

GRENADA REVOLUTION: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN A  
COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

By

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

2011

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This Manuscript has been read and accepted for the  
Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction  
of the dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## Abstract

# GRENADA REVOLUTION: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN A COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

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This is a study of how decision – makers in dependent states perceive their environment, and formulate policies and specific decisions to suit.

My research focuses on Grenada, one of the smallest states, which experienced a socialist revolution between 1979 and 1983. Foreign policy decisions were made at the time within a very constrained (Cold War) international environment. I propose to analyze the Grenada experience in foreign policy decision-making, focusing primarily on two key variables: the role of perception and the constraints posed by dependence. Dependence is usually viewed as a relation between core and periphery states. I posit that dependence between two ‘southern’ states is also possible. In this context, Grenada, during the period of its revolution, exchanged dependence on the United States for dependence on Cuba. Therefore, among other things, I am interested in determining if, and how Grenada elites were influenced in their decision-making by this type of periphery-periphery dependence. In terms of perception, I am interested in ascertaining how Grenadian decision-makers came to form a negative perception of the United States and positive perceptions of Cuba, and therefore framed their decisions in a particular way.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study owes a depth of gratitude to many persons whose wealth of information about the Grenada Revolution, and whose constructive criticisms contributed immeasurably to my effort to analyze the foreign policy of the Grenada Revolution.

Thanks are due to Professor Basil Wilson who advised me to write on the foreign policy of the Revolution, rather than concentrating on the American invasion of Grenada, as was my original intention. I am further appreciative of his many sophisticated contributions to my analysis of a foreign policy which lasted a mere fifty-five months. To Professor Sherrie Baver who graciously consented to be a member of my dissertation defense committee, on a very short notice, I offer my sincere appreciation and gratitude.

Don Rojas, who was the press secretary of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, met with me on several occasions and provided me with a wealth of information.

Thanks! Don for allowing me to call you as frequently as I did.

I wish to thank the many persons whom I interviewed in Grenada, through the instrumentality of Ferron Lowe. Prominent among these respondents were: Hudson

Austin, Sir Nicholas Brathwaite, George Brizan, Bernard Coard, Chris DeRiggs, Chester Humphrey, Dr. Terrence Maryshow,

Kendrik Radix, and Sir Paul Scoon. In Jamaica the following professors at the University of the West Indies at Mona, deserve my heartfelt gratitude: Brian Meeks, Rupert Lewis, Clermont Kirton, Trevor Monroe, and especially Anthony Harriott, to whom I turned frequently for information and analysis. I am likewise appreciative of the support which I received from the staff of the West Indies section of the University's main library.

Thank you Phyllis Coard for your kind input, which provided another side of the Grenada story as it relates to the foreign policy of the revolution. Richard Hart, who served as the Attorney General of the Revolution was gracious and informative. I tender him my deep thanks and appreciation.

I wish to thank Professor Braveboy-Wagner who was my mentor for the greater part of the journey toward my doctorate.

My deepest gratitude is owed to Professor I. Leonard Markovitz, without whose instrumentality, and willingness to defend a just cause, the successful closure of my doctoral odyssey might have been further delayed. I am also profoundly grateful for his thorough critique of my work, enabling me in the process to sharpen my perspective of many issues related to this study.

My friend, Neil Seaton was of great help to me during my research in Jamaica. I take this opportunity to thank him and his lovely wife Marcia for their kind and boundless hospitality.

To my sister Veronica, thank you for your kindness and many months of generous board and lodging while I conducted research at the University of the West Indies at Mona. Thanks are also due to my friend Anthony Rutherford with whom I share a background in International Affairs, and who provided wise counsel and encouragement relevant to this study. To our mutual friend Winston Searchwell, I tender my sincere gratitude for always being willing to help me with my many computer related problems.

The late George Louison, in his capacity as the former foreign policy advisor to Maurice Bishop, helped me considerably, although he passed away a few days before we would have completed the third of our overseas interview.

Finally, I wish to thank my former wife, Jeannette, my son Peter, my daughters Marie, Tatiana, and Natasha, and my grandchildren, Tasia, Jelani, Jelese, and Jhane for their kindness and understanding, as I endeavored to cope with the exigencies of a doctoral program. They have already begun to ask, “What will be the next project?”

I wish to dedicate this dissertation to my beloved father, Charles Solomon Da Costa, whose love has been my greatest source of sustenance.

## PREFACE

The March 13, 1979 upheaval which deposed the autocratic regime of Grenadian Prime Minister Eric Gairy, was undoubtedly, at that time, the most dramatic event in the political history of the Eastern Caribbean. In addition to being only the third successful revolution in the region,<sup>1</sup> the Grenada Revolution was the first, and only extra – legal transfer of power in the entire Anglophone Caribbean.

The fact that a small group of educated middle class Grenadians rejected the Westminster model in favor of a revolutionary modality of change, sent shockwaves throughout the region, where proximate states feared that dissident groups within their borders would be emboldened to copy the Grenadian example. Equally alarming was the decision of the revolutionary elite to delink from the United States and align ideologically and diplomatically with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The seriousness of this bold decision is best appreciated when seen in the context of the renewed Cold War between Moscow and Washington.

This demarche on the part of the Grenadian revolutionaries constituted an affront to United States hegemony in the Caribbean, and posed the first challenge to the Johnson Doctrine, which explicitly states that: “the American nations, cannot, must

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<sup>1</sup> The other two were the Haitian Revolution, 1804, and the Cuban Revolution, 1959.

not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere.”<sup>1</sup>

Deprived of needed British, Canadian, and United States economic and military assistance, Grenada turned to Cuba and found in Fidel Castro a willing and dependable patron, albeit one, who given the depth of Cuba’s dependence on Moscow, could not provide an adequate amount of consumer goods, thus Grenada was obliged to retain its ties with non-socialist sources.

The Grenada Revolution, which lasted for four years and seven months, suffered a tragic demise on October 25, 1983. Much controversy surrounds its self-destruction, but the most plausible explanation is that it was caused by a conflict of personalities, involving the popular charismatic Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, and his unpopular, but efficient Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. Some writers,<sup>2</sup> and a few of my respondents<sup>3</sup> maintain that the Revolution collapsed as a consequence of the machinations of Coard, and a cabal of his dedicated followers, drawn from within the Central Committee, one of the two branches of the legislature of the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG). This view, and other

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<sup>1</sup> President Linden B. Johnson’s speech cited in Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean. London: Latin American Bureau. 1982, p. 64.

<sup>2</sup> See Steve Clark. “The Second Assassination of Maurice Bishop.” New Internationalist. Vol. 6, 1984, pp. 11-90; see also Gordon K. Lewis, Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled. Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

<sup>3</sup> Foremost among these were Don Rojas, Bishop’s press secretary, George Louison, foreign policy adviser to Bishop, and Kendrick Radix, former law partner of Bishop.

analyses of the Revolution's untimely demise are presented in the penultimate chapter of this study.

All the major players involved in the Revolution have left the stage. The Soviet Union is defunct, the Cold War is in remission, and Grenada has returned to its element of obscurity. Why then a concern with the foreign policy of the Revolution? The answer, though seemingly simple, is nonetheless profound. In the first place, there is a need to include the foreign policy of micro- states in the focus of sophisticated scholarship. Secondly, the Grenada revolutionary experience offers important caveats for decision – makers of small states in the Caribbean, as they endeavor to navigate the perilous strait between the Scylla of dependence and the Charybdis of United States hegemony.

The research of this study was costly, interesting, and at times unrewarding.

Three days were spent at the National Archives on the campus of the University of Maryland, sifting through hundreds of documents, with the view to discovering some unpublished data relevant to this dissertation.

The trove of documents, widely publicized in the media, comprised of many manuals in English, German, and Czech, occasional love letters and other private correspondence addressed to Maurice Bishop, and information which is more easily available in the compendia released almost two decades ago by the joint endeavor of the United States Departments of State and Defense.

The West Indies section of the Main Library of the University of the West Indies, at Mona, Jamaica has a good collection of books, pamphlets, and other data relative to the revolution; by contrast, very little data on the revolution are available in Grenada, for obvious reasons. This situation will change if the United States honors its pledge to return the documents which were removed from Grenada shortly after the invasion.

A total of twenty respondents were interviewed in connection with this dissertation:<sup>1</sup> ten were interviewed in Grenada; five at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica; one in New York City, one by overseas telephone, and two in Kingston. Included in these numbers are six former members of the Central Committee, two former prime ministers, five professors, four of whom are former members of the Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), a Marxist organization, now defunct, a press secretary of Bishop, the attorney General of the revolution, and the Governor General of Grenada.<sup>2</sup>

My interviews began at the main prison in St. George's where, thanks to the instrumentality of Ferron Lowe, a pro -Coard barrister, permission was obtained to interview Coard and Hudson Austin, but for a restricted period of forty-nine minutes. Coard was affable, sophisticated, and rather loquacious. Before we could

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 2 for questionnaire

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 3 for names of all respondents

get to the topic of foreign policy the time had expired, and our importunity notwithstanding, the guard refused to grant even another five minutes.

Some of the respondents who were former members of the Central Committee gave frank responses on condition that no attribution be made to them; some few, who like Nicodemus in his visit to Jesus, came under the cover of darkness, were laconic in their responses, and manifested selective amnesia.

George Brizan, historian, former prime minister, and former member of the NJM, was forthright and informative; so too was Sir Nicholas Brathwaite, who was the prime minister who commuted the death sentences of Coard and his colleagues, to life imprisonment. Brizan resigned quite early from the NJM because he was not in concert with the communist trajectory of the party and the arbitrary arrests and brutality meted out to many people.

The respondents at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, were knowledgeable, frank, and obliging. Their input was particularly helpful in the writing of the operational codes of Bishop and Coard.

Phyllis Coard was an informative respondent who had spent approximately seventeen years in prison, along with her husband and his colleagues, all of whom were accused of the assassination of Bishop and five members of his cabinet.

Phyllis, a Jamaican, was released earlier than the rest because of compassionate

circumstances. Under the conditions of her release, no ascriptions could be made to her political statements. That condition no longer persists.

My longest interview was with George Louison, the foreign policy advisor to Maurice Bishop, and one of his most trusted supporters. Our two interviews were by overseas telephone. By prior agreement, the discussion of Grenada's foreign policy was scheduled for the third and last session, when, hopefully, he would have been in better health; on the day of the third interview, his secretary telephoned, tearfully informing me that he had just expired.

### **The Bishop-Coard Enigma**

Invariably, the interviews would result in some discussion of the enigma of Bishop's apparent cognitive inconsistency and Coard's seemingly insatiable lust for power. Respondents such as Sir Nicholas Brathwaite, George Brizan, Anthony Harriott, Brian Meeks, and Clermont Kirton gave what seemed an unbiased assessment of the characters of both the prime minister and his deputy. The most vitriolic anti-Coard responses came from Kendrik Radix, one of Bishop's earliest supporters to be expelled by Coard from the Politburo and the Central Committee. To appreciate Radix' posture, one ought to begin with the formation in 1975 of a Marxist study group called the Organization of Revolutionary Education and Liberation. Comprised for the most part by sixth form graduates of two of Grenada's most prestigious schools, this organization, more popularly known by

the acronym, OREL, had as its mentor, Bernard Coard, who, though residing in Trinidad, maintained close contact with this group.

In 1976, OREL joined the NJM en masse. Noting that this group represented a party within a party, and that, moreover, it displayed a loyalty to Coard alone, Radix, denounced its factionalism and demanded that it be disbanded. and that Coard be dismissed from the party. But Bishop intervened on Coard's behalf, and he was allowed to remain in the NJM with the proviso that OREL be disbanded; Coard agreed to that condition, but never got rid of the group. The members of OREL went on to become the Orwellian pups of Coard's "*Animal Farm*."

As mentioned in ensuing chapters, Bishop allowed Coard to displace some of his most loyal supporters without coming to their rescue. He further acquiesced to decisions Coard made while he, Bishop, was absent from the country. One of these was support for Moscow on the Afghanistan vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations; another was a substantial raise in salary of the Revolution's armed forces, during Bishop's absence from Grenada. In addition to Radix, Coard masterminded the removal of Vincent Noel, a pro-Bishop member of the Politburo and the Central Committee, and Don Rojas as editor of the *Free West Indian*. Rojas later became Bishop's Press secretary; Noel was one of the five cabinet members who were massacred with Bishop.

No psychological study has been made of Bishop's willingness to abandon supporters, and to ignore warnings from friends and relatives alike that Coard and OREL were embarked on a scheme to depose him; such a study awaits what promises to be a revealing dissertation.

Coard's compulsive character has been addressed by many analysts of the failure of the Grenada revolution. Jorge Heine is one of those scholars and he asks, *inter alia*:

Why would the man whose highly effective economic management was gaining increasing respect throughout the Eastern Caribbean and in international development circles not be content with lifting the island out of underdevelopment, working together in a seemingly unbeatable team he built with Maurice Bishop?"<sup>1</sup>

Even more poignant is Heine's query about Coard's ingratitude:

Why would he do this to a friend of twenty years, a man who had been his political mentor, had given major responsibilities for party work even before Coard formally joined the NJM, brought him from Trinidad to run for Parliament, and who stood up for Coard through all these years?<sup>2</sup>

Here again is a member of the Revolution whose political character awaits the study of political psychology. Perhaps the adage that there is no permanent love or

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<sup>1</sup> See Jorge Heine. "The Hero and the Apparatchik," in Jorge Heine, ed. A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1990, pp.217-256.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p.234.

lasting hate holds true in this case. What is certain, however, is that Bishop' opened the door for Coard to exercise his passion for power.

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## Overview of Chapters

This study consists of seven chapters. **Chapter One** defines the chief theoretical strategies that serve as the underpinnings of this research. Drawing on a wealth of perceptual literature, I accept the proposition that to understand the external behavior of a nation, one must perforce analyze the perceptions that the foreign policy decision – makers hold of their internal and external environments, as well as of their counterparts in the international arena. One might therefore agree with the postulate that the foreign policy of a state is consistent with the weltanschauung of its decision- makers. In this context, the works of Harold and Margaret Sprout, Richard Snyder, Michael Brecher, Kenneth Boulding, W. Ofuatey Kodjoe, and Robert Jervis are particularly instructive, and are cited frequently in this study. The second of the two major foci of this chapter is the role of dependence in the foreign policy decision – making of small states which are encumbered by immutable handicaps. This chapter is therefore relevant to the case of Grenada, a prototypical micro-state, devoid of any substantive natural resources. Chapter One would be incomplete without some discussion of the dynamics of revolution, and the relativity of geopolitics to an understanding of the PRG’s relations with the United States. Accordingly, the final paragraphs of the chapter will place both features in proper perspective.

**Chapter Two** discusses the antecedents to the Grenada Revolution, which, as mentioned earlier, was a discrete phenomenon in the political environment of Anglophone Caribbean. The chapter begins with a focus on the colonial heritage of the Grenadian people, who have manifested deep pride and resilience in the face of slavery, mercantilism, and other injustices of metropolitan rule. The historical continuum from colonialism to revolution is replete with accounts of Uriah Butler and Theophilous Marrayshow, whose advocacy for fair wages and civil liberties is known throughout the West Indies. These two men, particularly Marrayshow, served as role models for Eric Mathew Gairy, arguably the most controversial figure in Grenadian history.

Before Gairy's name became a synonym of brutality and corruption, he was revered as a man of the people, who was instrumental in getting Whitehall to grant Grenada universal suffrage, modicum of constitutional development, and eventually full independence. Then came his **volte face**: he became the personification of Lord Acton's dictum: "All power corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." In that capacity, Gairy used his notorious "Mongoose Gang," the Grenadian equivalent of Haiti's "Tontons Macoute," to terrorize his people, harass the political opposition, and vitiate the social and constitutional gains he had fought so hard to achieve. Although Gairy retained the basic institutions of the

Westminster system, he repeatedly contravened them, rendering them ineffectual for the most part.

This was the matrix out of which the Bishop – led New Jewel Movement (NJM) evolved to challenge, and eventually overthrew the Gairy regime.

The victorious NJM chose Bishop as its leader and Coard as his deputy, and promised the Grenadian citizenry to restore the principles of democracy, and provide a better life for all. But as this chapter explains, the NJM’s route to power was frightening to its neighbors, and its decision to seek aid from Cuba put it at variance with the United States, the hegemon of the North.

The NJM and its progeny, the PRG, chose to operate as crypto-Marxist/Leninists so as not to antagonize potential donors, or the local population, to whom communism was anathema. But as the rhetoric with Washington became more intemperate, and relations with Cuba grew, patently close, Bishop, in his “Line of March” address, announced that the revolution was embarked on a Leninist trajectory.

**Chapter Three** addresses the role of Grenada’s dependence on Cuba as an independent variable of the Revolution’s foreign policy decision-making. In this endeavor, I will employ the dynamics of quantitative content analysis of Bishop’s speeches, and a concise analysis of his operational code, and that of his deputy, Bernard Coard.

Borrowing from the constructive approach, as it relates to shared ideas, I will seek to determine if foreign policy decision-making in revolutionary Grenada was influenced by both material and ideational dependence on Cuba. Using the relevant literature on Caribbean dependence, it will be postulated that there is an enduring linkage between the traditional plantation economy and Grenada's immutable constraints of small size and paucity of natural resources.

Chapter Three also notes that by 1981, the second year of the revolution, religious and other groups began to articulate some measure of dissatisfaction with the PRG. Bishop was not affected by this development; his charisma was still recognized; so too was his near indispensability to the revolution. But the revolution saw the handwriting on the wall, and turned to Cuba for advice.

Grenada's decision to allow Cuba to build the Point Salines International Airport (PSIA) was the main source of Washington's unrelenting hostility to the revolution. **Chapter Four** places the airport in geopolitical context, indicating Grenada's proximity to Trinidadian, Aruban, and Venezuelan oil facilities. It also notes that Grenada lies athwart one of the region's most strategic sea lanes, therefore, the United States could not view with equanimity, the existence of a pro-Soviet regime in Grenada.

Although cogent arguments were offered by British, Finnish, and American firms<sup>1</sup> in support of the civilian purpose of the airport, the Reagan White House steadfastly maintained that it was another manifestation of Soviet penetration of the Caribbean, and accused Cuba and Grenada for being participants in that scheme. Ironically, shortly after the invasion of Grenada, Washington spent several million dollars to complete the project.

The likelihood of Grenada – based jets destroying oil facilities in the above mentioned countries, or posing a danger to tankers using sea lanes adjacent to Grenada was not imminent, as Reagan would have Americans believe, given the United States ability to obliterate the airport, and the grim consequences which it would entail for Cuba. There was, however, a need to deny Cuba the use of the airport to ferry troops to and from Angola, and other parts of Africa, and to prevent the Soviets from using it to refuel its reconnaissance aircraft in the Southern Caribbean.

**Chapter Five.** The second of the two most controversial decisions by the PRG occurred in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. **Chapter Five** traces the genesis of the invasion and comments at length on the implications which Grenada's support for the Soviets at the United Nations held for the revolution.

Three points warrant special consideration: (1) Cuba's advice to Maurice Bishop to

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<sup>1</sup> This refers to firms from the United Kingdom, Finland and Florida which were contracted to construct some of the sections of the Point Salines International Airport

abstain in the General Assembly's deliberation on the Afghanistan invasion, rather than vote in favor of the Soviets. This advice underscores the fact that Grenada's dependence on Cuba was not only military and economic, but ideational as well. Cuba was an experienced player in international politics; conversely, Grenada was a neophyte. (2) The second point relates to the misconception that all PRG foreign policy decisions were reached on a principle of "groupthink," which is explained at length in Chapter One.

Bernard Coard, known for his pro-Soviet predilection, convinced a slim majority in the Central Committee, during Bishop's absence from Grenada, to undo Bishop's decision to accept Castro's advice, and vote instead with the Russians. Here was an opportunity for Bishop to censure his deputy for having usurped his authority. But Bishop lacked the requisite fortitude; he acquiesced **ex post facto** to Coard's decision, thereby presenting a united front, a move consistent with his **modus operandi**.

**Chapter Six.** Nineteen seventy-nine was not a good year for the Carter White House. The year began with Cuba's celebration of the twentieth anniversary of its revolution, then the rise of a Marxist government in Grenada, followed by the Sandanista overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the fall of the Romero government in El Salvador, and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran. All of the

deposed leaders were friends of the United States, and in the Americas, their successors were pro-Cuban Marxists.

**Chapter Six** discusses at length the stormy relations between the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada, and the Government of the United States. The mutuality of misperception between both states sprung from two major sources: the New Jewel Movement's Marxist/Leninist predilection, and its close embrace of Fidel Castro. These decisions, seen in the context of the renewed Cold War between Washington and Moscow, were crisis generating, and betrayed a failure on the part of Grenada to properly assess the situation.

The chapter ends with the self-destruction of the revolution, not long after Bishop, on Castro's advice, had visited Washington, with the hope of affecting some measure of rapprochement with the Reagan administration. The failure of Bishop's mission tolled the knell of the revolution, but not before some members blamed Cuba, the revolution's benefactor, for conspiring with Bishop to eliminate Coard and his cohorts.

**Chapter Seven** offers a brief assessment of the fifty-five months of the revolution's existence, with particular analysis of the roles which perception, dependence, geopolitics, and the vagaries of the Cold War played in the success and failure of Grenada's foreign policy.

## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction

Grenada is a very small island of approximately 133 square miles located in the Windward Islands chain of the Eastern Caribbean. Geographically, economically, and demographically Grenada is the prototype of a microstate.

In 1979, at the height of the renewed Cold War, Grenada experienced an almost bloodless coup, which in addition to its uniqueness in the political history of Anglophone Caribbean, polarized Grenada's relations with her neighbors, and particularly with the United States.

Hitherto a quasi-unknown entity, Grenada came to world attention during this time because it sought to delink from the United States, already preoccupied with strategic exigencies in Cuba and Central America, and to ally itself closely with Cuba. Washington's reaction to this demarche was not one of posturing; Grenada would be informed outright that the United States was not prepared to view with equanimity such a development in the Caribbean.

Certain key decisions were made by the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) during its tenure – 1979-1983; two salient ones have been selected:

1. Support of the Soviet Union in the United Nations on the Afghanistan Question; a decision which incensed the United States and formally allied Grenada with Cuba and the Eastern bloc.

2. Decision to allow Cuba to build an airport in Grenada. This decision became the focal point of United States antagonism towards the PRG. Focus on the two pivotal decisions which I have chosen, is important to my research because they alienated the United States and the conservative states of Anglophone Caribbean and cemented relations between the PRG and Cuba, and to a lesser degree, the Soviet Union. They are therefore, good illustrations of how the PRG decision-makers perceived the situation.

This dissertation seeks to determine what factors motivated Grenada's decision-makers to go against the United States on which they were heretofore dependent. It is particularly concerned with analyzing the theory that they misperceived international constraints, became too dependent on Cuba, and as a result, they adopted certain Cuban views, which exacerbated their conflict with the United States, and ultimately resulted in the demise of the revolution.

## JUSTIFICATION FOR RESEARCH

### The importance of the Proposed Research

There are many reasons why this study is important. Although the emergence and demise of the Grenada Revolution have been researched profusely, few systemic attempts have been made to analyze the Revolution from the perspective of foreign policy decision-making. This research, therefore, constitutes an endeavor to

address that inadequacy. Additionally, this case study was chosen because of the dearth of literature on the formulation of foreign policy in the Anglophone Caribbean.

Most foreign policy studies focus on large states. There is therefore a need, acknowledged by Korany (1976) and Braveboy-Wagner (1989), among others, to redress this imbalance. In this context, I disagree with Rothstein's hypothesis that "Very small states are nothing more than or different from large states writ small" (1968:20). Some scholars (Reid, 1974; Braveboy-Wagner, 1983, 2000b; 2004a; East, 1973; Hey 2003, and Clarke and Payne, 1987, among others, have observed that foreign policy making in very small states is encumbered by the overarching problems of economic dependence and insecurity within and without. Braveboy-Wagner suggests that other constraining factors warrant consideration. Prominent among these are:

- the scarcity of resources for diplomacy;
- governmental inexperience;
- heavy reliance on multi-lateral institutions, and
- the paramount influence of one person on foreign policy decision-making.

Although Grenada is the focus of this research, its revolutionary experience hold serious implications for many political entities with which it shares common economic and military vulnerabilities. Accordingly, it would be hazardous for small states to operate on the assumption that because of the demise of the Cold

War, a repetition of the Grenada experience is highly unlikely. Finally, this study will corroborate the proposition that the perceptions decision-makers hold of the situation are crucial to the analysis of the foreign policy decisions nations make. In other words, cognition is quite often preferable over rational approaches

### **METHODOLOGY**

The research design of this study is based on the postulate that the foreign policy behavior of a state is predicated on the decision makers' perceptions of the national objectives and capabilities, as well as international constraints and opportunities.

This study, therefore, hypothesizes that:

Grenada's foreign policy was predicated upon dependence on Cuba, stemming from the personal affinity and ideological preferences of the decision-makers, and the exigencies of economic and military needs.

This hypothesis will be tested by using the data collected from primary and secondary sources, as well as information gathered from interviews with decision makers, most of whom, having regard for changed political and socio-economic circumstances, have requested that no attribution of statements be made to them; the writer has pledged to honor their requests, and in a few cases will cite their contributed information as "confidential interview."

The identification of the key decision-makers was done by utilizing a two-step positional-reputational method.<sup>1</sup> The first step involved the identification of those who participate in top-level national policy decisions of the PRG. This group comprised the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and five other members of the Revolution's Politburo.<sup>2</sup> Subsequent to the identification of these individuals, initial contact was made by telephone to arrange the necessary interviews, which entailed my making two visits to Grenada, and others to Jamaica. On rare occasions, interviews were conducted by over seas telephone.

The second step entailed the verification of those individuals who also participated in top-level decision-making on the basis of reputation rather than institutional qualifications. During the course of the interview, each respondent was requested to name 4 to 5 persons who participated in the decision-making process. The persons named did not necessarily have to be members of the government; they would be deemed a part of the decision-making process if two or more persons nominated them. Utilizing this procedure, some of fourteen persons were identified; nine of these were actually interviewed in person or by telephone.

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<sup>1</sup> This is similar to the methods used by Wendell Bell and J. Williams Gibson, Jr. "Independent Jamaica Faces the outside World." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 22, no. 1, March 1978; also P.J. McGowan and H.B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973.

<sup>2</sup> The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were massacred on November 19, 1983; I did interview the Deputy Prime Minister, Bernard Coard, who has been imprisoned for the past twenty-four years for his alleged participation in the deaths of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and many others.

Following the identification of the key foreign policy decision-makers, an endeavor will be made to ascertain their perceptions of the internal and external environments, and the constraints posed by dependence, when they made those decisions.

### Review of Literature and Theoretical Framework for the Making of Foreign Policy

This study will analyze the foreign policy of the Grenada Revolution by using the decision-making approach, which as a method of analysis, has its origin in the pioneering work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962), Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the study of International Politics<sup>1</sup>. These theorists maintain that “those who study international politics are mainly concerned with the actions, reactions, and interactions among political entities called national states.”<sup>2</sup> Snyder explains that states are the official decision-makers whose authoritative acts are acts of state, thus to understand why a state behaves the way it does, one needs to focus on the manner in which the decision-makers, in their capacity as actors define the “situation.” Accordingly, Snyder places a premium on the study of the actors’ perceptions, choices, and their expectations.

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<sup>1</sup> Snyder, Richard C., H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 60

Before proceeding, the explication of three definitions is in order: that of decision-making, that of perception, and that of “situation.” Decision-making is defined by Snyder as “a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematic affairs envisaged by the decision-makers.”<sup>1</sup> Expressed succinctly, decision-making is concerned with choices made as a consequence of the perceptions of those who are authorized to make decisions on behalf of the state.

Flowing from this hypothesis is the crucial need of the researcher to identify not only the decision-makers, but to carefully analyze their operational codes, as this study will do, with respect to the foreign policy decision-makers of the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada.

Cognitively, perception refers to the psychological process whereby individuals relate to their environment. Marshall Singer (1972:8-9) opines that “How an individual perceives his environment will determine how he evaluates, organizes, and reacts to stimuli emanating there from.”<sup>2</sup> This maxim applies equally to decision-makers, who, according to Snyder, act upon what they “see.” Another theorist postulates that “Although we can speak of a number of structural and

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p.90

<sup>2</sup> Singer, Marshall R. 1972 , *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships*, New York: The Free Press.

situational factors that influence foreign policy choices, ultimately these choices are made on the basis of what is perceived by those in position of authority”<sup>1</sup>

“Situation” is the designation of an analytical concept that the eclectically disposed Snyder borrowed from the American sociologist, W.I. Thomas, and made an important addition to the lexicon of international politics. The term relates essentially to “a pattern of relationships among events, objects, conditions, and other actors organized around a focus which is the center of interest for the decision-makers” and hence for the observer). This approach is encapsulated in the ‘Thomas theorem,’ which maintains that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Thus, it is a truism that decision-makers respond to situations, not necessarily as they are, but on the basis of how they perceive their psychological environment. It is within the ambit of these theoretical perspectives that I will locate the essence of how and why the Grenada decision-making elite made certain foreign policy choices.

Many leading scholars have offered varying approaches to the analysis of foreign policy decision-making. Most of these accept the primacy of the study of the decision-making environment as well as the background of the decision-makers and the motivation for their choices. Chief among these studies is the already

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<sup>1</sup> . Singer, Marshall R. 1972 , Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships, New York: The Free Press.

mentioned seminal opus of Richard Snyder, et al.(1962).<sup>1</sup> This study, which was influenced by the writing of Harold and Margaret Sprout,<sup>2</sup> and Alexander George,<sup>3</sup> has been enhanced by Brecher et al.,<sup>4</sup> Lloyd Jensen, and refined by Ofuatey-Kodjoe.<sup>5</sup>

The *raison d'être* of the Snyder study was not the formulation of a grand theory of international politics; the team was convinced that it would augur favorably for the analysis of international politics, were the analysis focused in part “on the behavior of those whose action is the action of the state, namely, the decision-makers” It is implied, therefore, that the centrality of the status of the decision-makers would facilitate the understanding of state action whose matrix is embodied in how decision-makers define the situation. Snyder has offered a typology of situation which merits replication at this point, and which bears important relevance to my study of the foreign policy decision-making of the Grenada Revolution:

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<sup>1</sup> Snyder, et al., Op. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Harold and Margaret Sprout. The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> George, Alexander, 1969. “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making” International Studies Quarterly, 13 (2) pp. 190-222.

<sup>4</sup> Brecher, Michael, B. Steinberg, and J. Stein, 1969. “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 13(1): 75-102.

<sup>5</sup> Kodjoe, W. Ofuatey. 1985. Elites and Foreign Policy: A Political Economic Approach: The Case of Ghana from 1972-1978. Unpublished manuscript

1. Structural vs. unstructured situations – pointing to the relative degree of ambiguity and stability, a situation for which the decision-makers find it difficult to establish meaning may be characterized by change as well as intrinsic obscurity.
2. Situations having different degrees of required ness – that is, the amount of pressure to act and its source (from within the decisional system or from the setting).
3. The cruciality of situations and their relatedness to, and importance for the basic purposes of the decision makers.
4. Kinds of affect with which the situation is endowed by the decision-makers –threatening, hostile, avoidance, inducing, favorable, unfavorable, and so on
5. How the problem is interpreted and how its major functional characteristic is assigned – political, moral, economic, military, or a combination of these.
6. The time dimension – the degree of performance attributed to various situations.
7. The degree to which objective factors impose themselves on the decision –makers – the number of uncontrollable factors and imponderables. <sup>1</sup>

Snyder and his associates affirm that foreign policy behavior evolves as a consequence of a decision-making process in which a strategy is selected by the decision-makers consistent with their perception of the goals that they aspire to achieve. They further state that the decision-making process is influenced by stimuli emanating from sources: (1) internal setting; and (2) external settings.<sup>2</sup>

Thus in order to explain the actions of state officials, one must perforce focus on how factors located in both internal and external settings make an impact on the decision-making process to produce the actions.

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<sup>1</sup> Snyder, op. cit., pp. 71-72

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp. 60-64

Among the many advantages in the Snyder model, two are particularly important. In the first place, it enables the foreign policy researcher to operationalize foreign policy behavior as the outcome of the decision –makers’ definition of the situation. Secondly, Snyder elucidates the relevance of domestic, external, and operational variables as sources of foreign policy behavior by virtue of the manner in which they affect the decision process.

Its innovative advantages notwithstanding, the Snyder model was not without some measure of analytical flaws and consequent criticisms. Herbert McClosky, while admitting that much of the model is praiseworthy, faults it none the less for being more taxonomic than theoretical and for imposing too heavy a requirement on the researcher. The model has also been critiqued by Rosenau,<sup>1</sup> Brecher,<sup>2</sup> Andriole et al.,<sup>3</sup> Kodjoe, and others, some of whom fault the Snyder model for the sheer number of internal and external variables that it incorporates, and for the authors’ “failure to show how the variables that they listed intermix to produce foreign policy outcome.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Rosenau, James N. 1971. *A Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*. New York: The Free Press.

<sup>2</sup> Brecher, *Op. cit.*,

<sup>3</sup> Andriole, Stephen, Johnathan Wilkenfield, and Gerald Hopple, “A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior,” *International Studies Quarterly* 19(12), 1975.

<sup>4</sup> Kodjoe. *Op. cit.*

The Snyder model and its modifications are especially suitable for the analysis of a small state like Grenada, where during the entirety of the Revolution there did not exist a legislature, *per se*, a legal opposition, a free press, or an established bureaucracy. It is important to note that four decades after its initial publication, the Snyder book was deemed important enough that it was reissued to the acclaim of many scholars who salute Snyder's foresight and eclectic scholarship.

Many of the theoretical attempts, subsequent to the publication of his classical study, can be viewed as efforts to add (as McClosky recommended) theoretical substance and clarity to Snyder's approach.<sup>1</sup> One of the most dynamic of these endeavors is a study by Michael Brecher, et al.<sup>2</sup>

The Brecher model is predicated on two basic propositions. The first proposition defines the foreign policy decision-making process as a conversion system embedded in an environment, comprising both national and international segments. The second proposition holds that whereas the actions of an actor are affected by the reality of the environment (his/her operational environment) within which the actor has to operate, the motivation for his/her actions is derived from the way the

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<sup>1</sup> Snyder, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Brecher, op. cit.

actor perceives and evaluates that environment (his/her psychological environment).

On the basis of these two propositions, Brecher envisages a foreign policy system having two major components: the operational environment, where foreign policy decisions are taken, and the psychological environment – the more important of the two – which is the decision – maker’s perception of his/her operational environment.

Brecher et al., define the Operational Environment as the venue in which foreign policy decisions are made, i.e. “a set of potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect a state’s external behavior.”<sup>1</sup> There are two components of this setting: the external components, which relate to conditions that exist outside the state, and internal components consisting of variables internal to the state. The external segment includes five sub-categories, namely: global, subordinate, subordinate other, bilateral, and dominant bilateral.<sup>2</sup> The data relevant to the external setting are classified into eight structural and four textural features.

Included in these features are all the attributes of the external setting that Brecher deems potentially relevant to foreign policy behavior, such as power stratification or the homogeneity of values. The internal setting is likewise divided into relevant

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid p. 81

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.82

variables: military capability, economic capability, political structure, interest group demands, and the demands of competing elites.

The Psychological Environment refers to the perception that decision-makers hold of their operational environment. It comprises the “attitudinal prism” and “elite images.” The attitudinal prism of the decision –maker is the composite of the psychological predispositions that create a perceptual screen or prism through which he/she perceives the external world. This prismatic content may derive from the ideology of the decision-maker or from the influence of personality factors. The “elite images” constitute the totality of cognitive, affective, and evaluative perceptions of the decision-makers environment. Thus, according to Brecher, the elite image “is the decisive input of a foreign policy system, because it is the elite image of the decision-maker’s environment that invariably influences his/her decisions.”<sup>1</sup>

Brecher is more successful than some of his fellow theorists in getting to the variables potentially relevant to foreign policy. Yet while he and his colleagues have a useful and impressive approach, they do not satisfactorily afford us a clear understanding of the actual dynamics of foreign policy. To assert that the source of foreign policy resides in the psychological environment of the decision- makers is to restate a generally accepted proposition. What is necessary, but not provided by

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid

Brecher's model, is a precise explanation of which elements within the decision – maker's psychological environment produce foreign policy. This of course, should be preceded by a lucid definition of foreign policy, thus enabling the researcher to deduce the various elements within the concept of foreign policy. Brecher's subsequent work, The Foreign Policy of Israel,<sup>1</sup> applies the model and is more satisfactory in this respect.

Kenneth Boulding, economist turned political scientist, notes that the behavior of complex political organizations is predicated on decisions that are made as a consequence of the decision-maker's image. Thus, how the decision-maker perceives his environment is more important than the environment *per se*,<sup>2</sup>

Building on Boulding's premises, Jervis examines the manner in which states can affect "images" others hold of them, and how these images are instrumental in achieving certain goals. Jervis postulates that states rely on images they have of another state to predict behavior, and demonstrates that the formation of images and their ultimate effect on interstate relations are an integral part of foreign policy making. He advises, however, "the images which a state holds of another are only one of the many elements that influence its foreign policy."<sup>3</sup> Jervis concedes in a

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<sup>1</sup> Brecher, Michael. The Foreign Policy of Israel

<sup>2</sup> Boulding, Kenneth. "National Images and International Systems," in James N. Rosenau, ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

<sup>3</sup> Jervis, Robert. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p.11.

later study “it is impossible to explain crucial decisions and foreign policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs and their images of others.”<sup>1</sup>

Jervis’ method of the analysis of decision-making is established on a framework that places the decision – makers’ perceptions of other nations and the world as an important intervening variable, between events (independent variable), and foreign policy decisions (dependent variable).

To enhance my framework of analysis, I will combine Jervis’ framework with that of Ofuatey-Kodjoe, who identifies perceptions of “influentials” as an independent variable, affecting decision-makers perceptions of other nations and the world as an important (intervening variable), and thus foreign policy decisions (dependent variable). This incorporated framework postulates a correlation among events as the independent variable, the perceptions of foreign policy elites as the intervening variable, and foreign policy outputs as the dependent variable.

Taking as a point of departure the fundamental precepts of the decision-making approach as it has been developed by Snyder, the Sprouts, Brecher, and others; Ofuatey-Kodjoe formulates a theoretical framework based on two principles: that the state as an international actor is comprised of individuals who are organized within an institutional framework, endeavoring to achieve particular objectives.

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<sup>1</sup> Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 28.

Secondly, Kodjoe echoes Snyder, Brecher, Boulding, and the Sprouts in asserting that “the actions of decision-makers are affected by the reality of the environment within which they have to operate (the operational environment), however, their motivations for the acts they try to perform are derived from the way they perceive and evaluate that environment (the psychological environment”).<sup>1</sup> By virtue of these principles, Kodjoe conceptualizes the phenomenon of foreign policy as the product of a Decision-Making System “Which receives inputs from the Psychological Environment of the decision-makers, converts them into decisional outputs which are then transmitted into the Operational Environment.”<sup>2</sup> On this basis, Kodjoe envisages the foreign policy system as possessing three fundamental components: the Decision – Making System, the Operational Environment, and the Psychological Environment.

The decision-making system is defined as being composed of a set of roles and organizations, which govern the process of foreign policy formulations and implementation. Included in this process are “the interactions between all persons, agencies, bureaus, and informal bodies who participate in the decision process from the initial gathering of information to the termination and evaluation of decisions.

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<sup>1</sup> Kodjoe, Op. Cit.

<sup>2</sup> Sprout and Sprout, op. cit

Although Kodjoe's discussion of the operational and psychological environments closely resembles those of Brecher, there are certain differences as well. The operational environment is defined by Kodjoe as "external setting, which exists outside the state. Decisions are implemented in this setting by using diplomatic, economic, and military instruments."<sup>1</sup> The other part of the operational environment is the internal setting, which encompasses all that exists and transpires within the state.

Kodjoe describes the psychological environment as the composite of the decision-makers' cognitive, effective and evaluative perceptions of their foreign policy environment. This is the source of all inputs into the decision-making process, since no factors can be considered as affecting the decision process unless they are filtered through the psychological environment of the decision-makers.

On the basis of Kodjoe's framework, one can realize that the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is dependent on "the flow of information from the psychological environment through the Decision Making System into the Operational Environment, then back into the Psychological Environment through a feedback process. It is further argued by Kodjoe that foreign policies are formulated and implemented within the decision Making System, based on how the decision-makers perceive the National interest, and then projected into the

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<sup>1</sup> Kodjoe op. cit.

Operational Environment by virtue of diplomatic, economic, and military actions. He writes that the “decision-makers’ perception of the National Interest is the outcome of their conceptions of national capabilities, national objectives and the constraints and opportunities that they face in the international arena.” This observation is particularly relevant to the Grenada experience, which is the focus of this study. Among the questions that it raises are: what were the Grenadian decision-makers’ conceptions of their capabilities and objectives? How, for instance, did they view them vis-à-vis other actors in the international system?<sup>1</sup> National interest, in the lexicon of international politics, is employed primarily as an analytical construct to identify the goals and objectives of a nation’s foreign policy. As such, its most celebrated exponent was Hans J. Morgenthau, who postulated polemically, that national interest defined in terms of power, constituted the prime motif of the external behavior of states.<sup>2</sup> Kodjoe defines the concept as “a notion in the minds of decision- makers of what they should do in the international arena in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives.”<sup>3</sup> Drawing upon this definition, he reasons that the perception of the National Interest resides in three prior perceptions: the nature of the foreign policy objectives that have to

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<sup>1</sup> Kodjoe. Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> See Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951.

<sup>3</sup> Kodjoe, op.cit

be achieved; the opportunities and constraints which confront decision-makers in the international arena; and the means they have at their disposal.


It is incumbent on decision-makers to determine, in the context of National interest, what are their cooperative needs and their security needs. The former relate to “types of cooperative activities that a country needs to engage in with potential partners in order to achieve its foreign policy;” the latter “denote perceptions of potential sources of external threats to National policy objectives, and what actions are needed to defend these objectives.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, pp. 39-40

CHART 1

Kodjoe's concept of The Psychological Environment as the source of Foreign Policy



Source: W. Ofori Kodjoe. Elites and Foreign Policy: A Political Economic Approach: The Case of Ghana From 1971-1978 Unpublished manuscript

Having acknowledged that the basis of national objectives resides in the decision-makers' conception of the internal and external needs of the state, it is then within their purview to determine the national objectives. Kodjoe conceives of national objectives as possessing three aspects: economic, security, and political; economic objectives generally include the acquisition of resources –human, financial, and material – from outside the state; security objectives relate to the securing of important 'core' values against potential outside threat, and political objectives, generally denote the acquisition and maintenance of influence capability in relation to other international actors.<sup>1</sup>

In the implementation of foreign policy, decision-makers select actions that are expected to facilitate, modify, or prevent future conditions in the international arena. According to Kodjoe, “their actions are predicated on their images of the conditions that prevail in the international setting. Of particular interest to decision-makers in this respect are possible obstacles that confront them in their attempt to achieve objectives.”<sup>2</sup>

Thus it is important that the decision-makers develop a keen awareness of the objectives and capabilities of other actors who participate in the international

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<sup>1</sup> Kodjoe, Op. cit. p.42.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.43

system, and by extension make estimates of potential sources of cooperation and antagonism.

On the basis of this theoretical perspective, this case study affirms that an important linkage exists between perception and national interest. Perception of the national interest represents the decision-makers' understanding of the objectives they are attempting to pursue, the systemic conditions under which they think they have to operate, and the capabilities they believe are available to them.

In the foregoing paragraphs it was shown that the Sprouts, Brecher, Snyder, Jensen, and Kodjoe share a consensus that the perception of the decision makers' is of paramount importance in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. This is true, whether the decision is reached by a group, or by a single person. I have likewise indicated that invariably decisions are made on the basis of the decision – makers' perception of the National Interest. This, however, needs some clarification. Why, for instance, is a given aspect of foreign policy executed in the name of national interest? In other words, is a particular interest “national” because it is so labeled? The answer to these questions is provided by O’Leary, who observes that, as is the case in domestic policy, “foreign policy produces private differential benefits to various individuals and groups within a national

society.”<sup>1</sup> In this context, it can be cogently argued that what decision-makers invariably adapt as “national objectives” are neither objective reality nor national, inasmuch as they do not reflect the welfare of the polity *per se*. Thus, occasionally, decisions made in the name of national interest are nothing but “the outcome of competing, sometimes coalescing and sometimes conflicting interests of different groups, especially elite groups within the society.”<sup>2</sup>

If national objectives emanate from elite interest as Kodjoe and others suggest, it becomes necessary for researchers to not only identify the decision makers who act authoritatively on behalf of the state, but to also identify those groups or individuals known as “influentials,” who are powerful enough to influence the decision-makers in a manner that their powerful interests are converted into national objectives through the process of authoritative decision-making.

### The Operational Code Syndrome

In the past four decades, a plethora of studies, subsumed under the rubric of “operational code,” has examined foreign policy decision-making from the psychological perspective. Coined by Robert Merton in 1940, the term

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<sup>1</sup> O’Leary, M. K. “Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Adaptation” in James R. Rosenau (ed.) Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods. New York: Halstead, 1974.

<sup>2</sup> Wendell Bell and J. Williams Gibson, Jr. “Independent Jamaica Faces the Outside World,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 22, no.1, March 1978.

“operational code” refers to the values, world view (Weltanschauung), and response repertoire, which an individual acquires and shares with other members of an organization. Nathan Leites, whose twin study: The Operational Code of the Politburo<sup>1</sup> and A Study of Bolshevism,<sup>2</sup> introduced the concept into the field of political psychology, in an effort to analyze the decision-making *modus operandi* of the Soviet Politburo. Refined by Alexander George, Ole Holsti, and Stephen Walker operational code is widely used, particularly in qualitative content analysis to determine the perception of leaders and decision-makers.

As George observes, the operational code constitutes five sets of philosophical beliefs and five sets of instrumental beliefs. George’s philosophical beliefs relate to the political universe in which the leader must operate, and the other actors with whom he must contend within that environment; the instrumental beliefs relate to the image of “self” in the leader’s political universe and the best strategies and tactics that could be employed to achieve one’s goals.<sup>3</sup> We may therefore conclude that the philosophical and instrumental beliefs that are the composite of a leader’s operational code, determine the parameters within which he/she will act.

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<sup>1</sup> Leites, Norman. The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.

<sup>2</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ . A Study of Bolshevism. New York: Free Press, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> George, Alexander. “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making.” International Studies Quarterly, 23, 1969, pp.190-222; see also Alexander George “The Causal Nexus Between Beliefs and Behavior,” in L. Falkowski (ed.) Psychological Models in International Politics. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1979; Stephen Walker “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis.” Political Psychology, 11, 1990, pp. 403-418.

## Groupthink and Decision-Making

Invariably, crucial foreign policy decisions are made by small groups of twenty or fewer officials – a maximum of eight in the case of the PRG. When members of a group manifest a tendency to concur with the prevailing viewpoint – usually that of the leader – rather than think for themselves, a state of “groupthink” is said to exist. Irving Janis, a social psychologist, first used the term in his book Victims of Groupthink,<sup>1</sup> in which he stipulated certain antecedent conditions of this pattern of behavior. Janis reasons that group cohesiveness is the primary cause of groupthink. The desire to be loyal to the group, and particularly to the leader, inhibits decision – makers from assuming an independent posture, for fear that such behavior would put them at odds with the other members of the group, for whom they have high regard. Other antecedent conditions of groupthink are:

1. The existence of a strong leadership – usually prescriptive – within the group;
2. The isolation of the group from critical opinions;
3. High levels of stress within the group as a consequence of perceived conditions of crisis confronting the group.

Janis identifies the following defects that are attributed groupthink:

1. The group fails to survey a sufficient range of alternatives or objectives;
2. The group fails to examine risks involved due to wishful thinking;
3. The group fails to re-examine courses of action that had been previously rejected;
4. The group fails to work out contingency plans.

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<sup>1</sup> Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1972

In a comparative analysis of some foreign fiascoes, Janis observes that they would have been avoided were it not for the phenomenon of groupthink. Those who would have otherwise have offered constructive criticisms, chose not to do so for fear of being perceived as deviant by challenging the wisdom and orthodoxy of the group. Therefore, decision-makers who are influenced by groupthink tendency would not be disposed to inform a disrobed emperor that he is naked.

Furthermore, Janis suggests that decision-makers influenced by the groupthink syndrome are inclined to satisfice rather than opt for maximum solutions and benefits. It should be noted, however, that groupthink is not devoid of some positive aspects, not the least of which is its ability to foster cohesion in times of crisis.

Janis' approach to decision-making has influenced an emerging concern about "good government," making him one of the few theorists to express serious concern with the dichotomy between good and bad decision – making.

### Dependence Approach

One of the two major foci of this study is the role of dependence in the foreign policy decision-making of the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada. It is important at this juncture to make a distinction between *dependence* and *dependency*, thereby avoiding a confusion of both terms and their related theories.

Dependency theory is concerned with the analysis of economic asymmetries in power relations between international actors, and as such is emphasized by International Political Economists (IPE). The emergence of dependency theory in the 1960s is credited to Raul Prebisch, whose research at the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) posited that the economic status of poor nations invariably decreased with the concomitant increase of the wealth of rich nations.<sup>1</sup> Andre Gunder Frank would later adapt dependency theory to Marxism<sup>2</sup>, and Immanuel Wallerstein subsequently, refined the global aspect of the theory and named it “world system.”

But there are a few common perspectives that are shared by most theorists of dependency. In the first place, most agree that the international system is characterized by a dominant/dependent (center/periphery, or metropolitan/satellite) dichotomy. According to this classification, the dominant states represent the advanced industrial nations, the dependent states and those nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, whose economies, for the most part, were based on the export of a single commodity.

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<sup>1</sup> Prebisch, Raul, 1963. Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America, New York: United Nations. See also his earlier study, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Problems, New York: United Nations, Social and Economic Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Frank, Andre Gunder, 1969. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, New York: Monthly Review Press. See also his earlier study, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 1967. New York: Monthly Review Press

Secondly, many dependency theorists share the assumption that external forces have a controlling influence on the economic activities of dependent nations. Some of these external forces are, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, multinational corporations, and such agencies that are used by dominant nations to promote their economic interests in dependent states. Although there are several definitions of dependency <sup>1</sup> all seem to agree that dominant /dependent relations are dynamic, particularly because the dominant actor uses its asymmetric powers to perpetuate the unequal pattern of interactions that determine dominant/dependent relations.

Dependence is a less complex term than dependency, and its related approaches may be considered less controversial. In agreement with Randolph Persaud, this study accepts the view that dependence may be defined concisely as a nation's reliance on external actors. <sup>2</sup>

Unlike the dependency thesis, which posits that peripheral economies are structurally dependent on core states, the dependence approach defines the global

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Osvaldo Sunkel, "National Development Policy and External Dependence in Latin America," Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, October 1969, p. 23; Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review, Vol.60, pp. 231-236; Ronald Chilcote, 1974. "Dependency: A Critical Review of the Literature." Latin American Perspective, No. I; James A. Caporaso, "Introduction to the Special Issue of International Organization on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System." International Organization 32, No. 1 (Winter). Fernando Cardoso, erstwhile President of Brazil, is arguably the most prolific writer in the field of dependency.. See his "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States." Latin America Review 978. 12. 3

<sup>2</sup> Persaud, Randolph B. 2001. Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica. Albany: SUNY Press, p.28.

political economy as being characterized by interdependence, i.e. mutual dependence. It should not, however, be taken for granted that *mutual dependence* presupposes a relationship based on equality. Neil Richardson, arguably the leading exponent of the *mutual dependence* theory affirms that “it is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another” This concept of asymmetrical interdependence serves as “the fulcrum of the dependence-compliance approach,”<sup>1</sup> which is the theoretical dependence approach, that informs Grenada’s relations with Cuba, as well as with Soviet bloc states.

Since economic resources represent the chief means of rewards and punishment in a compliance/dependence, it stands to reason that the foreign policy of dependent states<sup>2</sup> in the periphery will invariably change to reflect the interests of donor nations. Biddle and Stephens hold that empirical evidence suggests that the foreign policies of small developing states are usually consistent with the preferences of larger and more powerful states with which they have historical and commercial ties.<sup>3</sup> Both Armstrong<sup>4</sup> and Richardson express similar views. In

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<sup>1</sup> Richardson, Neil R. 1976. “Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance,” *American Political Science Review* 70

<sup>2</sup> The term “dependent state” is used in this context to denote a nation in a dependence relationship with another actor or actors; as such, it bears no relevance to a protectorate status.

<sup>3</sup> Biddle, W.J., and J.D. Stephens, 1989. “Dependent Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of Jamaica.” *International Studies Quarterly* 33

<sup>4</sup> Armstrong, A. 1981. “The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence.” *Journal of Conflucit Resolution*, 25, no.3.

discussing economic dependence and foreign policy compliance, Richardson states that “the foreign policy of dependencies is viewed as partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits derived from economic ties to the dominant country.”<sup>1</sup>

Bruce Moon rejects the thesis that dependent states which vote with the United States in the United Nations do so in exchange for foreign aid. He offers a *dependence-consensus* (constrained –consensus) model which criticizes as largely spurious, the argument of “ cross-sectional correlations between aid and voting in the United Nations.” This model, according to Moon, replaces the unified model with separate explanations for the behavior of the dominant and dependent nation.”<sup>2</sup>

In his analysis of Moon’s constrained-consensus model, Persaud notes that as a consequence of the deep penetration of Third World economies by the economic interests of core states, the following developments ensue: “(a) the economic interests of dependent states become mutually bounded up with that of the dominant states; (b) elites in dependent states become socialized in the world view

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<sup>1</sup> Armstrong, Op. Cit.. p.64.

<sup>2</sup> Moon, Bruce, 1985.”Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence.”International Organization 39, No. 2. p. 304.

of the dominant states, such that, they accept the perspectives and policies of the dominant nation.”<sup>1</sup>

For Moon, relations between dominant and dependent states must either be compliant or consensual.<sup>2</sup> This view is disputed by Jeanne Hey (and this author). She rejects the postulate that because a state is dependent its foreign policy will *ipso facto* be either consensual or compliant. Hey writes: “attempts to identify an exclusive or even dominant pattern convey the false impression that independence as a unique effect on foreign policy. Instead, it is necessary to catalogue the numerous ways in which each influence emerges.”<sup>3</sup>

Richardson sees a consensual arrangement as a logical possibility between a dominant and a dependent state. He explains the basic difference between<sup>4</sup> compliant and consensual relationship thus:

Given that two countries may agree on foreign policy matters, we might properly want to regard as compliance only those agreement where one of the two countries succeeds in convincing the other to adopt a policy positioned contrary to its original intent. Thus compliance implies influence and is thereby different from consensus,

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<sup>1</sup> Persaud, Op. Cit. p.30.

<sup>2</sup> Moon, op. cit. 1985.p.395.

<sup>3</sup> Hey, Jeanne, 1995. Theories od Dependent Foreign Policy and the Case of Ecuador in the 1980s. Athens, OH,: Ohio University Press, pp.143-144.

<sup>4</sup> Richardson, Neil , and C. Kegley, 1980. “Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis.” International Studies Quarterly 24.p. 191.

the latter referring to policy agreement that may not include prior consultation and does not denote capitulation.

I concur with Richardson. In this study, Grenada/Cuba, and Grenada/Soviet relations will be defined in terms of compliance dependence, rather than dependency.

Although Persaud and others observe that compliance should not be confused with compellence,<sup>1</sup> it should not be assumed that a subordinate state is free to make foreign policies without fear of jeopardizing its prospects of foreign aid, in the event that its choices are perceived as inimical to the interest of the core partner.

### **Geopolitics**

Many references to geopolitics will appear in the ensuing chapters of this study. It is therefore necessary to present at this juncture, a brief definition of the term, and an identification of some of the major theorists who have employed its principles in relevance to international politics.

Various definitions of geopolitics exist; the one provided by Graham Evans is chosen for its relevance and clarity. Evans defines geopolitics as “A method of foreign policy which seeks to explain and predict international political behavior

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<sup>1</sup> Persaud *Op. cit.* p. 29.

primarily in terms of geographical variables such as location, size, climate, topography, demography, and natural resources.”<sup>1</sup>

Using this definition, it is easy to understand the correlation between political behavior of a given people and the environmental factors of that country they inhabit. It will be shown later in this study that factors such as location, dearth of natural resources, population and geographic size determined not only the dependence of Grenada on other countries, but set the stage for its collision with the United States.

Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Montesquieu made correlations between climate and human behavior, and may therefore be considered precursors of the theory of geopolitics. But the scholars most identified with this theory are:

Sir Halford MacKinder (1861- 1947), a British geographer whose “Heartland” theory<sup>2</sup> is one of the most cited literature on geopolitics; Alfred Mahan, (1840-1914), an American admiral, who influenced Theodore Roosevelt with his advocacy for a two-ocean American navy;<sup>3</sup> Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), a Swedish geographer who first used the term geopolitics in reference to the geographical bases of power; Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), a German geographer whose

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<sup>1</sup> See Graham Evans. Dictionary of International Relations. London: Penguin Books, 1992

<sup>2</sup> Halford MacKinder. “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal XIII, April 1904.

<sup>3</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan. The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown, 1897.

geopolitical concepts became the foundation of what eventually came to be known as **lebensraum**, the German struggle for living room. This doctrine was later articulated by Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), who in the service of Hitler fused the concepts of lebensraum with realpolitik.<sup>1</sup>

## **Revolution**

Definitions of revolution are numerous. Foremost among those whose writings exemplify the political and legal meanings of this phenomenon are Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich, Chalmers Johnson, Crane Brinton, George Pettee, Eugene Kamenka, Theda Skocpol, Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky.

Friedrich defines political revolutions as “a sudden and violent overthrow of an established order.”<sup>2</sup> Tanter and Midlarsky claim that a revolution exists when insurgents illegally and violently challenge the governing elite for the occupancy of roles in the structure of equilibrium authority.<sup>3</sup> To Chalmers Johnson, a revolution is a disequilibrium in the social system, and since every social system must have equilibrium, a revolution is therefore a system that is

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<sup>1</sup> Other outstanding geopolitical theorists include Harold and Margaret Sprout, Richard Strausz-Hupe, Quincy Wright, Hans Wiegert, and Karl Wittfogel, to name but a few. Revolution. New York: Atherton Press, 1967, p.5.

<sup>2</sup> Carl J. Friedrich, “An introductory Note on Revolution,” in Friedrich, Revolution. New York: Atherton press 1967, p.5

<sup>3</sup> Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, “A theory of Revolution,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 11, 1967, p. 267.

disequilibrated.<sup>1</sup> Hannah Arendt defines revolution as being essentially a “quest for freedom.” She argues that there were no genuine revolutions prior to the American and French. Thus, she considers Marxian revolutions as perversions of freedom. In this regard she would not consider the Grenada revolution a true revolution, because, like the Russian Revolution, its objectives were material welfare and economic development, but not freedom. \*

Theda Skocpol defines revolutions as “rapid basic transformation of a society’s state and class structures.” To her, “social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation.”<sup>2</sup>

Despite variances of definition, most theorists of revolution agree on two points: (1) all political revolutions are illegal change of the established order; (2) all political revolutions are accompanied by violence. Some writers, such as Crane Brinton and Eric Hoffer assert that revolutions are not started by the lumpen proletariat, but by members of the middle and upper classes, who are usually

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<sup>1</sup> Chalmers Johnson. Revolution and the Social system Stanford University: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1964, Chapter 2

\* See Hannah Arendt. On Revolution. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963

<sup>2</sup> Theda Skocpol. States and Social Revolutions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 4

educated, and, or well traveled. This was definitely the case in the French, American, Russian, Chinese, and Grenadian revolutions.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a commentary on five theories which the writer deems essential to the analysis of foreign policy decision-making by the Grenada Revolution. Consistent with the central hypothesis which is stated in the ensuing chapter, the theories of dependence and perception are given the sharpest focus. Like most theories, those of dependence and perception are polemical, but it is the writer's conviction that they have succeeded in establishing the theoretical parameters which shape this study.

Irving Janis' theory of "groupthink" was included in this study because of its relevance to foreign policy of the PRG during its early days when approval of Bishop's decisions was pro forma. After the summer of 1983, "groupthink" lost its efficacy, when latent anti-Bishop sentiments came to the fore.

Grenada's small size, dearth of natural resources, and strategic location contribute a geopolitical dimension to the analysis of its foreign policy. Situated as it is in a sea which the United States considers *mare nostrum*, Grenada cannot fashion with impunity, a foreign policy which Washington deems inimical to its geostrategic

interest. On this basis, therefore, some mention of geopolitical theory in this chapter, was considered pertinent and necessary'

Outside of the Caribbean and West Indian communities in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Grenada was virtually *terra incognita*, until its revolution brought it international attention in 1979.

But what do we mean by the term revolution? This question has already been answered, and need no repetition at this point. But two others warrant answers. The first of these seeks to determine the preconditions of a political revolution. These preconditions emanate from a catastrophic breakdown in one, or all of the economic, political, psychological, and social sub-systems of the society.

The second question, one that is frequently asked, endeavors to ascertain if the upheaval of March 13, 1979 was indeed a revolution. Based on Chalmers Johnson's typology of revolutions, the NJM overthrow of the Gairy government can be classified as a Jacobin Communist revolution, a movement committed to the total political and social transformation of the society.<sup>1</sup> The following chapter will show how a combination of dysfunctional circumstances led the Grenadian society down a revolutionary path.

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<sup>1</sup> See Chalmers Johnson. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1966.

## CHAPTER 2

### ANTECEDENTS TO THE GRENADA CRISIS

#### Introduction

In attempting to analyze the foreign policy of the Grenada Crisis, it is essential to frame its antecedents in the context of that country's history. The advantage of such an approach lies in the ability that it affords to view in sharper perspective the factors that shaped the island's culture and determined the choices that it made in the decades preceding the Revolution

## The Colonial Legacy

Grenada comprises an area of 133 square miles,<sup>1</sup> which makes it one of the smallest nation-states of the world. Located approximately ninety miles to the north of Trinidad, Grenada lies near to some of the major sea lanes of the Caribbean.<sup>2</sup> This is a factor of significant geopolitical importance, especially in the context of Cold War politics.

Although considered a part of the Spanish empire,<sup>3</sup> Spain made no attempt to colonize Grenada. The first successful European colonization occurred in 1653 when Du Parquet, the French governor of Martinique accompanied by 203 armed men, took up residence in the island, and shortly thereafter, embarked on the cultivation of tobacco, for which there was a lucrative market in Europe. Seven months after the French established their colony on Grenada, the aborigines, who had initially welcomed them with hospitality, realized the imperious intentions of their European “guests,” turned against them, thus precipitating what eventually

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<sup>1</sup>Geographically, Grenada is the 11<sup>th</sup> smallest nation-state; demographically it ranks as the 15<sup>th</sup> smallest. Sources: Oxford Dictionary of the World; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 678, and UNDP Estimates 1991/1992 respectively.

<sup>2</sup> See. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power Present and Future, Boston: Brown, Little, & Co. 1898, p.289, in which he discusses the four major choke points which render the thirteen Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs of the Caribbean vulnerable to interdiction. See also Caspar Weinberger 1990. Fighting for peace: Seven critical years in the Pentagon. New York: Warner

<sup>3</sup> Columbus was the first European to sight the island, and he claimed it in the name of Spain

became a genocidal conflict. In the ensuing years, the French succeeded in eliminating all but a few of the Caribs, many of whom committed suicide rather than be captured.<sup>1</sup>

By the seventeenth century, sugar replaced tobacco as the chief export commodity, and for many years became the basis of Grenada's economy. The cultivation and processing of sugar cane into sugar require an abundance of cheap labor, which Europeans were not disposed to provide; some twelve thousand Africans were imported as slaves to fill the need.<sup>2</sup> Their advent substantially changed the demography of the island and further stratified its society. Wealthy whites stood at the apex of the social pyramid; below them were rich coloreds, then poor whites, and slaves at the very bottom. Wars between England and France resulted in the British capture of Grenada, its recapture by France, and finally its return to England under the Treaty of Versailles, 1783.

To guard against insurrection, the British enacted certain measures that denied participation of non-English subjects in the island's political process. French Catholics were forced to pledge allegiance to the Anglican Church; all real estate owned by the local Catholic Church was confiscated, and it was mandated that all births, baptisms, marriages, and deaths had to be registered with the Anglican

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<sup>1</sup> Many Caribs leapt to their death from a cliff known even today as La Morne des Sauters (Leapers Cliff). See George Brizan, Grenada: Island of Conflict. London: MacMillan, 1998, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp.93-94

Church. These fiats relegated the French Catholics and blacks to a second class status, and consequently intensified the hostility of Francophone Grenadians towards the English.(1) The hostility eventually grew into a rebellion, led by Julien Fedon, a colored planter, whose forces harassed the British for over a year before being overwhelmed. The English were unsuccessful in their efforts to make Anglicanism dominant; many places retain their French names, and other aspects of French culture survived, as evidenced by the use of patois by many present day Grenadians.

In 1833, the English parliament voted to abolish slavery throughout the British Empire. There were, however, certain provisos under an apprenticeship scheme that delayed total abolition. These were intended to mitigate the economic impact that a precipitous end of slavery would bring to bear on the planter, and to a lesser degree, the mercantile classes. But the apprenticeship system was tantamount to neo-slavery. George Brizan observes: “The period of apprenticeship, Grenada and elsewhere, can be seen as the last phase of slavery rather than the first phase of freedom.”<sup>1</sup> Another historian who was equally remonstrative, states “The apprentice remained an un-emancipated prisoner on estate to which he was attached, substantially liable to the same punishments and laboring under the same

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen, George, Grenada Free Press and Public Gazette, Vol. V. No, 267, ( March 1831).

incapacity as before; the whip followed him at every step, hard labor at every turn.”<sup>1</sup>

The abuse of the apprenticeship system by the planter class forced the hand of Parliament; on August 1, 1938, all slaves in the British Empire were totally emancipated. Slave owners throughout the Empire received a total of twenty million pounds sterling, of which Grenadian slave owners were allotted six hundred and sixteen thousand, two hundred and fifty-five pounds for the manumission of their slaves.

In the wake of Emancipation, a system of Crown Government was instituted. All power was vested in a governor who established a legislative and executive council drawn from the local elites. Both sides were legislatively nominal, and therefore could not override the governor. The Grenadian elites were anything but sanguine concerning the principle of Crown Government, primarily because it afforded them no power, and hence no role in decision-making; that they supported it was due for the most part to its exclusion of blacks from the legislature. These, and subsequent developments spawned social unrest and political agitation on the part of the Grenadian populace, and set the stage for the conflicts of the twentieth century, not the least of which was the rise of a Marxist/Leninist revolutionary government

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<sup>1</sup> Brizan, op.cit. p. 119

## The Interlude of Federation

For more than two centuries, British, and to some extent West Indian, statesmen and writers entertained the prospect that a federation of the Anglophone Caribbean would be administratively and economically advantageous to the territories involved. Attempts to implement that idea were made during the 19<sup>th</sup> century – all of which concentrated on the British territories of the Eastern Caribbean, where factors of location rendered a single political administration less difficult than the maintenance of individual governments. But these endeavors, limited in scope, unsupported by local sentiment, and occurring at inopportune periods, occasioned no success.

Held in abeyance during the early part of the twentieth century, the idea of a politically united British West Indies was given serious consideration by E.T.L. Wood (Lord Halifax, as he later came to be known), the then Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Colonies. Wood had toured the area to investigate the political development of British colonies in the Caribbean. In a report forwarded to Winston Churchill, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Wood acknowledged the potential of a West Indies Federation, but advised against its implementation at that time.

The Moyne Commission, which visited the West Indies from November 1938 to March 1939, manifested some official concern in the prospect of a closer union

amongst the British Caribbean territories. The Commission acknowledged in its report the existence of a developing interest in a federated British Caribbean. It also noted that local sentiment was more favorably disposed towards a wider federation than that which was advocated by both Marryshow and Wood almost two decades earlier. The absence however, of adequate inter-island communication, the impact of other major difficulties, and problems growing out of overbearing insularities rendered the idea unworkable at that time. The Commission concluded its report with the advice that “a combination into one political entity of all British possessions in the Caribbean area is the ideal to which policy should be directed.”<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after the end of World War II, the British Government made an endeavor to implement a closer association among its politically disparate Caribbean colonies. Positive impetus for the resuscitation of the federal idea was contained in the dispatch that Colonel Oliver Stanley, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, addressed to the governments of the British West Indies.

The Stanley Dispatch, as this directive was popularly known, reemphasized to West Indians the United Kingdom’s view that any movement towards political integration of their countries should come from within the area and should be implemented as soon as local opinion and improved communications rendered it

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<sup>1</sup> Report of the Moyne Commission, Cmd. 6607, p. 327.

feasible. Stanley suggested that federation should be regarded as a means towards self-government within the British Commonwealth, and urged that a conference be called to formulate definite proposals, subsequent to the debating and approval in principle of the idea by the local legislatures. The favorable reaction of the West Indian legislatures to the Stanley Dispatch reflected their willingness to conduct further discussions relative to federation. Consequently, Arthur Creech-Jones, Stanley's successor, scheduled the convening of a conference to

The dispatch, in addition to containing a reaffirmation of London's policy to promote the endeavors of colonial subjects to achieve independence, clearly expressed the Colonial Office's realization that certain conditions rendered individual independence for demographically and geographically small areas, like the West Indies, an impractical idea. Creech-Jones argued:

.. it is clearly impossible in the modern world for the present separate communities, small and isolated as most of them are, to achieve and maintain full self-government on their own. It is not, for example, practical politics to suppose that communities of two hundred thousand souls, or in some cases even less, should play an independent part in international discussions. On the other hand, a community of over two million could reasonably hope to achieve real self-government, and to be strong enough to stand against economic and cultural pressures and to formulate and carry through a policy and a way of life on its own.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Great Britain, Colonial Office, Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies, London: H.M.S.O. 1948. p. 7.

What Creech-Jones postulated was relevant to Grenada, whose 133 square miles of territory was home to a mere 88,600 persons; it was even more relevant to Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Montserrat, all with populations smaller than Grenada's.<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime, Jamaicans were having second thoughts about their country's membership in the proposed Federation. The Jamaican opposition party, led by Alexander Bustamante, pressured the ruling People's National Party (PNP) to hold a referendum to determine whether Jamaica should secede from the Federation; The PNP accepted the challenge, and on September 19, 1961, in a very low turnout, Jamaicans voted by a margin of six percent to secede from the West Indies Federation. The implications of the referendum were two-fold: it allowed Jamaica and Trinidad to opt for independence in 1962; it offered Grenada two choices: either to align itself with the other seven colonies (Barbados not included) in an Associated status with the United Kingdom, or to explore the possibility of joining Trinidad in a unitary state.

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<sup>1</sup> For a demographic portrait of the West Indies Federation, see Hugh Springer, Reflections on the Failure of the West Indies Federation. Occasional Papers in International Relations, No4, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1962

## The Gairy Years

Two categories of heroes are said to have emerged in the landscape of colonial West Indian history. The first is what A.W. Singham identifies as the middle-class hero; one who claims to have sacrificed prospects of advancement in an effort to help the people. It is this type of hero who is most likely to pursue constitutional advance.<sup>1</sup> The second hero springs from humble beginnings, and attributes his claim to political leadership on his role as a trade union leader. Yet, as Singham observes, “In spite of the differences in their class origins and leadership style, however, these two types share certain similarities: they tend to develop personal organizations which are essentially authoritarian.” Marryshow, who in the context of Grenadian politics could be characterized as a middle-class hero, did not attain the leadership of a mass party because of prohibitive political circumstances which obtained in his day; on the other hand, Gairy, who dominated Grenadian politics for almost three decades, emerged at a more opportune time when unfolding constitutional and other developments were more conducive to the formation of mass political parties.

Erich Mathew Gairy was born in 1922 near Grenville, Grenada, to poor parents, who like so many of their compatriots had experienced economic privation and its attendant evils. After a brief period of as a primary school student teacher, Gairy

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<sup>1</sup> Singham, A.W. The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

emigrated to Trinidad, where he worked in the construction of a United States Air Force base. From Trinidad, Gairy moved to Aruba, where he worked as a clerk in the oil refineries, but was soon expelled from the island when the Dutch authorities were not kindly disposed to his labor organizing activities.

While in Aruba, Gairy met Marryshow, who regularly visited the sizeable Grenadian community on that island. The meeting with the elder statesman instilled in him a keen interest in the affairs of their homeland. Aruba had taught Gairy to be unafraid of the colonial ruling class, thus upon returning to Grenada in December 1949, he was prepared and disposed to implement his trade union militancy. Three months later, he organized and registered the Grenada People's Party (GPP), the precursor of the Grenada United Labor Party (GULP).<sup>1</sup>

The most spectacular opportunity for Gairy to manifest his dynamism as a defender of the people's cause came early in 1950. One of the country's largest estates was sold to an English buyer who was not conversant with the paternalistic relations that obtained between the previous landlord and his tenant workers. When the latter asserted their traditional rights and privileges, the new owner sought to evict them. In their plight, they turned to Gairy, who sued the owner under the Tenants Compensation Ordinance and won a settlement of \$3,000.00 on their

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<sup>1</sup> Singham, pp. 153-154

behalf.<sup>1</sup> This precedent endeared him to the Grenada working class, who embraced him as one of them, and having perceived him in an avuncular manner, addressed him thereafter as “Uncle Gairy.”

Encouraged by his initial success, and riding the crest of a widespread popularity, Gairy founded the Grenada Manual and Metal Workers Union (GMMWU) in July 1950. His next move was to articulate the demands for wage increase for sugar workers at the Grenada Sugar Factory, and shortly thereafter, repeated the advocacy on behalf of all agricultural workers. But the propertied and mercantile class chose not to negotiate with Gairy, informing him that negotiations had already been consummated with the Grenada Trade Union Council (GTUC). Shortly thereafter, the price of cacao fell, and consistent with the agreement reached between management and the GTUC, the wages of agricultural workers fell correspondingly. This development fortuitously strengthened Gairy’s position. His next move was to demand an increase of 45 per cent for agricultural workers to bring their daily wage to \$1.20 (BWI) for men, and \$1.00 (BWI) for women. When management refused to accede, Gairy called the first all-island strike in Grenada’s history.

Four days before the strike, the Governor had informed London of signs of intimidation and fears of impending disorder. The following day, a frigate, the

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<sup>1</sup> Singham, p. 155.

H.M.S. Devonshire was ordered to proceed to Grenada, and when the strike actually began, the colony of St. Lucia was instructed to send military reinforcement. On February 20<sup>th</sup>, the Governor, in reaction to a deteriorating situation, declared a State of Emergency and ordered the arrest of Gairy and his assistant, Gascoigne Blaize. Both men were apprehended on February 22 and interned on the island of Carriacou. This move, however, had no calming influence on either the strike or the angry mood that had enveloped the entire country. To appease the strikers, the Governor ordered the release of Gairy and Blaize and returned them to Grenada. This, however, neither mitigated the prevailing tension, nor brought closure to the strike, which had become fraught with arson and violence.

As the situation worsened, the Governor and his advisors opted for a compromise with Gairy, who was now in a position to drive a fair bargain. But the Governor's decision to bargain with Gairy on a quid pro quo basis incensed the planters, who advocated repression as the only means of ending the strike. Reporting on his meeting with the planters and merchants, the Governor informed London that:

. . . feelings ran extremely high and several of those present appeared on the verge of hysteria, boasting, incidentally, that they went about armed and were in fact armed at the meeting with me their main contention was that the strike is nothing short of a communistic plot designed to overthrow the Society, and to treat directly with Gairy would mean the end of industrial and social peace in Grenada. They maintained that Government had failed to provide adequate protection for law abiding citizens of all classes who were in constant fear of

attack on person or property and more especially bitter because it lifted emergency powers and released detainees. They said Government had “abdicated” and they were prepared, if necessary, to take power into their own hands.<sup>1</sup>

The Governor had neglected to mention that both the strike and the planters’ reaction thereto contained serious racial overtones. The political, and more importantly, the economic underpinnings of Grenadian society were racist; the upstart who had thrown the society into near disarray, was a black, and his defiance threatened the imperious power of the whites in Grenada.

The strike was a phenomenal success in many ways. It compelled the planters to grant substantial wage increases to the laboring class, contributed immeasurably to the politicization of the masses, endowed Gairy with a messianic persona, facilitated the emergence of adult suffrage, and perhaps, most important of all, it brought to an end a specific aspect of colonial dominance which the plantocracy had exerted over the black masses of Grenada. On the basis of these accomplishments, Gairy and his party, GULP, would go on to win sixty percent of the seats in the election of 1951, thereby elevating him to the position of Chief Minister.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Note on General Disturbances February – March 1951, Colonial Office Grenada Document, London, 1951, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>. See Euclid Rose, Dependency and Socialism in the Modern Caribbean, New York: Lexington Books, 2002.

Gairy's tenure as Chief Minister, and later as Prime Minister, was marked by many defining factors, five of which are salient to this study: charismatic personality, abandonment of the working class, corruption and repression, and cosmic phenomena-related eccentricities. It is relevant at this juncture to visit Weber's concept of charisma, a term he borrowed from certain Christian theology.

Weber defines charisma as:

A quality of an individual by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as if endowed with super-natural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as divine in origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them, the individual concerned is treated as a leader.<sup>1</sup>

Although some detractors might question Gairy's charismatic endowment, he was perceived by the laboring masses as the Messiah who had come to free them from the yoke of white plantocracy. By dint of political dynamism, and his extraordinary ability to mesmerize his followers, he was able to project himself as a popular hero who had successfully confronted the white oligarchy, and whose efforts to eradicate the ingrained deference of the working class vis-à-vis their betters was not in vain.

This study posits that Gairy's mass appeal was undeniable, so too was his awareness of his endowment with the gift of grace, the perception, which held by

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<sup>1</sup> H.H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills (trans./eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford Press 1946. pp. 358-359

leader and follower alike, is the *sine qua non* of charismatic authority. But it is likely that his obsession with his personal charisma prevented him from realizing that the shared perception of a leader's unique qualities does not suffice to ensure the permanent affection of his constituents. In a poor agrarian society, the masses have serious expectations of tangible rewards that the charismatic leader must deliver if he expect to perpetuate the affection that they hold for him. Stuart Eisenstadt concurs that:

The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet he must perform miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform heroic deeds. Above all, however, his divine mission must prove itself in that those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do not fare well, he is obviously not the master sent by the gods.<sup>1</sup>

Gairy, as the leader of a terminal colonial society, did not possess a cornucopia of rewards to allocate to the expectant Grenadian masses; what he did, however, with his available resources portrayed him as wasteful and corrupt, and in the process, eroded much of the confidence and respect reposed in him by the laboring class.

Singham writes: "Gairy interpreted his accession to office as giving him the right to exercise almost complete control over Grenada's finances, and he was not

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<sup>1</sup>Stuart Eisenstadt "The Social Framework and Condition of Revolution," in L. Kreisberg (ed.) Research in Social Movements Conflict and Change. Greenwich, CT.: JAI Press., 1979.

<sup>2</sup>.Singham,. A. W. The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity. New Haven University Press 1968. pp. 153-154. Yal

always careful to make a distinction between his right to make policy and the necessity to account to the public how funds were being spent.”<sup>2</sup> Gairy’s legitimacy was never conceded by the Grenadian elite, hence, reports of his abuse of patronage, “squandermania,” and corruption vindicated the opprobrium in which they held him.

In 1962, the Grenadian voters rallied once more to Gairy’s candidacy, giving GULP 54.9 percent of the vote, which amounted to eight of the ten seats in the legislature.<sup>1</sup> But a year later, on the recommendation of a commission of inquiry, the British Government removed him from office on charges of corruption, gross mismanagement of public funds, as well as intimidation of civil servants. He was banned from the legislature for five years and his right of franchise suspended concurrently. These events occurred in the wake of the break up of the Federation. Grenada was consequently faced with the dilemma of joining Barbados, the Windward and Leeward Islands (the Little Eight) in an Associated Status, or seek to align itself with Trinidad. The latter seemed the more enterprising, but not the more realizable.<sup>2</sup>

The suspension of Gairy ended in 1967 and he returned to power contemporaneous with the beginning of Grenada’s associated statehood. Barbados having opted for

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<sup>1</sup> Grenada Electoral Results Report, 1951 - 1976

<sup>2</sup> Jacobs, W. R. and R.I. Jacobs, 1980. Grenada: The Route to Revolution, Havana: Casa de las Americas, p. 66.

independence, the Little Eight had become the Little Seven. The association with the United Kingdom was mutually voluntary, with freedom to demit the union, clearly expressed in the governing constitution. Apart from the portfolios of defense and foreign affairs, administered by London, each island was virtually self-governing. This provision enabled Gairy to manipulate Grenada's parliamentary system, as well as to exercise his proclivities for repression and corruption. But ominous clouds were amassing on the horizon. The masses that once hailed Gairy with messianic fervor now filled the streets in protest, chanting their mantra, "Gairy must go!" Even more threatening were the specter of a nascent Black Power movement, and the emergence of a formidable opposition, the New Jewel Movement.

### The Black Power Phenomenon

The Black Power Movement in the Caribbean was the extension of a series of anti-racial and anti – imperialist upsurges which occurred in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, and which had relevance to nationalistic reactions to European dominance in the Third World. Its first substantial manifestation in the Caribbean occurred in October 1968, when the government of Prime Minister Hugh Shearer deported Walter Rodney, a radical Guyanese lecturer at the University of the West Indies at Mona. Rodney was unpopular with the conservative Jamaican government because of his racial ideology, his communist

propensity, and his prospect of organizing the lumen proletariat in the ghetto areas of Kingston. Thus, when he returned from a trip to Canada, he was declared *persona non grata* and barred from re-entering Jamaica.

The incident gave rise to a student demonstration in Kingston and was later joined by faculty members of the University, members of the Jamaican middle and lower classes, and many others. What started as a peaceful protest escalated into mob action, claiming the lives of three persons and causing some \$2,000.000 worth of damage. In the wake of the upheaval, the Shearer Government banned marches, and some books, confiscated the passports of many Jamaicans who were involved in the riot, or who were suspected of radical behavior, and censored radio programs.<sup>1</sup>

In the Caribbean, the Black Power Movement was based on negritude, racial nationalism, and disestablishment. Its primary concerns were the plight of the poor, economic inequality, and the area's dependence on core states and international capitalist systems. The movement found its chief proponent in Rodney, who redefined its concept, placing it within a Caribbean framework, and identified imperialism and dependency as the twin evils which shaped the lives and prospects of the region's masses.

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<sup>1</sup> For a description of events relating to the Rodney riots in Jamaica see T. Lacey (1977) Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960-1970. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Rodney's thesis is that Black Power in the West Indies aspires for three interrelated objectives: (1) to break with imperialism, which is historically white; (2) the assumption of power by the black masses in the islands, and (3) the cultural reconstruction of the society in the image of blacks.<sup>1</sup> He added that "the road to Black Power here in the West Indies and everywhere else must begin with the reevaluation of ourselves as blacks, and with a redefinition of the world from our own standpoint." As if to blunt accusations of racist philosophy, Rodney asserts that "Black Power is not racially intolerant. It is the hope of the Black man that he should have power over his own destiny. This is not incompatible with a multi-racial society where each individual counts equally."<sup>2</sup> These principles were to become the guiding force of the movement as it spread throughout the English-speaking Caribbean.

In 1970, the focus on Black Power within the Caribbean shifted from Jamaica to Trinidad, where it gathered momentum and some semblance of organization, particularly under the influence of the National Joint Action Committee (NJAC). That year, a combination of events gave rise to a Black Power upheaval that engulfed the society, and came perilously close to overthrowing the democratic regime of Prime Minister Williams. Before the protest subsided, some units of the army mutinied in sympathy with the participants in the rebellion. With its back to

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Rodney The Groundings with my brothers. London: Viliers Publication Ltd. 1975, p. 28

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p.29

the wall, the government resorted to repressive measures to restore order and save the republic. A West Indian scholar, reflecting on the measures that the Government employed to defuse the rebellion, concludes that:

The realization that extremes of repression can come also from Black governments like the PNM must have been a rude awakening to the Black protesters, and should serve to support, unlike the strict black/white dichotomy of Rodney and NJAC, that blackness is itself not necessarily a guarantee of revolutionary or progressive consciousness of behavior.<sup>1</sup>

The events in Trinidad held serious implications for the Gairy regime. If a prosperous democratic state as Trinidad could have been pushed by a Black Power phenomenon to the edge of chaos and collapse, how would Grenada fare with its unpopular regime, its economy in disarray, and a rising opposition, strongly influenced by the Black Power ideology, waiting in the wings? As Brian Meeks sees it: “Black Power in Grenada represented a potential force autonomous of Gairy’s power and patronage, precisely because it effectively utilized the symbols which he had monopolized for twenty years.”<sup>2</sup> furthermore that “ Black Power with its anti-imperialist slogans, threatened not only to take away Gairy’s title of ‘defender of Black people,’ but to destroy the symbiotic relationship he developed with the British.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>. Perry Mars, Ideology and Change: The transformation of the Caribbean Left. Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1998, p.57.

<sup>2</sup> Brian Meeks. Social Formation and People’s Revolution. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 1988.

Given the propinquities that Grenada shares with Trinidad, it was not surprising that on May 10, 1970, a cross section of Grenadians staged a mass demonstration in sympathy of the Black Power advocates of Trinidad. Under the leadership of professionals, some who were later to emerge as members of the New Jewel Movement elite, the group used the occasion to voice their demand for jobs and benefits.

Gairy's response to the demonstration came swiftly. He enacted the Emergency Powers Act, a draconian measure which gave the police wide powers to search private premises without a warrant for "subversive literature," guns and ammunition, restrict the movement of persons within Grenada and travel abroad, limit the right to freely assemble, in addition to provisions for the arbitrary detention of persons, and the rationing of essential services and commodities.

In a radio broadcast on May 23, 1970, Gairy outlined his *modus operandi vis-à-vis* the sanitizing of Grenada against the spread of the Black Power contagion, and a repetition in his country of the rebellion that had menaced Trinidad a few weeks before. In his usual spirit of defiance, he assured his audience that:

There are no significant threats to Grenada today. However, being aware of what has been happening in some of our neighboring islands . . . Trinidad and Tobago in particular – one cannot be too cautious . . . I have absolutely no doubt that "Black Power" as manifested in Trinidad and Tobago can do tremendous amount of harm to any country.

. . . The opposition referred to recruiting criminals in a reserve force. . . I am proud of the ready response to my

call on Grenadians, regardless of their record to come and join in the defense of my Government and in the maintenance of law and order in their country. Indeed, hundreds have come and some of the toughest and roughest roughnecks have been recruited. <sup>1</sup>

This was the beginning of Gairy's assault against the Black Power movement and other organizations that he might deem inimical to his regime. His next move was to establish a number of "Police Aids" under different names. The first of these was "The Voluntary Intelligence Unit for the Protection of Private Property" (VIUPP). <sup>2</sup> In addition to VIUPP there were "Special Guards with Defensive weapons" (VSG), the Night Ambush Squad (NAS), and the fearsome "Mongoose Gang," which was the Grenadian counterpart of the infamous *tontons macoute* of Duvalier's Haiti. <sup>3</sup> The difference in the nomenclature of this grouping was not of major consequence; the sad reality was that the grouping was composed of the same assembly of predominantly criminal elements who were directly accountable to Gairy. It did not take long for Gairy to unleash his infamous "Mongoose Gang" upon his perceived enemies. <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Eric Gairy Radio Broadcast in Grenada: Commission of Inquiry into the Breakdown of Law and Order and Police Brutality (Duffus Commission, February 27, 1975, Kingston, Jamaica, p. 30. The Duffus Commission pointed out that the 1966 Grenada Police Ordinance provided for a "Grenada Constabulary" to be called out by the Commissioner of Police to assist the Regular police when required. The Commission further noted that Gairy was acting illegally when he assumed the power to create, call up, appoint and direct his police aids. See Meeks Op. cit. pp. 26-27

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 30

<sup>3</sup> Meeks, op. cit pp.198-199

The opportunity came on November 11, 1970, when nurses from the General Hospital in the capital, St. George's, took to the street to orderly demonstrate against poor working conditions, unhealthy facilities, and the shortage of medicines and other supplies. Gairy reacted harshly, transferring nurses and threatening others with outright dismissal. But his reaction proved counter productive; it served to elicit wide sympathy for the nurses' cause. On December 15, 1970, a larger demonstration convened. Although the nurses' grievances were pivotal, exponents of relevant causes joined the protest. Some of these came from groups such as FORUM, MACE, GNP, and members of the radical intelligentsia, including some future members of the New Jewel Movement.

In addition to being brutally attacked by the Mongoose Gang, many protesters were tear-gassed by the police; some thirty marchers were arrested under the newly proclaimed Emergency Powers Act and charged with conspiracy to riot. The protracted trial lasted for seven months and ended with the acquittal of all the arrested persons. The acquittal was propitious for two young lawyers, Maurice Bishop and Kenrick Radix, both of whom served as defense counsels for the arrested demonstrators, and both of whom would go on to become distinguished members of the Grenadian Revolution.

Despite Gairy's trajectory of repressive governance, he was able to dominate the election of 1972, winning 13 of the 15 contested seats. This development speaks to

two factors: one was the lackluster forces that opposed him; the other was his penchant for subverting the electoral process. The Grenada National Party (GNP) blamed its poor showing in the election on the corrupt electoral propensities of GULP, and its leader, Eric Gairy:

The 1972 General Election was notorious for its record of irregularities, for the wanton disregard of the rules of fair elections by secret ballot; for the high handed actions of the governing party and for the unfair result in their favor.<sup>1</sup>

There were, however, members of the society who were not prepared to allow Gairy to continue to ride rough shod over the rights of the Grenadian people, nor were they adverse to employing extra-legal means to achieve their goal. The perceived illegality of Gairy's triumph in the 1972 election was the catalyst that gave rise to the most serious opposition he was to face, and one that ultimately proved his undoing. In this context, the Mongoose Gang in particular, inadvertently galvanized the anti – Gairy forces and accelerated the revolutionary ethos.

### The Rise of the New Jewel Movement

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<sup>1</sup> G.N.P. Press Release, September 13, 1972, MF #7212.

The New Jewel Movement evolved in 1973 from a number of ad hoc organizations that were formed subsequent to the Black Power disturbances in Grenada's capital. One of these groups was FORUM, which was organized in 1970 by Maurice Bishop and a group of radical professionals with a view to promoting the welfare of the country's poor. FORUM was replaced early in 1972 by the Movement for the Advancement of Community Effort (MACE). This group, unlike its predecessor, focused on researching the social and economic problems within Grenada, and then applying the findings through the process of politicizing the economically deprived masses. Later that year, MACE merged with the Committee of Concerned Citizens to create another group, known as the Movement for the Assemblies of People (MAP).

MAP was an urban-based organization with radical orientation, led by Bishop and Kenrick Radix. Its main objective was the replacement of the Gairy regime and the two-party system, as obtains under the Westminster form of parliamentary democracy, and to replace it with a system of participatory democracy of peoples' assemblies. This system, modeled on the ujamaa villages of Tanzania, would enable mass participation in decision-making in rural communities and in the workplace. Its leader, Maurice Bishop, explained succinctly the expectations associated with MAP: "We envisage a system which would have village assemblies and worker assemblies. In other words, politics where you live, and

politics where you work . . . elections in the sense of the elections we now know, would be replaced by Assemblies at different levels. Grenada is small enough for this type of mass participation.”<sup>1</sup>

In 1873, MAP merged with another group known as the Joint Effort for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL). Formed by Unison Whiteman in 1972, JEWEL was a reformist movement aimed at undermining Gairy’s agro- proletariat base by exposing the contradictions between his rhetoric and deeds; at the same time, it endeavored to offer an alternative to the program that Gairy had often used to solicit and obtain the political support of the peasantry.

JEWEL won national recognition and acclaim, when late in 1972 it championed the cause of some of the rural folk in the famous La Sagesse Incident. This incident occurred when an Englishman, Lord Brownlow, denied the local citizens access to cross his land to reach a popular beach. For more than a century the people had enjoyed the right of easement to La Sagesse, until Brownlow acquired ownership of the property. When Gairy refused to assist them, the people found JEWEL a

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<sup>1</sup> Searle, Chris, 1983. Grenada: The Struggle against Destabilization. New York: W.W. Norton, p.16.

willing and capable advocate. Lord Brownlow was tried in absentia<sup>1</sup> and found guilty; the people, energized by JEWEL, marched to Brownlow's property, broke down the fences, and reestablished access to the beach. Some forty persons were arrested for their participation in the destruction of Brownlow's property; most of those charged were members of MAP and JEWEL, and included such leaders as Bishop, Whiteman, Teddy Victor, and Sebastian Thomas. The charges were eventually dropped; the people would long remember who their defenders were. Shortly after the La Sagesse Incident, MAP and JEWEL merged and became the NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT, with Maurice Bishop as its leader.

From the outset, the NJM showed a distinct difference as a political party, from GULP and the GNP, both of which were pro-capitalist in orientation. The NJM was definitely Marxist, although it did not so identify itself in its embryonic stage.

Selwyn Strachan explains:

The NJM started off as what we would call a revolutionary party. We never called ourselves socialist at the beginning. It was engaged in revolutionary politics, trying to raise the consciousness of the people, and fundamentally raising democratic issues amongst the masses and trying to get them to struggle with us for democratic rights and freedom. . . . As we got them more and more mature, we were able to work out a clearer ideological position. It didn't come artificially, it was the result of struggle, in a concrete way.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This was a mock trial.

<sup>2</sup> See Intercontinental, May 1981.

After his stunning electoral victory in 1972, Gairy's charisma began to wear thin, as he resorted to the use of terror, repression, and corruption to consolidate his position as "maximum leader," thereby alienating his former supporters, and simultaneously galvanizing the disparate forces that were then arrayed against him. His first clash with the NJM came when having decided to demit Associated Statehood, Gairy announced that he would opt for independence for Grenada. The NJM was not opposed to independence, but its leaders were critical of an independence that would be but a ceremonious exchange of flags and national anthems, without addressing the social and economic<sup>1</sup> problems of the country. In that regard, they argued for an independence accompanied by some of the wealth that England had extracted from Grenada during more than two centuries of colonialism. They further reasoned that while independence would enhance national unity, Grenada's economy was too dependent on foreign capital to be supportive of independence. The NJM had stated earlier in its Manifesto that "Independence must mean better housing for our people, better clothing, better food, better health, better education, better roads and bus service, more jobs, higher wages – in short a higher standard of living for workers and their children."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See the Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement

The Grenada National Party (GNP) took a jaundiced view of Gairy's decision to seek independence without affording the country the right to a Referendum:

We of the opposition took the view that people would not turn their backs on independence, but, that the Government has no mandate as yet to seek this; that although the question was listed in the Government's election manifesto, itself was published late and poorly distributed, that the issue of independence was never expanded on election platforms; that the worsening financial and economic positions in Grenada render the question of independence untimely; that the burdens, costs and responsibility of independence are such that Grenada alone with its limited resources could not sustain them; that it would be more constructive to pursue Independence in union with some, or all of the other Associated States.<sup>1</sup>

The GNP's objection to independence was not predicated solely on the question of economic viability. There was the realization that independence would afford Gairy unfettered power to wreak havoc upon his enemies and to extend his practice of corruption. Accordingly, the GNP petitioned the British Government to stay the granting of independence at least until some provision was made to ensure against the violation of the electoral process. But Lord Balniel, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs denied the request on the grounds that pursuant to the West Indies Act, any constituent member of the Associated Statehood was free to delink from the United Kingdom "as from that date as may be specified in the order" (in Council).

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<sup>1</sup> GNP Release, Gairy Independence Talks, October, 1972, MF # 7212.

Gairy did not share the misgivings which the NJM and the GNP held about independence. He was convinced that independence was good for Grenada, and that contrary to the fears the NJM and the GNP, it would not entail an economic onus on the Grenadian people. He reasoned that it would attract international economic and financial aid to the country, thus, Grenada would not have to support independence, because once independence was achieved, more than 150 nations would come to Grenada's aid. This having been said, Gairy departed for London, where he and his opponents, Bernard Coard (NJM), and Herbert Blaize (GNP), parleyed with the British on matters pertaining to the forthcoming independence. Under the influence of the NJM, Grenadians from all walks of life demonstrated against Gairy's schedule for independence, as well as his brutality and corruption. Prominent among the protesters were teachers, dockworkers, students, and merchants. Once again, the protests were neutralized by the onslaught of Gairy's goons, but the NJM scheduled another protest, labeled "The People's Congress," which drew a crowd in excess of 10,000. <sup>1</sup> The "Congress" indicted the Gairy regime on twenty – seven charges against the people, including murder and

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<sup>1</sup>. See Jay Mandle, 1985. Big Revolution, Small Country. Lanham, MD.: North-South Publishing Company, Inc. p. 17.

corruption, and demanded that Gairy resign by November 18, 1973, or face a general strike.

On the day of the general strike, Gairy struck preemptively. His cohorts arrested and beat several protesters, including Bishop and five other members of the NJM, all of whom had gone to the town of Grenville to plan strategy for the strike. The six NJM members were incarcerated without access to medical care or legal counsel. Known as “Bloody Sunday,” the event projected Gairy in the worst image to date.

This example of elite intransigence was consistent with Chalmers Johnson’s theory that as criticism mounts, the ruling elite, instead of responding to a need for change, relies on a policy of increasing repression, thus channeling all discontent into violent behavior. By visiting brutality upon Bishop and the rest, Gairy enhanced the very development, which he was trying to prevent, namely, a nationwide condemnation of his rule. Moreover, he inadvertently succeeded in welding together into a militant force, all the disparate groups that opposed him. This time, all major trade unions, save GMMWU, all major churches, several organizations and business enterprises were galvanized into a nation-wide strike. The forces opposed to Gairy banded together to form a “Committee of Twenty-Two.” This group confronted the government with a set of demands, some of which Gairy was obliged to honor. One of the demands to which Gairy assented

was the authorization of an investigation into the Grenville beatings, and punishment of all responsible parties. Sir Herbert Duffus, a Jamaican judge, was appointed to head a Commission of Inquiry, and as if there were a quid pro quo agreement, the strike, which was effective, came to an end.

As the New Jewel Movement grew in numbers and influence, the brutalities of the Gairy regime increased in intensity. To silence his critics, Gairy banned *The New Jewel*, the newspaper of the NJM, ceased paying his country's fees to the University of the West Indies, contravened the opposition's right in Parliament, and enacted harsh legislation in the name of anti-communism. On Monday, January 21, 1974, a mere fortnight before independence, Gairy's police aides, reacting to a national strike, gunned down Rupert Bishop, the father of Maurice Bishop, at point blank range as he sought to protect a group of women and children from the escalating violence. This infamous day, known thereafter as "Bloody Monday," and its related events radicalized the New Jewel Movement.

Every revolutionary movement must have an ideological component, if it is to articulate its protests and objectives, denounce the existing order, and elicit the affective response of the citizenry at large. In the case of the New Jewel Movement, the ideology was Marxist/Leninist, and as such, was employed clandestinely during the embryonic stage of the movement. Bernard Coard, the NJM's chief ideologue, radicalized the political inclination of the movement, made

the study of communist ideology a requirement of the leaders, and taught them how to capitalize on the grievances and malaise of the masses.

Although the NJM inveighed against the Westminster model and its related processes, it decided nonetheless to participate in the general election of 1976. The change of heart was influenced for the most part by three considerations: firstly, elections are invariably reflective of democratic legitimacy; secondly, Gairy having virtually banned *The New Jewel* and shackled his opponents' use of loud speakers, electioneering provided the fora – domestic, as well as regional – to articulate the NJM's dissensions with the government; thirdly, the NJM was desirous of displacing the pro-capitalist GNP as the opposition party in Parliament. Despite Gairy's atrocities and the rising popularity of Bishop and the NJM, a single party could not defeat GULP. But a coalition of opposition parties might stand a chance. Thus, an alliance of disparate political formations was welded together in an endeavor to defeat an 'absolute power that was absolutely corrupt.' Known as "The Alliance," the coalition was comprised of the Grenada National Party (GNP), the United People's Party (UPP), newly formed and politically moderate, and the New Jewel Movement, already soaring clandestinely of a Marxist/Leninist trajectory.

The election of 1976 was a manifestation of the basest electioneering behavior of Eric Gary. Yet, despite its attendant negativities, the election produced a strong

parliamentary opposition to GULP. Of a total of fifteen seats, GULP won nine, NJM three, GNP two and UPP one; the vote count was much closer: GULP received 51.8 percent, and The Alliance 48.2 percent.<sup>1</sup> Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, and Unison Whiteman won the three NJM seats, and by virtue of having more seats than either of the other two opposition parties, the NJM exercised its right to name Bishop as the leader of the opposition.

All three NJM members of Parliament were erudite. Bishop in particular, was charismatic and an articulate speaker, who like his other two colleagues, had a vision of political, economic, and social change for the Grenadian populace. But Gairy in Parliament was *deus inter homines*, and by contravening parliamentary rules, was able to neutralize the effectiveness of the Opposition's role. In bewailing this caricature of democracy, the NJM charged that the House of Assembly (the lower chamber of Grenada's parliament)

had degenerated into a theatrical act with Gairy as the leading actor. For the government, the object of their control of Parliament was to hurl personal invective, ridicule the Opposition, kill debate by giving insufficient notice of bills, while denying the Opposition the use of the radio.<sup>2</sup>

The leaders of the NJM, convinced that they would not be able to remove Gairy by relying on the Westminster model, decided to change their *modus operandi* by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Grenada Electoral Results Report, 1951-1976, St. George's, Grenada

<sup>2</sup> Thorndike, Tony, 1985. Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. p.52.

adding a military wing to the party. Only Bishop, Coard, Austin, and Whiteman were supposed to have been privy to this plan, but there are reasons to believe that two or three others knew something about it. Two of these would later be arrested in Philadelphia for smuggling arms from the United States to Grenada; the third person was probably, Kenrick Radix, or Dessima Williams.

### Revolution and the Rise of the People's Revolutionary Government<sup>1</sup>

On Monday, March 12, 1979, Gairy and his entourage left for New York, ostensibly to attend the United Nations Conference on the International Year of the Child. It is believed, however, that his primary objective was to impress upon Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the United Nations' Use of Outer Space Committee, the urgent need to investigate UFOs and other cosmic phenomena. Before his departure, Gairy is alleged to have instructed his security team to arrest and liquidate the entire leadership of the New Jewel Movement.<sup>1</sup> A policeman who was an NJM sympathizer, divulged the planned arrest to an incarcerated member of the NJM, and advised him to escape by nightfall if he wished to save his life.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The NJM claimed that Gairy's trip to the United Nations was a pretext to be absent when their leaders were to be liquidated. For more particulars, See Frederick L.Pryor, Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy, New York: Praeger, 1986, p. 257.

<sup>2</sup> The incarcerated NJM member was Vincent Noel. Another account claims that police informants had broken Gairy's assassination plot to the NJM, whose leaders went underground

Grenada was socially and politically ripe for a revolution. The social structure under Gairy was rigidly ascriptive, the value system of the ruling elite questionable, and the society per se was trapped in a vortex of anomie. Given the impact of all these negative circumstances, and further given the perception by the leadership of the NJM that its elimination was contemplated, it had no option but to revolt.

At 4:15 a.m., March 13, 1979, the 46-man National Liberation Army of the NJM, led by Hudson Austin,<sup>1</sup> surprised and easily overwhelmed the army garrison at True Blue.<sup>2</sup> An hour later, the insurgents captured the radio station at Morne Rouge, and Grenadians woke to the news that the Government of Eric Gairy had fallen. All members of the constabulary were instructed to surrender, and by noon some 3,000 citizens were assisting the insurgents in their mopping up campaign.

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on March 10<sup>th</sup>; Noel, not having received the warning on time, was the only NJM leader to be arrested; he subsequently escaped. See Ibid, p. 257.

<sup>1</sup> Three squads led by Leon Cornwall, Basil Gahagan, and Stran Phillip led the actual attack; two other squads headed by Ewart Lane and Einstein Louison covered the surrounding area. For a detailed chronology of the events, see Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion, and Aftermath. London: Sphere Books, 1984, Chapter 5; Maurice S Thompson, "The Day the Leader Died," Newsday, May 3, 1985; and Maurice Thompson, "Power, Not ideals, Fueled Coup," Newsday Sunday Magazine, November 6, 1983, p. 3 ff. Whether Cuban forces participated in the coup, is still a matter of controversy.

<sup>2</sup> True Blue garrison is located near the southern end of the island, adjacent to the new Airport.

The revolution surprised most Grenadians, including members of the NJM, and sent shock waves throughout the Eastern Caribbean, as will be explained below. On March 25, 1979, Maurice Bishop, in his new capacity as Prime Minister, officially promulgated a series of decrees which suspended the existing constitution, proclaimed the formation of the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), the retention of the Queen as the sovereign head of the country, the retention of the Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon as her representative, the formation of the People's Revolutionary Army, and other matters relevant to the governance of the state.<sup>1</sup>

A team of capable leaders is manifestly indispensable to all revolutions. Revolutionary leaders are invariably middle class and urban in background, educated, or well traveled, and neither very young nor very old. Crane Brinton notes that the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions were led by men in their thirties or forties. He reports also that of the fifty-six men who signed the American Declaration of Independence, five were physicians, twenty-two were lawyers, three were ministers of the gospel, and eleven merchants; thirty-five of the fifty-six signatories possessed college degrees, and only four or five had little or no formal education.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Brian Meeks and Clermont Kirton, The Grenada Revolution, Unpublished paper.

The leaders of the Grenada Revolution did not deviate from this classification. Maurice Bishop, Kenrick Radix, and Vincent Noel were lawyers, who had studied abroad; Bernard Coard and Unison Whiteman held Masters degrees from British and American universities; Bernard Gittens was a medical doctor, and Lynden Randhanny a successful businessman; George Louison had some formal education, and the Revolution's attorney General, Richard Hart, was an erudite Jamaican lawyer.

### Crises of the People's Revolutionary Government

Definitions of crises abound. This study posits that a crisis is a state of perceived threat to the power and other national attributes of a given state by another actor in the environment. The proposition that flows empirically from this definition affirms that the People's Revolutionary Government was the progeny of crises that would victimize it for the entirety of its brief existence. This realization was not lost to Bishop and other members of the PRG elite. They knew that the acclamation which they received subsequent to the swift and easy overthrow of the Gairy regime was not indicative of a predilection of the Grenadian populace for Marxist/Leninism. They further realized that the survival of the nascent revolution hung precariously on the speedy resolution of many critical problems that threatened it from the moment of its emergence.

Foremost among these was the solicitude for regime preservation. The PRG had deep fears of a counter coup to reinstate the regime of Eric Gairy. This apprehension would become one of the salient determinants of Grenada's foreign policy towards Marxist states as well as the United States of America, as the PRG reached out for military and economic assistance from both camps.

The second major problem to face Revolutionary Grenada was the need to obtain international recognition. Because the Revolution represented a unique modality of regime change in the Anglophone Caribbean, and further because of its radical disavowal of the Westminster parliamentary system, the PRG leadership was confronted with isolation and hostility from three sources. The first of these was Grenada's immediate Anglophone Caribbean neighbors, none of which had ever experienced the brutality and repression that forced the New Jewel Movement to seek a revolutionary alternative. The fears that the Grenada Revolution engendered among Eastern Caribbean states, and their reaction thereto, will be discussed at length in the ensuing chapter. Suffice here to say that Trinidad took a neutral posture, whilst the areas two socialist states, Guyana and Jamaica, their own constraining problems notwithstanding, recognized the PRG at the very outset. The second and most troubling source of isolation and hostility was the colossus of the North. The United States, solicitous of its hegemonic posture in the region, perceived the rise of the People's Revolutionary Government to be inimical to

Washington's national interest. On April 9, less than a month after the PRG came to power, Frank Ortiz, the United States ambassador to Barbados, visiting Grenada, to which he was also accredited, warned Bishop:

Although my government recognizes your concerns over allegations of a possible counter-coup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada's best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop close ties with Cuba.<sup>1</sup>

The warning was the first confirmation of the PRG's most troubling fear: the overthrow of the Revolution by an American invasion.

The elite of the PRG considered the United Kingdom as third potential source of isolation. People's Law Number 3 that retained the Queen as the Head of State, and the Governor-General as her representative in Grenada, served to neutralize that probability. One might speculate that an additional motive for retaining the Queen as Head of State was to discourage the United States from invading a Marxist Grenada. Given the extra-legal manner by which the NJM came to power, the Queen as nominal head of Grenada would probably placate many of her loyal subjects in the region, thus earning the PRG some measure of goodwill.

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<sup>1</sup>: Boodhoo, Ken, 1984. Grenada: The Birth and Death of a Revolution. Latin American and Caribbean Center, Miami: Florida International University, p. 25, and reported in several other publications.

On the domestic front, serious problems of crisis proportions emerged and demanded expeditious resolution. The most vexing of these was the perceived threat of a counter coup by Gairy. It was no secret that despite all the outpouring of support for the PRG, some Grenadians were still loyal to Gairy, especially among the farm folk, many of whom were recipients of his patronage.

The New Jewel Movement had come to power with many promises to keep, but with a cupboard that was bare. Its search for foreign assistance encountered militating circumstances which arose from its obsession with Marxist/Leninism, and the fact that aid from the principal potential donors: Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom was not forthcoming. Compounding this circumstance, was the absence of substantial aid from the Soviet Union, along lines of its largesse to Cuba.

Most revolutionary states in the wake of their accession to power have experienced a reluctance of many actors within the international system to grant acceptance of their legitimacy to rule. In some cases, internal factions have shown a troubling propensity for the *status quo ante*. The French, Russian, Cuban, and Vietnamese revolutions are cases in point. The crisis of Grenada's quest for legitimacy grew out of the twin matrices of revolution as a modality of change, and its ideological propensity. Marxist/Leninism was not an attractive ideology to West Indians in

general; it was anathema to the United States, which in the midst of a renewed Cold War, was seeking to reassert its hegemony in the Circum-Caribbean

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has endeavored to set in historical perspective the background of the Grenada Revolution, its troubled relations with Washington, and the factors which influenced its close ties with Cuba.

Like most of the Commonwealth Caribbean states, Grenada is a small demographic and geographic entity, encumbered by lack of major natural resources, a factor which limits its options for economic development, thereby rendering it dependent on foreign sources.

Grenada also shares with, all Anglophone Caribbean nations a political culture which guarantees personal freedom, adult suffrage, and a judiciary which ensures the right to fair trial and protection from arbitrary arrest. Gairy's violation of these rights was a contributing factor to the rise of the New Jewel Movement, and its post-revolution progeny, the People's Revolutionary Government. As noted in this chapter, Maurice Bishop, in the wake of the NJM's successful revolution, assured the Grenadian citizenry that the revolution would restore and promote the rights and freedom which Gairy had so brutally violated.

The revolutionary government of Grenada came to power at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a renewed phase of the Cold War. This held serious implication for the small Caribbean state which having reneged on its promise to restore democratic rights, and further, having aligned with the Castro regime, found itself at odds with the United States, which perceived the revolutionary elite as crypto-communists, influenced by Cuba, a presumed surrogate of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Bishop and his colleagues, perceived Cuba and other socialist states to be genuinely sympathetic with its problems and would therefore proffer aid without strings. Thus, the revolution framed its foreign policy on its fraternal perception of Cuba, on the belief that the Soviet Union would contribute substantially to the needs of the revolution, and on the conviction that Grenada would eventually ingratiate itself into the Soviet fold.

## CHAPTER THREE

### The roles of perception and dependence

#### Introduction

This chapter seeks to show that ideology, and dependence are interrelated poles which help explain the foreign policy of the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). It hypothesizes that specifically, the decision-makers' perception and interpretation of their dependent status provide the main explanation for their foreign policy decisions. The following design supports this hypothesis:

The section begins with a discussion of the pattern of dependence that characterized the external relations of Grenada and Commonwealth Caribbean states prior to the Revolution. The objective will be to demonstrate how the prevailing economic paradigm related to Grenada, and led to a situation of dependence. It will then show how the desire to overcome this dependence led the PRG decision-makers to assume a new economic and political paradigm.

Secondly, the chief decision – makers of the PRG will be identified. This study is particularly interested in ascertaining if in each case their perception of the situation affected key decisions, and if there is indeed a basis for assuming that those decisions were consistent with dependence on Cuba.

Flowing from this process is the need to determine what personal or other factors shaped their belief systems and perceptions. This approach is crucial to this study, and owes much to the theories of Jervis, the Sprouts, Snyder, Brecher, and others, who posit that a belief system is an important part of how decision-makers perceive the world, and consequently how they frame their decisions. As noted in Chapter 1, a concise qualitative operational code of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his deputy, Bernard Coard, will be employed, as well as a manifest content analysis of Bishop's speeches.

### An analysis of Grenadian dependence

The concept of dependence, as it relates to Grenada in this study, is based for the most part on the historical, structural, and institutional perspectives of the New World Group (NWG), which comprised a number of eminent economists at the University of the West Indies, at Mona, Jamaica.<sup>1</sup> The objective of this loosely knit group of Caribbean intellectuals was to formulate a development strategy to reduce the region's dependence on external sources, thereby discarding the then prevailing policy of industrialization by invitation. Among the group's most prominent members were: George Beckford, Lloyd Best, Havelock Brewster, William Demas, Norman Girvan, Sir Arthur Lewis (Nobel laureate for economics), Alister

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<sup>1</sup> The group was actually formed in Georgetown, Guyana by Clive Y. Thomas and associates in 1962 and subsequently relocated to the Mona campus of the University of the West Indies.

McIntyre, and Clive Thomas. The members were essentially dependency theorists, and reflected in their writings strong influences of Raul Prebisch, and particularly Andre Gunder Frank and Karl Marx.

The NWG associates, comprised for the most part of non-Marxists, neo-Marxists, and structuralists, identified five major reasons for Caribbean dependence: (1) “the stagnation and decline of agriculture in the region, which implied a slow growth in agricultural exports and a rapid increase and dependence on food and consumer goods import; (2) the high commodity concentration and dependence on a single or limited number of export products; (3) the high degree of foreign ownership in industry, and the dominant role played by foreign capital; (4) the growing fiscal deficit; and (5) high levels of unemployment.”<sup>1</sup>

At the core of the NWG’s analysis of the causes of underdevelopment and dependency in the Commonwealth Caribbean was the concept of the plantation economy, which by definition was a dependent economy based on free Caribbean land, slave labor, and European capital. The theory of plantation economy was developed by Lloyd Best and Kari Levitt, who claimed that those economies had

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<sup>1</sup> See Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transformation to Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. See also Norman Girvan, “The Development of Dependency in the Caribbean and Latin America’s Review and Comparison.” Social and Economic Studies 22, 1978.

experienced minimal structural change by the 1970's.<sup>1</sup> Best and Levitt maintain that there were three significant phases of the historical development of the plantation economy in the Commonwealth Caribbean. These were (1) Pure Plantation Economy, 1600-1838; (2) Plantation Economy Modified, 1838-1938; and Plantation Economy Further Modified, 1938 to the decade of the 1960's.<sup>2</sup> Although the associates of the NWG were united in their resolve to find an acceptable alternative to the constraining dependence of Caribbean states, they were not of one accord in their diagnoses, interpretations, and solutions to the twin problems of underdevelopment and dependency. Three different approaches to the problem of dependence in the Caribbean were: the non-Marxist, the neo-, Marxist, and the structuralist. The non-Marxist approach was articulated primarily by William Demas, who defined the region's development in terms of natural variables, such as size, limited resources and limited market size, and felt that there was a need to counter these through regional integration.<sup>3</sup> Contending that the Caribbean's overly dependence on foreign capital, foreign aid, and technology has

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<sup>1</sup> Lloyd Best and Kari Levitt, Externally Propelled Industrialization and Growth in the Caribbean. Montreal: Mimeo, 1969, p. 12

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> See William G. Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean. Montreal: McGill University Press. 1965, p.32.

inhibited its capacity to transform its production structures to sustain its development,

Demas writes:

The economies [of the Caribbean] are very dependent, not only structurally in the sense that there is a high ratio of foreign trade to Gross Domestic Product, but also in that there is great reliance on foreign private capital inflows and foreign aid, there is little financial and monetary autonomy, and there are still important gaps in the domestic financial structure. It is quite obvious that the size of a country in this sense imposes certain constraints on the pattern of growth and hence on the character and degree to which such growth can be self-sustaining.<sup>1</sup>

Demas' appraisal of the Caribbean's economic dependence concurs with that of Alister McIntyre, who maintains that "structural dependence is the dependence that arises out of the size and structure of a country's economy which cannot be changed."<sup>2</sup> Demas notes that many Caribbean leaders were pessimistic regarding the prospects of the Anglophone Caribbean achieving viable independence regarding the outside world: He claims that:

They believe that we are doomed to abject subordination because of our small and in some cases minuscule size, and because of our long colonial history as mere political, economic, military, and cultural appendages of the metropolitan countries. They consider that we can only be specks of dust . . . impotent, unable to control our destiny, imitative rather than innovative and inevitably subject to

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid p.115.

<sup>2</sup> Alister McIntyre, "Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies," in Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean, ed. Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group, 1972, p. 166.

the decisions, and indeed the whims, of outside countries, nearly all of whom are much larger and more powerful than we.<sup>1</sup>

Demas and his fellow non-Marxists embraced a less pessimistic view.

They proposed a Caribbean integration with adjacent underdeveloped countries, as well as those outside the region, with the conviction that such a union would create “a strategy of development based on import substitution rather than export creation, consequently resulting in a less dependent pattern of development in the region”.<sup>2</sup>

The second approach, one by the neo-Marxists, found its chief exponent in Clive Y. Thomas, who focused on the legacy of colonialism, slavery, the exploitation of Caribbean land, and people by metropolitan powers.<sup>3</sup> Thomas advises that a comprehensive socialist strategy and indigenous capital provide the only viable alternative to transform and liberate the political and social order in the Caribbean region.

The structuralist approach, advocated by Beckford, Best, Girvan, and Levitt, was critical of both non-Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, claiming that their approaches downplayed the role and consequences of dependent capitalist

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<sup>1</sup> William G. Demas, “Consolidating Our Independence: The Major Challenge for the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, 1975, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Demas, Economics of Development in Small Countries, pp.35-36.

<sup>3</sup> Clive Y. Thomas, op. cit. pp. 116-117. See also his work, The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988.

development. Best, in particular, shifted the responsibility for Caribbean dependence away from natural variables and societal factors and refocused on the view that dependency has militated against Caribbean states acting as autonomous units, inasmuch as the power to exercise economic control and influence employment, prices, and development are controlled by core capitalist states and transnational corporations.<sup>1</sup>

Discrepancies notwithstanding, the NWG approaches resonated with the NJM and initially influenced its elite's concept of development. Eventually, the theories of the NWG gave way among Caribbean Marxist-Leninist parties to the influence of the Cuban command- type model, which is a socialist development strategy, modeled after that of the Soviet Union, Although this model was beset by incidents of inefficient bureaucracy, poor work ethics, a lack of meritocracy, and an inordinate dependence on the Soviet Union, it was non the less appealing to many Caribbean leaders, who were impressed by Cuba's success in the fields of housing, health, education, and low levels of unemployment.<sup>2</sup> This was the case with the NJM. Thus, Bishop's analysis of economic development as outlined in his Line of

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<sup>1</sup> See Lloyd Best, "Size and Survival," in Norman R. Girvan, and O. Jefferson. Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean. Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> J.A. Braveboy-Wagner, "The Politics of Developmentalism," in H. Michael Erisman, ed., The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a volatile Region. Boulder, CO.:Westview Press, 1984.

March speech, was essentially a Marxist analysis,<sup>1</sup> which faulted imperialism for inhibiting the development of peripheral societies.

Consider this excerpt from Maurice Bishop's address to the Organization of American States on the Development of Small Island States:

We contend, comrades, that the real problem is not the question of smallness per se, but the real problem is the question of imperialism. The real problem that countries like ours face is that on a day-to-day basis we can come up against an international system that is organized and geared towards ensuring the continuing exploitation, domination, and rape of our economies and our people, That to us is the fundamental problem.<sup>2</sup>

The contradiction inherent in this utterance is that despite Bishop's philippic against imperialist states, the Grenadian tourist industry was overwhelmingly dependent on the United States. The PRG was also dependent on non-Marxist states for technology, loans, and diplomatic support in the face of a perceived threat emanating from Washington.

The social and economic status of Grenada, at the time of the Revolution, manifested the symptoms of structural dependence in all of its ramifications. As defined by Clive Thomas and others, structural dependence involves *inter alia*, reliance on imports of technical utilities, lack of production facilities, and

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<sup>1</sup> Grenada Occasional Papers – No. 1, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., August 1984. This speech was delivered before a secret joint session of the Politburo and the Central Committee.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce Marcus and Michael Tabor, Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution, 1979-1983. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1983, p. 200.

dependence on foreign capital and critical services. Havelock Brewster, a fellow neo-Marxist, endorses Thomas' view. He states that:

Economic dependence may be defined as a lack of capacity to manipulate the operative elements of an economic system. Such a situation is characterized by an absence of interdependence between the economic functions of a system. This lack of interdependence implies that the system has no internal dynamic which could enable it to function as independent autonomous entity.<sup>1</sup>

This definition and that given by Demas, speak to the Grenada experience, one in which spatial and demographic limitations, coupled with a dearth of natural resources frustrate efforts to achieve even minimal economic independence. Thus, contrary to Bishop's argument, imperialism cannot be blamed for all the economic woes which beset a country. This is particularly true in the case of Grenada where, unlike Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana, there were no major foreign investments.

### **The Bases of the PRG's Foreign Policy**

This section of the dissertation seeks to achieve three particular objectives: first, it endeavors to determine the bases of the foreign policy of the People's Revolutionary Government; secondly, to identify the four major foreign policy

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<sup>1</sup> Havelock Brewster, "Economic Dependence: A Quantitative Interpretation," Social and Economic Studies 22, 1973. In addition to this study, some other excellent analyses of dependency in the Caribbean are: Norman Girvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean and Latin America: Review ND Comparison," Social and Economic Studies, 22, 1973, pp. 1-33; Dudley Seers, Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment, London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1981; Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974

decision-makers, and thirdly, to ascertain the affective and other factors which influenced the dependence of the PRG on Cuba.

The Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement, established in 1973 the parameters within which its foreign policy would operate. Surprisingly, that document devoted little space to international affairs. It did, however, enunciate five basis principles which reflected the Party's foreign policy objectives, and which later became the underpinning of the PRG's international policy. These basic principles were:

1. Anti- Imperialism and Non-Alignment;
2. Achievement of a New International Economic Order;
3. Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation;
4. Pursuit of Regional Co-operation and Integration;
5. Support for National Liberation Struggles.

To buttress these five principles the Manifesto affirmed:

We support completely the political and economic integration of the Caribbean. But . . . we believe in real and genuine integration of all the Caribbean for the benefit of all the people. . . . We stand firmly committed to a nationalist, anti- colonialist position. We fully support the Organization of Non- Aligned Nations in their courageous attempts to prevent big-power domination of their economies and internal politics . . . .We condemn . . . the intervention of the U.S.A. in the internal affairs of the South-East Asian countries and the genocidal practices committed on their peoples. . . . We reject the right of the U.S.A. or any other big power to control the economies and lives of any people anywhere.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Tony Martin (ed.), *In Nobody's Backyard*. Dover, MA.: The Majority Press, p.39.

Subsequent to assuming power, the NJM added further tenets to its five principled positions: (i) the principle of ideological pluralism must be respected in practice; (ii) Latin America and the Caribbean should be recognized as a zone of peace; (iii) the people of the region must be free from aggressive military force; (iv) the right of self-determination for all peoples must be respected in practice; (v) the sovereignty, legal equality and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected regardless of size; (vi) there must be an end to the arming and financing of counter-revolutionaries and anti-popular, anti-democratic and anti-progressive regimes.

This declaration is reflective of the influence of Black Power ideology, from which many of the ideals of the New Jewel Movement evolved. It also expresses certain themes that became salient to the PRG's foreign policy decision-making, e.g. the assault on imperialism, and the equating of the United States with hegemonic powers within the Caribbean. But the core of the principled positions as outlined in the Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement sprang from a Soviet matrix.

Developed some four decades ago by Rotislav A. Ulyanovsky, a noted academician and foreign policy advisor to the Soviet Government,<sup>1</sup> this theory, popularly known as the non-capitalist path, was intended to assist newly

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<sup>1</sup> R.A. Ulyanovsky, Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964.

independent Third World nations in their socialist transformation, avoiding in the process, the vortex of capitalist imperialism.

Ralph Gonsalves, a Caribbean statesman and sympathizer of the PRG, lists nine features of the non-capitalist path, which many theoreticians agree are applicable to newly independent societies in their efforts to make the transition from colonialism to democratic socialist entities. The first feature is that of the necessity to abolish imperialism's political domination.<sup>1</sup> Countries undergoing a phase of socialist orientation articulate and implement an anti-imperialist foreign policy.

According to Gonsalves, the following usually ensue:

- ( 1) a termination of treaties, pacts and alliances impose political and military obligations aimed at compromising the country's sovereignty and right of self- determination and bolstering the hegemony of an imperialist country or countries;
- (2) the dismantling of any foreign military base on its soil;
- (3) a firm and unequivocal stand against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and international aggression;
- (4) the active support of liberation movements and non-aligned nations and the strengthening of the struggle for peace and détente; and
- (5) a drawing closer to the world socialist system in its

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<sup>1</sup> See Johan Galtung's seminal article, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." Journal of Peace Research, Vol.8, No. 2 (1971), pp. 81-117.

international alignments and away from imperialism. <sup>1</sup>

Essentially, the foreign policy of a state guided by the principles of non-capitalist path was expected to maintain a strong commitment to the ideals of non-alignment, and to be flexible in the execution of those ideals. How quickly a state disengages from imperialists control and embraces international socialism was determined by its geopolitical position and a range of internal and external variables. It was reasoned, therefore, that a state located in the Caribbean would be more circumscribed by the United States than one located in Central Africa, or some non-strategic region of the Indian or Pacific Oceans. Gonsalves maintained, however, “that the experience of Cuba, and increasingly Grenada (during the tenure of the PRG) had shown that there were countervailing forces which were capable of breaching the geopolitical restraints of imperialism.” <sup>2</sup>

The relevance of the ideals of the non-capitalist path was recognized by the founding fathers of the NJM and used as that body’s ideological framework, including the basic principles of its international affairs, as enshrined in the

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<sup>1</sup> See Ralph Gonsalves, The Non-Capitalist Path of Development: Africa and the Caribbean. London: One Caribbean Publishers, 1981. See also C.Y. Thomas, “The Non-Capitalist Path as Theory and Practice of Decolonization and Social Transformation,” Latin American Perspectives, Issue 17, Vol. 5, No. 2. Spring 1978.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Manifesto of 1973. While many writers, such as V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogolovsky,<sup>1</sup> have endeavored to provide varying interpretations of the non-capitalist path, the work of Karen N. Brutents, entitled National Liberation Revolutions Today,<sup>2</sup> was the one most widely used by the leaders and members of the New Jewel Movement before and after the overthrow of the Gairy regime.<sup>3</sup> Brutent's work is particularly important because it addresses the international sphere of non-capitalist development more thoroughly than most of the other theoreticians.

Included among the missions confronting the new national democratic state is the pursuit of "an active anti-imperialist foreign policy" concentrated upon three objectives: (1) the furtherance of "favorable international premises for the struggle for economic emancipation;" (2) the "development of all-round cooperation with socialist countries;" and (3) "coordination of action by the national states against neo-colonialism." The second point accentuates the imperative of socialist countries and the international communist movement to support national liberation endeavors. The importance of this support is underscored by Brutents:

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<sup>1</sup> V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogolovsky. Non – Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975.

<sup>2</sup> Karen N. Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions Today, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971.

<sup>3</sup> See Latin American Bureau, Grenada: Whose Freedom? London: 1984, p.32; also Frederic L. Pryor, Revolutionary Grenada, New York: Praeger, 1986, p. 249.

***In the political sphere***, it is the consolidation of the young states' independence, their rights and practical potentialities in deciding for themselves which social orientation to take efforts to eliminate all expressions of inequality and imperial dictates from international relations, and to strengthen world peace and security of nations.

***In the military sphere***, it is strengthening the defense capacity of the young states and helping them to defend themselves against aggressive acts and military pressure from the neo-colonialist; resistance to imperialist attempts to use areas of the former colonial and semi-colonial world as strategic and military bridgeheads against the forces of national liberation and the socialist countries.

***In the economic sphere***, it is the struggle for the economic emancipation of the developing countries from imperialism and construction of their national economy; extension of mutually advantageous economic cooperation between states, and against inequality, exploitation and discrimination in international economic relations.

***In the ideological and spiritual sphere***, it is exposure of the imperialist policy and ideology; struggle against the ideas of national and racial opposition, and against the spiritual expansion of neo-colonialism; and for a cultural revolution in the newly independent countries.<sup>1</sup>

The relevance of the tenets of the non-capitalist path to the principles of the PRG' foreign policy is easily discernable. The five basic principles of the Revolution's foreign policy, as enunciated in the NJM Manifesto, obviously "flow directly from

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<sup>1</sup> Ralph E. Gonsalves, The Non-Capitalist Path of Development: Africa and the Caribbean. London: London Press 1981.

the theory of non-capitalist development,”<sup>1</sup> and consequently provide a clear explanation of some of the PRG’s motivations in its relations with Cuba in particular, as well as with the United States and the Soviet Union. But as Brutents observed, the implementation of the non-capitalist path is not devoid of predicaments and dilemmas. One of these, which plagued the PRG throughout its tenure, was the need to maintain ties with the capitalist states, simultaneously promoting solidarity with the international socialist system. In this regard, the non-capitalist path did not offer Grenada a strategy for solving the specific problems which it encountered in the process of implementing the theory. The PRG’s bitter relations with the United States, is a case in point.

#### The foreign policy decision-making elite of the PRG

It is affirmed in Chapter One of this dissertation, that consistent with the models of Snyder, Brecher, Jensen, Sprouts and others, the decision-making of a state falls in the purview of those individuals who are authorized to make decisions on behalf of the state. Therefore, to understand how foreign policies are made, one must of necessity begin with an identification of the decision-makers. On the basis of this writer’s interviews with Anthony Harriot, George Louison, and Don Rojas, it is concluded that the four most prominent foreign policy decision-makers of the

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<sup>1</sup> See Anthony Payne, “The Foreign Policy of the PRG,” in Jorge Heine’s ed., A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990, pp.123-152.

People's Revolutionary Government were: the Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, the Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, Bishop's foreign policy advisor George Louison, and the Minister of External Affairs Unison Whiteman. These were relatively the most knowledgeable members of the PRG in the field of foreign affairs. All four were expected to lead discussions of foreign policy in both the Politburo and the Central Committee.<sup>1</sup>

During the entirety of the People's Revolutionary Government, Grenada did not possess a parliament in the true sense of the word, permit an official opposition, or allowed for the operation of a free press or pressure group of any kind. The Government consisted of a Central Committee of seventeen NJM members, and a Political Bureau, hereafter referred to as the Politburo, consisting of eight members, all of whom were also members of the Central Committee, as well as members of the New Jewel Movement.

In revolutionary Grenada, unlike the rest of the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Party- the NJM- was paramount. It was the party which created and controlled the PRG. This body, along with the Prime Minister, served at the behest of the NJM.

At least six members of the Politburo served also as members of the Prime Minister's cabinet. Foreign policy decisions were made initially at the Politburo

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<sup>1</sup> Interview of Anthony Harriott, at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, August 14, 2008. Prof. Harriott was a friend of both Bishop and Coard. It should be noted that Bishop, Coard, Louison, and Whiteman had no qualifications or experience in foreign policy decision-making prior to the revolution.

level, and routed to the upper house, the Central Committee, where approval was invariably *pro forma*.<sup>1</sup>

### Profiles of the PRG foreign policy decision -makers

Robert Jervis offers four relevant variables that influence the degree to which events affect later perceptual predispositions: “whether or not the person experienced the event first hand; whether it occurred early in his adult life or career; whether it had important consequences for him or his nation, and whether he is familiar with a range of international events that facilitate alternative perceptions.”<sup>2</sup>

Two events experienced first hand by the PRG elite, and which informed their political perceptions were the constraints of English colonialism and the corrupt regime of Gairy. These experiences occurred quite early in their lives and endured until the rise of the Revolution. The details of Grenada’s struggle against colonialism and the long years of Gairy’s misrule are discussed at length in the preceding chapter and do not require further elaboration at this juncture. Other important events which informed the

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<sup>1</sup> A major exception to this practice occurred in the debate on whether or not to support the Soviet Union in the Afghanistan vote in the United Nations. This incident is discussed more fully in Chapter Five of this dissertation.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Jervis: Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Princeton University Press 1976 pp 239-257  
Er in 1979

perceptions of Bishop, Coard, Radix, Whiteman, and others, were mentioned before, particularly systemic racism which they experienced in Britain and the United States.

In terms of international events, the NJM leaders who came to power in 1979 shared a revolutionary operational code which informed their weltanschauung. They were critical of the implementation of apartheid in South Africa, the role of Zionism in the Levant, and vestiges of colonialism in many areas of the periphery.<sup>1</sup> Yet, they chose not to take umbrage at the blatant ravages of Soviet communism, and the oppression endured by the Cuban people under the Castro regime. Equally disingenuous was their avowed support of the principles of non-alignment,<sup>2</sup> when in fact they chose to march lockstep with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

#### A concise Operational Code of Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard

Admirers and detractors alike are in agreement that Maurice Bishop was the embodiment of the Grenada revolution, and the most influential member of its foreign policy decision-making elite. This section is interested not only in presenting a biographical profile of Bishop, but more importantly in discerning how his belief system influenced his decisions in foreign policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Marcus, Bruce, and Michael Taber Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution 1979-1983. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1983, p.50.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.50.

Maurice Bishop was born in Aruba in 1944 to a well-to-do Grenadian family. He attended St George's prestigious Presentation College, and at age 19, left to study law in England, qualifying as a barrister at London University in 1966. Prior to the Revolution, Bishop was a political activist, joint founder with Unison Whiteman of the New Jewel Movement, and for three years, leader of the opposition in the Grenadian parliament.

In the wake of the Revolution, Bishop assumed the position of Prime Minister, and held in addition the portfolios of Minister of External Affairs,<sup>1</sup> Minister of Information, Minister of Interior and Defense, Minister of Health, and Minister of Carriacou and Petit Martinique Affairs.<sup>2</sup>

Travel and study abroad have invariably influenced the foreign policy perspectives of revolutionary leaders in particular.<sup>3</sup> A young Bishop in England during the sixties was "constantly exposed to the reverberations of the anti-colonialist movement throughout the Third World."<sup>4</sup> He was also sensitive to the raw manifestations of racism, not only in Britain, but on the international scene,

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<sup>1</sup> This position was subsequently passed to Unison Whiteman

<sup>2</sup> Carriacou and Petit Martinique are small islands adjacent to Grenada and are administered as an integral part of Grenada

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Jefferson, Ho Chi-Minh, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah and Fidel Castro are cases in point

<sup>4</sup> See Jorge Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik," in Jorge Heine (ed), A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990, p. 219.

particularly in the United States, which at the time was struggling to cope with the explosion of Black Power upheavals. The writings of Franz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Walter Rodney, and Malcolm X sharpened his perspective on colonialism and racism, and further served to influence his worldview, and foreign policy decisions in which he participated years later.<sup>1</sup> Bishop was also influenced by Michael Manley, a former prime minister of Jamaica, and as Brian Meeks claims, more so by C.L.R. James' combination of class analysis and a sense of Caribbean nationalism.<sup>2</sup>

Other fundamental bases of PRG perceptions of the United States were predicated on Washington's hegemonic posture in the Circum-Caribbean; the United States policy towards Cuba, her refusal to acquiesce to the PRG's demand for the extradition of Gairy, and America's role in the Vietnam conflict. These negative portraits of the United States were first articulated in the Manifesto, which was composed by two members of the PRG elite- Bishop and Coard - who had lived in the United States and Britain, where they experienced both racist conditions as well as having access to literature which was far from complimentary to the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Interviews with Professors Anthony D. Harriott, and Brian Meeks at the University of the West Indies, (Jamaica) as well as interview with Don Rojas, April 13, 2008. See also Rhoda Pearl Rabkin, "U.S. Soviet Rivalry in Central America and the Caribbean," Journal of International Affairs, 34, 1980-81, p.336.

<sup>2</sup> See Brian Meeks, Social Formation and People's Revolution: A Grenadian Study. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of the West Indies, Jamaica, 1988. p.206.

## Theory, Method, and Data

Most, if not all of the exponents of the operational code agree that the perceptions of leaders and decision-makers are pivotal as causal mechanisms in explaining foreign policy decisions. As such, since the publication of Leites' two pioneering studies, scholars have redefined this paradigm and used it to determine the foreign policies of John Foster Dulles, Konrad Adenauer, Mao,<sup>1</sup> Bill Clinton and Tony Blair,<sup>2</sup> Deng Xiaoping, and a host of other leading personalities across the world. This study, the operational code of Maurice Bishop, is an attempt to use the operational code to determine the belief system of a leader of a micro-state. But unlike those who analyzed the above cited studies of the operational codes of Dulles, Adenauer, et al., this study is constrained by a paucity of data relating to the prime minister of the PRG. No biography has yet been written of Bishop,

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<sup>1</sup> See Huiyun Feng, *The Operational Codes of Mao and Deng: Defensive or Offensive Realists?* Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 25 – March 1, 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, *The Operational Code of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair*. Paper delivered at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., August 31-September 3, 2000.

therefore articles such as one by Jorge Heine,<sup>1</sup> and a few others, are utilized, buttressed by interviews with Sir Nicholas Brathwaite,<sup>2</sup> Richard Hart,<sup>3</sup> Sir Paul Scoon,<sup>4</sup> Brian Meeks, Trevor Monroe, Anthony Harriott, Rupert Lewis,<sup>5</sup> George Louison,<sup>6</sup> and Don Rojas.

Salient to this study is the typology developed by Alexander George to add clarity to Leites' concept of an operational code. George borrows from O. Brim, et al.,<sup>7</sup> the distinction between epistemological and instrumental concepts, which he then labels as philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

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<sup>1</sup> See Heine, op. cit. See also Patrick Emmanuel, Farley Brathwaite, and Eudine Barriteau, Political Change and Public Opinion in Grenada, 1979-1984, ISER Occasional Paper 19, Cave Hill, Barbados, University of the West Indies, 1986

<sup>2</sup> Sir Nicholas Brathwaite, a former prime Minister of Grenada, knew Bishop in many capacities: as a student, a lawyer, leader of the Opposition, and eventually, as Prime Minister of the PRG.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Hart, a Jamaican, was the Attorney General of the PRG

<sup>4</sup> Sir Paul Scoon was the Governor-General of Grenada during the Revolution.

<sup>5</sup> Meeks, Munroe, Harriott, and Lewis are professors of Government at UWI (Mona), as well as members of the WPJ. All four knew Bishop and Coard very well.

<sup>6</sup> Bishop's foreign policy adviser, and press secretary respectively.

<sup>7</sup> See O. Brim, D. Glass, D. Lavin., and N. Goodman, Personality and Decision Processes: Studies in the Social Psychology of Thinking, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.

According to George, philosophical (i.e. epistemological) beliefs are predicated upon assumptions and premises relative to “the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, and the role of the individual in history.” Instrumental beliefs focus upon ends-means relationships in the context of political action.<sup>1</sup>

The categories of philosophical and instrumental beliefs are each broken down into five indices which evaluate specific beliefs relating to the decision-maker’s preferences for conflict or cooperation, the preferred tactics which will be utilized to achieve these goals, risk orientation, image perception, by which he/she perceives hostility or friendliness within the international system, and the role which chance plays in the political outcome.<sup>2</sup>

### PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS

1. What is the “essential” nature of life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

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<sup>1</sup> George, op. cit. p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> See Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code.” International Studies Quarterly 42: 175-190, 1998.

4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

## INSTRUMENTAL QUESTIONS

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

For the most part, this section will concentrate on Philosophical Questions 1 (P-1), and Instrumental Question 1, (I-1) which relate to the nature of the political universe and strategic approach to goals respectively. These are the indices which this study considers to be pivotal to an understanding of the other questions, and are more relevant to the endeavor to analyze the belief system of Maurice Bishop. This writer accepts George’s answer to Question P-1 that “a political actor’s belief system about the nature of politics is shaped particularly by his orientation to other political actors,”<sup>1</sup> most importantly those who are his opponents. It is suggested

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<sup>1</sup> See George, op. cit., pp. 201-202

earlier by George, that a pragmatic decision-maker ought to be cognizant of the world view of other actors in the international environment. This includes friend and foe alike. He should similarly be aware of actors in his own domestic venue. Maurice Bishop's orientation to other actors in the international arena, was informed primarily by the exigencies of dependence, and the tenets of Marxist ideology. He had no difficulty in identifying his international enemies: they were the United States, the multi-national corporations (MNC), and to a lesser degree, the Seaga government of Jamaica, Tom Adams, the late prime minister of Barbados, and Eugenia Charles, the late prime minister of Dominica. His perceived friends were Cuba, Soviet bloc states, the Michael Manley government of Jamaica, Trevor Munroe and his Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), and for a while, the Burnham- led government of Guyana. But Bishop erred in believing that ideological ties would inspire Soviet – bloc nations to contribute substantial aid to Grenada; consequently, the PRG made certain decisions which were not pragmatic. The decision to support the Soviets in the Afghanistan question before the United Nations was a case in point. This decision is discussed at length in Chapter Five of this study.

It is hypothesized here that by perceiving the non-socialist environment as hostile, Bishop's attitude veered toward a negative and conflictual direction, while by perceiving the socialist environment as positive and co-operational, influenced his

policy toward a cooperative path. It is posited, therefore, that Bishop's operational code measures vis-à-vis the P-1 index (image of the international environment) were - conflict towards the United States, and cooperation and friendship towards Cuba, socialist, and non-aligned states.

### Bishop's Perception of Cuba

Bishop's favorable perception of Cuba was not based solely on the alacrity with which that nation came to the aid of the PRG. Castro, who was to Cuba what Bishop was to Grenada: the avatar of its revolution, was a role model of many members of the NJM. Bishop noted that: "First of all, Cuba did have its own revolution in 1959, and that had a deep impact on every contemporary of mine. It certainly had a major impact on me."<sup>1</sup> It was also obvious that Bishop and Castro liked each other and were linked by strong fraternal and ideological bonds. The indispensability of Cuba to the Grenada revolution is encapsulated in Bishop's statement that "If there had been no Cuban revolution in 1959, there would have been no Grenada revolution in 1979."<sup>2</sup>

There is no agreement on the date when members of the NJM elite first visited Cuba to establish direct links with the Cuban Communist Party. But Grenada secret police records dated August 17, 1977, note that "Maurice Bishop and Unison

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<sup>1</sup> See New York Times, 7 August 1983, p. A12.

<sup>2</sup> Maurice Bishop, Forward Ever! Three Years of the Grenadian Revolution, Sydney: Pathfinder Press 1982, p 114.

Whiteman, both parliamentarians and Joint Co-Ordinating Secretaries of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) visited Cuba during the month of May.” The police log further states that “They said their visit was part of a familiarization tour sponsored by the Cuban Institute of Friendship with People (ICAP). They also held discussions with organizations, groups, individuals and Government officials.”<sup>1</sup> There is no record of any meeting between Bishop and Castro on that visit to Cuba, but both Bishop and Whiteman were impressed with the domestic accomplishments of the Castro regime, and particularly with its influence in the international arena. Later, Bishop, in an interview in Havana, expressed the hope that Grenada would emulate the system of socialism pursued in Cuba.<sup>2</sup>

#### The bases of Bishop’s animus towards the United States

It is important at this point to revisit Alexander George’s explanation of the first of his philosophical beliefs. George affirms that according to Bolshevik belief system, the “image of the opponent was perhaps the cornerstone on which much of the rest of their approach to politics was based.”<sup>3</sup> To what extent was this view axiomatic of Bishop’s operational code? Bishop’s obsession with his chief enemy, the

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<sup>1</sup> CDCM-007226: fiche #1, Grenada Special Branch, Secret. Monthly Intelligence Report of the Royal Grenadian Police Force for the Months of May, June and July 1977, Office of the Commissioner of Police, Special Branch Office, Police Headquarters, St. George’s, 17 August, 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> See interview of Bishop and Whiteman in the Cuban weekly, Bohemia, August 1977

<sup>3</sup> Alexander George, op. cit. p. 202.

United States, was predicated on the belief that Washington was ineradicably hostile towards the PRG ,<sup>1</sup> consequently, that perceived hostility became a major underpinning of Grenada's foreign policy.

Two pertinent questions need to be addressed; namely: what were the bases of Bishop's animus towards the United States? When did these negative affects begin? Bishop did not appear to harbor any deep-seated animus towards Americans. His letters to President Reagan were expressive of his desire for a restoration of amicable relations with the United States, and the fact that many Grenadians [probably more than who resided in Grenada] were domiciled in the United States, and thousands of American tourists were afforded a cordial welcome in Grenada. When asked by Steve Clark, a Socialist interviewer, what message he would like him to take back to the working people in the United States, Bishop's response was

First of all we would like to stress something that imperialism has been trying to use as a means of dividing and ruling – and this is that we have absolutely no quarrel with the American people. We have nothing against the American people as a people.<sup>2</sup>

What Bishop disliked most about the United States were its foreign policy, and racial prejudice towards blacks. He was opposed to all manifestations of the

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<sup>1</sup> Some of the reasons for Bishop's perceived hostility on the part of Washington towards the PRG are discussed at length in Chapter Five of this study.

<sup>2</sup> Marcus and Taber, *op. cit.* p117.

Monroe Doctrine, and other doctrines “aimed at perpetuating hegemonism, interventionism, and backyardism in the region.”<sup>1</sup> He was similarly opposed to United States policy towards Cuba, and Washington’s perceived use of the IMF, and the World Bank as instruments of imperialism against peripheral states. This study was not able to ascertain the genesis of Bishop’s antipathy towards the United States. It is likely that it began during his study and residence abroad, when he was radicalized by exposure to Marxist writings, and experiences of racism.

#### Analysis of Bishop’s operational code

Philosophical Beliefs: The nature of Politics

Belief 1. Bishop saw politics as a medium of providing law, order, justice, and social awareness. He established in his Line of March speech the parameters of the people’s compliance with the mandate of the government, and the responsibility of the political process to serve the needs of the people. But some of his pronouncements belie his professed democratic values. On September 13, 1982, he boasted that:

Just consider, comrades, how laws are made in this country. Laws are made in this country when Cabinet agrees and when - I sign a document on behalf of Cabinet. And that is what everybody in the country – like it or don’t like it – has to follow. Or, consider how people get detained in this country. We don’t go and call for no votes. You get detained when I sign an order after discussing it with the National Security of the Party body. Once I sign it – like it or don’t like it – it’s

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p 76

up the hill [prison] for them.<sup>1</sup>

In another speech, Bishop advised Grenadians that:

When the revolution speaks, it must be heard, listened to.  
Whatever the revolution decrees, it must be obeyed; when  
the revolution commands, it must be carried out; when  
the revolution talks, no parasite must bark in their corner.  
The voice of the masses must be listened to,<sup>2</sup>

These and other utterances, do not accord with the view, held by his admirers, and some of his critics,<sup>3</sup> that Maurice Bishop was more democratic than Marxist, hence the ideological opposite of Bernard Coard, who is often portrayed as “the Stalinist devil incarnate.”<sup>4</sup>

Belief 4. Bishop was perceived by many as an advocate of peace. He professed to believe in the possibility of peaceful co-existence and détente, but claimed that the achievement of such a dream was being impeded by the forces of imperialism. Bishop believed in the efficacy of the socialist system. He believed that socialist states were genuinely interested in aiding poor societies, unlike their capitalist

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<sup>1</sup> Maurice Bishop, “Line of March for the Party,” Grenada Occasional Papers – No.1, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C. August 1984, p.7.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber, eds. Maurice Bishop Speaks. New York, NY: Pathfinder Press, 1983, p. 164.

<sup>3</sup> See Minutes of the Fifth Setting of the Central Committee Plenary Meeting 9-26-83.

<sup>4</sup> See Bernard Coard, Summary Analysis of the October 1983 Catastrophe in Grenada. This is an unpublished monograph dated 2002, and written while Coard was imprisoned for his role in the assassination of Bishop and others. See p. 49 in particular.

counterparts, which he claimed were bent on raping and exploiting the resources of the periphery.

Belief 5. Bishop was an optimist. He believed that his goals for Grenada were achievable, and that socialist states would contribute to that process. This was an illusion. Were he more conversant of the history of relations between socialist states, he would have observed that socialist states, like all nations, are more committed to their national interests than to benevolent postures towards states of similar political persuasions. The bases of the Sino-Soviet conflict are illustrative of this truism. Moscow placed its national interests above the needs of Beijing; so too did the East Germans and the Russians in their trade with the PRG.<sup>1</sup>

#### Image of the Opponent

Belief 5. Bishop did not believe that Americans were inherently evil, but he was convinced that their government was driven by a domineering impulse, and a disregard for people within the periphery. He considered Reagan a fascist, but appealed to him to restore a state of peaceful coexistence with Grenada. Bishop's

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<sup>1</sup> See Frederic Pryor, Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy. New York, NY:PRAEGER, 1986, pp. 79-84.

fear of an American invasion was a case of justifiable paranoia, which drove the PRG closer to Cuba and Soviet bloc nations.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the occasional exchange of abusive rhetoric between Bishop and some of his Caribbean enemies, the PRG remained in CARICOM and OECS, and, according to his press secretary, Don Rojas, amicable contacts were maintained with most Caribbean heads of state, including those with whom he occasionally had bitter exchanges.<sup>2</sup>

## INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

### Selecting goals

Belief 1. The working class of the world constitutes the principal force for peace. It is incumbent on working people everywhere to oppose the military industrial complex, and fight against the forces of imperialism, both of which are committed to objectives inimical to poor countries.

### Goal priorities

Belief 2. The Caribbean should be a “Zone of Peace.” This means the exclusion of nuclear arms, and the closing of military and naval installations.

Belief 3. There should be an end to the American Trade boycott of Cuba.

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<sup>1</sup> See Bernard Coard, op.cit. p.7.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Don Rojas, April 25, 2008.

Belief 4. The United States and other powerful nations should respect the aspirations of Third World peoples for a more equitable status among states.

But Bishop was silent on Soviet imperialism. His spirit of umbrage should have constrained his acceptance of Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan.

Instead, he employed a hypocritical justification for what was an example of naked aggression against a weak and backward state.

Control of risks

Belief 5. Bishop was occasionally injudicious in his verbal attacks on the United States. This might have been intended to convince the Cubans and Soviets that Grenada had matured as a socialist state, and was not reluctant to stand up to the enemies of socialism. This posture was at best risky, in light of the negative perceptions which the United States held of Grenada's dependence and consequent alliance on and with Cuba.

Timing

Belief 6. Bishop was imbued with a sense of urgency. Instead of choosing an incremental *modus operandi*, he sought foreign aid for many projects which were put in operation simultaneously, and with dispatch. This proved disadvantageous,

especially in the construction of the Point Salines airport, which imposed a financial burden on the state, notwithstanding external aid for the project.

Bishop's decision to go to Hungary September of 1983 was inopportune. Faced with rising protest within the party against his administrative short-comings, he ought to have remained in Grenada and taken steps to mitigate the crisis.

### Analysis of Bishop's strengths and weaknesses.

The vast majority of analysts of the Grenada Revolution, and particularly those who knew him,<sup>1</sup> agree that Maurice Bishop was a person of uncommon human warmth, a gifted orator, a charismatic personality, and an exceptionally approachable leader. Even Bernard Coard, who is invariably reviled as Bishop's nemesis, writes that:

There was no one within – or without – the party with anything remotely approaching his particular skills or strengths:

- The ability to inspire, to motivate the vast majority of the people, to make everyone **listen, think**, and then act on that basis;
- The ability to break down the most complex

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<sup>1</sup> Those analysts whose works are cited in this study include George Brizan, Steve Clark, Jorge Heine, Gordon K. Lewis, Leslie Manigat, Brian Meeks, and Gregory Sandford. Others expressing similar sentiments, and are mentioned in this study are: Anthony Harriott, Rupert Lewis, Trevor Munroe, all three of whom are on the faculty of UWI, Mona, Jamaica, and Sir Nicholas Brathwaite, Richard Hart, Chester Humphrey, George Louison, Don Rojas, and Sir Paul Scoon.

concepts or ideas in a manner which made them intelligible to all;

- The ability to effectively communicate the party's vision of the future to the entire population; to give each member of a huge crowd a sense of perspective, of where he/she fit into the process.<sup>1</sup>

As a consequence of these extraordinary gifts, Bishop, according to Coard, was able to inspire Grenadians to work harder, volunteer for community-based infrastructural projects, be more united as a people, and join the Peoples Militia by the thousands.<sup>2</sup>

Bishop's many positive attributes operated favorably for him at home, as well as abroad. He was admired by most Grenadians, notwithstanding their lack of passion for the ideological posture of the NJM (see table 3.1). In the international arena, his ability to articulate the needs and aspirations of the revolution enabled him to obtain grants and loans in Western Europe and some Arab states. Even Bishop's Caribbean counterparts who abhorred the existence of a Marxist state in their midst, found him congenial, and one with whom they could work for the common good of the region.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bernard Coard, op. cit. pp. 20-21

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Jacqueline A. Braveboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking States. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1989, p. 181.

Table 3.1

What People Liked About Bishop's Leaders

Factor	Number	Percentage
Relations with the masses	160	41.1
Development policy	123	31.6
Speeches	34	8.7
Leadership	31	8.0
Other	41	10.5
Total	387	99.9

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Source: Patrick Emmanuel, Farley Brathwaite, and Eudine Barriteau, Political Change and Public Opinion in Grenada 1979-1984, ISER Occasional Paper 19, U.W.I., Cave Hill, Barbados, 1986, p.24.

But despite his commendable qualities, Bishop was beset by serious weaknesses which impaired his leadership. Foremost among these was his tendency to be over accommodating, even to the point of compromising his principles for the sake of achieving consensus (see table 3.2). This shortcoming was exemplified by his failure to rebuke Coard for making certain crucial decisions while he, Bishop, was absent from Grenada. These included the closing of the *Torchlight*,<sup>1</sup> and Bishop's *ex post facto* acquiescence to Coard's reversal of the decision, taken by Bishop, not to support Moscow in the Afghanistan vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Not the least of Bishop's shortcomings was the fact that he was trusting to a fault. He reposed implicit confidence in his deputy, and thus refused to countenance warnings that Coard was dangerously obsessed with power.<sup>2</sup> Far from being a strong leader, Bishop allowed Coard to displace from the PRG and the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) some of his most loyal supporters who were then replaced by members of OREL, where Coard's influence was most persuasive. A major consequence of this particular episode was the weakening of Bishop's base to the point where he lost all advantages, and in the power struggle which eventuated in the summer of 1983,

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<sup>1</sup> Discussed at length below.

<sup>2</sup> See Heine, *op. cit.* p. also Gregory Sandford, The New Jewel Movement: Grenada's Revolution, 1979-1983. Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State, 1985, p. 166.

found his supporters in the Central Committee outnumbered by pro-Cord forces 12 to 4.

It might be argued that Bishop, unlike some powerful Caribbean prime ministers,<sup>1</sup> was constrained by the tenets of the NJM Manifesto. The brief rejoinder offered by this study argues that Bishop chose to accept the principles of a “vanguard” party<sup>2</sup> which evolved from Marxist theory, rather than from the Grenadian people. Given his charisma, and the overwhelming acceptance accorded him in the early stage of the revolution, he could have defied some aspects of the Manifesto and drawn power from the people.<sup>3</sup> But Bishop was obsessed with Marxism, and too devoid of the requisite political will and disposition to take such a gamble. Thus we conclude that he was a dynamic personality, but too weak and vacillating to be a leader in a time of crisis.

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<sup>1</sup> Among these were Alexander Bustamante, Eric Williams, Michael Manley, Errol Barrow, Edward Seaga, and Forbes Burnham

<sup>2</sup> A vanguard party is defined as a group of members selected on the basis of rigorous tests for loyalty to the party and its ideology.

<sup>3</sup> It should be remembered that among the many promises which Bishop made to the Grenadian people on the very first day of the revolution was to restore fair elections.

Table 3.2

What People Disliked About Bishop's Leadership

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Factor	Number	Percentage
Softness toward party rivals	59	26.2
Lack of rights	49	21.8
Communism	37	16.4
Presence of guns	29	12.9
Other	51	22.7
Total	225	100.0

Source: Emmanuel, et al. p. 25

## Profile of Bernard Coard

Bernard Coard, deputy prime minister and Marxist theoretician of the People's Revolutionary Government, was born in August, 1944, some three months after Maurice Bishop. After graduating from secondary school, he received a scholarship to study economics at Brandeis University in the United States. He subsequently enrolled in a doctoral program at the University of Sussex, England, but returned to the West Indies before completing his dissertation.

Like Bishop, Coard's study and sojourn abroad resulted in an anti-imperialist disposition, and likewise exposed him, both in the United States and England, to intolerable aspects of international racism. He was particularly aggrieved by the subtlety of racism to which the British school system subjected the West Indian children in Britain. His book on that subject, is arguably his most important literary accomplishment.<sup>1</sup>

Returning to the Caribbean, before the completion of his doctoral studies, Coard taught economics at the University of the West Indies at Mona, where he met and married Phyllis Evans, the heiress to the Tia Maria fortune.<sup>2</sup> While at Mona, Coard came in contact with the New World Group, and Trevor Munroe, a lecturer, whose

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<sup>1</sup> See Bernard Coard, How the West Indian Child is made Educationally sub-normal in the British School System. London: New Beacon Books, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Tia Maria is an internationally known coffee liqueur produced in Jamaica.

Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), a Marxist formation, would later become supportive of the PRG, during its entirety. Coard, who was reputedly a member of communist parties in both the United States and England, had much in common ideologically with Trevor Munroe, including a preference for the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) over its Cuban counterpart, the Partido Comunista Cubano (PCC).<sup>1</sup>

Coard was not a participant in the early protests against the Gairy government, but was nonetheless committed to the cause and aspirations of the NJM. He went to Grenada, from Trinidad in 1973 to assist Bishop in the framing of the Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement, and later that year, he went with Gairy and Herbert Blaize, to participate in deliberations leading to Grenada's independence.<sup>2</sup> The following year, Bernard Coard accepted Maurice Bishop's invitation to join the New Jewel Movement, with the proviso that he be assigned the position of third coordinating secretary.

In 1976, Coard returned to Grenada, permanently, and was appointed to the NJM's Politburo. That same year, he demanded to be selected as a candidate for a parliamentary seat in a constituency that was overwhelmingly anti-Gairy. Bishop

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<sup>1</sup> See Grenada: A Preliminary Report, released by the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.: USIA, December 1983, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Coard went to the London talks in the capacity of the representative of the NJM, the Grenadian opposition in Parliament

acquiesced, and Coard was elected to Parliament, a mere two months after returning to live in Grenada <sup>1</sup>

There is agreement, even among his detractors, that Bernard Coard was a capable and hard-working officer, whose expertise in management and economic planning served the NJM well, prior to and during the incipient stage of the Revolution. But his obsession with the Soviet Union, and his alleged lust for personal power were viewed by some to be inimical to the success of the party, and its government, the PRG.<sup>2</sup>

Whether there existed a latent dialectical conflict between Coard and Bishop, is an enduring polemical issue; there is, however, a wide measure of consensus on the deputy prime minister's resentment for having to stand in the shadow of Bishop. Many who know Coard, describe him as being possessed with what David McClellan describes as N-Ach – Need for Achievement.<sup>3</sup> This theory refers to an individual's intense desire for significant accomplishment, mastering skills, and invariably assuming control of others. According to Jorge Heine, Bernard Coard's symptoms of compulsive character structure, and related idiosyncrasies owe much

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<sup>1</sup> See Jorge Heine, op. cit. p. 233.

<sup>2</sup> Gordon K. Lewis, Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, p.72.

<sup>3</sup> David McClelland, The Achieving Society. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961.

to his father,<sup>1</sup> and societal experiences while Coard was a youngster. This validates the second of Robert Jervis' four relevant variables mentioned above in this chapter.

Unlike Bishop, Coard did not possess a mimetic identification with Castro. Although cognizant of Grenada's dependence on Cuba, he was nonetheless critical of the PPC for not being sufficiently appreciative of Soviet aid, and likewise critical of Fidel Castro's personal domination of government and party organs in Cuba. Accordingly, Coard was determined that Grenada would avoid these 'mistakes and deviations,' and that the NJM would "maintain its autonomy from Cuban leadership."<sup>2</sup>

Claremont Kirton,<sup>3</sup> an economic advisor to Coard during the Revolution, does not share the view, held by many, that Coard was a power-hungry Machiavellian, but acknowledges that he lacked essential leadership qualities. Kirton writes:

Technically developed as an economist, certainly  
politically developed as a Marxist/Leninist, way  
above most of the other leaders in the Party  
in terms of historical grasp of the economy,  
extremely hard worker, stickler for details and

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<sup>1</sup> See Frederick McDermott Coard, Bitter- sweet and spice.:These Things I Remember. Devon, U.K.: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1970

<sup>2</sup> Manning Marable. African and Caribbean Politics. From Kwame Nkrumah to Maurice Bishop. London: Verso, 1987, pp. 215, 299; also Fitzroy Ambursley, The Grenada Revolution, 1979-1983: The Political Economy of an Attempt at Revolutionary Transformation in a Caribbean Mini-state. Ph. D. dissertation, University of Warwick, U.K., 1985.

<sup>3</sup> Kirton is a faculty member of the Economics Department at UWI, Mona

almost idealist in terms of his approach to work....  
extremely good player, but not a good captain.  
Committed, dedicated, but did not have the kind of  
character which allowed him to lead.<sup>1</sup>

This portrait of Bernard Coard is the perception in which he was viewed by many of his compatriots and foreigners alike. He was indeed a dedicated worker, and undoubtedly a rigid Marxist, but he was never successful in developing the image of a “popular man of the people.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Brian Meeks in Brian Meeks’ Social Formation and People’s Revolution: A Grenadian Study. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 1988. p.444.

<sup>2</sup> Brian Meeks, *Ibid*, p. 444

## George Louison

George Louison was Bishop's foreign policy advisor, confidante, and staunch supporter. He graduated from Grenada's Teachers College in 1874 and subsequently served as teacher, farmer, and youth coordinator of Christian Action for Development in the Eastern Caribbean (CADEC). It was Louison who was invited to cast the tie-breaking vote to launch the Revolution on March 13, 1979. As Bishop's chief foreign policy advisor, he was selected to meet with the heads of states of the Eastern Caribbean, in order to calm their lurking fears in the wake of the People's Revolutionary Government's extra – legal emergence.<sup>1</sup>

## Unison Whiteman

Unison Whiteman was born in the eastern part of Grenada and attended an Roman Catholic secondary school in St. George's, the nation's capital. He later attended Howard University, where he earned a bachelor's degree in political science and a master's in economics. Returning to Grenada, he served as a teacher, co-founder of the New Jewel Movement, and an elected member of Parliament in 1976.

Whiteman served the PRG as Minister of Foreign Affairs until he was assassinated with Bishop and other members of his cabinet on October 19, 1983.

## Grenada's dependence on Cuba

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<sup>1</sup> This writer interviewed Louison on two occasions by overseas telephone; he died two days before the scheduled third and final interview.

Most Caribbean states experience three critical needs at the time of independence. These are essentially: economic and technical assistance, international recognition, and security, (regime preservation) in that order.<sup>1</sup> These priorities were reordered in the case of the PRG's advent to power.<sup>2</sup> First and foremost was the need to protect the nascent state against mercenary forces, which were allegedly being recruited by the deposed prime minister, Eric Gairy. The second imperative, closely intertwined with the first, was to obtain international recognition, thereby enhancing the PRG's legitimacy, and its prospects of receiving military aid; thirdly, the need for economic and technical assistance to enable the revolution to offer services and tangible rewards to the people.

Prior to its revolution, Grenada was dependent for most of its economic sustenance on the U.S. Canada, and the United Kingdom. These three countries accounted for more than thirty percent of Grenada's tourism trade, and constituted, along with Trinidad, the major loci of the Grenadian diaspora and related sources of remittances. Furthermore, the United Kingdom, under the terms of Commonwealth trade preferences, provided concessions for the marketing of Grenada's bananas, spices, and other agricultural products. But given the

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<sup>1</sup> See Braveboy-Wagner, *op. cit.* p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> The prioritization of the PRG immediate goals was similar to those of Guyana and Belize, where irredentist threats from Venezuela and Guatemala respectively, made security the primary imperative.

revolutionary modality by which the NJM came to power, and more importantly, its espousal of Marxist/Leninist ideology, all three states refused to aid Grenada in its hour of need.

Speaking on behalf of the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, Nicholas Ridley, the then minister of state at the Foreign Office explained that “Grenada is in the process of establishing a kind of society of which the British Government disapproves, irrespective of whether the people of Grenada want it or not.”<sup>1</sup> This position was shared by some officials of the Carter administration, particularly Zbigniew Brzezinski, who, in his capacity as National Security Advisor, unsuccessfully urged President Carter to blockade Grenada, a mere thirty days after the Revolution.<sup>2</sup>

With aid not forthcoming from the traditional core sources, Cuba was perceived by Bishop and his colleagues as the only country in the western hemisphere which was both willing and capable to provide the arms and services necessary for the preservation of the regime and the implementation of the program of change to which the revolution was committed.

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony Payne, Paul K. Sutton, and Tony Thorndike. Grenada: Revolution and Invasion. London: Croom Helm Ltd. 1984, p.63; also Chris Searle, Grenada: The Struggle against Destabilization. London: Writers and Readers Publishing Comparative Society Ltd. 1985, p.55.

<sup>2</sup> Robert A. Pastor, “Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (Spring 1986):6

There are reasons to believe that Bishop had anticipated the refusal of military aid from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and had therefore solicited arms from Cuba a few days after the coup. The following chronology is instructive in this regard:

- March 22, 1979: the first shipment of Cuban arms arrived in Grenada from Havana via Guyana;
- April 4, 1979: a shipment of arms arrived in Grenada by plane from Cuba;
- April 6, 1979: The freighter, *Matanzas*, departs Cuba with a shipment of arms destined for Grenada; the following day Bishop met with the U.S. ambassador to Barbados, Frank Ortiz and requested weapons for the People's Revolutionary Army(PRA).
- April 7, 1979: Another planeload of arms arrived in Grenada from Cuba;
- April 10, 1979: Bishop meets with Ambassador Ortiz and denies the offer of any aid from Cuba. He did, however, inform Ortiz that he would seek aid from any source to protect Grenada from external aggression.<sup>1</sup>
- April 11, 1979: Cuba and Grenada decide to establish embassies in their respective capitals.

Grenada's approach to Cuba was influenced by (1) basic PRG needs; (2) convergence of ideological perspectives; (3) appreciation for Cuba's international

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<sup>1</sup> Pastor, *Ibid*, p.6; also John Walton Cotman. The Gorrion Tree: Cuba and the Grenada Revolution, New York: Peter Lang, 1993, pp72-74.

activities, particularly its military accomplishments in Angola against South African- backed rebels; (4) the perception that Cuba's approach to defeating capitalist underdevelopment was compatible with Grenada's; and (5) the belief that Cuba would provide substantial aid without constraining conditions similar to those which are included in aid from core capitalist states.

The rapid response of Cuba to the PRG's requests addressed the triad of needs mentioned earlier in this chapter. From a military standpoint, the adequacy of Cuban arms and relevant advisory personnel<sup>1</sup> to instruct the PRA in their use, ensured the protection of the regime from attack by foreign mercenaries.<sup>2</sup>

Cuban economic and technical aid to the PRG was also rendered expeditiously, notwithstanding Havana's shortage of funds, and its dearth of consumer goods. In the field of education, the Cubans constructed schools, provided forty or more scholarships annually in medicine and the sciences; by 1980 one hundred and forty-seven Grenadians were attending different institutions in Cuba.<sup>3</sup> This does not include scholarships to soldiers and officers to study at Cuban military institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> In less than a month after the NJM came to power, Cuba provided the new regime with a total of 3,800 infantry weapons and thirty artillery pieces. For more particulars, see Sandford, *op. cit.* p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> There was a lurking fear on the part of the NJM that even if Gairy failed to recruit mercenaries to attack the PRG, the U.S. might clandestinely engage in such an endeavor, as it tried in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and also in the case of Angola.

<sup>3</sup> Gregory Sandford. *Op. cit.* pp. 112-113.

Cuba was also instrumental in the improvement of health services during the period of the NJM revolution. Havana's contribution to Grenada's health care resulted in a net increase of forty-two per cent of the island's medical personnel from 1979 to 1983. Twelve of the thirty-seven physicians in Grenada in 1982 were Cubans; so too were three of the country's twelve dentists, and many of its medical technicians. Thanks to Cuba's financial assistance, Grenada's health budget increased by fifty per cent, simultaneous with a decrease in infant mortality per one thousand live births from twenty-four to eighteen.<sup>1</sup>

During the first three years of the revolution, Cuba constructed thirty miles of roads, upgraded bridges and feeder roads, built low-income housing projects, installed a network of rural electrification, and a system of adequate potable water supply. Cuba also donated ten fishing boats and gave free instruction in the dynamics of commercial fishing.<sup>2</sup>

The greatest contribution that Cuba made to Grenadian infrastructure was its underwriting of almost fifty per cent (US\$30 million) of the total cost of the construction of the Point Salines International Airport. This venture constitutes the theme of the ensuing chapter of this dissertation.

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<sup>1</sup> Frederec Pryor.op.cit. pp. 147-151.

<sup>2</sup> Pryor, op. cit. pp. 56-57

Arguably, Grenada's most significant dependence on Cuba was in the international sphere. Cuba was an indispensable guide to the PRG in the labyrinth of world politics, a field in which the Bishop regime had limited competence. In 1981, when Bishop was sending a delegation to Moscow to seek additional military supplies, he first sent General Hudson Austin to Havana, requesting that Raul Castro, or his designate coach him on the best ways to present the document to the Soviets.<sup>1</sup> This was but one of many instances when the PRG sought the ideational assistance of Cuba.

A few weeks after the NJM came to power Fidel Castro obtained membership for Grenada in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in his capacity as chairman of the organization's conference in Havana in 1979, enabled Bishop to address that body. Havana also provided the PRG with confidential assessments of many world leaders, particularly those from Marxist states and organizations.

Another manifestation of Grenada's dependence on Cuba was the need for Castro to vouch for the PRG in its efforts to forge links with and secure aid from the Soviet Union and other Marxist states. In this context, Cuba served as the conduit through which military and economic aid flowed from Moscow and the Eastern bloc for transshipment to Grenada. Cuba's intermediary role was said to be determined for the most part by the superiority of port and storage facilities in

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Maurice Bishop to Raul Castro, November 14, 1981. Log No. 102647

Havana to those in St. George's, Grenada. A more plausible reason, however, was probably because the Soviet Union, at that juncture, sought to "reduce areas of conflict with the U.S.A,"<sup>1</sup> particularly in the Caribbean Basin.

Table 3.3  
Grenada's Trade with Socialist Countries 1979 – 1983  
(millions in E.C. dollars )

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
<b>EXPORTS</b>					
China	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Cuba	0.00	0.22	0.19	0.11	0.42
Czechoslovakia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00
German Democratic Republic	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00
Poland	1.07	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00
USSR	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.73	2.49
Total	1.74	0.70	0.19	1.95	2.91
All Nations	55.61	44.51	50.28	47.75	48.46
<b>IMPORTS</b>					
Bulgaria	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
China	0.62	0.66	0.31	0.66	1.05
Cuba	1.39	2.74	2.74	33.67	24.02
Czechoslovakia	0.26	0.26	0.22	0.30	0.21
German Democratic Republic	0.10	0.10	0.27	0.40	15.75
Hungary	0.12	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.13
North Korea	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10
Poland	0.20	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09
Romania	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
USSR	0.08	0.26	4.16	0.30	0.18
Yugoslavia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Unspecified	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.00
Total	2.73	4.37	7.99	35.56	41.60
All Nations	117.98	135.57	146.71	152.42	154.48

<sup>1</sup> Appendix A, Document 5.

Source: *Annual Digest of Trade Statistics 1982* (St. George's: Government of Grenada, Central Statistical office, 1983).

Note: E.C. (Eastern Caribbean Dollars, EC\$2.70 = U.S.\$1.00)

Table 3.4  
Major Grants and Loans to Grenada by Source 1979 – 1983  
(Millions in U.S. dollars)

Source	Economic Grant	Military Grant	Loans
<b>Socialist Countries</b>			
Cuba	36.60	3.1	
Czechoslovakia	0.00	0.7	
German Democratic Republic	1.50	0.1	2.1
North Korea	0.00	1.3	
USSR	2.60	10.4	
<b>Radical Third World Nations</b>			
Algeria	2.3		
Iraq	7.2		
Libya	0.3		10.4
Syria	2.4		
<b>Other Nations</b>			
Canada	2.9		
Finland (Metex)	0.00		7.3
Nigeria	0.01		
UK Government	0.40		
UK (Plessy Ltd)	0.00		1.9
Venezuela	0.60		
<b>International and Governmental Agencies And Banks</b>			
Caribbean Development Bank	1.10		7.40
Eastern Caribbean Currency			

Table 3.4 continued

Source	Economic Grant	Military Grant	Loans
Authority			1.90
European Development Fund	2.70		2.10
EEC Emergency Fund	0.30		
IMF			6.60
Organization of American States	0.40		
OPEC	0.00		2.00
Underdevelopment Program	0.40		
UNICEF/Food and Agriculture Organization	0.10		
Nonspecified	0.70		5.70
Total	62.60	15.6	47.40

The import/export data in table 3.3 reveal that for the entirety of the revolution, the Grenadian economy remained tied to western countries. The Soviets and the Eastern bloc had very little in the form of consumer goods to offer the PRG; Cuba, dependent as it was on the Soviet Union, could offer only services ( see table 3.4 ) and a limited amount of non-military assistance. As table 3.4 indicates, Cuba contributed 58.8 percent of the total economic grants received by the PRG, as contrasted with a combined total of

4.2 percent contributed by the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic.

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Source: Pryor, op. cit. p. 46

Note: Data does not include commercial banks.

Table 3.5

Position of Grenada/Cuba Technical and Economic Assistance up to May 31<sup>st</sup> 1982

	Ongoing completed	pending	postponed cancelled	%ongoing completed	%pending	%cancelled
UNECA	7	1	0	87.5	12.5	0.0
MITRANS	12	1	2	80.0	6.7	13.3
MINCONS	2	3	0	40.0	60.0	0.0
MINCOM	3	1	0	75.0	25.0	0.0
ICRT	0	3	2	0.0	60.0	40.0
MINBAS	6	1	0	85.7	14.3	0.0
MINPES	12	3	0	80.0	20.0	0.0
MINCIN	1	1	0	50.0	50.0	0.0
MINIL	0	1	0	0.0	100.0	0.0
MINAG	14	3	1	77.8	16.6	5.6
MINAL	4	2	0	66.7	33.3	0.0
CEN	0	2	0	0.0	100.0	0.0
MINAZ	0	1	0	0.0	100.0	0.0
MINSAP	8	1	1	80.0	10.0	10.0
JUCEPLAN	3	0	0	100.0	0.0	0.0
BNC	3	1	0	75.0	25.0	0.0
CEE	1	0	0	100.0	0.0	0.0
CEATM	0	3	0	0.0	100.0	0.0
MINED	6	0	2	75.0	0.0	25.0
CULTURE	5	0	0	100.0	0.0	0.0
INDER	4	2	1	57.1	28.6	14.3
CECE	1	0	0	100.0	0.0	0.0
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>23.5</b>	<b>6.8</b>
<b>TOTAL PROJECTS =132</b>						

Source: **GDCM-004711: FICHE #3, PRG, Technical and Economic Assistance up to May 31<sup>st</sup>, 1982.**

Table 3.6

Grenada/Cuba Collaboration Program 1982/83. Review of Completed Projects up to June 31<sup>st</sup> 1983

Organization	Completed		Cancelled		Pending		Total
	Fulfilled/ongoing		Cuba /Grenada		Cuba/Grenada		
UNECA	8	22	0	1	0	2	33
MITRANS	4	2	0	3	2	5	16
MINCONS	2	1	0	0	4	0	7
MINCOM	0	4	1	2	0	3	10
ICRT	3	0	0	3	0	8	14
MINBAS	1	3	1	0	0	2	7
MINPES	2	5	0	0	2	1	10
MINCIN	0	1	0	2	0	0	3
MINAG	3	9	3	0	8	3	26
MINAL	3	1	0	3	0	2	9
CEN	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
MINSAP	2	5	0	0	2	2	11
JUCEPLAN	0	3	0	0	0	2	5
BNC	1	0	0	1	0	2	4
CEE	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
CEATM	2	3	0	0	1	0	6
MINCEX	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
MINED	4	3	0	1	3	5	16
CULTURE	1	6	0	0	1	1	9
INDER	3	1	0	0	0	0	4
CECE	3	3	0	0	1	3	10
CARTOGRAPHY	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
PEOPLE/S POWER	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>211</b>

Source: **GDCM-008148**: Joint Commission, *Memorandum* 17-24 June 1983, p. 5

Cuba's influence on Grenada's foreign policy

On the basis of the above data, this study hypothesizes that Grenada's foreign policy was significantly influenced by dependence on Cuba, and stemmed from shared ideological preferences among the governing elite of the NJM. Close diplomatic ties between Cuba and Grenada were premised on the realization that the U.S. would view such linkage as counter to its strategic interest, consequently both states anticipated Washington's effort to either co-opt the Revolution, or unleash strategies of destabilization against it. Grenada was therefore faced with a dilemma: to accept aid and close association from and with Cuba risked the displeasure of the United States; to sever ties with Cuba would imperil the Revolution. The choice of the former laid the basis of Grenada's foreign policy with Cuba, as well as with the United States.

#### Cuba-Grenada Protocol

The protocol which determined relations between Cuba and the PRG, was signed by the two governments on May 13, 1979. Discussions between the two states were to be held among representatives of equal rank; this meant that talks on the highest level took place between Castro and Bishop, or their designated representatives. At no time was the sovereignty of Grenada to be compromised, or its territorial rights infringed. These conditions were consistent with Cuba's claim that the conduct of its foreign policy was "on the basis of the most strict respect for equality, sovereignty, independence and national and territorial integrity." Castro,

himself had stated that “the principled character of the relations and policy of Cuba toward revolutionary movements: [sic] The principle: absolute respect for their policy, their criteria, and their decisions; expression of our viewpoint on any subject only if they are requested.”<sup>1</sup> What Castro said in essence was that Cuba would not interfere in Grenada’s decision-making process, but would be willing to participate in an advisory capacity in response to a request from the PRG. Cuba’s ideational support for the Grenada Revolution is best appreciated when seen in the context of the Cuba-Grenada Protocol. Grenada had basic needs for guidance, not only in international affairs, but domestically as well. Cuba was both willing and able to assist. On April 13, 1979, exactly one month after the NJM came to power, the Cuban government issued the following communique:

The Government of the Republic of Cuba considering that the Government born by the Revolutionary Movement and presided over by Maurice Bishop represents the will of the people of Grenada, and considering the statements and expressed decision to implement an independent foreign policy and to participate actively in the Movement of Non-Aligned countries and with the objective of strengthening the ties of friendship that always existed between the peoples of Cuba and Grenada, and in use of the facilities authorized by law, has agreed to recognize, the Government of Grenada and has instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to implement this Agreement.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Fidel Castro, *Speech of Mourning for the Fallen in Grenada*. Havana 14, November 1983, in Maurice Bishop Speaks, op. cit. pp 326-341. See also H Michael Erisman, Cuba’s International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. See also PCC, Programmatic Platform. 122.

<sup>2</sup> D. Sinclair DaBreo, The Grenada Revolution. Castries, St. Lucia: Management and Advertising Services, 1979, p. 311.

On the very same day that Havana released this communiqué, Maurice Bishop and Cuban ambassador to Guyana, Francisco Martinez Montalvo, signed the formal documents which established diplomatic relations between the two countries. A day later, Juan Torres Rizo was designated Cuban charge` d'affaires in Grenada. These events were concomitant with the arrival in St. George's of the Cuban freighter, *Matanzas*, which unloaded its cargo of weapons and cement under the darkness of an imposed blackout.<sup>1</sup>

Torres Rizo, who was elevated to the post of ambassador on October 3, 1979, was the object of many accusations of Havana's meddling in the domestic and foreign affairs of the PRG. His critics accused him of barging into cabinet meetings, and offering proposals which were occasionally incorporated into the PRG's foreign policy. Torres Rizo did offer suggestions and advice to the PRG, but research shows that those were tendered within the context of mutual understanding between Cuba and Grenada.<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Torres Rizo was responsible for the submission to Prime Minister Bishop of a bi-weekly summary and analysis of the

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<sup>1</sup>GDCM-004769: Countries with which Grenada Established Diplomatic Relations since March 13, 1979.

<sup>2</sup>GDCM-006817: fiche #1, 6 February 1980

Commonwealth Eastern Caribbean press coverage of the Grenada Revolution.<sup>1</sup> An exhaustive search by this author has failed to reveal the basis for this arrangement, which seems to contradict the spirit of the Cuban communiqué of April 13, 1979. As the ambassador of his country, Torres Rizo was also the conduit through which flowed Grenadian requests for assistance, and Cuba's response to those requests. The exception to this procedure was when Bishop dealt directly with Castro, and even then, Torres Rizo was privy to most, if not all such transactions. This was not the case with his counterpart in Havana.<sup>2</sup>

There were some pro-Coard members of the PRG who faulted Torres Rizo for being officious. One such official was Politburo member, Selwyn Strachan, who complained that the Cuban ambassador had repeatedly requested from him a "discussion on the state of the party." Strachan avoided meeting with him until the matter was placed before the Politburo, which decided that such a discussion would not take place with the Ambassador, but with Sister Isabelle Jommaron Gonzalez, who was a courier for Castro and Bishop.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> GDCM-004807: Cuba Embassy, St. George's, Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo letter to M. Bishop, 14 December 1979, re Press Analysis for Bishop compiled by Rizo and Cuban Embassy staff; GDCM-006119; PRG, Submission: The Establishment of a Joint Commission between the Government of Grenada and the Republic of Cuba with Aide Memoires of 21, 27 December 1979.

<sup>2</sup> See "Extraordinary General Meeting," cited in Steve Clark, "The Second Assassination of Maurice Bishop," New Internationalist, Vol. 6, 1987, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> CIA, Directory of Cuban Officials, 1987, 115, GDCM-004866, Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday 13, May 1981.

Some writers, Timothy Ashby, in particular,<sup>1</sup> have argued that Cuba exerted an inordinate influence on the foreign policy decision-making of the PRG. Tom Adams, the then prime minister of Barbados, had himself made a similar accusation. It was common knowledge that the Cuban ambassador would show up uninvited to meetings of the Politburo and the Central Committee, and would offer in his *ex officio* status unsolicited advice and opinions. Coard, in particular, was angered by this intrusion, and blames Bishop for not having done anything about it.<sup>2</sup> Torres Rizo's behavior was certainly counter to the principles of the Cuba-Grenada protocol, but could it have been consistent with some secret agreement between Bishop and Castro? Oddly enough, there are no official records available of Rizo's presence at any meeting of the Politburo, the Central Committee, or other branches of the PRG.

It should be noted, however, that Rizo was not the only member of Cuba's diplomatic corps to be accused of meddling in the affairs of an Anglophone Caribbean state. Ulises Estrada, Cuba's ambassador to Jamaica during the Manley regime was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Jamaica. Members of the Jamaican private sector and the elite of the opposition party, the Jamaica Labour Party were incensed by Estrada's behavior and petitioned Prime Minister

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<sup>1</sup> . Ashby, Timothy. "Grenada: Soviet Stepping Stone," U.S. Naval Proceedings 109. December 1983, pp. 30-36.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard Coard, op. cit. p. 15.

Michael Manley to declare him *persona non grata*; Manley refused, but his successor, Edward Seaga, made the expulsion of Estrada the first order of business when he became prime minister in 1980.<sup>1</sup>

One of the leading authorities on international law offers the following definition of diplomatic intervention thus:

. . . it must be emphasized that envoys must not interfere with the internal political life of the State to which they are accredited. It certainly belongs to their functions to watch political events and political parties with a vigilant eye, and to report their observations to their home states. But they have no right whatever to take part in that political life, to encourage one political party, or to threaten another. It matters not whether an envoy acts thus on his own account, or on instruction from his home State. No self-respecting state will allow a foreign envoy to exercise such interference, but will either request his home State to recall him, or, in case his interference is very flagrant, hand him his passport and herewith dismiss him.<sup>2</sup>

A fundamental flaw of the Bishop regime was the absence of any provision to accommodate dissent and criticism. In this regard, the PRG, assisted by the Cubans activated the phenomenon of *Gleichschaltung*, which is “the subjugation of all elements of society to the purposes of the state.” The following are three

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<sup>1</sup> For more information on Estrada’s ouster, See Holger Henke Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica’s Foreign Relations 1972-1989, Ph. D. dissertation, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 2000, p 107. See also R.B. Manderson-Jones, Jamaican Foreign Policy in the Caribbean, 1962-1988. Kingston: Caricom Publishers.

<sup>2</sup> Oppenheim, L., International Law, vol. 1 –Peace (ed. by H. Lauterpacht), 7<sup>th</sup> edition, London, 1948, pp. 704-705

examples in this context in which the advice of Cuba was of critical importance to the revolution:

#### The closure of the Grenada Voice

*The Grenada Voice* was a mimeographed newspaper whose owners were members of the landed and mercantile classes,<sup>1</sup> and who were deemed to be in opposition to the PRG, and connected to the CIA. An alarmed Bishop wrote Fidel Castro expressing the NJM fears that:

The launching of the newspaper is only one element of a total move to seize power by the bourgeoisie. Our intelligence reports are that a new party will be launched by this said group and that the party will become the main force for stirring up civil unrest. This civil unrest will lay the ground work for eventful invasion.<sup>2</sup>

Bishop further informed Castro that the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Government had discussed the matter for two days, and added that:

We recognize that our experience is limited. Consequently we would like to outline the entire situation and all the options we have considered to you and your Party and to ask for whatever advice of suggestions it may be possible to give.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Clark, "Second Assassination," p.27; GDCM-004807: M. Bishop letter to F. Castro 16 June 1981, 2.

<sup>2</sup> GD004807: Bishop letter to F. Castro 16 June 1981, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, pp. 4-5

The NJM sent George Louison to Cuba for consultation with a PCC member designated by Castro. No record is available of Castro's advice, or its impact on the PRG's decision to close the paper. Bernard Coard's proposal to "confiscate all of the large holdings in St. George's and to nationalize everything as a lesson to the bourgeoisie and that stratum," was rejected by Bishop and the Politburo.<sup>1</sup>

#### Havana's Advice on the Rastafarian Opposition

The Rastafarians in Grenada were once supportive of the NJM, and Maurice Bishop had served as the attorney for many of them during the period of Gairy's rule. But by June 1981, they had become disaffected with the NJM, and it was rumored that they contemplated attacking one of the military camps of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), the military wing of the PRG. To forestall that eventuality, the Politburo contemplated arresting some 300 Rastafarians and shaving their heads. Bishop opposed the idea, and the Politburo turned to the Cuban ambassador for advice. Ambassador Torres Rizo cautioned against such a move, for fear it would isolate the People's Revolutionary

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, pp. 4-5; also Steve Clark, *op. cit.* p. 27.

Government regionally and internationally.<sup>1</sup> The Rastafarians were never charged; Coard who had advocated draconian measures against them, informed the Politburo that the NJM had always been reluctant to take firm decisions on key issues.<sup>2</sup>

### Catholic/Anglican Opposition to the PRG

Perhaps the most serious opposition to the NJM was that which surfaced early in 1980. The Anglican bishop called for early elections, release of political prisons, and a condemnation of the PRG's seizure of the country's two independent newspapers. His Roman Catholic counterpart accused the Bishop regime of silencing popular opinion, and sponsored the publication of pamphlets to articulate his anti-Marxist protests.<sup>3</sup> The Government retaliated by accusing the Dominican Order of planning to bring in foreign priests to subvert the Revolution. Tension escalated on both sides, and the NJM turned to Cuba for advice and direction. Aurelio Alonso Tejada, the PCC America Department religion expert, was seconded to the PRG to provide advice on how to deal with what had become a delicate problem. Among his many recommendations were (1) that the PRG "study the possibility of formally creating a Register of Associations

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<sup>1</sup> Clark, *op. cit.* p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid* p.28.

<sup>3</sup> Marcus and Taber, *op. cit.* pp. 66-67

to regularize the access by the government to systemic factual information on the religious institutions and their activities;”<sup>1</sup> (2) that members of the Grenada Protestant clergy travel to Cuba to train in the Matanzas Evangelical Seminary.

#### PRG Economic Relations with Mexico

Prior to Bishop’s visit to Mexico, Belize, and Australia, in the fall of 1981, he was briefed by Castro on how to approach Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo, with the hope of securing economic aid and warm diplomatic ties. Castro advised Bishop that Portillo “likes to have private meetings with just the interpreter present. You will impress him with your youth, firmness, logical, rational [demeanor]. He likes young people, especially if they are firm.” Castro helped in structuring the details of a proposed oil agreement between Mexico and Grenada; in the process, he advised Bishop to inform Portillo that “you trust the stability and consistency of Mexico. That’s why you want the supplies only from Mexico.”<sup>2</sup> Castro did not specify what the supplies were, but the purpose of Bishop’s meeting with Portillo was to obtain a favorable oil deal, and Mexico’s agreement to construct oil storage infrastructures in Grenada, or in Cuba, where the oil could be refined and subsequently shipped to Grenada.

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<sup>1</sup> CIA Directory of Cuban Officials, 1987, 12, Tejada Religious Situation

<sup>2</sup> GDCM-005193: What to request from Mexico. Bishop’s notes of meeting with F. Castro re 24 September meeting between Bishop and Mexican President Lopez Portillo.

The four cases cited above represent a proverbial drop in the bucket of advice solicited from Cuba by Grenada, but they are illustrative of the popular view that the Bishop regime did almost nothing without consulting the Cubans.

Bishop and some of his colleagues seemed genuinely appreciative of the Cuban variant of socialism, of what Cuba had done for Grenada, and what it aspired to do elsewhere in the periphery. Thus in an effort to demonstrate its gratitude to Cuba, the elite of the PRG made certain foreign policy decisions which were definitely not in the best interest of Grenada. Some of these decisions were:

1. To join Cuba and Jamaica in advocating the return of Guantanamo to Cuba, a decision which aggravated Washington's strained relations with the PRG;
2. To join Cuba in calling for independence for Puerto Rico. Coming from a state that supported the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, this move was tantamount to plain hypocrisy. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the vast majority of Puerto Ricans were desirous of delinking from the United States;
3. Joining Cuba in supporting Argentina in the Falklands controversy. The PRG was the only Commonwealth state to take sides against the United Kingdom in the United Nations deliberations on this issue. This decision further strained relations between London and the PRG.
4. Joining Cuba against China in the Sino-Soviet conflict. There is no available evidence to prove that Grenada was pressured by Cuba to make this choice.

A question which needs to be addressed, is: Did a Cuba mind-set exist among the PRG decision-making elite? The answer to such a question is unequivocally

affirmative. The reason for the Cuba mind-set was threefold: first, and most important, was Grenada's dependence on Cuba for a plethora of supplies and services. This was a compelling cause for the PRG elite to make foreign policy choices that were not inimical to Cuba's interests; secondly, Bishop and some of his colleagues seemed to have genuinely admired Fidel Castro as a person, a leader, and a Caribbean "David" who dared to confront the "Goliath" of the North. Thirdly, the elite of the PRG was appreciative of what Cuba had done for Grenada, and what it aspired to do elsewhere in the periphery. But this fixation on Cuba was fraught with danger, given the geopolitical realities of the Cold War, and the failure of the PRG to appreciate the seriousness of Washington's opposition to a Cuba-Grenada linkage.<sup>1</sup>

#### Content Analysis of Grenada's dependence on Cuba

In an attempt to determine the PRG's dependence on Cuba, the methodology of manifest content analysis will be employed. There is consensus among scholars such as Ole Holsti, Klaus Krippendorff, and Robert Weber<sup>2</sup> that content analysis is a replicable and reliable research technique for ascertaining psychological characteristics of leaders, in particular, to whom access is invariably unavailable. Content analysis enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data with

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<sup>1</sup> See Bernard Coard, *op. cit.* p.7.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Philip Weber. Basic Content Analysis. Newbury Park, CA: 1990.

relative ease in a systematic fashion. It can be a useful technique for allowing us to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention. It also allows inferences to be made about the messages within the texts, the writer(s), the audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a part. Texts can be defined broadly as books, book chapters, essays, interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theatre, informal conversation, or really any occurrence of communicative language.

Ole Holsti merges some fifteen uses of content analysis into three basic categories:

- make inferences about the antecedents of a communication;
- describe and make inferences about characteristics of a communication;
- make inferences about the effect of a communication<sup>1</sup>

Klaus Krippendorff argues that six questions must be addressed in every content analysis:

Which data are analyzed?

How are they defined?

What is the population from which they are drawn?

What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed?

What are the boundaries of the analysis?

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<sup>1</sup> Ole R. Holsti. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, MA. 1969

What is the target of the inferences? <sup>1</sup>

According to *Zipf's law*,<sup>2</sup> the assumption is that words and phrases mentioned most often are those reflecting important concerns in every communication.

Therefore, quantitative content analysis starts with word frequencies, time counts, and key word frequencies.

Which data are analyzed and why (What are the target of the inferences)?

Public speeches by Maurice Bishop (Former Prime Minister of Grenada 1979-83) will be utilized as the source data for this research. 13 speeches from Maurice Bishop Speaks<sup>3</sup> will be used as a sample. These serve as sufficient samples from which to launch research as they refer to the relationship with Cuba and the United States which is a focus of my research. The speeches span the four and a half year tenure of Bishop as leader of the New Jewel Movement. Analysis will be done to determine the perceptions of dependence on Cuba and the United States.

How are they defined?

These data are defined as any multiple (co)occurring words or phrases within a sentence or series of sentences within a given context unit.

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<sup>1</sup> Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, 2<sup>nd</sup>. Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> Zipf's law, named after the linguist George Kingsley Zipf, states that given some corpus of natural language utterances, the frequency of any word is proportional to the rank in the frequency table. See George K. Zipf, The Psychobiology of Language. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1935.

<sup>3</sup> This is a compendium of Bishop's major speeches.

### Operationalization Measures

For the purpose of this dissertation, emphasis will be placed on predefined multiple (co)occurring words or phrases within each context unit (sentence). The *emergent* coding approach is used where categories are established following preliminary examination of the data. As seen in Table 1, a list of 9 main entries (words and phrases) is used in the search list for analysis. These words and phrases are counted as themselves but are further defined by the synonyms / related items identified. These represent the embodiment of the main entries and are counted as such

Table 1

Main Entries	Synonyms/ related items recognized
Cuba	Castro, Cuban, Fidel
Education/Social	Doctor, Fisherman, Fishermen, Scholarship, University, School, Teacher
Economic Dependence	Assistance, economic policy, Financial Aid
Military	Arms, Defense, US Invasion
Technology	Construction worker, Technical Expert, Technological Transfer, Airport, Road
America	America, U.S., U.S.A, USA
Economic Destabilization	Blocking Aid, Commerical Ties, Dissuading Tourists, Economic isolation Industrial Unrest, International Economic Order, Multinational Exploitation, Trade Sanctions
Ideological Animosity	Anti-Imperialism, Diplomatic Pressure, Non Support of Pluralism Propaganda Campaign
Imperialist Pressure	Carter Doctrine, Munroe Doctrine, Sever Ties with Cuba Threats of Destabilization
Military Threats	Amber & Amberines, Counter Revolutionaries, Intimidation Mercenaries, Red X, Solid Shield, Terror, Terrorism

To achieve the level of analysis required, I will use a computer-assisted text analysis program, HAMLET II, which generates statistics for individual and joint frequencies of words or groups of words, expressed in a specified unit of context in a text. In this regard, analysis is done at two levels first, frequency analysis: which is a count of how often a word or set of words appear within a text. It aims at identifying any trends within the speech pattern of the subject from which the angle of emphasis can be inferred. Second, Hierarchical Cluster analysis: this aims to graphically show the level of connectedness of words or phrases to each other. Displayed, using a dendrogram, items joined at the highest levels indicate that there is little connection with other words or phrases in the analysis. This technique provides a powerful corroborative tool to the frequency analysis which strengthens the accuracy of inferences made.

In selecting context units a variable context unit is employed, i.e it only counted context units where the main entries and selected synonyms were found. Context units are sentences ending with .!?) This decision will affect the co-occurrence figures as only context units with the selected entries will be counted.

## Significance of Results

### Cuba and Grenada

Apparent from the Text Profile of the speeches, 96797 words were read from the text file. 916 of these were in the search list, and 3372 context-units were counted and read and analyzed yielding the results in Table 1. The table shows that words that signified educational and social dependence accounted for .07% of the text, economic dependence accounted for .25% of the entire text, military dependence accounted for .16% and technological dependence accounted for .12% of the vocabulary list. Importantly, words representing Cuba accounted for .31% of the text.

Of the variables or dimensions of dependence provided as main entries and synonyms, the following frequencies were identified. Table 1 column % of vocabulary list allows the researcher to quantify the relative frequency of a entry as a percentage of all the entries that HAMLET searched for. The table shows that words that signified education and social dependence accounted for 7.1% of the vocabulary list found in the particular speech, military dependence accounted for 17.03 % of the vocabulary list. Importantly, words representing Cuba and Economic Dependence accounted for 33.08% and 30.57% of the vocabulary list respectively.

These frequencies are used to generate joint frequency analysis and jaccard coefficient<sup>1</sup> which are illustrated on a dendrogram.<sup>2</sup>

Figure 2 is a dendrogram illustrating the connectivity or clustering of the entries provided. It is illustrative and indicates that economic and technological dependence are closely clustered and are linked to Cuba and Military dependence. This suggests that these terms were closely clustered in the Bishop speeches.

What congruence if any exist between the frequencies of terms identified in Table 1 and the Hierarchical Cluster Dendrogram (Diagram 1) of the said terms?

According to Table 2 the terms associated with Economic and technological and military dependence co-occurred 26 times while Cuba and Economic dependence co-occurred 13 times. Cuba and Military dependence co-occurred 14 times.

### US and Grenada

Apparent from the text profile of the speech 96796 words were counted 524 of these were in the search list, and 3334 context-units were counted, of which 441

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<sup>1</sup> The **Jaccard index**, also known as the **Jaccard similarity coefficient** (originally coined *coefficient de communaue* by Paul Jaccard), is a statistic used for comparing the similarity and diversity of sample sets. The Jaccard coefficient is defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the union of the sample sets.(Source: Google).

<sup>2</sup> A **dendrogram** is essentially a visual depiction of associations such as those which I have described in this case. It shows the relatedness of the sets of words that represent, in the case of this study, the different dimensions of the concept of dependence.

contained at least one item in the search list and read and analyzed yielding the results in Table 3. The table indicates that words representing United States of America accounted for 0.45% of the entire text and 82.25% of the vocabulary list. Words representing Economic Destabilization and Military threats accounted for 7.82% and 8.78% of the vocabulary list respectively and 0.04% and 0.05% of the entire text respectively.

The dendrogram is also indicative as USA and military threats are closely clustered while ideological animosity and economic destabilization are directly linked. The dendrogram also shows a close link between the two clusters.

Table 2

vocabulary list	frequency	% voc. list	% text	context unit
Cuba	303	33.08	.31	226
Education/Social	280	30.57	.29	239
Economic Dependence	65	7.10	.07	48
Military	156	17.03	.16	133
Technology	112	12.23	.12	101

Table showing frequency of word occurrences for selected speeches

96797 words were read from the text file. 916 of these were in the search list, and 3375 context-units were counted, of which 659 contained at least one item in the search list.




Table 2.1 JOINT FREQUENCIES for groups of 0 SENTENCES, punctuated [ . ? !]

	Cuba	Economic	Social/educational	Military
Economic	13			
Social/educational	2	1		
Military	14	15	7	
Technology	10	26	3	2

Table 3 Vocabulary List

vocabulary list	frequency	% voc. list	% text	context unit
Economic destabilization	41	7.82	0.04	40
Ideological Animosity	5	0.95	0.01	5
Imperialist pressure	1	0.19	0.00	1
Military threats	46	8.78	0.05	41
US	431	82.25	0.45	368

It is important to note the absence of any mention of Soviet aid. In the speeches from which these tables are based, there are numerous praises for the benevolence of Cuba, even though Bishop and his colleagues aspired to obtain a substantial amount of aid from the Soviet Union

### CONCLUSION

This chapter, the most comprehensive of the dissertation addressed major aspects of the revolution which bear relevance to its foreign policy. Its opening statement attests to the interrelatedness of ideology and dependence as a crucial means of explaining the foreign policy of the PRG. In this regard, the study utilized the historical, structural, and institutional perspectives of the New World Group (NWG), a body of eminent economists affiliated with the University of the West Indies at Mona, Jamaica. Although their focus was not directed on a particular Caribbean society, many of their diagnoses and solutions were applicable to Grenada.

Grenada shares common problems of development and dependence with many islands in the Caribbean; it likewise shares a legacy of slavery and its attendant plantation system. These problems are compounded by the overarching constraints of small size, mountainous terrain, and the periodical ravages of hurricanes. But

unlike Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad, and Barbados, Grenada was not victimized by large multi-national imperialists, who were the object of many of Bishop's tirades. Despite their discrepancies, the NWG approaches found favor with the NJM, but it was eventually replaced among Caribbean leaders to a Cuban model which those leaders found more to their liking, thanks to Cuba's success in providing adequate housing, health facilities, education, and low unemployment.

Sometime in 1973, Bernard Coard, who was lecturing in Trinidad traveled to Grenada and jointly participated with Maurice Bishop in writing the Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement, which established the parameters within which the anticipated foreign policy of that group would operate.

Coming to power, the NJM accepted the tenets of the non-capitalist path, a Soviet model, which like Marxist/Leninism was incongruous to the political culture of Grenada. All members of the PRG's Central Committee were required to study the principles of the non-capitalist path, but this effort did not seem to bear any fruit. Not many, if any, operational codes of the leaders of micro-states are extant. This study presents one of Maurice Bishop, and a briefer one of his deputy, Bernard Coard. One of the objectives of this exercise is to demonstrate the attributes and shortcomings of both men, and to illustrate that despite his charisma, Bishop was too weak and compromising a leader, and Coard too driven with a lust for power to be men of the hour.

This chapter provides a substantial amount of data to validate the hypothesis that Grenada's dependence on Cuba was profound to the point of being indispensable. Cuba's assistance involved a plethora of projects and military assistance; it also was ideational at times. When Grenada had difficulties with the local Rastafarian group, the Central Committee consulted the Cuban ambassador for a solution of the problem; when both the Catholic and Anglican churches articulated their opposition to certain actions on the part of the PRG, Bishop dispatched an emissary to Havana for consultation on how to resolve what loomed as a threat to the future of the government. It is a truism that the revolution did precious little without consulting Cuba.

## CHAPTER FOUR: DECISION NUMBER ONE

### Background

This chapter constitutes the first of two foreign policy decisions made by the PRG, which were selected for critical analysis by virtue of their impact on Grenada-Soviet/Cuban relations on the one hand, and consequent relations between Grenada and the United States on the other.

There is relative consensus that its relations with Cuba were the most important aspect of Grenada's foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> Cuba, as mentioned earlier, was the PRG's most generous and dependable benefactor from the embryonic phase of the Revolution, when anticipated donors, particularly the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, refused to honor Bishop's appeal for critically needed assistance.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that it was Cuba which served as the nexus between Grenada and the Soviet Union, as well as the acknowledged root cause of the bitterness between the United States and the PRG, beginning with the Ortiz episode, and culminating four and a half years later, when the Revolution imploded.

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony Payne, "The Foreign Policy of the PRG," in Jorge Heine A Revolution Aborted, op. cit. p. 130.

<sup>2</sup> Cuba's early assistance was acknowledged by Bishop in a speech given on June 19, 1981. See Marcus and Taber, op. cit. 9. 151.

## The dynamics of Decision One

No aspect of Cuban-Grenadian relationship was more intolerable to the United States than the PRG's decision to allow Cuba to participate in the funding and construction of a new airport at Point Salines. Accordingly, the United States employed every means to frustrate Grenada's endeavor to secure funding for the project, which in the perception of Washington, was military in purpose rather than the economic undertaking the PRG proclaimed it to be.<sup>1</sup>

The idea of the airport was the brain child of Eric Gairy, ostensibly for the same reason that the PRG gave for its construction: to enhance the island's tourism potential, and consequently provide a much needed infusion in the economy.<sup>2</sup> But as early as 1977, when the NJM was in opposition, Bishop observed that the airport could serve dual purposes:

. . . through the World Bank the United States Government has told GULP it would be willing to build an international airport in exchange for permission to use it for ninety-nine years. The importance of this installation for our country is obvious, given that this is an island. But its importance for the military circles in the Pentagon is also obvious, given Grenada's strategic position in the Caribbean and on the routes to Africa and Europe<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Mark Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada: Notes Toward an inner History, in Jiri Valenti and Herbert J. Ellison, Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and OECS Intervention, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p.69.

<sup>2</sup> The NJM had opposed the Gairy initiative on the grounds that increased tourism would vitiate the morals and cultural integrity of Grenadians. For more particulars, see Ibid, p.69.

<sup>3</sup> Marcus and Taber, op.cit. p.19

Upon assuming power on March 13, 1979, the New Jewel Movement reversed its opposition to a new airport, and passionately endeavored to make the prospect a reality. The feasibility of the project was influenced substantially by the willingness of Cuba to underwrite most of the related cost of the venture. In an address to the nation on Radio Free Grenada, March 29, 1981, Bishop recalled that given the negative responses to his appeal for assistance in building the airport, he and his cabinet thought of abandoning the idea, but:

Fortunately, this proved not to be necessary, as following conversations that I had with President Fidel Castro, the leader of the Cuban revolution, at the Non-Aligned Conference in August 1979 and again at the United Nations in October of that same year, the fraternal government and people of Cuba agreed to assist whatever local efforts we could make with their own selfless and critical contributions. In this regard, it was clear from the outset that our fraternal friends in Cuba could help only in certain fields within their possibilities covering from major areas: (1) skilled manpower not available in our country; (2) vital equipment, such as graders, bulldozers, and other heavy equipment; (3) some technical expertise, and (4) some cement and steel.<sup>1</sup>

On April 14 and 15 1981, Bernard Coard scheduled a conference in Brussels to raise loans for the airport project; the United States dissuaded many of its allies from attending, but Cuba and the European Common Market made pledges, as did Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Venezuela.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 144

In reaction to Washington's anti-airport crusade, Bishop forwarded the following letter to Reagan in August 1981:

Dear Mr. President:

Greetings! and best wishes to you, your Government, and your people. We in Grenada have heard, read, and seen reports on radio, newspaper and television saying in effect that your Government is engaged in an intense diplomatic and press initiative aimed at discouraging European support for international financial assistance for our new international airport. In fact, Mr. William Dyess, spokesman for your administration is quoted in the Miami Herald of Sunday, March 22, 1981 as confirming this.

In fact these reports accurately represent your Government's views; I express deep concern and dissatisfaction with the position of your administration.

You must know of the genuine need for and character of the airport especially because it so clearly represents a major attempt by Grenada to break with underdevelopment and to assist in bringing economic justice to the people of Grenada. References, allegations and speculations to the contrary give greatly distorted and inaccurate views of this reality.

My government has always wanted good relations with your Government and people. All your diplomats and officials who have come to Grenada can confirm this. As we have continued to repeat the basis for such principled

Good neighborliness includes the fact that the U.S. tourists come to Grenada by the thousands annually; the fact that thousands of United States citizens (residents and students) live in Grenada; included also is the fact that thousands of Grenadians live in the United States. Equally important is the fact that Grenada poses no security threat whatsoever to your country, or indeed, to any other country.

As I am sure you know, my Government has been trying over a period to develop amicable and mutually beneficial bilateral relations between our countries. Indeed, we have made several requests for economic assistance and cooperation, including specific requests for economic assistance and cooperation, including specific requests for U.S. aid for the airport project itself.

Grenada is a small, poor country making every effort to break out of the cycle of cultural and economic dependency. Ours is one of the many countries characterized by the international community as a "small island state," with well-documented socio-economic and developmental problems. My Government, in the first two years of our existence, has put every possible emphasis on building a

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 144

viable economic and political existence for our people. I hope that you will agree that it cannot be in the objective interest of the richest and most powerful country in the world to use its might and power to try to crush one of the smallest and poorest countries in the world; in fact a country of 133 square miles, and 110,000 people.

Mr. President, I would like to suggest that our two Governments hold bilateral discussions at the highest possible level to discuss developments and to clear up possible misunderstandings. I sincerely look forward to a positive response to this proposal.

I avail myself of the opportunity to extend best wishes and highest consideration to you.

Yours sincerely,

Maurice Bishop

PRIME MINISTER<sup>1</sup>

This was the third of three letters which Bishop had written to President Reagan; it was the second of two which were never acknowledged. This was indicative of the diplomatic destabilization which Washington had brought to bear against the PRG. Both Carter and Reagan took a negative view of the Point Salines airport. But whereas Carter assumed a wait and see attitude on the matter, Reagan was caustic and determined to treat it as an act of Soviet projection in an area of United States hegemony, and as such, he was disposed to regard it as a potential threat of major proportion. In a speech on March 10, 1983, to the annual meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers, he inveighed against the airport, and other installations which he claimed were being constructed by the Soviets and Cubans in Grenada:

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<sup>1</sup> See EPICA, op. cit.

Grenada, that tiny little island – with Cuba at the west end of the Caribbean, Grenada at the east end . . . is building now, or having built for it, . . . a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and facilities for the storage of munitions, barracks, and training ground for the military. I'm sure all of that is simply to encourage the export of nutmeg.

People who make these arguments haven't taken a good look at a map lately or followed the extraordinary buildup of Soviet and Cuban military power in the region or read the Soviets' discussions about why the region is important to them and how they intend to use it.

It isn't nutmeg that's at stake in the Caribbean and Central America, it is the United States national security.<sup>1</sup>

About two weeks later, on the evening of March 23, 1983, Reagan delivered a nationwide address on national security, at which he unveiled. *inter alia* aerial reconnaissance photographs of the Point Salines Airport under construction:

On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, the Cubans with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passageway for our international commerce and military lines of communication. More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The rapid buildup of Grenada's military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to these island country of under 100,000 people and totally at odds with the pattern of eastern Caribbean states, most of which are unarmed.

The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region. And it is in this important economic and strategic area that we are trying to help the Governments of El

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<sup>1</sup> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 19, no 10, March 14, 1983, p.377.

Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and others in their  
Struggles for democracy against guerrillas supported  
Through Cuba and Nicaragua.<sup>1</sup>

Reagan laid out in this speech, with some measure of cogency, the trepidation of the United States towards the Point Salines project. He based his opposition to the new airport on the geopolitical and economic implications that they held for both the United States and the Circum-Caribbean, and indicated that Cuba and the Soviet Union had a common cause within the Caribbean. This he emphasized later in the speech:

These pictures only tell a small part of the story. I wish I could show you more without compromising our most sensitive intelligence sources and methods. But the Soviet Union is also supporting Cuban military forces in Angola and Ethiopia. They have bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen, near the Persian Gulf oil fields. They have taken over the port that we built at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. And now for the first time in history, the Soviet Navy is a force to be reckoned with in the South Pacific.<sup>2</sup>

A distinguishing feature of the Reagan speech was its success in elucidating the negative significance, from the United States perspective of Decision One on the part of the PRG. No matter how obvious the economic impetus to construct the airport, the fact that an avowed enemy of the United States was its chief architect

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<sup>1</sup> “National Security: Address to the Nation, March 23, 1983,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 19 no. 12, March 28, 1983, p. 445.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 445.

and underwriter, and that the construction took place during the renewed Cold War, Washington was bound to consider the project suspect and inimical to the strategic interest of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

In the wake of the United States invasion of Grenada, the companies which were involved in the construction of the Point Salines Airport issued disclaimers to the Reagan administration charge that the airport had a strategic *raison d'etre*. Plessy Limited, a British firm in charge of the airport's electrical installations, issued the following clarification:

The airport was designed to facilitate the economic development of Grenada; especially with regard to tourism it would enable direct international flights by wide-bodied jets to Grenada without transfer through other Caribbean countries. It was also designed to satisfy a diversionary airport requirement for other Caribbean countries.

The runway is 9,000 feet long by 150 feet wide and is designed to the standards and practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization. It would enable a Boeing 747 with a full load short of seven passengers to take off for a flight direct to London. Fully comparable runways exist in Antigua, Jamaica, St.Lucia and Barbados, where the runway is 11,000 feet long. Factors governing the length of runways for civilian aircraft relate primarily to payload and range at take-off and local climatic conditions. The terminal building was designed to accept a peak flow of 350

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<sup>1</sup> . A month before Reagan's national security speech, Nestor D. Sanchez, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs claimed that the PRG's new military facilities "would provide air and naval bases . . . for the recovery of Soviet aircraft after strategic missions. It [Grenada] might also furnish missile sites for launching attacks against the United States with short and medium range missiles." See Washington Post, February 27, 1983, p. A1.

passengers per hour, corresponding to the arrival of one Boeing 747. Floor space is 8,000 square metres against the FAAA standard of 10,000 square metres, the lower figure adopted in Grenada being acceptable outside the U.S.

. . . Navigational equipment does not include radar. Prevailing climatic conditions at Grenada allow Visual Flying Rules for most of the year.<sup>1</sup>

These specifics relate to civilian aeronautics, consistent with the purpose of the Point Salines infrastructure; according to Plessy, “ A military airbase would require the following facilities, none of which exist at Point Salines:

1. \_ parallel taxiway;
2. \_ arrangement for dispersed parking;
3. \_ radar;
4. \_ hardened aircraft shelters for protection against bomb blast;
5. \_ secure fuel farm (i.e. underground);
6. \_ underground weapons storage;
7. \_ surface-to-air missile sites or other anti-air defences;
8. \_ perimeter security;
9. \_ operational readiness platform with rapid access;
- 10.- aircraft engineering workshops and major stores;
- 11.- aircraft arrester gear.<sup>1</sup>

The absence of these facilities would not prevent the use of the airport by military aircraft, given certain contingencies. Despite the vast trove of documents which the invading American troops removed to Washington,<sup>2</sup> only a few dubious mentions of the military use of the airport have been found: (1),from the pad of Liam James

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<sup>1</sup>. See Grenada: Whose Freedom? London: Latin American Bureau, 1984, p.50.

<sup>2</sup> The documents were subsequently moved to the new National Archives complex at College Park, Maryland, and will soon be returned to the Government of Grenada.

comes the inscription:”The Revo has been able to crush Counter-Revolution internationally. Airport will be used by Cuban and Soviet military;<sup>1</sup> Bishop is also reported as having told Gromyko that it is well known that the airport would be a strategic factor.<sup>2</sup>

There was also the case of Selwyn Strachan who is said to have informed a meeting of the Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ) that the airport would be used by both Cuban and Soviet aircraft. Strachan denied having made the statement, and the U.S. Department of Defense which first reported the matter could not corroborate its accusation.<sup>3</sup> Chances are that there was an arcane agreement between Castro and Bishop relevant to Cuban usage of the airport; but Bishop is dead, and it is most unlikely that Castro will ever say anything on the matter, if there is indeed something to be said.

### Spatial Perspectives of Two Airports

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<sup>1</sup> See Pryor, op. cit. p.97.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> See Ibid, p.124.

Three major incentives may be considered as the prime motivations for the construction of the Point Salines airport: (1) the topographical constraints of the Pearls airport; (2) the economic prospects; and (3) the psychological advantages. Pearls airport was deemed marginally suitable for daylight flying, and under good atmospheric conditions at that. This restricted utility was caused by topographical circumstances which inhibited the extension of the 5250 foot runway, which was too short to accommodate large wide-bellied jets. Because of the steep encircling hills, night and instrument landings were not possible, and the airport fell short of the international Civil Aviation Organization standards.

Pearls Airport, located in North Eastern Grenada, and approximately an hour's drive from St. George's was opened in 1943 and substantially upgraded thirty years later to allow it to accommodate BAC-III type aircraft capable of carrying 100 passengers. At the time of the revolution, the airport was served by a regional carrier, Leeward Islands Air Transportation (Liat), which has been derisively dubbed by Grenadians "Leave Island Any Time." In addition to its unfavorable reputation, LIAT's flights have a seating capacity of only 48 persons.

Contrary to United States propaganda, the concern for replacing Pearls was not an NJM initiative. As early as 1955, twenty-four years before the Revolution, the British firm, Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick and Partners, commissioned to study airport development in St. Vincent and Grenada, submitted a report in which it strongly

recommended that a new airport be constructed at Point Salines with a view to accommodating civilian aircraft of the VC10 category.<sup>1</sup>

Five years later, a commission appointed by the Federal Government of the West Indies, specified in its report that Point Salines has the most desirable spatial attributes for a new airport in Grenada, and suggested that construction be started as soon as possible. In 1987 a Canadian study which grew out of a tripartite economic research sponsored by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, recommended the construction of a new airport at Point Salines. The Canadian study recommended a three-phase development of a 5800 foot runway in the first phase, extended to 7800 in the second phase, and eventually to 9,000 feet in the third and final phase.<sup>2</sup> It was this Canadian recommendation of a 9,000 foot long runway<sup>3</sup> that became one of the bases of Reagan's anti- Grenadian posture. It is interesting to note that the Reagan administration did not seek to shorten the runway when the United States completed the airport project subsequent to their invasion of Grenada.

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<sup>1</sup> See Boodhoo, op.cit. p.49.

<sup>2</sup> See B.J. Hudson, "The Changing Caribbean: Grenada's New International Airport," Caribbean Geography, 1, 1983

<sup>3</sup> An additional 800 feet was eventually added to the runway making its total length 9,800 feet.

A decade before the Grenada revolution, the firm of Scot Wilson Kirkpatrick and Partners, in conjunction with the Economic Intelligence Unit was commissioned by the British Ministry of Overseas Development to undertake technical and feasibility research with a view to constructing an airport with four runway alignments. Included in the detailed research were topographic and soil investigations and relative marine borings. The firm which had conducted studies in Grenada in 1955 once again recommended Point Salines as the “most likely alternative” to Pearls Airport. Furthermore, it concurred with the Canadian proposal that a three-phase construction of the airport should eventuate with a 9,000 foot runway.<sup>1</sup>

But all these studies and recommendations did not lead to the abandonment of the likelihood of constructing a new airport at Pearls notwithstanding its aforementioned drawbacks. Once again Scot Wilson Kirkpatrick and Partners were commissioned, this time to make a feasibility survey of the old airport. Its favorable report failed to win the approval of the British Crown Agents and experienced pilots, as well as LIAT and the Airline Pilots Association. Their disapproval was based on the contention that topographically, Pearls did not meet optimum safety conditions<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Hudson, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

In 1976, the same year of the ultimate rejection of Pearls, a mission under the auspices of the World Bank visited Grenada and investigated the development of a new airport in that country. The study concluded that “the existing runway at Pearls would continue to act as a constraint on the development of air transport and tourism growth.” The mission agreed that Point Salines was the optimum choice for siting the new airport, but recommended that once more technical and economic studies be undertaken in that regard. This was the status of plans for the new airport, when in 1979 Maurice Bishop approached Castro and received his promise to aid the project. Work on the Point Salines Airport began in December 1979, with Cuba committed to underwrite almost fifty percent of the total cost. This “benevolent” gesture on Castro’s part fueled United States’ suspicion that the Cubans had ulterior motives in proffering the “gift” of an airport to the PRG. There was collaboration between Cuban and Grenadian experts in the preparation of the master plan, which drew substantially on the British proposal of 1969. There was one significant difference, however: the team elected not to employ the phased construction of the runway, choosing instead to build the 2750 meter runway in a single stage. Cuba’s participation in this engineering phase of the airport’s construction reinforced Washington’s conviction that the project was indeed a military venture.

The length of the runway would continue to be perceived by the Reagan administration as a military asset for the Soviet/Cuban axis. There were those who argued that the 9,800 foot length of the runway at Point Salines would potentially extend the range of Cuban jet fighters throughout the Caribbean.<sup>1</sup> But as one scholar notes:

The length of runway was hardly any basis on which to rest this allegation. . . . The OAS economic secretariat in their “Economic Study of Grenada” had pointed out in 1977 that “Original airport planners in Grenada failed to foresee that within some 30 years of initial construction, Pearls airport would be inadequate in relation to aeronautical and technical innovation.” They went on to advise: “Owing to the large economic, financial, and social costs of airports, present planners of the future Grenada airport would be well advised to develop an air strategy to last at least for the next half century.”<sup>2</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> See map below.

<sup>2</sup> Hudson, *op. cit.*

Map 1

MAP OF STRIKING DISTANCE AND TIME OF MIGS  
BASED IN CUBA, GRENADA AND NICARAGUA



Source: Thomas D. Anderson, Geopolitics of the Caribbean: Mini-States in a Wider World. New York: PRAEGER, 1984, p. 135.

In its 1978 Circular Reports, the International Civil Aviation offers additional justification of a runway with the minimum length as that which would eventually be constructed at Point Salines:

Caribbean traffic growth and changes in aircraft technology require the continual expansion of existing facilities. . . . In general terms it can be said that the absence of at least one runway of no less than 3,000 meters (9800 feet) . . . restricts the operation of long-haul International services with modern equipment and is a potential limiting factor on the development of a pattern that fully meets the transport requirements of a country.

It could be argued that the above, and other advices militate against the effectiveness of the United States contention that the length of Point Salines runway is proof positive that the airport's purpose was overwhelmingly military. Furthermore, given its logistical advantage and its military asymmetry in the region, the United States could expeditiously neutralize the Point Salines airport, and all other Grenadian installations, if and when the situation so warranted. But American presidents have been known to be disingenuous in their execution of foreign policy. Classic examples are: Teddy Roosevelt's role in Panama's revolution against Colombia in 1903, Woodrow Wilson's strategies to get the United States into World War I, Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, and, of course, Ronald Reagan's effort to convince the American public that because

Marxist Grenada was constructing a 9800 foot runway it was *ipso facto* a military threat to the United States.

### The Economic Argument for the Point Salines Airport

The inadequate airport facilities at Pearls imposed serious economic hardships on Grenada, particularly in the field of tourism. As mentioned earlier, the short runway limited the number of passengers on a given flight to forty-eight; topographical circumstances prohibited night flight, and atmospheric conditions occasionally made take off and landings risky ventures. In 1980, European Tourism Demand Study evaluated 26 Caribbean countries and assigned the highest rating to Grenada on the basis of its climate, beaches, and natural attractions, but there was a corollary . . .

Grenada was designated as a touristically disadvantaged destination as a consequence of its difficult accessibility. As Hudson explains:

Long distance air passengers bound for Grenada have to change aircraft in Trinidad or Barbados. Normally arrivals there are so late as to necessitate an overnight stay at a total annual cost estimated at \$1.3 million which might have otherwise been spent in Grenada; the inconvenience of changing aircraft tend to deter tourists from choosing Grenada for their Caribbean holiday and some travel agents and tour operators have discontinued selling this country because the difficulty of obtaining confirmed bookings for their clients between Barbados and Grenada.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hudson, op. cit.

In addition to these constraints, there was the characterization of Grenada by the United States as an unsafe holiday destination. This was reminiscent of the Jamaica experience during the Manley years, when the United States destabilized the tourist industry of that country, as well as other aspects of its economy.

The construction of the airport began in December 1979, subsequent to the arrival in Grenada of heavy equipment from Cuba. The cost of the project was estimated at US\$71 million; Cuba would provide US\$33 in goods and services; the rest would be raised from grants and loans from many sources, including Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Libya, the European Economic Council, Venezuela, and the purchase of bonds by Grenadians.<sup>1</sup> Noticeably absent from the contributors was the Soviet Union. It was assumed that for reasons of prudence, the Soviets chose not to be involved in this venture. If that was indeed the case, Moscow's abstention did not achieve its purpose; the Reagan administration continued to view the purpose of the airport as a Cuban/Soviet threat to United States strategic interests.

In addition to a large contingent of over 600 Cuban workers, companies from three non-communist nations won bids to perform different roles in the project. Layne Dredging Company of Miami won the contract to dredge Hardy Bay, over which 200 meters of the runway pass. This company, with an American work crew of thirty was joined by another American firm, Norwich Engineering of Fort

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<sup>1</sup> See Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society, London: Frances Pinter, 1965, pp,124-125; Euclid Rose,op.cit.pp.318-320; Pryor, op.cit.

Lauderdale, which designed the full storage system. Metex, a Finnish firm, supplied and installed the lighting equipment for the airport's runway and parking lot; Plessey Airport Company of the United Kingdom, supplied and installed the air traffic control apparatus, navigational and communicational systems, and all electronic equipment for the terminal building. Incidentally, Plessey Airport Company received export credit guarantees from the Thatcher Government for the airport contract. These features, coupled with the fact that the construction area at Point Salines was not placed off limits, nullified much of what Reagan had expressed negatively about the airport.

Having discussed the topographical and economic perspectives of the Point Salines Airport, the merits of the project's psychological incentive will now be examined. In this context, one haunting question arises: Why, given its overarching economic constraints, did Grenada embark so precipitately in the construction of a new airport? The answer appears to lie not so much in the realm of stark economic necessity, as it does in its symbolic significance.

Most national societies possess some structure which personifies their national spirit. The Statue of Liberty, the Great Wall of China, the Pyramids at Giza are but a few that come readily to mind. Symbols are particularly significant to the people of poor societies. In some cases they take the form of giant stadium, a large statue, or a great bridge; the Point Salines Airport was intended to be symbolic in this

context. It would have served as the premier showpiece of the Revolution, manifesting in the process the accomplishments of the PRG.

Grenada's dependence on Cuba was not restricted to the provision of military and economic assistance. In discussing the phenomenon of South-South cooperation, Bishop, addressing a mass rally on the second anniversary of the revolution, expressed his gratitude to Cuba:

. . . one of the most important aspects of our relationship with revolutionary Cuba is the area of economic cooperation and assistance. . . . revolutionary Cuba has been able to come to our assistance, to help us to construct an international airport, to lend us their doctors, to lend us their internationalist workers, to lend us their fishermen, to help us with university scholarships.<sup>1</sup>

On another occasion, this time at the Cuban Communist Party's second congress, Bishop told the Cuban nation:

We know we are not alone. The people of Cuba unhesitatingly and unselfishly came to our aid in the first weeks of our revolution. . . . Cuba provided us with the military means necessary to defend and secure our young revolution. . . . Cuba provided urgently needed assistance in the areas of health, education, communications, and fisheries.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to these and many other acts of assistance, Cuba, as mentioned earlier, served as the nexus between Grenada and Moscow, as well as between Grenada and other eastern bloc countries. Ideationally, Cuba was also a benefactor of the

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<sup>1</sup> Marcus and Taber, op. cit. p. 134

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 125

PRG. Havana tutored PRG personnel on their way to Moscow, and to diplomatic encounters elsewhere. One instance was of paramount importance, and is therefore discussed at length below.

Apart from the controversial use of the Point Salines Airport to ferry Cuban troops to Africa, Havana needed Grenada as a foothold in its effort to establish close ties with English-speaking states in the Eastern Caribbean. One of the cardinal objectives of the PRG's foreign policy was the realization of "One Caribbean," which in essence was an advocacy for the end of Cuba's isolation within the region. This support for Cuba was given as a manifestation of the principle of non-alignment to which the PRG claimed allegiance.

### **CONCLUSION**

Randolph Persaud, a Caribbean scholar, cited in Chapter One of this study, has suggested that elites in dependent societies tend to become socialized in the worldview of the dominant state.<sup>1</sup> This was the case of the PRG in its relations with Cuba. Grenada's acceptance of the perspectives and policies of Cuba was demonstrated in at least three international fora: the United Nations vote on the Russian invasion of Afghanistan; the passionate support of Argentina in the Falklands War, and the defense of Cuba at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana in 1979.

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<sup>1</sup> See Persaud, *op. cit.* p.30.

Arguably, avoidable mistakes were made in all three cases. Bishop should have realized that there would be a penalty for excoriating the United States on its very doorstep; an even more brazen attack followed a few weeks after in his address to the United Nations. On both occasions Bishop lauded Cuba at the expense of the United States. Grenada's vote in the Afghanistan Question is discussed at length in the following chapter. It is likely that the Thatcher Government would not have been so anti-PRG were it not for the pro-Argentine posture which Unison Whiteman, the Grenadian minister of foreign affairs, assumed at the Security Council<sup>1</sup> sessions, and the many OAS conferences on the Falklands Crisis.<sup>2</sup> Grenada's decision to accept aid from Cuba, and to permit that country to contribute substantially to the construction of the Point Salines Airport, was initially a boon to the PRG. Bishop was right when he said "without Cuba, there would be no revolution." Grenada's dependence on Cuba was so deep rooted that it is inconceivable that the revolution could have survived without Havana's military and economic sustenance. Henry Gill placed this proposition in sharp perspective when he stated that "Cuba

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<sup>1</sup>See United Nations Security Council Document, S/14940 , April I, 1982; See also United Nations Security Council Documents S/14988 and S/15002, April 22, 1982

<sup>2</sup> For Whiteman's address to the Thirty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly see Document 34/PV.37 Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the 37<sup>th</sup> Session, 1982, pp. 643-748;

has become the PRG's savior. This is why Grenada's friendship with Cuba is not negotiable."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Henry Gill, "The Foreign Policy of the Grenada Revolution," Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 7, (March-April 1981) p. 2.

Table 3.7

Decision to allow Cuba to build an airport in Grenada

Decision Maker	Objective	Determinants	Consequential Problems
Maurice Bishop; Concurrence of the Central Committee	Construction of a new airport	Cuba's promise of substantial aid; need to create a modern airport, thereby obviating the need of in-transit services in Barbados. The new airport would expand and accelerate the marketing of the Grenadian farm products, and would serve as a showpiece of the Revolution	U.S. perception of the project as a base for ferrying troops and material from Cuba to Angola, as well as a Soviet air reconnaissance base; severe stress on the Grenadian economy as the PRG endeavored to complete the airport in a hurry.

## CHAPTER FIVE – DECISION NUMBER TWO

### Introduction

This is the second of the two most pivotal choices which arguably informed the foreign policy decision-making of the PRG. To better appreciate why the PRG's decided to support of the Soviet Union during the United Nations deliberations of Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan, it is important to begin by placing the invasion in historical and geopolitical perspectives.

Russian obsession with obtaining a warm water exit corresponds with the imperious impulse of Germany's *Drang Nach Osten*, and, with the concept and praxis of manifest destiny, articulated by the United States.

For more than a century, Afghanistan, a poor backward, landlocked state, featured prominently in Russia's scheme for reaching the Indian Ocean. A series of events between 1978 and 1979 emboldened the Soviets to put their Afghanistan design in operation.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet's first opportunity came in 1979 when a Marxist Afghani coup seized power in Kabul and brought the mountain kingdom closer to the Soviet orbit. But

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<sup>1</sup> Amury de Riencourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs 61, No2, 1982, pp. 421-429

the coup met with a Mujaheddin response of significant proportions.<sup>1</sup> This development held serious implications for the Soviet Union. Moscow could not allow a client state with which it has coterminous borders to be overthrown. Implicit in such an eventuality would be the projection of a negative image of the Soviet Union *per se*; more importantly, it would inadvertently provide a fillip to fissiparous ethnic groups within the Soviet Union that aspired for their own nation-state; invasion, therefore, was deemed a rational option, and an “invitation” from the Afghanistan president, Hafizullan Amin provided the Soviets a cogent pretext.

On December 27, 1979, Soviet army and air force units were airlifted or poured across the Oxus (Amu Darya) into Afghanistan. A few days later, another coup allegedly engineered by the Soviets, overthrew the Kabul regime and murdered its leader. Barak Karmal, a former deputy prime minister, more to Moscow’s liking, was brought back from his ambassadorial post in Prague to be the new prime minister.

It is doubtful that the Soviet Union anticipated the swift and virulent reaction of most of the world community to its invasion of Afghanistan. Seven days after the invasion was launched, some sixty nations petitioned the president of the Security Council to urgently schedule a meeting to discuss what they considered a crisis in

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<sup>1</sup> Amin Saikal. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006, pp.135-159

Afghanistan. On January 16, 1980, a draft resolution, sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Niger, was submitted to the Security Council, where its adoption was vetoed by the Soviet Union. In the General Assembly, where no veto power exists, the denunciation of the Soviet invasion was more acrimonious. A Pakistani resolution condemning the invasion and advocating an expeditious withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was adopted by 104 votes in favor, 18 against, and 18 abstentions.<sup>1</sup> Grenada was the only member of the Commonwealth Caribbean to vote against the Pakistani sponsored resolution. It was also one of only two western hemispheric states to do so – the other being Cuba.

Grenada's ideological support for the Soviet armed-presence in Afghanistan was neither a single event, nor was it confined to the forum of the United Nations. For three years the PRG voted against every resolution tabled at the General Assembly calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. During this period, the PRG used its membership in the non-aligned movement – at the time under the chairmanship of Cuba – to continue to support Moscow. The PRG's rationale for its unwavering support was that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was a response to a request for assistance in the context of a bilateral defense treaty signed

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<sup>1</sup> See Donatus St. Aimee, Foreign Policy Dimensions of Small States in their Quest for Economic Development. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center, N.Y. 1997.

in 1979 between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. It further insisted that Grenada's vote was not in support of the Soviet Union but rather consistent with a principled position in support of the Afghan revolution. Adding to this convoluted explanation, the PRG's news organ, *New Jewel* argued that were Grenada threatened by an invasion "we would want to have the right to call on any country of our choice to assist us."

Perhaps no other aspect of Grenada's foreign policy was more enigmatic than the decision to back the Soviet Union in the face of overwhelming opposition in the United Nations. There are many motives which some writers and interviewees have offered as probable reasons for what eventually proved to be the PRG's most reckless decision:

- To openly defy the United States;
- To emulate Cuba;
- To ingratiate itself with the Soviet Union.

From the perspective of the Carter White House, the first motive seemed plausible. But this was not a case of some far-flung island in the Indian or Pacific Oceans electing to embarrass the United States with its vote. Grenada was strategically located in an American "lake," daring to consort with Cuba, and by extension the Soviet Union, with whom the United States was locked in a renewed Cold War.

The second motive, if indeed it was a motive, was an exercise in folly. Two former PRG respondents, interviewed by this author, and whose anonymity will be protected in this study, have separately maintained that unbeknownst to most of their colleagues, Cuba had counseled Bishop to abstain in the Afghanistan vote for reasons of prudence. But Bishop and Coard were at loggerheads on this issue, the former opting for abstention; the latter for supporting the Soviets. During Bishop's absence from Grenada, Coard convinced the Central Committee to approve voting with the Soviets. When Bishop returned, the vote was a *fait accompli* and he acquiesced – *ex post facto* – to Coard's insistence, in order to project a united front.<sup>1</sup>

It is important at this juncture to address the motive behind Cuba's advice to the PRG to abstain in the General Assembly's vote on the Afghanistan question. Some scholars have posited that Castro was not sanguine in supporting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and did so only because of Cuba's overwhelming dependence on Moscow. One of these scholars, Jiri Valenta, argues that "Cuba voted against the resolution condemning the USSR, while at the same time signaling frustration over Soviet policies in Afghanistan and making no effort to

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<sup>1</sup> See Jorge Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik," in Jorge Heine, ed. A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1990, p.244

support or defend the Soviet rationale for the invasion.”<sup>1</sup> He continues by asserting that “The Cuban leadership, obviously displeased with the invasion, decided, as in the case of the Czechoslovakian invasion in 1968, to give only implicit and qualified support to the USSR.”<sup>2</sup> This, therefore, explains why, unlike the other allies of the Soviet Union, Cuba raised no objection to the United Nations’ right to bring the Afghanistan question before the General Assembly. Cuba’s displeasure with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan was further confirmed in April 1982 when a delegation of United States academicians visited Havana and met with upper echelon members of the Cuban government. The officials informed their American guests that Havana regretted the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, a development which they presciently argued could impair Cuba’s standing as a leader of the Non Aligned Movement.<sup>3</sup>

Fidel Castro did make an effort to broker a settlement of the Afghanistan crisis. Acting in his capacity as chairman of the Non Aligned Movement, he instructed the Cuban foreign minister, Isidoro Malmierca, in March 1980 to conduct shuttle diplomacy between the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and

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<sup>1</sup> Jiri Valenta. “The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa and the Caribbean,” World Today. February 1981, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Seweryn Bialer and Alfred Stepan.”Cuba and the U.S. and the Central American Mess, New York Review of Books. 29. no.9. May 1982, p.17.

Pakistan. But Malmiera's endeavors occasioned no success. Thereafter, Cuba's influence declined in the NAM, and Castro's image in many parts of the Third World diminished correspondingly. At the United Nations, Cuba failed to secure a seat in the Security Council. After an unprecedented 156 ballots in its contest with Columbia, Havana accepted the advice of India and Nigeria and withdrew its candidacy, thus Mexico became the compromise winner.<sup>1</sup>

Grenada, like its mentor, Cuba, suffered a backlash for having endorsed the Soviet position on the Afghanistan invasion. Its vote in the General Assembly not only caused it to lose face in many quarters of the Third World, but also widened the schism which had evolved in the Central Committee when Bernard Coard and his majority in that body decided, against Cuba's advice, to side with the Soviets in the protracted deliberations of the Afghanistan crisis.<sup>2</sup>

From the United States perspective, Grenada, by its sustained defense of the Soviets in the General Assembly, had *crossed the Rubicon*. Its pro-Moscow votes were viewed by Washington as an affirmation of the PRG's commitment to the Soviet camp. This meant, *inter alia*, that the Soviet Union,

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<sup>1</sup> For more details concerning Cuba's bid for a Security Council seat, see "U.N. Council Battle May Affect Afghan-Iranian Debates," Washington Post, January 4, 1980, p.14A; "Cuba Ends Fight for Seat on Council," New York Times, January 7, 1980, p.A2; "Mexico Wins a U.N. Council Seat in Vote Viewed as Defeat for Cuba," New York Times, January 8, 1980, p.A2; and "Cuba Pays a Price for Afghanistan," Newsweek, January 28, 1980, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Frederic op. cit. pp 63-64

through its satellite, Cuba, could eventually use Grenada as a foothold from which to penetrate the Eastern Caribbean and proximate areas of critical interest to the United States.

Some members of the PRG did manifest a seemingly obsequious attraction to the Soviet Union. But, Bishop, in particular was not among that group. A perusal of his speeches reflects only a few mention of the Soviet Union, as contrasted to copious laudatory references to Castro and Cuba.<sup>1</sup> Yet, in the exercise of pragmatism, the PRG seemed united in courting the favors of Moscow.

Accordingly, this study hypothesizes that it was the perception of the international environment, coupled with an acute awareness of economic need which influenced the PRG's vote in favor of the Soviet Union during the United Nations deliberations of the Afghanistan Question.<sup>2</sup> Because Grenada misperceived the situation, it failed to realize that the Soviet troops in Afghanistan were there to promote Moscow's geopolitical interests, and not as the defenders of the welfare of the Afghanistan people. This was obvious to the overwhelming majority of United Nations members who either voted against the Soviets or chose to abstain, an option to which the PRG could have availed themselves. Grenada also failed to

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<sup>1</sup> In the twenty-seven speeches contained in Marcus and Taber, ed. Maurice Bishop Speaks, not a single mention is made of the Soviet Union.

<sup>2</sup> Grenada voted against resolutions A/35/37 of November 20, 1980; A/36/34 of 18 November 1981, and A/37/38 of November 23, 1982, all advocating the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

appreciate the implications which her vote held for future relations with the United States.

More than any other factor, recognition of need was pivotal to the PRG's decision to vote with the Soviets. Burdened by military and economic exigencies, the PRG looked eastward to the Soviet Union for fraternal ties and consequent military and economic assistance.

Both Bishop and his colleagues were aware that Cuba was the recipient of cheap oil, and budgetary subventions from the Soviet Union, which enabled that island state to partially implement a wide variety of programs aimed at ameliorating social and economic conditions of the Cuban people. It was reasoned that with Moscow's 'benevolence' the PRG would do likewise for the Grenadian society. This need on the part of Grenada was the incentive for its endeavor to become assimilated in the Soviet orbit. Thus, the United Nations debates and subsequent condemnation of Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan provided the PRG with the opportunity to categorically support the Soviet Union, at a time when it was beleaguered by the recrimination of the vast majority of the United Nations' membership.

Convinced that assistance from capitalist states was not forthcoming, the PRG reasoned that socialist and other anti-imperialist nations would be more inclined to aid the young revolution, contingent upon its sustained attacks against the United

States in international **fora**. But unlike Cuba, the Soviet Union manifested no haste in fostering warm ties with the PRG,<sup>1</sup> and was even more reticent in providing a substantial amount of aid. In a secret memorandum, Richard Jacobs, the Grenadian ambassador to Moscow, places the Soviet reluctance in perspective:

The Soviets have been burnt quite often in the past by giving support to Governments which have either squandered that support, or turned around and become agents of imperialism, or lost power. One is reminded of Egypt, Somalia, Ghana and Peru. They are therefore very careful, and for us sometimes maddingly slow, in making up their minds about who to support.<sup>2</sup>

Jacob's memorandum raises two additional important points: firstly, Soviet aid to Grenada would be contingent on the progress the PRG made towards a communist identity; secondly, it contradicts those who assert that the Soviets recruited Grenada as a pawn; the truth is that it was Grenada which courted the Soviet Union, not the other way around.<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to note that unlike the leader of Nicaragua, Maurice Bishop was never favored with a meeting with either Leonid Brezhnev or Yuri Andropov, not withstanding his request for same. Seen, therefore in this context, the Grenada vote in the United Nations lends perspective to its need

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<sup>1</sup> The Soviets did not establish diplomatic ties with the PRG until September 1979, six months after the NJM came to power, See Peter Shearman, The Soviet Union and Grenada Under the New Jewel Movement, Essex, U.K. 1985. The Soviet Union did not establish an embassy in Grenada until some three years after the PRG came to power.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall, eds. The Grenada Papers, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1984, pp.200-201.

<sup>3</sup> See Shearman, op. cit. p. 4

to convince the Soviets that its credentials as a state in the process of socialist orientation were indeed admirable.

The PRG's preoccupation with winning Moscow's approval became an obsession which plagued the small Marxist state for the entirety of its tenure. As late as July 1983, Richard Jacobs observed in his secret memorandum that Grenada was not being accorded the serious and warm acceptance by the Soviets, commensurate with its status as a member of the Marxist/Leninist collectivity. Jacob writes:

Grenada is regarded as being on the path of socialist orientation. There is a general acceptance among Soviet authorities that we are at the national democratic, anti-imperialist stage of socialist orientation. The USSR assigns a special place to these types of countries in its foreign policy. . . . Therefore, whatever the internal debate, it is important that we continue to maintain our public assessment of our stage of development as the national democratic, anti-imperialist stage of socialist orientation.<sup>1</sup>

Acknowledging that the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) knew everything about the NJM, Jacobs asserted that "they cannot fail to recognize and accept the authenticity of our credentials,"<sup>2</sup> but this was obviously not the case. This was particularly noticeable in the area of protocol. The proper level at which PRG leaders ought to be met by the Soviets remained a sore point, but was nonetheless rationalized by Jacobs on two levels:

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<sup>1</sup> Brian Crozier, *The Grenada Documents*, Trowbridge, U.K.: The Sherwood Press., 1987, pp.70-71

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 71

1. They [the Soviets] sometimes adopt an over protective attitude towards us and urge that if we met too high a level the United States would use this as an issue to further squeeze Grenada. (This is one of the explanations floated as to why the PM did not meet with Andropov in April).
2. Although we are regarded as a fraternal party we are not in the “inner group” in members of the socialist community – their highest party officials are reserved for these levels of encounters. Their answer as to why Nicaragua is treated differently – and at a higher level – would presumably be that Nicaragua is already under direct US attack and it is necessary for them to openly show solidarity. They would like Grenada to avoid that direct attack. The core of the matter however, is that they regard Grenada as a small distant country and they are only prepared to make commitments to the extent of their capacity to fulfill, and if necessary, defend their commitment.<sup>1</sup>

Despite its effusive praise for the Soviet Union, the PRG was dissatisfied with Moscow’s lukewarm attitude toward Grenada. Jacobs ended his lengthy secret memorandum by reminding the Grenada Politburo that adjustments were in order:

On the whole, I have formed the view that the USSR is satisfied with the degree of support that they have received from Grenada. Indeed, I would say that they have every reason to be satisfied especially if our vote on Afghanistan for example, is recognized as one of two Latin American votes (the other being Cuba) in their favour. Considering the risks that we have taken on this and other matters, it might be fair to say that their support for us is actually below our support for them. We must therefore work to establish a balance of interests.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, pp. 71-72.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.85.

In addition to acknowledging the absence of warm reciprocity in Soviet-Grenadian relations, the Jacobs memorandum may have negated official and non-official United States pronouncements that the Soviet Union had incorporated Grenada into its orbit. But while the documents which were found by invading United States forces in 1983, do affirm that Grenada aspired to ingratiate itself with the Soviet orbit, they offer no evidence that this was a successful venture.

Although the vast trove of documents contained no smoking gun, two sections of the Jacobs memorandum come close to being one. Apparently by design, the PRG did not apprise Moscow of Bishop's trip to Washington. Castro, who was closer to the Soviets, did not inform them either; nor did Bernard Coard and his wife Phyllis, both of whom were vacationing in Moscow at the time that Bishop was in Washington.

The Grenadian ambassador to Moscow was also not informed of Bishop's visit to Washington. Jacobs was on a diplomatic mission to the German Democratic Republic where he heard on a Voice of America (VOA) program, a report on Bishop's conference with members of the Reagan administration. Upon returning to Moscow, Jacobs was approached by the Soviet Latin American expert, Dimitry Kasimirov, who expressed dissatisfaction with not having been extended the courtesy of being informed of the intention of Bishop's visit to Washington.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 76

It was obvious that the confidentiality surrounding Bishop's trip did not please the Soviets, who wanted to be kept abreast of relations between Grenada and the United States. Expressed succinctly, Moscow did not want to invest in Grenada if there were the likelihood of a rapprochement between Washington and the PRG. Some conspiracy theorists have opined Soviet misgivings of Bishop's mission to Washington contributed to the tragic demise of the Grenadian prime minister and the denouement of the PRG, per se.<sup>1</sup> To date, no evidence has surfaced to corroborate this charge.

#### Consequences of Decision Number Two

Despite Grenada's pro-Soviet advocacy at the United Nations, the desired economic assistance from Moscow was not forthcoming. Although the Soviets did make a few small grants to the PRG between 1981-1983, these amounted to no more than the equivalent of U.S. \$2.5 million in totality. A PRG request in July, 1983 for a critically needed loan of U.S. \$7 million was denied by the Soviets, on the grounds that it was their understanding that France was going to accede to a similar request.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Foremost among these conspiracy theorists, whose works are cited in this study are: Steve Clark, Gordon K. Lewis, Leslie Manigat, and Gregory Sandford.

<sup>2</sup> Pryor, op. cit. p. 53

A year and a half after their invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets, thanks to the intercession of Cuba, signed the below listed agreement with the PRG in Havana, July 27, 1980: <sup>1</sup>

Writing from Moscow, Richard Jacobs advised a new *modus operandi*:

On 27<sup>th</sup>. June, I had a very frank and friendly discussion with Boyko Dimitrov, the former Bulgarian Ambassador to Grenada who is now Director of International Relations in the Party. He told me that . . . Grenada has to face the reality that to the Soviet Union it is a question of size, distance, and priorities. I think that he is correct. But we have to deal with these realities. In order to elevate our priority in the socialist scheme of things. . . we have to raise and discuss with the highest authorities, global and regional issues rather than parochial or national issues.

Continuing, Jacobs tied the prospect of aid from the Soviet to a bolder activity by Grenada in enhancing socialist causes in the international arena:

. . . our legitimate begging operations have to be cast in the larger world context. We have in fact done this in the past quite successfully, linking our national requests to a global analysis. What we need to do now, it seems to me, is to become the spokesman for a broader constituency – perhaps the countries of socialist orientation.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A-1

<sup>1</sup> Pryor, op. cit. p. 81.

In the same memorandum, Jacobs advises that the Soviet Union would like Grenada to be more active at the United Nations. This is interpreted to mean that Moscow wanted to use the PRG as a conduit through which support from other states would flow to the benefit of Soviet causes. Consider Jacobs' encouraging words of compliance with this scheme:

Of all the regional possibilities, the most likely candidate for special attention is Surinam. If we can be an overwhelming influence on Surinam's international behaviour, then our importance in the Soviet scheme of things will be greatly enhanced. To the extent that we can take credit for bringing any country into the progressive fold, our prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced. Another candidate is Belize. I think that we need to do some more work in that country.<sup>1</sup>

Several observations may be made at this point: (1) the subtlety of Moscow's encroachment on Grenada's foreign policy decision-making; (2) the seeming willingness of Grenada to aid and abet said encroachment; (3) the fiction of the PRG's posture of non-alignment; (4) the fact that the secret memorandum was addressed only to Bishop, Coard, Whiteman, and Ewart Layne, whose promotion to the Politburo was engineered by Coard., and (4), the fact that it was forwarded in July, 1983, a mere three months before the revolution died. On the basis of interviews, this research concludes that the Jacobs recommendations, were never

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<sup>1</sup> Seabury and McDougall, op. cit. p 212; Pryor, op. cit.p. 52; Ledeen and Romerstein, op. cit. p.

discussed by the Central Committee, or was any move made to implement, albeit secretly, any of them. Action in any form would not have been taken soon after the memorandum was received, because that period was the start of the convulsions which escalated into the tragedies of October 1983.

#### The United States reaction to the PRG's Afghanistan Vote

Grenada's sustained defense in the United Nations, of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, was viewed by the United States as a *cause celebre*, warranting the freezing of relations with the island state. From the start of the NJM revolution, the Carter administration had maintained the door ajar, believing that despite ideological differences, some *modus vivendi* was possible, perhaps to the point of co-opting the PRG and luring it away from Cuba.<sup>1</sup>

But events proved otherwise. The Afghanistan vote was an affirmation of the PRG's commitment to the Soviet camp. In the eyes of Washington, this decision meant, among other things, that the Soviets would eventually use Grenada as a foothold in their design to penetrate an area of United States interest, one which was relatively unprotected.

As mentioned earlier, the NJM came to power at a time when the United States was perceived as unwilling, and seemingly incapable of defending many of its

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<sup>1</sup> The Carter administration was not, however, without its share of criticism and missed opportunities; chief among these were the Ortiz episode, the refusal of aid in the early days of the revolution, the refusal to accept the credentials of Dessima Williams, the ambassador-designate of the PRG, and the initiation of a strategy of economic destabilization against the PRG.

interests. This perception energized Soviet activism in the Third World, where it was believed that the shifting correlation of forces augured favorably for international socialism. But Soviet strategists knew that any faulty assessment, on their part, of American power and disposition to defend its spheres of interests, could have disastrous consequences.

Projection of Soviet power in the Caribbean was of increasing concern to Washington. With Cuba solidly in the communist fold, the rise of Marxist regimes in Grenada and Nicaragua meant that Moscow had augmented its political, psychological, and strategic initiatives in the region. Therefore, even if Soviet aid to Grenada were given to ensure regime preservation of that state, the closeness between the two nations did not bode well for the geo-strategic interest of the United States in the Circum-Caribbean.

Although it could be argued that the United States was in a position to inhibit an extra-hemispheric penetration of the Caribbean, it knew that in the perception of the Soviets, the area offered an excellent and low-cost opportunity to preoccupy the United States.

## CONCLUSION

Viewed in retrospect, Grenada's decision to vote with the Soviets on the Afghanistan Question, must be considered the PRG's most critical error, and an avoidable one at that. The decision proved to be fraught with more risks than

rewards. By supporting Moscow, Grenada got little in return. It took the Soviet Union almost four years to establish an embassy in Grenada, and for much of that time the Kremlin was parsimonious in aiding the PRG in its struggle to cope with dire economic problems. Conversely, by antagonizing the United States, Grenada quickly became the object of military and economic pressures from the hegemon of the North.

In interviews conducted by this writer in Grenada, Barbados, and Jamaica, all but one of the respondents, George Louison, agreed that the PRG's support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a colossal mistake.

Table 5.1  
Decision to support the Soviets on the Afghanistan Question before the United Nations

Decision Maker	Objective	Determinants	Consequential Problems
Bernard Coard; Concurrence of the Central Committee; Ex-Post facto concurrence of Prime Minister Bishop in order to present a united front	To demonstrate the PRG's independence in formulating its foreign policy. Support for the Soviets was expected to ingratiate Grenada in the Soviet fold. The PRG's vote in favor of the Soviet Union came a few weeks before Bernard Coard was scheduled to lead a PRG team to Moscow in search of economic assistance.	Grenada's need for military and economic assistance, as well as a higher ranking in the hierarchy of Socialist states.	The decision further alienated Grenada from the U.S; thereby putting Grenada at risk. This decision failed to achieve an expeditious grant of military and economic aid from the Soviets, and did not succeed in enhancing Grenada's status in the eyes of the Soviets.

## CHAPTER SIX

### The Foreign Policy of the PRG Towards the United States

This chapter takes as a point of departure the hypothesis that a substantive analysis of the PRG's foreign policy, or that of any state in the Circum-Caribbean, must be framed in the context of that nation's relations with the United States. The validity of this hypothesis resides in the acknowledged preeminent posture of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, where its military, economic, political, industrial, and diplomatic asymmetries contribute to Washington's self-appointed stewardship in the region.

In light of Cold War transformations in the global power equation, Washington came to regard Cuba as a threat to United States interests in the Caribbean. This perception was based on the militarization of the Castro regime, its collaborative links with the Soviet Union, and its military involvement in Ethiopia, Angola, and other areas of the international environment. This manifestation of the United States animus towards Cuba, speaks to the *surrogate thesis*, which posits that Cuba was a voluntary pawn of Moscow, and as such, its close ties with Grenada, in particular, was indicative of its role as a proxy of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that the *surrogate thesis*, per se, evolved from the containment policy,

which originated in the famous *long telegram* – 8000 words – written by George Kennan to Secretary of State George Marshall, and subsequently published in **Foreign Affairs** under the pseudonym of “X.”<sup>1</sup>

In an endeavor to explore, and subsequently explain relations between the PRG and the United States, during the entirety of the Grenada Revolution, a brief discussion of the historical, economic, geopolitical, and ideological backgrounds of these relations is in order. Subsequently, the chapter will be divided into two sections: the Carter years, and Relations with the Reagan administration. This will be done with a view to determining if, and how, political change in Grenada influenced the foreign policy of the People’s Revolutionary Government towards the United States, and by extension, Cuba. In this endeavor, the important foreign policy players will be identified, followed by an analysis of the impact of international events on Grenada’s decisions relative to the United States, and vice versa.

### The Caribbean in the context of United States hegemony

To better appreciate PRG/ United States relations, one’s analysis should begin more than a century and a half before the New Jewel Movement came to power on March 13, 1979. It is a proposition that the manifestation of the United States concern with events in the Caribbean Basin had its genesis in 1823, when, with the

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<sup>1</sup> See Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, no.4, July 1947, pp. 566-582

promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, Washington warned extra-hemispheric powers to stay out of the Americas.

The Monroe Doctrine, essentially an amalgam of economic and political interests, laid the basis of what would eventually become United States suzerainty over the Caribbean Basin. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the preeminence of European states in the Caribbean was in decline; United States influence in the region was in ascendance, and Washington started to regard the region as being in its backyard. This realization was articulated by Secretary of State Richard Olney, who, in a letter to the American ambassador in London dated July 20, 1895, noted:

To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.<sup>1</sup>

Less than a decade later, the Spanish-American War tolled the knell of Spain's presence in the Americas. Puerto Rico became a colony of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt detached Panama from Colombia,<sup>2</sup> obtained the right to build the Panama Canal, and the infamous Platt Amendment of 1901 ensured Washington's suzerainty over Cuba.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), America as a World Power, 1872-1945, Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1971, p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> See the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and more particularly the Hay-Banau-Varilla Treaty.

The economic interests of the nascent United States constituted the prime motive for the Monroe Doctrine. Protection of the sovereignty of American nations was never its driving force, nor was the doctrine per se, reflective of U. S. benignity towards its neighbors. The availability of raw materials,<sup>1</sup> and assured markets for United States goods were of paramount importance to Washington and would be protected by the armed might of the United States, if, and when the need arose. The strategic interest of the U.S. in the Caribbean Basin began in earnest with Admiral Mahan's<sup>2</sup> seminal opus, and his subsequent influence on Theodore Roosevelt in strategic matters pertaining to the Caribbean, and the need of the United States of a two-ocean navy. This interest was enhanced by the construction of the Panama Canal and its related air, naval, and army bases. Although there were serious losses of Allied shipping in the Caribbean during World War II,<sup>1</sup> the United States did not give the region the concern commensurate

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<sup>1</sup> The Caribbean Basin, is the fourth largest market for United States products, after Canada, Japan, and the European Union, accounting at the time of the Grenada Revolution for approximately 14 percent and 11 percent respectively of its imports and exports to the region. For more particulars see James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft, Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report on the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin. Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1984. For other related data, see, Andres Serbin. Caribbean Geopolitics: Toward Security through Peace? Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.

<sup>2</sup>. See Alfred T. Mahan, op. cit. Mahan's thesis was that naval power made England great; if the U.S. wished to obtain its potential as a world power, it needed a great navy, indispensable naval bases in the Caribbean and Pacific, and colonies essential to her commercial development.


with its strategic importance. This was to change with the vagaries of the Cold War. Perceived Soviet adventurism in the hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean, refocused Washington's attention on the vulnerability of the area's Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), and of the need to recognize the susceptibility of the southern flank of the United States to naval and ideological penetration by the Soviet Union, and its presumed surrogate, Cuba.

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<sup>1</sup> Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 200-201. See also Micahel Gannon, Operation Drumbeat: The True Story of Germany's First U-boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1990.

## MAP 2

### STRATEGIC WATERWAYS IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA



Source: Thomas D. Anderson. Geopolitics of the Caribbean: Mini-states in a Wider World. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, p.5

When the Caribbean became a locus of Cold War rivalry, it was incumbent upon Washington to demonstrate its ability to deny an extra-hemispheric ideology a foothold in the region. In this regard, Castro's Cuba represented a proverbial leak in the dike, making necessary the invoking of the Johnson Doctrine, which mandates "the American nations, cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere."<sup>1</sup>

Three events in 1979 alarmed Washington, by their perceived defiance of its hegemonic dominance in the Caribbean. The first of these occurred on January 1 when the Cuban Revolution celebrated its twentieth anniversary; less than three months later, the New Jewel Movement overthrew the Gairy government; within four months, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) followed suit by its defeat of the Somoza regime.

The confluence of these three events may be analyzed from two perspectives: first, they represented a disregard for the Johnson Doctrine, and its matrix, the Monroe Doctrine; secondly, they were perceived by Washington as constituting a "Marxist triangle" in what was hitherto *mare nostrum* of the United States. The implications of these developments were serious for Washington, and undoubtedly encouraging

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<sup>1</sup> President Lyndon B. Johnson's speech cited in Jenny Pearce, *Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean*. London: Latin American Bureau, 1982, p. 64. Johnson's speech was actually a justification for the invasion of the Dominican Republic by some 20,000 United States marines to prevent the communist regime of Juan Bosch from taking power in April 1965. This move came six years after Castro came to power, and eleven years after the Eisenhower Administration used the CIA to overthrow the government of democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala.

to Moscow. What did the rise of Marxist states at both ends of the Caribbean and on the mainland of Central America portend? How would this phenomenon affect the foreign policy between Grenada and the United States? These and other questions are answered below.

### Grenada and the Carter Years

Relations between the People's Revolutionary Government and the United States were marked by tension and mistrust from the birth of the Revolution on March 13, 1979 to its demise on October 25, 1983. This view is shared by Robert Pastor,<sup>1</sup> and by Maurice Bishop, who claimed that:

From the first days of coming to power, the United States pursued a policy which showed no respect for our national pride and aspirations, and sought constantly to bring the Revolution to its knees.<sup>2</sup>

Reflecting on the events which polarized relations between the United States and Grenada, Pastor notes that many reporters and analysts<sup>1</sup> agree with Bishop's indictment of Washington, and some further fault the United States policies which inadvertently pushed Grenada toward the communist fold.

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<sup>1</sup> See Robert Pastor, "The United States and the Grenada Revolution: Who Pushed First and Why?" in Jorge Heine, ed., A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp.181-214.

<sup>2</sup>See Ecumenical Program for Inter-American Communication and Action, op. cit., p. 61. also Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion, and Aftermath. London: Sphere Books, 1984, p. 10

The United States' rejoinder argued that Grenada's hostility and suspicion toward, and of Washington respectively were to be blamed for the tension in the relationship between the two states. Testifying before Congress in June 1982, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Bosworth faulted the PRG for its repression and failure to honor its pledge to hold elections. He further maintained that the salient reason for the strained relationship was because Grenada "adopted a militant foreign policy harshly critical of the United States and openly aligned with Cuba and the Soviet Union."<sup>1</sup>

Addressing the same body, on the very same day, Sally Shelton, Carter's ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, offered a contrasting view:

Our policy toward the Caribbean has traditionally been shaped to a substantial degree by our Cubaphobia. We have generally found it difficult to have friendly and constructive relations with countries which in turn, have close ties with Cuba. Grenada is a case in point.<sup>2</sup>

It is evident from both statements that a close association with Cuba was inimical to relations between the PRG and the United States. From the outset, Washington perceived Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua as constituting a "core revolutionary

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<sup>1</sup> Statement before the United States Congress, House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Policy Toward Grenada, 15 June 1982, pp. 33,38.

<sup>2</sup> Statement by Hon. Sally A. Shelton, to the Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on "U.S. Policy Towards Grenada" (U.S. Government Printing Office, 96-7930, 1982). June 15, 1982, p. 59.

community in the Caribbean;”<sup>1</sup> conversely, the PRG elite saw that formation in a fraternal perspective, and was not disposed to severing its close ties with the other two states.

There were four major loci of influence which informed relations between Washington and the People’s Revolutionary Government: Grenada, the United States embassy in Barbados (hereafter referred to as Barem), Havana, and Washington D.C. The primary foreign policy actors of the PRG have already been identified in the preceding chapter and do not require re-identification at this point, suffice it to say that Maurice Bishop was consistently the major player in the decision - making of Grenada’s foreign policy. The following Barem staff members are those who were most involved in U.S/Grenadian affairs: Frank Ortiz, ambassador; replaced one month after the NJM came to power, has been vilified for the contretemps which grew out of the paper with the talking points which he left with Bishop. But he was actually in the vanguard of those who urged the United States Department of State to handle the nascent PRG on a constructive basis, notwithstanding its Marxist propensity.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Henry S. Gill, “The Grenada Revolution: Foreign Policy and Caribbean Geo-Politics.” Paper presented at the Conference on the LDCs of the Caribbean, June 4-7, 1980, Antigua, p. 37

<sup>2</sup> See Ortiz’ letter to the editor of *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1984. See also Timothy Ashby, “The Reagan Years,” in Scot B. MacDonald, Harald M. Sandstrom, and Paul B. Goodwin eds. The Caribbean After Grenada: Revolution, Conflict and Democracy, New York: Praeger, 1984, p 169.

Sally Shelton, who succeeded Ortiz on April 13, 1979, was selected for the post because Washington believed that she would have a calming influence over the PRG. Shelton, like Andrew Young, and others, advocated a co-optation of the PRG, a policy which did not eventuate.<sup>1</sup>

Larry Rossin, Foreign Service Officer, was one of two or three staff members at Baram charged with monitoring events in Grenada. On his own initiative, Rossin drafted an account, entitled “U.S.-Grenada Relations Since the Coup: A Background Paper.”<sup>2</sup>, that illustrates in particular, Baram’s role in the conduct of Washington’s reaction to events in Grenada during the Carter years, and the early part of the Reagan administration.

Rossin’s references to Ortiz are particularly important to this study. He notes that although the ambassador shared Washington’s concern over the NJM’s revolutionary advent to power, he advised his superiors at the State Department that the leaders of the Revolution might eventually moderate their ideological predispositions to a point more acceptable to the United States. Given this expectation, Ortiz recommended that Washington “Reciprocate the NJM leadership’s expressed desire for a ‘non-confrontational relationship’ to create a space of time in which undesirable aspects of Grenadian events, notably the

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<sup>1</sup> See Schoenhals, Kai and Richard A. Melanson Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: the United States and the Caribbean. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 114-115.

<sup>2</sup> Source, U.S. Department of State case control number 8402598

unconstitutional nature of the transition and Marxist ideology of the new leaders might be influenced in a direction more in accord with U.S. interests in the Eastern Caribbean region.”<sup>1</sup>

Based on its ambassador’s advice, the United States ‘recognized’ the People’s Revolutionary Government on March 22, 1979.<sup>2</sup> Ortiz met with Bishop and Whiteman that day; subsequently, he advised Washington that “if we expect to have a significant constructive influence on the course of events, we shall have to play for time showing forbearance and patience and avoiding unnecessary confrontation until the new government is more comfortable in its relationship with us, and we understand its ultimate design better,<sup>3</sup>

Havana was the third locus of influence, and the sole actor vis-à-vis PRG/U.S. relations, was Fidel Castro, with whom Bishop had a fraternal relationship.

The two agencies of the United States Government most involved in matters pertaining to Grenada were the State Department, and the National Security Council (NSC), headed by Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, respectively.

Vance, a prominent lawyer, had served in the Kennedy and Johnson

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p.2.

<sup>2</sup> The United States did not sever ties with Grenada following the NJM coup; it took a ‘wait and see’ attitude, until Barem advised that the PRG had given assurances of an early election, a policy of nonalignment, and respect for basic human rights.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.10.

administrations. His *modus operandi* was to pursue negotiations with most countries “on the merits of their particular needs . . . and the capacity of the United States to relate to those needs,”<sup>1</sup> than employing the method of linkage and confrontation associated with the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Vance, Andrew Young, Sally Shelton, and Ortiz were the most prominent advocates for the co-optation of the People’s Revolutionary Government in the first weeks of its existence.

Brzezinski, realist, scholar, and former director of the Trilateral Commission, was Carter’s adviser on foreign affairs during his campaign for the presidency in 1976. Although he shared with Vance and Young a concern for human rights and Third World development, his approach to the promotion of these causes was conditioned by their serving “the geo-political imperatives of the U.S./Soviet competition rather than as ends in themselves.”<sup>2</sup>

Robert Pastor, a senior staff member for Latin America in the National Security Council (1977-1981), was a major maker in that body’s decision-making process. His responsibilities included relations between Washington and the PRG, and he contributed substantially to the related literature.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Syom Brown. The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy From Truman to Reagan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 454

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 453.

<sup>3</sup> See Robert Pastor “U.S. Policy Toward the Caribbean: Continuity and Change,” in Peter M.nn and Bruce Watson eds. American intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation

Barem and Washington often had varying appraisals of the situation in Grenada. President Carter and some of his staff at State and NSC were seen by Barem as having a tolerant attitude towards socialists in the Anglophone Caribbean.<sup>1</sup> This influenced their initial perspective of the NJM elite as “reasonably idealistic socialists in the Michael Manley sense . . . sufficiently pragmatic . . . to be coaxed into a free-enterprise approach.”<sup>4</sup> Barem was at variance with this view. To them, the “Marxist ideology of the new leaders would make the NJM ideologically predisposed against much of U.S. policy,” but they shared Ortiz’ view that “the assumption of power might moderate some of the extremist ideas.”<sup>2</sup>

### The impact of International events

Three major international events had an impact on Grenada’s relations with the United States. The most serious of these was the PRG’s decision to support the Soviets in the Afghanistan vote at the United Nations. The implications of this vote is the theme of one of the three following chapters of this study; suffice it to

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“Urgent Fury,” Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1985, pp.15-28; see also his article “The United States and the Grenada Revolution: Who Pushed First and Why?” in Jorge Heine, ed. A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada,Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1990, pp.181-214.

<sup>1</sup> National Security Council Memorandum #1603, dated 3-14-79, National Security Council, Washington D.C., 1994.

<sup>114</sup> National Security Council unnumbered memo, dated 3-15-79

<sup>2</sup> State Department background paper E.O. 11652, U.S.-Grenada relations since the coup: A background paper, 1-17- 83, p.2, authored by Larry Rossin.

say, at this juncture, that it destroyed whatever chances existed for goodwill between Washington and the PRG.

The second event was the Sandanistas' overthrow of the Samoza regime. This event created the specter of a Marxist triangle in the Caribbean. It also served to support the rightist argument in the United States that the Soviets were penetrating the hemisphere on Carter's watch.<sup>1</sup>

The seizure by Iranian zealots of the United States embassy in Teheran was a shocking and embarrassing event to Carter, and contributed significantly to his loss in the presidential election of 1980. Already dogged by the growing perception of the United States as a humbled giant, the Teheran incident was the last thing that Carter needed. As he focused on solving that problem, it seemed that others of lesser magnitude, such as relations with Grenada, would not receive his personal attention. But this was not exactly the case. Grenada was treated commensurately with its status in the hierarchy of nations, and according to the gravity of the problem which it posed for the United States.

Jimmy Carter will most likely not be remembered as one of the most illustrious presidents of the United States, but one cannot truthfully deny that he sought to eschew the arrogance and self-righteousness of the Monroe Doctrine and make

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<sup>1</sup> See Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean. Boston: South End Press. 1982, p. 173.

America relevant to the unprecedented changes of the world. Robert Pastor confirms this view: “The Carter administration was the first in U.S. history to focus on the Caribbean in the absence of a security threat, or as it turned out, before rather than after such a threat.”<sup>1</sup> As Pastor further notes, Carter’s position was not influenced solely on his recognition of the changed landscape within the region, but also because of personal and policy motivations. The Carter administration sought to demonstrate a willingness to relate amicably to socialists, “provided they were democratic, like Michael Manley of Jamaica.” It also wanted to manifest “that it was capable of approaching the developing world with a North-South rather than an East-West focus.”<sup>2</sup>

The Carter initiative was also influenced by the report of a blue ribbon Commission on United States-Latin American relations, which was chaired by Sol M. Lonowitz, and advised by many scholars and specialists, particularly Stanley Hoffman.<sup>3</sup>

The 1974 report, entitled “The Americas in a Changing World,” began by counseling that “the United States should change its basic approach to Latin

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Pastor in Heine, op. cit. p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 185..

<sup>3</sup> W. Anthony Lake, “Pragmatism and Principle in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Boston: MA.. June 13, 1977. (U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 1)..

America and the Caribbean.”<sup>1</sup> It argued that the assumptions which had governed United States foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere were made ineffective by the combined forces of regional and global transformations. The report suggested a revision of U.S. hemispheric policies to reflect four new regional conditions which had eventuated. The first of these advised that “Latin American countries are and will remain entirely diverse in their ideologies, political systems, economic systems, and levels of development;” the second condition maintained that “Latin American states are playing and will continue to play increasingly active and independent roles in international organizations and other arenas of world politics;” third, “Non-hemispheric states will play important roles in Latin American affairs;” fourthly, “the principal issues of U.S. policy towards Latin America will increasingly be issues which are not peculiar to U.S.-Latin American relations but rather involve global economic and political relationships.”<sup>2</sup>

Among the thirty-three recommendations the Linowitz commission made concerning political, cultural and economic issues, was the advice that the United States should refrain from unilateral military interventions, cease covert

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<sup>1</sup> Sol M. Linowitz, et al., The Americas in a Changing World, New York: Quadrangle Books, 1975.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 20.

interventions in the internal affairs of hemispheric states, sign and ratify a new Panama Canal Treaty, and take the initiative to normalize relations with Cuba.<sup>1</sup> President Carter and his advisers were favorably disposed towards many of the recommendations and assumptions of the Linowitz commission. These were to serve as maxims in his relations with Cuba, Panama, and initially the PRG, when he refused to approve Brzezinski's recommendation for a blockade of Grenada, in the wake of the NJM coup.<sup>2</sup>

We revisit at this point the infamous Ortiz demarche and its pivotal role in shaping the PRG's policy vis-à-vis the United States. In an effort to safeguard against Gairy's use of mercenaries to return him to power in Grenada, the PRG turned to the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom for military and economic aid. The Carter administration was of the opinion that Bishop would turn to Cuba for help, in the event that Washington refused to oblige; this was one of the reasons why the State Department wanted its envoy to the region to advise Bishop of its opposition to such an arrangement.<sup>3</sup>

Bishop and Ambassador Ortiz met in St. Georges on March 23 and discussed at length what was needed from the United States, as well as assurances from

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid pp. 60-61.

<sup>2</sup> Washington Post, July 6, 1979, p. A 1

<sup>3</sup> Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p113.

Grenada that free elections would be held in the near future. The two men were not strangers. A week before the PRG came to power, Ortiz had written Bishop:

The Presidents' Day reception on February 19, 1979 . . . was a fresh, pleasant memory made especially so by the honor now accorded us by your presence. Your words on the quality of democratic ideals in Grenada and your obvious respect for legitimate opposition suited the spirit of the occasion perfectly. I know all were inspired by the expression of your firm intention to assure the protection and welfare of Americans and their property.<sup>1</sup>

According to Ortiz, Bishop, in post-coup telephone conversations “solemnly assured me that U.S. lives and property would be protected, that good relations with the United States were a basic aim of his government, and that there would be prompt and free elections of a legally constituted government.”<sup>2</sup> On the basis of these assurances, Washington was disposed to reciprocate politely, although it was mindful of the affinity that the leaders of the NJM held for Cuba.<sup>3</sup>

Relations between the United States and the PRG, covering the period from the coup to the intervention, evolved, according to Pastor, through three phases: the

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<sup>1</sup> As quoted by Theodore R. Britton, Jr., at Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, November 2, 1983, “U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean,” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Frank V. Ortiz, “Letter to the Editor,” Harper's Monthly, June 1984, p.7.

<sup>3</sup> See Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p. 112.

*empty embrace*, which was the distinguishing feature of the first month of the Revolution; the *distant and cooler relationship*, which was ushered in on April 13, 1979, and continued until the end of the Carter presidency; the third phase, marked by *confrontation and attempts at intimidation*, began with the start of the Reagan administration.<sup>1</sup>

### The Empty Embrace

Events in the first month of the revolution were crucial to relations between the PRG and the United States. Baram was aware of the surreptitious arrival in Grenada of Cuban personnel; equally disturbing were, according to Ortiz, Bishop's allegations that a United States assassination team was pursuing him. There was also the PRG's claimant demand for the deportation of Gairy to stand trial in Grenada.

Washington, still desirous of co-opting Grenada, instructed Ortiz to meet with Bishop and discuss various points. The ambassador arrived in St. George's on 9 April, but was not granted an audience with Bishop until the following day.

Among the eleven points<sup>2</sup> which Ortiz was instructed to raise with Bishop, were: the holding of elections, a review of economic assistance which Washington was

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Pastor, in Heine, op.cit. pp. 166-167.

<sup>2</sup> See Ortiz, op. cit.

disposed to make available, and a guarantee, under the U.S. Neutrality Act, that Gairy would not be allowed to invade Grenada from the United States. Most importantly, Ortiz was “to express concern as delicately but clearly as possible that, if Bishop developed close military ties to Cuba that would complicate his relations with the United States.”<sup>1</sup>

Many aspects of Ortiz’ meeting with Bishop on 10 April require elucidation. In the first place, the State Department displayed an ambivalent posture on the issue of the co-optation of Grenada. On the one hand, the choice of cooptation would make it incumbent upon the United States to offer a substantial amount of economic assistance to the PRG, if Washington hoped to wean that government away from the Cuban fold. This strategy could have been successful, provided the Grenadian Marxists, already fixated on Cuba, were willing to molt and pursue a socialist policy similar to that of Michael Manley.

Conversely, cooptation of Grenada could be viewed by other states in the Eastern Caribbean as kowtowing by the United States to a government whose leaders had begun to condemn her publicly. The reaction of the American right would have been incisive to the extreme. There would also have been a need for the United States to extend to the rest of the Eastern Caribbean a largesse similar to that which would have been expended on the PRG.

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<sup>1</sup> Pastor in Heine, op.cit. p.191.

The United States unrelenting insistence that the PRG hold elections posthaste,<sup>1</sup> was in the opinion of this writer, and that of Bishop, an exercise in hypocrisy. A hundred and eighty years after the Declaration of Independence, the United States was still lax in its constitutional responsibility of putting blacks in voting booths in Mississippi and elsewhere. Furthermore, there were other dictatorships far more despicable than the PRG, but which enjoyed close ties with the United States. Why have different criteria for Grenada?

Not holding elections was indeed a major error on the part of the PRG, particularly since the odds were heavily in their favor; but to have done so, could have resulted in a schism between Grenada and its major donor, Cuba.

This was probably what the United States strategy was all about. A democratic Grenada would have been more prone to side with the United States than align itself closely with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

On the question of economic aid, Ortiz states that Bishop's reactions were nonchalant. It is likely that at this point in time, Bishop was already confident of receiving military and economic assistance from Cuba, and could therefore inform the United States ambassador that he was neither ready for a visit of AID officials nor Peace Corps volunteers. Bishop did promise to send representatives to Barem

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<sup>1</sup> See Bishop Speeches in Marcus and Taber, op.cit. pp.299-200. see also pp.162-163 of the same volume.

to discuss “specific offers of economic assistance,” but, like his promise to hold elections, he never did.<sup>1</sup>

The extradition of Gairy from the United States to Grenada was one of the eleven points of discussion between Bishop and Ortiz. The ambassador provided proof to Bishop that Gairy was in San Diego, and not on a nearby island with a band of mercenaries, planning to attack Grenada.<sup>2</sup> But neither Washington’s offer of aid nor its promise to interdict any move by Gairy to launch an invasion of Grenada from the United States obviated the PRG’s need for military supplies and its passion for Gairy’s deportation.

Much controversy surrounds just what the United States, through its envoy, was prepared to offer the PRG in March of 1979. Bishop and members of his government claimed that it was a paltry sum of five thousand U.S. dollars; both Ortiz and the U.S. Department of State deny this. He affirms that he and other members of Barem had met with Bishop and his ministers and had outlined Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) funds which were approved for Grenada, but advised that this was a slow – disbursing assistance. Accordingly, Ortiz advised Bishop that “for quick impact in the interim the embassy could immediately make available . . . several grants from the Special Development Activities (SDA) fund

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<sup>1</sup> Schoenhals and Melason, *op. cit.* p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Pastor in Heine, *op. cit.* p. 191.

of \$5,000 each for small-scale community-initiated projects.”<sup>1</sup> Ortiz maintains that Bishop was receptive to the CDB and SDA grants, and in addition, to keeping the services of the Peace Corps, yet “In all our meetings he was non-committal about discussion of new assistance and never responded to my urgings that he initiate specific talks with us.”<sup>2</sup>

The veracity of Ortiz’ recounting of his discussion with Bishop has been questioned by some members of the NJM. What is not disputed are the contents of a type-written note which Ortiz handed to Bishop, informing him that the United States would not countenance his obtaining arms or other forms of aid from Cuba. Instead of protesting the Ortiz dispatch through diplomatic channels, Bishop went public. In a radio address to the nation, he presented his version of what had transpired:

From day one of the revolution we have always striven to have and develop the closest and friendliest relations with the United States, as well as Canada, Britain, and all our Caribbean neighbors. . . . But no one must understand must misunderstand our friendliness as an excuse for rudeness and meddling in our internal affairs, and no one, no matter how mighty and powerful they are, will be permitted to dictate to the Government and people of Grenada who we can have friendly relations with and what kind of relations we must have with other countries. . . . When Grenada requested aid, the United States, the wealthiest country in the world, offered \$5,000.00. . . . If the Government of Cuba is willing to offer

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<sup>1</sup> See Frank Ortiz, Atlantic Monthly, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Ortiz in Atlantic Monthly, op.cit.

us assistance we would be happy to receive it. . . . No country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country, or who to be friendly with. . . . We do not therefore recognize any right of the United States of America to instruct us on who we may develop relations with and who we may not. We are not in anybody's backyard and we are definitely not for sale. Anybody who thinks they can bully us or threaten us, clearly has no understanding, idea, or clue as to what we are made of. . . . Though small and poor, we are proud and determined.<sup>1</sup>

Bishop's "In Nobody's Backyard" speech might have been ideal for his domestic audience, but it was impolitic in the context of PRG-United States relations. It demonstrated *inter alia* a careless insensitivity to the political, military, and economic asymmetries that the United States possesses, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. One might speculate that Bishop was giving vent to justifiable anger, and above all, that he was trying to demonstrate to Cuba and the Soviet Union the spunk of the PRG. No matter what the motive, the speech alienated the United States, and by extension complicated relations between that country and Grenada.

The Bishop-Ortiz incident was an inauspicious beginning of relations between the PRG and the United States. The note seemed to have been the wrong message, at the wrong time, delivered by the wrong messenger. Commenting on the Ortiz demarche, Robert Pastor writes that it served to reinforce the PRG's perception of the United States "as an imperialist monster, bent on destroying the young

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<sup>1</sup> See Marcus and Taber, ed. Op. cit. pp.26-31.

revolution,”<sup>1</sup> but Bishop was not without blame. The rancor of his response to Ortiz’ note “confirmed the impression in Washington that these young Marxists wanted to provoke the United States to justify their militarization and alliance with Cuba.”<sup>2</sup>

The second phase of relations between Grenada and the United States evolved from the Bishop-Ortiz impasse. Bishop’s “backyard” speech moved the United States to reevaluate its policy toward Grenada; it likewise indicated the PRG’s resolve to turn to Cuba for aid if such were not forthcoming from the United States.

At a joint meeting of the State Department and the National Security Council, an agenda was drawn up to discuss options which would be further discussed at a mini-Special Coordinating Committee. The options were:

“First, did Grenada’s new leaders have a fixed direction toward Cuba, or was cooptation a plausible strategy?

Second, what was the best path to influence the government to fulfill its pledges on elections, to remain closer to the Commonwealth Caribbean than to Cuba, and to preclude any support for radical activities in the region?

Third, what were the implications of a policy toward Grenada

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Pastor in Heine, *op.cit.* p.194.

2. *Ibid*, p. 194.

for the rest of the region?

Fourth, what should the United States do to preclude a repetition of another left-wing coup in the region?”<sup>1</sup>

Implicit in these four options was a willingness among some members of the State Department and the National Security Council to press forward with a strategy of cooptation. But there were detractors who argued that Grenada was not interested in being co-opted, therefore United States policy should endeavor to aid the rest of the Caribbean, instead of the NJM radicals. Supporting this argument was the failure of the PRG to respond to Barem’s offer to assist Grenada in designing aid requests. George Louison, Minister of Education also did not respond to an AID offer to visit Grenada with a view to developing education projects. Another example of PRG nonchalance occurred on April 17, 1979 when no member of the PRG met with a visiting AID team which had traveled to Grenada to inspect Special Development Activities. Even more disturbing was Pastor’s observation that “Bishop never followed up his offhand request for military aid. It appeared that he was asking for help from the United States without really wanting it. Perhaps he thought that confrontation with the United States would help them obtain more aid from other sources.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> These four options are excerpted from Pastor’s article in Heine, op. cit. p.194.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Pastor in Heine, op. cit. p.195

Despite this conviction, the State Department was bent on going the extra mile in its effort to co-opt the PRG. The minutes of a National Security Council meeting of April 23, 1979 note that “State would like us to try to buy out Grenada now and wants to . . . encourage other donors to give assistance, although such a move will open ourselves to criticism of pandering to leftists.”<sup>1</sup>

Two points dominated this NSC meeting: the first was that the State Department believed that a substantial amount of funds might succeed in getting the PRG to abandon its links with Cuba; secondly, were that approach to fail, the United States would have to face the realization that Grenada was not desirous of having amicable ties with Washington.

A number of developments, occurring less than six weeks after the PRG came to power, and others later in 1979, exacerbated the already critical relations between the United States and the PRG. Listed below, not necessarily in chronological order, are the most important of these:

### In the PRG Camp

1. On April 14, the day after Bishop’s “backyard speech,” the PRG Established diplomatic relations with Cuba. In the same month, Cuban arms arrived in Grenada and were surreptitiously unloaded.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> National Security Council Memorandum 2385, National Security Council, Washington, D.C. 1994.

2. PRG rhetoric becomes more belligerent towards the United States.
3. Grenada gravitates closer to Cuba and the Soviet Union.
4. Grenada snubs proffered United States aid.
5. Cuban medical teams arrive in Grenada on April 7; unidentified Cuban personnel deplaned at Pearls Airport, ostensibly because of aircraft emergency; the plane eventually left without them. One of these men was Ivor Martinez, who directed Cuban activities in Grenada until an ambassador was appointed by Havana. The following day, another plane, also “in difficulty,” landed at Pearls Airport and left arms and personnel. The next day, the *Jamaito*, a Guyanese vessel, delivered arms which had been flown from Cuba to Guyana. On April 14, the *Matanzas*, a Cuban ship, arrived at St. George’s and unloaded a large cargo of arms during a curfew.<sup>2</sup>
6. Grenada admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement; Bishop excoriates U.S. at the Movement’s conference in Havana;
7. PRG announces Cuba’s agreement to build a new airport in Grenada;
8. Bishop denounces U.S. imperialism in his maiden speech before the U.N.

On the United States side

1. United States mulls a naval blockade of Grenada, but does not follow through;<sup>2</sup>
2. U.S. perceives a PRG drift towards Cuba and the Soviet Union;
3. Frank Ortiz is replaced by Sally Shelton as ambassador, seeing her assignment to the Eastern Caribbean as “an opportunity to make another effort at reconciliation with the PRG, and to remedy some “unfortunate misunderstandings.”<sup>3</sup>
4. The U.S.A. refused to accept Dessima Williams as PRG ambassador to Washington;
5. The U.S.A. implements a series of destabilization against the PRG;
6. Washington grows apprehensive about Grenada’s projected new airport.

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<sup>2</sup> See Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p. 115.

<sup>3</sup> **Department of State telegram. State 153150, June 14, 1979.**

By the end of 1979, the convergence of events and mutual misperceptions created a distance between the PRG and the Carter administration. The Cuban assisted militarization of Grenada led Carter to prohibit Ambassador Shelton's visits to Grenada; the PRG permission to have the Cubans build a new airport in Grenada was deemed geo-strategically unacceptable to the United States and further polarized relations with the PRG. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 rekindled the Cold War, and Grenada's subsequent decision to support the Soviets in the General Assembly vote on that issue, became the proverbial straw that broke the back of relations with the PRG.

The catalyst of ill will and tension that defined, at this point, relations between the PRG and the United States, resulted from Grenada's refusal to accept Washington's hegemony in the Caribbean. It was speculated that such hubris could only have resulted from the PRG's close ties with Cuba, and a states willingness to align with "core community" in the Caribbean.

The United States was concerned that Cuba and the Soviet Union shared a common geopolitical worldview. Washington reasoned that the furtherance of strategic goals was essentially the sole interest of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean. Thus, if we accept the premise that the Soviet goal in the Caribbean was one of penetration, and accept that Cuba was the axis of such adventurism, it

stands to reason that Grenada, by virtue of its close affiliation with Cuba would be considered complicit in that Soviet scheme.

This perspective, framed by the realities of the then prevailing Cold War, justified, from Washington's standpoint, the economic and military postures of the Carter, and later, the Reagan regimes in their foreign policy towards Grenada.

Given the propensity of the United States to intervene in Caribbean societies that flout her will, one might question why Carter did not take that route. A cognitive analysis informs that a cavalier military intervention would have been contrary to his principles. Carter was not prone to betray his moral values because of his accession to the presidency of the United States.

As he explains in his book, *Why not the Best?*

Our personal problems are magnified when we assume different standards of morality and ethics in our own lives as we shift from one responsibility or milieu to another. . . Public officials, the President, the Vice President, members of Congress, Attorneys-General, federal judges, the triad of the CIA, . . . ought to set a standard that is absolutely exemplary. We ought to be like Caesar's wife. We ought to be free of any criticism or allegation.<sup>1</sup>

The commitment to moral principles did not, however, prevent the Carter

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<sup>1</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Why Not the Best*, New York: Bantam Books, 1976

White House from unleashing upon Grenada a series of diplomatic, economic, propaganda, and other destabilizations. There was, as Holger Henke observes, a questionable flip side to the “New Morality” which Carter sought to implant in American foreign policy. The Carter administration, like its predecessor, had worked to undermine the Manley Government; it was now Grenada’s turn. In the first place, the United States refused to accept the credentials of the PRG’s ambassador-designate.<sup>1</sup> It then reinforced its diplomatic isolation of the PRG with strategies to deny economic assistance to Grenada.

These strategies prevented Grenada from receiving bilateral and multi-lateral grants to repair infrastructures destroyed or seriously damaged by a recent hurricane which had devastated the area. This was blatant discrimination, in light of the fact that such assistance was made available to adjacent islands suffering the same fate. Some acts of terror that occurred in St. George’s were attributed to the CIA, which was also accused of disseminating a false portrait of the Revolution, and fomenting unrest in many parts of the island.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the perceptible hardening of United States relations with the PRG during the last year of the Carter administration, Grenada nonetheless became one of the foci of the 1980 presidential election. Neo-conservatives such as Jeanne

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<sup>1</sup> Ken I Boodhoo, Grenada: The Birth and Death of a Revolution Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, Miami, 1989, p.47.

<sup>2</sup> See Euclid A. Rose Dependency and Socialism in the Modern Caribbean. Lanham,MD.: Lexington Books, 2002, p.371.

Kirkpatrick, Norman Podheretz, and Carl Gershman, to name but a few, articulated in their writings the anti-Marxist worldview of their candidate, Ronald Reagan. They blamed Carter for his “dovish stance in dealing with the Soviets, and faulted him for much of the inroads that Moscow had made in many parts of the world, particularly in the Caribbean.

Equally poignant were the criticisms leveled at him by the Santa Fe Committee. In a report entitled, “A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties, hereinafter referred to as the “Santa Fe Report,” the Committee advocated a new positive policy for the Circum-Caribbean, the re-affirmation of the core principle of the Monroe Doctrine, the denial to hostile powers of bases and allies within the region, and the end of the status of Cuba as a Soviet vassal state.

The Report also blamed Carter for losing Grenada and Nicaragua on his watch, and in the process, brought Marxist revolution to the doorstep of the United States.<sup>1</sup> Echoing the rhetoric of Reagan and his aides, the Santa Fe Report warned that:

The U.S. is being shoved aside in the Caribbean and Central America by a sophisticated, but brutal, extra-continental superpower manipulating client states. Soviet influence has expanded mightily since 1959. The Soviet Union is now ensconced in force in the Western Hemisphere and the United States must remedy the situation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jenny Pearce Under the Eagle op. cit. p. 174.

The PRG was also one of the targets of a right-wing documentary film, “Attack on America.” Made for television, it was produced by the American Security Council (ASC), one of the most powerful pro-military lobbies in the United States. The ASC provided 150,000 dollars to make the film and an additional five million dollars to defray the cost of showing it on approximately 200 television stations throughout the United States.<sup>1</sup>

These propaganda initiatives were accompanied by attacks on Grenada by Reagan, himself, as he addressed the American public during the 1980 election campaign. Bishop and his colleagues read the handwriting on the wall: relations between the United States and the PRG would move from cold to frigid in the event of a Reagan presidency.

#### The PRG and the perception of America’s declining power

The widespread perception of the United States as a humbled giant affected in no small measure its foreign policy towards Grenada and vice versa. Watergate had significantly impaired the image of the United States, and her ignominious retreat from South –East Asia had given rise to the pervasive Vietnam syndrome.

As Washington withdrew within itself to contemplate, among other things, the wisdom of future interventions, the Soviet Union, having achieved conventional and strategic parity with NATO, became more assertive in the Third World. Boris

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 177.

Ponomarev, a former head of the International Directorate in 1980, regarded this development to be reflective of a change in the correlation of forces where the United States was in decline:

Today, under the onslaught of the liberation forces, which are rapidly increasing both on a national and international scale, American imperialism is no longer capable of protecting its protégées and puppets against being overthrown.<sup>1</sup>

We now know that Ponomarev and others were too precipitate in writing the epitaph of American power, but almost three decades ago, the United States was indeed perceived by many, including Ronald Reagan, as a humbled giant.

Commenting on the importance of how the United States perceived the status of its power, Anthony Payne writes:

It perceives its own standing as a great power and its credibility in the eyes of the Soviet Union to be dependent upon its ability to maintain and demonstrate control of its own hemispheric community. In official eyes, any weakening of this political control reduces Soviet perceptions of U.S. strength, weakens European and NATO perceptions of U.S. leadership and undermines the Third World's faith in the Western model of development. Much therefore, hangs upon U.S. dominance of the Western Hemisphere, including the Caribbean, which is deemed to be one of the core elements of the system.<sup>2</sup>

Payne's thesis is important in helping to identify and define the fundamental cause of the United States' perceived animus towards Grenada. The PRG's rejection of

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<sup>1</sup> See Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Payne, The International Crisis in the Caribbean. London: Croom-Helm, 1984, p.38

the Westminster model, although frightening to its Eastern Caribbean neighbors, was not the root cause of the problems which frustrated its efforts to establish, as Bishop claimed, amicable relations with the United States. Perhaps the cause was best articulated by Pastor as he endeavored to put the issue in perspective:

. . . Regardless of what the United States said or did, its relations with the PRG were destined to be cool and distant at best, given the NJM's preconception of U.S. imperialism as the devil incarnate, and the U.S. judgement that its interests would be affected by the expansion of Soviet-Cuban influence in the Caribbean.<sup>1</sup>

Pastor states, however, that :

. . . just because relations could not be good does not mean that a collision or a confrontation was inevitable. Perceptions of each other's behavior were crucial in bringing the two governments to a collision. Each suspected the other of the worst motives and interpreted information in a way that reinforced those suspicions.<sup>2</sup>

The Carter administration might not have distanced itself from Grenada were it not for four developments over which Grenada had control: the first was its alignment with Cuba; secondly, the decision by the PRG to have the Cubans build the new airport; thirdly, Grenada's decision to support the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan question, and fourthly, Bishop's intemperate rhetoric. It should be noted that neither Carter, nor any high member of his administration engaged in a bitter

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Pastor, in Heine op. cit. p.205.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp. 205-206.

verbal exchange with the PRG. The truth is that Carter saw the PRG as an irritant, and treated them accordingly.

### Reagan and the People's Revolutionary Government

Ronald Reagan's landside victory in the election of 1980, gave him a mandate to arrest the decline of the United States' international prestige, and neutralize some of the Soviet gains, particularly those that were made in the Circum-Caribbean. He lost no time in surrounding himself with a number of staunch conservatives who shared his worldview, resolve, and passion to check Moscow's encroachments in the Americas. Prominent among these were:

General Alexander Haig – Secretary of State;  
Jeanne Kirkpatrick – Ambassador to the United Nations;  
Casper Weinberger – Secretary of Defense;  
Langhorne Motley – Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs;  
William Casey – Director of Central Intelligence;  
George Shultz- successor to Haig

Invariably, the perceptions which decision-makers hold of a particular nation are modified when the leadership of either state changes. Reagan's assumption to the presidency of the United States was a case in point. On the American side, the new administration viewed Grenada in an East-West confrontational perspective, thus giving it an international significance; Carter, conversely, saw the PRG as a regional phenomenon, and considered it an irritant, rather than a threat as Reagan perceived it.

The PRG was apprehensive about relations with the Reagan presidency. His campaign rhetoric and the propaganda of his close advisers, had not been salutary towards Grenada, the PRG, therefore, sought at the very outset to establish some measure of goodwill with the new president. On the day of Reagan's election, Bishop sent him a congratulatory letter in which he requested a meeting between the two. The letter was acknowledged without any mention of the request; two subsequent letters were never answered.<sup>1</sup> It was obvious that Reagan was not disposed to having a *modus vivendi* with Marxist Grenada.

Reagan's policy towards Grenada may be described as one of traditional realism. Where Carter sought to infuse quasi-utopian normative principles in dealing with Nicaragua, Cuba and Grenada, Reagan chose the path of hostility, bent on eliminating the threat that he perceived them to pose. Early in his administration, he set in operation a series of strategies designed to isolate the PRG, economically, politically, and militarily. Milan Bish, who succeeded Sally Shelton as ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, was not accredited to Grenada.<sup>2</sup> This was tantamount to a rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Grenada, and remained the status quo for the rest of the revolution's brief tenure.

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<sup>1</sup> Euclid Rose, *op. cit.* p. 373.

<sup>2</sup> Sally Shelton was not allowed to make a farewell visit to Grenada before demitting her office

To cope with what neo-conservatives perceived as a growing encroachment of Cuban-Soviet power in the Caribbean, Reagan implemented the policy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). This strategy involved the use of military and non-military attributes that facilitated, as Holger Henke observes, “the spread of the new gospel of Pax Americana through the conduits of private, non-or para-statal institutions conducting psychological power or propaganda programs.”<sup>1</sup> This strategy was ideal for the propaganda destabilization of the PRG. It enabled the CIA to execute its destabilizing mission more prominently.<sup>2</sup>

Bishop and the PRG needed no Sibylline books to inform them of Reagan’s design against their country. Their only option, as Don Rojas recalls, was to pursue a “protective strategy” of placing more emphasis on the following: (a) the Revolution’s commitment to CARICOM and Caribbean unity; (b) the Caribbean zone of peace; (c) the United Nation’s principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states; and (d) plans for general elections under the framework of a new constitution.”<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> . Holger Henke. Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica’s Foreign Relations 1972-1989. Ph.D. dissertation University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 2000, pp. 341-342.

<sup>2</sup> Low Intensity Conflict had proven effective in Chile against the Allende government, and also in Haiti, the Philippines, and El Salvador; it was partially responsible for the fall of the Manley government in 1980. For more particulars, see Henke, *Ibid*, p.342.

<sup>3</sup> Telephone interview with Don Rojas November 12, 2006.

These noble ideals did not, however, address the issues which impelled Reagan to bring stern measures to bear upon the PRG. If Grenada were to succeed in ingratiating itself into the favor of the United States, it would have to sever all ties with Cuba; a condition with which Bishop and his team were not disposed to comply.

Another strategy which the PRG employed in its attempt to cope with Reagan's antipathy was to develop friendship in many circles in the United States. The most influential of these sympathizers was the Black Congressional Caucus, but they were never able to influence United States foreign policy towards Africa or the Caribbean, as the Jewish lobby did for Israel. Yet, the PRG deluded itself into believing that its objectives to win friends and sympathy in the U.S. were succeeding and would eventually restrain Washington from attacking Grenada.<sup>1</sup> Relations between Grenada and the United States worsened early in 1981. The Reagan team pursued a rigid foreign policy, one designed to harass, destabilize, and even overthrow the Bishop government.<sup>2</sup> Having suspended diplomatic ties with the PRG, Washington moved to isolate Grenada economically. Reagan used his economic leverage to deny the PRG access to IMF and other sources of

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<sup>1</sup> See Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, ed. The Grenada Papers, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984, pp. 151-180.

<sup>2</sup> Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p.130.

international funding.<sup>1</sup> This endeavor was successful for the most part; the chief exception was the EEC, which aided the Point Salines Airport Project, in spite of Reagan's advice on the contrary. To cope with the onus of the Reagan –imposed destabilization, a beleaguered Grenada relied more heavily on Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other friendly nations.

The importance of the media in the execution of a nation's foreign policy is well documented. As a consequence of the technological revolution in the field of information, the media have become an inestimable asset in the dissemination of propaganda. Ronald Reagan and his team were eminently qualified to employ this phenomenon to its fullest, and lost no time in doing so.

In January of 1981, the Reagan administration unleashed a systematic and effective media destabilization against the PRG. The strategy began with the launching of a twenty-five minute film entitled *Attack on America*. This documentary, critical of the Cuban, Grenadian, and Nicaraguan revolutions, was produced and underwritten by the American Security Council, one of the most powerful pro-military lobbies in the United States. The budget of the film was 150,000 dollars and an additional five million dollars was spent to cover the cost of showing it on approximately 200

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<sup>1</sup> Caleb Rossiter, "The Financial Hit List," International Policy Report, February 1984, p.4.; see also "U.S. versus Grenada, A Chronology of

television stations, as well as civic groups and public schools throughout the United States.<sup>1</sup>

A few weeks later, a CBS-TV series called “The Prisoner and the Police State,” vilified Grenada as a communist state controlled by Cuba and the Soviet Union. A CBS-TV sequel to this documentary focused on conflicts between the PRG and the Roman Catholic Church in Grenada, the suppression of the press, and the denial of certain human rights.<sup>2</sup>

Under the auspices of the United States International Communications (USICA), the propaganda arm of the State Department, a conference was hosted in May 1981 for the editors of the major Caribbean newspapers, where they were apprised of the growing number of Cuban troops and weapons in Grenada. The participants in the conference were offered pecuniary grants to collaborate with the United States campaign to isolate Grenada.<sup>3</sup>

Cooperating in the anti-Grenada media propaganda were such outstanding American periodicals as the Boston Globe, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Time, and Newsweek.<sup>4</sup> In their sustained anti-

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<sup>1</sup> See Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle, op. cit. p.177; also Chris Searle, Grenada: The Struggle against Destabilization, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc. 1983, p.66.

<sup>2</sup> . *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> . Euclid Rose, op. cit. p.377.

<sup>4</sup> .. *Ibid*, p. 377

Grenada crusade, some media ran the following headlines: “No More Freedom in Grenada;” “Grenada has become the Second Cuba in the Caribbean;” Soviet Tanks found in Grenada.” Some conservative newspapers in the Anglophone Caribbean followed suit. Foremost among these were the Trinidad Guardian, The Express, Barbados Advocate, The Sun, the Daily Gleaner, The Voice of St. Lucia, and Dominica Chronicle.<sup>1</sup>

It was no coincidence that on September 20, 1981, identical headlines appeared in five West Indian newspapers,<sup>2</sup> calling upon Bishop and his government to restore freedom to the people of Grenada..

The PRG regarded these negative press reports for what they were: a strategy to disrupt their tourist industry and its overall economy. It had closed the popular newspaper, *The Torchlight*, in 1979, and the less popular *Catholic Focus* in 1980 on the basis of alleged libel and imperialist propaganda; in the wake of the critical articles in the Caribbean press, the PRG expeditiously close the *Grenada Voice*, on the grounds that the paper represented the CIA efforts to destabilize the revolution.

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<sup>1</sup> . Ibid, p.377.

<sup>2</sup> . The Guardian, and Express, in Trinidad; The Advocate, and The Sun, in Barbados, and the Daily Gleaner, in Jamaica. All of these papers are available in New York City, Washington, London, Toronto, Montreal, and Miami, which have sizeable West Indian populations.

The PRG then arrested the paper's publishers, the so-called "Gang of Twenty-six," and accused them of complicity in a plot to overthrow the government.<sup>1</sup>

The PRG had other reasons for disquietude: reports of an impending invasion by the "Patriotic Alliance" were beginning to gain credence. The group comprised of Trinidad-based Grenadians opposed to the Revolution, were suspected of having United States backing. There were also alleged covert CIA activities in Grenada, and Jamaica, which were disclosed in 1982 by four former CIA agents, John Stockwell, Ralph McGehee, and Bill Schaap.<sup>2</sup>

The economic and propaganda initiatives of the Reagan government had a telling effect on the PRG. They destabilized the tourist industry, restricted the availability of funds, and cogently projected an unflattering portrait of Marxist Grenada. Compounding these problems was the fact that new, unfriendly conservative leaders had come to power in Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Dominica, all of whom joined Barbados in a pro-Reagan posture against the PRG. With cold relations between Grenada and Trinidad, and fraternal ties strained between Bishop and Burnham,<sup>3</sup> the PRG was almost friendless in the Anglophone Caribbean.

The success of Washington's destabilizing strategies motivated Bishop to

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 378.

<sup>2</sup> See Searle, op. cit. pp. 79-80. For Agee's operation in Jamaica, see Euclid Rose, op. cit. p.365.

<sup>3</sup> Ties between these two Marxist friends were strained when the PRG blamed Burnham for the assassination of Walter Rodney in 1980.

apprise Reagan of the PRG's concern for the deteriorating state of relations between Grenada and the United States. His letter to Reagan, dated August 11, 1981, placed in focus the salient problems that militated against the establishment of cordial relations between the two nations. The following are the most significant points of Bishop's letter:

1. The PRG's desire for the restoration of relations between both nations at an acceptable level;
2. The PRG is committed to the pursuit of peace through principled relations and cooperation with all countries, particularly its immediate neighbors;
3. Bishop is mindful of the number of American tourists who visit Grenada each year, and the considerable number of Americans who reside there. He was likewise mindful of the significant number of Grenadians who reside in the United States;
4. Contrary to certain notions in vogue, it must be obvious that Grenada, a small country of 133 square miles and 110,000 people, does not, and cannot pose a threat to a large and developed country of the United States;
5. The PRG lays down no conditions precedent to the improvement of relations with the United States, but insists that relations between Grenada and the United States must be premised on the principle of legal equality of states, mutual respect for sovereignty, territoriality, ideological pluralism, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
  - The United States has not responded to Grenada's many initiatives to normalize relations between both countries;
  - Grenada has been the object of the United States propaganda and economic destabilization;

- The construction of the Point Salines Airport is to enable Grenada to exploit its tourist potential and achieve economic betterment; it will serve no military purpose;
- The PRG is disturbed to realize that mercenaries are training in the United States with a view to overthrowing the revolution. Although Washington is aware of these activities, it has made no effort to arrest them.<sup>1</sup>

Bishop's letter was never answered, and relations between Grenada and the United States became more strained as Reagan embarked on a strategy of military destabilization. The CIA having failed to receive Senate approval for the implementation of a program of intense economic hardship against Grenada,<sup>2</sup> a war of nerves became Reagan's *modus operandi*. This took the form of massive air and naval maneuvers, first in the Vicinity of Vieques Island, off the southern coast of Puerto Rico, with a sequel within Grenadian waters. These maneuvers had four major effects: (a) they seriously disrupted Grenada's tourist trade; (b) they made the PRG more reliant on Cuba; (c) they sent a somber message to Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua of what the United States was capable of doing, and (d) they enhanced Reagan's status among the right-wing section of the United States population.

The uniqueness of Grenada's foreign policy toward the Reagan Government, or the lack thereof, lay in the latter's intransigent refusal to hold a dialog with the PRG.

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<sup>1</sup> See United States National Archives document (unnumbered)

<sup>2</sup> Washington Post, February 27, 1983, p. A1.

The patent basis of this refusal was the United States' aversion to Grenada's links with Cuba. This, however, was a non-sequitur, inasmuch as the Reagan White House conducted dialogs with Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union, which Reagan, himself, characterized as the "evil empire." What made a weak, minuscule political entity like Grenada more dangerous to the interests of the United States than its largest and most powerful communist adversaries? The answer lies not only in geopolitical realities but also in the brazen intemperate rhetoric which Bishop directed at the White House. The American president is the embodiment of his country's basic attributes and foreign policy; to attack him personally jeopardizes the prospect of cordial relations with his country, especially when the attacker represents a micro state within the shadow of American power.

### The Caribbean Basin Initiative

The foreign policy of the United States towards the southern states of the western hemisphere has been marked by a consistency that has not wavered since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.<sup>1</sup> The stewardship which Washington exercises over the region as had as its *raison d'etre* not only the protection from extra-hemispheric intrusion, but first and foremost the promotion of United States economic interest. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), announced by Reagan in an address to the Organization of American States on

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<sup>1</sup> It could be argued that FDR, Truman, and Kennedy liberalized the Doctrine, but in reality, those changes remained an instrument of the welfare of U.S. interests.

February 24, 1982, was a continuation of this policy. The objectives of the Bill are summarized in its introduction:

The CBI is a program of trade and tax incentives to promote economic development and greater stability in the Caribbean region. The legislation would establish a 12 year duty free scheme for imports from qualifying Caribbean countries. Articles which are import sensitive in the context of trade with these countries would be exempt from such treatment. In addition, eligible countries must meet strict criteria designed to protect our foreign policy and economic interest. These are also safeguards to protect against trade diversions from countries outside the region and to ensure protection against possible injury to domestic industries as a result of duty free imports. Finally, the Bill contains two important tax provisions: the first to rebate all excise taxes on imported rum to the treasuries of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands; second to permit a deduction for attendance at conventions.<sup>1</sup>

According to the Bill, all states of the Circum- Caribbean could be considered for eligibility or certification with the following provisions. The President shall not designate any country or beneficiary country under this title;

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<sup>1</sup> See the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Bill # 2769 of the 98<sup>th</sup> Congress of the United States of America, Washington, D.C. 27 April 1983

1. If such Country is a communist country;
2. If such country has nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise seized ownership or control of property owned by United States citizen or by a cooperation, partnership, or association which is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens;
3. If such a country affords preferential treatment to the products of a developed country other than the United States, which has or is likely to have, a significant adverse effect on United States commerce, unless the President has received assurance satisfactory to him that such preferential treatment will be eliminated or that action will be taken to assure that there will be no significant adverse effects, and he reports these assurances to the Congress.
4. If a government-owned entity in such country engages in the broadcast of copyrighted material, including films, or television material, belonging to the United States copyright owners without their expressed consent;
5. Unless such a country is a signatory to a treaty, convention, protocol or Agreement regarding the extradition of United States citizens;
6. The degree to which workers in such category is afforded reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to organize and bargain

collectively;

7. The extent to which a country prohibits nationals from engaging in the broadcast of copyrighted material, including films or television materials without their expressed consent, and
- 8 The extent to which a country is prepared to cooperate with the United States in the administration of the provision of this title.<sup>1</sup>

It is obvious that Grenada, Nicaragua, and Cuba did not qualify as beneficiary countries. The latter two manifested no interest in the CBI; Grenada, which was interested, criticized the selection criteria of the CBI and opined that its purpose was not to assist Caribbean in ameliorating their economic status but rather a disguised to funnel assistance to the Nicaragua Contras.

Perhaps the most demanding factor affecting Grenada's desire to participate in the CBI was that the paucity of funds was less than what was provided by the Cubans and the Soviets whom the PRG was not prepared to offend.

The Black Caucus in Congress did not endorse the CBI and shared the view that "the very notion of a Caribbean Basin as an artificial geopolitical construct did violence to the racial, cultural, linguistic, historical, economic, and political

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p.3.

diversity of Central America and the Caribbean.”<sup>1</sup> The group was further critical of Reagan’s efforts to isolate and punish Grenada, and in June 1982 its members succeeded in getting Michael Barnes, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs to convene hearings on the issue.<sup>2</sup> At the session, Stephen D. Bosworth, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, articulated the administration dispute with the PRG. He began by stating that:

1. Unlike her CARICOM neighbors, Grenada toed the Cuban line in the Falklands crisis by attacking British colonialism “and will no doubt repay its debt to Cuba with more than verbal support” by granting Cuba use of the Point Salines Airport for ferrying troops and supplies to Africa and other military bases.
2. Bosworth accused the PRG of transforming Grenada into a center for solidarity meetings and for establishing “close ties to small radical movements elsewhere in the Caribbean.”
3. Cuba, he noted, had provided training to Grenada’s vastly expanded security forces, as well as small numbers of advisers. It had also, in conjunction with the Soviet Union, provided an abundance of arms and materiel to the PRG security forces in excess of their needs.
4. Cuba’s role in the construction of the new airport was difficult to justify. The fact that upon completion that facility would be able to serve advanced military aircraft, adds a new and serious dimension to the security of the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Schoenhals and Melason, *op. cit.* p. 129.

<sup>2</sup> Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97<sup>th</sup> Congress, Second Session, June 15, 1982, “United States Policy Toward Grenada,” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982.

5. Bosworth questioned the PRG's "professed interest in high level dialog with the United States; anti-American utterances, typified by Bishop's reference to President Reagan as a fascist, and the CBI as "chicken feed," were not conducive to a climate of cordial ties.
6. The status of human rights in Grenada, and the PRG's ridicule of Westminster-style democracy were other polarizing issues from a United States perspective.<sup>1</sup>

The United States was resolute that relations with Grenada would not improve unless the PRG made the following changes: (1) "cease its unrelenting stream of anti-American propaganda and false statements about U.S. policies and actions; (2) take steps to "restore constitutional democracy, including prompt, free, and fair elections;" (3) resumed "the high standard of human rights observance that is typical of the CARICOM states; and (4) practiced "growing nonalignment rather than continuing its present role as a surrogate of Cuba."<sup>2</sup>

Bosworth's indictment against the PRG, and his conditions for a change in U.S.-Grenadian relations, repeated four themes which have pervaded this study: (1) the PRG's close ties with Cuba; (2) implications of the Point Salines Airport to U.S. security; (3) the war of words, and (4) Washington's insistence that PRG restore the right of suffrage. To these could be added the United States reaction to anti-American propaganda emanating from Grenada.

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<sup>1</sup> See Schoenhals and Melanson, *op. cit.* pp. 132-133.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p.31.

Traditionally, when confronted by a regime in the Caribbean, whose behavior is antithetical to U.S. interests, Washington has framed its policies

utilizing one, or more, of five options at its disposal: *normal relations*, *subversion*, *destabilization*, *military action*, and *distancing and isolation*.<sup>1</sup>

Initially, the Carter administration selected *normal relations* in its foreign policy towards the PRG. This option entailed the offer of friendship and cooperation with a view to having the PRG reciprocate in kind. But, as shown above, this approach was unsuccessful, and was replaced by *distancing and isolation*, which is a choice of last resort. Reagan on the other hand, opted for *subversion*, *destabilization*, *distancing and isolation*, with a view to reassessing all three options for that of military action, which eventuated when the revolution imploded.

Grenada's refusal to sever its alliance with Cuba and abandon its non-capitalist strategy of development, elicited the following reaction of the then Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in an out-going confidential telegram: "Grenada has become a virtual Cuban client, significantly expanding Cuba's reach in the area." Haig further noted that the Reagan Administration policy toward Grenada was premised on the following National Security Council analysis:

Strategically, we have a vital interest in not allowing the proliferation of Cuba-model states which would provide platforms for subversion, compromise vital sea lanes, and pose a direct military threat at or near

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Pastor in Heine, op. cit.pp.207-208

our border. This would undercut us globally and create economic dislocation and a resultant influx to the U.S. of illegal immigrants. In the short run we must work to eliminate Cuban/Soviet influence in the region, and in the long run we must build politically stable governments able to withstand such influence.<sup>1</sup>

Two conclusions could be drawn from Haig's dictum: the first is that the United States took the view that Cuba manipulated Grenada's foreign policy; secondly, Washington was not adverse to the use of force and other stratagems to check and eradicate what it perceived as the insidious encroachment of Soviet power and influence in the Caribbean.<sup>1</sup> Between 1980 and 1984 a total of eighteen United States air, military, and naval maneuvers were conducted in the region,<sup>2</sup> to particularly remind Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua that despite arguments of declinism,<sup>3</sup> Washington still possessed the might and the resolve to protect its interests in the Circum-Caribbean.

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<sup>1</sup> GDCM-USNA- 002294 I fiche, U.S. Dept. of State, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Confidential Dept. of State Outgoing Telegram. [ . . . ] Subject: Cuban Covert Activities in Latin America. [Text of background paper provided to NATO representatives at meeting in Brussels 14-16 Oct. 1981] 2; CDMC – USNA -007461: I fiche, U.S. National Security Council, U.S. Policy in Central America and Cuba Through F.Y. '84, Summer Paper, [ National Security Planning Group, April 1982 ] cited in New York Times 6 April, 1982, p. 1.

<sup>1</sup> For a critical analysis of the Soviet navy's presence in the Caribbean, see James D. Theberge, Russia in the Caribbean: A Special Report: Part II. Washington D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University's Special Report Series No.13 (1973). See also his Soviet Sea Power in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications. New York: Praeger, 1972.

<sup>2</sup>. See Euclid Rose, *op. cit.* p. 381.

<sup>3</sup> Declinism is an argument advanced in the post-Watergate-Vietnam era which maintains *inter alia* that Pax Africana was being challenged in the Caribbean. For more particulars see Paul

Fidel Castro, never one to take the United States for granted, realized the seriousness of the maneuvers, and advised Maurice Bishop to place a moratorium on his anti- Washington rhetoric and request a meeting with Ronald Reagan, hopefully thereby, staying an impending invasion by the United States. This was another instance of Cuba's role in the shaping of Grenada's foreign policy. But although Castro's advice was pragmatic, its acceptance by Bishop sundered the Central Committee; those who favored rapprochement, supported the Cuban initiative; the hardliners opted for a continuation of the politics of antagonism. The Central Committee debated the issue for over two weeks, in an atmosphere fraught with anger and near violence. The impasse was eventually broken when the motion for the Prime Minister's trip to Washington passed by a single vote.

The angry tenor of the debate brought several issues to the fore. In the first place, it shattered the accepted view of unison within the PRG, as well as the practice of the Central Committee to overwhelmingly endorse decisions reached by the Politburo. Secondly, the debate questioned the depth of Bishop's commitment to the principles of Marxist/Leninism. Thirdly, it revealed a failure on the part of many members of the PRG to assess the situation. Viewed from a realpolitik perspective, the entire episode was one which ought not to have eventuated. It is incomprehensible that members of a small powerless state could carelessly become

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Kennedy The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1988, also Richard N. Rosecrance (ed), America as an Ordinary Country. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976.

mired in a morass of dialectics in the face of an impending invasion by the United States.

Bishop arrived in Washington early in June, having been invited by Trans-Africa and the Black Caucus of the U.S. Congress. His aim was to meet with Reagan, but he was rebuffed by both the White House and the State Department. Two United States senators, Claiborne Pell and Lowell Weicker intervened on his behalf and the government consented to a meeting of Bishop with National Security Advisor, William Clark, and Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam.<sup>1</sup>

This encounter would be a novel experience for Maurice Bishop. He was accustomed to meeting friendly socialist and non-aligned leaders; in this case he would be in “enemy” territory and exposed to the rapier of the American media. Castro who had tilted with the American and international media, provided the necessary assistance for Bishop.

Gail Reed, the United States-born wife of the Cuban ambassador to Grenada, Julian Torres Rizo, instructed Bishop on the relative procedural tactics, and recommended that Grenadian leaders “work out their agenda for meetings in the United States with Ramon Sanchez Parodi,” an attaché to the Cuban Interest Section, the official Cuban diplomatic representation in Washington. The following is the gist of Gail Reed’s recommendations:

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<sup>1</sup> Congressional Record, October 28, 1983, S14884

With all due respect to the power of the U.S. media, once you've got their attention, the agenda must be yours not theirs . . .  
The U.S. media go after violence, when there is no war; controversy will do just as well- especially in an election year. I would say they're most interested in the visit as it fits into their idea of a "face -off" with Reagan and his administration, in the midst of the election campaign. . . . stick with Grenada's interest and objectives, and use the media as far as possible to enhance them, without getting cornered.

Leaving no stone unturned, Gail Reed offered the following suggestions:

Why the visit? Emphasize the long history of U.S.-Grenada relations – thousands of Grenadians reside in the United States and contributed to the country's development; thousands of Americans visit Grenada as tourists. The purpose of the visit is to reaffirm and develop those ties at as many levels as possible and by so doing reduce the tensions that have cropped up with the White House. Thus the importance of accepting the invitation of the Black Caucus and Trans-Africa. Look for the racist trap: "why would he come here just because a bunch of Black folks invited him? The strong answer is that of course it is legitimate in its own right to speak directly to the people, to other levels of their government, etc. that is what the PRG is all about.<sup>1</sup>

Background Notes for Bishop's Meeting  
with National Security Adviser Clark

*The following unsigned and undated tactics were presumably prepared by Ramon Sanchez Parodi and his team, for Maurice Bishop's meeting with National Security Adviser, William P. Clark.*

Section I. Background on the NSC.

1. It is widely felt (certainly in the Washington Post and Time magazine)

that the NSC under Clark has become the chief formulator of U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Brian Crozier, The Grenada Documents, London: The Sherwood Press, 1987, pp.131-132

foreign policy. Clark with Jeanne Kirkpatrick constitute the real formulator of policy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

2. . . . it should be noted that Clark has absolutely no background in foreign affairs at all. His only credential is his close friendship to Reagan. Moreover, that friendship is based on a shared hard line Right-wing approach on everything, including his limited knowledge of foreign affairs.

This dichotomy of control and limited knowledge has led to much conflict between the NSC and the State Department where real knowledge on foreign affairs exists. Nevertheless . . . the National Security under Clark is calling all the shots on foreign policy, particularly in regards to Central America and the Caribbean.

## Section II: Talking Notes

Comrade Bishop must clearly in practice and also be seen [sic] to take the initiative, even perhaps the offensive in the meeting. Two main reasons:

1. We asked for the meeting, so we must demonstrate that we have issues, topics, and agenda.
2. The psychological struggle will be fierce, but, of course, very sophisticated. We must definitely win that struggle.

## Section III:

Concretely propose the following:

1. Our two countries must exchange Ambassadors this year, 1983.
2. The United States Government must end its economic aggression  
And propaganda destabilization against Grenada without delay.

Later these two points will be added:

1. Miami-based agents of destabilization
2. Cease your support for countries – those opposed to PRG and extradite Gairy.

#### Section IV: Background on Grenada's Position:

For over three (3) years, Grenada's PRG has been saying we want to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States. Comrade Whiteman has also made the point on all his visits here. At the same time the U.S. has refused to respond to many of our overtures.

#### Notes of Bishop's Meeting with Clarke and Dam

Bishop's meeting with Clarke and Dam was the first and only diplomatic encounter between the PRG and the Reagan government. The only Grenadian record extant of the meeting is some meager notes presumably written by Dessima Williams.

The notes indicate Bishop's disgust with the late start of the meeting, and that it was hosted by William J. Middendorf, United States ambassador to the OAS.

Bishop was otherwise pleased that the meeting had eventuated, after having

requested it for over two years. He took the initiative by emphasizing the long history of good relations between Grenadians and the United States, and called for dialog and normalization of relations with Washington. This could be achieved by the formation of a committee to discuss differences and lay the groundwork for cooperation. Clarke's reactions were essentially these:

1. He had no problems with dialog but was more interested in conduct;
2. He was concerned with Soviet influence among Grenada's neighbors;
3. Agreed to off the record secret meeting which will deal with many issues;
4. Expect a lessening or cessation of PRG criticisms;
5. Was mindful of common strands (history and legal background) which might lead to progress.

Bishop was encouraged by Clarke's response, which indicated the United States' willingness to consider talks on the normalization of relations. While he was mindful of the PRG's need for careful language, he insisted that the toning down of public attacks be a mutual endeavor. Clarke suggested a change of venue for the next conference and expressed the hope that the PRG would return to a democratic form of government rather than adhere to the Eastern European model. At this juncture, he departed the conference leaving Dam to continue discussions with Bishop.

The Grenada prime minister requested a time perspective relative to Washington's response to his proposals. Dam's reaction was that the key issue was Soviet/Cuban influence; the United States would need to see a change in the PRG's conduct before committing to an agreement. Bishop then raised the issue of the economic destabilization of Grenada in all its ramifications. He further expressed a willingness to explore any range of subject with a view to providing the fullest assurance that Grenada did not constitute a threat to the United States. Dam's reaction was laconic. He thanked Bishop for coming to meet with Clarke. The conference was over.

Kenneth Dam was the only participant to comment on the substance of the conference. Appearing before a Senate committee, he concisely discussed his meeting with Bishop:

What he was proposing is that we move toward better relations, and we said that we would be pleased to do so. We thought that the first step would be that he should stop what was quite a campaign of attacks on the United States, and that would indicate that he had a desire for better relations, and that is where the matter was left.<sup>1</sup>

Obviously, neither Clarke nor Dam was aware that Bishop's decision to go to Washington had exposed him at home to bitter accusations of right-wing deviationism. Nor did the Reagan administration deem it prudent as a great power

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<sup>1</sup> United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Situation in Grenada*, 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup>. Session, 1983, p. 12.

to respond to this initiative by a weak Caribbean state by offering a modest gesture in return. Thus, Bishop returned to Grenada without even a modicum of success which would have served to assuage his critics.

But Washington's posture was one of *realpolitik*. As Thucydides observed centuries ago: "The strong do what they can; the weak suffer what they must." Bishop, by having heeded Castro's advice, might have stayed the invasion of his country – at least for the time being. He seemed to have impressed Dam and Clarke that the PRG was not just a communist social formation, but also a group of nationalists, dedicated to achieving the greatest good for their country. The next time that there was a dialog between Grenada and Washington was November 1983, a month after the revolution, which Bishop sought to save, had self-destructed, and he and many others were massacred by his PRG rivals.

A month after Bishop returned from Washington, a series of meetings were convened from 13-19 July, at which the Central Committee engaged in a marathon soul-searching, eventually arriving at the consensus that the party's [NJM] domestic, regional, and international goals were not being realized, largely because of a lack of ideological training.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13-19 July 1983," in Ledeen and Romerstein, *op. cit.* 110-1 through 110-23

A sequel to the July meeting was held on August 25 to ascertain if the party had made any progress since the previous conference. Leon Cornwall opened the conference with a veiled attack on Bishop. Cornwall presented a litany of complaints which he claimed to have heard in many circles of Grenadian society. All of these gripes were focused on the unsatisfactory operation of the Central Committee. Bishop acknowledged that internal problems threatened the party, and that another Central Committee conference was in order, but he warned for the first time, that secret dysfunctional activities were taking place.

The penultimate meeting of the Central Committee took place September 13-15. The emboldened pro- Coard forces they came<sup>1</sup> not to indulge in self-flagellation, as was the case at the July conference, but rather to accuse and vilify Bishop. Liam James led the attack, followed by John Ventour, Ewart Layne, and Selwyn Strachan. Then came Coard's wife, Phyllis. Her criticism was blunt and incisive. She accused Bishop of being disorganized, remiss in providing the necessary guidance, and often avoids responsibility for dealing with critical areas of work. Phyllis' vitriol was not surprising. She was not liked by most Grenadians, many of whom felt that she was arrogant and "drove her husband mercilessly."<sup>2</sup> Bishop had been warned about her and her husband, but the warnings fell on deaf ears.

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<sup>1</sup> They enjoyed at that time a 12 to 4 majority in the Central Committee

<sup>2</sup> Pryor, *op. cit.* p. 273.

Phyllis Coard's attack was followed by another by Liam James, who began by praising Bishop's "great strength, his capacity to raise the regional and international respect for the party and the revolution, and his charisma to build the confidence of people." James, however, hastened to remark that Bishop did not possess the requisite qualities for the leadership of the party.

James identified these essential qualities as "a Leninist level of organization and discipline, great depth in ideological clarity, and brilliance in strategy and tactics."<sup>1</sup> Then came the *coup de grace*: James proposed "a model of joint leadership, marrying the strengths of Bishop with those of Coard."<sup>2</sup>

One by one, the members of OREL took the floor, attacked Bishop's leadership, and unanimously concurred with Liam James' proposal. Bishop was totally unprepared for this demarche. He reacted by informing the Central Committee that although he was not opposed to sharing power with Coard, he needed some time to think about the proposal. George Louison, his foreign policy adviser, was sensitive to what was afoot, and bitterly condemned the idea of joint leadership. Fitzroy Bain, another Bishop supporter, was befuddled by the whole idea, and accordingly requested some measure of clarification. Unison Whiteman,

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<sup>1</sup> Steve Clark, *op cit.*, p.45.

<sup>2</sup> Gregory Sandford, *The New Jewel Movement: Grenada's Revolution 1979-1983*. Washington, D.C. Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1985, p.148; see also Jorge Heine, *op. cit.* pp. 243-249.

who co-founded the NJM with Bishop, opposed the proposal for joint leadership on the grounds that it was not necessary.

The pro-Coard faction refused to grant Bishop the requested time to study the concept of the joint leadership. They rushed a vote on the James proposal, which passed 9-1 with three abstentions. At that point, Bishop acquiesced to the decision of his detractors; he and Coard embraced, and the entire Central Committee rose and sang *The Internationale*.<sup>1</sup> Bishop left the following day on a scheduled trip to Eastern Europe accompanied by his press secretary, Don Rojas, Unison Whiteman, his minister of Foreign Affairs, Shahiba Strong, chief of protocol, reputedly a CIA plant,<sup>2</sup> and Cletus St. Paul, chief of security. The group was joined in Hungary by George Louison who persuaded Bishop not to accept the joint leadership proposal. Louison opposed the proposal because “Theoretically it was wrong; it was an ultra-left mistake, voluntarist; it did not consider the masses and the people. It was a half-baked idea.”<sup>3</sup> Don Rojas, one of the brightest members of Bishop’s team, opposed the James proposal because, in his opinion, it was nothing more than a subterfuge to “transfer the real power in the country from Bishop to Coard.

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<sup>1</sup> “Extraordinary Meeting of the NJM Central Committee, 14-16 September 1983,” in Seabury and McDougall, op. cit., pp. 300-15.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard Coard. The Side you Haven’t Heard: Bernard Coard Speaks to the Court in Grenada. 13-20 August 1986 (Mimeo), St. George’s, Grenada, 1987.

<sup>3</sup> See “Interviewing George Louison: A PRG Minister Talks about the Killings,” Caribbean Review, Vol.XII, no. 4, p. 17; Jay Mandle, op. cit. p. 85

The bicephalous model of leadership has not been historically successful. Examples of its failure are the duumvirates of Julius Caesar and Pompey, Octavian and Mark Anthony, George Danton and Maximilien Robespierre, and more recently that of Nikolai Bulganin and Alexsei Kosygin. The ambition of one member invariably militates against the success of a joint leadership; a Bishop-Coard example did not augur favorably.

#### The demise of the PRG: Was there a Cuban Involvement?

On their way back from Hungary, Bishop and his entourage made an unscheduled stop in Cuba for a few days. It is not known what Bishop discussed with the Cuban leader, but it was rumored that Castro had promised him to use the Cubans in Grenada to eliminate Coard and his cohorts within the NJM. A threatening telephone call made by Cletus St.Paul from Havana, warned that “blood will flow” when Bishop returned to Grenada; this served to reinforce the suspicion that Bishop intended to square matters with his detractors.<sup>1</sup>

Upon arriving at Pearls Airport, Bishop and his team were not met by the usual representation of the Central Committee. Only Selwyn Strachan was on hand. For the next three days, Coard made no attempt to contact Bishop- although their houses were side by side- nor did any other member of the Central Committee,

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<sup>1</sup> Sandford, op.cit., p.178.

save Hudson Austin, who, up to that point, was considered a friend of Bishop. In the meantime, Coard and his followers held secret meetings not far from Bishop's residence, while rumors of plots and counter plots permeated the Grenadian society.

The Cuban ambassador, Rizo returned to Grenada on the same flight with Bishop, and according to Coard, "he heads for his Embassy compound and turns it into an armed camp. Five days later, he also puts the Cuban the Cuban battalion (the 65 Cuban army officers, plus the 700 Cuban airport construction workers) on alert." <sup>1</sup>These developments, coupled with reports that Louison had informed some NJM members that Cuba was resolutely opposed to the joint venture proposal, created, according to Coard, a sense of foreboding in the NJM ranks. <sup>2</sup>

A Politburo conference was eventually scheduled for October 12. Bishop, en route to the meeting, paid a brief visit to the Cuban embassy to apprise the staff, ostensibly for the first time, of the fissures which had developed within the NJM.

An official Cuban statement issued on October 20, 1983 notes that:

On Wednesday, October 12, our embassy in Grenada reported the surprising and disagreeable news that deep divisions had surfaced in the Central Committee of the party in Grenada. During the morning of that day, Bishop himself communicated to the embassy regarding the differences that had arisen some time before. He said that

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<sup>1</sup> Bernard Coard, Summary Analysis of the October 1983 Catastrophe, 2002, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 56.

they were being discussed and that efforts were being made to resolve them, but that he had never imagined the seriousness they were going to take on during his absence. He simply stated the differences and did not request any opinion or cooperation on our part in trying to overcome them, once again showing great respect for Cuba's international policy and for the internal affairs of his own party.<sup>1</sup>

At the Politburo meeting on the morning of October 12, priority was given to the dismissal of George Louison from the NJM, the Politburo, and the Central Committee, for presumably convincing Bishop to refuse the proposal of joint leadership of the PRG with Coard. Louison was denied a chance to take his case to the full membership of the NJM and was subsequently arrested and imprisoned. The precipitate moves against Bishop, Louison, and Radix were relevant to a sense of unease that Coard and his allies felt about Bishop's relationship with Castro. The Cuban leader, by his own admission, neither admired nor trusted Coard; it is likely that he had communicated that fact to Bishop. Leon Cornwall, Coard's handpicked ambassador to Cuba, resented "a lot of information being channeled from Grenada to Cuba by our party and government without his knowledge."<sup>2</sup> He was particularly solicitous of two meetings between Bishop and Cuban leaders to which he was not privy.<sup>3</sup> In this context, the warning issued from Havana by

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by the Cuban Government and the Cuban Party," in Maurice Bishop Speaks. op. cit., pp.313-314; also Sandford, op.cit., pp. 178-180.

<sup>2</sup> See "Extraordinary General Meeting," in Caribbean Review, p. 53, cited by Steve Clark, op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Clark, op. cit., p. 56

Cletus St. Paul, Bishop's unscheduled stop in Cuba, Bishop's visit to the Cuban embassy on October 12, and the rumor that Castro was going to use his Cuban workers in Grenada to aid Bishop in eliminating Coard and his allies, somehow justified the fear of Bishop's enemies that some sinister move was in the offing.<sup>1</sup> Fidel Castro, in a quick and incisive response to the charge that Bishop had discussed the NJM's affairs with Cubans during his two-day sojourn in Havana, released the following dispatch to the PRG Central Committee, dated October 15:

I send you this message motivated by certain references which, in their conversations with our Ambassador, have been made by several Grenadian leaders in relation to Cuba. The supposed notion that on passing through our country Bishop had informed me of the problems inside the Party is a miserable piece of slander. Bishop did not mention a single word to me, nor did he make the slightest allusion to the matter. Completely the opposite. He expressed to me in general terms and with great modesty that there were deficiencies in his work which he thought he would overcome in the next few months.

In reality, I am grateful to Bishop for that discretion, and for the respect he showed to his Party and to Cuba by not touching on such matters.

We are indignant at the very thought that some of you would have considered us capable of meddling in any way in the internal questions of your Party. We are a people of principle, not vulgar schemers or adventurers<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp. 56-57.

It has not been determined if Castro was forthright in asserting that Bishop did not apprise him of the developing schism within the NJM. This study speculates that Bishop did not change his itinerary just to make a social call on his friend; this, however, begs the question. A crucial point, worthy of contemplation and analysis was the fact that, like the United States Government, most members of the NJM perceived Cuba as an important actor in the decision-making process of the revolution. It is therefore this perception that led Selwyn Strachan, Ewart James, and Leon Cornwall to accuse Bishop of taking “the party’s business to the Cubans. On October 13, Bishop was placed under house arrest by the Central Committee, stripped of his positions as prime minister, president of the Politburo and the Central Committee, relieved of his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and accused of “one-manism,” a term, which in Eastern Caribbean parlance refers to one who aspires to be maximum leader.

Six days later, on fateful October 19, Bishop and many of his supporters were executed. The bullets that killed Bishop also killed the revolution.

On October 25, 1983, The United States invaded Grenada, ostensibly in response from an invitation from several Caribbean states; Trinidad, Guyana, Belize, and the Bahamas refused to countenance the invasion.

Many theories have been advanced in the analysis of the demise of the Grenada Revolution. The most popular of these assert that the Revolution failed as a consequence of its leaders to resolve internal conflicts. Included under this rubric were personality differences between Coard and Bishop, the error of imposing an alien unwanted ideology on a people committed to a democratic political culture, and the failure of the revolution elite to honor the commitments it made to the Grenadian people in the wake of the overthrow of Eric Gairy.

## CONCLUSION

The Grenada Revolution destroyed itself. This was an incontrovertible reality. To what extent the Soviets might have contributed to the demise, remains a polemical issue. While it is obvious that personal ambitions created the crisis, and Stalinist methodology massacred the one person without whom the revolution could not long survive, there were obviously external causes which contributed, albeit in an uncanny manner, to the most unique venture in the politics of the Anglophone Caribbean. The United States, and particularly the Reagan administration, are culpable to some degree, and should therefore be apportioned some of the blame. Washington by its threatening war of nerves, manifested in its naval and air maneuvers, had served notice to the PRG that its demise was at hand. The Reagan government had left no stone unturned in its effort to deny the PRG access to

international funds. Reagan, himself treated Grenada with disdain, not because of Bishop's failure to hold elections, but because of his audacity to court the friendship of Castro, and aid from Cuba in an effort to help the Grenadian people. By not giving Bishop an audience, or even a promise of rapprochement, when he visited Washington in the summer of 1983, might done much to avoid disaster. But this was not done, because the United States chose to remain dedicated to the principles of the Johnson Doctrine, and the conviction that Grenada was a surrogate of Cuba, in same manner that Cuba was assumed to be a surrogate of Moscow.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION

This case study has analyzed the foreign policy of the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, during its brief tenure of four and a half years. Examined against a theoretical background of dependence, ideology, and perception, the varied aspects of Grenada's foreign policy provide an opportunity to assess the influence of Cuba on the survival of a micro state.

As mentioned earlier in this study, Grenada depended upon Cuba for the protection of its sovereignty, the amelioration of its economic conditions, and the improvement of the health of its citizens. But Cuba's greatest impact on the PRG was in the field of foreign policy, where in addition to serving as the nexus between Grenada and Moscow, Cuba provided essential advice and direction to the inexperienced foreign policy elite of the PRG. Cuba's benevolence, however, was not without its attendant problems. The chief of these was the refusal of Washington to countenance close ties between Cuba and the PRG. This was consistent with the *surrogate thesis*, which posits that Cuba is a consenting pawn of the Soviet Union, and was being used by Moscow in its scheme to penetrate the Caribbean region. The fact that the PRG aspired to radically transform its domestic and international policies, in a manner which Washington deemed antithetical to its

strategic interests, lent cogency to the *surrogate thesis*, and hardened the United States resolve to frustrate the Cuba – PRG axis.

Some analysts of the Revolution argue that the PRG could not have survived as a Marxist formation in a sphere of United States hegemony, given the realities of Cold War politics. The PRG's close alignment with Cuba is best appreciated in this context. Even if Havana had not armed the PRG, and had not become involved in the construction of the Point Salines International Airport, the United States would still have opposed close ties between Cuba and Grenada. Once again, the **surrogate thesis** rears its ugly head. But without it, the Reagan administration would not possess a cogent argument for its intolerance toward Grenada.

It was not surprising that the main thrust of the PRG's foreign policy was aimed at placating Cuba, from whom Grenada received an inordinate amount of military supplies, as well as economic and technical assistance. What was surprising was the PRG's unwillingness to admit that Grenada was located in a United States sphere of influence, where Washington was the preeminent power. In this regard, the foreign policy decision makers of the PRG could have learned from Finland's cautious policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The exchange of intemperate rhetoric between Washington and the PRG should be seen in this context. On the one hand, the United States, having perceived Cuba as a Soviet proxy, was not prepared to grant Moscow another foothold in the Caribbean. Conversely, the PRG, by

aligning itself closely with Cuba, and pursuing foreign policy objectives which Washington viewed as inimical to United States interests, found itself on a collision course with the region's only superpower.

Bernard Coard, writing in prison in 2002, lists three major foreign policy related causes for the failure of the Revolution:

- The Cold War context and the implications which it held For Grenada;
- The Right wing government of Ronald Reagan, and
- The incorrect policy – “both in substance and in rhetoric – by the PRG, especially close military, political and diplomatic ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

According to Coard, the incorrect foreign policy of the PRG was the result three major factors:

1. The PRG's fatal underestimation of U.S. imperialism's hostility to the Cuba/Soviet link and indeed its determination to destroy that link;
2. The PRG leadership's political immaturity and inexperience – [ not to be confused with explanations of ideological hardlinism, as such explanations palpably fail to explain this supposedly “hardline,” dogmatic leadership's highly flexible economic policies and good relations with the UK, EU, and Canadian governments, etc].
3. The PRG's belief that the Cuban/Soviet link was necessary for its defense against external aggression. The leadership failed to appreciate the circular reasoning, the self-fulfilling prophesy, involved in the Cuba connection: **we adopt an ever-closer embrace with Cuba (and by extension, in US eyes, the Soviet Union)**

**to protect ourselves from possible external aggression; but that very policy helps invite or motivate or trigger the external aggression! Cuba turned out, in many respects, to be the PRG's Kiss of Death, given the Cold War, and Right Wing government in Washington, D.C.** <sup>1</sup>

Neither the Grenada Documents nor the right-wing analysts of the Grenada Revolution provide any proof that Grenada's foreign policy was dictated by Fidel Castro. Bernard Coard mentions cases of Cuban intrusion in the internal affairs of Grenada, <sup>2</sup> but provides no data to indicate that Grenada's external affairs were compromised as well. But because in a small dependent state like Grenada, internal and external policies are invariably melded, this study concludes that Grenada was an acquiescent pawn of Cuba, and framed its foreign policy decisions to imitate those of Havana. This phenomenon developed out of Bishop's mimetic admiration for Castro, appreciation for Cuba's voluminous aid to the Revolution, and the ideological conviction that an emulation of Cuba's brand of socialism was advantageous for Grenada.

In retrospect, the foreign policy of revolutionary Grenada was an ambitious undertaking by the wrong people, at the wrong time, in the wrong place. A successful foreign policy requires decision-makers whose world view enables them to recognize the changes in the international landscapes, and make the necessary

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<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from Bernard Coard's Summary Analysis of the October 1983 Catastrophe in Grenada, 2002, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp. 16-17.

adjustments to deal with those changes, While it is true that Maurice Bishop, given his eloquence and charming personality, succeeded on many occasions in raising funds for the PRG, he obviously lacked the awareness of the situation, as defined in the first chapter of this study.

In his attempt to ingratiate himself with the Soviet fold, Bishop resorted to intemperate rhetoric which angered the United States, particularly during the Reagan administration. A more prudent practitioner of diplomacy would have been perceptive of his hegemon's proclivities for violence. Other crucial errors include supporting the then Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley in calling for independence for Puerto Rico, giving sustained moral support to Argentina during the Falkans crisis, as well as supporting the Soviets in the Afghanistan debates in the United Nations.. To these and other errors, must be added Grenada's refusal to accept the reality of the United States hegemony in the Caribbean.

Things might have been different if Grenada were located elsewhere, and the Cold War had not extended to the Caribbean. But those conditions are fanciful; Grenada is located in America's backyard, pejoratively, though that may sound, and the United States had put in operation its containment policy against the Soviets.

Grenada's relations with Cuba were predicated on the revolution's immediate needs, and the perception of Fidel Castro as a friend, hero, and defender of Grenada's sovereignty. This relationship, however, proved costly, inasmuch as it exacerbated poor relations between the PRG and Washington. In the end, Grenada paid dearly for misperceiving the situation. Its abandonment of Westminster democracy in favor of a Soviet model, prove a costly error. As Anthony Payne observes: "At the end of the day, Grenada's revolutionaries were let down primarily by the theory to which they had so rigidly attached themselves."

## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX ONE

### ABBREVIATIONS

BNC	National Bank of Cuba
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CC	Central Committee
CEATM	State Commerce for Material Technical Supply
CECE	State Committee for Economic Collaboration
CEE	State Committee for Statistics
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CEF	State Committee for Finance
CEN	State Committee for Standardization
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EC	Eastern Caribbean (currency area)
EEC	European Economic Community
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front
GDCM	Grenada Documents Collection Microfiche
GNP	Grenada National Party
GULP	Grenada United Labour Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ICRT	Cuban Radio and Television Institute
INDER	National Sports, Physical Education and Recreation Institute
JEWEL	Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation
JOY	Joint Organization of Youth
JUCEPLAN	Central Planning Board
LDC	Lesser Developed Country
MACE	Movement for the Advancement of Community Effort
MAP	Movement for the Assemblies of the People
MINAG	Ministry of Agriculture
MINAL	Ministry of the Food Industry
MINAZ	Ministry of the Sugar Industry
MINBAS	Ministry of Basic Industry
MINCE	Ministry of Foreign Commerce
MINCIN	Ministry of Domestic Trade
MINCOM	Ministry of Communication
MINCONS	Ministry of Construction
MINED	Ministry of Education
MINIL	Ministry of Light Industry
MINPES	Ministry of the Fishing Industry
MINSAP	Ministry of Public Health
MITRANS	Ministry of Transportation
NJM	New Jewel Movement
NSC	National Security Council

OC	Organizing Committee
OREL	Organization for Revolutionary Education and Liberation
PB	Political Bureau
PCC	Communist Party of Cuba
PRA	People's Revolutionary Army
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government
PSIA	Point Salines International Airport
SI	Socialist International
UNECA	Caribbean Construction Enterprises Union

## APPENDIX TWO

### Agreement

Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of special and other equipment.

The Government of Grenada and Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by aspirations, for developing and strengthening friendly relations between both countries on the principles of equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference into internal affairs.

Proceeding from the desire to promote strengthening the independence of Grenada and in connection with the request of the Government of Grenada have agreed upon the following:

#### Article 1

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure in 1982-1983 free of charge the delivery to the Government of Grenada of special and civil equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to Annexes 1 and 2 to the present Agreement to the amount of 10,000 Roubles.

#### Article 2

The delivery of the equipment listed in Annexes 1 and 2 to the present Agreement shall be effected by the Soviet Party by sea, at the port of the Republic of Cuba. The order of the further delivery of the above equipment from the Republic of Cuba shall be agreed upon between the Grenadian and Cuban parties.

#### Article 3

The Government of the USSR at the request of the government of Grenada shall ensure rendering technical assistance in mastering of the equipment under delivery by receiving in the USSR Grenadian servicemen for training in the operation, use and maintenance of the special equipment as well as by sending Soviet specialists to Grenada for these purposes. The Grenadian servicemen shall be sent to the USSR for training without their families.

The expenses connected with the Grenadian servicemen's training, upkeep, meals in the Soviet military educational establishments as well as with their travel fare from Grenada to the USSR and back shall be borne by the Soviet Party.

The Government of Grenada shall provide at its own expense the Soviet specialists and interpreters with comfortable furnished living accommodation with all the municipal utilities, medical services and transport facilities for the execution of their duties and shall ensure their having meals at reasonable prices at the places of their residence.

The Soviet specialists and interpreters shall not be imposed by any taxes and duties on entering or leaving Grenada and during their stay there. All other expenses connected with deputation of the Soviet specialists to Grenada shall be borne by the Soviet Party.

#### Article 4

The Soviet Party in periods to be agreed upon between the Parties shall depute a group of Soviet specialists to Grenada to determine expediency, opportunity and scope of rendering technical assistance in the creation of the stationary shop for repair of the special equipment and transport, commanding staff trainer school, training facilities for Armed Forces as well as the deliveries of missing building materials for construction of the storehouses and road.

The deputation of a group of Soviet specialists shall be effected on the terms and conditions of Article 3 of the present Agreement.

#### Article 5

The Government of the Union of SSR shall ensure free of charge the transfer to the Government of Grenada of necessary technical descriptions, instructions and manuals in standard composition on operation of the special equipment delivered under the present Agreement.

#### Article 6

The appropriate Grenadian and Soviet organization shall conclude contracts in which there shall be stipulated the detailed terms and conditions of deputing Soviet specialists, recording for training Grenadian servicemen and other services connected with the implementation of the present Agreement.

#### Article 7

The Government of Grenada shall not without the consent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sell or transfer, formally or actually, the special equipment, delivered under the present Agreement, the relevant documentation and information or give permission to use the equipment and documentation by a third party or any physical or legal persons but the officials and specialists of the citizenship of Grenada being in the service with the Government of Grenada.

The Government of the Union of SSR and the Government of Grenada shall take all the necessary measures to ensure keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the deliveries, all the correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present Agreement.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, The Grenada Papers. San Francisco, CA.: ICS Press, 1984, pp.23-26

## APPENDIX THREE

### QUESTIONNAIRE

Who were the principal foreign policy decision makers of the PRG?

**As a member of the foreign policy elite of the PRG, what were the fundamental bases of your perceptions of the United States?**

Why did the PRG form positive perceptions of Cuba and negative perceptions of the United States?

Did your perceptions of the United States change as a result of leadership change in that country?

To what extent did each of the following influence your perceptions of the United States?

- The Monroe Doctrine and its manifestations in the circum - Caribbean;
- Washington's refusal to extradite Eric Gairy;
- Racism in the United States;
- Your study or residence in the United States;
- The perception of the IMF and the World Bank as instruments of United States foreign policy towards peripheral states.

What were the dominant sources of your perceptions of Cuba? When were these perceptions formed?

Did the decision-makers of the PRG share a perceptual consensus of Cuba?

Did there exist, as some sources claim, a Cuba/Soviet Union dichotomy among the decision-makers of the PRG?

Why in the course of the Cold War did the PRG support the Soviet Union in the General Assembly United Nations vote on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Given the United States geostrategic sensitivity regarding the Caribbean Basin, why were the Cubans allowed to build the Point Salines International Airport(PSIA)?

Would you kindly comment on the occasional uninvited presence of the Cuban ambassador at, and participating in the cabinet meetings of the PRG.

Why did Grenada volunteer to be a magnet to attract other Caribbean states to the communist fold?

How were foreign policy decisions made during the revolution?

## APPENDIX FOUR

### Profiles of the respondents

Names	Where interviewed
Hudson Austin	Grenada
George Brizan	Grenada
Sir Nicholas Brathwaite	Grenada
Bernard Coard	Grenada
Phyllis Coard	Grenada
Chris DeRiggs	Grenada
Anthony Harriott	UWI, Mona, Jamaica
Richard Hart	Kingston, Jamaica
Chester Humphrey	Grenada
Clermont Kirton	UWI, Mona, Jamaica
Rupert Lewis	UWI, Mona, Jamaica
Ferron Lowe	Grenada
George Louison	Overseas telephone
Terrence Marryshow	Grenada
Brian Meeks	UWI, Mona, Jamaica
Trevor Monroe	UWI, Mona, Jamaica
Kenrik Radix	Grenada
Don Rojas	New York
Ian St. Bernard	Grenada
Sir Paul Scoon	Grenada

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