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**THE EUROPEAN UNION, IMMIGRATION AND INEQUALITY:
“ALBANIAN” LABOR IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL GREECE**

by

CHRISTOPHER M. LAWRENCE

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2005

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
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
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction for the dissertation requirement for the degree of doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THE EUROPEAN UNION, IMMIGRATION AND INEQUALITY:
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By

Christopher M. Lawrence

Advisor: Professor Gerald Sider

Many early studies of globalization hypothesized a withering away of the nation-state as a significant arena for the production of identity and social regulation. From this perspective the persistence of nationalism and resurgence of neo-racism in Europe have often been seen as a futile rear-guard defense by downwardly mobile classes or class fractions. More recent studies have suggested that rather than fading away, the nation and state have been undergoing a process of re-articulation. However, exactly how the nation and state are being re-articulated, and the implications of this process for our understanding of nationalism and national identity formation, are still unclear. Drawing on ethnographic data gathered from fieldwork in rural Greece during 2002-2004, I argue that the resurgence of ethnic nationalism has been instrumental to the incorporation of rural Greek communities into the globalized political economy of the European Union and its particular type of neoliberal political system. Greek farmers today are almost totally dependent on immigrant labor from Albania and other Eastern European countries. The presence of immigrants resolves a fundamental contradiction in the political economy of the E.U., namely the labor crisis created by social and economic liberalization. Racism and nationalism have become, paradoxically, fundamental elements of neoliberal governmentality and crucial techniques in the production of social

elements of neoliberal governmentality and crucial techniques in the production of social relations of production and consumption. In contrast with earlier eras, the complex of racial, ethnic and national identities are being produced through a novel arrangement of nation and state. As institutions that focus and shape national identities, such as the mass media, have been largely privatized, the nation has come to be perceived as “against” the state. The resistance of the nation against the state appears on the one hand to absorb the opposition to the neoliberal project of the state while at the same time subsidizing and facilitating its implementation.

PREFACE

My research seeks to document and explain the relationship between new forms of neo-liberal capitalism and racism by an investigation into the production of social inequality in several rural communities in Greece that have begun to feel the direct impact of global capitalism relatively recently. Research was conducted mainly in Midea township in the Argolida region of the Peloponnesos, the southernmost part of the Greek mainland. Initial fieldwork was begun in the summer of 2000 when, thanks to a Summer Travel Fellowship from the City University of New York Graduate Center I was able to spend six weeks in the area. Additional work was done in the summers of 2001 and 2002. In 2003 I was able to spend eight months (January through August) in Midea township thanks to a dissertation research grant from the National Science Foundation. Finally, I spent four months in the area during the spring and summer of 2004, thanks to a sabbatical from the New York City Department of Education which allowed me to fill in the gaps from my previous research and begin writing my dissertation.

My fieldwork involved several different methods of ethnographic research. In my research I focused on qualitative data. I conducted interviews with over 80 households in three villages of Midea township. Households were selected both at random and through “snowballing”. Although I interviewed over 20 immigrants in the area, the bulk of my research focused on the experiences and perceptions of local Greeks. The households in my sample covered the range of occupational and generational characteristics of households in the area. I found that data from this initial survey was only of limited value for my purposes. During cross-checking and verification I realized that for many of the issues that I was interested in researching I was not able to get reliable data due to the

sensitivity of the subjects and the reluctance of informants to “open up” to an unknown interviewer. However, these interviews were valuable in that they provided me with an introduction to the community and allowed me to establish relations with a group of households that proved very useful for my research. Out of these 80 households I selected 20 with whom I conducted more in depth and unstructured interviews. These interviews provide the bulk of my interview data. In addition I carried out participant observation. By living and working in the community I was able to establish social relationships with various residents and thereby gain a better understanding of the ways in which residents perceive, negotiate and resist the changing political, economic and social environment of the villages. I worked alongside residents and immigrants in the citrus harvest, accompanied shepherds in their daily tasks, hung out in the cafes and *tavernas*, attended community meetings and social events and observed daily family life in the villages. In short, I felt that I was able to become part of the community, if only for a brief period of time. While I do not claim in this dissertation to represent the perspective of the villagers, a task that is anyway impossible given the diversity and divisions among them, I believe that participating and observing the community on such an intimate basis gave me insights and taught me lessons available to few other “outsiders”.

There are many people who gave me assistance and encouragement during this project. First and foremost, I am extremely grateful for the help and comradeship of Dr. Gerald Sider. As my advisor and mentor, his unflagging enthusiasm and confidence sustained me through many periods of frustration and uncertainty. His insight and nuanced critiques of successive drafts provoked me to re-examine many of my assumptions and helped me to organize and present this work in a more coherent manner.

I am also indebted to Dr. Jane Schneider and Dr. Michael Blim, who both gave generously of their time and provided invaluable comments and critiques. I feel extremely fortunate to have studied under such a stellar group. I also wish to thank Dr. Gavin A. Smith of the University of Toronto who generously took the time to read and comment on the manuscript. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Louise Lennihan and Ellen Deriso who helped me to navigate the marshes of academia with cheer and kindness.

In Greece, Dr. Roxanne Caftanzoglou of the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) provided me with invaluable assistance. I am also indebted to Dr Charalambos Kasimis of the University of Patra for the time he took to discuss my research with me. Dr. Aggeliki Athanasopoulou was gracious in sharing with me her own research on one of the villages in the area that I worked. In Nauplio, Nikos Vrachnos and Giorgos and Jill Athineos provided me with introductions and refuge. The people of Midea township offered me hospitality and suffered my endless questions with patience and humor. To all of them I offer my sincere gratitude, especially the families of Panos Papageorgopoulos, Kotsiba Papageorgopoulos and Georgos Lekkas. It goes without saying that probably none of the people I thank here will agree with everything I have written. For any errors, I take full responsibility. Finally, I thank my daughters Selene and Thalia, who sacrificed more than anyone else for this research.

Christopher Lawrence

3/28/05

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INTRODUCTION

“In the pitiless war waged between tradition and modernity in the Greek countryside over the past thirty years, there is, at present, no evidence for predicting modernity’s inevitable victory.” (Damianakos 1997:206)

“In real space and time, we find particular societies embodying or combining [modes of production] in historically and geographically distinctive forms. Moreover they do so in combination or conflict (which is also a kind of combination) with one another. In the world studied by anthropologists, some of the most interesting problems concern the ways in which the expression of one mode may reinforce or alter inequalities in the other.” (Wolf 1981:55-56)

Ice cream and exploitation

In 2001, as I was beginning fieldwork, I sat at a sidewalk café on the main street of Agia Triada, a small town 100 kilometers southwest of Athens. It was early summer and I was drinking coffee with a few farmers I had just met. As we talked, two men walked down the main street, which was still deserted in the late afternoon sun. From the long-sleeved flannel shirts they wore and their sunburned faces it was clear that they were immigrant laborers, generically referred to as “Albanians” by the local Greeks, regardless of their country of origin. As they passed the main square the two men stopped at the kiosk and began to rummage through the ice cream bin. Immediately our conversation stopped as the farmers I was with turned their attention to the two laborers. The kiosk man emerged and stood by the two men as they rummaged through the bin and finally

made their selections. One of the farmers I was with chuckled and said sarcastically “Look, the Albanians are eating ice cream!” The others only scowled and watched the men until they had exited the square.

The hostility provoked by the simple purchase of an ice cream was palpable. It was clear that a social boundary had been transgressed. Later, I found that such episodes were often used by Greeks as examples of the irrationality of immigrants and justifications for their inferior social status. Ice cream is a small but common indulgence for rural Greeks, a treat mainly intended for the pampered children of local farmers. The gaudy ice cream bins are found in almost every small store and stocked by the trucks of several national brands, now mostly owned by multinational corporations. Ice cream is one of the countless small pleasures that have come to rural Greece as part of its incorporation into the globalized economy of the E. U. However, it is not for everyone. At between one and two euros each, an ice cream bar represents a substantial amount for most immigrants, given the daily wage of 25 euros they typically receive. When an immigrant buys ice cream it is seen as a wasteful extravagance or worse, as a deliberate attempt to subvert the relations of domination and submission that characterize the interaction between Greeks and immigrants.

As my fieldwork progressed, I realized that this ice cream episode condensed many of the changes and conflicts that have developed in rural Greece over the last several decades. Ice cream of course is a trivial example, but the episode reflects a pervasive social contradiction in the villages I studied. The incorporation of rural Greek communities into the political economy of the European Union since the early 1980’s has resulted in a broad trend toward rural prosperity as represented through rising levels of

consumption, particularly among groups such as land-poor peasants, women and children that were previously excluded from direct participation in consumer markets. It has also simultaneously resulted in the incorporation and marginalization of a new class of labor; illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe. These two developments are fundamentally connected in rural Greece.

As the quotation by Stathis Damianakos, a prominent Greek rural sociologist, at the head of this chapter indicates there are those who express skepticism about the potential for global forces to exert real and lasting change in the basic social relations of village society in Greece. This skepticism is based on either a belief in the strength and persistence of Greek identity or, alternately, on the weakness and transience of global forces. Indeed, when I first began to formulate my research questions on immigration and the production of inequality in village society another sociologist suggested to me that any changes wrought by immigration patterns were only temporary and peripheral. Immigrants, he predicted, would either go back to their home countries or be assimilated into village society the way that countless others have been over the centuries. Today, in 2005, such a possibility seems more and more improbable. In the villages too, many Greek farmers express confidence in their abilities, honed over centuries of domination by a series of occupiers, to withstand the shifting winds of change and resist new attempts to dominate and exploit them. Shortly before the end of my fieldwork a young truck driver in one of the villages I studied said to me,

“There is one thing I want you to put in your book. One thing I want you to tell them over there in America. You tell them that there is a village here in Greece that hates them. We hate them! Put it on the first page. And tell them they will never conquer us!”

Such expressions of defiance are common in rural Greece and often reflect a self-image of a rebellious and indomitable people. At the same time, however, rural Greeks also express a deep anxiety over the future and a pervasive suspicion that their way of life may be coming to an end.

Between this model of the “eternal peasant” and the conspicuous efforts of global capital and the policy-makers in Athens and Brussels to “rationalize” rural society, both of which are certainly naïve at a fundamental level, real changes are occurring, although not exactly as either side has foreseen. As Eric Wolf has suggested, in the second quotation that adorns the opening of this chapter, societies are the product of combination and conflict. Contemporary Greek rural society is being produced in the interface of historically and geographically distinctive modes of production. Some would call these forms “modern” and “traditional”, but this distinction obscures more than clarifies by assuming a temporal distinction that no longer exists, if it ever did. Rural Greek families are struggling to adapt to new global conditions by calling upon their existing repertoire of relations as well as inventing new ones. They seek to maximize their advantages and minimize their disadvantages through both combination and conflict. The results, tentative and contingent, are a type of creolized mode of production where, for example, neoliberal consumerism and “free” markets exist together with, and dependent on, almost neofeudal forms of servitude and where a transnational discourse of “human rights” is, in practice, limited to particular nationalities through the distinction between “legal” and “illegal” status. This is “hybridity” in its truest sense.

Globalization, European style

Over the last several decades the countries of the European Union have undergone profound political, economic and social changes through the process of increasing integration. Many of these changes have been attributed, by scholars and residents alike, to general processes of neoliberal globalization and their specific manifestations within European society. An important aspect of these changes in rural Greece has been the contradictory spread of a liberal discourse of social equality and prosperity with a simultaneous de-valuation of productive labor through the spread of free markets. In most of rural Greece, while residents survive on agriculture, they do not survive on agricultural *labor* but rather on a combination of the rights of ownership (a form of rent) and the rights of citizenship in the form of state subsidies. One of the most important effects on rural Greek society has been to undercut its ability to reproduce exploitable labor, which in the past has largely come from the household. In the emerging political economy of rural Greece under the E.U. regime, the liberalization of both markets and social relations has been accompanied by, and has perhaps necessitated, the development of new forms of social marginalization, in particular the creation of an illegal, immigrant labor market. As a result, while the Greek nation-state has undergone profound changes, the production of national identity continues to be instrumental for the reproduction of social inequality, even as the boundaries of the nation itself have been, to a certain extent, re-articulated.

Transnational and global economies have long been a concern, if not a focus, of anthropological research, particularly among anthropologists following a political-economy perspective (Mintz 1998). In the 1980's and 1990's, 'globalization' became an important keyword in the anthropological lexicon as anthropologists from many different

theoretical tendencies tried to come to grips with the seemingly ubiquitous spread of capitalist commodity markets and relations of production, especially after the fall of the Soviet bloc (Kearny 1995). Among social theorists, and in popular discourse as well, there are two basic tendencies in the interpretation of “globalization”; those who see new forms of global capitalist organization as a fundamental rupture with, and transcendence of, the past, and those who see simply the extension and re-invigoration of basic capitalist forms. What *has* really changed in the new global era? More than a few theorists breathlessly, and prematurely in my view, predicted the new era of globalization to be a transcendence of capitalism-as-we-know-it (for example, Appadurai 1990; Castells 1996). Others, such as Harvey (1990), theorized globalization as a form of “late” capitalism that was either a reprieve or a last gasp, depending on the nature of your optimism. The problem with such “grand” theorizing is its pretension to prediction on the basis of broad trends and its dependence on macro analysis. One of the enduring lessons of anthropology has been that often such predictions are stymied at the micro-level. In other words, it is one thing to understand capitalism at a global, and therefore necessarily abstract, level, and quite another to understand how capitalism is created and reproduced in the immediacy of daily life. As a result, there has been increasing attention paid by anthropologists to “bottom-up” views of globalization grounded in ethnographic methodologies (Burawoy 2001). Continuing the tradition established by Wolf (1982) among others, many recent studies have focused on how global and transnational processes are produced in particular localities. There has also been renewed attention paid to the uneven and variable nature of capitalist development (Blim 2000; Coronil 2000). In the following chapters I will present a “bottom-up” view of globalization that

illustrates the incomplete and uneven reach of global forces into particular localities. Beyond this, I will argue that the intrusion of global forces is necessarily incomplete, in the sense that they create fundamental contradictions that must be addressed in their locality by practical and immediate means. Specifically, I will argue that the restructuring of markets and infusion of neoliberal practices of citizenship that has characterized the reach of global capitalism into rural Greece has been facilitated through the exploitation of “illegal” labor and a resurgence of ethnic nationalism.

My research focuses on changes in social relations at the village level that have occurred under the regime of the E.U., which is itself a novel form of transnational governance. The E.U. represents a sort of supranational state, an innovative transnational form of economic, political and social integration intended to globally project the economic power and competitiveness of Europe (Verdun 2002). Within the E.U. there is a high degree of mobility of capital, commodities and labor while at the same time external borders have been kept relatively strong. At the same time, the E.U. operates both above and through existing nation-states. The development of transnational institutions and policies in the E.U. has followed a principle of “subsidiarity” (Holmes 2000), which involves the selective centralization of decision-making powers, state functions and market organization, and has resulted in a largely technocratic and depoliticized regime (Tsoukalis 1997; G. Smith 2003) managed by an elite of appointed officials and interest-group representatives (Bellier 2000). Nation-states continue to be important sites for the implementation of, and resistance to, E.U. policies. Increasingly, though they are constrained by transnational authority and markets.

One of the core problems of the E.U. project has been that it encompasses two sometimes often contradictory goals (Bellier and Wilson 2000). The first is the consolidation and expansion of capitalist production and markets in the face of global competition. The second is the promotion of social stability and cohesion through the construction and projection of a “European” model of common social structures and cultural affinities, a process often described as “Europeanization” (Borneman and Fowler 1997; Featherstone 2003). The basic contradiction between these two goals is that while the first necessarily involves the production of new inequalities while the second seeks to erase the older inequalities. This contradiction has been partly resolved through the development of an elaborate system of state subsidies, ostensibly to ease the transition to free markets. However, I argue that to a large extent the resolution has also been “off-shored”. That is, the problem of the creation of new inequalities has been resolved, or rather partly resolved, through the creation of a new class of labor that is explicitly *not* European: immigrants. To illustrate this development I will focus on the relationship between transnational labor migration, the state and the persistence of racist and nationalist discourses of social identity in the context of rural Greek political economy.

Transnational labor migration in Greece

Labor migration and illegal immigration are widely considered to be important components of globalization (Koser and Lutz 1998; Harris 1995; Richmond 1994; Herod 1997; Sassen 1983, 1998; Miles 1993). While globally the number of migrants are still relatively small (2.3% of the world population [World Bank 2000]) compared to other historical periods (Potts 1990; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Arrighi and Silver 1984),

their concentration in a few areas, including the United States and Western Europe, has dramatically increased their impact. The new immigration is notable for several reasons. In contrast with previous eras, new patterns of migration are often characterized by illegality, which has the effect of producing an extremely vulnerable workforce with few of the protections offered legal workers and citizens (Bales 1999; Harris 1995). In addition, immigrant labor today tends to be concentrated in “informal” and “irregular” sectors of economies (Castells 1989; Kloosterman, et al 1998; Wilpert 1998). In many parts of the world, migration flows have been gendered to the extent that males and females tend to move in distinct patterns, each responding to gendered employment patterns in the host countries (Anthias 2000). Female immigrant labor for example is particularly concentrated in domestic and sex work (Anthias and Lazaridis 2000). The role of the state has been characterized by some as “ambivalent” because of the lack of legal regulations (Cornelius 1994; Morris 1997), but in fact the ambivalent posture of the state has worked to produce vulnerability and reflects a transformation of state practices.

The beginning of large-scale labor immigration into Greece coincided with the accession of Greece to E.U. membership in the early 1980's. By the end of the century, immigrants in Greece were estimated to number around 1 million, making up around 10% of the population of Greece and 15% of its labor force (Fakiolas 2000; Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999). The immigration of Eastern European labor into Greece was, and is, spurred by two factors that, on a global level, are inter-related (King 2000). On the “push” side, Eastern European workers have been driven to emigrate by the social dislocations spawned by the pyrrhic victory of neo-liberalism in formerly socialist countries. On the “pull” side, they have been attracted to Greece by a growing labor crisis

driven by both declining birth-rates and a growing middle class supported by the expansion of service and professional sectors of the Greek economy. For the most part, immigrants have been concentrated in informal and irregular sectors of the economy, such as agricultural, domestic and construction work (Kasimis et al 2003; Droukas 1998). In rural areas, most of the agricultural labor is performed by immigrants. Greek farmers tend to view the presence of large numbers of immigrants as a necessary evil. Immigrants are thought to threaten the social fabric of the villages through their status as outsiders and their perceived proclivities towards crime and immorality. There is a strong sentiment that immigrants are a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Greek society and are responsible for a host of growing social problems, including drug trafficking, theft and prostitution (Mouzelis 2002; Seremetakis 1996). But at the same time farmers are dependent on their labor and even assert that without immigrants the already fragile agriculture would collapse completely due to a lack of workers at harvest time.

From a historical perspective the recent wave of immigration from Eastern Europe into Greece is hardly new. Throughout history, the Balkans have experienced many large-scale population movements, most recently in the 1920's following the Balkan Wars and fall of the Ottoman Empire, which led to massive population upheavals and migrations. The foundation of modern Greece took place during the course of the 19th and 20th centuries and was marked by a series of expansionary wars in which new populations were steadily added to the Greek nation. The last of these wars occurred following World War I and its end was marked by an ambitious program of ethnic cleansing. Following a disastrous invasion of Asia Minor by the Greek army in 1919 and its subsequent defeat by Turkish nationalist forces in 1922, Greece and Turkey agreed to

a compulsory exchange of populations. Under the terms of the exchange some 1 ½ million people were forced to emigrate; Orthodox Christians moved from Turkey to Greece and Muslims moved from Greece to Turkey. For Greece, the outcome of the exchange was a net population increase of around 15% (Ladas 1932), an amount comparable to contemporary immigrants. The Asia Minor refugees, while nominally “Greek” due to their religious affiliation, brought with them diverse customs and languages of Asia Minor and were assimilated into Greek society slowly and with much difficulty.

This earlier period of immigration is a useful point of comparison, even though the political, social and economic conditions were of course much different than the contemporary migration. While the causes of the Asia Minor migration were very different from today, there are important similarities in the ways in which they were integrated into the political economy of the Greek nation-state. When the Asia Minor refugees arrived in Greece they found themselves socially marginalized and the objects of a virulent anti-immigrant racism, despite the fact that they were considered Greek in the 20th century irredentist discourse of Greek nationalism (Hirschon 1989; Pentzopoulos 1962). Similarly, contemporary immigrants have also been rebuffed in their attempts to claim a common ethnicity with native Greeks. Many Albanians, for example, claim to be ethnically “Greek”, a claim that resonates with the Greek nationalist view of southern Albania as an unredeemed Greek province. In the early 1980’s such claims were sometimes honored. Today they are routinely scoffed at.

Like contemporary immigrants, the Asia Minor refugees filled important roles in the Greek economy as a flexible and highly exploitable labor force. The Asia Minor

refugees served as both a desperate and vulnerable proletariat for the nascent urban industrialization and a spearhead for land reform and agricultural development (Karakasidou 1997). In the area I worked in for example, Asia Minor refugees settled in the nearby towns, working in canning factories, and also established a village of their own on the coast from where they established a small fishing industry and converted a large area of swamp and marsh into productive farmland. In other areas of Greece, particularly the north from where large numbers of Muslims had departed, refugees were instrumental in breaking up and developing large unproductive landholdings and securing claims of the Greek state to national territory. The immigrants of today are also useful, but for somewhat different purposes. Contemporary immigrants are also spearheading the reorganization of an agricultural system deemed “irrational” by capitalist standards and uncompetitive in international markets. Their dispersal as a diaspora, as opposed to concentration into corporate communities, reflects the transformed political-economic conditions of global capitalism. Instead of contributing to the construction of a national peasantry providing support for urban industrialization, they are providing the wage labor for agro-businesses.

Foregrounding past migrations helps us to keep the contemporary idea of European “multiculturalism” in perspective. Many Greeks today assert that immigration threatens the fabric of Greek society by disrupting the homogeneity of Greek “culture”. History shows us however that the assumed cultural homogeneity of Greece, like all nation-states, is a myth. It never existed. Even without large scale immigrations, the Greek nation has always included many different linguistic and cultural groups. The idea of a homogenous Greek culture was a projection of an expansionary nation-state that

sought to incorporate an ethnically and culturally diverse population into what Anderson (1983) has famously called an “imagined community”. The imagined community of the nation-state may not have accurately reflected real cultural practices, but it was very effective in structuring the forms of class, gender and ethnic inequality that facilitated the incorporation of Greece, both as a territory and a population, into the expanding capitalist world system of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The state and the reproduction of labor

In most theories of globalization the role played by the nation-state is somewhat problematic. Often there is a tendency to see the nation-state as increasingly irrelevant; an out-dated relic of modernism fighting a rear-guard defense of its authority. This has variously been described as a product of “deterritorialization” (Appadurai 1990), “glocalization” (Swyngedouw 1989), the “spatial fix” of flexible accumulation (Harvey 1990) or, in the case of European nation-states, “Europeanization” (Borneman and Fowler 1997). However, there is increasing evidence that national and state level institutions and practices continue to perform important, although shifting, roles in the regulation of global capitalism (Friedman 2003) as well as the reproduction of forms of social inequality characteristic of capitalist social organization (Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2001), particularly in the realm of policing (M. Davis 1990). I argue that the nation-state is still vitally important to the production of inequality, especially through the process by which it marks immigrant labor as “illegal” and actively works to marginalize immigrants politically and socially.

In contrast to previous eras, today's immigration is marked by its *illegality*. In Greece the vast majority of immigrants enter the Greek economy with an illegal status. Greece was one of the last European countries to regulate immigration. A comprehensive system of temporary working permits was not instituted until 1997. By then over half a million illegal immigrants had already entered the Greek economy. Since the beginning of the 1980's, the position of the Greek state vis-à-vis immigration has been marked by ambivalence. While immigrants entered and remained in Greece illegally, the state often turned a blind eye to their existence. Periodic police sweeps and mass deportations occurred in response to public outcries, but there was a tacit understanding that low-cost immigrant labor was a boon to employers. In rural areas for example, police sweeps were generally limited to after harvest season. Publicly, officials claimed that Greece's mountainous borders were too porous to adequately control. However, given that these same borders were considered part of the "iron curtain" two decades before when Albanians and other Eastern Europeans were being held against their will, these claims seem disingenuous.

A more plausible explanation is that the illegality of immigrants is politically expedient. Being illegal creates conditions of extreme vulnerability. Immigrants have little choice but to accept lower wages and are not eligible for benefits given to Greek workers. Immigrants are often controlled by brutal mafias, sometimes working in collusion with local police, and have little recourse to state protections. Sex trafficking rings are the most brutal examples of these types of organizations (Psimmenos 2000). During my fieldwork, I collected many examples of incidents where illegal immigrants were turned over to local police for deportation by farmers at the end of the harvest

without being paid. The ambivalence of the state has the effect of delivering a vulnerable workforce to employers while keeping their hands clean of the dirty work necessary to producing that vulnerability.

Recent state policies of immigrant regularization have led to a system of working permits, but even so many immigrants remain on the edge of legal protections. When the state did act to legalize immigrants' status in the late 1990's the new laws did little to protect immigrants. In fact, many immigrants claimed that the new laws served to further their exploitation by making them subject to taxes and permit fees that represented a high proportion of their low wages. In rural areas immigrant laborers generally receive 25 euros per day. Under the new laws they must pay at least 620 euros a year in fees and taxes in order to obtain a working permit and rudimentary health insurance. In addition, in Greece the working permits for immigrants are issued only after a worker can prove steady employment and are dependent on the sponsorship of an employer, reinforcing patriarchal relations of dependency between the employer and immigrant. Thus the vast majority of immigrants start out with an illegal status, a fact that allows local employers and officials to "weed out" potential trouble-makers and unproductive workers. What few protections are granted immigrants under the new laws, such as the requirement that employers pay social security tax for immigrant employees, are routinely disregarded and in practice not enforced. For all practical purposes, immigrants remain outside the protection of the state and exempt from citizen's rights.

The illegality of immigrants in the contemporary era is only made possible by the state subsidized development of a vast transportation and communications network that allows immigrants to live and work as a diaspora. The organization of immigrants as a

diaspora deflects pressures for assimilation that accompanied previous patterns of immigration. For example, immigrants are highly mobile and dispersed and maintain communications through cell phones, allowing them to maintain social relations and take advantage of work opportunities over a wide area. The dispersal and mobility of immigrants is encouraged by Greeks, who both insist that immigrants “don’t want to stay” and simultaneously prevent their concentrated settlement. One consequence of this is that immigrants rarely form corporate communities and often lack local forms of social solidarity. Immigrants can also travel back and forth between their native countries relatively easily given the modernization of road networks and low-cost transportation. This enables immigrants to maintain families in their native countries where costs are much lower and deflects their aspirations for upward mobility away from the host country. In sum, despite the neoliberal emphasis on “multiculturalism” as a celebration of diversity and the recognition of cultural rights, the diaspora organization of immigrants acts as a safety valve, defusing potential resistance on the part of the immigrants.

This illegal status seems paradoxical, given the important and necessary role that immigrants now play in the Greek economy until we consider how illegality serves to construct immigrants as an extremely vulnerable and flexible source of labor. Illegality also serves to concentrate immigrants in the “irregular” economic sectors of agriculture, domestic work and unskilled construction labor that were previously staffed by women and children. In this sense immigration is linked to other social developments such as the increase in women’s increased employment in the formal economy, declining birthrates, and the economic position of children as primarily consumers rather than producers.

In the villages, immigrants have taken on the bulk of seasonal agricultural labor, replacing women, children and land-poor peasants and allowing family members to be economically “pluriactive” and increase their incomes. Because they are illegal and temporary, immigrants are low-cost and help to ease the economic pressures created by flat market prices and rising consumption demands that Greek farmers face. They also help to free up family members so they can participate in wage and salary labor in order to supplement household incomes. In short, illegality serves to structure the economic integration of immigrants in ways that in turn subsidizes the integration of rural households into the transnational markets of the E.U.

On a deeper level, the illegality of immigration is part of a broad restructuring of the modern state along neoliberal lines. The E.U. can be seen as a new, neo-liberal model of social organization that has arisen as a potential solution to the crises of European capitalism. With the demise of the social democratic model in Western Europe that largely followed a “Fordist” script (Gramsci 1971; Arrighi 1994; Harvey 1990) European states and the transnational institutions of the E.U. have increasingly adopted more neo-liberal social and economic policies and practices. In anthropology, neo-liberalism has received relatively little analysis, despite its wide currency as a descriptive term. Most often it is used to describe a form of “magicality” in contemporary capitalism that serves as an ideological disguise to an intensification of surplus extraction and growing inequality (Comoroff and Comoroff 2000; Nonini 2003). Others have argued, however, that neo-liberalism represents a distinctive discursive formation and an important shift in capitalist “governmentality” (Foucault 1991). In this sense neo-liberalism represents an extension and intensification of liberal techniques of governance through which market

rationality is diffused through society (Gordon 1991). This involves a new specification of the subjects of government as primarily consumers rather than producers and a proliferation of new techniques of surveillance and scrutiny as well as regulatory technologies (Rose 1996). The implications of this development are both a de-politicizing of the state as well as a re-casting of the interface between the state and “civil society”¹.

One aspect of this restructuring has been a change in the conception and practice of citizenship. The expansion and fulfillment of citizenship rights is one arena that has been used to promote a discourse of freedom and equality in the contemporary nation-state. In rural Greece the development of citizenship rights under the E.U. regime have promoted a widespread perception that there are less distinctions today between classes and genders. For example, rural Greeks today have many of the same opportunities as their urban cousins and women’s rights have expanded. However, such a perception is possible only if we exclude the most exploited class of labor, that is, immigrants. Despite their important economic role, many obstacles are placed before immigrants who aspire to the full rights of Greek citizenship. Some have described the evolving system as a two-tiered system of citizenship in which immigrants are granted some rights but not all (Soysal 2002). However, rights of citizenship in the nation-state have always been markers of exclusion as much as markers of inclusion (Wallerstein 2003). The exclusion of women from full rights until relatively recently illustrates this point. Citizenship has always been used to reinforce basic social relations of inequality. Today citizenship, or

¹ The concept of “civil society” has itself been suspect as a universal category and is linked to the emergence of Western European liberalism (Hall 1995; Gellner 1995). Despite the lip-service paid to it by policy-makers, civil society has clearly failed to accompany the spread of neo-liberal capitalism (Hann 1995).

rather the lack of citizenship, is being used to construct immigrants as a politically and socially marginalized class of labor.

Neoliberalism goes beyond simply new forms of inclusion and exclusion through citizenship rights. Neoliberalism is, in the sense suggested by Foucault (1991), a new form of rationality, a discourse of governmentality with several important aspects. The first is a shift to relations of consumption, rather than production, as a prime disciplinary technique in the exercise of social power. Neoliberalism elevates the consumer and commodity consumption as the prime marker of social identity and thereby implicates the individual as a market actor. The consumer becomes the perceived motor of economic activity and a position of sovereignty. The rationality of the market has been extended into what were previously seen as “non-market” activities. For example, citizens have come to be seen as consumers of government services. In rural Greece, this can be seen in the widespread perception of commodity consumption as both a marker and right of citizenship. Manual labor is increasingly seen as appropriate for “Albanians” but not for “Greeks”. Greeks more and more define and perform national identity in terms of consumption practices rather than production. Greek identity is increasingly defined and displayed through commodity consumption, whereas conspicuous commodity consumption among Albanians is met with ridicule or even hostility. The emphasis on consumption has had two important effects. It has given a practical characteristic to the division between natives and immigrants and it has created a dynamic contradiction for natives; namely, how are they to consume like citizens on the profits of farm labor? Given current conditions, the Greek farmers can consume only if they can marginalize and exploit immigrant laborers.

This brings us to the second important aspect of neoliberalism, what Nikolas Rose (1996) calls the “pluralization of social technologies”. By this he means in part the proliferation of governmental techniques outside the formal institutions of the state. One example of this process can be seen in the shift in how national identity is produced. One of the hallmarks of the modern nation-state was the role of state institutions, such as public schools and state-controlled media, in the production of national consciousness. Today this role has been largely “privatized”. Public schools increasingly emphasize skills rather than national mythologies. The work of producing narratives of national identity has increasingly fallen to the mass media, especially television, which has become ubiquitous since it was privatized from government ownership in the early 1980’s.

The production of national identity in the global era

As opposed to a concept of the nation-state that focuses on formal institutions of power, the Foucauldian notion of governmentality is useful for understanding the process by which nations and national identity continue to be produced in the contemporary era. Some have suggested that the state has undergone a “de-hyphenation” from the nation as it moves into the global era (Kearny 1995; Glick-Schiller, et al 1994). From such a perspective, though, it is unclear what relationship it may continue to have with the nation (Turner 2003). There is a tendency to see national identity as a vestige from the past in the new “post-national” world (Juergensmeyer 2002). While it is true that in many ways the direct role of the state in the reproduction of national identity (which itself was a hallmark of the modern nation-state [Anderson 1983]) has waned, it is a mistake to

extrapolate from this the demise of the nation. On the contrary, the production of national identity continues to be robust and vibrant. The formal institutions of the state may play a lesser role, but this slack has been taken up by other institutions, such as the mass media, which though not formally aligned, are certainly functionally aligned with the state. As the production of national identity has increasingly become the domain of “private” institutions and popular ideology it has come to be regarded as a form of reactionary xenophobia or racism. Divorced from the state, it has lost its mantle of legitimacy and is popularly regarded as a form of “resistance”. However, as we shall see, it is a form of resistance that paradoxically works to reinforce the new structures of inequality that characterize the neoliberal regime of the E.U.

Mass media markets continue to conform to national boundaries and have been resistant to the tendency towards deterritorialization common to other types of markets in the E.U. (Morley 2000; Waisbord 1998; Buckingham 1997). This is due largely to linguistic obstacles, but I would argue that it also reflects a continuing need for the production of nationalist narratives. Identities are of course a major theme of the soap operas, sit-coms and talk shows that are common to all television channels, and I found that in rural villages I studied television programs often provoked discussion and debate. Furthermore, television has also come to provide the main interface between citizens and the state. With the decline of political parties and increasingly technocratic nature of E.U. governance, television has become the main mode of communication and political link between rural residents and the state apparatus.

The mass media in Greece, especially television, have not been kind to immigrants. Immigrants are not a desirable demographic since they are not consumers.

Instead, the mass media have found it profitable to feed the “moral panic” surrounding immigration through shrill and exaggerated reports of an immigrant crime wave and the imminent demise of Greek culture. When rural Greeks discuss immigrants, their conversations almost always refer to stories garnered from the media in order to illustrate the threat represented by immigrants and their incompatibility with Greek society, providing many of the narratives used to shape and naturalize Greek nativist racism.

Increasingly visible, and virulent, anti-immigrant sentiments among Europeans have been analyzed by many theorists (Pettigrew 1998; MacLaughlin 1998). Some theorists have suggested that such widespread sentiments and the success of various anti-immigrant movements reflect an emerging “neo-racism” (Balibar 1991) although it is unclear just how “new” this racism is. In general it is seen as a reactionary phenomenon, either as a scapegoating reaction to the demise of the Fordist social contract (Solomos and Wrench 1993) or as an expression of social solidarity in the struggle for social resources by downwardly mobile classes and class fractions (Wimmer 1997). One problem with this line of analysis is that there is no clear link between immigration and native unemployment. In fact, because immigrants are concentrated in “irregular” employment, immigration may complement native labor and subsidize rising standards of living (Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild 1999). Others have argued that the new racism represents a xenophobic “cultural fundamentalism” (Stolke 1995; Taguieff 1990; Appadurai 1998; Pred 2000) that is a reaction to the disruption of the cultural homogeneity that reigned in Europe. The problem with this cultural approach is that the cultural homogeneity of European nations is questionable. In addition, the manifestation of racism varies significantly however among classes and social groups (Cole 1997). A

more productive line of analysis considers the role of racism in producing and disciplining a vulnerable workforce (Miles 1982, 1987; Campani 1993) and reducing the social costs of reproducing flexible labor. From this perspective, the production of race and ethnicity continues to be instrumental in the reproduction of social relations of production under global capitalism (Brodin 2000). Thus, racism may be not simply a reaction to immigration but a means by which immigrant labor is constructed as a flexible, and highly exploitable, labor force.

Anti-immigrant racism is widespread among Greeks. While its manifestation varies among social classes and political groups, Greek racism commonly posits immigrants as a dangerous social element. Albanians are widely considered to be prone to crime and disease, untrustworthy, lazy, and less intelligent than Greeks. The justification for such views vary between racial, or genetic, explanations involving head shapes or the existence of “Greek” and “Albanian” genes, and culturalist explanations that attribute inferiority to a “lack of culture”, poverty, or the experience of communism. This racism, nurtured by the mass media, clearly helps to maintain immigrants as a marginalized and vulnerable group and benefits Greek farmers by helping to maintain the low-cost of immigrant labor. In other words, racism in Greece serves to exclude immigrants from the nation while it structures their economic inclusion.

Greek racism, as a discourse of difference, not only excludes but also serves to include. One of the assumptions of racist discourse is that Greeks exist as a natural category and a historical lineage distinct from other peoples. As part of a nationalist ideology, racism underscores the essentialism of Greek identity. All this is nothing new. Racism has always been the dark side of the history of the nation-state. What is new is

the way that racism and nationalism today are framed as a form of resistance to the ideals of the neoliberal state, instead of as a celebration of a national essence.

Given the neoliberal discourse of human rights and equality that is pervasive in the E.U. today, the persistence and even re-vitalization of neoracism seems paradoxical. After all, the E.U. goes to extraordinary lengths to promote multiculturalism and overcome cultural and social divisions that have wreaked havoc throughout European history. After more careful consideration, however, it becomes clear that it is not paradoxical at all. The neoliberal capitalism of the E.U., as it is presently constituted, needs anti-immigrant racism in order to survive. The tendency of racism to appear as resistance to neoliberalism is a reflection of the altered relationship between the nation and state that has developed in Europe. It has sometimes been argued that nation and state have become “de-linked” under global capitalism. In such a view, identity has become de-territorialized and is no longer congruous with the state. Now it is becoming clear, however, that nation and state have been “re-linked” in a novel way. In rural Greece, national identity is still strongly territorial. However, it is increasingly used to police a class, and in some senses caste, distinction. It reproduces labor through exclusion rather than inclusion. In this sense the nation has been re-bordered to provide citizens with a set of privileges and rights not available to foreign labor. The immigrant laborers who make up the most exploited sections of the working class belong to a separate nation even though they participate in the same economy, a fact that facilitates their exploitation.

The political legitimacy of the E.U. is predicated on upward social mobility, through increased consumption, as well as the expansion of capitalist markets. The neoliberal discourse of choice and desire that infuses the focus on consumption has had

wide-ranging effects on rural households. Perhaps the most important effect has been a labor crisis arising from demographic shifts. Declining birthrates have fallen even farther. Women and children have abandoned agricultural labor. Who can blame them? Who would want to work in the fields if given a choice? The problem with the E.U. project is that capitalism always requires the coercion of labor for its surplus. And as always, national identity is one of the main techniques used to coerce labor. However, it is becoming clear that national identity is being deployed in novel ways. As the relationship between nation and state has shifted under pressure from neoliberal tendencies in the global political economy, the instrumentality of national identity in the production of social inequality has been altered. The danger is that, under the guise of neoliberal freedom and equality, the evolving system of exploitation may turn out to be more brutal and immobile than the old nation-state system it has replaced.

I. FRACTURES AND FACTIONS IN THE GREEK NATION-STATE

The villages

The township of Midea lies in the Argolid (*Argolida*) region of the northeast Peloponnesos, about 150 kilometers southwest of Athens. Argolida is a relatively rich agricultural region consisting of a wide plain opening onto the Gulf of Argos. Hemmed in by mountains on three sides, the Argolid valley enjoys abundant (for Greece) water as well as mild winters. The two main towns of the region are Argos, the inland commercial center of the Argolid valley, and the touristic port town of Nauplio. Roughly equidistant from both (6 km) lies Midea township, which takes its name from the ancient Mycenaean site of Midea lying nearby. Today Midea township is a thriving slice of the Argolid, stretching from the coast all the way up to Arachneo mountain. The township, within its current boundaries², consists of 12 villages and as of 2001 had a total population of 6,724. The largest of these villages is Agia Triada, the administrative and commercial center, with a population of 1,267³.

My research focuses on three villages of Midea township: Agia Triada, Manesi and Gerbesi⁴. Agia Triada, the “head village” of the township, lies in the valley surrounded by orange groves. During the winter harvest season it is bustling with trucks ferrying oranges and workers to and from the fields as well as people from the

² Township boundaries have shifted fairly frequently. The latest configuration dates from the early 1990's when it was expanded to include the community (“*koinotita*”) of Arachneo.

³ All population figures are from the 2001 census (Greek Statistical Services).

⁴ The official name of the village of Gerbesi is “Midea”. The name Midea derives from the ancient Mycenaean site adjacent to the village. “Gerbesi” is the Arvaniti name and was replaced after World War II in an effort to “Hellenize” place names. Locals still refer to it as Gerbesi however and I have followed their terminology to avoid confusion with the township as a whole, which is also called “Midea township” (“*Dimos Midea*”). Manesi is also an Arvaniti name, but for unknown reasons was not Hellenized.

surrounding villages running errands. In contrast to the coastal villages it has no tourism to speak of, except for former residents returning for vacation, and so the summers are relatively quiet. Manesi and its co-village of Dendra lies about 2 km outside Agia Triada and up the mountain. Its population of 622 is about half that of Agia Triada. Here the orange groves give way to olives, vegetable fields and, until recently, tobacco. While there are some orange groves in the village and other villagers own land down in the valley, Manesi lacks the abundant water of the valley villages and so has been limited agriculturally, missing out on the wealth that citrus brought over the last several decades. About 2 km farther up the mountain past Manesi lies the village of Gerbesi, with 454 residents. Gerbesi, being a “high village”, also lacks the water necessary for large-scale citrus production and continues to subsist on tobacco, truck farming and herding.

Together the three villages of Agia Triada, Manesi and Gerbesi demonstrate a type of vertical differentiation common in rural Greece. The valley town of Agia Triada is the wealthiest, with a large part of its income deriving from citrus production, as well as the administrative and commercial jobs inherent in its position as the township center. As you move up the mountain the villages become poorer, rely more on herding and tobacco, and are more dependent on agricultural subsidies and pensions. In the recent past, villagers from Manesi and Gerbesi supplied a significant labor pool for Agia Triada, working for day wages during the harvest. Politically, the villages formed a spectrum from the traditionally right-wing Agia Triada to the staunchly communist Gerbesi, with Manesi as a center-left, socialist stronghold. With notable exceptions, this pattern tends to hold throughout the Argolida. Many of the mountain villages have a strong history of rebelliousness. During WWII and the subsequent civil war in Greece, mountain villages

such as Gerbesi and nearby Limnes were local centers of the communist partisan resistance. The villages also differ ethnically. One of the first things that the villagers of Gerbesi will tell you about themselves is that they are Arvanites, descended from Albanian-speaking immigrants of the 14th and 15th centuries (Ouli 1965). While all three villages are considered to be historically *Arvanitika*, Agia Triada is considered to be less pure and more Greek. Manesi falls somewhere in between. This spectrum of economic, political and ethnic differentiation provides a framework for understanding the uneven historical development of the villages as well as points of comparison in analyzing contemporary social changes.

Early history

The Argolid has been continuously settled since ancient times. Since the Mycenaean era, it has been under the continual occupation of successive empires and states, from the city-states of ancient Greece through Rome and the Byzantium, the Venetians, Ottomans, and finally the modern Greek state. Successive waves of conquerors and immigrants have all left their marks. Today the area is widely considered to be the heartland of modern Greece. The revolution that led to the founding of the modern Greek state in 1821 was centered in the Peloponnesos, and Nauplio became its first capital. Since then, the construction of Greek national identity has tended to efface processes of social differentiation. The institutions and ideology of the Greek nation-state have sought to project an unproblematic narrative of Greek history stretching back to ancient times (Herzfeld 1982). Despite these efforts, however, it is difficult to document a continuous lineage of “Greek” identity. Instead what we find is a long history of

confrontation, contradiction and assimilation among contentious social groups and ethnic identities.

The notion of a “Greek” identity in the modern sense is itself in large part the creation of the movement toward statehood. It was not until the 19th century that the term came to describe a homogeneous ethnic group in the modern sense. Instead, the peoples of the Peloponnesos, including Argolida, made up an intricate mosaic of ethnicities and languages. In Argolida, dialects of Albanian, Greek, Turkish and other local languages were spoken (Andromedas 1976). From the Byzantine Empire and on, religion was an important marker of social identity. The Byzantines were Greek speakers, but they associated the Greek language with Christianity rather than ancient Greece, and in fact ethnically defined themselves as “Romans”, a term carried over into the Ottoman Empire as “Rum” meaning orthodox Christian.

Argolida, like the coastal areas of the Peloponnesos in general, has a long history of invasion and immigration due to the economic significance of the area and its location along the eastern Mediterranean trade routes. The three villages of Agia Triada, Manesi and Gerbesi all trace their history back to the decline of the Byzantine Empire. The original name of Agia Triada was Merbaka, probably derived from the Catholic bishop of Corinth during the Frankish crusader state, Wilhelm von Moerbeke, who established the diocesan seat there in 1277 (Salapatas 2000). It is mentioned in a census of 1700 as containing 30 families and 157 residents. In 1817 it is listed as having 160 residents. In 1834, Merbeka was incorporated as a town (“*dimos*”) with a population of 320 (Skiadas 1993). Gerbesi, and Manesi both seem to have been founded in the 16th century when the area was under Venetian control. Both names apparently refer to the names of immigrant

Albanian soldiers working for the Venetians that also appear as names of villages in what is today southern Albania (Mauros 1980). Albanian speakers moved into Argolida in several waves over the next centuries, creating differences that are still perceived today. Residents of Gerbesi are thought to share lineage with the people of Limnes, a village some 20 km away, while the villages of Prosimni and Arachnaio are thought to represent a later immigration. Residents of Gerbesi often cite this history in explaining inter-village difference and conflicts. In the early 1950's the names of Merbaka and Gerbesi were changed to the more "Greek sounding" Agia Triada (meaning *Holy Trinity*) and Midea (from the Mycenaean site), the culmination of a long process of cultural homogenization initiated by the emergence of the modern Greek state in 1821. Manesi, for unexplained reasons, was allowed to keep its *Arvanitiko* name.

The Greek Revolution and national project

In the early 1800's, Argolida was a relative backwater of the declining Ottoman Empire. It was an unlikely location for a Greek revolution given the diversity of linguistic, religious and political identities. Relatively few people identified as Greeks at the time. However, following a historic alliance between the Greek speaking mercantile class of the Ottoman Empire and the mostly Albanian speaking "bandits" (*kleftes*)⁵ of the Peloponnesos, it was here that the fledgling Greek state began its contest for the hearts and minds of the Balkan peasantry. The alliance between Greek speaking merchants and

⁵ "*Kleftes*" (lit. "thieves") operated mainly in mountainous areas. They were charismatic local military leaders who sometimes worked for local merchants and landowners and sometimes on their own account. They often controlled overland trade routes and frequently came into conflict with Ottoman authorities. In some ways they were comparable to the early "mafia" or "violent peasant entrepreneurs" of Sicily (Blok 1974) but developed under different circumstances, most notably the absence of a powerful landowning class. During the Revolution many were recruited to support the uprising against the Ottoman Empire.

Albanian speaking bandits, first united by a common religion and later enshrined in nationalist ideology, proved tenuous. The inherent tensions within the alliance have, at various times, broken out into violence and civil war. As a metaphor for the nation itself, the Revolution helped to forge a national identity but also continues to provide the symbolism of social division and class conflict.

The Greek revolution grew from the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire and was conditioned by the Ottoman *millet* system of governance. When the Ottoman Turks conquered the Byzantine Empire in the 15th century they effectively absorbed its population and many of its institutions. Byzantine Orthodox Christians, known as ‘*Rum*’ (Romans) to the Turks, were deprived of their state but the church was absorbed into the new Ottoman state. Under the Ottoman state, subjects were divided by religion into *millets*, administrative units with their own civil law, tax collection, and social institutions. The “*Rum millet*” of Orthodox Christians used the liturgical language of Greek to administer ethnically and linguistically diverse communities under the leadership of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. *Millet* affiliation was assigned and registered at birth. *Millets* were also largely endogamous, and proselytism and conversion were actively discouraged.

As the Ottoman Empire weakened, the *millets* began to take on national characteristics and became incubators for the nation-state successors to the Empire (Karpas 1973). But while *millet* divisions were convenient points of fracture for emerging national identities, the lack of geographical separation meant that state formation was a long and bloody process. In addition, the *millets* were themselves riddled with various

ethnic and class divisions. Thus the transformation from *millet* to nation was not even or smooth (Augustinos 1992).

Under Ottoman rule a Greek-speaking commercial class was able to develop and prosper. While the rural Orthodox Christian peasantry in many areas, particularly the interior of Asia Minor, was marginalized and declined through conversion to Islam (Vryonis 1971), in urban areas Christians thrived and established strong niches in the merchant and artisan classes. By the 18th century, Greek-speaking Orthodox merchants controlled the increasingly important trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. This new commercial class drew from various ethnic and linguistic groups- Greek, Slav, Vlach, Albanian, etc.- but the liturgical language of the *millet* also became the language of business, and all Orthodox merchants gradually came to be identified as Greek, regardless of their background (Stoianovich 1960:291). As the military expansion of the Ottoman Empire stalled, the religious hierarchy of the Orthodox *millet* formed a political elite, providing important technical and economic advisors to the Sultanate.

By the early 19th century much of the Greek speaking merchant class, especially on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, had fallen under the sway of the European Enlightenment and were quickly reconstructing their Hellenic roots. Nationalist ideas spread through secret organizations such as the *Filiki Etairia* ("Friendly Society") and the neo-classicism of European universities where merchant sons were sent to study. In many ways though they were an elite in search of a nation. The first Greek revolution was attempted in what is now Romania, and failed largely through lack of support among the peasantry, among other reasons. However, the mostly Albanian-speaking Orthodox peasantry in the western regions of the Empire, what is today Greece, were more

receptive. As the Ottoman Empire weakened, the impoverished peasantry had turned increasingly to piracy and brigandage, taking advantage of their position along increasingly important trade routes between Europe and the east (Stoianovich 1960). They slowly came to dominate these trade routes through violence and extortion, and their battles with Ottoman authorities became, under the tutelage of the nationalist Orthodox merchant elite, revolutionary acts.

Though the Peloponnesos was a peripheral region of the Ottoman Empire, it was heavily dependent on world markets. At the time of the revolution, Argolida was producing currants, wheat, tobacco and cotton for export (Lamprinidou 1950), mainly to European markets. In fact, it was the economic and political position of Peloponnesian society rather than its ethnic make-up that made the area ripe for rebellion. Unlike other areas of the Ottoman Empire, the Peloponnesos did not have a well-developed *tsiflik* system. A few large Ottoman plantations, or *tsiflik*, controlled by the Muslim elite were counterbalanced by a tradition of smallholders. These smallholders, Orthodox Christian for the most part, were heavily taxed by Muslim authorities. As European markets became more lucrative during the 18th century and indigenous, illegal trade networks flourished, resentment of Ottoman authorities and taxation increased, providing fertile ground for revolutionary activity.

The Greek Revolution of 1821, largely a product of the alliance between a nationalist commercial elite and a rebellious peasantry, was only successful with the direct intervention of Britain, France and Russia, who each had an interest in weakening the Ottoman Empire and whose price was the imposition of an imported European monarch, Otto I. The fledgling Greek state, established in 1831 with its capital at Nauplio,

set about building the Greek nation with several important social contradictions providing the dynamic for its development. First, there was the tension between the European oriented commercial class and the Balkan peasantry, a class division partly pacified by nationalist ideology. Second was the conflict between the commercial class and the religious hierarchy, who were skeptical of European intentions and had remained mostly loyal to the Ottoman Sultanate. This conflict was manifested in the struggle between a Greek identity as marked by language and classical heritage and one defined by Orthodox Christianity. And third, Greece's semi-peripheral status and the competing interests of the European powers, each of which in the early years of the Greek state was represented by a political party employing its separate patronage network.

The formal establishment of the Greek state in 1831, under the continuing protection of the European powers, was a major step in the consolidation of a Greek nation. The "imagining" of the Greek nation was a long and tortuous process, and was not to be fully realized until 90 years later. Through the institutions of the Greek state, the educational system with its new university, the press, neo-classical architecture, and the formalization of a modernized Greek language, a Hellenized Greek national identity gradually spread from a small core in the merchant class to the linguistically and ethnically diverse population.

The establishment of the Greek kingdom institutionalized the political imperative of ethnic nationalism and was a direct challenge to the *Rum millet* hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire. The founding of the Greek state created new institutions that rationalized and focused a national experience of identity, but the response from various social sectors was contradictory and uneven (Augustinos 1992:187). Outside of the new state, Orthodox

Christians were divided in their support. The upper class of church officials and some wealthy merchants as well as the rural Christian peasantry of Asia Minor generally had little interest in, or sympathy for, Greek nationalism. In fact, the Greek Patriarch at the time, Gregory V, worked hard to prevent the Revolution from succeeding, going so far as to excommunicate the leaders⁶. Up until the early 20th century there continued to be a strong faction within the Church that hoped to reconstruct the Ottoman Empire under Orthodox Christian leadership and actively cooperated with the emerging Turkish nationalist movement (Alexandris 1983:38). The middle classes of smaller merchants and urban artisans were more susceptible to Hellenic ideology, particularly through the developing “print capitalism” of the new state. At the same time, The Ottoman *Rum millet* was under internal ethnic pressure. A reorganization of the millet system in the mid-1800’s further ethnicized “Rum” into “Greek” with the breakaway of the Slavic churches, a political reform that benefited the merchant class at the expense of ecclesiastical authorities in the millet hierarchy (Augustinos 1992:143-144). In addition, educational institutions continued to be administered along millet lines, furthering the intrusion of the Greek state, with its new university, into the increasingly polarized Ottoman society.

The consolidation of the Greek nation-state

Until the end of World War I, Greece continued to acquire new territory and population at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire with sporadic help from the

⁶ Despite his opposition to the Greek Revolution, Gregory V was executed by the Ottomans in retaliation, an act that illustrated the ambivalent position of the Church (Clogg 1992:36-37).

British and other powers when their interests coincided. In 1909, a charismatic and dynamic nationalist leader, Eleutherios Venizelos, came to power. Venizelos led Greece through a 30-year period of intermittent warfare resulting in the dramatic expansion of the Greek state. In the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, in which Greece allied first with Serbia and Bulgaria against Turkey and then with Serbia and Turkey against Bulgaria, Greece increased its territory by 70% and doubled its population.

The conclusion of the Balkan Wars in 1913, which was formalized in 1919 by the Treaty of Neuilly, brought about the first attempt by states to stabilize and consolidate national identities in the southern Balkans through population exchange. Under the Treaty of Neuilly provisions were established for the voluntary exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria. The goal of the exchange was to secure a permanent border between Greece and Bulgaria and eliminate irredentist claims by separating the “two racial elements” (Ladas 1932:77). Despite the commitment by the two states to provide equivalent properties to incoming exchangees, the exchange was at first unsuccessful. By 1923 less than 400 people had applied for exchange. In addition, the cross-cutting linguistic, religious, kin and community affiliations of local groups presented problems for the exchange commission in determining “national identity”. National identity could be ascribed on the basis of race, language or religion, any of which could be used to demonstrate a “Greek” consciousness. However, the number of exchange applications increased dramatically after 1923 as incoming Greek refugees from Asia Minor in search of land and housing put increasing pressure on Bulgarian speakers in eastern Macedonia. By 1928 over 50,000 had emigrated. These Bulgarian

refugees from Greece then targeted Greek-speakers in Bulgaria in order to get land, pushing 30,000 back to Greece.

The end of World War I brought the last major attempt at Greek expansionism. During most of World War I Greece was immobilized by a political schism between the nationalists, led by Eleftherios Venizelos, and pro-German monarchists. Venizelos prevailed with Allied support and brought Greece into WWI in 1917, just in time to make territorial demands at the Versailles Conference. As a reward, Greece gained western Thrace and a foothold in Asia Minor around the city of Smyrni (today Izmir), a center of Greek commercial interests, from the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Ironically, Venizelos was defeated in elections soon after, the voters apparently exhausted by the long wars of expansion. The royalists who replaced him, however, could not resist the temptation to empire offered by the final disintegration of the Ottoman state and launched an offensive deep into Asia Minor. After a series of military blunders, the withdrawal of British support, and the reorganization of Turkish nationalist forces under Kemal Ataturk, the Greek army was defeated and forced into a disastrous withdrawal from Asia Minor.

The Greek invasion and subsequent defeat in Asia Minor was accompanied by the spread and polarization of nationalist sentiments among local groups. The 1919 landing of the Greek army in Smyrni was marked by the massacre of 350 Turks, apparently by local Greek paramilitary bands (Clogg 1992:94). When Turkish nationalists retook Smyrni in 1922 over 30,000 Greeks and Armenians were massacred, and again paramilitary irregulars played a leading role (Dobkin 1988). As the Greek army fled Asia Minor in disarray they were followed by tens of thousands of panic-stricken, destitute refugees seeking protection in Greece. In the peace negotiations that followed, under the

auspices of the League of Nations, both sides quickly agreed to the compulsory exchange of populations. Both governments denied being the first to suggest compulsory exchange, and this process was strongly opposed by the exchangeable populations themselves, but it was clearly beneficial to both governments (Ladas 1932:338). Greece already faced a severe refugee crisis and was enticed by the possibility of expropriating the homes and property of 400,000 Muslims in Greece. In Turkey, much of the property of fleeing Greeks had already been seized. To mollify the Greek Orthodox hierarchy in Istanbul, Greeks of Istanbul and Muslims of Thrace were exempted from exchange.

The exchange of populations had two immediate purposes for Greece. It was intended to settle once and for all the border questions between Greece and Turkey by eliminating ethnic justifications for expansion and it was intended to help alleviate the refugee problem brought about by the military disaster. In addition to people, the agreement called for an exchange of immovable property such as land and houses. In theory refugees were entitled to property in their new location equivalent to what they left behind. These properties were to be provided by the departing refugees of the opposite group. In practice this process quickly devolved into chaos. Competition between natives and incoming refugees over abandoned property quickly developed into animosity and violence. In both countries, incoming refugees were often housed with locals of the opposite religion as a way of speeding their departure. In addition, the process also attracted some non-eligible people. In the winter of 1923 a large number of Yugoslav Muslims passed through northern Greece to Turkey, attracted by the hope of obtaining land abandoned by Greeks (Ladas 1932:428).

The failure of the Neuilly exchange and the definite lack of enthusiasm among the target populations made a compulsory exchange necessary. But it also required a more objective marker of identity than the subjective definitions used in the Neuilly exchange. Religion became the sole determinate of nationality, overriding language or other cultural affiliations. A majority of the Greek Muslims subject to exchange spoke Greek and had virtually no ties to Turkish nationalists (Ladas 1932:378). Conversely, many of the Orthodox refugees, particularly the “*karamanli*” Christians from the interior of Asia Minor, were Turkish speakers with virtually no cultural affinities with Hellenic Greeks of the coast. Others such as the Pontic Orthodox from near the Black Sea spoke a dialect unintelligible to other Greeks.

With the imposition of population exchange, what would today be termed ‘ethnic cleansing’, most of the Ottoman Greek Orthodox elite and agents of the Greek government fled Asia Minor, leaving local populations vulnerable to retaliation by Turkish forces. Throughout Asia Minor Greek property was seized and Greeks were violently expelled. In Istanbul the Greek population was protected by an Allied military presence and was eventually exempted from exchange. With the consolidation of the Turkish state there was a sustained assault on Greek business interests to the benefit of the emerging Turkish national bourgeoisie. The Orthodox Church was stripped of its non-religious authority and forced to discard its national character. In fact, after 1922 there was a backlash against Greek nationalism within the Church with the formation of the “Turkish Orthodox” movement under the leadership of turkophone “*karamanli*” clerics. They unsuccessfully attempted a coup against the Patriarchate, demanding the appointment of a Patriarch with a “Turkish heart”. The leaders of this movement had

been exempted from exchange by their ties to Turkish nationalist leaders, but the movement itself was weakened when the “*karamanli*” population of Turkish speaking Christians was deported. However, a non-nationalist Patriarch, Gregory VII, was elected and immediately declared “sincere loyalty” to the Turkish state (Alexandris 1983:153-155).

The development of Greek national identity was shaped by historical conditions, or as Mosse (1961:57) argues for nationalism in general was “determined partly by the actual problems which the nation faced and partly by its past history”. The Greek nation as an imagined community reflected both the Ottoman society from which it grew and the constraints created by the struggle between world powers. With the violence of inter-communal warfare, religious affiliation further hardened into national, and even a form of racial identity. This boundary was never absolute, however, and was treated with a certain amount of ambivalence by the people it defined. As we shall see, it was also historically unstable. While Albanian-speaking Christians were considered to be “Greek” during the period of national expansion, by the end of the 20th century Albanian-speaking immigrants who claimed such an identity were routinely rebuffed.

If many of the Greek Orthodox of Asia Minor were ambivalent about national identity, this was only reinforced by their reception in their new country. With the exception of some of the upper class who managed to escape with their wealth, Greek refugees experienced extreme hardships. In the overcrowded refugee camps and embarkation points food was scarce and disease rampant. Refugees were often mistreated and exploited by native Greeks, a problem exacerbated by the gender imbalance in groups from areas where many Greek males had been killed or imprisoned by the Turks

(Gianulli 1995). In contrast to the ideology of inclusion inherent in national expansion, the arrival of refugees in Greece heightened the distinctions between Hellenic and Ottoman Greeks. Dissimilarities between the two groups were increasingly conceptualized as racial in nature, that is, as differences in physical appearance and mental capabilities arising from heredity as well as language and cultural characteristics. Refugees were often described as either sly, lazy and immoral, or “Asiatic, dull-witted, backward and submissive” (Pentzopoulos 1962:101).

The refugees increased the population of Greece by about 20%. About half the refugees, approximately 600,000, were eventually settled in rural areas, in particular Macedonia where the government hoped to consolidate a Greek majority. Most of the rest settled in urban shantytowns. Many natives perceived the refugees as a serious economic threat to their already scarce resources, competing for land in rural areas and jobs in the cities. Argolida had a relatively small influx of refugees. They were settled in a swamp area along the coast that eventually became the town of Neo Kios and in a shantytown outside Nauplio called Pronoia.

The refugees had a profound effect on rural Greece by spearheading the national homogenization of northern Greece and provoking fundamental changes in rural social relations. Almost half the refugees were directed to the northern province of Macedonia, which in the 1920's had a high proportion of Muslims and Bulgarian speakers and a low overall population density. During the Balkan Wars Macedonia was the scene of violent intercommunal conflicts between Greek, Bulgarian, and Macedonian paramilitaries representing conflicting national interests. The Greek state used the refugees to

consolidate its control over the newly acquired region and hasten the departure of the non-Greek population (Ladas 1932:105).

To facilitate the resettling of the refugees, the Greek government also passed a general land reform that expropriated many large and unproductive landholdings as well as land left behind by departing Muslims. In the north much of this land consisted of the *tsiflikes*, large plantations owned by Muslim landowners under authority of the Ottoman sultan. In the south, where *tsiflikes* were rare much of the seized land belonged to the church. The land reform measures ultimately affected almost 50% of all landholdings (Pentzopoulos 1962:155). However, the lack of surveys and titles made expropriation chaotic and in some places led to violent conflicts.

The process of land reform in Argolida differed somewhat in comparison with northern Greece. Argolida had no history of large *tsiflikes* like the northern areas and neither did it have the pressures of large numbers of refugees. Smallholders dominated most villages. The main exceptions to this were areas where the Church controlled large parcels, either renting to locals or farming through monastic labor. In Agios Andrianos, a neighboring village to Agia Triada, much of the land was controlled by the monastery of Agios Dimitrios Karakala. Here, according to informants, there were three large landowners. The rest of the village either rented land or worked as laborers. The land-poor residents rented land from the monastery and under the land reform these lands were distributed to village residents. In Manesi and Gerbesi both state and church lands, mainly pasturage, were distributed to local residents, each family receiving between 5 and 15 hectares, depending on family size and land quality. Much of this land had been used by transhumant pastoralists from Arcadia in central Peloponessos for winter

pasturage. Technically they were entitled to receive shares but the villagers excluded them by drawing up titles during the summer. The land seizures from the monasteries were stopped after six months when a new government bowed to pressure from the Church. Thus in Midea township land reform tended to benefit local smallholders at the expense of the Church and alleviated local class tensions while excluding outsiders.

The experience of land reform in Midea was a sharp contrast to other areas of Greece. Karakasidou (1997) has traced the social development of Assiros, a township in Macedonia, where between 1922-1928 the population doubled to 2,775 and three new villages were established by incoming refugees. The newcomers faced a great deal of hostility and resentment from natives, centering on conflicts over land. When the first groups of refugees passed through Assiros looking for land on which to settle, they were quickly expelled by local residents, who were especially hostile to the darker-skinned groups from the interior of Asia Minor. Eventually two groups of Thracians and one group of Pontics were allowed to stay. The first group of Thracians was made up of refugees from different villages and thus not socially unified and politically weak. They were housed in an abandoned section of the town and socially marginalized in an effort to confine them to positions of dependency providing cheap agricultural labor. The second group of Thracians was from a single village and attempted to settle on an abandoned Muslim *tsiflik* but was forced to relocate to less desirable land after locals cut off their water supply. Local authorities then attempted to subordinate the new community through high tax assessments, leading to open hostility including fights and shootings. The Thracian group in turn came to dominate and exploit a small group of impoverished Slav-speakers who were living in the vicinity of their settlement.

When the land reform and surveying process finally reached Assiros, each married adult male received title to a share of land. This encouraged extended families to divide and decreased dependence on patronage relations, weakening the local landowning elite. Land reform established a community of smallholders governed by a factionalized elite defined by alliance with national political parties. However, local refugee and native groups remained largely endogamous and maintained separate corporate rituals, such as patron saint celebrations. Neighborhoods and villages remained segregated with a high degree of animosity. Over time this animosity has become superficial and episodic, a development Karakisidou attributes to the homogenizing influences of national institutions such as school, church and political parties.

Urban refugee settlements exhibited similar processes of ghettoization and discrimination. Refugees were concentrated in urban shantytowns, providing the cheap labor that facilitated the industrialization of Greece after 1925. Between 1923-1930 the number of industrial workers quadrupled although unemployment remained high. To encourage businesses in providing jobs, wages were kept low and labor laws were “tacitly abrogated”, especially in regard to female and child labor (Pentzopoulos 1962:161-2). The urban refugee ghettos also gave rise to an extensive criminal underground that frightened the native middle class and provoked severe police repression. Nattily dressed dudes, or *manges*, who made their living from drug-dealing, pimping or theft became legendary figures. A new style of music called *rembetika* (Holst 1975) also evolved, based on the Anatolian scales and melodies favored by refugees from Asia Minor. *Rembetika* bears an uncanny aesthetic similarity to American blues and was banned from radio play for many years due to its risqué lyrics and drug references.

Refugee women became stereotyped as loose and immoral, and prone to prostitution. Dominant cultural discourse of the time attributed these behaviors to the “mentality” of the refugees and what one observer termed a “masochistic complacency for being utterly destitute” (quoted in Pentzopoulos 1962:201). This Greek version of the culture of poverty thesis attributed the extreme poverty of the refugees to both their racial characteristics and cultural inadequacies. Refugees were also commonly accused of exaggerating the discrimination they faced in order to exploit and manipulate government assistance.

In Argolida the refugees had a similar impact, although their numbers were relatively small. Refugees settled in three main areas in the period from 1923-1930. A small group from Asia Minor settled in the coastal swamplands forming the village of Neo Kios. Other refugees settled in shantytowns in the towns of Nauplio and Argos. Many of the initial settlers of Neo Kios were from the town of Kios (Gemlek) in Asia Minor. Their numbers were slowly increased as refugees who had settled in other areas moved there, encouraged by the availability of land. During 1929-30 the Greek government dredged the Inachos river, which runs through the town, and built levies to alleviate flooding. The government also built primitive housing and offered incentives to attract refugees from crowded urban areas like Corinth. Each family in Neo Kios was given 10 hectares and a small house. The houses were built on pilings surrounded by mud and standing water. Today Neo Kios is a large village of 3,600 residents. Many are descended from the original refugees although others have moved in through marriage.

I interviewed several older residents of Neo Kios, all of whom were in their 70's and had been born in Greece shortly after their parents fled Asia Minor. One older man, Panayioti, recounted his family's experiences:

“My family came from Kios. They left there in 1924 when the Turks came and kicked them out. That was a Greek village, we had a few Turks there, but we got along well. When my parents came here they had a difficult time, they were hungry and had no work. First they were sent to a village in Macedonia where they were given 40 stremmata. But they didn't like it there and had some problems with the locals. Then they heard from other villagers about this village and they came here. Things were hard in the early years. We had to eat wild greens. There was great hunger. You couldn't grow anything here, it was all swampland. Mud everywhere. All we had was a few fishing boats. That's what they used to do in Kios, fishing. That's the way we survived. In the summers we had to walk hours for work, sometimes all the way to Corinth. We worked from sunrise to sunset for a little bit of money or a little oil. Later we were able to plant our own fields. The other villages around here didn't want us. They were angry because we got some of their fields. They used to come around and make trouble. Big trouble! Fights and beatings, it was mostly about girls you know. We were like cats and dogs. They called us Turks and wanted us to leave, but we were stuck here. Where could we go?”

Another older resident told me his parents, from different towns in Asia Minor, had met and married in the refugee camp in Corinth. They came to Neo Kios in 1929 after being

offered 200 drachmas to move. The money was given by refugee leaders in Neo Kios, who were said to have skimmed 200-300 drachmas from the original sums given by the government. He said that the social structure in the early village tended to reproduce that of the Asia Minor communities. Those who had been merchants received better lands and buildings for stores in the center while peasants were given less desirable land on the periphery. “We definitely had different classes, and the rich ones took advantage of the poorer ones”. The villagers were strong supporters of the *Venizelist* Liberal Party and later the socialist PASOK party.

Today the village is relatively prosperous and differs little from surrounding villages of Argolida with few physical manifestations of its past history. After 1965 the villagers began to produce citrus as well as vegetables for the Athens market and ceased working for surrounding villages. The children and grandchildren of those I interviewed have little interest in farming. One older man has let his fields lie fallow, and both his children live in Athens. Another continues to produce oranges with migrant labor. One of his sons works in a nearby factory and the other has unspecified psychiatric problems. There are now approximately 150 foreigners living in the village doing most of the agricultural and manual labor.

Near the town of Nauplio, refugees lived along the beach in huts made from salvaged wood. Older residents, who were children at the time, have recounted the hardships they endured. “No party, neither the *Laiki* [Rightist] nor the *Venizeliko* [liberal] helped us. They made many promises but they were all broken. They called us Turkospori (Turkish seeds) and gangs used to roam the neighborhood at election time and threaten us” (N.A.- Apopeira Logou kai Technis 1992). Many refugees worked in the

local canning factories at low wages. In 1927 the government built and distributed housing on the edge of town for refugee families. Politically and socially, however, the refugees remained marginalized. It was not until 1964 that the first councilman of refugee descent was elected to the local council. As difficult as the early years were for Asia Minor refugees, their rights to Greek citizenship and their settlement into corporate communities enabled them to both resist exploitation at the hands of native Greeks and slowly assimilate into Greek society. In contrast, as we shall see, the comparably massive numbers of immigrants from Albania and other eastern European countries of the last several decades enjoy neither of these advantages.

Early in my research a man in Gerbesi, explaining the presence of both Arvanites and Albanians in the area, remarked that “every 100 or 150 years there is a wave of immigrants into Greece”. The Asia Minor refugees were one such wave. Understanding this history helps to dispel the assumption that the Greek countryside existed as a historically stable and homogeneous society. As we will see, the end of the 20th century has brought another wave of immigration that is in many ways comparable with that of the 1920’s. In both cases the population of Greece swelled by around 10-20% and made acquired a labor force that was used to transform the Greek economy. Also, in both cases the immigrants composed an ambivalent ethnic category, socially marginalized but with historic and economic claims to inclusion. The position of the state however is radically different in the two cases. In the case of the Asia Minor refugees, that state guaranteed their legality. In the case of the recent Albanian immigrants, the state guarantees their illegality.

Peasant uprisings of the 1940's

Conflicting processes of ethnic differentiation and the consolidation of Greek national identity dominated the first 100 years of the Greek nation-state. After the Second World War, however, political affiliation came to the fore. The invasion and occupation of Greece by Axis forces in 1941 helped to solidify national solidarity, but at the same time created a polarization of political factions that was to dominate Greek society for the next 50 years. The liberation of Greece from Nazi occupation brought with it a political crisis that was only resolved after years of civil war. The contest between left and right was devastating, but in the end a form of right-wing state capitalism closely aligned with United States political and economic interests emerged. The civil war and ensuing political struggles that continued until the end of the century are still fresh in people's minds, and narratives of partisan conflict are often used to explain the contemporary social situation.

The Greek civil war occurred in three distinct phases, or rounds. The first round (October 1943-February 1944) occurred during the Axis occupation of Greece as resistance groups organized to fight the occupiers. The largest of these groups was EAM (National Liberation Front), a communist dominated popular front group that by the end of the occupation controlled most of Greece and numbered around 2 million members (30% of the population) (Vlavianos 1992:24). Several smaller groups operated in northern Greece, but had little presence in Argolida. From the mountains, ELAS (Greek Liberation Army, the military wing of EAM) launched raids on German troops stationed in the valley towns and battled rival Greek groups like the Security Battalions, a fiercely

anti-communist militia organized by the Greek occupation government and equipped by the Germans.

While EAM was organized as a national liberation movement, much of its organization in rural areas resembled the revolutionary peasant movements of the Greek Revolution. In the political vacuum created by the German invasion, mountainous areas were left largely to their own devices, except for occasional punitive raids by occupying forces. Ad hoc groups assembled from particular villages and regions gathered around charismatic military chieftains, or *kapetanios*⁷, and operated in a semi-autonomous way under only nominal control of the urban political leadership (Eudes 1972). *Kapetanios* were thus able to effectively control large areas and clandestine smuggling routes in mountainous areas, as well as administer crude systems of taxation and justice. Most of these leaders, well as their followers, were drawn from the peasantry. For some, the EAM represented an attempt at social transformation, foreshadowing a modern Greek society (Hart 1996). For others it was an attempt to grasp political power and settle old feuds.

In Argolida, as in the rest of rural Greece, resistance was centered in the mountains. Axis forces, first Italian and then German, occupied the main towns of Nauplio and Argos and established garrisons in the larger valley villages, like Agia Triada. These villages and towns co-existed with occupation forces peacefully for the most part. Older residents still remember the soldiers who were garrisoned in their homes and the few bits of German they picked up from them. One man in his late 70's said that the most brutal part of the occupation was the Allied bombardment of Argos on a market

⁷ The *kapetanoi* in many ways resembled the *kleftes* of the revolutionary period (see p.39). Like the *kleftes*, *kapetanoi* were charismatic leaders of ad-hoc rural guerrilla groups and operated in semi-autonomy from the intellectual, and mostly urban, political leaders of the movements they represented. Both have become symbols of national resistance to foreign oppression.

day in October 1943 that killed over 100 civilians. In the valley the biggest problem was hunger. Occupation forces expropriated much of the local produce, giving little in return besides small amounts of sugar and fuel. In the mountain villages older residents I interviewed said that hunger was not a big problem. The villagers depended as before on subsistence agriculture and little of their produce was expropriated. Most of the mountain villages were not directly occupied and it was there that the local EAM/ELAS operated. Civilians in these villages were sometimes executed in retaliation for guerilla raids, and the people there remember the occupation as a time of danger and violence. In Gerbesi over 30 young men and one young woman died in the fighting against occupation forces⁸.

Although many young men from the valley came to the mountains to fight against the occupation, the bulk of EAM/ELAS in Argolida came from the Arvanitiko villages of the mountains. One effect of this was a confirmation of the Arvanites Greek identity through a fervent and costly display of nationalism. The Arvanites became more “Greek” than their Greek neighbors in the valley by virtue of their activism and sacrifice. In Gerbesi, one older man remarked, “They’re all ass-kissers down there. Our village here lost our young men fighting the occupation. They [in the valley] arranged themselves well and even profited”. On the other hand, the ethnic dimension of the resistance also had the effect of further meshing ethnic and political identities, so that the historic competition and antagonism between mountain and valley was not just ethnic and economic but partisan as well. At the end of the occupation these divisions would erupt into full-fledged civil war.

⁸ A monument with the names of those killed has been erected at the Church of St. John on the mountain above the village. Every year on Mayday a festival is held there.

Fighting in Argolida was sporadic and episodic. EAM/ELAS operated unhindered for the most part in the mountains with occasional forays into the valley for ambushes and attacks on garrison towns. Most of the guerilla fighters were residents of local villages organized on an ad hoc basis. The numbers of ELAS regular troops probably never amounted to more than a few hundred. Towards the end of the occupation fighting became more intense and the Germans retaliated by burning the village of Prosimni and massacring civilians in Limnes and other villages (Zegkini 1968:347-348). Both Prosimni and Limnes are large Arvanitiko villages near Gerbesi. Much of the violence during the occupation occurred between Greek groups. A unit of OPLA (Units for the Protection of the Popular Struggle), the ELAS internal security force, was formed in the village of Gerbesi during the occupation. OPLA conducted trials and sometimes executions of suspected collaborators at the church of St. John above the village. There were also conflicts between Arvanitiko villages. The nearby village of Arachneo (Hieli) was, and still is, the only Arvanitiko village in the area that is heavily right-wing. During the occupation they captured and turned over to the Germans two suspected guerillas, who were executed. In retaliation ELAS burned Arachneo.

In Argolida, violence during the resistance and civil war was primarily used as a tool for enforcing dominance on the part of particular political groups within and between villages. Much of the violence was used as retaliation or to demonstrate power and intimidate other residents, particularly in areas where neither EAM nor the German occupiers held clear authority. Data collected by Stathis Kalivas (2002) shows that the largest number of killings happened in “mid-elevation” villages that were a no-man’s land between the German controlled valley and the EAM controlled mountains. For

Argolida as a whole, 55% of victims were killed by EAM or EAM-affiliated individuals. Most of these were in the high and mid-elevation villages. In Gerbesi, for example, in 1944 20 villagers were arrested and executed by their fellow villagers. The group included five women and five children, the youngest three years old. While the executed were accused of being rightists, they also had the misfortune of being the objects of a pre-war vendetta on the part of several persons associated with the local EAM and OPLA.

The first round of the civil war came to an end with the withdrawal of occupation forces and the imposition of a rather tenuous truce agreement between resistance groups and the government in exile brokered by the British. However, the truce quickly unraveled as the new government attempted to disarm ELAS and it became clear that groups that had collaborated with the Germans were to be incorporated into the new security forces. As the Germans withdrew in September 1944, ELAS units established themselves in the valley and began battling remnants of the collaborationist Security Battalions and local gendarmes. After being defeated by ELAS in a major battle in the town of Argos, the Security Brigades and gendarmes retreated to Nauplio where they were able to hold out until British forces arrived in January 1945. This second round of fighting was brought to an end by another truce calling for the disarming of ELAS which EAM agreed to after it became clear that no help was forthcoming from the Soviet Union.

The third round of fighting began as a significant number of *kapetanoi* resisted attempts by the British to impose a right-wing government on Greece, and was only reluctantly supported by the Communist Party leadership. With the arrival of the British forces in 1945, ELAS units evaporated back into the mountains. Most of the fighters went home, retreating into the mountains with their weapons. A period of repression followed,

and many former partisans were arrested and imprisoned (Iatrides 1972). A number of men from Midea were exiled or imprisoned in Nauplio, and several were executed for communist activities. By October 1947, however, many ELAS units were back under the command of the Democratic Army (D.A.), formed as the military wing of the Greek Communist Party. As Greece slid into civil war following the exclusion of the communists from the post-war government and the severe repression of leftists, the mountain villages once again took up arms. The Democratic Army operated mostly out of former EAM villages like Gerbesi, Prosimni, and Limnes. In December of 1947, the D.A. attacked the village of Lirkeia, battling the local government-organized village self-defense units and in January of 1948 attacked the railway junction at Koutsopodi. The biggest battle of the civil war in Argolida occurred in October 1948 when over 400 D.A. fighters unsuccessfully attacked the town of Argos. By January of 1949, the D.A. had been defeated.

The partisan struggles of the occupation and civil war operated on three different levels. First was the geopolitical contest between patron states with their corresponding local elites. The right-wing monarchists were supported by the patronage of Britain and the U.S., while the communists looked to the Soviet Union for support. Each side essentially comprised a patronage network dependent on foreign support. Second was the class conflict, which in Argolida primarily took the form of an attempt by mountain agriculturalists and herders to overthrow the dominance of valley mercantile networks and establish independence. In many ways the geopolitical and class divisions that broke out into open conflict during the chaotic political vacuum created by the occupation represented a return to the unfinished business of the Greek Revolution. Finally there

were factional struggles as particular political action groups within villages attempted to exercise dominance through alliance with national groups. Factional divisions linked to national political parties and their incumbent patronage networks have traditionally divided rural communities in Greece. Factions often, but not always, incorporate alliances of patrilineal lines and are consolidated through agricultural cooperatives linked to national political parties. During the occupation and civil war violence erupted in, and between, many villages as factions jockeyed for position within the power vacuum left by the occupation (Aschenbrenner 1987).

The social memory of the occupation and civil war is today a highly charged issue that reflects the political divisions in Greek society (Collard 1989)). In Midea township the events of the occupation and civil war are still vividly remembered, at least by the older generation, but the interpretations vary from valley to mountain. Much of the chaos and complexity of the conflict has been glossed over by interpretations that reflect contemporary political allegiances. For the villagers of the valley, the occupation and civil war was a period of hardship brought upon them by outside powers. A retired taxi driver in Agia Triada had this to say about the civil war.

“Outsiders cause all the problems. Since the beginning the politicians have eaten from foreign hands, first the British, French and Russians. Then the Americans also came. The civil war was encouraged by the big powers. At Yalta they divided up the world. Greece was supposed to go with the west, but Russia tried to take it away anyway and they encouraged the communists here. Even today this continues.”

From the perspective of the valley, the communists in the mountains were misguided and manipulated by foreign forces into a futile battle against the interests of the Greek nation. The villagers of the mountain tend to have a different perspective on events. A truck farmer in Gerbesi told me,

“The civil war started as a rebellion against the British and the Greek traitors who had taken over the government. We fought hard for our freedom against the Germans and we didn’t want the British to just take it away again. We are patriots and we fight for our freedom. Unfortunately we were betrayed by our own people, the rich who care more about their money than their country.”

For most residents of Gerbesi, the resistance and civil war are seen as a nationalist struggle, a fight for national independence, rather than a communal conflict.

Post-war state capitalism

At the end of WWII Britain, exhausted from the war and unable to maintain its hegemonic position in the world economy, transferred its controlling interest in Greece to the United States⁹. In 1947 Greece became one of the first countries to feel the effects of the Truman Doctrine. The United States allocated \$400 million in emergency aid to fight the communist insurgency, financing military equipment, advisors, and a joint Greek-American general staff, which proved to be a decisive factor in the government victory

⁹ The departure of Britain and arrival of the U.S. as the dominant force in Greek politics and economy corresponds with the decline of what Arrighi (1994) calls the third systemic cycle of capitalist accumulation and rise of the fourth (U.S.) cycle.

(Clogg 1992:140). U.S. political and economic dominance reflected its position as the hegemonic power in the capitalist world economy of the mid-20th century.

Following Arrighi's (1994) cyclical scheme of the development of capitalist accumulation in the world economy, we can note several important developments in the post-war political economy of Greece. The U.S. dominated post-war regime of accumulation was more organizationally centralized and vertically integrated, as opposed to the more decentralized, "extroverted" colonial regime administered by the British (Arrighi 1994:281). In Greece, as a semi-peripheral European country, this difference led to greater direct control by the hegemon. Politically, dependence on American aid required that all government programs and policies be subject to U.S. approval, so that "the American mission had a controlling position in Greek government" (Legg 1969:73). U.S. advisors were attached to all ministries, and to the armed forces even down to the divisional level. Economically, the penetration of foreign capital was increasingly administered directly by U.S. owned multinational corporations, strengthening the comprador nature of the Greek bourgeoisie.

In the post-war period the Greek economy continued to follow the distinctive semi-peripheral structure of Mediterranean Europe. The economy was heavily dependent on American aid and emigrant remittances. Internally, the agricultural sector predominated, with a large peasantry still bound by pre-capitalist relations of production (Campbell 1964, Friedl 1962). The rural population was only partially integrated into market economies and served as a surplus pool of labor for international labor markets in developed countries and the uneven and unsteady urban industrial development of Greece itself. Domestic industry was dominated by small producers who, together with a

relatively large number of public employees, the result of the strongly clientelistic political structure, made up the middle class.

Labor emigration continued to be an important economic activity until the 1970's. Greek workers have a long history of emigration. In the first two decades of the 20th century, it is estimated that up to 25% of all young men aged 15-40 emigrated, mainly to the United States, but also to many other countries as far away as Australia (Clogg 1992:71). Remittances from emigrants had a significant impact on Greece's balance of payments. At their peak in the 1920's, remittances covered more than half of Greece's trade deficit (Sweet-Escot 1954:10). Emigration resumed after the disruptions of World War II, but with the imposition of quotas by the United States the main destinations became Australia, Canada and Germany. Between 1951 and 1980 almost 12% of the population had left (Clogg 1992:149).

Besides remittances, emigration has been important for absorbing the vast rural labor surplus in Greece and has declined as birthrates have fallen in the post-war period. Most of those who emigrated never returned home, although a substantial number used emigration to acquire capital for investment upon their return. In Agia Triada, for example, I found three small business owners who had worked in Germany, or had relatives who worked in Germany, before returning home and opening small shops. In Gerbesi several men of one lineage had emigrated to Oregon, and their remittances had greatly increased the stature and wealth of the family¹⁰.

¹⁰ Although this pattern of emigration to Oregon has ceased, there is still some contact with village descendants who live there. Other villages in the mountains share this Oregon connection. Once, in the village of Limnes (which shares patriline with Gerbesi), I was surprised to see a late-model American car with Oregon license plates parked on a narrow village street.

The post-war period in Midea township was characterized by both the slow but steady expansion of commodity markets and state services and the maintenance of political repression. Political parties were important mechanisms of patronage and power. Valley villages like Agia Triada were relatively well connected with urban centers both because of access to transportation routes and allegiance to right-wing political parties. State financed irrigation projects and other development schemes were used to reward villages that voted right. The local canning industry expanded, providing valuable jobs. Communist villages like Gerbesi could count on little in the way of state aid and were often excluded from jobs in local industries and government because of their political affiliation. Still, people remember the 1950's as a period when relative equality between the villages was maintained. The residents of Gerbesi were able to make a good living off tobacco, as the prices then were relatively high. The valley produced mainly cotton and tobacco, but prices were low for cotton and the quality of their tobacco was inferior, bringing a lower price. During the 1950's, no villagers from Gerbesi, or any of the surrounding villages, reported working on the cotton harvests. Cotton was harvested in the valley with family members, local poor, and migrants from interior Peloponnesos.

The situation changed in the 1960's. Starting in the mid-1950's, citrus began to take over as the dominant crop in the valley, aided by expanded irrigation networks and high prices. Then, in the early 60's tobacco production was limited to 300 kilos per family. The effect was the relative impoverishment of Gerbesi. Panos, a truck driver in Gerbesi remembers growing up in the 1960's,

“Towards the end of the 50's the valley people began to do better. They were all right-wing and besides, the oranges were selling better. In Midea

there was great repression. The police used to beat us, send us to jail because we were leftists. A lot of people suffered. When we were young [in the 60's] and we went to the high school in Agia Triada we had nothing. The valley kids had new jeans, new bicycles, even a few motorbikes and we were jealous. They used to make fun of us and exclude us. We could never get girls. But we were tougher and more sly. I quit school early, I was bored and wanted to work. We used to do everything, whatever we could for a day wage. We worked in the canning factories, worked the harvest, construction, whatever. We worked hard. And you know what we did with the money? We blew it going out and buying things. I remember working all week to buy a pair of Levi's. Those were the big thing then. We would go all around, Argos, Nauplio. We were cool. I remember we all got into rock music in the 60's. Mitso had the pirate radio station, he always had the new music and we were like, what is this? We heard it all, Doors, Pink Floyd. We were in love with that stuff."

In the 1960's many villagers from Gerbesi worked as day-laborers during the orange harvest. Villagers describe how trucks would come up from the valley before dawn to collect workers. This situation continued until the 1970's, when electricity and deep-well technology enabled villagers of Gerbesi to irrigate their lands and increase production, thus mitigating the economic advantages of the valley.

The U.S had a strong military interest in Greece during the Cold War and maintained tight control over the Greek military and government, which extended even to engineering electoral systems to favor U.S. backed candidates (Clogg 1992:147). The

blatant political dominance by the U.S. engendered strong opposition in the form of an active, if clandestine, communist party (KKE) and the United Democratic Left (EDA), a legal, communist dominated political party, which regularly garnered up to 25% of the electoral vote. Opposition to U.S. domination was regularly fueled by recurrent crises in Cyprus and in Greek-Turkish relations in general during which the Greek government was forced to follow U.S. interests. In 1964, the Center Union party was elected under George Papandreou, who initiated a more independent foreign policy, much to the displeasure of American authorities. The U.S. subsequently engineered his downfall and the ensuing political crisis was only resolved through the imposition of a military coup in 1967 by officers with strong ties to the C.I.A. (Couloumbis et al 1976). The Greek junta in many ways resembled the military dictatorships in Portugal and Spain (Poulantzas 1976). Within the context of the semi-peripheral status of southern Europe in the postwar period, military dictatorships facilitated the penetration of foreign capital into a relatively undeveloped economy. The ultra-nationalistic military junta ushered in a period of severe political repression, with thousands of communist activists arrested and imprisoned, including about 15 men from Gerbesi. The political repression of the military junta served U.S. interests but also gave rise to strong popular opposition. After a bloody student uprising in Athens in 1973 and another crisis with Turkey following the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, which was partially provoked by the inept adventurism of the Greek leaders, the junta was forced to resign and a new government was formed under center-right politician Konstandinos Karamanlis.

The Karamanlis government ushered in a modest liberalization of Greek politics. The U.S., preoccupied with its own economic and political crisis, was less concerned

with Greece, particularly after the *détente* of the Nixon years. Karamanlis negotiated the entry of Greece into the European Community in 1979 and normalized relations with its Balkan neighbors. During this period, however, the socialist party PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) under the leadership of Andreas Papandreu¹¹ steadily gained support, finally winning power in 1981. PASOK remained in power until 2004, with the exception of a short period in the early 1990's, and oversaw the incorporation of Greece into the European Community.

The E.U. regime in Greece

The historical development of the Greek nation state has been shaped by its semi-peripheral position vis-à-vis successive capitalist world economies. As we have seen, transnational or global forces have molded the development of state practices and national identity since its beginnings in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek nation state, then, cannot be seen as a purely autochthonous development, but rather as the product of a particular geo-political context. In addition, the history of the nation state, and of Greek society in general, is also the product of struggle and contradiction between social groups, organized along ethnic, class, geographic and gender divisions, for social dominance. The “imaginings” of Greek nationalism have not only been a force of solidarity, but have also and perhaps more importantly been techniques in the reproduction of social inequality necessary for Greece's incorporation into the capitalist world economy.

¹¹ Andreas Papandreu was the son of George Papandreu, the former leader of the Center Union party who was ousted from power in 1964.

The latest stage in this history has occurred with Greece's entry into the European Union, a peculiar and innovative transnational form of political, economic and social integration that has sought to project European power in the 21st century era of globalized capitalism. The European Union operates as a sort of "supranational" state that is constituted as an integrated set of treaties, institutions and policies among member states. In this sense it is a transnational form of governance relatively closed to the outside world. It also however conditions European participation in global economic networks, centralizing European capital and structuring its flow.

The context of globalized capital flows and the reorganization of capitalist economies post 1970's is crucial to understanding the development of the European Union. From its post-war origins as the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Union has promoted the development of transnational flows of capital, labor, and goods in Europe as a way of solving the violent competition of national economies. Early economic successes prompted more ambitious plans for integration. In 1970, the Werner Plan proposed complete economic unification, including a single currency, but failed amidst the disorganized response to the global economic crisis of the 1970's. In the early 1990's the plan was proposed again, this time more successfully. By the 1990's, economic and monetary unification was strongly backed by the business community "as a strategy to deal with the increasing lack of competitiveness and the perceived decline of the economic power of Europe vis-à-vis the United States and the Pacific Basin" (Verdun 2002:4).

The European Union embodies a particular capitalist strategy in the face of globalization, on the one hand liberating capital from the controls of individual nation-

states while on the other maintaining a certain degree of insulation from global markets. With the introduction of a single currency, the euro, and the elimination of internal customs barriers, the E.U. has provided for the more or less seamless circulation of capital within Europe while continuing a limited amount of protection from external competition. For Greece and other areas of what was traditionally the semi-periphery of Europe, membership in the E.U. has facilitated the increased intrusion of European capital into local economies as well as the “rationalization” of the industrial base and the restructuring of many state-supported industries. In return, the E.U. offers Greece the chance to develop economically through access to expanded trade networks (Damianos and Hassapoyannes 1997). For these reasons the left-wing political parties and trade unions vehemently opposed entry in the early 80’s. In fact, the socialist party PASOK under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou that oversaw Greece’s entry to the E.U. in 1981 was initially elected with strong support from urban workers and trade unions on an anti-E.U. platform. Later Papandreou managed to retain power through the increased support of the rural population after E.U. subsidies and development programs began to flow to rural areas (Louloudis and Maraveyas 1997).

Perhaps the most important aspect of the E.U. for Greece has been the set of institutions and policies related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). First envisioned in the Treaty of Rome and instituted as a European Community policy in 1958, the goals of the CAP are to increase agricultural productivity, ensure a fair standard of living for producers, stabilize agricultural markets and provide low priced food for urban markets (Molle 1994). These somewhat contradictory goals, to benefit producers and consumers simultaneously, have been pursued with a high degree of market regulation

and subsidies, making the CAP one of the most expensive E.U. programs and accounting for almost half of E.U. expenditures. The two main types of market controls that have been employed are price supports, where minimum prices are guaranteed by various mechanisms and world prices are screened off, and producer bonuses, where producers are directly subsidized while prices remain low. The persistence of this type of market regulation in the face of global trends toward market liberalization is a testament to the political sensitivity of agricultural commodity prices for both urban consumers and rural producers.

The E.U. is not only committed to the opening of the domestic market under the hegemony of European capital but also to social stabilization and cohesion. With the stabilization of agricultural markets, which was one of the most immediate and visible areas of early E.U. policy, the E.U. hoped to procure a stable supply of food for Europe as well as increase the standard of living in the countryside, thus controlling urban growth and increasing consumption. The contradiction at the heart of E.U. rural and agricultural policies is at least partly a reflection of the fundamental contradiction in the E.U. mission as a whole, the conflict between commitments to social stability and capitalistic market efficiency. E.U. policies and the officials who plan and implement them display a self-conscious ambivalence towards prioritizing either goal. This is a reflection of the basic dynamic of the European version of neo-liberalism¹².

For rural Greeks the rapid and direct infusion of E.U. cash into the countryside has had far-reaching effects. Greek farmers receive many subsidies directly from E.U. institutions, largely bypassing the elaborate labyrinth of patronage systems that previously held sway in rural Greece. Farmers in Midea still remember the golden days

¹² For a discussion of neo-liberalism in the context of the E.U., see chapter 5.

of the early 1980's when high prices for oranges were virtually guaranteed by the E.U. and excess production was bought and destroyed. In the early days, that is until around the mid-1980's, CAP policies were mainly focused on various kinds of price supports meant to maintain farmers' incomes and promote stable production. More recently, the CAP has shifted toward direct producer subsidies rather than price supports. Overall, the CAP has had little success in reforming Greek agriculture. The volume of production has remained flat with only a slight increase in productivity. "Traditional" Mediterranean products have strengthened, but in general there has been a decrease in agricultural investment. Farmers' incomes have increased significantly, but this is almost totally due to direct and indirect subsidies, which now make up over 40% of farmers' incomes on average (Maraveyas 1994).

In time however, serious problems have arisen with the CAP. CAP policies have resulted in overproduction in many areas. Agriculture, which makes up a relatively low proportion of the E.U. GDP, continues to be a major part of the E.U. budget and requires a high level of taxation. Prices for consumers remain relatively high. In addition, producer countries outside the E.U. have been hurt by both European protectionism and Europe's dumping of excess production on world markets. In the last several years moves to reform the CAP have been initiated, including declining price supports, increasing limits on production and the "buying out" of farmers in unproductive sectors. Within the debate on reforming the CAP a new approach to the "rural problem" became dominant (Gray 2000). Agriculture became somewhat marginalized from E.U. policies and more attention was given to non-agricultural aspects of rural life, such as education, leisure activities, transportation and small businesses. This has led to an increasing focus on rural

areas as locations of consumption rather than production that has radically changed the way E.U. policy makers see social processes in rural Europe (Marsden 1999).

The economic unification of the E.U. has been accomplished by the development of a supranational apparatus that is technocratic in character. The development and administration of policy, including the CAP, is largely carried out by the European Commission, an appointed body ostensibly working under direction of the European Council but in reality a relatively autonomous bureaucracy. Thus, despite a commitment to “European” ideals of democracy, much of E.U. policy making is opaque, carried out by a mandarin-type class of appointed officials in consultation with various “interests”, both national and Europe-wide (Bellier 2000). This “democratic deficit” insures a regime that “puts the emphasis on the technical at the expense of the political” (Tsoukalis 1997:272), empowering technical experts and leading to a growing gap between economic and political integration. The European Parliament is relatively weak and peripheral to policymaking, a fact reflected in low voter turnouts and the undeveloped international party structures in European elections (G. Smith 2003). Electoral politics continue to be the domain of increasingly hamstrung national governments, a result of the E.U. principle of “subsidiarity” or selective centralization by which state functions are relegated to different economies of scale (Holmes 2000). National states continue to be important sites for both implementing and resisting E.U. economic policies.

Social cohesion and stability are important goals of the E.U. not just in a moral sense springing from liberal ideals of democracy and equality but also in order to facilitate the smooth expansion and functioning of markets and legitimize E.U. political institutions. There are three specific areas in which E.U. institutions focus their efforts to

promote social cohesion, all of which can be seen as facets of “development”. First, there is the definition and regularization of issues of citizenship, with the attendant rights to social services, between and within member states. Second, there is the promotion and facilitation of increased commodity consumption. The third, and perhaps most ephemeral, area is the promotion of a “European” identity. These three policy areas are organized around the fundamental assumption that there is both a “European model of society” made up of common family structures, political ideologies and cultural affinities, and a “shared common interest” vis-à-vis the outside world (Bellier and Wilson 2000).

The reality of the E.U. is of course very different from the ideal. An uneven development as well as new processes of social differentiation today characterizes rural areas which are, in general, undergoing a period of transition. One of the goals of my research is to discern particular trends and processes as such areas become re-integrated into a new political economy. By the 1990’s the E.U. policy of price supports was under pressure both from the international regime of free trade under GATT and from European policy makers who came to question its effectiveness in alleviating underlying problems in rural society. Since then the means and role of state regulation has become more decentralized and region-specific, which is somewhat ironic given the E.U. commitment to political and economic integration.

The decentralized, regional approach to rural problems by the E.U. is at least partly a response to the differential effects of broad trends on specific areas. In global terms, the emergence of deregulated, transnational markets, the expansion of neo-liberal forms of governance, increased mobility, changing demographics and birthrates, a decline in agricultural employment and productivity, and the development of new uses

for rural space have affected rural areas across Europe. However, not all rural areas have been affected in the same ways. Specific areas have benefited from, or been hurt by, these developments in different ways. Rural populations have also responded to these pressures in different ways, taking advantage when they can benefit and seeking protection when they can't.

Changes in the political economy of Europe under the E.U. regime have contributed to changes in social and cultural relations, a process that has been conceptualized as "Europeanization" (Borneman and Fowler 1997, Featherstone 2003). Europeanization is a deliberately fuzzy concept that nevertheless highlights the effects of contemporary developments of European-wide policies and governance on strategies of self-representation and techniques of power. Given the relationship between state structures and the development of national identity, there is an expectation that the quasi-state nature of the E.U. and the on-going development of transnational networks of exchange and regulation will give rise to a strengthened "European" identity. As such, the concept resembles other work on the "deterritorialization" of identities in the wake of globalization (Appadurai 1990). However, questions remain concerning the extent and nature of Europeanization, especially given the resurgence of nationalism and neo-racism within Europe. In the following chapters, I will seek to outline some of the social changes that people in one European community, Midea township, have experienced within the changing political economy of Europe.

From the beginning, the integration of Greece into the E.U. has been marked by ambivalence and alternating periods of enthusiasm and skepticism on the part of the Greek government and people (Frangakis and Papayannides 2003). The rapid accession

of Greece in 1981 that was engineered by the conservative politician Karamanlis was motivated mainly by political concerns. Karamanlis saw E.U. membership as a way to stabilize Greek politics, cement Greece's ties to Europe, and end Greece's dependency on an increasingly undependable U.S., particularly in light of the growing U.S. tilt towards Turkey in foreign affairs (Kazakos and Ioakimidis 1994). On the economic side, the benefits were less clear, given the weak and underdeveloped position of Greek industry. When PASOK gained power in 1981, Papandreou was able to renegotiate more favorable terms that guaranteed a substantial infusion of E.U. structural funds and CAP subsidies while delaying the complete opening of Greek markets. Under Papandreou the Greek state remained, for the most part, highly centralized, clientelistic, and social democratic in orientation (Tsakalotos 2001). Throughout the 1980's the PASOK government worked against international neo-liberal trends by expanding the public sector, legislating wage increases and in general following Keynesian methods of economic regulation (Fouskas 1997:69). Among Europeans, Greece became "notorious for squandering its share of the structural funds" (Dinan 2004:311). For many Greeks, however, Papandreou was admired for his ability to manipulate and exploit European interests. The election of Kostas Simitis to replace Papandreou as party leader in 1996 marked a shift away from populist and clientelistic politics towards a modernization of the state and party more in line with a European, technocratic model. Despite the continued language of social democracy employed by PASOK, Simitis oversaw the spread of neo-liberal economic policies, particularly through Greece's inclusion into the European Monetary Union (EMU), during his tenure that has characterized the growing convergence of social democratic and conservative party programs in Greece (Tsakalotos 2001:170)¹³.

¹³ In general elections in the fall of 2004, PASOK was replaced by the conservative New Democracy Party

Despite the uneven and unsteady development of economic integration, the general trend in Greece has been toward the liberalization of markets, especially following the implementation of the EMU. E.U. integration has brought the dramatically increased market penetration of foreign products, mainly consumer goods, while domestic firms have been culled by squeezed profit margins (Giannitsis 1994). Since the mid-1990's both major political parties reflect an emerging consensus on the need to shift from a statist economic policy focused on employment and social services to one more in tune with a European liberal model emphasizing controls on inflation and deficit spending as well as the privatization and deregulation of industries (Kazakos 2004). This process has been uneven, however, and the state continues to support a large public sector. The state has followed a "twin-track strategy" in which formal changes in line with E.U. requirements are made but real structural reform is often blocked or diluted (Kazakos 2004:915). The result so far has been that Greece continues to have a high unemployment rate (hovering around 10%) and consistently ranks near or at the bottom of the E.U. for most economic indicators.

At the beginning of the 21st century, new challenges are arising as a result of the impending expansion of the E.U. into Eastern Europe. With the collapse of Eastern European socialism after the Cold War, the E.U. has been inevitably pushed to incorporate Eastern states by both its claims to a pan-European unity and the need for new markets, as well as the aspirations of the Eastern states for stability and prosperity. The outcome of this process has yet to be determined. One result of the enlargement process has been the continued and intensifying pressure to reform the CAP and the

as the governing party and Kostas Karamanlis, nephew of Konstandinos Karamanlis, became the prime minister.

administration of structural funds, which are intended mainly for social stability and development. Because the Eastern European candidate states are heavily agricultural, integration is certain to bring with it major cuts in E.U. agricultural price supports and subsidies (Dinan 1999:347). Enlargement will also almost certainly affect the political and decision-making processes of the E.U., making the current system of national vetoes and negotiation even more unwieldy. This could perhaps lead to a greater degree of political centralization, or alternately, to a dilution of political cohesion.

The enthusiasm among E.U. member states for enlargement has varied. Some countries, such as Germany, clearly stand to benefit while others, such as France, fear marginalization. The Greek government has generally been supportive of enlargement. Enlargement would tend to de-center the E.U. from its western European core and strengthen Greece's traditional ties to Eastern Europe (Frangakis and Papayannides 2003:175-6). However, there are also dangers for Greece, particularly concerning the potential accession of Turkey, a historic rival, and the threat to Greece's share of E.U. CAP and structural funds, which would surely be decreased.

As we shall see in later chapters, the villagers of Midea see the E.U. as a far-away power with significant influence over their daily lives. The E.U. for them is a faceless institution that offers considerable benefits but also dangers and their relationship with it must be constantly negotiated, taking advantage of the benefits while resisting the dangers. In this negotiation, villagers see the Greek state as a mediator. Villagers constantly call on the state and its officials to represent their interests vis-à-vis the E.U. as well as blame them for their vulnerabilities. For example, during my fieldwork I seldom heard villagers refer to the European parliament or their representatives there but I did

hear constantly of the failure of the Greek government to adequately represent their interests. Where one does get a sense of a “European “ identity in Midea is in the changing consumption practices of both individuals and households, but even here a strong and self-conscious sense of a “Greek style” of consumption is pervasive.

As villagers have adapted to the political-economic changes of the last quarter century, of which the E.U. is a significant part, village life has changed considerably. On the one hand, social differentiation among villagers, both in terms of class and gender, have narrowed due to demographic changes, greater rural-urban mobility, and an infusion of cash through price supports and development schemes. These same changes, however, have also acted to promote a new process of social differentiation through the increasing dependence on immigrant labor.

II. GREEK AGRICULTURALISTS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION- THE CONTRADICTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

Agricultural production in Argolida

Agriculture still provides the foundation for the local economy in Argolida, although in some parts of Argolida other industries play important roles. The coastal villages from Epidavros to Asini have a significant tourist industry, and the towns of Nauplio and Argos rely mainly on service industries, commerce and small manufacturing. For the interior towns and villages, however, agriculture remains the main productive activity. In Midea township, 57% of employed persons claim agriculture as their main source of income¹⁴. For many others, agriculture is a secondary income. While there is significant production of other crops, such as apricots, olives, grapes, vegetables, and others, the dominant crop in Argolida is citrus, mainly Merlin oranges. Virtually all agricultural production is carried out on small family-owned plots. Like the rest of Greece, landholdings tend to be small. The average plot size in Midea township is 6.4 *stremmata* (one *stremma*=1,000 sq. meters or one quarter hectare), but farming families tend to have multiple plots, a result of the trajectories of inheritance. In the citrus growing valley of Midea township the largest landholding is 60 *stremmata*. However, a few families actually control more, since ownership is often spread out among household members. For example, one wealthy family in Agia Triada works 150 *stremmata*. Many families produce on less than 10 *stremmata*.

¹⁴ These figures are based on the 2001 census published by the National Statistical Service of Greece (http://www.statistics.gr/gr_tables/s1100_sap_5_euro38%20lau%201.htm).

Historically, the dominance of particular crops has waxed and waned with both global and national market conditions. Local production of wheat, cotton, currants, tomato paste and tobacco, each once an important crop in Argolida, emerged, declined and eventually disappeared under pressure from international markets. Today's crops are no different. Citrus began to spread in Argolida in the 1950's, replacing olives, cotton and tobacco and raising the standard of living "like a blessing", as one local history puts it (Antonakatou 1973:73). Citrus spread through the valley following irrigation projects from the late 1950's on, bringing wealth to many villages. The ascendancy of the citrus monoculture in many areas of Argolida can be attributed to the post-war expansion of European consumer markets and improvements in transportation that made those markets accessible to Greek farmers. Citrus was further stimulated in the 1980's as Eastern European markets were opened with the easing of the Cold War and the granting of trade credits. In the last decade however, Greek citrus production has been under intense pressure from foreign producers, both inside the E.U. (Spain) and outside (Israel, Turkey). Both the Greek government and the E.U. have sought to promote crop diversification in Argolida, but so far with little success.

The dependency of the local economy on citrus has had a tremendous impact on social relations in Argolida. Citrus is the main export crop and thus the mainstay of the local economy. It is also the crop that, in keeping with the liberalization of global trade, is regulated the least. But the "de-regulation" of the citrus industry does not mean there is a lack of regulation, but rather that there has been a shift in the forms and agents of regulation from the state and farmers' cooperatives to the multinational companies that buy and market the fruit to consumers. The transnational "free" market of citrus has

squeezed farmers financially and contributed to the growing marginalization of agricultural labor¹⁵.

Today the yearly Merlin orange production in Argolida ranges from 300,000 to 400,000 metric tons¹⁶ (metric ton=1.1 U.S. ton). Other types of oranges, tangerines and lemons make up another 50,000 tons of production. Midea township produces about 60,000 tons of oranges on 17,000 *stremmata* of groves. Production has been steady over the last several decades, rising slightly as the average age of the trees has increased. In the 2003 season Argolida produced around 400,000 tons of Merlin oranges. Merlin oranges must be consumed within two months and the bulk of the crop is shipped north to both western and eastern Europe, but a large portion also goes to the domestic market. Whatever is not absorbed by fresh fruit markets is sold for juice to local factories under government subsidy. In 2003, 150,000 tons were exported, 40,000 tons went to the domestic market, and 100,000 tons were sold for juice. The remainder was spoiled by bad weather. Spoiled oranges were purchased by the Greek government under a special subsidy program and buried in landfills.

Variations in environmental conditions, such as water, soil condition, and winter temperatures, within both Argolida as a whole and the township of Midea, have contributed to significant differences in production from village to village. Citrus is the most important and, in recent times, the most lucrative crop, but not all villages can produce citrus. For example, in the village of Agia Triada 71% of village lands are

¹⁵ The effects of deregulated agricultural markets are not confined to Greece. In South Africa market liberalization in the citrus industry has also had grave social effects, including an increase in seasonal labor at the expense of a permanent workforce leading to a more impoverished and marginalized workforce (Mather and Greenberg 2003).

¹⁶ All figures on citrus production were obtained from the Office of Agricultural Development in the Argolida State Offices ("*Nomarhia*") in Nauplio.

planted with citrus, and in Manesi 14% while in the village of Gerbesi, where water has been in short supply, there is very little. Even within citrus growing areas there is great variation in the quality and quantity that can be produced on a given plot of land. Thus villages tend to produce different combinations and relative quantities of crops, contributing to the competitive and antagonistic nature of the social relations between them. While the valley villages tend to concentrate on citrus, the higher villages tend towards herding, olives, truck farming and, until recently, tobacco.

Crop “regimes” have significant implications for social relations between villages as well. Historically, relations between villages have been strongly influenced by their relative access to land, water and markets. Older residents of the higher villages remember the pre-citrus days as a time when the mountain villages were relatively well-off as a result of their herds and superior tobacco¹⁷. With citrus, residents of the higher villages began to work as day-laborers for their richer neighbors in the valley. In general, valley villages, with their more bountiful water supplies, fertile land and access to transportation, have been more successful and wealthy during periods of stability in world markets. There are some exceptions to this. In the early 20th century the higher villages were able to enrich themselves by producing a higher priced type of tobacco that did not do well in the valley. During periods of instability, mountain villages were wealthier than the valley due to their control of smuggling routes and their ability to produce for local markets. These differing economic strategies have contributed to the historical antagonism between villages that is often expressed in terms of ethnicity or

¹⁷ These memories are surely selective. Most local historians agree that higher villages were almost always poorer than the valley. Memories of economic superiority most probably reflect the competition and shifting fortunes of villages over time. Still, tobacco was an important crop for the higher villages and allowed them a certain amount of independence when prices were relatively high.

political affiliation, with the valley being “Greek” and right-wing and the mountains being “Arvaniti” and left-wing. More recently these antagonisms have been somewhat defused through the effects of subsidies and the availability of cheap immigrant labor.

Changing crop regimes have affected not only local society but the environment as well. Citrus crops need more water and fertilizer than other traditional crops, such as olives. Citrus trees must be watered at least every 20 days during the dry period from May to October and as a result have brought greater humidity to the valley and have severely taxed local water resources. Despite the expansion of the irrigation system over the last half-century, in many areas farmers still depend on electric powered wells to water their trees. As a result the water table has been steadily falling and its salinity increasing as the aquifer has been depleted. In addition, the regular and heavy use of fertilizers to maximize crop yields has polluted the ground water. Valley residents can no longer drink local water and now depend on bottled water, which is a considerable expense and requires disposing of massive amounts of plastic bottles, or they must drive to one of the few public fountains in the area that are still potable and fill containers.

Farmers in Midea township, as in other areas of Greece, are organized into local cooperatives. Each village has its own farmer’s cooperative, and the larger villages often have several that are divided by political affiliation or produce. Up until the 1980’s farmer’s cooperatives were usually associated with political parties, and many villages had two; one associated with the right-wing party *Nea Demokratia* [New Democracy] and another associated with the socialist party PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement]. Agia Triada has only one cooperative, started in 1937, that was historically associated with conservative parties. The cooperative of Gerbesi on the other hand was controlled by

communists. The role of cooperatives has changed somewhat in the past several decades. They were originally used for political lobbying, bulk purchasing of supplies, and organizing local production. Since the early 1980's however cooperatives have taken on an increasingly bureaucratic role. Cooperatives maintain weigh stations where weights are certified, and payments, taxes, and subsidies are usually channeled through local cooperatives. Part of the "pro-farmer" policy of the socialist government when Greece entered the E.U. was a bureaucratic decentralization that put much of the control over subsidy distributions in the hands of cooperatives. At the same time there was lax oversight of the large amounts of money that began to move through cooperatives. The result was a series of scandals, many real but at least some exaggerated by media coverage that tended to discredit farmer's cooperatives in general. Today the independence of cooperatives seems to be in decline, as they have become mostly institutions for the certification and distribution of subsidies. Other tasks like product marketing, bulk-buying of fertilizers, and political lobbying have become less and less common.

Farmers in Midea township as well as local officials almost universally express anxiety about the future of agriculture in the area. Farmers are well aware of the difficulties they face in the global market. Competition from other countries that produce citrus, like Spain, Turkey and Israel, has led to falling market prices, and there is an awareness that the subsidy programs of the E.U. are under economic and political pressure. At the same time there are obstacles to the modernization of Greek agriculture that is needed for global competitiveness. Local communities have resisted pressure for the "rationalization" of agriculture into larger industrial units that planners and policy-

makers almost universally argue will facilitate more efficient production¹⁸, but that will also almost surely put many small farmers out of operation. Plots remain small and dispersed. Productivity remains relatively low. Farmers are reluctant to sell their land and at the same time are reluctant, or unable, to make the kind of capital investments needed to become “professional” farmers. As local farmers look to the future, they often predict a rise in “boutique” agriculture, with greater crop diversification and specialization. Another possibility often discussed is organic agriculture, which has increased in recent years. However, in their current state, agricultural markets are far too disorganized to make these options practical now.

The anxiety of farmers in Argolida arises from the perception that family farming is longer provides sufficient income, but at the same time there are few acceptable alternatives. Given the plot sizes and prevalent market prices, it is difficult for a farmer to make more than 20,000-30,000 euro per year. While in the past such a sum may have been adequate, in the last several decades household needs have grown much faster than income. Farmers need modern houses, appliances, automobiles and cell phones. Their children require expensive clothes and private after-school tutoring. The increased consumption of consumer goods and commodified services has become an important part of status claims in rural communities, especially, as we shall see, with the growing dependence on immigrant labor. All these things have increased monetary pressures on households to maintain an “acceptable” standard of living. At the same time, there is a lack of well-paying jobs outside of agriculture. The service sector and civil service

¹⁸ It is not clear that industrial agriculture would necessarily be a more “rational” strategy, given the strains on the water supply, pressures from global production, and lack of employment alternatives. Agricultural “rationalization” usually takes into account only a limited set of goals, such as production levels and rates of profit, and excludes social and environmental effects.

provide steady, but low income, employment. Households usually try to combine the two strategies, giving rise to the ideal of the so-called “pluriactive” household.

Valley agriculture

In the valley village of Agia Triada 3,450 out of 3,950 cultivated *stremmata* produce citrus, almost entirely Merlin orange. In 2003 the village produced approximately 15,000 tons of citrus. There are 265 citrus producers (out of a total population of 1,267) registered with the local cooperative, who each produce an average of around 50 tons although individual amounts vary widely between one and 300 tons. Most of the registered producers are elderly, a reflection of both the ageing of the farming population and the tendency of Greek farmers to hold on to ownership of landholdings even while sons are doing most of the labor. Land is rarely rented, although it is common for farmers to manage and work groves for relatives who have moved away to cities. Thus, given an average household size of 4, the vast majority of households in Agia Triada engage in citrus cultivation at some level.

Citrus prices have been generally flat over the last 20 years. The peak season price in 2003 was around .16 euro per kilo, going up to around .32 euro per kilo by the late season¹⁹. Input costs, such as fertilizer, gasoline, and labor, have increased significantly however, squeezing the profit margins of farmers. Merchants and middlemen, who will quote prices that vary by quantity and quality of each farmer’s crop as well as the market, set prices. The size and quality of a farmer’s crop can move the price paid up or down by several cents euro. Farmers for their part can choose among

¹⁹ Prices here are approximate because they can vary slightly not only by market factors but also by the quality of fruit, difficulty of harvesting, and the social relationship between buyer and seller.

different buyers, including local merchants, of which there are 4 major ones in Midea township, and truckers who come from out of town to buy loads for merchants in more distant cities. Truckers usually use local farmers as middlemen who then introduce them to other farmers. Farmers try to maintain good relations with at least one merchant so they can be sure to unload their crop while at the same time they try to negotiate better prices with less well-known merchants and itinerant truckers. A floor price for oranges is set by juice factories, which are subsidized by the government to maintain a minimum price for the protection of the farmers.

Production can vary greatly by soil conditions, age of trees, and other factors but averages at around 4 metric tons (4,000 kilos) per *stremma*. The actual amount can vary from around 3 tons to a high of 10 tons. There are 40-60 trees per *stremma* and each produces from 60 to 200 kilos. Production can vary by a number of factors, including soil quality, age of trees, and amount of care provided by the farmer. Careful pruning and fertilizing can increase yields, and conversely poor care can decrease yields. Local farmers estimate that 30 *stremmata* (approximately 8 acres) are needed to provide minimum support for a family in the area. In 2003, information I collected from informants suggests that net income in the area averaged around 700 euro per *stremma* (2800 euro per acre). In practice however, it is rare to find a family surviving solely on 30 *stremmata*. The vast majority of farmers at this level of land ownership also receive some other income, either through other work, pensions or rents.

Orange production has a seasonal rhythm that influences the social and economic life of the township. The heaviest labor occurs at harvest time. Merlin is harvested from February to April, and during this period Agia Triada is crowded with tractor-trailers

hauling oranges to market and smaller trucks ferrying workers to and from the fields. Depending on field conditions, one person can harvest around 1,000-1,500 kilos per day; 30 *stemmata* take around 90 labor-days to harvest. Harvest labor can be mobilized in several different ways. Merchants will often provide labor crews and deduct .03 euro per kilo. Farmers can also opt to hire labor crews themselves. In addition farmers can harvest with their families and friends²⁰, supplemented with day-laborers as needed. The months following the harvest are devoted to pruning and fertilizing the trees and plowing the ground. This is less intensive work, and the pruning can be skipped some years. More farmers elect to do this work themselves, or only work with trusted laborers, as pruning is something of an art and requires more skill and care than harvesting. One person can prune around 25 trees per day and heavy pruning must be done every two or three years. A good pruning can increase a tree's production by a considerable amount. From May to October regular watering is needed and the farmer must visit his fields at least every 20 days or so to irrigate. In the fall more fertilizer is usually spread.

Most farmers in the valley with adequate water choose to plant orange trees. The return for the amount of labor required is considered better than other crops. However, it is still considered to be low. A few farmers think it worthwhile to rent their land to other farmers instead, but the numbers are low, under 5%. Others will try to manipulate their crops to increase yields. One way to do this is to take particular care with pruning and fertilizing. One farmer told me he is experimenting with pruning and fertilizing

²⁰ This generally takes the form of labor exchanges. Among the few families that continue to harvest citrus themselves, that is without paid workers, it is common for kin and friends to help out. It is generally understood that this assistance will be reciprocated in some form. In previous times, that is before the 1980's, many informants reported that such labor exchanges were more frequent and more organized, with several families or households working together to harvest groves collectively. However, I saw no instances of such a formal organization in my fieldwork.

techniques that would result in a stronger crop that could be harvested later when prices are higher. Another option is to change to another type of orange, one that might bring a higher price. Orange trees can be cut and new species grafted on to the stump. Planting a new species is risky for the farmer. Less common species can bring higher prices in the market, but may also be more difficult to sell, or may not do well in that location. New trees also take several years to begin producing fruit, and so they mean a loss of income for the farmer. A new planting or grafting will take 3 years to start producing fruit, and then only around 5 kilos per tree. A tree takes around 10 years to reach maturity and full production. Some farmers are turning to organic farming methods, and many more think about it as a future possibility. Organic crops must be certified over a three-year period and the crop is then sold to specialized merchants who market the organic produce in Europe. The organic farmers I spoke with complained that the market was disorganized and merchants unreliable, often going bankrupt. One farmer I spoke with had started the certification process but abandoned it after two years of low yields because he deemed the price premium inadequate.

There are several different strategies that households can adopt in citrus growing. Generally, given the uneven rhythm of labor requirements, small plot sizes and low returns, farming is a part-time occupation. In most households, about half by my estimates, the citrus crop is worked by elderly males while other household members, such as grown children and their spouses, are engaged in other occupations. The elderly male will manage the groves, overseeing irrigation, pruning and fertilizing. At harvest time the crop will be sold to a merchant who brings in a work crew of immigrants to collect the fruit. Thus, farming provides an important, but supplemental part of the

household income, in combination with pensions and the income of other household members, often wage labor in the nearby towns of Argos or Nauplio. Other, younger, farmers combine farming with other occupations that are flexible enough to allow them to do both. An example of this strategy is two brothers who owned a small café and together worked their landholdings, totaling 60 *stremmata*. By taking turns at the café they could also manage the groves. Another example is a young farmer who managed 40 *stremmata* while holding a civil service position. In both cases harvesting was done by work crews sent by the merchant purchasing the crop. In these cases the farmer only carries out the less intensive and more flexible tasks of pruning, irrigating, fertilizing, etc.

It is uncommon for young farmers to work exclusively in agriculture in Agia Triada. Those who do have usually made a conscious decision to forego a higher income in favor of a flexible work schedule with long periods of free time. However, these farmers can usually make more money per *stremma* because they can devote more time to care of the trees and can be more flexible with the timing of the harvest. One such farmer I interviewed supports a family of four on 25 *stremmata*. He has converted 8 *stremmata* to clementines, which he can harvest with family members and sell for up to 1 euro per kilo. Because he works full time in the groves he can raise productivity through careful pruning and fertilizing. He also watches the weather and markets carefully in order to harvest at the maximum price. In 2003 he was able to wait until late in the season and thus received double the peak season price of .16 euro. At harvest time he employs as much family labor as possible by spreading the harvest out and selling to merchants in smaller quantities, hiring day labor only when necessary.

A few other farmers follow the same labor-intensive strategy, often also using organic farming certification to get higher prices. However, most farmers consider this strategy to be too risky, and prefer to supplement their income with other occupations. By concentrating solely on agriculture one can increase earnings, but not to the extent that a second occupation can. Indeed, the full-time farmer told me wistfully,

“You know, when I was younger I could have gotten a job in the fire department or the electric company. I would be getting a pension now, being 45. I’d have a lot more money. But what can you do? I chose to be a farmer and have time to play soccer. I can’t say I have regrets.”

Additionally, a second occupation minimizes the effects of cyclical market prices and thus the risks that agriculturalists face. With the availability of cheap immigrant labor for harvests and subsidies that guarantee minimum prices, such a strategy is feasible. Many farmers claimed that they would prefer to leave agriculture entirely, but with the low level of wages and salaries in the service and government sectors they were forced to continue depending on agriculture as a crucial part of household income.

Hill agriculture

As one moves up the mountain, citrus groves give way to fields of vegetables, olives, tobacco and animal fodder. Landholdings are larger, but the lack of water reduces the productive potential. Citrus production is limited by the lack of irrigation. In the past, the lack of water in the higher villages of Manesi and Gerbesi limited agricultural production to herding and “dry” tobacco, enforcing social subordination to the wealthier valley. With the arrival of electricity in the late 1960’s followed soon after by deep well

technology, the higher villages have attained a certain amount of economic autonomy.

Wells are expensive, sometimes going down to more than 300 meters, but they have been used to irrigate large areas of the upper elevations. They are usually cooperatively owned and operated by 4-5 neighboring landholders.

The most dynamic agricultural sector in the upper villages, and the only one not directly dependent on state and E.U. subsidies, is the truck farming of vegetables. In Agia Triada only 4% of cultivated land produces vegetables, while this figure goes up to 67% in Gerbesi²¹. Truck farming has become more common in Argolida over the last decade as new road construction has provided faster links to the urban areas of Corinth and Athens, which is now reachable in less than two hours. Local farmers produce a variety of seasonal vegetables and fruits, such as spinach, artichokes, greens, okra, tomatoes, apricots and others, to sell in the weekly neighborhood farmers' markets ("*laikes*") of Athens and Corinth. In Manesi, some of this production occurs in hothouses. Full-time truck farmers usually make 2-3 trips to markets a week. In Gerbesi and Manesi there are approximately 30 full-time truck farmers, plus another 30 or so who do one or fewer runs per week. Farmers rent space at farmers' markets from the city and are, in theory, free to determine production and prices. In practice, however, prices are informally regulated by government authorities and pressure from fellow vendors. In the summer of 2003, for example, authorities forced farmers to lower prices on some produce after complaints from consumers by informally threatening to strictly enforce rules regarding space and garbage disposal.

²¹ All land use data for Midea township was obtained from the official agronomist of Midea township, who collects the data from each village. He provided me with a more detailed breakdown than was available from the Greek Statistical Services.

Truck farming is a labor-intensive activity. On the days when farmers are not traveling to markets they are usually busy caring for their fields. Almost all employ family labor, usually a husband and wife team supplemented by elderly parents and unmarried children. In addition most employ immigrant laborers on a regular basis. Usually they hire one or two immigrants for on-going work, often housing them in older houses or outbuildings. Others hire immigrants for day labor as needed. As one truck farmer explained, "With a [immigrant] worker you can make a third trip to the market".

Until recently, tobacco was still a main crop in the mountain villages. In the early 1980's tobacco was the major crop of Gerbesi and Manesi. At that time a combination of heavy subsidies from the E.U. and the lifting of production quotas by the socialist government of PASOK, together with lax regulation that enabled farmers to over-report production, enabled mountain villages to make huge sums of money, leading to a frenzy of new home construction and providing political support for Greece's entry into the E.U. Since 1993, however, tobacco production has been limited, and is now being slowly eliminated by the state. In 1993 licenses were issued to tobacco farmers and their production was frozen at those amounts. Licenses are non-transferable and so production has dropped partly through attrition. In addition, the government and E.U. have been providing incentives for farmers to give up their licenses. The result is that tobacco, once a major crop, is being grown on only 1,000 *stremmata* in Midea township, producing 300-500 tons. What tobacco remains is being produced in the higher villages where other possible crops are limited. Tobacco is a labor-intensive crop that is generally grown and harvested by family labor with additional labor provided by immigrant workers as needed.

The rhythm of planting, harvesting, threading²² and drying tobacco once defined village life the way citrus does in the valley (Athanasopoulou 2002). Few families survive solely on tobacco anymore, but many in Gerbesi still receive some tobacco income and hold on to their production quotas in order to collect the subsidies.

Olive groves also increase as one moves further up the mountain. In Agia Triada 14% of the land is in olive cultivation while in Manesi and Gerbesi the amount is 24%. In the valley, many olive groves were replaced with citrus, but the higher elevations, and areas of the valley without adequate water, continue to produce olives. Most olive species do not require irrigation in Argolida and many families with enough land maintain small groves for their own consumption. Olives require intensive labor at harvest during the late fall, but little labor at other times. Virtually all olives are harvested with migrant labor. However, prices are low and few people make a living producing olives. Most people in Midea township produce oil for household use and for sale or gifts to kin and friends in the cities. In addition, olive oil production is subsidized at one euro per kilo, regardless of the amount, providing a little extra income. There are exceptions. One farmer in Gerbesi, whose wife is a teacher, has planted 45 *stremmata* of olives, a more expensive variety used to produce high quality oil and requiring irrigation. He nets around 15,000 euro, a sum that will increase as the trees mature, but is content with the low amount of labor required and has little desire for increased income. Several small oil presses operate in Midea township. Presses take a 10% commission of the pressed oil. The oil is then either sold to merchants or stored for household use. Recently the E.U. has

²² Tobacco leaves must be threaded, or sown together at one end with string. The leaves are then suspended from drying racks for curing.

moved to regulate olive oil production. Owners are being required to register their groves in order to receive the subsidy, a first step towards production limits.

At the higher elevations, agriculture gives way to herding. Both sheep and goats are herded. In Gerbesi many families keep small numbers of sheep or goats for home consumption, and 15-20 families keep larger herds of over 20 head. Five families survive solely on herding, with over 200 head each. Milk is either sold to merchants who come to the village in trucks each day to collect the day's production or taken to local collecting stations. Many families sell as little as 20 liters of milk a day. In 2003 milk prices were just over one euro per kilo, with goat milk receiving less due to its lower fat content. A prime ewe can produce two kilos a day for much of the year. Meat is sold to merchants or to local butchers, or used for home consumption. In addition to income from the milk and meat, there is a yearly per head subsidy from the E.U. of approximately 30 euro per head that herders depend on. This subsidy for meat production allows an artificially low cost of meat to the consumer. The number of head a farmer can claim is fixed at the size of their 1991 herd. The only exceptions are young herders, who can increase their herds if they enroll in the New Farmers program, or by certifying organic production in which case a herder can have up to 750 head.

Like citrus farmers, herders have been squeezed between flat prices and rising expenses over the last 20 years. Expenses like medicine, feed, and fuel have risen much more quickly than milk and meat prices. In order to boost production, animals are given industrial feed in addition to grazing, which is a major expense at around .10 euro per kilo. Herders, unless they own their own grazing lands, must also rent land on which to grow fodder and graze their livestock. Full-time herders tend to be the poorer residents of

the village, and herding was the only activity that did not employ migrants as day labor. Because herding involves a steady, daily work routine, hiring non-family labor, even at the low rates paid to immigrants, would seriously decrease earnings.

Herding is still mostly a family occupation. The daily milking and grazing requires the steady and heavy labor of several individuals. In the summer the work is a little easier, as the animals often come and go from their grazing lands without a shepherd. They will return on their own for the morning milking and feeding. Also, milk production decreases during the summer months until ewes give birth in the fall. However, few young men are becoming herders. For one thing, herding is considered an undesirable occupation due to steady routine of work. As one herder explained, “there are no holidays for shepherds; Easter, Christmas, whatever, you must go to the sheep”. For another, it is considered dirty, smelly work, and young herders have a notoriously difficult time finding brides. Lately some herders have married immigrant Albanian women, who are said to have less aversion to hard work. One shepherd went to Albania to find a wife and also brought her brother down to help with the herd. One herder I spoke with who has three children said that herding and milking his 240 head is his family’s sole occupation, but that they could make more money working day-labor. He continues herding though because the hours are less and he doesn’t have to work for someone else. His children will continue herding only if they do not find civil service positions or get into training programs.

The effect of E.U. subsidies on local agricultural production

Farmers in Argolida experience E.U. policies most directly through the various subsidy and price support programs of the CAP. These programs work in various ways for different crops and are supplemented by various Greek government programs. For oranges, price support is provided through subsidies to juice producers who are able to absorb excess production and effectively set floor prices. Juice factories absorbed about one quarter of the 2003 production, around 100,000 kilos. Oranges sold for juice are usually of inferior quality to those sold as fruit, and factories pay the farmer about .10 euro. Of this sum around .08 euro is subsidized. The other form of support is payment for oranges destroyed by bad weather. In the winter of 2003 heavy rains destroyed about 100,000 tons of oranges. The spoiled oranges were purchased by the state-run EL.G.A. (Greek Agricultural Compensation) fund at a price of .13 euro per kilo, which was about 10% less than the full season market price.

The collection, certification and disposal of spoiled oranges was organized through the local farmer's cooperatives in each community. Farmers collected their spoiled fruit off the ground and once a week took them to the local cooperative to be weighed and loaded on trucks. The oranges were then transported to landfills for burial. The program was available to all communities even though the destruction had been centered in a few areas that had the most excessive rainfall and frost. This meant that in many areas farmers collected and took in fruit that had fallen off the trees as normal spoilage, enabling them to collect a little extra money. In addition, the compensation guarantee enabled some farmers to risk frosts and wait for market prices to go up, since they felt they had a guaranteed price to fall back on if their strategy failed and their crop was destroyed.

Other crops, like tobacco and olive oil, are protected by direct subsidies that guarantee minimum prices to the farmer in excess of the market price. These subsidies are given on a per kilo basis after certification of weight by local farmer's cooperatives. Tobacco subsidy policy has had an important impact on the higher villages, and its history is a good illustration of how E.U. policies have affected Midea township. Tobacco was a source of wealth for the upper villages, and for the first half of the 20th century insured their high socio-economic status within Argolida. Beginning in 1960, the government began to restrict production, limiting it to 300 kilos per family. The mountain villages became impoverished compared to the valley and began to work as day-laborers in the citrus groves. With accession to the E.U., tobacco subsidies were increased to 350 drachmas per kilo. At the same time, the socialist government under Papandreou lifted production limits. The result was that tobacco producers could produce as much as they liked and were guaranteed a good price. In addition there was very lax supervision of the subsidy program, so that farmers, especially those with positions or connections in the cooperative, were able to embezzle large amounts of money. For example, farmers would sometimes deliver 500 kilos and be certified by cooperative officials for two tons. Under this policy the mountain villages benefited enormously, gained wealth, and stopped working for the valley farmers.

In addition to direct subsidies and price supports there are also development programs that provide support to agriculture in the area. For example, the recent expansion of the national highway system that was aided by E.U. development funds has made it much easier for local truck farmers to sell in the Athens farmers markets. Other programs focus on developing infrastructure in targeted communities. In the community

of Dimena in the northeast Argolida a program was underway in 2003, funded by the E.U., to upgrade the irrigation and road systems. These programs benefit local farmers by making it easier and cheaper to produce. In Midea township one such project, started in the early 1990's, was the construction of a roadway to connect the major archeological sites of Mycenae, Tirintha, and Midea, with the goal of increasing tourism in the area by facilitating travel between the sites. However, the project was abandoned midstream for reasons that are unclear and the roadway now ends at an orange grove on the outskirts of Agia Triada. At the time the government announced that funding for the roadway had been depleted, but there was also some opposition from valley landowners whose land was in the roadway path. Some residents of the higher elevation villages assert that local politics played a role and that the project was stopped because it would have increased their economic independence. The villagers of Gerbesi are still hoping for completion of the roadway, as they consider this to be crucial for the development of a local tourist industry.

Finally, there are also programs aimed at developing local industries and modernizing agricultural production. The "New Farmers" program gives aid and privileges to young farmers who establish themselves on a professional basis. Young farmers must start off with a minimum amount of land or livestock and farm on a full-time basis. They are then eligible for grants in order to purchase equipment and build facilities, and are also exempt from certain restrictions on production. A herder for example must start with at least 70 head of livestock. Through the program he can get grants to build stables and milking facilities and is also exempt from the restrictions on

herd increase. Other grant programs are available that pay a substantial amount of the start-up costs for small businesses that open in mid or high elevation villages.

The implementation of the C.A.P. has had a number of effects on social relations within and between villages. First and perhaps foremost it has helped to disrupt traditional patterns of patronage. State aid has become an important source of income for villagers and villagers have effectively used it to by-pass the old patronage system linked to political parties. On the one hand, since a substantial part of the farmer's income comes from E.U.-regulated funds, he or she is no longer required to establish relations with local political operatives and other power brokers. This has contributed to the decline in the relevance of political parties and the rise of a technocratic political administration. Party affiliation was once a crucial aspect of community membership and defined one's social identity. Today it is difficult even to find the local offices of the political parties.

At the same time, the graft that accompanied the introduction of E.U. subsidy programs in the 1980's effectively discredited both local and national institutions like farmers' cooperatives and political parties. All the farmers I spoke with agreed that the early days of E.U. subsidies were characterized by graft and corruption. Lax rules and supervision on the part of the state made embezzlement easy. One farmer described the situation thus:

“When we went into the E.U., there was a lot of money that went to the farmers. At that time there was opposition, people were unsure how things would work. The government basically said, ‘here take this money and shut up’. There was no way to organize it, no way to distribute the money

fairly, so they just said ‘here, take the money, divide it up however you want’. And so of course everyone just took as much as they could through various schemes and tricks. The ones with connections to the cooperatives were in a position to steal the most.”

Virtually every farmer I spoke with remembers the 1980’s as a time when cooperative officials and politicians were able to embezzle huge amounts of money from E.U. funds. A common explanation was that the Europeans were naïve when it came to the Greeks and were taken advantage of. “We have only ourselves to blame”, said one man, “our leaders ate and ate [the money] with no thought of the future”. The result, according to local farmers, was that many cooperatives collapsed from internal graft and resulting bankruptcies and the E.U. finally wized up and tightened control over the disbursement of subsidies. A few farmers see a more conspiratorial explanation, a form of entrapment by E.U. largess that effectively decapitated local leaders. Whether intentional or not, local cooperative leaders were discredited and many cooperatives collapsed.

In addition, state aid has altered the relationship between villages by eliminating some of the economic inequalities between them. The tobacco money especially benefited the poorer mountain villages in Argolida that had previously depended on day-labor in the valley to supplement their incomes. Dependence on E.U. subsidies lessened the traditional dominance of the valley as by eliminating the poverty of the higher villages. Much of the money was spent on consumer goods, like household appliances and automobiles, and constructing new houses. A resident of Gerbesi described the change:

“In the 80’s the socialists came to power and a lot of money fell on the upper villages. Money I tell you! The tobacco market opened up and people were producing as much as they wanted. In Amigladitsa they had a contest to see who could build the most opulent house. Those people, they used to be total hicks. They would come down in old clothes, uneducated, none of them could read or write and they lived in shacks. Poverty I tell you. Then the money hit, and bam! You go there now and it’s all new houses in the village. Don’t get me wrong, we have good relations with them. Panos’ mother is from there and so is Mitso’s father. We have close relations with them and they were all leftists too. But they were very backward, worse than here. Today you go there and the whole village is new, but you go into these big beautiful houses and they are all peasants sitting around. A peasant in a big beautiful house!”

As the speaker indicates, new wealth from E.U. subsidies did not completely erase the lower status of mountain villagers. However, the economic independence and access to consumer goods greatly reduced the kind of class differences that existed in the post-war period.

The infusion of wealth into the rural communities of Greece came with a price. Along with subsidies came regulation. Since the 1980’s, crops that receive direct subsidies also have indirect production quotas. In the case of sheep and goats, subsidies are limited to the herd size declared when the quota went into effect. Herders may have more animals, but will only be subsidized up to their quota. Tobacco farmers are limited in the same way, but also cannot pass on their quotas to others. Olive producers are also

being required to register their production, the first step towards regulating oil production²³. In these cases E.U. policy-makers, interpreting market needs, indirectly regulate what is produced and how much. Rather than intervening directly in markets, through for example setting prices or buying excess production, E.U. subsidies go directly to the producer, both enabling the transition to free markets for agricultural products and preventing the social dislocations that would normally result. The E.U. can also influence how crops are produced, for example through the organic produce certification process and various environmental regulations. Thus the options and decisions available to farmers and national states are indirectly shaped by E.U. policies. For the farmers, there is also a sense that global consumers are increasingly influencing the market at the expense of producers. One orange farmer in Manesi remarked to me that “these days the German consumer is setting the prices”. Another lamented that consumers preferred large oranges, even if they were of inferior quality, saying that he was thinking of changing his trees because of the size of the oranges.

Despite the increased surveillance and regulation of producers entailed, farmers participate in subsidy programs because of the protection they offer from the market. Market forces are experienced by farmers in Midea township in an anarchic manner. The downward pressure on prices exerted by global markets is a constant and faceless threat to local farmers. There is little in terms of an organized response. Early attempts by state and state-affiliated organizations to mediate market forces have mostly ended in failure. For example, the predominance of Merlin oranges has made the area vulnerable to market fluctuations and kept prices low since the whole crop must be harvested and sold within a

²³ The effort to register production is a means towards greater surveillance and management of rural space by the E.U. administration. Scott (1998) has argued that the effort toward greater “legibility” through statistics is a basic tactic of the state as it tries to expand control and regulation.

relatively short period of time. In the mid-80's there was a concerted effort by the E.U. and Greek Ministry of Agriculture to diversify the orange crops in order to spread out the orange harvest and minimize threats of over-production. However, at the same time the E.U. and U.S.S.R. had signed new trade agreements that opened up the Soviet bloc to citrus imports. Trade credits stimulated exports and propped up the price of oranges, but also had the effect of discouraging diversification among farmers, who were making good money and saw no reason to lose income by replacing their trees. When exports to Russia declined in the mid-90's, farmers were left with the same problems, but by then the E.U. was no longer interested in funding diversification programs. Local officials assert that the failure of the first program has made E.U. policy-makers hesitant to grant new funding. As of now, although new programs are being discussed, none have materialized.

In general, the capacity of state bodies to carry out long-term planning in agriculture has declined since Greece's first decade of E.U. membership. A local official in charge of agricultural development in Argolida bitterly complained in an interview of the lack of planning.

"In the past the Ministry of Agriculture did have some policy-making and planning process and was involved in the politics of production but unfortunately that has broken into 15 pieces, as we say. Private industry has taken on some of that role, but the Ministry no longer really functions in that capacity. Agricultural policy in other words is left to chance. In general we are in a situation where there is absolutely no planning. There was once the ability on the part of the government to make policy, even if

it wasn't always successful. At least there were some attempts. Now there is nothing. It is just the free market. But even a free market has some rules. We don't even have that. Of course that is partly the Greek character. We operate on instinct and have an aversion to rules."

The same official went on to explain that the lack of planning has put Greek agriculture at a disadvantage compared to other producers like Spain and Israel. There was an attempt in the early 1980's to organize the Greek citrus market. A semi-private export company with state funding, AGREX, was established in order to standardize production and market Greek citrus products in Europe. A committee that included exporters, representatives of farmer's cooperatives, government officials, and the Agricultural Bank, directed the company. Steps were taken to standardize exports, impose quality control and establish a market identity for Greek products. However, it was dissolved in 1987 for reasons that are still obscure. Like the farmer's cooperatives, there were financial scandals involving the company, but some have also claimed that pressure was exerted by multinational companies that wanted more open markets.

Lack of long-term planning has made farmers even more dependent on subsidies as a way to weather the anarchic conditions of the market. In a sense the relationship of farmers with E.U. institutions has become a form of neo-patronage in which political support is bought through favors that enable agricultural families to prosper. Farmers are faced with a fundamental contradiction between their participation in a free market economy on the one hand and their continuing dependence on state subsidies on the other. Subsidies, ostensibly intended to promote a smooth transition to an efficient and "rational" agriculture, have actually had the opposite effect of sustaining an agricultural

system that, in market terms, is inefficient and disorganized. The result has been an incomplete transition to a form of “capitalistic” farming and the continuation of the peculiar nature of Greek agriculture, characterized as it is by small, dispersed landholdings and the pluriactivity of agricultural households.

Peasant to petty-bourgeoisie? The incomplete transformation of the semi-periphery

Rural Greece has traditionally formed part of the semi-periphery of world capitalist economies. In recent decades, and especially with the entry of Greece into the E.U. in the early 1980's, this condition has undergone a fundamental transformation. New relationships between local village economies and external markets have been established that have profoundly influenced village societies. The increasingly direct involvement of Greek agriculturalists in transnational European markets has affected both what is being produced and the productive strategies of rural households. The political institutions that mediate the relationship between producer and market in the agricultural sector have also begun an apparent shift away from the model of a clientelistic, authoritarian nation state to one of a bureaucratic, neo-liberal transnational regime. At the same time, the increasing dependence of rural Greeks on commodity markets to meet their consumption needs has increased their vulnerability and dependence on these markets for the income necessary to survive. Households depend less on their own production to meet their subsistence needs and more on transnational markets and state subsidies.

The household has historically been the basic unit of production in rural Greece, both in terms of subsistence and production for markets. In the household, the politics of production have been governed by the elaboration of strong ideologies of kinship and gender that have both organized the division of labor and defined social relationships. Despite the modernization of the Greek economy in the post-war period and the changes initiated since accession to the E.U., the household continues as an important unit of production, particularly in agriculture. This can be seen in Argolida where there is an almost total absence of large-scale production. Farms are family owned and operated. Yet while the household has remained the basic productive unit in agriculture, its nature has changed. Household production today is oriented almost exclusively to the market, at the expense of subsistence production. Families still produce a substantial part of their own consumption. Many families have small kitchen gardens or a few chickens. But in most households I observed, the bulk of the food consumed today comes from the supermarket. As a villager explained to me, the costs of production are too high.

“Say I want to raise my own meat, for my family. That meat is not free. I have to buy the lamb and buy feed for the lamb, I have to buy medicines, I have to take the time to take care of it. In the end it is not much cheaper than the supermarket. My mother grows a few vegetables, but mostly out of habit. In the end she only saves a few euro.”

The elderly members of households continue to provide much of the food on the table, but this share is dwindling, especially among families with young children, who tend to be avid consumers of store-bought foods.

The accessibility and low-cost of foodstuffs available in the supermarkets, as well as a demand for commercially produced and packaged foods, has made subsistence farming more and more impractical. A major exception to this is olive oil, which is still produced by many families for household consumption. Oil is produced for home consumption because it is a significant expense, given its high cost and the quantities consumed, and also because for many Greeks oil is a powerful cultural symbol embodying both an elementary foodstuff and a connection to the land.

These changes have had a profound impact on relations of production at the village level. In the past, the surplus labor and agricultural production of the Greek peasantry was a valuable reserve for both the industrial societies of the foreign capitalist centers and urban Greece. The production of this surplus was predicated on a complex web of non-capitalist, "traditional" social relationships, most prominently of gender and kinship. The advent of globalized labor markets and the increasing centrality of market economies in village life have both disrupted these traditional relationships and shifted the techniques by which the social inequalities and labor discipline necessary for rural production are reproduced. In short, the characteristic of Greek farmers as a class has undergone a significant transformation. Rural Greeks no longer form a reserve proletariat and the position of rural society as peripheral to the development of capitalist relations of production is diminishing. Thus while their incorporation continues and has even strengthened, the conditions under which this is accomplished have changed. Rural development and changing demographics have altered the ways that labor is controlled and reproduced, as well as the old relationship between rural and urban producers. In fact, it is problematic to speak of rural Greeks as a class of labor at all. What the E.U. has

made possible, it seems, is the incorporation of Greek peasants, not as an urban or rural proletariat, but as something close to a petty-bourgeoisie (Tsoukalas 1987).

Class has always been a problematic concept in the analysis of rural Greek society (Lampiri-Dimaki 1990). The historical development of rural Greek society has produced a number of special characteristics that distinguish it from other Mediterranean and Balkan societies. First and foremost, the series of politically expedient land reforms that accompanied the birth and expansion of the Greek state both dissolved the old Ottoman land-owning class and prevented the formation of a new landed aristocracy. The result was, and this is especially true for the Argolida region, a rural society of peasant smallholders with relatively little difference between the richest and poorest. The Greek economy, both rural and urban, has been heavily weighted towards small and medium scale production units, a problem that continues to today. In addition, the Greek state has always been relatively weak and for most of its history almost completely dependent on foreign powers. Internally, this has meant a reliance on patronage networks organized through competing political parties, a middle class dependent on civil service positions, and a weak national bourgeoisie propped up by both the state and foreign sponsors. Finally, the rich ethnic and geographic diversity of the Greek countryside has tended to compartmentalize both labor markets and social identity, further obscuring class formations and deflecting class-consciousness. Historically the result has been a notable lack of the kinds of antagonistic class formations found in other northern Mediterranean countries, as well as the lack of a peasant-based political party as is found in other Balkan countries.

Some propose that things are not much different today. Damianakos argues that Greek farmers as a whole have retained many qualities of a peasantry, and that even today “for most Greek ‘farmers’, agriculture is not an occupation: it is a condition to which they submit because the economy provides no credible alternative” (1997:192). In this view, the mass of Greek smallholders has basically retained a rationality of subsistence production, but with social relations that have been distorted by the expansion of capitalist markets. Control by transnational capital has increased, but the basis of their incorporation into world markets has not provided the foundation for a transformation of either class-consciousness or the structural conditions of their exploitation. The pluriactivity, high debts, shifting relations of production and continued dependence on subsistence production of Greek farmers thus represent a disorganized reaction rather than a step up the class ladder.

To be sure, Greek family farms employ a complex and heterogeneous set of productive relations between labor and capital. They are sites for both external and internal relations of production. They have also followed diverse and contradictory paths of integration with respect to global markets (Kasimis and Papadopoulos 1997). To think of them as a petty-bourgeoisie glosses over the contradictory nature of their involvement, as neither labor nor capital, and the incompleteness of their transformation. It does, however, highlight the degree to which Greek rural families have decreased their direct role in production and shifted their attention to ownership and management, even if this has been accompanied by more direct control by transnational institutions.

Today, Greek farmers in Argolida often characterize themselves as petty bourgeois or middle-class (“*mikro-mesai*”). They use this term in two senses. In one

sense they refer to a perception of social equality, of belonging to the same social class. There is a strong sense that social differences between Greek farmers have declined in the post-war period. Families that were wealthy and had large land-holdings slowly sold much of their land to finance their children's move to urban businesses, and land-poor peasants who did not move to the city were able to slowly gain land or small businesses. Today in Midea township I could not find a single Greek family that subsists entirely on wage labor with no property or business of its own. In another sense, "middle-class" refers to a perception of having land and property as capital to be monetized, invested in and exploited. Most of the land held by villagers is exploited for market production. Farmers are constantly strategizing for market success and their goal is to produce a return on their investment, to live off the profits of their production rather than labor.

Orange farmers for example constantly strategize to obtain the maximum returns from their land. They choose species depending on location of the land and availability of water. They invest in fertilizers and labor to maximize production. They also choose when to harvest by weighing the risks of bad weather against the rise of market prices. Most farmers carry out little of the actual labor themselves, preferring to hire day-laborers to harvest and often even to prune and fertilize. Instead they concentrate on managing their investments wisely in order to maximize returns. Other farmers operate in a similar manner. Truck farmers choose what crops to plant based on location and market prices. Even olive producers select species to maximize profits as one olive producer in Gerbesi explained to me.

"After high school I didn't make it into university so my father set me up with 45 *stremmata*. I decided to plant olive trees because they need very

little work and I have confidence that there will always be a demand for oil. I picked a species that produces very high-quality oil that gets a good price. This type of tree needs watering though, so I had to invest in a well and pump. Now the trees are 7 years old and produce well, but I take good care of them too, I don't just leave them to chance. Still, it's not much work, regular watering, a little fertilizing in the spring. The only hard work is harvesting in the fall, but I just get a few Albanians to do it. I clear about 13-15,000 euro a year, plus the subsidy from the E.U. That's enough for me to live on because my wife has a job."

For the villagers, land is capital to be invested in wisely. The returns come not from the labor, which is generally purchased and considered a business expense, but from the management of the investment. This is somewhat less true for truck farmers and herders though. In both of these cases the labor of the farmer plays a more direct role in the generation of profits.

At the same time, however, there has been a notable resistance to the "professionalization" of farming in Greece. For the most part this resistance comes from the farmers themselves. One of the explicit goals of the agricultural policies of the E.U. and Greek state has been the reduction and specialization of the agricultural labor force and a transition to "professional" large-scale farming. In Greece as a whole, it is estimated that around half the agricultural land and around one tenth of the farms qualify as "professional agriculture of large scale" (Papadopoulos 2001:13). In the Peloponnesos however, where small farms predominate, this proportion is much lower. In Midea township professional large-scale agriculture is the exception, found only in few of the

larger orange producers, truck farmers and hothouse operators. One indication of this is the relatively low number of full-time farmers enrolled in the New Farmers program.

The New Farmers program is an E.U. program designed to encourage the transition to professional farming. Under the program, farmers under age 40 who start out with a minimum amount of land or livestock are eligible for various subsidies and exemptions from production limits. In exchange they must agree to work full-time at farming. In Midea township there are only a few young men who have enrolled in the program. When I asked young men who are involved in farming why they did not take advantage of the program they described several obstacles. First is the problem of the initial landholdings, which are usually gained through inheritance. Because land holdings are small and inheritance is traditionally split equally among children it is difficult for one child to inherit enough land to qualify at a young age. Parents will sometimes distribute land unequally, but only after their other children are settled in careers and it is clear that one child has greater need. For example if one child becomes settled in the city with a good job and the other stays in the village, the one in the village will tend to inherit the bulk of the land. These issues are often not cleared up until later in life. In addition, there is a tendency for parents to hold on to land titles as long as they can, even if the land is worked by their grown children. This strategy enables parents to retain a measure of authority over grown children and is a constant point of conflict (Athanasopoulou 2002:103-112). Secondly, young men, and their parents, are loath to commit to a career in agriculture, preferring a flexibility of employment strategies that is precluded under the New Farmer program. Finally, some young men found the paperwork needed to enroll in the program onerous. In the village of Gerbesi I found only one young farmer, who had

set up a honey production operation, enrolled in the program. In Agia Triada I found only two, one who has an organic hothouse and another who grows oranges.

The lack of interest in the New Farmers program is symptomatic of the general ambivalence towards agriculture displayed by villagers, the overwhelming majority of whom say that they do not want their children to become farmers. Agriculture is seen as a career of last resort to be followed only when other career possibilities are exhausted. Villagers cite the declining prices of agricultural products and rising expenses that make it difficult to make a living with the small average acreage of the area. There is also anxiety about the future; indeed, the overwhelming majority are pessimistic regarding farming as a sustainable livelihood. At the same time however, agriculture is seen as an important supplemental income and land is sold only with reluctance. In fact, most farmers told me that, given the opportunity, they would buy more land rather than sell. While some of this ambivalence is based on speculation regarding the future land market for vacation homes, it also seems to be a result of the value placed on part-time farming, the so-called “pluriactivity” of Greek farmers, and the lack of other avenues for capital investment.

Rather than the “professionalization” of agriculture, the last several decades have brought an increased tendency towards this pluriactivity, rooted in the flexible patterns of employment and frequency of urban-rural movements that have characterized Greek society since at least the early 20th century. Statistically, around 30% of farm heads, 15% of farmer spouses and 23% of other family members combine agriculture with other jobs in Greece (Papadopoulos 2001:14). In Midea township, the percentages seem much higher. Based on interview data, I estimate that in the upper village of Gerbesi only

around 10% of households live exclusively on agricultural income. For the valley town of Agia Triada the figure is even lower, below 10%. The majority of households combine income from agricultural with other forms of income, and are thus pluriactive.

Pluriactivity can take different forms however. In some cases a head of household combines farming with other pursuits. A café owner in Agia Triada I interviewed for example, who runs the café with his brother, gets about a third of his income from oranges he grows on 30 *stremmata*. Many farmers, especially in Agia Triada, combine farming with a small business, civil service position, or skilled labor. Other households have pluriactive members, and this seems to be more common in Gerbesi. For example, in one family the 65 year old grandfather continues to farm a small piece of land and collects a small pension while his son and daughter-in-law, who live with him, work in salaried positions in the nearby city of Argos, he as a truck driver and she as a physical therapist. Eventually, the son plans to take over the farming responsibilities as well. In Midea township most pluriactivity centers around the service and tourist industries. In other areas of Greece, meanwhile, the pluriactivity of the rural population is connected to the development of light manufacturing and the garment industry (Kalantaridis and Labrianidis 1999; Hadjimichalis and Vaiou 1987).

Pluriactivity has a positive value for households for several reasons (Zakopoulou 1999). It is perceived as a safe strategy because it spreads out the risk of economic downturns. Farming is still perceived as something to fall back on in times of hardship while small businesses are considered to benefit when times are good. In addition, it is widely thought that more than one source of income is necessary to maintain an adequate standard of living. The generally low income of farming, the low profit margins of small

businesses and the low pay of civil servants put pressure on households to combine sources of income. Farming, because of its somewhat flexible labor requirements is thought to be an ideal complement to the regular schedules of wage and salaried employment.

It is somewhat misleading, however, to think of pluriactivity only as the holding of more than one job simultaneously. In reality, pluriactivity signals the ability of households to exploit the labor of different individuals simultaneously. The pluriactivity of households generally reflects a strategy of diversification. Given the unstable economy and limited prospects for high-income employment in the area, families try to spread members out over a number of professions. Parents encourage children to pursue careers outside of agriculture but at the same time encourage them to stay in the household. Many people told me in interviews that “we keep the family strong here and we like to keep our children close”. Indeed it is rare for an unmarried child to live outside the natal household in Midea township. Stem family households are the norm. It is very common for households to contain three generation, although in many cases grandparents live in adjacent dwellings while cooperating closely in terms of labor, child-care and meals²⁴. In the households, it is generally the elderly who carry out farming tasks. Young people may help out sometimes, but are usually either going to school, working or looking for work. Parents often complain that their children are lazy and that they expect to be taken care of by their parents indefinitely. However, in the family histories I obtained a clear pattern emerged of children taking over agricultural work and responsibilities when parents became incapacitated.

²⁴ The most common arrangement in Midea township is for new couples to construct their own dwelling either above or next to the husband’s parents house. While technically separate, the two households generally function as one, pooling labor, resources, and, to a certain extent, income.

Individuals who are pluriactive, who hold more than one job, can only do so if at least one job is flexible and part-time. In reality very few individuals in Midea township can work as farmers and hold a job at the same time. Farming demands periods of intensive labor that make a regular time schedule difficult. Those who are technically pluriactive in fact do relatively little of the work themselves. For example, one man I interviewed, Vasili, grows oranges on 30 *stremmata* in Agia Triada and at the same time has a position with the town administration as a street cleaner, a lucrative civil service position. He does little of the farm labor himself though. When intensive labor is required in his groves, such as at harvest or for pruning, he contracts with laborers. If he had to do the farm labor himself he would not be able to hold his second position, which requires that he work a five day, 35 hour week. Thus the pluriactivity of the Greek farmer in Midea township is possible only because of the available cheap labor of immigrants. It would not be possible otherwise, and indeed I found no example of a farmer who was pluriactive *and* did farm labor himself.

Pluriactivity in Midea township tends to reinforce perceptions of class homogeneity and minimize class antagonism. Since both individuals and families tend to simultaneously pursue different economic strategies, i.e. agriculture, small businesses, and wage labor, class consciousness remains ephemeral and diffused. Attempts to support the emergence of a professional class of farmers have met with only minimal success. While such a class may emerge under pressure from E.U. policies, the expression of its interests are so far inchoate and muted. Pluriactivity, a strategy of evading classification, in fact represents a certain resistance on the part of farmers to their consolidation as a class. A recent attempt to define a professional class of farmer through the Registry of

Farmers and Farm Enterprises (MAAE) competed in 1997 has so far been ineffective, in part because of the blurring effect of pluriactivity in farming households (Papadopoulos 2001:20-22).

Partly as a result of this resistance on the part of farmers, as well as other pressures like GATT policies, the E.U. has more recently shifted to a sectoral rather than agricultural approach to rural development. The latest phase of CAP policies emphasizes economic diversification and the preservation of heritage through tourism and “heirloom” production. It has been argued that the discursive framework of CAP policies and the paradigm shifts in the underlying definitions and assumptions concerning “rural” societies play a significant role in re-configuring local practices (Gray 2000). In Greece, the sectoral approach seeks rural development through policies that accept agriculture as a largely part-time activity. This approach inherently recognizes the power of family and community relationships in the transformation of rural areas and attempts to use them as bases for the ‘rationalizing’ of agriculture (CLSEP 1998). In contrast to previous C.A.P. policies, pluriactivity is being embraced as the norm and attempts to promote the development of a professional class of farmers are de-emphasized. The sectoral approach also has implications for understanding the reproduction of agricultural labor in the countryside. Rather than focusing on the *labor* of the farmer through his so-called professionalization, the focus now is on the management of the farm enterprise, the recruitment of labor being left to the family and community to sort out.

The incomplete and contradictory process of “petty-bourgeoisification” of the Greek peasantry has produced a number of problems and contradictions. The process has been limited by the inadequate structural conditions. Land is limited and existing

landholdings are inadequate for the basic capital needed by household economies, given current market conditions and prices. Furthermore, other economic sectors are still unable to provide enough economic opportunities for local residents, leading to a relatively high rate of rural under- and unemployment. This problem has largely been held in check by the existence of a program of state subsidies that allows families to maintain a high standard of living while propping up many unproductive rural businesses. The dependence on subsidies and bank loans, together with the control exercised by global markets, has meant that perceptions of increased autonomy and freedom, and of a corresponding rise in class status, are somewhat illusory. At the same time, the attempt to raise the peasantry into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie *as a class*, which has been necessary to preserve the political legitimacy of the shift towards neo-liberal market policies, has created a labor shortage. Rural Greeks, expecting a certain standard of living, no longer want to work as agricultural laborers. This has created the paradoxical situation in which a high level of unemployment co-exists with a shortage of agricultural wage-labor. Farmers can no longer afford to pay the wages demanded by Greek laborers and can no longer call on other means for mobilizing the necessary labor, such as kin and gender obligations. The solution to the labor crisis has been found through the introduction of migrant laborers from the destroyed economies of Eastern Europe, a process that has disguised the class contradictions in rural Greece and obscured the on-going problems of development.

III. IMMIGRANT LABOR IN THE VILLAGES

Household economies and the mobilization of agricultural labor

The agricultural economy is diffused through most of the households of Midea township. Indeed, there are few families that do not participate directly in agriculture. At the same time, there are few families that live exclusively from agriculture, and these tend to be among the poorer families in the area. But while agriculture is the foundation of the local economy, agricultural labor has a very low status. Local residents attribute this to the low profit levels of agricultural production, which are seen as inadequate for contemporary needs. Commodity consumption has risen steadily in the villages, as have the costs and amounts of supplies for farming. Market prices for agricultural products on the other hand have remained flat as a result of pressures to provide the lowest cost to urban consumers. Subsidies from the E.U. help to improve the low profitability of agricultural labor, but in order to maintain profits labor costs are squeezed. In addition, traditional pools of low-cost agricultural labor, particularly women, children and land-poor peasants, are no longer available. The solution to this labor crisis has been the massive immigration of Eastern European laborers.

In Midea township today there are three basic patterns of household economy. Each of these patterns has been affected by processes of globalization in slightly different ways. I distinguish between these three by using the terms *elderly* household, *pluriactive* household, and *agriculturalist* household in order to illuminate the different interests of each. There is of course significant variation within each category, as well as overlaps between them.

Elderly households are those made up exclusively of retired couples with children who no longer live in the area. I estimate that in Midea township such households make up around 30% of the total²⁵. Elderly households depend on a combination of pensions and agriculture for survival, and sometimes small amounts of aid from grown children. Pensions tend to be low, particularly agricultural pensions, which average around 400 euro per month. Agriculture is thus often an important source of supplementary income. Because their children are far away, usually working in Athens, labor is in short supply. Sometimes elderly households rent out their lands, but it is common for people to work their land into their 70's and even 80's. They can sometimes count on help from friends and relatives, but this is rare. For difficult work such as harvesting, it is necessary for these households to hire labor, almost always immigrants. Elderly households vary most significantly in the amount of pension they receive. Those who have retired from high paying jobs in Athens live relatively comfortably with their pensions and spend little effort in farming, sometimes renting out their land. Those who retire on agricultural pensions face more economic difficulties and generally must continue to farm.

The large number of elderly households in the village, and elderly persons in general, often gives the impression that the villages are dying out. Declining birthrates and urban migration both act to push the average age of village residents higher. However, on closer inspection the situation is more complex. In many of the elderly households I interviewed, almost half in fact, members reported that they had spent

²⁵ According to the 2001 census, 40% of households in Midea township have one or two members (http://www.statistics.gr/gr_tables/S1100_SAP_1_nik2001_mon.htm). Based on my observations, the vast majority of these are elderly households with children who live elsewhere or retirees from urban areas. My estimates are somewhat lower because my own incomplete census of the villages indicates a lower figure, which I attribute to the tendency for some elderly to live separately but adjacent to grown children and thus functionally in a larger household.

substantial parts of their lives outside the village, returning for retirement. Many for example had worked in Athens for at least part of their lives. Upon retirement these couples had decided to return to the village for several reasons. Peace and quiet was the most common, but residents also cited the sociality of the village and the ability to live more cheaply. Thus, the high proportion of pensioners is not necessarily indicative of a quickly aging population, but is also partly a reflection of urban-rural movements over the life span.

Pluriactive households, as described in the previous chapter, make up the majority of households in Midea township. More households are pluriactive in Agia Triada than in the higher villages because of the centralization of civil administration and businesses there. In pluriactive households, agriculture tends to be the domain of the older generation. Children, even if they live at home, usually do not take over management of fields until their parents are incapacitated. For example, a civil servant in Agia Triada, who supplements his income with 40 *stremmata* of oranges, tangerines and olives, complained to me that his grown son who has graduated from university and is looking for a position as a teacher “doesn’t even know where all the fields are”. These households also vary greatly in the degree of dependence on agriculture. For those heads of household with high-paying jobs such as professionals, agriculture adds only a small supplementary income while for others the wage labor of wives and children in service industries supplements the main income from agriculture. In general, the less dependent a pluriactive household is on income from agriculture, the more likely it is to use immigrant labor for farming. Those who are more dependent on agriculture are loath to

spend money hiring workers, and will only do so at times of peak labor demand such as the harvest.

In most pluriactive households I visited, members cited the need for consumer goods as the driving force behind pluriactivity. This is especially true for families with children, who are perceived to require great amounts of expenditure. While children in all households are encouraged to go into the professions and service industries, this is particularly true for pluriactive households, whose status rests on their foothold in such activities. Pluriactive families are more likely to spend money on after-school tutoring (*'frontistiria'*), fashionable clothing, motorbikes, and spending money for their children. In addition, as adult family members become more involved in economic activities outside of agriculture, they require more consumer goods. In the professions and service industries, workers are expected to maintain a degree of status through consumer goods such as clothes, appliances, cellular telephones and automobiles that agriculturalists do not necessarily require.

Finally there are agriculturalist households, those that depend exclusively or nearly exclusively on agriculture and its subsidies for a living. These households are more common in the higher villages such as Manesi and Gerbesi, where they account for around 30% of households. In Agia Triada they account for only around 15% of households. A few families live almost exclusively from oranges, but these are the exceptions. Most agriculturalist households are involved in either truck farming or herding, both occupations that require steady, intensive labor. There are about 20 households that live from truck farming in Agia Triada. Some of these sell oranges, but most operate hothouses and sell their produce in farmer's markets in Athens. Hothouses

require labor that is especially difficult and uncomfortable, and immigrants are used almost exclusively. In the upper villages there are fewer hothouses. There vegetables are grown in fields and trucked to farmer's markets. In this type of truck farming more family labor is used. For example a family I interviewed in Gerbesi that produces vegetables for farmer's markets rarely hires immigrants. Most of the work is done by the husband and wife, sometimes aided by their 25-year-old son. I found only a few cases of daughters working in agriculture.

Herders are found almost exclusively in the higher villages where there is adequate land for grazing and planting of feed crops. Among all households, herders tend to rely the most on family labor, generally a husband-wife team sometimes helped by grown children. Immigrants are seldom used. Herds require milking twice a day during most of the year and the average herd takes two people several hours at each milking. With such labor requirements the hiring of day-labor is difficult, as it is not a full day's work yet precludes other employment. Herding families also tend to be among the poorer households in Midea township, along with some of the pensioners. Of all the households, herders tend to have the most difficulty financing their children's status consumption. Their children are less likely to attend private after-school tutoring and lack many of the luxuries that other children, especially teenagers, in the village have.

The gendered division of labor varies between the types of households. In households that depend heavily on agriculture, such as the poorer elderly households and agriculturalist households, women participate and often take on the bulk of the farm labor. In pluriactive households and the wealthier elderly and agriculturalist households, women are less likely to participate in agriculture. In most pluriactive households women (except

the older generation) work outside the home in service jobs. Most are wage laborers in the local service industries, civil servants, or professionals such as teachers, medical professionals, etc. At the same time there is a strong feeling, expressed by both men and women, that women's primary responsibility should be with child-care. The education and care of children receives a great deal of attention from families, and it is generally the mother that spends the most time in child-caring tasks such as preparing food and helping with homework²⁶. Thus women often take on a "double duty" of wage labor and the bulk of housework and childcare. Men, on the other hand, generally replace their household labor by hiring immigrants if they work in jobs outside the household.

The departure of women and children from agricultural labor is generally seen as a mark of upward mobility. The withdrawal of family labor from agriculture is reinforced by strong perceptions that menial agricultural labor is inappropriate for Greeks. Labor tasks are commonly separated into "Greek work" and "Albanian work". Albanian, or immigrant, labor generally requires the least skill and is the most difficult and strenuous. Harvesting oranges, for example, is something that no Greek will do on a day-wage basis. Only the landowner and occasionally his or her family and friends will stoop to harvesting oranges. Tasks like pruning, that require more skill and care, will sometimes be done by immigrants, but Greeks complain that they want too much money (40-50 euro a day as opposed to 30 euro a day for harvesting) and cannot be trusted to take appropriate care with the trees. The low-status of "Albanian" tasks means that even unemployed Greeks will refuse such work. Indeed, when I worked for a few landowners

²⁶ There are exceptions to this pattern. In some households men contribute to cooking, light housework, and (more often) childcare. In one household that I interviewed where the mother worked as a teacher the agriculturalist husband and the retired grandfather took on much of the childcare responsibilities, including some cooking and cleaning. In general, though, village men avoid such tasks.

during the harvest it became a joke that I was really an “Albanian-American” [Alvano-amerikano]. There are some exceptions to this pattern. Two families I met make efforts to harvest without hiring immigrants, relying instead on family and friends, but even these resorted to hiring a few immigrants during the peak weeks of the harvest. Others claim to not hire immigrants on principle. One older man in Gerbesi, a very vocal and militant communist, told me he has never hired a single Albanian. But when I asked who harvests his apricots, he replied that he sold them to the merchants on the tree. The merchants then bring their own crews, immigrants of course, to harvest.

The perception of value in agricultural labor is worth a closer look. Greeks routinely look down on agricultural work as having little value. The reason given is almost always the low prices offered for agricultural products, as a herder in Gerbesi explained

“Look, agriculture is just not profitable anymore. My herd occupies a family of four; it’s a full time job for four people. If we all had regular jobs we would be making more money, even if we were making the basic salary. Plus it’s a constant headache, you never get off work. We have to work 365 days a year, 24 hours a day.”

Orange picking is a more extreme example. Wages for picking oranges, at 25-30 euro a day and no benefits, are considered low for Greeks and the work is difficult and uncomfortable. Greeks do work for 25 euro per day in the local fruit packing factories, but this work is considered easier and companies pay full social security taxes. Packing factories rarely employ immigrants. The difficulty and discomfort of work in the fields

thus seems to be a primary reason that local Greeks avoid working the harvests at the present wages.

Most farmers say that it is the low prices of oranges on the market that keeps the wages down, although others, unemployed workers in particular, will cite the availability of low-cost immigrants as the reason. Each argument uses a different calculus. From the data I collected, I estimate that a worker harvesting oranges produces 150-180 euro per day for the farmer at the peak season, up to twice this much in a good year. Of this sum, 30-35 euro goes to the worker at the present rates. I estimate that another 15-20 euro goes to maintenance costs such as pruning, fertilizing, water, etc. on average. The rate of profit for the farmer is then somewhere around 100-130 euro per worker day. Per *stremma* profit rates for Merlin oranges average around 400-500 euro on expenses of 180-220 euro, although this can vary widely depending on weather, age of trees, etc.

Greeks claim that agricultural wages are very low, well below what is needed to live, especially given the seasonal nature of the work. Based on interviews with young people and the underemployed, wages would have to be at least double in order to attract Greek laborers. For the Greek farmer, such an increase in the cost of labor would significantly reduce profits, reducing the ability of the household to keep up with consumption demands. The solution to this dilemma has been the large immigration of Eastern Europeans, who are willing to work for much less due to their poverty and the lower costs of social reproduction in their homelands. Through a variety of pressures, immigrants have been “accustomed” to a much lower standard of living. The squeezing of the farmer by low market prices on the one hand and increased production costs on the

other has thus been accommodated through reducing the price of labor by the use of immigrants.

The perception of the declining profitability of agriculture has encouraged families to reallocate their labor into other areas, such as skilled wage-labor, small businesses and professions while maintaining agriculture as a secure economic base. Most parents I spoke with actively discourage their children from going into agriculture. This redirection of family labor is strongest in pluriactive households. As one farmer in Agia Triada told me,

“No, I don’t want my sons to go into farming. Let them do something else. There’s no future here. It is impossible to make a good living here and in a few years this will all be gone, it will disappear. If they can’t get in anyplace else, OK, they always have farming to fall back on, but I wouldn’t wish that even on my enemy.”

In many households I interviewed even unemployed grown children were discouraged from helping out in the fields. For example, a civil servant with orange groves in Agia Triada said he was giving his 24-year-old son an allowance for spending money, but did not ask him to help in the fields since he was inexperienced and had no interest in agriculture. In agriculturist households children were encouraged to work in the fields only if they were unsuccessful in school. When I asked a herder in Gerbesi about the future he foresaw for his children, he responded

“It depends on school, how well they study. My older boy does not like to read. School, zero. So I have him working the herd with me. Maybe I’ll be

able to put him in a civil service position, otherwise he will be a shepherd.”

In addition, there is a demographic aspect to the exclusion of family labor from agriculture. The average number of children in the families I interviewed was under two, a significant change from just a generation ago²⁷. Parents told me that having fewer children allowed them to use more resources, such as social connections or money for private lessons, in establishing their children in well-paying jobs.

The strategy of excluding family members from agricultural labor encourages the formation of pluriactive households, but it is only possible because of the presence of a large number of immigrants willing and able to work. Immigrants subsidize the pluriactive household by providing labor at a cost that enables such families to continue to make a profit from agriculture while pursuing other more lucrative occupations. Given the smaller family size, the low prices of agricultural products and increased opportunities for jobs in the commercial, service and government sectors, it is difficult to imagine how agriculture would be possible without immigrant labor. And yet agriculture still provides the foundation of the local economy. Thus immigrants, who are marginalized and denigrated by Greeks, are a necessary part of the local economy and instrumental to the functioning of local households.

Albanian and Eastern European immigration

Since the early 1980's Greece has been experiencing a growing flow of immigrant labor, reversing its former status as an exporter of labor to more developed countries.

²⁷ From 1960-1981 the birthrate in Greece was fairly stable at around 2.3. Since 1981 the birthrate has declined significantly, to 1.3 in 1998 (Simeonidou 2002).

Immigrants come from many countries in Eastern Europe, particularly Albania, as well as from more distant countries like Pakistan and India. While accurate numbers are difficult to obtain because many immigrants are illegal, estimates place the number of immigrants at around 1 million, making up around 10% of the population of Greece and over 15% of its labor force (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999; Fakiolas 2000). Today immigrants live in almost every part of Greece and make up the lowest strata of workers in both urban and rural areas. Immigrants are concentrated in agricultural (Kasimis et al 2003) and “informal” (Droukas 1998) sectors of the labor market.

Statistics gained from working permit applications give a broad picture of the characteristics of immigrants (Lianos 2001)²⁸. The largest number of immigrants are from Albania (65%) followed by Bulgaria (6.5%) and Romania (4.5%). Smaller numbers come from as far away as Pakistan, India and the Philippines. Most immigrants are male (75%), although from a few countries (Bulgaria, Ukraine, Philippines, Moldova) the majority are female, reflecting their concentration in domestic and sex work. 82% are between the ages of 20-44, but males are younger on average. 48% of males are aged 20-29 compared with 36% of females. 82% of immigrants had secondary education or lower (32% at primary level. For post-secondary education, women had higher rates (16%) compared to males (6.4%). 40% of immigrants reside in metropolitan Athens.

The recent immigration pattern to Greece has been spurred by both “push” and “pull” factors related to the expansion of the E.U. and the reorganization of global capitalism (King 2000). On the one hand the collapse of socialist economies in the 1980’s

²⁸ These figures should be taken as approximate. They are based on applications for legal employment status after the implementation of the 1997 regularization program (Lianos 2001:6). Applications numbered 352,632, representing (depending on estimates of illegal population) between 30% and 50% of total immigrant population.

created social instability and poverty in eastern European countries that encouraged the mass emigration of many towards the west, including Greece. The political and economic victory of the capitalist west over the Soviet Union and its Eastern European periphery at the end of the Cold War both opened the previously militarized borders and created a huge supply of surplus laborers searching for work. At the same time the accession of Greece to the E.U. made it an attractive destination for migrants. Economic development spurred by E.U. investments and subsidies, as well the opening of Eastern European markets for Greek agricultural products, led to a rising standard of living and a growing middle class while at the same time creating a need for flexible and exploitable labor. This was particularly true in rural areas, where a declining birth rate and urban migration had precipitated a labor shortage as early as the 1950's, although it was for several decades offset by increasing mechanization (Pepelasis 1963).

In Midea township, the recent history of immigration is tied to the orange. As we have seen, recent patterns of labor migration may be new, but they are not unprecedented. The valley of Argolida has long depended on migrant labor for harvesting, whether it be cotton, olives, or citrus. Migrants have traditionally provided needed labor at periods of peak demand. As orange cultivation expanded from the 1950's on, migrant labor was often used to make up for local shortages. In the past the migrants have come from other areas of Greece, although periodically waves of immigrants from more distant lands have settled. In the 1980's orange production was further stimulated by the opening of markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The E.U. aided this development by negotiating trade agreements and providing subsidies. Trade agreements were portrayed as a form of humanitarian assistance, but were also clearly efforts to colonize new

markets. For the farmers of Argolida, this was a huge windfall. At the same time, however, labor was in increasingly short supply. Greek migrants and local workers became scarcer and family labor was inadequate. Hippie backpackers and Gypsies were used as a stopgap measure, but the real solution to the problem came with Eastern European migrants. The first migrants to arrive, in the early 1980's, were Poles (Romaniszyn 2000). By the end of the 1980's the majority of migrants were Albanians. Thus, by the end of the decade a curious circle had been completed, similar to the privatization and expropriation of peasant lands in the early Industrial Revolution. The products that had been used to help destroy the economies of Eastern Europe were now being produced with the human flotsam from that same destruction.

In the early 1980's most Greeks saw immigrants as both a temporary problem reflecting social upheaval and a temporary solution to the labor shortage. Many Greeks in Midea township continue to hold this view. As one farmer explained to me,

“These Albanians, they don't want to stay. They are all trying to get some money and return home. That's natural; everyone wants to live in their homeland. Besides, they don't fit in here. They are too different. They won't stay.”

Since the early 1980's however, immigrant labor has become institutionalized in Greece, and many sectors of the economy, agriculture in particular, are now dependent on it. In retrospect it is the temporary nature of the immigrants, their migrancy, that has facilitated their exploitation. In the beginning virtually all immigrants were illegal. The Greek state did not regulate labor immigration until 1997 when a system of residency permits was instituted. Up to that time all labor migrants were subject to immediate deportation if

caught. After the 1997 law, it is estimated that approximately 70% of immigrants have filed applications for legal status (Tzortzopoulou 2002:47).

I estimate that the total number of immigrant laborers that reside in Midea township is approximately 1,000. During 2003 the township had 914 immigrants registered as residents. Since the introduction of a work permit system in the late 1990's, most immigrants have legal, even if precarious, status. However, a small percentage, I estimate around 10%, continues to live illegally for various reasons²⁹. Either they are waiting to get employment, cannot pay the required fees, are wanted by the police, or have some problem with their documents. During the orange harvest the number of immigrants roughly doubles, although exact figures are hard to obtain because most who are there temporarily do not register as residents. Most immigrants live in the bigger villages of Agia Triada, Anifi, and Argoliko, each housing 150-200 immigrants. In recent years, more and more immigrants have come as families, with children, but the overwhelming majority, around 80% continues to be single males³⁰.

Immigrants make up roughly 15% of the local population and a much higher percentage of the local labor force. When one takes into account the fact that the majority are male workers, we can see that immigrants make up about one third to one half of the local agricultural labor force, depending on the time of year. At certain times and places,

²⁹ Due to the risks involved for the subjects, I did not collect data on immigration status. My estimates come from the estimates offered me by immigrants and local residents. The actual number may be well above 10%. In some cases I suspect that immigrants who claimed to have permits in fact did not, or had incomplete, expired, etc. papers. I base this on several instances when I saw immigrants run away at the unexpected appearance of the police. On the other hand, the lack of proper permits is not the only reason immigrants have for fearing the police.

³⁰ Overall 70% of immigrants to Greece are male (Tzortzopoulou 2002:47-48), but female immigrants tend to be concentrated in urban and touristic areas, a reflection of the gendered patterns of migration in southern Europe today (Anthias 2000; Anthias and Lazaridis 2000).

such as the orange harvest in Agia Traida or the olive harvest in the higher villages, immigrants make up the largest percentage of the labor force.

In the early years the situation for immigrants in Greece was very chaotic. With few exceptions, immigrants came illegally with no way to acquire working or residence permits. For most, this meant passage over the mountains into Greece on foot, furtive traveling by foot, bus or hitchhiking within Greece, and constant harassment from police (King et al 1998). One young man from Albania described the situation to me.

“I first came to Greece in 1990. I was 15 years old and I decided to go. I didn’t tell my parents anything, just left. I hitchhiked and walked to the border, about 60 kilometers from my village. And after I crossed the border by walking over the mountains. I met up with some others who were doing the same and they showed me the way. Wow, was I unprepared for what I found. In Albania we had heard good things about Greece, easy money, a rich place. I was so stupid. I thought the streets would be lined with flowers! When I crossed the border I found something different. We had no food and no place to sleep. We were sleeping in abandoned buildings and eating wild greens. Finally I made it to Kastoria and was able to find work harvesting peaches. I stayed there for a while then got a bus ticket farther south, to Larissa. I worked there for a while but then the police caught me and sent me back to the border. I had only managed to work for two months, but I saved a little money, took a bus home from the border. My parents were happy to see me, they didn’t

know if I was alive or dead! The next year I came back, but this time I knew what to expect.”

For these early immigrants from southern Albania, the trip to Greece was dangerous and the conditions there uncertain. Deportation was a constant threat. Some turned to theft in order to survive, although in the beginning they stole mostly food, clothing and cooking utensils.

The Greeks too remember the early years of immigration as a chaotic time. A Greek farmer in Agia Triada described his memories as follows.

“I will never forget those early years. People were coming down, they looked half-dead. They all traveled at night and people were afraid to leave their houses. Things started disappearing, little things like clothing from the clothesline. I would sometimes find them in the groves, sleeping under the orange trees wrapped in plastic sheeting to keep dry. Sometimes we gave them food. They wanted work, they worked for almost nothing in the beginning, just a plate of food sometimes.”

Because of the shortage of low-cost labor, Greek farmers began to employ the immigrants during the harvest and later for other menial jobs. In the early days wages were very low, 10-15 USD per day. Sometimes farmers would not pay the immigrants at all, turning them over to the police instead when the harvest was done.

As the numbers of immigrants grew during the 1990's, so did the need for some sort of state regulation. Greece was the last country of the European Mediterranean to regulate immigration, finally doing so in 1997 (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999). The delay was due to the ambivalent reaction of Greeks to the immigrants. On the one

hand fear spread that immigrants were taking away jobs from Greeks and that they were disorderly. On the other hand they clearly needed the labor. Many demanded immediate round-ups and deportation. This often occurred in urban areas as police conducted sweeps of neighborhoods. Farmers on the other hand demanded that immigrants be left alone during the harvest seasons. There was also a concern on the part of the state over the growing black-market labor force that was untaxed. Government officials have long seen the need to import labor as compensation for an aging population. As the illegal immigrant labor force has grown, so have problems in the taxation and pension systems that suffer under a black market labor regime (Tzilivakis 12/6/02). The result, instituted in 1997 and modified several times, most recently in 2001, was a system of temporary working permits for those already employed³¹.

All immigrants in Greece start off illegally, and it is very difficult to ever attain the same rights as native Greeks. Despite the laws, the Greek state bureaucracy makes attaining legal residence and citizenship rights a formidable task. Greece currently has the lowest recognition rates of political asylum in Europe, dropping to only 1% in 2002 (Tzilivakis 28/2/03), forcing all immigrants regardless of their motivation to go through the same process. One of the peculiarities of the Greek immigration law is that work and residence permits are only granted after an immigrant has worked for 120 days. During this grace period, immigrants are weeded of potential troublemakers by both police sweeps of trouble spots and the refusal of employers to sponsor those who are not deemed subservient enough. After 120 days, or the signature of an employer, an

³¹ Despite legalization and the implementation of working permits, the system remains chaotic. Gathering the various papers and stamps is extremely time-consuming. Permits are routinely issued late, in some cases permits have already expired by the time they are issued. The chaos of the bureaucracy and the delays in issuing permits keeps even legal immigrants in a precarious position (Tzilivakis 2004b).

immigrant can apply for residence and work permits. In many ways the immigration legislation has been an effort to tax immigrants without legalizing their entry. Under current law immigrants can receive permanent residence status after 10 years and apply for citizenship. Because the legislation went into effect in 1997, the first immigrants will be eligible for this in 2007.

The tangled bureaucracy an immigrant must navigate creates many obstacles (Tsarouha 2002). It often takes days of waiting in line at offices. Permits are often sent out late, or are refused if certain required papers are not filed. Even though a legalization process exists, many immigrants prefer to remain illegal (Tzivilakis 8/2/02). Reasons given are varied. Some immigrants are not planning to stay for long and the permits require too much time and money. Others are lacking some required document, such as an original birth certificate. Others want to avoid paying taxes on the little they earn. Often employers refuse to give immigrants the days off needed to apply for permits. In many cases, employers prefer immigrants to work off the books so as to avoid social security payments and more easily intimidate the workers.

Most immigrants I spoke with who have come to Greece after 1997 followed similar paths. First they enter Greece on a tourist visa good for three months. In order to get a working permit, an immigrant must first give proof of employment in the form a signed statement from an employer. A working permit is required before an immigrant can apply for a residence permit. Technically the employer is liable for social security taxes (either I.K.A.[Institute of Social Insurance], for laborers or O.G.A. [Organization of Agricultural Insurance] for agricultural workers) that have incurred from the immigrant's employment, but in practice these fees are either not paid or paid by the immigrant. The

laws concerning social security payments for immigrant workers have been confusing and contradictory. The result has been that immigrants are often forced to “purchase” retroactive social security coverage (in the form of stamps) when they apply for permits (Tzilivakis 2004a). The immigrant must also pay a 150 euro processing fee. The working permit that is issued is good for six months, after which it can be renewed by showing proof of payment of social security taxes and another processing fee. Working papers thus represent a substantial expense for the immigrant. In addition, immigrants pay 320 euro per year in social security taxes, representing approximately 13 day-wages. Social security entitles workers to health care and a modest pension, currently 140 euro per month. Social security taxes are almost always paid by the immigrant out of his or her wages. Despite these expenses, most immigrants today have valid working permits because they offer security from deportation and because of the health and welfare benefits they offer.

With the security offered by working permits, many immigrants have settled in the villages and even begun to raise families. In almost all cases they live in the older houses, often those that were abandoned as their owners moved to the cities or into new houses. In most of the houses I visited, cooking facilities were primitive, with faucets and toilets outside and no hot water. Often immigrants’ houses are sheds and outbuildings located in the fields and orange groves that house at least 2-3 persons per room. Housing for immigrants thus tends to be spread about the villages; unlike urban areas, there are no residential concentrations or “ghettoes”³². After work and in the evenings immigrants congregate in small groups in public areas like the village square and some cafes. In the

³² The dispersal of immigrant housing is also a characteristic of urban areas, which has become an important element in the marginalization and “invisibility” of immigrants (Lazaridis and Psimmenos 2000).

square they may talk and drink beer from bottles. In the cafes they may play cards and have a coffee, but generally avoid consuming more expensive drinks.

Due to their low wages, the consumption level of immigrants is much lower than that of Greeks in the villages. Immigrants have little property. The most common items are a cell phone and an old bicycle, both of which are useful for work. Immigrants maintain extensive networks of contacts throughout Greece and their home countries by cell phone and often travel to where job opportunities exist. Those with more money often buy a used car or van. A few immigrants have started or bought small businesses but for the most part buying immovable property is discouraged by high prices and the lack of long-term security. Greeks in the villages discourage each other from selling to immigrants and so the real estate prices quoted by Greeks are often doubled for immigrants. Because of the temporary nature of their work permits, immigrants are also fearful of making substantial investments that are not moveable. Instead, many immigrants try to save money for investment in their home countries. Most immigrants I interviewed told me their goal was to save enough money to buy property or start a business in their country of origin, where favorable exchange rates made prices much lower.

Greeks express an almost constant anxiety about the immigrants in their midst, whom they consider to be prone to crime and violence. The following assertion, by a Greek farmer in Agia Triada, is typical.

“Before the Albanians came in, we never locked our doors. We didn’t know crime here in the village. Now it is different. We lock the doors all the time. I am afraid to let my wife go out alone at night. The Albanians

are dangerous, a bad group [*faro* = kin group or lineage]. You can't trust them with anything."

Virtually all unsolved crimes, such as theft or vandalism, are routinely blamed on immigrants, and the crimes in which immigrants were caught and prosecuted are inevitably held up as examples by local residents. Such views are clearly exaggerated and emblematic of a moral panic concerning immigrants. According to the local police in Midea township the vast majority of those charged with crimes are Greek nationals.

Social relations between immigrants and natives

The immigrants who have made the most successful integration to Greek society are usually those able to establish a Greek identity by claiming Greek heritage. The two immigrant families in Midea township who have bought property, one a gas station the other a small piece of land, both claim to be Greek- Orthodox Albanians, and therefore to be of Greek descent. They also came in the early 90's in the beginning of the immigration wave. Both were unwilling to discuss their stories with me, insisting only that were Greek "by blood" and that everyone in the village had treated them well. The claiming of Greek descent by immigrants was a sensitive issue in the mid-90's. Greece has always had a special policy towards the Greek-Orthodox minority in southern Albania, including the sheltering of refugees during communist rule. However, with increasing numbers it became clear that distinguishing between Christian and Muslim immigrants was difficult. The collapse of the state bureaucracy in Albania and the ensuing flood of false documents

that circulated, as well as the lack of record-keeping by the beleaguered Church under communism and the historical flexibility of national identities in the region, made it easy for anyone to claim an Orthodox identity. Now most claims of Greek heritage are treated skeptically, and are applied only to those who “seem” Greek. For example, on my pressing the issue of how Greeks distinguish ethnic Greeks from ethnic Albanian immigrants, an acquaintance of mine in Athens threw up his hands and said: “Look, the Greeks did not come down from Albania, they stayed there. These ones that came, they are not Greeks. You can tell by how they act.”

Despite the difficulties, many immigrants try to integrate into Greek society by claiming a common religious identity. Most commonly this occurs through baptism. Immigrants who come as families with small children will try to have them baptized, if they can find a sponsor. Sponsors are almost always Greeks in a position to aid the family, most often employers. Since being a baptism sponsor is considered an honor, it is difficult for Greeks to refuse. Still, they look on it with skepticism. One farmer who told me he had been a sponsor of an immigrant child laughed and said that the child probably had several sponsors in the different towns the family had lived in. Greeks rarely maintain any sort of special relationship with the child, as they might with Greek children. Another woman who had baptized a little girl had not seen her in years even though she lives only several kilometers away. She expressed scorn for the Albanian parents, who had pulled the girl out of school so that she could watch her younger siblings while her parents worked. “They are so stupid! How is she going to make it if they don’t keep her in school?”

There were some cases in which baptism did seem to cement on-going ties between families of Greeks and immigrants. In the village of Gerbesi, two children have been born to Albanian parents, and one of them has been baptized in the local church. The father of the child has lived in the village for six years, and several years ago brought his wife from Albania. Neither parent claims to be Christian. He is employed steadily by a local truck farmer, who lets the family live in the ground floor of his two-story house. The employer served as godfather to the baby, and even paid for the reception afterwards. This incident of baptismal sponsorship was cited by several Albanians in the village as evidence of good social relations between Albanians and Greeks there. The other child has not been baptized, as no sponsor has yet been found, even though he is now three years old.

The experiences of immigrants tend to differ somewhat from village to village and depending on their employment situation. The immigrants who were transitory, arriving in Agia Triada for the orange harvest for example and then moving on, had the hardest time. Most of the immigrants who work the orange harvest are transient and thus have relatively little contact with local residents. Those who are able to become friendly with local farmers will sometimes stay on in the village after the harvest, picking up day labor from the farmers they know or sometimes more permanent work in a local factory or business. Transient immigrants find work is either in the informal “pick-up” areas or by signing on with a work crew. Immigrants who worked independently would find work in the central square in the early morning hours. During the harvest season the central squares of Agia Triada and other citrus producing villages fill up with immigrants looking for work, sometimes as many as a hundred. Most are men, but some women also

wait, usually in a separate area with benches. During the early morning hours, farmers drive by in their trucks and choose as many workers as they will need. If the immigrant is lucky, the job may last several weeks; in other cases it may be just for a day. Of course the immigrant may also get nothing at all and have to wait until the following day. Wages were generally not negotiated, as there was an informal standard that immigrants receive 25 euro per day plus lunch for an 8-hour day of harvesting. Instead, the main complaints of immigrant workers center on lunch, which many farmers tried to skimp on, and the insistence on meat by the immigrants, who clearly saw this as the main meal of the day.

In Agia Triada, work crews contracted by factories and merchants now do the bulk of orange harvesting. Many immigrants therefore secure work by signing on with crews. The advantage for the immigrant is steady work and housing. The disadvantage is slightly lower pay, sometimes 20 euro per day but more often at a piece-rate of .02 euro per kilo. Work crews are managed and operated by local Greeks, almost invariably from poor peasant backgrounds. I interviewed two crew operators, both from families with little land whose fathers had been day laborers. Crew operators own trucks for hauling oranges and hire 10-20 immigrants who they house in warehouses or outbuildings, providing them with basic food and water. According to operators, running a harvest crew is a brutal operation because the transient workers are of unknown character.

“You can’t trust the Albanians, they are ungrateful. 40% of them are criminals and you have to separate them out. I’m not afraid of them though. I carry a gun and I’m not afraid to use it. Most of the trouble is between themselves, different groups. I don’t get involved.”

Crews work in groups of four, and are paid for their tonnage as a group, which encourages the workers to discipline each other. In 2003 crew operators received .03-.04 euro per kilo, almost double what they paid to workers in wages. This system has enabled land-poor peasants who did not leave the village to make a good living.

In Gerbesi and other higher villages that have little citrus, the majority of immigrants are year-round residents, although transients come for the olive harvest in the fall. In Gerbesi immigrants work either exclusively for one farmer on a regular basis or work for several farmers irregularly as needed. Generally those immigrants with the most seniority get the most regular jobs. Immigrants who work for a single farmer tend to take on greater responsibilities. They often work alone, unsupervised, and take the farmer's truck for errands. Gerbesi, with a fairly stable population of 20 immigrants, also maintains a more organized hierarchy among the immigrants, with those who have been there the longest assuming the role of labor managers, deciding who gets what jobs and housing arrangements. Some even employ other immigrants. For example, Niko, an Albanian who has been in Gerbesi for seven years, speaks excellent Greek and despite his youth is the de facto leader of the immigrant community because of his seniority and contacts with local farmers. In 2003 he rented a field in addition to his work as a day laborer, something unusual for an immigrant. He planted okra and squash for the summer and hires other immigrants by the day to assist him. This was a risky move because, lacking a vendors license, he is forced to sell his produce to other vendors. Furthermore, he risked antagonizing local farmers through his ambitious attempt to compete with them. After one year he gave up in the face of low returns.

Niko left Albania at the age of 16 in 1991 and crossed the border on foot. He remembers the journey through Greece as the most difficult period in his life. The group he traveled with ate out of garbage cans and slept outdoors. One friend he was traveling with suffered severe frostbite and had to be abandoned along the way. Niko made his way to Gerbesi, where an Albanian woman from a neighboring village had married a Greek shepherd. When he arrived in Gerbesi he was taken in by an older man who gave him room and board in exchange for work. He was deported back to Albania three times, but since 1998 has a working permit. One other Albanian has been in the village longer than Niko, a skilled construction worker who is, however, severely alcoholic. As a result of his seniority, Niko does better than most of the other Albanians. He owns an old car and rents a decrepit house in the village. However, saving money is difficult, even though he usually works seven days a week.

“I’m the type of guy, if I have some money I’m going to spend it. 25 euro a day is not very much. OK, they feed us too, but it is still not much. Two packs of cigarettes a day, a coffee at the café, some little extra food, 10 euro a day goes just like that. Then there is rent, 90 euro a month, and electricity and cell phone. If I have anything left I play cards. I went to Athens last week for a day for some business and I spent 60 euro! OK, at least I got some pussy, I can’t go without that! Now I hope to make a score with this crop. I want to buy an old car with the money because I can’t do the work on foot all the time. I will hire a Russian or Romanian woman from the valley to help me, and if she looks decent, I can fuck her too.”

Niko's statement reflects the social hierarchy of resident immigrants, where senior or higher status individuals have a stake in the subordination of others.

In the higher altitude villages, although not in Gerbesi itself, Greek men have in some cases married immigrant women. Men in the higher villages, especially shepherds, have difficulty finding wives. Greek women try to avoid both the isolation of the mountain villages and the hard, dirty work of herding and milking livestock. Many young men in these places remain unmarried late in life. In the small village of Bardi, about 3 kilometers from Gerbesi, I interviewed a shepherd who had gone to Albania specifically to find a bride. He married a woman there and returned with her brother as well. Her brother now works for him tending the herd and milking, returning to Albania during the summer months when the work is lighter. In explaining why he went to Albania to find a wife, the shepherd stressed the cultural ties between Albanians and Arvanites and also the willingness of Albanians to work hard.

Immigrants in Greece tend to maintain strong ties with their home countries. In the smaller villages like Gerbesi, all the immigrants come from one of several villages in Albania. As one Albanian explained, "You must know someone in the village you go to. First of all, where will you sleep? I'm not going to take in someone I don't know". In the larger villages immigrants are more diverse, but still almost always arrive with some sort of contacts in order to secure housing and work. The expansion and improvement of the transportation and telecommunications networks in Greece over the last several decades have made it much easier to travel and communicate over long distances. Immigrants stay in touch with each other and with families back home through such networks. Immigrants use cellular phones for example to inform others of work opportunities as well as staying

in touch with family and friends. Immigrants who live year-round in Greece also regularly travel back home, often once a year for short periods. Others travel across borders each year for the harvest and then return home. The ease of transportation and communication has reinforced the diaspora quality of immigrant communities, allowing them to maintain social relations in diverse locales. Greeks often ridicule the use of cell phones by immigrants, characterizing it as a needless and expensive extravagance, but on the other hand they are suspicious of those immigrants who do not travel home regularly. Several villagers in Gerbesi for example told me they did not trust Niko, the senior immigrant there, because he rarely left the village and had not been home in years. For them this was an indication that he had something to hide, most probably being wanted by the police since it was rumored that many immigrants were fugitives from Albanian jails.

Often travel back to Albania or other Eastern European countries is justified by both Greeks and immigrants in terms of sexual activity. Several immigrant men told me they were returning to Albania for sex, since there was a scarcity of available women in Greece. There are few single immigrant women. Those who are single often work as prostitutes, and their fees are out of reach for most immigrant men. Sex with Greek women is dangerous for both the man and women. An immigrant man who makes advances toward a Greek woman is usually beaten and expelled from the village. Homosexual activity is considered to be a temporary substitute, and the passive partner risks social ostracism. Thus the trip back to the home country is often framed in terms of sexual activity. The returning immigrant is said to be rich by the standards of the home country and is able to engage freely in sexual activity.

The experience of immigration for women is substantially different, mainly because of the gendered significance of sexuality in social relations between immigrants and Greeks. While immigrant males are generally expected to express a sublimated, but dangerous sexual presence, women's sexuality conditions their integration into local society. In the villages I saw no evidence of sexual interaction between immigrant males and Greeks, although this is undoubtedly more common in the cities. The only exception to this was one case where a café owner was said to have a sexual relationship with a male immigrant who worked for him as a waiter. For female immigrants however, sexual activities and exploitation are a constant theme. In Gerbesi and the other higher altitude villages female immigrants are always married and come as part of a couple or family. While I was there in 2003 almost a quarter of the immigrants were women and all were married, two with children. All the women either came together with their husbands to Greece, or more commonly came after their husbands had become settled in the village. Male immigrants told me that a female would never come to Greece alone unless it was for prostitution, and indeed, the Greek males in the village constantly commented and speculated on sexual possibilities with various immigrant women. Immigrant husbands are very protective of their wives. They tend to work together in the fields or otherwise the women stay in their houses, socializing only among themselves and venturing out only for grocery shopping. One immigrant man was widely considered by villagers to be "hiding" his recent bride from the gaze of Greek males. The same pattern holds for Agia Triada and the valley villages. Among the transient immigrants at harvest time there are some lone females, but in all cases I found these were older women in their 50's and 60's who had arrived from Bulgaria and Romania for the orange harvest.

Sexual exploitation is a real and ever-present danger for female immigrants (Psimmenos 2000), even if they are with families. A particularly graphic example of this occurred during my fieldwork. During the orange harvest a family of three (father, mother and teenaged daughter) arrived in Agia Triada from a small town in Romania. I first met them in the company of a Romanian immigrant, Ilias, who operated between Agia Triada and Nauplio as a small-time hustler involved in prostitution and drugs. The father had been a butcher but had closed his store from lack of work. The family had an older daughter in a nearby city that had married a Greek man. They initially went there, but the Greek son-in-law refused to let them stay. The family had then come to Midea township and were working illegally for a local farmer picking oranges. The farmer had given them a place to stay. After several weeks, as the harvest ended, the farmer refused to pay the family and threatened to call the police. Ilias had taken the family in, giving them food and a place to stay. I was somewhat mystified by Ilias' generosity until I met the daughter, a pretty girl 17 years old. The next time I spoke with Ilias, he told me he was having sex with the girl. When I asked how the parents reacted, he said, "What can they say? I'm like a god to them, I give them everything, food, a place to stay, clothes." The last time I saw them, Ilias told me he had "found" the girl a job in a local nightclub known for prostitution. The father was with him and Ilias made a point of publicly humiliating him and insulting him in Greek, which the father does not speak well. This type of sexual-economic coercion is extremely common in Greece. The illegal status of immigrants and their consequent lack of political rights makes them extremely vulnerable to exploitation by both Greeks and other, more powerful, immigrants.

In the villages and small towns of Argolida virtually all prostitutes are from Eastern Europe. Many work at bars and nightclubs that sometimes feature nude dancing and where men can make appointments with the women. Others work out of hotels in the small towns that are controlled by Greek pimps. Often these pimps hold the women's passports and charge exorbitant rent for the rooms. Women held against their will have little recourse to the police, who are often customers and have friendly relations with the pimps. "Contracts" can also be purchased whereby men can procure a female immigrant for a certain number of months, essentially a form of short-term slavery. In the summer of 2003 contracts went for 1,000-2,000 euro per month, plus room and board. Sometimes women are brought into the country by trafficking networks to fulfill a previously agreed-on contract. In other cases women procure contracts after entering the country on tourist visas. I witnessed two incidents where young women, one Pole and one Bulgarian, were brought into villages by pimps for "viewing" by local men.

At the same time, some young female immigrants in their quest to integrate into local society have used sexuality as an advantage. An example is the case of Vanessa, a 28-year-old immigrant from Russia who is engaged to a Greek man in the nearby town of Nauplio. Vanessa came to Greece 8 years ago, driving down from the Ukraine with a friend and entering with a tourist visa. After working in several other towns, Vanessa came to Agia Triada for the orange harvest. She rented and fixed up an old house from a sympathetic farmer and ended up working in agriculture for four years, staying year-round in Agia Triada. After learning Greek she was able to find work as a waitress in a café in Nauplio, a desirable job for immigrants but usually available only to young attractive females. Her wages were the same but the work was easier and steady. Soon

after she started working in the café she met a young Greek man, Niko, and the two now have plans to marry. Vanessa is enthusiastic about the wedding and the prospects of staying in Greece. She told me;

“Once I have a good man I am happy. When I came here from Russia I went 6 years without sleeping with a man. That’s a long time for a Russian girl. They tried to set me up with men, even made marriage proposals, but me, nothing! I said I will wait to find a man who loves me. I finally found Niko and now I’m not letting go.”

This is a common strategy among young female immigrants from northeastern Europe. Indeed, Vanessa told me “all the Russian women here are looking to get married”. Some immigrants can use sexuality then as a strategy of assimilation and a mitigation of exploitation. Niko has intervened several times on Vanessa’s behalf in altercations with café owners. Her last employer fell behind on her wages and decided to withhold them altogether when she quit. Vanessa was intimidated by his threat to blacklist her from all the cafes and could not go to the police. In such cases immigrants get very little help from the police and can sometimes find themselves deported. When Niko found out, he called the employer and threatened to beat him. Vanessa quickly got her money. In Vanessa’s case sexuality has been not so much a means of exploitation as one of protection. Many female immigrants try this strategy, though, and relatively few succeed.

The social marginalization of immigrants in the villages

Despite the fact that almost half of all immigrants come from other countries, Greeks usually collectively refer to immigrants as “Albanians”. Sometimes other nationalities are delineated. Women who work in bars are rarely Albanians and are often referred to as “Russian girls” (*Rosides*), even though many are Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Romanian, etc., and male workers from countries such as Romania are sometimes singled out as being either better or worse than others. Collectively though they are often grouped together as Albanians. For example, to “take an Albanian” (*na paro Alvano*) is a common phrase among Greeks meaning to hire an immigrant. This defacement of immigrants into a single nationality is the first step in the process of the “othering” of immigrants and their social marginalization.

Immigrants live in every village in Midea township, but they remain for the most part socially invisible. Because they live in older dwellings and out-buildings and have little money to spend in the stores and cafes it is difficult for a visitor to the villages to gauge how many immigrants live there. Following the legalization of their status immigrants have begun to congregate in public areas like the main squares, but not in large numbers. When talking about the village, villagers never include immigrants in the “we” of their conversation, clearly not conceptualizing them as members of the community. With the exception of a few who have managed to claim Greek identity and integrate into village society, immigrants are almost completely socially marginalized³³.

In Greece there is a strong and persistent anti-immigrant sentiment. According to recent polls only 8.4% of Greeks think immigrants are a “positive” influence and 44% would like to see them restricted to separate neighborhoods (Galanopoulou 2003). Greeks

³³ Such patterns are typical of contemporary illegal migrations. According to DeGenova (2002:429), “undocumented migrations are constituted in order not to physically exclude them but instead socially include them under conditions of enforced and protracted vulnerability”.

justify the social marginalization of immigrants in terms of the “moral panic”³⁴

surrounding immigration. In Greece the massive immigration of recent years has often been depicted as a national crisis arising from the collapse of communist regimes in the east and a declining birthrate at home. According to popular discourse, which focuses on the “push” rather than the “pull” factors, the mountainous northern borders and liberal social policies of Greece have proven indefensible against this flood and the result has been a dangerous increase in poverty, crime and disease, threatening the fabric of Greek society (Seremetakis 1996). The following description by an Agia Triada resident of the early period of immigration is typical.

“In the beginning, in the early 80’s, it was a crazy situation. Albanians were coming down, thousands of them. They had nothing, they used to sleep like wild animals, outside, wrapped up in plastic tarps. Everything was new to them, they had no civilization (*politismos*) at all, nothing. We felt sorry for them, so we gave them blankets, cooking pots, a place to sleep. We gave them work so they could eat! But it was strange, they didn’t appreciate our hospitality. We would give them a blanket and they would say ‘Don’t you have a quilt?’ We would give them an old pot and they would say ‘Don’t you have a better one?’. They even began to steal from us. They would murder you for 10 euro! These people have no civilization [*politismos*], they are like animals.”

³⁴ The term “moral panic” denotes the way that perceived social problems carry significance beyond their “real” effects and thus highlights their social construction (Goode and Ben-Yahouda 1994). Developed by Cohen (1972), moral panics are seen to represent broader social anxieties and related to older forms of mass hysteria such as folk devils or witch hunts. Hall et al (1978) sees contemporary media-fueled moral panics as reflecting a breakdown of hegemonic control and a move toward more coercive measures on the part of the state.

The theme of ungrateful and “uncivilized” immigrants is one that appears repeatedly in people’s narratives of immigration.

In the moral panic surrounding immigration, many social problems have been blamed on immigrants. Crime and disease are commonly attributed to immigrants and more specifically to Albanians. Many villagers insist that doors were never locked in the villages before the immigrants arrived, but that now people sleep with loaded guns for fear of being robbed or murdered. The “crime wave” brought about by immigrants is almost certainly exaggerated (Mouzelis 2002). Statistically, immigrants are charged with between 25-30% of crimes, depending on the category (Eleutherotipia 2004). Arrests, however, can be misleading given the tendency of police to blame immigrants for many crimes even without evidence. Analysis of convictions for all serious crimes in Greece in 1996 shows that immigrants were responsible for 15% (Kourtovik 2001:190), a percentage roughly analogous to the percentage of immigrants among the Greek population. However, crimes committed by immigrants tend to get much more attention, both in the media and in people’s conversations. Unsolved crimes are often attributed to Albanians. A typical example occurred during my fieldwork when five sheep were stolen in Gerbesi during Holy Week. Following the theft one local resident publicly claimed to have seen a strange BMW in the area with Albanians inside. The thief later turned out to be a shepherd from a neighboring village.

The fear of an immigrant crime wave is largely fed by the mass media (Pavlou 2001). Newspapers and television reporting tend to paint an exaggerated view of crimes committed by immigrants. When immigrants are charged in crimes, the media stresses the ethnic identity of the suspect. When a Greek is accused, there is no mention of

ethnicity of course. Furthermore, stories of immigrant crime are given more prominence in the media than equivalent stories involving Greek perpetrators. Why these practices occur is unclear. The most likely explanation is that such stories grab the attention of viewers and readers, who are ready to have their fears confirmed and eager to have scapegoats for the contradictions and dislocations they experience as Greek society undergoes transformation (e.g. Cohen 1972). In the context of privatized media, sales and market share are the prime motivation for editorial policies. On the other hand, the anti-immigrant frenzy whipped up by the media and others also seems to benefit elite interests by justifying increased policing, deflecting class antagonisms, and producing vulnerabilities on the part of immigrants (e.g. Hall et al 1978). We shall return to this issue, and its relationship to emerging forms of nationalism in chapter VII.

Immigrants are also said to be responsible for prostitution in the villages. The larger villages usually have bars where immigrant work as hostesses and from here informal prostitution is said to occur. Agia Triada had two such bars, one a café-bar where women would prepare drinks and sit with customers and the other a late-night dance hall where women would sit or dance with men for overpriced drinks and tips. Stories circulated through the villages of men who had been enchanted by immigrant women and lost substantial sums of money to them, although in all probability it is the bar owners who profit the most through the exorbitant prices of drinks in such dancehalls, 10 euro and more. Immigrants are also thought to play a major role in the drug trade as smugglers of marijuana and heroin, although in Midea township Gypsies are said to be the major traffickers. Among marijuana smokers, low quality marijuana is referred to as “Albanian pot” while higher quality is said to be produced in Greece.

The scapegoating of immigrants as criminals creates fear among Greeks and makes it much less likely for Greeks and immigrants to form direct personal relations. It is also a way of elevating the self-image of Greeks, by projecting negative social phenomena outside the social body. Many times, Greeks in the villages advised me to be careful around immigrants and not to trust them. This fear and distrust limits the range of jobs available to immigrants. A housepainter in Agia Triada who told me he has difficulty finding Greeks willing to work for the basic wage of 25 euro per day also told me he refuses to hire Albanians. He said, "I just don't want to hire them, I don't trust them. Look, I often work inside people's homes and they would steal things and create problems for me". Also, since immigrants are not expected to have a long-term interest in the area, they are not usually hired for work that requires independent decision-making. For example, many orange farmers avoid hiring immigrants to prune trees since they are thought not to take the time and care required to do a good job. Immigrants are thus not considered to be appropriate for any job that requires responsibility.

Immigrants are also actively discouraged from settling permanently or establishing businesses in the villages. Sale prices and rents for houses are often doubled when an immigrant inquires, sometimes after the seller is pressured by neighbors. When immigrants do rent houses, they generally have little contact with their neighbors. When I asked a civil servant and part-time farmer in Agia Triada about his Romanian neighbors he responded,

"I don't know much about them. We don't get involved much with them.

They listen to their own music and do their own things. They are always disturbing the neighborhood. Hopefully they won't stay long."

Immigrant residents are generally ostracized from the normal, everyday sociality of village neighborhoods, and usually maintain their own, dispersed social networks. In addition to outright hostility from villagers, immigrants are loath to invest in real estate businesses, even if they can afford it, because of their precarious legal status.

Those immigrants who try to achieve an equal social status with Greeks invariably encounter problems. Even Niko, the young Albanian man who rented a field in Gerbesi for his own production faced difficulties. One evening I witnessed a conflict between Niko and another farmer. Niko had hired another Albanian man to work for him in his field the following day. A Greek farmer approached the worker and tried to hire him for the same day. The worker, clearly uncomfortable, referred the farmer to Niko. Niko resisted the farmer's request at first with a show of bravado and cursing, but the farmer made it clear that he would not relent and engaged Niko in a round of play fighting to assert his determination. An hour later, Niko had given in, even though the lack of a worker created problems for him.

Besides social ostracism, I also witnessed several incidents in the villages when play-fighting or mock aggression was used to publicly demonstrate the social superiority of Greeks. Once I was sitting with two farmers, both in their 40's, in the café in Gerbesi. Niko came and sat down at the same table. Niko is a frequent target of play-fighting and aggression because he socializes more with the Greeks in the café and is beginning to compete with them in production. Play-fighting is a way of keeping him in his place. One of the farmers gave Niko a hostile look and said, "get the fuck out of here" (*fige gamo to apo 'tho*). Niko took up the challenge and replied "ah, fuck off", but was smiling to make it clear he considered it a joke. The farmer got up, grabbed Niko and shoved him across

the room, upsetting two chairs and pinning him against a cooler. For an instant I thought a real fight was breaking out, because the farmer was shouting and cursing. Niko continued to smile, but was clearly embarrassed and tried to weakly resist. Finally the farmer stopped, smiled, and returned to the table with Niko, who then sat down with us. Niko had tried to assert himself as an equal, but the farmer, partly or wholly for my benefit, used this mock aggression as a public means of asserting Niko's inferiority, for he knew full well that Niko could not fight back without serious consequences.

In Gerbesi, Niko is a target of this type of aggression because he challenges the divide between Greek and Albanian by his attempts to establish himself as an independent producer. Other Albanians, who do not try to cross this divide and remain publicly submissive to their Greek employers are not usually targets. However, the violence displayed against Niko is readily available for use against others. While I was in Midea township, I heard accounts from local residents and immigrants of three incidents of group conflicts, none of them in the villages I worked in. In the nearby village of Prosimi, there have been at least two occasions when immigrants were beaten and expelled *en masse*. The first occurred after a burglary in which immigrants were suspected. All the immigrants were gathered into the main square by the men of the village, beaten with sticks, and chased away. In the second incident, a groups of Kurds were heard criticizing and insulting Greeks and were beaten and chased out of town by a group of Greeks. In another neighboring village, Panariti, Albanians were gathered into the square after one Albanian boy was rumored to be bothering a local Greek girl, following her around and calling her on the cell phone. They beat the Albanians. When

the local police arrived the villagers reportedly told them “it’s nothing, just a little problem that we will sort out ourselves”. The police left the village.

A more recent incident happened on the island of Crete while I was conducting fieldwork, and is an example of the kind of violence that can break out between Greeks and immigrants in the villages. On February 2, 2003, the village priest in the village of Antiskario, Crete rescued a young Albanian man from a crowd that had beaten him into unconsciousness. According to newspaper reports (Papadokostaki 2003), the young man was one of a group of Albanians who had recently arrived in the village looking for work. One of the group owed some money at the local mini-market and their credit there was cut. Another Albanian man, who had lived in the village for some time apparently, told the mini-market owner that the others were planning to rob the place, possibly in retaliation for the newer arrivals acceptance of lower wages. Relations between Albanians and Greeks were already tense because some of the Albanians had begun asking for higher day-wages. In addition to the wage issue there was also a “romantic conflict”, and on the same day unknown thieves stole a car in the village. As rumors of the planned robbery spread, the village exploded in violence. Greeks chased and beat any Albanians they could find, almost killing one young man. In the aftermath, all the Albanians, even those who had been in the village for years, fled, leaving the village without workers and the Greeks afraid to go to their fields. This incident reveals some of the political and social fractures that operate between and within ethnic groups in the villages, and the way these fractures can erupt into violence under stress.

Because of their lack of social ties to native villagers, immigrants are also at a disadvantage in personal conflicts. Two incidents I witnessed involving Niko illustrate

this point. The first involved Niko's car. Shortly after he purchased a decrepit Toyota, several local farmers confronted him in the village square. One said to him:

“Look, I've seen you driving through the village and you should slow down. I'm just telling you for your own good. If you happen to run down some kid it will be the end for you. If you get entangled like that in the village it will be the end, especially for you. You understand that right?”

Niko protested that he was a good driver, but the others just laughed and derided his “fake” Albanian license. The others had made their point, however, and it was clear that if some accident did occur, Niko, with no relatives or friends to intercede as is normal in tragic accidents, would be assured of a slow and painful death.

Overt violence against immigrants in the villages is the exception to the normal course of events and is avoided by both sides because of the damage it can do, both economically and socially. In general, Greeks rely on more subtle means of regulating the behavior of Albanians. Often, when talking about relations with Albanians, Greek farmers would say “They don't cause any problems. After a while we can tell which ones are trouble and we send them on their way. We have our means”. Immigrants who are suspected of being troublemakers by the Greeks are first of all not sponsored for working papers. In order to get papers, an immigrant must first have some sort of personal relationship with a farmer who in effect guarantees his behavior. At peak labor times of course this may not hold, but the transient population at harvest is less organized and easier to deal with by means of police.

The social marginalization of immigrants is facilitated by their illegal and non-citizen status. As we have seen, the attainment of legal status by immigrants is dependent on their establishing social relations with an employer. All immigrants start as illegal residents. It is this lack of legal status that makes them particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Even after legal status is granted, in the form of work and residence permits, the fact that the permits are valid only for a year at a time insures the continuing good behavior of the immigrant and his or her subservience to an employer. This process of political marginalization of immigrants and the lack of political rights vis-à-vis the state guarantees a malleable and obedient workforce in the villages.

Illegal immigrants make a particularly vulnerable and docile workforce because they have none of the legal protections of native workers. Working conditions and wages are essentially the prerogative of the employer. Illegal workers have no recourse to police or the courts. Job actions by immigrants are rare, although not unheard of. In 2002 Pakistani hothouse workers in the town of Marathon, outside of Athens, struck for higher pay, causing problems for farmers there. They eventually won a small wage increase. After the strike the Mayor of Marathon conceded that “without immigrants the cost of produce would probably double” (Tzilivakis 12/7/02). This is undoubtedly one reason the Greek state has been reluctant to legalize immigrant workers and grant them full protection under current laws.

In addition, lack of citizenship rights exclude immigrants from access to agricultural markets and the subsidies that are distributed by the E.U. and the Greek state. Niko, the immigrant who attempted to become an independent producer by renting a field, ultimately failed. Because he lacked citizenship he could not sell directly in the

farmers' markets and was forced to sell his produce to other truck farmers at a lower price. At the end of the season his profits were less than he would have made by day labor. When I last spoke to him, he had given up the field saying, "I'm not doing it anymore, too many headaches. If I work for a day-wage at least at the end of the day I can go home and relax".

As we have seen, immigrant laborers are filling a growing need for labor in the villages of Greece. Traditional sources of labor have dried up due to a declining birthrate and the growing pluriactivity of agricultural households. This labor crisis is largely a product of the integration of rural Greece into the consumer markets of the E.U. and the expanding service economy. At the same time the foundation of the local economy remains heavily subsidized agricultural production. Households have thus been squeezed between growing consumer needs and flat or declining productive capabilities. As a result, immigrants have been integrated under conditions of social and political marginalization, conditions that produce their extreme vulnerability. In the following chapters we will look more closely at the discursive and institutional formations that have developed around the production of this vulnerability, and their implications for understanding rural social organization in the social context of the E.U.

IV. THE SHIFTING DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF INEQUALITY IN RURAL GREECE

The production of social inequality in rural Greece

The dependence of agricultural production on immigrant labor that has developed over the last several decades has had far-reaching consequences for the social organization of rural Greece. Agricultural production within market economies is always dependent on the production of social inequality, not only through class differences in access to the means of production but also through culturally mediated distinctions of gender, age and ethnicity. In the past, social inequalities produced through arrangements of gender and kinship differences were crucial to surplus production. However, rising levels of commodity consumption and the general liberalization of Greek society have prompted changes in rural society. Today, while such inequalities continue to exist, agricultural production is much more dependent on ethnic and national differences for producing a vulnerable and disciplined workforce. In short, there have been profound changes in *how* the social relations necessary for agricultural production are constructed. Among the most important of these changes are the production and veiling of new kinds of social inequalities based on ethnicity and race. In this chapter, I will describe how discourses of gender, kinship, ethnicity and race are employed in rural Greece in the context of the contemporary political economy of E.U.-style globalization. In the following chapters I delve more deeply into the contemporary production and veiling of racism through both state policies and popular resistance to “globalization”.

New patterns of labor migration are only part of a host of systemic changes Greek society has undergone over the last two decades. Some of the most prominent and visible

of these changes have occurred in the area of gender and kinship. Greece, like the Mediterranean region in general, has long been a focus of gender and kinship studies. Prominent gendered discourses of honor and shame and visible symbols of female subordination have been documented and analyzed by researchers from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Gender inequality has been explained by analysis of symbolic dichotomies that transcend different levels of social organization, maintaining difference by the weight of ideology (Herzfeld 1986). It has also been analyzed in functionalist terms as the expression of social power, where kinship and gender difference organizes and maintains public and domestic realms of production and exchange (Friedl 1986, Dimen 1986, Vernier 1984). Others have sought to locate Mediterranean ideologies of gender difference in their wider political-economic context, as a method of social control and economic organization under weak states of the capitalist semi-periphery (Schneider 1971). Despite differences in analysis however, most studies note important connections between ideologies of kinship and gender inequality and relations of production, especially in rural areas. This is consistent with a peasant model of production in which the household exists on the periphery of capitalist production and is maintained through the reproduction of non- or pre-capitalist techniques of stratification (Medick 1981). In this model, the family serves both as a reservoir of surplus labor and a means of supporting that labor cheaply. Household labor, organized through kinship and gender, can be seen as a means of reproducing and maintaining productive labor at low cost. The labor of women and children, in particular, can be seen as an early form of flexible labor, filling seasonal, temporary, and part-time positions as needed and controlled through an ideology of patriarchal domination.

However, most of this work is based on ethnographic research from the 1960's and 1970's. More recently, under the influence of globalized markets and institutions, there is evidence that these patterns of social interaction have been transformed, particularly as women have entered the formal workforce of the service industries and wage labor. This has generally been seen as a process of modernization, depicted in popular discourse as part of a trend toward greater freedom and equality in rural areas. The commodification of female labor and declining fertility in Greece have both served to disrupt traditional labor markets (Kottis 1990). In rural areas this has contributed to a shortage of seasonal labor, which was temporarily offset by increased mechanization of agriculture and the opening of transnational markets, particularly Eastern Europe, in the early 1980's. However, the long-term effect has been the growing dependence on foreign migrant labor.

The way in which migrants have been used to replace family labor has received relatively little attention. We are beginning to understand the implications of the gendered patterns of the new migration and its relationship to the commodification of female labor in host countries (Anthias 2000). However, we have only just begun to understand how access to immigrant labor in rural areas has led to shifts in the discursive production of social inequality. When I first began fieldwork, one of my objectives was to find out if immigrant labor had served to subsidize increased equality for women. I quickly found out that the situation was much more complicated. Social inequality is not a zero-sum game, and its discursive production occurs in complex and contradictory ways.

While gender differences remain strong and inequality persists in many areas, such as the formal workforce, it seems clear that traditional gender constructions have been disrupted. In Greece, the social and economic position of women has undergone rapid transformation in the last several decades. These changes have been both ideological and material. As women have made progress towards legal equality under neo-liberal regimes and increased their presence in formal, public arenas, their association with the private sphere of household production has weakened. In addition, as we have seen, female labor in pluriactive households has tended to focus on wage labor in response to the increased dependence on commodity consumption rather than household subsistence production. The participation of women (aged 15-64) in the labor force increased from 42.6% in 1990 to 49.7% in 2000, although unemployment figures for women have risen as well, from 12% to 16.9%, over twice that of men (Ketsetzopoulou 2002:127). Rising rates of women's participation in the labor force are characterized by several important developments. First has been the expansion of the service sector, where female employment is most concentrated. Second is the rising levels of educational attainment for women, which have been rising much faster than for men. Third is the persistence of a high rate of female unemployment (Ibid:127-128). Despite high levels of unemployment, there is a definite trend among women away from agricultural labor. With the expansion of non-agricultural sectors and the increasing need for two incomes, female agricultural work as a per cent of all female employment fell from 21.5% in 1960 to 1.4% in 1995 (Crouch 1999:433-439). At the same time informal "family work" (chiefly agricultural) as a percentage of employment for females dropped from over 20% to under 10% during the same period (Ibid:89). These figures suggest

fundamental changes in the mobilization of female labor, in particular a shift from kin-organized household labor to wage labor.

The national statistics provide a framework for understanding some of the macroeconomic shifts in labor markets. If we look at figures for Midea township, the picture becomes somewhat more complicated. In the 2001 census³⁵, 72% of males and 46% of females aged 15-75 are listed as economically active. Of economically active males, 51% are employed in the primary sector (agriculture), 14% in the secondary sector (manufacturing and production), 24% in the tertiary sector (services), and 6% unemployed. For economically active women, 55% are employed in the primary sector, 6% in the secondary, 27% in the tertiary, and 8% are unemployed. From these figures we can discern that female employment still lags considerably behind male employment. Among economically active females however there is higher unemployment and less concentration in the secondary sector, which in Midea would be mainly packing and juice factories and various utilities, such as the telephone, electric, and water companies, all of which are considered to be good and stable sources of income. These figures, however, may not capture several important elements of the labor market. First, they exclude “off-the-books” labor, which is prevalent, and second they do not capture pluriactive individuals, in particular men who combine a formal job with part-time agriculture.

The changes that have occurred in gendered labor patterns in Greece are mostly consistent with patterns of development in other European countries. The mid-century model of social organization in Europe was characterized by a gendered occupational structure in which men were associated with formal industrial and distribution sectors,

³⁵ Figures from the 2001 census published by the National Statistical Services of Greece (http://www.statistics.gr/gr_tables/s1100_sap_5_euro38%20lau%201.htm).

while women were associated with informal household sectors (Crouch 1999:53-56).

That model has been undergoing a transformation since the early 1960's as more women have moved into the expanding service sector. The increased participation of women in the formal economy has been accompanied by the development of a "bicephalous gendered occupational structure" (ibid:112) in which the concentration of women in the lower-paid and more flexible service sector has balanced out the declining rates of male employment in the industrial and manufacturing sectors. This development has formalized many household tasks as staples of the service economy and has created incentives for the shift of domestic tasks from a private informal arena of the household to a public informal arena increasingly staffed by immigrants.

Greece is somewhat of an exception to this pattern due to the continuing prominence of the agricultural sector and the weakness of manufacturing. As a result Greece has a relatively high rate of self-employment characterized by a high degree of household production and multiple occupations. But even here the same type of transformation can be discerned. Agricultural production in Greece has long been characterized by small-scale household production. In this context, men's labor has also been associated with formal networks of exchange while women have been tied to informal, "private" arenas (Friedl 1986). In the last decade, women have entered the service sector, even in the villages. The result has been both a re-configuration of the family in relation to other social institutions and a reorganization of household economies.

As the capitalist mode of production has become increasingly pervasive and subsistence agriculture has all but disappeared, traditional patterns in relations of production and the mobilization of labor have undergone a transformation. Taking this

into account, we can better understand the articulation of migrant labor in new order of inequality. In Greece and other areas of the southern European semi-periphery the hegemonic position of ideologies of gender and kinship traditionally employed to organize relations of production are under pressure to change. However, this has occurred within a context of continued, and even growing, social inequality, which is increasingly legitimated and reproduced through constructions of ethnic identity and citizenship.

Collier (1997) has described the transformation of gender relations and family organization in an Andalusian village since the 1960's. Much of her analysis can also be applied to Greek rural society. Comparing two models of family organization, one of the 1960's and the other of the 1980's, Collier analyzes changing modes of social reproduction under the increasing intrusion of the capitalist market. The 1960's model was characterized by an emphasis on duty and organized around patriarchal authority and a well-defined code of kin and gender relations. Kin and gender relations organized relations of production through the ownership and inheritance of property and were thus crucial to the local production of inequality. Villagers could be divided into status groups based on property holdings, with a small aristocracy of landowners dominating smallholders and landless peasants. The household division of labor was largely organized by gender and age. By the late 60's, however, this model had begun to disintegrate as competition from capital-intensive mechanized farms drove prices for agricultural products down. Urban migration followed, particularly among lower class villagers who could no longer survive on day labor.

By the 1980's Collier detects a shift in the discourses of economic and moral inequality. As villagers became increasingly entangled in capitalist industrial relations

and alienated from the means of production, discourses of ownership and inheritance give way to discourses of earning and achievement. Increased value was placed on personal character, hard work, ambition, and education. This shift did not necessarily result in greater freedom or equality for women. In fact, Collier argues against a reading of modernization as increased freedom. In many ways, modernization represented a loss of power for women and their increased dependence on their husbands, particularly with the relative decline in the importance of dowry. Rather, Collier argues that this process of modernization more importantly resulted in a new subjectivity, where identity is made or achieved instead of inherited. At the same time she notes a shift to ethnicity (i.e. Andalusian) as opposed to local village distinctions of genealogy, age, and gender as primary markers (1997:195). Here Collier's ethnographic evidence is rather thin, but I suspect that this new experience of ethnicity is crucial to understanding new forms of social inequality, and is related to what Stolke (1995) terms "cultural fundamentalism". Collier does not mention the immigration of North African laborers into Andalusia in the 1980's and 1990's, but it seems that local inequality there is now organized by ideologies of ethnic and racial difference. In recent years extensive hothouse agriculture has developed, worked by low-wage North African immigrants who are also subject to violent racism from native Andalusians (Hoggart and Mendoza 1999; New York Times 2000a, 2000b).

The development of rural Greece has been somewhat different of course. Greece for the most part lacked a powerful class of rural large landowners and the extensive mechanization of rural agriculture was limited to certain crops, such as cotton. However, rural Greece has also undergone a similar transformation of gender and kin relations in

recent years. The most noticeable development in rural Greece has been the departure of women and, especially, children from agricultural labor. While men have continued to work in the fields, even if often as managers of immigrant labor, women have turned to either service industries or the growing demands of childcare. Women and children have also emerged as important consumers of various commodities. In the past, shopping and the purchasing of consumer goods was often a part of the male domain (Friedl 1986:47). Today that prerogative has passed mostly to women and children in the villages³⁶. Cowan (1991) has documented the proliferation of “*kafeterias*” as a disruption of traditional gendered forms of sociality. *Kafeterias*, or coffee and pastry shops frequented by both males and females, explicitly transgress the traditionally male public arena of the coffee shop [*kafeneio*] as a center of village life. Cowan argues that *kafeterias* represent the “hegemonic penetration...by urban Greek and European institutions, symbols, and forms of sociality that are effectively displacing their indigenous counterparts” (1991:202). Today *kafeterias* in rural Greece are full of males and females, but few immigrants frequent them, as they are more expensive than the *kafeneia*³⁷. Although some bars and cafes catering to migrants are beginning to open they remain segregated and out of view. This is not to say that gender inequality has disappeared. Indeed, what is more surprising is the ways in which discourses of gender difference have persisted in the face of changes in relations of production and consumption

³⁶ A great deal of variation exists between households concerning the division of shopping responsibilities. In general, women handle grocery shopping and low-cost consumer goods while men make large purchases. In some households however, men do most or all of the grocery shopping. In some households men manage the household finances and give their wives an “allowance” for household items such as groceries. In other cases I found that women manage the finances and give their husbands an allowance for incidentals such as cigarettes and drinks in the café.

³⁷ In Midea township *kafeterias* are found only in Agia Triada, where there are three. Agia Triada has two *kafeneia*. In Manesi and Gerbesi there are only *kafeneia*; one in Gerbesi and two in Manesi.

The ideology of gender inequality in rural Greece has always had a complex and often contradictory relationship with actual practice of gendered behavior, as has been noted by numerous anthropologists. Despite its importance in organizing relations of production, gender difference has never been reducible to economic relations. Gender has been used not only to define a division of labor within the household economy but also as a discourse for negotiating the complex relations between levels of identity, from the individual and family to the nation-state (Herzfeld 1986, Dubisch 1986). For this reason, despite the changes in the organization of household production, gender continues to be a strong and visible basis for inequality in rural Greece that even conditions the integration of immigrant labor into the household. In some ways, we can discern similarities in the techniques by which immigrants are, and women were, excluded from the public domains of social power.

The politics of gender and kinship in Argolida

Despite increasing access by women to political and economic rights under the E.U., social spaces in the villages of Argolida still tend to be segregated by gender. This is especially true in the higher altitude villages³⁸. In the towns of Argos and Nauplio women move freely, and there are few places or professions that are off limits to them. Couples often go out together, and men can be seen engaged in mundane tasks of childcare and domestic errands. The villages, by contrast, are considered more conservative and “traditional” [*paradosiaka*]. While in the valley villages there is somewhat more public mixing of unrelated men and women and the gendered division of

³⁸ In general, the gendered segregation of public spaces increases the further one goes up the mountain.

labor is not as strictly enforced, on the whole daily activities and the use of space continues to be segregated by gender. This fact had implications for my own research. As a single male working in the villages my ability to interview women or participate in their activities was severely limited. Thus most of my information comes from interviewing and observing men or family groups.

In the villages the traditional bastions of male authority have been strongly defended, especially in the upper villages. In Manesi and Gerbesi, and to a lesser extent in Agia Triada, coffee shops [*kafeneia*] and *tavernas* tend to be almost exclusively male, although they will sometimes be staffed by women, usually female relatives of the owners. Indeed, men have defended their monopoly on much of the public space of the villages, including the village square, roads, and surrounding countryside. Men freely travel from village to village at all hours of the day and night. Groups of boys (from age 9-10 and up) freely roam the village until well after dark. Not all men participate in the public male spaces of the village, but most do. By my estimate approximately 60% of village males regularly visit the coffee-shops and taverns, many on a daily basis. Men who frequent the public spaces of the village tend to define the political discourse of the village as well, and constitute what Loizos (1975) calls “political action groups”. Women on the other hand will rarely venture outside of their homes, other family properties such as fields, or the homes of their relatives. When they do venture into public spaces it is almost always for specific errands, such as purchasing bread, going to church services, or going to and from work. Within the home, however, women exercise a great deal of authority. This gendered division between “public” and “private”, often documented by anthropologists in the past, continues to define village life in Argolida today.

In the upper villages the division between male and female spaces is strictly enforced by the villagers, especially the men. Young girls are often seen playing in the public square when the weather is nice, and are often sent to the coffee-shop or the store on errands. However, as they get older the older men will begin to chase them away. Several times, as I sat in the square in Gerbesi watching groups of children play in the early summer evening, men would approach and let out a sharp “*oust!* Home!” that sent the young girls scampering. Boys on the other hand roamed the village freely until very late. When I asked a local man why he did that, he replied, “Girls have to learn. Their place is at home, not in the square.” After puberty, village girls are rarely seen loitering in public areas of the village, except in the company of relatives. Men maintain a strong ideology of female inferiority, despite somewhat contradictory practices. They insist that women are inadequate for many diverse tasks, such as driving cars or public leadership, even though in practice women frequently carry out such tasks. I frequently heard statements such as “Women are lower than men. That is a fact and you should remember.” On the other hand, women are thought to be capable of exercising power over males through the creation of dependency, giving rise to the view that “a man without a woman is nothing”. Often this takes the form of expressions of sexual dependency. On several occasions men repeated a common saying among males in the villages that “one pussy hair [*mounotrikha*] can pull an entire ship. If you see a ship up on the mountain, it was pulled there by a pussy hair.” On another occasion an elderly man confided in me that, “We have a saying here, ‘let the women depart first and leave us peaceful’, but if that really happens we suffer.” Thus men exhibit both hostility and

dependence towards women, behavior typical of the Mediterranean “machismo” complex³⁹.

The exclusion of women from public spaces is usually justified in terms of sexuality. Men are widely considered by villagers to be naturally promiscuous, and their promiscuity is even a badge of honor, entitling them to respect from other men and even many women. Women’s promiscuity, on the other hand, is considered shameful and most will avoid giving the impression that they are available for extra-marital sexual activity. When I asked one young couple, in their thirties, in Agia Triada about the difference the wife replied,

“Look, if my husband had an affair I would be angry, but I also understand that it is just their instinct [*instincto*]. That’s just the way they are, it doesn’t mean that much to them. With women it is different; it is more of a betrayal. Women can’t separate sex from everything else.”

In practice, this means that many men spend much of their time pursuing, or at least talking about, potential affairs with other women (usually married) while at the same time jealously guarding their own wives from the predations, real or imagined, of other men.

The gendered division of space and definition of sexuality provides an underpinning for the gendered division of labor within families, but it is also a frequent point of conflict. There is great variation in how families divide labor and the amount of conflict that this division provokes. However, through interviewing and observing many families in both the valley and mountain villages I could discern tendencies that correlated with household economic strategies. Agriculturalist households, not

³⁹ “Machismo” in rural southern European societies has most often been analyzed as psychological expression of male dominance (Brandes 1980) and/or a reflection of male ambivalence and psychological fragility in the context of female centered households (Gilmore and Gilmore 1979).

surprisingly, tend to maintain a stricter division of labor. Women's labor in the fields is a necessary component and their tasks tend to be sharply delineated. Among tobacco farmers, men handle most of the plowing, fertilizing, irrigation and other "heavy" or "dirty" tasks. Both men and women harvest the leaves, but women are mainly responsible for the tying and hanging of leaves to dry. Among herders, men will do most of the herding while women will do most of the milking. Among truck farmers, women will help with harvesting and will usually handle the sales at the farmers' market while men will handle the plowing, fertilizing, irrigation, lifting and packing. In most cases women's tasks keep them close to home or to their properties, seldom working alone, while men are often on their own for much of the day, running errands and carrying out solitary tasks. This freedom of movement often insures that many men will end up at a coffee shop or tavern to drink and gossip with his friends on a daily basis. As they pass through the village on various errands they will often run into friends and end up sitting for hours drinking and smoking. The men's ability to escape from the house is generally tolerated by women since it leaves them "peace and quiet" [*isihia*] to carry out their own tasks and visit with other female relatives and neighbors. Thus men often leave in the morning, return for the midday meal and nap, and depart again in the early evening, turning over the house and garden to the authority of the women. While women sometimes complain about their husbands' "laziness" [*tembelia*] and excessive drinking, they generally seem grateful not to have them around constantly.

The division of labor tends to be more fraught with conflict among pluriactive households, especially those in which the wife is employed. It is more and more common for women, especially younger ones, to live in the villages but work in nearby towns.

Village women hold a variety of positions, from wage labor in shops and small factories to salaried jobs such as civil service, teaching or other professions. In most cases they provide a significant, sometimes the most significant, part of the household income. At the same time they continue to carry the burden of housework and childcare, even if generally there are older female relatives around to assist them. Most women in this situation suffer from a high level of stress. In the villages men will sometimes step in to assume part of the responsibility for childcare and housework, but most often they will not, at least partly from fear of losing status in the eyes of other men. For example, when I attended the Easter feast at a house in Gerbesi one of the men there, who was visiting from Nauplio, became the butt of ribald jokes when he got up to help his wife wash the dishes at her request. In his defense he said, "That's the way we do it in the city. We both work, we both share the chores".

In households where women work outside the home men will generally take on agricultural responsibilities, even if they also work another job. They are able to make up for the wife's absence by hiring immigrant laborers to carry out necessary tasks. Women, however, do not have this option with housework and childcare. Immigrants are not trusted by families to work inside the house or to take care of children or frail elderly and so women must take on double duties. Women are judged by the quality of their housework and the condition of their children much more than men. In fact, several times villagers attributed unruly behavior of children to the fact that their mothers worked outside the home. This causes great anxiety in women, who feel that they are constantly behind in their housework and neglecting their children. In addition, many of the women who work outside the home are not native to the village but have "married in" and so lack

the support of relatives and childhood friends. At the same time, they feel that their economic contribution gives them a certain entitlement to the freedoms that, in the villages, are male prerogatives such as going out to cafes and *tavernas*. As one woman said,

“Look, the other women in the village, they can’t raise their heads or their husbands will cut them off. I’m not like that. I work. Why should he go out all the time and leave me at home. I want to go out too, I want to go to a café, the cinema, to visit friends in town. He doesn’t understand that.”

Despite her bravado however, this woman rarely socializes with friends on her own. Instead her “free time” is generally devoted to catching up on housework or watching television. “Going out” was a constant source of friction in pluriactive households. Most of the men avoid taking their wives out, claiming they don’t want to spend money and because they prefer to socialize with their male friends. Men are clearly uneasy with the prospect of their wives having public social lives not connected to themselves or family. This is a constant theme of women’s complaints in the villages.

Men try to hold on to their differential access to the public sphere by restricting the movements of their wives and monopolizing their labor, but at the same time are increasingly dependent on their involvement in the formal, public economy. This is also reflected in changing marriage strategies and dowry practices. Some agriculturalists, particularly herders and those in the higher villages, are finding it increasingly difficult to find wives. Most young women, and their families, see marriage as an opportunity for upward mobility. In the neighboring village of Bardi, for example, a 35-year-old herder has been trying unsuccessfully to find a wife for several years. He is fairly well-off, with

a large herd, but few women are interested in the monotonous and “dirty” duties of a herder’s wife. He has few opportunities to meet women socially and attempts at arranging a marriage have been unsuccessful. One of his friends told me,

“I found a shepherd girl over towards Epidavro. She wasn’t much to look at but she could handle a herd of goats like a man. So I found out who her father was and went to talk to him. I told him this and that, that I had a nice boy. But he said ‘What? She’s a shepherd now! What shall I do, give her to another shepherd?’ That was the end of it.”

In many villages herders are turning to Albanian women as brides, but this has yet to happen in Gerbesi or Manesi.

Other agriculturalists, such as truck farmers, have an easier although still difficult time. In general, both girls and boys try to marry “up” in class terms. For girls this is a little easier since they are not expected to carry on the family business and properties and parents are often willing to invest substantial dowries in a “good” match. Given the low number of children, there is more pressure on boys to stay in the village, unless they have other brothers. Thus while girls are often pushed to marry out of the village, boys are more often expected to remain in the village, something that a bride’s parents may resist if it is considered a step down. Often, rather than a formal courtship with parental approval, village boys must resort to “stealing” brides.

In the past, most marriages were within the villages, but villages often took brides from poorer villages and gave their own daughters to richer ones⁴⁰. For example, boys in

⁴⁰ For example, in Gerbesi in 1910 66% of marriages were endogamous while 19% came from higher elevation villages (including villages of central Peloponnesos that leased winter pasturage in Gerbesi). By 1940, 49% of marriages were endogamous and 28% were from higher elevation villages. By 1997, 41% of marriages were endogamous and 34% were from higher elevation villages (Athanasopoulou 2002:165-

Gerbesi and Manesi often took brides from the poorer villages of Bardi and Limnes further up the mountain, while girls were often married to boys in valley villages or towns. The same was true of Agia Triada. They took brides from Gerbesi and Manesi but more rarely gave them. The parents' first choice was to marry off their daughters outside the village if possible. Young couples could circumvent this pressure by bridetheft, whereby the couple publicly displays a sexual relationship, thus forcing the hands of the parents. Young men sometimes employed this strategy to obtain wives they could not have gotten formally. For example, a farmer in Manesi from a relatively poor family described to me how he got married.

"I got married young. I was 20 years old and we had some problems in the house. My mother died and my father, you know, he was drinking. My younger brother was getting wild. It fell on me to take care of things, to cook, everything. So I said to myself; 'this is not making it'. I decided to marry. I knew my wife from around the village. She was younger and used to go up the hill with a few sheep for her father. So I started following her, talking to her nicely, and soon we were having sex. She was crazy about me. Then I went to her father and said this and that. He went crazy, said he would kill us both. He wanted to marry her in the valley. She only had a sister and so she had a nice dowry. But what could he do? Everyone knew about it by then."

The disadvantage to stealing a bride is that the dowry is at the discretion of the parents, since it is not negotiated beforehand. In this case, because the only other sibling was a sister who had already married in the valley, the dowry was more or less assured.

166). Today endogamy seems to have collapsed as a marriage strategy, especially given the low numbers of children in the villages. In Gerbesi today there are less than 70 children between the ages of 0-14.

In other cases however a stolen bride may receive very little and parents may take the opportunity to bolster the dowries of her sisters or the inheritance of the sons. For this reason, some parents facilitate the theft of daughters by turning a blind eye to budding romances.

Today bridetheft of a sort continues. In some cases marriages today entail large dowries. In a recent example, when a young woman from Gerbesi was married to a doctor in Nauplio I was told the dowry was valued at close to a quarter million euro. My informant quickly added, “but he is a doctor”. However, as more and more daughters select their own husbands, either through socializing in the cafes and discotheques of nearby towns or while studying in the cities, dowries have become after-the-fact gifts rather than incentives. As one local farmer explained,

“My daughter is studying at university. When she finishes she will be able to get a good paying job. She doesn’t need a dowry to find a good husband. She will probably stay in the city. For her dowry I will probably give her some olive trees. That’s why we have the olive trees, to give them as dowry. The rest, the fields and the house, will go to my son. We like to keep sons close and he will need all the property in order to find a good wife himself.”

As this statement implies, many villagers have come to see the expenses of education as a kind of dowry. As women have entered the formal economy, dowries have become less important for marriage and have been replaced to a certain extent by the financing of young women’s education. Instead of dowry, women’s skilled labor is considered more valuable, something that helps to explain why in recent years more females than males in

the higher villages are going on to higher education⁴¹. Except for parental support during their education, women essentially earn their own dowries. The alternative for females is to find a husband through romantic sexual relationships. At the same time, this has allowed parents to endow sons with enough property to survive and prosper in the village.

Changing dowry practices also reflect changing practices in how children, in particular daughters, are raised in the villages of Argolida. Since the marriage prospects of daughters are perceived to be improved with education, parents generally encourage schooling and readily pay high fees for after-school tutoring. After secondary schools those who pass the exams attend post-secondary institutions. If they make it to university they will go off to live in cities far from the day-to-day surveillance of their parents. Such freedom for girls still in their teenage years was rare as recently as a generation ago. Even if they do not go away to school, girls in the last years of secondary school are afforded a remarkable amount of freedom from parental control. Village girls dress attractively, affecting the latest urban styles and, particularly in the summer, regularly go out to discotheques and cafes with their friends, often staying out until the early morning hours and traveling home by taxi. Most parents continue to insist on modesty and decorum for the girls while they are in the village, but often turn a blind eye to their romantic adventures in the nearby towns. This period of freedom is considered to be a time of experimentation preceding the duties of marriage, but is also a way that girls can find potential husbands. As one woman in Agia Triada explained to me,

⁴¹ In Gerbesi, for example, three young women and one young man were studying at university during my fieldwork.

“When I was a student, before I was married, I lived alone in Athens. It was a great time; I could do whatever I wanted. I could go out with boyfriends without any problems. Then I met my husband and settled down. It is important to have that experience, otherwise you think you are missing something and you have regrets.”

Compared to the experiences recounted by older women, such freedom is a stark contrast to the conditions usually faced by previous generations of women in the villages.

Sons have always enjoyed the kinds of freedoms that daughters are beginning to experience in the villages, but they too have benefited from new child-rearing practices. From my interviews with parents I detected a sharp decline in physical beatings of children by parents. While most parents, particularly men, told me they were regularly beaten by one or both parents when they were young, few would approve of such punishments today. Two parents told me of incidents when they had recently beaten their children, but they always told the story with expressions of guilt and regret, saying they had “lost control”. Also, in both cases the beatings occurred against older children who had failed to properly look after younger ones. Parents often threaten to beat children, sometimes carrying out an elaborate theater of taking off a belt in an attempt at scaring them into behaving, but they rarely carry out the threat. In explaining the change in practice, parents will often attribute it to a concern with the “psychological” well being of the child and the harmful effects of parental “repression” [*katastoli*]. Psychological problems are usually attributed to parents’ behavior. One mother told me in an interview,

“I saw a show on television and there were psychologists talking about children. They said that if your child is anxious [*nevriko*], look to yourself.

In other words it is the parents who make children anxious by being anxious themselves. This really seems true to me.”

Boys, however, are still encouraged to be aggressive and, by American standards, quite willful. In the villages, it is common to find boys of 4 or 5 who curse fluently and threaten their parents when they are denied sweets or other things. Such behavior is usually greeted with laughter and approving comments such as, “He’s such a tough fighter [*tsampoukas*]!”

Most Greek parents readily assert that children today are much more “spoiled” [*kakomathemena*] than in previous generations. Parents, in particular mothers, go to great lengths to accommodate the specific demands of their children, often preparing special dishes for them or buying them treats and toys. One young mother, as she bustled away in a kitchen preparing special snacks demanded by her two sons told me, “Look what I do for them! They are my masters [*kirioi*], that’s what I call them.” However, parents also often complain that as they reach their adolescence children are “lazy” and refuse to work or help out around the house.

In the last several decades children have become significant burdens on households. For parents the cost of freedom for their children is mainly economic. Education is expensive, given the necessity of private tutoring to overcome the perceived deficiencies of the public school system. In addition to schooling, children demand an increasing number of commodities in order to acquire and maintain social status. Cell phones, brand-name clothing, spending money and, for boys, motorbikes and cars are all considered necessities by young people, who rarely work before finishing school. Most of these things have to be provided by parents, even if it stretches their budgets. Parents

refuse requests for money with great difficulty and feelings of guilt. Once as I worked with a shepherd his son, a student in Athens, called on the cell phone to ask for 300 euro for some expenses including a trip to an island with some friends for the weekend. Even though I knew the shepherd was short on cash he agreed. I later accompanied the shepherd as he borrowed some money from his mother-in-law and got the rest from the bank before sending it via the bus company to Athens. "Let him have fun while he is still young" was his only comment. The expense of raising children was the main reason villagers gave for the precipitous decline in birth rates over the last several decades⁴².

Besides costing money, children have also generally ceased to contribute to household production. In most families children rarely help out in the fields. Again, this is a stark contrast with the childhood conditions described by older and middle-aged villagers, who vividly remember being awoken before dawn to accompany their parents to the fields to work. Today such treatment of children would be considered abusive. Collier (1997) describes a similar change in Andalucia, where children, who once were raised to carry out familial duties and obligations, are now encouraged to desire their work as a form of self-actualization, a sort of Foucauldian internalization of social discipline. Besides altering the mechanics of social discipline, however, this shift in child-rearing practices and discourses, along with the departure of female labor, has contributed to a serious labor crisis in the traditional patterns of household production, a crisis that has only been solved by the importation of immigrant labor as a replacement.

⁴² Among families in Midea township today the average number of children is around 2. This is a marked decrease from the previous generations.

“Neo-racism and cultural fundamentalism in Argolida

The increasing commodity consumption of households in Argolida is occurring at the same time that women and, in particular, children have been abandoning agricultural labor. The problem is that, while agriculture under the current market conditions cannot support the type of lifestyle sought and expected by village residents, there is no other productive sector capable of supporting them either. This problem has been partly solved by the exploitation of immigrant labor. The dependence on immigrant labor has created a class antagonism between Greek landowners and immigrant wagedworkers as they struggle over the profits from agricultural production, and this struggle is largely manifested through the elaboration of a neo-racist and anti-immigrant ideologies of naturalized inequality that acts to construct “Albanian” and “Greek” as distinct and incommensurable racial and social categories. The exploitation of immigrant labor is facilitated, as we saw in the last chapter, by legal and social constraints on immigrants, but it is also reproduced in the daily life of the villages through a pervasive and blatant form of anti-immigrant racism expressed by almost all Greeks.

The social isolation of immigrants in the villages is maintained through a self-conscious racism. Many farmers openly subscribe to racist views. One truck farmer in Manesi told me, “I admit it; I am a racist [*ratsistis*]. I hate the immigrants. I can’t stand them at all.” Others however, express anti-immigrant sentiments on the basis of cultural, rather than physical differences. In general, though, both ideological expressions contribute to a systematic marginalization and subordination of immigrants as a group within the villages that is based on ascribed differences that are perceived as both natural and immutable. This system is distinct in many ways from the types of racism found in

other regions, such as North America, or in other epochs. Indeed, there is debate on whether contemporary anti-immigrant ideologies and practices constitute a type of racism or a fundamentally different type of exclusionary rhetoric.. We shall return to this argument shortly. For the moment, though I will employ the term to denote the totality of discourses and practices that act to simultaneously exclude and subjugate immigrants.

To be sure, there are many cases of extraordinary kindness shown by some Greeks towards immigrants. Some farmers, particularly those in the higher villages have established strong personal relations with immigrant workers and their families. In some cases, individual immigrants have become “like family”. I witnessed instances when immigrants joined in family meals and when Greek families cared for sick immigrants.

On the whole however, immigrants are treated by native Greeks with the brutality that comes from a firm belief in natural inferiority that characterizes racialized notions of inequality. More often than sympathy or care, native Greeks greeted the sufferings of immigrants with indifference or even amusement. Once, as I sat in the square of Gerbesi at night with a group of farmers, Tomi the senior immigrant in the village and a severe alcoholic appeared out of the darkness and collapsed in the square, bleeding profusely from the head. As I got up and went to help him, the others laughed and one said, “What are you doing? Leave him alone. He’ll be dead soon anyway”. He was carried home by a group of Albanians. The presence or behavior of immigrants sometimes provokes the rage of Greeks. Another told me, “When I see them, my blood boils. They disgust me. If I could, I’d get rid of them all.” Sometimes these feelings lead to violent outbursts. When I was at a rooftop taverna with some Greek farmers and the Romanian waiter was not quick enough to bring up the orders, one of the farmers flew into a rage, upsetting the

table and scattering silverware. “These fucking foreigners are getting too bold. They just want to come here and have a good time. He needs a good beating to show him who is the boss here.” This rage sometimes results in physical assaults, and in some cases killings.

Racism in Greece is an ideology lacking a formal coherence. It is not a new phenomenon. Since at least the emergence of the modern state, Greeks have claimed a biological as well as cultural distinction between themselves and Turks. In addition, racism towards Gypsies and Jews is widespread. There are several words that Greeks use to denote groups with inherited or genetic differences, and each can in certain contexts be translated as “race”. *Faro* is used to denote “race” or “lineage”, indicating a group of closely related families. *Fili* is used to denote “race” or “tribe”, in other words a group of related lineages. On other occasions, Greeks will use the imported word “*ratsa*” to denote “race”. I heard all three words used to describe immigrants, and Albanians in particular. Part of the racialization of immigrants is based on the firm belief among Greeks that there exists a Greek “race” [*fili*] that is genetically distinguishable from other “races” such as Turks and Albanians. As a Greek-American I was the frequent object of speculation about exactly which “genes” [*gonidia*] passed to me were Greek and which were American. Greek genes are thought to have been passed down from ancient times, and many Greeks are proud of what they believe is a “gene” for “civilization” [*politismos*].

In practice, the concept of race often slips between biological and culturist assumptions. In some cases, I heard explanations for the inferiority of immigrants based on biological characteristics, such as the following.

“Albanians are different. They are a different race [*faro*, lit. lineage]. You can always tell them by the shape of their head. They are lazy and deceitful by nature. You must always be careful with them.”

In other cases, Albanians were characterized by a lack of “culture” [*koultoura*] or “civilization” [*politismos*]. For example, as an explanation for why Albanians are “stupid” and “without morals”, a small business owner in Manesi asserted “[Albanians] have no civilization; they have no religion, no state, nothing!” Others attributed the “backward” [*kathisterimeni*] state of Albanians to the isolationism of the communist regime. In both cases however such statements had a finality that precluded the ability of Albanians to adapt and change, at least the current generation. Albanians were seen as unredeemable barbarians, the development of their faculties stunted by a culture of poverty and isolation.

The stunted cultural and intellectual development of Albanians is used by residents in both upper and lower villages to justify and legitimize the superior social position of Greeks. Albanians and other Eastern Europeans are thought to be unfit to participate in Greek society or enjoy the prerogatives of modern citizens and consumers. The low living standards of immigrants compared to Greeks was often justified with the argument that immigrants were “not accustomed” [*den ekhoun sinithizei*] to modern lifestyles and would be spoiled by too much wealth. In other cases farmers assured me that immigrants were able to “endure” [*andehoun*] poor conditions and hard labor because of their history of deprivation. The exploitation of immigrants is thus naturalized by beliefs in the different intellectual and cultural levels between Greeks and immigrants. Because “culture” is assumed to be a quasi-hereditary quality, immigrants carry the

burden of underdevelopment with them into Greece, where it is used to justify a kind of cultural racism.

One manifestation of the kind of cultural racism experienced by immigrants is the anger expressed by many villagers concerning the consumption of commodities by immigrants. Immigrants are thought not to “need” many of the commodities enjoyed by Greeks. Ridicule and even hostility on the part of Greeks to the consumption of inappropriate commodities by immigrants was common. Many Greeks thought it ridiculous that immigrants should have cell phones. They often cited commodity consumption as an example of the stupidity of immigrants. One labor crew operator explained the difference by saying

“When the Greeks left as emigrants, they worked hard and saved their money. They improved their lives. These Albanians aren’t that smart. They waste their money on silly things. Cell phones, jewelry, those things. They should be saving their money to improve their lives, but they aren’t that smart. What can you do for them?”

Other times, conspicuous consumption by immigrants aroused outright hostility. Immigrants driving cars, especially relatively new or expensive cars, immediately provoked suspicions of criminality.

Commodity consumption, like land ownership, is a right claimed by Greeks and denied to immigrants. Along with the segmentation of the labor market, the segmentation of rights is a key expression of social inequality that is conditioned by the cultural racism at work in the villages. To claim these rights is, in effect, to claim a Greek identity. Those who are successful generally take on the identity of diaspora Greeks, that is “northern

Epirotes” (the Greek name for southern Albania) or “Pontics” (Greeks from the Black Sea region). This process was driven home to me one afternoon as I sat with a group of farmers in Agia Triada. After one of the group left, a young man I had met for the first time, the others turned to me and asked if I noticed anything strange. They laughed and one said,

“He is an Albanian! You wouldn’t know it to look at him. That is, he is a northern Epirote⁴³. He has been here a while and is trying to get his papers, to become Greek. He looks like a Greek, right?”

I understood immediately that he “looked like a Greek” because he had all the expected commodities; cell phone, nice clothes, a nice car. Despite the fact that many Greeks claim a biological difference with immigrants, in reality it is the trappings of commodity consumption that provides the essential “physical “difference.

There is a large body of literature on the rise of anti-immigrant discourse and the resurgence far-right ethno-nationalism in Europe over the last several decades. One point of debate is whether these discourses of exclusion constitute a form of “neo-racism” (Balibar 1991), that is a revitalized and resurgent racism, or a distinct form of “cultural fundamentalism” (Stolke 1995) more akin to nationalism. Balibar argues that contemporary practices, discourses and representations of immigrant subordination constitute a form of racism because they are organized by “intellectual elaborations of the phantasm of prophylaxis and segregation” that mimic scientific discourse and are articulated around “stigmata of otherness” (1991:17-18). The effect is the construction of

⁴³ The southern part of Albania is sometimes referred to by Greeks as “Northern Epiros”. Epiros is the province of Greece bordering Albania. “Northern Epirote” is used to describe ethnic Greeks or Orthodox Christians living in southern Albania and has connotations with the idea of a “Greater Greece” in the Balkans.

stereotyped ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ through simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, the “othering” of racial discourse. What is “neo” about it, however, is the substitution of “culture” for “race”. For Balibar this is not important in itself, because, as he argues, “culture can also function as nature” (1991:22). Neither is it simply a camouflage in the context of the discrediting of racial ideologies in post-war Europe. Rather, the emphasis on culture arises from the context of decolonialization. For Balibar, traditional racism in Europe was an ideology of domination within the context of colonialism (see also Stoler 1992). Neo-racism is being constructed within a very different context of social relations as capitalism has moved from colonialism to globalism and thus reflects both the changing nature of the nation-state and changing technologies of social subordination.

Stolke (1995), on the other hand, considers the characterization of contemporary anti-immigrant rhetoric as a neo-racism to be misleading. For Stolke, the pervasive “cultural fundamentalism” of European anti-immigrant movements legitimizes the exclusion of foreigners through a reification of culture as a bounded, historically rooted entity and reflects a resurgence of the primordial sense of identity associated with the rise of the nation-state. Working with a “rhetorical model of reversal” (Taguieff 1990:112) of liberal cultural relativist discourse, cultural fundamentalism argues for the incommensurability of cultures and the incompatibility of immigrants through a discourse of respect for difference. Whereas racism naturalizes relations of domination, cultural fundamentalism legitimizes xenophobia as a ‘natural’ reaction to cultural difference. The effect is that “instead of ordering different cultures hierarchically, cultural fundamentalism segregates them spatially” (Stolke 1995:8).

The problem with Stolke's argument is that she seems to ignore the way that anti-immigrant rhetoric not only excludes, but also orders the subordination of immigrants within the economies of Europe. Contrary to Stolke, in rural Greece anti-immigrant rhetoric does not segregate immigrants spatially as much as it legitimizes their subordination. In this sense it is closer to the neo-racism described by Balibar. For Balibar, "in neo-racist doctrines, the suppression of the theme of hierarchy is more apparent than real" (1991:24) and becomes manifest in its practical application. The other problem with Stolke's argument is her characterization of cultural fundamentalism as a resurgence of primordial nationalist identity. In the context of an increasingly transnational Europe such a resurgence is clearly reactionary. However, if this is the case, it is difficult to explain the growing dependence of Europeans on immigrant labor. The simultaneous dependence on, and rejection of, immigrants appears as a paradox. The key to unlocking this paradox, which Stolke does not address and Balibar only indirectly addresses, is the relationship between anti-immigrant rhetoric and the exploitation of immigrant labor.

The analysis of cultural fundamentalism in Europe tends to over-emphasize its ideological production at the expense of its political-economic context. The rise of xenophobic and racist movements in Europe is associated with the rapid social and economic transformations of the last several decades. These changes have particularly assaulted the working class and lower middle class, making them fertile ground for anti-immigrant movements. Some have argued that immigrants become scapegoats for the falling wage levels and loss of job security formerly enjoyed under Fordist or social democratic regimes (Solomos and Wrench 1993), or that immigrants represent a "tactical

weapon” (Kwong 1997:15) in economic restructuring by displacing native workers and negating their social and economic gains. Others consider the nationalistic character of anti-immigrant discourse to be an attempt by these downwardly mobile groups to reassert their position in the social fabric of the nation-state in the face of growing unemployment and decreasing access to state resources (Wimmer 1997). Indeed, such arguments are common in the villages, as many complain that immigrants are “stealing” jobs by working for much less than Greek workers demand and competing for state assistance, thus damaging villagers’ livelihoods⁴⁴.

The problem with treating anti-immigrant rhetoric in Europe as a form of reaction is that doing so tends to obscure the issue of social labor. Studies of racism often veer toward a kind of psychological reductionism in which ideology becomes a historical subject in itself. A more productive analysis takes into account migrant labor as the focus for the production and articulation of racism and not just migrants themselves (Miles 1982:5). As Robert Miles (1987) has argued, capitalist production continues to be dependent on the reproduction of “unfree” labor by means of the manipulation of cultural criteria or symbols. Racism is merely a variant of the process of producing the necessary constraints on labor that guarantee the extraction of comparatively high levels of surplus value. Others have also pointed out that immigrant labor tends to concentrate in jobs that natives either refuse or avoid and subsidizes the creation of certain kinds of employment, such as supervisory positions, among native workers (Harris 1995:195). In this sense,

⁴⁴ Such claims are doubtful. Baldwin-Edwards and Safilio-Rothschild (1999) argue that there is no direct link between immigrants and native unemployment in Greece. On the contrary, they argue that immigrants have bolstered employment in Greece by filling in gaps in labor supply and providing cheap labor for otherwise unprofitable economic activities.

neo-racism is seen as the consequence and site of struggle between classes, and class fractions.

In his ethnography of anti-immigrant sentiment in urban Sicily, Cole (1997) shows the complexity of contemporary racism. As in Greece, immigrants in Sicily are concentrated in the low-wage and informal tertiary sector, occupying jobs that for working class Sicilians are undesirable. Cole's analysis finds significant differences in the expression of racism among different classes. Urban workers tend to be somewhat ambivalent regarding immigrants, sometimes empathetic with their plight but for the most part pessimistic and resistant to their assimilation. Cole attributes this to the competition over state support and services rather than direct competition over jobs. Among middle and upper class Sicilians Cole documents a sophisticated liberal anti-racist ideology at the same time as there exists economic and political domination legitimized through an ideology of cultural difference. The middle and upper classes could afford magnanimity towards immigrants, who conveniently provided a pool of cheap labor without threatening bourgeois political or economic power (1997:97-98).

Variation in the expression of racism among class fractions can also be seen in Argolida. At the end of the summer of 2003 the Gerbesi Association (*Sillogos Gerbesioton*), the organization of Athenians who come from the village of Gerbesi, hosted a feast in the village. The goal was to raise money to plant trees along village roads, similar to other social events hosted by the club to raise money for village improvements. The Association is generally left-leaning politically and as part of the program, in addition to music, they booked a speaker to speak on the historical roots of Arvanites as an Albanian speaking ethnic group with the objective of mitigating the

pervasive racism among the villagers. The choice of speaker aroused controversy in the village as some perceived the presentation as a patronizing attempt to establish historical connections with contemporary Albanian immigrants. In general, the cultural relationship between Arvanites and immigrant Albanians is highly controversial in Arvaniti villages (Gefou-Madianou 1999). While some applauded the efforts of their urban kin, others were ideologically opposed to the proposition that local Arvanites and Albanians shared a common ethnicity. One local man, the self-appointed president of the village cultural society, was vehement. "There is no relationship between us and the Albanians. We are the original Greeks. We are more Greek than the Greeks! Our ancestors have been here for thousands of years, back to ancient Greece and the Mycenaeans." For the most part, the attempt to promote multicultural understanding was met with derision and even hostility on the part of villagers.

The debate over Arvaniti identity is a common preoccupation in the upper villages of Midea township. Villagers strongly identify as Arvanites and often discuss the distinctive features of Arvaniti "culture" [*koultoura*] and their differences with the "Greeks" of the valley. In comparison to the valley Greeks, Arvanites are considered to be more clever and "sly" [*poniri*] as well as more militant and resistant to authority, a feature that ties them historically to the communist party and the various peasant uprisings. At the same time Arvanites consider themselves to be more truly "Greek" than the Greeks. They claim to have provided the impetus for the revolution and continue to hold more closely to tradition while the valley villagers are constantly adapting to foreign rule, corrupting their culture. Valley residents are often referred to as "Turk-lickers" [*Tourkogliftes*] and fascists. Stressing their ethnic difference is a way that high villagers

have organized their resistance to the political and economic domination that reaches them via the valley villages and towns.

Villagers in Gerbesi and Manesi often assert that valley residents are descended from Arvaniti stock, but that they lost their identity under the yoke of national and foreign domination. For their part, except for families that have kin ties to the upper villages, most valley residents reject these claims. In fact, most valley residents are somewhat mystified by Arvaniti claims of ethnic difference and tend to downplay the distinction. One valley resident told me, “Arvanites. They are really Greeks. They were just more isolated and developed their own kind of Greek culture.” Arvanites are considered to be somewhat backward, their pride a cover for their lower social status. Valley residents see themselves as more modern and closer to the urban culture of the nation-state.

Arvaniti identity is sometimes used as an explanation of the different relationship between immigrants and natives in higher and lower villages. Early in my fieldwork a farmer in Gerbesi explained the difference to me.

“In Gerbesi, we have more sympathy for the immigrants because we are Arvanites, we have common roots and also because we too worked for day wages not too long ago. Our ancestors came here just like them. In Gerbesi they eat at the same table with us. We don’t take them food to eat alone. Even if they are dirty from working or whatever, it doesn’t matter, they’ll sit right at the table.”

Many immigrants seem to agree. One told me,

“The Greeks here are better, they’re Arvanites. They used to be Albanians.

The ones in the valley are shit. They won’t even talk to you.”

In some ways, I confirmed this view through observation. The residents of the upper villages do have more on-going social relations with immigrants. They do sometimes eat at the same table. In the valley, people have much less personal contact with immigrants. It was rare to find a valley resident who maintained an on-going relationship or observe Greeks and immigrants sitting together. However, this seems largely due to the relations of production dominant in each area. In the upper villages farmers were much more likely to employ immigrants on a regular basis. The familial style of their relationship is used to hold the immigrants under obligation and thus claim a right to their labor. In the valley most residents are insulated from contact with immigrants because of the seasonal nature of labor needs and the use of work crews, which precludes the need for on-going reciprocal social relations. However, even in the upper villages, in numerous interviews and observations I encountered instances of hostility toward immigrants in general, even on the part of individuals that maintained strong ties with particular individual immigrants. This hostility often took the form of a distinctive racism.

I did collect evidence that in the early years of Albanian immigration, the late 1980’s, immigrants were initially greeted with hospitality in the upper villages. This initial friendliness seems to have been based on villagers feelings of solidarity with Albanians. Being both leftist and Arvanites, speaking in fact a dialect of Albanian that was somewhat intelligible to the new immigrants, many villagers had long felt a common bond with Albania. One young woman from the village, a university student at the time, had volunteered to participate in an exchange program. She spent a semester in Tirana in

1989 and learned Albanian. She reported that she was disappointed that the Albanian she learned in Tirana was so different from the Arvanitika that she had learned from her parents, and even more disappointed with Albanian society, which she found to be corrupt and with little resemblance to that of the village. Back in Athens when the immigration to Greece began in earnest in the early 1990's, she received numerous requests for assistance from arriving immigrants who remembered her from her stay in Tirana. She gave some help to the first few, but after a while she "stopped answering the phone".

The development of anti-immigrant rhetoric and practices in the villages over the last several decades tends to argue against Stolke's (1995) view of cultural fundamentalism as primarily a technique of spatial exclusion and segregation. While spatial segregation is certainly an important element in the subordination of immigrants it has occurred in a context of economic integration. That is, anti-immigrant rhetoric has arisen as immigrants have come to play a fundamentally important role in agricultural production, but at the level of a highly exploitable, flexible source of labor. The high degree of exploitation is fueled by the farmers' own precarious situation of being trapped between the downward pressure on prices in the liberalized markets for agricultural products and the growing consumption needs of their households. The conditions of immigrants' integration and the strict enforcement of hierarchical relations required to guarantee these conditions, provides a fertile environment for the development of the kind of practices, discourses and representations that characterize systemic racism. However, as Balibar (1991) has pointed out, there are significant differences between what we see in Greece and more "classical" forms of racism. If Balibar's hypothesis is

correct, these differences can be explained by the changing role of the nation-state in the production of inequality, and the transition from colonial to neo-liberal techniques of domination in the capitalist world-system.

In rural Greece the discourse of racism that conditions the economic integration of immigrants tends to naturalize their social inequality in ways that both resemble and differ from older forms of domination. One example of this is the degree to which it resembles the construction of gender difference. In both cases the subordinate group is considered to be inadequate for participation in the public sphere and its exclusion enforced through the solidarity of the dominant group. This gives rise to a paradoxical relationship of both hostility and simultaneously dependence between the two. Just as men exhibit a hostile misogyny together with domestic dependence on women, Greeks socially reject the attempts of immigrants in their midst to assimilate while at the same time they have become completely dependent on their labor for agricultural production. The difference is, however, that women were always socially integrated with men through marriage, kinship, political parties, and myriad other ways that acted to mitigate the effects of male sexism. Immigrants enjoy few of these mitigating factors, arguably leaving them even more vulnerable to exploitation and violence than women ever were. Thus it can be argued that social inequality in rural Greece under the influence of neo-liberal globalization has become even more extreme, despite the perceptions among local residents to the contrary. As we shall see in the following chapters, this veiling of social inequality through anti-immigrant racism has been accomplished through the spread of neo-liberal concepts and practices of citizenship on the one hand and the framing of local resistance to the E.U. project on the other. I will argue that both of these developments

are aspects of the changing nature of the nation-state and national identity in the context of the global hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism.

V. THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE AND THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN ARGOLIDA

Labor migration and the nation-state

During my fieldwork, I was often struck by a stark contradiction between the perception held by many people that social inequality had decreased and the reality of a growing dependence on impoverished and marginalized immigrant labor. Many people, even those bitterly opposed to what they saw as the destructive force of ‘globalization’ [*pankosmopoiisi*], often asserted that Greek society today was much more equitable than the past. In particular, perceptions concerning the status of women and children have changed dramatically. Women are perceived to have greater political and economic power. Children are perceived to have more freedom and are no longer as oppressed by parents. Children of what was the rural peasantry have greater opportunities for education and upward mobility. For the population as a whole, conditions have also changed. The rural population is less isolated and less dependent on urban elites. Patronage networks have weakened. Many of these developments are attributed to Greece’s membership in the E.U., which has opened up trade⁴⁵ and promoted a shift towards more liberal techniques of governance on the part of the traditionally patriarchal, authoritarian and clientelistic Greek state. At the same time that this rural “liberation” has occurred, however, there has emerged a new, and arguably more oppressed, class of labor made up of non-Greek immigrants. That both these things, the perception of greater equality and the creation of a new exploited class of labor, have developed simultaneously is, of

⁴⁵ Before the liberalization of trade under the E.U. the Greek state imposed high tariffs on imported consumer goods, such as electronics and automobiles, pricing them out of reach for many rural households.

course, dependent on the concept of a Greek 'nation' that includes some and excludes others. Thus despite the apparent weakening of the Greek state that has followed its incorporation in to the E.U., the production of a Greek nation continues to be instrumental in defining and regulating social relations.

Just as the emergence of the modern Greek nation was conditioned by the development of a state apparatus within the fractures created by the declining Ottoman Empire and expanding European mercantile capitalism, contemporary processes of Greek nationalism are shaped by the context of the Greek state and E.U. para-state. In many ways, the persistence of Greek nationalism in the face of the transformation of the state under the regime of the E.U. is surprising. After all, for most of the 20th century the political principle of nationalism was based on the assumption that "the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner 1983:1). Many believed that as the E.U. developed, some form of pan-European national identity reflecting the new reality of the state would slowly replace ethnic nationalism. The fact that this has not happened is often attributed to the defensive reaction of those classes and class fractions most threatened by the transnationalization of state power. I will argue in this chapter that, far from being a defensive reaction to new forms of state power, nationalism in rural Greece is being conditioned by the particular characteristics of the E.U. state system and is in fact an integral part of the political economy in the context of E.U.-style globalization and neoliberalism.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Greeks in Midea township are constantly preoccupied with defining themselves vis-à-vis others in terms of gender, kinship, community, political affiliation, ethnicity, nationality and class. It is largely the definition

of these differences that, taken together, constitute what we call ‘Greek culture’. Today social differences are being produced under a particular form of globalized political economy that we can in shorthand label ‘global’ or ‘late’ capitalism. However, the production of global capitalism is dependent on the production of concrete social relations at the local level, which Swyngedouw (1989) has awkwardly termed “glocalization’. In each of these categories the state continues to play an instrumental role in both the definition and production of difference, and by now it is clear that globalization, far from eliminating or replacing local particularities in the production of difference through the weakening of the nation-state or the family, etc., acts to condition culture in ways that benefit global markets. In this chapter I will document some of the ways in which global forces have influenced the production of difference in Midea township through a re-organization of the relationship between nation and state.

The transformation of the role of the state can perhaps best be seen through a comparison of immigration policies and practices of today with earlier models. The current patterns of labor immigration from Eastern Europe are not without precedent in Greece. In the 1920’s and 30’s the massive immigration of ethnic Greeks from Asia Minor and the Balkans swelled Greece’s population by approximately 10% (Giannuli 1995; Ladas 1932; Pentzopoulos 1962), a figure comparable to today. Of course, the historical conditions for this immigration were somewhat different. The earlier wave of immigrants was stimulated by a series of nationalist wars and provided a solution to the national question amidst the debris of the Ottoman Empire. Today’s immigrants are stimulated by the destruction of their native economies and the labor needs of Greece and other E.U. countries. Regardless of the differences in cause, however, the two waves of

immigration pose certain structural similarities in terms of their relationship to the Greek nation-state. Like the immigrants of today, those of 1920-30 became a resource for the state and provided the impetus for important political and economic changes. Socially marginalized and the objects of overt racism by native Greeks, immigrants provided both a vulnerable labor force for early urban industrialization and the driving force for a comprehensive land reform program that fundamentally altered rural relations of production. However, the relationship of the state to immigrants was drastically different. Whereas the early state facilitated their incorporation through *legalizing* their existence, the contemporary state has *illegalized* them, despite the necessary and important role they fill in the national political economy.

Now it may be said that the early Greek state had no choice but to legalize immigrants in the 20's and 30's, given the conditions under which they arrived and the impossibility of return to their native lands. But such a posture on the part of the state was characteristic of most immigration patterns during the mid-20th century. The transnationalization of labor markets is not a new phenomenon, and indeed has been a characteristic of capitalist economies since their early development, even if it is only a recent focus of anthropological studies (Mintz 1998). In terms of sheer numbers, today's immigration is still dwarfed by the numbers of migrants during the period 1850-1914 as the capitalist core, especially the United States, industrialized (Hatton and Williamson 1998, Potts 1990). During that period however, the capitalist states actively facilitated immigration and the movement of labor through a legalistic policy of granting citizenship rights and encouraging, through various means such as public education systems, the assimilation of immigrant workers. Despite currents of nativist racism, nationalism also

acted to promote the cultural assimilation of new populations and to alleviate some of the social pressures of class conflict that labor immigration engendered.

In the post-WWII period European states continued to facilitate labor migration, but at the same time erected partial bulwarks to cultural assimilation. Immigrants provided between 10-25% of the industrial labor in the capitalist core of Western Europe, but were managed through various “guestworker” programs that legalized their labor and guaranteed partial citizenship rights (Piore 1979, Berger 1975). Immigrants, although protected by the state, saw themselves as temporary citizens, even if in fact many ended up staying and second generations went through at least partial processes of assimilation (Portes 1998).

By the end of the 20th century, however, the relationship of the state to immigration had undergone a radical change. While numbers have not significantly increased, labor markets have, with the bulk of immigrants now consigned to what has been described as “informal” or “irregular” economic sectors rather than the “formal” industrial sector (Castells 1989; Kloosterman et al 1989; Wilpert 1989). Most importantly, immigration is now characterized by its *illegality* (DeGenova 2002). The prevalence of illegal labor in European countries, including Greece, reflects a fundamental transformation of the state and its role in reproducing relations of production. As we have seen, the state is instrumental to the marginalization of immigrants, a significant difference from previous policies that supported, at least ostensibly, their assimilation. Today the state is in the apparently paradoxical situation of *illegalizing* the very labor on which it is dependent to subsidize economic development and social liberalization. In this chapter I will argue that this position reflects a

fundamental shift in the state to neo-liberal practices of governance as well as a transformation of the relationship between state and nation under advanced or “globalized” capitalism.

The politics and anti-politics of the European Union

The European Union is constituted by a diverse set of institutions, practices and ideologies and still very much a work in progress. It is experienced by the people of Argolida in three distinct ways, which we can roughly separate into political, economic and social dimensions. On the one hand it is experienced a sort of super-national state with a set of laws and policies that sometimes supplement and sometimes supercede local and national ones. On the other hand it is experienced as a form of mini-globalization where economic markets and capital flows have been separated from national-state controls and consolidated into economies of scale, at least within the confines of an expanding Europe. Finally, it is also experienced as a cultural or social project representing the convergence and strengthening of a “European” model of society, a process that some have termed “Europeanization” (Borneman and Fowler 1997). Each of these domains, the political, economic and social, are arenas of negotiation, conflict and accommodation for local residents as they confront social changes. Together they can be represented as aspects of the process of the capitalist “neo-liberalization” of Greek society.

One important effect of E.U. membership has been the weakening of the Greek state in certain respects (Ioakimidis 2000). Direct state control over the economy has decreased through the transition to “free” markets and the privatization of formerly

nationalized industries. In terms of laws and policies, the Greek parliament remains the primary source of governmental power, and local residents are much more interested in national elections than in those of the European parliament. However, in certain areas E.U. laws and regulations are seen to supercede or “tie the hands” of Greek parliamentary decisions. This is especially true in areas such as the exercise of citizenship rights, travel, government spending, business practices, and environmental regulations, to name a few. In other areas E.U. policies are seen as supplemental to Greek state policies. For agriculturalists this is especially true for the various programs of price supports and economic aid that are more and more administered and funded by E.U. institutions, as we have seen. The E.U. has also promoted the decentralization of state power in Greece and has provided substantial funding for NGOs and other citizens associations. Overall, E.U. membership is seen as having strengthened “civil society” in Greece through a “redefinition of the boundaries between the state and society in favor of the latter” (Ioakimidis 2000:90).

In economic terms the E.U. is seen by local residents in Argolida as the main instrument behind the creeping de-regulation of markets. The Greek state, in many ways a classic example of an authoritarian state managing a semi-peripheral economy (Mouzelis 1978), has historically taken a strong role in the capitalization and support of industrial development as well as the regulation and administration of domestic markets. This role has been rapidly dismantled by the E.U. insistence on “free” markets integrated into a European core economy. In urban areas many industries have been shut down or absorbed into transnational corporations as government support has evaporated. Small businesses have also been under pressure as large corporations such as supermarket and

electronics chains have moved in to displace small owner-operated shops. In Argolida, as we have seen, real market prices have declined as crops such as citrus have been subjected to international competition and price supports have declined. The perception among agriculturalists is that, as several farmers told me, “prices are now set by the German consumer”. On the other hand, the de-regulation of markets has also brought in a flood of lower-priced consumer goods, such as clothing, electronics and automobiles, which were formally subject to high tariffs by the Greek state.

Rising levels of consumption have contributed to the perception among rural Greeks that their society is becoming increasingly “Europeanized”. This development is viewed with a mixture of satisfaction and apprehension. On the one hand people perceive that the widespread poverty and “idiocy” of rural life has disappeared while at the same time they are troubled by the erosion of what they perceive traditional values of family and community solidarity through the influences of consumer markets and mass media. The participation of rural Greeks in European and global consumer markets, as well as the introduction of the euro currency and European passports, has tended to promote a kind of European consciousness among Greeks, who now see less difference between themselves and other Europeans. Often this is displayed in the common assertion that “in a few years Greeks won’t exist anymore, only Europeans”. This consciousness is generally promoted through practices of consumption. One young woman told me that after riding on the new, French-designed Athens Metro she “felt like a European for the first time”. Even in the villages, Greeks feel that through television and other media they are able to participate in “European” fashions of clothing and other consumer goods.

When I conducted fieldwork in 2003 Greece had been ruled by the socialist party PASOK for almost 20 years, with the exception of 1989-1993 when the conservative New Democracy party was in power. PASOK, guided to power by the charismatic Andreas Papandreou, oversaw the entry of Greece into the E.U. as well as the increasing liberalization of what had been a traditionally conservative and at times strongly repressive state apparatus. In many ways, PASOK was well suited to the modernizing project of the E.U. despite the clientelistic character of Papandreou's administration. Rural development was given a high priority, as were women's rights, the expansion of educational opportunities and social welfare programs. Throughout this period in Argolida PASOK gained support both in the valley, which had traditionally been conservative, and the mountains, where many villages were traditionally communist. Local residents attribute this increase to the pro-agriculturalist stance of the PASOK government and its success at attaining E.U. funds in the form of subsidies and programs (Fouskas 1997), as well as the increase in civil service positions that in Greece have traditionally served as a form of political patronage.

Ironically, the success of PASOK and the E.U. has led to a de-politicization of local government. In Greek villages, where political differences were once an important aspect of social relations, local party offices are now difficult to find or even non-existent. In Agia Triada offices of both major parties have closed. In Gerbesi where the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) had strong backing, the local party organization has been effectively dissolved. While people still vote on party lines, for the most part, and continue to identify with one or another party, their activity is no longer local but instead national. They vote for parties in national elections and garner information on political

programs and policies through the national media. Given the lack of formal party organization at the local level, people also seem to switch their votes more readily. For example, in Gerbesi several local men who had been active members of the KKE publicly announced their intention to vote for the conservative party in order to oust the socialists in the upcoming elections. In local elections most people do not vote on party lines, but rather for individuals. There is only one village in Midea township where town council representatives are formally affiliated to a political party.

For the last 10 years an independent bloc under the leadership of the mayor, Panagiota Nassou, has run the Midea township government. Ms. Nassou is the main doctor in the village of Agia Triada and has a medical office on the ground floor of the town hall. She has been practicing there for over 20 years and is married to a business owner from the city of Corinth, about 50 km away. Her father was one of the largest landholders in the township, with over 150 *stremmata*. Her brother and two unmarried sisters now manage the family lands. Nassou was originally a member of PASOK, but left the party and was elected as head of an independent slate.

The township government of Midea is run by the mayor and town council. The town council consists of 25 representatives. The presidents of each of the nine villages in Midea township serve on the council together with between one and three representatives, depending on the size of the village. Of the 25 council members, 18 belong to the Nassou bloc, with the remaining 7 representatives making up the opposition. Nassou's bloc is made up of representatives with a wide range of political affiliation. The vice-mayor for example is a conservative. Neither is the opposition, headed by a representative with PASOK leanings although no longer a party member,

united by political philosophy. Instead, the opposition operates mostly as a contrarian force, opposing the Nassou bloc on the basis of its competence in carrying out various programs and public works. For example, a recent program of installing public water fountains in several villages was opposed by the opposition bloc on the grounds of poor planning. The Nassou bloc meets in closed door session before every council meeting, where representatives from each village battle over funding and programs, each trying to secure a bigger share for their village. At the public meetings the bloc presents a united front, having already decided on various proposals.

Political parties play a larger role at the regional level, where representatives are elected to Parliament. Argolida elects three representatives to Parliament in a proportional system. In 2004, two of the representatives were from the conservative party, New Democracy, and the other from PASOK. One of the conservative representatives, Elsa Papadimitriou, is particularly active in Midea township, participating in many community events including the Mayday commemoration held in Gerbesi. Papadimitriou is from a family of conservative politicians. While party allegiance still tends to hold in the national elections, vote switching seems to be increasingly common. Several former communist voters I spoke with, and even some PASOK supporters, told me they intended to vote for Papadimitriou both as a protest against current corruption and because she is effective in getting funds and programs allocated to Argolida.

Most people in Midea township hold a fairly cynical view of politics and politicians. The decline in political activism and party membership in the area is generally attributed to the view that there is little real difference between the parties and

that in any case politician's hands are tied by both E.U. policies and the interests of big capital. In the words of a resident of Manesi, who supported first the KKE and then PASOK,

“Look, after the dictatorship fell in the 70's everybody ran to join a party. There was a feeling that with democracy many things could change. Everyone wanted to give their opinion. When PASOK took power, it was like a revolution, people were dancing in the streets. In those days the PASOKists were like regular people, they dressed without ties and expensive clothes. Now, if you look at them, they all wear Armani, expensive clothes. Where did they get so much money? For 20 years it has been eat, eat, eat. Do you know how much money they have eaten? They turned out to be thieves like the others. So now, no one gets excited about elections. Here one group will eat well, then another group will come and eat well. But it is better not to have the same group too long, it is better to keep them a little hungry.”

Political ideology plays a diminishing role in elections, particularly at the local level. Politicians are seen as technocrats whose job is to manage the country within the framework of the E.U. while keeping corruption within tolerable limits. A certain amount of corruption is seen by most as inevitable and even desirable as long as it is not concentrated in a few hands. One former communist told me “it would be better if everything belonged to the state, then we could all steal from the same source, we could have a democracy of thieves”.

Up until the late 80's, political parties were highly visible in the villages and towns of Greece. Party offices were usually prominently located along main streets and marked by large signs and flags. With the declining importance of patronage networks and greater restrictions on the parameters of state policies under the E.U., these offices have, for the most part, disappeared. Since 1989, the main political dynamic has been not so much the different policies and programs of political parties, but the struggle between "populists" and "modernizers" within each party (Fouskas 1997). Both major parties are undergoing a struggle between the 'old guard' of populist leaders who continue to exploit clientelistic networks of political support and a 'new guard' of modernizing technocrats. Since the passing of the regime of Andreas Papandreou, a consummate populist, in 1995 the modernists have had the upper hand. With the PASOK government under the leadership of Simitis from 1995 to 2004, there was a concerted move to reorganize and modernize the state and economy along European lines while preserving some elements of the welfare state. With the ascendancy of a technocratic, European-oriented political class, elections have become less about policy and more about personality. People I spoke with in Argolida generally ascribed their decisions on voting to which person they thought would perform better. Frequently they attributed their vote to a calculation of which politicians were more "hungry" [*peinai*]. A typical statement was, "There is not much difference anymore. But these in there now, they have gotten too lazy. They have eaten too much. This time I will vote New Democracy because they are hungry, they have been out of power for ten years. It is not good to have the same group in power all the time."

The constraints imposed by the E.U. model of economic development have led to conditions similar to the “anti-politics” described by Ferguson (1990) for Lesotho. In the case of Lesotho, Ferguson argued that international development projects generate their own form of discourse and facilitate particular kinds of intervention that narrow the parameters of possible social changes and reinforce the bureaucratization of state power. While Greece is a weak comparison to Lesotho, parallels can be seen in how the imposition of a bureaucratic discourse of economic and social development, a “European” model, has served to limit political options and even suppress political debate and struggles. “Development” is seen as a technical rather than a political problem. Political management is increasingly seen as an administrative skill rather than a creative act, hence the rise of a technocratic political class of university-trained managers.

The European Union and neoliberal governance

The development of the European Union as a political and economic system is the latest chapter in a long history of state development in Europe, which is in turn tied to the emergence and spread of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. As the European bourgeoisie rose to social dominance, first through the mercantilist expansion of the 17th and 18th centuries and then through the industrial revolution of the 19th century, the old feudal social order crumbled and disappeared. The new economic order required new forms of state regulation and administration different from the powerful and centralized monarchies that had risen with the decline of feudalism. The modern state, which first emerged in the Americas but was a product of a long struggle in the northern

European mercantilist kingdoms, was characterized by a philosophy of liberalism that provided a fertile environment for the development of capitalist relations of production.

Liberalism, as a rationality of government, essentially acted as a mode of regulating society that facilitated the expansion and consolidation of capitalism by setting limits to formal powers of government and conceptualizing society as divided into three relatively autonomous and self regulating domains; the state, the market and civil society. Liberalism was not so much a plan of government as a set of guiding principles that arose from the problematization of the relation between a free market and political sovereignty (Burchell 1996). The emergence of the liberal state was accompanied by a new source of political legitimacy, the nation, which made the liberal state possible as a functioning entity. Foucault (1991) and Scott (1998) trace the emergence of the nation as a unit through the statistical construction of populations by the statisticians of mercantilist monarchies. But the real importance of nations emerged with the development of national identities and the establishment of nation-states throughout Europe during the 19th century.

By the early 20th century the liberal capitalist nation-state system of Europe had entered a series of periodic crises, which resulted in several important corrections. Capitalist economies entered a period of Keynesian intervention whereby states sought to stabilize the fluctuations of capitalist production and regulate the intensity of class conflict. This period, often described as “Fordist” (Gramsci 1971; Arrighi 1994; Harvey 1990), culminated in the post-war establishment of “welfare states” in many parts of Europe. As the early liberalism of laissez-faire capitalism was perceived as failing to produce the necessary social effects, European states became more dependent on the

expertise of positivist social science to engineer social integration and exercise rule (Rose 1996:39-40). The Fordist resolution to the contradictions of liberal capitalist political economies proved to be temporary. By the late 20th century economic crises and social conflicts were once again ascendant leading to the most recent transformation, embodied in Europe in the expansion of the European Union, to “advanced liberal” (Rose 1996) or neo-liberal states and a globalized capitalist mode of production.

The neoliberal turn in global capitalism has been reflected in a paradigm shift within the capitalist core countries away from a Fordist-Keynesian state model to one that has been variously described as a “competition state” (Cerny 1995) or a “Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime” (Jessop 2002). The novelty of neoliberalism is that, as a form of economic liberalization not just within but across borders, market forces are able to exert pressures simultaneously on many different states. As a general trend, neoliberalism is reflected in pressures to privatize state enterprises and services, the use of market proxies in what is left of the public sector, and the shift towards viewing public welfare spending as a cost of production rather than a source of domestic demand (Jessop 2002:454). Older forms of state intervention are rolled back in favor of newer forms as the focus of the state shifts from planning and social policy to economic innovation and competitiveness. This does not necessarily result in a weakening of the state, but rather a readjustment as states seek to adapt to global trends and forces. The state in fact remains vitally important as a venue for containing the contradictions generated by market liberalization and preserving “‘stable democracies’ without generating policies that interfere with the free play of internationalized market forces” (Crouch and Streek 1997:12). Often this takes the form of a resurgent nationalism that neutralizes citizens’

demands, but also obscures the declining control of national governments over economic policies.

Neoliberalism, as an overarching philosophy, or “rationality” (Foucault 1991), of governance has been implemented in many different ways. Here I will argue that the E.U., because its development has been shaped by a context of market deregulation and globalized production and trade, essentially represents a particular manifestation of neoliberal governance. The European experience of neoliberalism differs significantly from other parts of the world, such as Eastern Europe, largely because of the social democratic history of the core European states and their ability to continue to provide a measure of social protection for the more extreme forms of market predation. As Vivian Schmidt observes, “Europeanization has acted both as a conduit for global forces and a shield against them, opening member states up to international markets and competition at the same time that they protect them through monetary integration and the single market” (1999:172). In this way, the E.U. has developed as a unique combination of both neoliberal economic principles and traditional European social policies. Furthermore, there are important differences between member states in how this combination has been achieved.

Even though the E.U. maintains a relatively strong social policy, the primary dynamic of European integration since the 1980’s has been the adaptation to global neoliberal trends (Laffen 1998). While a single European market was envisioned in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, its implementation in the 1990’s after the Single Market Act of 1986 and later with the European Monetary Union (EMU) was clearly aimed at furthering regional cooperation as a means of maintaining global competitiveness and

restructuring the economies of member states in a politically acceptable manner (Schirm 2002). The deepening regionalism of the E.U. has enhanced the ability of global markets to both limit the effectiveness and increase the costs of neo-Keynesian economic policies as well as enhancing the incentives for economic liberalization. The fact that this has, in many cases, been accomplished under the stewardship of social democratic political parties attests to the social opposition the move to neoliberalism has provoked and the special ability of leftist parties to survive the political consequences (Hamann and Wilson 2001). Social democratic parties and leaders are able to deflect responsibility to the European or global level as well as more easily ease or manipulate the economic costs of restructuring.

There is still some debate over whether the neoliberalization of the European economies can really be achieved. Many European states continue to blend liberal and social democratic policies and significant differences remain in national markets. While European firms have been consolidated, they have often done so on a consortium basis, like Airbus for example, and have not been restructured as truly transnational enterprises (Calleo 2001). Others argue, however, that the potential for producing a “social market” version of capitalism under the EMU is weak at best (Whyman 2001). So far social protection measures and labor regulation have been weak and there is little potential European-wide labor bargaining, given the power of employer interests and commitment to deregulation of labor markets and the reduction of social welfare programs on the part of the E.U. elite. The stringent conditions of fiscal policy effectively prevent a return to neo-Keynesian policies and the emphasis on low inflation seems certain to indicate continued high unemployment rates.

Besides the implementation of specific policies and market conditions, neoliberalism also works in a more ephemeral way as a discursive framework, a kind of rationality, whose effects have gone beyond forms of *government* to modes of *governance*. As part of this new model, new techniques in the production of social discipline have evolved. In one sense, neoliberalism represents an extension and intensification of basic liberal techniques of governance. According to Colin Gordon,

“The fulfillment of the liberal idea in government consists- over and above the economic market in commodities and services, whose existence founds the classic liberal attribution of an autonomous rationality to the processes of civil society- in a recasting of the interface between state and society in the form of something like a second-order market of governmental goods and services. It becomes the ambition of neo-liberalism to implicate the individual citizen, as player and partner, into this market game” (1991:36).

But neoliberalism also involves some novel shifts to the liberal paradigm. Rose (1996) analyzes the move to “advanced” liberalism through three characteristic shifts. First, there is a new specification of the subject of governmental rule embodied by the citizen-as-consumer so that subjects “fulfill their national obligations not through their relations of dependency and obligation...but through seeking to fulfill themselves...” (1996:57)⁴⁶. Second, along side a shift from social science to accounting and economic expertise as accountability, budget and audit take up positions as techniques of critical scrutiny. While this appears as empowerment of the consumer, in reality it represents new relations of power between experts, the state and its subjects. Finally, there is a pluralization and

⁴⁶ Rose’s definition of “advanced” liberalism is similar to Collier’s (1997) observations of the switch from “duty” to “desire” as technologies of self fulfillment in Andalusia.

detaching of various regulatory technologies. The government is “de-statized” and the state is “de-governmentalized”. Rule is exercised through the apparently “free” choices of citizen-consumers governed by particular modes of calculation and rationality.

One of the most important underpinnings of European neo-liberal governmentality is the principle of subsidiarity. Douglas Holmes (2000) describes subsidiarity as a “surrogate discourse of power”, a guiding philosophy that shapes the organizational structure and technocratic practice of the E.U. rather than an official doctrine or policy. Subsidiarity is a principle of selective centralization that seeks to centralize only those state functions amenable to an economy of scale while at the same time constructing an interdependence of social groups and levels of regulation. Extending the classic liberal skepticism of state authority, subsidiarity constitutes a principle for circumscribing domains of governmental action and devolving authority to the lowest possible levels while making as much room as possible for the construction and functioning of civil society.

The idea of civil society, as a diverse set of institutions operating between, and checking the power of, the market and the state on the one hand and individuals and families on the other, is a key concept of liberal society despite its “weak or incomplete sociological moorings” (Hall 1995:3). While it has been linked to the peculiarities of the emergence of western European modernity with its dispersed authority (Hall 1995; Gellner 1995), in recent years the idea of civil society has regained currency as models of “democratic” western society have been exported to other areas of the globe (Keane 1998). As a concept it has been employed by a diverse set of social philosophers, from

the architects of the E.U. and the economists of the World Bank to those further left such as Gramsci (1971).

For societies outside Western Europe, the concept of civil society is extremely problematic. In Eastern Europe for example, a western type of civil society has clearly failed to develop and perhaps even declined in the last several decades, despite its supposed importance in the demise of socialism (Hann 1995). For Greece, which like the rest of the Balkans shares many historical conditions of nation-state development with eastern Europe, civil society also appears as underdeveloped. Mouzelis (1995) argues that, unlike northwestern Europe where civil society developed in the context of a historically conditioned social pluralism, late-developing, semi-peripheral capitalist societies such as Greece experienced a different trajectory. In these societies the process of nation-building took a more authoritarian turn, relying on clientelistic and populist modes of integration that precluded the development of an institutional civil society.

Given the historically contingent nature of civil society, we should be skeptical of claims that the liberal mode of governance embodied in the E.U. has been, or can be, seamlessly exported into what has historically been semi-peripheral societies. Instead, we need a frame of analysis that can take into account the particularities of different paths and experiences of integration while enabling some generalization of their convergence. In this respect it is useful to think about Foucault's notion of governmentality (1991) as a way of understanding the transformations underway in European globalization.

In order to avoid ethnocentric assumptions of the relation between the state and other nation-level social institutions, the notion of governmentality is useful. Building on his analyses of the micro-physics of power embodied in such institutions as the prison

(1979) or discourses such as sexuality and psychiatry (1980), Foucault proposed to analyze the macro-physics of power relations within a nation-state in a way that transcends particular institutional divisions. Thus Foucault defines governmentality as the totality of institutions, procedures and techniques that allow the exercise of a form of power or rule over a population (1991:102). In thinking about governmentality the contours of the state as a formal institution are relatively unimportant, even a “composite reality” or “mythicized abstraction” (1991:103), for understanding how societies are ruled and power is exercised. Governmentality foregrounds two ways of understanding the power of the nation-state. First is an analysis of “governmental rationality” (Gordon 1991) or the “conduct of conduct”, the ways of thinking or acting that shape and regulate individual behavior towards certain principles or goals. In this sense liberalism or neo-liberalism constitute particular forms of rationality that guide the interpretation of social reality and shape individual behaviors. Secondly it focuses on the technologies of rule, the array of techniques, procedures, institutions and strategies through which authority is communicated and reproduced in the individual. The power of the state is an effect of the technologies of rule rather than a cause, and should be seen together with civil society as part of a totality rather than analytically distinct (Rose 1996:42-44).

While the concept of governmentality contains an inherent fuzziness as an analytic tool, it does allow us to avoid reifying both the state and civil society as distinct, coherent and purposeful actors. As an array of technologies loosely integrated under a pervasive rationality (a term we would sometimes define as ‘culture’ in anthropology) the exercise of social authority lacks a strict unity or functionality. This perspective is useful in understanding the dialectical relationship between resistance and state authority in a

way that goes beyond the simple oppositional relations entailed in some Marxist theory, such as Gramsci's notion of wars of "movement" and "position". It will also be useful as we try to understand the role played by resistance in Argolida as rural agriculturalists confront the neo-liberal capitalism of the European Union.

Neoliberal governmentality is enacted through a complex system of beliefs and practices concerning citizenship, that is, membership in the polity of the nation-state. This process is uneven and incomplete. The concept of citizenship in Argolida is increasingly egocentric, focusing on rights and privileges of consumption rather than production. As we have seen, such changes are particularly apparent in changing attitudes towards children and, to a lesser degree, women. In both cases we can detect a shift in the technique of imposing social discipline from, as Collier (1997) has suggested, "duty to desire". Social self-actualization is increasingly seen as a product of autonomous individual subjectivity rather than the imposition of identity by society. There is no indication that this process entails more freedom for the individual, but rather entails a shift in how the processes of reproducing certain forms of class consciousness are perceived by participants. In other words, the process of reproducing social identities has been increasingly out-sourced and internalized by the individual.

Evidence for this shift can be seen in the changing significance of public education. Public schooling has always been an important factor in the creation and reproduction of national identities. Indeed, public schools were critical tools for the forging of national consciousness together with the "print capitalism" of early state-affiliated mass media (B.Anderson 1983; Weber 1976). In speaking with older residents of Argolida about their early experiences in public school, I was struck by the

predominance of memories concerning civic mythology and state rituals. By their accounts, public schools placed great emphasis on teaching narratives that illustrated the origins and nature of the Greek nation-state, such as stories of the Revolution and its heroes, religion, and duties to the “Fatherland” [*patrida*]. Until the mid-1970’s teachers were responsible for encouraging church attendance among students. School discipline was maintained through beatings administered by teachers, a fact still remembered today with some fondness. Yet now there is a perception that such efforts on the part of schools have been dropped in favor of a focus on skills and individual development. A farmer in Agia Triada gave me a typical criticism of schools today. “They don’t teach patriotism anymore in school. There are too many foreign kids. My son, when he sees the flag, he doesn’t feel patriotic. Most of the kids today, they don’t know about the heroes of the Revolution, about the suffering of the people under the Turks. They are too easy on the kids, if they don’t want to learn they don’t punish them. We are getting soft! We are losing our culture!” There is a pervasive sense among the residents of Argolida that schools have begun to abandon their role in the reproduction of national identity. This is often blamed on the requirement of schools to take in and educate increasing numbers of immigrant children. In the Agia Triada primary school 15% of the students are from “non-Greek” families.

The perception that the nationalist character of schools has weakened is largely shared by teachers as well. Two local primary school teachers I interviewed both told me that in the last decade there has been a move away from memorization and factual recall in the curriculum. Currently there is a push towards what is termed “biometric education” [*viometriki paideia*], a curriculum that emphasizes thinking and research skills. Such a

curriculum is consistent with developments in other countries such as the United States towards a more student-centered educational model. For their part, the teachers complain of the lack of a knowledge base among students, who are often unable to recite basic facts, especially concerning Greek history. The teachers I spoke with assert there has been a conscious effort to de-emphasize the teaching of national identity. One said “the system does not need to pay attention to national consciousness anymore. It was useful for much of our history, but not so much now. Now the kids need to learn how to compete in the European economy.” Many patriotic rituals remain embedded in the schools, such as the annual parades on national Independence Day, but clearly the emphasis in education has changed from particularistic knowledge of the Greek nation and culture to more liberal, universalistic notions of individual development and self-discipline as well as skills considered necessary for students’ incorporation into transnational capitalist markets.

The diminishing role of education in the production of national identity has not however resulted in a noticeable decline in nationalism among Greeks in Argolida. The sense of a Greek community and the definition of a Greek nation continue to be a preoccupation of mass media, especially television. Virtually every Greek household I visited in Argolida contained at least one television, and people watch television on a daily basis. Television is also used as an “electronic babysitter” and many children watch five or more hours of television every day. There are many channels to choose from, including two local stations, six national stations, and one international (CNN) that are available with a modest antenna. Many more are available through satellite servers.

The importance of television in the villages has grown steadily over the last several decades. Until the late 1970's, television viewing was limited to two national stations, which only broadcast for part of the day. As was the pattern for Europe, both were government owned (one was run by the armed forces). In the early 1980's, as Greece entered the E.U., television was de-regulated and many private stations appeared, some supported by European capital. In the early years the privatization of television, the power of the American media market, and the rise of the E.U. led many to predict both a transnationalization of television through the rise of a "European" television market, a fragmentation of national into local or regional markets as technology became more accessible (Morley and Robins 1995). For the most part, however, such predictions remain unfulfilled. While production is increasingly outsourced, conforming to the economic principles of flexible accumulation, and distribution is increasingly monopolized by global media giants; privatized media production and consumption still tend to conform to national boundaries (Stevenson 1997). As Schlesinger observes, "the short history of attempts to fashion Europe-wide public-service satellite television channels has been above all a tale of casualties" (2002:43). It has been argued that this is due to cultural and linguistic differences, but even in Latin America, where linguistic diversity is less evident, mass media has not been very successful as a midwife to global or transnational identities (Waisbord 1998).

In retrospect, the persistence of national identities in Europe is not surprising. The expectation that the development of a European "state" will lead to the development of a "European" national identity represents a simplistic and uncritical assumption that the relationship between "print capitalism" (Anderson 1983) and the nation-state of the early

capitalist period will hold for late capitalism as well. In fact, with some exceptions (most notably among media directed to youth and business elites) mass media continues to be organized around national markets. Even though television has been largely severed from direct state control the audience, as media consumers, is still constructed in national terms. This can be seen clearly in the television-viewing of Argolida residents. Except for foreign (usually American) movies, dubbed children's programming and international sporting events, the vast majority of programs are Greek productions. Most commonly these include serial comedies or dramas and news and interview programs. In both cases these types of programs are self-consciously "Greek" in character and provide an experience of national belonging to viewers.

Serial comedies and dramas tend to focus on what are perceived as common dilemmas and characteristics of Greek cultural life. People tend to closely follow whatever program is most popular during a particular season, often discussing plot developments or the antics of characters with great relish. From my observations I found that women were much more likely to engage in discussions about such programs, with the explanation that the subject matter focused on family and love affairs. In discussing programs that they had seen on television, people were very self-conscious of their participation in a national audience of viewers. Viewers also frequently pointed out to me the "Greekness" of the narratives with assertions such as "that's the way Greeks are!" [*etsi einai oi Ellines*]. Thus, television viewing can be seen as a form of ritual (Ettema 1997) in which the representation of narratives of shared beliefs, and challenges to those beliefs, helps to construct a common sense of identity.

News programs and interview-format talk shows, which tend to be more heavily viewed by males, also contribute to the sense of a Greek community in Argolida. Except for news on the local stations that tends to be directed at specific groups like farmers, news programs operate in a national format. On the one hand they focus on events in different parts of Greece as well as issues of national government while on the other they present a self-consciously “Greek” interpretation and analysis of world events. Current news stories are avidly followed and hotly debated among village residents. I frequently found that different people would recount the same story to me, gleaned from television reporting, to back up their interpretation of the state of Greek society. For example, news stories of crimes committed by immigrants were frequently invoked to justify anti-immigrant sentiments, as we have seen. In another example, after widespread news coverage of an incident in which Greek troops participating in peace-keeping operations in Kosovo were attacked by protesters and an Orthodox church was burned, hostility against Albanian immigrants in Argolida noticeably increased. One young man told me, “When I saw that on the news my blood boiled. These Albanians are animals! It really made me want to go out and thrash one.”

Television has also had an important effect on the functioning of local governmental and civic institutions. In June of 2003 I attended a meeting of the Herder’s Association (*Sillogos Ktinotrofon*) of Midea. The meeting was called to deal with recent incidents of sheep theft that had occurred. A culprit had been identified and the meeting was called to publicly condemn him and recommend punishment to the court. As is usual, a cameraman and a reporter, a woman in her thirties, showed up from one of the local television stations (Max) to cover the event for the local news program. The President of

the Association, who happened to also be the brother-in-law of the culprit led the meeting. There was little debate over the recommended punishment, as it had been previously agreed to through informal negotiations among those most affected. The presence of the news media clearly excited the herders with the prospect of being shown on the evening's broadcast. After about 15 minutes the reporter, exasperated by the slow pace of the nervous President, took charge of the meeting from the sidelines. As the cameraman recorded the proceedings she urged the President to follow a narrative format with orders such as "Make an introduction now" and then "Now you have to make a proposal and the guys should vote", which the President duly followed. She clearly wanted to package the meeting in a way conducive to news reporting. After the recommendation was made for compensation and an official warning of community banishment in the case of further thefts, the reporter and cameraman interviewed individual herders for their reactions and quickly departed. On the evening broadcast the video from the meeting had been edited into a coherent narrative led by the voiceover of the reporter who concisely described the conflict and resolution. Later, I heard several people compliment the President on his performance. Despite the fact that the court case was still to happen, and possibly a year or two away, the conflict seemed to have reached closure and ceased to be a topic of conversation.

In the case of the herders' meeting, the narrative requirements of television had served to structure an official public process of conflict resolution. Local government has been affected in a similar way, with the requirement for "transparency" through the standardization and broadcasting of public meetings leading to a particular, media-friendly format and processual structure. The interest of the television producers lies in

attracting an audience in order to market advertising time to sponsors. Therefore, there is pressure to “package” news and events in a standardized, easily accessible narrative format. Through this process a particular form of governmentality is promulgated that provides both a rationality for social interactions and a technology for the exercise of social power. Furthermore, this process has the effect of channeling political behavior and conflict into well-defined, highly structured forms that reinforce the neo-liberal nature of the contemporary state system. In the case of the herders’ meeting, what had been a contentious issue was resolved peacefully. At the meeting there was little real debate or anger. The participants were pleased to be on television and what comments they made were *pro forma* and self-consciously performed for the benefit of the camera. The complexity and chaos of the real political event, the sheep theft and intercommunal conflict, was effectively deflected.

The relationship of mass media and audience is crucial to understanding the constructions of citizenship under the neoliberal governmentality of global capitalism (Morley and Robins 1995). However, despite a pervasive functionalist paradigm that assumes media shapes and maintains cultural patterns primarily through transmitting information, most studies show that people learn relatively little from television. Instead, television tends to reiterate and re-enact what is already known. Even though viewers often claim television as a source of information, ultimately it creates an “illusion of being informed” (Buckingham 1997:352). More importantly, television acts in important ways to construct the “we” of nationalist discourse, the audience becoming the imagined community of the nation. Besides this positive notion of community, television also serves as a defensive mechanism of community closure, acting to create the excluded

“Other” through its totalizing discourse. Thus television does not so much link people into global networks as provide a new technique for the construction and defense of national boundaries.

Television has become an important instrument of neoliberal governmentality in Argolida in the sense that it embodies a representation of a particular rationality, a “conduct of conduct”. Since the privatization of television, the rationale for its existence and the motor of its development and expansion have not been its role in educating and informing the population, as was arguably the case with state-controlled media. Instead television’s main purpose is to sell advertising. Under the commercialization of television, stations and programming are evaluated by the numbers of viewers it can attract. Viewers constitute a market of consumers, rather than a population of citizens. It is precisely this rationality that has come to define the neo-liberal subject as a “consumer” of government services, part of the proliferation of capitalist-economic rationality in previously “non-economic” domains of social life (Burchell 1996). Television viewers expect to be marketed to and their participation in the networked community of mass media is constituted and internalized as a product of their own desires as consumers, despite the fact that the expression of these desires is more and more regulated. Thus television has come to embody the logic by which individuals participate in the neo-liberal nation-state, as consumers of national identity and state services.

Television also serves as a technology in the exercise of governmental power under the regime of neo-liberal capitalism. John Thompson (1995) has argued that the impact of mass media in the modern age has been most pronounced in the transformation

of the public sphere and the relationship between power and visibility. Starting from a notion of “mediated publicness” (1995:126), a concept similar to Anderson’s “imagined communities”, Thompson argues that “modern” social identity is no longer defined by physical co-presence in a common locale. This development has changed the relation of power and visibility. In a counterpoint to Foucault’s theory of the exercise of power through increased surveillance, categorization and visibility of its objects, Thompson argues that the visibility of power itself through the mass media is an important element in its effectiveness. While the state then is concerned with the “legibility” of its domain and subjects (Scott 1998), the nation and national identity are produced through the spectacle of power in which the state and nation become legible to their subjects. The visibility of social power through spectacle has been a common technology throughout the modern era (Debord 1995), but under the regime of neo-liberal, late capitalism mass media has increasingly become a primary way that such spectacles are performed. In the late modern era of recent decades, there has been a growing disarticulation between the technologies of state surveillance and regulation on the one hand, and the spectacular production of national identity on the other. This development points to a reorganization of the nation-state project.

Citizens and “others”

The disarticulation of nation and state under the European Union has had important ramifications for issues of identity and rights. To the degree that the institutions and policies of the European Union have altered the form and function of national states in Europe, there has also been a concomitant shift in the concept of citizenship among

Europeans. Soysal (1994, 2002), among others, has suggested that a new form of “postnational citizenship” has emerged that differs significantly from previous forms. In her view “modern” citizenship, associated with the rise and consolidation of nation-states in Europe, was characterized by territorially bounded populations with specific sets of rights and responsibilities. Beginning in the late 20th century however, modern citizenship was transformed through the influence of the E.U. super-state, the intensification of a global discourse of human rights and the growth and institutionalization of transnational labor migrations. Under the post-national regime of the E.U. there has been a de-coupling of rights and national identities⁴⁷. While the materialization of rights is still vested in the nation-state, the E.U. and other transnational or global forces guarantee their legitimacy.

In addition to the shift in sources of legitimacy, a multiplicity of status, especially vis-à-vis rights, has also developed. Soysal argues that whereas modern citizenship presupposes the relatively uniform access to rights based on a territorial definition of national identity, the presence today of large, permanent communities of immigrants in European countries has led to an uneven distribution of rights. In other words, the incorporation of immigrant labor into European economies, beginning with the “guestworker” programs of the post-WWII period, created certain contradictions for liberal definitions of citizenship. As immigrants established de facto membership in European polities by virtue of economic necessity as well as the attribute of inherent human rights, they have continued to be excluded from the full rights of citizenship. This situation has led to a two-tiered system of rights in which some rights are increasingly abstract and legitimated at the transnational level, while others continue to be tied to

⁴⁷ In Greece, for example, it has become much more difficult for immigrants claiming “Greek ethnicity” to automatically acquire Greek citizenship.

national identity and so are particularized and territorial. Ultimately Soysal argues that immigrants have achieved rights to membership in European societies without achieving citizenship.

The main problem with Soysal's analysis is that it takes for granted an ideological concept of rights without regard for gender, class and racial distinctions that have always made such ideologies problematic. Following Wallerstein's dictum that "citizenship always excluded as much as it included" (2003:674), we can be skeptical of Soysal's assumptions about modern citizenship. For example, in most European countries women were not granted full citizenship rights until the post-war period when immigrants began to replace them as "second-class citizens". In addition, strong class-based social inequalities have always made the exercise of citizenship rights problematic for many, despite their existence on paper. Based on the ethnographic evidence from Argolida we can also take exception to Soysal's (1994:45) rather rosy view that immigrants have gained "most rights", even though full citizenship has eluded them. Even though immigrants may technically have been granted basic human rights to free speech, movement and religion, among others, in practice such rights are extremely limited or non-existent. The exclusion from citizenship still remains as a powerful tool for disciplining and making vulnerable a crucial source of labor.

That being said, the main point that Soysal makes, that the economic integration of immigrants into European societies has led to a new conception and new practices of citizenship does seem to be true. The exclusion of immigrants from the rights of citizenship simultaneously conditions their vulnerability and at the same time renders them invisible in the discourse of Greek society. Thus for example residents of Argolida

can assert, quite honestly, that their communities have become more affluent and less stratified over the last several decades despite the poverty and marginalization of the immigrants on whom they depend. The discourse of citizenship that often served to disguise and mitigate class differences in nation-states through *inclusionary* tactics is more and more used to disguise class difference through *exclusion*. The result has been a move towards a sort of neo-feudal, or as James Anderson (1996) suggests “neo medieval”, social structure. As sovereignty has been fractured into different levels, the class of immigrant labor has become fettered with a distinctive set of social and political rights, obligations and restrictions. This is especially apparent in rural areas like Argolida, where Greek landowners and the immigrant laborers operate under completely different sets of rights and obligations and are bound together largely through personal relationships of patronage and obedience.

The neo-feudal character of citizenship in Argolida is displayed not only in the structurally differentiated relationships to the land between Greeks and immigrants, but also in the different rights to consumption. As noted before, consumption among immigrants is kept at low levels not only by low wages and legal restrictions that make it difficult for them to get credit for example or purchase land, but also by social sanctions. Conspicuous consumption of commodities such as cell phones, cars, or brand-name clothes among immigrants immediately arouses suspicion, ridicule, and even physical aggression on the part of Greeks. For Greeks however such modern commodities have become necessities. Silverman (1996) has described a similar process in France. Silverman argues that citizenship, which has always conflated both principles of individual and community rights, has more and more come to conflate individual and

consumer rights. The rights of citizenship have come to be measured by consumption. In a similar vein, Canclini argues that “modes of consumption have altered the possibilities and forms of citizenship” (2001:15). In Argolida, consumption is often described as a birthright. The vast majority of Greeks in Argolida accept as “natural” the different levels of consumption between Greeks and immigrants. This view often slips into a form of racism. Thus Greeks are thought to be lazy by nature, fond of gadgets, and too vain to appear poor. Immigrants are hardworking, but untrustworthy, and able to endure conditions that Greeks by virtue of their longer economic and social development can no longer tolerate.

Policing the boundary between citizens and immigrants is an on-going and incomplete process, as evidenced by the widespread anxiety and hostility that transgressions provoke. While I was conducting fieldwork in the spring of 2003 a story circulated in the mass media concerning a conflict between parents and school officials in the town of Amaliada (Nodarou 2003). In what has become a regular occurrence in Greece, parents in the town were upset by the prospect of an immigrant student carrying the national flag during the school parade marking Greek Independence Day, March 25. By custom, school children throughout Greece march in parades on Independence Day wearing traditional local costumes. The honor of carrying the Greek flag at the head of the procession is traditionally given to the students with the highest marks. In recent years, as immigrant children have enrolled in public schools in increasing numbers, the honor has sometimes fallen to students of non-Greek background, creating a conflict between legal statutes guaranteeing equality and the ideals and expectations of ethnic nationalism. Indeed, before this incident was reported in the press I had heard similar

tales from several different informants. Such stories have become part of the public discourse surrounding the contradictions and ambivalence of immigration in Greece. For example, a government employee in Agia Triada told me the following during an interview.

“Our culture is disappearing here, it is dying. Look at the schools. Half of the kids there are foreigners. They don’t want to learn about Greek history. For them it has no meaning. They don’t even teach it anymore. Children today graduate and don’t even know when the Revolution happened. It’s a shame. During the parades they even have foreign kids carrying the Greek flag! They are not Greek, what business do they have carrying the Greek flag”

His comments reflect a general anxiety on the part of Greeks concerning immigration, the nation-state and Greek culture shared by many of the people I spoke with.

Both the Greek government and school officials have consistently enforced the equal right of immigrant children to carry the Greek flag during parades, and the issue has often been portrayed as a conflict between the neo-liberal ideals of European modernity on the one hand and traditional popular feelings of ethnic nationalism on the other. For example, several informants used the issue as proof that Greeks were not ready for the type of multicultural liberal society envisioned by the E.U. However, I believe that the situation is more complex than that. For me the story manifests some of the contradictions in the contemporary production of culture in Greece under the regime of neo-liberal capitalism. One of the reasons that the story is so attractive to Greeks is that it describes a major shift in how ‘Greek’ and ‘foreigner’ are produced as cultural identities,

and how the meanings presented by these identities act to construct social relations of inequality.

On the surface this is a conflict between two notions of citizenship; a neo-liberal notion of *sui juris* and a traditional notion of *sui generis*. Indeed Greeks themselves tend to naturalize the problem in terms of blood. By this logic Greeks are Greeks by virtue of their genes. In the villages I found this to be an almost unquestioned premise. Being “half-Greek”, that is having a Greek mother, people would constantly comment on and judge the level of my “Greekness”. As I became accepted into the community, people decided that my Greek genes outweighed my American genes. By the same logic, most immigrants were incapable of truly integrating into Greek society because they lacked a “Greek” nature. Those that did almost invariably were said to be ethnic Greeks descended from the Eastern European Greek diaspora, a fact that was of course impossible to prove one way or another given the vagaries of history. Such a view is incompatible with the contemporary discourse of neo-liberalism in the E.U., which holds that there be a basic equality of citizens before the law, regardless of their ethnic or natal origins.

The notion of a *sui generis* basis for Greekness however obscures both the history of citizenship in Greece and the complex politics of Greek ethnicity in general. Citizenship has always been a disputed category. During the 20th century, for example, the concept of citizenship has expanded to include both women and children. Both women and children are assumed today to have certain rights of citizenship that they did not always possess. At the same time the concept of Greek citizenship has narrowed to exclude certain groups that have in earlier historical periods been included, such as Christian Albanians. Greek ethnicity, as we have seen, is also a problematic identity that

has changed over the years to include and exclude different groups of people at different times. Thus we should consider the naturalizing of Greek identity, and citizenship, as a process reflecting historical and social conditions rather than a principle of citizenship itself. In other words, the *sui generis* notion of citizenship only superficially reflects a biological principle of inclusion/exclusion. Seen in an historical perspective, the biological principle of *sui generis* is itself no less a social creation than *sui juris*.

Given the institutional ambivalence of the state regarding immigrants, we can also question the neo-liberal assumption that the role of the state is to guarantee certain *sui juris* citizenship rights in face of popular “backwardness” and resistance. To be sure, in certain cases such as the school flag incident described above the state has acted to protect the equal rights of immigrants in the face of what is generally described as a nativist racism. On the whole however, state policies act to insure the exclusion of immigrants from citizenship rights through the continued enforcement of their illegal status and the erection of immense barriers to their attaining citizenship. This becomes especially clear when we compare contemporary immigration policies with those of the early 20th century. Contemporary immigration policies in fact reveal one of the main paradoxes of the neo-liberal state, which has combined an expansion of citizenship rights and perceptions of social equality among citizens with a more rigid exclusion of immigrants. In effect the neo-liberal state has created two categories of residents, citizens and non-citizens. This has always been a principle of bourgeois democracy, but is today being formulated on a new, and in some ways more brutal, basis.

Immigrants, as we have seen, are generally excluded from both the benefits and protections offered by citizenship in the Greek state. Most immigrants do not participate

in social security programs such as I.K.A. (Organization of Social Security) because of the high employment taxes that must be paid. Few employers, especially in rural areas, want to pay these taxes, which represent a substantial expense, and few immigrants can afford to pay them themselves. Most immigrants do participate in O.G.A., the agricultural pension system, but the benefits are minimal. O.G.A. pensions are under 300 euro per month. The lack of access to state social security programs and the lack of permanent residency status in Greece encourages many immigrants to maintain families in their home countries. Among the immigrants I interviewed less than half had families with them. The majority are young and single men supporting families by sending part of their earnings home. This of course represents a substantial savings for Greek society, which avoids many of the costs of social reproduction of the labor force, such as education, support of children, support of the elderly and sick, etc., and is one of the characteristics of the flexible labor force created by contemporary global capitalism (Sider 1992; see also Castles and Kosack 1973:409).

The lack of investment on the part of the state in the social reproduction of labor is accomplished by the construction of the pool of immigrant labor as a diaspora⁴⁸. It is common to hear among Greeks that immigrants “don’t want to stay in Greece” and that their goal is to save money and return home. In talking with immigrants I found this sentiment to be less pervasive. Many immigrants did indeed plan on returning home, but not because they missed their homeland or felt they “belonged” there, which was the

⁴⁸ “Diaspora” denotes the transnational movement of groups constructed as a deterritorialized ‘nation’ or ‘ethnicity’. It has gained currency in the social sciences as a way of avoiding essentialist notions of race and culture, especially around issues of transnational black identity (Hall 1990; Gilroy 1993). Clifford (1994) has extended the concept to describe the contemporary subversion of the nation-state in the era of globalization. In this sense diaspora acts to challenge the cultural hegemony of dominant social groups and provide subaltern groups a degree of autonomy and protection. Others, however, have criticized the diaspora model for obscuring internal dynamics of class and gender in transnational communities (Anthias 1998).

explanation usually offered by Greeks. Rather immigrants felt that their position in Greece would always be precarious and dependent on the shifting needs of the state. Most immigrants felt that investing in local communities through the establishment of families or the buying and improving of property was not a very wise strategy given the lack of long-term security and citizenship. Most felt it safer to invest, if they were able to save money, in businesses or properties in their home countries. I found this to be an important motivation for the maintenance of social ties with home communities as well as kin and friends who had immigrated to other parts of Greece. The social and political situation of immigrants in Greece encouraged them to organize as a diaspora with strong ties to home communities.

The organization of immigrants into diasporas also has a technical basis. Ties to home communities are facilitated by regular travel to and from Greece. Most of the immigrants I spoke with made a point of going home once a year, either to see family or as noted above for sexual encounters. There are few who go for many years without returning home; immigrants who do invariably provoke suspicions and even hostility. The state has encouraged this cyclical travel both indirectly, through the modernization and expansion of transportation systems and links between Greece and other Eastern European countries, and directly through the regulation of immigration and the system of work and residence permits that allow periods of travel to non-E.U. countries. Regular contact with home and other immigrants is also maintained through the expanded networks and lowered cost of telecommunications. Cell phones and telephone calling cards have become an important accessory for immigrants and natives alike.

Thus, the illegality and marginalization of immigrants in the contemporary era is made possible by the state subsidized development of a vast transportation and communications network that allows immigrants to live and work as a diaspora. The organization of immigrants as a diaspora deflects pressures for assimilation that accompanied previous patterns of migration. Immigrants are mobile and dispersed, preventing them from establishing corporate communities and forms of local solidarities. At the same time, it is easy for them to maintain social relations with their home countries, which deflects immigrants' aspirations for upward mobility away from the host country. The diaspora organization of immigrants not only provides a measure of protection and security to immigrants, but also acts as a safety valve, deflecting potential resistance and demands for social and political inclusion.

The presence of immigrant diasporas within Greece has also created a novel problem in the production of Greek national identity. Whereas historically the task of the Greek state and civil institutions has been to unite the different ethnic groups living within the borders of Greece into a single nation, now great effort is spent on constructing differences between national groups within the same state. This is partly accomplished through the regulation of immigration and citizenship by the state, which creates different sets of statuses, rights and privileges for individuals living in the same communities and participating in the same economies of production and consumption. It is also accomplished through social relations at the local and personal level that position subjects differently according to perceived differences in nationality.

The state of the nation in Argolida

Despite the increasing Europeanization of the Greek state, and the concomitant tendency toward de-politicization, nationalism and ethnic identity continue to be strong forces in social relations in Midea township. Given the important role, historically, of the state in the production of Greek national culture, this persistence presents something of a puzzle. During my fieldwork, I found little evidence of a developing sense of European identity among Greeks. In fact, I witnessed only a handful of instances when people referred to themselves as Europeans. On the contrary, the category of European identity was almost exclusively used to denote either the economic core countries of Europe or the politico-administrative structure of the E.U. Instead I found that national identity and ethnicity are still being actively produced, negotiated and practiced among the Greeks in Midea township.

There has been a tendency to interpret the persistence, and in some cases re-emergence, of nationalism in southeastern Europe as a product of the failure to adequately integrate with the globalized European economy. According to this view, contemporary nationalism could be seen as a popular reaction to the political-economic restructuring of the post-cold war period. Optimistically speaking, nationalism could then disappear as the neo-liberal global economy extends its reach into the less developed areas of eastern and southern Europe. Indeed, there are some people in Argolida who hold this view. As one citrus farmer in Agia Triada told me, "Our culture is dying. In a few generations there won't be Greeks anymore. We will all be Europeans." Such a view is rare however. Much more common is the view of Greekness as a genetic condition capable of weathering the rise and fall of empires, with the E.U. being only the latest. It is

this view that I want to consider here, not in the sense of Greekness being a genetic distinction, but in the sense that national identity continues to be instrumental in European social organization, although for somewhat different reasons. In other words the contemporary nation, even as it is de-coupled from the state, is not simply a holdover from a previous era of capitalist development but rather continues to be instrumental to the construction of social difference and solidarity, governing today a new complex of ethnic, class, gender, and kinship modes of the social reproduction of inequality.

First, though, it is useful to unpack the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ as they are used in Midea township. In anthropology, ethnic differences have long been considered as socially constructed categories whose importance lies in the boundaries they create rather than the characteristics they contain (Barth 1969; Vincent 1974). Ethnic differentiation thus tends to follow, and facilitate, processes of social stratification and class formation (Haaland 1969). In the anthropological literature the concepts ethnicity and nationality are theoretically slippery with overlapping definitions, and are sometimes used interchangeably. In Greek both concepts are conflated into the word “*ethnikotita*”. Greeks in Midea township, however, while at a loss to pinpoint the difference between the two, have strong feelings that they are distinctly separate. Arvanites for example strongly believe that they are Greek and not Albanian. They just as strongly believe that they are ethnically different from other Greeks. Following their lead I will define nationality as a form of ethnic, or descent-based group identity associated with state formation. The most significant difference between ethnicity and nationality, as conceptualized in Midea township, is how each form of identity is enacted or practiced. My sense, in other words, is that both ethnicity and nationality are kinds of experiences,

not just ideas or imaginings. Neither experience is completely rational or logical, as demonstrated by the high frequency of contradictions in nationalist and ethnic ideology. All told, I found that ethnicity and nationality are experienced differently-- ethnicity through landscape and nationality through spectacle.

For the Arvanites of Gerbesi, the experience of being Arvaniti not only comes from a notion of common descent, but from strong ties to local topography. For example, in Gerbesi I got the following explanation when I asked what Arvanites are.

“Look, our ancestors came down from Albania, from Illyria as it was called then. They were mercenaries, very good fighters, tall and strong. Then they settled here in the area. You can understand from the village names. There are villages in Epirus and Albania called Gerbesi, that was the name of a big family. The first village they settled was Limnes, that is the oldest Arvaniti village here. We are all descended from them, high up in the mountains. That’s why so many of us are shepherds. But we also spread to other areas, like the Saronic islands, they are all Arvanites there, and even to southern Italy. Some people in southern Italy still speak Arvanitika!”

Differences between Arvaniti villages are also prominent. Residents of Gerbesi for example consider themselves to be closely related to the Arvanites of Bardi, a small satellite village of Gerbesi that was traditionally a source of brides and which was politically dependent on Gerbesi. They also claim kinship with the more distant and isolated village of Limnes, which they consider to be their ancestral village. In the common view of the village, the first settlers of Gerbesi descended from Limnes.

Gerbesi, Bardi and Limnes are all considered to be historically communist villages, even though in none of them does the Communist Party garner the majority of votes today. On the other hand the nearby villages of Arachneo and Prosimi, two Arvaniti villages that are larger than Gerbesi and whose lands border those of Gerbesi are considered to be descended from separate lineages [*faroi*] and represent separate immigrations from Albania. Gerbesi has a long history of conflicts with these two villages arising from both land disputes and political differences. In addition, Valley villages of Agia Triada and even Manesi are considered by Arvanites to have been originally Arvaniti villages that were corrupted and came to be dominated by ethnic Greeks.

Arvaniti identity continues to be produced in the higher villages of Argolida, largely through the connection to topography and the claims on land. This is maintained in part by the increasing value of land in the upper elevations as irrigation networks are expanded and deep-well technology becomes more accessible. For residents of the valley, the strong ethnic identity of Arvanites is somewhat mystifying. They consider the Arvanites to be “wild” [*agrioi*] and unpredictable. Arvaniti identity, once the justification for political and economic domination by the valley “Greeks”, now provides a means of independence from local valley-based elites. At the same time, as we have seen, more recent Albanian immigrants have been strictly excluded from Arvaniti identity. Arvanites are not only Arvanites; they also have a strong consciousness of being Greek, and sometimes claim to be more “Greek” than the valley Greeks, whom they consider to be “turk-lickers” [*tourkogliftes*]. In fact, Arvanites from Gerbesi often claim to be “original” (using the English term) Greeks. Thus nationality continues to be produced separately from ethnicity.

The production of Greek nationality is something that mountain and valley residents have in common, but like the production of ethnicity, its significance has changed. With the disarticulation of nation and state under the E.U. the production of nationality is more and more framed as a site of resistance. As we have seen, the production of Greek national identity has historically been associated with an expansionary state. Today, the production of national identity is associated with the resistance to a state no longer expansionary and increasingly under the direct control of transnational political and economic forces. As the state has become de-politicized under the neo-liberal E.U. regime, the production of national identity has become more politicized. In short, there has occurred a fundamental reversal of roles between the nation and the state. Whereas in the early history of nationalism, national identity was generally an “anti-politics machine”, obscuring class differences in the development of capitalist markets, today it is the state that fulfills that role. National identity has become the primary site for the production of class differences through the exploitation of an immigrant working class while the state works to obscure the contradictions this production engenders. Paradoxically, it is nationalism, as a site of resistance, which facilitates the development of the class relations necessary to the transnational European political economy. In the next chapter I explore this paradox more carefully.

VI. LOCAL RESISTANCE AND NEGOTIATION IN THE GLOBALIZATION PROJECT

“Resistance” in Argolida

For the rural communities of Argolida, entry into the E.U. has further integrated local processes of production and consumption into transnational networks. The effect of what we call ‘globalization’ has been the increasing density of multiple and cross-cutting networks of social relations through which individuals and groups compete for power and wealth. If we conceptualize the expansion of global capitalism into rural communities like Midea township as expanding and multiplying chains of exploitation, we can also look at points of friction or resistance along the chains. To pursue the metaphor further, it is the heat from resistance that forges the links themselves.

In Argolida, “resistance” to the intrusion of global political and economic forces is a complex and contradictory process. Many residents consciously think of behaviors intended to subvert or deflect what they perceive to be outside and threatening interests in terms of “resistance” [*antistasi*]. In fact, though, these behaviors, as we shall see, often have the contradictory effect of furthering the entanglement of individuals and communities with global political-economic forces. Given the absence of an organized force of resistance or feasible alternative to the E.U., we could perhaps more accurately categorize acts of resistance as simply reaction. Indeed, local residents do sometimes describe their tactics as “reaction” [*antidrasi*]. However, their term “reaction” carries with it a conservative connotation of acting to preserve an existing social order and resisting change. While in Argolida such a description is not completely inaccurate, at

least as expressed by residents, it fails to capture the extent to which residents try to, not so much resist change, as manipulate and subvert social changes to their own benefit at the expense of outside interests. Following local usage, I will use the term “resistance” to denote acts and activities intended to defend local group and individual interests against elite outside interests and to alter or negotiate the terms under which individuals and local communities are being integrated to the transnational and global networks of the E.U. and beyond. In this sense, resistance is partly a reactionary process, but it is also *proactive* in the sense that resistance conditions the formation and evolution of social relations in practice.

Paradoxically, the most vocal resistance is found among those who, by objective measurements such as standards of living, seem to have benefited the most: the Greek farmers. Residents employ both passive and active methods of resistance to a process they perceive as damaging and exploitive. Indeed, one can scarcely have a conversation around contemporary issues of politics, economy or culture without people proclaiming their opposition to what they perceive as globalization. Regardless of political affiliation, people I spoke with in Argolida voiced strong opposition and bitter disappointment in what they perceive as a breakdown in social order and a decline in political and economic power arising from the global forces of media, transnational markets and immigration. People universally complain that television and marketing has weakened traditional values of work and family, and that agricultural markets are controlled by transnational political and economic elites who favor the interests of urban consumers over those of rural producers, and that transnational labor migration threatens the social order of the nation-state through rising crime and disease.

In the face of such a consensus, it seems strange that, compared with other periods of modern Greek history, there is little in the way of a serious challenge to the social order. That is, while people complain bitterly and display a cynical pessimism about the future, they for the most part continue to participate in the markets of consumption and production about which they complain. At the same time, there has been a notable decline in organized resistance, through political parties, cooperatives, and the like. None of the major political parties advocates withdrawal from the E.U., or even seriously advocates a restructuring of E.U. programs and policies. Therefore, popular resistance is expressed most strongly through the institutions and arenas of civil society, from the mass media to the coffee shop.

Argolida, and Greece in general, has a rich history of strong and sometimes violent opposition on the part of rural communities to the exploitation that has characterized their incorporation into various world economies. From the revolution against the Ottoman Empire that resulted in the founding of the modern state through the civil strife of the 20th century that often resulted in military dictatorship, rural areas in Greece have been sites of resistance and conflict. From a historical perspective, the resistance displayed in contemporary Argolida seems distinctively muted compared to earlier eras. That is, residents may complain, but have by and large peacefully accepted their place in the new world order. This 'culture of complaint' as opposed to a 'culture of opposition' can perhaps be explained in various ways. The most obvious is the nature of the contemporary world system itself. In Greece, opposition to world politico-economic orders has generally been shaped by fractures within the order itself. Opposition groups were almost always allied with competing world powers. The Greek Revolution was

shaped and nurtured by the rise of European capitalism and its confrontation with the Ottoman Empire, and more recently the Greek civil war of the 1940's was shaped and nurtured by the opposition between the U.S. and Soviet world systems. In short, opposition movements in Greece have historically been aided and nurtured by outside patrons, both practically through funding and military support and ideologically through the possibility of alternative or utopian social orders. At the end of the 20th century, the world has been confronted by the novel possibility of a globally integrated economic system and a hegemonic world power, the U.S., with almost no institutional opposition at the global level, save for the Islamicist revolt which, for now at least, has little relevance for Greek society.

Some interpret the 'culture of complaint' as endemic to Greek society. This interpretation is favored by many residents of Midea township, who criticize the 'laziness' and lack of initiative of their neighbors. In the academic literature on Mediterranean society such cynicism and complaining has sometimes been analyzed as defensive cultural practices against the exploitative nature of relations between peasants and urban elites and a form of passive resistance (Banfield 1958). For Greek rural society Herzfeld (1986) has argued that cynical complaints reflect a 'disemia' in Greek culture between 'Hellenic' and 'Romaic' identities that are linked to a gendered, oppositional practice of cultural discourse.

People in Midea township do not just complain, however. They also act in a many ways to defend themselves from exploitation at the hands of outside forces. As we shall see in this chapter, this takes the two main forms. First, there are a host of illegal and quasi-legal actions that local residents engage in, including theft, graft, and evasion, that

serve to deflect economic exploitation and take advantage of various opportunities to enrich themselves at the expense of the state, E.U., and markets. Second, is the reconstitution or reassertion of an autonomous subjectivity in terms of identity and consumption that local residents employ to subvert what they see as their political exploitation at the hands of national and transnational elites. Both of these forms of resistance, however, are premised on the ability of residents to both exploit immigrants and suppress any potential resistance on their part.

The preclusion of resistance among immigrants

From all appearances, immigrant laborers, as the most exploited and vulnerable class of labor in Midea township should be the most resistant to the social relations of globalization, and yet the opposite is true. In the interviews I conducted with immigrant laborers I collected few statements of animosity or bitterness towards Greeks regarding the conditions faced by migrant workers. While I did collect examples of immigrants complaining of specific Greek employers and the bureaucracy they were increasingly forced to deal with, I recorded few examples of hostility directed towards Greeks as a group. This may be partly attributed to my inability to speak Albanian, as well as my identification within the villages as a Greek-American. I did find indirect evidence of a subaltern current of resistance among the immigrants to some degree. However for the most part the people I interviewed felt themselves relatively lucky to have work and grateful to the Greeks who employed them.⁴⁹ Immigrants living in the valley villages had

⁴⁹ The apparent incongruity of this attitude among immigrants may be explained by the political-economic conditions of migration. As Martinez has pointed out for Haitian 'braceros', they are "neither slave nor free" (1996:22). That is, the lack of freedom faced by immigrants is tempered by the dire economic

hard-luck stories more often than those in the mountain villages, but even here they generally attributed their misfortunes to a minority of “bad” Greeks or ultimately to the failure of their natal states to adequately support them. How are we to explain the relative passivity of the most exploited sector of the working class, and their apparent acquiescence in their own exploitation?

The obstacles facing immigrants in rural areas as they try to organize and resist are enormous. As we have seen, state policies have contributed to making immigrants the most exploited and vulnerable class of labor in Midea township. At the same time, resistance among immigrants themselves has been precluded by the lack of secure residency and the temporary and transient nature of their role in the Greek economy. The paternalistic method of granting permits and working papers insures that immigrants can be individually monitored, at least in rural areas, and makes immigrants constantly dependent on the goodwill of individual Greek citizens. Thus a decentralized form of surveillance and control has evolved in rural Greece that is capable of efficiently enforcing social discipline and subservience among immigrants. Immigrants who actively resist or try to organize for greater political power face blacklisting from work, the inability to renew papers and permits, and finally deportation. The immigration system has been very effective in weeding out potential trouble-makers and promoting a form of self-discipline among groups of immigrants that has made organizing very difficult. In rural areas, the paternalistic ties of immigrants to employers has further limited immigrant organizing, as has their physical dispersal. Immigrants in the villages do not

conditions from which the emigrated. Haitian ‘braceros’ are probably in a more desperate situation than that faced by most Eastern European migrants, but the logic of their acceptance of conditions in the host country is similar.

live in one area or neighborhood, but are rather scattered among the properties of individual employers who employ them or rent them outbuildings.

The result of subsuming legal status under personalized relations of obligation and privilege has been the creation of a neo-feudal or “neo-medieval” (J. Anderson 1996) political hierarchy. The relations of agricultural production have become naturalized through a discourse of birthrights. The personal dependence of immigrants on Greek landowners creates overlapping political allegiances and a complex politics of caste in which sovereignty is diffused through familial, ethnic and national discourses. For immigrants in this situation, the possibilities of resistance become fractured between the personalized reciprocity they establish with individual landowners, their class identity as immigrant laborers and their segmentation into ethnic or national groups.

As we saw in the last chapter, the techno-bureaucratic conditioning of diaspora communities among immigrants acts as a safety valve for deflecting resistance among immigrants. Most immigrants plan to return to their home countries and regularly send back savings from their earnings with this goal in mind. In one case an Albanian family I interviewed described how they regularly send money to relatives in order to build up capital to buy property and open a small business in their hometown of Elbasan. They explained their actions by pointing to a favorable exchange rate as well as the difficulties they faced in securing permanent residency in Greece. While Greeks encourage this attitude, I also saw several examples when local Greeks berated Albanian immigrants for not encouraging their children to speak Greek. In one case the Albanian father replied, “Let her learn her own language first. She will learn Greek when she starts school.” I

later learned that the parents were considering sending the child back to relatives in Albania until they were able to join her.

In talking with immigrants, especially those who live year round in the villages rather than seasonal migrants, I was also struck by the general mistrust that they felt toward other immigrants. In the mountain village of Gerbesi, one Albanian immigrant told me that he would never help another Albanian get a job or find housing if he did not know him, or know of him. "You don't know what trouble you could find", he said. This mistrust is one element in the general lack of social presence in the villages. In the villages there are no public displays of immigrant cultural or ethnic identity, such as stores catering to immigrant tastes or religious symbols. In fact, immigrants are socially invisible to those from outside the community. Nor could I find any desire or aspiration on the part of immigrants to establish themselves as a cultural community or any immigrant entrepreneurs servicing the minority communities. Migrant workers wanted to make money and move on. Those who resided for longer wanted to blend in as much as possible, and their comments about the local Greek community were almost always characterized by a tone of gratefulness and subservience.

This is not to say that immigrants in the villages are totally passive. Some turn to petty theft, drug-dealing, or prostitution as a way to improve their social position and achieve independence from Greek bosses, although this is relatively rare in Midea township where residents can keep an eye on local immigrants and quickly eliminate those who challenge the Greek monopoly on such activities. There are also informal agreements among immigrants as regards wage rates with sanctions against those who work for lower wages and in some areas of Greece spontaneous strikes have occurred.

And despite their dispersed residences, certain public areas of the villages, such as sections of the public square or certain cafes, have become gathering spots for immigrant groups (usually separated by nationality) as fear of deportation has subsided with the new system of work permits. In these places immigrant communities have begun, perhaps, to coalesce beyond the watchful eyes of local Greek residents.

In the absence of any form of labor- or community-based immigrant organizations in the villages, power has been concentrated in the criminal, or “mafia” elites that have developed under the illegal and semi-legal conditions of immigration. Most of these groups seem to be based in urban areas and have somewhat limited authority in the villages. Growing out of the smuggling networks of the early period of illegal immigration, immigrant mafias often control drug and sex trafficking, “facilitate” the acquisition of permits, and in some cases operate extortion and protection rackets. During my fieldwork, however, the only evidence I encountered of such mafia-type groups was in the nearby towns of Argos and Nauplio⁵⁰. In the villages, immigrants often generate informal groups that regulate wages and job assignments. In the larger villages established groups of immigrants sometimes come into conflict with newer arrivals who will sometimes work for lower wages and try to take positions away from established immigrants. During my fieldwork I collected information on a serious conflict in a nearby village between two such groups that broke out into a bloody battle in the village and was only quelled by the arrival of riot police from Argos. The causes were somewhat obscure,

⁵⁰ Criminal groups from the nearby towns do sometimes venture into the villages. In one instance I witnessed an Albanian pimp arrived at a village café with a young Polish woman. He had brought her to the village for “viewing” in the hopes of securing a month-long contract from a local farmer. Such a contract would give the farmer exclusive rights to the young woman in exchange for 1,500 euro. In this instance no deal was made. Since neither the pimp nor the young woman spoke Greek very well and the farmers did not speak English, I was called in to translate. I managed to speak to the young woman out of earshot of the pimp and she assured me she was not being physically coerced, but rather saw this as a way of making a large sum of money quickly in order to return home.

but most attributed the battle to the fact that a group of newer arrivals had been working for lower wages and taking work from immigrants that had been in the village for a long time.

Immigrants' rights groups and anti-racist organizations in Greece are found almost exclusively in the urban centers, and are made up predominately of young Greeks with liberal or leftist perspectives. In Midea township, no such organizations exist or operate. In nearby Nauplio, there was a group of young people associated with the Greek Social Forum who were considering organizing an immigrant aid center similar to ones organized in some other parts of Greece. One young woman, an archeologist working in Midea township, told me the group was interested in "doing something about the racism and poor living conditions that immigrants faced" in the area. In Athens there is more activity, such as an annual 3-day "Antiracist Festival" held in July, where over a hundred groups set up information booths and panel discussions and organize cultural activities. For the most part, the planners and participants are again young and Greek. Only five of the booths were organized by immigrant groups, and none of these were from rural areas.

The failure of the left

The lack of political organizing among immigrants and the social distance between them and Greek labor organizations stands in sharp contrast to the earlier history of the left in Greece⁵¹. In the 1920's and 1930's, during the founding and growth of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and allied labor unions, immigrants played a major role

⁵¹ The vast majority of immigrants are not unionized and, because they are concentrated in agriculture and the informal sector, have little contact with the unions. The one exception are the construction trades where some immigrants have been unionized. The vice-president of the communist-controlled construction trade union federation is an immigrant from Albania.

(Hirschon 1989). The Greek Orthodox refugees who arrived in Greece after the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor and the establishment of the Turkish national state provided the cheap and vulnerable labor force that was instrumental in kick-starting Greek national industrial development, much as today immigrants from Eastern Europe are providing the labor for the transformation of the Greek economy under conditions of global capitalism. At that time immigrants provided fertile ground for recruitment for the KKE and stimulated the growth of labor unions and other working class organizations. Refugees from Asia Minor were in fact heavily represented in leadership positions in the KKE during the 1940's and 50's (Averoff-Tossizza 1978). During the occupation and civil war of the 1940's, the KKE made a conscious effort to recruit ethnic minorities, especially among slavophone groups in the north and Arvanites in the south. In the recent wave of immigration at the end of the 20th century, however, the left in Greece has been noticeably absent and/or ineffective in both fighting for immigrant rights and incorporating immigrants into existing working class organizations, especially in rural areas.

The failure of the peasant rebellion that was reluctantly directed by the KKE at the end of the German occupation, along with the incorporation of Greece into the American 'sphere of influence', had severe consequences for the left in Greece. After the defeat of the Democratic Army in northern Greece, the KKE leadership fled to Eastern European countries. The severe domestic repression of the 1950's and 60's, coupled with splits in the party between the 'outside' exile leadership following Soviet policies and 'inside' factions advocating a "euro-communist" strategy, weakened the party. In Argolida during the occupation and post-war struggle for power the KKE had become

associated with the traditional resistance of mountain Arvaniti communities against the urban Greek state. Afterwards the Greek state actively suppressed both communists, by jail and exile, and Arvaniti identity, through renaming their villages and suppressing their language. Communist sympathies remained strong in some of the villages and reemerged with the legalization of the party and return to parliamentary democracy in the early 1970's. However, many former partisans turned to various forms of traditional brigandage, either renouncing or changing political ideologies.

Here the story of *Kapetanio* Fani is illustrative. Fani was a legendary *Kapetanio*, or guerilla leader, during the German occupation and subsequent civil war. The son of a peasant, he came from the village of Gerbesi, but as a young man migrated to Athens where he became involved in petty crimes and robberies. During the German occupation he returned to the village and organized a guerilla band affiliated with ELAS (Greek Liberation Army), the popular front resistance group. At the end of the occupation when the pro-British government was installed in Athens Fani went into hiding and reappeared at the beginning of the civil war as a leader in the communist controlled Democratic Army in northern Greece. Before one of the major battles of the civil war, the battle for the city of Florina in northern Greece, Fani was either captured or surrendered to Greek government forces. Most people assume the latter since he served only a few years in jail. During his interrogation, reportedly by an officer who was also from Argolida, Fani revealed details of the guerilla attack on Florina, enabling the government forces to anticipate the guerilla strategy. After serving a short prison sentence he returned to Athens where he started a garment business and carried out an elaborate swindle of his supplier, one of the largest fabric mills in Greece. Instead of paying his bills, he

transferred money into the names of kinsfolk in the village and then declared bankruptcy. The mill had no choice but to continue to supply him in hopes of recovering some of the lost debt through future production. Fani also organized various currency and gold smuggling operations with the help of local kin. The story of Fani, which is well known in the villages of Midea township illustrates how easily Greek villagers can opportunistically shift back and forth between political opposition and brigandage, depending on particular conditions.

Communist sympathies have remained strong in some of the mountain villages, despite the fact the Argolida in general is a conservative stronghold. In the village of Gerbesi the KKE still garners 25-30% of the vote in national elections while in the valley villages it receives less than 5%. Gerbesi's strong communist base has earned it the moniker "Little Moscow" from area residents. Other nearby villages like Limnes also have a strong communist base, although in the post-war period many communist families ended up migrating to urban areas in the face of local repression. Despite the continuing electoral showings however, the party infrastructure has withered in the last several decades. The generation now in their 40's in Gerbesi was the last to have an active cell of the communist youth organization (KNE). Men from this generation remember the 1970's and early 1980's as a time of regular meetings and a group discipline that discouraged the use of drugs and resisted "American culture". Today the party structure consists of occasional meetings with party cadre from nearby towns attended by 5-10 remaining active party members. Among the younger generation, that is those in their 20's, I found very few individuals who identified themselves as communist or who had

much interest in the leftist heritage of the village. Those who did were invariably among the few young people who had left the village and were studying in universities.

KKE policy on immigration and immigrants remains progressive, but its organizational weakness means that it has little effect on local social relations or local governmental bodies. With the exception of the communist-controlled construction trades union, there have been few attempts to organize immigrant workers. Immigrants concentrate in sectors that were traditionally not unionized, like agriculture, and there have been few efforts to organize new unions given the defensive posture of the KKE. Local party members in Gerbesi told me that the party advocated the free movement of migrants across borders and their complete legalization. Indeed, KKE members in Gerbesi seemed to be the most sympathetic and supportive of immigrants among the villagers, and some had established friendships with them. For example, the only times I witnessed Greeks and Albanians socializing publicly, by going out to eat together at a *taverna* or pizzeria, was with villagers I knew to be KKE members. On the other hand, several ex-KKE members, who however still voted KKE, were very publicly anti-immigrant. One, who was otherwise very left-wing in his political orientation told me, “We are all racists now. Bad, I know, but that is the truth”.

The organizational structure of the KKE has weakened due to several factors. The most important is the demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist bloc that had previously provided the Greek communists with both a social model and a source of moral and organizational support. The Greek party was one of the last major European communist parties to end their support for Soviet style communism, even into the Gorbachev era. After the breakup of the Soviet Union it lost its sense of direction and

purpose. In addition, the ascendance of the socialist party PASOK to power in the 1980's had the effect of pulling members and votes from the more moderate wing of the KKE as well as some of its leadership at the local level. In Gerbesi for example there were many accusations against people who switched parties, or appeared to have switched parties, in order to get jobs or secure leadership positions in local government.

Another factor was that by the 1970's the KKE's hold on the imagination of the youth began to wane. Many teenagers began to listen to rock music, especially on the local pirate radio stations that had proliferated. Pirate stations acted to build networks among youth across Argolida, uniting them in a youth "subculture" that stretched across traditional village and kin boundaries. One early radio pirate from Gerbesi told me,

"I was high on the mountain so my station had the best range. I was playing all this new rock music, American music. I began getting calls from kids in the valley, from villages I had never been to and we started gathering together. We had a love for the music that united us."

The growing involvement in rock music and fashions, and later drugs, also stimulated the desire among youth for money to spend on consumer goods. The same radio pirate told me, "Every time someone was going to Athens I would find some money to send along for buying records. All my money, and whatever I could borrow, went to those records. What can I tell you, I had the biggest collection in the area." Another rock music fan and sometime radio disc jockey told me, "All of a sudden everything had to be rock style. The kids in the valley had money and tried to dress cool. We had to work. I remember working for weeks in the packing factory just to buy a pair of Levi's. Those were the thing then. All my money went to clothes and records." Many of the early followers of

rock music in the villages came from communist backgrounds. The official party line at the time condemned rock music as a form of bourgeois decadence, and thus alienated many from the communist youth groups. Rock music represented a form of generational rebellion, and the long hair and clothing styles often met with hostility from older relatives. However, it was a form of rebellion that ultimately drew young people into transnational consumer markets⁵².

There is a sense among many ex-leftists that the potential for social change no longer exists and that the current political system holds little possibility for effective opposition. In addition people feel more and more trapped by their entanglements with commodity consumption, working harder and harder to buy more and more. When I asked a middle-aged ex-communist in Gerbesi what had happened to the left, he replied,

“What really broke the left here? The television. It’s all television now.

Every house has one, sometimes several and they are on constantly. I watch it before I go to bed. I watch the news or some movie. If Al Pacino is on I will definitely watch. The people here used to be more revolutionary. There were about 10 kids from here at the Politechnic [uprising against the junta]. Now everyone is involved with their personal problems. In the press every party gets up and says their opinion, But you know now the two big parties, they have everything set up. There is little difference between them now. It is just a question of who gets to eat [i.e., steal]. Those who are in power now, they have eaten and eaten. The others?

What can they do? They wait their turn. Many leftists went to PASOK.

⁵² Frank (1997) has argued that the “rebellion” of youth culture has in actuality strengthened capitalism and reinforced capitalist social relations through its emphasis on consumption as a mode of rebellion, a tactic easily co-opted by marketers and advertisers.

Around here it was mostly poor kids that went to PASOK. We missed it.

— We were stupid, we didn't go to PASOK and we got screwed. Because when they went to PASOK they got good jobs. Like M., the jerk, he went to PASOK and now he has it made; easy job, nice little income.

When the dictatorship happened, the army came to the village and collected 40 people. They kept some for a few weeks, some for several years. Our village had the record for arrests for the whole Peloponnesos! In those days out of 400 votes, 360-370 went to the left. They called us "Little Moscow". Now what has happened? We lost it. We degenerated [*ekfilistikame*]! We lost our reflexes! Our character changed, everyone tried to get a good job. We were co-opted. All that is gone. We lost, we got scared and we gave up. The only way now is if the revolution starts in the U.S., otherwise there is no chance. Now, our heads are pulled inside. Work, gasoline, telephone, that's it. Pull the heads inside! We're finished. What has changed? It was globalization. You learn everything immediately. All the movies on television, we see how the Americans live. Plus all the tourists. We see how they live. We learn from them. We learn more from television. But everything is lies now. It's the system. But we are still very nationalist. That has remained. And we all have property. We have our houses and our fields. We get money from the fields. P., that doctor down in Agia Triada, he got 33,000 euro for his oranges last year!"

As this passage demonstrates, a strong feeling of pessimism regarding political change is pervasive in the villages. Instead, resistance takes the form of a resilient nationalism as

well as a defense of property, both of which are seen as defending the local community against the intrusion of the forces of globalized capitalism.

As the KKE has diminished in importance as a local organization of resistance, many residents in Midea township, and especially in the mountain villages, have returned to a form of brigandage, this time marijuana trafficking and consumption.⁵³ In virtually all the villages of Argolida are groups of marijuana smokers and dealers who constitute an underground economy in the area. They form networks that cross village and kin boundaries and often stretch across the Peloponnesos. While impossible to accurately count given their illegal status, I estimate that in the villages I studied around 10% of the population is involved in some way with marijuana consumption or production. According to informants, relatively little marijuana is grown in Midea township, due to the lack of isolated and secluded areas. Most of the marijuana consumed there is produced in the more isolated and rugged areas of central and southern Peloponessos. In interviewing middle-aged marijuana users in Midea township I found that most had been active in left-wing politics. In Gerbesi the most active users were all ex-KKE members. In the valley town of Agia Triada most had been active in PASOK. Thus as this generation, those in their 40's mainly, had moved out of activist politics they had moved into a social and economic network of marijuana consumption.

Marijuana is not new to the villages. Local residents claim it has been grown and smoked for at least the last 80 years. According to an elderly resident of Gerbesi, it was mainly the communists who learned to smoke marijuana.

⁵³ The most common illegal drug in Midea township during my fieldwork was marijuana. Other drugs, such as heroin and hashish, that are also common in urban areas were rare. I heard reports of heroin use among a few young men in their 20's, but in each case they had reportedly become users while living in Athens or in the nearby town of Nauplio.

“They learned it from the [Asia Minor] refugees in the 30’s. Back then, during the Metaxas dictatorship, a lot of communists were thrown in jail, and many from this village too. In jail they got to know a lot of refugees who were there for drugs and they used to smoke a lot of hashish in the prisons then. So when the communists got out, they had acquired the habit”

By all accounts however, marijuana remained rare in the villages during the period from 1950-1980. This was at least partly because of the characterization of marijuana as a form of ‘bourgeois decadence’ by left-wing groups. Then in the mid-80’s, as left-wing politics began to fizzle out in Greece, marijuana consumption surged. A middle-aged marijuana smoker recounted for me,

“My generation, when we were young, we didn’t get involved with drugs. We were hardcore communists in those days, in the 70’s. The dictatorship was over and we were all in KNE (Communist Youth of Greece). We considered drugs to be bad. Then the 80’s came with Papandreou and it was ‘take it, take it, smoke the pot!’. It was then that I started to smoke, in the army. The first few times I felt guilty, but at the same time I liked it. How good it was! Now with the younger generation, the kids in their 20’s, it is everywhere!”

Most informants linked the spread of marijuana consumption to the liberalism of the 1980’s, the decline of party discipline among the young, and the rise of consumer markets in general.

There are several other reasons for the surge in marijuana consumption and production in the villages. On the one hand, marijuana is simply one of many types of psychotropic substances used by villagers. Tobacco consumption is extremely high and there are few adult men who do not smoke. Alcohol consumption is also very high, and alcohol is consumed at all hours of the day and night. In addition, many villagers consume various forms of prescription drugs such as sedatives and painkillers for their “nerves”. As such, marijuana easily fits into the social life of the village, already so engaged with the consumption of psychotropic substances. It should be noted however that, like alcohol and tobacco, marijuana is mainly for male consumption. Women more rarely smoke and tend to drink only with meals⁵⁴. In fact, many males I talked with expressed hostility towards females who smoked marijuana. For women, marijuana is considered to be an aphrodisiac, and any woman who agrees to smoke with a man is considered “ready for anything”. There have been several cases of rape in recent years that were committed against women, tourists or from the nearby towns, who had agreed to smoke with men from the villages.

There is also a strong sense of solidarity among marijuana smokers and traffickers that transcends village and kin allegiances, much like the old underground KKE. Marijuana smokers and producers think of themselves as an underground of resistance by the fact of their illegality. Police units, including special plainclothes drug enforcement units, actively hunt them. The most fearsome of these are the “EKAM” (Special Interdiction Police Units), special paramilitary police that dress all in black, also called “Cherokees” [*Tserokoi*] because of the distinctive black Jeeps they drive. The EKAM

⁵⁴ The drugs that local women take at rates that seem to equal men are various prescription drugs for “nerves” (*nevra*) and depression.

often set up roadblocks where they stop cars randomly and do extensive searching for drugs. EKAM officers theoretically cannot serve in their home regions so that they have minimal connections to the local communities, although I knew of at least two exceptions to this in Argolida. That, in addition to their bravado and machismo, engenders an outlaw mentality among marijuana smokers and leads to elaborate evasion techniques that strengthen their solidarity and their sense of being an underground resistance movement. In the villages the cat-and-mouse game between police and marijuana smokers has largely replaced the militant communist underground of the post-war era.

Greek rituals of rebellion and national identity

The resistance of rural Greeks to transnational capitalism in the 20th century has often been associated with the communist movement, but this is not completely accurate. While certain rural areas have long supported the KKE in elections, the activity of rural communist groups has been distinct from the urban centers. The civil war for example was largely initiated as a peasant uprising by ad hoc rural groups that had, in the beginning, only hesitant and ambivalent support from urban communist leaders. Indeed, “communism” has a somewhat distinct meaning for rural agriculturalists. In the villages, understandings of communism tend to idealistically reflect the communalism of peasant producers as they struggle against outside exploitation. When I asked villagers who were self-identified communists what communism meant to them I got answers like the following

“Look, communism for us is a tradition, it is something handed down to us from our fathers, it is in our blood. We don’t like foreigners telling us

what to do and we don't like the rich, the bourgeoisie, exploiting us, making money from our sweat and blood".

Aside from a few local residents, mostly university educated, who in the past served as local party functionaries and officials, local communist ideologies are fairly undeveloped and often take the form of inchoate nationalist and ethnic sentiments. Another local communist, complaining of a local official who had reportedly used his connections to defraud a big company asserted, "That's what I hate about this system. The government should own everything, then we would all have an equal chance at stealing! It wouldn't just be a few people stealing everything."

Greeks think of themselves as a contentious, unruly people with a natural aversion to authority. This rebelliousness is enshrined in numerous popular rituals. Protests of even the most mundane nature such as neighborhood groups protesting against garbage dumps or of school crossing guards demanding higher pay, both of which I witnessed in Athens during fieldwork, often result in street fighting with riot police. To the outsider, it often seems like Greeks are prepared to stage violent protests at the drop of a hat, and the center of Athens is regularly closed down to allow for demonstrations⁵⁵. At the same time, most Greeks are resigned to such inconveniences, which they see as a natural right, so much so that the image of the young anarchist fighting against the overpowering force of the state has become a vibrant element of civic mythology. Most towns have a major street named for "The Heroes of the Politechnic" to honor the student uprising against the dictatorship. These practices go beyond political confrontations.

⁵⁵ Militant demonstrations by farmers have occurred in some parts of Greece. The most serious have occurred in the cotton producing region of Thessaly in central Greece where in 1996 farmers used tractors to block the main north-south roads for 25 days. The farmers were upset over the compensation offered farmers for crop damage from heavy rains, among other issues. The protest paralyzed Greece's transportation system and provoked a national crisis (Louloudis and Maraveyas 1997).

Early in my fieldwork, when I was trying to unravel the regulations of the state agricultural policy, a local farmer told me “Here everything is forbidden, and everything is allowed”. Greeks tend to resist state authority at almost every level. Even traffic and parking regulations are generally not followed. In the town of Nauplio, near my fieldwork, a traffic light was installed at the busiest intersection, the first ever in this town of 15,000. It had to be removed a short time later because, as a local resident told me, “it caused too many accidents. Nobody stopped at the red light”. Public meetings are invariably raucous, and most people freely argue with and even curse police officers and bureaucrats.

Even among the more docile villagers in the valley, the possibility of violent civil conflict is ever present. I often heard predictions that economic difficulties, if unresolved, would lead to violent conflict or civil war, and one young man, when I asked him who was to be blamed for his inability to make a living from his fields, said “we are, because we don’t take our guns into the streets”. At times such armed threats come close to being fulfilled. One evening I saw the local game warden, who lived in a valley village, come to Gerbesi for a visit. Many Greek men are avid hunters and spend a lot of time discussing the locations of hares and comparing the skills of their hunting dogs. The game warden is a particularly hated authority figure because he often pursues and arrests those hunting out of season. As I sat with a group of men and the game warden, I noticed that he had refused to go inside the café and insisted on sitting with his back to the wall. He also made a quite obvious effort to show us that he was armed with a handgun. After half an hour he made a quick exit and left the village. The remaining men laughed and explained to me that another village man, whom the warden had recently arrested and

who had sworn revenge, had just arrived. The warden was afraid that he would go get his hunting rifle.

Resistance to authority is also enshrined in local rituals. Easter is one of the most important religious celebrations in Greece. The Saturday midnight church service is the culmination of Holy Week and is widely attended in the villages. At the services, crowds of boys and men invariable gather outside the churches to explode powerful firecrackers. At the service I attended in Gerbesi around thirty teenage boys and adult men remained outside the church throwing M-80 type firecrackers in the square and onto the front porch of the church. The doors of the church were closed after one exploded near the entrance. At one point someone exploded a stick of dynamite near the wall of the church, provoking screams from inside. As people left the service, they had to use a side entrance to avoid the explosions. When I asked a parishioner later if anyone attempted to stop or limit the firecrackers he replied, "It doesn't do any good to ask them to stop. They will just throw more." The nearby town of Asini has a tradition on Easter day of shooting an effigy of Judas. After the midday feast, hundreds of drunken residents converge on a field where they spend an hour shooting the effigy with hunting rifles, finally blowing it up with dynamite. Even though technically illegal, the event is carried on the local news each year, and police are careful to stay away for fear of provoking the crowd.

Defying legal restrictions and flouting formal rules tends to increase social status in the villages, at least among males. The term "*mangas*" is used to denote a male who is defiant, tough and ostentatious, and is one of the highest compliments. Originally describing a colorfully marginal sub-culture of musicians and petty criminals among the Asia Minor refugees (Holst 1975:14), the term is now used generally to denote someone

who gains respect by flouting societal norms. The story of *Kapetanio* Fani is popular with many villagers precisely because of his individualistic defiance of both state laws and Communist Party discipline. Villagers also display a grudging respect for those among the rich who gained their wealth by challenging or swindling the existing order. Several villagers for example, recounted for me the story of how Onassis managed to rise from humble origins through various swindles to become one of the richest men in the world. Among villagers, *mangas* status can be attained through acts of conspicuous consumption at local festivals and parties. Men will often compete to see who can spend the most money and destroy the most property, for which they will later be charged. One young man, anticipating an upcoming village saint's day festival told me,

“You don't know me well, I might go crazy. I could blow 1,000 euro at the festival. That's right. When I get in the mood, nothing can stop me. If I start drinking, look out! Last time I went all out. Whiskey? Whole bottles! Lined up on stage. Money to the orchestra? Tons of it! I'm a very good dancer, you can ask anyone, and once I get started and if I'm drinking, forget about it! Once I emptied the whole freezer full of ice cream. On the floor! Cases of beer! Crash! On the floor. I smashed tables, chairs, everything I could find!”

Such behavior elevates male status and provokes respect from other males who appreciate defiant aggression.

For many, rebellion is also enshrined in the very landscape, especially in the mountain villages with a rich history of partisan activity. During my fieldwork, as I traveled and worked with local residents, I was impressed with the frequency with which

particular places or geographical features instigated historical narratives of resistance. The common terminology of place names in the area often referred to historical incidents or figures of the recent or distant past, but even where they did not, the places themselves gave rise to stories. Passing the church of St. John above the village of Gerbesi invariably incited either the story of how St. John had sat down there on his travels or, alternately, how the people's court had met there during the occupation and civil war and decided the fate of those accused of collaboration. In the nearby town of Nauplio there is an area of the old town called "Arvanitia" for the Arvanites that were thrown to their deaths by Turkish soldiers during the Greek Revolution. When I accompanied several hunters into the mountains above Midea township they provided an on-going narrative of the occupation and civil war as we passed cave hide-outs and various sites of shoot-outs and executions. The ongoing narration of such stories reinforces a sense of rebellion and resistance among villagers. One young man from Gerbesi explained,

"That's what makes us Greeks so manly, because we have a strong consciousness about our history. You hear all the stories, fighting the Turks and all the years of slavery, the civil war and occupation. It makes you tense, ready for action".

The conflation of rebelliousness with national character that is prevalent in popular discourse is also sometimes used to deflect a more structural analysis of local economic problems. When I spoke with Giorgos Raptis, the Agriculture Ministry official in charge of agricultural development in Argolida, about the declining protection for Greek citrus producers in transnational markets under the E.U. he commented,

“There once was the ability on the part of the government to make policy, even if it wasn’t always successful. At least there were attempts. Now there is nothing. It is just the free market, but even a free market has some rules and we don’t even have that. Of course, it is partly the Greek character. We operate on instinct and have an aversion to rules.”

Thus, the problems faced by Greek agriculturalists are sometimes attributed to their own inability to play by the rules and their inherent tendency toward selfishness and a distrust authority.

The conflation of resistance to the E.U. with the assertion of national identity has important implications for how that resistance is expressed. As the main discourse of resistance, nationalism serves to naturalize certain class characteristics of rural Greek landowners into perceptions of national identity. Greeks are “clever” [*poniri*], “lazy” [*tembeles*] and averse to following rules. Immigrants are hard-working, untrustworthy and not very intelligent. Both views tend to naturalize the opportunities and strategies available to Greeks as landowners and immigrants as landless laborers. They also condition the ways that resistance is expressed and collusion is negotiated. By naturalizing the difference between Greek landowners and immigrant laborers, concepts of national identity also provide a strategy for evading the pressures of transnational markets through the increased exploitation of labor. In other words, nationalism and concepts of national identity provide a way of resolving the main contradiction of Greeks’ involvement with E.U. institutions and markets, which is the spread of a liberal discourse of social equality and prosperity with a simultaneous de-valuation of productive labor through the spread of “free” markets.

Resisting 'rationalized' agriculture

From the perspective of the E.U., Greek agriculture is hopelessly inefficient. Almost 17% of the Greek workforce still makes a living primarily from agriculture, landholdings are small and dispersed, and most of the crops suffer from overproduction on the world markets. The goal, then, for the E.U. has been to reorder agriculture along the lines of capitalist rationalization by enlarging landholdings, reducing and mechanizing the workforce, and stimulating investment in diversified crops. This has been the pattern in both the advanced capitalist economies, such as the U.S., and socialist economies, such as the former U.S.S.R. In both the cases the consolidation of landholdings and shift to industrial agriculture was accomplished violently through land expropriation resulting in massive social upheaval, in the U.S. by means of bank foreclosures and in the U.S.S.R. by military means. For the E.U. with its neo-liberal trope of governance such solutions are unacceptable. Instead the E.U. must rely on incentives and subsidies as methods for enticing agriculturalists to carry out a program of rationalization.

E.U. programs in Argolida are centered on two methods of pushing agriculturists toward efficiency. On the one hand various subsidy programs have been used to soften, but at the same time facilitate, the discipline of global commodity markets. For some crops, such as citrus, minimum prices are more or less guaranteed, moderating the effects of a downward price spiral and price fluctuations. In this case, price supports act to prevent the political opposition that would arise among farmers with a collapse in prices while at the same time facilitating the slow but steady erosion of profits. In other cases

inefficient and overproduced crops, such as tobacco and milk, have been limited and production is being slowly bought out by E.U. incentive programs. In exchange for guaranteed high prices, farmers and herders essentially agree to limit and slowly reduce production. These programs mostly function in the mountain villages and have encouraged farmers to switch to truck farming for urban farmers' markets. In the valley, where citrus is only protected by minimum price supports, market pressure on agriculturalists has been greater, encouraging them to try and leave agriculture altogether. On the other hand, incentives such as the New Farmers Program have encouraged the "professionalization" of farming through the capitalization of large-scale, mechanized enterprises. There have also been various efforts, both state and private, to encourage specialized production of organic or "boutique" crops that command premium prices. Other programs subsidize the diversification of the rural economy through the development of tourism industries and small non-agricultural businesses. In addition, the growing consumer markets and availability of credit has put pressure on farmers to abandon low-return agriculture in favor of the service industries.

In Argolida these attempts at rationalization have met with only limited success, faced with the strong resistance of local residents. Following their own sense of "rationality", most residents have been extremely reluctant to part with their land, even when the returns are low and land prices are high. One citrus farmer I spoke with extensively was typical. Aware that he faced large debts, a dwindling income and growing family I asked him why he did not sell two unproductive plots he had that were close to a main road. He replied,

“Sell them and do what? OK, I would get a lot of money and what? Buy a new car? Fix the house? Pay off my debts? In a few years I will back in the same situation. They can go to hell! No, I will save that land for my daughters. They may need it for their education or whatever. Let them do what they want with the damned land!”

Farmers are reluctant to sell given the lack of optimism surrounding the development of the non-agricultural economy, what they perceive as the lack of safe investment opportunities and the dangers of consumer spending.

Local residents also view the New Farmers Program and various economic development subsidies with skepticism. In the three villages I studied there are less than ten people enrolled. One local herder explained his reluctance to enroll in the program despite his eligibility.

“Yes, it has some good things. I could build a new stable. They pay 70%, and with over-billing it would be free. Also I could increase my herd and get a bigger subsidy. But my parents are getting older. Who will help me with the work in a few years? Women don’t want to marry herders anymore. I will have to hire immigrants and there go my profits. And they kill you with paperwork. Plus I won’t be able to do anything else on the side. No, I will wait. When my parents are gone I’ll probably switch to truck farming.”

Young farmers are hesitant to give up the freedom of movement that pluriactivity allows by locking into a restrictive program that denies them the ability to work at second jobs, despite the benefits. Residents are reluctant to invest time and money in projects

that are risky. One valley resident who operates an old olive oil press turned down the opportunity to apply for funds to modernize his equipment. First, it involved training and more work, precluding other economic activities. Another resident who had modernized his press a few years earlier had gone bankrupt when he was unable to raise production to profitable levels given the competition from small presses. In the end he lost his press to the banks. Heavily capitalized and industrialized enterprises that do operate in the area are often the target of local resentment and opposition. One such business, a modern pig farm and slaughterhouse outside the mountain village of Bardi has been the focus of complaints by neighbors due to toxic runoff. In another case, two fish farms that opened on the coast near Midea township were the object of protests both because of pollution that threatened nearby resort areas and the fact that immigrants rather than locals were employed on the project.

Agriculturalists then, are able to frustrate and resist E.U. goals by holding on to land and its flexible uses. In this regard there are some differences between mountain and valley strategies. In the mountains, agriculturalists are more likely to avoid E.U. programs in order to preserve flexibility and freedom of movement in pursuing fluctuating market opportunities. In the valley, farmers are more likely to avoid full-time occupation with agriculture in order to preserve the pluriactivity of the household. In both cases, however, the main weakness in resistance strategies arises from the increasing dependence on store-bought consumer goods and services. Residents are fully conscious of the pressures exerted by growing household needs. Families need automobiles and cell phones, children need spending money and after-school private tutoring. In addition, virtually all food and clothing is now bought commercially, a drastic change from just a

generation ago. This explosion of needs necessitates further entanglement with market economies and a complete dependence on E.U. protection and subsidies to survive that entanglement. One of the greatest fears for agriculturalists is the loss of land due to defaults on consumer debt. Despite the ambivalence, therefore, agriculturalists find themselves in a position of having little choice other than to follow the policies and programs of the E.U.

Greek agriculturalists are able to subvert the interests and goals of the free market in two main ways. The first is by taking advantage of immigrants, who have even less protection than they and have already been displaced by market dislocations. With the use of immigrants, Greek farmers are able to absorb the decline in profits of agricultural production by both relocating the costs of labor reproduction to other countries and by employing both state and civil violence to enforce the extraction of surplus labor. The second way is by using various frauds to “scam” the system, thereby diverting funds and negating many of the E.U. policy goals.

The early days of E.U. membership are still remembered fondly by agriculturalists in Argolida. Money was there for the taking. With the combination of large subsidies and lax controls, frauds and scams proliferated. Tobacco was subsidized, but not yet controlled or supervised, so farmers could produce 500 kilos and, with the help of friendly cooperative officers, get registered for two tons. Trucks full of oranges would get weighed and recorded, and then the same truck would circle around and get back in line. Large amounts of money were made overnight, especially by the officers of cooperatives who were placed in charge of keeping records and recording weights. On

one occasion a leader of a local farmers' cooperative proudly told me "I have 40 years of illegalities. 40 years! And I don't have a single regret!"

Since those early years controls over subsidy disbursements have increased, but defrauding E.U. subsidy programs remains an active sport. While working with a group of citrus farmers I heard one loudly complain about delays in the per-head sheep subsidy. When I remarked, "I didn't know you had sheep" he replied, "I don't, but I'm down on paper for 100 head", and the whole group began to laugh. Shepherds are particularly adept at outwitting officials charged with monitoring subsidy claims. One shepherd described a common tactic,

"When the inspector shows up we call G. [local cooperative head] and then we insist that the inspector be treated to village hospitality. We take him into the café and buy him whiskey and start telling him stories, you know, conversation. In the meantime we send out people to get the herds ready. They just inspect a few, randomly. We take him to the first and say 'this is so-and-so's herd' then we go to the next. In the meantime the first herd is driven across the hill and he may see it again later under a different name. He can't tell the sheep apart! Especially with all that whiskey."

This ruse helps to explain why shepherds in Argolida do not brand or tag their herds. Recently, however, the E.U. has disclosed plans to require the tagging of livestock, ostensibly to track diseased animals, which will likely make this practice more difficult. In another instance I attended an afternoon conference on rural development programs with some local residents run by a local Agriculture Ministry official. The residents incidentally knew the official also as a former Communist Party local leader. The

program offered 50% capitalization for small business start-ups in specified higher villages like Gerbesi and Manesi. The residents were mostly unimpressed. Several expressed interest, but as I learned in discussions afterwards, they were mostly exploring the potential for scamming the system. In the words of one resident,

“It’s not bad. I could transfer the old house to my son, say we are starting a ‘traditional’ hotel, get half the money to fix it up and then he would have a nice house. Fuck them, what will they know?”

By the time I had left the field, no one at the meeting had actually filed the required paperwork, however.

As E.U. programs sought in the early years to work through existing channels of cooperatives and the state Ministry of Agriculture, opportunities for graft and corruption grew, making many wealthy. The downside of this graft for the communities however was a loss of credibility for indigenous farmer organizations. One cooperative leader in Agia Triada told me that the biggest mistake of the cooperative movement was taking up a role in subsidy disbursements. The temptation for graft has ruined many cooperatives, dividing boards and creating suspicions among members. Some former leaders have been charged with crimes in subsequent years. In the short term, graft and fraud enabled local farmers to exploit subsidy programs to their advantage. However in the long run the effect was to discredit local farmers’ organizations and reduce the ability of farmers to resist E.U. policies.

In the absence of a coherent alternative to the present dominance of free markets, especially with the discrediting of leftist alternatives, what is considered to be “resistance” among rural Greeks has taken on an individualistic, opportunistic and

reactionary character. Households concentrate on defending themselves from the increasing regulation and surveillance of the state by both resisting moves to 'rationalize' agriculture and attempting to exploit weaknesses in the current system of subsidies. Most farmers focus on short-term gains while awaiting future opportunities. E.U. institutions have adapted well to such strategies, offering subsidies in exchange for surveillance and regulation and sources of low-cost labor in exchange for low prices. Households have also reorganized and redeployed their labor in an effort to evade pressures from transnational commodity markets. The availability of cheap immigrant labor has allowed them to continue farming their small plots while at the same time searching for and exploiting other economic opportunities. Thus, the key tactic of "resistance" among the farmers of Argolida has been the exploitation of immigrant labor. And this exploitation has been facilitated by state policies concerning immigration, as well as the effects of E.U. economic policies in creating the conditions of emigration from Eastern Europe.

VII. NATIONALISM AND THE GLOBALIZED POLITICAL ECONOMY

In previous chapters we have seen how the incorporation of rural Greece into the transnational regime of the E.U., and by extension into the contemporary world system of global capitalism, has been in many ways incomplete or uneven. While agricultural markets have largely been “transnationalized”, farmers continue to depend heavily on state subsidies. Furthermore, while rural Greeks have become integrated as consumers the economic infrastructure that is needed to provide adequate incomes is still lacking. These developments have provoked both anxiety and anger among rural Greeks, giving rise to expressions of pessimism on the part of many residents as well as various reactions and forms of resistance through which residents attempt to protect their interests.

The state has played an important role in the transition to a globalized economy. The state, both E.U. and national, has been instrumental in promoting a liberal conception of citizenship and extending social rights to previously excluded people such as women and children. The expansion of consumer markets has been facilitated by state policies. The state has also tried to soften some of the contradictions rural agriculturalists experience by participating in global markets through the disbursement of subsidies and the policing of an “illegal” labor market. But state policies have also had a contradictory effect on rural communities. The liberalization of social policy and expansion of consumerism have contributed to a labor crisis gripping small towns and villages. In addition, the neo-liberal principle of “subsidiarity”, the selective centralization of state functions, has meant that many social processes that were previously regulated, at least in part, by the state have been privatized. Among these processes, I have argued, are the

production of national identity and social inequality. While the state continues to participate in both of these processes, it is largely indirectly, through for example the exclusion of immigrant laborers (who now constitute a *class* of labor) from citizenship rights. The state maintains a front of equal rights, leaving the work of producing vulnerable labor largely to the privatized mass media and the informal violence of local communities.

Within this context, “resistance” on the part of Greek farmers acts to assert national identity as a way of resolving the contradictions of their integration into the transnational political economy of the E.U. In the face of tensions between the promises of neo-liberal prosperity and freedom and the reality of an increasingly problematic economic base, farmers assert their Greekness both as a way of framing opposition to the neo-liberal ideology of the state and as a way of naturalizing the exploitation of immigrant laborers. Local opposition to the state seeks to subvert neo-liberal ideology and policies, but its expression generally reaffirms the basic principles of the capitalist market through a reliance on claims to neo-liberal rights and social markers generated by commodity consumption. The focus on national identity as a basis for claim-making also reinforces the marginalization of immigrant laborers. The exploitation of immigrant laborers ultimately subsidizes their participation of Greek farmers in the transnational markets of the E.U. as both producers and consumers. Resistance is thus safely deflected into forms that ultimately strengthen the expansion of European capitalism.

Terence Turner has argued that much of globalization theory has obscured the crucial issue of “the relation between the inner contradictions of globalization and the rise of political and ideological movements directly or indirectly opposed to global capital

and the neoliberal ideology and policies that have served as its ideological and political auxiliaries” (2003:37-38). The experience of rural Greek agriculturalists helps to shed light on this relationship between globalization and local opposition in a particular instance of the reorganization of relations of production (and relations of consumption). The danger in Turner’s critique however is the implication that resistance is shaped by the “inner contradictions” of globalization in a simple dialectical fashion. In fact opposition is much more complexly situated. As we have seen, some of the most prominent and self-conscious forms of resistance in Argolida more accurately serve to (perhaps partially) resolve and deflect the contradictions of globalization.

As numerous theorists have argued, processes of globalization are much broader than simply a widening of the transnational circulation of capital or the transnationalization of commodity production. The dynamics of contemporary globalization can be understood historically as changing relations between the main constituents of the modern world system: states, nations and the social relations of production. As outlined below, my ethnographic research in Argolida and the experience of rural Greek agriculturalists contributes to this understanding. In particular, I will focus on the changing relation of nation and nationalism to the other constituents of the “modern world system” and the way in which techniques of neoliberal governmentality have been used to condition that relation.

Globalization and the new nationalism from the perspective of the household economy

While concepts such as globalization and nationalism are often analyzed at the level of abstract theory, we must remember that as practices they are produced by individuals and groups acting within contexts of real social relations. In order to understand them, then, we must look at the contexts in which they are produced. To that end this study has attempted to document the production of national identity and social inequality within the context of the agricultural household economy in Argolida. In doing so, we have used the household as a microcosm of Greek society and a model of social processes at work in the larger social field.

Agricultural households in Argolida have experienced economic globalization in several ways. Most importantly, as Greece has become integrated into the economy of the E.U., households have become direct participants in the transnational markets for agricultural products. On the whole this has created downward pressure on prices for these products, a situation that has been somewhat mitigated by the expansion of subsidy programs. Yet although these programs have acted to insulate agriculturalists from the “shock” of conversion to transnational “free” markets, their ultimate purpose is to accomplish the gradual transition to capitalist agriculture through the regulation, attrition and ultimately shrinking of the agricultural sector. At the same time that agricultural households have been integrated as producers for transnational markets, they have also been integrated as consumers. Subsistence production has declined and households have become more dependent on transnational markets for commodity consumption. Indeed, the novelty of contemporary processes of globalization, from the perspective of the rural household, is the way that commodity consumption has come to define and condition the integration of the household into transnational markets.

The integration of Greek rural household production into global economies is nothing new. In the past however, peasant communities were integrated into the world system primarily as producers, of both agricultural products and industrial labor (Wolf 1982:317-318). As we have seen, modern Greece has been successively integrated into several world economies before the advent of the E.U., including the Ottoman, British, and American systems. Each of these earlier phases of world-systemic globalization have been accompanied by particular sets of relations between external and internal forms of social domination that were mediated by the construction of national identity and the development of the nation-state. Each also gave rise to particular sets of contradictions that were often resolved by military force through a succession of political/military struggles. In the post-WWII period the Greek nation-state under the hegemony of American capital developed under conditions characterized by its semi-peripheral relation to the U.S.-dominated world system. Agricultural households developed internal relations of production that were characterized by a gendered division of labor consistent with a reliance on subsistence production as well as an integration into systems of patronage that insured their domination by urban elites and, by extension, a national bourgeoisie. National identity acted both to condition the subordination of rural households and to provide an avenue of resistance to this same domination, as demonstrated by the series of nationalist struggles against foreign domination that characterized the post-war period. Both communist insurgents and right-wing military dictators claimed legitimacy and mobilized their supporters through a discourse of nationalism.

In contrast to earlier integrations however, the current phase of integration has been accomplished not through military force but through the techniques of neo-liberal governmentality that characterize the “globalized” capitalism of the E.U., a process that has given rise to a distinctive set of contradictions. Some of these contradictions can be seen in the system of agricultural subsidies. Borrowing a page from Fordism⁵⁶, subsidy programs use price supports in order to accomplish the transition to capitalist agriculture, but at the same time create an arena of autonomy and resistance for farmers. Farmers employ both fraud and political lobbying in order to use the subsidy programs as a way of forestalling the transition to more capitalist agriculture and as a way of mitigating the effects of free markets. That is, subsidies encourage the use of wage labor in agricultural production rather than family labor, but at the same time allow farmers to avoid, at least temporarily, other aspects of the shift to “modern” industrial agriculture such as the consolidation of landholdings and intensive capitalist investment that would more seriously threaten the social fabric of the villages. The effectiveness of the subsidy program for the E.U., however, is measured not only by its effectiveness in transforming agriculture but also through its effectiveness in promoting the political legitimacy of the E.U. itself. That is, even as farmers use the subsidy programs as an arena of resistance, their dependence on subsidies has been an important element in their support for E.U. integration and therefore in the political legitimacy of the E.U. project. Despite their

⁵⁶ The concept of “Fordism” has been used by numerous theorists (see Harvey 1990:125-140 for a synopsis) as a model of relatively stable regime of capitalist accumulation that held sway in the U.S. and Western Europe between World War II and the 1970’s. Briefly, it linked mass production to mass consumption in a system that provided benefits to a privileged sector of the working class in exchange for a stable rate of profit, labor peace and expanded consumer markets. The agricultural subsidy programs of the E.U. continue that logic to the extent that they are intended to support consumption levels among the rural population at the same time deflecting social discontent and buying the public support needed for the political legitimacy of the E.U. project. It should be noted however that, unlike Fordist social welfare and entitlement programs, agricultural subsidies are conceived as temporary measures intended to ease the transition to “free” markets.

opposition to the goals of E.U. agricultural policy, rural households increasingly recognize the sovereignty of the E.U. by supporting political parties that accept the E.U. political structure and abandoning those parties such as the KKE that have been most opposed to E.U. integration. Thus, despite their regulatory nature, subsidy programs can be seen as conducive to techniques of neo-liberal governmentality through their role in the manufacturing of consent among the governed and the political legitimacy of the E.U. An important effect of this process is the creation of an aura of inevitability to the logic of capitalist markets and the deflection of resistance from opposition to the capitalist basis of transnational markets to demands for government protection from their effects.

The effects of the neo-liberal production of governmentality can be seen in agriculturalist households in the widespread perception of a dramatic increase in “equality” and “freedom” among rural Greeks. As we have seen, most Greeks feel that the “modernization” of the countryside has freed them from the fetters of gender, age and class distinctions that characterized the post-war era. For example, women are perceived to exercise greater freedom of choice in marriages and careers and children have been freed from the labor requirements of households. In practice, these freedoms are accomplished through commodity consumption, primarily the exercise of purchasing power by women and children in the markets for consumer goods. Baudrillard was particularly prescient on this point when he argued that in contemporary consumer society “the democratic principle is transferred from a real equality of capacities, of responsibilities, of social chances...to an equality before the Object...the democracy of social standing, the democracy of the TV, the car and the stereo...” (1998:50). The link between rising levels of consumption and perceptions of equality thus acts to veil

emerging patterns of inequality engendered by the diffusion of neo-liberal modes of governance and integration into global markets.

A dominant neo-liberal ethos of the “marketing” of identities, and of the marking of identities through commodity consumption, has also developed that provides a new basis for the exercise of social control. This can be seen most dramatically in new attitudes and practices of raising children. Children require capital investments in the form of commodities and education in order to be successful in job markets. These requirements place enormous burdens on households and stimulate their productivity, but at the same time have encouraged smaller family size. The success of children is seen as a reflection of the discipline of parents, but is also ultimately a product of the children’s own participation in these forms of cultural capitalization, of their “desire” to succeed. In sum, households have come to see themselves as “petty-bourgeois”, that is, as small capitalist enterprises.

The twin processes of economic integration into the E.U. markets and the infusion of neo-liberal discipline has created a contradiction that is acutely felt by agriculturalist households, namely a labor crisis. At the same time that agricultural labor needs are increased through declining market prices, the access to surplus labor, in the form of the labor of women, children, and lower class co-villagers has been reduced. In the past all these sources of labor could be called upon to provide for the production necessary for subsistence. Today they have been curtailed precisely through the spread of neo-liberal concepts of freedom and equality as well as neo-liberal techniques for the expansion of markets through the discipline of consumerism. Part of the slack has been taken up through technological solutions, such as increased availability of machinery, fertilizers,

deep-well technology, etc. The shortage of labor, however, remains a serious problem especially given the relatively small plots and labor-intensive crops on which villagers depend. For agricultural households, the effects of neo-liberal capitalist globalization have presented a dilemma. If everyone has a choice, who will choose to be exploited? That is, given the neo-liberal ideology of freedom, how are exploitable sources of labor to be reproduced?

Robert Miles (1987) has argued that capitalism, despite the processes of commodification of labor described by Marx, continues to be dependent on the reproduction of “unfree”, fettered labor in order to sustain relations of production and the extraction of surplus. In Argolida, we can see a clear demonstration of this process. As agricultural labor has been freed from the fetters of kinship, gender and patronage that in the past organized and sustained rural relations of production, traditional forms of social hierarchy have disappeared. The simple and immediate effect has been that Greeks no longer work in the fields as they have been “freed” to participate in the labor markets of the service industry. This process has been represented as the “modernization” of the countryside. At the same time, given the conditions of agricultural production, there is still a demand among households, even an increased demand because of growing consumer needs, for access to forms of fettered labor that can be flexibly exploited to support rising standards of living. Subsidies, which help to ease the pressure on households, can never fully resolve the contradiction faced by rural households since their goal is to prod households towards transformation. The new fetters of agricultural labor are constructed through the exclusion from citizenship rights that characterizes the illegal market of immigrant labor.

Agricultural households in Argolida have responded to this crisis of labor in a typically post-Fordist fashion: by outsourcing the reproduction of exploitable labor to neighboring countries of Eastern Europe. This option has been made possible by the same global forces that have created the labor crisis in the first place, that is, by the global hegemony of capitalist markets. The global expansion of capitalism in the last several decades of the 20th century has brought with it the destruction of Eastern European economies and the proliferation of transnational social and cultural flows. The expansion of capitalist markets into Eastern Europe and the destruction of national economies there have created a vast pool of surplus labor. Advances in information, communication and transportation technologies has increased the mobility of Eastern European labor while at the same time making possible its diaspora character whereby the social costs of the reproduction of labor exploited by Greek households can be displaced to Eastern European societies. In other words, what makes Albanian labor so cheap for Greeks is the fact that so many of the costs needed to sustain and reproduce “Albanians” as a category of labor are absorbed by Albania and other Eastern European countries. Like the old trans-Atlantic slave trade, Greeks mostly take healthy male immigrants in their prime. The costs of raising children and caring for the old and infirm, many of whom are dependent on remittances, remain outside Greece where they are lower. In addition, the dreams and hopes for the future that motivate immigrants to work are cheaper in Albania. Thus immigrants in Greece can work for a lower wage and still support families and save money for future investments back home. The result is that the majority of agricultural households in Argolida are now directly dependent on immigrant labor and, by extension,

on the vulnerabilities of Eastern European economies wrought by new global processes of social inequality.

For rural Greek households, the alleviation of the labor crisis, and thus the resolution of the main contraction arising from their incorporation into the new globalized capitalism, is dependent on the maintenance of the difference between “Greeks” and “Albanians”. Eric Wolf (1999:274-291) has argued that societies under stress of transformation often respond by developing powerful ideologies that structure the differentiation, mobilization and deployment of social labor. Such ideologies are often constructed, or naturalized, as a cosmological imperative. Shades of this process can be seen in the rise and spread of a neo-racist ethnic nationalism among Greeks. For Albanians and other Eastern Europeans the structural conditions of their integration into the Greek economy has precluded the development of nationalist ideologies, or at least deflected it to their home countries, making assimilation a more attractive goal than differentiation. Given the economic integration of immigrant labor into the household economies of rural Argolida, the production of their social and political marginalization presents an acute problem, one that is solved through the elaboration of a set of national identities that explains and naturalizes the difference between the two groups. As we have seen, the elaboration of difference entails a legitimation of the appropriateness of Albanians’ political exclusion and social subordination, the naturalization of their position at the bottom of the social hierarchy, and the appropriateness of Greek social and political supremacy.

I have argued that the revitalization and spread of nationalist discourse has been instrumental in creating the social relations necessary for integration into the new

political economy of Europe. While the type of neo-racist nationalism pervasive in rural Greece may, on the surface, seem incompatible or contradictory with the neo-liberal tendencies of the E.U., in actuality it has served to subsidize political and economic integration through a resolution of the main contradiction facing Greek farmers. At the same time as Greeks have elaborated a complex ideology of the social marginalization of immigrant workers, even including demands for their expulsion, they have become almost completely dependent on their labor. Indeed, the expulsion of immigrant workers would undoubtedly require a fundamental restructuring of the Greek economy. Thus the vulnerability and exploitation of immigrant workers has been a key factor enabling the successful integration of rural Argolida into the contemporary regime of the Greek state and the E.U.

Looking back on the history of modern Greece, we can see that patterns of the exploitation conditioned by nationalist ideologies have always been crucial to the integration of Greece into world systems. Indeed we can argue that the emergence and spread of Greek nationalism was what allowed the Greek Orthodox merchant class of the Ottoman Empire to assert itself as a national bourgeoisie with monopoly rights of exploitation of a diverse rural peasantry. On the semi-periphery of the British- and later American-dominated world capitalist systems, Greek nationalism acted to organize an ethnicized and gendered system of class relations that facilitated its exploitation by a national *comprador* bourgeoisie supported by the armed force of successive world powers. A somewhat different process however has characterized Greece's incorporation into the current E.U. regime. For one thing, the old core-semi-periphery relationship that characterized Greece's relation to world systems no longer seems to hold. Instead, there

has been a clear attempt by the E.U. to fully integrate southern European economies into the European core. The success of this attempt has yet to be seen, but it is no longer adequate to describe Greece in terms of the post-war 20th century. What seems to be emerging, however, is a kind of internalization of the semi-periphery. With the weakening of internal borders and widespread dependence on foreign immigrant labor in Europe there has developed a kind of internal core and semi-periphery defined by differential access to wealth and policed by strong ideologies of ethnic and national difference and manifested in new and different strategies of labor mobilization and labor discipline.

Thus, nationalism in Argolida is not the vestige of an earlier era but rather the product of changing political-economic conditions. Recent trends towards globalization of capitalist markets have produced both the need for a new source of exploitable labor as well as the technological means for the creation of a diaspora working class of immigrants with strong social ties to their home countries. As a result, nationalism works to promote a form of “hybridity” based on exclusion. Rural Greece is indeed becoming “multicultural”, but cultural difference is being used to construct class distinctions and enforce vulnerabilities. Immigrants are actively pushed to maintain their interest in their home countries by their exclusion from Greek society on the one hand and the ease of movement and communication on the other. The effect is the creation of a particularly vulnerable workforce that is easily exploited by the host society. In this sense nationalism acts as a force of heterogeneity constructing and naturalizing national differences within the communities of Argolida as opposed to a homogenizing force. Social classes are economically and politically integrated through the creation of difference rather than

solidarity. This strategy of national differentiation rather than homogenization represents a significant change for both the state and nation in how the contradictions of capitalist development are resolved. The production of national identity, at least in rural Argolida, has become primarily a strategy of exclusion rather than inclusion. Whereas formerly nationalism was primarily a force that sought to include classes, thereby legitimizing capitalist exploitation and necessitating the production of gender, age and kinship stratification in rural households, the new nationalism defines class through the exclusion of the lowest, necessitating the production of ethnic and racial stratification in order to create exploitable labor.

Problematizing nationalism-as-resistance

Along with the increased transnational mobility of capital that has been achieved through technological means, an important element in “globalization” has been a re-articulation of the relationship between nation and state. The role of the state has shifted in significant ways from the Fordist and social democratic models of inter-class mediation. In the E.U., some state functions, such as monetary regulation, have been re-organized into economies of scale, while others have been “privatized”, or opened up to direct exploitation by capital markets. The production of national identity is one area in Europe that has been largely privatized but has generally resisted re-scaling, despite the apparent economy of scale offered by pan-European markets. That is, in economic terms, there continues to be a “market” for Greek identity. Often this is assumed to be a form of resistance, or reaction, to the globalizing pressures of the E.U., a positioning of nation

against state, which in itself would be a somewhat novel arrangement. However, as we have seen, the production of national identity continues to be crucial to resolving the contradictions entailed in integrating household economies into the E.U. Despite their apparent de-linking, state and nation in Argolida continue to work together at a fundamental level even if their formal links have been severed, or at least made tenuous, by the pervasive liberalism of the state apparatus. Why then is there a strong consciousness, among both rural Greeks and academic theorists, of contemporary nationalism as being against the state?

In some of the literature on globalization there is a common assumption that forces of globalization are antithetical to the forces that for the last several centuries have driven the formation of national identity and the consolidation of the modern nation-state. As finance capital, industrial production and commodity consumption have become increasingly organized into transnational or global networks the nation-state, or so it is thought, has lost its relevance and begun a long slow slide into insignificance (for example, Lukacs 1993). Capitalism, in short, is thought to have lost its moorings in the social and political relations nurtured by the global expansion of nation-states that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. As the state has become increasingly constrained in its ability to foster and regulate the social relations necessary for capitalist production, the value of nationalism, and of the formation of national identities, is also thought to have declined, becoming a historical vestige of an earlier era of capitalist development and something of a loose cannon on the decks as capitalism sails into its global future. Even those who, like Swynedouw, argue that a “hollowed out” state continues to be a contested arena for socio-political interests see nationalism as a form of “militant

particularism in which local loyalties, identity politics, and celebrating the different other(s) attest to an impotence when faced with the call to embrace an emancipatory and empowering politics of scale” (1997:161). Others are equally pessimistic about the future of nationalism. Sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer, for example, suggests that ethnic and religious nationalisms face three possible futures: “one where religious and ethnic politics ignore globalization, another where they rail against it, and yet another where they envision their own transnational futures” (2002:13). Nationalism, and national identities, it is thought, have lost their purpose in the new global order and serve only as a reaction, a doomed rear-guard defense that has mutated into virulent new forms of racism and social exclusion on the part of particular social groups, classes, or class fractions most threatened by the new world order. In rural Greece, however, there is little evidence of such a development. Instead, nationalism and concepts of national identity continue to be instrumental to the reproduction of relations of production in the new political economic environment of globalization. Paradoxically, while ideologies and practices of cultural differentiation continue to be instrumental, they tend to be thought of by theorists and participants alike as forms of resistance, in so much as they threaten the hegemony of global capitalism. The implications of both the instrumentality of national identities in rural Greece and their perceived role as sites of resistance have yet to be fully understood.

The withering of the nation-state breathlessly predicted by some early studies of globalization has, of course, not come to pass, at least not yet. More recent assessments have tended towards the sober view that the national state, while its role and function are changing, is in no danger of disappearing (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, Sassen 1996). While the ability of states to set economic policies, and to a lesser extent social and

political policies, has been undermined with the growth and expansion of transnational regulatory institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, states are still crucial instruments for both facilitating the circulation of capital and the extraction of surplus labor and for resolving or mitigating the contradictions arising from capitalist relations of production. Capital itself has only partially transcended state boundaries and is still highly dependent on the protection of state and para-state institutions. In additions, labor and commodity markets tend to remain segmented by national economies (Mair 1997). Labor does circulate, as we can see from the global flows of migrant workers, but is prevented from circulating with the same freedom as capital by state regulations. This can be seen in the E.U. where even as internal European frontiers have been dismantled, external frontiers have been strengthened and where even as social-democratic welfare systems are being weakened, states continue to be called upon to resolve the contradictions emerging from neo-liberal capitalism by mitigating the social inequalities and poverty wrought in its wake.

Many early anthropological studies of globalization described the tendency of globalized networks of production and exchange to shape cultural processes of identity formation. Appadurai (1990) argued that identities were becoming transnationalized through processes of hybridity that were giving rise to new forms, mediated through global networks of social relations. In a similar vein, Castells (1996) has argued that developments in information technology and the dispersal of production had profound effects on social relations, bypassing older techniques of the nation-state. In retrospect, such pronouncements seem hyperbolic. More recent analyses have pointed out that globalization is not fostering a new era of cultural hybridization as much as stimulating

increasing social polarization (Friedman 2003). Much of the early work has been criticized for ignoring or obscuring class differences in the development of global identities (Turner 2003). While certain economic and political elites, as well as diaspora communities of labor migrants, have certainly experienced a process of de-territorialization and hybridity, the vast majority of people who do not belong to these two groups have experienced these processes to a much lesser degree. Indeed, the qualitative social and cultural changes that globalization was thought to represent in early analyses has been tempered by more recent assessments that consider the similarities between the contemporary era of globalism and early periods of capitalist expansion.

What most analyses of globalization share, however, is an assumption that under current political and economic conditions nationalism is in a state of decline. Friedman for example argues that in addition to increasing “vertical”, or class, polarization, global economic forces have spurred increasing “horizontal” fragmentation. National identity has become increasingly fragmented and “ethnified” (2003:8) as ethnic groups compete for social resources. Terrence Turner has argued that the weakening of the nation-state has led to its “de-hyphenation” and a “crisis of sovereignty” as national identity has lost its instrumentality for the projection of class hegemony (2003:50-51). Such views seem to be based not on empirical evidence, but rather on assumptions about the relationship between nationalism on the one hand and the modern nation-state on the other. As the traditional role of the state has shifted and its sovereignty and range of movement narrowed, national identity has become less important for the projection of class power and reproduction of class relations. By such logic, the “persistence” of nationalism is a defensive reaction against the contradictions engendered by the new globalism and an

expression of rage on the part of the downwardly mobile classes and class fractions that make up the losers in the new economy. In this sense nationalism is linked to ethnic violence accompanying the disintegration of some states. Others have described it as an attempt to reestablish the purity of social categories (and, by extension, class privileges) disrupted by the hybridity of globalization (Appadurai 1998).

Such analyses are of little use in understanding contemporary rural Greece. As we have seen, in Argolida a strong and vibrant discourse of nationalism and national identity has developed alongside the incorporation of the Greek state into E.U. administrative and political hegemony. Expressions of nationalism are especially associated with a strong and pervasive xenophobia and racism directed toward labor immigrants from Eastern Europe. The resurgence of a virulent xenophobic nationalism has been documented in many areas of Europe and is usually explained as a defensive reaction against the loss of protection of the old nation-state structure in the new globalized political economy through a scapegoating of immigrants (Stolke 1995; Balibar 1991; Pred 2000). Given the weakening of the autonomy of the Greek state in the context of the E.U. supra-state we would expect that expressions of nationalism would be associated with demands among downwardly mobile classes for declining state resources. Indeed, the perception among most rural Greeks is that ethnic nationalism and anti-E.U. sentiment is a reaction to the threat that E.U. markets and institutions pose to their livelihood. At the same time, most people will also readily acknowledge that standards of living and social conditions in rural areas have generally improved under the E.U. Thus, in Argolida we have seen that such expressions of this “bottom-up” nationalism are most common among those who have objectively benefited from E.U. integration, i.e. the Greek farmers, rather than those

who are most exploited, i.e. the immigrant laborers. Indeed, the strategy of most immigrant laborers is to minimize their ethnic difference and assimilate into Greek society. What are we to make of this contradiction? The evidence from Argolida casts doubt on the hypothesis that nationalism in Europe is in a state of decline and that its resurgence is a last-ditch resistance to the predations of global capitalism. Instead, I argue that nationalism is a response to the threat posed by the processes of globalization in undercutting the ability of rural Greek households to reproduce exploitable labor. Under these conditions, nationalism and concepts of national identity have taken on a new importance as they serve to organize the new relations of agricultural production and facilitate the incorporation of the region into E.U. markets.

Reports of the demise of nationalism, like the state, have certainly been premature. Part of the problem arises from our understandings of the nature of the nationalism. Perhaps due to nostalgia, there has been a tendency to idealize the old European nationalisms into coherent institutions of social solidarity rather than the chaotic processes of social differentiation they more accurately represent. The endless variability and basic incoherence and irrationality of nationalism documented by Hobsbawm (1990) have long presented problems for the generalization of nationalism as a social phenomenon. Nationalism and the construction of national identities has been a multi-dimensional and often contradictory process. On the one hand, the emergence of modern nations in Europe has been strongly linked to the emergence of modern states in the context of the development and expansion of capitalism. In this process nationalism is seen as a form of social solidarity that provided both ballast against the class polarization inherent in capitalist development and an economy of scale for the development of

capitalist markets. On the other hand, nationalism has been seen as a form of political organization associated with needs of the modern state to exercise greater degrees of centralized, direct rule and mobilize larger armies (Tilly 2002:161-169). It is this link between nationalism and the emergence of strong European states that underpins the assumption that as states weaken so will nationalism, or as Tilly (2002:162) suggests, “what we loosely call nationalism waxes and wanes with the manifest value and feasibility of ruling your own state”.

The assumption that European states have weakened, as we have seen, is problematic. To be sure, various global institutions and forces have reduced the ability of states to set policies and prescribed a host of economic measures that have narrowed or constrained national political options. Many have argued that processes of globalization have hollowed out state power and that “in fact most states in the world system are apparent states that maintain the apparatus of sovereignty but are stripped of the ability to develop economic structures and activities that provide for the needs of the majority of their people” (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2003:205). But is this really a new development, or are we merely idealizing the old nation-state system? In reality, modern states have always been politically constrained by the economic imperatives of the capitalist economic system. The idea that before the current era of globalization states were able to exercise political autonomy in the world system is certainly a myth. Given the history of foreign domination and authoritarian regimes in Greece, for example, it is difficult to argue that the Greek state has lost sovereignty or been stripped of its autonomy under the E.U. regime. In fact, we could more easily argue that, in many ways, the Greek state has been strengthened by recent changes in the global political economy. State powers of

regulation, surveillance, and policing are increasingly robust. Under the current subsidy programs, state regulation of agricultural production and marketing in Argolida is at historically unprecedented levels, despite the rampant opportunism and petty graft pervasive in the countryside. As we have seen, the state is also crucial for the creation of a class of flexible, low-wage agricultural workers through the development of a work permit system that encourages a paternalistic relationship between immigrant workers and native employers. The result has been to create a two-tiered system of citizenship where “temporary” immigrants hold an official second-class status and are excluded from full political, economic and social rights. The fact that the Greek state now operates in the context of E.U. instead of U.S. domination has done little to diminish its exercise of power through the construction and management of exploitable labor.

The apparent de-linking of the state and nation under the transnational E.U. regime is also problematic. While it is true that formal state institutions no longer play a leading role in the reproduction of national identity through the traditional means of public education, state-controlled media and the old church-state alliance, it would be misleading to say that the state has gotten out of the business of nation-building altogether. Just because some state functions have been “privatized” does not necessarily mean they have ceased to exist. Indeed, national identity itself has not been measurably weakened by the neo-liberal tendencies of the contemporary state. The privatized mass media that has taken up the slack in national identity production is not part of a popular, democratic “public arena” or “civil society”. On the contrary, privatization has led to the centralization, regulation and monopolization of mass media at an unprecedented level. At a functional level, mass media, while formally independent, in reality serves as an

appendage of the state, simultaneously representing the state to its citizens and the citizens to the state⁵⁷. Rather than a withering away of the nation-state, or a de-nationalization of the state, it is more accurate to speak of its reorganization and the re-articulation of the relationship between nation and state. Just as the state continues to be necessary to the system of global capitalism, so does the nation.

The symbiosis of state and privatized national media has formed a “mediacracy” that continues to stimulate the formation and exercise of national identities as a means of shaping social relations of production in the present context of globalized capitalism. Ethnographic evidence from around the world suggests that mass media condition the construction of national cultures in several important ways. As a discursive formation, mass media, and in particular television, has become one of the primary means by which individuals participate in nations. Today in most parts of the world it is primarily through television that nationalist narratives are disseminated, both in the form of news and fictional drama, and their shared discursive features tend to articulate and reinforce contemporary notions of nation and nationalism (Mankekar 2002, Hamilton 2002)). Some researchers have argued that the shift to television has also entailed qualitative changes in the way nations are experienced. For Egyptians, Abu-Lughod (2002) has argued that television has been an important agent for constructing “modern sensibilities”. Studying televised serial dramas, she argues that the modernist project is being promoted both “through disseminating in their story lines moral messages inflected by local and national political ideologies, thus attempting to set the terms of social and political debate;

⁵⁷ In the past this role was largely filled by political parties and patronage networks. Today, most people get information on state policies through television and newspapers. For example, election campaigns are largely run through the medium of television. In addition television, through various talk shows, news reporting, and surveys has become a main medium for transmitting the views and opinions of the populace to politicians and political leaders.

but also more subtly through popularizing a distinctive configuration of narrative, emotion, and subjectivity” (Abu-Lughod 2002:116). In Foucauldian terms, television has become a technology for the production of new kinds of selves.

Besides the narrative, textual, content of its programming, television has conditioned national consciousness in other ways. Wilk (2002) argues that, in Belize, the arrival of advanced television technologies and widespread access has altered national conceptions of social difference. The development of more sophisticated television technologies has broken the link between geographic periphery and cultural lag, negating the perception of national and regional difference through the metaphor of time, with peripheries seen as ‘stuck in time’ and ‘backwards’. Instead, social differences at the national and regional level are increasingly seen in cultural or political terms. Modernization is no longer perceived as a function of economic development over time in which national elites are legitimized through their role as a conduit of progress and fashion. Rather, social relations have come to be more spatially constructed, with difference and inequality legitimized through notions of cultural and national difference. As a result, Wilk speculates that “television imperialism may do more to create a national culture and national consciousness in Belize than forty years of nationalist politics and nine years of independence” (2002:184). It seems clear that television has both taken up a role as a primary instrument of nationalism, and at the same time altered the techniques by which nationalism and national identities are constructed.

In rural Greece, television connects people to the nation in ways that previous institutions and technologies did not. Political parties, public schools and the military draft, all once primary conduits of nationalism, have lost their instrumentality and

withered under state privatization programs. The media, on the other hand, and in particular television, continues to be a potent force in the production of national identity. It has proved to be especially conducive to the governmentality of neo-liberalism. Its ability to ideologically frame national identity in terms of consumption, the citizen as consumer, and its ability to naturalize capitalist markets while at the same time delegitimizing the state have proven useful, indeed probably necessary, to the transnationalized E.U. economy. The media occupies an increasingly central role in constructing processes of “democracy”, through for example the construction of public “opinion” and the managing of elections, while at the same time destroying or co-opting popular movements. Structurally, television media represent a quite novel way of constructing citizens and linking them to the state. In Argentina television has tended to replace older institutions such as schools and political parties. These institutions allowed individuals to participate as groups, provoking forms of social solidarity that were also bases for resistance and negotiation. Television, on the other hand, is an individualistic experience that replaces the immediate social relations of groups with an imagined community of fellow viewers. The solidarity of viewers is precluded, except insofar as it is represented by the media itself—that is, as an ethereal, and corporately owned, “public” easily shaped by market interests or “viewer demographics”. As television programming tends to set the terms of debate and shapes public discourse, the agency of viewers is reduced to choosing between a relatively narrow and pre-selected set of choices.

As the media have become more significant for the production of nationalism, they have also moved into an ostensible opposition vis-à-vis the state. Independent media

organizations have become the main channels of communication between local communities, the nation and the state. The representation of the nation embodied in national media organizations is necessary for their legitimacy as well as being a powerful tool in the reproduction of national identity. Claiming to represent both the nation and local communities, the media generally maintain a cynical stance towards the state while at the same time demanding its strengthening. The opposition of the national media, and their cynical interpretation of the state, constitutes a sort of resistance to the state and global capitalism in general. However, it is a form of resistance that is profoundly ambivalent. The media contain strong expressions of nationalism but maintain a fundamentally symbiotic relationship with the state and other forces of E.U. integration. In fact, despite the *vox populi* image of many talk shows and new programs, media outlets are being increasingly consolidated under the ownership of powerful capitalists (such as Berlusconi in Italy and Murdock in Britain) or corporations (such as Disney, General Electric and Time-Warner in the U.S.). These owners clearly have a strong interest in both state power and global financial networks.

The nationalism of the media is often ideologically positioned against forces of globalization while at the same time, in practical terms, facilitating their spread. The impotence of this type of resistance is often recognized by participants. On several occasions older Greek leftists commented to me while speculating on the future direction of Greek society, "The situation has no hope. The festival is over. Our only hope now is for a revolution in the U.S. Whatever changes will have to come from there." I soon found out this was a common topic of conversation, indicative of their perception of an inability to resist dangerous developments. The co-opting of resistance and its harnessing

to the production of new and in some ways more brutal relations of production represents a novel social situation in Argolida and is key to understanding the relative ease with which neo-liberal global capitalism has been able to re-organize rural society.

Nationalism continues to be necessary because of its ability to define social difference and construct social relations of inequality. Nationalism was never solely an inclusionary force of social solidarity. It was at the same time an exclusionary force that served to define and reproduce social differences necessary for relations of production. In Greece, concepts of national identity have always been gendered and provided the ideological basis for a gendered division of labor in household production as well as the formal economy. Concepts of national identity also facilitated the subordination of internal ethnic minorities and class formation under capitalist development. Arvanites and other internal minorities for example, while they were included in the Greek national identity were also simultaneously subordinated to urban elites through their lack of access to the literacy and education that conferred the trappings of legitimacy on their national bourgeois patrons. In other words, nationalism has served to resolve the contradictions inherent in capitalist society not only through the mitigating the social effects arising from the extraction of surplus labor, but also through creating the ideologies of social difference that make the extraction, or exploitation, possible. Nation and state are still called upon today to resolve the contradictions of capitalist production, but the particulars of their arrangement have changed. One of the most important changes has been a re-positioning, or re-articulation, of the nation as resistant to the transnationalizing state. This resistance, however, is paradoxical in the sense that its expression, rather than threatening the transnational project of the state, in fact strengthens it.

The paradox of resistance

If indeed what has been described as global capitalism constitutes a transformation of the world capitalist system and the beginning of a new systemic regime of accumulation, one of the more curious aspects of its development has been the relative ease with which it has established hegemony. With some notable exceptions such as the Middle East, its ascendance has been accompanied not by bangs but by a series of whimpers. In both the social democratic states of Western Europe and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the reorganization of national economies under the dominance of globalized capital has been accomplished with surprisingly little violence or organized resistance⁵⁸. In Greece, the incorporation into successive world systems has generally been characterized by widespread violent conflict; first in the War of Independence that brought Greece into the orbit of the British Empire and then during the civil wars of the 1940's that established American dominance. In contrast, the events of the last several decades have been notable for their lack of serious resistance. Despite the opposition of a sizable percentage of the population, the incorporation of Greece into the E.U. and submission to the discipline of transnational markets has never been in doubt. In Argolida, many people see the lack of organized resistance as a weakness that has facilitated their subordination.

⁵⁸ Latin America may be another exception to this, particularly in the cases of Venezuela and Cuba, both states continue to directly oppose U.S. policies. In addition, other states such as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay have begun to challenge U.S. hegemony in the region with the election of center-left regimes. However, their ability to seriously challenge the institutions and practices of international capital remain to be seen.

Of course, as we have seen, there are patterns of resistance that can be discerned in the villages and towns of Argolida. Farmers have resisted the goals of E.U. policy in a myriad of ways. Farmers actively resist the surveillance and regulation of the E.U. through the defrauding of subsidy programs. They regularly over-report production in order to secure larger subsidy payments and constantly search for ways to take various grant monies without following through on the commitments entailed. Farmers also passively resist the capitalist rationalization of agriculture through the maintenance of the symbolic value of land. Their refusal to sell land and avoidance of using land as collateral have kept land prices high, kept plot sizes small and stymied the introduction of industrial agriculture. In addition, farmers have been able to resist the rationalization of agriculture through the squeezing of labor costs. By taking advantage of immigrant labor, they have been able to resist market pressures, at least temporarily, in effect playing off one “force” of globalization, the transnationalization of labor markets, against another. The use of the term “resistance” to describe these efforts may be somewhat misleading, as I have discussed in chapter VI. It may just as well be described as reaction or accommodation to the implementation of E.U. policies and global markets. However, what is important here is that, in general, the residents of Argolida perceive these actions to be forms of resistance [*antistasi*]. This perception, confirmed to them by media images of the rebellious and non-compliant Greek character, is crucial to understanding the mechanism by which Argolida has become incorporated into the world system of contemporary capitalism.

The residents of Argolida see these tactics as defensive measures. They generally feel that, faced with the overwhelming force of global markets, the best they can do is to

try and blunt the offensive through various forms of sabotage and non-compliance, and in the process negotiate greater autonomy. In some ways this has been highly effective, as the Common Agricultural Policy of the E.U. is largely seen today as having been unsuccessful and a huge drain on E.U. resources. In this sense, the farmers of Argolida perceive themselves to be involved in a class struggle with a European bourgeoisie. The view of the farmers is based on a consciousness of themselves as a class, either “farmers” [*agrotēs*] or “middle-class” [*mikro-mesai*] whose interests are diametrically opposed to the “rich” [*plousi*] or “bosses” [*afentika*], or sometimes “Jews” [*Evrai*] that control the global economy. In class terms such an analysis generally follows Gramsci’s (1971) concept of a “war of position”, a form of trench warfare between dominant and subordinate classes. For Gramsci a war of position ensues in historical periods when direct frontal attacks (“wars of maneuver”) are untenable. In the war of position, subordinate classes assumed a largely defensive position of resistance, contesting the hegemony of the dominant class on the battleground of civil society and the state. For the dominant class, “an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary and hence a more ‘interventionist’ government, which will take the offensive more openly against the oppositionists and organize permanently the ‘impossibility’ of internal disintegration with controls of every kind, political, administrative, etc, reinforcement of the hegemonic ‘positions’ of the dominant group, etc.” (Gramsci 1971:238-9). Many of the farmers of Argolida would see in Gramsci’s description their own predicament.

Several problems arise with applying Gramscian analysis to the situation in Argolida. First, of course, as a class the farmers of Argolida in many ways have come to resemble more the parasitic class of rural petty bourgeoisie living on rents and pensions

described by Gramsci as a vestige of feudal Europe (1971:283) than a dynamic urban working class engaged in a “war of position”. That is, despite the self-consciousness of farmers in Argolida as an exploited class of labor in reality it is the immigrants who do the bulk of the work. The farmers themselves live essentially off a form a rent on the one hand and through the subsidies that the E.U. pays in order to keep them quiet while the work of economic restructuring takes place on the other. Leaving aside the problem of class though, there is also the problem of the character of the resistance itself. In much of the literature on globalization, resistance is taken as a somewhat unproblematic category. Even those theorists sensitive to the importance of class in the analysis of forces of globalization tend to posit forces and acts of resistance as a more or less dialectical reaction to the action of capital. In the case of Argolida, tactics that are cast as acts of resistance to forces of globalization have a complex and sometimes contradictory relation to the forces that ostensibly provoke them.

As we have seen, the active defrauding of subsidy programs has had the effect of reinforcing the surveillance and regulatory power of E.U. institutions while at the same time weakening the local farmers’ organizations. The process by which this has occurred is similar to that documented by Ferguson (1990) for development schemes in Lesotho, where the “failure” of development programs was nevertheless successful in both strengthening the Lesotho state, and a transnational regime of surveillance and regulation, and in de-politicizing development policy and local administration. In the case of Argolida, it is not simply a matter of development “experts” reifying and misreading local cultures for their own bureaucratic needs, but also a resistance among the farmers that serves to derail programs aimed at economic restructuring. The fact that this

resistance is widely attributed to a Greek “culture” of non-compliance and anti-authoritarianism helps to de-politicize the entire process. “Resistance” becomes deflected and ultimately harnessed to the interests of European capital.

The general lack of resistance to the spread of neo-liberal capitalism, despite its effect of greater income inequality has been widely noted in many parts of the world. Storper (2000) argues that this lack of resistance can be explained in terms of “positionality”. In Storper’s argument a growing consumer surplus, in the form of cheaper goods, and a broad tendency to redefine identity and status in terms of consumption has altered the “lived experience” of inequality under postmodern capitalism (see also Baudrillard 1998). Following Storper, we could explain the lack of active resistance on the part of Albanian workers in terms of both their increased contact with home communities through the technological construction of a diaspora as well as the higher status immigrants gain in their country of origin through their access to consumer goods and capital, i.e. their advantageous social position. Likewise, for Greek farmers, the dramatic increase in access to consumer goods over the last several decades through participation in global markets has offset the economic pain they have endured through the same process of global economic restructuring. Indeed, Greek farmers themselves often give such an analysis to explain their predicament.

Further, Storper calls on the metaphor of the “prisoner’s dilemma” (2000:399) to explain why the pervasive dissatisfaction and skepticism surrounding this process of consumer entanglement does not lead to active or organized resistance. The prisoner’s dilemma alludes to the common tactic of police to interrogate suspects separately. Despite the possibility that they will go free if they refuse to cooperate, suspects will

often confess and agree to testify against the others because they doubt the others' loyalty. In this sense the destruction of class-based organizations and solidarity and the elevation of consumer identities, especially as constructed through the individualistic experience of television, preclude resistance because individuals doubt that others will do the same.

The elevation of a consumerist logic among contemporary capitalist societies as an explanation of recent social transformations in Storper's analysis is similar to Collier's description of the ascendancy of "desire" as a disciplinary technique in rural Spanish communities. The growing predominance of a discourse of consumption as a framework for the construction of identity also has implications for processes of resistance, negotiation and accommodation in social relations under global neo-liberal capitalism. Put simply, the resistance of the *consumer* seems to be qualitatively different from the resistance of the *producer*. In the growing body of literature related to the anthropology of consumption there are two main theoretical tendencies regarding the interpretation of consumer resistance or rebellion. Drawing on the work of both Walter Benjamin and Bourdieu, some theorists, such as De Certeau (1984) and Miller (1995), view consumption as a process of negotiation where the subaltern agency of the consumer is able to deflect and resist the imposition and regulation of behavior from above and in the process challenge the hegemony of capitalist markets. Such an approach celebrates the rebellious '*flaneurs*' who carry on the struggle against capitalist exploitation as a new and self-conscious proletariat. Others, such as Frank (1997) and Klein (1999) have argued that consumer resistance has become institutionalized and commercialized under postmodern capitalism so that "[t]he countercultural idea has become capitalist orthodoxy, its hunger for transgression upon transgression now perfectly suited to an economic-

cultural regime that runs on ever-faster cyclings of the new..." (Frank 1997:34)-- a development evidenced by the widespread use of revolutionary slogans in advertising campaigns. From this perspective, consumer agency is more accurately seen as a manifestation of the neo-liberal technique of reproducing disciplinary regimes within the individual consumer.

My observations in Argolida bear out parts of both these theories. Consumerism has indeed become a major arena for challenging social hierarchy. Villagers today often pride themselves on their familiarity with the latest fashions and their access to the latest consumer goods. This has certainly contributed to a disruption of the traditional domination by urban elites. In addition, local residents pride themselves on their ability to produce a sort of "creolized" consumer culture whereby commodities are incorporated into village society in ways that bolster a sense of local, village identity. Early examples of this, as we have seen, were the music and fashion commodities that stimulated a local youth movement in the early 1970's that was largely a pirated form of a global urban phenomenon. It is important to note, however, that the effects of consumerism have been experienced differently by different segments of the population. In Argolida, the contradictions of consumer resistance is felt most acutely by older males, precisely those who benefited the most from earlier forms of class-based organized resistance. Women and youth, on the other hand, tend to experience new forms of consumerism as empowering, enabling them to escape earlier forms of kinship and gender exploitation. There is little doubt that consumerism has had a great effect on disrupting local inequalities, both between and within villages. At the same time, growing commodity consumption has entangled local communities into new webs of domination and

exploitation, particularly as it has brought the villages and households into more direct relations with transnational markets.

Most theories of consumption center their analysis on the consumer and the point of consumption. It seems clear, though, that whatever the importance of consumer agency in deflecting and/or resisting the hegemony of capitalism, consumption also carries with it unseen transnational relations of production. In early capitalism for example, the consumption of commodities such as sugar (Mintz 1985) and calico (Mukerjee 1983) by the working classes of industrial nations was an important way that the capitalist transformation of social relations, both national and global, was accomplished. In much of the contemporary capitalist core today the relationship between commodity consumption and the transnational relations of production that feed that consumption is difficult to discern given the scale of global trade and the demise of formal colonial systems. As Roseberry (1996) has shown in the case of specialty coffee consumption, however, these relations persist. In Argolida such relations are easy to spot. The increased commodity consumption of rural Greeks, which provides an arena of resistance to exploitative relations within the national and local community as it simultaneously implicates Greeks in transnational capitalist markets, is both subsidized by and legitimizes the exploitation of immigrant labor.

One of the most important transformations wrought by globalized capitalism at the end of the 20th century in Argolida has been the transformation of the primary arena of resistance from production to consumption. As class-based organizations have declined and the labor force increasingly marginalized, resistance has come to be framed in a discourse of consumption. Structurally, the “resistance” of villagers as consumers

rather than producers puts them in a weaker position, and in fact forces their collusion with capital, because their consumption is more dependent on the transnational markets and world-systemic processes of contemporary capitalism. In short, their resistance is more easily co-opted because it is highly dependent on the very system that they seek to resist. This underlies the deep sense of helplessness and dissatisfaction that many villagers feel in their struggle against the neo-liberal tendencies of the E.U. regime, and why, despite widespread dissatisfaction there are few serious challenges to either the spread of neo-liberal capitalism or E.U. integration.

What can be framed as “resistance” to globalization in Argolida thus contains a contradictory dynamic. The nationalism and concepts of national identity that provide the discourse for resistance against the transnational forces of globalization at the same time facilitate the integration of local economies into the global. The successful co-optation of local forms of resistance in this manner presents a stark difference from earlier periods when global economies relied on military force, in addition to economic and cultural exchanges, to carry out their objectives. Within this difference we can discern the novelty of neo-liberal forms of government and their value in the construction of the new global political economy. An important element in the success of neo-liberal forms of government is the ability to produce disciplinary techniques within subjects, rather than to simply impose them from outside. In other words, it is resistance itself that is instrumental to the hegemony of global capitalism and a major technique by which local communities have become integrated into transnational markets.

The emergence of global capitalism at the end of the 20th century in some ways marks a shift in the political economy of capitalist world systems. Capital flows and

commodity production and consumption have changed their relationship to the structure and processes of the nation-state. Under the neo-liberal form of contemporary capitalism that has emerged as result of a re-articulation of the nation-state, capitalist markets have become consolidated through a discourse of market rationality in which the market stands for society itself. This discourse of neo-liberal governmentality, even without the complete implementation of neo-liberal forms of governance, has been very effective in de-politicizing the state and in providing an aura of inevitability about the spread and utility of the capitalist market. However, the spread of capitalist markets also creates intense contradictions that in the past were partly resolved through the nation-state and the production of national identity. Put simply, the “free” markets of neo-liberal capitalism still require the production of “unfree” or fettered labor. The capitalist system, no matter how much ideological dressing is applied, still requires the reproduction of social inequality as the basis for the extraction of surplus labor. This inequality is being enforced not just through the non-economic fetters of social identity, but also by a fundamentally different relation to the state through practices of citizenship and national identity. Today, consumers’ demands for an ever wider range of goods at accessible prices has intensified this requirement and diffused its enforcement throughout social classes. It is no longer just the owners who directly benefit, but consumers as well. Global capitalism has managed to “out-source” much of the reproduction of social inequality to the subjects of global domination. Thus, paradoxically, the dark underside of the liberalization of the Greek countryside is the development and spread of a racist nationalism, a privatized production of social inequality that serves to construct new, and arguably more heavily exploited working classes from the ashes of the old.

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