This same preoccupation is evident in most of Durkheim's work, although it is rarely couched in the polemical terms which are so typical of Bouglé. For Bouglé's generation it was not simply a question of national survival as such; it was, rather, the survival of the liberal society. That a society could exist divided, as France appeared to be, was not conceivable. Each group, right, center and left, believed that national unity must be built upon some clear ideological conception and must exclude the others; this is why, even though liberals

professed to believe in basic rights of free speech and association, it seemed imperative to exclude the Church from the education of the nation's children. For France to be liberal and democratic meant that both conservatives and the radical left had to be treated as enemies of the regime; and of course they were.

It seems clear that the preoccupation with solidarity that is so clear in Durkheim and Bouglé is related to the particular conditions of late nineteenth-century France. The divided nature of French society derives from a tangled web of historical circumstances which were part of the process of shedding a feudal past and gradually becoming an industrial state. With regard to the question at hand, the most important trait of this experience was the failure of class integration. Raymond Aron has remarked on the degree to which a significant proportion of French society has remained "faithful to a tradition of hostility to the state."⁸¹ This tradition has its origins in the nature of the revolt of the Third Estate against the ancien régime, and in the experience of the working class during the 19th century. The problem of political transformation can also be viewed, as Reinhard Bendix has pointed out, as a failure to adapt the plebiscitarian principle of representation, advanced by

the revolutionaries, to the more purely functional representation which characterized feudal society.⁸² Instead, because of the abstract and utopian turn which liberalism took in France, any theoretical defense of the representation of interests and justification of their role in the political system was largely lacking. Durkheim's theory is, among other things, an effort to effect a modern synthesis by providing a theoretical basis for intermediary groups, functional equivalents of the older estates. All during the nineteenth century, however, political confrontation was exacerbated and embittered by an inclination on all sides, as Professor Aron remarked,

. . . to transfigure economic, social or technological debates into ideological conflict.⁸³

The deep divisions which characterized French society in Durkheim's day were sharpened also by the fact that what LaPalombara and Weiner have called the crises of legitimacy and participation⁸⁴ had gone unresolved throughout the century. For the aristocratic elements--and for the Church until 1891--the Republic was anathema. The same may be said for the groups on the left which advocated its overthrow.

The failure to settle the question of legitimacy only meant that the crisis of participation was far less likely

to be resolved: the demands for entry into, or exclusion from the political system were rapidly clothed in the language of legitimacy. This development, in turn, can be traced to the resistance of the aristocracy to the claims of the middle class in the eighteenth century, which had two major consequences: first, it drove the Third Estate toward abstract doctrines of government and society;⁸⁵ second, because of the alliance of church and nobility in defiance of those claims, the revolution which occurred destroyed the religious fabric of the society. Tocqueville's comments on the experience of the eighteenth century are illuminating:

At the very time when the nobility, qua Order, was losing its political power, the nobleman as an individual was granted privileges he had never hitherto enjoyed. . . . Each privilege, once granted, became hereditary and inalienable. Thus, in the course of ceasing to be an aristocracy, the nobility tended more and more to become a caste, thriving on vested rights.⁸⁶

The resistance of the nobility to the demands of the bourgeoisie was all the more bitter under Louis XVI for, as Tocqueville pointed out,

It was easier for a man of humble extraction to become a high official under Louis XIV than it was under Louis XVI.⁸⁷

The Revolution and its aftermath contributed further to a sense of insecurity on the part of a class that had never been accepted. Their insecurity was revealed in the

particularly fanatical and doctrinal form taken by liberal philosophy, in the preoccupation with attack both from the right and the left, and in the seemingly urgent need to find security in many aristocratic values emphasizing hierarchy, order, stability, and permanence. Their fear of upheavals, their distaste for and fear of the city masses resulted, writes Georges Dupeux, in "a constant interest in the land" which gave this class "certain archaic traits."⁸⁸ Like the nobility in the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie isolated itself with tight restrictions on exogamous marriage and a code of morality based on concepts of property, stability and order.⁸⁹ There grew up, among the middle classes, doctrines concerning the relationship of man, the government and the nation which were not subject, in the nineteenth century, to compromise and flexibility in the face of changed conditions. Among these concepts was the belief that there existed only the interest of the individual and the interest of all; the political system could not tolerate any intermediary associations, and their repression by law and by arms was a thread that runs through the history of that era. It was not until 1884 that workingmen were legally permitted to form unions.

A second factor in middle-class resistance to working-

class demands was the devotion to classical liberal economic doctrines regarding the relationship of employer and worker: men were subject to the laws of the market, and labor must follow those laws. Employers obstinately refused to deal with workers on any but an individual basis; and wage reductions were a normal matter. Furthermore, the bourgeoisie, refusing to consider social questions as being within the realm of politics, behaved as though personal profit was a way of life which excluded all other considerations. In his history of the revolution of 1848, Tocqueville remarked

. . . that the middle class, when called upon to assume the government, took it up as an industrial enterprise; it entrenched itself behind its power, and before long, in their egoism, each of its members thought much more of his private business than of public affairs; of his personal enjoyment than of the greatness of the nation.⁹⁰

Dupeux has added the comment that the typical bourgeois was convinced that history had come to an end with him.⁹¹ One is struck, in reading of the bloody repression of working-class demands through the century, by the ferocity which characterized the bourgeois reaction. It is perhaps summed up by Cavaignac's remark, in June 1848, that "workers are the eternal enemies of the republic."⁹² The degree to which the ruling middle class and the peasantry

were isolated from the new classes thrown up by the process of industrialization is illustrated by John Christopher's comments on their inability to come to grips with the problems of the '90's:

The bourgeois spirit did not fully understand the social and economic issues which were now thrust forward. The traditional concepts of liberty and individualism proved to be inadequate. The only article of the bourgeois credo which now applied was the insistence on order--a static concept, implying at most a minimum of social and economic change.⁹³

In many ways the defeat at the hands of the Prussians broke the dike behind which serious social and economic pressures had been building for a long time. The growth rate of the economy had reached a peak of 4-5 percent during the Empire. This advance had generated two groups which emerged from a period of repression under Napoleon III: a small but growing working class concentrated in the center, north, and northeast, and particularly where iron and steel production had undergone a 400 percent increase under the Empire; a new middle class of tradesmen, small but progressive entrepreneurs, and professionals concentrated particularly in the cities. Among the latter, civil servants in general, and primary, secondary and university teachers in particular, made up a significant proportion, and supplied most of the leadership for social reform.

Terry Clark has characterized the members of the Durkheim school as having, typically,

. . . petty bourgeois family origins (ideally with a father as a primary school teacher), passionate devotion to the Republic, militant anti-clericalism, and Radical-Socialist or Socialist political preferences.⁹⁴

They were, in La Capra's words, "self-made men from marginal social groups in traditionally Catholic and status-conscious France."⁹⁵ Protestants like Ferry, Buisson, Steeg and Pécaut symbolized the way in which the birth of the Republic was revolutionary in a fundamental cultural sense; the establishment of the Third Republic marked the social and political liberation of Jews, like Durkheim.

Preoccupation with solidarity was certainly a response to national defeat, though this was probably more true of Durkheim, his teachers and contemporaries than it was of Bouglé's generation. Ernest Wallwork has noted the importance of a philosophical debate which was occurring during Durkheim's student years:

While Durkheim's thought was maturing, philosophers and scientists were still meditating on several problems induced by the rise of modern science, particularly the place of mental or spiritual phenomena in a world of brute facts. Scientists were pre-occupied with the so-called external world of objective facts, while idealistically inclined philosophers treated the human mind or spirit in a meta-empirical or non-scientific manner. Thus the world of objective facts was set

against the realm of ideas and ideals, and matter was contrasted with spirit.⁹⁶

Yet, he continues, while Durkheim was still in school, the two sides were already seeking ways of mediating the dispute. Men like Emile Boutroux, staunch defenders of idealism, "began to search for a modus vivendi";⁹⁷ and the supporters of the naturalistic faith "were showing an increased interest in avoiding metaphysics and reductionism."⁹⁸ This spirit of compromise, declares Wallwork, was due to

a desire to contribute to national recovery after the humiliating defeat. . . .⁹⁹

While Durkheim approached the controversy from the positivist side, he was, Wallwork argues,

. . . sufficiently convinced by the major contentions of the idealists to reject earlier forms of naturalism that either ignored higher forms of human thought and experience or simply explained them away.¹⁰⁰

Durkheim's work represents "the aim of bringing moral and religious phenomena within the sphere of nature."¹⁰¹

Of course Durkheim was doing much more: he was searching for a justification of the secular state which was emerging in France, and was confronted by a powerful segment of the society, backed by the Church, which was determined to resist. Important to Durkheim--and far more

important to Bouglé--was the defense of the Republic by an adequate ideological doctrine. Solidarity was not conceived in terms of an external enemy so much as against the enemies of the liberal republic. Such a defense was also, of course, a justification of those values which were most fundamental to the new class of intellectuals. Durkheim saw the intellectual, and particularly the sociologist, not only as the discoverer of the emergent, immanent morale of a society in transition. He also saw the sociologist as advisor of politicians,¹⁰² capable of pointing out the tendencies of a society that were progressive, and those which were relics of another age.

Bouglé himself made it only too clear that the notion of solidarity contained in the idea of a conscience collective was directed at specific targets:

The notion of a conscience collective and everything related to it aided us in reacting, first, against explanations of social ties by consciously-aimed-at conventions; second, against the explanation of social similarities uniquely by the ascendancy of the leader, or the initiatives of an inventor; third, against the explanations of social institutions by reference to the single motive of personal interest.¹⁰³

The appeal to solidarity was an appeal to unity under the aegis of a new class which could not advance its political and social fortunes without alliances, and these

could only be effected through a conciliation of positivist and idealist positions. To that end, Bouglé[/] had espoused the solidarist movement. During the period in which the working class was actively sought to support the battle to save the republic, solidarity promised emancipation.

For Bouglé[/], solidarity was also invested with the kind of mystical traditionalism that was useful as a concept capable of both denying the content of conservative ideology, while at the same time appealing to the cultural and historical thirst of his audiences. Yet after 1906, when social conflict increased rapidly, and the calls for revolution and violence became more strident, Bouglé[/] used the concept of solidarity more as a weapon to attack the left, and as an appeal to the moderates. Since it was a concept which cloaked both traditional and radical facets, emphasis could be shifted to meet the needs of social, political and ideological conflict.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

¹1907a, p. 132.

²Ibid., p. 139.

³Ibid., pp. 140-41.

⁴Ibid., p. 141.

⁵Ibid., p. 142.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 143.

⁸1935a, p. 20.

⁹Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁰1922a, p. 147.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 154-55.

¹²Ibid., p. 156.

¹³1900a, p. 2.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁵1902a, p. 82.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹1906b, p.

²⁰Durkheim, Individualisme et les Intellectuels,
p. 23.

²¹1900a, p. 13.

²²Ibid., p. 7.

²³Ibid., p. 11.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., p. 12.

²⁷Ibid., p. 13.

²⁸1921g, pp. 68-69.

²⁹1935a, p. 23.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., p. 24.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., p. 25.

³⁴Durkheim, Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Paris, 1968), p. 610.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 611.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 611-16; also p. 305.

³⁸Ibid., p. 610.

³⁹1938a, p. 5.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 6.

⁴²Ibid., p. 7.

⁴³Ibid., p. 8.

- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Ibid., p. 11.
- 46 Charles Gide, La Solidarité (Paris, 1932), p. 34.
- 47 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
- 48 Lukes, Durkheim, p. 351.
- 49 1907b, p. 6.
- 50 Bouglé-Halévy, 1902, #1, undated.
- 51 Bouglé-Halévy, 1902, #2, undated.
- 52 1907b, p. 42.
- 53 Ibid., p. 55.
- 54 Ibid., p. 54.
- 55 Ibid., p. 86.
- 56 Ibid., p. 93.
- 57 Ibid., p. 105.
- 58 Ibid., p. 106.
- 59 Ibid., p. 109.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Ibid., p. 139.
- 62 See Lukes, Durkheim, pp. 350-354.
- 63 1907b, p. 184.
- 64 Ibid., pp. 186-87.
- 65 1938a, p. 23.
- 66 Ibid., p. 25.

- ⁶⁷J.B. Bury, France (New York, 1962), p. 161.
- ⁶⁸1900a, p. iii.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., pp. iii-iv.
- ⁷⁰Ibid., p. iv.
- ⁷¹Ibid., p. iii.
- ⁷²Ibid., pp. 138-39.
- ⁷³Note articles in pedagogy journals, particularly 1899c, 1900b, 1902g, 1904b, 1920b, 1923c, 1923e, 1924d.
- ⁷⁴1921g, p. 10.
- ⁷⁵1938c, p. 317.
- ⁷⁶1921g, p. 74.
- ⁷⁷Ibid., p. 72.
- ⁷⁸Denis Brogan, The Development of Modern France (New York, 1966), p. 207.
- ⁷⁹Lukes, p. 41.
- ⁸⁰Durkheim, "La Science Positive de la Morale en Allemagne," in RP, Vol. XXIV, pp. 33-58, 113-142, 275-84.
- ⁸¹Raymond Aron, Démocratie et totalitarisme (Paris, 1965), p. 216.
- ⁸²Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, 1964), pp. 74-76.
- ⁸³Aron, p. 216.
- ⁸⁴La Palombara and Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966), p. 18.
- ⁸⁵Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (Garden City, N.Y., 1955), p. 140.
- ⁸⁶Ibid., p. 86.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸ Georges Dupeux, La Société française, 1789-1960 (Paris, 1964), p. 131.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 139.

⁹⁰ J.P. Mayer, ed., The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville (New York, 1959), p. 3.

⁹¹ Dupeux, p. 139.

⁹² Quoted in E. Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France de 1789-1870 (Paris, 1904), p. 385.

⁹³ John B. Christopher, "The Dessication of the Bourgeois Spirit," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Revolution (New York, 1966), p. 55.

⁹⁴ Terry Clark, Prophets and Patrons (Cambridge, 1974), p. 166.

⁹⁵ Dominick La Capra, Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher (Ithaca, 1972), p. 41.

⁹⁶ Ernest Wallwork, Durkheim: Morality and Milieu (Cambridge, 1972), p. 13.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁰² Durkheim, DTS, Preface to 1st ed., pp. xxxviii-xl; Preface to 2nd ed., p. xxvii.

¹⁰³ 1935a, p. 88.

CHAPTER VI

A THEORY OF HISTORY

Introduction

The manner in which the bourgeoisie developed in France had an important bearing on the attitudes and behavior of the working class throughout the century following the Revolution, and contributed to the failure of that class to penetrate effectively the French political system. First, it seems quite clear that the politicization of the urban working classes before the settlement of the constitutional question led to attitude structures characterized by insistence upon the fulfillment of abstract notions of equality and justice which could not be met by the political system. Secondly, although the concentration of urban workers in Paris gave them a powerful voice which bourgeois revolutionaries of 1789, 1830 and 1848 could not ignore, the "working class" represented, in France as a whole, at least until after 1871, only a fraction of a French society which remained markedly rural and conservative. Once the bourgeoisie was able to base its support on the rural elements, the workers were quickly deprived of whatever gains they had succeeded in making during the early days

of revolution. Thirdly, to borrow a proposal expressed by Val Lorwin,

Sluggish economic growth may generate the deepest and longest lasting protest. . . .¹

The consequences of these developments appear to have played a major part in producing a working class characterized by bitterness resulting from promises repeatedly made and broken, and by a tendency to seek violent solutions. Violent attack upon the social, economic and political structures were met with a savagery which, although partly explainable in terms of the bourgeois psychology, were also reactions to what were, at least before the last quarter of the century, minoritarian demands which no industrializing society can meet if it is to carry out the saving and reinvestment necessary to growth.

The granting of mass suffrage in 1789 before the settlement of the problem of constitutional exercise of power had the result of inculcating in the urban working class notions of equality and justice which constituted their battle cry in successive uprisings. In France, more than in any other European country at the time, the working-class movement was led and influenced by men like Fourier, Proudhon, Considérant, Leroux and Blanc who mapped their course in theoretical, abstract terms derived to an

important degree from the ideals of 1789. Yet what they understood by these notions were the very negation of bourgeois beliefs in the sanctity of property. In 1830, in 1848 and in 1861, not to mention other more narrowly economic clashes between workers and employers backed by state power, the working class went to the barricades under the banners of 1789. What Val Lorwin has described as "that curious combination of low immediate hopes and utopian dreams which has characterized [French labor] during most of this century"² was readily apparent in 1830 and 1848. On both occasions the workers participated in the uprisings which unseated first Charles X, then Louis Philippe. After eighteen years under the July monarchy, the working class, allied for a brief period with the petite bourgeoisie, went once more to the barricades and saw its hopes translated into laws passed by the provisional government guaranteeing the rights of free association and work. Even progressive taxation was voted by a government in which working-class leaders played a significant role.

The tendency to violence and mass action in pursuit of political and social change was strengthened not only by the propensity to think in abstract terms of justice, but by the bitterness which resulted from seeing their

revolutionary efforts in behalf of bourgeois leadership ignored in the days that followed what appeared to be their triumph. Although in 1789 the right of association had been clearly forbidden by the new regime, in the early 1830's, embryonic workmen's associations sought to launch strikes in the face of steadily declining wages and rising prices. They were met with the whole force of the bourgeois armed state, and in 1834 by a renewed legal abolition of the right of association. This drove the nascent movement first to protests which, in Paris and Lyon, were bloodily repressed. But the culmination of the process of promise and betrayal was the abolition, in May 1848, of the workshops, and the bloody repression of Paris workers in June. An embittered working class saw the Constituante, four-fifths of whom were representatives of rural France, abolish one by one the laws of March and scatter its leadership in exile. Universal suffrage, so long sought by the workers as a political answer to social and economic injustice, had proved to be the instrument of their own destruction. By mid-century the French working-class movement, still a small minority in the sea of rural traditional values, could be characterized by one writer as "great in its ideals, but weak as a movement."³

The period extending from the crushing of the 1848 uprising until 1860 is described by Georges Dupeux as war by government on the working class, involving the strict oversight of the very limited forms of the sociétés mutuelles which were permitted.⁴ Paul Louis describes the working class during this period as "timid, hesitant, as though it had been crushed. It was unorganized, undisciplined, and showed neither power nor even spirit."⁵ Yet Louis Napoleon's increasing need to assure his political base by cultivating the support of the growing numbers of industrial workers led to a gradual renaissance of working class organization. A de facto right of association was tolerated, after 1864, and workers, emboldened by government acquiescence, indulged in an increasing number of strikes. The creation of Chambres syndicales, embryonic unions, was well under way by 1870. Once again the hopes of workers rose; and once again, in 1871, many of those hopes were crushed in the Commune, as the bourgeoisie, firmly in control of the Versailles government, sought to take revenge for the years of Bonapartist indulgence in free trade and in St.-Simonian sympathy for the poor.

By 1873, when a long period of economic stagnation began, the gulf between social classes was probably

deeper than it had ever been. But while the movement of the working class toward entry into the political and social system received its most devastating blow in 1871, the face of the country was beginning to change: industrialization had entered a new phase in the 1860's which saw an increasing concentration of workers in larger sociétés anonymes. This in itself contributed to a worsening of the situation of the French worker in one respect which is relevant to our interest in his attitudes: with the greater detachment of the worker--particularly the new arrivals from rural areas--from the security of the small, family business, his lot seemed to him more inhuman.⁶ When this tendency is combined with the relative stagnation of the period, which could only further frustrate working-class hopes for economic and social justice, it is not difficult to understand why labor movements were sharply divided over the question of whether the working class should pursue its goals through the parliamentary system, or should launch its attack upon the whole political and economic system of French society.

Whatever the obstacles had been to the organization of the working class, and to its participation in the political system, the period during which Durkheim, and

later Bouglé, were beginning their careers was one of greatly increased proletarian organization. Although the movement was deeply fragmented on ideological grounds, it clearly identified itself as socialist. In 1893, the Panama scandal was responsible, in Brogan's view, for driving a number of men like Millerand, Jaurès and Viviani--all former Radicals--into the socialist ranks. From that time on, there existed a parliamentary socialist party capable of providing the support so necessary to the Radicals' effort to resist monarchists and conservatives, and to carry out those reforms necessary to separate Church and State.

Socialism, for Durkheim and for Bouglé, was a force both intellectually attractive and politically imposing. It is hardly surprising that both men addressed themselves to socialism virtually from the beginning of their academic careers. Before 1906, it was both a challenge and a stimulus; but after that date, as Marxists and revolutionary syndicalists gained the upper hand in influencing the policies of both the working-class movement and the parliamentary party, revolutionary socialism became a threat to the liberal regime, and to the integrity of the society.

The interest that Durkheim and Bouglé had in socialism derived, first, from the fact that it was very

much "in the air." Lucien Herr, at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, brought many normaliens to the movement.⁷

Though divided, socialism seemed to offer serious alternatives for any meaningful reform for the social, political and economic ills of French society. For Durkheim, socialism was an emergent religion in the secular industrial state:

All that matters is that we should realize, beneath the moral indifference that pervades the surface of our collective life, there are sources of commitment that our societies contain within themselves. One can go even further and say with some precision in which region of society these emerging forces are particularly in evidence; in the working class.⁸

No understanding of modern society could be reached without consideration of the social forms which characterized it. And for both men, this notion included not only structures, such as the division of labor, but ideas, called représentations collectives, or, when the term was appropriate for a general consensus on the values of a society, the conscience collective.

There was, for both men, more than a simple scholarly interest in socialism. For Bouglé, particularly, as we have argued earlier, the task of reconstruction was political as well as theoretical. He was seeking to provide liberalism with a theory of history, a theory of the state, and with

prescriptions of an institutional nature which could answer the challenge to the Republic from the left. Bouglé was intent, particularly, on cementing an alliance of liberal and socialist forces devoted to the preservation of the revolutionary principles of 1789, and the implementation of those principles of equality and autonomy for all members of the society.

Durkheim's unfinished study of socialism took the form of a series of lectures delivered in 1895. In them, he laid down, implicitly, a theory of history which Bouglé later expanded. The latter, preoccupied with conservatism and laissez-faire doctrines before 1906, did not turn to the study of socialism until it became apparent that a danger to the republic came from that source. During the earlier period, speaking as he did so often to workers, Bouglé was loath to criticize what was often their religion, and preferred, as we have noted in previous chapters, to expound the historical necessity of the liberal society, without dwelling upon the deficiencies of socialist theory.

In this chapter we shall explore Durkheim's study of socialism which did not go beyond Saint-Simon, Bouglé's continuation of this study, and the uses he made of the

analysis of socialism. In the following chapter we shall examine the durkheimian theory of the state and the prescriptions for institutional arrangements which flowed therefrom.

Durkheim's Socialism

Durkheim's abbreviated study of socialism was undertaken for several different reasons. First, by his own account, many of his students were "turning to the socialism of the Marxist, even Guesdist, variety."⁹ Second, it represented a logical continuation of a sociological construction of history undertaken in La Division du travail Social. If, in his doctoral thesis, his primary concern had been the relationship of solidarity and the division of labor, the study of socialism was concerned with the process by which a society reached that solidarity. Thirdly, if, in the Division du travail social, his primary adversaries had been conservatism and the Spencerian justification of laissez-faire, the lectures on socialism seem to have had Marx as the chief antagonist. Lastly, I would argue that Socialism provided an opportunity to undermine both classical liberalism and socialism by placing them both in a theory of history which did not so much deny them as "incorrect" as it did include them as partial, relative, and

historical expressions of the emergent conscience collective. In a sense, what Marx had attempted to do to the liberal, bourgeois state, Durkheim could do to the socialist movement.

Durkheim's study of socialism was a part of what constituted the central focus of his life's work: a diagnosis of the ills of his own society. He wanted, first, to establish that the essential feature of that society was industrial, and that it had evolved in a natural way. In this he was the heir of Saint-Simon. But what had troubled all those who had been observers of this evolution, in the nineteenth century particularly, was that the cohesion which they took to have been a central quality in earlier societies had clearly broken down; and social tensions culminating in war and revolution had become the hallmark of the industrial age. The question which nineteenth-century thinkers asked was whether the division of labor, assuming that it was natural, contributed or detracted from social solidarity, without which it seemed that a community must degenerate into a Hobbesian war of all against all. Saint-Simon, with whom Durkheim essentially agreed, took such tensions to be temporary, as Alvin Gouldner has pointed out,

. . . either because they are the archaic survivals of earlier conditions which no longer obtain, or

are the first growths of a new social system which has not yet matured.¹⁰

Comte, on the other hand, was pessimistic about these tensions, and saw the state as the ultimate source of cohesion. Marx, of course, saw the tensions as class- and system-related; the solution lay, therefore, in the elimination of the root cause, through a process that would likely be violent.

La Division du travail social was a study of the relationship between the developing division of labor and the passage from one kind of solidarity to another. The study of socialism was an effort to understand the dynamics of the process whereby a society groped toward a new conscience collective congruent with the stage reached by the division of labor. This was scarcely an orderly process. If Durkheim had written that "the division of labor produces solidarity,"¹¹ he was under no illusions that this result was certain. In the period of transformation, abnormal forms appeared: anarchic conditions in the economic sphere, restrictions on the uses of individual potential, and the continuation of archaic methods of role-selection.¹² These could occur singly, or together, as they appeared to do in his own time.

In a way analogous to the development of the division

of labor, the consciousness of the form and content of a new solidarity came only haltingly, and appeared in many different forms. The socialisms of his day claimed to represent the solidarity toward which the modern industrial state was advancing. But there were other claimants: varieties of liberalism, and a continuing strong movement which appealed to older values.

Any evaluation of the ills, and proposals for cures, would require an objective understanding of their nature and origins. There was, Durkheim felt (and he had reiterated this in La Division du travail social), an organic solidarity produced by the division of labor; by studying socialism it would be possible to understand why a lag existed between the objective stage of the division of labor and a conscience collective congruent with it, and how a society groped toward that objective solidarity whose secular religion would express a new consensus.

Durkheim's study began by defining socialism in terms of what he took to be the common characteristics of those doctrines which had carried the title:

One calls socialist those theories which demand a more or less complete connection of all economic functions, or certain of them, though diffused, with the directing and knowing organs of society.¹³

Durkheim went on to raise the question as to whether socialism was (as was communism) composed of "dreams in which generous spirits take delight"¹⁴ which appear in history "only sporadically";¹⁵ or whether varieties of socialism appear "by a kind of pressure which is strong evidence that they respond to a collective need."¹⁶ The purpose of this analysis was to establish the proposition that the socialist movement in its various forms was directly related to the growth process of industrial society; that it involves "social yearnings"¹⁷ which aim "to elevate industry by binding it to the state."¹⁸

The rise of socialism depended, Durkheim argued further, on the historical development both of the state and of the division of labor. Only when the former had acquired the means to control the economy and the latter had become sufficiently complex to make intervention possible, could state control be efficacious. In addition, the conscience collective had to have reached that point of attaching value both to the state and to commerce and industry. Since socialism arose under those objective conditions, it was a new phenomenon, and it was part of the evidence of an accompanying and growing consensus. It was not a fiction:

On the contrary, because socialism is bound to a socially concrete setting, it reveals itself at once as a social and enduring tendency.¹⁹

What conclusions could be drawn from this revelation?

Durkheim used Saint-Simon and his precursors to highlight his central assertion that there has been, since the eighteenth century, at least, a social evolution from which there have emerged certain generalized moral ideas, the most important of which are identified as "individualist" and "statist":

The first resulted in having it admitted as evident that the place of individuals in the body politic should be exclusively determined by their personal value, and consequently of having traditional inequalities rejected as unjust. The second had the result that reforms judged to be necessary were considered realizable because the state was conceived as the natural instrument of their realization.²⁰

In the eighteenth century, "individualist" and "statist" ideas appear largely in the form of "philosophical abstractions":²¹

They appeared to have so little contact with economic reality because they were formed under altogether different influences. Therefore all the economic reforms they inspired in the eighteenth century present themselves as appendages of political theories. It is political theories which are the center of gravity of the system.²²

Why, Durkheim asks, does the emergent conscience collective take abstract form? Why did these ideas not apply to the

economic sphere which contained the mass of the workers?

It could not have been, Durkheim argues, because the conditions of the working class had not sufficiently deteriorated to draw attention to this problem, to force an application of the ideas to the problems of the economic order. Research shows, he argued, that conditions in the eighteenth century were as bad as they were after the revolution. The answer, which offers an alternative to Marx, was stated as a rhetorical question:

In other words, could it not be that the political transformations of the revolutionary epoch brought about the extension to the economic order of the ideas and tendencies of which they themselves were the result? Could it not be that the changes wrought in the organization of society, once realized, demanded others which, moreover, stemmed in part from the same causes which engendered them? Could not socialism from this double point of view, have issued directly from the Revolution?²³

This certainly was the temporal order of events. But Durkheim does not explain why the emergence of these "ideas" should take abstract, philosophical form, nor why the one should necessarily precede the other. He wanted to deny that socialist "ideas" were class-based, and to argue, instead, that they arose, as "cries of pain" out of society itself. He thus took the position that the "objects" of those ideas were first, the political system, and later the

economic system.

Durkheim's sociology of knowledge, which was developed extensively in his later work, became most apparent in the way he dealt with the emergence of socialist thought. He introduced his discussion of socialism as follows:

Socialism . . . is entirely oriented toward the future. It is, above all, a plan for the reconstruction of societies, a program for collective life which does not exist as yet or in the way it is dreamed of, and which is proposed to men as worthy of their preference.²⁴

But, he continued, it "is not a science, a sociology in miniature." It is, rather, a "cry of grief, sometimes of anger, uttered by men who feel most keenly our collective malaise."²⁵ Thus, according to Durkheim, it is far from the ranting of irrational men who fail to appreciate some eternal truth, who are bereft of morality. Socialism is real, in the sense that it is the partial truth--a collective representation--of a social situation. Its "truth" is partial for two reasons: first, those who utter the cry cannot, for want of the necessary tools, grasp the social situation in a scientific way:

Socialism is to the facts which produce it what the groans of a sick man are to the illness with which he is afflicted, to the needs which torment

him. But what would one say of a doctor who accepted the replies or desires of his patient as scientific truths?²⁶

In the second place, the social situation of those elements in society which generate ideologies is painful to the point of obscuring their historical and intellectual analysis of the position in which they find themselves. Their "reactions" are valid and derive from social malfunctions, even though their understanding of those malfunctions is limited. For all that, however, they are instructive:

To be sure, we can be certain in advance that the remedies are not precisely those sought by the systems, just as the drink demanded by the feverish patient is not necessarily what he needs. Still, the needs that he does feel do not cease to serve as some guide in the treatment. . . . For the same reason, it is important to know what social arrangements, that is, what remedies, the suffering masses of society have spontaneously and instinctively conceived of. . . . This is what socialist theories express.²⁷

What Durkheim is saying is that, at least before the establishment of a scientific method of analysis, all social theory is the expression of particular groups within a society demanding relief from conditions which cause them pain. It follows from the above that the process whereby a society reaches a consensus congruent with a particular state of the division of labor is one of gradual discovery carried out by the various elements of the society, or

what Durkheim called a "collective diathesis."²⁸

Bouglé and Socialism

Bouglé's own work on the phenomenon of socialism falls within a more general effort on his part to make an argument which is implicit in Durkheim's treatment of the subject. It may be stated in the following way: the gradual complication of the division of labor has proceeded, at times, at such a pace as to create a lag between the objective stage of development and the state of the conscience collective which derives, in the final analysis, from the social forms of the division of labor. Any automatic congruence of the two was specifically denied; in fact, in the Castes, Bouglé showed how a powerful religion was capable of shaping the manner in which social labor was divided, and of resisting the tendances which, in western society, had produced complication, the multiplication of group intersections, and egalitarian ideas. But even where newer forms emerged, older forms resisted, sometimes to the point of producing revolutionary confrontations. Such had been the case in 1789.

Bouglé's study of socialism was an important part of his concern to reveal the variety of forms both of the French cultural tradition, and of the idées égalitaires.

Given the basic durkheimian assumptions concerning the relationship of the division of labor and the collective consciousness, Bouglé was exploring the manner in which the two aspects of any society progressed. He wanted especially to show that the diversity of belief systems which accompanied the evolution of modern industrial society were no more than dialectically related aspects of a single historical continuity.

Such a conclusion could pay important political dividends. At one level it would refute the absolutist claims of doctrinaire socialists and revolutionaries who drew on Marx or Proudhon to "prove" their contentions. But it could also effect a synthesis of idea and sentiment by arguing that the tradition of the French nation, of those who had fought and died pour la patrie had done so, whether they were aware of it or not, for ideals which were proclaimed first by the abstract "principles of '89," but also, in the nineteenth century, by socialist thinkers who were part of the French tradition. If, in Les Castes, he had wanted to emphasize the powerful effect of an idea system as a brake on progressive change, by studying socialism he wanted to tell the working classes and liberals alike that the emergence of a social and progressive democratic

liberalism, both in form and in faith, was inevitable. Lastly, he wanted to propose that sociology was the most perfected form of social analysis of which earlier social thinkers had been the forerunners.

In Bouglé's view, socialist thought was characterized, and defined by a number of propositions which went beyond Durkheim's own definition concerning the relationship of the economic system to the state. The first--which appeared in the eighteenth century--was the methodological substitution of a positivist approach to society and government for the metaphysical. Montesquieu,²⁹ in particular, was "a sort of antidote" to the "reformist philosophers after him who let themselves be drugged by abstractions." It was this man "who sent dreamers back to the school of experience."³⁰ The triumph of the dreamers and their "universalist rationalism, impatient to lay down laws for all times and for all countries"³¹ was only apparent; de Maistre and Bonald kept alive an opposition which found its most eloquent spokesmen in Saint-Simon, Fourier and Proudhon. Each represented a continuing effort to synthesize the two streams of revolt against feudal society, one epitomized by the rationalism of Rousseau, the other by the realism of Montesquieu.

Gradually breaking free from the barren traditionalism of Bonald and de Maistre, the nineteenth-century prophets proposed solutions for what they recognized to be a new and different kind of society. Saint-Simon recognized the dominant role of the economy, the necessary responsibilities of the state, and the social role of religion in any society. Property, its metaphysical foundations already undermined by the fact of revolutionary confiscation by the nation, became a historical and sociological category. Fourier continued the attack on classical postulates concerning man and his liberties. If Saint-Simon saw man as essentially producer, Fourier saw him as consumer. In either case, the notion of "citizen" was stripped of its rationalist garb to be clothed in reality.

It was Bouglé's central thesis that socialist thought was pushing the understanding of society forward first, by rejecting views of society which failed to recognize that the agrarian society of the eighteenth century and its accompanying values had passed into history and could not be revived; and secondly, by retaining those expressions of eighteenth-century formulations which were clear, if abstractly phrased, descriptions of the nature of commercial and industrial society. The challenge to religious mysticism

cleared the way for positivism even if it lingered for a time in the way-station of abstractions. Rousseau had, for example, provided a way of proclaiming the equality of men with respect to their humanity:

He is not yet thinking of that new race to be born with large-scale industry. . . . But at least, with an inflexibility never to be surpassed, he opposed not only man to the estates, but also the people to aristocracy. . . . ³²

However, if Rousseau's rationalist approach remained satisfied with the achievement of making every man a citizen, Saint-Simon and Fourier were equally content to categorize man in alternative, yet no less confining and partial ways. The Saint-Simonian system, by seeing man as producer, deduced therefrom a natural hierarchy in which bankers were philosopher kings. Rationalist principles, when tested on the touchstone of economic productivity, became meaningless. Fourier, on the other hand, whom Bouglé dubbed an "innkeeper-philanthropist,"³³ seeing man as consumer, deduced a radical anti-asceticism which had the merit of proclaiming the equality of human needs, and the right to their fulfillment. By his attacks on the constraints of Christian morality, Fourier expressed an important facet of egalitarianism.

The approach to authority of socialist thought depended largely on the premises from which men argued. If

Saint-Simon was content to opt for a platonic solution, Fourier's psychology proclaimed the repressed good will of man, and castigated all the constraints with which moralists had burdened human nature. What emerged from this was the phalanstère and a radical federalism which Bouglé described as "anarchic socialism."³⁴ But what interested the sociologist was precisely this thread--so clear in French radicalism--of distrust of far-off government. The problems of modern society were summed up in the dialectic of organization and freedom that characterized nineteenth century socialist thought. Modern sociology, by remaining free of ideological commitment, could, Bouglé believed, not only learn from the past dimensions of the emergent conscience collective, but, thus informed, move toward a reconciliation.

Not the least of the legacies of socialist thought was the recognition that religion--taken, at least, in the sense of a moral authority in society--was an indispensable part of social life. Both because of their rationalist assumptions and the place of the Catholic Church in the earlier social, political and economic structure they were bound to destroy, the makers of the revolution, both liberal and socialist, tended to destroy everything. Bouglé ascribed the failure of Saint-Simon's projects less to the

synthetic quality of his "religion" than to the "unbelievable flexibility in adapting to the cult of productive labor"; it had "made its peace with the machine" to the point that admiration was expressed "that a bishop had gone so far as to bless a locomotive."³⁵ It was both impossible, and unnecessary to invent a cult; socialism itself had shown

. . . that power of bringing people together that Durkheim was referring to . . . when he argued that our own times might well know new forms of [collective] effervescence capable of creating authoritative values.³⁶

If, as Bouglé admitted, Saint-Simonians would never have accepted this "rather vague religiosity,"³⁷ their efforts were clear insights into the problem of social cohesion. Fourier, on the other hand, required only the elimination of external authority in order that harmony exist:

Fourier resolves the problem in the best way, by eliminating it, or at least by making it look minimal.³⁸

Proudhon

The socialist thinker who engaged Bouglé's interest far more than the others was Proudhon, who represented, he believed, a major advance in increasing insight into the nature of modern society, into the process of ideological change, and into the necessary social and political transformations which were required. In Proudhon's hands,

socialism became "critical."³⁹ Bouglé readily admitted that his work was filled with contradictions,⁴⁰ and there was ample evidence for this in the way that movements stretching from revolutionary to monarchical were making use of his writings.

Bouglé sought to make the claim that Proudhon could only be understood if one looked below the surface and found the historical context within which his ideas sprang. This context was the analysis provided by Durkheim in his own work. Proudhon, like Saint-Simon and Fourier before him, was an example of the "cry of pain" which constituted a social fact worthy of attention. One had to separate the insights contained therein, while recognizing the distortions of reality.

Proudhon was a thinker whom Bouglé claimed as an immediate forerunner of Durkheim. He argued that, like Durkheim, the socialist had taken a view of society which was clearly sociological.⁴¹ There were similarities of methodology; his theory of solidarity bore a remarkable resemblance to what had been argued in Socialism; and, in addition, Proudhon's central concerns were equality, the autonomy of the individual, and the necessity of a societal morale. Proudhon was represented as a clear example of the

partial truth; but that included insight into the interdependence of social man, the collective nature of production, and the debtor status of all creativity, earning from Bouglé applause for being "a solidarist before the term was invented."⁴² Most important, Proudhon advanced the notion that what he called the force collective was

. . . something other than the sum of individual powers; as soon as the latter are associated, a surplus of energy is released which is not the result of any of them, but from the very fact of their association.⁴³

Furthermore, the force collective was the source of moral obligation which, in modern society, commands the equality of individuals and establishes the cult of the individual.⁴⁴

Proudhon, Bouglé argued, stood between an earlier idealist tradition, drawing on Smith, Rousseau and Hegel, and the materialist methodology which had spread in the nineteenth-century approach to society. He argued, for example, that man's history was the gradual emergence of an understanding of his society. Partial truths were "revealed"; yet in their ignorance, men declared them to be static and universal. Final understanding (or solidarity) always lags behind the objective stage of the society, but comes through a clash, among free and equal men, of various ideological elements. There is no complete unity, but

rather a constantly shifting equilibrium of partial truths.

Bouglé's study of Proudhon was, itself, a partial view. In his defense it may be said that he did not represent it otherwise, but only sought to bring out, as the title of his book suggests, the elements of a sociological approach to politics that can be clearly seen in Proudhon's work. Alan Ritter has remarked recently that

. . . the scholarly Celestin Bouglé . . . had no partisan motive for saying that Proudhon was a sociologist at heart; yet his interpretation, like that of the economists, ignores the normative and conjectural elements in his thinking.⁴⁵

This is possibly unjust; for Bouglé was well aware that there existed in Proudhon a tension between the moralist-idealist and the sociologist-realist. For whatever reason, he chose to emphasize the latter. When, in 1912, he presented his thesis at a meeting of the Société française de philosophie, Elie Halévy, while granting that the two themes existed in Proudhon, objected that "first place"⁴⁶ must go to the view that, for Proudhon,

. . . the individual affirms himself as absolute. This sentiment, innate or immanent, of personal dignity, is sufficient to found a whole moral system.⁴⁷

Alan Ritter concludes that neither Bouglé nor Halévy was right. He attempts to cut through the dilemma of conscience and sociology by pointing out that Proudhon

understood that autonomy is not deviance or rejection of moral precepts, but involves choosing among social norms which one confronts, and giving reasons for doing so.⁴⁸

No doubt Bouglé would have wholeheartedly concurred in this conclusion. For, as we have often suggested, Bouglé keenly felt the tension between the notion of a conscience determined by society, on the one hand, and one rooted in man's nature on the other. The durkheimians were following Proudhon in his demand for a science of society; but Bouglé, who always emphasized the dynamic quality of individual inventiveness and reason, would have agreed with Ritter's summary of Proudhon's position:

We can finally become the masters of history, provided we no longer lapse into despair when faced with a gap between the ideal and the actual. If, instead, we perfect our ideals in the light of reality and improve the actual so that it conforms to our revised ideals, we will at last be able to move down the road toward liberation.⁴⁹

Conclusion

In summarizing the effort and time which Durkheim, and particularly Bouglé, devoted to the study of various strands of the socialist movement, three aspects of their work stand out. First, without doubt, is Durkheim's contribution to the understanding of the origins and role

of ideological movements in the emergence of modern society. A second contribution lies in the suggestion that in the modern industrial state there is a moral role to be played by the state, and by a trained elite which has the capacity to separate truth from fiction in the programs of ideological movements. Lastly, as a balance against the above, the Durkheimian movement may be examined in the same terms that Durkheim and Bouglé applied to socialism. Bouglé's own work illustrates to what degree this theory was useful in promoting national unity, which required, at the very least, a political alliance of progressive liberals and democratic socialists. And when one considers the uses to which Bouglé put his studies of socialism, and Durkheim's theory which supported them, one cannot fail to appreciate the influence of the political and social milieu in which these men worked.

The theory laid down in Durkheim's and Bouglé's treatment of socialism seems more impressive as we gain greater distance from which to observe the growth process of the modern industrial state. The proliferation of ideological movements, the bitter terms of the debate in one society after another, suggest that, unless one subscribes to the proposition that these movements were the products of

mass hallucination, or induced by hypnosis (as is sometimes suggested in the case of Nazism), ideological movements are related to dislocations in the social, political and economic structures of society; that they are, in fact, "cries of pain" enunciated by various sectors of the society. What was brought out so effectively by Bouglé-- that all of the nineteenth-century movements which accepted the existence of the secular industrial state contained a number of common themes--can as well be applied to similar phenomena today. Wherever one looks around the world the language, if not always the behavior, points toward the greater equality and autonomy of man.

In addition, and especially in France, where the bitterness of ideological division is legendary, one can verify a modification of doctrinal differences, and a tendency to seek an emphasis on the common themes which Bouglé never tired of pointing out to his fellow citizens. Differences over means have come to occupy more attention than questions of theory and ends.

A second point to be made is that Durkheim and Bouglé drew attention to the very partial nature of the "truths" expressed in ideologies, pointing out that they were oriented toward the future, and failed to understand

the structures they purported to describe, since the views expressed were generated in only one part of society. For example, the complex nature of the modern society does not appear to make it possible, as utopians may have hoped, to eliminate hierarchical structures. The elimination of the property-holding class in the Soviet Union, for example, while bringing obvious advantages, has brought neither autonomy nor that equality dreamed of by the founders. As Durkheim made clear at the close of his Socialism, the search for the basic ills of society, and consequently the cures, is the task of a science; and that in spite of the efforts of "emotional and zealous beings . . . to lay hold of [the goal]" it could only be reached "slowly and laboriously."⁵⁰

One must recognize, lastly, that for Durkheim, and particularly for Bouglé, the sociological analysis of socialism was a weapon. They singled out Marxism as an explicit adversary; they also sought, as Durkheim had done in the Division du travail social, to undermine the claims of both classical liberalism and the conservative movement of their day. Bouglé, in addition, took up the assertions of revolutionary syndicalism which often drew upon Proudhon's writings.

In his study of socialism, Durkheim tended to avoid any direct confrontation with either Marxism or classical political economy. He dismissed the former as arguments "assembled by theoreticians anxious to document their affirmations," "to give form to their arguments," or "to establish a doctrine they had previously conceived."⁵¹ He described the latter as a concept which "no longer has many defenders, so irreconcilable is it with the facts."⁵² He further charged Marxism with misrepresenting its goals of improving the lot of the poor.⁵³ Though in doing so he laid himself open to a similar charge of misrepresentation, Durkheim seized opportunities to tax Marx with lack of originality.⁵⁴

It was not difficult to point out the logical and empirical difficulties with Marx' theory; but such an exercise never appealed to Durkheim directly. Nor did he spend much time pointing out that Marxist thought was closely related and deeply indebted to other thinkers who preceded him. A far more effective approach was to construct an alternative dialectical theory of history, and an accompanying theory of ideology.

Since socialist and liberal theories represent partial truths generated by social groupings, any

contradictions between them are more apparent than real. The conflict between a positivist sociology, the idea of religious regeneration, and the idea of socialism, which seemed so sharp in Durkheim's day, dissolves when one realizes that each

. . . expresses only one aspect of social reality.⁵⁵

A problem arises only when any one view,

unaware of its fragmentary nature, believes itself the only one--and is consequently irreconcilable with any other.⁵⁶

This clash of interpretations is Durkheim's version of the Marxist dialectic. The changes which occur in the underlying social system generate varying responses from social groups involved in that process. These responses are merely facets of men's understanding of social change. They oppose one another, and yet, at least to the degree they are progressive, they are not really antagonistic:

Adam Smith's doctrine had just been imported into France by Jean-Baptiste Say. Taught by Say . . . it rapidly found many followers. But scarcely was it formulated than the opposing socialist doctrine--or what passed for it--asserted itself with no less energy. There is nothing surprising about this simultaneity. In fact we will see that economics and socialism derive from one and the same source. They are products of a similar social condition which they interpret differently. But the identity of the basic reality is obviously beneath this dual interpretation. These hostile schools have a close kinship. They issued from the same source and so have

many more points in common than is ordinarily believed.⁵⁷

Was this message not addressed to his contemporaries?

Can one properly call this a dialectical theory?

Certainly not in the Marxist sense. Durkheim was insistently opposed to the proposition that ideological systems had their origins in the situation of class. His extended treatment of Saint-Simon was designed to emphasize that point. There is a sense in which social groups contend; but it is only secondary, epiphenomenal and "superficial."⁵⁸ What Marx took to be fundamental, Durkheim characterized as episodic and transitional. The continuity of the evolutionary process, and along with it the liberal notion of progress, was saved. The failure to achieve absolute knowledge is due to the lag between the progress of the division of social labor and the capacity of men to adequately represent it. Thus ideological conflict is conflict of mere opinion. But that conflict is also exacerbated by older manifestations of consensus appropriate to earlier, less developed social forms; the latter wage an incessant war against the new. In La Division de travail social, Durkheim described them as "the persistence of prejudices" and "vestiges of the past," related to certain "morbid" forms of the division of labor.⁵⁹

Bouglé's study of Proudhon was, in my view, an attempt to counter the claims of political groups who were trying to find support for their positions. Bouglé used Proudhon to minimize the contribution of Marx, and to refute the syndicalists' interpretations. More than that, Bouglé wanted to show that Proudhon had, in a partial way at least, paved the way for a better understanding of modern society--and understanding which the durkheimians were in the process of completing in a more scientific way.

Marx, Bouglé suggested, was beholden to Proudhon, who had deduced a theory of exploitation from the notion of a force collective, which was

. . . something other than the sum of individual powers; as soon as the latter are associated, a surplus of energy is released which is not the result of any of them, but from the very fact of their association.⁶⁰

From this, Proudhon arrived at his own explanation which preceded Marx's theory of surplus value: the excess of energy released by the harmonious unity of the workers constituted the stolen profit of the capitalists.⁶¹ Bouglé cast Marx in the role of one who had learned from Proudhon, and then turned on him. Proudhon had "revealed Marx to himself" and in The Holy Family, the German was merely "translating proudhonian thought."⁶² Long before the

meeting with Marx in 1844, Proudhon was "spontaneously employing a dialectical method."⁶³ In a final taunt, Bouglé asserted that Proudhon was more fundamentally revolutionary than Marx himself.⁶⁴ In fact it was the realization of this fact that prompted the revolutionary syndicalists to reject him in favor of the invitation to a permanent struggle which they found in La Capacité politique des classes ouvrières.

Bouglé also used Proudhon as a base from which to attack the syndicalists. The syndicalists, however, were equally wrong in believing that the confrontation must necessarily entail violence:

In La Capacité as well as in Justice, he refuses to recognize the right of strike. A fortiori, he would have condemned the violence for which strikes are the signal, and cursed in advance the new form of civil war which some seem to wish for as the natural accompaniment of the general strike.⁶⁵

He challenged the syndicalists by pointing out that Proudhon had recognized "the interests of a higher order" even in the midst of the conflict of workers and masters, and he challenged the syndicalists directly by quoting Proudhon to the effect that this "higher order" was

. . . the realization of justice (droit) in the social order, manifested by the observance of legal forms, and the progress of customs, which does not permit, however much in the right it may be, violence to set itself above the law.⁶⁶

Proudhon was not, Bouglé insisted, a proponent of class war. Instead,

. . . he demands that the working-class community isolate itself in order to form its own idea: he does not want it to act simply under the pretext of acting.⁶⁷

If Proudhon has spoken of "industrial struggle" it is free commercial competition that he has in mind;⁶⁸ and there is no mystique of the workers' association to be found in his writings:

The discovery of social truths is not the monopoly of the industrial organization. They are revealed, as well, to the intellectual, artistic, academic and school communities.⁶⁹

The Proudhon that Bouglé is presenting is a pluralist liberal, for whom conflict is justified by the transcendent ends that it serves. His sociology, Bouglé admitted, was that of the "liberal economist":

Proudhon persists in declaring an ultimate allegiance to Adam Smith. He wants equality, but by the interplay of liberties extending toward an equitable exchange, in [a system of] universal competition.⁷⁰

Property retains its place as a counter-weight to authority, and the state, the incarnation of organized egoism, is checked by "social spontaneity" which insists, in the name of justice, on respect for the individual.⁷¹ In his summary of the importance of Proudhon, Bouglé, who devoted his

political and intellectual life to the reconciliation of individualism and socialism, found in Proudhon a kindred spirit, a sociologist and an individualist:

No one has ever had a more keen sense of the logic which inheres in the collectivity. No one has been more attached, either, to the equal rights of individuals. An obstinate effort to found the latter on the former explains the complexity of his theory, which expose it to so many divergent interpretations. In the history of that pre-sociology composed by the systems of Bonald, Saint-Simon, Fourier and Comte, his place apart is marked by that audacious program: force collective reason to consecrate individual right.⁷²

The form and content of Bouglé's study of socialism was a continuation of Durkheim's own objectives. He sought to undermine the influence of both Marxist and Spencerian theories by emphasizing the degree to which French socialist thought had, obliquely, haltingly, yet with increasing perception, reflected a century-long movement toward remedies against the virus of an anarchic economic system, while at the same time rejecting the collectivist absolutism which was foreign to the French tradition. Significantly, he called socialist thinkers "prophets," thereby implying their similarity to scientists: both sought, knowingly or unknowingly, to predict the future. Bouglé was therefore not so interested in socialist theory qua theory as he was in showing the degree to which, in his own time, earlier

prescriptions had been realized. He asserted that "principles did not engender action," nor did history "carry out predictions";⁷³ that is, his whole methodology rejected an idealist construction of the process. Rather, the reverse was true: these men were merely representatives of social groups which had developed, from their own social conditions, insights into the evolutionary process. Thus it was that a new collective consciousness came into being.

The key to the defense of the Republic, and any cure for the deep divisions, the malaise which beset France in the years before the First World War, lay in three related efforts. First it was necessary to develop a science of society capable of analyzing social structures and of predicting the form and content of that solidarity toward which the nation was tending, even when ideological differences were extreme. Secondly, it was necessary to educate both the intellectuals and the people at large that these struggles were not fundamental where they involved progressive movements; instead they were the facets of a conscience collective which lagged behind the stage reached by the division of labor. Lastly it was necessary to weld those movements, liberal and socialist, into a political force which could supply the state with both the knowledge and capacity to provide the moral leadership so badly needed.

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

¹Val Lorwin, "Working Class Politics in Western Europe," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics (Homewood, Ill., 1964), p. 279.

²Ibid., p. 273.

³Georges Dupeux, La Société française, 1789-1960 (Paris, 1964), p. 150.

⁴Ibid., p. 161.

⁵Louis, p. 200.

⁶Edouard Dolléans, Histoire du mouvement ouvrier (Paris, 1936), p. 25.

⁷Lukes, Durkheim, p. 316.

⁸Ibid., p. 517.

⁹Lukes, p. 247.

¹⁰Emile Durkheim, Socialism, Alvin W. Gouldner, ed. (New York, 1962), p. 15.

¹¹Durkheim, DTS, p. 396.

¹²Ibid., pp. 343-390.

¹³Durkheim, Socialism, p. 56.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 74.

²⁰Ibid., p. 102.

²¹Ibid., p. 99.

²²Ibid., p. 103.

²³Ibid., p. 105.

²⁴Ibid., p. 39.

²⁵Ibid., p. 41.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 43.

²⁸Ibid., p. 44.

²⁹Durkheim's study of Montesquieu saw him at the head of a direct line leading through Rousseau, Saint-Simon and Comte to himself. See La Capra, p. 221.

³⁰Bouglé, 1932a, p. 5. Bouglé also stated that Montesquieu's esprit général was the ancestor of the notion of the conscience collective.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., p. 11.

³³Ibid., p. 114.

³⁴Ibid., p. 121.

³⁵Ibid., p. 94.

³⁶Ibid., p. 95.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 120.

³⁹Ibid., p. 139.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 140.

⁴¹Bougle, 1912a.

⁴²Ibid., p. 72.

⁴³Ibid., p. 73.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 143.

⁴⁵Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Princeton, 1969), p. 11.

⁴⁶Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie, XII, p. 176.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 173.

⁴⁸Ritter, p. 206.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 53.

⁵⁰Durkheim, Socialism, p. 284.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 41.

⁵²Ibid., p. 238.

⁵³Ibid., p. 90.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 95, 97, 98.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 284.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 44.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 44.

⁵⁹Durkheim, DTS, pp. 370-371.

⁶⁰Bouglé, 1912a, p. 73.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 74-75.

⁶²Ibid., p. 34.

⁶³Ibid., p. 122.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 302-303.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 308-9.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 309.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 310.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 311.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 316.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 327.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 328.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 328-29.

⁷³Bouglé, 1932a, p. vii.

CHAPTER VII

THEORY OF THE STATE AND THE
REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTSIntroduction

One of the central issues in the nineteenth century, and in our own times as well, concerns the role of the state in the industrial society which was clearly coming into being. The chief spokesmen of what Alan Ryan calls the "market" theory of democracy,¹ and Steven Lukes the "economic-individualist view"² were Adam Smith, James Mill and Herbert Spencer, who argued for minimal state involvement in the economic and social life of the society. The protection of individual rights (among which the foremost was usually property) became the primary state role in a society assumed to be composed of individuals motivated to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.

Durkheim took up the issue in the Division du travail social, and confronted Herbert Spencer on the specific question of the origin of the state and its function in contemporary society. He proposed, instead, a model of the positive, interventionist state which, in England, had been adumbrated by John Stuart Mill and later described more

systematically by the Idealists. In France, the same task had been assumed by Saint-Simon and Comte, and with variations, by socialists and radicals.

From the beginning, Durkheim's central concern was the pathological state which he found in the French society of his time. While it was necessary to educate, he had clearly stated in Suicide that education was "only the image and reflection of society";³ one had to confront the causes of that pathological condition, and make structural changes, after a careful analysis of the necessary structure and function of the state in a contemporary society marked by a highly complex division of labor.

Both Durkheim and Bouglé took up not only the question of the origin of the state and its functions; they also proceeded to outline institutional arrangements, the importance of intermediary associations, and the way in which the interests of the community ought to be represented. Bouglé, as one might expect, made rather explicit use of Durkheim's propositions as he confronted his ideological opponents on all sides. But he disagreed with Durkheim in those areas where the theory of the latter tended to alienate natural political allies in the progressive liberal coalition.

In this chapter we shall outline briefly Durkheim's theory of the state and take up the modifications which were introduced by his colleague and disciple.

Durkheim

The emergence of the state was directly related to the progress of the division of labor. The gradual evolution from social homogeneity to diversity characteristic of more advanced societies involved both a multiplicity of secondary groups and institutionalized means of coordination and unification. Durkheim had claimed that the former were a primary condition for any higher organization:

Far from being in opposition to the social group endowed with sovereign powers and called more specifically the State, the State supposes their existence; it exists only where they exist.⁴

The state, conceived as functionally related to the needs of society at a particular stage of development, was consequently natural and necessary. Thus did the durkheimians ground their opposition to Spencer and the economic liberals, on the one hand, and to the revolutionary syndicalists on the other. The emergence of the state from secondary groups was also clearly meant to be a refutation of the marxist theory of the class nature of the state.

In his refutation of Spencer, Durkheim took, as an

index of state activity, the degree to which the system of laws regulated social activities. There was no doubt about the increase in state action which had accompanied the growing complexity of the division of labor:

It is thus evident that far from diminishing it has been increasing and becoming more complicated. . . . If social intervention no longer has the effect of imposing on everyone certain uniform practices, it consists even more of defining and regulating the special relationships of different social functions.⁵

Durkheim was also at pains to refute any notion that the growth of the state diminished freedom. On the contrary, he argued that the modern state was directly related to the cult of the individual which it specifically promoted.

The functions of the state are, then, a response to needs which had developed historically with the division of labor, and with the gradual emergence of an organic solidarity which consecrated equality and the autonomy of the individual. It acted, first, as the primary source of moral constraint upon both individuals and intermediary groups. However, if secondary associations are not only related to the origin of the state, and a primary source of moral constraint,⁶ they are also a source of tyranny for the individual. Durkheim, like Bouglé, never failed to assume that unchecked power must necessarily become despotic. Thus

did the state stand, in modern society, as the guarantor of individual autonomy:

It is solely because, in holding its constituent societies in check, it prevents them from exerting the repressive influences over the individual that they would otherwise exert. So there is nothing inherently tyrannical about state intervention in the different fields of collective life; on the contrary it has the object and the effect of alleviating tyrannies that do exist.⁴

In a similar way, the associations stand as a counterbalance against the state, and, in their modified conflict, the individual is emancipated.

The second essential function of the state, beyond the mere coordination of complex social activities, is the task of "recalling us to the sentiment of common solidarity."⁸ Thus the state is required not only to determine just what is the content of that solidarity, but also to adopt those measures which will accomplish its purpose. The difficulty of determining the first has already been suggested in Socialism, where, as we have seen, the expression of the people at large may be only partially in touch with the goals and values congruent with an emerging stage of the division of labor. Liberals, like Durkheim and Bouglé, were faced with a dilemma. Either an elite which possesses the requisite knowledge must direct the society towards goals which are not yet, or only partially, understood by

the citizens until the nature of the new society is more fully revealed; or they must wait until the inexorable march of the division of labor brings about a sufficient consensus for taking action.

Durkheim opted for the latter position. In his lectures published by Marcel Mauss as Leçons de sociologie: physique des mœurs et du droit, Durkheim argued that the state, while "in touch with the masses of the nation," may make decisions which are valid for the whole community which "do not square with the state of social opinion."⁹

So we may say that there is a collective psychic life, but this life is not diffused throughout the entire social body: although collective it is localized in a specific organ. . . . When the state takes thought and makes a decision, we must not say that it is the society that thinks and decides through the state, but that the state thinks and decides for it. It is, in a certain sense, the organizing center of the secondary groups themselves.¹⁰

In a society that is "polycellular or polysegmental,"¹¹ consciousness assumes a variety of forms related to what Bouglé termed the complication of intermediary groups, each pursuing, to some degree, separate interests. These "social sentiments and social states of mind" are "obscure and indefinite."¹² Within the state, on the other hand, there is consciousness and deliberation:

To sum up we can therefore say that the state is a special organ whose responsibility it is to work out certain representations which hold good for the collectivity. These representations are distinguished from the other collective representations by their higher degree of consciousness and reflection.¹³

Durkheim assures us, furthermore, that the state "does not think for the sake of thought or to build up doctrinal systems."¹⁴ It exists, rather, "to guide collective conduct."¹⁵ And the essence of the guidance given by the modern state is the will to institute those rights of the individual which are inherent in the autonomy which has been a product of social evolution. Thus it can be understood that "the functions of the state may expand without any diminishing of the individual."¹⁶

The reason that the mass cannot govern in the Lockean sense is that it does not have either the necessary information or unity; and its "attention cannot be applied at the same moment to the same object."¹⁷ The state must, therefore, not so much "arrive at what the society is thinking, but . . . discover what is in its best interests."¹⁸ It cannot "be in servitude to the citizen and reduced to a mere echo of their will."¹⁹ It was in the principles enunciated by Alain that Durkheim saw a reflection of France's political, social and economic difficulties:

. . . these ideas, according to which the government is only the transmitter of general volitions, are current with us.²⁰

The true cause of these difficulties were not the result of "some intellectual fallacy"²¹ but in the social fact that

. . . the state and the mass of individuals are in direct relation, without having any intermediary being brought between them.²²

Durkheim therefore gave considerable attention to the problem of how the legislative branch of the state should be chosen. If the relationship of the state and the masses was too close, not only would the existence of intermediary associations provide a buffer against state power, but a cure for this proximity, one which would bring a replacement of "this variant" by the "normal form" of democracy,²³ was the institution of a two-stage voting system. Under such conditions

. . . the intermediaries that are intercalated set free the hands of government.²⁴

Thus freed, the state is capable of playing its necessary role of guide:

From the moment that the state emerges less immediately from the mass of the people, it is much less subject to the action of that mass: it is able to belong to itself all the more. Obscure tendencies, dimly at work in the country no longer exercise the same influence over its efforts and no longer have the effect of curbing its decisions so closely.²⁵

Durkheim further recommended administrative decentralization and suggested that "the professional association is the true electoral unit."

Because the links attaching us to one another derive from our calling rather than from any regional bonds of loyalty, it is natural that the political structure should reflect the way in which we ourselves form into groups of our own accord.²⁶

In this way, Durkheim argued, political assemblies, rather than giving expression to "individual sentiments" which are usually "egoistic whims,"²⁷ would derive from men thinking in common. In making this suggestion, Durkheim was clearly drawing on the notion, in Rousseau, of the emergence of a general will which transcended the individual wills. Yet the essential condition, implicit in Rousseau's construct, was that men must come together in order to think in common, to listen to one another, and only subsequently to arrive at decisions. Since this condition could not be met in modern society, Durkheim believed that the suggested method could succeed where Rousseau "had wrestled in vain."

But let us suppose that such nomination [to the political assembly] were made as a result of long, collective preparation, their character would be different. For when men think in common, their thought is partly the work of the community. It acts upon them, weighs upon them with all its authority . . . setting minds on a common course. Therefore, if votes are to be an expression of something more than individuals, and if they are

to be animated by a collective mind, the ordinary voting electorate should not be made up of individuals brought together solely for this exceptional occasion; they cannot know one another, they have not contributed to forming each others' opinions and they merely go along in single file to the ballot box. No, on the contrary, it must be an established group that has cohesion and permanence, that does not just take shape for the moment on polling day.²⁸

This recommendation for a change in the mode of representation is directed toward assuring that the state shall have that special competence necessary to the statesman. This is a role "for which the individual is not cast."²⁹ It is not simply the capacity to effect compromises among the social groups whose interests are in conflict, but to resolve conflict in the name of the social ideals that are inherent in the conscience collective--ideals which may not be perceived by the mass, or at least tend to be obscured by the partial interests of groups. Such a task implies, particularly when one recalls the durkheimian theory of history, a special knowledge, approximate as it may be, of the characteristics of a morale which is merely in the process of becoming. While Durkheim professed that "the task of the sociologist is not that of the statesman,"³⁰ there is, at least, the suggestion that the statesman must depend on the sociologist, or must become one himself; if he is to act as a guide, he must know the terrain.

The problem of individual rights and obligations is integrally related both to the nature and functions of groups and of the state itself. The historical basis for the emergence of rights had been in the conflict between state and the medieval corporations. But liberties won with the support of the state against oppressive corporations became increasingly insecure when the latter, incapable of adjusting to a new set of socio-economic conditions, disappeared or were destroyed. What was required, first, was a reconstitution of modern corporations which went beyond even the professional associations of owners or workers. While Durkheim found such syndicates "legitimate and necessary," he saw no "regular contact between them." They were, in fact, "two belligerents." While they might exist in a "de facto" state, they could not "create a just state."³¹

Rights had to be defended not only by the corporate group; they had to be defended against the "particularism" and "despotism" of the corporation.³² Thus did the state play a continuing historical role in the defense of individual autonomy, thereby expressing in coercive form, the prescriptions of an emergent conscience collective. The key, therefore, lay in the existence of a balance of state, secondary

group and individuals.

Durkheim's theory of obligation implicitly rejected the notion of consent, one of the cornerstones of classical liberalism. Instead, following Hume, Durkheim found the true source of obligation in the recognition by the citizen of the justice of laws and political arrangements.

Durkheim's own view comes much closer to the kind of construction put on the notion of tacit consent which can justify a sovereign who establishes such conditions as are conducive to individual liberties.

The true source of respect for the law lies in its clearly expressing the natural interrelation of things; the individual, especially in a democracy, will respect it only to the degree to which he recognizes it as having this quality. It is not because we have made a certain law or because it has been willed by so many votes that we submit to it; it is because it is a good one--that is, appropriate to the nature of the facts.³³

As we have come to know, allegiance to the modern state can be deduced only with the greatest difficulty from "participation" in the making of decisions, since few citizens participate in the Lockean or Rousseauian sense. It derives, rather, from both having received benefits or from having been given opportunities to participate which are equal to those granted to others.

Bouglé

Bouglé accepted Durkheim's argument as the foundation of his own thinking. Although he recognized that the origin of the state often lay in the will to power of both individuals and groups,³⁴ it was out of the nature of society that the state emerged, and it therefore continued to be a functional necessity. Without such an institution, a modern society would disintegrate. The following was addressed to the syndicalists:

A society is not a workshop. At the very least, a new society would be composed of a number of workshops. But at that point, is there no chance that the differences will remain between the interests of diverse categories of producers? Furthermore, would the interest of the producers always coincide with that of the consumers?³⁵

But the mere coordination of divergent interests, or even the adjudication of conflict was far from the most important role of the state. Human societies were not content to live simply for material ends. Beyond the responsibilities of the state which might be subsumed under the requirements of national defense, Bouglé emphasized to his students that the state was required to act so as to further the demands of the collective moral consciousness. Although liberty, equality, and state power had long appeared contradictory, this was no longer the case. He

quoted Durkheim's observation that the state had the obligation

. . . to realize at home the general interests of humanity, that is, to establish a wider reign of justice, a higher morality. . . .³⁶

The unity necessary to the survival of a society did not result automatically from the interdependence of secondary groups:

A considerable number of individuals can live together on the same territory and act in very diverse ways upon one another without necessarily constituting a unified society. In order that a group be born of this agglomeration, it is not sufficient that they enter into relations . . . it is necessary that their relations be defined and regulated by a certain community of recognized obligations and approved attitudes. . . . There is not complete social unity until there exists, to regulate the relationships of the associated groups, a certain political, judicial, administrative, economic organization--a law, a central power, in a word, a state.³⁷

Both Bouglé and Durkheim contended that in any society there exists a collective interest of which the members of the community may be only partially aware. First, Bouglé argued, with his ideological opponents always in mind, the collective interest did not require an organicist premise:

It is sufficient that amongst the individuals who pass away there remain forms which are the permanent ties among those individuals. If you look at it this way, if the essential structure of a nation is its political system and moral

beliefs, then the collective interest is going to be, above all, the maintenance of an order, and of a certain relationship between the individuals and secondary groups.³⁸

All collectivities have collective goals of which individuals may be only partially conscious, or in fact may not understand at all. Collective needs are, however, objectively inherent in the social nature of a given community or nation. Certain objective necessities flow from the collective ideals which, as Bouglé had noted was the case for egalitarianism, were the result of a historical set of social processes. Having argued that the health of an egalitarian society depended on the degree of obedience, resemblance and concentration which existed, it then devolved upon the state to intervene in such a way as to maintain and improve those conditions. In particular, the state had the responsibility to establish and promote those structures--such as intermediary associations--which were best able to "defend the major interests of members of society."³⁹ At the same time, the state required the existence of those associations for guidance and support.⁴⁰ Yet the very existence of the associations required that the state maintain a position of sufficient strength to settle disputes among them, always in the name of a higher, general interest which was informed by the moral ideals of the whole

community.

The state was also committed to "forming the new generations."⁴¹ Among those qualities essential to the citizens of a democracy was a critical mentality. Bouglé recognized the inherent conflict between this invitation to resistance (which characterized the philosophy of Alain) and the necessary task of organization. But, he added,

. . . this thorny problem prevents minds from going to sleep, and it invites [citizens] to associate under other banners than those of [material] interests.⁴²

The citizen of the modern republic had come to regard the rights of association and criticism as moral rights; and it was the duty of the state to guarantee them,⁴³ just as it was the corresponding duty of the citizen to devote a portion of his time to "groups serving the public interest" and "to be a good associate."⁴⁴ The moral goal of the state involves, then, educating its citizens in "the life of the mind."⁴⁵ The essence of the republican is faith in reason.⁴⁶

But reason, for both Durkheim and Bouglé, was not la raison raisonnante, or a kantian metaphysics, but the positivist reason of the sociologist which revealed, by examination of culture and tradition, the moral order which it was the task of the state to inculcate in its citizens:

It is clear that a social order cannot be maintained without the transmission of a culture. It follows that the life and longevity of a nation presuppose an effort to socialize the minds [of citizens]. There must be values respected in common, there must be a collective ideal, and without these forces of an internal nature, even though a nation be defended by gendarmes and magistrates, it will collapse and return to dust.⁴⁷

The emphasis in Durkheim is on the necessity of elite leadership capable of acting as guide for a society which is not fully conscious of its own ideals; but Bouglé always found his older colleague pessimistic, and certainly this attitude is evident in Bouglé's own approach to the questions of citizenship and institutions. Not only his writing, but his life-long devotion to education, and particularly his involvement with the Universités Populaires, make it plain that he believed that the capacity of the masses for la vie spirituelle needed only the removal of obstacles, such as the Church control of education, to be realized. The difference lies in Bouglé's confidence in the possibilities of teaching. He believed that the role of the state was to mobilize the moral forces which were on the point of converging. When he admitted that members of society were not necessarily conscious of their goals, he did not thereby imply that they could not be: it was a matter of education. Bouglé was as much of a moralist as Durkheim;

but he believed that the state had a responsibility to enlighten as well as to lead, and that an enlightened citizenry must form the basis of the modern state. In this sense, I think, Bouglé was more faithful to the Durkheim of "L'Individualisme et les Intellectuels" than to the lectures on the state.

Bouglé also differed with Durkheim on the question of institutional arrangements. He had a concern for the abuses of power that went deeper than was the case for his colleague, who, as a scientist, was less likely to consider his science a source of tyranny than the man who was always less certain of the prescriptive nature of the answers which sociology might give. Bouglé was certain that the abandonment of the liberal concept of the citizen, and his replacement by "the producer" would be unacceptably dangerous.

Bouglé took up the arguments advanced by the syndicalists which advocated the "substitution of a culture of producers for the ideological, even verbalist culture of the citizen."⁴⁸ Had not Sièyes argued that the third estate should rule because they were producers? Physiocrats, Saint-Simon and Proudhon had all accepted this premise, and Bouglé agreed, in principle:

Irrefutable reasoning . . . Deprecated for a long time, perhaps because it seemed to be the lot of

the slave in the Greek polis, work has tended to become the principle of all dignity in our industrialized nations.⁴⁹

However, upon examination, the notion of producer turns out to be as protean as that of "citizen" is abstract. Bouglé refused to be persuaded that the workshop would replace politics. Although it might be argued that syndicalism is the natural inheritor of democracy, and although he agreed that the majority rule liberal system was not sufficient to produce social justice,⁵⁰ he nevertheless defended the liberal construction of the citizen as vital to democracy:

Convention, if you wish, but outside of that convention, no safety, no peace.⁵¹

It is hardly surprising that Bouglé should make a certain obeisance to consent theory. Too much was at stake politically to categorically deny its validity.

Bouglé did not derive his argument from any theory of natural rights. He did, however, justify the notion of citizen on his quality of membership in the nation; while a producer is also a consumer, at another level he is much more: he is "the co-proprietor of a national heritage."⁵² He shares, equally with every other member of the nation, a membership that carries with it historically evolved rights, privileges and duties. The notion of individual autonomy requires the means of defending those rights

against the dangers inherent in other institutions which have evolved concurrently and necessarily. The bureaucratic state as well as the intermediary groups to which the citizen belongs are both sources of tyranny. If a positive liberty (liberté-puissance) was a major political value to be supported both by the state and the associations, liberty in the negative sense (liberté-indépendance) could only be assured by the retention, by the citizens, of an institutionalized defense.⁵³ For Bouglé, as well as for Durkheim, justice amounted to a balance of individual autonomy and constraints which should, to be effective, be internalized. The institutions capable of generating these constraints were, however, weak: the state was too close to the electors, and it had neither the understanding of, nor the capacity for its moral task; and the secondary associations were too weak to play their own moralizing role. Lastly, the emergent conscience collective, which contained the prescriptions capable of inducing a civic virtue congruent with the state of modern society, was only dimly perceived; "abnormal" and "morbid" ideas still laid claims which were historically and sociologically unjustifiable. In the light of all this, the danger of tyranny is aggravated. As Bouglé pointed out, having the collectivists in mind,

Property, while presently the most important means, is not the only means of domination. An egalitarian society would contain many varieties of the abuse of power.⁵⁴

Bouglé thus argued strenuously that the "principles of 1789" could only be maintained, at least for the foreseeable future, by the retention of politics, the parliament, and universal suffrage in the liberal sense of the right of each to cast a vote for the legislative assembly. However, this structure of representation must be supplemented by a Conseil Économique, wherein producers and consumers are represented as such through their associations. Rule, however, must remain, Bouglé argued, with that body which represents both the indissoluble nation, and the individuals who compose it. The state may be required to consult the Conseil, and it should always be in touch with it; but it cannot allow its task to be assumed by groups whose orientation can never be more than partial, and which are inclined, should the society be drastically decentralized (as the syndicalists demanded), to become widely-dispersed feudal tyrannies.

Bouglé, less optimistic concerning the historical determination of such a future state, less certain of the automatic emergence of the egalitarian ethic, was consequently more insistent on the importance of an institutional

defense of the individual. He believed that the theory must enter into a dialogue with reality. In an article published in 1932,⁵⁵ he pointed out that there existed two problems which were central to any discussion of a change in the manner of representation: the first was the open sore of Catholicism in the French body politic; the second involved the contradictions, both historical and contemporary, between the cultures of worker and peasant. Bouglé called "clerical intransigence" one of the "fatalities of our history which prevents the state from taking "positive action . . . to assure workers of real liberty."

The Church has been all powerful for too long. Too long it has had the whole of education in its hands. It feels insulted, wounded by a so-called liberal regime which reduces to the same level as others beliefs which it has long held sacred, and which have for so long been the instruments of rule. Even now, from time to time, priests repeat that the laws of secularization are iniquitous, that they are not laws. . . .⁵⁶

The state cannot therefore disappear all of a sudden, as the syndicalists would have it; it has a task which is, first, to assure the birth of a new moral order which is social democracy:

That is why republicans, be they radical or socialist, or even conservative liberals, believe they must mount a guard around the public school.⁵⁷

The authoritarianism of another age does not die so easily; and, he implied, it would not be safe to relinquish the institutions wherein the citizens were directly represented until the battle against the past had been definitively won.

The second reason why it would be dangerous to abandon liberal politics was that the rural culture had a long remembrance of local despotism. The farmer looked to centralized institutions for a variety of needs:

. . . to safeguard his living conditions, to maintain a high price for his wheat, to defend it against the abuses of speculation or excessive imports.⁵⁸

The agricultural community would continue to see things very differently from the workers. Solutions, then, could only be pragmatic. Only by retaining, at least for the foreseeable future, the system of representation instituted in 1789 could the values, dear not only to the rural population, but also to the intellectuals, survive. Prudence, however, required also that liberals understand that representation of functional interests required a forum of a different kind.

Conclusion

In the two previous chapters we have dealt largely with the notion of liberalism which Durkheim and Bouglé sought to clarify, just as John Stuart Mill and T.H. Green

had done across the Channel. They had addressed themselves to the question, "what does it mean for a human being to be free, and what social and institutional arrangements would best contribute to that end?" Early utilitarians had thought that this end did not require the active participation of the members of the society. Tocqueville had clearly warned that freedom might in fact be undermined by the masses unless there were powerful social, ideological and political restraints. John Stuart Mill had made a powerful argument for representation, and by the end of the century the position of a new and progressive liberal theory largely accepted the premise that the members of a society must have the means of active participation in the decision-making process. Democracy, for Durkheim and Bouglé, meant the involvement, albeit limited, of all the citizens in the choice of rulers, and indirectly, therefore, in the determination of the policies to be pursued by the society.

Starting from the twin premises of autonomy and equality, they wrestled with the question of how, in fact, these goals could be achieved, and once achieved, safeguarded. They believed that the division of labor produced, or at least had a strong tendency to produce, both equality and a solidarity based on a general consensus as to the

worth of the individual in two senses; first, his right to be free from the invasion of an area in which he could think and act for himself; and second, his right to aspire to a realization of his potential. In this, they combined both the older, classical notion of freedom with that expounded by John Stuart Mill and the Idealists in England, and by socialists and progressive liberals in France.

However, the advance of the division of labor did not produce automatically this condition. "Abnormal" social structures must be eliminated, and new and more appropriate ones must be built.

Three key areas of the Durkheimian theory of the state should be considered. First, what was meant by describing the new liberalism as a democracy? Secondly, what was the role of the state and what was its relationship to the society as a whole? Lastly, to what extent was functional representation a major feature of the proposed political structure, and how was such a system to be made viable?

Durkheim and Bouglé understood democracy somewhat differently. For Bouglé, it was the key to the defense of individual autonomy, understood as a socially derived and socially dependent freedom. Autonomy required not only the

existence of secondary associations, but the institutionalization of certain political and civil rights through a directly elected legislature. Consent for Bouglé was explicit, and implied an active, thoughtful role played by an informed citizenry. Durkheim, on the other hand, was less sanguine concerning the role of the citizen. While he believed that they should have an opportunity "to give or withhold their confidence,"⁵⁹ it was the secondary association which would "liberate the individual from the state . . . dispensing [the individual] from a task for which he is not fitted."⁶⁰ Durkheim's definition of democracy as "a political system by which a society can achieve consciousness of itself in its purest form"⁶¹ was a sociological definition. He did not assume any inherent relationship between the nature of the political system and the institutional forms: monarchy could perfectly well be democratic, depending on the "relations [the king] maintained with the country as a whole."⁶²

In the years since their time, Bouglé's hopes for an involved citizenry have not, at least in practice, been realized. Not only do voting studies show that the electorate knows little about the issues; but the complex nature of those issues suggests that Durkheim's notion of periodic

expressions of confidence is the more realistic. It is unlikely that in any modern industrial society the citizens can exercise more than a check on political elites.

Bouglé's confidence in the efficacy of the national legislature as a primary source of protection for civil rights is similarly open to serious question. The role of the state, both historically and in modern times, has not necessarily been, contrary to Durkheim's thesis, one of emancipating and protecting individuals. Too often the reverse has been true. Bouglé's insistence on the direct involvement of citizens in the electoral process attests to his strong doubts that intermediary associations could effectively counterbalance a state bent on the subjection of individuals.

Bouglé's concern over the tendency of the state to abuse its power was not unlike Madison's fears about the consequences of human ambition, "under the impulse of passion or of interest."⁶³ As Raymond Aron has pointed out, Durkheim tended to discount the role of conflict in society,⁶⁴ and consequently paid little attention to the important place of political institutions, being content to assume that the state could and would act in a beneficent manner. Whether, for Durkheim, this was a normative or empirical statement

is never made clear. For Bouglé, however, the threat to the individual that existed in the state was always an important consideration, and accounts for his insistence on maximizing both the role of intermediary groups and the degree of citizen participation in the governing process.

The role of the state which Durkheim proposed involved coordination of the economy, the creation and encouragement of "corporations," and counterbalancing the despotic tendencies of secondary groups in the name of an emergent conscience collective. Durkheim believed that the state must be free to act independently of the partial views of its citizens, attached as they were to intermediary groups, and limited as they were in their understanding of the nature and direction of the society as a whole. On this latter issue, Bouglé was ambivalent. On the one hand he implied that there is a discoverable, objectively valid morale which is congruent with the stage of the division of labor. It is to be found in the traditions and culture of the group, and is also implied by the social forms of the division of labor. The thesis of the Idées was, as we noted, that egalitarian ideals had emerged with, and were conditioned by, the realities of the modern industrial system, the existence of multiple secondary groups, and the

process of entrecroisement. But Bouglé suggests that the members of a given collectivity may not be consciously aware of "the ends which they embrace":

Collective needs are needs which individuals, as members of collectivities . . . feel either wittingly or without knowing them.⁶⁵

On the other hand, for Bouglé, the key to democracy was the capacity to defend one's autonomy, understood as a socially derived and socially dependent freedom. This capacity was only defensible within the liberal notion of citizenship. It required not only the existence of secondary associations, but also the institutionalization of certain political rights through a directly elected legislature:

In spite of the imperfections, it remains an incalculable means to social peace. We count heads, it is said, for no other end than not to fight with one another. The will of the majority is law. The minority retains its right to make its case to the country in order to become the majority.⁶⁶

Consent, for Bouglé, was more explicit, and certainly it implied a far more active, thoughtful role than was the case for Durkheim.

We are left then with a contradiction: for although the liberal notion of a citizen is maintained, it is admitted that this will not necessarily achieve progress toward the

egalitarian ideal, since either consciousness of that ideal may not exist in a majority, or the means--both institutional and programmatic--may not exist or may not be understood.

If that is the case, there are two choices: either those who possess the knowledge must be content to wait until that knowledge has been accepted by the majority, which can then act in its light; or an elite must direct the society toward the goals which are immanent in the development of the division of social labor, yet are not known to the citizenry, at least until such time as the nature of the new society is more fully revealed to the masses.

Bouglé did not come to grips directly with this contradiction. Yet is this apparent contradiction not inherent in the dialectical relationship of leadership and followers? For if by leadership we imply, or at least hope for, a wisdom beyond the average, we also look to the citizenry to limit the scope of power exercised by leaders. Without the leaders, the society may have no knowledge of itself; without the checks, a political elite can abuse the trust inherent in a role that contains much of the earlier notion of noblesse oblige. As in many other ways, Bouglé articulated the tension that is present in the gamble which is democracy.

One must seriously question the foundation of the proposition that there exists an objective knowledge of what is best for a given society in terms both of institutional structures and of policy decisions. All elite groups have justified their rule on similar arguments about a special insight. Both Fascism and Leninism draw upon this doctrine. However, while the dangers have long been apparent to man, a leadership which is hamstrung cannot lead; and voter studies over the past decade have shown conclusively that the knowledge requisite for leadership in a modern society is limited to highly trained and educated people. Even when leaders do not have technical knowledge, they must be able to evaluate the advice tendered by technicians. Bouglé wanted to argue that there is a balance to be struck between a leadership having the sort of knowledge he believed sociology could provide, and the citizen whose explicit consent was required periodically in the direct election of leaders.

Functional representation, which so captivated Durkheim, was, for Bouglé, a necessary part of the representational system, but only in addition to that political institution which represented citizens as individuals. Confronted by the syndicalist claim that the representation

of the individual was the institutionalization of an abstraction, Bouglé sought a compromise by advocating the creation of a Conseil Economique through which functional interests might be expressed. But he did not elaborate on just how this body would be chosen, or how it would arrive at authoritative decisions. Bouglé's fascination with functional representation underlines the great appeal this idea had in his time, and continues to have, even though the means of its implementation continues to defy solution, except where the body is only consultative. As such, it has been incorporated in successive postwar French constitutions. However, it should be pointed out that this body has been appointive, and has functioned largely in the role of giving technical advice.

Ernest Wallwork has remarked upon Durkheim's failure "to perceive that struggle and even violence are often essential weapons in the good fight against entrenched proponents of systematic oppression and injustice."⁶⁷ However, this fails to take into consideration either Durkheim's approval of the Revolution or his less-than-sanguine attitude toward the violence which might erupt should entrenched interests block the emergence of modern values and social forms. On the other hand, it is

true that particularly in his writing on political institutions, he does not see social conflict as endemic either in the sense of Madison's factions or Marx's classes. It is true that both Durkheim and Bouglé, anxious to deny Marxist assertions, tended to stress the cooperation and peaceful social structures which would characterize the modern state. Bouglé, however, had more correctly grasped these dangers, and consequently sought a solution which recognized both the necessary functions of leadership and the institutional protections of the individual. Sheldon Wolin has argued that Durkheim's recommendations closely paralleled Marx's expectation that politics would decline and the state wither away.⁶⁸

If politics is represented, for Durkheim, as the clash, essentially, of progressive and morbid views, the gradual extinction of the latter, and the spread of the former as society becomes conscious of itself, would result in the attenuation of "political" conflict. Such conflict was typical of a society in transition. Durkheim believed that the modern industrial state was approaching a relatively fixed form; the problem was that there existed a lag in the evolution of a consciousness of that form. Consequently there were differences among the members, with some

clinging to descriptions which fitted only bygone stages of society. But although "politics" in its virulent form would come to an end, Wolin is not justified in assuming that the kind of choosing which he calls politics would cease either for Durkheim or Marx; for both, choices would continue to be made, though within a new framework of values established by a collective moral consciousness.

Bouglé grasped, perhaps as Durkheim never did, the essence of pluralist politics in the modern state. He was acutely aware of the threat to the citizens inherent in the state, and he underlined all his life the necessity of leaving the state in the hands, ultimately, of the citizens. Yet he was also aware that modern society must be viewed as composed of functional groups, that the world of Locke and Adam Smith no longer existed. He wanted to institutionalize the representation of those groups, for he was convinced, as was Durkheim, that in the syndicalist "cry of pain" there was a truth which must find expression, just as they recognized the necessity for the coordination and direction of the society. If Bouglé did not systematically explore the ramifications of this idea, nevertheless it has come to be recognized in the ties which presently exist between contemporary legislatures and executives and the major

functional groups in the society. Bouglé would not have insisted that these ties be formal; that functional equivalents have been established attests to his insight.

CHAPTER VII

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Alan Ryan, p. 78.
- ²Lukes, Individualism (New York, 1973), p. 92.
- ³Durkheim, Suicide, p. 427.
- ⁴Durkheim, Leçons de sociologie: physique des mœurs et du droit (Paris, 1950), p. 45.
- ⁵Durkheim, La Division du travail social, p. 182.
- ⁶Ibid., pp. v-viii.
- ⁷Durkheim, Leçons, p. 63.
- ⁸Durkheim, DTS, p. 207.
- ⁹Durkheim, Leçons, p. 49.
- ¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹Ibid., p. 47.
- ¹²Ibid., p. 50.
- ¹³Ibid.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 51.
- ¹⁵Ibid.
- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 57.
- ¹⁷Ibid., p. 92.
- ¹⁸Ibid.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 93.
- ²⁰Ibid., p. 94.

- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid., p. 95.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid., p. 103.
- 27 Ibid., p. 105.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid., p. 108.
- 30 Durkheim, La Division, p. xxvii.
- 31 Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
- 32 Durkheim, Suicide, pp. 439-442.
- 33 Durkheim, Leçons, p. 107.
- 34 Bouglé, 1899a, pp. 222 ff.
- 35 Bouglé, 1909c, p. 414.
- 36 Durkheim, Education morale, p. 65.
- 37 Bouglé, 1899a, p. 207.
- 38 Bouglé, "La notion de l'intérêt collectif," in Cours de Sociologie Economique (Paris, n.d.), p. 53.
- 39 Bouglé, 1920b, p. 90.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Bouglé, 1932 f., p. 126.
- 42 Ibid., p. 127. See also Bouglé, 1922a, p. 73.
- 43 Bouglé, 1920b, p. 87.

- ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 89.
- ⁴⁵Bouglé, 1902a, pp. 1-22, passim.
- ⁴⁶Bouglé, 1906a, p. 63.
- ⁴⁷Bouglé, "La notion de l'intérêt collectif," p. 54.
- ⁴⁸Bouglé, 1920c, p. 379.
- ⁴⁹Ibid.
- ⁵⁰Bouglé, 1909c, p. 409.
- ⁵¹Bouglé, 1920c, p. 391.
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 389.
- ⁵³Bouglé, 1932 f., pp. 123-124.
- ⁵⁴Bouglé, 1908b, pp. 29-30.
- ⁵⁵Bouglé, 1932 f.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 126.
- ⁵⁷Ibid.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 129.
- ⁵⁹Durkheim, Leçons, p. 129.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 130.
- ⁶¹Ibid., p. 89.
- ⁶²Ibid.
- ⁶³The Federalist (New York: Modern Library Ed.),
p. 54.
- ⁶⁴Aron, Main Currents, p. 84.
- ⁶⁵Bouglé, 1932.
- ⁶⁶Bouglé, 1920c, pp. 390-391. See also Bouglé,
1932 f., p. 113 and 1902h, p. 650.

⁶⁷Wallwork, p. 118.

⁶⁸Wolin, p. 414 ff.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL ACTION (I)

Introduction

In preceding chapters we have concentrated largely upon the content of Célestin Bouglé's version of Durkheim, and its orientation towards its natural enemies, traditionalist conservatism, social darwinism, and revolutionary marxism and syndicalism. Yet this approach does not adequately answer the question of the importance of durkheimian theory as a political force under the Third Republic. Major writers on the Third Republic have scarcely mentioned Durkheim's name. Yet those critics, like Paul Nizan and Hubert Bourgin on the left, and Maurras and Simon Deploige on the right, clearly identified the school system as the epitome of democratic decadence and bourgeois ideology. They depicted it as the crowning, and in many ways the symbolic achievement of the République des Professeurs. Those who feared the social implications of Durkheim's beliefs, fought the spread of sociology in the school curriculum.

Although it is Alain's theories which are generally associated with the notion of radicalisme,¹ there was

developing, however, within the Third Republic, another radicalism which seems to have gone comparatively unnoticed, although Thibaudet, in Les Idées Politiques de la France, recognized, in 1932, the emergence of an ideological stream which he called "industrialism."² He identified it as a postwar movement resulting from rapid advances in French industrial practices provoked by wartime needs. As opposed to the old individualist conservatism of the nineteenth-century patronat, the new industriels were young, and inspired by Saint-Simon rather than Adam Smith, Thibaudet did not bother to explore the origins of these ideological newcomers; but he provided a clue by noting that they were imbued by the souci social which permeated the rue Visconti, the home of l'Union pour la Vérité.

This movement,³ founded by Arthur Fontaine and Paul Desjardins, in which durkheimians played a major role before the war, was complex. It was not a party, nor was it a homogeneous group in terms of the philosophical predilections of its leading spokesmen. It was marked, first, by its essentially intellectualist character, and secondly by its goal: to find, within a liberal framework, a flexible response to the rapid social, political and economic transformation of French society following the France-Prussian

war. Various members of the group sought to identify it with existing political structures; but because those structures had certain socio-political bases, the movement was incapable of finding a political home. Bouglé, who symbolizes in many ways the aspirations and contradictions of the group, once wrote to Halévy that, after several efforts to be nominated for office under the radical socialist party label, and after an effort to attract moderate socialist support, he realized that he was incombinable.⁴ On an earlier occasion, in the midst of what he saw as radical intolerance and doctrinaire insistence on the école unique he provided an insight into the place of this intellectual movement of modernizers in the political life of his times:

What I pointed out . . . was the worry and uncertainty of intellectuals, knowing that they can do nothing for themselves, and yet already fearing their collaborators, ready to hold back their hands at the very moment that they arm them; and tending to rush to the aid of the old world just as readily as they would aid the new one.⁵

For while the intellectuals had been in the forefront of the struggle for Dreyfus and the Republic, and had made possible the radical victory of 1902, they often found themselves outraged by an approach to governing which seemed to wish to substitute a new religion for the old.

It is our purpose in this and the following chapter to trace the development of this group of intellectuals, who differ so markedly from the school of Alain, through the activities of Célestin Bouglé, an active member of the major organizations under whose auspices movement members met and acted: Union pour la Vérité, Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, Ligue de l'Enseignement, Paix par le Droit, and la Société Française de Philosophie; the political parties which they sought to control or influence: le Parti Radical et Radical-Socialiste and the S.F.I.O.; the Universités Populaires, in which so many intellectuals participated during the first decade of the twentieth century; and lastly, the university system and, by extension, French public education. In addition, Bouglé provides a link between the foremost leaders of what may be termed an alliance of philosophers: Ferdinand Buisson and Émile Boutroux, representing a progressive idealism with its roots in kantian thought; Jean Jaurès, disciple of the idealist Lachelier, and proponent of a socialist idealism; Léon Bourgeois, advocate of solidarism; and of course Durkheim, who had brought sociology to the defense of liberalism. Bouglé even suggested to Halévy an expression which would suit his own views, and one may presume also those of the others to whom he felt himself to

be allied:

There is a title which I would like: liberal socialist. It would be a fine thing to try to show that it is not contradictory, and that if economic anarchy is to come to an end, that is no reason to eliminate with a single stroke all the liberties of thought, religious or intellectual.⁶

Bouglé later expressed his disappointment that this movement was completely without organization:

If we were truly a school, like your "English radicals," we would seize this chance to think a little more publicly.⁷

An examination of Bouglé's work, both intellectual and activist, reveals four periods during each of which there exists a nexus of ideological concerns and attitudes which, in turn, shed light not only on his orientation as a follower of Emile Durkheim, but also on the varying attitudes of the members of the alliance towards the rival ideological pressures of right and left, and towards the external pressures which beset France. During the first period, which lasted from 1896 to 1902, Bouglé concentrated on undermining the pseudo-science of the right, and on a defense of sociology, emphasizing the emergence of the autonomous individual within the framework of a French national tradition. The second period--full of reformist hopes--combined an attack on laissez-faire opponents to

social reform with arguments directed at showing how national solidarity required dealing with the alienation of the working class. The third period, from 1907 until the war, during which dangers arising from the external threats to the nation seemed to be exacerbated by the activities of the revolutionary left, saw Bouglé launch his counterattack on marxism and syndicalism. The postwar years, finally, witnessed an effort to reconstitute the decimated movement by revivals of the Année Sociologique, by efforts to keep alive the League of Nations; and a losing struggle to stem the tide of both right and left, each determined to bring an end to the République des Professeurs.

Formation of the Alliance

One must go back to the origins of the Third Republic to see the gradual emergence of radicalism as a political force. Although it was not an officially organized party until 1901, radicalism contained not simply that set of attitudes epitomized by Alain, but a moralizing tendency which was a powerful element in radicalism's jacobin ancestors. Claude Nicolet argues that French republicanism has always been marked by an intellectualist-moralist tendency to "construct a new city":

The Third Republic was to be the Republic of the Professors . . . because [they] considered it their national duty to extend their teaching into public life, because republicans wanted to construct their republic only on the school, the luminaries, and on science. . . . If that attitude was unanimous among republicans, the radicals of the nineteenth century represent most particularly the doctrinaire side. Here, no accommodation with the difficulties of the Revolution: they are clearly moralists in the French tradition.¹²

The doctrinaire aspect of radicalism emerged in the desire to destroy Catholic control of the education system, and was welcomed and supported by those elements of the republican left whose orientation was expressed by Alain's diatribes against the tyranny of power. Yet to men like Ferry, Liard, and Radical leaders Bourgeois, Buisson and Pelletan, there existed a clear notion that the state must play a positive, dynamic role, not only in the creation of a new moral climate through the instrument of the école unique, but more importantly, that state activity must sweep away the social obstacles to the realization of the rights enshrined by the Revolution. It was on the second of these goals that the ideological unity of Radicals tended to break down. In the early days of the republic, however, their isolated political situation, and a certain sympathy among les ruraux for an amelioration of the worst abuses of capitalism brought a gradual orientation towards finding a

modus vivendi with socialists. Even as early as 1880, Clemenceau had urged a progressive income tax, and inheritance tax, the constitution of workers associations, child labor laws, and a reduction of the work day.

During the '90's--and in fact until it was clear that Dreyfus had been condemned on forged evidence, Radicals stood in the opposition along with the rapidly increasing numbers of parliamentary socialists led by Jaurès. In the course of this decade the alliance was strengthened by efforts to elaborate both a program and an ideology capable of justifying social reform, and capable of providing liberalism with a theory of social progress. At the base of the alliance lay the program of secularization, fueled by a spirit of anti-clericalism which alone was capable of uniting the divergent elements of a political coalition. But anti-clericalism alone could hardly provide sufficient inducement for socialists to stand with the Radicals. What was required was a commitment which, at the very least, echoed Clemenceau's earlier demands.

Three sorts of arguments appeared in the '90's: Durkheim's sociology, Bourgeois' solidarism, and a Protestant-inspired kantism whose major proponents had been, earlier, Renouvier, and latterly, Émile Boutroux, who had

taught Durkheim at the École Normale Supérieure; Henri Michel, Bouglé's dissertation advisor; Louis Liard, Director of Higher Education; Octave Hamelin, Durkheim's closest friend at Bordeaux. Other members of the group were Bouglé's friends Paul Lapie and Dominique Parodi, sometime durkheimians; and Léon Brunschvicg, close friend of both Halévy and Bouglé; and most important, in some respects, Paul Desjardins. To this group should be added, inasmuch as their careers were closely related to those of Durkheim and Bouglé, Buisson, Steeg and Pécaut, the Protestants⁹ who returned from Swiss exile in 1870 to play major roles in the movement.

How could an alliance be built between such radicaux and a socialist party which, in outward appearance at any rate, seemed to claim a marxist heritage? A part of the explanation derives, no doubt, from the isolated position of the socialists. Standing in opposition to the centrist ministerial regimes of the '90's the socialists were naturally drawn to radicals by a common enemy: a patronat which François Coguel has described as "animated by violently individualist and authoritarian attitudes."¹⁰ I propose that the answer lies at least as much in a far closer ideological affinity of intellectualist leaders like Jaurès,

Millerand and Viviani, on the one hand, and, on the other, Buisson and the philosophical idealists, than would be evident if one saw only the party labels.

In the Chambre des Députés, in 1910, Jean Jaurès proclaimed that he did not disavow a single line of what he had written in his doctoral thesis published in 1891.¹¹ It was, wrote Isaak Benrubi,

. . . one of the most characteristic works of the renaissance of spiritualist metaphysics in 19th century France. It was written under the influence of Jules Lachelier and German idealism.¹²

It was infused with a "religious conception of knowledge" which "affirms God":¹³

I have said it, and I repeat it: it is because the infinite says "I" that I can say "I". . . . Thus the "I" absolute, perfect, eternal and divine is external and superior to us at the same time that it is internal.¹⁴

How does Jaurès accommodate Marx? In his Latin thesis¹⁵ he wrote:

I do not relate German socialism to the hegelian materialism of the extreme left, but to those idealists Luther, Kant, Fichte and Hegel . . .¹⁶

and also:

There is true humanity only where there is independence, active will, free and joyous adaptation to the whole.¹⁷

and furthermore:

We hear within us, in our soul, the idea of being, and the idea of being the idea of unity, of immensity, of homogeneous continuity.¹⁸

Yet for Jaurès, it was possible to come to terms with materialism and idealism by taking a position that even the most contradictory aspects of all philosophical and intellectual progress could be reconciled; that

. . . in the furthest reaches of human history, as in today's social and human history, there is constantly penetration, conciliation of what Marx called economic materialism, in other words crude influences of production, and human idealism. At whatever historical moment you examine the history of man, you will see that the humanitarian movement has been determined at the same time, in an invisible, indissoluble manner by the transformation of material conditions of life and by the transformation of social and moral concepts that men have had.¹⁹

The similarity of this view of history and that argued by Durkheim and Bouglé cannot fail to impress the reader. It is not an orthodox marxist theory of history. Whatever political stance Jaurès found himself required to take, particularly after 1905, he represented, as we have argued, an essentially idealist response to the social requirements of his time. And, writes his biographer,

[Jaurès] always remained faithful to that idea of the ascension of man from the zone of the material to that of the spiritual.²⁰

The Protestant movement is best represented by Ferdinand Buisson. In his introduction to the posthumous collection of Buisson's writings, Bouglé remarked that

. . . the history of the Third Republic could not be written without paying close attention to the diverse activities with which he had been involved, as well as to the doctrine by which he justified them. He not only contributed to the organization of that characteristic institution of the Third Republic, the secular school, the real moral center of our democratic regime . . . [but also] he never failed to insist on what must unite radicals and socialists if they want the Rights of Man to cease being abstract expressions and to be available to all citizens as a social reality, equal guarantees of unfettered development.²¹

Buisson's twin intellectual heritage was that of Kant and the French Revolution. He shared with the Durkheimians the conviction that religion does not command morality. Wrote Bouglé,

He often recalls, with approval, the notion of an independent morality. But he remembers that human consciousness has grown under the protection of religious doctrines, rejoining, in this respect, the philosophical-historical theories with which sociology has made us familiar.²²

Buisson was, of course, no durkheimian:

No doubt he would have a hard time admitting the theory which presents religious beliefs as so many crystalizations which arise from social life. . . . For Buisson appears to see religious feelings springing from some solidary contact of the individual and the infinite.²³

But Bouglé insisted on a similarity of conclusions concerning the lessons of history:

With Ferdinand Buisson, a concern for progress is paramount, for a progress whose variety of forms he is prepared to accept. . . . Whether it is the école unique, social revolution, feminism, one always finds Buisson ready to proclaim that the work of man is unfinished.²⁴

The similarity of Jaurès' and Buisson's philosophical orientation cannot be mistaken, at least with regard to an argument concerning the role of the individual consciousness in human evolution. Emile Boutroux may have best summed up their position when he argued that idealism is the basis of that notion of rights which lies at the base of modern democracy:

It is neither implied in the concept of right, nor imposed by nature. It represents a certain wish, a certain command issued by the [individual] conscience. And if conscience demands a state so contrary to facts, and even, in a sense, to the general course of nature, it is because it intends to take a position not to be considered natural, but moral.²⁵

What they are proposing is a view of human nature which does not really differ from Durkheim's notion of "autonomy"; for in both cases the content of that autonomy is reason and moral conscience. If in fact the origins of this nature are different in the two schools, the practical conclusions are not.

If the essence of this liberal movement of reform lies in the twin notions of reason and moral conscience, it can be rewarding to look briefly at that association--l'Union Pour la Vérité--which claimed the interest and support, before the war, of Durkheim, Jaurès, Buisson, Millerand, Halévy, Parodi, Lachelier and Brunschvicg, among those we have met before, and included a large number of other names well known in French intellectual circles: Aulard, Belot, Bureau, Ch. Gide, G. Lanson, Rauh, Levy-Bruhl and Van der Velde. Founded in 1892 by Paul Desjardins and Arthur Fontaine, the original name of the association was, significantly, l'Union Pour l'Action Morale. One year before Bouglé's graduation from the ENS, Desjardins, a classmate of both Bergson and Jaurès, had published Le Devoir présent, in which, in the words of Georges Guy-Grand,

. . . the author spoke out against the moral decadence which had been brought on, in a part of the elite, by a perversion of French culture.²⁶

Desjardins called for a reaction against this "spiritual anarchy" and its replacement by a positive moral purpose. Out of this call was born an organization dedicated, in the words of one of its founders,

. . . to struggle by our initiative against the weakening of social ties. . . . We want to discover in ourselves the rewards of rule, discipline, resignation, renunciation. . . .²⁷

The shock, however, of the Dreyfus affair brought a reorientation toward concern with public issues, and a recognition on the part of Desjardins that moral conscience, without critical reason, "can bring even the most devoted men to infinite evil,"²⁸ and that contemporary heroism required that political problems be subjected to rational analysis. Thus, in 1905, the name of the group was changed, and rue Visconti soon became a pseudonym for the group. The separation of Church and State, electoral reform, international questions, feminism, patriotism and the economic system became subjects discussed by many of the most outstanding liberal intellectuals in France, with an implicit conviction their discussions could lead to truths which would become the basis of concerted political and social action.

During the early years the alliance of intellectuals found a certain unity in the very fragile nature of the republican edifice. If there were large--even fundamental--methodological disagreements which separated its adherents, their conclusions as to what constituted a minimum program of republican defense and gradual, even imperceptible, social change made it possible, once Dreyfus' innocence became apparent, to assume political control. The elections of 1898 brought a greatly increased number of radicals and

socialists; and when, in 1899, "possibilist" leaders Poincaré, Barthou, Jonnart and Rouvier abandoned the parti de l'ordre for the parti de mouvement, Waldeck-Rousseau was able to form a ministry composed substantially of radicals and socialists.

What united moderates and most (though by no means all) radicals against Boulanger's aspirations had been more than a defense of the republic. It had been, and continued to be a defense of the "rights of man" and the "principles of 1789" against a coalition of republicans, Catholics and nationalists who claimed a prior right of the organic nation and its requirements over the rights of any individual. Put in these terms, the alliance of possibilists and radicals was without difficulty. But the socialists were not so quick to enter such an alliance. Denis Brogan argues that it was Jaurès--Jaurès the idealist, the universitaire, the professor, the intellectual--who brought it off:

It was the first great triumph of Jaurès as a party manager that he succeeded in convincing so many socialists that the Republic was in danger; that it was a matter of moment to the workers whether it was saved or not; that the entry of Millerand into the government was a necessary move in its saving, and that, in addition, a Socialist minister could help Socialism. For years to come, it was Jaurès, not Millerand or his successors or imitators, who held a large section of the workers to an alliance with the bourgeoisie which produced

no very striking benefits for the proletariat and seemed to deny the premises of the class war.²⁹

For the time being, at any rate, the argument was clearly limited to one of human rights, and the defenders thereof were free to make their arguments from whatever premises they chose. The revisionists spread into the countryside to speak to the people along lines which were most compatible with their own philosophies: Jaurès emphasized the dangers of an anti-revisionist victory for the working class; Buisson spoke to the theme of the necessary freedom of conscience of the individual; and Durkheim, by having recourse to his own sociological theory of evolution, defended the notion of individualism against Brunetière's charges. Léon Bourgeois publicized solidarist theory. Bouglé, as we have noted earlier, launched an attack on the theories of the right, while introducing the concept of the liberal nation as a reply to the charges of nationalists.

The organization which symbolized better than any other the common denominator of the revisionist alliance was the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme. Founded during Zola's trial in February 1898, it involved, at the outset, intellectuals, and particularly Protestants, like its founder, Ludovic Trarieux, its first President. The Ligue proposed

to undermine the principle of authority, to advance the rights of the individual and of all humanity; and to concern itself with social justice. The Ligue sought, in the shortest possible time, to organize, at the local level, committees instructed to accept even anarchists. Members were urged to launch a veritable offensive against the right wing through speeches and publications. By the end of 1899, there were 12,000 members, and that figure was doubled over the following six months.

Bouglé was not one of the first to be convinced of Dreyfus' innocence. In November 1898 he wrote Halévy, who was already convinced, that he was paralyzed, but thought that Dreyfus was guilty in fact, if not in intention. However, before a month had passed, he had changed his mind, expressed his opinions in print, and been fired from his lycee position at St. Brieuç following the intervention of the local Bishop. In January he was at the University of Montpellier, where he encountered widespread protest; Bouglé participated in the formation of the local chapter of the Ligue, and remained active in the organization for the rest of his life.

Bouglé also found the young professors, chargés de cours, and maîtres de conférences like himself, giving what

were called causeries populaires in any hall they could find. Often the local Bourse du Travail provided an opportunity to speak on the burning issue of the day.

In the same year, in Paris, what were soon to be called Universités Populaires were organized. The first, called La Coopération des Idées, was launched by a M. Deherne, a self-taught man, sometime printer and worker at a variety of trades. His announcement appeared all through the faubourg St. Antoine:

To Workers: Like you, we are workers. But we believe that human life has joys which are greater, longer lasting and less onerous than those found in bars. With all our strengths, in spite of our ignorance and our poverty, we aspire to an intellectual and moral life.³¹

Readers were then asked to come to the evening causeries.

"We want," the notice closed, "to be MEN, that is more than simply instincts: consciousness, intelligence and will."³²

And they came: artisans, petit bourgeois and manual workers, wives and even children:

On the rue Paul-Bert every evening, there took place a vast enquiry on every aspect of human knowledge, before a roomful of workers.³³

What is important to note, wrote Robert Dreyfus, is that the Universités Populaires had their origin in "a true desire for education, born in the working class."³⁴ At the same time, also in Paris, former members of an

anarchist commune, after spending several years in prison merely because their name brought them to the attention of the authorities, began to hold study sessions every Saturday evening in Montreuil-sous-Bois. Local doctors and teachers joined with the workers to discuss such propositions as "Reason based on science is the foundation upon which every human society must rest" and "If the working class wants to be liberated, the first thing it must do is to consider its ignorance as its greatest enemy."³⁵

A year later, in 1899, again as a result of the energy and efforts of M. Deherne, the Society of Popular Universities was founded, in part in order to control a proliferation which, he feared, was leading to the infection by politics and "too easy satisfaction."³⁶ The first Université Populaire was opened in October 1899:

It was a moving spectacle. From 8 o'clock onwards workers crowded into the theatre and the meeting hall. . . . They listened politely, and often interrupted with sympathetic remarks a humane and honest speech by Gabriel de Séailles.³⁷

Other universities sprang up. Although the rules of the association forbade any political orientation, it was only too natural that a certain bias appear in the manner of the founding. In Belleville, a Fondation Universitaire was organized by young members of the bourgeoisie "infused with

English ideas on the virtues of living in working-class neighborhoods."³⁸ The Emancipation, in Grenelle, was entirely worker-founded, and socialist-oriented, borrowing on the Belgian concept of the maisons du peuple. On the rue Mouffetard, the students of the nearby École Normale Supérieure played a major role. In some areas the hostility of the bourgeoisie was implacable; but this does not seem generally to have been the case.

The first few years saw the Universités Populaires expand like wild fire across France, particularly in the University towns. Daniel Halévy, still enthusiastic in 1904,³⁹ agreed with the Secretary of the Société des Amis de l'UP, Charles Guiesse, that they fell into four categories: anarchist (in organization), philanthropic, democratic and political, or union oriented or related. Halévy considered them an outstanding success. The difficulty, he reported, was that the craving for scientific knowledge, which appeared to workers to be the magic key to bourgeois success, tended to impose a specialization on the institutions which alienated the wives and the young. He opposed the affiliation of the universities with the Bourses du Travail, since he himself tended to understand the teaching as being related to French culture. And this belief he

shared with Bouglé.

Bouglé believed wholeheartedly in the necessity of workers' organizations. But he believed that, if taught to think, and to enjoy and participate in French culture, the worker could hardly accept the doctrines that he was hearing from the marxist and syndicalist leaders who emphasized class war. His own participation reflected a clear relationship to his conviction, like that held by T.H. Green and the English idealists,⁴⁰ that the removal of obstacles was the key to democracy. Professors like himself had emerged from their isolation

. . . to bring to the most needy, the most disinherited, the riches that we stand guard over. To be advanced posts to conquer and guard new territory for the life of the mind, threatened and pursued by the material organization of our civilization: those have been the goals of our universités populaires.⁴¹

Bouglé wanted to free the workers from their subservience to their leaders and launch them on another path:

Imagine how the universités populaires can tell the story of the English trade unions, their humble beginnings, their growing strength, the persecution they had to endure at one time, and the respect they inspire today. . . . If workers are so slow to organize it is because their horizons are not wide enough, their point of view is not high enough. . . . To enlarge ideas is to exalt [their] energy. Intellectual light will produce a moral warmth which will, in return, bring economic change.⁴²

This was written at the end of 1901. However, the fate of the universités populaires and of the alliance of intellectuals which played such a major role in them was not to be as happy as Bouglé and his colleagues hoped.

The elections of 1902 put the radicals and socialists in overwhelming control of the new Chambre; Léon Bourgeois was elected its president, Jean Jaurès its vice-president. The alliance of intellectuals appeared to have triumphed, and hopes were justifiably high that not only would secularization be carried out, but that a program of social justice would accompany it.

Strains in the Alliance

In 1902, Bouglé wrote to Halévy:

I am starting to lose interest. [All the politicians] disgust me. Jaurès is the only one I can approve of. I know vaguely that around here the nationalists are agitating, founding newspapers, calling meetings. But I also know . . . that they are not to be feared.⁴³

The problem clearly had shifted. If the essence of Bouglé's concerns--in Pour la démocratie française,⁴⁴ in Pour la liberté de conscience,⁴⁵ and in Vie spirituelle et action sociale⁴⁶ had been for the defense of laïcité and the "principles of 1789," his focus gradually shifted to concern for the requirements of social reform. The same year he had

expressed to Halévy a clear dissatisfaction with the failure of the government to proceed with a meaningful social program:

The present direction of politics makes me suffer. I can't help believing that human happiness is not as chimerical as they say. It exists. I've experienced it personally. . . . If it isn't a myth, if what is required for its realization are certain fortunate circumstances, among which the foremost is a certain degree of well-being, a certain quality in one's profession, in other words a certain social situation, that smacks of the social question. Because, in fact, happiness is so intimately dependent on certain external conditions, it is deplorable that most people can't share such conditions.⁴⁷

The high tide of progressive radicalism marked also the beginning of its retreat; for beyond anti-clericalism there was to be little that could hold the socialists in the alliance. It was not simply the parliamentary alliance that was shattered: the movement which united Buisson, Jaurès and Durkheim was gradually weakened by the pressures from the marxist and syndicalist left. Organizations like the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme underwent severe strains and losses of membership when the question was raised as to whether the rights of man required drastic social reforms. L'Union Pour la Vérité tended to lose what coherence it had had, becoming more a debating group not very different from the Société Française de Philosophie where questions

concerning Durkheim's methodology became important. The issues were not resolved at that level; perhaps any optimism that they could be was foolish. If the Ligue was a powerful force when the issues were so clear-cut, it could raise only a weak and divided voice on what had become the central problem: the state of the French working class. François Goguel goes so far as to accuse the proponents of anti-clericalism of having become so hypnotized by their fanaticism that even the requirements of international relationships received little thought when the primary concern was internal cohesion.⁴⁸ It is notable that at that time there existed a liberal catholicism, led by Alfred de Mun, whose advocacy of social reform was muted in the atmosphere of anti-catholic legislation. This analysis derives, however, from a premise that politics is a rational affair; in fact, the wild-eyed anti-clericalism as well as hostility to social change only translated traditional attitudes of a rurally located petty bourgeoisie, distrustful and uncomprehending. By 1904, if not earlier, the handwriting was on the wall. The movement was not strong enough to prevent the differences of radicals from deepening. The union of the two in the party constitution of 1901 could not delay the ideological split. The radicalism of Alain

and that of Buisson and Bouglé have little in common beyond a recognition of the social and political utility of the rights of free speech and association. These two currents are well summed up in two articles which appeared in Le Siècle in 1906. The first described those who were at least favorable towards social reform:

The radical petty bourgeoisie is not hostile to any reform. . . . Made up for the most part of workers, it is aware of the poverty of the proletariat as well as the abuses of owners. . . . They are . . . not disposed to display their political opinions openly, but it provides the most solid base for the Republican party as long as it does not fear for its material interest which are, all in all, the principle object of its concern.⁴⁹

The second article described the "radical without the socialist suffix" as one who would

. . . firmly oppose the ideal of the socialization of material things with the socialization of the mind. . . . Therefore, the essential part of its doctrine will rest in the task of public education. . . . Finally, in the matter of social reform, the Radical party does not consider State intervention essential in questions of work and capital. . . .⁵⁰

In spite of a dedication to inaction, lofty announcements of social concern were proclaimed by the party in 1907: demands for a progressive income tax and inheritance taxes; the need for workers associations "by means of which workers might realize their rights";⁵¹ various kinds of old

age, health and accident insurance, as well as special aid programs for children and working women; the regulation of hours and working conditions; and the nationalization of "de facto monopolies wherever the national interest requires it."⁵² The platform announced its implacable hostility to laissez-faire but cautioned that the party was "resolutely attached to the principle of private property";⁵³ and what is most revealing, it maintained a notion of the worker as an individual who could "obtain ownership of his means of production and a legitimate return for his labor, [and] arrive finally at an elimination of wage labor, and become an individual property owner, the very condition of his liberty and dignity."⁵⁴

The Radical party, based as was its majority in the countryside, thus exhibited a profound inability to come to grips with the nature of modern industrial society. As David Thomson has remarked,

Great Britain, in the same years, was putting through a corresponding program of reforms. But in France, they were obstructed at every stage, and the coalition of Radicals and Socialists came almost to nought.⁵⁵

Whatever devotion Radicals may have expressed for social legislation it always appeared as a codicil to the central themes of laïcité and anti-clericalism. The party, while

notably specific on the reforms outlined above, remained largely concerned with political questions. In 1907, there were five articles devoted to social legislation out of a total of 27; and the first of these appeared thirteenth, after the matters of school and church had been covered.

As we have earlier noted, Bouglé, during this period, was engrossed in support for solidarism, and in attacks on the laissez-faire doctrines which justified opposition to the enactment of legislation called for in the Radical Party pronouncements of 1901 and 1907. He did not, however, abandon his loyalty to arguments for the functional value of private property.⁵⁶ Though the alliance of Bourgeois, Buisson and Jaurès could agree on the historical relativity of property, it was differently understood by its interpreters. As Claude Nicolet has pointed out,

The most important point of their disagreement was the question of private property. . . . [Jaurès] points out that bourgeois property is only the extreme form of a long evolution. . . . But on this point the radicals were in agreement: they did not consider the relativity of individual property but its moral and political value. Léon Bourgeois . . . makes this point clear: Individual property appears to us the necessary guarantor of liberty, dignity and human activity . . . and we believe we can defend it better than others . . . by social reforms which we wish to bring about.⁵⁷

Buisson, in La Politique radicale,⁵⁸ wrote that reform must be essentially fiscal and political, and that what was

required was to eliminate the abuses of private property.⁵⁹ Where exploitation could be established as a fact, collectivization was permissible.⁶⁰ Jaurès, of course, took the private ownership of industry to be exploitative by its very nature.

The gradual estrangement of the radical and socialist elements in the coalition of parties became clearer after the elections of 1906, which brought, ironically, heavy increases in the strength of both parties in the Chambre. This was deceiving, however; for large numbers of men were elected under the Radical label who had no liking for social legislation. Though the leadership could push through a bold platform, there were not sufficient votes in the Chambre to enact it. With the pressure from the Guesdists on his left increasing, Jaurès refused to permit his party to enter the government. Since moderates, who intransigently opposed social reform held the balance of power, Clemenceau, and later Briand, could either ignore the party's position on social issues or hand over power to the moderates, something few Radicals under the Third Republic were ever willing to do. The stage was thus set for the third period we shall review, in which "the first policeman of France" set the tone for the settlement of profound social malaise by repression.

Victor Basch called the period from 1901 to 1905 "la poussée démocratique."⁶¹ From the point of view of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme it entailed a struggle against intolerance and injustice. Their activities took the form of lobbying, organizing protests, and encouraging articles and meetings in support of the rights of government workers who were, at that time, forbidden to organize. In particular, the teachers were often at the mercy of local authorities, and without legal defense or the means of bringing pressures in their own behalf. The LDDH also waged a continuous battle against the kind of colonial brutality that resulted in the French Army's killing of 23 strikers in Martinique in 1900.

In 1903, Trarieux was replaced as president by the militant Protestant Pressensé, who brought with him the conviction that the LDDH must play a leading role in the fight for social reforms. He remarked that "the notion of revolution is so wide that it contains within it the possibility of being collectivist."⁶² But the nature of the association was such that its activity, for the most part, involved efforts to change laws which inhibited the freedom of the individual. The LDDH kept up a running attack on the system of army justice that had made possible both Dreyfus

convictions, and it pressed continually for a legal refutation of his guilt. Its intervention into the increasingly violent confrontation of workers and employers took the form of promoting legislation designed to legalize strikes, and to establish means of arbitration and conciliation.

What is striking is that the Ligue counted a continuous increase in members (47,000 in 1904) with only indifferent results. Ligue resistance to "la réaction Clémenciste" was more an attitude than anything else. While Dreyfus had at last been rehabilitated in 1906, the Army's court-martial system remained unchanged. In many cases, what was required was not new laws but the strict application of those already in existence.

Individual rights continued to be in the forefront of Ligue concern; but what so many in the association objected to was the implication that there existed rights against the employer. In 1909, the position taken by Pressensé was challenged by Maxime Leroy, a long-time advocate of laisser-faire doctrines. At the Congress of Rennes, Pressensé was backed by a 25-6 vote of the delegates; but as the strikes continued, the minoritaires gradually left the Ligue. The real issue was one of whether violence--and particularly violence against property--was to be laid at

the door of the workers or of the patronat. Leroy's demand for social reform only on condition that it be peaceful really amounted to a decision for maintenance of the status quo. For Jaurès, violence was a symptom of injustice, a mark of prior violence done to working men. But Bouglé⁶² gradually moved to a position of opposition to the Socialists and condemnation of the workers' violence. He justified his attitude by arguing that one must await the emergence of a strong will, or conscience collective, which sanctioned reforms. Since this was not yet the case, one could only wait, agitate, and teach. The fulfillment of liberal values, even in a most radicalized, socialized form, depends upon a prior value: the society, or nation, must, even at great cost to some of its members, survive. As he wrote to Halévy in 1905,

How could our propaganda fight the popular idea of internationalism, since our own idea asks a certain amount of patience, even resignation and sacrifice--and they've had enough.⁶³

Bouglé⁶⁴ did not explain why the sacrifices of this kind are always to be borne by the most disadvantaged members of society.

The demise of the Universités Populaires was predictable. First, the euphoria, the sense of danger that drove intellectuals to give up their time for courses aimed

at the working class did not continue after the political victory achieved in 1902. Poorly paid, in fierce competition with one another either to obtain rare posts in the university system, or to escape from the provinces to Paris, there were few who equaled Bouglé's devotion. He neglected to apply himself to sociological research after finishing Les Castes, and moved into Espinas' chair at the Sorbonne more because of his relationship with Durkheim, his excellent rapport with major university figures, and on his service to the republican cause.

A second reason for the decline of the universities derives from the fact that, for the most part, those involved were republicans without being committed to the cause of major social reforms. Lastly, and probably most important, the traditional gulf which existed between the working class and the middle classes did not provide a very convivial atmosphere. The level of understanding of the workers was predictably low: Bouglé commented once to Halévy on their objections to metaphysics;⁶⁴ and later, as Guesde's attacks on the universities began to have some effect, Bouglé quoted a note he had received from a carpenter:

In the eyes of many members of the proletariat, you have lost what little confidence they may have accorded you. You must realize that just because you are a professor of philosophy you can

get away with saying the moon is made of green cheese and that one can be flesh and fish at the same time. I think it would be a good idea for you to stop trying to pretend you are spreading the idea of socialism (in order to strangle it). I hope you will learn to stay in your place, for you are taking a big risk of not always receiving the same courtesy that you found at the first meeting.⁶⁵

Denis Brogan interprets the intellectuals' efforts as one of "building a common culture for the workers and the left-wing intellectuals";⁶⁶ and there is ample basis for this in many of Bouglé's own speeches and lectures. While the fatigue of the workers and intellectual illusions and dilettantism undoubtedly played their part, Brogan attributed the decline of the universités populaires to the profound differences between the two cultures:

The only body, not itself under the workers' control, that was able to build up any organizations among the workers, or to be with them in their daily lives, was still the church. The attempt of intellectuals to be a priesthood for a body of working class believers broke down before that ironical distrust of his social superiors that marks the French working man.⁶⁷

The effort to build an alliance seemed, by 1909, to have failed. Bouglé was understandably disappointed. But with greater historical perspective, what one sees is the first steps in the creation of a "liberal-socialist" left. That alliance, even in the period before the First World War, checked the centrifugal tendencies of the

revolutionary elements, and acted also as a check on the tendency toward repression of the workers, both by the political strength it wielded, and by the moral precepts it taught. The relatively great unity with which France met the German attack in 1914 was due in part, I think, to the efforts contributed by both socialists and the progressive liberals we have discussed above. The fruits of their labors were further demonstrated in the resistance to communism after 1921, and renewed and periodic efforts at effective political action before 1940. Perhaps it is only today that France is acquiring a strong movement of liberal socialism of which he dreamed.

CHAPTER VIII

FOOTNOTES

¹See particularly Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought (New York, 1966), p. 1 ff.

²Albert Thibaudet, Les Idées politiques de la France (Paris, 1932), pp. 64-70.

³Information concerning the history of Union Pour la Vérité is drawn largely from Jean Dietz, "L'Union Pour la Vérité," in Pages Libres (January 1932), pp. 476-82, and Georges Guy-Grand, "Paul Desjardins," in Grande Revue (April 1940), pp. 211-224.

⁴Bouglé-Halévy, 1906, n.d.

⁵Bouglé-Halévy, 1902, n.d.

⁶Bouglé-Halévy, 1901-3, n.d.

⁷Bouglé-Halévy, 1903, n.d.

⁸Claude Nicolet, Le Radicalisme (Paris, 1957), pp. 7-8.

⁹See Georges Duveau, Les Instituteurs (Paris, 1958), pp. 122ff. Duveau characterized the movement as protestant and Kantian, and as a movement toward socialism. He described it as a "protocol of dignity and stoicism on which would be founded the behavior of those who, in 1916, would win out at Verdun." (p. 128)

¹⁰François Goguel, Les Partis politiques sous la III^e République (Paris, 1946), p. 100.

¹¹Jean Jaurès, La Réalité du monde sensible (Paris, 1891).

¹²Isaak Benrubi, Les Sources et les courants de la philosophie française contemporaine (Paris, 1955), p. 729.

¹³Ibid., p. 730.

¹⁴Jaurès, pp. 331-32.

¹⁵Jean Jaurès, De Primis Socialismi Germanici Lineamentis apud Lutherum, Kant, Fichte et Hegel (Talosa, 1891).

¹⁶Quoted in Marcelle Auclair, La Vie de Jean Jaurès (Paris, 1954), p. 202.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 203.

¹⁹Jean Jaurès, "La Justice dans l'humanité," in Pages Choies (Paris, 1922), p. 234.

²⁰Auclair, p. 203.

²¹Bouglé, 1933b, Introduction, p. 3.

²²Ibid., p. 9.

²³Ibid., pp. 11-12.

²⁴Ibid., p. 13.

²⁵Émile Boutroux, "Morale et démocratie," in Les Démocraties modernes (Paris, 1921), p. 201.

²⁶Georges Guy-Grand, p. 220.

²⁷Jean Dietz, p. 477.

²⁸"Regard en Arrière," in Bulletin de l'Union Pour L'Action Morale (December 1905), p. 74.

²⁹Brogan, p. 351.

³⁰For information concerning the League, see Histoire de la Ligue des Droits de l'homme, 1898-1926, Preface, V. Basch. The files of the League were destroyed during the occupation, and little remains except this history.

³¹Robert Dreyfus, "La Naissance et la Vie des Universités Populaires," in Grande Revue, T. 20, p. 684. See also Hayward, J.E.S., "The Cooperative Origins, Rise and Collapse of the 'Universités Populaires'," in Archives Internationales de Sociologie de Coopération, xi (1961), pp. 3-17.

³²Ibid., p. 685.

³³Ibid., p. 686.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 687.

³⁷Ibid., p. 693.

³⁸Ibid., p. 698.

³⁹Daniel Halévy, "Les Universités Populaires," in Pages Libres (August 1904), No. 27, pp. 161-67.

⁴⁰See Melvin Richter, Politics of Conscience (Cambridge, 1964), p. 284.

⁴¹Bouglé, 1902a, p. 7.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁴³Bouglé-Halévy, 1902, n.d.

⁴⁴Bouglé, 1900a.

⁴⁵Bouglé, 1901a.

⁴⁶Bouglé, 1902a.

⁴⁷Bouglé-Halévy, 1902, n.d.

- ⁴⁸Goguel, p. 164.
- ⁴⁹Quoted in Nicolet, p. 43.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., p. 44.
- ⁵¹Ibid., p. 51.
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 52.
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 50.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 51.
- ⁵⁵David Thomson, p. 176.
- ⁵⁶Bouglé-Halévy, 1903, Noël.
- ⁵⁷Nicolet, p. 54.
- ⁵⁸Ferdinand Buisson, La Politique radicale (Paris, 1908).
- ⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 119-20.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 232.
- ⁶¹Histoire de la Ligue des Droits de l'homme, p. 38.
- ⁶²Ibid.
- ⁶³Bouglé-Halévy, 1905-11, n.d.
- ⁶⁴Bouglé-Halévy, 1903, n.d.
- ⁶⁵Bouglé-Halévy, 1906-6, n.d.
- ⁶⁶Brogan, p. 372.
- ⁶⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL ACTION (II)

Introduction

The tendency of the working class to look with deep distrust on the bourgeois republic is related not only to the intransigent attitudes of the middle classes; it arose also from the nature of economic transformation in France, and from the deeply divided character of working-class politics.

An analysis of economic growth between 1789 and 1914 reveals four rather distinct phases: the first two periods ended with major confrontations between the ruling bourgeoisie and the working class in 1848 and 1870; the third ended with the frustration of the hopes generated in 1893 that socialist representatives could play an effective parliamentary role; and the last phase was interrupted by the outbreak of the first World War. While the growth of the French economy during the century and a quarter averaged about 2 percent per year, it was slightly greater during the first period, substantially higher (4-5 percent) under the Second Empire, almost stagnant between 1873 and the middle '90's; subsequently a new period of growth occurred, though

at a somewhat lower rate than at its peak under Louis Napoleon.¹

Economic growth was accompanied by a gradual movement of men and women from farm to city. Between 1835 and 1848, Paris had become the world's greatest manufacturing center, with 400,000 workers employed in industry.² Yet it does not appear that any substantial change in the rural-urban ratio took place until after 1848, and even then the movement remained relatively slow until the agricultural depression following the Franco-Prussian War generated a more rapid displacement of the population into the cities.³ Between 1846 and 1872, the percentage of Frenchmen living in communes larger than 2,000 increased from 24 percent to 31 percent; by 1901, the figure had risen to 40 percent.⁴ In terms of the work force of the country, however, the percentage of the male population engaged in agriculture declined between 1850 and 1900 only from 52 percent to 45 percent.⁵ What is important to note for our analysis is that the shift of the French population from the rural areas to the cities was continuous, but at a rate which little disturbed the preponderantly peasant nature of French rural society. Up until 1914, agriculture remained relatively untouched by mechanization and was characterized by the traditional "exploitation familiale."⁶

French industrialization was gradual and was concentrated in a few central and northern departments. During the first half of the nineteenth century some spectacular advances were made. The production of coal multiplied five times between 1820 and 1847.⁷ Water power was replaced by steam. Both government and private enterprise constructed an internal communications network of roads, canals and railroads which made possible the transportation of goods from one part of the country to another.⁸ Under the Second Empire, even more rapid progress was made, not only in the rapid expansion of the railway and telegraph network, but in iron and steel production, which increased four times within the same period.⁹ After a long period of stagnation, the government reverted to interventionist measures in the '90's in order to maintain and develop both industries and agriculture. A new period of industrial advance brought the nation, on the eve of the First World War, to a position of strength on the Continent second only to Germany.

In spite of the obvious growth of French industry during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, France had developed more slowly than other industrializing countries in Europe.¹⁰ Between 1856 and 1891 the number of

French industrial workers had remained constant at about 4.5 millions.¹¹ In 1906, over one-half of all industrial workers were employed in plants which hired only 1-5 employees. The poor quality of French coke seriously inhibited steel production, and contributed to a tendency to fence off the economy with high tariffs because of the difficulty of competing with other countries. The implications for the French social structure of a century of modernization were profound. Economic gains between 1820 and 1847 were made largely at the expense of the nascent working class: wages declined, and the prices of bread and lodging increased, and, the drive of factory owners to fully utilize their new machines, combined with an overabundance of labor, brought a general increase in the length of the working day. At the same time almost all the increase in the national wealth flowed into the hands of that class of wealthy landlords, industrialists and financiers which Georges Dupeux has characterized as "la grande bourgeoisie."¹² The latter was able to displace the aristocracy which had returned with Louis XVIII in 1814 and, after placing Louis Philippe on the throne in 1830, governed with the aid of the "bourgeoisie foncière" which dominated rural France as the aristocracy declined and gradually, for

all functional purposes, disappeared. By 1848 an alliance had been established between the upper bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The latter continued to remain substantially outside the political system, and docile to the leadership of the notables. Rural France supplied the base for the 1848 Assembly which steered the Second Republic toward the June repression of the working class. After 1877, the notables were forced to share power with the nouvelles couches of tradesmen, professionals and small entrepreneurs who formed the backbone of the radical movement.

The lot of the working class of the cities was somewhat improved during the phases which followed 1848. Wage increases between 1851 and 1873 were offset by price rises; but price declines after 1873 did not interrupt a continued wage rise. The French working class did not increase substantially in size until the 1890's, however, and suffered from its continued concentration in a small number of major industrial centers: even with universal suffrage under the Third Republic, it was overwhelmed by the vote of rural areas which still comprised a majority of the population.

Three facts stand out in our analysis of economic and social transformation which contribute to an understanding of the failure of the French political system to

integrate significant elements of the working class. First, the pace of industrialization was slow, thereby limiting the size of the proletariat. Second, the concentration of industry in the center, north and northwest of the country, tended to isolate the working class from the mass of French society which remained substantially rural and traditional in outlook. Lastly, the nature of industrialization in France was such that small, family companies with a handful of employees dominated the industrial sector and rendered organization that much more difficult.

Bouglé and Jaures

Within the labor movement itself, deep divisions existed, of which three are most important: first, a "myopic provincialism" which saw French workers "reluctant to delegate authority or to pay dues, particularly to see those dues paid over to a national body."¹³ The labor Federations constantly faced extreme decentralization, and attempts at discipline were met by wholesale desertion. The second factor in the weakness of the labor movement derived from social divisions among the working class itself. A smaller percentage of the working class was unionized in France than in any other European country. In particular, the new workers of the large, mechanized factories engaged in

mining, metallurgy and textiles were inadequately represented. Instead, the militant leadership was provided by workers in the older craft occupations, who, according to Bowditch, "had reason to fear and resent the new industrial age."¹⁴ These men, called by Dupeux the "haute culture,"¹⁵ were extremely individualistic, and outspoken advocates of direct, syndicalist action. It is these men, of course, in whom the tradition of broken promises was most strongly felt.

The third factor which so disastrously weakened the movement was the tendency to divide sharply over ideological issues. The division was all but complete between syndicalism, which animated the union movement, and socialism, which conceived of the worker's struggle as essentially political. These two forces failed completely to reach any working agreement. In fact, the Socialist party never gained the support of the industrial working classes, and became, by 1914, "a bolder extension of radicalism."¹⁶ A major reason for their failure lies in their almost total inability to reconcile ideological differences to the point of carrying out any effective program either within or outside the political process.

The impulse to creating a united socialist party

was supplied by a number of factors: first, the pressures from the International at Amsterdam, where Guesdists and Jauresists were ordered to unite; second, the increasingly rapid pace of industrialization was providing far more support for revolutionary attitudes than for the possibilism of Jaures; thirdly, militancy was reinforced by the syndicalism of the C.G.T.; lastly, the alliance with radicals was producing no results. The fact that many of Guesde's followers were Catholic workers meant that the appeal to anti-clericalism had no effect on them. The bloc des gauches had disintegrated; the alliance of the intellectual left was broken. Bouglé registered his anguish in letters to Halévy. He could not seem to understand the behavior of Jaures in terms other than a kind of betrayal, particularly because earlier he had closely identified the future of the French society with socialist goals. In 1899, after speaking to a group of workers he reported to Halévy:

The socialists are so lucky: they are the only ones in this abominable mess who have hopes for something. I would like to be a socialist.¹⁷

Both Durkheim and Bouglé felt that an effective component of any movement toward a just society was essential. But by 1903 he was complaining that earlier socialist optimism had become degenerated into a tendency

to constantly "raise the bidding"; that theirs was a "policy of perpetual opposition."¹⁸ By 1905, after hearing Jaurès speak, Bouglé admitted that he did not have the "socialist faith." He particularly criticized Socialist leadership for simply following a popular sentiment rather than taking a stand for what was right:

I saw clearly at Biarritz, and even at Chalons, that they tried to strangle quietly anti-patriotism. But speeches don't hold back the tide. I remain convinced that Hervé . . . only expresses a popular idea.¹⁹

It was particularly disillusioning to him to know that Jaurès, on his own admission, saw little sense in the "notion of the administration of things substituted for the administration of people";²⁰ and he added that he had

. . . been warning Jaurès for a long time that he would perish at the hands of [the C.G.T. syndicalists] unless he could manage to become their leader.²¹

In 1907, Bouglé had lost hope, but he seems to have continued to badger Jaurès about what he took to be the Socialist leader's weakness in the face of marxism and syndicalism:

I gladly defended poor Jaurès for a while longer. His excuse is that his thought is complex. It has as many facets as the eye of a fly. So, at the "historic moment" he sometimes shows one facet, sometimes another, and that's how he can keep on believing he's consistent with himself.²²

Bouglé continued to regret that the great faith that was socialism had become such a negative force:

I see no other way to recall workers to internal order than to make their eyes shine with the hope of a new city which would be their work. But why is it that in France one always stands against something? Why does the moral force of socialism become more and more (or so it seems) negative and destructive? That's where I get out Fourier and throw him at Jaurès.²³

In 1909, revealing his fundamental and theoretical attitude toward revolution, Bouglé reported to Halévy his most recent talk with Jaurès:

Talked syndicalism on the terrace at Pontillac: All that is happening these days is excellent, that extraordinary optimist told me. But what did he really mean? Excellent from the point of view of organizing. They hasten the formation of workers into large groups which will organize, they hope, the productive system--if, in the mean time, they haven't disorganized things too much.²⁴

After that, it appears that Bouglé no longer considered Jaurès capable of reclamation. His concerns became increasingly those of defending the liberal society against its enemies on the left.

The Limits of Progressive Liberalism

The decade which preceded the war was marked by a polarization of attitudes. Georges Dupeux has emphasized an anti-positivist, anti-scientific reaction to the victory of the intellectuals in the Dreyfus Affair. The grande bourgeoisie, bitter at the loss of the schools it had controlled, welcomed the movement led by Maurras and influenced by Bergson whose lectures at the Collège de France were filled to capacity by the femmes du monde.²⁵ The major papers remained in the hands of the rich; they put up a constant fight against social reforms, and sought to discredit the secular schools. Bouglé wrote a number of articles in La Dépêche seeking to refute the charges that these schools were responsible for a rise in criminality, and the decline in traditional moral values.

External affairs--the recurrent clashes with an arrogant Germany, coupled with a growing sense of French weakness--preoccupied both Bouglé and Halévy. The decline in the birth rate, and anti-militarist and internationalist doctrines proclaimed by socialists and many radicals, caused Bouglé to wonder if he was becoming a conservative nationalist.²⁶ In 1913, for the first and only time, the two friends, who had been writing one another almost weekly for

eighteen years, underwent a crisis in their relationship when Bouglé, who opposed the increase in the period of conscription to three years, called Halévy's position "reactionary."²⁷ The latter accused Bouglé of playing the socialists' game, risking an additional 200 seats in the Chambre. The difficulty was that between the resurgent nationalism of the right and the radical positions of the left, it was difficult for intellectuals to find a home, torn as were many like Bouglé between a deep-rooted memory of the Army's role in the Dreyfus Affair, and a revulsion at the stance assumed by the socially progressive forces in the Chambre.

In the elections of 1910 the Radicals lost a significant number of seats, and a wave of new députés had appeared who were listening to Maurras' call for national discipline.²⁸ Governmental majorities were so small that the position of any prime minister was precarious. For four years, social legislation was out of the question, given the intransigence of the socialists, and the increasing resemblance of Radicals to "modérés";²⁹ the center of the political spectrum remained at center-right until, after the elections of 1914, with gains made by both socialists and Radicals, an income tax law, first proposed by Clémenceau in 1880, was finally passed.

Bouglé replied heatedly to Halévy's remarks questioning the efficacy of the parliamentary system; but it was clear that he was sick at heart over the inability of the French state to generate a majority capable of acting in a positive way. The Durkheimian position demanded both radical social reforms and national solidarity backed by military strength. To gain the first required joining forces with a left which preached revolution and anti-patriotism; but to opt for the second required making common cause with the elements of the political spectrum which stood in intransigent opposition to the first:

As a result of the misfortune of our times,
Republican France is led, in order to defend
herself, to give up, if not disavow, her true
self. The Republic tomorrow will have nothing.
. . . That is why, when I don't retreat to a
superior attitude of not giving a damn, I boil
with rage.³⁰

After a year of hesitation, torn between the obvious attraction of a national platform on the one hand, and the realization that he was spreading himself too thin to do justice to his sociological responsibilities, in 1906, Bouglé accepted the offer of La Dépêche de Toulouse to become a columnist, joining Clemenceau, Pelletan, Brisson, Aulard and Jaurès under the rubrique "Opinion" on the front page. He was not to leave the paper until his death. His columns in that paper, which had become the virtual organ

of the Radical party, reflected positions with which we are already familiar. During the period 1906-1911, one-fifth of the columns, which appeared nearly every week, were directed against the revolutionary left, with the syndicalists and their leader Hervé the object of three-quarters of the attacks. Close behind among Bouglé's targets was the right. Catholicism, Royalists, ultra-nationalists and the anti-reformist bourgeoisie received his attention in an equal number of columns he wrote. There was, however, a notable decline in attacks on the right as the tempo of working-class violence rose, and as national defense assumed greater importance.

The rise of pacifism and open anti-patriotism brought out Bouglé's wrath in many of his essays. As an alternative he often reported on a variety of efforts towards international arbitration. But he also used his column to promote his strong feelings on national military strength, and the social necessity of patriotism. In the earlier days--before the threat of left-inspired anti-patriotic attitudes reached serious proportions--Bouglé was inclined to emphasize a relationship between such doctrines and the fundamental social injustices which generated them.³¹ But as time passed, he became less and less sympathetic with the extremist movements. While he

carried on a steady campaign urging social reforms on his party, he ultimately supported the measures Clemenceau and Briand took against violence growing out of strikes. He also sought to encourage the kind of peaceful organization of unions and cooperatives, those associations being fundamental to Durkheimian social theory. In 1906 and 1907 he paid a good deal of attention to the Socialists, combining criticism of their leftward movement with pleas to return to the centrist alliance with the Radicals. After 1907, he ignored them.

In addition to his column for La Dépêche, Bouglé maintained contact with the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, l'Union Pour la Vérité, and the Ligue de l'Enseignement. In 1909, he was elected to the central committee of the LDDH just as it was entering a period of severe crisis brought on by its ambivalent attitudes toward legality and social reforms. It was deeply divided, and membership declined from 80,000 in 1908 to 50,000 in 1913; 840 local sections were reduced to 656 during the same period. The leadership, under Pressensé, leaned toward taking an active part in working class pressure for better economic and social conditions. Confronted by the rash of strikes which marked this period, the Ligue condemned their illegality, but at the

same time fought the policy of arbitrary arrests and mobilization of workers into the army. Typical of the difficulties experienced by the LDDH was the division over the issue of the école unique, which would have established a monopoly of state education. The flexibility and devotion to pluralism which characterized the durkheimian position ran head on into the intransigent jacobin absolutism of a majority of the Parti Radical.

For Bouglé, the LDDH represented an important aspect of Durkheim's apotheosis of the autonomous individual, whose rights had become, or were becoming, the very religion of society. Yet in 1913, it seemed to him clear that the notion of "individual right" which had triumphed in France resembled more closely what Brunetière had so bitterly attacked in 1898 than the individualism which Durkheim had defended. As Bouglé wrote to Halévy:

The problem posed by history is quite clear: it amounts to holding people together who do not have the same beliefs, and who agree on nothing more than on individual rights. It is not impossible. But it supposes that the idea of the individual can become, itself, the object of collective enthusiasm, nourished by facts, by action. That supposes, in the final analysis, that people are collectively proud to live in a republic because of the great things that the republic can do for the liberation of the individual. In fact, we are a long way from that. 32

Influence in French Education

If the period before the war saw the political failure of the intellectuals' alliance, the success of these men within the educational system was substantial. Durkheim himself, in spite of the resistance to his sociological theory which challenged, in particular, the Kantian beliefs of the University elites, was befriended by the pioneer Alfred Espinas, and by Jules Ferry's Director of Higher Education, Louis Liard. The latter made possible Durkheim's year in Germany, and his subsequent appointment to the Faculty at Bordeaux where Espinas was Dean. In 1902, he replaced Buisson at the Sorbonne, the latter having won a seat in the Chambre, where he became one of the leaders of the Parti Radical et Radical-Socialiste.

The difficulty with Terry Clark's extensive analysis³³ lies in its failure to relate the success of the durkheimians in their penetration of the University system to their relationship to other key figures who were clearly not durkheimians. While Clark is at some pains to note the key roles of Liard, Buisson, Herr and Boutroux, one is left without understanding the political and ideological bonds which existed, though the social theories of these men differed considerably. Support of this kind did not arise from a great deal of sympathy with Durkheim's methodology.

But his conclusions were a welcome complement to an effort to overthrow the conservative and Catholic hold on the school system, and to impose a new ideology on French education.

In 1900 the only sociological chair in France was Durkheim's at Bordeaux. This was as true in 1914; for although both Bouglé and Durkheim were in Paris, they were teaching under the titles of Science of Education and History of Social Economy, respectively. As Clark has noted, the definition of sociology adopted by the durkheimians was deliberately wide enough to include economics, law, linguistics, religion, education and politics, and thus had the strategic advantage of placing durkheimians in positions which would not be open to anyone adopting a more limited notion of the field.³⁴ Even so, the rest of Durkheim's équipe remained outside the Sorbonne before the war.

However, men closely related to the intellectual alliance were in key positions. Paul Lapie was Director of Higher Education. Dominique Parodi was Inspector General of the Primary School system, and Gustave Lanson, an important participant in the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme and Union Pour la Vérité, was Director of the École Normale Supérieure, where Bouglé was to organize and head the Centre de Documentation after the war. Most important, Durkheim's sociology, as it applied to morality and education, was part

of the curriculum in the training of primary teachers, and was the basis for new materials prepared for use in the lycées.³⁵

The Resurgence Of the Right

The disappearance, after 1906, of the earlier, relative, solidarity of liberal intellectuals took place against a background not only of a radicalization of working-class movements, but also of a resurgence of nationalism and opposition to democracy on the right. While it involved the continuing monarchist and authoritarian bourgeois political opposition to the whole thrust of dreyfusisme, it was increasingly supported by a reaction of intellectuals to the positivism of durkheimians and the Kantism of the idealist reformers. In particular it was nourished by Bergson and Maurras, and even found its "bridge" to the working class in Georges Sorel. Though exploration of the attack on durkheimian theory and politics will be left to the following chapter, it is important to recognize that Bouglé, during the period preceding the war, not only carried on an attack on left-wing radicalism, but also found himself, bon gré mal gré, aiding the turn to the right which characterized these years. While the nationalism inherent in Durkheim's theory was explicitly

not the "integral nationalism" of Maurras, Bouglé, often to his dismay, found himself standing with the conservatives. When he ran, as a radical socialist, for a seat in the Chambre in 1914, his defense of the three-year law cost him socialist support: they ran their own candidate and Bouglé was defeated.

The resurgence of nationalism and royalism was the result of many factors which are complex and interrelated. In one sense they were merely the reappearance of old attitudes under new labels: hostility to Masons, Jews, aliens, the working class and parliamentary democracy has a long history in France. During a period when industrialization was rapid, stimulated by large public expenditures in armaments industries, the transformation of loose and floating political alliances into organized (if not necessarily disciplined) parties on the left brought a reaction on the right in which organic nationalists, bourgeois notables and royalists were inclined to move together in an effort to present a greater obstacle to what appeared to be a radical and socialist electoral steamroller. If the political and educational power of the Church could be so drastically reduced in a matter of six years, what was to prevent the wholesale destruction of their native land as they conceived of it?

The drift of political opinion to the right was encouraged by an apotheosis of anti-positivist, anti-scientific and spiritualist thought. As Georges Dupeux has pointed out, it was a response both to the loss of the school system to radical intellectuals and to left-wing militancy which the government would not put an end to.³⁶ Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, in Les Jeunes Gens d'Aujourd'hui, criticized the pessimism of the older generation and noted a new patriotic faith capable of modifying the previously anti-militarist attitudes of Paul Desjardins.³⁷ A Catholic renaissance had, they wrote, so affected the Sorbonne that

. . . the philosophy students, turning away from the sociological methods of a Durkheim or a Levy-Bruhl, have chosen as their guide a Catholic, M. Victor Debos.³⁸

The positivists were coming under attack by men like Émile Boutroux; and they were sure that Bergson was really writing about God in L'Évolution créatrice.³⁹

While the phenomenon was not as all-pervasive as Massis and Tarde suggested, still it was more than the negligible force referred to in Bouglé's letters. It was a surge of feeling which made itself felt in radical ranks against disorder, and a desire for morality and discipline in the community. This was demonstrated in the loss of

radical votes in 1910; and the party press revealed an increasing tendency to justify military repression by characterizing workers as "indifferent, stingy, prone to violence, and too easily led by demagogues."⁴⁰ In that election year also, two plays which excoriated liberal democracy as decadent and amoral had an overwhelming success: Le Barricade, written by Paul Bourget, the royalist novelist, and based on a chapter in Sorel's Réflexions sur la violence; and Péguy's Jeanne d'Arc.

The lack of cohesiveness of the right was soon revealed; a break between Maurras and the pretender on the one hand, and Péguy and Sorel on the other, occurred before 1912. Yet the decline in militancy thereafter resulted not only because of ideological differences but because they had been highly successful in influencing a reorientation of national policy. Clémenceau, Poincaré and Barthou were influenced by the notion of integral nationalism; and the latter is quoted as admitting "that the three-year law would never have been passed without the help of the Camelots du Roi."⁴¹

In Bouglé's choice between the working class and a nationalism which ultimately set itself against that movement, an important aspect of Durkheim's theory is revealed. While Terry Clark implies that Durkheim's followers were

socialists⁴² (and thereby implies that the theory itself was socialist), this categorization fails to recognize that there were many kinds of socialists, as there were many kinds of liberals. That Durkheim's theory could provide the ground for reform is clear; but it could also provide the ground for a nationalism which was effectively, in political terms, anti-reformist. If progress ultimately depended on a solidarity generated by a conscience collective which insisted on the sacred nature of the equality of conditions, then one is forced to acquiesce to the very partial emergence of such values, and to wait. Durkheim's theory, for Bouglé, contains the fatalism with which he taxed Marxism. Yet Bouglé was as free, logically, to choose the path of Jaurès who, though no Marxist purist, recognized that to not so choose amounted to a choice for bourgeois intransigence and inaction.

Earlier, during that euphoric period following the Affair, Bouglé had proclaimed that history was on the side of the workers. But he was not content that they should choose their own means even when he had become convinced of the immobilism of their only potential allies. Many durkheimians made their choice for socialism without abandoning their sociological theory. Had not Durkheim implied that revolution could result from the intransigent

opposition of political and economic power to an emergent morale? Had not the aristocracy done exactly that in 1789?

The Postwar Years

For our purposes, David Thomson's observation concerning the effect of the war on the politics of the inter-war years is highly revealing.⁴³ Both the farming and industrial sectors grew substantially, while "the position of the middle and professional classes was depressed."⁴⁴ The result of these shifts was, first, the strengthening of the rural, Alain-inspired wing of the Parti Radical et Radical-Socialiste, at the expense of its Solidarist elements;⁴⁵ and second, the socialist left, though divided, was, in a numerical sense, both strengthened and radicalized. The prewar tendency of the parliamentary socialists under Jaurès to follow the more radical working-class movements for fear of losing touch with workers, continued to an even greater degree after the war. Lastly, as Thomson points out, the growing power of the socialist and communist parties was accompanied by a concentration that was occurring in the economic sector.⁴⁶ Banks and trusts were replacing the earlier hegemony of the small, family-owned enterprises. It is difficult to avoid the impression that if the alliance of intellectuals, supported and informed by idealism

and durkheimian sociology, was the spearhead of a national political movement between 1898 and 1906, it became weak and divided in the '20's, and was not, with the exception of the brief Front Populaire, able to have a decisive influence on decision-making in the '30's. A clear mark of this impotence was the increased numbers of attacks on their position from the political right, from the radical left, and from within the intellectual community itself.

The areas of agreement between radicaux and the left were all but eliminated. In the words of François Coguel, the postwar patronat was "more intransigent than ever"⁴⁷ in its attitude and dealings with the workers. This had the effect of forcing an escalation of socialist demands and language, and these demands, in turn, bore on issues which had always tended to divide radicaux and socialists the most. Disagreement could no longer be papered over by falling back on anti-clericalism. Unless the republic, democratic and secular, came under attack, as appeared to be the case in the '30's, there was little ground upon which the parties of the left could stand together.

Within the Radical party itself, divisions between the two wings permitted the rise to effective control of a group Francis de Tarr has labeled "les radicaux de

gestion,"⁴⁸ who argued that it was the first responsibility of radicals to participate in governments, be they oriented to the left or to the right of center. Herriot himself, having been defeated in 1926, served nevertheless in the Gouvernement de l'Union Nationale headed by Poincaré, "a bourgeois of the time of Louis Philippe, or, at least, of the time and ideas of Léon Say."⁴⁹ Poincaré proceeded to increase taxes on all but those in the higher brackets. By the end of the '20's, the dream that had inspired all of Bouglé's work had substantially failed to materialize. As Goguel summed it up,

The re-integration of the working class into the community had failed. . . . Those who had seen, in the establishment of collective work relations only insurance against the chance of total expropriation, returned to views inspired by economic liberalism and the most intransigent kind of individualism.⁵⁰

"Radicalism" became

. . . in its real soul, violently individualist, obstinately attached to private property and to the social order installed by the Revolution.⁵¹

On the right, "authority" was the concept which ought to describe the employer-worker relationship. What is more, Goguel adds,

The general attitudes of the French public were to take these fixed positions for more than 15 years.⁵²

By the middle thirties, the Radical party contained only a few men, known as "young turks," who continued to urge the slogan "no enemies on the left."⁵³ If, for a moment in 1936, it appeared that the danger to the republic warranted joining the Front Populaire, the vast majority of the party took this as constituting only a limited commitment to social legislation as envisaged by Léon Blum; and by abstaining on crucial votes they forced the resignation of both the first and second Blum cabinets in 1937 and 1938. The "young turks" had failed, and, with the exception of Jacques Kayser, they had all either resigned or been ejected from the party by 1946.⁵⁴ The last inheritors of the ideological alliance of Buisson, Jaurès and Durkheim had been eliminated.

The last twenty years of Célestin Bouglé's life were devoted to reviving and rebuilding the movement which had been shattered not only by the death of Jaurès and Durkheim, and the decimation in battle of innumerable young sociologists, but also by what Terry Clark has described as "irrationality, Catholicism, nationalism and individualism."⁵⁵ A number of Durkheim's lectures and articles were published by his former colleagues, and an effort was made to revive the Année Sociologique in 1924. Only two issues appeared. Annales Sociologiques, a successor to Durkheim's journal,

appeared first in 1936, but was cut short by the war after three issues.

Bouglé's professional and ideological writings were limited to a few articles, and two books--L'Évolution des Valeurs⁵⁶ and L'Éducateur Laïque⁵⁷--which were simply summaries of the positions he had defined before the war. In addition, he collaborated in the editing and publication of the complete works of Proudhon⁵⁸ and Saint-Simon.⁵⁹ He did continue, however, to write his column in La Dépêche, where he continued to minimize the influence of the right in French social and political life, and to warn against the dangers of Marxist thought both at home and abroad. The Soviet Union was the object of a number of diatribes. He remained optimistic, even in 1937, that the notions of equality and the sacred nature of the individual which he had seen as emergent in the first years of the century, were the basis of a national unity which would be proven by any challenge from abroad. What seems clear is that Durkheim's sociology had, for Bouglé, long ceased to be a tool of social analysis, but had become a fixed description of ideals which he cherished. He thus tended to ignore, or minimize, developments which seriously challenged the assumptions which he had accepted.

The greatest part of Bouglé's time was devoted to furthering the place of sociology in the French school system, and defending that place against the efforts of conservatives to limit it. In 1920 he organized the Centre de Documentation Sociale at the École Normale Supérieure, and remained its Director until his death. By 1937 sociology had achieved a secure position. Primary teachers were given large doses of it in the Normal schools,⁶⁰ and in the secondary schools it was an optional subject, while at the University level it was required for a licence in philosophy.

Bouglé continued to play a role in the organizations which had been the center of his life before the war: the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme and the Ligue de l'Enseignement, organized lobby for the secular school. As a much sought after orator, he spent a great deal of time at conferences and meetings all over Europe, and he used his column as an outlet for the views of these groups. In addition, Bouglé was particularly active in Paix par le Droit, founded in 1896 to promote international peace through arbitration, treaty and law. As an obituary article described him,⁶¹ he was a "sharpshooter" who, while never involved in the administration, was a consistent contributor to its congresses.

If we can accept the hypothesis that Bouglé was essentially faithful to the essential propositions of Durkheim's theory, his espousal of the internationalist cause refutes any attempt to label Durkheim a "nationalist." He admitted, however, that Durkheim's primary interest had been in the evolution of the modern form of "society"--the nation:

He shows us in fact how these groups came into existence: he begins with the family group which is both political and domestic . . . [and] which evolves into the city, which is a federation of families; then the cities come to make up nations. Those are the societies that interest Durkheim when he talks about the conscience collective. . . .⁶²

But an article by Durkheim appearing in the last issue of the Année Sociologique,⁶³ as well as an article by Marcel Mauss⁶⁴ prove, Bouglé asserted, that durkheimian sociology had gone beyond the notion of society-nation, recognizing the clear evidence of ties between nations which are in the process of development. Bouglé summed up his argument in 1928:

We do not deny that the organized nation-state is the most complete grouping that humanity has known, but whatever pretensions states have to independence, there is no self-sufficient nation. They have ties which are regulated by treaties and agreements . . . a beginning to social organization.⁶⁵

As a student of Proudhon, finally, Bouglé saw this process taking place through federal arrangements:

Can one not dream that we will go further down this path and that one day there will be a League of Nations capable of establishing a new system of law?⁶⁶

The obituary which appeared in Paix par le Droit underlined a missionary zeal which Bouglé retained until the end:

During the last 10 years of his life, he gave us an opportunity regularly to admire his mastery at the Annual Conference of Peace through Education, which we called familiarly "the Bouglé congress." He was the smiling animator, having it presided by some well-chosen "star" . . . and bringing together, in the charming library of the Institute of International Cooperation, representatives of all the French associations for Peace Through Education: Young Catholics, Christian Young People's Union, Boy Scouts, Primary Teachers, Secondary professors, the National Council of Women, Vacation work colonies, Peace through World Law, etc. . . .⁶⁷

Thus was emphasized the twin pillars upon which Bouglé believed all societies were founded--associations and education. The former were essential, as Durkheim had pointed out, to provide the moral restraint necessary to social life; and the latter, was the only acceptable means of teaching the sociological facts the most important of which was that egalitarianism was the only value consistent with modern industrial social forms. Only if such values became

sacred could any society be provided with an affective ideal
necessary to meaningful communal life.

CHAPTER IX

FOOTNOTES

¹These figures, and others cited in the course of this chapter, are drawn from the following works: Georges Dupeux, La Société française, 1789-1960 (Paris, 1964); Paul Louis, Histoire du socialisme en France (Paris, 1963); Rondo E. Cameron, France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914 (Princeton, 1961); and Charles Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France and Britain (Cambridge, 1964).

²Cameron, p. 66.

³J.P.T. Bury, France, 1814-1940 (New York, 1962),

⁴Dupeux, p. 29.

⁵Ibid., p. 28.

⁶Ibid., p. 180.

⁷Cameron, p. 66.

⁸Bury, p. 69.

⁹Cameron, p. 69.

¹⁰Dupeux, p. 35.

¹¹Ibid., p. 29.

¹²Cameron, p. 65.

¹³John Bowditch, "The Concept of Élan Vital: A Rationalization of Weakness," in Edward Meade Earle, ed., Modern France (Princeton, 1951), p. 38.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Dupeux, p. 198.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Bouglé-Halévy, January 1899.

¹⁸Bouglé-Halévy, "Noël," 1903.

¹⁹Bouglé-Halévy, 1905 (11), n.d.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Bouglé-Halévy, 1905 (9), n.d.

²²Bouglé-Halévy, 1907, n.d.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Bouglé-Halévy, 1901 (1), n.d.

²⁵Dupeux, p. 192.

²⁶Bouglé-Halévy,

²⁷Bouglé-Halévy,

²⁸Goguel, p. 181.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Bouglé-Halévy, 1913, n.d.

³¹See particularly La Dépêche, 6/22/06, 7/19/06 and 9/27/07.

³²Bouglé-Halévy, 1913 (1), n.d.

³³Terry Clark, Prophets and Patrons (Cambridge, 1973), particularly Chap. 6.

³⁴Ibid., p. 167.

³⁵Raymond Aron, "La Sociologie," in Les Sciences Sociales en France (Paris, 1937), pp. 24-27

³⁶Dupeux, p. 192. Dupeux writes that the Instituteurs went considerably beyond the neutrality that Bouglé recommended. They became socialists, or leaned in that direction (p. 128).

³⁷Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, Les Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1919).

³⁸Ibid., p. 71.

³⁹Ibid., p. 83.

⁴⁰Leo Loubère, "Left Wing Radicals, Strikes and the Military," in French Historical Studies, Vol. III, No. 1 (1963), p. 102.

⁴¹Samuel Osgood, French Royalism under the Third French Republic (The Hague, 1960), p. 94.

⁴²Clark, pp. 186-90.

⁴³Thomson, pp. 181-182.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 182.

⁴⁵Roger Soltau, French Parties and Politics (New York, 1965, pp. 73-75. Soltau has emphasized the growing gulf, illustrated by recriminations concerning who had borne the brunt of the war, who had profited by it, between rural and urban France.

⁴⁶Thomson, p. 194.

⁴⁷Goguel, p. 270.

⁴⁸Francis de Tarr, The French Radical Party (London, 1961), p. 23.

⁴⁹Brogan, p. 595.

⁵⁰Goguel, p. 278.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., p. 279.

⁵³de Tarr, p. 65.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 66.

⁵⁵Clark, p. 215.

⁵⁶Bouglé, 1922a.

⁵⁷Bouglé, 1921g.

⁵⁸1927a, 1930a, 1931a, 1932c, 1935e.

⁵⁹1924c.

⁶⁰Aron, p. 18.

⁶¹Jules L. Puech, "Célestin Bouglé et la Paix,"
Paix Par le Droit (January 1948), pp. 1-10.

⁶²Célestin Bouglé, "Les Groupements Extra-Nationaux,"
in Bouglé, Cours de Sociologie Generale (Paris: Centre de
Documentation, 1935), p. 71.

⁶³Emile Durkheim, "La Notion de Civilisation," in
AS, Tome 12, pp. 47-50.

⁶⁴Marcel Mauss, "Civilisation: Elements et Formes,"
2^e Fascicule du Centre International de Synthèse.

⁶⁵Bouglé, "Les Groupements Extra-nationaux,"
pp. 74-75.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 75.

⁶⁷Puech, p. 7.

CHAPTER X

THE DURKHEIM SCHOOL
OF SOCIAL THEORY UNDER ATTACK

Introduction

The political nature of the movement to which Bouglé devoted his life and work could not fail to evoke a response at two levels, analytically separable, but always, in fact, closely related to one another. From the moment Durkheim published the Division du Travail Social he became the object of intense and continuing criticism by other scholars. These attacks, and the defenses thrown up by Durkheim, have been extensively reviewed, by Steven Lukes,¹ under the rubrics "methodological principles," "critique of liberal economics," and the "sociological treatment of morality, knowledge and religion."² Within this framework, a number of dialogues emerge which shed much light on what Durkheim meant; for he was often, in confrontations at the meetings of the Société Française de Sociologie, forced to clarify and underline salient points of his theory. Yet since the criticisms of Tarde, Richard, Fouillée, Belot, Deploige and Parodi, to name only a few, focused on the foundation stones of Durkheim's theory, Lukes' framework of analysis obscures the ideological nature of the critique.

The criticisms of Durkheim and his school can be considered from a different point of view; it is possible to relate the criticism to the wider social and political forces and currents which confronted one another in the years of Bouglé's life. If, as has been argued from the start, there is reason to believe that Durkheim and his followers sought to provide liberalism with a theory capable of reconciling liberty and equality in the context of industrial society, then it would seem reasonable to expect that the criticism launched at Durkheim and his theory would emanate from those socio-political forces which he was, explicitly or implicitly, attacking, and which contended, at every level of French life, for political and social power.

It is of interest to consider the criticism as emanating from two major sources. The first comprises those forces--conservative, marxist and syndicalist which were, in Bouglé's mind, the clearest enemies of the liberal state. The second source is the powerful expression of individualist resistance to the sociological assumptions which underlay all Durkheim's thought. This resistance is to be found among the members of the Société Française de Philosophie, in the Union Pour la Vérité, and in the Ligue

des Droits de l'Homme. Durkheim confined himself largely to the task of influencing those in a type of society increasingly dominated by intellectuals and "experts," most likely to play leadership roles. Bouglé, who appeared seldom at the Société, and even when present spoke little in that rarefied atmosphere, played a somewhat different, though related, role. With men like Boutroux, Parodi, Lapie, Buisson, Andler and Jaurès, he sought to establish and maintain an alliance which Durkheim's adamant position tended to undermine; and he directed the bulk of his work at what he considered the most dangerous political and ideological opponents. Those opponents, in turn, often singled out Bouglé as the symbol of all that was pernicious and destructive in the ideological atmosphere of the Third Republic.

Opposition at the Center

The opposition to Durkheim's theory which came from those who may be broadly categorized as "liberals"--that is supporters of the secular republic as opposed to revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries of the "left" or the "right"--was almost entirely methodological in the broader sense that they challenged his pretensions of "social realism," his views on the essentially "sociological" nature

of economics, and his sociology of morality. The first challenge involved the contrary assertion of the primacy of the individual; the second involved the assertion of the immutability of economic laws (which in turn rested on propositions concerning the immutable characteristics of the individual nature); and the third challenge came from those who argued a source of morality, whether metaphysical or religious, which was available to each individual conscience and was universal, absolute and ahistorical.

Among the first must be included Gabriel Tarde, whose polemical debate with Durkheim is well known.³ Tarde's sociology was founded on a psychology of the individual, and in particular on the notion of imitation which he simply posited. It was a reductionism at least as extreme as anything Durkheim was ever accused of. Everything is invention and the new is the product of genius. Lukes summarizes his political stance by noting that

. . . he was also hostile to socialism and in favor of an intellectual aristocracy.⁴

Tarde attacked, of course, the foundation stones of Durkheim's theory which, in effect, reversed Tarde's proposition that society, in its divisions of labor, its morality, its evolution, were the inventions of individual genius imitated by others. Specifically he denied that the "social"

beliefs were anything other than the sum of individual beliefs; Durkheim's theory, he argued, involved a very unscientific leap into the realm of the mystical.

Georges Palante expressed an even more radical--even Nietzschean--philosophy of the individual, and from this vantage point he wrote a number of works rejecting, implicitly or explicitly, the social philosophy of the Durkheim school which, for him, came down to an authoritarianism exercised by sociologists in the name of "society."⁵ He stood squarely on Tarde's methodological assumptions, advocating a laissez-faire philosophy in economic and political life. Social and cultural progress had always been, and would always be, the work of an aristocracy of genius. Progress, in fact, was due to individual originality.⁶ In particular, Palante emphasized characteristics of the individual which would forever resist "social pressure";⁷ and he argued that

. . . the law of social integration, even supposing it to be correct, will never suppress egoism, envy, malevolence and hatred.⁸

Palante concluded by stating categorically that "morality is the great enemy of individualism."⁹

One of the clearest expressions of the socio-political philosophy expressed by Tarde and Palante, and

intransigently opposed to the reformist aspirations of the Durkheim school, was written by Adolph Prins in 1902. In a defense of individualism, free enterprise, and freedom of movement, the state was nothing more than an institutional support for the needs of the industrial aristocracy:

The elite, in our contemporary societies, needs more outstanding qualities than the elite of patriarchal societies. . . . In modern civilization, the superior social class is more clearly differentiated from the average, and it rises far above the masses which express the inferior traditions of humanity as they progress toward a greater command of science, on a greater spirit of invention, intelligence and spontaneity; and nothing anyone could imagine for socializing the world could prevent the individual factor from winning out over the social factor, differentiation over equality.¹⁰

Criticism of Durkheim was more measured and less violent as one comes closer to the political position occupied by Durkheimians themselves. Among these the most important contemporaries were the sociologists, like Gaston Richard and his pupil, Daniel Essertier, who, paralleling Bouglé to some degree, sought to reconcile the seemingly reductionist views of Durkheim and Tarde. Richard, for many years a collaborator on the Année Sociologique, came by 1910 to reject Durkheim's sociology. As a protestant croyant, he rejected the essential atheism of the Durkheim school;¹¹ but his most persistent argument was that Durkheim's sociology

. . . put a definitive end to the ideal of human autonomy by opposing, to the illusion of liberty, a historical determinism which extends the naturalistic mechanism into the world of morality, with no other end than to teach us submission to a new form of fatalism.¹²

Unlike the critics who saw in Durkheim's theory an argument for a stultifying social unity, Richard believed that one was forced,

from these premises, to conclude a fatalistic acceptance of division, class struggle and universal war.¹³

Richard represents the disintegration of the alliance of what Bouglé referred to in 1907 as the "forward-looking intellectuals."¹⁴ When, in 1910, Richard openly announced his break with Durkheim,¹⁵ the socialist-radical tie was thin indeed. Richard's declaration was symbolic of the Protestant-idealist objection to anything having an aroma of determinism, whether materialist or sociologistic. Richard's Kantism appears to have been well known;¹⁶ he felt that Durkheim had made a fatal slide from taking society as a notion--an analytic category--to a position where society became for him a "being,"

. . . turning the interaction of minds, which is only a relationship, into a mysterious substance, and finally a Divinity.¹⁷

Richard's reaction is little different from the alarm expressed by Steeg at the pervasive influence (as he saw it)

of scientism in the University. Richard represented the fears engendered by the spectacle of forces loosed by the overthrow of clericalism. Since in so many respects Bouglé's own reservations about Durkheim's theories were similar to those enunciated by Richard, one may suspect that the former did not abandon the cause because he was an atheist.

Essertier, on the other hand, maintained a less emotional attitude towards the Durkheimians, and collaborated with them in the abortive attempt to revive the Année Sociologique after the war. In his anthology Philosophes et Savants Français, published in the year of his premature death, Essertier took issue principally with Durkheim's religious theory, and wrote that

. . . it is unlikely that any [secular] social faith would ever replace the faith of the coal miner; man wants a transcendent god. . . .¹⁹

Like many another critic, Essertier was certain that sociology could never develop a science of morality.

It was not only other sociologists that Durkheim's atheism bothered. It was only because the political goals were similar that the alliance of intellectuals survived as long as it did. For Boutroux, for Buisson, for Steeg, the association of Durkheim's sociology and protestantism

deeply influenced by Kant was a mariage de convenance which did not entirely survive the halcyon days of the Dreyfus Affair.

One of the most comprehensive critiques of Durkheim by a close associate appeared in Dominique Parodi's study of contemporary French sociology.²⁰ What he had to say about Durkheim's sociology amounted to a ringing defense of rationalism against what durkheimians admitted to be the relativity of morals:

. . . conceiving science to be essentially empirical and experimental, sociologists accustom us to take the raw fact as the last cause, to admit subsequently certain orders of facts which are heterogeneous, irreducible, and unexplainable: from this, [we are faced with] a singularly reduced conception of intelligibility. . . .²¹

Thus, Parodi argues, there can be little confidence left in human reason:

If all our ideas, even to their content, are relative to external conditions, whether organic or social, positive knowledge will itself participate in that relativity; and when [sociologists] found upon science these relativist consequences, they remove [from science], by the very fact of their conclusions, all the authority which they needed in order to establish the premises.²²

If all is contingent, then how is it possible to arrive at conclusions which oblige? This being the case, sociology, said Parodi, "seems to tell us to obey the law because it

is the law";²³ but in this extreme relativism, living with rules which we can neither justify nor even understand in themselves, why, Parodi asks,

. . . should the individual passions or personal fantasy, or some temperamental expression not have just as much right to obedience?²⁴

In the final analysis, individual reason is "disarmed before the forces which it submits to."²⁵

This apotheosis of individual reason was shared, with religious overtones, by the Protestant community which was such a prominent part of the effort to create a reformist liberal movement. Felix Pécaut, exiled during the Empire, returned with Steeg and Buisson to play a major role in the anti-clerical movement. It may well be said that this Protestantism was a rationalism lit by an internal, yet rational God. As Benrubi has described Pécaut--and, by extension the movement he represented--

. . . [he] adheres frankly to a Protestantism which consults the Bible with such an independence that it rejects the false in order to absorb only the truth. In brief, liberal Protestantism is neither a fixed dogma, nor a closed system, but a seed, capable of every kind of development; it is the free ascent of every one of us, with the help of all of us, toward the good. . . .²⁶

Undoubtedly, to some Protestants like Théodore Steeg, sociology represented a part of the unfortunate

rage for "scientism," or the "cult of the smallest fact":

The tyrannous apostles of the division of labor risk compromising the old and brilliant French qualities sacrificed to a morose Germanic pedantry.²⁷

The promoters of this spirit, said Steeg, were Mssrs. Lavissee, Lanson, and Durkheim. The Protestants could be reconciled, of course, to the rejection of metaphysics; and both Buisson and Boutroux remained adamant in their affirmation of an idealism which, if it did not reject sociology, found any claim to establish a morality preposterous. Boutroux expressed it thus:

Evolution, allege certain sociologists, is not only a fact, but is a principle, because this fact belongs not only to the past but at the same time commands the future in its concrete creations, and thus furnishes rules of conduct as well as the rational clarification of past events. . . . We do not see how one could prove that this evolution determined, and that no influence will ever appear to modify its course. . . . Either we hand over democracy under the pretext of a scientific positivism to the chance results of a spirit of system and to the fury of unchained passions, or we define it, regulate and idealize it in making it conform to a moral principle: those are our alternatives. How could our choice be doubted?²⁸

It is interesting to note that the opposition to Durkheim's theory which comes from within the liberal alliance is content to focus on two essential features which are themselves related. First, the objections of the

more radically individualist critics focus on the sociological theory of history which seems to them to decree a fatalism in the face of social conditions, and to posit an individual totally dominated by a society which smothers him. The second objection, coming largely from protestants and Bergsonians like Essertier, emphasizes the substitution of society for god, or for intuition, or for the external kantian imperative. As one reads these objections, one gets the impression that it is the a priori assumptions of the critics which largely blind them to the argument Durkheim was making. For them, Durkheim's theory is unacceptable because he cannot, or does not, refute the premises from which they argue. Their faith is fixed, as their political spectrum is limited to those policies which accord with a liberal idealism or intuitionism which, in effect, supports the Radical status quo. Reform is only possible whereby the autonomy of the individual as they conceive it is maintained. However, because Durkheim's own political stance is, in practical terms, similar, the criticisms which his theories evoke are muted, and held within the family; for both idealists and durkheimians are largely in control of the university system.

Opposition on the Right

It was only too natural, both on religious and political grounds, that Catholics should react violently against the man and the movement which saw one of its primary goals in the elimination of Catholic control of, or influence upon, the educational system.²⁹ This reaction was epitomized in several works written by a University of Louvain professor, Simon Deploige,³⁰ and in the studies published by Georges Fonsegrive.³¹ While Steven Lukes refers to Deploige's work as "unscholarly,"³² and does not mention Fonsegrive, these two, with Paul Bureau, are important if only because they represent the Catholic position which has never accepted the secularization of school and society.

The critique made by Deploige in 1912 represented the Thomist defense of the Catholic conception of morality, which admitted, of course, no place for a "science" of morality. He accused Durkheim of the same inconsistency which all of Durkheim's purist critics found unacceptable:

On the one hand he maintains for sociology, its amoral and disinterested approach, without which it would no longer be a science. But on the other hand he converts it into a normative discipline with the pretense of restoring Ethics on new and scientific foundations.³³

Armand Cuvillier, summing up the Catholic reaction to sociologisme, expressed himself as wishing that

. . .the criticism coming from this direction might have been less bitter and more equitable.³⁴

He agreed with Durkheim's own assessment of Deploige's work as tendentious and polemical.³⁵

Of considerably more interest than Catholic reaction, and considerably more acute in its attack on sociologism and scientism, was the liberal Catholicism of Georges Fonsegrive. In 1901 he argued that democracy was possible only if individuals in society became capable of practicing the kind of virtue which identified the individual interest with the interest of all, as had once been the case under the rule of the royal family and nobility. Education was the key to this end. In a phrase which seems to echo the teaching of Durkheim, Fonsegrive wrote:

Democracy will be religious, or it will not exist.³⁶

The question came down to just what that religion would be. Fonsegrive specifically rejected the solutions of monarchy or aristocracy, and accepted the reality that France was republican and democratic. It was necessary to carry the

word to the people who, up until then, had only heard the word of their adversaries.

For Fonsegrive, the enemy was not so much democracy as liberalism, which he took to be the liberation of man's "lustful passions" and his "cowardice." Democracy became possible when religion, through education, became, for man's consciousness, "both brake and propeller."³⁷ Without the first, anarchy; without the second, decadence. For Bouglé the equivalent words were "constraint" and "ideal." And in words that either Bouglé or Durkheim could have written, Fonsegrive observed,

More than any other regime, democracy needs a moral orientation and, consequently, a religion.³⁸

It was the duty of Catholics to accept republican France, to cure her of her illness:

We must give the people, now citizens, a civic education, a moral education. . . . Speak, write, act, and, particularly moralize. But learn the language of democracy and the Republic. The people will listen only to those who speak that language.³⁹

Fonsegrive made no concessions to Durkheim, calling his "religion" an "illusion":

Does society exist outside of the individuals which make it up? And beyond psychological facts such as they are felt by individual consciousness, is there, can there be, can any one imagine, any other? . . . Rather than

legitimizing religion, he makes it like every other [social] fact . . . it has no intimate specificity, and loses its originality.⁴⁰

Fonsegrive, in his study of the French mind from 1880 to 1914, was ready to document the failure of positivism, by appealing to the evidence he believed he saw of its decline in popularity before the war. "The most complete confidence in science" had given way to a "clear vision of the limits of our intellectual power."⁴¹ Even Taine, Fonsegrive observed, had ended his life in doubt. Rather than lean on any specifically Catholic writings, however, Fonsegrive sought to find shelter for the Catholic position in the popularity of Bergson, and by finding in the writings of Boutroux a criticism of scientism. Bergson, he wrote, was the "bridge" by which one escaped from Taine.⁴² Bergson's insistence on the "novelty of each moment" and Boutroux' demonstration of the contingency of natural laws "open the road to faith."⁴³

Fonsegrive extolled the avidity of the young for action, for sport, even for war, which had been accompanied by an "affirmation morale."⁴⁴ This spirit he saw not only in Catholicism and Action Française, but in syndicalism also. The thirty years preceding the war, wrote Fonsegrive, had

been a progress measured by a return to the respectability of faith; Claudel and Péguy were the living examples.⁴⁵

The attack on the Durkheim school from the right reaches its most violent form in the writings of Agathon, pen name of Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, son of the sociologist. Les Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui is a counterpart of Bouglé's Idées égalitaires, in the sense that it purports to argue that the emergence of a collectively held idea lends support to its moral validity. Agathon, as did Fonsegrive, documented that in the "new generation" which emerged in the years immediately before the war was to be read the rebirth of a temporarily submerged, or repressed, élan contained in the race. Within a theory which postulated a permanent conflict between "thought" and "action,"⁴⁶ Agathon sought to document the decline of the materialist scientism of the "generation of 1870"⁴⁷ and the renaissance of faith and action.

The hero, in many ways, of the "Catholic Renaissance" was Péguy. Daniel Halévy has recounted how Péguy, formerly an avid supporter of the dreyfusard cause, was converted after 1900; how he came to fall out with the "bureaucratic intellectuals who were organized to impose a doctrine" and who were in the process of taking over the University.⁴⁸

He went on to point out the disdain in which Péguy was held by his former comrades. As for Durkheim, wrote Halévy, he was a man of "spirit and passion, a mediocre mind, a good organizer," a "professor of a science he knew nothing about," who was used by the intellectuals.⁴⁹ The great minds like Bergson and Hauriou were excluded from the University, while Durkheim and his followers "took control of the state teaching apparatus."⁵⁰ Péguy's articles of 1907-08 were a declaration of war against the state bureaucracy which lived off the rest of the country.⁵¹

Fundamentally, Péguy and Daniel Halévy represent a Rationalist attack on the liberalism of their age--or perhaps the liberalism of any age. Halévy's quotations from Péguy support this thesis, for it was the mediocrity, the debasement of the human spirit which they saw as the essence of a world whose primary value was the pursuit of wealth. As Péguy observed,

To debase is the most profound instinct [of the contemporary social and political leadership].
 . . . The modern world debases everything. Other worlds had other occupations . . . other worlds idealized or materialized, built or demolished, brought justice or force, other worlds built cities, communities, men or gods. The modern world debases. That is its specialty.⁵²

Péguy recognized that Durkheim and his followers were "reformers"; but what they called the "conscience collective" was nothing more than a degradation of the human ideal: the "conscience collective" of Plato's democracy. Péguy associated the ills of the modern world with the destruction of forces in the anciens régimes which checked the "money power."⁵³ Now there was nothing but money and its handmaiden, the State, which invaded, and degraded, all aspects of French society: and the education envisaged, and shaped by Durkheim and his allies, was only a part of the widespread effect of the sovereignty of money and materialism, particularly, as Halévy notes, in the triumph of the "modern" curriculum over the classical "humanism." Péguy accused his enemies, said Halévy, of

. . . ruining in the young generation what was usually called the general culture, or, in other words, the humanities. All the humanities, for there are several kinds: the Ancient [Greek and Roman], the Christian, the Renaissance and Classical.⁵⁴

What is interesting in Péguy's longing for a Republic concerned as a moral order is his conclusion that sociology represented merely an aspect of the attack on that idea by the forces of "caesarism,"⁵⁵ radical-socialism, and money.

Although it seems clear that Durkheim and Bouglé conceived of the healthy society as a moral order, morality manifesting itself in a historically achieved conscience collective, Péguy's conception is more clearly and insistently Platonic. As Halévy has described it,

Liberty, first; with liberty, man developing his strength, and through him, the generation of values (devotion, goodness, audacity, creative power) which determine the hierarchy, that is, authority . . . The archiste (lover of spiritual order) defers to the true authorities, or to the archontes (sources of the Idea of God).⁵⁶

To one who saw the knowledge of the Good in the Catholics' God, all else (including the sociologists' faith in the source of a moral order in man and society) was degradation and anarchy.

A singularly bitter series of attacks against the liberal Republic and its intellectual leaders flowed from the pen of Hubert Bourgin, one-time socialist and contributor to every volume of the Année Sociologique after 1900. Like Halévy, Bourgin became a supporter of Vichy after 1940. He summed up the Third Republic by remarking that it had justified Plato's assessment of democracy.⁵⁷ Durkheim's sociology, which he took to be the underpinning of that regime,

applied itself to extracting religion from society.
 . . . The adepts of sociology thus considered

themselves justified in denying and combatting every revealed religion and in considering society as the supreme force from which emanates cohesion, constraint, command.⁵⁸

Bourgin attacked the "catechism" and "dogmas" of the system: democracy, revolution, equality, universal suffrage and the "science of morality."⁵⁹

If the French worker has lost, over the last 40 years, the greater part of his conscience, and his professional integrity, the school is largely responsible.⁶⁰

It is interesting to note that Bourgin, though no apologist for Catholicism, echoed other conservative sentiments by insisting that what was involved, fundamentally, in the clash of doctrines was opposing views of human nature:

Man is not good.⁶¹

Bourgin's most penetrating work, however, was his direct attack on the relationship between the École Normale Supérieure and the Durkheim school, on the one hand, and the political stance of the Third Republic.⁶² Having been a sociologist and contributor to the Année Sociologique, Bourgin was better trained than most to make such a study of social and ideological relationships, though his polemical excesses are only too apparent.⁶³ What Bourgin sought to do was to elucidate the sociology of sociology; or to turn Durkheimian methods upon the school itself.

The teaching which Bourgin underwent even before reaching the E.N.S. prepared the way for higher education:

Secondary education removed any reasons for cleaving to the State which instructed them, or the Nation upon which they were going to depend. . . . The abolition or the weakening of religious beliefs and the lessons taught by the moral traditions of the family, made certain, menacing and terrible the peril which lay ready to assault our adolescence.⁶⁴

The E.N.S. only completed the task, by applying the "dissolvent of anarchism, and the imperialism of socialism."⁶⁵ Bourgin described his mind as "possessed by anarchism" by the time he left, in 1900.⁶⁶ Once again, as with Péguy, and Fonsegrive, it was the anarchism of "democracy" as understood by the classical philosophers. As he saw it, the movement of intellectuals which dominated the E.N.S. and French politics was a conspiracy of elements foreign to France:

[Elie] Halévy and his kind stand at a crossroads which lead from radical English Free Masonry, from Jewish and German Marxism, and from the radicalism of the French revolution.⁶⁷

Taking up the durkheimian contribution to this degradation of the classical republic, Bourgin was capable of ranging from the most incisive perception⁶⁸ to the worst kind of antisemitism.⁶⁹ Bourgin seems to believe that Durkheim maneuvered his disciples like "pawns on a political

chessboard, though it was limited to the dimensions of the Sorbonne."⁷⁰ Yet that group, through contacts and friendship, extended into the government: Bourgin is at some pains to describe the social ties that united such men as Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Gustave Lanson and members of the government. As for the teaching of sociology in the schools, it was not directed so much at method, as to the political theory which his sociology supported.⁷¹

In spite of many tendentious remarks, Bourgin's respect for Durkheim and his method--even his conclusions--is enormous. He provides us with an interesting estimate of what he believes Durkheim's reaction would have been to the politics of the inter-war period:

He might have foreseen this posthumous lack of respect and fraudulent off-handedness if he had understood the real base, the deeper motives of a regime of perpetual usurpation, of perpetual destruction-by-leveling, and of perpetual anarchy; if he had understood . . . the direction and extent of a perpetual Boetian revolt of the politicians against the higher reason of science which is abstinent and slow-moving.⁷²

Bourgin thus supports, in part, our thesis that Bouglé, while despairing, on the one hand, of the direction of a moral radical politics, nevertheless permitted, for political purposes, a dilution of Durkheim's theory with a view to rendering it more compatible with the views of other elements in the political alliance.

Bourgin found in Bouglé the symbol of that marriage between

. . . the typical university professor and the typical politician of that time, with his expressive face, his lustreless skin, very brown hair, the black beard of the philosopher and republican, black eyes, serious or crafty, a physiognomie sometimes pensive and reflective, sometimes animated, laughing, malicious, and the cape of a professor or democrat of the grand epoque.⁷³

Bourgin worked for Bouglé's cause in the elections of 1914, where he was the candidate representing "everything which at the School [E.N.S.] was more or less attached to the sort of politics" which Bourgin came later to abhor:

Being the candidate of Steeg, he was a member of the Sect which the Jauresist socialists of the School, whether Free Masons or not, considered an indisputable and indispensable auxiliary for Democracy.⁷⁴

What lends to Bourgin's writing an interest far beyond the polemical style into which he lapses, is the recognition that his ideological perspective is really a Maurrassian sociology which treats Durkheim in a far more appreciative way than any other voice on the right.

His attack, even in 1942,⁷⁵ is certainly not on the scientific quality of men like Durkheim and his own friend and tutor, François Simiand, but on the uses to which their science was put and most particularly, on the alliances they permitted with the apostles of a vulgar democracy.

Bouglé he described as a "vulgarizer of sociology."⁷⁶

Bourgin seems to have recognized that Durkheim's notion of the role of the State, and of disinterested science, was not essentially different from his own appeals for a moral democracy.⁷⁸ However, the moral relativism which appeared to emerge from the sociological approach was grasped by others who sought, in the name of democracy and equality, to render all values--in art, music, literature and religion--equal, with a resulting mediocrity which spread like a virus through the society.

The View from the Left

There is some doubt as to whether the movement led by Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu and Daniel Rops, called L'Ordre Nouveau, should be classified as "left." It was born in the late '20's, and was part of a growing reaction to French political stagnation which also inspired the Jeune Droite associated with Jacques Maritain, Cahiers and La Revue Française. The Ordre Nouveau described itself as composed of "traditionalists but not conservatives . . . revolutionaries but not révoltés . . . socialists but not materialists."⁷⁹ It was disgusted by the weakness of the French party system and drew, for its critique, upon Bergson and Sorel, but especially upon Nietzsche:

We must call Nietzsche to the rescue. Nietzsche against the State, whether Hitler's or Stalin's. Nietzsche for man against the masses, whether they be fascist, American, or Soviet. Nietzsche against rationalism whether out of Rome, Moscow or the Sorbonne.⁸⁰

The movement was in the tradition of French Socialism and particularly Proudhon. Del Bayle is content to call all these movements which attacked the status quo "non-conformist." And in a way it is best to leave the matter there, for, like Daniel Halévy, whose sympathy to socialism had been strong, these men came to live on some kind of terms with Vichy. Yet it is clear that they were not fascists, though their "personalism" was fundamentally both anti-liberal and anti-collective. It can best be seen, as nostalgic and utopian in the tradition of both Fourier and Proudhon. They were men who could state far more clearly what they hated than what they envisaged as possible.

Three essential principles were announced in 1931, of which the first was philosophic personalism:

Primacy of man over society . . . the economic and social machine must exist for the person and not the person for the machine. . . . This personalism implies a break as much with the abstract individualism of the liberals, as with any doctrine ranking the state, whatever its form, as a highest value.⁸¹

The second principle was that of economic revolution:

"subordination of production and consumption" and replacement of the contemporary system wherein creative work was suppressed by a completely contrary sort of society."⁸²

The third principle involved a radical decentralization which echoed Proudhon.⁸³

Aron's position emerges from an analysis made of the Marxist and Bakuninist attitudes toward revolution. Rejecting both as being too extreme, Aron suggests that

. . . in order to avoid this double danger, we must organize anarchy.⁸⁴

Aron explains that this does not mean the suppression of society, but its "subordination to the spiritual interests of those who compose it."⁸⁵ Aron took the position that the Marxist formulation represented evolution rather than revolution, and would result in the installation--as had already occurred in Russia--of a technocracy. The leap, through revolution, to a new stage, would, as Kierkegaard and Bakunin had understood, have to be irrational.⁸⁶

The decadence of the French nation amounts, in sum, to a loss of spiritual strength brought on by organization, rationalism and a slavish acceptance of the modern myths of production and nationalism, all of which reduced man to an abstraction. The cry of the New Order is directed against

the modern industrial society and its theorists, like Durkheim, against the evolution toward technocracy and the bureaucratization of life which drains man of the spiritual forces which are a necessary part of his being.⁸⁷

The Marxist attack on the intellectuals' republic appeared at the same time from the pen of Paul Nizan, who had been at the École Normale Supérieure with Raymond Aron and Jean-Paul Sartre. After some years of indecision, Nizan became a communist in 1925. Trained in the schools which durkheimians and their allies had captured and controlled after 1905, Nizan felt that he was particularly suited to the task of exposing the essentially ideological base of that alliance which joined idealists, Protestants and sociologists. In 1932 he published Les Chiens de Garde.

André Gide remarked in his journal:

I am reading his Chiens de Garde with a lively interest. The book is badly done, full of repetition, and you have understood three times over what he means when he keeps on talking. But such as it is, the book is a sign of the times.⁸⁸

In 1933, Gide joined l'Association des Écrivains et Artistes Révolutionnaires. A review, Commune, was organized which included, besides Gide, Henri Barbusse and Romain Rolland. Aragon and Nizan were secretaries in charge of publication. In La Jeune Révolution, a publication seeking

to bring together young workers and revolutionary students, Nizan attacked the rival groups, asking who would be their patron: Nietzsche, God, or Kierkegaard? Joining Humanité in 1934, Nizan was active as a writer, columnist, and novelist in the cause of Communism until the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He resigned from the Party, and was killed at Dunkerque in June 1940.

Les Chiens de Garde is a long and repetitive polemic on the role of the philosophers as ideologists for the rulers of the Third Republic. Yet it is the serious work of a philosopher trained at the École Normale where Lanson was Director, and Bouglé, Director of the Centre de Documentation. For the purposes of this study, it will be sufficient to note the way in which Nizan related Durkheim to what he took to be the preponderant philosophy of the Third Republic: Kantian idealism. Léon Brunschvicg symbolized, for Nizan, the essential nature of a bourgeois philosophy which claims an imaginary purity:

Every philosopher, though he may consider that he does not, participates in the impure reality of his age.⁸⁹

Most important, Nizan argues, the bourgeois philosopher sees himself at the highest degree of a chain recalled by the history of philosophy; and thus it is claimed that the

truth gained by reason is of the highest order. That truth has fostered an abstraction which maintains no contact with man as a flesh and blood being who works, suffers and dies in a real world:

Philosophy does contemplate an Idea of Man, and it does pose and resolve a certain number of questions concerning man--but not concerning this or that particular man who exists and has to eat.⁹⁰

What is more, the choice made by philosophers is a partisan choice, and by opting for the world of pure idea, they have abdicated as human beings, and made an adjustment to oppression:

The philosophers who feel comfortable have come to the conclusion that human progress has reached its peak, or, at least, is well on its way. And so they fold their arms and relax in the warm serenity of the Sabbath. . . . But for some men, Sunday is still a long way off. . . . I too find that our work is not yet completed. But M. Lalande thinks that it is, and Mssrs. Bouglé and Thamin are basking in the Lord's peace.⁹¹

The philosophy of idealism, Nizan argued, existed in order to justify bourgeois rule which could not yet dispense with it. Philosophy must, among other things, justify the rule of the ideas which lie at the foundation of class hegemony:

M. Bouglé, addressing us from the dizzy heights of the sociological theories of his mentor, M. Durkheim, demonstrates the progress of egalitarian ideas and says that it is good. . . .⁹²

And, Nizan concluded, the effort of the philosophers, including Bouglé, had been effective:

The ideas it manufactures and puts into circulation do not float up to heaven, but fall back to earth and strike the very people for whom they were intended. A powerful network of institutions sustains this philosophy, disseminates it, and gives it official currency. . . .⁹³

Thus the capture of the school system was a necessary part of the revolution, and the overthrow of the ecclesiastical clergy made room for the establishment of a new clergy which has discharged exactly the same functions as its predecessor; that is, it has borne the chief responsibility for all the forms of moral suasion, all the spiritual propaganda, which the State might require. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the University in France is nothing more than the spiritual lever of the State.⁹⁴

As to the specific place of Durkheim's sociology within the larger framework of bourgeois philosophy, Nizan argued that the Kantian morality of the University remained "dusty precepts" which "floated in an atmosphere of beneficent learning" until the appearance of a new "dogma" which consolidated and justified scientifically the hitherto abstract versions.⁹⁵ The "Doctrine" of "respect for the French fatherland" and "collaboration between the classes" is spread through the schools through the "noxious works of

M. Bouglé.⁹⁶

It is clear that Nizan's view of Durkheim's sociology and Bouglé's role in the popularization, or vulgarization of that sociology, is not unrelated to the central thesis of this study. Yet it accounts less for the dynamic nature of Durkheim's thought or its radical implications, than it does for the position occupied by Bouglé, who sought to modify the more radical implications of a historical determinism in order that they might better offer support to his idealist allies. Thus understood, Nizan's study hits the mark more closely with Bouglé than with Durkheim himself; and this is not surprising, since it was Bouglé who was the living representative and spokesman for the political aspects of Durkheim's thought long after the death of the master; and Nizan certainly knew Bouglé both at the E.N.S. and as the propagandist of La Dépêche.

The criticism of Durkheim's sociology falls into a pattern which emphasizes its role as a liberal ideology. It is interesting that the assessment of both right, as represented by Agathon or Bourgin is remarkably similar to that of the left, whether it be Aron or Nizan. In both cases the durkheimians are clearly perceived as bearing a support to classical liberal theory which, so long as it

clung to abstract formulations, was especially vulnerable to sociological refutation. To the extent that Durkheim's theory was "scientific" it could confront its enemies on their own grounds. What the right and left attacked was not so much the theory, since they were not, it may be argued, competent to do so. But they could continue to attack the idealism which Durkheim's findings appeared to support, particularly when enunciated by Bouglé. In fact, however, Durkheim's own thought was far more open to a radical transformation of society than his idealist friends could admit.

It was this very openness, as well as the methodological denial of either the Protestant God or the categorical imperative that so deeply troubled the idealists and the spiritualist liberals. Yet, as political allies they could not dismiss its importance to their cause. They tended, therefore, to treat Durkheim as one of their own, while at the same time exercising their philosophical talents by pointing out the aspects of his theory that they considered dangerous. What made him most dangerous was his determinism; and consequently they coined the expression sociologism as a description of the degree to which a sociology, otherwise genuine, had stepped into that preserve which they had marked out for themselves: moral philosophy.

CHAPTER X

FOOTNOTES

¹Lukes, pp. 497-529.

²Ibid., p. 497.

³Ibid., pp. 302-13.

⁴Ibid., p. 304.

⁵Combat pour l'individu (Paris, 1904; La Sensibilité Individualiste (Paris, 1909); and Les Antinomies entre l'individu et la société (Paris, 1913).

⁶Palante, Les Antinomies, p. 166.

⁷Ibid., p. 189.

⁸Ibid., p. 82.

⁹Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁰Adolphe Prins, "La Tendance collectiviste," in Revue des Deux Mondes, 11 (1902), p. 444.

¹¹Terry Clark, Patrons and Prophets, p. 223.

¹²Gaston Richard, L'Évolution des mœurs (Paris, 1925), p. 380.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Bouglé, 1907p, p. 346.

¹⁵Richard published four letters explaining and justifying the break in Foi et Vie, June 1, 16; July 1, 16, 1911.

¹⁶See Emile Lasbax, "Daniel Essertier et les Sources du Bergonisme Sociologique," in RIS, 40^e Année, 1932, p. 186.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Bouglé was well known as an atheist among his colleagues. (Conversation with Mme. Hautmann, former student of Bouglé at the E.N.S.; January 23, 1974.

¹⁹Daniel Essertier, Philosophes et savants français (Paris, 1950), p. 83.

²⁰Dominique Parodi, La Philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris, 1919).

²¹Ibid., p. 151.

²²Ibid., p. 152.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 159.

²⁶I. Benrubi, Les Sources et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris, 1933), p. 973.

²⁷T. Steeg, "Questions Universitaires: Ancienne et Nouvelle Sorbonne," Revue Eleu, No. 21 (1910), p. 642.

²⁸Émile Boutroux, "Morale et Démocratie," in W. Steed, C. Bouglé, et al., Les Démocraties modernes (Paris, 1921), pp. 204-5.

²⁹See particularly A. Cuvillier, Où Va la Sociologie française (Paris, 1953), pp. 39-47.

³⁰Simon Deploige, Le Conflit de la morale et de la Sociologie (Paris, 1912).

³¹de Taine a Péguy: L'Évolution des idées dans la France contemporaine (Paris, 1917); Morale et Société (Paris, 1908); La Crise Sociale (Paris, 1901).

³²Lukes, p. 497, f.n.

³³Deploige, p. xi.

³⁴Cuvillier, p. 41.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Fonsegrive, La Crise sociale, p. 492.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., p. 493.

⁴⁰Fonsegrive, L'Évolution des idées, p. 204.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 331.

⁴²Ibid., p. 332.

⁴³Ibid., p. 335.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 336.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 339.

⁴⁶Agathon, Les Jeunes Gens d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1919), p. 7.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁸Daniel Halévy, Péguy et les cahiers de la quinzaine (Paris, 1941), p. 162

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 162.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 163. These articles were entitled "De la Situation Faite au parti intellectuel et a la sociologie dans le monde moderne" (1906); "De la situation faite au parti intellectuel dans le monde moderne (1906); and "De la situation faite au parti intellectuel dans le monde moderne devant les accidents de la gloire temporelle" (1907).

⁵²Quoted in Halévy, ibid., p. 166.

⁵³Ibid., p. 165.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 167.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 204.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 205.

⁵⁷Hubert Bourgin, L'École nationale (Paris, 1942),
p. 29.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 48.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 53.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 57.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²H. Bourgin, L'École Normale et la politique
(Paris, 1970) (originally published in 1938).

⁶³Ibid., p. 1.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 27.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 147.

⁶⁸Cf. p. 220: "[Durkheim] constructed his political
and sociological edifices with materials of the mind."

⁶⁹Cf. p. 221: "[Durkheim] apparently thought that
the reign of Israel is realizable."

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 225.

⁷²Ibid., p. 226.

⁷³Ibid., p. 469.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 471.

⁷⁵See Le Socialisme universitaire (Paris, 1942).

⁷⁶Bourgin, L'École normale, p. 468.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 215-27.

⁷⁸Note Bourgin's appreciation of Durkheim and Simiand, in L'Ecole nationale, pp. 347-365.

⁷⁹Quoted in J-L Loubet del Bayle, Les Non-conformistes des années 30 (Paris, 1969), p. 83.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 85.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 92.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Robert Aron, La Révolution nécessaire (Paris, 1933), p. 27.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 32.

⁸⁷Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, La Décadence de la nation française (Paris, 1931).

⁸⁸Ariel Ginsbourg, Paul Nizan (Paris, 1966).

⁸⁹Paul Nizan, Les Chiens de garde (Paris, 1960). Translation: Monthly Review Press (New York, 1971). (All references to the New York edition), p. 19.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 30.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 44-45.

⁹²Ibid., p. 54.

⁹³Ibid., p. 100.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 103.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 108.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 109.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

In this study we have approached the "Durkheim School of Social Theory" in essentially political and social terms; that is, it has been our purpose to examine the theory in terms of a particular group of intellectuals who can be distinguished both in terms of their position in French society and in terms of their political orientation as revealed by their adherence to political parties, and by the goals which they labored to reach. We have sought to do this by focusing on the theoretical stance, and the political action of one member of the group who was singularly close to Durkheim himself, and whose career embodies many of the aspirations of the group.

The "life situation" of the Durkheim group, or of Célestin Bouglé in particular, can be approached from a number of points of view. In particular, one can focus on the extent to which the national humiliation of 1870 played a major part in forming the mentality of Frenchmen over the following fifty years. Also, a large number of the men involved both in the Durkheim group and in the wider circles of political allies were members of minority religions

excluded or even exiled during the Second Empire, and were men who harbored very deep feelings about the Catholic Church. Consequently, one skilled in the analysis of the psychological roots of action would have an ample field for research. It is also possible to treat Durkheimian thought--as Alvin Gouldner has done--in terms of its intellectual forbears. Lastly, it may well be argued that the most characteristic aspect of Durkheim's sociology was its search for a new basis for morality, and therefore that an understanding of sociologism can be gained by looking into the need to find a substitute for a god destroyed by modern science, a need reinforced by the traditional educational emphasis upon moral philosophy. In a society for which the Lockean assumptions concerning human nature had never had the kind of influence they had on the Anglo-Saxon world, the medieval notion of the polity remained strong enough to resist any slide toward utilitarian or Madisonian theories of democracy.

We have elected to make the argument that the Durkheim school of social theory has its roots in the political and social aspirations of a wide spectrum of French society in France after 1870. This movement in search of the modern state comprised elements of all

classes in French society, though it had its strongest base in those parts of the society directly involved in, or concerned for the social and political consequences of modern industry and science. The group which clustered around Durkheim, made up for the most part of young intellectuals of lower middle-class or minority-group backgrounds, saw themselves not only as the philosophers of this movement, but equally important, as political activists whose task it was to unify the movement by giving it a solid ideological base. The effort to gain control of the educational establishment was a logical extension of their goals. At another level, the Durkheim school of social theory represents an important aspect of a wider, and more clearly political effort to weld a cohesive party capable of exercising political power. Lastly, we have argued that Durkheim's sociology appeared as a consequence of a need felt throughout Western societies to describe adequately an emerging industrial society, and, in particular, as a response to attacks upon the liberal state from both right and left. The revision of classical liberal theory demanded that both conservative and radical socialist theories be refuted on their own positivist grounds. The Durkheim school sought to justify the assumptions, policies

and goals of those elements of French society--in both the middle and the working class--which were a by-product of industrialization and urbanization or, to use Bouglé's own expression, the complication of the division of labor.

We have examined the way in which Bouglé transformed Durkheim's social theory into what Carl Friedrich has defined as political ideology:

Ideologies are action-related systems. They typically contain a program and a strategy for its realization, and their essential function is to unite organizations which are built around them. . . . Ideology is a set of ideas which unites a party or other group for effective participation in political life.¹

Among other characteristics of ideology which have been noted include the close relationship of ideologies and conditions of crisis,² a tendency to slip easily from "acceptance of certain descriptive propositions" to "belief in a set of values,"³ and, as David Easton has noted, having a "potential to capture the imagination."⁴ The work of Durkheim, and particularly of Bouglé, has all these characteristics, and is a clear attempt, particularly in Bouglé's hands, to unite a modernist movement in the years preceding the first World War. Lastly, the work of the Durkheim school can be characterized as ideological in the same terms which Durkheim himself used for the study of

socialism: it is a partial view, the "cry of pain" of an emergent group in society which suffered in a variety of ways from the failure of the French political system to cope adequately with a type of society which had been already evident to Saint-Simon. Like all political theory, it had its origin in the confrontation taking place in French society between those groups which defended the status quo and those which sought to overthrow it.

Célestin Bouglé's life and work were illustrative of the ideological aspect of the Durkheim school. Bouglé used sociology in three distinct tasks to which he devoted himself: first, in the name of anti-clericalism he played a life-long role in the effort to wrest control of both University and public education systems from the Church, with the clear purpose of creating a state educational instrument. At a second level he was long engaged in the political task of forging an alliance of liberals and socialists which could operate effectively at the legislative level. The realistic necessities of such an alliance with neo-Kantian reformism and Jaurèsian socialism, required that the determinist and intransigent tone of Durkheim's major works be softened and modified, yet that it remain a scientific adjunct of the fundamental principles which the idealists, both Kantian and socialist,

espoused. Lastly, Bouglé continued the work begun by Durkheim to provide liberalism with an effective answer to the ideological enemies of liberalism. His preoccupation with these class "enemies" coincided very roughly with the ebb and flow of threats to the liberal Republic: in the period of the Dreyfus Affair, it was the Right which, almost exclusively, was the target of attack. Subsequently, that battle won, the major obstacle to progress, the old liberalism of laissez-faire, became the object of his concern. And when the Left began to pursue a political course that challenged the Republic, Marxism and syndicalism became the objects of his theoretical concern. He seems always to have been aware, as was Durkheim himself, that sociology was a weapon in this conflict, and was the only effective weapon, in a positivist age, which liberals could use.

An evaluation of the work of the Durkheim school of social theory in terms of the tasks which they consciously or unconsciously set for themselves leads us to conclude that the effort, at least, during the lifetime of Bouglé, was rewarded by only minimal success. The effort to make sociology an important part of the teaching in primary schools appears to have met with increased resistance. Paul Lapie, Director of Primary Education, made a concerted effort after the first World War to introduce sociology at that level; but, as Terry Clark has pointed out,

With time, the indoctrination efforts of the Durkheimians became more generally known and increasingly opposed.⁵

An attempt, in 1923, to replace la morale in the Écoles Normales Primaires by an expanded course in sociology was rebuffed, with Henri Bergson taking the lead.⁶ In fact, sociology was eliminated altogether.⁷ Even at the higher levels the influence of the Durkheim school appears to have declined, incapable as it was of recruiting new members after the war. With the death of Durkheim himself, and the loss of so many promising young scholars, the sociological movement remained confined essentially to those original members of the circle around the Année Sociologique. While Bouglé, for example, organized the Centre de Documentation at the ENS, providing a first-rate library, the postwar generation followed other sociological and political paths.⁸ Bouglé remained the only member of the circle to hold a chair at the Sorbonne until joined by Halbwachs in 1935. Marcel Mauss taught at the École Pratique des Hautes Études until 1931 when he was appointed to the Collège de France, where he was joined by Simiand the following year. But none of these men were capable of fulfilling the role of grand patron, and, in institutional terms, the legacy of Emile Durkheim became the rather separated individual careers of Georges Friedmann, Jean Stoetzel and Georges Gurvitch.⁹

If the influence of the school reached a low ebb in the thirties, however, its world-wide influence, and the tremendous growth of sociology as a major academic discipline in France after World War II, makes very clear the lasting contribution of that small group which clustered around Durkheim in 1900. The individual careers of Georges Friedmann, Jean Stoetzel and Georges Gurvitch flow directly from the teaching and guidance of Durkheim and Bouglé.

On the political front, Bouglé's work came largely to an end before the first World War, although he made one last, unsuccessful attempt to run for office in 1924. The difficulties of achieving a synthesis of liberalism and socialism in the years between the two World Wars have been documented earlier. However, it is clear that, in spite of the failure of the Fourth Republic, efforts towards the forging of a closer alliance continued after the Second World War, and major elements of Durkheimian thinking have been accepted both by Gaullists and by the Left Alliance. Bouglé did not live to see the fruits of his labors.

The difficulties which the movement encountered may be usefully classified as ideological, socio-economic and organizational.

In reading the accounts of Durkheim's life recorded

by Lukes, Wallwork and La Capra, one is hardly surprised by the bitter resistance that his theories generated amongst the leading intellectuals of the Center. Accounts of meetings of the Société de Philosophie in which he participated are replete with examples of a man who was continuously on the defensive. This was no less true of Bouglé when he sought to defend his work on Proudhon. The tradition of idealist thought in France, nourished by the nature of eighteenth-century rationalism, the long years of exclusion and exile, and, also by the very powerful place of classical philosophy in the French educational system, provided a resistance that is typified by the reaction of Boutroux and Janet at Durkheim's thesis defense. While they grudgingly recognized a great mind, they were not influenced by the ideas and the methodology which he proposed. Nor were the relativist, and frankly atheist implications of his work acceptable to what was in many ways a religious movement bent upon the overthrow of the Catholic Church. The defection of men like Gaston Richard was typical: he seemed to lose no opportunity to attack Durkheim both before and after his death, as though he had to justify a period of waywardness.

Though resistance to what could so easily be called

(though unjustifiably) another materialism, went far deeper than just the intellectual elite. French socialism and the working class had found Marx objectionable and were reluctant to abandon the tradition of Fourier and Proudhon. The influence of Bakunin and Sorel on the working class certainly impeded the Marxist effort to organize a movement like the German Socialist Party. Socialist intellectuals in France, like Charles Gide and Jaurès, were idealists.

A second factor, not unrelated to the first, lies in the limited aims of the Protestant reformers. Their attitudes on the question of property set limits to meaningful social and economic change. Since they tended (as did Bouglé) to subscribe to the notion of property as a right, and to the necessity of private property as a counterbalance to political authority, they were not able to go very far beyond the position that the essential rights are legal and political, and that the achievement of these after the Dreyfus Affair, assured that ideal of les carrières ouvertes aux talents. While Radical-Socialists like Buisson could, and did, push hard for social welfare, and for improving the conditions under which the working class lived and labored, their idealism remained largely faithful to the "Principles of 1789."

One of the major reasons for the immobilisme of the Radical party after 1906 was its largely rural, or small town socio-economic and ideological base. Bouglé himself, as we saw in Chapter VII, was very much aware of the deep economic and cultural division of a country that was far less industrialized than Britain or Germany. This rural culture was most clearly expressed in the philosophy of Alain and it proved, before the Second World War, to be an obstacle even to the efforts of moderate reformers within the party. By the mid-thirties, the "young turks" were incapable of preventing the party from being essentially antagonistic to any form of socialism. The Socialist party, on the other hand, during that critical period before the first World War, had found itself incapable of maintaining its part in establishing a liberal-socialist bridge. Jaurès' movement to the left was occasioned just as much by the changed character of the Radical party as by the divisions within French society which forced a choice between les ruraux and les ouvriers.

A factor which played its part in the difficulty encountered in creating a synthesis of liberal and socialist ideals was the absence of the ability or capacity to build an organized movement. There was no one like Jaurès to fill

that role. Durkheim consciously chose the life and commitment of the scholar, and Bouglé's first commitment was to education; he was not able to follow Buisson's path to the Chambre des Députés. He was too intellectually honest, and fundamentally committed to Durkheim's position, to find a home in either the Radical or Socialist ranks. The divisions in French society were so sharp and ran so deep that a constituency which occupied a middle position had not yet developed. In the elections of 1914, Bouglé's position, which supported rearmament (alienating the socialists) and radical social and economic reforms (which alienated Radicaux), provides evidence of a theory in search of a constituency.

Durkheimian social theory was, in fact, related to the social and economic developments within a modernizing nation. Its emergence suggests both the conflicting needs of a new generation of middle-class intellectuals, members of a bureaucratic and professional element within the bourgeoisie which was, in the modern industrial state, to assume a major role. We are, in this study, bearing witness to the birth pangs of modern society. Beyond the clear conflict between modernizing and traditional elements in the society, there were serious differences between older

orientations towards man which legitimated the autonomy of the individual, and the seemingly imperious claim of science to be able to provide insight, if not knowledge, into the enigmas of human society. Durkheim himself, as Steven Lukes points out, underwent a deeply-felt dissatisfaction with the idealist justifications of liberalism. Under attack from both right and left, supporters of the liberal Republic had already begun to pick up, once again, the threads of a positivist approach to modern society. Classical liberal theory, lacking a theory of history adequate to deal with the social and economic dislocation of the nineteenth century, found itself increasingly on the defensive. Marxism and organicism, on the other hand, had developed ways of telling Frenchmen what the malady consisted of, and where the remedies lay.

The striking similarity of Durkheim's social theory to that of Karl Marx would seem to lend weight not so much to the "influence" of the latter on the former as to the argument that they were both seeking away of understanding the historical process which enveloped them. Since Durkheim clearly felt the dangers, both theoretical and political, of the Marxist movement, he chose to concentrate on those features of the emergent society which had captivated

Marx: class, alienation and conflict. The problem they confronted was essentially the same: each asked whether ideas, or representations collectives, "float in space"¹⁰ or whether they are related to the real world and have their real foundation in the natural human society. Each answered by recognizing their specificity and by seeing social life as determined by ascertainable laws. One commentator has summed up this convergence as follows:

The recognition of the transitory nature of historical social forms ends in the denial of absolute and changeless moral truths, and in the rejection of a constant human nature as a principle of explanation in history.¹¹

Their agreement that transformation of the base is the ultimate cause of transformations of the superstructure of ideas was not followed by agreement on just what constituted the social forms which underlay ideas, nor how, in fact, transformation in these forms took place. In 1897, Durkheim denied any influence whatsoever from Marx, and denied specifically that "the economic factor is the mainspring of progress."¹²

Given the fact that he refused to find the source of historical change in economic transformations alone, the refutation of Marxism required that the sources be found elsewhere. This he did in the early years by arguing that

the progress of the division of labor had its source in both the volume and the density of a society.¹³ Yet even there, notes Armand Cuvillier, there is a historical reciprocity of cause and effect not entirely different from Marx' relationship of idea and substructure, particularly as it is clarified by Engels.¹⁴

In 1897, with the introduction of the notion of représentations collectives, the conscience collective becomes a reality sui generis, and must be explained by other collective representations, and not by the social structure.¹⁵ From that time on, the superstructure takes on, more and more, "an idealist character."¹⁶ In 1903, however, Durkheim is admitting that

it appears certain that economic factors profoundly affect the manner in which the population is distributed, its density, and the form of human groupings.¹⁷

Even in the Règles, he had admitted that the economy represented an aspect, though only one among many, of "social facts."¹⁸ This was a position Bouglé always maintained.

Georges Kagan argues that the failure of Durkheim to explain the character of the social ties which exist among members of social groups, or the causes for their joining together, leaves Durkheim incapable of explaining social evolution satisfactorily. "Volume" and "density" by

themselves are insufficient.¹⁹

It was in order to explain more satisfactorily these ties, and this evolution, that Bouglé reintroduced the psychological factors which we discussed earlier. It had the double merit of saving Durkheim from the difficulties of his own contradictions and ambivalence and rendering the theory more acceptable to those who could not accept a pure determinism which excluded the intervention of man in his own history.

Bouglé never accepted the interpretation that Durkheim had created an "idealism." The représentations collectives had no more than a "relative autonomy," as did the représentations individuelles.²⁰ While society creates an "ideal,"²¹ this ideal is a product of a multitude of social factors, including the economic. It was at this point that Bouglé admitted that the work of sociology and psychology was far from finished:

The conscience collective is not a given: it is a historical product which every sort of converging analysis can help us understand.²²

The division of labor, finally, is the product of the "struggle to live" in addition to the pressure of numbers and density. This was, for Bouglé, the equivalent of Marx' and Engels' "economics." One must avoid, he wrote, taking

Durkheim too literally when he claimed that everything would come about mechanically.²³

What seems finally clear is that Durkheim's social theory seemed to be ambivalent and contradictory because it sought to challenge Marx with a determinism as compelling as his own but with different results. It was, at least at the outset, a liberal determinism that met with opposition even among his greatest admirers. Durkheim, we know, was not unaware of the difficulties. In an effort to retrieve the "idea" as something more than the epiphenomenon of his earlier work, he seemed to allow it to "float," finding its source in the mystical élan of human beings coming together in society. Yet, as Kagan has pointed out,

From the moment that the assembly of individuals gives birth to society, [l'être social], the contact between society and nature is broken, [and] society evolves without having anything in common with human needs, with economic functions, society is a spiritual being, superior to both individuals and nature.²⁴

Society is then the moral constraint required by the egoistic nature of men. But why should men of this type have come together at all?

Bouglé's efforts to rescue Durkheim's theory as an effective political instrument highlights the suspicion that liberal socialism is caught between the conflicting

values of individual autonomy and social constraints and, as such, is man's great gamble on the possibility of combining two deep human needs. The Durkheimian synthesis, faced as it was by political and ideological opponents who chose either one or the other as paramount, attempted to reconcile the two. In addition, that synthesis was forced, by the demands of the French tradition, and the conservative critique of liberalism, to reconstruct a liberalism which was moral. There is a tension which lies in Durkheim and his followers between a moral relativism (which coincides with the Marxist analysis) and the proclamation of a moral absolute capable either of refuting the conservatives, or of convincing the workers that social divisions were illusory. It derives precisely from the historical problem of liberal thought in France between 1870 and 1940. And it is because of this ideological confrontation that Durkheim has been accused of being variously a conservative, a radical, a socialist and a liberal. The Durkheim school of social theory was an attempt to conserve the essentials of a liberal philosophy by providing an insight into the way in which it could evolve into a just society which would be socialist, and above all, moral. It scarcely seems difficult to understand that the epithets ordinarily used are

not helpful.

In this study we have made an effort to provide some insight into the political and social context within which Durkheim and Bouglé formulated a theory of the modern industrial state. In their hands it was both descriptive, relying on the new science of sociology, and prescriptive. Such a study is interesting not only because it sheds light on the dialectical nature of theory formation, subject as it must be to both social and political pressures, as well as to the demands made upon its explanatory potential by other theories with which it must compete. In many respects, in the most advanced industrial states of the West, Durkheim and Bouglé have been prophets. For while, in a narrower sense, their efforts during their own lifetime were thwarted, the modern pluralist state conforms far more to their model than did the political societies they knew. We would be less than honest, however, if we did not also admit that pluralism has not always been accompanied by a social morale in the sense in which they both understood it. Some contemporary states have rejected the possibility that a society can exist which is both liberal and at the same time consecrates the individual potential of all of its citizens. They have sacrificed both the autonomy and

privacy of the individual, even though, in some senses, they have emphasized the self-development of all members of the society by removing obstacles formerly imposed by a hierarchical social, economic and political system. Perhaps the urgency of the task of industrialization played a large part in the choice of this path. However, the Durkheimian analysis would suggest that, just as pluralist societies have achieved only a partially satisfactory synthesis of individual autonomy, on the one hand, and a solidarity which consecrates equality in self-development on the other, so the Communist states have moved only part of the way toward organic solidarity. They must necessarily undergo increasing pressures which stress what Lukes has defined as "self-determined choosing" and "freedom from interference."²⁵ The price of the failure of either of these versions of the modern industrial state to heed the "cries of pain" or to avoid becoming immobilized in one of the morbid forms which Durkheim identified, can only lead to revolution.

Both Durkheim and Bouglé contributed much to the analysis of human society caught up in the difficulties of transformation from an agricultural base to one in which industrial productivity is the essential economic

characteristic. Bouglé's work focused largely on the problem of preserving and expanding the area of the freedom of all the members of the society within the modern social and economic context. To do so, it was necessary to reject the idealist foundation on which liberal theory had been built, and to reconstruct it on a sounder methodological base. Ultimately modern society, in its political, economic and social structures must be congruent with those emerging values and attitudes which dignify the individual. The essence of such a societal morale was expressed by Bouglé:

The only basis for unity today which is desirable or tolerable is that which accepts variety, which welcomes liberties: all affirmations whose common postulate is that today there is no value superior to the rights of the person, and that, whatever the cost, society must make whatever arrangements are necessary to assure that everyone can find his own path, fulfill his own potential, and test his ideas.²⁶

Durkheim and Bouglé provided not only a method of analysis. They also provided a warning that both liberty and equality depend, in the final analysis, not only on constitutions and political institutions, but on the active promotion of a social solidarity which consecrates the individual and provides the constraints necessary to make both liberty and equality meaningful.

CHAPTER XI

FOOTNOTES

¹Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York, 1963), p. 90.

²Edward Shils, "The Concept of Ideology," in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, David L. Sills, ed. (New York, 1968), Vol. VII, p. 69.

³Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, 1960), p. 173.

⁴David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965), p. 290.

⁵Clark, p. 222.

⁶See Chapter I, fn. 41.

⁷Clark, p. 222.

⁸Ibid., p. 219.

⁹Ibid., pp. 229-34.

¹⁰Emile Durkheim, "Labriola, Antonio, Essais sur la Conception matérialiste de l'histoire," RP, XLIV, p. 648.

¹¹Georges Kagan, "Durkheim et Marx," Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 235.

¹²Durkheim, "Labriola, Antonio, Essais," p. 651.

¹³Durkheim, 1902a, pp. 253, 372.

¹⁴Friedrich Engels, Letter to Franz Mehring, in Lewis Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels (New York, 1959), pp. 407-8.

¹⁵Armand Cuvillier, "Durkheim et Marx," in Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, Cahier IV, 1948, p. 83.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁷Emile Durkheim, "De la Position de l'économie politique dans l'ensemble des sciences sociales," in Journal des Economistes (April 1908), p. 115.

¹⁸Durkheim, 1895a, pp. 112-13.

¹⁹Kagan, p. 238.

²⁰Bouglé, 1935d, p. 6.

²¹Ibid., p. 5.

²²Ibid., p. 11.

²³Ibid., p. 63.

²⁴Kagan, p. 237.

²⁵Lukes, Individualism, p. 127.

²⁶Bouglé, 1905f, p. 587.

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