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PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION--
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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE:

DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH

AUTHORIZATION - 1961-1968

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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To CAROL

Whose love, friendship and assistance
made it possible for me to finish

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s the United States spent nearly 565 billion dollars on defense, maintained the world's largest standing army of over three million men, fought a war in Southeast Asia, affirmed through treaty commitments the defense of over 50 countries, and operated 340 foreign bases.¹ According to Congressional Quarterly Service this situation was an outgrowth of post 1945 events:

For the first time in American history, national security became a dominant peacetime concern after World War II, in the face of two unforeseen developments. The rise of a hostile, aggressive, and increasingly powerful Soviet Union bent on extending sway of communism; and a technological revolution in weaponry marked by the advent of the hydrogen bomb and the inter-continental ballistic missile. Together these forces impelled the United States² to commit itself to defend much of the non-Communist world . . .

In fiscal 1969 the United States government spent 87.4 billion dollars or 8.6% of its Gross National Product on military preparedness.³

¹Congressional Quarterly Background, Global Defense - U.S. Military Commitments Abroad (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, September 1969), pp. 1, 38. and U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Report no. 522 - Authorizing Appropriations for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength, and for other Purposes, 91st Cong., 1st sess., September 26, 1969, p. 7. (Hereafter referred to as Report no. 522).

²Congressional Quarterly Services, Congress and the Nation 1945-1964 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 23.

³These figures do not reflect veterans' payments and interest on the debt to pay off past wars. U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Report no. 522, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 7.

These developments have created two distinct trends. First, the executive branch has become almost totally responsible for national security policy. The President and his advisors initiate policy, and the Congress is expected to go along. Even in those areas of traditional Congressional supremacy, such as the right to declare war, the actions of the President have emasculated the Congress¹ value. The second development is the emergence of the military as an important participant in all aspects of American life.

The military because of their presumed possession of "inside knowledge" of circumstances necessarily withheld from the public, because of the vast prestige of their leaders in the postwar period, because of the inescapable necessity of consulting the general staff relative to the security factor in high policy, and because of the unprecedentedly large appropriations made for the Armed Forces in peacetime - occupying a position of power and influence never before approached in American history.²

Traditionally, the Congress has played a limited role in matters of national security. Usually they have refused to get involved in determining military strategies.³ Congress' major concern in relation to national security was the placement of military installations; their interest was not which expenditures were requested but rather which district would be the beneficiary.⁴

¹James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 174-188. and Dorothy B. James, The Contemporary Presidency (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 138-174.

²Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 242-243, and Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1962), pp. 4-51, 90-114. and Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 277-294, 306.

³Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," Foreign Affairs, vol. 38 (June 1960), 287.

⁴Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 400.

Since the end of World War II Congress has become more involved with matters of defense. Huntington claims that the legislative branch has an important role in national defense.

The most prominent congressional role is that of prodder or goad of the executive on behalf of specific programs or activities. With the executive as the decision maker, Congress has become the lobbyist. Congressional groups engage in sustained campaigns of pressure and persuasion to produce the desired strategic decisions on the part of the executive, just as in other areas the administration uses pressure and persuasion to move its legislation through Congress.¹

However, most scholars believe that Congress only plays a limited role in defense policy. Janowitz in the Professional Soldier and Kolodziej in the Uncommon Defense and Congress 1945-1963 argue that Congress' role is restricted to negativism and line item investigation and that questions of strategy and weapon alternatives are ignored. The Congress cannot initiate; it can only react.² A few years ago in a much quoted article, Lewis Dexter came to the rather extreme conclusion that Congress had no significant role in the formulation of military policies. The author found the typical member's attitude to be, "who are we to say no to the military?"³

One way the Congress tries to participate in the formulation of defense policy is through committees. Individual committees develop an expertise in their policy area and thus become the major bulwark that Congress has against executive domination. As Charles Clapp in

¹Samuel Huntington, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38 (June 1960), 287.

²Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 354-360. and Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress 1945-1963 (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), pp. 419-452.

³Lewis Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, 2nd edition, edited by Robert Peabody and Nelson Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 184.

The Congressman reports:

The volume and complexity of legislative proposals, the strong tradition of deferring to the specialists, the search for ways to reconcile often conflicting pressures on congressmen, the very size of Congress -- all conspire to enhance the authority of committee action. According to a congressional committee study, 90 percent of all the work of the Congress on legislative matters is carried out in committee.¹

The Congress has two full committees and two subcommittees which deal with the subject of national security policy. It is the purpose of this dissertation to investigate how one committee of Congress participates in national security policy. What part does the House Armed Services Committee play in defense research and procurement authorizations? In 1946 the Legislative Reorganization Act combined the old House Naval and Military Affairs Committee into a single unit known as the Armed Services Committee. The committee, because of the enormous growth of the Armed Services, in terms of manpower and weapon allocations, has become one of the most important and prestigious in the House. It has often attempted to protect congressional interests from what it considered unwarranted Presidential encroachments.

Prior to 1961 the Armed Services Committee was not involved in the Department of Defense's yearly requests for weapons. In the House of Representatives, the military subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee handled these requests whereas the Armed Services Committee spent most of its time on matters of military construction and personnel. Under the so-called "Russell Amendment," number 412b to the Military Construction Authorization Act for fiscal 1960, the

¹Charles Clapp, The Congressman (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1963), p. 213.

committee was granted yearly oversight over some of the military's weapon requests.¹ This oversight or "watchdog" power means the committee has the right to investigate continually certain of the administration's weapon requests. If the Department of Defense wants the same airplane the following year it still has to justify its needs before the authorization committee.² Since the passage of this amendment the House Armed Services Committee's power has been expanded, and it now has oversight over almost all defense procurement and research authorizations. The enlargement of Armed Services' jurisdiction has had a tremendous effect on the committee's workload.

The committee's relationship with the Department of Defense could take many forms. As is the case for the House Appropriations Committee, Armed Services could act as "protector of the Purse." In this capacity the defense oriented committee would be skeptical of all military programs, require the "brass" to justify every weapon request, and at every opportunity to cut funds.³ Another role would be as an initiator of policy. The House Armed Service Committee would develop its own independent approach to defense policy and weapon acquisition. Under these circumstances the Executive and Congressional policies could be diametrically opposed. The third possibility and the one which applies to most other House Committees is for Armed

¹For a thorough discussion of section 412b and the weapons for which the committee has an annual oversight function, see the first section of chapter six.

²Ernest Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary Role (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 117.

³Richard F. Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 264-414.

Services to act as a client group for the federal agency under its jurisdiction. Armed Services would promote the policies, procurement requests, and offer support and protection to the military. This dissertation will determine how the House Armed Services Committee has applied its new power.

In order to facilitate an understanding of the actions which the committee members have taken, it is necessary to know how the committee functions. As has been indicated by many political scientists, the working arrangements of a committee have considerable impact on its legislative output.¹ For this reason a significant portion of the study will focus on the internal operation of the House Armed Services Committee. The Committee's norms, rules, work routines, the roles of its chairman, sub-committee chairman, ranking minority member, staff, and new members will be analyzed in order to understand the type of environment within which policy is formulated.

Equally important is what type of Congressmen are attracted to the committee. The history of Congress reveals that Congressmen seek out committees which are either important to their districts or personally interesting to them. The type of individuals who are members of a committee may have an enormous impact on its legislative program. Dean Acheson, after appearing before Congressional committees for many years, came to the conclusion

¹Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades of Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 17-28, John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means," and Richard F. Fenno, "The Appropriations Committee as a Political System," New Perspective on the House of Representatives, edited by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, pp. 81-105, 125-174, and William L. Morrow, Congressional Committees (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), pp. 63-150.

That each committee, tends to develop a life of its own, in which members hold individual rather than strictly party attitudes, and where the influence of strong and set character is great.¹

J. Leiper Freeman, who has written about the operation of committees and the federal government, stated:

Beyond the individual committee personalities, the major enduring social characteristics of the membership of substantive committee dealings with a particular area of policy are helpful to an understanding of the member's behavior in policy-making. Many standing legislative committees tend, in varying degrees, to attract over the years a predominance of legislators with certain common values . . . For whatever the reasons, the factors are important ones for which to look in an attempt to understand long-term trends in the pattern of a subsystem.²

Three important variables in determining how a member of Congress will act towards a committee's workload are the socio-economic makeup of his district, his background, and his ideology.³ Anyone of these factors or a combination of all three can affect how a member relates to committee work. Members who either have districts which are affected by defense spending, or an illustrious career in the Armed Services, or believes national security is the nation's number one priority are more than likely to support the goals and aspirations of the Department of Defense. From another perspective, members whose districts are unaffected by defense spending, had only a limited or no military career, and believe the urban crisis is the nation's most critical problem, are likely to judge the Pentagon's actions or requests more critically.

¹Dean Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), pp. 24-25.

²Leiper Freeman, The Political Process (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), pp. 50-51.

³Ideology as operationalized in this work is defined as a manner of perceiving, thinking about, or acting upon problems or events from an a priori set of assumptions.

Prior to 1966 there was little difference in the way that liberal and conservative congressmen perceived and acted upon Department of Defense requests. Conservatives who in domestic affairs believe in government restraint and limited spending and liberals who advocate a larger federal role and increased funding viewed this issue from the same vantage point. With the exception of two or three members per term (who often had different political philosophies) the House of Representatives approved of Pentagon requests. Since 1966 because of the frustration over the Vietnam war, spiraling cost of weapons, Pentagon mismanagement, and the crisis nature of urban problems a large group of liberal congressmen have re-evaluated their positions towards the Department of Defense. These men who probably number even less than the membership of the Democratic study group want a re-establishment of United States priorities and a more thorough and systematic evaluation of defense spending. They have spoken out against waste and inefficiency and some voted against the 1969 Defense Authorization Act. In reaction to this situation, the most conservative members of Congress have rallied to the support of the military. They view an attack on the military service as a threat to the power and prestige of the United States. In word and through their votes they have attempted to maintain the traditional prerogatives of the Department of Defense.

Some members of the press and mass media have seemingly alleged that members of Armed Services are extremely "pro-military." According to these sources the committee is composed of large numbers of highly conservative congressmen and a handful of liberal representatives all of whom actively endorse Pentagon requests. The backgrounds,

districts, and ideologies of the members are considered to be the motivating factors in the positions they have adopted.

As used in this dissertation a person who is "pro-military" believes that the nation's number one and at times only priority is defense. Unlike domestic issues which can be debated and argued about, Armed Service matters are in need of resolution and too important to be viewed in terms of narrow partisan considerations. The need to rely on experts, the technical language which is employed, the lack of information, and the life and death quality of national security programs predisposes these men to support Pentagon proposals even when they disagree with minor aspects of the program. Furthermore, even though the Defense Department is expected to be run efficiently some waste and inefficiency must be tolerated in order to insure that the overall fitness and power of the Armed Services isn't impaired.

It is also expected that the professional as opposed to civilian military should receive the greatest allegiance.¹ An individual with a "pro-military" viewpoint accepts the idea that military men are great patriots, have sacrificed for the nation in the past and will continue to do so in the future, and are competent experts in their field of specialization. Since the man in uniform is restricted from speaking in his own behalf, a "pro-military" congressman believes it is his duty to protect the professional military from the press and executive superiors. According to these members, anybody who is willing to shift present spending priorities, to challenge the military's

¹The professional military as used in this study refers to those individuals who have made the military their career. The civilian elites or civilian superiors are officials who have been appointed by the President and are ultimately responsible for coordinating defense policy.

requests and actively expose waste, cost overruns, and inefficiency is considered anti-military.

It is hypothesized that the overwhelming majority of Armed Service members are "pro-military." That the members because of either their districts, backgrounds or ideologies or a combination of all three are highly supportive of the Department of Defense in general and the professional military in particular.

The purpose of all these hypotheses is to understand how the House Armed Services Committee functions and performs its authorization task. The study will investigate and analyze how one part of the legislative branch is involved with national security. The dissertation will be relevant and useful to any scholar interested in the operation of Congressional Committees and their role in making governmental policy. Hopefully, this research will be the starting point for an investigation of Congress' role in the formulation of national security policy.

Background for the Study

In 1885 Woodrow Wilson stated in Congressional Government that, "It is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee room is Congress at work."¹ Little has occurred over the last eighty years to change this observation. In fact, three postwar developments have increased the validity of Wilson's observation.² The growth of

¹Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Meridian Books, 1964), p. 60.

²On this point see Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy (New York:

the executive departments, the emergence of the welfare state, and the increasing complexities of problems and concomitant demand for expertise have caused the Congress to become even more attached to the committee system. Each committee holds hearings, investigations, and discussions, so that a majority of its members can either accept, modify, or reject a specific proposal, or in a few cases draft legislation and introduce it for ratification on the floor of Congress.

The important changes in legislation usually take place in committee with the House acting as a ratifying body. Even in those rare cases when the House as a whole modifies or vetoes the committee's legislative recommendations its actions are almost always the outgrowth of views expressed in committee by a minority sector of members.¹

Despite the importance of committees and their impact on the operation of the Congress, the literature about them is relatively limited. Until twenty years ago the only in-depth studies were Alan Westphal, The House Committee on Foreign Affairs (New York: 1942), and Eleanor E. Dennison, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Palo Alto: 1942).² Both authors, employing traditional research techniques,

David McKay, 1963), pp. 148-174; Holbert S. Carrol, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (New York: American Book Stratford Press, 1958), pp. 26-36; and Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 23.

¹Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle -- A Study in Social Combat (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 309.

²During this period of time an excellent article appeared on the House Appropriations Committee and its oversight function. See Arthur MacMahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse," Political Science Quarterly Report, Vol. 58 (June 1943), 161-190; 380-414.

For the reasons behind the scarcity of studies on committees see Richard F. Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little Brown

wrote descriptive historical studies of the operation and legislative output of the two committees.

Since 1950 there have been a number of studies which concentrate either on all phases of a congressional committee or one of their special properties.¹ During this period of time the three most important studies have been James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), Richard F. Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), and John Manley, The House Ways and Means Committee (Boston: Little Brown, 1970). These three

and Co., 1966), p. xvii.

¹The literature on general and specific aspects of particular committees is so extensive that space does not permit a total listing. The articles in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives edited by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson Polsby, second edition (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969) contain some excellent material on the Ways and Means, Appropriations, Agriculture, Armed Services, and Labor and Education Committees. Charles Clapp, The Congressman - His Work as He Sees It (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1963) has a plethora of information in the words of congressmen about the operation of the committee system. In a more theoretical sense William L. Morrow, Congressional Committees (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), discusses the purpose and function that committees serve. The author employs various systems, theories as well as models, to validate his points.

A number of doctoral dissertations were produced which dealt entirely with the operation and legislative output of congressional committees. Those by Robinson and Manley will be mentioned throughout the study. Other studies were by Evert Felix Cataldo, "The House Committee on Ways and Means 1964-1965," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 1965, and David Farnsworth, "The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Volume 49 (The University of Illinois Press, Urbana 1961).

The following sources have excellent bibliographies about congress, the committee system, and committees per se. William J. Keefe, The American Legislative Process -- Congress and the States (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Nelson Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades of Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy, second edition (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967); and Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966).

scholars attempted to understand the function, operation, and legislative output of their respective committees through both traditional as well as interview research gathering techniques. Discarding the historical approach to understanding committee action, the authors investigated how norms, membership, roles and expectations affected the operation and legislative function of their committees.¹

The Function of Congressional Committees

Committees are expected to perform two main tasks. The first and most well known is to pass legislation. As George Galloway in The History of the House of Representatives states,

. . . the standing committees of the House have acquired power over the years to receive legislative proposals, messages, petitions, and memorials, on matters within their defined jurisdiction; to test and act when and where they deem it advisable during session (by special leave) recesses, and adjourned periods; to send for persons and papers; to take testimony and to make expenditures; to conduct authorized investigations and to report by bill or otherwise upon any matter within their jurisdiction; to oversee the execution of the laws; to certify contumacious witnesses for contempt; to adopt rules and appoint subcommittees; to report in certain cases at any time or not to report.²

Although most of today's legislation is drafted in the executive departments, the committees still have a significant role. The committee evaluates the executive proposal and whenever it feels it is necessary, offers modifications, adjustments, and rejections. Usually, when the

¹For an in-depth discussion of these three committees see Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades of Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). Robert L. Peabody in analyzing the literature concerning Congress since 1950 spends a great deal of time evaluating the contribution that Fenno, Manley, and Robinson have made to the study of congressional committees, pp. 19-22.

²George P. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1961), p. 79.

committee approves a piece of legislation it states its reasons in a committee report. Once the bill reaches the floor of the House, it becomes the job of the committee members to pass it with a minimum of alterations. If it is necessary for the bill to be discussed in conference committee, the senior members of the respective House and Senate committees undertake to reach an accord.

The second task of committees is to act as "watchdogs" towards the executive agencies within their jurisdictions. The committees attempt to perform this task through the use of professional committee staffs as well as the development of experts within their ranks. Each committee contains senior members with vast knowledge of the executive agencies within its area of study.¹

Early in our history committees were the creatures of the House leaders. They decided how the committees would go about their business and what issues would be studied. The committees were organized on an ad hoc basis and were dissolved at the conclusion of their work. However, by 1816 the standing or permanent committee system was established and within a decade the relationship between committees and the House became similar to its present-day form.²

From that period of time to the present the numbers of standing committees have varied widely. This fluctuation reflects the

¹Professor Griffith suggests that this should be the main task of committees. Ernest Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary Role, pp. 224-235. See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1964) for the limits of this method.

²George P. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives, pp. 75-79. See also Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966).

constant emergence of new committees and the dismemberment or modification of those units which have existed for some time. The last major reorganization of the committee system was in 1946 with the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act.¹ This monumental piece of legislation was designed to streamline the Congress so it could maintain its power in the post-war era. The changes it recommended became necessary because the House had created too many committees, with overlapping jurisdiction, which were unable to supervise adequately the executive branch. The Act combined the forty-eight standing committees of the House into nineteen, establishing for each a fixed area of jurisdiction. Rules for the operation of committees were formalized and each unit was permitted to hire a fairly large professional staff. The hope of the Act's founders was to enable the Congress to perform its legislative function and "watchdog" role in a more thorough and productive manner.²

The most important member of every committee is usually its chairman. The chairman has the potential for wielding great power. He has an enormous range of formal and informal prerogatives.³

¹In this century previous reorganizations of committees took place in 1909 and 1927. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy -- The House of Representatives, p. 151.

²U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Hearings - The Organization of Congress, H. Cong. Res. 18, 79th Cong., 1st sess., March 13-June 29, 1945, and George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), pp. 591-623.

³An individual becomes chairman through the seniority principle. In simplest terms, seniority is a custom which bestows power on those members of the majority party who have the longest length of continuous service on that committee. See George Goodman, "The Seniority System in Congress," American Political Science Review, Vol. 53 (June 1959), 412-436, for a review of its history.

The overwhelming majority of the House, although they may not

Every chairman perceives his office in a different fashion. Some are interested in running a democratic committee, while others desire to handle it in a dictatorial manner. Many chairmen want to control the committee's legislative output whereas others prefer to decentralize the committee and delegate responsibility to subcommittee chairmen. Despite the importance of committee chairmen, both in terms of their impact on legislation as well as their operation on the committee, the literature on them is limited.¹ The House Armed Services Committee has had two strong chairmen, Carl Vinson (D, Ga.) and Mendel Rivers (D, S.C.). These men and their leadership offer an illustration of how a chairman operates a committee and affects its legislation.

fully endorse seniority, believe that it is the most useful system available. See the study by Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 77, 80, 86-90, in which the authors in studying congressional attitudes reached the same conclusion.

The present method of selecting chairmen, according to its supporters, is automatic, precise, and without prejudice. Furthermore, it enables every member to know exactly where he stands and has the advantage of getting everyone down to work with a minimum amount of hostility. Emanuel Celler, "The Seniority Rule in Congress," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 14 (March 1961), 164. Charles Clapp, in The Congressman, reports that some members feel, "that opposition to selecting chairmen by seniority is concentrated among those who write about Congress, many of whom, it is said, possess little understanding of it," p. 227.

For the most recent unsuccessful attempt by liberal members to modify seniority see The New York Times, July 28, 1970, p. 1.

²On this point see Ralph K. Huitt, "Internal Distribution of Influence in the Senate," The Congress and America's Future, edited by David B. Truman (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 90.

Methodology

This dissertation was undertaken in the following manner. In exploring the literature on the internal operation of the House Armed Services Committee or of its individual members it was found that almost every study was either impressionistic in content or emphasized the personal characteristics and habits of the chairman. No one attempted to understand how the Committee actually functions. It was believed that the most productive way to learn about Armed Services was to interview those members who belong, or belonged, to it. Thus, interviews were conducted with as many congressmen who served on the House Armed Services Committee as was possible. To obtain the interviews this writer followed the suggestions which are outlined by James Robinson in Congress and American Foreign Policy.¹ Three trips to Washington, D.C. were taken between March and July 1969 for a total of four weeks. During that time interviews were arranged with twenty-five members of the present Committee, four past members, and five staff officials.² Eleven individuals who either as congressmen, staff personnel, or reporters had a familiarity with military affairs in general and the House Armed Services in particular were also consulted. Finally, in New York City, additional interviews were obtained with a retired ex-member of Armed Services and two former members of Congress,

¹James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-Making, 1st edition (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1962), pp. 222-234. For further information on how this writer obtained interviews and the check lists he used see Appendices A-D.

²For purpose of analysis the present Committee is considered the one that operated during the 90th Congress -- 1967-1968. Included in the group of twenty-five members of the present Committee were five individuals who were not appointed until the 91st Congress. Of these

who had dealt with the committee.

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured, open-ended manner without taking notes. It was mentioned before the interview began that the member's comments and answers would be anonymously recorded. In terms of Congressmen who sat on the Committee the writer would begin the meeting by asking them why they joined the House Armed Services Committee. From that point on the questions and answers depended upon the drift of the conversation; interesting topics and ideas were explored as they arose. It was felt that these techniques would enable the members to speak in the freest possible atmosphere.¹

The second source of information is a more traditional research technique. It is based on written and recorded information as well as the statistical codification of pertinent data. This type of material is available in the primary and secondary source material which either the committee itself or reporters on the subject have produced.

In every session of Congress, the Armed Services Committee undergoes a change in membership. Those members who, either through death, retirement, election defeat, or a desire to switch have left the Committee, must be replaced by new recruits. Thus, every two years, or eleven times in its history, the membership of Armed Services has been altered. This dissertation, wherever documentation is available, will attempt to do an in-depth analysis of the membership, rules, hearings, and organization of the Armed Services Committee

five, two, Mr. Foreman (R, N.M.) and Mr. Mollohan (D, W.Va.) had served on the Committee during previous terms.

¹For a similar approach and the reasons for it see Richard F. Fenno, pp. xxvii-xxviii, and Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, pp. 28-34.

during the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congress. The Armed Services Committee of the 80th Congress was chosen because the first year of any organization is always important for establishing the general working arrangements, internal norms, and precedents for the future. The committees during the 85th and 90th Congress were selected because it was felt that a ten year span offered a long enough time period to observe if any significant changes had taken place in the membership, rules, and organizations of the committee. These three committees were led by different individuals and offer an additional opportunity to see how each chairman molded his group.

Most congressmen who were questioned about it believe that a committee's membership is the most important variable in determining how it operates. Regardless of the rules, chairman, or staff, if the committee possesses certain types of people it can channel legislation in a direction of its choice. Thus, the backgrounds, reasons for joining the committee, important socio-economic variables about their districts, voting records, are all relevant to the operation of Armed Services. If the membership has a "pro-military" orientation, they will react quite differently than if they perceive events from an "anti-military" vantage point. The study will enable this reviewer to understand what impact membership has on the committee's operations and legislative output.

The investigation of selected committee hearings will be undertaken. It is obvious that committee hearings as a research tool have a number of drawbacks. Some members edit the transcript, change material, and ask questions and receive answers off the record. Additional problems arise in the case of Armed Services because the

committee usually meets in closed session. Eventually the committee issues a censored public record which has been edited for security reasons. Under these circumstances the documents omit a small percentage of information which is usually highly technical in nature. Nonetheless, the hearings are a useful research tool; they are one portion of the committee's operation that becomes a permanent record.¹

On two occasions the Armed Services Committee has issued committee reports which expressed "the sense" of the committee as to their role in national security policy. These documents as well as any material in the Congressional Record which has bearing on the topic will be used.

The Congressional Quarterly Almanac will be employed for statistical material. In chapter seven it is intended to measure the monetary authorizations of Armed Services in national security as compared to the House, Senate Armed Services Committee, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, and the Department of Defense. These figures were obtained from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac which lists the allotted amounts of money for each session of Congress. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac will also be used for data on the backgrounds of particular congressmen that may not be available in the Congressional Directory.

¹Jack David Fleer, "Congressional Committees and the Making of Military Policy: Authorization and Appropriation for Major Weapons Systems in the Legislative Process," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 1963), pp. 11-13, 59-60, 87-88. See also David Amos Smeltzer, "The Role of Alternatives in Congressional Decision Making: The Role of Committee Hearings," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1964).

Chapter two, which is concerned with the districts of Armed Services members, will rely heavily on the Congressional District Data book. This source gives a detailed picture of the ethnic and economic makeup of Congressional Districts during the 88th Congress.

Organization of the Study

The study will be organized in the following manner. Chapters two and three will concentrate on the type of individuals who joined Armed Services, the districts they represent, and the overall prestige of the committee. It is believed that congressmen's actions are motivated by a number of considerations. Two of the most important are the socio-economic characteristics of their districts and their own personal backgrounds. If one knows the background and district the congressman represents, one is in a good position to understand his action.¹ Chapter four will deal with how the members perceive the committee and how it functions. The chapter will describe how the membership's allegiance to the norm of nonpartisanship affects the committee's operation and authorizations. Chapter five concentrates on the role and impact of the chairman on the Armed Services Committee. The chairman is more than first among equals -- he is an individual who wields tremendous power. The committee is continuously dealing with highly technical, difficult, and often secret material. Only the chairman, through the privilege of his office and control over his staff, has total access to all information.

¹On this point see: Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 189-219, Charles Clapp, The Congressman, Lewis A. Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituents (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960),

Chapter six will concentrate on how the Armed Services Committee interacts with the rest of Congress. Its relations with the Senate Armed Services Committee will be investigated and an appraisal of the more successful one in Conference Committee will be offered. The last part of this section will investigate how much money the committee has authorized for procurement and research compared to the Defense Department's legislative requests. In his massive study of the House Appropriations Committee, Fenno discovered that the Senate Appropriations Committee, as well as the Senate, always appropriated more funds for federal programs than did their House counterparts. Unfortunately, Fenno's study did not investigate the appropriations which were made by both bodies in the area of national security.¹ It would be expected, based on Fenno's work, that the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate would authorize more funds for defense spending than their House counterparts. This hypothesis is based on the constituency factors which Fenno found to be the reason that Senators were more likely to allocate funds for various federal programs. Since this did not occur, reasons will be suggested as to why this generalization proved invalid. The chapter will also reveal how the committee operates on the floor of the House, and why it succeeds in passing its legislative programs.

Chapter seven will discuss how the Armed Services Committee interacts with the Defense Department in formulating legislative authorizations; how the operation of the committee has changed since 412b went into effect. One section will analyze what weapon system

pp. 11-67, 218-242.

¹Richard Fenno, pp. 574-575.

particularly interested and earned the support of the committee members. What was there about the B-70 bomber, nuclear frigates, and Nike X missiles that won the unswerving support, despite the civilian Pentagon's opposition, of most of the members? Why is it that in a dispute between the military and civilian branches of the Pentagon the committee always sides with the former? Chapter eight will conclude the study by evaluating the major findings and speculating about the committee's future.

CHAPTER II

RECRUITMENT PRACTICES AND PRESTIGE OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Armed Services is concerned with some of the crucial foreign and domestic issues of the day. Through the authorization of defense programs the committee is involved with approximately 30% of the federal budget. The committee not only evaluates the Pentagon's weapon requests but it is also involved in the placement and dismemberment of military installations. On a committee like Post Office or Veterans Affairs, the individual congressman works within a rather narrowly defined legislative and investigatory jurisdiction. On Armed Services a representative can involve himself in any phase of national security, the material covered being vast, the issues complex, and the stakes high.

The members are involved in decisions which affect the social well-being of their community and country. Yet the process of decision-making is made in a relatively tension-free nonpartisan atmosphere. With the exception of the ABM issue no member interviewed ever received more than a limited number of letters concerning aspects of military policy.¹ The Committee affords most of its members an opportunity to do their job with a minimal amount of

¹Committee members, as do other members of Congress, get a substantial amount of mail concerning selective service matters and the personal problems of those constituents who are in uniform.

community pressure. As one Democrat from a traditional Republican district stated,

I was a complete freak. No reason in the world why I should have been elected. I decided to get on a nice safe committee, one where I could relax and be unobtrusive. I thought Armed Services fit the bill . . . ¹

Not only is Armed Services a safe place politically but it is an easy Committee to serve on. A member who does not like controversy or ideological battles can find a relatively quiet atmosphere at Armed Services. As one senior Democrat stated,

I was on Labor and Education and I would have been chairman. However, when an opening appeared on Armed Services I decided to get off. Our meetings were too hectic and nerve wracking. They were regular shouting matches. I wanted a committee which was quiet.

Those issues which do generate controversy are almost always over monetary matters; the members disagree about how much to fund a program rather than its utility. When a dispute occurs over substantive matters the factions are not divided along party lines for reasons which will be explained in chapter four. On these occasions a nearly unanimous majority is formed around the chairman and a handful of opponents constitute the minority. ²

As students of Congress know, it is not possible for every representative to get on the committee of his choice. A great deal has been written about the process by which individuals seek to obtain committee assignments. ³ Political scientists have discovered that many variables may affect the individual's chances of success.

¹This quote and others like it were recorded in accordance with the procedure described in chapter one. They are, as far as humanly possible, a faithful and accurate rendition of what individuals interviewed for this study actually said.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

³For example see Nicholas Masters, "Committee Assignments in

These factors are the congressman's district, section of the country, seniority, safeness of his seat, ideology, personality, role of the chairman and ranking minority member, role of the House leader, and personal contacts. It is the purpose of this chapter to understand how the committee solves its recruitment problems. How do the House leaders fill the openings on Armed Services and with what effect? Do the procedures they use benefit any group or section of the country? What effect does the process have upon the committee's legislative responsibilities? The concluding part of the section will analyze whether or not Armed Services is a prestige committee. A committee's prestige and importance is directly related to the type of members which it attracts. Congressmen who are contended with their assignments and believe they are working on a significant committee tend to produce a more thorough legislative program.¹ The prestige of a committee also influences its work norms and actions on the floor of the House.²

In every session of Congress, Armed Services undergoes the process of committee replacement. Through retirement, death, election defeat, membership switches, or changes in the size of the committee, Armed Services expect to gain approximately seven new members every two years. This information is available in TABLE 2.1. The

the House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (1961), 345-357; and Charles Clapp, pp. 183-213.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses. See also John F. Bibby and Roger Davidson, On Capitol Hill (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 183-186.

²Richard Fenno, pp. 82-85, and John Bibby and Richard Davidson, On Capitol Hill, pp. 172-173.

addition of 13 new Democrats during the 89th Congress was a direct result of the Johnson landslide which brought to Washington an extremely large number of Democrats. Throughout the committee's history

^{a,b}
TABLE 2.1.--Number of new members by party 80th through the 91st Congress

Congress Dem. Rep. Size of Comm.				Congress Dem. Rep. Size of Comm.			
80th	0	0	33	86th	6	1	37
81st	9	0	33	87th	3	4	37
82nd	2	5	36	88th	4	1	37
83rd	2	4	36	89th	13	0	37
84th	4	2	37	90th	0	4	40
85th	3	5	37	91st	5	3	40

^aThis table and others like it were created from the information listed in U.S., Congress, Congressional Directory, 80th through 90th Congresses, 1947-1969, and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Volumes 3-25, 1947-1969.

^b12 terms divided into 82 appointees equals 6.82 per term.

a substantial number of freshman Congressmen have been appointed to fill committee openings. Quite often they represent districts or have had personal backgrounds which have been intimately involved with the military. Since 1949 when the committee began to recruit new members (in 1947 the committee was created from the membership of the old Military and Naval Affairs Committees) the number of freshman appointees has varied from one to seven new members a term with an average of approximately 2.5 (see TABLE 2.2).

TABLE 2.3 reveals that over the years the Democrats are more likely to appoint freshmen to the committee than the Republicans. The Democrats have appointed 43% of their new members from the freshman class whereas the Republicans have appointed 30%. This indicates

^a
TABLE 2.2.--Number of freshmen assigned each Congress by party

Congress.	Dem.	Rep.	Congress	Dem.	Rep.
80th	0	0	86th	5	0
81st	3	0	87th	1	3
82nd	0	1	88th	1	1
83rd	0	1	89th	7	0
84th	2	0	90th	0	2
85th	2	0	91st	1	1

^a12 terms divided into 31 new members equals 2.58 members per term.

that Republicans are likely to perceive the committee as having more prestige. However, the difference might be explained by the enormous increases in House Democratic membership in 1959 and 1965. Since those two years the Democrats had an unusually large freshman class,

TABLE 2.3.--Percentage of freshmen appointed by the parties over the committee's history

Party	Total appointments	Total freshmen	Percentage of freshmen
Democrats	51	22	43%
Republicans	30	9	30%

the leadership was required to appoint more first termers. The freshmen who were appointed to the Committee reacted quite favorably. As TABLE 2.4 reveals, of the nine Republicans and twenty-two Democrats appointed in their first term, only three decided to leave.

One is unable to determine precisely why these twenty-eight individuals remained. Undoubtedly, to the majority of these individuals, Armed Services was a good Committee assignment. In fact, many

TABLE 2.4.--How freshmen reacted to the House Armed Services Committee by party

	Democrats	Republicans
Remained on the Committee while still in the House	19	9
Left the Committee while still in the House	3	0

of them desired to join the Committee and were lucky enough to be appointed in their freshman year. However, a number of representatives stayed because of unfavorable circumstances. Some remained because they could not move to a more desirable committee whereas others accepted the status quo because of the operation of the seniority system.

It was chosen for me, I wanted Judiciary or Foreign Affairs, this is where they put me. I couldn't do anything about it. It has no relevance to my district since I have no military hardware. The reason that I stayed was that I'm moving up in seniority and in a few more years I'll be a subcommittee chairman and possibly chairman, so I'll sit it out. I have no constituency pressure over the Committee which enables me to concentrate on other things without being bothered.

Another stated,

They put me on. I didn't want it. I wanted Banking and Currency. The previous Democrat was on and we have the largest air base in the country so the leadership thought it was a good idea.

Finally, freshmen who were appointed to the committee and were neutral or unhappy about it developed an interest in one phase of the military program. Of the twelve individuals with whom this writer spoke, who joined as freshmen, four stated that they had very little interest in the committee until they got involved in its actual operation. They discovered that the committee's work was challenging and decided to stay. As one former Republican member stated,

I really wanted to join the Judiciary or Banking and Currency Committee but the leadership said you must be kidding and put me here. Once on I found I really liked it. I found it offered me a great deal of excitement by the nature of the problem.

Why Members are Appointed to Armed Services

Although a large number of Congressmen are appointed to the House Armed Services Committee in their freshman term, the majority of appointees actively seek membership. The remainder of this section will discuss the criteria that are used in appointing freshmen and active seekers to the committee.

Nicholas Masters in his study of committee appointments came to the conclusion that:

Although a number of factors enter into committee assignments -- geography, group support, professional background, etc. -- the most important single consideration -- unless it can be taken for granted -- is to provide each member with an assignment that will help to insure his re-election.¹

This conclusion is also valid in the case of the House Armed Services Committee. Every former House leader and powerful member of the Armed Services Committee who was questioned about the reasons for Armed Service assignments stressed the importance of helping the individual member.² However, not every individual who wants to join the committee is able to. Each year the Republican and Democratic

¹Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, edited by Robert W. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, p. 251. For a similar viewpoint see William L. Morrow, pp. 41-48. George Goodwin, Jr., "The Seniority System in Congress," American Political Science Review, vol. 53 (June 1959), 412-436, believed the main criteria were geography, group pressure, background, and ideological balance.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

Committee on Committees must choose among many applicants. There are many ways that an individual can obtain membership on the Armed Services Committee; at times some or all of the previously mentioned variables influence whom will sit on it. Yet, if one were to select the most important variable, in determining committee appointments, it would be geographical considerations. The data in TABLE 2.5 reveal

^{a,b,c}
TABLE 2.5.--Number and percentage of times that members of the committee were replaced by individuals from the same region by party from 1947-1969

Region	Yes		No	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
South	1 (50%)	12 (66%)	1 (50%)	6 (33%)
Northeast	12 (70%)	10 (100%)	5 (30%)	0 (0%)
Central	3 (50%)	1 (50%)	3 (50%)	1 (50%)
West	2 (67%)	6 (83%)	1 (33%)	1 (17%)
Average	18 (62%)	29 (78%)	11 (38%)	8 (22%)

^aOne term was allowed to go by before the rule was considered broken.

^bIf a member left the committee in 1967, he was not used for the data.

^cStates in the regional breakdown were determined by the model used in Holt Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1963), pp. 27-29.

<u>South</u>	<u>Northeast</u>	<u>Central</u>	<u>West</u>
Alabama	Connecticut	Illinois	Alaska
Arkansas	Delaware	Indiana	Arizona
Florida	Maryland	Iowa	California
Georgia	New Jersey	Kansas	Colorado
Louisiana	New York	Kentucky	Idaho
Mississippi	Ohio	Michigan	Hawaii
North Carolina	Pennsylvania	Minnesota	Montana
Oklahoma	Massachusetts	Missouri	Nevada
South Carolina	Maine	Nebraska	Oregon
Tennessee	New Hampshire	North Dakota	New Mexico
Virginia	Rhode Island	South Dakota	Utah
Texas	Vermont	Wisconsin	Washington
	West Virginia		Wyoming

Since the inception of the Committee, the Democrats have applied the "same region rule" 78% of the time, while the Republicans have done so 62% of the time. The Democrats have been particularly faithful to this rule in the Northeast and Western regions with 83% and 100% respectively. The two strongest Republican regions are the Northeast and West with 70% and 67% respectively.

A possible hypothesis as to why the "same region rule" has not always been employed is the result of the continual shift in military districts and contracts around the nation. The West, especially California, has been the major postwar recipient of installations and contracts. This shift in Armed Forces business is reflected in the changing membership of the Committee. A comparison of the regional breakdown of the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congress clearly reveals this.

Since the committee's creation in 1947 the Southern Democrats and Northeastern Republicans have continually occupied the largest portions of committee seats. In 1947 (see TABLE 2.6) 11 of 14

TABLE 2.6.--Regional breakdown by party of Congressmen of the 1947, 1957, 1967 House Armed Services Committees

Region	1947		1957		1967	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
South	0	11	1	13	2	8
Northeast	11	3	9	3	7	6
Central	5	0	4	1	6	4
West	3	0	3	2	2	5

Democrats were Southerners; by 1967 their number had decreased to 8 of 23. The Northeast Republicans, who in the 80th Congress occupied eleven out of twenty Republican seats, now control only 7 out of 18. As was stated earlier, the shift in representation has been from the

South to the West. The committee now has seven western congressmen whereas in the past only three members from that area were present.

The Same State Rule

In the making of committee assignments the Democratic and Republican Committee on Committees have not only used the "same region rule" but have often applied the "same state rule" in making committee assignments. Over the years, each state has been allotted a specific number of representatives. Once that number is reached, it is almost impossible, regardless of qualifications, for other members from the state to be seated.

The case of former Congressman Allard Lowenstein (D,N.Y.) and Patrick Mollohan (D,W.Va.) illustrates this point. Allard Lowenstein, an extremely liberal Congressman from Nassau County, who devised the dump-Johnson strategy, attempted to join the Armed Services Committee in the 90th Congress. According to one knowledgeable source, Lowenstein was not blackballed from the committee because of his politics. New York State already had four representatives on Armed Services and under the geographical balance, which the Committee on Committees has tried to maintain, no one from New York can presently be seated. As has been true for some fifteen years, only if one of these seats is vacant does Lowenstein or any other New Yorker have a chance. It is unlikely that a representative of Lowenstein's anti-military feelings would be permitted on the committee, but it is apparent, based on past precedents, that geographical considerations were enough to keep him off. An interesting test would have arisen if former Congressman Lowenstein had applied to join when a New York State Democrat was

was leaving the Committee.

This rule also holds true for individuals who return to Congress after an absence of one or more terms; their chances of rejoining Armed Services depends on the regional situation. The case of Congressman Mollohan (D,W.Va.) is illustrative of this point.

Last term Mollohan wanted to get back on the committee from West Virginia. If there was another guy from West Virginia on the committee he wouldn't have had a prayer. He had been on twice before but this didn't matter in our selection. In the first go around he was given Banking and Currency; then we started trading and in a three member switch he got on. He didn't get on because of his previous experience but rather because of the regional opening.

Adherence to the "same state rule" has not been as firm as the "same region rule." As TABLE 2.7 indicates, the Democratic leaders have applied the "same state rule" 58% of the time whereas

^{a,b}
TABLE 2.7.--Number and percentage of times the "same state rule" was followed by party from 1947-1969

Party	Followed	Broken
Democrats	22 (58%)	16 (42%)
Republicans	10 (33%)	20 (67%)

^aOne term was allowed to go by before the rule was considered broken. If an individual is dropped off the committee or returns to Congress and is placed on the committee, it is considered a win for the state.

^bIndividuals who left the committee in 1967 are not considered in the data.

the Republicans have applied this procedure in one third of the cases. A study of which states are most successful in preserving committee seats reveals that the larger states do much better than the smaller ones. New York, California, and Texas tend to have the best record

of committee replacement (see TABLE 2.8).

^a
TABLE 2.8.--Won and lost record of each state in applying the "same state rule"

State	Total number of members who have served on the Armed Services Committee	Number of times the "same state rule" was followed	Number of times the "same state rule" was ignored
California	11	6	1
New York	11	5	2
Texas	8	4	3
Maryland	6	4	0
Pennsylvania	5	1	2
Ohio	5	3	1
Oklahoma	4	4	0
Massachusetts	4	1	1
Alabama	4	1	1
New Jersey	4	1	2
Indiana	4	1	2
Missouri	4	1	1
Michigan	4	1	2
Georgia	3	1	0
Louisiana	3	1	1
Illinois	3	1	0
Connecticut	3	1	0
North Carolina	3	1	1
Virginia	3	1	0
New Mexico	2	0	0
Florida	2	0	1
Maine	2	0	2
West Virginia	1	1	0
Oregon	1	0	1
Iowa	1	0	1
Montana	1	0	1
Tennessee	1	0	1
Kansas	1	0	1
Arizona	1	0	1
Mississippi	1	0	1
Colorado	1	0	0
Wisconsin	1	0	0
Vermont	1	0	0
Washington	1	0	0
South Carolina	1	0	0

^aSee TABLE 2.7 for the procedure used in compiling the data.

Other large states like Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Michigan have always had at least one and usually two members of their delegations on the committee. However, during the last twenty years these states have been unable to claim a specific number of committee seats. Often two or more terms have gone by before a member from these states is able to join. In the case of the following small states -- Oregon, Colorado, Iowa, Montana, Tennessee, Kansas, Arizona, and Mississippi -- the concept of "same state rule" was never applied. In most cases, representatives were appointed from these states either because of some factor in their background or probably as part of some regional replacement -- Iowa for Indiana or Tennessee for Alabama.¹

A state's ability to maintain a claim on a particular seat is due to a number of factors. The large states have fared well in committee reappointments because of their preponderant influence in the Democratic and Republican policy committees. The small states do not possess the political muscle which the large states can bring to bear. Second, since the small states have a relatively small delegation, at times only one or two members, the new congressmen and the senior members of the delegation might not be interested in serving on Armed Services. It is possible that these individuals are offered first choice of their former colleague's seat but refuse to use the option. In the larger states, it is much easier to find someone who wants to join and thus maintain and preserve the committee seat.

Since 1947 certain districts, regardless of who was Congressman, were represented on the committee. The reason, presumably, is

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

that these districts have a tremendous concentration of military installations. The 6th district of Oklahoma, the 16th in Texas, the 2nd in Virginia, the 2nd and 5th in Maryland, and the 3rd in Ohio contain some of the largest military installations in the country. As TABLE 2.9 indicates, the importance of military affairs to these communities virtually guarantees the congressman who is elected by them, regardless of party, a seat on Armed Services.

The military orientation of these districts is the main reason why so many freshmen have been appointed to the committee. Of the thirty-one congressmen who were appointed in their freshman year, fifteen, or almost one-half, of them came from these districts.

The Armed Services Committee and the South

In the literature about the Armed Services Committee it has often been alleged that the Southern Democrats have had an inordinate amount of influence on its operation and direction. This assumption stemmed from the fact that in the twenty-two year history of the committee, two southerners, Mendel Rivers of South Carolina and Carl Vinson of Georgia, have been chairman for eighteen of them. This section will test out this hypothesis.

One striking factor about Armed Services Committee membership is the number of Southerners who are always on it. Regardless of what year is chosen, the Southern Democrats make up a large percentage of the membership. In TABLE 2.10, the number and percentage of Southern Democrats on the committee is compared to the percentage of Southern Democrats among the House Democratic members from 1947-1969. The information reveals that although the percentage of Southern

TABLE 2.9.--Districts that have been represented on the committee by more than one Congressman

State	District	Congressman	Party	Freshman	Years on Committee
Maine	2nd	M. C. Smith	(R)		1947-1948
		C. P. Nelson	(R)		1953-1956
Maryland	2nd	J. Devereaux	(R)		1955-1964
		D. Brewster	(D)	yes	1959-1962
		C. Long	(D)	yes	1963-1964
	5th	L. Sasscer	(D)		1947-1952
		R. Lankford	(D)	yes	1955-1964
		L. Machen	(D)	yes	1965-1968
Massachusetts	6th	W. Bates	(R)		1947-1950
		W. Bates	(R)	yes	1951-1969
Michigan	6th	W. W. Blackney	(R)		1947-1952
		C. E. Chamberlain	(R)		1959-
Missouri	7th	D. Short	(R)		1947-1956
		D. Hall	(R)	yes	1961-
New Mexico	At Large	E. S. J. Walker	(D)	yes	1965-1968
		E. Foreman	(R)		1963-4, 1969
New Jersey	9th	H. Towe	(R)		1947-1951
		F. Osmer	(R)		1955-1964
Ohio	2nd	W. Hess	(R)		1947-8, 1951-60
		D. Clancy	(R)	yes	1961-
	3rd	R. Love	(D)	yes	1965-1966
		C. Whalen	(R)	yes	1967-
Oklahoma	6th	V. Wickersham	(D)		1951-56, 1961-64
		T. Morris	(D)	yes	1957-1960
		J. Johnson	(D)	yes	1965-1966
		J. Smith	(R)	yes	1967-1968
Texas	16th	T. R. Rutherford	(D)		1962
		E. Foreman ^a	(R)	yes	1963-1964
		E. White	(D)		1969
Virginia	2nd	P. Hardy	(D)		1947-1968
		W. Whitehurst	(R)	yes	1969

^aEd Foreman (R,N.M.) served on the committee as the representative from the 16th district of Texas.

TABLE 2.10.--The percentage of Southern Democrats among Democrats in the Congress and the number and percentage of Southern Democrats on the House Armed Services Committee among Democrats from 1947 - 1969

Year	Percentage of Southern Democrats in the House	Percentage of Southern Democrats on the committee	Number of Southern Democrats on the committee
1947	57%	79%	11
1949	42%	53%	10
1951	46%	58%	11
1953	49%	65%	11
1955	45%	60%	12
1957	44%	65%	14
1959	37%	52%	12
1961	40%	52%	11
1963	36%	48%	10
1965	32%	36%	9
1967	35%	35%	8
1969	35%	48%	11

Democrats in the House has declined steadily from 51% in 1947 to 35% in 1969 the number of Southern Democrats on Armed Services has not been greatly affected. Over the years Southern Democrats have been allotted approximately eleven seats on the committee regardless of which party controlled the Speakership. The Southerners are given representation term after term completely out of proportion to their numbers in the Democratic party. There is not one term in which the percentage of Southern Democrats on the committee is not significantly higher than the percentage of Southern Democrats in the House.

The overrepresentation of Southerners on Armed Services is dwarfed in comparison to their ability to control the policy-making positions. When one investigates how many Southerners have controlled the levers of committee power over the last twenty-two years the numbers are truly astounding. An individual was considered to have achieved power when he became one of the six top ranking Democrats in

seniority. The reasons for this are many. First, the committee is structured to operate with one chairman and four subcommittee chairmen. Furthermore, the committee is also involved with a number of investigations and usually the highest ranking Democrat without a subcommittee is given the right to chair one. Thus, the formal institutionalized power of the committee is bestowed on the six most senior Democratic members. Second, under Rivers and occasionally Vinson, the senior members have met to plan committee business and priorities. Usually the Democratic group is composed of anywhere from three to six of the most senior members. Third, only the senior members are privy to information of a highly classified nature. The greater one's seniority, the greater the likelihood of obtaining information which sets one apart from the rank and file member. Freshman members of the committee who were asked how they learned about the committee's operation usually replied that they listened and followed the example set by the top six Democrats. This is not meant to imply that a Democrat who is not among the top six in seniority cannot be influential and powerful, or that power is based exclusively on seniority. However, in terms of the Armed Services Committee the official and unofficial rules tend to make the top six members the most powerful.

Since 1947 the Southern Democrats have completely dominated the six senior positions on their side of the aisle. Throughout these years they never controlled fewer than four of the top six positions and for a number of years they controlled five of them.¹

What impact has the inordinately large number of Southern Democrats in positions of power had on the committee? This question

¹U.S. Congress, Congressional Directory, 1947-1969.

cannot be answered precisely. It can be stated that the domination by Southern Democrats year after year has empowered a group with very definite norms toward national security. The Southern Congressmen have always been willing to spend "as much money as it takes" to maintain a powerful Armed Forces. They have traditionally been the military's staunchest praisers and defenders on Capitol Hill. This has been especially true of the two Chairmen of the committee, Messrs. Rivers and Vinson.¹

In 1970 the Movement for a New Congress analyzed the pro-Vietnam war votes of Congressmen between 1968-1970. A perfect anti-war score for these three years would average 100% whereas a Congressman who had a score of 0% would be considered pro-military and a firm supporter of the Vietnam War. TABLE 2.11 lists the average yearly score of the Armed Services Members who were on the committee from 1968 through the present.

The members are divided into groups of Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans. The data reveal that the Southern Democrats with an average score of 10.5 have a significantly higher "pro-military" score than the average Northern Democrat at 50.6 and the average Republican at 22.7. As was expected, Chairman Rivers had an extremely low score. In fact, he was the only Democrat to have the lowest possible score of 0. The lowest average score for the Republicans was achieved by Bill Dickinson (R, Ala.). This suggests that if the committee attracts more Southern Republicans they are likely to perceive military issues similarly to their Democratic counterparts.

Furthermore, the Southern Congressman's allegiance to the

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

^a
TABLE 2.11.--The average score of House Armed Services Committee members on pro-war issues between 1968-1970 broken down into groups of Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans

Name	Party	State	Score
Nedzi, L.	N. Dem.	Michigan	86.8
Pike, O.	N. Dem.	New York	75.0
Evans, F.	N. Dem.	Colorado	68.3
Leggert, B.	N. Dem.	California	67.1
Hicks, F.	N. Dem.	Washington	59.7
Byrnes, J.	N. Dem.	Pennsylvania	52.2
Wilson, C.	N. Dem.	California	49.5
Price, M.	N. Dem.	Illinois	36.0
Philbin, P.	N. Dem.	Massachusetts	32.1
Stratton, S.	N. Dem.	New York	31.4
Randall, W.	N. Dem.	Missouri	26.6
Ichord, R.	N. Dem.	Missouri	21.9
AVERAGE SCORE FOR NORTHERN DEMOCRATS			50.6
Bennett, C.	S. Dem.	Florida	31.4
Hagan, G.E.	S. Dem.	Georgia	2.6
Hebert, E.	S. Dem.	Louisiana	24.0
Long, S. O.	S. Dem.	Louisiana	9.9
Fisher, O. C.	S. Dem.	Texas	3.0
Lennon, A.	S. Dem.	North Carolina	2.5
Rivers, M.	S. Dem.	South Carolina	0.0
AVERAGE SCORE FOR SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS			10.5
Whalen, C.	Rep.	Ohio	74.8
Stafford, R.	Rep.	Vermont	47.4
Arends, L.	Rep.	Illinois	26.7
O'Konski, A.	Rep.	Wisconsin	26.2
Chamberlain, C.	Rep.	Michigan	24.2
Wilson, B.	Rep.	California	23.6
Pirnie, A.	Rep.	New York	22.1
Bray, W.G.	Rep.	Indiana	20.2
Gubser, C.	Rep.	California	17.3
King, C.	Rep.	New York	7.5
Clancy, D.	Rep.	Ohio	2.8
Hall, D.	Rep.	Missouri	2.4
Dickinson, B.	Rep.	Alabama	0.0
AVERAGE SCORE FOR REPUBLICANS			22.7

^aThe average scores were compiled from the data which are available in Edward Schneier et al., Vote Power - The Official Activist Campaigner's Handbook (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 55-77.

military is likely to be of a very special nature. Whenever there has been a major dispute between the civilian branch of the Pentagon and one of the services, the Southerners have always aligned themselves with the professional military elites. The seventy group air force, B-70 bombers, a nuclear navy and a massive deployment of A.B.M. equipment are issues upon which the Southern wing have most staunchly supported the position of the "brass." Most of these congressmen who have the most domestically conservative voting records in the Democratic Party have been willing to pass almost every military program which is offered to them.¹ For the last twenty years the committee has been controlled by a group who believes the nation's priority is a strong defensive position. A Democrat with a liberal voting record or one attuned to the problems and needs of major urban areas has never achieved even a minor position of power. Thus, if the Harris and Gallup polls are accurate, the most military oriented region of the country, which has produced the most defensive minded and pro-military congressmen in the House, has dominated the committee throughout its history.

Why have the Southern Democrats been consistently overrepresented on the committee? It is likely that the Southern Democrats have continued to demand a high representation on the committee which is uncontested by other sections of the country. Congressmen are likely to seek out committees that are either important to their constituents or of personal interest to them. For years Southern Congressmen have achieved considerable prestige in their districts by

¹ See also Julius Turner and Ned Schneier, Party and Constituency (New Jersey: Johns Hopkins, 1970), for precise voting data on this point.

obtaining seats on Armed Services.¹ Furthermore, the authorizations of military installations, training facilities, and defense oriented industry that are located in the South have had a tremendous impact on the region's economy. What applies to Southern Democrats is not applicable to the majority of Congressional Democrats. For most big city Democrats the work of Armed Services is of secondary importance to their district. Few of them represent areas that contain military workers or installations, and if they are interested in defense matters they are more likely to join Foreign Affairs. In the 90th Congress, ten of the twenty-one Democrats on the Foreign Affairs Committee represented districts which bordered on or were part of cities having more than one-half million people -- New York City had three members. The Armed Services Committee which had twenty-three Democrats had only three -- Lucien Nedzi of Detroit, Charles Wilson of Los Angeles, and James Byrnes of Philadelphia -- from major urban areas with no Democrat (or, for that matter, Republican) from New York City.

Liberally oriented Democrats with a potential "anti-military" orientation feel that to join Armed Services is to become involved with a hopeless struggle against the forces of the committee and the military. It is generally agreed that if the committee had a high percentage of these types of Democrats, that military requests would be evaluated from a different perspective.² However, under the present circumstances, these individuals are not willing to join, and thus the general committee make-up remains the same. To a large extent these liberal Democrats have established their own self-fulfilling prophecy:

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

no one is willing to join the committee; therefore, the committee remains the same. These congressmen through their attitudes have partially allowed this to occur. Only Congressmen who share the overall goals and aspirations of the present committee membership are likely to be interested in joining.

Influence of Sponsors, Personality, Chairman, and House Leaders

Besides geography, other variables affect an individual's chances of a place on Armed Services. A powerful or influential sponsor can often promote his choices to be placed on the committee. As one Republican who had trouble getting on the committee stated,

I thought when I came down to Washington because of my background I would do my best on that committee (Armed Services). So did Mr. Reed, the senior Republican down there, even Joe Martin assured me I'm going on. So the next day some big shot from New Jersey comes down and tells Martin he wants ____ on, and what do you know, I wind up on Public Works.

Another discussed how he had once helped an old friend on,

In his last term ____ wanted to join. He felt it was a good way to finish up on a real prestige committee. I handled it for him. First I spoke to Ford and he said yes, then I saw Bates and he said yes and that was it.

Finally, individuals who have had long experience with the Armed Forces in a leadership capacity as did Commander Stratton (D,N.Y.), Commander Stafford (R,Vt.), or Colonel Bray (R,Ind.) are usually requested to join.¹

The role of the chairman in shaping his committee's membership is open to speculation. Of those members interviewed, only one, a southern friend of the chairman, stated he was encouraged by Rivers to apply for Armed Services membership. The other twenty-nine

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

Congressmen were not encouraged either by the chairman or ranking minority member to become members. In fact, most of them did not even meet with the chairman or ranking Republican before obtaining a seat.¹

It was generally assumed that if the chairman or even the ranking minority member expressed to the members of the Committee on Committees their desire to keep particular individuals off Armed Services their wishes would be granted. No one, including the staff, could ever remember this happening. The committee is so large, the material so complicated, and the members so pro-military, that the ability of an individual maverick to stir up trouble is severely constricted. As one Democratic member opposed to the committee's policies stated,

It doesn't make any difference who leads this committee, Vinson or Rivers, it's all the same. The main thing is the direction. The chairman is not the key, the ideology is. He can afford to be magnanimous or nice or tough, it's all the same because he has got all the votes.

Most members thought that the House leaders involved in committee appointments tend to keep mavericks off Armed Services. They believe that only men who are likely to support the administration's point of view can gain access. The comments of one former Democratic leader are typical of this viewpoint.

They want committees that can work with the administration. They are constantly evaluating who the men are in the House. They look to see who can be trusted and who is a maverick. They discuss these variables with the men on Ways and Means and the Chairman.

A former member claimed,

¹Charles Clapp, in his study of Congressmen, indicates that on other committees, members seek out the chairman's and ranking minority member's support. p. 210.

They try to keep off the hothead types. They know that the issue is so vital and the stakes so high that you can't afford to have guys shooting off their mouths. I know that to have an anti-military type would be like putting a communist on the Committee. We don't determine issues of war and peace we only want to prepare the nation in case of trouble. I think that both groups are careful to put on reasonable men. Occasionally too many men are appointed because they want to get on for the prestige. They do not know a damn thing about the committee's work and don't have the slightest background. At least half the Committee has very little ability but that is probably true of the entire Congress

If a maverick is defined as an individual who has voted against major defense authorizations or appropriations, then something definite can be said about the likelihood of his obtaining a seat on Armed Services. A study of bills involving the major military authorizations and appropriations for each session of Congress indicates that no individual who has ever voted against these bills has obtained a seat on Armed Services.¹ The reason for this is either that the House leaders blackball such individuals or that Congressmen who vote against this type of legislation do not attempt to gain a seat on the Committee. Whatever the reasons such individuals have never sat on Armed Services.

Is Armed Services a Prestige Committee?

The House of Representatives has twenty standing committees, each one encompassing a different legislative load. As a result of committees' workloads, Congressmen find some more desirable than others. The more desirable the committee, the more likely it is to attract the House's outstanding members who are interested in its workload.² Thus, a committee's prestige, by attracting particular

¹Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 3-25, 1947-1968.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

types of members, will have a lot to do with the committee's operation, legislative output, and general norms.

A precise ranking of committees on the basis of prestige is almost impossible. What appears to be worthy to one individual has little or no value to another.¹ Any attempt to evaluate the relative prestige of the various House committees immediately encounters several problems. As a former House leader said,

It is true that members seek out Committees with prestige and this helps. However, remember that every member believes that outside of the big two, he is on the best committee in the House. Otherwise there would be anarchy if this was not so. People are attracted to what suits their needs and their districts, and justify it in terms of their own committee . . .

There is general agreement among the members of Armed Services that their Committee is important and prestigious. As one enthusiastic former member stated,

Of course it's a prestige Committee. I would say that as far as the American people are concerned it is the most prestigious and important Committee in the Congress. They need it and look to it in both war and peace. Just check it out yourself; many men have joined the Committee very late in their careers, just to sit on it.

¹ Nonetheless, there have been several attempts by political scientists to rank them in order of importance. Masters, in his work on committees, placed committees into three separate groupings. The most prestigious group he calls exclusive committees - Rules, Ways and Means, and Appropriations. The next group are semi-exclusive committees which are Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Public Works, and Science and Astronautics. The least desirable committees he lists under the heading of nonexclusive committees - District of Columbia, Government Operations, House Administration, Interior and Insular Affairs, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Merchant Marines and Fishery, Post Office and Civil Service, Standards of Official Conduct, Un-American Activities, and Veterans. The author's conclusions were based on the appointment of congressmen to various committees since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Nicholas Masters, American Political Science Review, Volume 55, 345-457.

The most recent attempt to rank committees individually was done by William Morrow in 1969. The author created his list by

A powerful Democrat on the Committee said,

The Committee is extremely popular. In fact this is one of the reasons that the Speaker keeps enlarging it. The Committee is too big but it's so popular that the Speaker won't change it. We don't need any customers here; we need not advertise.

Despite the glowing praises, the members felt that although Armed Services was an important Committee, Ways and Means and Appropriations were the key committees in Congress. A number of Republicans and Democrats did state that they had turned down opportunities to join either Appropriations or Ways and Means but none of them nor any member of the committee was willing to declare that Armed Services was more prestigious. With the exception of the three major committees, the membership felt certain that Armed Services was the most desirable in the House. An attempt will be made to measure the validity of this claim. In order to accomplish this aim, three indices will be investigated. First, how many members of the committee have had more than one committee assignment, compared to other representatives, and for what reasons? It is generally assumed that the more important and prestigious a committee is, the less likely are its members to have a second committee assignment. Second, a study of the previous committee assignments of Armed Service members will show which committees are considered by many Congressmen to be less desirable. Third, under what circumstances do they remain on or leave the committee?

relying on the work of Goodwin, Masters, and Matthews as well as his emphasis on how many freshmen were allowed to join the committee. According to Morrow the Armed Services ranked fifth behind Rules, Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Foreign Affairs. William L. Morrow, Congressional Committees (New York: Charles Scribners, 1969) pp. 42-44.

Two Committee Assignments

On the basis of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 it was generally expected that representatives would be limited to one committee assignment. It was believed that each committee encompassed a large enough body of material to restrict a member's work to just one unit. Occasionally, a handful of members, for reasons peculiar to their districts, would be on two. Since the 80th Congress this rule has been eroded. More and more Congressmen are permitted to join two committees. In the 80th Congress 87% of the members had one assignment, while in the 89th the percentage had dropped to 60%.¹

It was assumed that the most prestigious and hardworking committees would be least likely to have committee members with dual assignments. This assumption is verified in the case of Ways and Means and Appropriations. However, in terms of the percentage of Congressmen who have only one committee assignment, Armed Services has in almost every session of Congress ranked third -- higher than the Rules Committee.²

A small number of Armed Service members do serve on other committees. In every session of Congress, anywhere from three to ten members will do so.

TABLE 2.12 indicates the number of Congressmen who have had for at least one term one other committee assignment while serving on

¹Louis G. Gawthrop, "Changing Membership Patterns in House Committees," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60 (June 1966), 366.

²Ibid., p. 377.

^a
TABLE 2.12.--The number of Congressmen who have had another committee assignment while serving on Armed Services 1947-1969

Other Committee	no.	Other Committee	no.
District of Columbia	7	House Administration	4
Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy	5	Un-American Activities	3
Merchant Marines	5	Standards of Official Conduct	3
Government Operations	5	Interior and Insular Affairs	2
		Post Office and Civil Service	2

^aMel Price has had two extra committee assignments - Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and Standards of Official Conduct.

Armed Services. There are many reasons why representatives are involved with more than one committee. First, the House leaders have encouraged various senior members of Armed Services, because of their backgrounds, to participate in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.¹ Usually one or two members represent the committee and they act as the committee's source of information in a field which is pertinent to national security. Second, Merchant Marines and Interior and Insular Affairs have attracted representatives whose districts are vitally affected by these committees' work. In order to protect their district's interest and continue as members of Armed Services, they have obtained a second assignment. Third, a number of representatives, because the work of Armed Services did not totally interest them, joined a second committee.²

¹Harold Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government and the Atom, pp. 32-34.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

Previous Committees of Armed Services Members

Over its twenty-two year history, Armed Services has attracted sixty-one individuals from other House Committees.

TABLE 2.13.--The number of congressmen who left other committees to join Armed Services - 1947-1969

Other Committee	No.	Other Committee	No.
Government Operations	8	District of Columbia	3
Merchant Marines	6	Science and Astronautics	3
Public Works	5	Education and Labor	3
Agriculture	5	Interior and Insular Affairs	3
Post Office and Civil Service	4	International and Foreign	
Veterans Affairs	4	Commerce	1
Banking and Currency	4	House Administration	1
		Judiciary	1

Government Operations, Merchant Marines and Fisheries, Public Works, and Agriculture are the four committees which congressmen are most likely to belong to prior to joining Armed Services. The number of individuals who have decided to join Armed Services from Veterans is surprisingly low. It was expected that this military oriented unit would be the largest source of ex-committee members.¹ Since 1960 Government Operations and Agriculture have contributed the largest number of new recruits.

The data in TABLE 2.13 also reveal those committees that have never had one of its members leave for Armed Services. As was expected no one who has ever sat on one of the three exclusive commit-

¹In fact, the last Congressman to join Armed Services from Veterans was James Byrnes in 1957. This seems to indicate that Veterans, because of the large number of ex-servicemen, has become a relevant and useful committee.

tees has ever switched. In the semi-exclusive category only Foreign Affairs has this distinction. Whether Foreign Affairs is regarded as more prestigious by individual congressmen is hard to determine. Although no one on Foreign Affairs ever joined Armed Services, no one on the latter committee ever joined the former. Three of the committee's present members stated that when they entered Congress, they would have preferred being assigned to Foreign Affairs. However, once they were on Armed Services, they were able to find issues and problems which related to their foreign policy interests.¹

How Armed Services Members React to the Committee

The overwhelming majority of Congressmen, both Republican and Democratic, who obtain a seat on Armed Services are unlikely to leave the committee while still a member of the House. A study of the one hundred and nineteen individuals who have sat or are sitting on the committee confirms this statement. As TABLE 2.14 indicates only eleven individuals, or approximately 9-1/2% of the committee members, have left Armed Services while still a member of Congress. Four of these eleven individuals went to the three semi-exclusive committees of Agriculture, Judiciary, and Science and Astronautics. The two Democrats who joined Science and Astronautics, Overton Brooks (D,La.) and George P. Miller (D,Cal.), were persuaded to do so as a personal favor to Speaker Rayburn and Chairman Vinson. In 1958, following the traumatic effects of the Russian Sputnik launching,

¹The phenomenon of being able to find an interesting issue or topic regardless of one's committee is not peculiar to Armed Services members. It pervades every committee of the House and probably tends to deter committee shifts. Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

a,b
TABLE 2.14.--How Congressmen reacted to membership on the House Armed Services Committee

Positive Response		Negative Response	
Defeated	24	Left the Committee while still in the House	11 ^d
Died or retired	32		
Forced off ^c	1		
Ran for higher office	8		
Still on the committee	40		
TOTALS	105	TOTALS	11

^a This table is based on the techniques employed by John F. Manley in his study of Ways and Means.

^b Five members are counted twice because they left and were able to rejoin the committee.

^c C. W. Bishop (R,Ill.) was forced off in 1949 when the Republicans became the minority party. He later rejoined the committee.

^d Seven went to exclusive committees and the other four went to non-exclusive committees.

the House leaders decided to organize a committee which would deal exclusively with the problems of space and rocketry. This meant that some of the work which Armed Services had traditionally done would be usurped by the new committee. In order to attract members from Armed Services, who would have an expertise in the field, Speaker Rayburn appointed Brooks as Chairman and Miller as the third ranking Democrat.¹ Yet despite their high positions, both men had to be coaxed off Armed Services.²

¹"House Committees," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. 15 (1959), p. 47.

²One writer expressed the view that Carl Vinson did not believe that Overton Brooks had the intellectual talents nor political skill needed to run the committee when he retired. Thus, he talked Brooks into the new assignment in order to eliminate him from ever becoming

In the case of Winston Smith (R, Kansas), who left for Agriculture and Lester Holtzman (D, N.Y.) who switched to Judiciary (and later was appointed a federal judge) one can assume a combination of personal disinterest in the work and the secondary importance of Armed Services to their districts, contributed to their leaving.

Most Congressmen who left Armed Services did so to join one of the three exclusive committees; four members have joined Appropriations, two have left for Rules, and one has switched to Ways and Means. The reasons that some of these representatives mentioned for switching to an exclusive committee corresponds to the findings of other political scientists.¹ One former member of Armed Services who left for Appropriations said,

I was getting into the big leagues with Armed Services. I was 10th in seniority but the offer came from the prestige committee and I could not resist. Appropriations is the best and it offers the most power.

Another member commented,

I felt that Armed Services was too specialized; it takes so long to really know anything and be able to participate. On Appropriations no matter what I deal with I have power. On Armed Services you have to be there for years. I felt I could benefit myself and my district most by switching.

Nonetheless, the data indicate that a member of Armed Services is likely to remain on the Committee so long as he stays in Congress. From term to term, Armed Services is likely to be a committee with a large number of senior members who conduct committee business in the same fashion.

On the basis of the data and interviews it is clear that the

the chairman. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, p. 159.

¹Richard Fenno, pp. 82-85 and James Robinson, pp. 94-98.

three exclusive committees of Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means have greater prestige than Armed Services. In terms of semi-exclusive committees, Armed Services can be ranked as one of the most desirable. The committee has attracted members from every other semi-exclusive committee except Foreign Affairs. Yet only four members out of 113 have ever left the committee for another semi-exclusive one and no one has done so since 1958. The fact that the committee is likely to attract a group of individuals who limit themselves to just one committee would tend to indicate that Armed Services offers a great deal of satisfaction to its members. For all of these reasons Armed Services may be considered one of the most desirable committees in the Congress.

CHAPTER III

THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Studies of Congressional committees indicate that to a certain extent a committee's investigations, authorizations, and legislative output are dependent upon the attitudes and orientations of its members.¹ Almost every member of Congress whom this writer interviewed stressed the importance of the individual in the operation of his committee. They believed that a determined group of members could always achieve their objectives. As one former member said,

In the end a committee is only as good as its membership. Despite the role of seniority or a powerful chairman, if a majority wanted to they could work their will. If you have mediocre individuals you are going to get mediocre results . . .

This chapter, as one of its major purposes, attempts to understand what attracts congressmen to membership on Armed Services. What is there about the committee's legislative lead and perceptions by the public that interest certain types of representatives? Why has the committee attracted individuals with very special districts and

¹In 1961 one of the major goals of the Kennedy Administration was to change the membership of the Rules Committee in order to affect the committee's work. It was felt by putting new members on, more liberal legislation could be passed. Hugh Douglas Price, "Race, Religion, and the Rules Committee: The Kennedy Aid-to-Education Bill," The Uses of Power, Alan Westin, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 1-71. See also the articles by John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," Richard F. Fenno, "The Appropriations Committee as a Political System" and Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments," in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, edited by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 81-104, 125-154, 227-252.

backgrounds?¹ Chapter two developed these questions from the point of view of recruitment. In the present chapter we shall investigate this relationship in terms of factors governing motivation.

Constituency Pressure

A Congressman's district plays a large part in directing his actions. Every district, because of its diverse population and economic makeup, has characteristics peculiar to itself. How much does each Congressman take constituency realities into account? Lewis Dexter has argued that Congressmen do not know what their constituents think about public issues and create their own self-fulfilling prophecies about how their constituents would like them to act. Congressional districts according to Dexter often contain so many diverse elements that the average Congressman can choose any section he desires to justify his decision.²

However, most of the literature about Congressmen and their constituents support the view that representatives are aware of and usually follow the dictates of their constituents. Froman noted that there are certain fixed and definite characteristics about every district that tend to move Congressmen in particular directions.³ Miller

¹ According to Jack Fleer, "One of the least studied but most important areas of congressional behavior is the relevance of Congressmen's personal and constituency characteristics to their behavior in the legislative process," p.8.

² Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel De Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 415.

³ Lewis A. Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 81. See also Samuel Shaw, "Jonathan Bingham: The Role of the Freshman Congressman," (Unpublished master's thesis, Department of Political Science, City College, 1967), p. 90.

and Stokes in studying the relationship between constituency attitudes and Congressional voting concluded that representatives attempt to follow their constituents' attitudes.¹ This conclusion was supported in earlier studies by Julius Turner and Duncan Macree. Both authors indicate the importance of district considerations on a member's vote.² Finally, the research of political scientists has been confirmed by the writings of various Congressmen.³

Voting is only one area where constituency attitudes affect a Congressman's actions. The number and variety of businesses, factories, and governmental installations which have a crucial impact on the district's economy also channel a member's responses. One of his most important tasks is to maintain or improve the community's economic well being. If a Congressman represents a district with many military

¹Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, pp. 31-53. Two authors using Mills and Stokes data and applying mathematical computations reached the same conclusions. Charles F. Enuddle and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage between Constituency Attitudes and Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60 (March 1966), 66-73.

²Julius Turner, "Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress," The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, series LXIX, no. 1, 1951, pp. 72-102. Duncan MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting (University of California Press: Berkley, 1958), pp. 257-267. See also the articles in Samuel C. Patterson, American Legislative Behavior: A Reader (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1968) and Thomas A. Flinn and Harold L. Wolman, "Constituency and Roll Call Voting: The Case of Southern Democratic Congressmen," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10 (May 1966), 192-200.

³Clem Miller, Member of the House: Letters of a Congressman, edited by John W. Baker (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp. 71-72. Joseph S. Clark, Congress: The Sapless Branch (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 32-33. Also Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

installations or defense-related industries, he will do everything in his power to make sure they are not adversely altered.¹

The remainder of this section will discuss the districts of Armed Service members. Ideally the districts of the members who served during the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses would have been investigated. Unfortunately, only in the 88th Congress are data available concerning the socio-economic makeup of Congressmen's districts. Thus, only the districts of the 1963 committee members will be investigated. So as not to forfeit more useful data where available, the section on members' backgrounds will use the more appropriate data for the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses.

The Districts of Armed Services Members

The average Armed Service member is likely to represent a white, urbanized, well educated, and high income constituency.² TABLE 3.1 lists the degree of urbanization of the members districts and those of twenty-one Democrats and sixteen Republicans selected at random.³ The data reveal that almost 50% of the committee represents highly urbanized communities. For the control group fewer than 1/3

¹Ernest S. Griffith, pp. 179-195. See also President Eisenhower's statement about the military industrial complex. "Defense Spending Lobby," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 19 (March 24, 1961), 364.

²According to the U.S. Census Bureau the average district in the country is 69.9% urbanized, 10.5% black, containing constituents who had 10.6 years of school and where the average worker earns \$5,660. U.S., Census Bureau, Congressional District Data Book, Districts of the 88th Congress, 1963, pp. 2-5.

³In order to select the members, the list of Congressmen's local addresses in the 1963 Congressional Directory was employed. Every 10th Republican and every 12th Democratic name was selected. Whenever a member of Armed Services came up in this selection process,

^a
TABLE 3.1.--Urbanization of Armed Service Members' Districts and those of randomly selected members by party

	High (71-100%)	Medium (41-70%)	Low (0-40%)
Armed Service Members			
Democrats	10	9	2
Republicans	9	5	2
Congressmen at Random			
Democrats	9	10	2
Republicans	2	11	3

^aThis and other tables like it were compiled from the data available in U.S., Census Bureau, Congressional District Data Book, Districts of the 88th Congress, 1963.

are highly urbanized with only two Republicans representing this type of district. One possible reason for the difference between the groups is the defense industries and military bases in Armed Service members' districts. The introduction of defense industries has an impact on urbanizing a community.¹ Congressional districts with high degrees of urbanization contain people who have relatively high incomes and a considerable amount of education. TABLES 3.2 and 3.3 list the median income and school years for the population of the districts which the committee and randomly selected members represent. Eleven out of sixteen Armed Services Republicans represented districts with median per capita incomes above \$5,501 whereas the Committee's Democrats with

the next Republican or Democrat on the list was chosen.

¹James L. Clayton, "Defense Spending Key to California's Growth," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 15 (June 1962), 280-293. One of the committee's senior Republicans mentioned that the reason he always opposed putting military installations in his district was the long range effect of such a move. He claimed that if your district acquired new installations you needed new roads, new schools,

TABLE 3.2.--Median incomes in the districts of Armed Service members and those randomly selected Congressmen by party

	High (\$5501#)	Medium \$4001-5500)	Low \$0-4000)
Armed Service Members			
Democrats	8	7	6
Republicans	11	3	2
Congressmen at Random			
Democrats	8	9	4
Republicans	8	6	2

TABLE 3.3.--Median school years in the districts of Armed Service members and those randomly selected Congressmen by party

	High (11.1#)	Medium (9.1-11)	Low (0-9)
Armed Service Members			
Democrats	4	11	6
Republicans	10	6	0
Congressmen at Random			
Democrats	4	10	7
Republicans	7	6	3

their high concentration of Southerners had only seven out of twenty. In terms of the control group sixteen out of thirty-seven represented districts with medium income above \$5,500, indicating no significant difference between the two groups. In terms of median school years per person the Armed Service Republicans had ten of their sixteen members in the high category; the Armed Service Democrats had six of twenty committee members, mostly in the South, representing districts where the average level of education is only up to the ninth grade.

new shopping centers, etc. to service the base. He didn't want to tamper with the district's makeup.

Once again the findings for the randomly selected group are approximately the same.

A few of the Armed Service members represent districts that on the basis of per capita income and schooling have large numbers of lower middle class people. A number of studies have linked this group to a value system which is the most patriotic and "pro-American" in the country.¹ However, most of the members, except those in the South, do not represent these types of districts. In fact, the Republicans are more likely to represent constituents with high incomes and advanced schooling.²

The members represent districts which are usually below the nation's average for percentage of blacks. TABLE 3.4 places the members of the committee into three categories: those above average in the South, the rest of the country, and those districts below average. Fourteen of the districts are above the national average. However, seven of these fourteen are located in southern districts where the impact of blacks on the actions of their representatives is marginal at best. In fact, these southern districts have produced Congressman who have expended considerable energy obstructing Civil Rights legislation. The twenty-three members who represent districts which are below the nation's average usually have less than 5% of their constituents who are classified with this ethnic group. On a local level,

¹Theodore Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 87-126 and Robert E. Lane and Michael Lerner, "Why Hard-Hats Hate Hairs," Psychology Today, volume 4 (November 1970), 45-49.

²In a recent study Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), the authors found that high education correlated with

TABLE 3.4.--The number of Armed Service Congressmen by party who have and do not have more blacks in their constituency than the country's average of 11%

Party	Above Average	Below Average
Democrats		
Northern Dem.	5	5
Southern Dem.	7	3
Republicans	2	15

most of them have not been directly influenced by the Civil Rights revolution. These members' only contacts with poor blacks occur through watching television or traveling to and from Capitol Hill. Under these circumstances most Armed Service members continue to stress military preparedness to the exclusion of domestic needs.¹

On the whole the data are extremely inconclusive. They reveal that most Republicans represent urbanized districts with populations that are predominantly white, educated, and financially solvent. According to Froman and other political scientists, these types of districts would probably be represented by more conservative Congressmen.² The Democrats, with the exclusion of southern Congressmen, come from urbanized districts which are predominately white, educated, and high income. Once again they are likely to be represented by conservative law makers. Unfortunately, the data do not lend themselves to any further generalizations.

patriotism. They discovered the main support of the Vietnam war was among middle class groups and college graduates from non prestige schools, pp. 40-48, 58-62.

¹ See chapter four for an in-depth analysis of this point.

²

Lewis A. Froman, pp. 1-15, 80-97; and V. O. Key, Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 112-113.

Economic Considerations for Joining Armed Services

Every Congressional district contains industries or businesses which employ large groups of people. Naturally, the Congressman channels his energies towards protecting these businesses in order to insure his constituents' economic well-being. This is especially true when the industry involved is directly owned, operated, or supported by government projects.

Many Armed Services members have districts that are economically dependent on the United States Armed Forces. These districts either have enormous military installations, employing thousands of civilians, or possess military oriented industries which are constantly receiving defense contracts.¹ This section will deal with two questions. First, how dependent are Armed Service members upon the Armed Forces for the economic solvency of their constituents? Second, do the districts of the Armed Service members, as alleged in the popular press, receive more defense contracts and have a greater number of military installations than those of their House colleagues?

The mass media have alleged that Armed Service membership insures a Congressman the opportunity to acquire military installations in his district. Some writers believe that this is the main reason why Congressmen join the committee. The comments of one Democratic member exemplify this idea:

I joined Armed Services because my state has been constantly bypassed when it comes time to give out military bases. All the other states get their fair share but we're always left holding

¹Congressman Speedy O. Long (D, La.) a member of the Committee in an appeal to make Fort Polk a permanent military installation said it "means a lot to the state of Louisiana economically as it is the state's largest single industry." U.S. Congressional Record, 90th

our hands out. All I want is a fair hearing, a chance to get my fair share.

This view was not shared or supported by anyone else who was interviewed. The members usually said that their primary goal was not to acquire military installations but rather to preserve those their districts already had. Many of these Congressmen sought committee membership because their districts contained a large military-industrial complex, which was vital to the economic well being of their community. A Democrat stated,

I joined the Committee because of my district. We have over one billion dollars worth of payroll because of defense, it was a real necessity for me. At first I was on Agriculture which was also extremely important to me, then I switched because of the industrial nature of my district.

A Republican member stated much the same reasons for joining.

I have the largest military base in the country and probably the world. Congressmen usually gravitate to those committees which affect their district so it was a natural. Being on the Committee certainly doesn't hurt as far as protecting one's installations. You have more access to the decisionmakers, you can offer suggestions and therefore a greater chance of adding additions.

What actual effect committee membership has in preserving installations is not quantifiable. Some of the representatives, although less than a majority, believed that committee membership could protect their installations from dismemberment. Others believed that membership was a useful way to convince the "folks back home" that their crucial interests were being looked after. In case military installations were removed, the Congressman could partially shield himself from adverse criticism, by claiming that except for his position on Armed Services things could have been much worse.¹

Cong., 2nd sess., February 28, 1968, vol. 114, part 4, p. 4728.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

It is indeed possible that the military elites are unwilling or uninterested in deactivating a military installation that is located within the district of a powerful member. A few members stated their belief that this was the case. The majority of questioned members, however, did not believe that a seat on Armed Services afforded their installations greater protection than those of the average Congressman. The value of being a member is that Armed Service Congressmen come to know the military leaders who are involved in construction and military development. This familiarity with the Pentagon elites enables them to discuss their districts' problems if a military installation is removed, and to attempt to obtain substitute ones. As a Southern Democrat with considerable seniority said,

There is constantly a process of change taking place in the military. New things come about and things must move. It is my thought that when a thing moves from a particular location, and when there are other things looking for a place to light, it is only fair to the local economy, to try to fill in the gap caused by breaking away, by putting things that are seeking a home.¹

Another Southern Democrat who was able to forestall the deactivation of his district's Air Force base said,

. . . I'm not saying I couldn't have done as well if I wasn't on the committee. In fact this might have happened anyway. I think I had an edge from my spot. I'm not saying things shouldn't be closed up. If it was obsolete, fine. Under these conditions I felt it was justified in staying open. Anyway by being on the committee I had access and ability to maneuver. It's like being in conference committee; they discuss some item that might affect your district, you get an edge, a chance to save it by standing there.

In 1961 the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report listed the number of military installations that every Congressman in the country

¹Personal letter

had in his district.¹ The survey lists the number of installations in a member's district; it does not indicate their economic impact.

TABLE 3.5.^a--The number of House members, Armed Service members, and Military Appropriations Subcommittee members by party who do and do not have military installations in their districts

	House		House Armed Services		Military Appropriations Subcommittee	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
One or more installations	65%	62%	79%	54%	75%	33%
None	35%	38%	21%	46%	25%	57%

^a"Defense Spending Lobby," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 19, no. 12 (March 24, 1961), 472-473.

TABLE 3.5 indicates by party the percentage of the House members who have and do not have at least one military installation in their district as compared to the percentage of members of the House Armed Services Committee and the Military Appropriations Subcommittee. The purpose of this table was to see if the defense oriented committees have a greater share of the defense installations. The data are somewhat contradictory. Democratic members of Armed Services and Military Appropriations are more likely to have military installations than the average House member. Only 65% of the House Democrats had one or more military installations whereas the figures for the Armed Service and Military Appropriations Subcommittee were 79% and 75% respectively. However, Republicans on the Committee have fewer installations than

¹This writer's efforts to obtain comparable data for the 90th Congress met with failure. The information departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were unable to furnish the necessary data.

their House colleagues. In fact almost 50% of the Armed Service Republicans and 66-2/3% of the Appropriations Republicans do not even possess one military installation.

This trend is also true when one investigates the military installations in the districts of the top six Republican and Democrat members. Based on the views expounded by journalists, it was expected that these men would have more defense establishments.¹ This expectation proved to be correct for the Democrats and incorrect for the Republicans. The Democrats, as shown in TABLE 3.6, all have at least one installation. Some of the members, like Mr. Kilday and Mr. Rivers, possess enormous military complexes. This finding is open to various explanations. Mr. Rivers, for example, would argue that natural conditions in the district accounted for the number of installations.

My district has been called a microcosm of the military-industrial complex. Charleston happens to be a great, natural warm water port. It was made that way by God -- why I presume is not a captive of the military industrial complex.²

Others have charged that the military goes out of its way to please the influential members of the committee. The general consensus among committee members, both Republican and Democratic, was a combination of these two possibilities. They felt that once the army had a legitimate choice between a senior member's district and a member who was not on the committee, or did not have as much seniority, the district

¹Washington Post, May 20, 1969, p. A20. See U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 1st sess., April 23, 1969, vol. 115, no. 65, daily edition, pp. E 3298-3311, for a reprint of articles which claim that Armed Service members have more installations.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 1969, vol. 115, part 9, p. H4767. See Don Oberdorfer, "Rivers Delivers," New York Times Magazine (August 29, 1965), p. 30, where the author quotes Rivers as claiming that 90% of the installations in his district were obtained through his hard work.

of the senior member got the installation. The members continually stressed the idea that this was only "human nature -- after all doesn't everybody including the army look out for its best interests."

TABLE 3.6.--The six most senior Democrats and Republicans and the number of military installations in their districts

Democrats	State	Military Installations	Republicans	State	Military Installations
Vinson	(Geo.)	1 naval	Arends	(Ill.)	none
Kilday	(Tex.)	4 air bases	Gavin	(Penn.)	none
		1 army	Norblad	(Ore.)	1 army
Rivers	(S.C.)	8 navy, 1 army	Zandt	(Penn.)	none
		1 air base	Bates	(Mass.)	none
Philbin	(Mass.)	1 army	O'Konski	(Wis.)	none
Hebert	(La.)	3 navy, 3 army			
Price	(Ill.)	1 air base			

The Republican leaders have not fared very well. Only Mr. Norblad with one small army base has any type of installation. It indicates that the professional military, if they do coddle individual Congressmen, have not found it necessary to reward senior Armed Service Republicans.

Number of Troops and Defense Workers in the District

The number of troops and defense workers located in a Congressman's district has a significant impact on the local economy. It was thought that the districts of Armed Service members would have large concentrations of these two groups.

It should be kept in mind that the number of government workers and military personnel in a state may be very small. Thus, if a member of Armed Services has an above average percentage of the

states total it may not in itself be significant. It was felt that any combination of government workers and military personnel which numbered more than 5,000 would have a significant impact on the economy of the district.¹

TABLE 3.7 lists the names, districts, and concentration of personnel during the 88th congress. Sixteen of the thirty-seven man committee fall within this category; of this group eleven districts are represented by Democrats and five by Republicans. Thus, approximately 43% of the committee has a significant concentration of defense personnel who live, work, and spend money in their district. It is impossible to determine how much pay and allowances the personnel brought into these districts. What is known is the estimated annual pay and allowances for the individual states. The estimated pay and allowances for the states from which the top three committee members in TABLE 3.7 came from are: Virginia at \$302,331,000 for 82,372 estimated soldiers and \$434,555,000 for 76,901 civilian employees; California at \$781,380,000 for 207,875 military personnel and \$788,659,000 for 140,445 government employees; and Pennsylvania at \$56,717,000 for 15,284 military personnel and \$381,272,000 for 68,204 government employees.²

¹This figure was selected for two reasons. First, members who were interviewed for this study invariably mentioned district considerations for joining the committee when their district's military base involved more than 5,000 people. Second, when this writer spent a week in Rapid City, South Dakota, he was very much aware in terms of newspaper coverage and conversations of the importance of Ellsworth Air Force Base with a personnel staff of 6,095 on the local economy.

²The cost in 1960 for 1,553,527 military personnel was \$6,064,484,000 for 947,933 civilian employees paid by the government \$5,318,791,000. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 17 (March 24, 1961), p. 468.

TABLE 3.7.--Armed Services Members who have more than 5,000 troops and government employees in their districts

Name	Party	Troops	Gov. Employees	Total
Hardy, P.	D	56,034	27,220	83,254
Wilson, B.	R	48,315	20,528	68,843
Byrnes, J.	D	378	36,312	36,690
Rivers, M.	D	25,322	10,990	36,312
Lankford, R.	D	31,437	3,652	35,089
Wickersham, V.	D	25,961	3,313	29,274
Foreman, E.	R	25,254	3,412	28,666
Ichord, R.	D	24,449	1,489	25,938
Gubser, C.	R	4,935	16,264	21,199
Long, C.	R	7,500	8,463	15,963
Hebert, Ed.	D	7,040	3,846	10,886
Pirnie, A.	R	2,565	7,778	10,343
Philbin, P.	D	10,323		10,323
Price, M.	D	4,395	3,786	8,181
Kilgore, J.	D	6,412	1,503	7,915
Fisher, O. C.	D	5,680	647	6,327

Unfortunately, the number of troops and defense workers in the districts of Armed Service members for the 90th Congress is not available. Applying the data, which are approximately correct, from the 88th Congress, the change in the committee's composition is significant. The number of Armed Service members with more than 5,000 troops and government employees in their district is 23 or 58% of the committee.¹ This is an increase of over 15% from the 1963 committee when sixteen members out of thirty-seven (the present membership is forty) represented such districts.¹

¹ As in 1963 the individual members are predominantly Democrats. The Democratic members are: Mendell Rivers, Philip Philbin, Edward Hebert, Melvin Price, O. C. Fisher, Porter Hardy, James Byrnes, Richard Ichord, Alton Lennon, William J. Randall, G. Elliot Hagan, Robert Leggett, Frank Evans, Rodney Love, Floyd Hick, Henry Machen, and E. S. Johnny Walker. The Republican members are: James V. Smith, Bob Wilson, Charles Gubser, Alex Pirnie, Carleton King, and William Dickinson.

The increase in members from these types of districts probably occurred as a result of Secretary of Defense McNamara's action. During 1963 and 1964 he announced the closing or phasing down of over 132 military bases, 110 in this country and 22 located abroad. His decision affected 34 states and would eventually eliminate 41,421 civilian and 60,713 military jobs at a savings of 577 million dollars.¹ This decision undoubtedly motivated many of the new recruits to join in order to make some attempt to protect their districts.²

Comparison of Armed Service Congressmen and Congressmen
selected at random in terms of number of defense and
military personnel in their districts

It was believed that an Armed Service member represented districts with larger concentrations of defense workers and military personnel than the average Congressman. In order to verify this hypothesis the districts of the 1963 committee members were compared to twenty one Democrats and sixteen Republicans selected at random.³ The number

¹"Defense Base Cutback," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. 19 (1963), p. 435 and "Shipyards, Bases Closed," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. 20 (1964), pp. 160-162. It was reported in the Wall Street Journal that on November 18, 1964, the same day that McNamara announced many of the cutbacks, he received 169 Congressional telephone calls, p. 162.

²Chairman Rivers in order to restrict further installation cutbacks, sponsored a bill which ". . . involved a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit plans for closing military installations to Congress for review . . ." It also forbade closing any base until 120 days after the Secretary's report was submitted to Congress." President Johnson vetoed the bill claiming it was a "fundamental encroachment" on the power of the executive branch. His veto was not overridden and a loosely worded bill was eventually passed. "President Wins Military Base Dispute," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. 21 (1965), p. 697.

³See page 61 of this study for method of selection.

of defense workers and military personnel in a member's district was compared to the total number of these people in the member's state. Whenever the number of troops or defense workers exceed the state's average the member was placed in the more than state average category. If his district contained fewer personnel than the average for his state he was put in the other category. The data in both TABLES 3.8 and 3.9 tend to confirm the hypothesis that Armed Services members have districts with greater concentrations of defense workers and military personnel.

TABLE 3.8.--The troops concentration in Armed Service members' districts and those of randomly selected congressmen

	Dem.	Rep.	Total
Armed Service Members			
More than state average	63%	29%	47%
Less than state average	39%	71%	53%
Congressmen at Random			
More than state average	28%	25%	27%
Less than state average	72%	75%	73%

Almost half the committee represents districts which are above their state's average for percentage of troop concentrations. Once again the Democrats, in 63% of the cases, far outrank their Republican counterparts. When one compares this information to the control groups the difference is significant. Only 27% of the districts of the randomly selected congressmen were above their state's average.

Similar results were obtained when the two groups were compared to the percentage of districts which were above their state's average for the number of defense oriented workers. On the House

Armed Services Committee almost half the members represented districts in which the number of defense workers was above the state average. Forty-seven percent of both Republican and Democrat had such a district -- see TABLE 11. In terms of the control group only 29% met this criterion.

TABLE 3.9.--The number of government defense workers in Armed Service members districts and randomly selected Congressmen by party

	Democrats	Republicans	Total
Armed Service Members			
More than state average	47%	47%	47%
Less than state average	53%	53%	53%
Congressmen at Random			
More than state average	28%	31%	29%
Less than state average	72%	69%	71%

The data indicate that members of Armed Services are likely to represent districts which probably have above the state average for percentage of military forces and defense workers. For at least 40% of the committee in 1963 and probably close to 60% in 1968, the number of such personnel has a significant impact on the district's economy.

Government Contracts

To many Congressmen the most important part of the "defense business" is the Pentagon's procurement and development contracts. These contracts, which total between thirty and forty billion dollars yearly, often determine the economic well being of a member's district. As in the case of military installations, the question arises -- what value is Armed Service membership in obtaining and maintaining government defense contracts? The members' attitude toward this issue

paralleled their feelings about military installations. They believed that Armed Service membership could not affect clear-cut Pentagon decisions. Membership did enable them to keep track of events and possibly influence marginal decisions.

A number of Congressmen commented that they joined the Committee not so much to protect their districts installations but rather the economic well being of their constituents and state. One western Congressman stated,

There is a real need for my state that we be represented on the Committee. I have some defense installations in my district but that wasn't the reason I joined. In fact I didn't know how much hardware I had when I applied. I wanted to protect the state's continued economic development . . .

The Department of Defense releases the amount of money which is spent in each state for defense contracts. TABLE 3.10 compares the percentage of committee seats and government contracts which the states of California, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Texas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut controlled in 1961, 1964, 1968. These states were selected because during this period of time they received well over 50% of the federal contracts.¹ The data indicate that during the same time period the eight states controlled between 40-48% of the Committee seats. Thus, those states that are virtually affected by Defense Department policy make up a very high percentage of the Armed Service's members. These members are in a position to at least try to protect their states' and districts' vital interests.

The only data available on defense contracts and Armed Service

¹"Prime Contracts for 1961 and 1964," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. 20 (1964), p. 451, and "Where the Military Contracts Go," Fortune, Vol. 81 (August 1, 1969), p. 75.

TABLE 3.10.--The percentage of committee seats and government contracts which the states of California, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Texas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut controlled in 1961, 1964, 1968

	1961	1964	1968
Percentage of the committee	48%	46%	40%
Percentage of defense contracts	63%	56%	56%

members' districts reveal that they do not receive an inordinate share of prime contracts. In 1969, Mendel Rivers asked the Pentagon to make a study of Congressional districts and defense contracts. The chairman, in a long House statement, noted,

To begin with, the idea that the Armed Service Committee members represent the fat-cat districts is simply not true. I had an analysis prepared for fiscal year 1968 prime contracts of \$1 million or more by Congressional districts. The analysis compared members of the House Armed Services Committee with the House members as a whole as regards the numbers of prime contracts. It showed that we have 10 members of the committee in the top quarter of the House members, 13 in the 2nd quarter, 9 in the next lowest quarter, and 7 members in the lowest quarter. In other words, the membership of the committee almost exactly reflects the membership of the House in terms of the relative number of prime contracts in their districts. So, it can be fairly said that the Armed Services Committee is not weighted in favor of the so-called military industrial complex. In addition, of the top 38 members of the House in terms of amount of defense contracts in their districts, only 3 of them are members of the Armed Services Committee. You might be interested to know that I am not one of these 3. There are 122 districts which received more prime contracts than my own first district of South Carolina. It might also interest you to know that of the top 10 Democrats on the committee, none of them are in the top quarter, and only 2 are in the next top quarter.¹

Thus, if Mr. Rivers' information is valid, Armed Service Members are not the most favored group in terms of defense contracts. They parallel the Congress as a whole.

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 1st sess. (June 12, 1969), Vol. 115, part 97, daily edition, p. H. 4767.

Whether or not committee membership is an effective means to obtain defense contracts or preserve or increase a district's military installations is a debatable point. What is not in dispute is the assumption by most voters of the utility of being a committee member. In a number of districts throughout the country, membership on the committee is extremely important. Often it is a significant factor in the representative's ability to be re-elected. One Republican who succeeded a Democrat on the committee stated,

It was a necessity to get on the Committee. I couldn't possibly run again if I didn't,--- had a seat on the Committee for 22 years. Even before I got to Washington I was maneuvering to get on. In August, during the campaign, I got an assurance from Gerald Ford stating that if I were elected, I would be given a seat. This helped my campaign. My real interest is foreign affairs and I didn't even know what D.O.D. stood for, but I couldn't afford to go anywhere else. I'm on the Committee I need. If I stay for another 20 years I'll be delighted.

A comment by a liberal Democrat stressed the same idea,

I had to. In 1964 I ran as a favor to the party ... Well one of the campaign issues was that a man from my district should be on the Armed Services Committee. So after I was elected and with the support of two Senators I was put on. The people think this means something but I don't. Well I would have preferred other committees but I'm trapped. My newspaper endorsements and a number of areas support me because of it ...

Finally, as one Southern Democrat put it,

Over the last 30 years every member who represented my district has been on the Committee. I have many military installations in my district and the climate and the area are perfect. Furthermore, I am a man of peace but I know it can only come through security, only through a strong defense. If we aren't strong we risk total annihilation. My constituents felt it was important so everything together I went on.

In combination, it is obvious that the Committee contains many members whose districts are dependent upon Defense Department spending. However, an extremely large percentage of the Committee members represent districts that have absolutely no economic involvement with the

Pentagon. These men cannot be adversely affected by any economic decision which the brass makes. They are in a position to recommend wide ranging cuts in defense budgets without upsetting their constituents well being. There is no constituency reason why these members cannot make impartial and unprejudiced judgments towards Pentagon requests.

The Background of Armed Services Members

Another major variable affecting a Congressman's actions is his personal background, those prior experiences that influence his decision-making. There are many drawbacks to understanding Congressional motivation in terms of psychological or personality dimensions. Most political scientists do not have the knowledge or clinical experience necessary to engage in psychological interviewing or testing. Second, it is very difficult to obtain the type of data necessary in order to offer some meaningful findings.¹ Nonetheless, part of this chapter will record certain traits in the backgrounds of Armed Service members and suggest how these traits might have affected their actions. It is impossible under this method of analysis to state that X number of character traits, and Y previous experiences, lead to Z types of actions on the committee. It is possible to say, based on numerous previous studies, that a particular background tends to predispose an individual in a particular direction.²

¹For an in-depth analysis of this problem see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1967).

²For example see James D. Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adoption to Legislative Life (New Haven: Yale University Press,

The background of a typical Armed Service member is similar to that of an average representative. A Congressman is likely to be male, white, over 50 and a Protestant; he probably attended college and his occupation before coming to the House was of a professional nature.¹

In the 90th Congress the average Congressman was male, white, 50.8, Protestant, a college graduate, and either a lawyer or public servant.²

TABLE 3.11 lists the names, ages, religions, schooling, and occupations of the membership of the recent Armed Services Committee. It indicated that the average member is likely to be a male, 52.6 years old, a Protestant, who attended law school, and prior to becoming a Congressman practiced law or public service. In terms of schooling twenty Democrats out of twenty-three, and sixteen Republicans out of seventeen had more than a high school diploma. The majority of the committee is Protestant although twelve out of the forty man committee belong to the Roman Catholic faith.³

1965); E. Frenkel-Bruinswick, "Interaction of Psychological and Sociological Factors in Political Behavior," American Political Science Review, Vol. 46 (March 1952), 44-66; Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61 (September 1967), 629-641; Harold Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: The Viking Press, 1967); Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931); Hans Eysenck, The Scientific Study of Politics (London: Routledge Kegan and Paul., 1952).

¹For a review of the literature about the backgrounds of Congressmen see William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 116-126.

²"Characteristics of Members of the 90th Congress," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 23 (1967), p. 33.

³In the 90th Congress there were 95 Roman Catholic Congressmen or approximately 22%. The percentage of Catholics on Armed Services was approximately 30%.

TABLE 3.11.^a--Personal data about the membership of the Armed Services Committee by Party for the 90th Congress

Democrats	Age	Religion	Schooling	Occupation ^b
Bennett, C.	56	Discipline of Christ	law school	c,1
Byrne, J.	60	Roman Catholic	high school	b,c
Evans, F.	43	Presbyterian	law school	b,c,1
Fisher, O. C.	63	Church of Christ	law school	c,1
Hagan, W.	52	Baptist	law school	a,b,c,j
Hardy, P.	63	Methodist	M.B.A.	a,b,c
Hebert, E.	65	Roman Catholic	college	c,j
Hicks, F.	51	Not listed	law school	1,t
Ichord, R.	40	Baptist	law school	c,1,t
Irwin, D.	40	Roman Catholic	law school	c,1,t
Leggert, B.	40	Roman Catholic	law school	c,1
Lennon, A.	60	Baptist	law school	c,1
Long, S. O.	38	Baptist	law school	a,c,1
Machen, H.	50	Episcopal	law school	c,1
Nedzi, L.	41	Roman Catholic	law school	c,1
Philbin, P.	68	Roman Catholic	law school	a,b,c,j,1
Pike, O.	45	Church of Christ	law school	c,1
Price, M.	62	Roman Catholic	high school	c,j
Randall, W.	57	Methodist	law school	a,c,1
Rivers, M.	61	Episcopal	law school	c,1
Stratton, S.	50	Presbyterian	law school	b,c,t,j
Walker, E.	55	Methodist	high school	b
Wilson, C.	49	Congregational Christ.	high school	b,c
<u>Republicans</u>				
Arends, L.	71	Methodist	law school	a,b,c
Bates, B.	49	Roman Catholic	M.B.A.	c
Bray, W.	63	Society of Friends	law school	c,1
Chamberlain, C.	49	Unspec. Protestant	law school	c,1
Clancy, D.	45	Roman Catholic	law school	c,1
Dickinson, W.	41	Methodist	law school	c,1
Gubser, C.	50	Episcopal	college	a,c,t
Hall, D.	56	Baptist	medical	c,m
Halleck, C.	66	Methodist	law school	c,1
King, C.	62	Roman Catholic	law school	c,1
O'Konski, W.	69	Roman Catholic	college	j,t
Pirnie, A.	53	Unspec. Protestant	college	c,1
Schweiker, R.	40	Central Schwelfelder	law school	b,c
Smith, J.	40	Church of Christ	college	a
Stafford, R.	53	Congregational Church	law school	c,1
Whalen, C.	46	Roman Catholic	M.B.A.	c,t
Wilson, B.	50	Baptist	high school	b,c

^a"Characteristics of members of the 90th Congress," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 23 (1967), pp. 33-41.

TABLE 3.11.--Continued

^bThe following letters stand for the following occupations:

a - agriculture	k - labor leader
b - business and banking	l - lawyer
c - public service or politics	m - medicine
e - engineering	r - minister
j - journalism	t - teacher

Trend analysis indicates that this situation has been stable over time. TABLE 3.12 compares the average age, religion, education, and occupations of the Armed Service members in the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses. The data indicate that the membership has been composed of individuals who are over 50, Protestant, at least college graduates and considered law and politics their occupations.

Military Backgrounds

The United States Congress has had among its members a high proportion of individuals who served in the Armed Services. Many representatives have had outstanding and illustrious military careers. Some Congressmen have served as junior or full grade officers, others were decorated for battlefield valor, and a third group, when their active duty was completed, joined the reserves. It was assumed, because of its subject matter, that the Armed Services Committee would attract a high percentage of members with such backgrounds.

Among those individuals who were interviewed a significant number stated that they had joined the Committee because of their military background. The comments of a Democrat are illustrative of this point,

I believe in world peace. That it can be achieved. I believe one way to achieve it is through security. Through being prepared. I was a war hero with lots of medals so I had a great interest especially through the idea of how the dough-boy or the lower echelon man thinks and feels. These factors, plus people in my district coaxing me to go on because of the hardware. I sort of

^a
TABLE 3.12.--The personal data for Members of the House Armed Services Committee on the 1947, 1957, and 1967 Committee by Party

	80th Congress Rep. Dem.		85th Congress Rep. Dem.		90th Congress Rep. Dem.	
<u>Average Age</u>	51.2	51	53	56.7	53.1	52.6
<u>Religion</u>						
Protestant	4	8	10	11	12	15
Roman Catholic	2	3	3	6	5	7
None or not recorded	11	2	4	3	0	0
<u>Schooling</u>						
High School	4	0	3	2	1	4
College or advanced Degree	1	6	4	5	6	2
Law school	9	6	8	12	10	17
Not recorded	3	1	2	1	0	0
<u>Occupations^b</u>						
Agriculture	2	3	3	3	5	3
Business or Banking	8	3	6	5	4	3
Civil service or politics	9	11	16	17	10	15
Journalism	1	2	1	3	5	1
Law	9	10	6	12	15	8
Teaching	2	2	3	1	4	3
Medicine	0	0	0	0	0	1

^aU.S., Congressional Directory, 1947, 1957, 1967 and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vols. 3, 13, 23, 1947, 1957, 1967.

^bSome Congressmen had more than one occupation listed.

felt that you can't evaluate this kind of pressure when it sends you in the direction that you yourself want to go.

A senior Republican mentioned,

I had a long service background and commanded large numbers of men during World War II. I certainly got a lot of pride out of it. The first term down here I was put on Public Works, which I didn't care for, and the next term I went on Armed Services.

A former Naval Commander related,

I joined Armed Services because of my Naval experience. When I came to Washington I felt I could make my greatest contribution on either Armed Services or Foreign Affairs.

Some members have been so interested in the subject and so active in military affairs that they might be considered "professional patriots." The comments of one former member are illustrative of this point,

I have always been interested in the military. In World War II, I volunteered and fought in France as a doughboy ... after the war I came home and joined the American Legion. One of the first things I did was to try and move up; eventually I got as high as the national public director. I might have been President if I didn't get interested in politics, you can't do both you know. Well anyway, at _____ I was in charge of rewriting the code of military law for the state and I got involved in the entire operation of the Armed Forces. I thought when I came down to Washington that I could do my best on that committee.

A Southern Democrat illustrated this point in his remarks about the type of person who joins the committee,

The type of guy who believes in the military and the need to have it. Someone who isn't interested in using it as a springboard to a higher office or one who wants to promote the left-wing McCarthy ideas. This might change in the future, but right now we have people who believe that military men are interested in peace not war. That David Shoup stuff that military men want war is pure buck. These guys recognize the importance of security. Anyone who held any other notions would find that committee anathema. He would feel isolated and lost and would want off.

Throughout the committee's history, individuals with significant military service have been interested in joining. A study of the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses reveals that the committee usually has a high percentage of its members with extensive military careers.

TABLE 3.13 lists the percentage of veterans in the House and on the committee by party in the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congress. In every Congress the percentage of Republican veterans on the committee is greater than the percentage of Republican veterans in the House. This has not always been true for the Democrats. In 1958 a greater percentage of Democrats were veterans in the House than on the committee. Furthermore, the percentage of Congressmen with military

^a
TABLE 3.13.--The percentage of Congressional members and committee members who served in the military by party in the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses

	80th		85th		90th	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
Percentage of the committee	50%	43%	75%	45%	77%	74%
Percentage of the Congress	41%	37%	63%	57%	73%	74%

^aMel Price (D, Ill.) who joined the committee in 1948 to replace Patrick Drewry (D, Va.) and Frank J. Becker (R, N.Y.) who joined the committee in 1958 to replace Sterling Cole (D, N.Y.) were not included in this or TABLES 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16.

service is increasing. In the 80th Congress, 41% of the Republicans and 37% of the Democrats had served in the military; in 1967 the former was 73% and the latter 74%. With the exception of a veterans' organization, it would be impossible to find a group with such a high percentage of previous military service. This trend is likely to continue. The institution, in 1948, of a peacetime draft brings into question the patriotic fervor and moral fitness of a candidate who has not served. For this reason the two major parties, especially the Republicans, are more likely to nominate a veteran for higher office.¹

Does prior military service have an impact on a member's committee work? Members who were asked this question stated that they were, or thought they were, "roughest" in terms of treatment of witnesses and budget allocations, on the service in which they had

¹Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenbaum, "The Veterans in the Electoral Process: The House of Representatives," Journal of Politics XIX (May 1957), 184-201. The authors also note that the general public, when given a choice in an election contest between a veteran and a non-veteran candidate, does not show any preference.

served. They felt that a lack of military experience could hamper an individual who was trying to evaluate a program; this handicap was thought to be especially severe in the area of personnel morale. However, no one was willing to state that if a member had not served in the military, he could not do a competent job. It was expected that such an individual would be more self-conscious of his position.¹

It was thought that those individuals who were officers in the Armed Forces would seek out membership on Armed Services. It was reasoned that Congressmen often join committees on which they can render, because of their backgrounds, the most useful service. A former career in the military would predispose many individuals to join Armed Services.

A study of the officers in the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congress and their membership on Armed Services indicates that officers do not have any special affinity for the committee. In these sessions the percentage of representatives who had been military officers was 14%, 24%, and 34% respectively. For the same sessions the percentage of officers on Armed Services was 21%, 33%, and 33%. In each case the number of members of the committee who had been military officers was not unusually higher than the number of members of the House with similar traits (see TABLE 3.14). What is unusual is the high percentage

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses. The two Democratic chairmen, Mr. Vinson and Mr. Rivers, and a powerful southern Democrat, Mr. Hebert, have never served in the Armed Forces. It has been clear that these three men have been the staunchest supporters of the military point of view. Much greater psychological data is needed before the lack of military service can be shown to have any influence on the attitude and outlooks of committee members. At this moment such a relationship must be greeted with greatest caution. Nonetheless, for the last 22 years, with the exception of Jefferson Cohelan, those committee members who have been the major critics of military programs and authorizations have all served or had distinguished service records.

of House members who either in war or as members of the reserves reached an officer's rank.

TABLE 3.14.--The percentage of Armed Service members and Congressmen who were previously officers, in the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses

	80th	85th	90th
Percentage of committee	21%	33%	33%
Percentage of Congress	14%	24%	34%

A very special type of officer is likely to seek out Armed Service membership. The committee is likely to attract officers who are above grade 4 pay scale.¹ This group, which for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps begins at Major and ends with a General, and the Navy, which begins with a Lieutenant Commander and ends with an Admiral, is composed of individuals who handled or handle large groups of men and make far reaching command decisions.

These men who made the military an important part of their careers often have occupational skills, especially suited for the work of the committee. This is readily apparent in TABLE 3.15. The percentage of full officers on the committee has gone from 6% in the 80th Congress to 23% in the 90th, whereas the percentage of full officers in the House has gone from 5% in the 80th to 12% in the 85th to 10% in the 90th Congress.

The percentage of committee members who were ex-officers,

It is always easier to criticize and be minimally subject to abuse when one has been an active or distinguished participant in a program under study.

¹Letter from Harold M. Maness, Colonel, U.S. Army, Military Personnel Policy, September 11, 1970.

TABLE 3.15.--The percentage of full officers on the committee and in Congress for the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congress

	80th	85th	90th
Percentage of the committee	6%	25%	23%
Percentage of the Congress	5%	12%	10%

especially full officers, was and is extremely high. Since 1957 approximately one-third of the membership has served in the Armed Forces in some sort of leadership position. What effect this has on their policy decisions can only be inferred. It was mentioned by those members interviewed that prior military service enabled an individual to bring to the committee a body of knowledge which is relevant to its work. This knowledge usually leads to a situation where the individual who possesses it becomes the committee's expert in that area of specialization. Whether or not ex-officers treat military authorizations with a more lenient or critical eye than other Congressmen cannot be precisely answered. It seems fair to say that such men, especially the full officers, would be more aware of the problems which the Armed Forces faces. They would be likely to evaluate all military authorizations and programs from a background which accepts the basic rationale for a large military machine.

War Heroes and Congressmen Active in the Reserves

Not only does the committee attract a high percentage of full officers but it also interests Congressmen who were war heroes. For purpose of analysis, a war hero is any individual who was decorated with a personalized medal in any one of America's wars. The committee

in the three sessions under analysis has had a large percentage of its members who were war heroes. TABLE 3.16 shows that the percentage of individuals with this type of trait varied from 13 in the 80th Congress to 15 in the 90th.¹

In terms of the entire Congress, the number of war heroes has increased from 5% in the 80th Congress to 14% in the 90th. This is an extremely high percentage of people possessing a very unusual award.

TABLE 3.16.--Percentage of members of the committee and the Congress in the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congress who were war heroes

	80th	85th	90th
Percentage of the committee	12%	16%	15%
Percentage of the Congress	5%	11%	14%

In terms of the general population, this percentage of Congressmen, taken as a group, is almost astronomical. There is no previous work in this area, but it seems apparent from TABLE 3.16 that individuals who have had an outstanding military career are more likely than the average citizen to seek higher office. A person who becomes a war hero apparently has certain qualities which propel him into the political arena. Naturally, much more work is needed in this area before this statement can be completely verified. Whatever the cause, there is a high percentage of Congressmen with unusual military backgrounds.

What impact this has on military programs and authorizations is not subject to concrete analysis. It is fair to say that these

¹In the 91st Congress three Congressmen who had been war heroes joined the committee raising the percentage of members with such a trait to twenty-three.

individuals should be predisposed to support the demands of the military, and in case of a national emergency expect similar types of sacrifices by the younger generation.¹

A number of Armed Service members have always been interested in the ready reserves. Although the top ranking leadership has never participated in the Reserves the committee's Chief Counsel and staff personnel have often been actively involved. Bob Smart, who was Chief Counsel from 1953 until 1963, and John R. Blandford, the present head, were, and are, reserve Major and Brigadier Generals. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know what effect their professional occupations had in their ability to rise in the reserves. It is obvious that their positions on the committee certainly could not have hurt them. The most recent data on Congressmen and the reserves indicate that of the ninety-four House members who belong in a ready, active, inactive, or retired reserve capacity, eleven were members of the Armed Services Committee.²

There is a great deal of controversy about whether or not members of Congress or the staff should be actively involved in reserve matters. Many Congressmen and outside groups feel it is unconstitutional.³ One staff official when questioned about this point replied,

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²This writer felt that the data for the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congress, on which members of the committee and Congress were in the reserves, as recorded in the Congressional Directory, were incomplete. Many individuals who are presently in the reserves did not list their affiliation under their biographies.

The present list was obtained from Congressman Biaggi's office. The Congressman sent me a Department of Defense release dated June 8, 1970 entitled Members of Congress who are Members of Reserve Components.

³A group called the Reservists Committee to Stop the War has brought suit in federal court to prevent a member of Congress from

Look, can anyone divorce himself from a conflict of interest. Should Congress be different . . . Why, according to that logic the only criteria for Congress would be whether a guy was on relief because they have nothing to which they are attached. Then they would vote themselves pay increases because it was the only thing they knew.

A number of committee members felt that it was unconstitutional for an individual to be a Congressman and a reservist. They, therefore, resigned their commissions when they joined the House. As one Democrat stated,

I think the Constitution clearly shows that a person can't stay in the reserves. I resigned for that reason. However, I feel everyone has to make his own choice.

A subcommittee chairman claimed,

I have always felt that being in the reserves and a member of Congress was unconstitutional. The entire relationship between the military and Congress becomes incestuous, it leads to a hand and glove operation. I think a man shouldn't be penalized for being a reservist, so that when he is in the Congress his rank should be frozen and when he leaves it should be reactivated.

However, a substantial number of Republicans believed that membership in the reserves was not only constitutional but beneficial to the committee.¹ They felt that any extra knowledge which an individual acquired through reserve service could only aid the group. The following statement by an Eastern Republican typifies this attitude.

By being in the reserves you get a better chance to understand what is going on. Look at ____, ____, and _____. When they come back from their summer camp duties they have fresh insights. Look, you simply can't learn anything from books and charts, you need experience. To my knowledge there has never been a major scandal involving the reserves and Congress. They can't sit on their tails to move up, they must produce, like everyone else.

being in the reserves. They claim that under Article I section 6 of the Constitution a legislator cannot be a member of the executive. "Military Congressmen," Time Magazine, vol. 90 (May 25, 1970), 67.

¹Of the seventeen Republicans on the committee, eight were in the reserves.

The same type of reasoning was offered by a senior Republican from the Middle West,

It helps the committee. Too many men don't know what it's like to be a member of the military . . . I don't believe in on-the-job training, I want a guy who knows what is up. I think a man should have the experience of the service. This on sight training isn't good for the job.

Ideological Viewpoints

One assumption made about the House Armed Services Committee in both the press and articles on the subject is the belief that the Committee attracts the most conservative members of Congress. It is alleged that only those individuals with a right of center persuasion seek out and are appointed to Armed Services. Congressmen who are conservative in both domestic and foreign affairs are selected for membership. These are the types of individuals who oppose government encroachment into the social and domestic sphere as well as the United Nations and foreign aid. Furthermore, it is assumed that this ideological bias tends to predispose them towards a "pro-military" viewpoint. A highly conservative member will be more likely to support the demands of the military.¹

In fact, a number of studies has linked extreme conservatism

¹For a similar interpretation by members of Congress, see William Proxmire, Report from Wasteland (New York: Praeger and Co., 1970), and Jonathan Bingham, "Can Military Spending be Controlled," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48 (October 1969), 51-67. Senator Joseph S. Clark in his discussion of the "Senate Establishment" alludes to this point. He believes the Senate is controlled by very conservative individuals who are united over white supremacy, a stronger devotion to property rights than human rights, support of the military establishment, belligerence in foreign affairs, and a determination to prevent Congressional reform. Joseph S. Clark, The Sapless Branch (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Chapter 6, in Ralph K. Huitt, "The Internal Distribution of Influence," The Senate, the Congress and America's Future, David B. Truman (ed.), p. 96.

with patriotism.¹

An individual who opposes domestic spending and civil rights legislation is more than likely to be "pro-military."² In the realm of foreign affairs he opposes international organizations and foreign aid, although such an individual would support a belligerent anti-communist foreign policy.³

One method that political scientists have used to study the actions of individual Congressmen is to analyze their roll call votes. The technique of roll call analysis has been used since the turn of the century, and the literature on it is extensive.⁴ The advantage of this method is that it enables the scholar to study Congressmen on

¹ Unfortunately, the link between these variables has been virtually ignored by those political scientists interested in the Congress, the reason probably being that until 1968 there was virtually no controversial "pro-military" votes. The roll call scores published by the Movement for a New Congress seem to indicate a relationship between opposition to domestic programs and "pro-military" voting. Ned Schneier et al., Vote Power, pp. 55-79.

² Richard Schmuck and Mark Chesler, "On Super Patriots -- A Definition and Analysis," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 19 (1963), 31-50; Mark Chesler and Richard Schmuck, "Social Psychological Characteristics of Super-Patriots," and James McEvoy, "Conservatism or Extremism: Goldwater Supporters in the 1964 Presidential Election," The American Right Wing, edited by Robert A. Schoenberger (U.S.A.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), pp. 163-192, 241-279.

³ Raymond E. Wolfinger, et al., "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," Ideology and Discontent, edited by David E. Apter (Colliers: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 267-272; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right: Coughlinites, McCarthyites, and Birchers," The Radical Right, edited by Daniel Bell (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 339.

⁴ For an extensive bibliography on roll call analysis and the use that political scientists have made of it see the first chapters of David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty Among Congressmen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), and William W. Shannon, Constituency and Congressional Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1968).

data which is clear and precise; anybody using the same material would come to the same conclusions.¹

The average Conservative Coalition score of every member who sat on Armed Services from 1961 to the present is listed in TABLE 3.17. The score which is compiled by Congressional Quarterly Almanac means the percentage of times a Congressman voted with a majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats against a majority of Northern Democrats. The issues which divide these groups are always controversial and ideological in nature and are a good measurement of an individual's conservative leanings.

The average score for the members was computed by finding each individual's mean score between the 87th through 90th Congresses.² For some Congressmen four scores were available, for others only one. Naturally, this method of analysis has many drawbacks. An individual who sat on the Committee for only one or two terms might have had a much higher or lower score if more data had been available. Secondly, in some terms of Congress more roll call votes are applicable than in others. As an example, in the 88th Congress 27 votes met the criteria, whereas in the 90th Congress the number was 105. Despite the shortcomings, it was felt that the present method would give the most complete picture of how Armed Service members compared to one another.³

¹Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Alden R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 4-5.

²This same method was used to find the mean scores for the average Republican, Southern Democrat, and Northern Democrat during the same time period. See V. O. Key, A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), p. 10.

³For an in-depth discussion of mean scores, see Dennis L. Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science (New York:

Furthermore, it was noticed that members who had sat on the committee between 1961-1968 had similar scores term after term. The data revealed that high or low scores in one term would have remarkably similar scores in the other three terms. Therefore, it can be assumed that the mean score of an individual who sat on Armed Services for only one term has a high degree of reliability.

The data which divide the Committee into groups of Republicans, Southern Democrats, and Northern Democrats, indicate the membership's conservative bias. The average Northern and Southern Armed Service Democrat has a higher score than his House counterparts. Twelve out of twenty-three Republicans, twelve out of sixteen Southern Democrats, and thirteen out of twenty-one Northern Democrats had mean Conservative Coalition scores above those of the average Republican, Southern Democrat, and Northern Democratic Congressman. For purposes of analysis it was decided that anyone who had above 75 on the Conservative Coalition score was a Congressman who, based on the linkage between conservatism and patriotism, probably had a "pro-war" bias. Seventeen members of the Committee, twelve of them Republicans and five Southern Democrats, have scores which would predispose them towards an ideological support of the military.¹

In terms of this writer's interviews, members of this group were by and large the most "hawkish" about Vietnam, the most determined to develop the A.B.M. and other new weapons, and the most concerned about the future prestige and needs of the military. The find-

Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1969), pp. 13-16, 95-108.

¹See Appendix F for the Americans for Democratic Action's scores of Armed Service members. The data indicate that members who had a conservative coalition score of 75 or more had an ADA rating of 11 or less.

ings are also revealing in view of the standard cliché that the Armed Services Committee attracts the most conservative members of Congress. In terms of most Republicans and Southern Democrats this is probably

TABLE 3.17.--The average Conservative Coalition score of Armed Service members compared to the average Congressman's score in terms of Republican, Southern Democrats and Northern Democrats

<u>Republicans</u>					
Foreman, Ed.	96	Gavin, L.	76	Osmers, F.	52
King, C.	92	Dickinson, W.	76	Van Zandt	49
Smith, J.	91	Gubser, C.	76	Stafford, R.	49
Chamberlain, C.	90	Becker, F.	76	Halleck, C.	48
Clancy, E.	87	Wilson, B.	68	O'Konski, A.	48
Hall, D.	82	Norblad	67	Schweiker	42
Bray, W. G.	79	Bates, B.	60	Whalen, C.	27
Arends, L.	79	Pirnie, A.	56		
The average Republican Conservative Coalition score is 70					
The average Armed Services Rep. Cons. Coalition score is 68					
<u>Southern Democrats</u>					
Kitchin, P.	95	Bennett, C.	71	Hebert, E.	45
Lennon, A.	93	Rivers, M.	71	Wickersham, V.	35
Kilgore, J.	89	Long, S. O.	71	Vinson, C.	30
Fisher, O. C.	84	Huddleston, G.	70	Johnson, J.	23
Winstead, A.	78	Rutherford, T.	69		
Hagan, G. W.	73	Hardy, P.	61		
The average Southern Democrat's Conservative Coalition score is 61					
The average Armed Service's S.D. Cons. Coalition score is 66					
<u>Northern Democrats</u>					
Ichord, R.	69	Evans, F.	16	Philbin, P.	8
Randall	60	Hicks, F.	15	Wilson, C.	7
Walker, J.	50	Brewster	13	Irwin	5
Pike, O.	29	Doyle, C.	13	Price, M.	4
Machen	23	Lankford	13	Byrnes, J.	4
Burkehalter	22	Kowalski	13	Nedzi, L.	2
Long, C.	19	Leggert, B.	9	Cohelan	2
Stratton, S.	19	Love, R.	8		
The average Northern Democrat's Conservative Coalition score is 12					
The average Armed Service's N.D. Cons. Coalition score is 18					

valid, but this generalization cannot be made about the Committee's Northern Democrats. The Committee has many Northern Democrats who, based on their Conservative Coalition scores, are in the liberal

wing of their party.¹

Chapter Summary

Several facts clearly emerge from the data on the backgrounds, districts, and ideologies of Armed Services members. An individual who is a member of the committee is likely to have had a significant military career. He has either served in the Armed Forces as a junior or full officer, or, if he was only a private, he distinguished himself in combat. The member is likely to represent, either through defense installations or military related industries, a district which is economically dependent upon the continuation of large defense budgets. The districts of many members could face economic crisis without large defense budgets.

In essence, almost every member has a personal background, district, or ideology which might predispose him towards the Armed Forces' goals. A member of Armed Services is likely to represent a district, to have had a personal background, or to have adopted an overall ideology which motivates him to support the Pentagon's proposals.

TABLE 3.18. arranges the 62 Congressmen who sat on Armed Services between 1961-1968 into categories based on their potential support of the military. The table is broken into groupings of Republicans, Northern Democrats, and Southern Democrats. The data reveal that, during this time period, almost every member had a personal background, district, ideology, or combination therein, which

¹See Appendix F to compare their high ADA scores to their low Conservative Coalition scores.

might predispose him towards the Armed Forces' goals. There is considerable difference between the three groups. In the case of the Northern Democrats, their main loyalty is potentially based on district considerations. Fifteen out of twenty-one represent districts

TABLE 3.18.--Armed Service members and possible motivation for supporting the military in terms of Republicans, Northern Democrats, and Southern Democrats

Reasons	Republicans	Northern Dem.	Southern Dem.
1 - District	2	15	9
2 - Background	4	0	2
3 - Ideology	3	0	2
4 - District and Background	3	3	0
5 - District and Ideology	4	0	2
6 - Background and Ideology	3	0	0
7 - District, Background, and Ideology	1	0	1
8 - None	3	4	0

which have significant concentrations of defense installations or defense related industries. In terms of the Southern Democrats all sixteen have potential loyalties to the military. Unlike Northern Democrats whose source of possible loyalty is through their districts, Southern Democrats have many members who are highly conservative. The most varied group in terms of potential allegiance is the Armed Services Republicans. Eighteen out of twenty-one have many different possible motivations towards a pro-military position. For this group the most important potential link seems to be ideology. Eleven out of eighteen are scaled along this dimension. Finally, of the sixty-two members only seven or approximately 11% of the membership (three Republicans and four Northern Democrats) have no preconceived or

apparent allegiances to the military.¹

Naturally, the absence or presence of a military oriented background, district, or ideology would not ipso facto make or not an individual favorably disposed towards the military. However, these variables do make it more likely that an individual is going to be favorably disposed towards the military's point of view. In terms of the House Armed Services Committee 89% of the members had a potential source of loyalty.

¹The three Republican members were Alvin O'Konski (Wis.), Richard S. Schweiker (Penn.), and Charles A. Halleck (Ind.). The four Democratic members were Clyde Doyle (Cal.), Everett G. Burkhalter (Cal.), Jeffrey Cohelan (Cal.), and Lucien Nedzi (Mich.). In terms of this group, apparently only Schweiker, Cohelan, and Nedzi ever adopted positions contrary to the official Armed Service position. The other four members always seemed to go along with the Committee's traditional goals. Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

CHAPTER IV

THE COMMITTEE IN OPERATION

Armed Services is a committee with a very heavy workload. Authorizations for defense must be made on an annual basis. As with most committees of the House, the executive branch of the government submits recommendations which the committee evaluates. According to the committee staff, 70-90% of all legislation which is discussed by the committee is proposed by the Department of Defense. Individual members rarely submit their own bill; at most they introduce legislation of a very minor nature.¹ The most important function of the Armed Services Committee is to present to the House its recommendations on the programs submitted by the Department of Defense. Usually, with a few minor alterations, the wishes of the military elites are presented to the House. Occasionally, the committee membership makes significant changes in the Pentagon's program. In either case the committee is responsible for drafting defense authorizations.

In devising a legislative program the committee members are motivated and channelled by many influences. As in any large group some members of the committee are far more important to its output

¹If a member wants to introduce a bill he first submits it to the Pentagon for its approval, and after it is reviewed it is forwarded to the Bureau of the Budget for the same purposes. If either body rejects the bill its chances of success are slight. Usually only the most minor bills pass without executive approval. Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

than others. Certain long standing committee norms of operation or accepted canons of action also shape the final program. It was hypothesized, based on the writings about Armed Services, that the committee operated with a minimum amount of partisanship and was led by its chairman and senior members. It is the purpose of this chapter to understand how the Armed Services Committee creates its legislation. What interplay of forces affects and shapes the committee's decisions? In order to answer to answer these questions the committee will be viewed from two perspectives. First, what norms or mode of actions affect the committee's operations? Second, how does the individual member affect the final program, and why are some individuals far more powerful than others?

The Norm of Nonpartisanship

The most important characteristic or norm which affects the operation of Armed Services is nonpartisanship. This trait influences not only how committee members work and interact, but also the type of legislation which is drafted. Nonpartisanship is usually defined as working and operating in committee without regard to partisan party considerations; each individual reacts according to the dictates of his own conscience without cues from his party leaders. This trait is not peculiar to the Armed Services Committee. Other committees of the House try to conduct business with a minimum of partisanship although they are not always successful.¹ The Armed Services Committee not only encourages nonpartisanship, but successfully employs it at

¹Richard Fenno, pp. 191-263, and John Manley, Wilbur Mills, paper presented at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 4, 1968, p. 15.

almost every stage of the committee's operation. From the very first committee meeting of each Congress, when both the chairman and ranking minority member speak out against partisanship, until the close of the legislative session the membership and staff reinforce the norm.

At the start of each term whoever is chairman impresses this committee norm on the members. Vinson once stated,

As we approach our legislative program, ... I want to emphasize the prevailing policy of the committee with reference to partisan considerations. As in the past, there will be no room for narrow or partisan considerations. Our sole objective is to provide, within our area of responsibility, the best possible defense of America.¹

He later went on to show the utility of such a policy.

I consider this as one of the most important committees in the Congress, because we have more work to do, we are charged with great responsibility, and we have made a great record. And we make it because we sit in here as a team. We do not sit here as members of the majority or members of the minority. We sit² here as Americans to do what is best and proper for the country.

At the same meeting the Ranking Minority member gave his bi-partisan support. "The chairman mentioned there was no partisanship in this committee. This is absolutely right, we do not decide issues here on the question of politics."³

Mr. Rivers in his capacity as chairman has fully endorsed this norm. On one occasion he remarked,

I will ask Mr. Bates in a few minutes to introduce the five new Republican members. This is the last time that the new members will be referred to as Republicans, for we pride ourselves in this committee on the fact that we are nonpolitical in every sense of the word.

¹U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Organization Meeting, 87th Cong., 1st sess., February 16, 1961, p. 2.

²Ibid., p. 11.

³Ibid., p. 3.

There is no room for political partisanship in national security affairs. We sink or swim together, and if our national security fails we will all go down together. I can't overstress this point. In the 20 years that I have been a member of this committee, I can't remember an important incident when there was a political division of the committee. This has been true regardless of which party has been in power and regardless of who has been presiding as chairman.¹

As in the past the ranking minority member concurred in the view.

Mr. Bates endorsed the chairman's view on nonpartisanship by stating, "as indicated in your statement, it is for one purpose and one purpose alone, and that is the best security of the United States."²

This norm which is expressed by the Armed Service leaders finds a receptive audience among the members. A study of the membership of the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses indicates that Armed Service members are less likely to follow their party's wishes on key legislation. The average Armed Service member is likely to have a Party Unity score below that of the average House member. TABLE 4.1 reveals that in every Congress under study with the exception of the Republicans in the 80th Congress, the average member had lower scores than his House counterparts. This indicates a readiness and predisposition towards the committee's norms of nonpartisanship.

The Norm of Committee Consensus

The committee's definition of nonpartisanship is more all-inclusive than the standard textbook usage. On Armed Services it also means that dissent should be kept to a minimum and consensus should be the individual member's guide. Committee decisions should be arrived

¹U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Organization Meeting, 90th Cong., 1st sess., February 1, 1967, p. 2.

²Ibid., p. 4.

TABLE 4.1.^{a, b} The party Unity Score for the average House and Armed Service members by party for the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses

	80th Congress		85th Congress		90th Congress	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
House Member	83	88	68	66	63	70
Armed Service Member	78	91	65.9	60.2	56.6	67.6

^aCongressional Quarterly Almanac, vols. 4, 13, 23 (1947, 1957, 1967).

^bCongressional Quarterly Almanac didn't use an average score for Republicans and Democrats in the 80th Congress. The average score was created by using every 10th Republican and Democrat listed in the data.

at by consensus or general agreement, and a member is expected to dissent in committee not on the House floor.¹

There are many reasons why this norm has developed. The Democratic and Republican parties do not adopt separate policies on matters of national security. They do not issue or demand from their members an official party position. Whenever there has been disagreement between the executive branch and the Congress, such as A.B.M., the issue has been decided on nonpartisan grounds.² Without party positions, the average member is totally unprepared to oppose the military's recommendations. As one staff official stated,

That's the nature of it. The parties never take a stand. Not even on ABM. When there is no party position most people feel they must go along. They believe they can't afford to tamper. People get into patterns and think along certain ways and begin to accept what they previously rejected.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²The only recent exception took place in 1961 when the Republican Policy Committee endorsed Congressman Gubser's amendment to add more nuclear submarines to the Pentagon's requests. The amendment was defeated although in the following year the Pentagon adopted his

However, this is not the most important reason for the membership's acceptance of the traditional Armed Service norm. The key factor is the type of Congressmen who join it. As was indicated in chapter two, Armed Services is a committee which has considerable prestige and an interesting workload. For these reasons large number of Congressmen actively seek to join. Once on the Committee a new member is more than likely to remain. Thus, almost the entire membership is made up of active seekers who want to specialize in the Committee's area of concern. These members who support Armed Service's goals should be predisposed to use and adopt the committee's working norms.¹

Secondly, consensus and bipartisanship is reinforced by the background, ideology, and districts of the members. As was demonstrated in chapter three, a high percentage of the committee had similar military backgrounds, shared the same basic philosophy towards the Armed Services, or represented districts which were dependent upon Defense Department actions. Many members because of one or all three of these variables share a common orientation; they perceive and react to events in a similar fashion. Instead of mirroring the factions and differing viewpoints which are present in the entire Congress, the members, on defense issues, are practically in accord. The Armed Service Committee thus brings together a group of likeminded individuals who naturally are predisposed toward consensus.

proposals. Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress 1945-1965 (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 396. "Extra Planes Approved for Planes, Missiles, Ships," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 17 (1961), p. 415.

¹For an example of what occurs when a committee is composed of members who are unhappy in their assignments see John Bibby and Roger Davidson, pp. 183-196.

The Membership's Perception of the Committee's Norms

According to those members who were interviewed, the main reason Armed Services has adopted the norm of consensus is the "nature of the issue." To these men "nature of the issue" means that national security is too important to be decided or debated in terms of narrow partisan considerations. The security of the nation demands that issues should not be decided along party lines. A former member stated,

It simply has to be that way. National defense is nonpartisan because of the importance of the topic to the nation (pounds the desk). Defense is a going thing and we cannot afford to let our security down. Some hotheads come down here and think they're going to change things but they soon learn the importance of being united for the sake of the country.

A Southerner on the Committee said,

... After all there is an awful lot of seniority on this Committee and the senior men over the years lead. It's not a subject of controversy or worth arguing over so that a person can have different views. We are on the same path ...

One former member disagreed slightly with the typical definition. He replied,

The Committee isn't totally nonpartisan. The final result is nonpartisan but getting there is sometimes steeped in controversy ... I will say at the end of a legislative period, based on the fact that we need something, and the vital security of the nation is involved, we all sort of come together.

Most members expressed the opinion that national security was vital, whereas domestic programs were not; they feared the day when defensive needs would be sacrificed because of domestic pressure. The nation, according to these members, could always postpone or survive without domestic programs but couldn't last without constant and continual defense authorizations. The other committees could afford to debate the merits of programs and bicker along partisan lines, but

Armed Services could not tolerate such a luxury. As a senior staff official stated,

The committee deals in national security. This is an issue that is needed from year to year. There is no controversy about this, and the committee has to have a definite program. The nature of the problem and responsibility makes it mandatory that agreement be reached. ... We are talking about the survival of our country and simply can't trifle. The committee moves the topic and the executive pushes us in a definite direction. The committee cuts across state lines. This isn't like poverty where you can ship all over the place, this is important.

A junior Democrat from a very poor state said,

We need an adequate defense. The idea of spending money for internal improvements would be fine, but if there isn't an adequate defense than there is no chance of maintaining any of these improvements.

A former member, stating an often heard theme, remarked,

I think the most important thing is defense. What's good for the whole rather than the parts. I don't buy the idea of building up one segment at the expense of all. Without defense we are licked. They only understand force. I don't see giving it to the ghettos.

The Committee's Protection of the Military

The membership's belief in the overriding importance of defense predisposes it to support and promote the interests of the military. During this writer's interviews, the members were questioned about the committee's role. Four of the five committee dissenters were adamant in their feelings that the committee acted as the spokesman for the military or the military supporter on Capitol Hill. One Democrat said,

We speak for the military. We are the bugle blowers. We shove the program through. It's a sad commentary but we are the lobby for defense. Without us more attacks on the programs ... The committee sees itself as the savior of the military. As Mr. Rivers so often reminds them if we don't protect the military who will. They feel the only way to protect them is to be on their side.

Another Democratic critic stated,

The role of this committee is to give the military what they want at all times or give them more. The committee publicly tells themselves that they are protecting the poor military who only have missiles and bombers. They also believe they are true watchdogs. In reality they are a group who vote legislation up or down. No real impact on policy or weapon development.

Finally, the comments of a Republican critic,

Whatever it is we aren't doing our job. We do not really check. They have failed one hundred percent. I don't blame the committee but the whole country. We are a disgrace just letting these programs and authorizations slide by. We don't dig we only hear the military's point of view and accept it as gospel. We only get a chance to vote things up or down. No real chance to be in there from the beginning. I am amazed at the laxity.

In terms of the members who supported the traditional Armed Services norms, seven Democrats and five Republicans were asked, "some people claim that the committee is pro-military, is this true?" For purpose of analysis it would have been better if every member of the committee who was interviewed was asked this question. Unfortunately, lack of time and the priority of asking certain members very specific questions prohibited this. Of those twelve committee supporters who were asked this question it was expected that they would deny the charge or greatly modify it. Somewhat surprisingly, only one individual, a freshman Democrat, even moderately disagreed.

It is because of the material and who you deal with. Who else is interested in going on? Would you expect someone from Labor and Education to be against Education and Labor? Why should we be different? Let's face it, if you want freedom, if you desire that the country move safely through the free enterprise, not socialist, system, have to have it. We are tough with them, tougher than I expected. We give them a real dressing down and make them justify all they say. We are real tough on them making them cut through the fat. It's no rubber stamp; real talent making them go back for more information. I sit and watch some of the guys give the brass a real tongue lashing.

The other members not only perceived the committee as being pro-military but saw this orientation in a very favorable light. They felt

that it was best for the Congress and the country. One Southern Democrat went so far as to claim that the committee's role as actively promoting the wishes of the military was constitutionally mandated.

Of course our role is pro-military; what would you expect. This is our role as defined under the constitution. If you don't like this idea change the constitution.

A subcommittee chairman stated,

Of course the committee is pro-military; what else could it be. We have the vital interest and security of the United States in mind. We cannot afford to allow this to be hurt. With the amount of information which we have, which is often highly confidential, we must back the military.

A junior Republican replied,

Naturally, we are pro-military, who else will be? We have an awesome responsibility; it is our job to protect the nation. We just have to support them.

The group stressed the idea that the committee's pro-military stand was necessary, that in a sense someone had to defend the military from attack in the press, Congress, and executive branch. The usual sentiment, which was echoed, was that the brass couldn't speak for its own interests, that they were being attacked from all sides, and if the committee members in word and deed didn't defend them who would. It was necessary for the good of the nation that they have some supporters.

This type of idea was expressed by a freshman Republican who stated,

The Committee is pro-military. Our rule of operation is to help the military view prevail in Congress. I don't agree with this Shoup idea (former Marine Commandant Shoup in the April 1969 issue of the Atlantic stated that the military favored war in order to receive promotions). I don't think military men go out of their way for wars. I think this view is accepted by the committee that the military wants peace.

One senior Republican pushed the argument so far that he felt the committee sometimes knew more about what the military needed than they did themselves.

It should be who else is willing to support the military's point of view, who else might help them. It is necessary. After all, we know more about what they need than they do. Take the issue of the Polaris Submarines and a Nuclear Navy. We rammed it down their throats and boy are they happy now. The Reserves and the two-front navy are other examples of what we did. We showed the way. In many instances the committee knew more about what the military needs and should have than they do.

The data indicate a strong adherence on the part of the members toward the goals and aspirations of the military. Eighteen members stated in one fashion or another that the main function of the committee was to act as the military's spokesman on the "Hill." It is noteworthy that most of these individuals, whose voting records indicate that they are fiscally conservative, adopt a position which requires them to "spend all that it takes" to meet the national security needs.

Consequences of the Membership's Support for the Military

These attitudes have significant consequences on the member's treatment of the military brass. It predisposes them towards a confidence in the military officials. The result of this confidence is that usually the military's programs and monetary requests are accepted in total. Individuals who quibble over a million dollars in a poverty program have supported defense programs, costing billions of dollars, with a minimum of debate.¹ When asked about this seeming contradiction, many stressed the idea that they "would rather err on the side of too much than too little," or "we never again want to

¹Fred J. Cook, p. 19. See chapter eight for the Committee's use of these tactics to pass the controversial 1969 Defense Authorization Bill.

come up short."¹ The following comment by one of the committee's top ranking Republicans typifies the members' rationale for defense spending.

The role of Armed Services is to keep the country prepared and make sure that we never again come up short as we did in Korea. In this world great need to insure fitness. We need to meet all contingencies. Need to be prepared. Our job is this, it's far better to err on the side of too much than on the side of too little. Look at the Pueblo; we couldn't do anything, we weren't prepared. I feel we should spend all we need and I'm willing to do it.

Many stated that the reason they were willing to go along with the Pentagon's requests was that they didn't have the technical knowledge to oppose the professional military's viewpoints. It is noteworthy that in the domestic field these same Congressmen who know as little about such complicated areas as tax policy, education, and housing are able to offer their opinions and even argue against policy without difficulty. Yet, in national security matters they are willing to defer their judgments.² As one Democrat, in a minority report accompanying the 1968 Defense Authorization Bill, wrote:

At a time when we weigh precariously in the House the extension or curtailment of critical Head Start, Education and Health programs on the basis of a few million dollars expenditure, on the Armed Services Committee we move ahead adding hundreds of millions of dollars to programs with hardly time to reflect on the magnitude of the act.³

¹These cliches were used long before Nixon's speech to go ahead with deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. They have been employed by Armed Service members since the committee's inception. Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²See chapter six for similar actions by Congressmen not on the committee. See also Lewis A. Dexter, New Perspective on the House of Representatives, edited by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, pp. 175-194, and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 418-427 on the same point.

³U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, House Report No. 1645, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 5, 1968, p. 71.

A liberal ex-member of the committee suggested why the committee and Congress have adopted this position.

The issue simply can't be bucked. The J.C.S. come down here and start talking about external dangers. They keep stressing, 'don't trust what they say, look at their potential.' Suppose they say to you the entire security of the nation rests on these weapons. According to our information, by 1975 Russia will have X number and we're in trouble if we don't go ahead and build them. How are you going to resist? Everyone is for national defense and who wants to take a chance on being wrong?

The same basic idea was expressed by a staff official commenting on why Congress approved Defense bills.

Do you know what a billion dollars is? Do you know what it will buy? Who the hell does! They say they need it so why argue. If you were told we need 100 missiles, costing 100 million dollars, could you resist ...

Consensus is what the members strive for in order to pass a legislative program. They realize that a committee which is in agreement on the floor of the House usually has little difficulty achieving its legislative requests. When the chairman can announce that the membership stands 100% behind the bill, it is very difficult for opposition to develop. Dissension is accepted by the members. However, they generally feel that it should be reserved for the committee room. An individual should express his point of view behind closed doors, and once the committee has reached a point of compromise he should support it.¹

The manner in which the members receive most of their information tends to reinforce their predisposition toward accepting the

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses. Manley and Fenno have recorded a similar phenomenon for Ways and Means and Appropriations. These committees try to settle all differences at mark up to protect their bills from Congressional amendment. Richard Fenno, pp. 95-112, 432-471, and John F. Manley, "The House Ways and Means Committee" (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University, 1964), pp. 81-104.

Department of Defense's requests. In order to find out about policy or projects, the committee members and staff deal almost entirely with the Armed Forces personnel. Some of the junior members are unhappy about the present research gathering techniques. One committee opponent summed up the problem by stating:

The process of education tends to eliminate any dissent in the committee. They keep getting only one point of view, and over the years they start to wear blinders. Year in and year out four star generals buttering you up. Regardless of how you felt when you first joined you get sucked in. Over a five year period you keep listening to all this pro-military stuff; before you know it you are one of them. There isn't any evil intent; the whole set up drives you. You realize you are one of forty with a limited ability to get anything but Armed Forces information. You are getting nowhere trying to hamper the direction of the committee. You discover that you really can't buck them.

Most members, even those who are extremely pro-military, understand the drawbacks of this situation but imply the only alternative would be to set up a Pentagon size staff on the Hill.¹

The members stated that the Pentagon officials are helpful and the present arrangement is perfectly acceptable. A few complained it was difficult under existing circumstances to discover any irregularities, but they felt in the last "analysis" the Department of Defense must be responsible for its own programs. "They have to check themselves."

Two other variables tend to promote committee agreement. First, the membership is willing, wherever possible, to postpone the authorization of funds till the future. Monetary authorizations which are not vital to the military's needs are tabled during periods of fiscal restraints. One Eastern Republican commented,

We stress the need to save money but never foolishly. Let's face

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

it, the Russians won't do much. I try to get them to postpone projects. Then later when the climate is right and we can afford to do it we'll proceed. The army wants an auditorium at West Point. Hell I want all the services to have them but the time isn't right for it now. So we get them to hold off.

A second factor is individual members' service loyalties. An individual committee member often favors, either from district considerations or personal background, one branch of the service over the others.¹

Your district often determines which service you are likely to favor. Mine is full of naval equipment, and I find that I tend to promote their interests as does the chairman. However, this tends to even out since the whole committee has its favorites.

A former member claimed,

I think that individuals favor particular branches either because of the location of their districts or because of their former service loyalties. In the end it all gets evened out.

Members who commented on this subject did not feel that it increased the size of authorizations for the program. However, it seems more than likely that service loyalties and district considerations of each member tend to expand the committee's program. Since so many individuals will not oppose the program over little matters, the House Armed Services legislative recommendations are subject to increases. This fact is discernible from the comments of one Democrat who is opposed to the committee's orientation. Yet when his state had an opportunity to gain defense contracts on an airplane he opposed, he did not protest.

¹In 1961 the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report printed the opinion of some political analysts that Armed Services had a pro-navy bias. According to these people the bias was based upon the fact that 25 out of 37 members had districts in states which bordered on the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 17 (March 24, 1961), p. 471. The present committee has 23 out of 40 members with this type of district. U.S., Congressional Directory, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1968.

. . . I was opposed to a particular bomber, but it would be built in _____. It would help my friend's district and would also benefit me. So what the hell, I wear two hats down here, one local and one national. I figured, let someone else complain. This often happens. Most men, if things will benefit their state or district, won't complain.

The Committee at Work

The impact of the committee's norms affect every phase of its operation. The House Armed Service staff is one of the few on the "Hill" which is completely nonpartisan.¹ Regardless of which party is in power, the same staff officials remain. As one Midwestern Republican stated,

We don't have any minority staff people and we won't allow it. We don't want two positions developing. One staff for all. We don't want cliques on this committee. The staff is loyal to the subject matter and the committee and that's the way it's going to remain.²

The chairman and the ranking minority member work "hand-in-glove" in order to produce a legislative program. It should be noted that of all the committees of the House few, if any, have their Republican and Democratic leaders in such total accord.³ Since the inception of the committee, the chairman and ranking minority member have publicly disagreed about only two policy issues. The issues of Universal Military Training divided Messrs. Short and Vinson between 1949 and 1952, whereas the reorganization of the Pentagon split Arends and Vinson in 1958.⁴

¹See page 136 for other nonpartisan staffs.

²See U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Organization Meetings, for 1949, 1953, 1955, 1965 on this point.

³See chapter five for an in-depth analysis of this relationship.

⁴Reconstructed from Interview Responses. U.S., Congressional

At mark-up sessions, the chairman reaffirms the need that for the good of national security they should go to the floor of the Congress united. The chairman believes that the more united the committee the less chance of their bill being amended. Most House committees attempt to come to the floor with a minimum of dissension but few are as successful as Armed Services.¹ Naturally, Armed Service members have numerous questions and complaints about the military's legislative requests. Executive sessions are often noisy and tumultuous. Nonetheless, on the major issues of each legislative session, a consensus is worked out.

Members of the present committee were asked "how often have you you disagreed with the committee's position?" This question was directly asked of nineteen members. Three Congressmen who in answer to other questions mentioned specific instances where they filed a minority report or offered an amendment against the committee position were also included in the data. Responses were divided into four categories -- never disagreed, try to go along, disagree with specific items, disagreements in answer to other questions. TABLE 4.2 indicates that among those members there is a broad consensus about trying to support the committee's conclusions. Five Democrats and two Republicans replied they have never disagreed with committee policy. This group included three Democrats and one Republican who were freshmen and thus had only a limited opportunity to oppose decisions. It also included a Democrat and Republican who each had over twenty years of

Record, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., June 11, 1958, Vol., 104, part 8, pp. 10894-10896.

¹ John F. Manley and Richard Fenno, New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, edited by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W.

TABLE 4.2.--Members' perception of how often they disagreed with the committee's position

	Never disagreed	Try to go along	Disagreed with specifics	Mentioned disagree- ments in answer to other questions
Dem.	5	4	1	2
Rep.	2	5	2	1

service on Armed Services. The following comments by a subcommittee chairman and a freshman Republican typify this group.

I can't remember one time that I disagreed. I might have been lukewarm but I can't recall. After all it's going to pass in the end. You can't buck the establishment. They will win out finally. So why rock the boat and possibly upset a very vital program. ...

I haven't disagreed with the committee as of yet. I find the information which is presented has been solid. I may disagree with the total defense bill when it is presented.

Four Democrats and five Republicans were placed in the category of try to go along. These men "for the good of national security" believed they should support the total program. Included in this group were two individuals, one Republican and one Democrat, who mentioned a particular committee decision which they opposed on the House floor. However, their answers were given in a manner that indicated they felt this was an exception to the rule and that generally they strive to go along. A junior Republican replied,

Not often, only once on anything that was important. Over the issue of fall-out shelters I opposed the committee's position and spoke out against it on the House floor. It was eventually defeated in the Senate. Otherwise in the give and take of committees I tend to come over. Let's face it, when you have all the facts one tends to get pushed in a certain direction. ...

The majority of members replied that although they might disagree over minor matters either for the good of the military or a fear of rejecting the program they supported the committee goals. As one senior Democrat said,

I disagree every day on little things, but in my sixteen years on the committee never on anything major. Once you get all the facts only one way to go in this area. This isn't Labor and Education. That is why we get together. That is the reason I go along. These issues need resolution.

A Republican who has been on the committee for twelve years said,

I have never written a dissenting minority position and have rarely spoken out against the committee on the floor. I prefer to argue and make my position known and settled in committee. We all favor the idea that dissent is reserved for committee. The issue is too important to argue in public and I have been in accord.

A third-term Western Democrat who would like to oppose the committee's direction tells why he has not.

I have disagreed very rarely. I will vote against ABM but that is different. There is a broad based support against it in the nation. I believe in an adequate defense, the need for strength. But there has got to be a stop, has to be a halt ... I think it's time to take some real chances to attempt to make some real breakthroughs. We're spending ourselves into the ground. Yet it's really hard to know when to cut, when to dig into the fat.

This attitude of ignoring minor complaints for the good of the program pervades these members' attitudes. The size of the defense budget is so large and concentrated that most members are not prepared to see it jeopardized through alteration. As one subcommittee chairman stated,

I start out with some questions but they get worked out. There is a tendency to try to get unanimity. I listen and move accordingly. In the end you must vote it up or down. Take the draft; I was opposed to our position. I liked the President's proposal but once out on the floor what could I do. I either could vote yes or no. The issues are so complex it's hard to buck.

A western Democrat commented,

... generally, one is unwilling to vote against only small parts of the bill but prefer to vote yes in terms of the total legislation. We are rarely given a clear cut choice. ...

Despite the broad consensus, apparent in TABLE 2, there are always a number of Armed Service members who oppose the Committee majority and take their complaints to the House floor. A study of the membership's action on the floor of the House, in the 80th, 85th, and 90th Congresses, indicates that on the major committee legislative requests a small minority, usually numbering no more than five, oppose the committee's position. In each term, these individuals took their complaints onto the floor of the House. They were unsuccessful in altering the committee's requests, but it indicates that despite all the committee's mores and unofficial rules, it is not always able to present a united front.¹

Committee Hearings

The House Armed Services Committee with a total membership of forty is one of the largest committees in the House. The committee, for security reasons, usually meets in full session behind closed doors. In fact, the need to maintain secrecy is one of the most important committee norms. The last major security leak was in 1951, when secret testimony was later printed in the press.² Since that time with every session of Congress the chairman and the senior

¹U.S., Congressional Record (Volume 94, part 7), 80th Cong., 2nd sess., June 15, 1948, pp. 8378-8383; U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., June 11, 1958, Vol. 104, part 8, pp. 10894-10903; U.S., Cong., House, Armed Services Committee, Report No. 1645 - Authorizing Appropriations for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, Fiscal Year 1969 and Reserve Strength, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 5, 1968, p. 71 (hereafter referred to as report No. 1645); and U.S., Cong., House, Armed Services Committee, Report No. 267 - Authorizing Defense Procurement and Research and Development, 90th Cong., 1st sess., May 2, 1967, p. 48 (hereafter referred to as report No. 267).

²Frank Eleanzer, "He Controls 55¢ of Your Tax Dollar,"

members have stressed the need to remain silent. The senior members are very proud that a major disclosure has not occurred in about twenty years.¹

The chairman has a very important role in committee hearings. Charles Clapp, after interviewing over fifty Congressmen, reported that:

There is general agreement that the quality of hearings and the reports that follow depend in large part on the chairman of the committee or subcommittee that conducts them.²

According to the rules of the Armed Services Committee, the chairman decides who questions witnesses and for how long.³ The size and work load of Armed Services necessitates restrictions on the length of questioning witnesses.⁴

In order to complete its workload the chair has always enforced the rule that a member, unless he receives special permission, cannot question a witness for more than ten minutes, the reason being that if the chairman permitted unlimited questioning, the committee could never fulfill its legislative obligations.⁵ Therefore, chairmen have always

National Business, Vol. 43 (December 1955), 68.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Charles Clapp, p. 264.

³U.S., House Armed Services Committee, Organization Meeting, 90th Cong., 2nd sess. (February 1, 1967), rule 12 and 13, p. 6.

⁴In the 88th Congress the committee conducted 69 hearings which totalled 10,600 pages of testimony whereas the figures for the 89th Congress were 102 hearings and 11,848 pages of printed testimony. Thus, the committee has to conduct orderly hearings if it desires to finish its legislative work. U.S., House, Committee on Armed Services, Organization Meetings, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (February 3, 1969), p. 4.

⁵Even if each member just used his ten minutes option some 400 minutes per witness would elapse and it is doubtful that the committee could ever complete its hearings.

reiterated the need to restrict questioning. The fact that meetings are conducted in an orderly and business-like fashion has disadvantages. Members have to stop questioning when their time is up, regardless of how useful their interrogation might prove. One member discussing Mr. Rivers' role, said,

The chairman never follows through on questioning. You can get a good line of questioning and really probe and when the time is up the chairman just drops it. It really bothers me to see the things that Rivers lets these witnesses get away with.

The more prevalent view of Chairman Rivers' action was expressed by a subcommittee chairman who stated:

The five minute rule in hearings is a necessity, otherwise never get anything done. Look, at five minutes apiece for 40 members, takes 200 minutes a witness. We need that rule to keep going. The chairman lets you ask more questions when all are finished, then you can ask questions forever. But to be fair to everyone only five minutes on the first go around.

Chairmen have different approaches at committee meetings. This has always been so on Armed Services. The two Democratic chairmen had markedly different styles. Vinson was very much the disciplinarian at hearings. He used to cut members off and close discussion on an issue.¹ A former member of the committee stated,

One time I sat on the committee at the very bottom and at the end of the hearing raised a point of order. I claimed the army should not appropriate a certain type of parachute in one area of Mississippi when they removed the item from other areas of the country. You know what he did, he said, 'I have never been consistent a day in my life,' banged down the gavel and walked out. The entire committee laughed and that was it.

A Republican member in contrasting Vinson to Rivers said,

¹Mr. Vinson was extremely good at getting other members to do his "dirty work;" he rarely, if ever, was personally involved in any squabbles. A good case in point was the committee's treatment of McNamara. Vinson had Hebert and Hardy attacking the Secretary in Committee meetings, while he stood aloof. Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

The committee hearings are more democratic and there is more dissent since Vinson left. Vinson was a real tyrant, he would rarely let me ask questions and he was not above cutting people off. You took it because of the tremendous respect which you had for him ...

Mr. Rivers has not been able to run the committee in this fashion. Unlike Mr. Vinson he does not try to channel discussion, and the members are free to do their own questioning. Furthermore, the members will not stand for Vinson's tactics, and Rivers' authority has been challenged on many occasions. Earlier this year, in order to speed the meetings along, Rivers arbitrarily tried to put a five minute rule into effect. The "young turks" would not stand for it. They informed the mass media of Rivers' actions and created adverse publicity against him.¹ After the story reached the press, Mr. Rivers changed his tactics. He now allows members to question witnesses for ten minutes.

Subcommittees

One of the major developments caused by the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act has been the increasing use of Congressional subcommittees. When the House eliminated a number of standing committees many of them reappeared as subcommittees.

Subcommittees offer the Congress a number of advantages over full committees. They enable a group of Congressmen to specialize in a particular subject area and permit junior members to meaningfully participate in a system which is ordinarily controlled by their senior colleagues.² The real power of subcommittees is that their work and

¹Washington Post, May 19, 1969, p. 20.

²George Goodwin, "Subcommittees: The Miniature Legislatures of Congress," American Political Science Review, Vol. 56 (September 1962),

recommendations are often totally accepted by the full committee.

Thus, given an active subcommittee chairman, working in a specialized field, the full committee can do very little to alter his conclusions and rewrite his legislation.¹

Armed Services operates with two types of subcommittees. The first kind are numbered subcommittees, without fixed jurisdiction. Originally Armed Services was divided into four subcommittees with fixed jurisdiction. In 1949 Mr. Vinson altered this by creating four numbered subcommittees with unfixed jurisdiction and work assignments. The purpose of numbering is to deter any one subcommittee from becoming specialized and, therefore, an independent source of power. This policy, which has never been altered, greatly increases the chairman's power by enabling him to control the committee's legislative power. Under Vinson, no subcommittee was able to develop an area of expertise because the staff and its legislative load were in a constant state of flux. Under Mr. Rivers this has begun to change. The increased power of the committee with the effect of 412b in 1961, has made it necessary for Armed Services to develop members with areas of specialization. Subcommittee No. 1 handles supplies and government stockpiling of strategic materials; subcommittee No. 2 now handles issues involving manpower-reserves, selective service, pay raises, et cetera; subcommittee No. 3 handles research and development; subcommittee No. 4² miscellaneous.

596, 604.

¹Ibid., 596, and Floyd M. Riddick, Congressional Procedure (Boston: Chapman and Grimes, 1941), p. 124.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

Since each subcommittee specializes in a different subject the subcommittee chairman and senior members have become experts in the field. On almost every single occasion their recommendations are accepted by the full committee.¹ However, over the last ten years their importance has waned. The important work of Armed Services is done primarily in full committee meetings, and most members do not consider their numbered subcommittee assignments of any special value. In fact, excluding subcommittee No. 2, which is usually working on army personnel matters, the other three subcommittees rarely meet more than a few times a year.²

Mr. Vinson had almost total control over his subcommittee leaders. He bullied his subcommittee chairmen, handled most important matters in full committee, and arbitrarily gave and withdrew staff assistance.³ Under Rivers, the subcommittee chairmen have been given great leeway. All four of them claimed that the chairman has never interfered in their work. His only contact with them, about subcommittee business, concerns when they expected to report legislation to the full committee. As one subcommittee chairman says,

I didn't serve under Vinson so I don't know. I don't think he was any different than Mr. Rivers. Mr. Rivers gives you a free hand to go anywhere if you feel a need, Carl was probably the same way. The only time he is likely to rush you is if he wants legislation passed. Then he will ask you how you are doing.

Nonetheless, Rivers has considerable influence over three of his four subcommittee chairmen. The personality of Messrs. Philbin, Fisher, and Price do not lend themselves to forcefulness and, if necessary,

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

the chairman's personality can influence their behavior.¹ This does not apply to Mr. Hebert. The chairman relies very heavily on his colleague and friend of some thirty years. Hebert's subcommittee handles approximately 70% of the legislation, which reaches the House floor, and he is usually appointed to chair special subcommittees which are important to the chairman.² The Louisiana Democrat is granted a privilege which no other subcommittee chairman has; he selects the subcommittee's Democrats and the staff. This was not true in Vinson's day when Mr. Hebert's subcommittees were continually altered.³

The second type of subcommittee is far more important. These are the special investigatory subcommittees which research and investigate various military programs or problems. They offer interesting work and usually a chance to travel. These subcommittees are manipulated by the chairman to reward his supporters and carefully channel the committee's direction. Invariably, the most important assignments are reserved for the chairman's friends or senior colleagues. The tedious work is given to the committee's mavericks and junior members. Thus, the positions of power are bestowed upon those members who will uphold the traditional goals and values of the Armed Services Committee.⁴

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Hebert was given the chairmanship of the Mai Lai massacre investigation.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

⁴Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

The Average Armed Service Member and Committee Specialists

The committee attracts a high percentage of members who are highly motivated to participate in committee business; this fact combined with the yearly needs of the military make Armed Services one of the hardest working committees in the House. When Congress is in session the committee, or its subcommittees, in order to meet its legislative responsibilities, usually convenes in both morning and afternoon sessions.

The majority of members interviewed believe that their main job is to attend committee meetings. They stated that given their crowded schedules and constituency obligations they simply didn't have the time to research particular topics thoroughly.¹ According to these men, the onus of investigation and research was up to the committee staff. The member's main function was to take the staff's findings and apply it at hearings. As one member said,

I go to as many meetings as possible. As you realize my first duty is to my constituents and the second duty is to get re-elected so this takes up most of my time. I try my hardest to read the daily newspapers and have informal liaison sessions with the staff.

Despite the problems of time some members do their own research. These members are usually one of two types. One category consists of interested senior members. The work schedule of a former member epitomizes the action of this group.

I put in approximately five hours per day over the six month period that the committee met. I used to take home stacks of documents to see what was up. Every night I used to sit there until I was practically exhausted. This went on six days a week. I

¹See Charles Clapp, pp. 264-269, for similar views by other members.

also used to rely on informal contacts with the highest levels of the Pentagon.

The second type is recent appointees. Unlike their senior colleagues most of their research is devoted to understanding the methodological procedure and programs with which the committee deals. What they desire is to learn the fundamentals of national security programs, in order to comprehend the committee's business. A Republican newcomer said,

I put in twenty hours a week, four hours a day, on my committee work and it's a lot of time. I'm also learning who I should and shouldn't listen to at committee hearings. It works this way, like anything else people tend to pigeonhole other people, place them in categories.

A second term Democrat stated,

I have a good legislative assistant, a man who was number one in his law school class. I use the staff whenever possible and I'm constantly in communication with the air base in my district. I work hard to get insights. Even when you're only scratching the surface it's incredible how much one has to do to acquire a real military expertise.

The most important individuals on the Armed Services Committee, as is true for almost every committee in the House, are its senior members.¹ However, in the case of Armed Services the trend is accentuated. Defense legislation is so complex that an individual needs many years to become acquainted with the intricacies, language, and trends of weapon programs. As one Democrat said,

It takes over 15 years to really know what is up. You have to follow the issues and the development of weapons over years to really know what is going on. You need men with seniority who are willing to stay and do it.

The chairman and the ranking minority member are the two key figures in affecting the military's requests. They have the experience,

¹ See Charles Clapp, pp. 238-244, and Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

contacts, staff assistance, and power to do so.¹ Besides these two officials, other individuals have a significant role. Some members and subcommittee chairmen who have studied and investigated certain aspects of Defense Department policy year after year become committee specialists. These men, by being able to evaluate particular Pentagon requests, become the committee's "watchdogs." Congressmen who are unsure about a particular program or do not have the time to investigate a topic can and do rely on the opinions of the committee specialists.² As one subcommittee chairman remarked,

I think through the work of the subcommittees that a gradual policy of expertise develops. Men like Stratton know more about tanks than most men in the Pentagon. So I trust and follow his judgment. I don't know anything more about tanks than I read in the paper. I notice like any other situation in life you tend to give people more weight if you feel they are experts.

Another Democrat stated,

Most legislation is assigned by the staff based upon the expectations of the subcommittee chairmen. After awhile men become experts, we are expert oriented . . .

The way in which subcommittees are selected tends to create specialists who become the committee's leaders. Thus, the position of power through monopoly of information is dominated by the friends of the chairman and his senior colleagues.³

Role of Freshman Members

A number of Congressional committee studies have dealt with the role and actions of its freshman members. Most of these studies

¹The contribution of the chairman and the ranking minority member to passing a legislative program and their importance to the committee's operation will be analyzed in chapter 5.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

indicated that committees have a set of operating norms which channel and mold the actions of its new members. A new member is expected to do his work, attend meetings, and defer to his elders. He is to be seen and not heard. Freshmen who violated these norms were given poor subcommittee assignments and were socially ostracized. The reason these methods were used was to protect the committee from partisan dissension and insure that only those senior members knowledgeable in the subject will make the final decisions.¹

On Armed Services the committee does not have any unofficial rules of behavior for its new members. The type of authorizations which the committee deals with tends to channel and moderate behavior. The national security program is extremely complex and it takes many years to understand the jargon. The military programs are so intricate and the turnover in weapons so rapid that an individual who sat on the Armed Services Committee twelve years ago and was recently re-appointed had absolutely no idea of what was happening.² It is not norms or unofficial rules that keep members from speaking out or participating at meetings and mark-up sessions, but the complexity of the subject matter and just plain common sense. As in any situation or organization, if an individual has limited knowledge or understanding of events he is likely to remain quiet. Armed Services is defined as a non-ideological committee and an individual cannot evaluate a weapons system as a conservative or a liberal. He must determine whether or not he believes the service needs such a weapon. Unlike domestic legislation the members always fear the fatal consequences if they in-

¹Richard Fenno, pp. 166-167, 215-228, Charles Clapp, p. 234.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

correctly judge the military's needs. For this reason, unless he has a thorough understanding of the problem, he is more likely to defer to the brass's wishes. Under these circumstances he needs time to acquire knowledge in order to evaluate the merits of a program. Thus, the reality of the situation, not any unofficial committee norm, dictates his behavior. As one former Republican member said,

Like any other group, it makes sense for new members to remain silent and not to annoy people. This is especially important when they don't know what they are talking about. If you know something you can speak out, but this takes time. This isn't an ideological committee but one that has issues which need solution. It's very technical and one needs time to acquire that knowledge.

A senior Republican said,

A new member needs lots of time to learn. It takes a long time to know what to check into, what to avoid. You're a smart fellow but you would have a hell of a time getting a handle to know how to approach the subject -- nothing can replace experience.

Every member who was asked about freshmen members stated that the committee had no special norms for its new members. They were expected to do their work and attend meetings, but besides this they could participate as they pleased.

Most new members believed that their first few years on the committee should be spent acquiring a knowledge of the subject matter and committee procedures. Most of them dismissed the idea that they were under any special rules of conduct. They indicated that common sense dictated a specific manner of acting. These members were cognizant of their knowledge limitations and feared embarrassing themselves by participating in defense discussions for which they were unprepared.

A freshman Republican said,

As a freshmen member I'm expected to learn, to come to meetings, and do my homework. Naturally, at committee meetings I go last so there is not much left to say. Once in a while I get to ask one . . . I can talk all I want if I have things to say, but

remember when I came down here I didn't even know what D.O.D. meant so that it was wise of me to keep quiet.

A second term Democrat stated,

In committee I try to be very quiet. I don't want to look foolish by asking some jackass question. So I just listen and 99-44/100% of the time I hear my question asked. If something is still bothering me I consult with Blandford and he is usually willing to see me to discuss it. This way I don't annoy the committee, there are no rules, but I am wary of spoiling my reputation.

However, this view was not shared by all the new members. One of them claimed that he asked all the questions he wanted.

I can do as I like. I have a lot of questions, some are good, some are a waste of time. I feel that it's a good education for me and the members are patient and as for the chairmen he is really great. He allows me to do it. It's real nice of him. I can do it and he doesn't mind.

Armed Services does not have any special committee norms for new members. What it does have is a legislative program which usually channels members in a particular direction.

Dissenting Members

A recent development on the committee is the emergence of a group that is opposed to its prevailing norms. Unlike previous dissenters these men, who usually do not number more than five, reject the committee's working philosophy. The astronomical costs of defense expenditures, which has almost doubled from \$39,996,608,000 in 1960 to \$71,869,828,000 in 1969, coupled with the wastefulness of cost overruns, and the economic burdens of Vietnam, have brought them together. They resent the pro-military consensus which pervades the committee and believe the purpose of Armed Services should be to represent the interests of Congress, not the brass. These members accused their colleagues of treating the military witnesses and programs with "kid

gloves."

The present group grew out of the fight over the B-70 bombers in 1962. At that time five Congressmen banded together to support the executive branch's requests over the committee on the floor of the House. This was one of the few times in the committee's history that a group of Democrats was willing to oppose Chairman Vinson, and they were nicknamed the "fearless fivesome." Two of the "fearless five," Mr. Nedzi and Mr. Pike, are now part of the new group.¹ The rest of the group consists of Mr. Leggert (D, Cal.), who is the committee's most outspoken opponent, Mr. Whalen (R, Ohio), who is the most outspoken Republican on the committee, and Mr. Stafford (R, Vt.). On particular issues, other individuals may join them in dissent. However, these are the nuclei of committee opposition. With the exception of Mr. Stafford, the rest have been punished for their attitudes. Nedzi, Pike, Leggert, and Whalen are assigned to only two subcommittees whereas the average member has three or four. In the case of Whalen and Leggert these subcommittees are the least important on the committee. Leggert has also been snubbed in terms of inspection tours. The chairman has restricted his access to travel by bypassing him when junkets are organized.²

All of the members with the exception of Stafford have found varying degrees of social ostracism because of their differing approach to committee business. As one said,

The major penalty for deviant behavior or what the committee considers deviant behavior is a restriction of subcommittees and lack

¹Jeffrey Cohelan (D, Cal.), Richard Ichord (D, Mo.), and Samuel Stratton (D, N.Y.) were the other members of the group.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

of publicity. Second, people are likely to get annoyed with you, give you the cold shoulder, and it hurts.

Another member, when asked why he was willing to risk such treatment, stated,

I play a role that needs to be done. Someone just has to put a check or at least raise a voice. I'm very wary of writing a dissent or a minority view but someone has to do it. Others are afraid and I rarely ask people to join me. Someone has to raise these issues, I'm willing to pay the price. The chairman doesn't like it and has penalized me.

The Committee's Staff

Since World War II the most important development in the operation of committees is their reliance on professional staffs. The professional staffs are the legislator's experts, who through their work, often shape the course of the committee's direction.¹ According to Kammerer, who studied the effect of professional committee staffs, the twenty House committees have a much better legislative and investigatory record since they employed large professional staffs.²

Over the years, the committees' staffs have become fairly permanent. The same group of staff men tend to be rehired, from session to session, and some of them have been working in an area of specialization longer than most members of the committee. Since the staff is hired by and is responsible to the chairman, they almost always give him primary allegiance. Members who are opposed to the chairman's

¹J. Leiper Freeman, p. 57. For a history of staffs prior to 1946 see George Galloway, Congress at the Crossroads, p. 91.

²Gladys M. Kammerer, Congressional Committee Staffings Since 1946 (University of Kentucky: College of Lexington, 1951), p. 1. To see how a staff functions consult Donald H. Riddle, The Truman Committee (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), and Kenneth T. Kofmehl, Professional Staffs of Congress (U.S.A.: Purdue University Studies, 1962).

point of view have found that the staff is only willing to go so far in helping them.¹

Some committee staffs are more active than others. This usually depends on the function that the chairman wishes the staff to serve. Some chairmen prefer that the committee's work be confined to mere record keeping whereas other leaders permit the staff to research issues and ask most of the questions at hearings.²

One of the most important characteristics about the Armed Services Committee is the power of the professional staff. The staff is a dominating force in channeling the committee's direction. First, the committee deals with highly technical material which many members have difficulty understanding. The staff enables Congressmen to comprehend the complicated terminology. Second, every member of the committee, from the most junior member to those with the greatest seniority, are dependent upon the staff for its researching skills. Although most members at one time or another do field research, and a few individuals conduct their own independent investigations, the bulk of the committee's work is done by the staff. As is true for most Congressmen, Armed Service members depend on the staff as their chief source of information.³ A former member commented,

¹One of the major proposals to reform the Congress suggested by a group of Republican Congressmen was to allow the minority to have exclusive control over a number of staff people. They believe the present arrangement makes it very difficult for them to receive adequate service. James C. Cleveland (ed.), We Propose: A Modern Congress Selected Proposals by the House Republican Task Force on Congressional Reform and Minority Staffing (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 4. See also U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, Senate, Organization of the Congress, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., July 28, 1966, p. 5.

²Charles Clapp, p. 226.

³Charles Clapp, pp. 256-264 and Donald G. Tacheron and Morris

They can channel the mark-up and hearings because they have the facts. They also write the committee reports so it's within their power to structure. It's like the State Department -- when you go abroad you notice that these guys give out their own prejudices. It's the same here. I don't think they are as bad as some other committees. The issue keeps them in bounds.

Most members of the committee felt that the present staff is extremely competent, but much too small for the amount of material it has to investigate. A Western Democrat said,

The staff is not big enough. I once asked Blandford how many men would we really need to check into the defense budget and suggested 3,000. He said that it was as good a guess as any. We are totally unequipped to do a good job, totally unable to really understand how things work. We can at best spot check 1% or 2% of these items. We are never going to get anywhere if we continue to be so lackadaisical.

A freshman Democrat said,

I think we need a bigger staff, especially in investigations. We only have two men to do it. Unless something falls in their laps they can't find out anything. I asked Blandford about this and he agreed with me. He said they can do little or nothing. In the final analysis the army and the air force have to check themselves. We aren't in a position to do it. The General Accounting Office isn't either.

The present staff consists of eleven members with two individuals assigned exclusively to the investigatory subcommittee. Under Vinson the regular staff consisted of five members with one individual assigned to the subcommittee on investigation. Vinson, who was quite conservative, didn't want to allocate funds for a large staff. He preferred working by himself and did not want independent sources of information to develop. A small staff insured that he could limit the direction of any investigation. An example of this occurred in 1960. Mr. Hebert was investigating conflict of interest between the military and civilian branches of government. Mr. Vinson, for reasons known only to himself, refused to give Hebert the increased staff facilities.

One high ranking member believes Vinson was convinced by the upper military echelons to limit the investigations.¹

As chairman, Mr. Rivers has added six new staff personnel. He is aware of the need of a large staff and is trying to obtain funds from Congress in order to enlarge the size of his investigatory group.² Unlike his predecessor, he permits his subcommittee chairmen almost unlimited access to staff personnel.

Throughout the committee's history the staff has been selected and maintained on a nonpartisan basis. Even during those years when the chairmanship changed hands the staff remained constant. The committee averages a change in staff personnel every four or five years. When a replacement is necessary the Chief Counsel informs the chairman or ranking minority member what is needed and how many people are available for the job. Under the unofficial committee rules the chairman or ranking minority member, depending on whose turn it is to nominate a candidate, suggests a particular individual to the committee. The candidate must be approved by a panel of senior members as well as the entire committee. The chairman or ranking minority member cannot hire someone who is unacceptable to a significant minority of his committee.³

¹The Congressional Quarterly Almanac reports that Vinson was instrumental in "watering down" Hebert's bill before it reached the House floor. "Retired Officers' Jobs," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 16, 1960, pp. 279-280, and Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses. Other committees without minority staffing are -- Agriculture, Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Internal Security, Judiciary, and Post Office. Charles B. Brown, 1970 Congressional Staff Directory (U.S.A.: Congressional Staff Directory, 1970), pp. 279-315.

The senior committee members believe the development of a majority and minority staffing would lead to political divisiveness. Once the committee staff develops two points of view it is conceivable that partisanship could develop. A Republican member of the committee said,

They are the key; like any other staff they have the ability to channel information but their power is no different than others. They have always been fair and nonpartisan. I don't even know which party anyone of them belongs to. No need for minority staffing, it would only be a diversion that might upset us. It would be destructive to the committee to have contrary opinions. I like and support the present arrangement. The chairman really helps, he encourages them to act this way. They really give us a hand.

The staff may be nonpartisan but its chief loyalty is reserved for the chairman. All the members, including some of the chairman's opponents, accept this fact and believe this is the way it should be. He alone is responsible for their salary, future careers, and security. An example of a chairman protecting his staff occurred under Vinson's tenure. Mr. Courtney, who was staff counsel from 1953 to 1963, was shielded by the chairman from the wrath of a senior member. Mr. Courtney and Mr. Porter Hardy, because of their belligerent personalities, had an intense dislike for one another.¹ Mr. Vinson protected Courtney, who was the staff official to the investigatory subcommittee, by making certain that Hardy never became chairman. He allowed Hebert to continue to chair the investigatory group even though he had acceded to a full subcommittee assignment. When Courtney retired in 1963, Mr. Hardy was then appointed the subcommittee chairman.²

It is not surprising that every staff individual who was interviewed believed his first loyalty was to the chairman.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses, and "House Committee," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 177 (1961), p. 50, and "House

Basically, we work for the chairman. He is the guy who hires me and gives me direction. If another member wants help I will do it, but my first allegiance is to the chairman. Occasionally, he will allow one of the subcommittee chairmen to pick his staff but that is rare. We go where he tells us. We will write speeches for other members, but only if we have finished our work. The other members realize this.

The result is that the staff is responsible to the chairman twelve months of the year, whereas the regular committee members only see the staff during committee business. This year-round responsibility to the chairman greatly increases his power through the monopoly of information. Other committee members have to ask the staff for information, whereas the staff automatically keeps its boss informed.

One of the major complaints mentioned by some members is what to do if they do not like the staff's approach, or want to develop a position which is opposed by the chairman. One Democrat said,

It's really tough to develop a position independent of the staff. They carry the chairman's program and are extremely loyal. I don't have time to do research and let my staff do it. We are trying to find out how many men in Vietnam have received head wounds which have totally incapacitated them. This is something the brass and the chairman don't want to come out. The way I intend to get this information is to ask hospitals and claim I need the information for certain favorable legislation I want passed. You see how tough it is and it may not work. We are very small down here, few men, few leads, they have an awful lot of guys who can help.

No staff official will help a member without first notifying the chairman. A member who is opposed to the chairman's position found this out recently.

The staff is the real power. The trouble is they are all loyal to the chairman. They go out of their way to please him . . . I wanted some information on the number of generals in the air force and their service records, so I asked Slatinshek, who said, 'let me clear it with Blandford,' Blandford called Rivers and Rivers tells me the figure and asks me if I propose to offer an amendment. So it's hard to go around him.

The average Congressman, because of his hectic schedule, can only devote a limited amount of time to committee work. In contrast the staff officials work on committee business a minimum of eight hours a day. This expertise enables them to shape the direction of committee hearings and the final version of legislation. Most of the staff officials are attorneys who have had a considerable amount of active or reserve military experience.¹

The work of the committee is divided along issues rather than service lines in order to prevent service loyalties from developing. An official will handle supplies, pay increases, etc., across the services rather than from just one branch of the Defense Department.²

Every interviewed member of the staff claimed that he was an integral and important part of the committee. The comments of one member although seemingly overstated are typical.

We are the committee; the committee is only as good as us. We can get the witnesses and do the leg work. Unlike other committees we do the questioning, we are allowed to cross examine. What the hell, we know the score, this is the major difference between our staff and the Senate's. In the Senate only the members can ask questions. We get the witnesses and supply the facts. We are assigned to subcommittees without any permanent spots. ... Then we help out the subcommittee chairman in full committee with answers. On the House floor we help the chairman with fact sheets and specific information either oral or written. Then in conference the same procedure including ironing out disagreements with the other staff. We never step out and try to reflect the committee's point of view. We have the same procedure for the minority groups and write their reports. The committee is only as good as we are. They haven't got the entire day as we do to work on the various issues.

There is no question that the staff has an active committee function.

The relationship between the staff and chairman has already been

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

mentioned. In terms of the committee, the staff's most important function is as a source of general information, speechwriting, and committee operations. In terms of committee operations, it is responsible for the smooth flow of the committee's legislative responsibilities. It is their job to research the topic, supply members with questions, call committee witnesses, and participate in debate.¹

The staff officials rarely, if ever, schedule as witnesses anyone but Pentagon officials. They feel that on any issue but selective service civilian witnesses or pressure group representatives are a waste of time. As one said,

What's the need. It just takes up time. Take the A.B.M. issue. If we let people speak we would have over 18,000 witnesses. It would go on forever. On the issue of A.B.M. I don't think there would be anything positive or negative contributed. The people who want to come now only want to get their name in the paper. No real desire to contribute.

Most committee members and the staff express a desire to hear the Pentagon's military rather than civilian personnel. The civilian witnesses are not considered knowledgeable enough and are mouthing information which is politically motivated. The members feel that, unlike the military, which is only interested in security, the civilians also take into account the overall domestic budgetary situation. The committee members and especially the staff prefer the professional military's point of view. They want to know what the leader in the defense field feels their needs to be. As one staff official forcefully stated,

No one disputes that the civilian sector should be in charge and listened to. However, they have a serious limitation, especially McNamara, putting all his eggs in one basket and forgetting that

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

it had a hole in it. The civilians are rarely there long enough, who would you trust? ... These are trained men (excited voice) they are like other professionals, doctors, lawyers, and accountants. We ought to listen to their expertise or what the hell is the point in training them? A military decision is a military decision. McNamara with this cost effectiveness just about killed us. He made decisions that were not militarily sound.

Another stated,

The civilians are only there a few months. Mr. Connolly of Texas just about got in his office when he was back as Governor. Since I've been here for five years, we have had five different men in charge of the Secretary of the Navy. What does some guy who has just been in government know about defense? Who really would trust them? When the chips are down the American people want military leaders.

The Committee's Chief Counsel

As is true for nearly all committees, the most important figure on the Armed Services staff is the Chief Counsel. However, Mr. Blandford, who is the key staff official on Armed Services, is much more outspoken, controversial, and "visible" than any other Chief Counsel on the "Hill."¹ Mr. Blandford is in charge of supervising the activities of the other staff officials and keeps the chairman informed. He has been with the committee since its inception and was elevated to Chief Counsel with the retirement of John Smart in 1963. Mr. Blandford is presently a Brigadier General in the reserves who has very definite and hawkish views on the United State's defensive needs.² He works very closely with the chairman and many members mentioned that he is a moderating influence on the chairman's personality. In fact, Mr. Blandford is invariably present whenever Mr. Rivers is being

¹Robert Sherrill, "Who Runs Congress?," New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1970, p. 78.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October 27, 1969, Vol. 115, part 74, daily edition, pp. 8907-8901.

interviewed.¹ Mr. Blandford has been dealing with committee issues for so long that the members considered him to be a weapons expert. The following two comments are typical of most members' feelings.

The staff is the key and Mr. Blandford is a highly insightful and articulate man with a great deal of useful perceptions. I sit next to him at meetings so I can learn.

A junior Democrat said,

I think that Blandford has power all out of proportion to what it should be. It's not good for the committee. He is a walking encyclopedia; in fact, the members really depend on him. The nature of the subject is so that there is greater reliance than usual on him. We need more men like Blandford or the curbing of his power.

Blandford's long service on the Hill, his expertise in the field and close relationship with Rivers, has made him an independent source of committee power. There is little question that, with the exception of the chairman and a few senior members, Mr. Blandford is the most important factor in determining the committee's direction and policy formulation. A Democrat from the West said,

Blandford is a very fine, bright and powerful man. We simply couldn't get along without him. I rarely speak to Rivers, he's hard to get to. I always go to Blandford. If he gives me the okay I can feel sure that I'll get what I want. I think he has great control over the chairman, he knows all, a real genius.

Mr. Blandford has not been adverse to using his considerable power.

One committee opponent tells about how Blandford once treated him,

About five months ago I was invited to speak before the Brookings Club about the committee. I called Blandford up on the telephone in order to get some information for my talk. Blandford waits for me to finish my request and says, 'be at my office 7 a.m. Monday morning,' and hangs up. Well, I didn't like that and that's one of the reasons we need minority staffing.²

¹When this writer interviewed Mr. Rivers, Blandford joined us after a few minutes and answered most of the questions.

²When this writer interviewed Mr. Blandford, he was also given a 7 a.m. Monday morning appointment.

A more public demonstration of Blandford's power occurred during the 1969 Boeing C-5A hearings. Congressman Pike was forcefully interrogating a witness about cost overruns. In the middle of his interrogation, which was highly critical of Boeing's procurement methods, he was cut off from further interrotation. John Blandford "pounded the table" to make him stop. As the Washington Post noted, this was, "an unusual show of strength by a Congressional employee."¹ Mr. Blandford's power and his friendship has begun to generate some unfavorable press coverage. Recently, newspaper and magazine articles have linked him with Rivers as the real power on the committee.² For the foreseeable future there is little reason why the present arrangement should not remain the same.

Summary

All committees of Congress adopt some method of creating legislation for introduction on the floor of the House. Although every committee calls witnesses, uses staff assistance, and delegates responsibility among its members, no two committees are alike. Each committee is different because of the subject matter it handles and the type of Congressmen who are its members. The House Committees on Appropriations and Ways and Means, which are controlled by conservative senior members, have precise norms of committee operation. The two committees strive for fiscal responsibility and are operated with a

¹Washington Post, May 23, 1969, p. A16.

²Washington Post, May 20, 1969, p. A20; Charles McCarry, "Ol' Man Rivers," Esquire, Vol. 74 (October 1970) 170-171, 211; and Robert Sherrill, "Who Runs Congress?," New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1970, p. 78.

maximum amount of consensus. In contrast, the House Committees on Labor and Education and Government Administration are decentralized committees, highly partisan in nature, and with members who endorse markedly different political ideologies. On these committees, conflict and controversy are the norms and their legislative proposals are usually challenged on the House floor.

The major factor which affects the operation of the Armed Services Committee is the nature of defense issues. National security matters are considered so important by the members that they must be discussed in a nonpartisan environment. This all encompassing norm results from the members' perception that for the good of the country and the interests of the military, disagreements must be kept to a minimum. The members are easily able to adopt this norm because of their similar districts and backgrounds. It takes many years of hard work to become versed in the defense language and issues; new members find that they spend most of their time on committee matters just learning the fundamentals of national security programs. It is for this reason that the staff and some senior members are so important to the committee. Only a select group has the background and knowledge to participate in the defense debate. The next chapter will focus on the most important member of the committee -- the chairman.

CHAPTER V

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Political scientists have always been fascinated by the concept of leadership. From the earliest writings of the Greek theorists until the present day, individuals have attempted to understand how men are able to influence the actions of others. The traditional approach to power relations are those exemplified by the writings of Robert Dahl. He claims, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."¹

In Richard E. Neustadt's Presidential Power, the author argues Dahl's point in terms of Presidential leadership. He states that Presidential power is the power to persuade. It is the ability to convince a Senator, Congressman, or businessman, that what the White House wants of him is really in his own best interests.²

Another approach to leadership and power is that employed by John Manley in his study of Wilbur Mills. The author claims that the secret of Mills' power and leadership is his ability to follow the general consensus of a majority of his Committee. Manley argues that leadership does not exist in isolation but takes place within a group. "The paradox of leadership is that it always involves followmanship."³

¹ Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1957), 203.

² Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Signet Books, 1964), p. 43.

³ John Manley, Wilbur Mills, A paper presented to the American

Committee Chairmen

Committee chairmen are the most influential and powerful members of the House. Through seniority a few Congressmen acquire great bases of power.¹ Regardless of an individual's ability or political skills, the office of chairman carries with it numerous prerogatives. As George Galloway stated,

... They arrange the agenda of the Committees, appoint subcommittees, and refer bills to them. They decide what pending measure should be considered and when, call Committee meetings, and decide whether or not to hold hearings and when. They approve lists of scheduled witnesses, select their staffs, and authorize staff studies, and preside at committee hearings. They handle reported bills on the floor and participate as principle manager in conference committees. They are in a position to expedite measures they favor and to retard or pigeonhole those they dislike. ...²

The chairman can accrue considerable influence through the use of his informal prerogatives. During his tenure, he has acquired "I.O.U.s of good will" for the favors he has rendered. It is the chairman who permits members to go on fact finding tours and to sit on specific subcommittees. Through his prestige he can aid a colleague in obtaining some "pet project," passing a bill, or chairing a special hearing. Furthermore, he can render some personal service by writing a letter, granting an interview, or campaigning for the members. The

Political Science Association, September 4, 1968, pp. 3-4.

¹In 1885 Woodrow Wilson observed that the most powerful members of the Congress were the committee chairmen. Woodrow Wilson, p. 58. Since that time, in many ways, their power has increased. It is true that "the great pigeonhole chairman" has practically ceased to function. Nonetheless, the average chairman today heads a committee which is better staffed, has a larger membership, and greater subject and legislative jurisdiction than his counterpart in the past. Reconstructed from Interview Responses. See also Charles Clapp, pp.221-226.

²George Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress, p. 289. See also Bertram M. Gross, p. 31.

result of these actions is that a large majority of the committee develops varying degrees of loyalty to its chairman.¹

The chairman's power can also be perceived in a negative sense. It is the fear of the chairman's wrath, and the types of penalties he can impose, that often deter membership opposition. This fact was expressed by a freshman member of Armed Services,

Look, he's got the power. He's able to help you a lot with bills and installations. It's true the committee almost always supports him and it appears that the members follow, but like anything else in life it's foolish to antagonize people you may need.

The chairman is the personalized embodiment of the committee. For most citizens and even Congressmen the chairman is the major association they have with particular committees. What people think of him can affect the operation and success of his group. A committee's reputation can thus be enhanced or hurt by the prestige of its chairman.² Further, as the committee's leader, the chairman has the greatest access to Congressional elites, other committee chairman, executive agencies, and cabinet officials. He is also the committee spokesman to the press and is featured in most publicity about the committee.³ For these reasons it is very important for the membership to protect and guard its chairman's reputation.

Naturally, the chairman's power is not unlimited. There are many instances in the House where the membership has arisen to slap down an arbitrary chairman.⁴ Every chairman must take into account

¹Richard Fenno, pp. 136-160, and John Manley, Wilbur Mills, A paper presented to the American Political Science Association, September 4, 1968, pp. 45-59.

²Ibid., p. 47, and Reconstructed from Interview Responses

³Kenneth Kofmehl, p. 28.

⁴Ernest Griffith, p. 30. Many Congressmen feel that the

the norms of the committee as well as the expectations of individual members.¹ Many leaders have found themselves less effective because they have ignored these facts.² An astute chairman knows when he must compromise, be a passive leader, or reverse his position. He must keep abreast of his committee's wishes and when necessary follow them.³

Despite all the checks on a chairman, both personal and institutional, he remains one of the key members of the federal government. As has been noted, Congressmen have heavy schedules and are pressed for time so that it is important for them to have an adequate source of information. The chairman and his staff fulfill this need. Hence, when an individual has little interest in a piece of legislation, or lacks a technical understanding of it, he will usually defer to the chairman's position.⁴ Chairmen become powerful because someone must take the lead. Under this reality and faced with no precedents to the contrary, it is easier to permit the chairman to act with a wide degree of latitude.⁵

chairman is no more than first among equals whom the mass media has given imaginary power. Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

¹George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), p. 123, and Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior - A Study of Leadership (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 185.

²William L. Morrow, p. 33.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

⁴In fact, many Congressmen feel that chairmen deliberately encourage this type of behavior by holding back information. Charles Clapp, p. 226.

⁵In his study Clapp found that most members preferred "strong" rather than "weak" leaders. They wanted someone who would make decisions which would move the committee in a definite direction. Charles

The Purpose of the Chapter

This chapter has two purposes. First, what techniques have the House Armed Services Committee chairmen relied upon to lead the committee? Was his leadership based on the Dahl, Neustadt, or Manley description of power, or a combination of all three? Second, what impact does the chairman's power have on the defense legislation which the committee supports? Does the chairman's actions affect the final bill? Does it really matter to the operation or legislative output of Armed Services if a very strong or weak leader is in control?

In order to answer these questions, an in-depth study of two of the four Armed Services Chairmen -- Mr. Vinson and Mr. Rivers -- will be undertaken. There are two major reasons why these individuals were selected. First, when the two Republican chairmen, Mr. Andrews and Mr. Short, were in charge, their influence was minimal. Mr. Vinson was the dominant force on the committee, even as ranking minority member, from 1947 until his retirement in 1965.¹ Second, both Mr. Andrews and Mr. Short served only one term as chairman. The shortness of their tenure, as well as the impossibility of meeting a Congressman or staff official who could recall anything but the most basic information about them, prevented any in-depth analysis. Nonetheless, a brief section will be devoted to the two chairmen to demonstrate the similarity of their methods and attitudes to their Democratic counterparts. The major part of this chapter will concentrate on how Vinson and Rivers operated as chairmen. What were the reasons for their considerable power?

Clapp, pp. 226-227.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

In order to evaluate an individual's power and influence one must investigate how a chairman uses his formal and informal prerogatives. The successful use of small favors, of junkets and subcommittee assignments, manipulation of the various committee power centers, liaison between the membership and the executive branch, establishment of rapport with the members, etc., are the types of activities which distinguish the average chairman from the powerful ones. It will be demonstrated that Vinson's and Rivers' power was based on different approaches to their informal prerogatives. Vinson's influence stemmed from his military knowledge and the esteem in which the membership held him. Mr. Rivers' power is based on his manipulation of the various committee forces.

Why the Chairmen of Armed Services Have Power

Armed Services chairmen are potentially powerful for a number of reasons besides the traditional advantages which committee leaders possess. There are three variables which increase the likelihood that an individual who through seniority becomes chairman will dominate the committee. First, the Armed Services chairman has the greatest access to the Pentagon elites. Since he is responsible for the success of their legislative requests, he is consulted on policy formulation. Only the chairman, and occasionally a few senior members who endorse the chairman's position, are completely informed about the development of programs. The average member is only privy to information which is divulged at his subcommittee or full committee meetings. His information about the Central Intelligence Agency and the development of new weapons is often restricted. The chairman and his trusted

lieutenants are the only ones who have a precise idea of all phases of the defense establishment.

Second, the staff is unusually loyal to its chairman. The staff works for the committee but as one staff official stated, "The chairman is the committee." The chairman has at his command the insights, knowledge, and research abilities of individuals who worked on Armed Services matters eight hours a day, five days a week, year in and year out.

Third, there is the committee's consensus. The membership is oriented towards approving the Department of Defense's requests. Ninety per cent of the legislative work deals with bills that have been submitted by the Pentagon. Unlike other committees where the members, because of ideological differences, haggle over the final version of a bill, Armed Services members rarely do more than add or subtract funds from military requests.¹ The chairman is thus leading the committee in a direction that it wants to go. His power, as Manley described for Wilbur Mills, is based upon promoting policies which the overwhelming majority of members support. Every chairman of the committee has actively supported the Pentagon and lobbied for the priority programs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Two Republican Chairmen

Gresham Andrews was the first chairman of Armed Services, and many of the precedents which he established and the rules he devised are still used today. He was an upstate New York Congressman with a friendly nature, who was nicknamed "Ham." He had the difficult task

¹For a thorough treatment of this point see Chapter 7.

of presiding over the first Armed Services Committee which combined the membership of the old Military and Naval Affairs Committees. One of his biggest problems was the attitudes of his colleagues. The committee was racked with conflicting service loyalties because of the members' pro-Army or pro-Navy biases.¹

Mr. Andrews, either to minimize conflict or because of a truly democratic nature, created a decentralized committee with power dispersed among many members. The committee was split into four major subcommittees, each one possessing a fixed legislative jurisdiction. Positions on these subcommittees were distributed equally between members of the former Military and Naval Affairs Committees. The subcommittee chairmen were permitted by Andrews to develop the legislation in subcommittee, justify it in full committee, and be responsible for its safe passage through the floor of the House and in conference.²

At the first committee meeting, seventeen rules of committee operation were adopted. They defined under what circumstances the committee would meet, the use of proxies, what constitutes a majority, procedure at meetings, etc. With few exceptions, most of them minor, the rules which the first committee adopted have remained intact to this day. During this first term, the committee adopted the policy of hiring its staff without regard to political backgrounds. The staff was expected to work for the committee, not the momentary majority or minority party.³

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 94, part 2, Appendix, p. A. 4552.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 93, part 6, June 25, 1947, p. 7656.

³U.S., House, Committee on Armed Services, Organization

Mr. Andrews, whose health was failing (he retired at the end of the 80th Congress and died some four months later) was often absent from committee hearings and meetings. Even when he was present, Mr. Vinson, the ranking minority member and previous chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, was the dominant force on the committee. At subcommittee or full committee hearings or meetings, even when the chairman was present, Mr. Vinson did most of the explaining, talking, and questioning. Chairman Andrews at meetings usually elaborated upon what Vinson had said and at hearings followed up on his questions.¹

Like every Armed Services chairman that would follow him, Andrews in the area of defense policy was favorably disposed to the viewpoints of the professional military rather than their civilian superiors. It has been a trademark of the committee that whenever the civilian and military officials disagree about policy, the Armed Services members and the chairman have supported the military elites. They have almost always felt that although this is a nation which supports and believes in civilian control of the military, decisions which require professional advice should be heeded.²

Meeting, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, January 18, 1947, p. 5.

¹For some examples see: U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 1369, 80th Cong., 1st sess., February 11, 1947, p. 135, U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 1943, H.R. 1366, H.R. 1359, H.R. 1365, 80th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 1947, pp. 746-749, and U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 1366, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., February 3, 1948, p. 5499.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., June 15, 1948, vol. 94, part 7, p. 8349.

Mr. Andrews was a chairman who ran a democratically decentralized committee and permitted his subcommittees a wide range of freedom. The formation of the committee made it necessary for Mr. Andrews to play a moderating role between the pro-Army and the pro-Navy personnel. He tried to divide power equally between these groups and to allow them a wide latitude of expression at meetings and hearings. Mr. Andrews was chairman in name only because of his poor health, and the dominant character of Mr. Vinson.

The other Republican chairman was Dewey Short who served from 1953-1954 and, as in the case of Mr. Andrews, was upstaged by his Democratic colleague. According to a number of senior members and staff personnel, Mr. Short never made an important committee decision without first clearing it with Mr. Vinson. Mr. Short was a former Rhodes Scholar and a conservative congressman who represented the most rural part of Missouri. Throughout the 1930's and 1940's he had consistently opposed the New Deal programs and federal spending.¹

Short had more control over subcommittee chairmen than Andrews. In the 81st Congress, Mr. Vinson, who became chairman when the Democrats captured control of the House, had changed the subcommittees from fixed ones with definite legislative responsibility to numbered subcommittees with flexible jurisdiction. Mr. Vinson had assigned legislation to these units and did not allow any one unit to become independent. Mr. Short maintained this arrangement and worked closer with Mr. Vinson than his Republican predecessor. As one staff official who worked closely with both men stated,

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

Short and Vinson were like one on 98% of the issues, there was total agreement. They were also very close friends, why one could just as well be chairman as the other ... Vinson confided in him and vice versa.

Vinson's overbearing personality and his ability to lead, even while a member of the minority, is revealed by a former Senator, who served with both men in conference. He wrote,

...In the two years that I was the Senate chairman and Dewey Short was the House chairman, I debated with Vinson as much as with Short, and Vinson was still the chairman in substance.¹

Short, who had a warm easy-going personality, operated his committee in a relaxed fashion. As has been true of all Armed Services chairmen, he tried arduously to achieve committee consensus on all legislation. At mark-up he strove for committee unanimity in order to present a united front behind any bill which came before the House. As one former Republican member stated:

Dewey Short because of the nature of the topic tried for consensus. He tried to do all the committee's fighting in closed hearings, to do the laundry in the kitchen, not on the floor of the House. He tried to come out of committee with a 90% favorable vote. Once that was done no one could defeat the legislation. That's why we are so good on the floor - the restrained partisanship does it.

At committee meetings he often reversed the order of asking questions to give the freshman a chance to participate. The chairman, because of his preacher background, was an accomplished speaker and an exciting campaigner. For this reason, many of his colleagues requested his aid in their campaigns, and he was always willing to help.

It is a popular belief that the Armed Services Chairman can get military installations placed in his district. In Dewey Short's case this was not true. When Mr. Short was chairman, he tried unsuccessfully to convince the Pentagon that an army base was needed

¹Personal letter.

in his Missouri district. Four years after he was chairman, and two years after he had been defeated for re-election, the army decided a need for a base existed and developed one.¹

Mr. Short responded to committee work in a manner compatible with his personality. He was an easy-going, friendly man who did not contest Vinson's domination of the committee. In terms of policy, he showed no independence of the Pentagon's position. He supported the legislation which they sent him and acted as the administration's spokesman. Even on UMT, a concept he had opposed for years, when he became chairman he accepted the administration's requests.² Thus, he was similar to Mr. Andrews in his style of leadership except for the more relaxed atmosphere and the unnumbered subcommittees.

The Orientation of Vinson and Rivers

Unlike their two Republican predecessors, Mr. Vinson and Mr. Rivers were, and are, powerful and influential. Mr. Vinson was a leader of particular stature, whose influence and power during his fifty years in Congress ranged far beyond his committee. As will be explained below, Carl Vinson was an authoritarian chairman who often acted in an arbitrary fashion. His long years of service and his acknowledged expertise in military affairs made it difficult for many people to oppose him, and his overbearing personality intimidated or inhibited representatives from acting. As chairman, Vinson often kept the membership uninformed about policies. Even the senior members found that Vinson would not only withhold information from them,

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 93.

but abruptly change his policy positions.¹

When Rivers became chairman, he was cognizant of the resentment that had built up against Vinson's methods. He immediately recognized that he could not operate the committee in Vinson's fashion. Therefore, he proceeded to democratize the committee. As Rivers later stated, "If I tried to emulate Mr. Vinson, somebody would knock my head off."² His entire method of operation is in sharp contrast to his predecessor. Mr. Rivers has chosen to lead by sharing power with senior members from both sides of the aisle. By involving those members in policy decisions, he has been able to control the committee's direction. The remainder of the chapter will analyze what their power was based upon. It will attempt to indicate what, if any, impact the chairman had on the committee's direction.

The two chairmen have had the same orientation towards their job. That is, they considered themselves the Congress' prime watchdog over national security. They perceived their role as making sure that the Congress would always be informed about the state of our defense. Both men recognized the importance of interservice rivalry and dissension as a source of information. Only when the services "fall out" or are overruled by their civilian superiors are the Armed Services Committee and Congress able to learn about policy alternatives. For this reason, these men actively supported and lobbied for separate services, including a large Marine Corps and active Reserves, in order to insure that the Congress would always receive as many viewpoints

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Don Oberdorfer, "Rivers Delivers," New York Times Magazine, August 29, 1965, p. 89.

as possible.¹

Both chairmen have consistently risen, in policy disputes, to the defense of the professional military over their civilian superiors. Vinson and Rivers have often sided with the civilian rather than military sectors of the Pentagon on specific itemized budget authorizations or the number of a particular weapon to be built.² However, on any disputed weapon system which the military elites considered of primary importance, the Armed Service chairman has supported their position.³

As Vinson stated in analyzing the Department of Defense fiscal budget requests for 1950,

Where do we look in this country for the best judgment on what is needed for an adequate national defense? The ultimate responsibility for the executive branch of government rests, of course, with the President. But his is not the expert military view. It can never be so, nor does the system so intend. Our top source

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses; Carl Vinson, "For a West Point of the Air Force," New York Times Magazine, June 22, 1952, p. 13, for the way in which Congress benefits from this situation see Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and Political Role of the Armed Forces," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (March 1961), 40-52; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 420; and Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, pp. 187-189.

²The author assumes that this true based on the evidence that both men have annually endorsed the committee report which often sides with the civilian elites. However, this writer has never come across a statement by either Vinson or Rivers or read an article about them which indicates that they had ever taken a position in opposition to the "brass." A number of articles about Vinson stated that he gave the military a "rough going over" but never indicated that he opposed their decisions.

³For an in-depth discussion of this point and its validity for the whole committee see Chapters 6 and 7.

for military judgment is the Joint Chiefs of Staff who under the law are charged among other things with the nation's strategic and logistic planning. It is to these men, who have risen to the top of the nation's armed forces after a generation of experience and effort in military life, to whom we must look, for the most authoritative advice on our national defense requirements. . . .¹

The Armed Services chairman went on to state that in any dispute between the weapon requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the monetary recommendations of the Bureau of the Budget he favored the brass.

. . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff, our highest military men in the nation, each of whom has had an outstanding military record in the last war, have made firm representations as to what the nation needs in today's world in order to provide an adequate defense for the American people. But no the budget says that is \$2,674,000,000 too much. I say that is for the Congress to decide. And as between the Bureau of the Budget and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will place my confidence in² the latter, in regard to what our national defense needs are.

Some years later Vinson, in a letter to Congressman Pike, counselled the same theme. He was unwilling to impose his view of defense over those of the professional military.

Some things proposed by the executive branch are virtually impossible to change. This is particularly so in the area of defense. I personally am reluctant, and indeed refuse to substitute my judgment on a military matter for the judgment of those so much more qualified to make decisions of a military nature.³

Mr. Rivers has followed this basic orientation. Like his predecessor he does not believe that defense is something which is subject to the momentary whims of the general public but must be guarded at all times.⁴ He has continually spoken about the dangers of under-

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., March 30, 1949, Vol. 95, part 3, p. 3450.

²Ibid., p. 3544.

³U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 1969, Vol. 115, part 65, daily edition, p. E. 3370.

⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., June 12,

mining the defense establishment. On numerous occasions he has defended their programs regardless of how carelessly they appear to have been managed.¹

Style of Leadership

In his dissertation on the Ways and Means Committee Manley tries to explain how Wilbur Mills acts as chairman. He notes that studies of small groups indicated that two types of leaders are likely to operate in any group: the instrumental or task-oriented leader, and the socio-emotional or affective leader.² Instrumental leaders are concerned with channeling the group towards the conclusion of their task. However, this type of direction often gives rise to "intra-group conflict and disintegrative pressures." The affective leader helps to minimize tension and create a friendly atmosphere. Experiments with small groups have found that although one may play both roles, by and large the "opposing requirements of their functioning lead to a division of labor within the group."³

Manley found that in the case of Ways and Means, Mills was both types of leader. He based this conclusion on his interviews with

1969, Vol. 115, part 97, daily edition, p. H. 4767, U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st sess., January 11, 1965, Vol. 111, part 6, p. 506

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 1969, Vol. 115, no. 82, p. H3834-3835; U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., July 9, 1969, Vol. 115, no. 113, daily edition, pp. 5873-5878.

²Robert F. Bales and Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Decision-making Groups," Family Socialization and Interaction Process, Talcott Parson, et al. (London: Routtenberg, 1956), pp.279-306, in Wilbur D. Mills, John Manley, a paper presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, September 4, 1968, p. 6.

³Ibid., p. 7.

committee members. Each member was asked two questions which were designed to uncover who was the committee's affective and task oriented leader. The questions were:

1. When you come to particularly difficult problems, does any member of the committee stand out as being the one who most often comes up with a way out? (task leader)
2. During the course of discussing legislation things can get rather tense from time to time. I know this happens even in Ways and Means at times. Does anyone stand out as the peace-maker in these situations? (affective leader)

His conclusions were that Democrats overwhelmingly considered Mills both affective and task leader, whereas the Republicans considered him the affective leader, but saw both Mills and the minority leader, Mr. Byrnes (R, Wis.), as the task leader.

It was thought that these questions would be relevant to a study of the Armed Services Committee. Only those members who are now on the committee were tested.¹ The results are different from those recorded for Mr. Mills. Mr. Rivers is considered the committee's affective leader but is not considered to be its task leader. TABLE 5.1 categorizes the responses to these questions by party. As Manley states, these questions and their results are fairly crude ways of measuring leadership. However, certain facts are apparent. More than half the Democrats and two-thirds of the Republicans are in agreement that the socio-emotional leader is Mr. Rivers; whereas not one out of eleven Democrats and only one out of nine Republicans believed he was the task leader. The response to the task leader reveals that five

¹The writer felt that there was no way to use the present questions to test Mr. Vinson without prejudicing or channeling the members' answers. In terms of Manley's questions the individuals who served on the committee under Vinson never mentioned him in answer to the questions. Yet, when these men were asked to comment on Vinson's ability as chairman, most felt he was a genius in Armed Service matters, although he was much too arbitrary and antagonistic.

TABLE 5.1.--Task and Socio-Emotional leadership on the House Armed Services Committee as perceived by the Republican and Democratic members

	all	no one	Rivers	other	staff
<u>Task Leader</u>					
Democrats	3	5	0	1	2
Republicans	0	7	1	1	0
<u>Socio-Emotional Leader</u>					
Democrats	0	4	6	1	0
Republicans	0	3	6	0	0

out of eleven Democrats and seven out of nine Republicans could not think of even one individual who predominated. Despite the wording of the question, the number of responses stating it was the staff who solved problems would indicate that if the questions had been phrased differently the staff might have been given considerable recognition. No one mentioned the minority leader, Mr. Bates, in his answer. It is assumed that since Mr. Bates was dying of cancer when these interviews were conducted, and hadn't been in Congress for five months, committee members no longer considered him part of the group.

The data reveal that whatever Mr. Rovers' reputation in the press, he is considered to be a fair and conciliatory chairman by his members. As one Democrat stated:

It might surprise you but when he's in committee he's tops. Everyone gets their chance to speak and no one can say they didn't get their chance. He's not the same in public; he tends to shoot his mouth off and get himself in trouble. . . . In committee without prepared speeches he is vastly different. No chairman wants the members holding a grudge or hating his guts, so he is willing to allow them almost free rein to express themselves.

A senior Republican stated:

You know that Rivers plays that role. Real good chairman. He is the one although you wouldn't think it by the press. I think he

gets his reputation because he is so nervous and patriotic, all his energy is exploding and he has a habit of talking too much.

. . .

In terms of those members who claimed that there was no one peacemaker on the committee, most gave the same reason. They felt that the committee was so nonpartisan and so noncontroversial that such a role was not needed. As one subcommittee chairman stated,

Armed Services is the most easy-going committee in the Congress. I never saw anything that required a peacemaker. The issue never arises no real fighting.

Use of Informal Meetings with Senior Members

Mr. Vinson often withheld information about various sections of the Pentagon's proposals. He was able to act this way because his long experience and reputation permitted him great leeway. Another reason was his personality. He was a bossy, hot-tempered individual who demanded and was used to getting his own way. He, therefore, operated in an aloof fashion working with the Pentagon to the exclusion of his committee. Even Mr. Arends, who was the minority leader from 1957-1964, rarely if ever was informed of what Mr. Vinson was doing.¹

Mr. Rivers runs a vastly different committee. One of his first acts as chairman was to create a policy committee of the senior members. The six senior Democrats and four senior Republicans periodically unite to discuss committee business. This technique increases Rivers' control over the committee by enabling him to know what is occurring in terms of legislation and members' attitudes. The group usually meets once a month and the general direction of the committee is discussed. Mr. Rivers is very popular because of this, especially

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

with those men who had served under Vinson. A high ranking Republican said,

This is what I like about Mendel Rivers. He takes us in. We meet once a month to discuss legislation among the senior members, see where we are going. Just the other day I told him, let's meet to discuss some upcoming hearings and he said 'that's a great idea!'
 . . .

Another Democrat said,

We sit and we all discuss legislation and decisions are reached upon which legislation will come before the full committee first. We decide how the agenda will look. Who else is going to do this. We had only one meeting this year. What do the newspapers expect.

Relations with the Minority Leader

Many committees of the House operate under circumstances of close cooperation between the chairman and the ranking minority member. Manley and Fenno have shown in their studies the close relationship between the chairman and ranking member of Appropriations and Ways and Means.¹ On both committees the majority and minority leaders make a constant effort to eliminate partisan feelings and work for the good of the committee. In contrast, Armed Services is a totally nonideological, pro-military committee in which the senior members are actively promoting the wishes of the major military elites. Their relationship reaches the zenith of cooperation. Since 1947, the relationship between the two in terms of passing a legislative program and promoting the goals of the Pentagon has been "hand-in-glove." They have always shared the same basic orientation and outlook towards defense programs. According to the formal rules of the committee, the

¹Richard Fenno, pp. 167-182, and John F. Manley, "The Ways and Means Committee" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University, 1964), p. 93.

minority leader and the chairman are the only two members permitted to sit on all the subcommittees. Under the unofficial rules the minority leader is permitted to determine upon which subcommittee members of his party are placed, and alternates with the chairman in the selection of committee staff.

Mr. Vinson served as minority leader in the 80th and 83rd Congresses and for most of that period dominated the committee. As chairman, Vinson worked with two minority leaders, Mr. Short and Mr. Arends, and had a very close relationship with the former. Not only did the two men work to pass a nonpartisan legislative program, but Mr. Vinson kept Mr. Short informed on all phases of national security policy. This was not true for Mr. Arends. As the Republican Minority Whip, Mr. Arends had duties which interfered with his work on Armed Services. For this reason, as well as Mr. Vinson's general distrust, he rarely took Arends into his confidence.¹

In 1965, after being Ranking Minority Member for eight years, Mr. Arends was compelled to give up his position. This event was precipitated by a minor revolt among committee members who opposed one man holding two leadership positions, and junior House Republicans who wanted Mr. Arends removed from his Whip position. Mr. Arends, in order to save his job as Minority Whip, decided to relinquish his Armed Services position to Mr. Bates. In 1969 with the death of Bill Bates, Mr. Arends assumed his old position. It is possible that Mr. O'Konski, the second-ranking Republican on Armed Services, could fight to become Armed Services minority leader. However, it is unlikely that Mr. O'Konski, who is not very interested in Armed Services affairs, would

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

want to assume the leadership position.¹

Mr. Arends enjoys better working relations with Rivers than he ever achieved with Vinson. He has been involved with policy to a greater extent than any time during the Vinson years. Nonetheless, because of his age and Minority Whip commitments, his role and participation are limited.²

Rivers had an extremely close working relationship with Bill Bates. The minority leader who served from 1965 until his death in 1969 was considered by many to be one of the most knowledgeable individuals on the committee. According to some Congressmen, Rivers never made a decision without first discussing it with the Minority leader. Furthermore, it was alleged that he had the ability to calm the chairman's "volatile nature."³

Mr. Bates, as a well informed Minority Leader, made committee work easier for those Republican members who were not particularly involved or interested in Armed Services affairs. A conservative Eastern Republican stated,

. . . Bates is a great loss. We really have lost something. We relied on him for everything. If a member wanted to be lazy or couldn't follow something he followed the actions of Bates and he wouldn't be wrong. He did everything for us, he would set up trips and get briefings. He never raised an issue and Rivers never raised an issue which they both didn't know about. I don't know if Arends will be as good. If he has the time. Most Republicans were really dependent upon Bates, I notice the difference.

The type of relationship existing between the chairman and minority member of the committee is likely to continue. The chairman,

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

depending on who is the minority leader, may or may not involve him in all phases of the Pentagon's operation. In a sense the degree of involvement is dependent on the personality of the two men. However, the chairman will work cooperatively with him to pass the military's legislative requests. The committee is so nonpartisan that on this point it really doesn't make much difference if the senior Republican or Democrat is chairman. They are both motivated by the same goals.¹

Informal Powers

The Armed Services chairman has a number of informal powers which can be used either to benefit or punish the membership.² Among his positive powers is his ability to influence the placement of military installations or the improvement of existing facilities. A chairman cannot arbitrarily change the location of an installation. If the Bureau of the Budget does not approve of a particular location, then it will not be used. However, the chairman's influence is felt when a specific installation could be located in several areas. Then the "good word" of the chairman at the Pentagon can help determine future events. As one staff official who is involved with military construction stated:

We can definitely add to or repair the existing facilities of an individual member. There is no doubt we have pull, although it's easier to stop the dismemberment of projects than it is to start them. I know that we stopped a lounge center for training people who come to the United States to work in embassies from being put in San Antonio. We couldn't see the point since they would

¹Interviewed members on both sides of the aisle expressed this view.

²For his formal powers of conducting hearings and operating the staff, see Chapter 4.

be coming back to D.C. anyway. We do have an impact if certain people want it.

It is recognized by the membership that the chairman is one of the committee members who can have an impact on the placement of installations. One junior Democrat stated:

I think he has influence in the distribution of military installations. It is not just a joke that one more piece of equipment in Charleston and the entire community sinks. The big thing is his contacts in the departments and the desire by the Brass to please him.

An ex-member said,

The deployment of military installations is under strategy and really isn't our job. We can't dictate installations, the army makes a pretty good case. Only the chairman can affect; he can go to the Pentagon and get what he wants. Even Short or Andrews who I don't think ever requested them could have done so.

The chairman's power is based on two factors. First, the military leaders require his support in order to achieve their authorization goals. He bears primary responsibility for passing their legislative programs, and is an active lobbyist for their positions. Second, Armed Services participates in promotion policy, and it is difficult to resist the requests of a man who can influence your career.

For those committee members who are interested in improving the installations in their districts the chairman can be an important ally. Every member the writer spoke with, regardless of party, stated if he interested the chairman in the conditions of his district's installations, he was able to obtain repairs or improvements. These men knew that the quickest route to their goals was the chairman and not the construction section of the Pentagon.

Chairman Rivers is well aware of the value of doing favors for his committee members. As one Western Democrat implied:

He is very paternalistic towards the committee and is willing to do everything in his power to protect his members. They come first and I've seen him protect a district installation of one of the committee members when the choice was between a member of Armed Services and a non-member. I've never seen him get someone a district or help repair a base unless the issue was pretty clear. ...

Rivers has also been willing to assist members in their re-election campaigns. He has actively travelled and campaigned for the re-election of men on both sides of the aisle. One Democrat, who was helped by the chairman, and grateful for it, said,

In 1966, my first term following my election, Blandford asked me if I would like the chairman to come to my district to help me get re-elected. Well, I said, 'sure,' and Rivers came all the way out. I took him to the air base to look at dilapidated structures. Well, it probably would have been fixed anyway but he took a look and the next year a giant station was built. So he has influence, I know that . . .

Rivers likes to please and protect his supporters and he will do everything feasible to insure their continued service in Congress. Naturally considerable good will has been generated by his actions. Mr. Vinson was more aloof was not as active in seeking committee support. He did help certain members obtain repairs for their installations, but he was never involved in any members' campaigns for re-election.¹

Another source of a chairman's power is his influence in the House of Representatives. Chairmen who are respected by their House colleagues are an asset to a committee. They improve the chances that the committee's legislation will pass unamended and offer individual members access to the House leaders.²

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses; and Louis E. Stockstill, "Uncle Carl Vinson: Backstage Boss of the Pentagon," The Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, Vol. 96 (February 18, 1961), 25.

²John F. Manley, Wilbur Mills, A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4, 1968, pp. 18-24, 45-59.

In this area Vinson had considerably more impact than the present chairman. In fact, Vinson's power was interwoven with his unofficial role as leader of the Southern Democrats. He was considered second in command to Judge Smith (D, Va.). It was estimated that with Vinson backing an issue it could make the difference between 6 to 12 votes.¹ In 1961 President Kennedy felt that in order to pass his legislative requests he would need the support of Southern leaders. The President was able to enlist Mr. Vinson's support and "Uncle Carl" was instrumental in the passage of a few bills.² Mr. Rivers' power is confined entirely to his committee. He does not have the ability to affect any legislation except those bills which come under his jurisdiction of Armed Services.³

Negative Power

Any chairman of Armed Services is in a position to punish his opponents. One method is to make it uncomfortable for an individual at committee meetings. All a chairman has to do is restrict a member to his minimal rights, while allowing his friends as much time as they wish. This technique was often employed by Mr. Vinson. However, Mr. Rivers has rarely used it. Rivers is very sensitive about being accused of playing favorites, and with the single exception of trying to

¹Rowland Evans, "The Sixth Sense of Carl Vinson," The Reporter, Vol. 26 (April 12, 1962), 25-27.

²Richard Bolling, House Out of Order (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1965), p. 90. See also Tom Wicker, J.F.K. and L.B.J.: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics (New York: William Morrow, 1968), pp. 100-108.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses

impose the five minute rule, he has not restricted questioning. In fact, many of his supporters accuse him of being too easy with his opponents. One Southerner said,

I find that he is likely either for psychological or strategic reasons to favor his enemies over his friends. He gives them all the rope they want. He is more likely to let them ramble on and he has often skipped over senior men for them to follow up questions. . . . This may be off the top of my head, but the best way to treat the chairman is to give him two or three kicks so he'll notice you.

Two other powers which the chairman has are control over junkets and subcommittee assignments. The power over junkets is summed up by a Western Democrat:

The chairman, if he can help it, does not permit his opponents to go on junkets. When it's the whole committee being invited he can't stop it like the Paris air show. But on things like small trips that he allows his friends to bring their wives, he doesn't allow them. _____ has bothered Rivers and he won't permit him to go on any special missions.

In terms of subcommittee assignments both Mr. Rivers and Mr. Vinson have used this power to reward their supporters and punish their opponents.¹ Mr. Vinson used to continually shift subcommittees and their staffs to suit his purposes. As one subcommittee chairman stated in comparing the two,

Rivers lets me pick my own subcommittee staff . . . only guys I want on the subcommittees get on. I appointed Nedzi, he is the conscience of the committee. He helps keep us straight. I couldn't choose my subcommittee under Vinson. He would keep putting guys on. It was a real bother. Rivers is straight, you know where you stand, he doesn't deceive you.

A good example of Mr. Rivers' policy occurred over the chairmanship of the Investigatory Subcommittee. Under Vinson, Mr. Hebert and Mr. Hardy were in charge of the subcommittee and in the case of

¹See chapter 4 for the type of subcommittees which the committee uses and their importance in passing defense legislation.

Mr. Hardy, he had a special staff assigned to him. When Mr. Hardy retired, Pike (D, N.Y.) probably should have become chairman. In 1968 Pike had exposed certain cost overruns in Army procurement practices which were very discomfoting to the chairman. In 1969 Rivers decided to head the subcommittee himself. His opponents claim it was an attempt to penalize Pike for his previous action; the chairman's supporters state that Rivers was only doing what Stennis had done on the Senate Armed Services Committee. The two men concluded that the most important subcommittee should be headed by the chairman. However, Rivers' action parallels the approach he has used to punish other committee enemies. When Rivers became chairman, he had a personality clash with Mr. Stratton. On several occasions the two of them verbally clashed at committee hearings, and Rivers was annoyed by Stratton's opposition to his pay raise bill. For two years Mr. Rivers assigned him to two insignificant subcommittees and refused to appoint him as an investigatory chairman. It was not until Stratton had "toned down" and ceased challenging the chairman that his workload was increased. In 1967 he was appointed to head an investigatory subcommittee dealing with antisubmarine warfare.¹ This same type of treatment has been true for Congressman Leggett of California. The Democratic lawmaker has only two subcommittee assignments whereas the average member has between three and four. Leggett's anti-military attitude, as demonstrated by his desire to cut weapon spending, has annoyed the chairman, and Rivers has retaliated by restricting his workload. As one member stated,

¹ Reconstructed from Interview Responses, and U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Report no. 72, Report on the Activities of the House Committee on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 11, 177.

Leggett could complain that he is entitled to four committee seats rather than two (sic), but that is what the chairman wants him to do. He wants him to have to ask a favor.

Mr. Rivers is anxious to maintain the public's confidence in his committee. When the Pueblo incident occurred, he appointed Pike as the investigatory chairman. This was done to show the public that he was truly interested in a thorough investigation. At the same time Mr. Rivers could keep Mr. Pike away from those subcommittees which deal with arms procurement. As one close observer of the committee noted,

Pike got the subcommittee as a favor of Rivers. Rivers wouldn't let him have the investigatory subcommittee because it might threaten some of Rivers' favorite projects. He was accused of snubbing a good man so he gave Pike this one to keep people quiet.

Thus, both chairmen have manipulated the membership and chairmanship of subcommittees to further their own aims. Subcommittee appointments is one area where the Armed Service chairman is able to reward and punish.

Impact of the Chairman's Power on Members

What effect do these informal powers, both positive and negative, have on the average Armed Services member? A representative who actively supports the chairman's viewpoint and maintains a cordial relationship stands to gain considerably. He is offered more opportunities to travel, significant subcommittee work, and perhaps the improvement of his district's defense facilities. Members who have alienated the chairman are usually penalized by having fewer subcommittee assignments and travel opportunities. Nevertheless, these powers play only a marginal part in channeling an individual's behavior. Men are not generally motivated by a chairman's ability to reward and punish.

This attitude was summed up by an ex-Republican member of the committee.

No one who is worth his salt is going to change his position just because the chairman holds a counter position. What in the world do you think the chairman can do. The guys who can't stand up to the chairman are the same ones who can't stand up to wives. I don't think the chairman can do that much to you. His power is limited . . .

The same idea was alluded to by one of the committee's dissenters.

What can Rivers possibly do to me. He can't prevent me from returning to Congress or kick me off the committee. The process of seniority goes on whether he likes it or not, and if he tries to cut the air base I'll blow my top, he'll feel sorry. After that article about Rivers in the Post (Washington Post article which criticized Rivers' methods) now you can ask all the questions you want. He gives me lousy subcommittees and my travel privileges are restricted, but so what. I don't think it amounts to much.

The Public View of Vinson and Rivers

Carl Vinson, who served in the House longer than any other man, was chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee for almost fifteen years before the creation of Armed Services. From 1914-1964 he represented a conservative rural, Democratic stronghold, during which time he faced sporadic and meaningless opposition.

More than any other man in Congress he deserves credit as the "father" of the two-ocean navy.¹ In 1935, despite considerable opposition, he pushed a bill through Congress which authorized replacement of obsolete vessels by spending nearly \$400,000,000 over a five year period.² Unlike the committee's two Republican chairmen, he was able

¹Rowland Evans, "The Sixth Sense of Carl Vinson," The Reporter, Vol. 26 (April 12, 1962), 26.

²"Who's News and Why 1942," Current Biography, edited by Maxine Block (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1942), p. 85. Vinson recently mentioned to some of his old friends on the staff that he considered this to be his greatest accomplishment.

to attract numerous defense projects for his district. During his years in office a navy fuse factory, a naval hospital, a huge military airport, a \$15,000,000 military repair and supply depot, a WAVE school and a military socket factory were constructed.¹ Later, in the early 1960's, he was able to persuade President Kennedy to invest government equipment in a Lockheed plant in Macon, Georgia.²

Vinson was considered a legislative genius because on only four occasions since 1931 did he suffer a legislative defeat.³ He used his legislative finesse to gain passage of favorable military legislation. He was constantly in the vanguard of those individuals who were proposing and propelling the military's most elaborate and sophisticated defense requirements. All these activities were glorified in the press, including his ability to receive defense installations - Carl Vinson was known as "Uncle Carl," the "Admiral," and the "Swamp Fox," and the constant cliché about his district was it had so many military installations that "one more base would sink the state."⁴

¹Vance Packard, "Uncle Carl Watchdog of Defense," American Magazine, Vol. 149 (April 1950), 122.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses, and John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Big Defense Firms are Really Big Public Firms and Should be Nationalized," New York Times Magazine, November 16, 1969, pp.50-54.

³The issues were a bill to defend Guam from attack in 1940, to institute Universal Military Training, a military pay raise bill, and finally strike curbing legislation on Navy installations. Rowland Evans, The Reporter, Vol. 26 (April 12, 1962), 27.

⁴For articles on the Vinson Mystique see Russell Baker, "Again Vinson Mounts the Ramparts," The New York Times Magazine, May 4, 1958, p. 3#; Rowland Evans, The Reporter, Vol. 26 (April 12, 1962), 25-27#; Vance Packard, American Magazine, Vol. 49 (April 1950), 30-31#; Louis S. Stockstill, "Uncle Carl Vinson Backstage Boss of the Pentagon," The Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, Vol. 98 (February 18, 1961), 1#.

Mr. Rivers, the present chairman, who is promoting the same types of policy as his predecessor, does not receive similar press coverage. He is, in fact, criticized and buffooned by many columnists. Outwardly Rivers is virtually the same type of chairman as his predecessor. He supports the professional military's point of view, tries to promote their legislative requests, and is always on the alert to protect the good name of the armed forces.¹ Yet unlike Vinson his reputation and public image are completely different.

Some of the reasons for Rivers' trouble relate to the problems of the 1960's. The cost of national defense has become so staggering that many citizens have begun to question its rationality. During the Eisenhower era few columnists or politicians quibbled over the amount of money which was theoretically needed to maintain an adequate defense in the face of a belligerent and seemingly monolithic communist front. The schisms in the communist camp, as well as the greater public awareness about the country's domestic needs, has made many individuals question the need of present defense budgets.² Mr. Vinson spoke and operated in an era when opposition to large defense authorization was almost non-existent. Mr. Rivers has been requesting vast sums for military programs during a period when the war in Vietnam and the cost

¹See the verbal exchange between Rivers and Chairman of Appropriations Mahon. Mr. Mahon (D, Tex.), who usually supports the military's requests, has become disillusioned with their inefficiency. Rivers accused Mahon that by criticizing the brass he was playing into the hands of the Defense Department's critics. The official version was printed in the Washington Post, May 21, 1969, p. 1. For the printed record Mr. Rivers toned down his remarks. U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 1969, Vol. 115, No. 10, pp. 13128-13129.

²Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), and Julius Duscha, Arms Money and Politics (New York: Ives, Washburn, Inc., 1965). See also the statements by anti-

of modern warfare has created an anti-military and anti-defense feeling in many parts of the country. It is no longer considered patriotic or functional to spend so much for defense.

Vinson was a more reserved individual who did not brag about his ability to get military installations. Rivers, apparently for political reasons (blacks have registered in his district and he faced primary opposition for the first time since the early 1940's), has claimed that he personally is responsible for many of the district's military installations. This attitude which was excellent for home consumption, "Rivers delivers," is counterproductive to his national image. Lately Rivers has begun to claim that Charleston is a magnificent warm water port and the installations which were placed there have nothing to do with him.¹

The greatest blow to Mr. Rivers' image was the Drew Pearson characterization. The picture which Pearson presented of a bourbon drinking drunkard who is incapable of remaining silent, has adversely affected the chairman. In almost every interview conducted, one of the first things the interviewee spoke about in relation to Rivers was the Drew Pearson characterization. Surprisingly, they stated that Mr. Rivers used to drink heavily, but even his worst opponents claim they had never seen him drunk. However, they all agreed that the stories have damaged his reputation.²

war Congressmen and Senators in the Congressional Record on military spending from 1967 through the present.

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 115, part 97, daily edition, June 12, 1969, p. H4767.

²See "The Muckraker," Newsweek, Vol. 67 (June 27, 1966), 87, for a review of these charges.

Mr. Rivers has often made some very controversial statements about national security matters.¹ Many members expressed the view that they not only hurt the chairman but the goals and work of the committee. A junior Democrat alluded to this point when he recalled Rivers press conference at an Air Force base in the member's district.

. . . a press conference is called and Rivers starts shooting off his mouth and getting warmed up. He starts calling for the use of nuclear weapons on any power that will interfere with our solution to the Vietnam war, especially the Chinese. I had to get involved and said I was dead set against that.

A good friend of the chairman said,

Rivers is a good friend so this is strictly confidential, but the trouble he has with the press is his own fault. He is very patriotic and it tends to blind him. He tends to shoot his mouth off and it hurts not only him but the committee.

Another Republican stated,

Rivers as chairman does not take the mood of the country into account. He is too quick to speak without thinking about how his words will be received. He does not think it through and ignores the trends. . . . I feel certain Vinson would have been quieter.

Vinson, on the other hand, only spoke in generalities and always advocated strength. He supported the build-up of the services, their weapon requirements, and the honor of the military. He rarely, if ever, became involved in how wars should be fought, what type of weapons should be used, or how ruthless the enemy might be. It was very hard to disagree with Vinson since he was usually supporting the military equivalent of motherhood.

Rivers gets involved with policy and advocates military solutions which are opposed by many segments of society. These are the major reasons why Rivers, who desires the same types of programs as Vinson and supports the same goals, has created such a different public image.

¹Don Oberdorfer, New York Times Magazine, August 29, 1965, p. 31.

The Pentagon's Image of Vinson and Rivers

The creation of a military budget is one of the Pentagon's most difficult problems. The process is very long, tedious, and political, involving the three branches of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and the President. In 1960 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean outlined the budgetary process for fiscal year 1960 (July 1959-July 1960). The authors claimed that department budget estimates had begun for this budget in mid-1957.

. . . Next, in the spring and summer of 1958, these programs were modified, costed, and converted into departmental budgets. Early in this period, the Secretary of Defense issued "budget guidelines" to the individual services. Then the budget offices of the Departments issue their "calls of estimates" and the various commands and bureaus prepared budget estimates. During the summer the Departmental budget offices sent preliminary budgets to the Secretary of Defense. At this point the Secretary discussed the figure with the President and with officials in the Bureau of the Budget. After some further revisions, perhaps on the basis of Presidential ceilings, the estimates were sent to the Budget bureaus.

During the autumn of 1958, these figures were revised by the Budget Bureau and also by the Defense Department. A series of discussions involving officials in the individual departments, the Defense Department, and the Budget Bureau took place. The Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Chief of Staff and each Department secretary, officially transmitted the estimates to the Budget Bureau. The latter sent its recommendations to the President. In January 1959, the President, having reached final decisions, submitted the official document to Congress along with his budget message.¹

Prior to 1961 each Service submitted its requests separately and on a yearly basis. This process tended to minimize cooperation between the three services and maximize individual service loyalties. Each branch was fighting for its own programs and weapons.² One of

¹Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 44-45.

²Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and

Secretary McNamara's major innovations was applying managerial techniques to the budgetary process. He made substantial modifications in the Defense Department's budgetary procedures, by introducing the concept of planning, programming, and budgeting. The system was originated by Charles Hitch who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense under McNamara specializing in budgetary matters. The first step in the process was military planning which generated,

. . . military economic studies which compared alternative ways of accomplishing national security objectives and which tried to determine the one that constitutes the most for a given cost or achieves a given objective at the least cost.¹

The second stage was programming.

The problem here was to sort out all of the myriad programs and activities of the defense establishment and regroup them into meaningful program elements, i.e., integrated combination of men, equipment, and installations whose effectiveness could be related to our national security objectives.²

The programs were then viewed in five-year terms instead of the previous annual arrangement. Thus, budgeting for weapons and personnel could be perceived as 1/5 of the total cost. Each defense budget came to represent 20% of the Pentagon's plans.³

The Armed Services Committee is officially involved in the budgetary process when it holds committee hearings on Defense Department Authorizations for Appropriations. However, long before the

Row, 1964), pp. 302-304; and Charles Hitch, Decision-Making For Defense (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

¹Charles Hitch, p. 30.

²Ibid., p. 32.

³Ibid., p. 39. For benefits of the system see William Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 188-189, 290-292.

committee holds hearings Armed Service members, and especially the staff, are evaluating sections of the Defense Department's requests. Since the staff always informs the chairman of its activities, he becomes the committee's communication center. Individual committee members simply do not have the time to thoroughly investigate various Pentagon proposals.¹ The chairman, through the staff, becomes the most knowledgeable member of Armed Services. This situation was noted by one of the committee dissenters:

He is the boss, the total power of the committee. An amazing, cunning, and powerful man. He has got everything going for him. For six months of the year when we are not in session he is running the show unattended by anyone else. All the staff at his call and he can work in any area unsupervised. ...

When Carl Vinson was chairman, members of the Defense Department would be continually coming to his office to explain various sections of the program. This trend has been greatly modified under Rivers.² Most of his information comes from his staff.

The knowledge that the Armed Service chairman has about new weapons and budget authorizations often enables them to control the committee's direction. Carl Vinson often served as the Pentagon's representative to convince the members of a particular course of action. As one subcommittee member stated:

This was his style. Early in the morning you would see limousines roll up, and out would come a general. He would discuss things with Carl privately and Carl would try to foster their points of view on the committee. Every once in a while we revolted but often we went along. He kept things pretty much to himself.

Chairman Rivers has engaged in the same type of activities. He has

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses

lobbied for Pentagon proposals and at times has "sprung" things on the members at committee mark-up. This situation was commented upon by one of the committee dissenters.

. . . He and the minority leader work hand in glove. That is why there is no debate. They hog all the time and call on their friends. We are lucky if we get to speak against something for 10 minutes . . . He hides things. I come to meetings and he suddenly springs new weapons. He asked for an airplane, the F54, which I never heard of. He had been promoting it for months quietly. He got in a friendly conversation with General ____ from the South . . . Within fifteen minutes the whole discussion was over. No one but the chairman knew what it was all about. . . .

The other relationship between the chairman and the Department of Defense is his impact on defense department decisions. How much do the military elites respect his judgment? There was general agreement among the staff officials interviewed that Mr. Vinson had much more influence than the present chairman. They claimed his views were respected and his opinions solicited. Most of them felt that Mr. Rivers' newness to the job and fewer personal contacts made him less effective in the corridors of the Pentagon. One official said:

Carl was right nine out of ten times for so many years you just had to listen. He was here for almost fifty years, so they naturally respected his judgment. He knew who to call and consult about any matter which arose.

Vinson had access to the executive leaders. He knew Franklin Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and in 1935 was encouraged by him to promote the two front navy. He knew Eisenhower as an officer before the committee, and John Kennedy from his House and Senate days. Finally, President Johnson was a close personal friend, who had served on Armed Services while a Congressman.¹

Mr. Rivers has less influence and less impact on the executive branch than did his predecessor. It seems that he is usually consulted

¹ New York Times, December 26, 1964, p. 18.

after a decision has been made on policy, rather than while it is in the developmental stage. This does not apply to Vinson who supposedly was intimately involved from the beginning.¹ As one staff official who worked with both men commented,

Rivers, unlike Vinson, has very little idea of overall direction of policy. Little idea of where he is going. He needs more staff assistance because of it. Mendel has more interests than Vinson. He needs the affection of receiving awards and praise by going round the country. He needs respect and gratitude. Rivers' traveling takes up time, unlike Carl who worked only for the legislation.

In terms of evaluating Department of Defense requests, one of Mr. Vinson's weaknesses was his dislike for travel. He never traveled anywhere except between his district and Washington, D. C. Therefore, his information about army bases had to be learned indirectly and to a great extent he would know only what he was told. Some Congressmen criticized Mr. Vinson for this failing and felt that Mr. Rivers who personally investigates bases often has more effect on policy.²

Mr. Rivers is a restless individual who loves to travel. In fact he has been accused of abusing his office by his constant junkets and the encouragement which he gives his colleagues to do the same. Regardless, he is constantly flying to evaluate military installations and projects and check on the needs of the army. This has created a situation whereby the present chairman is familiar with events on a first hand basis.³

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses

³Some of the staff and his colleagues mentioned that Rivers is an individual who needs and craves flattery. (His office contains over twenty framed awards as well as approximately fifty autographed pictures from defense officials.) They claimed that the reason Rivers traveled so much was to be praised and decorated. In terms of the

Vinson and Rivers: A Comparison

Mr. Vinson was a much more powerful and influential chairman than Mr. Rivers. Some reasons have already been stated; in conclusion the following factors should be noted. Mr. Vinson had that dynamic quality of leadership which encouraged other men to go along. Some men are leaders, whereas others, mouthing the same words and acting in the same fashion, are never more than followers. Mr. Vinson ran an autocratic committee and operated in an independent fashion. Whatever qualities enable one man to dominate another is not within the scope of this study. What can be said is that Vinson had those qualities which enabled him to get his way. This has not been true for Mr. Rivers.

Mr. Vinson had an alert and inquisitive mind and was willing to devote almost all his working hours to the committee's business. His long years of service gave him not only seniority but almost a total personal view of the creation of the modern United States Armed Forces.

His long service has paralleled that of eight United States Presidents, 18 Secretaries of War and Defense, 25 Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and 53 Admirals and Generals who have headed the land, sea, and ground forces.¹

In essence his perspective increased his power. He made so many correct

United States Armed Forces this is something they are not only willing to do, but are experts in.

One of Rivers' friends offered the opinion that the chairman's junkets resulted from his nervous energy. According to his friends Rivers can't sit still for five minutes and "the reason I get to go on so many junkets is because I'm an early riser just like the chairman, and he wants someone to talk with at that time."

¹Louis R. Stockstill, "Carl Vinson ROA's Minuteman of 1962," Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, Vol. 38 (February 1962), 16.

decisions that many individuals were afraid to disagree with him. His reputation as a diligent worker enabled him to act very arbitrarily.

One staff official said,

I once saw him look at a line item in a bill for sixty million dollars in authorization for a classified item and say 'I studied the bill last night, it's okay,' and bang his gavel and it passed. The members didn't budge because they knew he had done his homework.

When members who had served under Vinson were questioned as to why they allowed Vinson to act as he pleased, the replies were quite similar. Most members said they disliked the way he acted and felt he was often arbitrary and bossy. However, the consensus of feeling was that since he had been right so many times in the past, that he almost single-handedly built the two ocean navy, they simply were not willing to impose their judgments over his.

Even though Vinson ran the Armed Services Committee in an arbitrary fashion, "squirreled information," and had considerable influence in the Pentagon, his power, like that of Rivers, was based on "followmanship." He was supporting policies and programs which almost the entire committee enthusiastically endorsed. As in the case of Wilbur Mills, their power stemmed from their ability to represent the interests of the membership. Thus, these two chairmen who had different styles of leadership had virtually the same impact on the committee's legislative output. As has been mentioned, "the chairman gets what he wants, because the committee gets what it wants." Both the chairman and the membership have a pro-military orientation, support the Pentagon's overall legislative program, and in major policy disputes between the military and civilian defense elites side with the former.

Although their effect on defense legislation was similar, the two men had a vastly different impact on the committee's public image.

The chairman in a sense does personify the committee. This is especially true of Armed Services where the committee is viewed to a great extent on people's perception of the chairman. In this sense Vinson was outstanding. He gave the committee real prestige and status through his ability to legitimize his actions and those of the committee. The present chairman has hurt the committee, the Congress, and the prestige of the military. The first association most people have with Rivers is an alcoholic and a man who can be bought off by the brass. This type of image is destructive to the committee's reputation and its programs. The committee, which has always pressed for enormous defense allocations, is now pictured as the seat of the great giveaway. This was Vinson's greatest contribution and Rivers' greatest failure. The fact is that one increased the committee's prestige, whereas the other has hurt it.

What Difference Does It Make Who Is Chairman?

On Armed Services, the chairman's power is directly related to the membership's attitude towards military affairs. Thirty-five of the committee's present membership of forty are united in orientation, outlook, and goals with the chairman's position. The chairman is making decisions and pursuing policies which practically every member would make if he controlled the levers of power. Hence, the chairman achieves his objective because the membership "gets what it wants." The tremendous consensus and agreement is the secret of Vinson's and Rivers' seeming success. It is not very difficult to attain a specific legislative objective when you can almost always be sure of obtaining the support of 35 out of 40 members. If the membership

abandoned the committee's pro-military orientation, or was more concerned with domestic rather than foreign priorities, then the chairman's job and his position of power would be different. In that event, whoever was chairman would have to use subtle pressures and techniques of compromise to maximize his goals. Currently he does not have to employ any technique but fairness to all members at committee hearings and mark-up.

Manley, in his study of Wilbur Mills, repeatedly stressed that "leadership required followmanship." He kept pointing out that Mills had power because he always sensed the direction of the committee and led it.¹ On Armed Services the chairman does not have to sense consensus; he represents it. His views are indistinguishable from almost any other member of the committee. The following comments are typical of the attitudes which are held by the committee members. A committee critic said,

The chairman is crucial, but if Rivers dropped dead tomorrow then the direction of the committee would not change an iota. The same type of guys would take over. This is a committee which could run with almost any individual at the helm.

A former House leader claimed,

The power of the chairman is blown out of proportion by the mass media. The chairman is no better than a majority of his committee wants him to be. He only expresses their wishes. He can't do as he pleases as in the pre-1946 days. If the chairman is foolish he gets slapped down.

An ex-member of the committee, speaking about Vinson, said,

The chairman represents the overwhelming wishes of his committee. He does and acts in a manner which is approved by a majority of the members. No chairman would have very much impact if he tried to bully the members. He is really the first among equals. The

¹ John F. Manley, Wilbur Mills, a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4, 1968, p. 3.

stories about Vinson are myth. He didn't do anything special, the members granted him what they wanted. . . .

This idea was also expressed by one of the committee's dissenters,

If I were chairman I would have trouble. The type of people involved agree on everything. I would be overruled all the time and it would put me in a bad spot. There is no way in the world with the present type of group that my views would prevail.

Thus, what difference if any does it make who is chairman of the Armed Services Committee? The general consensus among the members was that in terms of the committee's direction it would not matter. The committee, because of the nature of the subject, its history, and membership, would always support a pro-military orientation. The chairman in a sense is only first among equals. It is possible that a man like Vinson might have more impact on the types of weapons which were developed and the location of installation sites. However, the general pro-military trend of the committee could not be deterred. Vinson had power because he was supporting and representing the consensus views of the members. He was leading the majority in a direction it favored. This is true for Mr. Rivers today. They have never endorsed programs which were opposed by the military or the committee members. In essence, because of the overwhelming consensus, a chairman can only go in one direction, or always be overruled by the majority.

If the attitudes of the membership toward satisfying the military's requests should change, or if one of the committee's rebels were to become chairman a much different result would ensue. Under those conditions a chairman with very special legislative and leadership skills would be required. This is not to say that Rivers and Vinson did not or do not possess such skills. It is only that during

the last twenty-five years neither man has been called upon to use them.

CHAPTER VI

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AND THE PASSAGE OF RESEARCH AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS

Prior to 1960 the House and Senate Armed Services committees played limited roles in national security matters. Almost all of their work involved military construction and personnel problems; the committee's influence in the areas of weapon authorization and strategy was nearly nonexistent.¹ Throughout their history both committees had drafted legislation which permitted Pentagon officials very wide latitude in the number and amount of weapons they might acquire without Armed Services Committee approval. The Secretary of the Army and Air Force under the Army and Air Force Authorization and Corporation Act of 1950,

. . . was authorized to procure material and facilities necessary to maintain and support the army . . . including . . . guided missiles, modern standard items of equipment; equipment to replace obsolete and unserviceable equipment; necessary spare . . . material, and parts; and such reserves of supplies as is needed to enable the army to perform its mission.

The navy, despite the enormous ship building needs of World War II, was still constructing vessels, without Armed Services involvement, based on the authorization legislation which was written in 1934.³

¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, No. 9, Military Posture Briefings, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, p. 628.

²Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress 1945-1963 (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 366.

³U.S., Congressional Record, 8th Cong., 1st sess., July 30,

Thus, when the Kennedy administration took office the committees had played a very minor role in their area of specialization. The important Congressional decisions concerning weapons and strategy were decided by the House and Senate military appropriations subcommittees. The passage in 1959 of section 412b or the so-called "Russell Amendment" changed this situation. The amendment which was a rider to the 1959 construction authorization said,

. . . no funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such dates.¹

The amendment was designed to re-introduce the respective House and Senate Armed Services committees into areas which they had avoided for most of their histories.

Most students of the amendment offer the following reasons for its creation: First, the amendment's supporters were opposed to the general drift of Defense Department programs and their inability to affect events. They believed that defense policy and weapon development was in a state of flux, and many felt qualified, because of the time they had devoted to military matters, to participate in the changes.² Second, the Senators who introduced the amendment were partly motivated by feelings of jealousy. They felt out of the lime-light because such issues as space, missiles, and aircraft were being

1959, Vol. 105, part 11, p. 14766.

¹Public Law 86-149.

²Raymond H. Dawson, "Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems," American Political Science Review, Vol. 56 (March 1962), 43.

investigated by other groups.¹

The members of the House Armed Services Committee were not instrumental in devising the amendment. The chairman, Carl Vinson, at first opposed it. He felt that the committee might not be able to handle the increased responsibility and he wanted the military to decide its own needs. It was assumed that some of Vinson's opposition stemmed from his extensive contacts in the Department of Defense; he did not need this type of legislation to make his views known. Nonetheless, he soon revised his position when the committee membership enthusiastically supported 412b.²

The amendment generated a certain amount of opposition. In the Congress members of the House and Senate Appropriations committees were lukewarm to a measure which would decrease their power.³ In the executive branch opposition to the amendment was open. The administration, and especially President Eisenhower, felt that Pentagon officials because of 412b would be forced to waste time on the Hill duplicating testimony.⁴ Despite the opposition the amendment was signed into law and took effect on January 1, 1961. Since that time the committee's jurisdiction in the field of defense authorization has been expanded.

In 1962 the Congress amended the new authorization procedure by adding research, development, test and evaluation with respect to aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. In 1963, the law was further amended to include all research, development, test and evaluation performed by the Armed Services. In 1965 the law again was amended to include all tracked combat vehicles. It is not unlikely that the law may be further amended to include other major

¹Bernard G. Gordon, "The Military Budget: Congressional Phase," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (November 1961), 699.

²Edward A. Kolodziej, p. 380.

³Ibid., p. 377.

⁴Bernard G. Gordon, Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, 696.

¹
procurement expenditures.

Most students of the legislation are in agreement that it increases the power and importance of the Armed Services Committee.² They believe it allows them to investigate the most important defense issues and affect if only in a negative way - as critic, questioner, skeptic, or prodder - the thrust of policy.³ The remaining two chapters will concentrate on how the House Armed Services Committee has adapted to its new legislative responsibilities. What impact has 412b had on its actions?

The present chapter will discuss the legislative phase of 412b, i.e., the way in which the House Armed Services Committee evaluates the Pentagon's defense procurement and research requests and guides its legislation through the Congress. In order to accomplish this goal three key phases in the process will be studied. First is the operation of committee hearings. Who participates at hearings, which witnesses testify, and the attitudes of individual members are factors which affect the passage of legislation. Second, is the way in which the Armed Service leaders guide the committee's recommended program through the House

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October 27, 1969, Vol. 115 no. 174, daily edition, p. E8909, U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Report no. 1293 Authorizing Appropriations During Fiscal Year 1966 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Naval Vessels, Tracked Combat Vehicles, Research, Development, and Test Evaluation, and Military Construction, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., February 18, 1966, has the exact language of the committee's authority, p. 4. (hereafter referred to as report no. 1293)

²Joyce Mitchell, "Congress and National Security," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, 1964), Raymond Dawson, American Political Science Review, Vol. 56 (March 1962), 42, Edward A. Kolodziej, p. 368; for an opposite view see B. Gordon, Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (November 1961), 695.

³Raymond H. Dawson, American Political Science Review, vol. 56 (March 1962), 56.

floor. It has always been important to the leaders that their legislation be passed without amendment. The members feel that they have worked hard creating a bill and they do not want noncommittee members with a limited view of the problems "cluttering up" their recommendations.¹ The committee's success in avoiding amendments and the reasons for it will be mentioned. Third, is the legislative relationship between House and Senate Armed Services Committees. On some committees of the Congress the Senate and House Conferees maintain different ideological viewpoints. These differences in outlook have a profound effect on the final conference version of the bill. This section will discuss if there is any difference between how the House and Senate Armed Services Committee members perceive defense authorizations.² Some of the more important questions which the chapter hopes to answer are: how does the committee justify its defensive recommendations on the floor of the House; and what is the relationship between the Senate and House Armed Services Committees?

The following chapter will discuss 412b from the perspective of the committee and the executive branch. What weapons and programs did the two branches disagree about and for what reasons? The three major policy differences between the civilian and professional military during the 1960's was over the place of bombers in the United States' overall defense program, the use of nuclear powered ships, and the emplacement of ABM missiles. On these issues the committee continually supported the service chiefs who were opposed to McNamara. The reasons for the committee's action will be undertaken.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses. For a similar feeling on the Appropriations Committee see Richard Fenno, pp. 443-445.

²For differences in philosophy between the House and Senate

Committee Hearings

One of a committee's most important tasks is to hold hearings. Usually hearings are held either to develop legislation or check on the progress of particular governmental programs. David Smeltzer in his doctoral dissertation on committee hearings found that they served two basic functions. First, the hearings allowed the committee to amend and negate executive legislation. Second, it enabled the committee to legitimate and justify the agencies' requests on the House floor.¹ Jack Fleer in his study of Congressional committees claimed hearings served three major purposes. First they enable Congressmen to ask questions which are important to their constituents. The second purpose is to scrutinize and supervise the executive branch of government; the process of hearings enables the Congress to check on the action of the federal agencies. Thirdly, the representative is able to express his views and opinions on policy. He is in a position to advise the administration.²

Richard Fenno discovered that Congressmen considered this "watchdog" function the greatest chance they possessed to influence the direction of executive programs. They expect the agencies personnel to testify frankly and to listen to the suggestions offered. Although the Congressman is often less knowledgeable about a government program

Appropriations Committees see Richard Fenno, pp. 626-641.

¹David Amos Smeltzer, "The Problems of Alternatives in Congressional Decision Making: The Role of Committee Hearings (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1964), p. 422.

²Jack Fleer, pp. 59-60.

than the agency official, the member using random questions and spot checking tends to minimize his disadvantage.¹

Executive agencies have found that a great deal of their time is spent preparing for committee hearings. They consider the hearings a chance to tell their side of the story and establish in the minds of the representatives confidence in what they are doing.² The amount of time which governmental officials must spend before Congressional committees in order to defend their programs is staggering. Dean Acheson claimed that one-sixth of his working days as Secretary of State were spent either testifying on the "Hill" or preparing to do so.³ Committee members desire two main things from their witnesses. They want an individual who knows his subject and who acts cooperatively.⁴ The performance of a government witness is extremely important to the monetary and legislative treatment which his agency is accorded.⁵

¹ Richard J. Fenno, p. 332. For criticism of Congressional hearings see Joseph P. Harris, Congress and the Legislative Process (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 108.

² Ibid., p. 278. See also J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process - Executive Legislative Committee Relations (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), pp. 23-29, 33-43.

³ Dean Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 65.

⁴ J. Leiper Freeman, p. 42

⁵ According to Fenno the bureau chiefs' presentation is 75% of what the agency gets, p. 289. See also Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 63-123. Many critics of Congressional hearings feel that the key decisions have already been made and the meeting is only pro forma -- see Clem Miller, Member of the House, edited by John W. Baker (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 8. For the legal power of Congress to call witnesses and investigate issues see: Alan Barch, Government by Investigation (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), pp. 10-20; George B. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives, p. 75; and George Goodwin, "The Seniority System in Congress," American Political Science Review, Vol. 53 (June 1959), 412-436.

Hearings are especially important for the Armed Services Committee. For most members, hearings are the only time they participate in national security matters. The information which is elicited at hearings enables some members to understand the Pentagon's decision-making process. Clever interrogation by experienced members often reveals differences between the civilian and military witnesses as well as inter-service rivalries. The hearings are also a forum for the interchange of ideas. Armed Service members are able to express their views and offer suggestions on the Pentagon's program.

The Armed Services staff is cognizant of the value of hearings. They find the committee couldn't influence the Pentagon's program except for the information which the forum elicits. As one senior staff official said,

This is where we get our information from. Most of the insights come from the committee hearings. We develop lines of questioning and reasoning whereas the members ask questions we didn't think of. Most of the information doesn't come over the telephone as you would expect. The trends come out in committee, they are especially important for trends.

Limitations of Hearings

Hearings as a source for research material have several limitations. The published hearings often are an incomplete record of the actual events because they omit material and off the record remarks. This is especially true for Armed Services meetings where a percentage of material is always deleted for security reasons. The public transcript, even when factually perfect, is devoid of the meeting's emotional content. The words which the members used are recorded but the rapport between a witness and Congressmen, the attitude of members toward the hearings -- are they interested or bored, do they listen to other

questions or work on non-committee business, how many members are present when a witness is answering questions -- aren't to be found in the released testimony. The hearings are further marred by being poorly organized, with helter skelter questioning, and seemingly endless chatter.¹

Despite these drawbacks, the hearings are useful sources of information. They are a written record which involves the entire membership and can reveal the sophistication or lack of it, of their work. They enable the scholar to understand how committee members interact with one another, ask questions of witnesses, the actions of the chairman and senior members, the responses of witnesses, etc.

Every Congressional committee differs in its method of operation. Some committees are loosely organized and allow unlimited participation by all members. Other committees are tightly structured and are dominated by a few senior officials.² It is the purpose of this section to understand certain factors about the operation of Armed Service hearings. This section will investigate who participates at hearings, which members are active or passive, the difference and similarities between Vinson's and Rivers' conduct at the hearings, and the type of programs and defense strategies that the members concentrate on. In order to achieve this goal the defense authorization hearings from 1961, 1964, 1965, and 1968 were chosen for analysis. The first year that the committee's legislative and investigatory jurisdiction was expanded under section 412b was 1961. This writer was interested to learn what

¹David Farnsworth, pp. 13-14, and Jack Fleer, pp. 60-70.

²John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means; Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," Richard Fenno, "The Appropriations Committee as a Political System," and "The House of

changes, if any, had occurred in the operation of the committee or the membership's questioning from that session to the present. The years 1964 and 1965 were selected because the latter was Mr. Vinson's last year as chairman, whereas 1965 was Mr. Rivers' first. It was felt that these four hearings would give useful insights into how the members operate and the actions of the two chairmen.

For purposes of analysis, the study will concentrate on how the membership interacted with a number of key defense witnesses. In 1961 and 1964 they were the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force Chief of Staff. In 1965 and 1968 they were the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Navy and the Navy Chief of Staff.¹ The Secretary of Defense was studied because he was the most controversial figure to appear before the committee. He represented the civilian approach to military matters, discussed the broadest range of issues, and involved the greatest number of committee members. Unlike the typical defense witness, who was asked specific questions about weapons development and budgetary cuts, the Secretary of Defense was continually questioned about the operation of the Pentagon, development of new controversial weapons programs, and matters of United States defense strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was selected because most of his testimony was concerned with defense policy rather than a factual discussion of weapons. He represented the military's viewpoint on strategy and decision-making. The

Representatives and Federal Aid to Education," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, edited by Nelson Peabody and Robert Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1968), pp. 81-104, 125-154, 281-324 are examples of different committee styles.

¹For a similar methodology and the reasons behind it see Jack

Air Force elites were chosen in 1961 and 1964 and the Navy elites in 1965 and 1968 because in those years their services had the most controversial programs. For this reason these witnesses were subject to questioning from most members of the committee. The Congressmen were actively seeking to elicit information from the brass which would reveal their disagreements with their civilian superiors. They wanted to know what weapons systems in the opinion of the military was necessary for our defensive security. The controversial nature of the testimony elicited information on how the committee operates when there is division in the Department of Defense.

The Mores of Armed Services

Armed Services, which is the second largest committee in the House, conducts all its authorization hearings in full committee. It is not surprising that the committee has established some very specific rules of operation in order to complete its work. The hearings are conducted in an orderly fashion and rarely if ever does one member interrupt another. Most wait their turn, ask two or three questions, and disappear from the recorded testimony.

Most committee members, as was noted in chapter four, considered attending committee hearings to be their most important committee responsibility. Only by attending hearings year in and year out could they hope to achieve an expertise in a particular defense area. Most claimed they did not have time to research a specific topic or learn the background of a weapons system. Committee hearings were the sole way to overcome these handicaps. Some of the junior members were

dissatisfied with the hearings; they expressed the feeling that they were participating in a charade. According to these members the really important issues had already been decided by the senior officials.¹

The chairman of the committee does not play any special role as leader of the hearings. He begins the questioning, recognizes other members, and keeps order. He does not dominate the hearings and remains aloof from personality clashes. Nonetheless, Vinson and Rivers acted quite differently at committee meetings. Vinson conducted tightly structured meetings. He often channeled questions and curtailed participants.² If someone spoke out of order he would skip over him when it was that person's regular turn.³ Unlike many other committee chairmen, Vinson restricted participation.⁴ When a witness first appeared, he normally asked a few questions, and then turned the floor over to his colleagues; he rarely interrupted them or followed up a member's question. The probable reason for this action was that Vinson had been on the committee for so many years, he was well aware of the development of particular programs. Furthermore, as was mentioned by a number of Armed Service members, Vinson did not need hearings to

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151 to Authorize Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for the Armed Forces and Other Purposes, 87th Cong., 1st sess., April 11-May 4, 1961, pp. 1303, 1150 (hereafter referred to as no. 10) and U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Hearings - Military Posture and H.R. 9637, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., January and February 1964, p. 6977.

³House Committee on Armed Services, No. 9 - Military Posture Briefings, April 11-May 4, 1961, p. 646.

⁴John F. Manley, Wilbur Mills, A Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Political Science Association, September 4, 1968, p. 57.

obtain information. He was personally informed by the key Pentagon officials on the progress of all weapons systems.¹

In contrast to his predecessor, Mr. Rivers operates a less structured committee. He allows members to interrupt one another and question witnesses past the ten minute deadline.² This is not to imply that Rivers allows unlimited discussion and debate. The very size of the committee makes this an impossibility. As did his predecessor, he will occasionally be forced to close off debate or ask the members to finish their inquiries.³

Rivers, unlike Vinson, is an important participant at hearings. He not only asks numerous questions at the start of a witness' interrogation but occasionally follows up on other members' inquiries. The chairman's chief interests are airplanes and naval vessels, and his questions indicate a sophisticated knowledge of both subjects.⁴

Participation of Individual Members

One question that always arises about Congressional committees is the contribution of its members. On some committees only a few senior members participate whereas on others almost everyone takes part.

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 89th Cong., 1st sess., February - March 1965, pp. 808, 821.

³Ibid., p. 186, and U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and Act (S3293), 90th Cong., 2nd sess., April 3-June 27, 1968, p. 8655.

⁴A number of Armed Service members mentioned that few men knew as much about these subjects as Rivers.

In order to measure the participation of individual members at Armed Service hearings, the number of pages on which they questioned a Pentagon official was computed. No attempt was made to measure the utility or thoroughness of the questions but only whether the member participated. This method of analysis has many advantages and disadvantages.

This measure is deficient in that it takes no cognizance of the kind, the significance, or the intensity of participation. However, it does indicate the extent of participation and who will assist in identifying characteristics of participation.¹

TABLE 6.1 compares the percentage of Republican and Democratic members who participated at committee hearings in 1961, 1964, 1965 and 1968. The data reveal that almost every member of the committee participated in the hearings. The Democrats have ranged between 68% and 83% whereas the Republicans have gone from 77% to 100%.

TABLE 6.1.--The percentage of Republican and Democratic members who asked at least one question at hearings - 1961, 1964, 1965, 1968

Years	Percentage of Democrats	Percentage of Republicans
1961	81%	93%
1964	81%	100%
1965	68%	100%
1968	83%	77%

Despite the high percentage of members who participate at hearings most of the Congressmen make only a marginal contribution. Holbert N. Carroll maintains that each committee is made up of two parts: The formal group, which includes the entire membership, and the efficient

¹ Jack Fleer, pp. 101.

section, which encompasses those members active in committee matters.¹ On Armed Services most members are part of the formal rather than efficient part. Most of the members ask superficial questions and have only a limited knowledge of the subject. In fact, in terms of the present study over half the committee asked questions and received answers which totalled only four to twelve pages of printed testimony. Most of these individuals asked each witness one or two questions, usually on a matter which concerned their district or some pet project.²

The efficient part of the committee consisted of fifteen to twenty members from both sides of the aisle. As had been expected, most of these men had served on the committee for ten or more years. These members, each of whom had particular areas of expertise, dominated the hearings by asking the most probing questions about weapons, strategies, and the development of new programs.³ It is felt, based on this writer's reading of the hearings, in terms of variety and depth of questioning, that at least ten members of the committee have a thorough

¹Holbert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 27-30.

²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., January 27-February 7, 1964, p. 7009. A prime example of this phenomenon is Mr. Byrnes (D, Pa.), whose district contains a large naval ship building yard. The Congressman asks each key Pentagon official of the chances that the yard will receive a government contract. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 1968, p. 9325. In 1964 and 1965 when the government instituted a policy of base closings, a significant portion of the committee's questions concerned it. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, 1965, pp. 799, 6006, 6953.

³For a treatment of how agencies prepare for committee hearings see Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1964), p. 27. According to the author, the agency witnesses carefully study previous hearings in order to prepare answers for possible questions.

knowledge of the United States defense program. However, these committee members, or for that matter any Armed Service member, rarely question the defense witnesses about how policy was arrived at. They do not ask how a particular weapon operates, costs, and its weaknesses; they do not ask why such a weapon was developed, why other weapons were rejected, and why it is expected to fulfill a function. They rarely try to find out what were the alternatives to a particular weapon system or defense program.

In conclusion, the main work of the committee is done by its senior members who have acquired an expertise in the field. Over half the committee and especially the junior members make a minor contribution to the hearings by asking open ended, generalized questions or restricting themselves to praising the witnesses.

The Type of Questions

Since the membership is composed of active and passive representatives with different interests and abilities, the defense witness is subjected to a "crazy quilt" of questioning. The hearings read like a presidential news conference. The members skip from subject to subject without rhyme or reason. The promising lead of one member is more than likely to be dropped by the next questioner.

Despite the helter-skelter nature of the committee's questioning, the committee's work can be divided into five headings. First, the bulk of the committee's time is spent asking technical questions about particular military projects and weapon development. Second is the very broad area of foreign affairs and its impact on national security policy. The membership asked about U.S. preparedness around the world,

and since 1964 most of these questions concerned the war in Vietnam. Problems of the war, battlefield incidents, and how to fight and supply it, have occupied the committee's time. Based on this writer's analysis the committee's discussions read more like briefings than a probe of policy. The membership was concerned with day to day events in Vietnam and the results of particular encounters. They didn't discuss alternatives, strategies, or other weapons that might be used. Occasionally, someone would call for greater military freedom to pursue the war but this was the exception. The committee was invariably receiving testimony that a reader of the New York Times was also privy to.

Third is the members' concern with the Russian military potential. Armed Service Congressmen constantly required the service secretaries to estimate the Russian proficiency in a particular area and what it would mean to our security if we did not stay ahead of them. The threat of Russian breakthroughs seemed to be one of the major rationales behind particular weapons.

Fourth, committee members in both a negative and positive fashion had suggestions for the defensive elites. These suggestions were in the areas of strategy, weapons development, and constituency matters. Whether the Congressmen spoke for constituent consumption or in the expectation of affecting policy cannot be determined. What can be said is that even in areas such as strategy and weapon development the members have views which they are willing to express.

In the area of defense strategy the members recognize the dangers of second guessing the Defense Department. An example of this occurred in 1961 when 412b became law. Mr. Kilday (D, Tex.), who was the second ranking Democrat on the committee, told his colleagues about

the disastrous effects that "the committee on Conduct of War" has on the Civil War. For this reason he cautioned the members to confine themselves to evaluating airplanes, missiles, and ships.¹ Furthermore, the members recognize that their limited knowledge of how policy is determined restricts their ability to comment on strategy and weapons. This fact was stated by Congressman Pike to Mr. McNamara in 1964.

. . . it is very easy for me and for us to sit up here and snipe at the details of your program and to peek around at the edge of it, but as you so well pointed out to me, I didn't have any alternative for the program that you have advanced and as the one who has the job of selecting among the many alternatives which are advanced to you I think you have been doing a tremendous job and I am very proud.²

Despite the limitation and drawbacks individual members do offer suggestions. The membership is likely to suggest ways and means of improving the weapon programs. The House Armed Services Committee has been in the vanguard of trying to get the Pentagon to produce nuclear powered ships, submarines, and air crafts. In fact, many senior members credit the committee's pressure for producing nuclear powered submarines.³

Fifth, is the rapport and support which the members give the professional military elites. The members spend a good deal of time praising the witnesses, their statements, and answers to questions. On issues in which the military brass was overruled by their civilian

¹House Armed Services Committee, Hearings No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151, 1961, p. 1597.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, 1964, p. 6993.

³House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151, 1961, p. 1300 and House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and Act (S3293), 1968, p. 8809. For one

superiors the committee enabled them to publicly state their views.¹

Armed Service members accord the military officials a very warm reception. Possibly, in other hearings, lower echelon military personnel are not as favorably received. Concerning the Pentagon elite the members are quite cordial. Mr. Rivers' comments to General Lemnitzer in 1961 and Mr. Foreman (R, Tex.) to General Lemay in 1964 typify this approach.

General Lemnitzer, I want to congratulate you on a very fine statement. I think you know more about airlift than anybody in America, and I want to congratulate you for having to do with helping us get additionally authorized and appropriated money for aircraft, more than anybody else in the Pentagon.²

I think you are doing a remarkable job, and particularly General Lemay, I commend you on the wonderful work that you and your organization are doing.³

Not only do the members praise the brass but they are wary of insulting or embarrassing them. On numerous occasions they have not pressed a military official for an answer because it "might be embar-

member's desire to see the Defense Department produce a nuclear aircraft see, House Committee on Armed Services, No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151, 1961, p. 1269-1279.

¹Jack Fleer in his study of Congressional committees between 1961-1963 reached the conclusion about defense hearings, that, "therefore although much of the testimony would serve the function of legislative oversight, the predetermined attitude of legislators leads to the belief that the hearings were used to represent a particular constituency, in the broad sense of that term. In this case the constituency is the military. The Congressmen were advocating a greater reliance on and fuller participation of the military in defense decisions," p. 198.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings - No. 9 - on Military Posture, 1961, p. 639-640.

³House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, 1964, p. 7448.

rassing."¹ Mr. Rivers, upon assuming the office of chairman, stated this nonaggressive approach as committee policy,

. . . and I want to say this, too, Mr. Secretary and all of you military witnesses. You don't come up here to be berated, insulted, lampooned, or lambasted or for any kind of vituperation. We are not going to permit this. You come up here as gentlemen and you come up here to do a job and we are going to respect you. You have no reason to feel that you are not going to get courteous treatment, because this is the history of this committee.²

The committee members prefer hearing the military rather than civilian witnesses. Most of the interviewed members expressed the view that the most useful and reliable testimony came from the professional military. One liberal Democrat said,

Except for McNamara I rarely listen or care about what the civilian witnesses have to say. I am only concerned with the views of the military. I figure the civilians don't know what they are doing.

A former Republican member stated:

I'm more likely to trust the military man. I don't like the civilians; they hardly know their job and are often too political. The military man will tell it to you straight. I know if he errs it's an honest error of the heart, not like the civilians. There is no doubt that the military will be more honest.

Finally, as one high ranking staff official stated:

The civilians are only there for a few months. Mr. Connolly of Texas just about got in his office when he was back as Governor. Since I've been here for five years, we have had five different men as Secretary of the Navy. What does some guy who just been (sic) Governor know about defense. Who really would trust them? When the chips are down the American people want military leaders.

¹Ibid., p. 7483, and House Committee on Armed Service, Hearings on Military Posture and Act (S3293), 1968, p. 8053.

²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 89th Cong., 1st sess., February-March 1965, p. 703.

The Committee and Military Witnesses

The members are interested in learning the personal views of the military witnesses as opposed to the established Pentagon policies. This has always been a difficult problem for the professional military man. It is the traditional function of the military to avoid partisan politics and carry out policy, not criticize it. When a general or an admiral speaks publicly it is assumed he is voicing an established program. Privately he is expected to give his opinion to his executive superiors and help create newly emerging policy. However, once the new policy is established, he is to voice no dissent. If a military man violently disagrees with administration policy, his only recourse is to resign and protest the policy as a civilian; while in uniform he must follow the commander-in-chief's program.¹

Nonetheless, the military has many subtle ways of commenting on existing policy without being insubordinate. The extent to which this is done depends upon the existing administration and its views on the issue of the military's right to speak. As Mr. Finer notes in The Man on Horseback, "The American system leads to what has been called legalized insubordination."²

The Chiefs had access to the president and, more importantly to the Congress. They might accept a ruling by the Secretary and even obey it; but in their role as advisors, they had a disconcerting habit of making it known on occasion that a given decision had been made in spite of their advice rather than because of it.³

¹"Why Generals Should Maintain Reticence," The Christian Century, Vol. 79 (February 7, 1962), 157; and Hanson Baldwin, "Walker Issue," New York Times, January 14, 1962, p. 4E. For the history of this precedent see New York Times, October 22, 1961, p. 23.

²S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback -- The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mill Press, 1962), p. 143.

³William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper

By having access to the Congress they are able to express themselves on issues which should not concern them. Specific questions pertaining to strategies, weapons, and programs which are under investigation by the Congress, enables them to express their views. Regardless of how an officer may feel about obeying his civilian superiors, the system lends itself to some form of insubordination. As General Taylor states in his book The Uncertain Trumpet,

. . . a Chief of Staff will find himself in the position either of appearing to oppose his civilian superiors or withholding facts from the Congress. Personally, I have found no way of coping with the situation other than by replying frankly to questions and letting the chips fall where they may.¹

The membership of Armed Services is particularly interested with the military witnesses' personal estimation of defense matters. For this reason the average member will press a military official to find out how he feels about a particular policy and what are the alternatives. The military official is encouraged to state what he believes are his service's needs. The following questions by Chairman Vinson in 1961 to General of the Army Dexter,

. . . now did you request certain moneys for various things in the budget that were denied? Of course, you did. What were some of them?²

and in 1964 to Curtis LeMay,

. . . All right, what additional money do you need to get it? From Mr. Rivers' question and your answer one would conclude that by no means is the Air Force modern and up to date considering the

and Row, 1964), p. 20.

¹Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 113.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings no. 9 - Military Posture Briefings, 1961, p. 673.

different types of planes that you have been discussing with him.¹
typify this approach.

Mr. Rivers has continued this policy. As early as 1965 he asked the members to solicit the personal views of the various military chiefs. "We just will not sit up here and spin our wheels and be denied testimony."²

The committee is always anxious to uncover any differences in policy between the civilian elites and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before the start of the hearings the senior members, through their extensive contacts in the Pentagon, are aware of policy differences. They discover these differences either through asking questions or being informed by a reliable source.³ The hearings then serve as a vehicle whereby the military can publicly announce their positions. In every one of the hearings under analysis a number of policy differences are revealed. The following examples typify this technique.

Kilday - So we are in the position that although the military service recommended the slower phasing out (of aircraft) but the civilian chief of the department overruled all the military advisers? General White - I believe those are the facts.⁴

Bates - Didn't the Navy recommend this year one nuclear frigate?
. . . Bates - So you believe, even as of now we should proceed faster than we actually are?

Admiral McDonald - And we believe we should have had a nuclear frigate in this year's budget, yes, sir.⁵

¹House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, 1964, p. 7513.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 1965, pp. 702-703.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

⁴House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151, 1961, p. 1561.

⁵House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Pos-

When the civilian heads of the Pentagon appear before the committee the members behave as the protectors of the military elites.¹ The members will inform the civilian secretaries of the need for military "inputs" in the decision making process. Many of the members cautioned Secretary of Defense McNamara to heed the counsels of the professional military. The following two examples are typical of the kind of statements made to McNamara on this subject. In 1961 Mr. Arends said,

Over the last couple of decades I have been one of them (sic), who have always had a wholesome respect for the "brass" as we sometimes refer to it . . . I read into your statement, the fact that you are giving every consideration to their opinions as you go along in making these conclusions and determinations, as you are. Because as military men as such I think they have devoted their lives to this business and they can pretty well qualify as experts.²

Another example is Congressman Bray's comments to McNamara in 1965 about the conduct of the Vietnam War.

. . . the military men know more than I do, and I have nothing but confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the Army, and in General Westmoreland, and I hope they are given sufficient leeway and authority - I am not saying they are not, but I certainly hope they are.³

In retrospect, the committee hearings serve four basic purposes. First, they enable the Department of Defense to publicly present its national security program. The committee over a two month

ture and H.R. 9637, 1964, pp. 776-777.

¹See House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 1965, p. 773, for an example of when the committee asks the civilian leaders for the written transcript of the Joint Chiefs' original weapons requests.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151, 1961, p. 1288.

³House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 1965, p. 286.

period hears testimony from every important military and civilian personnel. When the committee drafts legislation for the House floor, the testimony is then used to accept or modify the Pentagon's request. Second, the hearings allow individual members to express their views on various aspects of the Pentagon's program. The hearings act as a means of interchanging information between the Congress and executive branch; the representative is able to express his opinion and on occasion affect future policy. Third, the hearings are employed as a means of eliciting and determining differences in Pentagon policy. Disputes which took place and were settled at the Defense Department are reopened and reevaluated in the hearings. The meetings serve as a vehicle whereby information concerning policy differences can be publicly aired. Finally, the hearings act as a means by which the committee can reaffirm its support of the professional military. The committee, as was clear under McNamara's years, acted as the defender of the professional military elites.¹

The Congress and National Security

Throughout the 20th century the executive branch has been the dominant force in Armed Service matters. The power of Congress to "declare war," which was considered so important by the founding fathers, has been rendered practically useless. Following World War II the nature of nuclear war and the United States' defensive commitments have all but eliminated congressional participation. Decisions have to be made quickly and the legislature is not structured to act in this

¹See chapter 7 for an in-depth discussion of this point.

²Merlo J. Pusey, "The President and the Power to Make War,"

fashion.¹

Although the Congress is constitutionally empowered to raise and support armies they have been unable to make the President develop a defensive weapon which he does not want.

The Truman administration impounded \$615 million for bombers in 1949. It canceled a supercarrier in 1950. The Eisenhower administration rejected \$46.5 million for an increase in the Marine Corps in 1965 and more than \$380 million for a variety of items in 1959, including \$440 million for strategic airlift and \$90 million for minutemen missiles. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations refused to spend more than \$137 million appropriated for the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile in 1960-1961.²

Finally, in the 1960's the Kennedy administration restricted funds to develop the B-70 bomber.³ These issues have clearly revealed that there is no way short of a constitutional crisis which can compel the President to use appropriated funds which he does not want. Congress simply cannot force the Chief Executive to take actions which he deems inadvisable.

Jack Fleer, in his dissertation on Congressional Committees and the making of military policy during the 87th Congress, came to the conclusion that Congress did not have a uniform, overall policy. It varied with the issue and group. Unlike Dexter, who claimed Congress had no

The Atlantic, Vol. 224 (July 1969), 65-68.

¹Louis Smith, p. 155, and James Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959), pp. 190-192. The recent attempt by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to limit the President's action in Cambodia and learn about secret United States defensive commitments, is an attempt to change this situation.

²Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 297.

³Louis Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds (Unpublished draft of a future article, 1970), pp. 38-46.

role in defense strategy, the author claimed that Congress did play a part, although usually negative.¹ This conclusion was reaffirmed by Samuel P. Huntington in his study of The Soldier and the State.²

Joyce Mitchell, who analyzed the actions of Congress in the field of national security between 1959-1963, reached slightly different conclusions. She discovered that the Congress was likely to follow the executive wishes in a bipartisan fashion, especially on matters the President considered important.³

The Congress is required to authorize and appropriate funds for the various Pentagon programs. In this capacity it has the ability to limit and at times expand the Department of Defense's proposals. However, this power has rarely been emphasized by the House or Senate.⁴ The legislature's major impact is not in areas of research and procurement of weapons but comes in matters of personnel. In this area the Congress has had an active and positive impact. It has been the Congress which has helped mold the selective service system, defeat the administration plan of Universal Military Training, limit the size of the active force, resist administration proposals to alter the ready reserves, and influence the conditions of service for officers and

¹ Jack Fleer, pp. 241, 178.

² Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 421.

³ Joyce Mitchell, "Congress and National Security: An explanation of Legislative Decision-making," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkley, 1964) pp. 196-224.

The recent action by the United States Senate in passing the Cooper-Church amendment in response to Nixon's Cambodian operation indicates that this conclusion is subject to reevaluation.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 134.

enlisted men.¹ The legislature's interest is related to the fact that decisions in these areas may affect their constituents. This situation is equally valid in the area of military construction. In order to insure the economic solvency of their constituents, many Congressmen have spent a good deal of time trying to either obtain or preserve their districts' military installations. Throughout the last twenty-five years they have spent considerable time modifying the administration's requests.²

The legislature's inability to participate in weapons development or strategy except in a negative and haphazard fashion is based on many factors. One is the dependence of the Congress on the executive branch for its information. The Congressman, whether at hearings, informal contacts, or while doing his own research, must rely upon the Pentagon elites.³

Former Congressman Hardy (D, Va.), who served on Armed Services for eighteen years, echoed the sentiments of many when he said:

. . . The very heart of our difficulty is reached when we consider the fact that we are given no real choice of action. We are not asked to review alternative courses of action which might reasonably further the broad objectives of this program. We are not advised what alternatives have been considered within the executive branch, indeed that any alternatives have been considered, other than the plan which is presented each year. Thus, we are told this is the plan of salvation, that unless the budget request is endorsed in the full amount, catastrophe lies immediately ahead. What kind of choice does this present? Under the circumstances we are not deciding anything. We are simply voting "yes" or "no" on

¹Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 401.

²Ernest S. Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary Role (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 148.

³Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Information as a Limitation on Military Legislation: A Problem of National Security," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 8 (1954), 197-198.

the financing of decisions already made by the executive branch.¹

Despite the drawbacks to the present situation the alternatives are even less desirable. One high ranking staff official, when questioned on this point, replied,

We've got to trust the executive. They have got 85,000 and we've got only 5. If they lie twice in a row, well they won't get a dime, so they've got to watch their step. We spot check but very carefully, I can pick up a phone and call anyone from a Secretary of Defense to a private and get an answer. What's the alternative? Do you want a monstrosity like the Pentagon on the Hill? If you want that you're welcome to it.²

Another limitation on Congressional decision-making is the technical nature of defense issues. The language is so difficult, and the change in weapons so rapid, that few Congressmen are willing to devote the time it takes to comprehend defense matters.³ Furthermore, the need for secrecy allows the Pentagon to make many of its decisions unknown to the Congress (the most notable example is the Manhattan project during World War II). Thus, many of the factors behind decisions and programs even if a member were interested are not available.⁴

The result of these limitations are that Congressmen spend little or no time learning about defense matters. They concede the area of policy to the House committee responsible for legislation. The attitude

¹U.S., House, Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 1959, Vol. 105, part 8, p. 10961.

²In practical terms the cost of setting up a bureaucracy to rival the executive would be staggering. The Hoover Commission in the early 50's estimated that the Defense Department spent nearly \$30 million annually just to prepare its budget. George B. Galloway, "The Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946," American Political Science Review, Vol. 45 (March 1951), 41-68.

³James Burnham, p. 190.

⁴Gabriel B. Almond, "Public Opinion and National Security Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 20 (Summer 1956), 371-378.

of a Congressman who is not on Armed Services exemplifies this point.

People are afraid to vote against defense. The issue is something that can be used against them in the next election. They are fearful because of the whole McCarthy period, people sense they are going to be labelled. The House Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee consists of almost ninety individuals so that's quite a lot of favorable support. The opposition is small and people say to you what is the point of uniting with nuts like Fitts Ryan and Udall. You realize full well it's going to pass so why make a fuss . . .

an ex-member of the committee stated,

. . . Everyone thinks we need some national defense, okay, then you better have a pretty good reason to vote against something you haven't studied. Furthermore, if you vote against defense it's the first thing used against you in a campaign. Everyone wants to state, 'I'm for greater defense,' you want to wave the flag a little. Second, who the hell needs some veterans group down your neck barking at you. Who needs those guys hounding you about your vote . . .

A staff member gave a slightly different reason,

. . . the Congress doesn't study the bill - who can read 800 pages of hearings? They are lucky if they see the cover, and you can't get up and protest what you don't know.

The Congress and the Armed Services Committee

One of the most important tasks of the twenty-one House Committees is to guide legislation through its branch of Congress. Each committee acts as floor manager for the bills which it either has created or which were originally sponsored by the executive branch. The main goal of the committee's sponsors, after going through committee hearings and mark-up sessions, is to pass its legislative requests with a minimum amount of alterations.¹ Naturally, some committees are more effective in this pursuit than others. Richard Fenno, in studying power relationships in the House of Representatives, noted that Congressmen

¹William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, pp. 140-144, and Daniel M. Berman, A Bill Becomes a Law, pp. 79-88.

are likely to follow a committee's recommendations when the "issues are technical and complicated, when large numbers do not feel personally involved, or when all committee members unite in support of the committee's proposal." The above author notes that the success of the House Appropriation and Armed Service Committees, in passing their legislation unamended, is due to the fact that in their cases all of these variables usually exist. In contrast representatives are less likely to follow a committee's recommendations, "when the issue is of a broad ideological sort, where national controversy has been stirred, or where the committee is not unanimous." Fenno indicates that the trouble which Education and Labor and Agriculture have in passing unencumbered legislation is due to the presence of all these factors.¹

The House Armed Services Committee rarely, if ever, creates its own legislation; rather it modifies Pentagon requests. Generally, when the committee sponsors a bill on the House floor, it is acting as the "broker" or advocate for the Department of Defense. The remainder of this section will discuss how the committee guides the Pentagon's proposals through the House. It will determine why Armed Services is successful in protecting the military's proposals and passing unamended legislation.

The members of Armed Services recognize their House colleagues desire to remain aloof from matters of national security. They know that representatives will only get involved on issues which generate controversy or clearly define opposition. If the committee can draft a bill which all the committee members support then it will pass the

¹Richard J. Fenno, "The Internal Distribution of Influence: The House," The Congress and America's Future, edited by David B. Truman, p. 54.

House unamended. For this reason the committee, when preparing its bills, strives for two things. First, it tries to achieve consensus so that the bill will have unanimous or near unanimous support on the House floor. The second goal is fiscal responsibility. The chairman is wary of presenting a bill which greatly increases authorizations beyond the Department of Defense's requests.¹ In the rare cases when the committee has printed a public transcript of their mark-up session the documents indicate that many members were clamoring to increase defense authorizations. Chairman Vinson on these occasions cautioned the members to act "responsibly." He claimed that the committee would jeopardize the bill if too many new weapon authorizations were added.²

Vinson - Now I can't go to the floor of the House and say that I have brought in a bill \$1 billion over the budget and over the recommendation of the Department. What is the average member of Congress going to say? . . . You have to be reasonable about this thing . . . and your zeal will get you ridiculed and get you classified almost as irresponsible in the discharge of public duty.³

When the Armed Services Committee finishes its mark-up session it attempts to pass its legislation on the floor of the House. The bill goes first to the Rules Committee which, according to the committee staff, always gives it a favorable ruling.⁴ Some committees of Congress

¹For a similar finding on the House Appropriations Committee see Richard Fenno, pp. 437-441.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151, pp. 1665-1721, and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440, 88th Cong., 1st sess., January 30-February 25, 1963, pp. 1305-1314.

³House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 6151, 1961, p. 1687.

⁴Reconstructed from Interview Responses. A good example of this occurred in 1969 when the authorization bill of \$21 billion which included funds for the controversial ABM program was granted a rule which limited debate to only four hours.

have considerable difficulty either passing their legislation or face having it severely amended. Committees such as Labor and Education or Banking and Currency are concerned with issues which are highly political and ideological in content. Usually, their legislation is subject to endless debate and numerous amendments. Other committees, such as Ways and Means and Appropriations, attempt to deter and limit House interference with their bills. Fenno reports that all things being equal, a member of Appropriations, even if he is unhappy about sections of the bill, will support the committee's decision on the House floor. The reason being that once a committee is united it is very hard for noncommittee members to learn about or accept alternatives.¹ Second, the committee employs the House rules to its own advantage. According to the author, the committee leadership attempts to keep the nonmembers as uninformed as possible about the nature of appropriation requests. Committee reports are normally printed up three days before the discussion of legislation at a time when a minimal number of Congressmen have access to them. The House leaders give unswerving support to the committee's requests and whenever necessary will speak out against restructuring the bill.²

As in the case of the preceding committee Armed Services has numerous advantages in passing unamended legislation. The technical nature of the subject matter, the extensive closed door hearings, the overall committee consensus, and the ability of the committee to publish its reports only three or four days before the bill is voted upon, enhances their objectives.³ Secondly, the public hearings which are

¹Richard Fenno, pp. 438-441.

²Ibid., pp. 417-420, 469.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses, and U.S., Congres-

printed contain numerous deletions for security reasons. Every Congressman is privy to the information by asking for it at the Armed Services staff office, but it is a rare Congressman who bothers to do so. Since few, if any, Congressmen are able to understand the rationale behind the committee's decision they must support it on faith. This point was alluded to by Mr. Gross of Iowa,

It is impossible for the average grade variety member of the House to know a great deal about the justifications for this huge expenditure because on page after page of the hearings the questions and answers are deleted for security reasons. So we have all too little to go on. I will vote for this bill but at the same time I am going to hope for the best and fear the worst.¹

The result is that on defense procurement and research authorizations the committee passes its legislation with a minimum amount of discussion and amendments. The committee's advantage is tremendous when it is realized that poverty projects involving a few million dollars are debated for days.²

Throughout these eight years, only in 1968 was there any Congressional outcry about the committee's methods. In that year, the bill was authorizing funds for the deployment of the sentinel rocket system. Yet, discussion of the bill which authorized twenty billion dollars was only scheduled for two hours of debate.³

sional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., June 11, 1967, Vol. 114, part 16, p. 20738, and Jonathan Bingham, "Can Military Spending be Controlled," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48 (October 1969), 51-67.

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess., House, May 24, 1961, Vol. 107, part 8, p. 8827.

²John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. viii.

³U.S., House, Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, Vol. 114, part 16, pp. 20737, 20738, 20751. Congressman Pike was dismayed that such controversial issues could only attract 10% of the House, p. 20727.

Even in the time allotted for discussion the noncommittee members make a minimum contribution. They ask few questions or, when they do participate, they are concerned with the operation of a specific weapon, the importance of being economic, or problems concerning their district's military installations.

TABLE 6.2 is concerned with the authorization debate. It lists the number of pages, in the Congressional Record, which the research and procurement bill occupied, the number of committee and noncommittee members who participated, as well as the number of questions which the nonmembers asked, during 1961, 1964, 1965, and 1968. The data reveal that few Congressmen except committee members take part in the discussion. Furthermore, when they talk, it is not to ask questions but rather to make some generalized statement or to praise the committee. In terms of committee members about one half discuss the authorization bill.

TABLE 6.2.--The Committee and its attempt to pass defense procurement and research authorization bills

Year	No. of pages	Committee participants	Non-committee participants	Questions raised by non-committee members
1961	18	9	12	10
1964	30	22	22	8
1965	40	24	12	8
1968	52	19	21	6

Usually the members are involved on one of three levels. One group, which is made up of predominately senior members, discusses various aspects of the program. The second type is representatives who support their committee's program but believe that in specified

areas the Congress should expand the Defense Department's requests. The purpose of their appeal is aimed either at the appropriations committee to appropriate more funds or motivate the Department of Defense to adopt their suggestions for the following year. The third group is members of the committee who disagree with various parts of the bill and wish to offer substitute amendments.¹

The Membership's Justification for the Program

It is generally understood that debate or discussion on the floor of the House has little or no impact on the outcome of legislative matters. Congressmen who do speak on the floor or enter material in the Congressional Record usually do so for constituency consumption or to communicate to other representatives their views on the issues of the day.² In terms of the Armed Services' members their justification for the committee's bill indicates what members feel and perceive will be effective arguments with their House colleagues. They state the common fears and aspirations that motivate members and nonmembers to accept the program. The membership touches on or alludes to at least three basic themes to sanctify the legislation. In terms of the accepted Congressional mores the members claim that the bill is fiscally sound. They acknowledge the tremendous cost but retort that all programs have been cut to the bone; members will point to certain small cuts to

¹U.S., House, Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 1961, Vol. 107, part 8, pp. 8820, 8822; U.S., House, Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., February 20, 1964, Vol. 110, part 3, pp. 3205-3207; U.S., House, Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 1965, Vol. 111, part 7, p. 9564; and U.S. House, Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, Vol. 114, part 16, p. 20719.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses. Donald Tacheron and

validate this claim. However, even in 1968, the one year that the Congress was under nationwide pressure to hold down spending, the committee eliminated only those programs which were low priority, or according to the professional military's view, as in the case of the F-111, had failed.¹ The committee's advantage in passing its authorizations unencumbered results from the uncertainty of defense needs. No one wants to spend too little for defense. The following statement by Rivers is typical of the examples used by the committee in support of the program.

Sam Rayburn ... said this, 'I would rather be a live American with an empty pocketbook than a dead one with a full one. This is my philosophy. I do not want to cut to save a few dollars and then lack for something.'²

The greatest Congressional fear is the threat of communism. In every session of Congress a number of members will urge adoption of the program because of the "Red menace" or a fear if we do not invent a weapon the Russians will.³ In 1968 this was one of the major reasons given to develop an ABM.

Mr. Bates - The fact of the matter is the Russians have already bought an ABM system, they have already affected what we are trying to do. I do not believe that we can just stand still while the Russians advance.⁴

Morris Udall, pp. 202-208, 137-138.

¹U.S., House, Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, Vol. 114, part 16, p. 20724.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., February 20, 1964, Vol. 110, part 3, p. 3211.

³Fear of a Russian technological breakthrough was the main worry of House Armed Services members. Most of the weapons they mentioned to this reporter were discussed in relation to the Russian potential. The majority of these members supported ABM not because it was workable or even good but as one member put it - "The Russians have it so even though it isn't very good we've got to get one too."

⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11,

Finally, the program is justified in terms of the needs of the professional military. Unlike domestic matters where expert opinions are often suspect, most of the committee and Congressmen have total confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Mr. Rivers once stated,

What do I know about running a vessel on the high seas? What do I know about the strategic problems of a long-range bombing mission? What do I know about the tactical problems of battlefield saturation mission? Let the military do this. That is what they learn at the academies.¹

The committee members support the concept of civilian control of the military but believe the professional military's expertise cannot be dismissed. The argument was put succinctly by Mr. Bray in 1964 while discussing the authorization of funds for a manned interceptor bomber.

Mr. Bray - Mr. Chairman, I doubt whether any member of the committee of Armed Services has voted any more consistently toward economy than I. Today we are faced with a matter of national defense. General Lemay says that we need the bomber. Dr. Brown, as has been stated, says that we do not need it. In this matter are you going to listen to General Lemay or to Dr. Brown? It is just exactly that simple ... are we going to listen to General Lemay, and no one questions but that he is the greatest authority in the world on this matter, or are we going to listen to Dr. Brown, a 33 year-old physicist?²

The same idea in a more generalized fashion was delivered by the minority whip, Mr. Arends, who said:

Frankly, I am frustrated - it is a disturbing feeling to sit in committee and listen to the recognized military experts of our country state flatly that we need this or we need that, and for us to attempt to meet those military needs through legislation and have the whole thing an exercise in utter futility.³

1968, Vol. 114, part 16, pp. 20722-20723.

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., May 9, 1967, Vol. 113, part 9, p. 11981.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., February 20, 1964, Vol. 110, part 3, p. 3222.

³Ibid., pp. 3197-3198.

The Committee and Floor Amendments

The committee justifies its programs on the basis of expectations and fears which it shares with the House. The average Congressman has little or no time to study the Armed Services hearings or reports. If there are no disputes within the committee most Congressmen will support their proposals. In case of minor committee disagreements the House is likely to support the Armed Service leaders. The average member's fear of communism, the problem of the nuclear age, and his own limitations of understanding military strategy predisposes him towards supporting the wishes of the Pentagon.

The committee has been remarkably successful in passing unamended defense research and procurement authorizations. Of the 26 proposed amendments for 1961-1968, only those 11 which were approved by the committee were adopted (see TABLE 6.3). The key participant in floor proceedings was the Armed Services chairman. When he approved of a measure, it passed; when he disapproved, even on matters which expanded defense programs, it failed. The data indicate that the House will follow the dictates of the Armed Services Committee on matters which affect their bill.

In terms of the amendments which the committee did approve those proposed by noncommittee members were relatively minor in nature. Mr. Edwards (D, Ala.) had two amendments accepted which dealt with the Navy "giving due regard" to the Merchant Marines for any relevant research findings. Mr. Rivers supported the amendment claiming that for the good of national security the Merchant Marines was a necessity.¹

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., June 14, 1966, Vol. 112, part 10, p. 13-63, and U.S., Congressional Record, 90th

^a
TABLE 6.3.--Amendments offered to Defense Research and Procurement
Authorizations and their fates

	Accepted by House	Rejected by House
Non committee members who offered amendments		
1. With Armed Services approval	3	0
2. Without Armed Services approval	0	6
Committee members who offered amendments		
1. With Armed Services approval ^b	2	0
2. Without Armed Services approval	0	9
Committee Amendments ^c	6	0

^aU.S., Congressional Record, Volumes 107-114, 1961-1968.

^bSubmitted by subcommittee chairman to change improperly worded programs.

^cSubmitted by chairman.

Mr. Byrnes (R, Wis.) submitted an amendment which prohibited the United States government from constructing naval vessels in foreign shipyards without Congressional approval. The amendment was justified and seconded by the Armed Service floor leaders on the grounds that the civilian branch of the Pentagon and not the military supported building ships abroad.¹ The defeated amendments which were all explicitly rejected by the Armed Service leaders either supported the expansion of

Cong., 1st sess., May 9, 1967, Vol. 113, part 9, p. 13012.

¹Ibid.

a particular weapons program,¹ the restriction of a particular weapon system,² or an attempt to economize by reducing spending in an across the board fashion.³

The important challenges to the committee's authority have come from individual committee members dissatisfied with particular areas of the committee's bill. In 1961 Congressman Gubser, who had filed a dissenting opinion over the number of nuclear submarines authorized for fiscal 1962, attempted to have his views prevail on the House floor. He wanted to authorize \$697.5 million for his project. Although he had the backing of the Republican Policy Committee, his amendment was rejected by teller vote 58-105.⁴

In fiscal 1965 a number of unsuccessful committee amendments were proposed. The three members of the fearless fivesome who had written a minority report against the committee recommendations carried their complaints to the floor of the House. Pike's amendment was designed to cut \$171.5 million for the navy's VAL airplane which he believed should be discontinued. Stratton's amendment would reduce air force funds by \$92 million to restrict the development of two additional aircraft with undefined purposes. The dispute was similar to the

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., February 20, 1964, Vol. 110, part 3, p. 3216.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, Vol. 114, part 16, p. 20767, and U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., May 9, 1967, Vol. 113, part 9, p. 12009.

³U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., March 13, 1963, Vol. 109, part 3, pp. 4089-4091.

⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., March 21, 1962, Vol. 108, part 4, p. 4723.

B-52 and B-58 controversy with the Air Force Chief promoting an airplane which the Secretary of Defense didn't want. The Stratton amendment supported the Secretary of Defense. Cohelan offered a number of amendments to restore cuts in army, navy, and air force research and development. All the amendments were defeated.¹

In 1968 Mr. Leggett of California proposed an amendment to restrict the deployment of the sentinel rocket system. The rocket, which is part of the ABM system, consumed only ten minutes of debate. Mr. Rivers justified the system on the basis of the fact that it wasn't a full-fledged ABM, that it was designed to ward off a Chinese attack, and the Russians were building one so we were forced to.²

Thus, there is no specific pattern to the amendments which the members of Armed Service offered to the committee approved bill. Some are designed to increase procurement authorizations and spending whereas others try for the opposite result. In all cases the attempts have met with failure.

In conclusion the committee achieves its objectives because the Congress obtains its goals. The two are in perfect harmony, hence the ease with which the legislation is passed. On matters of amendments the Congress will follow the committee. As was demonstrated, the chairman determines the success or failure of particular amendments. The only real check on the committee is the nature of the administration's requests. The committee feels it can't go too much above them. It has violated this rule when there is a disagreement between the civilian

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., February 20, 1964, Vol. 110, part 3, pp. 3216-3221.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, Vol. 114, part 16, pp. 20753, 20761.

and professional military; in the past it has authorized huge sums for projects favored by the brass. As of this moment the overwhelming majority of the Congress is willing to follow these increases. A real test of the committee's persuasiveness would arise if they tried to authorize funds that neither the brass nor the President wanted or tried to cut projects that the Pentagon requested. At the moment, the committee's legislative task is an easy one.

Conference Committee

When the Senate and House pass different versions of the same legislation a conference committee is created. The committee is appointed by the presiding officer, and its purpose is to adjust all legislative differences. Usually, the committee consists of those senior House and Senate members who drafted the legislation.¹ Once the committee drafts compromise legislation it ceases to exist.² Conference committees are very informal and are held in executive session. The first named Senate manager often serves as chairman, and voting is done by the unit rule.³ Those members who were active in the passage of the bill do most of the talking, debating, and cajoling. In most conferences the members strive for compromise although occasionally sharp

¹There has been a great deal of controversy concerning this committee. First, the system of selecting members solely on the basis of seniority can place individuals in conference opposed to the legislation which they are supposed to defend. Second, the committee, instead of settling disagreements, occasionally rewrites whole portions of the bill. Joseph P. Harris, p. 81.

²George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress, p. 316.

³Gilbert Y. Steiner, "The Congressional Conference Committee - 70th to 80th Congress 1928-1948," Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 32, no. 3, 4 (1951), 10.

ideological differences occur. The ultimate threat that one side can use against the other is to seek binding policy instructions from the parent chamber.¹ The conference can last anywhere from a few minutes to several weeks, and the committee has an enormous impact on the shape of the final legislation. It is generally agreed that a conference committee's recommendations are almost impossible to defeat.²

On the average the House and Senate Armed Services Committees send conferees to conference three times a year. For these conferences the chairman, with the speaker's approval, has the right to select his conferees. Traditionally, the chairman picks the most senior members. Thus, the average member must wait almost 10 years before he is given an opportunity to attend a meeting. Mr. Rivers strictly adheres to the rule of seniority, but Vinson, when it suited his purposes, would violate it. A senior Republican, in discussing the 1958 reorganization of the Pentagon dispute, mentioned,

. . . Arends who is more political and more likely to be swayed gave into Ike's pressure. I didn't. Well we get to picking the conferees and Vinson bypasses five guys ahead of me in seniority to put me on. Arends complains what about seniority and Vinson replies that the House passed the bill in the version which Mr. ___ represents. Who then is better qualified to carry out the wishes of the House. Well Arends couldn't protest that and Mr. Vinson won out.

On rare occasions, a junior official familiar with a disputed topic is appointed as a conferee. As one ex-member of the committee reminisced,

The chairman selects the conferees and he picks guys that represent his point of view. The result is that he has a stacked crew. For this reason I was on very few conferences. The one occasion he put me on was because I had offered the two amendments which were different from the Senate. The chairman figures we might as well have the guy who knows about the legislation to debate it. When it came

¹Richard P. Fenno, p. 658.

²George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress, p. 319.

time to vote the chairman and his group voted with the Senate.

Unlike on other conference committees there are no fundamental differences between the House and Senate members.¹ Senate Armed Service members share the basic goals, orientations, and aspirations as their House colleagues. Of the individuals interviewed for this study not one could suggest an ideological or program difference between the House and Senate members. The only disputes concern dollar amounts, numbers of weapons, and the precise language of legislation.

The two committees do show a difference in how they go about monetarily cutting the Pentagon's program. The Senate has used an across-the-board technique whereas the House concentrates on line item changes. This difference was alluded to in 1968 by Mr. Rivers.

Two important modifications to the basic program that the Senate made and to which we do not agree is the Senate committee's action which cut the R and D program by 3% across the board. We do not believe in across-the-board cuts; we believe in studying the specifics of a program and taking out what we disagree with and putting in what we feel the country needs.²

Outside of this difference, the Senate members support the "pro-military" orientation of its counterparts. For this reason meetings are invariably cordial, friendly, and relaxed; members strive for consensus and compromise. One subcommittee chairman stated,

When we meet in conference there is no bitterness. We are all cordial since we all want the same goals. If an impasse arises we wait a few days, we never force an issue. We want consensus.

Another subcommittee chairman said,

Conference committee problems are settled by consensus. We have the staffs see what we can agree on before we get there. Usually the problem is numbers or dollars or involves one of the member's

¹See Richard Fenno, pp. 626-641 for differences.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, Vol. 114, part 16, p. 20716.

personal problems. We trade around and try to come to a consensus, rarely if ever a vote. Stennis will say ____ couldn't you put this off to next year and we'll adopt it. Or we'll give you this one, it's really friendly. Now over ABM might be different.

A high ranking Republican echoed the same theme,

The issues are usually settled by consensus. This is the security of the nation so no one wants to pop off. This is the strength of the committee; we stay quiet. We try not to rock too much. Not too many areas are less controversial. Anyway rarely a real vote, more attempt to see what has to be done to make us get close to reach accord, then it's finished. Nothing is ideological. The only difference was over McNamara, they were more likely to defend him.

The committees try to settle their differences before the conferees meet. The two staffs get together prior to the regular meeting, and according to one staff official, 80% of the disagreements are resolved. Next, the two chairmen meet informally and try to close the discussion. If the conferees actually have to meet, issues are normally settled through compromise or "horse trading." Whenever possible a vote is avoided and members strive to settle differences through compromise. When Vinson was chairman he normally tried to dominate the conferences through bullying tactics. Rivers is more conciliatory and goes in for "horse trading." He often comes into the conference room offering to trade what he wants for what the Senate desires.¹

Although the two groups are able to work smoothly, the Armed Services members do not hold a high opinion of their Senate colleagues. The members feel that their counterparts do not work as hard, conduct sloppy hearings, and only want to pontificate.² As one senior Republican said,

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

²For similar feelings by other Congressmen see Richard Fenno, p. 663.

We do more work, they are ill prepared. They have a very good staff priming them, but in pure info we've got it all over them. They need advisors in order to get along.

A former Democratic member said,

The Senate doesn't work as hard, they just like to pontificate. They are busy being strategists, so their hearings and bills are loose. We used to go to conference and Saltonstall would sit there and talk about nothing. He didn't know beans. Only Russell was any good. . . .

Who Wins in Conference Committee, the Senate or the House?

A number of political scientists have tried to determine whether the House or Senate is more successful in conference committee. Roland Young, in 1946, stated that the Senators are better bargainers in these committees.¹ Gilbert Steiner who studied 56 conference committees over a ten year period reached a different conclusion. He believed that of those 56 cases the House's version predominated in 32 cases, the Senate in 15, and an even break in 9.² However, one of his findings, that the Senate's view is likely to prevail in fiscal policy, was substantiated by Richard Fenno's study. Fenno discovered that about 60% of the time the Senate Appropriations Committee representing the Senate achieves its objectives.³ John Manley, who studied the House Ways and Means Committee, was unable to reach a precise decision.

The most important single reason behind the contradictory response to the who wins question, and the one which reveals the most about the nature of Congressional politics, is that in many cases no unambiguous answers are possible because the process is not a win-lose (zero sum) situation ... Small wonder that when all is said

¹ Bertram M. Gross, p. 324.

² Gilbert Y. Steiner, The Congressional Conference Committee, Vol. 32 (1951), 170.

³ Richard P. Fenno, p. 667.

and done no one feels badly about the outcome and each side claims victory; for the truth of the matter is that most everyone does win - something, sometime.¹

The remainder of this section will try to determine how the House Armed Services Committee fared in conference. The following criteria will be used. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees' recommendations in dollar amounts for the various service programs will be compared to the final conference figures. If a conference decision was closer to the House Armed Services Committee's original figure, then the House was said to have won. If the decision was nearer to the Senate Armed Services Committee's original recommendation, they were said to be the winners. Following the example of Fenno, a leeway of \$1000 margin from either side of the final figure, as compared to the House and Senate's original ones, was employed; if the final figure fell between the two bodies' version, by a plus or minus \$1000, then the result was classified as "splitting the difference."² No attempt was made to judge the relative importance of a particular victory, and all the items were treated equally.

Unfortunately, this is an imprecise way to evaluate success. It does not measure the motives of the participants or the circumstances under which policy is made. It is possible that either the Senate or House conferees deliberately allowed their opponents to win. Furthermore, one cannot know, under this method of analysis, which weapons systems were more important to the bargainer. Perhaps the House or Senate conferees were willing to allow a more expensive pro-

¹ John F. Manley, "The House Ways and Means Committee" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University, 1964), pp. 213-214.

² Richard Fenno, p. 662.

gram in one area in order to achieve their goals in another domain. Nonetheless, it is felt that the methodology will uncover some relevant material.

TABLE 6.4 compares the performance of the House and Senate conferees between 1961 and 1968 on the issue of defense procurement and research authorizations. During that period of time the committee had 80 issues which required settlement. These issues concerned either differences in dollar amounts over a particular program or else a weapon which was approved by one chamber but not the other.

^a
TABLE 6.4.--Distribution of Senate and House conference committee victories, eighty-one contests

Conference decisions	Number of decisions		Percentage of decisions
Senate Victories	31		38%
Same as Senate bill	23		28%
Less than Senate bill	1		1%
More than Senate bill	7		9%
House Victories	47		58%
Same as House bill	42		52%
More than House bill	1		1%
Less than House bill	4		5%
Split the Difference	<u>3</u>		<u>4%</u>
Totals	81		100%

^aFigures are rounded off to the nearest percentage.

The data indicate that the House conferees, by a margin of 58% to 38% are successful in obtaining the wishes of the House. The data also indicate that both committees settle many of their differences through some sort of "horse trading." Sixty-five of 81 issues, or 80%,

were settled by one House completely acceding to the wishes of the other. At least two hypotheses can be advanced for the House's superiority. First, the average House member does more work than his Senate colleagues and, in such a technical field as defense, is better able to impose his viewpoints.¹ Second, on many issues the Senate conferees probably want the House conferees to prevail. During the 1960's the House of Representatives has been far more conservative and military oriented than its Senate counterparts. A large portion of the Senate has attempted to cut defense spending and military commitments. This is not true of the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The committee attracts a group of individuals who share the basic ideology and military orientation of their House colleagues. In terms of defense policy they are closer to the attitudes of the House than their own body.²

TABLE 6.5 compares the types of victories that the Senate and House win. The table divides House and Senate victories into two categories. When the Senate or House victory authorizes more funds than its legislative counterpart, the decision is placed in the increased costs column. The settlement cost the American taxpayer more money than if the other chamber's figure had been used. When the Senate or House victory is less than its counterpart's figure, it is placed in the decreased costs column.

Of the eighty-one issues which were resolved by conference, forty-one, or 51%, resulted in expanded programs or increased defense

¹Reconstructed from Interview Responses. See also Charles Clapp, pp. 249-254, for similar comments on how Representatives perceive their Senate colleagues at Conference Committee.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

a,b,c,d,e
TABLE 6.5.--The number and cost, by service, of Senate and House Armed Service Committee victories
1961-1968

Victories	Increases		Decreases		Total	
	Number	Amount in Dollars	Number	Amount in Dollars	Number	Amount in Dollars
<u>House Armed Services Committee</u>						
<u>Procurement</u>						
Air Force	8 wins	337.0m ^c	none		8 wins	337.0m
Navy	16 wins	1279.0m	2 wins	-350.2m	18 wins	928.8m
Army	2 wins	32.1m	none		2 wins	32.1m
<u>Totals</u>	26 wins	1648.1m	2 wins	-350.2m	28 wins	1297.9m
<u>Research</u>						
Air Force	4 wins	407.1m	2 wins	-139.7m	6 wins	267.4m
Navy	4 wins	61.1m	4 wins	- 99.0m	8 wins	- 37.9m
Army	none		2 wins	- 53.1m	2 wins	- 53.1m
Defense Agency	none		2 wins	- 92.6m	2 wins	- 92.6m
<u>Totals</u>	8 wins	468.2m	10 wins	-384.4m	18 wins	83.8m
<u>Senate Armed Services Committee</u>						
<u>Procurement</u>						
Air Force	4 wins	531.6m	5 wins	-108.6m	9 wins	423.0m
Navy	1 win	221.0m	7 wins	-376.5m ^d	8 wins	-155.5m
Army	none		1 win	- 18.5m	1 win	- 18.5m
<u>Totals</u>	5 wins	752.6m	13 wins	-503.6m	18 wins	249.0m

TABLE 6.5.--Continued

Victories	Increases		Decreases		Total	
	Number	Amount in Dollars	Number	Amount in Dollars	Number	Amount in Dollars
<u>Senate Armed Services Committee</u> continued						
<u>Research</u>						
Air Force		none	4 wins	-131.7m	4 wins	-131.7m
Navy	2 wins	148.6m	4 wins	-177.8m	6 wins	- 29.2m
Army		none	3 wins	- 57.3m	3 wins	- 57.3m
Defense Agency		none		none		none
<u>Totals</u>	2 wins	148.6m	11 wins	-366.8m	13 wins	-218.2m

^aCongressional Quarterly Almanac, Volumes 17-24, 1961-1968.

^bThe two committees split the difference on three issues which in total reduced spending by 28.2m.

^cAll totals are rounded off to the nearest \$100,000 and m is equivalent to 00,000.

^dFor two disputes the dollar differences are not available.

authorizations. Based on Fenno's study of Appropriations it was assumed that the committees would take decisions which saved the taxpayer money. That one of the two committees would act as "protector of the purse." The data indicate that both groups, and especially the House Armed Services Committee, usually achieve their victories on issues which expand programs. Neither one of these two committees was oriented towards keeping military costs down. They both supported enlarged military programs. The result of this orientation is that defense spending has a natural tendency to rise. Since the Congress as a whole is unlikely to affect a defense program, the conferees' decisions stand.

Only in the area of research have both groups seen fit to continually reduce authorizations. It seems that in the field of experimentation the committees are skeptical of allocating the Pentagon's requests. In the area of weapon procurement the committees are unwilling to cut any service when one of the two chambers thinks it's important.

Throughout its history the House Armed Services Committee has been accused of having a pro-navy bias. The data tend to confirm this assumption. Over the last seven years the committee on sixteen issues has increased program costs by \$1,279,000,000 only on two issues have they cut costs by \$350,200,000 for a new increase of \$928,800,000. The major increase in Senate funds has come about over the bomber issue; the Senate Armed Services Committee has increased authorizations by \$249,000,000. The bomber is a weapon which has always been supported by the House Armed Services Committee although at a slightly lower increased cost.

When broken down into monetary terms the House victories author-

ize much larger sums than their Senate colleagues. The House's procurement victories increased costs by \$1,297,900,000, increased costs for research by \$83,800,000 for a total increase of \$1,381,700,000. The Senate's procurement victories increased costs by \$249,000,000, decreased research costs by \$218,200,000 for a total increase of \$30,800,000. The conferences have thus increased authorizations for defense over the last eight years by \$1,422,500,000. Based on the evidence, the House and Senate conferees in a unique manner represent the interests of their legislative bodies. They preserve those parts of the bill which their chamber approved and the other body did not. However, this fact is accomplished by acceding to the wishes of their Armed Service counterparts on those authorizations which their group did not support. Thus, both the House and Senate conferees preserve their chambers' program increases, by "horse trading" the bill's differences.

Conclusion

The House Armed Services Committee is responsible for legislation which affects the Armed Forces. In order to fulfill its responsibilities the committee holds hearings, drafts legislation, and guides its recommendations through the House and Conference Committee. As is the case of most House committees, Armed Services rarely creates its own legislation. Most of its proposals are either exact reproductions or modifications of bills which were submitted by the Department of Defense. The Armed Services Committee has a good working relationship with the military. At committee hearings the witnesses are treated with courtesy, their views are solicited, and their recommendations are often followed. Individual committee members do not seek to embarrass the

professional military or improve their careers at the brass's expense. At the committee's mark-up meetings the members strive for consensus. This strengthens the committee's goal of appearing on the House floor united in order to minimize the chances of crippling amendments. As is the case of the House Appropriations Committee, Armed Services has had considerable success in passing unamended legislation. Armed Services proposes technical and complicated legislation, nonideological in content behind which virtually the entire membership is united. These reasons correspond to Fenno's criteria for success on the House floor. During the last seven years, twenty-six amendments affecting defense authorizations have been proposed in the House. Only those eleven which were approved by the committee leaders were accepted. This is a remarkable record for legislation which involves billions of dollars. Since the House and Senate usually pass different versions of Department of Defense requests, a Conference Committee is almost always required. There is great rapport between the House and Senate conferees. Unlike the House and Senate Appropriations conferees who have different perception of their roles, the Senate and House Armed Service members are in total accord. Differences are rarely over policy matters but rather the number of a particular weapon to produce or moneys to authorize. In most cases problems are settled by "horse trading" differences in the two bills. The result is that the Department of Defense is more than likely to have greater authorizations than they had originally requested.

In essence the House Armed Services Committee acts as "broker" for the Pentagon. It is in accord with the Defense Department's goals and tries to pass their legislation without crippling amendments. During the last seven years the Pentagon has had an extremely competent

lobbyist for its viewpoint. The committee has enabled them to maximize their authorization requests.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AND THE AUTHORIZATION PROCESS

Under our constitution both the President and Congress are responsible for national security policy. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is empowered to preserve the safety and security of the nation.¹ The Congress, under Article I, Section 8, raises and supports the army and navy and makes rules for their operation.² As has been mentioned throughout the study, in the making of military policy the Executive Branch dominates. Briefly stated, the complicated state of modern weapon technology, the need for secrecy, the Executive's responsibility for formulating policy in its early stages, and the need to make quick decisions in a world of instantaneous mass communications and travel, have relegated Congress to a minor role. The Executive Branch is willing to listen to Congress' defense views but has acted as if it alone must make the final policy decisions. This point was made by Secretary McNamara before Senator Jackson's subcommittee on national policy machinery in 1961,

I feel that committees can serve a useful purpose, but they cannot be considered substitutes for creative leadership and personal responsibility for such leadership. Nor in my opinion should they be

¹See Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, for a discussion of which advisors the President uses to formulate policy, pp. 424-440.

²U.S., Constitution, article 1, section 8.

thought of as decisionmaking bodies, but rather, their functions should be limited to that of a forum in which advice can be exchanged.¹

The actions of Presidents from Truman through Johnson indicate that they basically shared McNamara's views. During these four administrations the Congress passed a number of items in the defense authorization and appropriation bills which the President disapproved of. Although the Chief Executive signed the bills into law he refused to spend appropriated funds on projects which he opposed.²

As of this moment no one has devised a way that the President can be compelled, short of a constitutional crisis, to spend money on weapons which he does not want.³ Thus, the President in terms of increases in weapon procurement and research authorizations need not follow the Congress' desires. As will be noted later in this chapter, the Congress from 1961-1968 never reduced weapon procurements or research authorizations for projects which the Pentagon considered of vital importance. For these reasons the Executive Branch has had considerable success in achieving its defense authorizations and appropriation goals.

¹U.S., Senate, Senate Subcommittee to Study National Policy Machinery, Organizing for National Security, Vol. I, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, p. 1190, found in Edward A. Kolodziej, p. 360.

²A complete list of these items until 1962 can be found in U.S., House, Committee on Armed Services, Report 1406 Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, pp. 5-6, and from 1962 through 1966, U.S., House, Committee on Armed Services, House Report No. 221 Authorizing Defense Procurement and Research and Development, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 5-8.

³For other examples of the President and the impounding of funds and the constitutional issue involved, see Louis Fisher, "Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue," The George Washington Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1969), 125-137.

The Armed Services Committee during the 1960's had a far different perception of the Congress' and its own role. They strongly believed that the legislative branch should also be involved and affect national security decisions. According to the Armed Service members once the President signs a defense program into law he is obligated to follow every part of it.¹

The previous chapter explored how the House Armed Services Committee evaluated the Pentagon's authorization requests and guided its version of the program through the Congress. The present chapter will concentrate on the specific alterations that the committee made in the Department of Defense's requests. What specific weapons systems or research projects did the committee disagree with and for what reasons? What impact did the committee have in imposing its vision of defense preparedness?

In order to evaluate the committee changes and impact on defense policy the chapter will be divided into three sections. The first part will discuss the three major weapons disputes between the committee and the executive branch. The continuation of manned bombers, the development of nuclear frigates, and the deployment of Nike-X missiles concerned far more than a dispute over weapon procurement and research development. The issues involved a fundamental difference in outlook and orientation between the committee and the executive over the United States defensive needs and strategies. The middle section will discuss

¹The committee's perception of its role and duties will be discussed in depth in connection with the disputes between the President and the committee over manned bombers, nuclear frigates, and Nike-X missiles. See U.S., House, Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 271 Authorizing Defense Procurement and Research Development, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, pp. 3-5, and the House reports for Armed Services in 1963 and 1966. In 1966 Minority Leader Bates of Massachusetts placed in

the yearly itemized changes in dollar amounts that the committee made in the Pentagon requests. It will concentrate on why the committee was usually willing to increase funds for the Department of Defense. Why did the committee choose the role of the military's enthusiastic supporter? The concluding section will evaluate the committee's relation with the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara. The writer was particularly interested in learning why the Secretary of Defense was so unpopular and treated so badly by the committee members. The answer to this question will reveal a great deal about the committee's defense orientation. It will indicate some of the major stresses and disputes between the two branches.

In every year under analysis, the House Armed Services Committee and the executive branch have disagreed over defense policy. Usually disputes center around the number of particular weapon systems or the dollar amounts necessary to develop a specific program. Occasionally differences between the administration and Armed Service members pertain to fundamental assumptions about national security needs. They involve issues of a strategic nature which have elicited different opinions between the civilian and professional military elites.¹ During the 1960's the House Armed Services Committee had three major policy differences with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The issue, in 1961-1963, of the future use of manned bombers, in 1965-1968, of the procurement of nuclear frigates, and the installation, in 1966-1968, of Nike-X missiles, involved more than a perception of a correct weapon system. The

the Congressional Record a long statement of the role and powers of the committee and Congress in defense matters. U.S., House, Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., June 14, 1966, Vol. 112, part 12, pp. 13061-13063.

¹For an in-depth analysis of this point see chapter 5.

dispute concerned questions of whether the United States should rely on missiles or bombers as the main part of their offensive delivery system? Should the United States Navy be powered by the most modern source of energy? Can the nation be protected from an enemy missile attack?

An in depth study of these three disputes will reveal considerable data on how defense policy is evolved and the part that the House Armed Services Committee plays in it. This section will investigate Armed Services actions from four perspectives: what decisions the committee made, how the membership arrived at their positions, how the committee guided its proposals through the House and Conference Committee, and what impact they had on the administration's final actions. It is hypothesized that in all these disputes the Armed Services membership will be almost totally united behind the positions of the professional military elite. Furthermore, the committee will have considerable success in achieving its objectives on the House floor and in Conference Committee. However, its ability to alter the plans of the civilian military elites will be marginal. The committee is expected to have limited impact on the administration's actions.

The Advanced Manned Bomber

The major dispute between the House Armed Services Committee and the Kennedy administration was over the future of the manned bomber.¹ Secretary McNamara believed that the United States' major offensive delivery system should be guided missiles. He believed that the B-52, B-58, and B-70 were weapons which had only a marginal utility in the

¹The term "manned bomber" will be used to refer to the B-52, B-58, B-70 and the later renamed RS-70 bomber.

nuclear age. The Secretary felt that bombers were no longer reliable or efficient enough to deliver nuclear weapons. They were too slow, vulnerable, and expensive when compared to missiles. This position was opposed by the Air Force military elites. They felt that the country could not depend upon, as the main offensive delivery system, a weapon system - missiles - which had never been tested under war time conditions. The committee agreed with the Air Force's arguments and from 1961-1963 tried to compel the Kennedy Administration to develop bombers.

Secretary of Defense McNamara throughout his term of office opposed heavy investment in manned bombers. His arguments against bombers were stated at the 1961 committee hearings and repeated yearly. First, he favored the phase out of B-52 and B-58 bombers. Second, the Secretary opposed investing in the experimental B-70, a weapon which was designed to fly at over 2200 miles an hour at a height of 70,000 feet. The B-70 was originally conceived in 1953 as a replacement of the B-52. At that time no one dreamed of the possibility of inter-continental ballistic missiles. For this reason B-70's would now have to be designed with extra radar and faster takeoff speed to ward off enemy missiles. These modifications would greatly increase the cost. McNamara believed the cost of producing a full weapon system of 200 planes would be approximately \$7.5 billion.¹ McNamara admitted that missiles still had not been completely tested and verified. He understood that bombers were more flexible because of the human control factor and could drop a larger load of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, he concluded that the B-70 should not presently be developed as a full scale weapon system.

¹ House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings No. 10 - Pursuant to H.R. 1561, 1961, p. 1245.

Instead, we recommend that it be pursued as a development program designed to demonstrate the technical feasibility of the aircraft structure and configuration, as well as certain major subsystems required in a high speed, high altitude environment. This approach, at the cost of 1 year's delay but with a saving of \$138 million in 1962 would still preserve the option of developing a manned bomber, if we should later determine such a system is required.¹

The Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert and Chief of the Air Force White in 1961 and Curtis LeMay in 1962 and 1963 staunchly supported the development of a manned bomber. General White argued that a manned bomber, unlike missiles, was a flexible weapon. Missiles could either be launched or not launched, but bombers had the flexibility of loitering above a target, changing directions, or simply returning.²

We will also need a post-strike reconnaissance capability to assess the results of our attacks and to show the way to the most effective employment of succeeding strikes. The B-70 which is now under development, was specifically created and designed to handle the tasks I have outlined.³

The remainder of his argument concerned the undesirability of relying on only one type of offensive delivery system and the disastrous consequences of the Russians developing a weapon which we had abandoned. The Air Force spokesmen stated that they were not prepared to rely solely on a weapon which had never been fired in anger.⁴ Finally, if nuclear weapons were ever outlawed, the country would need bombers to deliver conventional bombs; missiles were too expensive for this purpose.⁵

In 1962, the Air Force modified the B-70 into an RS-70. Its new function was now reconnaissance in nature. As in the previous year and

¹Ibid., p. 1245.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings No. 9 - Military Posture Briefings, 1961, p. 1087.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 1088, 1171.

⁵Ibid., p. 1171.

for the same reasons the Secretary of Defense opposed production of the new weapon which the Air Force favored. Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert and Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis E. Lemay claimed,

. . . that the Air Force had redesigned the mission of the plane, which would now reconnoiter enemy territory with special radar equipment after an initial missile exchange, and report on effectiveness of the first attack. The plane would be equipped with air-to-ground missiles to attack selected targets. Lemay said that such a plane could mean 'the all important difference of winning or losing.' The cost of building three additional planes, now redesignated RS-70 (for 'reconnaissance-strike') would be approximately \$1.3 billion, they said. The first wing (45 planes) of RS-70's could be operated at a cost of \$5 billion about 1968.¹

The differences between the Pentagon elites were over traditional assumptions about weapon systems versus an innovative one. The professional Air Force wanted to rely on a tested and proven weapon, whereas the Secretary of Defense was confident that the age of bombers was over. This was the first time that McNamara opposed a vast segment of his military elites, on a major strategy decision, and he generated considerable hostility, among Armed Service members, because of it.

The House Armed Services Committee sided with the Air Force department on this issue. They firmly believed in the continued procurement of B-52's, B-58's, and the development of an operational B-70 bomber. In its committee reports, the members listed a number of reasons for their attitudes.² The report stressed the membership's faith in ICBM's. They felt that sometime in the future missiles would be our major offensive weapon. However, they believed that an untried weapon

¹"High Speed Bombers Stir Controversy," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 18 (1962), p. 417.

²The same arguments and basic wording were used in the following two committee reports. U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, House Report No. 380 - Authorizing Defense Procurement, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 2-4, and U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Report No. 1406 - Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles,

was being rushed along to replace one whose "capabilities are tried and known." According to the members, the bomber had infinite movability, whereas missiles can either go or not go. The bomber increases the President's option by its ability to proceed to a target, stop, alter its mission, or simply return. The committee wondered whether the rocket would reach its target successfully.

By this the committee means an intercontinental ballistic missile will carry its nuclear warhead to great heights, subjecting it to intense cold. It then will arch down and upon reentering the Earth's atmosphere subject the nuclear warhead to intense heat. Who knows what will happen to the many delicate mechanisms involved in the nuclear warhead as it is subjected to these two extremes of temperature?

The committee reemphasized that it had nothing against missiles. However, it wanted a mixed force of weapons. It wanted the tried with the untried, until the complete reliability of missiles could be totally established.

The scientists may say that all of these things are determinable by extrapolation. Perhaps this is so. To the committee, however, it seems that our only knowledge of the actual workability of an ICBM fired in anger is in textbooks and in laboratories. The committee is unwilling to place the safety of this country in a purely academic attitude, and for this reason has added to the bill authorization for bombers.

For these reasons, in 1961 the committee authorized above administration requests, \$337 million for the continued procurement of B-52 and/or B-58 bombers, the reason being that the production line of these planes under present arrangements would cease production in October 1962. In order not to waste millions of dollars restarting these assembly lines the committee wanted more planes produced.¹ The House and Senate

and Naval Vessels, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, pp. 3-5 (both reports will hereafter be referred to as Report No. 380 and Report No. 1406, respectively).

¹ House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 380, 1961, p. 4.

conferees settled on the higher Senate figure for this program and authorized \$525 million above the administration's requests for the procurement of long range manned aircraft.¹ The executive department did not spend the \$514.5 million appropriated by the Congress nor did it alter its plans to stop the development of bombers in 1962. The B-52, the last strategic bomber, was destined to be replaced by the guided missile.²

In its 1962 report, the Armed Services Committee discussed its frustration in terms of affecting national security policy. It believed that the administration was impeding its constitutional right to participate in policy making. The committee was very much disturbed that the administration refused to spend the appropriated funds for the B-70 bomber. It listed many other instances when the administration had refused to spend money for projects which it had signed into law.

In 1962, the committee unanimously supported the development of RS-70 planes. The RS-70 was a reconnaissance and strike plane which was a modification of the B-70. The committee once again reiterated that, in the long run, missiles would be the center of our offensive delivery system, but at the moment the nation still needed bombers. According to the committee, the RS-70 would be crucial during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The committee authorized \$491 million above the administration's requests for the development of this weapon.³

In a highly unusual move the committee directed the Secretary of the Air Force to spend the money on the plane. This challenge to the

¹"Extra Funds Approved for Planes, Missiles, Ships," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 17, 1961, p. 415.

²Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 18, 1962, p. 416.

³Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 1406, pp. 5-6.

administration arose over the committee's desire to promote the weapon system and more importantly to re-establish the role of Congress in defense matters.

The committee in a long section of its report stated what it believed was Congress' power in national security matters. Invoking article I, section 8 of the Constitution, the report noted that Congress was empowered "to raise and support armies," "to provide and maintain a navy," and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."¹ The committee in determining what these words meant relied on various opinions and a Supreme Court case. The members concluded that the Constitution clearly implied that the Congress should have more than a passive role; it should be able to participate in policy. It was noted that over the years the ability of Congress to participate in policy has deteriorated badly.

More and more the role of Congress has come to be that of a sometimes querulous but essentially kindly uncle who complains while furiously puffing on his pipe but who finally, as everyone expects, gives in and hands over the allowance, grants the permission, or raises his hand in blessing, and then returns to his rocking chair for another year of somnolence broken only by an occasional anxious glance down the avenue and a muttered doubt as to whether he had done the right thing.²

The members felt that the RS-70 weapon system was the place to reverse the trend. The membership believed that the Congress has more than a negative function and it could initiate policy. It could encourage the development of weapons which it desired. In conclusion the report stated that the reason the Secretary of the Air Force was directed, ordered, mandated, and required to utilize the funds was to prevent anyone from missing the committee's intention. "If this language constitutes

¹Ibid., p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 7.

a test as to whether Congress has the power to so mandate, let the test be made and let this important weapon system be the field of trial."¹

The answer to this test proved very unsatisfactory to the committee's objectives. The mandatory language was opposed by many members of the House. They believed the President under his role as Commander-in-Chief could not be compelled to spend funds. The powerful chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on the Defense Department opposed the mandatory language. Mahon (D, Tex.) felt the committee's decision raised too many Constitutional questions and bypassed the usual House procedure "which called for direct action by the Congress as funds recorded by its Appropriation Committee before authorized programs can be executed."² The final turn of events occurred when Chairman Vinson was invited by President Kennedy to the White House to discuss the matter. The President convinced Vinson to remove the mandatory language in exchange for which Secretary McNamara would launch another study into the weapon's feasibility. On the House floor, the chairman changed the mandatory language and merely authorized the increased amount.³ Of the extra funds that the Congress authorized for RS-70 development the administration eventually used \$50 million for creation, aboard the plane, of more sophisticated radar and communication equipment.⁴

In 1963 the Armed Services Committee was once again trying to increase the reliance of the United States defense with the inclusion of

¹Ibid., p. 9.

²Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 18 (1962), p. 419.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 416.

RS-70 weapons. Siding with the Air Force and all the Joint Chiefs, but Chairman Maxwell Taylor, the committee wanted to develop five rather than three prototype planes. The committee noted that since 1955 \$1,751 billion had been spent on a weapon that the administration was unwilling to rely on. The committee believed that, if five prototype planes were created, the Pentagon could adequately determine the RS-70's feasibility.¹ For this purpose the committee authorized an additional \$363.7 million to increase the scope of RS-70 from three to five planes and supply an adequate number of missiles and radar that "would make it a weapons system."²

For the first time since the bomber controversy began in 1961, five members of the committee filed additional views. Representatives Stratton (D, N.Y.), Cohelan (D, Cal.), Pike (D, N.Y.), Ichord (D, N.Y.), and Nedzi (D, Mich.), wrote, " . . . time and technology are clearly in the process of overtaking the manned strategic bomber as the keystone of our nuclear deterrent force." They claimed the Air Force recognizes this by no longer pressing for a manned bomber, but rather for the RS-70 which is a postnuclear attack reconnaissance and strike aircraft. Further, they felt the weapon was not entirely developed and was not worth the cost.³

¹U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, House Report No. 61 - Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels, 80th Cong., 1st sess., March 6, 1963, p. 5 (hereafter referred to as Report No. 61).

²"\$15 Billion Defense Program Authorized," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 19 (1963), p. 421.

³House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 61, 1963, p. 47.

On the House floor the committee's amendment to add the funds was accepted by a roll call vote of 226-179.¹ As in the past the administration continued to refuse to spend the funds. Nineteen sixty-three was the last year in which the committee added additional funds for the RS-70 weapons. Throughout the rest of the Johnson Administration the committee supported the development and procurement of a "follow on" bomber. The committee authorized funds and the Congress passed the legislation. During this period the administration spent only part of the funds that were eventually appropriated.²

The issue of the advanced manned bomber indicates the committee's inability to affect policy when the administration is firmly set on a particular approach. McNamara concluded and never altered his conclusion that a manned bomber was no longer worth the cost of development. The Secretary never wavered in his belief and had the support of the President. Under these circumstances, and despite the opposition of numerous military elites and various sections of Congress, nothing could be done to make him build bombers. The Congress can authorize funds, but the executive branch, even when they sign weapon systems into law, need not spend for their development.

¹The 1968 committee report lists the entire manned bomber controversy from 1961 to 1968 with all the pros, cons, and cost of the system. The data reveal that an enormous amount of funds have been authorized and never used. U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Report No. 1645 - Authorizing Appropriations for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, Fiscal Year 1969 and Reserve Strength, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 5, 1968, pp. 23-33 (hereafter referred to as Report No. 1645).

²Ibid., p. 24.

Nuclear Frigates

Since the early 1950's, the members of the House Armed Services Committee have had considerable interest in developing a nuclear navy. They have continually supported the conversion of ships from fuel oil to atomic energy despite administration inaction or opposition. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the committee has always attracted members whose districts or states have naval interests. These Congressmen are likely to be open-minded and receptive to new naval programs. Second, the two Democratic chairmen have had pro-navy biases. They have been identified with naval interests. Vinson, who had as one of his nicknames the "Admiral," had been chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee for over fifteen years whereas Rivers represents a district which is dependent upon continued naval spending. Third, one or two of the committee's members have always been on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. These men who are familiar with atomic power have actively lobbied for nuclear weapons.¹ For these three major reasons the committee during the Eisenhower administration supported that faction of the navy department which endorsed nuclear submarines. On this issue, the executive branch eventually supported the committee's objectives. Among the United States major offensive weapons are nuclear powered polaris submarines.

¹For example see the statements by Mel Price (D, Ill.) and William Bates (R, Mass.) in support of nuclear power. U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess., May 18, 1961, Vol. 107, part 7, pp. 8380-8383, U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess., June 21, 1961, Vol. 107, part 8, pp. 10929-10940; U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 1965, Vol. 111, part 7, pp. 9552-9556, U.S. Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 1965, Vol. 111, part 8, p. 1141. U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., June 13, 1967, Vol. 113, part 12, pp. 15585-15586, U.S., Congressional

Under the Kennedy and Johnson regimes the committee wanted the entire navy to operate with nuclear power. They tried to make the administration develop nuclear carriers, escorts, and destroyers. Between 1965-1968, the committee and the executive department disagreed over the procurement of a specific nuclear ship. The committee tried to push the Johnson Administration to develop nuclear frigates (DLGN). In a ship convoy four frigates escort one aircraft carrier and protect it with sophisticated missiles and underwater devices from enemy planes and submarines. The committee strongly felt that these ships, especially when the carrier was nuclear propelled, should be run by atomic power.

Secretary of Defense McNamara favored conventional frigates over nuclear ones for one major reason. At a 1965 Armed Services Committee meeting he stated,

At present, the cost of nuclear-powered frigates, estimated at approximately \$150 million for the lead-ship and \$128 million for the follow-on ship compared with the D10's authorized in fiscal year 1962 at a cost of \$73 million (including black oil for a period equivalent to the life of the D10 cores) appears disproportionate to the benefits to be gained.

In the printed testimony that is available, McNamara never reveals why nuclear frigates are not worth the cost. It seems probable that he opposed spending money on a weapon which had little value against almost every United States enemy.

With the exception of the Soviet Union, the United States had complete freedom of the seas, and America was unlikely to fight the Soviet Union employing fighter bombers launched from aircraft carriers.

Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., June 20, 1967, Vol. 113, part 14, pp. 17898-17903.

¹House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 1965, p. 323.

The professional navy disagreed with their civilian leader's assessment. They believed a conventional frigate was too slow, vulnerable, and dependent upon fuel supplies; a nuclear frigate was therefore well worth the cost.¹ A number of prominent naval officials, including Admiral Miller, Admiral McDonald, and the father of the nuclear submarine, Admiral Rickover, all forcefully disagreed with the Secretary's position.² These men were unhappy that the only variable in determining the utility of nuclear power was cost effectiveness. Admiral Rickover stated,

They tend to rely on their book knowledge in fields where tested competence, judgment, experience, wisdom and intuition are also necessary. The issue of nuclear power has amply demonstrated this ...³

The committee overwhelmingly supported the professional navy on this issue. They believed that nuclear power afforded the vessel increased flexibility and freedom for independent action. The ships could travel further, have unlimited endurance at high speeds, and could operate more effectively in bad weather. Second, the ships had a reduced dependence on mobile logistic support; the DLGN's did not need oil. This lack of dependency made them less vulnerable to submarine and guided missile attack; the DLGN's could always use evasive routes and never had to return to port. Third, the ship was cleaner, subject to less corrosion, and generated its own power needs.⁴ Further, as was noted in the 1966

¹U.S., Congressional Record, House, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., June 14, 1966, Vol. 112, part 10, p. 13079.

²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 13456, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., January 24-May 2, 1966, pp. 8020, 8154, 8151-8157.

³Ibid., p. 8151.

⁴U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Service, Report No.

committee report, the cost of the nuclear task force and a conventionally operated one, both of which include four frigates, when fuel supplies are included, is not that much different.

The cost of conventionally powered ships does not include the cost of fuel or fuel delivery. When all costs are combined the difference in building and operating a nuclear-powered task force over a conventionally powered task force with the same type ships is only about 6% over their lifetimes.¹

As in the case of manned interceptor bombers, the committee has annually authorized a weapon which the administration does not want. The committee's ability to push or compel the executive branch to develop DLGN's have been just as unsuccessful.

From 1959 to 1963, the Department of Defense requested from the Congress authorization for three DLGN's, two of which, the Bainbridge and Truxton, were eventually built.² Beginning in 1965, the navy requested one DLGN from the Department of Defense, but was turned down. The House Armed Services Committee supported the position of the naval elites and included one DLGN in the fiscal 1966 military authorization

221 - Authorizing Defense Procurement and Research and Development, 90th Cong., 1st sess., May 2, 1967, pp. 6-7 (hereafter referred to as Report No. 221), U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 1965, Vol. 111, part 7, p. 9553; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, House Report No. 271 - Authorizing Defense and Procurement and Research Development, 89th Cong., 1st sess., April 29, 1965, pp. 40-45 (hereafter referred to as Report No. 271).

¹The committee's minority leader Congressman Bates stated on the House floor that according to the Chief of Naval Operations the difference between a nuclear and conventional task force over the ship's lifetime was only 1%. U.S., House, Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., June 14, 1966, Vol. 112, part 10, p. 13061.

²The third frigate which was appropriated in 1962 was unable to be built with a new type of SAM missile system called Typhon and was scrapped. "House Panel to Weigh Pentagon's Nuclear Warship Plan," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 22 (February 23, 1968), p. 321.

bill. The Congress authorized the ship although it eventually only appropriated \$20 million for long leadtime procurement.¹

In 1966 the executive department did not spend the funds which had been appropriated for the nuclear frigate. During the 1966 Armed Services Committee hearings, Congressman Price got Secretary of the Navy Nitze to admit that the navy had unsuccessfully requested the building of two additional nuclear frigates. The Secretary stated that he fully supported the committee's objectives, but doubted if the ships were authorized, the Department of Defense would allow them to be built.² Nevertheless, the committee authorized two new DLGN's at a total cost of \$258.3 million.³

In its House report the members criticized the Secretary of Defense for his "unimaginative" approach toward nuclear power. They claimed that because of his policies it would be a minimum of ten years before the first all-nuclear task force was in operation.⁴

The most controversial aspect of the committee's decision was the language which it employed to authorize the two frigates. The committee mandated the Secretary of Defense to build the weapons.

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy shall proceed with the design, engineering, and construction of the two nuclear-powered guided missile frigates as soon as practicable.

¹House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 271, 1965, p. 9.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 13456, 1966, p. 8010.

³The reason the cost of the frigates was so low was that the administration was supposed to build the ships with funds authorized in the previous year. U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Report No. 1536 - Authorizing Defense Procurement and Research and Development, and Military Pay, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., May 16, 1966, p. 17 (hereafter referred to as Report No. 1536).

⁴House Committee on Armed Services, House Report No. 1536,

In order to avoid any controversy about the committee's intent the Armed Services report stated,

Lest there be any doubt as to what the foregoing amendment means let it be said that it means exactly what it says, i.e., that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy as officials of the executive branch are mandated to utilize the authorizations granted; those officials "shall proceed" with the construction of the two nuclear powered guided missile frigates as soon as practicable. If this language constitutes a test as to whether Congress has the power to do so mandate, let the test be made and let this important weapon system be the field of trial.

As in the case of manned bombers, the issue raised a number of constitutional questions. In this instance, could the Congress mandate the actions of an executive officer whose first responsibility was to the President? Under our system of government, could the administration be compelled to do the legislature's bidding?

These issues were never brought to a test. Although the House passed the mandatory language, the Senate did not. In conference committee, the language was softened considerably. The House and Senate conferees included two DLGN's in the final version of the bill, but the language now read,

. . . shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress that its construction is not in the national interest.¹

This language also raised constitutional questions, but to a much lesser extent. In essence the Congress was saying that the President was required to explain the execution of his office. He was, under the official language, responsible for advising the Congress why a particular decision was not carried out. Congressmen from Washington to the

1966, p. 31. See the U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., June 14, 1966, Vol. 112, part 10, p. 13055, for Rivers' description of Secretary McNamara's nuclear program as unimaginative.

¹U.S., Congressional Record, House, 89th Cong., 2nd sess.,

present have ignored such actions.¹

Chairman Rivers was extremely happy with the new language. His earlier statements indicated that he wanted to force the Department of Defense to give the country nuclear frigates.² However, in discussing the conference report, he claimed he was more than happy with the settlement.

We arrived at an agreement with the Senate that is wholly satisfactory to the House conferees since it carries out the basic concept of indicating to the executive branch that we mean what we say about building a nuclear surface navy.³

The administration, as it did in fiscal 1966, refused to spend the appropriated funds and didn't submit to Congress its reasons for so doing.⁴

Secretary of Defense McNamara did announce in his annual 1967 policy statement that the funds for one of the DLGN's would be used in fiscal 1968. However, included in the fiscal budget were funds for two conventionally powered frigates. It seems likely that Congressional and naval pressure, as well the Secretary's decision to build a nuclear aircraft carrier, probably altered his previous thinking. As in the past, the committee opposed the Secretary's decisions. The members noted:

July 12, 1966, Vol. 112, part 12, p. 15307.

¹Edward S. Corsin, The President: Office and Power - 1787-1957 (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 110-118.

²U.S., House, Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., June 14, 1966, Vol. 112, part 10, p. 13058.

³U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., July 12, 1966, Vol. 112, part 12, p. 15307.

⁴"House Panel to Weigh Pentagon's Nuclear Warship Plan," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 26 (February 23, 1968), p. 321.

The advantage of nuclear power-- especially in not having to be concerned about the black oil logistics train for the complex task group which consists of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier and at least four escorts -- is clear to all except the D.O.D. The Armed Services Committees of both Houses, the Appropriations Committees of both Houses, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have all approved nuclear propulsion for our major fleet escorts. This has been the position of the Navy itself from 1963 until recently, when the Secretary of the Navy renounced his earlier position.
 . . .¹

Once again the committee included language which required the President to advise the Congress why they weren't constructed. In a deliberate criticism of Secretary McNamara, the committee raised the constitutional issue of the Congress' right to maintain and support a navy. The report noted,

If the reluctance of the Secretary of Defense to accept nuclear propulsion is not overcome shortly, the prime question before the Congress will become:
 Can the appointed Secretary of Defense thwart the exercise of the constitutional powers of the Congress to provide and maintain a navy?²

The administration's reaction to this action was the same as in previous years. It simply refused to procure weapons which it considered unnecessary.³

The issue was modified in 1968 when Secretary McNamara, in his last policy report before leaving office, varied his position. He still opposed the building of DLGN's, but was now in favor of a new experimental frigate known as DXGN. He proposed a five year \$3 billion ship-building program that included five experimental warships of a new design. The fiscal 1969 Pentagon recommendations included \$17.4 million for contract definition and \$52 million for long lead procurement

¹House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 221, 1967, p. 5.

²Ibid., p. 8.

³Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 24 (February 23, 1968), p. 322.

of 2 DXGN's. The committee welcomed this move, and because of the growing Soviet submarine threat encouraged the administration to consider building even greater numbers of the new weapons.¹

The Nike-X Dispute

The third major dispute between the Armed Services Committee and the executive department was over the production and deployment of Nike-X missiles.² In 1966 and 1967, the House Armed Services Committee tried to force the Johnson Administration to develop and deploy these types of anti-ballistic missiles. Of the three weapon systems under analysis the President's 1968 decision to install defensive missiles was the only one on which the committee successfully achieved all its goals. However, the reason for installing ABM's was based on world events rather than committee pressure. It was not that Armed Service members or the legislative branch altered the Secretary of Defense's and the President's thinking, but that Russian and Chinese actions altered their plans.

The Nike-X system was created to destroy enemy missiles which might someday be launched against the United States. The Defense Department, which began research on such a missile in 1955, by 1967 had spent approximately four billion dollars.³ The system consisted of a

¹ Ibid., p. 320, and U.S., House, Report No. 1645 Authorizing Appropriations for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, Fiscal Year 1969, and Reserve Strength, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 5, 1968, p. 44.

² The sentinel ABM missile system is a modified version of the Nike-X. It consists of fewer missile and radar components and is used for a more limited objective. "The U.S. and Anti-Missile Defense," Congressional Digest, Vol. 47 (November 1968), 257.

³ U.S., House Armed Services Committee, Report No. 221, 90th

long range spartan missile, a short distance sprint missile, and a complex arrangement of radar and computers. The spartan missile was designed to protect large areas of the country whereas the spring missile's primary function was to protect individual cities and defense installations.¹

Throughout the 1960's, Secretary of Defense McNamara opposed the deployment of the Nike-X system. He believed that the program was still in the research and development stage and therefore not sophisticated enough to be considered operational. In 1966, appearing before the House Armed Services Committee, McNamara claimed that the Nike-X system would provide only marginal protection against an all out Soviet attack.² For these reasons the Secretary favored continued experimentation to develop a weapon which would have the maximum capability against the Soviet and Chinese threat.³

The committee, as it had on many defense issues of the 1960's, disagreed with the McNamara diagnosis. In the 1966 committee report, Armed Services authorized an additional \$153.5 million for procurement and \$14.4 million for research and development for Nike-X. The committee's action paralleled those of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The additional funds according to the public report were authorized to give the administration a savings of one year in the "time required between a deployment decision and attainment of the first operational

Cong., 1st sess., May 2, 1967, p. 3.

¹"Congress Urges Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 22 (1966), p. 607.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 13456, 1966, p. 7423.

³Ibid., p. 7391.

capability."¹ The report noted that, unlike the civilian part of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their support of beginning pre-production activities.² Agreeing with the position of the professional military, the committee felt that defensive missiles could afford the nation real protection.

Recent advances in technology and concepts of deployment permit a blanket of protection for the whole United States against a relatively small number of attacking missiles, and tighter protection against heavier attacks for 25 major cities at a 5 year cost of \$8.5 to \$10 billion . . . Even a moderate ballistic missile defense might save millions of American lives in the event of an enemy attack.³

On the House floor, the committee members justified the increased authorization for Nike-X missiles for similar types of reasons. They claimed that an anti-missile defense afforded protection from a possible Russian or Chinese attack.⁴ Chairman Rivers defended the new authorizations on the expressed needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He stated the reason the committee authorized \$167.9 million was because this was the figure that the military chiefs had mentioned in order to successfully develop the program.⁵

In 1966 President Johnson refused to spend the extra funds which were appropriated towards the production of the Nike-X system. One of the reasons was the belief on the part of some experts that the

¹U.S., House, Report No. 1536, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., May 16, 1966, p. 16.

²Ibid., p. 17.

³Ibid.

⁴U.S., House, Congressional Record, Vol. 112, part 12, June 14, 1966, p. 13080.

⁵Ibid., p. 13059.

system would eventually cost over \$40 billion dollars for very limited protection. Nonetheless, by the end of 1966 the President began to re-evaluate his position. On November 10, 1966 Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the Russians were installing an ABM system.¹

Despite this possible threat to United States security, Secretary McNamara in 1967 was still resisting the Congressional and military pressure to deploy Nike-X missiles. He first wanted to see if an agreement could be reached between the two super powers about ABM limitations. The Secretary believed that to deploy Nike-X missiles would only generate a very expensive arms race which would not result in an increase in United States security. He felt that defensive needs would be better served by increasing our offensive strength to modify any benefit which might accrue to the Russians through installation of an ABM. In the short run, McNamara told the committee, the United States might have a strategic advantage in deploying an Nike-X system. However, in the long run, the advantage could easily be erased by the Russians increasing their offensive strength. Thus, great sums of money would be spent on a weapon which would not affect the present balance of power.² The Secretary with the President's approval did recommend,

. . . the inclusion of \$377 million in the FY 1968 budget for the production and deployment of Nike-X; but to take no action pending discussion with the Soviet Union on a limitation on the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. The Joint Chiefs and I agreed that we must press forward with undiminished vigor on the development, test, and evaluation of the system, for which \$440 million is included in the FY 1968 budget.³

¹Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 22 (1966), p. 607.

²U.S., Congress, House, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9240, Committee on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st sess., March 2 - April 10, 1967, pp. 392-395, 1010-1013.

³Ibid., p. 1013.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler, publicly disagreed with his civilian superiors. He informed the Armed Services Committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in the opinion that the Department of Defense should proceed immediately with the deployment of defense missiles. Wheeler mentioned a number of reasons for their attitude. First, the system would limit the damage of an attack and save lives. He estimated that between 30-50 million people could be saved. Second, it would eliminate uncertainty by convincing the Russians that we could survive a first strike and retaliate. Further, the installation of Nike-X missiles would stabilize the nuclear balance and convince the world we were not only interested in offensive weapons. Finally, in a psychological sense it would indicate to the Russians the United States' willingness to deny them "an exploitable capability."¹ To the professional military it seemed that the Nike-X represented a viable deterrent force as well as a less tangible but no less important state of mind.²

Although the committee passed the administration's recommendation to authorize \$337 million for Nike-X deployment, in its House report it encouraged the administration to begin development of a thin Nike-X program.

. . . The advantage of beginning with the thin deployment and possibly allowing the defense to grow toward posture A during the production cycle may be compared to learning to walk before trying to run. . . .³

Of the four Congressional committees involved with national security

¹Ibid., pp. 424-425.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 221, 1967, p. 4.

³Ibid.

issues, the House Armed Services Committee was the only one that recommended immediate deployment. The other three were willing to allow the administration to possibly reach an arms limitation agreement with the Russians.¹

After seven months of seemingly fruitless talks with the Russians and three months after the first successful Chinese H-Bomb detonation, the administration elected to install a defensive missile system. Secretary McNamara, on September 18, 1967, announced that the administration wanted to proceed with the deployment of a five billion "thin" ABM system which would be employed against a possible Red Chinese missile attack in the 1970's.² It is interesting that a system which McNamara usually spoke about in relation to the Russians, and which General Wheeler mentioned exclusively in terms of the Soviets, would now be built because of the threat of a Chinese attack.

Since this decision, the overwhelming majority of the committee has supported the administration's requests. In 1968 the committee's report, probably to tone down the issue, contained only one paragraph in approving this controversial program.³ On the House floor a minimum amount of time, less than one half hour, was allotted for discussion of a program which authorized for research and procurement over 665.6 million dollars.⁴

¹"Defense Authorizations," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 23 (1967), p. 222.

²Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 23 (1967), p. 212.

³U.S., House Armed Services Committee, Report No. 1645, July 5, 1968, p. 48.

⁴U.S., Congressional Record, Vol. 114, no. 16, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, p. 20717.

The committee's ability to realize its objectives were motivated by external forces. The administration's deployment decisions were not altered by House Armed Services feelings, but rather by the action of the Russian and Chinese. The issue once again reveals that the committee cannot force or compel the administration to do its bidding. Policy is made in the executive branch and the Congress can only try to pressure the administration to make changes. It cannot initiate these changes.

Interpretation of the Three Case Studies

Throughout the 1960's the House Armed Services Committee has attempted to play a part in creating national security policy. The committee has not acted as a "rubber stamp" for administration proposals and has taken definite stands on a number of controversial matters. The study of the disputes concerning the advanced manned bomber, nuclear frigates, and Nike-X missiles, have revealed considerable data on how policy evolved and the impact of Armed Services upon it.

The three cases demonstrate the House Armed Services loyalty to the professional military elite. On all of these issues the overwhelming majority of members supported those military elites who disagreed with administration policy. They adopted the arguments of those services who had been overruled. Experience, background, and intuition were considered more important than modern managerial techniques.

The positions which the committee supported seem to indicate that they have no overall policy objectives but rather react to events as they evolve. Each issue is evaluated separately, not as part of some greater framework. In the case of the bomber controversy the member-

ship was downgrading the usefulness and workability of missiles, whereas only four years later they were actively clamouring for the installation of an untried anti-missile. The creation of nuclear frigates which would supposedly modernize the navy for the 21st century was justified by arguments which applied to World War II.

In adopting its policy decisions the membership showed remarkable unity. Only on the issue of the advanced manned bomber were there committee members who disagreed so strongly with the Armed Service position that they took their fight onto the House floor. Yet, even this issue only produced five dissenters. The membership was totally united behind the building of nuclear powered ships and, with the exception of two members, on the immediate implementation of the Nike-X program.

This consensus is unusual when one considers the constitutional questions that the committee's actions raised. On two occasions, in 1962 and 1966, the Armed Service bill "directed" the administration to build RS-70 bombers and nuclear frigates. The issue in both cases involved the power of the legislative branch to compel the executive branch to carry out specific actions. Despite this clear challenge to executive action and the serious constitutional issues which it raised, the membership was united.

The Armed Services Committee was fairly successful in convincing the House members of the propriety of its policies. The expansion of the Nike-X program and authorizations for nuclear frigates were passed unamended and with a minimum amount of opposition. Only on the issue of the advanced manned bomber was the committee challenged. A large percentage of the House opposed the committee's faith in the future value of bombers and the language which "directed" the executive

to build RS-70 planes. A powerful member of Appropriations and the present Chairman, Mahon (D, Tex.) indicated that the Armed Services position was usurping what he believed was a function of Appropriations. If Chairman Vinson had not acceded to President Kennedy's wishes to remove the mandatory language, it is likely that the House would have. However, once Armed Services retreated on this point, the House authorized all the bombers.

The similar outlook between the Senate and House Armed Services members was once again reconfirmed through these issues. The two committees were in total accord on the need for an advanced manned bomber and Nike-X missile. On the issues of the development of nuclear frigates the Senate conferees have been less enthusiastic than their House counterparts. They have continually authorized less funds and in 1966 imposed on their Armed Service brethren to remove language which directed the Secretary of Defense to build nuclear frigates. Nonetheless, the differences between the two groups, where they exist, are over dollars and number amounts, not over policy.

Finally, the three cases demonstrate the committee's limitations in the defense field. The committee can only react to policy; it cannot initiate it. It doesn't develop independent policies, but rather chooses between arguments which are made by executive policy maker. Thus, its members' role is one of attaching themselves to winning or losing arguments. They become involved when there are disputes between the Pentagon elites. They can publicize their views, debate at committee hearings with administration officials who differ with them, and, for programs they favor, pass increased authorizations. However, they cannot make the executive branch use the funds.

The major impact of the House Armed Services Committee is as goader and prodder of the executive. The committee insures that factions that have lost policy disputes in the Pentagon are given other opportunities to achieve their goals. The committee, by keeping these issues alive, often forces the administration to moderate its actions. The development of nuclear powered ships and ABM missiles has been influenced by the committee's pressure. The committee does have a role, although limited, in influencing the course of policy.

The Committee and Defense Procurement
and Research Authorizations

This section will investigate the itemized changes that the committee made in the Pentagon's procurement and research requests. It will reveal on a yearly basis which weapons and research projects in the opinion of the committee should receive increases or decreases despite the Department of Defense's recommendations. The House of Representatives contains committees such as Appropriations, which perceive their main function as reducing the funds for the government agencies with which they are associated. Others, such as Agriculture and the present Labor and Education Committees, are motivated to promote and advance the programs and authorizations for the government agency which they supervise.¹ It is assumed, based on the membership of the Armed Services Committee and the technical, complex, and secretive nature of defense issues, that the committee will treat the Pentagon in a fashion similar to the latter two committees.

¹Richard Fenno and Charles O. Jones, New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, edited by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, pp. 125-154, 281-324, 155-174.

TABLE 7.1 lists the committee's itemized changes in defense program spending for the years 1961 through 1968. The data reveals that, although the committee makes some changes, it is usually above the Pentagon's recommendations. This is especially true in the field of weapon procurement. The committee which is not subject to Bureau of the Budget restrictions has been willing to recommend authorizations on the basis of purely military considerations. Armed Service members do not estimate the utility of an extra weapon as compared to a poverty program but rather they perceive the defense budget in purely military terms. This one-dimensional view of defense preparedness invariably pushes the committee to support high levels of spending. The only significant exception to this pattern was in 1968 when the committee, because of considerable anti-defense spending sentiment in the country and Congress, was under pressure to cut defense authorizations.¹ In that year the committee eliminated weapons which either were unpopular with the professional military or had not been fully developed. The F-11b is an airplane which for reasons of cost effectiveness McNamara wanted both the navy and Air Force to utilize. This weapon, which was opposed by the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unable to meet the specifications of both services. Its elimination by the committee was an act which the military elites favored.² The removal of DX (a new type of destroyer) and DXG (a new missile destroyer) resulted because neither

¹The reason for the cut of 2.8 million dollars in 1962 for ship conversion resulted because the committee did not feel that it had jurisdiction. " . . . such funds had in the past been handled under appropriations for the maritime administration in the Commerce Department. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 18 (1962), p. 417.

²U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Report No. 1645, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 5, 1968, pp. 6-7.

TABLE 7.1.--Itemized list of committee changes in Defense Department weapon and research requests in dollar amount differences from 1961 to 1968

<u>Procurement</u>		
1961		
Increases:	Four C-135 Engines	\$ 21,200,000
	Special air mission	25,000,000
	B-52, B-58 bombers	337,000,000
	DLGN-nuclear powered frigate	10,000,000
Decreases:	None	
1962		
Increases:	6 additional types of aircraft	55,290,000
	Army missile procurement	31,182,000
	RS-70 bomber	491,000,000
	Minuteman missile	10,000,000
Decreases:	Defensive equipment for the Merchant Marines	2,800,000
1963		
Increases:	2 killer submarines	67,000,000
Decreases:	None	
1964		
Increases:	None	
Decreases:	None	
1965		
Increases:	One nuclear guided missile frigate	150,500,000
	Air Force equipment	25,000,000
	Air Force industrial facilities	5,000,000
Decreases:	None	
1966		
Increases:	OH-6A helicopter	19,900,000
	Air Force broadcasting equipment	20,000,000
	F-12 aircraft	55,000,000
	CX-2 aircraft	51,200,000
	Nike-X missile	153,500,000
	DLGN	258,300,000
Decreases:	None	
1967		
Increases:	DLGN	83,000,000
	Aircraft additions and modifications	168,600,000
	C-130E	60,000,000
Decreases:	None	

TABLE 7.1.--Continued

<u>Procurement (continued)</u>		
1968		
Increases:	EA-6B	\$139,000,000
	Spare parts for the navy	39,300,000
	Submarine development	33,600,000
Decreases:	F-111B	388,800,000
	DX (navy destroyer)	221,000,000
	FDL (fast deployment logistic ships)	183,600,000
	DXG (nuclear powered missile destroyer)	20,000,000
<u>Research Alterations</u>		
1961		
Increases:	The committee does not possess oversight powers over	
Decreases:	research until 1963.	
1962		
Increases:	The committee does not possess oversight powers over	
Decreases:	research until 1963.	
1963		
Increases:	RS-70 bomber	\$363,700,000
Decreases:	None	
1964		
Increases:	Follow up bomber	52,000,000
	Improved manner interceptor	40,000,000
Decreases:	Army RDTE	62,000,000
	Navy RDTE	121,500,000
	Air Force RDTE	157,000,000
	D.O.D. RDTE	22,000,000
1965		
Increases:	None	
Decreases:	Army RDTE	31,600,000
	Navy RDTE	33,400,000
	Air Force RDTE	43,900,000
	D.O.D. RDTE	5,400,000
1966		
Increases:	Nike-X missile	14,400,000
	13 projects Army RDTE	48,400,000
	Navy RDTE	142,700,000
	Air Force RDTE	167,700,000
Decreases:	None	

TABLE 7.1.--Continued

<u>Research Alterations (continued)</u>		
1967		
Increases:	Advanced manned strategic aircraft	\$ 25,000,000
Decreases:	None	
1968		
Increases:	VFX-1	70,000,000
	Phoenix Missile	10,030,000
Decreases:	Army military science	10,000,000
	Navy military science	9,000,000
	Air Force military science	10,000,000
	Army management and support	10,000,000
	Navy management and support	9,000,000
	Air Force management and support	10,000,000
	Defense agencies	15,100,000
	Emergency fund	125,000,000

ship had been completely tested.¹ It is assumed that the removal of authorization for FDL's (fast deployment logistic ships) occurred because of their controversial nature. The ships were designed to swiftly move men and equipment. To many shipping companies and Congressmen they raised the specter of the government usurping the work of private shipping firms and preparing for more Vietnams. The opposition of the Senate and especially Senator Russell (D, Ga.) probably convinced the committee that the project was doomed anyway.²

In every other year the committee, usually influenced by one of the military service chiefs, has added funds for the procurement of weapons. The major additions in 1961 and 1962 of the manned bomber, in

¹Ibid., pp. 8, 56.

²"Noninterventionists, Shipping Interests, Combine to Defeat Administration Requests for Fleet of Mammoth Supply Ships," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 23 (1967), pp. 220-221.

1965, 1966, 1967 of nuclear guided missile frigates, and in 1966 of funds for Nike-X missiles have already been discussed. Since 1965 most of the aircraft additions and modifications are related to the U.S. experiences in Vietnam. The committee has speeded up the development of certain aircraft or modified others for use in the war.¹

The committee has sliced administration requests for research authorizations. Nonetheless from 1961 to 1968 the total research authorizations recommended by the committee to the House have exceeded Pentagon recommendations. Significant cuts have taken place in 1964 and 1965 involving hundreds of projects, but these have been cancelled out by substantial increases in 1963 and 1966.

Committee reductions have been characterized by an awareness of enormous waste in the research and development field. In 1965 it was reported that in the previous ten years substantial numbers of projects were cancelled at the last moment at a cost in excess of six billion dollars.² Despite the evidence of waste and mismanagement the committee is very wary of interfering with research projects. Usually the cuts they recommend will only reduce the authorization for a particular program rather than destroy it. This action insures that no program is radically altered. The members believe the need for research overrides certain wasteful techniques. As one high ranking staff official stated,

¹See House Committee on Armed Services, Reports No. 1536, No. 221, No. 1645, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 90th Cong., 1st sess. and 2nd sess., 1966-1968.

²For excess costs between 1966-1968 see "The Row Over U.S. Weapons," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 66 (June 30, 1969), pp. 26-27. The article lists cost overruns and waste totalling over eight billion dollars.

. . . You take a thing like Polio Vaccine. It took hundreds of tests over ten years before we got the answer. Do you mean to say that we should have gone out and shot those guys who did not develop it right away. The papers that do not like us like the Washington Post and the New York Post claim all these things were a waste as if any man could have developed it on the first shot. It's a real dirty move; it takes time and errors to come up with an adequate defense. We need this for our security. I don't see it as a danger but rather as our greatest defense.

In its reports the committee acknowledges that it only trims programs which receive marginal support by Pentagon officials. These programs are not entirely scrapped by Armed Services but rather are trimmed down. In order to avoid the possible destruction or hampering of marginal programs which may yet prove to be potentially valuable the committee gives the Pentagon wide discretionary powers. Programs which are slashed can always be revised.

. . . it is recognized that in a rapidly changing environment the military service must be allowed flexibility to cope with changing conditions and requirements. Therefore, it is the committee's position that the recommended reductions may be taken in program areas other than those indicated, so long as the total reduction to each military department remains the same as indicated in the report.¹

Further, the Secretary of Defense has reprogramming authority which permits him to refund a program which the Congress has sliced. This discretionary power of self-funding was continually used by McNamara in order to nullify Congressional action.² Thus, although the committee has made some reductions in research and development programs, the effect on the Defense Department has been marginal. The committee affords the Department of Defense wide latitude to shift its priorities, and it invariably trims rather than destroys programs.

¹U.S., Congress, House Armed Services Committee, House Report No. 271, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 33.

²Ibid.

The result of the committee's changes is to increase the cost of defense spending. TABLE 7.2 lists the committees and the Department of Defense's total research and procurement recommendations and the differences between them. In the eight years under analysis the committee has been extremely generous with the Pentagon by submitting to the House, in six of these eight years, defense authorizations above the administration's requests. This seems especially high when one considers that government agencies, because they often assume they will be cut, have a tendency to pad and increase their budgetary requests.¹ The Department of Defense is in the unique position of submitting its requests and feeling reasonably certain that it will achieve all its objectives. Under these circumstances the military officials responsible for budgetary matters would have to be inhuman not to request every item they thought they could get. This situation is clearly structured for a great deal of overspending.

The committee increases ranged between \$13,200,000 in 1965 to \$911,200,000 in 1966. During these eight years authorization for procurement was increased by \$1,489,372,000 and if the 1968 decreases are excluded the figure was \$2,098,972,000. In terms of research the committee increase totalled \$165,171,000.

The two decreases in the budget occurred in 1964 and 1968. The large reduction in 1966, as previously mentioned, resulted from Congressional and constituency pressure to reduce military spending. The fact that the cuts were approximately 3-1/3% of the entire authorization and concerned items which were deemed untested or marginally important by the services reemphasizes the committee's pro-military orientation.

¹Aaron Wildavsky, pp. 86-93, 102-126.

^a
TABLE 7.2.--The difference between Armed Services and Pentagon recommendations for research and procurement authorizations in dollar amounts for 1961-1968

	House Armed Services	Department of Defense	Difference
1961			
Procurement	\$12,368,000,000	\$11,974,800,000	+\$393,200,000
1962			
Procurement	13,065,772,000	12,481,100,000	+ 584,672,000
1963			
Procurement	12,363,500,000	12,299,500,000	+ 64,000,000
Research	3,492,891,000	3,129,191,000	+ 363,700,000
Total			+ 427,700,000
1964			
Procurement	10,613,300,000	10,613,300,000	-
Research	6,350,320,000	6,642,000,000	- 291,680,000
Total			- 291,680,000
1965			
Procurement	8,858,900,000	8,701,400,000	+ 157,500,000
Research	6,444,500,000	6,558,800,000	- 114,300,000
Total			+ 43,200,000
1966			
Procurement	10,579,500,000	10,041,500,000	+ 538,000,000
Research	7,278,559,000	6,905,359,000	+ 373,200,000
Total			+ 911,200,000
1967			
Procurement	14,080,500,000	13,785,000,000	+ 294,700,000
Research	7,373,900,000	7,300,000,000	+ 73,900,000
Total			+ 368,600,000
1968			
Procurement	13,761,013,000	14,369,613,000	- 608,600,000
Research	7,875,951,000	8,015,439,000	- 139,488,000
Total			- 748,088,000

^a The data is based on the information listed in U.S., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vols. 17-24, 1961-1968.

It was generally felt by Congressmen both on and off the committee that Armed Services would and should play the role of

protector and promoter of the Department of Defense. They felt it might be harmful for the moral and readiness of the military if this was not so. It is natural, according to these members, for a committee to promote the interests of the government agency with which they are involved.¹ These members felt the main cause of defense overspending was the House and Senate which permitted their defense authorizations and appropriations recommended by their committees to stand.²

The Senate Armed Services Committee, as ___ noted earlier, sees defense authorization from a slightly different perspective. Thus, the final defense research and procurement authorization must be resolved in conference committee. TABLE 7.3 compares the Department of Defense's requests to what the Congress agrees to after the conferees meet. The final figures, although reduced from the Armed Services recommendations, are still higher than the Department of Defense's requests. In 1961, 1962, 1965, 1966, and 1967 the conference committee settled on a bill higher than the administration's requests. In 1963, 1964, and 1966 the Congress passed defense authorizations below the administration's recommendations.³ Over the last eight years the Congress has increased weapon procurement by \$518,640,000 and increased research by \$72,110,000. The data indicate that in the final analysis the Pentagon is going to get almost its entire program approved with a few subtractions and additions.

¹ For a discussion of the role which the House and Senate Appropriations Committees play in implementing the Armed Services' authorization recommendations, see the next section.

² Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

³ See Chapter 6 for an in-depth discussion of this point.

^a
TABLE 7.3.--The difference between the final conference figures and Department of Defense requests in dollar amounts for 1961 - 1968

Year	Conference	Department of Defense	Difference
1961			
Procurement	\$12,571,000,000	\$11,974,800,000	+\$596,200,000
1962			
Procurement	12,969,300,000	12,481,100,000	+ 488,200,000
1963			
Procurement	11,915,200,000	12,299,500,000	- 384,300,000
Research	3,399,091,000	3,129,191,000	+ 269,900,000
Total	15,314,291,000	15,428,691,000	- 114,400,000
1964			
Procurement	10,339,940,000	10,613,300,000	- 273,360,000
Research	6,636,680,000	6,642,000,000	- 5,320,000
Total	16,976,620,000	17,255,300,000	- 278,680,000
1965			
Procurement	8,958,300,000	8,701,400,000	+ 256,900,000
Research	6,444,500,000	6,558,800,000	- 144,300,000
Total	15,402,800,000	15,260,200,000	+ 142,600,000
1966			
Procurement	10,437,500,000	10,041,500,000	+ 386,000,000
Research	7,043,259,000	6,905,359,000	+ 127,900,000
Total	17,480,759,000	16,946,859,000	+ 533,900,000
1967			
Procurement	13,862,400,000	13,785,800,000	+ 76,600,000
Research	7,305,632,000	7,300,000,000	+ 5,632,000
Total	21,168,032,000	21,085,800,000	+ 82,232,000
1968			
Procurement	13,832,013,000	14,369,613,000	- 537,600,000
Research	7,793,737,000	6,015,439,000	- 221,702,000
Total	21,625,750,000	22,385,052,000	- 759,302,000

^aCongressional Quarterly Almanac, Volumes 17-24, 1961-1968.

The House and Senate Appropriations
Committees and Military Spending

In the United States Congress two other committees are deeply involved in defense legislation. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees have subcommittees which also evaluate defense programs. After Pentagon requests are authorized these committees are empowered to make recommendations for spending levels. According to the Armed Service members these two committees are composed of individuals who share the same basic attitudes towards Defense Department programs. One former Armed Service member said,

In the Congress you can authorize anything but you can't get anywhere without appropriations. The Appropriations Committee digs deeper and harder but once again it's a like minded group. In fact the Appropriations Committee is even a bigger disgrace, it only spent one month on the whole military appropriation. As is the case on Armed Services the committee is dominated by the South, look who's in charge, Mahon. Nobody is willing to take a chance.

A Democrat on the committee, in answer to questions about who was more important in determining policy, Armed Services or the Military Appropriations subcommittee, said,

It doesn't work that way. The two groups are so close on issues that the problem never arises. Mahon and Rivers are exactly the same type, it's unlikely that a real fight could come about. It's hand-in-glove type of relationships, the same types of memberships and outlooks.

Finally, a high ranking staff official, in answer to a question concerning differences between the two groups, alluded to their similarities. He said,

Has to be opposition. The key to a fair bill. By the time the bill is passed pretty well massaged with all types being involved. In all my years never total agreement with military appropriations. It's a good thing, more honest program. They never appropriate what we set up in procurement. It's a constant battle.

In Richard Fenno's massive study of the appropriations pro-

cess, he does not discuss military appropriations. It is assumed, based on his general conclusions about funding, that the House and Senate Appropriations conferees will give less money for defense than their Armed Service counterparts. TABLE 7.4 compares (wherever data are available) the amounts of money which were authorized and appropriated for the same defense programs between fiscal 1963 and through 1969. The data indicate that in each year, based on the recommendations of its Appropriation Committees, the Congress appropriated less money for defense than it authorized. With the exception of 1964 when the difference between the two figures was \$949,601,000, in most years the legislature appropriated 20-250 million dollars less than it had originally authorized. Since the House and Senate Armed Services Committees recommended authorizations of between 15 and 20 million annually, the reductions in appropriations range from $\frac{1}{2}\%$ to 1%. This finding tends to indicate that what Fenno discovered about domestic appropriations may not be valid in the area of defense. TABLE 7.5 lists the Department of Defense's requests for total military appropriations (the House and Senate Armed Services Committees only handle 30%-35% of the military budget yearly) from 1961-1968 and the changes which the House Appropriations, Senate Appropriations, and Conference Committee made in their recommendations. The data indicate that with the exception of 1968 when massive cuts were made, the two committees have not appreciably affected Department of Defense recommendations. The large reductions in 1963 and 1964 were cancelled by increases for the Vietnam war in 1966 and 1967. The data confirms the hypothesis that in military spending the Pentagon, until at least 1967, got what it wanted.

TABLE 7.4.--The amount of funds authorized and appropriated for the same defense programs from fiscal 1963-1969

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Authorized						
Procurement	\$12,969,300m ^a	\$11,915,200m	\$10,613,300m	\$12,872,100m	N.A.	N.A.
Research	N.A. ^b	3,399,091m	6,363,320m	6,596,150m	\$7,178,259m	\$7,305,632m
<u>Total</u>		15,314,291m	16,976,620m	19,468,250m		
Appropriated						
Procurement	12,770,508m	11,411,099m	10,398,871m	12,724,400m	N.A.	N.A.
Research	N.A.	2,953,591m	6,323,520m	6,721,150m	7,093,459m	7,108,600m
<u>Total</u>		14,364,690m	16,722,391m	19,445,550m		
Difference						
Procurement	+ 198,792m	+ 504,101m	+ 214,429m	+ 147,700m	N.A.	N.A.
Research	N.A.	+ 445,500m	+ 39,800m	- 125,000m	+ 84,800m	+ 197,032m
<u>Total</u>	+ 198,792m	+ 949,601m	+ 254,229m	+ 22,700m	+ 84,800m	+ 197,032m
1969						
Authorized						
Procurement	N.A.					
Research	\$7,793,700m					
Appropriated						
Procurement	N.A.					
Research	7,551,328m					
Difference						
Procurement	N.A.					
Research	+ 242,372m					
<u>Total</u>	+ 242,372m					

^am stands for 000

^bN.A. stands for not available

TABLE 7.5.--Department of Defense recommendations for Military Appropriations and the increases or decreases that the House Appropriations, Senate Appropriations, and Appropriations Conferees made in the program from 1961-1968 in dollar amounts

	Difference between Dept. of Def. and House Appropriations	Difference between Dept. of Def. and Senate Appropriations	Difference between Dept. of Def. and Conference Committee
1961	- \$ 6,240,000	+ \$ 630,947,000	+ \$ 445,211,000
1962	- 67,509,000	+ 522,221,000	+ 229,247,000
1963	- 1,922,028,000	- 1,642,830,000	- 1,794,227,000
1964	- 711,733,000	- 696,599,000	- 718,949,000
1965	- 60,600,000	- 71,781,000	- 61,681,000
1966	+ 946,692,000	+ 525,519,000	+ 403,119,000
1967	+ 1,288,800,000	+ 1,150,020,000	+ 930,220,000
1968	- 4,834,300,000	- 5,187,107,000	- 5,204,172,000
Total Decreases	- 7,602,410,000	- 7,598,317,000	- 7,719,029,000
Total Increases	+ 2,235,492,000	+ 2,828,707,000	+ 2,007,797,000
Total Differences	- 5,366,918,000	- 4,769,610,000	- 5,711,232,000

McNamara and the Committee

One of the major sources of tension between the Armed Services Committee and the executive branch was Robert McNamara. It has been generally acknowledged by both his friends and foes that Robert McNamara was a powerful and influential Secretary of Defense. Since the inception of the office, in 1947, no previous occupant has had such total control over the military decision-making process.¹

¹ Jack Raymond, "Mr. McNamara Remodels the Pentagon," The Reporter, Vol. 26, No. 2 (January 18, 1962), 31. Tom Wicker, "The Awesome Twosome," New York Times, January 30, 1966, p.8#. Under the National Security Act of 1947 the Secretary of Defense is the President's chief advisor on national security matters. Naturally, in terms of purely military matters the Secretary is advised and influenced by the

During his tenure, tremendous innovations in Pentagon organization and weapon procurement policy, were initiated. McNamara's major innovations were applying business techniques to military problems. He used cost effectiveness and systems analysis to evaluate the utility of present and future weapons.

The services were called upon to estimate not only the initial years cost of a weapon system but their maintenance costs over five years. In addition the weapons were judged functionally. Strategic weapons are rated with the strategic weapons and tactical weapons with other tactical weapons, regardless of service.¹

In order to successfully apply his new concepts McNamara, with the full support of President Kennedy, brought to Washington a staff of managerial experts who were nicknamed the "Whiz Kids."² These "Whiz Kids," who had very limited military experience, challenged the basic tenets of Pentagon procurement practices and strategies.³

At first McNamara was favorably received by the committee. Carl Vinson stated at a 1962 committee hearing.

I want to say this. I say it from the very bottom of my heart. I have been here dealing with these problems since 1919. I want to state that this is the most comprehensive, most factual statement that has ever been my privilege to have an opportunity to receive from any of the Departments of government. There is more information in here than any committee in Congress has ever received along the lines that it is dealing with. It is so full of information all one has to do is just study it. You dealt with both sides of the problem. When you reach a decision, you set out the reasons why you reached that decision. You point out why it is probable that it could have been done the other

Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, in the last analysis he can render to the President any judgment which he thinks is appropriate. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 433.

¹ Jack Raymond, The Reporter, Vol. 26 (January 18, 1962), 32.

² Joseph Kraft, "McNamara and his Enemies," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 233, No. 1335 (August 1961), 42.

³ See William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) and Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense

way, but the other facts were superior and therefore you followed the method you did. It is a magnificent statement.¹

However, during McNamara's second year in office his methods and decisions created opposition. His desire to centralize decision-making in his own hands and rely on scientific approaches to problem solving were not in themselves subject to criticism. What was criticized was their effect on the professional military elite. The overwhelming majority of the committee opposed McNamara's treatment of the brass. McNamara's policies and innovations restructured the role and policy making function of the professional military elites. On every level, from freedom of expression to weapon procurement and strategy, McNamara made it known that he, not the military, was master of the Pentagon.

Under the Eisenhower Presidency military men were permitted to make speeches which were extremely partisan in nature; the topics discussed by some officers pertained to internal and external communism, the cold war, education, and other political and controversial topics.² Secretary McNamara a few weeks after taking office re-emphasized civilian supremacy; in a letter to all departments McNamara stated that once a policy had been determined by members of the administration, no civilian or military official will publicly disagree with it.³ On October 16, 1961 the Secretary established guidelines which officers must follow if they wished to make speeches. He forbid both military and

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965) for a thorough treatment of McNamara's innovations and policies.

¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9751, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., January 24-February 28, 1962, in William W. Kaufmann, pp. 205-206.

²Fred J. Cook, The Welfare State (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962), pp. 263-265, and Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 181.

³New York Times, June 18, 1961, p. 56.

civilian defense officials from expressing anti-administration views at public meetings. Military men could not speak at meetings unless their topics concerned their departments, were non-partisan in nature, and were in accord with existing administration policy.¹

The Secretary, besides limiting the speeches of military officers, attempted to restrict their contact with non-Pentagon officials. He issued an order which forbid the brass from accepting lunches from former associates or other individuals who were involved with defense industries.² He also restricted the informal liaison between the military and the Congress. According to the members of Armed Services military men were encouraged to avoid contact with the committee and to withhold committee hearings information about their disputes with the civilian defense elites.³

Most important in terms of the relationship between the committee and the Secretary of Defense was McNamara's decision to overrule all or some of his military advisors in making national security decisions. He was the only Secretary of Defense since the creation of the

¹The result of McNamara's decisions provoked the Senate Armed Services Committee to investigate charges of muzzling the military. The studies began on January 23, 1962 and were called to investigate whether or not muzzling or gagging was being practiced. New York Times, January 14, 1962, p. 4E. See U.S., Senate, Subcommittee on the Committee of Armed Services, Hearings on Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962. On October 25, 1962 the committee issued its findings. They reported that the charge of muzzling was completely without foundation. U.S., Senate, Subcommittee on the Committee of Armed Services, Report on Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962.

²Jack Raymond, "Brilliant Administrator or Human I.B.M. Machine?" New York Times, April 11, 1965, p. 30#.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

office in 1947 to consistently overrule either service secretaries or the entire Joint Chiefs on military issues and make his views prevail with the President. Furthermore, McNamara was not above replacing members of the Joint Chiefs, when their terms expired, with military officials who were more favorably disposed to his policies. For these reasons he was instrumental in having General Taylor appointed as Chief of Staff and shorteninig¹ Curtis Lemay's tenure as Army Chief of Staff.

Throughout his tenure the committee was divided usually along party lines, into pro- and anti-McNamara factions. The Secretary's style of leadership and personality was one of the few issues which disturbed the committee's norm of nonpartisanship. Most of the Republicans and Southern Democrats were intensely opposed to McNamara and his policies whereas some of the Northern and Western Democrats vigorously supported him. During this writer's interview, the question which generated the greatest controversy and emotional outpouring concerned the former Secretary of Defense.

McNamara's supporters appreciated his outstanding mind and innovations. They were particularly impressed with the fact that he was the first Secretary of Defense in history to fully control the Department of Defense. McNamara's major weakness, which was mentioned by both his committee friends and enemies, was his inability to admit his own errors or limitations. A committee supporter said,

I have met a lot of witnesses as a judge. So that I know I'm not kidding myself when I say that McNamara was just incredible. However, his arrogance used to annoy the committee. If he would have called the boys up once in a while and solicited their opinions he would have had them eating out of his hand. He just couldn't. One time Pike had him nailed to the wall, he just wouldn't give in . . .

¹Edward Kolodziej, pp. 356-357.

That arrogance hurt him.¹

McNamara's detractors were vitriolic in their feelings. McNamara was accused (one member was convinced that he could be successfully tried for treason) of three major errors.

First, he was criticized for ignoring or ridiculing the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A good example is Porter Hardy's comment to McNamara at the 1963 hearings:

. . . but the extent to which the Joint Chiefs actively participate or play a major part in decision-making with respect to military decisions is a matter that . . . concerns me, because if you, as a layman, are making military decisions counter to the decisions or recommendations of the Joint Chiefs it scares me just a little bit.²

This charge was forcefully reiterated in the 1966 committee report. The committee stated that the Department of Defense was being guided by ". . . a decision maker who as it has been said knows the price of everything and the value of nothing."³ The report went on to state:

Those who know of the instances where sound military recommendations have been overruled by the Secretary of Defense and the very much larger number of the public who, having few facts but an abiding distrust that this is common practice, quite understandably ask the question whether we might not be better nonled by a mediocrity than be absolutely dominated by a Caesar.⁴

Finally, the comments of one anti-McNamara Eastern Republican typify the attitude of many,

¹U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440, 88th Cong., 1st sess., January 30-February 25, 1963, pp. 360-401. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 13456, pp. 7370-7375 for examples of the committee and McNamara's inability to interact cordially.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440, 1963, p. 360.

³U.S., Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Report Authorizing Defense Procurement and Research and Development and Military Pay No. 1536, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., May 16, 1966, p. 9.

⁴Ibid., p. 14.

McNamara just about destroyed the military. He wouldn't allow anyone but McNamara to run the show, I've been told that the military had as much to do with the running of the show as you do . . . The military now tells me that they are making decisions again, they are the ones to make the mistake, not like in the past when it was McNamara rather than military mistakes.

Second, these members believed that McNamara was interfering with the right of the Congress to know about Pentagon decision making. He was accused of clamping down on the informal meetings between the committee members and the brass and reprimanding military officials for their honesty at Congressional committee hearings. As one junior Southern Democrat said,

I didn't like the way he treated the JCS. They would answer questions and he would jump in saying let me finish that. He treated them like little school children. I was dismayed at the way in which he stifled the leaders. It was terrible, he couldn't listen to anyone else. I became very tired of it. He was always infringing on our rights and duties by cutting off valuable information which the brass could give us. It was a real blow to us and I and other members resented this infringement.

This attitude was echoed by Congressman Hebert in a heated exchange with the Secretary of Defense at a 1965 hearing.

. . . but never in my life, in the twenty-five years I have been in this Congress, and in all the time I have been on the committee, have I been so frightened about morale in the Department of Defense and so disturbed about the difficulty in getting complete information unless we, or I, know a definite very emphatic question to ask the witness. Further, I know this to be a fact, that after some witnesses have appeared here, and have answered these questions, on a personal basis, when asked to make personnel observations, when they got back to the Pentagon they were severely reprimanded.¹

McNamara was accused of being discourteous to military men at committee hearings. He supposedly cut off witnesses while they were speaking in order to answer the question himself.² A very high-ranking Democrat

¹U.S., Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 281.

²Secretary McNamara did interrupt military spokesmen to clarify certain points or elaborate on their comments. See U.S., House, Com-

said:

I told him one day at committee hearings, after he had cut one of the generals off, that Mr. Secretary, 'one day a four star general is going to come into your office and you're going to mistake him for a Western Union boy and yell at him to get out because you have no message.' We all hated him at the end.

The greatest slur on McNamara's record was his total insensitivity to the needs of the professional military. According to these critics he was the most dangerous threat to the morale of the Armed Services in the entire history of the nation.¹ Despite the fact that under McNamara the services received much larger human and material resources than under the Eisenhower administration, the majority of Armed Service members felt he had hurt the brass.² A conservative Eastern Republican stated,

McNamara was the most demoralizing influence on the service in the history of the nation. He didn't know or care for people. If you want people to sacrifice you have to give them a reason to sacrifice. He never did. So uppity, he would never admit he was wrong. He kept giving you statistics . . . I think if he had been an officer, led men, he would have had a better idea of how to operate.

An ex-member of the committee concurred,

In my opinion McNamara did more harm to the United States than any other man in our history. He degraded and, along with the pacifists like Cohelan, attempted to belittle men like Burke, Lemay, Dexter, and others. He was out to build himself up, his ego got in the way. He was nothing but an accountant, he never did anything in the war, never even fired a water pistol, but he was going to reform

mittee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., January and February 1964, p. 6934.

¹Secretary McNamara was publicly castigated on the House floor by the Minority Whip Leslie Arends and Ed. Hebert (D, La.) for not listening to the professional military's views and destroying the Pentagon's morale. U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 1963, Vol. 109, part 3, pp. 4009, 4067.

²Edward Kolodziej, p. 420. See the increase in defense budgets, pay raises, and housing benefits which the military acquired under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations as compared to those between 1952-1960. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vols. 10-26,

the Armed Forces. He lied to us and the President. He brought in scientists to do the job of military men. Got Dr. Brown in, who knew nothing about weapons and development. He used to go to my office and I tried to tell him to get McNamara off the military. Not to hurt the morale of the military, not to rip them down. These men have integrity, trained at the Point . . .

The committee was opposed to McNamara's managerial innovations. They felt that issues which allegedly required human insights were being decided by computers and cost effectiveness.¹ This attitude was expressed by Congressman Wilson to the Secretary of Defense at a 1963 committee meeting.

. . . and I'm just a little bit disturbed - while I'm not against progress, I like computers and Univacs, and so forth, but I don't think you can crank all the basic information into a Univac or a computer that will get you the right answer. Sometimes it takes a little bit of flying by the seat of your pants. I'll have to take the word of Mr. Vinson who has been sitting here for 40 years listening to a lot of experts, and listening to the words of a young expert that may know a lot about different things but doesn't have the broad experience that is necessary.²

The same idea was expressed by Chairman Rivers to Admiral Rickover in 1966 when he was opposing McNamara's decision to proceed slowly with the development of a nuclear navy.

Well, now, cost effectiveness which is our own creation in this century, and option, which is a fabrication of the Department of Defense, will shoot down no enemy, sink no ships, down no planes, but it will down and destroy the security of America. It could easily do this.³ And the computer can well be our Achilles' heel in our defense.

(1952-1968). Committee on Armed Services, House Report No. 522 (1969), p. 7.

¹Hanson Baldwin, who was the New York Times' military expert for many years and confidante to numerous military elites, claimed that McNamara's procedures had caused delay in weapon development, increased the Pentagon staff and the size of the bureaucracy. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow Down in the Pentagon," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 (January 1965), 262-280.

²House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440, 1963, p. 386.

³House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Pos-

Finally, a number of members were incensed that the mistakes of McNamara were blamed on the military. They claimed that the mass media were criticizing the brass for enormous cost overruns when it was McNamara's concepts of systems analysis and cost efficiency that caused the waste. The comments of one subcommittee chairman are typical,

McNamara was absolutely brilliant. But he ran the concept of cost efficiency into the ground. You read in the papers about these cost overruns. Well he is the one who produced this mess. He is the one who ran the department for the last eight years. Why doesn't he get the blame? People say the military but what they really mean is McNamara.

Everyone on the present committee agrees that conflict between the Secretary of Defense and the committee diminished markedly with the resignation of McNamara. Clark Clifford, because he served only one year, had to rely more heavily on the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than his predecessor. For this reason he was praised at House hearings and on the floor.¹ However, once his views on Vietnam were known the anti-McNamara section of the committee became disenchanted with him.² The present Secretary, Mr. Laird, a former Congressman, has established very cordial relations with the group. They are especially pleased that the Secretary has permitted the military to speak frankly with them.³

The entire relationship between the committee and the Secretary of Defense indicates the members' allegiance to the professional brass. When, as in the case of Mr. McNamara, he overruled their recommendations

ture and H.R. 13456, 1966, p. 8152.

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 1968, Vol. 114, part 16, pp. 20735, 20720.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

³Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

and tried to restrict their post World War II prerogatives, then the committee actively opposed him. The professional military in policy discussions with the Secretary of Defense and other civilian heads has a very strong ally in the House Armed Services Committee.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate how the Armed Services Committee reacted to the administration's legislative requests. A number of conclusions emerged from the data. First, the committee in word and deed believes that the legislative branch has a significant role in national security policy. The members did not perceive themselves as the rubber stamp for the President. Throughout these eight years they made numerous changes in the administration's defense authorization requests. Some of their recommendations, like the development of a nuclear navy and continued reliance on a manned bomber, had enormous consequences for the United States' defensive position. Although the committee was unable to deter the administration's policies on the bomber controversy, it was influential in developing nuclear-powered ships and ABM missiles. It is true that Congress and the committee can't play the dominant role in developing defense requirements. However, the committee in terms of individual weapons and research can have some impact upon events.

The second major conclusion regarding Armed Services and defense policy is the committee's support of the professional military elite. The committee promotes the wants and goals of the service chiefs. The members invariably recommend changes in the Pentagon's defense requests on the basis of service secretaries' testimony. In six of the last

eight years the committee has recommended spending levels above those submitted. In the three major policy disputes between the service chiefs and the executive the committee sided with the former. They were willing to trust the judgment of those trained in the art of war rather than those skilled in managerial techniques.

Finally, the committee has opposed any move by the President or Secretary of Defense to downgrade the power, accomplishments or morale of the military elites. Throughout the 1960's committee members at hearings, on the floor of the House, and in the mass media criticized McNamara for his treatment of the brass.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

By the end of the 1960's national security had become a controversial topic. During the last eight years the United States doubled its defense budgets, developed highly sophisticated weapons, and became involved in an Asian land war. When President Johnson finished his term of office the Department of Defense and the so-called "military-industrial complex," were criticized for wastefulness and inefficiency. For the first time since World War II the military as a group was under attack.

Throughout these years the Congress has attempted to influence the creation and direction of defense policy. As is the case in foreign affairs, the President dominates the defense field. The nuclear age, the communist threat, the technical and secret nature of weapons, the need for research and long lead time complicates the legislature's ability to participate. In order to play a role the Congress has relied upon the four committees that supervise the Department of Defense. Without committees the Congress could do little more than act as a rubber stamp for administration requests; only committees through their smaller size and restricted legislative responsibilities can develop experts capable of participating in the defense debate. These committees through the use of hearings and their part in passing a legislative program can study and scrutinize policy decisions and possibly affect

them.

The major purpose of this dissertation is to understand how one committee of Congress participated in defense policy. What part did the House Armed Services Committee play in passing and altering the administration's defense research and procurement authorizations? It was concluded that Armed Services is a committee that is highly supportive of the executive agency for which it is responsible. It is favorably disposed towards and willing to support the goals and aspirations of the Department of Defense. For this reason, the overwhelming majority of the members, rarely totalling less than thirty-five out of forty, endorse changes in the administration's defense requests which either increase the Department of Defense's authorizations or make reductions which protect the services from more serious House cuts. The committee members perceive themselves as the protectors of the nation's defenders. In word and deed, individual members try to preserve and enhance the military's reputation. Furthermore, in any major dispute between the military and civilian Pentagon elites the committee sides with the career officers.

This conclusion was based upon the data which were found in analyzing six topics relevant to the committee and national security policy. Each section raised many questions.

1. Membership - What is there about the committee's legislative load and perception by the public that interests certain types of representatives? Why has the committee attracted individuals with very special districts and backgrounds?

2. Recruitment - What was the procedure for recruiting members onto the Committee? Did the operation of recruitment favor any

group or section of the country? What impact did the recruitment have on policy?

3. Committee Orientation - What effect do the committee's norms have upon its legislation? How important is the staff?

4. The Individual Member - What part does the average member play in reshaping the administration's legislative requests? Which members of the committee have power? Why is the chairman the most powerful member of the committee?

5. The Committee and the Congress - How does the committee guide legislation through the Congress? Does the membership act as "broker" for the military's objectives? What is the committee's relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee?

6. The Committee and the Executive - What type of changes did the committee make in the administration's legislative requests? What were the reasons behind the changes?

The answers to these questions will indicate how the conclusions about the committee were arrived at, how these six variables produced a committee which is oriented towards advancing the interests of the Department of Defense and protecting the professional military elites.

The House Armed Services Committee is composed of individuals who are predisposed towards the Pentagon's viewpoint. The members, through either their backgrounds, ideologies, or district considerations, are likely to support the committee's overall "pro-military" goals. A high percentage of the Armed Service members were full grade officers, war heroes, or hold positions in the reserves. In 1968 23% of the committee had been full officers, 15% had been war heroes, and 28% were still affiliated with the reserves. Although one individual

such as Congressman Bray might be placed in all these categories, generally this was not the case. Usually, members who were war heroes served as privates or junior officers and did not join the reserves. In contrast, full officers were rarely decorated, although they were likely to join the reserves at the completion of their active duty. Naturally, a military oriented background does not ipso facto make an individual a pro-military supporter. However, it is likely to predispose an individual to sympathetically listen to the problems of the military. In the case of members who were full grade officers and members of the reserves they are intimately aware of how much the military sometimes needs to properly fulfill its mission.

Congressmen are also attracted to Armed Services because of the economic impact of the Department of Defense. More than one half the committee members represent districts that are affected by Pentagon spending and procurement practices. In 1963, the last year for which such data are available, sixteen of the members were elected from districts that contained more than 5,000 troops or government employees. On the basis of the 1963 data, which are approximate, the present committee has twenty-three individuals, or 58%, of all members who represent such districts. Furthermore, Armed Services contains individuals who, although they have no military projects in their district, joined the committee to maintain the Department of Defense's investments in their state. The members agree that a seat on Armed Services offers them an opportunity to protect their district or state's vital interests. Most members admitted that they could not influence a clear cut Pentagon decision. However, a decision in which the Department of Defense has many choices could be influenced from their vantage point. This is

especially true if the member has considerable seniority or the support of the chairman. In any case, the committee attracts numerous members who, in trying to protect their districts, advance the cause of the military. Their desire not to cut installations or contracts is a goal which the military is unlikely to oppose.

A number of studies have linked extreme conservatism with "pro-military" positions. A Congressman with a high conservative coalition score would be predisposed to support Pentagon requests. The House Armed Services Committee, during the last seven years has had seventeen individuals out of sixty-two with scores high enough to be classified as ideologically "pro-military." They constitute a very large source of potential Defense Department support.

Of the sixty-two individuals who sat on Armed Services from 1961-1968, only seven, or approximately 11%, had no background, ideological viewpoint, or district which would predispose them to support the military. The remaining fifty-five congressmen, or 89%, of the committee had some strong tie to the Department of Defense.

Congressmen invariably seek to join committees that either interest them or benefit their constituents. As has been mentioned, Armed Services is made up of members who, either through backgrounds, ideology, or district considerations, are concerned and supportive of Pentagon decisions. The committee's recruitment patterns tend to perpetuate this situation. In placing members on Armed Services, the House leaders have relied mainly on regional and background considerations. An individual who had a distinguished military career is virtually assured of membership if he wishes to join. Both party leaders, in the great majority of cases, replaced a member who left the commit-

tee with another from the same region. In fact, the Democrats, in 58% of the cases, have filled an opening with an individual from the same state, although in the case of the Republicans it is only 33%. Over the years this has placed on Armed Services a disproportionate number of Congressmen from certain sections of the country. The Democratic side has been made up of a high percentage of Southerners, whereas the largest group of Republicans have come from the Eastern states.

The extent to which Southern Democrats have dominated the committee is truly astounding. When the Democrats have been the majority party, Southerners have controlled at least four of the six senior positions, always the chairmanship. What impact does this situation have on the committee's direction? It can be said that Southern Congressmen are likely to represent districts that are affected by Pentagon decisions and constituents who are favorably disposed towards a "pro-military" viewpoint. Furthermore, in evaluating the entire Armed Services Committee Southern Democrats scored highest on the "pro-military" scores published by the Movement for a New Congress. Thus, it is not surprising that individuals like Vinson, Rivers, Hebert, Bennett, Lennon, and Fisher have been in the forefront of support for the goals and aspirations of the Department of Defense.

The recruitment practices overrepresent Southern Democrats and underrepresent Democrats from major urban areas. Throughout the committee's history members from cities like New York, Chicago, Boston, etc. have been extremely few in number. It is conceivable that many Congressmen from these cities would perceive defense matters from a different perspective than the average House Armed Services Committee member. The overwhelming majority of these men represent districts

that are unaffected by defense spending and some of them have an orientation that questions the rationale for large defense budgets. However, the evidence is inconclusive whether or not such Congressman are blackballed from joining. In essence the same region rule, same state rule, and same district rule all tend to perpetuate previous trends. Nevertheless, even if they could, probably not many big city Congressmen would join Armed Services. They are interested in committees like Labor and Education and Judiciary which have a direct impact on their districts, as opposed to Armed Services which has only a limited value for their constituents. Furthermore, big city Congressmen with a questioning view of the military are discouraged from joining because of the seeming impossibility of affecting policy. According to committee and noncommittee members, because of the House Armed Service Committee's overwhelming support of the brass, an individual with a different orientation who joined would be extremely unhappy. Only if large numbers of Congressmen with suspicions of the military seek membership can policy be affected. If the committee had more men like Nedzi and Whalen, then its orientation and perception of defensive needs would be considerably different. At the moment Congressmen from urban areas continue to seek out Foreign Affairs, Labor and Education, and Judiciary. Until there is a change in the committee membership, the present values and orientation will be perpetuated from term to term.

The most important norm affecting the operation of Armed Services is nonpartisanship. Traditionally, nonpartisanship has meant that issues are not debated or settled along party lines. On the House Armed Services Committee this concept is significantly expanded. Not only are factions based on party considered inappropriate, but individual

members are continually encouraged to join the majority and avoid dissension. The overwhelming majority take the position that defense issues are vastly different from those of a domestic nature. According to these men a poverty program, assistance for educational institutions, agricultural subsidies, etc. are policies which can be debated, changed, and incorrectly funded. Defense issues are not afforded such luxuries. Debate, controversy, and inadequately funded programs can gravely weaken the nation's security. For the good of the nation, even if members have disagreements, they are encouraged to avoid controversy and to support the program. The operation of the committee reaffirms these values. The committee has a non-political staff, uses numbered subcommittees without fixed jurisdiction, invariably meets in closed door hearings, has senior members who are remarkably in agreement over defense issues, and conducts its mark-ups with as little voting as possible. The strongest reinforcer of the committee's norms is the relationship between the chairman and ranking minority member. These two men work "hand-in-glove" or "so closely together you wouldn't know one from the other," to pass a legislative program. The two men alternate in the appointment of staff and place members of their own party on subcommittees. The chairman and ranking minority member have considerable negative power. Individuals who oppose the committee's orientation and direction are usually give unimportant subcommittees, passed over for committee junkets, and rendered limited assistance from the chairman-oriented staff.

The average Armed Services member plays only a minor role in the formulating of defense authorizations. The defense language is so difficult and the changes in weaponry so rapid that a member must devote

long hours over many years to be informed and actively participate. In fact, of those members interviewed, only the senior members, who have an interest in three or four areas of policy, felt they could constructively participate. Most of the junior members viewed their committee work as preparation for taking part in policy at some future date. Members mentioned that they were too busy with constituency problems to do any of their own research or investigation. They were dependent upon the committee staff for almost all of their information. For the majority of members, attending committee hearings is their total commitment to defensive affairs.

Power on the committee is situated in the hands of senior members and the staff. Senior members who have followed Department of Defense policies for many years are the most active participants at committee hearings. They often make suggestions and offer specific recommendations on the administrations' legislative requests. Furthermore, these individuals control the important subcommittees and are usually sent on critical fact-finding tours.

The staff has power because most of them have worked on Armed Forces matters full time for a number of years. The knowledge and expertise which these individuals have acquired can obviously be used not only to inform the members but to channel the committee's direction. The most influential staff official is the Chief Counsel John Blandford. Mr. Blandford, who has been with the committee since 1947 and is a Brigadier General in the Reserves, is considered by his friends and opponents to be a legislative genius. The Chief Counsel, who has very "hawkish" views about defense preparedness, has easy access to the chairman, and according to those members questioned about it has con-

siderable impact on Rivers' actions.

The most important member of the House Armed Services Committee is the chairman. Unlike other House committees, such as Government Operations, Post Office and Civil Service, and Labor and Education, the Armed Service chairman possesses enormous power. First, as chairman he has numerous prerogatives over the committee's operation. He assigns members to subcommittees, determines who goes on field trips, conducts hearings, calls witnesses, etc. Second, the Armed Service leader possesses an extensive knowledge of Pentagon plans and programs. The staff is hired for the committee but its loyalty is reserved for the chairman. They report directly to him and will only do work for other members so long as it does not jeopardize the chairman's position. Thus, Armed Services, which has a staff of ten men and a total staff including investigators of fifty individuals, enables the chairman to keep abreast of developments in both the Department of Defense and the Armed Services Committee.

Individuals who have become chairmen have elected to run the committee in different fashions. Mr. Vinson was an authoritarian leader who led Armed Services in an arbitrary fashion. He "squirrelled" information, altered subcommittee assignments, restricted questioning at committee hearings, and acted independently with Defense Department elites. In contrast, Mr. Rivers operates a decentralized committee sharing his power with the ranking minority member and senior officials from both sides of the aisle. He has relied on these individuals in order to control the committee.

Despite their different approaches to leadership, both men were powerful. Their power, however, as would be expected, was not

based on their operation of the committee, but rather their "pro-military" philosophy. The chairman of Armed Services has power because he takes positions and makes decisions that are supported by the overwhelming majority of the committee. Thirty-five of the committee's present membership of forty would undoubtedly take the same kinds of actions. The chairman gets what he wants because the average member is in total accord. This is the reason that committee dissenters are so discouraged about making fundamental changes in the committee's policy decisions. It is not Rivers or Vinson who has channeled the committee's direction, but rather the average member's pro-military outlook. If Rivers were replaced by an individual like Pike or Nedzi, it is doubtful that the committee's legislation would be greatly affected.

The committee's treatment of authorization recommendations closely and clearly demonstrates their pro-military orientation. The Secretary of Defense, in recommending certain spending levels, not only depends upon military advice, but is also influenced by the Bureau of the Budget and domestic considerations. The Armed Services Committee has a much narrower focus and is only concerned with military preparedness. As Carl Vinson and Mendel Rivers often mentioned, military officials are in the best position to evaluate the country's military needs. For this reason when the members draft legislation they usually recommend authorizations in excess of administration requests. Over the last seven years the committee has added 1,461,372,000 dollars onto defense procurement and 165,171,000 million on to defense research. Only in 1964 and 1968 were funds reduced. Many members claimed that the 1968 cuts reflected a desire by Rivers and the committee to appease public and Congressional sentiment against military spending and protect the

Department of Defense's recommendations from even worse treatment on the House floor.

The House Armed Services Committee is an extremely important asset for the Department of Defense. The committee plays the role of "broker" or advocate before the House for the military. The Armed Service members support the Pentagon's proposals and safely guide them through the House. Programs are justified in terms of the need for national security, the communist threat, the honor of the military, and the technical nature of the problem. These reasons have enabled the committee to be extremely successful. In the last seven years only those amendments that were approved by the House Armed Service leadership were adopted. Of those that were passed, most increased defense spending or approved programs like building ships in American rather than foreign ports, which were supported by the brass. Military elites would have greater difficulties in achieving their objectives without a committee like Armed Services. The committee as it is presently constituted enables the Pentagon to be reasonably assured of large defense budgets. In the House of Representatives a number of committees like Agriculture and Labor and Education act as lobbyist for particular executive agencies. However, no committee is as successful as Armed Services in achieving the goals of the executive agency which it sponsors.

The relationship between the House and Senate Armed Services Committee also works to the advantage of the Department of Defense. There is no ideological disagreement between them over what is in the best interests of the Pentagon. Naturally, the committees do disagree over particular weapons systems and the amounts of specific authoriza-

tions. However, the final conference reports indicate that the conferees resolve differences by "horse trading" those items which were missing in the original House and Senate bills. The result is that in 1961, 1962, 1965, 1966, and 1967 the Congress approved conference settlements which authorized more funds than the administration requested.

During these eight years, weapon procurement totalled \$518,640,000 above the Pentagon's program, and research was increased by \$72,110,000. Thus, during this period of time, the House Armed Services Committee helped the administration pass a program with few additions and subtractions. There were some disputes over particular weapons but in a program which authorized approximately twelve billion dollars in 1961 and twenty-two billion dollars in 1968 they had little effect on the overall defense budget.

The committee's part in defense authorizations is limited. The members are neither trained nor have the inclination to develop their own approach to defense. Armed Services work consists of evaluating the administration's program under the handicap of not being actually familiar or privy to information about how that policy was formulated. Under these conditions the members attempt to ascertain any major differences between the civilian and professional military elites. This is the reason the members oppose any further unification of the services. The more diversification in the Pentagon the greater the likelihood that the House Armed Services Committee will learn about policy disputes. Only when the committee can choose between alternatives are they able to affect the course of events. In these cases the committee can act as prodder or goader behind one of the policy positions.

The continuation of manned aircraft, the priority of developing

a nuclear navy, and the immediate installation of Nike-X missiles were issues over which some or all of the service chiefs disagreed with their civilian leaders. Concerning these three cases the Armed Services Committee supported the military chiefs or chiefs who had been overruled. The members had some success in influencing the development of nuclear ships and the installation of anti-ballistic missiles. The committee not only disagreed with McNamara over policy but also over his alleged treatment of the military brass. The membership, which is concerned with officer morale, was greatly upset by McNamara's policies. McNamara was personally attacked at Armed Service hearings and on the floor of the House for his reported negative treatment of military elites. The committee through the references to the brass were apparently speaking for officers who because of their positions were unable to comment.

Further Research

The present study has raised a number of questions which can only be answered by further research. This dissertation has concentrated on the part that one committee played in national security policy. It would be interesting to know precisely what impact the Senate Armed Services, Senate Appropriation and House Appropriation Committees have in this same area. It is assumed, based on the data uncovered by this dissertation, that these committees would more than likely be favorably disposed towards the Department of Defense and play a minimum role in formulating defense policy. These committees could be investigated separately or as part of some larger study of Congress and defense. The House Armed Services Committee is a body which uses certain opera-

ting procedures and follows particular norms to meet its legislative objectives. Whenever possible Armed Service operating procedures and norms were compared to other committees. Unfortunately, during the past fifteen years the only in depth studies for committees have been of the so-called "prestige" ones -- Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules. Political scientists have dealt only with limited aspects of the other sixteen, with the exception of the House Unamerican Activities Committee. It would greatly benefit the understanding of one phase of Congress if work were done on "semi-prestige" and "non-prestige" committees. The present findings on the operation and norms of Armed Services would become more meaningful and generalizable if other studies existed. The most important individual on Armed Services is the committee chairman. Carl Vinson and Mendel Rivers, although they had different styles of leadership, forcefully guarded the committee. Yet, it was found that their power was ultimately based on their objectives which were supported by an overwhelming majority of members. Once again political scientists have only superficially studied a position that they acknowledge as the most important in operating the legislature. Such research projects would be useful not only to illuminate the power and operation of Armed Service chairmen but for the workings of the legislative branch. This dissertation has emphasized one area of Congressional involvement in defense policy. Aside from the intrinsic value of studying how the House Armed Services Committee operates and affects Pentagon decisions, hopefully, it will serve a heuristic function in generating further research on understanding committees and defense policy.

Events After 1968

Since 1968 anti-military feelings have become widespread. The frustrating and seemingly endless war in Vietnam, the documentation of enormous cost overruns, and the desire by various sections of the country to fund domestic programs have put a squeeze on the Pentagon. Congressmen and Senators in large numbers have been publicly demanding defense cuts.¹

The reaction of the House Armed Services Committee to these events is to play its traditional part of support for the Department of Defense. It is true that the committee, for the first time in the decade, recommended considerable cuts totalling 615 million dollars in the executive requests. However, some members believe that the reductions were motivated by the political climate and the need to maintain the committee's reputation.² This becomes apparent when one compares the House Armed Services Committee's action to those of its Senate counterpart. The Senate Armed Services Committee, which handled the

¹Senator Proxmire, after carrying out numerous investigations of the military, believes that Department of Defense appropriations can be cut 10 billion dollars. William Proxmire, Report From Wasteland (New York: Praeger, 1970). The following are a partial list of magazine articles related to the subject of military waste which have appeared over the last two years: Hudson B. Drake, "Major D.O.D. Procurement at War with Reality," Harvard Business Review, January-February 1970, 119,141; "Defense Under Fire," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 67 (September 8, 1969), 30-32; Congressman Jonathan B. Bingham, "Can Military Spending Be Controlled," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48 (October 1969), 51-67; "Critics Fume at Military Budget," Business Week, February 15, 1969, 112#; "The Row Over U.S. Weapons," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 66 (June 30, 1969), 26-27; Juan Cameron, "The Case for Cutting Defense Spending," Fortune Magazine, Vol. 80 (August 1, 1969), 69-74.

²Reconstructed from Interview Responses.

bill first, reduced the administration's requests by \$1,904,160,000 and the Senate then further reduced this amount by \$1,974,774,000. Faced with this reality, if the committee did not make substantial cuts, then their legislation would be subject to crippling floor amendments.

The committee's report, which was issued to explain its legislative recommendations, through words and charts, justified post-1952 levels of defense spending. The document revealed that the percentage of the federal budget for defense was lower today than it had been for most of the last fifteen years. Furthermore, if the Vietnam war is removed the military budget is taking a decreasing portion of federal expenditures and of the Gross National Product.¹

The committee's enormous power was demonstrated by the manner in which its senior members steered the defense authorizations bill through the House. The Armed Service Committee asked for and was granted by the Rules Committee a rule which limited debate on the bill to only four hours. This meant that an authorization request of 21.3 billion dollars containing funds for ABM procurements could only be superficially discussed. The committee also disarmed its opponents by releasing its report only two days before the bill reached the House floor.² With the exception of four or five individuals the remaining Armed Service members actively supported the committee's bill. The House debate is full of comments by Armed Service members praising the committee's work, its many meetings, thoroughness, and the professional

¹U.S., House Armed Services Committee, Report No. 522, 1969, p. 7.

²U.S., House, Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October 1, 1969, Vol. 115, No. 159, daily edition, p. H. 8765.

military elites.¹

In terms of the defense debate the committee was successful in defeating any attempts to attach crippling amendments. Twenty-one amendments were offered and of those only the five which Rivers formally supported were accepted.² The two amendments which would have had the greatest impact on altering the Armed Services defense program were both defeated. One amendment would have prohibited the use of funds for the procurement of ABM missiles, whereas the other would have rescinded the House Armed Services Committee's recommendations of authorizing approximately a billion dollars above Department of Defense requests for naval additions. The ABM amendment after limited debate was defeated by teller, 105 to 219.³ The 40% increase in naval equipment was justified by Congressman Rivers and Bennett (D, Fla.) on the basis of the supposed obsolescence of the fleet and the challenge of the Russian Navy. The committee's position was upheld by an ayes/nayes vote of 92 to 132.⁴

Throughout the 1960's defense bills were usually passed by a near unanimous roll call vote with two or three nays. In 1969 the

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October 1, 1969, Vol. 115, no. 159, daily edition, pp. H. 8769, 8772, 8787, 9793.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October 2, 1969, Vol. 115, no. 160, daily edition, pp. H. 8847-8922, U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October 3, 1969, Vol. 115, no. 161, daily edition, pp. H. 8940-9016.

³U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 115, no. 160, October 2, 1969, daily edition, p. H. 8847.

⁴Ibid., p. 8892. For a complete and more accessible list of the amendments see Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 25 (1969), p. 286.

final vote was 311 to 44 to 1 present to 75 not voting. Of this group three members of the committee, Messrs. Nedzi, Pike, and Whalen, voted against the bill.¹

What impact will the anti-military feeling, which is prevalent throughout the country, have upon the committee? In terms of the Congress as a whole the committee will probably have to be somewhat less generous to military programs. However, the fact that the committee was able to pass its defense recommendations, which added funds to particular administration programs, indicates their continued power. One check on the House Armed Services Committee is the Senate's apparent desire to cut military spending. The enormous cuts that the Senate is likely to recommend probably will inhibit or eliminate many House Armed Service proposals. The committees cannot annually recommend legislation which is substantially higher in dollar authorizations than those of the Senate without risking its credibility.

Internally, the committee is likely to be racked by increasing dissension. At the present time Armed Services has five individuals who are actively opposed to the committee's orientation. They want to see larger cuts in defense spending and a harder look at defense programs. During 1968 these men became increasingly disillusioned with their ability to alter the committee's direction. In order to be better informed about policy and establish new defense priorities they began meeting as a group in April 1969. During these meetings they called in their own experts in order to obtain non-Pentagon viewpoints. As one member confided,

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October 3, 1969, Vol. 115, no. 161, daily edition, p. H. 9016.

What this committee needs is to ask good hard questions. With the present staff it's very hard to get good information. I shouldn't tell you this but by the time your paper is published it will be out anyway. The five of us hold informal meetings and go to outside advisors in order to find out what is going on.¹

At the present time the impact of the dissenters is limited. Although the group contains some of the most capable members of the committee, they are still only five out of forty. Thus, on issues that are resolved by a vote, they will be in the minority.

At the present time the committee attracts individuals with the traditional Armed Service orientation. In 1969, of the eight new members, six represented constituencies in the South whereas the other two (one from New Mexico and one from West Virginia) belong to the conservative wings of their party. Unless there is a change in the type of Congressmen who seek out Armed Services membership, the present trends of consensus and pro-military outlook will continue.

¹This information was confidentially reported to the writer in July 1969. In the September 2, 1969 issue of the committee report this state of affairs is publicly acknowledged. U.S., House, Armed Services Committee, Report No. 91-522, 91st Cong., 1st sess., September 26, 1969, p. 147.

APPENDIX A--Interviewing Congressional Elites

As previously mentioned, this writer consulted James Robinson's Congress and Foreign Policy, 1st edition (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1966), pp. 22-234, for suggestions on obtaining interviews with Congressmen. In fact, many of his methods proved extremely valuable in achieving my objectives.

Whenever I planned a trip to the Capitol I would write letters, at least two weeks in advance, to approximately fifteen members of the committee. I briefly informed these individuals about the purpose of my doctoral dissertation and the amount of time that I would be in Washington. Following Robinson's advice, I never directly asked for an interview, but mentioned that once I arrived in Washington, I would come to their office to see if a meeting could be arranged. Although no reply was requested, a number of Congressmen wrote me that I should call their office to arrange an interview. Three days before embarking on my trip I obtained appointments with these individuals through long distance telephone calls. I was extremely lucky that on my three trips to Washington an early Monday morning appointment was obtained. I noticed that Congressmen tend to be more generous with their time on what surprisingly was the least hectic time of the week.

Prior to my first Monday morning interview, I visited the Capitol offices of those members to whom I had written. I asked to see the appointments secretary, mentioned my letter, and expressed a desire to meet with the Congressman. Furthermore, a letter of introduction from Congressman Bingham, who at the time represented my district, was presented which explained the nature of the project and requested a few minutes of the Congressman's time. The letter from

Mr. Bingham often was very effective in enabling me to obtain interviews from appointments secretaries who had little or no idea what a dissertation was. Another technique which I employed, usually to save time, was to call up the offices of Armed Service members and request an interview. However, after my second trip to Washington I realized that I had much better results when I asked for an interview in person while presenting Congressman Bingham's letter.

Even if an interview was arranged, actually seeing the Congressman was still not guaranteed. It sometimes took three or four reconfirmations or cancellations before the interview was held. In some cases interviews which were scheduled for the May visit did not take place until July. In one instance over twenty telephone calls and three personal appearances failed to nail down the interview. As a rule, it seemed that the easier it was to obtain the interview, the more useful and productive the meeting proved to be.

Another technique which I used to obtain interviews was paging members off the House floor. One very long interview was held with a member whose staff claimed that the Congressman never granted such interviews. Although the meeting was over an hour long, the House hallway is far from ideal for creating a relaxed discussion atmosphere.

In terms of obtaining interviews, the most important aspects seem to be persistence and the ability to present as many character references as is possible. For example, this writer was flatly turned down for an interview by Chairman Rivers when one was requested by mail. Attempts to get one of his staff personnel to arrange a meeting also proved unsuccessful. Yet when this writer was able to enlist the assistance of one of Rivers' former colleagues and present Rivers personal

secretary with a letter from the chairman of the Political Science Department at CUNY a meeting was arranged.

Prior to taking my trips to Washington an elaborate check list of questions was designed. This document listed in Appendix B contains some 102 questions and attempts to uncover information and elicit answers relevant to the committee's operation and legislative output. The purpose of these questions was to familiarize myself with the type of questions which I would use in the interview. I very much wanted to avoid asking questions from a written set of notes. I felt, and still feel, that this type of interviewing produces the maximum amount of data. A written set of questions, in my estimation, could not be administered to a large enough sample to be meaningful and would inhibit spontaneity. Second, the great differences in the time allotted for interviews presented problems of trying to create a uniform questionnaire. For these reasons I conducted an open-ended, quasi-structured interview without taking notes.

In the interviews whenever I sensed that the member was losing interest I would ask him one or all of the following questions: if there was anything in his own experience that he thought I ought to know about the Armed Services Committee; how he felt about the Vietnam war. This method usually kept the interview going for another fifteen minutes. The average interview lasted forty minutes, although a number of them lasted anywhere from an hour and a half to only fifteen minutes.

Immediately following the interview, the meeting was written up. In order to remember as precisely as possible what had been discussed, the check list was employed. Whatever had been discussed was categorized in terms of the check list. Thus, if in responding to

how the staff operated, the Congressman also spoke about how the chairman ran the committee, his answer would be categorized under both questions. Hence, every response would be matched to at least one, and sometimes three, different questions. The average interview touched upon approximately twenty questions and typed out to two and one half single-space pages.

One of the most important steps which I took to properly record my interviews was to consult with Congressman Bingham's staff. On the first trip I made to Washington I had asked the personal secretary if I could use one of the chairs in the office to take notes. I was extremely fortunate in that the staff permitted me to use the empty desk, make telephone calls, arrange appointments, and when I was not in the office, messages were taken for me. This saved me a great deal of time, money, and effort. Without this privilege I would have had a great deal of trouble arranging and recording my meetings.

APPENDIX B--Check list^a utilized in interviewing current and former members of the House Armed Services Committee

Recruitment and Attractiveness

1. Why did you choose to join Armed Services? Anything in your background which made you interested?
2. Why did you stay if it wasn't your first choice?
3. Does the committee helping with constituency matters enable you to be more productive?
4. Is it important for your position in Congress that you stay?
5. What type of people are usually attracted to the committee?
6. What considerations do the Republican and Democratic leaders, involved with placing individuals on committee, take into account when appointing members to Armed Services?
7. What role does the chairman play in who gets on the committee?
8. Is the committee membership likely to reflect a particular viewpoint? To favor a particular service, such as the navy?
9. Some people claim that the committee is pro-military. Is this true?
10. Is the membership likely to be conservative? Why are there no doves on the committee?
11. Is Armed Services a prestige committee? What committees have greater prestige?

Personal Involvement

12. What are your main duties on the Armed Services Committee?
13. Are your talents being utilized?
14. What area of national security are you most interested in?
15. How do you go about researching a topic?
16. Does each member of the committee have a particular expertise?
17. How would you say the members of the committee got along?

^aQuestions underlined are those most likely to be asked in an average interview.

18. Do you meet members of the committee socially?
19. How many members of the committee are your friends? Are they likely to come from the same party and have as much seniority? Do they have similar backgrounds?
20. Is it good or bad for the committee that a number of members are still in the armed forces active reserves? Why?
21. Do you find that those members of the committee who haven't served in the armed forces take a different view of national security issues than those members who have? Are they likely to be more pro-military in orientation? Hawkish?
22. How often do you disagree with the committee's position?
23. What issues were they? How did you make your views known? File a report? Speak out on the floor?

Organizing for Decision Making

24. What in your opinion is the role of the Armed Services Committee?
25. What traits do you associate with the committee?
26. Any special problems in 1965 when 1/3 of the committee consisted of new members?
27. Why is the committee so nonpartisan?
28. How important are subcommittee chairmen? Can they initiate policy independent of the chairman?
29. What does the committee expect from its new members? (For freshmen - tell me about your first impression at the opening meeting of the committee? Mark-up? When generals appeared, etc.?).
30. What is the relationship between the chairman and ranking minority member? Is this different than other committees?
31. What does the committee expect from the staff?
32. Are they more loyal to the chairman than other members?
33. Is the work of the committee interesting or tedious?
34. Are there any special unofficial committee rules?
35. What differences are there in the atmosphere of an executive session as compared to a public hearing?
36. What do you see as the main functions of committee hearings?

37. Are there any differences between how the civilian and military witnesses are treated?
38. What procedure is followed in executive session and mark-up? Who is in charge?
39. When you come to a particularly difficult problem does any member of the committee stand out as being the one who most often comes up with a solution?
40. During the course of discussing legislation things can get rather tense from time to time. I know that this happens even on Armed Services. Does anyone stand out as the peacemaker in these situations?

Chairman Oriented Questions

41. What is the prestige of a chairman based upon?
42. Can the prestige of a chairman influence who will join his committee? Will a chairman with low prestige deter people from joining?
43. Carl Vinson acquired a reputation of being an outstanding chairman? How did he acquire his reputation?
44. What is the relationship between the chairman and the subcommittee chairmen?
45. How important is the chairman in guiding the hearings and influencing the mark-up session?
46. Is the chairman the driving force in creating a legislative program and committee direction?
47. Why are members reluctant to oppose the chairman's point of view?
48. How much access does the chairman have to the executive branch?
49. How much influence does he have on the formation of strategic policy? Placement of military bases? Weapon development and procurement?
50. Why are the committee members willing to grant such far reaching powers to the chairman?
51. Do you think that the chairman's power and policy decisions almost always reflect the views of a majority of his committee?
52. What is the role of the chairman on the floor of the House?
53. How important is the chairman in the selection of staff?

54. Did Mr. Vinson have more influence in the executive branch of government than his committee?
55. How did Mr. Vinson conduct himself in conference committee?
56. How much of Mr. Vinson's operation and method have carried over into the present committee?
57. How does Mr. Rivers use a group of senior members to set committee policy? Why does he do so?
58. Does Mr. Rivers have a broader view of the committee function than Mr. Vinson? Why?
59. How does Chairman Rivers run the committee? Does he run a loose or tight ship?
60. Is Rivers a bargainer, a compromiser, or consensus builder?
61. When Rivers issues a statement about national security policy, does he speak for himself or for the committee? Is the same true for Vietnam?
62. What type of relations does he have with the executive branch?
63. What are the informal powers of the armed services chairman?
64. Do you believe that the chairman could in any way help you get one of your bills through? a military installation? pet project?
65. Do you believe that the chairman could hinder you in obtaining passage of a bill, a pet project, a military installation?

The Congress and the Armed Services Committee

66. Do people seek you out for information on committee work?
67. Is this equally true for other committees or more so in your case?
68. Who is more important in military policy, Armed Services, or the Military Appropriations Subcommittee? Why?
69. Why is the committee so successful on the floor of the House?
70. What part does the leadership play in the program?
71. What role does Mr. Arends play in passing legislation?
72. What traits does the Congress associate with the committee?
73. Is there a difference between the Senate and House Armed Services committee?

74. Who usually prevails in conference?

The Armed Services Committee and the Executive Branch

75. Have you been in basic agreement with the United States national security policy over the past eight years?

76. What areas have you disagreed with?

77. How have you expressed your disagreement?

78. Some Congressmen have said that certain aspects of national security policy are outside their competency, thus they must approve whatever the executive wants? Would you agree?

79. Do you believe that the executive branch and the Pentagon furnishes you with all the information which you need to judge their programs? Why not?

80. How can you make the executive branch accountable to you? B-70?

81. How much faith do you have in the civilian sector of the Pentagon?

82. Was the committee satisfied with the way McNamara handled his job?

83. Do you think the Secretary of Defense considers the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff enough when he makes military and policy decisions?

84. Is the committee more likely to trust the military rather than the civilian sector of the Pentagon?

85. What is the military lobby like?

86. Is the military industrial complex a potential danger to the country? Why, or why not? What can be done?

87. Do you think that the military services could ever become a potential threat to the country? Why, or why not?

88. Do you think that the executive branch has handled the Vietnam conflict correctly?

89. Should the administration have placed the type of restrictions on the military that they did?

90. What should our policy have been?

91. What policy should be carried out towards the war dissenters in this country: flag burners, card burners, protesters? Is the executive doing enough? Why, or why not?

92. What do you believe should have been the proper course of action of our government to the Pueblo and spy plane incident with North Korea?
93. How do you feel about the A.B.M.? What is motivating the opposition?
94. How do you feel about overseas military bases and alliances? Should the country have more or less alliances and bases? Spain?
95. How often does the committee take the initiative in national security legislation?
96. Would the reorganization of the Pentagon be in one area?
97. Why has the committee been so successful in reserve policy?
98. Why have they been so successful in selective service policy?
99. What is their role in strategic issues?
100. Is the committee able to dictate the placement of military installations?
101. What role does the committee play in promotion and retirement benefits?
102. Is there anything concerning your experience on the committee that you think I ought to know about?

APPENDIX C--Check list utilized in interviewing staff personnel

Staff Oriented

1. How is the staff selected?
2. What is its job?
3. Is it nonpartisan?
4. Does each branch of the service have its own special staff man?
5. Does this develop a staff with a service loyalty?
6. What sort of relations do you have with the minority?
7. Is there a special staff assigned to the subcommittees?
8. Is the staff's greatest allegiance to its chairman?
9. How does the staff act when two groups are developing a different approach to an issue? How does the staff remain neutral?
10. What do you see as the main function of committee hearings?
11. Does the staff supply questions at hearings?
12. Schedule witnesses? Question witnesses?
13. Why are there so few private witnesses?
14. Is the civilian sector of the Pentagon accorded the same treatment as the military?
15. Are some of the members awed by the military brass?

Staff Opinion Questions

16. Have you been in basic agreement with the United States national security policy over the past eight years?
17. What areas have you disagreed with?
18. How have you expressed your disagreement?
19. Is the military industrial complex a potential danger to the country? Why, or why not? What can be done?
20. Do you think that the military services are a potential threat to the country? Why, or why not?

21. Do you think that the executive branch has handled the Vietnam conflict correctly?
22. What should our policy have been?
23. What should our policy towards North Korea have been?

Committee Oriented Questions

24. When the committee holds hearings does it mean legislation will be passed?
25. Who initiates most of the committee's legislation?
26. How many bills are sponsored by committee members, non members, chairmen?
27. What chance of success do these bills have without executive support?
28. How do you know when the executive disapproves of a bill?
29. Why is the committee so nonpartisan?
30. Any other characteristics?
31. Is the committee the spokesman for the military point of view?
32. What is the military lobby like?
33. How does the committee view lobbying procedures?
34. What is the communication network between Congress and the Department of State?
35. Can the committee receive adequate information from the Pentagon?

Committee Members

36. Does the committee attract a certain type of person?
37. Why are there no doves on the committee?
38. Does each member of the committee have a particular area of expertise?
39. Is it good or bad for the committee that a number of members are still in the armed forces active reserves? Why?
40. Do you find that those members of the committee who haven't served

in the armed forces take a different view of national security issues than those members who have?

41. Are they likely to be more pro-military in orientation? Hawkish?
42. When you come to a particularly difficult problem does any member stand out as being the one who most often comes up with a way out?
43. During the course of discussing legislation things can get rather tense from time to time. I know that this happens even on Armed Services. Does anyone stand out as the peacemaker in these situations?
44. What role does the subcommittee chairman have?
45. What role does the Republican minority members play?
46. What role for the freshman members?

Chairman Questions

47. How important is the chairman to the direction of the committee?
48. Why are the committee members willing to grant such far reaching powers to the chairman?
49. Vinson acquired a reputation of being successful and influential? Why?
50. How much of Mr. Vinson's operation and method have carried over into the present committee?
51. What are the informal powers of the Armed Services chairman?
52. Do you believe that the chairman could in any way help a member get a bill through? A military installation? A pet project?
53. Could he in any way hinder these things?
54. Does Mr. Rivers have a broader view of the committee function than Mr. Vinson? Why?
55. What is their relation with the Secretary of Defense and civilian sector?
56. The relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
57. What sort of relations with the President?

The Committee's Relations with the Congress

58. If the committee passes the bill, will the House? Why?
59. Any sources of opposition? House Military Appropriations?
60. Are there any differences between the Senate and House committees?
61. What is the procedure for a conference committee?
62. How has the House fared?
63. What effect does the Rules Committee have on legislation?

The Power of the Committee

64. What areas of national security policy can the committee have its greatest impact?
65. What areas have the least impact?
66. Why has the committee been so successful in imposing its views in reserve policy?
67. How about the Marine Corps?
68. What influence can the committee have in the placement of military installations?
69. What has the committee done to implement section 412?
70. What role has the committee played in developing and shaping Selective Service policy?
71. Strategic policy - can it have any influence?
72. What role in reorganization of the Pentagon?
73. Is there anything in your experience concerning armed services that I ought to know about.

APPENDIX D--Check list utilized in interviewing Congressmen not on
Armed Services

1. What role can the House of Representatives play in national security policy?
2. What role does the armed services committee play?
3. Can the committee have any real impact on strategic policy?
4. Do they have any affect on national security policy?
5. What role do they play in the placement of military installations?
6. Why are they so influential in policy affecting the reserves?
7. What type of committee is it? Hearings, witnesses, procedure?
8. Why is it a nonpartisan committee?
9. Is a certain type of person attracted to the committee?
10. Are there any doves in the committee? Why not?
11. How important is the chairman to the committee? What is his power?
12. How successful was Carl Vinson? Why? How influential was he?
13. How successful is Rivers? Why? How influential is he?
14. Can an individual have more influence than his committee?
15. How many members can influence events?
16. What type of staff? Who are they loyal to? Do they work with opposition?
17. What does the committee expect from its new members?
18. Why is the committee so successful on the floor of the House?
19. Are there any centers of opposition?
20. What part does the leadership play in the program?
21. What traits does the Congress associate with the committee?
22. Who is more important in military policy, Armed Services or the Military Appropriations subcommittees? Why?
23. Are there any differences between the Senate and House committees?
24. What type of relationship does the committee have with the

Pentagon?

25. What type of relationship with the civilian sector?
26. How does it get along with the President?

APPENDIX E--Individual Congressmen who have served on Armed Services

Name	State	Years on Committee
<u>Republican Party</u>		
Anderson, Jack Z.	California	1947-1952
Andrews, Walter G.	New York	1947-1948
Arends, Leslie	Illinois	1947-
Bates, Robert	Massachusetts	1947-1950
Bates, William H.	Massachusetts	1951-1969
Becker, Frank J.	New York	1958-1964
Bishop, C. W. Runt	Illinois	1947-1948, 1953-1954
Blackney, William W.	Michigan	1947-1952
Bray, William G.	Indiana	1953-
Chamberlain, Charles E.	Michigan	1959-
Clancy, Donald D.	Ohio	1961-
Clason, Charles E.	Massachusetts	1947-1948
Cole, Sterling	New York	1947-1958
Cunningham, Paul	Iowa	1951-1958
Devereux, James P. S.	Maryland	1955-1958
Dickinson, William C.	Alabama	1967-
Elston, Charles H.	Ohio	1947-1952
Foreman, Edward	Texas, New Mexico	1963-1964, 1969
Gavin, Leon H.	Pennsylvania	1947-1964
Gubser, Charles B.	California	1957-
Hall, Durward G.	Missouri	1961-
Halleck, Charles	Indiana	1967-1968
Hess, William	Ohio	1947-1948, 1951-1960
Hunt, John E.	New Jersey	1969-
Johnson, Leroy	California	1947-1956
King, Carleton J.	New York	1967-
Nelson, Charles P.	Maine	1953-1956
Norblad, Walter	Oregon	1947-1964
O'Konski, Alvin E.	Wisconsin	1951-
Osmers, Frank C.	New Jersey	1955-1964
Patterson, James T.	Connecticut	1951-1958
Pirnie, Alexander	New York	1961-
Reece, B. Carrol	Tennessee	1957-1958
Schweiker, Richard S.	Pennsylvania	1965-1968
Shafer, Paul W.	Michigan	1947-1954
Short, Dewey	Missouri	1947-1956
Smith, Margaret Chase	Maine	1947-1948
Smith, James V.	Oklahoma	1967-1968
Smith, Wint.	Kansas	1953-1954
St. George, Katherine	New York	1957-1960
Stafford, Robert T.	Vermont	1961-
Thomas, J. Parnell	New Jersey	1947-1950
Towe, Harry L.	New Jersey	1947-1951
Van. Zandt, James E.	Pennsylvania	1947-1962

APPENDIX E--Continued

Name	State	Years on Committee
<u>Republican Party (continued)</u>		
Whalen, Charles	Ohio	1967-
Whitehurst, William G.	Virginia	1969-
Wilson, Bob	California	1953-
<u>Democratic Party</u>		
Anderson, Leroy H.	Montana	1959-1960
Bennett, Charles E.	Florida	1953-
Brewster, Daniel B.	Maryland	1959-1962
Brinkley, Jack	Georgia	1969
Brooks, Overton	Louisiana	1947-1958
Burkhalter, Everett	California	1963-1965
Byrnes, James A.	Pennsylvania	1957-
Clemente, L. Gary	New York	1949-1952
Cohelan, Jeffrey	California	1959-1964
Daniel, W. C.	Virginia	1969
DeGraffenreid, Edward	Alabama	1949-1952
Doyle, Clyde	California	1949-1963
Drewry, Patrick	Virginia	1947-
Durham, Carl T.	North Carolina	1947-1960
Evans, Frank E.	Colorado	1965-1968
Fisher, O. C.	Texas	1949-
Green, William J.	Pennsylvania	1949-1958
Hagan, G. Elliot	Georgia	1965-
Hardy, Porter	Virginia	1949-1968
Haverner, Frank R.	California	1949-1952
Hebert, Edward F.	Louisiana	1947-
Heffernan, James J.	New York	1947-1952
Hicks, Floyd V.	Washington	1965-
Holtzman, Lester	New York	1955-1956
Huddleston, George	Alabama	1955-1964
Ichord, Richard	Missouri	1963-
Irwin, Donald	Connecticut	1965-1968
Johnson, Jed.	Oklahoma	1964-1966
Johnson, Lyndon	Texas	1947-1948
Kilday, Paul	Texas	1947-1961
Kilgore, Joe M.	Texas	1963-1964
Kitchim, Paul A.	North Carolina	1957-1962
Kowalski, Frank	Connecticut	1959-1962
Lankford, Richard	Maryland	1955-1964
Leggert, Robert	California	1965-
Lennon, Alton	North Carolina	1965-
Long, Clarence D.	Maryland	1963-1964
Long, Speedy O.	Louisiana	1965-

APPENDIX E--Continued

Name	State	Years on Committee
<u>Democratic Party (continued)</u>		
Love, Rodney M.	Ohio	1965-1966
Machen, Henry G.	Maryland	1965-1968
Miller, George P.	California	1951-1958
Mollohan, Robert	West Virginia	1955-1956, 1969
Morris, Toby	Oklahoma	1957-1960
Nedzi, Lucien	Michigan	1962-
Nichols, Bill	Alabama	1969
Patten, Harold A.	Arizona	1953-1954
Philbin, Philip J.	Massachusetts	1947-
Pike, Otis G.	New York	1959-
Price, Melvin	Illinois	1949-
Randall, William J.	Missouri	1965-
Rivers, Mendel	South Carolina	1947-1969
Rutherford, T. R.	Texas	1961-1962
Sassber, Lansdale	Maryland	1947-1952
Sikes, Robert L. F.	Florida	1947-1948
Stratton, Samuel	New York	1959-
Thomason, R. Ewing	Texas	1947-1948
Vinson, Carl	Georgia	1947-1964
Walker, E. S. Johnny	New Mexico	1965-1968
Walsh, John R.	Indiana	1949-1950
Wampler, Fred	Indiana	1959-1960
White, Richard C.	Texas	1969-
Wickersham, Victor	Oklahoma	1951-1956, 1961-1964
Wilson, Charles	California	1965-
Winstead, Arthur	Mississippi	1947-1964

APPENDIX F--ADA scores of Armed Services Members in 86th, 88th and 90th Congress - by Party

86th Congress^a

Democrats

Cohelan	100	Vinson	63
Doyle	100	Kilday	50
Kowalski	100	Hebert	42
Price	100	Hardy	25
Brewster	100	Bennett	22
Lankford	100	Fisher	22
Philbin	100	Rivers	11
Byrnes	100	Durham	11
Stratton	67	Kitchim	11
Huddleston	67	Winstead	0

Republicans

Van Zandt	67	Wilson	22
O'Konski	63	Arends	22
Osmer	44	Bray	22
Gubser	44	Becker	11
Chamberlain	36		
Bates	33		
Gabin	33		
Pirnie	33		
Norblad	25		

^a156 Congressmen recorded scores between 100 and 88. 72 members, mostly Republicans, scored between 0-11. "Groups seek to influence Congressional Races," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 18, no. 4 (October 7, 1960), p. 1655.

88th Congress^b

Democrats

Cohelan	100	Hebert	45
Philbin	96	Hardy	44
Stratton	92	Ichord	44
Price	92	Rivers	40
Byrnes	92	Bennett	40
Nedzi	88	Huddleston	24
Long	88	Kilgore	16
Lankford	80	Lennon	4
Pike	76	Winstead	0
Wickersham	72	Fisher	0
Vinson	68		

Republicans

Osmer	52	Gubser	4
O'Konski	52	Arends	4
Strafford	36	Chamber-	
Bates	28	lain	4
Norblad	25	King	4
Pirnie	16	Foreman	0
Bray	16	Hall	0
Clancy	8		
Becker	8		
Wilson	8		

^b109 Congressmen, mostly Democrats, scored between 100-88, whereas 118 scored between 0-8. "Non party groups rate each Senator, Representative," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 22, no. 43 (October 23, 1964), p. 2542.

APPENDIX F--Continued

 90th Congress^c

<u>Democrats</u>		<u>Republicans</u>	
Byrnes	100	Walker	33
Leggert	92	Hebert	25
Irwin	92	Rivers	17
Hicks	83	Bennett	17
Wilson, C.	83	Long, S.	17
Nedzi	83	Randall	17
Price	83	Fisher	8
Philbin	75	Hagan	8
Machen	75	Hardy	0
Pike	50	Lennon	0
Stratton	42		
Ichord	42		
		Whalen	67
		Schwelker	50
		Stafford	42
		O'Konski	33
		Pirnie	33
		Bates	25
		Arends	8
		Chamberlain	8
		Gubser	8
		Hall	0
		Dickinson	0
		Wilson	0
		Bray	0
		King	0
		Clancy	0
		Smith	0

^c134 Congressmen mostly Democrats scored between 100-92%, whereas 78 scored between 0-8%. "Non party groups Senate and Representatives," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 23 (1967), 870-871.

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PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Democratic Members of the Armed Services Committee:

- _____. Personal Interview with Charles F. Bennett, Congressman from 3rd District of Florida, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Jack Brinkley, Congressman from the 3rd District of Georgia, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Frank Evans, Congressman from the 3rd District of Colorado, 50 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with O. C. Fisher, Congressman from the 21st District of Texas, 45 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Edward Hebert, Congressman from the 1st District of Louisiana, 60 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Floyd Hicks, Congressman from the 6th District of Washington, 60 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Robert L. Leggett, Congressman from the 4th District of California, 60 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Alton Lennon, Congressman from the 7th District of North Carolina, 30 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Robert Mollohan, Congressman from the 1st District of West Virginia, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Lucien Nedzi, Congressman from the 14th District of Michigan, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Phillip J. Philbin, Congressman from the 3rd District of Massachusetts, 60 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Otis Pike, Congressman from 1st District of New York, 20 minutes.

- _____. Personal Interview with Melvin Price, Congressman from the 24th District of Illinois, 45 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Mendel Rivers, Congressman from the 1st District of South Carolina, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Richard White, Congressman from the 16th District of Texas, 50 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Charles Wilson, Congressman from the 31st District of California, 45 minutes.

Republican Members of the Armed Services Committee

- _____. Personal Interview with Leslie Arends, Congressman from the 17th District of Illinois, 35 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with William G. Bray, Congressman from the 6th District of Indiana, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with William Dickinson, Congressman from the 2nd District of Alabama, 15 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Durward Hall, Congressman from the 7th District of Missouri, 5 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Edward Foreman, Congressman-at-large, from New Mexico, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Carleton King, Congressman from the 30th District of New York, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Alexander Pirnie, Congressman from the 32nd District of New York, 45 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Robert Stafford, Congressman-at-large from Vermont, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Charles Whalen, Congressman from the 3rd District of Ohio, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Bob Wilson, Congressman from the 36th District of California, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with W. G. Whitehurst, Congressman from the 2nd District of Virginia, 45 minutes.

Former Members of the Armed Services Committee

- _____. Personal Interview with Frank J. Becker, a former Republican Congressman from Long Island, Armed Service member from 1959-1964, four and one-half hours over two separate interviews.
- _____. Personal Interview with Jeffrey Cohelan, Congressman from the 7th District of California, Armed Service member from 1959-1964, one and one half hours.
- _____. Personal Interview with Sterling Cole, a former Republican Congressman from Upstate New York, Armed Service member from 1947-1958, 45 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Dewey Short, a former Republican Congressman from Missouri, Armed Service member 1947-1956, Armed Service Chairman 1953-1954, 90 minutes.

Former and Present Members of Congress

- _____. Personal Interview with Jonathan Bingham, Congressman from the 23rd District of the Bronx, 30 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Jacob H. Gilbert, Congressman from the 22nd District of the Bronx, 45 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Abraham Multer, former Democratic Congressman from Brooklyn, 50 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Morris Udall, Congressman from the 2nd District of Arizona, 25 minutes.

Staff Officials

- _____. Personal Interview with John Blandford, Chief Counsel of House Armed Services Committee, 70 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with William H. Cook, counsel for House Armed Services Committee, 45 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Charles "Duke" Dukander, Chief Counsel to the House Science and Astronautics Committee, former Counsel on the House Armed Services Committee, 40 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with John Ford, Permanent Staff Investigator for the House Armed Services Committee, 90 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Charles Kilbow, Chief Counsel for

the Senate Armed Services Committee, 90 minutes.

- _____. Personal Interview with John T. Reddan, Special Investigatory Counsel for the House Armed Services Committee, 45 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Frank Slatinshek, Counsel on the House Armed Services Committee, 80 minutes.

Administrative Assistants

- _____. Personal Interview with Jim Rabiney, Administrative Assistant for Congressman Durward Hall, 15 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Herb Jaenowitz, Administrative Assistant for Senator Steven Young (D, Ohio), 25 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Bennett Stong, former Administrative Assistant for Senator George McGovern (D, S.D.), 60 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Mrs. Lynne J. Pilot, Administrative Assistant for Congressman Donald Clancy (R, Ohio), 15 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with Douglas P. Bennett, Staff Assistant for Congressman Alexander Pirnie (R, N.Y.), 15 minutes.
- _____. Personal Interview with David H. Fishke, Administrative Assistant for Senator Richard Schweiker (R, Pa.), 15 minutes.

NEWSPAPER REPORTER

- _____. Mike Waldman, Congressional Specialist for Newsday, 30 minutes.

PERSONAL LETTERS

- _____. Personal Letter from Frank J. Becker, former Republican Congressman from Long Island, February 13, 1969.
- _____. Personal Letter from Charles F. Bennett, Democratic Congressman from Florida, May 31, 1969.
- _____. Personal Letter from Mario Biaggi, Democratic Congressman from New York City, July 30, 1970.
- _____. Personal Letter from Carl T. Durham, former Democratic Congressman from North Carolina, February 20, 1969.
- _____. Personal Letter from Rodney M. Love, former Democratic Congressman from Ohio, March 11, 1969.

- _____. Personal Letter from Harold M. Maness, Colonel, U.S. Army, September 11, 1970.
- _____. Personal Letter from Wayne Morse, former Senator from Oregon, February 10, 1969.
- _____. Personal Letter from L. Saltonstall, former Senator from Massachusetts, February 18, 1969.
- _____. Personal Letter from Victor Wickersham, former Congressman from Oklahoma, March 30, 1969.

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U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. No. 10 - Pursuant to the H.R. 6151 to Authorize Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for the Armed Forces and for other purposes. 87th Congress, 1st sess., April 11 - May 4, 1961.

U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9751, 87th Congress, 2nd sess., January 24 - February 28, 1962.

U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440., 88th Congress, 1st sess., January 30 - February 25, 1963.

U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637. 88th Congress, 2nd sess.,

January 27 - February 7, 1964.

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U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9240. 90th Congress, 1st sess., March 2 - April 18, 1967.

U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and Act (S3293). 90th Congress, 2nd sess., April 3-June 27, 1968.

OTHER HEARINGS

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U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on H.R. 1369. 80th Congress, 1st sess., February 11, 1947.

U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on H.R. 1366. 80th Congress, 2nd sess., February 3, 1948.

U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on H.R. 5314. 80th Congress, 2nd sess., February 17, 1948.

U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Selective Service, H.R. 6274. 80th Congress, 2nd sess., April 12-May 3, 1948.

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U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Organization of the Armed Services Committee. 84th Congress, 1st sess., January 25, 1955.

U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Organization of the House Committee on Armed Services. 87th Congress, 1st sess., February 16, 1961.

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U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Report No. 1406 - Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels. 87th Congress, 2nd sess., 1962.

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