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1979

KARL MANNHEIM

AND

THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

by

RANDI H. CRAWFORD

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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KARL MANNHEIM

AND

THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

PREFACE

Karl Mannheim (1893 -1947) considered "planning ... an approach to politics." He proposed "democratic planning" as a solution to the crisis of liberal, industrialized societies. (FPDP: 22)* Manifest in structural unemployment, war and alienation, the diagnosis of the crisis was deceptively simple. Men had invented many tools of social control but their inherited social institutions were unable to use them to serve the needs of mankind.

Mannheim believed the crisis was caused by the rapid proliferation of social techniques ("all methods of influencing human behavior") which came with industrialization.[1] The growth of "economic, political, psychological and mechanical" controls created more complex social organizations which in turn demanded "govern[ance] from a center." (FPDP: 6ff) Power ("every action which compels certain actions in others") accordingly concentrated ever more in the hands of a few at the pinnacles of these institutions. (MSR: 167) This organized power which begat the possibility of planning ("control

* Citations to Mannheim's writings are abbreviated throughout. See Appendix A for full titles and bibliographic details.

and social guidance") could not be stopped. Neither the market economy nor conflict politics could contain it. The "realistic" problem was how best to channel it. Mannheim advocated social reconstruction; democratic planning must supersede "power [as] ... the main driving force ... and expansion for the sake of exploitation [as] ... the organizing principle ..." of society. (FPDP: 9)

His encounter with democracy in the Weimar Republic and his confrontation with Hitler's planning led him to two conclusions. (Cf. Chapter 2) Democracy suffered because it could end in stalemate or elect dictators; planning "favored" "minority rule." Democracy obviously needed the effectiveness planning could provide; planning clearly required the public accountability democracy offered. Hence, democratic planning.

What is democratic planning? Is not the term "democratic planning" logically inconsistent? What does the rule of the people (democracy) have to do with the expert guidance of the future (planning)? Actually, definitions of planning and democracy vary. In Mannheim's theory, planning refers to the activity of goal setting and policy coordination; democracy is defined by the "principle[s]" that "all social classes shall be politically active" and that "deeds and thoughts" shall be "public." (MSR: 72-3; emphasis added)

The idea of democratic planning is primarily concerned with the ends of collective action via planning in a democratic community. But it also considers the issue of means.

In fact, the idea of democratic planning relates processes and purposes by asking two connected questions. How are (should be) knowledge and power linked? How does (should) the individual interact with others in the "planned, yet democratic, society"?

The concept of democratic planning is both normative and grounded in realistic appraisals of current trends and structures. Without prescribing specific actions, it provides a framework for social guidance. Democratic planning is a progressive idea in two senses. Programmatically it seeks to redress social ills by proposing alternatives for social reconstruction. Temporally, it is premised on the observation that the future is shaped by today's activities.

Above all, the idea of democratic planning is concerned with the purposes of democracy and planning. It contends that the fundamental humanity of men should not be hidden behind a highly organized political culture nor need it be diminished (or destroyed) by the panoply of contemporary techniques of social control. Any institutional arrangement makes demands on citizens. The idea of democratic planning asks that we restructure these changing institutions in a way which better assures that unnecessary and inhumane sacrifices will be obviated. The idea of democratic planning does not condone such practices as generations of black unemployment or death by undeclared war.

The idea of democratic planning is hopeful. It challenges cynicism by calling on all citizens to share responsibility

for their political community. It fosters individual freedoms by affirming the variety of contributions each can make. It promotes justice by advocating a theory of the public interest based on democratic fraternity as well as equality and liberty. It encourages social improvement by acknowledging that power is a "social resource" which can be used to prevent abuses and produce desirable ends. (Cf. Lynd, 1956; Chapters 7 and 8) Finally, it demands that we continuously reevaluate new directions, including the determination of which arenas of human activity are to be left to the spontaneous creations of the human spirit.

In short, the idea of democratic planning nurtures our capacity to control and shape our political environment.

The idea of democratic planning arose in the early twentieth century in urbanized, industrialized societies with developing democratic institutions. As we approach the twenty-first century, the idea of democratic planning is relatively unknown. The wealth of the world, in capital and human talent, has never been greater, yet human degradation persists. The idea of democratic planning does not explain how this happened. It simply asserts that we probably can solve these problems.

The word "probably" has double significance. First, the idea of democratic planning admits that planning and democracy are never more than social experiments. They can fail. Yet, because each involves the making of choices, errors may be corrected. We can learn from our mistakes. Second,

because the idea of democratic planning originated in precarious times (during World War I and the Depression), its proponents are eager, nay anxious, that the tasks of democratic planning begin immediately. To wait may result in certain waste of human potential, and possibly, irremediable violence. For example, since we know that nuclear war will assuredly kill many innocent people, to postpone nuclear disarmament increases the likelihood of this atrocity.

This dissertation specifically explores Karl Mannheim's idea of democratic planning. I chose to concentrate on a single theorist to investigate the development of the idea of democratic planning. Mannheim was selected because he offers the best known, most comprehensive and most recent formulation. However, his treatment, though wide-ranging, is not exhaustive. Indeed, the task of outlining the contours of the idea of democratic planning remains unfinished.

Mannheim's work has been interpreted in many, sometimes contradictory, ways. (See Appendix C) Is this confusion due to problems inherent in the idea of democratic planning? Is it caused by Mannheim's own limitations? Or, is it the result of random reading of Mannheim's several writings on democratic planning? In other words, this dissertation is concerned with the question "what is the idea of democratic planning?" Clearly, at least in the case of Mannheim, it is a complicated theory which requires extensive explication.

Consequently, the dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the reader to the concept of

planning and to Karl Mannheim, the man. The first chapter indicates the significance of planning in political life and considers various meanings of the term. It also briefly discusses the development of planning theory and compares major democratic planning theorists, including Mannheim. Mannheim's peripatetic life is sketched out in Chapter 2 to suggest the intellectual, historical and personal influences on his thinking.

Part II[2] concentrates on the development of Mannheim's idea of democratic planning. (Chapters 3 through 7) Two primary themes -- the role(s) of individuals in a collectivizing society and the relation of knowledge to the responsibility of power -- are elaborated.

Before he explicitly considered planning, Mannheim focused on issues of rationality. (Chapter 3) His early work, undertaken in Hungary and Germany between World War I and 1933, reflected the modernization and reconstruction of post-war Europe. He especially concentrates on developing a theory of knowledge which is both "psychologically and historically relevant." The outcome, after an initial excursion into gestaltian historicism, is his famed sociology of knowledge. In this period, which ends with the planning implications of his proto-democratic[3] theory of knowledge, Mannheim emphasizes the need (1) to understand the whole of political culture,(2) to recognize that social knowledge is always imperfect and unfinished, (3) to interrelate different personal and social perspectives, including

position and occupational niche, which infect judgments about social facts, (4) to use "doubt" (or uncertainty) to correct and improve social knowledge, and (5) to apply perfected[4] social knowledge to the problems of contemporary collectivized social life in a morally just and humanly productive way.

Mannheim wrote on planning while in residence in England from 1933. Where his earlier work emphasized how power informs social knowledge, Mannheim now looks at the changing patterns of power, in large part responding to the rise of fascism in Germany and Stalinism in the Soviet Union. (Chapter 4) Thus, he concentrates on the twin trends of "fundamental democratization" and "collective insecurity" in his explanation of why planning (democratic or not) is inevitable. He argues that the resulting "disproportionate development" (the lag in democratic social control relative to the creation of technological and institutional instruments for social control) can be countered only by "planning for freedom."[5] The mediating mechanisms (e.g., class, mass) through which individuals in a collectivizing society act define how and for whom power is used. Mannheim argues that community (geographically defined as ever expanding) accounts for the common ties which bind men together, and hence underlies the possibility of long-range democratic planning.[6] Mannheim also stresses the functional need for class alignments to promote the development of "substantial" social knowledge.[7] He urges, however, that the inequalities

between classes be attenuated, presumably by progressive social planning.

Mannheim then looks at factors of social change. He contends that effective progressive social change must be meaningful to the individual lives of the participants. (Cf. McWilliams, 1969) He also argues that social change is ultimately generational in two senses. First, "critical generations" break away from tradition to improve upon the world of their elders. Second, progress should be measured from generation to generation and over time within particular generations. In other words, are successive generations better able to control increasing power? Is the lot of all men enhanced over a generation?

Given the trends, the flexibility of social structures, and the nature of social change, Mannheim concludes that democratic planning is possible.

The strategy of democratic planning builds on the insights of Mannheim's theory of rationality. (Chapter 5; cf. Chapter 3) In an effort to explain how democratic life might be qualitatively improved through planning, Mannheim focuses on three issues. The first, relatively minor in his overall theory, but critical to the idea of planning intervention, concerns the points at which planned change should be initiated. Mannheim calls these strategic intervention points the "principia media." The principia media are the interstitial points between tiers in the power structure and between the realms of power (e.g., economic

and political). Exerting planning pressure at the principia media assumes increasing institutional interdependence. (Cf. Section 4.B.2) Planning is equated with institutional reconstruction. (Cf. Chapter 1)

Mannheim devotes much attention to the role of the intellectuals and the place of education in the strategy of democratic planning. (Chapter 5) Elaborating on his conception of generational social change (cf. Section 4.E) and the nature of political thinking (cf. Chapter 3), Mannheim argues that the intellectuals are "relatively classless" and therefore able to construct new and improved social truths which will light the way to democratic planning. This dependence on "experts" or intellectual "elites" has led many critics to conclude that Mannheim is not a democrat, but an elitist. (E.g., Benveniste, Bottomore, Cohen, Fisher, Floud, Heywood, Kornhauser, Lichtheim, Sereno, Spitz) However, as Bachrach most convincingly argues, despite the presence of elites, Mannheim promotes democratic purposes.

Education (at all levels) serves as a vehicle for the intelligentsia to communicate to (and with) all democrats. Education is also more than that, because the consequences of institutional practices in contemporary society are themselves "educative." The problem of education in democratic planning is thus twofold: citizens must learn to integrate their knowledge from all sources (including, but not limited to, the classroom) into farther-reaching frameworks and intellectuals must also learn from their fellow citizens.

In fact, Mannheim implicitly questions whether intellectuals do anything more than organize the knowledge of others which has its source in the many facets of political and economic life. In his detailed analysis of the formation of the intellectuals and their proper role in democratic life, Mannheim unhesitatingly concludes that intellectuals have considerable political responsibility. (Cf. Appendix F)

Freedom is both the rationale for and a result of democratic planning. (Chapter 6) Mannheim makes two points. First, freedom must be defined with reference to a particular social structure as well as for individual needs and wants. Second, freedom is not a state of being, but rather an essential activity in democratic life. It presumes political equality as one of the conditions of its expression. Other contingent factors (e.g., economic variables) are identified to show that social action does not occur in a vacuum. The consequences of freedom are also stressed because freedom both predicates voluntary associations and is the source of individual diversity.

Mannheim adds a democratic concept of power to the arguments on democratic rationality, the age of planning, the role of the intellectuals, the function of education, and freedom. Chapter 7 first considers the meaning of of power with reference to the planners, knowledge and economics. It then focuses on how power is to be organized under democratic planning. Mannheim proposes that centralization be kept to a minimum and that informal, reciprocal,

decentralized planning efforts be maximized.

The last part (Chapter 8) assesses the "essentials of democratic planning" which Mannheim forwarded. Changes in his emphases in the themes of knowledge and power, and the individual in the collectivizing society are summarized. The "ecological" unity of his idea of democratic planning is explored with the conclusion that democratic planning involves human valuations about what practices should be continued as well as which new purposes should be encouraged. (Cf. Kettler, 1971; Wolff, 1971, 1974) Mannheim's limitations -- the inattention to details of government and economics -- are identified as the major cause of his "vagueness." (Cf. Ehrmann, Joad, Rejai, Tawney, Weintraub, Wright) Indeed, this ambiguity may account for why Mannheim has both stimulated and frustrated scholars. That is, many find insights on particular points but are confused by the whole. (See Appendix C) Despite the fact that Mannheim's work is the best compilation of democratic planning theory, it is presented in essay form in four books and numerous articles. Because Mannheim assumed the reader to be familiar with his other work, no single volume (or piece) summarized his ideas on democratic planning. Thus, one additional reason for examining Mannheim's idea of democratic planning is to bring all these thoughts together in a more coherent fashion.[9]

Finally, Mannheim's lasting conceptual contributions to planning theory -- the centrality of citizenship, public control of communications, the recognition of the "drift to war,"

and a tacit theory of the public interest -- are discussed. I conclude that despite his limitations, Mannheim reaffirms critical planning issues for democratic societies. Mannheim's idea of democratic planning continues to provide theoretical guidance to the vexing problems of our time.[10]

FOOTNOTES to Preface

[1] Though he mentions "capitalism" and "monopoly capitalism" as "historical" antecedents, Mannheim's explanation of what encourages the growth of social techniques is quite eclectic; it also includes a psychological theory of human nature. (See, for example, MSR: 125ff; Section 4.E)

[2] Viewed another way, Part II might be considered the "data base" of the idea of democratic planning.

[3] Proto-democratic in this discussion means essentially democratic, despite the absence of the label "democratic."

[4] "Perfected" is used here to signify more perfect than before, not eternally correct.

[5] John Dewey and Robert Lynd make similar points in their views on democratic planning. See Chapter 1.

[6] Geographical expansion refers to the modern phenomenon of a global society. Just as nationalism expanded the "community" purview of rural and urban residents, so too the increase in international exchanges produces a world wide community. Lynd and Dewey make analogous arguments about the nature of contemporary community. See also Chapter 1 and Chapter 4.

[7] The class concern is typically European and therefore contrasts with other democratic planning theorists like Dewey and Lynd. See Chapter 1. On the meaning of "substantial" knowledge see Chapter 3, Appendix D.

[8] See especially discussions of community and class; sacrifice, security and compensation; and reciprocity in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. See also the notion of "integrated" knowledge in Chapter 3.

[9] Several scholars have considered the totality of Mannheim's work, but the deemphasize the theory of democratic planning. (Kettler, Remmling, Wolff, Bogardus) Recently, two authors have looked at Mannheim's theory of planning. Friedmann does not link it to democratic planning per se. (1973) Lakshmanna compares it with the work of Fromm and Jaspers but he does not include any references to actual planning experiences. Because of his migrations (see Chapter 2), Mannheim is usually seen to have had an intellectual career demarcated by phases of distinct problem interests. (See

Appendix C) Accordingly, his planning theory is sometimes interpreted as part of his interest in "Max Weber's question: How are freedom and democracy in the long run compatible with the development of capitalism" (Bramstedt and Gerth in FPDP); his determination to find a way "between reaction and revolution" (Bogardus, 1951); a society which could be "conducive to a healthy growth of personality" (Kecskemeti in ESSP); the need to overcome "a-temporal validity" (Wagner, 1953); "humanism" (Remmling, 1975); being constructive" in the face of "stubborn reality" (Wolff, 1971); adapting to the British environment (Shils, 1968); and the grand theory of "social reconstruction" (Weintraub, 1944).

[10] Finally, several appendices elaborate on particular topics to amplify the arguments in Part II. (See Table of Contents) Cross references are shown in the text where appropriate.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

PLANNING AND DEMOCRACY

Mannheim observed in 1935 that traditional democratic politics had not developed the capacity to guide the growing technological and institutional instruments of social control. He proposed democratic planning as a solution. Though his idea of democratic planning has not been adopted, the practice of planning has become widespread.

Internationally,

> [s]ince 1945 more than twelve hundred national development plans have been elaborated, over one-hundred twenty-five central planning offices have been established in both rich and poor countries, and around a hundred specialized training centers give courses in national and regional planning. (Benveniste, 1972: 14)

By 1974, the United States alone boasted approximately 11,000 professional planners. (Kaufman, 1974) Every federal agency, save the President's Council of Economic Advisers,[1] claimed to be planning. (Graham, 1976: 284) Altogether about 11,080 governmental planning bodies existed.[2]

All told, these planners and agencies have helped spend billions of public dollars to shape our current way of life. Under the veil of expertise,[3] these people, sometimes in concert with other professionals, businessmen, government officials, and citizens, have engaged in "colonizing the

future," "the most pretentious of political tasks." (Barnet in Raskin (ed.), 1978; Benveniste, 1972)

Their record is not the subject of this dissertation.[4] Instead, the justification of planning is the focus here. In Mannheim's words,

> ... the question is only who shall use these means of control for what end ... The alternatives are ... 'planning for what?' and 'what kind of planning?' (FPDP: 8)

1.A. Planning

"Planning is an extremely ambiguous and difficult word to define" because it means "different things" to different people. (Hall, 1975: 1) Planning has been defined in four ways:

(1) what planners do (cf. Benveniste, 1972)

(2) "rational social action" (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953)

(3) "goal-oriented" "policy coordination" (Mannheim; Sartori, 1962; Barnet in Raskin (ed.), 1978)

(4) the quest for "total control" (Hayek, 1944; Popper, 1962; cf. Sartori, 1962)

In all cases, planning utilizes "social controls" (Mannheim) and entails determining a sequence of actions to attain specific objectives ("simple or complex") (Hall, 1975). However, planning may (1) address specific issues (e.g., resources, social welfare, transportation) or be comprehensive (Madge, 1968; Scheff, 1976); (2) be long- or short-term; (3) occur in the public and/or private sector.

For this discussion planning will be defined as "goal setting" and "policy coordination." It will also refer only to those activities of government agencies and representatives and/or citizens. Since planning in the private sector often has public implications, the issue of what should be incorporated into (or be directed from) the public domain is itself a planning choice.

This definition is quite prevalent in the literature, particularly in the texts of "social planning." For example, Alfred Kahn defines planning as "policy choice and programming in light of facts, projections, and application of values." (Kahn, 1969: 17) Herbert Gans states:

> Planning is a method of public decision-making which emphasizes explicit goal-choice and rational goal-means determination, so that decisions can be based on the goals people are seeking and on the most effective programs to achieve them. (Gans, 1968: vii)

John Seeley considers planning to be

> (1) a rather more formal or ordered process, (2) in which men seek by forethought (3) to affect action (4) so as to bring about more desired states (5) than it is anticipated would otherwise occur (6) over a rather large domain of operation, (7) and for a relatively large span of time. (Seeley, 1964: 43)

The other three possible definitions are excluded for various reasons. "What planners do," while an interesting empirical question, is not clear enough to be theoretically helpful. (Cf. Hall, 1975) "Rational social action," including "regulation," is omitted because as Mannheim explains,

> The word planning if it includes every kind of regulation, without making a distinction between haphazard interference and co-ordinated control, is too vague to provide any clue why it should be precisely in this generation that planning begins to be of real significance. (MSR: 10)

"The quest for 'total control'" is rejected because it confuses the purposes of planning with the activities. (Cf. Wootton, 1945)

Planning is then a particular kind of decision making for the future. In selecting ends, planning is necessarily value-laden. (See especially Davidoff and Reiner, 1962) It is also political in that it "implies the existence of that will and power to intervene." (MSR: 194) "The essence of planning is control over those functional achievements which formerly grew up spontaneously." (ESSP: 306; emphasis added) This "control" involves both knowledge and power. The intention is to gain "control of control." (MSR: 326)

> You may ask me [i.e., Mannheim] whether correct knowledge will induce people to act in the right way. Indeed knowledge itself gives no guarantee that it will be used in practice. But it is the precondition of productive control. (ESSP: 309; emphasis supplied)

Power, which is a "social resource," is to be used constructively in planning.[5] (Lynd, 1956; FPDP: xviii) Organized power is not only inevitable, but "essential ... [to] social living ..." Power "... is neither inherently ... 'bad' or 'good' ..." Power accounts for both "... the process of ...

order and disorder ..." (Lynd, 1956: 36-8) Therefore, planning involves positing alternatives for a better life and preparing for contingencies. It entails a "continuous watch on the key-positions of society and the attempt to avoid [institutional] maladjustments which might lead to catastrophe." It requires demonstration of where (and why) there should be "interference with a changing environment." (ESSP: 307; FPDP: 318)

Planning is not equivalent to policy making. While both involve "statements of intentions" and are thereby distinguished from "other futuristic scenarios," policies do not inherently require action (or intervention).[6] Plans, however, do.

> A policy can be defined as a set of decisions for which (1) a considerable amount of cogitation is required and/or (2) the implication of the decisions on future goal attainment is perceived to be important ... [P]lanning ... is the conscious evaluation of interrelated decisions and policies prior to undertaking action. (Benveniste, 1972: 34)

At whatever level planning is done -- from neighborhood to nation[7] -- Mannheim believes that effective planning demands some "centralization." The degree to which "secondary decentralized" planning and non-interference are to exist depends on actual conditions and choice of "desirable ends." (MSR: 320; FPDP: 318) He reasons:

> Where big institutions are to be adjusted to each other, some centralized prevision has to watch their operation or else their clash becomes catastrophic.

Yet, simultaneously,

> /c/atastrophe such as war, rapid depression, great inflation, growing unemployment, which requires extraordinary measures (that is, the concentration of the maximum power in the hands of some government), is bound to precipitate the process ... /of planning, which, in turn, assures that the/ tendencies towards concentration will only increase. (ESSP: 258)

At least one experience seems to bear him out. In the early 1960s community action projects were explicitly set up with Ford Foundation (and later federal) money to combine goal-setting and policy coordination in six American cities. With expertise from university professors, broadly representative community boards were created to "plan" "coordinated" programs to "prevent" further "urban decay." State and local governments also provided support. Marris and Rein report that the intent was admirable and in many cases the results were significant. Nonetheless, the successes were limited by the lack of national planning to deal with the underlying causes of urban poverty (including unemployment). Though, they argue, clearly some procedures could have been improved, the problem, in this instance, was not the inability to imagine alternatives or too little purposive activity. Goals were set; the jurisdiction of "policy coordination" was just too limited and not centralized. (Marris and Rein, 1967) Although their intermediate conclusions have been debated,[8] as "urban decay" continued into the 1970s, federal departments, corporate

interests and banking institutions took over cities. (Alcaly and Mermelstein (eds.), 1977; cf. Gross, n.d.; Reissmann, 1964) Others looking at different programs have observed similar results. (Cf. Piven and Cloward, 1978)

The naive view of planning concludes that there is "an unresolvable dilemma ... between desire to shape the future and inability to foresee it." (The Times /London/, May 6, 1968) This statement is not inaccurate; it simply avoids the heart of the problem of planning: Who is to control what for which purposes? Or, as a daring minister in "Middletown" pronounced from his pulpit in 1935:

> The reason we are afraid of ... plans is that they might not be in accord with our plans ... /Yet, w/hat is there wrong about a plan? Lack of a definite plan has always been the stumbling block to progress. Is there anything wrong about planning for the day when men can get employment and maintain their self-respect? Is a man unpatriotic who thinks we ought to have a plan to end poverty? We have a tuberculosis society. What is its purpose but to make plans to eliminate this dreadful disease and see that they are carried out? Society needs some intelligent planning, the planning that will stop group strife that makes poverty, war, hatred, jealousies, and the state of mind that destroys us. (Lynd and Lynd, 1937)

1.B. Theory

Planners generally view planning as an interdisciplinary "field," yet they acknowledge there is something called "planning theory." The question is, what is meant by planning theory?

Theory is a form of reasoning which accounts for relationships among facts and assumptions. (Cf. Bronowski, 1965; Polanyi, 1958; Simey, 1968) Functionally, theories can be predictive (what will happen), explanatory (what did happen), normative (what should happen), or exploratory (what could happen). Because planning entails action, each type also tacitly becomes prescriptive.

Planning theories cover the range of these functions. Since World War II, they have grown out of mathematical modelling and gaming (i.e., exploratory), linear (and other) statistical progressions (i.e., predictive), and case studies (i.e., explanatory). Normative theory has been downplayed,[9] primarily because (1) social and political theory fill that need (e.g., Simey, 1968; Heywood, 1973); (2) the "big" questions were answered long ago (e.g., Friedmann and Hudson, 1974); or (3) social progress can only be advanced by small, detailed steps (e.g., Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Popper, 1957)

Normative and exploratory planning theory emerged in the early twentieth century.[10] For example, in the Soviet Union Lenin introduced a "New Economic Policy" to industrialize the largely agrarian, feudalized society. (Carr, 1948, 1951, 1969; Maynard, 1962) Later socialism and planning were equated in many minds, but Lenin actually modelled Russian economic planning after the German scheme, Planwirtschaft, developed by Walther Rathenau in 1918.[11] (This design -- where a central body of consumers, workers,

owners, and citizens would guid industrial production -- was never adopted in Germany despite the efforts of von Moellendorff and Wissell of the Ministry of Economics.) (Cf. Lederer, 1933; Carr, 1969)

The first large-scale planning efforts occurred during World War I. Although generals had long coordinated policies concerning troops and materiels, this time planning extended to the non-military sector. Goal setting was minimal: "win the war." In the United States, Congress gave President Wilson the power to create a series of "planning agencies." By 1918 they included the War Industries Board (which centrally guided the allocation of resources, production and distribution of goods); the Food Administration (to secure foodstuffs and set prices); the United States Shipping Board (to direct the use of available transport); and the Railroad Administration (to channel intercontinental traffic). (Soule, 1967: 32ff) Given the demonstrated capacity to coordinate policies nationwide, some asked why not apply the same approach to peacetime problems?[12]

War is different than peace, however, in several ways which have grave implications for planning theory. War is perceived as a temporary and urgent situation. War is usually backed by the appearance of consensus. Emergency and extraordinary powers are often granted governments during war. Furthermore, uniformity of treatment and conformity of behavior are better tolerated during wartime. It is difficult enough to coordinate policies with these favorable

conditions. Indeed, with reference to the more sophisticated planning of World War II, "students ... have concluded that the United States won the war in spite of planning rather than because of it. Controls were omnipresent, but control was lacking." (Barnet in Raskin (ed.), 1978: 120)

Even if wartime planning experiments work, how can the negative connotation of war be reconciled with the positive possibilities of planning?[13] As it emerged, planning theory analytically separated the phenomena. For instance, John Dewey announced in 1918:

> ... war has revealed the possibilities of intelligent administration -- administration which could be used to raise and maintain on a higher level the general standard and scale of living ... (Dewey in Ratner (ed.), 1939: 420-22)

Where World War I engendered debate on the possibility of planning, World War II marked the turning point to the "inevitability" of planning.[14]

In this context two planning theory orientations coexist. One concerns the nature of the "planned society" and its aims. The other involves the meaning of the "planning process" and its procedures. Both concepts survive, albeit the "planned society" notion actually predates the Second World War.

The primary issue of the "planned society" is whether planned change refers to marginal adjustments (or corrections) or to creating a "new society." If the former view is taken, social institutions are thought to be basically

sound; they just need to be better utilized. (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950; Hayek, 1944; Wolin, 1960; Nisbet, 1953; Etzioni, 1968; Friedmann, 1973; Wilson in Morris (ed.), 1964; Bennis et al, 1962) However, if the latter position is held, the whole point of planning is to redesign the institutional framework of society. (Mannheim; Wootton, 1934, 1945; Seeley, 1964; Titmuss, 1969, 1974; Hodges, 1970; Peattie, 1968; Reimer, 1947; Selznick, 1949; Mumford, 1944, 1967; Raskin (ed.), 1978; Lorwin, 1945; Mills, 1940, 1954, 1958, 1963 (in Horowitz /ed./); Bachrach, 1969; Means, 1969; Harrington, 1978; Hook, 1944; Baran, 1969; Lynd, 1939; Dewey, 1918)

The "planning process" is also viewed in opposite ways. Some seek "rationally" to improve conventional decision making procedures (like bargaining). (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950; Etzioni, 1968) Other emphasize the conflicts of interests of the various parties to planning. (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962; Scheff, 1976; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Peattie, 1968; Dyckman, 1966; Webber, 1963; Lynd, 1944; Mills, 1940, 1954) For example, in urban interstate highway planning, the affected residents, the local business community, the engineers, and government officials are involved. Each group has personal reasons for wanting (and not wanting) the proposed highway. These groups may be further divided on such issues as where the highway should run, where exits should be

placed, what amenities should be included in the planning package. (Altschuler, 1965)

A range of opinion as to the meaning of planning theory, therefore, has always prevailed. However, there are discernable trends in thinking. The planning theorists who wrote before World War II, including Mannheim, tend to favor the "planned society" as "new society" approach. Those who emerge later prefer the "planning process" formulation, though they remain divided on their interpretations. Sartori observes that:

> The difference, and therefore the root of misunderstanding between the two generations, lies in the fact that the first generation was envisaging long-range problems, whereas the following generation has short-range problems in its purview. In the former approach one covers a large horizon, but from a distance, with less perception of the details; in the latter, one sees the details but the horizon becomes small. (1962: 394)

Crosland,[15] the British socialist, agrees and comments further: in the postwar period planning was redefined in a "diminishing area of controversy." "A priori principles" gave way to "empirical considerations." (Crosland, 1956: 489ff)

Planning theory is largely refined, if not initiated, in the academy. During the postwar period, American professors have dominated the international social sciences. Consequently, most planning theory has issued from the Americans. This is true even for theories pertaining to the modernization of the third world. Friedmann and Hudson's

survey of planning theory, while not exhaustive, constitutes a "normal school" view of the development of planning theories. (Cf. Kuhn, 1962) Taking a methodological, rather than thematic, approach, they discern four kinds of planning theory:

(1) "philosophical syntheses"

(2) "rationalism/systems theory"

(3) "organization/development" analyses, and

(4) "empiricism," including "national" and "urban" planning theory.

"Philosophical syntheses" and "organizational/development" analyses have their roots in the work of Mannheim and Chester Barnard, respectively, and thus predate World War II. The other two, which are more prevalent today, emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

They note that most planning theories arise during "major periods of social crisis," though they do not define "crisis." They also infer that planning theory has become increasingly fragmented since 1950. In fact, they conclude that "cross-fertilizing" of these various approaches is needed. (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974)

Another overview of planning theory makes a similar observation:

> Society is the universe or map on which the planner works. Development is both the goal and the means toward achieving change to which the planner contributes. Neither society nor development are static concepts and neither is necessarily dependent on

> planning ... Neither society or [sic] development are simply social, or simply economic or simply physical. Nevertheless planning practice and its scientific rationale (social and physical sciences) are so divided today. It must, however, be recognized that this division is an analytic device and that reality is never so divided. (Scheff, 1976: 1)

On the whole, the post-war generation carried on, albeit implicitly, the justifications for planned intervention developed by the pre-war generation. Not until the second post-war generation came of age in the mid- or late-1960s were the presumptions of a "planned society" challenged within the planning community.[16] This doubt took two forms. One group, still believing in the possibility of good planning, turns to "social theory" to "define problems," to create a "vocabulary of new alternatives" and to assist in guiding social "construction." (Bailey, 1975) Usually without acknowledging their intellectual forebears, especially Mannheim and Lynd (see also below), they reopened the debate over the ends of planning. The other group takes a different perspective. Concerned with the encroachments of government, these planning theorists seek to expose the value biases of planning agencies and/or specific proposals. The development of "counter-plans"[17] characterizes their efforts. (Cf. Benveniste, 1972: 29, 125)

Both of these views, unlike the "normal school" of planning theory which stresses rationality, are vitally interested in power. The counter-planners seek to confute the improper use of organized power; the "new breed" attempt to

identify the proper uses of power. (Cf. Bailey, 1975)

1.C. Democracy and Planning

It is precisely this regard for power which leads them, as it did Mannheim, to the concept of democracy. What are the ends of democracy? What are the means? Why are they desirable? How can they be applied in planning?

The major difference between Mannheim's generation and the current one lies in their disparate views of democracy. Where Mannheim stressed the purposes, and then the means, of democracy, the new generation has focused mostly on processes. This is seen in the large literature on citizen participation where it is assumed that the critical problem is to ensure that the people have a voice in planning. (Cf. Arnstein, Pateman, Peattie, Davidoff and Reiner, for example) While Mannheim does not disagree, he goes further.

The "principle of democracy," for Mannheim, "is that all social classes shall be politically active" and that "deeds and thoughts" shall be "public." (MSR: 72ff; cf. FPDP) The aim of democracy is to "foster individualization" and to achieve "the integration and unity of a great society ... by way of the mutual complementing of /institutional/ functions." (ESSP: 260ff) Democracy is the only form of political organization which encourages "our real liberties ... /and/ the idea of ... self-determination." (MSR: 6) In democracy, the individual "shar/es social/ responsibility in

planning the whole course of events in the society in which he moves." (MSR: 70) In short, democracy provides "control" through participation and abets improvement by espousing the ideals of individual potentiality and social fraternity. Democracy seeks both to curtail the abuses of power and to constructively apply power to meet human needs and wants.[18]

Regardless of their perspective -- the planned society and/or the planning process -- planning theorists increasingly assume that the practice of planning has become "continuous" and accordingly "that all sorts of planning constitute a distinct type of human activity, concerned with controlling particular systems." (Hall, 1975: 269) However, as Wootton notes: "planning is /always/ a matter of degree. It is nowhere completely absent nor does it anywhere cover 100 per cent of all ... activity." (1945: 9)

Notice that both planning and democracy imply experimentation. Furthermore, both essay to "control" power, albeit democracy more inclusively. Democracy, in other words, subsumes political decision making of all types, including planning.

Where democracy and planning are conjoined, the expectation is not one of certain outcome. Rather, the intention is to use available power differently to avoid, or remedy, the errors of the past. For example, "advocacy" planning theory calls for planning experts to speak for underrepresented interests, particularly the poor and minorities. Experiments in planning and democracy are often complementary.

Both necessarily confront the same situation.

> We have no power to choose the social order and its techniques of control. They are already in existence, and the most we can do is to combine and mould them to the best advantage. (MSR: 6)

Planning and democratic actions ultimately either try to "prevent" the continuation (or rise) of certain social ills and/or they attempt to "construct" a better society. (Mannheim; cf. the ideas of planning "alternatives" and for "contingencies" in Section 1.A.) Each of these endeavors is informed by selected goals. Each adopts (or invents) procedures deemed effective and theoretically compatible with expressed aims. But, each recognizes that their relative success (or not) depends on a complex of factors, some of which cannot be anticipated. Two predominant themes emerge when "control and social guidance are at stake": the relationship of knowledge and power and the interaction of man and society.[19]

In "democratic planning" these threads are woven together into a theory of the public interest which in turn is informed by "social science" and instructs collective action.

Whereas recent normative planning theory has focused on the process of democracy (particularly citizen participation[20]), the "democratic planning" approach concentrates on the purposes of democracy. "Democratic planning" theory argues that the "middleway" between "impos/ing/ power" and

"surrender/ing/" to it is best. (Rein, 1976) Otherwise, "drift" ("the consequences of innumerable decisions coalesce and collide to form blind and overwhelming events of historical fate") or defeat (by dictatorial or totalitarian regimes) will result. Since each of these situations is abetted by planning ("partial" or not) in today's world, the political choice is between "good planning and bad." (MSR: 6) Or, as Mumford (1967) puts it: "the fear of planning led to bad planning."

The criteria for good planning (including the selection of goals), then, are fundamental. The "task," Mannheim avows, "is to build a social system by planning, but planning of a special kind: it must be planning for freedom, subjected to democratic control." (FPDP: 29) "The great and urgent task of social science /is/ to classify the problems of planning and to think of means of guiding this process towards its optimum ..." (ESSP: 259) "The possibilities of planning are great, but the dangers are greater."[21] (ESSP: 309) In other words, Mannheim foresaw the possibility of abuse of power by the State (and concentrated private power) even in so-called democracies which engaged in planning.

1.D. Major Theorists of Democratic Planning

John Dewey, Robert Lynd, and Karl Mannheim are the three major theorists of democratic planning. The fact that all three are best remembered as theorists of knowledge (or educa-

tion) is a telling sign of the misunderstanding of the idea of democratic planning. Nevertheless, their theories of knowledge and education are intimately tied to the idea of democratic planning.

This comparison does not seek to be thorough, but, rather, to introduce the reader to the predominant themes of democratic planning.[22]

All three worked on the notion of democratic planning before 1950. Dewey was the first to write on the topic. In a rich and haunting piece, Dewey, in 1918, proposed an agenda for "internal social reorganization after the war": full employment, a better "scale of living" for all, and industrial democracy. (Dewey, 1918: 385ff)

In subsequent books,[23] written in the 1920s and early 1930s, Dewey developed his ideas to emphasize:

(1) the need for a "planned economy" to meet social needs,

(2) the creation (and sustaining) of a strong democratic "public" to control the vices of privatism (especially corporate domination),

(3) democratic education "to shape the experiences of the young so that ... better habits shall be formed, and thus the future adult society /~~will~~/ be an improvement on their own," (Dewey: 1916) and

(4) community cohesion to guarantee security which in

turn provides the foundation for the promotion of individual potentials.

Lynd and Mannheim extend Dewey in different directions. Lynd, who shared the American experience with Dewey, had to justify planning to individualist democrats. Mannheim, however, as a European, could assume a broader acceptance of social democracy.[24] Therefore, Lynd devotes much attention to "private planning" and its implications for public democratic life, while Mannheim focuses more on public planning and the possibility for democratic progress. Another important distinction between the two is explained by their different scholarly orientations which are in turn a consequence of the different political cultures in which they lived. The philosophy of pragmatism (especially as forwarded by Dewey) and empirical social science were far advanced in the United States by the 1930s, when Lynd and Mannheim began their forays into the issue of democratic planning. Thus, while Mannheim continues in the European tradition of grand social theory, Lynd develops "outrageous hypotheses" for research. (Lynd, 1939; cf. Chapter 2)

Despite their differences, they agree with Dewey on fundamental points. Planning must proceed for democratic reconstruction. Democratic control of increasingly collectivized power (including state economic planning) must be learned in practice as well as be informed by theory. The "drift to war" must be countered by "planning for peace."[25]

(Cf. Mills, 1958) Corporate power must be curtailed; a public economy encouraged.[26]

Democratic planning involves more than just finding remedies to social problems; it also includes choices (predicated on human values) about where political society should go. Consequently, social institutions must be re-ordered to allow for flexible experimentation in planning and intellectuals are obligated to identify options. Democratic planning, however, is ultimately a community enterprise, and so, public education, stressing the contingencies and consequences of social action, must be expanded. Democratic planning (in intention, process, and results) essays to strengthen the bonds among men even as it encourages individual diversity. It endeavors to augment the "mutual controls" of a simpler time with "shared control." (FPDP: 3ff) It seeks to define a "level of human behavior 'below which no citizen should fall'." (Bogardus, 1951: 111-2) In short, democratic planning involves "distributing and controlling communal power for maximum security, efficiency, and freedom." (FPDP: 45)

Significantly, all three theorists, though they give detailed examples, assiduously avoid imposing "blueprint/s/" on their fellow men in the belief that the activity of planning is the best way of exercising democratic citizenship.[27] Thus, the inherently democratic character of social knowledge[28] is to be clarified and integrated by scholars, and educators are charged with expanding the capacity of

democratic intelligence by emphasizing the interrelations among social data (chronologically and across cultures).[29] In this way, planning can improve the quality of democratic life even as it extends democratic participation.[30]

Instead of "blueprint/s/," democratic planning theorists develop the theory of the public interest. They believe that as power becomes increasingly organized and society is more collectivized, the public interest becomes more important. Their view of the public interest is decidedly forward looking, though they differ on particular points.

Lynd suggests that the public interest needs to be defined in terms of chronological progress. Instead of the "helter-skelter affair" that results when "the process of change ruled by private enterprise, /is/ unchecked by any clear philosophy of control in the public interest," "the aim /of the public interest/ is to create a cultural situation which, by minimizing occasions for wasteful mistakes, would free energy and resources for the vital creativities of living." (Lynd, 1939: 100, 235)

In contrast, the traditional debate on the public interest assumes static conditions. It ignores the real interdependencies of contemporary society by distinguishing between public and individual interests. The usual query is whether a particular proposal or action is, or is not, in the public interest. The method is to find and justify a set of rules which can be applied to specific situations.[31] Struc-

turally, this approach to defining the public interest reduces to three mutually exclusive possible conclusions:

(1) The public interest occurs when common and individual interests coincide.

(2) The public interest is synonymous with the common interest. The common interest thus overrides individual interests.

(3) The public interest is defined by the consensus of a majority of individual interests.

Each view has its representatives.[32] (Cf. Held, 1970) The debate then extends in different directions. Many focus on refining what is meant by "interest." (E.g., Benn and Peters, Rawls) Others concentrate on civil disobedience on the assumption that no scheme of the public interest is infallible. (E.g., Walzer, Bay)

The democratic planning theorists, on the other hand, tend to compare public interest(s) with private interests. (E.g., Mills, Lynd, Dewey) Beginning with the contention that waste and destruction are inhuman, they focus on the meaning of "public."

John Dewey best elaborates the argument. He first suggests that the problem of the "public" is that it is ever-changing. Thus, the initial requirement for defining the public interest is to define the "conditions" under which the "public" is organized. (Dewey, 1927: 33, 153) The next step involves the recognition that the "public has no hands except those of individual human beings." (Dewey, 1927: 82)

The bonds between these individuals, which create the possibility of the public interest, issue not from "affection" but rather from "attachment." "Attachment" is bred in the continuity of social life; affections, in contrast, arise in functional interactions. Because of the different motivational sources, "/t/he very things which stimulate and intensify affections may undermine attachments." (Dewey, 1927: 140-1; cf. Sections 4.C. and 8.B.)

The public interest then is defined in "experimental" terms. Consequences of judgments and actions are emphasized. A moral concept, the public interest can never be defined solely in terms of appropriate machinery (e.g., representative government) or simple rules (such as voting). Instead, the public interest, while it has concrete manifestations, is inherently an unfinished political inquiry. (Dewey, 1927: 77, 82, 86, 184)

Since the "public" always is being reshaped (due to the birth and death of individuals, physical mobility, jurisdictional boundary changes, and other real social factors), Dewey emphasizes the shared root in the words "common," "community," and "communications." The organization of the "public" minimally requires improved "publicity" and "communications." The public interest accordingly entails democracy, which, in turn, affirms the political rights of individuals. Government is simply the "instrumentality" for the "public's interests." The goal of the public interest

is the formation of the "Great Community." (Cf. Chapters 4 and 8)

From this perspective, Dewey acknowledges several possibilities for planning in the public interest. At the national level, two socio-economic goals must be met: (1) full employment and (2) administration of inflation and production to "raise" the "standard of living." (Dewey, 1918) In turn, states[33] must offer public education which teaches "continuous inquiry... continuous in the sense of being connected as well as persistent ... /to/ provide the material of enduring opinion about public matters." Otherwise, planning should be initiated in the local community by members of that community. For example, there should be "reorganization" of the workplace so that workers better "control/ / the conditions of /their/ ... activity." (Dewey, 1918) Over time, Dewey places more emphasis on community planning, as does Mannheim. (Cf. Chapter 7)

Indeed, after surveying the planning situation in America in the first part of the twentieth century, Dewey concludes that the democratically constituted "political agencies" have not been "worthy" of their task of creating the "Great Community." Hence, reforms should be undertaken at the local level. "Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community." (Dewey, 1927: 143ff, 213)

Both Dewey and Lynd directly link the idea of the public interest to the issues of chronological change and control. (Cf. Section 4.E. and Chapter 8) Mannheim's view is quite

similar, particularly to Dewey's.[34]

Mannheim conceived of the idea of democratic planning as a "yardstick" by which to measure current planning efforts and new proposals. Thinking in terms of structure and function (cf. Chapter 4) and process (cf. Chapter 7), Mannheim tacitly identifies[35] four layers of the public interest. In order of priority they are:

(1) The common (human) interest.[36] Defined as those preconditions basic to human survival, three irreducible needs include (a) an end to nuclear armament and control of the military; (b) full employment to ensure that each is able to afford elementary needs (like food and shelter); and (c) publicity, or the communications necessary for the people to collectively improve the quality of democracy. (Cf. Chapters 5, 6 and 7)

(2) Individual-interests-in-common. These relate to the reciprocal arrangements among all citizens. They are created and modified by repeated choices which reflect and produce changing conditions. Interests-in-common may be procedural and/or substantive. Examples include national health care, constitutional rights, and truly progressive taxation. (Cf. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7)

(3) Community interests. Defined as those rights to control the decisions which reconstruct and sustain

the jurisdictions (e.g., region, locality, factory) in which people live, community interests do not, like the categories above, imply full agreement of all members of communities. They recognize (and reinforce) the fact that some degree of social cohesion must be promoted among diverse individuals and groups. (Cf. Chapters 3, 4, and 7)

(4) "More complicated" democratic values. These individual and group rights are upheld as long as they do not contravene the functioning of the above categories. They encourage innovation and "facilitate personal relationships." They are guided by a notion of "self-control" in the exercise of democratic tolerance." (Cf. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6)

In summary, the problem of the public interest, for Mannheim, is the problem of controlling the use of power for human purposes.

Two presumptions about democratic life inform his view of the public interest. First, democratic security cannot obtain unless "all ... institutions are thoroughly oriented to democratic ends." (FPDP: 173) Second, democracy rightly understood diminishes the distances between people. (Cf. Chapter 4) Because of the increasing density and interdependence of social relations, individualist democracy leads

to "collective insecurity." Each person within the whole political culture must be substantially secure for "reciprocity" to govern.[37] "Reciprocity" affirms individual rights while allowing for collective decisions to be made. (Cf. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) While some theorists argue that the public interest should be defined in terms of conflict or consensus, Mannheim, by using the concept of "reciprocity," essays to show how both consensus and conflict can be mutually reinforcing in democratic society. (Cf. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8)

The political implication of Mannheim's view, like Dewey's, is: a democratic public must be formed to actively decide its interests. In matters human there can be no equivocation. In matters social there is room for experimentation.

Finally, it should be noted that Mannheim thinks education can be used to help individuals develop their human and public interests, but he never assigns the task of defining the public interest to intellectuals. (Cf. Chapter 5) Thus, by inference, the public interest involves an intelligent use of social knowledge, and, as such, it is a concept that is always amenable to improvement. (Cf. Chapter 3)

* * *

Before proceeding to the textual analysis of Mannheim's writings on democratic planning, Mannheim's biography will be briefly presented.

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 1

1
Ironically, the President's Council of Economic Advisers was created by the Full Employment Act of 1946 which in its original form sought to establish a national planning mechanism to attain full employment. (Bailey, 1950)

2
Large cities (500,000 to 1,000,000), for example, averaged full-time planning staffs of 36 funded at $640,000/staff/year as of 1973.

3
Mandates for planners, at least official ones, are often ambiguous on several points. Since planners are normally one of several functionaries in agencies, mandates are usually charged to a particular agency or to the governing body of an agency. Planners, almost as technicians, are to carry out that part of the mandate which is earmarked to the future.

For example, the enabling legislation of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) permits the board to "do all things it deems necessary, convenient or desirable to manage, control and direct the maintenance and operation of transportation facilities, equipment or real property ..." (McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Public Authorities Law, Section 1266, Article 8) Mass transit riders are simply part of the general "public" to which the authority has an obligation to operate on a "self-sustaining basis." The dependence on public transport of certain populations, particularly lower class workers, is not explicitly noted.

Another instance of ambiguity is seen in the New York City Planning Commission's "purpose": "to guide and to influence the city in its development and future growth." (State Charter Revision Commission, 1973) Rather than being asked to provide a vision of what the city might be, or options from which locally affected people might choose, planning is viewed primarily as "an overhead function." The "challenge" is not to improve the life of the city, especially for those worst off, but rather to "order[ ] and balanc[e] priorities and trade-offs between conflicting demands in an economy of scarcity for public services." (State Charter Revision Commission, 1973) "Politicization" is viewed organizationally in terms of procedures within or without the mayor's office and the extent of community involvement.

4
For surveys of the American planning experience see Benveniste, Raskin (ed.), Soule, and Graham.

5
Power, because it occurs in all social relationships, grows as the number of relationships in a society increases. Under contemporary circumstances this means that power is an expanding, not contracting, "resource." It also explains why an uneven distribution of power tends to become more lopsided. In other words, relationships between organized power and organized power beget more power than those between unorganized power and organized or unorganized power. This premise underlies the work of community or labor organizers.

6
Harold Lasswell, for example, defines the "policy sciences" as "the study /of/ the process of deciding or choosing and evaluating the relevance of available knowledge for the solution of particular problems." (In International Encyclopedia for the Social Sciences, 1968 edition, volume 12)

7
International planning is also conceivable. However, in the absence of a world government it is difficult to ensure the central power and authority necessary to comprehensive "goal setting" and "policy coordination."

8
See, for example, the Kerner Commission report on the urban riots of the mid-1960s.

9
In fact, mirroring the supremacy of positivism in social science theory in general, many planners have assumed normative questions to be irrelevant and impracticable. (Cf. Appendix E and Chapter 3)

10
For early urban and social welfare planning theory, see Mumford, 1961; Martin, 1976; Mencher, 1967.

11
Walther Rathenau, a Jewish millionaire, denounced the "profit motive" in his famous The New Economy (1918). He asked why "three hundred men, all acquainted with each other, /should/ control the economic destiny of the /European/ continent?" He proposed a publicly controlled economy because the private sector acts irresponsibly. "Whoever squanders labor ... is robbing the community."

In 1914, Rathenau presented himself at the German War Ministry to organize production for the war effort. Some believe his small unit of seven people was responsible for extending the war to 1918. After the war, Rathenau, a friend of the Kaiser's, was made Minister of Reconstruction, and then, upon the resignation of Friedrich Rosen, the Foreign Minister. In 1922, while negotiating the Versailles Treaty, Rathenau was assassinated by a group of young thugs. Without a clear political position, the two killers later claimed they had to get rid of the "Bolshevik." Eleven years later a survivor of the gang accosted Joseph Goebbels: "It wasn't for swine like you that we shot Rathenau!" Yet, in early 1933, the assassins were commemorated by Heinrich Himmler&Ernst Rohm for their "SS" "spirit." (Friedrich, 1972: 124ff and passim)

12

War, also, because it leaves disintegrating institutions and physical destruction necessitates reconstruction (sometimes a synonym for planning). Thus, the activity of planning, given the impetus of war, tends to continue after the cessation of fighting. For example, the Marshall Plan, Monnet's "indicative planning" in France and "United Europe" campaign, and the British Welfare State followed World War II.

The Marshall Plan not only provided European countries needed capital after the war, it also was an integral piece of the United States' welfare-warfare approach to maintaining economic stability. (See Baran; Bailey, 1950; Soule; Graham) British reforms leading to the Welfare State had begun before World War I, but the components of nationalized industries were not added until after World War II. (See Havighurst, Mencher, Crosland)

To return to the similarity between "reconstruction" and "planning." Both terms in English are over 200 years old. "Planning," which dates back to 1748, means "scheming, designing, contriving." It stresses "will" rather than purposes. "Planning" was earliest used in reference to mapping new roadways and saving money for the future. (Oxford English Dictionary, volume II: 2197) In contrast, "reconstruction," first used in 1791, denotes the "action" of "construct/ing/ anew." Emphasizing purpose, even initially, it connoted choosing what to carry from the past into the future for the reintegration of society. (Oxford English Dictionary, volume II: 2444)

There are subtle differences. "Planning," refers to implementing given values, "reconstruction" instead intends structural changes. Yet, both terms have always been concerned with repairing a disintegrating social world. Some repairs are temporary on the assumption that replacements (by new institutions, for example) will occur. Other repairs are done more carefully in the knowledge that certain

things cannot be replaced. Reconstructionist repairs begin with the principle that human beings cannot be replaced, but that human errors, especially those of interpretation, can be corrected. (Cf. Chapter 3)

Mannheim used the term "reconstruction" in his first book on planning (MSR, 1935) and "planning" in his last book (FPDP, 1950). However, because he always modified "planning" with the word "democratic," this language change is not really significant. In fact, it reflects a change in popular usage in that period. (I will use the terms democratic planning and social reconstruction interchangeably.) "Reconstruction" was a common designation at the turn of the century. (Dewey, however, used the term "reorganization" in his 1918 article on social planning, reserving the word "reconstruction" for his philosophical theory of pragmatism.) As the notion that men make their social life grew more prevalent and as technologies developed, "planning" (which emphasizes "new") superseded "reconstruction" (which stresses "anew") in the 1930s and 1940s. During the transition, both terms were in vogue. But, "reconstruction," insinuating some retrieval of the values of previous times was gradually dropped in favor of planning, where only the future offers hope. For example, the names of American public housing programs changed from "redevelopment" or "renewal" to "Model Cities" or "New Towns" in the period after World War II.

13
On the other hand, to the extent that war is justified for higher purposes, such as "making the world safe for democracy," planning continues to be associated with war. Witness the names of programs such as the War on Poverty.

14
War continues to be a testing ground for planning ideas. The Vietnam War bred a host of technical approaches, including the Rand Institute orientation and PPBS.

15
For Crosland's interpretation of socialism see Chapter 8.

16
These statement are made within the context of intellectual debate on planning. In the pre-war generation the "grand issues" were heatedly and openly discussed. (Cf. Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Hayek, 1944; Wootton, 1945; Allin, 1937; Mills, 1944; Ascoli and Lehman (eds.), 1937) Nevertheless, the recipients of actual planning efforts, particularly the poor, quickly realized that planning was not always in their interests. For example, "urban renewal" was translated into the ghetto vernacular as "slum removal." (Cf. Gans, 1968, 1972; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Altschuler, 1965)

17
A counter-plan is akin to a dissenting opinion in a court verdict. It sometimes offers alternative remedies which are put into practice by relatively independent groups in small-scale projects. For example, counter-planning in education has been applied by some teachers in the classroom.

18
This, of course, is the "social" view of democracy. Representative thinkers include MacPherson, Rousseau, Pateman, Lynd, Dewey, Mannheim, Raskin, Carr, Buber. The liberal individualist democracy focuses on the abuse of power, almost to the exclusion of its positive uses, on the grounds that organized power is always dangerous and must be diffused. See, for example, the Federalist Papers, Spitz, Cohen, and Hayek.

19
Notice that Mannheim's first book on planning is entitled: Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction.

20
Arnstein, for example, shows how "participation" can be translated into varieties of activities (e.g., advisory panels), most of which dilute the power of citizens. (Arnstein, 1969) Contrast this to the discussion on "power to" and "power with" in Chapter 8.

21
Reaction to Mannheim's planning theory has always been mixed. (See Appendix C) Moreover, despite almost 15 years of work on planning theory, Mannheim is more frequently considered a sociologist famous in the subfield of the sociology of knowledge. The field of planning, because it is concerned with the future, is, I think, more prone than the other social sciences to innovation for the sake of novelty. For example, on chronological grounds alone, Mannheim is often relegated to the "old" school of planning theory without a reassessment. (E.g., Benveniste, 1972) Other recent planning theories which have tried to incorporate Mannheim typically adapt isolated elements of his idea. (E.g., Friedmann, 1973)
My intentions here, however, are less to resurrect Mannheim's reputation than to revisit his idea in hopes of finding the "new in the old" and to reinvigorate debate on democratic planning. (Cf. Jay, 1973)

22
Incidentally, though Mannheim and Dewey are often compared, I have never found Mannheim and Lynd contrasted. Both Mannheim and Lynd frequently cite Dewey. Additionally,

Dewey admiringly reviewed Mannheim's Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction in the Saturday Review of Literature (1940).

23
See particularly, Individualism: Old and New; Freedom and Culture; The Public and Its Problems; and Democracy and Education. The last, though written before the article on socio-economic planning, provides much of the basis for Dewey's later writings.

24
Basically, individualist and social democrats depart on two points. First, the goal of individualist democracy is the same as the precondition: individual political freedom and equality. The social democrat rather focuses on the possibility of democratic fraternity. (Cf. Buber, Carr) Second, the frame of reference differs. Where individualist democrats concentrate on interference with individual power, social democrats emphasize collective uses of power. Accordingly, individualist democrats stress the summation of individual gains and losses of power while social democrats are more concerned with the distribution of power throughout society. For further discussion on the social view of democracy, see footnote 17 above and Chapter 5.

25
"Drift," C. Wright Mills' term, is when "the consequences of innumerable decisions coalesce and collide to form blind and overwhelming events of historical fate." (1958: 42) The phrase "planning for peace" is also Mills'. Dewey in reviewing Mannheim's Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction applauded Mannheim's demonstration that the political crises in Europe which erupted into World War II were not "local" disorders run rampant, but rather symptoms of larger "social ... transformation." (Dewey, 1940: 10)

26
None committed himself to "socialism" though all believed some form of collectivized economy would emerge. Moreover, they appear not to have thought that public ownership was sufficient; the issue for them was public control. Mannheim is the least clear in his economic theory. See Chapters 7 and 8.

27
The term "blueprint" is Mannheim's. (Cf. FPDP)

28
All agree that each individual has a singular perspective. (Dewey, for example, restates the adage about who else knows

if the shoe pinches.) Moreover, individual knowledge is refined by one's social position, especially class. Mannheim, more than the others, concentrates on the scholars' functions and place in society. (See especially Chapters 3 and 5)

29

Mannheim, Lynd, and Dewey, however, stress different aspects of this point. Lynd focuses on discerning options for planned intervention. Dewey, of course, elaborates theories of democratic education and pragmatism (or, "philosophical reconstruction"). Mannheim develops theories of historicism and the sociology of knowledge (including "relationism"). (See Chapter 3) The compatibility of Mannheim's and Dewey's theory is seen, for instance, in their similar themes: compare "education as groundwork" and "education as reconstruction," respectively. (FPDP; Dewey, 1916)

30

Democratic planning then solves the dilemma Ortega y Gasset identified: namely, in an age of mass politics how can political culture be qualitatively improved? (See also Eliot, 1948, 1975; Chapters 3, 4 and 5)

31

This is why Gans states: "I am skeptical that the conception of the public interest is very useful today [1973], other than as a heuristic tool on which to base political advocacy and action." He is particularly distressed by those views of the public interest which are justified on "communal" "criteria." (Cf. Meyerson and Banfield) Rarely, he claims, do these communal theories benefit more than a portion of the population. Instead, in the absence of "consensus or majority agreement," "supra-political norm[s]" are portion of the population." Inste"Who know what is good for "consensus or majority agreement, kind of power"] is that persare invoked as "justifi[cation]." notion of goodness?" Nevefor the community, and how ["by were are three common human goals: "physiological survival" (including the end of war), "a set of political rules which makes it possible for people to fight for the achievement of their political goals, that is, democracy," and "economic equality" which is really a "prerequisite to political equality, which in turn is a prerequisite to democracy." (Friedmann et al, 1973: 10ff)

32

For example, Rousseau's argument in the Social Contract comports with (1); Hobbes' contentions in the Leviathan concur with (2); and Bentham (and the utilitarians) favor (3).

33
Dewey does not specifically cite the state level, but he reaffirms the need for public education. Because he is American, and education was and is in the purview of the states, I have inferred this point. However, the actual level of government is not critical to the argument. Regardless of which level is to provide education, Dewey places enormous responsibility on the direct participants in education -- the teachers and students.

34
With regard to planning, Mannheim is reported to have considered Dewey the most significant and convincing of the social theorists. (Kettler, 1975) Indeed, after discovering Dewey (probably in 1933 in England) to be a planning theorist, Mannheim cites and quotes him often.

35
Though Mannheim speaks about each layer tacitly at different points in his work, he does not use the term "public interest" nor does he specifically link the priorities. Unless quoted, therefore, the nomenclature is mine.

36
The knowledge gained by anthropologists, social psychologists, and historians informs pre-conditions for contemporary definitions of democracy. More specifically, human existence is necessarily social. Donne's eloquence has not been outdone: "No man is an island unto himself." For historical perspectives on this point see Arendt, Marx, Tocqueville, Bryce.

Human life is also characterized by change (over generations; within lifetimes; in material aspects; culturally; in the capacities to learn, imagine and invent; in socio-political relations within and among polities).

Human experience is necessarily continuous. For theory on this claim see particularly Dewey, Mannheim, and Erikson. Evidential texts include Wallerstein, Marx; Martin, 1976; Gimpel. With particular reference to planning, see Soule, Graham, Zinn, and Mumford.

Finally, human survival is based on physiological and psychological needs. See Gans' statement on physiological needs in Friedmann et al, 1973, for the planning implications. See also Henry, Maslow, Moore, Fromm, and Mills (1958) on psychological needs. Of particular importance to the issue of democratic planning are the notions of security and perfectability. Security is discussed in Chapter 5. Perfectability is considered in Chapter 6. For further reading consult de Jouvenal, Mencher, Rousseau, Dewey, and Berman (1972).

37
Mannheim cites as "evidence" Piaget's findings that children develop morality only when they recognize the reciprocal relationships among people. (Piaget, 1932)

CHAPTER 2

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

OF

KARL MANNHEIM

> If I am not for myself, who will be for me?
> If I am only for myself -- then what am I for?

With this quote from Hillel, Mannheim ends a series of four lectures on democratic planning at Manchester College in Oxford in 1938. (ESSP: 310)

Mannheim's political persuasions are revealed in, rather than lead to, his idea of democratic planning. Accordingly, his life holds clues as to why he developed democratic planning.

Mannheim considered himself a citizen of the world.[1] Born and educated in Hungary (1893-1920), he studied and taught in Germany (1920-1933), and wrote on planning and died in England (1933-1947).

2.A. Hungary

Karoly Mannheim was born in Budapest on March 27, 1893 of bourgeois Jewish parents -- his mother was German.[2] He entered the University of Budapest in 1912.

Though little is known of Mannheim's childhood in Hungary, in college Mannheim joined other Budapest intellectuals in criticizing local politicians who ignored the cultural

dimension in their proposed reforms. (Kettler, 1971) Budapest was a "young" city, comprised of three culturally distinct adjacent towns, in the polyglot and multicultural Hungarian nation.

In 1915, with income provided by his parents, Mannheim stayed on at the university of advanced study in philosophy. (Remmling, 1975) Though not formally a member of any of the prominent campus political clubs, Mannheim participated in Professor Georg Lukacs' Sunday discussion group, the Sprites, until he received his doctorate in 1918.[3] Mannheim was there introduced to the nascent sociology which later informed his thoughts on democratic planning.

In his first paper, "Soul and Culture," presented to the Sprites in the autumn of 1917, Mannheim reiterated the cultural concerns of his college days. Thereafter, the influence of the political sociology of Max Weber (with whom Lukacs had recently spent time in Heidelberg), Marx (via the agitators on and off campus during the tumultuous period), and the Fabian Socialists/American Progressives (translated by members of the various intellectual circles at the university) become more apparent in his writing.

Many of Mannheim's fellow students went on to creative careers. Arnold Hauser, the art historian, and Bela Bartok, the composer, were also members of the Lukacs clique. Mannheim knew Karl and Michael Polyani in those days; yet,

they grew apart in England, their mutual home, in later years.[4]

After graduation Mannheim taught philosophy at his alma mater until 1920 when he left Hungary because of anti-semitism.

2.B. Germany

Mannheim is usually considered a sociologist. Yet, he was not formally trained in sociology until he went to Heidelberg in 1920.[5] In Germany, Mannheim studied with Alfred Weber, Max's brother. Whether he had intended to seek out Max,[6] who died in June 1920, is unknown. However, from Alfred he learned a new interest, historicism. Alfred, too, later became interested in planning; his study of the criteria of locational decision making (1929) remains a classic in the economic/physical planning literature.

Mannheim married Juliska Lang, a fellow Hungarian student, in 1921.[7] A social psychologist,[8] and later a psychoanalyst, she was a "lifelong adviser and collaborator," though her specific contributions are unknown.[9] (Remmling, 1975) Julia and Karl, as their names were Teutonicized, had no children, but enjoyed a marriage of 35 years. (She outlived him by nine years.) It is not known why they were barren, but, poignantly, Mannheim, especially in his later years, referred to children as the measure of humanity and compared social progress to child development.

Mannheim was to spend almost thirteen years in Germany. In the early 1920s he travelled to Freiburg to attend Heidegger's lectures. (Remmling, 1975; Kettler, 1967, 1971) By 1926, he was installed as a privatdozent (an unsalaried position analogous to the rank of assistant professor) at the University of Heidelberg, then "the major intellectual center of the German academic world." (Shils, 1968; Jay, 1973)

Already consumed with large purpose, in 1925 Mannheim turned from historicism to the sociology of knowledge in response to Scheler's recent book on the subject. After several articles, of which the most significant was "Conservative Thought" (1927), Mannheim published his first book, Ideology and Utopia in 1929. A product of a fledgling social science movement and an heir to 19th century political philosophy, Mannheim became Professor of Sociology and Political Economy at the University of Frankfurt am Main on April 1, 1930.

The University of Frankfurt had a distinctly modern countenance. The Youth Movement (similar to student movements in the 1960s), the plastic arts, and the social implications of new technologies (particularly in communications) were actively investigated at Frankfurt. Weimar Germany was the focal point of modernity in the 1920s, and betwixt the various fads and political experiments (including national economic planning proposals), the Institut

für Sozialforschung (the so-called "Frankfurt School") emerged in 1923. The home built by Adorno and Horkheimer housed Karl Mannheim. (Jay, 1973; Hughes, 1958, 1975)

Mannheim, however, was not integrally involved in the development of "critical theory," the intellectual contribution of the Frankfurt School. Nevertheless, the admixture of Marxism and Freudianism in the analysis of cultural crises spilled into Mannheim's work of the period, especially Ideology and Utopia. Some commentators believe Mannheim's knowledge of Marx hails mainly from Lukacs' Class and Class Consciousness (1923), but given Mannheim's citations, it seems more likely that he absorbed much of the Frankfurt School orientation. (Cf. Lichtheim, 1967; Remmling, 1975) Furthermore, when Mannheim compares American and German sociology in the early 1930s, he almost equates the German school with the frontier work of the Institute.

The Frankfurt School set the tone of German social investigation for its young associates (e.g., Marcuse and Fromm) as well as for others (especially those who later formed the hub of the New School of Social Research, such as Arendt and Lowe). These peripatetic scholars, simultaneously hopeful and despairing of the modern socio-political condition, shared a Judaic tradition and a bourgeois life style. (Jay, 1973) Eschewing purely quantitative analyses, they typically chose the largest human questions for study

(e.g., the "authoritarian personality," "the banality of evil," and the "fear of freedom").[10]

The promise and horrific end of the Weimar Republic were to have lasting effects on all of them. In the late 1920s Mannheim told Arendt that he would not be surprised if the Weimar culture were subsequently dubbed the "new Periclean Age." (Gay, 1968: xiv; Remmling, 1975) Indeed, Mannheim's turn to planning might well be described as a result of his wrestling with the causes of success and failure in the Weimar Republic. For example, the Weimar culture nurtured expressionist and surrealist artists (including Kadinsky and Klee), Bauhaus architects, realist novelists (e.g., Thomas Mann), and social criticism in the performing arts (e.g., Brecht-Weil plays).

The Weimar Constitution, adopted in 1919, was drafted by an astute body of experts. (Cf. Stern, 1961; Friedrich, 1972; Gay, 1968) But for the Republic's collapse in the Depression and ultimately with Hindenburg's appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933, the multiparty system might continue to be heralded as the "true" means to democracy.[11] Instead, Mannheim and others discovered the pitfalls (particularly in the inefficiency of decision making) of cumbersome democratic machinery. (Cf. "Democratization of Culture," 1933)

Mannheim's German work is theoretical and notably bereft of contemporaneous political examples. When his Frankfurt

classes were disrupted by debate between Nazi and Jewish students, Mannheim "patiently" "waited" to begin his lectures. (Bogardus, 1947: 548-9) Yet, in 1933, his name was among the first proscribed academics. Ideology and Utopia was banned, but the Hitlerian bureaucrats "forgot" to burn it. (Wolff, 1971)

Hence, Mannheim does not write about Weimar politics and the rise of fascism until after his ouster from Germany. And, though he mentions Mussolini's fascism in Ideology and Utopia, he never alludes to the fascist regime in Hungary. (K. Polanyi, 1951: 240-1)

In Weimar Germany liberalized cultural life and capital concentration[12] developed simultaneously. (Cf. Pachter, 1975; Friedrich, 1972; Gay, 1968) Mannheim, like others, saw the replacement of laissez-faire institutions by an increasingly integrated political economy.[13] Not surprisingly, then, when fascism arrives, Mannheim understands it as a variant of totalitarianism. So, too, he perceives the growing functional requirement for coordination (or, planning).[14] Mannheim only mentions "economic planning" in Ideology and Utopia. He does not join the planning debate which accelerated in response to global depression and corrections in the second Soviet five-year plan (1930-34). (Cf. Abraham, 1977; Lederer, 1933; Carr, 1948, 1969)

Because he did not address planning before departing from Germany, some analysts believe his planning interest solely a reflection of the British environment. (E.g., Remmling, 1975) However, his first excursion into planning, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, was written in German and published in Holland in 1935. Not until 1940 was it amended and released in English.

By late spring 1933, Mannheim, from Holland (on a pre-arranged university lecture tour) and Paris, communicated with the London School of Economics (LSE). Although the instigator of the relationship is uncertain,[15] with the approval of Morris Ginsberg, the don of sociology at the LSE, Mannheim was first invited to give the Hobhouse Memorial Lecture[16] and then asked to join the part-time faculty in the fall.

2.C. England

When Mannheim arrived in London in 1933, he was already well-known among German sociologists and acknowledged by some in the English speaking world. That first year, the American edition of Ideology and Utopia (to which a new essay and a recent German encyclopedia article were appended) appeared. Mannheim was also invited by the American Journal of Sociology to contribute an article on social science methods.[17] (Remmling, 1975)

The rest of the decade of the 1930s was spent quietly producing the first and second editions of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, two encyclopedia articles ("Troeltsch" and "Utopia"), and several pieces on the cultural crisis amplified by fascism. He also taught sociology at the LSE. In 1938, provoked by an invitation to lecture at Manchester College, Oxford, and his new involvement with a group of socially concerned Christians (the Moot), Mannheim began to focus his thoughts on "planning for freedom."

The Moot,[18] a discussion group to which Mannheim belonged until his death, held four weekend retreats annually. Numbered among the participants were A.D. Lindsay, the political theorist, T.S. Eliot, the poet recently converted to Catholicism, and H.A. Hodges, a British philosopher. (Hodges, 1970; Kettler, 1975) The Moot connections provided a wider audience for Mannheim's planning ideas and challenged his initial planning propositions. Two shifts stand out. Rather than elaborating on rationality, Mannheim returned to his earlier concern about cultural cohesion. Second, the expert-dominated, parliamentary democracy which Mannheim favored in 1935 was increasingly modified to include more participatory arrangements.

The only other non-Christian member of the Moot was Mannheim's friend, Adolf Lowe. Lowe, an economist, and Mannheim met in Frankfurt and there developed a comprehensive interdisciplinary curriculum. Lowe, who moved on to

the New School in New York, was at the University of Manchester from 1933 to 1940. Despite their later physical separation, they remained very close. Lowe, in fact, headed the editorial team which published Mannheim's manuscripts, including Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, posthumously.

In addition to the influence of the Moot, Mannheim was obviously smitten by many of the British political traditions and evolving responses to the economic and military crises. He was meeting first-hand the Fabian schemes he read about in his Budapest student days.

The English setting in which Mannheim spent his remaining years was alive with planning ideas. Sir William Beveridge, the principal author of the social insurance legislation which culminated in the Welfare State, was the Director of the LSE in 1933. H.J. Laski and R.H. Tawney were still very active faculty members, and in the 1940s, E.F. Schumacher and R. Titmuss joined the brigades. Obviously encouraged, Mannheim chose not to accept any American university offers.[19] In fact, he never visited this country. Yet, because of the common language, his transplanted friends, and the growth in intellectual interchanges, Mannheim's work was well-read in American sociology and related disciplines. Who among native American intellectuals he met and/or corresponded with, however, remains largely unknown.[20]

Because Mannheim published only one statement on planning in the 1930s, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, he is not mentioned in the voluminous literature on planning in that decade. By European standards he was fairly late to the planning discussion which had been brewing since World War I. Although his 1935 treatise was published during the New Deal, the delay in the English translation and the turmoil occasioned by the dispersal of German intellectual refugees during the 1930s meant that Mannheim was not widely known as a planning theorist until later. Indeed, today many planners know only the Mannheim of Ideology and Utopia.

Norman Birnbaum credits Mannheim with introducing a Marxist influence to the LSE.[21] Perhaps, this factor accounts for the putative discrepancy in Mannheim's reception at the LSE. The students apparently flocked to his classes while his colleagues questioned whether the students were being "prepared" to undertake their own research. Indeed, Mannheim's later move to the London Institute of Education in 1946 may have been triggered by the reputed break with Morris Ginsberg over this issue. (Kettler, 1975)

Upon England's entry into war, social science classes were suspended and Mannheim was entirely free for research and writing. The 1940s were very fertile and his planning idea blossomed into "democratic planning."

That Mannheim stayed in England likely accounts for his continued interest in planning. Not only were the British historically more at ease with competing theoretical propositions, but, additionally, unlike the Americans, they more fully nurtured the planning spirit during World War II. For example, though their prescriptions differed, Harold Laski, Mannheim's colleague at the LSE, and Julian Huxley, whom Mannheim was to join at UNESCO after the war, shared with Mannheim a profound belief in the need for social reconstruction.[22] (Ehrmann, 1944)

The different experiences in World War II cannot be underestimated. The ravaged physical environment and the everyday threats to security and life in England created a mentality which invited thoughts of planning. In the United States, on the other hand, for all the private suffering of families whose boys were "over there," the war became an escape from economic depression. Consequently, although high post-war unemployment was feared in both countries, American schemes tended to isolate the problem while English proposals linked it to other national reforms. Sociology journal articles reflect this difference. For example, during the war years American social theorists turned to (1) forms of propaganda, (2) types of leadership, and (3) the reintegration of the international economy. In contrast, the British magazines, particularly those related to the LSE, such as Agenda, Fabian Tracts and the New

Statesman and Nation, concentrated on democratic reconstruction and international peace.

Part of the reason for this divergence lies in the different views of "democracy." In 1919 Wilson proclaimed that the "world must be safe for democracy." In contrast, Stalin pressed for "independence and democratic liberty" in World War II. (Carr, 1948: 2ff) That democracy had to be redefined under modern conditions occurred to only a few Americans (notably Mills and Lynd); while in European countries the existence of "socialist" parties forced the issue. The National Socialists (i.e., the Nazis), the leftovers of the Social-Democrats (including Mannheim), the labor parties (including the British Labour Party), and the Communists often distinguished among themselves by highlighting the difference between individual and social democracy.[23] Accordingly, groups within democratized nations (especially in Britain) debated procedural versus substantive democracy. Those who stressed individual procedural democracy tended to believe the problem of democracy to be its maintenance. Those favoring social and substantive democracy, including Mannheim, thought true democracy had yet to be established.

As Germany became fascist and Stalin hardened internal policies, the procedural and individual democrats increasingly emphasized the limits of democratic rationality. This view, which involves the consequent surrender to minimal

conditions of democracy such as free speech and free elections, survives to this day. Or, as Meinecke argued in urging his students to accept Republicanism:

> If we cannot have what we would love best, then let us love what we have. (Pachter, 1975: 147)

In contrast, Mannheim and the social democrats argued that the procedural view of "democracy itself produces its own antithesis." (Bramstedt and Gerth in FPDP: xi) Instead, democratic constitutional rights must be used for the development of human potential in individuals and communities.[24] Mannheim was highly impressed by Dewey's contention[25] that:

> In social phenomena the relation is: 'If we do something, something else will happen' ... [T]he assumption is generally made that we must be able to predict before we plan and control ... [T]he reverse is the case.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> This process is self-corrective and self-developing. (Dewey in Ratner (ed.), 1939: 952-3, 951)

Thus, Mannheim's planning theory seeks a democratic solution which recognizes that human potential has rational, emotional, and purposive qualities. Otherwise, Mannheim argues, "power" will be used in ways that are "destructive and self-defeating." (DOOT: 107)

2.D. Global Citizen

Mannheim dared to ask "What if?" What could our contemporary world be like? Appalled by the atomic conclusion

to World War II, Mannheim turned to a more practical and international task. He had accepted, and was about to assume, the position of European Director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) when he died suddenly in January 1947, two months before his 54th birthday.[26]

Several weeks before his death Mannheim wrote the foreword to the manuscript which became Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning. His last words in this text echo his first theme from the Budapest paper of 1918, "Soul and Culture." Rather than abandon the responsibilities of "(1) diagnosing society in transition; (2) focusing attention on important issues; and (3) integrating human conduct on the various levels of social life," Mannheim stubbornly and bravely passed on the challenge.[27]

2.E. Mannheim's Legacy

Mannheim published four books -- each still in print -- and over 25 articles during his career. (See Appendix A)

Scholarly reputations spread because former students become disciples, because one's work genuinely transcends the confines of the academy, or both. Mannheim became known because of the widespread publication of his books and continued interest in his ideas, particularly the sociology of knowledge.

To this day, even among planners, the sociology of knowledge overshadows his theory of democratic planning. (Cf. Appendix C) The facts that he taught general sociology (including the sociology of knowledge) during the 1930s, had no classes between 1939 and 1945 at the LSE, and moved to the London Institute of Education in 1946 meant that none of his students were schooled in his theory of democratic planning.

With the sparse development of normative planning theory in the post-war period, Mannheim's ideas were kept alive in the classroom and by word of mouth.[28] Nevertheless, as years passed, references to Mannheim, at least in the context of planning, became less frequent and urgent.

In the early 1970s, in the aftermath of the Vietnam war and the social turmoil of the 1960s, a resurgence of interest in Mannheim's planning ideas was sparked by the paperback re-publication of some of his work (Wolff, 1971), the translation of Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning into German, and John Friedmann's attempt (1973) to update Mannheim.

Ironically, Mannheim who believed social change is measured by generations and who ardently strove to help the post-war generation avert social crises was reconsidered a generation later by those shaken by the continuing crisis.

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 2

1
Notice that in his concept of freedom, Mannheim describes world citizens as "emancipated." (Section 6.E.)

2
Who's Who in England, 1941-1950; Mannheim was the "only surviving child." (Wolff, 1971)

3
Mannheim also spent some time in 1912-13 with Simmel in Berlin.

The Szellemkek, Hungarian for Sprites, was named by outsiders who identified the group by its concern for the German idea of Geist as brought back by Lukacs in 1915 after a sojourn in Heidelberg. (Cf. Kettler, 1971: 54ff)

Mannheim was also associated with the Social-Scientific Society, which brought translations of Marx to the campus in the first decade of the century, and the Martinovics Lodge. Yet, Mannheim was never as politically active as he was intellectually involved. Therefore, as Kettler relates the history, his prime passion in these days was to "reject[ ] ... Positivism." Notice that Mannheim in his German writing believes Marxist analysis to be positivistic. (See Appendices D and E; Kettler, 1971: 54ff and passim; for further background on Mannheim in this period, see Kettler, 1967)

4
Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation (1944) was published in English and quickly became a classic. Although written in the United States, Polanyi pays tribute to England where "it was begun and finished." Polanyi developed the idea in 1939-40 while teaching for the Workers' Educational Association and he completed while at the University of London in 1943-44. Despite the similarity of concern, neither Mannheim nor Polanyi refer to the other in their books on planning.

Michael Polanyi, Karl's brother, two years Mannheim's senior, like Mannheim left Budapest for Germany and in 1933 migrated to England (to the University of Manchester). In England, Michael, best known for Personal Knowledge (1958), gave fierce lectures against planned science. Three texts, The Contempt for Freedom, Full Employment and Free Trade, and The Logic of Liberty, contain the arguments.

Michael, arguing against his brother and Mannheim, became centrally concerned with the future of society. He voluntarily switched Chairs, from chemistry to social science,

in 1948. Moreover, though he later wrote against positivism and Marxism, much as Mannheim did in the 1920s, Polanyi in Personal Knowledge does not even consider the sociology of knowledge. In fact, he does not mention Mannheim in any of his books.

5
A formal social sciences faculty did not collect at the University of Budapest until January 1919 under Lukacs' guidance.

6
Max Weber had accepted a post at the University of Munich in 1919. (Bendix, 1962: 3)

7
Julia's brother-in-law, Paul Kecskemeti, a sociologist at Brandeis University, edited three of Mannheim's posthumous books: Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, and Essays on the Sociology of Culture.

8
Julia Mannheim was a Freudian and Jungian.

9
Bogardus, Mannheim's student in Frankfurt, remembers Julia's participation in conversations at the Mannheims' home. Given her training, I suspect, Julia heavily influenced Mannheim's excursions into social psychology.
Whether his marriage to Julia Lang was responsible for his admiration of women, or, instead, was a manifestation of it, Mannheim always treated women equally in his writing.
In 1969 Sonia Gold, an American economist, in an article on the "professional commitment of educated women" cites Mannheim's axiom that "value conflict /is/ ... inevitably part of the human situation." (DOOT: 291) Her reliance on Mannheim is more apt than she herself is aware. Not only was he a champion of women's rights throughout his life, but he also wrote the introduction to Viola Klein's The Feminine Character: The History of an Ideology.

10
Habermas, a current exponent of the Frankfurt School, has followed Mannheim's sequence of scholarly investigation -- from theories of rationality to those of planning -- and, yet, does not mention Mannheim.

11
Instead, Mannheim, like others, concludes that a two party system is preferrable. Though, of course, Mannheim did not

rest his theory of democracy on a formal party structure. (See also Chapter 8)

12
For example, in October 1926, approximately 15% of the German stock companies controlled 65% of stock capital. (The World Almanac, 1929: 620)

13
The Deutsche Reichsbahn (whose common stock was owned by the government) was the largest railroad system in the world. The United Steel Works upon formation in 1926 was "Germany's largest trust"; the largest European corporation was I.G. Farben, the German chemical company. (The World Almanac, 1929: 621)

14
Unpersuaded by the Marxian international explanations, Mannheim focused on the next level of human organization, the nation.

15
According to Kettler, Laski intervened on Mannheim's behalf on the recommendation of a "woman friend whom Mannheim met in Paris." (Kettler, 1975) If Laski was ever impressed by Mannheim's work, he was soon alienated by Mannheim.

16
The lecture, "Rational and Irrational Elements in Contemporary Society," became "Part I" of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1935, 1940).

17
He contended that American empiricism would benefit from German theoretical overviews, a point made by many others over the next 15 years.

18
Mannheim anonymously acknowledges the Moot's influence in a footnote in Diagnosis of Our Time (1943).

19
He reportedly did so in order to meet the residency requirements for British citizenship. (Kettler, 1975; Remmling, 1975)

20
L. Charles Cooper's biography of Mannheim is still forthcoming. The Mannheim archives at the University of Keele, England, doubtless contain some correspondence. Additionally,

some memoranda are left at the Sociology and Social Reconstruction Library offices at Routledge and Kegan Paul, Mannheim's publishers. Finally, Paul Kecskemeti holds Mannheim's private papers. (Cf. footnote 5 above)

21

Birnbaum's account is a most interesting example of how the concern for national planning evolved into "critical sociology" in the generation after Mannheim's death.

Birnbaum thinks the LSE declined as a vocal, alternative-producing institution when the faculty no longer included reforming activists (especially members of the British Labour Party). However, Birnbaum, mistakenly I think, makes too much of the Marxian critical stance. The Fabian reconstructionist attitude died with Mannheim, Tawney and friends. As history has apparently shown, the critical approach, while necessary, is insufficient to producing new goals and directions. (Cf. Raskin (ed.), Benveniste)

22

Laski emphasized the political-economic factors. Huxley attempted a "blueprint." Mannheim turned to education and social planning. (Ehrmann, 1944)

23

Or, in Carr's terms, the democracies introduced by the American and French Revolutions. (Carr, 1948: 12ff) Carr's analysis differentiates between emphases on freedom and on equality, respectively. Buber, I think, goes on to the next important question. How do we find the common purpose on which democratic fraternity is based, and which sustains a reciprocal tension between equality and liberty? (Buber, 1949: 32, 135) Mannheim is closer to Buber's formulation with his emphasis on the educational and religious dimensions of democracy as well as the political-economic factors.

24

In their introduction to Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, Bramstedt and Gerth, the editors, stress Mannheim's courageous willingness to deal with the "challenging present" by "raising us to a new level of self-awareness." (FPDP: vii) They view Mannheim as a descendent of the great social theorists, specifically addressing "Max Weber's question: How are freedom and democracy in the long run compatible with the development of capitalism?" (FPDP: x) They conclude that Mannheim's observation of the "disintegrative" consequences of modern coordinating social institutions -- "industrialization, urbanization and bureaucratization" -- led him to formulate the planning idea. (FPDP: xii-xiii)

25

Mannheim considered Dewey's 1931 article "Social Science and Social Control" one of the best interpretations of social planning. (In New Republic, July 29, 1931) Mannheim apparently did not read this piece before the English publication of Ideology and Utopia (1933). Indeed, perhaps much of Mannheim's inspiration for Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction came from this article and Dewey's statement, "I am not arguing here for the desirability of social planning and control."

26

UNESCO's first general director was Julian Huxley, the British zoologist and humanist. The similarity in viewpoints between Huxley and Mannheim is seen not only in their agreement on the unity of human knowledge and the need for religious cohesion and social reconstruction, but also on how intellectual pluralism furthers knowledge and the importance of education to creating humanistic democracy. (Cf. Huxley, 1961, 1973)

In his review of Mannheim's Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1940), Huxley predicted that it would become the "planner's bible."

27

Accordingly, Lowe, Mannheim's friend, considers Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning "his political testament."

28

It took over a decade to fully prepare and release the various manuscripts Mannheim left behind. Translations of his work have trickled into other countries. (See Appendix A)

PART II: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 3

THE FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING: MANNHEIM'S THEORY OF RATIONALITY

As noted above, Mannheim is vitally concerned with democracy. He tends to stress structural/functional, over procedural, issues. Thus, his theory of rationality involves conflict between ideas (as in ideologies vs. utopias) and consensus on thinking (as in "substantial rationality" and "relationism"). In other words, ideas both distinguish and integrate individuals in a collectivizing society. In terms of democratic planning, both functions are critical. The first sustains freedom, and in consequence, permits experimentation for progress. The second binds different forces into a democratic community, which, in turn, underpins the human continuity needed for progress.

Two major concerns are raised in his theory of rationality. How are disproportions between "know how" and "know why" to be overcome? How are individual truths to inform and be accountable to socially responsible thinking?

Mannheim's thoughts on rationality largely predate his interest in planning. However, they also lead him into the topic of planning. These ideas continue to underlie his views on democratic planning. (See especially

Chapters 5 and 6)

Of the major democratic planning theorists, Mannheim and Dewey were most concerned with specifying a theory to improve democratic intelligence. Mannheim explicitly borrows from Dewey's "pragmatism," but he also extends Marx's theory of ideology. Thus, at least one commentator believes he endeavored to "graft" the continental intellectual heritage onto related Anglo-American developments. (Shils, 1968) This assessment accords with Mannheim's interest in discovering the whole of social thinking and political life. Mannheim's "synthesis," however, is a singular contribution in at least one way. His "European" approach to ideology and "substantial rationality"[1] explains how, despite changing forms, social knowledge drifts away from democratic purposes.

From the time Mannheim wrote, epistemological justifications of positivism have dominated social science. Mannheim consciously sought to incorporate this "value-free" knowledge building into a larger framework.[2] Social knowledge, Mannheim maintains, cannot be divorced from human conditions, but it also must be used to further human purposes. For this reason, Mannheim believes the nascent separation of philosophy and the social sciences, and the divisions within the social sciences, to be important in extending the detail of social knowledge, but contradictory to the integration of social knowledge for human purposes. Thus, he uses the term "sociology" (and

sometimes "political science") to encompass all social learning. He is not suggesting a pecking order of social sciences, but instead a comprehensive framework for evaluating social knowledge.

In particular, Mannheim focuses on two questions in his work on rationality. How are political truths to be reconciled? What are the crises in political thinking for which planning is a solution?

3.A. Rationality and the Seeds of Democratic Planning

Mannheim's theory of rationality, though a full conception, is not a true epistemology. It is more an anthropological explanation which reaffirms the notion of human culture.[3] As such, it goes well beyond philosophy to embrace all the social sciences in a humanistic manner. It recognizes human emotions and acknowledges that we will never know all in complete certainty. It begins with a scientific spirit, without pretending to be a science, which stresses that "wisdom is a thinking state" predicated on "human uncertainty." (Tinder, 1970: 135) Rationality, for Mannheim, ultimately calls for a "unidisciplinary" (as opposed to a "multidisciplinary") approach. (Wallerstein, 1974: 11)[4] The "unidisciplinary" name changes from Weltanschauung, to historicism, to sociology (or political science), to planning. Mannheim, in short, would wholeheartedly agree with T.J.G. Locher when he said: "One

should not confuse totality with completeness. The whole is more than the assembled parts, but surely it is also less." (Wallerstein, 1974: 8)

Translating into Mannheim's terms, the whole of rationality is more than the unmodified summation of individual pieces of reason but it is less than all the parts because some of the parts are irrational, and yet critical.

Few commentators see the continuation of Mannheim's concept of rationality in his planning work. However, Kettler hints at it in pronouncing that Mannheim's first piece,"Soul and Culture"(1918), is quite close in concern to the later planning theory. K. Wolff, in a little-known statement written several years after his well-known introduction to Mannheim's writings, forthrightly states that Mannheim anticipated the growing "global" nature of society in his relationism. In Wolff's words, Mannheim's work might be summarized as follows:

> How can we reinterpret our traditions so that we can all live together not by compromise but by being truer to ourselves? In the light or mood of such questions the idea of one world and cultural relativism may impress us as a democratized version of the idea of the brotherhood of man and the immortality of the soul ... We may revive if we realize that this phase ["world wars, death camps, atom bombs, genocide and the administered life"] challenges us to <u>reinvent</u> ourselves so that we may learn how we can <u>live</u> in one world. We must get hold of our <u>trans</u>cultural selves ... Without postulating a transcultural human nature we could not account for the possibility of understanding between two persons of

> different cultures ... this means between any two persons, even myself today and yesterday, here and in another place. The pursuit of understanding others and ourselves evinces faith in their dignity and our own, in the dignity of man. (Wolff, 1974: 562; some emphasis added)

Every theory of planning implies an underlying view of rationality (Klosterman, 1978), although the reverse is not always true. Unlike most planning theorists, Mannheim began his career with an interest in how men interpret their social world. He then turned to the sociology of knowledge to see "how men actually think," and, thereafter, he investigated the nature and causes of rationality and irrationality. Finally, he came to democratic planning. These shifts are not as distinct as some (e.g., Remmling) would have it, but rather represent subtle detours in a life-long quest to explain how men interactively create meaning in their socio-political lives.

This chapter is based on writings from the period between 1918 and 1940. Several themes recur through most of this period and reemerge, albeit in modified form, in his explicit statements on democratic planning.

Three themes predominate: (1) a belief that the parts cannot be understood except in relation to a fuller whole -- to this end he constantly strives to define wholes which can accomodate the myriad ideas, facts and emotive expressions he comes across in his wide-searching, voracious reading; (2) the need to discover a structure of meaning,

to find a certain but flexible truth scheme to overcome the apparent chaos of the intellectual and political world surrounding him; and (3) a constant search for more stimulation, to mine the riches of human life. His indefatigable curiosity was appropriately matched by his capacity to be delighted by surprise[5] and wonder[6]. On first glance, it would seem that the first two themes contradict the last, but in fact, I will argue, their juxtaposition creates an intellectual tension which proves critical to the notion of democratic planning. Kurt Wolff (1974) maintains that Mannheim was very uncomfortable with anarchic explanations, but such an appraisal misses the point Mannheim strenuously thought, and so argued in many ways, that ideas do not come from intellectuals alone, though they are reorganized and corrected by them. It is even debatable, as we shall see, Mannheim believed that any significant ideas originate with intellectuals. (See Chapter 5)

3.B. Political Truths: The Foundation of Democracy

Meaningful interpretation of social data underlies the possibility of political truths. Throughout his writings Mannheim returns again and again to a common structural argument about knowledge and its impact on the social world in which we live. First, he identifies a crisis caused by the splitting apart of subjective and objective factors.[7] The solution lies in the reunification of these

factors, but in a way which appreciates the temporal and spatial changes which have created the social reality of the present. Change, for Mannheim, is the cause as well as the effect.

The whole culture rather than particular products of man's daily life was Mannheim's focus.[8] Accordingly, Mannheim identifies sociology as one of the cultural sciences.[9] ("Cultural sciences" is a translation of Geisteswissenschaft and Kulturwissenschaft. Though somewhat different in their connotation -- the first was associated with Dilthey, the latter with Alfred Weber -- Mannheim used them interchangeably as he sought to "synthesize" the two approaches. (See Appendices E and F) Both sociology and the cultural sciences are 19th century terms. Though a scientific intent existed, they remained largely social philosophies and histories into the first decades of the 20th century. In contrast to the taxonomic beginnings advanced by Max Weber and others, only Marxism claimed to be fully scientific. And Marxism was decidedly not part of the cultural sciences, the humanities or the non-natural sciences.

Since the cultural approach to social science survived as the social sciences split off from the cultural sciences, it needs be distinguished from other sociological orientations. The cultural view emphasizes the horizontal integration of institutions and functions within a specific geographic location and "vertically in the historical

sense."[10] Unlike anthropology (as a discipline), it tends to concentrate on the frontiers of social organization rather than primitive groups, and on how human thinking and intervention reconstruct social relations. As Robert Lynd points out, this approach leads to considerations of planning. (Lynd, 1939: 38)

In short, Mannheim, from the start, seeks a rationality which comprehends both purposive and empirical (material) factors within a particular spatio-temporal frame. The integrity of rationality already implies for Mannheim a "certain normativism": the refusal to consider society from an "anarchic world-view," preferring instead a structural gestalt. (Kettler, 1976: 408-10) In the terms of later positions advanced by Mannheim this was to mean that while he recognized (and indeed in certain ways celebrated) relativism he was also looking for a way to overcome the worst confusion and harm promoted under its banner.

Mannheim's dissertation[11] explored the structure of epistemologies. Maintaining that "primacy among logical forms belongs to systematization" (ESSP: 16) and that "the formation of a new concept in science -- or ... in everyday life" is predicated on a "chain sequence" (p. 18), Mannheim contends "Epistemology involves both a task of analysis and one of evaluation." (p. 65) Analytically, there is a tripartite division in any epistemology:



Depending on where one begins the other two factors follow, however, "the known" "changes most conspicuously" from one epistemology to another. (p. 59) "The essence of epistemological systematization ... then ... consist[s] ... in the resolution of the correlations involved in formulating the problem." (p. 61) From an evaluation of Kant and others Mannheim concludes: "Structural analysis discloses that epistemology actually solves a problem which is entirely different from the one it has set itself. Instead of a critique of value, it turns into a theory about how a particular value can be attained and realized. (p. 69) The implication, from which his subsequent work flows, is that:

> Nothing but an analysis of the mode of presentation of ultimate presuppositions could suggest a reason why divergent solutions of the epistemological problem are possible. For it is characteristic of the constructive -- as opposed to immanently descriptive -- disciplines that, although in both only one of several suggested solutions can be true, the wrong solutions in the descriptive sciences are always impossible as well, whereas in the constructive discipline a wrong answer can be, not true, to be sure, but nevertheless possible. (p. 73; some emphasis added)

Mannheim from this point on seeks the meaning of reality (to "to-be-known") and premises his searches on (1) re-

moving the distortions blinding the knower (e.g., ideology) and (2) overcoming the limitations of "partial" thinking by integrating the types of knowledge ("consciousness" and "objectivity").

In another piece, "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung" (1921-22), Mannheim critizes then existing theory as inadequately explaining the whole (or even the parts) of Weltanschauung. Assuming it exists, the major problem lies in the fact that many cultural manifestations are excluded in most explanations. For Mannheim these phenomena (e.g., religion, art) are ordered along a hierarchical continuum from the irrational to the rational. With due credit to Dilthey, Mannheim continues: "As long as Weltanschauung is considered as something theoretical, entire vast provinces of cultural life will be inaccessible to historical synthesis." (FKM: 13) He observes:

> ... man is the citizen[12] of several worlds at the same time ... The paradoxical nature of theoretical thoughts, ... consists in this, that it seeks to superimpose a logical, theoretical pattern upon experiences already patterned under other ... categories. But if this is so, we cannot accept that extreme form of irrationalism which holds that certain cultural facts are not merely a-theoretical but are radically removed from any rational analysis. Aesthetic or religious 'experiences' are not wholly devoid of form ... There must be something to theory after all, something positive and fruitful; it must achieve something else besides chilling the authentic experience with the cold blast of reflection... (FKM: 14-15; emphasis added)

Thus, in one breath Mannheim dismisses then prevailing theories of rationalism and irrationalism because neither

can make sense of the fullness of reality. Even were it possible to list "all cultural objectifications ... of an epoch," he contends, the result would "still fall far short of that unit we can Weltanschauung." Instead, he suggests we need to ask two distinct but related questions: "...is it at all possible that something of this kind should be given? Can it become the object of scientific inquiry?" He believes the exploration worthwhile and turns to phenomenology.[13] Using three categories of meaning -- the objective, the expressive, and the documentary (or evidential) as roughly conforming to object, subject and interpretation -- Mannheim believes we can study such entities as spirit ("Geist"), Weltanschauung, etc. Recognizing that the documentary meaning may prove the most elusive, Mannheim does not carefully define it at this point, but rather offers examples (ranging from art evaluation to an explanation of a charitable act) and concludes:

> What we have to ask is not whether the theory is correct -- or what its proponent 'meant' by it. Rather, we must go beyond this 'immanent' interpretation and treat the theoretical confession as confession: as documentary evidence of something ... as a driving force, just as a doctor will take the self-diagnosis of one of his patients as a symptom rather than a correct identification of the latter's illness. (FKM: 33)

The medical imagery is significant since illness is taken to be something extraneous to the definition of an individual, but at the same time something which does not have meaning except as it is manifested in the individual. (Cf.

Appendix B) Furthermore, the integrity of the individual is an expression of a gestalt,[14] a concept Mannheim embraces. Arguing against those who refuse to admit the validity of gestalt, Mannheim suggests:

> Our tendency to break down Gestalts of meaning in this atomistic fashion can be explained only by the unjustifiable paradigmatic preponderance of word language. Word language gives an impression as if more comprehensive units of meaning (sentences or systems of propositions) were built up, mosaic-like, from isolated phonetic units (words with their conceptual meanings), and as if the individual concepts had their own firmly circumscribed meanings outside the systems. (FKM: 44)

Mannheim continues: "The methodological problem might then be ... how can we describe the unity we sense in all works that belong to the same period in scientific terms capable of control and verification? ... Our first task... is to evolve concepts applicable ... to every sphere of cultural activity ... [including] political ideology." (FKM: 49) He concludes a "cross-section" of two axes, one describing variations across cultural sectors, the other describing changes over time, is needed. (FKM: 50) The validity and utility of such an approach requires "verifiability [including] ... (1) ... empirical confrontation of the hypotheses with the historical material; and ... (2) an attempt to establish logical links connecting the various symptomatic, documentary phenomena ... with one another and with one guiding principle." Yet, he warns, "such a rationalization, ... has nothing to do with a logi-

cal deduction of consequences from a theoretical principle -- because it constantly presupposes the faculty of grasping pre=theoretical documentary meaning. (FKM: 52) Neither, it should be added, is it strictly inductive, given the inclusion of a "guiding principle." For the nonce, Mannheim does not elaborate on what such a "guiding principle" might be.

He then goes on to explain the various methodologies which have been employed by such "synthesizing" thinkers as Max Weber and Dvorak, the composer. Should the connection be based on "'correspondence,' function,' 'causality,' or 'reciprocity'?"[15] Mannheim asks. (FKM: 55) For interpretation he considers his classmate, Dvorak's parallelism (correspondence) the "most adequate." (FKM: 56)

Mannheim concludes the essay stressing again that ultimately there are two kinds of analysis -- interpretative and explanatory. Though both are important, "[m]eaning in its proper essence can only be understood or interpreted," and, thus, is more significant because it can meet our current and future human needs.

In what context does meaning emerge? A changing social world, Mannheim answers, as he turns to "Historism."

In "Historicism" (1924),[16] Mannheim sets out the philosophical framework from which his inquiries proceed. This pivotal essay conjoins the implications of his dissertation research and his assumptions about the nature of social study.

Historicism for Mannheim is more than another idea.

> ... Historicism has developed into an intellectual force of extraordinary significance; it epitomizes our Weltanschauung (world view) ... [it] permeates everyday thinking ... for example, 'capitalism,' 'social movement,' 'cultural process,' ... These forces are grasped and understood as potentialities, constantly in flux, ... already at the level of everyday reflection, we seek to determine the position of our present within such a temporal framework, to tell by the cosmic clock of history what the time is ... Historicism is therefore ... the very basis on which we construct our observations of the socio-cultural reality. (ESOK: 84-5)

Historicism appreciates "flux and growth" not as "relativism"[17] but rather as an "ordering principle" which goes into "two directions" -- "historical vertical analysis" and "historic cross section." (ESOK: 86) It becomes more than "historiography" because "[w]e no longer wish to know merely 'what happened.' We are interested not only in the immediate 'why' ... but we constantly ask ourselves: 'What does it mean?'" (ESOK: 87)

The rationality of historicism, a "philosophy of history" (p. 87) departs from that of the Enlightenment in its dynamism, its unwillingness to posit the "form-content dichotomy" (p. 91). In other words, "[i]t would be ... unhistorical simply to reject the conclusions of an earlier philosophy. They, too, derive from reflection upon a certain stage of socio-cultural reality which is itself part of the total dynamic process." (p. 90)

In "Historicism," Mannheim outlines his work to come. The foundations to the sociology of knowledge emerge vivid-

ly; in fact, here Mannheim first labels the "sociologist of knowledge." (p. 96) He identifies here the key components of the theory which culminates in Ideology and Utopia and which continue to inform his planning theory.

(1) The positing of intellectual location (Standort) determines what and how one sees (p. 102). For example, when viewing a sculpture the whole remains, but different profiles appear depending on one's position relative to the object. Thus, Mannheim asserts, a multiplicity of perspectives is needed to comprehend the whole, and the understanding of the totality in its "spatio-temporal determinations" is the primary quest (pp. 100-101).

(2) History is understood both from the "rational-dialectic method"[18] (with its "activistic progressive tendencies") and the "organic-intuitive method" (p. 124). In Alfred Weber's terms, the first constitutes a "process of 'civilization,'" the latter a "process of 'culture.'" Mannheim, not content to leave these two ideas unbridged, suggests that a philosophy can provide an "intermediary field." (p. 114) For Mannheim, this bridging approach has a "strongly marked dialectical character in the structure of its development [which by weaving threads of earlier thinking into new tapestries] becomes more complete as time passes." Extending Alfred Weber's categories, he, in summary, discerns "three types of developmental sequence" -- "the psychic development which can be represented only as a concrete Gestalt; the dialectical, in which certain

rationalized fields organize themselves anew round new new systematizing centres; and progressive evolution, in which it is one and the same system which is gradually being built up.[19] (p. 116).

(3) Interpretation remains critical to Mannheim. He goes so far as to suggest that unless thought can "give a concrete answer to the question 'what shall we do?'" it cannot be judged to bear upon reality. (p. 129; emphasis added) Furthermore, a "philosophy of history cannot mean a deduction from one principle, a constraining of facts." (p. 108) In short, history "always must be written anew, not in the sense of a process of correction but in the sense of a new total orientation." "There exists, therefore, a subtle bond between thought and reality." (p. 104) Twelve years before Mannheim utters the word planning, the idea of planning as reconstruction is germinating.

(4) Mannheim believes that the natural sciences are different from the social sciences as each follows a different logic. He asserts that the social sciences "primarily attract the attention of those whose chief aim is the rational mastery of the historical process" and that there is "essential unity of the rational and irrational in human consciousness."[20] (pp. 110-111; emphasis added) In contrast, he is singularly uninterested in the history of science and thereby erroneously presumes a unilinear progress in the development of "technology and the

exact natural sciences." (p. 115) Despite the fact that he believes we must reconsider all "static thought" including "natural science" (p. 132), even after the detonation of the hydrogen bomb at the end of World War II, Mannheim does not acknowledge that the development (as opposed to the application) of technological tools is itself a statement on social relations. (Cf. Bernal, Douglas, Gimpel) Instead, he takes the view that the technology (for example, nuclear energy) is neutral and can be used for good or bad purposes.[21] (FPDP: 73)

(5) The intellectual can discern "a historico-philosophical hierarchy of unique temporal levels" (p. 118), but this is a difficult task because "[t]he historico-philosophical position of the observer makes itself evident not merely in the sense of a position of assent or dissent to that which is reported, but in the very categories of meaning, in the principle of selection and its direction." (p. 101) Nevertheless, the intellectual must remember:

> The historico-philosophically relevant subject is just that kernel of the human personality whose being and dynamism is consubstantial with the dominant active forces of history ... Thus ... a point essential to all historical knowledge: that is, the point of convergence between the rational analysability of the past, and the forward-probing, primarily suggestive, irrational,mental and psychic potentialities of the total man and his activity. This convergence should not be pushed aside as a source of error; on the contrary, ... it [is] a constituent element of historical knowledge ... (pp. 102-103)

Furthermore, the characteristics of what will be described as the model "free-floating intelligentsia" emerge in this essay. He identifies Troeltsch, whose work on historicism[22] he reviews, as one who endeavors, if not fully successfully, to synthesize the "pressures which spring from the contemporary situation" with a "grasp [of] the eternal." (pp. 98-9) Mannheim admires the attempt.

(6) Finally, Mannheim in one of his few statements on the subject defines truth:[23] "Truth in a perspectivic sense means that within one historical constellation only one perspectivic conclusion can be correct." (p. 130) The means to truth, in brief, rely on historicism. "Historicism is, therefore, ... the only solution of the general problem of how to find material and concretely exemplified standards and norms for a world outlook which has become dynamic." (p. 132)

Although Mannheim's understanding of historicism is fraught with many problems and open to many criticisms, many of these key concepts recur (albeit in different forms) in planning theory.

Mannheim's writings for the next five years (through 1929) focused on various sociological determinants and manifestations of knowledge -- from "Conservative Thinking" (1927) to "The Problem of Generations" (1927) to "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon" (1928). Interspersed were three articles developing his concept of the sociology of knowledge.[24] The final product of this period is Ideology

and Utopia (as revised and published in English in 1936).

Political truths must be interrelated. First released in German in 1929, Ideologie und Utopie consisted of only three parts: "Ideology and Utopia," "Is Politics Possible as a Science?" and "The Utopian Consciousness."[25] The English edition was amended to include an article Mannheim prepared for a German sociological encyclopedia, "The Sociology of Knowledge" (1931), and a formal introduction, "Preliminary Approach to the Problem." In the course of these revisions the tone of the argument shifted.[26] More significantly the sequence of the argument changes.

The German version began with the "inner connection" of ideology and utopia and the "resulting" "crisis" which emerges from "thinking consistently in terms of 'ideas.'" (Notice again the technique of arguing from the perspective of crisis.) The focus is the Marx-derived concern with "false consciousness."[27] In contrast, the English edition begins more formally: "This book is concerned with the problem of how men actually think." (I&U: 1) The new introductory section concludes with his most famous, shorthand definition of the sociology of knowledge: "the systematization of doubt which is to be found in social life as a vague insecurity and uncertainty." (I&U: 50) While it is generally accepted[28] that Ideology and Utopia markes a turning point in Mannheim's work, the justification relies on the "continuations as well as anticipation" of substantive concerns. (Wolff, 1971: lxx) I would

suggest Ideology and Utopia does not mark a turning point conceptually in that two motivations, which underlie Mannheim's earlier and later work, remain: the urgency of perceived crisis and the calmer search for systematization. These two motivations, coupled with the stress on function and structure, over process, I think, account for much of the ambiguity reviewers detect in Mannheim's work. However, the confusion between the crisis and reconstructive mentalities can be sorted out, and the deemphasis of process, especially in economic terms, is better understood as a deficiency. (See also Section 3.E.)

In the intervening years, the social sciences were becoming more "empirical." (I&U: 15) The effects of this non-psychic-cultural approach were summarized by Mannheim:

> Such meaning-giving interpretations with qualitatively rich contents (as, for instance, sin, despair, loneliness, Christian love) were replaced by formalized entities such as the feeling of anxiety, the perception of inner conflict, the experiencing of isolation ... The category of external causality was increasingly used ... as illustrated in the scheme: 'Fear arises when something unusual occurs,' in which it was purposely overlooked that every type of every type of fear changes completely with its content ... Or else the category of function was employed in the sense that single phenomena were interpreted from the point of view of their role in the formal functioning of the whole psychic mechanism. (I&U: 17-18; emphasis added)

By "purposely overlooked" Mannheim does not imply evil intentions but rather means that unintended consequences occur when social investigators adopt narrow methods to

analyze social thinking and behavior and misapply larger ones. In both cases the offending scholars "might say with Nietzsche 'I have forgotten why I ever began.'" (I&U: 20) In short, "[w]hat may be valuable for a specialized discipline as the research hypothesis may, however, be fatal for the conduct of human beings." (I&U: 23) For example, the study of human life in "formalized simplified elements," "the mechanistic method, in spite of the concrete achievements for which we are indebted to it, has, from thepoint of view of life-orientation and conduct, contributed very much to the general insecurity of modern man." (I&U: 24)

Instead, we need to remember that "[e]very real decision (such as one's evaluation of other persons or how a society should be organized) implies judgment concerning good and evil, concerning the meaning of life and mind." (I&U: 19) Thus, Mannheim asks, what are the preconditions necessary for good judgment? He answers: (1) a data-gathering framework which ensures that all relevant facts are found; (2) an ordering scheme which allows all pertinent data to be assimilated (and not discarded at the outset); and (3) an evaluating structure which understands social interdependencies, individuals' idiosyncracies, and developmental change. Mannheim understands "good" judgment to involve an understanding of the development of ideas and social actions.[29] Less concerned with process than with sequence, development does not connote inevitable progress.

In his planning and education theory, development infers a chain of events which once begun cannot be reversed, although it may be stunted or redirected. Culture, a term derived from the Greek word "to cultivate, to grow," thereby remains significant in his analysis.

In other words, political truths should be incorporated into a political culture framework. For this reason, the social "[i]nvestigator ... need not be concerned with ultimate truth ... but [should] ... direct his attention to discovering the approximate truth as it emerges in the course of historical development out of the complex social process." (I&U: 84)

Mannheim continues: "It is precisely our uncertainty which brings us a good deal closer to reality than was possible in former periods which had faith in the absolute." (I&U: 84)[30]

By analogy, a farmer knows that weather exists and changes. Inevitable sotrms can severely damage his crops, and he cannot forego planting without renouncing farming. Assuming he must grow food for himself and his family, the farmer will then turn his attention to the hardiest seed strains and watch for developing storms, not with the intention of deflecting them but to prepare against savage damage.

The farmer has learned that weather prayers are not always answered, that other steps must be taken in case of stormy weather. His neighbor who predicts storms different-

ly and practices other preventive measures has about the same net loss, but his peas (not his corn) suffer. Further assuming peas and corn bring the same market price, it might be simply that the first farmer prefers corn to peas, a different value, which accounts for the different losses. Certainly both would seem to hold: "that in order to act we need a certain amount of self-confidence and intellectual self-assurance." (I&U: 85) Now suppose that these two farmers meet at the fence and argue about who has the Truth. Mannheim maintains were these farmers to overcome the "absolute tone" of their individual ways of understanding and coping, their "conflicting intellectual positions may actually come to supplement one anothers." (I&U: 85) In other words,

> To-day, there are too many points of view of equal value and prestige, each showing the relativity of the other, to permit us to take any one position and to regard it as impregnable and absolute. Only this socially disorganized intellectual situation makes possible the insight, hidden until now by a generally stable social structure and the practicability of certain traditional norms, that every point of view is particular to a social situation. (I&U: 84-5)

The farming analogy will not be further pursued, but it should be underlined that the example is not a "scientific" one, but rather a social one.[31]

What does it mean to exercise good judgment? Mannheim begins by announcing: "the control of the collective unconscious [is] ... the problem of our age." (I&U: 33) (The

collective unconscious is Mannheim's more encompassing notion for what Marx calls "false consciousness.") Mannheim explains:

> Precisely because knowing is fundamentally collective knowing (the thought of the lone individual is only a special instance and a recent development), it presupposes a community of knowing which grows primarily out of a community of experiencing prepared for in the subconscious. However, once the fact has been perceived that the largest part of thought is erected upon a basis of collective actions, one is impelled to recognize the force of the collective unconscious. The full emergence of the sociological point of view regarding knowledge inevitably carries with it the gradual uncovering of the irrational foundation of rational knowledge. (I&U: 31)

From this premise the exercise of good judgment depends on "that fullness of knowledge required for rational thinking" which can be seen by certain individuals who by dint of their "social life-situation" avoid "collective myths" and are encouraged and reinforced in their "scepticism." (Cf. Section 5.C.) "Scepticism" is basis; without it an individual even if freed from collective thinking cannot think for himself. (I&U: 35; cf. Section 5.D.) Mannheim continues

> [While] the merchant, the entrepreneur, [and] the intellectual ... occup[y] ... position[s] which require rational decisions concerning the tasks set by everyday life ...[t]his is not true for peasants of the older type nor for the recently emerged mass of subordinate white-collar workers who hold positions requiring <u>little initiative, and no foresight of a speculative kind</u>. (I&U: 35; emphasis added)

Judgment, then, is a continuous activity as seen in the examples of daily (especially working) life. It is also defined in social interactions. The need "to develop ... self-consciousness"[32] (I&U: 35) is reiterated in Mannheim's theory of democratic planning in terms of education (cf. Chapter 5), class and community (Chapter 4), social change (Chapter 4), freedom (Chapter 6) and power (Chapter 7).

3.C. Political Knowledge

Mannheim empirically defines politics as "conflict [which] tends increasingly to become a life-and-death struggle." "Political conflict ... is ... a rationalized form of the struggle for social predominance." (IU&: 38) Political knowledge, therefore, involves adversarial thinking,[33] or the conflict of ideology and utopia.

Traditionally, the proponent of an idea confronts the "ideology" of the opponent, without admitting his own bias. Mannheim, however, endeavors to tear the masks off all political thinking which can be characterized as ideological or utopian.

Ideology, discerned by distrust, assumes "that opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It signifies further that the specific character and life-situation of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions, and interpretations." (I&U: 56) Ideology, revealed in

adversarial relationships, can be "partial" (where an individual is blinded to reality and thus acts against his better interests[34]) or "total" (permeating an "age," or a "concrete historico-social group, e.g., ... a class" in its interpretation of reality). (I&U: 56) Particular ideology "operates primarily with a psychology of interests, while the total concept uses a more formal functional analysis, without any references to motivations..." (I&U: 57-8) Nonetheless, there is a tendency for the particular to be transformed into the total conception. (I&U: 65) In the process, consciousness increases to embrace a unitary view of the social world, albeit one which because it is "more pliable and flexible," can take into account specific situational factors. The dynamism and effects of such consciousness vary with "historical periods, nations, and social classes." (I&U: 68) Or, reiterating his vertical and horizontal views of culture, Mannheim again concludes: (1) that "human affairs cannot be understood by an isolation of their elements" and (2) "this interdependent system of meanings varies both in all its parts and in its totality from one historical period to another." (I&U: 68-9)

The last point is Mannheim's way of reminding us that rationality entails forgetting as well as learning. Much of "false consciousness," for example, is based on not having unlearned that which now irrelevantly distorts our understanding of current reality. (I&U: 69-70) Converse-

ly, negating the existence of documentary knowledge leads us astray. Mannheim is thus quite distant from intellectuals who maintain that those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.[35]

While ideological thinking involves opposition of the past in the present, utopian thinking is forward looking.[36] In "transcending reality ... they [the utopians] ... tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time." (I&U: 192)

Ideology and utopia each permit thinking beyond one's immediate situation, but at the same time they "do not occur separately in the historical process." Indeed, "[i]t is always the dominant group which is in full accord with the existing order that determines what is to be regarded as utopian, while the ascendent group which is in conflict with things as they are is the one that determines what is regarded as ideological." (I&U: 203) Thus, the label, as well as the content, of these types of political thinking reflect the distribution of power in the society.

Mannheim believes social progress requires utopian thinking. Where ideological thinking inheres in political thinking, utopian thinking is intermittent. Thus, Mannheim worries:

> The disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing. We would be faced then with the greatest paradox imaginable, namely, that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any

> ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses. Thus, after a long tortuous, but heroic development, just at the highest stage of awareness, when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more man's own creation, with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it. (I&U: 263)

To amalgamate various perspectives, particularly ideologies and utopias, Mannheim proposes "Relationism." This approach to interpret social phenomena seeks to overcome the sterility of "pure theory" (i.e., epistemology) (I&U: 295) and to give insight into the burgeoning empiricism.[37]

Incidentally, the growth of empiricism paralleled the development of technologies for recording and transmitting information to the masses. Mannheim was not unaware of the consequent responsibility being thrust on social scientists.[38]

Mannheim defines the sociology of knowledge: "as theory it seeks to analyse the relationship between knowledge and existence; as historical-sociological research it seeks to trace the forms which this relationship has taken in the intellectual development of mankind." (I&U: 264) He continues, the sociology of knowledge is

> ... more than a sociological description of facts ... it also becomes a critique by redefining the scope and the limits of the perspective implicit in given assertions ... The function of the findings of the sociology of knowledge lies somewhere ... between irrelevance to the establish-

> ment of truth ... and entire adequacy for determining the truth. ... (I&U: 285)

Thus, the sociology of knowledge does not seek to replace epistemology,[39] but rather to explain how alternative explanations of validity can be developed to appreciate a "more developed empiricism." (I&U: 288)

Nevertheless, Mannheim believes that the sociology of knowledge permits the approximation of "objectivity." Those from the same life-situation can "eradicate as an error every [observation] that deviates from ... unanimity." Similarly, opponents from different perspectives must find the "common denominator" in order to "separate the necessary differences of the two views from the arbitrarily conceived and mistaken elements." In both cases with the errors removed, real debate begins. Mannheim asks: "which of the various points of view is the best?" He replies that "pre-eminence is given to the perspective which gives evidence of the greatest comprehensiveness and greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical materials." (I&U: 300-301)

There are some major problems with the sociology of knowledge so defined. It deals only with sins of commission, not ommission. Does Mannheim presume new ideas will emerge in debate? Given his criterion for determing the best view, it is difficult to imagine how Mannheim would not find the proponent with the greatest <u>amount</u> of data (assuming the obvious biases to be erased) to be the most

comprehensive. Quantity would seem to win out over quality. If so, Mannheim disregards how the power structure might intervene in the generation, organization, and dissemination of empirical research. For example, a public agency may present much interesting and valid information, but not product the data necessary to resolving problems, while a protesting citizens' group is unlikely to be as convincing because fewer resources result in less or no counter evidence. This is one area of concern where his investigation of planning improves his formulations. (Cf. Chapters 5 and 6)

Another difficulty relates to the meaning of time. In Ideology and Utopia he states: "A perception may be erroneous or inadequate to the situation by being in advance of it, as well as by being antiquated." (I&U: 96) How does this comport with his call for more "initiative" and the need for "foresight"? (Cf. Chapters 5 and 7) Up to this point (**ca.** 1933), Mannheim has only stressed the flux of time, but he is becoming more aware of the need to interpret social phenomena within a specific time frame. Time which is a key factor in "imputation" (a method he adapts from the discipline of art history to apply to "actual research in the historical-sociological realm") is no longer a matter of contextual concern, it is a critical variable in choice making and right conduct.

Therefore, the sociology of knowledge is only a beginning. Its "most important task ... remains to demonstrate

its capacity in actual research, ... to work out criteria of exactness for establishing empirical truths and for assuring their control." (I&U: 306-307)

Significantly Mannheim bequeaths the sociology of knowledge to others and presses on. (Cf. Appendix D)

Political thinking involves more than unmasking ideological and utopian biases. It raises the question of whether rationality is possible. In Mannheim's words: "... the elemental perplexity of our time [is] ... epitomized in the symptomatic question 'How is it possible for man to continue to think and live in a time when the problems of ideology and utopia are being radically raised and thought through in all their implications?'" (I&U: 42)

The modern age presents a "paradox": If men have the reason for "self-control and self-correction" and if reason is socially determined, can men be masters of reason? Mannheim believes the question suggests the answers for social science and understanding. In a critical footnote, Mannheim considers the scale of investigation. He insists that the "macroscopic" (whereby the "turning points which appear to be crucial" are identified) needs be "complement[ed]" by the "microscopic" (which "seek[s] to verify details"). (I&U: 51) So much for understanding the past and present, how "how," Mannheim asks, "is a science of politics possible in face of the inherently ideological character of all thought?" (I&U: 53) What is to be done about the precarious future?

Mannheim maintains the possibility of a science of politics is dependent on a reformulated "framework" of thinking. It is "utopian" to assume that the irrational will be easily superseded by full rationality. A "common basis of thought" to define the "common problem" is needed. (I&U: 171, 190)

To this end he expands his definition of politics to include the "process of becoming." (I&U: 112) Possibilities arise out of a "constant state of flux." (I&U: 116) "Theory and practice" interact. (E.g., I&U: 123) Politics occurs where the rational and the irrational meet.[40] (E.g., I&U: 130) Consequently, political thinking, however limited, must guide action, recognizing that "at the same time only a limited number of situations can occur." (I&U: 129; cf. 136) Political knowledge, and its attendant sense of history (I&U: 117ff), in turn, informs the definition of politics. Politics, then, in contrast to fascism, is more than deed alone.[41] (I&U: 136)

Politics is not simply "preparation for an insurrection [but more significantly] ... the continual transformation of conditions and men." (I&U: 183) Politics, then, involves making decisions and taking action within the limits of one's "knowledge [which in turn is "bound"] by one's (individual or group) position in time and society." (I&U: 188) Politics involves "choice" and "continues only as long as the realm of the irrational still exists." (I&U: 190) The "irrational" in this context is not solely

negative, but includes positive human values. Put differently, as along as human values change and/or conflict politics will continue. (Cf. Chapter 7) Institutional rearrangements (including socialism), therefore, do not obviate political life. (Cf. Chapters 7 and 8)

The irrational which can be expressed as "prescientific" data, "partial" perspectives, or "uncontrollable" "insight" is complicated by the "constant state of flux." The "two main sources of irrationalism in the social structure [are] uncontrolled competition[42] and domination by force." (I&U: 116) "Psychic annihilation" might be even worse than "physical repression." (I&U: 38) In other words, as long as power is abused, political knowledge must expose its irrationality and provide more complete rationality.

Thus, unlike Weber, but akin to several interpretations of Marx (e.g., Bottomore, Ollman, Tucker), Mannheim is saying that political science[43] must seek to remedy the negative aspects of politics (especially deadly conflict) and simultaneously enhance the positive factor, human potential. In this regard, Mannheim continues his indictment of positivism for not tapping the "fullness of reality." (I&U: 165; see Appendix E)

Because of the possibility of unlocking potentials, "politics" "should [also] be a stimulus to the revision of our conception of science as a whole." In other words, "it appears that our conception of science is much narrower

than the scope of present-day knowledge." (I&U: 164-5) Does it make sense, asks Mannheim, "that the practical man dealing with concrete situations and applying his knowledge informally, [is] more intelligent than the theorist who observe[s] only a limited sphere because he was improsioned by the presuppositions of his science?" (I&U: 166) Therefore, the cultural (social) scientist must rise to the occasion and find a way of making sense of the fact "that life affords possibilities of knowledge and understanding even where science plays not part." (I&U: 165) It is not enough to relegate to science (and by implication, validity) only the "measurable," to define "everything qualitative ... only as a derivation of the quantitative."[44] (I&U: 165)

Under these conditions, the "knowledge of everything knowable becomes the obligation of the acting person."[45] (I&U: 191) Mannheim thus reverses Max Weber's conclusion separating evaluation from fact in the study of politics. Instead he seeks "the creation of a [new] common point of departure for political analysis." (I&U: 163n) Such a point is not reached by "add[ing] together" "all ... [the] disciplines" impinging on politics (e.g.,"history, statistics, political theory, sociology, history of ideas, and social psychology"). Rather political science should be "a science of creative activity" (I&U: 111ff) which makes sense of the "'rationalized' structure of society and the 'irrational' matrix." (I&U: 114)

3.D. The Crisis in Political Thinking and the Beginnings of Planning

Mannheim first mentions planning in an example of what he means by the meeting of the irrational and the rational.

> Our economic life, although extensively rationalized on the technical side, and in some limited connections calculable, does not, as a whole, constitute a planned economy ... Our social structure is built along class lines, which means that not objective tests but irrational forces of social competition and struggle decide the place of the function of the individual in society ... (I&U: 115)

The crisis in political thought consists in the failure to recognize "actual differences in styles of thought -- differences that extend even into the realm of logic itself." (I&U: 117) Mannheim suggests five "ideal-types" of modern western political thought, each of which provides "insight" but also "overlook[s]" important social facts. (I&U: 119) These "mode[s] of thought" to this day understand planning differently.

"Bureaucratic conservatism" "turn[s] all problems of politics into problems of administration..." Mannheim offers two apt illustrations. The "administrative, legalistic mind" "does not understand that every ... [legal] order is only one of many forms in which socially conflicting irrational forces are reconciled." Therefore, events such as revolts (or in modern American history, race riots) are seen as aberrations to be overcome by "arbitrary

decrees." (I&U: 118) The "military-bureaucratic mentality" "interprets a revolutionary outbreak as nothing but a serious interference with its own neatly planned strategy." Each "generalizes" from a narrow perspective which forgets the "total political reality." Planning in this view is equated with administrative procedure, irrespective of human needs and purposes.

"Historical conservatism" almost contradicts bureaucratic conservatism by relying on "instinct" to follow the "irrational" traditions of time. (I&U: 120-1) In Michael Oakeshott's terms, the task of political leaders is to detect "intuitions" and thereby keep the ship of state on an even keel. Destination does not matter, only the sharpening of "political instinct." "Historical conservatism" amplifies politics but in a manner which ensures the perpetuation of the traditionally dominant groups.[46] Planning in this view is to maintain social stability.

The third mode, "liberal-democratic-bourgeois thought"[47] "demand[s] a scientific politics" which can create "institutions into which the political struggle [can] be canalized." The goal is to compartmentalize theory and practice, to divorce "the intellectual sphere" from the "emotional." If the "one right set of ends of political conduct" do not yet exist, eventually, via "discussion," the universal truth and principles will emerge and the "ideal State" will conjoin with the "positive State" into a new "perfect State." Thus planning from

this perspective would anticipate the perfection of truth via the building of ideal institutional processes. Mannheim admits that he collapsed liberal and democratic tendencies together for "simplicity" despite their different social histories.[48] (I&U: 122-4) The resulting ambiguity continues into his planning theory, particularly in his limited understanding of political economy.

The "socialist-communist conception" as it emerges to counteract bourgeois liberalism is collectivist, not individually, oriented. It recognizes for the first time the ideological overtones of political thought (and in the case of Marx, the utopian irrationalities of socialism), but it denies being prey to similar distortions. By showing how political thinking is rooted in one's social position, it explicates the source of "insight" in the dialectical interaction of thought and action. This conception "signifies" a major breakthrough by its emphasis on politics as a "process of becoming." (I&U: 126) Consequently it contrasts with the above modes of thinking which in different ways presume politics as conflict.

Instead of "extreme intellectualism" or "complete irrationalism" it "concrete[ly]" "step[s] ahead." (I&U: 127) Without determing "what a thing should be like or what it will be like" the assumption is made that "[w]e can influence ... the general trend of the process of becoming." (I&U: 126) Planning, in this view (at least as presented by Mannheim), would consist of taking advan-

tage of turning points in history to advance the dialectic. While socialism and communism explicitly seek to identify the irrational and transform it into the rational, Mannheim concludes that the dialectical process is essentially irrational because at critical points (discerned by "intuition") revolution is to be mounted.[49] It should not be forgotten that Stalin sponsored the first non-wartime national plan, the Soviet five-year plan begun in 1926.[50] Stalin's political tactics were despicable, his subjugation policies inhumane. Consequently, the chronological parallelism caused many western observers to equate national planning with totalitarianism. (Cf. Popper, 1966 to Carr, 1948)

The final mode of thought which Mannheim considers is "fascism" where the "irrationalism of the deed ... negates even interpretation of history." (I&U: 135) Unlike the previous modes of thought each of which has a view of history, fascism uses "knowledge" only "as a technique for manipulating the masses" (e.g., social psychology). (I&U: 139) Thus, "the ideology of 'putschist' groups [is] led by intellectuals who are outsiders to the liberal-bourgeois and socialist stratum of leaders, and who hope to seize power by exploiting the crises which constantly beset modern society in its period of transformation..." (I&U: 141) Politics "clear[s] the way for action."[51] (I&U: 140) Planning in this view entails "reshuffling ... personnel," not "chang[ing] the social

structure."[52] (I&U: 144) This is because fascism is "the exponent of bourgeois groups,"

> A class which has already risen in the social scale [and] tends to conceive of history in terms of unrelated, isolated events. Historical events appear as a process only as long as the class which views these events still expects something from it. Only such expectations can give rise to utopias on the one hand, and concepts of process on the other. Success in the class struggle, however, does away with the utopian element, and forces long-range views into the background the better to devote its powers to its immediate tasks. The consequence is that in place of a view of the whole which formerly took account of tendencies and total structures, there appears a picture of the world composed of mere immediate events and discrete facts. The idea of a 'process' and of the structural intelligibility of history becomes a mere myth.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Fascism finds itself serenely able to take over this bourgeois repudiation of history as a structure and process without any inconvenience, since ... [it] ... has no intention ... but ... of substituting one ruling group for another within the existing class arrangements. (I&U: 146)

Mannheim again mentions planning as he lists the alternative directions of social transformation uninterrupted by fascism: "socialism" or "capitalistically planned economy." Since fascism substitutes myth for reality, the example of Mussolini's trains running on time only seeks to buttress a belief in the power of the ruler in its pretense of planning.

Where many accounts equate fascism with overt violence and ruthlessness, Mannheim takes note of the apparently inviting aspects. Part of this is likely due

his focus on Mussolini rather than Hitler.[53] In this sense Mannheim's awareness of the importance of psychology to political thinking, and hence political change (including via planning) is reaffirmed.

For Mannheim planning per se is not a suitable solution to social and economic dislocations. Planning at least requires an understanding of the sinew of social life and development and a sense of direction born out of historical insight.

Although Mannheim has not yet defined planning, he implies planning as the attempt to apply control to guide the future. These "thought styles" implicitly answer the question "control for what?" differently:

"THOUGHT STYLE"	"CONTROL FOR WHAT?"
Bureaucratic conservatism	smooth functioning of existing institutions
Historical conservatism	social stability
Liberal-democratic thought	perfection via canalization
Socialist-communist conception	collectivism
Fascism	personal aggrandizement

When Mannheim confronts planning directly, he compares good and bad planning. All of the above would be bad planning, though for different reasons. The fascist view is clearly abhorrent to democracy; the other four

perspectives are insufficient to meet democratic purposes. Finally, all five take too limited a view of power. "The exclusive emphasis on power ... without regard to human needs ... [is an] expression of ... malignant growth." (FPDP: 9)

In other words, not only is there a crisis in political thinking, but also in politics. Crisis, a medical term, denotes a turning point where a patient will improve or die. The idea of crisis lies beheath his opposition of democracy and totalitarianism. The latter is definite illness (and probable death) while the former is never in perfect health though it indicates a basically healthy condition. Moreover, the allusion continues in Mannheim's assertion that although democracy can degenerate into totalitarianism (including Fascism and Communism) the reverse process can never occur.

Etymologically, "crisis" derives from the Greek Krinō (= I decide). The Chinese idiograph for crisis signifies danger and opportunity thereby suggesting the importance of intervention and/or correct interpretation. Though Mannheim does not mention this Chinese symbol, he, unlike many other westerners, points strongly to the positive connotation. In planning, as in medicine, the decision to intervene should depend on the extent of the ailment, accurate diagnosis, and the state of knowledge. The last item includes both the techniques of intervention as

well as the theoretical understanding of sickness. Furthermore, planning knowledge, like medical knowledge, cannot fully describe good health as well as what particular illnesses entail. Even if intervention is called for and successful, the speed (and sometimes the degree) of recovery are modified by the patient's attitudes towards the doctor, his own illness, and the future in general. Thus interpretation of multiple factors -- some rational, some not -- by both the patient and the doctor are involved.

It is not surprising that when Mannheim writes his first book on planning, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction[54] (1935), he begins with the paradoxical question (with which he ended the German edition of Ideology and Utopia): What if man finally had the capacity to control his social life and had no utopia to pursue?

Political knowledge, like medical knowledge, cannot be tested in the laboratory. It requires real patients and actual epidemics. Thus, in response to political events between 1929 and 1935, Mannheim, who was on the first list of professors to be banished from Germany, begins Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: "The crisis has its lessons and we must learn from them." (MSR: 39)

The five years between Ideology and Utopia and Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction witnessed some

profound changes in Germany (indeed in the entire world) including the crash of the stock markets, the confusing effects of global depression, and, in 1933, the ascension of Hitler. Aside from the obvious fall of the German character (and its theoretical presumptions which had been circulating in various forms at least since Hegel), the "belief in the 'gradual progress of Reason in history' collapsed." This belief "has chiefly been associated with a positive attitude towards the changeability of man and society" based on a "tendency towards a rational and moral progress inherent in the human mind." (MSR: 39, 51) Unwilling, however, to completely give up the possibility of progressive reason, Mannheim states: "[T]he human mind, when suddenly brought into unfavorable circumstances, can relapse quite directly into earlier stages of its development ... [W]e must ask ourselves above all which situations favour certain forms of egoism and recklessness, and which have the opposite effect of creating a capacity for responsibility..." Furthermore, though "[t]here is, of course, one question which we can never answer scientifically, namely: What are the unique and individual paths which a given person must follow to attain a rational and moral way of life? We can [and must], however, ... diagnose the typical situations which lead to rational and irrational conduct." (MSR: 51)

After reviewing an extensive literature on the concept of thinking, including Dewey's conjunction of thought and

action, the sociologists of knowledge (e.g., Simmel and Max Weber), Mannheim considers alternative typologies of thinking. In a well-known formulation, he distinguishes "functional" from "substantial rationality."[55]

> We understand as substantially rational an act of thought which reveals intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events in a given situation. Thus the intelligent act of thought itself will be described as 'substantially rational,' whereas everything else which either is false or not an act of thought at all ... [including] drives, impulses, wishes, and feelings, both conscious and unconscious ... will be called 'substantially irrational' ... [In contrast w]hether a series of actions is functionally rational or not is determined by two criteria: (a) functional organization with reference to a definite goal; and (b) a consequent calculability when viewed from the standpoint of an observer or third person seeking to adjust himself to it. (MSR: 53)

Anything which interferes with the smooth operation of the functionally rational is defined by Mannheim as functionally irrational. Both substantial rationality and irrationality may interfere with functional rationality because "they do not harmonize with the series of actions on which attention is focused." (MSR: 54) In fact, the growing industrialism in the western world which is characterized by increasing functional rationality "does not to the same extent promote 'substantial rationality'" with the ill-effect that "functional rationalization is ... bound to deprive the average individual of thought, insight, and responsibility and to transfer these capacities to the

individuals who direct the process of rationalization." (MSR: 58) Continuing, Mannheim asserts that "[t]his is the state of affairs which has led to the growing distance between the elite and the masses, and to the 'appeal to the leader' which has recently become so widespread." The call for leaders is magnified "[w]hen the rationalized mechanism of social life collapses in times of crises [and] the individual cannot repair it by his own insight. Instead his own impotence reduces him to a state of terrified helplessness. In the social crisis he allows the exertion and the energy needed for intelligent decisions to run to waste. (MSR: 59) Mannheim then looks for the sources of substantial rationality. In the early liberal order, he believes, the "independent entrepreneurs with intelligent self-interest [and] a relatively independent intelligentsia" "together ... guaranteed the existence of substantial rationality." (MSR: 60) It is clear that Mannheim is expanding upon his observations in Ideology and Utopia. However, he has abandoned the categories of ideological/utopian thinking for those of functional/substantial rationality. Why? For one thing the scale of the crisis has changed from a primarily psychological one affecting an individual (or group) and manifested in the inability to develop self-consciousness. Instead, what begins as a psychological crisis becomes a crisis of power whereby the afflicted further subordinate themselves by

following a leader. Political thinking is expanded to include different types of rationality. Because rationality is limited in meeting contemporary crises, Mannheim reinfuses morality. He observes that in modern society there are a multiplicity of impulses (irrationalities). Some are antagonistic, one to the other, but irrationalities per se are not necessarily evil (e.g., passionate enjoyment of sports). (MSR: 63) Thus, Mannheim parallels morality and rationality.

> The functional aspect of a given type of moral discipline consists in those standards which, when realized in conduct, guarantee the smooth working of society. There are many types of these and they vary with the social structure. ... Substantial morality consists of certain concrete values, ... standards of which may be completely irrational in quality. (MSR: 67)

(Notice the similarity in argument to the distinction between democratic process and democratic purposes in his planning theory. See Chapters 4 and 8) Likewise, the interconnections are similar. "The more modern mass-society is functionally rationalized the more it tends to neutralize substantial morality or to sidetrack it into the 'private' sphere. In public matters it seeks to confine itself to universal standards which have a purely functional significance."[56] (MSR: 67) "Substantial morality" is measured by the "range of people's foresight and the range of their sense of responsibility." (MSR: 68) Historically, three stages emerge. In "horde soli-

darity"[57] (characterized by "homogeneous" actions dictated by "tradition and fear") an individual "must stand or fall with his group." Next, individual competition reigns in a kind of integrated chaos.[58] Finally, "super-individual group solidarity" (wherein "individuals ... are compelled to renounce their private interests and to subordinate themselves to the interests of the larger social units")[59] occurs. (MSR: 69) Notice that these are alternative formulations of the public interest which, in turn, follow the social transformation from national unification through liberalism to collectivism. In the last, the individual comes to recognize that his own interests are protected by "resigning partial advantages ... to save the social and economic system." In this way, the individual comes to identify the personal and the social, in turn, to see the need for longer-range perspectives and wider community views. Without such an approach the "biased planning" of the previous period may be extended. Nevertheless, more efforts are needed to promote the process by which one looks forward and increases the scope of his responsibility. People must be prepared to render "considered judgment" and to "shar[e] ... responsibility in planning the whole course of events in the society in which [t]he[y] move[]." (MSR: 70)

Having thus introduced the concept of planning as an outgrowth of rationality, Mannheim cautiously advances

with some examples of how planned changes can be both constructive and destructive.[60] Because of his inordinate awareness of how irrational factors can distort political thinking, he is "haunted":

> We have progressed so far as to be able to plan society and even to plan man himself. Who plans those who are to do the planning? (MSR: 74)

He recognizes two alternatives. The "religious and quietistic one" relies on a faith that, ultimately, despite our intentions, some outside force will control beneficially. The "realistic and political one" suggests that the first planners will self-select from the existing elites. Thus, even though educational policies should be instituted, we can only hope that through the conflict of "minorities,"[61] planners will emerge who have "the energy, the decisiveness, and the capacity to master the vast social machinery of modern life ... [and be able to act] for the whole of society, and bear the responsibility for it." (MSR: 74-5; cf. Chapters 5 and 7)

Mannheim has come full circle to return to the maxim "interpretation is fundamental." He has not found the utopian vision(s) he hopes for at the end of Ideology and Utopia. Instead he has discovered a new framework for pursuing rationality. He realizes this in his discussion on "thought at the level of planning" and in his forays into educational theory. The importance of one's life situation to the possibility of "initiative" and "specula-

tive foresight" leaves too much to chance. Thus, he substitutes the social need to plan to overcome the limited perspective of one's occupational goadings to think. Implicitly assumed is the formation of a public to exercise and extend substantial rationality (or, democratic intelligence).

Mannheim has solved the problem of interpretation by calling for more activism.[62] The business of interpretation is constant as things (social and economic) are always in flux. Interpretation is a uniquely human exercise as it depends on reconstructing the meaning of the past as well as anticipating the future in today's thoughts and actions. Thus, the most important demand for interpretation is that it be as comprehensive and as humane as possible.

3.E. Conclusions

In his theory of rationality, Mannheim explains how different forms of rationality can be "disproportionate" and support "drift." (Cf. Chapters 1 and 4) Specialized social science is less complete than common sense. Functional rationalities perpetuate non-direction. Ideological thinking is disproportionate to the needs of tomorrow.

Political truths will continue to be in flux, but within an appropriate framework (e.g., historicism, the sociology of knowledge) they can be corrected and rein-

terpreted for social reconstruction.

Rationality and irrationality are not inherently antagonistic. Instead, they are intimately related in several ways. At their conjunction, political thinking occurs. Positive irrationality (e.g., morality) guides substantial rationality in "good" planning to overcome the situation where men have the tools to plan but not the "foresight" or "initiative." "Thought styles" can be distinguished in terms of their purposes. Thus, Mannheim tries to integrate rationality and irrationality. "Since about 1860" there has developed a "consciousness of the extreme importance of the non-rational in human conduct and the products of human activity." (Maquet, 1951: 7) Evident in such disparate thinkers as Freud, Marx, Sorel and their successors, this perception has widespread currency to this day. Witness public willingness to accept the mad-man theories of social upheaval in explaining Hitler's Nazism, McCarthyism, Watergate. Such a view of non-rationality further assumes belief in the growth of rationality. Otherwise what is labelled non-rational would rather be called fate, destiny.

Whether there has been a progressive growth in rationality is quite a different question than whether there is a belief in the possibility of such improvement. The belief is well measured in the worldwide increase in educational activities. In linking social knowledge to political groups,[63] Mannheim suggests the source of pro-

gressive growth in rationality. In planning, he detects the capacity for further advances. But, he realizes that a theory of rationality to meet this goal logically leads to a theory of learning. This theory of learning, premised on his early work, provides the link between political thinking and democratic planning. (Cf. Chapter 5)

Mannheim's theory of rationality is proto-democratic in that it seeks to validate the truths, however limited, in each person's perspective. It is also proto-democratic in the sense that it essays to synthesize these different interpretations to provide common social understanding which, in turn, implicitly coheres democrats in a community. (Cf. Dewey) Moreover, by integrating thought and action --- one's thoughts originate from one's position in the political economy and by activity thoughts are clarified -- Mannheim hints at how a democratic community might continue. He also explains how democratic intelligence can be improved.

His theory of rationality led him to the topic of planning. Thereafter, planning was his major focus. Like his theory of rationality, Mannheim's theory of planning developed over time to include different emphases, as shown in Table 1.

Although his theory of rationality ends with the transition to the need for planning, thereafter, Mannheim

Table 1: Progression of Mannheim's Ideas on Planning

Year	Source	Major Orientation
1929, 1933	Ideology and Utopia	First, but infrequent, mention of "economic planning; final work on the sociology of knowledge
1935	Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (German edition)	"Thought at the level of planning"; rationality; need for planning
1938	Manchester Lectures at Oxford (in ESSP)	"The Emergence of the New Democratic Idea of Planning"
1940	Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (English edition)	"Planning for Freedom"
1943	Diagnosis of Our Time	"Third Way: a militant democracy"; a "planned democratic order"; religion
1947	Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning[64]	"democratic planning"; power, education, everyday life

argued that planning is inevitable. For this reason, Mannheim's implied democratic leanings become voiced and subsequently explored in conjunction with planning.

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 3

1
The concept of ideology builds on Marx's insights. The idea of "substantial rationality" has its roots in Max Weber's work.

2
His solution, though different than Marx' or Max Weber's, thus is predicated on the same approach. Both Marx and Weber tried to tie "scientific" social knowledge to larger political issues. (Cf. Appendix E)

3
The fullness of the approach follows the definition of culture formulated by Edward B. Tyler, "the great British pioneer of anthropology": "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." (Coser, 1972: 2)

4
Immanuel Wallerstein in The Modern World-System is extremely close to Mannheim in his formulations though he does not mention Mannheim. The adoption of the world-system as the unit of analysis which not miss the parts and also sees the whole, the belief that objectivity can be approximated, and statements like "'Truth' changes because society changes" continuously reappear in his text. (Wallerstein, 1974: 10) Like Mannheim, his roots in Marxian analysis are very evident, but also like Mannheim he is unconvinced by the preeminence of the proletariat, at least as defined by Marx.

5
In one of his earliest pieces, a review of Lukacs' Theory of the Novel, Mannheim explicitly registers his happy surprise.

6
The sense of wonder comes through vividly in his discussion on pre-theoretical understanding. That planning is in part premised on a sense of wonder is seen in the feelings we have when we think we can change our world purposively and imagine what it would be like to be in a different, preferably better, world.

7
In his first publication, "Soul and Culture," (1918), the crisis concerns culture which in the historical process has separated the subject from the object. ("Soul and Culture" was circulated as a pamphlet by the Free School for Human-

istic Studies, Budapest, a group of young intellectuals. Written in 1917, the paper demonstrates the "influence of George Lukacs and George Simmel" on the young Mannheim.) (Kettler, 1967: 407) Unless the subject and the object can be reunited in a new synthesis, Mannheim foresees continued "inauthenticity." (Kettler, 1967: 410) Although the language is strikingly similar to that of Marx' discussion of alienation in the Grundrisse and the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Mannheim could have read neither of them by 1918. (The Grundrisse was first published in Germany in 1953; the German Ideology and the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts were made available in 1927, 1932, and 1944, respectively.) (Tucker, 1972) The tone, of course, permeated other Central European writing, such asthat of Mannheim's teacher, Simmel.

8
This concentration on cultural life was also not unique to Mannheim; rapidly changing cultural manifestations goaded the work of many, including three with whom Mannheim interacted, Lukacs, Scheler, and Alfred Weber. (Alfred Weber, Max's brother, was to be Mannheim's mentor when he went to the University of Heidelberg. Mannheim credits this Weber with the contribution of "constellational analysis" to the cultural sciences. (I&U: 208)

9
In "Historicism." (See ESOK: 97)

10
The terms are Lynd's in Knowledge For What? (1939: 20) The analog in the economic sciences is "institutional economics." (See, for example, the work of Veblen and Commons.)

11
Published in 1922 in Kantstudien (supplementary vol. 57, Berlin); a translation appears in ESSP.

12
This function becomes very important in Mannheim's planning theory. (Cf. Chapter 5)

13
Mannheim also credits phenomenology, especially Scheler's version, with "show[ing], in opposition to modern intellectualism, that there is more than one form of knowledge." (I&U: 177)

14
"Gestalt," Wertheimer's coinage, signifies a unified physical, psychological, or symbolic configuration having properties that cannot be derived solely from its parts. Interpretation, in part, depends on scale. Thus, an individual can be sick and still whole; an otherwise healthy social group including one sick individual will appear as a healthy society.

15
Note that democratic action, however, will later be justified, in part, on "reciprocity." (Cf. Chapters 5 and 6)

16
Published in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, J.S.B. Mohr, Tubingen; vol. 52, no. 1, June 1924; translated in ESOK.

17
Relativism, as Mannheim points out, is easy to "refute." (ESOK: 86) He later cites Socrates' formal argument of the "international contradiction." (ESOK: 130)

18
Significantly, Mannheim in his early years, believed Marx to be a positivist, hence the modifier "rational-".

19
Mannheim understands Max Weber's work to be guided by this question of discovering the "cultural backgrounds" which "favored the emergence and complete unfolding of such forces as capitalism, exact science, etc." (I&U: 116)

20
Freud seems more influential than Marx in this last contention. Psychological interpretation is to become very important in Mannheim's idea of democratic planning as not only the society, but the individual pysches, are to be transformed.

21
This, of course, emerged as a critical topic in the 1940s; nevertheless, Mannheim's misunderstanding is shared by many, even today. (Cf. Weiner, 1950; Ravetz, 1971)

22
These last comments are offered in the context of a consideration of Troeltsch's Historismus und seine Probleme. Mannheim later wrote the article on "Troeltsch" for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1935).

23
Along the way, Mannheim notes the constructive role to be played by "dynamic utopias." (I&U: 119f)

24
"The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge" (1925), "The Ideological and Sociological Interpretation of Intellectual Phenomena" (1926) and "Problems of Sociology in Germany" (1929).

25
English translations taken from Wolff (1971).

26
The language, at the hands of the translators, Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, changed from "relatively idiosyncratic German" to "relatively standardized English." Wolff speculates that perhaps this language difference is responsible for the significantly smaller sales in Germany. He also notes that the"Third Reich 'forgot' to confiscate it." (Wolff, 1971: lxi, n. 1)

27
Cf. the table of contents translated in FKM (p. lxii).

28
See, for example, Wolff's and Remmling's considerations of the whole of Mannheim's work.

29
He prefers the "pyscho-genetic" ideas of Hegel and the Romantics to a mechanical, atomistic model. (I&U: 30) Nevertheless, Mannheim tries to correct their major shortcoming: they are too "individualistic" to appreciate the "collective context" "in which ... each has a different share." (I&U: 27, 29)

30
Titmuss (1969) uses this quotation to explain why planners should not base their actions on whether an outcome can be predicted. Benveniste (1972) argues that it is precisely this bias toward adopting the "safe" known path that impedes imaginative democratic planning.

31
Rogin, for example, finds that American midwestern wheat farmers were more likely to be part of agrarian radicalism than corn farmers because they were more dependent on the vicissitudes of weather. (Rogin, 1967) Were scientific efficiency the major criterion and all farmers were rationally seeking ultimate truth they would all plant corn. Obviously other social (and economic) criteria enter in. In recent years this point has gained greater currency.

From another standpoint, the proponents of "appropriate technology" looksless at the choice of crops and more at the social means by which farming is pursued. (Cf. Schumacher, 1973)

32
Mannheim means by this term not an anxiety-producing state where an individual observes himself as if from without, but rather a self-awareness serving as a prelude to self-development.

33
The adversarial relationship is not to be confused with the liberal idea of antagonistic interests. For further discussion see Chapter 6.

34
This is Mannheim's closest formulation to Marx' false consciousness.

35
Explicitly countering Marx, Mannheim states: "The blindness to the action context of ideas gains support from the fact that ideas remain communicable and seemingly understandable long after the social situation which they helped to define or control ended." (ESOC: 44) Compare the term "communicable" with Kettler's analysis of the sociology of knowledge in light of the recently discovered manuscript on "communicative" knowledge. (See also Appendix D)

36
Mannheim distinguishes between "utopian" as a "spatial" concept and "chialism" which is basically "temporal." The first would be possible, the latter is always a dream (i.e., an unreal time). (I&U: 205)

37
Mannheim believed thathis concept of relationism overcame critics' charges that the sociology of knowledge was relativistic. But not many were convinced. Melvin Lasky, among others, asks: Where does utopian thinking emerge? When? How frequently? (Lasky, 1976: 617) Moreover, Lasky maintains "To determine concretely ... in a given case [such as a third world revolutionary party platform] what is ideological and what is utopian is extremely difficult." (Lasky, 1976: 176)

However, Mannheim's relationism entails continuous reinterpretation. Its connection to Einstein's theory of relativity is explicitly stated by Mannheim. (Cf. Chapter 5)

In contrast, Ollman's "relational" interpretation of Marx' concept of alienation rests on a different framework

in which the "whole at rest ... is but a limiting case of the whole in movement... structure is but a stage in process." (Ollman, 1971: 18) In other words, interpretation is equated with explanation, and the historical process continues dialectically to reveal the growing contradictions in capitalist society which can (and will) only be overcome by the next stage of history. Utopian thought in this scheme is also ideological, and together these ideas mask the real social relations which are defined by the structure of the means of production. Thus, unlike Mannheim's relationism which attempts to synthesize all elements of the knowledge of social life, Marxian relationism is predicated on a synthesis resulting from the clash of thesis and antithesis, a process which sorts out all but the most essential and relevant aspects of social relations. Mannheim shudders at the criterion of "relevance [because it] merely denotes that an event is foreshadowed by the design of a known system." (ESOK: 74) One implication of this attitude is that his theory is necessarily not parsimonious. It tries to include the richness of actual social life and thereby avoids a standard normal science criterion, simplicity. In this way, Mannheim is closer to a contemporary historiographer, despite the limited empiricism in his work, than to a sociologist.

38
For Mannheim, "methodology" and "epistemology" follow new techniques of data gathering.

39
Maquet argues that since Mannheim did not use the term "Wissenschaftlehre (epistemology)" but rather "Erkenntnistheorie (gnosiology, philosophy of knowledge)" he misses an important distinction between the two. (See also Chapter 5)

40
He depends on Schaffle's distinction between those events which are "routine affairs of state" and those which are "politics." (I&U: 112f) He admits that his view of politics is neither all encompassing nor the only possible one. (I&U: 116)

41
Politics, without a sense of history, would be like human thinking on a tabula rasa. Both are unthinkable, unreal to Mannheim. See also Chapter 5 and Appendix E for how close Mannheim's conception of sociology is to that which we now call the"craft of history." (Cf. Stern, 1973)

42 For the differences between the adversarial method of the sociology of knowledge and the need for limited competition, see Chapter 4.

43 The question of the possibility of a political science hails back to Max Weber and the implication that that which is routinized and regulated is no longer politics is also a Weberian notion. Strangely, Marx when suggesting that communism would bring about an "administration of things" also shares this view.

44 Mannheim cites Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in support of his argument. (I&U: 306)

45 Intellectuals' involvement should be, as will be seen, different from other social groups. (I&U: 155f, 116; cf. Chapter 5)

46 It is largely because of this last point that Mannheim assigns the cult of leadership to the category "fascism."

47 Mannheim intentionally hyphenates these adjectives to distinguish a particular view of democracy, one which departs widely from his own later developed one.

48 Mannheim notes that the "original conception of parliamentarism was, as Carl Schmitt has so clearly shown, that of a debating society in which truth is sought by theoretical methods." (I&U: 124) Schmitt himself is a good example of the importance of ideology. During the 1920s, he was considered one of the most brilliant political-legal scholars in Germany. However, because of his decision to serve the Nazis he became almost anonymous overnight in the academic literature. Mannheim's references to Schmitt thus occur only the in sections of Ideology and Utopia written before 1933. A minor revival of Schmitt's thinking is found in the work of George Schwab.

49 (I&U: 124ff) No doubt this assessment reflects Mannheim's reading of Lukacs and especially Lenin, in addition to Marx. Mannheim only cites The German Ideology, The Holy Family, Communist Manifesto, The Poverty of Philosophy, and Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.

50
In addition to Lenin's writings, Mannheim refers to Stalin's Foundations of Leninism. (I&U: 128)

51
The earliest antecedent for this kind of thinking according to Mannheim is Machiavelli whose idea of virtu anticipates the "elan of the great leader" who suggests "psychic manipulation of the deeply despised masses." (I&U: 140-1) Mannheim, however, is partly disingenuous in this assessment because Machiavelli wrote in a different socio-historical setting. Italy in the 15th century was the location of many squirmishes between city-states and among the noble and ecclesiastical ranks within city-states. Furthermore, Machiavelli begins The Prince by considering the possible forms of states (monarchies or republics). In The Discourses, he says that the republic with a "legislator sufficiently wise to give her laws so regulated that ... they afford security to those who live under them" has the best "fortune." So while a cursory reading of Machiavelli can yield the most cynical of political maxims, Machiavelli intended not simply to improve the position of the Prince. As will be seen, the "crisis" metaphor and the search for security (albeit of a somewhat different nature given cultural-historical changes) are of as great a concern to Mannheim as they were to Machiavelli.

52
Although he does not build on Mannheim's ideas, Bert Gross' notion of "Friendly Fascism" assumes the same process. The similarity is all the more interesting since Gross too espouses planning. Arguing that the McCarthy period (late 1940s to early 1950s) is not an instance of American fascism, Rogin nevertheless observes a similar phenomenon. He states that what most political scientists label "pluralism" is really only a circulation of leaders born of the same social-economic perspective.

53
The ignorance of Hitler and the attention to Mussolini is repeated in some of the planning literature of the period. See,for example, Findlay MacKenzie's edited volume on Planned Society (1937), wherein Mussolini's tract on fascism is reprinted.

54
Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus was published in German in 1935 in Holland. It was expanded and translated for an English edition released in 1940 under the title given.

55
The notion is similar to formulations of Max Weber and Veblen.

56
On the importance of public life to the identification and pursuit of community goals see Sennett's The Fall of Public Man and The Social Uses of Disorder. Mannheim, too, remarked on the importance if not the pervasiveness, of "publicity" to counter the not infrequent "violence" resulting from "secret negotiations." (MSR: 73)

57
Mannheim notes the similarity to Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity."

58
This, of course, closely follows the political theory of Adam Smith and John Locke as well as other liberals.

59
It might be noted that these three stages concide with one view of the three basic definitions of the public interest. (Cf. Held, 1970)

60
Among the abuses of the capacity to mold men and change social life cited by Mannheim are propaganda efforts.

61
Mannheim pits elites and minorities against the masses. For the changes in his thinking about the structure of power in western society see Chapters 4 and 7.

62
See Arendt's The Human Condition for the modern significance attached to the notion of vita activa, and especially how it is seen as one of the basic elements of what it means to be human.

63
History bears him out as seen in the mass educational campaigns in revolutionary third world countries like China. It is also seen in the "educational" efforts of major corporations in the western world. (Cf. Engler, 1961, 1977; Schiller, 1973) Furthermore, every "movement" has stressed re-educating its adherents, from the black movement to women's lib.

64
Actual publication dates are 1950 and 1951.

CHAPTER 4

THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING: POLITICAL TRENDS, STRUCTURAL PATTERNS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

By 1935, Mannheim concluded that planning was needed. However, because of the rise of fascism, the inevitable progress of democracy became suspect.[1] At the same time, national planning efforts pervaded all western countries, largely in response to the depression. Since total planning efforts occurred in undemocratic states (e.g., fascist Germany, Stalinist Russia), some observers warned that democracy was threatened by planning. (E.g., Hayek, Popper) Others, like Mannheim, investigated each concept and then decided that democratic planning was possible. (E.g., Allin, Finer, Lynd, Wootton)

This chapter focuses mainly on the modern conditions under which democracy needs be redefined, though it begins with Mannheim's argument about the inevitability of planning.

Mannheim distinguishes between democracy (a social and substantive idea) and democratization (a more individualistic and procedural concept). Mannheim defines democratization as "a growing number of social groups striv/ing/ for a share in social and political control and demand/ing/ that their own interests be represented." "Negative" and positive consequences follow. Constructively, democratization overcomes "pseudo-democracy" (where only "a small propertied

and educated group" governs). However, because of the accelerated rate of democratization in the modern world, "masses" unprepared for the responsibility of citizenship, governance increasingly is subject to the irrationality of emotional appeals. Moreover, the struggle of different group interests impedes the possibility of finding the common goals of democracy (e.g., fellowship, tolerance). (MSR: 44-5; cf. Eliot, 1949; Kornhauser; Meisel; Ortega y Gasset) Thus democratization can paradoxically curtail the development of democracy. Where democracy requires a shortening of the distances between men, democratization ignores the problem. Where democracy requires security for each and all, democratization furthers "collective insecurity." Where democracy needs lasting social cohesion, democratization breeds impulsive groupings (e.g., masses). Where democracy entails some competition among individuals as well as social cooperation, democratization allows masses to be manipulated by leaders in the name of political cooperation. Where democratic social change must be personally and generationally meaningful, democratization proceeds amorphically. Where democracy involves the political economic culture, democratization tends to highlight and isolate the state. Where democracy requires that competitive and cooperative organizations be adopted as appropriate to particular situations, democratization tends to foster competition among unequals.

In brief, the trends towards planning and democratization, without reference to democratic purposes, will amplify the social crisis. Since the problems of democracy and planning similarly revolve around control and rationality, their synthesis into democratic planning is only a possibility, not a certainty.

4.A. The Inevitability and Crisis of Planning: Political Trends

Mannheim's starting point differs from most. He avoids the 1930s debate as to whether planning is desirable by proclaiming it inevitable. (Cf. Allin, Hayek, Mills, Popper, Wootton) Not as sanguine as the Marxists who believe in the inexorable progress of history, Mannheim insists that attention should focus on whether the impending planning is to be for the good or the bad.

Mannheim refers to "an age of planning" suggesting that he continues to look for a historicist totality.[2] In Rollo May's words, an "age of planning" assumes that "the historical is to the man-in-society what the genetic dimension is to man-as-adult." (1977: 175) Or, as E.H. Carr states: "/t/here is no such thing as democracy in the abstract: the nature of democracy depends on the historical development of the society in which it is established, ... /N/either are the/ laws of economics ... universally true without regard to time or place." (1948: 90) In short, the social struc-

ture is a dependent, not independent, variable.

Mannheim uses the term planning in several ways. In 1929 he refers to concrete proposals for economic planning, be it under capitalism or socialism. (I&U: 115, 121, 141) He announces the "age of planning" in 1935. At the same time, to overcome the limited view of economic planning, Mannheim proffers a psychology of planning, "planning for freedom." (See especially MSR: 152, n.1) Derivatively, there are two basic forms of planning -- totalitarian and democratic -- and which results depends on how we play out the "tendencies" and possibilities of this age. "There is nothing in the nature of planning or of democratic machinery which makes them inconsistent with each other." (MSR: 339) Opting for democratic planning, Mannheim believes that issue is not "ideological" (or "abstract"), but rather involves "a concrete sociological analysis /of/ what sort of freedom, democracy and culture would be possible under an altered social system." (MSR: 9; Dewey; Lynd, 1939)

The urgency of this task informs all his post-1933 work.[3] He believes that the "collapse of liberalism and democracy and the adoption of a totalitarian system /are not/ passing symptoms of a crisis which is ... confined to a few nations" but rather "a change in the very structure of modern society." (MSR: 3)

The two essential ingredients of Mannheim's concept of planning -- rationality and control -- are always linked

but their relative predominances change over time. Thinking, a legacy of his earlier work is accented in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1935, 1940).[4] Control is primarily treated as a means. In Diagnosis of Our Time and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning democratic control becomes the goal to approximate and thinking is the means.

This reversal in emphasis is best explained by Mannheim's changing understanding of democracy.[5] Democracy was strongly tied to liberalism in his German writings. (Cf. I&U: 12, n.10; MSR: 3ff) Increasingly, he saw that liberalism was inherently unstable and created conditions for the emergence of dictators, that it was only a temporary "phase between two forms of planned order -- that of the local authorities ... and /that/ of the territorial state." (MSR: 160)[6] Because liberalism is predicated on "the mobile person" who behaves differently "in the market place" and among "neighbors," who "contrast/s/ ... everyday life and holidays," whose workplace is "separat/e/ ... from the home," the "abstraction /of/ ... separate spheres" of activity and thought is created and maintained." (MSR: 161) The "principle of democracy" under these conditions focuses on rules such as "all social classes shall be politically active" and "deeds and thoughts" shall be "public." (MSR: 72-3) It is, thus, against this background that he first urges "planning for freedom." He wants to preserve the liberties gained in liberalism. As he ponders and develops

his planning theory he concentrates increasingly on the conditions under which we can fully realize ourselves. This leads him to expand the definition of freedom and ultimately to consider democracy as a substantive, not solely instrumental, concept. (Cf. Chapters 1, 6 and 7; Carr, 1948; Dewey) In 1947 Mannheim concludes: "/d/emocracy, rightly understood, implies a theory of power aimed at defining ways of distributing and controlling communal power for maximum security, efficiency, and freedom." (FPDP: 45) He turns, therefore, from hope that a utopian vision will emerge, to "Realism."[7]

"It is a widespread illusion that spheres of social reality are separated. Properly speaking there are no spheres in social reality -- only in human activity." (MSR: 161) The decisive criteria for planning are the "degree" of possible "action" and "foresight." "... radius of action /is/ the extent of the causal sequences directly brought about by our initial activity and remaining more or less under our control ... radius of foresight /is/ the length of the causal chain which can be more or less accurately forecast in a given situation as regards the initial activity." The radii of foresight and action are enlarged as "technical and institutional control grow." (MSR: 149)

Man has progressed through three stages of thoughts. In the first stage, "chance discovery (Finden)" "man carries on his struggle with nature directly" and learns "by trial

and error." Thought is advanced by "remembering." (MSR: 150) The next stage, "inventing (Erfinden)" entails "imagin/ing/ a definite goal" and then preparing to attain it. "Tools and institutions" are consciously modified and then directed towards particular goals." "Adaptation" includes decisions which lead to the survival or death of institutions. (MSR: 151-2) The final stage, planning, or "planned thinking (Planen)," involves "mastery of the relationships between" institutions. Planning transcends "linear" thinking and understands "the development /of/ ... separate spheres" in terms of how they "interact upon each other and lead to a multi-dimensional structure."

Remnants of earlier stages are still evident; in fact, Mannheim avers: "Today we are in the main still lingering at /the second/ ... stage." (MSR: 152-3) The transition/s/" between stages are "vague," but Mannheim is not concerned to focus his energies on a more exacting determination. Instead he stresses the inevitability of planning because "competition ... /is/ increasingly narrowed by regulatory intervention" and "conscious" "forces" direct "the process of selection." But, he quickly adds, the outcome is not always progressive. For example, despite the elimination of natural causes of starvation by "a whole series of inventions in division of labor and of technology," when the "social processes of production and distribution" misfunction "even more persons suffer than when natural forces were still uncontrolled." At this point (1935) he puts

primary blame on (1) the "incomprehensibility" of these "complicate/d/" processes, and (2) the possibility of social dislocation due to the sheer "increasing density of events." (MSR: 155, 157) Hence, he concludes "integrated thinking" is more necessary than ever.

Flux is the condition of modern life observes Mannheim. Therefore, planned intervention is not needed to provoke social change, but to direct it. Planned intervention can be misguided by functional rationality and/or irrationality. Or it may be guided by substantial rationality to limit social abuses and promote humane potentials.

> Some people think the mind is impotent to influence social affairs, others think it is omnipotent. Whilst I believe that technological factors are important, I should maintain that they may be manoeuvred according to human ends which are culturally agreed. Or, as Lewis Mumford puts it, 'our capacity to go beyond the machine rests in our power to assimilate the machine.' In our advanced technical age it would be impossible to destroy the machine but it is possible with intelligence to remove those institutions which do harm, or strengthen those tendencies which are already at work and useful but not yet fully developed. Social reform does not mean building society anew from the beginning, but observing the tendencies at work and through a definite strategy guiding it in the desired direction. (SS: 139)

The planning intention divides into preventive and constructive measures. Preventive planning depends on correct diagnosis of the directions of social change and an adequate understanding of human motivation. Constructive planning, on the contrary, requires a flexible strategy

oriented towards chosen democratic ends.

Mannheim bases his notion of preventive planning on a diagnosis of social crises. He uses the term crisis in two ways. Quintessentially, he argues that the concentration of control has reached a critical turning point. This concentration prohibits the prolongation of liberalism and laissez-faire policies. Without democratic planning totalitarianism surely will ensue. Emotionally crisis is an important label because it spurs, Mannheim hopes, the majority to think and act. Mannheim appends the emotional connotation because he wants to emphasize simultaneously (1) the irreversability of totalitarianism and (2) the perpetual threat totalitarianism poses. Mannheim is not a cold warrior; he is not speaking about foreign policy but rather about domestic policy. He is warning that the people of a nation must ever be on guard even as they pursue constructive programs. In effect, Mannheim is updating Marx -- not only do men make their own history, from inherited conditions, but the meaning of the bequested environment needs be reinterpreted as we step into the future. This is why Mannheim is so concerned to keep up intellectual conflict and also why he stresses the neutrality of social functions. Much of the crisis, then, is one of "valuation." Changing the structure is only part of the task; man too must be changed.

> Owing to [a] ... dual origin, valuations are partly the expression of subjective strivings, partly the fulfillment of objective social functions. Thus there is a continuous adjustment at work between what individuals would like to do if their choices were directed by their personal wishes only, and what society wants them to do ... Re-valuations and re-definitions of the situation will necessarily accompany the changed structure of society. A new social order cannot exist without these re-valuations and re-definitions, as it is through them alone that individuals will act in a new way and respond to new stimuli. Thus the valuation process is not simply an epiphenomenon superstructure, an addition to the economic order, but an aspect of changed behaviour is wanted. (DOOT: 16-7)

On the issue of crisis Mannheim departs from the Marxists and, he adds, the Idealists. (E.g., DOOT: 15) Crisis is not simply an analytic category, or even a step towards the revolution. Whether manifested in atomic war or totalitarianism, crisis must be averted. Nor, is crisis, for Mannheim, one possible step in decision making theory. (Cf. Benson) To see crisis from a short-run perspective invites dictatorships as "temporary solutions in an emergency." (MSR: 3)

Hence, we are ever at the brink, we must ever be responsible for making our history. Mannheim does not abuse the term crisis. He would have no patience with those who annually announce a new crisis (e.g., the urban crisis, the energy crisis, the fiscal crisis).

> Crises are not overcome by a few hasty and nervous attempts at suppressing the newly arising and troublesome problems, nor by flight into the security of the

> dead past. The way out is to be found only through the gradual extension and deepening of newly won insights and through careful advances in the direction of control. (I&U: 108)

Rather than applying the term crisis to those situations of great chaos and lack of control, he reserves the appellation for those cases where control is used against humanity by default or design. When one controls others, the blame lies with both parties. As long as totalitarianism has not solidified, there remains a chance for democracy. Totalitarianism grows out of dictatorships, but they are not synonymous. Thus, Nazi Germany can be transformed into democracy as can third world countries.

Only in the modern world is total control possible. But the threat of total control can be overcome if political economic problems are reframed in terms of collective control. Both total control and collective control are predicated on the existence of (and increase in) organized power. Yet, whereas total control is wielded by the self-aggrandizing few, collective control is shared by legitimate representatives and/or cooperative groups of the democratic constituency in the public interest. (See Chapter 1) Examples include parliaments and citizen planning boards, respectively. The rest of Mannheim's formulations flow from this understanding of control. He warns that given the possibility of total control, we must ever watch for abuses. Taking the positive, constructive step toward democratic

collective control is the most effective way to overcome probable abuses. For this reason "mere repairs and institutional patchwork" are not "sufficient." (FPDP: 4)

4.B. Disproportionate Development: More Political Trends

Mannheim observes two simultaneous and internally paradoxical social trends in the modern western world.[8] As social life becomes increasingly democratized dehumanization grows. As social interdependence multiplies collective insecurity is amplified. Together these trends constitute his theory of the "disproportionate development of human faculties." Wanton psychic and physical violence too often result in our imbalanced social "ecology."[9] "The dilemma of our age may be restated as follows: Our anxieties push us to extremes; lack of control leads to chaos -- stringent controls confine us to a caged-in existence." (FPDP: 73) Progress requires "harmonious growth," not disparity between the "psychological and technical development of society." (MSR: 39) Mannheim stresses that social friction is not necessarily caused by the co-existence of technologies originating in different historical periods. Progress can absorb "the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous."[10] T. S. Eliot, a friend of Mannheim's during the 1940s, makes a similar point when he claims culture necessarily encompasses the past and the future in the present. (1948:

302-3) The dilemma arises when "... modern technical mastery over nature is miles ahead of the development of the moral powers of man and of his knowledge of the social order and social control." (MSR: 42)

Mannheim explains disproportionate development in terms of knowledge and power. In the first case, "technological and natural scientific knowledge" outpace "human capacities" for "moral" and social understanding. "Social disproportion," a corollary, occurs when such disproportion varies for different social groups. In the second case, the social structure defines "problems" which "favour certain groups and condemn others to passivity." (MSR: 43)

Both types of disproportionate development have occurred in previous periods. Neither, however, is stable under modern industrial conditions because of the "processes" of "fundamental democratization" and "growing interdependence." (MSR: 44)

Mannheim speaks of "mis-development," particularly as it relates to interdependence, as early as 1918 in "Soul and Culture." (Kettler, 1967: 410)[11] Though he also hints at the idea of democratization in his first published essay (Wolff, 1971: xv), he does not use the term "democratization" until 1929 in Ideology and Utopia.

In the years between 1918 and 1940 the seriousness of "mis-development" increases. "If such an unevenness in total development is dangerous for the individual, in society it

must sooner or later lead to a catastrophe." (MSR: 43)

4.B.1 Democratization and Dehumanization

Democratization is the process of incorporating more people and groups into the political society. "The secret of the democratization which took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries lay in the simple fact that one man meant one gun ..." (MSR: 48) "Pseudo-democracy," the "grant/ing/ of political power" to more groups, precedes "effective" "democracy," when "all classes play an active part." The transition involves re-defining interests (which are expressed emotionally[12]) more rationally. Yet sometimes before interests are rationally averred, irrationality burgeons. As the "democratizing process" expands, the masses do not "remain in their former state of ignorance." (MSR: 46) The fact that emerging dictators need "deaden ... /these/ newly mobilized energies" is one sign of the fundamental democratization. Another is the frequent resort to violence to control the masses.[13]

Democratization "... seems to be associated with a growing complexity of the social and economic process, involving the necessity of making choices and of applying analysis instead of just trusting in the automatic working of tradition." The "masses" now have "responsibility for the shaping of their own destiny." (ESOC: 216)

Yet other processes conflict with democratization. Most significant is the growing "monopolization" of "social power" which attends "the concentration of the means of production." Three ramifications are (1) the "monopolization of knowledge" by "specialized expert/s/" engaged in the process of rationalization, (2) the creation of "an almost caste-like bureaucratic order" with certain "monopoly of control," and (3) the "concentration of the instruments of military power" in a "military force ... isolated from the general population." (MSR: 47-8) Such "dominance of small minorities" occurs in capitalist and communist countries alike. (MSR: 46)

Under these conditions, there are two alternatives: dictatorship and democracy. But dictatorship is inherently unstable as it requires "centralizing the control of the individual wills" of the specialists, bureaucrats, and soldiers. (MSR: 46) Implicit in his argument is the notion that as these three mediating groups become larger the difficulty in controlling them to control others increases.[14]

Democratization is "incomplete democracy" (FKM: 295), and necessarily precedes real democracy. But true democracy, unlike the process of democratization, is not inevitable. Democratization involves an "underlying social change" (FKM: 320), a sense that, in Goethe's words: "Everything could be different." (FKM, 282) It stresses "individualized" "responsibility" (FKM: 285); "spontaneity and creativity"

(FKM: 285); human adaptation (MSR: 71); forms of selection which result in a "loss of homogeneity in the governing elite" (FKM: 272); a share in control (FKM: 285); purposive, rather than classical humanistic, education (FKM; 334); and a suspicion of that which is not public. (FKM: 285) Among the positive consequences are the "democratic diffusion of knowledge" (I&U: 8, 33); the breaking down of barriers between men (SS: 47), and greater "stylistic" heterogeneity in the "realm of art, literature and religion." This last characteristic is very important because it stresses the basic unity of men while allowing for their different proclivities as individuals. Negatively, democratization creates a kind of mass homogeneity wherein judgment is obscured by "functional rationality." (FKM: 327)

In brief, democratization strips us of our "social masks," but does not offer a means of democratic reconstruction. (FKM: 346) Democratization dehumanizes us as it forces the disintegration of cohesive social institutions which in turn breeds individual insecurity.

Tocqueville first identified democratization, a fact which Mannheim does not acknowledge though he read Democracy in America. (MSR: 445) Mannheim, like Tocqueville, sees the importance of public opinion in political matters and worries about the trend in the direction of "equalitarian mediocrity." (ESOC: 200) But the divergence in their

thinking is more striking and due no doubt to the differences between America of 1835 and Europe of 1935. It is not the tyranny of the majority, but the irrationality of the mass, which upset Mannheim. In contrast to the decentralized political and economic life of America before the industrial revolution and the consequent huge waves of immigrants, Mannheim observes the concentration of power guided by and for the few. The democratic issue for Mannheim is not majority versus minorities, it is rather the place of the individual in a collectivizing society. In this way Mannheim's formulation of democratization more closely follows Marx' concerns.

If democracy is to be achieved, "everyone /must be brought/ to more or less similar levels of understanding." (MSR: 46) It is interesting that at this point, 1940, Mannheim does not deal specifically with control from the democratic standpoint.

Democratization manifests itself in accelerating urbanization and industrialism. Mannheim spent his entire life in cities (Budapest,[15] Berlin, Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and London). Because of this he distinguishes between city life and the process of urbanization. The modern city is the refuge of non-conformists, and the "natural area of secondary contacts." (SS: 44) City people are less prejudiced because they are less "rooted."[16] The economics of city life is implied to be heterogeneous and supportive of experimental (innovative) business, including cultural en-

deavors. The great universities of Europe, with the exception of "Ox-bridge," are located in cities. Cities are also, Mannheim implies, international; Budapest, for example, was the meeting ground for the diverse nationalities of Hungary. Thus, cities are large because of the mixture of many elements.

In contrast, urbanization is tied to industrialism, to an integrated and rationalized division of labor. Size is a function of the concentration of interrelated functions in a single place. Industrialization undermines cities. Culture becomes homogenized for mass audiences. Trades are replaced by functions. Specialists join workers and bureaucrats as functionaries. Because of the great labor needs of the factories, cities are forced to absorb groups from rural areas and villages. The huge influx of these non-city people overshadows the indigenous population. In short, under industrialism cities are demoted from the rank of cosmopolity to that of metropolity. Rationality dissolves into functional rationality and irrationality. The city's flexibility becomes urban irresponsibility. (SS: 45)

Throughout his writings distantiation -- "an external or spatial distance, and an internal or mental distance" -- is an important concept. (SS: 47) Both "men" and "objects" can be distanced. (SS: 53) A gestaltian term, in his early work Mannheim often equates distantiation with individual alienation. In his later work he concentrates almost exclusively on social distancing. Social distancing,

an interpersonal concept, is measured by "primary" and "secondary contacts." Primary contacts are at least "face-to-face" and may be "intimate." (SS: 43ff) The individual treats the other(s) as whole person(s). Primary social contacts may be "antipathetic" or "sympathetic." In secondary contacts, the individual deals with others only in particular roles. Thus, secondary contacts are always "categoric."

> The secondary contacts thus created operate in such a way that they promote the abstract attitude; they enable us to compare facts and to develop long-term interests and calculations, because 'trends' can be worked out and new systems of controlling people by emphasizing the different parts they play as taxpayers or workers, can be devised. The fact to face situation, dominated by primary contacts, has thus been transformed. (SS: 44)

But another consequence is stereotyping which may be manipulated to incite prejudice against "Negroes, Germans, Jews, foreigners, 'them.'" (SS: 44)

Village and rural life are characterized by a predominance of primary contacts, but such contacts are also possible within the city neighborhood, workplace, clubs, etc. (SE: 46) Since "Every real experience is based on immediate contacts," prejudicial sentiments and behaviors are more likely reinforced in the village and rural areas than in the city.

There appears to be a contradiction in Mannheim's thinking. Prejudice occurs in cities because of the predominance

of secondary contacts, and yet it is mitigated in cities because people are less "rooted." Actually, Mannheim is saying only that there is more than one cause of prejudice.

Nevertheless, he implies that on the whole city dwellers are less prejudiced than "rooted" people because "prestige" derives not from "who your father is" but from "personal achievement." He may also be implying that prejudice is more idiosyncratic in the city than in villages or the country. In other words, in cities prejudice does not become as large a social problem because it is more diffuse. However, with increasing industrialization prejudices can be inflammatory as workers do not usually partake of city life.[17]

Obviously, democratic cohesion is in part premised on overcoming prejudices. Thus, social distance continues to underlie Mannheim's thinking on democracy. The major psychological problem of social democracy is to make the individual feel as though he matters even as collective decisions are made. While Tawney was unimpressed by Mannheim's treatment of this issue, McWilliams thinks it one of Mannheim's most important insights. (Terrill, 1973; McWilliams, 1969) In his words: "Karl Mannheim warned us that groups large enough to be effective had become too large to be meaningful to the individual; Mannheim was aware that man's senses -- and hence, in a very large degree, his emotions -- are limited and parochial." (McWilliams. 1961: 365)

In his last writings, Mannheim began to focus on participatory democracy in the workplace and community. Some (e.g., Bogardus, Remmling) believe his commitment to this democratic thrust disingenuous because it came so late in such small doses. Others (e.g., Brown, Dahl, Spitz) entirely miss this point. However, the kernels of a participatory theory of democracy, as seen in the discussion on distantiation, were continuously evident in his work. Therefore, "democracy diminishes /'vertical'/ distances." Yet "/t/he whole variety and diversity of social and cultural life would be inexplicable without the category of social distance." (SS: 47; ESOC: 210) Unlike social distancing, mental distancing is always "created by the subject." The problem, then in democracy is to ensure that there is neither "over-" nor "under-distancing." "Under-distancing" or inappropriate intimacy, threatens the need and right for privacy. "Over-distancing" is manifest in a rigid, hierarchical power system which seeks to "preserve the power of the ruling men" by "keep/ing/ up distance between the ruling groups and the subjected ones." Thus, democratic agendas call for "change/s/ /in/ the methods of distancing." (SS: 53) As "the democratizing process ... tends to diminish social distance ... /It/ uncover/s/ the purely existential relationships between men." (SS: 54) Though such a transformation would <u>prima facie</u> seem fully beneficial, it is not necessarily so. Escaping from politics is not always wise, even in a democracy because "/d/istanc-

ing is a most important factor in the transmutation of the power structure into mental and cultural patterns. History shows that changes in the style of culture are closely linked with changes in the power structure." (SS: 55) Democratic planning then must recognize that:

> Democratic authority ... is not bound to any person as such. It is conferred only temporarily and conditionally upon certain individuals. But while the mythically sanctioned distantiation of persons is absent in democracy, the fundamental institutions do become 'distantiated.' They are elevated to symbolic dignity as myths. (ESOC: 218)

4.B.2 Increasing Interdependence and Collective Insecurity

"Increasing interdependence" is Mannheim's shorthand term for the fact that modern society, especially its economy, is more functionally interrelated than earlier "social orders." This increasing interdependence permits flexibility, but at a price. As compared to simpler societies, "irrational /and/ emotional shocks" convulse the modern system. As the society becomes more interrelated, the "more serious are the repercussions of even the slightest disturbance." Mannheim is thus surprised that the capitalist system has been able to "support such gigantic armies of the unemployed for many years."

Mannheim concentrates on collective insecurity in the 1935 portion of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction,

although he speaks of the "general insecurity of modern man" earlier. (E.g., I&U: 24) Collective insecurity has become "organized" in the modern world because of increasing interdependence. (MSR: 128) The concept presumes that one's security is tied to that of others. Unlike the Marxist view that the capitalist's security is gained at the expense of the workers, Mannheim believes that collective insecurity affects all members of the political economy. Thus, collective insecurity does not replace, but rather adds to, the insecurity of the labor-capital struggle. (MSR: 135) Economic insecurity is abetted by political insecurity. "Latent insecurity may be systematically exploited and manipulated by men in control." (FPDP: 72) As evidence he cites the fact that modern weapons do not discriminate among classes. He further argues that since under contemporary conditions irrationality often infuses political thinking, the likelihood of deployment of grossly destructive devices grows. Dictators as well as an isolated "democratic" military may pull the trigger.[18] (Cf. Mills, 1940, 1958)

Collective insecurity is both a social condition and socially caused. Mannheim underlines that insecurity is not based on uncertainty or the "unexpected and novel." (MSR: 182) Rather it is based on the possibility of certain danger. There are traditionally two reactions to "objective insecurity": "[e]ither society can teach the individual to

face risk and danger by heroic principles and training, or it can foster his passive inclination to submit to a higher and inscrutable will." (MSR: 240) The responses, flight or fight, are outmoded by new remedies, reconstruction and prevention, as social knowledge improves our understanding of the social causes of collective insecurity. Concomitantly, Mannheim restates the issue from the question of the best defenses to that of the best assurances. He abandons the stress on insecurity to address security. This reorientation substitutes the commonality of human needs and wants for the division between friend and foe. Thus he announces: "[i]t is very likely that the slogan of a future society will be 'security and justice first and foremost.'" (MSR: 347)

Because security is a basic human drive, Mannheim argues, a "minimum of security" for each and all must be considered to promote a better life and social responsibility. (Emphasis added; MSR: 317; cf. Hofstadter, 1955; 250) A "minimum of security" becomes a constant, not a means or an end. In this way Mannheim bypasses the problems other analysts face of how to deal with insecurity. (Cf. Hayek, 1944; SS: 35) To be a constant, democratic planning must encourage collective security. This principle implies that security be a major criterion in every policy decision.

This approach is profoundly different from one which sees the need for security, but treats it individually and

isolates it in sectoral programs designed to compensate for the insecurities bred by other policies. (Cf. Mencher) Collective security is the only way to guarantee the equality which reminds man of his humanity. Thus, at one point Mannheim suggests that even if annual national production were to decline, the entire product should be equitably divided among the whole population. (SS) This, of course, is contrary to modern practice. Nevertheless, it indicates one positive effect on Mannheim's naive understanding of political economy. Namely, rather than identifying a minimum, Mannheim argues that we must justly apportion whatever the annual social wealth is.[19]

Mannheim increasingly ties the need for collective security to the issue of control. In his last formulations, control is to be shared and exercised at all levels of society.

At first glance, the need for collective security would seem to contradict Mannheim's belief that planning requires an experimental attitude. But these ideas are quite distinct despite their interrelation. The experimental approach (which comes out of his concept of rationality) should never be abandoned, at least in the arena of political thinking. However, the application of thought to political actions must be limited. And, the criterion for restricted action is the principle of collective security. (Cf. Chapter 6)

Planning theory has roots in utopian thought. (Cf. Barnes, Hyams, Reiner) Yet, in contrast to the static certainty of utopian visions, Mannheim's democratic planning is predicated on dynamic uncertainty in thought and collectively secure experimentation in action. Only in such a way will development be proportional.

4.C. Social Patterns

> It has become clear that even the most careful study of individuals and masses produces a false picture when it neglects the total situation of the society in which they exist. (I&U, 1929: 124)

In the age of planning a number of social patterns coexist. Rather than question which analytic unit (e.g., class, mass) is most explanatory of contemporary conditions, Mannheim sought to relate each concept to the whole of society, and by implication to each other. In such a way he considers the value of each social formation for democratic planning. He also specifies the different pulls on individuals in a collectivizing society which exacerbate collective insecurity. However, most critically, he announces in this fashion the reason he cannot embrace socialism, at least socialism as defined by the end of class conflict.

"Institutions are nothing but forms of /social/ adjustment which have been fixed by tradition, and often reinforced by system, organization, material features and pos-

sessions." (SS: 10) Like other of his concepts, the idea, though not the specific form, of institutions, is neutral. Thus, examples are the profit motive and "warlike attitudes." (MSR: 123) The notion is a functional one. For example, in a capitalist society "institutions /include/ such things as pecuniary compensation for services and goods or the system of property ..." (FPDP: 187)

"Most of our value attitudes are bred by institutions ... /such as/ the Roman Catholic Church, the ... Nazi system, ... a professional organization, ... or ... an army." "/S/ocial organizations ... take the shape of institutions ... /hence/ the influence which churches, schools, universities, research institutes, press, radio, and all types of organized propaganda exert upon intellectual and cultural life." (MSR: 81) But, since "institutions after all, are nothing but fixed behavior patterns of interrelated individuals" and "require training for 'institutional behavior,'" they can be changed. "By manipulating these institutions we indirectly modify human behavior." (FPDP: 187) Hence, Mannheim's later concern for educational solutions. More importantly, this institutional view underlies the notion of planning as social reconstruction.

Mannheim's entire vision of democratic planning is predicated on the claim that "/e/xperience shows that Democracy cannot exist unless all its institutions are thoroughly oriented to democratic ends." (FPDP: 173)

This is because institutions are "general/ly/ interdependent." (MSR: 359) Institutions embody "values and standards." (May, 1977: 238) Since these values are not always clearly enunciated, they

> can only be studied with reference to their social antecedents -- that is to say their history and the whole situation of the group. Because of this organic character, values vary with the time, the group and the social class. Within the frame of these group values each individual may have a value system of his own which is a variation of the institutional values within his reach. (SS: 133)

Mannheim strongly believes that a traditional economics approach is too narrow excluding too many institutional ramifications. He illustrates his point: "... our system of monetary rewards is linked to the 'money mores,' a set of attitudes and habits ... /based on/ security, both natural and artificially induced. The distrust of leisure in the Victorian Age was linked to the capitalist compulsion to save and accumulate without end." (FPDP: 188) In this sense he is close to the so-called institutional economists, such as Veblen. "An institution is, after all, a prevalent habit of thought, and as such it is subject to the conditions and limitations that surround any change in the habitual frame of mind in the community. (Veblen: 34)

In contrast to institutions, the community is a "social group occupying a territorial area /with/ social coherence /based/ on common living." Overarching all social associations,[20] community is historistically defined. (SS: 114)

"We are born into community" and therefore, "cannot ask why communities exist ... anymore than we can ask why life exists." (SS: 115; emphasis added)

This view of community has several implications. It seems to deny the possibility of community membership to any who do not remain in the locale of their birth. Are the large number of contemporary migrants -- from rural to urban and urban to suburban settings, from city to city, or region to region, or neighborhood to neighborhood -- left with no possibility for community because it can't be created? No, Mannheim contends; it is only a matter of extending the "community" of birth to comprehend the region, the nation and ultimately the world. Thus, the new suburb is not properly a community, but rather an association. (See below) The community responsibility of the transplanted suburbanite is not then to the residential area in which he lives, but to a larger community which comprehends where he was born.[21] Mannheim's definition of community is also important as it provides the basis for defining a common interest among heterogeneous groups. There is always just one community, characteristically a widening one for each individual given migration.

Precisely because of his definition of community, associations, particularly classes, become operationally important in modern life. Associations are voluntarily entered and characterized at least by "like mindedness."

The totality of a society can only be explained in terms of both the fluid integrations [i.e., community] and the group consolidations [i.e., associations]. (SS: 108) Unlike community, associations are the "end-products" of "social forces." They are the consequence of "integrating" and "separating forces." (SS: 103) The continuum of social associations runs from the least structured, the crowd, to the most organized, institutionalized groups.[22] These social units are distinguished by several criteria including size, longevity, and the source (external or internal) of individual stimuli.

As early as 1929, Mannheim believes masses unstable in comparison to classes who have "long-range view[s]." (I&U: 131) In a mass, be it a crowd or public, individuals react to external stimuli and not to each other. Since the "whole personality" is not "involved," these associations are temporary. Unlike publics, crowds always exhibit physical proximity.

Masses may be unorganized or united around a leadership figure or "common end." The storming of the Bastille in revolutionary France exemplifies the latter. The "unorganized crowd" is potentially the most dangerous of social formations because it is part of a "process in which emotion increases[,] ... the capacity for reflection is lowered[,] ... [and in the absence of a 'common end'] nothing constructive can be done." (SS: 105) Nevertheless, even organized

masses can be destructive because the external stimuli to which they respond can be manipulated. The possibility and extent of manipulation (e.g., advertising or propaganda) increases as mass communications technologies develop.

Mannheim does not believe it possible to prevent mass formations -- whether spontaneous or engineered -- but proposes a way to reduce their frequency and impact. This objective is met not by dealing with masses qua masses, but by focusing on and developing other associations and individual sensibilities. The result of this approach is that members of the mass are able to appropriately "bracket"[23] their identifications.

> Every member of a society is in an ambiguous situation: as the member of a family or of a party he is influenced by certain definite types of motivation. Thus he has political attitudes, aesthetic attitudes, family feelings, sex attitudes, and so on. But if he becomes for a short time the member of a public in a real sense, he puts his traditionalised attitudes into brackets and lets himself be influenced by the impressions of the attitudes of a public. (SS: 108)

As is becoming apparent, Mannheim does not believe the "public" to be inherently a force of social progress. Instead, he implies that the "public" needs be defined in reference to the basic encompassing social organization, the community, and appreciate other social groupings (e.g., class). In this sense, his formulation is not far from Dewey's: the "public" must be organized. However, unlike Dewey's, Mannheim's scheme incorporates different levels of

social behavior. The effect of these views is seen in the difference between their concepts of the public interest(s). (Cf. Chapter 1)

Notice also, however, that both relate the public interest(s) to institutional development. Finally, where Dewey concentrates on two levels -- the individual and the public -- Mannheim further explores the mediating groups through which individuals act (and think) in modern political economies.

Members of organized groups interreact as well as react to external stimuli. Membership is voluntary, hence individual consciousness, if not substantial rationality, is implied. Specific characteristics of groups include (1) "a relative persistence," (2) a degree of "organization" of internal "fuctions" and "power," (3) "norms or standards" which direct the "activities" of group members, (4) "certain ideas about" how the group acts as a group and in relation to other groups, and (5) a "collective interest" in addition to "personal" interests of the group members.[24] Thus, groups create "situations" internally and externally. (SS: 110) (Cf. Chapter 7) Organized groups include "the family, the clan, the tribe, the neighborhood community, the church, the sect, the political party, the bureaucracy, and the state."[25] The cohesion of organized groups is maintained through personal and institutional means. However, as groups grow larger, the effectiveness of personal means

diminishes and "institutional attitudes" become more important. (SS: 111)

The state is the "frame-group" -- the principle which regulates the other groups -- of "our epoch" by virtue of being the "power organization which acquires the greatest control among existing groupings within a territory ... /and/ possess/es/ the monopoly of legitimate coercion." Because the state is checked by other states, it is unlikely that an international "frame-group" will emerge. Regardless of "legitimacy," without "coercive power" even the United Nations is limited. (SS: 118-9) Mannheim doubts that integrated international social power will ever be possible without external threats (say, from Mars) to force us to bind together.[26] In this definition, Mannheim reiterates the point that power is increasingly organized. (Cf. Chapters 1 and 6) By implication, the growing organization of power allows planning but also raises the problem of how to control planning.

Mannheim cannot conceive of a power void. The uses of power depend on how one sees the state. (Cf. ESSP: 181) Mannheim prefers the organic model of the state, not in the Aristotelian sense of the polis as human, but in the Gestaltian sense where "the melody is entirely different from the sum of single notes."[27] (ESSP: 178) The contract theory of Hobbes and others is too mechanistic. (ESSP: 170) Instead "the whole /must be seen/ as an organism of freedom. (ESSP:

173) In many ways Mannheim is trying to update and improve upon Rousseau.

> ... [T]he vital question is whether the state, as a controlling and co-ordinating agency can itself be controlled: that is, whether the principle of planning can be reconciled with freedom and democracy. The history of parliamentarianism is in this respect the history of the control of control. From our standpoint the history of government must be re-interpreted as the history of a special social technique by which the control of human beings is subjected once more to human control. (MSR: 326)

For this reason Mannheim emphasizes internal rather than international relations; education becomes critical for directing power; and issues of social democracy take priority over individuation. (Cf. Carr, 1948: 5-19; ESSP: 171)

Because the state is a "frame-group" Mannheim's idea of democratic planning pertains to national planning. However, the state is also an association and therefore mutable. The state simply provides the largest context of power in which democratic planning is to be undertaken. But, Mannheim argues, the state and its bureaucracy are not the only levels on which power is exercised.[28] Since frame-groups require stability to be effective, in times of turbulence other organizations of power, especially classes, gain importance.

"Class itself is more a layer than a group." A layer incorporates people "who ... have a chance to similar

experiences and may also have similar response patterns in certain fields." (SS: 120) Though a "generation" is a layer it "does not form a class because the similarities /of experiences/ are not fundamental and consequently do not become integrated." (Cf. Section 4.D.; Chapter 5) Or,

> /I/f the layer is formed by people who can be characterised by chances of similar experiences, then class is the sum of people who find themselves in the same position concerning their fate in society ... /A class is/ integrated /when its members are/ unified ... by a consciousness ... /which/ understand/s/ the awareness of the similarity of social changes, the arising of a notion about similarity of interests, the growth of an emotional tie connected with this similarity of experiences and a common striving towards a common social goal.

This common striving is based on a "compound of ideal and material interests." (SS: 121; emphasis added) Classes also use organized groups, especially political parties to further their interests. (SS: 122)

Mannheim denounces the "descriptive" definitions of class, including "purely statistical groups," in favor of functional ones which indicate how power is distributed in the society. Class thus explains "one's place in the social order." (SS: 140, 114)

Mannheim draws on the class analysis of Marx and Max Weber but concludes differently because times have changed.

> ... /D/ifferent social classes have quite different outlooks, and ... the mental qualities of a class can to a very large extent be derived from its position in

> the economic process of production. Accordingly the interest which a group has in the progress of further industrialization and in technical rationalization is vital in the present situation. Certain classes and groups depend for their existence on the growth of industrialization and the creation of large-scale productive units. Their economic position nourishes in them a sympathy for technical rationality and for the further development of man's rational capacities and humanistic spirit. It is clear that the proletariat which owes its existence to industrialization, the technical invention of the large factory, and the rationalization of certain social relations, will be unconsciously inclined to push social development in this direction ... The petty entrepreneurs, who direct their own tiny individual economic units, the small shopkeeper and the artisan, whose enemies are technical invention and large-scale production, have a quite different attitude towards further industrialization and rationalization. To maintain their independence they must destroy the big concerns, the great factories, and the department stores. If they were to have things their own way, technical rationalization would be brought to a standstill. (MSR: 104-5)

Mannheim does not restrict the concept of class to capitalist society, in contrast to many thinkers (e.g., Birnbaum, Giddens, Rex, Runciman) Nor does he reserve it only for industrial situations (cf. Bottomore, Dahrendorf). Nor does he consider elites an alternative analytic concept. (Cf. Bottomore; Michels; Mills; Pareto, 1956)

Class, as an organization of social power, is most significant because of the inherent comparison with others. Since institutions of power change from culture to culture, Mannheim argues, it is not sufficient to define class by property or control alone.[29]

Mannheim refutes Marx' claim that class is the only source of social identity, but asserts that all individuals' social identities are at least class-based. One cannot avoid class anymore than one can avoid community. But just as community can be expanded, the parameters of class definitions can be altered.

Thus, the types of classes vary from culture to culture and over time even though "every social order" appears to distin/guish/ between higher and lower" classes. (SS: 140-1) In addition to Marx' economic classes -- the proletariat and bourgeoisie -- Mannheim identifies other functional classes including intermediate (or middle) classes, commanding and executing classes, mixed classes (such as "white-collar workers"), "declasse groups" (such as "beggars" and "vagrants"), the relatively classless intellectuals, and the ruling class. (Cf. SS: 141)

As the institutions of power can change, "there are no absolute class antagonisms." In fact, "classes which in one configuration seem to be irreconcilable may march together in another situation." (MSR: 342) Nevertheless, class divisions will reemerge.

> Thus the problem of the struggle for power remains, class conflicts are still important, but the concrete patterns they produce are much too changeable to be accepted as the external framework of future events. In contrast with them the themes created by the transformation of laissez-faire into planning, the advent of mass society, and the growing significance

> of social technique are bound to endure. One cannot think of the future without assuming their existence, whereas no one can predict which class pattern, which form of planning will prevail. (MSR: 251)

Where Marx emphasizes the economic, and Weber the political, Mannheim attempts to combine the two into a sociological analysis where the issue of "mediation (Vermittlung)" and the development of class consciousness are critical.

> ... /I/t is only possible to understand the real extent of sociological influence on civilization as a whole if we call attention also to the psychological effects of the elementary social processes. It is not only the economic framework of society which is reflected in the vicissitudes of the human mind, but changes in the other surroundings, wide and narrow, in which men struggle or cooperate. How and where and why people meet, how power and influence, risk and responsibility are distributed, whether men act spontaneously or under orders, taken individually and collectively, decide what is said, how it is said, what is consciously suppressed, or repressed into the unconscious, and within what limits the dictates of public morality are regarded as binding for all or as valid only within certain groups. (MSR: 20)

Mannheim does not wish to deny class distinctions because to do so is to hide the distribution of power. He points to the role of the ruling class. For example, in Soviet Russia, he observes, putative classlessness coexists with a ruling class. Again, he sees a ruling class lurking behind the masses in Nazi Germany. Mannheim implies by these examples that powerlessness is a myth. To abdicate one's power is the height of irrationality.

Class consciousness is thus essential to democracy because

> There are times when the evolutionary course fails for the time being and crises become acute. Class relations and class stratification become strained and distorted. The class-consciousness of the conflicting groups becomes confused. In such periods it is easy for transitory formations to emerge, and the mass comes into existence, individuals having lost or forgotten their class orientations. At such moments a dictatorship becomes possible. (I&U: 143)

Classes are vital to democratic planning because "[i]n modern mature democracy solidarity is not automatic; it must be realized anew all the time through conflict and stress." (ESOC: 194) Remember, too, that Mannheim's concept of rationality depends on a class competition as much as it does classless intellectuals. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 5)

But what class structure is Mannheim proposing for democratic planning? Mannheim only specifies the criteria:

(1) All people must learn to identify with the class structure including the classless intellectuals and the declasse groups;

(2) extreme class differences need be minimized to avoid class warfare. In this case economic factors are highlighted as he calls for a more even distribution of income and collective control of wealth and resources (SS: 96; FPDP: 125; MSR: 181; SS: 137ff);

(3) "open classes" must be promoted by reducing "economic and educational""barriers"[30] (SS: 140; cf. I&U: 115); and

(4) class, though a primary political organization, must be redefined to not preclude, but rather encourage, group associations, awareness of global community, and individual development.

The implications are significant. Following Max Weber, Mannheim accents the "communal" function of classes. He implies that a class structure, reflecting the uneven distribution of power acts as a mechanism for prodding the majority out of passivity. Thus, a class structure keeps the issue of power -- its uses and abuses -- in the forefront at all times.

Mannheim's ideal class structure then becomes not the provocation for social change but rather the mechanism for controlling social change.

Mannheim's thoughts on class would seem to add confusion to an already controversial concept. However, I believe his larger intentions help clarify this discussion. Mannheim develops the theory of democratic planning as a remedy for capitalists who wish to avoid class warfare and/or dictatorships and as an alternative to socialists who despair of the outcome of the Soviet experiment and/or are concerned by the limited development of revolutionary class consciousness. In his own words, Mannheim is seeking a "middle way" in which classes can productively and humanely coexist within a democratic community.

His approach is both inspired and frustrating. It contributes by addressing a dilemma Marx did not foresee.

> ... the search for the elimination of exploitation comes into blunt opposition to the endeavor to rationalise social organisation through the conscious direction of social and economic life. The dilemmas inherent in this antagonism are not resolved in Marxian theory, nor ... in the practical development of the advanced societies since the close of the nineteenth century. The contradiction which Marx identified in capitalism is itself contradictory! ... In capitalist society, the class system continues to constitute the fundamental axis of the social structure, and remains the main channel of relationships of exploitative domination. The state socialist societies, on the other hand, have genuinely succeeded in moving towards a classless order, but only at the cost of creating a system of political domination which has altered the character of social exploitation rather than necessarily diminishing it. The challenge ... is to explore the limits of the opposition between rationalisation in each of its aspects, and then to attempt to build a new reconciliation between them. (Giddens, 1973: 294)

Having identified a major difficulty in class analysis, Mannheim, however, does not suggest a tactical way of resolving it. Instead, he presumes that by improving consciousness, social reform will follow. His strategy also ensues from this presumption. Interrelations between elites and classes must be redefined. (See Section 5.B.) The absence of concrete explanations of how the proposed relationships are to come about troubles his reviewers.[31]

Nevertheless, his theory of democratic planning builds on this class analysis and also seeks to reinforce classes,

albeit with minimized differentials in power. Instead of explaining the difference between a "ruling class" and governing elites, Mannheim turns to who the planners should be and how they will operate. (See Chapter 5) Instead of formulating a group theory of social change, Mannheim focuses on the individual as he exists in generations. (See Section 4.D.) In other words, Mannheim does not consider how to make the possibilities of democratic planning probabilities. He does not offer formulas for progressive reform. (Cf. Gorz, Lenin, Marx) He only provides guides for social action. Structurally, these guides recognize that institutional power is modified by the interaction of classes and associations within a community context. Not the presence of multiple groups, as in pluralism, but the consciousness of class and community are pivotal to exploiting the possibilities of democratic planning. (Cf. Bachrach) Class, by defining the temporal dimension in the distribution of power, and community, by measuring the spatial purview of organizing power, are vital to promoting conflict and consensus in redirecting the political trends toward democratic planning. They provide the necessary matrix for democratic choice and control. In short, democratic planning entails the extension of consciousness of both community and class for the long-run service of humanity. (Cf. DOOT: 102) They are the fundamental mechanisms through which individual needs and wants must be mediated.

4.D. Competition and Cooperation: More Social Patterns

Competition and cooperation are the two primary social forces to affect common goals.[32] Both, Mannheim admits, also can be seen as "organizing principles" which define the character of a society: hence, capitalism and socialism. It is because of this ambiguity between organizing principle and social force, Mannheim argues, that competition is maligned.[33] Consistent with his devaluation of economic factors, Mannheim ignores the capitalist/socialist debate and instead concentrates on the functional aspects of competition and cooperation going well beyond traditional economic definitions.[34]

Competition, "a general category of social life," means that "the common end /'of any kind of race' is/ ... to try to reach the goal first." Sometimes the goal can only be attained by one of the competitors, as when "two men wish to marry the same woman." In other cases, several contenders may gain something. Competition does not ensure that a goal is reached, only that it is approximated. (For instance, "two different scientific schools /may/ attempt to solve the same problem" and only succeed in further clarifying it.) (Cf. Dahl and Lindblom, 1953)

The English homonym, concurrence, of the German word for competition, Konkurrenz, suggests integration. "Compete" from the French and Latin means "to fall together, coincide, come together, be convenient or fitting, be due." (Oxford

English Dictionary, vol. I: 490) Thus, competition is not opposition to others, struggle (or Kampf).[35] Similarly, Mannheim distinguishes conflict from competition to the extent that the former entails "physical violence." (Cf. Parsons, 1947: 132) Neither does Mannheim equate competition with a means of distribution or exchange. (Cf. Parsons, 1947: 181-202) Rather competition is a "secondary mechanism" which might be used to expand the "common good" by encouraging "pioneer adventure and initiative." (FPDP: 196-7, 124) Yet, the degree of competition within any culture is determined by the array of power. Behind the cloak of competition, capitalist societies "determine when /power whose 'ultima ratio' is 'violence'/ is to appear and what forms it is to take." (MSR: 65)

Therefore, competition as a selection process varies according to the situation and does not "always ... select those who are best according to an absolute standard of worth." Even when benignly adopted, competition too often underrates "objective abilities" in favor of "social abilities."[36] This may be one of the chief reasons Mannheim conceives of planners as intellectuals and not politicians.

Competition is but one way to discharge the social function of selection, "especially of assigning to each a place in the social system." A planned society might substitute other criteria, including "inheritance," "seniority," and "the measurement of ability by ... graded tests."[37] (SS: 77)

The "intensity of competition" is measured by the "amount of activity associated with the selection process" and "varies with the degree of personal liberty, with the rate of social change, and inversely with the nature of the selective agents." (SS: 78)

There is a difference between individual and group competition.

> Group competition creates out-group antagonism but in-group cooperation ... A society that reduces the number of individual competitive efforts and replaces them by group competition undoubtedly stimulates sympathetic emotions and provides more opportunities for democratic agreement. Of course, this does not hold if greater group solidarity is bought at the price of greater out-group hostility. This effect might be overcome if smaller competing groups on some occasions had to cooperate in competition against larger units, thereby learning to expand group loyalty. (FPDP: 192-3)

Thus, competition may have negative and positive consequences simultaneously.

> Competition heightens the versatility, the plasticity and the mobility of the individuals who take part in it. It is, in most cases, connected with social mobility. Only if I can move towards the best possible result is competition able to evolve its social potentialities. However, individual competition is an agency which tends to disintegrate group solidarity ... Psychological competition /moreover/ tends to create inferiority feelings. /In come cases these/ feelings ... create new incentives and lead to reorganization of the human personality; /in others, particularly when they are "excessive," these feelings/ ... paralyse ... the individual. (SS: 79)

And, even when the inferiority feelings are "manageable" they can lead to "discreditable methods" such as "handicap/ping/ our competitors," "denigrat/ing/ the ideas or personalities of competitors," and "scapegoat/ing/." (SS: 80)

For these reasons competition should be adopted as a social force within strict limits determined by a sense of "fair play." (SS: 80-1; cf. Rawls) Underlining the possible "dangers of socially uncontrolled competition," Mannheim quotes Davis and Barnes:

> Perhaps the greatest objection to the profit motive is that it destroys higher values. There is a sort of Gresham's Law for motivation and for social standards. The worst competitor may drag down the good to his own level or force him to bankruptcy. For example, if southern mills use child labour, northern mills claim they cannot do without it ... We will have to face the necessity of revolutionising the incentives of our business life away from profits and towards the service of all. (SS: 82)

Fair play may be buttressed by "set/ting/ up institutions which might be independent of the competitors and are empowered to control their behavior ... /such as/ courts, administrative boards, professional councils, arbitration committees" but it cannot be assumed that these organizations alone would fully regulate competition.

In fact, extensive competition may transform itself into "its opposite," "monopoly." Citing the history of guilds, Mannheim concludes that as the number of contestants in competition increases, a "closed group" develops out of the

"open group." This group not only prevents access of others to their membership, but more significantly it develops a different "mentality." Although an "esprit de corps" may arise, more likely "members of a closed group tend to become narrow-minded, and ... intolerant and hostile to anything which does not fit into the framework of their prejudices." (SS: 82-3)

Competition among equals can "foster[ ] independence and self-reliance." But in the corporate economy competition among unequals prevails. Equal competition requires a rather even distribution of risk. "Corporate enterprise ... however, has great stability and transfers major risks to government." "Competition among unequals always has a demoralizing effect" even if ameliorative efforts (such as government programs for victims of competition) are promulgated. (FPDP: 194) The "liability of misplaced equalitarianism" suggests that competition be adopted only for true equals and then only when it "seems to promise best results." "An excessively competitive society" "creates an unfriendly society of men seeking fulfillment like robots in a meglomaniac achievement ... that ... can lead to the Nazi type of destructive efficiency." "Competition among equals" spurs "individualization and the will to freedom," but cooperative ventures also promote "initiative and individual responsibility." (FPDP: 196)

The choice between adopting competition or cooperation is determined by the desirable use of power. "We should

admit competition in all fields where, as in science, competitive stimulation has unlimited opportunities without leading to accumulation of power." (FPDP: 195) Competition is compatible with democracy when, like Bronowski's scientific spirit, it maintains "a constant tension between dissent and respect; between independence from the view of others and a tolerance for them ... /when it/ fuse/s/ ... private and ... public needs." 38 (Bronowski, 1965: 62-3)

To repeat this critical point: Competition, especially in the promotion of knowledge, can further democracy, but only if "we should jealously watch unlimited growth of rewards in the economic and social spheres." (FPDP: 196)

> Whereas competition is a force which compels people to act against one another, co-operation is an integrating activity. Like-mindedness, sympathy, mutual helpfulness are the most important integrating forces. Like-mindedness alone does not integrate people for a long period. If you want to stabilise the integration you must have a common external purpose. (SS: 89)

Cooperation, as opposed to competition, Mannheim infers, is more difficult to attain because it requires internal compatability, and more difficult to maintain because it is not inherently predicated on a common goal. Giving many examples of cooperation as a defensive activity, including the development of modern trade unions, Mannheim is struck by the fact that <u>apparently</u> "cooperation cannot be effected without some kind of compulsion." (SS: 89, 91; cf. Brooks, Emerson, Raybeck, Suttles) "Spontaneous readi-

ness to give mutual aid ... works better in hard times than in easy times." This is why the "lower social classes" are "generally" more in favour of mutual aid than the middle or upper classes. (SS: 92; cf. Schiller) Although he avers that compulsion is relatively ineffective for constructive individual change, Mannheim's basic argument for democratic planning rests on a social compulsion to avoid dictatorial chaos and totalitarianism. (Cf. Section 4.E.)

Size also limits cooperation. City life rarely fosters cooperation because the population is too large and "differentiated." "The voluntary method of taking care of common needs ... /requires that/ members know each other personally and /be able/ to act readily in concert." (SS: 93) (Mannheim amends this view as he observes the enormous cooperative efforts during World War II.)

Though he tends to correlate economic cooperation with primitive societies, he notes that, historically, large-scale cooperation, as a form of the division of labor, has been used to control nature -- as in the river developments of the Nile, Euphrates, and Ganges -- and to "construct/ / ... public works."[39]

Cooperation -- or, "collaboration" and "collectivism" -- in the division of labor may be "based upon a division of functions ... or professions." (SS: 93) Different cultures adopt different standards. For example, functional cooperation may coexist with an uneven distribution of power. "/T/he social valuation of work does not coincide with its

usefulness to the community, but hinges more upon the power structure of that society and on the fact that some functions are reserved for the ruling groups and others are allotted to the subjected ones." (SS: 96) Thus, Mannheim concludes, cooperation is not inherently democratic. The importance of this insight cannot be underestimated.

Neither competition nor cooperation is inherently bad or good. Both forces can be effective. Either can fail.

Because cooperation and competition interrelate functions each is found in the increasingly complex division of labor. But since all societies, without or with "exchange," have a division of labor the major issue remains who controls for what purpose.

Because competition and cooperation foster different personality traits, the adoption of one social force over the other "should" be predicated "on the merits of the given case." (FPDP: 191) For example, the competitive approach makes people more "self-centered" at the same time that it promotes "individualization." (FPDP: 188) Nevertheless, "self-centeredness and self-assertion can find other outlets besides those of appropriation, exploitation, and domination." (FPDP: 189)

Mannheim emphasizes competition over cooperation in his writings prior to World War II. Thereafter, the accent is placed on cooperation. Why? Several reasons come together simultaneously. The dissolution of Weimar Germany seems to have shaken his faith in competition. Similarly, he was

awed by the strength, breadth, and depth of Allied wartime cooperative efforts. Second, Mannheim became more economically sophisticated in his later years. Recognizing the immense control of corporations and certain governmental units (like the military), he concludes competition among equals is less and less possible in many spheres. The term "mixed economy" (but not "socialism") is more frequently espoused in each subsequent publication. Increasingly, he realizes competition as an "organizing principle" overshadows competition as a "social force."

> The educational impact on the individual of monetary rewards and artificial scarcity is intensified by another mechanism, that of competition. Its power of personality formation is even more radical than that of pecuniary incentives ... The growth of the competitive urge may work itself out no less ruthlessly in economics than in politics. Both, unrestrained economic and political struggles, may destroy the community. (FPDP: 188, 192)

Yet some competition must continue because of its importance in encouraging greater substantial rationality. (Cf. Chapter 3) Even the "Soviet Union," he observes, "has introduced 'socialist competition' ... in work and education." (FPDP: 191) Therefore, he concludes:

> In the envisioned mixed society the planner will introduce competition or cooperation as social mechanisms in those areas where their educational effect seems to be desirable ... How much of this should be maintained in a society planning for freedom is open to question ... /but n/ot even a fully planned society is committed to place a premium on cooperation in all spheres of activities. (FPDP: 191-2)

4.E. Social Change

Mannheim observes a basic "desire on man's part to change things." (Bastide, 1971) Thus, flux is a natural consequence in human society. However, with growing interdependence, flux leads to drift unless intervening forces push for reform. Interdependence also accounts for the "accelerated pace of social change characteristic of our time." (ESOK: 287) In other words, social transformations occur by design and default. The multiplicity of attempts to "change things" persistently reconstructs the social world. The problem of social change is not whether or not it will occur, but to what extent, for what purposes it is directed.

Historically, Mannheim contends, critical generations account for reformist social change. What are "critical generations"? Somewhat analogous to movements, "critical generations" are groups, largely populated with younger people, who rebel against received values. Thus, they are not defined biologically, but in terms of "social factors." (ESOK: 284)

He begins by looking at the two dimensions of intergenerational cohesion. The conjunction of time and space "create potentialities" for "generation status" which are further specified by a common "historical and cultural" setting. A generation becomes an "actuality" "only where a concrete bond between members" "expose/s/" the "social and

intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization." The "generation unit" emerges when some "work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways." (ESOK: 302-4)

Social change occurs when generation units conflict with the status quo. (Cf. Chapter 3) Thus, a young group of peasants, if following the patterns of their parents, do not constitute a generation unit because there is no new "identity of responses." (ESOK: 306) Yet, peasants migrating to urban areas might be a generation unit. Emerging generations absorb isolated members of previous generations. (ESOK: 308) The extent to which they do so, in part, determines the magnitude of social change. Most importantly, "not every generation location -- not even every age-group -- creates new collective impulses and formative principles original to itself and adequate to its particular situation."[40] The emergence of a "new generation style" then is not a biological fact with social implications, but rather entirely a social fact. (ESOK: 311-23)

Generation units may be "leading, diverted, and suppressed"[41] according to their relation to the dominant social thinking of the time and their ability to attract "intermediary" generations[42] and "socially unattached individuals." (ESOK: 316-18) The generational stratification which thereby arises is one of the "factors impinging upon the social process." Generation is an underlying principle in Mannheim's conceptions of class consciousness

and the appropriate roles for intellectuals. (Cf. Section 4.C. and Chapter 5)

In the age of planning, generations tend to be overshadowed by masses. Because of this, Mannheim develops his concept of the intellectuals' role in the democratically planned society to encourage the formation of generation units, and the coalescing individuals, around generational issues.

Humans, like animals, make adjustments to "new situation[s]." Unlike animals, humans rarely behave instinctually. Rather they tend to make adjustments on the basis of habits, learned from their own experience or in imitation of others. One person's (or group's) adjustment to a new situation can have a rippling effect by creating new developments to which others need readjust. Such change through adjustment is primarily reactive, not purposive, even when it is widespread.

Social change is a particular category of change characterized by the restructuring of all major institutions of the society. It infers new directions, but not necessarily shared control. Institutional change may come about through dictators' propaganda efforts or from pressures from the lower classes or from unquestioned technological developments. But the driving force of social change is the "psychic energy" of individuals.

Mannheim's socio-psychological explanation is an outgrowth of his understanding of Marxian class struggle. He

sought to update class consciousness by infusing it with his knowledge of Freudian psychoanalysis[43] and his reading in the infant field of social psychology.[44]

Mannheim begins with Marx because he offers a "consistent" theory of social change. Acknowledging the importance of "economic production," Mannheim includes other "techniques" such as "improvements in military" technology and "propaganda" as pivotal factors. To Marx' definition of class he adds the "reality" of a "new middle class ... consist/ing/ of technicians, white-collared groups, professional groups, those engaged in the marketing and distributive system, small business men, small investors, the housewives, the people with annuities and small founded incomes." These people cannot be underestimated, Mannheim believes, because "/o/ne of the reasons for the rise of Fascism is that the Italian and German working class parties alienated these groups by not realising their special psychology and lacking a constructive scheme which would have provided them with an active function in their movement." (SS: 144) History shows that "the formation of consciousness of the general interest of the class is slow and intermittent" and "that economic interests ... /are/ overshadowed from time to time by cultural, religious and ethnic factors ... /including/ nationalism." (SS: 145)

He concludes, "Everybody is guided by a set of various motivations, and it depends ... on the situation which comes

to the fore." Class struggles, then, are "not the only form of transformation of societies."

"Adjustments" made by myriad individuals in the course of their daily lives erode older institutions. The re-creation of institutions requires redirecting "psychic energy." "Emotions are needed only when institutions are lacking. The breaking of an old habit and the establishing of a new one needs emotion -- that is the social function of emotion." (SS: 26) Therefore, "The great problem for the sociologist today is to find ways in which to use these energies in a socially valuable way ..." (SS: 27-8) New habits must be developed to "fit" "new conditions" without being "rigid." (SS: 12; cf. MSR: 39) The problem of democracy is, then, to create and constantly recreate itself. Unless conscious efforts with reference to democratic purposes are made, democracy is likely to be de-stabilized. (Cf. Section 5.B.)

Habit formation requires carrots and sticks but, Mannheim claims, "the better a social organism works, the less repression it needs." (SS: 17-18)[45] In other words, "compulsion gives poor results."[46] (SS: 39) Thus, sublimation -- the rational guidance of unconscious needs -- should be pursued as much as possible.[47] Democratic planning requires that: "... psychological substitutes for vanishing gratifications would have to be foreseen by the decision-making groups of society and controlled in the same way as the purely material changes." (FPDP: 188)

Mannheim, relying on W.I. Thomas's findings, identifies four basic human motivations: "the desire for a new experience, the desire for security, the desire for response, and the desire for recognition ..." (SS: 34ff) Each leads to good and bad consequences in practice. But, each can be attenuated, and one or two can be downplayed.[48]

Thus, cultural incentives and institutional changes can discourage humanly harmful expressions of these wishes. For example, it is possible to "substitute for monetary rewards to satisfy the need for recognition." (FPDP: 188)

Not accidentally, Mannheim refers to the constellation of human motivations as man's "psychic equipment." (SS: 7; cf. DOOT) He is convinced that a theory of social change, i.e., "politics," is "/in/adequate" without an understanding of psychological imputation. Yet, there are limits to a psychological explanation because "it tends to cut out the social factors, such as the development of institutions and of the technical apparatus of society and it neglects economic pressures and the needs and influences arising from strategic and military factors to which a society is exposed." (SS: 33)

In brief, the task for progressive social change is to make the unconscious conscious and then rationally direct and control "psychic energies."

Mannheim infers that democratic reconstructive social change is impossible unless personally understood -- rationally and emotionally. (Cf. McWilliams, 1969) This conclu-

sion foreshadows the importance of education under democratic planning. (See Chapter 5) It also explains why Mannheim distrusts large "agglomerations" of people (e.g., masses) and in his last work seeks to enhance primary group contacts. (See Chapter 7) Industrial and urban substitutes for the small group interaction of town life must be found. Democracy requires integrated development, not "disporportionate evolution" where "[i]n consequence of a lack of contacts with others, the individual or group does not know of the evolution of other persons or social units." (SS: 56) Democratic planning intends that the different scales of human interactions are bridged in time and space.

The antonym of constructive social change is not paralysis. Indeed, changes are incessant and the rate of change seems to be increasing. Looking back from 1940 Mannheim announces:

> ... more structural changes have taken place in a decade than in the whole century preceding it, more psychological incentives are produced each week than in years of former life, and the man in the street experiences a greater tension between adjoining worlds than was felt perhaps by the Christian knights who first went East on the crusades. (MSR: 254)

The velocity and multitude of changes not only disorient the individual but obscure the directions of social movement. Constant flux does not determine, but does abet, manipulation. Only democratic planning overcomes drift. Individual and social needs must be constantly reassessed as new environ-

ments unfold. Transitional periods must be made supportive of longer-range democratic goals.

Mannheim believes both the Marxist and capitalist views of social change are too mindless. Inexorable historical progress and the "invisible hand"[49] forgive human irresponsibility too quickly. Weimar Germany, with all its "democratic" promise, ended in horrific human destruction. Therefore, change must be monitored consistently and redirected when necessary. Or reversing Keynes, Mannheim seems to be saying, "in the short run we may all be dead!"[50]

Mannheim is not a mechanical social tinker. Social change involves the redefinition of culture. Democratically planned social change entails a reorientation of individual adjustments towards humane and collective reconstruction. It is never a sure process, but attempts must be made. Or in the more eloquent words of T.S. Eliot, Mannheim's friend:

> Indeed, the one thing that time is ever sure to bring about is the loss /of culture/: gain or compensation is almost always conceivable but never certain ... /O/ne of the features of development ... is the appearance of scepticism /--/ ... the habit of examining evidence and the capacity for delayed decision. Scepticism is a highly civilized trait, though, when it declines into pyrrhonism, it is one of which civilization can die ... for we need not only the strength to defer a decision, but the strength to make one. (Eliot, 1975: 293, 296; some emphasis added)

Perhaps the most crucial implication of Mannheim's idea of social change is the impracticability of marginal reforms. Mannheim is decidedly reformist, but argues for large-scale

reforms. He is not convinced that "the principle of cumulation" works. (Cf. Myrdal, 1944: 1065-7) Surely, changes in everyday behavior matter, but they need be informed by and inform a larger and longer view. (Cf. Baran, Gorz)

4.G. Conclusion: Democratic Planning is Possible

In this chapter, which is based on Mannheim's first writings on planning, the theme of the individual's place in a collectivizing society predominates. Three basic conclusions are reached. There is no single structural arrangement which ensures a democratic relationship between the individual and the collectivized society. However, two social forms (i.e., class, community) are necessary to democracy, while others may actually hinder democracy (e.g., mass).

Second, democracy can only be measured in terms of sequential changes. And since humans innately desire change and changes in an interdependent world create other changes, democratic social change is only likely when democratic purposes are explicitly built into adapting institutions. In short, there is no single social process which ensures a democratic relationship between the individual and the collectivized society.

Third, because individual demands for democratization have arisen concurrently with the concentrating political-economic power, disproportion tends to mark contemporary

development. Consequently, the major task for democratic planning is to continuously reconstruct society in a way which both enhances primary relationships and promotes collectively constructive efforts.

This chapter also discusses the implications of cooperation and competition, the basic forms of organizing individuals in a collectivizing society.

Competition and cooperation have been the focus of many planning debates. Capitalists who accede to the idea of planning generally call for "planning for competition." (E.g., Rostow, 1959; Hayek, 1944; Etzioni, 1968; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953) Those who favor socialism tend to stress planning for cooperation. (E.g., Baran, 1969; Crosland, 1956; Sinclair, 1936) Only very recently has the proposal for a mixture of cooperation and competition been seriously considered. (Cf. Stauber, 1978; Harrington, 1978; Dahl and Lindblom, 1976) The sensible point made by Mannheim is that to confuse democratic planning with the second order question of how to organize particular functions in society distracts from the question of purposes. If predetermined, the organizational form of social action (cooperation or competition) precludes serious political choice which should be made repeatedly by those who will be affected in light of the conditions of particular times.

The major negative consequences of inevitable planning and democratization are disproportionate development and collective insecurity. These political trends are problems

because they are not guided by rationality and democratic control. But rationality and democratic control can be engendered by greater consciousness of community and class and by recognition that social change can be directed humanely.

Democratic planning is possible, but its promulgation and sustenance requires that understanding of political trends, social patterns and social change be individually accessible and at the same time that individuals be able to broaden their perspectives through class and community.

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 4

1
Hitler came to power in a "democratic" manner. That is, the elected Chancellor appointed him when ill health forced his retirement.

2
See Chapter 3 and Appendix E. Mannheim, though early intrigued by phenomenology, deemphasizes the approach as he realizes that the "intuitive" only applies to those wholes which are accessible through hearing or seeing. (MSR: 184)

3
Thus, where he "dedicated" the German edition of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction to "My Masters and Pupils in Germany," he addressed the English edition to those who still live "in an illusion of traditional stability" and have "not experienced the tremendous changes of an age of transformation."

4
Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction is in many ways a transitional work -- from Germany to England, from how men think to how men plan, from sociology and historicism to a psychology which is "socially and historically relevant."

5
The idea of democracy, for Mannheim, is not modern; yet it changes forms over time. Thus, he maintains, "custom is really democratic and totalitarian," simultaneously, in primitive societies. (SS: 126) From this perspective, "planned order" means a decided plan for everyone in an integrated society. (Cf. Berman, 1972; Rousseau)

6
Cf. note 5 above. Mannheim is not alone in this view although he states it with less negative connotation than others. Carr, for example, asserts that "the age of individualism" "stands in history as an oasis between two totalitarianisms... the medieval church and empire and" Soviet Russia. (Carr, 1948: 109) Mannheim also appears to have had in mind feudal Europe, but with a twist; he thinks local authorities were relatively independent of larger institutions.

7
Mannheim adopts a functional method to analyze this "age of planning." He first looks for those functions which exist in all culturesat all times. This is a starting point to overcome the lack of "consensus" of "evaluation." (I&U: 23) His functionalism is anthropological stressing development rather than stability. As a historicist he

seeks to discern a structure by asking how certain organizing principles predominate at particular times in specific cultures. As a sociologist he specifies the links between structure and functions and then clarifies options. Particular attention is placed on the definitions of social units and forces.

Mannheim's functionalism is decidedly cross-cultural (not only from place to place, but also from time to time). Spiro points out thatfunctions may refer to "purpose" or "consequences" of "institutions." (Spiro, 1970: 284-5) Mannheim tends to accent functions of purpose over those of consequences. Because of this Mannheim emphasizes socio-psychological substitutes rather than structural-functional equivalents. Mannheim's implicit functionalism thus proceeds from an assumption that humans create their society. Therefore, if men become conscious of their choices, they can direct their collective life. Social guidance requires awareness of the larger implications of certain functions (e.g., competition) as well as articulation of goals.

Mannheim cannot conceive of dysfunction because he does not assume an inevitable social structure. (Cf. Merton, 1957: 53) Misfunction in the sense of a particular method failing to attain a given goal, nevertheless, is possible in his scheme. For Mannheim as for the cultural relativists "functions" does not carry normative overtones. Unfortunately, this approach may be more useful in discovering the mixed metaphors of modern social explanation than in providing "correct" interpretations of purpose. (Cf. Barthes) In any case, the legacy of the sociology of knowledge is apparent.

8
Carr makes a similar diagnosis. (Carr, 1948: 112)

9
Although used only once, Mannheim anticipates the language of later thinkers. (Cf. Leo Marx, 1970; Chapter 8) He borrowed the concept from biology in 1936 and urged us to think of the "social situation" as a "closed system." (MSR: 175) The idea of a "closed system" usually infers an equilibrium theory. Yet, Mannheim distinctly opposes equilibrium theory because it "close[s]" out too many emerging social "dimensions." (MSR: 153) He rather means by "closed system" that we need mold hour human environment to appreciate our humanity. He remains unconvinced by Talcott Parsons' The Structure of Social Action (1937). (MSR: 52, n. 1; 177, n. 1) What Mannheim means by "closed system" becomes more apparent in his discussion of the "common interest" and especially in his arguments for disarmament.

10
Mannheim credits W. Pinder, an art historian, with this insight. (MSR: 41) Notice that Mannheim carries forward his knowledge of art history. He wrote this passage in 1940; Pinder's book was published in Berlin in 1926. Mannheim also uses this concept in his discussion of generations in 1927. See ESOK.

11
Cf. the discussion on Mannheim's essay on "Conjunctive and Communicative Thought" in Appendix D.

12
Mannheim is persuaded by Scheler's distinction between the "democracy of Impulse" and the "democracy of Reason." (FKM: 273; MSR: 45)

13
Mannheim's knowledge of labor history is not extensive but nevertheless it is based on the seminal works, all of which given countless examples of the use of violence by private and government agencies to control labor. Aside from Marx, Mannheim has also read the American labor historians including S. Perlman and J. R. Commons.

14
Increase in size and primary contact are inversely related, a fact Mannheim makes much of in the contexts of democratic planning at the neighborhood and factory levels. (See Chapter 7)

16
Mannheim means by "rooted" an unchanging cast of characters in one's daily existence. Mannheim as usual does not offer specific historical or empirical support. But, both McCarthy's and Hitler's strengths lay with their more rural "constituents." (Cf. Rogin, 1967; Neumann, 1957)

17
This observation is obviously time bound. Access to city life has grown since 1935.

18
Mannheim is admittedly influenced by Harold Lasswell. See especially Lasswell's "Garrison State."

19
Of course, the simplicity of such a view distorts such real issues as capital accumulation and investment.

20
Drawing on Tönnies, Mannheim distinguishes between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society).

21
Mannheim finds support for this notion in Durkheim's theory of mechanical and organic solidarity and in Bucher's claim that the modern world has a global economy. (SS: 98f, 96)

22
Institutions, for Mannheim, involve a principle, a mentality, which binds individuals.

23
Bracketing is a Kantian idea which intrigues Mannheim as early as 1922 (in his dissertation).

24
I collapsed Mannheim's eleven characteristics into the five listed here.

25
The modifier, neighborhood, alters the sense of community here to emphasize conscious, voluntary identification.

26
Cf. Arthur Clarke's Childhood's End in which the United Nations fictionally gains power to maintain world peace as long as alien space creatures sojourn in New York City. The importance of external threat to social cohesion is documented in many studies including those of Suttles and Emerson.

27
Notice that this musical metaphor implies that social meaning has a temporally sequential dimension.

28
The widely different environments in which Mannheim and Max Weber mature -- end of empire Hungary and Weimar Germany as opposed to Bismarckian Germany -- probably account for Mannheim's severe departure from Weber's formulation. (Cf. Giddens, 1973: 49)

29
Giddens correctly points out that Marx' concept of property ownership includes the notion of control. (Giddens, 1973: 71)

30
The notion of "open classes" derives from Max Weber. (Cf. Gerth and Mills, 1946: 182; Giddens, 1973: 103)

31
Cf. Appendix C.

32
Liam Hudson's findings in his study of English schoolboys adds support to Mannheim's view. He found that achievers came from the ranks of both convergent and divergent thinkers, and that each attitude excelled in areas that the other did not.

33
Mannheim's interest in competition predates his discussion of democratic planning. See especially "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon" (1928) where he gives the reasons for emphasizing competition over conflict and announces that he does not "believe in ... [an] absolute synthesis." (ESOK: 225) A related sicussion on the meaning of success is found in "On the Nature of Economic Ambition and Its Significance for the Social Education of Man" (1930).

34
Mannheim notes that the term competition was adopted by Darwin in 1859 from the economist, Adam Smith, and the Physiocrats. (SS: 77) Actually, Darwin took the term from Spengler.

35
Struggle, for Mannheim, involves compulsion and force. It is not clear whether Mannheim intended the black pun on Hitler's autobiography, Mein Kampf.

36
He cites Cooley's quintet: "self-control, enterprise, perserverance ... address, and common sense." (SS: 86-7)

37
This last item, "scientific testing," is exaggerated in some reviews of Mannheim's theory of democratic planning. (E.g., Weintraub, 1944)

38
Bronowski interestingly concludes in a footnote that "democracy" "limits" the actions which the individual scientist thinks himself entitled to impose on others. [But this does not mean that] individual scientists take away the responsibility for ... [the] proper use [of scientific discoveries] from the community." (Bronowski, 1965: 74) In fact, he argues Einstein was right to have told President Roosevelt that "an atomic explosion might be produced" because the president was elected to "act" for the citizenry. Mannheim, though he does not specifically consider scientific questions, would probably disagree on the grounds that such knowledge should be made public before anyone acts. Mannheim is a decided pacifist and abhors military decisions that are made in isolation. However, were national

security seriously threatened, he might make an exception not for the president to hear and decide on action, but for a planning board with classless intellectual members to consider Einstein's scientific judgment.

39
In American colonial times, Massachusetts built roads and bridges cooperatively. The department of public works enlisted its labor by drafting young men. The endeavor was not strictly democratic, however, because the rich could buy their way of of service. (Cf. Walsh)

40
The positivist sees the rhythmic recycling of experience, the romantic/historical interpreter sees "unilinear" progress in generations. (ESOK: 278, 281) Mannheim's view, while not admitting of predictive powers, explains why two social views can coexist at the same time. For example, "romantic/conservatism" and "liberal/rationalism" continue in the same generation actuality but as discrete generation units. (ESOK: 304; cf. I&U)

41
Mannheim takes these categories from Petersen. (ESOK: 315-6)

42
Intermediary generations are those biological generations which do not form in "actuality" or as a "unit." In a sense, they are not fully mature.

43
It appears that his wife, Julia, was the catalyst and sounding board for many of his claims about psychological processes. She never published. Nevertheless, her influence is acknowledged by Mannheim in the introductions to his books and her collaborative assistance in editing the posthymously released materials is noted by all the editors (e.g., Wolff, Stewart and Eros, E. Manheim).

44
Mannheim is particularly smitten by the work of Lasswell, Allport, Sullivan, Horney, and Thomas. His later excursions into educational theory seem a continuation of this intellectual research.

45
Throughout this discussion Mannheim refers to Lasswell's "elementary psychological structures" in everyday life.

46
He states: "Slaves are the poorest workers"!

47
The sociologist can use the concentration on the "ego-ideal" to influence individuals and to understand social institutions. (Cf. SS: 25)

48
Individual "character" reflects the domination of one or more of these "wish[es]." For example, the "rebel" most strongly wants "adventure" while the "traditionalist" seeks "security." The political or industrial leader desires "recognition," and an "ardent courtship" demands "response." The expressions of each of these "wish[es]" may be "socially useful" or "noxious." (SS: 34ff)

49
Notice that C. Wright Mills' definition of "drift" is not in form too different from Adam Smith's "invisible hand" formulation. Only their evaluation of consequences is disparate.

50
Mannheim takes Michels' findings seriously, not because of the inevitability of oligarchy, but because "the long-range picture may be very different from the short-range one. In the short run, however, the differences may be very real." (ESOC: 198)

CHAPTER 5

THE STRATEGY OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

In the last chapter the possibility of democratic planning was explored. Given the possibility, how is democratic planning to be undertaken? Mannheim is not a tactician; he does not provide a roadmap for going to democratic planning. Instead, he suggests what will be done under democratic planning, and, by implication, hints at some initial steps which will lead to democratic planning. His "strategy" of democratic planning is built on the proto-democratic foundation of his theory of rationality. (Cf. Chapter 3)

> The essential attitude of the planning age seems to be a synthesis of ... the courage to intervene in the interplay of fundamental forces ... [and] the humility ... that ... does not pretend to act as a creator of these forces, but rather as a strategist, who only watches over the factors at work in society in order to detect the new possibilities which are coming to the surface at the proper moment, and to reinforce them at those points where vital decisions must be made. (MSR: 190; emphasis added)

By "strategy" Mannheim intends both the clarification of possible alternatives and the specification of substantially rational means to chosen democratic ends. (MSR: 194) He is least definite on what particular goals should be in the belief that they cannot and should not be predicted, but rather revealed in the process of democratic planning.

The strategists of democratic planning are the intellectuals, a category Mannheim carefully defines. The primary long-run strategy is education, a relatively late concern of his, but nevertheless a natural outgrowth of his interests in rationality and the role of the intelligentsia.

Although the bulk of this chapter focuses on education and the intellectuals, because strategies must begin in the present, it leads off with two short sections.

The first, "principia media," describes the interrelation of spheres of human activity. Another analyst might make the point better by showing the nexus between the public and private sectors in a decision-making framework. I include this short discussion for several reasons, including (1) most significantly, to demonstrate the difficulty of talking about planning totally in the abstract; (2) to illustrate Mannheim's proclivity for meandering through theoretical materials, and (3) to indicate how misleading a statement Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction[1] is out of context.

The second short section on elites is placed here to show how the intellectuals relate to the social structure. Until Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, this elite analysis was Mannheim's major consideration of power. Although this appraisal derives from his 1933 pronouncement on the need for elites in democratic societies, many commentators overstate its importance by concluding that Mannheim wanted intellectuals, one of the elites, to rule. (See especially Bottomore, 1964)

The elite analysis mainly taken from Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, I think is better understood as an underpinning to his call for a "third way" in Diagnosis of Our Time and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning as well as the foundation for his later insights into the corporate and warfare state. (Cf. Appendix B)

A subtle shift in approach to the idea of democratic planning is revealed in the phrase, "the courage to intervene in the interplay of fundamental forces" above. Written in 1935, it follows his first appeal to those fearing dictatorships. Meaning by "fundamental forces" the elites maneuvering the principia media, Mannheim is addressing more directly the masses of followers and victims of unplanned, non-authoritarian regimes.[2] In contrast to other planning theories of the same period, the absence of concrete programs to end the world-wide depression and massive unemployment and the apparent replacement of government and industrial elites by well-intentioned, though non-specialist, intellectuals would seem minimally persuasive. But Mannheim's work outsurvives that of other planning theorists. Why? Several reasons emerge. Mannheim did not originate the idea of democratic planning (cf. Chapter 1); peacetime planning experiments surrounded him in Germany, Russia and England from the 1920s and in America since the 1930s. Thus, he spoke from a crowded stage. His offering was several steps ahead of others in that, presuming planning would occur, it sought less to

redress then current maladies than to prepare for coming generations. Thirdly, not actively engaged in contemporaneous planning efforts, Mannheim received little popular press attention and his academic audience was limited by language -- Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction was not translated into English until 1940 -- and to some extent distribution. To compound matters much of the German intellectual community dispersed throughout the world during the 1930s and many English speaking intellectuals were pressed into government service. (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; Bentwich, 1936; Martin, 1976; Hughes, 1975) Thus, the traditional networks so important to scholarly exchange were disrupted. Finally, the diversion of the war postponed many planning debates. Relieved of his teaching duties during the war years, Mannheim continued his excursion into planning theory thereby providing new insights for the post-war generation (e.g., Dahl, Dyckman, Gans, Reiner, et al). (Cf. Appendix C)

In his planning theory, consciousness is again stressed, but in different forms. Mannheim focuses particularly on education, broadly defined. He believes that democratic intelligence requires life-long learning which in turn is possible because all aspects of social life are "educative." Learning is more than reading books or attending classes, though these are not unimportant activities. It also involves looking at and interpreting the particular worlds in which we live our everyday existences. It further includes developing a sense of "biography" -- our own and our society's. (Mills, 1959) Moreover,

through reciprocal interactions with others we can extend our perspectives. All of these efforts enlarge the capacity for democratic intelligence, a fundamental factor in democratic planning.

5.A Principia Media

Principia media, a concept Mannheim takes from J. S. Mill who, in turn, "derived" it from Bacon,

> are in the last analysis universal forces in a concrete setting as they become integrated out of the various factors at work in a given place at a given time -- a particular combination of circumstances that may never be repeated. (MSR: 177-8)[3]

The notion is first used by Mannheim in the German edition of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction and replaces Weltanschauung as the primary unit of analysis of the totality of an historicist moment. Mannheim finds the concept which interrelates "the unique and general in history" preferable to Marx's dialectics because it doesn't "exaggerate[] economic interpretation." (MSR: 196) "Qualitative analysis" to discern the principia media must precede "quantitative analysis." (MSR: 185) The principia media "form a structure" and so "structural change" is brought about by "an interdependent change in a number of" them. (MSR: 184) Because principia media have "mutual relationships," new ones have implications which are wider than first seen. For example, developments in the economic sphere might have both political repercussions and result in new social psychologies.

Though Mannheim urges the principia media approach to social investigation, he recognizes that there has been a "studied neglect" of this method. Even when such analysis is begun either "investigator[s]"overemphasize one principle (e.g., economics) or they give equal weight to all factors "without any attempt to relate them within one another." (MSR: 186-7)

The most serious consequences of such neglect include: (1) the inability of the social scientist to differentiate between "eternal" and "single epoch" "structural laws,"[4] (2) the incompacity to diagnos[e] correctly those facts which first emerged individually and in apparent isolation,"(3) the failure of history to be more than a "post-mortem," and (4) the misinterpretation of "events ... in terms of [an] ... anticipated future." (MSR: 180, 189-90)

The principia media, therefore, are vital to distinguishing between the "accidental" and the "essential" factors in social life. Moreover, the principia media expose "multiple possibilities." (MSR: 189) Planning "involves" "ben[ding]," coordinating, and ultimately "transforming" the principia media of the social process as well as the "psychological principia media." (MSR: 194, 218, 231)

Mannheim's idea of the principia media infers both an organization of social reality and the "experimental," "intellectual" interpretation of social structures at particular times in history.

An intriguing, yet unconvincing, concept, the principia media represent a distinct turning point in Mannheim's thinking.

and act as a bridge between his historicistic and democratic planning theories.[5] Significantly, he does not extend the discussion in his later writings, including the English amendments to Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. In short, the accent on "logic" diminishes in importance as that on "control" ascends.

5.B. Elites

Within months after leaving Frankfurt in 1933, Mannheim began to speculate why Germany had been overtaken by a dictator. He began by asking what had gone wrong with the Weimar democracy Assuming that democratization was inevitable, he then proceeded to ask what the requirements of a strong, yet just, democracy would be. He concluded that a major democratic task is the development and control of elites. After this theoretical analysis, he turned to the case of Weimar where he saw a confused elite, characterized by inordinate infighting, seeking to arouse mass followings. On the sidelines stood a non-integrated, largely helpless intelligentsia. If this was "political democracy" (see Figure 2), another form of democracy must be invented. He proposed a balanced elite instead.

He first "distinguish[ed] the following main types of elites: the political, the organizing, the intellectual, the artistic, the moral and the religious."[6] (MSR: 82-3) The organizing elite includes financiers, businessmen and other "technical" people who direct production and exchange.

Figure 2: 1933 Observation of Elite Structure: "Political Democracy"



(MSR: 351, 83) Presumably it would also include public sector bureaucrats. These types of elites can be divided into two functional groupings. The "political and organizing ... aim at integrating a great number of individual wills" while the others "sublimate those psychic energies which society, in the daily stuggle for existence, does not fully exhaust." Though each culture manifests a different balance of elites, danger points occur when the scales are tipped so far towards the "organizing" elites that the "sublimating" elites "would scarcely exist, and if they did, would be very ineffective." Only the "sublimating" elites can "direct [society's] ... culture [and] ... further its creative powers." (MSR: 83) The most important of these sublimating elites, the intelligentsia, must increase social knowledge, and, therefore, class rather than mass formations are urged. His scheme (see Figure 3) is strikingly different from his observation (Figure 2).

Mannheim further refined his elite scheme in the 1940s. Taking more seriously demands for "general public participation," he demoted the "organizing" elites and brought workers' control and local initiative up to the level of the intelligentsia. Classes still continue to filter their insights through the elites. (See Figure 4) Together the local/workplace groups and the intellectuals function as "pioneering elites." (Cf. SOE: 165; Section 5.E.2) "Democracy of Reason" is joined with maximum possible direct democracy.

Few democratic theorists dwell on the issue of leadership. (Cf. Sartori, 1962) Of those who do, fewer depart from the

Figure 3: 1933 Proposal for Elite Structure in Democracies:

Balance of Sublimating and Organizing Elites



Figure 4: 1940s Proposal for Elite Structure in Democracies:

Pioneering Elites



confines of traditional political roles. Mannheim proceeds differently stating:

> But the vital question is whether the state, as a controlling and co-ordinating agency can itself be controlled ... From our standpoint the history of government must be re-interpreted as the history of special social technique by which the control of human beings is subjected once more to human control. (MSR: 326)

For that reason, leadership under democratic planning must emerge at all levels of society as planning "demands consensus and cooperation at every stage." (FPDP: 105) Leaders in this conception must then (1) "visualize and define ... the principles and objectives of democracy in industrial society" and (2) "devise practicable ways and means to attain its ends by reforms and mass consensus." (FPDP: 106)

In brief, the democratic solution is not to get rid of leaders, but to make them democratically responsible. Mannheim is most concerned with intellectual leaders, as their insights are premised on the continuity of human society and their foresights contribute to democratic intelligence. (Cf. Appendix F)

5.C. The Intelligentsia

Mannheim initially assumes that planners will come from the ranks of the intellectuals because intellectuals supply the common cognitive basis of social change (I&U; cf. Section 4.E)

Additionally, as the division of labor becomes more specialized and complex in industrial urbanized society, only intellectuals are forced by their working roles to broaden their perspectives. Though knowledge arises from all crannies of society,

> Innovations come about mostly through a free integration of deviating types [i.e., the bohemian intellectuals who later are called the free-floating intelligentsia] who remain as insignificant dissenters outside the established social structure, yet often contribute new ideas and possible solutions in crisis situations of social change. (FPDP: 190-1)

Mannheim borrows and extends Alfred Weber's notion of the relatively classless intelligentsia. (ESSP: 125, n. 1) Because of the critical role intellectuals play in democratic planning, Mannheim devotes considerable thought to the formation and responsibilities of intellectuals. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 7)

The centrality of the intellectual to Mannheim's theories of the sociology of knowledge and democratic planning is highly disputed as an impossible ideal (e.g., Kettler), as exceedingly elitist (e.g., Floud), as self-contradictory (e.g., Nettl), or as politically naive (e.g., Remmling). Only a few accept it as an incomplete, but useful, construct (e.g., Bachrach, Wolff).

Mannheim defines intellectuals functionally but not in direct reference to particular institutions or organizations like schools. Thus, he does not equate intellectuals with academics, though of course some university people are

intellectual. To be intellectual is to be comprehensive, not specialized, in viewpoint.

Always self-conscious about the proper role of the intellectual, in 1925 Mannheim wrote:

> The peculiar function of this intermediary concept, that of 'intellectual stratum,' consists in making a coordination of intellectual configurations with social groups possible without blurring the inner differentiation either of the world of mind or of social reality. Further, we have to take the fact into account that at no moment in history does a social stratum produce its ideas ... out of thin air, as a matter of pure invention. (ESOK: 187)

In several places Mannheim traces the historically changing roles of intellectuals, from secular scholastics in Renaissance universities to party spokesmen in the 19th century to Alfred Weber's "socially unattached intelligentsia." (E.g., I&U: 155; FKM: 305-6) The subtle, but profound, differences in working climates between modern and earlier times alters the consciousness of the intellectuals.[6] Though they always addressed each other directly, not until contemporary times did they identify with each other as a distinct group. Prior to that, class and institutional affiliations were emphasized. This transformation in self-interpretation leads to a clearer understanding of the relations between ideational and material factors.

> The rise of the intelligentsia marks the last phase of the growth of social consciousness. The intelligentsia was the last group to acquire the sociological point of view, for its position in the social division of labour does not provide direct access to any vital and functioning segment of society. The secluded study and the dependence on

> printed matter afford only a derivative view of the social process. No wonder that this stratum remained long unaware of the social character of change. (ESOC: 101)

5.C.1 The Formation of the Intelligentsia

Mannheim develops his conception of the intellectuals in three stages.[7] In the first segment, prior to Ideology and Utopia (1929), "socially unattached" intellectuals fulfill their roles by joining with critical generations. Only the "hommes de lettres" "can vacillate, joining now one trend, now the other." This "literati"[8] often joined ranks with "the younger generation" in the nineteenth century. History shows that each "epoch" is characterized by a "dominant" intellectual trend, romanticism, for example. The intellectuals of that time need therefore to identify themselves with or against the trend. In short, "culture [is] polarized in this respect." (ESOK: 317-8)

As the formal institutions of law and education expand, the unattached intellectuals organize themselves differently. In the second phase (discussed in Ideology and Utopia and the German edition of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction), Mannheim urges a "synthesis" of the polarized intellectuals in to a "relatively classless intelligentsia." (I&U: 155) With increasing massification of society, the intellectual must replace "critical generation[s]" as the major source of social interpretation.

In the third stage, an "independent intelligentsia" provides guidance as well as interpretation. (FPDP: 264) Guidance takes two forms: education and planning. Where in the 19th century, intellectuals had attached themselves to progressive forces in society, they now become a progressive force.

It should be underscored that while the first stage is historically observed by Mannheim, the last two phases are theoretical constructs created to treat distinctly modern problems.

Mannheim sees intellectuals in all three phases residing at the "intersti[ces]"of class society and remaining less cohesive than other social groupings (ESOC: 104) The notion of the "relatively uncommitted intelligentsia" infers that (1) they necessarily define their work in reference to others, and simultaneously, (2) they are not unreasonably tied to given perceptions and conclusions. (ESOC: 106)

In a piece on intellectuals composed in the early 1930s Mannheim clarifies his position. There are four types of intellectuals who coexist in the contemporary world. (Cf. the idea of "non-contemporaneous contemporaneity" in Chapter 4) Arising in "different phases of history" they are "distinguished by their occupational characteristics, their conduct and their social orientation." (ESOC: 111-14) The "contemporary intellectual" bridges knowledge of "everyday" life with that of past and distant cultures. Recognizing "that we have no [single, 'eternal'] truth," the contemporary intellectual can

"disclos[e] ... [the] contingent character [of social phenomena] and the alternatives which are open to us." (ESOC: 120; emphasis added) And though this uncertain enterprise may discourage some because of its "empath[etic] approach, the intellectual can "insightful[ly] transcend[] ... [his] own milieu" and "focus on real problems." (ESOC: 118) To guard against "An all-pervasive empathy [which] may become easily a non-commital, flighty, and frothy intellectualism," the contemporary intellectual "expan[ds] ... [him]self through ... participation in a multipolar culture." (ESOK: 119) He thereby "explode[s] any fixed frame of reference which relies on ultimates ... [to] anticipate alternatives before they become acute." (ESOC: 120-1)

Though traditionally the intellectual emerges from specific "social background[s]" in contemporary society the process is more open. (ESOC: 123) The other three types came out of more restricted settings. Intellectuals have always tended to associate with other sublimating elites (like artists) in cooperative, informal, small groups, but, where intellectuals were appendages to the courts in feudal times, they have been "outsiders only since the middle-class revolutions." (ESOC: 133) In post-Renaissance Europe, the intelligentsia formed "language societies" by which "they established channels of interclass communication and assembled local elites who learned how to use ["the vernacular of the middle classes"]." (ESOC: 135) Salon life, a pre-modern phenomenon, became "significant

in a period in which the princely patronage is on the wane while the democratic public is not yet formed." (ESOC: 137) The public analog, the coffee house, which "originated" in the Near East," became [in the mid-17th century] the first centres of opinion in [the] partially democratized societ[ies]" of England and France. (ESOC: 138) Governments tried to close these coffee houses because of their "political potential" (e.g., provoking revolutionary activities).[9] But in a period before large newspaper circulation and high levels of literacy, adamant public opinion reversed local ordinances. Coffee houses did not function like the salons as "agents of selection." Instead,

> In a sense the coffee-house coteries of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century [sic] constituted the freest association in Western history; at no time was opinion as fluid and socially independent as in that period. (ESOC: 140)

Standard sociological profiles (including factors like class affiliation, mobility, "social habitat"), while useful for categorizing intellectuals, do not "effectively predict [their] behavior." (ESOC: 159) Instead, because the "transcending impulse ... is basic to every intellectual process," the "life-history" of the intellectual is more indicative. Three categories of contemporary intellectuals are thereby identified: "vocational," "leisure-time," and "passing-phase." (ESOC: 163) After "realiz[ing] that his milieu is not 'the' world at large," an intellectual may pass through three "phases." In the first, he "discovers alternative

interpretations and new values. Self-assertion and defiance accompany this experience." Next comes the "rev[elation of] uncertainty and the tendency to drift from one viewpoint to another." The third phase entails the "resolution of suspense." The results range from "intellectual fanaticism" to "connoisseurs, the specialists in refined pleasures, the humanists" to "perenial ironists and sarcasts[,] ... the professional critics of smugness" to "those who preserve the productive core of their scepticism." The last, "as steadfast seeks of truth ... expose hypocrisy and self-deception. Their radical disillusionment is like leaven in the bread, although they do not provide the dough." (ESOC: 165-6)

Mannheim implies that only the last category truly deserves the title intelligentsia.

5.C.2. Intellectuals and Leadership

> Ultimately the solution depends on our insight and wisdom. (FPDP: 73)

Leadership is needed for planning, as all the great social experiments have indicated. Witness Mao, Lenin, Castro, in recent times. It is also "perhaps" the greatest need of democracies. (Cf. Bryce, Sartori) Even the height of Greek democracy was made possible by Pericles' "independent control over the multitude." (Thucycides, in Sartori, 1962: 118)

Mannheim is one of a few scholars who raise this issue directly. And the subsequent question -- "who should the

leaders be?" -- takes him back to the intellectuals. (Cf. Gramsci in Appendix F)

Aside from their relative detachment from the organizing and producing elites and their broad perspectives intellectuals are very suitable because (1) they are in positions to think more, better, or both; (2) they are attuned to trying to comprehend the structure beneath the complex exterior of the modern social world; and (3) their putative rationality provides a necessary antidote and alternative to the irrationality of dictators. (Cf. MSR: 87)

It should be made very clear that Mannheim never intends intellectuals to serve as leaders in a political system, but rather as a group to provide leadership to the entire society. It is not that intellectuals inherently know better, but that they use their intelligence for social understanding. It is not that intellectuals have better values, but that they can foresee alternatives and consequences. It is not that intellectuals have achieved more and should be thus rewarded, but that they should be made responsible for their achievements. If leadership means direction (not compulsion), who, asks Mannheim, is in a better position to offer it? (In his last writings, Mannheim seems to assign another role to the intelligentsia -- namely, the promotion of a renewed faith in humanity. See especially DOOT.)

There are two intellectual layers -- that of the free-floating intelligentsia and that occupied by specialists

serving various interests. When Mannheim calls on the intellectuals he means only the free-floating intelligentsia. However, when he exhorts intellectuals to be responsible he addresses both layers.

Despite the considerable burden (or some might say privilege) Mannheim places on the intelligentsia, he is not a simple exponent of the philosopher-king school. C. Wright Mills overestimates the "greater power for the 'man of knowledge'" in Mannheim's writings. (1959) Certainly Mannheim began that way, but in his final book on planning the intelligentsia were downplayed. Knowledge and power interact in many ways, as Mills notes in The Sociological Imagination when he points to growth of justifications of sheer power on "rational" grounds. Mannheim, too, is acutely aware that knowledge is increasingly used in the service of power. In describing the rise of mass dictatorships, Mannheim stresses the need to teach the masses to become thinking citizens. (MSR) His continued interest in propaganda is another indication of this insight. And, I think, it is precisely because of this observation Mannheim attacks the problem directly. It is as though he says, well, if this is so, why not acknowledge it and then proceed to the next step and consider the obligations which follow. He also intimates that rewards should be primarily limited to intellectual satisfaction and not involve undue economic or social benefits. (See below)

In brief, Mannheim never pushes the intelligentsia above a strategic position. Even then, they are one of several elites.

The significance of the limit cannot be underestimated. Strategy entails connecting means and ends; it does not involve determining goals, though it might elucidate them.

Nevertheless, there is a temptation to see the intellectuals as Mannheim's leaders, especially since in the early English writings they appear to be equated with planners. But they are not leaders in the sense of being defined by followers. Sociologically, it is not that they become lonely or detached at the top, but rather that they rise because they are loners and detached. Mannheim implies an interaction of the intellectuals and other member groups of society. (See Figures 3 and 4 above) In this interaction, the functions of the intelligentsia differ from that of others (be they classes, generation units, workers' collectives, etc.). The intellectuals are not a primary source of power and therefore they have no special right to control. They are simply guardians of truth. As such they show us "that power without sociological knowledge is blind and ends by making society a prison for the citizen or by involving us in chaos." Intellectuals are merely "the thinkers and forerunners of a new society." (MSR: 365-6)

5.C.3. Intellectuals and Social Change

The traditional Marxist view places the intellectual in the camp of the capitalist class. Mannheim demurs: "the planless overproduction of a jobless intelligentsia in Europe between World Wars I and II contributed in a major way to

social unrest." (FPDP: 268) However, he is not prepared to go as far as Raymond Aron in saying:

> The revolutions of the twentieth century have not been proletarian revolutions; they have been thought up and carried out by ["the impatience of"] intellectuals." (Aron, 1957: 312)

Two categories of intellectuals participate directly in social change, albeit differently. The class-associated intellectuals serve a limited function in clarifying the nature of class conflict. Increasingly, the free-floating intelligentsia become more important because of their relative freedom from class and the consequent choice of affiliation with emergent groups.

For Mannheim, then, the possibility of progressive social change is predicated on the existence of a "leading" generation unit working in combination with the detached intellectual. (Cf. Chapter 4) Even so, the free-floating intellectual must remain responsibly thorough in seeking and transmitting knowledge. (Cf. Chapter 3) We must remember, Mannheim says,

> <u>that every major phase of social change constitutes a choice between alternatives</u>. Society outlines the alternatives, but minorities can play their part in the making of choices. Whether the intellectuals are such a minority depends partly on them. True, as a group they do not control power and resources. They do not even join the same parties, and we find them in opposite pressure groups and in conflicting classes, but they do leave their stamp on the public interpretation of affairs, and at times they have played a part in the making of choices when choices existed.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> What then can the intellectual do? First of all let him take stock of his limitations

> and potentialities. ... A group such as the intelligentsia abdicates only when it surrenders its self-awareness and its capacity to perform in its own peculiar way. It cannot form a special group ideology of its own. It must remain as critical of itself as of all other groups. After all, thought, the intellectual process is in all its phases the product of concrete situations, let us also remember that the product is more than the situation. (ESOC: 169-70)

In the above statement Mannheim appears very Max Weberian[10] despite his obvious indebtedness to Alfred Weber. (Cf. Chapter 2) But where Alfred Weber was not inordinately concerned with bureaucratic trends, Mannheim worried about the consequent "decline" of "the spirit of inquiry." He regrets the trend:

> Increasing specialization calls for a growing army of experts, and the large-scale organization of government, private enterprise, labour unions, and parties make uniform standards of training necessary.

He argues for a revitalized intellectuality to prevent

> The retailing of knowledge in standard packages [which] paralyzes the impulse to question ... [and which] quickly becomes obsolescent ...

We cannot afford, Mannheim maintains,

> a civil service or a profession which depends on a personnel whose critical impulse is benumbed [and] becomes rapidly inert and incapable of remaining attuned to changing circumstances. (ESOC: 167)

Thus, through his German period Mannheim stresses the positive effects of the contemporary detached intelligentsia. After 1933, he also considers the negative impacts.

Speaking of the "isolated intellectual" in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, he considers the loss of prestige

which attends the oversupply of intellectuals in the period between the world wars. (MSR: 254; cf. FPDP: 268) Contemporary intellectuals must find a way to remind society of its common humanity in a democratic age. (MSR: 81)

> The intellectual will no longer look down upon the manual worker, just as he is not looking up to the aristocrat. He will treat his speciality as being essentially on a par with other skills -- possibly superior to others in quantitative terms as involving more knowledge and training, but not superior in an essential and qualitative terms, as the realization of a higher human type. (ESOC: 206; emphasis added)

Notice the unusual juxtaposition of qualitative and quantitative evaluations. It is the nature of the intellectuals' work (with its intrinsic rewards), then, that makes them uniquely qualified to play a major role in planning.

Acknowledging that this work requires freedom, Mannheim urges that the intellectuals not be discouraged as "indeed many were in England and on the continent in the 1940s."[11] (MSR: 136; 365-6) If they are not assigned a clear role, the intellectuals "may too quick[ly] ... resign[] ... their proper function as the thinkers and forerunners of a new society" thereby creating a situation "even more disastrous in a social setting where more depends on what the leading elites have in mind than in any other periods of history." (MSR: 365-6)

Intellectuals must be encouraged as social critics, a role necessary for preventive planning. (Cf. ESOC: 142ff) But this critical stance cannot arise under conditions of

massive unemployment. "Without a stake in the social order" they might fully "turn against it," thereby precluding the possibility of reconstruction.

Mannheim gives evidence. While Nazi Germany "discourage[d] the pursuit of higher education and intellectual careers," America "greatly expanded and subsidized" "university education." Yet the mere support of universities is not a sufficient means to more integrated intellectuality, Mannheim remarks, for "the vested interest of the educated classes in limiting higher education is at least as powerful as the vested interest of capital." (FPDP: 268-9)

5.C.4. The Role of Intellectuals

In divergent appraisals, the proper role of intellectuals is derived from different views of the nature of knowledge. Thus intellectuals are compared to magicians (e.g., Graves), value-free scientists (e.g., Popper, Bell), court jesters (e.g., Dahrendorf), leaders (e.g., Gramsci), and critics (e.g., Lukacs). (Cf. Appendix F) Depending further on their interpretation of the relation between knowledge and power, the extent of the intellectuals' role ranges from referee to creator.

More sophisticated in his analysis, Mannheim concludes that intellectuals continue to play many roles; therefore, the primary issue is social responsibility. Accordingly, Mannheim's view grows out of his theories of rationality and power. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 7)

The insignia of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, which Mannheim established, is illustrative.

As the drawing indicates there are two trees -- "Arbor Vitae," and the tree of life, and "Arbor Scientiae," the tree of knowledge -- whose roots intertwine but whose branches foliate separately. Together Arbor Vitae and Arbor Scientiae require a common strong root structure. The symmetry of the leaves implies that both trees are equally interdependent. If one tree overshadows the other, the umbraged tree will wither. That is, knowledge and life must develop proportionately. This organic image hints at the relation Mannheim sees between power and knowledge. Knowledge is not synonymous with power but neither can it be divorced from power.

Mannheim recognizes that as society becomes more complex the role of intellectuals increases, yet, in turn the intellectuals' development is limited by the healthy growth of life. The term "healthy" implies that intellectuals alone cannot create the good society, though they may inform it. It also negatively connotes that intellectuals cannot stop social decay though they may warn of it. This symbiotic relationship is not a stagnant one, and therefore, intellectuals must assume responsibility <u>in</u> the survival of the whole. From this perspective,

it must be remembered that Mannheim only implied that the intellectuals should be the initial planners. With each successive work, Mannheim focused more attention on people's direct assumption of control over their lives. (Cf. Chapters 6 and 7) In short, he would not disagree with C. Wright Mills' observation that the intellectual

> feels helpless in the fundamental sense that he cannot control what he is able to foresee. (in Horowitz, 1963: 293)

And though he starts with Mills' prescription: "The effective way to plan the world's future is to criticize the decisions of the present." (in Horowitz, 1963: 303), Mannheim tries to do what Mills considered an impossibly naive task.

> In the covenants of power the future is being planned, even if later it must be laid down in blood with a sword. The powerless intellectual as planner may set up contrary expectations; he will later see the actual function of his 'planning.' He is leading a prayer and such prayer is mass indirection. (in Horowitz, 1963: 303)

Power, for Mills increasingly is "organized irresponsibility." (in Horowitz, 1963: 295)

Where Mannheim worries about the unemployed intellectuals Mills worries about the institutional and financial incentives for scholarly "self-intimidation." (in Horowitz, 1963: 297) However, Mills was self-nurtured on Mannheim, and applauds Mannheim's agenda for intellectuals, including the "alert[ness] to new directions," the "attempt to discuss political problems without being a naive victim of bias," and the attention to "social control and techniques [which] raise[] fundamental

problems." (Mills, 194): 969, 966, 967) Nonetheless, Mills remains unconvinced by Mannheim's prescription. It overlooks the concrete forms of power exercised by elites occupying the "key positions" in society and it ignores the critical question of "planning for what?" (Mills, 1940: 968)

The above criticisms were proferred in 1940 in a review article of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Fourteen years later, after reading Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, Mills still believed Mannheim's planning theory to lack concreteness on "all the issues of power and politics." (Mills, 1954: 495) Yet, on "planning for peace" Mills adopted a similar position. (Mills, 1958)

It is not known whether Mannheim and Mills corresponded with (or met) each other. Mannheim never directly acknowledged his critics in his writings, but I surmise that at least in the case of Mills, of whom he was aware, he responded. (E.g., FPDP: 324) Mills' observations may indeed be one of the reasons Mannheim in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning deemphasized the role of the intellectual as planner.[12]

Mills and Mannheim are similar in their focus on elites as the center of power in modern society (cf. Mills, 1956), but they depart on the role of workers. Raised on the soil of populism (Texas), Mills follows Marx's assumption of the primary importance of production less forcefully than Mannheim. Neither is a socialist in the sense of Marxist parties. (In fact, at times Mills seems especially taken by Mannheim for

his non-allegiance to Marxism.[13]) Instead, though both were highly influenced by the pragmatism of John Dewey, Mills' American background makes him a closer adherent.[14]

Not surprisingly, Mills and Mannheim are complementary thinkers, and, at times, even closer. The convergence is seen best in a comparison between Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning and Mills' The Sociological Imagination. Mills admits that "the class social analyst," Mannheim, for instance, "grasp[s] history and biography and the relations between the two within society." (Mills, 1959: 6) The intellectual helps write, and thereby shapes, the biography of contemporary society. By necessity it is a "public role." Mills detects three ways in which the intellectual plays this role. As a "philosopher-king," the category to which Mills assigns Mannheim, "the quality of politics depends very much upon the intellectual qualities of those ... engaged." As "adviser," good performance depends on both the "integrity" of the intellectual and the "clients'" capacity for enlightenment. The third requires that the intellectual "remain independent ... [to] direct [his] ... work at kings as well as to 'publics.' (Mills, 1959: 179-81)

I believe Mills mistaken in his appraisal of Mannheim's intellectuals because they could play any of the three roles. Furthermore, it is interesting that even though Mills' typology is predicated on different views of the locus of power, all three roles assume the isolation of the intellectuals as a

group. This is far different than Mannheim's integrating formula where the intellectuals infuse knowledge into the elite and stress education for the masses. (See below.)Nevertheless, it is in this sense that Mannheim's intellectuals can provide leadership.[15]

Mannheim, in his advice on research directions, agrees with Mills that intellectuals must be reformers. "If an institution [i.e., a research university], allegedly devoted to enlightenment, does not even try to enlighten, it merely sanctions the status quo." (FPDP: 254) The task of research is "to form sound ideas about man's place in nature and society" in the context of a basic curriculum which imparts "knowledge of the vital philosophies that govern [t]his Age" because

> It has suddenly been realized that one of the reasons for moral breakdown is the mentality of the specialist who has remained a barbarian. (FPDP: 258-9; cf. Veblen)

"Biography" is thus a key concept because it forces each of us to confront human development, individual and social. Though Mannheim does not use the term "biography," the notion underlies all his work including historicism, the sociology of knowledge, and democratic planning.

Biography is an important idea which assumes a developmental relationship between human capacity and social environment. This nexus provides a standard by which to assess underdevelopment (where human capacity is thwarted) and overdevelopment (where social environment runs rampant). Unlike the technologically defined undeveloped and less-developed regions, the

biographical approach never forgets man. After all, "biography" literally means the writing of life.[16]

The intellectuals' social responsibilities, for Mannheim, then include monitoring development, suggesting remedies to under- and over-development, and discovering paths for greater participation for more people in the process of developing. This view neither assumes inexorable progress nor easy transitions. To reiterate, it stresses the "contingent" factors. Neither too tentative nor too bold, this attitude seeks to contravene Schumpeter's fear that "we always plan too much and always think too little ... [Consequently,] we walk into our future ... blindfolded." (Schumpeter, 1942: xi) The intellectual thus properly plays intermediating roles appreciative of an inherently democratic concept of rationality (cf. Chapter 3) and aware of the trends toward total control (cf. Chapters 4 and 7)

5.D Education

Mannheim developed his theory of democratic education between 1935 and 1947, in conjunction with his argument to plan "for freedom." (Cf. Table 1 ; Chapters 6 and 7) Rather than embrace any of the "three main types of education" outlined by Max Weber,[17] Mannheim seeks a humanist education which can accomodate to change.

Educational "theories ... have this in common, that they are trying to transform what exists into something higher and

better." The general purpose of education is to bridge past and future. (Cf. FPDP: 254)

> In a society which is more liable to change, those who have the historical perspective can become aware of the transitions which are taking place during their lifetime and in the larger span of historical time of which they are a part. People thus aware of change have to digest and assimilate the knowledge which is theirs through their education and to detect what are to become the important aspects of this knowledge. They have to prospect in ideas ahead of their time. (SOE: 33)

On the basis of his historical knowledge of the functions, aspirations and development of education, Mannheim adopts a broad definition of education, not limited to formal institutitions or particular age groups.[18] Mannheim was thorough in his discussions, devoting perhaps more printed pages of his writing to the topic of education than to any other subject.

Public education emerged in England and America in the 19th century, largely, as Mannheim was well aware, in response to the demands of labor groups (cf. Ware, Menscher, Foner,Laidler, Brooks) and social reformers (c.f., Mill, Bernal, Terrill).[19] Nevertheless, Mannheim reminds us:

> The main educative agent is the community, the group of people in which the child lives and the objects which these people have created, their relationships, their culture, and their connections with still larger society beyond ... Sir Fred Clarke [who] uses the phrase 'an educative society' ... meant, first the educative influence of a society, second, the education which may be obtained through membership of a society, and third, education which is related to a society. (SOE: 19)

As the community is overshadowed by the growth of large-scale organizations, Mannheim increasingly turns to the formal institutions of education.

To ascertain "what healthy education could contribute to a regeneration of society and man," Mannheim begins with the "sociological questions" -- "Who teaches whom for what society, when and how?"[20] (SOE: 160, 159) This approach portends Mannheim's concern with the meaning of power in contemporary society and reflects his findings on the range of rationalities.[21]

Mannheim's educational theory, as most completely expressed in class notes, articles and books written after 1940, reacts strongly to his understanding of the "social control" function of education in fascist and socialist states. Because he foresees possible "disintegration" of the "personality" in mass, capitalist society, Mannheim is especially concerned to develop an educational theory which will nurture individuality while providing a foundation for integrated social responsibility from which democratic social controls may be derived and modified.

5.D.1. Why Education?

Like other thinkers concerned with the question of liberty (e.g., Rousseau, Mill, Dewey), Mannheim carefully considers education. (Cf. Chapter 6) Additionally, his chosen vocation, teaching, impels contemplation of his everyday working role.

Mannheim and Dewey are among the best known democratic thinkers to write after the advent of compulsory public education. For this reason, their arguments differ from earlier political philosophers. Rather than a general call for education for the masses or specific curriculum proposals for the children of elites, they look at the various social functions of education and then recommend educational strategies for further developing democracy.[22]

The linking of educational theory to theories of freedom is not accidental. All democratic thinkers ask how can society ensure that freedom is exercised as widely and as responsibly as possible. Mannheim adds: if more people are gaining the right to exercise their freedom, then surely they must learn to make the most informed and thoughtful choices. Like Ortega y Gasset and Zolla he worries about the sagacity of condoning visceral reactions to political questions framed by others. Furthermore, Mannheim is aware that people make choices in their everyday lives, in the community and in the workplace, which cumulatively determine the world in which they live.

Fascism, perhaps Mannheim's greatest fear (and deservedly so given his own experience), is characterized by enormous educational efforts, propaganda. The plasticity of the young brownshirts especially fascintates and alarms Mannheim. More than many he takes seriously Hitler's assertion that he would control the world if parents would relinquish their children to him.

5.D.2 "From custom to social science"

In modern political thought theories of human nature are often displaced by theories of rationality. Marx and Freud with their discoveries of the regularities of certain irrationalities set the intellectual context for the twentieth century. "Social sciences" thus overtake "custom." (FPDP: 175)

In the age of planning, Mannheim proclaims, "primary attitude-moulding institutions" such as "the family, ... the neighborhood, [and] the Church ... have been greatly weakened"[24] by the growth of larger scale and more formal institutions. Many traditions, the major source of regulation in the past, are obviated or rendered "harmful." Social science can fill the vacuum by

> clarify[ing] (1) the democratic idea of co-ordination in contrast to totalitarian regimentation; (2) the making and remaking of human behavior, i.e. social and psychological means of conditioning ... man; (3) the pattern of democratic behavior, conscience, and personality as ends of democratic planning. (FPDP: 176)

Such social science will recognize that

> Each [human] action is a link in a chain of more or less co-ordinated social activities and therefore somehow dependent on society as a going concern, which shapes and co-ordinates human behavior. (FPDP: 174)

In anticipation of the political uses of education, Mannheim suggests that social science must be used to redirect the assimilation function of education. Just as public education brough immigrants into the capitalist politicaleconomy,

> A democratically planned society will approximate its ideal only if it makes similarly creative use of all problem groups, that without reintegration, remain a cause of disturbance ... Democratic reintegration differs from regimentation and rigid organization by its ability to use the most varied types of people, by exploring and developing suitable functions for every social group. Integration thus does not simply mean conformity, as the conservative would have us believe, nor does it mean order at any price. It means orderly interdependence and continuity between human institutions ... (FPDP: 178-9; emphasis added)

Mannheim believes education a life-long issue, therefore, he emphasizes the potentialities of the plasticity of men.[25]

5.D.3 Educational Impact[26]

The relation of education to the life of a society has been recognized for centuries. What makes Mannheim's inquiry any different? First, compulsory universal education expanded rapidly after its introduction in the mid-19th century. (McManners, 1969: 406; Men cher, 1967: 247) Though literacy grew in the western world, along with publishing, and later, the communications industry, substantial rationality does not appear to have grown proportionately. Aware of Veblen's and Dewey's pioneering work in America, Mannheim looked more and more into the external influences on educational institutions. Significantly, Mannheim was a product of the Youth Movement of the 1920s, a phenomenon analagous to the 1960s student movements. (Pachter, 1975)

In short, as more becomes known of how, if not why, our thinking and behavior relate, it is applied to our everyday lives as workers, consumers, students, parents, and especially as citizens. Against this trend, education becomes increasingly important to our ability to assert our independence as individuals (or, as classes).

"Everything in society is an educational factor"; "man is forever learning." (FPDP: 246-7; emphasis added) Following Marx (p. 236) and Max Weber (p. 229), as well as his own sociology of knowledge, Mannheim points to the many sources of learning, including the money system. (FPDP: 238ff, 188ff) Educational theory must face the fact that we learn from experience in all types of settings.

This has two important implications. First, formal education must provide the "groundwork" (p. 246) for understanding our social life. Second, planning must openly consider the "educational impacts" of policy alternatives. For example, Mannheim worries about what long bouts of unemployment (however insured) do to the self-respect of individuals.

Mannheim's later focus on the military and communications sectors bespeaks his great concern for the educational impacts of everyday events. What is the effect of retitling the War Department the U.S. Department of Defense? Who controls the communications networks which provide most of our information?

The schools have their own "educational impacts." Is there any other organization through which all members of

contemporary society pass? Even drop-outs, truants and the mentally retarded at some point attend school. Formal education has become a rite of passage, the introduction of individuals to the adult community and the political economy. (SOE: 19ff) It is "ideological" to believe that schooling is individualistic.

> it show[s] signs of society blindness ... [when we are not] sufficiently aware of the fact that society around us indicates and limits our potentialities much more than we realize. (SOE: 47)

That we first encounter formal, organized power/(and sometimes extended community) in school, indicates not only the essential importance of education in modern society, but also signals the appropriateness of public attention to education. Failure to actively and seriously participate constitutes "cheating [one]self" for it is in school that we both develop our individuality and learn social cooperation. (SOE: 81) That individuality may be thwarted and cooperative integration superseded by manipulated domination are of prime social concern.

Early education is particularly important because

> Here democratic society must realize that the adult world reflects the world of childhood and adolescence, and that attitudes, habits, and aspirations not developed in childhood cannot develop later. (FPDP: 184)

Nevertheless, adult education should not be ignored because "attitudes, habits and aspirations" are continuously modifiable.

5.D.4 Education for Social Change

> The task of the school is to show how to learn more efficiently from life, how to draw correct conclusions from experience, how to become one's own educator.
> . . . . . .
> As schools should serve as stepping-stones to intelligent orientation throughout life, it will be their special function in a democratically planned society to interpret all phases of life in terms of democratic experience. (FPDP: 250)

Modern schools, by virtue of the growth of social knowledge and the decline of other informal educational institutions, have become central. However,

> ... the assumption of ever-more responsibility by any institution is not without dangers ... school can hardly replace the home, or the teacher substitute for the mother ... the solution must be sought in the direction of a wise redistribution of functions ... (FPDP: 249)

Schools must henceforth provide preventive and constructive assistance to the populace by recognizing a middle point between excessive individualism and unnecessary totalitarianism. The preventive and constructive functions are intimately related. (Cf. FPDP: 252)

> The vain belief that everyone is sufficiently creative to master his own difficulties has lost ground ... The apathy of the average adult is not so much his own fault as the result of lack of stimulation, encouragement, and guidance. Democratic society ... must break the spell of apathy, for it is only mental vacuum that affords the ideal breeding ground for fascist slogans. (FPDP: 251)

Educational "policies should help to develop co-operation, tolerance, self-reliance, joint responsibility, and especially

the feeling that every person counts." (FPDP: 252; emphasis added)

At the lower levels of education "socialization" needs be stressed; at the higher levels "intellect." In both cases the aim is the development of democratic personalities. Following Rousseau and Dewey, Mannheim implores us to remember that "education should start from human needs." (FPDP: 211-12) The untutored cannot be left entirely to their own devices nor should prepared formulae be foisted on people. (Cf. FPDP: 255)

The content of education should proceed from the perspective that, though we make our futures, we cannot anticipate the world in which we will spend the passing decades of our adult lives. While different age groups have different educational needs, "enlightenment" at all levels demands "integration of knowledge" and an attitude which is "open-ended and ever ready for expansion." Frustrations must be minimized without relinquishing needed criticism. A community supportive of dissent is necessary, in recognition of the fact "that in the same age different trends of thought vie with one another." (FPDP: 256) Students must learn social responsibility paradoxically including the capacity for "individual judgment." (FPDP: 256; cf. Chapter 6)

In short, education is the breeding ground for leaders and citizens. Specialization "can [only be] afford[ed] . . . if we constantly seek to broaden and deepen our common educational groundwork." (FPDP: 257) Unlike the flat stiff profiles

of citizens in voting analyses, Mannheim's citizens are constantly redefining themselves. The

> basic orientation would need supplementing by factual knowledge to enable everybody to form sound ideas about man's place in nature and society. (FPDP: 259)

Rather than create Veblen's men of "trained incapacities,"

> We assume that every sensible human being desires integrated knowledge and therefore we cannot put up with fragmentary learning. We further assume that tools are requisite for action and moral orientation. If science does not satisfy this demand, propaganda or dogmatic doctrine will. (FPDP: 255)

Education, therefore, becomes a critical strategy for developing democracy.

> Education, however, will not accept any given level as final ... All expansion of education on both the social and intellectual level should be a matter of strategy. In both respects improvement can be effected by degrees ... The common fund of knowledge could be presented in different forms to different social groups, taking their background, mentality, and varying educational levels into consideration. Democratization does not mean to level down in order to eliminate differences, but rather to allow for a variety in cultural life and to appreciate cultural differences as valuable points of departure in man's quest for knowledge. (FPDP: 264)

Like democracy, education is not a one-time endeavor. Thus, Mannheim stresses "post-education" and "re-education" for all adults, not just specialists requiring retraining. (FPDP: 253) Dismissing vocational and recreational interests as "meaningless variety," Mannheim instead agrees with Tawney and other builders of the London School of Economics.

> If adult education truly seeks to help create judicious and public-spirited citizens in all walks of life, well-equipped to judge the current issues of Democracy, it will have to cease following the vagaries of the hour; if it is to become a genuine groundwork it will have to discriminate and concentrate on the important issues and tasks. (FPDP: 255)

Reminiscent of earlier concerns, Mannheim explicitly mentions education's relation to leading generations.

> In the pattern of democratic development ... periods of expansion and contraction alternate ... Within this rhythm, the phases of expansion are the creative one, whereas the phase of contraction [with restrictive elements] represents the effort to establish a new balance in the dynamic process. (FPDP: 212)

Mannheim goes beyond the democratic tension evident in Rousseau (cf. Berman, 1972) to observe these "recurring phase[s]." Believing Dewey's ideas follow from the modern "optimistic approach to man" set forth by Rousseau, Mannheim seeks to update "concrete idealism." (FPDP: 211-12) Not persuaded by Idealism, yet unprepared to renounce ideals, Mannheim proclaims:

> The constant 'definition of the situation,' the continuous valuation of events makes values an educative power. This re-discovery of their significant in the social context will be welcomed by all who dislike abstract ideas, but are receptive to concrete idealism. (FPDP: 198)

Poignantly, he then denounces those who forget the social meaning of "concrete idealism":

> It is indeed irritating to listen to one who suggests in the midst of war that everybody become a pacifist, or who tells

> the butcher or baker in a competitive society that he should stop being selfish and renounce profits. (FPDP: 198)

We, he implies, need to face our common plight, not blame others.

He also seems to be adding a time dimension to Rousseau's famous:

> Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains ... How did this change take place? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? To this question I hope to be able to furnish an answer. (Barker (ed.), 169)

In effect, Mannheim argues, to the extent that social science and education can show us how and where we are enslaved we can throw off some chains. But never will we be unbound from others. The issue of legitimacy must be repeatedly raised. "The answer depends on what we want. It is up to us to direct ... development." (FPDP: 253)

Democratic education then entails far more than "putting knowledge into circulation" (Dewey) -- a situation which "may easily miscarry ... in an age of mass-produced education." Rather, it must also build on the recognition that "quality ... matures slowly in society."

> Not that the democratic thinker necessarily denies human 'greatness'; he merely re-interprets it, seeing in it a manifestation of that human perfectability which is the universal heritage of man. The 'great man' is great, not because he is different from others in his primordial substance, but because he has had greater and better opportunities to develop himself. (FKM: 282)

"Free discussion" replaces "obedient acceptance of things" in democratic education. (Cf. FKM: 283f) Mannheim's conception of "free discussion" is based on his sociology of knowledge and assumes the "coexistence of rival schools of thought ... which tend[] to slough off whatever is extreme, one-sided, and irrational in each of them." (ESOC: 199; cf. ESOK: 191ff) Related to "modern parliamentary democracy," "free discussion" is not "self-neutralizing." (ESOC: 191, 199) Nor is it the "domination of the masses -- by a levelling down." (FKM: 282ff; FPDP: 263)

> Educating the mass in reality-oriented ways of thinking, that is, real democratization of the mind, is the paramount task at the stage of fully developed democracy. (ESOC: 199)

In conclusion, social change brought about by education "cannot [be] expect[ed] ... to [occur] painlessly ... [as] there is no pre-existent pattern of order guaranteed in a democratic world; order and integration must always be created anew." (ESOC: 197) The "rate of transformation" can only be "accelerated" by closely aligning educational and planning activities. (MSR: 195-6)

5.D.5 Education and Planning

Aside from the important acculturation function served by education, the very process of education resembles planning.

> Democratic education is triumphant not only in the exhortation to be constructive or spontaneous, but in planning the life of the individual so that it presents a

> constant challenge to initiative, to making one's own choices, to finding new combinations, to remaining self-possessed and swimming against the current for a while, if necessary. But the person who is 'against it' should not be so from neurotic negativism. Courage to oppose should emanate rather from the healthy, constructive personality ... it is part of the democratic vision that there should be some people swimming against the current and part of democratic education that there be good swimmers among them. (FPDP: 213)

Like democratic planning democratic education

- requires a "minimum of social conformity" (SOE: 163; cf. Lukes);
- is predicated on forging new paths and rediscovering the humane;
- involves a search for whole frameworks, for links between various activities and institutions (Cf. Dewey);
- presumes an ongoing process, one which relates living generations to each other, the dead to the unborn (Cf. FPDP: 213);
- demands the clarification of values and the adoption of a "social conscience" (Cf. FPDP: 215);
- has as its purpose the definition of options (Cf. FPDP: 250; cf. Lynd);
- heeds the environmental backdrop of social life as well as the depths of individual feelings and thoughts.

In short, both are processes of "leading out." In the contemporary world, planning and education become "the exercise of a new type of responsibility more public in character" to

compensate for and augment "the responsibility in private life [which] may disappear, if the care of one's parents, one's relatives, and oneself ceases to be the concern of the individual." (FPDP: 225)

Neither planning nor education is based on selflessness nor selfishness, yet both recognize the need for greater development of self in the senses of "self-control" and self-actualization. (Cf. FPDP: 181) Both recognize the social character of self-definition. (Cf. FPDP: 215ff) From this perspective Mannheim sets limits on the proper roles of government and other large-scale institutions. The key lies in the meanings of self-control he intends. Not meant simply to convey social conformity, self-control also implies individually deciding upon and pursuing certain directions. It is the control to develop effectively as well as the control to hold oneself back. These two kinds of self-control complement each other in practice; for example, doing x precludes doing y. This view, by underscoring which of our resources are limited (e.g., time), forces the perpetual weighing of values. By implication large agencies (public and private) are only to be suffered when they serve human purposes. (Cf. FPDP: 182)

Finally, in democratic planning as in democratic education, a super-/sub-ordinate relationship (between planner and planned and between educators and educated) appears to exist. But, admonishes Mannheim, the "reciprocity" in the relationship is

more salient. After Piaget, Mannheim takes "reciporcity" as integral to the "democratic social process." (FPDP: 200) By reciprocity he does not mean a direct exchange. Instead he infers that democratic relationships rest on an interchange of value expressions and rational ideas. Rather than the isolated wants in utilitarian calculus of felicity or the ephemeral emotional impulses of mass members, reciprocity engages informed feelings. Reciprocity assumes different types of rationality as well as different values. (Cf. ESSP: 15ff) Reciprocity heightens one's awareness of self as well as of others.[28] It is essential to democratic morality, to democratic learning, and to democratic planning.

Because of his death, Mannheim was unable to explore in greater detail the relationship between planning and education. However, manuscript notes indicate his continuing interest.[29]

5.E. Conclusions

The strategy of democratic planning fundamentally involves the expansion of democratic intelligence. Mannheim contends that the intellectuals must do immediately what the people cannot yet do for themselves -- think substantially. At the same time they must support educational efforts to teach people to think for themselves. Thus, the intellectual role of critic is not sufficient. While the intellectual might reasonably be a political activist, such involvement is not vital to his endeavors. (Mannheim's own career was more pasive than

participatory. It was as witness and victim that he sought to understand the social upheavals in post-World War I Hungary and Germany.)

Not a Marxist, Mannheim believes that the intelligentsia must avert rather than resolve crises.

> The thinker whom events cannot refute is prone to forget the principal purpose of thought: to know and foresee in order to act ... The mere ability to communicate ideas about vexatious questions seducingly resembles their mastery ... [with the cruel possibility that] in crises an intellectual ecstasy may fall on fertile soil. Masses who grope for security occasionally follow a shaman whose utterances suggest omnipotence. (ESOC: 160)

This advice heeds Dewey's pragmatic wisdom ("That consequences matter"), but apparently confutes Carr's finding that in the period between World War I and World War II:

> Even where the illusion of their leadership was strongest, modern [western] intellectuals have often found themselves in the position of officers whose troops were ready enough to follow them in quiet times, but could be relied on to desert in any serious engagement. (Carr, 1939: 15)

While not expressly stated, Mannheim, like Carr, is trying to explain the hideous roles played by some intellectuals in the Third Reich.[30] In other words, Mannheim and Carr both believe that the intellectuals of recent years should not be seriously heeded because so much of their work has not even intended to guide larger human purposes. (Cf. Carr, 1951) Thus, Mannheim concludes that the intellectuals need be responsible for their thinking to avoid misleading the unsuspecting

who seek certainties and to guide us realistically to a range of rational choices.

Mannheim's exhortations apply to all intellectuals, but he places additional burdens on a special category, the free-floating intelligentsia. Not all intellectuals are detached enough to see the whole (or, perhaps, better, a whole). And only some of the free-floating intelligentsia will be planners.

The creativity of the free-floating intelligentsia is not inherent.[31] Indeed, the very process of being intellectual makes it possible for the relatively classless intellectuals to emerge from all ranks of society. The overcoming of "the radius of one's action and immediate situation" by invoking the "transcending impulse" is basic to every intellectual process." (ESOC: 160ff)

Mannheim's concern for intellectual responsibility is not naively founded, but based on his historical knowledge. It is an

> illusion that free thought and inquiry have a long and impressive history ... [that] the intellectual output of the liberal era [was] overwhelmingly liberal ... [Instead,] liberalism and free ideation are but an episode between periods of institutional culture. (ESOC: 167; cf. I&U)

The newly emerging institutional culture is "bureaucratic" and relies on "vested""prescribed interpretation" which tends to result in "intellectual desiccation."[32] (ESOC: 167-8) Since "every major phase of social change constitutes a choice between alternatives," "bureaucratic machines ... to survive

in the long run ... must use critical judgment." The problem is to promote the honest, inquiring and responsible participation of the intellectual because "the intellectual process is in all its phases the product of concrete situations ... [though] the product is more than the situation ..." (ESOC: 169-70)

Among the factors which impinge on how the intellectuals use their talents are:

> the social background of the individual; the particular phase of his career -- whether he is on the upgrade, at a plateau, or on the downgrade; whether he moves up individually or as a member of a group; whether he is blocked in his advancement or thrown back on his initial situation; the phase of a social movement in which he participates -- the initial, middle, or the terminal shape; the position of his generation in relation to other generations; his social habitat; and finally, the type of aggregation in which he performs. (ESOC: 158)

Of the above dimensions perhaps the most significant and complex factor is that of generational influence. Mannheim is particularly concerned with two questions: Why is generation important? What is the structure of generational change? In response to the first, Mannheim seeks to explain the dynamic continuity of social life. However, with political-economic and technological changes affecting social relationships, the generational functions have become more and more circumvented. It becomes increasingly important to define and reassess education broadly and bolster intergenerational interchange because "originality" arises in the "tension" between the fresh

"a-problematical" view of youth and the reorientation of the problem-focused view of the elders. Pointedly, Mannheim offers as an example the fact that teachers also learn from students. (ESOK: 301)

The intellectuals integrate myriad values and facts into a synthetic whole view; generations jointly forge the human life of today and for tomorrow. Through education the intellectuals and generations meet and re-interpret and reconstruct society.

For that reason, education must emphasize the common interest, including most significantly, the need to prevent "pan-destruction."[32] (FPDP: 193) Hence, the focus on community. (Cf. Chapter 4) However, class and individual development permit more alternatives to be discovered. (Cf. Chapters 3, 4 and 6) Education must then incorporate both perspectives to reinforce a democratic palnning which is just, substantially rational and far-ranging.[33]

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 5

1
Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction is Mannheim's best-known "planning" book. Written in 1935 and expanded in 1940, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction was followed by Diagnosis of Our Time and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning as well as several articles on planning.

2
See, for instance, the dedication to the 1940 version of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction.

3
He notes that his friend, Adolf Lowe, has further developed the idea in Economics and Society.

4
He cites, for example, Max Weber's mistaken belief that the "principle of formal law" applies to "capitalism in general." (MSR: 180) Instead, Mannheim insists it only applied to the "liberal-competitive phase."

5
Interestingly, Talcott Parsons criticized the notion of principia media as used by Lowe in Economics and Society. Mannheim was early aware of Parsons' work; a harsh, but implicit criticism of Parsons is found in "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon" (1928). (FKM: liv, n. 31)

6
Mannheim distinguishes the "bohemian" from the "corporate" intellectuals with the first corresponding to the free-floating intelligentsia. (FKM: 305-6)

7
Kecskemeti in his introduction to Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge points to the first two stages. (ESOK: 24)

8
I.e., "poets and thinkers." (ESOK: 317)

9
At that point, English coffee houses incorporated themselves into political clubs. (ESOC: 139)

10
Cf. especially "Politics as a Vocation" in Gerth and Mills (1946).

11
See Samuels (1970) on the "disenchantment of the British intellectual left." (Cf. MSR: 99ff)

12
Concomitantly, he accentuated "everyman" participation in all sectors of society. Mannheim also appears to have heeded Mills' suggestion that more attention be paid to voting trends in analyzing the character of mass society. (Mills, 1940: 967; cf. especially DOOT: 167-8)

13
"Mannheim has worked out [in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction] a penetrating set of critiques of Marxism." (Mills, 1940: 967)

14
In fact, C. Wright Mills' dissertation is on American pragmatism (1942). (Horowitz, 1963: 615)

15
After all, education literally means the activity of leading away.(Cf. FPDP)

16
The issue of development seen from the biographical approach has been treated from many aspects. Dewey's statement, which Mannheim refers to, in Reconstruction in Philosophy is most significant:

> Development holds merely of the course of changes which takes place within a particular member of the species ... [It] never means, as in modern science, origin of new forms, a mutation from an old species, but only the monotonous traversing of a previously plotted cycle of change. So potentiality never means, as in modern life, the possibility of novelty, of invention, of radical deviation, but only that in principle in virtue of which the acorn becomes the oak. Technically, it is the capacity for movement between opposites. ... only the base can become a man ... Potentiality instead of implying the emergence of anything novel means merely the facility with which a particular thing repeats the recurrent processes of its kind, and thus becomes a specific case of the eternal forms in and through which all things are constituted. (Dewey, 1957: 58)

On the relation of size to proportional development see Schumacher's work. Michael Harrington in The Other America captured widespread interest in the early 1960s in its depiction of the coexistence of under- and over-development in the contemporary United States. Bryce's American Commonwealth tells a similar story a century earlier. On the underdeveloped effects of over-developed social services see Titmuss' The Gift Relationship. An excellent consideration

of social development is found in Robert Graves' utopia, Watch the Northwind Rise.

17
Max Weber specified "charismatic education," "education aiming at culture," and "specialist education." (SOE: 160-1)

18
"Face-to-face contacts, ... help to determine the way in which people will react spontaneously to both the trivial and the important objectives of life." (SOE: 162) Mannheim implies that there is no substitute for breeding such habits and that as a consequence when the number of primary contacts decline in everyday life, desultory, if not fully irrational, behavior is more likely.

19
In America, the populists, as opposed to the progressives, appeared to place less stress on education. Perhaps this difference reflects the respective economies, agrarian versus urban, industrialized, which they addressed. (Cf. Goodwyn, Rogin, Hofstadter)

20
Cf. "Who plans the planners?" (MSR; Chapters 1 and 3)
Mannheim's main types of elite functions are based on Max Weber's analyses. (Cf. Gerth and Mills(eds.), 1946: 342, 97, 268) Just as Mannheim countered Marx' theory of ideology by showing its claims to be ideological, so too he appears to underscore the importance of the "super-structure." Within his own work, the intellectual and moral elites are derived from the concept of rationality. (Cf. Chapter 3) The artistic hails back to Mannheim's earliest cultural concerns as does the religious. (For a period during World War II, Mannheim reasserted the importance of the religious elite because of their cohesive function.) Finally, the distinction between the "political" and "organizing" elites emerges again in his disctions between the distribution and use of power. (See Chapters 6 and 7)

21
A similar motivation underlies Bryce's observation in America of the 1880s:

> The Americans are an educated people, compared with the whole mass of the population in any European country except Switzerland, parts of Germany, Norway, Iceland, and Scotland; that is to say, the average of knowledge is higher, the habit of reading and thinking more generally diffused, than in any other country. (I speak, of course, of the native Americans, excluding the negroes and recent

> immigrants.) ... That the education of the masses is nevertheless a superficial education goes without saying. It is sufficient to enable them to think they know something about the great problems of politics; insufficient to show them how little they know. The public elementary school gives everybody the key to knowledge in making reading and writing familiar, but it has not the time to teach him how to use the key... (Bryce, 1891, Vol. II: 319)

Note that Mannheim supplements his Man and Society bibliography on power with an article on "Obedience" by Bryce. (FPDP: 319)

22
Note that Mill's liberalism is inaccurately confused with democracy in his idea of "clerisy," though, of course, on the surface, clerisy would seem a forerunner of Mannheim's theory of the elites.

23
That Hitler's campaign was as successful as it was is in part due to the application of some of the findings of social science to political control.

24
Mannheim lists "school" as well by which he intends a community-controlled institution. For example, the colleges are under the tutelage of a community of scholars; the elementary schools are guided by local residents.

25
Barrington Moore in a very cogent and persuasive argument turns the question around and wonders whether men are not too plastic. (Moore, 1972: 76) Nevertheless, Mannheim follows a progressive tradition in his theory which incorporates the trilogy of (1) the expectation of development, (2) the "malleability of man" and (3) the "limits of reason." (Mandelbaum, 1971: 41)

26
"A community that pursues an educational end is likely to give due weight to the educational implications of any change it may introduce." (FPDP: 197)

27
Involving children in social change is as Freud remarked "revolutionary." Reiff, citing Dewey and Wilhelm Reich as "the great theorists of the child as the agent of social change," suggests that Marx is not nearly as "subversive" as some think. However, I think Mannheim, Reich, and Dewey all reacted to a different world than Marx, a world

where children were regularly inculcated by societal institutions, and in the case of Nazi German, politically exploited.

28
In Lasswell and Kaplan's terms, reciprocity involves the continuous readjustment of the integration of "welfare" and "deference values." (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 55ff)

29
Bramstedt and Gerth,in a note in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, explain that Mannheim intended to pursue the idea of "progressive education" further to develop (1) a curriculum determined by "purposes" not "traditional subject matter"; (2) an activities schedule which would entail "planning" group projects; (3) "cooperative" and "self-improvement" rewards to "substitute ... for competi[on]"; and (4) other internal reforms. (FPDP: 357)

30
Carl Schmitt, before the 1930s regarded as one of the most profound and important social thinkers in Europe, is little known in the English speaking world because references to his work fell off after he supported the Nazi regime.

31
The division of labor makes it difficult for most people to see the whole from their individual situations. Moreover, the "public scrutiny" afforded by village life is lost in the city setting. Another source of the cutting of human community ties is found in the growth of the public service sector which replaces the reliance on face-to-face "voluntary cooperation." The intellectual is additionally cut loose from the community by his ability to avoid reality by associating only with those of his own type and by relying on books (or printed information) instead of informing himself from the "real setting." While Mannheim notes that the lack of normal pressures -- eased schedules, output determined by the individual, and pursuits and interests not dictated by one's immediate situation -- are necessary to intellectual life, he warns that the intellectual must pursue "doubt in which one's questions outrun the scope of one's inherited answers" if progress is to continue. (ESOK: 160ff)

32
The abuse of intellectual life is evident in Veblen's "trained incapacity to think" and the growth of "public interpreters" (i.e., "public relations experts" who are "usually trained intellectuals, equipped with the tools of free inquiry, who dischrage their duties as experts of directed thinking, as specialists in arriving at fixed conclusions from variable premises." (ESOK: 168-9)

33 After all, Mannheim asserts: "Genuine democracy is allied to rational science and the diffusion of knowledge." (FPDP: 73)

CHAPTER 6

FREEDOM AND DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

The idea of democratic planning differs from socialist and welfare state theories. All three concepts presume procedural political equality. However, the notion of democratic planning is defined less in economic terms, and, accordingly, has a different fundamental objective -- to extend and enrich freedom. In contrast, socialism and welfare state theory hold economic equality and equity, respectively, supreme. Where socialism seeks economic equality (i.e., just distribution of resources and products) in a public economy, welfare states try to achieve equity (i.e., compensatory goods and services for the disadvantaged) by regulating private industries and public resources (e.g., land). Welfare states also provide certain goods and services through public agencies. (Myrdal, 1960, 1972; Baran, 1969; Lange and Taylor, 1964; Dobb, 1969; Galbraith, 1973) The idea of democratic planning recognizes the need for diminishing extreme inequalities in wealth and income, but it does not consider this the ultimate goal. Instead, quest is to achieve the ideals of democratic community. The focus on freedom, therefore, has several implications.

Freedom, more directly than equity or equality, addresses the issue of control. Relative economic equality and equity are measured by the consequences of control;

freedom, however, is assessed by the extent of initiative for taking control. Second, equity and equality compare the situations of individuals to other individuals (or groups), whereas freedom concentrates on the interaction of individuals (and groups) in the context of the whole society. Third, while the maximum limits of equity and equality in theory can be specified, freedom can forever be "enhance/d/." (Lynd, 1939: 210ff; Carr, 1951; Mannheim; Dewey) Fourth, freedom is a political and intellectual concept, while equality is a political-economic notion. Consequently, freedom can contribute more to democratic intelligence. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 5) Finally, freedom prescribes, unlike equality or equity, how individuals are to interrelate in a democratic collectivizing society. Without attention to this issue, even the most egalitarian societies cannot forward democracy in the long run.

Freedom, therefore, is a basic goal of democracy. However, freedom also is redefined as political-economic conditions change. This short chapter presents the sequence of Mannheim's argument for why freedom must be defined in terms of social, not individual, democracy. (Cf. Carr, 1948)

In Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, Mannheim concludes that:

> ... freedom in a planned society should not be judged in terms of the absence or

> presence of bureaucracy and regulation, but in terms of the common good and the best use of individual potentialities... (p. 284)

Thus, true democratic freedom demands developing a "psychological and material environment... /which/ induce/s/ people to choose desirable values." It also recognizes that "the real idea of tolerance" is "not passive acquiescence," but rather involves "the ideal of creative tolerance" "/to/ ... establish/ / a common purpose and real co-operation with dissenters who are forever in ferment." (FPDP: 190, 204ff; cf. Mills in Horowitz, 1963: 297)

Mannheim's much talked-about "democratic personality" is simply a short-hand term to describe freedom under democratic planning.

6.A. Freedom and Rationality

Mannheim's thoughts on freedom develop out of his concept of rationality.[1] (Cf. I&U, 1929, 1933) In a profound sense the sociology of knowledge and the call for a science of politics are deliberate attempts to demystify contemporary meanings of individual freedom. (Cf. I&U: 261-2) Mannheim hesitates there to offer a substitute definition, but he does explore some of the parameters for an improved definition.

The first step toward a redefinition of freedom, Mannheim maintains, is the recognition of contingent factors.

> Those persons who talk most about human freedom are those who are actually most blindly subject to social determination, inasmuch as they do not in most cases suspect the profound degree to which their conduct is determined by their interests. (I&U: 48)

> Those who fear that an increased knowledge of the determining factors which enter into the formation of their decisions will threaten their 'freedom' may rest in peace. Actually it is the one who is ignorant of the significant determining factors and who acts under the immediate pressure of determinants unknown to him who is least free and most thoroughly predetermined in his conduct. (I&U: 189)

One contingent factor is personal knowledge which reflects, in turn, particular historical settings, and varies according to group interests. Thus, in the "19th century," the "conservative" notion of freedom was a "qualitative conception" "mean/ing/ the right to maintain either their historical or the inner, individual distinctiveness" and necessarily "divert/ing/ the issues concerning freedom from the external political realm to the inner non-political realm." In contrast, the liberal idea, which stressed "freedom from precisely those privileges which to the old-style conservative appeared to be the very basis of freedom," was "an 'equalitarian conception' of a group which sought to overthrow the external, legal, non-equalitarian social order." Neither the liberal nor the conservative view is appropriate to the contemporary need to create and sustain democracy. (I&U: 273; cf. Chapters 4 and 5)

Freedom is more than an individual political right. Another contingent factor is the interpersonal implications. These social factors cannot, however, be exaggerated. Mannheim is wary of the "search/es/" of Max Weber and others for "eternally valid generalizations." (I&U: 253) So too, he is leary of simple socialist rule-making. Democratic freedom, instead, involves recurrent individual judgment and consequent action in the context of the historistical "whole." (Cf. I&U: 255)

Neither can freedom be tied solely to contingent economic factors. Mannheim warns against the "reduction of politics to economics"; freedom is not clarified by Marxian prophecies or technical "realism." (Cf. I&U: 254ff)

Just as freedom is modified by contingent factors, so too, it must be exercised with foresight as to the consequences. Any act today which limits human possibilities tomorrow, he implies, may not truly be an act of freedom. (Cf. I&U: 260-1)

In summary, acts based on "separat/ing/ thought from the world of reality,... conceal/ing/ reality, or ... exceed/ing/ its limits" are never free. (I&U: 98) The issue of freedom is "rather how man deals with his problems of knowing, bound as he is in his knowledge by his position in time and society." (I&U: 188) Moreover, because "new

problems of thought arise, man must learn to think anew ... must continually adapt to his changing history." (I&U: 107)

Freedom is never an isolated exercise of choice. (Cf. Bay) And though choices improve with social knowledge, they are never perfect, as social knowledge is always unfinished. Choices must, therefore, appreciate the limits of social knowledge.

6.B. Freedom and Intervention

In Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1935, 1940), Mannheim's first statement on planning, freedom is redefined as "essentially the chance for spontaneous initiative." Freedom assumes rationality directs and interprets choices. Because of "organized control," freedom must first make use of "available ways of escaping the apparatus of coercion." (MSR: 160, n.1; emphasis supplied) However, this is not enough.

Distraught by the "ambivalent tendencies towards freedom and revolution" of the "intelligentsia" in Nazi Germany, Mannheim concludes

> we have a negatively developing liberalism -- which in an age of the domination of the masses allows the liberties which it provides to be used against itself without hindrance and permits the social mechanisms which it has itself created to be misused by its opponents. (MSR: 89, 109)

The transformation of liberal ideology into functional rationality has unleashed a monster which without planned transformation precludes the salvation of individual liberties. This situation occurred not because liberalism was "/in/elastic" but because no integrative structure emerged to counteract "deteriorative tendencies." (MSR: 106, 61; cf. Chapter 4) To retrieve the best of liberalism, Mannheim argues, requires the development and reinforcement of substantial rationality. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 5)

The forerunners of a new age of freedom will emerge from the ranks of the "mobile" -- including Jews and the free-floating intelligentsia -- whose very tenuous positions force them to constantly "think/ /" and "organize" "anew." (MSR: 57) Mannheim here implies that though democratization and industrialization may extend political equality, non-equality is more likely to engender real demands for greater freedom. (Cf. MSR: 58) Non-equality (i.e., being left out of the social structure) is quite different from inequality (i.e., differences in individual rights within a social structure). He further implies that the discrepancy between political equality and working-life inequality is likely to decrease demands for freedom. (MSR: 59) Anticipating Fromm's Escape from Freedom (1941), Mannheim raises the question of how behavior and thinking change when one has a stake in the system.[2] (Veblen, who earlier made similar observations on American culture, con-

cluded that "vested interests" and "emulation" work against the ideals of democracy.[3])

Not surprisingly, then, Mannheim calls for "Planning for Freedom." Acknowledging himself to be a "man for whom freedom and personal responsibility /ar/e the highest of all values," Mannheim avers that "abstract" arguments for freedom bring "too cheap a victory."

> The problem is rather to discover what structural changes in the different countries led to the downfall of the type of freedom, culture, and democracy which prevailed in the 19th century. (MSR: 5, 9)

"Freedom from" government intervention is obviously insufficient in the 20th century. "Freedom for what?" must also be determined. (MSR: 346)

The considerable English influence on Mannheim's planning theory especially asserts itself in the concept of freedom. The home of liberalism, England prepared for post-war "reconstruction" as early as 1941. The so-called Beveridge Commission worked under the aegis of Churchill's war cabinet. While France was overrun by Germans and America was winding down the anti-depression machinery -- the National Resources Planning Board disbanded in 1943 -- Britain was looking to the future. A Beveridge Commission document released in 1942 announced "the purpose of victory is to live into a better world than old world." (Clough, et al, 1968: 337) To the question of "freedom for what?"

the bipartisan reports, which underpinned post-war national planning, answered: at least "freedom from want." (Clough, et al, 1968: 344; Mencher, 1969; Havighurst, 1962)

Thus, Mannheim's continental heritage, a social view of liberty (cf. Carr, 1948; Barber, Rousseau), conjoined with the British legacy of individualism and the increasingly socio-economic interpretation of freedom (cf. Mill, Terrill, Mencher).

The result is Mannheim's call for planned government action to preserve and enhance freedom. "Regulatory intervention" is insufficient as it only addresses individuals. "Conscious[ ] control[ ]" to re-integrate social structures is also needed. (MSR: 155ff) Such "planning for freedom" emphasizes "interdependence" and individual and social consequences. (Cf. MSR: 223, 229)

To act freely one must feel secure.[4] The "organization of insecurity" (which is manifest in the individual behavior of scapegoating and "automatism," and in corporate and national behaviors like "imperialist expansion") conceals the attendant loss of freedom in the contemporary world. (MSR: 136) Psychological factors are, hence, critical. (Cf. MSR: 372ff; Mills in Horowitz, 1963: 297)

Finally, the degree of human interaction and stage of historico-technical development affect the extent and kinds of freedom.

Mannheim envisions three concentric circles of human interaction. In the center, interaction is direct (usually

with only one other person) and freedom consists of (1) "the continual opportunity for resistance," (2) "the continual possibility of taking the initiative," and (3) "the continual process of voluntary compromise." "Coercion," "permanent subjection, a permanent sacrifice of initiative," is absent. (MSR: 371)

The middle circle is characterized by the interaction of individuals within and with small groups. "Freedom consists in a clear definition of the spheres where complete freedom of action is possible, and of democratic control over the rules governing the regulated spheres." Freedom is lost when a group usurps regulatory power over all spheres of activity. (MSR: 371)

Society, the outer circle, overarches the two simpler arenas of freedom. At this level freedom consists more of "the possibility of self-expression" than "freedom of action." (MSR: 371)

Similarly, the three stages of technical development have various implications for freedom.[5] (Cf. K. Polanyi, 1944) In the first stage, "chance discovery," man learns independence, especially in the manipulation of nature. "Freedom expresses itself in direct action on and reaction to the stimuli of surroundings." Freedom is impeded by the direct interference of other person(s) and is limited by surface access to nature. In the second stage of "invention," "intermediate aims" are made possible by "accumulated knowledge of tools." Man also learns his dependence on

others to complement his independence.

> Apart from freedom to decide one's own destiny and dispose of one's own property, freedom will depend on the influence one is able to exert in determining the aims which are to be realized by collective action.

The subtle, yet cumulative, psychological effects of this stage are serious as men increasingly sacrifice the "liberty of action" and "spontaneity" for the "free/dom/ to invent" social "entangle/ments/." So too, the "techniques" developed to control nature often dictate their own ends. (MSR: 371-5)

The third stage, which has yet to occur, is freedom in an age of planning. Just as freedom was not lost, only redefined, in the second stage, freedom is not threatened by planning. Indeed, without planning, the second stage will "enslave/ _/" us. Having sacrificed "primary ... freedom," personal freedoms can only be ensured by "regulat/ing/ all social relationships so as to secure the collective freedom of the group in accordance with democratically recognized plans." (MSR: 376-7)

In summary, Mannheim is arguing that freedom must be considered in light of the institutional development of society. (Cf. Chapter 4) Therefore, "the guarantees of freedom are entirely different at the three stages." "Freedom to escape" corresponds to the first; "balance of power" (with "no /acknowledged/ higher authority") to the second; and "planning for freedom" to the third. (MSR: 378-9)

Reapplying the "contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous" formula (cf. Chapter 4), Mannheim suggests that all three forms of freedom will continue to some degree in the planned society. Yet, under democratic planning, "freedom for individual adjustment" and freedom for "local" "initiative" will be maximized, not solely for ideological reasons, but to promote "individual capacity" and innovation. In addition, Mannheim thinks that "corporate initiative"[6] will increasingly share the task of "invention" with planners.

The actual mix of freedoms will depend on "concrete" situations and how far democratic planning has progressed. Thus, he argues against the inevitability of "bureaucratic absolutism." Freedom at the stage of planning, based on the interdependence of men, must begin with the recognition that "responsibility increases with every advance in the course of history." (MSR: 379-81) Such responsibility determines the controls to ensure freedom.

Hitherto, "the problem of freedom /though/ ... one of the most recurrent in the history of religion and the philosophy of man... has always been couched in too abstract a form." (MSR: 369) Indeed, the question "is Man free?" needs to be posed again and again, but "in reference to a given society and to the social techniques existing in it." The same question "is Man free?" serves as a starting point to determine "how far a definite type of social environment

can be changed and where are the best points to intervene ..." (MSR: 370) The first issue of freedom under contemporary conditions, then, is not how many choices we should have as much as what kinds of choices. The second issue of freedom is how to prevent "physical force" and/or "psychological compulsion." (MSR: 371) Misplaced controls destroy freedom. In the third stage it leads to "planning for conformity"; in the second stage it creates "chaos."[7] (MSR: 263)

Democratic control, at least, presumes intervention to narrow the economic differences between classes.

> What is the use of freedom in teaching and learning to a poor man who has neither the time nor the means to acquire the necessary education? What use is the freedom to choose our own philosophy of life, to form our own opinions, if the sociological mechanisms of our society create insecurity, anxiety, neuroses, which prevent us from making sound and rational decisions? (MSR: 377)

At every particular time and place, "varying degrees of freedom and coercion" are to be found (in "politics, in public life, in the family, in social work, in art, and in the intellectual spheres"). Therefore, freedom must be defined in terms of "the principles of a healthy community life." (MSR: 244-5) "Psychological freedom is impossible unless fundamental social relationships have been organized ... [to secure] the basic conditions of social life." (MSR: 352) Intervention must be determined in a way which understands the links between freedom and control. For example,

> In an age in which unemployment /despite freedom of occupation/ and unplanned migration /i.e., free movement/ upset the balance of community life and whole suburbs and cities have to be built at a moment's notice, it is impossible to create a new order without understanding how to coordinate the forces of society. (MSR: 245)

6.C. Freedom and Social Change

In Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist (1943),[8] Mannheim extends his discussion of freedom in reference to democracy and economic planning. He totally renounces "laissez-faire liberalism." Instead, "democracy has to become militant if it is to survive." In other words, the self-neutralizing "relativist" liberalism must be superseded by "courage" to "agree on some basic values" like "brotherly love, mutual help, decency, social justice, freedom, respect for the person, etc." A working definition of "authority" must be developed to support the practice of these common values. Political society must also allow for "individual choice or free experimentation" in the "more complicated values." (DOOT: 7)

The clarification of two levels of democratic values -- the "common" and the "more complicated" -- is critical to prevent the takeover of "economic planning" by "intellectual groups" with "an /ambiguous but/ all-embracing purpose." (DOOT: 103) In short, we must use our current measures of freedom to garner more freedom. Indeed, freedom properly

understood will engender participation in "common-experience groups" (as opposed to passive support of interest groups). (E.g., DOOT: 49) In effect, Mannheim is saying that freedom will be lost if it is not used, and that its full use depends on "conscious" reference to democratic goals. (DOOT: 10)

At the concrete level, Mannheim admits the task is not always simple and direct.

> We have no accepted theory and practice concerning the nature of freedom and discipline. Some think that, owing to the self-regulating powers inherent in group life, discipline would spontaneously emerge if only full freedom were given and the pressure of external authority removed. In contrast to this anarchist theory, others hold that if strict regulation is applied to those spheres of life where it is necessary, the scope for real freedom is not suppressed but rather created. To such thinkers discipline is the precondition of freedom. Having no settled views on freedom and discipline, it is not surprising that we [, for example,] hesitate whether to treat the law-breaker as a sinner or as a patient, and cannot decide where he or society is at fault. (DOOT: 13)

We can only be sure, he remarks, that

> ... there is a continuous adjustment at work between what individuals would like to do if their choices were directed by personal wishes only, and what society wants them to do. (DOOT: 16)

Therefore, the process of "revaluation" is not only necessary for orderly integration, it is also "an aspect of social change." (DOOT: 17)

Since social change burdens some and rewards others, Mannheim is careful to consider some principles of compensa-

tion. "Additional regulations" must be publicly weighed for their social "costs" and to "/en/sure that nobody will regulate for the sake of regulation." Furthermore, "economists" "should tell us which classes and groups will profit, which will lose most, if one scheme or another is carried out." Though "we have to be willing to pay heavily for" "Planning for Freedom," the prices of "murder, concentration camps and the suspension of all liberties" are too dear. Instead, "if we know who will suffer most from any necessary alterations, it /would be/ ... possible to provide for them, to compensate them, to re-train them, to give them new functions in society." (DOOT: 145)

Notice that Mannheim's idea of compensation puts men on a more equal footing in the new society. Implicitly based on a labor theory of value, "victims" are not rewarded. Since the upper classes presumably have the most to lose, Mannheim compensation scheme, though apparently just, is unlikely to be a tantalizing carrot.[9]

The "political method of transformation will be reformist." Under the surveillance of "Parliament" "those types of freedom which are compatible with ... /a/ minimum of centralization and organization" will be encouraged and "maint/ained/." (DOOT: 49)

Similarly, Mannheim redefines tolerance. Unlike the liberal view, which allows one "to tolerate the intolerant," under "democratic tolerance" "the citizen of our commonwealth has a perfect right to hate and exclude those who wish to

misuse the methods of freedom for abolishing freedom." (DOOT: 49; cf. Marcuse, Spitz, Walzer, R.P. Wolff)

Marcuse, with whom Mannheim shared office space in Frankfurt in the late 1920s, makes a similar argument in the mid-1960s, though to criticize capitalism rather than to advocate planning. The difference between the two lies in Marcuse's implicit call for revolution. Of course, as revolution entails warfare which in turn precludes freedom, Mannheim's position is ultimately incompatible with Marcuse's. But since the enemies of socialism are more easily identified than those of freedom, Mannheim's position suffers from its lack of detailed constitutionally grounded analysis. Mannheim tries to defend his position by maintaining that rules are inadequate: "the choice is not between absolute freedom and blind obedience." (DOOT: 51) In contrast to legal arguments, Mannheim seriously considers the time-frame in which freedoms are to be exercised.

> ... formerly there was need for short-term decisions only. The more matters become interdependent in planned society, the more the long-range consequences of a decision and long-range responsibilities become a matter of daily deliberation. (DOOT: 102)

6.D. Freedom and Social Cohesion

The English environment may have reinforced Mannheim's concern with freedom, but he ultimately remains unconvinced by liberal arguments.[10] In "democratic tolerance," Mannheim

ties together several loose ends. His fear of the desultory behavior of masses combined with his observation of the importance that small events play in individual behaviors and interpretations (cf. SS; Chapter 4) lead him to conclude that another substantially rational form of social cohesion needs be introduced for a democratic planning society. That he chooses to focus on religion to meet this need is not surprising because (1) the history of religious freedom is intimately tied to the development of political freedoms; (2) his first paper, "Soul and Culture," in part sought to redefine religion; (3) his Marx/Weber heritage was vitally concerned with social manifestations of religion; (4) he was a member of the Christian group, Moot ; and (5) the relation between religious beliefs and psychological reactions to the Depression and the advent of war were actively studied on both sides of the Atlantic.[11]

Looking back, it was not the emphasis on religion, but linking it to planning, that was unique. For example, some analysts argue that the secular denial of religion helped Nazism brew. (Cf. deGrazia, 1948) Others look more generally at the community functions of religion. (Cf. Lynd and Lynd, Horkeimer) Religious leaders have played active political roles (e.g., Rev. Coughlin, Martin Luther King). Finally, religions tend to provide a structure by which to make "sense" of everyday feelings and happenings.[12]

In Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist, Mannheim calls for a new religion to conjoin people in

a new consensus for democratic planning. (Cf. DOOT: 120) The religion, defined by the common aims of democratic planning and emphasizing the etymological root, religere, to bind together, would be nourished by "paradigmatic expe-riences" of "real participation" and a "share in the life of the community." Such "paradigmatic experiences," Mannheim argues, separate "saint" from "hysteric." In other words, such a religion prevents a "complete despiritualization of emotions which runs amuck without any concrete purpose." It allows freedom to be exercised creatively. (DOOT: 136-7) For example, in a manner similar to Greek drama or medieval morality plays, a democratic planning society would sponsor dramatization/s/ ... of a final common aim." The public celebration of democratic ideals, as Lynd notes, coheres a community. (Lynd, 1939) This approach contrasts with re-staging historical events, as for instance, the Battle of Bunker Hill.

For Mannheim, western society appears to have reached the point where historical residues are more likely to engen-der malevolent psychological reactions than to suggest alternative directions. History as a force seems more power-ful in constraining individual initiative than in provoking a search for more social knowledge and new directions.

Modern religious teachings tend to rest on the tacit assumption that if men do not learn true religion, they will learn something else, probably worse. Mannheim also takes this position in his educational theory. He thus misleads

readers, I think, when he speaks of the "modern type of emptiness." He infers less a total ideational void than a simple lack of integrated interpretation to inform democratic direction. In this way his connection between intellectualism and religion makes sense. Religion is also important as it implies everyday (or at least regularly frequent) practice which, in turn, supports the continuity of the humanity of men in light of their potentials and limits. The "synthesis" of religion and freedom is best seen in Mannheim's affirmation of Hillel's statement:

> If I am not for myself, who will be for me?
> If I am only for myself -- then what am I for?
> (ESSP: 310)

In short, "militant" democracy intends less global proselytizing and more a local fervor grounded in a strong and humane faith.[13]

6.E. The New Freedom: Choice and Control

Mannheim increasingly discusses freedom in reference to existing realities with "descri/ptions/" of what "freedom of choice" could be like in "an age of planning." (FPDP: 281ff) A "fundamental transformation" is occurring as seen in the unheralded but "striking ... increase in the number of deliberate choices" in "modern society." At least four factors attend this change: (1) choices "increase automatically with the increasing capacity to produce," (2) "the rising volume and efficiency of means of communication /, including

advertising, and/ ... distribution ... spread/ _/ knowledge about desirable things far and wide," (3) "habits and customs of self-restraint" now yield to "wishes and desires" that in turn "are now allowed much wider scope" and, (4) only the lack of money prevents all classes from purchasing "luxury goods." Mannheim is not naive about what this increase in choice signifies or the reasons for its emergence. Like Marx, he is not antagonistic to the rise of capitalism. Yet, as capitalism advances, without humane control, new problems erupt.

> This striking change has come about because the choice-restricting factors have largely been reduced to price-income relationships ... If not accompanied by a general rise in mass income, the new aspirations must result in a resentful yearning to equalize wealth and income opportunities ... /U/nplanned /society/ ... readily produces dissatisfaction in the midst of plenty. (FPDP: 281)

The problem of capitalism is not scarcity; capitalism is marked by surplus production and artificial scarcities. Thus, scarcity per se does not cause dissatisfaction. Instead, the gulf between possibility and reality, the "disparity between /human/ wants and their satisfaction," lead to profound dissatisfaction. Mannheim illustrates the point by describing how war-time rationing and price controls not only helped the poor eat better balanced meals, but, more significantly, created "a new level of social awareness" of new possibilities given available planning instruments.

Under these conditions, freedom must be defined at two levels. In some cases, individual "egoism" must be sacrificed

for the "common good"; "/t/he yardstick for freedom and discipline cannot be the freedom of the well-to-do to monopolize high-priced goods." In other cases, the individual must be "compelled[14] to follow his self-interest." (FPDP: 282) Since the "dualism" is "permanent," the contemporary problem should prevail.

In other words, freedom is relative, falling midway on the continuum between alienation and anomie. (Cf. Lukes) Where anomie results from the lack of societal integration, alienation occurs because of a too rigid social structure. The behaviors elicited by both alienation and anomie appear similarly unfree, however.[15] Anomie and alienation are usually seen as alternative conceptions, but in Mannheim's scheme they are linked because he believes "in every society there are always motivated and motivating individuals." (FPDP: 64) Mannheim insists that a sense of belonging is essentially correlative to freedom. (Cf. FPDP: 311) Belonging is defined in reference to both common human bonds and differentiated group ties. Such dual belonging is the only way to overcome alienation and anomie, or, to permit emancipation. (Cf. FPDP: 226)

> We may call a person 'emancipated' who does not think in terms of 'my country -- right or wrong,' who is not a chauvinist expecting his parish church to be the most magnificent in the world. He achieves emancipation by partial uprooting, by selecting for personal identification only certain traditions and values of his community. In so doing he does not shut out the character-forming influences of community participation, nor does he sacrifice

> his right to independent thought and personal development. He is emancipated because he is always ready to move toward a more comprehensive integration of the world but he does so without turning cosmopolitan by denouncing his solidarity with his nation. The emancipated person shares the fate of his country, but his vision reaches beyond the sacro egoismo of the modern nationalism. An increasing number of emancipated citizens in all camps can help to bring about an integrated world for all. (FPDP: 63)

Since all societies have "sanctions and punishments" the contemporary democratic political culture must discern the policies which foster individual growth while enhancing community cohesion. "There is [likewise] no innate form of responsibility"; "every society trains for or at least carefully prepares the individual for the assumption of responsibilities." (FPDP: 275, 207)

Thus different forms of freedom and discipline have to be encouraged. The anarchist conception of "spontaneous self-discipline" appropriately pertains to small groups and should be reinforced in that setting to stimulate "vital energy." (FPDP: 276-7; cf. Hyams, Morris & Hess, Bookchin) But large-scale organizations are also required, and so "adequate controls" must be developed. Liberal controls are inadequate because "any freedom differing from their own will seem to be the opposite of freedom." (FPDP: 278) Totalitarian controls, while recognizing that self-discipline is not automatic in large-scale organizations, fail to permit any freedoms to be "known or cherished." "Plutocratic" controls, while historically liberating, exclude the many

under modern industrial conditions of "corporate big business." (FPDP: 278) Socialist controls rest too much on equality of treatment which inhibits individual potentialities.

Therefore, "freedom and discipline under democratic planning will be defined by the nature of groups, subgroups and their purposes." (FPDP: 279) Particular decisions should err on the side of freedom rather than discipline.

> ... it is ... short-sighted to say that freedom prevails if a society produces goods and services on a sufficiently large scale and distributes them more or less fairly, but leaves the regulation of discipline and freedom in the political and cultural spheres to a bureaucratic or political elite. A society that sacrifices cultural and political freedom for greater equality of income and education demonstrates its low appreciation of the former values. The issue is not material welfare, but how to extend self-determination to all spheres of life for the full development of personality, which requires both material and cultural opportunities. (FPDP: 279)

In short, direct democracy is always to be preferred to elite guidance.

The regulation of organizations of any size must be considered in reference to democratic criteria. Large-scale centralized organizations are to be condoned only when coordination and economies of scale are shown to be necessary. Even within these large-scale organizations, internal democratic structures must be encouraged. Mannheim agrees with the syndicalists that often the individual is protected

and supported mainly within the context of particular groups. Hence, a democratically planning society must also regulate new and existing groups to promote democratic group interaction, internal behavior, and "activities." Since he lists corporations under the category of groups, Mannheim thereby justifies interference with "their external relationships /and/ ... their internal organization, in /the form/ ... of industrial democracy." (FPDP: 281) By the same token, occupational choices are to be at least guided by democratically planned needs and evaluations of the workers. (FPDP: 284)

6.F. Conclusions

Mannheim's conception of freedom under democratic planning thus involves individual initiative (1) at three levels -- the community, the group and alone, (2) on questions of production, consumption, distribution, resource allocation, and leisure, (3) with responsibility for interpersonal and long-range consequences. To inform and improve the exercise of freedom, substantial rationality must be reinforced by extending educational opportunities, maintaining an independent intelligentsia, and encouraging free thought and speech. These formal arrangements must be further complemented by informal groupings which "give scope to people of specific gifts or aspirations." (FPDP: 284)

As thoughtful and optimistic as Mannheim's formulation is, his conception of freedom seems to favor "the best and

the brightest." What happens to those who do not live up to their potentials?

Yet, what Mannheim fears, and with reason, is "socially induced stupidity." Without the pressure to think freely and act responsibly "docility" or "self-neutralization" will occur. (ESOC: 178) Furthermore, given Mannheim's concept of rationality, without active ("militant") exercise of freedom, democracy will atrophy into a pre-authoritarian state. (Cf. Chapter 4)

His arguments stand up very well in light of subsequent events in Anglo-American democracies. (Cf. Bay, R.P. Wolff, MacPherson) Mannheim nicely defines the limits to freedom (i.e., promotion of violence and advocacy for "power-drunk" minorities are never to be condoned) and the goals of freedom (to extend and sustain democratic involvement at all levels). His flexibility on intermediate problems of freedom simply reflects his wisdom about the need for recurrent assessments of the uses and abuses of freedom.

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 6

1
This is not to deny that Mannheim discussed freedom and related concepts, like autonomy, in his earlier works. See, for instance, "Towards the Sociology of the Mind" (ESOC: 30ff)

2
National Socialism, forged by the Nazi party, brought large-scale planning to Germany. (Cf. Nolte, 1966) In this experiment, ironically Mannheim, who pined for a new eutopian vision in Ideology and Utopia, plays the role of the alien interloper discovering the atrocities of the planned society. (Cf. Butler's Erewhon.)

3
(See Lerner (ed.), 1948; Reissman, 1953) In "The Intellectual Pre-eminence of Jews in Modern Europe," (1919), Veblen contends that their "skepticism" and "pioneering" intellectual talents result from their "alien" positions within gentile societies and not from their racial or religious background. Therefore, he suggests that the repatriation of the "Chosen People" will reduce the pre-eminence of Jews as scholars. (Lerner (ed.), 1948: 467ff)

4
Mannheim implies that individual and collective security can be overcome partly by education which helps further explain his broad and longitudinal view of education. (Cf. Chapter 5)

5
Cf. the three stages of thought which lead to planning in Chapter 4.

6
Here he means any group endeavor, not just business organizations.

7
In theory, at least, liberalism depends on an atomistic view of a realtively equal distribution of power. Whenever control is exerted to impinge upon an individual's power, or to coalesce group power, the delicate, yet fundamental, basis of liberalism is undermined.

8
Diagnosis of Our Time is a series of papers, some of which were written especially for the volume, others of which were delivered on various occasions between 1939 and 1942. See Appendix A.

9
The logic employed here is not unlike that lying beneath Rawls' "veil of ignorance" in that it never assumes full economic equality. (Cf. Rawls, 1971)

10
Interestingly, to a British audience at Manchester College, Oxford, in 1938, Mannheim "present[ed]" himself as a "liberal" "whose vested interests are not so much to be found in the economic world as in his being a member of a certain type of intelligentsia whose only capital is his learning and whose fundamental demands on life are freedom of thought and free development of personality." (ESSP: 255)

11
Mannheim calls "religion" a "community affair" and reminds us that the term comes from the Latin, religere, meaning to bind together. (SS: 91) See also Wecter, Polenberg, Buber, deGrazia, Lynd and I&U. Lynd makes a similar point in noting the importance of annual parades and feasts to reaffirm community cohesion. (Lynd, 1939)

12
See especially Marx' "theses" on Feuerbach, who exposed this critical function of religion.

13
The perversion of religious capacities in politics is nicely described by Noam Chomsky in "The Secular Priesthood."

14
Mannheim seems to mean by "compel" not the force of right reason as much as the support of individual initiative.

15
Anomie, literally, the absence of laws, is associated with the theories of Durkheim and Scheler, both known to Mannheim and considered more conservative than progressive. Alienation, now primarily associated with Marx, was in Mannheim's time a more general term signifying the isolation of some men from others. (Cf. Lukes, 1967, 1973)

CHAPTER 7

POWER AND DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

In 1943 Mannheim announced his forthcoming book, Essentials of Democratic Planning. (DOOT: 166) Mannheim's last work on planning was published posthumously in 1950, however, as Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning. He apparantly changed the title to suggest that freedom and power are the two "essential" ingredients of democratic planning.[1]

Why does Mannheim emphasize power and freedom? In theory and practice, he believes, democracies seeking individualistic freedom suffer from trying to minimize the importance of power. Either they devise schemes to cancel out power or they pretend power does not matter. On the other hand, planning efforts often tend to extinguish freedoms by overemphasizing power. (Cf. FPDP: 45) In both cases freedom and power are juxtaposed. Only in anarchy are power and freedom fully and spontaneously compatible. But, cautions Mannheim, anarchy only works in small groups where adjustments are made by face-to-face encounters. What can be done in more complex and institutionalized societies? The resolution, he answers, must lie in the consolidation of the best of planning and democracy.

Mannheim is frequently criticized for overstressing the leadership of the intellectuals in his theory of democratic planning. However, as the last and this chapter show, Mannheim was at least as concerned with the context and

processes of freedom and power in the changing everyday milieu.

The philosopher-king interpretation of Mannheim's theory of planning thus ignores Mannheim's basic orientation. Where Plato indicates the superiority of his abstract plan by entitling his program, The Republic, Mannheim, instead, stresses human interchanges in his titles. The terms -- "Man and Society," "Reconstruction," "Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning," and "Diagnosis" -- all underscore interrelated human acts. They suggest the possibility of improvement without dictating final outcomes.

Writing in response to turbulent times, Mannheim was immodestly ambitious in his proposals, though his basic convictions remain quite humble. (Cf. MSR: 27) Never the supercilious expert, Mannheim tendered his ideas to the thinking public as well as to his scholarly colleagues. Though there is no evidence that Mannheim commingled with non-intellectuals, his planning work was reviewed in non-academic journals and he gave public radio talks during World War II. Sometimes, his zealous convictions led him astray, but never did he depart from the goal of making the social world intelligible and, hence, controllable for human purposes.[2]

Not an eternal truth, democratic planning, Mannheim asserts, is unnecessary until a concentrating socio-economic power structure cannot be controlled by liberal institutions. (Cf. FPDP: 176-7; MSR: 79ff and passim) The liberal focus

on individual rights and obligations becomes outdated "by the complexity of the modern age" where "social responsibility /is/ required." Writing in the last month of his life, Mannheim claims that the task, democratic planning, is possible because "never in human history have rulers and decision-makers accumulated such great power to do the right thing." (FPDP: xviii)

Two questions follow: What is the "right thing"? and How "to do the right thing"?

> Our task is to build a social system by planning, but planning of a special kind; it must be planning for freedom, subjected to democratic control; planning, but not restrictionist so as to favor group monopolies either of entrepreneurs or workers' associations, but 'planning for plenty,' i.e., full employment and full exploitation of resources; planning for social justice rather than absolute equality, with differentiation of rewards and status on the basis of genuine equality rather than privilege; planning not for a classless society but for one that abolishes the extremes of wealth and poverty; planning for cultural standards without 'leveling down' -- a planned transition making for progress without discarding what is valuable in tradition; planning that counteracts the dangers of a mass society by co-ordination of the means of social control but interfering only in cases of institutional or moral deterioration defined by collective criteria; planning for balance between centralization and dispersion of power; /and/ planning for gradual transformation of society in order to encourage the growth of personality ... (FPDP: 29)

Democratic planning, properly understood, is (1) more than "manipulation or institutional devices" (FPDP: 189); (2) "not regimentation" (FPDP: 29); and (3) different than

the mere creation of economic programs and policies. "Real planning consists in co-ordination of institutions, education, valuations and psychology." (FPDP: xviii)

Democratic planning lies somewhere between theory and reality. Premised on the continuous need for social thinking and acting, democratic planning stresses the simultaneity of being and doing and the totality of social learning and judgment.[3]

As such democratic planning entails at least three activities: (1) diagnosis of necessary human functions and social ills (cf. Chapter 4); (2) clarification and coordination of directions and options (cf. Chapters 5 and 6); and (3) developing the willingness to intervene in social processes with full knowledge that "difficulties or sacrifices ... /will occur/ for no birth is without suffering, no growth without pain, and no education without effort and discipline." (FPDP: 31)

7.A. Power

Mannheim's conception of power is intimately related to freedom. (Cf. Chapter 6)

> Democracy, rightly understood, implies a theory of power aimed at defining ways of distributing and controlling communal power for maximum security, efficiency, and freedom.[4]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> ... freedom is threatened /not/ only by state power, ... /but/ other organizations

> of society [are] ... equally dangerous and out to encroach on man's life, i.e., to expand beyond their legitimate sphere of activity. It is meaningless to assert that the fight for freedom consists in hampering central authorities as much as possible, and to call this goal freedom regardless of the possible chaos resulting from the unhampered action of lesser social units. (FPDP: 43)

Social power, a byproduct of social interaction, is omnipresent. (Cf. MSR: 167f; cf. Lynd, 1957) This statement about power at least implies that (1) individuals inherently have power, though they cannot exercise it without involving others; (2) the amount of power varies depending on the recognition and willingness to use it[5]; (3) the actual total power exerted at a given time in a specific situation is more than the sum of powers exercised by the involved individuals, and less than the possible sum of power of all individuals in the society, including those who do not participate for whatever reasons; (4) institutions are created and destroyed by habitual patterns of exercising power; and (5) the sources of power are as different as individual motivations, rational and irrational. Thus,

> ... in our modern world everything is political ... and public responsibility is interwoven in the whole fabric of society. Freedom consists not in denying this interpenetration but in defining its legitimate uses in all spheres, setting limits, and deciding the pattern of penetration, and last, but not least, in safeguarding public responsibility and shared control over decisions. (FPDP: 44-5)

Obviously, for Mannheim, power is fundamental and inescapable. Every exercise of power is irrevocable. We

cannot undo it. However, we may use power subsequently to mitigate ill consequences or to try to prevent future abuse. Thus, power is controllable. Powerlessness has no meaning for Mannheim. Instead, the issues of power include whether it is "arbitrary" or "functional," how much or little is exerted, what forms it takes under different historico-structural conditions, and how it is distributed among "different members and agents of society." (FPDP: 45)

In a perceptive statement he compares social power to electrical power, noting that human control (with the aid of "technolog/y/") determines whether power is "destructive" or "serves human ends."[6] The electrical metaphor underscores Mannheim's fundamental belief that power can be transformed.[7]

Mannheim also does not limit the discussion of power to political institutions but rather takes a "comprehensive" approach.

> Power is present whenever and wherever social pressures operate on the individual to induce desired conduct. The means of inducing 'obedience to pressures' are significant, but of secondary importance. The pressures may be overt or they may be inherent in the socio-economic system or any established pattern of social roles. (FPDP: 46)

"Violence" is only one type of power, lying on a continuum at the "inhuman" "impos/ed/ regimentation" extreme. At the other end, "social power" is "human" and "demand/s/ cooperation." Therefore, "the issue /for a "theory of democratic power"/ is not that of freedom <u>versus</u> power but of alternate

forms of pressures exerted by social power." (FPDP: 46) In this way Mannheim brings "economic and administrative power as well as the power of persuasion working through religion, education and media of mass communications" into his treatment.

The "three basic forms of power" -- (1) "free sway," (2) "organized destruction," and (3) "canalized power" -- are "distinguish/ed/" "according to their means of control." In contrast to "free sway" and "organized destruction" (where violence is the ultimate "method" and often "uncontrolled") "canalized" "power is controlled and in turn controls conduct." "Vested in institutions" canalized power may be "too lax or too rigid"; in any event, the "function" of this social power is chosen. Such power is regulated by "convention," "reciprocity" and "formal law." (FPDP: 48-51) Which regulatory mechanism prevails depends on several factors including (1) the number of people involved, (2) the degree of social integration, (3) the educative effects of current institutions, and (4) the tasks before us and their urgency. In general, Mannheim prefers reciprocal mechanisms and shuns legal sanctions.

7.A.1 Planning and Power

Planning is impossible without power. Indeed, planning is an expression of power. Democratic planning constructively seeks to harness and transform social power for public

purposes. Democratic planning preventively seeks to control abuses of power. While planners use power, they do not have a monopoly on power. In fact, because each individual in a social encounter contributes to the sum of power, albeit not always at the same rate or in the same way, planners must identify a minimum consensus position where everyone gives some of their power for common ends. Beyond that, it is up to planners and non-planners alike to persuade others to contribute or withhold additional power for particular purposes. (FPDP: 49)

Constructively, the paramount issue in a democratic theory of power involves the judgment and choice of how best to channel power into common and personal (or group) goals. Democratic planning thereby also entails both "initiative" and "control" in redirecting already amassed social power. (SS: 117) Moreover, democratic planning must create and support numerous power bases for diverse endeavors. Power must be integrated, not dissipated by compromise. (E.g., FPDP: 203)

Preventively, planners must

> find some new ways of guaranteeing independence, not necessarily based on private property or income, /to support/ ... those very dissenters on whose resistance to vested interests progress depends. (FPDP: 227)

Even the heretic, Mannheim early realizes, has historically contributed to social knowledge which, in turn, leads to new directions. (Cf. I&U) While an "independent intelli-

gentsia" has an important function under democratic planning, they are incapable of all social insights; they need to be buttressed, or even confronted, by unorthodox views. (Cf. Chapters 3, 5 and 6)

In 1935 Mannheim wrote:

> 'We have progressed so far as to be able to plan society and even man himself. Who plans those who are to do the planning?' The longer I reflect on this question the more it haunts me. (MSR: 74)

Acknowledging that "planners can recruit themselves only from already existing groups" (MSR: 74-5), Mannheim first looks at the nature of planned thinking. Concluding that planning (meaning the redesign and reconstruction of "interrelated" "institutions") requires an attitude that is "constantly experimenting," he warns of a "real danger" that thinking will tend to become "rigid." (Cf. Chapter 3) Instead, strategies must be developed from diagnoses of real problems to avoid the irrationality of being too "theoretical." (MSR: 234-5)

Five years later (1940), after observing more planning experiences in the western world, Mannheim amends his ideas to stress "planning for freedom" and education.

Following this tack, Mannheim spends the last seven years of his life further elaborating upon education and freedom. By 1943, he also becomes increasingly aware of the issue of power. That his last book was renamed Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning indicates that the "haunt/ing/" question still nags him.

While he does not relinquish the idea of centralized coordination and an authority based on consensus, he devotes more attention to controlling abuses of power and to encouraging planning efforts at all levels of society by all members of the community. In doing so, he enlarges the pool of prospective planners and increases the possibilities of direct democracy.

Democratic planning is not simply a formula to be applied by planners to a transformed and transforming society. Democratic planning is also an everyday activity for widespread citizen involvement. Yet, ironically, as Mannheim deemphasizes the planner/intellectual his theory becomes more abstract. In contrast, Lynd by focusing on the social scientist as planner suggests concrete tasks. Nevertheless, the broadening of the category "planners," I think, helps account for Mannheim's continued relevance. This is one instance where his foreseeing inevitable planning led to an important readjustment in the theory of democratic planning. If planning is inevitable, Mannheim seems to be saying, the intellectuals must be goaded to assume more responsibility in defining issues and clarifying alternatives. However, other groups must also become more conscious of their responsibility in planning.

Mannheim intimates that the initial planners will be the "independent intelligentsia." But he clearly does not equate them with experts (e.g., FPDP: 113). He limits their jurisdiction to common issues (presumably at the national,

and, perhaps, international levels) and their authority to "visualiz/ing/" options and determining the means of effecting them.

Augmenting the efforts of this august group are citizen commissions and workers' collectives who perform similar tasks, but at lower levels (e.g., city or factory). (Cf. FPDP: 114, 106) These planning bodies must be small enough to ensure face-to-face discussion. Their members, coming from all niches of society, are expected to disagree on particular policies as they try to discern a consensus on what planned intervention is needed where. Not united by "creed," they must nevertheless be responsible for deciphering the minima required by each to live humanly in contemporary society -- including, for instance, employment opportunities. (Cf. FPDP: 118) These decisions are to be translated into integrated "basic planning laws" by "experts" whose acts are to be, in turn, publicly scrutinized for inconsistency and "conscious or unconscious group interests." Disputes are to be adjudicated by "educated laym/e/n." (FPDP: 113)

The national planners in a "coordinating planning body" (FPDP: 113), Mannheim implies, are similar to a constitutional convention and also somewhat like a fourth branch of government. (Cf. Tugwell) Mannheim leaves intact the traditional democratic tripartite division of labor, though he stresses "centralized" executive authority. The span of

control of the national government, however, can be largely "devol/ved/" onto "lower authorities without surrendering final responsibility," while "local self-government" (abetted by an increase in "self-help and popular initiative") can assume responsibility for interrelating government and community functions. (FPDP: 115) In the economic sphere, democratic forms are to be introduced into the workplace, including, by implication, government bureaucracies.

This spread of democratic governance, Mannheim suggests, brings planning and policy decision-making into the "workaday experience" and provides the setting for a perpetual democratic "educational campaign." (FPDP: 114-5)

Thus, Mannheim thinks of planners primarily as thinkers, not doers. (Cf. MSR: 191ff; Nettl, 1970: 92; Mumford, 1967; Tugwell, 1953)

Planners discern options and formulate plans. They are to be distinguished from administrators (or bureaucrats) who implement plans. Though Mannheim never states that planners will supersede political leaders, he sometimes implies that planners are important leaders in the political culture. They are intellectuals leaders in that they integrate democratic knowledge (cf. Chapter 3) and they are responsible for promoting and applying democratic intelligence (cf. Chapter 5). He intimates, however, that their major leadership function is advisory.

In Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, though, the distinction is blurred as Mannheim suggests that qualitative

"case-study" analyses of individuals be used for leader selection, presumably including planners. (FPDP: 95) While Mannheim does not contradict himself on the role of the planner as adviser, in his later writings he emphasizes the planner's interactive role with the citizenry. (Cf. Friedmann) Throughout his writing Mannheim upholds majority rule as the source of consent and minorities' rights as necessary for initiative and dissent. (E.g., MSR: xii) Initially, Mannheim sees the planners in largely independent roles, working at the national level. By Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, he also envisages the possibility of planners working in conjunction with small, informal groups and collaboration with local governments.

7.A.2 Knowledge and Power

Mannheim early recognized that the signal feature of contemporary politics is the conscious and public need to justify positions, choices and actions. Unfortunately the content of the justifications seems often to matter less than the form. Why else do we tolerate the profusion of oft meaningless statistics, lame excuses, and nonsensical repartee from our public officials?[8] This phenomenon is not unique to putative democracies. Even authoritarian states make similar efforts to justify decisions (and non-decisions) of rulers. Though it is beyond the scope of this project to determine why and how the functional requirement for

justifications grew, clearly such factors as mass education, technological innovations in information dissemination, and the ideology of objectivity have contributed. (Cf. Appendix E)

Justification campaigns typically employ three activities simultaneously. Propaganda and mass media communications networks define the forms, range and kinds of acceptable justifications and create an overall climate of expectations conducive to probable approbation of tendered justifications. Advertisements, including candidate and programmatic plugs, are aimed at specific audiences to generate particular and stronger reactions to proferred justifications. Finally, public relations offices are maintained to cope with sporadic incidents requiring justifications.

The production of justifications -- whether honest, half-truthful, specious, inaccurate, or deceitful -- demand some knowledge and thought. Attention to justifications varies according to the recipients' concentration, interest, and level of knowledge. Regard also depends on the frequency and scope of the tendered justification and the extent to which competing justifications are being voiced.

Justifications tend to perpetuate existing power structures by giving the illusion of choice. They demand (and help manipulate) a plastic audience on the implicit assumption that men do learn forever.[9] (Cf. Chapters 5 and Section 6.E.) The justification process is likely most unjust when

it stunts man's natural learning capacity. (Cf. Schiller, Marcuse)

Though justifying often corrects errors and though justifiers can be imaginative and inventive, the notion of justification connotes finality.[10] Being "right" disregards the "contingent" nature of social knowledge. Extended inquiries tend to be discouraged. Thus, an overzealous justificatory approach vitiates the experimental orientation required by democratic planning.

"The Self is the deepest point to which social transformation can penetrate," Mannheim claims. If individuals are socially taught to seek certainty, their insecurities are aroused by sudden or expanded freedoms, creating the inhuman paradox of "fear of freedom." The "banality of evil" is just one other manifestation. (FPDP: 311; cf. Fromm, Arendt) This is why Mannheim argues that more than crude psychology is involved in real planning; indeed, the democratic personality must learn to appreciate the fundamental relationship between knowledge and power. (Cf. FPDP: 189)

Knowledge also sustains dissident individuals and minority groups. Power is unlikely to be constructively canalized without substantial knowledge. Violent power is likely to erupt when functional knowledge reigns. (Cf. MSR: 194, n. 1) The power of each individual and of social institutions may be enhanced by increased knowledge; it can also be obfuscated. By insisting on the mutuality of

knowledge and power, Mannheim explains how the planners and intellectuals serve limited, but critical, functions under democratic planning. (See Chapters 3 and 5)

Because of the relationship between knowledge and power, communications is important. Mannheim is concerned with two levels of communications, each of which can be "for good and evil." (FPDP: 73)

At the interpersonal level, be it in a parliamentary chamber or on the post office steps, debate acts as a "catalyst" to individual interpretation and provides an exchange of information. Debate is only a means to knowledge. Yet, "civil liberties ... free speech and assembly" (which must be vigorously "maint/ained/" to permit democratic intelligence) alone cannot sufficiently control power.

As power increases with the growth of social interactions, mass communications (especially radio, press and TV) become a technique for further expanding power. Planning requires "rapid communication" for "centralized control." (FPDP: 7) Planning also emerges when the "radius of communications" "shrink/s/" "time and space" to expose the "interdependent world-wide civilization." (FPDP: 216, 53) Although modern communications technologies can more quickly alert more "citizens" to abuses of power, they can also be used abusively. (FPDP: 134ff) Mannheim, no anti-technologist, always sees the possibility of democratic applications.[11]

Modern communications serve a distinctly public function. As such, Mannheim argues, its forms and applications must be publicly financed and determined in reference to community interests. (FPDP: 134ff) Because of the "impossibility of escaping from politics," the mass media levelling-down approach is inappropriate. Instead, communications need to be used to enhance public interchanges and promote democratic intelligence.

Mannheim does not specifically consider such communications technologies as telephones and their cousins, wiretaps and computers.[12] As a result, he does not address the issue of the right to privacy in this context. However, he generally feels that "privacy" is "exaggerated." (E.g., DOOT: 44, 52) Allowing that individual solitude is needed for substantial thinking, he continues to stress the need to develop more communality. Indeed, the shared linguistic root in communal and communications is not missed by Mannheim.[13] (Cf. DOOT: 157ff; cf. Dewey)

> Thus, ideas represent power, especially manifest when in the form of sabotage. Totalitarian dictators, however great their power, fear nothing more than sabotage ... by sapping the loyalties of man to whom weapons are entrusted and who have to do the work in fields and factories. (FPDP: 65)

Since knowledge is not in reality divorced from power,[14] Mannheim's theory of democratic power is informed by his concept of rationality. In essence, radical doubt is the only way to prevent the abuses of power while constructively

channeling it.

7.A.3 Power and Economics

Mannheim was not a political-economist. (In fact, his section on "Control of the Economy" in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning was rewritten by Adolf Lowe.[15]) His approach to economic issues is rather psycho-sociological. (Cf. ESOC: 230) Yet, through this prism Mannheim reaches conclusions similar to contemporary American progressives.[16] Though he sometimes calls himself a socialist, and other times a liberal, these labels better describe his political concerns than his economic positions.

As early as 1930 Mannheim considered the possibility of alternative economic systems.

> Since one's economic activity is by no means a part-time affair, the motives associated with it always mould and shape one's personality. (ESOK: 273)

In this essay, Mannheim, still in Germany, is very Max Weberian (Lowe in ESOK: 25ff) in concluding:

> If up to now we have tended to formulate the problem as though the economic system formed men but men could not form the economic system, it was merely because we wished for once to work out all implications of one aspect of the connections between the two. But we most certainly did not want to suggest that men must accept fatalistically everything that follows 'inevitably' from the economic structure. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that under certain circumstances men can also form their economic and social systems. (ESOK: 274-5)

His 1940 phrase, "psychic economy," is thus no coincidence.[17] (ESSP: 243ff) Mannheim's sorties into competition and cooperation are also so oriented. (See Chapter 4) Similarly, his focus on the "educative" impacts rather than mere income/wealth mal-distribution belie his approach. (See Chapter 5)

The psycho-social approach permits Mannheim to interrelate economic means and ends. For example, seeing that "unbridled competition" and pure ambition create an "asocial" individual, Mannheim suggests that the criteria for economic decisions be reversed. (FPDP: 234; ESOK: 230ff)

> Labor follows capital ... communications facilities and income decide /where/ one will or can afford to live ... The psychological and educational implications, however, deserve priority over profit motives in planning the neighborhood and the home. (FPDP: 185)

Following Simmel, Mannheim repeats a favorite axiom:

> In our opinion there are many relationships which have nothing to do with economics and yet are social. (MSR: 19)

Reacting to the then oft stolid arguments for socialism (cf. Taylor and Lange, 1964; Hayek (ed.), 1935; Carr, 1969; Ascoli and Lehmann, 1937), Mannheim is unprepared to embrace socialism. Instead, he maintains that "Democracy" is not inherently tied to "Capitalism." (FPDP: 233; cf. Schumpeter)

Contending that his conception of power is neither "Ghandi/'s/ abstention from all power," nor "the blind power worship of Nazism," nor even "the 'Golden Mean'" (FPDP: 45), Mannheim prefers economic arrangements which emphasize the

exercise of choice. For this reason, he applauds Schumacher's mid-1940s

> suggestion that the control of industry by Government should be accomplished not so much by participation in the process of production, as by becoming the most powerful buyer ...[18] (1944)

This same thinking underlies his wariness of large-scale public bureaucracies and private corporations. (FPDP: 44) It also informs his call for a more evenly shared wealth.

> ... hardship poverty or unemployment is a severe handicap over which the worker has virtually no control. While it is true that exceptional people manage to achieve remarkable things while hungry or homeless or cold, these are the kinds of conditions which sap the energy and achievement of ordinary people. The history of civilization shows that for any lasting cultural achievement a nation, no less than an individual, has to be assured of the physical necessities of life. The world's culture has not been built during times of war and famine. (SOE: 77)

Nevertheless, Mannheim <u>also</u> admits preferring some proposals, like Schumacher's, because they "give the <u>illusion of choice</u>." (Emphasis supplied; FPDP: 337-8) Does Mannheim favor "functional" over "substantial" economic choices? And, if so, is he not undermining the rest of his theory?

Actually, Mannheim is more sophisticated, though still deficient, in his economic thinking. The notion of choice, of course, underpins all economic theories. Socialist analyses of capitalism, at base, agree that capitalism limits significant choices to those with private property (beyond their own labor power). (Cf. Braverman, Baran, O'Connor,

Lange) Orthodox economists emphasize, instead, the extent of choice available to consumers (including corporations). Socialism, therefore, stresses social welfare over individual choices. Orthodox economics compounds individual choices and relegates social consequences to the category "externalities." From this dichotomy the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative analyses and ends versus means emerge.

Thus, Mannheim's approbation of the "illusion of choice" is directed to those (i.e., capitalists) who would react very negatively to the appearance of coercive programs. If, as capitalists maintain, all have the possibility of choice (when in fact most do not have the probability of much choice), Mannheim uses the same verbal trick to assure capitalists that under democratic planning they have the illusion of individual choice (when actually social choice will also reign). Obviously, this is a minor point because, just as the man-in-the-street perceives the limit of his choices, so would the capitalists. But the example reflects well Mannheim's reformist and non-revolutionary attitude.

Yet Mannheim's emphasis on choice rather than economic laws of dialectical progress changes the tone (and, likely, content) of economic decision-making. Rather than the Manichean choice Marx offered workers in the Communist Manifesto, Mannheim maintains that many choices will entail sacrifice and, therefore, both gains and losses must be equitably distributed. (Cf. Chapter 6)

Significantly, such an approach opens the questions of organizational scale and growth rates. Rather than having to decide once and for all between intermediate technology and large-scale operations, for example, Mannheim's scheme presses the question. What economic institutions are appropriate for what purposes? It may well be that certain functions required for wider social integration (e.g., telecommunications) need be centrally organized. By leaving the form open to a discussion of alternatives, Mannheim also underscores the point that controls must be devised for human purposes to meet actual situations. No technologies incorporate their own controls; only men control.

Yet, overall, Mannheim's economic analysis is lacking. Occasionally mentioning resource allocations, Mannheim has little understanding of (or interest in) capital accumulation and investment. The section on "Economic Controls" in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, which was written after Mannheim's death by his friend, Adolf Lowe, tends to contradict Mannheim's own allusions to economic reforms. Lowe, although a non-orthodox economist, uses the traditional categories of economic analysis and focuses on governmental "remedial" and "preventive" reforms. On the other hand, Mannheim proceeding sociologically, stresses the need for removing contradictions between public and private economic organizations. Such proposals derive from his contention that the "principle of democratic organization is not confined to politics" but also appears in "economic democracy."

(MSR: 246)

Without an adequate investigation of the nature of the economic environment,[18] Mannheim favors worker collectives and cooperatives and industrial democracy.[19] Mannheim's primary concern is the "sharing" of responsibilities and their impacts. (E.g., FPDP: 232, 187, 185, 143, 116) Though he repeatedly calls for greater equality in distribution of wealth and income, the argument is premised on the minimal requirements for "true" sharing. (Cf. FPDP: 108 and passim) As such, he sometimes confuses "participation" (a means) with control (an end), at least in the economic sector.[20]

Only on the need for full employment is he consistently cogent. Remarking in 1940 that "what is economically irrational for a whole nation may still be profitable for particular groups," Mannheim concludes that the acceptance of unemployment is ego-debilitating and socially dangerous. (MSR: 136) Full employment prevents the ascension of dictators promising easy cures to unemployment. Moreover, constructively, full employment allows individuals to formulate and implement "life plans," a "vital" exercise of substantial rationality. (MSR: 104, n. 2) Mannheim admits the need for unemployment relief, but, like Eveline Burns and others, concludes that "preventive" measures are more important than "palliative measures." (FPDP: 337) Thus, in this aspect, Mannheim's "illiterate" economics pays off. By ignoring the causes of unemployment, he relentlessly

pushes for real full employment for everyone. Mannheim would clearly condemn the American and British redefinitions of "full employment" (which permit as much as 6% or 7% unemployment). (Cf. Mencher, 1969; Annals, 1975; Bailey, 1950)

Despite himself, is Mannheim a socialist, albeit ill-informed? If one takes Taylor's definition of socialism --

> the control of the whole apparatus of production and the guidance of all productive operations is to be in the hands of the state itself. In other words, the state is to be the sole responsible producer, that is, the sole person, natural or legal, who is authorized to employ the economic resources of the community, its stock or income of primary factors, in producing commodities. As such sole producer, the state maintains exchange relations with its citizens, buying their productive services with money and selling them the commodities which it produces. (Lange and Taylor, 1964: 43)

-- he is not. However, Pachter's more expansive notion that,

> Socialism strives to abolish exploitation and inequality. It seeks a society where merit and character are the only marks of distinction; where economic resources are controlled by public agencies, themselves under public scrutiny; where production is geared to the human needs of all and the product is distributed equitably; a society, finally, where man is no longer utilized as a means for purposes alien to him.
>
> In practice, however, socialism has usually come to be identified with 'collectivism,' and two of its best-known features are public ownership of the means of production and a comprehensive 'plan' of production and distribution. (1978: 294)

better approximates Mannheim's position.

Both Taylor and Pachter wish to perpetuate certain aspects of liberal democracy. Taylor's narrow economic definition was proferred in 1928; Pachter's wider one in 1978. Mannheim, writing in the two decades after Taylor, is obviously reacting to the overstatement of purely economic ends. He anticipates the later humanistic and democratic emphases. Mannheim, however, never contrasts socialism and capitalism. He rather concentrates on the psychosociological conditions for democracy. Thus totalitarianism is often opposed to democracy. His terminology might best be understood as a reflection of a major theme of his time (cf. Arendt, 1951)[21] or as derivative of his speciality (sociology). Consequently, socialism (at least as understood by him) is but one economic means. Although he calls for greater economic equality, his interest lies mainly in what people do with it, hence education and planning. (Cf. Chapters 5 and 6) The label "public" is not sufficient. (Cf. Chapter 4) After all, public ownership is properly only a means to public control, and maybe not the best one. Likewise, public decision making is critical only with regard to the overarching problem of human purposes and controls. In short, the designation "public" is not necessarily equated with humanly beneficial actions.

Mannheim reportedly considered himself a socialist. (Lichtheim, Harrington) Surely he was not a Milton Friedman capitalist. His programmatic ideas were decidedly more far-reaching than liberal capitalist suggestions. Yet his obvious

discomfort with statism, partly based no doubt on his personal experiences in Hungary and Germany, prohibited full conversion to socialism.[22] In short, Mannheim is better viewed as a crude economist of externalities and spillover effects. On the evidence of his manuscripts, Mannheim most likely would not have turned more to political-economic considerations had he lived longer. Nevertheless, given his growing stature in the Anglo-American world, his proclivities might have prodded others to develop more unorthodox economic studies. He even might have collaborated with an economist to investigate more specifically the interconnections between alternative economic systems and the concept of democratic planning

7.B. The Organization of Power under Democratic Planning

Mannheim adopts neither the doctrinaire Marxist nomothetic nor the Weberian ideal-type framework in discussing the organization of power under democratic planning. Instead, with the "contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous" still in mind (cf. Chapter 4), he contends that

> The task for the political sociologist is to describe the forms of co-ordination between all political groups prevailing in a given social structure, and the sociological problem, the relations between groups and their regulation, which can be hierarchical, federative, or co-ordinating in a democratic sense. (FPDP: 44, 42)

He focuses on the coordinating effort, which, in turn, involves three variables of political organization:

. centralization/decentralization

. regulatory intervention/non-interference

. "delegation of power"/"self-government by small governing bodies." (FPDP: 44)

(The centralization/decentralization and delegation/self-government variables will be considered here. Intervention/non-interference is taken up in the next subsection. See also Section 6.A.1.) The issue of organizational forms (including bureaucracy) is secondary and determined by appropriateness to specific tasks. Each proposed form, however, must meet the criteria of "promise of optimal efficiency, accountability, and ease of democratic control." (FPDP: 44)

In contemporary "Western democracies,"

> the state no longer confines its attention to the three spheres of legislation, administration, and jurisdiction, but is changing into a social service state ... /A/ccelerated by the universal preparations for war/,/ ... /i/t is not society which is absorbing the State but /rather/ ... the State is absorbing society. If the present trends remain unchecked, the State instead of withering away, becomes more and more ambitious and powerful.[23] (MSR: 336-7)

To counteract this trend, Mannheim advocates some decentralization, and much devolution of delegated power. In other words, "constructive" planning "deliberately creates fresh /social/ opportunities and incentives" for individuals while "preventive" planning aims to ensure "a government which is 'ours' ... and ... public responsibility." (MSR: 354; FPDP: 112-3) Constructive planning (by focusing on

"long range policy") and preventive planning (by coordinating "basic policy issues") together will sustain a socially integrated community in which diverse human potentials can thrive. (MSR: 355; FPDP: 115; cf. Chapters 4, 5 and 6)

The major issue of governance, for Mannheim, is where "initiative" and control should be located. Mannheim presumes the continuation of parties and interest/lobby groups, but he does not exaggerate their importance. Instead, he starts with the proposition that to the greatest extent possible governmental decisions must result from "direct activities." "Representative activities," while necessary in large-scale, industrial, urbanized society, must be justified separately as situations occur. (Cf. SS: 117) In short, government power is to be questioned as much as private. Both public and private power must ultimately answer to the community.

Democratic planning involves the recognition that despite distinct roles, the planner, the judge, the mayor, the soldier, the bureaucrat, the producer, the consumer, et al are all citizens as well. Not only does this "fact" infer the duties and rights of initiative and control, but it also accounts for the possibility of agreement on common ends. In other words, citizens qua citizens share in common their political culture. But, in practice, citizens act collectively and "there is always a process of redistribution and re-organization of power going on." (SS: 117)

Mannheim envisions three interrelated levels of collective action in democratic planning. (See Table 5) He suggests devolving as much responsibility to local and "private" groups as possible, in order to reserve national bodies for comprehensive issues and common value clarification. Direct democracy also has inherent benefits. For example, face-to-face encounters help deter mass formation and manipulation. (Cf. FPDP: 52)

Table 5 shows by level of collective action (cf. "jurisdiction") the corresponding type of practicable democracy, the extent of citizen involvement, and the planner's role. Interaction between levels is indicated by italics.

Policies with democratic implications emerge at all three levels, despite the distinction between "private" (level I) and "public" (levels II and III). Accordingly, democratic procedures (and ideals) should inform decisions at all three levels. Size and proximity of the collective action groups determine the form of democracy. For example, participatory democracy is urged for investment and work-rule decisions within the private firm and representative democracy is required for national policy. (Representative democracy by his definition understands that the planners and/or government officials have the authority to determine and express the interests of those they represent; representative democracy does not, like delegatory democracy, assume the representatives to be simply spokesmen for views pro-

Table 5: Levels of Democratic Planning (and their interaction)

Level of Planning	Type of Democracy	Jurisdiction	Citizen Involvement	Planners' Role
III	Representative	Public: national, international	Sporadic	Leadership on common interest issues
	Interaction among government officials and planners who must coordinate policies across levels			
II	Delegatory	Public: regional, state, and local	Constant	Advice on options
	Interaction among citizens who overlap both levels			
I	Direct	Private: organized and informal groups	Regularly intermittent	Advice on social costs and implications for democratic community

pounded by their constituents.)

Delegatory democracy utilizes participation as much as possible to determine and assign issues to specific individuals and groups for execution. That is, to the extent possible, agendas are determined in public convocation with particular items allocated to formal agencies and/or informal task forces. This level (II) exercises citizens in various ways. Not simply electing officials or voting on referenda, citizens are called upon to decide what can be mutually resolved and what needs to be channelled into the machinery of government. (See Section 7.C.) (Mannheim proposes situational analyses as the best means of reaching agreement. See below.)

Centralized authority is required to support policies regarding "common human interests" and "interests-in-common." (Cf. Chapter 1) However, specific programs can (and should, according to Mannheim) be formulated and implemented at lower levels of formal government because more direct control is possible. Issues concerning "community interests" and "more complicated democratic values" likewise should be determined at lower levels. Nevertheless, in certain cases, "objective grounds" (including "technical efficiency") might justify central responsibility. (Cf. MSR: 319ff, 327) Finally, he implicitly argues that formal government is only the guardian of central authority. (Cf. Dewey) Because ultimate authority rests with the citizens, democratic governance also needs be applied to the "private"

sphere.

Mannheim's comments on formal government are cursory. He is far more interested in informal arrangements. This fact detracts from his theory of democratic planning. As important as informal arrangements may be, they do not (or, at least Mannheim does not show how they do) contravene increasingly institutionalized power. (Cf. MSR: 363 to Lynd, 1944) At best, he suggests that within institutions attention to situations may result in more democratic control.

Mannheim defines a "situation" as "a unique configuration between certain people" on a "common theme." Somewhat analogous to case studies in the social sciences (and medicine), situations interrelate "participants /who/ ... need not necessarily have any common purpose in mind." "'The pressure of the situation'" "act/s/ as a control on our behavior." In other words, situations force people to make decisions in concrete settings where no "one ... is entirely free." (MSR: 299) In situations -- be they "catastrophic," "rebellious,"[24] or "readjust/ive/" -- participants work out the connections between general principles and unique conditions. Individual citizens perform various public functions, the most important of which is judgment. To do so, the participants must first determine whether the situation is repetitive (and thus calls for "patterned" behaviors) or "unpatterned" (in which case innovative responses to new combinations of social forces

should be explored). Most situations will be "patterned" because of limited social "tolera/nce for/ the unpredictable." (MSR: 300ff) Yet, unlike most other planning mechanisms, the situational approach presumes the inevitability and recurrence of "unforeseen" events.

The situational approach, Mannheim avers, allows for "independent controls" and largely precludes the possibility of subverting "standardized forms of guidance." It is expected to be especially appropriate in local public arenas.

Situations are not simply mechanisms for accountability, they also highlight links among different individuals and groups, forge together emotional and rational aspects of human capacities, and cohere political experience and experiments.

7.C. Intervention

From his view of power, Mannheim contends that "in our modern world everything is political." In turn, he concurs with Mosca that

> Instead of asking what the limits of state activity ought to be, we try to find out what the best type of political organization is, which type, in other words, enables all the elements that have political significance in a given society to be best utilized and specialized, best subjected to reciprocal control and to the principle of individual responsibility for the things that are done in the respective domains. (FPDP: 44)

By so framing the argument, the burden of proof is placed on

both sides -- those who want more state intervention and those who want less.

Mannheim prefers to leave private family life untouched by government edicts. However, he finds two cases where public intervention is required to enhance personal options. Birth control must be condoned by government to allow women and couples to make choices. Second, Mannheim urges publicly sponsored research on "harmful practices of primary groups" -- such as "poor diets" or "parental superstitions /which may have deleterious/ psychological effects on mental development" -- to engender debate. He admonishes those who would condone "state ... take/ /over /of all/ educational functions or ... control/ / of family behavior" because the "well-meaning ignorance of parents /may only be replaced/ "by the conceited one-sidedness of the expert." (FPDP: 183-4)

Intervention may be direct (i.e., dictating "right" behavior) or indirect (i.e., providing conditions and incentives for changed behavior). Mannheim is particularly concerned with indirect intervention policies. He prefers, when possible, indirect to direct intervention because it exercises the capacity to choose. Yet, he stipulates that such policies need to be formulated to breed in the individual "an attitude of security and acceptance." Thus, "special problems ... should be dealt with in their own terms" to overcome the oft attendent "sense /of/ failure." (SOE: 76) Proportional development of society is, for Mannheim, akin

to child development. (Cf. FPDP: 184-5; cf. Chapter 4) Democratic planning, properly understood, refers to both the experience and the outcomes of chosen development patterns.

"Interdependent thinking," when applied to the issue of intervention, suggests that the "structure" of democratic planning "be determined by problem-units" which "necessar/ily/ ... regulate not only single institutions but also the manner in which they are interrelated." (MSR: 229-30, 234) Planned intervention must relate to the "total life process." Yet, just as situations change, so too must the specific intervention policies. (MSR: 233, 232) In brief, planned intervention "is not establishment" but rather "constant/ /experiment/ation/." (Emphasis supplied; MSR: 223, 234; cf. MSR: 191ff; Chapter 5)

Intervention is for "reconstructing society instead of building it anew." (MSR: 191) Thus, Mannheim expects actual intervention policies to change, both in their concrete goals (and hence strategies) and in the range of arenas of "human activity."

No area of social life is inherently immune to planning, but Mannheim has his own planning priorities. Textually Mannheim devotes most attention to the spheres of education and employment, in that order. He also mentions such diverse policy areas as city planning (e.g., FPDP: 185, 183); taxation (e.g., FPDP: 235); "regulating property" (e.g., FPDP: 117); industrial organization (cf. MSR: 195); housing;

transportation; agriculture; electricity (cf. FPDP: 133-4); etc. But, Mannheim believes four broad areas to be most critical: the military, the economy, the communications network, and the civil service. (See especially, FPDP: 119ff)

A standing army, apparently necessary in a world of disharmony, has always been of concern to democrats. (Cf. Tocqueville; Barnet; Rousseau) Mannheim, seeing the military as a necessary evil, believes democratic equality might even be enhanced if the "soldier-citizen" philosophy is promoted. What scares Mannheim most, and indeed anyone who gives it any thought, is the uncontrolled proliferation of long-range, mass-annihilating weaponry. Aside from the inherent dangers of the "free and non-free world" arsenals, Mannheim understands that the specialized experts who design, construct, and maintain these lethal systems are often functionally rational and oligopolistically organized. Largely uncontrolled, their growing power constitutes a real threat to democracy. (FPDP: 127ff) Yet, controls are possible because, more than any other aspect of contemporary life, military power threatens defenders, offenders and innocent bystanders alike, thereby instigating solutions based on common human values.

The civil service, traditionally a concern of political reformers, refers to a range of policy areas in Mannheim's treatment. Concerned primarily with how to ensure that civil servants can become active participants in anticipating

future problems, Mannheim also worries about how to hold them accountable. Mannheim is notoriously vague on actual proposals, though he suggests that "internal" and "external controls" are necessary. (FPDP: 131ff; cf. Gardner) Implicitly, Mannheim seems to be seeking to define the "bureaucrat-citizen."

Without having to subscribe to economic determinism most planners admit the need for controlling the economy. Mannheim, not excluded, questions how far economic tampering need go. He fully seems prepared to adopt some form of wage and price controls, but the desirability of public ownership and investment controls remain open to further question.[25] (Cf. FPDP: 125) In effect, Mannheim does not eschew economic socialism; he only asserts that it is different from (and subsidiary to) democratic planning.

Significantly, the overall economic goal is enough stability to ensure psychological security for all. Under relative stability annual gains or losses are to be evenly shared. The wide swings of the business cycle are to be controlled; the uneven impacts of narrower swings are to be diminished.

Mannheim's frequent references to a "mixed economy" further reveal his position. He seems to think that the first economic response under democratic planning is the imposition of controls on monopolistic and oligopolistic practices which impede "self-restraint" and production for the common interest. Only when such efforts prove to be

insufficient should more fundamental changes in the economic system (i.e., towards traditional socialist remedies) be attempted. Free enterprise should not be abandoned on simple ideological grounds. Economic systems do not inherently contain the solutions; they only offer resolutions for particular problems. (Cf. Chapter 6; FPDP: 119ff)

In this regard, Mannheim's stress on communications is particularly interesting. While it is obviously an outgrowth of the propagandist times in which he lives, he understands how dependent the modern industrial world is on mass communications. Specifically addressing the press and radio, his remarks have validity for TV as well. Citing the London Times and other journals, Mannheim suggests that the communications institutions be held in public trust.

> The balance of society cannot be maintained if privileged groups can use the most powerful apparatus for dissemination of their ideas while the less privileged are deprived of similar means of expression. (FPDP: 135)

Acknowledging how modern communications technologies lend themselves to awesome totalitarian applications, Mannheim cites the fledgling BBC experience as proof of how "the growth of creative control did not diminish freedom but increased it." "Proportional representation" of interests, while not always just, is always preferrable to monopoly control of the organs of communications.

When Mannheim refers to "public trust" he means what the words say, not the practices that have been associated with "public trusts." For example, in the United States,

public broadcasting (TV and radio) are not fully financed by public funds. Corporation grants and listener support are extensive. The effect on the content of what is presented in the name of the "public" is striking. Controversy is okay, but fundamental questions about the nature of the political-economic culture are not. Cultural coverage is more likely "highbrow" or "daring" (e.g., folk songs and jazz) than critically attuned to the everyday life of most. I suspect that 98% of the public broadcasting audience is from the top 10% of income earners, whereas commercial broadcasting (with the exceptions of news, and, perhaps, sports) primarily serves the other 90% of the population. In short, public broadcasting seems to be within the de facto control of private interest. (Cf. Schiller, 1973)

Additionally, the bifurcated broadcast system (commercial and "public") distracts attention from the larger issue. Who is to entertain and educate "the public" for whose purposes? Even entirely "public" efforts sometimes suspiciously are undemocratic. For example, the White House announced in late 1978 that they would prepare short (under a minute) briefing tapes for "free" distribution to small radio stations throughout the country. These messages, unidentified by source, are intended to keep the public informed of its business in Washington. But, one wonders how short statements can do explanatory justice to any important national policy questions. More seriously, what news items will be omitted? on what grounds? More seriously

still, why has the White House intervened at all? Spokesmen maintain that small "independent" radio stations cannot afford their own (or network) news coverage of national events. Have profit considerations rendered the White House (and national institutions) insignificant?

The need for news (and conflicting analysis) is critical to the functioning of democracy. It is not simply a matter of free speech; it is the major source for monitoring the society which, in turn, is a necessary ingredient for democratic control.

In face-to-face communications Mannheim places no limits on free speech, but in the one-way mass communications technologies he believes that pronouncing "violence as a method of settling disputes" negates "one of the essentials of democracy[,] ... peaceful change." (FPDP: 137-8) The recent UNESCO compromise on control of global communications followed an acrimonious debate on whether war and other inhumanities should receive extensive coverage. (Cf. The New York Times, November 10, 1978)

While the issues of the economy, the civil service, and even the military might be resolved at some point, communications is a policy which will continue to be of concern for democratic planning. As long as men live in human society, communications will persist. As long as power exists, communications policy problems will recur.

7.D. Conclusions

Mannheim does indeed espouse a democratic theory of power. (Cf. Brown, 1951; Mumford, 1944; Weintraub, 1944; Dahl, 1950) His view profoundly captures the source of authority (i.e., citizens) and the attendent responsibilities of all citizens, regardless of their positions in the political economy. Moreover, those who by dint of their life work can see larger wholes (i.e., the intelligentsia) must be especially responsible to their fellow citizens in providing corrected interpretations and suggesting options.

Nevertheless, Mannheim's democratic theory of power is neither original nor is it the best statement. On the contrary, with the exceptions of his concerns about knowledge and communications, Mannheim's theory of democratic power is weak. He is vague on actual proposals (e.g., Sections 7.B. and 7.C.) He seems to forget his institutional diagnoses (e.g., Section 7.A., Chapter 4) as he formulates personal interactionist schemes (e.g., Section 7.B).

Yet, he raises fundamental questions. How should knowledge and power interact in contemporary political society? How can government and private power be controlled? How should planners interact with and behave as citizens? He also answers critical issues about the responsibility of

power. Democrats, not masses, must be supported. Leaders and bureaucracies must be held accountable. Intervention policies can only be justified on the grounds of enhancing democratic choice and control. Agents of technological power, the military and communications workers, have especial responsibility to preserve human life and promote democratic intelligence, respectively.

Perhaps, there is a simple explanation for the deficiencies in his concept of democratic power: power cannot be fruitfully discussed in the abstract. In this regard, Lynd was a better theorist of democratic planning. Mannheim did see the negative and positive implications of power in particular cases (e.g., the military), but he never understood (and therefore never tried to unravel) the contradictions of power in specific instances.

Substantively, the public policy problems he identified -- e.g., militarism and nuclear armament, full employment, community development -- remain, as indeed they were legated to his times. (Cf. Dewey, 1918, 1939) Therefore, his reiteration should not be fully criticized. Just because Mannheim did not first identify these problems does not mean that they should not be repeated. It would seem that part of democratic consciousness raising involves this very repetition. Part of what is sometimes called a needed "sense of history" involves the recognition that certain fundamental problems have not been solved despite recurrent concern.

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 7

1
He wrote the preface in January 1947, the month of his death. The volume opens with the aim of discussing the "content" and "the way" "to plan for freedom." He claims that democratic planning will be characterized by more "organiz[ation] in some ... basic spheres" and "more freedom where freedom is essential."

2
For example, in 1930 Mannheim proclaims:

> The greatest part of our lives is spent in a continual attempt to grapple with the array of the overpowering recurrent factors characterizing a certain concrete social environment. The nature of these influences, their strength, and the direction in which they develop or stunt personalities, would be quite capable of investigation and description, and could be made more easily amenable to control, if they were investigated rationally in the same way as other data of human existence have been up to now. (ESOK: 232)

Lynd's famous Knowledge for What? was published in 1939; Chase's The Proper Study of Mankind almost a decade later (1948). Mannheim was not alone in recognizing that most people learn about society through cultural media including novels, theater and art. (Cf. Sorokin, Coser) Agee and Walker's photographic essays, Ellison's Invisible Man, Chaplin's The Great Dictator, probably awaken consciousness more effectively than many social science treatises. Mannheim also perceives the limits of these partial social statements for extending and perpetuating social conscience. To deny their validity and utility, however, is sheer idiocy. (Cf. Chapter 3)

3
The distinction between "empiricism" and "concept[ualization]" is false Mannheim believes. Each approach needs the other. (Cf. MSR: 28-9)

4
Returning to a former interest -- what political science could be (Cf. Chapter 3) -- Mannheim argues against the liberal distinctions between individual and society and between society and state. Instead, he asserts, the public and private realms at least overlap and the individual cannot be understood as an isolated entity. Thus, the issue of freedom cannot be divorced from that of organization which in turn is tied to power.

Mannheim's political science is based on a curious realism (Cf. Fisher, 1954: 65-6) in that it proceeds from empirical evidence, albeit culled by others, to the determination of options which will transform reality. Mannheim relies on "conservative" and "radical" analyses alike (e.g., Fortune Magazine, Perlman; cf. FPDP: 319-20). Without the punch of later expositions (e.g., O'Connor, Miliband) Mannheim warns not only of the enormous power of corporations but also of governments.

5
Potent means effectively powerful; potential presumes the possibility of exerting power.

6
The comparison is all the more interesting considering the terminology in energy studies. Those like Commoner concerned with the socio-political implications concentrate not only on energy sources but also on the "end-use of power." Mannheim makes a similar point by focusing on the purposes to which social power is put.

7
Dewey and Lynd also speak of "transforming" power for democratic purposes.

8
This phenomenon appears to account for the rather extensive attention paid to Hirschmann's Exit, Voice and Loyalty.

9
What they learn is quite another story. That suburban children might know how to make martinis before they know how to read is analogous to the notorious evidence that prisons school inmates in new crime techniques and better methods of law evasion. Too often learning simply reinforces ignorant or prejudicial attitudes.

10
Not incidentally, theologically, justification means the absolution of guilt.

11
For example, he cites the beneficial possibilities of atomic energy, a development only used for city-destroying bombs in his lifetime. (FPDP: 73)

12
Indeed computers were just beginning to be produced when Mannheim died.

13
Mannheim had read Dewey's insight on the fundamental connection between community, communication, and common interest.

14
Mannheim notes that only in recent history has the exercise of free will been punished. Previously, the Devil or other preternatural causes were blamed. (FPDP: 207)

15
I sometimes wonder whether Lowe clarified or obfuscated Mannheim's economic thinking. Though clearly Mannheim's economic language was primitive, the confusion as to which kind of economy Mannheim prefers is greatest in the fifth chapter of Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, the one penned by Lowe.

16
By "contemporary American progressives" I mean those who advocate social reconstruction. These people believe social tinkering insufficient to the problems of our society. While they do not share formal party (or group) identity, most are generally located on the "left." These progressives, however, are to be distinguished from those who seek revolution without addressing what the "new society" might be. These progressives tend to use media vehicles such as Working Papers for a New Society and In These Times. They also have network publications, such as Planners Network, Shelterforce.

17
His specific intention was to consider how society emotionally prepares men for war.

18
In "Essay on State Control of Business," Agenda (February, 1944). He goes on to cite Walton Hamilton: "private business succeeds better than government in imposing its coercions because they are disguised as choices." (He took this from Lynd, 1939.) While this entire enthusiasm could be Lowe's and not Mannheim's, because of Mannheim's repeated interest in choice, it is likely not.

19
The differences between these forms are important to the issue of power. Collectives are organized to integrate the working and non-working aspects of life for all members. Cooperatives distinguish between a shared working life and private individual non-working lives. Industrial democracy, of which there are many forms, is limited to managerial decision-making and does not question concentrated ownership, the allocation of resources or specific product lines.

20
Cf. Selznick's evaluation of the TVA (Tennesee Valley Authority) wherein participation involved "shar[ing] of the burdens and responsibility for power, rather than of power itself." (Selznick, 1966: 264)

21
Arendt, for example, finds that the Hungarian uprising of 1956 "started with the intellectuals and university students, and generally with the younger generations." (Arendt, 1958: 494; cf. Chapter 4)

22
These quotations were taken from a passage on how to treat children with "innate incapacity" but were placed in this context because they repeat more succinctly his social advice elsewhere.

23
The size and power of the state are not inherently linked, however. Even with a growth in welfare functions, the democratically planned state may not need be as large and complex as welfare states have become. Indeed, coordination and devolution may diminish the size of the state apparatus even as the state more powerfully protects and encourages all citizens. (Cf. FPDP: 112) In fact, the size of the state seems to be more highly related to the economic structure of the society.

24
Mannheim approvingly quotes Jefferson's letter to Madison in 1787: "A little rebellion now and then is a good thing and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical ... It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government." (FPDP: 348, n. 5)
With regard to situational analysis, Stupak believes Mannheim's examination of "alienation, irrationality, and industrialization" still "pertinent" to the United States of the 1970s. (Stupak, 1971)

25
Quotations are taken from the section of Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning for which Lowe takes credit; it is not clear how specific Mannheim was in his economic proposals.

PART III: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 8

KARL MANNHEIM AND THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING: FINAL ASSESSMENTS

This final chapter seeks to establish to what extent Mannheim's idea of democratic planning is fragmentary or unified, and to assess the shortcomings of his theory and his lasting contributions. It is divided into four sections. The first summarizes Mannheim's thoughts on democratic planning and indicates the changes in his thinking over time. The second section argues that Mannheim's idea of democratic planning is unified in an ecological sense. The third examines two major omissions in Mannheim's scheme -- the appropriate economic system for and the role of governmental machinery in democratic planning. The final section elaborates on Mannheim's tacit theory of the public interest and his other lasting contributions.

8.A. Recapitulation of Mannheim's Idea of Democratic Planning

Mannheim's theory of democratic planning, more than "isolated reformist attacks" and less than a "blue print," is based on two premises: (1) the "spirit of a social system ... [which] permeates everything," and (2) "the impossibility of escaping from politics." "Reorientation" and consequent

reconstruction require (1) "discussing the principles which should guide us," (2) recognizing "that we are ... bound to start from the world as it is," and (3) acknowledging that "the revolt against evils in our society often contains in itself the creative and positive suggestions."

Democratic planning proceeds in stages marked by "paradigmatic experiences" which "lend shape to later experiences." (DOOT: 172, n. 7) "Planning the transition /toward improved democratic community/ is ... at least as important as planning in the subsequent stage." Exacting diagnoses of causes of social "maladjustments" -- sometimes "capitalism," sometimes "urbanization" or "mechanization" -- must precede remedies. (DOOT: 149ff) Democratic planning, based on imperfect social knowledge, must continuously learn from all situations. Indeed, the experimental attitude of democratic planning expects unanticipated consequences, some of which might be more beneficial than intended results.

The constructive task of democratic planning involves creating and sustaining a psycho-social environment hospitable to innovation, substantial rationality, individual democratic rights (especially liberty) and community cohesion. Simultaneously, democratic planning must prevent abuses of power by imposing a certain degree of social conformity and "draw/ing/ on the resources of public talent." (MSR: 345)

Democratic planning, in contrast to mere "economic planning" or "totalitarianism," seeks less to "manipulate"

"directly" individual behavior and more to create a "protect/ive/" "environment to facilitate and set free /humane/ ... spontaneous and latent forces." (DOOT: 103; FPDP: 184ff) Though fully endeavoring to strengthen primary, non-institutionalized relationships, democratic planning does not shirk its "neighborly" duty of state-provided social services. (Cf. FPDP: 182; MSR: 351) In short, democratic planning works through, rather than denies, the tension between individual and community needs. "Preventive planning" is emphasized in the transition stage. Against those who believe that any degree of conformity precludes individual freedoms, Mannheim maintains that:

> This unbridled craving for variety is not ingrained in human nature but is the product of the constant stimulation aroused by anarchic competition ... Freedom of thought in intellectual production is perfectly compatible with the standardization of our primary needs. (MSR: 348)

Most will be motivated to accept sacrifices in the "relative amount of variation" for "greater social security." (MSR: 348ff) The "impulse to improvement" is not hindered by less economic competition as other rewards and honors can replace monetary measures. (MSR: 349; FPDP; cf. Lynd, 1944)

The success of democratic planning is to be measured by the extent of "democratic self-discipline" and cultural progress which occurs within a generation. (DOOT: 148; MSR: 351; cf. Chapters 4 and 5)

Despite persistent reiteration of these broad pronouncements, Mannheim alters the specific principles of planning from Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1935, 1940) to Diagnosis of Our Time (1943) to Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1950). In the first edition (1935) of Man and Society Mannheim stresses preventive and national planning declaring that overarching "vital purposes," however theoretically elusive, can be "instantly solved in practice." (MSR: 346)

At the advent of World War II, still bruised by the Depression, Mannheim, in the expanded edition (1940), focuses more on economic measures[1] including:

(1) control of the "trade cycle" because "the effect of the whole cycle is more important than the satisfaction of individual desires,"

(2) limitation of consumer preferences to those items adduced by opinion polls and experts to be most necessary and/or wanted (cf. MSR: 348ff),[2]

(3) curtailment of the excessively negative effects of private property, not by "aboli/tion/," but by "withdrawing certain functions of ownership of capital from the competence of capitalists,"

(4) awarding public and private positions on the basis of "merit" and providing for a "minimum standard of living for everybody" with full employment, "pensions, health and unemployment insurance" programs (MSR: 351), and

(5) downplaying the "political" (in the sense of emotional appeals and petty trade-offs) until a more even "distribution of scarce commodities" has been achieved (MSR: 361ff).

He also enumerates the following non-economic principles:

- teaching the basic virtues of "co-operation, brotherly help and decency,"[3]
- supporting and extending the interplay of ideas in the context of open debates, university research units, and the communications industries (MSR: 353f),
- "safeguard/ing/ ... constitutional guarantees" while promoting more responsive and effective leadership (MSR: 355f),
- "co-ordinat/ing/ emotion and reason" at the level of small groups to encourage greater "articulation" of long- and short-term policies and avoiding mechanisms (like referenda) until mass men have better learned to judiciously determine and express convictions (MSR: 356ff), and
- emphasizing the "power of reason" over passive "consent" and "blind" accession to power plays (MSR: 364ff).

In brief, in the atmosphere of "distress," Mannheim now warns against easy solutions. The fact is that "reconstruction of society is a matter of life and death for every citizen." (MSR: 366)

Again, in Diagnosis of Our Time, Mannheim proceeds from a similar crisis perspective, but this time he devalues the economic in favor of the technological and psychological --

> The reason why I lay such emphasis on these social techniques is that they limit the direction in which modern society can develop at all. The nature of these social techniques is even more fundamental to society than the economic structure or the social stratification of a given order ...

-- and the political --

> Now the main point about these improved social techniques is not only that they are highly efficient, but that this very same efficiency fosters minority rule ... /and/ allows a much greater concentration of power in the hands of the few than did the techniques of any previous period ... /The concentration of power appears not only in the/ military ... /but also in/ government and administration ... /and/ the means of forming public opinion ... /These techniques/ ... penetrate/ / our private lives ... /and/ enslave the greater part of the population and superimpose creeds, beliefs and behavior which do not correspond to the real nature of the citizen ... (DOOT: 1-3; emphasis supplied)

Sometime between 1939 and 1942, Mannheim prepared a paper for the Moot group in which he began to define a "new social philosophy" for democratic planning. He forwarded three basic propositions:

. the need to reinforce simultaneously "the right to criticize" and the "duty to be responsible to the whole" in party platforms and educational curricula,

- the need to recognize and "daily" reconsider the "conflict between short-term interests and long-range responsibilities," and
- the need to define "a unifying purpose" by means of "spiritual integration of the members of society," rather than "extermination or internment of those who do not agree." (DOOT: 100ff)

Mannheim did not abandon his earlier ideas as he continued reading, thinking and writing about planning. Yet his emphases changed appreciably from a general discussion of "principia media" in the contemporary stage of history to a greater concentration on planned and unplanned aspects of democratic society. (Cf. MSR to FPDP)

From a readiness to accept centralization and elite rule as necessary and sufficient for democratic planning, by Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning Mannheim calls for workplace democracy (e.g., FPDP: 365ff, 266ff) and the "extension of local self-government" as a means of "not only help/ing/ to stimulate civic interest in public affairs and link/ing/ it to common issues, but ... also /of/ foster/ing/ identification of the citizen with his government and plan." (FPDP: 115; 336, n. 12)

From a position where the planners synthesize democratic free speech and thought, Mannheim turns increasingly to "spontaneous" and participatory efforts wherever possible, limiting the intellectual elites to the tasks of interpreta-

tion at the level of common value formation and fact-finding. (E.g., FPDP: 337, 256ff)

From the singular concern with shared control and consolidated power for public purposes, Mannheim, wary of the socialist solution of government ownership, increasingly presses for more interpersonal "mutual controls." (FPDP: 202) While he continues to advocate a "mixed economy," he exhorts us to consider carefully the best ways to organize the public's business (i.e., full employment, communications, military and the civil service). (E.g., FPDP: 119ff, 337)

From the recognition of the "plasticity" of man, Mannheim focuses more on the social "conditions of the formation of man," and hence education. (FPDP: 362, n. 4)

From the exposition on the ideological and utopian distortions in political thinking, Mannheim attends more to "integration of different purposes" and the development of quasi-religious institutions to guide everyday action with reference to both short-term and long-range aims. (FPDP: 313, 203)

From a concentration on the arenas for planned intervention, Mannheim more frequently discusses the need for "free zones." (FPDP: 380, 369ff) Indeed, he states: "non-interference in most spheres is an accepted principle /of democratic planning/." (FPDP: 318) Intervention becomes justified only where traditions are harmful and/or where social disintegration occurs. (Cf. FPDP: 119, 175) For this reason, his notion of accountability shifts more to support

small groups who can work out differences face to face. (E.g., FPDP: 185-6) Scalar questions are mediated in situational analyses. (FPDP: 338, 351; cf. Table 5; Section 8.C.)

From a generalized belief in the self-regulation of meritorious elites, Mannheim turns to scientific selection. Then, after considering the limitations of scientific selection, he worries about how best to develop all citizens. (Cf. MSR: 309, 366; FPDP: 134, 253ff, 95ff)

Finally, from an argument centering on the nature, forms and purposes of public planning, Mannheim delves more deeply into the psycho-social conditions for democratic planning.

In summary, Mannheim essays to define democratic planning in terms of "concrete idealism." (Cf. Section 5.D.4) He amends his "democratic principle" that "all social classes shall be politically active" and that "deeds and thoughts" shall be "public" to incorporate a notion of accountability. In other words, democracy must be evaluated by outcomes, not just inputs. (Cf. Section 8.C.)

8.B. Ecological Unity in the Idea of Democratic Planning

In 1935 Mannheim compared the "social situation" to "ecology." In the "marsh ... /,/ ecology /is defined as/ the interdependent metabolism of the creatures living together in this particular environment /and/ by the history of the marsh in question." (MSR: 175; emphasis added) "Ecology" is a dynamic concept which implies continuous activity which, in

turn, reconstructs the balance of the system. Each, the natural environment and the political culture, exists "as a relatively self-contained whole." (MSR: 176) The integrity of the particular whole is influenced by "accidental" and "constant" (or "necessary") factors. (MSR: 176) The difference between natural ecology and human society lies in the fact that "[m]ankind is tending more and more to regulate the whole of its social life." (MSR: 176) Intervention is inevitable in the human "concrete environment," thus the issue is to direct such activity according to "principles" which appreciate that to survive, human life essentially requires ecological balance.

The two themes -- 'man and society in an age of reconstruction' and the link between power and knowledge -- which intertwine in Mannheim's idea of democratic planning are separately, and together, ecological. Indeed, Mannheim anticipated an ecological perspective on democracy, and, unaware, he expanded the ecological approach of the Scot town planner, Patrick Geddes (1854-1932).[4] (Hall, 1975: 64ff)

A comparison of his elemental contributions to Leo Marx' analysis in "American Institutions and Ecological Ideals" is illuminating. (Marx, 1970: 945ff) Leo Marx begins by asserting that the ecological approach presumes a "thorough and delicate interpenetration of consciousness and environment." (1970: 945) In Mannheim's thinking this assumption is revealed in many forms. It underlies the "relationism"

of his theory of rationality and accounts for his perception of a crisis of "disproportion" between the technological and moral capacity of men. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 4) It also explains why democratic planning is at once a goal and an activity of collective behavior. (Cf. Chapters 1 and 7) Leo Marx defines the "ecological ideal" as

> ... the maintenance of a healthy life-enhancing interaction between man and the environment. This is layman's language for the proposition that every organism in order to avoid extinction or expulsion from its ecosystem, must conform to certain minimal requirements of that system. (1970: 945)

The "healthy life-enhancing interaction" in Mannheim's scheme focuses largely on relations between man and society. Among the critical "interactions" Mannheim identifies are "reciprocity" and generational social change. (Cf. Chapters 4, 6 and 7) In reference to the "interaction between man and the environment," Mannheim looks especially at the problem of "controlling" "social techniques" ("economic, political, psychological and mechanical").

Leo Marx continues, however, to note that the "concept of the ecosystem" is "difficult to grasp" because "boundaries between systems are always somewhat indistinct." (1970: 945) For Mannheim, the "community" is analogous to the "ecosystem," the democratic community compares to the "ideal." (Cf. Chapters 4 and 6) Within the community, various overlapping social groupings (e.g., mass, interest groups, classes) are found. Only the class formations are integral systems, in Mannheim's view, for they define "one's place in

the power structure." (Cf. Chapter 4) Yet, recognizing that extreme class differences invite "extinction or expulsion" for certain "organism/s/," Mannheim seeks in his idea of democratic planning to identify the "principles" for "necessary" "conform/ity/ to certain minimal requirements of ... /the eco/system." (MSR: 175ff; Marx, 1970: 945) These "minimal requirements" become the tacit theory of the public interest. (See Chapter 1 and below)

Implicit in the idea of ecology is the notion of constant change. When extended to the ecological ideal this concept translates as development. In other words, the ecological ideal does not condone all change. It warns against "uncontrolled growth of each cell in the social organism" (i.e., cancer). (Marx, 1970: 949) Indeed, the cancer metaphor helps explicate how Mannheim relates the "chaos" of the liberal order to the "caged-in existence" of the totally"regimented" society. Chaos and total control are both antonyms of democratic planning for Mannheim. Cancer cells organize their efforts in competition with normal cells. The normal cells, differentiated according to function, eventually are totally overcome by the cancerous cells if timely treatments are not undertaken. Recent scientific research has shown that virulent cancer cells from adult animals when transferred to infants do not interfere with normal development. (New York Times, February 1979) This finding, by analogy, supports one of Mannheim's main contentions. The proper development of man and his society can be

controlled by changing the political environment (i.e., adapting and reconstructing institutions). Man learns from his environment though he brings individually innate capacities to it. Likewise, the transplanted cancer cell remains structurally defective but the different "educative" environment of the infant's body contains its malignant growth. (Cf. Chapter 5) Furthermore, contrast Mannheim's concern for chronological measures of improvement with the fact that even the progeny of paired contaminated animals do not manifest cancer though the muted cells are still evident. (Cf. Sections 4.E. and 5.D.3)

Democratic development for Mannheim requires "proportion" and "harmonious growth." (Cf. Chapter 4) Democracy is not a static configuration of governmental bodies (e.g., parliaments). Instead, democracy, in Mannheim's view, involves institutions and decision making in the larger framework of political culture. Consequently, democracy must adapt along with other changes in society. The "democratic principle" states that "all social classes shall be politically active" and that "thoughts and deeds" shall be "public." Yet, to maintain a "thorough and delicate interpenetration of consciousness and environment," modifications in the human environment must be guided by democratic ideals -- especially justice and security for "every organism ... to avoid extinction or expulsion from its ecosystem." (Cf. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7; Marx, 1970: 945) Notice that some of Mannheim's titles reflect this "interpenetration." For

example "Soul and Culture" is nigh synonymous with "consciousness and environment." This orientation underlies Mannheim's prescription that each must take responsibility for the "whole society in which he moves," which, in turn, is predicated on the diagnosis of "collective insecurity." (Cf. Chapter 4) This is why Mannheim does not define security in relative financial terms, but rather in reference to fundamental needs. This is also why Mannheim emphasizes substitute rewards and stresses sublimation. (Cf. Chapter 4) This is, finally, why Mannheim does not see redistribution of wealth and income to be the end of a just society, but rather simply a precondition for a strong democratic community. (Cf. Chapter 7)

In contrast to the conservationist viewpoint, so long associated with the idea of ecology. Mannheim does not divorce man from nature. This is seen in his earliest work when he is concerned with wholes (e.g., gestalt, historicism, Weltanschauung) and authenticity (i.e., relations between self and other(s); between subject and object; among the known, the knower(s) and the to-be-known). (Cf. Chapter 3, Appendices D and E) We cannot, Mannheim maintains, return to a simpler "pastoral" life, yet we can learn from this history and "preliterate peoples" the essences of human life. (Cf. Marx, 1970: 945ff, 949ff, 948; Appendix B) Parenthetically, Mannheim was as intrigued by anthropological cross-cultural investigations as he was by historical analyses. (Cf. Chapters 3, 4, Appendices B, D and E)

The ecological perspective clarifies several issues. Resources are not to be wasted in our "self-contained" environment. Mannheim's argument is premised less on the exhaustability of natural resources than on the belief that by its very nature humanity has a "prior need to sustain life itself." (Marx, 1970: 951) In fact, power is a "social resource" which often grows. Thus, the resource problem is "to determine where the destructive power of our society lies and how to cope with it." (Marx, 1970: 951) Moreover, to the extent that resources are limited, we must substitute for unbridled economic growth standards of "sufficiency" predicated on actual production. Mannheim argues at one point that annual gains and losses in the GNP should be evenly shared. He does not, however, subscribe to a "no growth" philosophy. (Cf. Schumacher) The problems of democracy and planning are not obviated by limiting the size (or scale) of organization. The use and abuse of power can arise in any social group. The jurisdiction of planning is determined by the possible "radius of action." (Cf. Chapter 3) Planning must comprehend a more interdependent world and an expanding community. With reference to the "marsh" example, this is tantamount to suggesting that the marsh is now a subsystem of a larger ecosystem. Hence, though Mannheim increasingly proposes decentralized, face-to-face interaction, he is too realistic to deny the continued need for centralized coordination.

The difference between a social and a purely natural ecosystem is the possibility of rational control by human intervention. Since man has the capacity of foresight and since he can manipulate nature, the issue of rationality becomes paramount. (Cf. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6) Mannheim warns that the social ecosystem runs "amuck" when "functional rationality" overshadows "substantial rationality." (Cf. Chapter 3) In the taut words of the Melville protagonist, Ahab, "My means are sane ... my motives and my object are mad." (In Marx, 1970: 950) Mannheim implies that democratic processes such as elections are usually "sane" but, in the absence of continuous reconsideration of democratic ideals, may become "mad." This is why Mannheim repeatedly calls for "control of controls." He seeks to reverse Thoreau's observation that "men become the tools of their tools." (Marx, 1970: 949) I believe Mannheim downplayed economic solutions (e.g., socialism) and governmental arrangements in his discussions on democratic planning because he felt that in many ways these were "tools." To place undue emphasis on them, accordingly, would lead to Nietzsche's dilemma: "I have forgotten why I ever began." (I&U: 20) The fundamental and recurrent question of planning, "control for what?" might recede from public attention. While socialism may well be compatible with, or even necessary for, democratic planning, it suffers from an inherited and unquestioned assumption that life is divided into only two segments: work and leisure. Thus labor control and

class consciousness are the prisms through which democracy is to be filtered. But such a view denies the possibilities we have created for choice and control. It further ignores how we are to create other possibilities. Where is the political nexus?

Extreme attention to governmental machinery, similarly, tends to distort the meaning of political. Power is defined by actual decision making rather than as "power to" do something.[5] (Cf. Domhoff, 1978: 125ff) (The economic and governmental issues will be considered more below.)

The ecological perspective contends that there is no escape from ourselves, but we can by criticizing and providing alternatives escape dangerous situations we have created. (Cf. Marx, 1970: 949, 953) For Marx, the task of escaping life-threatening conditions involves the application of "substantial" rationality to problems. (Cf. Chapter 3) The rest of his proposal for constructive change closely parallels Mannheim's views on the intelligentsia. Specifically, "scientists" must (a) "... speak with their own disinterested public voice," (b) bring any disagreement into the public eye, (c) "join forces /with other citizens and groups/ ... wherever common aims can be found ... to change basic institutions," (d) "recognize ... that, while public awareness may be indispensable for effecting changes in national policy, it hardly guarantees results," and (e) realize that "the essential problem is not technological ... /but/ inheres in all of the ways in which this dynamic society generates

and uses its power." (Marx, 1970: 951, 947; cf. Douglas (ed.), 1970)

Notice that Leo Marx and Mannheim are not denying the rights of citizens to participate even though they stress the responsibility of intellectuals. They are simply asking that quality thinking not be lost in political scuffles. They both seek to overcome the "bewildering ... disparity between words and action." (Marx, 1970: 946)

Conservation and conservatism share the same etymological root. Yet, the first connotes the effort to use resources "wise/ly/" while the second implies the attempt to "preserve" the known. Krieger points out that this distinction between "conserving" and "preserving" is great, for the first admits of the possibility of improvement with increased rationality while the second fears any change. (Krieger, 1972; cf. Chapter 3) Mannheim and Dewey both addressed the conservative question. Mannheim analyzed variants in "Conservative Thought," some of which accord directly with the notion of conservation. Dewey cautioned thinkers to remember that their efforts are experimental and provide no guarantees other than the certainty of "put/ting/ some portion of an apparently stable world in peril." (Dewey in Ratner (ed.), 1939: v)

Mannheim has been labelled "conservative" and "utopian." (Cf. Appendix C) The ecological unity of his idea of democratic planning suggest that both labels are accurate, and yet misleading. In other words, the ideals Mannheim pro-

claims are "utopian" by intention. (Cf. Chapter 3) So too, many of the elements of his theory, especially the maintenance of class distinctions and the approbation of the intellectual elite, are conservative. Nevertheless, the point Mannheim makes, and I think forcefully, is that we are forever caught between two times -- the past and the future -- and only by endeavoring to utilize the best of each can we truly progress. The revolutionary solution, which Mannheim abhorred, too often attempts to create a tabula rasa. The new society towards which Mannheim strives, however, seeks to reaffirm the continuity of mankind. The symptoms of the crisis Mannheim identified -- the "drift to war," alienation and severe economic dislocation -- are not rooted in human nature, they are caused by disproportionate institutional development. (Cf. Preface, Chapters 1, 3 and 4) When Mannheim, in his last work, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, calls for "new men," "new values," and "new institutions," he is using the religious language of rebirth. Yet, not solely the rebirth of the Christian "man-centered attitude," but the transcending faith that binds men together in their natural setting. (Marx, 1970: 948) The words of Hillel which Mannheim quotes at the end of an Oxford lecture on democratic planning,

> If I am not for myself who will be for me?
> If I am only for myself -- then what am I for?

appreciates the "indistinct" but intractible "boundaries" of the "ecosystem." (ESSP: 310)

Part of the reason subsystems are somewhat amorphous lies in the fact that both competition and cooperation among "organism/s/" exist in natural ecology. (Witness symbiosis and parasitism.) The balance of the ecosystem is determined by both processes. Thus, Mannheim, in refusing to choose between competition and cooperation as "social forces" reaffirms a link between man and nature.[6] (Cf. Chapter 4)

The ecological perspective, in other words, is a different way of stating Mannheim's claim that politics, and consequently, planning, must deal with a world that is in the "process of becoming." We cannot ignore what has been inherited. We cannot deny human frailties. We can only work with what we have in a moral and rational way to try to ensure the "maintenance of a healthy life-enhancing interaction between man and /his/ ... environment." (Cf. Marx, 1970: 945)

8.C. Mannheim's Limitations

Mannheim is often vague about how to proceed with democratic planning. The primary reason for the ambiguity seems to lie in Mannheim's conspicuous inattention to economic and governmental details. This situation is odd because Mannheim was forever surrounded by debates on whether to pursue socialism or reform governmental machinery. (Cf. Chapter 2) For someone who developed a philosophy of collective action,

Mannheim is strangely silent on the burning decisions of his time.

The economic issue is the most troubling. Is Mannheim, David Wright asks, "a moderate 'compensatory' Keynesian, a centralized 'Beveridge' planner, or a public-ownership-of-heavy-industry advocate?" (1951: 175-6)

Mannheim is clearly not an advocate of capitalism (in the sense of extolling private property and the profit motive). Indeed, he points to the monopolistic tendencies of capitalism. (Cf. Chapters 4 and 7) Neither is he a "'compensatory' Keynesian" as seen in his analyses of security and sacrifice. (Cf. Chapters 4, 6 and 7) Also, he does not subscribe to "public-ownership-of-heavy-industry," as indicated by his approval of Schumacher's suggestion that government can better control production by assuming the role of large buyer. (Cf. Section 7.A.3) This would suggest that Mannheim is a "centralized 'Beveridge' planner." Yet, Wright does not exhaust the choices of economic positions.

Is Mannheim a socialist? If by socialism is meant the public ownership of all the means of production, no, Mannheim is not. Even if a broader definition of socialism is used, he still is not quite a socialist. Nevertheless, Mannheim's idea of democratic planning is compatible with socialism if Crosland's definition is used. Socialism, in this view, stands for five "ideals":

> First, a protest against the material poverty and physical squalor ... Secondly, a wider concern for 'social welfare' ... Thirdly, a belief in equality and the 'classless society,' and especially a desire to give the worker his 'just' rights and a responsible status at work. Fourthly, a rejection of competitive antagonism, and an ideal of fraternity and cooperation. Fifthly, a protest against the inefficiencies of capitalism as an economic system. (Crosland, 1956: 103)

(The major difference in Mannheim's formulation is the unwillingness to pursue a "classless" society. Cf. Chapter 4) By this standard, Crosland argues, the concentration on economic planning to the exclusion of other human and political activities is short-sighted.[7] (E.g., Crosland, 1956: 515ff)

In fact, Mannheim's idea of democratic planning theoretically supports the British welfare state. (Cf. Titmuss, Birnbaum, Brown, Bogardus)

How can Mannheim's idea of democratic planning straddle the economic issue? Mannheim, like Dewey and Lynd, believed a more public, collectivized economy was emerging. As Crosland notes this type of economy is neither "capitalism" nor "socialism." Mannheim accepted the central economic planning proposals of Wootton.[8] (Wootton, 1934, 1945) He also concurred with her cautious attitude that whether planning can proceed without socialism remains to be seen in practice. (Wootton, 1945) He strongly believed that the economic debate overshadowed psychological and cultural considerations. Yet, he assumed that wealth and income would

be redistributed more equitably; indeed, he makes this a precondition for democratic planning.

Given his evaluation of economic power, Mannheim neglects his own advice about proposing remedies consistent with diagnoses for the important transition period of democratic planning. He does not, in Mills' terms, "squarely face all the issues of power." (Mills, 1940, 1954) Mannheim put too much faith in the trend toward the welfare state. Surely, as Crosland argues, "collectivism" (the admixture of a "public" and "private economy") has met many social needs. (1956: 59 and passim; cf. Myrdal) But, it has not, and likely cannot, reverse all the symptoms of the crisis. (Cf. Dobb, Baran) On the other hand, despite the cogent Marxian analyses of the misfeasant ways in which the welfare state operates, their prescription of class revolution is anathematic to violence-shy Mannheim. (Cf. Chapter 7) Indeed, Mannheim seems to agree that many social ills are rooted in the economic institutions of monopoly capitalism, but he is unwilling to admit that the solution lies simply in the rearrangement of the economy. In fact, he implicitly takes a more "institutional economics" approach.[9] In other words, political power drives economic life.

> Power ... has been known as Ability, Capacity, Freedom, Citizenship, or Membership ... A citizen ... is one who has power or recognized 'capacity' to call upon the collective force of the concern to protect and assert for him all the claims against others which the rules of the concern recognize and enforce. Power is the individual's share of collective power ...

> But this share of collective power would be meaningless if the officials did not recognize an equivalent duty ... Responsibility ... (Commons, 1961: 687ff)

This leads to the second major limitation in Mannheim's thinking. If politics is inescapable and quintessential, then how is democratic planning to proceed through existing governmental mechanisms? Or, what new forms are needed? Mannheim clearly believes a central advisory body of planners, similar to Tugwell's fourth branch of government, is mandatory for "policy coordination." Yet, he does not deal with the "transfer of power" to these planners. (Cf. Dyckman, 1966) Nor does he explain how these planners will control the distribution of power in society. He does not, for example, call for constitutional reform or plebiscites. At the most, he appeals to every individual, and especially intellectuals, to assume responsibility. Yet, in the transition period he deems so critical, Mannheim does not propose a series of tactics (such as civil disobedience, public demonstrations, increased legislation, landmark judicial cases). Instead, he turns back to the idea of consciousness and forward to the ideal of freedom.

In short, Mannheim assumes social change will continue to occur in the myriad ways it always has. (Cf. Piven and Cloward, 1978) The issue for Mannheim is not taking power, but using it well. (Cf. Appendix F) Crosland would agree with Mannheim's presumption: "the Marxists always ... underrate the socio-economic consequences of political democracy."

(Crosland, 1956: 56ff) Conservatives will only "dent[7]," "not destroy," the "new social and economic structure." (Crosland, 1956: 61-2)

As it were, Mannheim thinks the critical task of planning to be "goal setting." Thus, he considers the many ways in which this capacity can be encouraged and reinforced. They include education and personal interaction at the local level. He maintains that in "goal-setting" the tensions between power and knowledge and between man and society can be resolved democratically. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 6)

The "essence of planning" for Mannheim is "control." Control must be for human development. Yet, control is not assured simply by the creation of "right political institutions" or the mere adoption of new economic systems. Neither the Weimar Republic nor the Soviet Union, Mannheim contends, exhibited "shared control" over outcomes. Moreover, control always exists in a world of social uncertainty.

> Uncertainty, then, is part of the price that has to be paid for being interested in the many-sidedness of human needs and behavior. However, we draw some comfort from Karl Mannheim's thought that it is precisely our uncertainty which brings us closer to reality ... (Titmuss, 1969: 14; cf. I&U)

The proper role of planning theory, then, for Mannheim, is to establish "principles" to guide better "what is in the process of becoming." (Rein, 1976: 87ff) This is done by tackling the "larger questions" and "describing broad, general choices." (White, 1951; Means, 1969: 250-1) It does

not entail outlining the "precise problems and priorities of /our/ ... fellow citizens." (Heywood, 1972) Instead, it requires showing that planning should be the primary focus of political life and political study. In effect, Mannheim's idea of democratic planning asks that citizenship be more comprehensively defined and more widely supported. Intermittent involvement simply signifies that "survival itself does not interest" us. (Mumford, 1944: 593) Only in this fundamental way is true democracy possible.

Citizenship does not require socialism nor does it necessitate certain forms of government. Nevertheless, it can be (and apparently is) impeded by monopoly capitalism and closed governments. (Cf. Baran, Galbraith, Nelson, O'Connor, Henderson, Miliband)

The State as well as the economy must be controlled, Mannheim insists. Control requires policy coordination and, most significantly, goal-setting.

Mannheim foresaw the expansion of planning efforts; he also anticipated the prevalence of planning according to received, not chosen, values. (Cf. Benveniste, 1972) It is precisely this concern with "valuations" which accounts for his lasting contributions to planning theory. It also, parenthetically, is a common element in his entire life work. The very fact that valuations differ is why Mannheim develops the two primary themes of man and society and knowledge and power.

The word "value" is difficult to define because it signifies different things to different people. Or, as Dahl and Lindblom avow: "The things men value are countless." (1953: 25) They, accordingly, distinguish between "prime" and "instrumental" values. (1953: 26ff) "A prime goal /value/ when attained is a direct source of satisfaction in itself; an instrumental goal ... has value only because it facilitates the attainment of one or more prime goals." (1953: 26ff) Maslow contends that even "perceptions" (or "interpretations") of facts are "value statement/s/." (1971: 109) Mannheim compares "relative" and "absolute" "values" according to whether (or not) they are time-bound. (ESOK: 6, 8) Social values are intimately tied to the development of social groups and their functions in society. (ESSP: 236ff) Therefore, as social life becomes more complicated conflicts among values are likely to increase. However, because collective action is necessary in the more inter-dependent contemporary world, a "consensus" must emerge from certain valuations. Mannheim thinks for this purpose the "longer view" values are most important. Consequently, he would agree with Baran that "what is at issue in planning is not patchwork aiming at some improvement of the performance of the existing economic and /governmental/ ... system, but a change in its very foundations, a reorientation of the energies and activities of society" in light of ultimate values. (Baran, 1969: 245-6) The satisfaction of simple desires, or even impulses, is not the appropriate approach. The utili-

tarian "calculus of felicity" is not adequate to problems of planning. On the other hand, "consensus" cannot be imposed by a ruling minority, or even an intellectual elite. It must at least be "the fully considered choice of free people ... /who decide/ in light of objective needs and possibilities .. the cultural life of society ..." (Baran, 1969: 245-6)

8.D. Mannheim's Contributions

Mannheim contributed to planning theory in at least four lasting ways. As seen above, he wove a far-reaching notion of democratic citizenship into the normative theory of planning. In summary: "The essence of democracy is the integration of purposes and not mere compromise." (FPDP: 203)

Second, his analysis of the "drift to war" remains acute. (Cf. Mills, 1940, 1958; Dewey, 1940) War is no "accident," Mannheim maintains. Consequently, democratic planning must curtail the growth of the military sector. A military planning its own future in isolation (and, in secrecy) threatens democratic control, and, worse, in a nuclear age, increases the likelihood of annihilation. (Cf. Tocqueville, MSR, FPDP, DOOT) Mannheim, however, believes that minimal military preparedness is necessary as long as the world is politically divided into nation states. Nonetheless, he clearly argues for arms limitation. He does not

elaborate on where military intervention is justified, and thus, one might presume that he subscribes to a variant of deterrence theory. In other words, Mannheim does not advocate "planning for peace" by abdicating all military responsibility. (Cf. Mills, 1958) Instead, he hopes for better international relations through more communications, which, in turn, reinforces a sense of global community and shared responsibility for the fate of mankind. (Cf. Chapter 4) Indeed, his acceptance of the UNESCO position indicates his stand. (Cf. Chapter 2) He proposes direct "planning for peace" only within the nation to curb possibly violent struggle among subgroups. (Cf. Chapter 7) The international solution, by implication, is scaled down to national programs to create and maintain democratic communities.

Mannheim's third contribution consists of his implicit theory of the public interest. The "public interest" is not one of his favorite phrases, but his "principles" for democratic planning condense to four priorities. In essence, Mannheim ranks valuations according to democratic needs to provide guidelines for possible conflicts among specific planning proposals.

The four layers of the public interest might be interpreted in reference to the "ecological ideal." In other words, they speak to the "self-contained whole" while allowing for "healthy life-enhancing" activities. In order of importance they are:

(1) The common (human) interest

(2) Individual-interests-in-common

(3) Community interests

(4) "More complicated" democratic values.

The common human interest defines the minimal requirements to prevent the "extinction or expulsion of each organism" in the "ecosystem." It includes the preconditions basic to human survival. For Mannheim, three situations must obtain: the control of war, economic security (including full employment and price controls), and publicity. Since the first item is discussed above and the last item will be considered below, a few words on economic security are needed here. Economic security for Mannheim means that each (and thereby all) are freed from the problem of being "progress immune." Harrington's term "progress immune" denotes the situation wherein some groups, notably the poor, do not gain proportionately from rises in the economy and lose most in times of downturns. (Harrington in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), 1966: 620) Mannheim contends that sacrifices must be evenly apportioned, that the wide differences in wealth and income must be limited, and that 'compensation' must be defined constructively. (Cf. Chapters 6 and 7) The last point is important. If economic dislocation is caused by structural changes in the economy, Mannheim argues, it makes no sense to put the unemployed on long-term welfare. What, he asks, will happen to their self-respect? How can they be expected to function in their fullest capacities in

other realms of life, particularly as citizens? Thus, he asserts, the victims of economic dislocation must be retrained to assume new places in the society. (Cf. Wootton, 1964)

To reiterate, the common (human) interest refers to those social conditions which make it possible for every human to exist. In passing, it might be noted that Leo Marx maintains that the natural environmental issue not only is common to all men, but is at base a political problem because vested interests decline to get involved in publicizing and fighting for needed changes. (Marx, 1970; cf. Section 8.B.)

Individual-interests-in-common concern the special capacities of men gua humans, including most importantly the ability to think (and relate past, present and future) and concomitantly to make their social institutions. These interests define interactions required for collective behavior. They must, he insists, be grounded in the principle of "reciprocity." Reciprocity does not denote even exchanges, but rather emphasizes shared choices. These choices, which may be procedural and/or substantive, are expected by Mannheim to change over time according to altered social conditions. Examples of individual-interests-in-common, then, would include constitutional rights, national health care, truly progressive taxation, and public education. This priority does not seek merely to attain more equality. Rather, it intends to define the political environment neces-

sary to the fuller expression of each man's creative capacities. (Cf. Chapters 5, 6 and 7)

Community interests deal with those aspects of social life which cohere individuals into a meaningful collective entity. They are premised on the fact that we cannot escape ourselves and thus must live with a certain amount of conformity (or consensus). They differ, however, from individual-interests-in-common in that they do not assume complete agreement among all members of a community. Rather they define the setting in which differences can coexist. On the positive side, community interests refer to the decided goals of collective efforts. For example, the community interest may be translated into a plan for a region in which mass transportation investments ensure that each has the option of travelling to desired destinations. Concurrently, industrial and business zoning might be limited to areas directly serviced by mass transport, thereby preventing discrimination against workers without automobiles. The community interest may determine local needs such as how much decent housing construction is required, which public facilities (e.g., zoos or opera houses) should be built, the extent of export of indigenous resources (such as coal), etc.

Mannheim calls for majority rule in these community choices. (FPDP) Because he thinks the community framework is ever expanding, he also allows for choices at various levels. (Cf. Table 5) Whatever the jurisdictional scope

these decisions should be informed by substantial rationality and expert advice on available options.

Moreover, he appears to contend that the issues of what is to be done and how it is to be done are distinct. The decision, for instance, to manufacture X tons of steel might be made by a national planning body[10] and the regional locations of plants might be determined by scientific criteria such as proximity to iron ore. However, how production proceeds and what local social costs (e.g., pollution) are to be borne are properly to be determined in the factory and town, respectively. If a town or firm is unwilling (or unable) to pay for pollution control and/or the damages incurred, the community interest can be redefined more broadly and a larger jurisdiction can take responsibility. In other words, Mannheim's scheme seeks to bring questions down to the grass-roots level, especially for goal-setting, while it appreciates the fact that both horizontal and vertical policy coordination is needed. (Cf. Marris and Rein, 1967) This is why a central planning body cannot be avoided. It also explains why planning is a political activity. The channels of power designed by constitutional and institutional arrangements are not meant to be rigid, they should abet progressive social change.

Obviously, community interests are the most difficult to define theoretically. In practice, they seem to require an extraordinary effort on the part of all citizens. This is likely why Mannheim's idea of democratic planning places

more stress on citizenship than socialism or governmental mechanisms. (Cf. Section 8.C.)

The final layer of the public interest, "more complicated" democratic values, concerns those individual and group rights to free thought and latitude in action. These values permit myriad, albeit constructive or, at least, benign, human differences to be cultivated. They encourage innovation and "facilitate personal relationships." They are guided by a notion of "self-control" in the exercise of "democratic tolerance." (Cf. Chapter 6) Yet, in contrast to the shared control in community interests, they also sustain "mutual controls." (Cf. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7)

These values while limited by certain social "compulsion" affirm freedom and encourage new possibilities and choices. They may not, Mannheim insists, contravene the common human interest, but they may (and indeed should) inform choices at the levels of individual-interests-in-common and community interests.

This category of the public interest also supports class consciousness, which Mannheim believes critical to the improvement of "democratic intelligence." (Cf. Chapters 2, 3 and 4) In addition, by sustaining classes, and other chosen groupings, "more complicated" democratic values encourage necessary mediating devices between democratic man and his collective society.

The four layers of the public interest taken together speak to the problem of extending democratic intelligence.

Democratic intelligence is expanded when what we know substantially is better applied in our political activities and when we are persistently urged to widen and deepen our social knowledge in the pursuit of humane goals.

If planning is a "political activity" and its "essence" is "control," then the theory of the public interest advanced by Mannheim must indirectly, at least, speak to the question of power. Given the ecological unity of the idea of democratic planning, it must also conceive of a balance of power(s) system. Moreover, if Mannheim is to be exonerated for not considering governmental machinery and economics in detail, his prescriptions must be realistic with respect to power. In Chapter 7 I concluded that Mannheim's treatment of power is lacking. Indeed, this is so if one searches for explicit analyses. However, if one searches behind the words, especially through the prism of the tacit theory of the public interest, Mannheim seems to have conceptualized power quite adequately. This is, of course, different than saying that his notions can be easily operationalized for social science research. (Cf. Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lynd, 1939)

The reason, I maintain, that Mannheim offers a reasonable formulation on power is that he includes three kinds of power -- the "systemic (class), structural (institutional), and situational (decisional)." (Domhoff, 1978: 130) What Mannheim does not do well is show how these three kinds of power are related to one another. It would appear, to me at

least, that this task can only be done in the form of case studies. Since case studies necessarily come after the event, how can this triumvirate of power conceptions be fruitfully employed in a theory of planning, particularly democratic planning?

"Systemic" and "structural" definitions of power distill to the idea of "power over." "Situational" definitions involve the "power to." (Domhoff, 1978: 125ff) Planning, as it addresses the future, is primarily concerned with power as a "social resource," or the "power to" do something. Nevertheless, as Mannheim argues, "power to" is confined by concentrations of "power over." For example, organized institutional power favors minority rule and the class system of capitalism thwarts much individual development. Thus, Mannheim contends to promote "power to" do constructive planning, certain forms of "power over" must be mitigated. He apparently thinks that the best method involves using the growing "power to" in order to garner more "power to" and in consequence to shift the balance away from "power over." The struggle for "power over" breeds conflict without necessarily leading to new social directions. The contest for "power to" (to the extent that it emerges) necessarily defines directions. For instance, in the United States the many efforts which led to the creation of national social security and other labor programs were initiated at the local (or state) level to protect workers from arbitrary "power over" them. (Martin, 1976; Ware; Bernstein;

Raybeck) The unionization movement for all the gains it has posted has not promoted planning. (Cf. Lorwin) Organized labor, whether stressing institutional or class power, has found itself largely in a defensive posture and unable to direct the applications of new technologies. (Cf. Kelber and Schlesinger) It has not, at least in America apparently, been sufficiently concerned with "power to." (Cf. Fischer; Anderson and Blackburn (eds.); Crosland) Mannheim would maintain that by adopting the citizen perspective, the worker would have looked earlier to issues of planning. (Cf. Martin, 1976; Raybeck) Second, by focusing too much on policy coordination and not persistently "discussing the final values and objects of life," alternative possibilities have been lost. In other words, when the "power over" is the focus of political activity, those who already have "power over" can almost without interference pursue "power to." (Cf. Mills in Horowitz (ed.), 1963: 292ff) However, Mannheim reasons, if those over whom power is exercised, use the strategy of "power to," they might not always win, but at least they directly join in the "process of becoming." (Cf. Table 5) This is why Mannheim emphasizes the purposes over the inputs of social democracy. Participation is not enough because its primary aim is to convert "power over" into "power with." "Power with" assists policy coordination, but it does not necessarily encourage new goal-setting. (Cf. Arnstein, 1972) Without new goal-setting,

the crisis of "disproportionate" institutional development continues.

New goal-setting requires democratic communications, Mannheim's last major conceptual contribution.

The "democratic principle" for Mannheim states that "all social classes shall be politically active," and that "deeds and thoughts" shall be "public." By implication, then, perhaps the most important democratic activity is communications. Indeed, democracy historically, as Mannheim notes, developed in conjunction with a locale for communications. The ancient Greeks had the agora, the English had their coffee houses, which later became political clubs known as "pubs."

In a contemporary, complex society spanning large geographical distances, the face-to-face locale for democratic communications is necessarily translated into more remote channels of information. How well these channels work is a critical democratic issue.

Marris and Rein contend that in modern America:

> No style of government has ever talked so much, printed so many words, broadcast so many facts, while communicating so little of its real intentions. There seem to be two processes of government: one formal and democratic, where the people are represented, but increasingly empty; the other obscure, technical and decisive, where expertise colludes with political self-interest. The crucial problem is then to reintegrate informed analysis and democratically determined purpose, within a society where the variety of interests is as great as ever, but the parts are more interdependent. (Marris and Rein, 1967: 278)

They explain that this situation arose largely for "logical" reasons to prevent information "overload" in central offices. (Marris and Rein, 1967: 278) They are particularly concerned about the clogged flows of information from the bottom to the top and across various levels. Political scientists have endeavored to improve democratic communications by emphasizing "feedback" in policy formulation.[11] Planners have tried to expand political communications from the bottom up with advocacy and client-oriented schemes.[12] Yet, the "centralization" of information continues. In mass media news, for example, digests of many topics for a mammoth audience appears to be the only practicable approach. Critics, thus, tend to focus less on the limited quantity of information and more on the quality and selection of information. (Cf. Marcuse, Schiller) Other critics concentrate on deliberate obfuscation. (Cf. Halperin et al)

The tasks of developing consciousness, interpreting social data, determining policy coordination, and setting goals are difficult enough with a free flow of information. They are significantly obstructed without a "democracy of information." (Marris and Rein, 1967: 272ff) "In practice, therefore, communication and power cannot be divorced." Yet, "the process is circular: without power, you will not be heard; but until you are heard, you cannot influence the basis of consent to the power you seek." (Marris and Rein, 1967: 281, 296)

Mannheim was consistently concerned about communications and consciousness.

He particularly urged full publicity.[13] He recognized that the distances between men and among groups could not be shortened without publicity. (Cf. Chapter 4)

Yet, Mannheim anticipated the developments Marris and Rein chronicle. He also foresaw the growth of a private economic sector devoted to the pursuit of knowledge.[14] He worried about leaving information production in the hands of private business.

Baran, like Mannheim, contrasts "the intellect workers," who "liv/e/ off their wits rather than off their hands," with the intellectuals who are driven by the "desire to tell the truth" and whose "courage" permits "rational inquiry to wherever it may lead." (Baran, 1969: 3, 14) To be sure, "intellect," or even production, workers may sometimes be intellectuals, but the fact of using one's mind does not also describe for what purposes it is used.

Just as ideas are never "ethically neutral," so too there is never a "vacuum" of ideas. (Baran, 1969: 11; cf. Chapter 3) It is precisely this issue Mannheim addresses when he writes about education, freedom of thought, democratic tolerance and planning. It is precisely for this reason that he singles out the communications industry as unqualifiably the public's business. (See Chapter 7; cf. Sackman) And, it is also for this reason that he suggests daily exercise of citizenship. Indeed, the intellectuals

have an acute responsibility to discern options, but they alone cannot (and should not) perform the entire task of democratic planning. In fact, Mannheim almost infers that since we have surplus productive capacity, more time should be devoted to being citizens, to choosing and effecting our goals, including the development of deeper human bonds.[15]

Mannheim also previewed the consequences of such developments. Publicity forces us to see the relationships among men and their institutions. Because most of us in our daily lives interact with different institutions of various scopes, our own attention to social data is diffused. Discerning social relationships is always an abstract endeavor. When the visible clues[16] are beyond our experience we must rely on others to observe, make connections, and report them. Even in our own neighborhoods, the disposition of the empty lot is often decided somewhere else and behind closed doors. The question is, then, for the purposes of human progress how should privacy and publicity be redefined?

Comprehensive coordinated policy and goal-setting cannot be undertaken without large publicity. Since democracy requires publicity, democratic planning demands priority for publicity over privacy. The Russians, Cubans, and Chinese through publicity created a consciousness by which they transformed their societies. The decline in publicity attended the rise of the U.S.S.R. as a totalitarian state.

Who creates plans is a critical question, in part, because it speaks to the issue of publicity. (Cf. Mills in Horowitz (ed.), 1963: 302ff) Full publicity would expose where there has been improvement and where there has not.[17] How can we direct the "process of becoming" if we do not know "what has become"? Only by making available historical and comparative data as well as new information can we assess how politically and economically democratic our society is, and how well our planning efforts succeed. Has the entire population been accounted for? Do we know the status of the whole "ecosystem"? Can we identify the imbalances which threaten the individual "organisms"? Have the interrelations among different segments of the population been strengthened? While we speak of "generations" of communications technologies, human generations necessarily overlap. Treating any human generation disproportionately, as, for instance, we do with the elderly today, is a sure "sign of social deterioration" for Mannheim. (FPDP: 253) Communications must enhance the natural "contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous" in human political culture. (Cf. Chapters 3 and 4)

Publicity, therefore, raises planning questions related to the cycles of those now living, as well as those yet-to-be-born. It attends to the "chronology" of the public interest. (Cf. Lynd in Chapter 1; Krieger) It assists in explicating our social "biography" so that we may better guide our future actions. (Cf. Chapters 5 and 6; Mills,

1959) The principle of publicity simply reinforces the points that communications and consciousness are not incidental to everyday life.

Aside from the issue of publicity, we must learn, Mannheim insists, to communicate "moral imagination" and "sociological imagination." (Cf. Mills, 1959; Means, 1969)

Mannheim's education theory has been largely ignored by those interested in his planning ideas. (Cf. Chapters 5, Appendices C and F) Why is education important to social transformation? Education, in the best sense, presents students with visions of other cultures, with dreams of civilized men through the ages.[18] We tend to love leaders who dare to dream (or have a vision) and hate them when the dream does not materialize or work out in our favor. As democratic citizens how are we to assess our planners' dreams if we do not have some visions of our own against which to compare them? As Lynd long ago noted, important social science "hypotheses ... cannot be definitely proved or disproved. /But t/his does not excuse us from doing what we can." (1939: 205) Or, in Mannheim's words:

> Neither democratic tolerance nor scientific objectivity demand that we should never take a stand for what we believe to be true, nor that we should avoid discussing the final values and objects of life. (DOOT: 73)

The terms communications and consciousness express two formal aspects of imagination. Communications refers to the processes and structures by which imagination is conveyed.

Consciousness refers to the natural process and structure by which individual imagination is developed and received. (Cf. Barthes, Bruner)

The problem of communications and consciousness is exacerbated by the development of new information technologies. What kinds of citizens will the children raised on the "black boxes" of calculators and computers be? What kinds of informal analytic training are lost when even the mechanics of information processing and transmission are hidden by miniaturized electronics? How is abstract thinking about relationships to be cultivated when the investigation of causes is overshadowed by displays of correlations? (Cf. Appendices D and E) What kind of democratic polity is possible when we can dismiss another by turning off the radio or hanging up the phone?

Information technologies not only discourage face-to-face encounters, they more seriously diffuse the receiving population while concentrating the powers that transmit. Information has come to be treated as private property; to give of it honestly and fully is to preclude possible profit.[19] In government overloaded with information, "technically sophisticated systems of analysis /with/ ... simplifying assumptions tend inevitably to pre-empt questions of political choice." The oft result is "indeterminate images and slogans, which represent but do not define goals." (Marris and Rein, 1967: 278) Vertical integration of in-

formation is choked, lateral policy coordination is impeded. "Thus democracy drowns in the flood of information it is trying to master." (Marris and Rein, 1967: 279)

Two largely unquestioned means of safeguarding democratic communications have arisen. Decentralized independent units are to gather and disseminate information. Open competition is to keep public vigil on errors (deliberate and not). However, Mannheim warns, in an increasingly interdependent and highly organized society, these approaches may not be sufficient. He, therefore, advocates public takeover of democracy's most important business, communications. He gives as an example the BBC. However inappropriate this agency may be as a model, Mannheim raises a difficult question. If the public is to "share control" over communications, do they do so by providing public financial support to all groups who seek to inform their fellow citizens? Is a commission (or, in his terms a "trust") established to manage information? Mannheim does not resolve specific issues, but he implicitly raises the further question of whether access to information should continue to be passive. For example, given the wealth and capacity of modern industrial societies, might not all citizens by public right receive at least one daily newspaper? In an era of advanced telecommunications technologies might not every citizen have a phone with a computer terminal tied in by which to request and quickly receive "public in-

formation," such as committee hearings, budget reports, etc. and by which to directly speak with their political representatives and fellow citizens? Given the capabilities of television might not more informal two-way "town or regional meetings" be held electronically to deal with vital issues? Many communications technologies can overcome geographical distances and functionally replace the role of central democratic meeting places. The extent to which such substitutions (and augmentation) occurs is probably the most important decision of democratic planning. How else can we ever expect to truly "control the controls"? How else can we transform "power over" into "power to"? How else can we monitor the ecosystem to ensure that it is "healthy" and "life enhancing"?

Surely, the "shared control" of public information is not the only end of democratic planning. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to the processes and purposes of democracy. To treat the issue of communications and consciousness solely as means may result in the loss of progressive citizenship and consequently the possibilities of democratic planning.

> The merits of any concrete solution are open to debate and some or even all proposals may have to be changed in detail ... We present this general view for the discussion of those vital issues facing all of us in the hope that the reader may join us in working toward a new society. (FPDP: xviii)

* * *

> At the crossroads of history we must look for reorientation, consult the map, and ask ourselves: Where do the roads lead, where do we want to go?
> . . . . . .
> It is at such crucial crossroads of history that we find ourselves. (FPDP: 4)

FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER 8

1
Mannheim seems to have adopted Wootton's checklist for "successful economic planning" as presented in Plan or No Plan (1934). (The details are found below in note 5.) Mannheim also occasionally repeats his conclusion that economic planning theory is more advanced than socio-psychological, and therefore, the major task is to refine the latter and unite it with the former.

2
Mannheim, in this advice, goes against a commonly held notion that consumers' interests are underrepresented in advanced capitalist nations. (Cf. Schumacher, 1944)

3
Mannheim cites the concurrence on these values of many of the world's religions. (MSR: 352; cf. Marx, 1970)

4
Geddes, a biologist by training, introduced the idea of ecology to urban planners in Cities in Evolution (1915).

5
This is why Bachrach and Baratz contend that "non-decision making" is also a statement of power.

6
Socialists have traditionally denounced markets, non-socialists have extolled markets. Yet, recently, their views seem to be changing. Thus, Lindblom questions the efficacy of the market, while Stauber pleads for adding market criteria to a concept of socialism. (See Lindblom, 1978; Stauber, 1978)

7
Crosland chastizes the Fabians and their successors for being too severe in their proposals and for tacitly condemning the peregrinations of the human spirit.

8
Wootton enumerates nine "conditions for successful economic planning":

- "Knowledge" and "the ability to use" it
- "An authority /with/ ... power both to draw up ... and to supervise" "plans," which though national, include the "support of local organs in every area and in every industrial unit"

- Staged sequences in planning processes
- Preventive planning
- Constructive planning
- The integration of specific and general goals
- Some inducement for engendering compliance with the plans
- Industrial reorganization
- Recognition that national self-sufficiency is dictated by military concerns; economic planning admits international trade.

9
For reading on institutional economics see Commons and Lowe.

10
Mannheim, in his early work eschews referenda, but presumably as citizens become more experienced, he would approve of more frequent referendum campaigns for particular planning decisions. (Cf. MSR, FPDP)

11
See, for example, the work of Donald Price, Harold Lasswell, and Karl Deutsch.

12
See especially, Piven, 1968; Davidoff and Reiner, 1962; Peattie, 1968; Arnstein, 1972; Pateman, 1970; Scheff, 1976; and Benveniste, 1972.

13
"Publicity" is defined as "the quality of being public; and condition or fact of being open to public observation and knowledge." (Oxford English Dictionary, volume II: 2349)

14
By "pursuit of knowledge" I intend all those enterprises involved in information processing and transmission, information gathering and manipulation, interpretation, and communications technologies. Examples would include public relations, advertising, publishing, and computer companies, and, of course, universities.

In the United States, research and development, and formal training, accounted for at least $157.463 billions in 1976, or more than 9% of the GNP. (Excluded from the tabulation are related capital costs, business/Federal laboratory operating expenses, state government expenditures (which alone amounted to $273 millions in 1973). (Statistical Abstract, 1978) The $157 billions expenditure supported approximately 4.9 "intellect workers," slightly over

2% of the population. In 1972, about $61.8 billions of revenues were collected in the non-educational industries communicating "new" knowledge and information. These industries include phone, postal service, broadcasting (television and radio), newspapers and periodicals. (Statistical Abstract, 1978: 428, 612, 5, 142, 145, 572)

One in 40 Americans worked in schools, and almost one in four were active students (from kindergarten to graduate school) in 1974. (Statistical Abstract, 1978: 145, 616, 134) Additionally, data processing and measurement companies command an increasingly significant share of corporate earnings. Indeed, in 1977, two (AT&T and IBM) of the top three corporations, in earnings, were information businesses. In the same year, publishing was among the top three industries, in percentage increase in profits. (Business Week, March 20, 1978)

Other business functions such as advertising, public relations, law and accounting constitute a small segment of the labor force, but interpret much of our social data.

In brief, "vested interests" in interpretation have never been greater despite the fact that communications underlies the very idea of democracy. (Cf. Schiller; Chapters 1, 3, 5 and 6)

15

This innuendo is seen as early as his German essay on ambition, and as late as Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, where he argues that leisure must be used constructively and "creatively" and cites (from Bertrand Russell's In Praise of Idleness) the "idea that the poor should have leisure /for contemplation and political participation/ has always been shocking to the rich." (FPDP: chapter 11; 369, n. 21)

16

For example, Mr. X of Corporation A met Mr. Y of Government Agency B at his office four times in one week, an unusual occurrence.

17

The shorthand expressions which presumably measure the performance of public policies often distort. For example, from February to March 1978 in New York City, the unemployment rate fell from 9.2% to 8.4%, and the number of payroll jobs increased almost 21,000 (to 3,168,000), but the number of employed residents dropped about 2,000 (to 2,793,000). (Fiscal Observer, June 1, 1978)

18

Religions perform similar functions, as Max Weber and Mannheim were well aware.

19 For example, a house organ of IBM, announces "ideas are assets, too." It continues:

> In the past years there have been significant, well-documented cases of misappropriation of IBM assets ... These losses ... representative theft of ideas and creativity ... of the competitive advantages these ideas would have brought in the market place. (THINK, August/September, 1976)

APPENDIX A

MANNHEIM'S BOOKS AND ARTICLES: ABBREVIATIONS AND CHRONOLOGY

Citations to Mannheim's work in the text are abbreviated. Alpnabetically, the acronyms are:

DOOT — Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1943.

ESOC — Essays on the Sociology of Culture. Edited by Ernest Manheim. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956.

ESOK — Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952.

ESSP — Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953.

FKM — From Karl Mannheim. Edited and Introduced by Kurt H. Wolff. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

FPDP — Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning. Edited by Hans Gerth and Ernest K. Bramstedt. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950.

I&U — Ideology and Utopia. Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936. (Ideologie und Utopie, 1929)

MSR — Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Translated by Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1940. (Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter im des Umbaus, 1935)

SOE — An Introduction to the Sociology of Education. With W.A.C. Stewart. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.

SS — Systematic Sociology: An Introduction to the Study of Society. Edited by J.S. Eros and

W.A.C. Stewart. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957.

Save for a few items, Mannheim's writings are available in these publications. Nevertheless, only three of the works cited above are integral texts: Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, Ideology and Utopia, and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning. Of these three books, only the last was unexpanded after publication. In fact, many of Mannheim's articles and lectures were incorporated into Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist and the second editions of Ideology and Utopia and Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction.

The following chronology of Mannheim's work indicates where each is available. A single asterisk denotes that the original was written in Hungarian, a double star signifies that the text first appeared in German. The subsequent translations of books, marked by full capitalization of titles, is noted in parentheses to show the extent of Mannheim's international reputation.

Extensive bibliographic data are also found in Remmling (1975), Wolff (1971) and Corradini (1976). The bibliography at the end of the dissertation includes secondary literature on Mannheim's thinking, especially as related to his idea of democratic planning.[7]

[7] The Mannheim archives at the University of Keele, England, were not consulted. Neither were surviving relatives and friends interviewed. However, I did discuss this project on Mannheim with Gunter Remmling and David Kettler as indicated in the bibliography.

Chronology of Mannheim's Writings

1918* "Soul and Culture," lecture presented at the University of Budapest, 1917; excerpted in Kettler (1967)

1920** "Review of Lukacs' Theory of the Novel," Logos, IX, 2 (1920-1): 298-302; in FKM: 3-7

1921** "Review of Erich Becker's Geistenwissenschaften und Naturwissenschafter (1921)"; excerpted in Remmling (1971)

1921-2** "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung," Jahrbuch fur Kunstgeschichte, I (XV), 4 (1921-22): 236-74; in ESOK: 33-83

1922* "Concerning the Peculiarity of Cultural and Sociological Cognition," excerpted in Kettler (1967)

1922** "On the Problem of the Classification of the Sciences," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 50, 1 (1922): 230-7; in Wolff (1964)

1922** "Structural Analysis of Epistemology"(Kant-Studien, Erganzungsheft no. 57), Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1922; in ESSP: 15-73

1924** "Historicism," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 52, 1 (June, 1924): 1-60; in ESOK: 33-83

1924* "A Sociological Theory of Culture and Its Knowability: Conjunctive and Communicative Thought," excerpted in Kettler (1967)

1925** "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 53, 3 (April, 1925): 577-652; in ESOK: 134-90

1926** The Ideological and the Sociological Interpretation of Intellectual Phenomena," Jahrbuch für Soziologie, II (ed. by Gottfried Salomon), Karlsruhe: G. Graun, 1926, pp. 424-40; in FKM: 116-131

1927** "Conservative Thought," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 57, 1-2 (1927): 68-142, 470-95; in ESSP: 74-164

1927** "The History of the Concept of the State as an Organism: A Sociological Analysis" in ESSP: 165-182

1928** "The Problem of Generations," Kolner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie, VII, 2-3 (1928-29): 157-85, 309-30; in ESOK: 276-322

1929** IDEOLOGIE UND UTOPIE (first edition of I&U, 1933)

1929** "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon," Verhandlungen des sechsten deutschen Soziologentages vom 17. bis 19. September 1928 in Zurich, Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1929, pp. 35-83; in ESOK: 191-229

1929** "Problems of Sociology in Germany," Neue Schweizer Rundschau, 22, 36-7 (November, 1929): 820-9; in FKM: 262-70

1930** "On the Nature of Economic Ambition and Its Significance for the Social Education of Man," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 63, 3 (1930): 449-512; in ESOK: 230-75

1931** "The Sociology of Knowledge," Handworterbuch der Soziologie (ed. by Alfred Vierkant), Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1931, pp. 659-80; in I&U: 237-80

1932** "The Tasks of Sociology Called for by the Present: A Teaching Program," lecture for congregation of German university sociology teachers, 28 February 1932; excerpted in FKM: lxxvff

1932 "Review of 'Stuart A. Rice (editor), Methods in Social Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931'," American Journal of Sociology, 38, 2 (September, 1932): 273-82; in ESSP: 185-194 as "American Sociology"

1933 "The Democratization of Culture" in ESOC: 171-246

1934 "German Sociology (1918 - 1933)," Politica, I (February, 1934): 12-33; in ESSP: 209-28

1934 "Rational and Irrational Elements in Contemporary Society," Hobhouse Memorial Lecture, Fall 1933; incorporated in MSR

1934 "The Crisis of Culture in the Era of Mass-Democracies and Autarchies," Sociological Review, XXVI, 2 (April, 1934): 105-29; incorporated in MSR

early 1930s "Max Weber," Encyclopedia Brittanica, Second Edition (Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica Inc., 1929, 1930, 1932, 1936 ...) Vol. 23: 470-1

early 1930s "Towards the Sociology of the Mind: An Introduction" in ESOC: 15-89

early 1930s "The Problem of the Intelligentsia: An Inquiry into Its Past and Present Role" in ESOC: 91-170

1935 MENSCH UND GESELLSCHAFT IM ZEITALTER DES UMBAUS (first edition of MSR, 1940)

1935 "Utopia," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (ed. by E.R.A. Seligman and A. Johnson) (New York: Macmillan, 1935) Vol. XV: 200-3

1935 "Troeltsch, Ernst," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (ed. by E.R.A. Seligman and A. Johnson) (New York: Macmillan, 1935) Vol. XV: 106

1936 IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (expanded edition, translated into English by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils; translated into French in 1936, into Spanish in 1941, and into German in 1952)

1937 "A Few Concrete Examples Concerning the Sociological Nature of Human Valuations," paper presented at London conference sponsored by the Institute of Sociology and World University Series, September, 1936; in ESSP: 231-42

1937 "On the Diagnosis of Our Time," Mass und Wert, 1, 1 (September-October, 1937): 100-21; in FKM: 350-366

1937 "The Psychological Aspect," in Peaceful Change: An International Problem (ed. by C.A.W. Manning) (London: Macmillan, 1937); incorporated in MSR

1937 "Present Trends in the Building of Society" in Human Affairs (ed. by R.B. Catell, J.I. Cohen, and R.M.W. Travers) (London: Macmillan, 1937); incorporated in MSR

1937 Mannheim's Response to a Prager Presse Poll, in FKM: cvf

1938 "Planned Society and the Problem of Human Personality: A Sociological Analysis," four lectures at Manchester College, Oxford; in ESSP: 255-310

1938 "Adult Education and the Social Sciences," Tutors' Bulletin of Adult Education, 2nd Series, no. 20 (February, 1938): 27-34

1939 "Mass Education and Group Analysis," in Educating for Democracy (ed. by J.I. Cohen and R.M.W. Travers) (London: Macmillan, 1939, pp. 329-64); in DOOT: 73-94

late 1930s "On War-Conditioned Changes in Our Psychic Economy" in ESSP: 243-51

1940 MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION (expanded edition of Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus, 1935; translated into Spanish in 1942, into German in 1958)

1941 "Nazi Group Strategy," BBC Broadcast; excerpted in FKM: cxix

1941 "Diagnosis of Our Time," lecture at Conference of Federal Union, Oxford, April 1941; in DOOT: 1-11

1941 "The Problem of Youth in Modern Society," Opening Address, New Education Fellowship Conference, Oxford, April 1941; in DOOT: 31-53

1941 "Education, Sociology and the Problem of Social Awareness," lecture, University of Nottingham, May, 1941; in DOOT: 54-72

1942 "The Crisis in Valuation," lecture for London School of Economics at Cambridge, January, 1942; in DOOT: 12-30

1943 DIAGNOSIS OF OUR TIME (translated into Spanish in 1944, into German in 1951)

1943 "Sociology and Education," lecture at Institute of Sociology conference, Oxford, 1943; incorporated in SOE: 143-55

1944 "Democratic Planning and the New Science of Society," in This Changing World (ed. by J.R.M. Brumwell) (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1944)

1945 "The Meaning of Popularisation in a Mass Society," The Christian News-Letter, 7 February 1945, Supplement to No. 227: 7-12

1945 "The Function of the Refugee," The New English Weekly, 27, I (19 April 1945): 5-6

1946 Personal letter to Kurt H. Wolff (15 April 1946) "in response to a critical analysis of Mannheim's work by members of a seminar on the sociology of knowledge," in Wolff, 1974: 557-59

1946 Introduction to The Feminine Character: The History of an Ideology by Viola Klein (London: 1946)

1950 FREEDOM, POWER AND DEMOCRATIC PLANNING (translated into German in 1970)

1957 SYSTEMATIC SOCIOLOGY (translated into Italian in 1960)

1962 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

APPENDIX B

MANNHEIM'S METAPHORICAL APPROACHES

Mannheim's essay form is illuminated by metaphorical language. The metaphorical approach implies the limits of pure science in social questions. He sequentially experiments with three images -- the "optic," the medical, and the "Third Way."

B.1 Art and Optics

In Mannheim's pre-planning writings (through 1935), as Kurt Wolff notes, the "optic" image prevails. (Wolff, 1971) This metaphor, derived from his interests in gestalt psychology and art history, helps Mannheim explain the parts in the context of the whole and differentiate between wholes at different times and places in history. The topics of Weltanschauung and historicism lead easily into the sociology of knowledge, where assorted perspectives interpret different aspects of the same whole. (Cf. Chapter 3, Appendices D and E) The task of the sociologist is to discover the whole which ordinary individuals cannot bring into full focus. This image accounts, in large part, for Mannheim's eclecticism. So, too, the link between "intentioning" (or purpose) and belief and action is revealed here. (Kettler, 1971: 65) Mannheim's occasional references to the geography of city planning and the idea of social distantiation,

previously used by Scheler, seem also to derive from this orientation. (Cf. ESOC: 218ff; Chapter 4)

His Hungarian classmates, Bela Bartok, the composer, and Arnold Hauser, the art historian, appear to have introduced the young Mannheim to the difference between the artistic expressions of the urbane "cultured" classes and the peasants. Mannheim's travels, in the period from 1913 through 1933, to Berlin and Paris, centers of revolutionary changes in art, could only have reinforced this proclivity. Therefore, while Mannheim necessarily follows in the trail of Max Weber's "interpretive sociology," written evidence suggests that Mannheim's "interpretive" approach was learned less in sociology classrooms and more through direct exposure to art and art critics. In fact, one of the underlying principles of democratic planning, "the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous" is directly taken from Pinder, the art historian. (Cf. MSR: 41; Chapter 4) In short, art is, for Mannheim, both a summary of and a clue to hidden social forces. For example, in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, he observes:

> One has only to look at pictures like those of Bosch and Grunewald in order to see that the disorganization of the Medieval order expressed itself in a general fear and anxiety, the symbolic expression of which was the attention given to the underworld with its demons, and the widespread fear of the devil. (MSR: 117)

Mannheim's final idea of democratic planning, in fact, to some degree constitutes a "vision" of a better life.

Mannheim, with the medium of the printed word, consciously worked on one canvas of humanity, highlighting certain ideas from his early work as he painted over others to persistently bring the emotional punch of life to the search for social truths.

B.2 Medicine and Crisis

The second image Mannheim employs is medical, with especial emphasis on the phenomenon of crisis. This analogy overlaps his German and English writing.

Medical analogies, variants of the family of organic metaphors, enjoy a long history in political theory (cf. Aristotle, Machiavelli, Marx, et al). Though crisis has always been understood as a life or death turning point, sometimes it is seen as a moment of fate, other times as one of possibility.

Exact usage tends to reflect the contemporary state of medical knowledge. Inevitably, the tension between the art of healing and the science of organic functions emerges.

Progressing quite naturally from the optic metaphor, the medical image challenges the observer to diagnose (i.e., to see behind the presented symptoms) and suggest remedies. Not surprisingly, Mannheim relies heavily on medical language in his first writings on planning.

Though Mannheim always intended the scientific medical connotation, the term "crisis" then was popularly used to

denote "surprise" economic downturns. Ironically, as Mannheim began to adopt crisis language in 1929 (In Ideology and Utopia), stock market and bank run panics occurred throughout the western world. Despite the regularity of the business cycle, first noticed in the mid-19th century and well documented in W.C. Mitchell's 1913 treatise, the terms "crisis" and "panic" were not superseded by the more "scientific" "depression" and "recession" until the mid-1930s. (Garraty, 1973: 935)

Politically, however, the term "crisis" is more intractable. To some it signals charged emotional uncertainty, to others diagnostic certainty of grave danger. In both cases, the particular situation to which the term is applied is deemed unique. Therefore, increasingly, Mannheim dropped the crisis language while refining other medical concepts (such as functional analysis within the context of wholes, the psychology of expert/patient relationships, and the comparative method). (Cf. MSR: 310, 304)

The history of medicine, as read by Mannheim, understands medical science to be the definition of illness, not health. (Cf. FPDP: 373, n. 6) This fact helps account for Mannheim's initial concern with fascism and other forms of totalitarianism. Later, Mannheim sought to define the preconditions and forms of healthy politics, true democracy, as well as to specify the situations which precede the onset of political diseases (like fascism). Since liberalism, as he observed, it had not lead to health and sometimes

ended in illness, it was dismissed as a political antidote, or real alternative. (Cf. Section 8.C.)

Mannheim's distinction between preventive and constructive planning also appears to be an outgrowth of the medical metaphor. He recognizes, as, for example, in his fascination with community preventive health clinics in London, that expert intervention at the last and most critical moment is not always sufficient. That he urges daily citizenship exercises to controvert early "symptoms" is based on the belief that a "'syndrome' /is/ ... a concurrent series of interrelated maladjustments." (FPDP: 111)

His unwillingness to completely forgo experts to diagnose possible crises (by relating known social data) and to deal with unforeseen crises (by more comprehensive and democratic education) also hails from this medical analogy. (Cf. Chapter 5) Finally, the medical image suggests the limits of intervention in democratic planning. Just as health is not gained by surgical removal of all potentially cancerous organs at birth, so too, democratic planning cannot begin with a social tabula rasa.

The significance of the comparative method changes for Mannheim. The basic questions underlying comparative analyses are: What are the critical factors? Of these critical factors which are unique and which are recurrent? Mannheim's insight into the comparative method improved as he moved from revolutionary Hungary to Weimar Germany to the incipient Welfare State Britain. In "Conservative Thought"

(1929), Mannheim argues against comparative national studies because they cannot appreciate the unique and decisive factors in local social change. Yet, by Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction he argues that what appear as discrete phenomena are really often symptoms of shared diseases. (Cf. Dewey, 1940)

In all cases, however, Mannheim never forgets what so often is lost in the practice of medicine -- the human life. To be sure, Mannheim was unusual in his understanding of medicine. Even the well-intentioned Mumford and Tugwell while adopting medical metaphors too often forget the cultural differences of good health. (Cf. Tugwell; Mumford, 1967: 3615, 3611) For example, high cholesterol diets for 19th century Norwegian fishermen and farmers did not provoke arterial sclerosis, but, in fact, helped sustain long energy cycles in a harsh climate.

B.2.A War and Medicine

The relation between war and medical advances is as well documented as that between planning and war. (Cf. Chapter 1) In military language, "emergency" substitutes for "crisis" and "danger" replaces "symptoms." Using the language of war much less frequently than other proponents of planning, Mannheim rephrases the interconnections. (Cf. Speier) Thus, in Diagnosis of Our Time, subtitled "Wartime Essays of a Sociologist," Mannheim calls for a "militant

democracy." Significantly, Mannheim focused this military language more on the problems of democracy than of planning. Thus, propaganda,[1] a continued interest of his, is a problem of democracy more than planning. (Cf. Chapter 8) To relate planning to war stresses a temporary rational need, while to connect democracy with war emphasizes the common values for which such a consuming endeavor is undertaken. (Though it is sheer speculation to believe that Mannheim would have devoted a longer life to the sole pursuit of democratic planning, since he was essentially a pacifist, his use of military language, however limited, suggests that his shift to democratic planning was a deep and lasting one.)

B.3 The "Third Way"

Mannheim's final analogy, the "Third Way," first appears in Diagnosis of Our Time (1943). Often misunderstood as a compromise between democratic liberalism and revolutionary socialism, Mannheim rather imagined a new course, qualitatively different from both. This confusion partially stems from the prevalent British and Scandinavian planning terms, "middle way" and "third alternative." (Cf. Mumford, 1944)

Despite his belief in the inevitability of planning, Mannheim does not subscribe to the "blue print" theory of planning, but rather envisions a map where contemporary society stands at point "x" along the road of history. Behind

lies liberal capitalism, ahead stretches totalitarianism. Going back is impossible, and stepping ahead is abhorrent. Blazing a "third way" is the better solution. The deliberate use of the term "way" underscores the idea that roads are man-made. As such, their direction, and even composition, are matters of choice.

Popular in the 1930s and 1940s, the road metaphor was probably applied in movie titles and song lyrics to subliminally encourage those forced to migrate because of the depression and war, and in literature and theater to emphasize the choices in the direction history takes.[2] Therefore, despite Mannheim's phrase, the "Third Way,"[3] his critic, Hayek (1944) and his ally, Finer (1945) appear to have chosen their book titles, The Road to Serfdom and The Road to Reaction, for their popular appeal.

Mannheim did not think in terms of the road to democratic planning, so much as equate democratic planning with the Third Way. That is, the process of blazing the trail and arriving at a frontier can only be distinguished as two sequential stages of the same new beginnings. The switch in metaphors accompanies a shift in emphasis to constructive planning. Mannheim increasingly speaks of "pioneering" efforts to create a new "groundwork."[4] He calls upon "pioneering elites" to assist in planning. (Cf. Chapter 4)

Mannheim also reveals his persistent belief in triadic analyses. For example, in his dissertation on the structure of epistemology, Mannheim concludes that all justifications

for true knowledge involve the interaction of the knower, the known and the to-be-known. (ESSP: 59) In "On the Nature of Economic Ambition ... " Mannheim calls for bringing a "third dimension" (the "social dimension") to educational theory to equip "people ... to act as agents of social development to a further stage." (ESOK: 234) In "Conservative Thought," Mannheim suggests a "third alternative which is neither nominalism nor realism [, but, rather,] ... a dynamic, historical structural configuration." (ESSP: 97)

In fact, Mannheim's "Third Way," a personal and somewhat iconoclastic image, is a cumulative one comprehending the earlier perceptual triad of the optic imagery (i.e., the seer, the parts of the seen, and the whole of the to-be-seen) and the diagnostic triad of the medical metaphor (i.e., the healer, the patient, and medical know-how).

Mannheim sometimes believes himself to be dialectical, by which he means less the residue of the clash of two entities than the presence of three interacting independent variables. Democratic planning thus involves "changing institutions," "new man," and "new values." (Cf. FPDP)

B.4 Metaphors and Objectivity

Mannheim is consistently an ardent functionalist. Yet, he is extremely wary of methodological traps which in their obsession with objectivity neglect the need for human judgment. His unbranded functionalism provides room for both

his undaunted skepticism and his faith in humanity. He is guided by the simple, yet profound, notion that the basic purpose of social science and political agendas is the improvement of human life. (Cf. Chapter 1, Appendix E) Because man is the measure, Mannheim analyzes programs and proposals in terms of their psychic implications for the humane development of individuals and their communities. (Cf. Lynd, Chase, Engler, Rustow) His idea of democratic planning, thus, arises not out of an uncomplicated view of human nature, but, rather, out of a conviction that human thoughts (rational and emotional) and behavior can only be understood and directed in concrete socio-historical settings. Mannheim never relinquishes responsibility -- as a social scientist and a citizen -- in describing and forging the paths of humanity.

In contrast, American social sciences have been dominated by a different functionalism where "non-objective" factors are intentionally excluded. This functionalism ultimately begs the questions of "functions of what? functions for what?" In other words, though functionalism is necessarily derivative of a more comprehensive view of structure, the contours and nature of the structure under investigation often go unquestioned. (Cf. Gans, 1972)

No doubt, Mannheim's functionalism helps explain his influence among American academics. (Cf. Friedrichs, 1970) However, because American social scientists tend to be hyperfunctionalists, Mannheim's later work, which better

specifies socio-political structures, is largely ignored. For the same reason, where his planning theory is considered, the mechanisms of planning are emphasized over the goals of planning. (Cf. Appendix C)

Mannheim's functional approach also accounts for why he could use the large body of empirical studies produced in America. Indeed, Mannheim's bibliographies in his planning books tend to neglect theoretical treatments in favor of more empirical findings.

* * *

Mannheim is neither a mere social scientist -- in the sense of seeking transcendental principles of social interaction -- nor a simple scientific socialist -- in the sense of applying prescribed principles in social criticism. The certainties of social science and socialist programs, for Mannheim, are tentative at best. (Cf. Section 8.C.) Instead, the only possible certainty is that of human purpose. (Cf. Dewey; Chapter 1) Thus, the problem of planning (and reason) is not certainty. Rather, it is first the elucidation of human purposes, and only second, the effort to use certain means to reconstruct habitats conducive to humane and democratic purposes.

FOOTNOTES to APPENDIX B

1

Propaganda, etymologically traceable to the 17th century Papal doctrine disseminated to outlying churches, has been associated with secret societies since the mid-19th century. Yet, Britain and France also plagued by the Great Depression resorted to propagandist techniques far less often than FDR or Hitler. Apparently, the military overtone accounts for this difference. (Cf. Garraty, 1973)

2

Robert Sherwood, later to be President Roosevelt's speech writer, popularized the image in his 1927 historical comedy, Road to Rome. Thereafter followed Remarque's Road Back (1931) about German post-World War I life, Orwell's non-fiction Road to Wigan Pier (1937) about the depression in England, and, of course, the famous Bob Hope movies beginning with the Road to Singapore in 1940. Road referents in the Wizard of Oz (1939) and Woody Guthrie's music further seem to signal a distinctly modern social orientation where change predominates. The social commentaries of the "road" analysts (including Kerouac) recall the diversity of life and the spatio-temporal limits of choice in contradistinction to the utopian literature, both eutopian and dystopian, where one is caught forever in stagnant bliss or hell.

Though seemingly unrelated to the crescendoing titutalar use of "road" in the 1930s, a generation earlier Jack London's magazine series, "My Life in the Underworld," a poignantly direct and personal statement on the idiocy of American social institutions, was issued as a book entitled The Road (1907).

3

Franklin Roosevelt, one of the few American presidents to publish a book while in office, produced for propaganda purposes On Our Way (1934).

4

Contrast this idea of "groundwork" with Marx' idea of infrastructure, structure and super-structure.

APPENDIX C

SUMMARY OF REACTIONS TO MANNHEIM'S THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

Mannheim's idea of democratic planning has inspired and frustrated scholars and professionals for four decades. Those who praise his insight assume its relevance to Great Britain; some further suggest its applicability to the United States. Critics, instead, tend to believe Mannheim was avenging the shame of Nazism by embracing the political solutions of his adopted England.

Mannheim was a well-known sociologist by 1947, as indicated by the international reports of his death. Yet, he was not fully associated with the idea of democratic planning until the publication of Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning in 1950.[1] Thus, his reputation as a planning theorist, particularly in America, is mainly posthumous. Consequently most of the reactions considered here were registered after Mannheim's death in 1947. This appreciates the totality of Mannheim's contributions. Contrary to some opinion, there is no evidence that Mannheim directly contributed to the creation of the post-World War II British welfare state.

In this summary of reactions, Mannheim's planning theory is assessed from three perspectives, the disciplinary, the chronological, and the cross-cultural.

Over the four decades since Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction appeared, Mannheim's planning theory has been considered by all social scientists and practitioners but historians.[2] However, in the early 1940s and early 1950s his work also received a fair amount of popular attention.[3] For example, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction was reviewed in both The New York Times and the Times Literary Supplement.

In the main, scholars have kept Mannheim's ideas alive.[4] Although some commentators note his "empirical" method,[5] Mannheim is uniformly considered a theorist.

Because planning is so often thought marginal to or derivative of other larger concerns, few in the intellectual disciplines delve deeply into Mannheim's idea of democratic planning.[6] Instead, most disciplinarians concentrate on isolated concepts, especially elitism. These fragmentary accounts of Mannheim's thinking are, however, excluded from this summary review. On the other hand, practitioners, public policy and planning representatives, tend to invoke Mannheim to justify the validity of their efforts.

Table 6 shows that although Mannheim has been reviewed from twelve disciplinary or professional standpoints, he is best known in sociology (N = 19) and then in planning (N = 16). Yet only in planning does his reputation appear to grow over the decades. The disciplines of sociology and political theory maintain interest in his planning ideas in the same period. In contrast, reference to his planning work falls

Table 6: Range and Predominance of Disciplinary/Professional Treatments of Mannheim's Planning Theory

Field	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	Totals
Anthropology (An)*	-	-	-	1	1
Biology (B)	3	-	-	-	3
Economics (E)	3	2	1	-	6
Education (Ed)	1	1	1	-	3
Literature (L)	2	-	-	-	2
Philosophy (Ph)	2	1	-	1	4
Planning (P)	2	-	6	8	16
Political Science (PS)	1	2	3	-	6
Political Theory (PT)	1	2	5	2	10
Psychology (Py)	-	-	1	1	2
Public Policy (PP)	2	2	1	1	6
Sociology (S)	4	5	4	6	19
Unknown (?)	-	-	-	1	1
Totals	19	15	22	21	77

* These abbreviations are also used as codes in Table 7, column 5.

off after the 1940s and 1950s in economics, public policy, education, and literature. Political science interest declines after the 1960s. This suggests that Mannheim's broader and more specialized appeal was fleeting. In terms of his explicit planning theory Mannheim is most popular in the 1960s, particularly in the field of planning.[7]

Table 7 arrays various evaluations of Mannheim's planning theory by decade alphabetically by author. Clearly, there is no consensus on Mannheim's work, but patterns of reaction do emerge. (See also Code Sheet for Table 7)

The secondary literature on Mannheim is voluminous.[8] However, few commentaries consider his planning theory. This summary of reactions only includes those who are planners and refer to Mannheim's work and those who explicitly discuss his planning theory. In other words, the selected commentators must have read at least one item by Mannheim, and non-planners must have read one of the three planning books (i.e., Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, Diagnosis of Our Time, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning).

The commentators are primarily from England and America. (An underscored "Nationality" code /Table 7, column 67 denotes a naturalized citizen. See also Code Sheet for Table 7) Most naturalized authors were German-born, suggesting that the refugee network continues to be strong.

Table 7: Comparative Evaluation of Mannheim's Planning Theory, by decade by author

Author	Evaluation of Mannheim			References	Author's Perspective			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
THE 1940S								
J. Dewey (1940)	*N*	*G*	*C*	*M*	*Ed*≠	*A*	*P*	*N*
H. Ehrmann (1944)	*N*	*S*	*U*	*D*	*PS*	*A*	*?*	-
T. Eliot (1940s)	*U*	*G*	*C*	*MDO*	*L*	*B*	*C*	*Y*
F. Hayek (1944)	*N*	*N1*	*U*	*MD*	*E*	*B*	*C*	*Y*
S. Hook (1944)	*N*	*S*	*C*	*MD*	*PT*	*A*	*P*	*N*
J. Huxley (1940)	*U*	*G*	*C*	*M*	*B*	*B*	*P*	*Y*
C. Joad (1943)	*D*	*I*	*U*	*D*	*Ph*	*B*	*C*	-
H. Lasswell (1946)	*N*	*S*	*V*	*M*	*PP*	*A*	*L*	-
C. Mills (1940s/1950s)	*N*	*N1*	*V*	*MF*	*S*	*A*	*P*	*N*
L. Mumford (1944)	*D*	*S*	*C*	*MD*	*P*	*A*	*P*	-
*J. Norton (1940)***	*N*	*S*	*C*	*IM*	*E*	*A*	*?*	-
K. Popper (1946)	*N*	*N2*	*U*	*M*	*Ph*	*B*	*C*	*Y*
S. Reimer (1947)	*D*	*S*	*C*	*MD*	*P*	*A*	*P*	*N*
A. Salomon (1947)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*IMDO*	*S*	*A*	*?*	*Y*
P. Selznick (1949)	*U**	*S**	*C**	*M*	*PP*	*A*	*L*	*N*
P. Weintraub (1944)	*N*	*S*	*U*	*MD*	*S*	*A*	*?*	*N*
L. Wirth (1947)	*N*	*S*	*C*	*MD*	*S*	*A*	*L*	*Y*
L. Woolf (1940)	*U*	*G*	*C*	*M*	*L*	*B*	*P*	-
B. Wootton (1945)	*N*	*S*	*V*	*MD*	*E*	*B*	*L*	*Y*

** implied in commentary*
≠ discipline as commonly perceived
*** John DeWitt Norton worked as a planner; in 1968 he was at the National Planning Association in Washington, D.C.*

Table 7 , continued, page 2 of 6 pages

Author	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
THE 1950S								
B. Brown (1951)	*U*	*S*	*C*	*IF*	*PS*	*A*	*L*	*N*
E. Bogardus (1951)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*IDFO*	*S*	*A*	*P*	*Y*
Bramstedt & Gerth (1950)	*D*	*S*	*V*	*IMDFO*	*S*	*A*	*P*	*Y*
R. Dahl (1950)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*IMDFO*	*PS*	*A*	*L*	*N*
Dahl & Lindblom (1953)	*U*	*S*	*C*	*MF*	*PP*	*A*	*L*	*N*
M. Fisher (1954)	*U*	*I*	*U*	*IMDFO*	*Ed*	*A*	*L*	*N*
P. Kecskemeti (1953)	*U*	*G*	*V*	*IMDFO*	*S*	*A*	*L*	*Y*
A. Lowe (1950)	*U*	*G*	*V*	*IMDFO*	*E*	*A*	*P*	*Y*
J. Meisel (1958)	*N*	*C*	*C*	*MF*	*S*	*A*	*L*	*N*
J. Plamenatz (1951)	*D*	*I*	*U*	*F*	*PT*	*B*	*C*	*N*
D. Spitz (1951)	*U*	*C*	*U*	*IMF*	*PT*	*A*	*L*	*N*
R. Titmuss (1951)	*N*	*S**	*V*	*I*	*PP*	*B*	*P*	-
H. Wagner (1953)	*U*	*S*	*C*	*IFO*	*S*	*A*	*L*	-
M. White (1951)	*U*	*S*	*C*	*F*	*Ph*	*A*	*L*	*N*
D. Wright (1951)	*D*	*N1*	*U*	*F*	*E*	*A*	*P*	*N*

Table 7, continued, page 3 of 6 pages

Author	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
THE 1960S								
Anderson et al (1968)	*N*	*S*	*V*	*I*	*P*	*A/I*	*L*	*N*
P. Bachrach (1969)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*IMDFO*	*PS*	*A*	*P*	*N*
Bennis et al (1962)	*U*	*S*	*U*	*MDF*	*Py*	*A*	*L*	*N*
T. Bottomore (1964)	*N*	*I*	*O*	*O*	*S*	*B*	*P*	*N*
J. Dyckman (1966)	*N*	*S*	*C*	*M**	*P*	*A*	*P*	*N*
A. Etzioni (1968)	*D*	*S*	*O*	*IMDF*	*PP*	*A*	*L*	*N*
J. Floud (1963)	*U*	*C*	*U*	*IMDF*	*Ed*	*B*	*L*	*Y*
H. Gans (1968)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*I*	*P*	*A*	*P*	*N*
M. Harrington (1965)	*D*	*S*	*U*	*M**	*PS*	*A*	*P*	*N*
T. Lowi (1969)	*N*	*S*	*C*	*F*	*PS*	*A*	*L*	*N*
W. McWilliams (1969)	*U**	*S**	*C*	*I*	*PT*	*A*	*P*	*N*
T. Reiner (1961)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*I*	*P*	*A*	*L*	*N*
L. Reissmann (1964)	*N*	*S*	*U*	*I*	*S*	*A*	*L*	*N*
M. Rejai (1967)	*N*	*S*	*V*	*F*	*PT*	*A*	*L*	*N*
G. Sartori (1962)	*N*	*S*	*C*	*IMF*	*PT*	*It*	*P*	*N*
J. Seeley (1964)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*MD*	*P*	*A*	*P*	*N*
R. Sereno (1962)	*U*	*S*	*V*	*IM*	*PT*	*A*	*L*	*N*
E. Shils (1968)	*U*	*S*	*C*	*IMDFO*	*S*	*A*	*C*	*Y*
T. Simey (1968)	*D*	*C*	*C*	*IMD*	*S*	*B*	*L*	-
H. Wallich (1960)	*N*	*I*	*U*	*F*	*E*	*A*	*C*	*N*
M. Webber (1963)	*N*	*S*	*V**	*IMF*	*P*	*A*	*L*	*N*
S. Wolin (1960)	*N*	*I*	*U*	*MF*	*PT*	*A*	*C*	*N*

Table 7, continued, page 4 of 6 pages

Author	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
THE 1970S								
J. Bailey (1975)	N	S	O	I	P	B	P	N
R. Bastide (1971)	U	G	C	IF	An	A	P	N
G. Benveniste (1972)	N	I	O	IMF	P	A	L	N
S. Chodak (1973)	U	G	V*	IF	S	C	L	N
C. Cohen (1972)	U	I	U	M	PT	A	C	N
J. Douglas (1970)	U	S	V	D	S	A	P	N
A. Faludi (1973)	U	S	O	M	P	A	L	N
J. Friedmann (1973)	U	S	O	IMDF	P	A	L	N
Friedmann & Hudson (1974)	U	S	O	IM	P	A	L	N
P. Heywood (1973)	U	I	V	IM	P	B	P	N
H. Hodges (1970)	U	S	V	IO	Ph	B	P	Y
D. Kettler (1971)	U	S	V	IMDFO	PT	A	P	N
C. Lakshmanna (1975)	U	G	V	MDF	S	In	L	N
L. Mann (1972)	U	S	O	I	P	A	L	N
D. Martin (1975)	U	S	O	IMDFO*	?	B	?	-
R. May (1977)	U	G	V	MF	Py	A	L	N
M. Rein (1976)	U	S	V	I	P	A	P	N
G. Remmling (1975)	U	S	C	IMDFO	S	A	P	N
M. Raskin et al (1978)	U	S	C	M	PP	A	P	N
R. Stupak (1971)	U	G	V	IMF	S	A	L	N
K. Wolff (1971)	U	S	C	IMDFO	S	A	L	Y

Table 7 , continued, page 5 of 6 pages

CODE SHEET

Evaluation of Mannheim:

As a thinker (column 1)
- *U = unique*
- *N = not alone in his concerns*
- *D = derivative*

Quality of his argument (column 2)
- *G = good arguments and conclusions*
- *S = satisfactory, but insufficient*
- *C = self-contradictory*
- *I = inadequate*
- *N1 = economically naive from a conservative standpoint*
- *N2 = economically naive from a radical standpoint*

Import of his idea of democratic planning (column 3)
- *U = utopian, impractical*
- *V = visionary, far-reaching*
- *O = obsolete*
- *C = challenging to presuppositions of practice*

References to Mannheim's Work (column 4)

- *I = Ideology and Utopia (1929, 1933)*
- *M = Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1935,1940)*
- *D = Diagnosis of Our Time (1943)*
- *F = Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1950)*
- *O = other articles and/or collections of essays; cf. Appendix A*

Author's Perspective

Field (column 5) — see abbreviations on Table

Nationality (column 6) — refers to the country in which the commentary is produced; underscoring denotes naturalized status of author

A = American; B = British; C = Canadian; I = international; It = Italian; In = Indian

Table 7 , continued, page 6 of 6 pages

Ideology (column 7)

L = liberal
C = conservative
P = progressive

Conservatives are defined as those who think planning and democracy inherently incompatible. Planning, if they accept it, is to improve the the private economy machinery. Liberals believe planning and democracy mutually exclusive. Improvement comes by tinkering with political processes. Progressives maintain that true democracy does not yet exist; improvement necessitates institutional transformation. Most progressives, therefore, contend that planning is required to acheive a democratic society.

Knew Mannheim personally (column 8)

Y = yes
N = no
- = possibly

Of the 77 selected commentaries, 26 were book reviews or memorials to Mannheim. Only six were full texts exclusively concerned with Mannheim's work.

Is Mannheim original? Those who reviewed his work as they shared his times tend not to think so. (See Table 7, column 1) The further away one moves from the 1940s, the more unique Mannheim seems to be. Yet, cross-culturally 50% of non-Americans found Mannheim unique in the 1940s, while approximately 72% of Americans thought him original. On both sides of the Atlantic, in the 1970s, however, there is general agreement that Mannheim is a unique thinker.

Is Mannheim convincing? This is measured by the evaluations of the quality of his argumentation (Table 7, column 2) and the import of his democratic planning idea (Table 7, column 3). Mannheim's argument is considered convincing if in column 2 the response is G (good) and if in column 3, C (challenging) or V (visionary) is recorded. He is deemed unconvincing if column 2 is marked N1 or N2 (economically naive from a conservative or radical standpoint, respectively), I (inadequate), or C (self-contradictory) and if in column 3, U (utopian) or O (obsolete) is noted. Other combinations of responses are considered mixed reactions.

Most Americans, of all disciplines, take a moderate position. In contrast, the non-Americans tend to

divide rather evenly to see Mannheim as either very convincing or not at all convincing. This pattern roughly persists over the four decades. From an ideological orientation (Table 7, column 7; see code sheet for definitions), Mannheim is systematically excoriated by conservatives, and predominantly praised by progressives; liberals fall into both camps.

In terms of what and how much commentators read of Mannheim, several points are apparent. (Cf. Table 7, column 4) By the 1970s those who read more than one item found Mannheim more convincing than not. Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist does not arouse extreme reaction over the entire period. Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction seems to be the least persuasive. Of the 17 who considered Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction alone or in conjunction with other items, 14 found Mannheim unconvincing. By itself Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning appears unconvincing; if read in conjunction with other items, 58% were convinced.

Ideology and Utopia, which is now considered an important book in planning theory, received minimal attention during the 1940s. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, which contains Mannheim's fullest statements on democratic planning, is quite forgotten in the 1970s. Diagnosis of Our Time, best known during the 1940s, is rarely cited thereafter.

Nor is personal knowledge of Mannheim an indicator of his persuasion. (Table 7, column 8) Over the entire period, half of those who knew him had mixed evaluations, 25% were convinced and 25% were unconvinced.

By discipline, no political scientists, planners, economists and public policy professionals found Mannheim's argument fully convincing in the 1970s; however, half of the sociologists did. In the 1950s and 1960s, the sociologists along with the political scientists, planners, and public policy people believed Mannheim somewhat useful but not totally convincing. In the 1940s, economists joined these ranks. Clearly, for those involved in the details of planning and policy, Mannheim is less persuasive than for those appraising him from different vantage points. Significantly, with the exception of Dewey, who is also a democratic planning theorist, but here listed under the category of education, the education specialists, including Mannheim's own student, Jean Floud, find Mannheim's planning theory unpersuasive.

Overall, Mannheim persuaded 20% of the 1940s reviewers, less than 12% of the 1950s and 1960s commentators, and 25% of the 1970s assessors. This seems to reflect the extreme positivistic myopia in the social sciences in the intervening decades.

With the possible exceptions of Adolf Lowe and Lakshmanna, even the most approving accounts consider Mann-

heim's democratic planning theory unfinished. Critics and supporters alike detect a good deal of vagueness, though some believe it primarily caused by writing style.

All careful analyses further discern problems Mannheim left unresolved or did not address. A few question the apparent logical contradictions between Ideology and Utopia and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning. Most dissenters, however, raise substantive issues. Thus, Mannheim is accused of being elitist, centralist, utopian, economically misinformed, relativist and apolitical.

Admiration for Mannheim clusters around the following points, though no single commentator includes them all:

- responsibility of the intellectuals;
- substantive definition of democracy, including that of power theory;
- warnings about the possibility of bad planning;
- fact and value integration;
- identification of barriers to real democracy;
- extension of democratic analysis to social and economic institutions;
- humanism; and
- participation.

Strikingly few commentators consider Mannheim's idea of democratic planning in comparison to other democratic planning theorists, or even in systematic contrast to socialist and welfare state theories of planning. Indeed,

Mannheim seems to have been treated as a "free-floating intellectual," albeit not the relationist he aspired to be. This phenomenon appears to be less a reflection on Mannheim and more an indication of the general turn away from the "larger issues" of planning and political-economy in post-World War II scholarship. (Cf. Chapter 1)

Why does Mannheim's theory of planning still survive?

The first set of reasons surround the general state of planning theory. Mannheim's books constitute the single compilation of the best planning thinking of the 1930s and 1940s. During the planning fever of that time, activists rarely theorized in writing, and social theorists tended to be less culturally and temporally grounded. Mannheim was, therefore, among many concerned with democratic planning, but he was less a direct contributor to, than an imaginative historian of, his times. In the post-war decades many social scientists and professionals specialized. (Cf. Chapter 1) The few practitioners concerned with comprehensive planning, therefore, had little contemporary (and relatively compact) social theory other than Mannheim's to guide and/or justify their work. Members of the next generation (coming of age in and after the mid-1960s) concerned with democratic planning find it easier to turn to Mannheim's easily identified books than search through defunct journals for penetrating commentaries and analyses.

The second set of explanations lies in the nature of his planning theory. Though the diagnosis is somewhat out-

dated, the vision of what might be continues to be seductive. Moreover, the breadth of Mannheim's planning theory accounts for its great success as well as its failure. Because of the many niches of social life he explored, many continue to find relevant and challenging ideas. Yet, the sacrifice of depth (especially in terms of political-economy) increasingly undermines the persuasion of many of his insights. So too, because his work overlaps so many fields, without conveniently falling into a single one, disciplinary or professional specialists' treatments tend to be fragmentary.

Finally, as Mannheim left us thoughts for reconstruction, the world launched into a period of economic growth unparallelled in the history of mankind. Worries about democratic reconstruction faded for both the beneficiaries (who argued democracy naturally follows economic growth) and the losers (who were fighting for economic life and minimal democratic rights). As the worst economic crisis since the Depression hit in the 1970s, greater concern for democratic reconstruction erupted again and Mannheim re-ascended. (Cf. Raskin (ed.), 1978; Friedmann, 1973)

Mannheim's significance today, I believe, is threefold. First, reading him reminds us of what we seem to have forgotten -- where are we going? Second, his ideas and accounts force us to ask why more social progress has not occurred. Third, his story provides some preliminary maps. Yet, many new places and new roads have been built since

he wrote. So, too, have many dead ends been exposed. To push the road metaphor perhaps too far, we seem to have succumbed to the functional rationality of travel. Never before have men journeyed so long on such sophisticated transport at such speeds and with such motion sickness to get nowhere.[9] Our travel, however, has destroyed cities, despoiled virgin land and cemented over possibilities. Our travel technologies, most frightenly, have permitted nuclear holocaust to be delivered at our doors any time without notice. These roads and vehicles are no escape, only its illusion, from the socio-political-economic dilemmas Mannheim identified. Mannheim died optimistically believing that the United Nations and national planning would reconstruct democracy. His idea sadly still stands as a challenge. Where are we going? How do we get there?

FOOTNOTES to APPENDIX C

1

Mannheim had been working on Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning at least since 1943 (Diagnosis of Our Time) and the bequested manuscript indicates that he meant only to expand on a couple of points related to education and religion. Having written the forward in January 1947, weeks before his death, Mannheim seems to have only anticipated the last minute additions and revisions attending any such endeavor.

Mannheim, from his analysis of the situation, clearly felt no need to have his planning materials translated into German. Though Diagnosis of Our Time was reprinted in German in 1952 and the expanded version of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction appeared in 1958, Mannheim's major planning thrust, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning was not translated into German until 1970, a full generation after its first publication.

2

History is missing for the obvious reason that it is not future oriented. Nevertheless, historians often use the insights in Ideology and Utopia.

3

Unlike Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1935, 1940), Diagnosis of Our Time (1943) was widely reviewed in non-academic journals; for example, the Times Literary Supplement, Commonwealth, Saturday Review of Literature, the Springfield Republican, The Nation, New Republic, and New Statesman and Nation. Similarly, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1950) received broad attention; for instance, Foreign Affairs, Canadian Forum, Manchester Guardian, Current History, the San Francisco Chronicle, Commentary, Survey, and the Annals of the American Academy.

4

Aside from the paucity of long or direct treatments of his planning theory, surprisingly the activist planners (e.g., Tugwell, Davidoff) neglect Mannheim's ideas. In fact, their theories tend to arise almost exclusively from their personal experiences with planning. This finding astonishes me because (1) it contradicts the assumption that theory, particularly in the case of planning, plays a critical role in defining the goals to be pursued, (2) more significantly, it tends to overrate the planner and his strategies vis-a-vis the elucidation of democratic goals, and (3) it suggests the lack of integration of planning ideas and practices even among those with similar sympathies. Indeed, the relative isolation of these planners from the

arenas of knowledge and of power sheds a different light on Mannheim's conception of the free-floating intelligentsia as planners.

5
"Empirical" means that he derived his diagnosis and prescriptions from contemporary institutional practices and that he incorporated social data into his arguments.

6
One reason for this, I believe, derives from the form his argument takes. Partial reading of Mannheim's writings tends to confuse rather than clarify the issues he addresses. Yet morsels of truths fall from wherever one bites. Thus, paradoxically, his insights have been widely recognized while his overall thrust remains muted.

7
In fact, in the last two decades Ideology and Utopia continues to be the major text for many social planners. (Cf. Mann, 1972; Gans, 1968; Reiner, 1963; Rein, 1976)

8
While a thorough search from 1935 (the publication date of the first edition of Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction) was made through such indices as the Social Sciences and Humanities Index, the Social Sciences Citation Index, the Library of Congress Catalogues, Dissertation Abstracts, Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, International Political Abstracts, International Bibliography of Historical Sciences, International Bibliography of Sociology, the bulk of materials used here were found by searching through apparently relevant literature in the fields of planning, political science, philosophy, history, sociology, political economy, psychology and anthropology. Yet the very nature of the exercise precludes the possibility of total exhaustion of the references to Mannheim. The bibliography includes only those items actually used, not all those consulted.

9
Note that utopia means no place, while eutopia means a good place. (Cf. I&U; Appendix B)

APPENDIX D

REACTIONS TO MANNHEIM'S SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

This appendix surveys some representative criticisms of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. The commentaries are taken chronologically to see whether changes occur in the contexts in which the sociology of knowledge is judged. Links, made by authors, between planning and the sociology of knowledge are noted. In all cases, the selections reflect at least a reading of the expanded English edition of Ideology and Utopia.[1]

D.1 The 1930s and 1940s[2]

Review articles appeared within a year of the release of the revised edition of Ideology and Utopia (1936). The initial American response to the sociology of knowledge, as seen in book reviews by VonSchelting, Speier, Merton, MacIver and Sabine, was "negative" and centered on its incongruence with epistemology. Shortcomings were stressed. Louis Wirth, for example, would have been happier had Mannheim incorporated a social psychology to explain the interaction of reality and thought.[3] (I&U: xxix) However, the sociology of knowledge was not entirely dismissed; it was just thought a limited approach to specific topics.

In 1940, against the mainstream, C. Wright Mills[4] wrote of the "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of

Knowledge." Basically accusing those who see no connection between the sociology of knowledge and epistemology of forgetting history, Mills embraces the empiricism of the sociology of knowledge.

Underlining Mannheim's affinity to Dewey's pragmatism, Mills continues. The focus on the logical inconsistency of relativism is misplaced, instead the sociology of knowledge permits the sociologist to "refer to a degree of truth and ... include the conditions under which they [assertions] are true." Absolutism, maintains Mills, precludes the need for inquiry, but the nature of "scientific inquiry is self-correct[ion]." (In Horowitz (ed.), 1963: 461) He equates "seeking truth" with "thinking" (p. 462) and chastises his colleagues for belittling a technique which "presents an opportunity to study comparatively ... diverse norms themselves, their function and genesis." (P. 463) Since the sociology of knowledge was never proferred as an epistemology, Mills contends, Mannheim would have shown fewer "ambiguities and mislocations in his work" had he been clearer on this point. (P. 464) Rather, "in its 'epistemologic function' the sociology of knowledge is specifically propaedeutic to the construction of sound methodology for the social sciences." (P. 464) One of the few to cite Mannheim's article on "American Sociology," Mills applauds Mannheim's efforts "to treat politically important problems without being a victim to bias."[5] Even if Mannheim fell short of the task, he still provided a framework which al-

lows important questions to be asked.

> Not only the content of values in social inquiries should be detected, but how values creep in, and how, if at all, they condition the direction, completeness, and warrantability of the results of research ... (p. 467)

Discussion on the sociology of knowledge quieted during the war years. Mannheim's attention after 1936, of course, turned to planning and education and his untimely death preceded the reemergence of interest in the sociology of knowledge. Some articles appeared simply as testimonies to his work, others continued the debate.

With good intentions but many inaccuracies,[6] Daniel Robinson reviewed Mannheim's work in the April 1948 issue of The Personalist. Identifying Mannheim as a philosopher of history concerned with the "Social Question" which arose in mid-19th century Europe, Robinson acclaims his attempts to "seek the real structure of modern society" (p. 140), but concludes that the planned society, which Mannheim proposes to be "controlled by some minority group," must yield to "an omnipotent and omniscient spirit that is capable of overruling the best-laid schemes of mice and men." (P. 148)

Robinson demonstrates the narrowness of partial perspectives which so concerned Mannheim. Robinson is quite obviously anti-Marxist, and, so, to "forgive" Mannheim's indebtedness to Karl Marx he explains how the term "ideology" "came from the Napoleonic era in France." (P. 142) Branding Mannheim a "practical thinker," Robinson continues to assert

that "Professor Mannheim thinks that modern life is governed primarily by mechanisms that are basically irrational." (P. 143)

However, Robinson exposes a serious shortcoming in the common interpretation of the sociology of knowledge. The fact that this review was written in 1948, the year Orwell's 1984 arrived, two years after Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, seems significant. As illustration of the relationship between ideology and utopia, Robinson recalls how the communist utopia of Marx (who lived "unmolested" in capitalist society!) became ideology after "Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other bolshevists ... seized power in Russia at the end of World War I." (P. 144) The sociology of knowledge alone is not an explanatory methodology, it is rather one which elucidates via error correction. The sociology of knowledge demands serious contextual and historical research. Thus Mannheim would shudder at Robinson's example which ignores the experimental in the Soviet revolution, and which forgets the notion of the dialectic. (Cf. I&U: 127ff)

D.2 The 1950s

In a full length book dedicated to the sociology of knowledge, Jacques Maquet appraises the work of Mannheim. Out of a crowded field of competing theories Maquet discerns two basic types: the Durkheimian and German sociologies of knowledge. He notes Scheler's observations (in 1924 and

1926) of the rudimentary elements of a sociology of knowledge in Max Weber's writings and views Veblen as a "natural[ ]" forerunner to a sociology of knowledge position. (1951: 9) Maquet then begins with a Jamesian distinction between knowledge (or science, Wissen) as meaning "to know a thing" or as signifying "to know such and such things about a thing." (1951: 3)

Maquet evaluates Mannheim from both sociological (concerned with the "nature of knowledge") and philosophical (focused on "problems of truth") standpoints. Maquet, later to study African post-colonialism, is most concerned to identify the independent variable of "influence" in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In contrast to other reviewers, Maquet finds Mannheim "little inclined to order" and typically "operating[ing] in a radiating rather than linear manner." (1951: 14, 20) Maquet further discovers a "close relationship between the results of the sociology of knowledge and ... [Mannheim's] manner of reforming society." (1951: 21)

For Maquet, Mannheim substitutes "perspective (Aspekstruktur)" for Marx' "ideology." The "social factor," the "independent variable," is specified as the "group" in its "situation" "in society and in history" guided by "the objectives and necessities of its collective action." Maquet believes Mannheim closely follows in the Marxian tradition. He, therefore, stresses the class genesis of ideas in Mannheim as well as conflict. Without alluding to the

ambiguity in Marx' concept of class,[7] Maquet is struck by the competition of Mannheim's social groups for "power." (1951: 48) Maquet concludes that Mannheim is more successful in showing a close relationship between certain ideas and political groups than he is in demonstrating connections between ideas and material reality. (1951: 43)

Examining Mannheim's method Maquet identifies three steps. The first occurs on an "intellectual plane" and consists of "reconstructions[8] of the style of thought," (in Mannheim's terms). The second requires historical verification of the actual existence of such ideas, while the third entails "sociological interpretation." (1951: 36, 39)

Though Maquet recognizes Mannheim's limited empirical forays (the work on generations and conservative thought being "exceptions rather than the rule"), he applauds Mannheim for his "scientific theory." (1951: 41, 97) Maquet underlines Mannheim's contribution in introducing "cultural personality types" lying on a continuum between "individuals" and "human nature."[9] (1951: 101) Thus, unlike others who criticize Mannheim for neglecting psychology, Maquet emphasizes Mannheim's understanding that the psychological cannot be understood without the social. (Cf. "The Sociology of the Mind," 1927)

The Marxian strain also emerges in the <u>implied activism</u> of Mannheim's concept of relationism and in the ontological orientation (1951: 63-4; 76) But, Maquet criticizes Mannheim for the elementary contradiction between his recognition of

"Partisan" truths and his search for "pure" knowledge. (1951: 82) Maquet pinpoints the trouble to lie, not with Mannheim's free-floating intelligentsia, but, in his assertion of the possibility of "objectivity." (1951: 82, 84-5) Yet, Maquet believes Mannheim's sociology of knowledge potentially fruitful, especially in conjunction with other formulations. Mannheim's greatest shortcoming is, then, the paucity of empirical testing, while his greatest achievement is the attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge whereby man may "adapt[ ]" to his "environment," "master nature" and reduce conflict.[10] (1951: 90, 104; cf. Section 8.B.)

Helmut Wagner, writing in 1952, conversely contends that "Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is understandable only as a historic system." (1952: 303) As such it does not fall into the narrower category of "empirical enquiry" and does not, therefore, correspond to Dewey's pragmatism or Weber's nominalism, or other recognized methodologies. (1952: 302) Wagner elevates Mannheim's "interest in a basic change of modern society," finding the roots of his thinking in Marx and Hegel.[11] (1951: 303) Knowledge thus becomes "<u>functional</u>" to political groups for "self-maintenance and assertion." (1951: 306) Wagner quotes Mannheim to say that the test of an "idea" is "its congruence with reality," (I&U: 87) defining reality as

> not only an embodiment of social existence within the ongoing historical process, but also the necessarily restricted or partial

> comprehension of that existence by members of individual groups or social strata. (Wagner, 1952: 303)

From this perspective Mannheim's increasing focus on the "process of democratization" makes sense. (See Chapter 4) Regardless of the social structure,[12] the "modern mass society" condones "equal claims to validity," and herein lies the problem for the social interpreter. One route out of the dilemma is to posit that a certain group, the free-floating intelligentsia, have the possibility (but not necessarily the probability) of relating many claims of unequal validity. The other simultaneous route is Mannheim's search for a new utopian vision to guide us into the future and away from the "dangerous rapids of economic collapse, depression, fascism and a new world war." (Wagner, 1952: 315) The process of search and intellectual synthesis is assumed by Mannheim to be "unending." At this point, Wagner concludes that the sociology of knowledge is valid if and only if the "historicistic presuppositions" are accept/ed/." (1952: 317)

But, he asks what about its claim to empirical validity? He answers succinctly: There "difficulties arise which seem of a forbidding nature." (Wagner, 1952: 318) When Mannheim departs from the "psychogenetic" and enters the "social-existential" framework for comprehending and synthesizing perspectives he walks on treacherous ground. The first system is not just closed, it also requires eventual "unanimity." But "unanimity" cannot emerge in the second system without a reference group. The "'socially unattached

intelligentsia' ... proves to be a historistic construction without empirical counterpart." (1952: 319) Wagner does not accept Maquet's apologies for Mannheim nor is he convinced by Mannheim's criterion that the "best perspective" is that which yields the greatest "empirical fruitfulness." (Wagner, 1952: 319) Overall, Wagner concludes Mannheim asks some important "questions" for "modern sociology" but he has not provided "adequate" means of answering them.

In the same year, Frank Hartung takes an even stronger position against Mannheim. He finds a "genetic fallacy" in Ideology and Utopia. (Hartung, 1952: 27) Simply stated, Hartung maintains that if the reasons for rejecting a proposition are largely unconscious, then so too must be the reasons for accepting another proposition, and the two cannot be true at the same time. For Hartung, this ultimately leads Mannheim to an "anti-intellectualism ... where man is primarily irrational." (Hartung, 1952: 32) While this indictment might be softened were Hartung to have considered more than Ideology and Utopia, he still raises some difficult issues with respect to Mannheim's formulation.

Assuming Mannheim is on to something, Hartung asks, where and how does the transformation of "existential basis of thought" into "thought" occur? Citing Mannheim's statement that thought "is influenced in many decisive points by extra-theoretical factors of the most diverse sort ... called ... existential factors" (I&U: 239-40), Hartung asks, just how are we to recognize such "decisive points"? Further-

more, Hartung asks, just what are the "processes" which affect man's thinking? And finally, for Mannheim, what is meant by knowledge? All are reasonable criticisms of Mannheim, but by couching his argument largely in terms of the "collective unconsciousness," Hartung rests on a slender strand of Mannheim's formulation. He neglects the earliest motivations of Mannheim, who asks: how are we to study that which we know exists but which we cannot with current epistemologies validate? How are we to account for the fact that while we have a greater power than ever to understand, interpret, and even control, much of the social/political world, we still fall back on, or cannot overcome, irrationalities, such as fascism? In other words, how do we find out how people believe what they do, and, then, if we have reason to think they are unconsciously embracing an "ideology," how do we expose the irrationality of their position? And while Mannheim is concerned to debunk all partial ideologies, he is not naively assuming that better rationality will develop in most people. Instead, since the task is at best cumbersome, and at worst still elusive, a group of concerned and socially unattached analysts are needed for this function -- the free-floating intelligentsia.

Hartung, in contrast to other critics of the extreme relativism in Mannheim's formulation, somewhat uniquely suggests that Mannheim's scheme "... would be very fruitful in research." (Hartung, 1952: 21; cf. I&U: 244)

Tom Bottomore, writing in 1956, sees the confluence of two German intellectual concerns -- historicism and the theory of ideology -- in the sociology of knowledge. Karl Marx is highlighted, but threads of other thinkers are woven in. Bottomore feels that the philosophical approach to the sociology of knowledge has "stultif/ied/ sociological inquiry." (Bottomore, 1956: 52) Bottomore's insightful comparison of Mannheim and Marx unfortunately is too tangential to this discussion. Aside from the inherent self-contradiction in Mannheim's formulation, Bottomore asks more pointedly why it is that Mannheim primarily dealt with only "one sphere of knowledge, i.e., political doctrine"? (Bottomore, 1956: 55)

Bottomore reflects on what a properly conceived sociology of knowledge would include. Defining knowledge more broadly than the philosophers, "to denote any product of reflective thought, as distinct from intuition or immediate experience," Bottomore suggests that an "empirical sociology of knowledge" begins with "a classification of types of knowledge" perhaps following Gurvitch's breakdown of

> (i) perceptual knowledge of the external world; (ii) knowledge of other persons and of groups; (iii) commonsense knowledge; (iv) technical knowledge; (v) political knowledge; (vi) scientific knowledge; and (vii) philosophical knowledge. (Bottomore, 1956: 52ff)

The next step then concentrates on the "interaction of knowledge and social structure, /establishing where possible/ the

character of this interaction." In short, this study would

> aim simply at describing and analyzing some of the more important ways in which knowledge is conserved, extended, suppressed, or revived, in different societies and at different times. (Bottomore, 1956: 57)

Since Bottomore wrote, particularly during the 1960s in America, much has been done along these lines, and, yet, since many of the attempts directly issue from neo-marxist perspectives, they succeed mostly in debunking the ideological views. These exercises are most helpful in building our empirical knowledge, but they limit their sights to criticizing the existing social structure. Instructively some visions, albeit fragmentary, have emerged from the non-academic activists. But, unfortunately the dualism Wagner saw in Mannheim's thinking is repeated.

D.3 The 1960s

In 1963 the Civil Rights Act has just been passed in America, the image of a third world had surfaced, Cuba was socialist, the war in Vietnam was escalating, and the so-called counter-culture was in the making. Violence and near-violence oozed at every cultural crack. Thus, with certain justification, Harry Bash in 1964 presents his discussion in light of

> an increasingly serious dilemma. A world has emerged in which the narrowing of cross-cultural value differences does not seem to keep pace with the pressures

> toward increasing contact and functional interrelation of diverse cultures. (Bash, 1964: 189)

However, Bash acknowledges no specific political traumas and quickly leaves the real world to ask abstractly:

> ... given the deterministic character of culture, what measure of freedom resides with the individual to transcend his cultural imperatives? (Bash, 1964: 189; cf. Shklar)

He uses Stevenson's definition of freedom as "avoidability"[12] with its focus on individual "choice." This definition serves Bash's concern to locate individual responsibility in the consequences, but not the acts, of choosing among alternatives. (Bash, 1964: 187-8)

For cultural determinism, Bash begins with an anthropological view "that it is only within and through culture that the individual can attain and expand his range of freedom." (Bash, 1964: 188) He then considers the work of Mannheim (only Ideology and Utopia) and Marx. Bash oversimplifies Mannheim's view of freedom[13] -- "Mannheim observes in the history of mankind a progressive movement toward freedom, in the sense of avoidability." (Bash, 1964: 191) He too quickly condemns Mannheim for the paradox: "the opportunity for relative emancipation from social determination increases proportionately with insight into this determination." (I&U: 47-8; cf. Bash, 1964: 192)

After a slightly lengthier summary of Marx, Bash concludes:

> Yet freedom in the sense of avoidability is /also/ beyond realization here,

> precisely because the direction of the deterministic relationship places the causal element in the sociohistorical matrix, rather than in individual volition. (Bash, 1964: 198)

However, Bash's own conclusion suffers from the same obstacle he accuses Mannheim and Marx of building -- "an intellectual barricade hindering an unbiased understanding of the relationship between man and his sociocultural context in history." (1964: 198-9) Bash bases his argument on the "facts" that social structure, in Mannheim's case, and social change, in Marx' case, dwarf the individual. Bash's pronouncements on Mannheim are unfortunately reinforced by a biased selection of secondary texts (i.e., Hartung, Merton and Maquet) and more seriously suffer from too limited a reading of Mannheim.[14] Bash's overall conclusion that Mannheim's "radical cultural relativism" is best regarded as a "methodological caution," is particularly distressing as it avoids Mannheim's larger point about the crisis of political thinking.

An apparently more even-handed approach is taken in 1966 by Robert Coombs who claims that although epistemology and the sociology of knowledge are not, and never will be, synonymous, overlapping interests deserve collaboration. Thus, Coombs, a philosopher, suggests that philosophers and social scientists work together on important questions. Each can bring the special insights and orientations of his respective discipline to bear. For example, the study of semantics and syntactics is properly within the domain of

the epistemologist, while empiricism and pragmatics[15] are in the province of sociology.

Coombs, though he concurs with Mannheim's concern to improve and augment social/political knowledge, is reluctant to cross disciplinary lines. In effect, he requests that Mannheim, and others, choose a disciplinary identity and stick to it rather than trying to traverse disciplines. Yet, it appears that much of Mannheim's intellectual fertility, and likely the ambiguity as well, derives from his multidisciplinary forays.[16]

David Kettler, one of the most thoughtful assessors of Mannheim's work, first published articles on Mannheim in 1967.[17] Delving deeply into the archival materials at the University of Keele, England, and returning to the fragmentary records from Budapest, Kettler sheds tremendous light on Mannheim's early thinking.[18] (Cf. Chapter 2 and Appendix A)

Though Kettler admits that Mannheim is mostly remembered for his sociology of knowledge, he finds his narrowly focused statements "misled and misleading." (Kettler, 1967: 399) Instead, Kettler maintains, Mannheim's work on the sociology of knowledge cannot be divorced from the earlier and later topics. Indeed, Kettler sees a unity in Mannheim's thinking, which he characterizes as a "style of thought" or a "moral search," and later, in 1971, as a quest for "political education." (Kettler, 1967, 1971)

Furthermore, Kettler believes the sociology of knowledge needs be understood from the standpoint of a "moral-philosophic syndrome" in which "initially antithetical aspirations" (such as freedom and security) are "reconcile/d/." (Kettler, 1967: 402-3) Thus, he concludes, similarly to Kurt Wolff, that Mannheim

> /t/ypically ... proceeds on the basis of some peculiar variation of the old Socratic formula: 'if I know who I am, what it means to be who I am, I shall know what I must do.' (Kettler, 1967: 405)

Kettler's work is most interesting for exposing the commonalities in Mannheim's earliest and latest ideas. Specifically, Kettler uncovered two unpublished manuscripts of Mannheim's written in the early 1920s. In the first, "Concerning the Peculiarity of Cultural-Sociological Cognition," (1922) Mannheim addresses the issue of time. Following upon his prediction, in "Soul and Culture" (1918), that the early 1920s would be a "time of intellectual rebirth," Mannheim asks, in 1922, "Does the historical social process change anything about the destiny of being human?" (Kettler, 1967: 410, 407, 415) Concerned to overcome 19th century positivism and head "once again towards a metaphysical idealism," Mannheim finds that the "deliberate homelessness of our humanity" as seen in the "sailor, historian, and sociologist" allows "new substantive insights" to "transcend the cultural situation." (Kettler, 1967: 410, 415) Time is increasingly linked to change, and as such is

elevated over other factors such as social stratification. Time becomes both an analytical category, as seen in the idea of "crisis" as turning point, and a political force, as in the sense of urgency. Thus, Kettler remarks, Mannheim "views the world quite unashamedly as anthropomorphic."

A second paper, "A Sociological Theory of Culture and Its Knowability: Conjunctive and Communicative Thought" (1924), introduces the concept of time to the problem of "validity." Reacting in large part to Lukacs's History and Class-Consciousness (1923),

> The measure of adequacy, according to Mannheim, is defined by the historical variability of the context of meanings, ... and ... by the diversity of perspectives within a given context. (Kettler, 1967: 421)

In contrast to the "conjunctive thought" of natural science which seeks "general scientific explanation," "communicative thought" characterizes the social sciences and concerns "the interpretation of meanings." "The basic control which must be applied to disciplined communicative thought is authenticity." (Kettler, 1967: 423; cf. Chapter 8)

Mannheim has already come to the conclusions of his sociology of knowledge, which he has yet to formulate and which leads directly to the planning theory. Namely,

> The intellectual mission of the intellectuals, if they are true to their mission at this time and place, will in itself lead to their self-transformation, their coming to a new consciousness, and will decisively transform the situation. (Kettler, 1967: 423)

Kettler believes Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, as reported in Ideology and Utopia, would have made far more sense had Mannheim published his ideas on "conjunctive" and "communicative" thought.[19] It would have better explained

> The insight which Mannheim shared with many of his contemporaries /which/ remains relevant: social scientists labor under a discipline in intellectual work which increasingly prevents them from dealing with matters which first drew them to intellectual work. (Kettler, 1967: 425; cf. Chapter 8)

It would also account for the "eclecticism" in Mannheim's approach. (Cf. Kettler, 1967, 1971; Wolff, 1971, 1974; Appendix B) Indeed, it seems that the "eclecticism" explicates both Mannheim's continued freshness and his ambiguity. In essaying to encompass all social knowledge Mannheim was both the schoolboy seeking certainty and the scholar systematizing doubt.[20]

Kettler treats Mannheim only in the context of the academy. He, therefore, does not consider where in collective action the "moral search" leads. Whether Mannheim would have stepped beyond the library doors had not Hitler appeared is a silly speculative question. The fact remains that Mannheim was always concerned with collective action, not in the sense of mimicry, but of an overall effect of combined individual actions. Furthermore, with each step Mannheim went further from the academy. His choices to investigate planning and education were tantamount to reach-

ing out from the university. With his appointment to UNESCO he was to bridge the university and community.

Moreover, Mannheim, while he loved knowledge and sought to infuse substantial morality into the social world, was more than a moral philosopher. He realized that all workers in knowledge must take responsibility, but that ideas and interpretations emerge from all ranks of society. Thus, rather than the elitist Kettler implies he was, Mannheim was conservative in the ecological sense. (Cf. Section 8.B.) The university had special responsibility, but political ideas form in the streets. Coordination within the university -- to avoid the situation where "badly organized bureaucrac/ies/" cannot deal with important social problems -- and with the community, Mannheim argued, was desperately needed. (ESSP: 202) It is in this sense that his sociology of knowledge represents a "pioneering contribution to a new inquiry." (Kettler, 1967: 399) In other words, Kettler's analysis is acute in revealing the traditions from which Mannheim hailed (i.e., moral philosophy) and those against which he rebelled (i.e., positivism), but he does not fully appreciate Mannheim's efforts to serve as a catalyst to progressive social change.

D.4 The 1970s

Gunter Remmling has spent long years studying Mannheim. One of the few to consider the full range of Mannheim's

thinking, Remmling divides Mannheim's work into four discrete periods.[21] Concentrating on the sociology of knowledge, he further demarcates a philosophical period (1918-1924) and a sociological one (1925-1932).[22] (Remmling, 1971: 532; cf. Remmling, 1975) He notes Mannheim's early and deep concern for "classificatory schemes in general," and from such work as his dissertation on the structure of epistemology and his review of Erich Becker's book, Geistenwissenschaften und Naturwissenschafter (1921), Remmling sees an emerging interest in relativism. (Remmling, 1971: 537-8) Remmling contends, Mannheim's first solution to the problem of relativism is stated in his article on historicism: "... only a philosophy which is able to give a concrete answer to the question 'what shall we do?' can put forward the claim to have overcome relativism." (ESSP: 128-9) This translates into Mannheim's later "call to action" via planning. (Remmling, 1967: 207)

Remmling, however, is far from satisfied. In another book looking at diverse formulations of the sociology of knowledge (including, of course, Mannheim), he begins with concern for the "corroding influence" of the "systematic doubt." "Fear and hostility grow out of the suspicion which each group forms of the other's motives and intentions."[23] (Remmling, 1967: ix) It is "no accident that main varieties of the sociology of knowledge [e.g., Scheler and Mannheim] developed in the distrustful climate of the Weimar Republic." (Remmling, 1967: 10) The outcome is "brinksmanship"

because in contrast to the isolated skepticism of thinkers of earlier ages, the "modern /doubting/ mentality" permeates "literate humanity." (Remmling, 1967: 4, 42) Remmling is hence unconvinced by Mannheim's "dubious construction of a so-called socially unattached intelligentsia" to overcome relativism. (Remmling, 1967: 45) Not only does thought become fragmented, but it is increasingly ahistorical because the sociology of knowledge emphasizes images and values. Remmling, thus, emphasizes the phenomenological roots in the sociology of knowledge.

Remmling is overwhelmed by current evidence of "much individual anxiety and more social malaise." (Remmling, 1967: 199) He suggests three reasons for this condition: (1) social arrangements continue, or better reemerge, while having lost their past, and for Remmling, "natural" meaning[24]; (2) "modern men were never granted a respite from social changes"; and (3) there is no unity of values. Remmling ends his 1967 book pessimistically: we have been disillusioned.[25] As it were, Remmling has retraced Mannheim's steps towards democratic planning.

In fact, almost a decade later, Remmling finds greater hope in Mannheim as he more carefully considers the planning theory. Still convinced that Mannheim's work was "segmented," he now sees "unity in diversity." (Remmling, 1975: 141) However, still divorcing the sociology of knowledge from Mannheim's work on social planning, Remmling, apparently in response to the student movement of the 1960s, now stresses

the latter task. But why was he so long unconvinced by Mannheim's sense of urgency? Remmling defines planning in terms of consciousness raising and re-education; he seems to get caught in a sticky web where one does not turn to planning until the personal repercussions are evident. He attributes the social environment of England, coupled with the horrors in Germany, as the catalyzing events in Mannheim's life. He further quotes C. Wright Mills as he begins the book: "We are at a curious junction in the history of human insanity; in the name of realism, men are quite mad, and precisely what they call utopian is now the condition of human survival." (Remmling, 1975: x; cf. Chapters 1, 3 and 8) Yet, Remmling's prognosis is most pessimistic as, by implication, we must await individual breakthroughs in true understanding.

D.5 Summing Up

This sampling of commentaries on the sociology of knowledge is not meant as a full examination of the field, or even of Mannheim's work in it. Rather, it seeks to (1) illuminate some of the issues, (2) illustrate the range of perspectives from which Mannheim's sociology of knowledge has been viewed,[26] and (3) stress the continued interest in Mannheim for his sociology of knowledge. The chronological ordering indicates no pattern of changes in receptivity to Mannheim's ideas, but it does suggest the impact (more ap-

parent for some than for others) of the times in which the commentators wrote. While most doubted Mannheim's claim of overcoming relativism, the social scientists tended to focus on the empirical inadequacies of the formulation and the philosophers turned again and again to the lack of epistemological validity.[27]

One more text might prove useful in sorting out the disorder. Friedrichs in 1970 developed A Sociology of Sociology. Rather than use Mannheim's ideological/utopian categories, he adapts Thomas Kuhn's paradigm of the history of science. Thus, the division between "priestly" and "prophetic" "modes" is based on a larger theory of "normal and revolutionary sociology." Influenced greatly by the reascension of Marxist approaches in America in the 1960s, Friedrichs is concerned with the effect of the university community on the intellectual consciousness. He numbers among the prophetic sociologists, "Karl Mannheim, Pitirim Sorokin, Robert Lynd, Robert MacIver ... Louis Wirth /and/ C. Wright Mills." (1979: 74) (Only the last, he sadly notes, was still in the academy by the mid-1950s.)

By prophetic Friedrichs does not mean predictive, but, rather an attitude which "br/eaks/ false images" and seeks "to alter the future."[28] (1970: 75, 66) The priestly mode expands upon "the community's tradition in symbol and ritual." (1970: 67)

Friedrichs's argument is subtle and deep and while he prefers the prophetic to the priestly mode because it tends

to underscore the reality of conflict among "value-laden choices," he believes that both modes can be mutually informative.[29] (1970: 327) He would only like to see them work more dialectically. From this vantage point he appraises Mannheim:

> Had Karl Mannheim's life not been cut short, he might have more fully resolved the dilemma he had earlier posed in taking the sociology of knowledge even more seriously than had Marx himself. From a position that would naively exempt the intellectual from the social conditioning that he saw dominating the ideologies and utopias offered by the bourgeouisie and the proletariat, he had begun toward the end of his life to articulate a faith in the emancipating process of social science itself. Neither class nor the elimination of class could emancipate man from the compulsions of his culture or subculture; but self-conscious involvement in the dialectic of social-scientific enlightenment and societal reconstruction might.[30] (Friedrichs, 1970: 185)

One of Mannheim's major contributions to American sociology, according to Friedrichs, is that of relational analysis, the idea of "system" which emerged from "the English and continental traditions." (1970: 220) Friedrichs because he sees Mannheim as concentrating on "relationships and configurations of the parts rather than the parts themselves," in short, discerns an ecological unity.[31] (Cf. Chapter 8) Mannheim was one who "focused upon relationships rather than upon interpretation of the quality of an element in the relationship in and of itself." (Friedrichs, 1970: 220) Yet, Mannheim does not overlook "individuals or groups of individuals" in favor of "social relationships."

Instead his relationism seeks to realize an ecological balance of individual and group thinking. Indeed, Mannheim addresses social processes (e.g., competition) but they are not the major focus of his work.

Mannheim is widely recognized, especially for his Ideology and Utopia, throughout the social sciences literature, as the more than three decades of criticism of his sociology of knowledge indicate. By the same token, however, because Mannheim's work is usually considered in bits and pieces,[31] his overall intentions are lost to squabbles over details. The fact is that Mannheim lived eleven more years after the English edition of Ideology and Utopia, his last statement on the sociology of knowledge, was published. That he never returned to the sociology of knowledge, but rather tread new waters, must mean something. Why did he not answer his critics? Shortly before his death, in a personal letter (April 15, 1946) to Kurt Wolff,[32] Mannheim clarified his position on the sociology of knowledge by restating it:

> I use this method /the sociology of knowledge/ because I think that in this marginal field of human knowledge we should not conceal inconsistencies, ... but our duty is to show the sore spots in human thinking at its present stage ... I think our whole generation will have to work on it as nothing is more obvious than that we transcended in every field the idea that man's mind is equal to an absolute Ratio in favor of a theory that we think on the basis of changing frames of reference ... (Wolff, 1974: 557-9; emphasis added)

The issue, he repeats, is not eternal truth but the need "to transcend the immediate and fragmentary scope of observation ... to ... grasp ... structures." (ESOC: 43) The sociology of knowledge in the last analysis, for Mannheim, despite its "inconsistencies," is not truly a method, nor an epistemology. (I&U: 289) It is an attitude which flexibly allows for more and more social data (including behaviors, perceptions and attitudes) to be comprehended. However cumbersome, it does not imply a narrowing of the discipline of sociology.[33] Instead, it is inherently democratic in its effort to engage the real variety of human thinking. Finally, it seeks to distill the quality thinking from that generated by the equality of all men. That Mannheim did not fully succeed in his goals is really less important than the fact that he tried.

FOOTNOTES to APPENDIX D

1
For this reason the commentaries are in the main American and British, including German refugees.

2
Because of the war in Europe, academic life was somewhat curtailed in its traditional tasks, like teaching. This was also the time when academic consulting grew rapidly and applied social science became more prevalent than theoretical.

3
This idea reappears in later American writings including Merton (1957: 562) and Berger's The Social Construction of Reality. As Remmling notes: "Ironically, during his English period, Mannheim gained more than sufficient insight into social psychology ... but, by then, he was no longer sufficiently interested in questions concerning the sociology of knowledge." (Remmling, 1971: 542) Notice that some chastise Mannheim in his planning theory for his emphasis on social psychology. (Cf. Mills, 1940)

4
Mills was trained in philosophy and sociology as an undergraduate and in sociology and anthropology in graduate school. (Horowitz, 1963: 6)

5
Mannheim's words as quoted by Mills.

6
For example, Robinson identifies Max, not Alfred, Weber as Mannheim's teacher. He also reverses the chronology of when Mannheim left Germany and when the English edition of Ideology and Utopia was published.

7
See especially Bottomore's essay on Marx in Karl Marx (1973).

8
Note that planning and reconstruction are interchangeable terms.

9
Mannheim in his last writings on planning made much of the "democratic personality." (See FPDP)

10
Significantly, for Maquet, Mannheim explicates the sociological dimension while Sorokin illuminates better cultural factors.

11
Wagner thinks Lukacs "the most Hegelian of all modern Marxists" as he recognizes his influence on Mannheim. (Wagner, 1952: 306)

12
The other factor in Stevenson's definition is indeterminism, an uninteresting concept to Bash because it does not have ethical meaning.

13
Bash admits Mannheim's determinism is not "simple." (Bash, 1964: 190)

14
The same criticism might be made of Bash' treatment of Marx.

15
Coombs defines pragmatics as the "existential dimension of knowledge."

16
See bibliographies in his various writings.

17
Kettler also published Marximus und Kultur in 1967; this statement is rather based on "Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy."

18
For example, he notes that Mannheim continued to elaborate on "relationism" in hs last lectures at the University of London. (Kettler, 1967: 401)

19
In fact, given actual criticisms of the sociology of knowledge, to include the conjunctive/communicative typology might too easily have sidetracked Mannheim's readers from his major task of positing an approach uniquely applicable to the social sciences. Though it is not clear from Kettler's excerpts in this piece, Mannheim seems to have well understood (intuitively or not) natural science in his concentration on conditions, not laws, and in his awareness that many natural scientific phenomena are interpreted, by the deceptive simplicity of description, centuries before they are "scientifically" explained.

Indeed, the seven year span, 1918 to 1925, during which Mannheim produced these manuscripts, was a period of great social debate over scientific explanation. Einstein's relativity theory, for instance, was the topic of many editorials and letters to the editor in journals; the Scopes "monkey" trial and the "modern" contraptions of World War I

were other stimuli to public scientific debate. (Cf. Morison, 1966; Derby and Williams, 1960)

20
This, I believe, isone of Mannheim's greatest charms, one which unfortunately remains rare. Or, in Veblen's words: "The university man is, properly, a student, not a schoolmaster." (Veblen, 1954: 18)

21
The names of the periods change depending on the article or book, but Remmling, a sociologist, frequently sorts them out as (1) the sociology of knowledge (1918-32), the sociology of culture (1933-38), the sociology of religion (1939-44), and the sociology of education (1944-47). Note that "planning" is not specified in periodic terms.

22
Notice that Kettler's philosophical interpretation of Mannheim is largely predicated on this early work.

23
Scheler's sociology of knowledge, which Mannheim found "static," centered on the "selection of ideas" not their genesis. (Remmling, 1967: 201-2) In its own way the stress on "selection" rather than "genesis" may speak more directly to the issue of social power than to that of validity and content.

24
He cites as an example the practice of medieval neighborliness in suburbs. His counterposing of presumed medieval social life and that of modernity is to my mind much too abstract because it ignores real differences at certain points in the development of modern life and overstates the tranquility of the middle ages. Cohn (1961) gives strong evidence for the existence of widespread social turmoil in the middle ages. The most modern of nations, the United States, has developed from a largely controllable rural society into a more complex and increasingly distant industrial society in less than 100 years. (Cf. Rogin, Goodwyn, O'Connor)

25
As a footnote, we should add that this study emerged in the mid-1960s, a period of great social upheaval throughout the world. It is included in this section on the 1970s reaction to Mannheim because Remmling continued to write on Mannheim well into the 1970s and a meeting with Remmling confirmed that he has not abandoned his earlier interpretations, though they are somewhat modified.

26
The psychological literature was not included as it was felt to be too far afield. Thus, the authors cited here cluster in the fields of political science, sociology and philosophy.

27
A finding which reinforces Maquet's observations almost thirty years ago.

28
He begins the chapter on this mode with a particularly apt quote by E.A. Ross: "One prophesies ... because persuading others to anticipate the future which he foretells furthers his present designs." (Cf. Mills in Horowitz (ed.), 1963)

29
In sociology this idea is pitted against Parsons' equilibrium theory; in political science the alternative conception is pluralism; in economics the counterpart is perfect competition. See, for example, Runciman, Godelier, Roszak (ed.), Mills and others. Though much, most of it fairly recent, empirical work has seriously questioned these "systems," they remain the predominant constructs in their respective disciplines.
Nevertheless, in power research, "conflict" explains both conservative "balance" and radical class warfare. (Domhoff, 1978)

30
Significantly, Friedrichs compares the prophetic mode to the Hebraic tradition, an apparently strong undercurrent in Mannheim's intellectual development. (Friedrichs, 1970: 75; cf. Chapter 2)

31
Friedrichs mistakenly associates him with Parsons and others of that ilk. Parsons' system assumes that equilibrium is inevitable unless severely threatened by conflictual change. Mannheim assumes change inevitable and therefore, intervention is necessary to control its worst effects. But, Mannheim would not condone simply stability, instead he seeks freedom and democratic development.

32
In the same letter Mannheim further states that doing empirical research is like "observing the world from a moving staircase." (Wolff, 1974: 558)
This letter responded to Wolff's seminar's criticisms of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, as forwarded by Wolff to Mannheim.

33 Mannheim would appear to agree mostly with "George Bernard Shaw's observation that every profession was a conspiracy against the laity." (Friedrichs, 1970: 89)

APPENDIX E

THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSITIVISM AND HISTORICISM

Since it arose in the 19th century, positivism has been the center of debate in the social sciences, and consequently planning theory. Positivism is broadly defined by the tenets (1) "the science is the only valid knowledge and facts the only possible objects of knowledge," (2) that the task ... is to find general principles ... and use these principles as guides to human conduct and as the basis of social organization," and (3) that the scientific "method" is the only means of ascertaining general principles. (Abbagnano, 1968: 414) Three forms of positivism exist: "social positivism," as represented by Comte, Saint Simon, Fourier, Bentham, Ricardo, and others, "sought to promote through the use of the methods and results of science a more just social organization." (Abbagnano, 1968: 415) "Evolutionary positivism," where "the faith in progress ... is based not on society or history but on nature, the sphere of physics and biology," is expressed in Herbert Spencer's work. "Critical positivism," which leads into "neopositivism" substitutes "description" and, later, logic, for "perception." (Abbagnano, 1968: 415, 418-19)

The possibility of planned intervention was originally couched in "social positivism." (Cf. Hyams, 1973) When Mannheim calls Karl Marx a positivist he has this view in mind. However, much planning theory since World War II is

premised on neopositivism. In the intervening period, logical positivists led the fight against planning. Thus, Mannheim uses this definition when he counters the positivists in his sociology of knowledge and his early planning theory. Remember that Mannheim overcomes partial perspectives by embracing them in the relationism of the sociology of knowledge. Therefore, although positivism of the "social" and "neo-" varieties is compatible with his formulation, they are not identical.

In the period between the two world wars, historicism emerged as the major anti-positivist approach. Mannheim joined this camp. Some positivists in arguing against this "total" perspective cited Marx as an exponent. In short, the intellectual debates were somewhat confusing.

Thus, to understand Mannheim and his fervent critics (like Karl Popper) it is essential to look at the debates over historicism and positivism. Mannheim was severely criticized for his historicism by Popper, yet the argument cannot be understood without knowing that Popper was an anti-positivist too.

Negative reaction to positivism in the 1930s and 1940s tended to reaffirm the tenets of free inquiry against the historicists while seeking to correct the limitations of positivism. Thus, Michael Polanyi, a biologist, wrote several tracts in the 1940s calling for unfettered freedom as the highest goal of government; Popper made similar arguments a decade earlier.[1] Both were reacting as much to

Marxism, which they saw as a variant of historicism, as to calls for planning in western European countries, particularly Britain. (Though chronologically irrelevant, the Marxist claim for controlling scientific inquiry is epitomized in the Lysenko affair (1948); Lysenko, a Russian agronomist, openly denounced the genetic (as opposed to the environmental) explanation of biological mutation, an argument fully contradicting the international scientific findings.)

The historicists, however, did not uniformly embrace Marxism and though they stressed change, they did not all assume class conflict to be the cause of change. In fact, the historicism which matured in Germany after second decade of the twentieth century was more intent on finding a way to understand the diversity of existing social forms. (It is well to remember that Mannheim's Hungary remained a country of many nations and that Weimar Germany was created as a coalition of social groups.[2]) Furthermore, despite historicists' wide-ranging interests they did not usually trespass into the realm of natural science.

The philosophy of science and social-scientific arguments against positivism often differed. The anti-positivists of the first group contended that scientific discovery was not due to a summation of observations but rather to some individual exercising imagination to produce a theory. (Cf. Bronowski; Hanson; Polanyi, 1958; and Popper) Because positivists believed in the unity of

science, they sought to identify elementary methods to ensure that truthful statements were made. Noting that these statements were not to be construed as the total truth, Popper substituted the idea of "falsifiability" for the Vienna Circle's principle of "verifiability." He also refused to permit different standards for social scientists. In short, his arguments were framed by the question, What is science? not How do we explain reality?

Historically positivism was closely associated with empiricism, and so critics of positivism were accused of being non-empirical. Likewise empiricists were considered positivists. Thus, Mannheim could call Karl Marx a positivist. (Cf. I&U) This facile argument which reemerges in the 1950s and 1960s debate over positivism in the social sciences (particularly sociology and political science), confuses the difference between sources and interpretation of data. The issue, then, concerns not the use of quantitative methods -- in fact, even Mannheim later eloquently argued that such methods may have some validity. Rather, the worry is that studies so couched too often neglect larger questions.[3]

In an article on behaviorism in 1972, Eugene Miller contends that the anti-behavioralists are just modern-day historicists. Citing historicists' indebtedness to Nietzsche and the pragmatist movement of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, Miller focuses on the common stress on values which are "relative to time and place." (Miller,

1972: 797) He further asserts that Manhheim and other historicists hold to an epistemology which is characterized by three factors: (1) "No direct awareness of pure sense-data," (2) "The Historicity of the human mind," and (3) the "relativity of truth." (Miller, 1972: 800) Jumping across time and cultures, Miller compares Kuhn's concept of "paradigm" to the historicist notion of "Weltanschauung" and announces that Kuhn and the historicists (1) intend to change the social world and (2) respond to political crises, not theoretical ones. Their differences depend on the rates and extents of changes they envision. Radicals are distinguished from conservatives by favoring the activity of "mak/ing/ history" over passive "evaluation."

Miller's entire statement is directed against David Easton's interpretation of the anti-behavioral attacks of the 1960s as compatible with the foundations of scientific inquiry. Instead, Miller contends, they depart completely as they rest on different epistemological grounds. The proponents of anti-behavioralism, for Miller, share Easton's view "that the crisis of modern thought and life is largely the result of a pervasive disillusionment with reason." "Historicism is primarily a manifestation of contemporary irrationalism," Miller continues, but does not concur with "Easton's implicit assumption that what arose in the past has been rendered obsolete by historical progress." (Miller, 1972: 817)

The argument hinges on Miller's assumption that knowl-

edge (especially political knowledge) must be "future oriented." According to Miller, because modern historicism is necessarily relative to particular times and places and behavioralism eschews values, political philosophy (with its concern for values) needs to be recognized for its importance in determining future options. This conclusion is especially interesting in light of my view that Mannheim sought to refine traditional concepts of political philosophy to inform collective action for the future. (Cf. Chapters 6 and 8) Miller, unfortunately, stops short of Mannheim's planning theory, and, therefore, misses this point.

E.1 The Historicist Approach

Meinecke traced the roots of historicism back to the Enlightenment, but the full-grown bloom did not appear until Troeltsch published Der Historicismus und seine Probleme in 1922. (Mandelbaum, 1971: 51ff) (It was reviewed by Mannheim in the following year. See also Mannheim's 1935 encyclopedia article on Troeltsch.) Troeltsch understood historicism not as a methodological approach, but rather a way of viewing social life, apart from natural science frameworks. Troeltsch's stress on the importance of Weltanschauung to social understanding led him to conclude that the "crisis of historicism" was due to a concomitant "moral and intellectual skepticism."[4] (Mandelbaum, 1967: 22-3)

Mannheim's subsequent article on historicism (1924) devotes a large section to Troeltsch, but is better understood as a reaction to the release of his early mentor's, Lukacs's, History and Class Consciousness (1923). (ESOK: 124n.; Kettler; Lichtheim) Nevertheless, this essay also continued an earlier theme, "On Weltanschauung" (1921-22).

Like Troeltsch, Mannheim is acutely aware of incessant change, but he argues this recognition "also permeates everyday thinking." Foreshadowing his self-appointed task in Ideology and Utopia, namely, to discover "how do men actually think," Mannheim states:

> We have historicism only when history itself is written from the historistic Weltanschauung. It is not historiography which brought us historicism, but the historic process through which we lived has turned us into historicists. Historicism, therefore, is a Weltanschauung, and at the present stage of the development of consciousness it is characteristic of Weltanschauung that it should not only dominate our inner reactions and our external responses, but also determine our forms of thought. (ESOK: 85)

The point for Mannheim is that historicism offers an "ordering principle," a possible response to the question "what does it [i.e., change] mean?" (ESOK: 87) The crisis of ethical relativism perceived by Troeltsch is resolved in Mannheim's treatment by linking theory and practice, no doubt another reflection of the impact of Lukacs. It might be noted, however, that Lukacs was unconvinced by Mannheim's concept of relationism. Moreover, though H.A. Hodges defends Mannheim, Lukacs in The Destruction of Reason (1953) thinks

Mannheim untenably approves of capitalism. (Cf. Chapters 7 and 8; Hodges, 1970: 86ff, and, especially, 104ff) Thus the main intellectual difference between Lukacs and Mannheim returns to the cause of their splitting apart: Mannheim refused to adopt Marxism. In fact, Mannheim pointed out the irrationalism of Marxism when he suggested that it too was an ideology. (Cf. I&U)

In the early 1920s, Mannheim is still a philosopher working at the University of Heidelberg. Mannheim's turn to sociology appears in "Historicism" (1924) which itself provides the foundation for his first sociology of knowledge piece in 1925. (ESOK: 87) Building on his dissertation analysis of the structure of epistemologies (1922) and his reading of Dilthey (a man treated more generously by Lukacs and one whose work greatly informed the historicists), Mannheim begins to understand social life through historicism. (See also below)

Maurice Mandelbaum, a scholar of 19th and early 20th century European thought, interprets Troeltsch's and Mannheim's views of historicism as based on two elements -- "change and development." He summarizes their efforts as countering prevailing political philosophies based on "universal and unchanging natural law." (Mandelbaum, 1967: 23) Mandelbaum further maintains that the concept of historicism substantially changed in the hands of Meinecke, who stressed the "concrete, unique and individual" to avoid Troeltsch's moral crisis. It was not until Croce, in his

attack on materialism and positivism, synthesized these views to define "history as the self-development of the human spirit" that the full intellectual debts to Vico and Hegel finally surfaced.[5] Until this point, historicism was thought a theory of knowledge, where "knowledge was conceived in terms of creation rather than discovery." (Miller, 1972: 796)

In the synthesized, yet ambiguous, form, historicism emerged as a social science method in the "late 1930s and the 1940s in the United States and in England." In contrast to Mannheim's early conception, historicism became fused with the idea of "holism" (i.e., social wholes cannot be broken down into constituent parts which follow their own patterns of development). (Cf. Hayek, Popper) Marx and Comte were identified with Hegel as the major exponents.[6]

In this context, as will be seen, Popper in The Poverty of Historicism (1944) strenuously, if not convincingly, argues against Mannheim.[7] The discussion is marred by treating historicism as an ancient approach. Instead, historicism, one of the prime concepts of Mannheim's early work with implications for the planning theory, like other of Mannheim's foci is distinctly modern. John Stuart Mill in 1831 proclaimed that "The Spirit of the Age"

> is ... a novel expression ... The idea of comparing one's own age with former ages, or with our notion of those which are yet to come, had occurred to philosophers; but it never before was itself the dominant idea of any age. (Mandelbaum, 1971: 51)

Indeed nineteenth century denizens (at least in the western world) became acutely attuned to history, probably in part because they were so simultaneously aware of the beginnings of modernity.[8] (Cf. Berman, 1978)

Mannheim, in 1924, had not yet changed his temporal focus from the present to the future, but he introduced the "kernels"[9] of thought which lead him to democratic planning. These "kernels" include the three primary ideas of historicism, irrationalism and culture. Since Chapter 4 considers the last two items, we will here focus on the first.

E.2 Mannheim's Historicism

Mannheim defined historicism not only as an intellectual category, but also a social one by which people make sense out of the chaotic in a rapidly changing world. It grasps the present and hence ignores the Marxian theory of historical progress erupting in large historical stages defined and organized by man's relation to the means and modes of production. But Mannheim has a sense of history, at this point seen in cultural biography, later in the biographies of democratic individuals and society, based on the movement of time, chronology. (Cf. his implicit theory of the public interest and generational social change.) The logic of time, for Mannheim, does not negate the continuation of irrational and rational elements in human thought.

It simply makes the crisis of "disproportion" more urgent. (Cf. Chapters 1, 3, 4 and 8) The concern with time leads to the ecological unity in his idea of democratic planning. (See Section 8.B.; cf. Appendix D)

Significantly, Mannheim eventually inverted the importance of thought relative to action. In his early work Mannheim supposed that thought was based on one's standpoint, irrespective of one's activism. Later activity becomes more instrumental to thought. He was horrified, but fascinated, by the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda, especially the brown shirts movement. (Meanwhile, Mannheim proudly contended that none of his German students became Nazis!) (Hodges, 1970: 104)

In hindsight, I have applauded Mannheim's emphasis on culture, largely because of the amorphous directions non-Marxist social sciences have followed. However, Lukacs, with whom Mannheim has been unfavorably compared,[10] condemns Mannheim's focus on culture for its ahistoricity.

However, Mannheim's historicism is heavily influenced by Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness (1922), a book Lukacs later repudiated. Among the points Mannheim adopts are: (1) the methodological orientation; (2) the integrity of the totality; (3) praxis, i.e., "reality must also strive towards thought"[11]; (4) the need for a "framework" to interpret necessary, but insufficient, empirical evidence; (5) the non-economic emphasis; (6) the importance of "standpoints"; and (7) the fact that "society becomes the reality

for man." (Lukacs, 1971: 2, 54)

For the later "more" Marxist Lukacs, not only does Mannheim's "relationism" fail to resolve the questions of historical materialism, but Mannheim also sins for reducing economics to sociological behavior (e.g., "competition"). (Cf. Chapters 4, 7 and 8; cf. Lukacs, 1953: 551) Systematically excoriating the work of German social scientists in the pre-World War II period, Lukacs identifies Mannheim as a direct successor to Alfred Weber and as a link between Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. He abhors all for the "irrationalism" of their liberal and fascist analyses.

If appraised from a Marxist perspective, Mannheim's work is obviously lacking. To assume, as Lukacs does, that Mannheim should attempt directly to answer the questions posed by historical materialism distorts analysis.[12] The Marxian approach was less a product of the university, and more one of European political life. Yet, Mannheim is basically a creature of university life. Thus, to be fair, the innovation (if not the success) of his ideas must be considered in the realm he addresses.[13]

Though Meinecke's ultimate conclusions differ profoundly from those of Mannheim, his adherence to historicism for its illumination of values and its evaluation of culture follows Mannheim's intentions.

> Value-relativity is not relativism, anarchy, accident, arbitrariness. It signifies rather a fusion of the factual and normative, which ... cannot, therefore, be determined timelessly. (Meinecke in Stern (ed.), 1973: 283)

His linking of "spirit" (often a sign of Hegelian influence) to "culture" is also quite close to Mannheim. "By Spirit," Meinecke states, "we ... mean 'distinguishing, choosing, and judging.'" (Meinecke in Stern (ed.), 1973: 273, 278) Therefore, though "Spirit" often signals Hegel's influence, it does not necessitate Hegel's prescription. In fact it is the departure from a preordained Marxist or Hegelian truth which attracts Mannheim and Meinecke to historicism.

Mannheim more than his teachers (e.g., Alfred Weber) presses for the reconsideration of historical meaning. (Cf. Chapter 2) By understanding social thought sequentially, by surveying the many facets of contemporary social phenomena, and, especially, by proposing frameworks (relationism and planning) to tie together fragments of social behavior and thinking, Mannheim extends historicism in a way which greatly influences the craft, if not the course, of history. He, in other words, is trying to go beyond Marx. Mannheim's approach has generally been accepted by the historians.

For example, Braudel, without credit to Mannheim, reaffirms the need to consider both temporal and spatial dimensions in appraising social phenomena. (Cf. Braudel in Stern (ed.), 1973: 428ff) The unconscious or barely conscious, the irrational, is also a focal point for Braudel. (in Stern (ed.), 1973: 420ff) Braudel's general criticism that pinpointing change is not sufficient, that crises are

to be discerned and heeded repeats Mannheim. (Braudel in Stern (ed.), 1973: 418, 429) But, warns Braudel, "to adopt one kind of history to the exclusion of all others ... would be to repeat the error of the historicists." In summary, Braudel's aim is similar to Mannheim's:

> For me, history is the sum of all possible histories -- a collection of specialized tasks and perspectives from the past, the present and the future. (Braudel in Stern (ed.), 1973: 414)

Barzun restates, without acknowledgement, Mannheim's reason for looking at cultural history. Barzun avers that only an appreciation of culture comprehends the emotion of historical events and at the same time captures the continuity in the humanity of life, which via culture continues across time. (Barzun in Stern (ed.), 1973: 394, 396)

Charles Beard cites Mannheim in "That Noble Dream," an essay on what history can and cannot be. One of the few commentators to consider Mannheim relativistic and then embrace the position, Beard concludes that if we assess the historian's role in what he chooses (and not) to study as well as his conclusions, we gain needed insight into our own social world. (Beard in Stern (ed.), 1973: 328; cf. Appendix D) Thus, Beard reminds us that the mere adoption of an economic analysis of history does not assure a leftist position, nor indeed does a close following of Marx' methods necessarily ensure full accuracy. (Beard in Stern (ed.), 1973: 326)

Another historian, Richard Hofstadter, appreciates

Mannheim's psychological link between "ideas and social situations." (Hofstadter in Stern (ed.), 1973: 362) In The American Political Tradition, Hofstadter confirms (at least, in the case of Herbert Hoover) Mannheim's assertion that

> Nothing is more removed from actual events than the closed rational system. Under certain circumstances, nothing contains more irrational drive than a fully self-contained, intellectualistic world-view. (Hofstadter, 1948: 313; cf. Hofstadter, 1955: 306-7)

That Mannheim's ideas can be found in so many historical schemes attests to the diversity of thinking which Mannheim tried to subsume under the single framework of historicism.

The importance of history in the modern world lies less in the discovery of new facts than interpretation of the past (and, by extension, current social/political life). For some, including Mannheim, history and science are alternative organizing concepts; they would agree with Meinecke as he gently states:

> Where science fails it is wiser for history to use these supra-scientific means than to apply scientific means where their application must lead inevitably to false results. (Meinecke in Stern (ed.), 1973: 270)

The persuasion of this statement grows with the evidence. For example, Popper's invective against historicism is based on a definite conception of science, but breakthroughs in the understanding of scientific discovery have been made by means of historical analyses. (See, for instance, Kuhn,

1962) Even exponents of scientific history, such as Benson, only argue that the historian is obligated to provide as tight a case for his assertions as possible. Never is it assumed that method will obviate the need for further historical thinking. Therein lies a subtle, but critical, difference between the natural and social sciences. While both social and scientific facts have meaning because of human interpretation, social facts are also transformed by human actions.[14] These two factors explain how Mannheim's concern for history is closely aligned to his idea of democratic planning. While we know the outcomes of past human choices, we cannot change them, and whereas we can make choices about the future, we cannot be absolutely sure of the results. In short, the importance of historical thought for Mannheim is not so much the discovery of new facts, or, even revision of older facts, but the reorientation of man towards his social life. Modern historiography leads to "the sociological view of the past and present ... that sees history as a field for experiment and reform." (MSR: 147) Distinguishing between the fields of social science blurs the point; sociology and modern history, for Mannheim, emanate from the same source -- man's increasing social consciousness as brought about by the modern conditions of the western world. Though Mannheim believes progress possible, he does not deem it inevitable. Where the simplistic Marxist might argue that speeding up the sequence of historical staging is required for progress,

Mannheim argues that how men think about their world is pivotal to whether we progress or regress. (Cf. Dewey) When Mannheim reaches this realization, by the early 1930s, his intellectual path for the rest of his life is determined. There is no recourse but planning, the issue is how men make and interpret their collective history.

E.3 Popper and the Crusade Against Historicism

Karl Popper, a continental philosopher, excoriated Mannheim's historicism and planning ideas. [15] Popper, hence, allied the two notions in his criticism of Mannheim.

Popper challenges Mannheim's historicism in The Poverty of Historicism where he contends that Marx misled his readers. [16] Popper translates Marx' "The point is not to interpret history, but to change the world," into the historicists interpret the past to "predict the future." (Popper, 1957: 49ff)

For Popper, historicist views are "holistic"; the social group which is more than a sum of its individuals develops organically. (Popper, 1957: 17ff) He concludes that historicism (1) has "... marked tendencies towards 'activism'," characterized by "plans /which/ ... fit in with the main current of history" and (2) necessarily "denies to human reason the power of bringing about a more reasonable world." It only admits a modicum of "human reason" to "play" the "part" of "Social midwifery." (Popper, 1957: 49ff)

His entire argument is premised on the belief that science (and its canons), not reality, is the ultimate source of truth. Thus the understanding of the physical world and the social world should be discerned by the same means. Popper's views have received a great deal of attention, but they suffer in at least three respects. First, Popper must show that the explanation of social changes rests on the same grounds as the explanation of physical conversions and movements. He must also prove that his view of progress (which is dependent on increasing the amount of knowledge) is actually related to social reform. Third, he must show that the "atomistic" mechanical image is fully distinct from the "holistic" organic view not only for social life, but also for the natural scientific world which he presumes unifiable. On the last point, confusion appears in many tracts. For example, in Lovejoy's examination of the psychology underlying the Federalist Papers, man is "actuated always by non-rational motives -- by 'passions,' or arbitrary and un-examined prejudices, or vanity, or the quest of private economic advantage" and "always inwardly and incorrigibly assured that his motives were rational." (Lovejoy, 1961: 37)

Popper responds to such criticism by avowing that in the realm of science the organic and mechanistic views are not separable but just different ways of looking at phenomena, and their unity is made possible by the introduction of quantification. For this reason, Popper also attacks the

historicist for presumably bypassing the quantitative approach. After all, he argues, "mathematical methods are actually being used with great success in some of the social sciences." (Popper, 1957: 24) Popper does not accept the contrast between nominalism (description of behavior) and "essentialism" (the mainly intuitive understanding of the social unit -- e.g., group or nation -- only through its history, only through its change). (Popper, 1957: 33) Instead, Popper, using physics as an example, contends that the causal model is based on the interactions of forces.[17] Consequently, Popper assumes experimentation in physics is the same as that in society. In other words, an experiment is "a means of acquiring knowledge by comparing the results obtained with the results expected," not "an action whose outcome is uncertain." (Popper, 1957: 85) Mistakes are made in physical experimentation if the effects of changed conditions are not controlled. Since Popper believes the same rule holds true for social experimentation, he announces that comprehensive planning necessarily results in "the notorious phenomenon of unplanned planning." (Popper, 1957: 69) However, despite Popper's stress on the importance of the conditions under which experimentation or behavior occurs, he will not admit that the conditions under which men live have changed in the last twenty-five centuries. Plato is as much a villain as Mannheim. Contemporary capitalism is not basically different than Greek polis life. Popper,

therefore, concludes that man is not affected by the context in which he lives. Only the technologies of understanding human and physical phenomena are at issue.

> There seems no reason why we should be unable to frame sociological theories which are important for all social periods. The spectacular differences between these periods are no indication that such laws cannot be found ... on the contrary, these differences seem to be ... of a comparatively superficial character. (Popper, 1957: 101)

Popper continues, "If we were to admit laws that are themselves subject to change, change could never be explained by laws." (Popper, 1957: 103)

One must ask how Popper reconciles his view of man as a free and thinking entity with the idea of immutable social laws? Indeed, the difference between social and physical experimentation is usually explained by the fact that men are not objects with limited responses brought out by changed conditions, but instead possess motives (unconscious and purposive) which in themselves affect the experiment. (Cf. Rustow, 1971)

Popper resolves the dilemma by suggesting that individual purposive action better attend to the laws of social science, especially economic laws which deal with "practical problems." He adopts the classical view of economics, crediting Hayek. He implies that planning simply involves the elucidation of these laws. Collective action, therefore, is unscientific because it denies the laws of supply and demand.

Popper's position is unusual given his arguments because he thinks planning can and should be undertaken. He simply advocates piecemeal planning to discover and abet the fundamental laws of society. Therefore, in contrast to those like Friedrich Hayek and Michael Polanyi, who join the debate of "planning or not?," Popper addresses the issue of "what kind of planning?" However, in contrast to Mannheim, Popper disregards the moral controversy and defines "bad planning or good" in scientific terms. He counters the "scientific" claims of fascist and communist planning by suggesting their view of science is mistaken. Mannheim is also concerned to condemn communist and fascist planning, but he chooses different grounds, namely, that social science, and hence social planning, has always moral implications.[18] (Cf. Chapters 3, 6, 7 and 8) In summary, Popper's "technological approach" is "neutral," not "anti-interventionist," and predicated on the notion that technology "point/s/ out what cannot be achieved." (Popper, 1957: 60-1)

Popper's sequel, The Open Society and Its Critics (1962) equates historicism with collectivism, or "totalitarianism." Interestingly, Popper exposes a logical inconsistency in the "holistic" compromise between Marxists (who champion change because it "inevitably" improves the world) and Platonics (who abhor and attempt to stop change). Holists, including Mannheim, Popper contends, see change as constant but dangerous and thus try to "control it by cen-

tralized large-scale planning." (Popper, 1962: 212) As such, holists constrain rationality by relying on "great men" to lead the way.[19]

Again stressing the unity of science, Popper insists that scientific theory must be testable and falsifiable. (Popper, 1962: 260) However, now he maintains that historical science (as opposed to "generalizing sciences") should explain "particular event/s/." (Popper, 1962: 264) Popper then states that Mannheim's "social aspects of knowledge" is scientifically untenable. (Popper, 1962: 217) He, however, confuses his point by asserting that the ability to predict is not the test of science. (Popper, 1962: 3) In brief, Popper is ambiguous on the question of whether planning theory is (or should be) predictive. In some places, he implies that planning theory suffers because it cannot predict, and, therefore, opens up the possibility of many abuses and shortcomings. At other points, Popper is miffed by the specter of a predictive planning theory which would interfere with his freedom.

Popper somewhat revises his position on Mannheim in an addendum to The Open Society. He now admits the relativists are right; there is "no general criterion for truth." Popper, 1962: 374) He should have distinguished "facts," not from "decisions," but from "standards" or "policies." (Popper, 1962: 383) Retaining his "pluralistic" view, Popper concludes "What, then are we to trust? .. to accept? ... whatever /it is/ we accept we should trust only tenta-

tively." Popper by now agreeing with Mannheim's sociology of knowledge frames the argument differently. In short, the sociology of knowledge is incompatible with the idea of democratic planning. (Cf. Spitz, 1951; Mills in Horowitz (ed.), 1963)

Popper now concurs with Mannheim that human intervention changes the course of history. The issue for Popper no longer concerns the "scope" of reform. Instead, only the pace of reform is critical.

> Thus the difference between Utopian /i.e., Mannheim's/ and piecemeal engineering turns out, in practice, to be a difference not so much in scale and scope as in caution and in preparedness for unavoidable surprises. (Popper, 1962)

Throughout his work, Popper never discusses the goals of planning, though he gives Liberal[20] illustrations; he considers only the means of planning. Less clear than Mannheim on who would plan, Popper implies a dependence on technical experts.[21]

Although Mannheim and Popper are both skeptical, "uncertainty" for Popper is due mostly to the "personal element." (Popper: 1957: 66) For Mannheim, the dilemma is larger and more ominous. Summing up in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, he asserts:

> This is the moment of scepticism, hard for the individual yet productive for science, as it destroys the petrified habits of thought of the past. (MSR: 129)

It is not that uncertainty still exists -- it always has in men's relationships with one another and the social world in

which they live -- but that we first must recognize and analyze the causes of uncertainty to eliminate that which we can (given modern techniques and advances) and then accept responsibility for judgment in light of the remaining uncertainty. (Cf. MSR: 67) In other words, for Mannheim the "personal element" about which Popper worries is remediable, if not easily, via democratic planning.

The views on "uncertainty" proferred by Mannheim and Popper compare with a third position more frequently espoused in recent planning literature. (Cf. Mann, Freidmann and Hudson, Dahl and Lindblom) On the belief that planning is necessary, but imperfect, "uncertainty must refer to particular events; it is not a general condition." (Downs, 1957: 78; cf. Crozier et al) This is the neo-positivist position. Applied to democracy, this view emphasizes two formal groups -- political parties and voters. Where Popper and the neo-positivists are concerned with reducing risk, Mannheim is both interested in avoiding certain "catastrophe," such as war, and economic dislocation, and enhancing the possibilities of meaningful democratic life. Popper departs from the neo-positivists in his emphasis on the human factor as the cause of mistakes and uncertainty. In this sense, he converts the "great man" theory of social progress into the "little man" theory of social blundering. To some extent, Popper believes, responsibility lies with men. On the other hand, the neo-positivists do not explicitly blame specific men, or groups.

The imperfection of rationality is at fault for whatever shortcomings occur. Summing up, in contrast to Mannheim, these two views imply that the goal of planning is simply to diminish uncertainty.

E.4 Positivism Reconsidered

Many of the internal debates in the social sciences and planning literature turn on the issue of positivism. (Cf. Runciman, 1969; Klosterman, 1978) The questions of whether the social sciences, and their applications, including planning, could have developed without positivism and whether social science must be positivistic are distinct. With reference to planning, there is also long, if infrequent, historical evidence of bottom-up attempts at creating new societies without benefit of elegant theories. (Cf. Piven and Cloward, 1978; Cohn, 1961; Hyams, 1973; Goodwyn, 1976; Morris and Hess, 1975; Henderson, 1978; Foxer, 1965; Bezold (ed.), 1978; Levison, 1974; Goulet, 1973; Sinclair, 1936)

When judged from the needs of democracy, as Mannheim argued, the debate qualitatively shifts. The choice (and ranking) of approaches must be made on "substantial" "rational" and "moral" grounds. "Positivism," especially "neo-positivism," leads to a descriptive definition of "democracy /which/ is restricted to numerical applause or silent resentment." (Kuenzlen, 1972: 31) The lack of over-

all interpretation occasioned by focusing on "facts" and "general laws" leads to what C. Wright Mills calls "the loss of a sense of structure and the /concomitant/ submergence into powerless milieux." (Mills, 1956: 331-2) Thus, Mannheim's historicism eventually led to the idea of the need for "militant democracy." Yet, because he refused to fully dismiss positivism, Mannheim continues to be misunderstood both by "neo-positivists" and anti-positivists. (Cf. Appendix C) Mannheim spent a lifetime trying to convey the point that approaches to social understanding and action must be first informed by purposes. For this reason, he increasingly addressed the issue of democratic purposes.

FOOTNOTES to APPENDIX E

1
Popper, Mannheim and Polanyi all migrated to England. Polanyi had been Mannheim's classmate in Hungary. England, though torn by war, continued the debate on socialism begun in the late 19th century.

2
Much of the ideology of the two party system as preferrable to multi-party systems arises as a result of the disillusionment with the outcome of the Weimar experiment. See,for example, Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzenzinski's Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.

3
See Mannheim's three articles on sociology as a discipline (listed in Appendix A) and Lynd's Knowledge for What?

4
Troeltsch died before he could complete the intended four volume work.

5
Gramsci, one of Croce's students, is compared to Mannheim in Appendix F.

6
Remember that Mannheim believed Marx a positivist, at least at the time he was writing on historicism. Furthermore, Comte is almost regarded as a forerunner to the positivists.

7
The title is apparently a play on Marx' Poverty of Philosophy.

8
Perhaps, too, for this same reason, historicism remained a perjorative terms until after World War I. "Its first widespread use probably dates from methodological debates among German-speaking political economists." (Mandelbaum, 1967, Vol. 4: 22) By the 1880s "Carl Menger criticized Gustov Schmoller and his school for making economic theory unduly dependent on economic history."

9
A Mannheimian term; see "Conservative Thought."

10
Lichtheim maintains that if Max Weber is"bourgeois Marx," Mannheim is"bourgeois Lukacs."

11
Lukacs does not necessarily accept the reverse as valid; indeed, this is probably the primary reason for his abandonment of this treatise.

12
Lukacs, writing in 1953, only considers Ideology and Utopia and Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, a fact which I think distorts his interpretation.

13
Mannheim, also much influenced by the phenomenological work of Scheler, Heidigger, and Simmel, and by the development of the new disciplines of sociology and psychology, eagerly and freshly forges new paths in academic studies. His knowledge of the outside world is always [illegible] by commentators. The analysts of the Frankfurt School and Lukacs exert the most profound influence prior to his ouster from Germany.

14
This is what Maslow means when he says psychological "facts just lie there like pancakes." Of course, natural scientists are well aware of how facts are limited to validity only under certain conditions. (Cf. Bronowski) In fact, Mannheim himself was well aware of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.

15
Popper, who joined the faculty at the London School of Economics, and then the University of London in 1945, must have known of Mannheim's later work since Mannheim remained at the University of London until his death in 1947. I cannot discover from published materials if they knew each other personally. Neither does Mannheim mention Popper in his later works. This inattention to critics is characteristic of Mannheim's writings and comports with his view of sociology and planning as synthesizing and real-world-oriented, not just scholarly concerns.

16
Popper wrote it in 1935-6, but it was not published until 1945-6 (as articles) and in book form it appeared in 1957.

17
He uses physics as the scientific evidence. Statics is thus one form of dynamics, when change does not occur. (Cf. Popper, 1957: 40)

18
Thus, he mistakenly dedicates the book to the "victims [of] the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny." (Popper, 1957: iv) Because Mannheim's reasoning seems correct when he says in Ideology and Utopia

that among the varieties of modern thought fascism is distinctly ahistorical, Popper's equation of communism and fascism as "expression[s]" of "totalitarian intuition" based on historicism which seeks to change by plan the entire society is disingenuous. (Popper, 1957: 79) However, Mannheim does link the fascist and communist approaches under the rubric of "totalitarianism" in Man and Society. Indeed, he warns that western liberal democracy is similarly threatened. (It is largely from this view that he later emphasizes democratic control.)

19
Popper appears to equate Lenin with Plato's philosopher-king.

20
The term is capitalized not to signify the party, but to avoid confusion with an alternate meaning of "many."

21
Popper also underscores the limitations of the technical experts, however. (Popper, 1957: 64n)

APPENDIX F

THE ROLE OF THE INTELLECTUAL: MANNHEIM AND GRAMSCI COMPARED

Strangely, two who foresaw a primary social role for intellectuals in mid-twentieth century diverge at critical points. Despite many shared assumptions and claims, Mannheim champions an "independent" intelligentsia while Gramsci advocates a party-affiliated intellectual cadre.[1]

Born two years apart[2] Mannheim and Gramsci finished their undergraduate studies -- Mannheim in Budapest, Gramsci in Turin -- before the outbreak of World War I. Mannheim continued his formal education, but Gramsci declined an invitation from his mentor, Matteo Bartoli, and became a social activist.

A founder of the Italian Communist Party and editor of Ordine Nuovo, Antonio Gramsci fought as an intellectual for the Italian peasants and workers. Maintaining that the "struggle" was "for power," he abandoned the idealism of his other teacher, Benedetto Croce, soon after leaving the academy. (Marks (ed.), 1957: 12; Lawner (ed.), 1973) In 1926 he was imprisoned by Mussolini's associates. Until his death in 1937 Gramsci wrote against fascism and further developed Leninism-Marxism in his famous Prison Notebooks.

One of Gramsci's primary concerns during the prison period was the formation and influence of intellectuals in Italian political history.

An earlier victim of fascist sanctions than Mannheim, Gramsci was little known until the posthumous publication of his prison writings in 1946. Mannheim died in 1947, long before they were translated. On the other hand, Gramsci who read encyclopedically in several languages was unaware of Mannheim's works.

Nevertheless, both Mannheim and Gramsci believe intellectuals can serve social change. Gramsci adopts a revolutionary, rather than reformist, attitude. Where Mannheim posits a relatively classless intelligentsia, Gramsci sees two stages of development. "The 'organic intellectual' is one who works consciously for his own social class." The problem is to extend this function so that the "party" becomes "the collective intellectual." (in Lawner (ed.), 1973: 44, 186)

The similarities in their arguments are striking. Both view intellectuals as part of "civil society" (Gramsci's term) rather than as appendages of the superstructure. Hence they definitely depart from Marx. Both affirm the capacity of all men for "intellectual activity," yet admit of "different levels" of individual attainment. Mannheim would concur with Gramsci's claim that:

> All men are intellectuals ...; but all men do not have the function of intellectuals in society. (in Marks (ed.), 1957: 121)

Both underrate affiliations with schools and universities and magnify intellectuals in the arts, literature and journalism. (Cf. Marks (ed.), 1957: 122) They also further

distinguish intellectuals from professional specialists. Both consider the intellectual as "mediat[ing]" between the mind and social reality. (E.g., Marks (ed.), 1957: 124) Both stress the need to "deepen and widen the 'intellectuality' of every individual, as well as to increase and refine specialization." (Marks (ed.), 1957: 122) Both assume that the intellectuals are simultaneously "creators" and "distributors" of "culture." (Lawner (ed.), 1973: 43) Both believe the contemporary intellectual must be able to discern and guide the bases for social "consensus" necessary for progressive change. (Lawner (ed.), 1973: 43) Both accent the importance of planning and education.[3] Both respond to the emergence of Fascism and the development of the Soviet state. Both seek to overcome the ideological bias of thinking. (Lawner (ed.), 1973: 55) Both are, therefore, "nonsectarian." (Lawner (ed.), 1973: 54) Both believe the intellectual must engage in praxis. Both argue in terms of the "long period." (Lawner (ed.), 1973: 51, 54) Both distrust the state as the primary means of society-wide change, though Gramsci's argument is clearer and more elaborate. Both conceive of a "democratic centralism" in which a strategic group provides "tutelage" to the masses. (Marks (ed.), 1957: 152f) Both assume the "planned economy" inevitable and hence worry about its form and psychological effects. (Lawner (ed.), 1973: 182) Both define the intelligentsia with reference to classes, but Mannheim's elite concept might be an anathema to Gramsci. (Cf. Chapter 4)

They seem to depart most profoundly on the issue of power. Even though both link power and control, Gramsci, more than Mannheim, focuses on economic power. Production is the basic source of power for Gramsci, not social relations. Moreover, Gramsci speaks directly to the peasants and industrial workers of Italy in the 1920s and 1930s, while Mannheim addresses the citizens of unspecified, highly organized, industrialized countries.[4] Consequently, Gramsci seeks to discover and encourage bonds among the actual producers of goods and food in order to wrest power from the owners of the means of production. Mannheim, in contrast, attempts to identify the necessary factors for democratic consensus to ensure that organized power is better utilized.[5]

This comparison illustrates two points. First, and most significantly, the control of power, especially in the twentieth century, requires improved knowledge and forethought. Therefore, the role of the intellectual is a vital political issue.

Second, the intellectual, because of his increased political importance and his ability to know better, must be responsible for promoting social justice. Mannheim and Gramsci simply hold two different views of the public interest. Gramsci thinks the needs of the proletariat should be served. Mannheim believes the survival of humanity is predicated on establishing and reinforcing a strong democratic community among all classes. I think Mannheim's is the

stronger case because it encompasses more. The redress of social ills is intimately connected to the democratic reconstruction of society via planning. The problems of militarism and the "drift to war" are directly confronted. (Cf. Mills, 1944)

FOOTNOTES to Appendix F

[1] Mannheim considered the intellectual as party spokesman a stage in the historical development of the intelligentsia. (See Chapter 5)

[2] Gramsci was born in Sardinia in 1891. The son of a minor bureaucrat, Gramsci worked from the age of eleven to supplement the family income. In school his scholarly talents were recognized and Gramsci was selected to attend the ginnasio in Santa Lussurgiu and, then, the liceo in Cagliari. His formal study, augmented by a voracious reading habit, enabled him to go the University of Turin on scholarship. (Marks, (ed.), 1957: 11)

[3] In prison, sometime between 1926 and 1937, Gramsci wrote:

> ... today's widespread educational crisis can be precisely linked to the fact that this process of differentiation and specialisation has taken place ... without a well thought out and consciously fixed plan. (Marks (ed.), 1957: 126)

[4] Mannheim names his German and British audiences, but he implies that his ideas are also relevant to the people of the United States and other developed western nations, including Italy.

[5] Cf. Chapters 1, 7 and 8.

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