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THE CONCEPT OF A BLACK PERSON: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY.

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THE CONCEPT OF A BLACK PERSON: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

by

WALLACE SAMUEL AUSTIN

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Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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1979

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THE CONCEPT OF A BLACK PERSON: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

by

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This is a study in black personhood. It does not take place primarily in accordance with Eurocentric or Western-derived concepts. It does not consist of reactions to non-black peoples since that would more properly be a historical study. But since the black self is only one of other non-black selves, this study also consists of a general conception of personhood. In the establishment of the concept of a black person, my analysis revolves, among other things, around the black self in its physicalistic and other aspects. The concept of black personhood consists of a prescriptive formulation for individuals with a black self who attain personhood upon following those rules that uniquely pertain to them, and these rules are partly constitutive of a moral life. Personhood is not just a state of mind. It is an attainment having as a necessary condition the reconciliation of the individual with his or her self. In the hoped-for attainment of personhood, this study presents the following benefits as part of the general conception of personhood:

- A solution to the problem of the black aesthetic
- A re-interpretation of black history and of history generally
- Insight into the basis for a theory of development in our part of the third world
- A new conception of personhood
- A model for discussing issues of morality, gender, and race

The preliminary analysis is taken up with two items, the black aesthetic and black history. The limitations and the significance of these two approaches are indicated insofar as they pertain to the problems of the black self. I then establish those conditions that are necessary for any conception of black personhood. What is also indicated is that the aesthetic and the historical approaches contain a set of problems that pertain uniquely to the black self, and that the anticipated conception of black personhood will, among other things, be applicable to the solution of these problems. I then develop a general conception of personhood which has the theoretical and conceptual foundations for the conception of black personhood. This general conception of personhood is contained in a model for persons which I have constructed. The person-model gives a new recommendation for understanding the concept of a person. Part of the model's utility consists in a new way of thinking for Blacks, other peoples, women, and other individuals comprising special-interest groups. Prior to presenting the conception of black personhood, I employ the person-model to remove certain obstacles. Some of these obstacles are presented in the doctrine of transcendence which is not a doctrine that has been consciously put forward by any individual. Rather, I show how it is that the doctrine of transcendence has served as a guide to action for individuals with a black self, and has interfered with their achievement of a path to personhood. After the conception of black personhood is presented, I apply it in re-interpreting history and also for providing a solution to the problem of the black aesthetic.

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There is a time-honored belief that philosophy is concerned about what is a-historical and what is universal. Coupled with this belief is the ancillary one that the body of philosophy, more properly phrased "Western or European philosophy", has its foundations in a line of thinkers consisting of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Berkeley, and others. Upon this belief decisions are made as to what topics may be considered philosophical. A much-used division places Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in an early camp, and the remainder that follow them in what is called the moderns. Later on, I will discuss the reasons for this seemingly arbitrary division' in that all of these philosophers are acknowledged as belonging one and all to the family of Western civilization. There are other philosophers of perhaps equal or better claim to excellence than those I have already mentioned. What is common to the work of those philosophers not mentioned, as well as to the contents of any work judged to be philosophical, is that they all deal with some specific issue raised by one of the thinkers mentioned or with something resembling an issue raised by them. When questioned further about what is the nature of a philosophical issue, the philosopher's time-honored response is that the philosophical issue is concerned about what is a-historical and universal. Faced with a work entitled "The Concept Of A Black Person", the philosopher can make two decisions on classifying it: The first decision is that such a work is not, and cannot possibly be philosophical. The second decision refrains from

classifying the work and postpones such a decision, until the burden, which it has placed on the proponent of the work, is carried out; and this burden is that the proponent show how this concept of a black person has a relationship to the issues dealt with by the acknowledged philosophical thinkers.

It would seem at first that upon neither decision can it be established that the concept of a black person can be of a philosophical nature. Upon the criteria of a-historicity and universality, the work in question seems to be ruled out of being philosophical since the black person is a specific entity not including all sorts of persons. Furthermore, upon the first criteria, the concept of a black person concerns itself with the history and traditions of black people and could not be philosophical. Since the concept in question has not apparently met the a-historicity and universality criteria of the first decision, it would seem equally impossible for it to meet the standards of the second decision which would render the work philosophical if it were shown to have connections with topics that have received the stamp of philosophical respectability, namely the works of the foundational thinkers in Western philosophy. In the course of defending this work entitled "The Concept Of A Black Person", I will show that the criteria of universality and a-historicity do not always both hold for the works of established philosophical thinkers. I will also show that, whatever meaning is given to the term 'philosophical', as applied to the works of the established thinkers earlier mentioned, that the work on the concept-of a black person is philosophical. In summary, therefore, coupled with the belief in the a-historicity and universality of philosophy, is another notion making a claim on the content of philosophy: Against any work entitled "The Concept Of A Black Person" is counterposed the notion

that the writings of the founders of political philosophy need only be interpreted as applying to all persons, in which case, no ethnic, racial, or similar distinction, need be made among persons, and that such seemingly partisan work is precluded. Furthermore, the argument continues, philosophy is not concerned with historical empirical events, its findings being abstract and conceptual. In dealing with this counter-argument one only need examine the writings of the fathers of political philosophy and the philosophical texts on persons to see whether or not the counter-argument is supported.

Hobbes was born in England in 1588 and died in 1679 after having lived and travelled only in Europe. In the introduction to his Hobbes On Civil Association, Michael Oakeshott writes about Hobbes between the years 1610 and 1628;

The ... years were the germinating period of his future intellectual interests and activities. ...and the only literary product of this period of his life was the translation of Thucydides.¹

Elsewhere, in a biographical account of Hobbes, Avrum Stroll writes:

....Hobbes lived through some of the most unsettled years in English history. He witnessed the rebellion against King Charles, the resulting civil war in 1642, and finally was forced to flee to the continent where he remained in exile for eleven years. But he was not safe there, either. In danger of assassination by his political enemies, he returned to England only to see his writings condemned as subversive. In 1662, on the threat of imprisonment, he was ordered to refrain from further publication about social and political problems.²

With these quotations in mind, let us see what is a-historical and universal in the philosophical works of Hobbes who is sometimes referred to as the founder of modern political philosophy. The second quotation helps to locate the historical context of the social disorders in England that Hobbes was addressing himself when he wrote his papers on a political system of rights and obligations. His writings in Leviathan, his philosophical masterpiece, make it clear that he is addressing himself to the historical and ethnic background belonging only to Europeans; For example, on page 248 of Leviathan, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, reprinted from the edition of 1651), Hobbes cites political controversies involving Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, and King Henry the second, and cites another controversy involving King John which led to Magna Carta.³ Hobbes' illustrations leaves no doubt as to the historical, ethnic, and cultural tradition to which his concepts of rights and obligation are pertinent, and that this tradition belongs to European persons, and to persons of European descent, for whom he seeks to develop a system of rights and obligations.

Now that the historical context for Hobbes' writings has been pinpointed, the question remains as to the universality of this work. The earlier quotation referring to Hobbes' translation of Thucydides is significant in that Thucydides wrote a history of the Peloponnesian wars with detailed accounts of the social disorders taking place on a scale at least as great as those taking place in Europe to which Hobbes directed his writings. Not surprisingly, Hobbes refers to these social upheavals in Greece when he carried out his analysis in the Leviathan. Hobbes' resulting

system of rights and obligations, therefore, which he develops with the implicit condition that such a system would have been applicable as far back as the earliest points in European history and tradition, is a philosophical system that is clearly neither a-historical nor universal. It is not a-historical in that the system of rights and obligations more than conveniently fits in with important historical events in Europe. The philosophical system is not universal in that European traditions and history cover a relatively tiny segment of the universe of persons on Earth. A reading of Hobbes' Leviathan shows the historical acuity he employs for choosing the social and cultural settings for his arguments. By the time Hobbes was thirty, his native England was busily enslaving millions of Africans. Not a single passage reveals Hobbes' inclusion of these people in his system of rights and obligations. The tacit message of Hobbes' system of rights and obligations to his people is a clear one; The system is not universal and it is not a-historical. The work of another philosopher now remains to be examined for its a-historicity and universality.

John Locke is one of those philosophers generally recognized to have subscribed to the foundations of Western philosophy. His work on the system of rights and obligations, The Two Treatises Of Government, can certainly not be said to be a-historical based on the facts I will shortly point out. Locke's work on the system of rights and obligations of individuals is also certainly not universal since Locke clearly pointed out the strictly European nature of the individuals and societies for whom he was

constructing a system of rights and obligations. I will now point out the historical aspects of Locke's philosophical writings as well as the limited rather than universal nature of his system. Locke wrote, among other texts, Two Treatises On Government, in which he constructs a system of rights and obligations. In a short biographical note on Locke, Avrum Stroll writes;

Locke lived in a period of great social unrest. Involved in intrigue against the king, he was forced to flee England twice during his life, once in 1675 and again in 1679.⁴

Why should it be thought that Locke was never motivated by historical events? On the contrary, Locke was addressing himself specifically to the society in which he lived, for the purpose of constructing a system of rights and obligations consistent with that society's historical and ethnic traditions. In order to document the nature and direction of Locke's work, I now turn to Peter Laslett who, in his introduction to Locke's Two Treatises On Government, writes that while Locke was waiting in Holland for a ship to take him back to England after the revolution there in 1688, he received a letter which read;

Ours/[the revolution in England] went out like a farthing candle, and has given us by this convention an occasion not only of mending the government but of melting it down and making it all new, which makes me wish you were there to give them a right scheme of government,.....⁵

Laslett himself continues that ;

This letter, except for its last phrase aptly expresses the traditional reasons why Locke sat down to write Two Treatises of Government. ...What was wanted was an argument, along with a scheme of government, an argument deep in its analysis, and theoretical, even philosophical, in its premises, but cogent and convincing in its expression. Two Treatises presents precisely those things. The author's objects and the occasion of his writing are set out just as might be expected in the preface. He hoped the work would be; (and here Laslett quotes Locke)

sufficient to establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, out Present King William; to make good his Title, in the Consent of the People,...and to justifie to the World, the People of England, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine.⁶

Let us direct our attention to the last seven lines of the quotation, which are Locke's own words, to see if his philosophical intentions fulfill the criteria of a-historicity and universality. The historicity of the revolution of 1688 and the events surrounding the King William are clearly evident to preclude any discussion as to whether or not Locke's work was historical. There remains only one other question: Is the work of Locke's, The Two Treatises, universal?. In other words, is the work such that it is written and directed, not to an ethnically determinate constituency, but to all humanity; in which case, all humanity can historically claim the problems identified by Locke and welcome his philosophical efforts as solutions to their problems? When Locke speaks of 'our Great Restorer', 'our Present King William', he certainly could not have meant 'our' in any universal sense. Even if we think of the English people dominating a large part of the world at the height of the British Empire, there was a large part of

humanity outside of the empire whose historical and, in addition, whose cultural problems were nothing like the problems to which Locke addressed himself. Only the crudest chauvinism could insist that no matter what the rest of humanity's problems are, the solutions that Locke devises for the people of English, and of Western history and culture, are somehow the solutions for the rest of humanity. However, nothing in the quotation shows that to be Locke's view. The quotation shows that Locke himself intended his philosophical efforts to serve as a theoretical foundation against the "Slavery and Ruine" of the English people. In these efforts there could be nothing of a universal solution since the English people of Locke's time were enslaving the African people and ruining the African continent.

At this point there should be no doubt that Locke's philosophical work might be one in which he addressed himself to a problem set in a historical and social context, and for individuals in Europe all having similar social traditions. Not only did Locke devise a system of rights and obligations for Europeans in Europe; but, as will be shown in his text The Two Treatises Of Government, he devises the text for Europeans wherever they might find themselves. Thus Locke is strangely silent on the historical fact of the European conduct of the slave trade. Locke was silent in that he did not set about devising a system of rights and obligations for the Africans whom the Europeans were enslaving, and Locke himself invested in the Africa Company, Locke was not silent, however, on the rights and obligations of Europeans vis a vis Africans or any other people the Europeans were enslaving and driving off the land. Later on I point out Locke's philosophical contributions to this problem. At this point I would like

to contrast the approach of Hobbes and Locke with those of a twentieth-century philosopher.

In A.I. Melden's Human Rights, Richard Wasserstrom writes as follows in his article entitled "Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination" :

The subject of natural, or human, rights is one that has recently come to enjoy a new-found intellectual and philosophical respectability. This has come about in part, I think, because of a change in philosophical mood--in philosophical attitudes and opinions toward topics in moral and political theory. And this change in mood has been reflected in a renewed interest in the whole subject of rights and duties. In addition, though, this renaissance has been influenced, I believe, by certain events of recent history--notably the horrors of Nazi Germany and the increasingly obvious injustices of racial discrimination in both the United States and Africa. For in each case one of the things that was or is involved is a denial of certain human rights. ⁷

Much later in the same article, Wasserstrom identifies what he considers to be an important point of contention. He writes:

Vlastos has it that the rights to well-being and freedom do satisfy these conditions, since he asserts that we, at least, do regard each person's well-being and freedom as having equal intrinsic value. If this is correct, if each person's well-being and freedom does have equal intrinsic value, then there is no general and relevant principle for differentiating among persons as to these values and, hence, as to their rights to secure these values. But this does not seem wholly satisfactory. It does not give us any reason for supposing that it is plausible to ascribe equal intrinsic value to each person's well-being and freedom. ⁸

And on page 108:

Negroes have almost always been made to endure needless and extremely severe suffering in all too many obvious ways for all too many obviously wrong reasons. ...What is wholly missing from this description of the situation is the ability to conceptualize the Negro--any Negro--as the possible possessor of rights of any kind, and a fortiori of any human rights. ⁹

These quotations from Wasserstrom's article should make it clear that the need for a theoretical and philosophical understanding of the difficulty between the interaction of concepts of persons, in an ethnic and racial sense, and the concepts of rights and duties, is not merely an idiosyncratic concern of mine. I must also point out, with those quotations in mind, that the proper approach does not consist in holding the view that the philosophical literature on rights and duties is complete, with there being only the incomplete or improper application of these principles by empirical society. Rather, the proper philosophical approach is to the effect that the work on persons, rights, and duties is theoretically and philosophically incomplete, there being significant issues to be resolved if all sorts of persons are to be accorded their fair share of rights and duties. I will now point out the philosophical legacy deriving chiefly from Hobbes and Locke, of which Wasserstrom's views are not wholly a part, which dominates current philosophical thinking.

The traditional doctrines of rights and duties are those that have been handed down by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and others that were mentioned earlier. For example, the American declaration of independence echoes both Locke and Rousseau in its phrases such as "We hold these truths to be self-evident...All men are created equal...". Where the philosophers' writings are not openly quoted by Western governments, the thoughts of these Western philosophers are incorporated in the existing legal and political systems. And this is why, as I will subsequently explain, the treatment handed out by white people to black people, of the sort indicated by the Wasserstrom quotations, has always been fundamentally

inequitable and immoral. But what is more generally true is that there have always been theoretical difficulties, in the legal as well as in the humanistic fields of thought, in putting forward and clarifying such concepts as equality and justice across ethnic and racial lines; and, it must be stressed that it is just because the traditional background of thought governing such concepts as rights and duties derive from Western or European customs and traditions, that the traditional stock-in-trade concepts are so inadequate for an applicability to persons with non-Western customs and traditions. The real problem is therefore not the devising of clever means to bring about the universal acceptance of Western-derived concepts of rights and duties; instead, the philosophic problem consists in putting the traditional philosophic concepts in abeyance and starting from scratch with a new universe of persons which admits the plurality of ethnicity, race, historical and social traditions. Wasserstrom's portrayal of the immoral conditions under which Blacks live in the United States, South Africa, and other parts of the world dominated by Whites, cannot be unknown to other Western philosophers. It should not be said that this kind of inquiry does not fall within the purview of philosophy under the weak excuse that philosophy is not concerned with the here and now, or that philosophy is not concerned about existing empirical events closely familiar to philosophers. For, on the contrary, much philosophy has always sprung from empirical events affecting philosophers: Hobbes and Locke wrote their political treatises in reaction to, and in the light of, cataclysmic political and social events in their immediate surroundings. What must be stressed, however, and this point is as much philosophical as it otherwise could be taken, is that Hobbes and Locke put forward their concepts of rights and duties in keeping with the ethnic,

cultural, and historical background of the European people. Hence it would be absurd to suggest that this sort of philosophy contains a universal rather than a partial set of truths.

Before completing my earlier remarks on Hobbes and Locke, I digressed briefly to contrast these approaches and concerns with those of Wasserstrom, a twentieth-century philosopher. I will now complete my remarks on Hobbes and Locke in order to give a more detailed account of their philosophical legacy. I will then present two philosophers, Immanuel Kant and T.H. Green, who inherited this legacy and put forward solutions which I will show to be abortive. It should be pointed out for historical purposes that Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and T.H. Green lived in the order in which their names here occur, and that they all are before Wasserstrom. Moreover, lest Wasserstrom's position be misrepresented, I must point out that while Wasserstrom makes a significant break with his predecessors, nothing in his article here cited, or in any other of his writings, indicates that he holds my position. Wasserstrom's position is that more philosophic activity is needed to justify the distribution of the fruits of Western conceptual thinking, regarding rights and duties, to all persons. My position has already been stated: It questions the universality ascribed to concepts developed for the benefit of partisan interests. The remaining accounts of the legacy of Hobbes and Locke now follow.

Concerning rights and duties, Hobbes devotes a great deal of his philosophical efforts to the analysis of European events, to a large part those that took place in Greece, and to events of a more modern sort in the disturbances of the France and England of his time. From his analysis of these strictly European events, Hobbes builds his political treatise of the rights of man with a view to correcting the infringements of individuals'

rights, and the dislocations of society. But when Hobbes speaks of the rights of man, it is clear that he means the rights of Europeans, and certainly not the rights of all men including black men. This is not a mere oversight on Hobbes' part; since, as assiduous a scholar of history as Hobbes was, it would be impossible for him to be unaware of the systematic enslavement of black people by white men including his own countrymen. Whatever Hobbes writes about rights clearly does not include the rights of black men or black people. One possible explanation for this is that in keeping with prevailing Western thought, as Wasserstrom points out in somewhat similar circumstances in the twentieth century, Hobbes did not consider black men to be humans on a par with white men. Hence the question pertaining to the rights and duties of Blacks and Whites towards each other is a topic not discussed by Hobbes, and it will be interesting to see whether the findings of Locke's analysis are in conflict with, or, are in keeping with Hobbes'.

Locke's views on rights and duties, particularly on the concepts of property and slavery, are regarded as a cornerstone in the philosophical literature of this area. As in the case of Hobbes, Locke's views and analysis are written to correct the abuses to the rights of men in England and in other parts of Europe. But here again care must be exercised in understanding which men he was talking about and meant his remarks to be directed towards. In Locke's time the enslavement of black persons was integral to the fibre of European life and thought, there being millions of African slaves in England and in other parts of the world controlled and ruled by England. The objection may be raised that when Locke wrote he intended his enunciations on rights and duties to be unqualifiedly applicable to all persons, and that the use of his doctrines by societal or political

institutions to form the philosophic basis for their systems, reflects not Locke's true views but a perversion of them. Hence, the objection would continue, the use by the framers of the American declaration of independence and the American constitution, by persons who obviously held to Locke's doctrines, their use of Locke's phrases such as "All men are created equal", while at the same time these persons owned black persons as slaves, is not in any way a reflection of Locke's philosophy. Rather, the objection concludes, this comment about Locke is merely of sociological significance pertaining to the functioning of empirical society. This objection can be settled by citing the relevant parts of Locke's text, The Two Treatises Of Government, chapter four which is entitled "Slavery". Concerning this section Peter Laslett writes in his Locke's Two Treatises Of Government

This [sections 24, lines 1-8, 23, 85, lines 8-16] is Locke's justification of slavery. It may seem unnecessary, and inconsistent with his principles, but it must be remembered that he writes as the administrator of slave-owning colonies in America. 10

It must also be pointed out that Locke was a major stockholder in the Royal Africa Company which enslaved, shipped, and sold Africans. Locke cannot be said to have merely ignored black persons when he spoke of rights and duties. Rather, Locke's view was that black people were the property of Whites in societies like the one he described in his chapter entitled "Political Society".

-Locke also extended his views on the non-personhood of other peoples to say that those Whites who left Europe and went to North America were the rightful possessors of the territory and goods for which they decimated the Indians and herded them into reservations. His denial of the personhood

other peoples is carried out in his fifth chapter of Two Treatises entitled "Property". In this chapter Locke puts forward a concept of person in which the individual has a sense of self in terms of his labor and the objects brought into his possession through his labor. At the time when this administrator of the colonies in North America was writing, Europeans were dispossessing non-white peoples of their lands in various parts of the world. Not surprisingly, the chief element of property for which Locke strives to give a philosophical justification is land. Making use of traditionally European concepts of the individual, work, and labor, Locke carries out an analysis which makes no attempt at insight into the concepts of other peoples, and which rationalizes the seizure of their lands and their physical persons. It can also be seen that Locke's remarks apply wholesale to those Whites who exterminated the Indian population in the Caribbean, the so-called Caribs. Pushing Locke's views even further to see the sense of the obvious universal applicability he intended, the following historical events indicate the consequences of Locke's views on the rights of all people in the world: It was right for Europe to have systematically killed off the native inhabitants of Australia and to have deprived them of their land and other material possessions. In Africa, so the Lockean analysis would run, it was right for the Europeans to have gone to South Africa and to have systematically killed off the native inhabitants and deprived them of their lands. When we look at the twentieth-century condition of non-white peoples in various parts of the world controlled by Whites, we find them deprived of their rights in North America, Africa, South America, the Caribbean, Australia, etc. These people in the twentieth century live in conditions imposed on them from Locke's time, and sanctioned by Locke's writings. It is true in the twentieth-century,

however, that black people are no longer slaves, and that Indians in North America are no longer hunted down, slaughtered, and the remainder of them herded into reservations. But what is significantly the case is that all of these people live under conditions inherited from the governing concepts of Hobbes and Locke which gave philosophical foundations to the political systems under which they presently live. These matters are all in need of further textual proof, and to this I now turn.

One point this introduction seeks to establish is that The Concept Of A Black Person is philosophical in whatever sense the term can be taken. If it is pointed out that the material includes historical data pertinent to the Black individual, and items concerning a Black aesthetic, items that are historical and not universal, and that therefore the undertaking is not philosophical, attention must be drawn to Locke and other philosophers whose works are acknowledged as being philosophical. If after the comparison is made the objection is raised that even though Locke concerns himself with items that are historical and non-universal, his resulting work could still contain a-historical and universal truths, my rejoinder is that the same holds for The Concept Of A Black Person. While I continue with this institutionally required apologia for The Concept Of A Black Person, some additional matters are in order for the consideration of Locke's apologists

We begin with Locke and Hobbes, not with Plato and Aristotle since they are not of our time. Our concern is with the generation of philosophers who laid the philosophical foundations for the present historical system arising out of slavery, racial extinction, and colonial aggression. These are the historical events with which Locke and Hobbes were familiar:

1. Colonial aggression in all parts of the non-White world
2. The extermination of some non-White peoples
3. The enslavement of Blacks, and of Indians in the New World

4. The non-recognition of other peoples' rights to their property

All of these events will be fully dealt with in the course of the discussion.

We are asked to believe that these philosophers wrote universally, for all humanity, so that the benefits of their systems of political obligation would extend to all humanity. We will discover what this universal system is really like. It must also be kept in mind that we are asked to believe specifically that Locke wrote universally, and that the events of colonialism, colonial aggression, slavery, the extermination of people, are merely perversions of views cherished by the good Locke. Before we begin sampling Locke's writings that are pertinent to slavery and colonialism, we must consider some objections.

The objection is made that a mathematician's personal life has nothing to do with the mathematical propositions he formulates. Moreover, it goes on, the mere fact that Locke might have looked at one segment of humanity only, i.e. Europeans, and considered only one segment of historical and cultural traditions, that of Western civilization, for couching his system of political obligation, does not mean the results he formulated are not universally applicable. In the case of mathematics, the argument continues, the mathematician might start with a few instances or particulars, and from them formulate propositions of universal scope. In response to this argument, I grant that it is narrowly true when it is applied to Locke's undertakings, only in the limited case, or some other like it, that from observing two or three humans it could be concluded universally that all men die when they do not have things like food or air. In this way some facts about persons are like some propositions in mathematics. In addition, what is generally true of mathematics is that the personal life of the thinker has no bearing on the truths he formulates. By implication, the conclusion is drawn that even if Locke owned

slaves, this fact of his personal life would have no bearing on his philosophical views on slavery. We must expand the scope of the inquiry, however, and consider some broader aspects of proceedings in mathematics and in persons.

The conclusions in various divisions of mathematical theory are not accepted simply because the proponent claims they have universal applicability. They are not accepted even when the proponent shows that the conclusions follow from the premises. What comes prior to acceptance of his conclusions are an examination of his premises and the concepts lodged in them. What is important in such an examination is the formulation of concepts and the meanings given to them. In the case where there is no interpretation of concepts, there being only syntactic relations between the lines in a proof, one of the key items relevant to an acceptance of the conclusions, is the meaning given to the deductive and connecting relationships between the uninterpreted expressions in the proof. An interpretation of certain concepts might be asserted that results in the denial of the law of the excluded middle. Here the result would be: It is possible P and not P , where P stands for a sentence or a state of affairs.¹¹ The various types of logics with their irreconcilable 'truths' testifies to this.¹² In the case of number theory where there may not be much room for interpreting the few axioms about numbers, the mathematician's findings will be looked at askance if he left out a large percentage of the axioms pertaining to number theory. In completing the analogy between mathematics and theories that have to do with persons, we must require an examination of the conceptions underlying the supposedly universal truths about persons. In addition, we must see if the thinker left out important conceptions about persons, the exclusion of which gave results that might not be universal. One could point out that mathematics is not about the world, and that while an interpretation of a theory in mathematics might be true or false, such a finding would have no bearing on the theory itself. An inter-

pretation of Euclid's geometry, in which a term such as 'straight line' is interpreted as 'a ray of light', does not therefore affect the truth or falsity of Euclid's system. What happens on such an interpretation is that it becomes false, as Euclid would have it, that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. What happens in this interpretation is that a ray of light connecting two points could be bent by a gravitational field, and it becomes true that a curved line is the shortest distance between two points. Riemann, a mathematician, showed that if some of the assumptions in Euclidean geometry were changed, new and different conclusions could be reached which would apply to a wider range of phenomena than is possible with Euclidean geometry.¹³ Two points can be elicited from this discussion, on the analogy to mathematical reasoning, that are pertinent to the subsequent inquiry into Locke's conceptions: The first point is that the mathematical thinker need not be acquainted with the whole world to formulate propositions of empirical, and in some cases, universal applicability. The second point is that the starting points in the systematic conceptions of the thinker, starting points we can think of as axioms and postulates, can determine the conclusions drawn by the thinker which he puts forward as having universal scope; and one is free to reject these starting points, and the conclusions, when they clash with observations. Concerning Locke's observations, therefore, about which we are suspicious, we are forced through the first point to leave open the possibility that his conclusions may be of universal applicability. On the basis of the second point, however, one is permitted to examine the starting points in Locke's conceptions and to reject them upon not finding the applicability that is attributed to the conclusions.

Let us now proceed to the discussion on persons to discover why it is that a philosopher, supposedly speaking for all mankind, and womankind, is

permitted to ignore the majority of historical and social conceptions about humanity, and still be considered as giving universal findings. I will also consider why the conceptions he holds of some segments of humanity are not considered to be of much theoretical importance in his discussions on persons. We are interested in getting at the meaning of what Locke wrote, and in doing so we must ferret out his various conceptions of humanity, for whom he was supposed to be writing. The procedure here is not as straightforward as in mathematics where the truth-giver explicitly states the meanings of his conceptions. In the case of Locke, a look at at his personal life is revelatory as to what his hidden conceptions of humanity were. This procedure should not be balked at. Let us consider one part of the Sermon On The Mount, a doctrine which is said to offer universally moral conceptions: Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.¹⁴ Put in the form of a prescription it reads: The meek shall inherit the earth. If we want to find out the meaning, scope etc., of the Sermon on the Mount, we should not find it in the actions of the people who colonized(their concept of inheritance) and now govern South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, South America, and North America. We can know the meaning of the Sermon on the Mount only by looking at the broader context of Christ's life, the man who gave the doctrine. Again, take the simple sentence, "We must now set ourselves to solve the Jewish problem.". If the sentence is uttered by Golda Meir, a jewish patriarch(or matriarch) to be so thought of in the distant future, we can know what she meant by looking at the broader context of her life. In this case the sentence means some such thing as, "We(jews) must remove ourselves from the European people and build a Jewish homeland in the land of the Jewish patriarchs.". When Hitler said, "We must now set ourselves to solve the Jewish problem.", there is only one way to know what his words meant: We must look at his actions. In this

case the sentence means some such thing as, "We must exterminate the Jews." It is of no use claiming that his actions, or what his subordinates did, are merely perversions of what Hitler meant. Neither should one resort to the subterfuge that this is a case of the same sentence, having one meaning, that is put to different uses by two people; since, in the strict sense of 'same sentence' there is not one sentence but two different ones, Golda's and Hitler's. The reason this method of verification must be sometimes resorted to is that a great deal of the language for human beings is concerned about prescriptions for their actions.¹⁵ In the case of mathematical theory or natural science, the statements are implicitly about the world, and are confirmable or falsifiable with reference to actions and events. This does not mean, however, that all mathematical propositions, natural-science statements, and all statements about persons can be so determined. But the wider class of complicated theoretical undertakings in mathematics, natural science, and investigations into persons require more than a quick glance for their acceptance. We are now in a position to discuss the full scope of Locke's conception of humanity, to determine how universally applicable Locke's writings were, and to discover whether his writings justify slavery and colonial oppression.

Let us place Locke with the rest of humanity, a position he certainly would not have liked, and never took; since, his Africa company was enslaving humanity in Africa and dropping millions of them in the Atlantic ocean. In North America, Locke administered the territory that belonged to the Indians, who were subsequently herded into reservations. I do acknowledge, however, that it might be said in some quarters that these private and seedy events have no bearing, neither on the universal validity nor on the applicability of Locke's work to these persons. While our primary concern is with Locke's text, on the way to making sense of it we must first become aware of the context

for his discussions.

In the Second Treatise, in the chapter entitled "Property"(pg.309, Peter Laslett, ed.) Locke writes, "God gave the world to all Men in common;...", and later(page 319 ibid.), "Thus in the beginning all the World was America,...".

To gain further evidence for this colonial context, we turn to page 206 of D.J. O'Connor's book entitled John Locke:

I/[D.J.O'Connor] cannot help thinking that Locke was generalizing, though he does not say so, from the examples of the American colonies founded about that time. It was not an uncommon practice to draw up a constitution for such a settlement, as Locke himself had helped to do for Carolina, before any large scale emigration had taken place.¹⁶

Further evidence for Locke's participation in this act of colonizing is indicated in John Locke's Two Treatises Of Government, P. Laslett, ed., page 302, where Laslett writes in a footnote:

As Leslie Stephen pointed out (1902,11,139), The Fundamental Constitutions Of Carolina provide that every free-man 'shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves'... The instructions to Governor Nicholson of Virginia, which Locke did so much to draft in 1698...regard negro slaves as justifiably enslaved...".¹⁷

Since we have now located the context for discussion, we are now free to eventually ferret out Locke's conceptions of persons. It is said in defence of Locke, that even though much of his writings are directed toward a European audience, and that he considers solely the historical and cultural traditions of Europeans, his conceptions thereby being restricted to European persons, that there is nevertheless, much that is of universal and a-historical value;and, by tacit assumption, his conception of humanity, or of persons, is adequate for all humanity. It must be kept in mind, that apart from European persons, it is not only to Indians in North America to whom this defence

of Locke is addressed, but also to Blacks in North America, Australia, South-Africa, and other places where Locke's countrymen, for whom Locke wrote, were carrying out similar policies of colonization as took place in North America. Therefore, in the preceding lines where Locke writes that "God gave the world to all Men in common", and then later, "Thus in the beginning all the World was America", it is legitimate to include with 'America', the names of other places where Locke's countrymen were colonizing. We then obtain the following sentences:

God gave the world to all men in common.

Thus in the beginning all the World was Australia, Rhodesia, America, South Africa etc.

What we will discover in the course of this discussion are Locke's conceptions of persons outside of Europe, and the presumption of Locke's that Europeans were entitled to the properties of these other peoples, and in some cases that Europeans were exclusively so entitled. What we will also curiously discover is that nowhere does Locke make the provision that the rest of humanity holds property in Europe in common with Europeans. In what is even more striking, we do not find a place in his section on the concept of property, where the founder of democratic theory states that the landless poor in England hold in common with the English nobility, the vast tracts of land reserved in England for the nobility. Before continuing with this analysis, the reader must rid himself of the myth that there were vast territories which the Europeans settled, and that while going about their business peacefully, they were set upon by hostile Indians and Blacks who, as Locke would have it, were covetous. For accurate accounts of these events, these texts may be consulted:

American Indians, William T. Hagan

Racism: The Australian Experience, F.S. Stevens, ed.

What turns out is that in all of these cases is that Locke's countrymen coveted

these peoples' lands, drove them off, slaughtered some and enslaved others. I'll now continue with the analysis of those parts of Locke's texts insofar as it is clear that he gives North America as the context for his writings.

By means of close scrutiny we can be free of the straw-man argument that slavery, colonialism, colonial aggression, and genocide, are perversions of the good Locke's writings. One context for Locke's concept of property in the Second Treatise (Laslett ed.) is given on pages 304-305:

God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience. ...The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.¹⁸

This passage clearly locates North America as one part of the world which Locke and his countrymen have supposedly been given in common with the Indians. The people that Locke and his countrymen have come upon are, at this point, not only co-owners with the Europeans of the land in North America; but, as we can infer from the passage, they are 'wild' and just ready for domestication as are the geese, horses and other animals. It seems as though Locke acknowledges the Indians' sole right to their land, but he withdraws that right when, as he states in the preceding passage, other people have a right to the Indians' land when it can do them "...any good for the support of his/[their] life."

In the shift from co-ownership with the Indians to solely European ownership, Locke continues on page 304, *ibid.* :

But I shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common, and that/[holds] without any express covenant of all the commoners.¹⁹

He then gives his reasons, page 304 *ibid.* :

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he that hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. ²⁰

Locke's reasoning here is that it is the individual's labor that gives him ownership. Before discussing the passage, let us see if this concept of property belongs only to those persons in the culture of Western civilization, or if Locke has gone outside of Europe to see how other peoples conceptualize the link between them and their belongings. In other worlds, for Locke to have a universal conception of humanity he must respect their different ways of life, and then develop a conception of property which acknowledges their rights of ownership. Let us see if Locke considers the conceptions of other peoples, their ways of life. He writes at the end of his discussion on property (section 51, pg. 320, *ibid.*):

And this I think, is very easie to conceive without any difficulty, how labor could at first begin a title of Property in the common things of nature. ²¹

One would have expected that the Indians' labor, which they expended in carrying out their way of life, would have been sufficient to give them title to the land coveted by Locke and his people. But Locke qualifies the concept of labor, (page 309, *ibid.*):

God gave the World to Men in common;...It cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the Industrious

and the Rational [The Europeans], (and Labor was to be his Title to it;) not to the Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious [people displaced by the European settlers]. He that had as good left for his ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's [the settlers] labor. 22

The interpolations in the preceding quotation are mine. The 'quarrelsome and the contentious' of whom Locke speaks are the native peoples who fought the Europeans for the fertile farmland taken from them by force. The places where the Indians had erected their teepees and adobe buildings, cultivated the land, had carried on their way of life, were not indications of labor to Locke.

He writes on page 309, "...and Labor was to be his Title to it [the land]".

According to Locke's defenders who insist that much of universal value is to be found in Locke's writings, it would follow, then, that the Indians had title to North America. But Locke qualifies labor. He writes on page 309, "God gave the world in common, not to the ...Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious [The native peoples]...but to the Industrious and Rational [The European settlers]". The interpolations in these parts of Locke's sentences are mine, and it is clear that this is what Locke meant given the context in which he wrote. What his arbitrary qualification of the concept of labor amounts to is that the Indians' way of life is not a rational one; and that their activities really do not constitute labor. For Locke, 'rational' is defined by the European way of life, and the concept of labor is to be defined upon those activities that sustain the European way of life, or the way of life in Western civilization. For the activity to count as labor, not only must it take place in the European way of life, but there is something additional which Locke indicates in the chapter entitled "Political Society"(pg. 341, *ibid.*):

These Men [Blacks] having, as I say, forfeited their Lives, and with it their Liberties,...and being in

the State of Slavery, not capable of any Property, cannot in that State be considered as any part of Civil Society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of Property. ²³

Locke's Royal Africa Company had kidnapped Blacks in Africa and had brought them to the settler colony of Carolina, of which Locke, in his capacity of colonial administrator had written the constitution. The Black people laboured for Locke and his countrymen who kept them as chattel and never compensated them. As Locke writes (pg. 317, Second Treatise, *ibid.*), "Thus Labor in the beginning gave a right of property,...". One would think, therefore, that this would give Blacks in Locke's society a right to property. Black people, unlike the Indians, labored in the way of life prescribed by the 'rational and the industrious(the Europeans), as Locke would have it. But Locke still denies to Blacks the right to property. He writes on page 305, *ibid.* :

...yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. ²⁴

Since every man has a right to his own person, one would expect Locke to have said, which he did not, that his settler-society had no right to the persons of Blacks, i.e. to own them as chattel. If the labor of a man's body and the work of his hands are his, as Locke states, then the Black people in Locke's society had a right to property. But Locke denied this. To clarify what seems to be a contradiction, we need some indication as to what may have been Locke's concept of humanity. We find it in a commentator's footnote to Locke's Second Treatise:

...it must be remembered that he/[Locke] writes as the

administrator of slave-owning colonies in America. As Leslie Stephen pointed out (1902,11,139), The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina provide that every freeman 'shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves'. ...The instructions to Governor Nicholson of Virginia, which Locke did so much to draft in 1698...regard negro slaves as justifiably enslaved because they were captives taken in a just war, who had forfeited their lives 'by some Act that deserves Death. ...Locke seems satisfied that the forays of the Royal Africa Company [in which he owned stock] were just wars of this sort, and that the negroes captured had committed such acts. 25

It seems that a just war occurred, on Locke's conceptions, when European settlers coveted other peoples' lands. We have found Locke and his countrymen depopulating the African continent in an apparent duplication of widespread European settlement in North America, Australia, and New Zealand, etc.. In what sense could it be said that Locke wrote universally? Let us look at one of his cherished prescriptions to his audience, (Second Treatise, pg.311):

...Let him [the European settler] plant in some in-land, vacant places of America, we shall find that the Possessions he could make himself upon the measures we we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of Mankind [indigenous peoples in North America, Australia, South Africa, etc.] or give them reason to complain, or think themselves injured by this Man's [the European settlers] Incroachment, ... 26

The interpolations in the preceding quotation are justifiably placed by me, since the audience Locke addressed was colonizing not only America, but other parts of the world. It is now clear why the descendants of those people whom Locke addressed still cite his work as containing much that is of universal value; for, we have exhumed the foundations upon which their

political societies are built, and have found a skillful philosopher defending genocide, slavery, and colonial aggression. This is the legacy that has been inherited by the people for whom Locke did not write. The moral responsibility of the philosopher consists in directing his attention to create a truly universal conception of persons, and not in justifying the status quo.

One philosopher who put forward a conception of rights and duties which differed radically from those of his predecessors was Immanuel Kant. This is not the place for a sketch or a discussion of Kant's philosophy. My intent here is to point out one element of Kant's philosophy that could conceivably be used as a starting point for a philosophy of persons, rights, and duties, that truly includes all persons. Later on I will deal extensively with some of Kant's conceptions. Kant's views are contained in his Critique Of Practical Reason and The Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of Morals. Kant believed that concepts of right and duty should be cleared of everything empirical. His concept of a person as a rational being required that a priori or rational means be used to discover the essential elements of the concepts of right and duty. Another of Kant's requirements was that humanity be regarded as an end in itself. This precept would seem to scrap the empirical procedure of starting with the history, customs, and traditions of ethnic or racial parts of humanity. The response to Kant's precept is that it would be adequate if humanity were not significantly different, as well as being alike, in many aspects. Hence what would affect the outcome of specific decisions concerning the rights and duties of persons would have to be their significant differences, and not their humanity, which is merely a presupposition for discussions on their correlative rights and duties. Further aspects of the difficulty with Kant's concept of humanity as an end

in itself can be found in T.H. Green's Principles Of Political Obligation. Green's contribution, which I will not pursue at this point, was that the goals of a society should also be considered in questions of rights and duties. My starting point, in what may be seen as a completion of Kant and Green, is that society itself is not the relevant end any more than is humanity. Rather, the governing concept for discussions on persons, rights, and duties, is the identity of individuals given in terms of their phenomenological and physicalistic aspects, the theoretical arguments for which occurs in chapter seven.

in a specific area of philosophy, my intention is not to produce a negative doctrine on Western philosophy. Rather I will be directing my efforts toward the aspect, or aspects, of philosophy that have so far been overlooked. I therefore propose to discuss philosophically a topic which has for a long time featured prominently as an area of inquiry in the disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities. It, however, has not been a subject of philosophical inquiry. This area of inquiry centers around the black person, and is treated differently as permitted by the methodologies of the different disciplines. These disciplines psychology, sociology, history, anthropology art history with its area of aesthetics, and literature with its areas of fiction, poetry, and essay writing. There are also independent writers whose writings do not fit neatly into the separate disciplines and indicate a great of overlapping. I will now point out briefly how some of the research areas in these disciplines are concerned with the black person.

- In history this topic is explored in the reconstruction of the African past and the detailing of more recent events such as slavery, imperialism, and colonialism.

In sociology some of the more recent historical events such as slavery are examined for ascertaining their impact on the black person. In equally significant ways, the discipline of sociology in its area of ethnic-and-race-relations focuses on racism in its institutionalized form, and on its giving rise to ill-effects in black individuals. Sociology focuses also on the black family, its deviation from the white family structure with its concomittant ill-effects for the members of the black family, and its lack of these advantages enjoyed by the white family. In summation, sociology focuses on the question of how Blacks are affected by the dominant white group in their social relations in ways that ultimately affect the quality of their lives as individuals.

In the discipline of psychology there is a vast literature that focuses on the black person. Some of these psychological studies include the negative or positive self-image of Blacks, and some of these studies, one of which is the doll-study experiment, are the subject of continuing controversy.

In political science the inquiry centers on ideologies that have a practical significance on the achievement of the goals and ambitions of black people. Some of these studies in political science include nationalism, as it pertains to the nation-states that are largely or predominantly black, and also as it pertains to any ideology that presents a program of action for black individuals in the hope of attaining their goals. Areas of political science that are devoted to the study of the black person are ethnic conflict, development in terms of nation-building, leadership and forms of government, and the theory of the dependent economy. The area of development remains one of the key areas of study, and a controversy arises out of the competing notions of development one of which holds that development for the black nations means their adherence to the values of the largely white and indus-

trialized nations, while the other notion holds that development must be seen along lines that pertain uniquely to the needs and values of the individuals comprising these nations.

In the disciplines of literature and aesthetics the point of major concern is the concept of a black aesthetic. In literature, the writer as novelist, poet, short-story writer or essayist, focuses on the problem of a black aesthetic insofar as such an aesthetic contains standards and values in reference to which the inner life of the black person receives attention in the above-mentioned forms of literature. In art-history and aesthetics the topic centers around the delineation of standards of beauty and art, insofar as these standards pertain uniquely to the black person.

Finally, there is a large number of individuals who have contributed significantly to the vast body of literature that bears directly on the issues surrounding the black person, as these issues are considered by the various disciplines in the social sciences. Some of these writers and their contributions are indicated in the bibliography.

These writers and their contributions cannot be classified neatly into the separate disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities. What is also significant is that while these writers and disciplines are concerned with the black person, they neither agree on ways of looking at the problems of the black person nor do they agree on solutions.

I propose a way of approaching the problems of the black person that takes into account certain elements of these writers and the various disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities. My undertaking is therefore not primarily concerned about an examination of these writers or with the methods and analyses of the various disciplines. The problem or set of problems to which I address myself is to produce the concept of a black person, and to give a philosophical account and analysis of such a concept in a way

that takes into account the difficulties focused on by the social sciences, the humanities, and the body of literature produced by interested writers. I will now give further indications as to how I will approach such a problem.

I have already pointed out concerning the disciplines of the social sciences, the humanities, and the writings of independent scholars, that these three categories of research all contain implicitly or explicitly the concept of a black person. This is not to say, however, that these researchers see as their task the construction of the concept of a black person in the sense that I as a philosopher am concerned. Rather, a research item in one of these disciplines may be said to contain the concept of a black person in that it contains certain general assumptions about the black person which are preliminary to the kind of study being carried out; and in this case the concept of a black person can be said to be contained implicitly. In the case of Leopold Senghor's writings on negritude, and he is one of the independent scholars, the main thrust of his undertaking is devoted to stating explicitly what sort of person Blacks intrinsically are, in terms of aesthetic and other qualities that differentiate them from other peoples; and it is to be noted here that Senghor draws heavily upon historical data pertaining to the African past and to more recent periods in Black history. In any such given item of research belonging to one of the three categories, the material pertaining to the concept of a black person will have been derived either from historical data and their interpretation or through some notions of a Black aesthetic. I will now indicate how these three categories of research are significantly grounded on historical data and their interpre-

tation, and also upon the concept of a Black aesthetic.

In the case of a research item in the discipline of sociology a large portion of its content is culled from historical data and their interpretation. From this sociological perspective, the black person, wherever he is in the world, is to be evaluated or examined in the light of certain historical experiences which have been instrumental in his development. For example, the experience of slavery is taken by sociologists as crucial in theoretical discussions of black people.

In the case of a research item in psychology designed to measure in Blacks their levels of self-image and self-concept, their notions of their racial characteristics as being desirable or undesirable, a large part of the data contains material that can be used by aestheticians and literary persons in their discussions of the larger concept of a Black aesthetic. For example, the psychologists' questions of the nature of Black self-image, Black self-worth, and Black self-esteem, are importantly related to the question of what sort of Black aesthetic can be created so that the black person's self-ascriptions of terms such as 'beautiful' and 'desirable' can be carried out with a consistent concept of himself. It can therefore be seen how the inculcation of certain notions of a Black aesthetic can influence the results of a psychological study of the kind just mentioned.

Other disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities make use of history, though in different ways, when they carry out studies of black people. In addition, the independent black scholars, and these

need not be attached to academic institutions, have produced their own reflections by relying heavily upon historical data and upon data belonging to the concept of a Black aesthetic. Historical data and the concept of a Black aesthetic both feature prominently in the three areas of research insofar as the research makes assumptions about the black person which can be welded together into a general concept of such a person. In summary therefore, these two elements unify the three categories of research; The first element is that all of these research efforts contain some implicit or explicit concept of a black person which provides the presuppositions and assumptions foundational to their inquiries. The other element is that all of these areas of research employ either historical data or data pertaining to the Black aesthetic, or they employ both of these types of data.

My concern is with developing a philosophical analysis that leads to the concept of a black person. It is for this reason that my preliminary analysis is concerned about certain fundamental facts and assumptions about the Black aesthetic and about Black history. At various points where relevant I will make reference to writings concerning the black person as these occur in the social sciences, the humanities, and the works of independent writers. After the preliminary analysis I will present a philosophical concept of a person which takes into account the significant elements brought out in the preliminary analysis of historical and aesthetic data. Part of the utility of this enlarged concept will be its applicability to ethnic issues and to the content of different ethnic experiences. In addition, the issue of rights

and duties will be central to this enlarged concept of a person.

Although this enlarged concept will have general applicability to all other persons, the focus of the analysis will be on the black person.

After the concept has been developed I will apply it in discussing some salient points which have long been the topic of discussion in the social sciences, the humanities, and the works of independent writers. In summation, therefore, my task is to develop the philosophical concept of a black person which will be applicable to problems in the three categories of research.

Notes To The Introduction

1. Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes On Civil Association (University Of Chicago Press, 1975), p.3.
2. Avrum Stroll, Philosophy Made Simple (Doubleday & Company, Garden City N.Y., 1956), p.54.
3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan(Oxford, Clarendon Press, reprinted from the edition of 1651), p. 248.
4. Avrum Stroll, Philosophy Made Simple (Doubleday & Company, Garden City N.Y., 1956) p.57.
5. Peter Laslett, Locke's Two Treatises On Government (Cambridge, England, University Press, 1970), p.50.
6. Ibid. p. 50.
7. Richard Wasserstrom, "Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination", Human-Rights, Ed. A.I. Melden, (Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California, 1970), p.96.
- 8 Ibid., p. 105
9. Ibid., p. 108
10. Peter Laslett, Locke's Two Treatises On Government (Cambridge, England, University Press, 1970), p. 302.
11. These mathematical and logical notions are to be found in Geoffrey Hunter's Metalogic, An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic (University Of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), pgs. 46-71.

12. This pertains to the field of modal logic of which a variety of systems of logic can be found in G.E. Hughes' and M.J. Cresswell's An Introduction To Modal Logic(Methuen And Co. Ltd., London, 1968).
13. Philipp Frank, "Geometry: An Example Of A Science", in his Philosophy Of Science(Prentice-Hall Inc., N.J.,1957), pgs.48-90.
14. St. Matthew 5.5.
15. Some of the literature relevant to this point can be found in in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. While all critics may not agree on what Wittgenstein meant on certain points about language, I would like to draw attention to W.D. Hudson's Modern Moral Philosophy, where he writes on page 49 of "Moral Discourse And Theories Of Meaning:

Language does not exist in a vacuum. It is,to use Wittgenstein's own word, "woven" into other activities.
16. D.J. O'Connor, John Locke(Dover Publications, Inc. New York, 1967),
p. 206
17. Ibid., p.302
18. Ibid., pgs. 304-305
19. Ibid., p.304
20. Ibid., p.304
21. Ibid., p.320
22. Ibid., p.309
23. Ibid., p.341
24. Ibid., p. 305

25. Ibid., p. 302

26. Ibid., p. 305

(1) Persons who are black speak of having a black self which serves to identify them or to distinguish them from non-black persons.¹ Given this self, questions arise about it concerning its beauty, its choice-worthiness, its status, and its goodness.² These questions about the self constitute the subject matter of black consciousness, and we can know what we mean by this self through an examination of concepts such as consciousness, self-consciousness, and personal awareness. While these states of consciousness and awareness are had by persons, I am not presently concerned with the concept of a person in its entirety which is a conceptual notion of a high order, and which the topic of a subsequent chapter. My present concern is with what it means for a person to have personal awareness, self-awareness, or self-consciousness.³

Consciousness, as had by persons, includes a consciousness of self.⁴ Black consciousness is a consciousness of oneself as being black. Personal consciousness is an awareness of oneself as being uniquely different from other persons and from objects around one. The consciousness of a black person is an awareness of one's self as being significantly different from the physical persons of other peoples. The basic characteristics that form a basis for a black consciousness are those that racially identify a person as being black. All of this can be rephrased more explicitly in the following way. To say that I am conscious makes sense just in case I can say or indicate what I am conscious or aware of. Black self-consciousness is a consciousness of a black self. What is involved in saying that a black person is aware of himself are facts such as these: He is aware of himself as

being black. He is aware of himself in such a way as would tell him what sort of person he is, in the sense of a description of his physical appearance. He can distinguish himself, not only from the things in nature, but also from other persons who have consciousness and can be said to possess self-awareness. The specific characteristics that make up the black self are those that racially identify a person as being black. Such persons are those that are native or indigenous to the continent of Africa from the time of the kingdoms of Kush and early Egypt to the present day.⁵ Any one of these persons is an individual black self, and a large number of these constitute a collective black self. This description suffices to identify the black self which is the locus of black consciousness.

(2) The questions constituting black consciousness are indicative of the problems of the black self and are questions such as these: What is a black person?. What is a person of African origin?. What should he think of himself?. What should he do?. Is black beautiful?. Is anything black ever beautiful?. Is a black person ever beautiful?. These are questions with which we begin our childhood, and we pass our lives either trying to answer them or to persuade ourselves that our positive answers to these questions are always right and beyond doubt. One may even suggest that these are trivial questions whose answers could never be productive. But questions which are always with us can never be trivial, and we seem to know intuitively that if our lives are to be meaningful the answers to these questions must be productive of something fundamentally good. In subsequent chapters I consider the conceptual difficulties involved in providing answers to these questions.⁶

Notes:

Ch. 1

1. There have been noted attempts to deal with the black self. The following are among the yet noteworthy ones. Kwame Nkrumah put forward the concept of an African personality while Leopold Senghor put forward the concept of negritude. Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist, put forward the thesis in his Black Skin White Masks, that the black person is pathologically ridden with what I call an alien self-concept; in Fanon's words this would be a self-concept appropriate to a white person. Other writers such as Elyden, DuBois, George Padmore and Marcus Garvey have also contributed to the study of the black self. What is lacking in all of their contributions is that none of them is really a study of the black self in itself. Rather, each one of theirs is a study of the black self in some relation to what is always a contingent event in history, for example, colonialism, imperialism or slavery. What differentiates my approach from theirs, as will be seen in the course of this work, is that unlike these authors I focus strictly and exclusively on the black self and consider, essentially, only those features inherent to the black self.

2. As a philosophical starting point this is more than a mere convenience. Other philosophers have also begun their speculations with the self as their starting point, and one such philosopher is Gerald E. Myers whose book is entitled Self, Religion, And Metaphysics. In this book, one of the contributors, M. Holmes Hartshorne, writes as follows in the section entitled "The Concept Of Self", pg. 11 :

The nature and existence of the self has always been a persistent problem in modern philosophy. Forsaking the theocentric perspective generally characteristic of medieval thought, modern philosophers like Descartes began not with God but with man- with the self as the indisputable starting point for philosophical reflection.

My work, however, represents a departure from the way the concept of the self has been dealt with in the history of philosophy.

3. My approach to the concept of the self departs from traditional approaches in the history of philosophy as seen in the works of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant and Strawson. Presently, and for the most part of this work, I will not be concerned with issues in self-consciousness of the type raised by Von Rintelen in "Existence-Self-Transcendence", located in Myers' Self, Religion, And Metaphysics. An indication of what is not of interest to me is given in the following sample of Rintelen's article, pgs. 51-52 :

Let us, however, take a brief look at the treatment of self-consciousness in European thought. In Plotinus self-consciousness...is the turning...of the spirit toward itself(Ennead IV, 4,2). Augustine speaks of the (self-) apprehension of mind by itself. "Mens se ipsam novit per se ipsam"(De Trin. IX,3) resembles Thomas Aquinas' version. In William of Occam the intuitive element comes into the foreground, although it does not develop into an authentic image of the soul in the thought of his contemporary, Eckhart. Descartes knows self-reflection in his cogito ergo sum, and Kant writes of a self-consciousness that is yet quite far from a cognition of one's self(Kritique der Reinen Vernunft, 11, 1, 407; Anthropologie, 1,1). In Fichte "spirit (obtains) an immediate awareness of itself" through willing, it has an intellectual apprehension of of itself(W.W.I,1, 401). In most recent times Oswald Kulpe lays emphasis on the "unity of self-consciousness" in the subject.(Vorlesungen uber Psychologie, pages 99ff1, 1922). Let us mention R.B. Perry: If self-consciousness means anything it means mind functioning in an elaborated, complicated way.

To return briefly to Rintelen's opening sentence which runs "Let us, however, take a brief look at the treatment of self-consciousness in European thought", it is very clear that the history of Philosophy, at least with respect to the topic of the self, is merely European thought. These studies pointed out by Rintelen, and also others of a like kind not pointed out by him, are not directly relevant to my work, and indicate considerations which I am not concerned about.

4. There is a tradition in the history of philosophy that is opposed to the conception that the self is a 'certain I know not what'. One thinker who opposes such a conception and makes the self an empirically verifiable thing, though he himself does not claim originality for this alternate conception, is William James. He writes in "The Self" of his "The Principles Of Psychology": "... it is much to the imperishable glory of Hume and Herbart and their successors to have taken so much of the meaning of personal identity out of the clouds and made of the self an empirical and verifiable thing". This aspect of the self to which James is committed is indicated in a passage of "The Consciousness Of Self" in his The Principles Of Psychology: (pg. 333)

For, whatever the thought we are criticising may think about its present self, that self comes to its acquaintance, or is actually felt, with warmth and intimacy. Of course this is the case with the bodily part of it; we feel the whole cubic mass of our body all the while, it gives us an unceasing sense of personal existence.... The character of 'warmth', then, in the present self, reduces itself to wither of two things, -something in the feeling which we have of the thought itself, as thinking, or the feeling of the body's actual existence at the moment, -or finally to both. We cannot realize our present self without simultaneously feeling one or other of these two things.

5. Background readings giving detailed descriptions of Africa in early times can be found in the following sources:

- a) W.E.B. DuBois' The World And Africa, Viking Press, N.Y. 1947
 - Ch. IV, "The Peopling Of Africa"
 - Ch.V, "Egypt"
 - Ch.1, "The Land Of The Burnt Faces"
- b) Shirley Graham DuBois, "Egypt Is Africa", in Chrisman and Hare, eds., Pan-Africanism

On page 21 Mrs. DuBois quotes Herodotus to the effect that the Colchians are an Egyptian race since they are black-skinned and woolly-haired.

6. These questions include and go beyond those raised in the concepts of negritude, pan-Africanism, black nationalism etc. Questions of this sort, as will be shown later, are at the basis of writings by thinkers such as Blyden, DuBois, Garvey, Fanon, Padmore, Senghor, Cesaire, Nkrumah and Sekou Toure.

Chapter 11

The Aesthetic Approach To The Problems Of The
Black Self

(1) A black aesthetic is a conceptual notion pertaining to the positive appraisals of black people. These positive appraisals are in reference to the beauty of things which include the physicalistic black self that is shared by black people. While this conceptual notion of a black aesthetic has not yet been developed, and no one can presently say what it would be like, there are certain statements or expressions that would not be permitted by the black aesthetic. Statements of the kind, "This person is black, but he, or she, is beautiful", would not be permitted; since, the implicit idea in the statement is that one should not expect a person who is black to be beautiful because of the negativity of blackness. What a black aesthetic would do is to provide a thoroughgoing conception in which blackness has positive connotations. The black aesthetic would then license all physiognomic traits of Blacks as comprising a standard of beauty in and of themselves. This may seem to be an easy matter, But there are obstacles to a black aesthetic. In the course of my analysis, the extent of these difficulties will be shown.

Before a discussion of the black aesthetic, some preliminary matters should be taken up which serve to give a context for the discussion. One of the fundamental issues about which anything pertaining to be a black aesthetic would have to be concerned is the concept of blackness. This concern with the concept of blackness has to do with things and states in nature, as well as with people, that are black. There are

certain presuppositions about the concept of blackness deriving from the conceptual framework of Western civilization which Europeans, white people, have imposed on black people all over the world. The concept of blackness has to be understood not only by examining certain concepts found in Western civilization, but also by having an awareness of how this conceptual framework has been imposed on black people. This imposition has its origins in colonial aggression, slavery, and the extinction of black people in some parts of the world. The concept of blackness has to be understood by all peoples with reference to the moral world that has been created by Whites. In this moral world, Whites who have shaped this way of life are good, and their actions are right. By inference, Blacks are not-good(bad) and their collective actions(their ways of life) are not right. But this way of life goes beyond black people who were not the only ones singled out for colonial aggression, racial extinction, and slavery.

The moral world, as we know it, includes the United States, South Africa, Rhodesia, the Caribbean etc.. Within this colonially derived context, how does a black person come to learn of blackness? Stated differently, the question is "How is the concept of blackness first presented to black people?". We must look to the ever-present agent in the activities of slavery and colonial aggression. This is the missionary who brings Christianity to the people he considers heathens. He tells them a story from Genesis: ¹In the beginning a certain man had three sons named Ham, Shen and Japheth, from whom sprung all the races of mankind. It happened that Ham saw his father naked, and laughed at him. As punishment, Noah cursed Ham and, as the missionary implies,

caused him to turn black. The missionary tells us that we, Blacks, are the sons of Ham. He also informs us that the bible requires, as part of the punishment upon the sons of Ham, that we be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water', in effect, slaves. But the missionary gives hope. He tells us that Christ died for us, and although our skins are black it is possible for our souls to be as pure and white as snow. The achievement of this goal is to be our real concern. We must forsake this world resulting from colonial aggression, seek our father in heaven and his son Christ, both of whom are anthropomorphically presented as having the racial appearance of the colonial aggressors. Examples, such as the missionary's story and his instructions, are typical of the various routes through which people concerned with the black aesthetic have first been introduced to themselves through the concept of blackness.

While we belong to a world whose foundations rest on colonial aggression, there are obstacles to a black aesthetic which do not seem to derive from the context of colonial aggression. The Sermon on the Mount is a doctrine of moral prescriptions that are supposedly universal. The following sentences are taken from the doctrine:

The light of the body is the eye: If therefore thine eye be single/good or healthy, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness.²

I find it convenient to think that Christ, who is reported to have uttered these words, was not a racist. Yet he clearly equates the concept of darkness(blackness or the absence of light) with evil, by using

darkness as a metaphor for evil. This kind of example is quite different from the one in which some people refer to Africa as the dark continent, or to undesirable events as black. There then appears to be a class of psychological or cultural associations which, while it associates blackness with evil and with generally undesirable things, seems to cut across cultures that have never colonized or enslaved Blacks. The analysis into the concept of blackness therefore has to be concerned, not only with the historical and cultural associations that link black people to Western civilization in the events pertaining to slavery and colonial aggression; rather, the analysis pertaining to the black aesthetic has to be concerned with the structure of language in general, to discover how it could come about that the concept of blackness has negative connotations linked to it. But since all of our knowledge and stocks of concepts derive from the historical context of our involvement with Western civilization, the investigation into the black aesthetic must be understood as having a somewhat limited rather than unlimited truth value; since, the individual, myself, who conducts this investigation, and also all black persons to whom it is pertinent, operate conceptually within the boundaries of Western civilization and its conceptual legacies of slavery and colonial aggression.

(2) The Black Aesthetic

(2) In the previous chapter entitled "The Black Self" certain questions were presented as constituting the subject matter of black consciousness which has as its locus the black self. Some of these questions were concerned about the beauty of this self. The answers and issues surrounding these questions are concerned about the issue of a black aesthetic. My concern with the issues of a black aesthetic in this chapter is not to evaluate or to criticize the efforts of writers in their attempts to construct a black aesthetic.³ My concerns are more fundamental in that I will investigate the concept of a black aesthetic in order to discover what these critical enquiries dictate about the construction of any black aesthetic. In other words the enquiry that I am about to undertake is expected to yield discoveries about the black aesthetic concerning its possibility, whether anything like a black aesthetic is possible, and if a black aesthetic is possible the enquiry should indicate the boundaries and limits of the black aesthetic.

This enquiry into the possibilities of a black aesthetic should not be mistaken with the other and quite different theory as to whether an aesthetic, as opposed to a black aesthetic, is possible at all. This other theory, with which I am not concerned, asks whether it is possible to construct a theory so that one can find out through its application whether a given thing is beautiful.⁴ For the following reasons this other theory is a futile one. What is beautiful is

dictated by the psychological reaction of a person when an object is presented to his senses which are hearing, sight, touch, smell, and feeling. Since the psychological reactions of individuals to similar objects differ markedly, one and the same object could be given incompatible or inconsistent beauty-appreciations. For example, a flower could be judged by three different persons each of which says it is beautiful, not beautiful, or indifferent. While the flower could not have all three of these qualities the three persons can be quite sound in their aesthetic appraisals; since, these kinds of aesthetic appraisals are unruly in the sense that they cannot be brought under the rules of a system. The purported beauty of the flower is therefore an unpredictable psychological relation between the person and the flower. What this other aesthetic theory⁵ purports to do, and this is not the concern of the black aesthetic, is to provide conditions apart from the psychological states of individual persons under which an object can be called beautiful. In the course of the discussion I will show how it is that the concerns of the black aesthetic are certainly not those of what I have referred to as 'the other aesthetic'. Previously I have identified the concerns of the black aesthetic as those that pertain to the black self, and these specific concerns will be made clear in subsequent analyses. I now proceed to discuss two methods of enquiry that I will use in unearthing the conceptual foundations of the black aesthetic.

(3) Two types of procedure that are pertinent to an enquiry concerning the fundamentals of a black aesthetic are naturalistic considerations, otherwise called considerations from nature, and

linguistic or language considerations.⁶ By 'language' I mean not this or that particular language, but language in general. Previous analysis in chapter one, "The Black Self", has shown the black self, in part, to be a physical entity, something found in nature; and it is for this reason that naturalistic considerations will be employed. The reason for the linguistic considerations is that if any purported theory of a black aesthetic is to be intelligible it will have to be placed in language. An investigation into language will therefore show how its structures affect the essential concepts of a black aesthetic. I will now indicate how these two kinds of considerations should be taken.⁷

The locus of all purported theories of a black aesthetic is the black self. All considerations prior to the construction of any black aesthetic will therefore have to be concerned about the concept of blackness, and in the absence of such a study there cannot be a reasonable hope of constructing any black aesthetic. The considerations of aspects prior to the construction of any black aesthetic will be seen to be negative considerations expressed in the form of arguments which constitute obstacles to any black aesthetic. In other words, these arguments are to the effect that there cannot be a black aesthetic. Before I proceed to present these arguments I will make initial remarks on the two methods of enquiry to be used, the naturalistic and the linguistic.

(3a) This linguistic approach is not to be confused with other purportedly linguistic approaches. Other approaches that claim to be linguistic examine dictionaries or oral languages to see how

concepts or words are used in different societies, and finding certain regularities or uniformities in usages these researchers then claim that they have been examining the structure of language. The claim is an erroneous one, for such an approach is really sociological and not linguistic. This approach, the sociological one, merely tells how concepts or words are used as reported by dictionary entries or users of this or that language, and does not concern itself with what I will later show to be the structure of language in general. Initial remarks on the naturalistic enquiry now follow.

(3b) The first set of considerations concerning blackness are those that have been described as naturalistic. Naturalistic considerations pertaining to the fundamentally aesthetic aspects of blackness are focussed on processes, events, or things in nature. The reason for this focus on nature is that since the physicalistic, or bodily, self is a part of nature, it will flourish or function adequately when it is in harmony with nature. Naturalistic considerations therefore look to nature to discover those natural conditions in accordance with which a black aesthetic should be created. These natural conditions, which are foundations for an aesthetic designed for a black self, are such that they will be conditions under which the black self will be at home in the world, in nature. Subsequent analyses will be devoted to the motivations and reasons underlying the need to create a black aesthetic, and it is for this reason that this topic, of motivations and reasons, will not be pursued extensively in this chapter. But this brief mention of the motivations for a black aesthetic was required in order to make clear the reasons for the naturalistic considerations. I now

proceed to discuss the naturalist enquiry and its considerations.

(4a) Naturalistic considerations are investigations or enquiries into the fundamental aspects of a black aesthetic. These are only initial considerations and are not sufficient by themselves to constitute a complete enquiry into the concerns of a black aesthetic. These naturalistic considerations are about the primary elements that are the subject matter for any doctrine claiming to be an aesthetic. These primary aesthetic elements are the basic materials that present themselves to the senses, as opposed to the intellect; and it is out of an overall attitude to these primary elements that a black aesthetic can finally be created. The naturalistic investigations into these primary elements can therefore constitute only a small part of the enquiry into matters prior to the creation of a black aesthetic. It will be seen that the naturalistic considerations initiate the enquiries and point to the elements that should be considered by other parts of the investigation, the whole of which constitutes the investigation of all that is prior to the construction of a black aesthetic. More of the naturalistic considerations follow in the form of concise arguments, and I will later refer to the naturalistic considerations as the arguments from nature since these considerations contain implicit or embedded arguments to be later made explicit in subsequent sections.

(4b) What will be presented are not rigorously intellectual or philosophically formal arguments. Most inclusively, and most generally, they represent a reflective consciousness at a rudimentary level. More narrowly and specifically, these arguments should be taken as the persistent bits of thought that remain with the black individual whose conceptual boundaries have been demarcated by imperialism, colonial

aggression, and slavery; and, who tries to make sense of things phenomenologically as they might be outside of the sole conceptual framework permitted to him. It is possible to counter all of these arguments intellectually, either by pointing to common-sense examples or to locate logical flaws in the arguments; but, to do so would be to miss the existential agony of the black person. The world of persons is not a logical one. Why has Africa always been pejoratively called the Dark Continent when it has more sunshine than Europe, and it was in Kemet, the Black Land, as the Egyptians called their country, that civilization arose and flourished? The world, as we know it, is a conceptually created place. It is a world in which we who survived slavery, colonial aggression, and racial extinction, are not at ease with ourselves in a world whose moral and conceptual frameworks are founded these historical antecedents. This world, limited though we are by its conceptual routes, forces us to go outside our present one to eventually create a moral conception of ourselves. Such a world, as we know it, is not necessary; but, since its conceptual routes are the only ones we know, it is necessary for us. The counterexamples to the arguments I will subsequently present, belong to a world we do not phenomenologically inhabit, and in which we could not be at home since its moral and conceptual frameworks are founded on a way of life deriving from our enslavement and colonization.

(4c) The naturalistic considerations base themselves on the general argument from nature which is as follows:

Consider all the things in nature that are pleasant, good, and desirable. Whatever is beautiful is found to be pleasant, good,

desirable, or is found to be all of these. In nature there are abiding pairs of day and night, growth and decay, living and dying, cleansing and dirtying. In all of these pairs there is a remarkable consistency in which all the things that are not good, not pleasant, and not desirable, are black.

(4d) What follow are really symbolic associations; but since they are taken as real, it will be convenient to refer to them as arguments. The specific arguments from nature, otherwise referred to as naturalistic considerations, are designed to explicate the general argument from nature. Each argument focusses on a single pair of events given in the general argument from nature. The specific arguments now follow:

(4d1) In nature there is living and dying, or life and death. The basis of all life on earth is vegetation, plant life. In sunlight vegetation flourishes. In the absence of sunlight, and consequently in darkness, all vegetation would die and all life would come to a halt. In blackness or darkness, therefore, there can be no life. Blackness or darkness is therefore fundamentally opposed to life.

(4d2) Concerning the pair of day and night what is more natural than for a child to love the daylight and to play in it?. What is more natural than for a child to fear the night and its blackness?. Adults are not different. Adults naturally shun the night and its darkness. Night is the time of inactivity, of sloth. Night and its accompanying darkness are the repository of all that is dreaded. The argument ends. A brief reflection on this argument reveals that it is derivative of the argument from living and dying in that the argument about day and

night implies that human beings flourish when their activities are grounded in the activities found in nature.

(4d3) The argument from growth and decay proceeds as follows: Everything that is pleasant, good or desirable, is something that grows or flourishes; and this holds for all living things in nature. Flowers are the beauty of nature and they are never black. When things in nature decay they invariably become brown then black; we see a loss of nature and we do not like this. Nothing decaying in nature is ever pleasant, good, or desirable.

(4d4) The argument from nature concerning the activities of cleansing and dirtying is this: In nature things are either clean or dirty. Water is the universal cleanser and it is not black; for if it were black it could not cleanse things but would only make them dirty. The notion of cleansing is essential to health and to life. The notion of cleansing, on the one hand, and the notions of dirt and blackness, on the other hand, are opposed to each other. We find health and life to be pleasant, good, and desirable; and we must therefore reject whatever is opposed to life and health. We must therefore reject dirt and with it, blackness.

(4e) The preceeding considerations or arguments from nature can be partly summarized at this point in order to derive some conclusions which are of immediate interest. The naturalistic considerations employ the notion that certain things, events, states or processes in nature are good, pleasant, and desirable. Things, events, states

and processes exhibit themselves as dualities, examples of which are the pairs of living and dying, day and night, cleansing and dirtying, and finally, growth and decay. Each pair of these dualities in nature has the dual characteristic of being pleasant or unpleasant, good or not good, or finally, desirable or not desirable. All the left members of these pairs in nature are those that are good, pleasant, and desirable. The right-side members have qualities that are not pleasant, not good, and not desirable. Curiously, the right-side members are often, if not always, black or associated with blackness. These are some of the initial findings of matters that come prior to the construction of a black aesthetic that the arguments or considerations from nature have uncovered.

I had stated earlier that any black aesthetic would have to be placed in language if the purported aesthetic were intelligible. I now employ some considerations from language, which I at other times refer to as linguistic considerations, in order to make further comments about these critical findings of the arguments from nature, or the body of naturalistic considerations.

5. The Linguistic Enquiry And Its Considerations

(5a) The naturalistic considerations gave rise to certain unanalyzed conclusions about blackness that were summarized in the arguments from language. The appraisal of these naturalistic findings constitutes the task of linguistic considerations. The pseudo-linguistic considerations that I have previously termed as being really sociological would comment on the naturalistic findings in the following way: If anyone wants to know what blackness means, let him look in a dictionary since it is a guide to language. The meaning of 'black' or blackness is the same for all languages because the significance or signification of black is the same for all languages. I have shown earlier that this kind of consideration is not linguistic but really sociological since dictionaries merely show how this or that group of language-users employ words. Stated differently, this type of pseudo-linguistic approach reveals a certain convention agreed upon by language users, in which case the approach concerns itself with the language users and their conventions but not with the structure of language itself. The approach which in a certain way concerns itself with the structure of language itself is what is properly called a linguistic approach.⁷ I now proceed to illustrate this linguistic approach and its implications for some of the findings of the naturalistic considerations. The items to be dealt with are the arguments from language of which the first is the general argument from language.

(5b) The linguistic considerations with respect to the natural-

istic findings are summed up in what I call the general argument from language which states that three elements essential to language are duality, negation, and metaphor.⁸ The argument from language continues that in a very important way language is about the world, otherwise it would be an opportunity for fantasy alone. These three elements of language must therefore be illustrated or explained with reference to nature, the world, and it is in the light of these language or linguistic considerations that the naturalistic findings are rendered intelligible. I now present two of the specific arguments from language, each of which employs a single one of the three elements just mentioned.

(5c1) Duality refers to the dual or twofold nature of things or thoughts. Given anything, if we can think of it as being either this way or that way, we say the thing exhibits duality. Yet it need not be that a given thing can only be spoken of in just two ways. What duality indicates is that the notion of 'either-or' is virtually indispensable for language. Thus we speak of ourselves as being happy or unhappy, tall or short, etc. Similarly, nature exhibits duality: Things in nature are living or dying, in day or night etc. But this series of dualities in nature is important just in case it has meaning. Meaning cannot exist apart from persons. How then does duality in nature become meaningful for us?. The argument from duality answers that I know the meaning of the series of dualities in nature just in case I am aware of the naturalistic considerations given in the arguments from nature. For example, if I know or understand the duality of day and night then I know that the day is the time for certain

activities, for sunlight and the flourishing of nature; and that the night is the time for the ending of activities, a time for sloth.

(5c2) The second element essential to the structure of language is given in the argument from negation which proceeds as follows. Negation is a sense of 'what is not'. A sense of 'what is not' is a sense of what is not pleasant, what is not desirable, and what is not good. But language can have a sense of 'what is not' just in case it has a sense of 'what is'. The senses of 'what is' and 'what is not' are all found in nature or based on nature. Given the series of dualities in nature, of day and night, of growth and decay, etc., the left-side members of each pair indicate 'what is' and the right-side members indicate 'what is not': For example, 'living' indicates what is pleasant, and dying indicates what is not pleasant. In effect, all the right-side halves of the pairs in nature sum up the sense of negation, a sense of 'what is not', a sense of the negative. In each pair of the dualities in nature blackness is tied in with the sense of 'what is not', with the sense of negation or the sense of the negative. Later considerations about the element of metaphor will further clarify these findings. But the elements of duality and negation require further analysis at this time.

(5d1) The naturalistic considerations showed earlier that of the pairs of events in nature, living and dying, growth and decay, cleansing and dirtying, that the right-side members, such as dying, decay, dirtying, etc., were events we do not like. But the mere fact that we do not like these events is itself a naturalistic consideration, pertain-

ing to certain selves or persons who are themselves objects in nature, which needs to be explicated through linguistic considerations. What is hoped for is an explanation as to why some of these events or activities in nature were noted in the argument from nature as being not pleasant, not good, and not desirable, were all activities that were not liked. One should not think at this point that an adequate explanation is supplied by pointing out, that upon understanding the meaning of the words involved, that we should not like whatever is not pleasant, not good, and not desirable. Such an analytic consideration would be true but would not supply the explanation sought, part of which would indicate why we call certain events in nature not pleasant, not good, and not desirable. To say we call them not good, not pleasant, and not desirable because we do not like them is as circular as saying that we do not like them because they are not pleasant, not good, and not desirable. The explanation sought is one that breaks out of this circularity. The linguistic consideration, that these are events that express the sense of what is not, the sense of negation, does not help for the following reason. Given any pair of the events in nature that I have selected, for example growth and decay, growth is what decay is not; and decay is what growth is not. Therefore both members of that pair, and consequently all other pairs in nature resembling the ones I have selected, would be not pleasant, not good, or not desirable; and we would like neither member of a given pair in nature. Hence the sense of 'what is not', is not by itself sufficient to explain why we do not like any member of a given pair in nature, and why we then go on to call it not pleasant, not good, or not desirable. However, the two linguistic elements of duality and negation will

figure importantly in the needed explanation of this, which takes place in the following two sections.

(5d2) Duality and negation constitute the structure of the concept of choice. The concept of choice, as will be indicated shortly, is different from the structure of the concept of choice. The concept of choice indicates that I can choose only if I have alternatives which are a pair of actions containing a reasonable course of action that contributes toward my well-being. The choice of one action therefore involves the notion that the other action is seen more negatively, and is to be rejected. The structure of the concept of choice, on the other hand, consists of duality and negation, and is illustrated as follows. The letters L and R designate a pair of actions that can be considered as alternatives. The schema of the structure of the concept of choice follows:

1. Duality: L or R
2. Negation: Not R
3. The choice: L

The structure of the concept of choice is easily seen to derive from the concept of choice since the duality of L and R correspond to alternatives as explained by the concept of choice, and negation corresponds to what is negative or fit to be rejected. Although the structure is derived from the concept they are different notions in that the concept of choice, unlike the structure of choice, contains a condition for negating or rejecting a course of action of which more will be said in the following section.

(5e) In a very important way the concept of choice is relevant to the problem of the naturalistic considerations concerning the pairs in nature, the considerations which point out that we systematically do not like the right-side members of the pairs in nature. The person, by virtue of the self which identifies or distinguishes him, is a part of nature. Part of what it means to be a person, as I will later show in a complete examination of this concept, is that one chooses or selects actions or activities which constitute a way of life or a form of life. The naturalistic considerations show some of the activities which constitute nature, or the world. The left-side members of the pairs in nature are the activities of living, cleansing, and growth (in the sense of flourishing). The right-side members of the activities in nature are those of dying, dirtying, and decay. One's choice of activities for the self, which is a dynamic part of nature, must be consistent, at least symbolically if not actually so, with one set of the activities in nature, either the left-side members or the right-side members. Further analysis of the concept of choice shows that I can choose only with a view to furthering my well-being in which case my activities must be like those of the left-side members of the pairs in nature; and some of these are living, growth, and cleansing. The right-side members of the pairs in nature, those of dying, decay and dirtying, are actions that lead to the termination of my actions or activities, a termination of me in effect, and therefore contradict the concept of choice which contains the condition that what I choose must further my well-being. The right-side members are therefore those that are seen as negative and consequently are always rejected or never chosen.

One of the naturalistic findings was that blackness consistently

accompanied those events in nature that were not pleasant, not good, and not desirable, and that blackness was therefore to be rejected. This naturalistic consideration concerning blackness was also substantiated by the linguistic considerations of duality and negation when they were brought to bear on the concept of choice. What duality and negation confirm about the activity of choosing is that certain events in nature are choiceworthy and that others are to be always rejected. Those events or activities in nature that are consistently rejected are consistently associated with blackness. All of these discoveries need to be further analyzed and explained, but prior to this I will consider the extent of the applicability of the elements of duality and negation which were the tools for these discoveries.

(5f) The preceding analysis utilizing duality and negation pointed out that certain events or activities in nature are not liked and also that they are seen as not pleasant, not good, and not desirable. One of the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis was that events or activities that are consistently rejected are systematically associated with blackness. Given the events called day and night, which are themselves not only activities but also contain activities, it is also a consequence of the analysis that the night with its attendant blackness is to be rejected. Blackness itself is not specifically rejected with the other events or activities in nature; instead, blackness is regularly associated with activities that are themselves rejected. This rejection of blackness was cited in naturalistic findings concerning the pairs of events or activities in nature. The rejection of blackness was also cited in the linguistic considera-

tions of duality and negation, which make up the concept of choice, in which it was pointed out that blackness was always rejected or never chosen. We need to understand this feature of choiceworthiness and the rejection of blackness pointed out by the entire analysis from duality and negation. This final consideration of blackness, inasmuch as it itself is the fundamental basis of any doctrine that may purport to be a black aesthetic, is now to be dealt with through the remaining linguistic element of metaphor.

(5g1) Metaphor is a linguistic device in which many different concepts are connected for the sake of conveying meaning. Hence the concept of metaphor consists structurally of two parts, a connecting concept and the many other distinct and perhaps unrelated concepts that are linked by the connecting concept to itself. Metaphor can be illustrated by the use of the following sentence;

Henrietta was a fading sunset last July.

The connecting part of the metaphor is the concept 'fading sunset'. The concepts that are connected are 'the ending of a life', 'quietness', 'being in a subdued state', 'the faint glimmers or traces of a once very dominant event', and 'melancholy-arousing'. The meaning of the sentence 'Henrietta was a fading sunset last July' is derived by removing the connecting concept and substituting for it the concepts which it connects together. The meaning of the sentence is therefore this;

Henrietta is now a subdued person. She is nearing the end of her life in which one may see in her actions the faint glimmers of a once dominant person. Comparing her once bright life with her present state of quietness arouses a feeling of melancholy

in one.

A comparison of the original sentence about Henrietta with the later explicated sentence shows that the original sentence with the connecting concept 'fading sunset' achieves, among other things, economy of language. The connecting concept is therefore a metaphor for the distinct concepts which it links. With this explanation in mind I turn to the application of metaphor in the linguistic considerations concerning blackness.⁹

(5g2) The naturalistic and linguistic considerations that developed in the investigation of the concept of blackness were designed, among other things, to determine the meaning of the word black. These considerations have therefore determined the metaphorical use of blackness. The discovery governing the use of the concept of blackness as a metaphor is as follows: Black is a connecting concept for all the right-side members of the pairs of events or activities given in nature which are night, dirtying, decay, and dying. A complementary formulation is that blackness is a connecting concept for all that is negative, all that cannot be chosen. Since black is a connecting concept for these kinds of events or activities in nature and also for the linguistic elements of duality and negation constituting the concept of choice, the conclusion of the entire investigation into the possibility of the black aesthetic is that there has never been and can never be a black aesthetic.

Notes:

Ch. 2

1. Genesis 9. 18-27
2. Matthew 6. 22-23
3. Some articles in Addison Gayle's The Black Aesthetic are indicative of the concerns with the Black Aesthetic. While my work is in no way a commentary on these articles or a critique of them, but is rather directed toward fundamental ideas and concepts, some of which are dealt with in these articles, what is in order at this point is a sampling of some representative approaches to the problem of the Black aesthetic. This sampling should not be taken as stating the theses of these essays, necessarily. Rather, the sampling shows ideas having key significance to the concept of a Black aesthetic. The sampling now follows.

In "Towards A Black Aesthetic", Hoyt Fuller writes that he is "...in search of a Black aesthetic...which reflects the special character and imperatives of the Black experience.

In "You Touch My Black Aesthetic", Julian Mayfield admits openly the difficulty in defining the Black aesthetic. He writes on page 26 that "It/[the Black aesthetic] is in our racial memory, and the unshakable knowledge of who we are, where we have been, and, springing from this, where we are going...". He writes further on page 27 that "The black aesthetic...is the search for a new program ...lost and buried in the African past". Finally, on page 29, he indicates that he believes the Black aesthetic is tied to action, right action".

In "Black Literature And The White Aesthetic", Addison Gayle shows an awareness of the thrust of my naturalistic arguments, especially as they pertain to the concept of blackness. Gayle, however, pursues this concept in the literature of Western civilization. In Gayle's terms, "the Black aesthetic is an alternative to cultural strangulation of Blacks by the White aesthetic".

In "Blackness Can: A Quest For Aesthetics", James Emanuel, on page 187, in answer to his self-posed question 'Why the need for a Black aesthetic?', quotes Don L. Lee to the effect that Blacks have their own frame of reference and perception. Later, Emanuel quotes

Cecil Brown to the effect that the Black aesthetic would be a kind of cocoon against hostile White values.

Finally, in "Some Observations On A Black Aesthetic", Adam Miller espouses the view that the Black aesthetic is inherent in the Black experience and is rendered when we honestly re-create the experience.

At the end of this chapter it will have been clear to the reader that my analysis lays to rest, as a fruitless endeavor, the attempts of these approaches, as well as all others of their type, to create a Black aesthetic. Since the concern with the Black aesthetic comprehends a great number of seemingly disparate and extraneous issues, which would still be of urgent concern to someone yearning for a Black aesthetic, this representative sampling of articles on the Black aesthetic should be taken up again to be re-examined in the light of the findings presented in the third and fourth chapters.

4. Concerning this 'other theory', remarks pertaining to it appear in Immanuel Kant's The Analytic Of The Beautiful and The Critique Of Judgment.

5. In "The Role Of Theory In Aesthetics" in Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks At The Arts, Morris Weitz argues that "...theory -in the requisite classical sense- is never forthcoming in aesthetics"(pg.49). Weitz's arguments concerning what I call 'the other aesthetic' are quite different from mine. What is significant in Weitz's article, however, is the fact that he contends that art is an open concept and that there can never be an exhaustive enumeration of art forms. The significance of this contention is that it leaves open the possibility of an art form or an aesthetic that is Black. Concerning unique conditions pertaining to the Black aesthetic, Weitz does not make any remarks about whether or not they can be deduced from what he considers as the standard theories of aesthetics in Western thought. It is not to be thought that I am criticizing Weitz for not discussing the Black aesthetic, for this does not come within the purview of his

essay. My point in citing Weitz is to indicate to researchers in the field of the Black aesthetic, if there are any that are still taking this approach, that there is no solution to the problem of the Black aesthetic to be got from applying the exhaustively enumerated aesthetic theories in Western thought to Black artifacts.

6. George A. Carver, in his Aesthetics And The Logical Positivists' Criterion Of Meaning, approaches aesthetics with these two considerations, among others, in mind. Carver discusses the meaning of statements of aesthetic judgment from the logical positivists' standpoint of how a statement is formulated syntactically and semantically, and in his book he takes up the general question of language. Though he himself does not call it by this name, Carver takes up what I call the naturalistic considerations, in his discussion of the positivists' claim that the truth or meaning of a statement is grounded on the experiential routes of the hearer or speaker. Rudolf Carnap, one of the early logical positivists, formulated the criterion of meaning to include the claim that language needs certain predicates of a spatio-temporal sort, which he called thing-predicates, for some of its ultimate constituents. Carver concludes his investigation by stating that the positivists' criterion is too narrow for aesthetic statements, and he includes aesthetic sensitivity which he claims to be a necessary element in appreciating aesthetic statements. Later on I will comment on this requirement of sensitivity.

7. In his work on the philosophy of language, Rudolph Carnap concerns himself with the structure of language. In one of his important documents, "Testability and Meaning", he details the connecting elements, conjunction, negation, etc., out of which a grammatical sentence is built. He also considers deductive relationships between sentences which he includes as part of the general structure of language. Finally, Carnap includes a class of intersubjectively observable predicates which language-users can use for confirming the truth or falsity of their sentences. Out of this procedure of deciding the truth-status of claims,

a criterion of meaning arises. Carnap's motivation, in his work on the structure of language, is to develop meaning-conditions for claims that can be formulated within the boundaries of empirical science.

My concerns have almost nothing to do with Carnap's goals. We share similar points about the systactic elements required for sentential structure. My use of the spatio-temporal elements is not restricted to a referential use. Rather, I am concerned with the spatio-temporal items in the naturalistic considerations with a view to discovering how valuations come to be assigned to the concept of blackness.

8. It is not to be thought that these remarks are directed to a specific author who might have put forward these three elements in his claim about language. Most thinkers will admit duality and negation, but fewer still will admit metaphor. W.V.O. Quine, for example, in his Elementary Logic, includes negation in his formalistic view of a truth-functional language. He does not include metaphor here since the language he considers is truth-functional. In his later writings Quine's view on the matter is undoubtedly that metaphor can be eliminated without loss of meaning. I, however, do not side with him on this view of metaphor.

Quine uses duality in the truth-functional sense, and is of the opinion, at least in his Elementary Logic, that this is not an essential element of a truth-functional language. Nonetheless, he concedes that there are good reasons for admitting duality into his language. I use duality not only in the truth-functional sense, but also in the broader sense indicated in my chapter.

Concerning metaphor, Max Black, in "Metaphor" in Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks At The Arts, thinks it important enough to devote a sizable article to it. Apart from his 'interaction' view of metaphor which I consider to be significant, and I will later make fuller reference to it, Black is of the opinion that metaphor cannot be eliminated without loss of cognitive content. And I think it would be safe to conclude that Black's view, at least in the article in question, is to the effect that metaphor is one of the essential elements of language.

9. Extensive discussions of metaphor occur in sources additional to those I have mentioned. However, it would not serve any purpose at this point to join the dispute in the way of siding with one of the views expounded on metaphor. To do would be to lose sight of the nature of the context at issue, an aesthetic one, in which the question of metaphor arises. In this kind of context, to extend an argument put forward by Morris Weitz in "The Role of Theory In Aesthetics" in Margolis' Philosophy Looks At The Arts, there can be no complete description of the characteristics of an art form. Since, for my purposes, metaphor would be an art form in poetry or fiction, an 'incompleteness' view of metaphor would be in order. My brief illustration of metaphor does not go against what can be regarded as a sensible insight of Weitz, and is quite in keeping with it.

Chapter 111: The Historical Approach To The Problems Of The
Black Self

(1) Given the presence of this black self in the sense of which it has been already defined, I understand fully that this is the self I call 'I'.¹ I ask myself: What is this self?. What is the relevance of this self to the rest of the world?. What am I to do with this self?. What has this self done?. These questions are asked in view of the fact that I have a deep sense of emptiness, a certain gap. This is the emptiness that comes from my need to fill the historical past with my self and with other individual black selves. There is a gap because when I think of a community of black selves in the African past I do not know how to relate myself to them. Apart from this relation of myself to a community of black selves, there is also a general sense of emptiness concerning the place of myself in the rest of the world. But although these feelings of a certain emptiness and of a certain gap are involved with the rest of the world, they are fundamentally concerned with the black self.

The state of mind in which I ask these questions is one in which I feel like a tree withering. The flower of my spirit wilts. I search within myself for answers to these questions and then I realize that I am looking for my roots.

This search for roots is a search for myself in the past. Since the individual black self of which I am an instance can only be known with reference to the collective black self in the past, this search for roots in ways to be later discussed is a search for a collective black

self in the past. In another way of speaking the collective black self is a mirror in which I look to see myself. I tell myself that if I can find out what this collective black self did in the past I can then ascribe an estimate of worth to it. I therefore view my own individual self as having existed in the past. I am merely the point in time at which this self is. Time cannot distinguish selves like mine since there is a peculiar identity of my self with all past black selves; and in a later chapter I will deal with the nature of this identity. This state of self-searching, of looking into the collective self of the past, is a looking for one's roots in the African past and has generated what I will call the historical approach.²

(2) The historical approach comes about when a black person aware of the dilemma in the aesthetic approach seeks his self-worth in his actions. Perhaps it does not matter that his actions, or those of the collective black self are not at this time fitting or proper. And perhaps the search for the collective black self in the past will give him a true estimate of his own self-worth. This search for a collective black self is carried out by the historian. In this chapter I will examine how this search is carried out. My purpose is not to examine individual historians. Instead, my intention is to point out and to examine certain inherent constraints constituting the frameworks within which all historical investigations take place. I will first outline the method of the historical thesis, it being understood that 'approach' and 'thesis' are used interchangeably, and go on to explain it in detail. This does not imply that any particular historian has

offered as a thesis what I am about to put forward. Rather, by a 'method of the historical thesis' I mean necessary issues and questions with which any historian would have to be concerned with in writing about the African past. While it need not be that an individual historian will be concerned with all of these issues and questions, it must be the case that he is concerned with at least one or some of these items, and a presumably comprehensive account of African history has to include all of the items to be presented in the outline of the method of the historical thesis. Whether or not there exists a comprehensive African history does not affect the undertaking in this chapter since the method of the historical thesis is meant to apply to whatever could be put forward as a comprehensive African history. The method of the historical thesis is fourfold, and it is as follows.

(3) Outline of the method of the historical thesis;

First phase: The resurrection of the African past

The 'This is the way we were' account, or what amounts to the same thing, the 'This is the way I was' account.

Second phase: The series of questions concerning the first phase;

(a) Why are we no longer this way?

(b) Why are we no longer there?

Third phase: The series of 'how' questions some of which are characterized as follows.

(a) How the ... destroyed Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Songhai, etc., where '...' stands for the relevant invaders.

(b) How the West underdeveloped Africa

(c) How slavery grew

Fourth phase: The presentation of solutions

(a) Nationalism

(b) Dialectic

(c) Transcendence

I now proceed to explain and discuss the outline.

(4a) The first phase of the historical thesis is entitled 'The Resurrection Of The African Past' or the 'This is the way we were' account. In this phase the authors reconstruct periods in which black persons collectively were doing things the author-historians would consider right.³ This is the period of perfection in which African empires and kingdoms such as Egypt, Kush, Axum, Ghana, Mali, and Songhai are resurrected and brought to close scrutiny. The authors stress many different aspects of the African past all of which constitute a concept of African civilization or a concept of an African way of life. Underlying the material and other obvious aspects of the way of life depicted in African civilization are the moral and ethical tenets which are guidelines for the overall actions of persons who take part in what is found to be the African way of life. This way of acting, of being, of planning etc., comes to be identified as the way we, as black persons, were collectively. Inasmuch as the historical thesis holds that the actions of an individual constitute his worth as a person, the concept of the collective or the individual black self that is met with in the African past is the concept of someone doing what is right and to whom an estimate of self-worth and consequently personal worth can be attributed. Since the collective black self is a mirror in which I an

individual black self see myself, the way we were becomes the way I was. On this historical account I have located myself in the African past and I have found myself, and can therefore attribute an estimate to my self-worth and achieve personal worth. Thus far, the historical thesis in phase one has nailed down what it takes to be the concept of a black person

(4b) The second phase of the historical account is made up of considerations as to why we are no longer living the way of life resurrected in accounts of the African past. The real problem for the historical thesis is this. The African empires and civilizations do not come to life when resurrected. The present state of the collective black self is far removed from the way it was in the reconstructed history of the African past. The real state of the collective black self comprises such things as the loss of territory in Northern and Southern Africa. There is the loss of our population resources through 'trade' and slavery carried on between ourselves and other peoples. The historical thesis is therefore left to explain how it is that the concept of a black person could lead to these embarrassing events in African history. The embarrassment for the historical thesis arises because of the implicit condemnation that the concept of a black person resurrected through the historian's efforts must have been a very inadequate one which led to the embarrassing events. In other words the questions posed to the historian are as follows: What kind of person would let such territorial loss occur?. What kind of person would permit himself to be carried off systematically into slavery?. What kind of person would allow the continuing loss of his

irreplaceable natural resources?. These questions imply the concept of an individual with little personal worth, and they successfully bring a halt to the historical thesis insofar as it can be viewed as providing a viable concept of a black person as one whose actions constitute his personal worth. But this is not to say that the efforts of historians have all been in vain. It will later be shown that it is the sum of answers to these questions characterizing the second phase, as mentioned in the outline, that provide an insight into the unfruitfulness of the historical thesis.

(4c) The third phase of the historical movement is characterized by a series of 'how' questions. 'How' questions are designed to elicit answers to the series of embarrassing questions posed in the second phase of the historical thesis.⁴ The following are examples of 'how' questions that historians pose to themselves:

- (a) How did ... destroy the African kingdoms and empires of Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Songhai etc., where '...' stands for the relevant invaders?.
- (b) How did ... enslave Africans, where '...' stands for the relevant slavers?.
- (c) How did ... take away African territory, where '...' stands for the relevant occupier?.
- (d) How ... underdeveloped Africa, where '...' stands for non-African peoples?.

A 'how' question is designed to elicit an answer which accounts for a specific shortcoming attributed to the collective black self, and the 'how' question makes mention of the shortcoming. In the 'how' question

of the type 'How did the ... destroy the empires of Egypt, Kush, Ghana, Mali, etc., where '...' stands for the relevant invaders?', the shortcoming attributed to the black self is the progressive decline of empires and kingdoms. In the 'how' question 'How did slavery grow?' the shortcoming attributed to the collective or black self is its enslavement. In the 'how' question 'How did ... underdevelop Africa?', the shortcoming attributed to the black self is its backwardness. While answers to 'how' questions vary depending on the specific shortcoming they deal with, all 'how' questions are similar in that they share a common feature whose significance should never be underestimated. This common feature of all 'how' questions is that they contain along with the shortcoming attributed to the black self the causal factor or causal agent of the black-ascribed shortcoming. In the case of the destruction of the empires and kingdoms the causal agent is some non-African or non-black personage. In the case of slavery the causal factor is an ideology or principle of action adhered to by the non-black agent who enslaves, and one such agent used in building an answer to the corresponding 'how' question concerning the growth of slavery is capitalism. All of the shortcomings pointed out by 'how' questions constitute the demise of the collective black self, and all of the causal factors or causal agents contained in the 'how' questions are put forward to account for this demise. It was pointed out earlier that all 'how' questions share the common feature of containing the causal factor or agent which serves as an explanatory feature in accounting for a particular shortcoming, and that in some way this was significant. I now proceed to explain this significance. Inasmuch as non-African

individuals are made responsible and blameworthy for each shortcoming attributed to the collective black self, non-Africans are responsible and blameworthy for the demise of the collective black self; for it was pointed out that all the shortcomings of the black self constitute the demise of the black self. A consequence of this is that the collective black self, or the totality of individual black selves, is not really responsible and blameworthy for its own demise. Once this position is taken the whole concept of black personhood is lost. Much later in a separate chapter when I have fully explicated the concept of a person and then the concept of a black person, I will show that being made responsible for one's own actions or for certain kinds of events that befall one is an indispensable condition for the concept of any kind of personhood. I will also show in a later chapter dealing with the concept of black personhood how the series of 'how' questions is best answered.

(4d) The fourth stage in the method of the historical thesis consists of giving directions which are supposedly steps out and away from the present morass in which the collective black self finds itself. At the same time these solutions offer a way of looking at or interpreting the embarrassing events in African history. These solutions are therefore an alternative to the 'how' questions in the third stage of the historical thesis. The 'how' questions were put forward to elicit answers to the series of questions in the second stage which pointed to the embarrassing events deriving from the fact that the glorious African past of the first stage is no longer existent. The facts con-

stituting the non-existence of the African past were such events as the destruction of empires and kingdoms, slavery, and the occupation and territorial loss of major parts of the African continent. In that the 'how' questions embody a certain method of explaining and making sense of the events in African history, the method of the 'how' questions constitutes a philosophy of history. And such a philosophy has been shown to be inadequate. The fourth stage of the method of the historical thesis, however, consists of a set of philosophies of history that are given as alternatives to the philosophy embodied in the method of the 'how' questions. These alternative philosophies of history given in the fourth stage of the historical thesis are of interest not only to historians but to political scientists and sociologists in their theory constructions regarding black people. These significant solutions given in the fourth stage of the historical thesis to remedy the dilemma of the black self are as follows:

- (a) Nationalism
- (b) The dialectic
- (c) Transcendence

I will deal with these purported solutions individually. Here again my purpose is not to consider particular authors who are advocates of the solutions. My purpose is to make certain initial observations on the conceptual foundations of these solutions. Later on when I have developed a solution to the problem of the black self, I will undertake a more lengthy analysis of these solutions and of other parts of the method of the historical thesis. What follows is the initial and partial analysis of these solutions.

(4d1) Nationalism is a general doctrine or thesis stating that Blacks constitute an autonomous and independent nation wherever they are. What is damning for the nationalism thesis is that it simply has not succeeded empirically in that there is no viable black nation or nation-state which adheres to any variant of the nationalist thesis, one such variant being the thesis of Pan-Africanism.⁵ The basic reason for the failure of the nationalist thesis is that it has never stood on firm conceptual foundations, and one reason for this lack of theoretical underpinnings is that the doctrine or solution of nationalism is none other than a hankering after the nation-states and empires of the African past whose histories are the subject of explanations in the method of the 'how' questions. One reason for the lack of empirical confirmation of the nationalist thesis, and by empirical confirmation I mean a nation-state that practices the tenets of the nationalist thesis, is that the nationalist thesis requires that the fact of blackness be recognized as an important guideline for moral and political actions taken by blacks. What has never been shown, however, is how blackness has prescriptive force. Consequently, the nationalist solution is subject to charges of racism as well as unworkability. I will now discuss the second solution entitled the dealectic.

(4d2) The lack of a conceptually coherent nationalism coupled with its lack of empirical success leads to the second solution called the dialectic. The dialectic solution maintains that the progress of events in history is the result of the blind clashing of social forces. Thus the events of black history are not accounted for as being caused

by human agency. The strong attraction of this solution is that it removes the possibility of assigning responsibility, and therefore the attendant blame, on either blacks or non-blacks. The absurdity of this position is that it acknowledges the unhappy state of affairs concerning the black self and then calls on the black self to submit to the blind playout of events in history. This purported dialectic solution explains away the problem of the black self, but it is not really a solution since it precludes any development of the concept of a black person.⁶ I will later return to the dialectic since it is significantly related to the third solution called transcendence which I now proceed to discuss.

(4d3) Transcendence is the general notion which stipulates that all men belong to the same humanity and that their distinct racial or ethnic peculiarities are inconsequential to their conduct. Transcendence calls for a sort of universal brotherhood to which it claims is the right of every person to aspire. I will show eventually in a later chapter that this putative solution is incoherent and destructive. Yet transcendence develops logically and naturally from the two solutions of nationalism and the dialectic. The nationalist solution, having neither conceptual coherence nor empirical success as a guide to moral or political action, leads to the dialectic which offers a solution on the basis that there cannot be a guide to moral and political action. But the dialectic solution is not really a solution. For it dissolves the problem of the black self by eliminating the difficult problem of assigning responsibility and blame, to black and non-black persons, for the embarrassing events in the African past, and substitutes for that

problem the quite different considerations of the 'blind forces in history in unending interaction with each other'. Since the problem has been shifted to this kind of non-human agency over which there can be no human control through a guide to moral action, the dialectic solution with its language of social forces turns the person into an invalid and removes as a real question the general problem of the collective or individual black self. But those who accept the dialectic solution still need to do something about the collective black self or with their individual black selves since one always needs a principle of action. The inactivity of the dialectic solution leads to the transcendence solution which seeks to avoid the inactivity of the dialectic, and presents a principle of action which avoids the earlier mentioned pitfalls of the nationalist solution. This solution of transcendence gives hope of a future existence in which the individual metaphorically sheds his black self and becomes a universal man.⁷

Notes:

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1. This sense of 'I' will be developed in the chapter entitled "The Concept Of A Person".

2. The subject of the Black past is not merely an academic undertaking for historians. The concern of black individuals with their collective past is a deeply personal matter as can be evidenced by the extent to which Alex Haley's book, Roots, has affected millions of people. What is noteworthy about Haley's work is that the entire book apparently grew out of his own personal concerns, but could still move others as deeply as it did. This should not be unexpected since the black self is a collectively owned and shared entity.

Efforts similar to Haley's are undertaken by Langston Hughes, and by George Lamming in Castle In My Skin.

3. The Following are representative of the first phase of the historical thesis:

Jan Mittelholzer, They Came Before Columbus

W.E.B. DuBois, The World And Africa

Stanlake Samkanga, African Saga; A Brief Introduction To African History

Charles De Graft-Johnson, African Glory: The Story Of Vanished African Civilizations

Sheikh Antah Diop, The African Origin Of Civilization

One of the leading figures of the first phase of the historical thesis is Sheikh Antah Diop. In his "The Birth Of The Negro Myth" in Markovitz, ed., African Politics And Society, Diop strives to rehabilitate the concept of a black person, not only in the sense of resurrecting the African past, but to build the sense of worth of the person in an historical context.

Another such thinker is Joseph Ki-Zerbo who expresses somewhat similar views in his "African Personality And The New African Context" in Pan Africanism Reconsidered. On page 268 he asks, among other questions, 'What are the main features of the social organization and conception of the traditional African society?'. As part of

the answer to this question, Ki-zerbo constructs a "...healthy state of the African past", central to which are its cultural practises. All this is nothing but resurrection. Later on, page 281, he writes of 'recapturing, restoring the African , rehabilitating African history'. In his words "...the greatest asset to be saved, in my opinion, is the functionalism of African personalism". Ki-zerbo's approach cannot be described, however, as being only of the phase-one type in the method of the historical thesis. His efforts are also proper to other phases of the historical thesis. In chapter ten I will again make reference to him.

4. The following is an example of the elaborate work devoted to how-questions: Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.

5. Writers such as Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore are subscribers to the doctrine of nationalism. Stokeley Carmichael, an adherent to Nkrumah's position, makes some interesting remarks in his article "Pan Africanism- Land And Power", in Chrisman And Hare, eds., Pan-Africanism.

Carmichael pinpoints land (a land base) as a material condition for staging a revolution, the elements of which include removing from Africa those outside groups that illegally occupy African territory. Carmichael's ideology for the revolution is to be Pan-Africanism, which leads to nation-building on the land(in Africa). Pan-Africanism is therefore nothing but a nationalism of some sort which Carmichael admits to being unclear about. But what is the unknown essential nature of Pan-Africanism, which he says will take another ten years to define sharply?. There are indications as to what Carmichael thinks Pan-Africanism might be. He avows that Nkrumahism is the solution. In support of his belief he cites Nkrumah's "Consciencism" in stating that the theories of Marx and Lenin have their roots in communalism, which both Carmichael and

Nkrumah believe to be native or indigenous to Africa. Furthermore, Carmichael states that he and Nkrumah both accept the theories of Marxist-Leninism as embodying "...universal guidelines and scientific method...which should guide and direct African reconstruction". At this point it is clear what Carmichael thinks Pan-Africanism or African nationalism should be. This instance of the nationalist solution has to be rejected since I will show in Chapter six that Marxism is irrelevant to the problems of the black self; furthermore, I will show in chapter 10 that no resurrected account of the African past, such as African communalism, is a coherent principle of action.

6. Instances of the dialectical type of writing are to be found in the following:

- a) Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
- b) Sekou Toure, "A Dialectical Approach To Culture"
- c) Robert Allen, "A Historical Synthesis: Black Liberation And World Revolution"

7. In subsequent chapters devoted to the doctrine of transcendence, its ramifications will be brought out. At this point, however, among authors who can be identified as subscribing to the doctrine of transcendence are Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and Marcus Garvey.

Chapter 1V. Concluding Remarks On The Two Approaches

(1) A large portion of the analysis up to now has been devoted to the black self in that the black self has been the focus of the chapters concerned about the black aesthetic and black history. A very important issue to be dealt with at this point concerns the relevance of an aesthetic and of a black history to the black self. A variant but equally relevant issue is the question as to how the very different and distinct topics of an aesthetic and a history can have common concerns in their application to the black self. This later issue is important for the reason that any purported solution to the problems of the black self must cater to the needs of a black history and of a hoped-for black aesthetic. This is not to say that the yet-to-be-given solution will provide assistance to notions of black history and a black aesthetic as these are understood according to notions apart from this text. It may be that the solution will establish proper conceptual foundations for either a black aesthetic or for a black history, or for both of them. What is meant at this point is that this yet-to-be-given solution will satisfy whatever needs are intended to be satisfied by a black history and by a black aesthetic even if neither a black history nor a black aesthetic is suited to the task. This mention of a solution points to something that should now be discussed, and this is the general issue of what problems there are about the black self which the aesthetic and the history are really or fundamentally concerned about.

In order to deal adequately with this issue I now return to the

self which was the original focus of the enquiry. The black self is that on the basis of which I identify myself as being the kind of person that I am. Stated differently and generally, whatever is identified as 'this person' is always an individual with 'this determinate kind of self'. In a later chapter I will deal extensively with the concept of a person and show how it is that the self figures in the analysis of this concept. But for the purposes of this chapter no more than these remarks are needed, and I now return to the present discussion. The self is always the distinguishing characteristic of the person. My sense of being a person, which is my personhood or my personal worth, is therefore importantly related to the particular self on the basis of which I identify myself. Questions about the self are therefore questions about my self-worth or my personal worth. Questions about self-worth are questions about personhood. Questions about the black self are questions about the worth of a black self, and are thereby questions about black personhood. All issues about the black self are therefore issues about my self-worth or my personal worth. In certain ways not yet explained, the black aesthetic and black history, inasmuch as they were concerned about the black self, were concerned about my personal worth. But given questions of the sort 'What is the worth of myself who am black?', or 'What is my personal worth?', why should a purported doctrine of a black aesthetic have a bearing on these questions?. After all, an aesthetic is concerned solely with questions about beauty. In other words, a puzzle arises as to what is the relation between beauty and self-worth. The historical approach, on the other hand, in

its search for the worth of the black self resurrected African kingdoms and civilizations to show that these were the parameters within which the black person did good things, and that more importantly these were morally good things. The underlying motivations of the two approaches can therefore be restated in this way. For the aesthetic approach the physical characteristics of the black person are beautiful, and these characteristics constitute the black self. Black personhood, which is the sense of worth of an individual having a black self, is therefore to be identified as something beautiful. Black personhood is identifiably beautiful or black personhood is to be identified with the beautiful. For the historical approach the actions of individual black selves in the past are commendable or have moral worth. Black personhood is therefore to be identified as something having moral worth, and this something is the black self. The underlying motivations belonging to the aesthetic and to the historical, as revealed by the foregoing analysis, can therefore be summarized as follows:

The Aesthetic: Black personhood is the identifiably beautiful.

The historical: Black personhood is the set of identifiably
good actions of the past.

(2) Now that the concerns of the aesthetic and the historical approaches have been revealed, much remains to be said about the relationship between these revealed concerns especially since it has already been shown that these two approaches focussed on the black self as their common concern. In effect, the specific issue to be

discussed is the relationship between beauty and good actions, both of which in the preceeding section have been attributed to the black self.

Given that my consciousness of self unavoidably includes the awareness of myself as being black, as having a black self, why should I now proceed to wonder or to ask if I am beautiful?. Why should questions about beauty be relevant to the concept of self-worth?. It seems inevitable that I should wonder about the issues raised by these questions. I call the things around me beautiful, and I ask other people for their opinions when I am puzzled about an instance. Since my self is as much part of the empirical world as is anything else in nature, my self comes up for the same kind of scrutiny. The things in nature around me that I call beautiful are the things I am likely to prefer, and the things that are not beautiful are the things I am likely to reject. I can never escape my self, and it would seem as though I am not free to accept or to reject it. But whether I call my self ugly or beautiful will greatly influence the concept of myself, my sense of personal worth. Not only is the beautiful preferred or accepted, and the not-beautiful rejected, but we also prefer the morally good and reject the morally bad. This analysis therefore reveals the underlying basis of our valuation, which is an intuitive one, that we must prefer the good and prefer the beautiful, and that there is a near-relation of identity between the beautiful and the good.

A few clarificatory remarks are in order at this point concerning the concept of a near-relation of identity. I speak of a near-relation of identity between the beautiful and the good, and not

of a relation of identity between these concepts for the following reasons. If a relation of identity held between these concepts it would always be true that whatever is beautiful is simultaneously good. But it is possible to think of something beautiful that is not good, for example, caterpillars with poisonous spines. It is also possible to think of something good that is not beautiful, an example of which is a moral person with an ugly face. However, further considerations are in order about these examples. In the case of the caterpillar judged to be beautiful before knowledge was had of its poisonous spines one would feel compelled to withdraw the judgment that it was beautiful. In the case of the moralist judged to be ugly before knowledge was had of his goodness we would feel compelled to withdraw the judgment that he was ugly. In justifying this change in our opinion we might say that his person was to be found in his moral character and not really in his physical appearance. All of these peculiar judgments are to be explained by reference to the near relation of identity to which I now return in the context of the black self.

I have shown that there is a near-relation between the beautiful and the good. Conversely, there is a near-relation of identity between the ugly(the not-beautiful) and the bad(the not-good). What relates beauty to goodness is our preference for them both. What relates ugliness to badness is our rejection of both the ugly and the bad. Consequently, it is easily seen that an important factor in the near-relation of identity between the beautiful and the good is our preference for both of these notions and our rejection of their

negations. This near-relation of identity between beauty and goodness is strictly an intuitive one which contains the following notions which will be discussed more completely in the chapter entitled "Towards The Concept Of A Black Person";

1. The beautiful is the good.
2. Since the good things with which we are concerned pertain to actions, 'beauty is as beauty does': The black self is beautiful insofar as it does good things.

These preceeding notions underlie all attempts to create a black aesthetic and also underlie all efforts in black history to resurrect the African or black past. How then do these notions affect our final considerations about these approaches, the aesthetic and the historical, in their attempts to construct a viable concept of a black person?. How then is the question 'Is black beautiful?' to be construed, given that I am black?. In the light of the analysis of the near-relation of identity these answers are forthcoming. If black is not beautiful I must call myself not-good and reject myself. But if, on the other hand, black is beautiful, the black self is therefore good and I accept myself. But I showed earlier in the chapter entitled "The Black Aesthetic" that there cannot be a black aesthetic; consequently, I cannot know that black is beautiful. Therefore a concept of black personhood cannot rest on an aesthetic. I also showed the historical approach failed because it had as a consequence that the collective black self did not do certain things which can be termed moral; and the moral is the good. I can therefore base my concept of personhood, my sense of self-worth, neither on the aesthetic approach nor on the historical approach.

Chapter V. Towards The Concept Of A Black Person

(1) When I started the investigations into the aesthetic, one of my realizations which served as a clue for unearthing the fundamental concepts of the black aesthetic was the fact that any black aesthetic would have to be expressed in language if whatever purported to be an aesthetic were to be intelligible. I then discovered that the main concepts of the aesthetic itself would be influenced by the structure of language since all concepts, no matter what their origin might be, are not significantly knowable apart from language. The next step was then to proceed in the section entitled "The Linguistic Enquiry And Its Considerations" to discover precisely how the structure of language influenced the essential considerations necessary and prior to the construction of a black aesthetic. These elements of the structure of language needed for these enquiries were duality, negation, and metaphor. Some of the concepts essential to a black aesthetic were blackness, choice, the pleasant, and the good. These latter concepts that I have referred to as being fundamental to a black aesthetic were examined in the naturalistic and linguistic enquiries. Later, in the chapter entitled "Concluding Remarks On The Aesthetic And The Historical Approaches" it was shown that the fundamental conceptual concerns of the aesthetic were akin to those of the historical. These concluding remarks, particularly with reference to the historical, were made on the strength of the different techniques or conceptual methods employed in the naturalistic and linguistic enquiries. Since I am approaching the stage where the solution to the problem of the

black self must be put forward, something should be said concerning the limits of the purported solution. These limiting conditions on what one may say with plausibility constitute a criterion of meaning. Although it was not explicitly pointed out in the naturalistic and linguistic inquiries, a criterion of meaning was, in those places, being developed and put to use. The subject matter was the problem of the black aesthetic with its concept of blackness; and, what these two inquiries indicated were the ways in which the concept of blackness comes to have the valuations attributed to it. The criterion of meaning, in effect the naturalistic and linguistic inquiries, was not invented by me; instead, my contribution was to bring out the presuppositions at work in the mind of the ordinary person who reflects on the valuations pertinent to a black aesthetic. Since the arguments from nature, or the naturalistic considerations, are about nature-bound events, they can be referred to as empirical. Joined with the linguistic considerations, these two can be referred to as an empirical-linguistic criterion of meaning. For the present it suffices to state that the general argument from language and the general argument from nature constitute the conceptual or theoretical basis of the criterion. The general argument from nature, which can also be taken as a symbolic association, is as follows:

Consider all the things in nature that are pleasant, good or desirable. Whatever is beautiful is found to be pleasant, good, or desirable, or is found to be all of these. In nature there are abiding pairs of day and night, growth and decay, living and dying, cleansing and dirtying. In all of these pairs there is a remarkable consistency in which all the things that are not good, not pleasant, or not desirable are black.

The general argument from language is as follows:

Three of the elements essential to language are duality, negation, and metaphor. In a very important way language is about the world, otherwise it would be an opportunity

for fantasy alone. These three elements of language must therefore be illustrated or explained with reference to the world, and it is in the light of the ensuing linguistic considerations that the naturalistic findings are rendered intelligible.

(2) The criterion is applied to determine what is choice-worthy, pleasant, good, desirable, the nature of blackness, the significance of metaphor, the significance of duality, and the significance of negation. I mentioned earlier that the analytical proceedings in the naturalistic and the linguistic considerations employed a criterion of meaning that was not explicitly stated as being a criterion of meaning. This yet unstated or underlying criterion of meaning consisted of inter-relationships between facts about nature (the world), and a few mentioned linguistic structures. The purpose of this section is to illustrate this implicitly-used criterion of meaning while employing it in narrowing down the search for conditions of self-worth, which is one of the primary items in solving the problems of the black self. I now proceed to this task.

The initial part of this undertaking concerns the relationship between the arguments from nature and the arguments from language which consist of references to the structure of language. It is from the interplay of the arguments from nature with the arguments from language that the previously-mentioned criterion of meaning arises. The criterion of meaning is of only indirect interest here since these empirical and linguistic elements are not themselves presently under study. What is of direct interest here, however, is the interplay of these empirical and linguistic elements insofar as they shed light on the search for a solution to the problems of the black self. The empirical ele-

ments presented in the arguments from nature are the events, activities and actions that take place in nature; and these are the pairs of events such as living and dying, growth(in the sense of flourishing) and decay, night and day, and finally, cleansing and dirtying. The linguistic elements are the structures of language some of which have been identified as duality, negation and metaphor. By the interplay of the empirical and linguistic elements I mean the sort of procedure demonstrated in the chapters concerned with the naturalistic and linguistic enquiries and considerations. For example, the concept of blackness was discussed with reference to the activities in nature, and also with reference to the concept of duality and negation which constitute the concept of choice. I now make further recourse to the interplay between the empirical and linguistic elements to illustrate how they assigned meanings to certain important concepts.

(2a) The naturalistic considerations were undertaken for the sake of presenting some relatively unanalyzed concerns important to a black aesthetic. In these considerations some events, actions or activities in nature were scrutinized which were later examined by the aid of some elements that were presented as belonging to the structure of language. The events or activities in nature were presented as the pairs of living and dying, cleansing and dirtying, growth and decay, and finally, night and day. The elements presented as belonging to the structure of language were duality, negation, and metaphor. These two sets of empirical and linguistic elements were used extensively in discussing the concept of choice or preference. It was pointed out that while I must choose from each pair of the events in nature that are

pleasant, good or desirable, my activity of choosing takes place in the light of my understanding of the concept of choice whose structure is duality and negation; and it is the explication of the linguistic elements of duality, negation, and metaphor, that shows what constraints there are on the activity of choosing. Given the series of pairs of events in nature reflecting the linguistic structure of duality, for example night and day are dual states of nature reflecting the linguistic structure of duality, and given my understanding of the concept of choice or preference, my choice or preference of the parts of the dualities in nature is restricted in very significant ways. I must choose what is pleasant, good, or desirable, and I must choose in such a way as to advance my well-being. It should be understood that this is not meant in the sense of logical necessity; nor should the act of choosing be conceived in a deterministic way as in the dialectic standpoint, of the historical approach, where the person is conceived as not really having causal agency in his own actions. Rather, the act of choosing is to be understood as a report of the ordinary person's affirmations which form the core of his moral consciousness. It was shown in the naturalistic considerations that black occurs with those parts of the dual events in nature that are not good, not pleasant, and not desirable. Subsequently, it was pointed out in the linguistic considerations how it was that blackness comes to be a metaphor for all that is not pleasant, not good and not desirable. In effect, blackness is shown to be a metaphor for whatever is not choiceworthy and must be rejected. But

since my person, my physical self, is black I cannot choose myself and I must reject myself. Earlier, in the chapter on the beauty and actions of the black self, I pointed out that one of the real concerns of the aesthetic was with the question of self, with the worth of a self that is black. This fundamental concern which motivates the desire to create a black aesthetic is now seen to be of the utmost importance. The real and most important concern of the aesthetic can be summed up in the question 'Under what conditions can I, this black person, choose and not reject myself?'. Given the arguments from nature and the arguments from language the answers to the black aesthetic are: There are no such conditions. I cannot choose myself. I must always reject myself. I now illustrate the criterion of meaning as it was applied to the historical approach.

(2b) The historical approach, in its quest for establishing a concept of self-worth, takes as a basis the actions of the collective black self in history. On this account the actions of the collective black self sum up the worth of this self. But it was shown in the chapter on the historical approach that the series of how-questions indicated that the actions of the collective self were wanting. They were not good, and therefore are to be rejected. Since on this approach actions characterize the self and sum up the worth of this self, I must also reject the collective black self whose actions they are. These conclusions are stated differently, and more explicitly, from the standpoint of the linguistic considerations utilizing duality and negation (the structure of the concept of choice), and also using metaphor.

The actions or activities of the collective black self in history are either good or not good, pleasant or not pleasant, and finally desirable or not desirable. It was shown also that these actions have to be negatively considered; consequently, the collective black self cannot be chosen or identified with. The collective black self and its actions are therefore a metaphor for all that is implicit in not being choiceworthy, i.e. the negation of the good, the negation of the pleasant and the negation of the desirable.¹

Through the use of the criterion of meaning, the significance for the black self of the concepts of a black aesthetic and of black history has been disclosed. What follows in the next section is the further use of the criterion towards solving the problem of the black self.

(3) A Summary Guide For The Solution To The Problems Of The Black Self

The empirical-linguistic criterion of meaning was successively applied first to determine the issues underlying the aesthetic, and then in the later chapter on black history. It was the use of this criterion that uncovered the concerns of a black aesthetic, and finally showed the relationships between the aesthetic and the historical. I will shortly apply the criterion by using it to construct guidelines for a solution to the problem confronting both the aesthetic and the historical; and this is the problem of black personhood or black self-worth. Before proceeding to the solution I will summarize the method underlying the entire undertaking. This method should be of interest to methodologists in the social sciences.²

A criterion of meaning was formulated out of the naturalistic and the linguistic considerations which assigned valuations to the concept of blackness. It was through the employment of this criterion that the analyses of the aesthetic and the historical approaches were carried out to discover their common concerns. In effect, such an application of the criterion discovered what was sought, concerning the worth of the black self, in the aesthetic and historical approaches. Hence any solution to the problems of the black self must satisfy the needs of the aesthetic and the historical approaches. Let the solution be called the conception of black personhood. The test of this solution takes place in its utility and applicability. The aesthetic and the historical considerations, together with the naturalistic and linguistic findings, form an essential core for the scope of concerns pertaining to the black self; and it is this essential core to which the conception of black personhood must be applicable. The test of the conception of black personhood is therefore this: Find an independent problem having to do with the black self, such that when the criterion of meaning is applied to the problem to derive an interpretation for it, the conception of black personhood will provide answers to the problem. Using this summary guide, I now proceed to the next section to consider further aspects in the solution to the problems of the black self.

(4a) What has been demonstrated is that neither purported doctrine of a black aesthetic nor any black history can put forward the solution to the problems of the black self some of which were indicated by the questions in the chapter on the black self. Neither can both the aesthetic and the historical approaches jointly solve these problems. Yet the analyses which negatively evaluated these approaches

cannot all have been in vain since what these analyses have pointed out are the precise details of the problems that these approaches unsuccessfully tried to cope with. In addition the entire analysis has pointed out the needs of the two approaches that are separate and distinct from the problems of the black self that are acknowledged by the two approaches. Any solution to the problem of black personhood must therefore be presented in the light of a twofold task:

1. Solve the problems of the black self.
2. Meet the needs of the aesthetic and historical approaches.

I now proceed to the ways in which the solution to the problem of the black self can be achieved.

What the naturalistic considerations revealed about the aesthetic approach was that it places the self in an order of things consisting of activities in which nature exhibits itself. The linguistic considerations showed that such a location of the self reflected a motivation to make the self choiceworthy and metaphorically sound. The historical approach, on the other hand, attempts unsuccessfully to identify the self with its past actions and to make the self choiceworthy on the basis of these actions. The imperatives underlying these two approaches are therefore these: The imperative of the aesthetic approach is 'Let the black self be placed in nature as the locus of good activities in nature, i.e. blackness accompanies living and not dying, growth and not decay, etc. The imperative of the historical approach is 'Let the self be placed in history as the locus of actions that are the self's. Since imperatives are given for the sake of satisfying needs, the needs of the aesthetic and the historical can now be identified. In the light of its imperative, the need

of the aesthetic is that inasmuch as an aesthetic is concerned with beauty the black self attains self-worth when it is placed in an order of things in nature that are good and beautiful. Stated differently, the need of the aesthetic is that the beautiful person be the good person. The need of the historical is that self-worth be attained by fitting the black self in with certain actions of the African past.

The solution to the problem of the black self which lays down general guidelines for a criterion of self-worth is as follows.

(4b) The self must itself be part of an order of things in nature. The physicalistic, or bodily, black self is a thing in nature. The collective black self therefore constitutes an order of a system of nature. What a criterion of self-worth does is to prescribe these activities or actions for the self so that what results is the concept of a black self, and consequently a black person, that is chosen just in case the actions are such that they have moral worth.³

These guidelines to a criterion of self-worth are easily seen to satisfy the historical approach as well as the aesthetic approach. The aesthetic is satisfied in that the self is placed in nature, an order or system of nature made up of the collective black self whose activities or actions are prescribed by a criterion of self-worth. When the black self is reflected on and found to be acting in accordance with these prescribed rules, the apprehension of such a self will be pleasing and therefore beautiful in all the aspects revealed by the naturalistic and linguistic considerations. What this means then is that the beautiful self is the self that does good things, a self whose actions are good. The need of the histori-

cal approach is also satisfied in that these guidelines make the self the locus of actions to be specified by a later-to-be-given criterion of self-worth, which if complied with in the future will make it possible for any individual black self to look back into the past, which is the future of the collective black self, and find an empirical basis for its personhood.

Notes: Chapter V

1. It should be clear at this point, that while examples can be given of cultures that do not ascribe negative valuations to the concept of blackness, the analysis carried out here is not affected. The analysis here is concerned with the reality that it is a phenomenological problem for black individuals, and also a theoretical problem for those who are concerned with the problem of the black aesthetic, that the evaluations they know are those that include significantly negative ascriptions in the concept of blackness. In working with this problem, the concern is to reconstruct, as best as one could, how these negative ascriptions could have come about. It is not alleged in this analysis that the concept of blackness must necessarily be developed by all peoples in a negative light.

2. This methodological procedure can be stated in formal terms in the way that some methodologists are accustomed to discussing matters. Let the letter C be used to designate the expression 'criterion of meaning'. This criterion of meaning was developed to explain valuations attributed to certain items of concern to the black self. Two such items were the black aesthetic and black history. We can at this point, for use at a later stage, say that we have a criterion of meaning that was applied to A and H, where the letters A and H designate the aesthetic and the historical concerns of the black self: We can represent this in the methodologist's manner as C(A&H). Since the criterion of meaning was developed in terms of the naturalistic and linguistic considerations, we may follow the methodologist's example and more completely represent the criterion of meaning as C_{n1} . Furthermore, we can more completely represent the entire undertaking concerning the black self as $C_{n1}(A\&H)$. Since $C_{n1}(A\&H)$ represents the scope of the analysis concerning fundamental issues about the black self, we can say that C_{n1} provides an interpretive or meaningful basis for A and H, wherever aesthetic or historical issues have a bearing on a problem concerning an individual with a black self. Both the historical and the aesthetic issues need not figure in a given case. For example, in a psychologist's concern with the self-esteem or self-image of Blacks, $C_{n1}(A)$ alone may be relevant. How this works will be indicated in chapter XII. Given that $C_{n1}(A\&H)$ represents the core of items pertaining to the

problems of the black self, the solution to these problems must direct itself to $C_{nl}(A\&H)$. One way of testing the solution is this: Apply C_{nl} , in terms of A or H, to an independent problem of the black self to derive an interpretation of the problem; the problem must be independent in the sense of its not being specifically present in $C_{nl}(A\&H)$. Then apply the solution. If it is indeed a genuine solution, it will be applicable to the independent problem. After developing such a solution, I will show how the test works.

3. This connection between the self and morality is stressed by Kant, in The Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of Morals, and The Critique Of Practical Reason, where he discusses at length, in both texts, the problem of what it is that qualifies a person as having moral worth. For Kant, it is not merely the actions that qualify a person as having moral worth, but that it is the maxim underlying the actions that is the source of moral worth.

Other writers have also argued for a connection between the person and his actions, whereby some moral worth can in a way be attributed to the person. One such writer, Fritz Joachim Von Rintelen, not only acknowledges the connection but traces it back to Socrates. As Von Rintelen writes in his "Existence-Self-Transcendence" in G.E. Myers, ed., Self, Religion And Metaphysics, "Being a self thus obtains an ethical-personal sense".

Chapter VI. The Doctrine Of Transcendence

(1) Whatever doctrine is developed which provides guidelines for an individual to achieve his self-worth and realize his personhood, such a doctrine will consist of guidelines to conduct and will contain imperatives to which the individual is bound; and these will be moral imperatives for a black individual. These moral imperatives are specifically concerned about the black self and are necessary and sufficient conditions under which a black individual can be a person. But there is a very old and persistent belief which lingers on and appears to threaten the idea of any concept of black personhood. This belief belongs to what I will call the doctrine of transcendence. Briefly and tentatively, the doctrine of transcendence is to the effect that the black individual must transcend his blackness. Before I say more specifically or define adequately what the doctrine of transcendence is, I will first discuss its origin and development. The preceding chapters on the naturalistic and linguistic considerations about the concept of blackness have shown the conceptual difficulties of developing a concept of self-worth through a black aesthetic. Failing the development of a concept of its self-worth, the collective black self would be hard put to take actions to promote a self that was shown in the naturalistic and linguistic considerations to be never choiceworthy and therefore always to be rejected. It was therefore not surprising that the analysis of the historical approach confirmed that the collective black self reflected through its historical

actions the negative conception of the black self. In the face of all of these difficulties associated with the concept of the black self, black individuals think it a reasonable solution that there can be a principle of action alternative to the one contained in the conception of black personhood. This alternative principle of action would be one according to which the black self would not really be an important or relevant part of the black individual. Such an alternative conception in which the black self is de-emphasized or ignored completely is contained in the doctrine of transcendence.

The doctrine of transcendence offers a putative principle of action along certain lines which may be taken by an adherent of the transcendence doctrine or by someone skeptical of what has been given so far as a doctrine of black personhood. The following summary characterizes the line of approach that may be taken by an adherent of the doctrine of transcendence;¹

Whatever moral imperatives are derived from a yet-to-be-given conception of black personhood will be specifically concerned with my black self, my blackness. Such imperatives would be necessary and sufficient conditions for black personhood and would be offered as the sole conditions under which a black individual can be a person. But I want to be a person, not a black person. I must therefore transcend my blackness. I must transcend my black self. I therefore look to a doctrine offering imperatives or a principle of action under which I can be a person, a cosmopolitan, a universal man, a

universal person.

The preceding as I have outlined it is the doctrine of transcendence. In the next section I will consider some ways in which it has been hoped that this transcendence can be achieved.

(2a) This section arises because of the need to place in perspective the ideology of Marxism. A very strong argument that I will be faced with is the one that race or color did not play a part in the 'old world', meaning the world at the time of Egypt, Kush, Meroe, Ethiopia, and other African empires. The argument continues that the concept of race or color is very recent, and that the phenomena of racism and color distinctions follow capitalist exploitation. The conclusion of this argument which proceeds along Marxist lines is that if capitalism were replaced by Marxism, racism and its attendant evils would disappear.² The implicit thrust of the argument is that there really are no problems of the black self which pertain uniquely to it in the way that I have pointed out. The Marxist argument continues that what I have taken to be problems of the black self are to be solved not by some conception of black personhood, but by the implementation of Marxism as a way of life.

The Marxist argument provides what I will later show to be a mistaken basis for the first form of transcendence. In dealing with this form of transcendence I will need to show that Marxism provides a politico-socio-economic framework as a way of life, which the black individual may adhere to and still not be a person in the sense of the conception of black personhood.

My preliminary response to the Marxist argument is that the current understanding of the phenomenon of racism is an incorrect one which will be replaced by an adequate explanation in a subsequent chapter. I now proceed to discuss the Marxist argument.

Marxism is mainly a formula prescribing the distribution of material benefits based on a close study of the industrial countries of Western Europe. This formula merely says let there not be a gap between the rich and the poor. This pertains strictly to the material needs of food, clothing and shelter. After all this has been taken care of there still remains the problem of the black self which requires considerably more than the material needs of food, clothing, and shelter. For Marx, European or industrialized man is alienated from his labor because of an economic system.³ The black individual is also alienated from himself and this has nothing to do with the means of production or with the prevailing economic order. The Marxist thesis is quite right insofar as its subject matter, European man, is concerned. There are no obstacles to a European aesthetic. From the standpoint of black individuals the European self is so wholesome that the black self feels it must lose itself in the European self through intermarriage and cultural adaptation.⁴ As was indicated in the naturalistic and linguistic enquiries, the black individual is alienated from himself because of the perceived relations between the black self and nature. Even under a Marxist system I would still have to deal with the difficulties exposed by the enquiries into the black aesthetic and black history. In Marxist Russia Africans are not at home. There is on the other hand a

large emigration of Blacks to the capitalist countries in the world, and after we have there satisfied all the requirements of food, clothing and shelter, that we are to the greatest extent forced to come to grips with the agonizing problems of the black self.

My purpose in this section has not been that of discussing Marxism in depth, but merely to point out that the problem of the black self merits special considerations. One consideration is that some of the problems of the black self are unrelated to the economic and social ills that Marxism purports to remedy, so that even if these ills were remedied the problems of the black self would be left over. The point is that the facts about blackness and the black self, pointed out in the naturalistic and linguistic considerations, require separate study of a sort to be subsequently undertaken in later chapters of this text. I now proceed to the next section where I discuss another form of transcendence.

(2b) A self-searching black person does not seek an African religion for transcending his blackness for the obvious reasons that the goal of transcendence is to escape the black self and every vestige reminiscent of it. The religions that are candidates for transcendence are Islam and Christianity. On an obvious or superficial account religion calls for the worship of God, and it is not readily apparent how the individual can lose his black self in a sought-for relationship with God. The procedure or intelligible task in this sort of transcendence is therefore brought to light by an examination of what the person hopes to gain by losing his black self and also what he seeks in transcendence.

Religion tells the following story. The world of space and time as it is inhabited and known by persons is one from which they will depart after death and pass to a world beyond. The person dies, and that part of him that survives the transition to the other world is his soul, which is imperishable. Dependent on how the person conducts himself in the world of space and time inhabited by his physical person, his soul will accordingly be punished or rewarded in the world beyond in which the soul will exist eternally. There are two or more details to make the story complete. The first detail is that the person himself is not his body; he is his soul. The second detail is that there is a powerful being, quite unlike man, standing beyond the spatio-temporal world to whom persons are accountable in the world beyond where they are meted out rewards and punishment. This concludes the story of religion.

My purpose is not to consider the religious account for the sake of deciding its conceptual validity. Instead, my purpose is to discuss the significance of religion insofar as its consequences are pertinent to the person who wishes to avail himself of religion in order to transcend his blackness. I now proceed to discuss these aspects of religion. The significant aspects of religion relevant to the analysis of transcendence are as follows:

1. The soul
2. A world beyond
3. A supernatural being to whom the person is accountable in the world beyond.
4. The earthly conduct itself

In this story of the person, or the concept of a person, as told by religion, the person vanishes as a black person. He is not black; for he is not a physical person. His earthly body is just so much a perishable thing. He is really his soul. If he asks himself what rules he must prescribe to himself he finds his answers in the following principle of conduct: Act so that your actions are pleasing to God and that your soul will thereby be saved. But the significant aspects of the story of religion have yet to be told and discussed. These aspects are the soul, the world beyond, and a supernatural being who hands out rewards and punishments. The discussion concerning these aspects arises in answer to the question "How are things like a soul, a supernatural being, and a world beyond, to be understood?. What I mean is that none of these aspects of religion is tangible or is the bearer of sensual or empirical qualities. The religious story says that the person himself is the soul; but no amount of looking, feeling, hearing, etc., ever locates the soul. The same holds for the remaining aspects of religion. However, all of these religious aspects are understood or made intelligible even to an atheist. I now proceed to explain what is involved in understanding these aspects of religion.

Given the soul, God, and the world beyond, the religious account stipulates that none of them are in the world we know, which is the world of space and time. However, our understanding cannot find intelligible anything that is devoid of both spatial and temporal qualities. It would seem then that the concepts of a soul, God, and a world beyond, all of which are devoid of spatio-temporal qualities on the religious account, are doomed to unintelligibility. These concepts do

not suffer such a fate since the religious account makes use of predicates found in the world of space and time to make these concepts intelligible. These predicates of intelligibility are natural predicates or predicates of things occurring in nature. This understanding is achieved as follows. Concerning the soul, evil deeds or actions not pleasing to God can only dirty or blacken the soul. The task of the person in his earthly existence is then to free himself of sin(undesirable actions) until the soul is cleansed and made as white as snow. The other predicates in nature applicable to the soul are the predicates of being dirty or being clean. The argument from language, which is to the effect that metaphor is essential for language, stipulates that the dirty state of the soul be understood with reference to what naturally occurs in nature blackly, and that the cleansing of the soul be understood with reference to what in nature depicts the cleansing process, namely the state of going from black to white. The question as to how the supernatural being and the world beyond are to be understood with reference to predicates in nature is answered by noting that the religious account portrays God as good and the world beyond as pleasant and desirable. It was shown in the chapter on the black aesthetic that the things in nature that are pleasant or desirable, or both, are never black. Consequently, in virtue of the same argument, the argument from nature, both God and the world beyond are ascribed the full range of predicates that are non-black.

There is one more aspect in the religious account to be discussed; and this concerns the actions themselves which are required of

the person if his soul is to be welcomed in the world beyond. His actions must be pleasing to God and this entails that his actions must be pleasant, but more importantly his actions should be good or desirable. Only by this means can God choose his soul for salvation rather than for damnation. In short, all of the aspects of the religious account that have been analyzed reveal the following features. The basic concepts of religion are explained upon sensible predicates occurring in nature. The sensible predicates in nature most resorted to are the colors black and white, and the functions of dirtying and cleansing. Finally, the person's actions determine if he will be chosen by God, and he is chosen if his actions are good, pleasing to God, or desirable. But when all of the person's actions are grouped together religion resorts to the function of metaphor to characterize the actions that are chosen and are not chosen. The suitable metaphor for an action that is not chosen, not desirable or not pleasant is always blackness.

What the analysis thus far has revealed is the situation in which the candidate for transcendence places himself when he undertakes to transcend his blackness through religion. Specifically the following dilemma the candidate faces is this: The soul, the supernatural being, the person's actions, and the world beyond, are found to be desirable, good and pleasant just in case they are not black. But the person seeking transcendence through religion is himself black. The attempt to transcend himself in religion thereby brings him face to face with himself and he experiences an abiding feeling of self-disgust.⁵ But if

the individual hates himself, then no matter how many good deeds he does to other persons there is always one person, which is his own person, to whom the individual's actions are never pleasing to God. Consequently his soul is blemished and the hope for the world beyond fades. The transcendence that is sought through religion is therefore never achieved.⁶

(3) I have already outlined briefly and tentatively what I have called the doctrine of transcendence. Subsequently, I pointed out two ways in which the individual cannot successfully achieve transcendence. In fairness to the adherents of the doctrine I must point out that these two failed instances cannot refute the doctrine of transcendence since it is possible that there are more than two ways in which an individual may wish to achieve transcendence. At this point I will therefore point out more sophisticated ways of thinking which exhaust the ways in which a hypothetical adherent of the transcendence doctrine may claim the possibility of transcendence. In what follows the transcendentalist states his position;

1. How and why is blackness prescriptive of rules of conduct?.

That I am black is irrelevant. I wish to be a person.

Black personhood is therefore irrelevant as a prescriptive basis of conduct in terms of rights and duties. National status, for example, prescribes rules of conduct for me. And there are other additional concepts on the basis of which specific rights and duties are prescribed for me.

I am not black primarily. I am a person; and this is the basis of the prescriptivity of all my actions, rights,

and duties. The guidelines for my actions, or imperatives for my actions, are therefore as follows;

- (a) I am human or I am a person; therefore I am equal.
- (b) I am human or I am a person; therefore I have rights.
- (c) I am human or I am a person; therefore I have equal rights.

The preceeding summary which I call the wider scope of the doctrine of transcendence may be coupled with the earlier version of transcendence expressed in religion or the ideology of Marxism to make up the complete doctrine of transcendence. In the light of this coupling, all transcendence doctrines, or all variants of the basic transcendence doctrine, are seen to express the following belief: Black though I may be from head to toe I am fundamentally an individual for whom blackness plays no part. My blackness is irrelevant. I am a person who is a Christian, Moslem, holder of an ideology such as Marxism, holder of a certain national status etc.

In discussing this wider scope of the doctrine of transcendence I will put forward a novel conception which allows for a thorough appraisal of these claims. These claims of the wider transcendence doctrine can be interpreted as rejective of a yet-to-be-given conception of black personhood which is intended to produce, among other things, a complete list of rights and duties binding on individuals who are black. The conception of black personhood will therefore have to explain such things as how and why it is that blackness is uniquely prescriptive of rights and duties. In the next chapter I will present a model in which concepts basic to the doctrine of transcendence can be assessed. This model will also make room for the concept of black personhood.

1. I must stress that there is no text of the sort entitled The Doctrine Of Transcendence in the sense of transcendence relevant for the purposes of this enquiry. Neither is there any thinker who openly passes himself off as an adherent of the doctrine of transcendence. My contention is that there are books whose contents show an acceptance of what I call the doctrine of transcendence, and also that there are persons whose views and attitudes show their adherence to the doctrine of transcendence. My purpose is not to gainsay the contribution of important thinkers to the solution of problems of problems of the Black self. Therefore the following remarks are not to be taken as downgrading their efforts. Nonetheless, a critical review of their works, properly the subject of another textual undertaking, would be in order. My intention is merely to place their work in a new light, and to indicate how it is that these thinkers can truthfully be said to be adherents of the doctrine of transcendence. Some of these thinkers are DuBois, Garvey, Blyden, Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, and Fanon.

2. In his Rebellion Or Revolution Harold Cruse rejects, on grounds different from mine, the applicability of Marxism to the Black problem in North America. Surprisingly, however, he retains the Marxist terminology and explanation in conceiving the struggle as being 'that of the Negro against American capitalism'. His analysis is wrong inasmuch as it can be easily shown that with American capitalism removed, the problems of the black self will still remain.

Another thinker, Joseph Ki-zerbo, in his "African Personality And The New African Society", pg. 277, dismisses Marxism as being irrelevant to Africa or to Africans. He argues on pg. 281 for the 'recapturing, the restoration of the African past'. He continues that "...the greatest asset to be saved, in my opinion, is the functionalism of African personalism". I have already dealt with his remarks that are of a piece with those concerned about recapturing

the African past. His remarks on 'the functionalism of African personalism do not belong strictly to the method of the historical thesis, but to the more important issue of the concept of a person to be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

3. Karl Marx, "Estranged Labor", in The Economic And Philosophic Manuscripts Of 1844, ed. D.J. Struik, (International Publishers Inc., N. Y. 1964), pp. 106-120

4. Among authors who hold that the Black self must lose itself in the European self, biologically and culturally, are Leopold Senghor and Frantz Fanon.

5. The analysis pertaining to the black self of African origin can also be extended to the black self in India, specifically to the Dravidian peoples. These people had their own variation of the doctrine of transcendence which called for complete freedom or liberation from the phenomenal or earthly world. Their variation on the doctrine of transcendence is unique, however, in that while theirs is a religious transcendence which calls for the future life beyond the phenomenal world, they reject the entire phenomenal world as well as their bodily selves and thereby their R-I-B identity. Their chief deity, Chrishna, whom they portray as black, summarizes, in his physical person, both the essence of the phenomenal world from which they are estranged, and the example of one who has escaped from the self and the world. The question of how it is that the Black self in India is estranged from the world and from itself is answered by chapter 3, "The Aesthetic Approach To The Problems Of The Black Self".

6. While reading this section on religious transcendence, the reader cannot help being struck by the presence of the difficulties surrounding the Black aesthetic which lurk behind the search for religious transcendence. As a matter of fact these difficulties that were pointed out in the discussion of the Black aesthetic are

in large part responsible for the movement of the Black individual toward all forms of transcendence. The inquiries into the aesthetic pointed out the problems of the Black individual toward the Black self, and transcendence is a means of escape from the Black self.

Chapter VII. The Concept Of A Person

(1) Given the previously asked questions pertaining to the relation between persons and rights, correct and adequate answers are forthcoming just in case the concept 'person' is properly understood.¹ I propose the following model upon which the concept of a person is explicable. Later on I will show how, by the use of the model, further questions about persons and their rights can be appropriately answered. Before I proceed to construct the model for understanding the concept of a person I will make a preliminary sketch of some matters pertinent to the model.²

A claim frequently advanced by many people is that they wish not to be a black person but to be a person, a universal person. This claim to be a universal person will in another chapter be discussed for its full meaning, but I will briefly consider a dismissive way in which the claim should not be taken: All the things that are known to exist are things in the universe. A universal man, on this interpretation, is a man in the universe. The wish to be a universal man is therefore empty since the wisher has already been granted what he yearns for.³ This sense of being universal does not distinguish persons from objects; since, what the interpretation amounts to is the trivial claim that if any kind of entity is a member of the universe then it is a universal entity. On the other hand, the wish to be a universal person pertains to an idealized conception of personhood free of elements such as ethnicity, race, gender, nationality, etc.. Objects and persons do share the trivially common factor of being universal since they are members of the universe. In a sense this innocuous interpretation of the term 'universal' is significant since persons

are like objects in that they can be handled, weighed, seen, and dealt with in ways objects are dealt with. But in an important way persons are not like objects. The claim or the wish to be a universal person, on another interpretation, does not merely amount to being a member of the universe, but instead implies a distinction among types of persons, or implies a distinctive or special way of being a person.⁴ The subsequent model and the accompanying discussion offer the comprehensive senses or interpretations of being a person.

(2) The schematic derivation of the person-model is as follows.

Persons or individuals can be seen in these ways:

I: As an individual entity

S: As having membership in a specific or determinate biological class

R: As a rational or cognitive entity

The preceding schema can also be rendered as"

I-individuals

S-individuals

R-individuals


Inverting the schema for the sake of convenience yields the following:

R: As a rational or cognitive entity

S: As a biological entity spontaneously occurring in nature, the various forms being piscatorial, primate(in the case of humans), plantlike, etc.

I: As an individual entity, this is the being with a sense of 'I' who is in some way spatio-temporally located.

I(The individual uttering 'I' has twin aspects for self-identification)



Since the S and I entities share a B-feature, a designation for their being biological or organic entities, the individuals that result are:

R-individuals

SB individuals

IB individuals

From the preceding levels we get the corresponding senses of the concept of a person:

R-persons

SB persons

IB persons

The explanation for this schema now follows:

1. R-persons are individuals who are rational or cognitive.
2. SB persons are those individuals sharing a specifically biological form which may be that of primates, plants, birds, etc.. Each of these specific forms constitutes a form of life and can be said to demarcate SB individuals.
3. An IB individual is any numerically distinct I-individual with a B, biological, feature.

An example of an IB individual from the human SB sphere is a Black or an Oriental. The three items R, SB and IB, indicate different ways of being a person. If we can speak of these IB individuals as having phenomenological

systems or conceptions, we can consider the ways of being a person as variant states of an IB individual. These ways of being are different contexts in which the IB individual can conceive of himself in activities of prescribing courses of action to himself and to others. These courses of action can be conceived as rights; and the necessary condition for these individuals prescribing courses of action, that can be seen as rights, is that these IB individuals are rational or cognitive. These rights in their corresponding person-contexts are therefore:

R-rights

SB rights

IB rights

SB rights are those that an IB individual may demand on the basis of what he needs for biological survival, given the particular SB form he has. But another category of rights is required. A collectivity of IB individuals having diverse SB forms may find themselves in the position of determining the kinds of moral considerations that bind them. Here the consideration underlying their moral legislation would have to be free of their particular SB forms which force their own peculiar rights. The universal law binding them would still, however, have to be constructed in view of a single feature that unites all of these individuals. Such a feature would be the B-feature, which pertains to the universal conditions governing their biological or organic makeup which they all would have. The resulting conception would be a set of universal laws, in the ethical or moral sense, for these IB individuals. This is the U-level or the 'U' set of rights. What is significant about this level is that apart from the B-feature which unites IB individuals of varying SB form, is the shared conception of rationality or cognitivity which ties individuals together in the

reciprocal actions they prescribe. The levels, or contexts of rights, that result are therefore as follows:

R-rights

U-Rights

S-rights

I-rights

The corresponding persons that result, who share these rights and have a B-feature, are therefore:

R-persons

UB persons

SB persons

IB persons

Since the feature 'R', rationality and cognitivity, is also a shared one, the description of corresponding persons and rights that results is therefore as follows:

R-persons

RUB persons

RSB persons

RIB persons

Given the form of life of an RSB collective, The RIB individuals will carry out those functions necessary for the perpetuation of that form of life. For example, if an RSB group reproduces itself through the twin gender traits of maleness and femaleness, the males and females would be contingent individuals. In the case of the human RSB group that needs food, clothing and shelter, the individuals that carry out tasks to provide these necessities would be contingent individuals. But a wider number of contingent individuals arises beyond those needed for the form of life. Depending on the phenom-

ological expressions of the RIB individuals of a given RSB sphere, their way of life, culture or civilization, will create contingent individuals as needed. In the case of a way of life that does not allow the eating of meat, butchers will not be needed. Other individuals such as policemen, basketball players and college professors, are contingent persons.

This has been a schematic derivation of the person-model whose contents will subsequently be given full clarification. The complete person-model now follows.

(3) The Person-Model

R-persons: Rational or cognitive beings

R-U-B persons: Rational beings which are organic or biological entities

R-S-B persons: Rationally and specifically biological persons; e.g. spider-person or human-person, exclusive sense of 'or'

R-I-B persons: Rational and individual biological persons-
This is the individual that says 'I' and means a set of physicalistic traits of its bodily mass as well as his phenomenological life.

Contingent Persons: These are individuals who fill occupations necessary to a form of life or to a way of life.

I now proceed to explain the person model.

(3a) One important fact which serves to distinguish persons from objects is that objects are not rational, are not cognitive, and do not think. This way of separating persons from objects in no way implies that this is all that characterizes persons. What it states is

that the functions of being cognitive, or rational, constitute a necessary but not a sufficient condition for my being a person. It would therefore make sense to characterize a being, or a thing, as not being a person insofar as its behavior was not cognitive, not rational, or not thinking. The R-level therefore includes non-organic or non-biological entities that may be cognitive. I do not mean computers and robots as we know them, but perhaps their metaphorical descendants in the sense that the human species is a descendant of primate precursors with negligible cognitivity; but more on this later.

Thus far the R-level persons have been distinguished as being cognitive or rational. From now on I will use the terms cognitive and rational interchangeably. By virtue of being cognitive, R-persons can, among other things, prescribe courses of action to themselves whether these actions be of an intellectual nature or involve physical activity.⁵ Prescribing actions for oneself becomes meaningful or significant just in case the prescriptions have an end or purpose in view. The concepts of right, wrong, correct and incorrect, therefore enter into the behavior of R-persons since the end or purpose for which one prescribes actions to oneself can be thought of as successful just in case the prescriptions are right or correct. R-level persons can use the concepts of right and wrong, and also the concepts of what is correct or incorrect, in the following two distinct ways. An illustration of the first way follows. Given a task of the sort "Prescribe a rule for addition whereby the sum of $x+y = z$ (e.g. $4+10 = 14$)", an R-person understands that the rule he prescribes for himself in completing the task must not be idiosyncratic, but must be the sort whereby any R-person

would achieve the same result. The R-person therefore understands that the rule of action he prescribes for himself is a rule he can prescribe for others. This is the non-moral use of the concepts of right and wrong.

An illustration of the second way, in which R-level persons understand the use of the concept 'right', follows. Faced with the question, "Can you whimsically end the life of another R-level person?", the R-level person understands that such a rule cannot be right or correct. The R-person understands that his cognitivity, whose purpose it is to prescribe action, would be subverted; since, all R-persons could then kill each other and no further prescribing of actions, which is the purpose of cognitivity, would result. In other words, the R-person understands that he can prescribe a rule to himself or to others just in case the rule does not violate cognitivity.⁶ This use of the concepts 'right' and 'correct' is a moral one. Further illustrations of the second way in which R-persons understand the use of the term 'cognitive' will follow in the course of further explanations of the person-model. Later on I will refer to the second use of the term 'right' as an essential condition for moral action. The explanation of R-type persons, or persons on the R-level, is at this point adequate. What follows is a clarification of some conceptual matters.

(3a1) The cognitivity of R-persons, who have been presented as rational or cognitive, has been exhibited in their two kinds of behavior where they prescribe morally and also non-morally. I will refer to these two kinds of behavior as non-moral prescriptivity and moral prescriptivity. Since R-persons can prescribe rules for themselves, in either sense of prescriptivity, it is clear that they can also be autonomous, but more

about this later. One of the conditions in the person-model is that if R-persons are morally or non-morally prescriptive, then they are cognitive or rational. This means that cognitivity or rationality is a necessary condition for being prescriptive, either morally or non-morally. Cognitivity or rationality could not provide sufficient conditions for either sort of prescriptivity since it is logically possible for some quirk to occur which prevents the R-person from being prescriptive. Our ordinary moral experience tells us that the persons we hold as morally blameworthy, and possibly punishable if they are still alive, are the ones that are cognitive and rational. We have such experiences in the cases of colonial aggressors and the perpetrators of the Nazi holocaust. The victims of these atrocities, and other people with a moral conscience, would readily make sense of these facts: These R-individuals, in this case colonial aggressors and Nazis, were rational and cognitive. They were not moral. They were responsible for what they did, and were punishable. Hence it does not follow that since an R-individual is cognitive or rational, that he is morally prescriptive. In summary of what has been said, it is therefore true that:

1. If an individual is morally prescriptive or non-morally prescriptive, then he is cognitive and rational.
2. If an individual is non-morally prescriptive, then he is cognitive and rational.
3. If an individual is morally prescriptive, then he is cognitive and rational.
4. If an individual is morally and non-morally prescriptive, then he is cognitive and rational.

I will now point out and examine some consequences that follow from this.

5. If an individual is cognitive and rational, then he is morally and non-morally prescriptive.

Sentence '5' is false. This is the earlier discussed case of colonial aggressors and Nazi perpetrators of the holocaust. They were cognitive and rational, were also non-morally prescriptive, but certainly not morally prescriptive.

6. If an individual is cognitive and rational, then he is morally prescriptive.

Sentence '6' is false since there are individuals, already pointed out, who may be cognitive and rational yet not morally prescriptive.

7. If an individual is cognitive and rational, then he is non-morally prescriptive.

Sentence '7' is false since as was pointed out earlier, it is possible for some quirk to occur which prevents the R-individual from prescribing.

8. If an individual is cognitive and rational, then he is non-morally prescriptive or he is morally prescriptive.

Sentence '8' is false. As pointed out earlier, an individual can be cognitive and rational, but through some quirk, he might never be morally or non-morally prescriptive. A Buddhist monk, for example, might claim rationally that his goal is to reach an ineffable state where he does neither sort of prescribing.

9. If an individual is autonomous, then he is morally prescriptive.

Sentence '9' is false; since, our ordinary moral experience tells us of autonomous individuals, colonial aggressors and Nazi perpetrators of the holocaust, who were not moral, or did not prescribe morally.

10. If an individual is autonomous, then he is non-morally prescriptive.

Sentence '10' is true. As was pointed out earlier in the discussion on

R-individuals, non-moral prescriptivity is a necessary feature of the rule-governed activities that R-individuals enunciate for activities pertaining to their conduct. Since, at the barest minimum, autonomy is the prescribing of rules for oneself, it is therefore required as a necessary condition that the autonomous individual be non-morally prescriptive. We therefore have as true:

11. If an individual is morally prescriptive, then he is non-morally prescriptive.

But not

12. If an individual is non-morally prescriptive, then he is morally prescriptive.

Sentence '12' is clearly false, being none other than the case of the Nazi or the colonial aggressor.

From '9' and '10', we derive '13' which is clearly seen to be false:

13. If an individual is autonomous, then he is non-morally prescriptive and morally prescriptive.
14. If an individual is autonomous, then he is non-morally prescriptive or morally prescriptive.

From considerations of '9' and '10', sentence '14' is seen to be obviously true; since, while it may not hold that the individual is morally prescriptive in '14', it follows from the truth of '10' that he is non-morally prescriptive if autonomous. I'll now proceed to discuss R-U-B persons.

(3b) R-U-B persons are rational and universally biological; These are all the rational and organic(biological) persons in the universe. R-U-B-type persons share the cognitivity of R-persons and consequently share with them the consequences of cognitivity relevant to

this enquiry. However, R-U-B persons differ from R-type persons in that while R-type persons include non-organic entities, resembling computers or robots, that cannot logically be excluded from being cognitive or rational, R-U-B persons are all biological or organic entities occurring naturally anywhere in the universe.⁷ It should be clear that I am not attributing cognitivity to actual computers and robots as we know them. Rather, I am considering a logical possibility which would permit a non-organic entity to be cognitive. Therefore all R-persons, excluding possibly cognitive entities that are non-organic, are R-U-B individuals. As was pointed out in the schematic derivation of the person-model, the R-U-B level pertains to the relationships that biological entities may devise for themselves in virtue of shared cognitive or rational abilities. Further remarks on R-U-B persons will follow subsequently in general discussions on the person-model. Prior to this, some considerations are in order for expanding the concept of a person.

(3b1) The accepted application of the concept of a person has traditionally been applied only to a small part of the universe, namely to the planet earth. The term 'person' has been used to refer only to human beings. The result has been that since the concepts person and human are used interchangeably, people come to believe incorrectly that only humans are persons. I propose an extended use of the term 'person' whose legitimacy is based on the forthcoming analyses of the concept of a person. This analysis now follows.

It has been traditionally accepted that humans are persons and that no other biological entities on the earth or other parts of the universe are persons. But contrary to what is commonly accepted, the biological form of a human being, that he is a primate who is two-legged

and two-handed...etc., provide no indication why we call ourselves persons. For chimpanzees resemble us closely and they are not called persons. Confronted with the yearly stories of a man brought up by wolves, monkeys etc., we do not call him a person and this is because he does not exhibit the desirable features of our behavior made possible by cognitivity. Instead we call him a wolf-man or a monkey child. We also apply the concept 'person' to humans who live in different cultures and subsequently manifest different behavior patterns; but, this is only because we identify the features of cognitivity, e.g. the use of the concepts of right and wrong, underlying their different social and cultural behaviors. In other words, beneath the relativity or variation of human cultures we identify a fixed and unchanging set of the features of cognitivity that were pointed out in R-type persons in the two ways of prescribing behavior. What this analysis shows is that the concept 'person', in the sense of the R-U-B level, is correctly applied just in case the candidate for the status is an R-type person and a biological entity occurring naturally in the universe. According to the person-model, human persons are therefore R-U-B persons. A legitimate extension of the concept 'person' implied by the analysis now follows.

In the light of the model and the analysis in this section, the R-U-B-level of persons can be constructed free of bias from the perspective of the earth, a tiny part of the universe. One of the benefits of this extension of the concept of a person is that serious discussions can be made of such claims as the following:

(a) I want to be a universal person, not a black person.⁸

(b) I want to transcend my blackness. I want to be a universal person, not a black person.

R-U-B individuals are naturally occurring individuals who may have bodily

forms differing from that of humans.⁹ Those primates that are R-level members are called humans. Further discussions of this level of persons will follow later.

(3c) R-S-B-individuals are rational and specifically biological persons. On this level the concept of a person denotes a particular R-U-B kind of R-U-B persons occurring in nature. By a particular R-U-B person I mean human persons or spider persons, but not both. The difference between the R-S-B level and the R-U-B level is as follows. On the R-U-B level all the persons in the universe of the person model are considered collectively, and these are human persons, spider persons etc. In the R-S-B-level only one sort of persons is considered; A spider person or a human person but not both. One use of the distinction between these two levels is that there is a sense in which rights and duties of all the sorts of persons in the person-model differ significantly from the rights and duties of one sort of these persons considered in isolation from the remaining sorts of persons. A greater detailing of the purpose of the distinction between the R-U-B-level and the R-S-B-level will be shown in subsequent explanations. I now proceed to the R-I-B level of persons.

(3d) R-I-B persons are rational and individually biological persons. The R-I-B level is significantly different from all of the preceeding levels. This level considers the sense in which any person on any of the preceeding levels of the model refers to himself as 'I' or uses the term 'I'. This is the sense of personal identity on a collective scale which separates individuals who belong to one sort of R-S-B persons. The person on the R-I-B level who uses 'I' is, for example, either a spider person or a human person. R-I-B persons who use the

expression 'we' are either spider persons or human persons, but not both. When R-I-B persons say 'we' they mean 'we spider persons who are in a collective way identifyingly different from other spider-persons'. I will consider further how R-I-B persons use the terms 'I' and 'we' by comparing their usages when they utter the terms 'I' and 'we' in an R-S-B sense while still being R-I-B persons. When an R-I-B human-person uses 'I' in an R-S-B sense he means that he is a member of the human species. When a spider-person uses 'I' in an R-S-B sense he means that he is a member of an arachnoid-like species. There are two senses in which R-I-B individuals use the expression 'we'. Two or more spider-persons may use the expression 'we' and mean that they are members of an arachnoid-like species. Two or more human-persons may use the term 'we' to mean that they are members of the human species. Two or more persons who are spider persons and human persons may jointly or collectively use the term 'we' to mean only that they are R-U-B persons or R-persons. A group of individuals with different R-S-B identities cannot assert the term 'we' with a view to determining rights and duties on the R-S-B level. The use of the term 'we' by individuals of differing R-I-B identities, with a view to determining rights and duties on the R-S-B level, can be done successfully only if the individuals of differing R-I-B identities are members of one R-S-B sort of persons. These remarks on rights and duties will be expanded in a later section.

But the uses of 'I' and 'we' in an R-I-B sense by R-I-P persons differ significantly from all other uses. Prior to further discussion of these uses, I will give a further explanation and illustration of R-I-B persons.

(3e) Reading off from the preliminary sketch of the person-model, an R-I-P individual has membership on all levels of the person-model. An R-I-B individual is a person who is rational, is an organism naturally occurring in the universe, and most importantly is an individual who has a sense of self. I will explain more fully in due course what I mean by a sense of self, but a tentative definition is that a sense of self is a sense possessed by a person of his R-I-B identity. Further indications of this sense of self possessed by an R-I-B person are shown by the way in which an R-I-B person identifies himself. In a very important way, which will not be pursued here, self-identification and having a sense of self(a sense of oneself) are inter-related. A reading of the person-model shows that an R-I-B person identifies himself by virtue of physicalistic and phenomenological facts about himself. I now proceed to explain what these facts are, and how they constitute a sense of self or are involved in the self-identification of an R-I-B person.

An example of an R-I-B person is precisely the kind of person, the black person, described in the chapter entitled 'The Black Self'. The physicalistic facts about the R-I-B person are the facts or characteristics of his body about which he becomes aware in visual and tactile inspections of himself. In the case of this R-I-B person those facts are black skin and facial characteristics that upon inspection he finds are absent in other kinds of R-I-B persons. In effect these are the physical attributes of the black self. When I use the expression 'I' to refer to myself I do indicate implicitly, if not explicitly, the physical or physicalistic facts about my body. But when I think

of myself or tell another of myself I do more than refer to the physicalistic characteristics of myself; I think of my physicalistic blackness in a certain way. This certain way of thinking about myself is a phenomenological account of myself. The phenomenological facts about myself are those concerns that lead me to ask questions such as 'Is black beautiful?', 'What is the worth of a black person?'. In effect, phenomenological facts about blackness are those facts about the concerns that arise from having black skin. Phenomenological facts are the concerns about blackness that lead to the need for the creation of a black aesthetic, to an understanding of the obstacles to a black aesthetic, to establish the worth of the black person by resurrecting black history, and among other things, to escape from the black self through transcendence. At this point, a sense of self in terms of an R-I-B identity can be defined as the collective identity shared by individuals. This collective identity is made up of the phenomenological and physicalistic facts¹⁰ of the individual's bodily form, facts which distinguish and uniquely identify him; and this is a shared personal identity belonging not only to a group of individuals but also possessed by each individual in the group. It will be shown in subsequent analysis that the yearning to transcend one's blackness is a denial of the existence of R-I-B persons. Once this denial is made, all other levels in the person-model are asserted as ways of being a person. Subsequent analysis in the light of the person-model will show the full conceptual implications contained in the concept of a person.

Thus far I have sketched different types or sorts of persons and distinguished them as being on distinct levels of the person-

model. I have have also stated ways, such as being cognitive and being biological entities, in which these kinds of persons may be similar. I wish in the next level of persons to consider another way in which these different persons are similar, and this is the level of being contingent persons.

(4) Given the different kinds of R-I-B individuals permitted by the person-model, the ways in which they organize themselves can be said to be forms of life. There are many forms of life but there are only two concepts of a form of life, an R-S-B form of life and an R-I-B form of life. One concept of a form of life refers to the conditions which are necessary for the physical survival of the members of the person-model. These conditions may also be thought of as being compatible with whatever is required for the physical continuation of these persons under natural circumstances. This concept of a form of life is concerned about the biological facts of whatever person-type or person-sort is being considered. It is therefore clear that this concept belongs to the R-S-B level of the person-model where groups of R-S-B individuals are demarcated by differing bodily forms. One important aspect of the concept of an R-S-B form of life is that bodily form forces a form of life specific to itself. For example, among R-S-B-individuals who are spider-persons, restful conditions will require web-like features or suspension-type settings. The significantly different anatomical features of spider-persons and human-persons require these different accommodations. The need for rest is only one of the many aspects required for a form of life, and even though all R-S-B-members by virtue of being organisms may have common biological needs such as food, clothing, rest and shelter, the differences in

their anatomies require different ways in which these basic can be fulfilled. In discussing the basic need for rest among humans I pointed out that this aspect of a form of life can be satisfied in various ways such as beds, couches, floor mats and hammocks. Each of these ways allowed by the form of life is a variation on a given R-S-B form of life. In satisfying other aspects of their form of life, the R-S-B individuals will have a range of choices among the variations permitted by the form of life. Consequently, individuals sharing a common R-S-B identity can potentially organize themselves into distinct societies demarcated by the overall choice of variations permitted by their R-S-B form of life. Another example of an aspect of a form of life is the need for communication which among human R-S-B-individuals is reflected in different languages which at the same time serves effectively to demarcate their societies. This discussion suffices for the needs of this chapter. Further explication of the concept of an R-S-B form of life will follow in a later chapter. An important part of what has been pointed out is that an R-S-B form of life pertains only to those societal structures that make the physical existence of R-S-B individuals possible given their anatomical or biological needs.

There is another concept pertaining to the existence of individuals in the person-model which has to do not with their biological or physical well-being, but pertains instead to their moral well-being. This other concept is needed since by virtue of being cognitive, members of the person-model will have the ability to reflect on their conduct and finally to form opinions of themselves indicating wither self-respect or contempt. This concept applies to the R-I-B level of the person-model where individuals have a sense of self or a sense of 'I'.¹¹

The kind of consideration relevant to the individuals on this level has to do with what kinds of structural or moral features are necessary in his society if an R-I-B individual is to have an 'approving' concept of himself or a sense of self-worth. This other concept that contains these R-I-B-related structural and moral features is the concept of an R-I-B form of life. It will be shown in subsequent analysis that the structural and moral features required for an R-I-B form of life will be dictated by the R-I-B identity of the individuals making up the society. As a result, even though different types of R-I-B individuals may belong to a common R-S-B group, their societies and ways of life will all be further demarcated by the set of features making up their R-I-B forms of life. This further demarcation along R-I-B lines will occur because, as will be shown later, a single R-S-B society cannot comprehend all the needs of individuals having different R-I-B identities.

Whether the way of life is specified by the concept of an R-S-B form of life or by the concept of an R-I-B way of life, the members of the person-model will require certain institutions and occupations to maintain their way of life. Those persons needed or qualified to fill the institutions or occupations are contingent persons.

(5) What has occurred in the person-model is that all of the individuals are qualified by the prefix 'R', which indicates a trait of rationality or cognitivity. What is disturbing to an individual having biological or organic form, and who is also rational, is that individuals of non-organic or non-biological form, such as sophisticated computers and robots, are credited with rationality and are included in the person-model. The

significance of this inclusion is that it is possible that the concerned R-I-B individual might find himself on the R-level with these R-individuals in a situation where reciprocal rights and duties are discussed. True it is, the R-I-B individual agrees, the R-individual may receive messages, type letters, and perform sophisticated tasks which are mentally beyond most R-I-B individuals. But, he continues, this R-individual who in various ways mimics his behavior is not moral and is therefore not rational. In response to this concern, two issues should be dealt with. One issue is about the concept of rationality, and the other is the sense in which R-persons should be taken.

The issue of morality is a very complicated one, and to make it a necessary condition for one's being rational only leaves us bogged down in the discussions of morality. On the other hand, it is more fruitful to make rationality a necessary condition for morality. It is clear that if an individual were not cognitive there would be no point in discussing the moral worth of his actions. The Latin roots of these conceptions, rationality and cognitivity, inform us accordingly: 'Cognosco', from which 'cognitive' is derived, indicates learning, perceiving(in the sense of having insight), and knowing. 'Ratio', from which 'rational' is derived, indicates having reason, the ability to plan, to construct methods, and the ability to give an account(of an event). It might still be argued that rationality, in the sense that Kant might have meant in his concept of a rational being, has a wider domain than cognitivity. But it is clear from the closeness of these concepts that whatever meaning is given to the concept of a rational being, with regard to its morality, certainly includes its being cognitive. In the indisputable sense of 'rational' that is synonymous with 'cognitive', rationality would have to be a necessary condition for morality.

The issue now arises as to how R-persons should be taken, concerning their inclusion in the person-model and consequently having moral interaction with other R-I-B individuals. Suppose a time, millennia ago, when the precursors of the human R-S-B sphere walked the earth. Suppose also that at that time some R-I-B individuals from a distant galaxy, with an R-S-B identity unlike that of Homo Sapiens, were surveying the planet Earth with a view to determine whether the precursors of the human R-S-B sphere should be included in the person-model. What would have been puzzling to these visitors would not only be the rudimentary form of the intelligence of our ancestors, but also the bodily form of their R-S-B sphere. These visitors would reason that later generations of, for example, Homo Afarensis, an R-S-B group that anthropologists currently believe to have lived in East Africa, might very well attain a significant level of cognitive development. How the rational behavior of their descendants, R-S-B Homo Sapiens, would be expressed, would be revealed in their form of life, ways of life, and the phenomenological expressions of the human R-I-B individuals.

The concern of R-I-B individuals with R-individuals, such as sophisticated computers and robots, can be understood by analogy with the concern of the hypothetical intergalactic travellers. Individuals having the strange and unfamiliar bodily form common to Homo Afarensis and Homo Sapiens, can certainly be included in the person-model as R-U-B individuals, on the basis of their attainment of cognitive abilities; and, it will be understood that they constitute an R-S-B sphere distinct from that of the intergalactic visitors. For the metaphorical descendants of computers and robots exhibiting a yet to be determined level of cognitive behavior, their inclusion in the R-level cannot be denied. But since they are not biological entities, they will never be included as R-U-B, R-S-B, or R-I-B individuals.

(6) General Observations On The Person-Model

(6a) Some general observations on the model are in order, which which even though they do not amount to a summary, provide a basis for further insight into the model.

The person-model is presented essentially as a framework within which one can answer questions about persons and their rights.¹² Since rights are secured with a view to successful action, rights imply duties which are actions that are recommended or prescribed; and the person-model also provides a basis for discussing duties as will be later shown. The model exhausts all applications of the concept of a person by discussing the concept not only in terms of human beings who occupy a small portion of the universe, but also in terms of any rational being who may not have human form. This wider perspective frees the discussion from the distortions that occur when confinement of the concept 'person' is applied only to humans. The utility of the wider perspective will become clear in a later chapter where the analysis of persons, rights, and duties, takes place. The result is that the form of the person is sifted out and the concept of a right is examined neutrally. Having made distinct the complete application of the concepts 'persons' and 'rights', the model then allows a full discussion concerning the rights of determinate kinds of persons, especially R-I-B individuals.

(6b) According to the model, the universe consists essentially of R-I-B persons who may for different purposes, either by force or by mutual consent, form any single society or a multiplicity of societies. Similar R-I-B self-identifications constitute different spheres of R-I-B persons. Given the model there is therefore a multiplicity of R-I-B persons belonging to mutually exclusive R-I-B spheres in the sense that no R-I-B individual belongs to more than one R-I-B sphere.¹³

A sphere of R-I-B persons has uniquely to it a sphere of rights and duties; Hence the rights of another R-I-B sphere cannot be known by looking at the rights of another R-I-B sphere. A unique sphere of R-I-B rights and duties is determined by physicalistic and phenomenological facts of the R-I-B individual. The R-S-B level does not blanket-wise donate R-S-B rights to R-I-B-persons who are members of the R-S-B-level. The R-S-B level allows a mention of rights only in the way of comparing or contrasting different R-S-B groups.¹⁴ A unique sphere of R-I-B rights and duties is determined by a complex analysis made up, on the one hand, of an empathic understanding of physicalistic and phenomenological facts pertaining to the R-I-B identity of the individual, and on the other hand of an objective understanding of R-I-B persons in the light of the person-model. A subsequent section is devoted to the derivation of a unique sphere of rights and duties of R-I-B individuals who are black humans.

(7) But a very important general question arises at this time concerning R-I-B rights. Given that there are various and mutually exclusive R-I-B spheres of rights, and that the spheres of rights cannot be manufactured a priori, could not the rights of one R-I-B sphere mean the infringement of the rights of another R-I-B sphere? In other words, what limits or constraints are there on an R-I-B sphere of rights?. The question is an important one requiring lengthy analysis which will be given in a later chapter. Tentatively, however, the answer is that the person-model contains restrictions which make the assertion of a right intelligible; Given what has been said about R-I-B individuals, they must be autonomous if they are to create their different ways of life. The phenomenological expressions, with which their

way of life is interwoven, have as a referent the physicalistic aspect of their R-I-B identity. Their autonomy, or their freedom to create laws of legal, moral, and aesthetic considerations which they make for themselves, always has the physicalistic aspect of their R-I-B identity as a referent. This kind of activity is always future-directed toward the physicalistic aspect of their R-I-B identity. Since it is the well-being of the physicalistic self for which these phenomenological aspects shows up in the relationship of the R-I-B individual toward his physicalistic self. These three principles, autonomy, self-continuation, and self-respect, are therefore necessary for the attainment of personhood.

The use to which these three rules are to be put raises some issues, but not all of them will be resolved at this point. It could be raised, questioningly, that these three rules of personhood require a transition from the R-S-B level to the R-I-B level. The rule of self-respect understandably leads to the individual's R-I-B identity; since at all times the self he has is the physicalistic aspect of his R-I-B identity. However, it is not immediately clear why self-continuation has to refer to the individual's R-I-B identity. Could not the individual seek to continue his R-S-B identity? The answer to this question should be pursued. Being the determinate person that he is, as one of many other R-I-B individuals in his R-S-B sphere, many of whom have different R-I-B identities, the R-I-B individual could agree with others to dissolve their diverse R-I-B identities to create a single R-I-B identity. This can be achieved by normal biological means of mating, or it could be achieved through genetic engineering. Whatever course is chosen, the result would be that the ensuing R-I-B identity, in its physicalistic aspect certainly, would be the sole representative of the R-S-B sphere. It should not be thought, however, that the R-I-B identity will have disappeared. These new

R-I-B individuals will still have the duty, or concern, of creating phenomenological expressions appropriate to their physicalistic self; and thus it is that the R-I-B identity remains as the referent for self-continuation.

This question concerning the R-I-B identity being the locus for self-continuation can be generalized even further. Could not individuals of different R-S-B identities agree to dissolve the disparate physicalistic aspects of their R-S-B identities in the ways previously suggested?. The answer is that they could do so; and a single R-S-B identity would result with the ensuing individuals all having a single R-I-B identity. The new physicalistic self remains, however, and the individuals create phenomenological expressions appropriate to the new physicalistic self. Once more the R-I-B identity is generated, and the physicalistic aspect of that R-I-B identity remains as the referent for self-continuation. What remains to be dealt with is the reason for the individual's continuing himself.

The moral or legal conceptions that R-I-B individuals enact for themselves will not be done haphazardly, but will be created within the boundaries of rationality or cognitivity, the R-trait; and it is this feature that implies their autonomy. It is clear that rationality or cognitivity by itself has no content, and only embodies rules common to all R-individuals. The imperative is therefore binding on all R-I-B individuals to be autonomous. Since the R-I-B individual achieves personhood when he is autonomous, or is free to create moral, legal, and aesthetic considerations pertinent to his R-I-B identity, the imperative therefore binds him to respect his R-I-B identity for which he makes laws. The effects of his lawmaking may or may not be achieved in his lifetime. But in either case he takes upon himself the duty to accomplish these effects, either through his own physicalistic self, or through offspring having his R-I-B identity. The imperative is

therefore binding on him to continue himself. In summation, the rules of personhood binding on all R-I-B individuals are three:

1. The imperative of autonomy: Be autonomous.
2. The imperative of self-respect: Respect the R-I-B identity in you.
3. The imperative of self-continuation: Continue the R-I-B identity in you.

These three imperatives making up the conception of R-I-B personhood indicate an important fact about individuals with R-I-B identities: Inasmuch as the autonomy of the R-I-B individual is always in keeping with the self-continuation and the self-respect of his R-I-B identity, the R-I-B identity is something for which actions are undertaken and is therefore an end. Individuals having a common R-I-B identity constitute an R-I-B sphere, and following upon what was said about the R-I-B identity being an end, individuals of different R-I-B spheres are seen to have different ends.

Further discussions on these imperatives are forthcoming in the next section, and also in the chapter on black personhood.

(8a) The R-I-B sphere has been presented as definable or understandable upon the physicalistic and phenomenological characteristics of individuals. In the case of Black individuals, the physicalistic characteristics are those physiognomic traits that set them off collectively from other persons. Their phenomenological aspects have been understood as those concerns pointed out in the sections on Black history and the Black aesthetic. More precisely, given the set of phenomenological expressions in the Black R-I-B sphere, such as music, aesthetic, ethical and moral valuations, poetry, literature, etc., what will be centrally woven into those phenomenological expressions will be the concerns of Black history and the Black aesthetic. Since no other spheres of R-I-B individuals have a black self, these two concerns make for the uniqueness of the Black R-I-B sphere. In the most general sense, the phenomenological life of a people, be they Blacks, Whites, Orientals, etc., can be seen as the unique ways that a people collectively express their inner lives. In the case of Whites, the phenomenological life is understood in the phrase "Western Civilization" which includes such things as their music, language, theatre, literature, aesthetic preferences, historical traditions and their conceptions of morals and values. All these items enumerated are probably to be found in the phenomenological lives of Blacks, Orientals, North American Indians, and other peoples, each of which can be seen as distinct R-I-B spheres. The forms of phenomenological expression found in Western Civilization do not, and could not, have the same expression as the forms for phenomenological expression in Blacks. The result is that these forms of expression in Western civilization form a way of life readily distinguishable from those of Black people, and of other peoples, before they were colonized by the West. It is this readily distinguishable set of phenomenological expressions

of Western civilization, coupled with the equally distinguishable physical appearance, that sets the White individual off as an R-I-B individual, and the collection of White individuals as an R-I-B sphere.

The Black individual lives in post colonial or post slavery conditions fortified by the militarism and cultural dominance of Western civilization. The following issue therefore arises. The case could realistically be posited of a large number of Black individuals who know no forms of phenomenological expression except those of Western civilization. If this form of phenomenological expression, supposedly unique to the R-I-B sphere of White individuals, could be learned by Black individuals, the question arises as to what connections there could be between the individual and the concept of an R-I-B identity, in its physicalistic aspect, with respect to the phenomenological life. The answer is that there is more than an accidental or contingent connection between R-I-B individuals and the phenomenological life they develop; since, this connection lies in the fact that individuals build up their phenomenological lives around themselves and for themselves. As a consequence, the symbol systems in the various phenomenological expressions of Western civilization have developed the concept of whiteness and blackness in ways that accomodate the White individual. On the other hand , as pointed out in the Black aesthetic, the symbol-systems of whiteness and blackness cannot possibly enhance the personhood of the Black individual insofar as his physical person is identifiably black. In short, the symbol-systems of Western civilization, as can be seen in the case of language, literary enjoyment and appreciation etc., are based fundamentally on the understanding that blackness is a symbol for those things that are morally beyond the pale of Western civilization. For

the Black individual, the symbol-systems of blackness and whiteness exclude him from the sphere of White individuals: This is a consequence of the inquiry into the Black aesthetic. The phenomenological expressions of Western civilization were not, however, originally developed with a view to exclude Blacks; rather, they were developed solely out of consideration for Whites. The phenomenological expressions of an R-I-B sphere are to be understood as its own path to personhood. I will show later on that R-I-B spheres are neither eliminable nor are the phenomenological expressions that inhere in them interchangeable across R-I-B spheres.

The self that the individual has is a physicalistic mass to which the aesthetic valuations in his phenomenological system refer. He realizes that valuations in the symbol-system were not built up specifically for the numerically distinct physical self that he has, and this holds for all R-I-B individuals no matter the R-I-B sphere. In the case of a White individual, he realizes that the aesthetic valuations in his language refer to all other individuals having a White physicalistic self. His phenomenological system does not include individuals having a physicalistic mass identifiable as Chinese, Black, or Iranian. This sense of personal identity had by the White person is therefore shared by all others having a White physicalistic self. This is simply a sense made possible by the set of valuations and preferences in the phenomenological system of Western civilization. This sense of personal identity is therefore a shared one, a collective identity, and this is the R-I-B identity. The R-I-B identity is therefore primary, basic and uneliminable. It is into this phenomenological system that the individual is born and learns anything. This is his route to personhood, and for this personhood to be achieved the phenomenological system must not be at variance with the physicalistic aspect of his R-I-B

identity, but must complement it. A phenomenological system which has as fundamental principles, the preference for whiteness and the negativity of blackness, is one that cannot possibly be a path to personhood for a Black individual. Later on I will show that individuals who are not permitted to have a phenomenological system pertinent to their R-I-B identity, or who by force or choice, have a phenomenological system pertinent to individuals of another R-I-B sphere, are not pursuing a path to personhood.

(8t) Given the criteria for an R-I-B sphere, the question about how many R-I-B spheres there are is taxonomical. It cannot be determined a priori how many R-I-B spheres there are, but only by empirical study. A further question arises as to the limitation on R-I-B-types to prevent their endless proliferation. This question is understandable. While it does not ask for R-I-B-apartheid, in the sense of restricting the benefits of the concept of an R-I-B existence to a single R-I-B sphere, it seeks criteria that will prevent the confusion that will result from the arbitrary designation of the R-I-B title. Stated differently, the question is concerned about the possibility that the present criteria for R-I-B spheres permit anyone to be an R-I-B individual, and for any group to be an R-I-B group. By way of a counter-example, the suggestion is put forward that a group of basketball players has a distinct R-I-B identity and thereby constitute a unique R-I-B sphere. More seriously, the counter-example is put forward that women are an R-I-B group. In the case of the basketball players, it is said that they have a similarity of height, which satisfies the physicalistic criterion of R-I-B personhood, and that they possess the distinguishing trait of being in a certain relation to the game of basketball, a characteristic which supposedly satisfies the phenomenological criterion of R-I-B personhood. This counter-

example shows a seriously erroneous application of the criteria for R-I-B personhood. The criterion for the physicalistic aspect requires that the R-S-B individuals have physical traits which set them off collectively from other members of their own R-S-B sphere. This cannot be true of basketball players since other R-S-B individuals possess the features of extreme height, athletic ability, and still are not basketball players. As was pointed in the person-model, individuals who carry out functions that are structural aspects of the form of life of the R-S-B sphere to which they belong, are contingent persons. Individuals of whatever R-I-B identity, who are basketball players, are fulfilling an aspect of the R-S-B form of life, recreation,

in the form of competition, that a particular R-I-B sphere has determined from its own standpoint of phenomenological reference, the expression that the human R-S-B form of life should take. The basketball player is a contingent individual since this cultural activity he carries out is not necessarily a form of recreation that would characterize all R-I-B spheres. Basketball players are therefore, regardless of their R-I-B identities, contingent individuals, as are policemen, dentists, firemen, etc.. In the case of women, it could be said that they have physicalistic traits that men as a group do not have. In addition, given their further biological differences from men, such as childbearing, their sense of identity includes items that are never the experiential data of consciousness for a male. Their phenomenological life, it is argued, and understandably so, differs significantly from that of men. It could then be believed that the sense of unique personhood, shared only by women, gives them a collective identity that demarcates them as individuals constituting their own R-I-B sphere.

Here again the previous analysis is employed. Women, as well as men, are simply R-I-B individuals carrying out, in a sexual or gender-different way, those reproductive functions necessary for perpetuating the human R-S-B sphere. This element of gender difference cannot characterize or demarcate an R-I-B sphere since this twin-gender route is a peculiarity exhibited by the entire human R-S-B group, and is not necessarily to be exhibited by other sorts of R-S-B groups which may not have this gender route for their perpetuation. Men and women in the human R-S-B group are therefore not constitutive of separate R-I-B groups, but are contingent persons carrying out functions necessary to their R-S-B form of life. What is left over as a significant issue, however, is the fact that in any given R-I-B sphere of humans, regardless of the unique phenomenological expressions in the given R-I-B group, its general phenomenological expressions must take into account the traits of gender-difference, since it is true in all cases that it is some gender-specific R-I-B individual who is involved in the web of phenomenological expressions. There is no virtue in becoming involved with the epistemological question as to the causal connection between the gender-differing individuals and their phenomenological expressions: This is the issue of whether the gender differences with their attendant unique experiential routes cause the phenomenological expressions that result, or whether the phenomenological expressions cause the different experiential routes had by the gender-different individuals of an R-I-B sphere. What is fruitful for discussion, however, is that a particular gender trait constitutes significantly the physicalistic mass of the R-I-B individual. Necessarily coupled with the phenomenological expressions belonging to the collective identity of the R-I-B sphere to which the individual belongs ,

will be the particular sense of personal identity influenced by his gender trait. Since the individual, as he could only and always know himself, is through the route given by the phenomenological expressions of his R-I-B sphere, the issues of gender identity will always be relative to the R-I-B sphere to which the individual belongs. One consequence of this, to be dealt with subsequently, is that there can be no doctrine of women's rights in a universal sense.

Lest the frugality of the concept of an R-I-B identity and of an R-I-B sphere be bemoaned, some further discussions are necessary to show that these are rich and comprehensive concepts. What demarcates R-I-B spheres is the twin set of physiognomic and phenomenological traits that are unique to each sphere. Apart from these two, no R-I-B group has a monopoly on traits that qualify it for membership in its R-S-B sphere, for instance the human one; since, if a given R-I-B individual lacked the qualifying trait he, or she, would not qualify for membership in a particular R-S-B sphere. In the human R-S-B sphere these are traits of being bipedal, having a gender identity, mathematical ability, musical ability, etc.. The gender traits are really to be seen on the same order as other biological traits that are available to an R-S-B group to ensure its survival. Thus sexuality is as important as cognitive skills or digestive skills. In one case some individuals are the bearers of military talent or mathematical talent. In another case some individuals are the bearers of the reproductive ability. Some are the bearers of what we term the trait of maleness. Others are the bearers of the traits of femaleness. The interpretation of the gender traits will take the form that is consonant with the phenomenological expression of the R-I-B sphere; consequently, masculinity and femininity will

vary across R-I-B spheres.

At this point a seeming conflict arises. The person-model permits R-I-B individuals who belong to different R-I-B spheres to organize themselves, for various purposes and reasons, across their different R-I-B spheres. In a related case, the interesting phenomenon occurs in Western civilization, among White women, to form movements that press for women's rights. They do not confine themselves to their own R-I-B sphere, but insist on including Black women, Iranian women, and all other women regardless of their R-I-B membership. In so organizing themselves, these women are on the R-S-B level, and can promulgate and claim all the R-S-B rights claimed by men. But these would not be women's rights anymore than they would be men's rights. These would simply be R-S-B rights. The claim for women's rights is still a coherent one. However, what it means to be a woman is not to be discovered in terms of white feminists with their hegemonistic tradition of forcing the values of their own R-I-B sphere, that of Western civilization, on other R-I-B spheres.

In Western civilization commerce is seen as a male activity. For Western women the question of male dominance and the oppression of the female is instanced by the exclusion of women from this activity. In short, the concept of femininity, or the concept of a woman, in Western civilization rules out female individuals from participation in roles of commercial activity. It should also be noted that Blacks, regardless of their identity, have been excluded significantly from these roles in White societies. The somewhat similar sorts of exclusions do not, however, automatically mean that this is not an example of a legitimate case for women's rights. Nonetheless, these are exclusions for different reasons. In the case of White women, the

issue is one in which R-I-B individuals complain that they are disqualified from having certain rights because of their being gender contingent persons. White men who have the right to carry on commerce are also gender-contingent individuals. Unless it is shown how the characteristic of gender has a relevant bearing on the right to carry on commerce, neither gender-contingent individual, male or female, should be denied the right to commerce. While no causal connection is being made here, it can safely be asserted that the rights allocated to white women are those that are compatible with the entire set of phenomenological expressions held by the R-I-B group of Western civilization. The case of Blacks being excluded from commerce, however, is one in which they as a different R-I-B group are clearly perceived to have ends which are fundamentally incompatible with those of the White R-I-B group, ends which can be furthered only if they have the material base provided by commerce. One such end would be to create a phenomenological system, sometimes referred to loosely as the Black aesthetic, which would provide a path to personhood for the Black R-I-B sphere. Counterproductive actions to impede this development has historically been the policy of the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. But even if such a policy were suddenly changed, the adoption of such a course by the Black R-I-B sphere would still not only be not an end for the White R-I-B sphere, but would be incompatible with its own ends. The development of such a phenomenological system in which a Black aesthetic would be developed, automatically carries valuations for blackness and whiteness that would lead to the negative evaluation and rejection of the White self. The sum of these results would be the destabilization of the conditions of control, which the Western R-I-B sphere maintains over the

Black R-I-B sphere, by allowing to Blacks a phenomenological system designed for the R-I-B individual of Western civilization, which is either irrelevant to Blacks or degrades and denies their personhood. The concerns of the White feminists and the concerns of Blacks are therefore quite different ones. The problems of Blacks exemplify the divergence or conflicts of ends among different R-I-B spheres. The questions of White feminists point to the issue of gender differences within an R-I-B sphere. Within an R-I-B sphere the ends of individuals with different gender identities could be incompatible, but not fundamentally so. The reason is that no matter the gender trait of individuals having the same R-I-B identity, they share the uneliminable physicalistic self which they wish to be complemented in their symbol systems. In more than the biological sense, a woman is really an expression of the gender trait of femaleness along the phenomenological lines of the R-I-B sphere to which she belongs. Women's rights, or the rights due a human R-I-B individual in virtue of its having a certain gender trait, are therefore knowable and confirmable only within an R-I-B sphere.

(8c) Prior to proceeding to further questions about persons and rights, a few more remarks about persons are in order. The concept of person is so interpreted in the person-model, that the individual's sense of himself derives from both his bodily mass and the thoughts pertaining to the phenomenological expressions, for which the bodily mass is the focal point. The individual's sense of personal identity is not so understood that he bases his identity upon the thoughts or feelings he discovers in isolation. Rather, the person-model requires an interpretation for personal identity that acknowledges the thoughts or feelings, so encountered by the introspective individual, to be derived from the collective society of R-I-B

individuals like himself, in the midst of whom he is born and develops an interior life. The reason the collective entity must be R-I-B individuals, and not R-S-B or R-U-B, is that no matter how the societal collection of individuals is made up, either by a single R-I-B identity or by a plurality of R-I-B identities, the dominant phenomenological mode of expression will have to be that of a determinate R-I-B identity which may or may not have borrowings from the phenomenological lives of one or more distinct R-I-B spheres. The reason for having phenomenological expressions is not hard to fathom since it reflects the common human experience to have an inner life of myth, tradition, literary expression etc.. Thus, the person model requires the introspective individual to refer his own thoughts, feelings etc. to the R-I-B-originating phenomenological expression. The phenomenological expression gives its own peculiar way of interpreting or seeing the world. For example, a dog barks in the presence of a native speaker of Chinese and in the presence of a native speaker of a language of Western civilization, possibly English. To the native speaker of English, the sound of the barking dog will be interpreted and regarded as 'bow-wow', but to the Chinese person it occurs as 'Ching An Lang'. Orientals, and White individuals from and among whom Western civilization originated, constitute two different spheres of R-I-B individuals. Within the language-groups of Western civilization, there can be enough variations on the phenomenological expression that the sound of the barking dog can be reported differently. Despite this variation and other possible ones, however, the phenomenological expression in Western civilization has an overall quality or nature which certainly distinguishes it from an Oriental expression. Thus an informed observer can easily identify a variant phenomenological expression, a culture,

as Western and which cannot be confused as being Oriental. In the conditions of the person-model, therefore, an individual is a person or attains personhood when he has a phenomenological expression that his societal collection of fellow R-I-B members have developed, or would have developed, in reconciling the physicalistic mass of their R-I-B identity with their collection of myth, social traditions and history. This concern of the person-model with R-I-B individuals and their personhood, leads to what some individuals may take to be a counter-intuitive use of the concept of person. The intuition that such an individual might voice is that the person-model leads to the fact that some people or individuals might not be persons. This matter requires careful consideration. A bit more is in order about R-I-B identities. White individuals within the fabric of Western civilization constitute a single R-I-B identity. Counter-examples about Southern Italians or Spaniards in Europe who have physiognomies and phenomenological expressions differing significantly from White individuals generally, who are acknowledged to be the originators and bearers of Western civilization, is not in order. In other words, the objection is to the effect that different nations or nation-states might constitute different R-I-B identities. But the historical facts are clear as the champions of Western civilization often point out: Africa begins at the Pyrenees, a large mountain range in Southern Europe. This claim refers to the fact of an African presence in Southern Europe, a Moorish presence in Southern Spain, and an Arabic one in Southern Italy. The people in these parts of Europe constitute R-I-B identities different from the R-I-B identity of the White individuals of Western civilization. The description of the R-I-B identities in the South of Europe is a taxonomic and empirical question not to be carried out here. Suffice to say that

Southern Italians, chiefly Scicilians, and Southern Spaniards differ significantly from Europeans generally in their physiognomic traits. What their phenomenological expressions are, or should be, is the matter of an empirically based study.

What is also to be kept in mind is that an R-I-B identity, or sphere, is not to be divided by national or geographic boundaries. The people in the Soviet Union who are referred to as the racial, not necessarily ethnic, minorities belong to R-I-B identities that are distinct from the R-I-B identities of those persons referred to as White Russians who have created the boundaries of the Soviet Union through military force. It should not therefore be thought that the geographic boundaries of the Soviet Union demarcate a single R-I-B sphere. Thus the governing populations of Europe, North America, South Africa, Rhodesia, Australia, and some countries in South America, and New Zealand, have a single R-I-B identity and consequently belong to a single R-I-B sphere sharing the phenomenological expressions of Western civilization. As Wasserstrom points out in his "Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination", a Black person in the United States of America is defined legally as anyone having a drop of Black blood in his veins through parental linkage, as opposed to blood transfusion.¹⁵ This definition holds true not only for the White R-I-B individuals in North America, but also for the remainder in Europe, South Africa, Australia etc.. With regard to the physicalistic aspect there could not be a stricter sense of an R-I-B identity. Paradoxically, the concept of an R-I-B identity governs the theoretical and practical concerns of the R-I-B individuals comprising Western civilization, and is most practised by them; however, the extension of the R-I-B concept to explicate the moral condition of individuals not belonging to the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization, is objected to by philosophers in the R-I-B sphere of Western

civilization. It is in these quarters that the objection arises as to how it could come about that there are people who are not persons. The fact that there could be people who are not persons is not an idle consequence of the person-model. This fact arises in the case of Native Americans, sometimes called Indians, in North America, and of Blacks in North America. It arises in the cases of the R-I-B identities of the Soviet Union, of South Africa, and of New Zealand. In all the cases mentioned here, the single R-I-B identity that denies the personhoods of a plurality of R-I-B identities is that of the White R-I-B identity. That this has occurred is the single most important event in history. This is not, however, the exercise of pointing an accusing finger at White oppression. What is at stake here is forcing the philosopher, regardless of his R-I-B identity and allegiance, to consider seriously the question that people of non-White R-I-B identities are not permitted to develop a phenomenological expression appropriate to their R-I-B identities, are not permitted to follow the three general rules of R-I-B personhood, and are consequently not permitted to follow the paths to personhood which the White R-I-B collective reserves for itself. Incidentally, the non-White R-I-B identities do not comprise a single R-I-B sphere. Rather, the expression 'non-White R-I-B identities' is used to refer to the distinct R-I-B spheres in the Soviet Union, Australia, North America and Africa, about whom it will shortly be explained why it is that they are people who are not persons. This consequence of the person-model will be explained by reference to some examples of R-I-B spheres; These are Blacks, Iranians, Jews, and Native Americans. Briefly, those concepts of the person model that may be brought to bear on the examples will be the concepts of R-U-B persons, R-S-B persons, R-I-B persons, contingent persons, the imperatives of R-I-B personhood consisting of autonomy, self-continuation and self-

respect. These sketches are not designed to explicate these concepts since this is done elsewhere. Rather, my intention to to give flesh and blood to the plurality of R-I-B identities in the person-model. It should be understood that only the individuals with the corresponding identities can give thorough and complete descriptions of their R-I-B identities in the physicalistic and phenomenological aspects.

(8d1) The R-I-B identity of Iranians consists, in the physicalistic sense, of their general bodily traits that distinguish them from Chinese, Blacks, and Whites; and, in the phenomenological sense, of the language, customs, history, ethics and mores that they have developed over the past five thousand years. Incidentally, nothing in the person-model requires that the Iranians be a single nation, since in the case of Whites they are a single R-I-B entity that has devolved into several nations. The reason an R-I-B group tends to be identified by a nation or by a national boundary is that this sort of structure allows it to carry out rules of autonomy, so that it can be relatively undisturbed in being self-respecting and self-continuing. In this case, matters are greatly simplified since there is only one R-I-B self as the end for moral or legal legislation.

In what are undisputed historical facts, the Western nations engineered themselves into the position of securing the petroleum resources of Iran to suit the needs that they, as an R-I-B group, have evolved as their ends.in technological and economic ways. To ensure that Iranians would become means, the policy of Westernization was put into effect to permit the various forms of Iranian phenomenological expression to be replaced by the forms of Western civilization. Westernization could mean no more than that the Iranian collective self would divest itself of the phenomenological forms which it had evolved for the various needs of its

physicalistic self, and to take up the phenomenological forms of an alien R-I-B group. The metaphorical comparison would be to take a fish out of the salt water in which it had evolved and become adapted, and then place it in fresh water. The fish might hardly survive. The Iranian people would find themselves with a set of values having no relation to their historical experiences, and with aesthetic preferences having no relation to their physiognomies. There would then be a loss of self-respect since there would be no way of reconciling the physicalistic Iranian self with the new phenomenological expressions that would at times either mock that self or at best be irrelevant to it. The best example of the loss of personhood is the Shah who urges Westernization. His wife is not Iranian, and she has a physicalistic self belonging to the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. The Shah's unspoken message is clear. He says: I do not respect the Iranian physicalistic self, and do not wish to continue it. I wish for my R-I-B sphere to end itself, and to achieve the personhood of the White R-I-B sphere in its physicalistic and phenomenological aspects. This route to personhood is elsewhere in this work shown to be unattainable. But while the Western R-I-B sphere maintains its own puppet regime in Iran, the autonomy of the Iranian people is suspended; since, the end of their legislation or general lawmaking is not for the sake of their own R-I-B self but for the sake of the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. The unanimous arising of the Iranians to set things right cannot be seen on a par with the American revolution, in which individuals belonging to the same R-I-B group and sharing the same phenomenological expressions, made a pragmatic choice for a sort of political system. What the path to personhood for the Iranian R-I-B sphere will be is not to be decided apriori, but by individuals of an Iranian R-I-B identity having intimate knowledge

of Iranian phenomenological expressions.

(8d2) The case of Native Americans in the United States of America demonstrates an R-I-B identity for whom all the requirements of personhood are denied. Their case is quite similar to that of the Blacks in Australia. Two of the imperatives for personhood are those of self-continuation and autonomy. Not even the greatest distortion of history will deny that the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization deprived the Native American of the right to autonomy; since, its policy was to deprive the native Americans of their land, and to herd into barren tracts those who missed extermination by being too feeble to resist their humiliation.¹⁶ From then on, none of the actions of Native Americans could take place without the supervision of White R-I-B individuals. The physicalistic self of the Native American R-I-B identity lives like the decimated remnants of a herd of wildlife kept in a limited clearing. To this day the stuffed and mummified Native American can be found adorning doorways of antique shops like the stuffed tiger that adorns the living room of a hunter. The Native American individual could have no respect for the physicalistic Native American R-I-B identity, either in its individual or collective form. Another R-I-B group has decreed that it will never be allowed to pursue a path to personhood. If the Native American individual were to take up the phenomenological expressions of the White R-I-B entity in North America, to secure for itself a proxy path to personhood, it can have a symbolic system that prides itself on the denial of personhood to an R-I-B individual having the physicalistic identity of the Native American. By himself the Native American cannot achieve personhood. Another R-I-B sphere has decided: Your land is now mine.

I will allocate to you those parcels of it that are of no present value to me. If any resources of value to me are found on your land, I will decide on their exchange value. In short, you will always be under the jurisdiction of my laws. I will never be under yours.

If the Native American wishes to transcend his own R-I-B identity through intermarriage, he wills the non-continuation of his own R-I-B identity. In any case his own R-I-B identity must end. It does not require an empirical investigation for one to have a sense of despair that is the Native Americans'. The net result of the analysis permissible within the person-model is that Native Americans, or Black Australians, or any people in a plight similar to theirs cannot be persons.¹⁷ But there is disagreement with these findings which leads to an objection. The point of departure for such an objection is that the R-I-B individuals of Western civilization have brought progress to humanity, and that any suggestion of other peoples faring badly in the course of its own progress smacks of ingratitude. The objection continues that it is counter-intuitive that there could be people who are not persons, and that the findings are merely a peculiarity of the person-model. In fact, the objection continues, Western philosophical thinking has it that all people are persons. These objections are serious, and a starting point for considering them is to consider the prior question as to why it is that traditional philosophical thinking has it that persons are never flesh and blood entities, but are always monads or units of consciousness. The objections to the person-model can only be said to reflect the narrow desire to acknowledge only one path to personhood, that of the R-I-B identity in Western civilization, as being legitimate.

(8d3) The conception of Black personhood gives an account of the non-personhood of Blacks within the boundaries of Western civilization. The record of history shows that Blacks have been forcibly deprived, in varying degrees, of their own phenomenological expressions, and have been forced to graft onto themselves the phenomenological expressions of Western civilization. The resulting sense of identity experienced by Blacks is at variance with the physicalistic aspect of their R-I-B identity. What the inquiries into the Black aesthetic have shown is that even if Black individuals were to voluntarily adopt the phenomenological expressions of Western civilization, the result would still be the denial of their personhood. The reason is that the symbol systems of Western civilization, as explained in the aesthetic, use the conception of blackness as the symbol or metaphor for whatever is not choiceworthy or is to be rejected. The conceptions of the symbolic systems of blackness, as these occur in the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization, also lead to the rejection of the physicalistic self of the Black R-I-B identity. This physicalistic self is the basis for a Black individual for self-reference, and for collective identity in the case of a plurality of individuals; since, the same physicalistic black self is shared by other individuals. In the absence of this acceptance of the self, or the lack of respect for the self, an individual cannot put himself on a path to personhood. The result can only be the attempt to transcend the black self. One such way to transcendence is the adopting of the phenomenological expressions of Western civilization.

(8d3,a) This brings us to the sense in which R-I-B identities are not interchangeable or non-transferable. What must be kept in mind is that an R-I-B identity consists, not only of the physicalistic self but also of the

phenomenological expressions developed with that self as the locus. This so-called path to personhood offered by Western civilization is, therefore, a bogus one. When caught in this dilemma, the Black individual shifts his focus of personal identity to the R-S-B level. He cannot, unlike the White R-I-B counterpart, enjoy the security of the phenomenological expressions of his R-I-B sphere who says:

In the old age black was not counted fair,
Or if it were, it bore not beauty's name'
But now is black beauty's successive heir¹⁸
And beauty slandered with a bastard's shame.

On the way to transcending himself, the Black R-I-B individual attempts to base his sense of personal identity on the R-S-B level. A personal identity based on the R-I-B level unavoidably requires a reference to the physicalistic self and the phenomenological expressions for that self. By attempting to take a route to personhood through the phenomenological expressions of the R-I-B identity of Western civilization, the Black individual finds that the uneliminable references to the physicalistic self, in the expressions of the new R-I-B identity, bring him back to the physicalistic black self he wished to transcend. He then proclaims that his blackness is irrelevant and that being human is what really matters. But nothing is gained here. The rights belonging to an R-S-B group are really rights that prohibit any individual in the person-model from denying to another individual those conditions that are essential to it as a form of life. Thus for human R-I-B individuals these conditions would be those of food, clothing, shelter, and whatever material items needed for its survival. These conditions for survival permit only biological survival. They do not require the individuals to develop a phenomenological life, though they do not prevent it. Human rights should be

therefore limited to R-S-B survival. This is the only coherent sense of human rights. The question of human rights, in the sense that these are commonly understood, needs further discussion.

(8d3,b) R-S-B rights are those that permit an R-S-B sphere to exist or to survive. In the case of the human R-S-B sphere, human rights would pertain strictly to the biological survival of the individuals in that sphere. R-I-B rights are those that pertain to the R-I-B identity of the individual. The R-I-B identity, apart from the physicalistic aspect, consists of the phenomenological life the R-I-B sphere constructs with the physicalistic self of its own sphere always as its own referent. R-I-B rights therefore pertain to aspects in the phenomenological life of an R-I-B sphere. These phenomenological aspects characterize the way of life or the culture of an R-I-B society. It is only within the context of a way of life that people as R-I-B individuals come to have rights, which in all cases are rights only of the R-I-B sphere to which they belong. These sets of rights inhering in the different human R-I-B spheres can therefore be seen as competing doctrines espoused by rival R-I-B groups in their conceptions of what should be the way of life for the entire R-S-B sphere of humans.

Rights, therefore, in any sense beyond that of biological survival, are understandable only in social contexts. Human rights, in the sense that is taken to be universal and trans-social, can only be erroneous. R-S-B rights, in this case human R-S-B rights, are the rights that individuals belonging to a single R-I-B sphere would like to universalize for the R-S-B sphere to which they and many other R-I-B spheres belong. The conception of human rights that is touted is usually the one belonging to R-I-B individuals of Western civilization. That R-I-B group sees human-kind through the

phenomenological conceptions of its own R-I-B identity. Armed with this conception, and with military might, they presume to tell every other R-I-B sphere what rights, and consequently the way of life, they must have. In one sense the call for human rights constitutes a route for transcendence offered to these other R-I-B individuals. This supposedly universal sense of human rights must be restricted and made trans-social only within the various societies of a single R-I-B sphere, the White one. The great majority of rights available to individuals would then have to be R-I-B rights. They could be called human rights only in the trivial sense that from the standpoint of R-I-B individuals who belong to a non-human R-S-B sphere, the plurality of R-I-B spheres belong to the human R-S-B sphere. R-I-B rights, properly understood, are the rights to R-I-B individuals of a single R-I-B sphere to develop tribal, ethnic or linguistic differences and variations, in ways they think the phenomenological expression of their single R-I-B identity should be expressed. These R-I-B rights would prohibit a variant R-I-B group from imposing its phenomenological expression on another variant R-I-B group. In the case of the Black R-I-B sphere, these rights grant to any variant Black R-I-B tribe, or other collectivity, the powers to ensure the development of a Black aesthetic with symbol-systems to enhance the relationship of the individual to his Black physicalistic mass, and to develop other phenomenological forms, theatre, poetry, literature, etc., which self-respectingly have the black self as their referent. The R-I-B sphere that remains to be dealt with is the Jewish one.

(8d4) What constitutes the R-I-B identity of the Jew is not a question to be answered directly, but one that requires careful consideration. This investigation is partly carried out by working backwards through Jewish

history. The physicalistic aspect of the R-I-B identity of the Jew is derivable from the fact this individual is defined in a way analagous to how Blacks are defined. Within the White R-I-B sphere of Western civilization, a Black person is defined as anyone having a single drop of Black blood in his veins. This is tantamount to saying that the R-I-B individuals of Western civilization have a strict sense of the physicalistic aspect of their R-I-B identity which they desire to keep constant. This view of the White R-I-B identity has, at one time or another, been expressed in legal documents wherever the White R-I-B sphere found itself in contact with Black or other spheres of R-I-B identities. These laws might well seem as the roots of racism by humanistic and social-science thinkers. But given the person-model, however, racism falls away as a concept and is replaced by the complex reality of the R-I-B identity. Vis-a-vis Jews, the White R-I-B identity is defined indirectly in a way similar to the situation with Blacks: Anyone having a drop of Jewish blood is a Jew. The physicalistic aspect of the Jewish R-I-B identity cannot therefore be an illusion; however, precisely what it is cannot easily be said as subsequent inquiries will show. Armed with the Mendelian concept of the gene, an individual finds the constant and scientific basis for the physicalistic aspect of his R-I-B identity, and also for that of other individuals in his own R-I-B sphere. In metaphysical parlance, the Mendelian genes are the substance of the physicalistic aspect of the R-I-B identity. It is no mystery that the motive for such a strict sense of R-I-B identity, in the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization, is a strong desire to protect and to maintain it. The reason for such a motive is interesting. The phenomenological expressions for the individuals in a single R-I-B sphere evolve and

develop with the physicalistic self as their referent. In time, these forms come to be treasured for themselves. But they also contain the particular physicalistic R-I-B self as their referent, and it in turn comes to be treasured for itself with the same degree of devotion given to the forms of the phenomenological expression. Let us consider one of the forms in the phenomenological expressions of the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. The symbol system is that of poetry. This White R-I-B individual, William Butler Yeats, writes as follows in an essay entitled "The Symbolism Of Poetry":

There are no lines with more melancholy beauty than these by Burns;

The white moon is setting behind the white wave,
And Time is setting with me, O!

and these lines are perfectly symbolical. Take from them the whiteness of the moon and of the waves, whose relation to the setting of Time is too subtle for the intellect, and you take from their beauty.¹⁹

Needless to say, if the R-I-B identity were to be consciously changed, the phenomenological expressions would have to be changed to accomodate a new physicalistic self.

The R-I-B individuals of Western civilization are not alone in their desire to maintain the constancy of their R-I-B identity, an activity they regard as their right and a duty to perform. The Jews have also codified the principle that their R-I-B identity should be preserved by requiring it as a duty that Jews marry only within their R-I-B sphere.²⁰ It could be argued that this principle of theirs does not by itself show that the Jews have always thought of themselves as having a distinctive physicalistic identity, or that they recognized themselves as having one. But such an

argument does not hold up. History shows that at all times of their persecution in Western civilization, the R-I-B individuals of Western civilization have always used, or attempted to use, the distinctive physical traits of Jews in selecting them for various sorts of persecution. These attempts at identification were not always successful, given the occurrences of intermarriage or cross-mating. These actions show that there has always been a physicalistic basis for the Jewish R-I-B identity that other individuals have recognized the Jews as having. Precisely what that physicalistic R-I-B identity is, or has been, is to be dealt with later on. But the historical actions of the R-I-B individuals of Western civilization show that the aim of their persecution of the Jews always has been the removal of the Jewish R-I-B sphere from the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. The Spanish inquisition, the subsequent expulsion of the Jews from Spain, the holocaust in Europe, are some of the events that attest to this. In these actions there has been contempt not only for the physicalistic aspect of the Jewish R-I-B identity, but also for their phenomenological expressions.

What has been established thus far is that the Jews have an R-I-B identity. The part of it consisting of phenomenological expressions leaves no doubt as to what they are: They are the set of customs, traditions, a way of looking at the world that Jews uniquely have. The part of their R-I-B identity consisting of a physicalistic self is something that is troublesome. What this physicalistic aspect of their R-I-B identity might be is discovered by considering the following claim: I am a Jew. Therefore I have a right to the land of the Jewish patriarchs. Later on I will deal with the apparent conflicts that arise from the assertion of this right.

The example in use here is not to be taken as justifying the existence of the state of Israel, or as rebutting the claim of the Palestinians. This claim to the land of the Jewish patriarchs is one that no other R-I-B sphere can make with the slightest bit of credibility. Paradoxically, even though the Jews have suffered greatly at the hands of R-I-B individuals of Western civilization, it is these latter individuals who uphold most strenuously this unique R-I-B right of the Jews. At present, the Western R-I-B sphere makes it its duty to enforce this right through its military and economic powers. But other considerations, apart from those of military and economic ones, make this right a coherent claim belonging to the R-I-B sphere of Jewish individuals. Were the member of any other R-I-B sphere to show up and say, "I have a right to the land of the Jewish patriarchs", he would rightly be laughed at. Imagine Chinese or Native Americans, with or without a conversion to Judaism, claiming such a right. The reason such a claim would be ridiculous by individuals who are not Jews is that Jewish individuals who claim the unique right to the land of the Jewish patriarchs are biologically continuous with the people to whom the Jewish patriarchs belonged, and a good argument can be made that there are cases where descendants are entitled to the labors of their ancestors.

The issue to be dealt with at this point is the apparent conflict over my saying that the example in use does not rebut the claim of the Palestinians, which is tantamount to saying that they as well as the Jews have unique rights to the same thing. There is not really a conflict. The Palestinians by themselves do not constitute an R-I-B sphere. They are fellow members in an R-I-B sphere of individuals originating in Arabia, and who generally call themselves Arabs. The Palestinians and the Jews in Israel

are in conflict over an area of land. No Palestinian claim could intelligently be formulated to read: I have a right to the land of the Jewish Patriarchs. The area of land under dispute is never so thought of in the phenomenological expressions of the R-I-B sphere to which the Palestinians belong. It is thought of, not as the land of the Jewish patriarchs, but as something pertaining solely to the Palestinians. But leaving aside how the two R-I-B spheres think of the land under dispute, what is clearly true is that given the reality of their R-I-B spheres, they both have unique R-I-B rights to the land from the standpoints of their phenomenological expressions. This is simply a case of R-I-B spheres having incompatible ends.

History is revelatory as to the physicalistic aspect of the Jewish R-I-B identity. The historical records show that they developed a material culture with its own phenomenological expressions and that they were a homogeneous people. That having been accomplished, what occurred several times is that they either handed over, or lost, their autonomy to the individuals of other R-I-B spheres. No one knows for sure under what conditions the Jews entered Egypt, but what everyone knows for sure is that the Jews lost their autonomy in Egypt. Centuries later, after being used primarily as means to the ends of the 'sons of Ham', the Jews left Kemit, the Black land, as the Egyptians called their country.²¹ What is also indisputable is that the Jews left Egypt with their phenomenological forms influenced and altered by the phenomenological expressions they had learned in Egypt, witness the similarity between Egyptian literature, which had been in existence long before the Jewish presence, and the so-called songs of Solomon. What is also indisputable is that the Jews could not have carried out in Egypt the personhood conditions of autonomy and self-continuation.

Their physicalistic selves having been subordinated to the ends of the Egyptian R-I-B sphere, the Jewish end to continue its own physicalistic R-I-B identity was subordinated to the whimsical desire of the powerful Egyptian to use the physicalistic Jewish self as a sexual plaything. Despite its altered state, however, the physicalistic Jewish identity was collectively defined with reference to whatever it was before the Egyptian admixture. The experience with the Egyptians has repeated itself with other R-I-B groups who have contributed alterations to both the physicalistic and phenomenological expressions of the collective Jewish self. Their most recent such experience has been with the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization, which, beginning with the Romans, sought primarily to deprive it of its autonomy, and ended with the Germans, who sought both to end the Jewish R-I-B sphere and to remove its phenomenological forms from Western civilization.²²

We are now in a position to consider finally the question concerning the status of the Jewish R-I-B identity. It has ostensibly set itself on a path to personhood. It has located itself in a region, the Middle East, where the R-I-B sphere in which it claims membership perhaps also tried to develop its personhood. But whatever the ancient physicalistic self might have been, the new physicalistic self is certainly at variance with it. This new physicalistic self is more like that of the White R-I-B identity of Western civilization. Accompanying this altered physicalistic Jewish self are many of the phenomenological expressions of the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. But the physicalistic self of the Jewish patriarchs and the accompanying phenomenological expressions, to which the present Jewish R-I-B sphere refers itself, are at variance with each other. The original R-I-B sphere of the Jewish patriarchs could not have as its end,

the dissolving of its physicalistic R-I-B identity, its substitution with that of the White physicalistic self, and taking up of Western phenomenological expressions that do not accomodate the physicalistic self of the Jewish patriarchs. What must be kept in mind is that the present Jewish R-I-B sphere has as its ostensible end the continuation and development of the phenomenological expressions of the original R-I-B sphere of Jewish patriarchs. But each Jewish individual is aware of his physicalistic self as consisting of the ancient and original one of the Jewish patriarchs and of the White R-I-B. The Jewish individual not only has the physicalistic self of the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization, but also has its phenomenological expressions. The Jewish R-I-B individual therefore consists of two physicalistic selves and two phenomenological expressions. The dilemma that occurs for each Jewish individual is therefore as follows. On one hand he asks himself, "How can I, with the physicalistic self and phenomenological expressions of the White R-I-B identity of Western civilization, seek the ends of another R-I-B identity, the R-I-B identity of the Jewish patriarchs?". On the other hand, the same Jewish individual who understands his physicalistic self to have physiognomic components of the original Jewish self, and which are not present in the White R-I-B self, asks himself, "If I do seek Jewish ends, how are those phenomenological expressions reconcilable with the White R-I-B self I find myself having?". Other things add to his predicament.²³

Not all members of the Jewish R-I-B sphere followed the Romans into Europe to attain a White physicalistic self. Some Jews remained in the region of the Jewish patriarchs living in Morocco, Ethiopia, and other such places. These individuals generally have an altered physicalistic self which Europeans loosely refer to as Black. Having migrated to what is now

taken to be the land of the Jewish patriarchs, these individuals are approximately equal in number to Jewish individuals with generally White physicalistic traits. What unites two sets of individuals belonging to the Jewish R-I-B sphere is that they both are biologically continuous with the R-I-B sphere of the Jewish patriarchs. Those individuals that immigrated from places like Morocco and Ethiopia make the claim, however, that both the physicalistic self and the phenomenological expressions that they have is truer to that of the original Jewish R-I-B sphere prior to its Roman occupation and subsequent dispersal. These rival claims for the Jewish R-I-B identity are clearly inconsistent. The Jewish self, with its Western-derived physicalistic self and phenomenological expressions, clearly rejects the physicalistic Jewish self described loosely as Black. All of this is explicable on my earlier discussions on the Black aesthetic and the doctrine of transcendence. For the Jewish R-I-B sphere, insofar as it is politically represented as being akin to that of the R-I-B identity of Western civilization, the end of the Jewish R-I-B sphere can only be the transcendence of the Jewish R-I-B identity, insofar as it is strenuously argued by "Oriental" Jews to be "loosely" Black. Further considerations on the Jewish R-I-B sphere are not properly mine, but are the real concern of individuals who credibly identify as belonging to the sphere of Jewish R-I-B individuals.

(8e) We have now come full circle to the individuals in the person-model. How do we adjudicate their claims? What considerations enter into the moral or legal systems that we may use to solve their problems? What is the status of philosophical ethics? Are the moral values that underlie systems of political obligation really universal? These questions enter into the contentions of individuals with different R-I-B identities. One instance

in which these questions arise is that of the society of Locke's time: This is the society made up of the American colonies of which Locke was an administrator. At least three R-I-B identities make up the society of this time. They are the White R-I-B individuals, Black R-I-B individuals, and Native American(Indian) R-I-B individuals. For the sake of simplicity only two of these will now be considered, the Native American and the White R-I-B identities. The individuals of these R-I-B spheres have different phenomenological systems. They have different conceptions of morals and values. Before anyone was herded into reservations there were, broadly speaking, two societies: One having phenomenological expressions of Western civilization, the other having a phenomenological system that is still regarded as alien to the Western mind. Before the meeting of the two R-I-B spheres, it was not just the geographical distance that marked them off as different societies. Rather, it was their different conceptions of morals, values etc., that provided different ends for their societies. These ends characterize differently the ways of life for the two R-I-B spheres. An R-I-B individual from either of these societies must therefore be understood as conceptualizing within the symbol-system of his R-I-B sphere. The significant things to which he refers his knowledge will therefore be the values, traditions etc., the things constituting his phenomenological life, and the end or implicitly understood goals of his R-I-B sphere. Locke, as an example of such an R-I-B individual, can be no other than a foundational thinker for a particular R-I-B sphere laying down concepts of political obligation arising out of the phenomenological systems familiar only to the individuals of his own R-I-B sphere. This philosopher espousing supposedly universal truths is in reality a handmaiden for his

R-I-B sphere. His is the concept of property made out while he was an administrator of the colonies in North America, owned stock in the Africa company, and saw nothing contradictory in constructing a political theory that would save the English people from "slavery and ruine", while the Native Americans and Blacks were enslaved and their societies ruined.²⁴ The important question here is, "Whose end is served by Locke's concept of property?". It is a concept that belongs to the history, traditions, customs, in short to the phenomenological system of the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. A great deal of Locke's section on property is taken up with the colonies in North America, of which he was an administrator. This is an exercise that should properly be seen as an attempt to justify the seizure of Native Americans' property. If it is asked whose end is served by Locke's concept of property, the answer can only be obvious. Since it is a concept developed with no concern for the phenomenological life of the other R-I-B sphere, that of Native Americans, nothing in the concept guarantees the other sphere a right to its property. This is important since the concepts of a phenomenological system are what individuals use as guides to their actions. The concept of property cannot be seen otherwise than as serving the ends of the White R-I-B sphere. This lack of concern for the phenomenological lives of other R-I-B individuals, which would prompt one R-I-B sphere to philosophize, and to subsequently take actions that would affect individuals outside its own sphere, is the cause of the status quo in North America, Australia, South Africa, the Soviet Union and other places. Given the unhappy lot of many of these R-I-B spheres, a further discussion concerning their status is in order.

Pragmatically, an R-I-B sphere devolves itself into a society, or

more simply, into a collective. It has its own phenomenological expressions which lead to a way of life. Given its way of life, and the ends of its R-I-B sphere, agreements are made as to what courses of actions are required of the individuals or permitted to them. These courses of action can be called rights. The question then arises. Is there any place for a set of ethical values that are universal? The answer is 'no'. "Universal means "applicable to the individuals of a single R-S-B sphere", if we are speaking of individuals of different R-I-B spheres, all of whom belong to the same R-S-B sphere. If we are speaking of individuals of different R-I-B identities but who do not all belong to the same R-S-B sphere, the answer is again 'no'. There is no universal body of ethics here either. The reasons are clear. The set of moral or ethical values would have to be meaningful only in a social context, which is the complex whole of the way of life and phenomenological expressions. This complex whole is not knowable apart from the R-I-B context. The intended universal conception for all R-I-B individuals, a conception of morals, ethics, a theory of political obligation etc., would therefore always be R-I-B-sphere dependent, and would at the same time be nothing but the furthering of the ends of a particular R-I-B identity.

(8f) What further is to be learned from the person-model about traditional philosophical ethics? Given what has been said of R-I-B spheres with their different ends, how can the individuals in these spheres be moral? These are questions pertinent to individuals in North America, South Africa, Australia, and other societies having individuals of different R-I-B identities, different paths to personhood and consequently different ends. It might be thought that an *a priori* ethics, such as Kant's, would have elements of moral behavior

that could be of use here. In his conception of morals there are rules of moral conduct which he regards as uneliminable. These are keeping promises, helping others, developing one's talents, and not committing suicide.²⁵

In the case of promising, Kant reasons that the institution of promising would break down if people generally intended not to keep promises they made. From the standpoint of the person-model, this consequence would be true provided the society in question is understood to include persons only of one R-I-B sphere. It is clear that individuals would realize that they share common ends toward which the institution of promising is directed. Now if individuals of different R-I-B identities are included in that society, the result is that those individuals would not all have the same ends. This would apply to South Africa, the United States, the Soviet Union, among other societies. In any of these geographical locations the society is understood to be pursuing the ends of R-I-B individuals who are White. The institutionalized promises of democratic, or other virtues contained in the political systems of these societies, have not been historically binding between White individuals and others. Indeed, the history of R-I-B spheres within a given society is invariably that of broken promises. It cannot be said, however, that the institution of promising has broken down in any of these societies. Rather, there is a tacit understanding between the different R-I-B individuals, in each and every one of these societies, that their different R-I-B spheres have different ends, the furthering of which are not in the interests of individuals across R-I-B spheres. But there could possibly be an extension of the institution of promising in a given society of different R-I-B individuals, where it is clearly the case that the phenomenological expressions of a single R-I-B sphere are the only ones permissible in that society, or if not, the political institutions in that

society are clearly seen to be carrying out only the ends of a single R-I-B sphere. In the case of the Jews who left the Middle East for Europe, the answers are very clear as to what took place. In some cases the Jews were willing to transcend their R-I-B identity and become simply human beings or persons: This meant they tried as best they could to end their R-I-B identity, both in the physicalistic and phenomenological aspects, and to take up these aspects as they were exhibited by White R-I-B individuals in Western civilization. For example, in Germany a Jew could try to be as Teutonic-appearing as possible and to be very Germanic in his culture.²⁶ This occurrence in Europe is perhaps the furthest any R-I-B group has ever gone in attempting to transcend itself and to seek a path to personhood outside of its own R-I-B sphere. In the case of North America, South Africa, Australia, the Soviet Union, and other societies made up of different R-I-B spheres, it is certainly not the end of the White R-I-B individuals to promise to other R-I-B identities this option of transcending themselves physicalistically and phenomenologically, in order for them to become persons, as this concept of personhood is instantiated by White individuals in the R-I-B sphere of Western civilization. What is possible for other R-I-B spheres in these societies is only domestication.²⁷ Consequently, none of the non-White R-I-B spheres in these societies will attain their personhood. What is also true is that these societies carry on, and they do not have the institution of promising across R-I-B spheres.

The other moral principle that Kant wished to universalize was that of helping others. How could this be possible? Since the activities of an R-I-B sphere are for the purposes of achieving its own ends, it could possibly be altruistic and help another R-I-B sphere if it determined

their different ends in a particular case were not incompatible. But generally the prior need arises that its own actions are to be directed towards its own R-I-B sphere. It could help another R-I-B sphere, then, if it saw that in so doing it would further its own ends. Furthermore, the asking of help, by one R-I-B sphere of another, calls into question the viability of the importunate sphere.

Concerning the universality of the moral rules to develop one's talents and to not commit suicide, these two seem to be truly universalizable. Individuals of an R-I-B sphere can achieve their personhood only if they collectively outlaw suicide, which is simply the elimination of the physicalistic self. Without need for argument, the physicalistic self is clearly a necessary condition for personhood, since without it there could be no locus for phenomenological expression. There is, however, no readily apparent connection between this physicalistic self and anything moral. Morality itself occurs only within the phenomenological expressions of an R-I-B sphere. It would be difficult to know apriori if a specific issue, such as suicide, would be a moral issue, and if so, whether one could universalize its permissibility or non-permissibility; since, no one knows what form the phenomenological expressions may take in a given R-I-B sphere. The Kantian case has to be put in a proper perspective. Kant's case is as follows:

A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: From self-love I adopt as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law

to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.²⁸

If the 'man' of whom Kant posits this state of despair is imply a human, the example would be meaningless. There is nothing simply like an R-S-B individual having these thoughts whom we could conceive or make sense of. Kant's 'man' , which is a human R-S-B individual, is always a determinate R-I-B individual with a phenomenological system and its conception of morals. It is not necessary that this would be a moral issue for him. It might be that it is a moral issue, not whether he should commit suicide, but whether he should commit it in this instance. Kant's conception for the non-permissibility of suicide requires as a precondition that suicide need universally be a moral issue. The example can, however, be translated into more appropriate language to see if there is any contradiction for an individual to will suicide.

It is the physicalistic self of the R-I-B individual towards which the action of suicide can be directed. When an individual speaks of his sense of self, his R-I-B identity, he means not only the physicalistic aspect. Neither does he mean only the phenomenological aspects. He does not really dichotomize them. It is the interwoven character of them which give him a sense of self and constitute his personhood. There is therefore not just one self that is loved in self-love. The R-I-B individual would then reason that the sense of self attained in the path to personhood is more valuable than the physicalistic self which, outside of phenomenological

capabilities, is merely the biological form of an entity on the R-S-B level. But Kant's case of the solitary individual asking this question of himself is pathological and academic. The question of suicide gains significance in the following R-I-B contexts. A sphere of R-I-B individuals is told by another sphere of R-I-B individuals. Your R-I-B identity is now ended. You will not be permitted a path to personhood. These are your options:

1. You will not be permitted to continue your physicalistic R-I-B identity or your phenomenological expressions.
2. You will be permitted to continue your physicalistic self as we see fit. You may have those aspects of your phenomenological expressions that we permit. You will not have the right to autonomy, to self-continuation, or self-respect. You may exist with bare R-S-B rights to biological survival, but your population and your natural resources will not be under your own jurisdiction.²⁹

There are variations on these options that an R-I-B sphere can allow to another, but these two suffice for discussing suicide. In the case of the Jewish R-I-B sphere in Germany, the Caribs in the Caribbean, and the Blacks in Australia, theirs was the first option. This is a significant instance where the contemplation of suicide would take place. We would not permit Kant to ask any of these individuals to consider the moral permissibility of suicide, since there would be nothing to consider. The actions of these individuals would not make a practical difference.

The second option is a more complicated one. At one time or another it has been given to some R-I-B spheres. For some R-I-B spheres it is a continuing condition. This is the option given to the Jews at the time of the Roman conquest leading up to Massada. It is given to Blacks in

Australia, South Africa, and other parts of the world. It is a continuing condition for Native American Indians in the United States. It is in these cases that the morality of suicide can be seriously pondered. The R-I-B individual clearly understands that his phenomenological life, among other things, which gives him a path to personhood is ended. It is only in the phenomenological system, that he chooses on the path to personhood, that he can have a moral life. Since its possibility is not present in the second option, ending the physicalistic self could not be a moral issue for an individual who would be under the second option at all times. The same analysis holds for developing one's talents. Since the ends of his R-I-B sphere are never to be realized, why should he contribute to ends that are never his?.

(2g) This brings us to the R-I-B sphere that figures prominently in the conflict of R-I-B identities. Insofar as the individuals of a single R-I-B sphere, all of whom have the same gender-contingent identities, resolve to suppress the phenomenological expressions of individuals of the same sphere, whose gender identities are different from theirs, the two sets of individuals divided along gender lines cease to have compatible ends. This must be the case since nothing in the concept of personhood permits a human trait to be suppressed or ignored if it contributes to the development of phenomenological expressions that are directed to the shared, physicalistic, R-I-B self. The traits such as musical ability or appreciation, having a gender trait, poetic ability etc., make the R-I-B individual a contingent individual relative to those traits. Nothing in the person-model permits an R-I-B individual to be excluded from contributing to the creation of the phenomenological life of his sphere; since, the only criterion

required for such a contribution is that one be an R-I-B individual. All R-I-B individuals, in the human R-I-B spheres, have the contingent identity of being gender-contingent individuals. In one sense this is trivial since there are other traits shared by all R-I-B individuals, such as handedness (left or right), musical ability or appreciation etc., But how the trait of gender is to be interpreted depends on the significance given to it by the phenomenological expression of an R-I-B sphere. The phenomenological expressions of an R-I-B sphere might give an extraordinary significance to the experiential route possible through the trait of gender identity. An R-I-B individual of such a sphere might reason that even though the members of that sphere all share the same physicalistic self, their shared physicalistic R-I-B identity is always known, felt, perceived, as far as each R-I-B individual is concerned, through a gender route. The complaint of the White feminist is now made intelligible.³⁰ White women have had their gender-identity suppressed, and have been barred from contributing to the development of phenomenological expressions for the White R-I-B self. Since in general the path to personhood for an R-I-B sphere consists in developing phenomenological expressions to accomodate its physicalistic self, and in particular for its members to have the full freedom of choice in developing its phenomenological expressions, it follows that White women are not persons. It could not be otherwise, since a different finding would license the male gender route as the solely legitimate one for developing phenomenological expressions for the R-I-B sphere. This need not hold for R-I-B spheres which could cast gender in a different phenomenological form. As to whether White men are persons, it is doubtful. They also could not be persons since the phenomenological expressions for their R-I-B identity are inadequately

and improperly developed given the significance of gender in its R-I-B sphere. Thus while this is an R-I-B sphere that has secured for itself the necessary conditions for personhood, it has for its end not the development of its own personhood, but the denial of it for other R-I-B spheres. The position of the White feminist is that her physicalistic self will no longer be used to spawn these individuals. They would like to remove themselves from the community of White males. The gender-contingent members of this R-I-B sphere therefore have incompatible ends. But their ends are not fundamentally incompatible. These gender-contingent identities still wish to continue their R-I-B identity, at least in the physicalistic sense; in which case, they share an end that is not shared by the gender-contingent R-I-B identities of any other sphere, to continue the White physicalistic self.

Notes: Chapter VII

1. The connection between persons and rights is not a strange one, and I am not alone in holding it. Neither does it follow that since other philosophers make the connection that it is a correct one. The correctness of a specific connection between persons and rights has to be argued for and established, and this I will do in the course of my work. Presently, the reference that is of interest to me which shows some sensitivity between persons and rights, of the sort that I will shortly be establishing, is indicated by Amelia Oskenberg Rorty in an article entitled "The Transformations of Persons" : (pg. 270, Philosophy, Vol. 48, July 1973)

Upon the concept of personal identity hang the social functions of allocating responsibility for socially necessary tasks. However personal identity is defined, it will demarcate the unit of agency; the analysis of the nature of persons will be used to justify the distribution of rights and duties; principles of political obligation and privileges will be derived from, and will in turn support, accounts of the powers and limits of individual persons.

2. What I will give as my model is compatible with some specific points in an article written by Amelie Rorty. The following passage from her essay "The Transformation Of Persons" is of interest to me; (pg. 270, Philosophy, Vol. 48, July 1973)

We need to distinguish criteria that give:

- (1) Class differentiation; What distinguishes the class of persons from their nearest neighbors: baboons, robots, human corpses, person-stages?
- (2) Individual differentiation; What are the criteria for the numerical distinctness of persons who have the same general description?
- (3) Individual re-identification; What are the criteria for re-identifying an individual as the same person in different contexts or under different descriptions?
- (4) Individual identification; What sorts of characteristics identify a person as essentially the person he is, such that if they were changed he would be said to be a different person, though he might remain differentiated and re-identifiable as the same individual? We must distinguish two perspectives:

- (i) The external perspective: What sorts of characteristics are treated by observers as essential?
- (ii) The internal perspective: What sorts of characteristics are central to an individual's conception of what is essential to him so that he would consider himself a different person in their absence?

These items that I have culled from her article need not make up part of what Rorty might want to incorporate into a model of persons if she were at some point to present one. Therefore, her ideas here can only be taken as given in sketchy form, and not as elaborate arguments of an overall conception of persons. So even if she were to repudiate some of the ideas in this sketch of her article, I would still consider them as being importantly relevant to my own conception of persons. I agree with her that there should be criteria that give class differentiation of humans, baboons and robots. Concerning individual differentiation and individual re-identification, I also agree with her that these items cannot be logically entailed by the analysis of the criteria for personal identity, but by pragmatic considerations as she indicates: (ibid., pgs. 270-271)

Upon the concept of personal identity hang the social functions of allocating responsibility for socially necessary tasks. However personal identity is defined, it will demarcate the unit of agency; the analysis of the nature of persons be used to justify the distribution of rights and duties; principles of political obligation and privileges will be derived from, and will in turn support, accounts of the powers and limits of individual persons. For this reason alone, it seems unlikely that the definitional problems will be on a par with similar taxonomic problems in the natural sciences. Even the most apparently straightforward distinctions will carry political and moral consequences in their wake; for instance, whether we forbid or condone the dismantling of individual persons. Of course these consequences will not be logically entailed by the analysis of the criteria for personal identity and vice versa.

Concerning Rorty's items (i) and (ii), the external perspective and the internal perspective, I further agree with her as she writes: (ibid., 270)

It might be thought that the criteria for individual identification and re-identification would exhaust individual identification. But the characteristics that distinguish and re-identify individuals may be criteria that are not considered significant in identifying a person as the sort of person he essentially is.

3. This presentation of the argument about the universal man is not what a proponent means when he says he wishes to be a universal man. He might object that his real argument has been replaced with a straw man since a universal man is not simply a man in the universe. Apart from the flippant attitude with which the proponent is dismissed, is another, more serious, attitude that says: Any man, in the sense of a people, is a universal man since his customs and ways can be made universal.

Take two different sorts of men, a Rastafarian, sometimes called a Rasta man, and the other sort, an Englishman. The Rasta man lives a way of life that stress the African origin of his people. In his manner and dress he can be easily identified by his clothing and the peculiar way he braids his hair. The Englishman, on the other hand, and he can be generalized to indicate the average Westerner, has a manner and dress that immediately distinguish him from the Rastafarian. Through conquest, and I refer to the various forms of European expansion, colonialism and imperialism, the European manner and dress became commonplace all over the world among non-Westerners, so that, for example, wearing a three-piece suit and tie is seen to be acceptable practice in the tropics as well as in the cold European climate where this manner of dress evolved.

The same kind of extension applies to the practise of European manners. It is in this context that I have just described that a comparison between the two different sorts of men takes place. When we speak of the Rasta man's dress and manner, we tend to shun them as being racially motivated, as practices localizable to a

single race rather than apparently having applicability to all sorts of people. When we think of the Englishman or of any other Westerner, the tendency is not to think of his dress and manner as being racially motivated or applicable to a single race. We think, on the other hand, of his manner and dress, in short his customs, as being aspects of a universal or world-wide behavior.

But this is wrong since both types of manner and dress have a racial locus for their origins, in the sense that it was with some determinable and identifiable race that the manner and dress evolved. These two sorts of men at the same time represent the outgrowth of a very important historical fact and also the indication as to what can be a universal man. The historical fact is this: A few centuries ago, some African slaves in Jamaica, who have since been called Maroons, revolted against their enslavers, and managed for some time to live and to carry on their own customs undisturbed by the Englishmen. They were encircled, and the Englishmen eventually, through military means, managed to contain them. In the centuries that followed, the Englishmen set about replacing the customs of the enslaved Africans in the whole of Jamaica with customs of their own. This mode of enslavement or of military occupation was also put into practice in many other parts of the world. Centuries later, these two sorts of men still survive, the spirit of the Maroon in the person of the Rasta man, and the enslaver in the person of the Westerner with his customs imposed and taken up all over the world.

The Rasta man's dress and manner, however, are given a racial identification and are shunned as not being universal. But neither man's customs, the Rasta's or the Englishman's, are more universal than the other. Neither is it the case that the Rasta man's dress and manner have a racial locus while the Englishman's do not. At the starting point both sorts of men were simply men in the universe. Now, after centuries of enslavement and other forms of suppression of the Rasta man, the Englishman's dress, manner and customs are celebrated as universal norms. The Englishman or other Westerner somehow represents the universal man while the Rasta man is not so

taken to be. But this is really a historical event whereby simply a man in the universe has come to be taken as the standard for a universal man.

4. The conception underlying this preference for being a universal person pertains not to the distinction between persons and animals, or between persons and objects, but to the distinction between types or sorts of persons. It need not be that a person expressing this preference among sorts of persons has in mind a sophisticated conception of persons. It might very well be that the person expressing such a preference admits to having no well-thought-out conception of persons in a philosophical sense. But to be specific, what the claim amounts to for the individual who makes it is that he would rather not be thought of in an ethnically or racially identifying way ever. The motivation for this claim comes from the difficulties about the Black self pointed out in the earlier chapters on the Black aesthetic and Black history. What the claim about being a universal man really amounts to is the wish to escape or to transcend the Black self.

5. When I say "By virtue of being cognitive, R-persons can, among other things, prescribe courses of action to themselves whether these actions be of an intellectual nature or involve physical activity", I do not mean it in the sense that if some person is cognitive or rational then it follows necessarily that such a person will be self-prescriptive in his actions. There certainly is no necessary connection between being cognitive and being self-

prescriptive of one's actions. A person can be cognitive or rational, but through some peculiar physiological or psychological fact about himself he may simply never prescribe actions to himself; this seems to apply to actions of a physical sort only. What about actions that are not physical, actions that are of a mentalistic sort? These would be actions of varying degrees of reading or mathematics, actions taking place in the head. It still could be argued that the person could be cognitive or rational, and still not perform any of these mentalistic operations of adding, subtracting or multiplying. But for the person to be labelled cognitive or rational, he would have to give some external or behavioral indication that would lead to his being labelled cognitive or rational. Such a test would show the person to be acting in a rule-governed way in conditions apart from instinct. The connection between being cognitive or rational on the one hand, and on the other hand, being self-prescriptive of intellectual or physical courses of action, is that being cognitive or rational is not a sufficient, but is a necessary condition of being self-prescriptive of courses of action.

6. My discussion of the question about 'killing', in connection with the concepts of rationality or cognitivity, is in line with Kant's concept of a rational being in The Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of Morals. Though Kant does not explicitly define what he thinks a rational or cognitive being is, he demonstrates how he understands the concept in his four tests of moral action, by the use of the categorical imperative. While none of these tests deals with the subject of murder or intentional killing, a Kantian analysis for this subject can be derived and applied to my discussion. Two of Kant's tests are important at this point, the test of whether it would be right to commit suicide, and the test of whether one should develop or waste one's talents. In his test of the

morality of suicide and the test of whether one should develop or waste one's talents. In his test of the morality of suicide, Kant writes (pg. 39 of The Fundamental Principles Of The Metaphysics Of Morals, T.K. Abbott, trans.) :

A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.

This applicability of this moral test of suicide to the problem under consideration, that of the rightness or wrongness of murder, is that suicide is on a par with murder since some self is killed intentionally, the only difference being that in suicide one kills one's own self whereas in an intentional killing one kills the self of another person. Given the question "Can you whimsically end the life of another R-level person", a 'yes' answer by someone means that he willingly permits his own extinction by another person, and since he himself permits, licenses, and recommends the death, in this case his own, the permission would be tantamount to suicide. However, there is no empirical impossibility to this taking place. Neither is there a logical inconsistency in such a position. It is at this point that the second of Kant's tests becomes relevant. Kant writes: (ibid., pg. 40)

A third finds in himself a talent which with the help

of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law, although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species-in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.

What is most significant in the quotation is the last line which runs, "For, as a rational being...". Since I stated earlier in this chapter that the terms 'cognitive' and 'rational' are used interchangeably by me, the meaning of what was said about the intentional killing being violative of cognitivity becomes clearer. What is brought out is that the whimsical ending of a person's life would, in Kantian terms, contradict the will of a rational being that his faculties be developed, and whimsical killing certainly precludes such a possible development.

7. If the question is raised as to why R-U-B persons should be biological or organic entities occurring naturally, and why couldn't they occur synthetically, the answer is that a synthetic entity would be on par with cognitive, but non-organic, entities having membership only on the R-level of the person-model.

8. At this point it should be understood that 'universal person' is really a misnomer if it is used to specify some determinate sort of

person; for there is really no such. The thrust of the wish to be universal is that 'black person' designates a particular segment of humanity, and that there is some way of being a person that has no reference to the Black self. This claim to being some sort of universal person is really part and parcel of the doctrine of transcendence which will be thoroughly examined in the chapter entitled "The Refutation Of The Doctrine Of Transcendence".

9. It is true that here on earth, spiders, snakes, birds and reptiles do not have significantly cognitive or rational faculties, and that porpoises, while also non-human, come closest to humans in being cognitively endowed. But this is a contingent fact known to be true on earth. Now, the person-model was devised to hold true not only for the planet earth, a small section of the universe, but for the entire universe. There could conceivably be other parts of the universe where individuals with the forms of spiders, snakes, birds or reptiles, are cognitive and rational. For the purposes of this analysis it makes good sense, therefore, to contemplate as a reality what only contingently may not hold for the planet earth. Subsequently, the person-model, which contains a universe of persons, allows R-U-B persons to be of any naturally occurring organic and biological form while also having cognitiveness or rationality.

10. These phenomenological and physicalistic facts that serve to distinguish and to uniquely identify the black individual have been earlier explored in the first four chapters. No argument is in order at this point, consequently, for showing how it is that these physicalistic and phenomenological facts affect the black individual. In fact, a great deal of what is said in this chapter requires much familiarity with the first five chapters.

11. At this point the question may arise as to why it is that this

sense of self or sense of 'I' could not also apply on the R-S-B level. The answer is forthcoming in the light of the analysis of the first five chapters. A set of R-S-B individuals who all belong to one sort, humans for example, differentiate themselves in one very significant way which points to the physicalistic and phenomenological facts about themselves, and thereby constitute a class of R-I-B individuals. The analysis in the first five chapters showed how it is that physicalistic and phenomenological facts about the self common to all R-I-B individuals who are Black gives rise to unique difficulties. One of the facts of R-I-B individuals who are black is that the sense of self, a certain we-ness, belongs to black individuals all of whom collectively share the reality of owning or of having the Black self. The sense of a collective self, of an 'I' shared by all of these individuals, reveals a set of unique considerations that they share with no other members of the person-model, no matter what level of personhood is involved. When we leave the R-I-B level and are on the R-S-B level with other humans, we may collectively say 'we' and understand that all other humans are included with us. But the sense of 'we' on the R-S-B level never approximates to the sense of 'we' on the R-I-B level. The sense of 'we' on the R-S-B level is as artificial as the sense of 'we' on the R-U-B level or the R-level. All levels but the R-I-B level are contingent forms of association. But the R-I-B level does not express an arbitrary or contingent association; we are as persons bound necessarily to it and can never leave, transcend or escape it.

12. Later on in the eighth chapter the analysis of rights and duties will be fully investigated. At this point it need only be said that if persons have rights then there is at least one duty, namely that of some person not to interfere in the carrying out of those rights.

13. A society may be made up of individuals of different R-I-B identities. But within such a society, we can speak of R-I-B spheres, each of which is made up of individuals possessing the same R-I-B identity. If the question is raised as to whether R-I-B identification is objective or subjective, the answer is that it is both. R-I-B identification is objective since there are physical facts about the self of the person which are accessible to every observer. R-I-B identification is subjective in the sense that pains and joys are. It is only to the person owning a particular R-I-B self that the phenomenological aspects of this self are a direct reality, which is to say that only R-I-B individuals with a Black self can, interiorly and directly, be acquainted with the matters such as those pertaining to the Black aesthetic and to the problem of the Black self and its transcendence.

14. All of these matters are a summary form of issues to be dealt with in chapters eight and nine.

15. Richard Wasserstrom, "Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination", Human Rights, Ed. A.I. Melden, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California, 1970), pgs. 96-111.

16. See William T. Hagan's American Indians (The University of Chicago Press, 1961).

17. A concise introduction to the problems of Blacks in Australia, a historical background, is to be found in F.S. Stokes' Racism: The Australian Experience (Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1972), Vol. 2.

18. William Shakespeare, The Sonnets Of William Shakespeare (Crown Publishers, New York, N.Y.

19. William B. Yeats, "The Symbolism Of Poetry", Poetry: Theory And Practice, Ed. Laurence Perrine (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p.75.

20. Roland De Vaux, Ancient Israel(McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1961), p.31.
21. This reconstruction of Jewish history is to be found in Cheikh Anta Diop's Nations Negres Et Culture(Editions Africaines, Paris, 1955).
22. These historical facts are obtainable in Roland De Vaux's Ancient Israel(McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1961); and in Gerald Leitingner's The Final Solution(Barnes & Noble Inc., N.Y. 1952).
23. A concise introduction to this conflict is given in Michael Selzer's The Aryanization Of The Jewish State(Black Star Book Company, New York, N.Y.1967).
24. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Ed. Peter Laslett(Cambridge University Press, 1970), pgs. 50, 302.
25. Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental Principles Of The Metaphysics Of Morals, Trans. T.K. Abbott(Longmans,Green And Co. Ltd. 6th. edition) pgs. 38-40.
26. George L. Mosse, Germans And Jews(Howard Fertig, New York, 1970), pg.43
27. This is discussed in chapter eleven.
28. Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental Principles Of The Metaphysics Of Morals, Trans. T.K. Abbott(Longmans, Green And Co. Ltd. 6th.ed.) p. 39.
29. These historical facts can be found in the texts given in notes 16, 17, 22, and 26.
30. For a good introduction to feminist literature, see Kate Millet's Sexual Politics(Avon Books, New York, N.Y.1969).

Chapter Vlll. The Refutation Of The Doctrine Of Transcendence

(1) In earlier chapters preceeding the presentation of the person-model I discussed what I have called the yearning to transcend one's blackness. What I showed in those chapters was that the ways of transcendence were not viable paths. An adherent of the doctrine of transcendence may therefore offer the following objections.

1. The discussions in the previous chapters showed only that the specific ways to achieve transcendence were untenable or non-viable ways. This therefore does not show the conception or idea of transcendence to be incoherent. In the absence of a disproof of the validity of all transcendence claims, these possibilities still remain:

- (a) The conception of transcendence is a coherent one.
- (b) The concept of R-I-B personhood can itself be dispensed with or transcended; consequently, the individual's rights, at least in part, cannot be said to derive from his R-I-B status.

In assessing the above-mentioned objections, I will discuss those basic ideas that pertain to the particular case of transcending one's blackness. In addition, I will discuss some cherished dogmas on which the doctrine of transcendence is based. This general conception of transcendence is to the effect that there is a way whereby a person derives his rights other than from the fact of his being black.

A Summary Of Dogmas In The Doctrine Of Transcendence

(2) In this chapter I am going to discuss a few important claims that are cherished as the cornerstone of the human condition. These claims are to be understood as dogmas of the doctrine of transcendence. First I will state the claim and explain how it is commonly or significantly interpreted, then I will discuss the claim within the framework of the person-model. The claims I will discuss in this order are the following:¹

1. I wish to be a person, not a black person.
2. I am not black primarily. I am a person.
3. I am not black primarily. I am a person:
 - (3a) I am human or I am a person. Therefore I have rights.
 - (3b) I am human or I am a person. Therefore I am equal.
 - (3c) I am a human or a person. Therefore I have equal rights.

While all of these dogmas are inter-related, in one such way that the first two dogmas are implied by the third, I have separated them out in the this way for the sake of convenience so that the third dogma is not stated first.² The first two dogmas will receive a brief but adequate analysis. The third dogma, which is the heart of the doctrine of transcendence, will receive a thorough analysis. In addition, the discussion on the third set of transcendence dogmas will shed light on the first two dogmas. I now proceed to the first dogma.

(3) The first dogma states: I wish to be a person, not a black person. The meaning of this statement which has always been taken to be clear and reasonable, will now be examined in the light of the person-

model.

The person-model showed that there are five levels of being a person. Granted that someone is an R-I-B person, in this case a black person, what does the claim amount to if he should say "I want to be a person?". Which person does he want to be?. In respect of what level of the person-model does he want to be a person?. As was explained in the introductory passage to the chapter on the person-model, the claim to be a person is made preliminary to claiming certain specific rights. Hence the claim to a right has to be preceded by a mention of the level of the person-model at which one asserts his personhood. In saying that he does not wish to be a black person the person says simultaneously that he does not want to be an R-I-B person. Hence he says implicitly, or as a consequence, that he does not wish to exercise his R-I-B rights. But he cannot at the same time exercise all of his other rights that correspond to the non-R-I-B levels of the person-model since he cannot be all the other persons at the same time. And in the absence of specifying in the person-model what person he wishes to be, it must be assumed that he wishes to be all of the persons in the universe of the person model, or that he wishes to assert his personhood at all levels of the person-model.³

But there still remains one other way of interpreting the claim. Perhaps the person means that he wants to be the person who can potentially exercise any of his non-R-I-B rights when he sees fit. But this interpretation will not do: The speaker, by wanting not to be black, gives up his R-I-B personhood which is a presupposition for

claiming his non-R-I-B rights; and, upon doing so, relinquishes his claim to personhood which can only be of a determinate sort,⁴ no matter the level at which the individual locates himself in the person-model. One's R-I-B identity is therefore uneliminable if one is to put oneself on a path to personhood. An examination of the second dogma now follows.

(4) The second dogma states: I am not black primarily.

I am a person.

The second dogma inasmuch as it states 'I am not black primarily', is easily seen to be related to the first which states 'I wish to be a person, not a black person. They are different dogmas in that the first dogma shows a belief, albeit an incoherent one in the light of the person-model, that one real kind of persons, which are R-I-B persons, do not exist or could logically be said not to exist even while there are other persons in the universe of the person-model. On the other hand the second dogma admits the reality of R-I-B persons, who in this case are black persons, but denies that they are the fundamental or real level of being a person in the terms of the person-model. The second dogma then goes on to state, without specifying, that some non-R-I-B level of being a person is the fundamental level of being a person, or that all the non-R-I-B levels collectively make up some fundamental or real way of being a person. The second dogma is unmeaning because it does not show an understanding that one cannot be a person simply. One must be a determinate sort of person. The level from which one makes the claim to be a person must be stipulated. The point is that the only level at which I can be a person primarily is at the R-I-B level. I now proceed to point out other similarities

and differences between the first dogma and the second dogma.

The first dogma states 'I wish to be a person, not a black person'. The second dogma states 'I am not black primarily. I am a person'. Another difference between these dogmas is that the second dogma shows an implicit belief that any concept of a person, excluding that of R-I-B personhood, contains the fundamental or real sense of the concept of a person; and as a consequence one's rights are derived from one's being a person simply. The first dogma also rejects the reality not of all kinds of R-I-B persons, but only of one R-I-B person, a black person, and also states implicitly that the believer in the dogma would rather be any R-I-B person other than a black R-I-B person.

A resemblance between the first dogma and the second dogma occurs because both dogmas contain the transcendence wish to escape the black self. The first dogma which states 'I wish to be a person, not a black person', clearly means 'I do not wish to be a black person'. The second dogma states 'I am not black primarily. I am a person'. What occurs implicitly in the second dogma is a contrast of the concepts of blackness, on the one hand, with the concept of a person devoid of any notion of blackness, on the other hand. In this implicit contrast that takes place in the second dogma the two concepts of being black and of being a person are regarded as being exclusive of each other. Thus the first and the second dogmas are seen to resemble each other in containing the rejection of one's being a person insofar as one is black. The rejection of one's being a person insofar as one is black is a rejection of one's R-I-B identity.

Accompanying this rejection of one's R-I-B identity is the belief that one can be a person in any sense except that of an R-I-B identity, and that one can be a person in any sense corresponding to any non-R-I-B level of the person-model. This yearning for another way of being a person other than a black person is what I have called the yearning to transcend the black self; and this yearning is the cry for transcendence. On the strengths of the first and second dogmas the transcendentalist may utter that the task of blacks is to transcend their blackness, and might state further that 'I can transcend my blackness' or 'I have transcended my blackness'. The chief items that I have pointed out in the second transcendence dogma are its notions concerning the status of R-I-B persons. These are questionable notions which will be examined in a later section entitled "A Theory Of Persons Rights, And Duties."⁵

The Dogmas of Persons, Rights, and Duties

5) The remaining set of dogmas belonging to the doctrine of transcendence are the following:

3. I am not black primarily. I am a person.

(3a) I am a person or I am human; therefore I have rights.

(3b) I am a person or I am human; therefore I am equal.

(3c) I am a person or I am human; therefore I have equal rights.

This latter set of dogmas constitute virtually the essence of the entire doctrine of transcendence. In the initial dogma labelled '3', the hypothetical transcendentalist claims that he is a person primarily. In the dogmas labelled '3a' through '3c', which are variants of '3', the claim of being a person recurs in such a way that 'person' may, but of course not necessarily, be used interchangeably with 'human'.⁶ These later dogmas following the dogma labelled '3' all assert claims about rights and equality. What is significant here is that it is on the strength of being a person or being a human that the hypothetical individual makes the claims that he is equal, that he has rights, and that he has equal rights. Stated differently with equal meaning, the hypothetical individual who asserts these dogmas may be taken to mean that either from the concept of a human or the concept of a person, or from both of them, that certain concepts such as rights, equality, and equal rights can be derived.

I have already referred to these preceding claims as belonging to the dogmas of transcendence, and I have also stated that they are all mistaken claims which are not completely or correctly understood. I therefore constructed a conception called the person-model which I will

later use to examine and to assess the claims contained or concealed in the dogmas. I also stated that I will put forward a conception of black personhood which will contain conceptions in lieu of the dogmas of transcendence. In effect the conception of black personhood would prescribe rules and duties which are distinct from and also quite likely to be opposed to the rules and duties concealed in the dogmas of transcendence. On a few occasions I have referred to the dogmas of transcendence as containing concealed items such as claims, rights and duties; however, it is certainly not obvious as to what these concealed items are. Later on in the examination of the dogmas I will state fully what these concealed items are, but presently I will give an example of a concealed item. A dogma of transcendence is seen to contain a concealed item in the following way. The second dogma states that the task of Blacks is to transcend their blackness. Inasmuch as the dogma stipulates a task for individuals it presupposes they have a duty which, in one sense, is what a task is. This supposed task of transcending one's blackness takes place only when certain procedures are followed. In other words, the act of transcending one's blackness is a goal which can be attained when certain procedures have been followed; and these procedures are duties. It should not be objected that 'task' is synonymous with 'duty' and that the duty in the transcendence dogma is not really concealed. The objection would be ill-placed since the concept of duty, including its moral sense, is wider than the concept of a task. One can speak of a task which one carries out, possibly under duress, which one is not morally required to carry out and wouldn't regard as one's duty. The point is that there is a concealed item, in this case a duty, in that upon explication the second dogma is

seen to contain duties for the individual; and this holds for the other transcendence dogmas.

6) Any examination of the transcendence dogmas must pay attention to how a hypothetical transcendentalist (an adherent of the doctrine) would choose to defend the doctrine of transcendence. One such way is not simply to defend transcendence, but for the transcendentalist to question the viability, or conceptual clarity, of the conception of black personhood, which is put forward as an alternative conception to transcendence. I will now outline the response of the hypothetical transcendentalist, in his defense of transcendence, and his attack on the anticipated doctrine of black personhood. Subsequently, I will explain this outline:

- a) What is your use of the concept 'person' in the putative doctrine of black personhood?
- b) How is blackness prescriptive of anything?
- c) Are not my rights, my duties, and my equality guaranteed by my being human, or by my being a person?.

I now proceed to explain the responses of the hypothetical transcendentalist. It is my contention that the claims of transcendence are based on mistaken notions concerning the concepts of persons, rights, and duties. It is therefore clear, that in discussing evaluatively the doctrine of transcendence, I must produce what I take to be the correct or coherent notions of persons, rights, and duties. In addition, these alternative and

correct notions are contained in a conception of black personhood which has as one of its precepts that blackness has prescriptive force in terms of rights and duties. Therefore the hypothetical transcendentalist is in order in asking that it be shown how blackness is prescriptive of anything. In effect, the assessment of the doctrine of transcendence will also clarify the conceptions of persons, rights, and duties that belong to the yet-to-be-given doctrine of black personhood. The model for the entire analysis will be the person-model. I now proceed to the examination which constitutes a theory of persons, rights, and duties.

A Theory Of Persons, Rights, and Duties

7) A very important thesis of the doctrine of black personhood is that blackness, which is the predominantly identifying characteristic of the black self and consequently of black individuals, has prescriptive force for actions. An objection which arises to this thesis is that blackness cannot be a prescriptive basis for any action and the objection is illustrated in this way: Any action prescribed for black individuals under the doctrine of black personhood would also be an action prescribed for individuals anywhere in the universe who are rational and are not black. The objection continues that a rule forbidding the murder of a Black by a Black would also be binding on a rational spider and would thereby forbid the murder of such a spider-person by another spider-person. I will later refer to this argument as the argument which seeks transcendence through the concept of a rational being. In the light of the person-model the rule forbidding murder would also be binding on these two different types of RIB individuals as a constraint on their conduct towards each other.

The objection therefore concludes that the prescriptive basis of the rule forbidding murder is not the RIB identity of the individuals but the rationality which they have in common; since, prescriptive rules for moral conduct on the levels of the person-model other than the RIB level are derived in accordance with criteria of rationality, which is the R-level, in which all RIB individuals have membership. The objection which, in the argument from transcendence through rationality, produced a moral rule binding on black individuals but which is not prescribed by blackness, is then generalized to assert that blackness is a determining criterion of nothing. Briefly, I will state here that the objection is partly right in that there are some rules binding on RIB individuals which are not related to their RIB identity. But the objection is seriously mistaken in claiming that one's RIB-identity is prescriptive of no rules. I will eventually discuss this objection at greater length but before doing so I will turn to some matters that are preliminary and necessary.

A prescriptive rule for moral conduct is a guarantor of rights, and such a rule forbidding murder guarantees to a person the right not to be murdered. These questions therefore arise: How do I, as a specific kind of RIB individual, know what my rights are?. What is the basis of my rights?. The chapter on the analogy to a spider implicitly contains the answers to these questions but these issues to be considered here were not dealt with explicitly since that chapter was concerned about issues of a different sort. What is sought in this chapter is a general doctrine of rights which demonstrates those factors relevant for determining rights. Such a conception will by implication show what factors are irrelevant for determining rights. But most importantly the conception

will show how to deduce a specific right once the right-determining factor is given. I now proceed to some preliminary considerations pertinent to this conception of rights.

By a right, I mean a course of action or a state of being that I can prescribe to myself.⁷ The prescribing of these rights does not take place solely in terms of the cognitivity or rationality shared by individuals in the person-model. Rather, this activity takes place in adherence to the imperatives of autonomy, self-continuation, and self-respect, that were deduced in the chapter on the person-model. Animals do not have rights since they are not rationally prescriptive of courses of action or states of being.⁸ To say that animals, or any individuals outside of the person-model, have rights is to speak metaphorically. I will now explicate the metaphorical sense in which animals and other entities outside the person-model have rights.

Animals have rights in the sense that plants, tables, chairs, mountainsides, and countrysides have rights. One context in which the so-called right of an animal is asserted is that in which it is claimed to be unnecessarily beaten. The beating is objected to on many grounds which include the question-begging one that it is wrong to cause pain unnecessarily to a sentient being. The ground is question-begging because it has not been established that it is because a being is sentient that it should not be caused pain. A similar type of right is asserted for a table, chair, or countryside when it is requested that the destruction stop. The so-called right asserted for the inanimate object is not based on a sensation state which it could not have. Yet

the right of the inanimate object not to be destroyed is asserted as vehemently as the right of the sentient animal not to be caused pain. The metaphorical sense in which animals and inanimate objects have rights is in their utility or aesthetic value for a rational being. The reason we, as RIB persons, transfer or extend the right is for the following considerations. With regard to the human R-S-B sphere, only R-I-B persons can claim rights. Individuals or entities that do not have R-level status, defined in the person-model in terms of cognitivity or rationality, are available to RIB individuals in the pursuit of their states of being or courses of action. Unnecessary damage to the animal or non-R-I-B entity lowers its utility to an unknown but possible RIB owner or enjoyer in the person-model. Since the potential R-I-B owner or enjoyer is unknown there is no one present to claim a right to the animal or non-RIB entity, and since only R-I-B persons can claim rights we transfer the right to the animal or non-R-I-B entity. This transference or extension of rights proceeds in accordance with the realization that if RIB individuals or persons have rights to courses of action and states of being that it would be counterproductive to allow a practice that could prevent these rights from being realized. This is how it comes about that animals, mountains, paintings, countrysides, and other non-RIB entities have rights; but as has already been explained this is only a metaphorical and not a real sense of having rights. I now proceed to discuss specific factors determining rights in the context of RIB persons only.

It has already been established that rights are related to duties in that while rights are the courses of action and states of being that

persons prescribe to themselves, duties are those steps or procedures taken to realize these self-prescriptions. The question that naturally arises at this point concerns a full and complete understanding of what it means for an RIB individual to say coherently 'I have a right'. The conditions for a coherent claim to a right can be found only in the relations between the person and the claimed right. The specific items to be discussed in evaluating the coherence of a claim to a right are then the following:

1. How it is that the thing claimed as a right followed from facts about the person
2. The specific right itself
3. The basis on which the RIB individual, who utters 'I have a right', identifies itself as 'I'. This is concerned about how the individual identifies his person. The basis of this concern is that 'I' designates some sort of person.

A very important point here is that my person is strictly 'that by which I identify myself'. Since one of the concerns here is to show how it is that my person is determinant of my rights the question arises as to what I mean by 'person' or the concept of a person. For the concerns at this point I mean 'person' in the following sense. Again, I will not be speaking of actual entities in one's bee-hive or garage, but of cognitive beings with a form other than human(primate), which the natural scientist may taxonomically use for the sake of convenience. Given the person-model with its universe of RUB persons some of whom are spider-like persons and human persons(a kind of primate persons), all of these are kinds of persons; and the rights for each kind of person will be different from the rights of all the other kinds. Having identified himself as a member of the R-U-B level of persons an individual can claim membership in the

R-S-B level which serves to identify him, for example, as a bee person and not as a spider person. But this kind of person-identification will not serve to identify him within his own R-S-B person-sphere as being, for example, Jimmy the spider as opposed to Michael the spider. What must be kept in mind is that the R-S-B level is concerned about a particular species-name. Consequently the R-U-B person cannot identify himself within the species by the species name. In other words the species-name partitions species or R-S-B person-types. However, having identified himself as an R-S-B person the individual may go on to claim specific rights that are pertinent to his well-being as, for example, a spider-person and not a bee person

What has been established up to now by the constant reference to the person-model is that 'person' is a relative term. My person, 'I', or 'me' is simply a function of my self-identification or a function of how I identify myself. What has been happening all along in the analysis is that there is an individual with a constant sense of 'I', and by this I mean an individual who remains the same while he shifts to different levels of the person-model to claim various types of rights. The question then arises as to what constitutes the permanence of the individual who travels through the universe of the person-model. What this points to is that there must be some level of being a person where the individual with a sense of 'I' can be located; and this level is the level of personal identity. From an examination of the person-model this is seen to be the R-I-B level which is the primary level basic to self-identification. The R-I-B person, or 'that by which an individual identifies himself' on the R-I-B level of the person model, is in part the sum of physical characteristics which, in my case, constitutes the personal awareness

of myself as being black.

It is this fundamental fact of personal awareness which governs in a distinct way the concept of a person from which the claim to a right follows. The peculiar relation between the concept of a person and the right deduced from the concept is, in effect, what constitutes the prescriptivity of the rules of rights and duties for persons. Prescriptivity may therefore be defined as the governing relation between a person and a right in such a way that the governing relation forces unique rights and duties for each kind of R-I-B person in the person-model. Hence inasmuch as blackness defines or constitutes the concept of this kind of R-I-B person, blackness is prescriptive of unique rights and duties for the black individual. This fundamental fact of prescriptivity therefore carves out a whole and separate sphere of rights and duties for me.

These have been preliminary discussions which have established among other things the prescriptivity of blackness, and the full extent of the meaning of this discovery and of other items in the preliminary discussions will be illustrated in the passages which now follow.⁹

The Refutation Of The Third Set Of Transcendence Dogmas

8) The entire doctrine of transcendence, in that it calls for the individual to transcend his blackness, states indirectly that blackness is prescriptive of nothing. This section is devoted to an extended analysis of those specific dogmas of the doctrine of transcendence which purportedly point to ways, other than blackness, from which the entire scope of rights and duties of the individual may be derived. The specific dogmas are as follows.

3. I am not black primarily. I am a person.

(3a) I am human or I am a person; therefore I have rights.

(3b) I am human or I am a person; therefore I am equal.

(3c) I am human or I am a person; therefore I have equal rights.¹⁰

All of these dogmas offer the following forms of transcendence.

1. Transcendence through the concept of a person

2. Transcendence through the concept of humanity

3. Transcendence through equality

An additional form of transcendence not contained in the dogmas 3a through 3c, but which will be discussed, is that of transcendence through national status. What follows is an argument in summary form which contains the easily identifiable transcendence dogmas. The position expressed is that of the hypothetical transcendendist. The argument follows;

My blackness is either accidental(incidental) or is irrelevant to me as a person. I do not wish to pursue this notion of blackness to be found in a yet-to-be-given doctrine of black personhood. I wish to pursue my humanity. As a member of humanity I wish to have the rights of humanity and to secure my equality with the rest of humanity. I therefore wish to pursue those forms of life under which my equality will be guaranteed. I seek a doctrine of equality, a doctrine of equal rights.

I, in opposition to the transcendentalist, wish to show that the transcendence argument is senseless. Equality implies a plurality of individuals having a right, indicated as a course of action or as a state of being. What has been revealed in the preliminary analysis was that there is a deductive connection of prescriptivity between some characteristic of the person and the thing claimed as a right. Prescriptivity therefore forces a certain criterion of equality with the result that there cannot be a coherent doctrine of equality or a doctrine of equal rights. I will state and discuss this criterion of equality in due course. The deduction of prescriptivity showed that a relevant characteristic of the person is the basis for the person's qualification to have the right. Persons lacking the relevant characteristic are excluded from having the right. Consequently it is only by virtue of being the specific kind of person I am that I can claim a right. Inasmuch as there are different kinds of R-I-B individuals or persons, there are different spheres of rights peculiar to these persons. In other words, unique spheres of rights correspond to unique R-I-B persons. To say that I am a person is

not by itself a sufficient basis on which I can claim rights. A look at the person-model shows the different levels at which I can claim personhood and shows also the rights specific to each level or sort of person. In addition 'person' is an abstraction, an indeterminate concept, just in case the use of the concept is not pinpointed with reference to the person-model. In all cases the persons who can claim rights are R-I-B individuals each of whom has a unique end determined by his R-I-B identity. In the pursuit of a unique end, a society of R-I-B individuals follows a unique way of life characterized by courses of action and states of being that guarantee their autonomy, the continuation of their R-I-B identity, and their self-respect. Hence, there are unique rights specific to individuals in a society where an R-I-B identity is an end for its moral and legal legislation. With regard to R-I-B rights, it would be pointless for an R-I-B individual to claim a right not belonging to his R-I-B society; since, an R-I-B right is claimed in order to promote one's end which can be found only in one's own R-I-B society. Transcendence through the various forms of equality, equal rights, national status, the concept of rationality, and the indeterminate concept of a person, can therefore be speedily denied at this point. Equality and equal rights can only be claimed with a view to one's R-I-B identity. Once one's R-I-B identity is transcended or ignored there cannot be a coherent claiming of rights.

The question about transcendence through national status is here also easily settled. A nation is either an extended society of one kind of R-I-B individuals or a larger grouping of different kinds of R-I-B individuals. In the case of a nation of one kind of R-I-B

individuals, national status serves to guarantee that the end of that kind of R-I-B individuals is met. Since the ends of R-I-B individuals are all different, national status cannot guarantee the end of more than one kind of R-I-B individuals. Transcendence through national status is therefore a non-possibility, and what really occurs in keeping with this dogma is that the transcendentist follows the end of another kind of R-I-B individual. The final kind of transcendence that remains to be dealt with is transcendence through humanity. This does not require a separate discussion since the analysis thus far indicates how this transcendence dogma concerning humanity should be handled. A brief look at the person model shows that 'human' designates a kind of person on the R-S-B level at times referred to as a species-person. Human is merely a person of primate form which is shared by monkeys, chimpanzees, and gorillas. Of all these primate forms, the only one in the person-model is the person called human. As was indicated by the person-model, 'human' is not a basic category of persons, but includes many such who are located on the R-I-B level of which black individuals are one such distinct R-I-B group or society. Distinct R-I-B groups have distinct ends which force the rights for the R-I-B individual corresponding to his R-I-B-group membership. Consequently, the assertion of an R-I-B individual that he is human is not by itself sufficient to secure rights for him. Within the sphere of human rights in the person-model the individual must select those rights that do not conflict with his own R-I-B end. One must recall at this point that rights include courses of action and states of being. It is then easily seen that the person-model

offers a basis for procuring and distributing those rights to individuals of differing R-I-B identities in ways compatible with their ends. This point in the discussion also provides the opportunity for stressing the point that 'person' is an abstraction and is meaningless just in case it is not specific and determinate with respect to some particular level of the person-model. While discussing transcendence through the concept of a rational being, further points about equality and national status are in order. Concerning equality it is clear that there can be no claim to equality of rights across R-I-B societies. Rights across R-I-B societies are simply different and devoted to the distinct ends of the R-I-B societies. It is only within his own R-I-B society that an individual may claim equality with a similar R-I-B individual. The same analysis holds for the transcendence dogma of national status where the would-be transcendentalist claims that his blackness is irrelevant in determining his rights, and that his national status completely secures his rights to him. National identity is simply one course of action, a right, that R-I-B individuals use to realize their R-I-B end. Insofar as the transcendence dogma of national status is not thoroughly understood and black R-I-B ends are not formulated, there cannot be a viable black nation state. This terminates the discussion and refutation of the transcendence dogmas and consequently also the refutation of the entire doctrine of transcendence. But further clarifications are in order concerning the concept of a person.

I pointed out that 'person' is a cluster-concept including the following two definitions where 'Q=' can be taken to mean 'can be understood as'.

Person C= that in virtue of which I claim a right

Person C= that by which I identify myself

However, 'that in virtue of which I claim a right' need not be understood in all cases as 'that characteristic of my person by which I identify myself'. Earlier in the discussion I said that the thing claimed by virtue of a right will be accompanied by criteria under which it can be had. Since not all persons will manifest the criteria relevant to the thing claimed they are different persons in the sense, for example, of R-I-B persons. But this does not show that they identify themselves as R-I-B persons on the basis of criteria relevant to the thing claimed.¹¹ This point can be illustrated by reference to the transcendence dogma of national identity.

Let 'voting' or 'the right to vote' be the thing claimed. Let 'qualifications for voting' be the characteristics of the person claiming the right to vote. Qualifications for voting in a single nation-state may cut across R-I-B identities. In other words, within the nation-state individuals of differing R-I-B identities may be qualified to vote. Yet the right to vote distinguishes persons but does not tie in with their self-identification. The real questions pertinent to this point are the following:

1. What is being voted for?
2. To what end or to whose end is the thing voted for; To which R-I-B end is the thing voted for pertinent?

In the light of the person-model the answers to these questions are that whatever is voted for is chosen in line with a particular self, in terms of a basis of self-identification. This brief clarification of the concept of a person has also dealt with one kind of person relative to a form of life which in the person-model was called the contingent person.

'Person' has been revealed in this chapter as a being with rights and duties to himself and to others. In answer to the question 'What is a person?', the answer is that one is an R-I-B individual who is a person just in case one appropriates to oneself those rights on all levels of the person-model which are pertinent to one's own R-I-B end.¹²

(9) The refutation of the doctrine of transcendence makes way for an alternative doctrine of black personhood which will be presented in the next two chapters. Some of the conceptual foundations of this alternative doctrine have already been presented in this chapter, and they constitute the prescriptivity of blackness. I will now make a brief summary of those facts that should be borne in mind while the conception of black personhood is presented in the next two chapters. Some of the claims made in this chapter are as follows:

- (a) Only persons may claim rights.
- (b) The determinate sort of person that claims the right, or rights, must be specified.
- (c) It is the sort of person I am that entitles me to claim a right.

One of the important facts relevant to the present undertaking was the establishment by the model that R-I-B persons are the fundamental part

of the concept of a person. The person-model showed that a necessary condition for claiming a right was that one be an R-I-B person. This does not, of course, mean that only R-I-B rights may be claimed. Once his R-I-B status is asserted one may go on to assert his non-R-I-B personhood, for example R-S-B personhood, and claim the right of a determinate non-R-I-B person on the corresponding non-R-I-B level. There is also the qualification that it is the sort of R-I-B person that I am which determines the kind of non-R-I-B right that I claim. The person-model showed that there are different sorts of R-I-B persons, or spheres of R-I-B persons, for whom it was asserted that their rights depend on peculiar facts about their distinct personhoods. The spheres of rights of these R-I-B persons have not been completely spelled out; but in the next chapter where I discuss the conception of black personhood I will discuss in considerable detail the rights of one sort of R-I-B persons, and these are black humans all of whom have a black self or are Africans. Now that the person-model has been put forward we are for the first time in a position to answer the question, "How is black or blackness prescriptive¹³ of anything (rights, duties, rules of conduct etc.)?"¹⁴ A study of the person-model shows that it is a necessary consequence that black persons have unique rights and duties, and the following discussion shows how this truth is established.

It is dependent on the kind of person I am that I can go on to claim rights. Granted that I am an R-I-B person I have R-I-B-type rights. Since there are different sorts of R-I-B persons, my being

the sort of R-I-B person that I am carves out a sphere of rights for me different from the rights of other R-I-B persons. The criterion that is relevantly related to the distinctness of my rights consist of those facts that establish me as a distinct R-I-B person; and these facts are the physicalistic and phenomenological aspects of my self pointed out in the enquiries on the black aesthetic and black history. My R-I-B sphere of rights is therefore derived or established with my R-I-B identity as the most important factor. A recurring factor to be kept in mind in the derivation of my R-I-B sphere of rights will be my R-I-B identity which belongs to the general concept of a person provided by the person-model.

1. The third dogma is to be understood as including items 3a, 3b, and 3c, whereas the second dogma is not to be so understood. This distinction has to be made to reflect accurately what people think. Some people will utter the second dogma, and in the course of conversation it can be easily seen that they are not making any of the more sophisticated claims detailed in 3a through 3c.

2. How it comes about that the first two dogmas are implied by the third dogma is that if, as is erroneously believed, all possible rights follow from one's being a person or being human, then, one's identifying oneself as black, or one's being identified as black, would seem to qualify one, as historically been the case, for a status that is less than human or less than the status of a person. The problem here, as pointed out in the person-model, is that there is no such entity as a human or a person simply, but only a determinate and specific human, or a determinate and specific person. As an inescapable consequence, one is always a black human or a black person. This fact of identification holds at all levels of the person-model and is of varying significance depending on the level of the person-model at which one finds oneself; the most important level for such an identification being the R-I-B level. The difficulty with trying to escape from the determinate or specific identification of the sort of person or sort of human that one is, is that there is a great neglect of the significance of the ways in which one's R-I-B identification affects one's rights and duties allotted to persons and to humans. This sort of requirement is not difficult to grasp; since, there are historical examples of the ways in which cultural and ethnic characteristics of a society affect its implementation of what may be taken to be a cross-societal right of a political sort. Ethnic and cultural characteristics are some, but not all, of the elements making up the concept of an R-I-B society.

3. Two specific examples are in order at this point in order to show how the claim to a right would proceed in the person-model.

Case 1. Take a society in which there are different R-I-B spheres of individuals, in which individuals are punished and rewarded in a significant degree that pertains to their physical appearance. This is the case in all parts of the world, and there would be no point served in citing any society for the apparent purpose of giving an example. In order to decide what punishment or reward is forthcoming to an individual, some knowledge must be had of his location in the person-model with respect to his R-I-B identity. This is borne out in history in the punishment, and possibly also the reward, of the Semites with respect to Europeans be they Romans or Nazis, Africans with respect to Europeans And Arabs, and Indians in the New World with respect to Europeans, and the list goes on. Within an R-I-B sphere there may also be conflict with attendant punishment, but it never approximates to the scale of inter-R-I-B conflict. Suppose in any one of these societies that programs are put forward to reduce inter-R-I-B conflict and to undo the harms caused to a sphere of R-I-B individuals. Such a program could work only if an individual, asking himself whether or not he qualifies for a benefit in such a program, i.e. whether he has a right to the benefit, could decide which R-I-B person he is. And those administering the program would also make the same judgment. It is not to be thought that I have been putting forward a proposal to minimize inter-R-I-B conflict; for, as I will show subsequently, R-I-B conflicts are ineradicable. Each sphere of R-I-B individuals has its own ends or goals, and the ends of different R-I-B spheres are either not harmonious or are inconsistent.

Case 2. This example is meant to point out specifically how at least one claim is allowed by the person-model. This is only a tentative statement since this question of rights and duties in the person-model will later on be fully discussed. On the most general

level of the person-model, the R-level, it is reasonable that all persons so inclined will develop an aesthetic. Hence the right, or claim to having an aesthetic, is automatically the right of every individual on other levels of the person-model. However, given the difficulties pointed out in the previous chapters dealing with the Black self, it is clear that the problems of the Black self coupled with the difficulties of the Black aesthetic pertain uniquely to black individuals. What is then discovered is that the person-model does not permit an individual to arbitrarily make the claim for any aesthetic; he can claim only an aesthetic keyed to his R-I-B identity. For individuals with a Black R-I-B identity, the person-model recognizes the connection between the Black R-I-B identity and their claim for a Black aesthetic, and also holds the solutions to these difficulties.

4. Given the undeniable connection between persons and rights such that it would be hard to conceive of persons subsisting without rights, and the fact that the person-model shows the necessity of the connection between the rights that one may claim and one's R-I-B identity, it is clear that there is an undeniable connection between having an R-I-B identity and being a person such that R-I-B identity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being a person. It is not a sufficient condition for being a person, for R-I-B individuals who cannot or do not exercise their rights in the person-model are not persons.

5. A question may linger on at this point concerning the grounds for an R-I-B identity. The question, or objection, runs as follows. An R-I-B identity is predicated on physicalistic and phenomenological facts about the person. Women are phenomenologically and physically different from men, and the body of feminist literature shows this. It would therefore seem that women are entitled to a place in the person-model with the full powers to claim rights as R-I-B persons.

The answer to this query is that women are not R-I-B persons. Neither are men R-I-B persons. The element of gender makes an

individual a contingent person, and as such he does have rights. However, whatever rights the gender-contingent person has are relative to the R-I-B sphere to which the individual belongs. There are no such things as women's rights or men's rights in a blanket fashion. Only by locating myself in some determinate R-I-B sphere can I, this gender-contingent person, claim men's or women's rights in the person-model.

6. Items 3a through 3c are not to be understood as being separate from item '3'. They should be understood as being constitutive of item '3'.

7. In this use of the concept of 'right' I am following, to some extent, T.H. Green in his Principles Of Political Obligation. It should be pointed out that Green was heavily influenced by Kant. On the basis of Kant's use of the concept of rationality, and on his categorical imperative, my general statement here about what a right is, is in order. To make a prescribed action more specific Kant supplied his own concept of humanity being an end in itself. This would be alright if all humanity were not significantly different as well as significantly alike in many respects. T.H. Green saw one aspect of this difficulty, namely that of the question of societal differences; so that the relevant end for moral and political legislation could not be humanity, but would have to be the society itself which human beings could cast in very interestingly different sorts. The important aspect that Green missed, as well as Kant, is that the principle for society, no matter what form it takes, is to the effect that an R-I-B end is the fundamental end to which a society must be subordinated.

8. This sentence is meant to be taken in the sense which Immanuel Kant defines the practical will in the Critique Of Practical Reason. However, I do not imply that Kant supplies the foundation for what I assert in connection with rights.

9. The theory of persons, rights and duties is to be understood as continuing throughout the following section entitled in the text "Examination Of The Dogmas Of Transcendence", and entitled in the table of contents "The Refutation Of The Third Set Of Transcendence Dogmas".

10. Discussions of the traditional sort of human rights and equality occur in Locke's Treatise On Civil Government, Hobbes' Leviathan, Spinoza's Tractatus Politici, and Rousseau's Social Contract. Discussions of a more modern sort occur in A.I. Melden, ed., Human Rights. Two of the contributors in this anthology, Vlastos and Wasserstrom, find it convenient to equate natural rights with human rights. My work is neither a discussion of the essays in this anthology nor is it a reaction to them specifically or to essays of their genre. These essays, modern though they may be, are part and parcel of the traditional views on which notions of equality and human rights rest. Vlastos in his essay "Justice And Equality" Offers criteria of well-being and freedom as grounds for human rights. Wasserstrom, in his "Rights, Human Rights, And Racial Discrimination", takes Vlastos to task for the inability of his suggestion, among other shortcomings, to deliver any specific rights. I have no reason to take Vlastos to task since his concerns are not mine. Wasserstrom, however, in his essay, comes somewhat near the periphery of the subject of the R-I-B person. Wasserstrom adopts Vlastos' criterion that each person's well-being and freedom has equal worth. Wasserstrom then takes the American South as a case study for the application of this principle. Finding it not applied to black individuals, he castigates the American South. But he could have repeated the investigation for any other part of the world and found Vlastos' principle not in application anywhere. What my work does, and here it departs from the traditional approach and the supposedly modern approach, is that it does not a priori legislate rules pertaining to the equality, rights, and duties of persons without regard to the fundamental reality of personhood which is grounded in the R-I-B identity of individuals.

11. Amelie Rorty holds a variant of this claim when she writes, in her essay "The Transformation Of Persons", that some externally identifying characteristics of a person, those on which another person might identify someone, need not be what he takes to be an element on which he grounds his self-conception. This is not to indicate Rorty holds my view on persons as revealed in the person-model.

12. To be more perspicuous this should be restated as follows: One is a person when, as an R-I-B individual, one appropriates to one's self those rights on all levels of the person-model which are pertinent to one's own R-I-B end.

13. Prescriptivity is defined on page 145.

14. This is a very old question, though not so recognized because it has never been explicitly phrased. The work of the early thinker Edward Blyden shows this concern, and some of his thoughts are summarized in Andrew Billingsley's "Edward Blyden: Apostle Of Blackness" in Chrisman and Hare, ed., Pan Africanism.

Billingsley characterizes Blyden as 'an apostle of blackness' and attributes to him a 'futuristic sense of black peoplehood'. Viewed from the standpoint of the conception of black personhood, Billingsley is quite wrong. While Blyden makes some suggestions that are consistent with my conception of black personhood, some of his other suggestions conflict with and are clearly forbidden by the conception of black personhood. I now point out some of Blyden's salient mistakes. Blyden rejects Christianity, and rejects also the mulattoes whom he considers a hindrance to Black progress. These two rejections might lead an unwary person to believe that Blyden's sense of black peoplehood has some kinship with my conception of black personhood. This belief would be mistaken. For while Blyden rejects Christianity, he puts forward Islam thereby committing himself to the doctrine of

transcendence. Apart from his experience in Liberia which culminated in his rejection of the mulattoes, Blyden has no theoretical understanding of the mulatto condition. There is clearly in Blyden a revolt against the Black condition as he understood it, and in attempting to deal with it he suggested building a sort of Black togetherness and unity. However, Blyden does not really have a positively comprehensive doctrine that would stand scrutiny from the standpoint of the conception of Black personhood.

Chapter IX. The Conception Of Black Personhood

(1) The concept of black personhood is concerned about those conditions under which an individual with a black self can be a person. This concept is therefore importantly concerned about those unique facts about blackness which constitute my person. The concept of black personhood also concerns itself with the conditions for the awareness of my self-worth. This concept therefore provides answers to questions of this kind: What is the worth of a black person?. 2. Given that I am this black person, what is the relevance of this black self to the rest of the world?. 3. What is the relevance of the rest of the world to me?. 4. What should I do in the world or with the world?. 5. Does my unique personhood give me unique duties?. 6. Are there any actions essentially required of me because I am black?. The person-model provided answers to these questions, and the section on the prescriptivity of blackness specifically asserted the prescriptive force of blackness. The concept of black personhood goes one step further in showing what it is that blackness is prescriptive of if I am to be a person.

(2) The rights of the black self, through which it can attain its own personhood by being an R-I-B individual, are three. The deduction of these rules of personhood was carried out in the previous chapter:

1. Autonomy
2. Self-continuation
3. Self-respect

I will now take these R-I-B rights and derive from them specific rights

of an R-I-B person. I will show how, in keeping with the person-model, these three rights lead to R-I-B black rights.

(3a) The imperative of autonomy is as follows: Obey at all times those rules that uniquely pertain to the black self. To say that I am autonomous is to say that I prescribe laws or duties for myself. But I am one individual self out of a vast collection of black selves, and since it is impractical for each individual self to make his own laws or to prescribe for himself alone what rules he should apply to himself it would then seem as if I can never be autonomous. But this is not really so. To say that I am autonomous is to say that I follow rules pertaining to this black self that I would want other individual black selves to follow. In other words, to say that I am autonomous is to say that I, this individual black self, follow rules which I would prescribe to myself were I so empowered. In terms of specific rules and duties, as one of the conditions to be later expanded on, one important condition for autonomy is that the collective black self is autonomous just in case it follows or actively promotes those rules that uniquely pertain to the black self. But when does a rule uniquely pertain to the collective or individual black self?. Given that I make laws for myself I thereby bind myself to obey them. But what if the law cannot be fulfilled in my lifetime?. In other words, the law tells me what duties should be done by black individuals for the sake of the collective black self, of which they are the constitutive members, and it is quite likely that many of these significant

duties, some of which will later be detailed, cannot be accomplished in the lifetime of an individual black self; and it also amounts to saying the same thing that there are specific duties that cannot be accomplished in the lifespan of a given set of members of the collective black self at any given time in history.

(3b) If I cannot fulfill in my lifetime those rules prescribed for the sake of the black self then another duty falls on me. This other duty is that of self-continuation. The imperative for this duty is as follows: I must continue myself in order to guarantee the applicability of the rule to the black self which constitutes my R-I-B identity.

Concerning this imperative of self-continuation the following question arises in a negative frame of mind: Given the black self from which I cannot escape, must I pass on to my children this legacy of difficulties brought out in the analysis of the black aesthetic? In my children I see myself. My self is none other than the basis of my black personhood. The question of whether I should have black children amounts to the question of whether I should continue myself. This all comes down to the question of what obligation I have to continue this black self. Inasmuch as the previous analysis concerning the concept of blackness is taken to be final and irrevocable, there cannot be respect for the black self which is the basis of black personhood. But there is a solution to the problem of the black aesthetic, which I will present in the final chapter, which offers an alternative analysis

for the concept of blackness and consequently offers a basis of respectability for the black self. But even in the absence of this alternative conception of blackness the person-model implies that R-I-B individuals must have respect for their unique personhoods. Granted that I have respect for my personhood I must follow its laws. The laws which I am due to obey cannot prescribe action for the past, and they cannot prescribe action only for the present. These laws are future-directed and my lifetime need not extend far enough into the future to accomplish the goals of these laws. I must therefore continue the black personhood in me, i.e. through my offspring, so that the laws may be carried out. In what follows in the next chapter I will show that there are two ways in which the rule of self-continuation can be made concrete: First, I can continue myself by having black offspring. Secondly, I must secure a geographical territory in which I can express the duties prescribed by my R-I-B status. I now proceed to discuss the third rule of black personhood.

(3c) What then is the status of my black personhood? Granted that I am a person, and therefore rational, I understand the necessity of the laws that I prescribe to myself. It is my black personhood for the sake of which all the laws governing my actions have been prescribed. Hence black personhood has the highest value for me. For black personhood I must have respect. I can feel secure in all my actions if I know they are undertaken for its sake.

(3d) The three imperatives making up the conception of black personhood point to an important fact about the black self or the R-I-B

black identity. Inasmuch as the autonomy of the black individual is always in keeping with the self-continuation and the self-respect of the black self, the black R-I-B identity is something for which all actions are undertaken and is therefore an end.

Chapter X. Application And Further Explication Of The Concept Of Black Personhood

(1) The three rules of black personhood are criteria for action. In the light of these criteria I will examine the actions of the resurrected African past for the reason that the past has always been singled out as a model for present action. Between the African past and the present there is an interval called the era of imperialism or colonialism which is viewed as interruptive of the past of the collective black self.¹ The present, or the time following the interruptive period, is viewed as the period in which we can resume our past African glory and thereby attain our personhood.² The present is seen as the time for throwing off the colonial yoke and its vestiges, and for affixing ourselves to the past.³ The interruptive era of colonialism or imperialism is viewed as the source of many of our difficulties in the present; consequently, the interruptive period receives much of our studied attention under the notion that its influences have diverted or cut us off from the African past, given us problems that are traceable to the interruptive stage which keeps us from linking up with the past.⁴ Our task in the present is therefore twofold:

1. To rid ourselves of the intervening heritage
2. Deciding on a basis for action in the present, part of which includes linking up with our past

In opposition to these notions concerning the past of the collective black self, notions which were fully discussed in the chapter on the

historical approach to the problems of the black self, I put forward a twin thesis which while it serves as a reinterpretation of history also serves as an empirical application of the conception of black personhood. The twin thesis is as follows;

1. The interruptive period is the improper object for the focus of our attention.
2. The past is not our desired object as a source of imperatives for our conduct.

I now proceed to discuss the twin thesis. The interruptive period occurred not because of anything intrinsic to itself but because of our lack of certain concepts. Our desire for the past is pointless since, as I will later show, we then also lacked these concepts. The proper focus of our attention is the acquisition of these concepts contained in the conception of black personhood. In confirmation of the twin thesis I will analyze the past and the present of the collective black self in the light of the imperatives of black personhood. Prior to doing this I will consider another reason as to why the interruptive period is improperly focussed on.

The interruptive period of imperialism or colonialism which took place roughly between the eighteenth and the early part of the twentieth century has been improperly focussed on under the mistaken notion that it has been the only interruptive period. Egypt, Ethiopia, Axum(after the destruction of Meroe), and Arab penetration of Northern Africa, are all interruptive periods. The real question is not why the last interruptive period of European occupation occurred, but why

these interruptive periods have all occurred. The answer is not to be found in examining the character of each occupying set of individuals, but in looking more closely at ourselves. An ascription of blame and responsibility to non-black individuals frees us from those aspects of blame and responsibility. While such a condemnation of the alien R-I-B group comforts us in our miseries of oppression, we fail in a very important task which is that of our becoming persons; for only persons can be blameworthy and responsible. Since the problem for the black self is to achieve its personhood, part of which requires the ending of these interruptive periods, the proper concern should be not with alien R-I-B groups but with ourselves and with those actions we should prescribe to ourselves in influencing events that befall us. In the course of the analysis I will apply the conception of black personhood as a way of arriving at these actions that we should prescribe to ourselves.

The earlier explanation of the rules of black personhood considered Blacks as one kind of R-I-B persons having R-I-B rights. At that point it was explained to some extent what is required for black individuals to be black persons. These considerations have not been put forward merely for speculative purposes, and in keeping with the practical applications outlined in the preceeding paragraphs of this section I now proceed to apply the concept of black personhood to the past of the collective black self.

An application of the rules of black personhood to the past is a tool for examining the past, a method of analysis, and since these are rules of black personhood, the application of the method tells us

whether we were persons in the past. The same holds for the application of the rules to the present. Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that the primary concern in an application of the concept of black personhood is to explain this concept to as full an extent as possible so that fruitful work could be started in the pertinent areas of study to make the conception of black personhood actual or concrete, i.e. to make black individuals persons. In discussing the past and the present I do not intend to focus on every detail in history. My task is to focus on a sufficient number of these significant events which offer an empirical basis for the explanation or application of the conception of black personhood.

(2) One of the much vaunted contentions of contemporary writers is that in the African past we were autonomous and that we made laws for ourselves. Evidence for this autonomy is brought forward in the mention of Egypt, Carthage, Ethiopia; the moslem kingdoms such as Mali, Timbuktu and the Sudan; and finally the later and 'more indigenous' kingdoms of Ghana and Songhai. Early cultural nurturing of the black individual focusses on these stages of empires and kingdoms in the African past by citing their virtues in some such way as the following: Here we are the inheritors of a glorious African past from which we have been rudely cut off by savage non-Africans, the newcomers to civilization. Why should we in a world controlled by non-Africans (or non-blacks) be so victimized as to be victims of racism?. When our ancestors ruled the world things were quite different. I now proceed to analyze a few details of this past in things were supposedly quite different.

To say that Egypt or Ethiopia or any other African form of civilization made laws is to say that blacks in Africa followed rules which prescribed for them their rights and duties. If we at that time prescribed rules for ourselves we must then have showed in our activities that we were autonomous, self-continuing, self-respecting, and that our R-I-B identity was the end of our law-making or prescriptions. I do not know in what sense I can understand Egypt, Ethiopia, or any other such nation-state or empire being autonomous. Egypt, Carthage, and Ethiopia were never concerned with Africa except in a predatory sense. These kingdoms or empires cut themselves off from Africa and carried on dealings with the people of the mediterranean world. Law-making in Egypt, Carthage and Ethiopia could not then have been carried out to prescribe rules and duties to Africans who were black. What occurred at that time was, by reference to the person-model, a set of activities on an R-S-B level which never could have brought the benefits of the R-I-B level, which is the fundamental or real level of being a person. These non-R-I-B-level activities formed the scope of our actions which we carried on when we had Africa to ourselves, and it can be shown that it was these activities in this early period that set the stage for later events that befell us.⁵ In resurrecting the African past what is ignorantly lauded about our activities at this time of our existence was a state in which we did not act on an R-I-B level and thereby take on ourselves the responsibility of being autonomous.⁶

- Concerning the Moslem empires or kingdoms of Mali and Timbuktu nothing good can be said of them in terms of the conception of black

personhood. These are empires in which blacks are followers of Islam and are engaged in religious transcendence.⁷ The analysis of religious transcendence showing how it subverts the attainment by the black individual of his personhood has already been given in the section on religious transcendence and does not need to be restated here. But briefly, the analysis concerning religious transcendence is that inasmuch as I seek to transcend my black self, my blackness, or my R-I-B identity, I cannot then go on, in accordance with the person-model, and be autonomous; for the person-model shows that I am autonomous insofar as I follow those rules pertaining uniquely to my R-I-B status. But centuries have elapsed by the time of the 'indigenous' empires of Ghana and Songhai, and the centuries-old practice of neglecting autonomy for the black self is the experience on which these later kingdoms must draw. It is the neglect of autonomy which must form one of the pillars in the construction of their culture. Subsequent analysis will show how this neglect of autonomy is carried out. These analyses will also shed further light on the concept of autonomy as the remaining rules of black personhood are discussed. I now proceed to another rule of imperative in the conception of black personhood. This is the rule of self-continuation.

(3) If the collective black self self was autonomous in the past and made rules for this self, it must have been understood in the past that this self has to be continued if the rule is to be applicable to it or if the self is to carry out the law bound up with the rule. For I cannot systematically prescribe to myself rules of conduct which

I never intend to carry out, and in so prescribing I must see to it that I continue so that the law is made actual. What all of this boils down to is that I must continue myself in the form of my offspring who carry my R-I-B identity. There are two ways in which self-continuation is secured for the individual black self and subsequently for the collective black self:

- (a) There must be secured a territory over which only the black self has sole jurisdiction so that it can be guaranteed that these activities prescribed by the imperative of autonomy are carried out.
- (b) But the individual black self or the collective black self cannot prescribe future action for itself and simultaneously or subsequently act so as to discontinue the black self either by alteration or by outright extinction. This requirement of self-continuation is precisely that of reproduction for the sake of continuing an R-I-B identity that is black.

I now proceed to apply the rule of self-continuation to the African past.

The territory to be secured in the African past was the continent of Africa. But the territorial integrity of Africa was never secured. The Egyptians thought that their task was to secure their own borders from the rest of Africa and to carry out looting and punitive expeditions in the rest of Africa. Ethiopia and the other nation-states did likewise.

But how were Egypt and Ethiopia conforming to the rest of the rule concerning self-continuation through reproduction?. The individuals in these kingdoms did not understand who they were in terms of their R-I-B identity. They could not seriously have prescribed laws to themselves since their continual intermarriage with the people of the mediterranean physically and actually ends their black R-I-B identity which is the end of their lawmaking. In such a prolonged activity which they indulged in, no serious lawmaking for the purpose of actualizing the rules of black personhood could have taken place since the collective black self was acting to discontinue itself. I now proceed to discuss the rule of self-respect.

(4) If I am autonomous, which is to say that I prescribe laws to myself in accordance with my R-I-B identity, then I must be in a certain relation or attitude toward myself. I understand that my R-I-B identity, my blackness, is that of which I must take chief cognizance in prescribing laws to myself. I therefore immediately understand that the black self is something which commands my highest respect, something which I must always cherish. Consequently, I understand there are things I must never do to myself, meaning the black self in my person, and also that there are things I must never do to or with myself. In general, however, I am prohibited from doing those things which will either end my R-I-B identity or will remove my R-I-B identity as the end of my actions. The preceeding remarks on self-respect are additional guidelines for my negative and positive duties. Consequently, if I lose my self-respect I have empirical or real evidence that I have ceased to be a person. What this condition of self-

respect in the African past?. Having examined the adherence to the rules of self-continuation I am now in a position to consider self-respect while I make the following observations on autonomy and self-continuation.

Given the kingdoms and empires of Egypt, Ethiopia or Carthage, the collective black self lived in a context in which the marriage practices with individuals of non-black R-I-B identity call for discontinuing the black self. The Moslem kingdoms of Mali and Timbuktu forced, by means of Islam, the activity of transcending the black self through religious transcendence. The territory of Africa is not secured against occupation by individuals of non-black R-I-B identities. This kind of occupation has taken place in the Northern and North-Eastern regions of the continent where settler populations imposed their own R-I-B ends on all of the African kingdoms, empires and nation-states that have been previously mentioned. Since individuals with different R-I-B identities have different ends which are not compatible with each other, and since these are ends which give substance to the three rules of autonomy and self-continuation, the autonomy and the self-continuation and subsequently the self-respect of individuals having a black R-I-B identity is thwarted. This subversion of the ends of individuals having a black R-I-B identity will later be discussed at full length in the chapter entitled "The Concept Of Domestication". I will now make some final remarks on self-respect within the context of autonomy.

Since none of the laws for self-respecting conduct, in the way of autonomy and self-continuation, had as their end the R-I-B identity of the black self, the condition in which the collective black self approached the interruptive period, of colonialism and imperialism, can be described as follows(In other words, this condition of the black self, prior to the interruptive period, is typified by rules of a spurious or alien personhood that the collective black self has been actualizing): The northern part of Africa, which is occupied by persons of other than black R-I-B identities, has been the gateway through which its resources, population and natural resources, have passed out to benefit non-African peoples; and in no sense is this autonomous conduct. I cannot, for example, make laws for a collective black self whose members I will dispose of as slaves; since, the law is put forward to each individual with the understanding that each individual will obey the law in the pursuit of his own R-I-B end, whereas slavery makes him a mere means or object without an end. Furthermore, I cannot neglect securing my territory in which the collective black is located under the illusion of transcendence that such security forms no part of my interest since I am not essentially black but a person. Having acted in this manner, I cease to be a person. What I then become is to be shown later in the doctrine of expectations which tells me to expect to be domesticated; since if I cannot secure my own ends then I must secure someone else's. This suffices for an application of the concept of black personhood to the African past. In the next section I apply the conception of black personhood to the present, which is the

period following the interruptive period of colonialism or imperialism.

(5a) The question that now arises is concerned directly with the conduct of the individual or collective black self in the present time and is also concerned with the future of the black self if only indirectly. What was pointed out in the previous section was that the collective black self in the past did not measure up to the standards of conduct required by the imperatives of black personhood. It was further pointed out that it was because the collective black self lacked the concepts underlying the conception of black personhood that certain events, one of which I termed the interruptive period, have occurred. Consequently, it was pointed out that all efforts to draw upon the African past for a guide to conduct in the present time are wasted. Since the alien R-I-B individuals who imposed the interruptive period on the collective black self are not fundamentally our concern, for reasons pointed out in the previous section, all modes of enquiry for those eternal standards of conduct for the black self which focus upon the interruptive period produce only reactive doctrines. These reactive doctrines which force upon the black self a conception of its own action only in response to the actions of alien R-I-B groups, and thereby removes from the black self the concept of an initiative, denies personality to black individuals insofar as one is a person just in case one acts from standards originating within oneself. What I am arguing indirectly is that in the absence of the conception of black personhood, problems of the black self are to be found significantly in the present period in the light of the conception of black

personhood. I now proceed to examine the present period of the existence of the collective black self in the present time.

(5b) The conditions for autonomy that were applicable in the past are also applicable to later times. This means that although historical conditions have changed, the criteria of autonomy remain constant. As I apply and explicate the rules of black personhood I will specify those relevant historical conditions that have changed. The application of the rule of autonomy was to the past of the collective black self as it existed in Africa. The collective black self of the present, however, has been dispersed from Africa and now exists also in North America and the Caribbean. There are individual black selves in other parts of the world, but the focus of the concept of autonomy for the purposes of this study will be Africa, North America, and the Caribbean.

The current story concerning the autonomy of the collective black self in the present is that having shaken off the yoke of non-African domination, in the form of imperialism and colonialism, we are now self-governing and to that extent we are therefore autonomous. The competing story concerning our autonomy is that we are subtly controlled by non-African or non-Black sources for reasons which do not work toward our benefit, and that we are therefore not autonomous. I do not find either account comforting. If the first story were true, and could be demonstrated, the second story would not have the widespread currency that it does. The second story does not have much substance since non-African or non-Black R-I-B persons while they have

a moral obligation not to work against us have no obligation to work for us or to enhance our well-being. That other R-I-B agencies work to attain subtle control over us and thereby accrue benefits for themselves has no relevance to the rules governing conditions for our autonomy. The relation of them to us is one whereby they propose to themselves certain ends or goals that they would like us to see as our own ends, and in doing so hope to profit from our joint actions. Another reason that all of this detailing of their behavior has no bearing on the conditions pertaining to our own autonomy is that in their policies towards us they see us as mere instruments or means to their own ends; and were we no longer important to them as means or objects to their own purposes they would cease to have a working relationship with us, and in that case we would still have to work out for ourselves the peculiar conditions for our own autonomy. In other worlds we fail to be autonomous not for reasons consisting of what they do to us but because of reasons concerning what we fail to do for ourselves. A note should be added at this point concerning the relationship of ends and means between different sorts of R-I-B persons. Non-Black R-I-B persons see us as mere instruments to their ends not because these other R-I-B persons are immoral. What is more pertinent here is that we do not figure in their scheme of things. What I mean is that their task in the world is to fulfill certain duties to themselves which are in conformity with their R-I-B identity. A similar duty is binding on us with the result that they and we have the task to exclude each other in the prescribing and the actualizing of our

duties. Persons of a non-Black R-I-E identity cannot view our end as tied up with theirs or as something they must achieve. Rather they are forced to view our end as something we ourselves must achieve. One item in the relationship between different sorts of R-I-B persons is that of trade, and while this is not an economics inquiry I wish to make the point that we, i.e. black R-I-B persons, have an improper attitude toward our resources in general i.e. natural resources and population resources. Whereas in the past we traded off our population resources, i.e. slaves, for the sake of 'goods' or material products possessed by other R-I-B groups, we now deplete our land areas of the natural resources to trade them off for 'goods' that we come to believe constitute part of our ends. Thus far I have talked about an improper attitude toward our resources in general, an attitude which consists partly in our having ends or goals which are not really ours. But the question arises as to what bearing a discussion concerning our improper attitude toward our resources has to do with autonomy. The question is well placed and in answering it I will lay down general conditions which apply to the specific issue of our attitudes toward our resources in general which are our population and our natural resources.

(5c) Part of what it means to say that I am autonomous is that I prescribe rules for duties governing my conduct. As was shown in the preliminary explanation of the rules of black personhood, the facts to be kept in mind while legislating rules for myself are the following:

- (a) self-continuation
- (b) self-respect
- (c) The postulate that my R-I-B status, i.e. my black personhood is an end in itself

I will consider these facts of personhood in explaining autonomy with respect to the problem of our attitude toward our resources in general. The resources mentioned were our population resources and our natural resources. The peculiar fact involved in the handing over of our population resources, in the form of slaves in this case, to non-Black R-I-B persons during so-called trade transactions was that this practice did not end when we chose, but rather ended when our trading partners decided to end it seeing that the continuation of the practice was not in keeping with their own ends. The same holds for our other resources, in this case our natural resources, at this moment in the period that I call the present: Their exploitative use will end when our trading partners no longer find them conducive to their own ends. In the case of our population resources if the practice had gone on for another century the continent would have been depopulated. In the case of our natural resources it seems likely, given existing trading conditions, that we will lose all of them. But in the case of our population resources certain African tribes, representing parts of the collective black self, grew 'wealthy' by acquiring the trinkets of our non-Black R-I-B trading partners. And in the case of our natural resources certain sectors of the collective black self claim to have gotten wealthy. But how do these 'trade' practices violate our economy?. I will later show this. But tentatively the answer is that

goods or materials do not contribute toward our end, as has been explained in the conception of black personhood, and such a trading arrangement that the black self has historically prescribed to itself could not further its autonomy. I now proceed to make further remarks about autonomy.

In all cases of law-making the end of those prescriptions is my R-I-B identity; therefore, I must legislate rules that are prescriptive of duties which further the well-being of this R-I-B identity. I now proceed to an example of a practice which contains a prescription that could not further the well-being of the black self. The example is that of slavery. There are two kinds of slavery. One kind of slavery takes place within a sphere of one sort of R-I-B individuals in which case these individuals having a similar identity enslave each other. The other kind of slavery is one in which individuals of one R-I-B identity enslave individuals of a different R-I-B identity. Slavery within the sphere of R-I-B black persons is disallowed for reasons apart from there being no loss to the collective black self. But slavery beyond the boundary of our R-I-B sphere causes a loss to the collective black self and discontinues it. It must be kept in mind that law-making, a condition for autonomy that takes place within the confines of the concept of black personhood, considers every individual black person as an agent who will carry out the duties prescribed by the law. But I cannot, as happens in the practice of slavery, prescribe duties to the collective black self and then act so as to discontinue that self. No thought of the amount of the amount of gain received for

the exchange of our population resources can ever be part of our end; since, this end is always to be considered with a view to furthering the progress of the collective self, and the trading of our population resources diminishes and finally ends this self.

Concerning the loss of our natural resources through trade, this practice has to be halted immediately, and it is clearly seen why. If we ever hope to be autonomous, which in effect means prescribing duties to ourselves, then we must have resources with which to make our duties actual. The continued loss of our natural resources will one day place us in the unenviable position of lacking the means to carry out our duties. This will be tantamount to our corollary position in the past when having begun trading away our population resources in the early times of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Carthage, we later found ourselves lacking the means to fulfill certain duties such as safeguarding our territory in order to continue ourselves. This suffices for the discussion of the key aspect of resources in the general question of autonomy. In summary the two conclusions derived are conditions for autonomy, and they constitute some of our moral imperatives; they are as follows:

1. The safeguarding of our population resources is basic to our having moral agents who will carry out their responsibilities and duties specified along the lines of the concept of black personhood.
2. The safeguarding of our natural resources is basic to our making our duties actual.

I now proceed to explain and to apply the rule of self-continuation in the present.

(51) Self-continuation is a significant rule in the concept of autonomy for if I do not expect to continue myself it would be absurd for me to prescribe rules to myself stipulating my future conduct. The prime ministers, presidents, and other political leaders of countries in which the collective black self finds itself have traditionally been the exponents of the concept of autonomy. What I will show in this section is that the concept of autonomy with respect to the rule of self-continuation has not been understood, and what is quite significant is that black political leaders have shown by their actions that they do not really understand this concept. In discussing the rule of self-continuation at this point I will focus on what I choose to call the mulatto question. I will state in a while what I mean by the 'mulatto question' and I will tentatively define 'mulatto' as 'the offspring of the union of two individuals of different R-I-B individuals of different R-I-B identities at least one of which is black'. One of my concerns in this entire work has been to discover those rules that prescribe or prohibit duties or actions for the individual or collective black self insofar as these actions contribute to the actualization of black personhood. My concern is in part, and at this point, with the moral basis of action. The point raised about the mulatto question is whether the rule 'Create mulattoes' is a moral one. The method for deriving the answers is a very straightforward. I ask myself, "Can I prescribe as a duty to myself as an individual black self,

or to any member of the collective black self, that I choose to continue myself in a mate not of my R-I-B identity?". Prior to discussing the answer it will be recalled at this point that continuing oneself means to have offspring. The answer follows. I cannot continue myself through a mate who has an R-I-B identity different from my own. In having offspring with someone having an R-I-B identity different from my own I end my own R-I-B identity since the offspring are mulatto, and a mulatto identity is certainly not a black identity. In creating mulatto offspring I would be discontinuing myself thereby contradicting one of the rules of the conditions of my being a person, i.e. self-continuation. But what if I as a leader of the collective black self, as president or prime minister etc., did this?. In what sense would I be acting in the interests of the collective black self?. How could I who do not choose to continue myself prescribe duties to them, duties which are possible just in case these individual black selves continue themselves?. I, in the person of a given political leader, am the person in whom the responsibility for the autonomy of the collective black self rests. The rules prescribed for the collective black self are rules to which I, as equally as they, am subject. But in choosing to end myself I certainly cannot prescribe a law for the continuation and autonomy of the collective black self which also includes me.

There is another consideration concerning this matter. It was shown earlier that the rule to create mulattoes was not contributory to the progress of the collective black self and that a mulattocracy is inimical to the black self. What would be the duties of the mulatt-

oes once they have been created?. Theirs can be only one duty. Since I have chosen to end the blackness in me and to create mulattoes, I must have implicitly asserted that I in the person of my mulatto offspring will carry out the purported duties of autonomy. The rule, 'Create a mulattocracy' is therefore a rule in obedience to which I actualize the following practice: Let the collective black self abandon the task of self-rule or autonomy and hand it over to the mulattocracy. But since I created a mulattocracy in order to end or to discontinue my R-I-B identity, the mulatto can never have as the end of his legislation the well-being of the black R-I-B identity.

Notes: Chapter X

1. For background readings on colonialism the following sources are helpful;

Robert O. Collins, The Partition Of Africa: Illusion Or Necessity

Robert O. Collins, Europeans In Africa

It is not to be thought, however, that these texts contribute to my analysis or that they are the subject matter for my analysis.

2. Leopold Senghor subscribes to this erroneous notion and thinks of African glory in terms of the concept of Negritude. Consequently, his concept of negritude has to be understood as supposedly being a way for the Black individual to attain his personhood.

3. A prominent subscriber to this view was Kwame Nkrumah. He thought of the African past as consisting importantly in its communalism. He then conceived of Marxist-Leninism as a philosophy spelling out the nature of this communalism which was to be re-instituted in place of colonialism.

4. One of the prominent texts contributing to this notion is Walter Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Rodney does not understand that the ends of R-I-B groups are incompatible, and that because of this fact of R-I-B existence the ground for conflict is already set. The real question is this: Given the fact of the incompatibility of R-I-B ends, what are the imperatives that should guide R-I-B individuals or the collective Black self? An honest search will reveal the lack of these imperatives in any conception other than that of Black personhood. Hence we are forced to reckon with the fact of our own condition; since, if it were not the European R-I-B it would be some other R-I-B entity that adapted us as mere means to their ends. On the other hand, if these imperatives of Black personhood were known and practised by us, then, and only then, would it be in order for us to genuinely pose the questions that vary on the theme as to how

an R-I-B group adapted us as mere means to their ends.

6. In Chrisman and Hare's Pan Africanism Shirley Graham DuBois makes a remark that is of interest here. She quotes Herodotus who wrote that "Sesostris, a pharaoh, who became master of Scythia and Thrace left a colony called Colchis on the bank of the river Phasis.... She continues that "... Herodotus says of the Colchians that they are an Egyptian race since they are black-skinned and wooly-haired". By means of this quotation Mrs. DuBois means to resurrect the African past favorably. What is seen in the light of the conception of black personhood, however, is that this action of Sesostris of involving himself with the Mediterranean is a negative one. Inasmuch as he is involved with the Mediterranean in an R-S-B way to the neglect of Africa, he did not promote among the individuals of the collective Black self the imperatives of Black personhood.

5. i.e. the events of interruptive periods such as European and Arab slavery, and occupations of Africa

7. For a brief and concise introduction to these empires see the Horizon History Of Africa.

Chapter XI. The Departure From The Conception Of Black Personhood:
Domestication

(1) The analysis in the preceeding chapters has fulfilled the purposes of explaining the rules underlying the concept of black personhood which stipulate the conditions under which a black individual can be a person. The analysis also showed that a knowledge of these concepts has always been lacking and that the imperatives of black personhood have not been adhered to. Consequently, in the strict sense of the person-model which requires an adherence to those rules of personhood pertaining uniquely to one's R-I-B identity, it follows that at no time have black individuals been persons. In view of the fact that we have not all along been persons, what interpretation must be placed on the activities of the collective black self; or, how are we to understand our behavior in the past as well as in the present? The task to which I will devote myself in this chapter is concerned about an account of ourselves in the absence of our having never existed as persons. At this point I will point out again that I mean 'person' not just in the sense of an individual but that I mean 'person' in the sense of an individual in the person-model who has a determinate R-I-B identity and who also pursues those rights and duties that have as an end his R-I-B identity. Prior to discussing in later sections the overall account of ourselves in the past and in the present, I will review briefly some of the facts that have long stood in the way of our attaining our personhood. These facts

have been fully analyzed in preceeding chapters. These hindrances to personhood can be seen as problems of the black self and they are as follows:

1. The obstacles to a black aesthetic
2. An adherence to the doctrine of transcendence
3. Holding to false dogmas concerning the nature of persons, rights, and their duties
4. Ignorance of who we are, an ignorance of the concept of our R-I-B identity as stipulated by the concept of a person in the person-model.

The person-model has up to now been exploited to free us from all of these above-mentioned problems including the not-yet-dealt-with problem concerning the black aesthetic which will be dealt with in a subsequent section entitled "The Solution To The Problem Of The Black Aesthetic". In succeeding sections where I will consider the collective black self from a different perspective I will again rely heavily on the person-model. These above-mentioned problems of the black self will also figure importantly, either directly or indirectly, in the analysis that now follows.

(2) The rules of black personhood have been shown to be pertinent to empirical or actual consequences. What the doctrine of black personhood shows is that being a person is not merely an abstraction or a state of inactivity. Rather, the concept of being a person is bound up with empirical requirements regarding the actions of the

person. In the light of the fact of the members of the collective black self never having been persons, certain empirical consequences are to be expected, and they are spelled out in a doctrine of expectations. The doctrine of expectation states:

In the light of my never having been a person and never having fulfilled certain duties to myself requisite to my R-I-E status, I am therefore subject to actions disadvantageous to me in my dealings with individuals of R-I-E identities different from my own R-I-E identity.

These duties to myself which I have neglected to fulfill are my autonomy, my self-continuation, and my self-respect. Since I have violated all of these rules I also violate the postulate, which is a consequence of these rules, that my R-I-E status is an end in itself. In applying the doctrine of expectations I should then expect that in my dealings with R-I-E identities different from my own, the end or good of all the activities involved will never be my own end. I am now therefore in a position to understand what the mode of existence of the collective black self has been.

(3) Given that I am black cannot I simply say to myself: "I reject the imperatives of black personhood"? Which imperatives would I then follow? There must be some physical description of the person whose imperatives I opt to follow, and in that case I can only follow the imperatives applicable to a person who is non-black. If I take

this option I am in some sense rejecting myself and am pretending that I am not black, which is to say that I act as if I were not black. What then must I think of me?. I am certainly no longer a person for I have given up the essence of personhood which is the function of acting in accordance with laws that I should prescribe for myself. The question recurs; What am I to think of me once I have disregarded the imperatives of black personhood?. The answer is clear. I can then no longer be autonomous, but I can be domesticated. What is to be said of an individual who is domesticated?. This is strictly a question pertaining to the moral evaluation of a person. Prior to elaborating on the concept of domestication, in the way of making empirical or historical applications of the concept, I will clarify the conceptual underpinnings of domestication.

(4) The analysis of the existence of the collective black self in the past and present has revealed that the collective black self has never acted under the conception of black personhood as laid out in this study. We have always acted either in violation of or non-adherence to the conception of black personhood. The alternative conceptions under which we have always acted have already been discussed, and they are the doctrine of transcendence, and the dogmas of persons, rights, and duties, which have been examined in the light of the person-model. The obstacles to developing a black aesthetic are primarily responsible for our inclination toward the doctrine of transcendence ; since, the sum of considerations on the black aesthetic revealed facts about the black self toward which the black

individual cannot reconcile himself. On the other hand, adherence to the dogmas of persons, rights, and duties, have ignorance as their root cause. But it is only in the light of the rules governing the conception of black personhood derived from the person-model that our adherence to the doctrine of transcendence and its dogmas can be put in proper perspective. What the conception of personhood indicates is that by adhering to the doctrine of transcendence and to the dogmas of persons, rights, and duties, I do not pursue or further my end, which is the set of those rights and duties compatible with my R-I-E identity; and, insofar as I do not act towards my end I am not a person. Since the collective black self has not pursued or furthered its own end it must, in its dealings with other non-black R-I-E groups, have pursued the ends of non-black P-I-E individuals. This acting in pursuance of R-I-E ends which are not our own indicates that the mode of existence of the collective black self has always been one of domestication. The postulate of domestication is simply this:

Inasmuch as I, an R-I-E individual, prescribe to myself rules and duties which violate the necessary conditions for attaining my own personhood, as stipulated by the person-model, I am domesticated or I place myself in a state of domestication.

The concept of domestication can be partially understood as a denial or negation of the rules comprising the conception of personhood. It might seem that an examination of the past and present of the collective black self, whether by means of an application of the concept of

black personhood or an application of the concept of domestication, would afford the same understanding. But this is not really the case. An understanding by application of the conception of black personhood is a negative one since it tells me, by what I should be, what I am not. On the other hand, the understanding afforded by an application of the concept of domestication is a positive one since it tells me what I am or have been. I now proceed to apply the concept of domestication to the past and present of the collective black self. One must note that the concept of black personhood is not wholly or in itself a negative one, but that only in this context does it assume the meaning that has just been pointed out.

(5) When we speak of a glorious African past and of our duty to resurrect it we have in mind places like Egypt, Carthage, Ethiopia, Mali, Songhai, and Timbuktu. In all of these republics the collective black self set about the task of discontinuing itself by creating a mulatto population, particularly in places like Egypt, Carthage and Ethiopia, which then proceeded to place the territory of Africa, its population and natural resources, at the disposal of the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and other parts of the world. The collective black self, through these many periods, never understood the value of securing the African continent for actualizing its own duties; since, its population resources and natural resources have always been shipped off to other parts of the world to be used for realizing the ends of other R-I-B individuals. By the time the collective black self goes on to establish the Moslem kingdoms of Timbuktu and Mali, religious trans-

cendence is the mode of life. The continent is secured as their own territory, in effect, by individuals of non-black R-I-B identity who depopulate the continent and carry off its natural resources. All of this takes place before the intervening stage of imperialism, or colonialism, during which other kinds of non-black R-I-B individuals domesticate the collective black self for the sake of making concrete non-black R-I-B ends. What this analysis has done so far is to shed light on the African past of the collective black self, and in view of its domestication this is not a glorious past. Nevertheless, black thinkers have designated it as glorious and as a model for the present. What I want to show at this point is that the collective black is as much domesticated in the present as it was in the past.

The collective African or black self exists presently in Africa, North America, and the Caribbean. We have not secured the territory of Africa in order to secure the possibility of carrying out the duties of autonomy. Instead, other R-I-B groups have secured about a third of it for themselves. In the absence of the adherence to the rule of autonomy in the concept of black personhood, we still pursue religious transcendence. These relevant R-I-B groups for whose purposes we are domesticated, and who occupy our territory, adhere to the rule of expectations in which case it should follow that in our pursuit of religious transcendence, one of the necessary conditions for our domestication, Islam and Christianity should be the competing and fastest growing forms of religious transcendence in Africa. One of the conditions for securing the territory of Africa is that repres-

entatives of the collective black self come together in a single organization to determine rules and duties binding on all of them. One such rule stipulates the establishment of black jurisdiction in both the Northern and Southern ends of the continent which are occupied by two different non-black R-I-B groups. This rule has been undermined in three ways which make reference to the person-model. I now proceed to the first way.

(5a) The Organization Of African Unity, which is the putative instrument for establishing the rule of territorial integrity or security, itself includes alien R-I-B members who have secured the Northern parts of the African continent for themselves. Such an assembly contravenes the rule of autonomy stipulated by the person-model. The model states that in prescribing a rule to myself my R-I-B status alone is the end of my legislation. The Organization Of African Unity is an agency which can be thought of as containing delegates to whom the collective black self has given all rights and powers to prescribe and to secure the R-I-B rights and duties for the black self. Since this organization includes persons of non-black R-I-B identity, those concerns with which the organization must be concerned cannot be of an R-I-B nature. Instead, the totality of delegates can act only in the capacity of non-R-I-B persons. Hence the question of the Organization of African Unity securing R-I-B rights for the black self can never seriously be entertained. I now proceed to the second way of undermining the rule of autonomy.

(5b) One important way in which Africa is related to the

rest of the world is through trade. This trading is carried on for the sake of end called development, and in the purported achievement of this end we exchange our natural resources. But no investigation has ever really decided what the goal of the collective black self in Africa should be; for this development which is really an end of our trading partners has been incorrectly appropriated by us as our end. In this appropriation what has actually taken place is the making by an alier R-I-B group of their end as ours. Consequently, we live our lives to our detriment pursuing an end which is not ours, and thereby exist to serve the needs of others. I now proceed to the third way of undermining the rule.

(5c) The third way in which domestication is produced is shown in the discussions or answers surrounding the expression 'Whither Africa?', which asks in effect 'Which way should Africa go?', or, 'Which path to development should Africa follow?', or, 'With which R-I-B groups should Africa ally itself?'. These are discussions in which individual blacks representing the collective black self argue among themselves as to which non-black R-I-B group Africa should be allied with; or, the argument is concerned about which non-black R-I-B groups should be selected so that their ends can be Africa's ends. The discussion is fruitless. Insofar as I pursue an end that is not my own I place myself at the disposal of the person whose end it is and I domesticate myself. One of the causes of the discussion is the adherence to the dogmas concerning persons, rights, and duties, which were exploded by the person model.

The adherence to this model begins when the leader rejects his R-I-B identity and seeks his duties on the mistaken notion that he is a person just like the other non-black R-I-B persons whose ends he seeks to make his own. This discussion then leads to an interesting paradox. Inasmuch as we do not in Africa pursue our own ends we cannot follow a rule to the effect of "Secure the territory in which you pursue your own ends". The collective black self must therefore look to an alien R-I-B group whose end the collective black self seeks to follow, and ask that this group secure by military force the security of the territory in which the black self is located. And this is the utmost loss of personhood or the affirmation of domestication: It is the refusal to be responsible for oneself.

As a tentative summary of all that has been said so far concerning domestication in Africa, the perfect model of domestication of the collective black self consists of the following:

1. A population in the activity of religious transcendence
2. A leader who sets up a model for self-discontinuation through establishing a family with a mate of non-black R-I-B identity
3. A policy of national development through trade as it is presently carried on.
4. The open rejection of the black R-I-B identity through our allegiance to transcendence doctrines of the various sorts, and to the dogmas of persons, rights, and duties.

I now proceed to discuss domestication in the Caribbean.

(6) The collective black self as it exists in the Caribbean exhibits features of domestication that violate or do not contribute to the requirements of the conception of black personhood. But this is really nothing new since the collective black self knew the lessons of domestication ever since in antiquity when having set ourselves up in the past in the empires of Egypt, Carthage, Ethiopia etc. we discontinued ourselves by creating mulatto republics, and shipped ourselves and our natural resources out of Africa to serve the needs of other R-I-B persons. The only difference between domestication in the Caribbean and in Africa is that the identity of the R-I-B persons we serve has changed. So much for this short comparison of the Caribbean with early Africa. Part of the analysis in this passage is undertaken for the sake of rectifying the mistaken thesis that the black self in the Caribbean is progressing under the guidance of responsible persons who make policy in the light of remedying the deficiencies of what I have called the interruptive period. I now proceed to apply the concept of domestication to the Caribbean.

If the collective black self in the Caribbean were autonomous then black individuals would be fulfilling those duties which promote their own ends. Given that the territory of the Caribbean is ours we could establish ourselves in it so that within its borders we could carry out those autonomous activities which are in keeping with the rule of self-continuation and self-respect. The rule of autonomy is to be understood to mean that the self-continuation and the self-respect of the black R-I-B identity are the parameters for making laws.

But we do not seem to understand this rule of autonomy and instead we follow rules which are in direct contravention of our personhood. The following description shows our attitude toward this vital condition for personhood.

Given that I am this individual black self in the Caribbean I consider what my relation to my territory is. I scorn the idea of myself being associated with land, i.e. my being an owner and a worker of the land, and then later I am unable to feed myself. The idea of other individual blacks gainfully employing their land irritates me and I scorn them. Such is my attitude toward land and the other members of the collective black self share the same attitude. I then think of another P-I-B group in whose territory I can feed myself. Given that all things arise from land and that the previous description reports the attitude of the collective black self in the Caribbean, it follows that the abiding attitude of the collective black self is to leave its own territory for that of non-black P-I-B individuals. If things are going well in the new territory it follows that the non-black P-I-B group is pursuing its own end which is incompatible with the end of the collective black self, in which case then individual black selves must negate or deny the conditions of their own autonomy if they are to survive in this new territory; and this state of existence is domestication. Hence the abiding dream of the collective black self to leave the Caribbean is essentially the wish to avoid achieving its own personhood and to domesticate itself. But not all of the indi-

vidual black selves in the Caribbean have land to sell or the means to leave the Caribbean. Hence the dream to escape the Caribbean can never be fulfilled and many must remain in the Caribbean. I now consider the kind of conditions in which they live in regard to the remainder of the rules constituting black personhood.

Given our attitude toward land our general condition in the Caribbean would be expected to be a wretched one even apart from the conditions of black personhood. But since there is at least one non-black R-I-B group to whose territory we aspire to escape then it follows that this R-I-B group fulfills the R-I-B rules of its own personhood and understands the importance of territory. At least this R-I-B group, if no other, will acquire territory in the Caribbean and fulfill with the land those duties which are in keeping with the conditions of its own unique personhood. In pursuing its own end the alien R-I-B group will have at its disposal individuals of the collective black self which can only be used primarily as means or instruments to achieve the goals of the alien R-I-B group. The alien R-I-B group will occupy territory in the Caribbean on no other conditions. Since it is in the duties concerned with land that all activities arise, it follows that all the ends pursued in the Caribbean are the ends of non-black R-I-B groups. Since all the activities of the collective black self center around activities fulfilling these ends, i.e. those pertaining to a non-black R-I-B identity, it follows that the collective black self in the Caribbean pursues ends which are not its own

and is thereby domesticated.

So far the analysis has shown the rule of self-continuation and autonomy to be violated with respect to territory, and nothing has been said concerning self-continuation with regard to the R-I-B identity itself as regards the mulatto question. The problem with self-continuation of the R-I-B identity is, for the male, which female he should choose in order to continue himself; and, for the female which male she should choose in order to continue herself. The question asked is "Does the collective black self in the Caribbean follow the rule which says 'Discontinue yourself by creating a mulatto republic?'. No empirical research is needed to answer this question. The rule of autonomy with respect to territorial security having been violated, the collective black self does not follow or pursue its own end with respect to its R-I-B identity. The relation between the black individual and his own R-I-B identity can only be one of contempt toward the R-I-B identity, or disrespect for oneself, and under such conditions no individual would feel moved in a moral sense to continue himself. Given that I am some individual black self, the moral duty is incumbent on me to continue myself in the form of an R-I-B identity in respect of which its end is followed. Failing an understanding of the rules of black personhood which underlie such a duty, I will act either in one or both of two ways so as to discontinue my own R-I-B identity since I in no way see it as an end which commands duties of me. These two ways in which I can discontinue my R-I-B identity are firstly through my acting under the precept to create a mulatto republic through my offspring,

and secondly to disregard the importance of the territory on which I and other black selves are located. I now consider the domestication of the black self in North America.

(7) None of the analysis thus far has dealt with that part of the collective black self as it exists in North America. Because of its peculiar historical conditions it should be expected that the black self in North America should exhibit all of the features of domestication since it has never enjoyed any of the conditions for autonomy in the conception of black personhood. The real difference between this branch of the black self on the one hand, and those in the Caribbean and in Africa on the other hand, is that while the African and Caribbean selves have an improper attitude toward their territory they at least have some territory, which in a crude sense is under their sole jurisdiction, from which they cannot migrate and on which they are forced to come to terms with themselves even while they never approximate to the conditions of personhood. The black self in North America, on the other hand, has never had the personhood-requirement of territory in which it could carry out its activities even if these duties were not in accordance with its own R-I-B identity. In the absence of this all-important condition of a separate territory under the sole jurisdiction of R-I-B individuals with a black self, it would be labor lost to apply the conditions of personhood to the North American black self. Nevertheless, all of the violations of the rules of black personhood by the black self in North America can be

documented a priori. The state of existence of the black self in North America can be derived from considerations of the person-model and by understanding the doctrine of expectations and the postulate of domestication. Briefly, the a priori understanding of the state of existence of the collective black self in North America is as follows. The collective black self in North America lives in a territory controlled by individuals with an R-I-B identity that is certainly not a black one. Inasmuch as the collective self having a non-black R-I-B identity controls its own territory, the activities that take place in the territory are carried out for the purposes of promoting the end of their non-black R-I-B identity. Since autonomy in the conception of personhood is always defined with a view to the end of a particular R-I-B identity, the autonomy of the collective black self in North America is therefore ruled out. The only course available to the black self in North America is clearly that of always acting in pursuit of an end which belongs to individuals of a non-black R-I-B identity, in which case the collective black self is domesticated.¹ At this point remarks are in order concerning domestication and territory. Given that the collective black self in North America does not secure its own territory, it clearly could not have jurisdiction over its males and females. Since the collective self with a non-black R-I-B identity sees to it that its own non-black R-I-B ends are pursued, part of its personhood rules would require the discontinuation of the black self whenever such a practice would con-

ceivably promote the end of its particular non-black R-I-E identity.

Among other things I will show in the next chapter that there are facts pertaining to the conditions of the black self in North America that have implications for the universal black self.

1. This comment concerns Harold Cruse's Rebellion Or Revolution. In chapter 7, pg.67, Cruse acknowledges that black individuals in the U.S. are alienated from themselves. He thinks that "... our problem is fundamentally a cultural one". What he identifies as the solution to the problem i.e. the problem of alienation from the black self, is phrased in his question which reads, " As Afro-American descent, and as writers, artists, creative individuals, whose culture do we develop and uphold- an Afro-American culture or an Anglo-American culture?". Cruse's concern is interesting. His question is, however, doubly wrong. It is a wrong question since the imperatives of Black personhood forbid a choice between Anglo-American and an Afro-type culture. These imperatives permit only an Afro-type culture, not the resurrected type, but one developed within the imperatives of Black personhood. However, since the requirement of land is absent for the Black self in the U.S., and North America generally, the imperatives are inapplicable and cannot prescribe action for this segment of the collective Black self. The question is also wrong in that the concept of domestication forbids any choice and forces the Anglo-culture.

Chapter XII. The Test Of The Conception Of Black Personhood;

Application Of The Concept To A Problem In Psychology

(1) Psychologists and other social scientists in North America pose to themselves these kinds of questions;

1. What sort of persons are black individuals?.
2. Are black individuals assertive?.

Questions of this kind are put forward under the guise that they are starting points for genuine empirical research. Two of the trumpeted intentions of these researchers are that first the questions are put forward with the researchers' ignorance of what I have called the domesticated state of the collective black self, and secondly that it is possible once the answers to these questions have been secured to rectify the prevailing situation of Blacks. In the light of the analysis of the previous chapters concerning R-I-B persons, questions can be asked not as starting points for empirical research but as questions whose answers are forthcoming when one reflects upon the real conditions governing the existence of the black self. Nor should it be expected that out of the answers found in these reflections that there should be a reversal of the existence-conditions of the collective black self in North America; for the rules of the conception of personhood forbid this. Concerning the questions of the sort 'What sort of persons are black individuals?', and 'Are black individuals assertive?', what follows are indications as to how these questions should be taken.

Concerning the question as to what sort of persons black individuals are the answer is that inasmuch as black individuals cannot fulfill in North America the requirements of the conception of black personhood it follows necessarily that black individuals in North America are not persons, and in the light of this fact any enquiry into what sort of persons they are is an erroneous enquiry. Concerning an enquiry into the assertiveness of black individuals the considerations of the conception of personhood are as follows. The analysis of the previous chapter showed that black individuals do not pursue their own ends, and that they are domesticated insofar as they pursue the end of an alien R-I-B group. All meaningful conditions of assertiveness must be in pursuance of ends which are the individual's own. It follows that the collective black self in North America is not and cannot be assertive. Further considerations on these matters are forthcoming in the analysis of this chapter where I deal with the task of psychologists and other social scientists. I now turn to this concern.

(2) Using the machinery of the entire conception of black personhood, I will analyze one of the methods used by social scientists in North America in their studies of black individuals. This method of enquiry has been called 'The Doll Study' and I will briefly summarize it. In the doll study, or doll experiment, small children are used as the experimental subjects and are given a set of instructions pertaining to dolls representative of distinct human R-I-B groups. The instructions which typically are given to the subjects are as follows:

1. Give me the doll you like.
2. Give me the doll that is a nice doll.
3. Give me the doll that looks bad.
4. Give me the doll that is a nice color.
5. Give me the doll that looks like a white child.
6. Give me the doll that looks like a black child.
7. Give me the doll you would most like to play with.
8. Give me the doll you most look like.
9. Give me the doll you most would like to be.
10. Give me the beautiful doll.

Psychologists and other social scientists disagree as to the significance of this study.¹ They disagree as to what the questions mean. And given the responses to the instructions they disagree further as to how they should interpret these responses. Furthermore, the views of social scientists concerning the significance, results, and conclusions of the experiment, have been contradictory when not conflicting.

The study has been used to measure among other things self-esteem among Blacks, self-hatred or self-love of Blacks, and self-identity concepts of blacks. Concerning these self-regarding attitudes, different researchers point to conflicting or contradictory findings among themselves. Controversy surrounding the doll-study experiment centers on such things as what the experiment was supposed to test for, what the results of the experiment were, and how the results should be interpreted. I do not wish to delve further into the specific details of

the controversy surrounding this experiment. What I propose to do concerning this experiment is to show how, by the use of the concept of black personhood, some significant conclusions about the experiment can be established. I will show further how this conception provides a univocal framework for social scientists. These issues among others will therefore be dealt with:

1. What the doll-study experiment can test for
2. How the results of the experiments can be interpreted

I now proceed to the next section where I consider the nature of experiments.

(3) Experiments normally proceed on the basis that the events under scrutiny are observation-items to be later interpreted to produce an understanding of the phenomena studied.² This later part of the experiment pertaining to the interpretation and understanding of the observation items requires the use of language in a way that the monitoring of observation items does not. This difference is as follows. The whole experiment takes place within the framework of language in the sense that the whole experimental process or undertaking must be statable or accounted for in language (the use of sentences). What I mean is that the conduct of the experiments presupposes or requires the use of a linguistic system, or a system statable in language, if the entire experimental procedure is to be made sense of. But a very crucial aspect of the nature of an experiment is that the experiment itself, its observational items, proceeds without being parasitic on language. With this concept of an experiment in mind I turn to

investigate the doll study.

(4a) The doll study proceeds in this way. Some small children are brought within visual range of a set of dolls with varying physical descriptions answering to what I have termed R-I-B identities. The experimenters or researchers then pose the children a series of questions and instructions which were already presented in section 2. The children then give verbal or written answers which are recorded and kept by the researchers. These answers are kept as data to be later interpreted by the researchers. I now proceed to point out significant features of the doll-study in the light of what I have said concerning the linguistic bounds and linguistic freeness of experiments.

(4b) The doll study conforms to the concept of an experiment in that the entire procedure of the experiment can be accounted for and be presented in a linguistic form, i.e. in some language or other. But the doll-study departs radically from the concept of an experiment in the following way. When I consider that part of the doll-study from which the data were gathered I find that this data-producing part, unlike as required in the concept of an experiment, does not really consist of observation items but instead consists of linguistic items which are in two parts, the series of instructions and questions posed by the researchers to the children, and the verbal and written answers of the children. The observation part of an experiment is therefore absent in the doll-study, and in the place of observation items the

doll-study contains linguistic items only. What the doll-study tests therefore is the linguistic competence of the children. However, the objection can be made that while this part of the doll-study is not purely observational it is observational in that the researchers observe the responses of the children toward the dolls. The objection is easily dealt with. What is peculiar about the conduct of this part of the experiment is that the very observation items, which are the children's responses concerning the dolls, can themselves occur just in case the children are linguistically competent enough to deal with the concepts harbored by the instructions and questions; and I will show later what these concepts are. A second peculiarity about this part of the pseudo-observational part of the doll-study is that the supposedly observational items, the children's responses, are themselves linguistic. The only conceivable part of the doll-study that may not be considered linguistic are the frowns, smiles, grimaces and gestures of the children; but it is inconceivable what a coherent theory of these non-linguistic items of the children's behavior would be like which does not itself beg the question, i.e. assume the facts being questioned, concerning the differing appraisals of the meaning of the children's responses to the instructions and questions. What is noteworthy about the doll-study in the light of what was said about the nature of experiments, is that the doll-study is entirely linguistically bound in that the part of it which should be observational is itself linguistically parasitic. As a consequence of being linguistically bound the doll-study has its boundaries formed by concepts of

language, and what should have been the observation part of the experiment proceeds only on the presupposition of the use or understanding of certain concepts in language. This linguistic bind constrains the experiments and I now proceed to examine the particular linguistic item that provides the linguistic context for the experiment. What I mean is that the linguistic bind places constraints or forces the children's answers which constitute the observation items for the researchers. I now proceed to examine the instructions and questions used in the experiment.

(4c) The instructions or questions in the doll-study experiment have already been presented. All of these instructions belong to a certain linguistic setting or specific language. It is also self-evident that all of these instructions are concerned about choosing and are therefore dependent on the linguistic features constituting the concept of choice. But concepts themselves have no meaning except within the framework of language. In order to draw out facts concerning the concept of choice I will first set up the appropriate language within whose context the instructions of the doll-study are set. This language was already encountered in the form of a criterion of meaning when I elucidated the problems concerning the construction of a black aesthetic, and I will therefore not restate it in its entirety but only to the extent suitable to the purposes of this present study. For a full appreciation of the instructions used in the doll-study a re-reading of the chapters on the aesthetic and on the linguistic approaches to the problems of the black self is recommended.

But if the reader feels confident enough he can dispense with the re-reading since what follows in the succeeding paragraph is essentially a review of what he should be familiar with. I now proceed to discuss the concept of choice with reference to the earlier-mentioned criterion of meaning, with the expected result that light will be shed on what I have called the linguistic setting or specific language of the doll-study.

(4D) It was stated earlier that the feature of meaning, an essential requirement or constituent of language, was determined by reference to nature in the sense that the meaning of a word was achieved by the use of naturalistic predicates which are the descriptions of real things in nature. The question was considered as to how it was that the word 'black' could be understood or given a meaning, and it was shown that ultimately this was achieved through metaphor. On the way to showing this it was revealed that certain states of affairs in nature were good, pleasant or desirable; or that otherwise they were not good, not pleasant, and not desirable. In other words the consideration of the events in nature was like this: The things, events, or states in nature that are desirable, good or pleasant, are those such as living, flourishing, cleansing etc. Those that were not good, not pleasant or not desirable, were those such as dying, decaying, dirtying, etc. It was then argued that things in nature that are black occurred with those states of nature that are states such as dying, decaying, dirtying etc. It was then shown that another aspect

of language made perspicuous these observations in nature so as to provide for still further operations or uses of language, one of these being the activity of choosing. These other aspects which in part make up the mechanism of language are negation, 'either-or'(i.e. disjunction), and metaphor. The mechanism simply displays or represents the dualities of nature in the following way.

Either	Or
Flourishing	Decaying
Living	Dying
Cleansing	Dirtying

The mechanism of disjunction achieves the following with certain states of affairs.

Either	Or
Pleasant	Not pleasant(unpleasant)
Good	Not good(bad)
Desirable	Not desirable(undesirable)

The dualities in nature as well as the things in nature that may be desirable, good etc. are infinite. How does language find an economical and convenient way of describing all of one set of the dualities that consist of the infinity of things in nature that are not living, not good, etc. The conclusions of the argument from language are

twofold, and it is primarily the argument from metaphor on which the conclusions are based. These conclusions are;

1. Since all of the events in nature occurring on one side of the dualities frequently occur blackish or blackly, all of these events or states of affairs in nature can be designated or indicated by the use of the term 'black'.
2. Since all of the events or states of affairs in nature can themselves be designated by terms like 'undesirable', 'unpleasant' and 'not-good-', then these latter terms themselves can all be designated by the term 'black' in the light of the concept of metaphor.

This overall designation through the use of the word 'black' is achieved through metaphor. Given all these facts about dualities there is an independent argument from language to the effect that the concept of choice, or the function of choosing, takes place with one's understanding of the relationship of the dualities found in the arguments from nature on the one hand, to the states such as desirable, pleasant and good, and also to the function of black as a metaphor. The linguistic consideration concerning the concept of choice is that what I choose is designed to promote or enhance my well-being. What the analysis has shown so far is the linguistic framework within which choosing takes place. My earlier contention was that the doll-experiment was linguistically bound with respect to its instructions. What I have presented in this chapter concerning language and the

concept of choice allows for a significant interpretation of the instructions in the doll study. The thesis concerning these instructions is that all of their answers can be predicted by reference to the language of choice as I have analyzed it. The restriction of this thesis is that since the concept of choice has been shown to be complicated, a proper use of the instructions and consequently a proper use of the entire doll-study, occurs just in case the test-subjects are normal users of language.

So far I have described the linguistic bounds of the experiment which form the unexpected linguistic context of the supposedly observational part of the doll study. I now propose to look at another factor of the instructions, with regard to the concept of choice, since they themselves force or form another context for the doll-study experiment.

(4e) How do we find this other context?. Why is it important?. This other context is derived from an understanding of what the conception of black personhood is about so that this conception gives insight into the relation of the test-subjects to the dolls. In other words, the instructions to the test subjects when interpreted in the light of an understanding of the concept of personhood reveals another context of the experiment. What I am getting at is that before instructions are set up one has to examine the nature of the experiment itself so that one may know beforehand what kinds of information and uses are possible given the study itself. Stated differently, the nature of the experiment forms the boundary of its applicability, its exploitation

or its use. The point of all this, which is later to be made specific, is that the experiment itself states all that is possible within it, and by this means constrains the nature of the general subject matter of the instructions no matter what they may be. Once having located the boundaries of the experiment my procedure will be to apply a general interpretation which gives specific interpretative details of the boundaries of the experiment. The interpretation will give the meaning of the specific parts within the boundaries of the experiment. This interpretation is comprised of certain aspects of the conception of black personhood. In summary, the two things that are to be presented are as follows:

1. The question-boundaries which form contexts of the experiment
2. A general interpretation

Before I proceed to present either of these I will discuss the method of researchers which can be shown more clearly by way of contrast to the method I propose to follow in the general interpretation.

The current procedure is for researchers to pose questions and instructions to the test subjects without first finding out what instructions and questions are possible within the context of the experiment. In interpreting the responses to their instructions, the researchers then assign meanings that are not consonant with the meaning-boundaries of the experiment. When different researchers therefore reach conflicting or contradictory findings concerning the experiment there is not way of confirming or verifying the findings of the researchers; and the controversy therefore continues unabated.

Prior to giving my solution I now present the list of question-boundaries. In discussing the doll-experiment I will point out the context-aspect, which is a linguistic boundary of the experiment, and then I will apply the conception of black personhood as a means of interpreting these boundaries of the experiment. The general boundary of the experiment consists of individuals of a certain R-I-B identity who are in relation to the dolls which represent individuals of varying R-I-B identities. The specific boundaries of the experiment are as follows:

1. The children are in the relation of parent to child
2. The children are in the relation of individual to spouse,
individual to companion etc.
3. The children are in a relation to their own R-I-B identity.
4. The children are in a relation to the aesthetic and moral
predicates of the different R-I-B identities.

These elements, 1-4, constitute the boundaries of the experiment itself and thereby determine what questions may be asked pertaining to the entire doll study. I have already indicated that all the questions and instructions pertaining to these boundaries are themselves governed by the over-arching linguistic boundary which includes the concept of choice and the other facts about nature and language. This linguistic boundary itself lets us answer questions and instructions a priori or apart from the children's responses. The final question remains concerning what answers are possible within these boundaries, and as to what significance or interpretation may be put on these answers. The

solution is that the conception of black personhood supplies this significance index or interpretation. The things that are now to be achieved are the following: First, show it is that the linguistic boundary stipulates concerning the concept of choice as it is operative on the question and instruction-boundaries, and secondly to interpret these answers by reference to the conception of black personhood. I now proceed to the interpretation.

(5a) Concerning the first question-boundary which is the relation of parent to child, the specific content of a question or instruction concerns the R-I-B identity of the child that the test-subject would like to have. The linguistic concept of choice now enters in providing the answer which states that whatever the R-I-B identity of the doll(the surrogate child) that is chosen, the reasons for the R-I-B identity chosen must be in conformity with the arguments from nature and from language. Insofar as the R-I-B identity of the R-I-P identity of the doll(the child surrogate) is black the doll cannot be chosen. The significance or the interpretation of this choice is now given by an application of one of the rules of the conception of black personhood. The rule to be applied is that of self-continuation since the question of what kind of whild I would choose to have simply states how I would like to continue myself. The puzzling result of all this is that if I understand the concept of choice I cannot choose to continue myself if my R-I-B identity is black. But self-continuation is one of the necessary conditions for personhood. Hence the puzzling result appears either that if I understand the concept of choice I cannot

continue an R-I-B identity if it is black, or that individuals of black R-I-B identity cannot be persons.

(5b) The second question-boundary concerns the relation of individual to spouse, and the content of the question to be asked is to the effect of "Whom would you choose for a spouse, companion etc.?". It is a consequence from the first question-context that the question pertaining to choice of spouse is already answered; since, if I am black and I cannot choose to continue myself through a child of my R-I-B identity, then it follows that for a spouse through whom I will continue myself I must choose a spouse with a non-black R-I-B identity not my own. But the other items, such as companions etc., dealt with in the second question-context cannot be answered or dealt with by the first question-context. In answer to the second question-context the linguistic context forces the answer that I cannot choose as companions and associates those individuals whose R-I-B identity is black. The rule of black personhood to be employed in dealing with these other items of the second question-boundary is the one pertaining to autonomy. The rule of autonomy is to the effect that individuals are autonomous insofar as they follow rules which comprehend an applicability to furthering the interests and duties which comprehend only individuals of their R-I-B type. This rule does not prohibit my forming rules with diverse R-I-B individuals on the other levels of the person-model. But the person-model and the conception of black personhood prohibit me from fulfilling duties toward diverse R-I-B individuals unless I fulfill those duties requisite to my being a person; for, only persons can have

duties, and I am a person only insofar as I secure to myself my rights and duties. Since the linguistic boundary provides the answer to the question-boundary by saying that I cannot choose as companions or associates those individuals of black R-I-B identity, then I cannot be autonomous since a condition for autonomy in the sense of legislation is that I select as the subjects of my lawmaking those individuals of my own R-I-B identity.

(5c) The final question-boundary of the experiment pertains to the aesthetic and moral qualities possessed or ascribed to the dolls representing varying R-I-B identities. Insofar as the aesthetic item is concerned the linguistic context, consisting really of the arguments from nature and language, showed that nothing black could be chosen as the bearer of aesthetically desirable qualities. Consequently, insofar as the dolls had black R-I-B identities the test-subjects could not choose them for ascribing aesthetic qualities such as beautiful, pleasing, and choiceworthy in general. The issue of moral qualities in the third question-context can only be understood generally through the linguistic force of the concept of choice. Anything moral, whether it be action or thought, can be considered worthy of the predicate 'moral' only if it is such that it is necessary that if an action be moral that it be choiceworthy. But the argument from language showed that blackness was a metaphor for whatever was not choiceworthy. Hence the linguistic context forces the answer that the dolls, as surrogates of black R-I-B individuals, cannot be chosen as the bearers of moral qualities. This answer in the third question-boundary is not to be

interpreted by a particular rule of the conception of black personhood. Instead it is to be interpreted by the fundamental presupposition of the concept of black personhood. This conception states that individuals of black R-I-B identity are persons just in case they fulfill certain moral duties. The answer to the third question context denies, in effect, that black individuals can fulfill their moral duties, and therefore also denies that they can be persons.

The final observation concerning the general context of all the instructions in the doll-study experiment is that since the linguistic enquiry shows that blackness is a metaphor for whatever is not to be chosen generally, then individuals whose R-I-B identity is black cannot be chosen generally, and the question of their self-respect is not be raised. I now proceed to make concluding remarks on this chapter.

The interpretation of the question-boundaries brings out the domestication of the collective black self in North America. These question-boundaries also have implications for the collective black self wherever it is and bring out the ever-remaining possibility of its domestication.

Notes: Chapter XII

1. The doll-study experiment is regarded as having begun with Kenneth Clark. Since then, many similar studies have appeared. These questions I have listed should not be taken as belonging to any particular or individual study. Rather, the list is to be regarded as representative of the subject-matter of what is put forward as a doll-study experiment. The literature in this area can be found in Joseph Hraba's and Geoffrey Grant's "Black Is Beautiful: A Reexamination of Racial Preference And Identification", *The Journal of Personality And Social Psychology* (Nov. 1970), pgs. 398-402.

2. This priority given to observation items can be found in Ernest Nagel's discussions on the two-tier conception of science in his book The Structure Of Science (New York and Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961).

Chapter XIII. The Task Of Black Psychology And The Solution To The
Problem Of The Black Aesthetic

The preceding analysis of the doll-study consists of insights into the concept of a black individual insofar as there is the important concern as to whether these individuals are persons. This kind of doll-study experiment represents the sort of way in which psychologists have been concerned with what they term the concept of a black person. What the analysis of the concept of a black person has shown thus far is that since the conditions of black personhood have not either been understood, or actualized, the task of psychologists and sociologists could not all along have really been to help blacks become persons or to help make them self-assertive. The reason is that black individuals can become persons or become self-assertive only if they act in accordance with the conception of black personhood. Hence all along the real task of psychologists and sociologists, vis-a-vis black individuals, could only have been that of domesticating black individuals.

The question arises as to what duties and responsibilities accrue to those black individuals who are themselves sociologists and psychologists. These individuals themselves are domesticated and would be averse to the conception of black personhood. But these individuals, since they themselves are ostensibly concerned with the task of what they generally term 'helping black people', would be bound to heed the prescriptions of the conception of black personhood.

But if black psychologists and sociologists accept this responsibility their first question would be "What is the task of psychologists and sociologists, or of psychology?". More directly stated, this question asks "What is the task of black psychology?", and these answers are forthcoming. What the analysis in this chapter concerning the doll-study revealed were the insurmountable problems which forbid Blacks becoming persons. The heart of these insurmountable problems was the structure of language with its implication for the concept of choice. Since this is a logical or conceptual problem about the unchoiceworthiness of anything black, it cannot be overcome in order to actualize what it expressly forbids, namely, the actualization of the conception of black personhood. What sense does it make, then, to propose such a task which would be the undertaking of a black psychology? I now proceed to deal with this difficulty.

The conception of black personhood showed how it was possible for black individuals to become persons. Therefore there cannot be any real obstacles to making the conception actual. Since it was the person-model from which the concept of a person in general is derived, if there are any difficulties concerning the concept of a particular kind of person (or R-I-B personhood), it is to the person-model that we return for solutions. One of the facts of the person-model was that with respect to the duties and rules on the R-I-B level, R-I-B individuals must conduct themselves in a way compatible with their R-I-B identity. Any conduct incompatible with their R-I-B identity is not valid for them if they are to be persons. I now turn

to the topic of language, our linguistic activity, that threatens to impede the task of a black psychology in its attempt to make actual the conception of black personhood.

One of the facts concerning the meaning of a word or a concept is that meaning is determined by or arises from the relation of the cognitive individual to nature as he brings the structure of language to bear on things in nature. It is the individual that decides how the structure of language should be applied in fixing the meaning of things in nature. What this shows is that things in nature are not in and for themselves good, pleasant or desirable. The use of these terms reflect psychological responses of the language user to things in nature. What has just been pointed out is that insofar as language is a device used by individuals it contains a psychologism or psychological element. The structure of language therefore, while essentially syntactical, operates on content which contains psychologies. A psychologism is simply the peculiar or idiosyncratic way in which the individual is affected emotionally by something occurring in nature. An example of a psychologism is the so-called meaning of the word 'yellow' as it occurs in nature. Yellow may indicate cowardice or on the other hand it could mean joy. A similar occurrence takes place regarding the meaning of 'black'. What the arguments from nature put forward as occurrences in nature are not really so. To say that significant and undesirable features occur in nature with the color black, and then to use black as a metaphor for undesirable things in general is to speak not of all the significant things in

nature but to speak for the things in nature that are significant for certain R-I-B individuals and also compatible with their own ends; and this is quite a legitimate procedure. The way of life of the R-I-B individuals should be in keeping with their end, and how they decide what the significant events in nature are and how to speak about them is determined by their way of life and hence serves their end. Part of the way of life of R-I-B individuals will be an aesthetic. This discussion concerning psychologism in language therefore determines that the task of a black psychology must be to regulate the meanings of significant terms, the chief of which is the word black, which are compatible with the end of our own R-I-B identity as set out in the conception of black personhood. Once this task of deciding on a set of suitable psychologisms is achieved, the concept of choosing will be compatible with these new facts about blackness. The black individual will therefore see himself in a new light and move forward to take up the yoke of black personhood.

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