INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

U·M·I

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Order Number 9130356

General officer loyalties in the Spanish Civil War. (Volumes I and II)

Nofi, Albert A., Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1991

Copyright ©1991 by Nofi, Albert A. All rights reserved.

U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

GENERAL OFFICER LOYALTIES IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

by

ALBERT A. NOFI

Volume I

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1991

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

c 1991

ALBERT A. NOFI

All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

15 Feb 1991
Date

David Sprott
Chair of Examining Committee

March 4, 1991
Date

Stuart O'Neil
Executive Officer

Patricia Albjerg

John Weiss

Eric Foner
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Acknowledgements

There are several people without whose support and assistance this project would not have been completed.

Professor Emilio González López, who served as a member of the Cortes and diplomatic official during the Spanish Republic and subsequently as a member of the Graduate Faculty of the City University of New York, kindly permitted me to intrude upon his time on several occasions. Professor González López proved an invaluable source of useful and unusual information concerning many of the men and events with whom this work was concerned, for which I am extremely grateful.

Senor Felix Alvárez Rubio of Hueristic, in Madrid, proved an extraordinary source of advice, assistance, observations, and suggestions, particularly with regard to the various archival resources in Spain.

My old friends, Senor Manuel Serna Añon, late of the Ejército popolar republicana, and his son, Juan Francisco Serna Jorda, provided valuable advice, assistance, and insights, not to mention the generous hospitality which they and their families extended.

Professor Edward Malefakis of Columbia University and Professor Brian Sullivan of the Naval War College provided useful advice on a number of important matters.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

My good friend and associate James F. Dunnigan was of enormous assistance in helping me to cope with the technical difficulties of consolidating, coordinating, and evaluating the tremendous volume of data with which I found myself confronted. Professor John Boardman of Brooklyn College helped to explicate some rather obscure questions in statistics. Keith Poulter and Joyce Gusner of Strategy & Tactics magazine very kindly provided the maps. Professor Helga Feder of the CUNY graduate school library was tireless in helping to track down often quite obscure works of enormous importance. James Dingeman proved enormously helpful in providing access to the resources of several other major libraries.

I am particularly indebted to Professor Béla Király, Professor Alan Schulman, Professor Patrick Abbazia, Professor John Weiss, Professor Keith Eubank, and Professor David Syrett, of the CUNY Graduate Faculty, for their assistance, encouragement, advice, and support.

Above all, I am especially thankful for the support and understanding of my wife, Mary S. Nofi, and my daughter, Marilyn J. Spencer, who suffered through this project with considerable good humor.

Albert A. Nofi

8 March 1991

Brooklyn, N.Y.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table of Contents

Volume I

Acknowledgements iv

Maps

Spain: Military Territorial Divisions viii

Spanish Morocco ix

I. The Problem 1

II. The Civil-Military Relations, 1898-1931 16

III. The Republican Military Reform, 1931-1932 100

IV. The Army and the Republic, 1932-1936 180

V. The Military Conspiracy and Rising of 1936 216

VI. The Spanish General Officers in 1936: A Profile 258

Volume II

VII. The Generals and the Military Rebellion of 1936 346

VIII. Conspirators and Loyalists 430

IX. Conclusions 510

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendices:

1. Methodology and Terminology 538
2. The Generals of 1936 568
3. Sample Career Summary and Postings Work Sheets 571
4. Azana's Memorias as an Historical Document 577

Bibliography 586

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Spain: Military Territorial Divisions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Spanish Morocco



Chapter I

The Problem of General Officer Loyalty in 1936.

On the afternoon of 17 July 1936 the garrison of Spanish Morocco rose in rebellion in conformity with a meticulously laid plan for a pronunciamiento against the incumbent administration of the Spanish Republic. Over the next few days other garrisons in many parts of Spain and her colonies joined the rising --the Alzamiento-- as well. But the attempted coup d'etat was a failure, due partially to poor execution and to a lack of determination by some of its leaders, and not a little to the courage of other officers and the support given the government by loyal troops, police, and citizens in many areas. However, the failure was not total, and the putschists --who were soon known as "Nationalists" in contrast to their opponents, the "Loyalists" or "Republicans"-- retained control of a considerable portion of Spain, all of Spanish Morocco, and Spain's other colonies, as well as a sizable part of the Spanish Army. The result was a divided Spain, a civil war which tended to become internationalized, and untold suffering, with long-enduring political, social, and diplomatic consequences.

Accounts of these events have been inclined to a pro-Republican viewpoint, seeing the Alzamiento as a movement

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

supported by virtually the entire army, solidly seconding the machinations of its reactionary generals, all under the dire influence of an international fascist conspiracy directed from Rome and Berlin.[1] The position taken in a recent work is fairly typical of the prevailing opinion concerning the army and the political situation in the first half of 1936.

"In fact, several generals had already decided that power should be taken away from a government which was both helpless to stop what they saw as the break-up of Spain at the hands of regional separatists, and responsible for policies that were undermining the structure of society. In consequence, they concluded that the time had come for a Primo de Rivera-style 'iron surgeon'. The high command, faced in 1936 by the chaos of the Popular Front, a chaos orchestrated by their rightist allies, felt no qualms about intervening in politics. The senior generals who could remember the Cuban disaster --men of Primo de Rivera's generation such as Sanjurjo and Queipo de Llano-- had long-since developed a haughty contempt for what they saw as the ineptitude of the professional politicians. The younger generals had little sense of loyalty to a regime which they believed to be impermanent. At all levels, there was a belief that the army had the right to intervene in politics to defend both social order and the territorial integrity of Spain."[2]

Such views are frequently bolstered by observations that "the movement, essentially military, was very clearly

---

1. For an excellent critique of the Spanish Civil War as viewed in the liberal West see Stanley G. Payne, Ejército y sociedad en la España liberal (Madrid: Akal, 1977), pp. 485ff ["Payne, Ejército"].

2. Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York: Grove, 1986), p. 44 ["Preston, SCW"]. Director of the Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies at the University of London, Prof. Preston's work is dedicated to "the men and women of the International Brigades who fought and died fighting fascism in Spain."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fascist-inspired."[3] Moreover, the impression created in much of the literature is that the generals acted as a bloc, so that "In the spring of 1936 there were still 425 generals, of whom eighty-four were on the active list. Few of them were to fight for the Second Republic."[4] Most existing accounts assert that the army followed the lead of its generals: "The majority of the officers had made common cause with the rebels. Of 15,000 officers, barely 500 remained in the service of the Republic. Many of those 500 were Republicans by conviction; the rest stayed with the Government out of fear or in order to perpetuate acts of sabotage within the army ranks."[5] Such views can be tested against the available evidence.

The critical actors in the military rebellion of July 1936 were the officers. A perceptive recent observer has

---

3. Federico Bravo Morato, La república y el ejército (Madrid: Editorial Fenicia, 1978), p. 151.

4. Herbert L. Matthews, Half of Spain Died (New York: Scribner's, 1973), p. 73. Technically, Matthews' statement is correct, for only ten of the pre-war active-duty generals saw serious service with the Republican armies during the Civil War. However, the number who saw such active service with the Nationalist armies was actually less, only eight; see below, Chapter VII.

5. Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Freedom's Battle (New York: Hill & Wang, 1971), p. 122. For an even more extreme view see Helmuth Gunther Dahms, La guerra española de 1936 (Madrid: Rialp, 1966), pp. 127-128, which avers that only 200 officers remained loyal. Neither author cites a source for these figures. For a more accurate estimate see note 8, below.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

noted that "The apparent readiness of the majority of Spanish army officers to overthrow civil government in July of 1936 is sometimes taken for granted."[6] Clearly, many officers were deeply involved in the conspiracy against the Republic under President Manuel Azaña.[7] But many others formed the backbone of the resistance to the rebellion. As a result of the military rebellion the pre-war officer corps split into two roughly equal factions.[8] An

---

6. Michael Alpert, "Soldiers, politics and war," in Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1936 edited by Paul Preston (New York: Methuen, 1984), p. 202 ["Alpert, 'Soldiers.']. Note that, based on the views he expresses in his 1986 work, Preston does not appear to have read this essay.

7. The only attempt at a serious biography of Azana is Frank Sedgewick, The Tragedy of Manuel Azaña and the Fate of the Spanish Republic (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1963), a sympathetic but highly incomplete treatment. A more extensive listing of works on Azana will be found in Chapter III.

8. This is not to suggest, however, that each side secured the services of roughly half of the officers. Many officers --apparently about a third altogether-- found themselves ideologically on the wrong side of the geographic front lines. Most of these men were quickly eliminated: shot, imprisoned, cashiered, or exiled. As a result, only about 3,600 of the prewar regular officers appear to have seen active service with the Republic, while nearly 5,000 seem to have done so with the Nationalists. For two short but careful examinations of the figures on the split in the officer corps see Jose Maria Garate Cordoba, Alféreces provisionales (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1976), pp. 24-28 ["Garate Cordoba, Alféreces"], and Ramon Salas Larrazabal, Los datos exactos de la guerra civil (Madrid: Dracena, 1980), pp. 63-72 ["Salas, Datos"]. By referencing the names of officers mentioned in various wartime documents, memoirs, and operational accounts, the present writer has tentatively established the loyalties of 1,486 of the 15,343 officers named in the Anuario militar de España of 1 April 1936. Among these are 552 of the majors, lieutenant-colonels, and colonels of the general

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

examination of the factors motivating officers to join the rising against the Republic and to participate in the subsequent civil war as Nationalists would be quite interesting. Unfortunately, the numbers involved, some 15,000, make this an unwieldy task. However, the number of general officers lends itself to such an analysis.

The smaller number and greater importance of the general officers presents both a more manageable population and one likely to yield particularly valuable insights. On both sides it was the generals who played some of the most important roles in the critical days and weeks of July of 1936. Individual generals planned and attempted to carry out the proposed coup against the Republic.[9] Other

---

staff, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, 28.2% of the 1,954 on duty in those grades and arms. Of these 552 men, 280, or 50.7%, may be considered Nationalists, and 268, 48.6% Republicans. Figures for lower ranks are too sparse to be relied upon, but Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 316 ["Payne, Revolution"] estimates that of about 70% of the officers were in what became the Republican zone at the onset of the war, and that only abut a third of these sided with the rebels. In contrast, Michael Alpert, "The Spanish Republican Army, 1936-1939," Iberian Studies, Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 31-32 ["Alpert, 'SRA'."], argues that the officer corps in the Peninsula and Islands was equally divided between the two factions, with the Nationalists also securing the approximately 1,500 officers in Morocco. He also estimates that, including retired personnel, perhaps 800-900 officers were shot in the Republican zone, and an equal number imprisoned.

9. There is no satisfactory treatment of the military conspiracy of 1936. Felipe Beltran Guell's Preparación y desarrollo del Alzamiento Nacional (Valladolid: Santaren, 1939) is incomplete and partisan, as is Robert A. Friedlander's unpublished dissertation "The July 1936 Military Rebellion in Spain: Background and Beginnings"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

generals played equally important roles in frustrating their efforts.[10]

The Anuario militar de España for 1936, which had a closing date of 30 April, lists 103 officers of general or equivalent rank on active duty.[11] However, for the

---

(Northwestern, 1963). The official account by the Servicio Historico Militar, El Alzamiento y sus antecedences, to be published shortly, is likely to be more extensive and useful than either of these, but unlikely to be complete, despite the reputation for objectivity which the editor, Jose Maria Martinez Bande, has acquired.

10. The events of the crucial first few days of the Alzamiento have been treated in excruciating detail, with considerable passion but little analysis, in Joaquin Arraras' staunchly Nationalist Historia de la Cruzada Española, (eight volumes, Madrid: Ediciones Españolas, 1940-1943) ["Arraras, Cruzada"]. The treatment in Salas'Historia del ejército popolar de la república (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1973), ["Salas, HEPR"] I, pp. 87-177, is both more balanced and more critical.

11. Anuario, pp. 149-151, 319, 343, 361, 373, 377, 391, 395. In addition to these 103 men of general officer rank on active duty, the Anuario lists ten generals and three asimilados --officers with ranks equated to that of generals-- in the First [Active] Reserve, a further 343 generals and 43 asimilados in the Second [Retired] Reserve, and 270 honorary generals plus four honorary asimilados, see pp. 432-449. This host of personnel technically holding the status of general officer is sometimes cited by careless observers to suggest that the Spanish Army was over-generalled, see, for example, Miguel A. Gonzalez Muñiz, Problemas de la Segunda República (Madrid: Jucar, 1974), p. 58, and A. Ramos Oliviera, Politics, Economics, and Men of Modern Spain (second edition, New York: Arno, 1972), p. 325]. A number of the officers in both reserve categories returned to active service with the Nationalists during the Civil War. Although no retired generals returned to active duty on the Republican side during the war, at least two openly sided with the Loyalists: see entries for Ricardo Burguete Lana and Emilio Herrera Linarea in Manuel Rubio Cabeza, Diccionario de la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Planeta, 1989), pp. 142, 418.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

purposes of this study, 19 officers holding generalships or the equivalent in the following categories have been excluded:

Cuerpo Jurídico Militar	1
Cuerpo de Intendencia	4
Cuerpo de Intervención	2
Sanidad Militar	4
Cuerpo de Invalidos	1
Guardia civil	5
Carabineros	2

Some explanation of these exclusions is necessary. The eleven officers of the Cuerpo Juridico Militar, Cuerpo de Intendencia, Cuerpo de Intervención, and Sanidad Militar did not technically rank as general officers, but as asimilados, a status equated with that of general. These men were in the administrative and service branches of the army, the military justice corps, supply corps, finance corps, and medical corps, and were not considered part of the Estado Mayor General.[12] The Cuerpo de Invalidos

12. Daniel R. Headrick, The Spanish Army, 1868-1898, (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton, 1971), p. 450. It should be noted that in the Spanish Army the term which is usually translated as "general staff" has three different meanings. The body traditionally understood to be the "General Staff" was variously known as the Estado Mayor Central or the Estado Mayor del Ejercito. The body of officers trained for general staff service was at various times known as the Cuerpo de Estado Mayor or the Servicio de Estado Mayor. Finally, the generals as a collective body were known as the Estado Mayor General. These, and other definitions used throughout are derived from Nomenclator historico-militar published by the Estado Mayor del Ejercito (Madrid: Estado Mayor del Ejercito, 1954).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consisted of 1,630 disabled officers and men who were technically retained on active duty as a form of pension.[13] The Guardia civil[14] and the Carabineros were paramilitary organizations technically included in the army, being respectively the national police and the frontier guard. Although ranked as generals, the nineteen men in these categories were not in the chain of command. None of the asimilados took an active part in the events of mid-1936. Although several of the police generals did play a part those events, their career patterns were completely alien to those of the regular army personnel, which requires that they be excluded.

This leaves a total of 84 generals. It is, however, still necessary to make some adjustments to this figure.

At the time of the Nationalist coup attempt on 18 July 1936 the army list was already more than four months out-of-date.[15] Between the closing date of the Anuario militar

---

13. Arguably, Brigadier General José Millán-Astray of the Invalidos ought not to be excluded in as much as he was an enthusiastic supporter of the Nationalist cause. However, his status was a militarily ambiguous one, for he neither held active command nor did he take any active part in the Nationalist coup attempt.

14. It should be noted that while the army list gives only five generals for the Guardia Civil on the day of the Nationalist uprising there were actually six, one colonel having been promoted in the period after the closing of the list.

15. The early closing date of the Anuario, 1 April, frequently confounds efforts to identify officers playing important roles during the events of mid-July. A large number of new junior officers were commissioned between the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and the outbreak of the Civil War, three colonels were promoted to brigadier general,[16] while one brigadier general retired[17] and a second died in peculiar circumstances.[18] This leaves 85 generals on active duty as

---

closing date of the Anuario and the rising. In addition the situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Anuario is full of typographical errors, poorly indexed, frequently uses variant spellings of people's names or omits them entirely, and manages to contain a remarkable number of other minor errors as well.

16. Antonio Ferrer de Miguel in the room of Augustín Ortega, on 7 May 1936 [DOMG No. 104], plus Miguel Campins Aura and Manuel Gárcia Benet on 8 May 1936, all to brigadier general.

17. Eduardo Agustín Ortega retired on 12 April 1936 [DOMG No. 87] and took no part in subsequent events. He has been included in this study only insofar as information about his career and background may be useful in developing a control on the larger sample.

18. This officer, Amado Balmes Alonso, military governor of Gran Canaria, is reported to have accidentally shot himself whilst reloading his pistol at target practice on the morning before the alzamiento. Paul Preston (SCW, p. 49) argues that Balmes was a loyal officer who resisted efforts to draw him into the conspiracy and suggests that the Nationalists had him killed as a necessary preliminary to their coup. On this view, Balmes ought perhaps to be included in the sample, as a Republican sympathizer. This opinion must, however, be rejected, for it cannot be substantiated on the basis of what is known about Balmes' politics. In letters dated 19 February 1935 (MID 2041-316.7) and 2 March 1936 (MID 2041-316.11) Col. Stephen G. Fuqua, U.S. military attache in Madrid, lists Balmes as a rightist. Rubio Cabeza, p. 95, says "it is beyond doubt that this general was compromised in the rising which took place immediately after his death." Professor Emilio Gonzalez Lopez has reasonably suggested (interview, 19 December 1987) that Balmes' death was more probably a suicide prompted by a last minute unwillingness to support or oppose the uprising. The official report on the matter, summarized in a memorandum in Balmes' dossier dated 29 March 1940 from the Secretariat General of the Army Ministry to the Chief Archivist of the ministry merely concludes that the general died while on active service

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of 17 July 1936, divided into the following categories:

Lieutenant Generals[19]	3
Major Generals	24
Brigadier Generals	58

It is with these 85 officers that this study is concerned.

The rapid unfolding of events after the initial Nationalist rising in Morocco on 17 July 1936 saw great confusion throughout the army all over Spain and in her overseas possessions. Individual officers, particularly general officers, had to make rapid decisions as to their loyalties. Many men responded promptly, taking an active role in supporting or opposing the rising. Some had their minds made up for them, their more committed subordinates forcing them to take action in support of the Republic or

---

during the preparation of the Nationalist uprising [AGMS, Legajo R-4916, Expediente B-62]. As there is no way to determine the truth, Balmes has been excluded from the data base. However, for purposes of developing a control on the profile of the general officer corps he has been included with Agustin Ortega.

19. Inclusion in the sample of the lieutenant generals presents some difficulties, as all three were scheduled to retire. None of them held more than a purely ceremonial post, nor did any of them play any role in the events of July of 1936. However, all three had enormous prestige in the army and one --Alberto Castro Girona-- was widely regarded as one of the finest officers in the service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Nationalists.[20] Others found themselves incapable of acting and were removed. Still others --perhaps the most tragic group of all-- never had a chance to display their loyalties, but were executed or imprisoned as presumed opponents of the locally dominant faction even before they could act.[21] Perhaps not surprisingly, the apparent split among the general officers was roughly in conformity with that in the officer corps at large, with the Republic securing the apparent loyalties of a bit less than half the generals on active duty, and, indeed, retained the loyalties of a majority of the senior generals.[22]

---

20. Republican apologists aver that Major General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, one of the most respected and liberal generals, was led to support the Nationalists because a pistol was placed at his head: see Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (first edition, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 143 note 2 ["Thomas, 1st"], which he repeats in his The Spanish Civil War: Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 229 note 3 ["Thomas, 2nd], though citing no source. This is denied by the general's son, Guillermo Cabanellas, in his Cuatro Generales (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977) ["Cabanellas, Cuatro"], written primarily to exonerate his father.

21. The most obvious member of this group was Major General Eduardo Lopez de Ochoa, widely regarded as a leftist, who was nevertheless murdered by Republican extremists in the hospital bed to which he had been confined for some time: see Ramon Salas Larrazabal, "Los 40 generals víctimas de la guerra civil," Historia y Vida No. 95 (February, 1976), p. 25 ["Salas, '40'."].

22. It should be noted that securing the loyalty of a particular officer did not necessarily mean securing his services. Roughly half the generals ascribed to each faction found themselves in enemy hands at the outset. Moreover, many of the others displayed "geographic loyalty," supporting whichever side happened to have the upper hand in the local situation. One result of this was that very few of the prewar officers were actively employed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A cursory examination of their loyalties suggests that of the 85 generals on active duty in the days immediately following 17 July 1936, 37 were generally regarded as supporters of the Republic while fully 48 were perceived as being supporters of the Nationalists. It is important to understand that the actual loyalties of many officers can never be known. For both camps, the figures include men who took an active part in events, those who allowed themselves to be swept along by their subordinates, those who had their loyalties dictated by geographic circumstance, and those who were treated as presumed opponents by whichever faction happened to be locally dominant. As a result, these figures, which are summarized in Table 1, are, as will be demonstrated later, only approximately correct. Nevertheless, they can be used as a basis for further study, and some refinement is possible as a result.

---

by either side after the initial period of the Civil War. Of the 85 general officers on active duty on the eve of the Civil War, the Nationalists would shortly execute, imprison, or expel from the army 16 and the Republicans 26, while one would eventually flee the country. Of the remainder, only 18 saw serious employment during the war, ten in the Republican ranks and eight in the Nationalist. For a summary --which omits the three lieutenant generals-- see Garate Cordoba, Alféreces pp. 26-27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 1
General Officer Loyalties: The Traditional View

	Summary	Lt Gen	Maj Gen	Brig Gen
Total[23]	85 [100%]	3 [3.5%]	24 [28.2%]	58 [68.2%]
Nationalist	49 (57.6%)	3 (100%)	12 (50%)	34 (58.6%)
Republican	36 (42.4%)	0	12 (50%)	24 (41.4%)

The customary view, that the military rebellion was supported by a majority of the generals certainly seems to he supported by this summary. As can be seen, none of the three seniormost generals, the lieutenant generals, were loyal to the Republic. While exactly half --12 of 24-- of the major generals were loyal to the Republic, but they were joined by only 24 of the 58 brigadier generals. But is this summary necessarily reliable? As will be demonstrated below, the apparent alignment of the generals does not necessarily reflect their actual inclinations.

This study will sift the available professional, personal, political, and social information on each of the 85 generals on active duty with the Spanish Army on the eve

---

23. On this table Total refers to the whole number of generals on active duty. The columns break this total down into the numbers and percentages of each grade of general. "Republican" and "Nationalist" show the number of generals in each category who are generally considered to have been supporters of the indicated faction. Percentage figures on these lines refer to the whole number figures on the Total line, thus 11, or 45.8%, of the major generals were Nationalists. It is important to keep in mind the limitations of the data base when examining this and all other tables in this study. A shift of a single officer from one faction to the other constitutes a net change of 2.4% when dealing with the entire sample of 85.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the outbreak of the Civil War in an effort to determine if there were any common factors at work which may help to explain the choices made by those officers in the crisis of July 1936. As such, this study is a combination of an historical examination of the period and a sociological profile of the Estado mayor general. The personal background of the individual officers will be examined, including regional origins, family connections, individual distinctions, and social relationships. In addition, their political views, activities, and associations will be investigated. The military record of these officers will be examined from their initial entry into the army, including their career pattern, postings, combat record, administrative and technical performance, personal reputation, distinctions, command relationships, and "office politics." In addition, this study will examine political and military institutions and events in Spain during the period. As a result, a profile of the general officer corps can be developed, as well as profiles of the Loyalists, the Nationalists, and any other definable groups which emerged from it in the summer of 1936. From these profiles it will be possible to determine the existence of patterns in the behavior of the generals officers in connection with the military conspiracy and uprising of 1936. The principal objectives are to determine the ways in which the generals represented a coherent group, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

degree to which they cooperated in their opposition to the Republic, and the ways in which the leaders of the military uprising differed from the generals as a group and from those generals who remained loyal to the Spanish Republic. This will clarify the role, importance, and motivations of the general officers in the events leading up to the military uprising and help in the development of a clearer understanding of the origins of the Spanish Civil War.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter II

The Army and the Coming of the Republic.

The causes of the dissolution of the Spanish army and state in 1936 were deeply rooted. Ultimately the war was a consequence of what Stanley G. Payne termed "the institutional weakness of modern Spain."[1] No institution --monarchy, church, aristocracy, army-- proved able to dominate Spanish society. This weakness began in the eighteenth century, when power passed from the capable Carlos III to his incompetent son Carlos IV, and intensified when the Borbón monarchy collapsed under pressure from Napoleon in 1808. The subsequent outbreak of guerrilla resistance which led ultimately to the restoration of the monarchy in 1814 had little to do with the established political institutions of the Spanish state.[2] Nor did the accession to the throne of the

---

1. Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain ["Payne, Politics"] (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 1.

2. The best treatment of the War for Independence in English remains Gabriel H. Lovett's two volume Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain (New York: New York University, 1965). Works in Spanish are numerous, the most extensive of which is the Servicio Historico-Militar's multivolume, Guerra de la Independencia, 1808-1814 edited by Juan Priego López (Madrid: Servicio Historico Militar, 1966-). There is no satisfactory military account in English, since all such works, including C.W.C. Oman's seven volume The History of the Peninsular War (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1902-1930), focus almost exclusively on British operations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ineffectual Fernando VII signal a return to internal political stability. Over the next 61 years there were dozens of serious plots, revolutions, uprisings, pronunciamientos, civil wars, and the like, with nine major changes in regime.[3] The consequent effects on the political infrastructure of the country were devastating.[4] Only in 1875 did a measure of stability return, with the

---

3. Julio Busquets, Pronunciamientos y golpes de Estado en España (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982), passim ["Busquets, Pronunciamientos"], pp. 47-88, contains a summary analysis of most of the events in question. Miguel Alonso Baquer, El modelo español de pronunciamiento (Madrid: Rialp, 1983), p. 31-32 ["Alonso Baquer, Modelo"], observes that the specifically military risings fell into three categories: liberal movements, designed to express public opinion, royalist ones, expressing support of the crown, and purely military ones, expressing the corporate solidarity of the army, but notes that virtually all were ill-planned and "romantic" in nature.

4. The precise number of such affairs is uncertain, as can be seen from the listings in Julio Busquets, El militar de carrera en España (Barcelona: Ariel, 1971), pp. 60-61 ["Busquets, Militar"]; Busquets, Pronunciamientos, pp. 74n, 204-209; Ramon Alonso's Historia politica del ejército español (Madrid: Editorial Nacional, 1974) ["Ramon Alonso"], p. 291; Bernardo Gil Murgaza, España en Llamas (Barcelona: Acervo, 1968), endpapers; and Julio Merino, La tragedia de los generales españoles, 1936 (Espluges de Llobregat: Plaza & James, 1985), pp. 36-37. There is no adequate treatment of any of these events in English, but Raymond Carr's Spain, 1808-1939 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966) ["Carr, 1808"] provides a useful overview. The literature in Spanish is extensive. The sense that Spain was ungovernable was a pervasive one. In Lorenc Villalonga's 1956 novel Bearn, set in Mallorca during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Senyor of Bearn remarks, "Ever since the War of Independence, everything has been pure anarchy here." Lorenc Villalonga, Bearn, or The Doll's Room, translated from the Catalan by Deborah Bonner (Madrid: Iberia Airlines, 1986), p. 44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

restoration of the Borbon monarchy in the person of Alfonso XII. No Spanish institution emerged from this experience with its credibility intact. The army played a major role in these events.[5] However, the army proved incapable of imposing its will upon the nation, largely because it lacked adequate leadership, education, discipline, and unity.[6] Moreover, the army itself suffered from its repeated interventions in the political arena and the civil wars. The number of generals was extraordinary,[7] that of

---

5. The best treatment of the political career of the Spanish army is Payne Ejército, a revised and expanded version of about half of his Politics and the Military in Modern Spain. Jose Ramon Alonso's Historia politica del ejército español, Carolyn P. Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1979), Miguel Alonso Baquer, El ejército en la sociedad español (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1971) ["Alonso Baquer, Sociedad"], Fernando Fernández Basterreche, El ejército español en el Siglo XIX (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1978), Gabriel Cardona, El poder militar en la España contemporanea hasta la guerra civil (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1983) ["Cardona, Poder], and Carlos Seco Serrano, Militarismo y civilismo en la España contemporanea (Madrid: Coleccion Tablera, 1984), are also of value. See also Rafael Bañon and Jose Antonio Olmedo, La institucion militar en el Estado contemporanea (Madrid: Alianza, 1985), p. 41, for some useful observations on the character of Spanish military interventions in political life during the nineteenth century.

6. Payne, Politics, p. 4; Busquets, Pronunciamientos, pp. 50-55, contains a short analysis of the effects of the War of Independence on the officer corps.

7. Save for 1824-1825, between 1816 and 1900 there were never less than 450 --and often well over 650-- generals on active duty with the Spanish Army, including those of the Guardia Civil, Albarderos, Carabineros, and marine infantry, but excluding asimilados, who usually totalled about 100. In 1896 Spain had more generals on active duty than did Italy, Germany, or Austria-Hungary, which had considerably larger armies. At times only about a third of the generals could be usefully employed. Headrick, pp. 111, 448-452.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers far in excess of needs,[8] nepotism was rife,[9] discipline was poor,[10] and performance in the field

---

8. The Anuario militar de España for 1893-1894 lists 18,562 officers, including 494 generals, on active duty with 98,446 enlisted men, a ratio of one officer for every 5.3 men and one general for every 235.9 men of lower rank. This excess of officers was a consequence of (a) the failure to discharge surplus officers, (b) the incorporation of officers of the defeated armies into the national army at the end of the civil wars in the period 1836-1875, (c) promotions which were faster than those prevailing in other armies, at least to the rank of colonel, and (d) the absence of a proper reserve officer corps: see Ramon Alonso, p. 442; Miguel Alonso Baquer, "La guerra hispano-americana de 1898 y sus efectos sobre los instituciones militares espanolas," Revista de historia militar xxvii, 54 (1983), p. 141 ["Alonso Baquer, RHM"], Boyd, p. 28; Headrick, pp. 113, 147; Gonzalez Muñiz, p. 56ff. In the Moroccan Campaign of 1859, the most successful Spanish foreign war in the nineteenth century, there was one officer for every 18.6 men, and one general for every 1,297 [Ricardo Pieltain de la Pena, "Panorama general de la guerra de Africa," Revista de Historia Militar, iv, 6 (1960), pp. 140ff], a ratio generally within the parameters of contemporary military practice: at the end of the American Civil War the ratio of generals to lower ranking personnel in the Union Army was 1:1561. By the Moroccan Campaign of 1893-1894, however, an expeditionary force of 22,000 officers and men was commanded by no less than 30 generals, for a ratio of one general to every 733.3 others, and the army was accompanied by 220 unassigned officers: Headrick, p. 400.

9. In 1898 the 53 generals in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico had at least twelve sons, nephews, or brothers serving as aides-de-camp: see Anuario militar de España, 1898. The case of the Garcia Aldave brothers is instructive, both spending many years as aides-de camp to their father, Lieutenant General Jose Garcia Aldave: the younger Jose Garcia Aldave, a brigadier general by 1936, served eleven years in this capacity, nearly a quarter of his time in uniform.

10. As a result of the award of numerous brevets --of 1444 infantry majors during the mid-nineteenth century, 892 had brevets for lieutenant colonel and 92 of these also had brevets for colonel-- the practice of officers greeting each other with a salute repeatedly fell into disuse, despite over 40 royal and ministerial decrees concerned with its preservation. See Headrick, pp. 175-178 and my "Honorary Rank in the Spanish Army during the Nineteenth Century," Strategy & Tactics 106 (March, 1986), p. 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

inadequate.[11] Nevertheless, the army was the principal guarantor of the Restoration system,[12] under which the Crown shared constitutional authority with the Cortes, and liberal and conservative governments rotated in office in a process known as the "turno pacífico," which was designed to keep the army out of politics by eliminating internal conflict among the elites.[13] The Restoration brought many benefits to Spain, perhaps the most important of which was

---

11. In addition to engaging in three civil wars and several colonial ones in the Americas between 1814 and 1900, the Spanish Army confronted foreign foes on a number of occasions, most notably during the French invasion of 1823, Spanish interventions in Portugal in 1834 and 1847, an expedition to Italy in support of the Pope in 1849-1850, the Moroccan War of 1859-1860, the Indochina War of 1859-1863, the "Guano War" of 1863-1866, which was primarily a naval affair, and in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Aside from the Spanish-American War, these have been but poorly treated in the literature, but see Rafael Gambra Ciudad, La primera guerra civil de España (Madrid: Escelicer, 1972); Emilio Esteban-Infantes y Martin, Expediciones españolas, Siglo XIX (Madrid: Instituto de Cultura Hispanico, 1949); and Emilio Alcalá Galiano, La Guerra de España con Peru y Chile en 1866 (Madrid: n.p., 1895). The only treatment of any of these in English is William C. Davis, The Last Conquistadores: the Spanish Intervention in Peru and Chile, 1863-1866 (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia, 1950).

12. Alonso Baquer, RHM, p. 145

13. James H. Rial, Revolution from Above: The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship in Spain, 1923-1930. (Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University 1981), pp. 19-21; Boyd, pp. 4-5; Carr, 1808, pp. 357-360; and Raymond Carr, Modern Spain, 1875-1980 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 8-11 ["Carr, 'Modern."] contain summary treatments of the Restoration system.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a long period of stability and peace, the longest such period in Spanish history between the late-eighteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries.[14] But because of its role, the army as an institution profited little.

Despite several well intentioned attempts, the Restoration regime found itself powerless to effect major reforms in the army.[15] The Regency tolerated an inept and unprofessional army because it was politically reliable and integrated into the social elite.[16] Moreover, with the death of the "soldier-king" Alfonso XII in 1885, the throne passed to his posthumous heir, Alfonso XIII, under the regency of his mother, María Cristina of Habsburg. Although a devoted and able ruler, the Regent proved uninterested in military matters[17] and such reforms as were

---

14. Carr Modern pp. 7-70 includes the most convenient account of the Restoration in English.

15. Alonso Baquer, RHM, p. 145. A good survey of the several attempts to reform the army during the Restoration and Regency is contained in the Headrick dissertation, especially pp. 386-398. For a discussion of the most ambitious proposal see the articles by Fernando Maria Puell de la Villa, "El General Cassola, Reformista Militar de la Restauración," Revista de historia militar, No. 45 (1978), pp. 173-196, and "La reforma del General Cassola," Revista de historia militar, No. 46 (1979), pp. 143-174, and Miguel Alonso Baquer, "La estructura del ejército en la epoca de Cassola," Revista de historia militar, No. 64 (1988), pp. 187-203.

16. Boyd, p. 157.

17. Salvador de Madariaga, Spain: A Modern History (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

instituted were relatively modest in scope.[18] The Restoration and Regency were largely free of acrimonious civil-military disputes, not least because the years 1878-1894 were relatively peaceful. This began to change in 1895, with the outbreak of revolution in Cuba and the Philippines, which initiated what Stanley G. Payne called the "colonial disaster," the humiliating failure of the Spanish Army to suppress the rebellions and the devastating defeat at the hands of the United States, which led to the loss of the remnants of Spain's colonial empire.[19] It was the disaster of 1898 which sensitized the political leadership to the pressing need for military reform, and particularly to the necessity of a drastic reduction in the size of the officer corps.[20] However, in the decade following the Spanish-American War the political leadership was unable to develop a consistent military policy,[21] while the army began to become repoliticized as a result

---

18. Michael Alpert, La reforma militar de Azaña (1931-1933) (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1982), pp. 85-91 ["Alpert, Reforma"].

19. Headrick, pp. 399-412; Payne, Politics, p. 66.

20. Alpert, Reforma, p. 91-92. The disaster also sparked a remarkable literary movement, the "Generation of '98," on which see Pedro Lain Entralgo, La generacion de Noventa y Ocho (Madrid: F. Muñiz Alonso, 1963), and Herbert Ramsden, The 1898 Movement in Spain (Manchester: University of Manchester, 1974).

21. Alonso Baquer, RHM 54, p. 144.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

perceived to be threats to its integrity as an institution.[22]

The Spanish Army emerged from the wars of 1895-1899 with 471 generals and 24,705 officers for 110,926 men. The enlisted men of the former armies of the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico had been demobilized, but the officers were retained on active duty.[23] The number of officers was clearly excessive, but the prospects for reducing the number were not great.[24] Lieutenant General Miguel Correa, Minister of War from October of 1897 to March of 1898, remarked "The excessive number of generals which today confronts us is a result of the prodigality with which we granted promotions during the campaigns. It is a genuine waste, but I do not see any way that we can remedy this evil."[25] The problem had to be addressed on several fronts at once: the number of men entering the officer corps had to be reduced, the age of retirement had to be lowered, and

---

22. Boyd, pp. 10-11.

23. Andres Mas Chao, La formación de la conciencia africanista en el ejército español (1909-1926) (Madrid: Servicio Geografico del Ejercito, 1988), p. 9.

24. Anuario militar, 1900. Arguably, since the Spanish Army lacked a proper reserve system, the surplus of officers could be justified on the grounds that they served as a cadre in the event of mobilization: Headrick, p. 147. See also below, note 67.

25. Payne, Ejercito, p. 133.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a rigid system of promotion by seniority had to replace the much abused system of promotion by the merits of war.

While initially introduced to reward gallantry, promotion by the merits of war --méritos de guerra-- had become greatly debased. By the end of the nineteenth century, it was an unusual officer in the infantry or cavalry who had not secured at least one promotion in this fashion if he had been in a combat zone. However, officers in the engineers, the artillery, and, albeit to a lesser degree, the staff corps rarely had the opportunity to earn such promotions, since many of them were assigned to coast defense, industrial, and staff posts. In addition, the army's operations for most of the century were guerrilla campaigns, which made few demands on artillery and engineers.[26] In addition to unnecessarily raising tensions between the arms of service, the lavish, often politically motivated or nepotistic distribution of merit promotions resulted in a scarcity of first and second lieutenants in the infantry and cavalry, with a consequent demand for new officers in those grades, while there was a surplus of

---

26. By way of example, the Anuario militar for 1898 indicates that the Cuban garrison amounted to nearly 160,000 men. However, excluding coast defense and fortress troops, of these, only about 2,200 were artillerymen and 2,400 engineers. Similarly, of nearly 8,000 regular troops and 6,000 militiamen in Puerto Rico, only about 120 were field artillerymen and there were no field engineers, while the nearly 45,000 men in the Philippines included only about 600 field artillerymen and 1,700 field engineers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

middle-rank personnel.[27] This helped contribute to the "spiritual gulf" between the infantry and cavalry and the "facultative corps" of the army --the artillery, engineers, and staff--, which viewed themselves as intellectual superiors of the infantry and cavalry by virtue of their academic preparation. The officers of the "facultative corps" saw merit promotions as a threat to the principle of seniority.[28]

Since under Spanish military law merit promotions could be remitted for decorations, it became the official policy of the "facultative corps" to require officer candidates to certify in writing that they would decline

---

27. Alpert, Reforma, p. 93. In his diary , Manuel Azaña, Minister of War, Prime Minister, and ultimately President under the Republic, cites several cases of dubious awards of a promotion by the "merits of war," including one to Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, for "being bruised by a bullet" (10 June 1932). He also records two other extraordinary promotions, "for services and circumstances," awarded by Alfonso XIII to officers upon their marriages, including one to Agustín Muñoz Grandes, "a good officer" (22 July 1931). Citations are to Manuel Azaña, Memorias políticas y de guerra, 1931-1939, in Obras completas edited by Juan Marichal, Vol. IV (Four volumes, Mexico City: Editorial Oasis, 1966-1968) ["Azaña, Memorias"], For a discussion of the reliability of this work, see Chapter III, note 22, and Appendix 4.

28. There are a number of works which deal with the tensions among the arms which resulted from the existence of merit promotions, of which the more useful are Headrick, pp. 164-179; Payne, Ejército, p. 187; Emilio Mola Vidal, El pasado, Azaña, y el porvenir in Obras completas (Valladolid: Santaren, 1940), pp. 971ff ["Mola, El pasado"]; and Jorge Vigón, Historia de la Artillería española (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciónes científicos, 1947), II, pp. 135ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

any promotions by merit which they might be offered, accepting instead the Order of María Cristina, which carried a 10% pay bonus in lieu of promotion. An officer who accepted a merit promotion was forced to transfer to the infantry or cavalry or was liable to be subjected to court of honor proceedings which could lead to his expulsion from the army.[29]

---

29. The first officer in one of the "facultative corps" to accept a merit promotion and remain in his arm of service was Juan Picasso y Gonzalez of the staff corps. Picasso, who was, incidentally, the only Protestant to become a general in the Spanish Army, and the uncle of Pablo Ruiz Picasso, was awarded the Cruz laureada de San Fernando --Spain's highest decoration for valor-- and accepted a merito promotion to major in 1893, successfully defending himself before a court of honor. There is no biography, but see Boyd, p. 290. One result of this seems to have been that staff officers began to accept merit promotions. Of eight former staff officers who were generals in 1936, five held at least one promotion by merit, including three major generals, Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, three such (major, 1910; lieutenant colonel, 1915; brigadier general, 1926) [AGMS, Expediente F-84], Manuel Goded Llopis (colonel, 1922; major general, 1927) [AGMS, Expediente G-2142], and José Sánchez-Ocaña (colonel, 1922; brigadier general, 1925) [AROM, Expediente S-116-4], and two brigadier generals, Eugenio Espinosa de los Moneteros (1st lieutenant, 1897) [AROM, Expediente E-126-T], and Abilio Barbero Saldaña, who also had three promotions by merit (major, 1914; lieutenant colonel, 1922; colonel, 1925) [AGMS, Legajo B-118]. In the other "facultative corps" acceptance of such promotions was rare, and pressure on such an officer must have been considerable, for several members of these arms remitted merit promotions after having accepted them. Thus, Carlos Bernal García, an engineer, was promoted to major by merit in September of 1914, but reverted to captain the following September, having accepted a María Cristina [AGMS, Expediente B-2072], while Rafael López Gómez, an artilleryman, was promoted to captain by the merits of war on 28 September 1899, but accepted a María Cristina and reverted to lieutenant on 30 October of the same year [AGMS, GC: Lopez Gomez]. Even Barbero Saldaña, who had already broken the solidarity of the "facultative corps" in this matter three times, nevertheless found it politic in 1929 to refuse a merit promotion to brigadier general in exchange for a María Cristina.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The hostility among the arms and services may perhaps best be illustrated by noting that there were five different organizations looking after orphans of officers: one for those of infantry officers, one for those of cavalrymen, one for those of artillerymen and engineers, one for those of Intendance and Auditing Corps officers, and one for orphans of the Medical, Veterinary, Juridical, and Staff Corps.[30] This rivalry also had a pernicious effect on the higher ranks of the army, for officers of the artillery and engineers rarely had experience commanding forces of all arms before being promoted to general. It appears that during the Rif War (1919-1927) there was only one instance of a colonel of engineers leading a combined arms column. In contrast, in the French Army engineer and artillery officers frequently led columns composed of mixed troops.[31] These tensions among the arms did little foster

---

30. Anuario militar, 1936 pp. 35-36. The grouping of Staff Corps officers with the Medical, Veterinary, and Juridical officers indicates yet another aspect of hostility among the arms in the Spanish Army, though one by no means so pernicious as that which pitted the infantry and cavalry against the "facultative corps." Indeed, although normally allied against the infantry and cavalry, the artillery and engineers had bitter rivalries of their own, such as a long standing dispute over control of automobile training in the army, which was such "a great question between the artillery and the engineers, who are like cats and dogs, as are all the arms and corps" (Azaña, Memorias, 6 July 1931), that for a time there were two automobile schools in the army.

31. Mola, El pasado pp. 1025-1026.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the development of a professional consensus on questions such as military policy and reform.[32] Nevertheless, it was generally accepted that the army had too many officers.

However, reducing the surplus of officers demanded nothing less than a major restructuring of the army, a matter which could not be effected due to financial constraints and resistance from various political factions and the officers themselves.[33] Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Camilo Palovieja, who became War Minister shortly before the Spanish-American War broke out, made a serious attempt to deal with the problem. Palovieja greatly restricted access to the military academies,[34] a matter which generated considerable hostility.[35] In addition, he attempted to amortize 50% of the vacancies among field grade officers, thus virtually paralyzing promotions. This caused such acrimony that Palovieja's ministry lasted

---

32. This issue is by no means merely one of historical interest. It remains a controversial matter in the Spanish Army. When, in 1987, the War Ministry introduced regulations reestablishing promotions by merit, some 60% of senior officers polled expressed their opposition to the idea and so vehement was one brigadier general's opposition that he was relieved of duty: news item, Army Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 1 (January, 1988), p. 82.

33. Alpert, Reforma, p. 90; Boyd, p. 151.

34. From 1892 to 1899 a total of 4,065 new officers had graduated from the Infantry Academy alone: see Ramon Alonso, p. 441.

35. Alpert, Reforma, p. 92.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

barely longer than the war.[36] Captain General Valeriano Weyler,[37] who assumed the post in March of 1901, reduced the amortization of vacancies in the ranks of field grade officers to 25%, but in compensation attempted to close some of the military academies,[38] only to be frustrated by the interference of the recently enthroned Alfonso XIII.[39]

---

36. Boyd, pp. 27-28.

37. Weyler (1840-1930), better known to Americans as "Butcher" Weyler," was the most distinguished officer in the Spanish Army from the mid-1890s until well into the 1920s. Despite the reputation which he gained in Cuba, Weyler was the principal "liberal" in the officer corps and remained politically active virtually until his death. There is no useful biography. Note that in Spanish military usage the term "captain general" has two meanings. A "Captain General" ranked just above lieutenant general in the army hierarchy, but was equated with field marshal in other armies. Officers of this rank were considered to be on active duty for life. In this century the rank has been rather rare, being at times granted upon the retirement or death of a distinguished officer, as well as being held by Alfonso XIII, Francisco Franco, and Juan Carlos I. "Captain General" also has another sense: the commanding officer of an army corps district was in the past officially referred to as the "Captain General" of that particular district, regardless of his substantive rank, usually a lieutenant general or major general. A territorial captain general had wide military and civil powers, particularly in emergencies. For an historical discussion see Aurelio Guaita Martorell, "Capitanes y Capitanias Generales," Revista de historia militar, Vol XXXII, No. 65 (July, 1988), pp. 125-172.

38. For a discussion of the Spanish military educational system see Busquets, Militar, pp. 118-128, and especially Gabriel Cardona "La reforma de la enseñanza en la II Republica (1931-1932)," ["Cadorna, 'Enseñanza'."], in La ensenanza militar en España: un análisis sociológico, edited by Julio Busquets and Valentina Fernández Vargas (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciónes científicos, 1985), pp. 65-107.

39. Ramon Alonso, p. 448.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Weyler left office in December of 1902 and reform became a dead issue for several years. When, in December of 1905, Lieutenant General Augustín Luque assumed the post of War Minister he made several major proposals, including a reduction in the mandatory retirement age for generals,[40] an increase in the number of battalions per regiment from two to three, with a contingent reduction in the number of regiments which would result in the elimination of a number of colonels and staff officers, and the introduction of premilitary instruction. Altogether, Luque planned to cut the officer corps by about 25%, using the funds thus saved in salaries to pay for new equipment, higher salaries, and a modest increase in enlisted strength. Luque's plan got nowhere, blocked not only by opposition from within the army, but also by the increasingly anti-militarist liberals and republicans, and he was forced out in July, only to return in October, and be ousted again in December.[41] His replacement, Valeriano Weyler, also got nowhere with the proposed reforms. Back in power in October of 1909, Luque encountered further problems because of the Moroccan Campaign of that year, when those not favored by a rather

---

40. Mandatory retirement ages were set at 72 for lieutenant generals, 68 for major generals, and 66 for brigadier generals. In the German Army the comparable ceilings were 63, 60, and 56. See Cardona, Poder, p. 3, note 3; Payne, Politcs, pp. 97, 479, note 16.

41. Alpert, Reforma, p. 93; Boyd, p. 52-54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

lavish distribution of merit promotions lambasted him in the military press.[42] Luque moved quickly, and perhaps ill-advisedly, arresting the editor of La Correspondencia Militar, which had published some of the most vituperative attacks, but was again ousted in February of 1910.[43] Such systematic opposition to various ministerial proposals and actions was an indication of a fundamental lack of discipline in the ranks of the officer corps. There were a number of reasons for this. Obviously, careerist concerns were extremely important, but perhaps of equal importance was the fact that "the '98" had inflicted a severe psychological blow to the Spanish Army, a blow for which there was no compensatory success in the decade following the disaster.[44] Meanwhile, the officers were becoming increasingly insecure, as the colonial disaster, economic

---

42. One of the most outspoken critics of the 1909 promotions was Captain Gonzalo Queipo de Llano: Boyd, p. 41. Queipo, later a prominent Republican general and still later an important leader of the Nationalist movement, has been characterized by Professor Emilio Gónzalez López (interview, 15 March 1988) as a "professional upriser."

43. Payne, Politics, p. 124. Luque altogether served five terms as minister of war: December 1905-July 1906, October 1906-December 1906, October 1909-February 1910, April 1911-October 1913, and December 1915-April 1917.

44. Alonso Baquer, RHM, p. 142. It is of some interest to note that only six of the generals of 1936 entered the army after the debacle of 1898, and two of those did so in 1899.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

expansion and industrialization, and intellectual ferment[45] began to create strains in Spanish society.[46] The first decade of the twentieth century saw a revival of Catalan separatism,[47] the beginnings of an active socialist movement, and increasing criticism of the army. These furthered the politicization of the officers, who once more began to seek an active role in political life after a hiatus of nearly three decades. An early manifestation of this occurred on 25 November 1905. Responding to what they considered an insulting comment about the army, a group of officers sacked the offices of the satirical Catalan conservative regionalist journal Cu-Cut!, and, for good measure, those of La Veu de Catalunya, another conservative regionalist publication.[48] A tremendous uproar ensued, but the principal result of the "Cu-Cut! Incident" was the Ley de Jurisdicciónes, enacted in March of 1906, which

---

45. One of the results of the colonial disaster was the intellectual flowering known as the "Generacion de '98," which included Joaquín Costa, Angel Canivet, Miguel de Unamuno, and José Ortega y Gasset: see Salvador de Madariaga, pp. 87-101.

46. Alpert, Reforma p. 84.

47. On Catalan separatism see Carr Modern, pp. 62-67; Madariaga, pp. 177-226; Jesus Pabon, Cambó (Barcelona: Ediciones Alpha, 1969), I, and particularly pp. 256ff.

48. The Cu-Cut! affair was only the most recent in an increasing series of violent attacks by officers intent upon punishing perceived "insults" to the army: Boyd, p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

classified criticism of the army as a military offense, actionable before a military tribunal.[49] Public disenchantment with the army spread, particularly after the outbreak of war in Morocco in 1909. The mobilization of reservists for the war led to considerable unrest and a very violent outbreak in Barcelona, the "Tragic Week," which saw widespread looting and attacks on ecclesiastical property. Repeated clashes between the rioters and the police and Guardia civil left over 100 dead and caused millions of pesetas worth of damage, in a telling demonstration of working class resistance to the war.[50] Criticism of the army mounted. The poor performance of the army in Morocco, stimulated further unrest, criticism, and talk of reform.[51] When Lieutenant General Ramon Echague --

---

49. Joaquin Romero-Maura, The Spanish Army and Catalonia: the "Cu-Cut! Incident" and the Law of Jurisdictions (Beverly Hills: Russell Sage, 1976) is the best account of these events, and may be usefully supplemented by Ramon Alonso, pp. 449ff; Merino, pp. 56-58; and Payne pp. 94-97. In addition to providing for courts martial in cases where the army was criticized, the law included penalties for desecration of the flags and emblems of the regime, or of the regions, provinces, and towns of Spain.

50. The best treatment of the "Tragic Week" is Joan Connelly, "The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr, 1963). See also, Boyd, pp. 20ff; Payne, p. 107-109.

51. Curiously, despite the widely held perception that the Spanish Army was less than competent, in 1912 France opened secret negotiations with the Spanish government for the purpose of securing six Spanish divisions to help defend the line of the Alps against Italy, at the time allied with Germany: Paul G. Halprin, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1971), p. 286.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Conde de Serrallo-- became Minister of War in 1913 he again attempted to institute a series of reforms. Essentially reiterating previous efforts at reforming the army, Echegue proposed lowering the retirement age, a further amortization of vacancies, and the introduction of physical fitness tests for majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. Although actual testing did not begin until 1916, by which time the program was extended to include generals, it was these last which created the most serious outbreak of military indiscipline since the Restoration.[52] The public and humiliating way in which some of the tests were conducted in the division posted at Barcelona, the first unit to be subject to the new regulation, prompted the formation of a junta de defensa --"defense committee"-- among the infantry officers of the garrison in late 1916.[53]

---

52. Mola, El pasado, pp. 998-1000; Payne, Ejercito, p. 188 --who observes that many officers considered their rank to be a bureaucratic status, regardless of capacity or performance, as a result any test of fitness was likely to be considered an infringement of their rights--, and Politics, pp. 126-127, a point explored in Sam C. Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), pp 62ff.

53. On the origins of the juntero movement see Mola, El pasado, pp. 998ff. It should be noted that corporate organizations similar to the juntas had deep roots in the Spanish Army, the earliest being formed in the artillery in 1847, for the purpose of defending the closed scale: see Headrick, pp. 167-168. A similar movement had flourished for a time in the late 1880s and early 1890s for very much the same reasons, initially in the artillery but soon spreading to the engineers and staff corps: Boyd, pp. 54ff. The new juntero movement differed from these earlier ones in that it involved the infantry, by far the largest arm of the service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The juntero movement spread rapidly, fueled by long-felt grievances which sparked an unusual degree of cooperation among the normally fractious arms and services, and there were shortly juntas de defensa in the artillery, staff corps, engineers, and cavalry, as well as among the support services and even one for noncommissioned officers.[54] In essence, the juntas were little more than labor unions, they had no broad ideological underpinnings save for a general nationalism.[55] They existed to protect the interests of the officers, not merely in professional and career matters, but also politically, socially, and economically. World War I was hard on the Spanish officer

---

54. Eduardo Benzo, Al servicio del ejército: tres ensayos sobre el problema militar de España (Madrid: Javier Morata, 1931), p. 26; Ramon Alonso, pp. 468-469. There is no adequate history of the juntero movement, but see José María Capo, Las juntas militares de defensa (Havana: Librería Sintes, 1923), Jose Luis Coello de Portugal, Las juntas militares de defensa: Como perdi mi carrera militar (Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1922), and Candido Pardo Gonzalez Al servicio de la verdad: Las juntas militares de defensa (Madrid: Rehyma, 1930). The best short treatment is that found in Mola, El pasado, pp. 998ff, which may be usefully supplemented by Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Alfonso XIII (Barcelona: Montaner y Simon, 1936), pp. 291ff. For a defense of the juntas see José Pérez Salas, Guerra en España (1936 a 1939) (Mexico City: Grafos, 1947), pp 20-30.

55. Alpert, Reforma, p. 96; Mola, El pasado, p. 990; Payne, Ejército, p. 187. Stanley G. Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 5, has a brief discussion of the ideological poverty of the juntero movement. Cardona, Poder, p. 75, notes that the juntas did not welcome officers who had risen from the ranks.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

corps.[56] The war brought prosperity to Spain, but also considerable inflation, widespread labor unrest, and a rash of public disturbances. When the government failed to take action swiftly and coherently, the army became increasingly disaffected with liberal institutions. In the summer of 1917 there were sporadic insurrections which had to be put down with military force.[57] Soon after the juntas spread through the officer corps, they began to wield considerable power.[58] In the year after the juntas appeared on the scene, the economic, social, and political situation of the country began to deteriorate at a rapid rate. Late in 1917 the government fell, partially due to dissatisfaction over what many considered the excessive use of force in suppressing the revolutionary outbreaks. That November a conservative government came to power, with Juan de la

---

56. The cost of living index rose from 117.6 in September of 1914 to 161.8 four years later, 37.5%: Anuario estadística de España, 1929, pp. 494ff. In the same period a second lieutenant's pay rose from an inadequate 2,115 pesetas (c. $350) to 2,500 (c. $415), barely 18%: Payne, Ejercito, p. 211.

57. Carr, 1808, 500-508. On the army's role in these events see particularly the observations of Ramon Alonso, pp. 471-472. For an extensive treatment of the events of 1917 see J.A. LaComba, La crisis española de 1917 (Madrid: Ciencia nueva, 1971).

58. Both the Crown and the government were unwilling to suppress the juntero movement because rising social unrest made them fear a revolution, which would require the willing cooperation of the army. Yet at the same time they recognized that the juntas themselves could provide the base of power for a coup: Boyd, p. 61.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Cierva serving as the first civilian minister of war since 1875.[59]

La Cierva, the conservative political boss of Murcia, proved to be one of the few ministers of war, and few politicians, to enjoy the confidence of the army. The highly critical La Correspondencia Militar called him ". . . one of the most serious, most sensible, and most prestigious figures in Spanish public life."[60] La Cierva's principal work was the Ley de Bases para la Organización del Ejército, enacted in 1918, after he had left office.[61] Expected to signal a sweeping reform of the army, the new law merely instituted some technical changes[62] and secured some modest and badly needed increases in salaries.[63] The

---

59. Boyd, p. 91.

60. La Correspondencia Militar, 4 November 1917, p. 1.

61. La Gaceta de Madrid, 10 March 1918.

62. The peacetime strength of the army was fixed at 180,000 enlisted men, plus 14,104 officers and 163 generals on the regular list and about 5,000 on the so-called reserve list, organized into 16 active and 16 reserve infantry divisions. Officially, the reforms established an 18 year military service obligation for all adult Spanish males [three years with the colors, five in the ready reserve, six in the regular reserve, and four in the territorial reserve], but provision was made for commutation and limited service, and recruits could be discharged before their time was up. There is no general treatment of la Cierva's program, but see, Ramon Alonso, p. 475; Alpert, Reforma, p. 98; Payne, Ejército, pp. 211-212, and Politics, p. 145.

63. Ramon Alonso, p. 475; Payne, Ejército, pp. 211 and Politics, p. 145. The total increase was barely sufficient to keep up with the rise in the cost of living since 1914: see note 56, above.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

essential problem, the enormous surplus of officers, was barely addressed. La Cierva did abolish promotion by merit in peacetime, which greatly pleased the junteros,[64] but this did little to resolve the officer surplus and exacerbated a growing split in the officer corps between the Moroccan veterans --the africanistas-- and the junteros.[65] Retirement age was reduced by two years, so that lieutenant generals now had to retire at 70, which, as the British military attache observed, still left Spain with officers who were "very old and not up to the demands of their assignments."[66] To conceal the fact that there were far more officers than jobs for them, a special reserve category was introduced which permitted an officer to receive full pay while taking a post with some government agency. In addition, the law abolished the rank of brigada, a senior enlisted grade which permitted

---

64. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 102-103. Vigon, II, p. 6, claims that between 1909 and 1917 a total of 236,718 merit promotions and decorations were handed out for service in Morocco.

65. On relations between the two groups of officers see Boyd, pp. 103, 112, 149-150, 174 and 197ff; Busquets, Militar, pp. 146-147, 159-160. So acrimonious were relations between the two groups that when it was proposed to confer the national colors on the native regiments which had been raised in Morocco, the junteros objected on the grounds that "the national ensign should only be entrusted to Spanish troops": Cardona, Poder, p. 4.

66. Alpert, Reforma, p. 98, note 19, citing PRO London, Series FO.371. W.12056/367/41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sergeants a chance for promotion without making them reserve officers. As a result, the scale of the Reserva Retribuida, or compensated reserve, was reopened; a separate list of officers promoted from the ranks, which, of course, actually exacerbated the problem.[67] The net

---

67. The term "reserve" in Spanish military usage is not cognate with its usage in other armies. The subject is a complex one which has not been well treated in the literature, but see Angel Sánchez Bravo, Apuntes para la historia de la Escala de Reserva del Ejército (Cuenca: privately published, 1929), which deals only with the reserva retribuida. There was, in fact, no true reserve in the Continental or American sense. What did exist were several different reserves. The most efficient part of the reserve was the enlisted reserve, composed of men who had been discharged upon completion of their compulsory service and those who had received various forms of deferment. Reserve centers existed throughout the country, each with a complement of regular officers and each capable of mobilizing battalion after battalion of infantry so long as the supply of men and equipment held out. For officers the matter was not so simple. The "First Reserve" consisted of former regular officers available for service, while the "Second Reserve" included former regular officers no longer fit for service, usually by reason of age. The reserva retribuida or "compensated reserve" consisted of the men promoted from the ranks, and were really not reservists at all, since they were usually on active duty, though rarely permitted to rise above captain, particularly since their seniority in the army list was calculated only from their date of commissioning, while that of regular officers was calculated from the time they entered a military academy. The oficialidad de complemento --"complementary officers"-- were reserve officers in the European sense, men who had secured commissions through limited military service, on the model of the German einjahrfreiwillige. All of these officers were maintained on separate lists, so that there was no unified listing of seniority which included all officers, regular and reserve, active or inactive. Moreover, the actual number of inactive men able to serve with the colors was extremely small: in 1931 there were only 2,117 officiales de complemento in the principal arms, mostly comprising the sons of prominent families, or young men of military families who had no interest in a military vocation. There were, in addition, about 4,000 officiales de complemento in the railroad engineers. At this same time France had 120,000 and Italy 153,000 reserve officers: see Nazario Cebreiros, Las reformas militares, (Santander: Talleres Tipograficos J. Martínez, 1931), p.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

result was that, although de la Cierva managed to increase the military budget, the additional funds were largely consumed by the increase in officer salaries, with little left over to meet the urgent need to modernize the army. Despite this apparent failure, the reforms instituted by de la Cierva were the most extensive since the 1880s.[68] Indeed, so strained was the military budget that in July of 1918 most of the semi-annual contingent of recruits was dismissed early to save money. Nevertheless, the Ley de Bases did accomplish one thing, it bought peace between the government and the juntas de defensa. But it was a short-lived peace. When the government proved incapable of dealing with a crippling post and telegraph strike in early 1918, it fell, to be replaced by a center-right coalition of national unity.[69]

The Ley de Bases got off to a bad start. When it finally came up for consideration in the Cortes, it sparked a general debate on the role and capability of the army. Several leftist deputies[70] engaged in a series of bitter

---

26; Cardona, Poder, p. 9.

68. Ramon Alonso, p. 475.

69. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 97-99.

70. Among them was the moderate Socialist Indelicio Prieto (1883-1962), later prominent during the Second Republic, serving in a variety of ministerial posts through to the end of the Civil War.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attacks on the army, to which the officer corps responded with equal bitterness, and attempts were made to bring the deputies to trial under the Ley de Jurisdicciónes.[71] For the next few years relations between the army and the civil government deteriorated steadily. Yet the government found itself incapable of imposing discipline on the army, for it was unable to function without military cooperation. No government could rule without the support of the army, which was essential to the suppression of the widespread unrest, and ministers and governments often found themselves more dispensable than ill-disciplined army officers.[72] In consequence, there was little possibility of military reform through government action. Nor could the army reform itself, even if the will had existed, since all parties, from left to right, had a strong tendency to put a political interpretation on all differences of opinion among soldiers concerning professional matters, a practice exacerbated by the custom of having generals serve

---

71. Boyd, p. 111.

72. The cases of Lieutenant General Lorenzo Milans del Bosch and Major General Severiano Martínez Anido, respectively Captain General of Catalonia and Military Governor of Barcelona are educational. The two acted with what was unquestionably excessive vigor against strikers, limited freedom of the press, and even expelled representatives of the government from Barcelona. Martínez Anido would later remark, "Basically, I didn't speak with the government, it was all on my own responsibility." When the government attempted to dismiss the two, it fell. See Boyd, p. 139; Payne, Politics, pp. 146ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

as the War Minister.[73] This was the state of affairs when Spain found itself once more embroiled in a war in Morocco.

By the early twentieth century, Spanish colonial interest in Morocco was long and well-established, but Spanish control was limited to several small enclaves on the northern coast.[74] The Second Moroccan Crisis (1911), resulted in the partition of the country between France and Spain. While France secured the larger portion of the country, Spain nevertheless found itself responsible for "protecting," in the Sultan's name, a substantial zone stretching inland for about 50 miles along the country's northern coast. Limited military operations in the period 1912-1915 had succeeded in imposing a measure of control over the protectorate.[75] However, Morocco had a divisive effect on the officer corps. "Only a small proportion of the officers on active duty were disposed to volunteer to fight in Africa. The enormous military bureaucracy did not demonstrate enthusiasm for the adventure."[76] Indeed, most

---

73. Boyd, p. 210.

74. Melilla has been in Spanish hands since 1497 and Ceuta from 1580, following 165 years under Portugal.

75. For military operations in this period see Servicio Historico Militar, Historia de las Campañas de Marruecos, II (Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1951), keeping in mind that this official account was prepared at the height of the Franco years.

76. Payne, Ejercito, pp. 183-183.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers regarded themselves almost as a part of the civil service and had little inclination for active duty in the new protectorate.[77] Those officers who saw Morocco as a place to gain rapid promotion were soon dubbed "africanistas".[78] Tensions soon developed between the africanistas and the rest of the officer corps, whom in retaliation they named "peninsulares".

The africanistas saw merit promotions as a justifiable reward for services rendered. Those officers less enthusiastic about the Moroccan war took a different view, based on the fact that merit promotions inflicted serious

---

77. Ricardo de la Cierva, "The Nationalist Army in the Spanish Civil War," in The Republic and the Civil War in Spain edited by Raymond Carr (London: St. Martin's, 1977), p. 194 ["La Cierva, 'Nationalist'"].

78. Mas Chao's La formacion de la conciencia africanista en el ejército español provides a short, generally favorable, but careful look at the development of the africanista phenomenon. A decidedly hostile view of the may be found in Perez Salas, pp. 20-30 passim, in which he asserts that they were all "frauds," as were most promotions by merit as well. For a discussion of the career implications of merit promotions see Cardona, Poder, pp. 30ff. Not all africanistas had purely professional reasons for seeking a career in Morocco, for it was possible to accumulate a considerable fortune there as well. Not only was there a substantial combat bonus, fully 50% of base pay, but the opportunities for graft were enormous. On this see Arturo Barea, The Forging of a Rebel (New York: Viking, 1972), who cites many instances, including one (p. 280) in which a sergeant with twenty years service managed to accumulate the enormous sum of 150,000 pesetas, equal to a captain general's pay for five years, roughly $25,000 in money of 1920. In passing it should be noted that Barea's work is not only a valuable source for the Moroccan War, but is also one of the finest memoirs by a common soldier in any language.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

harm on the career prospects of officers not in Morocco. For example, when Francisco Franco graduated from the Academia de infantería in 1910 he ranked 247th in a class of 341, while by 1930 he had been jumped 2,438 places on the Army List, having risen to brigadier general as a result of five promotions by the merits of war. Other africanistas in the class also did well, if less spectacularly so: Juan Yagüe Blanco, who graduated 75th, skipped 1,595 spots, while Heli Tella Cantos, 318th, skipped 1,117 spots. Based on their promotion records, the 27 generals of 1936 who may be identified as africanistas, made captain at about the same time as non-africanistas, but reached major nearly four years sooner, lieutenant colonel about five years sooner, and colonel about seven years sooner. Of course, such accelerated promotions hampered the seniority of non-africanistas. In Franco's academy class the 20th man lost 165 places on the Army List between his initial commissioning and 1930, while the 40th, lost 153 spots. Similarly, while the mean seniority of the 87 generals was 44, that for the 27 africanistas was only 28, and that for the other 58 generals was 52. It was thus by no means unreasonable for the peninsulares to take a dim view of merit promotions and call for reform of a system which had indeed occasionally been abused. Of course, africanistas tended to view proposals for reform as schemes to meet the needs of the peninsular bureaucrats-in-uniform

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

rather than those of the combat soldiers.[79]

This rift in the officer corps was slow in developing, for in 1915 France, deeply involved in World War I, requested a moratorium on serious military operations. Over the next four years, Spain contented herself with political action, supplemented by limited military undertakings. This policy was rather successful, and permitted peaceful penetration of extensive areas. However, two prominent tribal leaders, both former Spanish clients, began to build up substantial military strength, Mawlay Ahmad al-Raysuni, in the Jibala, a rugged area in the western part of the protectorate, and Mohammed Abd el-Krim, in the Rif, a mountainous region in the east. In early 1919, with World War I over, the French assumed a more forceful stance in Morocco.[80] The Spanish felt compelled to go along, lest the French interpret their

---

79. For treatments of the relations between africanistas and penisulares, see particularly Boyd, pp. 103, 112, 149-150, 174 and 197ff; Busquets, Militar, pp. 146-147, 159-160. Figures on the class of 1910 are based on calculations in Cardona, Poder, pp. 31-32. Statistics on promotional patterns are more fully discussed in Chapter VI, below.

80. For a summary of the period 1915-1919, see Boyd, pp. 160ff; David S. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif (Stanford: Stanford University, 1968), pp. 60-66: this is the best published account of the Rif War in English. For a more comprehensive treatment, particularly of the latter portion of the war, see Shannon E. Fleming's unpublished dissertation, "Primo de Rivera and Abdel Krim: The Struggle in Spanish Morocco, 1923-1927" (Wisconsin, 1974).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

unwillingness to take a more active role as an invitation to extend their influence into the as yet uncontrolled portions of the Spanish Protectorate.[81] Almost as soon as Spain adopted a more aggressive posture, insurrections broke out.

The subsequent war (1919-1927) had a profound impact on the Spanish Army.[82] It quickly became obvious that the Spanish Army was not a combat-ready force, lacking adequate equipment, training, logistics, and leadership.[83] The

---

81. There appears little doubt that the French would have preferred to control all of Morocco, but were restrained by fears of the British reaction to such a move. Nevertheless, they several times eroded the dimensions of the Spanish zone: see Woolman, p. 180.

82. Woolman, which is a general account lacking in military detail, is the only lengthy treatment of the Rif Rebellion in English. The volumes of the official history, Servicio Historico Militar, Historia de las Campañas de Marruecos which cover the Rif War, III and IV (Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1980), were prepared under King Juan Carlos, and are rather comprehensive. For a useful brief account in English, see Payne, Politics, pp. 152-186, 208-223.

83. Ramon Alonso, p. 476. At the time that the French were prepared to resume military operations in Morocco they had about 90,000 men there, in contrast to only about 60,000 troops in the Spanish Zone. However, while the area of the French Zone was nearly twenty times that of Spanish Morocco, the population of the two zones was approximately the same. In addition, the French were far more lavishly equipped and much better organized, with command being vested in a major general and six brigadier generals, while the Spanish had a lieutenant general, three major generals, and eleven brigadier generals. In addition, about 80% of the French troops in Morocco were native levies, in contrast to only about 15% of the Spanish troops. Merino, p. 63; Cardona, Poder, p. 34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

insurrection spread rapidly. By 1920, however, the Spanish began to have some degree of success. The principal credit for this must go to Major General Damaso Berenguer y Fuste, the High Commissioner of Morocco, who favored a policy of careful preparation, political action, and slow advance, never taking ground which could not be held, in conscious emulation of the French "oil stain" theory of colonial occupation.[84] Berenguer was aided in his work by the emergence of a number of particularly able younger officers, such as Alberto Castro Girona, Jose Sanjurjo, Miguel Nunez del Prado, and Francisco Franco, plus the development of elite military forces, the Fuerzas indígenas regulares, a formally recruited and disciplined native contingent, and of the Legión del Tercio de Extranjeros, or foreign legion.[85] Berenguer sought to deal with one

---

84. On Berenguer see particularly Boyd, pp. 163ff. On the French "oil stain" theory of colonialism as practiced in Morocco see Jean Gottman, "Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy edited by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton: Princeton University, 1943), passim, and particularly pp. 249-255. For a later critique of this technique as treated by Gottman, see Douglas Porch, "Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy edited by Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986), passim, and especially pp. 391-395.

85. There is no history of the FIR, but see Joaquín de Sotto Montes, "Notas para la historia de las Fuerzas indígenas del antiguo protectorado de España en Marruecos," Revista de historia militar 35 (1973), pp. 115-154. Although several works deal with the Legion, almost all are paeans to regimental glory, such as the Legion's own La Legión española, 50 anos de historia (Leganes: La Legión, 1970), but see Carlos de Arce, Historia de la Legión española (Barcelona: Mitre, 1984). The best treatments in English are John H. Geley, "Bridegrooms of Death: A Profile Study of the Spanish Foreign Legion," Journal of Contemporary History, IV, 2 (April 1969), pp. 47-63, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

problem at a time, thereby not straining his limited resources, and so concentrated his efforts in the western region, keeping operations in the Rif extremely limited, though there too, steady progress had been made. Berenguer held that no advance should be made until the territory could be held, which included provision for political action and development. In addition to bringing the Moroccans under Spanish control, Berenguer's policies had the beneficial effect of being relatively inexpensive in both men and money, which made the war moderately popular in middle and upper class circles.[86] Then, in January of 1920, Berenguer had to find an assignment for Manuel Fernández Silvestre,[87] a well-connected old friend whom he had found a difficult subordinate, largely because Silvestre was "brave, but also rash, impatient of detail, and unfamiliar with Berenguer's brand of colonial warfare."[88] Since the Rif was relatively quiet, Berenguer assigned Silvestre as Commander General of Melilla, the

---

John Scurr The Spanish Foreign Legion (London: Osprey, 1985), a volume in the "Men at Arms Series."

86. Boyd, pp. 166-168.

87. The intricacies of hispanic nomenclature are such that while the general's family name was actually "Fernández" he was more commonly referred to by his matronymic "Silvestre."

88. Boyd, p. 169. Silvestre also technically outranked Berenguer by one number on the Army List.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

principal Spanish post in eastern Morocco.

Silvestre's new post was autonomous of Berenguer's direct control, and he quickly took advantage of his independence. Although lacking adequate resources, Silvestre began a series of advances, most frequently without political action. He ignored repeated suggestions from Berenguer to advance more slowly, to neutralize the tribes which he had bypassed, and to engage in political action. Silvestre's advance was so rapid that in 14 months he almost doubled the area under Spanish control. Despite Berenguer's concern, by mid-1921, the Spanish Army in Morocco appeared to be winning the war. The revolt in the west seemed likely to be at an end as Berenguer's forces isolated and surrounded those of al-Raysuni in the Jibala, while Silvestre's front was well advanced towards the territory of the Beni Waryaghil, the heart of Abd el-Krim's rebellious coalition, a movement which was garnering extraordinary press coverage. However, Silvestre's troops were dispersed on a broad front, with many of them guarding installations and holding blockhouses. Most of his men were ill-trained, ill-disciplined conscripts --Silvestre, at least spiritually a juntero, refused to have "elite" units in his sector-- as were most of his officers, who frequently spent the night away from their units.[89]

---

89. Barea, p. 326 cites specific instances.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Moreover, many of the tribes behind Silvestre's front had not been properly neutralized, and were waiting for a chance to strike a blow against the invaders.[90] Silvestre himself greatly underestimated the resourcefulness of the Rifians, whom he despised, and paid no attention to unpleasant intelligence.[91] By mid-July the lead elements of Silvestre's army held a front of some 35 miles, fully 80 miles west of Melilla. What was perhaps an inevitable disaster occurred on 21-22 July, when the head of Silvestre's 21,000 strong army was ambushed at Anual. Abd el-Krim's forces, initially not more than 4,000 strong, began a series of devastating attacks which resulted in the army virtually dissolving in panic over the next few days. Silvestre and at least 8,000 of his men perished as the front was thrown back almost to Melilla. The entire Spanish position in the eastern part of the Protectorate was only saved by Berenguer, who rapidly redeployed troops, including many Regulares and legionnaires, from the western zone --thereby abandoning his chances of crushing al-Raysuni-- and an infusion of nearly mutinous reservists and

---

90. Barea, pp. 253, 277-278.

91. Signs of an imminent Rifian offensive had become increasingly evident in the weeks and days before the actual attacks began, but were ignored by Silvestre and his staff, with the exception of Colonel Gabriel Morales, head of the office of Native Affairs in the sector. See Boyd, pp. 176ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

conscripts from the motherland.[92] A new government came to power on 4 August 1921, led by the prominent old conservative Antonio Maura, with the portfolio for war going to Juan de la Cierva. La Cierva juggled commanders, shifted men and equipment into Morocco, and soon had the situation stabilized. By mid-September Spanish troops were again on the offensive, and much of the lost ground was recovered. But it was clear that there would be much hard fighting before the war could be brought to a successful conclusion. And meanwhile, recriminations had begun, and few prominent political and military leaders escaped unscathed. The King came in for some particularly harsh criticism, it being widely held that both Berenguer and Silvestre had received their appointments through the Royal interference. Moreover, it was widely believed that the King, in the hope of gaining a spectacular victory, had urged Silvestre, to ignore Berenguer's orders to proceed

---

92. The literature on Anual in Spanish is less extensive than one might expect. Damaso Berenguer y Fuste, Campañas en el Rif y Yebala, 1921-1922 (Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1948), II passim, is self-justificatory, but of some value, as is also account by the Vizeconde de Eza, Mis responsibilidades en el desastre de Melilla como Ministro de la Guerra (Madrid: Graficas Reunidas, 1923). In English, Woolman, pp. 83-105 provides the most complete account, which may be supplemented by Pabon, II, pt. 1, pp. 266-299; Fleming, pp. 65-70, Payne, Politics, pp. 160-169, and Boyd, pp. 175-182.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

cautiously.[93]

Even before Anual, the Moroccan War had begun to create tensions in Spanish society. In general, liberals, republicans, and some conservatives supported the war, while other conservatives, the separatist parties, and the working class movements were opposed.[94] After an initial burst of patriotic solidarity, Anual exacerbated the debate.[95]

---

93. Barea, pp. 326, 329-330, 398, contains a discussion of this point from the perspective of a common soldier hearing the generally accepted rumors to this effect. Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, Memorias (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), pp. 74-77, and Boyd, pp. 7ff, deal with Alfonso's interference in promotions and assignments.

94. Several leftist parties were willing to support colonialism when it involved a 'civilizing mission.' Boyd, p. 162.

95. The best treatment of the "responsibilities" question is James A. Chandler, "The Responsibilities for Anual," Iberian Studies 2, No. 7 (1977), pp. 68-77. There were two official inquiries. The highly regarded Major General Juan Picasso y Gonzalez chaired an investigating commission which concluded that while individual officers were derelict in their duty, no one person was responsible for the disaster, but rather years of neglect by a broad spectrum of civilian and military personnel, who permitted the morale, equipment, and training of the army to deteriorate: see El Expediente Picasso: Las responsibilidades de la actuación española en Marruecos, Julio 1921 (Madrid: Congresso de los Diputados, 1931). The "Expediente Picasso" was rejected, and a parliamentary commission appointed to examine the matter. However, after an exhaustive investigation, the new commission arrived at the same conclusions as had the old: see Congreso de los Diputados, La comision de responsibilidades: Documentos relacionados con la información instruida por la llamada "Comision de responsibilidades" acerca del desastre de Anual (Madrid: Congresso de Diputados, 1931).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Meanwhile, Morocco had reopened the old argument over promotions by merit versus strict seniority.[96] After Anual, public opinion strongly supported the africanistas,[97], particularly since several prominent junteros proved to have been among those responsible for the disaster.[98] The africanistas were not slow to press their advantage, and produced a steady stream of articles,

---

96. When the War Ministry floated a proposal to reinstitute merit promotions in July of 1920, by which time the Moroccan War was well under way, so that such a measure was proper under the terms by which merit promotions had been abolished in 1918, the junteros staged public demonstrations and made other manifestations of their displeasure, with the result that the measure was abandoned: see Ramon Alonso, pp. 101-102. Junteros also opposed combat pay, 50% above base pay, because it suggested officers in combat were more valuable than those who were not: Boyd, pp. 160-161. See also Payne, Politics, pp. 258-259, for other examples of africanista-juntero tensions.

97. The africanistas were generally well regarded by the public due to their tendency to devote themselves to their profession rather than to politics: see Boyd, p. 214.

98. The President of the Junta de Infantería, Colonel Silverio Araujo, had surrendered his troops without a fight on 21 September, to be held for ransom while his men were subject to torture and massacre. Within a month, his successor as president, a Colonel Lacanal, had to be relieved after his command incurred 1500 casualties attempting to escort a supply column to an isolated post, a mission which was successfully accomplished a few days later by Brigadier General Jose Cavalcanti with a handful of Moroccan Regulares and army engineers. In retaliation, the junteros accused Cavalcanti of conduct inappropriate to a commanding officer: see Boyd, p. 192. According to Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco (Barcelona: Planeta, 1978), pp. 136-137 ["Franco Salgado, Conversaciones], Francisco Franco himself had a very favorable view of Cavalcanti's achievement.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

books, and speeches which placed the blame for the disaster squarely at the feet of the juntas. The King, always a weathercock, named several prominent africanistas to his military household.[99] Thus, in the summer and fall of 1921 the juntas seemed to be losing their influence, even as the africanistas, at the head of the Regulares and the Legion, were recovering much of the ground lost after Anual. However, that October la Cierva announced merit promotions for 15 officers who had particularly distinguished themselves prior to the disaster. Among the men listed was Damaso Berenguer, scheduled for a promotion to lieutenant general. Although the promotions all appear to have been properly earned, la Cierva's timing was terrible. The proposal smacked of the worst kind of favoritism and was immediately attacked by the junteros, as well as most republicans and socialists. The resulting outcry forced la Cierva to drop the matter, and to retreat on a number of other issues as well, which was widely interpreted as a major victory for the junteros.[100] It was, however, the

---

99. Never a politically reliable character nor man of principal, Alfonso was at this time greatly concerned that a Moroccan disaster could cost him his throne, as had recently occurred to Constantine I of Greece in the aftermath of the loss of Smyrna. As a result, he was anxious to associate himself with the new heroes of the war: Ramon Alonso, pp. 482-483; Boyd, p. 192.

100. Alpert, Reformas, p. 103; Boyd, pp. 197-198. It is worth noting that virtually all of the officers in question were eventually granted their promotions, during the Dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

last victory which the juntas would claim, for la Cierva thereupon resolved to nullify the juntas.

In February of 1922 la Cierva issued a ministerial decree integrating the juntas into the War Ministry, as auxiliary services to the various arm-of-service sections. By abolishing dues payments and funding the reorganized juntas out of public monies, de la Cierva hoped to subject the juntas to a degree of political control.[101] Then, in April some 300 africanista officers resigned from the Junta de Infantería because of the promotion question.[102] Merit promotions were reinstituted in May of 1922, with parliamentary approval required on a case by case basis, and later restored to the War Ministry in July.[103] To curb corruption and further political action, the administration of the Protectorate was civilianized.[104] Then, in September, widespread corruption was discovered in the administrative services of the army, the very branches which were most staunchly juntero.[105] Although Alfonso

---

101. Alpert, Reforma, p. 103; Boyd, p. 207.

102. Boyd, pp. 213-214.

103. Alpert, Reforma, p. 103; Boyd, p. 225.

104. Alpert, Reforma, p. 104; Boyd, pp. 222-223, 238-240.

105. The most famous case was that of the "Larache Millions," in which a group of Intendance Corps officers at Larache were found to have embezzled over 3,000,000 pesetas (c. $500,000 in money of 1921) from funds entrusted to their care. The matter only came to light when one of the perpetrators, Captain Manuel Jordan, discovered that his associates had omitted his share while he was on leave. Angered, Jordan swiped all the loot for August 1922, over 1,000,000 pesetas (c. $165,000), and refused to share,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

XIII's open favoritism towards africanista officers and a flood of 250 nominations for merit promotions generated some leftist support, the junteros began to lose their influence.[106] In October of 1921, having discovered the mutilated remains of some 500 Spanish troops, Brigadier General Miguel Cabanellas, a prominent africanista, delivered a devastating condemnation of the juntas.[107] In an open letter addressed to their presidents, Cabanellas, bluntly asserted "I believe you are the ones responsible," and went on to accuse them of being responsible for most of what was wrong with the Army.[108] The final blow came as a result of a dramatic gesture.

On 10 November 1922 Lieutenant Colonel José Millán-Astray, founder of the Foreign Legion and a distinguished

---

whereupon his superiors foolishly pressed charges. See Boyd, pp. 223-224; Woolman, p. 108.

106. Alfonso XIII had alternately supported, opposed, or been neutral towards the juntas and the africanistas, his chief concern being his throne. This, of course, did much to help erode support for him in the army. Boyd, p. 201.

107. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp. 92-93.

108. The letter appeared in several newspapers, such as La Voz de la Palma, 31 October 1921, p. 1, and La Correspondencia Militar, 24 October 1921, p. 1. See also Ramon Alonso, p. 480; Boyd, p. 193; Fernandez Almagro, pp. 399ff; and Payne, pp. 174, 490, note 63. Francisco Franco joined in the outpouring of africanista condemnations of the junteros, see Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Diario de una bandera (Madrid: Editorial Pueyo, 1922), p. 279 ["Franco, Diario"].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

war hero[109] who had been subject to considerable harassment from by the *junteros*, openly submitted his resignation from the army in order to take the case against the *juntas* to the public.[110] Millán-Astray's action galvanized public opinion across the political spectrum, permitting the Conservative government of Jose Sanchez Guerra to act. On 14 November the government introduced a bill to abolish the *juntas*. In recognition of legitimate *juntero* concerns, the bill modified existing legislation so as to limit merit promotions to set percentages of each rank and to make acceptance of such mandatory. As a compromise, the measure was quite good, for it preserved the rights of the majority of officers to orderly promotion and curbed grants of higher rank for political reasons or royal whims, while retaining the government's ability to select particularly distinguished officers for accelerated promotion in time of war. The measure passed the Cortes with broad support.[111] Although the *juntas* continued to exist informally for some

---

109. Millán-Astray (1879-1954), an infantry officer and staff college graduate, was a veteran of the Philippines and Morocco, who had lost an eye, and arm, and two fingers from the remaining hand. Of several hagiographic Franco-era biographies, the least unsatisfactory is Carlos de Silva's *General Millán-Astray* (Barcelona; AHR, 1956).

110. *La Correspondencia Militar*, 10 November 1922, pp. 1-2; de Silva, p. 175.

111. Boyd, pp. 228-229;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

time thereafter, they wielded little power, and gradually disappeared. Despite this, individual junteros continued to be of influence. The juntero movement had been broken by a judicious mixture of reform and firmness, a rare combination in Spanish military policy at the time. The matter was cleared up just as an even more serious problem in civil-military relations was about to develop, for within months of the resolution of the juntero question Spain fell under military rule.

Questions of military policy and the Moroccan War were not the only problems plaguing Spain in the period. The economic boom caused by World War I had created severe economic strains, which exacerbated existing social, sectional, and economic tensions. Strikes, demonstrations, and riots, were not uncommon. The end of the war, caused a serious recession, which only increased the political strains.[112] The military problems, culminating in the Anual disaster, also fed the fires of unrest.[113] As a result, the Spanish government became highly unstable.

---

112. Shlomo Ben-Ami's Fascism from Above: the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1983), pp 1-17 ["Ben-Ami, Fascism"] contains a useful summary of the economic, social, and political effects of World War I on Spain.

113. The Russian Revolution also had a profound effect on the situation in Spain at the time, encouraging the working class parties and terrifying the upper strata: see the observations of Boyd, p. 121; Ben-Ami, Fascism, passim.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Cabinets rose and fell with remarkable frequency, fifteen from early 1917 through 1922.[114] The primary reason for this was that Spanish politics was highly fragmented, with many small parties.[115] Since all governments had to be coalitions, it often proved difficult to maintain cabinet unity. Complicating matters was the fact that with civil disorder commonplace, no government could rule effectively without cooperation from the army. Although the largely conservative governments were committed to maintaining the turno pacífico and were willing to undertake some reform, as was the electorate at large, the conservatives were divided as to the political and social measures necessary. As a result, the successive governments alternated between repression and conciliation --mostly the former-- which only further alienated the dissatisfied elements and increased the regime's dependence on the army.[116] Then, in

---

114. Although at the time the 16 years from 1901 through early 1917 was generally regarded as an unstable period, there had been only 18 governments. It should be noted that there was a measure of continuity in the period 1917-1922 since many men served several times --the fifteen cabinets were headed by only eight premiers-- and from April of 1919 to December of 1922 the cabinets were all conservative coalitions, with occasional centrist and liberal members: see Boyd, pp. 283-284; Rial, p. 24

115. By way of example, it should be noted that the Cortes of 1918 included fourteen parties having from 6 to 97 seats, plus 19 independents of various stripes: Payne, Ejército, p. 208.

116. Boyd, p. 170.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

December of 1922, amid great enthusiasm a liberal coalition under Manuel García Prieto came to power with an extensive program of reform. However, the new government, which for the first time included some republicans, soon found itself as incapable of coping with the problems of Spain as had its conservative predecessors.[117]

The political situation deteriorated through 1923, as the Moroccan War dragged on with no end in sight, the economy contracted, and social unrest spread. Moreover, Garcia Prieto soon lost the support of the army by a variety of measures, including concessions to Catalan regionalist sentiment and some half-hearted efforts at military reform. Worse, the government failed to develop a coherent policy for Morocco. The question was simple, either to pursue the war or to abandon Morocco. Yet whichever course the government might chose would cause considerable dissatisfaction in some circles. Although the War Minister, Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, a civilian with considerable sympathy for the problems of the army, proposed a series of military measures, including an amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay into the heart of the rebellious Rif,[118] the government decided to "flee from

---

117. For a discussion of Spanish political life in this period see Boyd, passim, and particularly pp. 69-93, 116-140, 236-261; Madariaga, pp. 355-340.

118. For the origins of the Alhucemas plan see Ramon Alonso, p. 481; Woolman, pp. 119-120; Fleming, p. 84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

halfway solutions" and proceeded to adopt one, continuing the occupation of areas presently under Spanish control, while halting all further offensive military operations, thus satisfying neither the *africanistas* nor the *abandonistas*.[119] The government's inability to take decisive action in Morocco, whether to seek victory or to abandon the venture, was due largely to its political weakness.[120] But such a position did little to secure such support. Nor did the government's decision to pay an enormous ransom for the liberation of Abd el-Krim's prisoners endear it to the army.[121] Meanwhile, Catalan separatists jeered the Spanish flag, openly acclaiming the "Republic of the Rif" and sending messages of solidarity to Abd el-Krim.[122] The halt which the government had called to offensive operations in Morocco had proven bad for morale, particularly since the army had very nearly recovered all the ground which had been lost as a result of Anual. Nevertheless, limited offensives continued to be undertaken in disregard of official policy. As a result,

---

119. The text of the cabinet resolution is in *El Liberal*, 26 December 1922, p. 1

120. Boyd, p. 224.

121. Altogether 4,270,000 peseatas were paid for the release of the surviving 326 prisoners, most of whom had been subjected to torture, starvation, and other indignities: Boyd, p. 241; Woolman, pp. 200-207.

122. Payne, *Politics*, p. 187.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the front continued to advance. In mid-August Abd el-Krim undertook a series of attacks which panicked the Commander General of Melilla, Enrique Marzo, into requesting reinforcements. The government, which was attempting to negotiate with Abd El-Krim, reluctantly mobilized 20,000 men.[123] This led to widespread protests and riots by troops en route to ports of embarkation.[124] Meanwhile the "responsibilities" investigation became heated and somewhat irrational.[125] Military discontent grew, particularly among africanistas, but also among former junteros, and officers openly expressed their lack of sympathy for a government which in their perception brought dishonor on

---

123. El Liberal, 19 August 1923, p. 1; Woolman, p. 120

124. El Liberal, 23 August 1923, p. 1.

125. One of the more bizarre incidents which exacerbated tensions during the responsibilities debate was the Aguilera-Sánchez de Toca affair. Francisco Aguilera, the senior lieutenant general on the active list, President of the Supreme Military Council and a member of the Senate, was implicitly accused of preparing a coup by Senator Joaquín Sánchez de Toca. In a letter on official stationery Aguilera accused Sánchez de Toca of libel and threatened to demand satisfaction. Sánchez de Toca read the letter in the Senate, arguing that it constituted an assault on parliamentary supremacy by a high ranking military officer. During the ensuing political uproar, Aguilera traded blows with José Sánchez Guerra, head of the Conservative Party, and there was a fight in the back benches of the Senate. The matter ended when the President of the Senate, the Conde de Romanones, a Liberal, forced it to be dropped. The affair, which lasted three days, is dealt with in Ricardo de la Cierva y de Hoces, "La dialéctica de las bofetadas," Historia y Vida, 2 (1969), pp. 137-141. See also, La Correspondencia Militar, 5 July 1923.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the army. In an ill-advised move, the government alienated powerful Liberal politicians by attempting to pin the blame for Anual on the Maura government, in which several Liberals had participated.[126] With confidence in the parliamentary system ebbing, talk of the need for an "iron surgeon" grew. Not only soldiers, but even liberal intellectuals[127] and the King himself spoke of the advantages which might be gained from a dictatorship.[128] Rumors of a conspiracy began to circulate.[129] As the political and military situation continued to

---

126. Boyd, p. 254.

127. José Ortega y Gasset advanced the notion of a military dictatorship for the first time in his essay "La clave del arcos" (El Sol, 13 February 1920, p. 1), in which he wrote "A military government offers the opportunity to have done with these parliamentary farces which we find so repugnant," a theme to which he would several times return over the next few years.

128. Alfonso, whose primary concern was for the safety of his throne rather than the stability of the state, broached the subject of a "temporary alteration in the constitution" on several occasions in early and mid-1923, but appears to have been dissuaded from acting on the advice of Antonio Maura, who pointedly suggested that it would constitute "suicide" regardless of how successful: Gabriel Maura Gamazo and Melchor Fernández Almagro, ¿Por que cayo Alfonso XIII? (Madrid: Ediciones Ambos Mundos, 1948), 361-362; Alcalá-Zamora, p. 89-90.

129. As early as 29 December 1922 rumors of a republican military conspiracy were reported in several newspapers. See, for example, El Heraldo de Madrid, 29 December 1922, p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

deteriorate,[130] such a conspiracy began to take shape.

The military conspiracy of 1923 was led by Miguel Primo de Rivera, the Captain General of Catalonia.[131] He

---

130. During the first six months of 1923 riots, shootings, bombings, and similar outrages increased markedly, culminating in the assassination of Salvador Segui, a moderate, anti-terrorist labor leader, in early May and of Cardinal Soldevila of Zaragoza a month later: Ramon Alonso, p. 484; Ben-Ami, Fascism, p. 39; Boyd, p. 241; and Payne, Revolution, pp. 59-61. Casualty figures are largely conjectural: Boyd says there were "34 deaths and 76 injuries" for all of Spain in this period, while Payne gives 154 deaths. Ben-Ami gives the Boyd figure for Barcelona alone, while Alonso says there were "53 dead and 102 wounded" in Barcelona. Ben-Ami, p. 13, and Payne Revolution, p. 60, concur that casualties from political violence in Barcelona in the period 1917 through 1923 totalled 241 dead and 576 injured.

131. Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja (1870-1930), came from an old military family. The son of a retired colonel, he was the nephew of Captain General Fernando Primo de Rivera, one of the most distinguished officers of the Restoration period, from whom he inherited the title Marques de Estella, and a cousin of Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Primo de Rivera, one of the few heroes of the Anual Campaign, who was awarded the Cruz laureada de San Fernando for his work in covering the retreat with the Cazadores de Alcantara, during which he died of gangrene after refusing to leave the front. Primo had had a meteoric career in the army, serving in Morocco, Cuba, and the Philippines, earning three merit promotions and the Cruz laureada de San Fernando, Spain's highest award for bravery. He was the first man in his academy class (1887) to attain the ranks of brigadier general (1911) and major general (1913). Promoted lieutenant general in 1919, Primo was elected to the Senate in 1921 and was later named Captain General of Catalonia. He was the father of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Falange. Primo was in many ways an ideal choice to lead a military takeover at the time, for he was acceptable to a broad spectrum of political factions. Despite having been a supporter of the juntas and an abandonista [Payne, Ejército, p. 293; Barea, p. 413.], he was relatively popular in the army due to his support for increased salaries, his willingness to change his views on Morocco, and his resort to martial law in periods of disorder [Boyd, p. 252.]. This last, and his willingness to take forceful action against anarchist labor unions, made him popular in middle and upper class circles [El Sol, 16 June 1923, p. 3.], while at the same time he had some following among moderate workers for his even-handed resolution of a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

appears to have begun laying plans in the late spring.[132] On 18 June Primo convinced the "Quadrilateral," a group of africanista generals who were in the habit of meeting regularly to discuss the political situation,[133] to back him in a coup designed to "cleanse the Augean stables."[134] Primo made little secret of his intentions, travelling

---

transportation strike [El Liberal, 29 June 1923, p. 1.]. An Andalucian himself, his moderate views on Catalan separatism, as well as his strong stand against anarchism, brought him the support of the centrist and conservative regionalists [Pabon, II, p. 427.]. There is no useful biography, but Rafael Salazar, "Perfil humano de Primo de Rivera," Historia y Vida, 3, 22 (1970), pp. 56-65, provides an interesting personality sketch.

132. There is no adequate account of the conspiracy and coup of 1923, but Chapter 1 of Primo's own La obra de la dictadura (Madrid: Imprenta Saez Hnos, 1930), contains a surprisingly reasonable treatment. Also useful is Francisco Hernández Mir, La dictadura ante la historia (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1930), pp. 30ff, and particularly 64-70 ["Hernández Mir, Historia"]. English treatments of considerable value may be found in Boyd, pp. 236-273, and Payne, Politics, pp. 186-207. For a hostile view, which asserts that the sole motivation for the coup was a desire on the part of the army to suppress the Picasso Expediente, see Perez Salas, pp. 30-31. In contrast, Chandler, p. 74, observes that "Given the probable of the parliamentary commission, it is unlikely that the military was motivated by any desire to suppress their findings."

133. Hernández Mir, Historia, pp. 30ff, gives a sympathetic account of the origins and activities of the "Quadrilateral" and of the conspiracy.

134. Ramon Alonso, pp. 484. Strictly speaking, the "Quadrilateral" --Brigadier Generals José Cavalcanti, Federico Berenguer [brother of Damaso], Antonio Daban, and Leopoldo Saro, none of whom had sufficient prestige to undertake a coup on their own-- agreed to "second" a movement which Primo would begin in Barcelona, Primo, pp. 12-13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

about the country openly, or sending emissaries, in order to secure the backing of various commanders.[135] By the end of the summer virtually all prominent military leaders were committed to support, or in the least not to oppose, Primo's coup.[136]

On 13 September 1923 Primo de Rivera rose. Primo's action was not actually a coup d'etat. Rather, from his headquarters in Barcelona he announced that he was taking over the government. Although garrisons in Catalonia and Aragon moved to seize the organs of political control, Primo made no overt moves against Madrid, and his rising was essentially an "unarmed coup."[137] Rather than take direct action he waited to see what the government would do. While the government was inclined to act with energy, it soon discovered that it lacked a constituency willing to back it against Primo. Although the Prime Minister asked Alfonso XIII to dismiss Primo, the latter procrastinated.

---

135. His movements, which were often accompanied by large demonstrations in his support, were even reported in the press: see, for example, El Liberal, 24 June 1923, p. 1, reporting on the warm reception which he received upon returning to Barcelona from his negotiations with the "Quadrilateral." The failure of the government to take any action in its defense is inexplicable, yet would be replicated by the Republic thirteen years later.

136. Alonso, p. 484, observes that only two prominent officers were uncommitted by the time Primo was ready to act, one of whom was the Infante Don Carlos, the King's cousin.

137. Alonso Baquer, Modelo, pp. 45, 206ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In response, on 14 September, the entire cabinet resigned. Alfonso appears to have briefly toyed with the idea of taking power himself, but, after an exchange of telegrams, asked Primo to form a military government on the 15th.[138] Primo came to power with surprisingly broad support across the political spectrum, from rightists to moderate leftists.[139]

---

138. The role which Alfonso XIII played in Primo de Rivera's coup is unclear. Eduardo López de Ochoa y Portuado, De la Dictadura a la Republica (Madrid: Editorial Reus, 1930) ["Ochoa, Dictadura"], p. 31, quotes Primo as saying that if Alfonso resists, "we are lost." Leftist treatments usually assume that he was actively involved. Thus, Ben-Ami (Fascism, p. 26) claims Alfonso was briefed by Primo and his cohorts on 3 September, citing FO/371/10593/Rumbold to MacDonald, 28 March 1924, which reports an alleged conversation between Alfonso and Austen Chamberlain, at best hearsay evidence and could easily represent a bit of dissimulation on Alfonso's part. On the other hand it is clear that Alfonso was by no means ignorant of the imminence of a coup, taking care to absent himself from Madrid when it was clear something was brewing. Moreover, his failure to dismiss Primo from the army when requested by Garcia Prieto is a significant indication of where his sympathies lay.

139. For a sampling of contemporary opinion on Primo see La Correspondencia militar, 13 September 1923, p. 1; El Liberal, 14 September 1923, p. 1; El Sol, 14 September 1923, p. 1. Madariaga, pp. 341-345, has an interesting portrait of the Dictator, seeing him as a characteristically Spanish phenomenon. This view may be contrasted with those of Rial, passim, who holds that Primo had an essentially nineteenth century liberal program, designed to regenerate the nation, and overcome lethargy and partisanship in government, the economy, and society, and those of Ben-Ami, Fascism, pp 29ff, who argues that Primo was acting as a tool of the establishment to stamp out the growth of a genuinely parliamentary democracy and stifle reform. With considerable insight, Gonzalez Muniz has observed (p. 55) that Primo's coup was the first in the history of Spain in which a military rising was not in direct support of a particular political party: Primo rose against all parties.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although some political leaders believed Primo would not last long, he proved surprisingly durable, lasting for seven years.[140] Primo established a directorate of eight brigadier generals and a rear admiral.[141] Although each of these was responsible for a particular government department, none were accorded ministerial status. The dictatorship provided stability which permitted considerable economic development, vast public works, and some social reform. While some citizens had their civil liberties infringed, it appears that most were relatively unaffected by the regime.[142] However, despite the relatively benign character of his administration and its many very real achievements, Primo de Rivera proved unable

---

140. To be sure the times were not the best for parliamentary regimes, about a dozen European countries would fall under dictatorial or authoritarian regimes by the end of the decade: see Alonso Baquer, Modelo, pp. 194ff, 201.

141. Ramon Alonso, p. 495; Fernández Almagro, p. 441; La Gaceta de Madrid, 16, 17 September 1923; El Sol, 16 September 1923. Primo selected his directors with care, choosing one general from each of the eight military regions, and making sure that the several arms were proportionally represented among them.

142. Aside from the occasional closing of a newspaper, the most serious violations of civil rights were probably the closing of the Ateneo in Madrid and the exile of Miguel de Unamuno to the Canaries. Primo also occasionally directed a particular verdict in a judicial procedure, the most notorious being in cases involving of the noted courtesan "La Caoba" and his good friend the Conde de los Andes. See López de Ochoa, Dictadura, pp. 67-69; Ben-Ami, Fascism, p. 105; on Primo's relationship with "La Caoba," see Barea, p. 412.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to resolve the basic political issues which had permitted him to achieve power, particularly as these were exacerbated by the Great Depression.[143]

For the Spanish Army, the principal test of the vitality of the dictatorship was the question of Morocco.[144] Although generally regarded as an abandonista, Primo was nevertheless committed to maintaining Spanish control of Morocco.[145] However, he had to be certain of his political support in Spain, where large elements of the

---

143. A good summary of the Primo regime may be found in Carr, Modern, pp. 98-110. The most extensive treatments are Ben-Ami's Fascism from Above: the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930 and Rial's Revolution from Above: the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship in Spain, 1923-1930, both of which deal with the character, accomplishments, and failures of the Dictatorship in some detail. The two works also provide an excellent insight into the state of scholarly opinion on the Primo years, for, although both are largely based on the same sources, they reach greatly differing conclusions about the nature of the regime.

144. On Primo's relations with the Army see Busquets, Pronunciamiento, pp. 114-118.

145. Pabon, II, p. 309, citing Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja, Cuestión del dia: Gibraltar y Africa (Cadiz: privately published, 1917), a pamphlet which reprints some remarks made by Primo de Rivera at a meeting in Cadiz on 25 November 1917, during which he proposed trading Ceuta for Gibraltar, observing "To have even a single soldier on the other side of the strait is, strategically, a weakness for Spain." On another occasion he is said to have remarked "Gibraltar for Spain, and everything below that to whomever wants it": Ramon Alonso, pp. 517-518. Arturo Barea once spoke with Primo on the matter and also came away believing that he was an abandonista: Barea, p. 413. The best treatment of Primo's Moroccan policy is to be found in Fleming's "Primo de Rivera and Abdel Krim: The Struggle in Spanish Morocco, 1923-1927".

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

bourgeois were opposed to the war.[146] In addition, he believed that a diplomatic offensive was necessary, since Spain could not fight both al-Raysuni and Abd el-Krim simultaneously. While Raysuni proved amenable to conversations which would ultimately led to something resembling an armistice, Abd el-Krim was not inclined to negotiate anything less than the total independence of the Rif.[147] Although creating the impression of inactivity, Primo began careful military preparations. This double game enraged some africanistas, who feared "passivity and inaction" would lose all that had been gained. Early in 1924, after major withdrawals were ordered in the Rif, Primo was subject to several attacks in La Revista de Tropas coloniales, an outspokenly africanista publication founded by Gonzalo Queipo de Llano.[148] Primo banned the

---

146. Francisco Hernández Mir, La Dictadura en Marruecos (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1930), pp. 157ff ["Hernández Mir, Marruecos"]

147. Hernández Mir, Historia, pp. 174-175 contains a brief treatment of these negotiations. By this time, Abd el-Krim had established all the trappings of a government, and dispatched representatives abroad in the hope of securing foreign endorsement of his position. Although he never received official recognition, it is interesting to note that the Almanaque de Gotha for 1925 includes the "Emirate of the Rif" in its list of independent countries: see Woolman, pp. 47-160.

148. By way of example, see Francisco Franco Bahamonde, "Pasividad e inaccion," La Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano I., No. 4 (April, 1924). Although this essay is very hostile to Primo, when, in January of 1925, Franco became editor of the Revista, he proceeded to reduce the political content, increasing the proportion of serious, professional articles, such as his own "Necesidades sobre material y fortificacion," La Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano III, No. 4 (April, 1926). See Fleming, pp. 150-151 for a critique of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

journal for a while, ignored mounting criticism, and proceeded with his preparations. In July of 1924 Primo paid his first official visit to Morocco, during which he made a number of staff changes and proposed some withdrawals to improve the Spanish position. Accompanied by Francisco Franco, head of the Legion, he toured various posts. At Ben Tieb on 19 July he was invited to lunch by the officers of the Legion, mostly all confirmed africanistas. In an elaborate insult to Primo's manhood, the menu was composed entirely of egg-based dishes.[149]

For a time Primo pretended not to notice the peculiar character of the menu. Finally he asked why there were so many egg dishes. The reply was to the effect that those who wished to abandon Morocco had no need for "eggs," but that the officers of the Legion needed "eggs" aplenty for they were determined to stay and fight. Soon afterwards, Franco offered an insubordinate toast in which he expressed the Legion's distrust of the regime's Moroccan policy, and stressed that the only way to avoid disaster was to press on. Franco's words were accompanied by cries of "¡Viva la Legión!" and "Down with the Dictator!" When the tumult died down, Primo rose. He reminded the officers of the

---

this journal.

149. In Spanish "eggs" is a common euphemism for testicles.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

bonds of discipline, and, ignoring shouted insults and catcalls, went on to stress that he had fully intended to bring the war to a successful and honorable conclusion. He observed that it was necessary for the present to give up a small amount of territory in order to improve the strategic situation, and emphasized that it was not the business of junior officers to be privy to matters of grand strategy.[150] Although the dinner ended coldly, Primo's bold confrontation of the hostile officers earned him considerable admiration. Although some remained uneasy -- and Franco himself offered his resignation-- Primo managed to gain time to lay the foundation for a proper subjugation of the Protectorate, beginning with a reorganization of the army.[151]

There were many things wrong with the Spanish Army in Morocco. Equipment was often in short supply, rations were

---

150. For accounts of the Ben Tieb affair see Barea, p. 426; Hernández Mir, Marruecos, pp. 161-163; Hernández Mir, Historia, p. 180; Mola, El pasado, p. 1024; Fleming, pp. 156-160; Woolman, pp. 131-133.

151. Franco's retrospective observations on the Ben Tieb affair are in Franco Salgado, Conversaciones, pp. 137-138. According to Queipo de Llano, a prominent africanista and republican activist, even after Ben Tieb Franco planned to arrest Primo, but was unable to involve others in the plot: Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, El general Queipo de Llano perseguido por la Dictadura (Madrid: Javier Morata, 1930), pp. 105-107 [Queipo de Llano, Dictadura"]. While there is no corroborating evidence to support this statement, Payne, Pol, pp. 213-214, and Fleming, pp. 105-107, 182-183, agree, the latter observing that Franco never refuted Queipo on this point.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

poor, training was inadequate, the troops were spread too thinly, and, perhaps above all, the quality of leadership at the highest levels was poor. Primo attempted to address each of these problems, while reorganizing the command system and weeding out incompetents. In addition, he supervised a series of limited withdrawals, giving up 180 posts in the period from July through December of 1924. As Abd el-Krim lent considerable support to al-Raysuni's Jibalan forces, the retreat was a costly affair, the Spanish incurring rather heavy losses. Nevertheless, by the end of 1924 the army was ensconced in a strong defensive position known as the "Primo de Rivera Line," behind which Primo proceeded to direct a vast reorganization of the Moroccan forces, which would ultimately number 135,000 men.[152] Militarily the situation improved still more when, at the end of 1924, apparently believing that the French were going to lend strong support

---

152. Hernández Mir, Marruecos, pp. 183-244; Woolman, pp. 132-145. The most serious losses contingent on the withdrawals occurred at Xauen, in the Jibala, on which see El Sol, 13-14 September 1924, Barea, pp. 419-422, and Francisco Franco, "Xauen, El triste," Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano III, No. 7 (July, 1926). Fleming, pp. 185-195 has the most detail of any account in English, observing that deaths during the retreat numbered slightly less than 2,000. For the reorganization, see Fleming, pp. 212-217. One of the interesting innovations introduced by Primo during this period of "semi-abandonment" was the use of air power to dominate a broad area, in conscious emulation of the British experience in Iraq: Fleming, pp. 140ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to the Spanish, Abd el-Krim unwisely invaded French Morocco.[153] This had the effect of reducing pressure on the Spanish positions in the Protectorate, while forcing the French, who had hitherto rather enjoyed Spain's discomfit in the Rif, and made a bit of a profit off supplying Abd el-Krim with arms in the bargain, to collaborate in suppressing the rebellion.[154] While the stunned French rushed troops to Morocco, the Spanish were given a respite from serious fighting. Moreover, Abd el-Krim fell out with al-Raysuni, and in a brief campaign defeated and imprisoned his erstwhile ally, who died in April of 1925. As a result of Abd el-Krim's attacks on the French and al-Raysuni, the military situation greatly improved for the Spanish. During the spring and summer of 1925 a series of Franco-Spanish political and military conferences were held and the old proposal for a landing at Alhucemas Bay was revived, considered, and implemented.

On the morning of 8 September 1925 a combined Franco-Spanish fleet put 19,000 Spanish troops ashore at Alhucemas Bay under the watchful eyes of Primo, who chose to command the operation personally.[155] The landings proved an

---

153. Woolman, p. 161ff; Fleming, pp. 229ff.

154. Alonso, pp. 497, 518; Woolman, pp. 179ff.

155. Franco, who led the first battalion ashore, has left an excellent first hand account of the operation, Francisco Franco, "Diario de Alhucemas," Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano II, Nos. 9-12 (September-December 1925). A copy of the plans for the landing can be found in "El proyecto de desembarco en Alhucemas del General Martínez Anido," Revista de historia militar 49 (1980), pp. 139-169. There is a lengthy account of the landings, from

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

enormous success. Within a month Ajdir, the Rifian capital, had fallen. Abd el-Krim surrendered to the French on 22 May 1926. This brought the rebellion to an effective end, though there was some organized resistance into the summer of 1926, and the war was not officially proclaimed over until 10 July 1927. It had been an extraordinarily long and costly war for Spain, sixteen years and 20,000 dead.[156] The subjugation of the Protectorate was the principal achievement of the Dictatorship and gave Primo sufficient prestige to rule for almost five more years.[157]

---

their inception, through their execution, and operations subsequent to them, in Fleming, pp. 247-361.

156. In retrospect it is difficult to comprehend how daring an undertaking the Alhucemas landing was. It was the largest successful opposed amphibious landing in history until the Sino-Japanese War, and undertaken barely a decade after the Allied debacle at Gallipoli. It was, indeed, the specter of Gallipoli which delayed for so long the adoption of the plan: Cardona, Poder, pp. 73, 89-90. There is no good account in English, but see Woolman, pp. 187-196, which may be usefully supplemented by Payne, Politics, pp. 219-220. In Spanish there are a number of useful accounts, including official histories, memoirs, and popular treatment. Professor Brian Sullivan of the Naval War College (conversation, 2 August 1990), has indicated that the landings were completely ignored by the United States Navy and Marines, just then developing their own amphibious warfare doctrine.

157. Ramon Alonso observes that success was so great "Primo de Rivera's most irreparable error was in not abandoning power in the autumn of 1925, immediately after the landings at Alhucemas, when he had reached the peak of his prestige with the nation," (Ramon Alonso, pp. 498). Primo did, however, take the opportunity to "civilianize" his administration, replacing the military directory with a civilian one on 3 December 1925.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

During the balance of his dictatorship, Primo faced a number of difficult problems. Although the regime took a number of important steps to promote development, the economy remained weak, political opposition continued from a broad spectrum of parties, separatists in Catalonia and elsewhere tended to become increasingly extreme, and, despite the victory in Morocco, the army remained wary of his intentions and its prerogatives. The difficulties with the army began early and continued right through to the end of the Dictatorship. By issuing a blanket amnesty to cover responsibilities for Anual, Primo alienated the africanistas in the army. By granting merit promotions to several officers who had particularly distinguished themselves in the Alhucemas campaign, he irritated the former junteros.[158] And proposals to reform the army and reduce the number of officers disturbed everyone.[159] In addition, the regime had to deal with a series of coup attempts. Some of these were little more than amateurish plottings, but others were full-blown military conspiracies.[160]

---

158. Among the officers promoted were Francisco Franco, Joaquín Fanjul, and Manuel Goded, all of whom would play prominent roles in the military conspiracy of 1936.

159. Pérez Salas, pp 50-51, asserts that Primo's intention was deliberately designed to divide the army internally, as insurance against a countercoup.

160. Altogether there appear to have been seven conspiracies of a serious nature against Primo. The following account is based generally on López de Ochoa, Hernández Mir, Historia, and Vicente Marco Miranda, Las conspiraciones contra la Dictadura (Madrid: Hijos de Tomás Minuesa, 1930)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first attempt to oust the regime was an abortive effort to organize a coup in September of 1924 by Brigadier General José Cavalcanti, who had quickly become disenchanted with Primo.[161] Shortly afterwards there occurred an obscure affair at Vera de Bidasoa in the western Pyrenees on 7 November 1924, when a band of armed men attempted to cross the frontier from France, skirmished with the Carabineros, and were arrested for armed rebellion.[162] Although opposition to Primo was widespread in the army, notably among senior officers, most of the attempts to overthrow him appear to have been organized at a lower level. Early in January of 1925, Segundo García, a former enlisted man who won the Cruz laureada de San Fernando, Spain's highest award for valor, and subsequently risen to colonel on the Reserve list, began to weave a conspiracy which received wide support, including that of Major General Eduardo López de Ochoa. The whole plot was closely observed by the police, however, and in May the principal leaders were arrested, tried, sentenced, and then pardon by Primo. This experience did little to cool Garcia's ardor for conspiracy, however, and he was shortly

---

161. El Sol, 24 September 1924.

162. There are brief accounts of this cloudy incident in Madariaga, pp. 356-357; Payne, Politics, p. 230, and Ejercito, pp. 336-337.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

involved in another plot. García shortly attracted 83-year old Captain General Valeriano Weyler, a noted liberal whom Primo had deposed as chief-of-the-general staff, and Lieutenant General Francisco Aguilera, second seniormost man in the army. By early 1926 García was in contact with coconspirators throughout Spain, with notable concentrations in Madrid, Valencia, and Cartagena, and including several prominent politicians from across the political spectrum, from monarchists to socialists. Garcia made his move on the evening of 24 June 1926, the "Night of San Juan." But the reading of a manifesto in the Madrid Military Casino failed to spark the planned moves. As a result, within 24-hours the principal conspirators were all under arrest. The "sanjuanada" failed largely due to its improvised nature, which resulted in a lack of support on the part of the bulk of the officers.[163] The leaders of the plot were given fines and prison sentences of varying lengths.[164]

Meanwhile, Primo had announced, on 9 June 1925, that the "open scale" of promotion was henceforth to prevail in

---

163. Alonso Baquer, Modelo, p. 212

164. On the sanjuanada see Fernández Almagro, pp. 486ff; Hernández Mir, Historia, pp. 343-360; López de Ochoa, Dictadura, pp. 108ff; Alpert, Reforma, pp. 111-112; Payne, Ejercito, pp. 338ff, Politics, pp. 244-247. Primo made a number of organizational changes in the aftermath of the conspiracy, the most notable of which was to abolish the Estado mayor central, leaving the chief-of-the-general staff without a staff: Cebreiros, p. 133.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the entire army. The threat to the "closed scale" resulted in a virtual mutiny in the artillery, an essentially conservative minded corps already suffering a crisis of modernization.[165] The result was the most sustained crisis during Primo's dictatorship.[166] While the chief of the artillery section of the general staff, a Brigadier General Correa, dragged his feet over implementing the proposed changes, a dozen colonels and four generals, acting as representatives of the artillery officers, convened an open conference on 12 June 1926 to discuss the violation of their rights and traditions. Despite orders from Primo prohibiting the conference, the officers persisted and even attempted negotiations with the Dictator. Nevertheless, Primo remained adamant, and threatened to resign and return the country to "chaos" should the officers resist the measure.[167] While artillerymen engaged in public demonstrations in support of their privileges, Brigadier General Juan Arzadum, a distinguished officer and writer

---

165. Alonso Baquer, Modelo, p. 213. Although the abolition of the "closed scale" appears to have been the principal grievance of the artillerymen, there were others contributing factors as well. For example, Primo had severely slashed the proportion of artillerymen among the generals, reducing it from 17.7% to a mere 9.8%. See Cardona, "Enseñanza," p. 68, note 4.

166. What follows is based largely on Vigón, II, pp. 193f; Fernández Almagro, pp. 491ff; Payne, Politics, pp. 236-240, and Ejército, pp. 342ff.

167. Vigón, II, pp. 196.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with access to the Crown, intervened on their behalf with Alfonso XIII, who, as was so often the case, proved unwilling to act. Primo moved slowly, since he was by this time aware of Segundo García's imminent coup attempt. On 17 June he concluded a verbal agreement with Correa which limited the number of non-seniority promotions, restricted the assignments which such officers could receive and promised new regulations by 1 October. This seems to have satisfied the artillerymen. But Primo was only biding his time. Once the sanjuanada was over, he began to prepare to deal with the artillerymen. On 26 July, Primo announced that promotions by merit were to be abolished, thereby satisfying the principal objection of the artillerymen, but went on to decree that a certain percentage of vacancies at each level were to be reserved for promotions by "election" of the government, with all promotions, whether by seniority or election, to be approved by the Minister of War. This enraged the artillerymen, who rightly felt that Primo had deceived them. Artillery officers began a series of demonstrations, claiming that Primo had broken his agreement. Primo, in turn, declared that there had been no agreement. Correa resigned, to be replaced by Brigadier General Fabriciano Haro. Haro sent Primo a lengthy communication in which he attempted to present the case for the artillerymen. Primo responded to this in a detailed letter, refuting each point. On 20 August there was a mass

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

meeting of the artillerymen in which they agreed to resist to the last. Primo was, however, now ready to act forcefully against them. On 5 September he made his move. Declaring that a state of war existed, Primo literally disbanded the artillery corps of the Spanish Army, save in Morocco. A few artillerymen attempted to resist, and there was some fighting, with a handful of casualties, but the mutiny was broken so completely that within weeks Primo was able to reconstitute the artillery corps, even permitting virtually all of the expelled officers to return to duty in their former ranks and positions. The crushing of the artillery mutiny was a major step towards instituting uniformity in military organization and regulations.[168] However, Primo's victory was achieved at a price: the affair "broke the loyalty of the artillerymen to the system."[169]

---

168. In passing, it is worth noting that the engineers, who shared the privilege of the "closed scale" with the artillerymen, were less vigorous in their opposition to the measure. Although most of them requested early retirement or transfer to the Reserve, all such petitions were rejected, no penalties were imposed on any engineer officers save three who, having been particularly outspoken, were briefly placed under arrest: Payne, Politics, p. 495, note 36. The Staff Corps, which also shared the "closed scale," was also affected by Primo's measure, but did not react for a variety of reasons, not least because several distinguished staff officers, notably Joaquin Fanjul and Manuel Goded, were early beneficiaries of the measure. In addition, Primo had just dealt the Staff a severe blow by reducing its status from that of a separate corps to that of an auxiliary service: see below.

169. Ramon Alonso, p. 501.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A Catalan secessionist plot was uncovered in November of 1926. The conspiracy, directed by Colonel Francisco Macia, a prominent Catalan separatist, is rather obscure, but it appears that an internal uprising was to coincide with the landing of a small filibustering expedition under Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi, grandson of the Italian national hero, whereupon Catalan independence would be proclaimed. Little came of the matter, and it was quickly cleared up in a series of arrests.[170] The political situation was stable through 1927 and well into 1928, and the army remained quiet, permitting Primo to implement several reforms.

One of Primo's intentions upon assuming power was to reform and modernize the Spanish armed forces. He was able to achieve some measure of success, due primarily to the satisfactory resolution of the war in Morocco. In a symbolic gesture indicative of his intentions to pursue a peaceful foreign policy the Ministry of War became the

---

170. Although Fernandez Almagro (p. 499), says Macia received aid from the Soviet Union, this seems highly unlikely given the presence of Garibaldi, a notorious agent of Mussolini. López de Ochoa, Dictadura, pp. 132ff, has some details on the character of the conspiracy. See also Mott to G-2 (22 November 1926), US NA M.I.D. 2657-S-122 No. 5, which reports on the attempt, and reviews evidence to suggest that it was backed by Mussolini. On Garibaldi's career see Renzo de Felice, Mussolini il fascista (Torino: Einaudi, 1968), Vol. II, pp 145-146. See Alonso Baquer, Modelo, p. 214, for some comments on the romantic, nineteenth century style of the attempt.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ministry of the Army.[171] More concretely, the end of the war permitted a major reduction in the enlisted strength of the army,[172] which permitted the military budget to be reduced by about 20% while leaving sufficient surplus to grant salary increases for field and company grade officers,[173] and allow a modest degree of modernization. In addition to providing some new equipment for the army,[174] while the air force[175] and navy were strengthened.[176] In a particularly important reform, Primo

---

171. Cebreiros, p. 3, has some interesting things to say about this. Primo also became a staunch supporter of the League of Nations, going so far as to seek for Spain a permanent seat on the League Council: Madariaga, pp. 353-354.

172. By 1930, when Primo left power, the enlisted strength of the army had been reduced by about 30% from its 1927 wartime peak of 207,000, while the number of officers had fallen by about 10% from a peak of about 25,000: Anuario militar de España, 1927 and 1930. Note that Primo had little more success at reducing the size of the officer corps than had previous reformers.

173. The increase amounted to about 15% for lieutenants, 30% for captains, 25% for majors and lieutenant colonels, and 20% for colonels. See Payne, Politics, p. 498.

174. See, for example, Javier de Mazarrasa, Los carros de combate en España (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1977), p. 5.

175. On the development of the Spanish Air Force in this period see Jesus Salas Larrazabal, Air War Over Spain (London: Ian Allen, 1969), Chapter I, passim, and José Goma, La guerra en el aire (Barcelona, AHR 1958), pp. 22ff.

176. In 1930 the Spanish Navy ranked sixth in tonnage in the world, primarily due to the work of the Dictatorship. See Alfredo Aguilera and Vicente Elias, Buques de la Armada Española (Madrid: Editorial Naval, 1968), passim.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reduced the staff corps to the status of a service. This change, which had long been advocated by military reformers, permitted the rotation of staff officers back to their original arms so that regimental and battalion staffs could benefit from the skills of trained general staff officers. Although the measure was greatly resented by members of the Estado Mayor, it appears to have pleased officers in the other arms.[177] Primo also attempted to end the parochialism which existed in the various arms by creating a unified military academy which would promote a sense of professional unity among the officers such as was displayed by the africanistas. The idea was sound, to train all officer candidates in one institution for a short period before they went into the separate academies for the individual arms and services.[178] However, the measure was strongly opposed by the "facultative corps," which saw it as a threat to their special privileges. As a result, although a unified military academy had several times been

---

177. The decree changing the status of the staff is found in DOMG 12/15/1925. The staff had historically been a highly privileged arm, and held itself to be the elite of the army. Nevertheless, it did not function as a proper staff corps, neglecting regimental and general staff duties in preference for highly specialized activities such as cartography and military history: Boyd, pp. 142-143, 277. Payne, Politics, p. 232, observes that Primo's action "gratified the animosity felt by most of the other corps toward the General Staff."

178. Alpert, Reforma, p. 255-256; Benzo, pp. 41-42.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

established, it did not long endure. Nevertheless, having apparently broken the power of the artillery, in 1928 Primo decreed the establishment of an Academia General Militar at Zaragoza, under the direction of the brilliant young Brigadier General Francisco Franco.[179] A number of Primo's reforms were rather less successful. He proved unable to effect a significant reduction in the size of the officer corps, although he did severely reduce the number of incoming cadets with the intention of eventually cutting about 5,000 officers from the Army List. The surplus, as it turned out, was of some use, for Primo found jobs for officers as military delegates to local governments, as officers in the Somaten, the bourgeois citizens militia which he created,[180] and in his civil engineering projects. An attempt to streamline promotion procedures and bring them more closely under the control of the War Ministry led

---

179. General military academies existed in the periods 1825-1833, 1842-1850, and 1882-1892. For a treatment of the Spanish experience with a unified military academy see Julio Busquets, Militar, pp. 117-123; on Primo's recreated AGM see Carlos Blanco Escola, La academia general militar de Zaragoza (1928-1931) (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1989), passim, which is comprehensive, if hostile, and the comments in Alpert, Reforma, pp. 109ff.

180. Ben-Ami, Fascism, pp. 168-173 contains a short discussion of the composition and role of the Somaten. José María March, El Somaten (Barcelona: Tipografia la Educación, 1923), is a history of this ancient corps up to Primo's time.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

them more closely under the control of the War Ministry led to some dissatisfaction in the officer corps.[181] Moreover, in the interests of economy, Primo postponed a major modernization of equipment.[182] On the whole Primo's attempts at reform were perhaps modest, but all were reasonable measures and rather successful.[183] Given time, Primo might have accomplished more, but time began to run out in 1928, as Spain's economic situation, quite good in the mid-twenties with the successful conclusion of the Rif War, began to worsen.[184] Political opposition began to grow again.

---

181. López de Ochoa, Dictadura, pp. 78ff; Payne, Politics, pp. 224-226.

182. Payne, Ejercito, p. 348.

183. There exists no study of the military reforms of the Dictatorship, but see Alpert, Reformas, pp. 105-115; Payne, Politics, chapter 12 passim, and Ejercito, chapter 13 passim. Although Primo's ideas on military policy and organization are unclear, he seems to have reasoned that, since Spain was unlikely to become involved in a foreign war, the optimal military establishment for the country was to have an army of four regular divisions plus colonial forces, all backed up a Swiss-style national militia: Payne, Politics, p. 241.

184. For a variety of reasons --a continuing 25% deficit, a French ban on importation of wines, and finally the onset of the Great Depression-- the value of the peseta began to fall after 1927, and continued to do so despite government efforts to bolster its value. Thus,

Pesetas to the Pound Sterling

Gold Par	25.25
January 1927	28.00
December 1928	29.87
June 1929	34.30
October 1929	35.00
December 1929	40.00

Source: The Times of London.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although Primo's dissolution of their corps in 1926 had brought the artillerymen to heel, it had not reconciled them to his regime. Resentment smoldered and in 1928 a series of abortive conspiracies were hatched among artillery officers. Nothing came of any of these, and Primo wisely ignored word of them. However, a more serious conspiracy began to unfold in late 1928, directed by the prominent Conservative politician José Sánchez Guerra.

The Sánchez Guerra conspiracy, which had the support of many artillerymen and Lieutenant General Francisco Aguilera, a veteran of the sanjuanada,[185] also appears to have at least peripherally involved prominent republican and socialist leaders.[186] Vital to the success of the rising was the cooperation of Lieutenant General Alberto

---

185. It will be recalled that Sánchez Guerra had been involved in an exchange of blows with General Aguilera in 1923: see note 125, above. It should be noted that a number of other generals were involved, including Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Eduardo López de Ochoa, Miguel Cabanellas, and José Riquelme, several of whom would play important roles on both sides in 1936: Carlos de Arce, Los generales de Franco (Barcelona: Mitre, 1984), p. 113 ["Arce, Generales"]. Note that on page 42 of his extremely pro-Republican work, José Pérez Salas, a prominent leftist officer who rose to become a general in the Republican Army during the Civil War, argues that Queipo, Cabanellas, and López de Ochoa were motivated to join the conspiracy out of personal pique with Primo rather than for ideological reasons: the introduction to this volume, by Mariano Salafranca, mentions the author's two brothers who were shot by Franco after the war, but not the one whom Franco promoted to lieutenant general, see pp. xii-xiii.

186. Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 116, argues for the probable involvement of Alejandro Lerroux and Manuel Azaña.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Castro Girona, the Captain General of Valencia, a prominent liberal and one of the most capable officers in the Spanish Army. However, Castro Girona had little confidence in the undertaking and refused to commit himself. Meanwhile, of course, the whole business came to Primo's attention. As a result, just as the conspirators were preparing to move -- on 25 January 1929 instructions went out to strike on the night of the 29th-- Primo made a personal visit to Valencia to confirm Castro Girona's loyalties. Although Castro Girona was equally non-committal, in the end, he refused to rise and the whole conspiracy collapsed, although not before the artillerymen of the garrison of Ciudad Real had risen. This rising was quickly suppressed by a column of troops and Civil Guards sent from Madrid under Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo and Brigadier General Luis Orgaz Yoldi. Although some artillerymen in Valencia attempted to emulate their comrades, they were quickly overcome and the whole affair was at an end by 4 February. Some civilian and military leaders were penalized for their participation in the abortive coup, but Primo reserved his particular ire for the artillery corps. Within a few weeks he repeated his performance of 1926, dissolving the entire artillery corps and humiliating the cadets of the artillery academy, who had not been compromised in the rising, thereby compounding the alienation of a significant faction of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officer corps from the government and the crown.[187]

Although the Sánchez Guerra conspiracy had collapsed, it revealed serious weaknesses in the regime's support. So bankrupt was the regime, that Sánchez Guerra was acquitted of charges by a court martial presided over by Federico Berenguer, one of the officers who had helped put Primo in power, a verdict which was confirmed by the Supreme Council of Military Justice. In an attempt to put the best possible face on matters, Primo granted clemency to all individuals convicted of involvement in the conspiracy.[188] The Sánchez Guerra conspiracy demonstrated rather clearly that the Dictator had lost his constituency. Primo began to seek ways to leave power gracefully.[189] It was a decision which had already been reached privately by Alfonso XIII. By the end of 1929 Primo, who was in failing

---

187. Vigón, II, p. 245. One artillery regiment in Madrid attempted to resist dissolution but was quickly overcome: see Payne, Politics, p. 247.

188. Beni-Ami, Fascism 368, says the verdict in the Sánchez Guerra case "amounted to a recognition that a rebellion against an unconstitutional government was unpunishable," which seriously misses the point. On the Sánchez Guerra conspiracy see particularly the account by his son, Rafael Sánchez Guerra El movimiento revolucionario de Valencia (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1930), and López de Ochoa, Dictadura, pp. 150ff. Nine officers who had been sentenced to death had their sentences reduced first to life imprisonment, and these were subsequently reduced to much shorter terms. All of the others involved were pardoned except Castro Girona, who was transferred to the reserve list.

189. Ramon Alonso, p. 506; Ben-Ami, Fascism, p. 378.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

health, had outlined a plan for a series of elections which would lead to a new constitution within two years. At about the same time opposition to the regime became more active.

Towards the end of 1929 Major General Manuel Goded, a talented staff officer who had benefited greatly under the Dictatorship,[190] began to pull together a conspiracy. Although Goded had no coherent program save to get rid of Primo, he achieved considerable success in building a coalition which included republicans and monarchists as well as resentful artillerymen and staff officers.[191] Word of Goded's conspiracy eventually reached Primo's ears. Uncertain of his support, the Dictator took the unusual step of publicly polling the higher ranking officers of the army.[192] The results were less than encouraging. Soon afterwards Primo notified Alfonso XIII that he intended to resign shortly.[193] Meanwhile the conspiracy spread. On 26

---

190. As a reward for his brilliance in the planning of the Alhucemas Campaign, Primo had jumped Goded from colonel to major general on 1 October 1927.

191. The radical republican fringe in the conspiracy was led by the popular and daring aviator Major Ramon Franco, one of the first men to fly the South Atlantic and the brother of Francisco Franco. His personal account of the conspiracy, Deciamos ayer (Barcelona: Maucci, 1931) ["Franco, Deciamos"], is of some value.

192. Hernández Mir, pp. 358-359.

193. Fernández Almagro, p. 540.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

January 1930, the King's uncle, Lieutenant General Don Carlos de Borbon, the Captain General of Seville, sent a letter to his nephew in which he detailed the extent of the conspiracy and pointed out the danger it posed to the throne due to the significant role played by republican elements. To emphasize his concern, two days later he sent a even stronger letter by the hand of his son. Don Carlos' concern moved the King to act. On that same day, Alfonso dispatched the Conde de los Andes to Primo, requesting his immediate resignation. With the Crown joining the opposition, Primo was isolated. On 29 January he resigned and left for Paris, where he died three months later.[194]

The Dictatorship had by no means been unsuccessful. But it had failed to resolve the basic political, social, economic, and military problems of Spain. Although well-intentioned, Primo had lacked the will and the support to undertake a fundamental overhaul of society. Intending to save the state as he knew it, in the end Primo destroyed the constitutional monarchy.[195] The crown survived the dictatorship by little more than a year.

Alfonso XIII had no difficulty in choosing a man to replace Primo de Rivera, selecting the Commandant General

---

194. Fernández Almagro, pp. 540ff; Hernandez Mir, pp. 356ff.

195. Payne, Politics, p. 255, contains a brief survey of opinions on Primo de Rivera's dictatorship; see also Carr, Modern, p. 110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the Albarderos, the Royal Guard, and chief of his Military Household, Lieutenant General Damaso Berenguer.[196] Although Berenguer had been commander-in-chief in Morocco at the time of the Anual disaster, in the years since he had accumulated some measure of popularity and even acquired a reputation as a liberal due to a run-in with Primo which had resulted in his being placed under house arrest for six months in 1924.[197] Berenguer's government was clearly intended to be an interim one, designed to facilitate the transition from an essentially military, authoritarian regime to a more liberal civilian one.[198] In an attempt to cool military tempers, Berenguer reversed many of Primo's most irritating reforms, and restored to active duty most of the officers whom he had expelled from

---

196. Ramon Alonso, p. 507.

197. Payne, Politics, p. 228.

198. Although an attempt to explain and justify his administration, Berenguer's memoir of his year in power, De la dictadura a la Republica (Madrid: Ediciones Plus Ultra, 1946) ["Berenguer, Dictadura"], is relatively self-critical and provides a useful insight into his perception of events. Berenguer made relatively few military appointments. Aside from himself, there were only two other officers in the cabinet, the Ministers of Marine and of the Interior. In an effort to neutralize the potentially politically dangerous Goded, Berenguer named him Undersecretary of War. Brigadier General Emilio Mola Vidal, a good administrator and veteran africanista with moderately liberal political beliefs but no experience in police work, was made Director General of Security, effectively head of the national police. On the Berenguer government, see particularly Payne, Politics, p. 257.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the army and navy,[199] and even arranged for a pay increase.[200] However, these measures were insufficient to do very much to restore confidence in the monarchy, coming much too late to be of help.[201] Although the departure of Primo had caused the Goded conspiracy to collapse, its more extreme elements, led by Gonzalo Queipo de Llano and Ramón Franco, soon formed the Asociación militar republicana (AMR), a loosely organized group of discontented artillery, air force, and intendance officers.[202] Meanwhile, exacerbated by the deepening world depression, the economic

---

199. However, at the specific request of Alfonso XIII, Miguel Cabanellas, Eduardo López de Ochoa, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, José Riquelme, and Pedro de la Cerda, all prominent liberal generals, were not restored to active duty. These officers appear to have all been involved in the clandestine Assóciacion militar republicana, which had been formed during the Dictatorship for the specific purpose of promoting the overthrow of the Monarchy. Queipo de Llano is generally believed to have been the president of the A.M.R. and López de Ochoa was certainly an activist: see Busquets, Pronunciamiento, pp. 122ff. Most of these men would play important roles in the events of 1936: see Arce, Generales, p. 223. On the AMR, see below.

200. Among several measures taken to pacify various factions in the armed forces, Berenguer restored the cherished "closed scale" to the artillery. For this, and other changes see, Ramon Alonso, p. 508; Berenguer, p. 5; Vigon, II, p. 250.

201. Berenguer, Dictadura, p. 6.

202. On the creation of the AMR see Franco, Deciamos, pp. 163-166. So discontented with the regime were the artillerymen that the Director General of Security, Emilio Mola, who proved an excellent intelligence officer, would shortly write "the artillery arm is today virtually wholly at the service of the revolution": Emilio Mola Vidal, Memorias, in Obras completas, p. 410.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

situation continued to deteriorate. Berenguer found himself unable to do more than drift in the face of rising opposition, the feebleness of his regime earning the nickname dictablanda.[203] On 16 August 1930 a mixed group of conservatives, liberals, and leftists met at San Sebastian, in the north of Spain. A two day conference resulted in an agreement to form a junta revolucionaria to press for the creation of a Republic. Naming Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, a former liberal monarchist, as their chairman, the signers of the "Pact of San Sebastian" in effect created a "shadow cabinet" ready to assume power when the time came.[204] By the autumn of 1930 a new conspiracy was afoot. Organized by veteran africanista Captain Fermín Galán, both Gonzalo Queipo de Llano and Ramon Franco played important roles in this widespread republican plot which was set for 14 December. Galán upset the timetable for the rising by taking over the garrison at Jaca, in the Pyrenees, on the 12th. Although Galán got his

---

203. Although Mola was able to effect some changes in the security forces, his primary success was to turn them into a relatively effective intelligence gathering service. So unpopular was the regime, that both Berenguer and the security forces themselves were reluctant to become too repressive. On Mola's career as Director General of Security see his Memorias, passim. Payne, Politics, p. 259, has a number of observations on Mola's experiences as well.

204. Madariaga, p. 389. Most of the members of the junta revolucionaria formed the first Republican cabinet in April of 1931; Sedgewick, pp. 71-72.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

men into trucks and on the road to Huesca, the principal garrison in the region, the local Guardia civil remained loyal and, with the help of troops dispatched from surrounding areas, the rebels were overcome on the morning of the 13th. In an effort to salvage the something from the disaster, Quiepo de Llano attempted to raise the garrison at the Cuatro Vientos air base outside Madrid, while Ramon Franco dropped a few bombs on the palace. When the government failed to collapse, Franco, Quiepo, and several other plotters fled by air to Portugal, leaving the less fortunate Galán to face a firing squad. Like so many of the attempts against the Dictatorship and the Monarchy, the Jaca and Cuatro Vientos risings had failed primarily due to their improvised nature, more characteristic of a romantic nineteenth century liberal insurrection than of a meticulously timed military maneuver.[205] That the Berenguer government successfully weathered the events of 12-14 December 1930 was largely a matter of good luck. The

---

205. Berenguer, pp. 246ff; A good treatment of the Jaca affair may be found in Manuel Tuñon de Lara, "La sublevacion de Jaca," Historia 16 1 (May, 1976), pp. 57-64. Fernandez Almagro, pp. 569ff, and Emilio Mola Vidal, Memorias, pp. 531ff, both contain accounts of the rising. For highly partisan treatments see Ramon Franco, Madrid bajo las bombas (Madrid: Zeus Editorial, 1931), and Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, El movimiento revolucionario de Cuatro Vientos (Madrid: Javier Morata, 1933). On the character of the risings see Alonso Baquer, Modelo, pp. 224-228. Years later the Franco regime would maintain the special pension which the Republic granted to Galán's widow: Franco Salgado, Conversaciónes, p.414.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

regime staggered on for some weeks more. Finally, with little support to be had from any parties, even the monarchists, the government resigned on 14 February 1931. Alfonso XIII named a nonentity to replace Berenguer, the 71-year old Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar, a man "geographically from Cartagena and politically from the moon."[206] Although well-intentioned, the Aznar cabinet, which included Damaso Berenguer as a very reluctant Army Minister and Juan de la Cierva as Minister of the Interior, was essentially an attempt to create a conservative government in order to restore the constitution of 1876. However, the monarchy was so totally discredited that there was little hope that the Aznar government would remain in power for very long. Republican agitation became widespread, particularly during the trial of the Jaca conspirators. A revolutionary committee was formed and there was virtual open talk about the composition of the first republican cabinet. Lacking a political base, in early March the government announced that on 12 April municipal elections would be held for the first time in many years. Alfonso and Aznar apparently believed that the elections would demonstrate a strong monarchist undercurrent, a "silent majority" as it were. The voters returned 40,168 republican municipal delegates to 40,320

---

206. Ramon Alonso, p. 510.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

monarchists, despite widespread fraud and coercion in rural areas, largely controlled by monarchist political bosses. The result constituted a disastrous defeat for the monarchy.[207] Various members of the government, and apparently the King himself, inquired as to the possibility of ruling by force. While Berenguer sounded out the principal military commanders, la Cierva met with Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo, hero of Alhucemas and currently Director General of the Guardia Civil. Both received discouraging replies.[208] Similarly, Emilio Mola, the Director General of Security, expressed his reluctance to send the police to suppress what he called the "indisputable expression of the national will."[209] The experience of the Dictatorship had soured most of the officers on politics and the Crown. As a result, the bulk of the officer corps was politically confused and indifferent, no longer committed to the monarchy. Nor, save for a few extremists such as Queipo de Llano and Ramon Franco, were they committed to a republic, but they were,

---

207. Ramon Alonso, p. 520, note 47, contains a brief discussion of the figures.

208. Berenguer, pp. 379-380; Conde de Romanones, Las ultimas horas de una monarquia (Madrid, 1931), pp. 79-80. Years later Francisco Franco would, perhaps uncharitably, say that Sanjurjo was ill-disposed towards Alfonso because he had not been named a Gentleman Chamberlain nor awarded the Toison de oro: Franco Salgado, Conversaciones, p. 498.

209. Mola, Memorias, pp. 849, 858-859.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

at least, willing to give one a chance.[210] At best a small minority of the cavalry officers were willing to stand by the regime.[211] However, although the bulk of the officers were not convinced republicans, by 1931 a "republican 'revolution' was for many a conservative solution" to the problems of Spain, especially in view of the experience of the Dictatorship and of the role of Alfonso XIII in undermining the constitution.[212] The withdrawal of the army from active support of Alfonso XIII effectively created a situation of "everyone against the monarchy."[213] As in 1923, when no one was willing to stand by the parliamentary system, and in 1930, when no one was willing to stand by Primo de Rivera, so now no one was willing to stand by the Crown. On 14 April Alfonso XIII stepped down

---

210. Mola, in Memorias, p. 397, and El pasado, pp. 1039-1041, and Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, in his Dictadura, pp. 46ff, both make this point most effectively. See also, Payne, Ejercito, pp. 365, 370, and Miguel Maura, Asi cayo Alfonso XIII (Mexico: Imprenta Manez, 1962), p. 29, who observes that "A minority were Republicans -- others, simply soldiers -- the rest, merely crazy." Miranda, p. 54, asserts that Alejandro Lerroux, the long-time leader of the radical republicans, maintained a file of officers "apt" to be induced to support a republican coup due to liberal inclinations or general discontent with the monarchy.

211. Maura Gamazo and Fernández Almagro, p. 395.

212. Shlomo Ben-Ami The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 28 ["Ben-Ami, Origins."].

213. Merino, p. 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from the throne which he had occupied since birth.[214] Thus was the Spanish Second Republic born.[215]

---

214. Treatments of the fall of Alfonso XIII are numerous and all largely partisan, of which the most recent is Ben-Ami's Origins. For various first-hand perspectives see Berenguer, Dictadura; Romanones; Miguel Maura; Maura Gamazo and Fernández Almagro; and Mola, Memorias, pp. 707ff.

215. Arguably the Republic came to power as the result of a military coup, a view which is discussed and rejected in Seco Serrano, pp. 367-373. Many years later Franco would observe that "The Republicans acted . . . when they became convinced that neither the King nor the Army would offer resistance." Franco Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 467.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter III

The Republic, Manuel Azaña, and the Army, 1931-1933.

On the advent of the Republic Major Ramón Franco is said to have remarked to Major General Miguel Cabanellas that "the bulk of the army is republican."[1] He was wrong. The army, as represented by its officers, was not republican, it was merely not anti-republican. The officers supported the Republic because it was the only alternative to the hopelessly compromised monarchy.[2] In effect, they were acting in conformity with the priorities set in a slogan of which Primo de Rivera had been fond, "Religion, Country, Monarchy."[3] Aside from a small group of ardent republicans perhaps best represented by Ramon Franco himself, most officers were "passive and expectant" about the Republic.[4] More than anything else, a majority of the officers seem to have believed that the Republic would not undertake a great transformation of the nation, and were confident that it would assure the orderly

---

1. Guillermo Cabanellas, La guerra de los mil dias (Barcelona: Planeta, 1973), p. 165 ["Cabanellas, Mil."].

2. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 127-128.

3. Madariaga, p. 344; Alpert, Reforma, pp. 127-128.

4. Payne, Ejército, p. 380.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

functioning of society.[5] Equating the national interest with their own, most officers were inclined to withhold judgment on the Republic until it revealed its military policy.[6] However, no one knew what that would be. Indeed, it appears that many believed such a policy did not exist, for the Republicans were by no means a coherent group with a well-defined platform for the global reform of society.[7] Nevertheless, the Republic did, in effect, have a military policy, in the person of a man who had a vision of what constituted the proper relationship between the military and society for Spain. In accord with the "Pact of San Sebastian," the new cabinet, headed by Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, included Manuel Azaña as War Minister.[8]

Manuel Azaña (1880-1940) was a staunch left-wing republican with a taste for letters, who had occasionally written on military affairs, but who lacked any practical

---

5. Arce, Generales, p. 46; Boyd, p. 278

6. Boyd, p. 278.

7. Arce, Generales, p. 46; Carr, Modern, p. 112.

8. For the political career of the Alcala-Zamora government see Carr, Modern, pp. 116ff. Interestingly, although in 1927 Primo de Rivera had changed the name from "Ministry of War" to "Ministry of the Army" to demonstrate his intention to pursue a peaceful foreign policy, the signers of the "Pact of San Sebastian" created Azana shadow "Minister of War," a designation which was carried over into the Provisional Government of the Republic and subsequently incorporated into the Constitution of 1931: on this see Cebreiros, p. 3; Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 225.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

political, administrative, or military experience.[9] He was born into comfortable circumstances in Alcalá de Henares, a small city some 30 miles northeast of Madrid.[10] Azaña, his brother, and a sister were raised by his paternal grandmother, both his parents having died when he was young. Aside from displaying a precocious talent for literary endeavors, his early life and education was not unlike that of most other boys of his class, and he received a doctor of laws degree in 1900, at the age of 20. Although he secured a position with a prominent law firm in Madrid, Azana continued his literary pursuits, producing

---

9. The closest thing to a proper biography of Azaña in any language is that by Frank Sedgewick, The Tragedy of Manuel Azaña and the Fate of the Spanish Republic (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1963), upon which the following account of Azana's early life is largely drawn. Cipriano Rivas-Xerif [Cherif], Retrato de un desconocio (Vida de Manuel Azaña) (Mexico: Oasis, 1961), by Azaña's lifelong friend and brother-in-law, although essentially a memoir, is of some value for its personal perspective on the man and events. See also Emilio Aguado, Don Manuel Azaña Díaz (Barcelona: Nauta, 1972); Vincente Alberto Serrano and José María San Lucar, editors, Azaña (Madrid: Edoscal, 1980), a collective work in which various scholars examine different aspects of Azaña's life and work; E. Giménez Caballero, Manuel Azaña (profecías españolas) (Madrid: Turner, 1975), a brief, highly sympathetic personal profile; Juan Marichal, La vocación de Manuel Azaña (Madrid; Editorial Cuadernos, 1971), an interesting summary of Azaña's thought. For Azaña's role in the Civil War see Carlos Rojas, Dos Presidentes: Azaña/Companys (Barcelona: Dirosa, 1977).

10. Azaña's father, a prosperous, liberal-minded landowner and soap manufacturer who imparted to his son his penchant for letters, served several years as mayor of the city: Sedgewick, pp. 4-7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

various essays and articles, and for a while publishing a weekly satirical journal at Alcalá. A brief attempt at managing the family properties proved unsuccessful, and Azaña secured an administrative post in the Ministry of Justice. Over the next few years he built a varied career as a bureaucrat, teacher of law, journalist, and essayist, becoming an active member of the Ateneo of Madrid. In 1911 Azaña was awarded a government grant to study at the Sorbonne for a year, during which period he developed an interest in French constitutional forms, coming to believe that they held the key to the resolution of the problems which beset Spain.[11] On his return to Spain, Azaña resumed his previous activities, becoming secretary of the Ateneo and joining the newly founded Reformist Party in 1913. The following year saw the outbreak of World War I. The war was of considerable importance in Azaña's development as a politically active individual.

Although Spain was neutral in the Great War, its people were rather seriously divided. Most conservatives, nationalists, and the Church tended to be pro-German, while the Left, the crown, and the more industrialized regions were pro-Allied. The army was split into pro-Allied and

---

11. Sedgewick, pp. 15-16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

pro-German factions.[12] Azaña himself readily adopted a pro-Allied position and soon became actively involved in numerous pro-Allied activities. He delivered lectures, wrote newspaper columns, and organized demonstrations supporting the Allied cause. In 1917 Azaña toured the Western Front as a guest of the French government, and shortly afterwards was invited to visit the Italian Front.[13] His wartime experiences resulted in a number of essays and newspaper reports[14] and, in January of 1918, in a series of lectures on French military policy which he delivered at the Ateneo. These formed the core of Azaña's first important political work, a study of French military policy. Designed to be the first part of a three volume work, Estudios de política francesa contemporánea, La política militar [Studies in Contemporary French Policy,

---

12. Madariaga, pp. 311ff; Payne, Politics, 120, 122. It appears that africanistas and staff officers tended to be pro-Allied, while the balance of the army was largely pro-German. For the attitude of the Army, see José María Garate Cordoba, "Los militares españoles ante la Gran Guerra," Hispania, Vol. 45, No. 161 (September-December 1985), pp. 579-614.

13. It is interesting to speculate as to the extent to which Azaña was involved with Allied intelligence agencies. The late Leonard Covello, born in culturally similar Southern Italy and fluent in Spanish, served as an American intelligence operative in Spain during 1917-1919, and counted among his duties making contact with Allied sympathizers. (Personal communication.)

14. These are most conveniently available in his Obras Completas, edited by Juan Marichal (Mexico: Oasis, 1966), Vol I, pp. 116-202, 234-249, and 506-540.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Military Policy] addresses itself to broad questions of fundamental policy.[15] Published just as the Great War was coming to an end, the book does not seem to have created much of a stir. With the war over, Azaña returned to the literary life.

Over the next decade Azaña became a fairly successful author, critic, and translator, producing a considerable number of essays, lectures, reviews, and other works, while editing several journals and engaging a number of literary enterprises and battles with such notables as Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset.[16] Undoubtedly his most important work in this period was El jardín de los frailes [The Garden of the Monks], a powerful attack on the Church published in 1927 in the form of a novel, but essentially a memoir of his student days at a Church-run secondary school.[17] That same year he won the Spanish National Prize

---

15. La política militar was completed in October of 1918 and published soon afterwards. The standard edition is Manuel Azaña, Estudios de política francesa contemporánea: La político militar in Obras Completas, I, pp. 259-434 ["Azaña, Militar"]. The other volumes were to be entitled El laicismo [Laicism] and La organización del sufragio [The Organization of the Suffrage], but were never completed, nor apparently even begun: Sedgewick, pp. 17-18; Marichal, p. 117.

16. For a discussion of Azaña's literary life see Sedgewick, pp. 20-69. The Obras completas include all works which have survived.

17. See Sedgewick, pp. 41-44 for a discussion of El jardín de los frailes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for Literature for a biography of Juan Valera, a prominent nineteenth century Spanish literary figure.[18] Thus by the late 1920s Azaña had carved an important niche for himself in the literary life of Spain, and in recognition of his talents was elected to a two-year term as president of Ateneo in 1930.[19] Meanwhile he began to become active in the country's political life as well, helping to form Acción repúblicana in 1927, a movement dedicated to the replacement of the monarchy by a republic. As one of the founders of Acción repúblicana, he became a signer of the "Pact of San Sebastian" in August of 1930. Azaña was given the post of "shadow" War Minister in the junta revolucionaria, apparently on the strength of his La

---

18. Sedgewick, pp. 30-35, contains a discussion of the influence of Valera on Azaña's intellectual development. Curiously, this work of apparently considerable literary merit was never published and is now largely lost: Sedgewick, p. 30. Interestingly, Azaña's prize was awarded during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.

19. Azaña's personal life in this period was rather conventional. Although generally considered a confirmed bachelor, in 1929 he married Dolores Rivas Cherif, 22 years his junior and the sister of his close friend Cipriano Rivas Cherif. His long bachelorhood, and his friendship with Rivas Cherif, a homosexual theatrical director and litterateur, prompted accusations of homosexuality from his political foes during the Republic and Civil War. However, such charges are not unknown in Spanish politics: Francisco Franco, who had a high pitched voice and no mistress, was the subject of similar tales. On this see Sedgewick, p. 22, and Gabriel Jackson, Historian's Quest (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 55, ["Jackson, HQ"], a work of considerable value in developing an understanding of Spain and the political forces at work during the Republic.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

política militar, none of the other signers having had any military exposure whatsoever, nor any concrete ideas about the armed forces.[20] In consequence, when the Republic was proclaimed, the littérateur became the War Minister at 10:00 p.m. on 14 April 1931.[21]

Azaña, who was fundamentally a pacifist, never set down in a concise fashion his ideas concerning military policy and organization. Nevertheless, his subsequent actions, combined with bits and pieces from his speeches, his diary,[22] and particularly La política militar permit the development of what is probably a reliable picture of Azaña's military ideas at the time he assumed power in the

---

20. Cardona, Poder, p. 117.

21. The cabinet which took office upon the advent of the Republic included all nine "shadow" cabinet members, plus three other persons. Of the twelve, only one was not a member of the Ateneo, Francisco Largo Caballero, head of the Socialist Unión general de trabajadores [General Workers Union], the Minister of Labor: Carr, Modern, p. 120. In addition, six of the twelve ministers, including Azaña, were Freemasons: Conselleria de Cultura, Educació, i Ciència, Generalitat Valenciana, "Exposición de La Masonería Española, 1728-1936" (Valencia/Alicante: La Conselleria, 1989), p. II ["Conselleria, 'Exposición'"].

22. The standard edition of Azaña's diary is in Manuel Azaña, Memorias políticas y de guerra, 1931-1939, in Obras completas, IV ["Azana, Memorias"]. This is, however, incomplete, lacking those portions of the Memorias previously published in Memorias intimas de Azaña, edited with annotations by Joaquín Arrarás (Madrid: Ediciones españoles, 1939) ["Azaña/Arrarás, Memorias"], of which there is no mention in the edition of Juan Marichal. For a discussion of the Memorias as an historical document see Appendix 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

War Ministry.[23] Azaña believed that the Spanish Army was wasteful,[24] poorly organized,[25] "inefficient, ignorant, and pretentious."[26] Worse, it was praetorian, plagued by

---

23. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 18-60, and Cardona, Poder, pp. 116-137, contain the most evenhanded discussions of Azaña's military thought. For more enthusiastic but less objective treatments see: Giménez, p. 163, "Azaña undoubtedly had an instinct for military matters"; Marichal, p. 13, "Azaña was for many Spaniards the incarnation of all the hopes of that glorious spring [of 1931]."; Ramos Oliviera, p. 326, "Azaña was justly reputed to be well informed on military matters. . . "; and Pérez Salas, pp. 47-53. In contrast, consider the view of Cabanellas, Cuatro, II, pp. 225-227, who remarks upon the peculiarity of having "An anti-militarist reorganize the army." Overall, it is difficult to view Azaña as a genuine reformer. The net effect of his principal efforts were to establish a "republican" attitude in the army, rather than to embark upon any major institutional restructuring: see below for various criticisms of his work.

24. Azaña noted that in the late monarchy the cost of horses --which had to be of "the Spanish race"-- produced by the Servicio de criar caballar [Horse Breeding Service], which, with related agencies, employed 17% of the cavalry officers in its dozen establishments, was a bit over 4,000 pesetas a head, a sum equal to the annual salary of a second lieutenant. Manuel Azaña, Speech to the Cortes, 2 December 1931, Obras completas, II, pp. 85-102. This address was a general survey of Azaña's accomplishments as War Minister, and provides a useful insight into his thought.

25. On assuming control of the War Ministry, Azaña was surprised to learn that, rather than being an all-powerful commanding general, the chief-of-the-general staff was in fact a glorified clerk with a salary actually less than that of the territorial inspectors general: Memorias, 31 May 1932.

26. Arce, Generales, p. 47

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

careerism, and "infected with militarism."[27] These problems had been caused by a lack of unity and will in Spanish society, as expressed in the weakness of the successive governments of the monarchy, which required the support of the army "in order to enforce obedience and even to maintain themselves in power."[28] The army --like the nation-- did not belong to one family but represented the "nation armed." As the Republic was the nation, the army could identify with the nation only in the Republic.[29] Since the army had heretofore been closely identified with the "former regime," it was therefore necessary to "republicanize" it so that it could become a symbol and support of the Republic.[30] Indeed, the abolition of the

---

27. Manuel Azaña, "La Dictadura en España," Obras completas, I, p. 552 ["Azaña, 'Dictadura.'"]. Under the Monarchy and the Republic the Left criticized the Army for being "too political." By the 1960s, after a generation under Franco, the criticism had come full circle, now revolving around the notion that the Army had "no ideology." In fact, it was the dictatorship of Francisco Franco which did most to professionalize and depoliticize the Army. See Stanley G. Payne, Franco's Spain (New York: Crowell, 1967), pp. 93-94 ["Payne, FS."].

28. Azaña, 2 December 1931.

29. Manuel Azaña, Speech to the Cortes, 22 April 1931, Gaceta de Madrid, 23 April 1931: see also Alpert, Reforma, p. 127.

30. Azaña, 2 December 1931; see also Boyd, p. 157. Note how Azaña ignores the role of the army in helping to bring about the Republic: Alonso Baquer, Modelo, p. 195, observes that most Spanish intellectuals had the "ingenuous pretension" that nothing had ever occurred in Spanish politics which required them to assign a role to the military in the preparations for a Republic.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

existing military system was a "matter of life or death" for the Republic.[31] The new Spain required "a national, compulsory, and democratic army."[32] Thus, the existing army had to be integrated into a liberal state, politically disciplined, professionalized, and turned into a force capable of fighting a modern war.[33] The model for a reformed army would be that of France, as Azaña saw it in his La política militar.[34]

La política militar concentrates on French military policy from 1871 through 1914. As Azaña was essentially seeking lessons applicable to Spain, the work is highly theoretical, concentrating on the problem of securing the most effective army with the least threat to civil liberties and society. As a result, Azaña's focus is far too narrow and ideological. Basically the only aspect of French military policy which really interested Azaña was civilian control of the military.[35] Azaña's sympathy for Republican France led him to ignore inconvenient realities.

---

31. Azaña, Militar, p. 262.

32. Giménez Caballero, p. 165.

33. Azaña, Militar, p. 262; see also Arce, Generales, p. 47.

34. Arce, Generales, p. 47; Giménez Caballero, p. 164. In contrast note that Rivas Xerif, p. 75, asserts that the reforms were not based on the French model save in principle.

35. Payne, Ejército, p. 381.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Thus, La política militar gives no hint that the Third Republic, even in its most radical periods, was always imperialistic and revanchist, generally very militaristic, and usually not unwilling to use the army as an instrument of social control. Surprisingly, Azaña, glosses over the Dreyfus Affair in four pages, concluding that "the Republic lost its fear of the generals,"[36] while making no mention of the "affaire des fiches" in 1904, which found the War Minister, using a network of Freemasons in the army as informants, maintaining secret dossiers on the religious views of the members of the officer corps, and arranging to deny promotions and choice assignments to officers suspected of being too religious.[37] Azaña also clouded the issue by making frequent reference to Jean Jaures' L'Armee Nouvelle, which, whatever merit it may have had, did not reflect the military policy of the Third Republic.[38] Moreover, he overlooked the fundamental differences between the strategic situation of France and that of Spain, and he ignored technical matters as being beyond the realm of

---

36. Azaña, Militar, pp. 303-306.

37. Payne, Ejército, p. 381, and Cebreiros, 127-128, have some observations about Azaña's omission of this affair, but avoid any discussion of his cursory treatment of the far more significant Dreyfus Affair.

38. Jaures is the particular focus of pp. 392-411 of La política militar. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 14, 54-57 and Cebreiros, pp. 21ff, contain critiques of the influence of Jaures on Azaña.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

policy.[39] Yet it was precisely in these areas --strategy, tactics, heavy artillery, fortifications-- that the French Army was to prove most deficient at the onset of the Great War.[40] Another important weakness of the work is that Azaña completely ignored the war which was being waged even as it was being written. Despite the fact that in the Prologue he says "The German War has, in effect, become a test of the military organizations of the entire world, whether belligerent or not, in terms of their professional capacity and technical preparation,"[41] there are no notable references to the events of 1914-1918 in the work, nor any attempt to consider the effects of pre-war French military policy on wartime performance. Of 411 items listed in his bibliography, only eight --less than 2%-- were published during the war.[42] Thus, whatever validity La política militar possessed was applicable only to the period up to 1914.[43] Nevertheless, the military policy of the French

---

39. Azaña, Militar, pp. 264-266.

40. Although other works are perhaps more detailed and more scholarly, the most convenient summary of the defects in French military doctrine in 1914 remains Barbara W. Tuchman's The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962), passim.

41. Azaña, Militar, p. 260.

42. Azaña, Militar, pp. 423-434.

43. Nazario Cebreiros, a perceptive, decidedly hostile, and occasionally acid critic went so far as to say that "Azaña interrupted his studies in 1913": Cebreiros, pp. 169-170.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Third Republic, as he understood and interpreted it, was to be the basis of Manuel Azaña's attempt to reform the army of the Spanish Second Republic. Azaña believed that Spain's military needs could best be served by a regular army which, with reserves, would total no more than 200,000 men, supplemented by a militia of several millions. Such an army would be sufficient for internal security, to maintain control of Morocco, and to serve as a covering force in the event of war, to secure the time needed for the militia to mobilize and take the field.[44] The army that Spain had when Azaña became War Minister was something else entirely.

The army which the Republic inherited from the Borbón monarchy was certainly not a very good one. On paper it was enormous and top heavy. There were 148 generals and 43 asimilados with 21,996 other officers to command about 145,000 men in the Peninsula and dependent areas, with an additional 55,000 more in Morocco and the colonies,[45] plus

---

44. González Muñiz, pp. 74-75. Citing no evidence, Aguilar Olivencia, p. 91, claims that a proposal to reduce the army to five divisions was considered but rejected. It is interesting to compare Azana's view with that of Primo de Rivera, who believed that Spain could get by with an even smaller regular force, four divisions plus the colonial army, supplemented by a national militia: see above, Chapter II, note 183.

45. The paper strength of the Spanish Army, approximately 217,000 officers and men, was excessive when compared with the armies of other European powers. Deducting the approximately 10,000 indigenous colonial troops, on paper Spain had one citizen under arms in every 110.8, about 0.9% of the population. The military participation ratio --the number of civilians per soldier-- for some of the other powers was: Belgium, 277.9; Britain, 313.2; Czechoslovakia, 121.9; France, 129.7; Germany,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a pool of over a million reservists.[46] Of course, actual strength was a good deal less. Due to budgetary constraints, only about 80,000 men were called annually, and, Morocco aside, there were frequently no more than 50,000 men with the colors.[47] As there were 16 infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and several separate brigades in the Peninsular Army, organization was extraordinarily skeletal, with some battalions in cadre, having only 80 men.[48] The army was expensive, running

---

638.3; Italy, 212.8; Poland 115.5; and Portugal, 178.2, again excluding colonial troops. Germany, of course, was still operating under the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. League of Nations Armaments Yearbook, 1931.

46. See U.S. National Archives, State Department Decimal File 852.20/81 (21 February 1936).

47. Based on the actual active duty strength of the army, including Morocco, about 12,700 officers and 102,000 enlisted men, the enlisted-to-officer ratio was 7.6:1, at the time the worst in Europe save for Portugal. Adjusting for the existence of independent air forces in some countries, the number of enlisted men per officer in various European armies was: Belgium, 18.3; Britain, 19.3; Bulgaria, 20.7; Czechoslovakia, 10.9; France, 13.9; Germany, 22.1; Greece, 12.3; Hungary, 19.7; Italy, 12.2; Poland, 13.9; Portugal, 6.4; Romania, 10.7; and Yugoslavia, 13.8. Figures exclude colonial forces and police troops: The League of Nations Armaments Yearbook, 1930. Surprisingly, the number of generals was not excessive, for, excluding asimilados, the Royal Guard, and honorary ranks, there was about one major general for each 3400 men in the army in 1931, at a time when the British Army had one major general for every 2530 men: see Alpert, Reforma, p. 178-179.

48. Azaña, 2 December 1932. The multiplicity of units was partially a consequence of Spanish mobilization plans, which envisioned the standing formations as cadres to be fleshed out in time of war, and partially as a way to provide jobs for the enormous number of officers. See Cebreiros, pp. 43-48, with particular reference to p. 46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

about 17% of the national budget.[49] It was poorly equipped, lacked heavy artillery, had few modern machine guns, virtually no motorized elements nor modern aircraft, and was short of ammunition.[50] Considering its performance in Morocco, the efficiency of the army was open to question. Moreover, it was widely regarded as a conservative, caste-ridden preserve of aristocrats, generally hostile to the Republic. The new War Minister

---

49. Including the Navy and Moroccan budgets, military expenditures ran to about 25% of the national budget, a sum roughly equal to the deficit: Ben-Ami, Fascism, p. 340; González Muñiz, p. 59. However, it should be noted that the problem was perhaps not so much that the armed forces cost a great deal, as that Spain was a poor country. Spanish per capita defense spending was actually among the lowest in Europe, 20 pesetas, excluding expenditures for Morocco. Converting local currency into pesetas, the comparable figures for various European powers were: Belgium, 109.0; Britain, 51.6; Czechoslovakia, 12.2; France, 41.0; Germany, 14.0; Italy, 21.4; Poland, 22.0; Portugal, 12.3; and Switzerland, 24.0: The League of Nations Armaments Yearbook, 1930.

50. See Mola, El pasado, p. 1096ff. Some of these problems were the result of budgetary constraints, complicated by the need to support the excessive number of officers. A number, however, had more complex roots. For example, Azaña made much of the lack of heavy artillery. In his speech of 2 December 1931, he claimed that the Rifians had heavier guns than did the Spanish. This was technically accurate, for the Moroccans had captured a few 150mm guns from the French and had employed them against the Spanish on occasion (Woolman, p. 183), while the Spanish had relied heavily on 75mm and 65mm pieces. However, as pointed out by Franco in his "Reformas necessarias," Revista de Tropas coloniales (Nov., 1928), while heavier artillery was understandable for a regular European army, experience had shown that the Spanish artillery required lighter pieces, since heavier pieces had frequently proven an impediment to rapid movement in Morocco. See also Cebreiros, p. 39.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

set out to change all of this.

On taking office, Azaña, had six major objectives;[51]

1. Reduce personnel to match the resources of the nation.
2. Cut expenditures.
3. Create an army able to defend Spain and the Republic.
4. Republicanize the army.
5. Keep the army in the barracks.
6. Reduce the army's political, social, and economic influence.

It was an ambitious program, and one which could easily run into difficulties from entrenched interests. But it was also a program with which many officers could sympathize.[52] Azaña began well, issuing a statement on 15 April in which he praised the patriotism and discipline of the army in its support for the new Republic.[53] Such a conciliatory tone was highly uncharacteristic of Azaña. Indeed, quite the contrary. Even sympathetic observers

---

51. A good summary of Azaña's objectives is to be found in Ramon Salas Larrazabal's foreword to Payne, Ejercito, p. xxx.

52. Ben-Ami, Origins, p. 255; Cebreiros, pp. 3ff; 284-288. If the word of his cousin and life-long aide Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, is to be trusted, Francisco Franco Bahamonde, the Caudillo, expressed sympathy towards the efforts to reform the army, observing that many of the proposals were neither "badly planned nor inappropriate for the period": Franco Salgado, Conversaciones, p. 397. See also Mola, El pasado, p. 971.

53. ABC, 15 April 1931, p. 1. Years earlier Azana had also managed to find some kind words for the army, calling it "the salvation of the country" back in 1924, when he hoped it would oust Primo de Rivera: Azaña "Dictadura," I, p. 544.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

remark that he was ". . . vain, sensitive, and somewhat vengeful,"[54] ". . . standoffish, short tempered . . . ."[55] Azaña was "a little cold, like a person playing poker," and "had contempt for the opinions of others."[56] "What Azaña said was sometimes not so important as the way he said it,"[57] for he was given to "rhetorical excesses."[58] "A fastidious intellectual of haughty character and exacting ways,"[59] ". . . at bottom, Azaña was an aesthete whose language and style were almost as important to him as the substance . . . ."[60] "Haughty, misanthropic, and absolutely scornful of the majority of his contemporaries and compatriots,"[61] Azaña's attitude and personality were not ingratiating, and his manner often produced unnecessary friction,[62] for he liked to gloat over the discomfits of

---

54. Sedgewick, p. 21. See also Madariaga, p. 474, which essentially repeats these charges.

55. Salvador de Madariaga in his Foreword to Sedgewick, p. vii.

56. Emilio González López, interview, 15 March 1988.

57. Payne, Revolution, p. 91.

58. Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1987) ["Payne, Franco"], p. 77.

59. Madariaga, p. 387

60. Sedgewick, p. 41.

61. Payne, Ejército, p. 381.

62. Michael Alpert, El ejército republicano en la guerra civil (Barcelona: Ruedo Iberico, 1977), pp. 9-11 ["Alpert, Ejército"].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

others[63] and had a talent for antagonizing even his friends.[64] Tactless, often supercilious,[65] and arrogant,[66] Azaña's "insistence on 'pure' liberalism was so extreme that it led him to illiberal positions."[67] Moreover, Azaña was by no means so well educated as he believed. He had little knowledge of, nor much interest in, foreign affairs and the modern world,[68] lacked any practical managerial experience, and had no military education or training.[69] Azaña had never served in the army. Surprisingly, no account of his life, not even hostile ones, makes any reference to this matter. While it was common for middle class youths to pay commutation rather than endure the rigors of the barracks, Azaña was myopic, which may have disqualified him for service. Moreover, he became of military age in the aftermath of the colonial disasters of 1898, a time when draft calls were extremely low, and may

---

63. Payne, Politics, p. 275.

64. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I., 248, 431.

65. Payne, Politics, p. 275

66. See Robinson, p. 118.

67. Payne, The Spanish Revolution. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 91 ["Payne, Revolution"].

68. Payne, Ejército, p. 381.

69. Payne, Politics, 266, and Ejército, 381.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

well have avoided service as a result.[70] But this was by no means the most serious question which could be raised about his qualifications to head the Army Ministry.

Azaña had no great opinion of, nor much sympathy for, the Spanish Army or its officers.[71] He believed that Spaniards were "not gifted with military spirit, that is, with the talent and capacity for the organization of armed forces,"[72] and wished to "put the army in its place."[73] Even many of his political allies in the officer corps found his personality, attitude towards the military profession, and his unwillingness to heed their technical advice, irritating.[74] Miguel Maura, a center-left politician once inquired of Azaña as to why he seemed deliberately to seek "to wound" and "pour scorn" on his enemies, and received the reply "I do it because it amuses

---

70. This writer has been unable to find any specific explanation for Azaña's lack of military service. On this see Payne, Politics, pp. 88-89

71. González López, interview, 15 March 1988, in contrast to Pérez Salas, who asserts (pp. 50-51) that Azaña had too much respect for officers.

72. Manuel Azaña, Plumas y palabras, p. 97.

73. Manuel Azaña, "Supresión de la prensa llamda militar," (1 March 1932), Obras completas, II, p. 177.

74. Robert Alan Friedlander, "The July 1936 Military Rebellion in Spain: Background and Beginnings" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1963), p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

me."[75] Considering his personality, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Manuel Azaña was a poor choice to direct the reform of the Spanish Army.[76]

Despite his lack of administrative experience, Azaña took control of the War Ministry with remarkable energy.[77] A tireless worker, while War Minister (14 April 1931-12 September 1932), during which service he was also for much of the time Prime Minister (3 October 1931-29 November 1933), Azaña penned dozens of separate ministerial decrees, orders, and laws for the purpose of reorganizing and reforming the army.[78] As he had publicly expressed a

---

75. Maura, p. 230.

76. Payne, Ejército, p. 351, observes that when the Venezuelan military dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez was overthrown in 1958, the new civilian regime under President Romulo Betancourt adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the army, which had been far more politically active than had been that of Spain on the eve of the Republic. The result was that over the next few years there took place an almost total diminution of the army's political influence, which permitted the implementation of a sorely-needed and highly successful military reform.

77. Although he had a reputation for lethargy, promoted by his appearance, which was rather stocky and fleshy, Azaña was a man of tremendous energy. During the period 1931 to mid-1936, one of intense political and administrative activity, he not only executed his official functions, but also managed to complete and publish eight volumes of his speeches and political commentaries, literary essays, and translations from foreign languages.

78. As the texts of the various reform measures have never been collected together, nor does there exist a convenient summary listing, one must peruse the Gaceta and the Documentación official de la Ministerio de Guerra in order to examine them all. However, an outline listing of the principal measures adopted in 1931 may be found in Muñiz González, pp. 92-98. In addition, Bravo Morato, pp. 170-225, reprints the text of several of the more important ones.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

commitment to the professionalization of the service, promising to depoliticize promotions and postings and to undertake a modernization of the army, the initial reaction to Azaña's reform program was positive.[79] On the whole, the measures taken were a mixed bag.[80] The response of the officer corps to these reforms was uneven. A number of the measures were welcomed, others regarded with indifference, and a few resented bitterly.

Azaña's first priority was to reduce the size of the officer corps. Two important measures were undertaken. On

---

79. Boyd, p. 278.

80. Alpert, Reforma; Cebreiros; Federico Bravo Morato; Mola, El pasado; Merino; Tomás Peiré, Una política militar expuesta ante las Cortes constituyentes (Madrid; Valliñas, 1933); and Candido Pardo González, La problema militar de España (Madrid: Rehyma, 1934) are all essentially book-length critiques of the Azana reforms. Shorter treatments of value are Alpert, Ejército, pp. 9-13; González Muñiz, pp. 55-98; Payne, Politics, pp. 266-276, and Ejército, pp. 379-393; and Salas, Ejército, I, pp. 1-80. Several of these men were military professionals offering sound criticism, of whom Cebreiros was the most clearly hostile to the regime and Pardo González the most sympathetic. Peiré was a former Staff Corps major and liberal republican member of the Cortes who, although initially a member of Azaña's "black cabinet" of military advisers, had become an outspoken critic of many aspects of the reforms. Bravo Morato is a strong Republican partisan who's views may be balanced by the opposing views of Merino. While Alpert, González Muñiz, and Payne, tend to a pro-Republican view, and Salas's position is much less so, all provide serious, even-handed treatments. Mariano Aguilar Olivencia, El ejército español durante la Segunda República (Claves de su actuación posterior) (Madrid: Editorial Norte, 1986), deals with the entire period, but has a good overall evaluation of Azaña's policies on pp. 65-75.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22 April 1931, eight days after Azaña assumed office, all officers on active duty were required to swear an oath of loyalty to the Republic or leave the service.[81] As it was widely held that the officer corps was largely composed of monarchists and aristocrats, this measure was expected to result in a good many retirements. Since, in fact, the bulk of the officers were of petty bourgeois origins, and generally lacking in strong political commitments, the result was that virtually all the officers took the oath.[82] Meanwhile, a second decree was already in preparation, and on 25 April Azaña issued a proclamation permitting virtually any officer on active duty to retire with full pay provided they requested such within 30 days, with all vacancies so created to be amortized immediately.[83] It was a remarkably simple measure, one which any government might have implemented over the previous 50 years, for it removed the principal reason for officer opposition to the reduction in their numbers, the fact that those who were separated from the service would lose their livelihood.

---

81. Gaceta 23 April 1931.

82. Payne, Ejército, p. 316; Salas Ejército, I, pp. 5-7; Carlos Martínez de Campos, Ayer (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1970), I, p. 27, who says "almost all of the officers signed the oath."

83. DOMG, 27 April 1931, with extensions and modifications issued two days later, and further clarifications issued on 5 May 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The measure was enormously successful, and by no means unpopular.[84] Altogether 84 generals (c. 66%) and 8,650 other officers (c. 40%) took advantage of the measure.[85] The effect of the retirement degree on the general officers may be seen in the accompanying table.[86]

Table 1
General Officers on Active Duty
1931-1936

Rank	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
Lt. Gen.	18	3	3	3	3	3
Maj. Gen.	34	20	21	21	23	24
Brig. Gen.	96	35	43	48	58	57
TOTAL	148	58	67	72	84	84

84. Cf. Mola, El pasado, p. 971, where he says "The retirement decree of Sr. Azaña was a resounding success, definitely. . . . there existed an excess of personnel for the needs of the service." Francisco Franco is also reported to have thought well of the measure: see Franco Salgado-Araujo, Conversaciones, p. 397. Public reaction to the reduction was very favorable, thus in El Sol on 2 June 1931 Jose Ortega y Gasset wrote "The Republic has, in its short existence, achieved an enormous feat, fabulous, unexpected, and unique in the world, . . . the radical reduction of the Army."

85. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 152-174 contains a statistical analysis of the effects of the decree on the officer corps, which may be supplemented by Cardona, Poder, pp. 140ff, and particularly 281-301, which also contains considerable statistical analysis: about two-thirds of the colonels and lieutenant colonels left the service, as well as half of the majors, 46% of the captains, 37% of the first lieutenants, and 46% of the second lieutenants. Azana himself claimed 11,000 officers retired as a result of the decree: Manuel Azaña, "El presupuesto de Guerra" (10 March 1932) ["Azaña, 'El presupuesto.'"], Obras completas, II, pp. 202-203.

86. Figures include only officers from the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff corps. Source: Anuario militar for the appropriate year. Note that table is based on the closing date of the Anuario.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

To be sure, as Azaña himself would later point out, the generosity of the offer did little to resolve the budgetary burden, at least until the retirees died, when they would not be replaced. However, the retirement of such great numbers of officers would permit other changes in the organization and strength of the army which would yield immediate financial benefits.[87] Moreover, there would be immediate military benefits as well. As a result of the retirement decree, the over-all enlisted to officer ratio rose from less than 8:1 to 15:1, while the ratio of all personnel to generals rose from nearly 850:1 to about 1700:1, a considerable streamlining of the army.[88]

---

87. Azaña, 2 December 1932. Azaña's decree accelerated a gradual reduction in the ranks of the officers which had been going on for several years. Immediately upon the conclusion of the Rif War, Primo de Rivera had reduced the annual intake of new officers to about 225, a figure which appears to have been much lower than the peacetime attrition in the officer corps: see Busquets, El militar, p. 149.

88. For an extensive discussion of the retirement decree see Alpert, Reforma, pp. 133-199. The figures quoted are based on the personnel listings in the Anuario militar for 1930 and 1931. It is, however, difficult to determine the precise ratios, and others can be found: see Alpert, Reforma, 150ff; Ramos Oliviera, p.326; and Salas, Ejército, I, pp. 12-13. The figures given here are not intended to be taken as a statement of the specific ratios in question, but rather as an indication of the general degree of magnitude involved. Figures on the actual number of men under arms at any time are extremely elusive, for it was customary to discharge large numbers of conscripts early. In addition, many officers were officially supernumerario, carried on the active list without pay while serving in the government bureaucracy or civil administration, in the various police forces, or even in private industry: see the explanation in Nomenclotur historico-militar.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although its framers apparently believed that the retirement decree would have the beneficial side-effect of ridding the army of many conservatives, the officers who left the army represented all shades of political opinion, from archconservative Carlists up through left republicans. The largest group probably had no political opinions at all, the bulk of the officer corps having been largely indifferent to politics for over a generation, save as it affected the army.[89] Those who remained were divided broadly into two groups, "bedrock professionals who stayed by choice and narrow-minded incompetents."[90] Of course this is not to say that the officers had no common views which were essentially political, and many of these were at variance with the prevailing philosophy of the Republic. Most officers were nationalistic in outlook, whereas the

---

89. Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective (London; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977), p. 66 ["Carr, Tragedy"]. On the political inclinations of the officers leaving the army see Alpert, Reforma, pp. 181ff, and Ejercito, p. 11; Emilio Faldella, Venti mesi di guerra in Spagna, 1936-1938 (Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 1939), pp. 33-34; González Muñiz, pp. 64-65; Payne, Politics, p. 275; Ramos Oliviera, p. 328. Benzo, p. 33, observes that most officers lived a "monastic life" with regard to the rest of the populace.

90. Payne, Politics, p. 275. Citing no sources, González Muñiz, p. 69, and Ramos Oliviera, p. 328, are in agreement that of the approximately 10,000 officers remaining after the mass retirements under the terms of Azaña's decree, about 30% were pro-republican, with the balance either neutral or hostile.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republic was internationalist, enshrining its dedication to the League of Nations in its Constitution. Virtually all officers, even relatively leftist ones, viewed with suspicion the centrifugal forces represented by Basque and Catalan regionalism, while the Republic was vaguely committed to a quasi-federal Spain. Most officers considered themselves skilled professionals and believed they served a vital societal function, a notion which more extreme republicans viewed as obsolete, holding that armies were anachronistic and favoring a workers' militia for defense purposes.[91] The vast majority of the officers held centrist political views, ranging from liberal monarchists on the British model to conservative republicans. A few, perhaps 5%, held clearly leftist views and a somewhat larger group, perhaps 10%, appear to have been actively rightist, including Carlist unconstitutional monarchists, conservative Alfonsine monarchists, and a handful of fascist-sympathizers. Most of the officers "lived outside the great political and social problems of the world and of Spain," concerned primarily with supporting their families and maintaining their status, while holding the view that

---

91. Spain, like most powers, had adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928. The Republic, however, went further than any other power, incorporating the principal phrases of the pact into Article 6 of the Constitution of 1931, a matter which in itself stimulated some criticism: Cebreiros, pp. 5-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the army was above politics, serving the needs of Spain -- which were, of course, the needs of the army-- before those of any party. It was perhaps a parochial attitude, but one by no means confined to the Spanish Army.[92] Alejandro Lerroux, leader of the centrist Radical Party, observed that if few officers were rabidly republican, not many more were outright monarchists.[93] Lerroux's opinion, however, was very much at variance with that held by Azana and most republicans, who believed the army was a hotbed of anti-republican sentiment, thereby disregarding the role which it had played in the deposition of Alfonso XIII.[94] Nevertheless, despite Azana's opinion most officers appear to have adopted a "wait and see" attitude towards the reforms.

Many of Azaña's reforms generated only technical objections. For example, he undertook a massive reduction in the cadres of the army.[95] In consequence, there was a major reorganization of the army resulting in an over-all reduction in the number of battalion-level units by about a

---

92. Benzo, p. 33; Payne, Ejército, 446-447; Payne, Politics, pp. 316, 347; Ramos Oliviera, p. 329; Thomas, 2nd pp. 94-95; Faldella, pp 33-34.

93. Cited in Payne, Ejército, p. 447.

94. Alpert, Ejército, pp. 10-11.

95. Decrees of 25 May, 6 June 1931, Gaceta 26 May 1931, 17 June 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

third, mostly in the infantry and the cavalry.[96] Since this led to an increase in the proportion of artillery and especially engineers to the other arms, a good deal of debate resulted.[97] While objections to the change could be interpreted as part of a general opposition to reform, the critics had a point. The recent combat experience of the Spanish Army had largely been in irregular warfare, in which numerous small units with little or no artillery or engineers were generally regarded as the most valuable elements.[98] This cut in the number of battalions was part

---

96. The infantry lost 39.4% of its units, going from 213 to 129 battalions, the cavalry was cut by two-thirds, from 30 regiments to 10, while the artillery was reduced by only 10.4%, from 83 battalions to 75, and the engineers were actually increased by 27.2%, from 22 battalions to 28.

97. There was some criticism over the fact that these changes weakened the strength of the army in the event of war. Nazario Cebreiros, a retired artillery lieutenant colonel with a string of books and articles to his credit, argued (pp. 4-5) that the reorganization was dangerous in view of what he termed "the Portuguese threat". Few Spaniards shared such notions, and men as widely different in opinion as Manuel Azaña, Miguel Primo de Rivera, and Emilio Mola were in accord that Spain was highly unlikely to become involved in a serious war. Cebreiros was on sounder ground when he observed that the nature of any possible Spanish military involvements differed from those likely to embroil France, thereby dictating a different proportion among the arms, and noted that in all of Spain's most recent wars the critical shortage had been one of infantry battalions, followed by too little cavalry, while artillery had usually been adequate: Ceberiros, pp. 36-41, 47, 49ff, 62.

98. See particularly the observations of Cebreiros, pp. 49-54, concerning the virtual abolition of the mountain infantry, which had proven to be one of the most valuable elements in the principal civil wars of the nineteenth century, and noted that, aside from the mountainous character of the Protectorate, Spain's frontiers with both France and Portugal were largely mountainous.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of an massive reduction of the major units of the army, so that the number of infantry divisions fell from 16 to eight and the cavalry from three divisions to one. These changes were accomplished through consolidation of the existing units. As the divisions officially comprised some 7,800 officers and men, about a third of war strength,[99] the net loss in manpower was only about 20%, but the requirements

---

99. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 300ff; Aguilar Olivencia, pp. 91ff. One reason for the excessive number of officers on active duty was the necessity of providing officers for mobilization purposes, since the army lacked a proper officer reserve. On mobilization each of the sixteen skeletal divisions was to fill up with enlisted reservists and then double, forming two divisions of 21,000 men each, for a field force of 32 divisions totalling 672,000 men, supplemented by the colonial army, cavalry, and army troops. In early 1936 an American estimate gave Spain about 725,000 men in the five most recently discharged year-classes, what may be termed the "ready reserve," more than sufficient manpower to fill the 32 infantry divisions resulting from mobilizing and doubling the 16 divisions of the old army: see NA SDDF 852.20/81 (21 February 1936). These figures were, however, highly optimistic, being based on the official draft quota of about 120,000 a year. During the last years of the monarchy and during the Republic only about 80,000 men were usually drafted each year, yielding a reserve pool of at best 400,000 men from the five most recently discharged classes. It should be noted that the mobilization machinery was quite efficient, as demonstrated during the Civil War. Excluding untrained recruits, by May of 1937, the Nationalist Army totalled about 250,000 men, mostly in some 350 battalions of infantry, while the Republic had about 350,000 under arms, with between 380 and 475 infantry battalions. Thus, after ten months of war, a total of about 600,000 men were under arms, mostly organized into some 730 to 825 infantry battalions, plus small contingents of artillery, cavalry, and engineers. For the basis of these calculations see Hieroteo Fernández Hernando, Reclutamiento, remeplazo, y movilización de los ejércitos españoles (Madrid: Estado Mayor del Ejército, 1959), p. 87, and Faldella p. 33, 187.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for officers were slashed by nearly 50%, a savings which reflected the general reduction in the size of the officer corps as a result of the retirement decree.[100] A number of officers advocated the adoption of the three regiment -- "triangular"-- divisional organization pattern which had emerged in the principal European armies as a result of World War I. Surprisingly, Azaña opposed such proposals and the decree establishing the new divisional structure specifically rejected a "triangular" organization on the grounds that it was "too light, creating tactical difficulties," arguing that military authorities in some of the very countries which had initiated the reform desired to return to the old four regiment --"square"-- pattern, before proceeding to outline the new divisional structure in considerable detail.[101] The changes in the table of

---

100. As a side-effect of the reduction in cadres, the army was able to save enough money to keep more men under arms for a longer period, so that the enlisted strength present with the colors rose from about 94,000 men in 1931 to 107,000 in 1932, and fully 145,000 in 1933: see Alpert, Reform, p. 120, and the appropriate issues of the Anuario militar, keeping in mind that most troops were still furloughed before their tours of duty were at an end.

101. See Cebreiros, pp. 43-45, 74, for a critique of Azana's refusal to permit the introduction of the "triangular" division. Cebreiros perceptively observes that eight square divisions of 21,000 men had the same number of battalions as eleven triangular ones of 15,000, but notes that the latter would require rather more middle and higher ranking officers. Interestingly, the liberal military critic Pardo González defends the square division, though arguing for a slightly different table of organization than that prescribed by Azana, pp. 258-259, 405.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

organization stirred up some controversy. Not all of it opposed the measures because they went too far, and at least one prominent conservative, Emilio Mola, is reported to have observed that the needs of the Republic might best be served by a volunteer army of six divisions maintained at approximately full strength.[102] Indeed, on the whole most of Azaña's organizational reforms met with general acceptance, indicating a recognition of their technical merit.[103]

---

102. Mola, El pasadop. 1151. See also González Muñiz, pp. 69, 74.

103. Although Rivas Xerif, p. 133, asserts that all the reforms were instituted at Azaña's initiative, the latter was not interested in technical questions [González López, interview, 15 March 1988], and, indeed, dismissed them as unimportant in La política militar. As a result, the actual framing of many of the decrees was done by his "black cabinet," a group of republican and leftist officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Juan Hernández Saravia, an artilleryman who rose to command an army group whilst in Republican service during the Civil War, and, briefly, Tomas Peire, a staff major who later left the army to enter politics and become a leftist critic of the military value of the reforms. While their work was generally confined to professional matters, the existence of this small group, many of whom were former junteros, led to some skepticism concerning the purposes of many of the reforms. Cebreiros, p. 126, says Azaña's military cabinet "was composed of ten conspirators, ranking as captains and majors, who's chief [Hernández Saravia] was a technician . . . in lechery"! See also Alpert, Ejército, p. 12; Merino, 142-143. On Hernández Saravia, who is mentioned more often in Azaña's Memorias than virtually any other individual, see Cristobal Zaragoza, Los generales del pueblo (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1977), pp. 128-129 ["Zaragoza, Generales"]. On Peire see Merino, pp. 142-143. There is a listing, with some biographical detail, of the officers in the "black cabinet" in Alpert, Ejército, p. 337.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A reorganization of the Moroccan garrison encountered little more serious opposition than did that of the Army of the Peninsula. Since Morocco was quiet, Azana made a number of major changes in the organization and strength of what he called the "Army of Africa." The administration of the Protectorate was civilianized, the military territorial organization cut from four to two sectors, and manpower was reduced from 57,000 in 1930 to 34,000 by 1933.[104] Moreover, a special law was enacted to encourage men to volunteer for service in Morocco by offering cash bonuses and higher rates of pay, thereby relieving the government of the necessity of sending conscripts.[105] The principal objection to these changes was that the reduction in manpower created a precarious military situation in the event of an uprising, a point which was difficult to support given the general calm which prevailed in the Protectorate.[106]

---

104. Decree of 3 June 1931, Gaceta, 4 June 1931.

105. Ley de Voluntariado, 15 May 1932, Gaceta, 16 May 1932. Unfortunately, the law was never put into force, as the government could not find the money to pay for it, since each volunteer was to receive three or four times what a conscript received: cf., Cardona, Poder, p. 137, note 65.

106. Mola, El pasado, pp. 1118-1120. Francisco Franco made the same point in his article "Ruud . . . Balek! . . . ", Africa [formerly Revista de Tropas coloniales] I, 2 (February, 1933), his first foray into matters of policy since the Ben Tieb affair of 1924. While these views may be dismissed as alarmist, it is useful to recall that as late as 1935 the French were still encountering resistance deep in the interior of Morocco.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Among other reforms which encountered little opposition, and indeed some enthusiasm, was the reestablishment of the Consejo superior de guerra [Supreme War Council] to coordinate joint service planning and operations, a need for which had been demonstrated in the planning for the Alhucemas operation. In addition, Azaña reorganized the War Ministry bureaucracy, reestablishing the Estado Mayor Central [Central General Staff], which had been abolished by Primo de Rivera in 1925, after the then chief, Valeriano Weyler had become involved in the sanjuanada conspiracy.[107] The staff corps, which had been restored to the status of a corps during the Berenguer regime, was once again demoted to that of a service, greatly pleasing the officers of the combat arms, though not, of course, those of the staff itself.[108] A very important measure was the establishment of the Consorcio de Industrias Militares [Military Industrial Consortium], bringing under the direct supervision of the Minister of

---

107. The history of the Central General Staff of the Spanish Army was rather erratic: organized in 1904, it was dissolved in 1912. Recreated in 1916, by the same War Minister who had eliminated it in 1912, it was again disbanded in 1925, only to be reorganized in 1931: see Cebreiros, pp. 119ff, 131-171, who calls the Spanish experience with a general staff "eccentric," (p. 163), and observes that at no time did the army really have a proper chief-of-the-general staff (p. 137).

108. On the reaction to the staff's loss in status see particularly Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 71, and Mola, El pasado p. 971.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

War existing army-owned military industries and contingency planning for industrial mobilization in the event of war, activities hitherto the individual responsibility of the various affected arms, corps, and services.[109] Likewise, there were only minor objections to his establishment of the Centro de estudios superior de guerra, a national war college.[110] Other measures generally regarded as useful were the creation of a Transportation Corps[111] and the formation of the Cuerpo auxiliar de servicio del ejercito [Army Auxiliary Service Corps] in which skilled career enlisted personnel were permitted to attain what may be termed warrant officer status, with their prestige enhanced

---

109. Although Azaña first appears to have considered this reform as early as July of 1931 (Memorias, 4 July 1931), the enabling decree was not issued until 6 February 1932, DOMG 7 February 1932. See also his speeches on 27 and 28 January 1932, Obras completas, II, 145-164. Emilio Mola, while observing that there were insufficient safeguards to prevent the Consorcio from unfairly competing with private industry, praised its establishment on the grounds that industrial planning in, and the industrial plant of, the Spanish Army, had been a "veritable disaster," and went on to observe that in 1932 alone the new arrangements had saved more than 700,000 pesetas: El pasado, pp. 971, 1103-1108. See also Alpert, Reforma pp. 315-321, Salas, Ejército, I, pp. 29-30. The Consorcio proved so useful that it was continued during the Franco regime and survives today as the Instituto Nacional de Industria: see César Ruiz-Ocaña, Los ejércitos españoles (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, n.d. [1980]), pp. 261-263.

110. Cebreiros pp. 197-207.

111. Decree of 25 March 1933, Gaceta, 26 March 1933. Mola said of the measure, "this initiative alone would merit praise," El pasado, specific page reference lost.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by a significant pay increase.[112] A new special national police force was established, the Cuerpo de Seguridad y Asalto, which, although not part of the army, did provide employment for some hundreds of regular officers whilst relieving the army of occasional unpleasant police duties.[113] In addition, Azaña instituted some modest improvements in artillery, created two tank regiments, several machine gun battalions, and a cyclist battalion in

---

112. Law of 4 December 1931, DOMG 6 December 1931. José María Garate Cordoba, Sargentos provisionales (Madrid: Editorial San Martin , 1977), p. 21, observes that the creation of the C.A.S.E. was a response to "a genuine and profound need, [and] was received with enthusiasm." See also Salas, Ejército, I, pp. 68-69, and José María Garate Cordoba and Mariano Aguilar Olivencia, "El cuerpo de suboficiales de España," Revista de historia militar 43 (1977), pp. 94-96. At a time when a second lieutenant was earning 4,000 pesetas and a first lieutenant 5,000, pay for the four grades of sub-officials in the C.A.S.E. ranged from 3,500 pesetas to 5,750. Cebreiros, pp. 263-273, has a lengthy discussion of the C.A.S.E. in which he mixes some praise with considerable criticism as to the cost. The new category of sub-officers proved sufficiently valuable to survive in modified form in the Franco-era army: see Ruiz-Ocaña, p. 153.

113. Neither the army, the Guardia civil, nor the civil police, the Cuerpo de Seguridad, were trained or equipped to deal with large-scale urban disorders. As a result, when the police lost control of a situation and the army or Guardia civil were called in, the latter rather quickly resorted to firepower to quell public disturbances, with the frequent result that they exacerbated rather than calmed the situation. As a result, a new paramilitary force, the Guardias de asalto, was created as a branch of the civil police, trained and equipped precisely to control urban outbreaks, with a "Republican" leadership: Payne, Politics, pp. 278-279. Garate Cordoba, Alféreces p. 28, observes that on the eve of the civil war in 1936 about 450 officers were on secondment to the Guardias de asalto, about 3% of the total.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the infantry, began the modernization of the cavalry with the creation of a "motor-mechanized" battalion, and redefined regulations for the award of decorations.[114] One of the most important measures was the unification of military aviation under a Director General responsible to the War Minister.[115] However, while these measures were received with considerable favor, not all reforms were so welcome, but most of the opposition was muted.

There was some objection to the abolition of the ranks of captain general, lieutenant general, and of their equivalents in the auxiliary services of the army, as well as of the distinction of territorial captain general, since these measures removed the uppermost rungs of the promotion ladder.[116] The generally anti-clerical policy of the

---

114. It should be noted that many of these innovations existed on paper only. Indeed, Cebreiros would caustically observe that the tank regiments had no tanks (p. 38), which was not wholly accurate, since each of the two regiments had about five old French FT-17 tanks: Mazarrasa, p. 6.

115. Gaceta 27 June 1931. Organizationally, aviation activities were divided into civil, naval, and military directorates, under the overall supervision of the Director General, who reported to the cabinet. In practice the Director General was also usually the chief of military aviation: Cebreiros, pp. 241-262.

116. Decrees of 16 and 18 June 1932, Gaceta 17 June 1931, 19 June 1931. These decrees abolished promotions to the affected grades. Personnel holding such ranks were, however, permitted to continue on the active service pending retirement. Pardo González indirectly argues that the abolition of the higher ranks of the army were in error, suggesting the creation of a new rank above major general [general de división], to be called "army corps general" [general de cuerpo de ejército] and use the rank badges of the former captain generals: p. 207.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republic resulted in the abolition of the military ecclesiastical corps, which was greatly resented in some circles but hardly disturbed many officers, such as the hard core africanistas.[117] Likewise, the abolition of the Servicio de criar caballar sparked some degree of opposition.[118] Surprisingly, while the reorganization of the military justice system, which included the abolition of the Ley de Jurisdiciones and confined the jurisdiction of military tribunals to purely military matters, generated some controversy, the debate was by no means unreasonable.[119] There was also surprisingly little objection from within the army to changes in the compulsory service regulations, which created two categories of conscripts: those with special educational or technical

---

117. Gaceta 5 July 1932. One of the arguments advanced for the abolition of the chaplaincy was that there were thousands of non-Catholic soldiers in the army who were forced to attend Catholic religious ceremonies (Bravo Morato, p. 62), but this could easily have been rectified by provisions for non-Catholic clergy, instead under terms of this act religious services were to be provided by "soldiers who happen to be priests or by personnel extraneous to the Army."

118. Cebreiros, pp. 81-88, has a lengthy attack on this measure, which he terms a "vengeful" act that would deprive the army of horses in time of war.

119. Decree of 17 July 1931, Gaceta 8 July 1931. Cebreiros, pp. 275-282, is about the most angry commentator on the restructuring of the military justice system, which placed final appeals in the hands of a civilianized branch of the supreme court, arguing that only military personnel were qualified to judge their peers (p. 282).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

skills, who need serve only four weeks, and everyone else, who were obliged to serve for a full year, but could be released at the end of six months upon payment of a commutation fee.[120] Thus, the greater part of Azaña's reform program does not appear to have greatly disturbed the officer corps. It was when Azaña addressed himself to the composition and character of the officer corps itself that he ran into serious problems.

Real controversy was generated by Azana's efforts to create a liberal, democratic army. His conviction that the officer corps was an aristocratic caste led him to attempt

---

120. As Payne, Politics, pp. 272-273, rightly observes, the system was by no means as fair as Azana would claim in his address of 2 December 1931. Interestingly, of the principal critics of the Azana reforms, both Cebreiros and Mola make little more than passing reference to the changes in compulsory service, which did not alter the 18 year obligation established in 1918. However, Pardo González, a retired brigadier general of liberal persuasion who was on the historical commission for the Moroccan Campaign [Anuario militar, 1936, p. 439], observed that the changes did not address the need for a formal restructuring of the existing reserve system, which he believed was inadequate to provide for a field force of 530,000 men. He proposed a standing army of 200,000, including about 75,000 long-term professionals and 125,000 conscripts per year, backed by a reformed reserve system: Pardo González, pp. 253-257. Other than that, the principal criticism of the new regulations seems to have come from the middle class, who's sons were now unable to avoid serving at least some time in uniform, provided they were called, and from the left, which legitimately protested that the obligation of military service was still not being shared equally by all classes: Radical Deputy Tomas Peire called for abolition of the commutation provisions and condemned Azaña for not pressing for a completely voluntary military establishment, op. cit.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to deliberately change its nature and reduce its influence. In fact, Azaña's understanding of the character of the officer corps was seriously flawed. From the middle of the nineteenth century the officer corps had been open to all social classes to a remarkable degree. The proportion of nobles was traditionally low, certainly lower than in most other European armies, and declined steadily through the twentieth century.[121] Most officers were of petit

---

121. Jackson, HQ, p. 84, and his The Spanish Republic and the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University, 1972), p. 66 ["Jackson, CW."], observes that in 1914 the number of nobles in the Spanish Army was lower than in either the French or the German armies. Based on the appropriate issues of the Anuario Militar, between 1907 and 1930 the percentage of titled nobles among the colonels in the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff fell from 3.13% to 0.29%. During the first third of the century the trend was generally downwards:

Percentage of Colonels Holding Titles
1903-1930

Arm›	Staff	Infantry	Cavalry	Artillery	Engineers	Total
1907	3.70	1.26	8.33	3.03	4.44	3.13
1910	0.00	0.90	4.55	6.35	4.88	2.63
1915	5.56	0.81	9.09	8.57	1.89	3.59
1920	6.90	0.51	3.77	0.00	0.00	1.29
1927	0.00	0.00	7.59	2.24	2.70	2.03
1930	0.00	0.00	1.92	0.00	0.00	0.29

As the number of officers in the infantry was greater than that in the other arms combined, the figure for that arm is the most significant in determining the overall proportion of titled nobles in the army. The number of titled nobles serving under the Republic cannot be determined with any accuracy since titles were abolished by a decree of the Minister of Justice on 1 June 1931, though the concept of nobility itself was not attacked. Figures for untitled nobles at any time are also unavailable. During the same period the number of titled nobles among the generals was consistently higher, nor did it decline, since it was not unusual for a distinguished officer to be given a title upon promotion to major general or lieutenant general. Thus, Cardona, Poder, pp. 5-6 and 267, observes that of 148 generals on active duty in 1931, eleven were titled generals, of whom eight had been ennobled while in the service and two were members of the royal family.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

bourgeois origins, often the sons of minor government functionaries or senior non-commissioned officers,[122] with many others from traditionally military families, including a sprinkling of aristocrats.[123] In addition, there was always a goodly number of men from the lower classes, usually holding reserve commissions, but sometimes on the regular list.[124] The advent of the Republic furthered this

---

Tuñon, p. 195, has observed that although the number of persons holding titles "more than doubled" in Spain between 1875 and 1931, the percentage of officers with titles fell steadily through the same period.

122. Alpert Ejército, p. 4; Payne, Ejército, p. 447; Busquets, El militar, p. 88, and particularly 200, wherein he notes that in 1960-1963, 20.5% of the officers in the Spanish Army were the sons of enlisted men. It is interesting to note the patterns of family service among new men in the army: an older brother obtains a commission in the Guardia civil or some other less prestigious branch such as the Intendance Corps or Auditing Corps, and is thereby in a position to help the next brother secure the education necessary for a commission in a more distinguished branch, such as the infantry or cavalry. See, for example, the careers of the Cano Portal, Cid Moreno, Garrido Martínez, or Romero Basart brothers as outlined in the successive issues of the Anuario militar during the late Monarchy and the Republic.

123. Busquets, El militar, p. 200, observes that 29.7% of the officers in the Spanish Army in the period 1960-1963 were the sons of officers. It will be recalled that while Miguel Primo de Rivera's family had seen seven generations of military service, his uncle Fernando Primo de Rivera was the first to attain any real distinction, rising to Captain General and a marquisate. Similarly, although from the late eighteenth century the Franco family had been in military service, mostly in the administrative branches of the navy, which used army ranks, Francisco Franco was also the first to attain a generalcy.

124. Busquets, El militar, pp. 85-88, and Fernández Bastarecche, pp. 110-117, both discuss the role of the army in social mobility in modern Spain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

trend, as nobles in high ranks left the army. Moreover, Azana deliberately undertook to liberalize the officer corps. Some measures were relatively innocuous, even welcome.

Spain had virtually no reserve officers in the sense of men in civilian life liable for service in wartime.[125] A university-trained reserve officer corps, the Oficialidad de Complemento, had been created during the early years of the century. But the corps had never amounted to much: in 1931 only 3,247 oficiales de complemento were listed in the Anuario militar, a third of whom were assigned to the military railroad service. Azana went on record as supporting an increase in the number of oficiales de complemento, though he was vague about objectives and ridiculed a proposal to raise the total to 80,000, a figure which, when adjusted for population, would have given Spain a pool of reserve officers roughly comparable to that of France or Italy.[126] The effort to increase the size of the reserve officer corps met with only modest success. By

---

125. A brief review of the various "reserve" officer corps of the Spanish Army may be found in Chapter II, note 67, above.

126. Azaña, "El presupuesto," pp. 209-210. See also Alpert, Reforma, pp. 49, 192. The proposal to recruit 80,000 reserve officers would have given Spain approximately one reserve officer for every 287 inhabitants, at a time when France had one for every 342 and Italy one for every 274.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

more aggressive recruiting, and by permitting senior non-commissioned officers to be promoted into the oficialidad de complemento after successfully completing a series of examinations, the number of such officers rose to about 6,100 by 1936.[127] The proposal to increase the number of reserve officers seems to have been generally well regarded in the army.[128] Surprisingly, the politically more explosive merger of the regular and Reserva retribuida scales of the officer corps into a single unified list provoked little controversy, and indeed a good deal of support from officers across the political spectrum.[129]

---

127. DOMG 6 May 1931; Garate Cordoba, pp. 31-32; Payne, Politics, p. 269. During the Republic the Anuario militar ceased listing the oficiales de complemento, although they had been included regularly under the Monarchy. No explanation can be found for this omission.

128. Cebreiros urges increased recruiting for the oficialidad de complemento, and is highly critical of their small numbers, but chooses to blame Azaña for the problem: Cebreiros, pp. 26, 74-75. The problem was one which concerned members of all parties. In mid-1935, the center-right War Minister José María Gil Robles asked the American military attache for a briefing on the R.O.T.C. program in American universities: Stephen Fuqua to the Department of State, 11 June 1935 (NA SDDF 852.00/2102).

129. DOMG 13 July 1931. There was little grumbling among the artillery officers, some of whom argued that the arm was being handled as "as rudely as by Primo de Rivera": Azaña, Memorias, 15 July 1931. Nevertheless, even Cebreiros, who's comments on the reforms are sometimes curmudgeonly --at one point (p. 67) he complains about the "vulgarity" of the Anuario militar having been reduced from 1,049 pages to 300-- fails to discuss the issue. See also Alpert, Reforma, p. 87. Azaña, Memorias, 8 August 1931, notes generals of such diverse political inclinations as Queipo de Llano, Goded Llopis, and Rodríguez del Barrio approved of the measure.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

More serious controversy accompanied Azaña's decision to alter the basis for recruiting and training officers.

One of the first measures adopted by Azaña as War Minister was to cancel the entrance examinations for the Academia militar general, widely viewed as a rightist bastion, effectively closing the institution.[130] The move came as a shock to professionally-inclined officers, including Brigadier General Francisco Franco, director of the academy since its opening in 1927.[131] Azaña instituted a sweeping reorganization of the military educational system, which resulted in the opening of two officer training academies, one for infantry, cavalry, and intendance at Toledo, and one for artillery and engineers at Segovia, plus a series of technical schools for

---

130. Decree of 25 April 1931, Gaceta, 26 April 1931. The actual closing of the academy took place soon after, see DOMG, 30 June 1931. Cardona, "Enseñanza," contains a good summary of Azaña's efforts to reform military education.

131. Franco made a carefully worded farewell address to the departing cadets in which he stressed obedience to the established order, a speech which was interpreted as subversive in some circles: see Merino, pp. 197-199. The speech is reprinted in Blanco Escola, pp. 235-237. Azaña appears to have had difficulties understanding Franco, possibly because his competence and professionalism were unusual traits in a Spanish general. Upon closing the AGM, he arranged to have Franco followed by the police. Shortly afterwards, during a conversation, Azaña said that he would like Franco's assistance, whereupon the latter asked if that was the reason why three policemen were always following him. Azaña took this in good humor and ended the surveillance: Azaña, Memorias, 20 July 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

specialized advance training.[132] Although Azaña justified his actions on the basis of "the disproportionate cost of the AGM in comparison with the present and future needs of the Army " the move was in keeping with two of his most deeply-held beliefs, that anything Primo de Rivera had done was wrong, and that the French military system, which included separate academies, was the model upon which to base the reform of the Spanish Army.[133] He failed to see that a major reason for the creation of the AGM had been to promote greater unity among the arms of service in the interests of enhancing professionalization and reducing the internal political squabbles which had so frequently in the past been injurious to the service and the state. As a result, many officers viewed the abolition of the academy as an attempt to politicize the officer corps.[134] Such suspicions were increased when, early in 1932, Azaña announced the new regulations for admission to the academies.[135] Henceforth aspiring officers had to have a

---

132. Decree of 21 July 1931, DOMG, 22 July 1931.

133. Arce, Generales, p. 47; 57. For Azāna's views on the French military educational system, Militar, pp. 311-312.

134. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 109ff. Azaña, Memorias, 3 July 1931, in which he mentions the visit of a delegation urging him to rescind his decision to close the AGM, suggests that he felt the pressures of office more than he appears to have betrayed in public.

135. Gaceta, 6 February 1932.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

secondary school certificate and serve at least six months in the ranks before entering an academy and the curriculum was redesigned to incorporate one year of university level liberal arts. Furthermore, it was decreed that 60% of the places in the academies would automatically go to former enlisted men, for whom a special preparatory program was instituted. The purpose of these changes was to secure better human material as officer candidates, to give aspiring officers a taste of enlisted life, and to improve the education of prospective officers.[136] This reorganization stimulated some controversy. Elements of the reform met with general approval.[137] However, many officers were concerned about the effects the abolition of the academy would have on the long-term professional development of the army, particularly since Azaña seemed less than interested in a truly professional officer the officer corps.[138] Indeed, Azaña almost seemed to go out of

---

136. Cardona, "Enseñanza," p. 76, contains a summary of the new entrance requirements. See also Alpert, Reforma, p. 254.

137. Cebreiros, pp. 210-229, is generally critical of the closing of the AGM, but manages to praise the new entry requirements and the liberal arts curriculum as long-needed improvements: pp. 218, 222.

138. Mola, p. 1072ff, had little good to say of the changes. The more liberal Pardo González argued for the reopening of the Zaragoza academy, p. 274. Antonio Cordón, a leftist artillery officer expelled from the army by Primo de Rivera who later went on to become a Republican general during the Civil War, seconded Pardo González' view: Arce, Generales, p. 57; Zaragoza, Generales p. 17ff. See Aguilar Olivencia, pp. 119-129, for a brief critique of Azaña's views on military education.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

his way to harass the most outstanding officers.

In mid-May of 1931 Azaña issued the first of a series of important measures concerning promotions by election and by the merits of war, reestablishing the closed scale for promotions.[139] Azaña was convinced that promotions by merit and by election had all been largely political in motivation, the result of rather arbitrary actions by the King or the Dictator.[140] This was an opinion which many officers were willing to concede was at least somewhat valid.[141] Azaña canceled many such promotions and instituted a sweeping review of the remainder,[142] though permitting officers who petitioned for retirement before their promotions were subject to review, so that they could retain their higher status regardless of its legality.[143]

---

139. Boyd, p. 279.

140. Alpert, Reforma, p. 330. Barea, p. 367, notes instances of officers receiving clearly fraudulent promotions by méritos. In his diary Azaña mentions several promotions of dubious legitimacy, including two "for services and circumstances" granted as wedding gifts by the crown, and one by the "merits of war" to Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, for being "bruised by a bullet" (Memorias, 22 July 1931, 10 June 1932).

141. See Azana's citation of Goded, Memorias, 22 July 1931.

142. Decree of 18 May 1931, DOMG 19 May 1931. For convenience, this the following discussion will include matters also touched upon in decrees of 3 June, 8 June, 4 July, 26 July, and 14 September of 1931, and 28 January and 2 February of 1933.

143. It appears that only six officers took advantage of this provision, see Alpert, Reforma, p. 220.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The measure delighted many former junteros and most artillerymen and engineers,[144] but was viewed quite differently by those who held méritos. Several officers, such as Eduardo López de Ochoa, Francisco Franco, and José Varela, had accumulated as many as five merit promotions. At a stroke scores of fine officers, the best and most talented men in the army according to Deputy Tomás Peiré, were humiliatingly reduced in rank and seniority.[145] Altogether 513 promotions were subject to review, of which 365 (71.2%) were found to be invalid.[146] A number of very distinguished officers found themselves losing one or two grades, including Azaña's own hand-picked chief-of-the-general staff, Manuel Goded, who suffered a serious loss of seniority. Curious problems developed, such as in the case of Francisco Franco, who fell from a senior brigadier general to a very senior colonel, a rank which he held by a merit promotion which was ruled valid, and in which he had sufficient seniority to be promoted to a very junior

---

144. Alpert, Ejercito, pp. 6-7.

145. Peiré, op. cit. A former Staff Corps Major, Peiré had served in the War Ministry under Azana before leaving the army to become a Radical Deputy and outspoken critic of the reforms, later serving the Republic during the Civil War: Payne, Politics, pp. 274-275; Alpert, Reforma, pp. 263-264.

146. Alpert, Reforma, p. 221; Aguilar Olivencia, p. 88, note 68.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

brigadier general.[147] Under pressure, Azaña made some modifications to his orders. Since drastic reductions in grade would be injurious to good military order --men who had been commanding brigades and divisions for as long as eight years ought not to be sent back to lead battalions--, in February of 1933 most of the officers who had enjoyed promotions by merit or election were placed at the bottom of the seniority list of their former rank and frozen there until they should accumulate sufficient time-in-grade to resume progress up the seniority ladder.[148] Although the number of officers directly affected by the revision of non-seniority promotions was small, less than 3% of the total, the overall impact of the measure on the officer corps was considerable. The officers subject to these drastic revisions in their rank and seniority --who were nicknamed the "congelados [frozen ones]"-- were the best

---

147. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 214-215, briefly reviews the career of a less distinguished officer who suffered a demotion, José Moscardo, later the defender of the Alcazar of Toledo in the early weeks of the Civil War, and still later a prominent Nationalist general. As a result of the decrees, Moscardo went from 129th on the list of 177 infantry colonels in the Anuario militar of 1931, to 15th on the list of lieutenant colonels in 1932, a loss of 63 places. However, Moscardo served less than a year as a lieutenant colonel, for he was again made a colonel on 3 February 1932, since, counting the time that he had served as a supposed improperly promoted colonel, he by then had sufficient seniority as a lieutenant colonel for the promotion.

148. See, for example, the lists of generals in the Anuario militar, 1935, pp. 146-147.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

men in the army. Most of them were africanistas, the most effective and experienced commanders in the army, widely respected among the junior officers.[149] Their political views ran the spectrum from right to left, and most had been supporters of the Azaña reforms, or at worst indifferent to them.[150] The revision in their status turned many of them against Azaña, for it appeared that he was implementing the policies of the despised junteros.[151] To be sure, this had little immediate effect on the overall relationship between the officer corps and the Republic, largely because the africanista element constituted no more than 20% of the officers.[152] However, Azana made no effort to strengthen the ties of the officer corps with the

---

149. Payne, Politics, p. 281; Merino, pp. 247-248.

150. Alpert, Ejército, p. 12, remarks on several republican officers who were adversely effected by the cancellation of promotions by merit and election.

151. Boyd several times observes (pp. 103, 112, 149-150, 197ff) that the junteros in the past had frequently used the term "reform" to mask their efforts to consolidate the position of the bureaucratic soldiers at the expense of the combat troops, even to the extent of opposing combat pay: pp. 160-161.

152. Discussions of the revision in the status of the officers who had receive promotions by merit or election are numerous. In addition to Tomás Peiré, noted above, see also Cebreiros, pp. 12-19, who supports the closed scale but is critical of Azaña's arbitrary attitude towards the officer corps; Mola, El pasado, pp. 1025f; Alpert, Reforma, pp. 223-233. Bravo Morato, a strong supporter of Azaña, carefully reprints the texts of decrees of 18 May and 3 June 1931 and 28 January 1933 (pp. 183-184, 195-197, 225-228, and just as carefully omits any extensive discussion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

regime. In his desire to expunge the actions of the Dictatorship, he refused to consider that many of them were taken for sound professional reasons. As a result, many of his actions tended to create the impression that politics, not professionalism dominated the War Ministry, an impression which eroded sympathy for the Republic among the officers.[153] Azaña's desire to republicanize the army deepened this impression, for, despite his public pronouncements to the contrary, Azaña did not believe that a professional army could be politically neutral.[154] He therefore wished to develop an army with a high degree of political commitment to the Republic. As a result, he very early began to make openly political promotions and appointments, often in disregard of, in the very least, the spirit of his own ministerial proclamations.[155] The first of these were by no means considered unreasonable, for Azaña restored to duty many of the officers who had been thrown out of the service for their political views by

---

153. Boyd, p. 278.

154. In a brief speech to the officers of the garrison at Valladolid on 14 November 1932, Azaña stated that the foundations of military professionalism were to obey in silence the will of the nation and to be citizens and professionals, using the phrase "the school of command is obedience." Speech, 14 November 1932, Obras completas, II, pp. 473-475. Interestingly, his addresses to the non-commissioned officers and to the enlisted men were considerably warmer: ibid., pp. 475-476.

155. Boyd, pp. 278-279.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Primo de Rivera, among them Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, José Riquelme, Miguel Cabanellas, Pedro de la Cerda, and Eduardo López de Ochoa. Azaña's assignment of the pro-republican Manuel Goded as chief-of-the-general staff was also acceptable because of the latter's very strong qualifications for the post. However, there was some question as to the propriety of judicial proceedings which resulted in the expulsion from the army of both Damaso Berenguer, who succeeded Primo as dictator in 1930-1931, and Emilio Mola, who served as Berenguer's Director General of Security.[156] Even more blatant was Azaña's promotion of veteran Republican activist Lieutenant General Francisco Aguilera to Captain General "in consideration and reward for the eminent services that he has rendered in the cause of liberty," since he was at the time preparing to abolish that rank.[157] A number of officers received promotions

---

156. Among the aspects of the proceedings which appeared questionable to many officers was the fact that Berenguer's request to be represented by Francisco Franco was denied: Payne, Politics, p. 278. Berenguer's request was later used by pro-Republican writers to support the view that Franco was involved in anti-Republican activities from the very start of the new regime: see, for example, Bravo Morato, p. 108.

157. Aguilera was promoted to Captain General on 2 May 1931, DOMG, 5 May 1931, upon his retirement, and just two weeks before he died, while the rank of captain general was abolished on 16 June 1931: Gaceta 18 June 1931. See Cebreiros, pp. 102ff, for some particularly caustic remarks, and Salas, Ejército, I, p. 18, who observes that Aguilera's was Azaña's first promotion based solely on political criteria.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

which were widely regarded as political in nature, including Domingo Batet, José Riquelme, and José Fernández de Villa Abrille, who became major generals, and Nicolás Molero Lobo and Francisco Llano Encomienda, who became brigadier generals. All of these men had excellent republican credentials, but several of them were not noted for their abilities, which left the impression that junteros were being preferred to men with combat experience.[158] Moreover, Azaña created an enormous number of honorary generals, most of whom appear to have been former junteros.[159] Such measures helped erode the initial

158. Alpert, Ejército, p. 12; Boyd, p. 279. Of the five, only Batet was well regarded in the officer corps. It is interesting to note that all five were masons, a matter of some concern in Catholic circles: see Payne, Ejército, p. 428; Bravo Morato, p. 104. Aside from long-term anti-masonic sentiments, freemasons had been active in all of the "liberal" nineteenth century military conspiracies: see Busquets, Pronunciamientos , pp. 69-70. For an extreme view of the perceived pernicious role of freemasonry in Spanish history see the works of Eduardo Comin Colomer, Lo que España debe a la masonería (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1952) and La masonería en España (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944), which more or less express Franco's personal hostility towards masons. There are no treatments from the opposite side of the issue.

159. The listings of honorary generals in Anuario militar, 1936, pp. 445ff, reveal that during his 29 months in power (April 1931-September 1933) Azaña created 106, while the Center-Right governments of December 1933-February 1936 created only four. The Spanish Second Republic today probably has more honorary generals than any other army. Shortly after the demise of Franco, officer veterans of the Ejército popolar republicana were "promoted" to various honorary ranks, complete with identity cards and officer's club privileges: interview 18 October 1988 with Manuel Serna Añon, Captain and Honorary General of Brigade, Retired, People's Republican Army.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

good humor with which the army had accepted the Republic, particularly as Azaña was frequently unable to conceal his contempt for general officers, whom he called the "princes of the army."[160]

Azaña's diary provides numerous examples of his dislike of the professional soldier. When veteran Republican activist Major General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano raised a technical question, Azaña dismissed it as a "trivial matter."[161] Recording the proceedings of a staff conference which he had requested concerning the state of the fortifications of the Balearic Islands,[162] Azaña remarks that Major General José Riquelme --"avowedly republican and leftist"[163]-- became involved in a technical discussion with the other officers present, using the word "<u>tonterías</u>" [foolishness] to express his opinion of the matter.[164] On another occasion he managed to call a

---

160. Azaña, <u>Memorias</u>, 24 June 1931.

161. Azaña, <u>Memorias</u>, 7 July 1932.

162. The request is noted in Azaña, <u>Memorias</u>, 1 August 1931.

163. Letter, Col. Stephen G. Fuqua, U.S. Military Attache to Spain, to Military Intelligence Division, 15 May 1935, US NA, MID 2041-316.8

164. Azaña, <u>Memorias</u>, 8 August 1931. Azaña repeats this phrase in essentially similar circumstances on 5 May 1932. The army's concern for the Balearics was by no means displaced, as Mussolini had several times indicated his interest in acquiring the property. The subject seems to have first surfaced in an informal discussion during the visit of Alfonso XIII and Primo de Rivera to Rome in November of 1923, at which time Mussolini attempted to involve Spain in an anti-French coalition. So serious was Italian interest in the islands that the Italo-Spanish treaty of friendship of 1926 was generally believed to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

retiring general's desire for a decoration "a ridiculous pretension," joked that Major General Juan García y Gómez Caminero, a leftist officer "absolutely loyal to the regime,"[165] wore a sash "as big as a bed sheet," and referred to the notion of esprit de corps as "childishness," all in one day.[166] When Manuel Goded protested that although he had earned his two merit promotions to brigadier general and major general, "you have rid me of both" because of the cancellation of such, Azaña replied "I do not think you have lost anything."[167] Nor was he able to understand why a leftist general engaged in a personal dispute with a rightist colleague thought that bringing the matter to Azaña's attention would be unprofessional, for officers did not "engage in

---

include a secret clause which promised Italy the use of the islands in the event of a war with France, a clause which did not, in fact exist. Italian military planners regularly assumed that they would have to seize the islands in the event of war with France. See particularly John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University, 1975), pp. 34, 41, 53, and 76-77, and also Alan Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970), pp. 209-215; Payne, Revolution, p. 262. Prof. Brian Sullivan of the Naval War College at Newport was of particular assistance in clarifying this matter in a conversation 5 July 1989.

165. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 430.

166. Azaña, Memorias, 4 July 1931.

167. Azaña, Memorias, 22 July 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

vilification" of each other.[168] One of the most widely publicized incidents illustrative of Azaña's attitude towards senior officers was the so-called "Mangada Affair."[169]

On 27 June 1932 elements of the 1st Division were involved in a major review held at Carabanchel, outside of Madrid. After the ceremonies, a luncheon was held for the assembled officers, among whom was Lieutenant Colonel Julio Mangada Rosenhorn, an africanista and ultra-leftist of questionable sanity.[170] Major General Rafael Villegas Montesinos, the division commander, a conservative monarchist, made a short speech which included some remarks of dubious loyalty to the Republic, comments which were apparently well received by most of those present. He was followed by Major General Manuel Goded, the chief-of-the-

---

168. Azaña, Memorias, 21 June 1932.

169. The most comprehensive account of the "Mangada Affair" is A. Vila de San Juan, "El brindis de General Goded," Historia y Vida No. 70 (January, 1974), which is in general agreement with the account in Azaña, Memorias, 27-28 June 1932. There are also useful discussions in Alpert, Reforma, pp. 288-293, and Aguilar Olivencia, pp. 290-302. It is upon these that the following is based. For a more radical view of the affair see Ramos Oliviera, pp. 329-330.

170. Azaña's judgment of Mangada, whom he had been forced to order to desist from distributing subversive ultra-leftist literature to the troops and from making public speeches on political topics, was "Mangada is crazy . . . a vegetarian, Esperantist, and spiritualist," to which he might have added theosophist and nudist as well: Azaña, Memorias, 4 July and 9 September 1931. There is no biography, but see Rubio Cabeza, pp. 507-508.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

general staff, who was attending in an informal capacity. Goded, a political moderate hitherto strongly identified with the Republic, had become increasingly disenchanted with Azaña. He appears to have been disinclined to rebuke Villegas publicly. Nevertheless, in his address he stressed the importance of discipline to the professional soldier, and emphasized that soldiers "should refrain from political quarrels, which cheapen the role of the army." Upon concluding, Goded called for "One '<u>viva</u>' only, '¡<u>Viva España</u>!" When this had been given he said "And nothing more" and stepped down. At this, Mangada, already angry over the tone of Villegas' remarks, became enraged. He jumped up, insolently demanding that the cry of "¡<u>Viva la República</u>!" be given. When he was ignored, Mangada took off his coat, threw it on the floor, and jumped on it several times. Villegas had him placed under arrest. By early evening the matter had come to Azaña's attention. Azaña quickly made an investigation.[171] When questioned, Goded replied that he had not called for a "¡<u>Viva la República</u>!", mandatory under a decree of 1 May 1931,[172]

---

171. Azana's principal informant appears to have been Col. Carlos Leret Ubeda of the 1st Infantry Regiment, an eyewitness: Azaña, <u>Memorias</u>, 27 June 1932.

172. Many of the early decrees which Azaña instituted dealt with the "republicanization" of uniforms, colors, and procedures, among which was one which replaced "traditional" cries with that of "¡<u>Viva la República</u>!": <u>DOMG</u> 1 May 1931. This was one of a series of decrees replacing "monarchist" forms and emblems in the army with Republican ones: see <u>Gaceta</u>, 18 April, 30 April, 15 May 1931, and Arce, <u>Generales</u>, p. 48.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

because he believed that in the circumstances "no one would have responded," and added that, like Azaña himself, he was in the habit of concluding conferences with the phrase "And nothing more."[173] In retrospect, Goded may in fact have been exercising sound judgment. At the time, however, the matter was less clear. Azaña's own opinion is equally obscure. He took action in the matter very quickly. While Mangada remained under arrest for insubordination, both Villegas and a brigade commander were sacked on the technicality that the review had not received prior approval of the Ministry. Using an unrelated matter as his excuse, Azaña removed Goded as chief-of-the-general staff, leaving him "at disposal".[174] The result satisfied no one. When, on 28 June, some leftist deputies in the Cortes demanded to know why Mangada was still under arrest if the generals in question had been found at fault, Azaña replied

---

173. It seems that use of the form "And nothing more", at the end of an address was by no means unusual in Spain at this time. Indeed, several of Azaña's own speeches end in this fashion. Francisco Franco was apparently the first Spaniard to regularly end a speech by saying "Thank you."

174. Azaña's relations with the generals were at this point so bad that he found no one acceptable to himself who was willing to serve as chief-of-the-general staff in Goded's place. As a result, Brigadier General Carlos Masquelet Lacaci, became Acting Chief-of-the-General Staff. Masquelet, a member of the newly formed Left Republican Party who "did not inspire confidence," was not promoted to major general until 15 February 1933: Fletcher to MID, 25 March 1933, NA MID 2041-242.1. See also Martínez de Campos, II, p. 27; Payne, Ejército, p. 419, 444; Zaragoza, Generales p. 132; Alpert, Ejército, p. 400.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that, regardless of the provocation, Mangada had committed military insubordination and was therefore subject to military penalties, while the generals --and he was vague as to whether Goded was one of them-- had committed a political offense, which was punishable by the War Minister.[175] Although this answer was also unsatisfactory, it was very much in keeping with Azaña's character.[176] The fact that his decision tended to alienate everyone does not seem to have bothered him. As far as the bulk of the officer corps was concerned, the fates meted out to Goded and the others appeared politically motivated. Linked with the dissatisfactions stimulated by many of the other

---

175. Manuel Azaña, "Incidentes militares de Carabanchel," (28 June 1932), Obras completas, II, pp. 326-333. In this address Azaña adopts an unusually conciliatory tone, as if trying not to offend anyone.

176. Azaña appears to have been seriously troubled by the "Mangada Affair," observing in his diary that it was a "disgraceful incident," but seeing no way out of the confusing situation save that which he adopted. He was very much concerned with the maintenance of discipline. Less than a year before the "Mangada Affair" a field officer who was friendly with Queipo de Llano, a notoriously leftist general on extremely cold terms with Villegas, charged the latter with harassment as a result of this friendship. Azaña dismissed the charges on the grounds that Villegas had been acting within the bounds of military discipline, though he could not refrain from observing that the matter at issue was typical of the military mind, "making a mountain out of a molehill": Azaña, Memorias, 21 August and 3 September 1931. Similarly, when a delegation from his beloved Ateneo petitioned him for the release of Mangada, Azaña turned them down on the grounds that it would be bad for discipline: Azaña, Memorias, 2 July 1932.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

actions of the Republic, the "Mangada Affair" tended to politicize many essentially apolitical officers.[177]

Despite the battering to which they had been --or perceived themselves to have been-- subjected by Azana, the officer corps proved surprisingly cooperative and quiescent.[178] Although Azaña did not succeed in

---

177. Interestingly, the "Mangada Affair" does not figure in the principal contemporary rightist critiques of the relationship between the army and the Republic, neither Mola nor Cebreiros having anything to say on the matter, nor, surprisingly, is it mentioned in the account of Bravo Morato, a strong Republican sympathizer writing after the death of Franco.

178. Aside from major reforms, many of the perquisites of officers had been eliminated, including special tax breaks and half-fare passes on the national railroad system. Such measures were particularly irritating due to the relatively low pay officers received. In January of 1931 second lieutenants had received a 500 peseta raise, to 4,000 a year, a 14.2% increase. However, over the preceding six months, the value of the peseta had fallen from 48 to the pound sterling to 62, so that despite the raise the value of a second lieutenant's pay had actually fallen by about 13%. Although under the Republic bonuses were instituted for officers with special credentials, such as a staff corps diploma or pilot's license, the sums involved were modest, and the number of officers affected quite small, so these did little to alleviate the very real financial hardship felt by many officers: Aguilar Olivencia, p. 133. Aguilar Olivencia, p. 480-482, reprints the household accounts of a major with a wife and three children, concluding that the officer's monthly pay and emoluments (791.66 pesetas) were sufficient to cover only about 75% of the family's living expenses. Despite living in special subsidized military housing, rent alone totalled 1,500 pesetas a year. This tends to confirm the observation that the officers were "a badly paid group within the middle class" (Cardona, Poder, p. 5). Azaña's own apartment, in the Salamanca, a middle class district of Madrid, cost 3,000 pesetas a year, roughly 75% of a second lieutenant's salary.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reconciling the officer corps to the Republic, hostility was neither general nor open.[179] Even many conservative officers were willing to concede that the Republic had made some improvements in the army.[180] However, as citizens most officers were concerned about the course which the Republic appeared to be following in terms of Spanish society.

Military reform was not the only objective of the Republic. Indeed while military reform may have been uppermost in Azaña's mind, the desultory fashion in which most military measures were debated in the Cortes, and the one-sided votes which authorized many reform measures, suggests that the bulk of the deputies were concerned with other matters.[181] The Republic had come to power with a lengthy agenda. For most politically active Spaniards, military reform was less important than questions of church-state relations, land reform and rural development, labor legislation, educational policy, regional autonomy, and the enormous financial mess which they had inherited from the Monarchy. Most of these questions sparked far

---

179. Merino, pp. 217-218, observes that Azaña's reforms had "pulverized" the army of the Monarchy, but had not created the "Army of the Republic."

180. Alpert, Ejército p. 9.

181. Payne, Politics, pp. 270, 274, Ejército, pp. 385, 391. It should be note, however, that only about 15% of the deputies were rightists.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

more controversy than did military reform, frequently because the measures taken failed to take into consideration legitimate alternative views and practical realities.[182]

The early months of the Republic were an unruly time.[183] There were a number of violent outbreaks, including attacks on ecclesiastical property, land seizures, and strikes.[184] The new government acted quickly to restore order, but many middle class and conservative elements felt inclined to place the blame for these events on the Republic, while many leftist elements felt that the Republic had sold out to the established order. As the provisional government began to unfold its program of reforms, other strains began to appear. Despite their

---

182. Payne, Franco, p. 38, observes "The great weakness of Azaña's leftist Republicans was their intolerance and arrogance, grounded in fanatical anticlericalism."

183. The definitive history of the Spanish Republic has yet to be written. Jackson, CW, pp. 25-55, contains a good, succinct treatment of political events from the proclamation of the Republic on 14 April 1931 to the accession of the first regular government under the Constitution, on 12 October. Madariaga, pp. 499-420, has a useful summary of the principal actions of the new government. Joaquín Arrarás, Historia de la Segunda República española (Madrid: Editora Nacaional, 1970), I, pp. 7-202 ["Arrarás, República."], is very detailed, but hostile to the Republic, though he does not engage in any outright falsehoods.

184. Arrarás, República, has an entire chapter devoted to the disorders, "La quema de conventos" [The Burning of the Convents], I, pp. 101-129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

often radical sounding rhetoric, the leaders of new Republic were essentially progressive bourgeois reformers, desirous of promoting a modernization of Spain but by no means committed to a revolutionary restructuring of society. Like Azaña, most appear to have been inspired by the example of the French Third Republic. And like Azaña, most were intellectual idealists with little or no practical administrative experience. As a result, the reforms which they attempted to institute, while well-intended, were often poorly-planned, ill-conceived, badly-timed, or based on erroneous assumptions.[185] Thus, the Republic's anti-clericalism tended to frustrate its efforts to improve education: although the Republic opened 7,000 new schools in its first ten months of existence, the number was barely sufficient to replace the thousands of schools which had been run by various religious orders now banned from teaching.[186] Similar problems developed in the

---

185. Scholarly treatment of the Republic's reform program has been uneven. Edward Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain (New Haven: Yale University, 1970) and Jacques Maurice, La reforma agraria en España en el Siglo XX (1900-1936) (Madrid; Siglo XXI, 1975), are quite valuable on the subject of land reform. Mariano Pérez Galán, La Enseñanza en la Segunda República española (Madrid: Cuadernos para el Dialogo, 1975) is useful for the educational policy of the Republic. Neither church-state relations nor labor policy have received comparable attention.

186. Jackson, Civil War, pp. 56-65, contains a brief account of the educational question. See Madariaga, pp. 412-413, for the effects which the ban on church-related schools had on the overall educational policy of the Republic.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

land reform program,[187] agricultural policy,[188] labor relations,[189] regional autonomy,[190] and financial reform.[191] Although in retrospect, the efforts at reform

---

187. Malefakis, pp. 186ff, observes that most of the lands being worked by renters or day-laborers were owned not by the Church or the nobility, but by middle class absentee landlords, who formed the backbone of the Radicals, the most conservative, but also the single largest, party in the ruling leftist coalition, making any energetic efforts at land reform politically dangerous.

188. Efforts to keep the cost of the urban worker's food basket as low as possible conflicted the desire to help the peasantry: Richard A.H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right the Republic, and Revolution, 1931-1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1970), p. 57

189. In 1931 railroad workers demanded higher wages and an eight-hour day, at a time when the railroads had already been running at a deficit for several years. Although the workers were persuaded to accept an eight-hour day and some improvements in working conditions without the pay increase, this was a solution which irritated everyone, since the costs to the railroads rose as a result, while the workers remained dissatisfied. See Jackson, CW, p. 91.

190. The principal Republican leaders were committed to a policy of granting limited autonomy to the ethnically diverse regions of Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia. However, Catalan leadership in particular was committed to nothing less than a federal "Iberia," with more extreme elements demanding independence. See Madariaga, pp. 400-405; Ararrás, República, I, p. 115.

191. Republican leaders failed to anticipate the enormous cost which their programs would entail, nor the effects of the Great Depression on national finances. Azana's military reforms, for example, instituted in part to reduce costs, had the immediate effect of greatly increasing the military budget. By 1933 the C.A.S.E. alone was costing 17,817,868 pesetas, at a time when total army expenditures had risen to 434,000,000 pesetas, 18% over 1929, and that in a deflationary economy: Mola, El pasado, p. 1085; Payne, Politics, pp. 273-274; Peire also has some observations on this subject.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

met with modest success, given the obstacles which had to be overcome, at the time there was a perception of failure in many circles. Certainly many people soon grew dissatisfied with the performance of the Republic, those on the Right because they perceived the Republic as revolutionary, and those on the Left because it was insufficiently so. Thus, José Ortega y Gasset was so disillusioned as to call for action to "rectify" the Republic, possible by a "party of national breadth."[192] Nevertheless, when the first regular government took power under the Constitution of 1931, it was essentially a left-center regime and it was headed by Manuel Azaña.[193] Although Azaña brought his surprising administrative energies to the office of prime minister, he also brought his personal style. Unable to take criticism, he was largely responsible for the almost immediate enactment of the "Law for the Defense of the Republic," which permitted the Minister of the Interior to close newspapers and levy fines where he found anti-government sentiment, even to "verbal defense of the monarchy," a measure which created

---

192. Robinson, p. 84, citing El Debate, 8 December 1931.

193. The Presidency, occupied by Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, a liberal former monarchist and devout Catholic, was a largely ceremonial post with limited powers to impede legislation and dismiss the Cortes: see Madariaga, p. 389.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

considerable fear of dictatorship.[194] Moreover, his tendency to deliberately use abrasive language did little to calm heated feelings at either end of the political spectrum. A fine example was his use of the phrase "Spain has ceased to be Catholic" upon passage of legislation disestablishing Catholicism as the state religion.[195] Whatever he meant by this, it was certainly taken as an indication of a desire not merely to curb religious interference in the political life of the country, but as a declaration of war against the Church, which had hitherto avoided an open confrontation with the government.[196] Azaña's carelessness in his choice of words was frequently more provocative than the actions about which he was speaking. A similar instance was his use of the verb "triturar" --pulverize, smash, crumble-- in a speech describing the ways in which the proposed new Constitution would deal with groups presently monopolizing power in the nation. Delivered at Valencia on 6 June 1931, Azaña does

---

194. Robinson, pp. 68-69.

195. Manuel Azaña, Speech of 13 October 1931, Obras completas, pp. 49-58.

196. Stanley G. Payne has observed that in 1931 "Catholic opposition to the Republic in any official or organized sense cannot be said to have existed": Stanley G. Payne, Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisonsin, 1984), p. 152 ["Payne, Catholicism"], on church-state relations during the Republic see pp. 152-170 of this work.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not mention the army in this address. He makes reference to "Personal, economic, financial, and territorial conspiracies which have come to monopolize the fruits of the nation. . . " and goes on to say that under the new Constitution, "These have been smashed," adding that in like fashion the government will have the power "to smash others no less dangerous to the Republic."[197] Precisely what Azaña meant by "and others no less dangerous" is unclear.[198] The vagueness of the phrase quickly led conservative elements in the army, already stunned by the initial wave of reform measures, to interpret it to mean that Azaña intended to "smash" the army, and they launched a number of bitter attacks on Azana and the reforms. La Correspondencia Militar said of the retirement decree of 25 April 1931 that it was "More than a reforming measure, it was a pulverizing one. . . ."[199] The word "triturar" became a stick with which opponents of the military reform

---

197. Maura, pp. 226-227, reprints the speech.

198. Considerably later, Azaña wrote in his diary that he intended the phrase to apply to caciquismo, rural political bossism: Memorias, 13 September 1931. However, as Michael Alpert points out (Reforma, p. 296), an analysis of the entire speech demonstrates that Azaña had already referred to caciquismo in an earlier passage, making it difficult to avoid the conclusion that he did, in fact, intend the phrase to apply to the army.

199. La Correspondencia Militar, 18 June 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

could beat Azaña, and appears widely in the literature.[200] With his characteristic disregard for the opinions of his foes, Azaña ignored their use of the phrase, making no effort to dampen the controversy.[201] The whole matter was a consequence of Azaña's personality. It was frequently his style, rather than the content of his program, which aroused opposition.[202] Of course, much of the Republic's program was sufficiently controversial in any case. However, although the military reform and many of the civil measures instituted by the Republic sparked considerable hostility in the officer corps, few officers were inclined to take action against the government.

There were a number of attempts to overthrow the Republic during its first two years. Almost from the onset of the Republic emigre monarchists based in Paris began to

---

200. See, for example, Mola, El pasado, pp. 1045-1046, and Cebreiros, pp. 9, 13. Also, and more interestingly, is the repetition of the phrase in more recent literature. Thus, Payne, Politics p. 276, "[Azaña] gloried in being able, as he put it, to "pulverize" (triturar) the Army." In the first edition his The Spanish Civil War, Hugh Thomas writes (p. 58), "With his usual fatal facility for creating a phrase which would be remembered, [Azaña] announced that he would 'triturate' the military caste," which in the second edition he changes to (p. 92) "With his usual fatal facility for creating a phrase which would be remembered, [Azaña] announced that he would 'triturate' the enemies of the Republic," closer in meaning to the original wording, but nevertheless links it with the army reforms.

201. Alpert, Reforma, pp. 293-297, has a short, careful analysis of the controversy.

202. Ben-Ami, Origins, p. 255.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

plot a coup.[203] Although largely civilian in composition, several senior officers who had taken advantage of Azaña's retirement decree were numbered among them, including Brigadier General Luis Orgaz and Lieutenant Colonel José Varela, two prominent africanistas. Although the plotters attempted to drum up support for a coup, their close identification with the discredited Alfonso XIII lost them the support of the Carlists, while their conservatism alienated the Basques, nor was Orgaz able to secure much sympathy in the officer corps. As a result, nothing came of their efforts.[204] Although this plot was the most serious threat to the Republic in its first year, it was by no means the most obvious. Early in 1932 there occurred a number of violent outbreaks of leftist inspiration.

---

203. At this remove it is difficult to sort out the many reports of plots and conspiracy which were circulating in the early months of the Republic, some attributed to the Right and others to the extreme Left. In his Memorias Azaña notes many such rumors: 4-5, 8 July; 13, 20 August; 1, 7, 8, 15, and 16 September. Some of these were taken more seriously than others: on 5 July he arranges with Manuel Goded, the Chief-of-the-General Staff, to prepare troops in case Navarra "had to be invaded." Such rumors continued unabated for years. Thus, in June of 1934, rumors of a complex plot were taken seriously by several radical and republican newspapers, which even reported such specifics as the names of the officers assigned to arrest the President: see El Socialista, 7 June 1934, p. 1, and La Voz, 7 June 1934, p. 1

204. Beltran Guell, pp. 82-86 has a brief account of this conspiracy, which may be supplemented by Payne Politics, pp. 279-281, 283ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

From the beginning of January into mid-February of 1932 a series of demonstrations and general strikes took place in many areas of Spain.[205] There were outbreaks in Extremadura, Andalucia, Valencia, Asturias, and Catalonia. Several of these turned violent, and about two dozen deaths occurred, mostly in clashes between strikers and the Guardia civil. Particularly violent outbreaks occurred on 1 January 1932, when a peasant uprising at Castilblanco, an impoverished village in Extremadura, left four Civil Guards dead, and on 5 January, when Civil Guards in Arnedo, in Old Castille, fired on a large crowd of demonstrators, killing six. However, the most spectacular events occurred in Catalonia, where an anarcho-syndicalist outbreak took place in the valley of the Llobregat on 20 January. So extensive was the insurrection --which Azaña termed "a revolutionary movement with the intention of bringing down the Republic"--[206] that troops had to be brought in to supplement the Guardia civil.[207] Although Azana moved with

---

205. There is no comprehensive treatment of the events of January of 1932, but see Arrarás, República, I, pp. 284-309, which is distinctly conservative in tone. Azaña's Memorias for the affected days are also useful, as are his addresses to the Cortes on 5, 6, 21 January and 10 February, Obras completas, II, pp. 127ff, 165-166.

206. Azaña, Memorias, 21 January 1932. In general, Azaña's diary during early and mid-January is full of references to the various incidents, some of which he blames on "extremist revolutionaries": Azaña, Memorias, 4 January 1932.

207. Payne, Revolution, p. 118.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

commendable energy to restore order, the events of January and February of 1932 cost him a great deal of political support, for in acting firmly he alienated many of his erstwhile supporters on the Left, and particularly the extreme left, who saw these outbreaks as a legitimate expression of popular dissatisfaction. Many leftists blamed the violence on the Guardia civil and demanded, among other things, the removal of Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo, a veteran africanista who was Director General of the Guardia civil. In April of 1931 Sanjurjo had informed Alfonso XIII that he ought to leave the country and had then placed the Guardia civil at the service of the Republic.[208] In the period since he served loyally and efficiently. As a result, when Azaña summoned him to a meeting on 5 February, by which time the unrest had largely been put down, he was startled to discover that he was to be sacked, although to cushion the blow Azaña made him Director General of the Carabineros, the frontier guard. The removal of Sanjurjo had little practical effect. Politically it failed to mollify the Left, while deepening the panic on the Right. Worse, although Azana believed that he had parted with Sanjurjo on cordial terms, the latter seems to have been extremely hurt by the treatment

---

208. Berenguer, pp. 379-380; Ben-Ami, Origins, p. 251.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

which he had received.[209] As a result, he began to flirt with various opposition groups, including the Paris-based monarchist conspirators.

In the late winter and spring of 1932 a number of semi-distinct conspiracies had developed among several groups of conservative Republicans, monarchists, and various rightist dissidents.[210] So active did these groups become that in March a special law was enacted which banned military "journals of opinion," thus closing down such old publications as La Correspondencia militar, founded in 1869, which had been receiving "subsidies" from the monarchist conspirators and had been particularly vicious in attacks on the government.[211] In the same decree Azana

---

209. For Azaña's view of their relationship see Memorias, 5 February 1932. The account of this meeting in Julio Romano's Sanjurjo, el caballero del valor (Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1940), pp. 120-122, is rather different than that given by Azaña, but nevertheless suggests the two parted on friendly terms, and even suggests that the Prime Minister offered to promote Sanjurjo to Captain General and send him on an extended mission to Latin America, an honor which Romano says the latter declined. As this was nearly a year after Azaña had abolished the highest rank, the offer seems unlikely. Rivas Xerif, p. 170, who terms Sanjurjo "a very good example of a soldier of the last century," has some interesting observations on the latter's personality. See also Payne, Politics, 281-282, and Sanjurjo's subsequent actions.

210. On the development of the monarchist conspiracy in this period see Arrarás, República, I, pp. 470ff; Beltran Guell, pp. 84ff.

211. Ley de Azaña, 23 March 1932. Azaña's address to the Cortes on this subject is interestingly titled "Supresión de la prensa llamada militar," ["Suppression of the So-Called Military Press."], Obras completas, II, pp. 173-178. In it, he argues that the journals in question are not professional and that banning them is thus not a violation of freedom of the press: p. 177.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

announced that retired officers who engaged in acts of insubordination and conspiracy were liable to lose their pensions, and that generals and staff officers who went without employment for six months had to accept forcible retirement, thus striking a blow at two groups which had, in his view, hitherto enjoyed government subsidies to engage in anti-government conspiracies. This measure had little practical effect on the plotters, who were well-financed by subsidies from various noble families. There were essentially two separate groups of plotters who had linked their fates together.[212] The older conspiracy was a well-financed monarchist plot headed by retired Lieutenant General Emilio Barrera, who had begun his work almost as soon as Alfonso XIII had stepped down from the throne, with the intention of restoring the latter. Major General Manuel Goded, angered by his treatment in the "Mangada Affair," led a conservative Republican plot with the intention of curbing the perceived excesses of the regime.[213] José Sanjurjo became a key player in the

---

212. Pérez Salas (p. 53) advances the curious claim that the plotters were a depraved lot who deliberately conducted their meetings in the red-light district of Barcelona and similar places, so that they indulge in "degrading vices."

213. Precisely when Goded became sufficiently disenchanted with the Azaña regime to begin plotting against it remains unclear. In a volume published during the Civil War after attacks on the general's character and political credentials by ultra Nationalists, Goded's son argued that the general was a dedicated rightist throughout his life, suggesting, for example, that his conduct in the "Mangada Affair" was deliberately intended to provoke a coup: Manuel Goded, Un 'faccioso' cien por cien (Zaragoza: Editora Herlado de Aragon, 1938), with particular reference

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

plotting. His new position as head of the Carabineros permitted him to travel extensively without attracting attention and he was able to sound out the views of many officers. Although a number of officers did commit themselves to a coup, Sanjurjo had relatively little success overall, the 'morphrodite political character of the plot being sufficient to warn most officers away.[214] The cautious were wise, for the flaws in the fabric of the plot were fatal. Double-crossing their republican allies, the monarchists rose on 10 August, proclaiming their intention to "rectify" the Republic, in which "force has replaced right, corruption, the law, license, discipline."[215]

The sanjurjada lasted two days. In Madrid, only a single squadron of cavalry joined the rising, and it was

---

to pp. 5-16. On the other hand, Cabanellas, Cuatro, II, p. 251, observes that relations between Azaña and Goded had been fairly cordial until the Mangada Affair, after which they chilled precipitously. The consensus seems to be that the general was a non-monarchist, conservative republican rather than a rightist, who had become extremely disenchanted with the regime. See, for example, Payne, Politics, p. 238.

214. Payne, Politics, p. 501-502, note 35, remarks that Francisco Franco, then commanding an infantry brigade at La Coruna, managed to arrange to be occupied on a visiting warship in order to avoid meeting representatives of the conspirators.

215. The text of the manifesto issued by the conspirators is reprinted in Merino, pp. 210-211.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

quickly overcome. Although Sanjurjo succeeded in gaining control of Seville and nearby Jerez, loyal troops and Guardia civil began approaching on 11 August.[216] Sanjurjo attempted to reach the Portuguese frontier by car, but then surrendered to the Guardia civil: his monarchist associate Barrera escaped in an airplane which he had presciently arranged to have at hand. Over the next weeks and months a modest purge was held of those involved in the sanjurjada. Altogether 173 persons were convicted of various crimes, among whom were 93 active officers, including 12 generals, 47 retired officers, and 33 civilians. Sanjurjo was given a death sentence which was commuted to life. Most of the others were sent to a penal colony at Villa Cisneros in the Spanish Sahara. A further 300 officers were relieved of duty and placed "at disposal" but not otherwise penalized. The ease with which the sanjurjada collapsed led Azaña and others to believe that there was little serious possibility of a rightist coup against the Republic, and indeed tended to confirm Azaña's opinion that the Spanish Army was incapable of undertaking a serious conspiracy.[217]

---

216. In addition, Azaña had ordered up reinforcements from Morocco, including Moorish and Foreign Legion troops who were landed at Cadiz: Arrarás, República, II, pp. 166-167; Juan Jose Calleja López, Yague, un corazon al rojo (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, 1963), p. 57

217. Azaña, "Fin de la rebellion militar," Obras completas, II, pp. 389-392 ["Azaña, 'Fin'"]; Alpert, Reforma, pp. 111-112. Azaña/Arrarás, Memorias contains a long excerpt covering 9-12 August (pp. 187-136) which provides some details on the affair. The entries for 27 July 1932 and 5 August 1932 (p. 186), suggest that Azana was aware of the existence of the conspiracy. They also suggest that he was less concerned about Sanjurjo's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Moreover, his success in crushing the affair helped restore the sagging prestige of the Azaña regime on the Left, a trend which was strengthened when the estates of noble families implicated in the plot were confiscated.[218]

The boost which the failure of the sanjurjada gave to the Azana government was short lived. The parties which

---

position as head of the Carabineros than about his enormous prestige in the army. In addition, he was uncertain as to what action he could take given the lack of clear evidence of wrongdoing. According to this source, Azaña appears to have spoken to Sanjurjo on 9 August, the eve of the coup (pp. 187-189), in a conversation in which neither appears to have hinted that anything was amiss. That same night, however, Azana ordered Brigadier General Manuel Romerales Quintero to take control of one of the local regiments and made other arrangements as well. The entry concludes with a description of a fire fight in the Cibeles gardens, which Azaña witnessed from his office. Azaña's next entry, "7 a.m., 10 August" (pp. 199-202) includes the line "All is calm. No news from the provinces, save from Seville." The final entry for the date includes a note that in the Cortes Azaña was warmly greeted and congratulated on the failure of the coup (p. 234). On this plot, Francisco Franco, who would later remark that he believed there were too many masons involved, said that on the morning of the rising Azaña telephoned him at his office. Asked what he was doing, Franco replied that he was "discharging the duties of his command and had nothing to report." This greatly pleased Azaña, who had though that Franco would side with Sanjurjo. See Franco Salgado, Conversaciones, p. 452.

218. The sanjurjada has not received extensive treatment in the literature. Payne, Politics, pp. 279-291, and the somewhat different account in Ejército, pp. 398-412, may be taken as standard. In addition, there are the highly sympathetic treatments in Beltran Guell, pp. 89-97; Merino, pp. 208-217; and Arrarás, República, I, pp. 477ff, 491-558, the latter of which is very detailed. Rivas Xerif, pp. 170-176, recounts the events as he witnessed them virtually at Azaña's side. See also the special feature "La sanjurjada," in Historia 16 No. 7 (August 1982), pp. 43-67.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

constituted the bulk of the regime's support were an inchoate mass ranging from quite conservative Basque and Catalan separatists through social democratic republicans, various types of socialists and marxists, to extreme anarchosyndicalists. There were few ties which bound them together. As the process of reform advanced, those ties eroded. The principal threat to the stability of the government came not from the Right, but rather from its own more radical supporters, who proved increasingly difficult for Azaña to control.[219] Moreover, the non-radical Republican movements tended to fragment as time went on, leaving the radical groupings substantially more powerful in consequence.[220] In January of 1933 there occurred a new batch of ultra-leftist outbreaks such as those at Castilblanco and in the Valley of the Llobregat just a year earlier. Anarchistic disturbances took place in Aragon, Barcelona, Valencia, Murcia, and Seville, with attacks on the Guardia civil, arson, spontaneous seizures of private property, strikes, and rioting, culminating in a violent uprising at Casas Viejas, in Andulucia.[221] On 11 January a band of anarchosyndicalists proclaimed "libertarian

---

219. Sedgewick, p. 153ff.

220. Payne, Revolution, p. 103, observes that while there were three non-radical republican parties in 1929, these had split into nine by 1931, and fourteen by 1934.

221. Payne, Revolution, p. 118.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

communism" in the village and proceeded to lay siege to the local Guardia civil station, which was stoutly defended by a sergeant and a small detachment of guards, three of whom were mortally wounded. A platoon of Guardias de asalto, soon arrived and the radicals were beaten off and driven back to a farmhouse where seven of them made a stand. The asaltos fired the house, killing all inside. They then proceeded to shoot a number of villagers out of hand, few of whom appear to have been involved in the outbreak. Casas Viejas shocked the nation, the more so for having been committed by the supposedly "Republican" Guardias de asalto on ignorant peasants. Worse was to follow, for upon being questioned by journalists the commander of the Asaltos reported that he had received orders from the Interior Minister, Santiago Casares Quiroga, to take "neither wounded nor prisoners" and that Prime Minister Azaña himself had said "Shoot them in the belly." Azaña denied saying any such thing and ordered an immediate investigation. The investigation proved nothing, for it was clear that while the Asaltos had received rather blood-thirsty instructions, these had not been issued by Casares Quiroga or Azaña, although precisely who had issued them was never resolved.[222] Casas Viejas cost the government

222. The fullest treatment of Casas Viejas is in Ramón J. Sender, Viaje a la aldea del crimen (Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1934), which is anti-government but includes lengthy excerpts from the depositions of eye witnesses. Arrarás, República, II, pp. 81-105, is also of value for his citations of original documents.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the support of both the Left and Right wings of the Republican coalition.[223] Although hitherto the pace of reform had been fairly speedy, the last major piece of legislation, a massive restructuring of church-state relations, proved extremely difficult to carry through as a result of lack of support on the far left and opposition from Catholic republicans. Moreover, Azaña seems to have become depressed, a state which appears to have deepened with time, and became less able to marshal his arguments and his votes effectively.[224] The "Law of Confessions and Congregations" eventually passed with a comfortable margin in May. Meanwhile, continuing political turmoil and the

---

223. For the political implications of Casas Viejas see Jackson, Civil War, pp. 100-102, 513-514; Robinson, p. 122; and particularly Madariaga, pp. 417ff. Gabriel Jackson, "The Azaña Regime in Perspective (Spain, 1931-1933)," American Historical Review, vol. 64 (January 1959) ["Jackson, 'Perspective.'"], p. 298 observes that Casas Viejas was like Annual: as Annual had served to focus the blame for the accumulated resentments and evils of the past few years on Alfonso XIII, Casas Viejas had a similar effect with regard to Manuel Azaña.

224. Several authors remark on Azaña's increasingly depressed state of mind, a condition which began in 1933 and appears to have increased with time: see Jackson, "Perspective," p. 300. Azana's own La velada en Benicarlo (Obras completas, III, pp. 379-460), written in late April of 1937, after nearly a year of Civil War [perhaps in conscious imitation of Napoleon's Le souper de Beaucaire?], takes the form of a dialogue among various loyalist officers, officials, and citizens and has a depressing, self-justificatory tone. For an English translation see Manuel Azaña, Vigil in Benicarlo, translated with an introduction by Josephine Stewart and Paul Stewart (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1982). Sedgewick, pp. 64ff, 192-197, attempts an upbeat analysis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

erosion of Azaña's base in the Cortes led President Alcalá-Zamora to dismiss the government in early June. The Azaña regime fell as much a victim of the Left as of the Right.[225] A series of caretaker governments followed, including one headed by Azaña, who managed to oversee the establishment of the supreme court which had been authorized in the Constitution of 1931, and replace the widely disliked "Law for the Defense of the Republic" with a less draconian measure. New elections were held in November and December of 1933.

The elections resulted in a Center-Right government under the leadership of Alejandro Lerroux, a member of the Radicals, a centrist republican party.[226]

---

225. Jackson, "Perspective", pp. 282-300, is a good summary post-mortem on the character and achievements of Azaña's years in power. See also, Payne, Revolution, p. 118.

226. On the collapse of the Azaña government and the installation of Lerroux see Jackson, Civil War, pp. 103-120.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter IV

The Army and the Right Republic, 1933-1936.

Spanish leftists termed the two years following their defeat at the polls in November of 1933 the "bienio negro" [black biennium]. Yet, although the center-right governments which held power during this period impeded the implementation of parts of the religious and agrarian legislation, they proved unable, or unwilling, to reverse most of the actions of their leftist predecessors. The largest voting bloc in the new Cortes was a new center-right coalition, the Confederación española de derechas autonomas (C.E.D.A.), with about 200 seats. Based on Acción Popolar, a middle class Catholic political movement, but also including conservative Basque Nationalists and Catalan separatists, the landed Agrarian party, and various traditionalist groups including Alfonsine monarchists, the C.E.D.A. had been engineered by José María Gil Robles, a young attorney. In effect, the C.E.D.A. was a successful effort to reconcile moderate Catholics with the Republic.[1] However, the C.E.D.A. did not control sufficient votes to constitute a majority. Since none of the center parties

---

1. Arrarás, República, II, pp. 273ff; Payne, Catholicism, p. 165.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were willing to back a cedista as Prime Minister, Gil Robles agreed to support Alejandro Lerroux, a member of the centrist Radicals, the largest single party in the Cortes, with about 100 seats, which had formerly been the rightmost-element in the earlier leftist coalitions. The Lerroux cabinet was composed almost entirely of members of center parties, with only one cedista, who was balanced by a single leftist, an arrangement which seemed to satisfy the Right but not the Left.[2]

Lerroux attempted to pursue a policy of reconciling the Right to the Republic, making conciliatory gestures to the Church and the Army. The War Minister in the new cabinet was Diego Hidalgo Durán, a Radical with no background in military affairs. Although he would later defend his record, Hidalgo was little more than a caretaker, with few concrete accomplishments to which he could point,[3] though he did manage to reduce the overall

---

2. For an analysis of the Cortes and the first Lerroux government see Madariaga, pp. 422-424.

3. See Diego Hidalgo Durán, ¿Por que fui lanzado de Ministerio de la guerra?: Diez meses de actuacion minesterial [Why Was I Fired as War Minister?] (Madrid; Espasa-Calpe, 1934). In this work Hidalgo attempts to justify his actions whilst War Minister, expresses some mild criticisms of the Azaña Reforms, and discusses his initiatives while in office.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

military budget to its lowest level since 1929.[4] During his ten months in office Hidalgo reduced to 75% the amortization of vacancies in the officer corps, raised the salaries of non-commissioned officers a bit, and established a pool of active duty colonels and lieutenant colonels to draw upon for "eventualities."[5] Although he did propose the abolition of the Consorcio de industrias militares and the creation of a motorized infantry division, neither initiative got anywhere.[6] His most

---

4. The military budgets of the Republic were all higher than Primo de Rivera's last budget.

Spanish Military Spending
1929-1935

Year	Regime	Pesetas (millions)	As Percent of 1929	As Percent of Previous
1929	Dictatorship	367.0		
1930	Dictablanda	n.a		
1931	Left	422.1	115.0	?
1932	Left	384.0	104.6	91.0
1933	Left	433.6	118.2	112.9
1934	Center-Right	378.3	103.1	87.3
1935	Center-Right	404.4	110.2	106.9

The Anuario estadistico de España is the principal source for the budgets. Figure are not adjusted for inflation, but in any case this was a period of economic deflation, so Republican budgets were actually higher than they appear. Payne, Politics, pp. 273-274, 307, briefly deals with trends in the military budget under the Republic. Pardo González, p. 78, observes that Spain was spending only 16% of its budget on defense in 1934.

5. Hidalgo, pp. 105, 108-110, and 119-125.

6. Hidalgo, pp. 166-171, 155-157. The proposal for a motorized division was incorporated in a decree of 5 November 1934, printed in the Gaceta of 1 December. The proposed formation resembled the division légere méchanique which had just been introduced in the French Army: see Albert A. Nofi, "The Beginning: Armored Divisions, 1934-1940," Strategy & Tactics No. 111 (May 1987), p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

important accomplishment was an attempt to depoliticize the armed forces by an order prohibiting all military personnel from affiliating with political or labor organizations.[7] In addition, on 27 March 1934 he approved the promotion of Francisco Franco to major general. Overall, however, neither Lerroux nor Hidalgo acted in any serious way contrary to the tone set by Azana, even leaving Azana's choice, Carlos Masquelet Lacaci as chief-of-the-general staff.[8] The principal military developments during Hidalgo's tenure at the War Ministry had little to do with him. Among these was the growth of the Unión militar española (U.M.E.), a loose association of conservative officers created in the aftermath of the sanjurjada.[9] Views on the U.M.E. [Spanish Military Union] are generally unfavorable. At best it has been termed a "mild recrudescence of juntero feeling."[10] Less favorably it has been called an "ultra-rightist" organization aimed at

---

7. DOMG, 19 July 1934.

8. It will be recalled that Masquelet had succeeded Goded after the Mangada Affair. See Chapter III.

9. Ricardo de la Cierva y Hoches, Historia de la guerra civil: Antecedentes (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1969), p. 761 ["Cierva, Antecedentes"].

10. Payne, Politics, p. 293.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

overthrowing the Republic.[11] In the sense that it was, like the juntas de defensa of old, a quasi-legal association of officers, the first statement is correct. However while principal objective of the juntas had been the defense of the individual arms and services against encroachments on their particular interests, and thus were only incidentally concerned with politics, the U.M.E. had a broader focus.[12] Moreover, although generally conservative, the U.M.E. was hardly "ultra-rightist," since it included in its ranks a number of officers of decidedly

---

11. Preston, SCW, p. 48. Preston does not, incidentally, mention the radical leftist military organization, the U.M.R.A., variously known as the Unión militar de republicanos antifascistas, the Unión de militares republicanos y antifascistas, or the Unión militar republicana antifascista, formed in 1935 through the merger of the communist Unión militar antifascista and the less radical republican leftist Unión militar republicana, which had been formed about a year earlier: see Payne, Politics, pp. 321, 338, 346, and 350; Payne, Ejército, p. 454; Alpert, Ejército, pp. 15ff; Salas, Historia, I, pp. 69ff; Thomas 2nd, 166; Busquets, Pronunciamientos, pp. 127-129.

12. The only extensive study of the U.M.E. is Antonio Cacho Zabala, La Unión militar española (Alicante: Egasa, 1940), which is highly partisan, incomplete, and hagiographic. As a result, Payne, Politics, pp. 293-294, 300ff, and Ejército, pp. 414-415, 425-427, are of considerable value as the author had access to certain sources not generally available: see Payne, Politics, p. 502, note 2. Boyd, p. 279, asserts that the organization was formed primarily to "protest stagnation, working conditions, and favoritism" in the army, which is only partially true.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

moderate and even liberal sympathies.[13] The U.M.E. was open to all officers, including oficiales de complemento and retirees, and even to enlisted men. Although its highly decentralized character makes generalization difficult, the U.M.E. was essentially a loose coalition of officers who were in some way dissatisfied with the present state of affairs. Some members were technocrats concerned about professional questions. Others appear to have viewed it as essentially an association of patriotic officers.[14] Most, to be sure, were conservatives. The range of political opinion ran from those favoring a moderate Republic but concerned over the increasing radicalism of the Left, to those seeking to overthrow the new regime.[15] Although one of the principals in the foundation of the U.M.E. had links to the embryonic fascist movement, Falange española, founded later in 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, eldest son of the late Dictator, he was shortly shoved into the background, and it would be unfair to term

---

13. Among liberal officers known to have been associated with the U.M.E. were Brigadier General José Miaja Menant and Major Vicente Rojo, who rose to become respectively the supreme commander and the chief-of-the-general staff in the People's Republican Army during the Civil War; see Chapter VI, note 163. Active generals were not actually permitted to become regular membership in the organization: Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 423.

14. Payne, Franco, p. 87.

15. Busquets, Pronunciamientos, p. 126.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the U.M.E. "fascist."[16] The U.M.E. at first attracted little support, and that mostly among junior and mid-level officers. Although attempts were made to secure the support of various generals, none of them initially were willing to do more than make vague gestures of approval.[17] The U.M.E. was, in fact, of little consequence in this period. The same cannot be said of other groups hostile to the Republic, both on the right and the left.

The failure of the sanjurjada had not dampened monarchist conspiratorial inclinations. Contact with Mussolini resulted in some encouraging promises of support, but efforts to develop a new conspiracy were disappointing. There were a number of reasons for this. Officers most inclined to support a monarchist coup had already committed themselves in the sanjurjada and had suffered the

---

16. The willingness of leftist groups to term their opponents "fascists" is well known. In the case of Spain, the number of fascists was extremely small right up to the onset of the Civil War, even if one counts all ultra-right wing groups, such as the Carlists, in with the avowed fascists: see Payne, Franco, pp. 36ff, 46-66, for a summary of the principal far right groups.

17. Payne, Politics, p. 294, mentions in this regard Mola, Goded, and Franco, citing evidence presented by Eduardo Pardo Reina, a principal in the Madrid U.M.E. Major General Joaquín Fanjul appears at one point to have attempted to become nominal head of the U.M.E., but he proved a singularly inept administrator: Cacho Zabala, p. 18; Payne, Politics, p. 306. Major General Manuel Goded was also later affiliated, but does not seem to have taken any important role in the organization: Payne, Ejercito, pp. 415, 427.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consequences, being expelled from the army and imprisoned As for the officers still on active duty, if they had proven unwilling to act against the leftist Azaña government, they were hardly likely to move against the politically more conservative Lerroux. Moreover, the plotters themselves were unable to reconcile the differences among the Carlist and Alfonsine factions into which they were divided. Thus, by its very character, the center-right Lerroux government was secure against serious threats from the right, though rightist rhetoric and violence remained a problem.[18] It was not, however, safe from the left.

The anarchosyndicalists and other extreme leftist groups had had no sympathy with the moderately leftist Azana regime. They had even less for the "reactionary" government now in power. From the start the new government began to have difficulties with the far left. In December of 1933 and January of 1934 a series of violent strikes, sabotage attacks, and abortive uprisings by anarchosyndicalists left nearly 100 dead.[19] In March of

---

18. Beltran Guell, pp. 99ff, has a highly sympathetic treatment of ultra-rightist activities during this period. See also Payne, Politics, p. 295

19. The most extensive treatment of the December uprisings is Francisco Aguado Sánchez, La revolucion de Octubre de 1934 (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1972), pp. 21-38, 43-44. See also the observations in Arraras, Republica, II, pp. 254, 278.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1934 a Socialist conspiracy was uncovered in the 19th Infantry Regiment, with the result that several officers and noncommissioned officers were expelled from the Army and a large number of enlisted men subjected to disciplinary action.[20] Tensions rose steadily, with many leftists openly expressing the most extreme sentiments.[21] When, in April, Lerroux amnestied the participants in the sanjurjada, his government came under severe attack. Although he prohibited the amnestied officers from returning to the Army, Lerroux found himself unable to keep his coalition intact and his government fell soon afterwards.[22] Rather than ask Lerroux to form a new coalition, which would inevitably have to include increased C.E.D.A. participation, President Alcalá-Zamora asked Ricardo Samper, a Radical nonentity, to take up the task. Samper attempted to pursue essentially the same policies, and with virtually the same cabinet, as had Lerroux. Unfortunately, he proved an inept, unskilled Prime

---

20. Arrarás, República, II, p. 357.

21. See Aguado, p. 46, and Payne, Politics, p. 296, for a sampling of radical statements.

22. The decree of amnesty, which remitted Sanjurjo's life sentence --already reduced from death-- to one of exile, is found in Gaceta, 25 April 1934. On the amnesty see José María Gil Robles, No fue posible la paz (Barcelona: Ariel, 1968), pp. 119-122; Azana, Memorias, 7 August 1937 has some interesting observations on the subject.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Minister, lacking Lerroux's political skills and base in the middle class. The country began to drift towards civil war. As both rightists and leftists accelerated their stockpiling of arms, numerous strikes took place and violent incidents multiplied.[23] Meanwhile there was an enormous increase in Communist agitation,[24] which tended to drive the leaders of the less radical workers movements leftwards in order to more effectively compete for support.[25] At the same time Catalonia began to become restive once more. The autonomous status which the region had acquired in 1932 had calmed the more moderate Catalan nationalist elements. However, in the summer of 1934 a decision of the Supreme Court negated an important piece of legislation enacted by the Catalan Generalitat, thus re-igniting the whole argument about regional autonomy.[26] Then, on 1 October, during a debate in the Cortes on the Catalan situation, Gil Robles announced that the C.E.D.A.

---

23. Aguado, pp. 51-95, has a useful treatment of the domestic unrest in the period April-October of 1934.

24. Aguado, pp. 67-73, deals specifically with Communist efforts to subvert the Guardia civil during this period.

25. Madariaga makes this point several times, most clearly on p. 417.

26. Madariaga, pp. 430-431. Exacerbating the Catalan situation was the fact that Colonel Francesc Macia, the principal architect of the Catalan statute, had died in late 1933, leaving a vacuum in Catalan leadership into which more radical separatists were able to step.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

could no longer support the Samper government, which promptly fell. Gil Robles commanded the largest single bloc of votes in the Cortes and ought logically to have been asked to form a government. However, Alcalá-Zamora was suspicious of Gil Robles' objectives and once more turned to Lerroux.[27] After some careful negotiations, Gil Robles accepted minority status for the C.E.D.A. in the a new Lerroux government. The new cabinet, formed on 4 October, included three cedistas, holding the portfolios of Agriculture, Justice, and Labor, with Hidalgo Durán continuing as War Minister. The notion of a Catholic party sat ill with most leftists, given recent memories of the German Catholic Center Party's support for Hitler and of Engelbert Dollfuss' destruction of the Austrian Socialist Party.[28] Despite the open condemnation of Fascism by Gil Robles and several other cedista leaders,[29] the extreme

---

27. Although a practicing Catholic, Alcalá-Zamora's feelings about Gil Robles were colored largely by his anticlericalism. Gil Robles had served as defense counsel for several of the officers involved in the sanjurjada and was also an attorney for the Jesuits. In addition, he seemed tepid on the legitimacy of the Republic, advancing the theory of "accidentalism," that it was the duty of a good Catholic to support the incumbent regime, regardless of personal preferences: see Jackson, CW, p. 121-122, for a brief, but evenhanded analysis. For views of Alcala-Zamora's consistent opposition to having Gil Robles as prime minister, see Gil Robles, pp. 314ff; Jackson, HQ, pp. 68-69, 85.

28. Jackson, CW, p. 128.

29. Payne, Catholicism, p. 165.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

left reacted violently to the new "fascist" government.[30] The result was widespread violence throughout Spain, a coup attempt in Madrid, secession in Catalonia, and a major insurrection in the Asturias.

The "Revolution of 1934" was the most violent outbreak in Spanish politics since the Restoration. There were incidents in all but ten of Spain's fifty provinces.[31] Most often these involved general strikes, sabotage, and attacks on police, ecclesiastical property, and the wealthy. In Madrid and most other places the local police, the Guardias de asalto, and the Guardia civil had little difficulty coping with outbreaks.[32] Only in Barcelona and the Asturias did the situation require the forceful intervention of the Army.

On 5 October Luis Companys, the new President of the Generalitat, decreed Catalonia's autonomy within a "Spanish Federal Republic" and invited "the leaders of the general protest against Fascism . . . to establish the Provisional

---

30. Madariaga, p. 428. For leftist perceptions of the C.E.D.A. see Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Methuen, 1978) ["Preston, Coming"], pp. 92ff.

31. Aguado, map facing p. 96.

32. Aguado, pp. 351-376, deals with the situation in Madrid, and pp. 399-456, with the rest of Spain save for Catalonia and the Asturias.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Government of the Republic in Catalonia."[33] Companys, who controlled the Mozos de la escuarda, a special regional police force, plus elements of the Asaltos and Guardia civil, distributed arms to some 4,500 men in a newly formed "Catalan Army,"[34] officered by supporters from the regular army and the Somaten, the traditional Catalan bourgeois militia. However, the commander of the local regular army garrison, Major General Domingo Batet, a wealthy, liberal Catalan, refused to cooperate. Within hours of Companys' proclamation, Batet declared martial law throughout Catalonia. After a day of delicate negotiations he sent troops and Civil Guards into action on the night of 6-7 October. Batet handled his men carefully, and casualties were few. By the end of 9 October the region was firmly under his control, with Companys and virtually all his principal supporters under arrest.[35] Thus, within less than a week the insurrection had been crushed in most of

---

33. Cited by Madariaga, p. 434. Companys hand appears to have been forced by radical rightist elements within the Catalan Nationalist movement: Jackson, CW, pp. 151-152.

34. Arrarás, República, II, p. 505.

35. Aguado, pp. 377-398, and Arrarás, República, II, pp. 365-387 and 469-514, deal with the insurrection in Catalonia. Arrarás, República, II, p. 509, gives 47 dead and 117 wounded as the casualties of the uprising in Barcelona, of whom 6 of the dead and 26 of the wounded were among army and Civil Guard personnel. There are no figures for casualties in the rest of Catalonia, where there was some fighting, but these cannot have been very numerous.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Spain. However, the situation in the Asturias was markedly different and ultimately required large-scale military operations.

There were a number of factors which made the rising in the Asturias a more serious affair.[36] Perhaps the most important was a pact concluded in the Spring of 1934 between the regional branches of the three principal radical workers federations, the Socialist Unión general de trabajadores, the Federación Socialista Asturiana, and the Anarchosyndicalist Confederación nacional de trabajadores, the first occasion on which the anarchists expressed a willingness to cooperate with the other radical workers movements. This led to an unusual degree of cooperation among the frequently fractious radicals, permitting them to mobilize perhaps as many as 30,000 men under the direction of a central leadership, which included several leftist military officers, who helped develop a well-reasoned, if optimistic plan of operations.[37] In addition, the Asturian

---

36. Although he has a conservative bias, Aguado, pp. 105-338, is the most even handed treatment of the Asturian revolt, with Arrarás, República, II, pp. 531-641, being far more hostile. Eduardo López de Ochoa, Campaña militar de Asturias (Madrid: Ediciones Yunque, 1936) ["López de Ochoa, Campaña"], is a personal memoir of great value, written partially to rebut charges brought against the general from the extreme left. See also Vicente Palacio Atard, Cinco historias de la República y de la Guerra Civil (Madrid, 1973) [hereafter, "Palacio Atard, Cinco"], pp. 11-38.

37. Aguado, p. 127, summarizes the principal points of the overall plan of operations developed by the "General Staff" of the insurgents.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

miners and factory workers --among the highest paid workers in Spain-- were well prepared, had access to considerable stocks of dynamite and small arms, which they supplemented during the opening phase of the uprising by seizing the virtually undefended artillery and small arms plants in Trubia. They also made excellent use of their industrial skills to improvise crude but effective armored cars and trains.[38] Moreover, local forces were inadequate, there being only 600 Civil Guards, 100 Assault Guards, some 200 Carabineros, and about 1,700 regular army personnel, fewer than 2,700 men to cover a province of over 200,000 inhabitants.[39] Finally, the Asturias is a rugged, mountainous region, relatively isolated from the rest of Spain.[40] Thus the overall situation at the onset of the uprising greatly favored the insurgents.

The rebels struck with considerable force at 0130 hours on 5 October. While police posts and Guardia civil barracks throughout the province were assaulted with almost

---

38. Aguado, p. 274, 291.

39. Aguado, pp. 118-125. Palacio Atard, Cinco, pp. 25-27, has a short analysis of the numbers involved on both sides.

40. See José Diaz de Villegas Bustamante, Nueva geografia militar de España (Madrid: Ediciones Ares, 1953), pp. 414, 417-418, 422ff, for a military and historical analysis of the geography of the Asturias and surrounding areas.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

suicidal ferocity, large numbers of workers began to concentrate against Oviedo, the capital, a leftist-sympathizing city of about 80,000 inhabitants, set in a valley dominated by higher ground and defended by some police troops and fewer than 1,000 army personnel.[41] The garrison entrenched in the central part of the city and, reinforced by a handful of volunteers from local rightist organizations, held its ground against assailants who initially numbered at least 8,000. While rebel supporters established a libertarian communist society behind the lines, seizing hostages, expropriating property, and in some cases committing various atrocities, a regular siege quickly developed at Oviedo. Casualties were particularly high among the insurgents, who had a penchant for frontal attacks by dynamite throwing enthusiasts. The situation was critical, but the government acted with considerable speed.

Rumors that the far left was preparing an uprising had been circulating for some time.[42] Having little confidence in the abilities of the chief-of-the-general staff, Masquelet, in mid-September Hidalgo Durán had taken the

---

41. Aguado, p. 199, lists 600 infantrymen, 200 engineers, 70 civil guards, 20 Carabineros, and 310 civil police.

42. It was perhaps the "most advertised revolution in modern times," notes Palacio Atard, Cinco, p. 22: see also Arraras, Historia, II, p. 403.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

unusual step of summoning Francisco Franco to the War Ministry, ostensibly to act as technical adviser for the upcoming autumn maneuvers.[43] As a result, when the Asturian revolt broke out, Major General Eduardo López de Ochoa, a noted liberal republican and mason who was the Chief of the Third Inspectorate General of the Army, which covered the region, was given command in the field,[44] while Franco coordinated operations from Madrid, serving as an informal chief-of-staff to Hidalgo Durán.[45] Troops began moving on 6 October, as three columns began converging on Oviedo: two battalions of infantry and some artillery advancing from León, on the southwest, another battalion newly landed by sea at Gijón, to drive southwards with the aid of the local engineer battalion, and a fourth infantry battalion, under López de Ochoa himself, moving in from the west.[46] Rebel forces proved strong enough to hold the

---

43. Hidalgo, pp. 77-81 and 90-91, contains a lengthy discussion of Franco.

44. Arrarás, República, II, p. 465, states that Lerroux selected López de Ochoa for the command precisely because he was a liberal and a mason.

45. Aguado, pp. 193-194.

46. López de Ochoa had briefly toyed with the idea of parachuting or using an autogiro to fly into Oviedo, so as to take direct command of the beleaguered garrison, but was dissuaded by Franco, thus failing to secure for himself the distinction of being the first military man to make a parachute jump into a combat situation or to undertake a combat mission in a rotary wing aircraft: López de Ochoa, Campaña, p. 28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

passes from Leon and Gijon, thereby preventing movement from those directions. The column from the west, which had the most ground to cover, was better led, and despite sometimes very heavy fighting, López de Ochoa reached Oviedo on the 11th.[47] This did little more than reinforce the isolated garrison. More forceful measures were needed. Right at the start of the uprising Franco had recommended that units of the Legion, Cazadores de Africa, and the Regulares be committed.[48] By 10 October several battalions of these elite troops had been ferried to Gijón, where, with the troops already at hand they formed a column 3,000 strong. Under Brigadier General Rogelio Caridad Pita, a left republican,[49] and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe, a veteran africanista, these troops drove south with considerable energy, reaching Oviedo on the 12th. The city and its suburbs were secured within two days. Heavily reinforced, the column from Leon broke through on 16 October, by which time López de Ochoa had already dispatched several small columns from Oviedo to effect the

---

47. López de Ochoa, Campaña, pp. 41-102, has an account of the experiences of his column, including an incident in which he was briefly arrested by some suspicious Civil Guards (p. 57).

48. Hidalgo, pp. 83-88, contains a discussion of the decision to commit troops from the African Army.

49. González López, interview, 19 December 1987; Bravo Morato, p. 128-129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

pacification of the rest of the province.[50] On 19 October López de Ochoa announced that the entire province was under military control, by which time perhaps 15,000 army troops and about 3,000 police troops were at hand.[51] Despite the many advantages enjoyed by the rebels, and their considerable numerical superiority, the Army had put down the revolt with relative ease, mayhap a reflection of increasing efficiency as a result of the Azaña reforms.[52] Perhaps 1,200 people were killed in the Asturian revolt. Aside from 88 soldiers and 168 police, the casualties were almost entirely among the rebels, who had frequently engaged in frontal attacks, and other local inhabitants, including rightists shot by extremists. A number of atrocities were committed by both sides during the campaign. Afterwards, as patrols of Guardia civil and Asaltos combed the province arresting known or suspected

---

50. Lopez de Ochoa, Campana, p. 127.

51. Having forgotten that Azaña ordered Moroccans and Legionnaires moved to Spain during the sanjurjada [see Calleja, p. 57.], Leftist apologists made much of the presence of these "savages" and "mercenaries" in the Asturian campaign: in fact, however, less than a third -- perhaps 2,500-- of the troops taking part were from the African Army: Aguado, p. 307.

52. The influence of Azaña's reforms can be seen clearly at work in the matter of decorations, regulations for which had been redrawn during Azaña's ministry to facilitate awards to enlisted men. Fully 14 of the 25 Medallas militares awarded during the Asturian Revolt went to enlisted men, in contrast to but 10 of the 107 awarded during the Rif War: Anuario militar, 1936, pp. 146-148.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

revolutionaries and confiscating arms,[53] there were reports of widespread casual shootings by the police, charges which appear to have been exaggerated,[54] but which were symptomatic of the erosion of the Center and the increasing chasm between Left and Right in Spain.

Salvador de Madariaga, a leftist republican later observed that the revolt of 1934 was unpardonable. Not only was it unjustified by any immediate danger to the Republic from the Right, but it also stripped the Left of any moral authority to condemn equal excesses on the part of the Right.[55] The participation of the principal far left parties in the revolt of 1934 made inevitable a greater clash at a later date, for it suggested very strongly that the Left believed in democracy and the parliamentary process only for itself. Although Azana and other moderate Republicans opposed the rising, they failed to rally strongly to the support of the government and were guilty by association in the minds of the more conservative elements in society.[56]

---

53. Aguado, p. 313, notes that 24,500 rifles and carbines were confiscated during and immediately after the revolt.

54. Madariaga, p. 434.

55. Madariaga, p. 434-435

56. So convinced was the government of the collusion of Azaña and other moderate leftists, that the latter was placed under arrest and imprisoned for some months on a warship in Barcelona harbor, a wholly illegal action given his parliamentary immunity. Azaña's arrest was prompted by his presence in Barcelona during the rising. Shortly before the rebellion he had been seen closeted with Francisco Largo Caballero, the self-styled "Spanish Lenin."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although perhaps as many as 30,000 people languished in jail for some time after the Asturian Rebellion, legal reprisals against the rebels and their sympathizers were not extreme. About thirty men were sentenced to death for their role in the Asturian Revolt. With the precedent set in the sanjurjada in mind, Alcalá-Zamora and Lerroux commuted the sentences of all but two of the condemned, both responsible for particularly heinous crimes. Several officers who acted in sympathy with the Rebels were expelled from the army. Few of those sentenced to prison served very long. This brought the government little praise, for the Left condemned it as vindictive and the Right as soft.

Although it had been intended to strike a blow against "fascism," the "October Revolution" of 1934 instead served

---

This meeting had taken place on a train some days earlier, when both men were travelling to Barcelona to attend the funeral of a former cabinet colleague. If Madariaga is to be trusted (p. 432), Azaña attempted to suggest that the Socialist leaders adopt a less radical attitude. Azaña's version of these events is not known, as he had once again left off making diary entries some weeks before, but see his Mi rebelion en Barcelona in Obras completas, III, pp. 23-172, which offers an explanation of his activities in October of 1934 wrapped around a lengthy attack on the illegal treatment to which he was subjected: interestingly, although pp. 61ff deal with his trip to Barcelona in late September, he glosses over his conversation with Largo Caballero. The account in Arrarás, República, II, pp. 511-514, is in rough agreement on the basic facts, but offers much less sympathy. Azaña was released by order of the Supreme Court. One result of this affair was to cause his popularity on the left to rise: Jackson, CW, pp. 167-168.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to greatly strengthened the far right.[57] At the same time, in consequence of rightist attempts to charge moderate leftist leaders such as Azaña with complicity in the insurrection, left-leaning elements became even more convinced than before that the right intended nothing less than the destruction of the left and of the Republic.[58] Extremist elements on both sides particularly profited from the reaction to the uprising. Those on the left, however, were forced to lay low for a time, while established conspirators on the right renewed their efforts: there was a proposal to attempt a coup under the leadership of José Sanjurjo, living in exile in Portugal, a move frustrated by the opposition of Franco and other senior generals.[59] In the Cortes extreme Rightists put so much pressure on Hidalgo Durán for being too "soft" and permitting leftists in the high command, that he resigned in mid-November, with Lerroux taking the War Ministry himself.[60] Over the next few months Lerroux attempted to mollify the extreme Right. He made Franco Commander-in-Chief in Morocco, gave Goded a

---

57. Payne, Franco, p. 43.

58. Jackson, CW, pp. 167-168.

59. Payne, Politics, p. 298.

60. See Hidalgo's memoirs, passim, for a refutation of the charges laid against him by José Calvo Sotelo, the principal parliamentary spokesman for the anti-republican right.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

choice post in the War Ministry, his first real assignment since the Mangada Affair, and gave similar desirable billets to other officers widely perceived to be Rightist. Despite these moves, extremist views spread in the army. Membership in the U.M.E. increased, and some elements in the coalition began to become involved in conversations with various subversive groups, including monarchists and the Falange.[61] Meanwhile, José Calvo Sotelo, a former cabinet minister under the Dictator and now an extreme monarchist spokesman in the Cortes, began to pull together archconservatives and right republicans into a new political bloc favoring an authoritarian, corporativist regime. It was, however, the center-right C.E.D.A. which, rejecting extremism, found itself in a position of particular power as a result of the rebellion.

Gil Robles made significant efforts to strengthen the center against the extremes. Soon after the Asturian affair was concluded, Gil Robles began to pressure Lerroux to seek modifications in the clerical legislation and for some alterations in the Constitution of 1931.[62] In

---

61. Cacho Zabala, pp. 23-25; 27-28.

62. Madariaga, pp. 440-441, has a summary of the principal measures proposed by Gil Robles, observing that ". . . they were all arguable, some of them highly desirable, and in any case . . . not one of them was outside the jurisdiction of a reasonably understood Republic." Jackson, CW, pp. 130-134, has a short discussion of some of the more important problems and proposals. Niceto Alcalá-Zamora's Los defectos de la Constitucion de 1931 (Madrid: Imprenta de R. Espinosa, 1936), written after the author fell victim of one of those very defects, contains a detailed discussion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

addition, he urged some changes in the Republic's military policy and a strengthening of the army, a not unreasonable policy given the changing international climate of the day. Little came of these efforts until May of 1935, when, faced with a minor cabinet crisis, Lerroux incorporated five cedistas in a reorganized cabinet, including Gil Robles as Minister of War.[63] In his new capacity, Gil Robles instituted a series of reforms of an importance second only to those implemented by Azaña in 1931-1933.[64] These reforms were intended to supplement rather than supplant those of Azaña.[65]

Upon taking office Gil Robles convened an extraordinary five-hour conference of a dozen of the 22 active major generals in order to obtain their views on the state of the Army and to consider proposals for its

---

63. Despite the presence of the five cedistas, Lerroux's May 1935 cabinet remained solidly a center-right affair, no member being from an avowedly anti-republican party: see Payne, Falange, p. 85

64. The Gil Robles reform program has been almost totally ignored in the literature. The only treatments are Gil Robles' own account, pp. 232-264, which is brief and rather self serving, and the even shorter account of Bravo Morato, pp. 102-116, which is extremely hostile. There is also a brief, relatively favorable treatment in Merino, pp. 240ff. These aside, there are only a few leftist accounts which touch upon the program lightly, usually dismissing it as an attempt to overturn the Azana reforms: see, for example, Preston, Coming, pp. 157ff.

65. Merino, p. 273, uses the word "rectification" to describe the Gil Robles program.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

improvement.[66] The consensus was that the Army of the Peninsula was in poor condition. The Azaña reforms had largely addressed organizational and policy matters, so that materiel, already poor, had deteriorated further.[67] Ammunition and even uniforms were in short supply, there was little modern equipment, no mobilization plan, virtually no air force, and recruit training was inadequate.[68] Gil Robles attempted to correct these deficiencies. He began by making a number of important command changes. As Azaña had purged the higher commands of the Army of all those whom he considered politically conservative, so now Gil Robles removed many of Azaña's protegees, welcoming conservatives and *africanistas* in the central administration of the ministry and army. The most controversial appointment was that of Francisco Franco, who

---

66. Gil Robles, pp. 234-235, gives their names. Of the dozen taking part, five (Joaquín Fanjul, Francisco Franco, Manuel Goded, José Sanchez-Ocaña, and Rafael Villegas) joined the military rebellion of 1936, while the rest were either Neutral (Angel Rodríguez del Barrio, Manuel Lon Laga, Virgilio Cabanellas) or supported the Republic when the crisis came (Riquelme, Gómez Morato, Cristobal Peña Abuin, and Nuñez de Prado).

67. Alpert, *Reforma*, pp. 320ff, observes that he could find only two measures directly affecting the procurement of new equipment during Azaña's tenure at the War Ministry, one authorizing the purchase of new mortars, dated 12 March 1933, and one establishing a competition to determine the selection of a new automatic rifle, dated 9 September 1933.

68. Gil Robles, p. 235. See also Payne, *Politics*, p. 303; Cardona, *Poder*, p. 216.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

had only recently been named commander-in-chief in Morocco, as chief-of-the-general staff because "almost the unanimous opinion of the Army designated him as the indispensable commander."[69] In addition, Manuel Goded, already Inspector General of the Army, was made Director General of the Frontier Guards, Director General of Aviation, and a justice of the military chamber of the supreme court, while Joaquín Fanjul, a notorious rightist and militarist, was made Under Secretary of War, and Emilio Mola was restored to active duty for the first time since the advent of the Republic and given command of the Moroccan garrison. Several other conservatives and *africanistas* were promoted or brought out of retirement, while some officers of leftist sympathies found themselves without employment.[70]

---

69. Gil Robles, p. 235n. See also Merino, pp. 280-281. Although he had assiduously avoided political involvement, Franco had acquired the reputation of being a staunch conservative and monarchist. Gil Robles quotes Alcalá-Zamora as saying he opposed Franco's appointment because "Young generals are aspiring Fascist leaders," but went along because the chief of his military household, the notoriously leftist Major General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, to whose daughter his son was married, favored the appointment and because Gil Robles threatened to bring down the government. Arrarás, *República*, II, p. 128-29 discusses the reasons for and the reaction to Franco's appointment. See also Payne, *Politics*, pp. 303-304.

70. Payne, *Politics*, p. 304. Since most Spanish officers, even Republican ones, often had their hand in the till, it was easy to justify several of the removals on the grounds of irregularities in their accounts. Manuel Azaña observed that Lieutenant General José Rodríguez Casademundt once had his headquarters garden planted in vegetables and sold the yield for personal profit (*Memorias*, 6 July 1931). Azana also had to deal with the scandal which accompanied the discovery that Brigadier General Manuel Llanos Medina was operating an unregistered automobile in order to avoid paying the taxes due on it (*Memorias*, 23 October 1931). Gil Robles (pp. 240ff) cites Brigadier General José Miaja

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Nevertheless, the extent to which Gil Robles "purged" leftists from the more important posts in the Army appears to have been exaggerated. Indeed, seven of the eight infantry divisions and the only cavalry division were entrusted to generals considered to be liberal or leftist, and several of them were known masons.[71] Although ranks held through méritos de guerra were restored,[72] Honor Courts reestablished,[73] and the chaplaincy reinstituted, Gil Robles and Franco canceled few of Azana's reforms, believing most of them to have been sound.

Gil Robles and Franco took a series of steps designed to strengthen the Army by modernizing and expanding it. Under the direction of Emilio Mola a new mobilization plan

---

Menant for financial shenanigans.

71. The generals in question were Domingo Batet, José Fernández Villa Abrille, José Riquelme, Nicolás Molero Lobo, José Sanchez-Ocaña, Augustin Gómez Morato, and Cristobal Peña Abuin, who commanded the Cavalry Division. At least five of these men --Villa Abrille, Riquelme, Molero Lobo, Sanchez-Ocaña, and Gómez Morato-- were Freemasons, on which see Payne, Ejército, p. 428, and Bravo Morato, p. 104. For the political affiliations of these generals see: Fuqua to MID 21 February 1935 (NA MID 2447-S-19.1); Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 431; Fuqua to MID 15 May 1935 (NA MID 2041-316.8); Fuqua to MID 14 January 1936 (NA MID 2041-316.10); Historia y Vida No. 141 (December 1979), pp. 40-43; Fuqua to MID 19 February 1935 (NA MID 2041-316.7); and Alpert, Ejército, pp. 102-103, 357, 404.

72. Gaceta, 18 July 1935. Merino, pp. 270-273 includes a brief discussion of the question.

73. DOMG 28 May 1935. See also Gil Robles, p. 237.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was developed.[74] Large scale combined arms maneuvers were held for the first time in many years. The Consejo superior de guerra was restructured,[75] organizational changes were made in the eight infantry divisions[76] and the embryonic Air Force,[77] and they proposed the creation of two motorized divisions and three special mixed brigades.[78] In addition, a start was made at modernization, with a reorganization of the military industrial plant, and orders were placed for nearly 100 new field pieces, several squadrons worth of new bombers and fighters, and new infantry equipment and uniforms, while new fortifications were authorized for the Balearic Islands and Cartagena.[79] A long-overdue commission was created to study gas warfare,[80] steel helmets were ordered adopted for the first time, government owned munitions works were expanded, and

---

74. The Mola plan, which included a reorganization of the recruiting service, is discussed briefly in Gil Robles, pp. 252-253.

75. DOMG 18 June 1935. Gil Robles, pp. 236-237.

76. Law of 27 June 1936. See also Gil Robles pp. 248-250.

77. DOMG 25 October 1935; Gil Robles p. 251.

78. Gil Robles, pp. 246-248. In the event only one new brigade was actually created, by a Law of 26 June 1935.

79. Gil Robles, pp. 255-261, includes a short discussion of the material aspects of the reform.

80. DOMG 8 August 1935.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

traditional names were restored to the regiments.[81] The officer corps, always a thorny question in the Spanish Army, also received some attention. Aside from reestablishing honor courts, retirement ages were revised downwards by two years,[82] and efforts were made promote greater corporate feeling within the Army by permitting officers to spend one-year tours of duty in branches other than their own.[83] While Franco proposed that the AGM be reestablished,[84] Gil Robles himself appears to have been interested in ways to increase the number of oficiales de complemento,[85] and authorized the promotion of many senior non-commissioned officers to the rank of second lieutenant

---

81. DOMG 25 June 1935; Gil Robles discusses the reasoning behind this measure on p. 245.

82. For example, the retirement age for major generals fell from 66 to 64, which was still higher than the limit for officers of comparable rank in most other armies, a point which Gil Robles himself makes, pp. 238-239: see also Merino, p. 246.

83. DOMG 14 June 1935; Gil Robles, pp. 242-243. Merino, p. 251 has some useful observations on this measure.

84. For brief discussion of this proposal see Gil Robles, pp. 253ff, and Merino, pp. 261-262.

85. Gil Robles' desire to expand the number of genuine reserve officers caused him to request that the American military attache, Colonel Stephen Fuqua, prepare a briefing on the ROTC program: Fuqua to Department of State, 11 June 1935 (NA SDDF 852.00/2102). Although it is difficult to determine whether the increase was due to Azaña's efforts or to those of Gil Robles, by 1936 the number of oficiales de complemento had risen to 6,156, nearly a 300% increase: Garate Cordoba, pp. 31-32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on the active list.[86] Efforts were also made to insure the political reliability of the enlisted personnel.[87] The Gil Robles-Franco reform program was almost as sweeping as had been that of Azaña.[88] It was also necessarily an expensive one. Nevertheless, it does not seem to have been considered extraordinary and, though criticized by some leftists, met with relatively little opposition in the admittedly conservative Cortes. There were sound reasons for a renewed interest in military matters in 1935. Azana's reform and reduction in the armed forces had taken

---

86. Under terms of a law of 5 December 1935 1,882 senior non-commissioned officers and C.A.S.E. officials were promoted to second lieutenant in the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, plus 83 more in the newly created aviation branch and many others in the auxiliary corps and services. The reasoning behind these promotions is unclear, as the men involved were considerably older than the norm for second lieutenants -- only 33 had been born after 1900 and several had been born as early as 1885-- and none had been in the service for less than ten years: Anuario militar, 1936, pp. 225-240, 258-260, 289-294, 310-316.

87. Gil Robles, pp. 244-245, and Payne, Politics, pp. 304-305, contain brief discussions of Communist Party efforts to infiltrate the ranks of the enlisted men and of the counter moves which were adopted, including a proposal for an all volunteer army. No similar effort seems to have been made to discourage the U.M.E., which was, however, a singularly ineffectual and fragmented organization: Payne, Politics, 308-309.

88. Gil Robles also became involved in a silly paper battle with Paramount Pictures over what he the considered the anti-Spanish, anti-Spanish Army, and anti-Guardia civil character of a film then in production, to which he devotes more space in his memoirs --pp. 262-264-- than to virtually any other single aspect of his tenure as Minister of War.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

place at a time --1931-1932-- when international tensions had been slight. However, by the time Gil Robles entered the Cabinet, tensions were rising between Britain and Italy as a result of the Ethiopian Crisis and the possibility of a Mediterranean war could no longer be considered remote.[89] As a result, in December of 1935 the Cortes approved a three-year expansion program for the Army costing 1,500 million pesetas, including 400 million for aviation.[90] Given time the Gil Robles-Franco program would have resulted in a considerable improvement in the Spanish Army. However, by the time the program had been approved, the Center-Right coalition was already in dissolution. Gil Robles had spent little more than six months in the War Ministry. He had taken a number of important steps to improve the army, but his initiatives had yet to yield obvious results when he left office, by which time there was little to show for his efforts beyond an additional mixed brigade designed to serve as a garrison for the

---

89. See the observations of Alpert, Reforma, p. 307, on the relationship between the Ethiopian Crisis and the Gil Robles reform program. On the crisis itself see Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire (New York: Viking, 1976), pp. 65ff. Although the Center-Right coalition government which included the C.E.D.A. was widely considered "fascistic" in most leftist circles, at its final cabinet meeting, in September of 1935, it approved plans to support the League of Nations sanctions against Italy over the Ethiopian War: Payne, Revolution, p. 263.

90. Gil Robles, pp. 261-262 gives some details.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Asturias.[91]

Alejandro Lerroux's Center-Right governments were singularly ineffective and proved incapable of resolving the numerous problems confronting Spain.[92] In September of 1935 the government collapsed as a result of a gambling scandal.[93] Lerroux was the last important centrist politician in Spain.[94] Rather than call upon Gil Robles to form a new government, Alcalá-Zamora asked Joaquín Chapaprieta, an independent, to form a cabinet. The Chapaprieta government, in which Major General Nicolás Molero Lobo served as War Minister,[95] struggled on until December, when it too succumbed to a scandal. This put Alcalá-Zamora in a difficult position. Given the

---

91. The Asturian garrison brigade was authorized under a law of 30 June 1935. There is a good summary of Gil Robles' less spectacular accomplishments in Merino, pp. 254-263. Interestingly, during his term at the War Ministry Gil Robles created only four honorary generals, in contrast to the 106 created by Azaña during his admittedly far longer tenure in office: see Anuario militar, 1936 pp. 445ff.

92. For a discussion of the political life of Spain after the Asturian Rebellion see Jackson, CW, pp. 169-183.

93. For one view of this affair and its effects on the government see Gil Robles, pp. 295-313.

94. Jackson, CW, pp. 176-177.

95. Molero Lobo, a moderate leftist who canceled a number of Gil Robles' appointments, insisted on keeping Franco as chief-of-the-general staff: see Fuqua to M.I.D, 14 January 1936 (NA MID 2041-316.10); Payne, Ejercito, p. 439; Salas, Ejército, I, p. 105. He continued as War Minister until 19 February 1936.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

composition of the Cortes it was impossible to avoid asking Gil Robles to form a government. This he was unwilling to do, for he shared a widely held belief that Gil Robles had ambitions of being a Spanish Dollfuss.[96] As a result Alcalá-Zamora called upon Manuel Portela Valledares, a conservative former Minister of the Interior, to form a caretaker government. Then he exercised his constitutional right to dissolve the Cortes and call new elections.

Elections for a new Cortes were held on 16 February 1936. It was a bitter contest, rife with rumors of an impending coup,[97] and there was considerable violence. Conservative and moderate voters cast their ballots primarily in defense of religion and property, rather than in favor of authoritarianism, while leftists did so for individual freedom and social reform, not radical

---

96. On the Dollfuss analogy see Jackson, CW, p. 174. Jackson, CW, pp. 172, note 7, includes a brief discussion of the widely held view that Gil Robles was planning a coup, which is the firm conviction of Preston, Coming, passim. Madariaga, a staunch republican, defends Gil Robles against such charges, pp. 439-440.

97. Several officers, including Fanjul and Goded, but not Franco, appear to have attempted to convince Gil Robles to stage a coup: see for example, Goded, pp. 25-26. Later, during the Civil War, in a letter which he sent to Gil Robles in March of 1937, Franco expressed his reasons for having opposed such a move at the time. This letter is reprinted in Gil Robles, pp. 376-378, and Joaquín Arrarás, Historia de la Cruzada española (Madrid: Ediciones espanolas, 1940) ["Arrarás, Cruzada"], II, p. 401. As Gil Robles was essentially persona non grata for most of the Franco era, it is reasonable to assume that the letter is authentic.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

revolution. Nevertheless, it was the rhetoric of the militants which dominated each groups' impression of the other.[98] Despite the existence of a so-called "National Front", the parties of the right were in disarray, while those of the left formed the Frente popular[99] and thereby managed to secure a majority of the seats in the new house.[100] When the results became apparent, mobs of leftist enthusiasts began to take to the streets in violent demonstrations of support for the new government. Meanwhile, fear grew that a military coup was afoot to frustrate the election results, fueled by the barely concealed efforts of Joaquín Fanjul, Manuel Goded, Angel Rodríguez del Barrio, and various U.M.E. elements to put

---

98. Payne, Revolution, p. 181.

99. The Spanish version of the Popular Front was created on 15 January. It included Azaña's own recently formed moderately radical Izquierda Republicana, the left-of-center Unión Republicana of Diego Martínez Barrio, who had seceded from Lerroux's Radicals, the Catalan left autonomist Esquerra, and the Socialist and Communist parties, along with the conservative, but autonomist Basque Nationalist movement: see Jackson, CW, pp. 124, 186-187.

100. The Popular Front election is best treated in Jackson, CW, pp. 184-195. For an extensive conservative view see Gil Robles, pp. 380-503. Jackson, CW, pp. 192-194, and Madariaga, pp. 444ff., both include interesting analyses of the voting patterns and the composition of the resulting Cortes. Both tend to concur that by a slim margin the electorate voted against the Popular Front, which nevertheless won the election because anti-front votes were usually split among several rival rightist and centrist candidates: Madariaga, p. 446 makes this point most clearly.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

one together on short notice,[101] and the more public efforts of both Gil Robles and Francisco Franco, still chief-of-the-general staff and still not inclined to take part in a coup,[102] to get Portela to impose martial law to deal with the disorders.[103] Although on 17 February he proclaimed a "state of alarm," the least restrictive of the three degrees of emergency powers permitted the government under the Constitution of 1931, Portela proved unwilling to deal with the situation.[104] On 18 February he tendered his resignation. Although Alcalá-Zamora attempted to convince

---

101. Goded, pp. 26-27; Payne, Politics, p. 311; Merino, p. 305.

102. As Franco put it to Gil Robles, the state was in no "immediate danger" which would require a coup to save it: Gil Robles, pp. 364-367, 377-378. See also Arraras, Cruzada, II, p. 441.

103. Jackson, CW, pp. 194-195, has a brief discussion of the question, coming to no firm conclusion. So serious were the disorders in Zaragoza that Major General Miguel Cabanellas, a well known leftist and mason, imposed martial law on his own initiative as military governor: Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 425. Many years later, having read a leftist treatment which charged him with involvement in a conspiracy in February of 1936, Franco specifically denied any such complicity in conversation with his cousin Francisco Franco-Salgado, and went on to note that Gil Robles had not attempted to get him to stage a coup either, but that both of them had attempted to get Portela to establish a temporary state of martial law to insure an orderly transition of power: Franco Salgado, Conversaciones, pp. 522-524.

104. Curiously, at the time Franco appears to have believed that Portela had decided to impose a "state of war," the most draconian of the emergency provisions of the Constitution: Arrarás, Cruzada, II, 439-440.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

him to remain in power until the opening of the new Cortes, on 16 March, Portela refused. Seeing no other option, Alcalá-Zamora asked Manuel Azana to form a government immediately rather than face the possibility of continued disorder.[105] Azaña took power on the evening of 19 February with a cabinet composed entirely of personal friends and members of his own Izquierda Republicana, including Major General Carlos Masquelet Lacaci, his Minister of War, regarded in military circles as a political general of mediocre attainments.[106] To the Right, it looked as if a revolutionary government had taken power.

---

105. Jackson, CW, p. 195; Madariaga, p. 451.

106. Fletcher to M.I.D., 25 March 1933 (NA MID 2041-242.1).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter V

The Popular Front and the Military Conspiracy of 1936

Despite the disorders which began to occur throughout Spain upon the accession of the Popular Front government in February of 1936, most right-of-center groups appear to have been willing to accept the Popular Front victory in the election of 1936 as an expression of the national will.[1] Various conservative leaders were quick to express their willingness to accept the verdict of the electorate.[2] Although a handful of officers, notably Manuel Goded, Joaquín Fanjul, and Angel Rodríguez del Barrio, urged an immediate coup, they found little support.[3] Even officers with no sympathy for the new government believed that there was nothing that could be done at the moment. Franco's position perhaps best reflected that of the majority of the senior officers. During the weeks immediately following

---

1. Preston, Coming, Chapter 17, "The Abandonment of Legalism," passim, pp. 176ff, is only the most recent proponent of the notion that the Right, the Army, and the Church viewed the outcome of the election of February of 1936 as a signal to plot the immediate destruction of the Republic.

2. Payne, Politics, p. 314, and Jackson, CW, pp. 196, 199, each cite several expressions of support from various conservative and rightist leaders.

3. Merino, p. 305, comments upon the efforts of these three to get Franco to join a coup.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the election he conferred with both Alcalá-Zamora and Azaña, urging them to be wary of excesses on the left which could promote a violent reaction on the right.[4] He also met briefly with José Antonio Primo de Rivera, leader of the Falange, and appears to have admonished the latter to follow the lead of the army.[5] Beyond his normal political caution, Franco's refusal to support a coup was based on the assumption that the situation was by no means desperate and that Azaña should be given a chance to work matters out.[6] Nevertheless, Franco had progressed to the point where he was at least willing to contemplate action against the government. On 8 March, shortly before sailing for his new post in the Canary Islands, he took part in one of several secret conferences held by various senior officers in the weeks after the election.

---

4. According to Franco, as cited in Arrárás, Cruzada, IX p. 468, Azaña's reply to his remarks was "I do not fear developments. I knew about Sanjurjo's rising, and could have prevented it but preferred to let it fail."

5. Beltran Guell, pp. 115-116

6. Beltran Guell, pp. 116-117. Years later Franco is said to have told his cousin, Francisco Franco Salgado, "I always said . . . 'While there remains any hope that the Republican Regime can still prevent anarchy or will not surrender itself to Moscow, we must support the Republic.'": Franco-Salgado, Conversaciones, p. 452. Note also the observation of Stanley G. Payne, "If Azana had made a determined effort to uphold the Republican constitution . . . the revolt probably would not have occurred": Payne, Revolution, p. 219.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Despite its critical importance, little is known about the meeting of 8 March 1936, which was held in Madrid, at the home of José Delgado Hernández, a cedista businessman. Among the officers generally accepted as having been present were Francisco Franco, Joaquín Fanjul, Manuel González Carrasco, Angel Rodríguez del Barrio, Andrés Saliquet, and Rafael Villegas, all active major generals, and Emilio Mola, Luis Orgaz, and José Varela, active brigadiers, plus a number of retired generals, including Alfredo Kindelan, Miguel Ponte, and Miguel García de la Herran.[7] At this meeting the generals found themselves

---

7. Evidence for the meeting of 8 March is poor, albeit that more is known about this meeting than about the less-well attended ones on 17 and 20 February, at which Franco was not present. It is unlikely that a definitive reckoning of those present at any of these meetings can ever be made. The dozen names --already an excessive number for a clandestine activity-- given here for the 8 March meeting are those found in Arrarás, Cruzada, IX, p. 467, which is a semi-official account, and are confirmed in la Cierva, Antecedentes, p. 764. Occasional attempts have been made to suggest that Manuel Goded, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, and even Gil Robles were also present: see, for example, Goded, pp. 26-27, and Arce, Generales, pp. 69-70. This seems unlikely. Goded's presence is mentioned only by his son, who was attempting to rescue his father's reputation as a man of action, and his view is not supported by any other authority. Wartime Nationalist propaganda made no mention of the presence of José Antonio, a matter which would have helped solidify the sometimes reluctant support of the Falangist camisas viejas --"Old Shirts"-- to their cause (see Payne, Franco, pp. 163ff, for a discussion of political infighting within the Nationalist ranks during the Civil War.), and, indeed, his participation would have made unnecessary Franco's meeting with him reported in Beltran Guell, pp. 115-116. Gil Robles himself denies he took part. And, indeed, as both Madariaga (pp. 439-440) and Jackson (CW, p. 194, note 6) observe, his character, political views, and record make unlikely his participation in so extra-legal an activity. Moreover, he was estranged from the Army at the time (Payne, Politics, pp. 314, 506, note 2). For Franco's observations on the meeting see Franco Salgado, Conversaciones, pp. 216ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

unable to agree on a unified policy. In the end, the best they were able to come up with was a agreement that collective action would be necessary and justifiable only under certain rather restricted circumstances. These were defined as government action to disband the Guardia civil, the principal bulwark of "order," wholesale dismissal of army recruits, dissolution of the officer corps, an insurrection by the left, or, interestingly, a "premature" rising by a garrison. It was a program which stressed the corporate identity of the Army rather than a generalized anti-republican attitude or even hostility to the social program which the government would presumably seek to implement. In effect, the generals were saying that so long as the government was able to maintain order and continued to respect the integrity of the Army, the Army would obey orders.[8] Moreover, the generals agreed that should a rising become an "absolute necessity" it would be done within the structure of the regime, preserving Republican forms and symbols, even to the use of the red, gold, and purple flag rather than red, gold, and red of the monarchy. Before adjourning, they agreed to set up a permanent junta to oversee developments and designated

---

8. Felix Maiz, Alzamiento en España (Pamplona: Ediciones Gómez, 1956), 50-51 ["Maiz, Alzamiento"]; Beltran Guell, pp. 115-116.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Sanjurjo as the titular head of in the event that a rising should become necessary.[9]

Although Azaña maintained in force the "state of alarm" that had been proclaimed by the Portela government, which suspended certain constitutional guaranties, he proved unwilling to act boldly to restore order. Political violence began to become commonplace.[10] Azana continued press censorship as a means of dampening inflammatory news, and attempted to provide additional security for churches and convents, favorite targets of anarchist arson. He also dissolved the Falange, responsible for some of the street violence, arresting José Antonio and several other prominent members, a measure which only deprived the organization of its most moderate leaders, while driving its more extreme elements underground. However, these measures did little to curb excesses perpetrated by the more extreme elements on both the left and the right. Azana's motives at this time are unclear.[11] To some extent

---

9. Cierva, Antecedentes, p. 764, citing the diary of González Carrasco; Beltran Guell, pp. 116-117.

10. Payne, Falange, p. 104, estimates that political violence claimed the lives of about 40 Falangists, over 50 leftists, and a number of conservatives in the three months after the election of February 1936.

11. Azaña's own reasons for his failure to take decisive action are unclear. The period in question is one of those for which we have no journal entries, nor did he refer to his inaction in any of his subsequent writings.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

he was a prisoner of his own rhetoric and that of his supporters. Thus, a decree of 23 February which had suspended rents in Extremadura and Andalucia in anticipation of a renewed land reform effort, was taken by anarchists as a signal for the immediate expropriation of land. Strikes and demonstrations became commonplace. Socialist extremists began openly to compare the situation of Spain with that of Russia in 1917, casting Azaña in the role of Kerensky, and their own Francisco Largo Caballero as Lenin.[12] Essentially a moderate idealist, Azaña found himself unable to act without risking the loss of his political base.[13]

---

12. Jackson, CW, p. 197. The causes of the radicalization of Largo Caballero and his wing of the Socialist Party are unclear. Largo Caballero and his party had been collaborators during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. He had afterwards begun to move leftwards, perhaps in partial compensation for this, and also in fear that he was losing supporters to the more radical communists and anarchists. According to Madariaga, Luis Arquistain, Largo Caballero's "Intellectual in Ordinary" and later a staunch anti-communist, claimed that "the initiative in the use of this title ['the Spanish Lenin'] came from Moscow." See Madariaga, pp. 449-450 for a brief analysis.

13. Azaña was not the only relative moderate to face the erosion of his political base, for it was a problem which plagued Gil Robles. He would later observe that the C.E.D.A. youth group, Juventudes de Acción popular lost 15,000 members to the Falange in the months following the election: Gil Robles, p. 573. The C.E.D.A. also began to lose various affiliates to the extreme right, such as the Derecha regional valenciana, a coalition of conservative, regionalist groups in Valencia, which shortly after the elections fell into the hands of radical rightists who began to create a clandestine militia: Arrarás, Cruzada, V, 463-464.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Azana's inactivity in the face of deteriorating internal order greatly frustrated most Army and Guardia civil officers, and even many in the supposedly more Republican Asaltos. This was, of course, only a reflection of the division and radicalization which was increasingly plaguing Spanish society as a whole. Worse was to follow. On 11 March Major General Eduardo López de Ochoa, one of the most distinguished and liberal generals,[14] was arrested on the grounds that he had commanded the troops in the Asturias eighteen months earlier and was therefore responsible for the atrocities which they had at times perpetrated, an act of "leftist vengeance of the most narrow sort,"[15] since the government had amnestied the revolutionaries on 22 February,[16] and had gone so far as to restore to the active list officers who had taken part in

---

14. López de Ochoa, a member of Alejandro Lerroux's Radicals, had been one of the officers restored to the Army on the proclamation of the Republic, Primo de Rivera having expelled him for republican activities. American military attache Colonel Stephen G. Fuqua later said that he was "one of the most liberal generals" (Fuqua to M.I.D., 21 February 1935 [NA MID 2447-S-19.1]).

15. Payne, Politics, p. 317. Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 131, although a devotee of the Left, terms the arrest of Lopez de Ochoa "an act of total political myopia."

16. Azaña's amnesty of the imprisoned revolutionaries was done without the approval of the Cortes and was thus technically unconstitutional: Payne, Revolution, pp. 185.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the rising.[17] The case against Lopez de Ochoa, who's actions in the Asturias were viewed by most officers as having been too lenient, soon collapsed.[18] But the treatment to which he was subject furthered the alienation of the officer corps from the regime, and he himself shortly afterwards affiliated with the U.M.E.[19] By this time, conservative and middle-of-the-road officers had began to join the U.M.E. in increasing numbers.[20] To many,

---

17. Payne, Revolution, p. 212. In contrast, although in early 1934 then President Alcalá-Zamora had, at the urging of Gil Robles and Lerroux, amnestied the officers who had taken part in the sanjurjada, none of them had been readmitted to the officer corps. Azaña himself later observed (Memorias, 7 August 1937) that the restoration of the officers in question to active duty had been an error.

18. Bravo Morato, pp. 117ff attempts to justify the government's action against López de Ochoa.

19. Fuqua to M.I.D. 17 April 1936 (NA MID 2657-S-164.6) and undated (NA MID 2657-S-144.39) contain reports and an analysis of the investigation into the charges against López de Ochoa and his subsequent affiliation with the U.M.E. See also Payne, Ejército, p. 448. Note that active duty generals could not actually become members of the U.M.E.: Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 423.

20. Citing various sources, including personal testimony, Payne, Politics, pp. 317 and 506, note 8, comes up with figures for the U.M.E. which range from about 40% to about 85% of the officers on active duty, plus some thousands of active noncommissioned officers and retired officers. Elsewhere he cites the testimony of Julio Mangada that the U.M.E. included about 3,500 officers, roughly 45% of those on active duty: Stanley G. Payne, "The Army, The Republic, and the Outbreak of the Civil War," in The Republic and the Civil War in Spain, edited by Raymond Carr (New York: St. Martin's, 1977), p. 89 ["Payne, 'Army'."]. Payne, Franco, p. 83, says that 3,436 active officers, 2,131 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, and 1,843 reserve or retired officers were members of the U.M.E., but cites no source. In contrast, Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 127, note 36, suggests that the number of "active" members may have only been a few hundred, but elsewhere --pp. 12-13-- suggests perhaps 10% of officer corps [which agrees with la Cierva, Antecedentes, p. 763], plus many officers in sympathy. Officers of a more-leftist bent were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the treatment accorded López de Ochoa appeared to be part of a widespread and deliberate abandonment of legality on the part of the new government,[21] which furthered the erosion of support for the Republic among many moderate officers.[22] Other actions of the government seemed to confirm this view.

Shortly after being seated, the leftist-dominated Cortes engaged in a series of doubtful legal maneuvers which resulted in a serious reduction in the number of center and rightist deputies and a modest increase in those of the left, thus increasing the already large leftist

---

prone to join the U.M.R.A., formed in April of 1936 through the merger of two older leftist military associations. This never approached the numbers of its rival: Alpert, Ejército, p. 13, suggests that it totalled about 200 members in Madrid and "some hundreds" more in various other garrisons. However, the U.M.R.A. appears to have been both more coherent ideologically and more disciplined than the rather inchoate U.M.E.. Some members of the U.M.R.A. were also active in the Communist Milicias antifascistas Obreras y Campesinas [M.A.O.C.] [Workers' and Peasants' Antifascist Militias], which had begun organizing clandestinely in 1933: see Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 128. For two views of the M.A.O.C. from opposite ends of the political spectrum see E. Comin Colomer, El 5 Regimento de Milicias populares (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1973), pp. 17ff, and Juan Modesto, Soy el Quinto Regimento (Paris: Ebro, 1969), Chapter I, passim.

21. Azana's decree canceling rents in Extremadura and Andalucia was widely considered as having been of dubious legality, though perhaps justified in the circumstances, for it was the only way to defuse a potentially very dangerous situation in the countryside: see Madariaga, pp. 451-452; Jackson, CW, p. 211.

22. Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 131.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

majority rather significantly.[23] Nevertheless, when, on 4 April, Azaña spoke before the Cortes to outline his legislative program, most of the center and rightist deputies appeared satisfied with its relatively benign character. Azaña proposed resuming the partially suspended land reform program, continuing the expansion of the educational system, and enhancing the powers of municipalities. He also proposed that the Basque provinces be granted autonomy and that all workers discharged for political or union activity during the bienio negro be rehired. Rightist leaders in the Cortes expressed their willingness to support the government's program, though José Calvo Sotelo, one of the most outspokenly anti-republican deputies, expressed concerns for the degree to which the extreme left would permit the moderate leftists to govern. Such cooperation from the right appears to have pleased Azaña for, although he admonished them to condemn rightist-inspired violence as vigorously as they condemned

---

23. The original composition of the Cortes included 258 Popular Front deputies, 62 belonging to various center parties, and 152 rightists of various stripes. Following the parliamentary machinations of 31 March, the revised figures were 277 for the Popular Front, 32 for the center, including only one Radical, and 132 rightists. There are analyses of the figures in Madariaga, p. 445; Jackson, CW, p. 199; Thomas, 2nd, pp. 161-162. Preston, Coming, pp. 182-183, glosses over the increase in the number of leftist deputies by claiming that the investigating commission "consistently favoured the Right." Yet so blatant were the proceedings that Indelecio Prieto, the moderate Socialist President of the Credentials Committee resigned in protest: Payne, Revolution, pp. 183-184.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that of the left, he nevertheless acceded to a request from conservative leaders to postpone scheduled municipal elections given the state of civic unrest which prevailed in the country.[24] Unfortunately this conciliatory spirit did not last. On 7 April the leader of the moderate Socialists, Indelicio Prieto, provoked a major political crisis.

Under the terms of the Constitution of 1931 the President of the Republic had the power to dissolve the Cortes in order to call new elections twice during his six-year term of office. However, Article 81 of the Constitution, specified that the Cortes elected after the second dissolution had as its first order of business to investigate whether this dissolution was justifiable. In the event that the new Cortes determined that the President lacked sufficient reason to dissolve the house a second time, he was automatically to be removed from office. The applicability of this provision to President Alcalá-Zamora at the time that Prieto presented his case was by no means clear. As the President's defenders' observed, he had

---

24. Jackson, CW, p. 199. For a less sympathetic treatment of the role of the right in these and subsequent events see Preston, Coming, pp. 184ff. One action which Azana took is rather curious. As one of its last acts, in September of 1935 the outgoing conservative cabinet had approved plans for Spanish compliance with the League of Nations sanctions against Italy as a result of the Ethiopian War. Among the first acts of the new Azana government was the cancellation of these plans. See Payne, Revolution, p. 263.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

indeed twice dissolved a Cortes. However, that which he had dissolved in 1933 was the Constituent Cortes, a provisional body elected for the specific purpose of writing the Constitution, which it had done. In consequence, the dismissal of that Cortes was thus not within the purview of the constitutional provision in question. Hence, Alcalá- Zamora's dissolution of the Cortes in January of 1936 was the first such act under the terms of the Constitution. Moreover, since the results of the election held that February returned a house of a markedly different political complexion than the previous one, it could hardly be argued that Alcalá-Zamora had acted without justification: the new elections clearly demonstrated that the old Cortes had indeed lost the support of the electorate. These arguments were ignored. In attempting to maintain a middle course, Alcalá-Zamora increasingly had isolated himself politically, alienating the right by his unwillingness to appoint Gil Robles as Prime Minister and his alleged appeasement of the left, and the left by his willingness to cooperate with Gil Robles and his alleged appeasement of the right. In the end, Prieto's position was supported by a vote of 238 to 5, the Right abstaining. As a result, Alcalá-Zamora was deposed. The President of the Cortes, Diego Martínez Barrio, became

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Acting President as specified in the Constitution.[25] The deposition of Alcalá-Zamora was a blunder of enormous proportions for he was the only prominent political leader in Spain willing to work with both the Left and the Right.[26] To many people of moderate political views, the move removed "the last guarantee of moderation."[27]

Public order deteriorated further over the next few weeks. Political murders increased, an attempt was made on

---

25. Jackson, CW, pp. 200-201, contains the most even-handed discussion of the deposition of Alcala-Zamora. See also Joaquín Arrarás, Historia de la Segunda república española: texto abbreviado (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965), pp. 401-417, which is an abridged and somewhat revised version of his Historia de la Segunda república española; Madariaga, pp. 453-454; Payne, Politics, p. 318; Preston, Coming,p. 184; Madariaga, 453-454. Interestingly, after his deposition, Alcalá-Zamora would write a book entitled Los defectos de la Constitución de 1931 (Madrid: Imprenta de R. Espinosa, 1936).

26. Madariaga, in his Preface to Sedgewick, p. ix, observes "Azaña was wrong in ousting Alcalá-Zamora from the Presidency . . . . Wrong in substance and wrong in form. For that maneuver implied a deed of injustice towards the President and an irreparable blow to the stability of the Republic."

27. Payne, Catholicism, p. 166. There was also a military implication to the removal of Alcalá-Zamora, for his son was married to the daughter of Major General Gonzálo Queipo de Llano, one of the most liberal of the generals and a prominent republican agitator under the Monarchy, currently head of the Carabineros, the frontier guard. Already somewhat disenchanted with the Popular Front government, Quiepo, who had ambitions of becoming Minister of War, now joined the U.M.E. and began to flirt with various conspirators. See Beltran, p. 129; Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 100-103; Teresa Suero Rosa, Los generals de Franco (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1978), p. 44. According to Mola's aide, Felix Maiz, Queipo de Llano committed himself to the conspiracy on 1 June: Felix Maiz, Mola, Aquel Hombre: Diario de la conspiración, 1936 (Barcelona: Planeta, 1976), pp. 133-136 ["Maiz, Mola"].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the life of the Acting President, and anarchist-led expropriations of lands increased, with contingent clashes between police and peasants. There was much parliamentary debate over the violence, but essentially it all amounted to each side blaming the other for the disorders, amid exchanges of wild charges and threats.[28] Thus, when Gil Robles, who observed that his party commanded as many votes as did any of those of the left and was by no means as radically inclined as the parties of the left believed, noted that he was in danger of losing support to the radical right if action was not taken to curb the violence, he found himself the object of a thinly veiled death threat.[29] Meanwhile the Cortes began searching for a new President. In the end there was little choice, for although he was feared and vilified by the Right, only Manuel Azaña had sufficient prestige and the necessary political support on the Left and the Center. As a result, on 8 May Azana was elected President by a nearly unanimous

---

28. Jackson, CW, p. 198, note 2, has a brief discussion of the responsibility for the violence, concluding that it was essentially unplanned. For a contrary view, which charges "fascist provocations," see Preston, Coming, p. 184. Madariaga, pp. 455-457, observes that the atmosphere of violence had become so pervasive that adherents of the radical caballerista --Largo Caballero-- faction of the Socialist Party were taking pot shots at members of the more moderate prietista --Indelecio Prieto-- wing of the party.

29. Payne, Politics, p. 319.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

vote, various center parties and the Catalans joining the Popular Front, while the C.E.D.A. and the monarchists abstained.

The election of Azaña to the Presidency was a political error of the first magnitude, for the post was a essentially ceremonial one. Thus, Azaña's elevation to the Presidency deprived the Republic of his considerable administrative and political skills at a critical time.[30] Azaña immediately requested Indalecio Prieto to form a government, an excellent choice, given the latter's popularity and relatively moderate views. However, Prieto declined on the grounds that he could not govern without the support of the extremely radical Largo Caballero faction of the Socialist Party, which was very hostile to him personally.[31] As a result, Azana turned to a staunch Republican, the firmly anticlerical Santiago Casares Quiroga, a man of little administrative skill, who accepted only out of a sense of loyalty to the new President, a

---

30. Jackson, CW, pp. 203-204, discusses Azaña's reasons for accepting the presidency.

31. Madariaga, p. 455ff, argues that it was the rift which developed between Prieto and Largo Caballero which made the Spanish Civil War "inevitable," for it split the largest and most powerful political party in Spain into two feuding factions, the moderate prietistas and the radical caballeristas, thereby preventing the party from entering the cabinet in an orderly fashion and with a coherent program. Jackson, CW, pp. 206-210, deals with this point in less dramatic terminology. Preston, Coming, p. 1, tends to support the argument.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

close personal friend.[32] Neither the succession of Azaña to the Presidency nor the appointment of Casares Quiroga as Prime Minister and Minister of War signalled a restoration of normal political life. Nevertheless, the government was able to implement some of its program.[33] But a solution to the problem of domestic political violence proved elusive, largely due to an unwillingness on the part of both those moderately to the left-of-center and those moderately to the right-of-center to cooperate with each other, despite the fact that the problem was being caused by the more extreme leftists and rightist.[34]

On the Left, the anarchists and the caballerista Socialists believed that the Azaña government was the final phase of "bourgeois" rule in Spain, and that efforts should be made to precipitate the inevitable proletarian

---

32. Emilio González López, conversations, 29 November 1988, 10 October 1990. It is worth noting that the Casares Quiroga government was the eighteenth and last of the Republic before the outbreak of the Civil War. The average government endured about three and half months. Of the eighteen governments, only two fell as a result of a real political crisis: each the others dissolved due to a cabinet crisis. See Carr, Modern, p. 117.

33. Jackson, CW, pp. 211-215, has a brief discussion of the achievements of the Azaña-Casares Quiroga governments in the Spring of 1936.

34. Madariaga, p. 386, would call the ensuing disaster a result of the "Failure of the Center." See also Gil Robles, pp. 615ff, on his efforts to work with the government in the Spring of 1936 and the reaction which these generated, and Robinson, pp. 59-60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

revolution, so as to avoid the fate of the comrades in Italy, Germany, and Austria, who failed to act and were overcome by Fascism. On the Right, the various small fascistic movements, as well as the Carlists and the more conservative of the Alfonsine monarchists, were equally convinced that the revolution was imminent, and, with the hands of Moscow and liberalism and Freemasonry all at work, only force could now save Spain. The result was increasing violence.[35]

On 16 June Gil Robles once again addressed the Cortes on the matter of public order. He claimed that in the four months since the elections of 16 February 170 churches had been destroyed by fire and that a further 251 attempts at arson had taken place; that 269 people had died and 1,287 had been wounded in street fights and assassination attempts; that 69 political offices, union halls, and the like had been destroyed; that there had been 133 general strikes and 218 partial general strikes.[36] Many of the

---

35. For summary discussions of the violence which was taking place see Jackson, CW, pp. 220-223; Payne, Falange, pp. 99ff.

36. Although it seems unlikely that a member of the Cortes would not have had some notion of the extent of political violence, the press was being heavily censored at the time and the public at large was certainly unaware of the degree of disorder in the country. One result of this is that there are no reliable statistics on the number of incidents which occurred in this period. Gil Robles' figures are the only ones available, and were largely conjectural. Nevertheless, Madariaga, a republican, reprints them, p. 457. The amount of violence must have been extraordinary: Beltran Guell, pp. 136-138, offers a list of 13 politically-related violent incidents culled from the newspaper El Diario Vasco for 14 May 1936. Jackson, CW, pp. 218-219, offers a brief critique. Payne, Revolution, pp. 206ff, has somewhat

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

deputies reacted to this address by accusing Gil Robles of being a fascist and attempting to discredit the Republic. Calvo Sotelo, who spoke shortly afterwards, echoed Gil Robles' concern for public order, stressing the role of the anarchists, and, while claiming that he did not know of a single officer inclined to rise against the Republic in favor of a monarchy, observed that he would "consider crazy any member of the Army who, facing his destiny, would not be willing to rise up for Spain against anarchy."[37] In the ensuing uproar Calvo Sotelo and several other conservative and rightist deputies became involved in an shouting match in which they traded various insults, during which at least one remark was made which many would interpret as a threat against the life of the Calvo Sotelo.[38] This acrimonious

---

differing figures.

37. Quoted in Payne, Politics, p. 329. In a recording of one of his other speeches at this time, Calvo Sotelo suggests that even a communist regime would be preferable to the anarchy which seemed to prevail in Spain: cf., Gil Murzaga, disk 1.

38. Although El Sol, 17-18 June 1936 was largely devoted to an examination of the events in the Cortes on the 16th, precisely who said what is still largely a matter of opinion. For a Rightist treatment of the Cortes session of 16 June see Ararrás, Abbr, pp. 455-477. In Rightist circles the most widely accepted story is that Delores Ibarruri, famed as "La Pasionaria," a Communist deputy, said "That is your last speech." This version of the exchange cannot be rejected as a purely partisan view in as much as it is one in which Salvador Madariaga, who has little sympathy for the Right and none for Calvo Sotelo, concurs: Madariaga, p. 460. Citing El Sol, Jackson, CW, pp. 219-220, asserts that the alleged threat was less obvious and was delivered by the President of the Cortes. Leftist writers generally ignore the question: cf. Preston, Coming, p. 199.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

exchange in the Cortes was merely a reflection of the disorder which was increasingly plaguing Spain, a disorder which military men found highly disturbing.

The position of the Servicio historico militar, while hardly unbiased, may be taken as a fairy accurate assessment of the situation in Spain as perceived by the military leadership:[39]

> "With the attainment of power by the Popular Front there began a period of total anarchy, of outrages and capricious acts without number. Moreover, the Azana government . . . quickly lost control to leftist organizations and extreme rightists. Rather than oppose these outrages . . . the Popular Front government tended to promote them, reducing to impotence the forces of order, including the Armed Forces, from whose principal commands were dismissed those officers who would not consent to such excesses by the populace. "In the face of such patent collaboration by the Republican parties with subversive organizations, General Franco and other prominent leaders of our army decided to prepare military uprising which would halt the imminent ruin and dismemberment of our nation."[40]

This passage perhaps best summarizes the "ideological" motivation of the Army: order above all else. Not all senior

---

39. Servicio historico militar, Sintesis historica de la guerra de liberacion, 1936-1939 edited by Juan Priego López (Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1968), pp. 29-30.

40. Note particularly the willingness to spread the blame for disturbing "order" among both the leftists and the "extreme rightists", which can only mean the Falangists. Compare this view with Payne, FS, p. 8: "Some conspirators were monarchists, some were fascists, and a few were clerical reactionaries, but the majority were ordinary middle class officers without elaborate ideological designs who simply wanted to avoid chaos or a leftist takeover."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers had been satisfied with the results of the secret conference held on 8 March. One of the participants, Joaquin Fanjul, who was now disponible forzoso, in a state of semi-retirement, appears to have taken the decision of the assembled officers as a signal to begin plotting. He soon put together a loose board of generals, almost all of whom were retired, to act as a central commission to facilitate communications among the generals and supervise preparations for a coup. Hoping to use the U.M.E. as the basis for this adventure, Fanjul made an unsuccessfully attempted to take control of the organization in the 1st Division.[41] By early April major generals Rodríguez del Barrio, Villegas, Fanjul, Saliquet, González Carrasco, with brigadier generals Varela and Orgaz were involved in a conspiracy along with several retired generals to develop a coup, which was set for 20 April. The plotters were extraordinarily inept, none of them having any troops directly under their command. Worse, Rodríguez del Barrio fell seriously ill and withdrew from the plot on the eve of the attempt. Of course, the coup fizzled: the plotters could get no active troops to take part. The reaction of Azana, at this time still Prime Minister, was

---

41. The 1st Division leadership of the U.M.E. served as a central junta, loosely linking together the various branches in the rest of Spain. Although the reasons for Fanjul's failure to gain control are unknown, the general was widely regarded as unreliable and mentally unstable: Payne, Ejército, p. 425.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

careful and well reasoned. Few of the participants suffered any serious penalties, most merely finding themselves abruptly shifted to new, and usually distant posts.[42] Although a list was found which included the names of several prominent officers as part of a military cabinet which the plotters proposed to form, it was clear that none of the men indicated had any links to the attempt and none suffered any adverse consequences.[43] Fanjul's failure appeared to strengthen the hand of the government.[44] However, Azaña seems to have drawn the wrong conclusions from the plot, seeing it as a further demonstration of the ineptitude of the officers and believing that the manifest lack of support for the demonstrated by the bulk of the officer corps indicated a generally quiescent

---

42. Rodríguez del Barrio, who was shortly confined to his bed by cancer, was stripped of his post but otherwise left undisturbed. Orgaz was banished to the Canary Islands. Fanjul, Saliquet, and González Carrasco were stripped of all posts and placed at disposal in Madrid, Villegas retained his seat in the military chamber of the Supreme Court but was otherwise at disposal in Madrid, and Varela was placed under virtual house arrest in Cadiz.

43. The proposed government included Sanjurjo, then living in Portugal, as President, plus Severiano Martínez Andino, in retirement, Francisco Franco, Emilio Mola, Manuel Goded, and, surprisingly, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, head of the Frontier Guard, and Miguel Cabanellas, commanding the 5th Division, at Zaragoza, both of whom had considerable reputations as leftists.

44. Treatments of the 20 April 1936 military conspiracy are rather poor, being uniformly short and mostly conservative: Arrarás, Cruzada, p. 510; Beltran Guell, pp. 126-127, which suggests a role for Franco which probably did not exist. See also Payne, Politics, pp. 319-320; Payne, Ejército, pp. 451-453; Arce, Generales, pp. 71-72.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attitude on the part of the Army. Quite the contrary was the case, for even while Fanjul was putting together his feeble conspiracy, Brigadier General Emilio Mola had begun to spin a complex web from his base in Pamplona.

The forty-nine year old Mola, a veteran africanista, had earned several promotions by méritos de guerra, and been awarded the Medalla militar.[45] Rare for a Spanish officer, he was a man of some intellectual attainments.[46] A freethinker, Mola was generally regarded as a liberal monarchist or conservative republican, an anti-semite,[47] and a probable mason.[48] A thorough professional with no obvious political ties,[49] in 1930 he had been chosen by Berenguer to serve as Director General of Security, a function which he discharged

---

45. There is no satisfactory biography of Mola, but see Jose Maria Iribarren, Mola, second edition (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1945), and Jorge Vigón, Mola (El Conspirador) (Barcelona: AHR, 1957), and the short accounts in Suero, pp. 24-39, Manuel Rubio Cabeza, pp. 541-550, and James W. Cortada, editor, Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 340-341.

46. In addition to several volumes of memoirs and a critique of the Azaña reforms, Mola produced a number of works of some literary merit and a chess manual. His military writings are collected in Obras completas (Valladolid: Santaren, 1940). Alpert, Ejército, p. 19, terms him "the best [Spanish] military writer of his times."

47. For an example of his anti-semitism see El pasado, p. 1167.

48. Payne, Ejército, p. 415; Suero p. 24.

49. Payne, Franco, pp. 88-89, suggests that Mola was primarily anti-extremists.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with some skill. In consequence of the impressive intelligence gathering capabilities of his office, in April of 1931 Mola concluded that a republic was inevitable. As a result, he was among those who urged Alfonso XIII to leave Spain rather than risk civil war.[50] Despite this, he was treated badly by the new government, which subjected him to various indignities. He was expelled from the Army and briefly jailed, before being put on the inactive list. Mola did not receive a command again until the advent of Gil Robles as War Minister in 1935. Restored to active duty, Mola was the principal architect of the new mobilization plan created during Gil Robles' tenure at the War Ministry, and was later given the post of commander-in-chief of the African Army in succession to Franco, when the latter became chief-of-the-general staff. As Mola had assiduously avoided political involvements during the Republic, when the Popular Front came to power he was retained on active duty, though shifted to command the 12th Brigade, in Pamplona.[51]

In consequence of his having been persecuted and rusticated by the Republic in 1931-1935, Mola had developed a

---

50. Arrarás, Abbr, p. 494.

51. Although Azaña appears to have transferred Mola to Pamplona on the assumption that he would stay out of trouble in that backwater provincial capital, the latter found that the assignment was much to his liking. The capital of Navarra, Pamplona was a major center of the ultra-rightwing Carlist movement, which Mola was able to coopt into his plans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

strong dislike for Manuel Azaña and the Left, which he viewed as unpatriotic and subversive. Nor was he comfortable with Gil Robles and the conservative center, whom he believed had failed the nation.[52] Although Mola appears to have been one of the generals present at the 8 March 1936 meeting in Madrid, upon taking command in Pamplona he continued his policy of avoiding political entanglements. This attitude did not long endure. He had once expressed his views on the subject of a military coup, writing "Indiscipline is justified when the abuses of power constitute an insult and a shame, or when they lead the nation to ruin",[53] a view which, while extreme, could be reconciled with the Army's constitutional mandate to defend the country against internal as well as external foes.[54] By early April of 1936, Mola had come to the conclusion that the political situation was desperate, that nothing the politicians could do would be likely to save the nation, and that the Army must act. He moved cautiously, for the machinations of Fanjul and his Madrid junta had alerted the government to the possibility of a military conspiracy. Mola worked through the U.M.E., the Pamplona junta being

---

52. Payne, Politics, p. 323, contains a brief analysis of Mola's political views in early 1936.

53. Mola, El pasado, reference misplaced.

54. Robinson, p. 408, note 6, has some observations on the implications of Article 2 of the Constitution of 1931, concerning the responsibilities of the Army.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

particularly hostile to the regime.[55]

On 19 April, even as Fanjul's conspiracy was beginning to come to pieces, Mola met with representatives of the U.M.E. juntas in Pamplona, Burgos, and Logroño. The delegates, virtually all junior officers, willingly placed themselves at Mola's service for the purpose of planning a military undertaking to rectify the political situation. The collapse of Fanjul's coup attempt on 20 April left Mola and his U.M.E. network as the only functioning military conspiratorial nucleus in Spain. It was clear that in order for a conspiracy to succeed it had to be far better organized than any previous one in Spanish history. Mola, a meticulous staff officer, immediately began to sketch out a detailed plan of action.[56] A series of juntas were to be formed at the regional, provincial, juridicial district, and local level. Every garrison, no matter how small, was to form a local junta to supervise preparations for a coup and to establish contact with civilians likely to favor military action and cooperate in establishing a conservative civil administration. The purpose of the rising was to curb disorder, restore strong government, preserve the economy, and eliminate the Left.[57]

---

55. Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 19-21.

56. Beltran Guell, pp. 119-124, reprints the nine point bases tecnicas.

57. Payne, Revolution, p. 212. Although outside the scope of this discussion, it should be noted that the increasing disorder in Spanish society was having a deleterious effect on the economy: see Payne, Revolution, 206ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Unlike the improvised character of the preparations for all of the previous coups against the Dictatorship, the Monarchy, and the Republic, Mola's arrangements were extremely professional: his was the first coup attempt in Spanish history to be planned as a proper military operation.[58] He specified the seizure of local administrative centers, post, telegraph, radio, and telephone installations, the organization of auxiliary police forces, the mobilization of civilian motor vehicles, and much else beside. Nor did he leave any doubt about the degree of violence with which the attempt would be made, writing "It should be understood that the action must be violent in the extreme, in order to overcome the enemy, who is strong and well organized, as quickly as possible. Moreover, the leaders of all political parties, organizations, and unions not in support of the movement are to be arrested and subject to exemplary punishments in order to stifle the possibility of rebellions or strikes."[59] Soon afterwards the remnants of Fanjul's old Madrid junta of generals formally accepted Mola as the director of a new conspiracy.[60] Mola's

---

58. Indeed, so meticulous was Mola's planning that many Spaniards remain convinced that he had outside [i.e., German] help: Emilio López González, 19 December 1987, 15 March 1988.

59. Beltran Guell, p. 123. See also Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 69-70, and la Cierva, Antecedentes, p. 771.

60. La Cierva, Antecedentes, pp. 767-768; Beltran Guell, p. 123. Beyond endorsing Mola's activities, the junta, by now comprising only Ponte, Saliquet, Fanjul, Villegas, and González Carrasco, does not appear to have had any influence on the development of the conspiracy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

efforts received an important boost on 30 May when former Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo, still living in exile in Portugal, lent his name to the plot, an important development as only he had sufficient prestige to head an uprising.[61]

Working through the U.M.E., Mola developed a concise plan of action which envisioned a coordinated series of risings by garrisons in various parts of Spain followed by a brief, coordinated military advance on Madrid from the north and northeast by elements of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions, for the purpose of ousting the incumbent government.[62] A military commission would then be established, headed by Sanjurjo, which would run Spain for a few years before giving way to

---

61. Maiz, Alzamiento, 103-104; Payne, Ejercito, p. 459.

62. The accounts of the military conspiracy of 1936 by Iribarren and Maiz, cited above, are of considerable valuable since both men were aides to Mola. Maiz' first work, Alzamiento en España was published at the height of the Franco regime. Shortly after the death of Franco, he published his diary of the conspiracy of 1936, B. Felix Maiz, Mola, Aquel Hombre which is generally in accord with his earlier work, but provides far more detail. There is no comprehensive, scholarly monograph on the subject, but see the account in Payne, Ejército, pp. 445-487. The most detailed sympathetic account is that in la Cierva, Antecedentes, which may be supplemented by Salas, Ejército, I, pp. 66ff, though these will certainly be surpassed by José Manuel Martinez Bande's forthcoming El Alzamiento y sus antecedentes, a volume in the official history series, Mongrafías de la guerra de España. Gil Robles, pp. 707ff, treats the matter from a much less sympathetic perspective. A leftist treatment is Perez Salas, pp. 103-282. For a detailed hostile treatment see Robert A. Friedlander's unpublished dissertation, "The July 1936 Military Rebellion in Spain: Background and Beginnings" (Northwestern University, 1963). In English the best treatments are Payne, Politics, pp. 314-340 and Thomas, 2nd, pp. 159-214.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

some form of conservative parliamentary state. Mola made it clear that the rising was not aimed at a restoration of the monarchy, but rather that it was intended to save Spain from anarchy and revolution. Thus, Mola's conspiracy was very much in the traditional pattern of Spanish military interventions over the previous century, the army was moving to fill a perceived vacuum at the center.[63] As a result, there was little genuine political content to the conspiracy.[64] The principal objectives of the rising were to curb disorder, halt the deterioration of the economy, restore strong government, and eliminate the power of the left.[65] Nevertheless, Mola stressed that land reform was to continue, the "legally attained" benefits secure by the working classes were to be recognized, and the separation of Church and State preserved, though religious discrimination would cease, while the Republican flag, Republican protocols, and Republican reforms would be maintained.[66] This vague program enabled Mola to

---

63. Gil Robles, p. 232.

64. Payne, Falange, p. 102.

65. Payne, Revolution, p. 212.

66. For an outline of Mola's program see Arrarás, Cruzada, III, pp. 448ff, IV, p. 315; Payne, Franco, pp. 89-90. Mola also had a professional agenda for his proposed new military government, including reform and expansion of the armed forces, the creation of a national militia, and premilitary training in the schools: see Ararrás, Cruzada, III, p. 449; La Cierva, Antecedentes, 779-780. On the "Republican" form of the rising see Payne, "Army," p. 103.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

bring a broad spectrum of groups into the plot, including Carlist unconstitutional monarchists, Alfonsine constitutional monarchists, conservative republicans, centrists, liberals, Falangist neo-fascists, and even a few outright leftists.[67] It appears that virtually all of the generals were approached at least indirectly by Mola's agents in an effort to get them to take part in the rising. Certainly few of them could have been unaware of the existence of the conspiracy. However, few were willing to openly commit themselves, no more a dozen or

---

67. So broadly-based was Mola's support that it proved difficult to secure the participation of the reactionary Carlists, since their principal leader, Manuel Fal Conde, was suspicious of the part taken by such reputed leftists as Gonzalvo Queipo de Llano and Miguel Cabanellas: Payne, Politics, pp. 335-336. Mola's achievement in bringing these disparate groups together was remarkable. Payne, Franco, pp. 88, 91ff, observes that when Mola began there at least six separate groups all plotting simultaneously, and yet he managed to bring them all into his conspiracy without compromising the political flexibility of the Army: see also Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 23-24, 133. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp. 425-443, has a great deal to say about the shades of political opinion represented in the conspiracy. Alonso Baquer, Modelo, p. 31, observes that the broadly based nature of Mola's conspiracy lent it much of the character of a popular uprising, rather than a classic pronunciamiento in the nineteenth century style. Banon and Olmeda, p. 41, also comment on the untraditional character of Mola's coup. It should be noted that although it is frequently asserted that the rising was the result of an conspiracy hatched in Rome and Berlin, Mola was neither the agent of, nor in contact with any, foreign powers. Although certain of those involved in the rising, such as Sanjurjo and Fal Conde, had on occasion individually been in contact with such, these contacts had no lasting importance. For a detailed exploration of the alleged Nazi-connection see Angel Vinas, La Alemania nazi y el 18 de julio (Madrid: Alianza, 1974). Even leftist scholars have now abandoned the issue, and it is not mentioned in Preston, Coming, Chapter 7, which deals with the period in question.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

so. The burden of the organization and execution of the proposed coup rested on the shoulders of field grade and junior officers. Meanwhile Mola established contacts with the Church and various conservative and rightist political leaders.

Around the beginning of June, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, writing from his prison cell in Alicante, tentatively agreed to support a military rising with his Falangists.[68] On 13 June, Calvo Sotelo placed himself "at the orders of the Army,"[69] and just three days later making his statement to the Cortes that he knew of not "a single person in the Army ready to rebel against the Republic in favor of the monarchy. If there were, he would be crazy. I say this clearly, though I also consider crazy any member of the Army who, facing his destiny, would not be willing to rise up for Spain against anarchy, should such a situation arise."[70] Even Gil Robles, rapidly losing supporters to more extreme groups while being eclipsed in the Cortes by the more inflammatory Calvo Sotelo, appears to have been at least tangentially involved in the plot, and at least one component of the C.E.D.A. placed substantial funds at Mola's disposal.[71] Thus, by the end of

---

68. For the Falangist role in the conspiracy see Payne, Falange, pp. 108-115.

69. Maiz, Alzamiento, p. 168; Beltran Guell, p. 130.

70. Quoted in Payne, Politics, p. 329.

71. Arrarás, Cruzada, III, pp. 456-457.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

June of 1936 virtually all of the prominent rightist political leaders in Spain were privy to Mola's conspiracy. Such machinations did not go unnoticed.

As evidence of the existence of a widespread conspiracy began to accumulate, staunchly Republican officers such as Major General Miguel Nuñez de Prado, Director General of Aviation, one of the few nobles left in the Army, and widely regarded as head of the U.M.R.A., urged the government to take action.[72] It seems clear that for some time before the actual rising, both Casares Quiroga and Azaña were aware of the existence of a major military conspiracy against the regime.[73] However, neither Casares Quiroga nor, more importantly, given the Prime Minister's lack of administrative ability,[74] Azaña appear to have been convinced of the danger, dismissing it as of little consequence and taking no action. Various explanations have been advanced to account for their attitude. One problem was that rumors of coups and conspiracies were commonplaces of Spanish politics throughout the period of the

---

72. Arce, Generales, p. 71; Vicente Palacio Atard, "El gobierno ante la conspiracion de 1936," in Aproximacion historica a la Guerra española (1936-1939), edited by Vicente Palacio Atard [Anejos de "Cuadernos Bibliograficos de la Guerra de España (1936-1939), No. 1] (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, 1970), p. 137-138 ["Palacio Atard, 'El gobierno'."].

73. Perez Salas, pp. 77, says the conspiracy as an open secret. See also Arce, Generales, pp. 225ff.

74. "Casares should have been appointed porter or doorman," not prime minister: Emilio González López, conversation, 10 October 1990.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republic.[75] Moreover, given the poor track record of the Spanish Army when it came to organizing and implementing coups, it is possible that Azaña and Casares Quiroga believed that, as in the past, the plotters would prove so inept that the whole thing would collapse of its own accord.[76] Then too, a premature move against the conspirators might provoke precisely the coup which they were hoping to avert.[77] Equally valid is the possibility that Azaña, who was at heart a bourgeois reformer rather than a revolutionary, feared to act against the conspirators lest he find himself without recourse

---

75. Palacio Atard, "El gobierno," p. 133; La Cierva, Antecedentes, pp. 735ff; Arce, Generales, pp. 71-72. In his diary, Azana cites rumors of conspiracies on 5 and 21 September 1931, 13 and 16 November 1931, 7 and 8 January 1932, 11 June 1932, 7 May 1933, and so forth. So frequent were reports of plots that on 7 January 1933 Azana referred to a report of such as the "rumor of the day," and the very next day noted that he had heard another of the "horror stories."

76. Of over 50 military coups which actually reached the stage of implementation between 1814 and 1936, only 10 proved successful: Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 28. Some idea of the contempt with which the conspiratorial prowess of the Army was held may be gained from Azaña's remark to Franco earlier that same year, "I do not fear developments. I knew about Sanjurjo's rising, and could have prevented it but preferred to let it fail," cited in Arrarás, Cruzada, IX p. 468. His life-long friend, Rivas Cherif, remarked that Azana "did not have any fear of a possible military unpleasantness": p. 137. So deeply ingrained was this notion that on 18 July 1936, the morning after the first risings in the Army of Africa, La Voz referred to the events as an "absurd incident."

77. Palacio Atard, "El gobierno", p. 148. Pérez Salas notes that when, on 22 March 1936, he told Azaña that he feared a military conspiracy was afoot, Azaña replied that he did not want to take action against suspected officers lest such action provoke a rising.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

should the Republic be threatened from the growing radicalism on the left, where calls for an immediate proletarian revolution were increasingly being matched by demands for the dissolution of the army and Guardia civil, all against a background of spontaneous seizures of property and crippling strikes. In effect, Azaña was trapped between the extreme right and the extreme left.[78] Moreover, Azaña was apparently growing very depressed over the course of events,[79] saying at one point "If the Spanish Republic goes under, ours will be the blame."[80] Finally, the relative weakness of the Presidency within the framework of the Constitution of 1931 made it difficult for Azaña to take decisive action.[81] In any case, the most the government would do was to transfer officers in garrisons where conspiratorial activities seemed most developed, and even then it hesitated to move senior

---

78. Palacio Atard, "El gobierno", 147; Robinson, p. 288.

79. Emilio González López, conversation, 29 November 1988. See also Payne Revolution, p. 196, "It is clear by this time that Azaña was profoundly depressed --indeed almost benumbed-- by the political situation into which he had maneuvered himself. See also Azaña's La velada en Benicarlo, written in 1937, after nearly a year of civil war, which displays a highly pessimistic tone. Thus, at the very end of the book (Obras completas, III, p. 457) one of the characters says "It's useless. This war is good for nothing; that is, for nothing good."

80. Cited without attribution in Sedgewick, p. 100.

81. This is one of the themes of Alcalá-Zamora's Los defectos de la Constitucion de 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers.[82] As a result, Mola was free to work in relative safety.[83]

Mola had considerable difficulty in maturing his plans. Despite a fair degree of success in securing the support of many junior and middle level officers, Mola was aware that the bulk of the officer corps, and virtually all of the generals, were reluctant to take part in a conspiracy.[84] One consequence of this was a directive from Mola that "he who is not with us, is against us," reemphasizing his commitment to a

---

82. The only lengthy discussion of the attitude of the government towards the conspiracy of 1936 is that of Palacio Atard, "El gobierno". See also Gil Robles, pp. 740-745; Alvarez del Vayo, pp. 245ff.

83. Mola took numerous measures to mask his activities, spending hours lounging in cafes, writing letters complaining about the lack of intellectual stimulation in Pamplona and completed preparations for the publication of a book on his experiences in Morocco. This latter project enabled him to maintain contact with some conspirator-officers: see Iribarren and Maiz, Alzamiento and Mola, passim, for examples. As a result he had only one close call during the conspiracy, when, on 29 June, Alonso Mallol, the Director General of Security, suspicious of his activities, made a surprise trip to Pamplona with several carloads of security officers, in hopes of catching the general off guard. Alerted by Santiago Baguenas, the chief of police in Madrid, Mola was able to cover himself: see Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 214-218; Vigon, Mola, pp. 93-94; Ararrás, Abbr, p. 497. On at least three separate occasions Mola prevaricated to his superior, Major General Domingo Batet, giving his word of honor that he would not join a rising: Iribarren, pp. 51-53; Beltran Guell, p. 129; Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 198, 244-245, 256-257. He was less successful in deceiving Major General Juan Gómez Caminero, who was sent to visit him in May, and came away "very suspicious" of Mola's ties to the garrison: Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 105ff; Iribarren, pp. 30-31.

84. Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 140-142.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

decisive rising.[85] The most important of the hold-outs was Francisco Franco.

Since being posted to Tenerife in the Canary Islands, Franco had remained largely uninvolved in the conspiracy, vaguely affirming his willingness to do his duty, but without committing himself to action.[86] In May he allowed his brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suner, a cedista and leader of Gil Robles' youth organization, to place his name in nomination for a by-election in Cuenca. He instantly regretted the move. Under vigorous attack from both the Left and the Right --Indelicio Prieto, a leader of the moderate wing of the Socialist Party, accused him of being a potential military dictator, while Jose Antonio threatened to pull out of the race-- Franco withdrew his name.[87] This experience appears to have confirmed his reluctance to become involved in politics. Uncertain as to the political justification for a coup and concerned about the risks involved, Franco continued to avoid involving himself in the conspiracy.[88] Indeed, so

---

85. Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 155-156. Despite the ferocious character of Mola's directive, it appears that in the event, neutrality was a satisfactory option: testimony of Ramiro Garcia de Dios Linares, Captain of Intendance, cited by Emilio Lopez Gonzalez, 19 December 1987. See also the statement of Francisco Partaloa, a prosecutor, cited in Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pantheon, 1979), pp. 275-276.

86. Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 82, 126.

87. On Franco's candidacy see Gil Robles, pp. 563-565.

88. Franco Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 526.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reluctant to commit himself that some of the conspirators referred to him as "Miss Canary Islands"[89] and Sanjurjo himself remarked, "With little Franco or without little Franco we will save Spain!"[90] However Franco's participation was essential, due to his considerable reputation throughout the Army and in particular to his immense popularity with the Moroccan Regulares and the Foreign Legion. Precisely when Franco committed himself to the rising is unclear, but he had certainly done so by 23 June, when he wrote a letter to Casares Quiroga which is frequently termed a final effort to prod the government into taking decisive action to avert a disaster.[91] In this letter Franco attempted to explain to Casares Quiroga the sources of discontent in the army. Observing that many acts of the government --the reinstatement of officers expelled for their participation in the Revolution of 1934, the punishment of some officers who had ordered their men to defend themselves when stoned by a radical mob in Alcalá de Henares, favoritism shown to leftist officers, the frequent changes of assignment of conservatives-- were injurious to good discipline, he noted that evidence of

---

89. Payne, Ejercito, p. 468, citing the testimony of Jose Maria Iribarren, Mola's secretary.

90. Quoted in Payne, Politics, pp. 332, 335, and Thomas 2nd, p. 199. Gil Robles has some observations on Franco "coyness" towards the conspirators, p. 780.

91. See, for example, Brian Crozier, Franco (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 178.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

discontent could be found in revival of the juntas de defensa as manifested in the form of the U.M.E. and the U.M.R.A., concluding with a veiled suggestion that such discontent threatened the safety of the State, though denying that a conspiracy existed.[92] Franco received no reply. In any case he was by then almost certainly committed to the coup attempt, for his name appears as commander of the Moroccan Army in Mola's final orders for the rising, dated 24 June.[93] It was the first time Franco had lent his support to a military conspiracy.[94]

---

92. Ararrás, Cruzada, IX, p. 523ff; Beltran Guell, pp. 46-49; Franco's letter is reprinted in facsimile in Manuel Aznar, Historia militar de la guerra de España (Third edition, Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1958) I, pp. 55-57. A reasonable English translation may be found in Crozier, pp. 516-518. See also Boyd, p. 279.

93. Vigón, Mola, p. 97. Payne, Politics, pp. 334-335 and 508, note 75, expresses the belief that Franco committed himself around 1 July, but in his Falange, p. 98, suggests it took place much later, after the death of Calvo Sotelo, on which see below. Robinson, p. 288, concurs with this later date, citing various conversations, and adds that Franco did so only after being told the rising would go ahead without him. Nevertheless, so late a date for his commitment seems improbable. As Franco was in the Canaries, an airplane had to be secured to fly him secretly to Morocco so that he could lead the rising there, and these arrangements began on 5 July: see Luis Bolin, Spain: The Vital Years (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967), pp. 11ff. Years later Franco explained his caution by noting the risk and difficulties attendant upon a coup attempt: Franco-Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 526.

94. Franco in Franco-Salgado, Conversaciónes, pp. 499-500. Although generally regarded on the Left as an arch-reactionary, Franco appears to have been a moderating force in the Army during the Republic. While chief-of-the-general staff in 1935 he rebuffed efforts by José Antonio and the Falange to develop a coup: Payne, Falange, p. 87.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Mola's rising was planned for the latter part of July. It would begin in Morocco, with garrisons in various parts of Spain joining over the next few days.[95] The plan realistically assumed that success in Madrid would be unlikely, and so the garrison there was to remain in its barracks until relieved by columns from the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions, marching on the capital from Valencia, Zaragoza, Burgos, and Valladolid, while the 4th Division held Barcelona and the fleet ferried troops over from Morocco to help secure the South, where the rising was expected to fail in the territory of the 2nd Division, and then join the march on Madrid.[96] The period between the approval of the plan and its execution proved a trying one, for Mola had great difficulties in maintaining the support of both the Carlists and the Falangists.[97] Moreover, events tended to disrupt the smooth development of the coup. Political rhetoric became

---

95. The final arrangements for the uprising appear to have been concluded around 12 July, when a number of the principal conspirators were able to gather together without attracting too much suspicion by reason of their attending one of the largest peacetime maneuvers ever held by the Spanish Army, at Llano Amarillo in Morocco. See Critobal Zaragoza, El levantamiento en Africa (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1977), pp. 31-32 ["Zaragoza, Africa"].

96. Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 69-70, 93-95, 97; La Cierva, Antecedentes, p. 771-778. Mola gave the undertaking a 50-50 chance of success. In the event of failure he expected to withdraw north of the Ebro and attempt some sort of negotiated arrangement: La Cierva, Antecedentes, pp. 775-776.

97. Payne, Politics, pp. 333-339.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

more violent, as did political action.[98] During June and early July a series of assassinations and gun battles took place between leftist and rightist partisans throughout Spain. Fear was by now perhaps the dominant political force.[99] Tensions were rising rapidly when, during the pre-dawn hours of 13 July, José Calvo Sotelo, by then the principal conservative political spokesman in the Cortes, was taken from his home by a detail of leftist Guardias de asalto and murdered, ostensibly in revenge for the slaying of a leftist asalto officer some hours earlier.[100] The resulting political uproar almost destroyed Mola's plans. Although the date for the rising had been tentatively set for 21 July, several

---

98. Among the more extreme views expressed in the waning weeks of the Republic were demands by the Communist Party that the C.E.D.A. be dissolved and Gil Robles jailed: Gil Robles, p. 702. More extreme members of the Party and the M.A.O.C. were even demanding that the Army be disbanded and replaced by a workers' militia, a matter which seems to have stimulated some hitherto hesitant officers to join Mola: Palacio Atard, "El gobierno", p. 143.

99. Azana himself would later observe that "The political act of rebellion was incubated by the heat of fear": Azaña, Benicarlo, Obras completas, III, p. 406. See also Palacio Atard, "El gobierno," p. 145.

100. The most detailed treatment of the circumstances surrounding the death of Calvo Sotelo is Ian Gibson, La noche que mataron a Calvo Sotelo (Barcelona; Grijalbo, 1982), although his conclusions are disputed in some circles: cf. statement of Manuel Serna Añon, 19 October 1988. During the late Spring of 1936 the incidence of violence had increased remarkably. From 16 June to 13 July, that is, in the period from Calvo Sotelo's last speech in the Cortes to his death, Gil Robles counted 10 churches burned, nine vandalized, and eleven robbed, plus 61 people killed and 224 wounded, along with numerous other crimes: Gil Robles, pp. 824-825.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers urged immediate action. Mola succeeded in holding things down for several days, while political chaos increased and the government lost virtually all authority.[101] Then, under severe pressure from those who wished to move immediately, and fearing imminent government action, on 15 July he ordered the Moroccan garrison to move on 17 July.[102] At about 1700 hours on 17 July the Army of Africa began to rise. Soon afterwards Mola's meticulous plans began to come apart.

Events over the next few days were extremely confused.[103] Some garrisons rose in accordance with Mola's revised timetable, while others attempted to adhere to the 21 July time-table. Several units failed to rise when the local commanders backed out at the last moment. Failures occurred where success had been expected, and success where failure had

---

101. Jackson, HQ, p. 194.

102. Ararrás, Cruzada, IV, p. 384. Ricardo de la Cierva has suggested that one reason for the necessity to act quickly was the possibility that the government would invoke an old, but never enforced order limiting tours of duty in Morocco to five years, a move which would have decimated the ranks of the conspirators in the Protectorate: La Cierva, Antecedentes, pp. 766-767.

103. There are numerous accounts of the events of the Alzamiento of 1936, some concentrating on a single province or city. The most detailed are all by historians more or less in sympathy with the rising, notably Ararrás, Cruzada, III-IV, passim, which while extremely favorable is very meticulous, Beltran Guell, pp. 141-327, La Cierva Antecedentes, I, pp. 735-816, and the more scholarly Salas Larrazabal, Historia, I, pp. 89-210. There is no comparable treatment in English, the Friedlander dissertation being highly unreliable.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

been assumed. Generally, where the conspirators acted boldly and intelligently, they succeeded, where they hesitated, they failed.[104] Many of the generals vacillated, for a wrong decision could be fatal.[105] But events soon trapped all but a few. For most of them, there was little opportunity to influence events, their junior officers taking matters into their own hands. Threats and geographic accident proved more important than class solidarity or political inclination. More than one general is alleged to have joined the rising with a pistol at his head. In the end, perhaps a dozen

---

104. Ramón Salas Larrazabal, "La organización militar, el Alzamiento, y la guerra civil," in Aproximacion historica a la Guerra española (1936-1939), edited by Vicente Palacio Atard p. 112 ["Salas, 'Organización.'"].

105. For many officers the events of July 1936 created a conflict between their ideological sympathy for those leading the coup and their sense of discipline and loyalty to the Republic: Segismondo Casado, "The Republican Command in the Spanish War," The National Review, Vol. 113, No. 672 (July, 1939), p. 58. Noting the importance of discipline in a soldier's life, Franco later expressed his sympathy for those unable to make a decision, such as in the case of Brigadier General Francisco Patxot Madoz: Franco Salgado, Conversaciónes, pp. 526-527. Professor Emilio González López observes (interview, 19 December 1987) that one officer may have found a "third alternative" to joining or resisting the rising. On 16 July 1936, almost literally within hours of the rising, Brigadier General Amado Balmes Alonso, an africanista and political conservative who had been approached by the conspirators but neither committed himself nor reported them to the government, "accidentally shot himself" in his quarters in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. In contrast, Paul Preston, SCW. p. 49, suggests that Balmes Alonso was murdered by agents of Franco for refusing to join the coup. A discussed elsewhere in this study, the official version appears likely to be he one closest to the truth. Nevertheless, for all of the generals the decision must have been hard.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

generals actively supported the rising, and few more than that were actively opposed. The enlisted men largely obeyed their officers, though in Madrid and Barcelona, where many officers held their units for the Republic, the troops in units which rose deserted to the government in great numbers.[106] The rising had been an audacious undertaking by perhaps 1,000 middle and junior level officers, not all of whom were on active duty, counting upon the support of the majority of their comrades.[107] As the days passed it became clear that the coup had failed. And it was just as clear that the government had failed to crush the rising completely. The officer corps, the Army, and Spain itself were divided and compromise was no longer possible. At that point, given the degree of polarization in Spanish political life, civil war became inevitable.

---

106. Salas, "Organización," p. 114. Despite rhetoric, the attitude of the workers was of far less consequence in determining the outcome of the coup than that of the Guardia civil and Guardias de asalto, who, along with loyal regiments, proved the decisive factor in Madrid and Barcelona. For a recent incarnation of the "heroic workers" version of the failure of the rising in these cities see Paul Preston, SCW, pp. 51ff.

107. The estimate for the number of officers involved in the coup is in Payne, "Army," p. 98. Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 127 note 36, cites an even lower figure, 260.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter VI

The Spanish General Officers in 1936: A Profile

The databases created for this study make it possible to develop a series of profiles of the generals of 1936 as a whole, and of the several arms of service and other groups --*africanistas* and *peninsulares*, for example-- into which they can be divided on the basis of the available information.[1] These profiles fall naturally into four areas: General Considerations, such as age, years in service, and the like, including arm of service, decorations, and modifications to seniority; Career Pattern, including postings and assignments; Personal Background, including social origins, regional heritage, and family; and Political Profile, including not only political affiliations, but also attitude towards various individuals and movements.

---

1. For a discussion of the specific form of the database, and the tools used to process the information, see Appendix 1. For a sample of the record of one of the generals, see Appendix 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A. General Considerations.

As noted, there were 87 generals on active duty with the Spanish Army during the first half of 1936.[2] Of these, three (3.4%) a were lieutenant generals, all of whom were preparing to retire and none of whom held an important command.[3] There were also 24 (27.6%) major generals, the effective senior-most officers in the army, and 60 (70.0%) brigadier generals.

The generals averaged not quite 60 years of age,[4] with a standard deviation of 4.6 years, though the oldest was 65 and the youngest only 42.[5] The mean age for the lieutenant generals was 64 years, with a standard deviation of 2.2

---

2. For the purpose of drawing as broad a statistical picture of the general officer corps as possible, the two brigadier generals who were no longer on active duty on 17 July 1936, Eduardo Augustín Ortega, who had retired on 12 April 1936, and Amado Balmes Alonso, who had died on 16 July 1936, have been included in this analysis.

3. Of the three, Pio López Pozas and Alberto Castro Girona were wholly without assignment, being officially at disposal in Madrid, while Jose Rodríguez Casademunt was President of the Directory Council of the Military Orders, an essentially honorary post.

4. Note that for statistical purposes, age has been calculated not from the specific date of birth, but rather from the year only. Thus, an officer born on 1 December 1872 would be considered 64 years old at the time of the military uprising of 17 July 1936.

5. Fully 57 of the generals (65.5%) had entered military service through enrolling in a military academy before the youngest of their number, Oswaldo Capaz Montes, had been born.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

years and a range of 61 to 65. Major generals averaged 60 years of age, with a standard deviation of 4.9 years and a range of 44 to 66 years.[6] Brigadier generals averaged slightly more than 59 years, with a standard deviation of 4.4 and a range of 42 to 64 years.[7] Although their ranks included men as young as 42, the generals as a group were all of approximately the same age, as shown by the smallness of the standard deviation.

Statistically, the "average" general had been in the army for 43 years, with a standard deviation of 4.6 and a range of 26 to 50.[8] The lieutenant generals had been in

---

6. The considerable range in age among the major generals is attributable largely to Francisco Franco, who at 43 was younger by slightly more than a decade than the next youngest major general, Manuel Goded Llopis, who was 53. Only five of the major generals were aged 55 or younger: Franco (born 1892), Goded Llopis (1882), Nuñez del Prado (1882), Riquelme López Bago (1880), and Fanjul Goñi (1880).

7. Although the bulk of the brigadier generals were over age 55, eleven (c. 18%) were that age or younger, including three (5%) who were 49 or younger: Mola Vidal (1887), Varela Iglesias (1891), and Capaz Montes (1893). Note that Francisco Franco (1892), was thus not only the youngest major general, but was also younger than all but one of the brigadier generals.

8. In accordance with Spanish military practice, the figures for years in service include time spent in a military academy as well as any time spent as an enlisted man. Note that as with age, year of entry, rather than specific date has been used as the basis for calculating the number of years in service. As most officers entered the service in September, this gives a technical difference of about two months. In the cases of several of the men under study, very unusual relationships were found between the number of years which they had been in service, and their relative seniority in the whole sample of 87 generals. Antonio Ferrer de Miguel, who had joined the army as a volunteer in September of 1891 and entered the Academia general militar the following August, was not promoted to brigadier general until April of 1936, at which

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the service for 47.3 years, with a standard deviation of 2.5 and a range of 44 to 50[9]. The mean number of years in service for the major generals was 43.6, with a standard deviation of 4.6 years, and a range of from 29 to 50 years.[10] For brigadier generals the mean number of years in service was 42.6, with a standard deviation of 4.5 and a range of 26 to 48.[11]

Only nine of the generals were found to have entered military service as enlisted volunteers, a proportion of about 10%, relatively high for a European army of the time. The nine included one of the lieutenant generals (33.3%)[12],

---

time he was the 85th ranking officer, after 46 years in the service. Almost as bad was the case of Brigadier General Carlos Bernal García, who's overall seniority was 82nd after 47 years in the service, having entered the old AGM in the summer of 1889. At the other extreme, Francisco Franco, who had entered the academy in 1907, ranked 26th in overall seniority after 29 years in the service, followed by Miguel Nuñez de Prado, who after 38 years in the service was 16th in overall seniority

9. Rodríguez Casademundt had been in the army for 50 years, while Castro Girona had been in only 44 years.

10. Masquelet Lacaci had been in the service for 50 years, Franco Bahamonde for 29.

11. García Antúnez and Miquel Lacour had both been in the service 48 years, Capaz Montes only 26.

12. Alberto Castro Girona enlisted as a volunteer in the infantry in 1892, 23 days before his 17th birthday, and entered the academy a year later.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

two of the major generals (c. 8%)[13], and six of the brigadier generals (10%).[14]

The generals were distributed among the principal arms and corps as indicated on Table 1.

Table 1
Generals by Arm of Service

Arm	All	Lt. Gen.	Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen.
Infantry	48 (55.2%)	3 (100%)	15 (62.3%)	30 (50%)
Cavalry	12 (13.8%)	0	5 (20.1%)	7 (11.7%)
Artillery	12 (13.8%)	0	0	12 (20%)
Engineers	7 (8.0%)	0	1 (4.2%)	6 (10%)
Staff	8 (8.2%)	0	3 (12.5%)	5 (8.3%)

At the level of brigadier generals, the allocation among the several arms was more or less in conformity with

---

13. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano enlisted as a trumpeter in the cavalry in 1891, at the age of 16, serving about one year in the ranks before entering the AGM, and Miguel Nuñez de Prado, who although the son of an officer, and a member of an aristocratic military family, enlisted in the engineers in 1898, at the age of 16, entering the Academia de Caballería about four months later.

14. Gregorio Benito Terraza, enlisted in the infantry in June of 1895, at 16 years of age, and entered the Infantry Academy the following September; Julio Mena Zueco, although his father was an officer, enlisted in the cavalry in 1891, at the age of 16, and served more than three years in the ranks before entering the Academia de Artillería; Toribio Martínez Cabrera, enlisted in the artillery in 1892, at the age of 18, and served two years in the ranks before entering the artillery academy; Manuel Cardenal Dominicis, enlisted in the engineers as a trumpeter in 1889, when still only 15 years of age, served one year in the ranks, and then entered the AGM; José Varela Iglesias, enlisted as a trumpeter in the Marine Infantry, a branch of the Navy, in 1909, at the age of 18, served three years in the ranks, and then entered the Academia de Infantería; and Antonio Ferrer de Miguel, enlisted in the cavalry in 1890, at age 16, entering the AGM a year later.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a longstanding policy on the matter.[15] It is interesting to note that while artillerymen comprised, after the infantrymen, the second largest group among the brigadier generals, they were not represented among the two higher ranks of general officer ranks. In contrast, cavalrymen, who were third among the brigadier generals, were second among the major generals, and, indeed, statistically almost twice as numerous as they were among the brigadiers. The effects of the Rif War may be seen in action here. Infantrymen and cavalrymen found much greater opportunities for enhancing their careers in the Rif than did members of the other arms. This can be demonstrated by comparing the promotional pattern of the generals as a group, with that of the generals of each particular arm, from captain through lieutenant general.[16]

---

15. See Fletcher to MID, 21 August 1931 (NA MID 2041-274.16) for a discussion of the formula, which officially allocated approximately 48% of the brigadier generalships to infantrymen, 11% to cavalrymen, 20% to artillery men, 9% to engineers, and 11% to the staff corps. The figures for 1936 do not greatly vary from this formula, save in the case of staff corps members, who were, however, very well represented among the major generals. Note that in addition to the eight generals who were members of the staff corps, there were six generals who held staff college diplomas but had chosen to remain in their original arms of service. These officers were all infantrymen or cavalrymen.

16. Figures on the accompanying table include only time in the service from commissioning as a 2nd lieutenant. Note that up to the rank of brigadier general the sample includes all 87 officers, while that for major general includes only 27, and that for lieutenant general only three. First lieutenant has been omitted because officers of the staff corps would normally attain promotion to this grade while still in their original arm of service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 2
Years in Service to Attain Promotion

	All	Inf	Cav	Art	Engr	Staff
To Captain						
Mean	7.5	6.5	8	10.4	8.1	7.4
St Dev	2.8	2.5	4.0	0.5	1.6	1.4
Range	2-13	2-11	3-13	10-11	7-11	5-9
To Major						
Mean	17.0	15.1	17.3	22.8	21.3	15.6
St Dev	4.3	3.8	3.4	0.4	0.9	2.0
Range	5-25	5-25	12-24	22-23	20-22	13-19
To Lieutenant Colonel						
Mean	22.8	21.2	22.5	27.8	26.3	22.9
St Dev	4.1	3.9	3.9	0.9	1.4	2.3
Range	10-30	10-27	15-30	26-29	24-24	18-26
To Colonel						
Mean	28.7	26.3	27.6	35.8	35	29.5
St Dev	5.7	5.2	4.8	0.7	0.8	3.6
Range	14-38	14-35	20-38	35-37	34-36	24-34
To Brigadier General						
Mean	34.2	32.5	32.9	39.1	39.3	34.5
St Dev	5.8	6.0	5.6	0.9	1.4	4.2
Range	16-43	16-40	22-44	38-40	37-41	28-40
To Major General						
Mean	34.2	33.6	34		43	35.3
St Dev	5.3	5.6	3.9		0	3.8
Range	23-43	23-43	28-38		0	30-38
To Lieutenant General						
Mean	35.7	35.7				
St Dev	2.9	2.9				
Range	32-39	32-39				

The table rather clearly indicates the essentially "lock-step" character of promotions in the artillery and engineers, as demonstrated by the very small standard deviation and range found for all grades. In contrast, the greater standard deviations and broader ranges shown for the infantry and cavalry at each rank demonstrate considerably greater opportunity for officers of these arms.

Artillerymen and engineers were always commissioned before completion of all academic requirements. This was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

due to the rather rigid academic and technical requirements imposed by the nature of their professional specialization: their academy preparation required four to six years, rather than the three to four prescribed for infantrymen and cavalrymen.[17] Once they went on active duty, engineers and artillerymen tended to be promoted in batches, and at a much slower rate than infantry and artillery officers.[18] Moreover, officers of the other arms, and particularly of the infantry, often benefited from curtailed academy courses in times of emergency. They were sometimes commissioned after a year or less.[19] In the case of men

---

17. There were, in fact, no 2nd lieutenants of artillery or engineers on active duty. A 2nd lieutenant in these arms was still associated with his academy, officially in the grade of alférez alumno (2nd lieutenant cadet), until he completed his education. The careers of Carrasco Amilibia, an artilleryman, and Moya Andino, an engineer, who are discussed at some length below, will illustrate this.

18. Of the twelve artillerymen among the generals, eight had been commissioned in 1894. All eight were promoted 1st lieutenant in 1896, captain in 1904 or 1905, and major in 1917. Of the three commissioned in 1895, all made 1st lieutenant in 1896, captain in 1905, and major in 1917. There are no similar patterns among the infantrymen or cavalrymen commissioned in these years.

19. The standard academy course varied from time to time, but was normally three to four years, though for artillerymen and engineers it was sometimes as much as six years. However, during the Cuban, Philippine, and American wars of 1895-1898, the academic preparation of infantry officers was very drastically reduced, in the case of Amado Balmes Alonso to but ten months: he entered the academy in February of 1897, and graduated that December. The cavalry course was also reduced, but far less drastically, going from 48 months to 30, and in the case of Manuel del Alcazar Leal to 24 months: he entered the academy in January of 1897 and graduated in December of 1898. With the exception of López Viota, who entered the academy in August of 1892 and graduated 39 months later, in November of 1895, none of the artillery or engineer generals of 1936 was a graduate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

who had been cadets in the mid-1890s, this meant that they got into the field faster, being sent to fight in Cuba and the Philippines. It was in these theaters that the infantry and cavalry officers acquired their initial promotional advantage,[20] an advantage which they developed

---

of a curtailed course during these wars. All of the other graduates from these arms who were in one of the academies during this period stayed for the full course, such as Martín-González, who entered the AGM in August of 1891 and graduated from the Academia de Artilleria in December of 1896, and Moya Andino, who entered the AGM October 1890, and graduated July 1896. The basic data for the infantrymen in these years may be summarized as follows:

Entered	Graduated	Duration
1893	June 1895	24 months
1894	February 1896	20 months
1895	December 1896	18 months
1896	June 1897	10 months (one, January 1899)
1897	June 1898	10 months (one, December 1898)

The class entering in the summer of 1897 was commissioned by a Royal Decree of 27 January 1898 (DOMG, 141). Even the Staff College course was curtailed during these wars, so that Espinosa de los Monteros entered the Escuela superior de guerra in September of 1896, and was ordered overseas at the end of the month, serving thereafter in the Philippines as a staff lieutenant, only completing the course after the war: AGMS, Expediente E-1396.

20. Of the 60 infantrymen and cavalrymen in the sample, 22 (36%) were in Cuba or the Philippines during the Spanish-American War, while only one or two of the artillerymen or engineers were present. Aside from a handful of men who were not yet in the army, such as Franco, Varela, and Capaz Montes, most of the rest of the infantry and cavalry officers in the sample had already done tours during the colonial wars of 1895-1898: all 28 of the infantry and cavalry officers commissioned in the period 1895-1898 served at one time or another in one of these theaters. Only one artilleryman, Martín-González, and two engineers, García Antúnez and Bernal Garcia, served in any of the colonial campaigns of 1895-1898. See the personnel files of the officers in question, and the Anuario militar for the appropriate years.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

further in the Rif. As a result, the mean number of years required for infantry officers to rise to colonel was the same as that required for engineers to make lieutenant colonel, 26.3, and two years less than the number required by artillerymen to the same rank, 28.3. And, although at the opposite end of the infantry promotional range, that is, among the officers with the slowest movement up the ladder, infantrymen and cavalrymen were moving at a rate about the same as, or even slower than, artillerymen and engineers, at the lower end of the range it was quite possible for an infantry officer to have attained a colonelcy in a third fewer years than required by the average artilleryman or engineer to reach a majority, 14 as against 22.8 or 21.3.

The Rif War, of course, brought with it the africanistas. Almost a third --27 (31.0%)-- of the generals can be classified as africanistas.[21] The determination of which officers belong to the africanista

---

21. The generals so-classified are Alvárez Arenas (who named one of his daughters "María Africa"), Balmes Alonso, Barbero Saldaña, Benito Terraza, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Campins Aura, Capaz Montes, Castello Pantoja, Castro Girona, Fanjul Goñi, Franco Bahamonde, Goded Llopis, Gómez Morato (who had a daughter named "Africa María"), González Carrasco, Llano Encomienda, Miaja Menant, Mola Vidal, Nuñez del Prado, Orgaz Yoldi, Queipo de Llano, Riquelme y López Bago, Romerales Quintero, Salcedo Molinuevo, Saliquet Zumeta, Sánchez-Ocaña, Varela Iglesias, and Villegas Montesinos. Note that in as much as africanistas comprised only about 20% of the officer corps, they were heavily over-represented among the general officers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

group hinges on several specific criteria.[22] The most obvious of these criteria is extensive service in Morocco, particularly in the period from 1919 through 1927.[23] Prolonged service with one of the several native corps raised by the Spanish in the Protectorate[24] or with the

---

22. See Mas Chao, pp. 40ff, for an outline of the criteria which must be met to qualify an officer as an *africanista*.

23. *Africanista* officers had several years of more or less continuous service in the Protectorate, in contrast to non-*africanistas*, who may have served, but usually did so for only about two years. "Time on Campaign" credit is a useful guide here, as it was awarded for service under fire. Thus, among the *africanistas* Goded Llopis had 51 months time on campaign credit for Morocco, González Carrasco 43, and Benito Terraza 48, while among the non-*africanistas* Villa Abrille had five months time on campaign credit, Losada Ortega, 22 months, and Peña Abuin, none. The record holder was Castro Girona, who had a remarkable 138 months time campaign credit: several other officers -- Franco, Varela-- may have approached this figure, but the absence of their personnel files makes it impossible to determine their time on campaign credit. Note, however, that several officers considered *africanistas* had relatively little time on campaign credit. José Riquelme, for example, was awarded only about 35 months time on campaign, yet served in Morocco for nearly 20 years, largely as a political officer with the Office of Native Affairs: see his file in CGET, Riquelme. Similarly, although Bernal Garcia had 46 months time on campaign credit for Morocco, he is nowhere referred to as an *africanista*, perhaps because his corporate identification was as an engineer: AGMS, Expediente B-2072.

24. There were three types of native troops in Spanish Morocco. The *Fuerzas indígenas regulares* [FIR or *Regulares*] were part of the Spanish Army, while the *Mehallas Jalifiana* were the regular forces maintained by the protected government of Morocco, and the *Policía indígena* --Native Police-- were the Moroccan equivalent of Spain's *Guardia civil*, a gendarmerie officered by regularly commissioned personnel. Although by no means the only criterion, perhaps the most useful guide in determining whether an officer was an *africanista* is association with the *Regulares* and other native units in Spanish service, since such service was on a purely voluntary basis. Although native troops constituted no more than about 15% of Spanish forces in Morocco, fully eleven (40.7%) of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Spanish Foreign Legion,[25] as well as a predeliction for personal involvement in combat[26] are also of significance. An additional factor of lesser importance is hostility towards the juntero movement.[27]

The group profile of the africanistas was rather different from that of the general officers as a whole, and considerably so from that of their non-africanista

---

27 officers classified as africanistas had such service: Benito Terraza, Miguel Cabanellas, Capaz Montes, Castro Girona, Franco, González Carrasco, Mola Vidal, Nuñez de Prado, Orgaz Yoldi, Riquelme, and Varela Iglesias. However, such service is not an absolute criterion for inclusion as an africanista, and several of the men who served in various of the native corps are not so considered, such as Rodríguez González, discussed below, or Martínez-Monje, discussed briefly in Chapter VIII.

25. Although created only in late 1920, and never numbering more than about 3000 officers and men, by mid-1936 there were three Legion officers who had attained generalships, José Millán Astray, a brigadier general in the Cuerpo de invalidos, plus two on the active list, Major General Francisco Franco and Brigadier General José Varela Iglesias. With the Regulares and the Mehal-as Jalifianas, the Legion carried out the most serious fighting of the war after Anual. Ten of the eleven collective awards of the Medalla militar went to elements of these corps: Anuario militar, 1936, p. 146.

26. On this, see particularly Mas Chao, p. 58.

27. Although several of them were affiliated with the juntas, africanistas were particularly active in the anti-juntero movement in the army. Note, by way of example, the activities of José Millán Astray, the archetypical africanista, and Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, in helping to bring about the destruction of the juntero movement, as discussed in Chapter II, above. All seven of the generals who can be identified as being opposed to the juntero movement were africanistas: see below.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

colleagues. On average, the africanistas were more than three years younger than the mean for the generals as a group, 56.3 years as against 59.7, and five years younger than the non-africanistas --peninsulares--, who averaged 61.3 years of age.[28] All four of the generals under age 50 were africanistas,[29] as were sixteen of the 27 between 50 and 59, and only ten of the 56 who were 60 or older.[30]

Statistically, the africanistas had been in the army fewer years than their non-africanista colleagues of comparable rank. The average number of years in service since commissioning for the generals as a whole was 43, for africanistas it was only 39.4 years, while for the peninsulares it was just about 44.7 years. All three of the generals with fewer than 30 years in the service were

---

28. While the oldest generals in both groups were more than 65, the youngest africanista, Oswaldo Capaz Montes, was only 42, whereas the youngest non-africanista was Manuel del Alcazar Leal, who was 55.

29. Capaz Montes, Franco, Varela Iglesias, and Mola Vidal.

30. All ten of the generals who entered the army after the colonial debacle of 1898 became africanistas: Orgaz Yoldi, Llano Encomienda, and Barbero Saldaña, and Nuñez de Prado joined in 1898, Alvárez-Arenas and Castello Pantoja in 1899, Mola Vidal, 1904, Franco Bahamonde, 1907, Varela Iglesias, as an enlisted man in 1909, passing to the academy in 1912, and Capaz Montes in 1910. This group constituted 37.0% of the africanistas.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

africanistas.[31]

Africanistas were much more likely to have seen service as enlisted men than were non-africanistas. Of the nine generals who were found to have entered military service as enlisted volunteers, five (55.6%) were africanistas, including the one lieutenant general among the former enlistees,[32] both major generals[33], and two of the six brigadier generals who had formerly served in the ranks.[34] This is a rate nearly twice that which would be expected based on the proportion of the generals who were africanistas. The africanistas similarly accounted for a disproportionate number of the generals with aviation credentials, seven of the ten men holding aviator ratings coming from their ranks.[35]

---

31. Capaz Montes (26), Varela Iglesias (27), including time served as an enlisted man, and Franco (28). Capaz Montes was the officer with the fewest years in service, only 26, while the peninsulares with the fewest years in service were Llanos Medina and Rodríguez Ramírez, who had been in for 38 years. The officer with the greatest number of years in the service, Jose Rodríguez Casademunt, with 50 in uniform, was not an africanistas.

32. Alberto Castro Girona.

33. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano and Miguel Nuñez de Prado.

34. Gregorio Benito Terraza and José Varela Iglesias.

35. The ten aviation qualified generals included three rated as pilots, six as observers, and one as a balloonist. Of these Barbero Saldaña and Campins Aura, pilots, and Nuñez del Prado, Alyárez Arenas, Capaz Montes, Varela Iglesias, and González Carrasco, observers, were africanistas. The non-africanistas included Legorburu Domínguez, pilot, plus Bernal García, observer, and García Antúñez, balloonist.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As a group, the *africanistas* were mostly infantrymen and cavalrymen.

Table 3
Africanistas vs *Peninsulares* by Arm

	Total	*Africanistas*	*Peninsulares*
Infantry	48	20 (41.7%)	28 (58.3%)
Cavalry	12	3 (25%)	9 (75%)
Artillery	12	0	12 (100%)
Engineers	7	0	7 (100%)
Staff	8	4 (50%)	4 (50%)

The nature of the war in Morocco may perhaps be best illustrated by the distribution of the *africanistas* among the arms. Infantrymen constituted the bulk of the *africanistas* (71.4%), a proportion roughly 30 percent greater than their numbers among the generals as a whole, while neither artillerymen nor engineers were numbered among them, despite the fact that these two arms accounted for more than a fifth (21.8%) of the generals as a whole.. Cavalrymen, who comprised almost 14% of the general officers, amounted to slightly more than 10% of the *africanistas*, while staff officers, less than 10% of the generals as a whole, amounted to almost 15% of the *africanistas*.[36]

---

36. Note that of the four staff officers who qualify as *africanistas* two, Barbero Saldaña and Sánchez-Ocaña, were former cavalrymen, and two, Fanjul Goñi and Goded Llopis, were all former infantrymen. On this basis, the proportion of infantrymen among the *africanistas* rises to 82.1% and that of cavalrymen to 17.9%. In addition, two of the *africanista* infantrymen were *DEM* officers, that is, held a diploma from the Staff College, Castro Girona and Campins Aura. Mas Chao (p. 19) has observed that the Rif War changed the balance of generals among the arms: previously there had been proportionally more generals from the engineers, artillery, and staff, precisely those arms which were least "benefited" by the war.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The exigencies of active service in the various colonial wars in which Spain was involved from the 1890s through the 1920s resulted in many of these officers received promotions by méritos de guerra. Of the 87 officers in the sample, fully 58 (66.7%) had received at least one promotion by the merits of war, while several had received more than one, and one officer had seven.[37] Statistically, the mean number of such promotions held by the generals as a whole was 2.1, with a standard deviation of 1.3. Virtually all such promotions were awarded to officers of the infantry and cavalry, as can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4
Promotions by Méritos de Guerra

	Infantry	Cavalry	Artillery	Engineers	Staff
Men	41 (70.7%)	11 (19.0%)	0	1 (0.2%)	5 (8.6%)
Mean	2.2	1.8		1	2.2
St Dev	1.4	1.2		0	0.7
Range	1-7	1-4		0	1-3

The fact that the infantry and cavalry garnered the vast majority of promotions by merit is not surprising.

---

37. The record holder was Alberto Castro Girona, all of whose promotions from 1st lieutenant through major general were achieved through méritos de guerra. Second place was tied among Franco, López de Ochoa, and Varela Iglesias, each of whom had received five mérito promotions. Varela Iglesias held an additional unusual promotion, for in June of 1917, two years to the day after he graduated from the Academy of Infantry, he was granted an extraordinary, but not a mérito, promotion to 1st lieutenant, though the precise reasons are unclear: AROM, Expediente B-101-T.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The nature of the wars in which Spain was involved, being all colonial affairs characterized primarily by small unit actions, made it less likely that such officers would have the opportunity to earn merit promotions. In addition, the institutional hostility of officers in the "facultative corps" --artillery, engineers, and staff-- towards the notion of promotions by merit was also an important factor in limiting the number of such held by officers of those arms. On those occasions when an officer in one of these arms so distinguished himself as to be considered for a merit promotion, it was, of course, the custom to remit the honor for an award of the María Cristina.[38]

There were fewer winners of the María Cristina than of promotions by merit, only 27 (31.0%), with a mean of 1.5 awards, and a standard deviation of 1.0, the range being from one to five.[39]

---

38. On this see Chapter II, with particularly reference to note 28. The sole engineer who had received a promotion by merit was Carlos Bernal García. Of the five staff officers who had received such promotions, three were former infantrymen, Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, Manuel Goded Llopis, and Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros, and two former cavalrymen, José Sánchez-Ocaña and Abilio Barbero Saldaña. Espinosa de los Monteros received his merit promotion came while he was a 2nd lieutenant, and thus not a member of the staff corps. Rafael López Gómez, an artilleryman, briefly held a promotion by merit in 1899, but this appears to have been due to administrative difficulties in arranging to remit it for an award of the María Cristina.

39. The record holder was José Riqueleme, who was awarded the María Cristina on five occasions, and was followed by his fellow infantryman Manuel González Carrasco, with four awards.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 5
Awards of the Maria Cristina

	Infantry	Cavalry	Artillery	Engineers	Staff
Men	17 (62.9%)	3 (11.1%)	1 (3.7%)	1 (3.7%0	5 (18.5%)
Mean	1.6	1	1	3	1.3
St Dev	1.1	0	0	0	0.4
Range	1-5	0	0	0	1-2

As Table 5 demonstrates, despite the fact that members of the facultative corps were willing to accept this decoration in lieu of a promotion by merit, the majority of the awards still went to infantrymen and cavalrymen, the other arms together accounting for only 23.1% of the awardees, a figure which was nevertheless more than double that of the officers of these arms holding promotions by merit.[40]

The gulf separating the africanistas from their fellow officers is once again underscored in the matter of merit promotions and decorations. The africanistas managed to garner far more of both than would be expected on the basis of their proportional representation in the army.

---

40. The sole artilleryman holding a María Cristina was Rafael López Gómez, the engineer was Carlos Bernal García, who had three awards, and also held a mérito. The staff officers were Abilio Barbero Saldaña, a former cavalryman who had two awards and three merit promotions, Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, a former infantryman with two awards, plus three merit promotions, Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros, a former infantryman who also held a merit promotion, plus Emilio Araujo Vergara, a former cavalryman, and Rafael Rodríguez Ramírez, a former infantryman.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 6
Africanistas and Merit Promotions

	Total	Africanistas	Peninsulares
Awards	124	76 (61.3%)	48 (38.7%)
Awardees	58	27 (46.6%)	30 (53.4%)
Mean Awards	2.1	2.8	1.5
St Dev	1.3	1.3	1.0
Range	1-7	1-7	1-5

Of 124 promotions by méritos de guerra held by the 87 general officers, the 27 africanistas accumulated among themselves fully 76 (61.3%), leaving the other 60 generals to account for 48 such promotions: in effect, the africanistas averaged nearly three promotions by merit each, while the rest of the generals averaged less than one. All of the africanistas had received at least one such promotion, and most had received two or more, with the record being seven.[41] Among the peninsulares, fully half had never received a merit promotion, while of those who had earned merit promotions, only eight had received more than one, with the record being five.[42] This tendency for

41. Four africanistas held only one merit promotion each, ten held two, eight held three, four held four, two held five, and one held seven, Alberto Castro Girona.

42. There were 29 non-africanista officers who held no promotions by the merits of war, 21 who held one such, five who held two, one with three, one who held four, Pio López Pozas, and one who held five, Eduardo López de Ochoa. Many of these méritos had been earned in Cuba or the Philippines. Thus, López Pozas earned three of his merit promotions in the 1895-1898 wars, plus one in Morocco in 1913. López de Ochoa earned two merit promotions in the 1895-1898 wars, plus three in Morocco in the period 1909-1914. Despite their Moroccan credentials, neither officer can be counted as an africanista, since neither served in Morocco during the most critical part of the subjugation of the protectorate, the Rif War, which began in 1919, and was the critical determinant in the creation of the africanista mentality: see Mas Chao, pp. 40ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

africanistas to garner the bulk of promotions by the merits of war was carried over to awards of the María Cristina, though somewhat less markedly.

Of the 27 generals who had been decorated with the María Cristina, ten (37.0%) were africanistas, a figure almost exactly proportional to their representation in the general officer corps as a whole. However, of 42 awards of the María Cristina, the africanistas managed to collect slightly more than half, garnering 22 (52.4%)

Table 7
Africanistas and the María Cristina

	Total	Africanistas	Peninsulares
Awards	42	22 (52.4%)	20 (50%)
Awardees	27	10 (37.0%)	17 (65.4%)
Mean Awards	1.5	2.2	1.2
St Dev	1.0	1.3	0.5
Range	1-5	1-5	1-3

The María Cristina was frequently awarded to distinguished commanders and for outstanding staff work, as well as in lieu of promotions by the merits of war. The africanistas holding the María Cristina did so largely as a reward for distinguished leadership or outstanding staff work.[43] Some of the peninsulares held their María Cristina

43. The officers include José Riquelme, who had been awarded the María Cristina five times, and Manuel González Carrasco, with four awards. In addition, there were five officers with two awards and three with one. All of these officers had also received at least one promotion by merit.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in lieu of promotion by merit,[44] but it appears likely that the majority were for command or staff functions.[45] Nevertheless, the pattern of award still greatly favored the africanistas.[46]

Merit promotions greatly enhanced the ability of the africanistas to climb the promotion ladder. Indeed,

---

44. Beyond Carlos Bernal García and Rafael López Gómez, both of whom actually accepted a merit promotion and subsequently remitted it for a María Cristina (See Chapter II, note 29), it has not been possible to identify which officers received this decoration in lieu of a promotion by merit.

45. Carlos Bernal García had been awarded the María Cristina three times, including at least once in lieu of promotion. Of the other recipients, two officers had been twice decorated with the María Cristina, and 15 others once.

46. In addition to the María Cristina, data was compiled on two other high decorations, the Orden militar de San Fernando, a rarely granted order of valor, which was occasionally awarded for distinction in high command, and the Medalla militar, awarded for distinguished service in a combat or command capacity under terms of a decree of 11 April 1925. Five of the generals held the San Fernando in one or another of its degrees, two of which were for service in Morocco, both of which had been awarded to Brigadier General José Varela Iglesias, an africanista. Two of the awards, to López de Ochoa and Batet Mestres, were for their performance in command during the 1934 uprisings in the Asturias and Catalonia, respectively. The other two awards, to López Pozas and Rodríguez Casademunt, both lieutenant generals, took place during the colonial wars in the 1890s. The Medalla militar was held by 16 generals, all but two of whom were africanistas. As this decoration was instituted specifically to reward service in Morocco, it's inclusion here was considered inappropriate. Also excluded from consideration were two other decorations: the Real y militar orden de San Hermengildo, an honorary order of which nearly all of the generals were members, and the lavishly distributed Cruz de mérito militar, held by virtually all the generals, on which see Appendix 1, note 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

although *africanistas* began to move up the promotion ladder at a somewhat slower rate than did the *peninsulares*,[47] they thereafter attained each rung on the promotion ladder at an increasingly accelerated rate. Table 8 presents this in statistical form.

Table 8
Africanistas vs. *Peninsulares*
Years in Service to Attain Promotions

Rank	All	Africanistas	Peninsulares
To Captain			
Mean	7.5	7.9	7.3
St Dev	2.8	2.6	2.9
Range	2-13	2-11	3-13
To Major			
Mean	17.0	14.1	18.4
St Dev	4.3	3.5	3.9
Range	5-25	6-19	5-25
To Lieutenant Colonel			
Mean	22.9	19.5	24.4
St Dev	4.1	4.0	3.1
Range	10-30	10-26	16-30
To Colonel			
Mean	28.8	23.4	31.3
St Dev	5.7	4.2	4.4
Range	14-38	14-30	19-38
To Brigadier General			
Mean	34.2	28.7	36.8
St Dev	5.9	5.4	3.7
Range	16-43	16-38	23-43
To Major General			
Mean	34.2	31.7	37.3
St Dev	5.3	4.5	4.6
Range	23-43	23-38	29-43
To Lieutenant General			
Mean	35.7	32	37.5
St Dev	2.9	0	1.5
Range	32/39	0	36/32

47. Technically the *africanistas* were promoted to captain about six months later than their non-*africanistas* colleagues, on the basis of number of years in service. However, note that many of the *peninsulares* had received one or two merit promotions whilst serving as junior officers in Cuba or the Philippines. Note also, as demonstrated on the accompanying table, that, despite their somewhat slower ascent to captain, *africanistas* had both a smaller standard deviation and a narrower range than did the *peninsulares*.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Africanistas actually attained promotion to captain at a rather slower rate than did the peninsulares. However, they made major more than four years faster than their non-africanista brothers-in-arms, lieutenant colonel a bit more than five years faster, colonel nearly eight years faster, brigadier general somewhat more than eight years faster, and major general and lieutenant general each at about five and a half years faster. The cumulative advantage was statistically almost 28 years.[48] Nor was this figure a purely theoretical one. Officers who accumulated several promotions by the merits of war quickly outstripped those lacking such. Examples are numerous. Thus, both Oswaldo Capaz Montes and José Varela Iglesias made brigadier general 23 years after being commissioned, and Francisco Franco was a brigadier general 16 years from commissioning and a major general in another ten. In contrast, consider such officers as Rogelio Caridad Pita, who made brigadier general 42 years after being commissioned, or Antonio Ferrer de Miguel, who did so in 45 years. Their rapid movement up the promotion ladder helps to explain the enormous hostility between the africanistas and the peninsulares. Consider, for example, the impact of this

48. The actual figure is 27.8 years, including the six month disadvantage at the rank of captain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

accelerated rate of promotion on the relative seniority of the generals. The mean seniority of the 87 generals was 44. However, that for the 27 africanistas was only 31, while that for the 60 other generals was 50, despite the fact that africanistas averaged about five years younger than the peninsulares, and had spent about four fewer years in the army. The root of these differences in the promotional experiences between the peninsulares and the africanistas is to be found in the greater amount of combat time experienced by the latter group. It is possible to gain some notion of the extent of the difference due to the Spanish custom of granting "time on campaign" credit.

"Time on campaign" credit involved counting time served in combat as double for determining years in service for the purpose of granting pensions upon retirement.[49] Thus, an officer retiring after 35 years in the army, two of which had been spent under combat conditions was credited with 37 years of service for pension purposes.[50]

---

49. The Spanish Army was not unique in this regard. Several other armies also granted what amounted to "Time on Campaign" credit. For the practiced in Napoleonic France see David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 336-337.

50. The awarding of time on campaign credit followed some rather complex formulae. As a result, an officer might serve in a theater of war without receiving credit for time on campaign, which was technically awarded for front line duty only. An excellent case in point is that of Riquelme López Bago, who served some 20 years in Morocco, mostly as a political and intelligence officer in the Office of Native Affairs. Although his duties included pacification, political action, and intelligence gathering, Riquelme received a little less than three years time on campaign credit. On the other hand, Goded Llopis, a staff officer, received about four years time on campaign credit

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The pattern of such awards is examined in Table 9.[51]

Table 9
Years of "Time on Campaign" Credit
Africanistas vs Peninsulares

	All	Africanistas	Peninsulares
Total			
Mean	3.3	6.5	2.4
St Dev	2.8	3.6	1.6
Range	0-14.5	2.2-14.5	0-5.9
"Other Campaigns"			
Mean	1.0	0.3	1.4
St Dev	1.2	0.8	1.2
Range	0-3.3	0-3.0	0-3.3
Morocco, 1909-1927			
Mean	2.1	5.7	1.2
St Dev	2.6	2.9	1.0
Range	0-11.5	2.2-11.5	0-3.8

for his involvement in the planning and execution of various operations in the Rif in the period 1921-1927, though he was under fire relatively rarely. Carrasco Amilibia, an artilleryman who served as an observer and technical adviser to the troops in the field at various times during the Rif War, received no such credit, despite the fact that he was often in Morocco, and several times came under fire. His career is discussed at some length below.

51. Information on aumentos por abonos del doble tiempo de campaña is found in the 3rd Subdivision of the hoja de servicio of each officer. Because of the partial nature of some of the hojas, and the total absence of others, this table is based on data derived from the personnel records of only 40 (46.0%) of the officers under study. Since time on campaign credit was awarded in accordance with certain specific criteria, on which see the discussion which follows the table, it was not possible to reconstruct the necessary data for the balance of the generals. In consequence, the table is incomplete, and must be used with some caution. However, since among the files which could not be obtained were those of Francisco Franco, Nuñez de Prado, Queipo de Llano, and José Varela, among the most prominent africanistas, it is reasonable to assume that the general pattern suggested by the table may be considered reliable. Indeed, it may understate the gulf between the africanistas and the peninsulares. Note that no time on campaign credit was awarded for the 1934 Asturian Rebellion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Most of the generals appear to have had at least some time on campaign credit.[52] Since as a group the africanistas were rather younger than the generals taken together, many of them saw no service in the colonial wars of the 1890s.[53] However, they more than compensated for this by their activities from 1909 through 1927, accumulating overall more than twice the time on campaign credit as was gained by non-africanista officers, despite the fact that these had what amounted to a "head start"

---

52. Only two of the 40 officers for whom complete records can be found in this regard had no time on campaign credit, Carrasco Amilibia, an artilleryman who, in fact, did see service in Morocco, as noted below, and Rodríguez Ramírez, a staff officer of infantry origins. Five other generals had less than a year's worth of time on campaign credit, López Gómez, Ravassa Cuevas, Legorburu Domínguez, Carednal Dominicis, and Espinosa de los Monteros.

53. The campaigns in question are those of Morocco in 1893-1894, and Cuba and the Philippines, 1895-1898. While the status of several officers is unclear due to a lack of records, africanistas who had entered the service before 1898 but who had no time on campaign credit for the colonial wars include Benito Terraza, Goded Llopis, Riquelme y López Bago, Castello Pantoja, Barbero Saldaña, Orgaz Yoldi, and Campins Aura. Alvárez-Arenas, Balmes Alonso, Capaz Montes, Franco Bahamonde, Llano Encomienda, Mola Vidal, Nuñez de Prado, and Varela Iglesias, all entered the army after the colonial campaigns, and therefore also lacked such time on campaign. Together the two groups amount to 55.6% of the 27 africanistas. Non-africanistas who lacked similar time on campaign credit were, Araujo-Vergara, Rodríguez González, Moya Andino, Barro García, Ravassa Cuevas, and Legorburu Domínguez, all of whom had entered the army before 1898.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

during the earlier campaigns.[54] This difference in time on campaign credit helps explain the greater success of the africanistas in securing relatively rapid promotion.

It is against this background that the impact of Manuel Azaña's review and wholesale cancellation of promotions, and particularly of those held by méritos de guerra, must be viewed.[55] The measure affected the seniority of 47 of the generals, 54.0% of the total. Statistically, the cumulative effect on officer seniority was slight: when all gains and losses of seniority are considered, there was an overall loss of about three months seniority. Of course the impact on individuals was frequently greater. The 17 officers who underwent cancellation of merit promotions experienced an average loss of 3.2 years in seniority, while the 30 who gained as

---

54. In addition to the two who had no time on campaign credit whatsoever, several of the 40 generals for whom it is possible to compile time on campaign data saw no service in Morocco between 1909 and 1927: Peña Abuin, a cavalryman, López Gómez and Cardenal Dominicis, artillerymen, Espinosa de los Monteros, staff, and, rather surprisingly, Morales Díaz and Gamir Ulibarri, both infantrymen.

55. Azaña, of course, was convinced that promotions by merit and by election had all largely been politically motivated, the result of arbitrary actions by the King or the Dictator: Azaña, Memorias, 22 July 1931. There was some validity to this view. Barea, for example notes instances of officers receiving clearly fraudulent promotions by méritos: Barea, p. 367. However, the view held by some junteros, that all merit promotions were frauds (cf., for example, Pérez Salas, pp. 20-30) cannot be sustained.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a result of specific adjustments advanced an average of 1.4 years. Africanistas accounted for eight of the officers who lost seniority (47.5%). Moreover, as a group, the africanistas were hurt more by the reform than their non-africanista colleagues, suffering a mean loss of just about five years of seniority each,[56] while the nine non-africanistas lost an average of 1.6 years, though again several lost much more than that.[57] The group which gained seniority as a result of the reforms under the Republic comprised four of the africanistas, who gained an average of 3.3 years,[58] and 26 peninsulares, who gained an average of one year.[59] As the africanistas gaining seniority had

---

56. The africanistas losing seniority were Orgaz Yoldi, 7.8 years, Campins Aura, 6.8, Balmes Alonso, 6.1, Varela, 4.6, Capaz Montes, 4.4, Castello Pantoja, 2.4, Alvárez Arenas, 2.4, and Franco, 2.

57. The non-africanistas losing seniority were Virgilio Cabanellas, 3.8, Bernal García, 3.4, Martínez Monje, 2.6, Mena Zueco, 2.5, Araujo Vergara, 2.1, Augustín Ortega, 2.1, and Gamir Ulibarri, 2.2, while Martínez Cabrera, lost 2.4 months, and Batet Mestres lost about two weeks.

58. The officers in question were Queipo de Llano, 6 years, Romerales Quintero, 4.8, Riquelme, 3, and Saliquet Zumeta, 2. Of these, Queipo de Llano's gain in seniority came about because upon the establishment of the Republic he was restored to duty and granted a pre-dated promotion to major general, which had been denied him by Primo de Rivera: see Chapter III, above. The other three officers could also lay claim to having been denied promotions due to politics.

59. The principal gains were made by López de Ochoa, 6 years, Cerda y Lopez Mollinedo, 5, Gómez Caminero, 5, Fernandez Burriel, 2, Cavanna del Valle, 1.24, López Gómez, 1.1, and Espinosa de los Monteros, 1. The other 19 officers gained less than a year apiece, including several who were advanced by only a few days. The change in seniority of López de Ochoa, Cerda y López Mollinedo, and Gómez Caminero occurred on the establishment of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

earlier been denied promotions as a result of political hostility to Primo de Rivera, the overall effects of Azaña's tinkering with promotions and seniority fell most heavily on the africanistas.[60]

In general, and taking into account differences dictated by the character of the individual officer's arm of service, there seems to have been only relatively minor distinctions among the generals, save with regard to the africanistas. This general similarity extends even to the assignments which the generals experienced during their years in service.

B. Career Pattern.

Overall, there was remarkably little variation in the pattern of assignments which the officers received during their careers. Allowing for obvious differences due to their respective arms of service and the fortunes of war,

---

Republic, when they was restored to service with pre-dated seniority, after having been expelled from the army by Primo de Rivera: see Chapter III.

60. Note that the figures cited here refer to officers specifically affected by Azaña's decrees on seniority and promotion. In fact, of course, the seniority of all officers was affected by the modifications in the seniority of those officers who experienced specific changes in their relative standings.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

upon graduation from one of the military academies, a young officer could look forward to a fairly predictable series of assignments throughout most of his career.

Infantry officers who graduated the academy in time of war were almost always assigned to units in an active theater of operations. A fairly typical case history is that of Major General José Villa Abrille y Calivara.[61]

Villa Abrille entered the Academia de infantería in July of 1896, graduated the following June, and immediately took ship for the Philippines, where, upon his arrival in August, he was assigned to the 3rd Expeditionary Rifle Battalion[62], with which he served until the following February. In February of 1898, Villa Abrille was assigned to a special police battalion which saw extensive service on Cebu, earning a merit promotion to 1st lieutenant in

---

61. This officer's name is correctly José Fernández de Villa Abrille y Calivara (1878-1946). His father was Faustino Fernández de Villa Abrille, a career army officer who rose to lieutenant colonel. The general's brother was also an a professional soldier, but had left the Army as a field grade officer in consequence of Azaña's retirement offer of 1931. The information which follows is derived largely from GCET, Fernández de Villa-Abrille; AGMS-CG, Villa Abrille; and AROM, Expediente F-36-B. There is also a short entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 314.

62. The Spanish term cazadores --"hunters"-- has here been translated as "rifles" in accordance with terminology established in the War Department, Military Information Division, Notes and Tables on the Organization and Establishment of the Spanish Army in the Peninsula and Colonies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898). The translation of Spanish military nomenclature used throughout has been based on this work.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

April and garnering three awards of the Medalla de mérito militar. Not engaged against the Americans during the Spanish-American War, he remained with this unit until October, when he was assigned to the 71st Infantry Regiment, and then, as the Army of the Philippines was gradually repatriated, to the pool of officers and men awaiting transportation to Spain. Villa Abrille was among the last officers to return to Spain, not doing so until July of 1899, nearly a year after the armistice that ended the brief war. After nearly three months in Madrid without an assignment, in September of 1899 Villa Abrille was posted to the 36th Infantry, with which he served until August of 1900, when he enrolled in the Escuela superior de guerra, the staff college. He remained at the ESG until June of 1907, when he was awarded a Diploma de estado mayor, a staff college certificate: he did not, however, become a member of the Staff Corps.[63] While enrolled in the ESG Villa Abrille was also officially attached to various regular infantry regiments and reserve battalions, largely for administrative and mobilization purposes. He was promoted to captain by seniority at the end of 1904. From September of 1907 to December of 1909 Villa Abrille

---

63. Meanwhile, in December of 1901 he married María de las Mercedes Franco Salgado, a cousin of Francisco Franco, the future dictator, then aged 11. In 1933 he sued for, and secured, a divorce.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attended the Infantry Section of the School of Fire. During this period in his career, he served as a temporary staff officer in the defense of Melilla in May of 1909, being wounded in action and earning a merit promotion to major. In December of 1909 he was assigned as an instructor in infantry tactics at the School of Fire, but spent most of his tour serving variously as a troop commander and staff officer in Morocco, where he was again wounded, earning a mention in dispatches.[64] In August of 1911 he was transferred to the 38th Infantry. From November of 1912 to June of 1916 Villa Abrille was excidente --casual-- in the Madrid military region, serving most of the time as military attache in Vienna, during which period he was promoted to lieutenant colonel by seniority. Returning to Spain, over the next few years he was briefly assigned to the First Military Region, the 43rd Infantry, the 108th Recruit Depot, the First Military Region again, the 3rd Infantry, the First Military Region once more, the 39th Infantry, the 50th Infantry Regiment, the First Military Region yet again, and the 32nd Recruiting Zone, until October of 1920, meanwhile rising to

64. According to Mas Chao (pp. 28-29), about 25% of the officers sent to Morocco became casualties.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

colonel by seniority.[65] On 31 October 1920 Villa Abrille was declared supernumery without pay at his own request, in order to travel.[66] He did not return to active duty until

---

65. This seemingly curious sequence of ten short assignments in succession between June of 1916 and October of 1920 --for an average of five months each-- was by no means unusual. Between January of 1899 and January of 1905, Fernando Martínez Monje had seven different assignments, an average of one every ten months; Manuel González Carrasco held eight assignments from April of 1912 through March of 1914, an average of only 11 weeks each. On the other hand, there were officers who remained with particular units for considerable lengths of time: thus, Luis Orgaz Yoldi served with the 11th Rifle Battalion from April of 1900 to November of 1904, a period of 55 months, and then passed to the 9th Rifles until the end of 1909, for another 55 months, while Manuel Llanos Medina served with the 4th Infantry Regiment from October 1903 through December of 1909, for a total of 74 months. All figures from the respective hojas de servicio.

66. The precise reasons as to why Villa Abrille was declared supernumery is unclear. Although he indicated that he wished to visit the United States, Canada, and Japan, he spent virtually the entire period living in Manila, which, indeed, was listed as his official residence in the proclamation placing him on the supernumery list: DOMG No. 241. Villa Abrille had been born in Davao, the Philippines, where his father was serving. His mother's family, the Calivaras, appears to have had Filipino connections. Interestingly, on 3 November 1924 Major W. E. Prosser, Assistant Chief-of-Staff to the G-2 of the U.S. commanding general in the Philippines made inquiries of the U.S. Military Attache in Madrid as to Spanish army officers with "Filipino blood," ostensibly because Filipino nationalists were claiming that under Spanish rule Filipinos were not discriminated against. Military Attache Major Cambell B. Hodges responded by noting that at least 50 Spanish officers were part-Filipino, and possibly as many as 500 could be so-termed if men with as little as "one-eighth" Filipino ancestry were included. Hodges noted that the men in question, who included one lieutenant general on the retired list, an active major general, Pio López Pozas, and "one of the best" brigadier generals, Alberto Castro Girona, seemed to suffer no discrimination. See US NA M.I.D. 2041-240-2 (22 December 1924) and 2041-240-3 (16 January 1925).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

January of 1924. At that time he was given command of the 52nd Infantry, which entailed serving also as military commandant of the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, posts which he held until June of 1926, when he was assigned to the Directorate General of War Plans at the Ministry of War.[67] Promoted brigadier general in January of 1928, Villa Abrille was given command of an infantry brigade, the first of three such which he would hold until February of 1933, when he was promoted major general. Assigned to command of the 6th Division, he transferred to the 2nd in May of 1935, which post he was still holding on 17 July 1936.[68]

---

67. Meanwhile, after lengthy technical negotiations with the War Ministry, in April of 1924 Villa Abrille secured a correction to his seniority as a colonel, the effective date of his commission being changed from 12 December 1919 to 31 October 1919 by DOMG No. 94.

68. A confirmed Republican, and considered a Freemason, Villa Abrille refused to join the military uprising when summoned to do so by Major General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. As a result, he was deposed from command and placed under arrest. Subject to a court martial for "military rebellion," at the end of the Civil War he was sentenced to six years in prison. Shortly afterwards he was released for reasons of health, largely through the intercession of Nationalist Brigadier General José Cuesta Monereo, who had been a major on his staff in July of 1936. He died in 1947. Villa Abrille was one of a number of generals and other officers who were penalized by both sides; in 1938 he was expelled from the Republican Army on the grounds that he was in an "unknown location" (Mundo Obrero No. 799 (29 June 1938), p. 2.). This may seem illogical, given that he is considered a Republican supporter. However, information about the activities of many officers was difficult to obtain, and in the absence of any concrete news, the Republican authorities tended to assume that an officer was a Nationalist. The difficulties of obtaining firm information are perhaps best illustrated by noting that not until nearly a year after the military rebellion did the Republican government learn that Major General Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo and Brigadier General Rogelio Caridad Pita had been shot by the Nationalists, the news having been conveyed by the latter's son, who, after

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although he had more staff time than most, due primarily to his war college credentials, Villa Abrille's career was not markedly different from that of the majority of infantry officers. Although during the period of his commissioned service Spain was involved in active military operations for about 22 years --1895-1898 and 1909-1927-- he received only about 16 months "time on campaign" credit for his two years service in the Philippines and only about five months "time on campaign" credit for his 21 months in Morocco. He played no part in the most serious period of the Rif War, from 1919 through 1925. Nor was Villa Abrille's career particularly different from that of his comrades in the other arms.

Brigadier General Alejandro Rodríguez González[69] entered the Academia de Caballería in July of 1897 and graduated as a 2nd lieutenant in January of 1900. He was immediately assigned to the 24th Cavalry Regiment, with which he remained until the end of March of 1903, when he went to the 28th Cavalry, remaining with it through June of that year, whereupon he was assigned as a replacement to

---

pretending support for the Nationalists, had finally managed to slip across the lines (Azaña, Memorias, 15 July 1937).

69. The general's full name was Alejandro Rafael Valentin Rodríguez González (1880-1947). His father was a prosperous landowner from Asturias. Sources for his career are AGMS, Expediente R-1571, and AROM, Expediente R-215.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Fourth Military Region through November of 1904, meanwhile being promoted to 1st lieutenant by seniority in December of 1903. From December of 1904 through February of 1908 he was assigned to the 4th Cavalry Regiment, and then went to the 12th Cavalry, serving in Morocco during much of 1911-1912. In November of 1912 he was transferred to the 26th Cavalry. Promoted captain by seniority early in December of 1912, Rodríguez González remained with the 26th Cavalry until February of 1913. He was then assigned to the 23rd Cavalry, but was seconded to the 11th Cavalry Reserve Depot through March of 1913, and then spent April of that year with the 1st Cavalry Reserve Depot.[70] Rodríguez González was then assigned to the Fuerzas regulares indígenas de Larache, a native Moroccan formation, with which he remained until October of 1915, earning a merit promotion to major in the process. In October of 1915 Rodríguez González left Morocco, to which he did not return.[71] Assigned to the 8th Cavalry, he was promoted lieutenant colonel in April of 1920, and that May was made A.D.C. to the Captain General of the Eighth Military Region, in which post he served until the end of

---

70. Note that the numerous short assignments which Rodríguez González experienced at this time is very similar to that which Villa Abrille experienced in the period 1916-1920.

71. Rodríguez González was credited with 22 months "time on campaign" for his two years in Morocco.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1923, when he was placed "at disposal" of the military region until July of 1924, and then once again A.D.C. to the captain general until the end of the year.[72] In January of 1925 Rodríguez González was assigned to command the 8th Reserve Cavalry Regiment. Promoted colonel by seniority in August, he was given command of the 4th Cavalry Regiment in September, a post which he continued to hold until December of 1931. Rodríguez González was made an A.D.C. to the President of the Republic in December of 1931, and continued as such through to the outbreak of the Civil War, meanwhile rising to brigadier general in December of 1933 and attending various military institutions of higher learning and serving on several commissions and boards.[73]

---

72. An officer placed "at disposal" was not necessarily unassigned. In fact, he was attached to a headquarters, usually that of a military region or to supreme headquarters in Madrid, and was available for various duties. For example, Brigadier General Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros was "at disposal" in the 1st Military Region from 1921 to 1929, during which period he spent most of his time a delegate to the Franco-Spanish Pyrennes Frontier Commission: see below. Similarly, officers designated as excidentes --casuals-- or as reemplazos --replacements-- were also available for assignment. Of course, an officer placed "at disposal" might also be awaiting a court martial.

73. Although he remained loyal to the Republic at the outbreak of the Civil War, Rodríguez González was given no significant assignments. According to a deposition which he filed with the Nationalist military authorities on 6 November 1937, in August of 1936 he was arrested by "Reds" for refusing to cooperate with a "cheka." Imprisoned in various locations, in March of 1937 he was able to elude his jailers, taking refuge in the French Embassy, from whence he made his way out of the country in September. Rodríguez González entered Nationalist Spain within a few days. Turning himself in to the Nationalist authorities,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The career of Alejandro Rodríguez González was quite similar to that of José Villa Abrille. He saw some active service, being about two years in a combat zone,[74] earning a few decorations and a merit promotion,[75] but spent most of his career in garrison, a pattern which was familiar to the other cavalrymen in the Spanish Army.[76] And, indeed, although the details of their careers varied due to the character of their professional specialization, this pattern was also familiar to officers of the artillery and engineers.

Brigadier General Victor Carrasco Amilibia[77] entered the Academia general militar in August of 1891, transferred

---

he was placed "at disposal" but otherwise left unemployed. In 1940 he was placed on the retired list. Meanwhile, in October of 1937 the Republican military authorities expelled him from the Army: see Alpert, Ejercito, p. 358.

74. It will be recalled that during his career, Spain was engaged in almost continuous military operations in Morocco from 1909 to 1927, operations which were particularly arduous in the period 1919-1925, during which Rodríguez González saw no active field service.

75. Rodríguez González received three awards of the Medalla de mérito militar, two of the San Hermengildo, and one María Cristina.

76. Like all Spanish cavalrymen, Rodríguez González' career included service in several of the branches of his arm. The 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, and 28th Cavalry Regiments were officially light cavalry --cazadores--, while the 4th and 5th were lancers, and the horsed elements of the FIR were essentially mounted rifles.

77. Victor Carrasco Amilibia (1875-1941), was born in San Sebastian, into a bourgeois Basque family with ties to the Socialist Party. Sources on his career are: AGNS, Expediente C-1501, and AROM, C-165-4. There is also a memorandum concerning his active service in Morocco by U.S. Military Attache F.W. Manley: Manley to M.I.D., 22 June 1925, US NA M.I.D. 2657-S-43, No. 216.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to the Academia de Artillería in June of 1893, and was commissioned "2nd lieutenant cadet" [alférez alumno] in July of 1894. Continuing his studies at the academy, he graduated and was promoted a regular 2nd lieutenant in March of 1895, remaining at the academy until completion of his studies in March of 1896, when he was commissioned a 1st lieutenant. That September he was assigned to the 5th Fortress Artillery Battalion, with which he remained until February of 1897, when he transferred to the 7th Fortress Battalion. He remained with this battalion until the end of April of 1902,[78] when he was sent to the Menorca Fortress Artillery Battalion, with which he served until the end of June. From July 1902 through January of 1908 Carrasco Amilibia was a supernumery attached to the headquarters of the Sixth Military Region, rising in the meanwhile to captain by seniority in March of 1905. Thereafter, he spent February of 1908 with the Menorca Artillery Command and March with the Inspector General's staff of the Sixth Military Region, then passing to the Artillery Command of Pamplona, where he remained only until the end of May. He was then assigned to the Artillery Command of San Sebastian, with which he remained until the

78. In the interval the unit was redesignated as the 6th Fortress Battalion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

end of November of 1917, when, shortly after having been promoted major by seniority, he spent almost a month as an excidente --casual-- in the Sixth Military Region. Carrasco Amilibia was then assigned to the 5th Fortress Artillery Battalion,[79] remaining until April of 1918, when he as again assigned to the San Sebastian artillery command. Promoted lieutenant colonel by seniority in October of 1922, at the end of November he was briefly "at disposal" in the Sixth Military Region, and then in January of 1923 was assigned to the Trubia Artillery Factory, a government owned facility. Carracso Amilibia spent nearly four years at the Trubia works, performing various staff functions, conducting weapons trials, and serving as a technical adviser. In his capacity as a member of the Trubia staff he also went to war, serving as a technical adviser and observer in Morocco on various occasions.[80] Though earning no "time on campaign" credit for his time service in Morocco, he was awarded the Cruz de la Real y Militar Orden de San Hermengildo, which brought with it a small annual stipend. Carrasco Amilibia's career at the Trubia works ended abruptly on 5 September 1926, when Primo

---

79. Due to a series of redesignaions and amalgamations, this battalion was not the same organization with which he had earlier served.

80. See Manley to M.I.D., 22 June 1925, US NA M.I.D. 2657-S-43, No. 216.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

de Rivera disbanded the entire artillery corps for mutinous conduct.[81] From then until the end of November, Carrasco Amilibia was, like all other artillery officers, unemployed. When the artillery corps was re-established at the beginning of December, Carrasco Amilibia had his rank restored, but was placed disponible forzoso, in a state of virtual house arrest, without pay.[82] In January his pay was restored, and he was assigned to the Eighth Military Region, as an excidente, in which status he remained for 35 months.[83] In December of 1929 he was briefly assigned to the 2nd Coast Artillery Regiment, but at the end of January he was placed "at disposal" in the Eighth Military Region until the end of 1930, meanwhile being promoted colonel by the Berenguer government in November.[84] At the beginning

---

81. On this see Chapter II.

82. He was even deprived of his stipend from the Order of San Hermengildo: DOMG No. 199.

83. The extent to which Carrasco Amilibia was involved in the collective indiscipline of his fellow-officers in the artillery is unclear. However, the treatment which he received was considerably more severe than that experienced by most other artillerymen, which suggests strongly that he was among the more politically active members of the corps. In contrast to the treatment accorded Carrasco Amilibia, note that although unemployed in September, October, and November of 1926, upon the reconstitution of the artillery Rafael López Gómez and Eduardo Martín-González both returned to their previous assignments, while Gerardo Ravassa Cuevas was made A.D.C. to a general.

84. During the Republic Carrasco Amilibia's seniority as a colonel was revised, and his promotion predated to December of 1929, further evidence that his activities during the artillery "mutiny" had been particularly notable.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of 1931 Carrasco Amilibia received his first regular assignment since September of 1926, when he was given command of a mixed artillery regiment at Tenerife in the Canary Islands, a post which he held until the end of June, when he was transferred to command the 11th Light Artillery Regiment. In April of 1934 he was promoted brigadier general, and assigned to the 6th Artillery Brigade, in which post he was still serving on 18 July 1936.[85]

Although the details differed somewhat, due largely to the fact that he was a coast defense specialist rather than a field artilleryman, Carrasco Amilibia's career was fairly typical of that of all the artilleryman in the Spanish Army in this period. His service was mostly in garrison, on

---

85. Carrasco Amilibia committed his brigade to the Nationalists when summoned to rise by Emilio Mola Vidal. However, his performance over the next few days proved lethargic, convincing Mola that his heart was not with the alzamiento, a reasonable conclusion given that Carrasco Amilibia's family had ties to the Socialist Party in the Basque Country, and he himself was generally regarded as a republican. As a result, he was relieved on 20 July. By a decree of 12 December 1936 (B.O. No. 57) he was expelled from the army, and in 1939 was briefly imprisoned. Meanwhile, the Republic had expelled him from the army on 12 August 1936, for "military rebellion." See variously, Salas, Perdidas, 70; HEPR, 42; Alpert, Ejercito, p. 384; and Historia y Vida 141 (December, 1979), pp. 40-43. The general's younger brother, León Carrasco Amilibia, was colonel of the 5th Heavy Artillery Regiment based at San Sebastian on the outbreak of the Civil War. A confirmed monarchist, in contrast to his brother, the younger Carrasco Amilibia attempted to seize the town for the rebels and failed. Eluding capture for several days, he was eventually captured and shot. There is an entry in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 165-166, but curiously, none for the general.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

staffs, or as a technical specialist, and his promotions came as prescribed by rigid seniority; he saw very little combat and became caught up in the political problems of his arm, albeit perhaps to a greater extent than did his comrades. It was also very similar to that of the engineer officers among the generals.

Brigadier General Alfonso Moya Andino[86] entered the AGM in October of 1890, passed to the Academia de ingenieros in July of 1893, shortly after being commissioned as a "2nd lieutenant cadet" of engineers. Continuing his studies at the academy, he graduated and was commissioned as a regular 2nd lieutenant in March of 1895. Remaining at the academy, he completed his studies at the end of June of 1896 and was commissioned as a 1st lieutenant, being posted to the Railroad Battalion, with which he served until the end of September of 1901,[87] when he returned to the academy as an instructor. Promoted captain by seniority in October of 1902, at the end of November Moya Andino was assigned to the Engineering

---

86. Alfonso Moya Andino (1874-194?) was the son of an army officer who was of peasant origins but had managed attain the rank of lieutenant colonel. Sources on his career are ARMS, Expediente M-35583, and AROM, Expediente M-381. References to him in the literature are rather sparse.

87. During his service with the Railroad Battalion, Moya Andino participated in an experimental three day bicycle "march" for which he received the Medalla de mérito militar.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Commandancy at Segovia, a post in which he served until the end of August of 1910.[88] He then returned once more to the academy, serving until the end of March of 1915,[89] when, shortly after having been promoted to major by seniority, he spent a month excidente --casual-- in the First Military Region, assigned to the Academy. He spent the period from May through the end of September of 1915 officially assigned to the academy, but actually attached to engineering headquarters in Larache, Morocco. His connection with the Larache engineering commandancy was formalized in October of 1915, and he remained with it until the end of October of 1919,[90] meanwhile being promoted lieutenant colonel by seniority in September of

---

88. Most of Moya Andino's service was as a construction engineer. Thus, in the course of 1910, he served as the chief engineer for the construction of three warehouses to be used by the Central Artillery Park of the Army, then directed repairs to the barracks of the Royal Guard, and finally supervised the installation of a disinfection facility at the military hospital in Segovia.

89. Among his various duties while assigned to the Academy of Engineers, were service on the admissions committee and command of the 1st Cadet Company, as well as serving as an instructor.

90. Although he spent some 53 months in Morocco, technically a war zone, Moya Andino was only credited with 17 months and one day of combat service under terms of a ministerial decree of 13 May 1916 (DOMG, No. 109).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1919.[91] Leaving Morocco, he was briefly attached to the 5th Regiment of Sappers and Miners in November of 1919. At his own request, at the beginning of December of 1919 Moya Andino was placed on the list of supernumeries without pay in the Fifth Military Region.[92] He did not returned to active duty until the end of June of 1924, when he was placed "at disposal" in the Fifth Military Region until the end of August. At that time he was assigned to the Reserve Center in Valladolid, a post which he held until the end of the year. From January of 1924 through March of 1928, Moya Andino was assigned to the 1st Railroad Regiment. He was then assigned to a provisional staff supervising various railroad engineering projects until the end of May of 1930, meanwhile attaining the rank of colonel by seniority in February of 1930.[93] After a very brief period "at disposal" in the First Military Region, Moya Andino was assigned as Chief of Engineering Works, Reserve Affairs, and Supplies in the Sixth Military Region, before passing

---

91. Whilst in Morocco, Moya Andino served in provisional command of a mixed engineers group from 6 December 1915 to 27 January of 1916. From time to time he in "accidental" command of the entire Larache commandancy, during the absence of any higher ranking engineering officers, and also likewise once had brief tenure of the Moroccan Telegraph Regiment.

92. His service record gives no explanation for the request to be made supernumery without pay.

93. In 1932 Moya Andino's seniority as a colonel was corrected to date from May of 1929.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

at the end of June of 1931, to the office of the Chief of Engineers in the 6th Division.[94] Promoted brigadier general in March of 1934, he was assigned as Inspector General of Engineers in the Second Military Inspectorate Zone, in which capacity he rendered valuable services during the Asturian Rebellion of October of that year. He continued in this post, and was still holding it at the time of the military uprising in July of 1936.[95]

Although this bare outline of his service record does not show it, Moya Andino's career alternated between service as an instructor to cadets and non-commissioned officers of his corps, duties as a civil engineer, and service on various boards and commissions. Moya Andino had virtually no experience as a troop commander. Although he did see more overseas service than most engineers, his actual service "under fire" was minimal.[96] In contrast,

---

94. During part of his service with the 6th Division, Moya Andino was also commander of the divisional engineer battalion, and served as a member of the board which reviewed the promotions and status of engineer officers.

95. At the time of the Alzamiento nacional Moya Andino was in Logroño, in northern Spain. He joined the uprising on 19 July, apparently having been a party to the conspiracy. He thereafter served in a variety of administrative posts until the end of the Civil War. Passing into retirement, he died in Spain sometime in the 1940s.

96. Officially, Moya Andino was given time on campaign credit amounting to 17 months and one day for his time in Morocco. A good deal of this was due to his services as commandant of engineers of various columns, an activity in which he was particularly involved during 1919. His performance appears to have been satisfactory, but unspectacular: he received no decorations for his combat service, though he was three times awarded various degrees of the San Hermengildo.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consider the career of Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros, a member of the staff corps.

Eugenio Espinose de los Monteros[97] entered the Academia de infantería in August of 1894, and was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant in February of 1896, and was posted to the 23rd Infantry. He spent September of 1896 at the Escuela superior de guerra [ESG], and was then ordered to embark for the Philippines. Arriving there in early November, he was given a series of staff assignments which often took him into the field, being awarded a merit promotion to 1st lieutenant in February of 1897 and earning four months and thirteen days "time on campaign" credit[98]

---

97. Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros y Bermejillos (1880-1954), was the son of Colonel Carlos Espinosa de los Monteros Sagasta, a staff corps officer and sometime military attache in Vienna. He came from an ancient and distinguished aristocratic military family, which dated from at least 1006, and until 1931 had the privilege of standing guard in the royal bedchamber. His grandfather and father are the subject of entries in the Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada (Madrid: Espas-Calpe, 1964), Vol. XXII, pp. 240-241. Sources for his career include: AGMS, Expediente E-1396; CGET, Espinosa de los Monteros; AROM, Expediente E-126-T. There is a short entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 285. Information on family background courtesy of Alvarez Rubio, letter 24 October 1988.

98. He was also awarded the 1st Class Cruz de María Cristina and the Cruz de Mérito Naval, in addition to a Cruz de Mérito Militar.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

before being shipped back to Spain.[99] Arriving back in Spain, on 1 July 1897 Espinosa de los Monteros was again assigned to the 23rd Infantry, with which he served until the end of August, when he enrolled in the ESG to complete his staff training, graduating in August of 1902.[100] Over the next 15 months he held five short assignments on the staffs of various military regions, and for a brief time with a reserve infantry regiment. In December of 1903 Espinosa de los Monteros was made ADC to a major general.[101] One year later he was assigned as ADC to another major general, and then, at the end of 1905 was posted to the Central General Staff. In May of 1906 he was

---

99. Espinosa de los Monteros' records for this period are extremely confusing. Apparently, during his entire stay in the Philippines he was never assigned to any particular unit. Thus, the 4th subdivision of his hoja de servicio merely says of his time in the Philippines, "In the replacement cadre until 15 April 1897, 4 months, 12 days."

The 5th Subdivision is somewhat more helpful, noting that Espinosa de los Monteros was variously attached to the Philippine Artillery Regiment, serving under fire in engagements at Pamplona Bayama (15 February), for which he received his merit promotion, and other locations.

100. Meanwhile, on 15 January 1901 Espinosa de los Monteros was promoted to captain of infantry by seniority, a rank which he gave up to assume that of captain of the staff corps, with seniority dating from 28 August 1902: in effect, he abandoned 18 months of seniority when he took his commission in the staff corps.

101. During this period, Espinosa de los Monteros married María del Carmen, daughter of Conservative Party leader, and sometime prime minister Eduardo Dato, who was later assassinated in 1921.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

made ADC to a lieutenant general, in which post he remained until October of 1909. From the beginning of October of 1909 until the end of March of 1912, Espinosa de los Monteros was assigned as either an excidente --casual-- or a replacement to the 1st Military Region, meanwhile attaining the rank of major by seniority in January of 1911. While remaining officially attached to the 1st Military Region, in March of 1912 Espinosa de los Monteros was placed at the orders of the Minister of War, in which post he served for six years. At the end of March of 1918 he was made an ADC to Captain General Fernando Primo de Rivera,[102] serving until the end of May of 1921, having meanwhile ascended to lieutenant colonel by seniority in November of 1918. After three months "at disposal" in the 1st Military Region, at the beginning of September of 1921 Espinosa de los Monteros was assistant chief-of-staff of the naval base at El Ferrol, serving for four months. He was then placed "at disposal" in the 1st Military Region, and was not given another formal assignment until the end of January of 1929, meanwhile being promoted colonel by seniority in January of 1928. From January of 1929 to April of 1934 Espinosa de los Monteros served with on the

---

102. This officer was the uncle of the later dictator, Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Franco-Spanish Pyrennes Frontier Commission.[103] Promoted brigadier general by seniority in March of 1934, he was again placed "at disposal" in the 1st Military Region. The general spent the period March-June of 1935 as chief-of-staff to the Third General Inspectorate of the army, was then made director of the Escuela superior de guerra, which post he occupied at the time of the Nationalist military uprising of 1936.[104]

Espinosa de los Monteros' career was a series of staff assignments, rather than active commands. His service was appropriate to his status as a staff officer. He saw only a little field service, and did not serve in Morocco. Although he accumulated some "time on campaign" credit and

---

103. This assignment only recognized a status which Espinosa de los Monteros had held informally for several years: virtually all of his duties whilst "at disposal" since 1921 had been in connection with the Pyrenees Frontier Commission.

104. The outbreak of the Civil War found Espinosa de los Monteros in Madrid. Removed from office on 11 August, he fled, taking refuge in the French embassy. After some time, he was able to escape to Nationalist Spain, where he was given various responsible assignments, including command of an army corps. At the end of the Civil War he was promoted to major general and named ambassador to Germany. Espinosa de los Monteros was present at the famous meeting between Franco and Adolf Hitler at Hendaye in 1940, at which his brother, Alvaro Espinosa de los Monteros, a naval officer, served as one of the translators: cf., Hernando, Juan, Gonzalo, and Ignacio Espinosa de los Monteros y Bermejillo, Espana en Hendaya: demistificada la famosa entrevista Franco-Hitler, 23 Octobre 1940 (Madrid: Reunidos, 1981)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

earned a number of decorations,[105] his career was not dissimilar from that of most of his brother officers.

Despite differences in detail dictated by the demands of their particular arm of the service, the careers of Jose Villa Abrille, Victor Carrasco Amilibia, Alejandro Rodríguez González, Alfonso Moya Andino, and Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros were quite similar. Their duties involved them in the various branches of their arm, mostly in their particular specialization. Although serving at a time when Spain was involved in many years of colonial warfare, they had relatively little exposure to combat. In the course of their careers, they garnered a few decorations, and gradually moved up the promotion ladder in a fairly routine fashion. Their records may appear rather pedestrian, but they were by no means unusual,[106]

---

105. By the outbreak of the Civil War Espinosa de los Monteros had been awarded three degrees of the San Hermangildo, in addition to the decorations which he had received in the Philippines.

106. Although the careers of these officers may seem rather commonplace, there were others who had considerably less impressive service records. Rafael López Gómez, an artilleryman, graduated from the academy in 1897 and spent the next decade with various artillery units, including service in the Philippine Campaign, before passing to the national gunpowder factory in Murcia. Except for a six month period in 1923, when, as a newly minted lieutenant colonel, he served with the 6th Heavy Artillery Regiment, López Gómez remained at the Murcia powder works until the end of 1933, when he was promoted brigadier general and given command of the 1st Artillery Brigade. Leopoldo Jiménez García, an engineer, graduated from the academy in 1897, served with the Army Telegraph Regiment until 1906, then passed to the Army Museum, remaining there until 1915. Thereafter he alternated between staff duties and service with the Army Telegraph Regiment until promoted brigadier general at the end of 1933. After being "at disposal" for a time, he was then assigned to command the Military

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

considering the nature of the service and the military situations which confronted Spain during their time in uniform. Nevertheless, their records were hardly comparable to those of the africanistas. Consider, for example, the case of the senior-most brigadier general in the Spanish Army at the time of the military uprising of 1936, Luis Orgaz Yoldi.[107]

Brigadier General Luis Orgaz Yoldi[108] entered the Academia de infantería in August of 1898, graduating as a

---

Railroad Service. Perhaps the oddest record of all the generals was that of José García Aldave Mancebo, who spent eleven of his 45 years in uniform as an aide-de camp to Lieutenant General José García Aldave, his father.

107. Selecting a "typical" africanista from the 29 officers so-termed is rather difficult. The choice of Orgaz Yoldi was based the fact that his personal profile was about as near to the norm for the africanistas as a group as was possible. An infantryman, his overall seniority among the africanista generals placed him roughly in the middle of the group. At 55 he was only slightly younger than most africanistas, who averaged 56.6, while he had served 38 years in uniform, in contrast to the overall mean of 39.8 for the africanistas. In addition, he had earned three promotions by merit, where the mean for africanistas was 2.8, during a career in Morocco which earned him 7.5 years time on campaign credit on his hoja de servicio.

108. Luis Orgaz Yoldi (1881-1946) was the son of an infantry major, with solidly middle class connections all around in his native Vitoria, a city in the province of Alava, in the Basque Country. The principal sources for his career are AGMS, Expediente O-479, and AROM, Expediente O-53-5. He is the subject of entries in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 585-586, Cortada, pp. 370-371, Suero Roca, pp. 85-87, and particularly Arce, Generales, pp. 80-90. Orgaz is mentioned often in all standard works on Spain and the Spanish Army in the period under study. There is no useful biography. An unsigned, handwritten, undated memo in the general's expediente at AGMS makes reference to "an edition of 600,000 copies of 'my book'." It has not proven possible to locate a copy of this work, and it appears that it never existed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2nd lieutenant in April of 1900, whereupon he was assigned to the 11th Rifles. He served with this light infantry battalion until the end of November of 1904, rising to 1st lieutenant in December of 1903. Orgaz then went to the 9th Rifles, serving until the end of June of 1909, when he was assigned to the 2nd Machinegun Section of the 1st Rifle Brigade, effectively attached to the same battalion. In July, Orgaz went with his battalion to Morocco, serving there until the end of December, during which he saw his first taste of combat. He remained in this post until October of 1910, shortly after he was promoted captain, in September. In October and November of 1910 Orgaz served in the recruit and reserve depot at Badajoz, before returning to the 9th Rifles until the end of January of 1911. From February of 1911 through February of 1912 he was in the Machinegun Group of the 1st Rifle Brigade. Orgaz then served on the staff of the First Military Region until the end of the year, and was then excidente in the region until the end of April of 1913. Up to this point, Orgaz' career was not particularly different from that of most of the other officers. However, in May of 1913 went to Morocco as a volunteer officer of the Fuerzas indígenas regulars de Alcazarquivir, a native corps. He served with the FIR de Alcazarquivir until the end of April of 1914, in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

process earning a merit promotion to major in August. From the end of April to that of October of 1914 Orgaz was part of the cadre at headquarters in Larache, attached to the 2nd Tabor --battalion-- of the FIR de Alcazarquivir. Sent to the Larache Native Police until November of 1915, he became an excidente in the First Military Region attached to the Infantry Academy, and was shortly assigned as an instructor at the academy, in which post he served until the end November 1919. In December of 1919 Orgaz was assigned to the Native Police of Ceuta, with whom he served until the end of February of 1920, meanwhile being promoted to lieutenant colonel by seniority at the beginning of the year. Orgaz spent March of 1920 with the 21st Infantry Regiment, a regular army unit stationed in Morocco. However, he was soon back with the Ceuta Native Police, serving until June of 1921. He was then officially supernumery without pay in the First Military Region until the end of December of 1921, while attached to the Mehal-la Jalifiana de Tetuan. That December Orgaz was placed "at the service of the Protectorate," and formally assigned to the same mehal-la, with which he served through February of 1924, earning a merit promotion to colonel in January of 1922. Attached to the administration of the protectorate until the end of November of 1924, Orgaz then spent a month at disposal in Ceuta before passing once again to the Morocco office until September of 1925, when, he was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

promoted brigadier general by merit for his services in helping to plan and carry out the amphibious landings at Alhucemas. Assigned as Secretary to the Directorate General of Colonial Affairs, he served in this capacity until the middle of February of 1928. Orgaz spent the next ten weeks at disposal in the First Military Region, before assuming command of an infantry brigade in the 13th Division, a post which he held until the end of 1928, when he transferred to a brigade in the 1st Division. A confirmed monarchist,[109] and a supporter of Primo de Rivera, Orgaz lost his command shortly after the Republic was proclaimed. His career thereafter virtually evaporated, due partially to hostility on the part of Republican political leaders and partially to his own penchant for conspiracy. Orgaz was disponible forzoso in Madrid from May through September of 1931, when he was sent to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands in the same situation until the end of July 1932. Meanwhile, Manuel Azana's revision of all promotions by merit hit Orgaz particularly hard. His promotion to brigadier general was canceled, and he reverted to colonel. Deeply involved in the sanjurjada, he was arrested and subject to a court martial. Convicted, he was included in the general pardon of all officers

---

109. In 1923 Alfonso XIII had made Orgaz a Gentleman Chamberlain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

involved in the plot. He was, however, not employed. Although in July of 1934 he was again promoted to brigadier general, he had lost nearly eight years seniority. Meanwhile, the various conservative governments of 1933-1935 maintained him at disposal in Madrid. With the advent of the Popular Front government in February of 1936, Orgaz became involved in several conspiracies.[110] Apprised of his activities, at the April of 1936, the government sent him to Santa Cruz de Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, ostensibly to prepare a study of the artillery defenses of the archipelago. This did little to curb his appetite for intrigue, and Orgaz was a major player in the military conspiracy of 1936.[111]

Until he went to Morocco in 1913, there was little to distinguish Orgaz Yoldi from any of the other junior officers in the army. It was Morocco which made his career. His extensive service in Morocco brought Orgaz a

---

110. Orgaz was involved in the abortive attempt by Major General Angel Rodríguez del Barrio to initiate an immediate coup against the new regime shortly after the February elections. He was also a participant in the famous conspiratorial meeting of 8 March 1936, on which see Chapter V, above.

111. Orgaz had an important role in the military uprising of 17 July 1936, and subsequently filled numerous high posts for the Nationalists, rising to lieutenant general by the end of the Civil War. Meanwhile, on 11 August 1936 he had been expelled from the Army by the Republic (Gaceta de Madrid, 225). He died in Madrid in 1946, still on active duty. There is some additional biographical information on the general in Chapter VIII.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

generalship only 25 years after his commissioning as a 2nd lieutenant. Although markedly different from that of the non-africanistas, Orgaz' career resembles closely that of most of the other officers who can be considered africanistas. He saw far more combat than did non-africanista officers, being officially credited with nearly 7.5 years of time on campaign, which led to several merit promotions and numerous decorations,[112] as well as an occasional wound.[113] Orgaz was perhaps somewhat more politically active than most of the africanistas, though certainly no more so than some of the more extreme members of the group, whether on the right or on the left, such as Miguel Nuñez de Prado.[114]

---

112. Orgaz received ten awards of the Medalla de mérito militar, three degrees of the San Hermengildo, and four other decorations, plus a cash bonus equal to 60% of his salary on at least one occasion. In addition, he received various civil and royal honors.

113. Orgaz was seriously wounded on at least one occasion, in July of 1921, an injury which required 74 days to heal.

114. Major General Miguel Nuñez de Prado y Subsielas (1882-1936), scion of an aristocratic family with a strong military tradition, was a confirmed republican and mason. Despite sharing the status of Gentleman Chamberlain with Orgaz, Nuñez de Prado was deeply involved in the military side of the various conspiracies which eventually brought about the collapse of the monarchy. During the Republic he was openly leftist. In July of 1936 he took an leading role in attempting to suppress the military uprising, was captured by the Nationalists, tried, and executed. Sources on his career are AGMS, Expediente N-656, and AROM, Expediente N-74-T. For his masonic connections see AHNS, Legajo 19, Expediente 25A. There is no biography, but he figures prominently in all treatments of the Republic and Civil War. There are entries in Rubio Cabeza, p. 577, and Cortada, p. 368.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

C. Personal Background

As with any group of individuals, there were many similarities and many differences among the generals of 1936 in terms of their family background and their individual personalities. In the course of developing the database for this study it was possible to accumulate a considerable amount of information on the generals as individuals, although not always to the same degree for each of them. Nevertheless, some generalizations are possible based on the information available.

Most of the generals came from military families. It proved possible to identify the occupation of the father of 52 of the officers, 59.8% of the total sample.[115] Of these, 48 (92.3%) were the sons of men who were somehow connected to the military. Three of the generals (5.8%) were the sons of landed proprietors, and one (1.9%) was

115. It should be noted that in cases where an officer was born in Cuba, the Philippines, or Puerto Rico, but his father's occupation is not known, there is a high probability that the father was in military service, whether as an enlisted man, officer, or an official of military administration: Alvárez Rubio, letter, 24 October 1988. However, as this is at best an assumption, it has not been adopted for purposes of this analysis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officially described as "the son of an unmarried woman."[116] The 48 military-connected fathers of the generals may be subdivided into several groups.

Table 10
Generals with Military-Connected Fathers

Father's Status	Number	Percent
General	11	21.2
Other Officer[117]	32	61.5
Army Official	2	3.8
Enlisted Man	2	3.8
Army Contractor	1	1.9

There was little difference in father's occupation between generals who were *africanistas* and those who were not. Statistically, the *africanistas* were about as likely to have an father who was in military service as were those who were not numbered among them: sixteen *africanistas* had military-connected fathers, a third, which was roughly their proportion among the generals.

Table 11
Paternity and *Africanismo*

Father's Status	*Africanistas*	*Peninsulares*
General	3 (27.3%)	8 (72.7%)
Other Officer	11 (34.4%)	21 (65.6%)
Army Official	1 (50%	1 (50%)
Enlisted Man	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
Army Contractor	0	1 (100%)
Landowner	0	3 (100%)
Unknown	1 (100%)	0

---

116. The officer in question was Major General Manuel González Carrasco: *AROM*, Expediente G-295-5.

117. Note that this category includes the father of Francisco Franco, who was actually a naval paymaster.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Despite the fact that overall the occupations of the fathers of africanistas differed little from those of the fathers of the other generals, it is interesting to note that the data suggest the sons of relatively more successful individuals, generals, landowners, and defense contractors, were rather less inclined to be africanistas than were the sons of relatively less successful fathers, although the sample is too small to be considered conclusive.

It proved possible to ascertain the "social class" background of the families of 51 (58.6%) of the generals. Once again the generals proved overwhelmingly to be of military backgrounds. Moreover, the handful who did not all came from the "better classes."[118]

---

118. The precise status of the families of several of the generals could be subject to differing interpretations. For example, the Legorburu Domínguez came from a landholding family with a long tradition of military service. On this basis Legorburu's family has been listed as "Military", though his father was not himself a career officer. Pozas Perea and several other generals came from similar backgrounds. Nuñez de Prado's family were members of the untitled nobility, and had respectable landholdings. However, the family's distinction derived from extensive military service over several generations. During the Civil War, José Miaja Menant, who rose to the highest levels of command in the service of the Republic, was widely reported to have been the son of a "laborer." This was a fabrication for propaganda purposes, as the general's father was actually an career enlisted technician at the government artillery factory at Trubia in the Asturias. For a brief discussion of Miaja's background see Alpert, Ejercito, p. 115. Finally, although not listed, it should be noted that, although the identity of his father is unknown, the fact that González Carrasco was in a position to secure the education necessary to gain entry into one of the military academies argues for some degree of prosperity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 12
Social Background: General

Family Status	Number	Percentage
Bourgeois	3	5.9
Industrialist	1	2.0
Landed	2	3.9
Military	45	88.2

On the basis of the available evidence, none of the generals came from either the professional class or the working class.

As in the case of father's occupation, the africanistas did not vary greatly from the peninsulares in social background.

Table 13
Social Background: Africanistas and Peninsulares

Family Status	Africanistas	Others
Bourgeois	1 (33.3%)	2 (66.7%)
Industrialist	0	1 (100%)
Landed	0	2 (100%)
Military	14 (31.1%)	31 (68.9%)

Among generals from families of a military character, the africanistas were roughly proportional to their overall representation among the generals as a whole, approximately a third. Although the sample is small, this may also be said about those of bourgeois origins as well. Although no firm conclusion may be drawn from the available figures for generals from industrialist or landed families, it is interesting to note that the three men in these categories were not africanistas. This might be taken as confirming the impression that the scions of relatively more

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prosperous families perhaps felt less need to "prove" themselves.

Fully 26 of the generals can be shown to have had brothers who were themselves in military service, 29.9%. Nine of the generals in question were africanistas (34.6%), and seventeen peninsulares (65.4%), figures which roughly conform to the proportions of both groups among the generals.[119]

It proved possible to determine the marital status of 82 (94.3%) of the generals. Three (3.4%) of these men were bachelors at the time of the military uprising of 1936[120], while 79 were married, widowed, or divorced.[121] Once again the figures demonstrate no particular difference between africanistas and peninsulares. One (33.3%) of the bachelors and 27 (34.2%) of the "married" men were africanistas, figures which conform to their representation

---

119. Note that it was not always possible to determine whether an officer had brothers, so that data on siblings in uniform is highly inconclusive.

120. One of the three, Varela Iglesias, eventually married, after the Civil War.

121. Although divorce had only been legalized in Spain since the advent of the Republic, two of the generals were divorced, Villa-Abrille and López de Ochoa, both of whom received divorces in 1933. Curiously, López de Ochoa's divorce was rescinded posthumously, during the Franco years, while that of Villa Abrille was not, despite the fact that the latter had been married to Franco's cousin, the sister of the latter's lifetime aide, Francisco Franco Salgado.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

among the general officers. Among the 45 (51.2%) of the generals known to have had offspring, the africanistas did not differ from the norm, roughly a third (15 of 45) being numbered among the generals having at least one child, and also accounting for roughly a third (11 of 32) of those having at least one son.[122] Of the eighteen generals known to have had sons in military service prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, eight (44.4%) were africanistas, which is significantly higher than their proportion among the generals. However, this is probably an anomalous statistic, resulting from the incomplete nature of the data.

---

122. Information about the children of the generals proved particularly elusive. Unless an application was made for a widow's or orphan's pension, or an alternative source was found, the information was generally unavailable. As a result, information on the number of children each general had is very incomplete. Note that although the data base contains an indication of the actual number of children each general had, where known, as well as the number of sons, and the number of those who were in military service, the summary figures which appear here are based on whether or not the general had any children whatsoever, whether any of these were sons, and whether any of the sons were in the service, without regard to the actual numbers involved. This was done because the size and composition of families varied so much that the use of the actual numbers involved would have produced statistics of no particular value: Franco, for example, had only one child, a daughter, and hence no sons in military service, while Alvárez-Arenas had nine children, of whom four were sons, one being in military service, and Llano Encomienda had three children, all sons, two of whom were officers prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, with the third eventually serving as such in the Republican Army.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

An attempt was made to determine the regional origins of the generals, in the hopes of determining whether regional loyalties, which are strong in Spain, may have been of influence in subsequent developments. Unfortunately, it proved possible to determine the regional background of only 22 (25.3%) of the generals.[123]

Table 14
Regional Origins

Region	Total	Africanistas	Others
Catalonia	3	1	2
Valencia	1	1	0
Murcia	4	1	3
Andalucia	4	4	0
Castille	4	1	3
Galicia	3	2	1
Asturias	1	1	0
Basque Country	1	0	1
Aragon	1	0	1

Although the figures for some regions --Andalucia, Murcia, Castille-- suggest possible trends, the very small

---

123. With the exceptions of Cavanna del Val and Patxot Madoz, it was possible to determine the birth place of all of the generals from their personnel files. However, birth place is usually not a useful guide to regional origins, particularly in the case of men who were the sons of military personnel or government functionaries. For example, Riquelme was of Andalucian background, although born in Catalonia, where his father, an official of the Telegraph Service, was stationed, while Martínez Monge, of Castillian background (Old Castille, in fact), was born in Andalucia, where his father, a brigadier general, was stationed. Fully 13 of the generals were born in the colonies: five each in Cuba and the Philippines, two in Puerto Rico, and one in Morocco.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

size of the sample argues against drawing any conclusions.[124]

In terms of individual attainments, there was little to choose from among the generals.

All of the generals could be termed "writers" in the sense that in the course of their professional duties they occasionally prepared reports, manuals, articles, and translations which saw publication, usually for official circulation only. However, 25 (28.7%) of the generals can be termed authors, having written books for both professional and lay readers, whether published by official or commercial presses.[125] Of the 25 author generals, nine

---

124. Surveying the men entering the resuscitated Academia militar general during the 1960s, Julio Busquets determined that about a third were of Castillian origins, figures which, although a generation later, and inclusive of lower ranking personnel, nevertheless strongly suggest the limitations of the available data for the generals of 1936: Busquets, Militar, pp. 213-223.

125. Most of the books by the generals were on military, historical, or political themes, as a sampling of titles will demonstrate: Justo Legorburu Domínguez Matamoros, Un problema nacional, la industria y la guerra (Bilbao: Editorial Vizcaina, 1924), 123pp; Eduardo López de Ochoa, De la Dictadura a la República (Madrid: Editorial Zeus, 1930), 265pp; Juan García Gómez Caminero, De Montenotte a las piramides (Madrid; n.p., 1929), 366pp; Pedro de la Cerda y López Mollinedo and Eugenia Lefevre, El sol de los soviets. La III Internacional Social de Moscu frente a la Internacional armada del capitalismo (Valladolid: Castellana, 1931), 287pp; and Manuel Lon Laga, La Bulgaria en la guerra europea, 1915-1919 (Madrid: Deposito de Guerra, 1920), 360pp. A number of the generals did, however, write on topics other than military or political, such as Celestino García Antúnez, who produced Lecciones de cinamatica elemental (Guadalajara: Colegio de Huerfanos, 1907), 298pp, as well as a series of mathematics textbooks. Note that figures used in this survey omit works produced during and after the Civil War. A number of the generals produced memoirs or histories during and after the war, such as the Republican Mariano Gamir Ulibarri's Guerra de España, 1936-1939 (Paris: Imprimerie Moderne,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(36.5%) were africanistas, a figure marginally higher than the proportion of africanistas among the generals.[126] Interestingly, however, although statistically the author generals produced an average of just about two books each, the africanista authors produced an average of 2.8 books apiece, while the others produced an average of just two books each.[127] This literary productivity certainly reflects the more active military careers of the africanistas, several of whom produced memoirs and other works about the Rif War,[128] rather than any greater

---

1939). In 1940 Francisco Franco found the time to write a novel about the Civil War, Raza, under a pen name.

126. It will be recalled that africanistas constituted about a third of the generals. The africanista authors were Mola Vidal, Romerales Quintero, Queipo de Llano, Franco Bahamonde, Goded Lopez, Sanchez Ocaña, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Fanjul Goñi, and Varela Iglesias. The other author generals were Cerda y López Mollinedo, García Antúnez, López Pinto, García Benitez, Gómez Caminero, López de Ochoa, Virgilio Cabanellas Ferrer, Caridad Pita, Cruz Boullousa, Ferrer de Miquel, Lon Laga, Losada Ortega, Martínez Monge, Masquelet Lacaci, and Legorburu Domínguez.

127. The two most prolific author generals were both africanistas, Emilio Mola Vidal, with seven books and a chess manual to his credit, and Manuel Romerales Quintero, with four. Three of the peninsulares, Cerda y López Mollinedo, López Pinto, and García Antúnez, had each authored three books, as had the africanista Queipo de Llano. In addition, three men in each group had written two books apiece. The balance, three africanistas and ten peninsulares, had each produced just one volume.

128. Among prominent africanistas who wrote memoirs or similar works about the Rif War were Goded Llopis, Mola Vidal, Varela Iglesias, and Francisco Franco, who not only produced two slim volumes of memoirs, but also wrote some two dozen articles for the Revista de Tropas Coloniales, of which he was for some time the editor, as well as pieces for other publications as well. In contrast, the only genuine "memoir" by any of the peninsulares, is López de Ochoa's Campaña militar de Asturias en 1934 (Narración tactico-episodica) (Madrid: Ediciones Yunque, 1936). In

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

intellectual capacity on their part.[129]

---

general, the character of works by the generals varied depending upon their original arm of service: artillerymen and engineers mostly produced technical works and staff officers mostly wrote geography or history books, while infantrymen and cavalrymen mostly wrote memoirs.

129. An attempt was made to establish the linguistic skills of the generals. Unfortunately, information in this area proved extremely elusive. It was possible to secure what appeared to be definitive evidence as to the linguistic abilities of 67 of the generals. This represents a significant proportion --77.0%-- of the group, including 16 (57.1%) of the africanistas and 51 (86.4%) of the peninsulares. Under normal circumstances such sample would make it possible to draw some sturdy conclusions. However, a closer examination of the data demonstrated that it was seriously flawed. The personnel and other records available on the generals virtually ignore mastery of various non-European languages. Thus, only four of the generals are indicated as having any Arabic: Fanjul Goñi, Riquelme y López Bago, Bernal García, and García Alvárez. Only the first pair of these four can be classified as africanistas (see note 21, above). Nevertheless, from various secondary sources, including their own writings, it is clear that a number of the generals had command of Arabic and Berber, which are not to be found in their personnel records. Thus, Castro Girona's records indicate that he was fluent in French, but make no reference to his mastery of various Berber dialects, which enabled him to pass for a native, earning him the sobriquet "The Spanish Lawrence" (Barea, p. 294). Among other officers known to have had some fluency in Arabic and Berber were Francisco Franco, Orgaz Yoldi, and several others who commanded in the various native contingents raised by the Spanish. In addition, the records make no mention of mastery of any of the non-Castillian languages common to Spain --Galician, Basque, Valencian, and Catalan-- with which some of the generals would have been familiar. As a result, no conclusions can be drawn as to the linguistic abilities of the general. For the record, however, of the 67 generals on whom some data was available from official records, 60 (89.6%) had some command of French, a reasonable conclusion given that French was required in the various military academies. English and German were each spoken by a dozen of the generals (17.9%), Arabic by four (59.7%), as noted above, Italian and Portuguese by two (3.0%), and Russian and Esperanto each by one (1.5%). Figures do not sum due to a number of officers who had command of more than one language: Statistically, the average officer had command of about 1.5 languages. The officer reputed to be the best linguist among the generals, Francisco Patxot Madoz, who had five languages, is not counted in the sample of 67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Considering the available data on family, social background, and personal attainments, there do not seem to have been any significant differences between the various groups of generals, whether one divides them by arm of service or between africanistas and peninsulares.[130]

D. Political Profile.

Despite the Spain's often tumultuous domestic political life during the first third of the century, determining the political views of most of the generals proved a rather difficult task. Similar problems exist in determining the relationship of many of the generals to various organizations, such as the Masonic Order and the juntas, and to particular individuals, such as Miguel Primo de Rivera and Manuel Azaña. Although a few of them

---

generals, as his personnel records did not include a reference to his linguistic abilities: see Salas, Ejército, pp. 92-93.

130. Note that based on data derived from the records of 68 of the generals, it was determined that their average height was 1.679 meters (about 5'6"), which was rather taller than average for Spaniards of that era. The africanistas averaged only 1.653 meters (5'5"), while the peninsulares averaged 1.688 meters (5'6.5"). This is not a significant difference.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

publicly expressed their views on politics, people, and institutions, most kept the own counsel. As a result, there are few sources, virtually none of which can be considered unimpeachable. Nor can the actions of the individual generals during the crisis of July of 1936 be taken as indicating their political inclinations. Aside from being an egregious case of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning, relying on their actions during the alzamiento would ignore reliable evidence to the effect that at least some of the generals acted against their personal preferences, whether out of a sense of duty or due to implied or explicit coercion. As a result, in many cases the determination of political views and affiliation had to be made on the basis of the opinions of others, whether contemporaries or later historians.

Political Inclinations.

The political views of several officers proved extremely difficult to evaluate. A good case in point is that of Major General Augustín Gómez Morato. Although generally regarded as a Republican,[131] and a friend to Manuel Azaña,[132] Gómez Morato was apparently considered by

131. Salas, HEPR, I, p. 87, among many others.

132. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 431.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

some Republicans as "too conservative.[133] The case of Brigadier General Amado Balmes Alonso is similar.[134] It proved possible to obtain reasonably reliable information on the political inclinations of 48 of the generals (55.2%).

Table 15
Political Affiliation

1. Overall Summary[135]

Carlist [Car]	1 (2.1%)
Monarchist [Mon]	12 (25%)
Centrist [Cen]	8 (16.7%)
Republican [Rep]	25 (52.1%)
Socialist [Soc]	2 (4.2%)

2. Political Inclination by Arm of Service

	Inf[136]	Cav	Art	Eng	Staff
Total	34 (70.1%)	6 (50%)	2 (16.6%)	1 (14.3%)	5 (62.5%)
Car	1 (2.9%)	0	0	0	0
Mon	10 (29.4%)	0	0	0	2 (40%)
Cen	5 (14.7%)	1 (16.7%)	1 (50%)	0	1 (20%)
Rep	16 (47.1%)	5 (83.3%)	1 (50%)	1 (100%)	2 (40%)
Soc	2 (5.9%)	0	0	0	0

3. Africanismo and Political Inclination

	Africanistas	Peninsulares
Total	25 (89.3%)	23 (38.3%)
Car	1 (4%)	0
Mon	8 (32%)	5 (21.7%)
Cen	6 (24%)	2 (8.7%)
Rep	9 (36%)	15 (65.2%)
Soc	1 (4%)	1 (4.3%)

---

133. Fuqua to MID, US NA, MID 2041-316.7, 19 February 1935.

134. The U.S. military attache considered him a rightist (cf., Fuqua to MID, 19 February 1935, MID 2041-316.7, and 2 March 1936, MID 2041-316.11), and Rubio Cabeza (p. 95) says "it is beyond doubt that this general was compromised in the rising which took place immediately after his death," but Paul Preston argues that he was a "liberal" (SCW, pp. 49).

135. For purposes of interpreting the accompanying table, the following definitions are assumed: "Carlist," supporter of an absolute monarchy under the Carlist branch of the Spanish Borbons; "Monarchist," supporter of a constitutional monarchy under a restored Alfonso XIII or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The sample represents an overwhelming majority of the africanistas, and well over a third of the other generals, and so may be considered reliable. Clearly, the political views of the generals ran from the rightist to leftist. The extent to which the range of political opinion among the generals reflected the political division of the Spanish people as whole is difficult to ascertain. Analyzing the results of the election of 16 February 1936, Salvador de Madariaga concluded that the "Marxist Left"[137] received about 1.8 million votes (20.5%), the "Non-Marxist Left" about 3.2 million (36.4%), and the "Parliamentary Right" about 3.8 million (43.2%), with the "Anti-Parliamentary Right" managed to garner "a few thousand"

---

his heir; "Centrist," supporter of a constitutional regime, whether monarchist or republican; "Republican," supporter of a secular, liberal regime modelled on the French Third Republic; "Socialist", supporter of a socialist republican regime. These range from the extreme right to the moderate left, but are not necessarily accurate labels. For example, many supporters of a restoration of the alfonsine monarchy looked to England as a model, which would not necessarily constitute a conservative point of view.

136. Figures across the top refer to the generals as a proportion of all those in their arm of service, while the columns refer to generals of each political persuasion as a percentage of the whole number in each arm.

137. Madariaga defines this group as the communists, whether stalinist or trotskyite, the anarchists, and the various brands of socialists.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

only.[138] Dividing, as Madariaga did, the group here termed "Centrist" between the "Parliamentary Right" and the "Non-Marxist Left," about 31.3 percent of the generals belonged to the former group, and about 63.5 percent to the latter, if we include the two socialists. While these figures do not reflect the national political profile very closely, they do suggest strongly that the generals were not particularly extreme in their political views. It is interesting to note that while overall the africanistas were rather more conservative than the peninsulares, the bulk of them were nevertheless, still essentially middle-of-the road.[139]

---

138. Due to Madariaga's rounding, the figures exceed 100%. The analysis is to be found in Madariaga, pp. 444-448. Madariaga notes that his analysis is based on the "raw" vote, the initial count, as opposed to the count as revised by a leftist-dominated commission: see Chapter V, note 23, above.

139. Note that although Spanish military law forbade membership in political parties or organizations, it did not prohibit candidacy with the endorsement of a particular party, and there were always a handful of active officers or various ranks in the Cortes, even under the Republic. Four of the generals had parliamentary aspirations. Fanjul Goñi sat as a maurista in 1919-1923, and as an Agrarian in 1931-1932 and 1933-1934; Gómez Caminero as an independent republican member of parliament in 1931-1932; Miguel Cabanellas sat as a Radical in 1932-1934; and Franco entered the 1936 elections as a cedista, but withdrew when Falangists and leftists alike raised an outcry against him (cf., Payne, Ejercito, pp. 467-468).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Institutional Affiliations

Several organizations played, or were perceived to have played, an important role in the political vicissitudes of Spain and her army from the colonial disaster of 1898 to the onset of the civil war of 1936, notably juntismo, freemasonry, and, on the very eve of the civil war, the two rival politico-military groups, the Unión militar española and the Unión militar republicana antifascista.

The Juntas.[140] Although the juntero movement was of enormous importance in the period 1916-1922, few of the generals of 1936 can be shown to have had any connection with them. Only one can be shown to have been a member, Castello Pantoja, who was, rather surprisingly, an africanista. Several others can be shown to have expressed support for the juntas, López de Ochoa, Rodríguez del Barrio, Riquelme, and Saliquet Zumeta, the last two of whom were africanistas.[141] In contrast, seven of the generals can be shown to have publicly opposed the juntas: Miguel Cabanellas, Castro Girona, Franco, Queipo de Llano, Mola

---

140. For a general outline of the history of the juntero movement, see Chapter II, above.

141. Boyd, pp. 62, 204.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Vidal, Orgaz Yoldi, and Varela Iglesias.[142] Given the sparseness of the evidence, no conclusions can be drawn based on the influence of the juntas, save to note that all of the generals known to be in the anti-junta camp were prominent africanistas. On the other hand, three of those who were in sympathy with the juntas were also africanistas, Castello Pantoja, Saliquet, and Riquelme.

Freemasonry. Conservative Spaniards have traditionally considered all of Spain's woes over the last two centuries to have been caused by an international anti-Catholic conspiracy controlled by the Masonic order. Freemasonry was certainly active in Spain, and a remarkably large number of prominent indidivuals were Masons, including a significant number of generals, particularly during the tumultuous nineteenth century, when liberalism and freemasonry went hand-in-hand. However, with the Restoration Spanish masonry began moving towards the

---

142. Information on the status of the generals with regard to the juntas derives partially from several letters from Sr. Alvárez Rubio (8 September, 24 October 1988), and from their own public statements on the matter. See, for example, Miguel Cabanellas' open letter on the juntas in La Correspondencia Militar, 24 October 1921, p. 1, and Franco, Diario, p. 279. See also Ramón Alonso, p. 480; Boyd, p. 193; Fernández Almagro, pp. 399ff; and Payne, Politics, pp. 174, 490, note 63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

center, losing much of its political character in the process.[143]

Determination of membership in the Masonic order is obviously rather difficult. Aside from the secretive nature of Freemasonry, there is the existence of the retroactive Ley de Represion de la Masonería y Comunisimo of 1 March 1940, under which membership after 1934 could be construed as a criminal offense in Nationalist Spain.[144] Evidence for membership comes from various sources. Some officers were openly known to be Masons even before the Civil War.[145] In addition, on 15 February 1935 the Deputy Dionisio Cano López read into the record of the Cortes a

---

143. This discussion of Freemasonry is based largely on Angel María de Ler, La masonería que vuele (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980); Bravo Morato, pp. 104ff, 122; Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp. 345-347; Jackson, CW, p. 510; Jellinek, p. 50; Payne, Catholicism, p. 127ff; Payne, Ejercito, 428ff; Payne, Politics, pp. 297, 305, 504; Conselleria, "Exposición", passim. There is also a lengthy discussion in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 523-527. In passing it is worth recalling that six of the twelve members of the first Republican cabinet, in 1931, were masons, including Manuel Azaña: Conselleria, "Exposición", p. II.

144. The peculiar cut-off date in this law appears to have been Francisco Franco's doing, for he observed that "a military engineer might wish to become a mason in order to prosper in the construction business . . ." upon leaving the army. Franco-Salgado, Conversaciones, p. 99. Overall, however, Franco was quite hostile to the masonic order. His writings on the subject were published under the psuedonym Jakin Boor, Masonería (Madrid: Valera, 1952).

145. Among these we may cite Queipo de Llano (Alpert, Ejército, pp. 102-103) and Miguel Cabanellas (Payne, Ejército, pp. 383, 396; Suero, p. 74; Alpert, Ejército, pp. 102-103).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

list of nine major generals and twelve brigadier generals whom he claimed were Masons. Similar lists and references to masonic affiliation appeared in the newspaper El Siglo Futuro on 16 January 1936 and in a number of books.[146] More importantly, the files of the Nationalist commission which investigated 21 generals, plus numerous other officers and many civilians suspected of masonic sympathies are available. Although there are some differences between the various lists, they are in general agreement. Any inquiries into the question of freemasonry among Spanish Army officers in this period must inevitably rely upon these sources.[147] Nevertheless, the accuracy of any such listing is subject to question.[148]

---

146. Note, for example, Leon de Poncins, Histoire secrete de la revolution espagnole (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1938), F. Ferrari Billoch, La masonería al desnudo (Madrid: Ediciones Españolas, 1939), and Eduardo Comin Colomer, Lo que España debe a la masonería (Barcelona: Editora Nacional, 1956), all of which are very Nationalist in tone.

147. For example, documentation for La Masonería espanola, 1728-1939, a major exhibition held at the Ateneo of Valencia in November of 1989, included a list of nine major generals and eleven brigadier generals who were reliably believed to have been Masons. All can be found in either the Cano López or the investigating commission lists. See Conselleria, "Exposición".

148. Consider, for example, the case of Brigadier General Juan Urbano Palma, one of the officers cited in Cano López' speech. In a memorandum to the Army Minister dated 24 March 1941 he vigorously denied the charges [AROM, Expediente U-26]. This, of course, was after the organization had been declared illegal. Nevertheless, Urbano Palma was not apparently investigated by the Nationalist regime, which implies that he did not come under suspicion of being a Mason. Despite this, several works regard him as having been a Mason, probably on the strength of the Cano López speech: Bravo Morato, Rep, p. 104; Poncins, p. 117. Occasional rumors have surfaced to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

If all types of evidence are considered, fully 34 (39.1%) of the generals might be considered to have been masons.

Table 16
Freemasons

A. Overall Summary

Confirmed [Conf]	6
Investigated [Inv]	20
Suspected [Susp]	8

B. Freemasonry by Arm of Service[149]

	Inf	Cav	Art	Eng	Staff
Total	19 (39.6%)	6 (50%)	3 (25%)	3 (42.6%)	3 (37.5%)
Conf	2 (4.2%)	4 (66.6%)	0	0	0
Inv	13 (27.1%)	2 (33.3%)	1 (8.3%)	2 (28.6%)	2 (25%)
Susp	4 (8.3%)	0	2 (16.7%)	1 (14.3%)	1 (12.5%)

C. Africanismo and Freemasonry

	Africanistas	Peninsulares
Total	14 (51.9%)	20 (33.3%)
Confirmed	4 (28.6%)	2 (10%)
Investigated	7 (50%)	13 (65%)
Suspected	3 (21.4%)	5 (25%)

Those officers included under "Confirmed" can be shown to have been reliably know to have been masons even before

---

the effect that Francisco Franco was himself a member (cf., Friedlander, p. 173, and Alvárez Rubio, letter, 24 October 1988). Nevertheless, even before the Civil War it was public knowledge that both of Francisco Franco's brothers were masons, and as such they were investigated afterwards, but cleared of having violated the Ley de Represion de la Masonería y Comunisimo: Ramón Franco, Francisco's radical brother, had become a member in 1930 (cf., Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 234; Alvárez Rubio, letter, 24 October 1988.)

149. Breakdown figures on this table represent the proportion of persons in the entire arm who are classed in the indicated category, rather than the proportion of those in that arm who are considered masons.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the outbreak of the Civil War.[150] The other two groups include persons charged with having been masons before the war, such as in the address made by Cano López. The status of those included under "Investigation" was sufficiently believable for them to be subject to formal inquires after the war by the Nationalists,[151] while those under

---

150. These were the africanistas Miguel Cabanellas [AHNS, Legajo 12, Expediente 5a], Nuñez del Prado [AHNS, Legajo 19, Expediente 5a], Queipo de Llano [AHNS, Legajo 1035, Expediente 40]; and Riquelme y López Bago [AHNS, Legajo 18, Expediente 21], plus López de Ochoa [AHNS, Legajo 188, Expediente 25a] and Pozas Perea [AHNS, Legajo 106, Expediente P-13]. Evidence for Riquelme is particularly strong, and includes several original membership documents.

151. These officers were publicly charged with having been freemasons before the war, and were later investigated by the Nationalists. In all but one case the investigating commission returned a "Negative" report. The officers receiving a negative verdict were: the africanistas, Castello Pantoja [AHNS, Legajo 1418, Expediente 40], Goded Llopis [AHNS, Legajo 1023, Expediente 81], Gómez Morato [AHNS, Legajo 1204, Expediente 17], González Carrasco [AHNS, Legajo 1040, Expediente 16], Miaja Menant [AHNS, Legajo 1418, Expediente 49], and Llano Encomienda [AHNS, Legajo 1137, Expediente 34]; plus the peninsulares Rodríguez del Barrio [AHNS, Legajo 204, Expediente 48], Batet Mestres [AHNS, Legajo 1252, Expediente 115], Cerda y López Mollinedo [AHNS, Legajo 1083, Expediente 9], Cruz Boullosa [AHNS, Legajo 1109, Expediente 106], Fernández Ampon [AHNS, Legajo 1467, Expediente 13], Ferrer de Miguel [AHNS, Legajo 1171, Expediente 16], García Alvárez [AHNS, Legajo 1263, Expediente 40], Gómez Caminero [AHNS, Legajo 1132, Expediente 121], López Pozas [AGMS, Expediente L-1716], Martínez Cabrera [AHNS, Legajo 1614, Expediente 23], Martínez Monje [AHNS, Legajo 1207, Expediente 6], Masquelet [AHNS, Legajo 1418, Expediente 60], and Molero Lobo [AHNS, Legajo 1580, Expediente 56]. The only case in which an officer was investigated and did not receive a negative verdict was that of Bernal García [AGMS, Expediente B-2072], who was not, however, confirmed as a mason either. Note that several of the officers listed under "Confirmed" were also investigated.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"Suspected" were not so investigated.[152] Of the officers investigated, the commission returned a "negative" verdict on all but one.[153] As a number of the officers investigated were prominent Republican commanders during the Civil War --such as Llano Encomienda, Miaja Menant, and Martínez Cabrera-- the conclusions of the investigating commission must be regarded with some confidence, and thus the degree to which Freemasonry influenced developments in the army must be regarded as slight.[154] Indeed, it is most

---

152. Officers suspected or rumored to have been masons, but who were never investigated include Jiménez García, López Gómez, López Viota, Urbano Palma, and Villa Abrille, plus the africanistas Romerales Quintero, Sánchez-Ocaña, and Franco. As Jiménez García, López Gómez, López Viota, Urbano Palma, Villa Abrille, and Romerales Quintero were Republicans, thereby giving the Nationalists an incentive to accept rumors of their masonic affiliation, it seems reasonable to assume that evidence for this was extremely sketchy, although by the time the commission was conducting its business several of them were dead, and the matter may have been considered moot. In the case of the two officers who became Nationalists, Sanchez-Ocaña and Franco, evidence could, of course, have been ignored or destroyed. The case of Urbano Palma has already been discussed in note 148, above. Busquets, Pronunciamiento, p. 129n, argues that Villa Abrille was probably not a mason.

153. The exception was Bernal García, on whom no verdict was rendered, though he continues to be regarded as a mason: AGMS, Expediente B-2072.

154. Technically, of course, the commission merely found that there was no evidence that these officers had become masons, or maintained active membership in masonic organizations, after 1934, the cut off date of established in Ley de Represion de la Masonería y Comunisimo. Thus, although Queipo de Llano was certainly a mason for many years, the investigatory commission returned a "negative" verdict: AHNS, Legajo 1035, Expediente 40. However, since the files of the various masonic lodges were all seized by the Nationalists, it seems reasonable to conclude that no evidence was found to show that these officers were masons in violation of the act of 1940. It is, however, interesting to note that virtually all of the officers in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

probable that charges of masonic ties were made based on the political views of the generals, rather than on any known connections with freemasonry.[155]

Relationship to Primo de Rivera. The dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera dominated Spain for most of 1920s.[156] Nine of the generals --10.3%-- can be shown to have openly opposed his regime. Of the nine, four (44.4%) were africanistas, and five (55.6%) peninsulares.[157] It is

---

question are still generally regarded as having been masons by many authors: for example, Payne, Politics, p. 504, n. 31, lists most of those included in the "Investigated" category, with the comment "The fact of Masonic membership seems plausible in the case of almost all these generals," while Cabanellas, Cuatro, passim, also considers most of them to have been masons, as does Conselleria, "Exposicion". One general, Benito Terraza, was a Rotarian: AHNS, Legajo 2, Expediente 59.

155. The political inclinations of 25 of these officers can be determined, of whom three (12%) were monarchists, four (14%) centrist, fully 16 (64%) liberal republicans, and two (8%) socialists. Of the five officers confirmed to have been masons, all were liberal republicans; the other 20 officers included three monarchists (15%), four centrists (20%), eleven (55%) liberal republicans, and two socialists (10%). Arguably, charges of masonic ties may have been leveled because of the relatively leftist inclinations of many of these officers, rather than on the basis of any real evidence.

156. For Primo and his dictatorship, see Chapter II, above.

157. All of the officers included here suffered penalties at Primo's hands for various acts of defiance, ranging from public expressions of opposition to open rebellion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of some value to give their names:

Africanistas	Peninsulares
Cabanellas, M.	Batet Mestres
Goded Llopis	Cerda y López Mollinedo
Queipo de Llano	Gómez Caminero
Castro Girona	López de Ochoa
	Legorburu Domínguez

All of these officers were center or left-of-center politically, the most radical being Gómez Caminero, an avowed socialist.

Only three of the generals on active duty in 1936 can be shown to have been strong supporters of Primo de Rivera, Losada Ortega, Saliquet Zumeta, and Orgaz Yoldi, all of whom were monarchists, and the last two africanistas.[158]

Monarchist/Anti-Monarchist Activists. By 1936 there remained in the army only one general who could be considered a monarchist activist, Brigadier General Luis Orgaz Yoldi, an africanista.[159] In contrast, six of the

---

158. Azaña (Memorias, 2 November 1931) calls Losada Ortega "the right-arm of Primo de Rivera." Evidence for Saliquet is less direct, see Cortada, p. 424. Of course many of the generals, such as López de Ochoa, were initially inclined to support Primo, but later came around to the opposition. In passing, it is interesting to note that, save for Legorburu and Orgaz, brigadier generals, all the officers listed, whether pro- or anti-Primo, were major generals, or, in the case of Castro Girona, a lieutenant general.

159. Arguably, Brigadier General José Varela Iglesias should be counted as a monarchist, in as much as he was a staunch supporter of the "restoration" of the Carlist pretender to the throne. However, Carlism, a movement dating back to the 1830s which supported an absolute monarchy under a cadet branch of the Spanish Borbóns, was hostile to the mainstream of Spanish monarchism, which supported the restoration of Alfonso XIII or his heir under a constitutional system similar to that of England.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers, all major generals, can be shown to have been not merely republican in sympathies, but actively involved in attempts to overthrow the monarchy. Four of these were africanistas, Queipo de Llano, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Riquelme y López Bago, and Nunez de Prado, while two were peninsulares, López de Ochoa and Cerda y López Mollinedo.[160]

U.M.E./U.M.R.A. Activity. The Unión militar española (U.M.E.), a loose association of moderate and conservative officers created in 1934, and the leftist Unión militar republicana antifascista formed in 1936 through the merger of two older organizations, were of some importance in the plotting which attended the final deterioration of the political situation in 1936 and the military conspiracy which resulted in the Nationalist uprising that July.[161] Several of the generals can be shown to have belonged to

---

160. Criteria for inclusion as an anti-monarchist activist include membership in the Asociación militar republicana (AMR), on which see R. Franco, Deciamos, pp. 163-166. On anti-monarchist conspiracies and conspirators, see above, Chapter II, and Busquets, Pronunciamiento, pp 122ff.

161. For background on both organizations, see Chapter IV and Chapter V, with particular reference to note 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

one or the other group.[162]

Table 17
U.M.E./U.M.R.A. Affiliation

	Total	Africanistas	Peninsulares
U.M.E.[163]	10	8	2
U.M.R.A.[164]	6	4	2

Although the U.M.E. is generally regarded as a conservative, and even an "ultra-rightist" organization,[165]

---

162. There exist no official membership lists for either organization. Both organizations were technically limited to officers up to the rank of colonel, though generals could affiliate in various ways. Evidence for those officers believed to be so affiliated is essentially secondary. The men named here may be reliably regarded as having been members. Presumably there were others as well. See Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 423, for a brief discussion of the problem of establishing who was, and who was not, a member.

163. The officers in question are Goded Llopis, Fanjul Goñi, Miaja Menant, Queipo de Llano Vidal, Orgaz Yoldi, Varela Iglesias, Campins Aura, and Villegas Montesinos, all africanistas, as well as López de Ochoa and Rodríguez del Barrio. Evidence for Miaja's affiliation with the UME is particularly strong, as some membership papers bearing his name were among various documents seized by Republican investigators early in the Civil War. On 18 June 1937 Miaja personally extracted his card from the files, in addition to that of Colonel Vicente Rojo Lluch, his chief-of-staff, an act witnessed, and protested, by seven officials of the bureau responsible for maintaining the files. A copy of this protest is reprinted photographically in The Red Domination in Spain: The General Cause (Madrid: n.p., 1961) ["The Red Domination"], Annex X, Item 3; see also therein pp. 291-292. This work is essentially a massive indictment of the Republic compiled by the Nationalists after the Civil War, but is generally reliable, if highly selective.

164. The officers were the africanistas Castello Pantoja, Nuñez de Prado, generally regarded as the head of the organization, Llano Encomienda, and Riquelme y López Bago, plus Gómez Caminero and Pozas Perea.

165. Cf., Preston, SCW, p. 48.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the range of political views evidenced by the known members might suggest that it was more of a professional than a political association. Thus:

Republican:	Campins Aura
	Miaja Menant
	López de Ochoa
	Queipo de Llano
Centrist:	Goded Llopis
	Fanjul Goñi
Monarchist:	Villegas Montesinos
	Orgaz Yoldi
	Rodríguez del Barrio
Carlist:	Varela Iglesias

However, while the range of political views does suggest that the U.M.E. was politically inchoate, it is important to note that five of the officers listed, Fanjul Goñi, Orgaz Yoldi, Varela Iglesias, Rodríguez del Barrio, and Villegas Montesinos, were present at the 8 March 1936 meeting of the Spanish generals which established criteria for justifying a coup against the government of Manuel Azaña.[166] In contrast, the U.M.R.A. was far more cohesive ideologically, all members being liberal republicans or socialists.

A particularly interesting aspect of these organizations is the prominence of africanistas in both of them. Of the sixteen officers involved, 12 (75%) were

---

166. See above, Chapter V.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

africanistas, eight in the U.M.E. and four in the U.M.R.A., a majority in each case.

Relationship to Azaña. Manuel Azaña was the dominant political figure during the entire period of the Republic, whether in office as war minister, prime minister, and, at the last, as president, or in opposition. Ten (11.5%) of the generals can be shown to been on friendly terms with Azaña ("Pro"), and 14 (16.1%) to be ill-disposed toward him ("Anti"). Interestingly, both supporters and opponents came from both of the two principal factions in the Army, africanistas and peninsulares. Their names are of some importance:

	Africanistas	Peninsulares
Pro:	Gómez Morato	Batet Mestres
	Miaja Menant	Martínez Monje
	Nuñez de Prado	Masquelet
	Riquelme	Molero Lobo
	Salcedo Molinuevo	Pozas Perea
Anti:	Cabanellas, M.	Cerda y López Mollinedo
	Fanjul Goñi	Gómez Caminero
	Goded Llopis	López de Ochoa
	Mola Vidal	Ròdríguez del Barrio
	Queipo de Llano	
	Orgaz Yoldi	
	Varela Iglesias	
	Romerales Quintero	
	Saliquet Zumeta	
	Villegas Montesinos	

There are several observations which can be made on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the basis of this list.[167] Arguably, an officer's personal view of Azaña might be colored by his professional and political feelings. This, however, does not appear to have been the case. More than half of the africanistas are on the list, whether as friends or opponents of Azaña, though the latter clearly predominate (66.7%). Similarly, it is interesting to note that the range of political opinion among the generals opposed to Azaña ran from arch-conservative[168] and monarchist[169] to centrist[170] and republican,[171] while those strongly supporting Azana were more homogeneous, being mostly centrists or republicans, with two socialists as well.[172] Of particular importance

---

167. Evidence for the opinion of the generals toward Azaña is based on a variety of factors, including public expressions of support or opposition. Although participation in conspiratorial activities is one criteria, plots undertaken after the elections of 1936 have not been considered, as the situation had by that time deteriorated to an extraordinary degree. Arguably, Franco Bahamonde could be added to the list of those on poor terms with Azaña, given that the latter consistently believed him to be an enemy of the regime. However, Franco does not appear to have ever openly expressed similar hostility towards Azana.

168. Varela Iglesias, a Carlist.

169. Fanjul Goñi, Rodríguez del Barrio, Saliquet Zumeta, Villegas Montesinos, and Orgaz Yoldi.

170. Goded Llopis and Mola Vidal.

171. Batet, Cerda y López Mollinedo, López de Ochoa, Queipo de Llano, and Romerales.

172. One of those favorably disposed towards Azaña is sometimes regarded as a monarchist, Salcedo Molinuevo: González López, 4 December 1987.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

is that seven of those listed as being on unfriendly terms with Azaña are also to be found on the list of Primo de Rivera's opponents: the africanistas Miguel Cabanellas, Goded Llopis, and Queipo de Llano, and the peninsulares Batet Mestres, Cerda y López Mollinedo, Gómez Caminero, and López de Ochoa. In effect, the generals who were most opposed to Miguel Primo de Rivera were also prominent among those most opposed to Manuel Azaña.[173]

E. Conclusions

The generals in the Spanish Army in the Spring of 1936 were a remarkably homogeneous group. The principal divisive factor was the differing career opportunities presented by an officer's choice of arm: infantrymen, and to a somewhat lesser extent cavalrymen, were likely to be promoted more rapidly than their comrades in the other arms, due primarily to their greater access to field service in the colonial wars in which Spain was involved for about 22 of the 41 years beginning in 1895. And it was these wars which created the single most clearly

---

173. In this regard it is worth recalling that one of the generals whose name appears on both lists, Queipo de Llano, has been characterized by Professor Emilio González López (15 March 1988) as a "professional upriser."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

identifiable faction in the Spanish Army, the *africanistas*, who were otherwise indistinguishable from the other officers in the army.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

GENERAL OFFICER LOYALTIES IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

by

ALBERT A. NOFI

Volume II

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1991

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter VII

The Generals and the Military Rebellion of 1936

At the time of the attempted military coup in July of 1936 there were 85 generals on active duty with the Spanish Army.[1] These officers held the following ranks:

Lieutenant Generals	3
Major Generals	24
Brigadier Generals	58

The failure of the military conspirators to seize control of the centers of power in Spain was coupled with a failure on the part of the Republican government to completely overcome the conspirators. The result was a divided Spain, and the Spanish Civil War. The generals both created and were caught up in this division. Given the nature of the chaotic and revolutionary upheaval which afflicted Spain in the days and weeks following the

---

1. This figure excludes the two brigadier generals who were included in the profile of the general offices found in Chapter VI, but were not on active duty as of 17 July 1936, Eduardo Agustín Ortega, who retired on 12 April 1936 and took no part in subsequent events, and Amado Balmes Alonso, military governor of Gran Canaria, who appears to have committed suicide on 16 July. For brief treatments of their cases see Chapter I, notes 17 and 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

abortive uprising, it is important to understand that the actual loyalties of many these officers can never be known. Some took an active part in events, some allowed themselves to be swept along by their subordinates, some had their loyalties dictated by circumstance, and some found themselves treated as opponents by whichever faction happened to be locally dominant. As a result, there are a number of ways in which the loyalties of the generals can be measured. What may be termed the "traditional" view, assumes that all of the generals made deliberate decisions as to the faction which they wished to support. It is this view which is the prevailing one in scholarly circles.[2]

Taking the generally accepted view of their loyalties suggests that of the 85 generals, 36 can be regarded as supporters of the Republic while fully 49 were supporters of the Nationalists. This tradition view of the division of the generals between the two factions is summarized in Table 1.[3]

---

2. A brief survey of scholarly opinion on the loyalties of the generals will be found in Chapter I.

3. On this table Total refers to the whole number of generals on active duty. The columns break this total down into the numbers and percentages of each grade of general. "Republican" and "Nationalist" show the number of generals in each category who are generally considered to have been supporters of the indicated faction. Percentage figures on these lines refer to the whole number figures on the Total line, thus 11, or 45.8%, of the major generals were Nationalists. It is important to keep in mind the limitations of the data base when examining this and all other tables in this study. A shift of a single officer from one faction to the other constitutes a net change of 2.4% when dealing with the entire sample of 85.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 1
General Officer Loyalties: The Traditional View

	Summary	Lt Gen	Maj Gen	Brig Gen
Total	85 [100%]	3 [3.5%]	24 [28.2%]	58 [68.2%]
Nationalist	49 (57.6%)	3 (100%)	12 (50%)	34 (58.6%)
Republican	36 (42.4%)	0	12 (50%)	24 (41.4%)

On the basis of these figures, the generals were clearly aligned against the Republic. Yet these figures include officers who displayed less than enthusiastic adherence to their purported faction; men who were swept up in the course of events, often without even having the opportunity to make a conscious decision. It is possible to develop a more accurate summary of the preferences of the generals.

Part I. A Critique of Loyalties.

This discussion is made mecessary by the fact that on both sides assumptions were made about the loyalties of several officers, often without any overt actions on their part which placed them in the opposing camp. The status of many of the generals who have usually been considered Nationalists can be questioned, as can that of several of those usually considered loyal. An examination of the individual cases illustrates this point quite effectively.

Usually counted among the Nationalists, Major General Eduardo López de Ochoa was "one of the most liberal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

generals."[4] He was a republican and acknowledged mason.[5] Although initially a supporter of Primo de Rivera, he quickly became disillusioned with the Dictator. He was involved in both the Segundo García and Sánchez Guerra conspiracies against Primo, and had been expelled from the army as a result.[6] During this period, he became an active member of the Associación militar republicana, which had been founded for the specific purpose of promoting the overthrow of the Monarchy. As a result, on the downfall of Primo, he was among the officers whom Alfonso XIII refused to permit back in the army.[7] On the advent of the Republic, López de Ochoa was recalled to active duty and

---

4. Fuqua to MID 21 February 1935: US NA MID 2447-S-19.1. Sources for López de Ochoa are excellent. AGMS, Expediente L-1152, is quite thick, and includes a complete hoja de servicios to 1936, while AHNS, Legajo 188, Expediente 25A, includes details of his masonic ties, and AROM, Expediente L-167-5, miscellaneous information concerning his promotions and family. The general wrote two semi-autobiographical books about particular periods of his career, De la Dictadura a la República, with a prologue by Eduardo Ortega y Gasset (Madrid: Editorial Reus, 1930), and Campaña militar de Asturias en 1934 (Narración tactico-episodica) (Madrid: Ediciones Yunque, 1936). There is an entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 470, and the general figures prominently in most accounts of the period.

5. On López de Ochoa's status as a republican see Payne, Politics, pp. 297-298, 317; Payne, Ejercito, p. 453; Bravo Morato, Republica, pp. 117ff. See also the entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 470. On his status as a mason see AHNS, Legajo 188, Expediente 25A.

6. On these see Chapter II.

7. Arce, p. 223; Busquets, Pronunciamiento, pp. 122ff; R. Franco, Deciamos, pp. 163-166.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

retroactively promoted to major general by Manuel Azaña.[8] In September of 1933, López de Ochoa was named Inspector General of the Third Inspectorate Zone, covering northern and northwestern Spain, and, as a result was given command of the forces assigned to suppress the Asturian Rebellion which broke out on 5 October 1934.[9] On 6 October López de Ochoa put himself at the head of an infantry battalion which advanced on the besieged city of Oviedo from the west, reaching the it on the 11th.[10] This feat failed to break the siege, and isolated López de Ochoa from the balance of his forces. As a result, he played only a marginal role in the operations which suppressed the rebellion. Nevertheless, on the left he was widely held to have been directly responsible for the brutalities that accompanied the crushing of the rising.[11] On 11 March 1936

---

8. Fletcher to MID, 30 April 1931: US NA MID 2041-225 No. 24, discusses the political aspects of the restoration. In addition to López de Ochoa, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Cerda y López Mollinedo, Queipo de Llano, and Riquelme y López Bago were also restored to active duty, the last three being retroactively promoted to major general at the same time.

9. On the Asturian uprising see Chapter IV. Arrarás, República, II, p. 465, states that the Prime Minister, Alejandro Lerroux, decided to give the task of suppressing the outbreak to López de Ochoa precisely because he was a liberal and a mason.

10. There is a good account of this operation in Lopez de Ochoa, pp. 41-102.

11. Payne, Ejército, pp. 419-420. Interestingly, on the right he was considered responsible for the "leniency" with which the rebellion had been put down.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

López de Ochoa was relieved of command of the Second Inspectorate, to which he had been appointed only a few days earlier, and arrested on charges arising from his command in the Asturias.[12] He was shortly afterwards hospitalized, and as a result took no part in the military uprising in July of 1936, about which he apparently had some knowledge.[13] On 17 August 1936 a group of radical militiamen broke into the hospital and took the general from his bed. After subjecting López de Ochoa to various tortures, the militiamen cut off his head.[14]

The case of Alberto Castro Girona is similar, though less tragic. A lieutenant general, Castro Girona was something of a national hero --"The Spanish Lawrence"-- for his exploits in Morocco. He had the reputation for being a liberal, and even republican officer, on the strength of his tangential involvement in the Sánchez Guerra conspiracy. For this last, Primo de Rivera imprisoned him briefly, and later placed him on the retired list.[15] Restored to active duty by on the advent of the Republic,[16]

---

12. Fuqua to MID, 17 April 1936, US NA MID 2657-S-164, No. 6, and undated, 2657-S-144 No. 69.

13. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 423; Payne, Ejercito, pp. 453-454.

14. Cabanellas, Cuatro, II, p. 416.

15. DOMG 162, 26 July 1929.

16. DOMG 152, 10 July 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Castro Girona was placed "at disposal," in which situation he remained until July of 1936.[17] The outbreak of the civil war found Castro Girona in Valencia, at the home of his daughter. On 30 July he was arrested by a group of "armed communists." Charged with being the "Chief of the Fascist Movement in Valencia," the general was being taken to a "cheka" for examination when, fortuitously, he was recognized by a police official who had served under him in Morocco. This official effected his release. The general continued "at disposal" until October of 1936 when he was once again arrested, but shortly afterwards released.[18] Not long after this he was officially expelled from the army. On 2 November, Castro Girona was given asylum by the French embassy. In mid-1937 he was able to escape to France, from whence he made his way to Nationalist Spain, where he was assigned various important administrative posts.[19] Despite the fact that he had not committed

---

17. It will be recalled that one of the Azaña reforms was the abolition of the rank of lieutenant general, the three officers in this grade all being continued on the active list pending attainment of retirement age: see Chapter III.

18. Castro Girona later claimed that shortly after his release he declined an active command in the Republican Army. There is no corroborating evidence for this. See note 19, below.

19. The foregoing is based on the personal statement by Castro Girona dated 7 April 1941, found in CGET, Castro Girona.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

himself to the rising, Castro Girona escaped death for presumed Nationalist sympathies by the merest chance.[20] The other two lieutenant generals, Pio López Pozas and Jose Rodríguez Casademunt, were not so lucky. Although neither can be shown to have taken any steps to support the military rebellion, they were expelled from the army for being "hostile to the government." Both were eventually shot.[21]

Other officers whose status as Nationalists appears to have been taken for granted include Virgilio Cabanellas,[22]

---

20. The extent to which Castro Girona was privy to the military conspiracy of 1936 is unclear. In as much as virtually all of the generals appear to have at least had some notion that something was afoot, it is reasonable to conclude that he was not ignorant of its existence. However, he does not appear to have taken any part in the organization or execution of the uprising. Had he done so he would certainly have made much of it in the personal statement cited in the preceeding note, which he made for the record in 1941.

21. This writer has been wholly unable to uncover any information about the activities of either López Pozas or Rodríguez Casademundt during the period in question. El Heraldo de Madrid, 12 August 1936, p. 6, contains the order expelling them from the army.

22. Commanding both the Second Inspectorate and the 1st Infantry Division at the time of the military uprising, Major General Virgilio Cabanellas, described by his nephew as a man "little disposed to participate in adventures" [Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 430], was deposed from command on 18 July, apparently on the strength of the fact that his brother, Miguel Cabanellas, was one of the generals who had risen against the Republic, and "no one was sure that he did not intend to rise" [Salas, HEPR, p. 124]. He was thereafter unemployed until 3 November 1937, when he was expelled from the army and imprisoned [Alpert, Ejército, p. 357; Salas, HEPR, pp. 90-91]. Released at the end of the Civil War, on 10 July 1939 he applied for reinstatement in the army [AGMS, Expediente C-1095]. Although this petition was granted, and he eventually rose to lieutenant general, Virgilio Cabanellas was never given an active assignment. He died in retirement in 1954. There is a short entry in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Losada Ortega,[23] Araujo-Vergara,[24] and Lon Laga.[25] In the case of these, and the four officers already cited, there is no evidence to demonstrate that they took any actions which would have demonstrated their affiliation with the

---

Rubio Cabeza, p. 146.

23. Generally regarded as a rightist [e.g., "The right arm of Primo de Rivera", Azana, Memorias, 2 November 1931], Major General Antonio Losada Ortega was "at disposal" in Madrid at the time of the military uprising of 1936. Shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War he was arrested. Expelled from the Army on 11 August 1936, he was shortly afterwards shot, apparently without official sanction, though details are lacking. Sources: AGMS, Expediente L-1897, which includes reference to his expulsion from the army. See also, Alpert, Ejército, p. 356.

24. Brigadier General Emilio Araujo-Vergara was chief-of-staff to the commander of the Second Inspectorate. Several days after the outbreak of the Civil War he was arrested by militiamen and incarcerated in the Model Prison, where he perished in the general massacre of prisoners which took place there on 22-23 August 1936. In June of 1938 he was formally expelled from the army as being "hostile to the regime," apparently in order to deny his family pension rights: Mundo Obrero, 29 June 1938, p. 2. References include AROM, Expediente A-272-4, and AGMS, Expediente 2077. See also Alpert, Ejército, p. 358; Rubio Cabeza, p. 58.

25. A monarchist, Brigadier General Manuel Lon Laga was chief of the First Section of the Central General Staff in Madrid, responsible for organization and planning, at the outbreak of the Civil War. There is no evidence to indicate that he joined the military uprising, but he was removed from his post and shortly afterwards shot. Along with Araujo-Vergara, in June of 1938 he was declared "hostile to the regime" and posthumously expelled from the army: Mundo Obrero, 29 June 1938, p. 2. Sources are sparse: AGMS, Expediente L-913, which only goes up to 1931; AROM, Expediente L-99-B; Fuqua to MID, 15 May 1935, US NA MID 2041-316.8. See also Alpert, Ejército, p. 357.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

rebels.

Several cases are rather difficult to assess.

Brigadier General Manuel Llanos Medina, commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, at Granada, was believed to be so deeply compromised in a military conspiracy that he was relieved of duty on 11 July, a week before the rebellion actually occurred, and placed "at disposal" in Valencia. Occasionally harassed by Republican police officials in the months following the military uprising, in November he was passed to the reserve for "hostility to the regime." In March of 1937 he was tried for conspiracy, and on 29 June was cleared, but ordered expelled from the army. At the end of the Civil War he petitioned the Nationalists for restoration of his rank and privilege. In late 1939 he was placed in the second reserve.[26]

In July of 1936, Brigadier General Gonzalo González de Lara was commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade, at Burgos. When word came of the military uprising in Morocco on 17 July, the division commander, Major General Domingo Batet Mestres, a confirmed Republican, relieved him of command on orders from the Minister of War. Imprisoned at a military installation in Guadalajara, González de Lara was freed when the local garrison --an engineer corps balloon

---

26. Sources on Llanos Medina are AHMS, Expediente LL-88, and AROM, Expediente LL-9. There is a brief entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 474.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

regiment-- rose in rebellion on 21 July. González de Lara joined the rebels, and took part in the defense of the city against a column of Republican militiamen and loyalist army and police forces, which arrived from Madrid on 22 July. Resistance was overcome by evening, and González de Lara and the other surviving officers were hastily tried and shot.[27]

Brigadier General José García Aldave y Mancebo, commander of the 6th Infantry Brigade, at Alicante. Unable --or unwilling-- to make up his mind,[28] the general held his troops in their quarters until 23 July. At that time he indicated that he would abide by the decision of his brigade. The troops declared for the Republic, and the general requested that he be relieved of duty. Shortly afterwards he was arrested, tried, and condemned.[29] The case of Brigadier General Oswaldo Capaz Montes is similar.

---

27. Sources for González de Lara are AGMS, Expediente G-3109, and AROM, Expediente G-322-4. There is a brief entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 391. The entry in Cortada, p. 245, is seriously in error.

28. Rubio Cabeza, p. 359, suggests that García Aldave was awaiting orders from his superior, Brigadier General Fernando Martínez de Monje, commanding the 3rd Division. This would seem unlikely as the latter was a staunch republican with close ties to Manuel Azaña.

29. García Aldave was shot on 13 October 1936. There are no significant documents in his files, AGMS, Expediente G-1131, and AROM, Expediente G-47. His case is treated in Cabanellas, Cuatro, II, pp. 182-183, and there is a brief entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 359.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In July of 1936 Capaz Montes, one of the youngest and most popular of the generals,[30] was commander of the Western District of Spanish Morocco. Although he was aware of the military conspiracy, he took no action either to join the plotters or denounce them to the government. On 16 July he went on leave, possibly as a way of avoiding having to commit himself to the conspiracy, and made his way to Madrid. He was in Madrid from 18 July to 12 August,[31] on which date he was arrested by radical militiamen, apparently without government authorization.[32] Incarcerated in the Model Prison, he was killed along with Araujo-Vergara, noted above, and Villegas Montesinos, in

---

30. Capaz Montes was known by the sobriquet of "The last conquistador", since he had commanded the Spanish forces which occupied Sidi Ifni in 1934. An africanista, he held four promotions by the merits of war. See AROM, Expediente C-42-B. There are numerous references to him in the secondary literature.

31. Prof Emilio González López (interview, 19 December 1987) believes that Capaz Montes may have been seeking an assignment from the government during this period. While this cannot be confirmed, it remains a possibility. Politically the general was a moderate republican, though considered conservative in some circles: Payne, Ejército, pp. 383, 415; Thomas, 2nd, p. 224.

32. The group which arrested him was known as the Milicia Popolar de Investigación, organized by one Agapito García Atadell, a shady character who had earlier been imprisoned for participating in the Asturian Rebellion, on whom see The Red Domination, pp. 125-131; Rubio Cabeza, pp. 359-360, 538.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the massacre of 22-23 August.[33]

Three cases are very similar, those of generals Sánchez-Ocaña, Espinosa de los Monteros, and Abilio Barbero Saldaña.

Major General José Sánchez-Ocaña was serving as chief-of-the-general staff, in the Spanish Army primarily an administrative rather than a command post, when the military rebellion broke out in Morocco on 17 July 1936. On the 18th he was relieved of his post.[34] Expelled from the army on 11 August,[35] he shortly afterwards made his way through the lines to the Nationalists, who gave him various administrative assignments.[36]

---

33. Aside from personal information found in AROM, Expediente C-42-B, there are no surviving documents regarding Capaz Montes. Available references include Fuqua to MID, 20 November 1935 (US NA, MID 2041-316.9); Bravo Morato, República, pp. 127, 227; Payne, Ejército, pp. 383, 415. On his death, and that of Villegas Montesinos, see The Red Domination, pp 119, 223-224, 228ff, which includes a coroner's photograph of Capaz Montes. The general's son, a cadet on summer leave from the Academia de Infantería, was killed in the storming of the Montana Barracks, in Madrid.

34. Bravo Morato, República, p. 124, and Salas, "40", both say that he was removed due to rightist sympathies.

35. Alpert, Ejército, p. 355.

36. Sánchez-Ocaña was promoted to lieutenant general on 27 November 1940. He soon retired, dieng in 1964. There are no detailed sources on his career, his file at AGMS being missing, and that at AROM, Expediente S-52-T, containing only personal and promotional data. There is a short entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 702.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The outbreak of the Civil War found Brigadier General Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros in Madrid, as director of the Escuela superior de guerra.[37] Although he appears to have made no effort to support the military rebellion, on 11 August he was removed from his post. He shortly afterwards took refuge in the French embassy. After some time, he was able to escape to Nationalist Spain, where he was given various responsible assignments, including command of an army corps.[38] Along with Sánchez-Ocaña, Espinosa de los Monteros is usually listed as having "pretended" to be loyal until he could find an opportunity to pass to the enemy.[39]

Chief-of-staff to the commander of the Third Inspectorate General in the summer of 1936, Brigadier General Abilio Barbero Saldaña, a staff corps officer with a distinguished combat record,[40] was arrested a few days after the military uprising. On 11 August he was expelled

---

37. There is a short biography of Brigadier General Espinosa de los Monteros in Chapter VI.

38. At the end of the Civil War Espinosa de los Monteros, by then a major general, was named ambassador to Germany. In 1940 he served as Franco's translator when the latter met with Adolf Hitler at Hendaye in 1940. He retired in 1946 and died in 1954. Sources include CGET, Espinosa de los Monteros; AROM, Expediente E-126-T. There is a brief entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 285.

39. See, for example, Salas, HEPR, p. 189.

40. Barbero Saldaña held two promotions by merit, and was awarded 96 months time on campaign credit.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from the army and incarcerated in various prisons in Madrid. In January of 1937 he was freed. Subject to close police surveillance and harassment, in August he sought refuge in the Turkish Embassy. The following January Republican police intruded into the embassy and arrested several persons, including Barbero Saldaña. Transported to Barcelona, the general was charged with operating a Nationalist intelligence ring from the Turkish Embassy. He was once again imprisoned, until the Nationalists freed him when they took Barcelona early in 1939. Barbero Saldaña was restored to his rank, and served thereafter in various administrative assignments.[41]

Perhaps the most curious case is that of Brigadier General Francisco Patxot Madoz, commander of the 4th Infantry Brigade, at Malaga. Hesitant at the onset of the rebellion, he raised his brigade late on 18 July on orders from Major General Gonzalvo Queipo de Llano, who had himself just seized control of the 2nd Division from its rightful commander, José Fernández Villa-Abrille. However,

---

41. AHMS, Expediente B-118, includes documentation concerning Barbero Saldaña's record during the Civil War. There is no evidence to substantiate charges that he engaged in intelligence operations while in the Turkish Embassy. That he makes no mention of any such services in personal statements dated 13 January 1940 and 14 August 1940 strongly suggests he did no such thing, a conclusion which seems to be confirmed by the fact that his record includes no decorations for the Civil War. See also, note 48, below.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on the night of 18-19 July, Azaña made an attempt to establish a "government of reconciliation" under middle-of-the-road Republican Diego Martínez Barrio. The new prime minister immediately telephoned Patxot, and convinced him that the orders he had received from Queipo de Llano were illegal. Widely known as a man "likely to obey orders,"[42] Patxot Madoz recalled his troops to their barracks. Within hours he was arrested by Republican militiamen. Subject to brutal tortures for several weeks, he was shot on 12 August.[43]

Two officers who actually did join the military rebellion appear to have done so under considerable duress.[44] Widely held to be "a man of his word," if

---

42. Salas, HERP, pp. 92-93.

43. There is no information on Patxot Madoz in any of the archives; his file at AROM, Expediente P-92, is empty. References include Alpert, Ejército, p. 356; Rubio Cabeza, p. 613; Salas, HEPR, I, pp. 92-93. The entry on Patxot Madoz in Cortada, p. 389, is highly inaccurate, even to spelling the name incorrectly. Years later, noting the importance of discipline in a soldier's life, Francisco Franco expressed his sympathy for those unable to make a decision, specifically mentioning Patxot Madoz: Franco-Salgado, Conversaciones, pp. 526-527

44. Note that only cases for which there is some evidence beyond rumor or innuendo have been included. In fact, stories to the effect that a particular general was convinced of the righteousness of the cause by an irrefutable argument in the form of "a pistol at his head" are told about several officers, including Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, on whom see Friedlander, pp. 107, 154; Jackson, HQ, p. 101; Suero, p. 74. Evidence for these cases is frequently poor, however, as Cabanellas' son has taken pains to demonstrate in several of his books. In fact, Miguel Cabanellas was an important conspirator in 1936.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"likely to obey orders," Brigadier General Miguel Campins Aura commanded the 3rd Infantry Brigade, at Granada. At the outbreak of the military rebellion he was inclined to loyalty, and had actually begun organizing a column to suppress the rising in nearby Cordoba, when he was pressured into raising his brigade. He was shortly afterwards deposed from command by the Nationalists, tried, and shot.[45] Brigadier General José Iglesias Martínez was chief of the 8th Artillery Brigade, in Pontevedra, in northwestern Spain. His initial reaction to word of the military uprising was one of "timidity."[46] He did not join the rising until informed that the local naval base and the regional Guardia Civil had already been committed to the enterprise. On 18 August he was placed "at disposal" by the Nationalist Supreme Junta. He remained in this status until 23 December, when he was officially expelled from the army.[47]

It seems unreasonable to conclude that all of these eighteen officers were Nationalists. In the case of Llanos

---

45. He was also expelled from the army by the Republic. Sources: AGMS, Expediente C-701; AROM, Expediente C-76-B. Other references include Alpert, Ejército, pp. 258, 387-388; Cabanellas, Cuatro, II, p. 60, note 24; Salas, HEPR, I, p. 93. There is a short entry in Cortada, p. 102.

46. Salas, HEPR, p. 108.

47. AGMS, Expediente J-21, contains documents relevant to Iglesias Martínez' expulsion from the army. See also Alpert, Ejército, p. 357; Salas, HEPR, I, p. 108.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Medina, the fact that he was absolved of conspiracy charges by a Republican military tribunal requires the removal of his name from the list. Similarly, on the basis of their actions, López de Ochoa, Castro Girona, López Pozas, Rodríguez Casademundt, Virgilio Cabanellas, Losada Ortega, Emilio Araujo-Vergara, Barbero Saldaña, Lon Laga, and Capaz Montes cannot be shown to have been Nationalists, nor, despite their adherence to the military rebellion, can either Campins Aura or Iglesias Martínez.[48] The extraordinary indecision displayed by García Aldave argues against his being classed as Nationalists as well.

The cases of Sánchez-Ocaña, Espinosa de los Monteros, and González de Lara are more difficult, since they clearly acted as Nationalists once given the opportunity. Despite the fact that they were treated as Nationalists by the Republican government before committing any demonstrably overt acts, it seems reasonable to confirm this classification. Finally, although he acted in accordance with what he perceived to be legitimate orders, it seems reasonable to classify Patxot Madoz as a Nationalist.

---

48. Barbero Saldaña is usually listed along with Espinosa de los Monteros as having "pretended" loyalty until he could slip away to join the enemy (cf., Salas, HEPR, p. 189). However, his case does not seem particularly different from that of Castro Girona, who is never so listed, yet not only escaped from Republican Spain, but ended up on active duty with the Nationalists.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Thus, fourteen of the eighteen officers whose status as Nationalists can be questioned do not, on the evidence, merit the designation.

Although fewer in number, the status of several generals usually regarded as loyalists may also be questioned. The most obvious of these is that of Major General Angel Rodríguez del Barrio.

In the Spring of 1936, Rodríguez del Barrio was officially vice-president of the Supreme War Council and president of the Senior Officers Promotion Board.[49] Staunchly anti-republican, on very poor terms with Manuel Azaña, and an affiliate of the UME,[50] Rodríguez del Barrio had been urging a military coup against the regime since the elections of 16 February 1936.[51] He was a participant in the clandestine meeting of senior officers held on 8 March 1936, which in effect drew up guidelines to determine the circumstances under which the army should rise.[52] In April he was involved in an abortive conspiracy to

---

49. Junta clasificadora de generales y coroneles.

50. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 229; Payne, Ejército, p. 450.

51. On this see Chapters IV and V. References include, Goded, pp. 26-27; Payne, Politics, pp. 311, 319; Merino, p. 305.

52. Arrarás, Cruzada, IX, p. 467; la Cierva, Antecedentes, p. 764.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

undertake a coup.[53] Shortly afterwards he was diagnosed as having stomach cancer. Rodríguez del Barrio was relieved of duty for reasons of health and hospitalized on 25 May. He took no further part in any military machinations and died on 7 November 1936, still carried on the Army List.[54]

At the time of the military uprising Brigadier General Fernando Martínez de Monje was commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, in Valencia. Although a major general's post, Martínez de Monje held the assignment "in superior category" due to his reputation as a republican.[55] When the military rebellion occurred, he supported the Republic, though by some accounts he had to be "talked" into doing so.[56] As a field commander he proved indecisive and frankly incompetent, and was eventually arrested and accused of treason. Cleared, he was released and restored to duty. Though he held no further field commands for the

---

53. Arrarás, Cruzada, p. 510; Beltran Guell, pp. 126-127. See also Arce, pp. 71-72; Payne, Politics, pp. 319-320; Payne, Ejército, pp. 451-453.

54. Sources on Rodríguez del Barrio are poor: AROM, Expediente R-182-4 contains some personal and career information, and AHNS, Legajo 204, Expediente 48, indicates that he was investigated for masonic ties, with negative findings. Other references are Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp. 229, 431; Rubio Cabeza, p. 684; Cortada, p. 419.

55. Bravo Morato, República, p. 126; Salas, HEPR, p. 147.

56. Cortada, p. 321; Payne, Ejército, p. 428.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

balance of the war, he served in a variety of responsible administrative posts.[57]

The case of Brigadier General José Miaja Menant is of particular importance, for it brings up the question of "geographic loyalty." Several scholars have suggested that many officers sided with a particular faction due largely to an accident of geography: it was healthier to do so considering one's environment. Indeed, the notion of "geographic loyalty" is well established in the historiography of the Spanish Civil War.[58] Miaja, an africanista and suspected mason, with a liberal reputation and family ties to the socialist leadership in Galicia, was commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, in Madrid at the time of the military uprising. When the division commander, Virgilio Cabanellas, was removed on 18 July, Miaja was immediately named to replace him. That evening

---

57. Sources on Martínez de Monje are poor: his file at AGMS, Expediente M-1521, contains no documents relevant to the events of 1936. He is mentioned numerous times in most standard treatments of the war. There are short entries in Cortada, p. 321, and Rubio Cabeza, p. 521. See also Azaña, Memorias, 21 October 1938.

58. Cf., Raymond Carr, "without the concept of 'geographic loyalty' the Civil War is incomprehensible" (Carr, Tragedy, p. 77) and "Loyalty was often a matter of locality" (Carr, Modern, p. 135). On this point, see also Alpert, Ejército, pp. 111ff; Alvarez del Vayo, p. 122; de la Cierva, Antecedentes, p. 760. For a contrary view consider Ramón Salas', "There were those whom Carr termed 'geographically loyal,' but their number was relatively meager, and very probably of about the same degree on each side": Salas, HEPR, pp. 77ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

one of the local leaders of the conspiracy, Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Alvárez Rementeria, commander of the divisional engineer battalion, burst into Miaja's office, demanding to know if the general would join the rebels. Miaja replied in the negative, even when Alvárez Rementeria's associate began to wave a pistol. Disheartened, Alvárez Rementeria left, without harming the general, whom he apparently personally admired. That same night Miaja was named Minister of War in Diego Martínez Barrio's abortive government of national conciliation. During his brief tenure in office, Miaja spoke by telephone with Emilio Mola Vidal in a vain attempt to get him to call off the rebellion.[59] Within days Miaja was commanding troops at the front, and by the end of the war he had risen to generalissimo of the Republican armies. This record would certainly suggest that Miaja was a staunchly loyal officer. Nevertheless, a number of historians have questioned his devotion to the Republic, arguing that it grew largely out of the geographic circumstance that he chanced to be in Madrid at the time of the military

---

59. Details of Miaja's activities on 18 July are recounted in Defensa de Madrid (Mexico: Editora A.P. Marquez, 1945), pp. 55ff, by Antonio López Fernández, an eyewitness. This account of the conversation between Miaja and Mola, who were old friends --Miaja had commanded the company to which Mola was assigned upon being commissioned a 2nd lieutenant--, strongly suggests that Miaja had some prior awareness of the existence of the conspiracy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

rebellion.[60] Among the evidence usually cited is Miaja's affiliation with the UME and his unwillingness to arm the workers' militia in the early days of the Civil War.[61] Given the general's performance on 18 July, these arguments are not convincing.

As can be seen, questions can be raised as to the status of three generals usually considered Republicans. It certainly seems reasonable to exclude Rodríguez del Barrio from the list of generals who were loyal to the regime.[62] The worst with which Martínez de Monje may be charged is incompetence as a commander, a not uncommon problem at the onset of a war.[63] The Loyalist credentials of Miaja Menant seem unimpeachable.

---

60. See particularly, Burnett Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage: The Spanish Civil War and Revolution, 1936-1939 (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 236-244, but also Alpert, Ejercito, pp. 115ff; Cortada, p. 335.

61. Alpert, Ejército, p. 116; Payne, Ejercito, p. 428, 453; Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 133-134. See also, Chapter VI, note 163.

62. There was another officer who was extremely ill at the time of the military uprising, Brigadier General Gerardo Ravassa Cuevas. At the time of the military uprising the general had been on sick leave for several weeks, and would eventually succumb to his illness on 3 February 1938. However, although unable to take action, unlike both Rodríguez del Barrio and López de Ochoa, Ravassa Cuevas was able to make his preferences clear, as demonstrated in documents filed on his behalf by various Nationalist officers: see AGMS, Expediente R-15. As a result, it seems reasonable to consider him a Nationalist.

63. A third of the division commanders with which the German Army began World War I had been relieved within 90 days of the beginning of the war, as were slightly more than half of those in the Italian Army, and roughly two-thirds of those in the Austro-Hungarian and French Armies. Cf., James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, Shooting Blanks (New York: William Murrow, 1991), Chapter 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, Castro Girona, López Pozas, Rodríguez Casademundt, López de Ochoa, Virgilio Cabanellas, Losada Ortega, Campins Aura, Iglesias Martínez, García Aldave, Capaz Montes, Araujo-Vergara, Barbero Saldaña, Llanos Medina, and Lon Laga must be removed from the list of Nationalists, and Rodríguez del Barrio from that of the Loyalists.

This greatly changes the table on loyalties.

Table 2
General Officer Loyalties: Revised

	Total	Lt Gen	Maj Gen	Brig Gen
Total	85 [100%]	3 [3.5%]	24 [28.2%]	58 [68.2%]
Nationalist	34 (40%)	0	9 (37.5%)	25 (43.1%)
Republican	36 (42.3%)	0	11 (45.8%)	25 (43.1%)
Neutral	15 (17.6%)	3 (100%)	4 (16.7%)	8 (13.8%)

On this table all of the officers who have been indicated as Nationalists demonstrated willing support for the military uprising of July 1936. Similarly, all those shown as Republicans demonstrated opposition to that uprising.[64] It is on the basis of these figures which an

64. Note, however, that even this revised listing does not necessarily eliminate officers who may have sympathized with the other side. It merely includes those who can be shown to have acted with some deliberation. The question of geographic loyalty is a thorny one. Consider the case of a lower ranking officer, Manuel Gutierrez Mellado. A lieutenant of artillery, on 18 July 1936. Gutierrez Mellado was attached to the horse artillery regiment outside of Madrid, although his actual location is unclear. He supported to the Nationalists and rose steadily through the ranks. Over 50 years later, as a retired lieutenant general, he has the reputation as the most liberal officer in the Spanish Army, and, as Deputy Prime Minister, was the only member of the Cortes to attempt to resist during the abortive coup d'etat of 1981. Is Gutierrez Mellado a case of "geographic loyalty" or did he grow more liberal with age? Now consider the many officers who may well have had

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

inquiry into the personal backgrounds and motivations of the generals can most profitably be made.

Part II. A Profile of the Generals in Crisis

The databases make it possible to develop a series of profiles of the generals of 1936 who are considered Nationalists and those who are considered Republicans, and to compare the profiles of these two groups with that of the generals as a whole, and of the definable groups into which they may be divided, such as Neutrals and africanistas.[65]

The profiles fall naturally into several broad areas: General Considerations, such as age, years in service, and the like, including arm of service, decorations, and modifications to seniority; Personal Background, including social origins, regional heritage, and family; and Political Profile, including not only political

---

Nationalist inclinations, but chose a discretionary course in the Summer of 1936 and as a result ended up on the losing side in the Civil War. It is a tale which can never be told.

65. As in the case of Chapter VI, for a discussion of the specific form of the database, and the tools used to process the information, see Appendix 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

affiliations, but also attitude towards various individuals and movements. In contrast to the profile developed in Chapter VI, an extensive consideration of Career Pattern has been omitted here. However, three new areas have been added, Personal Relationships, which attempts to examine the possible effects of ties to old comrades and individual friendships and animosities on the choices which the generals made, Civil War Careers, which looks as the services performed by the generals after the military uprising, as a way of possibly further refining the definition of loyalties, and Leaders, which looks more closely at the officers who were most important on both sides.

A. General Considerations.

Although the mean age for all of the generals in the army was statistically somewhat less than 60 years, with a standard deviation of 4.4 years and a range of 42 to 65, the Nationalists averaged a little younger than 59, with a standard deviation of 4.9 years and a range of 44 to 64, while the Republicans averaged a little younger than 61, with a standard deviation of 3.2 years and a range of 54 to 65. Thus, the Nationalists averaged about two years younger than the Republicans. The Neutrals averaged almost

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

precisely the mean age for the generals as a group, 59.5 years, with a standard deviation of 5.7 years and a range of 42 to 65. Only two of the Nationalists were 64 or older,[66] in contrast to eight of the Republicans[67] and two of the Neutrals.[68] Of the four generals under age 50, three were Nationalists[69] and one a Neutral[70]: the youngest Republican general was 54.[71]

Where the "average" general had been in the army for 43 years, with a standard deviation of 4.6 years and a range of 26 to 50 years,[72] the Nationalists averaged 42.4 years, with a standard deviation of 4.9 years and a range

---

66. The oldest Nationalists were Miguel Cabanellas and Bosch Atienza, both of whom had been born in 1872.

67. Cerda y López Mollinedo, Salcedo Molinuevo, Gómez Caminero, Molero Lobo, Masquelet Lacaci, Urbano Palma, Peña Abuin, and Batet Mestres had all been born in 1872 or earlier.

68. López Pozas and Rodríguez Casademundt, both lieutenant generals, born 1871 and 1870, respectively. By the traditional reckoning of the loyalties of the generals, both of these officers are counted as Nationalists.

69. Franco, Mola Vidal, and Varela Iglesias, all africanistas.

70. Capaz Montes, an africanista, and counted as a Nationalist under the traditional view of the loyalties of the generals.

71. Nuñez de Prado, an africanista.

72. Rodríguez Casademundt has been in the service 50 years, Capaz Montes only 26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of 27 to 48 years,[73] while the Republicans averaged 43.8 years, with a standard deviation of 3.6 and a range of 37 to 50.[74] So the average Nationalist general had joined the army slightly more than a year after his Republican counterpart. The Neutrals averaged 42.6 years, with a standard deviation of 5.8 years and a range of 26 to 50.[75]

The median seniority of the generals overall was 44, on a scale of 1 to 87. That for the Nationalists was slightly lower, at 45, the most senior being 5th on the overall army list, and the most junior 86th.[76] The median for Republicans was 46, the seniormost being 7th and the juniormost 87th in the army.[77] For the Neutrals, the

---

73. Miquel Lacour had been in the service 48 years, Varela Iglesias only 27.

74. Masquelet Lacaci, 50 years in the service, and Castello Pantoja, 37.

75. Rodríguez Casademundt has been in the service 50 years, Capaz Montes only 26. The two also held the same distinctions in the army as a whole.

76. The seniormost Nationalist was Major General Miguel Cabanellas, commissioned in 1924, while the juniormost was Brigadier General Antonio Ferrer de Miguel, commissioned only on 9 April 1936.

77. The most senior Republican was Major General Pedro de la Cerda y López Mollinedo, whose commission dated from 1927, while the juniormost, and the juniormost of the generals as a whole, was Brigadier General Manuel García Benet, commissioned along with Ferrer de Miguel on 7 April 1936.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

median seniority was 39, with a range from 1st to 85th.[78] These figures suggest no great difference among the three groups.

The role of the africanistas is emphasized in all treatments of the military conspiracy of 1936. However, at best information on this group is ambiguous. Of 27 officers identifiable as africanistas,[79] 14 (51.9%) were Nationalists, comprising 41.2% of the generals in that faction,[80] in contrast to only eight (22.2%) who joined the Republicans,[81] comprising less than a quarter of the generals in that faction: four (14.8%) africanistas were among the Neutrals, a little more than a quarter of that

---

78. The most senior neutral, and the most senior man in the army, was Lieutenant General Pio López Pozas, commissioned in 1927, and the juniormost was Miguel Campins Aura, 85th, commissioned 9 March 1936.

79. There is a list of officers classed as africanistas in Chapter VI, note 21.

80. Africanista Nationalists were the major generals Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Goded Llopis, Queipo de Llano, Villegas Montesinos, Saliquet Zumeta, González Carrasco, Sánchez-Ocaña, Franco Bahamonde, and Fanjul Goñi, and the brigadier generals Orgaz Yoldi, Mola Vidal, Benito Terraza, Alvárez-Arenas, and Varela Iglesias. Note that all nine of the Nationalist major generals were africanistas, but only five of the 26 brigadier generals.

81. Africanista Republicans included the major generals Gómez Morato, Salcedo Molinuevo, Riquelme y López Bago, and Nuñez de Prado, plus the brigadier generals Llano Encomienda, Castello Pantoja, Romerales Quintero, and Miaja Menant. Thus, only four of the 11 Republican major generals were africanistas, and only four of their 24 brigadier generals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

group.[82] This would certainly suggest the africanismo played an important role in determining the choices made by the generals.[83] Logically, it would follow that in areas where africanistas were to be found, the split between Nationalists and Republicans was be weighted in favor of the former. However, this cannot be shown to be the case.

Of the nine generals who had entered the service as enlisted men, four were Nationalists,[84] four Republicans,[85] and one Neutral,[86] a division roughly in keeping with that of the generals as a whole. However, five of the former enlisted men were africanistas, and only three of these proved to be Nationalists,[87] while one was a Republican,[88]

---

82. Africanista Neutrals include Castro Girona, a lieutenant general, plus the brigadier generals Capaz Montes, Barbero Saldaña, and Campins Aura.

83. Note that if we take the composition of the two factions on the basis of the traditional view of the loyalties of the generals the overall pattern with regard to africanistas considerably reduces the importance of this group among the Nationalists. On the traditional basis, 17 of the 49 Nationalists (28.6%) would have been africanistas and nine of the 36 Republicans (25%).

84. Major General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano and Brigadier Generals Gregorio Benito Terraza, José Varela Iglesias, and Antonio Ferrer de Miguel.

85. Major General Miguel Nuñez de Prado and Brigadier Generals Julio Mena Zueco, Toribio Martínez Cabrera, and Manuel Cardenal Dominicis.

86. Lieutenant General Alberto Castro Girona.

87. Queipo de Llano, Benito Terraza, and Varela Iglesias.

88. Nuñez de Prado.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and one a Neutral.[89] This lack of pattern is also notable among aviation officers. Although half of the ten aviation officers were Nationalists, two Republican, and three Neutrals, of the seven africanistas among the generals with aviation qualifications, only three were Nationalists,[90] while one was a Republican[91] and three Neutrals.[92] In this regard, it may be noted that despite the fact that the africanistas comprised almost 42% of the infantrymen, a quarter of the cavalrymen, and half the staff officers, the division of the army by arm of service does not reflect this pattern, as seen in the accompanying table.[93]

Table 3
Factions by Arm of Service

Arm	Army	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
Infantry	46	16 (34.8%)	19 (41.3%)	11 (23.9%)
Cavalry	11	5 (45.5%)	6 (54.5%)	0
Artillery	12	6 (50%)	5 (41.2%)	1 (8.3%)
Engineers	7	3 (42.9%	4 (57.1%)	0
Staff	8	4 (50%)	2 (25%)	2 (25%)

Although the numbers involved are fairly small, the generals of cavalry, artillery, and engineers clearly split

---

89. Castro Girona.

90. Alvárez-Arenas, Varela Iglesias, and González Carrasco.

91. Nuñez de Prado.

92. Barbero Saldaña, Capaz Montes, and Campins Aura.

93. Note that for purposes of this table the number of infantry generals has been reduced through the deletion of Balmes Alonso and Rodríguez del Barrio, and of cavalrymen by that of Augustín Ortega.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

roughly in half: only one of them may be classed as a Neutral.[94] This suggests a relatively high degree of commitment by the officers of these arms. The division among the infantrymen, and particularly the relatively large proportion of them counted among the Neutrals, suggests greater uncertainty among the men in that arm. The disproportionate division in the ranks of the staff corps suggests a strong degree of dissatisfaction with the regime.[95]

---

94. This officer was Brigadier General José Iglesias Martínez, the commander of the 8th Artillery Brigade, who rose only under pressure from his subordinates, and was subsequently expelled from the army by the Nationalists. See the text accompanying note 46, above.

95. If, as has generally been the case, Araujo-Vergara and Barbero Saldaña, the two staff officers who have been considered Neutrals, are counted as Nationalists, the proportion of staff officers supporting the Nationalists rises to 75%. The causes of the apparently enormous dissatisfaction among members of the staff corps are unclear. The staff corps had rather privileged position in the Spanish Army, with a disproportionate number of generals coming from its ranks, which was a cause of considerable annoyance to the other arms. Although as a "facultative corps" the staff conformed to many of the practices of the artillery and engineers, such as support for the "closed scale" and opposition to merit promotions, they do not seem to have considered it equal. Thus, while the orphans of artillery and engineer officers were cared for in the same institution, those of staff officers were lumped in with those of medical, veterinary, and juridical corps orphans in a separate institution (Anuario militar, 1936 pp. 35-36). Demoted to the status of a "service" by Primo de Rivera in 1925, a move which Stanley Payne (Politics, p. 232) observes that Primo's action "gratified the animosity felt by most of the other corps toward the General Staff." Restored as a "corps" by the Berenguer government in 1930, the staff was again demoted to a "service" by the Azaña reforms of 1931. Furthermore, in the Ley de Azaña of 23 March 1932, Azaña had established that staff officers who went without an assignment for six months were to be forcibly retired, a handicap which he placed on no other corps. See also Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 71, and Mola, El pasado p. 971.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Surprisingly, only nine of the 19 africanista infantrymen were Nationalists.[96] Almost as many, seven, were Republicans,[97] and three were Neutrals.[98]: a majority of the africanista infantrymen were uncommitted or opposed to the military uprising. Of the three cavalrymen who were africanistas, two were Nationalists[99] and one a Republican[100]. Similarly, of the four staff officers who were africanistas, three were Nationalists,[101] while one was a Neutral.[102]

---

96. Africanista infantrymen who were Nationalists include the major generals Villegas Montesinos, Saliquet Zumeta, González Carrasco, and Franco Bahamonde, plus the brigadier generals Orgaz Yoldi, Mola Vidal, Benito Terraza, Alvárez-Arenas, and Varela Iglesias.

97. Africanista infantrymen who were Republicans are the major generals Gómez Morato, Salcedo Molinuevo, and Riquelme y López Bago, plus the brigadier generals Llano Encomienda, Castello Pantoja, Romerales Quintero, and Miaja Menant.

98. Africanista infantrymen who were neutral include Castro Girona, a lieutenant general, plus the brigadier generals Capaz Montes and Campins Aura.

99. Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer and Queipo de Llano, both major generals.

100. Nuñez de Prado, a major general.

101. Goded Llopis, Fanjul Goñi, and Sánchez-Ocaña, all major generals.

102. Barbero Saldaña, a brigadier general.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The split among the generals can also be examined in terms of the composition by arm of each of the factions.[103]

Table 4
Arm of Service by Faction

Arm	Army	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
All	84	34 [40%]	36 [42.3%]	14 [16.7%]
Infantry	46 (54.8%)	16 (45.7%)	19 (54.3%)	11 (78.6%)
Cavalry	11 (13.1%)	5 (14.3%)	6 (17.1%)	0
Artillery	12 (14.3%)	6 (17.1%)	5 (14.3%)	1 (7.1%)
Engineers	7 (8.3%)	3 (8.8%)	4 (11.1%)	0
Staff	8 (9.5%)	4 (11.4%)	2 (5.7%)	2 (14.3%)

Although almost the same number of generals adhered to each of the two factions, the distribution of the generals in each faction among the several arms and corps is quite different. The distribution of the Republicans resembles the proportions of the arms among the generals as a whole somewhat more closely than does that among the Nationalists. The degree of significance which this can be accorded is difficult to asses, particularly in as much as, age and years in service aside, the profiles of the two factions do not demonstrate any significant differences in other regards, save that there were nearly twice as many africanistas among the Nationalists than among the Republicans.

---

103. As for Table 3, the number of infantry generals has been reduced through the deletion of Balmes Alonso and Rodríguez del Barrio, and of cavalrymen by that of Augustín Ortega.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This lack of pattern extends even to the promotional experiences of the officers in question.[104]

Table 5
Years in Service to Attain Promotion

	Army	Nats	Reps	Neutrals	Africanistas
To Captain					
Mean	7.5	7.7	7.8	6.7	7.9
St Dev	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.4	2.3
Range	2-13	3-13	3-13	3-11	4-11
To Major					
Mean	17.0	17.3	17.7	14.8	14.0
St Dev	4.2	4.8	3.4	4.5	3.5
Range	5-25	6-25	12-23	5-23	6-19
To Lieutenant Colonel					
Mean	22.9	22.7	23.6	21.5	19.6
St Dev	4.1	4.7	3.3	4.1	4.1
Range	10-30	10-30	15-28	13-28	10-26
To Colonel					
Mean	28.8	28.7	30.0	26.7	23.5
St Dev	5.9	6.4	4.7	5.5	4.2
Range	14-38	14-38	20-37	16-35	14-30
To Brigadier General					
Mean	34.2	33.7	35.5	32.4	28.8
St Dev	5.8	6.5	4.5	6.0	5.4
Range	16-43	16-43	22-41	21-40	16-38
To Major General					
Mean	34.2	32.2	37.2	32.5	31.9
St Dev	5.3	5.4	5.0	3.5	4.6
Range	23-43	23-38	28-43	29-39	23-38
To Lieutenant General					
Mean	35.7			35.7	32
St Dev	2.9			2.9	0
Range	32-39			32-39	32

---

104. Figures on the accompanying table include only time in the service from commissioning as an officer. Note that for the Army and Africanista columns, the figures are based on the statistics found in Chapter VI, Tables 2 and 10, with 87 officers up to the rank of brigadier general the sample includes all 87 officers, 27 for major general includes only 27, and only three for lieutenant general only three, while figures for Nats (Nationalists), Reps (Republicans), and Neutrals are based on 84 officers up through brigadier general, 26 for major general, and three for lieutenant general. As in the tables in Chapter VI, the two ranks of lieutenant have been omitted.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although officers identifiable as Nationalists begin to demonstrate a small measure of faster movement at the level of lieutenant colonel, they were promoted rather more rapidly than the Republicans to brigadier general, and much more rapidly to major general. However, both factions were relatively close to the mean for the generals as a whole, and officers in both groups attained most ranks at a slower rate than did those officers classed as Neutrals or africanistas. However, at the lower end of the Range for each rank the Nationalists came out notably ahead of the Republicans, and in almost every case the Neutrals as well: in every case the Nationalists matched the africanistas in minimal time required to attain promotions. This reflects the fact that statistically the Nationalists were relatively younger than the Republicans, 58.9 years in contrast to 60.7 years, while the africanistas averaged younger still, 56.1 years.

There were, of course, several factors which could accelerate an officer's rate of movement up through the ranks, notably promotion by méritos de guerra.[105]

---

105. Due to the elimination of Rodríguez del Barrio, Balmes Alonso, and Augustín Ortega, figures on the accompanying table do not tally to 100%. Note that on this and some subsequent tables africanistas has been abbreviated as "afric".

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 6
Promotions by Méritos de guerra by Faction

	Army	Nats	Reps	Neutrals	Afric
Awards	124	51 (41.1%)	32 (25.8%)	34 (27.4%)	76 (61.3%)
Awardees	58	22 (37.9%)	22 (37.9%)	11 (19.0%)	27 (46.6%)
Mean	2.1	2.3	1.5	3.1	2.8
St Dev	1.3	1.2	0.7	1.8	1.3
Range	1-7	1-5	1-4	1-7	1-7

Although there was little difference between the Nationalists and the Republicans in terms of the number of men who held promotions by merit, the number of such promotions held by the Nationalists who had received such was significantly higher than the number held by their Republican counterparts. However, despite this, the Nationalists who had received promotions by merit nevertheless had received significantly fewer such promotions than did those officers considered Neutral, who even exceeded the africanista holders of merit promotions. This is attributable primarily to the fact that eleven of the fourteen officers classed as Neutrals had received at least one promotion by merit, and four of those had garnered a total of 20 such promotions.[106] A similar pattern emerged upon examination of statistics on recipients of the María Cristina.

---

106. These officers are Castro Girona, seven meritos, López de Ochoa, five, López Pozas and Capaz Montes, four each.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 7
Awards of the María Cristina by Faction

	Army	Nats	Reps	Neutrals	Afric
Awards	42	13 (31.0%)	16 (38.1%)	11 (26.2%)	22 (52.4%)
Awardees	27	9 (33.3%)	9 (33.3%)	8 (29.6%)	10 (37.0%)
Mean	1.6	1.4	1.8	1.4	2.2
St Dev	1.0	1.0	1.3	0.5	1.3
Range	1-5	1-4	1-5	1-2	1-5

The notably greater number of María Cristinas held by Republicans is significant, but certainly not so significant as the number held by Neutrals. Moreover, the proportions with each faction are not particularly different, save again for the Neutrals: 26.5% of the Nationalists held a María Cristina, as against 25% of the Republicans, and 53.3% of the Neutrals, in which regard they were superior even to the africanistas.[107]

This similarity in pattern is also to be found in the matter of credits received for "time on campaign," which,

---

107. There also exists no significant pattern in the division among the generals who won the highest decorations, the Medalla militar and the San Fernando. Of 16 generals holding the Medalla militar, half, eight, proved to be Nationalists, five Republicans, and three Neutrals. Of the 14 holders of the MM who were africanistas, eight were Nationalists, four Republicans, and two Neutrals: of the two non-africanista holders this decoration, one was a Republican and one a Neutral. Of the five generals who had won the San Fernando, one was a Nationalist, Varela Iglesias, who, uniquely, held two, one a Republican, Batet Mestres, and three Neutrals, López Pozas, Rodríguez Casademunt, and López de Ochoa. Batet Mestres and López de Ochoa received their awards of the San Fernando for command distinction during the 1934 Asturian Rebellion, the other three officers won theirs on the battlefield.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

as will be recalled, is a useful guide to the amount of time an officer spent in a combat zone.[108]

Table 8
Years of "Time on Campaign" Credit by Faction

	Army	Nats	Reps	Neutrals	Africanistas
Total					
Mean	3.3	2.7	2.3	5.6	6.5
St Dev	2.8	2.2	1.4	3.6	3.6
Range	0-14.5	0-7.5	0-5.6	1.8-14.5	2.2-14.5
"Other Campaigns"[109]					
Mean	1.0	0.6	1.2	1.5	0.3
St Dev	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.3	0.8
Range	0-3.3	0-3.3	0-3.2	0-3.2	0-3
Morocco, 1909-1927					
Mean	2.1	2.0	1.1	3.9	5.7
St Dev	2.6	2.1	1.3	3.5	2.9
Range	0-11.5	0-7.5	0-3.8	0.5-11.5	2.2-11.5

Although overall the Nationalists had only slightly more "time on campaign" credit than the Republicans, they had significantly more such credit for the Moroccan Wars of 1909-1927. However, both groups were considerably inferior to the Neutrals in terms of "time on campaign" credit, and even this group averaged much less "time on campaign" credit than did the africanistas. So once again, the differences between the two factions are relatively small.

As demonstrated, differences between Nationalist and Republican officers were rather modest, with the former group at best having a slight advantage. Interestingly, the differences between the two groups were frequently of

---

108. See Chapter VI, Table 11 and accompanying text.

109. The campaigns in question are those of Morocco in 1893-1894, and Cuba and the Philippines, 1895-1898.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

much less significance than the differences between either group and the Neutrals or the africanistas. It is against this background that the impact of Manuel Azaña's review and wholesale cancellation of promotions, particularly of those held by méritos de guerra, must be viewed.

It will be recalled that Azana's the measure affected the seniority of 47 of the generals, 54.0% of the total.[110] Overall, the mean loss of seniority was about three months, though the impact on individuals was frequently greater. The 17 officers who underwent cancellation of merit promotions experienced an average loss of 3.2 years in seniority, while the 30 who gained as a result of positive adjustments to seniority advanced an average of 1.4 years.[111] The effect of this measure on the officers in each faction is examined in Table 9.

Table 9
The Azaña Reform of Seniority by Faction

	Army	Nats	Reps	Neutrals	Africanistas
Cases	47	19 (40.4%)	21 (44.7%)	5 (10.6%)	12 (25.5%)
Mean	-0.2	-0.1	0.5	-2.1	-1.7
St Dev	3.0	2.7	2.3	4.3	4.4
Range	-7.8/+6	-7.8/+6	-2.6/+5	-6.4/+6	-7.8/+6

110. For a review of the impact of Azana's modifications to seniority see Chapters III and VI.

111. Note that these figures apply only to officers specifically affected by Azaña's decrees on seniority and promotion. Naturally, tahe seniority of all officers in the army was affected by the modifications in the seniority of those officers who experienced specific changes in their relative standings.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

An equal number of officers among both the Republicans and the Nationalists were affected by the Azaña reform, amounting to somewhat more than half the members of each faction. However, overall, the officers classed as Nationalists mostly lost seniority,[112] while those classed as Republicans mostly gained.[113] Nevertheless, the mean statistical difference between the officers in the two factions was modest, barely a year. In contrast, only a little more than a third of the Neutrals were affected by the measure, but the overall changes in their status were

---

112. Nationalists who lost seniority as a result of the Republican reforms were Orgaz Yoldi, 7.8 years, Varela Iglesias, 4.6, Alvárez Arenas, 2.4, and Franco Bahamonde, 2.0. Those gaining seniority were Queipo de Llano, 6 years, Fernández Burriel, 2, Saliquet Zumeta, 3, Espinosa de los Monteros, 1, and eleven others who gained anywhere from 11 months to a few days. Queipo de Llano's jump occurred upon the establishment of the Republic, when he was restored to active duty, and given a predated promotion to major general, after having been expelled from the army by Primo de Rivera and Alfonso XIII for republican activity.

113. Republicans losing seniority under the reform were Bernal Garcia, 3.4, Martínez de Monje, 2.6 years, Mena Zueco, 2.5, Castello Pantoja, 2.4, Gamir Ulibarri, 1.1, and Martínez Cabrera and Batet Mestres, who each lost a few weeks. Officers gaining under the reform were Gómez Caminero, 5 years, Cerda y López Mollinedo, 5, Romerales Quintero, 4.8, Riquelme y López Bago, 3, Cavanna del Val, 1.2, López Gómez, 1, and six others who gained from six months to a few weeks. As with the Nationalist Queipo de Llano, the changes in seniority of Cerda y López Mollinedo and Gómez Caminero came about upon the establishment of the Republic, when they was restored to active duty, and given a predated promotions, after having been expelled from the army by Primo de Rivera and Alfonso XIII for republican activity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not particularly more pronounced.[114] However, the question of changes in status was by no means a matter of statistical interest to the officers involved. If officers who gained seniority due to retroactive promotions upon the establishment of the Republic are excluded from the figures, the mean change in seniority of the Nationalists amounts to a loss of nearly two years, and the Neutrals a mean loss of 5.7 years, while that for the Republicans becomes a gain of 1.5 years.[115] Eight of the officers who lost seniority were africanistas (47.5%), and four of those were Nationalists, as against only one Republicans.[116] Three africanistas gained seniority,[117] two were

---

114. Neutrals losing seniority were Campins Aura, 6.4 years, Capaz Montes, 4.4, Virgilio Cabanellas, 3.8, and Araujo Vergara, 2.1. López de Ochoa was the only Neutral to gain seniority, 6 years, which took placed when the newly proclaimed Republican government restored him to active duty with a predated promotion to major general in 1931, after he had been expelled from the army for republican activity.

115. The officers excluded are Queipo de Llano, Cerda y López Mollinedo, Gómez Caminero, and López de Ochoa.

116. Nationalist africanistas losing seniority were Orgaz Yoldi, 7.8 years, Varela Iglesias, 4.6, Alvárez Arenas, 2.4, and Franco Bahamonde, 2, while Castello Pantoja, 2.4, was the only Republican africanista to lose seniority. Two africanistas who lost seniority are numbered among the Neutrals, Campins Aura, 6.4 years, and Capaz Montes, 4.4. One africanista losing seniority is not counted, Balmes Alonso, who died on 16 July 1936.

117. Note that figures exclude gains of less than a year, and Queipo de Llano, on the grounds that his gain in seniority was due to his restoration to active duty by the Republic.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republicans[118] and one Nationalist.[119]

Save for the fact that africanistas were much more likely to be Nationalists than Republicans, there appears to have been little variation in the overall character of officers in either camp.

B. Personal Background

Of the generals on active service at the time of the military uprising, the occupations of the fathers of 49 of those on duty at the time of the military uprising can be identified. Of these, 18 (36.7%) were Nationalists, 21 (42.9%) Republicans, and 10 (20.4%) Neutrals, a division which roughly parallels that of the generals as a whole, though the Neutrals are proportionally somewhat more numerous. Overall, of the 47 of the generals who had fathers in military service 16 (34.0%) were Nationalists, 19 (40.4%) Republicans, and 16 (36.4%) Neutrals.

Table 10
Paternity by Faction

	Army	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutral
Sample	49	18 (36.7%)	20 (42.9%)	10 (20.4)
General	11	4 (36.4%)	4 (36.4%)	3 (27.3%)
Other Officer	32	11 (34.4%)	12 (37.5%)	7 (21.9%)
Army Official	2	0	2 (100%)	0
Enlisted	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0
Army Contractor	1	0	1 (100%)	0
Landowner	3	2 (66.7%)	1 (33.3%)	0

118. Romerales Quintero, 4.8 years, and Riquelme y López Bago, 3.

119. Saliquet Zumeta, 2 years.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Of the generals whose fathers were not in military service, two were Nationalists[120] and two Republicans.[121] One general who was officially recorded as "the son of an unmarried woman" was a Nationalist.[122]

The available data on the social background of the generals also suggests no particular pattern to their choice of faction.[123]

Table 11
Social Background by Faction

	Army	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
Sample	49	18 (36.7%)	21 (42.9%)	10 (20.4%)
Bourgeois	3	1 (33.3%)	2 (66.6%)	0
Industrialist	1	0	1 (100%)	0
Landed	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0
Military	43	16 (37.2%)	17 (39.5%)	10 (23.3%)

This data tends to conform to the basic pattern of a roughly equal division between the two factions, with a sizable group of Neutrals.[124] However, this pattern of

---

120. García Benitez and Legorburu Dominicis, who's fathers were landed proprietors.

121. Bernal García, who's father was an army contractor, and Rodríguez González, who's father was a landed proprietor.

122. Major General Manuel González Carrasco: AROM, Expediente G-295-5.

123. See Chapter VI, note 118 for a discussion of problems in determining the social background of particular officers.

124. Although the division of the officers whose fathers were in military service, as found on Table 10, is the same as the division of those from traditionally military families, it must be stressed that the same officers are not necessarily to be found on both lists. There were a number of instances in which the occupation of the father could be determined, but not the social background of the family, and a number in which the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

rough equality in the number of officers adhering to each faction does not hold with regard to the africanistas.

The occupations of the fathers of 16 (61.5%) of the africanistas can be determined.[125] Most of them were Nationalists.

Table 12
Paternity and Africanismo by Faction

	Total	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
All[126]	16	9 (56.3%)	5 (31.3%)	2 (12.5%)
General	3 (18.3%)	0	2 (66.7%)	1 (33.3%)
Other Officer	10 (62.5%)	8 (80%)	1 (10%)	1 (10%)
Army Official	1 (6.3%)	0	1 (100%)	0
Enlisted Man	2 (12.5%)	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0

The overall division of the generals in the sample is not particularly dissimilar to the division among the africanistas as a group.[127] However, while nearly a fifth of the africanistas were the sons of generals, not one of

---

father's occupation could not be determined, but the family background could. García Benitez, for example, came from a military family, but his father was not a professional soldier.

125. For purposes of the following calculations, González Carrasco, whose father was officially unknown, has been deleted from the list of africanistas, as has Rodríquez del Barrio, who at the time of the abortive coup of July 1936 was dyeing of cancer.

126. On this table, percentage figures under africanistas indicate the proportion of the sample of 16 who belong in each category. Other percentage figures refer to the whole numbers in the column.

127. It will be recalled that of the 27 africanistas, 14 (51.9%) became Nationalists, eight (29.6%) Republicans, and four (14.8%) Neutrals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the three men in question became a Nationalist,[128] Interestingly, virtually all of the africanistas who were the sons of lower ranking officers sided with the Nationalists,[129] in which they were joined by one of the two men who were the sons of enlisted personnel,[130] as well as by the one officer in the army listed as being the "son of an unmarried woman."[131]

The social origins of only 14 (53.8%) of the africanistas can be determined.[132] Eight of the thirteen generals who were the scions of traditionally military families were Nationalists (61.5%),[133] three Republicans (23.1%),[134] and two Neutrals (14.3%).[135] The one

---

128. Of the three generals' sons, Nuñez de Prado and Salcedo Molinuevo were Republicans, and Capaz Montes a Neutral.

129. Africanista Nationalists whose fathers were officers below the rank of brigadier general are Alvárez-Arenas, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Fanjul Goñi, Franco Bahamonde, Goded Llopis, Mola Vidal, Orgaz Yoldi, and Sánchez-Ocaña. The lone Republican was Romerales Quintero, and the Neutral was Campins Aura.

130. Varela Iglesias, who was himself a former enlisted man.

131. González Carrasco, per AROM, Expediente G-295-5.

132. Figures exclude González Carrasco and Rodríguez del Barrio.

133. See note 129, above.

134. Nuñez de Prado, who's family was of the untitled nobility, plus Salcedo Molinuevo and Romerales Quintero.

135. Campins Aura and Capaz Montes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

africanista who was of bourgeois origins was a Republican.[136] These figures conform roughly to the pattern found upon examination of the occupations of the officers' fathers. However, in both instances the size of the sample is such that at best the pattern may be said to be interesting, rather than convincing, and may merely reflect the relatively greater degree to which it is possible to gain information about the Nationalists,[137] in as much as it proved extremely difficult to secure detailed family information on a broad basis.[138]

---

136. Riquelme y López Bago.

137. This basically reflects the outcome of the Civil War. Aside from brief entries in reference works and collective biographies, eight of the Nationalist generals have been the subject of biographies, albeit if only hagiographic ones: Fanjul Goñi, Franco Bahamonde, Goded Llopis, Queipo de Llano, Saliquet Zumeta, Mola Vidal, Orgaz Yoldi, and Varela Iglesias, to whom may be added Miguel Cabanellas, indirectly in his son's various works. In contrast, only two of the Republicans have received extensive treatment, Gamir Ulibarri, who wrote his memoirs, and Miaja Menant.

138. Some information was available on the brothers, marital status, and children of a number of the generals, as found in Chapter VI. The trend suggested on the officers in the two factions on the basis of this information indicates no particular differences between the two groups. For example, of 76 active generals who were married, widowed or divorced, 32 (42.1%) were Nationalists, 32 (42.1%) Republicans, and 12 (15.8%) Neutrals. Of the three generals known to have been bachelors, one adhered to each of the three factions. Of the five generals whose marital status cannot be determined, two were Nationalists, two Republicans, and one Neutral. No conclusions were possible on the basis of the regional origins of the generals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Of the 25 generals who can be termed authors, 12 (48%) proved to be Nationalists, nine Republicans (36%), and four (16%) Neutrals. There was no significant difference in literary output of the generals of each faction. However, of the ten africanistas who were authors, fully nine were Nationalists, Mola Vidal, Francisco Franco, Queipo de Llano, Goded Llopis, Sánchez Ocaña, Varela Iglesias, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, and Fanjul Goñi. The names are important because, with the exception of Sánchez Ocaña, these officers were all prominent among the leaders of the military conspiracy of 1936.[139] Aside from their overall prominence among the Nationalists, this is one of the few areas in which the africanistas can be shown to have gone heavily to one side.

Considering the available data on family, social background, and personal attainments, there do not seem to have been any significant differences between those generals who became Nationalists and those who became Republicans. To be sure, the africanistas were strongly inclined to be Nationalists, but, save for those africanistas who were authors, there was no particular difference in between those africanistas who became Nationalists and those who did not.

---

139. The lone Republican africanista author was Romerales Quintero.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

C. Political Profile

Few of the generals publicly expressed their views on politics, people, and institutions before the outbreak of the Civil War. As a result, in many cases it proved rather difficult to establish what a particular general's views were on the basis of wholly objective evidence. Nevertheless, using available evidence, it is possible to draw some conclusions, and it is upon these that the following analysis has been based.[140]

Political Inclinations.

It is in the political views of the generals that a more consistent pattern of can begin to be discerned. Few of the generals were formally affiliated with any political parties. Many did, however express political views, or have informal ties to various parties or politicians.[141]

---

140. On the difficulties of determining the views of the generals on politics, people, and institutions see Chapter VI. For a brief discussion of the resources used, see Appendix 1.

141. Figures have been adjusted to omit Augustín Ortega, Balmes Alonso, and Rodríguez del Barrio.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 13
Political Affiliation: The Factions Compared

	Army	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
Sample	48	17	22	9
Carlist	1	1 (100%)	0	0
Monarchist	12	7 (58.3%)	1 (8.3%)	4 (33.3%)
Centrist	8	4 (50%)	1 (12.5%)	3 (37.5%)
Republican	25	5 (20%)	18 (72%)	2 (8%)
Socialist	2	0	2 (100%)	0

As a group, the political views of the Nationalists ranged from the extreme right to the moderate left: 5.9% were Carlist, 41.2% monarchist, 23.5% centrist, and 29.4% moderately leftist. The Republicans, in contrast, were 9.1% center or right, 81.8% moderately leftist, and 9.1% extreme leftist. This breakdown strongly suggests that the generals who supported the Republic were ideologically a more coherent group than those who became Nationalists. These figures can be compared with the results of the election of 16 February 1936.[142] In that election, 43.2% of the votes came from what Salvador de Madariaga termed the "Parliamentary Right," while the "Non-Marxist Left" received 36.4% and the "Marxist Left" 20.5%: thus, leftist candidates received 56.9% of the votes. On this basis, the Republican generals were more leftist than the electorate. Dividing, as Madariaga did, the "Centrist" group between the parliamentary right and the non-marxist left, over 90% of the Republican generals were left-of-center, although

142. See Chapter V, note 23, and Chapter VI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

none of them were actually members of the radical marxist left. In contrast, although the imbalance was by not means as extreme as that of the Republican generals, the Nationalists were further to the right than the electorate: 41.2% to the left of center and 58.9% to the right, including one on the far right.

The political views of 23 of the africanistas can be determined, which represents 92% of those on active duty at the time of the military coup of 17-18 July 1936.

Table 14
Political Affiliation: Africanistas by Faction

	Africanistas	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
Sample[143]	23 (82%)	12 (52.1%)	8 (34.9%)	4 (17.4%)
Carlist	1 (4.3%)	1 (100%)	0	0
Monarchist	6 (26.0%)	5 (100%)	1 (16.7%0	0
Centrist	5 (21.7%)	3 (50%)	0	2 (33.3%)
Republican	10 (43.5%)	3 (30%)	6 (60%)	1 (10%)
Socialist	1 (4.3%)	0	1 (100%)	0

As with the figures for the overall division among the general officers, the data for the africanistas strongly suggests a greater degree of ideological commitment among those who became Republicans than among the Nationalists. The twelve nationalists ranged from extreme right-wing Carlists (8.3%)[144] through constitutional monarchists

143. The figures in the africanista column refer to the percentage of persons holding such views as a proportion of the entire sample. Those in the other columns refer to the proportion of generals holding such views who supported that faction.

144. Varela Iglesias.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(41.7%)[145] to middle-of-the-road types (25%)[146] and on to liberal republicans (25%),[147] hardly an indication of political cohesion. In contrast the Republicans were mostly just that, liberal republicans (75%),[148] an indication of strongly held political views.[149] The three Neutrals fit the profile for Nationalists better than they do for Republicans.[150] Comparing the division among the africanistas with the outcome of the election of 16 February 1936 we find once again that the Republican generals were far more likely to have left-of-center political views than the electorate, over 90% in contrast to 56.9%. However, the Nationalists among the africanistas were more strongly rightist than the electorate, 62.5% as against 43.2%.[151] So while as a group the Nationalists may

---

145. Fanjul Goñi, Orgaz Yoldi, González Carrasco, Saliquet Zumeta, and Villegas Montesinos.

146. Mola Vidal, Franco Bahamonde, and Goded Llopis.

147. Queipo de Llano, who had been a republican radical in the last years of the monarchy, plus Sánchez-Ocaña and Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer.

148. Romerales Quintero, Miaja Menant, Riquelme y López Bago, Nuñez de Prado, Castello Pantoja, and Gómez Morato.

149. The centrist was Salcedo Molinuevo and the socialist was Llano de Encomienda.

150. The republican among them was Campins Aura, and the others were Capaz Montes and Castro Girona.

151. Note, however, that the left-of-center element among the Nationalist africanistas was roughly proportional to Madariaga's "non-marxist left," 37.5% as against 36.4%.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

have more closely reflected the political views of the Spanish voter, the africanistas in that group, the critical leaders of the Nationalists, were far more conservative than the electorate as a whole.[152]

Institutional Affiliations

The relationships of the generals in each faction to the juntas de defensa of 1916-1922, freemasonry, and, on the very eve of the civil war, the two rival politico-military groups, the Unión militar española and the Unión militar republicana antifascista are of some interest.

The Juntas.[153] Few of the generals of 1936 played any role in the juntas de defensa which were of consequence in the period 1916-1922. Only one of the generals was an active member, Castello Pantoja, and he became a Republican. Two of other generals known to have sympathized with the juntero movement were both Neutrals on the outbreak of the Civil War, López de Ochoa and Rodríguez

152. Of the four generals who stood for the Cortes, Fanjul Goñi, a monarchist, Franco, centrist, and Miguel Cabanellas, a moderate republican, were africanistas were among the leaders of the Nationalists, while Gómez Caminero, a socialist, was a Republican.

153. For a general discussion of the juntero movement, see Chapters II and VI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

del Barrio,[154] while Riquelme y López Bago, was a Republican of note, and Saliquet was a Nationalist. Of the seven officers who were active opponents of the juntas, six (85.7%) became Nationalists --Varela Iglesias, Orgaz Yoldi, Mola Vidal, Franco, Queipo de Llano, and Miguel Cabanellas-- and one a Neutral, Castro Girona. All seven of these officers were africanistas, as were Castello Pantoja, Riquelme, and Saliquet. It seems reasonable to conclude that the officers who displayed unusual activism in opposing the juntas would be more willing than most to undertake other political initiatives.

Freemasonry.[155] If all types of evidence are considered, fully 34 (39.1%) of the generals were masons. However, looking more closely at the evidence suggests that only six of the generals can actually be shown to have been masons. Most of these officers were investigated by the

---

154. Neither López de Ochoa nor Rodríguez del Barrio were in a position to make a choice in 1936, being both confined to hospital beds. Based on his participation in various plots in the period from the election of 16 February to his hospitalization in mid-spring, it seems reasonable to conclude that, given the opportunity to make a conscious decision, Rodríguez del Barrio would have chosen the Nationalists. López de Ochoa is a more difficult matter, as, although a life-long liberal he was becoming disenchanted with the regime. He could easily have gone either way, given the opportunity.

155. On Freemasonry in the Spanish Army, see particularly Chapter VI, Part II, Section D.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

commission established under the Ley de Represion de la Masonería y Comunisimo of 1 March 1940, and few were found to have been masons in contravention of the law: a handful were never investigated.

Table 15
Freemasonry and Faction

	Army	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
Sample	34	9 (26.5%)	22 (64.7%)	2 (5.9%)
Confirmed	6	2 (33.3%)	3 (60%)	1 (20%)
Investigated	20	5 (25%)	13 (61.9%)	2 (9.5%)
Suspected	8	2 (25%)	6 (75%)	0

The officers regarded as masons were more likely to be Republicans than Nationalists, whether their affiliation was confirmed, or merely charged. Since it seems clear that many of the officers in the "Investigated" and "Suspected" categories were not masons, or at least not in terms of the provisions of the Ley de Represion de la Masonería y Comunisimo, this is probably due to the relatively leftist political views of many of these officers.[156]

The africanistas usually regarded as having a masonic tie split roughly in two, seven (53.8%) becoming Republicans and six (46.2%) Nationalists. Of the confirmed masons among them, two became Nationalists and two Republicans.[157] The africanista masons who were subject to

156. See Chapter VI, note 155.

157. The Nationalists were Miguel Cabanellas Gonzálo Queipo de Llano, the Republicans Riquelme y López Bago and Nuñez de Prado.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

investigation after the war included three Nationalists and four Republicans,[158] while those suspected of being masons but never investigated included two Nationalists and one Republican.[159] It seems reasonable to conclude that freemasonry had no particular influence in the events of 1936.

Relationship to Primo de Rivera. Nine generals were open opponents of the Dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, four of whom were africanistas and five peninsulares. Four of these officers became Nationalists, the africanistas Miguel Cabanellas, Goded Llopis, and Queipo de Llano, plus Legorburu Domínguez, while the other three became Republicans, Batet Mestres, Cerda y López Mollinedo, and Gómez Caminero, and two were Neutrals, López de Ochoa and the africanista Castro Girona. Politically all of these generals were center or left in alignment, with Gómez Caminero being an avowed socialist. Of the generals who had been strong supporters of Primo de Rivera,

158. The Nationalists were González Carrasco, Goded Llopis, and Queipo de Llano, while the Republicans were Miaja Menant, Castello Pantoja, Gómez Morato, and Llano Encomienda.

159. Nationalists Franco and Sánchez Ocaña, Republican Romerales Quintero.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Saliquet Zumeta and Orgaz Yoldi became Nationalists, and Losada Ortega is classed as a Neutral.[160]

Monarchist/Anti-Monarchist Activists. Aside from officers who preferred a monarchy to a republic, only one of the generals on active duty in 1936 had been an outspoken supporter of the monarchy which was abolished in 1931, Orgaz Yoldi, an africanista who became a prominent Nationalist.[161] There were six officers, all major generals, who had been open opponents of the monarchy, four africanistas, Queipo de Llano, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Riquelme y López Bago, and Nuñez de Prado, and two peninsulares, López de Ochoa and Cerda y López Mollinedo. Two of the africanistas became Nationalists, Queipo de Llano and Miguel Cabanellas, while two became Republicans, Riquelme and Nuñez de Prado. Of the other two officers, Cerda became a Republican and López de Ochoa a Neutral. Thus, 33.3% of the anti-monarchist generals --and 50% of the africanista anti-monarchists-- were Nationalists, while 50% of the anti-monarchists, and 50% of the anti-monarchist

160. On Losada Ortega, see note 23, above.

161. Arguably, a case could be made for the inclusion of Brigadier General José Varela Iglesias with Orgaz Yoldi as a particularly devout monarchist. However, Varela's ultra-monarchism did not develop until after the establishment of the Republic, and his commitment was to the ultra-conservative Carlist branch of the Spanish Borbóns. There is a brief biography in Chapter VIII.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

africanistas were Republicans, while one anti-monarchist (16.7%) was a Neutral. The prominence of the africanistas in this group, as among the anti-Primo activists is of some importance.

U.M.E./U.M.R.A. Activity. The Unión militar republicana antifascista and particularly the Unión militar española played important roles in the events which unfolded in Spain in the spring and summer of 1936.[162] Sixteen of the generals can be shown to have been affiliated with these organizations. Of the ten who had ties to the U.M.E., six became Nationalists, one a Republican, and three Neutrals.[163] The six U.M.R.A. members all became Republicans.[164] Fully thirteen of the seventeen generals in question were africanistas, nine in the U.M.E., of whom seven became Nationalists, one a

---

162. See Chapter IV and Chapter V, with particular reference to note 20, for a review of the two organizations. See Chapter VI for a short profile of the members.

163. The Nationalists were Varela Iglesias, Fanjul Goni, Orgaz Yoldi, Queipo de Llano, Villegas Montesinos, and Goded Llopis. The Republican was Miaja Menant, and the Neutrals were López de Ochoa, Campins Aura, and Rodríguez del Barrio. Arguably, Mola Vidal could also be counted among the U.M.E. affiliates, since U.M.E. members were prominent among his agents in the Spring of 1936.

164. Castello Pantoja, Pozas Perea, Nuñez de Prado, Gómez Caminero, Llano Encomienda, and Riquelme y López Bago.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republican, and one a Neutral,[165] while all four africanistas in the U.M.R.A. became Republicans.[166]

Relationship to Azana. A significant number of the generals harbored strong views on Manuel Azaña. All ten of the generals who were strongly disposed towards him became Republicans, including five africanistas.[167] In contrast, of the fourteen generals who were on poor terms with Azana, nine became Nationalists, three Republicans, and two Neutrals.[168] Of the eight africanistas in the anti-Azana group, seven became Nationalists, and one a Republican.[169]

---

165. The Nationalists were Varela Iglesias, Fanjul Goñi, Orgaz Yoldi, Villegas Montesinos, Mola Vidal, and Goded Llopis. The Republican was Miaja Menant, and the Neutral, Campins Aura.

166. Castello Pantoja, Nuñez de Prado, Llano Encomienda, and Riquelme y López Bago.

167. Martínez de Monje, Masquelet Lacaci, Molero Lobo, and Pozas Perea, plus the africanistas Salcedo Molinuevo, Gómez Morato, Miaja Menant, Riquelme y López Bago, Batet Mestres, and Nuñez de Prado.

168. Nationalists, Miguel Cabanellas, Fanjul Goñi, Goded Llopis, Mola Vidal, Queipo de Llano, Saliquet Zumeta, and Villegas Montesinos; Republicans Romerales Quintero, Cerda y López Mollinedo, and Gómez Caminero; Neutrals, López de Ochoa and Rodríguez del Barrio, who almost certainly would have been a Nationalist if able to make a choice. See Chapter VI, note 167 with regard to the question of Francisco Franco's relationship with Azaña.

169. The Nationalists were Miguel Cabanellas, Fanjul Goñi, Goded Llopis, Mola Vidal, Queipo de Llano, Saliquet Zumeta, and Villegas Montesinos. The sole Republican was Romerales Quintero.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Politically, the officers who became Republicans were center or left-of-center, while all of those who became Nationalists were ranged from moderately leftist to right-of-center: one neutral was a monarchist and one a liberal republican.

Conclusions. It is in the matter of political inclinations and personal affiliations that a modest pattern begins to distinguish Nationalist from Republican officers. Although the Nationalists tended to a right-of-center inclination, they were politically less cohesive a group than the Republicans, who were strongly left-of-center. Despite this, the officers who had been prominent in the opposition to the juntas, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and the monarchy itself were more likely to be Nationalists than Republicans, by a considerable margin. An important determinant of faction appears to be the relationship which the individual officers had with Manuel Azana, with those favorably disposed towards him being unanimous in their support for the Republic. Finally, although they were inordinately prominent in both faction, africanistas were more likely to be Nationalists than Republicans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

D. Personal Relationships

There is sufficient evidence available to permit an examination of the influence which personal relations with former comrades and other acquaintances may have had upon the generals' actions in 1936.

Comrades-in-Arms.

Despite the fact that the group of men under study is only 85, the number of them who served together at various times is remarkable, the more so considering that between 1893 and 1925 the officer corps rose from some 18,500 members to over 27,000. This was notably true of infantry officers and of those with staff corps credentials, including the six DEM officers, cavalry and infantry generals who held a diploma from the Staff College.[170] The officers of the other arms were much less likely to have served together.

The first place in which the men in question were likely to have met each other was as cadets at one of the

---

170. These officers were Castro Girona, africanista infantryman and lieutenant general, Rodríguez del Barrio and Villa Abrille, infantry major generals, plus three brigadier generals, Campins Aura, an africanista infantryman, Aviles Melgar, infantryman, and García Benitez, cavalryman.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

military academies. Prior to 1893 cadets entering the army did so through the Academia general militar. In 1893 the AGM was discontinued.[171] At that time all old cadets passed to the new academies established for each of the individual arms of service.

Table 16
Academy Classes by Faction

Academy	Entry	Number	Nationalists	Republicans	Neutrals
AGM	1886	2	0	1	1
	1887	2	0	2	0
	1888	6	1	2	3
	1889	7	3	2	2
	1890	8	5	3	0
	1891	12	6	4	2
	1892	6	2	4	0
Infantry	1893	9	2	3	4
	1894	6	3	2	1
	1895	3	2	1	0
	1896	5	3	2	0
	1897	2	0	1	1
	1898	2	1	1	0
	1899	2	2	0	0
Cavalry	1897	2	0	2	0
	1898	2	0	1	1

Given the small number of cadets in each entry,[172] the only year which shows an unusual imbalance towards one faction is 1893, with its large proportion of Neutrals, over 50%. A closer look at the actual composition of each of the class demonstrates that this imbalance is anomalous,

171. For a review of the history of the vicissitudes to the AGM, see Busquets, Militar, pp. 117-123.

172. Note that the officers no longer on active duty have been omitted from this table, as have those who were the only ones in their classes to attain the rank of general.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for among the Neutrals are listed Rodríguez del Barrio and López de Ochoa, neither of whom was in any physical condition to make a choice in July of 1936. It seems reasonable to conclude that academy associations were of no importance in helping determine an officer's choices in 1936.

Many officers served together for extended periods. Thus, Bosch Bosch and Mena Zueco served in the 3rd Rifle Battalion from early 1897 until late 1903,[173] while Martín González and Cruz Boullosa were in the 6th Field Artillery Regiment from 1906 through 1911 and again in 1918.[174] However, most officers served together for no more than three or four years. For example, Morales Díaz and Virgilio Cabanellas were with the 46th Infantry from 1905 through 1909,[175] while Araujo-Vergara and Urbano Palma served together on the Central General Staff from 1919 through 1920.[176] During a typical tour of duty with a headquarters, installation, or field unit, one of the

---

173. In 1897-1898 the battalion was in Cuba. During their service with the battalion Bosch received a merit promotion from 1st lieutenant to captain in 1897, and Mena Zueco a seniority promotion to 1st lieutenant in 1898.

174. Both officers were captains during their first tour with the regiment, majors during their second.

175. Both officers were captains. Cabanellas was transferred upon promotion to major by seniority.

176. Urbano was a lieutenant colonel at the time, to which rank Araujo was promoted to in mid-1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

future generals might have contact with several of his future colleagues. As an example, consider the officers with whom José Varela Iglesias, one of the most prominent africanistas, served whilst with the Fuerzas indígenas regulares No. 4.

Varela volunteered for the 4. FIR shortly after graduating from the Academia de infantería in 1915. He remained with the unit until mid-1924, by which time he had risen to major.[177] During that period four of the future generals were numbered among Varela's comrades, González Carrasco, Capaz Montes, Balmes Alonso, and Salcedo Molinuevo, as can be seen in the accompanying summary.

1915	González	Capaz	Balmes	
1916	González	Capaz		
1917	González	Capaz		Salcedo
1918	González			Salcedo
1919				Salcedo
1920	González		Balmes	
1921	González			
1922	González			
1923	González			

There were literally scores of occasions on which the future generals served together. As a result, it is reasonable to ask whether men who had undergone such extensive service together might not develop similar views

177. Varela accumulated an impressive combat record while with the 4. FIR, earning an extraordinary promotion to 1st lieutenant in 1917, a merit promotion to captain in 1920, and another to major in 1922, while winning the Cruz Laureada de San Fernando twice, in 1920 and 1921.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on a variety of matters, not least the political life of Spain. However, this does not seem to have been the case, as can be demonstrated both by looking at the officers already cited in the foregoing examples.

When the test came in 1936, the old comrades from the 3rd Rifle Battalion made wholly incompatible choices, Bosch Bosch becoming a Nationalist and Mena Zueco a Republican. Similarly, the two officers who had been together for so long in 6th Field Artillery Regiment, Martín González and Cruz Boullosa, became, respectively a Nationalist and a Republican, while Morales Díaz and Virgilio Cabanellas, from the 46th Infantry, became a Nationalist and a Neutral, and Araujo-Vergara and Urbano Palma, old comrades on the Central General Staff, became a Neutral and a Republican. Of the former comrades from the 4. FIR, Varela Iglesias and González Carrasco became Nationalists, Salcedo Molinuevo a Republican, and Capaz Montes a Neutral, while Balmes Alonso may have chosen suicide rather than take sides.[178] An examination of the scores of other instances in which officers had served together also does not suggest any influence.

There are several reasons for this. Perhaps most important is the fact that as the men rose in rank, they served together less and less often. In 1903, when most of

---

178. See Chapter I, note 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

them were still lieutenants and captains,[179] there were ten different posts in which at least two of the future generals were serving together, for a total of 21 officers.[180] By 1913, when most of them were captains and majors,[181] there were only three such posts, for a total of eight officers.[182] Of course, as the men began to approach the top, they would once more be thrust into relatively close proximity with each other. In 1933, when they were all either colonels or generals,[183] there were eleven posts in which two or more of the generals of 1936 were serving together, for a total of 39 men. This time we find that in the crisis of 1936 many of these men do seem to make the same choices as their erstwhile comrades of 1933.[184]

---

179. In 1903 two of the future generals were majors, 43 captains, and 38 lieutenants, while four were not yet in the service.

180. In only three instances did both pairs of officers end up on the same side in the Civil War.

181. In 1913 there were only two lieutenants, Francisco Franco and Capaz Montes, plus 29 captains, 46 majors, eight lieutenant colonels, and one colonel, with one man still in the academy, Varela Iglesias.

182. No more than two officers in any post ended up on the same side.

183. There were three lieutenant generals, 22 major generals, 38 brigadier generals, and 24 colonels.

184. Thus, all four of the senior officers of the 2nd Infantry Division, stationed in Andalucia, supported the Republic, as did three of the four in the 3rd Division, stationed in Valencia.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

However, there may be nothing more at work here than the political astuteness with which Manuel Azaña and his chief-of-the-general staff, Major General Carlos Masquelet Lacaci, selected senior officers for critical posts. Thus, of the 39 officers in question, 24 would become Republicans, ten Nationalists, and five Neutrals: in contrast, of five generals whom Azaña and Masquelet placed "at disposal," only one became a Republican, and four were Nationalists.

It seems a reasonable conclusion that ties of comradeship were of little influence in terms of the decisions which the generals had to make in 1936.

Friends and Enemies.

Not only did many of the generals of 1936 serve with each other from time to time during their military careers, but a small number of them cam also be shown to have been linked by various personal ties, such as friendships, mutual animosities, and even family connections. In addition, several of them had personal ties to various persons of note who were not military men.

Several of the generals had close personal friends among their colleagues. Major General Enrique de Salcedo Molinuevo was a close friend to former Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo, the titular head of the military

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

conspiracy.[185] Nevertheless, in July of 1936, Salcedo remained loyal to the Republic.

Brigadier General Fernando Martínez de Monje and Brigadier General Toribio Martínez Cabrera were regarded as friends,[186] though they had never served together[187] and had no common ties in their background save that both were committed republicans and both were generally regarded as having been freemasons.[188] In 1936 both men sided with the Republic.

Similarly, Major General Francisco Franco Bahamonde and Brigadier General Miguel Campins Aura were regarded as having "a great friendship."[189] The two had served

---

185. Rubio Cabeza, p. 697.

186. González López, interview, 19 December 1987.

187. Both men were in the Academia de Infantería together for the 1894-1895 academic year, when Martínez de Monje was a senior cadet, and Martínez Cabrera a freshman. In 1921-1922 both men were stationed in Madrid, the former at the Ministry of War and the latter initial with the Captaincy General of the First Military Region and later as a supernumery. In 1934 both were apparently often in contact since Martínez de Monje commanded the 15th Infantry Brigade, an element of the 8th Infantry Division, which was subordinate to the Third Inspectorate, of which Martínez Cabrera was chief-of-staff.

188. Both men were included in the list of supposed masons in the officer corps which was read in the Cortes on 15 February 1935 by Dionisio Cano López. However, after the Civil War the Nationalist commission investigating suspect masons returned a "negative" finding on each, which suggests that they were not masons within the definition of the law under which the commissions operated.

189. Alpert, Ejército, pp. 387-388.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

together in Morocco, particularly during the Alhucemas landings in 1925. In 1928, when Franco, then a brigadier general, was named head of the new Academia General Militar, he requested that Campins Aura be made chief of academic studies.[190] Despite this close relationship, in July of 1936 Campins Aura's inclinations were to remain Loyal to the Republic, and he had to be "convinced" to join the military uprising.[191] He was subsequently tried by the Nationalists and sentenced to death. Despite appeals from both Campins Aura and his wife, Franco did not grant clemency.[192]

The friendship between Brigadier Generals José Miaja Menant and Brigadier General Emilio Mola Vidal was also well established. The two had first met in 1907, when both had served in the 68th Infantry, Mola being a newly mined

---

190. Blanco Escola, p. 12: this history of the AGM mentions Campins Aura more often than any other person except Franco Bahamonde.

191. There is a short discussion of his case above.

192. In his Mi vida junto a Franco (Barcelona; Planeta, 1977), Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, the dictator's cousin and military secretary, reprints these appeals. On pp. 349-350 there is a letter from Campins Aura to his "respected friend" Francisco Franco, dated 12 August 1936, in which Campins Aura requests clemency, noting that he had never been involved in "organizations which have perturbed the life of the army," and stating that at no time had he opposed the Nationalist movement. Appeals from the general's wife are reprinted on pp. 348 and 352-353. Franco Salgado's message of condolence is on p. 353. Sra. Campins' response is on p. 373.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2nd lieutenant in Miaja's company. They had again served together in 1911-1912, the 59th Infantry, when Miaja was a major and Mola a captain. It will be recalled that on the night of 18-19 July 1936, Miaja, War Minister in the soi disant Diego Martínez Barrio government of national conciliation, telephoned his friend, the brains behind the military uprising, in a vain attempt to get him to call it off. Their conversation was cordial, but fruitless, and the two were on opposite sides in the Civil War.[193]

Major General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer and Major General Miguel Nuñez de Prado, two of the most liberal generals, were on friendly terms, which was why, in the crisis of July of 1936, the government sent Nuñez de Prado to Cabanellas' headquarters at Zaragoza, to help insure that latter's loyalty. However, Cabanellas had already risen by the time Nuñez de Prado arrived, and placed his erstwhile friend under arrest.[194] On the other hand, Cabanellas was on rather cool terms with two of the other generals, Major General Francisco Franco,[195] on whose side he nevertheless found himself in the military conspiracy, and Brigadier General Oswaldo Capaz Montes,[196] who is classed as a Neutral.

---

193. On this, see note 59, above.

194. Friedlander, p. 151.

195. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 65.

196. Payne, Politics, p. 269.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Two of the generals were on very hostile terms, to the point of public scandal, Major General Gonzalo Quiepo de Llano and Major General Rafael Villegas Montesinos. The reasons for this were probably more political than personal, but are not clear. The two had never served with each other, and the only time that they were frequently in contact was during the first two years of the Republic. During this period Villegas Montesinos was commander of the 1st Infantry Division, garrisoned at Madrid, while Queipo initially served as Inspector General of the First Inspectorate, which included the division, and was later an aide to President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora. In the course of their normal duties the two apparently encountered each other quite often.[197] Nevertheless, the animosity between the two appears to have pre-dated the establishment of the Republic. As early as 8 August 1931, not four months after the fall of the monarchy, Queipo remarked to Azaña that Villegas was "an undesirable."[198] Queipo also sided with a Lieutenant Colonel Angel Sánchez Cases when the latter wrote a letter accusing Villegas, a well-known monarchist, of trying to stir up discontent in the 1st Division.[199]

---

197. As this was the period during which Manuel Azaña was Minister of War, and for most of the time Prime Minister as well, the two figure prominently in his Memorias.

198. Azaña, Memorias, 8 August 1931.

199. Azaña, Memorias, 21 August 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although upon investigating Azaña concluded that there was nothing to the matter,[200] the issue dragged on for months.[201] The tensions between the two were often barely concealed on public occasions[202]. Certainly some of Azaña's exasperation with generals --"the princes of the army"--[203] and military men as a group must derive from such experiences. Yet despite this enormous gulf between Queipo, a liberal republican and mason, and Villegas, a conservative monarchist and Catholic, the two were on the same side in the Civil War, both becoming Nationalists.[204]

---

200. Azaña, Memorias, 22 August, "like others of his stripe" [i.e., republican activists], Sánchez Cases saw conspiracies everywhere. Azaña makes a similar remark ["very inclined to believe 'horror stories'."] about Queipo de Llano and Legorburu Domínguez when, on 8 January 1932, they came to him with rumors of a coup conspiracy.

201. Azaña's Memorias have entries regarding the affair for 26 August, 3 September ["From a grain of sand they make mountains"], and 12 September.

202. For example, at a reception held by the French Embassy, Villegas deliberately failed to salute Queipo, because the latter had deliberately not returned the salute of another officer with whom he was feuding, Brigadier General Eduardo Augustín Ortega: Azana, Memorias, 24 June 1932.

203. Azaña, Memorias, 24 June 1932.

204. Viewing the evidence, one is tempted to conclude that the principal fault in the quarrel between Villegas and Queipo lay with the latter, who fell to remarkably petty acts of spite in order to "get" Villegas, often exceeding his authority as Inspector General of the First Inspectorate to meddle in the arrangements for ceremonies, making a fuss over picayune details of uniform, ceremonial, and procedure: Azaña, Memorias, 3 November 1931, 4-7 April 1932. While one is tempted to suggest that the roots of his differences with Villegas were political, Queipo was also on bad terms with the conservative José Sanjurjo, who led the abortive anti-republican coup of August 1932, and had a running feud with Julio Mangada Rosenhorn, a notoriously leftist officer: Azaña, Memorias, 4 July 1931,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Family Connections

Several of the generals were tied to other officers, and even to various political leaders, by blood or marriage. While in many cases it has proven impossible to determine the faction which the relatives of a particular general supported, there is sufficient evidence available for a number of them, enough to permit some modest conclusions, once some care is taken to recall that available evidence tends to be more voluminous for persons with Nationalist connections than for those with Republican associations.

The factional connections of the brothers, sons, or first cousins of nine of the generals can be established. In four (44.4%) instances the family members found themselves on the same side, while in the other five (55.6%) they found themselves in different camps.[205] Based

---

12 September 1932, 21 September 1931.

205. The generals in question are: the Cabanellas Ferrer brothers, a Nationalist and a Neutral; the Carrasco Amilibia brothers, Nationalists; the Cruz Boullosa brothers, one Republican and one Nationalist, as was the son of the general; the Fanjul brothers, and the son of the general, Nationalists; the Franco Bahamonde brothers, both Nationalists, and their cousins, a Nationalist and a Republican, who was shot, despite family appeals for clemency; the Mola Vidal brothers, Nationalists; Caridad Pita and his son, both Republicans; the cousins Cardenal Dominicis and Otero-Cossio, the former a Republican, the latter a Nationalist; and the Pozas Perea brothers, a Republican and a Nationalist. Arguably, the Franco Bahamonde brothers were also related to yet another officer, Major General Jose Fernández Villa Abrille y Calivara: in 1901, Villa Abrille, married María de las

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on a sample of 47 sets of brothers of all ranks, representing 99 individuals, the members of 27 (57.4%) of the families supported the same faction, while the other 20 split (42.5%).[206] The differences between the two sets of figures are so minor as to be insignificant, and moreover, the families of the generals are also counted in those for the officers as a whole. Certainly the figures do not suggest a high degree of family cohesion.[207]

Two of the generals were related to prominent political leaders of the Spanish Republic.

Brigadier General Angel García Benitez' cousins Cipriano de Rivas Cherif and Dolores de Rivas Cherif were respectively the best friend and wife of Manuel Azaña. Azaña, who several times referred to García Benitez as "my

---

Mercedes Franco Salgado-Araujo, the sister of Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, who later became the military secretary to his cousin Francisco Franco Bahamonde. Villa Abrille sued for, and secured, a divorce in 1933. In the crisis of 1936 he became a Republican.

206. This sample is not necessarily scientific, being based on mostly secondary references to the loyalties of individual officers. However, the number of men in question represents about .7% of the approximately 15,000 officers on active duty at the time of the military uprising, and fully 7% of the nearly 1,500 officers for whom the present writer has been able to identify factional loyalties: see Chapter I, note 8.

207. Of course the extent to which the figures reflect sincere political commitment, expediency, or geographic loyalty, cannot, and can never, be known.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

cousin",[208] considered the general "very loyal to me."[209] Nevertheless, in the crisis of 1936 Gárcia Benitez, who commanded a cavalry brigade at Vitoria, in the Basque Country, became a Nationalist.[210]

Major General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano was connected by marriage to Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, the general's daughter having married the Alcalá-Zamora's son.[211] The relationship between the two men appears to have been close. Both were involved in several conspiracies against the monarchy. Alcalá-Zamora was chairman of the "shadow cabinet" created by the "Pact of San Sebastian" in August of 1930, and Queipo de Llano is usually considered to have been the head of the Asociación militar republicana, a clandestine group within the armed forces which worked towards the establishment of a republic, and was a key player in several abortive military conspiracies, including that of December 1930, and had been expelled from the army

---

208. Azaña, Memorias, 23 October 1931, 11 January 1932.

209. Azaña, Memorias, 13 August 1931.

210. Gárcia Benitez proclaimed a state of war on the morning of 19 July. There is no suggestion that he was anything but a genuine supporter of the military uprising. See Salas, HEPR, pp. 101-103; Rubio Cabeza, p. 784, under "Vitoria."

211. Their mutual grandson is José Alcala-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, a distinguished historian.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

as a result.[212] When Alcalá-Zamora became president of the Republic upon its proclamation, Queipo de Llano was restored to active duty and performed many important services. Yet Queipo proved to be one of the principal ring-leaders of the military conspiracy of 1936.

Family ties appear to have been only of marginal influence in helping officers make their choices in July of 1936.

Overall, personal relationships do not seem to have been of significance in helping officers make their choices in the crisis of 1936.

---

212. See Chapter II for a summary review of the roles of Alcalá-Zamora and Queipo de Llano in the collapse of the monarchy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

E. Civil War Careers

Few of the generals of 1936 can be said to have prospered as a result of the military conspiracy and subsequent Civil War.[213] Fully 33 died during the war, 24 by execution,[214] one by accident,[215] and eight from natural

---

213. The fate of various of the generals is very confusing. In "Los 40 generals victimas de la Guerra Civil," an article written primarily to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the matter, Ramon Salas points out that a lot of misinformation keeps circulating. For example, he notes (p. 24), that Brigadier General Victor Carrasco Amilibia is regularly reported as having been shot by the Nationalists "by virtually all the exiled Republicans and practically all French authors," whereas, in fact, it was the general's brother, León Carrasco Amilibia, who was shot, and by the Republic.

214. Executed by the Nationalists during the war were the major generals Domingo Batet Mestres, Miguel Nuñez de Prado, and Enrique de Salcedo Molinuevo, and the brigadier generals Miguel Campins Aura, Rogelio Caridad Pita, and Manuel Romerales Quintero. In addition, Toribio Martínez Cabrera, a brigadier general, was shot in 1940. Killed -- some were murdered without the formality of a trial-- by the Republicans were the lieutenant generals Pio López Pozas and José Rodríguez Casademundt, the major generals Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, Manuel Goded Llopis, Eduardo López de Ochoa, Antonio Losada Ortega, and Rafael Villegas Montesinos, and the brigadier generals Emilio Araujo-Vergara, José Bosch Atienza, Oswaldo Capaz Montes, Jacinto Fernández Ampon, Alvaro Fernandez Burriel, José García Aldave, Gonzalo González de Lara, Justo Legorburu Dominicis, Manuel Lon Laga, Federico de Miquel Lacour, and Francisco Patxot Madoz. As noted earlier in this chapter (see Part I, above), a number of the officers executed by each side were probably not adherents of the opposing faction.

215. The Nationalist conspirator Brigadier General Emilio Mola Vidal, in an airplane crash in 1937.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

causes.[216] In addition, in the course of the Civil War 21 of the generals were jailed or expelled from the army by the opposing faction, or even, in some cases, by their own, and were thus not available for active service.[217] Of the

---

216. The generals who died of natural causes during the war include Major General Angel Rodríquez del Barrio, on 7 November 1936, who by 18 July 1936 was physically incapable of taking any action and is thus counted as a Neutral, as well as the Republican Major General Juan Garcia y Gómez Caminero, who died on 14 December 1937, after rendering valuable services to the Republic and then passing into retirement for reasons of health, and Major General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, one of the principal Nationalist leaders, who died 14 May 1938, in semi-retirement. Four brigadier generals also died of natural causes during the war, the Nationalists Manuel García Alvárez, on 19 October 1938, and Gerardo Ravassa Cuevas, 3 February 1938, who had been on sick leave since before the alzamiento, but had made his preferences clear [see documents filed on his behalf by various Nationalist officers, AGMS, Expediente R-15], plus the Republicans Rafael Rodríquez Ramírez, on 24 June 1938, Celestino García Antúnez, on 15 August 1936, while being investigated for loyalty [Alpert, Ejército, p. 356], and Manuel de la Cruz Boullosa, 4 January 1939.

217. Officers subject to expulsion from the army or jailing by the Nationalists include the major generals Jose Fernández Villa Abrille, Agustín Gómez Morato, and Nicolas Molero Lobo, plus the brigadier generals Julian López Viota, and Julio Mena Zueco, Republicans or Neutrals all. In addition, they penalized with expulsion the brigadier generals Carlos Bosch Bosch, Victor Carrasco Amilibia, Jose Iglesias Martínez, Ricardo Morales Díaz, and Anselmo Otero-Cossio, who were technically on their side, but had displayed a noted lack of enthusiasm or ability. Those expelled or jailed by the Republic include Major General Virgilio Cabanellas Ferrer, and the brigadier generals Abilio Barbero Saldaña, Manuel de la Cruz Boullosa, who died on 4 January 1939, Enrique Aviles Melgar, Celestino García Antúnez, Eduardo Cavanna del Val, Alejandro Rodríguez González, Leopoldo Jiménez García, Rafael López Gómez, Angel San Pedro Aymat, and Rafael Rodríquez Ramírez, who died on 24 June 1938. None of these officers can be said to have supported the Nationalists, and several --Cruz Boullosa, San Pedro, Rodríquez Ramírez-- had rendered valuable services to the Republic in the early days of the Civil War: on Rodríquez Ramírez see Appendix 1, note 16, for several of the others see the discussion earlier in Part I of this Chapter. This list excludes officers on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

remaining generals, one went into self-imposed exile shortly after the Civil War broke out[218] and one suffered a nervous breakdown.[219] Other generals, particularly those on the losing side, suffered greatly after the war.

Excluding those officers killed, expelled from the army, or imprisoned during the first weeks of the Civil War, and those unfit for duty by reason of health, and including those who were later subject to expulsion or

---

whom the Nationalists inflicted various penalties after the war, including several of their own adherents who had displayed incompetence or a lack of enthusiasm. Note that two men listed here are also to be found among those who died during the war.

218. Major General Manuel González Carrasco, an africanista, and notably conservative officer, was "at disposal" at the time of the military uprising. A supporter of the conspiracy, his role was to lead the coup in Valencia, a task which he bungled. He fled abroad. He eventually returned to Nationalist Spain, where he was imprisoned. See the summary transcript of his court martial record in AGMS, Expediente G-3447.

219. Brigadier General Luis Castello Pantoja, africanista and staunch republican, held the garrison of Badajoz loyal in the face of an abortive rising on 18 July 1936. The next day he was called to Madrid to serve as Minister of War. Over the next few weeks his mental state began to deteriorate, his brother having been murdered and his wife and children having fallen into the hands of the Nationalists. On 2 August he was relieved of duty. In October he was institutionalized for insanity. He later escaped and fled to France, from whence he returned after the Civil War. Tried by the Nationalists, he was briefly imprisoned. See AGMS, Expediente C-2166. There are references to him in Alpert, Ejército, p. 389; Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 36; and Maximiano García Venero, El General Fanjul: Madrid en el Alzamiento Nacional (Madrid: Ediciones Cid, 1967), p. 286.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

imprisonment, there were 45 generals available for active duty in late 1936, 25 with the Republic and 20 with the Nationalists. Of these, 25 served in various minor capacities or remained substantially unemployed during the war, twelve with the Nationalists[220] and thirteen with the Republicans.[221] The underemployment or lack of employment of these officers was presumably a reflection on their age,[222] doubts their competence,[223] possible questions

---

220. These include one major general, José Sánchez-Ocaña, and ten brigadier generals, Eliseo Alvárez-Arenas, Carlos Bosch Bosch, later forcibly retired, Gregorio Benito Terraza, Antonio Ferrer de Miguel, Manuel García Alvárez, Angel García Benitez, José Iglesias Martínez, who was later expelled from the army, José María López Pinto, Eduardo Martín-González, and Alfonso Moya Andino, who performed such duties as presiding over courts martial or serving as military governors. To these must be added one officer elsewhere classed as a Neutral, Lieutenant General Alberto Castro Girona, who performed some administrative functions after fleeing from the Republican Zone.

221. There were two major generals, Pedro de la Cerda y López Mollinedo and Cristobal Pena Abuin, plus the brigadier generals Manuel del Alcazar Leal, Manuel García Benet, Eduardo Cavanna del Val, who were never subject to disciplinary proceedings, plus Juan Urbano Palma, who retired in December of 1936, as well as Alejandro Rodríguez González and Rafael Rodríguez Ramírez, both expelled from the army in the autumn of 1937, Angel de San Pedro Aymat, put "at disposal" in August of 1937, and Enrique Aviles Melgar, Manuel de la Cruz Boullosa, Leopoldo Jiménez García, and Rafael López Gómez, who were expelled from the army in mid-1938.

222. This is probably the reason why the Republic did not employ Major General Pedro de la Cerda, who had just turned 65, or Major General Cristobal Pena Abuin and Brigadier General Juan Urbano Palma, who were 64. On the other hand, Miguel Cabanellas played an important role among the Nationalists at the age of 64, and both Gómez Caminero and Masquelet Lacaci were important assets to the Republic despite being over 65.

223. A case in point is that of Brigadier General Carlos Bosch Bosch, 63, who commanded the 16th Infantry Brigade, at Léon, in northern Spain. On receiving word of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

about their loyalties,[224] or perhaps merely the result of political machinations or personal animosities.[225] As

---

the military uprising in Morocco on 17 July, a large column of armed radical miners had been hastily organized in the Asturias and on the 18th set out for Madrid. As Léon lay on their line of march, Bosch Bosch delayed joining the rebellion until this dangerous horde passed, on the 19th. On the morning of the 20th, two days after most garrisons in Spain had risen, he proclaimed a state of war. His delay did not go down well with the Nationalist leadership, for it greatly strengthened the hand of the Government in Madrid. Moreover, during the two days in which he had pretended loyalty, Bosch Bosch had permitted leftist Major General Juan García Gómez Caminero to elude capture. As a result, Bosch Bosch was given only administrative posts, and was passed to the reserve on 24 February 1937. See his "Relacion de servicios" dated 21 May 1941, in AGMS, Expediente B-3572: see also Salas, HEPR, pp. 110-111.

224. This would certainly appear to be so in the cases of the Republican brigadier generals Rodríguez González, Rafael Rodríguez Ramírez, Enrique Aviles Melgar, Leopoldo Jiménez García, and Rafael López Gómez, the last three of whom were over 60 years of age. All of them were eventually expelled from the army or forcibly retired. Yet the evidence against some of them seems rather flimsy. Consider Brigadier General Rafael Rodríguez Ramírez. Together with Major General Juan García y Gómez Caminero, Rodríguez Ramírez had been sent by the government to secure the loyalties of garrisons in the northwestern part of Spain on 18 July. The two were at Leon on 20 July 1936 when the local garrison rose, in a solidly conservative area. Both officers briefly pretended to support the rising, and then deserted at the earliest opportunity. Escaping on horseback, they made their way over the mountains to Portugal, and thence into the Republican zone at Badajoz. Yet while Gómez Caminero was assigned a number of important posts until his retirement for reasons of health and age in early 1937, Rodriguez Ramirez was denied employment and subsequently expelled from the army: cf., Alpert, Ejército, p. 358; Salas, "40", p. 21.

225. Arguably, the fact that Major General Pedro de la Cerda, who was the shortest of the generals, 1.52 meters, only about 4'10", was not employed could as readily have been for his personal habits as for his age. Although a republican activist for many years, he was not on friendly terms with Manuel Azaña, due partially to his peculiar personal habits. Azaña wrote of him "Incompetent, semi-crazy, a disaster even to the way he dresses. . . . he practices naturism and walks naked among the pines, . . . with an assistant to alert the neighbors." Azaña/Arrarás,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

result, only 19 of the generals may be said to have performed significant military or political duties during the war,[226] including several who died in the course of the war or became otherwise unfit for service. Seven of these were Nationalists,[227] and twelve were Republicans.[228] What is perhaps most interesting about these 19 officers is that the africanistas are heavily represented in both camps. All seven of the Nationalists, and three of the Republicans were africanistas. Moreover, the role of the africanistas is emphasized, if those activist generals who were killed in the first days of the Civil War are included. Including the Nationalist conspirators who were executed by the

---

Memorias, 27 August 1932 (pp. 160-162).

226. These figures naturally exclude prominent officers killed in the first days of the Civil War, such as the Republicans Batet Mestres and Nuñez de Prado and the Nationalists Goded Llopis and Fanjul Goñi.

227. Francisco Franco Bahamonde, generalissimo of the Nationalist movement, plus Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Emilio Mola Vidal, José Varela Iglesias, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Andrés Saliquet Zumeta, and Luis Orgaz Yoldi, who all held high political or military posts. Cabanellas and Mola died in the course of the war.

228. Luis Castello Pantoja, José Riquelme y López Bago, Carlos Bernal García, Francisco Llano Encomienda, Jose Miaja Menant, Mariano Gamir Ulibarri, Sebastian Pozas Perea, Toribio Martínez Cabrera, Fernando Martínez Monje, Manuel Carednal Dominicis, Juan García y Gómez Caminero, and Carlos Masquelet Lacaci all held important political or military posts. Castello Pantoja's services lasted barely two weeks before he had to be removed due to a nervous breakdown.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republic soon after the beginning of the Civil War, the total number of high level Nationalist generals rises to ten, all of whom were africanistas.[229] Similarly, adding those generals who were shot for actively opposing the Nationalist uprising during the first few weeks, the figures for prominent Republican generals rises to 17, of whom eight were africanistas.[230] In effect, of the generals of 1936, africanistas constituted 100% of those who became prominent in the Nationalist ranks and over 40% of those who became prominent in the Republican camp.[231] These figures bear no relationship to the proportion of africanistas among the generals, which was rather less than a third.[232] So while the africanistas were of overwhelming

---

229. Franco Bahamonde, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Mola Vidal, Varela Iglesias, Queipo de Llano, Saliquet Zumeta, and Luis Orgaz Yoldi, to whom must be added three major generals captured and later executed by the Republic in the early days of the uprising, Manuel Goded Llopis, Rafael Villegas Montesinos, and Joaquín Fanjul Goñi.

230. Prominent Republican africanistas were Castello Pantoja, Riquelme y López Bago, Llano Encomienda, and Miaja Menant, who played an active role in the war, plus Miguel Nuñez de Prado, Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo, Agustín Gómez Morato, and Manuel Romerales Quintero, who were shot or imprisoned by the Nationalists within days of the onset of the Civil War. The additional non-africanista general was Domingo Batet Mestres, who was also shot.

231. The somewhat clumsy wording of this sentence is necessitated by the fact that on both sides additional officers rose to considerable prominence, including, particularly on the Nationalist side, several who had been in retirement in July of 1936.

232. On the proportions, and identity of the africanistas among the generals in 1936 see Chapter VI, with particular reference to note 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

importance to the Nationalist movement, they were also very prominent in the ranks of the leading Republicans.[233] It is worth looking more closely at these 27 men.

---

233. It is worth noting that of the seven generals executed by the Nationalists, four were africanistas, the major generals Nuñez de Prado and Salcedo Molinuevo, plus the brigadier generals Romerales Quintero and Campins Aura, of whom the first three were activist Republicans. In contrast, of the 18 generals executed by the Republic, only Fanjul Goñi, Goded Llopis, and Villegas Montesinos, major generals, plus Capaz Montes, a brigadier general, were africanistas, of whom the first three were active Nationalist conspirators.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter VIII

Conspirators and Loyalists

The generals who played critical roles in the military uprising of July 1936, whether as participants or opponents of the coup, constituted about a third of those on active list at the time, 27 men --seventeen Republicans and ten Nationalists-- out of 85. Before attempting to compare these officers with the generals as a whole, and with the members of their respective factions, a look at the reasons for their inclusion as leaders is in order.

Part I. Establishing the Leadership.

The principal criteria for determining whether an officer should be included among the leaders of his faction was the degree of commitment to the faction demonstrated in the crisis which erupted with the military coup of 17-18 July, and the type of posts to which the officer eventually rose.[1]

---

1. The brief sketches which follow are not intended to do more than present the evidence for including each of these officers among the leaders of their respective factions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republicans. Ten of the seventeen generals who were prominent among those siding with the Republic in 1936 were brigadier generals, balance were major generals. Although a number of these men had attained no particular distinction prior to the events of July 1936, several were among the most notable officers in the Spanish Army.

Major General Domingo Batet Mestres[2], an infantry veteran of the Cuban campaign, during which he had earned a merit promotion, spent much of his military career in his native Catalonia, where his family had extensive industrial holdings. The general was openly known as a liberal republican and had been involved in various conspiracies against Primo de Rivera.[3] Reputedly the most reliable man in the army, he was very well regarded, even among the Nationalists.[4] In 1936 he was commander of the 6th

---

2. Primary sources for Batet are poor. His file at the AGMS, Expediente B-1095, includes only one document, the decree of 25 March 1937 expelling him from the army. His file in the AHNS (Legajo 1252, Expediente 115), indicates that after the war he was investigated as a suspected mason, with a "negative" finding. There is a substantial entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 113, and a short one in Cortada, p. 80. Batet is frequently mentioned in the literature regarding the military uprising.

3. Fuqua to MID, 21 February 1935, US NA MID 2447-S-19.1. See also Payne, Ejército, p. 418.

4. When a Nationalist court martial sentenced him to death in 1937, a number of prominent Nationalist commanders, including Miguel Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano, attempted to secure commutation of the sentence: cf., Rubio Cabeza, p. 113; Cortada, p. 80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Division, with headquarters in Burgos, in Old Castille, one of the most conservative regions of Spain. One of the few generals whom Emilio Mola did not attempt to bring into the conspiracy, Batet nevertheless appears to have suspected that somesuch was in the wind. On three separate occasions he attempted to question Mola, who commanded one of his brigades, as to whether there was a conspiracy afoot, only to allow himself to be put off by the latter, who gave his word of honor that he would join no conspiracies. Batet was less gullible with regard to Brigadier General Gonzalo González de Lara. On instructions from the Minister of War, Batet ordered González de Lara relieved of command of his brigade on the afternoon of 17 July, as it became clear that there had been a military uprising in Morocco.[5] The following afternoon, Batet's chief-of-staff, Colonel Fernando Moreno Calderon, accompanied by several other conspirators, accosted the general in his headquarters. Moreno Calderon, who held Batet in high regard, asked the general to join the uprising. Batet refused and was

---

5. Iribarren, pp. 51-53; Beltran Guell, p. 129; Maiz, pp. 198, 244-245, 256-257. The actual relief was effected personally by Major General Juan García Gómez Caminero. Whether Batet attempted to alert the government to his suspicions remains unclear. Although Friedlander, p. 173, argues that he did not, there is no evidence either way. Given Batet's commitment to the regime, it is unreasonable to assume that he would not have made some efforts to bring his concerns to the attention of the government, as did several other generals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

arrested. In early 1937 Batet was tried by court martial and found guilty of "military rebellion."[6] He was executed on 18 February 1937.

Son of a civilian contractor for the military, Brigadier General Carlos Bernal García[7] was an engineer and veteran of the Philippine and Moroccan wars.[8] Generally regarded as a republican, in July of 1936 he was serving as Secretary of the Consejo director de las Ordenes militares, which supervised decorations and special pensions. The military uprising found him in Madrid, where he placed himself at the service of the government. He was immediately made Undersecretary of War, in the room of Manuel de la Cruz Boullosa, arrested on suspicion of disloyalty. Bernal García served in this post for only about ten days, being sent to command troops on the

---

6. The court was presided over by Brigadier General Angel García Benitez, generally regarded as a republican, who was a cousin by marriage of President Manuel Azaña.

7. Sources for Bernal García are AGMS, Expediente B-2072, which includes a summary transcript of his court martial by the Nationalists. There is some material in AROM, Expediente B-247-6. He is only occasionally mentioned in the literature.

8. Bernal García had a far more distinguished combat record than most members of the "facultative corps," having nearly 5.7 years time on campaign credit. He was one of the very few engineer and artillery officers to have received a merit promotion. In September of 1914 Bernal García was promoted to major by merit. However, the following September he remitted the promotion for a María Cristina. In 1927 he accepted a promotion to colonel "by election" [AGMS, Expediente B-2072].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Somosierra Front, north of Madrid for several months. He was later inspector general of engineers in the Madrid military region and commanded a territorial division from mid-December of 1936 to July of 1937. Thereafter he served as inspector general of various army corps on the Extremaduran and Andalucian Fronts until October, when he was made Director of Rear Area Services and Transportation. In January of 1939 he was made commander of the naval base at Cartagena, where he suppressed a premature rising by the local Nationalist underground. In March he became military commander of Madrid. As by this time the fortunes of the Republic were definitely in decline, Bernal García supported the effort of Colonel Segismundo Casado to bring the war to an end, helping to suppress an uprising by Communist Party-dominated units intent on continuing the war.[9] After the war, Bernal García was tried by the Nationalists for "military rebellion" and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.[10]

---

9. For this episode, see Segismundo Casado, Así cayo Madrid (Madrid;Guadiana, 1968); Xavier Costa Clavell, Los ultimos dias de la República (Barcelona; Bruguera, 1975), pp. 90-134; José Manuel Martínez Bande, Los cien ultimos dias de la República (Espluges de Llobregat: Carlat, 1973), pp. 155-213; and Jose Manuel Martínez Bande, El final de la Guerra Civil (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1985), pp. 235-290.

10. Bernal García's wartime career is outlined in the Juicio Sumarisimo, in AGMS, Expediente B-2072. He died in prison in 1940, an appeal for clemency for reasons of health having been denied.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Brigadier General Manuel Cardenal Dominicis entered the army by enlisting in the engineers in 1889.[11] Save for some field service in Cuba, virtually his entire career was spent in garrison.[12] In July of 1936 Cardenal Dominicis was commander of the 1st Artillery Brigade, in Madrid. Although his personal political views cannot be established, at the time of the military uprising Cardenal Dominicis sided with the Republic, being instrumental in holding the 1st Light Artillery Regiment loyal. He was sufficiently well regarded to be immediately entrusted with a variety of critical posts, beginning as acting commander of the 1st Division, in Madrid, on 19-20 July. Thereafter Cardenal Dominicis served in a variety of administrative and judicial posts, during which he presided at the court martial of a number of officers with ties to the military conspiracy, resulting in several death sentences. In November of 1937 he was named military commander of Madrid, holding what was in effect the second most important post on the Madrid Front. In August of 1938 Cardenal Dominicis retired for reasons of age. Thereafter inactive, after the

---

11. Sources for Cardenal Dominicis are poor. His dossier at the AGMS, Expediente C-1302, contains an incomplete hoja de servicios, but does have the a summary of his court martial by the Nationalists after the war. His file at the AROM, Expediente C-142-B, is empty. He is occasionally mentioned in the literature.

12. Cardenal Dominicis earned only about five months time on campaign credit whilst in Cuba.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Civil War he was tried by the Nationalists and sentenced to death, which was subsequently commuted to 30 years imprisonment.[13]

Brigadier General Luis Castello Pantoja,[14] a former juntero, was both an africanista and a staunch left-wing republican, with ties to the U.M.R.A.[15] In July of 1936 he commanded the 2nd Infantry Brigade, headquartered in Badajoz. In Madrid at the time of the military uprising in Morocco on 17 July, Castello Pantoja drove to Badajoz and there quashed an abortive rising on 18 July 1936. The next day he was called to Madrid to serve as Minister of War. The pressure of work,[16] plus news that his brother had been murdered by an anarchist, and that his wife and children

---

13. Cardenal Dominicis' wartime activities are found in the Juicio Sumarisimo of his court martial, in AGMS, Expediente C-1302. See also Salas, HEPR, Vol. I, pp. 417, 627, and Vol II, pp. 1550, 1573 (note 10), 1846, 1936, and 2048. This writer has been unable to establish anything about this general after the commutation of his sentence.

14. Sources on Castello Pantoja are adequate. There are documents in AGMS, Expediente C-2166, including 14 sheets referring to his post war trial by the Nationalists, in AHNS, Legajo 1418, Expediente 40, concerning his masonic connections, and AROM, Expediente C-230-B. There is a short, satisfactory entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 183, and Cortada, p. 113. See also, Payne, Ejército, p. 428; Alpert, Ejército, pp. 12, 389; Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 36; and Garcia Venero, p. 286.

15. Payne, Ejército, p. 428.

16. Azaña said that he was "a very hard worker", and appears to have trusted him completely: Memorias, 1 March 1933.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

had fallen into the hands of the Nationalists, caused him suffer a nervous breakdown. On 2 August he was relieved of duty. In October he was institutionalized for insanity. He later escaped and fled to France, from whence he returned after the Civil War.[17]

The son of a lieutenant general, Brigadier General Mariano Gamir Ulibarri[18] had a satisfactory, if unspectacular career as an infantryman. Save for service in Cuba, for which he was granted 2.7 years time on campaign credit and received on promotion by méritos de guerra, virtually his entire time in the army was spent in garrison or administrative posts, including a tour as commandant of the newly opened Academia de infantería, 1931-1932. A liberal republican, Gamir had the reputation of being well-grounded in his profession, but not quite up

---

17. After being imprisoned for a time, Castello Pantoja was tried by the Nationalists, and expelled from the army in 1942. In 1944 the general wrote an appeal for relief, in longhand, which appears to have been granted. He died in 1962. See AGMS, Expediente C-2166, which includes the general's appeal.

18. Gamir Ulibarri's file at the AGMS, Expediente No. G-374, is empty. However, there is extensive documentation in CGEM, Gamir Ulibarri, and some information in AROM, Expediente G-35-T. Also available are his very short memoirs, De me memorias (Paris: Imprimerie Moderne, 1939), and his more extensive Ofensiva del Norte: Bilbao-Santander (Paris: Vaires, 1939). There are short entries in Rubio Cabeza, p. 358, Cortada, p. 230, and Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 124-125. He is mentioned frequently in the literature of the Civil War.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on the most modern developments.[19] In July of 1936, he was commander of the 5th Infantry Brigade, stationed in Valencia, and was instrumental in helping to keep the local garrison loyal to the Republic. He subsequently held a variety of critical posts, including command of all forces in the Valencia region for some time. In June of 1937, Gamir was given command of all Republican forces on the isolated northern front, including the Basque provinces, Santander, and the Asturias, a hopeless post given the political and military situation.[20] Sacked after the fall of Santander in late August, Gamir held several administrative and territorial posts until early 1938, when he was made Inspector General of Military Instruction, a post in which he continued to the end of the war, when he fled the country.[21]

---

19. Zaragoza, Generales, p. 124.

20. The region was cut off from the rest of Republican Spain by Nationalist-controlled territory, and part of his inadequately equipped and trained forces were under the control of the autonomous Basque Republic, making the exercise of command extremely difficult. For a military treatment of the campaign see Gamir's Ofensiva sobre el Norte, José Manuel Martínez Bande, Vizcaya (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1971) and El Final del Frente Norte (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1972), the official accounts, and Gabriel García Volta, La campaña del Norte (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1975). See also the entries for Martínez Cabrera and Llano de la Encomienda.

21. In common with several other former Republican senior officers, Gamir returned to Spain in the early 1950s, where he was subjected to a pro forma court martial which found him guilty of various crimes, but which imposed no sentence. He died in retirement in 1962.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

One of the most leftist and politically active generals in the Spanish Army, Major General Juan García Gómez Caminero was also one of the oldest on active duty in 1936, having passed his 65th birthday in February of that year.[22] A man of some intellectual power, his early career included service as a military attache in Rio and on the staff of the Supreme War Council, but does not appear to have had very much combat time.[23] During the later years of the Dictatorship, Primo de Rivera put Gómez Caminero on the retired list for his outspoken republicanism. His staunch republicanism insured that he would be restored to duty on the advent of the Republic, despite the fact that he was not on friendly terms with Manuel Azaña, and he held a variety of responsible posts.[24] A reputed mason,[25] Gómez

---

22. Primary sources for Gómez Caminero are very poor. He has no file at the AGMS, and the one at AROM, Expediente G-111-4 contains no useful information. His file at the AHNS, Legajo 1132, Expediente 121, indicates that he was investigated as a suspected mason, with "negative" results. There is a short entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 360. That in Cortada, p. 244, is seriously in error. The general is often mentioned in the literature.

23. The absence of documentation makes an evaluation of Gómez Caminero's early career difficult. He may have seen active service in the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century, but he certainly saw none in Morocco.

24. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 430.

25. His name appears on all lists of suspected masons, such as Bravo Morato, República, p. 105.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Caminero was a member of the U.M.R.A.,[26] and a leftist candidate for the Cortes. In July of 1936 he was head of the Third Inspectorate General, covering the northwestern part of Spain. After the Moroccan garrison rose on the 17th, Gómez Caminero, with the consent of the Minister of War, began to sack various officers whose loyalties were suspect, personally removing Brigadier General Gonzalo González de Lara from his brigade on the 18th. The 19th found him and his chief-of-staff, Brigadier General Rafael Rodríguez Ramírez, in Leon, which had not yet risen, but where he perceived that the conspiracy was too deeply rooted for him to take effective action. For a day or so the two officers pretended to support the rebels, and then managed to escape over the mountains to Portugal, and thence made their way back to Republican Spain. During the first five months of the Civil War, Gómez Caminero held a variety of posts, including presidency of the court martial which tried Major General Joaquín Fanjul, one of the most important Nationalist conspirators to fall into Republican hands. In early 1937 Gómez Caminero retired for reasons of health, and died before the year was out.

---

26. Bravo Morato, República, pp. 124-125; Salas, HEPR, p. 67; Zaragoza, Generales, p. 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Among the most distinguished officers in the Spanish Army, Major General Agustín Gómez Morato,[27] an africanistas, had a very impressive career, including service in Cuba and Morocco, where he earned two promotions by méritos de guerra and a third by "election." A moderate republican,[28] and suspected mason[29] Gómez Morato was a friend to Manuel Azaña.[30] In July of 1936 Gómez Morato was commander of all military forces in Morocco, a post to which he had been appointed in the hope that he could help keep the troops loyal. On 17 July he was at his headquarters in Larache, on the Atlantic coast of the Protectorate. Apprised by telephone that the garrison of Melilla had risen, the general immediately set out by air for the latter place, at the opposite end of the

---

27. Sources for Gómez Morato are poor. AGMS, Expediente No. G-2218, contains only the a few documents, including a copy of the Nationalist decree expelling him from the army. AROM, Expediente G-255-4 includes some information about his family, and AHNS, Legajo 1204, Expediente 17, indicates that he was investigated as a suspected mason with "negative" results. There is a file bearing his name at CGEM, but it contains no useful information. The general has a short entry in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 387-388. He is only occasionally mentioned in the literature.

28. Fuqua to MID, 19 February 1935, US NA, MID 2041-316.7. See also Salas, HEPR, p. 87.

29. Bravo Morato, República,p. 104; Payne, Ejercito, p. 428.

30. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, 431.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Protectorate.[31] Arrested upon landing at Melilla, Gómez Morato was imprisoned. On 23 December 1936 he was expelled from the army.[32]

The son of an army officer, Brigadier General Francisco Llano de la Encomienda[33] had a distinguished military career in Morocco, where he served for some ten years, earning two merit promotions and numerous decorations.[34] One of the most openly leftist generals, a socialist, outspoken anti-fascist, probable mason, and member of the U.M.R.A.,[35] Llano de la Encomienda's

---

31. For Gómez Morato's movements on 17 July, see Zaragoza, Africa, pp. 61-63.

32. Decree 125, in Bolletin Official No. 67. At the end of the Civil War, Gómez Morato was tried by court martial and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Released in 1942, he settled in Valencia, where he died in 1952. The general's three sons and his son-in-law were Nationalists. For some details on his later life see Ramón Salas Larrazabal and Jesus María Salas Larrazabal, Historia general de la Guerra de España (Madrid: Rialp, 1986), p. 33.

33. Sources for Llano de la Encomienda are AGMS, Expediente LL-80, which is quite complete, as well as AROM, Expediente LL-8. The files of the Heuristica organization, Madrid, are also of value, as they include some letters from the general's sons. There are long entries in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 473-474, and Cortada, p. 305, as well as a shorter one in Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 130-131. The general is mentioned frequently in the literature.

34. The absence of a portion of the general's hoja de servicio makes it impossible to determine the amount of time on campaign credit he received for his service in Morocco.

35. Payne, Ejército, p. 428, among others.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

republican credentials were so sturdy that in February of 1936 he was named commander of the 4th Infantry Division, the garrison of Barcelona, in plaza superior categoria, that is, above his substantive rank. Although several sources claim he vacillated in the crisis of 1936,[36] his actions do not confirm such charges. He was instrumental in frustrating the uprising in Barcelona and subsequently gave evidence against Major General Manuel Goded Llopis, head of the military conspiracy in the local garrison.[37] Relieved of the 4th Division in mid-August, Llano de la Encomienda was soon given a succession of responsible posts. He was given command of the Army of the North in November of 1936, a post of considerable strategic importance and unusual difficulties, given that it covered the isolated strip of Republican territory on the northern coast. Although he enjoyed the full support of the government, Llano de la Encomienda had a difficult, and ultimately unsuccessful tenure in command, not surprising given his slender resources and the persistent interference

---

36. Alpert, Ejército, p. 399; Cortada, p. 305; Zaragoza, Generales, p. 130.

37. For events in the 4th Division during the military uprising, see Ramón Salas Larrazabal, "Militares de la 4a. Division el 18 de Julio", Historia y Vida, No. 142 (January 1980), p. 52 ["Salas, '4a. Division'"].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the government of the autonomous Basque Republic.[38] Relieved at the end of June of 1937, Llano de la Encomienda commanded the local garrison in Valencia for a time, and was then named inspector general of infantry, in which post he served until virtually the end of the war, when he fled abroad.[39]

A member of the staff corps, Brigadier General Toribio Martínez Cabrera,[40] began his military career as an enlisted man in the artillery. Although his early service is unclear,[41] he appears to have had a purely

---

38. For an account of the military aspect of the war in the north, see José Manuel Martínez Bande, La Guerra en el Norte (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1969), and the entries for Gamir Ulibarri and Martínez Cabrera.

39. Llano de la Encomienda eventually settled in Mexico, where he died in 1963. The general's three sons all served as officers in the Republican Army, one being killed in action. The youngest son, Luis de Llano Palmer, who served as a captain of infantry, now resides in Los Angeles. Although this writer several times spoke the with latter's secretary, he was unable to establish contact with Mr. de Llano.

40. Sources for Martínez Cabrera are AGMS, Expediente M-2052, which includes a juicio sumarisimo, but no hoja de servicios, AROM, Expediente 163, which contains some family data, and AHNS, Legajo 1614, Expediente M-23, which indicates that the general was investigated as a suspected mason, with "negative" findings. There are short entries in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 518-520, Cortada, p. 321, and Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 131-132.

41. Martínez Cabrera was commissioned in 1896, and so could have served in Cuban or Philippine wars. However, his name does not appear on the list of officers assigned to those theaters to be found in War Department, Military Information Division, Notes and Tables on the Organization and Establishment of the Spanish Army in the Peninsula and Colonies (Washington: 1898), so if he served, he did so during 1896-1897.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

administrative career in the Spanish Army, spending some 15 years as an instructor at the Staff College, which he directed for a time in the early 1930s. In July of 1936, Martínez Cabrera was commander of the Cartagena Coast Defense Plaza, protecting the largest Spanish naval base. A staunch republican,[42] and suspected mason, when he became aware of the existence of a military conspiracy Martínez Cabrera appears to have attempted to alert the government, with the aid of his friend Brigadier General Martínez Monje, who commanded the regional infantry division, only to be ignored.[43] At the outbreak of the Civil War he helped hold Cartagena for the Republic. Thereafter he rose high in the service of the Republic. He commanded in Andalucia in the late summer of 1936, and was the named chief-of-the-general staff in November of 1936. He was removed the following March, largely as a result of political machinations, but ostensibly due to the loss of Malaga.[44] Charged with responsibility for the defeat at Malaga, Martinez Cabrera and several other generals were

---

42. Alpert, Ejército, p. 400; Bravo Morato, República, p. 128; Ramón Salas Larrazabal, Perdidas de guerra (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), pp. 66-67 ["Salas, Perdidas"].

43. González López, intterview, 19 December 1987.

44. Martínez Cabrera had ties to the trotskyite P.O.U.M., which proved a distinct handicap as the stalinist Communist Party gained increasingly influence in the government and army. See Rubio Cabeza, p. 518, Cortada, p. 321.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

cleared by a court martial.[45] He was soon afterwards named inspector general of the Army of the North, serving until the fall of Santander, in June of 1937.[46] He subsequently issued a scathing report, highly critical of the organization, training, and discipline of the Republican Army, which brought him into conflict with several high political and military figures, particularly those with ties to the Communist Party.[47] Accused of treason, he was jailed. Cleared and released, in early 1938 he was named military governor of Madrid, one of the most critical posts in the Republican Army, in which he remained until relieved in March of 1939. Soon afterwards he aided Colonel Segismundo Casado in the latter's attempt to secure a negotiated surrender. At the end of the war he refused to flee the country, and was arrested by the Nationalists. Subsequently tried for "military rebellion," Martinez Cabrera was shot in 1940.[48]

---

45. The case against Martínez Cabrera and the others is referred to in Azaña, Memorias, 15 September 1937, 21 October 1937, and 21 November, 1937.

46. See the entries for Llano de la Encomienda and Gamir Ulibarri.

47. Azaña called Martínez Cabrera's reports on the military situation in the north "succinct" (Memorias, 12 July 1937), and subsequently wrote "it confirms what I believed" (24 July 1937).

48. Martínez Cabrera was the only one of several former regular army generals siding with the Republic sentenced to death by the Nationalists after the war whose sentence was not commuted to a lengthy prison term. The present writer can find no explanation for this.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The son of a brigadier general, Fernando Martínez de Monje Restoy[49] had a satisfactory, if unspectacular career in the Spanish Army. He served as an infantry lieutenant in Cuba, 1896-1897, for which he received only about eight months time on campaign credit. In the mid-1920s he served in Morocco, receiving a merit promotion to colonel for the Alhucemas Campaign.[50] A suspected mason[51], in July of 1936 he was commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, garrisoned in Valencia. He was given this post in plaza superior categoria, that is, above his substantive rank, in deference to his credentials as a republican.[52] Some authors charge that he wavered in his loyalty to the

---

49. Sources for Martínez de Monje are AGMS, Expediente M-1521, AROM, Expediente M-202-T, and AHNS, Legajo 1207, Expediente 6. There are short entries in Rubio Cabeza, p. 521, and Cortada, p. 321-322. He is occasionally mentioned in the literature.

50. Despite about three years' service with the Regulares, and his presence at the famous Ben Tieb banquet, Martinez de Monje is not classed as an africanista. Both his service in the Protectorate and his affiliation with the Regulares were incidental, as was his presence at Ben Tieb.

51. Martínez Monje's name appears on all lists of suspected masons in the army: see, for example, Payne, Ejército, p. 428. As in the case of virtually all the generals charged with being masons, the post-war Nationalist investigation returned a "negative" finding: AHNS, Legajo 1207, Expediente 6.

52. Bravo Morato, República, p. 126; Salas, HEPR, p. 147.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republic,[53] but there is also some evidence that he tried to help his close friend Brigadier General Toribio Martínez Cabrera alert the government to the danger.[54] In the crisis of sparked by the militar uprising of 17-18 July he appeared hesitant and indecisive, but nevertheless declared for the Republic, being instrumental in keeping the garrison of Valencia loyal. He afterwards commanded with little success in Andalucia. On the fall of Malaga, in early 1937, he was removed from command. Charged with treason, along with Martínez Cabrera and several other generals, Martínez Monje was cleared in November.[55] In the interim, Martínez Monje held a command in Catalonia, during which he attempted to avoid involvement in the suppression of the P.O.U.M., almost being shot by irate communist militiamen as a result.[56] After his court martial, Martínez Monje held a variety of administrative posts, which were apparently more suited to his talents than operations, as he does not seem to have been a decisive

---

53. Cf., Cortada, p. 321; Payne, Ejército, p. 428; Payne, Politics, p. 350.

54. González López, interview, 19 December 1987. Azaña, Memorias, 7 August 1937, states that when Mola attempted to get him to join the conspiracy, Martínez Monje avoided committing himself.

55. The case against Martínez Monje and the others is referred to in Azaña, Memorias, 15 September 1937, 21 October 1937, and 21 November, 1937.

56. Azaña, Memorias, 20 May 1937.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

commander. At the end of the Civil War he went into exile, settling in Argentina, where he died several years later.[57]

One of the oldest officers on active duty, Major General Carlos Masquelet Lacaci had a long and varied career in the Spanish Army.[58] A talented engineer, he directed a number of major military and naval projects, including the construction of a naval base at El Ferrol, served as deputy chief-of-the-general staff in 1931-1932, and then as chief-of-the-general staff in 1932-1934. Masquelet was a republican and got along well with Manuel Azana, who wrote of him, "Masquelet is reticent, silent, cold. Liberal, without ambition, unmarried. He spends his time reading or working. I take him to be loyal."[59] In

---

57. Years later Franco said that he "was certain" both Martínez Monje and Llano de la Encomienda "were patriots . . . convinced of the inevitable necessity of saving Spain. He added that both had taken part in the Ben Tieb affair, on which see Chapter II. Franco-Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 506.

58. Primary sources for Masquelet are poor. AGMS, Expediente No. M-248, contains only miscellaneous documents, AHNS, Legajo 1418, Expediente 60, contains information about his masonic ties, and AROM, Expediente M-244-T, some details about his family and his promotions. However, two letters from U.S. military attaches are of considerable value --Fuqua to MID, 21 February 1933 (US NA MID 2041-316.5) and Fletcher to MID, 25 March 1933 (US NA MID 2041-242.1)-- and the general figures prominently in Azaña, Memorias. There are brief entries in Cortada, p. 326, and Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 132-133, and he is frequently mentioned in the literature.

59. Azaña, Memorias, 10 April 1932. Earlier Azaña had referred to the general as "always silent and enigmatic" (8 August 1931). Shortly after the sanjurjada, Azana wrote "Masquelet is an exception in the army, and I am very pleased to have discovered him. I propose to maintain him where he is [as chief-of-the-general staff] indefinitely": Azaña/Arrarás, Memorias, 12 August 1932 (p. 314). Prof. González López notes that Masquelet was a man of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

contrast, most of the army considered Masquelet a nonentity, promoted largely for political reasons: during the Asturian Rebellion of 1934 he proved so inept that the Minister of War brought in Francisco Franco to serve as "technical adviser."[60] In July of 1936 Masquelet was serving as chief of the Azaña's personal military staff. During the Civil War he served in numerous administrative and technical posts, designed the defenses of Madrid, organized the Fortifications Commission, proved helpful in defusing the P.U.O.M. crisis of May 1937, and continued as an adviser to Azaña even after his retirement for age in July of 1937.[61] At the end of the Civil War Masquelet went into exile in France, where he died in 1940.[62]

---

considerable culture (interview, 19 December 1987).

60. Fuqua to MID, 21 February 1933 (US NA MID 2041-316.5), "Regarded in military circles as a man of mediocre attainments." Fletcher to MID, 25 March 1933 (US NA MID 2041-242.1), "In the army, his sudden rise seems to be attributed more to political reasons than to military merit." See also Alpert, Ejército, p. 20, "Did not inspire confidence."

61. See, for example, the entries in Azaña's Memorias for 14 August 1938 and 4 January 1939. In contrast to Azaña's belief in Masquelet's abilities, Gil Robles said that the general "Does not inspire the least confidence" (p. 140).

62. On 12 November 1942 Masquelet was formally expelled from the army for being in "an unknown location." AGMS, Expediente No. M-248.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The son of an enlisted technician at the Trubia arms works, Brigadier General José Miaja Menant[63] had a satisfactory, if unspectacular career. An africanista, with one promotion by the merits of war to his credit, he was generally considered a liberal and a mason.[64] However, he was also a practicing Catholic[65] and a member of the U.M.E.[66] Never considered brilliant, he was nevertheless well regarded in the army, having the reputation of being a prudent, paternal commander.[67] His varied career included

---

63. Primary sources for Miaja are very poor. There is no "expediente" in the AGMS, AROM, Expediente M-327-B, contains some personal and promotional information, and AHNS, Legajo 1418, Expediente 49, indicates that he was investigated for masonic ties with a "negative" finding. There is, however, a wealth of secondary material about the general, including two biographies: Lazaro Somoza Silva, El General Miaja (Biografia de un héroe) (Mexico: Ediciones Tirys, 1944), and Antonio López Fernández, El general Miaja, defensor de Madrid (Madrid: G. del Toro, 1975). Miaja has extensive entries in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 534-535, Cortada, pp. 355-356, and Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 133-141. He is frequently mentioned in the literature, particularly in treatments of the defense of Madrid.

64. Alpert, p. 116; Payne, Ejército, pp. 428, 431, 453; Payne, Politics, p. 304; Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 133-134. The general's nephew was head of the Left Republican Party in Santiago de Compostela (González López, interview, 19 December 1987).

65. Payne, Catholicism, p. 169.

66. The Red Domination, Annex X, Item 3; see also therein pp. 291-292.

67. Miaja's nickname in the army was "Papa Miaja." For views of his reputation see Cortada, p. 335; Payne, Ejército, p. 453; Salas, HEPR, p. 578; and Zaragoza, Generales, p. 133.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

service as interim minister of war during the first days of the Popular Front government in February of 1936. In July of that year, Miaja was commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, one of the principal components of the garrison of Madrid. He appears to have been aware of the existence of a military conspiracy, but does not appear to have taken any measures to alert the government.[68] Nevertheless he remained loyal when the military uprising took place, and held numerous posts of great responsibility right from the start, when he was named war minister in the abortive government of reconciliation which briefly existed on the night of 18-19 July. Miaja later directed the defense of Madrid, and ended the war as generalissimo of the Republican armies. Afterwards he fled abroad, settling in Mexico, where he died in 1958.[69]

The son of a general, Major General Miguel Nuñez de

---

68. Miaja is one of those officers who are sometimes charged with having "geographic loyalty" to the Republic. See, for example, Alpert, Ejercito, p. 115 and Cortada, p. 335. There is a discussion of Miaja's loyalties in Chapter VII.

69. After nearly a year of civil war, Manuel Azaña wrote that Miaja was "a prattler and a light weight" (Memorias, 20 May 1937), an opinion in which Francisco Franco appears to have concurred, saying that Miaja was "a complete mediocrity," to which he added the dubious compliment that the general was "less immoral than rumored." Franco-Salgado, Conversaciones, p. 225.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Prado,[70] had an unusual and very distinguished career, which included service as an enlisted man. One of the handful of generals with aviation credentials, Nuñez de Prado was an africanista, with considerable service in the Regulares. Described by one foreign observer as an "outstanding" officer,[71] not only was Nuñez de Prado a fine combat soldier,[72] but he was also an excellent administrator, and had once served as the governor of Equatorial Guinea. A mason,[73] and the scion of an aristocratic family which had sent its sons into the army for several centuries, Nuñez de Prado was a gentleman-in-waiting to the Alfonso XIII, but became a confirmed republican during the Dictatorship, so strongly so that in

---

70. Primary sources for Nuñez de Prado are not extensive. AGMS, Expediente N-656, contains some documents concerning his family's request for a pension, AHNS, Legajo 19, Expediente 25A, has some information on his masonic connections, and AROM, Expediente N-74-T, has some details about his family and promotions. However, secondary sources are extensive. There are short entries about him in Rubio Cabeza, p. 577, and Cortada, p. 368, and he is mentioned often in the literature.

71. Hodges to MID, 30 December 1924, US NA MID 2657-5-43, No.4. Hodges bracketed Nuñez de Prado with Castro Girona and Franco, using the word for all three.

72. He had had four promotions by the merits of war plus one by "election" and held numerous decorations, including the Medalla militar.

73. Nuñez de Prado was a member of the Hijos de la Africana lodge, of Melilla, which he joined on 30 March 1923. The relevant documents are in AHNS, Legajo 19, Expediente 25A.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1930 he was forced to flee Spain, only returning upon the advent of the Republic in 1931. Although he was not on good terms with Manuel Azana,[74] under the Republic Nuñez de Prado held a variety of important administrative posts, and in July of 1936 was Director General of Aviation. In the early summer Nuñez de Prado, a member --and rumored director-- of the U.M.R.A.,[75] was one of those officers who were unable to convince the government of the danger of a military conspiracy.[76] When the garrison of Spanish Morocco rose on 17 July, Nuñez de Prado was appointed inspector general of the forces in Morocco, on the assumption that the insurrection was a minor, localized affair and that he might be able to keep it under control if he could get there immediately. However, events moved so swiftly that Nuñez de Prado never left for Africa. As the revolt spread to Spain on the 18th, Nuñez de Prado was made inspector general of the Second Inspectorate. He immediately left for Zaragoza, in order to insure that Major General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, commander of the 5th Infantry Division, did not join the rising. He reached

---

74. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 431. Nuñez de Prado appears to have differed with Azaña over many of the details of the military reforms.

75. Cortada, p. 308; Salas, HEPR, p. 69; Zaragoza, Generales, p. 19.

76. Palacio Atard, Gobierno, p. 154.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Zaragoza to find that Cabanellas had already risen, and he was placed under arrest. Nuñez de Prado was shortly afterwards tried and shot.

Brigadier General Sebastían Pozas Perea,[77] who came from a prosperous military family with strong ties to the monarchy, had a substantial combat record in Morocco, with two promotions by merit and a Medalla militar, but was not generally considered an africanista, despite service with the Regulares. Considered "able and energetic" by the Italian Emilio Faldella,[78] Pozas Perea held a variety of posts during his career, including command of a cavalry brigade. A mason,[79] and, despite his family background, "a

---

77. Primary sources for Pozas Perea are satisfactory, if incomplete. AGMS, Expediente P-2662, contains a partial hoja de servicios, and several miscellaneous documents. AHNS, Legajo 106, Expediente P-13, contains documents relevant to his masonic ties. AROM, Expediente 314-B, contains some information about his promotions. There are lengthy entries in Rubio Cabeza, p. 629-630, Cortada, pp. 405-406, and Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 147-149. The general is often mentioned in the literature about the Civil War.

78. Faldella, p. 127. Faldella, one of the ablest Italian soldiers of the Fascist era, served as a staff officer during the Spanish Civil War, notably in the Battle of Guadalajara, in March of 1937, during which Pozas Perea command an army corps. Not all opinions on the general are so favorable. Rodion Malinovski, later a Marshal of the Soviet Union, had time served as an aide to Pozas Perea at Guadalajar, characterized him as "quibbling, indifferent, dull, and domineering": Rodion Malinovski et al., Bajo la bandera de la España republicana (Moscow: Progress, n.d.), p. 19.

79. Pozas, alias "Olozaga" was a member of the Democracia lodge, in Barcelona, which he joined at the latest by 1932: see AHNS, Legajo 106, Expediente 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

great republican,"[80] in February of 1936 Pozas Perea was made Director General of the Guardia civil by the newly elected Popular Front government.[81] By some accounts he was approached by agents of Emilio Mola with the intention of bringing him into the military conspiracy, but neither committed himself nor informed the government.[82] Nevertheless, during the July crisis Pozas Perea kept the very large Guardia civil contingent in Madrid loyal, thereby contributing significantly to the frustration of the uprising in the capital. Appointed Minister of the Interior on 19 July, he was also among the first professional soldiers to advocate arming the workers. Thereafter Pozas Perea, who shortly joined the Communist Party, held numerous important and sensitive posts, culminating in the command of the Army of the East from May of 1937, during which he undertook the suppression of the anarchist and P.O.U.M. "insurrection" in Barcelona and conducted an initially successful offensive against the Nationalists in Aragon (August-October 1937). In late 1938 he mishandled his part of a Republican offensive against

---

80. Zaragoza, Generales, p. 147.

81. It was apparently Pozas Perea who convinced caretaker Prime Minister Manuel Portela Valledare, to reject the advice of Gil Robles and Franco that he impose martial law during the transition period to the Popular Front. See Franco-Salgado, Conversaciónes, pp. 522-524.

82. Cf., Bolleton, p. 241; Cortada, p. 405.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Teruel, which, coupled with the inability of his army to hold a Nationalist offensive in Aragon the previous spring, led to his relief. He held a number of much less responsible posts thereafter, and at the end of the war fled into exile in Mexico, where he died in 1946.[83]

Major General José Riquelme y López Bago[84] was unusual among the generals in being of middle class background.[85] One of only five major generals under 55 years of age, Riquelme, who was fluent in Arabic, had a very long career in Morocco, where he served for a time with the Regulares,

---

83. In 1942 the Nationalists expelled Pozas Perea from the army for being "in an unknown location." The general's younger brother, Gabriel Pozas Perea, was an infantry lieutenant colonel in 1936. An aide to Emilio Mola, he was deeply involved in the latter's conspiratorial machinations. The younger Pozas Perea died with Mola in an airplane crash on 3 June 1937. There are brief entries in Rubio Cabeza, p. 629, and Cortada, p. 405.

84. Primary sources for Riquelme, are relatively good. Although his file at AGMS, Expediente R-1319, is empty, CGEM, Riquelme, contains significant portions of his hoja de servicio, totalling 42 pages up to 1942. AHNS, Legajo 18, Expediente 21, contains evidence relating to his masonic connections. AROM, Expediente R-145-B, contains about his marriages. There also exist two short personal sketches by U.S. military attaches, Fletcher to MID, 30 April 1931 (US MA MID 2041-225, No. 24) and Fuqua to MID, 15 May 1935 (US NA MID 2046-316.8). Rubio Cabeza, p. 681, and Zaragoza, Generales, pp. 149-150 each have short entries. The general is also mentioned frequently in the literature.

85. The general's family hailed from Cadiz. His father, Augusto Riquelme O'Cronley, was director of the telegraph service there. His paternal grandfather, Joaquín Riquelme García, was a professor, his maternal grandfather, Manuel López Bago y Barbery, an attorney from Seville.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

winning one promotion by the merits of war, but earning only about three years of "time on campaign" credit, since most of his duties were as a political and intelligence officer. A mason[86] and "one of the few avowedly republican and leftist generals",[87] Riquelme was involved in conspiracies against the dictatorship and the monarchy, resulting in his being expelled from the army. Upon the establishment of the Republic he was restored to duty and given a retroactive promotion to major general.[88] Riquelme held a variety of responsible posts during the Republic, including a governorship in Morocco, but in 1936 was chief of recruitment and a member of the Consejo director de las Ordenes militares. When the Nationalist uprising took place, Riquelme stood with the Republic. On 20 July he was given command of the 1st Infantry Division, the garrison of Madrid, and was shortly named chief of the Army of the Center, during which he conducted a series of unsuccessful operations intended to frustrate the movement of Nationalist columns from the south of Spain on Madrid.

---

86. Riquelme, alias "Modestia," joined the masons some time before 1927, when he became a member of the Gran Logia Española. See AHNS, Legajo 18, Expediente 21, which includes his membership diploma and other documents.

87. Fuqua to MID, 15 May 1935 (US NA MID 2046-316.8). See also Payne, Ejército, p. 431, "a notorious leftist sympathizer."

88. Fletcher to MID, 30 April 1931 (US MA MID 2041-225, No. 24).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Removed from command, he was subject to a lengthy investigation but managed to clear himself of all imputations of disloyalty. Nevertheless, he was not again employed until the Spring of 1938, when he made military commander of Catalonia, in which post he served until virtually the end of the Civil War, when he fled into exile.[89]

Widely regarded as "the fattest Spanish general,"[90] Brigadier General Manuel Romerales Quintero,[91] was an africanista with a satisfactory, if unspectacular, combat record, gaining one promotion by the merits of war, to

---

89. The general died in Paris in 1972, at the age of 91. This writer has been unable to verify his whereabouts for most of his life after leaving Spain. It seems unreasonable that he would have remained in France for the entire period, since several Republican politicians and leaders in France when the Germans took over in mid-1940 were arrested and shipped to Spain: see, for example, the case of the Catalan Regional President Lluis Companys i Jover.

90. Cf., Bravo Morato, República, p. 104; Cortada, p. 420; etc. Actually, according to Sr. Alvárez Rubio this "distinction" was in dispute between Romerales Quintero and Major General Enrique de Salcedo Molinuevo (letter, 23 December, 1988).

91. Primary sources fro Romerales Quintero are adequate. AGMS, Expediente R-2795, contains career data up through 1931, in addition to a record of his sentence and execution. AROM, Expediente R-297, contains information about the general's marriages. Although one of the generals alleged to have been a mason in the Cortes by Cano López on 15 February 1935, there is no "expediente" at the AHNS, indicating that he was not investigated for masonic ties. The general is the subject of short entries in Rubio Cabeza, p. 687, and Cortada, p. 420. He is often mentioned in the literature.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

colonel in 1925.[92] When not in Africa, he alternated between line and staff appointments, leading to brigade commands in the early 1930s. Although a republican and on very good terms with Manuel Azaña, not to mention being a suspected mason, in 1934 the conservative government promoted him to brigadier general, with two years retroactive seniority, and assigned him to command the Eastern District of Morocco, in which post he remained upon the election of the Popular Front government in early 1936. Considered by many lethargic, not overly bright, and unsuited to high command,[93] he nevertheless appears to have performed his duties in an acceptable fashion and was well regarded by Manuel Azaña.[94] On the afternoon of 17 July 1936, while in his office in Melilla, Romerales was costed

---

92. Romerales Quintero's Moroccan experience was rather different from that of most africanistas, as he served with the cazadores, or light infantry. Altogether he seems to have spent the better part of nine years in Morocco, in the period 1913-1927. The incomplete nature of his hoja de servicio makes it impossible to determine his total time on campaign, but during his first tour in the Protectorate, 1913-1914, he was credited with nearly six months, on top of the nearly 15 months he had previously acquired in Cuba in 1896-1898.

93. Bravo Morato, República, p. 104; Alvarez Rubio, letter, 23 December 1988.

94. In his Memorias, Azaña occasionally mentions asking Romerales for advice, as on 27 June 1932, during the Mangada Affair. Romerales published to librettos for zarzuela (one of which was printed by the headqarters press of a mountain infantry battalion) and was the director of an amateur theatrical troupe, La Farandula, which seems to have impressed Azaña: Memorias, 31 May 1933.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by several officers on his staff, who attempted to get him to join the uprising. The general refused, despite a pistol "under his nose," and was removed from command and placed under arrest.[95] On 26 August Romerales Quintero was tried for "military rebellion." He was shot on 28 August, dyeing, one eyewitness said, "with great fortitude."[96]

The son of a major general, Major General Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo was an africanista and a staunch monarchist who was nevertheless on reasonably good personal terms with Manuel Azana.[97] He had accumulated an excellent combat record, earning a merit promotion in Cuba in 1896 and another, to brigadier general, in Morocco in 1923, plus a promotion to major general for "services and circumstances" in 1928. During the Republic he held commands in the Balearics and the Canaries, and in the summer of 1936 was commander of the 8th Infantry Division, with headquarters in La Coruña. Although the garrison in

---

95. For events in Melilla on 17 July, see Zaragoza, Africa, pp. 54-63.

96. Salas and Salas, p. 33.

97. Primary sources for Salcedo Molinuevo are poor. There is nothing in AGMS, Expediente S-418, and AROM, Expediente S-43, contains only information about his marriage and promotions. Prof. González López was able to provide certain details concerning the general, interview, 4 December 1987. There is a brief entry in Rubio Cabeza, p. 697. The general is occasionally mentioned in the literature. For his relationship with Azaña, see González López, interview, 4 December 1987, and Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 431.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Morocco rose on 17 July, and troops in Spain began rising on the 18th, the conspirators in La Coruna remained inactive for several days. On the 19th, Emilio Mola telephoned Salcedo in an effort to get him to join the alzamiento. Aware that the rising appeared to be failing in Madrid and Barcelona, Salcedo refused, supported by Brigadier General Rogelio Caridad Pita, a liberal republican, who commanded one of the division's brigades.[98] Meanwhile Popular Front supporters rallied in the streets and demanded arms, which the generals and the Popular Front civil governor were reluctant to distribute. On 20 July the conspirators rose. Despite the fact that several of the ring leaders were arrested, the surviving plotters managed to secure control of the troops. Although some of the troops, the local Guardia civil, the Asaltos, naval personnel, and workers offered fierce resistance, the city was in Nationalist hands within several hours.[99] Salcedo Molinuevo and Caridad Pita were arrested. Tried by court martial, they were shot on 9 November 1936.

---

98. A great many sources --Thomas, 2nd, p. 252; Rubio Cabeza, p. 241, etc.-- state that Caridad Pita was a strong influence on Salcedo's decision, in effect, of having "talked" him into remaining loyal. While there may be something to this, Prof. González López (interview, 4 December 1987) pointed out that Salcedo was a man of considerable character, perfectly capable of this decision on his own.

99. The events in La Coruña may be followed in Salas, HEPR, pp. 106ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Of the seventeen generals, one died of natural causes during the war, four were shot by the Nationalists during the war and one afterwards, one was imprisoned by the Nationalists during the war and three afterwards, and seven went into exile after the war.[100]

Nationalists. In the summer of 1936, seven of the ten Nationalist leaders were major generals, the other three brigadier generals. All were africanistas, and all had attained considerable distinction.

One of the most well-regarded officers in the Spanish Army, Major General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer,[101] had a

---

100. Although beyond the scope of this study, the question of who was and who was not shot by the Nationalists is an interesting one. Why were Batet, Nuñez de Prado, Romerales, and Salcedo Molinuevo shot, but not Gomez Morato? Why, for that matter, were such other Republican generals as Villa Abrille and Molero Lobo, both of whom also opposed the rising not shot? Similarly, why, of all the Republican generals who fell into Nationalist hands at the end of the war, was Martínez Cabrera the only one to be shot? There is no pattern to the penalties inflicted upon the Republican generals by the Nationalists. Gabriel Cardona and Joan Villanaya, "La represion contra los militares republicanos," Historia 16, 8, No. 92 (December 1983), pp. 33-36, deals with the question from a purely narrative perspective, making no attempt to explain what policies, if any, guided the decisions of the Nationalist courts martial. On Molero Lobo, who is sometimes listed as having been shot, see Ramón Salas Larrazabal, "La muerte del general Molero," Historia y Vida, No. 142 (January, 1980), p. 86.

101. Sources for Miguel Cabanellas are AGMS, Expediente C-71, which contains mostly miscellaneous documents, AHNS, Legajo 12, Expediente 5A, with documentation about his masonic ties, and AROM, Expediente C-7, with some family details. The general figures prominently in several letters by the US military attache Major Robert H. Fletcher, Jr.: Fletcher to MID, 30 April 1931 (US NA, MID 2041-225, No. 24), Fletcher to MID, 26 May 1931 (US NA, MID 2657-S-126, No. 31), and, particularly,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

brilliant career in Cuba and Morocco, accumulating three promotions by merit, plus three other extraordinary promotions.[102] Among the most prominent africanistas, Cabanellas was instrumental in the creation of the two principal indigenous corps in the Protectorate, the Regulares and Mehal-las.[103] A mason,[104] Cabanellas was widely regarded as a liberal, and in some circles as a radical,[105] and had immense popularity among some elements of the working class.[106] He played a key role in the

---

Fletcher to MID, 4 February 1932 (US NA, MID 2041-225, No. 26). The general's son, Guillermo Cabanellas, has written extensively on the Republic and Civil War, and his Cuatro Generales (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), is the closest thing to a formal biography of the general. There is are extensive entries in Arce, Generales, pp. 221-227, and Rubio Cabeza, pp. 145-146, and shorter ones in Cortada, p. 99, and Suero, pp. 74-76. The general figures prominently in all treatments of the Republic and Civil War.

102. As with almost all of the prominent generals on both sides, Cabanellas' dossier lacks a complete hoja de servicios, making it impossible to determine his time on campaign credits. However, he did spend some 13 years in Morocco before the advent of the Republic.

103. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp. 62-63; Salas, HEPR, p. 99.

104. Cabanellas was a member of the Gran Logia Regional de Marruecos: AHNS, Legajo 12, Expediente 5A. As Franco put it, "Cabanellas was a mason, and did not deny it": Franco-Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 99.

105. Alpert, Ejército, pp. 102-103; Suero, p. 74.

106. Carr, ST, p. 104.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

suppression of the juntero movement,[107] was strongly opposed to the dictatorship of his old academy classmate Primo de Rivera, and was an active anti-monarchist, for which he was expelled from the army.[108] Restored to duty by the Republic, Cabanellas was briefly Captain General of Catalonia, during which he clashed with provisional government when he imposed martial law to suppress leftist rioters.[109] He was shortly assigned as the first commander of the armed forces in Morocco under a civilianized administration, in which post he clashed frequently on matters of policy with Luciano Ferrer López, the civil governor, and was in consequence relieved of duty in 1932.[110] Despite this, and the despite the fact that he

---

107. See his J'accuse! letter which appeared in various newspapers in late October of 1921, such as La Voz de la Palma, 31 October 1921, p. 1, and La Correspondencia Militar, 24 October 1921, p. 1.

108. Cabanellas took part in the Sánchez Guerra conspiracy of 1928, for which he was expelled from the army. Cabanellas was one of the republican officers whom Alfonso XIII refused to let guerra de España (Madrid, 1986), p. 43; Rubio Cabeza, p. 145; and particularly Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp. 425-428.

109. Fletcher to MID, 26 May 1931 (US NA, MID 2657-S-126, No. 31).

110. See Fletcher to MID, 4 February 1932 (US NA, MID 2041-225, No. 26), which contains a discussion of the issues, as well as a profile of the general. The governor was later relived in turn, for financial irregularities; during the Civil War he was also a Nationalist: cf., Rubio Cabeza, p. 470.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was not on friendly terms with Manuel Azana,[111] Cabanellas remained in favor with the government, and was entrusted with command of the Guardia civil.[112] Over the next few years Cabanellas held various important commands, and sat in the Cortes as a Radical. By late May of 1936, Cabanellas, by then commanding the 5th Infantry Division, in Zaragoza, had committed himself to Emilio Mola's military conspiracy.[113] Despite rumors that he was reluctant to rise, he raised his division on 19 July.[114] On 23 July, Cabanellas was elected president of the Junta de Defensa Nacional, due partially to his status as the most senior general and partially to his credentials as a

---

111. Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 431.

112. Fletcher to MID, 9 February 1932. See also, Payne, Ejército, p. 401.

113. Cabanellas appears to have met with Mola on several occasions during June to iron the details of his commitment to the conspiracy: Maiz, Mola, pp. 154-156, 228-229. It was Cabanellas who, along with Franco, convinced Mola that the uprising should have a "republican" character, using the tri-color republican flag and the anthem. His view was that the coup would establish a "republican military dictatorship" which would convene a new constituent cortes: see Salas and Salas, p. 43; Rubio Cabeza, p. 145; and particularly Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp 425-428.

114. Gabriel Jackson, HQ, p. 101, observes that the story that Cabanellas rose only after a pistol was placed at his head has become an integral part of the popular culture in Spain, he himself hearing it from a bank president in Zaragoza, where the incident is alleged to have taken place.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"notorious liberal,"[115] with the intention of reassuring moderate and liberal opinion.[116] Over the next few months Cabanellas' influence waned, as that of Francisco Franco rose. The only general to oppose Franco's nomination as chief of state and generalissimo in October of 1936, Cabanellas was given the largely honorary post of inspector general of the army. He retired for age in early 1938, and died shortly afterwards.

One of the few Catalans in the officer corps, Major General Manuel Goded Llopis[117] was one of the most politically prominent generals from the mid-1920s until the outbreak of the Civil War. He had a highly successful and

---

115. Suero, p. 76.

116. True to his early political inclinations, Cabanellas continued to employ, and protect, civilian and military personnel with liberal and even leftist affiliations until his retirement. See, for example, Rubio Cabeza, p. 145, Cortada, p. 98.

117. Primary sources for Goded Llopis are quite good. AGMS, Expediente G-2142, contains a complete hoja de servicios covering up to 1936. AHMS, Legajo 1023, Expediente 81, contains information on the investigation of his alleged masonic ties. AROM, Expediente G-214-T, contains considerable personal information. The general's son wrote a biography, Manuel Goded Llopis Alonso, Un "faccioso" cien por cien (Zaragoza: Editora Heraldo de Aragon, 1938), which, although undertaken out of filial piety is nevertheless of some value. There are long entries about Goded in Arce, Generales, pp. 247-252, Suero, pp. 63-69, and Rubio Cabeza, pp. 383-384, plus a short one in Cortada, p. 242. He figures prominently in all accounts of civil-military relations in Spain during the 1920s and 1930s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

varied career as a staff officer,[118] which included service as an observer with the Austro-Hungarian Army during World War I.[119] He had a very impressive career in Morocco, where he participated in numerous field operations, and helped plan and execute the Alhucemas landings, during which he commanded a brigade, garnering two promotions by the merits of war and one for "campaign services," while accumulating over four years of "time on campaign" credit. Despite lavish rewards from Primo de Rivera, Goded was an active opponent of the Dictator, and was instrumental in organizing a military conspiracy which helped bring about Primo's resignation in 1930.[120] In July of 1931 Goded was named the first chief-of-the-general staff under the Republic, in which post he was responsible for the development and implementation of many of the "Azaña Reforms." Despite this close association with the Republican regime, Goded did not approve of all the reforms, and was particularly disturbed by the review of

---

118. Goded graduated from the Escuela superior de guerra in 1902, in the same class as Fanjul Goñi.

119. Goded was one of a number of Spanish officers who served as military observers, or International Red Cross representatives during the war, on whom see Fernando Redondo Díaz, "Los observadores militares españoles en la primera guerra mondial," Revista de Historia-militar, 59 (1985), p. 204.

120. On this, see Chapter II.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

merit promotions instituted by Manuel Azaña.[121] This apparently began his disenchantment with the regime, which was deepened by the notorious "Mangada Affair," which resulted in his being sacked as chief-of-the-general staff in June of 1932 and placed "at disposal." Too peripherally involved in the sanjurjada, Goded managed to escape punishment, but was otherwise continued virtually inactive until October of 1934, when conservative War Minister Diego Hidalgo called upon him to serve as a technical adviser during the Asturian Rebellion. Not until February of 1935 did Goded receive a formal assignment, as commandant of the Balearic Isles. Thereafter he held various inspectorates, and in February of 1936 was once again appointed to the Balearics. By this time Goded, despite his liberal and masonic reputation, had become affiliated with the U.M.E., was deeply involved in various conspiracies against the Republic, participating in the secret 8 March meeting at which several of the principal generals in the army defined

---

121. When Goded protested that although he had earned his two merit promotions to brigadier general and major general, "you have rid me of both" because of the cancellation of such, Azaña replied "I do not think you have lost anything." See Azaña, Memorias, 22 July 1931. Of Goded, Azaña wrote "[he] is little, dry, billious, with tiny eyes that do not seem to belong, . . . is very vain and pedantic. . . ." (Memorias, 19 April 1932). Later (31 May 1932), he added that Goded was "very ambitious" and "He's good where he is [as chief-of-the-general staff]; but never give him command of troops." Yet he had earlier observed that Goded was the "only general with brains" (12 September 1931).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the circumstances under which a coup would be undertaken. In the coup plan developed by Emilio Mola, Goded was assigned the task of securing the Balearics for the insurgents, and then flying to Valencia to raise the garrison there. At almost the eleventh hour, Goded arranged to switch the Valencia assignment with González Carrasco, in exchange for Barcelona. After successfully raising most of the Balearics, Goded flew to Barcelona on the morning of 19 July. Although he took control of some of the garrison, sending troops to seize the center of the city, resistance, from loyal police and military forces, as well as armed workers, proved very strong. After several hours hard fighting, Goded ordered his men to surrender.[122] Taken prisoner, Goded was tried, and shot on 12 August, in company with Brigadier General Alvaro Fernández Burriel.[123]

One of the most politically active and liberal officers in the Spanish Army, Major General Gonzalo Queipo

---

122. For the uprising in Barcelona, see Salas, HEPR, pp. 138-146, and "4a. Division".

123. Goded's surrender tainted his reputation among the Nationalist leaders, who usually neglected him when offering homage to the "heroes" of the Alzamiento. This slight to his father's memory which prompted the younger Manuel Goded to write Un "faccioso" cien por cien. On the basis of a personal communication with Indalecio Prieto, Robert Alan Friedlander (pp. 100-103, 117) suggests that Goded may have tried to back out of the conspiracy at the last moment. There is no way to confirm this statement, and it seems unlikely, given the thrust of the general's activities since the elections of February 1936.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

de Llano[124] had one of the most varied and distinguished careers of any of the generals. Enlisting as a cavalry trumpeter in 1891, Queipo passed to the Academia de Caballería in 1893, graduated in 1893 and went immediately to Cuba, where he earned two merit promotions. Of a rebellious nature, he was early involved in acts of political defiance,[125] being imprisoned for one month in

---

124. Primary sources for Queipo de Llano are poor. AGMS, Expediente Q-13 is missing. AHNS, Legajo 1035, Expediente 40, includes documents which conclude that he was not a mason illegally. AROM, Expediente Q-2-T includes some details about his family. However, there is more secondary material on Queipo than on anyone of prominence in the period, Republican or Nationalist, save for Franco himself. Queipo wrote two self-serving works which contain some useful biographical data, and provide some insight into this political views, El general Queipo de Llano perseguido por la Dictadura (Madrid: Javier Morata, 1931) and El movimiento reivindicativo de Quatro Vientos (Madrid: Javier Morata, 1939). Several works deal with his activities during the Civil War, notably the pseudonymous "Guzman de Alfarache", 18 de Julio! Historia del Alzamiento glorioso de Sevilla (Sevilla; Editorial FE, 1937) and Julio de Ramón-Laca Bajo la frula de Queipo. Como fue gobernada Andalucia (Sevilla: Imprenta FE, 1939), plus Un año con Queipo de Llano: Memorias de un nacionalista (Barcelona; Ediciones Españolas, 1938), by Antonio Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, who had served for a time as the general's aide before fleeing to the Republican Zone. One of the best works dealing with him is Ian Gibson, Queipo de Llano, Sevilla, verano de 1936 (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1986). There is one biography, Antonio Olmedo Delgado and Jose Cuesta Monereo, General Queipo de Llano. Aventura y audacia (Barcelona: AHR, 1957), which is rather propagandistic. The general merits lengthy entries in Arce, Generales, pp. 228-237, Rubio Cabeza, pp. 660-664, Suero, pp. 39-53, and Cortada, pp. 411-413. He figures prominently in all treatments of the period.

125. Queipo has been characterized by Professor Emilio González López (interview, 15 March 1988) as a "professional upriser."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1901 for failing to secure Royal permission before marrying[126] and was particularly prominent in protesting an unusually generous dispensation of merit promotions following the brief 1909 campaign in Morocco.[127] Nevertheless, it was in Morocco that Queipo made his career, serving in a variety of posts, while earning a merit promotion to lieutenant colonel and garnering several decorations. During the Dictatorship, Queipo, a mason and anti-clerical,[128] gained a reputation as a republican activist. Briefly imprisoned by Primo in 1924, Queipo was involved in the Sánchez Guerra conspiracy of 1928, for which he was expelled from the army, and the 1930 Jaca-Cuatro Vientos uprising, which resulted in his having to flee the country in the company of his co-conspirator, Ramon Franco.[129] Queipo was almost certainly the head of the clandestine Asociación militar republicana.[130] His republican credentials were strengthened further by the

---

126. Suero, p. 40.

127. Boyd, p. 41.

128. Queipo had briefly been a seminarian, before enlisting: cf., Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 224, Suero, p. 44. His anticlericalism was so notorious that on one occasion during the Civil War a cardinal is supposed to have refused to meet with him: Franco Salgado, Conversaciones, p. 47

129. See Chapter II.

130. Busquets, Pronunciamiento, pp. 122ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fact that his daughter was married to the son of Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, chairman of the quasi-secret junta revolucionaria formed at San Sebastian in August of 1930.[131] Upon the proclamation of the Republic, Queipo was restored to duty and promoted to major general retroactive to early 1928. During the first months of the Republic Queipo was given various responsible posts, serving as captain general of the Madrid Military Region in April and May of 1931, then briefly as acting chief-of-the-general staff, before being named chief of President Alcalá-Zamora's military cabinet. Manuel Azaña wrote of him, "Save for Queipo, [the generals] all . . . must think me a demon, an interloper, a wrecker."[132] Queipo's ties to the Republic seemed unbreakable. Yet they proved fragile in the extreme. Queipo began to fall out with Manuel Azaña, and then with the Republic, for a variety of reasons, personal and political. Personally ambitious, he was denied the post of Minister of War, which went instead to Azaña. In May of the same year, Azaña reprimanded him for using his troops without authorization to try to suppress incendiarism during the "Burning of the Convents." Relations between the two were also affected because Azaña would not back Queipo in a personal feud with Villegas

---

131. Madariaga, p. 389; Sedgewick, pp. 71-72.

132. Azaña, Memorias, 8 August 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Montesinos.[133] By August of 1932, Queipo was sufficiently annoyed with the regime to flit with the Sanjurjo conspiracy, though in the end he did not commit himself. For most of the life of the Republic, Queipo served as chief of the Presidential military household. But in April of 1936 Alcalá-Zamora was deposed from the presidency by a parliamentary maneuver of dubious legality. This act appears to have been the final element in Queipo's disenchantment with the regime.[134] He shortly joined the U.M.E.,[135] and was soon deeply involved in Emilio Mola's conspiratorial machinations.[136] Queipo proved an enormous asset to the conspiracy, for as head of the Carabineros, the Frontier Guard, he was uniquely able to travel about the country. His role in the final plan was to seize

---

133. See Chapter VII for some mention of this dispute, which crops up several times in Azaña's diary, e.g., 21 August, 3 September 1931.

134. Prof. Emilio González López believes that the deposition of Alcalá-Zamora was of prime importance in Queipo's decision to join the conspiracy: interview, 4 December 1987.

135. Beltran, p. 129; Maiz, Alzamiento, pp. 100-103; Suero, p. 44.

136. Queipo committed himself to the conspiracy on 1 June, Maiz, Mola, pp. 133-136. Queipo's participation in the conspiracy caused Mola some difficulties with the rightist elements on which he counted for considerable support, as the general was hardly persona grata on the right: he once very nearly had a fist fight with Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Falange: cf., Cardona, Poder, p. 107. See also, Chapter V, note 67, above.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Seville, which he did with virtually no troops and an enormous amount of audacity.[137] Thereafter, Queipo commanded the Army of the South for the entire war, being nicknamed the "Radio General," for his propaganda broadcasts, and the "Social General," for the public service programs which he instituted. Gradually eased from power by Franco, shortly after the Civil War Queipo de Llano, by then a lieutenant general, was named ambassador to Italy, serving until early 1942. He retired in 1943 and died in 1951.

An outspoken monarchist, Major General Rafael Villegas Montesinos,[138] had an excellent combat record in the colonial wars of 1895-1898, earning two promotions by merit, and went on to earn another in Morocco, where he served for several years as aide-de-camp to the commander of a light infantry brigade, and as later as commander of the 6th Rifles Battalion. Although generally regarded as an africanista, Villegas saw no active service in Morocco after 1918. In the early '20s he commanded an infantry regiment, served on the Infantry Board, and spent several

---

137. Aside from the various accounts of Queipo's wartime service cited above, events in Seville are succinctly treated in Salas, HEPR, pp. 92-98.

138. Primary sources for Villegas are poor. He has no "expediente" at AGMS, and AROM, Expediente B-311-4, contains about his family and promotions. There are short entries in Rubio Cabeza, p. 781, and Cortada, p. 474. He is often mentioned in the literature.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

years on the Consejo Supremo de Guerra, before going on to command an infantry brigade and then a division. Shortly after the creation of the Republic he was given command of the 1st Infantry Division, in which post he repeatedly clashed with the liberal Major General Gonzalo Queipo. Despite support from Manuel Azaña in his dispute with Queipo,[139] Villegas remained irreconcilably hostile to the Republic. As a result of the "Mangada Affair," he was removed from command in mid-1932 and placed "at disposal," a status which the conservative coalition governments of 1933-1935 did not change, save to make him a member of the military section of the Supreme Court. With the election of the Popular Front in February of 1936, Villegas became an active conspirator against the Republic, taking part in the secret 8 March planning session and in Rodríquez del Barrio's abortive coup attempt the following April. Villegas was a member of the secret junta which technically oversaw Emilio Mola's arrangements for a military coup. Under these arrangements, Villegas was to lead the coup in Madrid. However, when the call to action came, he proved cautious and indecisive, and delegated his role to Fanjul Goñi. With the collapse of the rising in Madrid, Villegas was arrested and incarcerated in the Model Prison, where he

---

139. See Chapter VII for some mention of this dispute, which crops up several times in Azaña's diary, e.g., 21 August, 3 September 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

perished in the massacre of the inmates on 23 August 1936.[140]

Major General Andrés Saliquet Zumeta,[141] a diplomado of the staff college, served with distinction in Cuba, where he earned a merit promotion to captain, and Morocco, where he earned merit promotions to major and lieutenant colonel. Unusual for an africanista, Saliquet sympathized with the juntas. A partisan of Primo de Rivera, who made him a major general in 1929, with the advent of the Republic, the very conservative Saliquet was placed on the retired list by Manuel Azaña, who he greatly disliked, and immediately became embroiled in various plots and conspiracies.[142] Although restored to the active list when Gil Robles became Minister of War in 1935, Saliquet was

---

140. Although the success of the coup in Madrid was at best an iffy proposition, its failure was certainly made more likely by Villegas' incompetence. As with Martinez Monje in the Republican ranks, Villegas' ineptitude in no way detracts from the fact that he was one of the most critically important rebel leaders.

141. Primary sources for Saliquet are poor. He has no "expediente" at AGMS. AROM, Expediente S-52-T, contains information about his two marriages and his promotions. There is no biography beyond a propaganda tract issued in 1937. Saliquet is the subject of short entries in Arce, Generales, pp. 191-196, Rubio Cabeza, pp. 697-698, Suero, pp. 87-89, and Cortada, p. 424. The general is only occasionally mentioned in the literature.

142. Alpert, Ejército, p. 13; Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, pp. 247-248, 431. Surprisingly, Saliquet managed to avoid becoming involved in the collapse of the sanjurjada in August of 1932.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

given no significant posts. In February of 1936 the Popular Front government placed him disponible forzoso. One of the officers who took part in the clandestine meeting of 8 March, at which the generals established the ground rules for a coup, Saliquet played an active role in the organization of Emilio Mola's conspiracy, and was assigned the task of raising the 7th Infantry Division, headquartered in Valladolid, since Major General Nicolas Molero Lobo, the division commander, was a staunch Republican. On the afternoon of 18 July, while the local Guardia de asalto moved to seize various vital installations, Saliquet, accompanied by some other officers, arrived at Molero Lobo's headquarters with the intention of assuming command. Molero Lobo refused to relinquish command, whereupon a gunfight broke out between his staff and Saliquet's, resulting in heavy casualties -- three dead and five wounded-- before the conspirators were able to secure control.[143] Over the next weeks, Saliquet directed operations against Madrid and on the northern front. In September he was named a member of the Junta de Defensa Nacional, and was one of the officers who backed Franco's nomination as Chief of State and generalissimo. He later commanded the I Corps and the Army of the Center,

---

143. Salas, HEPR, p. 105; Salas and Salas, p. 41; Suero, p. 88.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

being effectively responsible for the investment of Madrid until the end of the Civil War. After the war his outspoken anti-masonic views earned him the chairmanship of the investigatory commission established by the Ley de Represion de la Masonería y Comunisimo of 1 March 1940, and later served as the president of the Supreme Court of Military Justice. After retirement, he was made a marquess. Saliquet died in 1959.

The reasons for including Major General Francisco Franco Bahamonde among the Nationalist leaders seem self-evident.[144] It is worth noting here that Franco had one of the most spectacular careers of any officer in Europe

---

144. Virtually all primary sources on Franco are understandably unavailable. AROM, Expediente F-178-B, contains some information about his family and his promotions. US military attache Colonel Stephen G. Fuqua included some interesting comments in Fuqua to MID, 15 June 1935 (US NA, MID 2041-311.5). There are several notable biographies, all in English: J.W.D. Trythall, El Caudillo: A Political Biography of Franco (New York: McGraw-Hill 1970), Alan Lloyd, Franco (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), and Brian Crozier, Franco (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), of which the first, though short, is probably the most insightful, and the last the most detailed. In addition, the works of his cousin and life-long aide, Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida junto a Franco and Mís conversaciónes privadas con Franco are of considerable value. Revista de historia militar No. 40 (1976), is entirely devoted to Franco, including a useful bibliography of his own writings. There is a very long entry in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 326-346, and a shorter one in Cortada, pp. 219-226. The general tends to dominate treatments of the Republic and particular the Civil War.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

between the world wars.[145] The guiding principal of Franco's career appears to have been caution, and he was far less politically active than most of his colleagues in the officer corps. Nevertheless, he was widely regarded on the left as being an ultra-rightist, partially because of his strong identification as an *africanista*,[146] partially because of his marital ties to the *cedista* leadership,[147] and partially because in 1930 he had presided over the court martial of the republican officers who had participated in the Jaca uprising, which led to the execution of republican hero Captain Fermin Galán.[148] In addition, although he agreed with many, if not most of the

---

145. Franco, who earned five promotions by merit, was a major at the age of 24, within six years of being commissioned, a lieutenant colonel at 30, a colonel at 32, a brigadier general at 34, and a major general at 41, reportedly the youngest holder of each rank in all of Europe at the time that he attained it.

146. It will be recalled that Franco participated in the Ben Tieb affair, during the Dictatorship: see Chapter II.

147. His brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer, was head of the *cedista* youth movement.

148. Two of the rebels who managed to flee abroad were Major General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, who was later one of the most prominent Nationalist leaders, and Major Ramón Franco Bahamonde, the general's radical brother. Interestingly, during his many years as dictator of Spain, Franco continued the special pension which the Republic awarded to Galán's widow: *cf.*, Franco Salgado, *Conversaciónes*, p. 414.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

military reforms imposed by the Republic,[149] and even worked to expand and strengthen some of them while serving as chief-of-the-general staff in 1935,[150] his obvious opposition to some of them, notably the closing of the Academia general militar and the revision of promotions by méritos de guerra, made him seem like an enemy of the regime.[151] Franco's apparent lack of political commitment,[152] and his professionalism seem to have perplexed many, including both Manuel Azaña and José Antonio Primo de Rivera, head of the Falange.[153] It was

---

149. Cf., Franco Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 397, in which he remarks that many of the reforms were neither "badly planned nor inappropriate for the period." Note also that he maintained, and even strengthened a number of Republican initiatives during the many years which he ruled Spain, such as the Cuerpo auxiliar de servicio del ejército and the Consorcio de Industrias Militares, both of which survive in modified form: see Ruiz-Ocaña, pp. 153, 261-263.

150. Alpert, Ejército, pp. 14-15.

151. Cardona, "Enseñanza," p. 80, argues that the closing of the AGM, his "personal project," made him an "enemy" of the regime and an opponent of the military reforms. This seems rather extreme, particularly since Franco demonstrated considerable commitment to furthering most of the reforms when himself chief-of-the-general staff in 1934-35.

152. Citing the personal evidence of a prominent leader of the organization, Stanley G. Payne says that Franco even refused to become a member of the U.M.E.: see Payne, Ejército, p. 415; Politics, p. 294.

153. Payne, Ejército, pp. 467-468; Payne, Falange, p. 87.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not until the disorders attendant upon the Popular Front victory at the polls in February of 1936 that Franco began to become more politically active, advocating the imposition of martial law to maintain order, and taking part in the 8 March 1936 meeting at which a number of generals established the ground rules to determine if a coup should be "necessary."[154] Nevertheless, he avoided committing himself to several abortive conspiracies in the spring of 1936, and went so far as to attempt to impress upon the government the potentially dangerous consequences of failing to reign it its more radical supporters.[155] It appears that Franco, who's participation in the coup was deemed essential by Emilio Mola,[156] did not commit himself to the enterprise until some time in mid-June.[157] Upon the

---

154. On this, see Chapter V.

155. "I always said . . . 'While there remains any hope that the Republican Regime can still prevent anarchy or will not surrender itself to Moscow, we must support the Republic'", cited in Franco-Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 452. See also Payne, Ejército, pp. 438, 441-442, 467, 469.

156 Payne, Ejército, p. 471, . Mola's view was not, however, apparently shared by all. Indeed, so reluctant to commit himself that some of the conspirators referred to him as "Miss Canary Islands" (Payne, Ejército, p. 468, citing the testimony of José María Iribarren, Mola's secretary), and Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo, titular head of the conspiracy, is said to have remarked, "With little Franco or without little Franco we will save Spain!" (Payne, Politics, pp. 332, 335, and Thomas 2nd, p. 199. See also, Gil Robles, p. 780.

157. Franco explained his caution by noting the risk and difficulties attendant upon a coup attempt: Franco-Salgado, Conversaciónes, p. 526.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

premature rising of the garrison of Spanish Morocco on 17 July 1936, Franco flew there from the Canary Islands to assume command of the Army of Africa. Thereafter, of course, his rise to the dictatorship of Spain was virtually unimpeded.

Major General Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, had a distinguished military and political career.[158] The son of an enlisted man who rose to lieutenant colonel, Fanjul, an infantryman turned staff officer, earned three promotions by merit and two awards of the María Cristina in Morocco. As befitting a staff officer, most of Fanjul's career was spent in administrative and staff duties. During his career Fanjul was also a practicing attorney,[159] vice-president of a

---

158. Primary sources for Fanjul Goni are poor. AGMS, Expediente F-84, contains only a few miscellaneous documents. AHNS, S.M. Legajo 324, Pieza 9, Folio 3048, contains information about his participation in the defense of the officers subject to courts martial for the sanjurjada movement of 10 August 1932. AROM, Expediente F-8-T, contains information about his family and promotions. There is a short profile of Fanjul by US military attache Colonel Stephen G. Fuqua, Fuqua to MID, 15 June 1935 (US NA, MID 2041-311.5) which contains some interesting details. Maximiano Garcia Venero, El General Fanjul: Madrid en el Alzamiento Nacional (Madrid: Ediciones Cid, 1976), contains considerable biographical information. There is a very long entry in Arce, Generales, pp. 137-161, plus a shorter one in Suero, pp. 53-56, an extensive one in Rubio Cabeza, pp. 307-308, and a short one in Cortada, p. 196. The general is mentioned frequently in the literature.

159. AHNS, S.M. Legajo 324, Pieza 9, Folio 3048, contains documents relative to his service as a defense attorney to officers who took part in the sanjurjada.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

major shipping firm,[160] and member of the Cortes, sitting as a maurista in 1919-1923, and as an Agrarian in 1931-1934.[161] The advent of the Republic brought no benefits to Fanjul, a conservative monarchist, widely considered an ultra-nationalist and militarist.[162] One of the officers who suffered heavily as a result of the Azaña reforms,[163] Fanjul was generally unemployed during the liberal administrations of 1931-1933. Under the conservative governments of 1933-1935 he found employment variously as Undersecretary of War, commander of the 6th Infantry Division, and military commandant of Cartagena, while becoming affiliated with the U.M.E.[164] The Popular Front government left him inactive, "at disposal," in which situation he found himself in the summer of 1936. One of the principal participants in the military conspiracy of

---

160. Suero, p. 56.

161. Suero, p. 56; Payne, Ejercito, p. 404.

162. Payne, Ejército, pp. 425, 434; Payne, Politics, pp. 304-306; Suero, p. 57; Cortada, p. 196.

163. As a result of a decree in January of 1933, Fanjul's seniority as a brigadier general fell from February of 1926 to the bottom of the list of brigadier generals. His seniority was restored when Gil Robles served as Minister of War.

164. Fanjul appears to have at one point attempted to take control of the organization. See Payne, Politics, pp. 294, 306; Cacho Zabala, p. 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1936,[165] Fanjul's role was to support the effort of Major General Rafael Villegas Montesinos in seizing control of Madrid. Due partially to Villegas' indecisiveness, and not a little to quick action by the government, the loyalty of several subordinates, including Brigadier General José Miaja Menant, and many of the troops, the local Guardia civil, Asaltos, and the people, the uprising fizzled in Madrid. Arrested, Fanjul was tried by court martial, sentenced to death, and shot on 17 August 1936.[166]

The early career of Brigadier General Luis Orgaz Yoldi has been discussed elsewhere.[167] One of the most conspiracy-prone generals in the army under the Republic, Orgaz played an important role in the military uprising of 17 July 1936. He subsequently filled numerous high posts for the Nationalists, both as a field commander, notably in the battles around Madrid in late 1936 and early 1937, and

---

165. Fanjul had begun to involve himself in anti-government conspiracies at least as early as December of 1935, when, in cooperation with Manuel Goded Llopis, he had attempted to organize a coup: Goded, pp. 25-26; Payne, Ejército, p. 338; Suero, p. 59.

166. Azana seems to have disliked Fanjul in the extreme, engaging in a thinly veiled personal attack on the general in his speech Supresion de la prensa llamda militar (Obras completas, II, pp. 173-178), and in extremely sarcastic entries in the Memorias (e.g., 10 June 1932, "poor Fanjul . . . that brave general"). The two clashed often in the Cortes, notably on 29 January 1932 and 21 June 1932.

167. See Chapter VI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

as an administrator, in which he proved particularly capable. Organ served variously as chief of mobilization, created the academies which trained the alféreces provisionales and sargentos provisionales, who proved to be the backbone of the Nationalist armies,[168] and was later made one of the leaders of the F.E.T. y las J.O.N.S., the Nationalist "popular front" equivalent. Orgaz ended the war as a lieutenant general commanding the Army of the Levante. After the war he held a number of important posts, dying in 1946 on active duty as chief-of-the-general staff.

Perhaps the most critical actor in the military conspiracy of 1936, Brigadier General Emilio Mola Vidal,[169]

---

168. On Orgaz' work in this regard, see Garate Cordoba, Alféreces, pp. 115-198.

169. As with all of the most prominent of the generals, primary sources on Mola are poor. He has no file at the AGMS, and AROM, Expediente M-363, contains only information about his family and promotions. However, secondary sources are numerous. Two of his aides have left useful accounts, José María Iribarren, Mola. Datos para una biografia y para la historia del Alzamiento Nacional (Zaragoza: Editora Heraldo de Aragon, 1938) and El General Mola (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1945), and B. Felix Maiz, Alzamiento en España (Pamplona: Ediciones Gómz, 1956) and Mola, aquel hombre. Diario de la conspiración 1936 (Barcelona: Planeta, 1976), this last being of particular value for being post obitum Franco. Jorge Vigón, General Mola (El Conspirador) (Barcelona: AHR, 1957) is also valuable. Mola merits lengthy treatment in Arce, , Generales, pp. 101-131, Rubio Cabeza, pp. 541-550, and Suero, pp. 24-39, as well as a shorter one in Cortada, pp. 340-341. The general is one of the most commonly mentioned persons in all accounts of civil-military relations in Spain during this period.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a man of considerable intellectual power, was a veteran africanista[170] with a flair for administration and conspiracy.[171] After engineering the military uprising, Mola successfully raised the garrison of Pamplona and was instrumental in securing control of Burgos and in isolating the Loyalist Basque country and northwestern coastal zone from the French frontier. A member of the Junta de Defensa Nacional, Mola was appointed commander of the Army of the North in September of 1936, Mola conducted operations against Madrid and the Republican northern zone, and played a role in the bombing of Guernica. On 3 June 1937, while en route to a conference with Franco at which plans were to be made for a final offensive against the Republican northern front, Mola was killed in an airplane crash.

Not even Francisco Franco had a more spectacular career in the Spanish Army than Brigadier General José Varela Iglesias,[172] rose from enlisted trumpeter in the

---

170. Three méritos, numerous decorations.

171. There is a biography of Mola up to the outbreak of the Civil War in Chapter V, above.

172. As with most of the more prominent generals, primary sources for Varela are poor. He has no "expediente" at AGMS. AROM, Expediente B-101-T, contains information about his family and promotions. However, secondary sources are adequate. There are two biographies, José María Peman, Un soldado en la historia. Vida del General Varela (Cadiz: Escelicer, 1954) and Francisco Javier Marinas, General Varela. De soldado a general (Barcelona; AHR, 1956), which, although done during the Franco Era, are serviceable. In addition, Varela merits a lengthy entry in Suero, pp. 93-102, and shorter ones in Rubio Cabeza, p. 773, and Cortada, p. 470. Not often mentioned in general accounts, Varela figures prominently in military works on the period.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

marine infantry to brigadier general in 26 years, earning five merit promotions in Morocco, plus one other special promotion, while twice winning the Cruz Laureada de San Fernando, Spain's highest award for valor, as well as a Medalla militar and the dignity of serving as a Gentleman Chamberlain to Alfonso XIII. The son an infantry sergeant, Varela spent virtually his entire career in the Regulares and the Legion, and was one of the few general's with aviation credentials. A fervent monarchist, in August of 1932 Varela was imprisoned as a result of the Sanjurjo conspiracy, and was not released until February of 1933. During his imprisonment Varela transferred his loyalties from the exiled Alfonso XIII to the arch-conservative Carlist branch of the Spanish Borbons. Varela soon became very active in the Carlist movement, serving as clandestine military adviser to the Carlist militia, the Requetes.[173] Promoted to brigadier general shortly before the collapse of the conservative coalition in October of 1935, Varela became an active anti-republican conspirator after the Popular Front electoral triumph in February of 1936. He was shortly placed disponible forzoso at Cadiz, where he

---

173. Varela was eventually made head of the Carlist militia, for which he wrote Compendio de Ordenanzas, Reglamentos y Obligaciones del Boina Roja, Jefe de Patrulla y Jefe del Requete, published by the General Delegation of Requetes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was confined to the castle of Santa Catalina. Released upon the success of the military uprising at Cadiz on 18 July, Varela was given command of the Nationalist columns which very shortly began advancing on Madrid. Thereafter Varela commanded columns, divisions, corps, and ultimately an army, in virtually every one of the major battles of the war, from the relief of the Alcazar of Toledo to the Battle of the Ebro. Shortly after the Civil War he was made Army Minister, in which post he directed the demobilization of both the Nationalist and Republican armies, while instituting numerous reforms. Promoted lieutenant general in 1941, Varela shortly became involved in an unseemly quarrel with the Falange which resulted in an attempt on his life. In concert with several other high officers, in 1943 he signed a petition requesting that Franco restore the monarchy, for which the latter removed him from the Army Ministry, but in compensation made him High Commissioner of the Protectorate. Varela died in Morocco in 1951, and was posthumously made a marquess and substantive captain general.[174]

Three of the principal Nationalist leaders --Goded, Villegas, Fanjul-- were killed as a result of the abortive

---

174. Franco was extremely stingy with regard to the rank of captain general. Excluding posthumous elevations, he promoted only two officers to captain general. See Cuaita Martorell, p. 163.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

coup. The others all held very responsible posts. Although two --Cabanellas and Mola-- died in the course of the war, the others all held very responsible posts in the Nationalist government and military establishment. All of them, however, were rather quickly eclipsed by Francisco Franco.

Part II. A Profile of the Leaders in Crisis

The differences between the Republican and Nationalist leaders are even greater than the differences between the generals constituting each of the two factions.

A. General Considerations

Although the mean age for the generals as a group was somewhat less than 60, that for the Nationalists was somewhat less than 59, and for the Republicans somewhat less than 61. However, the Nationalist leadership group averaged much younger than the mean for their faction, 54.8 years, whereas their Republican counterparts were only slightly younger than the Republicans as a whole, 60.3 years. Thus, although the difference between the mean ages of the officers in the two factions was only about two years, that between the two leadership groups was slightly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

more than five years. At the upper end of the age range there was little to choose from, the oldest Nationalist leader, Miguel Cabanellas, was, at 64, only slight younger than the oldest Republican leaders, Juan García y Gómez Caminero and Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo, both 65. However, the youngest Nationalist leaders were very young: Francisco Franco was 44, José Varela Iglesias, 45, and Emilio Mola Vidal, 49, in contrast to Miguel Nuñez de Prado, the youngest Republican, who was 54. As a result, the standard deviation for the Nationalist leaders is 6.2 years, while that for the Republicans is only 3.5. A similar pattern exists if one looks at the mean number of years in service.

The "average" general had been in the army 43 years, with the Nationalists averaging 42.4 and the Republicans 43.8, a difference of a little more than two years. However, the mean number of years in the service for the Nationalist leaders was only 38.4, in contrast to 43.5 for their Republican counterparts. Once again, at the upper end of the scale there was little to choose from between the Nationalist Miguel Cabanellas' 47 years in uniform and the Republican Domingo Batet's 49. At the lower end of the scale, Varela, with 27 years, and Franco, with 29, had considerably less time in the service than had Nuñez de Prado, with 38 years the Republican with the least time in uniform. These differences are again reflected a greater

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

standard deviation for the Nationalist group, 6.3 years to 4.1 for the Republicans.

The same pattern holds true for relative seniority. The median seniority of the generals was 44, omitting the Neutrals, with that for the Nationalists being 45 and that for the Republicans 46. Despite this very minor difference, the median seniority for the Nationalist leaders was 24, while that for their Republican counterparts was 38. This was due largely to the fact that there were proportionally more major generals among the ten Nationalist leaders than among the 17 Republican ones: there were seven major generals in each group, the rest were brigadier generals.[175]

Of particular interest is the fact that, although only nine of the generals in the army had entered the service as enlisted men, little more than 10% of the total number of generals, fully five of these men (55.6%) were numbered

---

175. The ranks and relative seniority in the army of the Nationalist leaders were: major generals Cabanellas (5th), Goded (8th), Queipo de Llano (10th), Villegas (12th), Saliquet (14th), Franco (26th), and Fanjul (27th), plus the brigadier generals Orgaz Yoldi (28th), Mola (30th), and Varela Iglesias (83rd). For the Republicans: major generals Gómez Morato (11th), Salcedo (13th), Riquelme (15th), Nuñez de Prado (16th), Batet (21st), Gómez Caminero (22nd), and Masquelet (24th), plus the brigadier generals Pozas Perea (29th), Llano Encomienda (39th), Martínez de Monje (40th), Castello Pantoja (42nd), Romerales Quintero (43rd), Miaja (49th), Martínez Cabrera (57th), Gamir Ulibarri (58th), Cardenal Dominicis (77th), and Bernal García (82nd).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

among the leaders of the two factions. Three of the former enlisted men were Republican leaders and two Nationalists.[176] Although the proportion of former enlisted men among the leaders is extraordinarily high, their distribution between the two leadership groups is statistically identical. Of the ten generals with aviation credentials, three belong to one of the leadership groups, a figure roughly proportional to the total number of officers in this category compared with the general officers as a whole. Two of these officers were Republicans, one a Nationalist, a distribution which, like that for former enlisted men, is without statistical significance.[177]

There were significant differences in the distribution among the arms of service of the officers in the leadership groups. These differences were not only manifest between the two leadership groups. In both factions, there was a significant difference between the distribution among the

---

176. The Republican activists were Riquelme and Nuñez de Prado, former enlisted engineers, plus Martínez Cabrera, a former enlisted artilleryman. The Nationalists were Queipo de Llano, a former enlisted cavalryman, and Varela Iglesias, a former marine infantryman.

177. The Republicans were Nuñez de Prado, who at the time of the military uprising was serving as Director General of Aviation, and Bernal García. The Nationalist was Varela Iglesias. All three were certified as observers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

arms of all the adherents and that of the leaders of the faction.

Table 1
Faction Leadership by Arm of Service

	Army	Nationalists		Republicans	
	All	All	Leaders	All	Leaders
Army	87	34	10	36	17
Infantry	48 (55.2%)	16 (47.1%)	6 (60%)	19 (52.8%)	11 (64.7%)
Cavalry	12 (13.8%)	5 (14.7%)	2 (20%)	6 (16.7%)	2 (11.8%)
Artillery	12 (13.8%)	6 (17.6%)	0	5 (13.9%)	1 (5.9%)
Engineers	7 (8.0%)	3 (8.8%)	0	4 (11.1%)	2 (11.8%)
Staff	8 (9.2%)	4 (11.8%)	2 (20%)	2 (5.6%)	1 (5.9%)

Infantrymen were disproportionately represent among the leaders of both factions.. Among the Republicans all four of the other arms were more or less represented among the leaders, albeit not necessarily in proportion to their numbers within the whole of the general officer corps, or even within the faction itself. This was clearly not so in the case of the Nationalists. Although artillery and engineer generals totalled over 25% of the Nationalist partisans, not one of the Nationalist leaders came from either of these groups, while cavalrymen were somewhat over represented, and staff officers, with a long list of grievances, particularly so.

There were also notable differences in the promotional experiences of the officers in the leadership groups, not only between the two groups of leaders, but also when compared with the officers in their faction as a whole, and even with the africanistas.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 2
The Leaders:
Years in Service to Attain Promotion by Faction

	Army	Nationalists		Republican		Afric
		All	Leaders	All	Leaders	
To Captain						
Mean	7.5	7.7	6.1	7.8	8.5	7.9
St Dev	2.8	2.8	1.9	2.7	2.2	2.3
Range	2-13	3-13	4-10	3-13	4-11	4-11
To Major						
Mean	17	17.3	12.9	17.7	17.1	14
St Dev	4.3	4.8	4.4	3.4	3.6	3.5
Range	5-25	6-25	6-18	12-23	12-23	6-19
To Lieutenant Colonel						
Mean	22.9	22.6	17.5	23.7	22.8	19.6
St Dev	4.1	4.7	4.0	3.3	3.8	4.1
Range	10-30	10-30	10-24	15-28	15-28	10-26
To Colonel						
Mean	28.8	28.5	21.4	30.0	28.4	23.5
St Dev	5.9	6.5	4.3	4.7	5.0	4.3
Range	14-38	14-38	14-27	20-37	20-37	14-30
To Brigadier General						
Mean	34.2	33.7	25.8	35.5	33.7	28.8
St Dev	5.8	6.5	5.2	4.5	5.2	5.4
Range	16-43	16-43	16-34	22-41	22-40	16-38
To Major General						
Mean	34.2	32.2	31.1	37.2	36.6	31.9
St Dev	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.0	6.0	4.6
Range	23-43	23-38	23-38	28-43	28-43	23-38

Although the Nationalists as a group were promoted somewhat more rapidly than were the Republicans as group, the Republican leaders equalled, or did slightly better than the Nationalists as a whole at all grades except that of major general, where they averaged about two years more time in the service. However, the Nationalist activist group required significantly less time to attain promotions than either the Republican leaders or the Nationalists as a whole. Indeed, at virtually every level the Nationalist leaders went up the promotion ladder faster even than did

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the africanistas as a group, and this despite the fact that there were only slightly more africanistas among them as among the Republican leadership, ten as against eight. Of course, the promotional advantages which the Republican africanistas had was diluted by the fact that africanistas were a minority among the Republican leaders, while they constituted the overwhelming majority of the Nationalist ones. Moreover, as an examination of the Range figures will demonstrate, the Nationalists consistently were at the lower end of the africanista promotional range. This was due to the presence among them of several officers who had moved up the promotional ladder with extraordinary speed.[178]

Such rapid movement up the ranks was only possible by means of promotions by the merits of war. All of the

---

178. Franco made brigadier general a little less than 19 years after entering the academy, and major general a little less than 27 years; Mola, brigadier general in 24 years; Varela, brigadier general in a bit more than 26 years, including three as an enlisted man in the marine infantry; Orgaz, a brigadier general in 28 years, a feat matched by Miguel Cabanellas, who rose to major general in 34 years. Queipo de Llano made brigadier general in 29 years, including two as an enlisted man, and major general in 34. The fastest moving Republican leaders were Nuñez de Prado, brigadier general in 25 years and major general in 32; Gómez Morato and Riquelme, both brigadier general in 27 years and major general in 32; and Batet, who was not an africanista, but was a brigadier general in 28 years and a major general in 34. Two Neutrals did better than any of the Republican leaders: Capaz Montes was a brigadier general after 23 years in the service, and López de Ochoa a brigadier general in a little more than 25 years and a major general in 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

generals designated as leaders had at least one such promotion.

Table 3
Leadership Merit Promotions by Faction

	Army	Nationalists		Republican		Afric
		All	Leaders	All	Leaders	
Total Awards	124	51	34	32	20	76
Awardees	58	22	10	22	12	27
Mean Awards	2.1	2.3	3.4	1.5	1.7	2.8
St Dev	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.9	1.3
Range	1-7	1-5	2-5	1-4	1-4	1-7

As was the case with regard to movement up the promotion ladder, the leaders of each faction won more merit promotions than did the members of their respective factions as a whole. However, the Republican leadership did not secure more such promotions than did the Nationalists as a whole, nor did the Nationalist leaders outstrip the africanistas in this regard.[179] No similar pattern was evidenced in terms of awards of the María Cristina.

Table 4
Leadership María Cristinas by Faction

	Army	Nationalists		Republican		Afric
		All	Leaders	All	Leaders	
Total Awards	42	13	3	16	12	22
Awardees	27	9	2	9	5	10
Mean Awards	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.8	2.4	2.2
St Dev	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.5	1.5	1.2
Range	1-5	1-4	1-2	1-5	1-5	1-5

179 Two africanistas among the Neutrals, Castro Girona, who had seven méritos, and Capaz Montes, with four, were among the officers who moved most rapidly up the promotion ladder. This is one reason why the figures for the Nationalists do not equal those for the africanistas as a whole.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The leadership group among the Republicans were far more likely to have received the María Cristina than were their Nationalist counterparts, who did not even match the mean number of awards of either faction, nor of the africanistas. Indeed, the most distinguished holder of the María Cristina among the africanistas were to be found not among the Nationalist leaders, but among the Republicans, Riquelme y Lopez Bago, who held five such awards.[180]

The question of promotions by merit and of decorations naturally brings up that of time on campaign.

Table 5
Leadership Time on Campaign Credit by Faction

	Army	Nationalists		Republican		Afric
		All	Leaders	All	Leaders	
Total						
Mean	3.3	2.9	5.8	2.3	2.8	6.5
St Dev	2.8	2.2	1.7	1.4	1.7	3.6
Range	0-14.5	0-7.5	4.2-7.5	0-5.6	0.5-5.6	2.2-14.5
"Other Campaign"						
Mean	1.0	0.6	0.0	1.2	0.7	0.3
St Dev	1.2	1.1	0.0	1.1	1.0	0.8
Range	0-3.3	0-3.3	0	0-3.2	0-2.7	0-3
Morocco, 1909-1927						
Mean	2.1	2.0	5.8	1.1	1.8	5.7
St Dev	2.6	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.6	2.9
Range	0-11.5	0-7.5	4.2-7.5	0-3.8	2.2-3.8	0-11.5

180. Although an africanista, Riquelme's particular services were in political administration, intelligence, and pacification. As a result he had earned only a bit less than three years of "time on campaign" credit, and only one promotion by merit. In addition to the María Cristina, he held 17 other decorations, mostly including multiple awards of the Medalla de mérito militar. See the 8th Subdivision of his hoja de servicios, in AGMS, Expediente R-1319.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This analysis of "time on campaign" credit points up most particularly the relative youth of the generals comprising the leaders of both factions. Few of the principal Republican officers had much experience in the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century, and one of the Nationalist ones. Nevertheless, overall these officers can be shown to have had more "time on campaign" credit that their comrades in the same faction, particularly so in the case of the Nationalist leaders. Indeed, since "time on campaign" data was missing for several of the most prominent Nationalist leaders, including Franco, Fanjul Goni, Queipo de Llano, and Varela, prominent *africanistas* all, it seems reasonable to assume that the actual figures for the Nationalist leaders were higher even than would seem to be the case based on the this table.[181] The leaders on both sides were clearly the more experienced men in the army.

Table 6
Modifications to Seniority of Faction Leaders

	Army	Nationalists		Republican		Afric
		All	Leaders	All	Leaders	
Cases	47	19	5	21	10	12
MN Change	-0.2	-0.1	-1.3	+0.5	+0.3	-1.7
St Dev	3.0	2.7	4.9	2.3	2.9	4.4
Range	-7.8/+6	-7.8/+6	-7.8/+6	-3.4/+5	-3.4/+5	-7.8/+6

181. While such data is also missing for several of the *africanistas* among the Republican leaders, Miaja Menant, Llano Encomienda, Gómez Morato, none of them were of the stature of their Nationalist counterparts. This is also the case for several of the Nationalist leaders who were active in the army during the 1895-1898 period, but for whom "time on campaign" credit cannot be established due to the difficulty of securing their records.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

There were some officers who gained and some who lost seniority among the leaders on both sides as a result of the advent of the Republic and the Azana reforms. The statistics suggest that the Nationalist leaders lost more heavily than did the Republican ones. Although this is deceptive, since more of the Republican leaders lost seniority than did their Nationalist counterparts.[182] Nevertheless, the Nationalist leaders losing seniority did lose far more than the Republicans. Moreover, these officers were among the most prominent africanistas

B. Personal Background.

---

182. Actually, only three of the eleven Nationalist leaders suffered a significant loss of seniority, Orgaz Yoldi, 7.8 years, Varela Iglesias, and Franco Bahamonde, 2.0 years. Three others actually gained seniority, Queipo de Llano, six years as a result of being restored to duty and retroactively promoted to major general in 1931, plus Saliquet Zumeta, three years. More of the Republican leaders actually lost seniority, albeit to a lesser degree than did the three Nationalist losers. Thus, Bernal García lost 3.4 years, Martínez de Monje, 2.6 years, Castello Pantoja, 2.4, and Gamir Ulibarri, 1.1 years. Three of the Republican leaders also gained seniority by these measures, notably Gomez Caminero, five years as a result of being restored to duty and retroactively promoted to major general in 1931, plus Romerales Quintero, 4.8, and Riquelme y López Bago, three. Among both groups there were a number of generals who gained or lost seniority to a lesser degree, often as little as two weeks.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It was possible to identify the occupation of the fathers of eight of the eleven Nationalist leaders and ten of the 17 Republican ones. Although the overall pattern does not particularly differ from that of the generals as a whole, most being the sons of military men, there is one unusual pattern. It will be recalled that there were eleven generals who were themselves the sons of generals, four of whom aligned themselves with each faction, while three are classed as Neutrals.[183] None of the four sons of generals who became Nationalists is counted among the prominent leaders of the Nationalist Faction. All four of those who became Republicans were among the leaders of their faction, Nuñez de Prado, Salcedo Molinuevo, Gamir Ulibarri, and Martínez Monje. There is no evidence which would suggest an explanation for this e anomaly.

There is no similar unusual datum for any other aspect of personal background. In terms of social origins and family status the leaders of the two factions were about as reflective of their factions as a whole as is statistically possible.

---

183. See Table 10, above.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

C. Political Profile.

The prominence of the leaders of the two factions make it possible to secure more information on their views of politics, institutions, and personalities of importance in the period proceeding the Civil War.

Political Inclinations.

The political views of all eleven of the Nationalist leaders, and 15 of the 17 Republican ones can be established. Not surprisingly, the Republicans were all left-of-center, essentially reflective of the political views of the Republican generals as a whole. The Nationalist leaders also more or less reflected the political outlook of their factional comrades, which were somewhat inchoate.

Table 7
Political Affiliations of Faction Leaders

	Army	Nationalists		Republican	
		All	Leaders	All	Leaders
Carlist	1	1	1	0	0
Monarchist	12	7	4	1	1
Centrist	8	4	3	1	0
Republican	25	5	2	18	12
Socialist	2	0	0	2	2

Although the generals leading the Nationalists were certainly more conservative than those leading the Republicans, their political views spanned a greater

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

proportion of the spectrum, ranging from reactionary Carlism to staunch republican. The table can be compared with Salvador de Madariaga's analysis of the results of the election of 16 February 1936, dividing the "Centrists" between his "Parliamentary Right" and "Non-Marxist Left."[184] On this basis, the Republican leadership was overwhelmingly of the "Non-Marxist Left," which garnered about 36% of the votes. In comparison, about 55% of the Nationalist leaders belonged to the "Parliamentary Right," which garnered only about 43% of the votes, and there was one general from the "Anti-Parliamentary Right," a group which garnered very few votes at the polls. However, despite this rightward slant, about 35% of the Nationalist leaders were adherents of the "Non-Marxist Left," a figure very much in keeping with the election results.[185]

Institutional Affiliations

The principal generals of each faction do seem to have been more likely to have had ties to various of the organizations which played, or were perceived to have

---

184. For a discussion of Madariaga's analysis see Chapter VI, part D.

185. Of the four generals who had stood for the Cortes at various times, three were among the Nationalist leaders, Fanjul Goñi, Miguel Cabanellas, and Franco, and the third among the Republican ones, Gómez Caminero.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

played, important roles in Spanish political life during the period in question.

The Juntas.[186] Although overall only a dozen of the generals of 1936 were involved in the juntero movement, those who were, whether as sympathizers or opponents, were heavily represented among the leaders of the two factions. Of the five men who were members or sympathizers with the juntas, two were prominent among the Republican leaders, Castello Pantoja and Riquelme, and one among the Nationalists, Saliquet Zumeta. Curiously, all three were africanistas. Of the seven generals who openly opposed the movement, six, africanistas all, were numbered among the leaders of the Nationalists: Miguel Cabanellas, Queipo de Llano, Franco, Orgaz Yoldi, Mola Vidal, and Varela Iglesias.

Freemasonry. Although only about a third of the generals were regarded as having ties to freemasonry, these officers were prominent among the principal commanders of both factions, and particularly among the Republicans. Of the six generals known to have been masons even before the war, three --Pozas Perea, Nuñez de Prado, and Riquelme--

---

186. For a general discussion of the juntero movement, see Chapters II and VI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were prominent among the Republican leaders and two -- Miguel Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano-- among the Nationalists: four of these men were africanistas, Nuñez de Prado, Riquelme, Miguel Cabanellas, and Queipo de Llano. Of the twenty generals suspected of having ties freemasonry who were so investigated by the Nationalist after the war, only one figured among the Nationalist leaders, Goded Llopis, an africanista, while ten were among the Republican leaders, Castello Pantoja, Gómez Morato, Llano Encomienda, Miaja Menant, Bernal García, Batet Mestres, Gómez Caminero, Martínez Cabrera, Masquelet Lacaci, and Martínez Monje: the first five of these men were africanistas. Of the eight officers sometimes accused of having been masons, but never investigated, one figured among the prominent Republican generals, Romerales Quintero, and one among the leading Nationalists, Franco Bahamonde, both africanistas. Looking at the question from a different perspective, confirmed masons comprised 20% of the prominent Nationalist military leaders and nearly 18% of the Republican ones, virtually identical proportions. Counting persons believed to have been masons for any reason, over 82% of the Republican leadership had some sort of link with freemasonry, as did 40% of the Nationalist leaders. Superficially this would tend to suggest an important role for Freemasonry. However, the unusually large proportion of masons playing prominent roles in the leadership of both factions is more

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

likely to be linked to the fact that Freemasonry attracted the more energetic and capable officers in the army. Nearly 40% of the generals know or suspected of having been masons were africanistas, a figure about 30% higher than the proportion of africanistas among the generals as a whole, and africanista masons comprised 40% of the leadership of the Republicans and 40% of that of the Nationalists.

Relationship to Primo de Rivera.[187] Only three of the generals can be termed to have been supporters of Miguel Primo de Rivera during his dictatorial rule, 1923-1930, while nine of them openly opposed him. Of those favorably disposed towards Primo, two, Saliquet Zumeta and Orgaz Yoldi, figured among the Nationalist leaders, as did three of those opposing him, Miguel Cabanellas, Goded Llopis, and Queipo de Llano: all five of these men were africanistas. Two of those opposing Primo, Batet Mestres and Gómez Caminero, were prominent Republican leaders.

Monarchist/Anti-Monarchist Activists. Organ Yoldi, an africanista, was the one general who was an outspoken supporter of the monarchy which was abolished in 1931, and

---

187. Chapters II, VI, and VII, contain discussions of the question of the relationship of the generals to Primo.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

figured prominently among the leaders of the Nationalists. Of the six generals who openly worked against the monarchy, two, Miguel Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano, were numbered among the Nationalist leaders, and two, Riquelme and Nuñez de Prado, among the Republican ones. All five of these men were *africanistas*, as was Varela Iglesias, who was an enthusiast for the Carlist branch of the Spanish Borbons.

U.M.E./U.M.R.A. Activity.[188] The two clandestine military-political organizations active during the final year of the Republic, the *Unión militar republicana antifascista* and particularly the *Unión militar española* can be shown to have attracted sixteen of the generals. Of the ten *U.M.E.* affiliates, six figured prominently among the Nationalist leaders: Fanjul Goñi, Orgaz Yoldi, Queipo de Llano, Villegas Montesinos, Varela Iglesias, and Goded Llopis, to whom may be added Mola Vidal, who, although not apparently affiliated with the *U.M.E.* used members of the organization as his agents. One *U.M.E.* member was a prominent Republican leader, Miaja Menant. These officers were all *africanistas*. All six of the generals affiliated with the *U.M.R.A.* became prominent Republican leaders, Castello Pantoja, Nuñez de Prado, Llano Encomienda,

---

188. On these organizations see Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Riquelme y López Bago, Pozas Perea, and Gómez Caminero. Save for the last two, all of these officers were also africanistas.

Relationship to Azaña. The strong feelings which many of the generals harbored about Manuel Azaña seem to have played some role in the events of the summer of 1936. All ten of those who can be shown to have been favorably disposed towards Azaña were prominent Republicans, Martínez de Monje, Masquelet Lacaci, Molero Lobo, and Pozas Perea, plus the africanistas Salcedo Molinuevo, Gómez Morato, Miaja Menant, Riquelme y López Bago, and Nuñez de Prado. In contrast, of the fourteen generals on poor terms with Azaña, nine, africanistas all, became prominent Nationalists --Miguel Cabanellas, Fanjul Goñi, Goded Llopis, Mola Vidal, Queipo de Llano, Saliquet Zumeta, Villegas Montesinos, Orgaz Yoldi, and Varela Iglesias--[189] and two --Romerales Quintero, an africanista, and Gómez Caminero-- were numbered among the most important Republican commanders.

---

189. If Francisco Franco is included among the generals on poor personal terms with Azaña, based on Azaña's perception of the matter, then the whole of the leaders among the Nationalists would have been personally hostile to the President. See Chapter VI, note 167.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Summary. The pattern which could be discerned upon examining the political inclinations and personal affiliations of the generals overall in their respective factions,[190] becomes clearer when the leaders of the two factions are compared. Although the leaders of both groups tended to have been rather prominent in the opposition to the juntas, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and the monarchy itself, overall the men with such credentials were far more heavily represented among the Nationalist leadership than among the Republican. Only in the matter of their political inclinations and their personal relationship with Manuel Azaña, do the prominent Republican generals demonstrate a greater degree of cohesion than do the Nationalist leaders. Finally, although they were prominent among the Republican leaders, the africanistas were overwhelmingly important among the Nationalist leaders: all of the Nationalist generals to attain some prominence as conspirators or commanders were africanistas, a fact which, more than any other, most clearly distinguishes them from the prominent Republicans, only four of whom were africanistas.

---

190. See the conclusions to Chapter VII.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter IX

Conclusions

The traditional view of the military rebellion which took place against the government of the Spanish Republic in July of 1936, that it was the result of a broadly-based conspiracy by a fascist-inspired, aristocratic officer corps following the lead of their reactionary generals, is not supported by the evidence.[1] Indeed, quite the contrary is true. Based on an examination of the background, accomplishments, character, and actions of the generals, the officer corps appears to have been in as serious disarray as were the Spanish people as a whole.

Considering the available information on family, social background, and personal attainments, the generals on active duty with the Spanish Army at the time of the military rebellion of 1936 were an extremely homogeneous group of men. They came overwhelmingly from families with a strong tradition of military service,[2] including a

---

1. Chapter I contains a number of references which will serve to illustrate the traditional, and generally still current state of scholarly opinion on the Spanish officer corps during the Second Republic. See particularly the references to Preston, SCW, p. 44; Bravo Morato, p. 151; Matthews, p. 73; Dahms, pp. 127-128.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

handful from the nobility,[3] plus a few from the landed gentry[4] and the professional classes.[5] Despite this

---

2. Over 88% of the generals came from families with a military tradition, including men from families of the military nobility, such as Nuñez de Prado and Espinosa de los Monteros. Excluding such officers, figures for men from traditional military families are still well over 80%. They were essentially middle class, and, indeed, "a badly paid group within the middle class" (Cardona, p. 5). Many military families lived in a state of bordering on genteel poverty, as did the Franco Bahamonde family during the childhood of the future Caudillo (cf., Crozier, pp. 33-36, and Lloyd, pp. 19ff.). See also, Chapter III, note 179, and Chapter VI, Table 14.

3. There were, in fact, only two genuine aristocrats among the generals, Espinosa de los Monteros and Nuñez de Prado, both of the untitled nobility. The only other man of "upper class" background among the generals of 1936 was Batet Mestres, probably the wealthiest of the generals, whose money derived from his family's extensive industrial holdings in Catalonia, on whom see Fuqua to MID, 21 February 1935, US NA MID 2447-S-19.1. Cardona, pp. 5-6 and 267, observes that although eleven of the 148 generals on active duty in 1931 were titled, eight of these men had been ennobled while in the service, and two were members of the royal family, which left just one general of genuinely aristocratic background, about 0.6 percent. At that time only about 0.3% of the colonels on active duty were titled nobles. See Chapter III, note 122.

4. Only two of the generals of 1936 came from landed families which lacked a military tradition, García Benitez and Rodríguez González. Arguably, several of the officers from military families could as readily be considered to have roots in the landed gentry, as could the two officers of noble origins. However, in these cases the principal family distinction was military service, not land management.

5. Only three of the generals came from the professional classes. Riquelme's father was an official of the Telegraph Service, while his grandfathers were respectively a university professor and an attorney; Bernal García's father was a contractor specializing in military construction; and Carrasco Amilibia came from a moderately prosperous Basque family which had ties to the socialist party.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

similarity of social background, there was little commonality among the political views of these officers. Politically, the generals ranged across the entire political spectrum, from the far right to the moderate left. However, the overwhelming majority were either constitutional monarchists or moderate republicans.[6] Politics aside, the only really substantial differences among the generals was in their professional experiences.

Professionally, there were notable variations in the promotional and the career experiences among the officers of the different arms and corps. On the whole, generals who came from the "facultative corps" --artillery, engineers, and staff-- had notably less impressive careers than those who were cavalrymen or infantrymen. This was particularly so in the case of infantrymen, who were far more likely to have been involved in active operations.[7]

---

6. About a third of the generals were to the right-of-center, with opinions ranging from Carlist through constitutional monarchist to conservative republican, while the balance held views from moderate republican through moderate socialist, proportions roughly in keeping with the views of the electorate. See Chapter VI, Table 17.

7. Although there were some officers in each of the arms who lacked any time on campaign credit, this was far more common a phenomenon among engineer and particularly artillery officers than among infantrymen or cavalrymen. Based on partial information, infantry generals averaged 4.3 years of time on campaign credit during their careers, while artillerymen who had such credit earned only about nine months on the average.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This enabled infantrymen to earn promotions by merit,[8] and thus to move up the promotion ladder more quickly.[9] However, the differences among the several arms in this regard were by no means as significant as those between the africanistas, officers who had experienced extensive wartime service in Morocco, and those who had little or no such service, regardless of their corps, with the former moving up the promotion ladder at a very accelerated rate.[10] Indeed, it was precisely because of the existence

---

8. Although there were wide variations, with some officers earning none and several five or more, and granting the absence of documentation for a few officers, nevertheless, infantry, cavalry, and staff corps generals had earned about two promotions by méritos de guerra, while, with one exception, artillery and engineer generals had none, their corporate preference being to "remit" such promotions for awards of the María Cristina (See Chapter II, note 28). However, an analysis of officers who won the María Cristina demonstrates that here too, over 90% of the awards went to infantrymen, cavalrymen, or staff officers. See Chapter VI, Tables 4 and 5.

9. Whereas the statistically "typical" officer took a bit over 34 years in the service to rise to brigadier general, infantrymen averaged about 1.5 years less and cavalrymen about a year less, while artillerymen and engineers required over four years more, with staff officers being virtually on the mean. See Chapter VI, Table 2.

10. Africanistas averaged about 5.5 years fewer years in the service to the rank of brigadier general than the mean for the generals as a whole, 34.2 years, while other officers averaged about 2.6 years more. Statistically africanistas earned nearly twice as many merit promotions and awards of the María Cristina than did other generals, while accumulating more than twice as much "time on campaign" credit, virtually all of it in Morocco, where the other officers earned only about half of their "time on campaign" credit. See Chapter VI, Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the africanistas that there existed such notable divergence in the career experiences of officers of the different arms. This group, the africanistas, was the single most important identifiable group in the army, distinct not only from officers of the three facultative corps, but even from their comrades in the infantry and cavalry.

It was the africanistas who played the most significant role in military and political events from the mid-1920s to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Yet the men in this group were themselves by no means particularly different from their fellow-officers who were not africanistas. The africanistas were recruited from the same social classes as were the rest of the officers[11] and had much the same academic background. In virtually every respect they were little different from that of the generals as a whole,[12] save that they tended to be younger men, with rather less time in the service and rather greater seniority than the norm,[13] all due to their

---

11. See Chapter VI, Tables 11 and 13.

12. For example, the proportions of bachelors and married men among the africanistas was precisely the same as that for the generals as a whole.

13. On average, the africanistas were more than three years younger than the mean for the generals as a group, 56.3 years as against 59.7, and five years younger than the non-africanistas --the peninsulares--, who averaged 61.3 years of age. The africanistas had been in the army an average of slight more than 39 years, nearly four less than the mean for the generals, and more than five less than

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

considerable service in Morocco.[14] The only area in which the africanistas differed significantly from their comrades-in-arms was that they were rather more politically conservative.[15] This aside, it is important to note that the principal differences between the africanistas and the other generals derived from the very fact of their being africanistas.

This overall lack of significant variation in the profile of the Spanish generals even prevails when looking at the generals within their faction of choice in the crisis of 1936. There was little difference in the personal profile of those officers who were Nationalists and those who were Republicans, or even those who may be considered Neutral.[16] The overwhelming majority of the officers in both factions had similar social origins, being

---

that for the non-africanistas. Where the median seniority of the generals was 44, that for the africanistas was 30, and that for the peninsulares 50.

14. See note 10, above.

15. Nearly half of the africanistas were to the right-of-center, in contrast to about a third of the generals as a whole. However, note that while the political views of virtually 90% of the africanistas can be ascertained, those of only about 40% of the other generals have been established. See Chapter VI, Table 15.

16. This discussion is based on the conclusions derived from the analysis of the commitment of the generals to the two factions in Chapter VII, Part I, which concluded that 34 of the generals can be said to have committed themselves to the Nationalist cause and 36 to the Republic, with 15 classed as Neutrals for various reasons.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mostly the offspring of officers, themselves members of traditionally military families.[17] On the whole the Nationalists tended to be slightly younger than the Republicans, with somewhat fewer years in the service and with rather greater seniority,[18] differences which were at best marginal, despite the greater proportion of africanistas among the Nationalists.[19] Indeed, overall there is little to choose from between the generals of the two factions in virtually every category. To be sure, the Nationalists were somewhat more likely to have earned promotions by the merits of war, which somewhat accelerated their promotions.[20] Despite this, the Nationalists had

---

17. See Chapter VII, Tables 10, 11, and 12.

18. Nationalists averaged slightly less than 59 years of age, with a median seniority of 45 after slightly more than 42 years in the service, where the norms for the generals as a whole were somewhat less than 60 years of age, with a median seniority of 44 after 43 years in the service. In contrast, Republicans averaged slightly less than 61 years of age, with a mean seniority of 46 after nearly 44 years in the service.

19. Nearly 54% of the africanistas became Nationalists, in contrast to only about 31% who became Republicans, the remainder being counted among the Neutrals.

20. Of 124 known merit promotions among the generals, 51 went to Nationalists, for an average of 2.3 each, and only 32 to Republicans, for an average of 1.5 each. One result of this was that the Nationalists reached brigadier general somewhat more rapidly than did the Republicans, 33.7 years as opposed to 35.7, where the mean for the generals as a whole was 34.2 years. See Chapter VII, Tables 5 and 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

only about as much time on campaign credit as did the Republicans, albeit more of it was gained in Morocco.[21] Even in so seemingly important a matter as the revision of promotions implemented by Manuel Azaña in early 1931 there does not appear to be any notable difference between the two groups: although the Nationalists on average lost seniority and the Republicans gained it, the overall impact was small.[22] Among officers who entered the service as enlisted men there was no difference between the two factions.[23] While officers who held aviation certificates were more heavily Nationalist, it would be difficult to generalize on the basis of the numbers involved.[24] So in terms of both personal background and career there are no

---

21. Despite the fact that the records of certain of the most prominent of them --Franco, Varela, Queipo de Llano-- are incomplete or missing, Nationalists averaged about 2.7 years time on campaign credit, in contrast to about 2.3 years for the Republicans, where the overall mean was 3.3, due to the presence of Castro Girona, Capaz Montes, and several other seasoned veterans among the Neutrals. Morocco accounted for about two-thirds of overall "time on campaign" credit, but fully 75% of that for the Nationalists and only about 48% of that for the Republicans. See Chapter VII, Table 8.

22. Overall, the future Nationalists lost a statistical average of about a month's seniority, while the future Republicans gained about six months. See Chapter VII, Table 9.

23. Of nine former enlisted men, four adhered to each faction and the last was a Neutral. See Chapters VI and VII.

24. Of ten generals with aviation credentials, half were Nationalists, two Republicans, and three Neutrals. See Chapters VI and VII.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

discernible differences between the two groups. Only in the areas of political views and personal relationships do serious differences between the two groups emerge.

Politically, the Nationalists ranged from the extreme right to the moderate left, but nearly 60% of them were to the right-of-center, in contrast to less than 10% of the Republicans, who very clearly appear to have been ideologically more cohesive. However, neither side was particularly reflective of the political inclinations of the Spanish people as a whole, who were slightly more than 43% right-of-center, 36% moderately to the left, and over 20% on the radical left.[25]

In terms of political activism, the officers who took the lead in opposing the juntero movement were much more likely to be Nationalists than Republicans, while those who supported the juntas were somewhat more likely to be Republicans.[26] Similarly, of three generals who were open supporters of Primo de Rivera, two were Nationalists and one a Neutral, while of the nine who were active opponents of the Dictator, four were Nationalists, three Republicans,

---

25. See Chapter V, note 23, and Chapters VI and VII, for an analysis of the results of the election of 1936.

26. Of seven generals openly opposed to the juntas, six became Nationalists and one a Neutral generally regarded as a Nationalist, while of five more or less in sympathy with the juntas, two were Republicans, two Neutrals, and one a Nationalist. See Chapter VII, Part II.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and two Neutrals.[27] Among generals with strong views on the monarchy, the one open royalist was a Nationalist, as were a two of the six anti-monarchists, while three were Republicans, and one a Neutral.[28]

Although officers who were believed to have been affiliated with the Masons can be shown to have mostly been inclined to be Republicans,[29] no firm conclusions can be drawn concerning the relationship of Freemasonry to Republicanism in as much as officers of republican or leftist views were more likely to be accused of being masons.[30] More importance can be placed upon the fact that the generals with ties to the Unión militar republicana antifascista[31] were overwhelmingly Republican, which demonstrates a high degree of political motivation on the part of those joining this organization, while those in the Unión militar española, although mostly Nationalists, were not overwhelmingly so, a reflection of the fact that this organization was more of a professional association of

---

27. See Chapter VII, Part II.

28. See Chapters VI and VII.

29. Only about a quarter of the 34 officers known to be, regarded as, or rumored to be Masons were Nationalists, with nearly two-thirds being Republicans and only about 6% Neutrals.

30. See Chapter VI, note 155.

31. All six of the generals with ties to the U.M.R.A. became supporters of the Republic.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

admittedly mostly middle-of-the-road and conservative officers.[32]

With one exception, personal relationships do not appear to have had significant influence on the generals and their choice of side. An examination of men who were old comrades, personal friends, and even relatives does not demonstrate any degree of predictability. The exception is that of the officers' relationship to Manuel Azaña. All of the generals who were on good terms with Azaña became Republicans. Interestingly, they were joined by four of the thirteen generals who were not on friendly terms with the President. Of the remainder, seven became Nationalists and two Neutrals.[33] This is one of the few areas in which there is a clearly defined difference between Nationalists and Republicans, and it is by no means conclusive. In effect, the overall lack of pattern which prevails in most other areas, is manifest, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree, in the matter of relationship to Manuel Azaña. It is only upon examination of those generals who may be said to have been the leaders of their respective factions in the army that some significant differences begin to emerge.

Of the 27 generals who can be identified as prominent

---

32. Six of the ten U.M.E.-affiliated generals were Nationalists, one a Republican, and the rest Neutrals. See Chapter 7, note 163.

33. See Chapter VII, notes 167 and 168.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

leaders of their faction, ten were Nationalists and the rest Republicans. The social background of these officers differs little from that for the generals as a whole, or from that of the officers comprising the two factions. However, some significant differences emerge upon camparison of the careers of the officers who comprised the leaders. The Nationalist leaders were significantly younger than the norm for their faction, and more so for the generals as a group,[34] while the Republican leaders averaged only slightly younger than the mean for their faction, and were actually about a half year older than the mean for the generals as a group.[35] Similarly, the Nationalist generals had attained a much higher median seniority after fewer years in the service than the norm for their faction, and for the generals as a whole.[36] While the Republican leaders had a higher relative seniority with fewer years in the service than their

---

34. The Nationalist leaders averaged slightly less than 55 years of age, well below the mean for their faction, nearly 59, and for the generals as a group, which was slightly below 60.

35. The leading Republican generals averaged slightly over 60 years of age, only somewhat younger than the nearly 61 which was the mean for the faction as a whole, and somewhat higher than the 59.7 for the generals as a group.

36. Median seniority of the Nationalists was 45 after an average of about 42 years in the service, the leaders of the faction having a median seniority of 24 after an average of 38 years in uniform, while the generals as a whole had a median seniority of 44 after about 43 years in the service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

faction, the figures did not surpass those of the Nationalists, or even of the generals at large.[37] This rapid movement of the Nationalist leadership can be attributed to the predominant role of the africanistas among them, with their strong commitment to service in Morocco. Although the africanistas were well represented among the leaders of both factions, the eight africanistas in the Republican leadership constituted only 47% of leading generals,[38] while the ten africanistas in the Nationalist leadership comprised the whole of the leadership.[39] The difference is noticeable in all areas under consideration: for example, the members of the Republican leadership group moved up the promotion ladder

---

37. The Republicans had a median seniority of 46 after nearly 44 years in the service, while the leaders of the faction had a median seniority of 38 after about 43.5 years in the service, the figures for the generals as a whole had a median seniority of 44 after about 43 years in the service.

38. The eight africanistas among the Republican leaders were Gómez Morato, Salcedo Molinuevo, Riquelme y López Bago, Nuñez de Prado, Llano Encomienda, Castello Pantoja, Romerales Quintero, and Miaja Menant. See Chapter VII, note 81.

39. Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, Goded Llopis, Queipo de Llano, Villegas Montesinos, Saliquet Zumeta, Franco Bahamonde, Fanjul Goñi, Orgaz Yoldi, Mola Vidal, and Varela Iglesias were all africanistas, as were most of the field grade officers who rose to prominence in the Nationalist ranks, such as Aranda Mata, Estebán Infantes, García Valiño, Moscardo Ituarte, Solchaga Zala, and even el-Mizzian, the only Moroccan officer in the Spanish regular army, on whom see Suero, pp. 130ff. See also Chapter VII, note 80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

at a slower rate than did their Nationalist counterparts.[40] The Nationalist leaders had more "time on campaign" credit[41] and earned more promotions by the merits of war[42] than did their Republican counterparts. Only in the matter of decorations did the Republican leaders outstrip the Nationalist ones.[43] In addition, the Republican leaders

---

40. Nationalist officers attained the rank of brigadier general an average of about eight years sooner than did Republican ones (25.8 years to 33.7), which was nearly nine years sooner than the norm for the generals (34.2) as a whole and about three years sooner than the norm for the africanistas (28.8): the Republican leadership group actually reached brigadier general an average of slightly longer than did Nationalists as a whole (33.7 to 33.6 years), and only about two years faster than the norm for their faction (35.5). See Chapter VIII, Table 2.

41. All of the Nationalist leaders had time on campaign credit for Morocco, for an average of 5.8 years, even omitting the records of such officers as Varela Iglesias and Francisco Franco. In contrast, the Republican leaders averaged only about 2.8 years time on campaign credit, about a third of which was for service in the colonial wars of 1895-1898. Although it is impossible to make a firm conclusion, due to the incomplete records concerning time on campaign credit, available data suggest that the least combat-experienced of the Nationalist leaders still averaged more "time on campaign" credit than did the most combat-experienced Republican leaders, 4.2 years to 3.8. See Chapter VIII, Table 5.

42. The ten Nationalist leaders held an average of 3.4 promotions by the merits of war, with no man holding fewer than two, where the norm for the army was 2.1, which were distributed among only two-thirds of the generals. In contrast, the Republican leaders averaged only 1.7 promotions by merit, with over 40% of them holding none whatsoever. See Chapter VIII, Table 3.

43. Of 42 awards of the María Cristina, five of the Republican leaders held a total of twelve such, while among the Nationalist leaders, two officers held a total of only three. Of 16 generals holding the Medalla Militar, four were counted among the leaders of each faction (Republicans Gómez Morato, Nuñez de Prado, Llano Encomienda, and Pozas

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

also fared much better than did the Nationalist ones in the matter of adjustments to seniority which were instituted by Manuel Azana in 1931.[44]

In both factions the range of political views was rather extreme. Thus, the Nationalist leaders ranged from arch-conservatives to republican liberals, and the Republican ones from conservative to socialists.[45] However, overall the Nationalists tended to be mostly middle-of-the-road or to the right-of-center,[46] while the Republicans were mostly to the left-of-center,[47] which

---

Perea; Nationalists Goded Llopis, Franco Bahamonde, Orgaz Yoldi, and Mola Vidal, with Franco having won it twice). Of the four generals who had won the San Fernando, one was a Republican leader (Batet Mestres, who had earned his for distinguished command service in suppressing the October 1934 insurrection in Barcelona) and one a Nationalist leader (Varela Iglesias, who had won two in Morocco in 1920-1921). See Chapter VI, Table 7, Chapter VII, Table 7, and Chapter VIII, Table 4.

44. Overall the Nationalist leaders as a group lost about 1.3 years' seniority as a result of the Azana reforms, despite the fact that two of them (Queipo de Llano and Miguel Cabanellas) gained nearly six years' seniority. In contrast, the Republican leaders gained an average of about .3 years' seniority. The maximum loss suffered by one of the Nationalist leaders was 7.8 years, while the greatest loss among the Republican leaders was only 3.4 years. See Chapter III, Chapter VI, Chapter VII, Table 9, and Chapter VIII, Table 6.

45. See Chapter VIII, Table 7.

46. Only two of the Nationalist leaders, Queipo de Llano and Miguel Cabanellas, were left-of-center.

47. Only two of the Republican leaders were middle-of-the-road or right-of-center, Salcedo Molinuevo and Gómez Morato.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

strongly suggests that the leaders of the two factions constituted politically cohesive groups.

The leaders of the two factions would be expected to have markedly divergent views on a number of the more important issues which affected Spain and the Spanish Army in the two decades before the Civil War. Surprisingly, this was by no means the case, as can be seen by examining the available evidence. To be sure, the generals who were prominent in opposing the juntero movement were almost all among the Nationalist leaders, and none were among the Republican leaders.[48] However, of five generals known to have openly sympathized with the juntas, one is counted among the Nationalist leaders and two among the Republican ones, a distribution hardly indicative of a pattern.[49] Similarly, although counting all officers suspected of having ties to Freemasonry suggests that the Republican leaders were heavily influenced by the masonic order,[50] on

---

48. Six of the seven generals who were openly hostile to the juntas were among the Nationalist leaders, Miguel Cabanellas, Franco, Queipo de Llano, Mola Vidal, Orgaz Yoldi, and Varela Iglesias, while the seventh, Castro Girona, was a Neutral, though traditionally classed as a Nationalist.

49. Saliquet Zumeta was the Nationalist leader with ties to the juntas, Castello Pantoja and Riquelme, the Republican ones. The other two were Neutral, both being seriously ill at the time of the military uprising, López de Ochoa and Rodríguez del Barrio, thought the latter would almost certainly have played a prominent role among the Nationalists had he been in a position to do so.

50. Over 80% of the 17 Republican leaders are included in the various lists of confirmed or suspected Masons:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the basis of this sort of evidence a significant proportion of the Nationalist leaders would also have had such ties.[51] However, considering only officers with confirmed ties to Freemasonry, there was virtually no difference between the leaders of the two factions.[52]

Virtually all of the officers who had expressed strong views on the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera were among the leaders of the respective factions, but once again their distribution between the Nationalists and the Republicans fails to demonstrate a clear pattern. While two of the

---

Pozas Perea, Nuñez de Prado, and Riquelme were openly acknowledged as Masons before the Civil War, while Castello Pantoja, Gómez Morato, Llano Encomienda, Miaja Menant, Bernal García, Batet Mestres, Gómez Caminero, Martinez Cabrera, Masquelet Lacaci, and Martínez Monje had been accused of being members and were investigated, but cleared under the terms of the Nationalist anti-masonic legislation of 1940, and Romerales Quintero, who was rumored to be a Mason but never investigated. See Chapter VI, Table 16, and Chapter VIII, Part II.

51. Four of the Nationalist leaders figure on the various lists of confirmed or suspected Masons, Miguel Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano, both openly acknowledged to have been members, Goded Llopis, charged with membership and investigated, but cleared under the terms of the narrowly defined 1940 laws condemning masonic activity after 1934, and Franco Bahamonde, widely rumored to have been a member.

52. Of the six generals openly known to have been Masons before the Civil War, three --Pozas Perea, Nuñez de Prado, and Riquelme-- were among the principal Republican leaders and two --Miguel Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano-- among the Nationalist ones, while one --López de Ochoa-- was a Neutral.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

three generals who were strong supporters of Primo were among the Nationalist leaders, so too were three of the nine who were prominent in the opposition: only two of Primo's opponents were among the Republican leaders.[53] Not even on so important an issue as their participation in the fall of the Borbón monarchy can any pattern be discerned. While the only avowed monarchist activist among the generals was one of the Nationalist leaders, so too were two of the six outspoken anti-monarchists, with two others being prominent Republicans.[54]

Although most of the generals affiliated with the U.M.E. figured among the Nationalist leaders,[55] and all of

---

53. The two pro-Primo men among the Nationalist leaders were Saliquet Zumeta and Orgaz Yoldi, who were joined by the three anti-Primo men, Miguel Cabanellas, Goded Llopis, and Queipo de Llano. The two anti-Primo generals among the Republican leaders were Batet Mestres and Gómez Caminero. The other generals with strong views on Primo were mostly Neutrals. See Chapter VI and Chapter VIII.

54. Orgaz Yoldi was the only monarchist activist among the generals, and figures among the Nationalist leaders, along with Queipo de Llano and Miguel Cabanellas, who were prominent anti-monarchists, as were Riquelme and Nuñez de Prado, among the Republican ones. The other two anti-monarchists were a Neutral (López de Ochoa) and a Republican who was out of favor with the President (Cerda y López Mollinedo). Note that this discussion omits Varela Iglesias, a Carlist. Nevertheless, even if the latter were to be included, the number of activist monarchists would be exactly balanced by the number of activist anti-monarchists.

55. Of ten U.M.E. affiliates, six figured prominently among the Nationalist leaders: Fanjul Goñi, Orgaz Yoldi, Queipo de Llano, Villegas Montesinos, Varela Iglesias, and Goded Llopis. Nevertheless, one U.M.E. member rose to become the most prominent Republican general, Miaja Menant.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

those affiliated with the U.M.R.A. numbered among the Republican ones,[56] this apparently straightforward alignment is not necessarily significant. Both organizations were formed after Spanish politics had begun to become hopelessly polarized,[57] and it is far more reasonable to assume that the organizations attracted officers of particular opinions than that they helped mold those views.

All of the generals on excellent terms with Manuel Azaña were numbered among the most prominent Republicans in the army, which would certainly suggest a considerable degree of cohesion. Given that virtually all of the officers in question were of "republican" sympathies in any case,[58] the influence of their relationship with Azaña is

---

The remaining three affiliates are numbered among the Neutrals. Arguably, Mola Vidal, who was not apparently affiliated with the U.M.E., nevertheless used members of the organization as his agents, might be added as yet another Nationalist leader with ties to the organization. See Chapter VII, note 163.

56. Castello Pantoja, Pozas Perea, Nuñez de Prado, Gómez Caminero, Llano Encomienda, and Riquelme y López Bago.

57. For a discussion of the two rival organizations, see Chapter IV, with particular reference to note 11, and Chapter V, note 20.

58. Of the nine, Martínez de Monje, Masquelet Lacaci, Molero Lobo, and Pozas Perea, Miaja Menant, Riquelme y López Bago, Nuñez de Prado, and Gómez Morato all had credentials a moderate or liberal Republicans. The ninth officer, Salcedo Molinuevo, although a monarchist, nevertheless was on favorable terms with Azaña. There are short biographies of each of these officers in Chapter VIII.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

likely to have been marginal. In contrast, the generals who were on poor personal terms with the President split badly, most being numbered among the principal Nationalist leaders, with several among the Republican ones.[59] It is difficult to evaluate the importance of this. Was hostility towards Azaña a result of political differences, or was it a manifestation of such differences? It seem reasonable to conclude that the "correct" interpretation depends greatly upon the individual in question. Some officers seem likely to have opposed the regime under any circumstances, even if Manuel Azaña had played no role whatsoever in its life or been a man of far more ingratiating character.[60] Likewise, those officers in the anti-Azaña camp who supported the Republic were clearly not

---

59. Of the fifteen generals on poor terms with Azaña, nine became prominent Nationalists --Miguel Cabanellas, Fanjul Goñi, Goded Llopis, Mola Vidal, Queipo de Llano, Saliquet Zumeta, Villegas Montesinos, Orgaz Yoldi, and Varela Iglesias-- while three --Romerales Quintero, an africanista, Batet Mestres, and Gómez Caminero-- were in the Republican leadership group. Of the rest, one, Cerda y López Molinuevo, was a Republican who played only a marginal role in the war due to his mutual animosity with Azaña, while the other two were Neutrals, López de Ochoa and Rodríguez del Barrio, although the latter would almost certainly have been prominent among the Nationalist leaders had his health permitted. See Chapter VII, note 168. There are short biographies of each of these officers in Chapter VIII.

60. This would certainly seem to have been so in the cases of Orgaz Yoldi, Villegas Montesinos, and Varela Iglesias, and probably Saliquet Zumeta as well.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

influenced by their personal feelings towards the President.[61] However, the other officers on poor terms with Azaña who became prominent Nationalist leaders were all either originally staunch republican sympathizers,[62] or essentially neutral towards the regime.[63] The importance of the personal animosity which developed between these officers and Azaña cannot be overlooked.[64]

Although personal hostility towards Manuel Azaña may have influenced the actions of some officers during the crisis of 1936, it seems reasonable to conclude that other personal ties had no such influence. It cannot be shown that men who had been cadets or comrades-in-arms together,

---

61. This is certainly the matter in the cases of Romerales, Batet Mestres, and Gómez Caminero.

62. Cabanellas, Queipo de Llano, and Goded Llopis, all of whom had been republican activists in the last days of the monarchy.

63. Fanjul Goñi and, despite his service as the last Director General of Security under the Monarchy, Mola Vidal. Although not included in this study, José Sanjurjo would also seem to fall into this group: see the following note.

64. In this regard, it is worth recalling that in several instances it is clear that this animosity was generated by the attitude and actions of Manuel Azaña, and ultimately reciprocated by the officers in question. See, for example, the instances of insensitivity and outright hostility towards loyal officers in which Azaña indulged as cited in Chapter III, notes 162-168. Note also Azaña's treatment of Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo, a veteran africanista who, in April of 1931, as Director General of the Guardia civil, had informed Alfonso XIII that he ought to leave the country and had then placed the Guardia civil at the service of the Republic: see Chapter III, note 209.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

or who were personal friends or linked by family ties acted in concert in any way.[65]

Thus, although there were important differences between the men who emerged as leaders of the Nationalists and those who were equally prominent among the Republicans, there are nevertheless no critically important factors which can be cited as impelling officers to make the choices which they did. Although the generals who led the Nationalists uprising all were prominent among the africanistas, so too were many of those who were prominent among their opponents. Nevertheless, nearly half of the most active and effective of the leading Republican generals were africanistas, all of whom rendered excellent service. The prominence of the africanistas in both camps seems clearly linked to their reputation as men of action, their well-established tendencies to political action, their professionalism, and perhaps, at least in the case of the Nationalists, to a sense of collegality.[66] Nor can

---

65. Several instances are cited in Chapter VII, Part II, Section D. However, note that this may not have been the case among lower ranking personnel. Busquets argues that officers who had been cadets at the Academia General Militar in the period when Francisco Franco was director (1927-1931) were "largely inclined (by some 60-70%) to the Nationalist camp": Busquets, Militar, p. 166.

66. This conclusion is somewhat speculative, and cannot be substantiated by direct evidence. Yet its seems reasonable given the nature of the africanista type, and the influence which africanistas had on political and military developments from the early 1920s through to the outbreak of the Civil War. In this regard, it is of some value to recall that, at least on the Nationalist side, it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

political differences be cited as strong evidence for the split in the ranks of the generals. To be sure, those generals siding with the Republic were generally left-of-center, while their Nationalist equivalents were more likely to be right-of-center. Yet anomalies were notable in both camps, even among the leaders, in keeping with the overall lack of pattern which has been demonstrated repeatedly. Ultimately, the men who joined the rebellion or stood by the Republic all had their own reasons for doing so. However, the reasons were by no means the same for each man.[67] For those who stood with the Republic, ideological reasons were probably strong, as can be seen by the greater cohesion in the political profile of the generals in question.[68] However, there appears to have been a good deal less ideological cohesion among the Nationalists. Consider the principal Nationalist generals.[69]

---

was africanista officers who several times interevened, with some success, in attempting to secure pardons or reduced sentences for other officers condemned by courts martial during the Civil War.

67. "It was very much an individual, personal choice": Lopez Gomez, 19 December 1987, reiterated on 15 March 1988.

68. Bonds of discipline, honor, and integrity also ought not to be overlooked, given the presence among the Republican generals of so conservative an officer as Salcedo Molinuevo.

69. There are short biographies of all of these officers in Chapter VIII, and a longer one of Orgaz Yoldi in Chapter VI. These should be consulted for background and documentation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It seems reasonable to conclude that several of the ten prominent Nationalist generals were motivated primarily by their political views. The monarchist generals, Varela Iglesias, Orgaz Yoldi, Saliquet Zumeta, Villegas Montesinos, and Fanjul Goñi, had all been more or less openly opposed to the Republic from its inception, and by the time of the military uprising were all in various states of unemployment due to their outspoken, and often activist, views. The remaining officers --Cabanellas Ferrer, Goded Llopis, Queipo de Llano, Mola Vidal, Franco-- were all politically moderate or even liberal in outlook, and their choice of faction is more difficult. Some, perhaps all of them, may have been at least partially motivated to support an uprising because of personal difficulties with Manuel Azaña.

Cabanellas Ferrer had twice been removed from command by Azaña, once for using his troops to put down rioting by Republican sympathizers and the second time for disagreeing with the civilian High Commissioner of the Protectorate. His experience was not very different from that of Goded Llopis, who had fallen out with Azaña over the question of merit promotions and subsequently been removed from command as a result of the "Mangada Affair," or Queipo de Llano,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

who had been removed from command in 1931 for attempting to suppress Republican disorders, who was, moreover, related to Alcalá-Zamora, whom Azaña had replaced as President of the Republic through a parliamentary maneuver of dubious constitutionality. Mola Vidal had been subject to a court martial and been ejected from the army as a result of having served as the last Director General of Security under the Republic. Francisco Franco also had personal reasons to resent Azaña, including the closing of the Academia General Militar and Azaña's consistent personal animosity towards him. Nevertheless, personal pique seems hardly sufficient reason for supporting a military coup.[70] An important clue to the motivations of these officers may be found in the famous conspiratorial meeting of 8 March 1936, held in the wake of the Popular Front triumph in the parliamentary elections the preceding month.[71]

The generals present at the clandestine meeting[72] in Madrid essentially established a set of guide-lines to

---

70. Certainly there were other officers who had ample reason to dislike Azaña, such as Romerales Quintero, Batet Mestres, Cerda y López Mollinedo, and Gómez Caminero, all of whom stood with the Republic.

71. See Chapter V.

72. The generals present included Francisco Franco, Joaquín Fanjul, Manuel González Carrasco, Angel Rodríguez del Barrio, Andrés Saliquet, and Rafael Villegas, all active major generals, and Emilio Mola, Luis Orgaz, and José Varela, active brigadiers, plus a number of retired generals, including Alfredo Kindelan, Miguel Ponte, and Miguel García de la Herran. Most of these men were monarchists, though Franco and Mola were probably inclined

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

determine whether a military coup was "necessary." They determined that such would be the case if the government disbanded the Guardia civil, the principal bulwark of "order," dismissed army recruits, or dissolved the officer corps, or if there was an insurrection by the left, or, interestingly, a "premature" rising by a portion of the army. The program which stressed the corporate identity of the army rather than a generalized anti-republican attitude or even hostility to the social programs which the government would presumably seek to implement. In effect, the generals were saying that so long as the government was able to maintain order and continued to respect the integrity of the army, the army would obey orders.[73] Moreover, the generals agreed that should a rising become an "absolute necessity" it would be done within the structure of the regime, preserving Republican forms and symbols, even to the use of the red, gold, and purple flag rather than red, gold, and red of the monarchy, a point which was latter stressed by Emilio Mola during his conspiratorial activities which led to the military uprising in mid-July, a matter which appears to have enabled such "liberal" generals as Miguel Cabanellas and

---

towards a liberal monarchy or conservative republic.

73. Felix Maiz, Alzamiento, 50-51; Beltran Guell, pp. 115-116.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Gonzalo Queipo de Llano to go along with the conspiracy,[74] particularly given that they had a record of indulging in military conspiracy, albeit in favor of Republic during the Dictatorship and the Monarchy.

The principal motivating force for the moderate and liberal generals among the Nationalist leaders, and by extension perhaps among the Nationalists as a whole, seems to have revolved around the corporate integrity of the the ary, the question of the preservation of order in society, and the defense of the Republic from extremism and revolution. As Stanley G. Payne has observed, "If Azaña had made a determined effort to uphold the Republican constitution . . . the revolt probably would not have occurred."[75] Certainly the attempted coup was not a massive, fascist-inspired movement by an aristocratic officer corps following the lead of their reactionary generals.[76] It is perhaps among the greatest tragedies of

---

74. Fraser, in his Blood of Spain, cites comments by various individuals, including a Carlist, as to the surprise with which they greeted the news that such liberals were among the rebels: see pp. 49-50, 209, and 275-276.

75. Payne, Revolution, p. 219. This motive was probably shared by many officers of a more conservative bent, as well, thus "Some conspirators were monarchists, some were fascists, and a few were clerical reactionaries, but the majority were ordinary middle class officers without elaborate ideological designs who simply wanted to avoid chaos or a leftist takeover": Payne, FS, p. 8.

76. The ten principal commanders of the Nationalists were the only pre-war generals to attain any distinction in their ranks. In this regard it is worth noting that Arce,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Spanish Republic that "it estranged many who had at first contemplated collaboration with it."[77] And it is clear than much of the prevailing scholarly opinion on the subject is seriously in need of revision.

Generales, lists 26 "generals of Franco," of whom only nine were active generals at the time of the military uprising, while seven were retired generals recalled to duty and ten were active or retired officers of lower rank. Suero's list of "generals of Franco" makes the total 43, including the nine pre-war generals, plus the seven recalled retirees, and adds 17 more active or recalled officers of lower rank promoted by Franco, for a total of 27.

77. Thomas, SCW, p. 111.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix 1

Methodology and Terminology

This project consisted essentially of an attempt to develop a profile of the general officers on active duty with the Spanish Army on 17 July 1936 in order to determine what, if any, patterns existed in the backgrounds of those officers who rebelled against the government of the Spanish Republic and those who remained loyal. The population in question consists of 85 men, in the following grades:[1]

Lieutenant General	3
Major General	24
Brigadier General	58

In addition to these 85 men, two others were involved as well, one of whom had retired on 12 April 1936 and one of whom had died, apparently accidentally, on 16 July 1936,[2] so that the total sample amounts to 87 men holding the rank of general in the months immediately prior to the military rebellion of 1936.

---

1. See Chapter 1, pp. 5-8, above, for a discussion of the derivation of this figure.

2. For a discussion of the circumstances of this officer's death see Chapter 1, p. 8, note 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The nature of this project involved collecting data on the backgrounds, personal achievements, and professional careers of each of the 87 generals. Both primary and secondary sources were used in the collection of this data.

Primary materials were culled from various archives in Spain. Ultimately, materials were derived from nine major archives.

1. Archivo general militar (Segovia) [AGMS], the first section of the general military archive, which contains the personnel files, the expedientes, of all officers, unless these have been transferred elsewhere for various reasons, such as courts martial.
2. Archivo historico-nacional (Madrid) [AHN-M], the Madrid branch of the Spanish National Archives, and the principal repository for operational documentation.
3. Archivo historico-nacional (Salamanca) [AHM-S], the Salamanca branch of the Spanish National Archives. This is the principal repository of documentation relating to the Civil War.
4. Asamblea reales Ordenes Militares (Madrid) [AROM], the archives of the former Assembly of the Royal Military Orders, which has files on all military personnel who received a decoration.
5. Biblioteca nacional [BN] (Madrid), the National Library.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6. Cuartel general del Ejercito de Tierra [CGET] (Madrid), Army General Headquarters, in Madrid.

7. Hemeroteca nacional [HN] (Madrid), the national newspaper collection.

8. Heuristica (Madrid), a non-governmental institute for academic research.

9. Servicio historico-militar [SHM] (Madrid), the Military Historical Service.

10. United States National Archives [US NA] (Washington), the principal repository of attache reports and memoranda concerning the Spanish Army.

The quantity and type of documents contained in individual dossiers --expedientes-- varies. In normal circumstances, most expedientes held at the AGMS contain only about 15 pages. However, those for the generals of 1936 each contain an average of about 600 pages. This is due not only to their more exalted status, but also to the vicissitudes of history: the Cuban, Philippine, American, and Moroccan wars, the Juntas, the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the collapse of the Monarchy, the Republic, the Azaña reforms, the Asturian Rebellion of 1934, and the Civil War of 1936-1939 all added bulk to their dossiers. Many of the generals under study were awarded promotions or decorations in the various campaigns, only to find them rescinded by later developments. In cases where an officer

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was subject to a court martial proceeding --and some officers were so tried two or even three times-- the transcript of the proceedings is included in the expediente. A fair case in point is that of Major General Eduardo López de Ochoa.

Eduardo López de Ochoa's file runs to several hundred pages.[3] The official summary of his military record, his hoja matriz de servicio, a document prepared periodically in conformity with a Royal Order of 31 July 1881,[4] normally only a few pages long, runs to 40 double-sided pages. Admittedly López de Ochoa had a more active career than most officers, or even most generals. He had numerous merit promotions, had been an extreme anti-Primo activist, which had resulted in his expulsion from the army, only to be reinstated when the Republic was proclaimed. During the bienio negro he commanded in the Asturian Rebellion, which led to his being arrested and subject to court martial proceedings when the Popular Front returned to power early in 1936. All of this resulted in quite a number of entries in his hoja de servicio, and additional documents inserted in his expediente: the transcript of his court martial alone runs about 270 pages. López de Ochoa was killed at the onset of the Civil War, so his personnel files were

---

3. Lopez de Ochoa's service record is in AGMS, Expediente L-1152.

4. R.O. 31 July 1881 (C.L. 340).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

effectively closed in July of 1936. Those generals who lived to serve in the Civil War not only have several more years of normal entries on their hoja de servicio and items in their expedientes, but may also have been subject to courts martial or other investigations, occasionally by both sides. The hoja de servicio of Brigadier General Eliseo Alvárez-Arenas, who rose to a major generalcy during the Franco Regime, runs to 54 pages.[5]

Some expedientes were found to be unavailable at the AGMS. A number of the missing files were located at Army General Headquarters. In addition, since most of the generals were members of the Military Order of San Hermengildo, several of the missing files were located in the archives of the Assembly of the Royal Military Orders. As a result, the files of virtually all of the 87 generals were found. The exceptions were those of various generals who attained distinction during the Civil War, such as the Republicans José Miaja Menant and Mariano Gamir Ulibarri, or the Nationalists Francisco Franco, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, and Emilio Mola Vidal. These appear either to have been lost, destroyed, or deliberately removed during civil war or the Franco years. In such cases, the absence of an expediente was less of a critical obstacle to collecting

---

5. Alvárez-Arenas' personnel file, AGMS, Expediente A-696, contains no hoja. However, his file at AGET, "Alvárez-Arenas", does.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

information on the general in question than an inconvenience. Given their prominence, there was considerable information available from other sources.

Only a few of the generals left personal reminiscences or memoirs, and these most often dealt with their role in various military operations. None left a diary or letters.[6]

Official communications of the successive American military attaches to Madrid proved a useful, if limited, source of information concerning the generals, with particular regard to their perceived political views.[7]

As some of the information required about the generals had to do with their personal views and associations, a considerable amount of secondary material was combed. There were essentially four "tiers" of such materials, based on the degree of reliability with which they could be regarded. These are:

---

6. The only available diary from this period is that of Manual Azaña, which is useful only insofar as it reflects his views of the army, the officer corps, and particular generals. For some general observations on Azana's diary see Chapter 3, note 22, above.

7. The official reports and communications of the military attaches are housed in the National Archives, among State Department and Military Intelligence Division documents.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1. First hand accounts and memoirs.[8]
2. Scholarly works.
3. Popular works, including collective biographies.
4. Political tracts.

This essentially anecdotal information has not always been readily available, particularly in the cases of the many generals who played only minor or marginal roles in the events of the uprising and subsequent civil war. In addition, data on officers who sided with the military rebellion proved somewhat easier to obtain than that for those who remained loyal to the Republic. Despite these limitations, it ultimately proved possible to collect some of this anecdotal information even on those generals who played less than prominent roles in the events.

As information was collected for each general, it was entered on a work sheet.[9] These worksheets facilitated the

---

8. Manuel Azaña's Memorias Politicas y de Guerra are an obvious source. None of the generals involved wrote particularly valuable memoirs. However, some lower ranking officers did, notable among them being B. Felix Maiz, Mola, Aquel hombre: Diario de la conspiración, 1936, an expanded, post obitum Franco version of his Alzamiento en España, and Francisco Franco Salgado, Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco, based on the diary maintained by Franco's cousin and life-time aide.

9. Appendix 3 includes an example of such a worksheet, converted to typescript from the original longhand, which was then transcribed for data entry.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

preparation of the information for data entry. Two large files were created using the available information:

1. Career Database
2. Postings Database

The Career Database.

The Career database is the more important of the two. It includes personal, professional, and political information on the generals in a total of 67 fields, not all of which necessarily are applicable to each officer, and not all of which ultimately proved useful.

Field 1: Name.[10]

---

10. The intricacies of the Spanish surname often presented serious obstacles to the pursuit of information concerning the generals. In normal circumstances a Spaniard's surname is composed of his father's followed by that of his mother, as in "Francisco Franco Bahamonde," the son of Sr. Franco and his wife, the former Srta. Bahamonde. However, compound names are common, as in Pedro de la Cerda y López Mollinedo, the son of Sr. de la Cerda and the former Srta. López Mollinedo, offspring of a family which appended the additional name "Mollinedo" to distinguish them from the numerous branches of the rather plebian "López" surname, or Miguel Nuñez de Prado y Subsielas, whose name indicates a particularly aristocratic, branch of the many Nuñez families. As a result, some officers with compound names preferred to be known by their more distinguished matronymic, such as Juan Garcia Gómez Caminero, most commonly listed as "Juan Gómez Caminero," and José Fernández Villa-Abrille y Calivara, most commonly known as "José Villa-Abrille y Calivara." In several cases officers actually changed their names, primarily for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 2: Year of Birth.

Field 3: Age in 1936.

Field 4: Years in service.

Field 5: Seniority. The officer's overall standing on the list of all 87 general officers.[11]

Field 6: Side. An indication of the side to which the general is traditionally regarded as having adhered during the events of July of 1936. This was the most difficult field to determine. Aside from the clearly activist generals on both sides,[12] determining who was a

---

career reasons. Thus, in 1915 Major José García Mancebo and his brother changed their family name to "García Aldave y Mancebo," possibly to remind everyone that their father was the recently retired Lieutenant General José García Aldave. In addition, the spelling of the names of several of the officers changed over time, as in the cases of Francisco Patxot --or Paxot-- Madoz, Leopoldo Jiménez --or Giménez-- García, Victor Carrasco Amilibia --or Amilivia--, and Gerardo Ravassa --or Rabassa-- Cuevas. Such changes were not always clearly reflected in the documentary record, particularly if the occurred when the officer held relatively junior rank.

11. This includes the two officers who were not active on the day of the military rebellion, Augustín Ortega, who retired the proceeding May, and Balmes Alonso, deceased on 16 July 1936.

12. Obviously the inclinations of officers such as Francisco Franco, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, or Emilio Mola were not in doubt, as they were among the principal leaders of the military uprising. Similarly, the Loyalist credentials of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"Nationalist" and who was a "Republican" was by no means cut and dried. As a result, it was often necessary to examine the long-term aspects of an officer's career subsequent to the actual period of the military uprising.[13] On both sides many officers were swept away by events, frequently following the lead of their juniors.[14]

Domingo Batet, Miguel Nuñez de Prado, and Manuel Romerales, who stuck by the Republic despite imminent death, are not in question.

13. The most convenient summaries of the ultimate fate of the generals may be found in Salas, "40," and Alpert, Ejército, pp. 355ff. For more detail on individual officers reference may be made to the specific entries in Rubio Cabeza; entries in Cortada must be treated with caution, as they are frequently in error. The fate of some officers remained obscure for many years, both during and after the war. For example, on 19 July 1940 the Army Ministry received an inquiry concerning the fate of Brigadier General Manuel Romerales Quintero, who had been executed on 28 August 1936: AGMS, Expediente R-2795]. The most curious fate of any of the generals was that of Brigadier General Luis Castello Pantoja. A decided leftist, member of the Unión militar republicana antifascista, and a mason, Castello Pantoja, who commanded the 2nd Infantry Brigade, held Badajoz for the Republic on the first day of the military rebellion. Named Minister of War the next day, 19 July 1936, he soon afterwards suffered a complete mental breakdown upon learning that his family had been captured by Nationalist troops, and his brother, also an officer, had been murdered by Republicans. He was relieved. His mental state deteriorated to such an extent that on 13 October he was institutionalized. He shortly afterwards escaped, fleeing to France, whereupon he was expelled from the army by the Republic. In 1942 he was returned to Spain by the Germans. Tried by court martial, he was condemned to death by the Nationalists, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The general was imprisoned from 1943 to 1946 and then released. Thereafter he lived in retirement. He died in 1962, by which time he appears to have been carried on the retired list. [AGMS, Expediente C-2166; AHNS, Legajo 1418, Expediente 40; AROM, Expediente C-230-B].

14. Miguel Cabanellas was by no means the only officer who was rumored to have joined the rebels "with a pistol at his head" [Friedlander, pp. 107, 154; Jackson, HQ, p. 101;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Similarly, on both sides there were several officers who's enthusiasm and efficiency was so wanting as to result in their being left substantially unemployed during the war, or even subjected to disciplinary proceedings, expulsion, and imprisonment.[15] As a result, the "Side" field is

---

Suero, p. 74]. As his son has taken pains to establish, in Cabanellas' case the stories are probably untrue. However, similar assertions have been made with considerably more reason about Miguel Campins Aura [Salas, HEPR, I, p. 93; Cortada, p. 102] and Jose Martinez Iglesias [Alpert, Ejército, p. 357; Salas, HEPR, I, p. 108]. On the Republican side Fernando Martínez de Monje is alleged by to have been "talked" into remaining loyal [Cortada, p. 321; Rubio Cabeza, p. 521]. It is possible that evidence is lacking in still other cases.

15. While this occurred on both sides, it was particularly common in the Republican zone, and many officers who remained loyal were nevertheless subsequently investigated and in most cases expelled and even imprisoned. Among these were Enrique Aviles Melgar, Celestino García Antuñez, Manuel de la Cruz Boullosa, Eduardo Cavanna del Valle, Alejandro Rodríguez González, and Leopoldo Jiménez García, all of whom may perhaps have demonstrated less than whole-hearted commitment to the Republic, and Virgilio Cabanellas, who fell under suspicion largely because his brother was prominent among the rebels. Even officers who demonstrated considerable support of their faction sometimes found themselves under suspicion. Consider, for example, Brigadier General Rafael Rodríguez Ramírez. Together with Major General Juan Garcia Gómez Caminero, Rodríguez Ramírez had been sent by the government to secure the loyalties of garrisons in the northwestern part of Spain. The two were at León on 20 July 1936 when the local garrison rose, in a solidly conservative area. Both officers pretended to support the rising, and then deserted at the earliest opportunity, making their way to the Republican zone through Portugal. Yet while Gómez Caminero was assigned a number of important posts until his retirement for reasons of health and age in early 1937, Rodríguez Ramírez was denied employment and subsequently expelled from the army. [Alpert, Ejército, p. 358.] On the Nationalist side, Victor Carrasco Amilibia and Ricardo Morales Díaz, and Anselmo Otero-Cossio were similarly subjected to disciplinary proceedings. Some officers were badly treated by both sides. Brigadier General Angel San Pedro Aymat, Chief of the 7th Infantry Brigade at Barcelona, refused to join the uprising, which helped secure the city for the Republic. Despite this,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

limited to a simple indication of "Republican" or "Nationalist," based on the generally perceived allegiance of the officer in question at the time. Since this may be an inaccurate assessment a number of additional fields were necessary to modify the "Side" field. These allow for a more elaborate assessment of the loyalties of the individual officers.

Field 7: Classified As. This field incorporates the results of the analysis of choices in Chapter VII, as to whether the officer in question was a Nationalist, a Republican, or a Neutral.

Field 8: Choice. An indication of whether the side given for each officer in Field 6 was deliberately chosen or was ascribed to him by the opposing side. This field was necessitated by the fact that assumptions were made about the attitudes of several officers despite any overt actions on their part which placed them in the opposing camp.[16]

---

he was mistrusted. Given no significant assignments, he was relieved of all duties in August of 1937. At the end of the war the Nationalists sentenced him to three years and a day in prison. [Alpert, Ejército, pp. 357, 408; Salas, "40", p. 52.]

16. The cases cited at the beginning of Chapter VII -- López de Ochoa, Castro Girona, and others-- will serve to illustrate this point.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Filed 9: Leader. Indicates whether the general in question was particularly prominent in his faction. For the Nationalists this means he was one of the principal conspirators of 1936 or held a major political or military post during the Civil War. In the case of Republicans, an officer who was conspicuous for his efforts in attempting to suppress the uprising or who rose to high political or military posts during the Civil War.[17]

---

17. The principal criterion for inclusion as a leader was the degree of commitment to the faction, and the type of posts to which the officer eventually rose. Nationalist generals designated leaders are Francisco Franco Bahamonde, who, of course, became the generalissimo of the Nationalist forces, plus Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, who was for a time head of the Nationalist military junta, and Emilio Mola Vidal, the "Director" of the military conspiracy, plus José Varela Iglesias, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Andrés Saliquet Zumeta, and Luis Orgaz Yoldi, all of whom held high commands, in addition to Manuel Goded Llopis, Rafael Villegas Montesinos, and Joaquín Fanjul Goñi, who played key roles in the conspiracy and uprising, but were captured and executed: only one of these generals was not a major conspirator, Espinosa de los Monteros. Republican leaders are Luis Castello Pantoja, who was for a time Minister of War, José Miaja Menant, who rose to generalissimo of the Republican armies, plus José Riquelme y López Bago, Carlos Bernal García, Francisco Llano Encomienda, Mariano Gamir Ulibarri, Sebastían Pozas Perea, Toribio Martínez Cabrera, Fernando Martínez Monje, Manuel Carednal Dominicis, Juan García y Gómez Caminero, and Carlos Masquelet Lacaci, who commanded corps, armies, and even army groups or held other significant military posts, plus Miguel Nuñez de Prado, Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo, Agustin Gómez Morato, Manuel Romerales Quintero, and, Domingo Batet Mestres, who made strenuous efforts to oppose the alzamiento, but were shot or imprisoned by the Nationalists.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 10: Switched Allegiance. This field was to include the handful of officers believed to have initially pretended adherence to one side, only to take the first opportunity to flee to the other.[18]

Field 11: Geographic Loyalty. An indication of whether evidence exists to the effect that this officer's choice of side may have been dictated by geographical expediency, that is a discretionary decision to support the side which was locally successful, rather than that to which the officer may have been personally inclined.[19]

---

18. In addition to the previously cited cases of Gómez Caminero and Rodríguez Ramírez, who passed from the Nationalists to the Republicans, there were also two officers who are traditionally believed to have passed from the Republicans to the Nationalists, Brigadier General Barbero Saldaña was --or pretended to be-- loyal until February of 1937, when he was accused of being a Nationalist sympathizer, and fled to the Turkish Embassy, from which he allegedly proceeded to develop a pro-Nationalist intelligence network, and Brigadier General Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros, whose case is generally regarded as similar. Both of these officers are the subject of short biographies in Chapters VI and VII. Upon a closer examination of the evidence, this category proved of no value.

19. Cf., Raymond Carr, "without the concept of 'geographic loyalty' the Civil War is incomprehensible" (Carr, Tragedy, p. 77) and "Loyalty was often a matter of locality" (Carr, Modern, p. 135). On this point, see also Alpert, Ejército, pp. 111ff; Alvarez del Vayo, p. 122; de la Cierva, Antecedentes, I, p. 760. For a contrary view consider Ramon Salas', "There were those whom Carr termed 'geographically loyal,' but their number was relatively meager, and very probably of about the same degree on each side": Salas, HEPR, pp. 77ff. Unfortunately, attempting to determine which officers were "geographically loyal" proved impossible (cf., Professor Emilio González López, conversation, 10 October 1990).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 12: Indecisiveness. An indication of whether there is evidence to suggest that the officer exhibited a considerable degree of indecision at the time of the military uprising of 1936.[20]

Field 13: Employment during the Civil War. This field indicates the type of posrts to which the officer was

---

20. The most extraordinary example of indecision was Brigadier General Francisco Patxot Madoz, commander of the 4th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, at Malaga. Hesitant at the onset of the rebellion, he raised his brigade on orders from Gonzalvo Queipo de Llano, who had himself just seized command of the division. Then Azaña made an attempt to establish a "government of reconciliation" under middle-of-the-road Republican Diego Martínez Barrio on the might of 18-19 July. Patxot came under pressure by telephone from the new government, and recalled his troops to their barracks: in the end the new government fell even before it was completed and Patxot was murdered by some Republican militiamen. [Alpert, Ejército, p. 356; Salas, HEPR, I, pp. 92-93]. Aside from those who were convinced of the justice of one side or the other by a "pistol under the nose," for whom see note 15, above, several other officers displayed a considerable degree of indecision, though less spectacularly than Patxot. Unable --or unwilling-- to make up his mind, Brigadier General Jose García Aldave, chief of the 6th Infantry Brigade, indicated that he would abide by the decision of his brigade, which decide to support the Republic, whereupon the general was arrested, tried, and shot. Brigadier General Oswaldo Capaz Montes deserted his post rather than make a decision, went to Madrid, where he was arrested by Republican forces and subsequently murdered. Manuel González Carrasco, commander of the Valencia garrison, dithered for several days before deciding to join the rising, with the result that his troops were overwhelmed: eluding arrest, the general fled from Spain, never retuning, and was expelled from the army by both sides. Arguably the death of Balmes Alonso could be attributed to an extreme case of indecision, but was more probably an accident than a suicide.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

assigned during, and in the case of Nationalists, after, the Civil War. This field was of some value in determining each side's assessment of the reliability of a number of officers.[21]

Field 14: Entered. Year of entry into the Army, normally that in which the officer enrolled as a cadet at one of the academies, but in a few rare cases that in which the officer enlisted.

Field 15: Enlisted Service.

Field 16: Academy attended. Cadets entering the Academy prior to 1889 would have attended the old Academia general militar during their entire military education. Those who entered 1889-1892 began their education at the AGM, but transferred to one of the new separate academies for each arm in the summer of 1893.[22] Cadets entering from

---

21. There were a number of instances in which officers incarcerated or otherwise penalized by the Republic during the Civil War were given employment by the Nationalist regime afterwards, as in the case of Virgilio Cabanellas. These circumstances were not taken as an indication of pre-war Nationalist sympathies in as much as they constitute post hoc evidence.

22. The only exception to this was Brigadier General Emilio Araujo-Vergara, who entered the AGM in August of 1891, and transferred to the Academia de Administracion Militar in September of 1892, later passing into the Academia de Caballería in August of 1893: AGMS, Expediente A-2011].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1893 onwards spent their entire educational career at the branch academies. The specific academic career of each officer was detailed on the "Posts" database.

Field 17: Arm of Service upon Commissioning. Branch of service in which the officer was originally commissioned. Except for those who passed into the Staff Corps, this was usually the arm in which the officer spent his entire military career until promotion to general.

Field 18: Arm of Service in 1936. This includes Staff Corps officers in their appropriate arm of the service.[23]

Field 19: Staff Corps. This field was provided in order to group officers who were graduates of the Escuela superior de guerra, the General Staff College, whether they had become members of the Staff Corps or remained with their original arm of service.

Field 20: Aviation Qualifications. An indication of whether the officer was certified as a pilot, observer, or balloonist.

---

23. Changes of arm were rare, but not unheard of in the Spanish Army in this period. Thus, Celestino García Antuñez switched from artillery to engineers in 1892 after a year as an Alférez alumno of artillery [AGMS, Expediente L-745].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 21: Year Commissioned. Depending upon circumstances, a cadet of the artillery or engineers was not always promoted to 2nd lieutenant upon graduation from the academy, but rather was commissioned as an Alférez alumno ["Second Lieutenant Cadet"] for a time, prior to being properly commissioned, usually while completing advanced training in his arm.

Fields 22-39. Even numbered fields in this sequence indicate year in which the officer achieved each rank from 2nd Lieutenant to lieutenant general, as per the last modifications in seniority found in his expediente, or, where this was not available, the Anuario militar de España.[24] Odd numbered fields show the number of years the officer had been in the service upon attaining each rank, based upon his year of commissioning.

---

24. In each case the year given is that of the seniority conceded upon promotion. Promotions were often predated, with seniority being as much as two or three years earlier than effective date. Thus, Manuel del Alcazar Leal was promoted lieutenant colonel of Cavalry effective 21 March 1924, with seniority from 31 July 1923 [CGET, Expediente A-100-T]. Also, officers attending the Escuela superior de guerra might already have some degree of seniority as captains, which they would lose upon being commissioned captains at the bottom of the Staff Corps list. Thus, Lieutenant Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros was promoted to Captain of Infantry by seniority on 15 January 1901, and then to Captain of the Staff Corps upon completion of his studies at the ESG on 27 August 1902. [CGET, Espinosa de los Monteros]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 40: "Total Time on Campaign" Credit. Like several other European armies, the Spanish Army counted time served in combat as double for determining years in service for the purpose of granting pensions upon retirement. Thus, an officer retiring after 35 years in the army, who had spent two of them under combat conditions was credited with 37 years of service for pension purposes.[25]

Field 41: "Time on Campaign" Credit for Morocco. Years credited for "Time on Campaign" in Morocco, 1909-1927.

Field 42: "Time on Campaign" Credit for Other Campaigns. Years credited for "Time on Campaign" other than for operations in Morocco, 1909-1927.[26]

---

25. Note that an officer might serve in a theater of war, without receiving credit for "Time on Campaign," which was technically awarded for front line duty only. An excellent case in point is that of José Riquelme, who had a little less than three years time on campaign credit, but actually was some 20 years in Morocco, serving mostly as a political officer in the Native Affairs Office. Other cases are equally instructive, such as Goded Llopis, a staff officer, who received time on campaign credit for his involvement in the planning and execution of the final operations in the Rif, while neither Carrasco Amilibia, an artilleryman who served as an observer and technical adviser to the troops in the field at various times during the Rif War, nor Moya Andino, and engineer who performed various headquarters functions in Morocco for about four years (1915-1919), received no such credit, despite the fact that both occasionally came under fire. See the respective hojas de servicio.

26. The campaigns in question are those of Morocco in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 43: Was this officer an Africanista?[27]

Field 44: Modifications to Seniority. Final summary of changes in seniority as a result of the Azana reforms and other changes instituted under the Republic.

Field 45: Promotions by Méritos de guerra. This figure includes those méritos which were subsequently canceled, rescinded, or remitted for decorations after having been accepted, but not those proferred but remitted before acceptance.

Field 46: Awards of the María Cristina. The María Cristina, which carried with it a monthly stipend, was the decoration which officers of the artillery, engineers, and staff corps usually accepted in place of promotions by merit.[28]

1893-1894, as well as Cuba and the Philippines, 1895-1898.

27. Determination of whether an officer was an africanista is based on the criteria established in Chapter VI, above. These include extensive service in Morocco, with particular reference to the period from 1919 through 1925; continuous association with one of the several native corps raised by the Spanish in the Protectorate or with the Spanish Foreign Legion, as well as a predeliction for personal involvement in combat are also of significance, and, usually, hostility towards the juntero movement. See also Mas Chao, p. 58.

28. Usually the remission of a mérito de guerra for a María Cristina occurred before the officer was actually

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 47: Promotional Honors. A summary of the proceeding three fields.

Field 48: Awards of the Medalla militar. The Medalla militar was created under a decree of 11 April 1925 to reward distinguished service in a combat or command capacity.[29]

---

awarded the promotion, but there were rare instances of this taking place after the officer had actually served in the higher rank. Thus, Carlos Bernal García, an engineer officer, was promoted to major by merit in September of 1914, but, having accepted a María Cristina, reverted to captain in September of the following year [AGMS, Expediente B-247-6]. Similarly, Rafael López Gómez, an artilleryman, was promoted to captain by the merits of war on 28 September 1899, but accepted a María Cristina and reverted to lieutenant on 30 October of the same year [AGMS, Expediente L-1726].

29. Anuario militar, 1936, p. 146. Note that the Medalla militar should not be confused with the Cruz de mérito militar, which was an older decoration, awarded for meritorious service, not always of a combat nature. It was not unusual for distinguished officers to have had as many as ten awards of the Merito militar. By the time Manuel Llanos Medina was a colonel (1920) he had received seven, while Carlos Bosch Bosch (1921) had accumulated eight, in their various grades [AGMS, Expediente LL-88; AGMS, Expediente B-3572]. These were often given out for very commonplace activities. The citation for the first of Bernal García's seven awards reads "The Cross of Military Merit in the 1st Class, with Red Distinctive, awarded by His Excellency the Captain General of Cuba on 28 October [1897] in recognition of the comportment with which he executed certain works in the area of Sabanilla on 28 August": AGMS, Expediente B-2072, Hoja, 9a Subdivision. Similarly, in 1901 then 1st lieutenant Alfonso Moya Andino was awarded a Cruz de mérito militar for participating in an experimental ten days long bicycle "march" [ARMS, Expediente M-35583]. In 1912 1st lieutenant Francisco Franco received one for "being three months on active service without an award": DOMG 160.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 49: Awards of the San Fernando. This indicates awards of the various degrees of the Order of San Fernando, the highest Spanish decoration for valor.

Field 50: Father's Occupation.[30]

Field 51: Family Background.[31]

Field 52: Marital Status.

Field 53: Brothers in Military Service.

Field 54: Sons in Military Service.[32]

---

30. It should be noted that in cases where an officer was born in Cuba, the Philippines, or Puerto Rico, but his father's occupation is not known, there is a high probability that the father was in military service, whether as an enlisted man, officer, or official [Alvárez Rubio, letter, 24 October 1988]. However, this assumption has not been followed for purposes of this analysis. Note that Major General Manuel Gonzalez Carrasco was officially listed as "the son of an unmarried woman" [AROM, G-295-5].

31. Although direct evidence was lacking in most instances, where an officer's father or brothers were listed as officers the family background was assumed to be military.

32. Note that this field actually consisted of three separate sub-fields: Total Children, Total Sons, Sons in Military Service. Information about the children of the generals proved particularly elusive. Prof. Alvárez Rubio has observed that unless an application was made for a widow's or orphan's pension, or an alternative source can be found, such information is generally unavailable. As a result, information on the number of sons each general had in military service is very incomplete: letter, 24 October 1988.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 55: Regional Origins. An indication of the native region of the officer, which often differed from region of birth.

Field 56: Political Inclinations. As officers were prohibited from belonging to political organizations, this assessment had to be made on the basis of the officer's expressed views, or the opinions of those acquainted with him.[33]

Field 57: Candidacy. Did this officer ever stand for the Cortes?[34]

Field 58: Attitude towards the Juntas. Was the

---

33. The political views of several officers proved extremely difficult to evaluate. Major General Augustín Gómez Morato may serve as a case in point. Although Gómez Morato was generally regarded as a Republican [Salas, HEPR, I, p. 87], and a friend to Manuel Azaña [Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 431], in a memorandum to the Military Intelligence Division on 19 February 1935, Col. Stephen G. Fuqua, the U.S. Military Attache, says that some elements considered him "too conservative" [MID 2041-316.7, 19 February 1935].

34. Spanish military law forbade affiliation with political parties or labor unions. However, it did not prohibit candidacy as an independent, and there were always a handful of active officers or various ranks in the Cortes, even under the Republic.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officer a juntero, a juntero sympathizer, or an anti-juntero activist?[35]

Field 59: Activism towards Primo de Rivera.

Field 60: Monarchist/Anti-Monarchist Activist.

Field 61: Active Relationship with Azana.

Field 62: Was this officer an adherent of the Unión militar española?[36]

Field 63: Was this officer an adherent of the Unión militar republicana antifascista.[37]

Field 64: Was this officer a Freemason?[38]

---

35. On the juntas see Chapter II, above. Note that since the juntas restricted their membership to officers up to the rank of colonel, generals could not actually be members. However, several were on record as supporting the juntas.

36. The UME was technically limited to officers up to the rank of colonel, but generals apparently could affiliate in various ways. Evidence for those officers believed to be so affiliated is essentially secondary. See Cabanellas, Cuatro, I, p. 423, for a brief discussion.

37. As with the UME, there exists no official membership list for the UMRA, and as a result evidence of membership is drawn from secondary sources.

38. Determination of membership in the Masonic Order was rather difficult, not merely because it is a secret society, but also because under the retroactive Ley de Represion de la Masonería y Comunisimo (1 March 1940), membership could be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 65: Number of published works.[39]

Field 66: Number of languages known.[40]

---

construed as a criminal offense in Nationalist Spain. Evidence for membership comes from various sources. Some officers were openly known to be Masons even before the Civil War. Furthermore, on 15 February 1935 the Deputy Dionisio Cano López read into the record of the Cortes a list of five major generals and seven brigadier generals whom he claimed were Masons. The files of the Nationalist commission which investigated eleven major generals and ten brigadier generals officers suspected of Masonic sympathies are available as well. Although there are some differences between the two lists, they are in general agreement. In addition, documentation for "La Masonería espanola, 1728-1939, a major exhibition held in Valencia in November of 1989, included a list of nine major generals and eleven brigadier generals who were reliably believed to have been Masons. Most, but not all, of the officers named are also to be found on the Cano López and investigating commission lists. Several cases were particularly difficult to determine. The Republican Brigadier General Juan Urbano Palma, one of the officers cited in Cano López' speech, vigorously denied the charges, in a memorandum filed in his defense with the Army Minister dated 24 March 1941 [CGET, Urbano Palma]. This, of course, was after the organization had been declared illegal. Nevertheless, Urbano Palma was not apparently investigated by the Nationalist regime, which implies that he did not come under suspicion of being a Mason. Despite this, several works regard him as having been one, probably on the strength of the Cano López speech: cf., Bravo Morato, Rep, p. 104.

39. Only books were included in this category, as virtually all of the generals had at various times contributed articles to the military press, or assisted in the preparation of manuals and instructions.

40. The source for this was a standard entry in the hoja de servicio of the individual officers. However, this turned out not to be a useful guide, for it fails to list the various dialects of Berber and Arabic which many of the officers understoon, nor even the regional language within in Spain -- Galician, Basque, Catalan, Valencian-- with which many of them would have been familiar.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Field 67: Height.

The Postings Database.

The Postings database has several purposes. It proved useful in helping to develop a picture of the "typical" career pattern which the generals followed. In addition, it helped to determine which officers were cadets together at the various military academies, and which served together during their careers, in an effort to verify whether there was any common pattern of choice in 1936 based on earlier common service. This database consists of a summary of the assignments held by each general year by year basis, as determined by his entry in the Anuario militar for the appropriate year, which usually indicated his post around the beginning of April.[41] The only exceptions to this practice were:

1. The year of enrollment in an academy, which usually occurred in the summer of the indicated year, and was thus not listed in the Anuario.

---

41. It proved impossible to determine the unit of assignment for the small number of officers who entered the army as enlisted men, and so in such cases there are no entries under the years for enlisted service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2. Instances where no assignment was listed in the Anuario, in which case the post listed under the appropriate date in the 4th Subdivision of the officer's hoja de servicio was used.

This method was chosen over use of the actual service records since many officers had occasional very short term assignments, often of only a few weeks, the inclusion of which would have greatly complicated any attempt to build a generalized picture of the basic career pattern.[42] However, this too has some limitations, as the assignment indicated in the Anuario, or even that found on the hoja de servicio, may not actually have been the one the officer was fulfilling, having been seconded to some other activity.[43]

---

42. The record of Brigadier General Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros may serve as an example of the problems involved. According to the 3rd Subdivision of his hoja de servicio, from his entry into the Academia de infantería in August of 1894 until the outbreak of the Civil War in July of 1936, a period of almost exactly 42 years, he had 27 different assignments, of which only eleven were for one year or more and eight for three months or less [CGET, Espinosa de los Monteros.] See also the summary career patterns in Chapter VI.

43. The best example of this is the case of Manuel Lon Laga's activities from 20 October 1915 through December of 1918. Although officially assigned to the Escuela superior de guerra, the staff college, he was actually with the Spanish military observation mission to the Bulgarian Army, during which service he was decorated by both Bulgaria and Germany. [AGMS, Expediente L-1942]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Finally, note that for 1936 two entries were made, that indicated in the Anuario militar, which closed on 1 April of that year, and that actually held on 17 July, as determined from other sources.

Methodology.

The successful completion of this project involved the use of a computer to assist in the analysis and evaluation of information.[44] In this case the analysis of the two databases was performed on an Epson Equity II+ microcomputer, using Reflex 2, a standard database management system produced by Borland International.

A database manager is a program which allows the user to analyze and evaluate a collection of information --a database-- organized in a particular structure.[45] Such a program permits the manipulation of the available information in a variety of ways. In many instances the

---

44. Although old, and written before the microcomputer came upon the scene, Edward Shorter's The Historian and the Computer: A Practical Guide (New York, 1975) remains an enormously valuable introduction to the subject.

45. A discussion of how Reflex 2 works may be found in Borland International, Reflex Workshop (Scotts Valley, CA: Borland International, 1986), pp. 5ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

results obtained are no different than what would be the case using conventional methods of investigation. Thus, analysis of the basic patterns which characterized the early careers of the generals of the several arms could have been accomplished without the use of a database manager. Likewise, the generation of various statistics characterizing the generals, whether in their arm or in their faction, did not require a computer or database manager. These tasks could have been done manually, albeit at considerably greater cost in time. For example, the only Reflex function which was used in processing the Postings database was the sort function, which alphabetizes or numerizes the items in a field. The principal benefit of using Reflex was that the sorting and resorting, which, of course, had to be done for every year from the late 1880s through the mid-1930s, could be accomplished almost instantaneously. This was a function which could have been performed manually if the data were on index cards. Nevertheless, using index cards would not have permitted the careers of all the officers to be compared on a year for year basis without an extraordinary amount of work. However, the processing of the Career database would have been most difficult without a database management system.

Reflex provides a "flat file database" with built in crósstabs tool. That is, in processing the Career database, Reflex permitted the rapid cross referencing of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

several fields simultaneously. It thus differs from other spreadsheets and older databases, which required the user laboriously to build crosstab routines. As a result, Reflex permitted far more rapid linkages between different types of data than would be possible using manual methods, and in a number of cases led to the discovery of linkages which might not have been apparent from a purely manual sifting of the available data.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Spanish General Officers on Active Duty

Spring of 1936

Lieutenant Generals

1. Pio LÓPEZ POZAS
2. Alberto CASTRO GIRONA
3. Jose RORIGUEZ CASADEMUNT

Major Generals

4. Eduardo LOPEZ DE OCHOA y PORTUONDO
5. Miguel CABANELLAS FERRER
6. Angel RODRIGUEZ DEL BARRIO
7. Pedro de la CERDA y LOPEZ MOLLINEDO
8. Manuel GODED LLOPIS
9. Antonio LOSADA ORTEGA
10. Gonzalo QUEIPO DE LLANO y SIERRA
11. Agustín GOMEZ MORATO
12. Rafael VILLEGAS MONTESINOS[1]
13. Enrique de SALCEDO MOLINUEVO
14. Andrés SALIQUET ZUMETA
15. José RIQUELME y LOPEZ BAGO
16. Miguel NUÑEZ DE PRADO y SUSBIELAS
17. Manuel GONZALEZ CARRASCO
18. Cristobal PEÑA ABUIN
19. Virgilio CABANELLAS FERRER
20. José SANCHEZ-OCAÑA y BELTRAN
21. Domingo BATET MESTRES
22. Juan [Garcia y] GOMEZ CAMINERO
23. José [Fernandez] VILLA ABRILLE CALIVARA
24. Carlos MASQUELET LACACI
25. Nicolas MOLERO LOBO
26. Francisco FRANCO BAHAMONDE[2]
27. Joaquín FANJUL GOÑI

Brigadier Generals

28. Luis ORGAZ YOLDI
29. Sebastian POZAS PEREA
30. Emilio MOLA VIDAL
31. Amado BALMES ALONSO[3]
32. Gonzalo GONZALEZ DE LARA
33. Angel GARCIA BENITEZ
34. Franciso PATXOT MADOZ[4]

---

1. Prior to 1931 the Anuario militar gives the name as "Montesino," save in 1913, when it is "Montesinos."

2. Also sometimes found as "Baamonde."

3. Died, possibly a suicide, on 16 July 1936.

4. In issues of the Anuario militar prior to 1931 this officer's name is commonly indexed as "Paxot", but is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35. Manuel LLANOS MEDINA
36. Gregorio BENITO TERRAZA[5]
37. Juan URBANO PALMA
38. Carlos BOSCH BOSCH
39. Francisco LLANO ENCOMIENDA
40. Fernando MARTINEZ DE MONJE RESTOY[6]
41. José GARCIA ALDAVE y MANCEBO[7]
42. Luis CASTELLO PANTOJA
43. Manuel ROMERALES QUINTERO
44. Eliseo ALVAREZ-ARENAS ROMERO
45. Julio MENA ZUECO
46. Celestino GARCIA ANTUNEZ
47. Federico de MIQUEL LACOUR
48. Eduardo AUGUSTIN ORTEGA[8]
49. José MIAJA MENANT
50. José LOPEZ PINTO BERIZO
51. Manuel de la CRUZ BOULLOSA
52. Alvaro FERNANDEZ BURRIEL
53. Anselmo OTERO-COSSIO MORALES
54. José IGLESIAS MARTINEZ
55. Ricardo MORALES DIAZ
56. Alejandro RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ
57. Toribio MARTINEZ CABRERA
58. Mariano GAMIR ULIBARRI
59. Leopoldo JIMENEZ GARCIA[9]
60. Rafael LOPEZ GOMEZ
61. Angel de SAN PEDRO AYMAT
62. Manuel LON LAGA
63. Manuel GARCIA ALVAREZ
64. Eduardo CAVANNA DEL VAL
65. Marcial BARRO GARCIA
66. Eugenio ESPINOSA DE LOS MONTEROS y BERMEJILLO
67. Enrique AVILES MELGAR
68. Alfonso MOYA ANDINO
69. Jacinto FERNANDEZ AMPON
70. Rogelio CARIDAD PITA

nevertheless occasionally given as "Patxot" in the actual listings.

5. Also sometimes found as "Terrazas."

6. Also sometimes found as "Monge" and occasionally as "Restoi."

7. Adopted the form "Garcia Aldave" upon his father's retirement, and appears thusly from 1915.

8. Retired, 12 April 1936.

9. Occasionally found spelled as "Gimenez."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71. Victor CARRASCO AMILIBIA[10]
72. Gerard RAVASSA CUEVAS[11]
73. Julían LOPEZ VIOTA
74. Eduardo MARTIN-GONZALEZ DE LA FUENTE
75. Oswaldo Fernando de la Caridad CAPAZ MONTES
76. Jose BOSCH ATIENZA
77. Manuel CARDENAL DOMINICIS
78. Justo LEGORBURU DOMINGUEZ MATAMOROS
79. Rafael RODRIGUEZ RAMIREZ
80. Emilio ARAUJO-VERGARA
81. Abilio BARBERO SALDAÑA
82. Carlos BERNAL GARCIA
83. José VARELA IGLESIAS
84. Manuel del ALCAZAR LEAL
85. Miguel CAMPINS AURA[12]
86. Antonio FERRER DE MIGUEL[13]
87. Manuel GARCIA BENET[14]

---

10. Also sometimes sound as "Amilivia."

11. Also sometimes found as "Rabassa."

12. Not listed as a brigadier general in the Anuario Militar for 1936; promoted from colonel, 7 May 1936.

13. Not listed as a brigadier generalin the Anuario militar for 1936; promoted from colonel, 8 May 1936.

14. Not listed as a brigadier general in the Anuario militar for 1936; promoted from colonel, 8 May 1936.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix 3:

Sample Career Summary and Postings Work Sheets

Two separate work sheets were developed for each of the generals in this study. One was a "Career Summary" work sheet, which summarized the principal background and career information on the officer in question, and the other was a "Postings" worksheet, which indicated the officer's assignments according to the Anuario Militar for each year from his entry into the army. Sources for information were entered on the worksheets, as well as miscellaneous notes and observations. The information on these worksheets was used to construct the "Careers" and "Postings" databases. Information entered in the databases was encoded to facilitate mathematical processing, which permitted, for example, the members of the several arms of service to be sorted separately.

What follows is the contents of the two worksheets for Brigadier General Miguel Campins Aura. The principal sources for Campins Aura are AGMS, Expediente C-701, which includes a complete hoja de servicios, and AROM, Expediente C-76-B. Unless otherwise indicated, information is derived from these sources and the various issues of the Anuario Militar. Where necessary, additional sources have been indicated in footnotes.

Note that blanks indicate that information either was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not available or not applicable. Square brackets are used to indicate information of a more detailed nature which was not included in the database.

Career Summary Worksheet: Campins Aura, Miguel

Year of Birth:	1880 [18 March]
Age:	56
Years in Service:	39
Seniority:	85th
Side:	Nationalist[1]
Classified as:	Neutral
Choice?:	Forced
Faction Leader?:	No
Switched Sides?:	No
Geographic?:	Possibly
Indecisiveness?:	Yes
Civil War Employment:	None[2]
Entered the Service:	1897 [6 July]
Enlisted Service:	No
Academy:	Infantry
Arm at Entry:	Infantry
Arm in 1936:	Infantry
Staff Credentials?:	Staff College Graduate[3]
Aviation Certificate:	Yes [16 January 1924]

---

1. The entries for this and the following six items are based on the fact that at the outbreak of the military rebellion he was inclined to loyalty, and had actually begun organizing a column to suppress the rising in nearby Cordoba, when he was pressured into declaring for the rebels. There are short descriptions of his actions in Alpert, Ejercito, pp. 258, 387-388; Cabanellas, Cuatro, II, p. 60, note 24; and especially Salas, HEPR, I, pp. 92-93.

2. Campins Aura was shot by the Nationalists at 0630 Hours on 16 August 1936.

3. Campins Aura was certified as a Diplomado de Estado Mayor at the end of August of 1911.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Promotion Record[4]	
Commissioned:	1898 [27 June]
2nd Lieutenant	
Promoted:	1898 [27 June][5]
Years to Rank:	1
1st Lieutenant	
Promoted:	1903 [31 December]
Years to Rank:	5
Captain	
Promoted:	1909 [29 September]
Years to Rank:	11
Major:	
Promoted:	1914 [11 January]
Years to Rank:	16
Lieutenant Colonel:	
Promoted:	1921 [23 February]
Years to Rank:	23
Colonel	
Promoted:	1925 [1 October][6]
Years to Rank:	27
Brigadier General	
Promoted:	1936 [9 March]
Years to Rank:	38
Major General	
Promoted:	
Years to Rank:	
Lieutenant General	
Promoted:	
Years to Rank:	
Changes in Seniority:	-6.4 years[7]

---

4. Years indicated for promotions are those on the basis of the officer's final hoja matriz de servicios. The "Years to Rank" figures are calculated on the basis of whole years, regardless of the actual date of promotion, which is indicated in brackets. Notes indicate adjustments to Campins' seniority, and explain the circumstances. The "Changes in Seniority" entry represents a summary of such modifications.

5. Campins Aura entered the Academia de infantería in mid-1897, so that his promotion to 2nd lieutenant came approximately one year after entering the army as a cadet.

6. As a result of the Azaña reforms Campins Aura's seniority as a colonel was revised to 1 March 1932, for a net loss of 6.4 years. However, the original promotion date was reinstated during the conservative ministries of 1933-1934, and was not again revised with the advent of the Popular Front in early 1935.

7. See the note on Promotion to Colonel, above.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Other Professional Data	
Combat Time, "Other:	0 years
Combat Time, Morocco:[8]	6.8 years
Combat Time, Total:	6.8 years
Merit Promotions:[9]	2
María Cristina:[10]	3
Total Promotional Honors:	5
San Fernando:	0
Medalla Militar:	
Personal Profile	
Father's Status:	Major of Infantry
Family Background:	Military
Brothers in Service:	None
Marital Status:	Married
Children, Total:	None
Children, Sons:	None
Sons in Service:	None
Regional Background:	
Political Views:	Moderate Republican[11]
Candidacy:	None
Africanista?:	Yes[12]
Juntas, Activism?:	
Primo, Activism?:	
Monarchy, Activism?:	
Azaña, Activism?:	
Masonic Status:	No evidence

8. Campins Aura received time on campaign credit for 19 separate periods from 1911 through late 1925, ranging from as little as three days [8-11 May 1922] to as much as 373 [6 October 1924-13 October 1925].

9. To major in 1914 and colonel in 1925.

10. One awarded for meritorious service in combat near Melilla, 22-27 December 1911, one for combat operations near Beni-Sibel, 11-15 May 1912, and the third for his services in Morocco from 1 October 1925. Campins also collected 12 awards of the Medalla de Mérito Militar, four degrees of the San Hermangildo, and seven other decorations, including a French Legion of Honor.

11. Blanco Escolar, p. 12.

12. Campins Aura's 6.8 years time on campaign credit in Morocco, and his close association with Francisco Franco support the conclusion that he was an africanista.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

U.M.E. Member?:	Yes
U.M.R.A.:	No
Author:	No
Linguistic Skills:	
Height:	1.660 meters[13]

Postings Worksheet

Rank	Year	Assignment in the Anuario Militar
Cadet	1897:	Academia de Infantería
	1898:	Academia de Infantería
2nd Lt	1899:	55th Infantry Regiment
	1900:	55th Infantry Regiment
	1901:	14th Rifle Battalion
	1902:	14th Rifle Battalion
1st Lt	1903:	14th Rifle Battalion
	1904:	14th Rifle Battalion
	1905:	14th Rifle Battalion
	1906:	14th Rifle Battalion
	1907:	22nd Rifle Battalion
	1908:	22nd Rifle Battalion
Capt	1909:	22nd Rifle Battalion, and ESG.[14]
	1910:	87th Reserve Regiment and ESG.
	1911:	Excidente, 1st Military Region and ESG.[15]
	1912:	ESG
	1913:	ESG
Maj	1914:	Eventualidades, Larache
	1915:	10th Rifle Battalion
	1916:	51st Infantry Regiment
	1917:	Excidente 1st Military Region
	1918:	69th Recruit Depot
	1919:	3rd Infantry Regiment
	1920:	40th Infantry Regiment
Lt Col	1921:	40th Infantry Regiment

13. While this was somewhat shorter than average for the generals as a whole [1.69 meters], Campins Aura still was of above average height for Spaniards of his generation (Alvarez Rubio: letter 24 October 1989.)

14. Escuela Superior de Guerra, the Staff College.

15. During much of the time in which he was supposedly an instructor at the Staff College, from August of 1911 through January of 1914, Campins Aura served in the field in Morocco. He received nearly 14 months time on campaign credit for the period.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

	1922:	71st Infantry Regiment
	1923:	71st Infantry Regiment
	1924:	71st Infantry Regiment
Col[16]	1925:	8th Rifle Battalion
	1926:	8th Rifle Battalion
	1927:	8th Rifle Battalion
	1928:	Academia General Militar
	1929:	Academia General Militar
	1930:	Academia General Militar
Lt Col	1931:	Academia General Militar
	1932:	1st Mountain Bde
Col	1933:	1st Mountain Bde
	1934:	2nd Mountain Bde
	1935:	5th Infantry Regiment
	1936a:	5th Infantry Regiment
Br Gen	1936b:	3rd Infantry Brigade

Miscellaneous Notes[17]

Considered "a man of his word" and one "likely to obey orders."[18]

Friend to Francisco Franco.[19]

Presumably a man of considerable ability, given that upon his appointment as director of the new Academia General Militar in 1927, Francisco Franco specifically requested Campins Aura as Chief of Studies, a post which he held until the academy was dissolved in 1931.[20]

---

16. See note to Colonel, above.

17. Items included here were not incorporated in either of the databases, but were entered into the master manuscript file maintained on this officer.

18. Salas, HEPR, I, pp. 92-93.

19. Alpert, Ejército, pp. 387-388, is only one of several references which mention this relationship. Salgado-Araujo, Vida, pp. 349-350 includes a letter from Campins Aura to his "respected friend" Francisco Franco, dated 12 August 1936, in which Campins requests clemency, noting that he had never been involved in "organizations which have perturbed the life of the army," and stating that at no time had he opposed the Nationalist movement. See Chapter VII, note 192.

20. Blanco Escolar, p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix 4

Azaña's Memorias as an Historical Document

At least from the establishment of the Republic, in April of 1931, Manuel Azaña kept a diary, recording on a more or less regular basis the principal political and military developments of the day, with occasional personal items as well. Many years after the Civil War, with the full cooperation of Azana's widow and her brother, his life-long friend, Cipriano Rivas-Cherif, Prof. Juan Marichal of Harvard included this diary as Memorias politicas y de guerra, 1931-1939 in his edition of Azana's Obras Completas, published in 1966-1968.[1]

Scholarly opinion on the value of the Memorias has generally been favorable. For example, in a lengthy article, James A. O'Connell[2] observes "Simply put, the diary is an extraordinary political, social and moral document."[3] Noting that the anecdotes, observations, and

---

1. Manual Azaña, Obras Completas, edited by Juan Marichal, with an introduction by Cipriano Rivas-Xerif [sic] (Four volumes, Mexico City: Oasis, 1966-1968). For convenience, this discussion will ignore the more recent two volume edition of the Memorias, Memorias politicas y de Guerra (Barcelona: Inelvasa, 1978, with reprints in 1978, and 1980), which is substantially identical to that in the Obras completas.

2. James A. O'Connell, "Republican Spain, the Provisional Government, and Manuel Azaña: A Consideration of His Diary," Iberian Studies, III, 2 (Autumn, 1972), pp. 70-78,

3. Ibid., p. 70.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

comments in the Memorias are "of a generally informative nature,"[4] O'Connell concludes, "Such is the range, insight and sensitivity of Manuel Azaña's diary that it will be some time before its entirety can be properly synthesized into a more complete understanding of the Republic."[5] Prof. Marichal himself has observed that the Memorias "have an exceptional value."[6] Hugh Thomas praises the Memorias as "more honest and better written, and altogether the most emotive political diary ever written at any time by any chief of government."[7] These views are not misplaced, as the Memorias do provide an unusually candid insight into the views of Manuel Azaña. However, there are some problems with the official version of Azaña's diary, as it appears in the Obras completas.

As published, the Memorias suggest that Azaña was by no means a faithful diarist. An examination of the work indicates that he would sometimes fail to make an entry for a day or two, would occasionally conflate several days' activities into one long entry. Moreover, from time to time he seems to have completely abandoned the undertaking

---

4. Ibid., p. 74.

5. Ibid., p. 75.

6. Azaña, Obras completas, I, p. xi.

7. Hugh Thomas, "El Presidente desposeido," in Serrano and San Lucar, p. 290 ["Thomas, 'El Presidente'."].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for lengthy periods, only to resume it again much later. The coverage of the Memorias can be conveniently summarized in tabular form.

Table 1
Pattern of Azaña's Entries in the Memorias

Year	Coverage	Azaña's Activity
1931	April-December	War Minister, Prime Minister
1932	December-22 July	War Minister, Prime Minister
1933	1 March-31 July	War Minister, Prime Minister
1934	none	In opposition[8]
1935	none	In opposition
1936	19-20 February	Reappointment as Prime Minister
1937	1 January-31 July	President, Civil War
1938	1 March-31 August	President, Civil War
1939	January	President, Civil War

The nature of the gaps is somewhat curious. The long hiatus beginning in late July of 1932 seems understandable, given that this was the period of the sanjurjada, during which Azaña was presumably too busy to attend to such details as maintaining a diary. Yet he was certainly almost as busy on 19-20 February of 1936, when he was hastily putting together a government in the aftermath of the Popular Front electoral victory and the surprise resignation of Manuel Portela's caretaker government, in a politically tumultuous atmosphere rife with rumors of imminent military insurrection.[9] Nor could he have been

8. It was, of course, during this period that Azaña was briefly imprisoned, as a result of "Revolution of 1934." However, while under arrest he managed to write Mí rebelión en Barcelona, best found in Obras completas, III, pp. 23-172.

9. See Chapter V for the efforts of Rodríguez del Barrio and others to stage an immediate military coup to prevent the seating of the Popular Front government.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

less pressed during the disastrous January of 1939, when the Republic was breathing its last. Although in their respective introductions to the Memorias, neither Marichal nor Rivas Cherif make note of it, portions of Azaña's diary were lost and are not included in the authorized edition. There is ample evidence for this, which has hitherto been neglected.

On 21 August 1937, in the midst of the Civil War, the ABC, a conservative Madrid daily then being published at Seville, in the Nationalist zone, began publication of a series of articles, "Las memorias secretas e intimas de Azaña."[10] This contained what purported to be excerpts from the diary of the President of Republic.

Then, in 1938 a small volume was published anonymously in Santiago de Chile entitled Memorias intimas y secretas de Manuel Azaña.[11] This was a year before the end of the Civil War.

Finally, in 1939, shortly after the conclusion of the Civil War, Joaquín Ararrás, a monarchist, pro-Franco historian,[12] published a volume entitled Memorias intimas

---

10. ABC, 21 August 1937, p. 11, with further installments over the next several weeks.

11. Memorias intimas y secretas de Manuel Azaña (Santiago de Chile: n. p., 1938), 128pp. I would like to thank Sr. Felix Alvárez Rubio for not only bringing this volume to my attention, but also for making a copy available to me.

12. Arrarás' works have already been referred to several times in the course of this study. Hugh Thomas (2nd, p. 760), states that Arrarás was also the editor of the excerpts published in ABC the previous year.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

de Azaña,[13] purporting to be excerpts from the diary of the President of the soi disant Spanish Second Republic. All of these were, of course, published a generation before the authorized --and ostensibly first-- edition of Azaña's diary.

None of these early versions of the Memorias is organized as a diary. Rather, each consists of a series of excerpts describing various notable personalities or events of the Republic. As the selections were designed to show how ridiculous or unscrupulous these people were, the materials are somewhat scurrilous.[14]

Nevertheless, although rarely used as sources, these three versions of the Memorias appear to be genuine.[15] Working entirely from internal evidence, a number of important points can be made to demonstrate that these

---

13. Memorias intimas de Azaña, con anotaciones por Joaquin Arrarás (Madrid: Ediciones españoles, 1939), 330pp., which has been cited herein as "Azaña/Arrarás Memorias".

14. Hugh Thomas says that the comments accompanying the ABC and Arrarás editions established "a new low standard of personal invective" (Thomas, 2nd, p. 760). Elsewhere ("El Presidente," p. 291), he implies that the earlier versions may be bogus, using the word "pretended."

15. Only one of the three unauthorized editions of the Memorias has been used as a source, the Arraras version, which may be found in the bibliographies of several works, such as Stanley G. Payne's Politics and the Military in Modern Spain. Professor Edward Malefakis observes that he has occasionally cited the Ararrás work, though it is not a very good source, due to the fragmentary nature of the entries and to Ararrás' purposes, which was to show various Republican leaders in the worst possible light. (Conversation, 5 October 1990.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

three manifestations of Azaña's Memorias are precisely what they purport to be.[16] The version appearing in the ABC in the summer of 1937 and that published in Santiago de Chile the following year are virtually identical. All the materials included in these two versions are also to be found in the much longer Arraras edition, on which the following analysis is based.

1. Virtually all the excerpts in the Arrarás edition fall between 22 July 1932 and 24 February 1933 or between 1 August 1933 and 24 November 1933, periods missing from the official edition.[17]

2. A few entries in the official edition make reference, albeit obliquely, to events which are cited, by

---

16. It is interesting that although O'Connell, cited above, makes several references to Arrarás' Historia de la Segunda República Española in his essay on Azaña's diary (O'Connell, p. 76, notes 4, 5, 10, etc.), he makes no mention of Arrarás' Memorias intimas de Azaña nor the earlier versions.

17. There is an overlap on 22 July 1933 (Arraras/Azana, p. 184). Sr. Alvárez Rubio suggests that Azaña repeated the entry from the end of his fourth notebook at the beginning of his fifth. In addition, Azaña/Arrarás has entries for 9 December 1931, 17 February 1932, and 1 May 1933 (letter, 20 November 1990). For the first and last of these there are entries in the authorized edition of the Memorias, which in no way correspond to citations, while for the second there is no entry whatsoever. Since the referencing of the entries in Azaña/Arrarás is in the form "17 II 32," it is possible that these are the result of typographical errors, of which there are more than a few in the text proper: the entries would not be out of place shifted by one year. Interestingly, the July 1933 entries do not overlap with those for July 1932, which also suggests a typographical gremlin. Both Prof. Malefakis (5 October 1990) and Sr. Alvárez Rubio (letter, 20 November 1990) concur with this conclusion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

date, in the Arrarás edition.[18]

3. All three of the unauthorized versions reproduce photographically a portion of the diary in Azaña's handwriting, which can be read as being identical to various passages in the book. In addition, the handwriting appears the same as similar samples of handwriting reproduced in the Obras completas.[19]

4. The tone and style of the entries reproduced by Arrarás are quite in keeping with the sort of thing that can be found in the official edition.[20]

---

18. Thus, for 22 February 1933 (p. 310), Arrarás has Azaña write that Franco seemed overly concerned about the revision of seniority and will be sent to the Balearic Islands to get him out of the way, while in the Marichal edition under 1 March, Azaña notes that Franco, although still annoyed about the revisions in seniority, talked of nothing else but his new post as commanding general of the Balearics.

19. Granted that comparing various samples of handwriting reproduced photographically in reduced form in a book does not provide the clearest evidence for passing on the genuineness of one of them, nor that the present writer makes any claim to expertise in handwriting analysis. Sr. Alvárez Rubio concurs with this conclusion, and notes that the pattern of capitalization and punctuation found in the works in question is identical with that in the authorized edition: letter 20 November 1990.

20. Compare, "Incompetent, semi-crazy, a disaster even to the way he dresses. . . . he practices naturism and walks naked among the pines, . . . with an aide to alert the neighbors," on Major General Pedro de la Cerda (Azaña/Arrarás, Memorias, 27 August 1932 [pp. 160-162]), with "A fool, in whom there is nothing of importance," on Brigadier General Jose Varela Iglesias (Azaña, Memorias, 29 December 1931-4 January 1932. Similarly, on Colonel Julio Mangada, "crazy . . . a vegetarian, Esperantist, and spiritualist" (Azaña, Memorias, 4 July, 9 September 1931), and "That nut Mangada" (Azaña/Arrarás, Memorias, 28 July 1932 [p. 136]).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As if this were not sufficient evidence, there is more. In his introduction to the Memorias, which, by the way, makes no reference to Arrarás' work, Marichal states that Azaña's diary comprised eight notebooks, five of which, covering the period from 1931 to the end of July 1933, consist of about 400 lined pages, while the three covering the later period are different.[21] In the introduction to his edition of the Memorias,[22] Arrarás states that in the autumn of 1936, when, with the Nationalist armies marching on Madrid, Azaña entrusted nine notebooks, including his diary, to Rivas Cherif to take to safekeeping in Geneva,[23] where he served as the Spanish consul. In Geneva, by misadventure, three of the notebooks were stolen.[24] Arrarás, who wrote, it will be recalled, a generation before Marichal, describes the physical character of the notebooks as each being of 400 ruled pages.[25] Interestingly, in the course of his description of the notebooks, Marichal uses a very peculiar turn of phrase with regard to the those covering the period 1931-1933, saying "the five notebooks reproduced here."[26] This

---

21. Obras completas, Vol. IV, p. vii.

22. Azaña/Arrarás, Memorias, pp. 1-43.

23. Ibid., p. 30.

24. Ibid., p. 42. Professor González López was in Geneva at the time and confirms that the notebooks were removed from the consulate (12 October 1990).

25. Ibid., p. 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

seems to imply that there may be others, not reproduced. Therefore, although Marichal does not say so, at least three of the notebooks in which Azaña was wont to keep his diary, those covering the period from 22 July 1932 through 1 March 1933, and that covering the period from 1 August 1933, appear to have passed somehow into the hands of Joaquín Arrarás.[27] Unfortunately, Arrarás did not publish these notebooks in their entirety, being satisfied with making selections of the juicier materials. In any case, it is certainly clear that the three early unauthorized versions of the Memorias are genuine.[28]

Ascertaining the location of the missing notebooks would be of enormous value.

---

26. Obras completas., IV, p. vii. Curiously, later in this same volume Marichal terms the fifth notebook, "the fifth (and final one of the series 1931-1933)": see p. xiii.

27. This still leaves unresolved the question of how many notebooks existed. Deducting the three which Arrarás gives as stolen [Thomas, "El Presidente," p. 291, says two], leaves six, yet Marichal says he worked with eight, only five of which dealt with the period to the outbreak of the Civil War. Sr. Alvárez Rubio (letter 20 November 1990) suggests that the stolen notebooks were number five (22 July 1932-19 September 1932), seven (28 November 1932-28 February 1933), and nine (1 June 1933-28 August 1933), and believes that number six, which would have covered the period from 19 September-28 November 1932, disappeared entirely.

28. Prof. Emilio González López agrees with this conclusion (conversation, 10 October 1990), as do Prof. Edward Malefakis of Columbia University (conversation, 5 October 1990) and Sr. Felix Alvárez Rubio, of Heuristica in Madrid (letter, 20 November 1990).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Bibliography

Repositories of Primary Sources

Archivo general militar (Segovia) [AGMS]

Archivo historico-nacional (Madrid) [AHNM]

Archivo historico-nacional (Salamanca) [AHNS]

Asameblea reales Ordenes Militares (Madrid) [AROM]

Biblioteca nacional (Madrid) [BNM]

Cuartel general del Ejercito de Tierra (Madrid) [GGET]

Hemeroteca nacional (Madrid) [HNM]

Heuristica (Madrid)

Servicio historico-militar (Madrid) [SHM]

United States National Archives [US NA]
State Department Decimal Files, 1933-1936.
War Department, Military Intelligence Division Files, Spain.

Interviews, Letters, and Conversations

Felix Alvárez Rubio: 8 September, 24 October, 26 November, 23 December 1988; 20 November 1990

Leonard Covello[1]

Emilio González López: 29 November, 4, 19 December 1987; 15 March 1988; 10 October 1990

Edward Malefakis: 5 October 1990.

Manuel Serna Añon: 18, 19 October 1988.

Brian Sullivan: 5 July 1989; 2 August 1990

1. Dr. Covello, with whom the present writer worked on an almost daily basis in the period 1966-1969, several times recounted his adventures with the Intelligence Service during the Great War. He died in 1982, at 94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Official Publications

Anuario estadistica de España

Congreso de los Diputados, La comisión de responsibilidades: Documentos relacionados con la informacion instruida por la llamada "Comision de responsibilidades" acerca del desastre de Anual. Madrid: Congreso de los Diputados, 1931.

El Expediente Picasso: Las responsibilidades de la actuacion española en Marruecos, Julio 1921. Madrid: Congreso de los Diputados, 1931.

Documentacion official de Ministerio de Guerra

La Gaceta de Madrid

League of Nations Armaments Yearbook.

The Red Domination in Spain: The General Cause. Fourth Edition. Madrid: 1961.

Spain, Ejército, Servicio Historico-Militar, Historia de las Campañas de Marruecos, four volumes. Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1951-1980.

Spain, Ejército, Estado mayor central, Anuario militar de España. Madrid: Ministerio de la guerra, various years.

Spain, Ejército, Estado Mayor del Ejército, Nomenclator historico-militar. Madrid: Estado Mayor del Ejército, 1954.

United States, War Department, Military Information Division, Notes and Tables on the Organization and Establishment of the Spanish Army in the Peninsula and Colonies. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898.

Bibliographic Aids

Bardi, Ubaldo, La guerra civile di Spagna: Saggio per una bibliografia italiana. Urbino: Araglia, 1974.

de la Cierva y Hoches, Ricardo, editor, Bibliografia sobre la guerra de España (1936-1939) y sus antecedentes. Madrid: Ariel, 1968.

Cien libros basicos sobre la guerra de España. Madrid: Publicaciones españoles, 1966.

Garcia Durán, Juan, Bibliografia de la guerra civil española. Monetvideo: El Siglo Illustrado, 1964.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Palacio Atard, Vicente, editor, Cuadernos bibliograficos de la guerra de España (1936-1939). Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, 1970-.

Memoirs and Diaries

Alcalá-Zamora, Niceto, Memorias. Barcelona: Planeta, 1977.

Azaña, Manuel, Memorias intimas de Azaña edited with annotations by Joaquín Arrarás. Madrid: Ediciones españoles, 1939.

Memorias intimas y secretas de Manuel Azaña. Santiago de Chile: n. p., 1938

Memorias politicas y de guerra, 1931-1939, edited by Juan Marichal, in Obras completas, Vol. IV. Mexico City: Oasis, 1966-1968.

Memorias politicas y de guerra, edited by Juan Marichal. Two volumes. Barcelona: Inelvasa, 1978.

"Las memorias secretas e intimas de Azaña," ABC, 21 August 1937 et seq.

Gamir Ulibarri, Mariano, De mé memorias. Paris: Imprimerie Moderne, 1939.

Mola Vidal, Emilio, Memorias, in Obras completas. Valladolid: Santaren, 1940.

Unpublished Works

Connelly, Joan, "The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain" (Doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr, 1963).

Fleming, Shannon E., "Primo de Rivera and Abdel Krim: The Struggle in Spanish Morocco, 1923-1927" (Doctoroal dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974).

Friedlander, Robert A., "The July 1936 Military Rebellion in Spain: Background and Beginnings" (Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1963).

Headrick, Daniel R., "The Spanish Army, 1868-1898" (Doctoral dissertation, Princeton, 1971).

Secondary Sources

Aguado, Emilio, Don Manuel Azaña Diaz. Barcelona:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Nauta, 1972.

Aguado Sánchez, Francisco, La revolución de Octubre de 1934. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1972.

Aguilera, Alfredo, and Elias, Vicente, Buques de la Armada Española. Madrid: Editorial Naval, 1968.

Aguilar Olivencia, Mariano, El ejército español durante la Segunda República (Claves de su actuación posterior). Madrid: Editorial Norte, 1986.

Alcalá Galiano, Emilio, La Guerra de España con Peru y Chile en 1866. Madrid: n.p., 1895.

Alcalá-Zamora, Niceto, Los defectos de la Constitucion de 1931. Madrid: Imprenta de R. Espinosa, 1936.

de Alfarache, Guzman, pseudonymn, ¡18 de Julio! Historia del Alzamiento glorioso de Sevilla. Sevilla: Editorial FE, 1937)

Alonso, Jose Ramón, Historia politica del ejército español. Madrid: Editorial Nacional, 1974.

Alonso Baquer, Miguel, El ejército en la sociedad español. Madrid: Ediciones del movimiento, 1971.

"La estructura del ejército en la epoca de Cassola," Revista de Historia-militar, No. 64 (1988), pp. 187-203.

"La guerra hispano-americana de 1898 y sus efectos sobre los instituciones militares españolas," Revista de historia militar, No. 54 (1983), pp. 127-145.

El modelo español de pronunciamiento. Madrid: Rialp, 1983)

Alpert, Michael, El ejército republicano en la guerra civil. Barcelona: Ruedo Iberico, 1977.

La reforma militar de Azaña (1931-1933). Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1982.

"Soldiers, Politics and War," in Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1936 edited by Paul Preston

Alvarez del Vayo, Julio, Freedom's Battle. New York: Hill & Wang, 1971.

de Arce, Carlos, Historia de la Legión española. Barcelona: Mitre, 1984.

Los generales de Franco. Barcelona: Mitre, 1984.

Army Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 1 (January, 1988), news item, p. 82.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Arrarás, Joaquín, Historia de la Cruzada Española. Eight volumes. Madrid: Ediciones Españolas, 1940-1943.
Historia de la Segunda República española. Fifth edition, four volumes. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1970.
Historia de la segunda república española: texto abbreviado. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965.

Azaña, Manuel, "La Dictadura en Espana," Obras completas, Vol. I.
Estudios de politica francesa contemporanea, La political militar, Obras completas, Vol. I.
"Fin de la rebellión militar," Obras completas, II, pp. 389-392
"Incidentes militares de Carabanchel," (28 June 1932), Obras completas, II, pp. 326-333
Mi rebelión en Barcelona, Obras completas, III, pp. 23-172,
Obras Completas, edited by Juan Marichal. Four volumes. Mexico City: Oasis, 1966.
"El presupuesto de Guerra" (10 March 1932), Obras completas, II, pp. 202ff.
"Supresion de la prensa llamda militar," (1 March 1932) Obras completas, II, pp. 77ff.
La velada en Benicarlo (Obras completas, III, pp. 379-460)
Vigil in Benicarlo, translated with an introduction by Josephine Stewart and Paul Stewart. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1982.

Aznar, Manuel, Historia militar de la guerra de España. Third edition, three volumes. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1958-1963.

Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, Antonio, Un año con Queipo de Llano: Memorias de un nacionalista. Barcelona: Ediciones Españolas, 1938.

Bañon, Rafael, and Olmedo, Jose Antonio, La institución militar en el Estado contemporanea. Madrid: Alianza, 1985.

Barea, Arturo, The Forging of a Rebel, translated by Ilsa Barea. New York: Viking, 1972.

Beltran Guell, Felipe, Preparación y desarrollo del Alzamiento Nacional. Valladolid: Santaren, 1939.

Ben-Ami, Shlomo, Fascism from Above: the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1983.
The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978.

Benzo, Eduardo, Al servicio del ejército: tres ensayos sobre el problema militar de España. Madrid: Javier Morata, 1931.

Berenguer y Fuste, Damaso, Campañas en el Rif y Yebala, 1921-1922, Two volumes. Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1948.
De la dictadura a la República. Madrid: Ediciones Plus Ultra, 1946.

Blanco Escola, Carlos, La academia general militar de Zaragoza (1928-1931). Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1989.

Bolin, Luis, Spain: The Vital Years. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967.

Bolloten, Burnett, The Grand Camouflage: The Spanish Civil War and Revolution, 1936-1939. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Boyd, Carolyn P., Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1979.

Bravo Morato, Federico, La república y el ejército. Madrid: Editorial Fenicia, 1978.

Busquets, Julio, El militar de carrera en España. Barcelona: Ariel, 1971.
Pronunciamientos y golpes de Estado en España. Barcelona: Planeta, 1982.

Busquets, Julio, and Fernandez Vargas, Valentina, editors, La enseñanza militar en Espana: un analisis sociologico. Madrid: Consejo superior de Investigaciones cientificos, 1986.

Cabanellas, Guillermo, Cuatro Generales. Two volumes. Barcelona: Planeta, 1977.
La guerra de los mil dias. Barcelona: Planeta, 1973.

Cacho Zabala, Antonio, La Unión militar española. Alicante: Egasa, 1940.

Calleja López, Juan José, Yague, un corazon al rojo. Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, 1963.

Capo, José María, Las juntas militares de defensa. Havana: Libreria Sintes, 1923.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Cardona, Gabriel, El poder militar en la España contemporanea hasta la guerra civil. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1983.

"La reforma de la enseñanza en la II República (1931-1932)," in La enseñanza militar en España: un analisis sociologico, edited by Julio Busquets and Valentina Fernandez Vargas, pp. 65-107..

Cardona, Gabriel, and Villanaya, Joan, "La represión contra los militares republicanos," Historia 16, 8, No. 92 (December 1983), pp. 33-36.

Carr, Raymond, Modern Spain, 1875-1980. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980.

The Republic and the Civil War in Spain, editor. New York: St. Martin's, 1977.

Spain, 1808-1939. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966.

The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977.

Casado, Segismondo, Así cayo Madrid. Madrid: Guadiana, 1968.

"The Republican Command in the Spanish War," The National Review, Vol. 113, No. 672 (July, 1939), p. 58ff

Cassels, Alan, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy. Princeton: Princeton University, 1970.

Cebreiros, Nazario, Las reformas militares. Santander: Talleres Tipograficos J. Martinez, 1931.

Chandler, David G., The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Chandler, James A., "The Responsibilities for Anual," Iberian Studies 2, No. 7 (1977), pp. 68-77.

de la Cierva y de Hoces, Ricardo, "La dialectica de las bofetadas," Historia y Vida, 2 (1969), pp. 137-141.

Historia de la guerra civil: Antecedentes. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1969.

"The Nationalist Army in the Spanish Civil War," in The Republic and the Civil War in Spain, edited by Raymond Carr.

Coello de Portugal, José Luis, Las juntas militares de defensa: Como perdi mi carrera militar. Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1922.

Comin Colomer, Eduardo, La masonería en Espana. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Lo que España debe a la masonería. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1952.

El 5 Regimento de Milicias populares. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1973.

Conselleria de Cultura, Educacio, i Ciencia, Generalitat Valenciana, "Exposicion de La Masoneria Espanola, 1728-1936." Valencia/Alicante: Conselleria de Cultura, Educacio, i Ciencia, Generalitat Valenciana, 1989.

Cortada, James W., editor, Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1982.

Costa Clavell, Xavier, Los ultimos dias de la República. Barcelona: Bruguera, 1975.

Coverdale, John F., Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War. Princeton: Princeton University, 1975.

Crozier, Brian, Franco. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

Dahms, Helmuth Gunther, La guerra española de 1936 [Translated from the German by Alvaro Soriano Trenor.] Madrid: Rialp, 1966.

Diaz de Villegas Bustamante, José, Nueva geografia militar de España. Madrid: Ediciones Ares, 1953.

Davis, William C., The Last Conquistadores: the Spanish Intervention in Peru and Chile, 1863-1866. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia, 1950.

Dunnigan, James F., and Nofi, Albert A., Shooting Blanks. New York: William Murrow, 1991.

Espinosa de los Monteros y Bermejillo, Hernando, Juan, Gonzalo, and Ignacio, España en Hendaya: demistificada la famosa entrevista Franco-Hitler, 23 Octobre 1940. Madrid: Reunidos, 1981.

Esteban-Infantes y Martín, Emilio, Expediciones españolas, Siglo XIX. Madrid: Instituto de Cultura Hispanica, 1949.

Eza, El Vizeconde de, Mís responsibilidades en el desastre de Melilla como Ministro de la Guerra. Madrid: Graficas Reunidas, 1923.

Faldella, Emilio, Venti mesi di guerra in Spagna, 1936-1938. Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 1939.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

de Felice, Renzo, Mussolini il fascista, Vol. II. Torino: G. Einaudi, 1968.

Fernández Almagro, Melchor, Historia del reinado de Alfonso XIII. Barcelona: Montaner y Simon, 1936.

Fernández Basterreche, Fernando, El ejército español en el Siglo XIX. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1978.

Fernández Hernando, Hieroteo, Reclutamiento, remeplazo, y movilización de los ejércitos españoles. Madrid: Estado Mayor del Ejército, 1959.

Ferrari Billoch, F[rancisco]., La masonería al desnudo. Madrid: Ediciones Españolas, 1939.

"Francisco Franco, Escritor militar", Revista de Historia-militar, No. 40 (1976).

Franco Bahamonde, Francisco, Diario de una bandera. Madrid: Editorial Pueyo, 1922.

"Diario de Alhucemas," Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano II, Nos. 9-12 (September-December 1925)

Masonería. Madrid: Valera, 1952. Published under the pseudonym "Jakin Boor."

"Necesidades sobre material y fortificacion," Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano III, No. 4 (April, 1926).

"Pasividad e inacción," Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano I., No. 4 (April, 1924)

Raza. Madrid: Ediciones Numanancia, 1945.

"Reformas necessarias," Revista de tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano IV, No. 11 (Nov., 1928)

"Ruud . . . Balek! . . . ", Africa I, 2 (February, 1933)

"Xauen, El triste," Revista de Tropas coloniales, Epoca II, Ano III, No. 7 (July, 1926).

Franco Bahamonde, Ramón, Deciamos ayer. Barcelona: Maucci, 1931.

Madrid bajo las bombas. Madrid: Zeus Editorial, 1931.

Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, Mi vida junto a Franco. Barcelona: Planeta, 1977.

Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco. Barcelona: Planeta, 1978.

Fraser, Ronald, Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War. New York: Pantheon, 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Gambra Ciudad, Rafael, La primera guerra civil de España. Madrid: Escelicer, 1972.

Gamir Ulibarri, Mariano, Ofensiva del Norte: Bilbao-Santander. Paris: Vaires, 1939.

Garate Cordoba, José María, Alféreces provisionales. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1976.

"Los militares españoles ante la Gran Guerra," Hispania, Vol. 45, No. 161 (September-December 1985), pp. 579-614.

Sargentos provisionales. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1977.

Garate Cordoba, José María, and Aguilar Olivencia, Mariano, "El cuerpo de suboficiales de España," Revista de Historia-militar, No. 43 (1977), pp. 83-96.

Garcia Venero, Maximiano, El General Fanjul: Madrid en el Alzamiento Nacional. Madrid: Ediciones Cid, 1967.

García Volta, Gabriel, La campaña del Norte. Barcelona: Bruguera, 1975.

Geley, John H., "Bridegrooms of Death: A Profile Study of the Spanish Foreign Legion," Journal of Contemporary History, IV, 2 (April 1969), pp. 47-63.

Gibson, Ian, Queipo de Llano, Sevilla, verano de 1936. Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1986.

Gil Murgaza, Bernardo, España en Llamas. Barcelona: Ediciones Acervo, 1968.

Gil Robles, José María, No fue posible la paz. Barcelona: Ariel, 1968.

Giménez Caballero, E., Manuel Azaña (profecias españolas). Madrid: Turner, 1975.

Goded, Manuel, Un 'faccioso' cien por cien. Zaragoza: Editora Heraldo de Aragon, 1938.

Goma, José, La guerra en el aire. Barcelona: AHR, 1958.

González Muñiz, Miguel A., Problemas de la Segunda República. Madrid: Jucar, 1974.

Gottman, Jean, "Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy edited by Edward Meade Earle. Princeton:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Princeton University, 1943.

Guaita Martorell, Aurelio, "Capitanes y Capitanias Generales," Revista de Historia-militar, No. 65 (1988), pp. 125-172.

Halprin, Paul G., The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908-1914. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1971.

Hernández Mir, Francisco, La dictadura ante la historia. Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1930.
La Dictadura en Marruecos. Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1930.

Hidalgo Durán, Diego, ¿Por que fui lanzado de Ministerio de la guerra?: Diez meses de actuación minesterial. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1934.

Iribarren, José María, El General Mola. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1945.
Mola. Datos para una biografia y para la historia del Alzamiento Nacional. Zaragoza: Editora Heraldo de Aragon, 1938.

Jackson, Gabriel, "The Azana Regime in Perspective (Spain, 1931-1933)," American Historical Review, vol. 64, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 282-300.
Historian's Quest. New York: Knopf, 1969.
The Spanish Republic and the Civil War. Princeton: Princeton University, 1972.

Jellinek, Frank, The Civil War in Spain. New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.

LaComba, J.A., La crisis española de 1917. Madrid: Ciencia nueva, 1971.

Lain Entralgo, Pedro, La generación de Noventa y Ocho. Madrid: F. Muñiz Alonso, 1963.

La Legión española, 50 anos de historia. Leganes: La Legión, 1970.

de Ler, Angel Maria, La masonería que vuele. Barcelona: Planeta, 1980.

Lloyd, Alan, Franco. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969.

López Fernández, Antonio, Defensa de Madrid. Mexico: Editora A. P. Marquez, 1945.
El general Miaja, defensor de Madrid. Madrid: G. del Toro, 1975.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

López de Ochoa y Portuado, Eduardo, Campaña militar de Asturias. Madrid: Ediciones Yunque, 1936.
De la Dictadura a la República. Madrid: Editorial Reus, 1930.

Lovett, Gabriel H., Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain. Two volumes. New York: New York University, 1965.

Mack Smith, Denis, Mussolini's Roman Empire. New York: Viking, 1976.

de Madariaga, Salvador, Spain: A Modern History. New York: Praeger, 1958.

Maiz, B. Felix, Alzamiento en España. Pamplona: Ediciones Gómez, 1956.
Mola, Aquel Hombre: Diario de la conspiración, 1936. Barcelona: Planeta, 1976.

Malefakis, Edward, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain. New Haven: Yale University, 1970.

Malinovski, Rodion, et al., Bajo la bandera de la España republicana. Moscow: Progress, n.d.

March, José María, El Somaten. Barcelona; Tipografia La Educacion, 1923.

Marichal, Juan, La vocación de Manuel Azaña. Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos, 1971.

Marinas, Francisco Javier, General Varela. De soldado a general. Barcelona: AHR, 1956.

Martínez Bande, José Manuel, Los cien ultimos dias de la República. Espluges de Llobregat: Caralt, 1973.
Mongrafias de la guerra de España, nineteen volumes. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1968-.[2]
Vol. 4: La Guerra en el Norte (1969)
Vol. 6: Vizcaya (1971)
Vol. 8: El Final del Frente Norte (1972)
Vol. 17: El final de la Guerra Civil (1985)

Martínez de Campos, Carlos, Ayer. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios politicos, 1970.

Mas Chao, Andres, La formación de la conciencia africanista en el ejército español (1909-1926). Madrid; Servicio Geografico del Ejército, 1988.

2. This work constitutes the official history. Only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Matthews, Herbert L., Half of Spain Died. New York: Scribners, 1973.

Marco Miranda, Vicente, Las conspiraciónes contra la Dictadura. Madrid: Hijos de Tomas Minuesa, 1930.

Maura Gamazo, Gabriel, and Fernández Almagro, Melchor, ¿Por que cayo Alfonso XIII? Madrid: Ediciónes Ambos Mundos, 1948.

Maura, Miguel, Así cayo Alfonso XIII. Mexico City; Imprenta Manez, 1962.

Maurice, Jacques, La reforma agraria en España en el siglo XX (1900-1936). Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1975.

de Mazarrasa, Javier, Los carros de combate en España. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1977.

Merino, Julio, La tragedia de los generales españoles, 1936. Espluges de Llobregat: Plaza & James, 1985.

Modesto, Juan, Soy el Quinto Regimento. Paris: Ebro, 1969.

Mola Vidal, Emilio, El pasado, Azaña, y el porvenir in Obras completas. Valladolid: Santaren, 1940.

Nofi, Albert A., "The Beginning: Armored Divisions, 1934-1940," Strategy & Tactics No. 111 (May 1987)
"Honorary Rank in the Spanish Army during the Nineteenth Century," Strategy & Tactics No. 106 (March, 1986)

O'Connell, James A., "Republican Spain, the Provisional Government, and Manuel Azana: A Consideration of His Diary," Iberian Studies, III, 2 (Autumn, 1972), pp. 70-78.

Olmedo Delgado, Antonio, and Cuesta Monereo, Jose, General Queipo de Llano. Aventura y audacia. Barcelona: AHR, 1957.

Oman, C.W.C., The History of the Peninsular War. Seven volumes. Oxford: The Clarnedon Press, 1902-1930.

Ortega y Gasset, Jose, "La clave del arcos" El Sol, 13 February 1920.

volumes referred to in the text have been listed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Pabon, Jesus, Cambó. Two volumes. Barcelona: Ediciones Alpha, 1969.

Palacio Atard, Vicente, Cinco historias de la República y de la Guerra Civil. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1973.

"El gobierno ante la conspiración de 1936," in Aproximación historica a la Guerra española (1936-1939), edited by Vicente Palacio Atard, Anejos de "Cuadernos Bibliograficos de la Guerra de España (1936-1939), No. 1. Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, 1970.

Pardo González, Candido, La problema militar de España. Madrid: Rehyma, 1934.

Al servicio de la verdad: Las juntas militares de defensa. Madrid: Rehyma, 1930.

Payne, Stanley G., "The Army, The Republic, and the Outbreak of the Civil War," in Raymond Carr, The Republic and the Civil War in Spain

Ejército y sociedad en la España liberal. Madrid: Akal, 1977.

Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism. Stanford: Stanford University, 1967.

The Franco Regime: 1936-1975. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1987.

Franco's Spain. New York: Crowell, 1967.

Politics and the Military in Modern Spain. Stanford: Stanford University, 1967.

Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1984.

The Spanish Revolution. New York: W.W. Norton, 1970.

Peiré, Tomás, Una politica militar expuesta ante las Cortes constituyentes. Madrid: Vallinas, 1933.

Peman, José María, Un soldado en la historia. Vida del General Varela. Cadiz: Escelicer, 1954.

Pérez Galán, Mariano, La Ensenañza en la segunda Republica española. Madrid: Cuadernos para el Dialogo, 1975.

Pérez Salas, José, Guerra en España (1936 a 1939). Mexico City: Grafos, 1947.

Pieltain de la Pena, Ricardo, "Panorama general de la guerra de Africa," Revista de Historia-Militar, No. 6 (1960), pp. 89-151.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

de Poncins, Leon, Histoire secrete de la revolution espagnole. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1938.

Porch, Douglas, "Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy edited by Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University, 1986.

Preston, Paul, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. New York, Methuen, 1978.
Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1936, editor. New York: Methuen, 1984.
The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. New York: Grove, 1986.

Priego López, Juan, Guerra de la Independencia, 1808-1814. Ten volumes. Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1966-.
Síntesis historica de la guerra de España. Madrid: Servicio Historico-Militar, 1968.

Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja, Miguel, Cuestion del dia: Gibraltar y Africa. Cadiz: privately published, 1917.
La obra de la dictadura. Madrid: Imprenta Saez Hnos, 1930.

"El proyecto de desembarco en Alhucemas del General Martínez Anido," Revista de Historia-militar, No. 49 (1980), pp. 139-169.

Puell de la Villa, Fernando María, "El General Cassola, Reformista Militar de la Restauración," Revista de Historia-militar, No. 45 (1978), pp. 173-196.
"La reforma del General Cassola," Revista de Historia-militar, No. 46 (1979), pp. 144-174.

Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, El general Queipo de Llano perseguido por la Dictadura. Madrid: Javier Morata, 1930.
El movimiento revolucionario de Cuatro Vientos. Madrid: Javier Morata, 1933.

de Ramon-Laca, Julio, Bajo la frula de Queipo. Como fue gobernada Andalucia. Sevilla: Imprenta FE, 1939)

Ramos Oliviera, A., Politics, Economics, and Men of Modern Spain. Second edition. New York: Arno Press, 1972.

Ramsden, Herbert., The 1898 Movement in Spain. Manchester: Manchester University, 1974.

Redondo Díaz, Fernando, "Los observadores militares espanoles en la primera guerra mondial," Revista de

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Historia-militar, No. 59 (1985), pp. 197-208.

Rial, James H., Revolution from Above: The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship in Spain, 1923-1930. Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University, 1981.

Rivas-Xerif [Cherif], Cipriano, Retrato de un desconocio (Vida de Manuel Azaña). Mexico: Oasis, 1961.

Robinson, Richard A.H., The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right the Republic, and Revolution, 1931-1939. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1970.

Rojas, Carlos, Dos Presidentes: Azaña/Companys. Barcelona: Dirosa, 1977.

Romano, Julio, pseudonym for José Rodríguez de la Peña, Sanjurjo, el caballero del valor. Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1940.

Romanones, El Conde de, Las ultimas horas de una monarquia. Madrid: Javier Morata, 1931.

Romero-Maura, Joaquín, The Spanish Army and Catalonia: the "Cu-Cut! Incident" and the Law of Jurisdictions. Beverly Hills: Russell Sage, 1976.

Rubio Cabeza, Manuel, Diccionario de la guerra civil española. Two volumes. Barcelona: Planeta, 1989.

Ruiz-Ocaña, César, Los ejércitos españoles. Madrid: Editorial San Martin, n.d. [1980].

Salas Larrazabal, Jesus, Air War Over Spain. London: Ian Allen, 1969.

Salas Larrazabal, Ramón, "Algunas generales en la guerra civil", Historia y Vida, No. 141 (December, 1979), pp. 40-43.

"Los 40 generals victimas de la guerra civil," Historia y Vida No. 95 (February, 1976), p. 25ff.

Los datos exactos de la guerra civil. Madrid: Dracena, 1980.

Historia del ejercito popolar de la república. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1973.

"Militares de la 4a. Division el 18 de Julio", Historia y Vida, No. 142 (January 1980), p. 52.

"La muerte del general Molero," Historia y Vida, No. 142 (January, 1980), p. 86.

"La organizacion militar, el Alzamiento, y la guerra civil," in Aproximación historica a la Guerra española (1936-1939), edited by Vicente Palacio Atard, Anejos de

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"Cuadernos Bibliograficos de la Guerra de España (1936-1939), No. 1.

Perdidas de guerra. Barcelona: Planeta, 1977.

Salas Larrazabal, Ramón, and Salas Larrazabal, Jesus Maria, Historia general de la Guerra de España. Madrid: Rialp, 1986.

Salazar, Rafael, "Perfil humano de Primo de Rivera," Historia y Vida, 3, 22 (1970), pp. 56-65

Sánchez Bravo, Angel, Apuntes para la historia de la Escala de Reserva del Ejército. Cuenca: privately published, 1929.

Sánchez Guerra, Rafael, El movimiento revolucionario de Valencia. Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1930.

"La sanjurjada," Historia 16 No. 7 (August 1982), pp. 43-67.

Sarkesian, Sam C., The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975.

Scurr, John, The Spanish Foreign Legion. London: Osprey, 1985.

Seco Serrano, Carlos, Militarismo y civilismo en la España contemporanea. Madrid: Coleccion Tablera, 1984.

Sedgewick, Frank, The Tragedy of Manuel Azana and the Fate of the Spanish Republic. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1963.

Sender, Ramón J., Viaje a la aldea del crimen. Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1934.

Serrano, Vincente Alberto, and San Lucar, José María, editors, Azaña. Madrid: Edoscal, 1980.

de Silva, Carlos, General Millán-Astray. Barcelona; AHR, 1956).

Somoza Silva, Lazaro, El General Miaja (Biografia de un héroe). Mexico: Ediciones Tirys, 1944.

de Sotto Montes, Joaquín, "Notas para la historia de las Fuerzas indígenas del antiguo protectorado de España en Marruecos," Revista de historia militar, No. 35 (1973)

Suero Rosa, Teresa, Los generals de Franco. Barcelona: Bruguera, 1978.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Thomas, Hugh, "El Presidente desposeido," in Serrano and San Lucar, pp. 287-296.

The Spanish Civil War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961.

The Spanish Civil War: Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.[3]

Trythall, J.W.D., El Caudillo: A Political Biography of Franco. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

Tuchman, Barbara W., The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.

Tuñon de Lara, Manuel, "La sublevación de Jaca," Historia 16 1 (May, 1976), pp. 57-64.

Vigón, Jorge, Historia de la Artillería española. Two volumes. Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones cientificos, 1947.

Mola (El Conspirador). Barcelona: AHR, 1957.

Vila de San Juan, A., "El brindis de General Goded," Historia y Vida No. 70 (January, 1974)

Villalonga, Lorenc, Bearn, or The Doll's Room, translated from the Catalan by Deborah Bonner. Madrid: Iberia Airlines, 1986.

Vinas, Angel, La Alemania nazi y el 18 de julio. Madrid: Alianza, 1974.

Woolman, David S., Rebels in the Rif. Stanford: Stanford University, 1968.

Zaragoza, Cristobal, Los generales del pueblo. Barcelona: Bruguera, 1977.

El levantamiento en Africa. Barcelona: Bruguera, 1977.

Contemporary Newspapers and Journals

ABC [Madrid/Sevilla]

Africa[4] [Ceuta]

3. The "third edition" of this work (New York, 1986) is identical in all important particulars to the second, including pagination.

4. Formerly Revistas de Tropas Coloniales.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

La Correspondencia Militar [Madrid]
El Heraldo de Madrid
El Liberal [Madrid]
Mundo Obrero [Madrid]
La Revista de Tropas coloniales[5] [Ceuta]
El Siglo Futuro [Madrid]
El Socialista [Madrid]
El Sol [Madrid]
The Times [London]
La Voz de la Palma

5. Later Africa.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.