

NATIONHOOD IN THE CITY: ASSIMILATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND NATIONAL  
BELONGING AMONG COLLEGE-EDUCATED, SECOND GENERATION TURKS IN  
BERLIN AND DOMINICANS IN NEW YORK CITY

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## Abstract

Nationhood in the City:  
Assimilation, Citizenship, and National Belonging among College-Educated, Second  
Generation Turks in Berlin, and Dominicans in New York

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The main question posed by the study is: “How are university-educated immigrant-origin young people from disadvantaged backgrounds responding to the social and political opportunities provided by their cities and nations?” Through in-depth interviews and secondary research, my project explores how local and national institutions, and the historical context, of host societies shape the outlook of upwardly mobile second generation immigrants on questions of citizenship and national belonging. It focuses on interviewing college-educated individuals from similarly disadvantaged groups in two similar locales: Turks in Berlin and Dominicans in New York. My hypothesis is that New York City and the United States offer an institutional package of opportunities and responses that provides a more favorable context of reception for these individuals; and that this in turn fosters a stronger sense of commitment to and membership in the U.S. polity than is the case in Berlin and Germany. This package includes: the civil rights culture/laws, the relatively liberal and pluralistic citizenship regime, an immigration-oriented national and local political culture and institutional history, and the relatively penetrable and inclusive local and national political system that accommodates immigrants.. The project goes beyond segmented assimilation theory to critique its overly structural and deterministic views of race, immigration, and class. The dissertation also takes issue with the view that citizenship and nation-states have been decoupled in our globalized age, a view that has by now largely superseded traditional notions of citizenship tied to the nation-state.

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*Dedicated to: Babam, Annem, Echo, Altan, and Mutlu (my dear family), as well as to the young immigrant trying to make her way, somewhere, someway, against the grain.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS:

CHAPTER:	PAGE:
PART I. Introduction	
-Chapter 1: Introduction & Theoretical/Conceptual Framework.....	pp. 1-25
-Chapter 2: Research Design, Methods, & Research Contexts.....	pp. 26-50
PART II. “THE WORLDS OF OUR CHILDREN”: Interviews and Field Data	
-Chapter 3: Civil Rights, Diversity, and Discrimination: Political Culture, Institutions, and Policies as Experienced by Respondents.....	pp. 51-101
-Chapter 4: Political Incorporation & Citizenship as Experienced by the Respondents: <i>Civis Americanus/Germanus Sum?</i> .....	pp. 102-156
-Chapter 5: Home Sweet Home? : National Membership, Belonging, Civic Assimilation, & Transnationalism as Experienced by Respondents.....	pp. 157-220
PART III. Conclusion	
-Chapter 6: Summary of Findings, Discussion & Conclusions.....	pp. 221-247
-Endnotes .....	pp. 248-260
- Appendix .....	pp. 256-273
-Bibliography.....	pp. 274-304

## Chapter 1. Background and Contexts

### I. Background

Since the end of World War II, tens of millions of immigrants have arrived at the shores of wealthy (post-) industrialized Western societies. Currently, 31 million immigrants live in North West Europe and about 38 million in the U.S. (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009b: 1). Many of these immigrants have arrived with little human capital (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), especially in Europe (Crul and Schneider 2009). Moreover, they have largely been from the developing world and/or non-white backgrounds—to their frequent disadvantage in the host society.

These massive flows of humanity have deeply shaken the receiving countries' national identities, values, and long-institutionalized beliefs. The resulting demographic metamorphoses have sparked heated debates on immigration, citizenship, nationhood, and pluralism (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009a, b; also see Lowenstein 2006).

The integration of these immigrants' offspring into the socio-economic and political mainstream of post-industrial democracies deeply concerns the public, policy/opinion makers, and academics throughout the Western world. Conflicts and debates have raged in the United States and Europe over the “assimilability” of these new immigrants: the native-descent residents have given intense scrutiny to the nature of citizenship laws, national citizenship regimes, and multiculturalism—and the extent to which these have shaped the assimilation and incorporation of immigrants in socio-economic—including educational—and political terms.

These debates have been marked by anxiety over the perceived lack of assimilation by disadvantaged immigrants and the perceived decline of national cohesion. The issue is so salient in Germany that a Turkish-German newspaper (*Sabah Avrupa*, 2010) named 2010 *Das Jahr der Integrationsdebatte* (“the year of the integration debate”). Populist politicians and demagogues

have capitalized on these mainstream perceptions. Contentious and polarizing national debates over multiculturalism and integration have raged on, even among die-hard liberals (Schlesinger 1994), provoked by immigration and rapidly increasing diversity (Sarrazin 2010).

This dissertation takes advantage of the emergence of a successful professional segment among the adult second generation of immigrants (even from the most disadvantaged groups) to explore how structural, cultural, political, and institutional factors, as well as the respondents' life histories and particular experiences, have shaped their outlook on their feelings of national membership and group identity.

Through in-depth interviews and secondary research my project sheds light on how the "best and brightest" of immigrant youth from disadvantaged groups are negotiating the past and present political and socio-economic structures of host societies, in this case, Berlin, Germany and New York City, the United States. It explores how the interaction of professionally and educationally successful second-generation individuals from disadvantaged and stigmatized groups (Turks in Berlin and Dominicans in New York) with the socio-economic and political institutions of their host societies shapes their outlook on citizenship and national belonging.

The second generation provides considerable fodder for anti-immigrant sentiment, as many members of the public, especially in Germany, perceive the second generation as a permanent underclass that is all too ready to turn to crime (Der Spiegel, Dec. 28, 2007), who are unwilling to speak/learn the host language, who refuse to identify with the host country, and who do not work (Solms-Laubach 2012). For example, the Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere himself has estimated 10 to 15% of Turkish youth falls into this category (Sabah Avrupa, 2010).<sup>1</sup> The second generation's socio-economic trajectory will thus have important implications for the debate over immigration, citizenship, and nationhood. As noted, political movements have often

gained power, legitimacy, and influence by blaming these global, confusing, unstable phenomena squarely on immigrants and native minorities (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2007; De La Baume and Erlanger 2011).<sup>2</sup> Especially in European countries, far-right parties (in the American case a large section of Republican primary voters) have gained great influence and even public office at the turn of the twenty-first century; and they have moved the center of the mainstream immigration debate to the right in many contexts (Rydgren 2007; Minkenberg 2009).

Dominicans and other Hispanic immigrants in the United States are also similarly negatively stereotyped, and nativists have become a part of the debate (Huntington 2002, 2004; Chavez 2008; Fraga 2009). (I use Hispanic and Latino interchangeably but usually use Hispanic because that is the term chosen by the Census.

Thus, immigrants and their children are widely faulted for willfully not integrating. At the same time, immigrants' supporters point out that integration is a two-way street and that it is often the host society's unwelcoming context and structures that fail to integrate immigrants (see Connor 2010), especially in Europe and in Germany in particular; interviews with Turkish-German community leaders such as Safer Cinar (of the left-leaning secularist *Türkische Bund Berlin-Brandenburg*), Bekir Yilmaz (of the more conservative *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*), and the Green Berlin MP Özcan Mutlu reveal this point.

In sum, the primeval (Smith 1999) and fundamental questions of “Who belongs to the nation and who does not?”—“Who are We?” in Huntington's words (2004)—remain very salient for a great portion of the public (Brimelow 1996; Chavez 1999; Minkenberg 2009; Duyvendak 2011).<sup>3</sup> After all, as Schain argues, “Immigration, by its very nature, tends to challenge established ideas of national identity” (Schain 2009: 10).

As debates on assimilation, citizenship, and nationhood intensify, the second- and third-generation children of the postwar immigrants are coming of age, so we can study their integration in a fuller and more profound way. Their lives and fates will begin to answer the questions posed by their parents' experience.

Until roughly the last decade, most academic and public discussions of immigration and citizenship focused on the first generation or studied only the adolescent second generation (see Portes and Rumbaut's CILS, 2001, 2006), ignoring the multigenerational nature of the process of assimilation. But it is the *adult* second generation that offers us a glimpse of the futures of these societies. The future of national self-understanding, the integration of minorities, and the prospect of equal rhetorical and legal citizenship in these two leading and most powerful nations of the Western world are crucial matters to investigate, and the entry of large numbers of the native-born children of immigrants into the national mainstream (or, into various *segments* of that mainstream) finally gives us the opportunity to begin to answer the questions posed initially by their parents' experience. This endeavor will help us make better sense of the drastic changes that national identities are undergoing as a result of mass immigration.

In addition, the growing debate on the second generation has focused on the likely trajectories of different groups compared to those of their parents and native-born peers (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Heath et al. 2008; Crul and Thompson 2008; Crul and Schneider 2009; Crul et al., 2010). This literature identifies some groups as more disadvantaged or downwardly mobile than others. Intra-group distinctions are not always made explicit. In all groups and metropolitan settings, however, at least *some* second-generation young people are rising through the education system, getting advanced credentials, and seeking to enter the top ranks of many professions (a thus-far neglected phenomenon in the literature).<sup>4</sup> This "leading

edge” will set the tone for much of what follows because they will serve as opinion leaders and role models for the rest of their generation and their oft-maligned communities.

For example, the avant-garde of the Dominican-American community is not few and far between but rather common in the community. For example, 26% of young-adult second-generation Dominicans in New York City have a bachelor’s degree or higher (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008: 137). In the same vein, contrary to public perceptions, most native-born Turkish-Germans do speak German “very well” (Diehl and Schnell 2006: 801)—though at much lower rates than Dominicans and Latinos who speak English very well (Alba 2004)—and many German Turks flourish as acculturated, mainstream German speakers who are making films (Fatih Akin), writing best-selling books (Necla Kelek), or starring in the German national soccer team (Mesut Özil).

Despite finding serious problems among the second generation—especially the Dominicans—Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway (2008) can still coin the term “second generation advantage” in light of their observation that these hyphenated, second-generation Americans are making a go at having the best of both worlds and not at all conforming to the “stuck in-between two worlds” cliché (which may of course well not be the case in a context other than New York City). This is true for many from disadvantaged groups other than Dominicans who also do better than their parents and show improvement. The authors confirm that many will and do enter the mainstream, especially if they are university-educated.

Transatlantic comparisons in this field have historically been late in developing (as Thomson and Crul 2007 note), although a number of studies have recently appeared (Alba 2005; Alba and Waters 2011; Alba and Silberman 2009; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009a, b; Crul

and Schneider 2009; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; Crul et al. 2012; Lucassen 2005; Lucassen and Foner forthcoming). This dissertation seeks to contribute to this emerging literature.

In particular, the United States and Germany both attracted massive waves of migration in the postwar era and are both going through a painful social and political transition necessitated by their changing demographics today. At the subnational level, Berlin and New York City are the largest and among the most diverse and cosmopolitan cities in their respective countries. These metropolises are at the forefront of the momentous demographic transformations outlined above. Over the span of only a few decades, mass migration has transformed the ethno-racial make-up of these two countries and cities virtually beyond recognition.

In 2010, the foreign-born made up about 13 % of the U.S. population<sup>5</sup> (the highest since 1920; see Trounson 2012). The percentage has climbed up to its current level following the floor hit during the era of immigration hiatus: roughly from the thirties to the seventies (in 1970 only 4.7% were foreign-born).<sup>6</sup> In addition, the second generation accounts for roughly another 11% of the population (Dixon 2006; US Census 2010).<sup>7</sup> In total, circa 2010, following four decades of migration, the first and second generations combined amounted to at least 24% of the entire population of the U.S, making one out of every four Americans either an immigrant or the child of one.

A less frequently noted fact among the public is that nearly 13% of the population is foreign-born in Germany as well (Bloemraad et al. 2008: 2; OECD 2011: 384). In fact, this rate equals or narrowly exceeds that of the U.S., which is universally thought of as a “natural country of immigration.” Moreover, in total, approximately 20% of the people in Germany today have a “migration background.”<sup>8</sup>

The *qualitative* (Creswell 2012), small-n *comparative* (Lijphart 1971, 1975; Eckstein 1975; Freeman 1979; Brubaker 1992; Bleich 2004; Foner 2005; Rubio-Marín 2008; Schain 2009), reflexive (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; see Creswell 2012), *interpretive* (Geertz 1973a, 1973b, 1983; Denzin 1989), and in-depth *interview* (Spradley 1979) methods applied to these questions permit a thick, detailed, nuanced, and context-informed exploration of the process by which the respondents form their attitudes and behavior and arrive at their perceptions of the host society context.

## II. The Research Questions in Detail

Above all, this dissertation aims to answer two questions: How do university-educated second-generation young adults from stigmatized, poor, large, “threatening” groups construct and practice their senses of citizenship and (national) belonging, given their personal/group backgrounds and the host society context? And, at a **narrower level**, is socio-economic assimilation (and the socio-cultural assimilation related to it) in the form of acquiring a college or university degree sufficient for the host society to give them the sense that they are accepted and included within the national political community, therefore reinforcing their identity with the host national identity? *In other words, given that one is native-born, well-educated, socially/economically integrated—or in Norman Podhoretz’ words “has made it” (Podhoretz 1967)—is that enough for one not only to identify as part of the German or American mainstream, but to be accepted by that mainstream as one of “us,” a co-citizen?*

If even *well-assimilated* children of immigrants cannot feel part of the demos and nation, this would be a highly counterintuitive finding. Do the accomplished respondents feel that the host society’s social and political institutions permit them to participate in and identify with the mainstream, as is usually the case with other successful middle class urbanites?

This study focuses particularly on the impact of varying contexts on outcomes. **By context, I mean “socio-political opportunity structures,”** that is, a compound of political, legal-institutional, but also socio-cultural institutions/structures that are fairly entrenched in any society. They influence individual- and society-level conceptions of citizenship, national membership, diversity, and civil rights, and also the individual’s ability, contingent on origins, to attain valued statuses.

Most importantly, I aim from the outset to show what kind of variation exists between the sociopolitical opportunity structures found in the two nationally-tethered urban contexts of Berlin, Germany and New York, the United States. More important than the *nature of variation* between contexts is, of course, the degree and nature of the *impact* that the cross-contextual variation of the phenomenon has on the outcomes, that is, the way these second-generation immigrants experience and practice citizenship and national membership. I explore these connections and interactive processes.

Important to framing the question of how respondents perceive their subjective and objective positions in their host societies is the issue of ‘national models’ of integration. A longstanding theme in the literature is that three distinct national models of integration, citizenship regimes, and conceptions of nationhood can be identified (Freeman 1979; Brubaker 1992; Schnapper 1991; Todd 1994; Kepel 1994; Jennings 2000; Favell 2001; Bleich 2003 and 1998).<sup>9</sup> However, lately some authors have claimed that national policies towards immigrants in the West are all converging on a liberal assimilationist model and that erstwhile multiculturalist societies are retreating from their old models (Joppke 2004, 2007; Palmowski 2008). Rather than the persistence of national models, they posit that national policies are converging (Hansen and Weil 2001).

This research will allow me to comment on whether the *ethnic vs. civic nation* distinction is invalid and outmoded (Brubaker 1992, 1999). Do national traditions, national public philosophies of integration or *national models* exist—and do they matter? Are there distinct national institutional or policy-making patterns and norms that are built upon distinct national structures with fateful consequences? Or, is there a drastic *convergence* taking place among Western societies of immigration, as some observers claim? Is there one national tradition/model, or do “*multiple traditions*” (Smith 1997; Gerstle 2001; King 2001) co-exist within each national political community? Is there, for example, an ethnic/racist side to supposedly civic-liberal-republican American nationality, and to what extent? Is there emerging a new Germany, a civic-republican, liberal, multicultural, inclusive one, to battle with or prevail over the “ethnic Germany”?

### **III. The Theoretical and Conceptual Context of the Study: Institutions, Norms, Political Cultures, and Institutionalism**

The study draws on two theoretical frameworks: the new assimilation theory in sociology (Alba & Nee 2003; see also Brubaker 2001) and the new institutionalist comparative perspective in political science (Pierson & Skocpol 2000; Soskice & Hall 2001).

In addition to placing this dissertation in the context of these two strands of the literature, this chapter engages their interplay with the literatures on *citizenship*, *national identity*, *ethnic* versus *civic* nations, the alleged *decline or even demise of the nation-state*, and the decline of unifying national identities, which is actively advocated by multiculturalists such as Taylor 1994, and by some cosmopolitans (Carens 1987, Held et al. 1999).

An inextricably linked issue concerns the threats posed by *globalization* to the nation-state's power and sovereignty (Jacobson 1996; Strong 1996; Sassen 1998; Castles and Davidson 2001). Globalism as an academic school—that is, the argument that global forces exert a growing hegemony over the restrained, declining, sometimes-powerless nation-states—and the process of globalization itself have contributed tremendously to schools of thought related to this dissertation, such as: *Transnationalism* (Duany 1994; Glick-Schiller et al. 1994; Levitt 2001); and *Postnationalism* (Soysal 1994; see critiques by Joppke 1998, and Aleinikoff 1999); as well as, lastly, *urban-centric (ethnic)* studies. Thus, the focus on cross-border phenomena signaled a retreat from “the nation,” “national citizenship,” and national identity. This seems curious and a relic of the optimistic, supranational, global nineties, given the current era's zeitgeist of populism, recession, neo-nationalism, and global dislike of international—especially financial—organizations and their encroachment of national sovereignty (i.e., Greece).

Great emphasis will thus be placed here on structural variables (especially on the distinctness of national structures), while not discounting agency, process, or contingency. The behavior of the second generation is not simply determined by the scope or shape of the institutional opportunity structure facing them. They, their families, their neighborhoods, their somewhat random relationships with influences such as mentors, bring much to the table as well.

### **The New Assimilation Theory**

Alba and Nee, of the neo-assimilation school, define assimilation as “the decline of [*the salience*] of an ethnic distinction, and its corollary cultural and social differences,” not requiring the *disappearance* of ethnicity or immigrants' conforming to an unchanging core American culture. This conception asserts only that “ethnic origins [may] become less and less relevant in relation

to . . . the ethnic majority group” (Alba and Nee 2003:11). An ethnic group *can* assimilate even if the ethnic group’s culture remains highly visible and even distinctive.

Rejecting the old one-way assimilation of the “Anglo (or Euro)-conformity” perspective, it posits the possible alternative of assimilation occurring—provided certain conditions are met—in a more fluid dynamic, where *host society* and *immigrant groups* interact and modify each other as they gradually merge (i.e., a two-way conception of assimilation where *both* parties give and move). Immigrants thus become more *similar* to the core society (and vice versa) as generations succeed each other, but not the *same* (see the historical development of the concept in Kazal 1995, Gans 1997, Barkan 2006).

Alba and Nee (2003) concentrate on the concept of (bright or blurred) social boundaries (see Lamont and Molnar 2002 for a review of boundaries; see also Zolberg and Woon 1999 and Alba 2005, 2009) and define assimilation not as immigrants’ shedding their culture and taking on the majority’s identity in a conscious way but as *a two-way interaction* between immigrants and host societies, and increasing similarity between the descendants of immigrants and an ever-changing and diversifying mainstream, a process structured by institutions but also influenced by individual agency (as in Esser 2003). Mobility on the part of immigrants aids this process by decreasing the social distance between them and the majority.

I agree with this conceptualization and agree that it is for the most part taking place today in many contexts and across many groups (Alba et al. 2011), however gradually and unevenly, but *only* where “the mainstream” (the socio-political structure in my terms) is dynamic, adaptive to immigration, and hospitable.<sup>10</sup> My argument is that this has not been the case in Germany, where the integration discourse has stressed *cultural* assimilation (according to my respondents; see also Ehrkamp 2006, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009) or boundary crossing by individuals as

they stop being Muslim or Turkish and become secular/culturally Christian Germans, although the barriers to do so seem to be more rigid than those facing Mexicans in the United States (Alba 2005).<sup>11</sup> This process is structured by institutions but also influenced by individual agency (as in Esser 2003, a European theorist of “integration,” which is the term in use in European social sciences and public debates) (see Schneider and Crul 2010 for European views on integration/assimilation theory). In the neo-assimilationist point of view, bilingualism, hybrid/situational identities, softer forms of multiculturalism (Schuck 2009), transnationalism, and an ethnic identity (however diluted) are not necessarily incompatible with the assimilation of individuals and groups (gradually and over multiple generations). On the contrary, it is quite possible that these pluralizing phenomena and ideas are indeed *supportive* of assimilation as understood here. The dissertation will shed light on this matter.

Some scholars argue that current migration is qualitatively different from that of a hundred or so years ago, in ways that make assimilation less likely (Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Segmented assimilation theory argues that the racial backgrounds of current immigrants and their largely working-class backgrounds increase chances of marginalization. These disadvantages, coupled with declining opportunities for advancement in the post-industrial labor market, do not bode well for the children of immigrants. Segmented assimilation theory implies that only second generation immigrants from families with high levels of human capital, or only those who “selectively acculturate” to U.S. society—those who maintain their particularistic communal identity—can get ahead.

This theory ignores cases like the ones analyzed here: namely, upwardly mobile individuals from low SES backgrounds. Moreover, in the U.S. case the theory expects Dominicans, a poor Latino group of partly African origins, to have insurmountable difficulties in

assimilation. Other scholars, however, believe that the similarities between the two waves of immigration, as well as the steady progress current immigrants and their children are making, point towards eventual assimilation for many if not most (Alba & Nee 2003; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Smith 2008). To them, gradual upward mobility—whether on a “shallow slope” or a “steep slope”—seems to be the master trend for the children of immigrants from varied class backgrounds.

As noted, such an upwardly mobile process can be discouraged by rigid societal barriers like those facing Turkish immigrants in Germany. On the other hand, Mexican-Americans and other Latinos in the U.S. face a myriad of problems of their own (for the precarious socio-economic situation of many Hispanics, see Valenzuela 1999; Suarez-Orozco et al., 2001; Stanton-Salazar 2001; on Dominicans, see Itzigsohn 2009). Moreover, racial boundaries remain strong in the United States; and as far as the assimilation process race remains a strong negative factor, especially for immigrants of (partly) African-origins, such as West Indians, Haitians, and Dominicans.<sup>12</sup> American nativism has made a recent reappearance as well, targeting Mexican immigrants especially, as anti-immigrant laws are passed by states and the Republican Party becomes more nativist (see Perea 1997, Chavez 2008).

With the coming of age of postwar immigrants’ children, the literature has taken a much-needed new turn as neo-assimilation and segmented assimilation scholars have focused much of their debate on how the second generation is faring (Alba 2005, 2009; Kasinitz et al. 2008 vs. Portes and Rumbaut 2001). There has also fortunately been a shift to the particulars of educational and occupational attainment of young second-generation groups in different national contexts (Crul & Vermeulen 2003, 2004; Heath et al. 2008; Alba and Silberman 2009; Holdaway and Alba 2009; Crul et al. 2010). This study's emphasis on the second generation, the “leading

edge” of the incorporation of immigrant groups, owes much to these recent examples of scholarship. However, the successful among the generally disadvantaged groups have not received adequate attention, as noted.

### **Institutionalism**

In addition to the new assimilation theory, a *comparative new institutionalist perspective* (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Hall and Taylor 1996, Thelen 1999, Immergut 1999, Pierson and Skocpol 2003) helps me to analyze and explain differences in national and local contexts. Institutions or policies affect attitudes and social, economic, and political outcomes. A comparatively new institutionalist perspective underscores how differences in national and local contexts may have varying consequences for the integration process.

For example, the dynamics of national educational institutions (as in Germany’s multi-track system having 19<sup>th</sup> century elitist origins—see Alba et al. 1998: 124), labor market institutions (e.g., see Reitz 1999), legal frameworks, dominant political ideologies/cultures (Minkenberg 1993, 2003), citizenship laws, national and municipal political institutions, historically based associational lives, and incorporation and mobilization mechanisms all generate a certain amount of “path dependence” in immigrants and their children. These institutions shape incentives available to individuals and groups, and to governments, in the context of assimilation and citizenship. Alba & Nee (2003:37) employ such an institutionalist theory of assimilation. Similarly, Freeman (2004: 950) argues that incorporation of immigrants is to a large extent the result of the institutional incentive structures. Institutions often vary cross-spatially and can be compared.

Institutions are complemented in a socio-political context by less tangible but no less significant structures such as ideas, ideologies, rules, norms, and political culture (cf. North

1990). In Peter Hall's words, the "prevailing set of political ideas" matters; this includes "shared conceptions about the nature of society . . . various ideas about the appropriate role of government, a number of political ideals, and collective memory of past policy experiences" (Hall 1989: 383; see also Berman 2001). Ideas will play a great role in any analysis of the effect of political culture and conceptions of citizenship/nationhood on assimilation. The national discourse on nationhood, historical conceptions of nationhood, and the current political debate on immigration and national identity (all a part of political culture) affect the attitudes of second-generation immigrants by providing a discursive opportunity structure to actors (Koopmans & Statham 2000).

### **Historical Institutionalism**

Simply put, the premise in the *historical institutionalist school of thought* utilized here is that history and institutions matter. In particular, this method of analysis firstly privileges the role that institutions play in shaping actors' and social groups' behavior. Institutions matter in shaping outcomes (see Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; and Thelen 1999 for excellent analyses of historical institutionalism and a review of the two other separate schools of "New Institutionalism:" "Rational Choice Institutionalism," which this study does not adopt, and "Sociological Institutionalism," which this study does adopt).<sup>13</sup> Past legacies affect current realities (Lucassen and Foner 2013).

Secondly, causality in this method of analysis is often thought of "as being contextual" (Immergut 1998: 19). Differences in contexts and institutions produce different results and different chains of causation in different countries. The peculiarity of both the German and U.S. institutions illustrates the issue of "contextuality" well enough.

Moreover, policy-making in historical institutionalism is seen as a historical or evolutionary process. This evolution requires that one pay attention to “temporality”: a consciousness of particular timeframes, “processes over time,” or sequentiality of events (Pierson and Skocpol 2002).

The way in which history matters, remains, and influences the present as well as the future is clearly illustrated by concepts such as “policy continuity,” which is often caused by “path dependency.” In historical institutionalist literature, so-called “policy feedback” mechanisms effect such continuity and create the said path-dependent trajectories. In Stephen Krasner’s words, “path dependent patterns are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feedback” (in Thelen 1999: 392).<sup>14</sup>

Practical and relevant examples include: German immigration and citizenship policy remaining largely unaffected by mass immigration and relying chiefly on a 1913 citizenship law until the partial jus soli reforms of 2000; persistence despite mass illegal immigration of the strict, automatic, and universal jus soli citizenship mandate of the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; the “stickiness” and unintentional universality of U.S. Civil Rights laws; and the inability of the U.S. Congress to either reduce or increase legal immigrations as well as the perennial persistence of a *laissez-faire* but ultimately permissive non-policy on immigration, despite the empirical reality of millions of undocumented immigrants living in limbo. Similarly, Pierson and Skocpol (2002) characterize path dependency as referring to “the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a political system.” In other words, it is hard for policy makers to abandon years of thinking in policy areas such as immigration, citizenship, and national membership. Once a course is set, by legislation and/or

tradition, the feedback loops and interactions become self-reinforcing. The “legacy” lives on (Minkenberg 2003).<sup>15</sup>

### **Sociological Institutionalism and Political Culture: The Role of Ideologies, Norms, and Discourses**

In addition to the more tangible legal-institutional differences, dominant ideologies that vary from context to context also constrain and shape actors’ rationality, their “logic of appropriateness,” and their cognitive scripts (see North 1990 and the sociological institutionalism of DiMaggio & Powell 1991; for the effects of political culture on political behavior, see Minkenberg 2003). Policymakers and activists who demand rights often have to adhere to widely-accepted “frames” (Bleich 2003) and utilize what Skrentny (2002) calls “meaning” in agenda-setting, political discourse, and policy-making, which marks the boundaries of what is acceptable.

The role of ideas in policy-making and politics has been amply documented (Berman 2001; see Freeman 1979, Ch. 9, Hall 1993, Smith 1997, Favell 2001, Bleich 2003, Mandel 2008; and, for the effect of particular national ideologies on immigration and citizenship, Hansen and Koehler 2005). As Pickus (2005: 11) argues, “politics is itself structured by deeper and more constitutive issues. Efforts to fix immigrant policy without careful attention to competing conceptions of citizenship will result in bad theory and bad policy.” Historical conceptions of nationhood and belonging may be ideologies and myths, but they nonetheless matter for political culture and, through that, immigrant behavior and immigrant policy: “the historical accuracy of national stories seems to matter less in its own right than for the effect it has on the nation’s present self-understanding” (Miller 1997: 39-40).

In fact, public opinion on immigration may be similarly negative in Europe and the US (Schain 2009); however, the civil rights culture and the idea of the United States as a nation of immigrants make it more difficult for political actors and the general public in the U.S. to use overtly hostile “frames” in immigration and diversity-related debates, in comparison to Germany. The differences in what Lowi (1969) and Favell (2001) call “public philosophies” structure the discourse differently in the two contexts.

For example, analyzing such phenomena as belonging, attachment, and a feeling of being at “home” is inextricably linked to the concept and theories of assimilation outlined above; such work highlights the impact of social normative institutions on individuals’ realities. This “crisis of home” (Duyvendak 2011) is a social problem that is acute particularly in Europe, where nationhood, immigration, and the notion of home are inextricably linked, to the detriment of non-native minorities.

In sum, I treat what may collectively and broadly be called (political) *culture* (Almond and Verba 1965) as a constituent part of what I define as structure. I argue that in addition to legal-institutional differences, dominant ideologies that vary from context to context also constrain and shape actors’ rationality, their “logic of appropriateness,” and their cognitive scripts (see North 1990 and the sociological institutionalism of DiMaggio & Powell 1991; for the effects of political culture on political behavior, see Minkenberg 1993).<sup>16</sup>

In addition to embracing the general political opportunity structure model of political incorporation (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009b) adopted in much of institutionalist literature, this dissertation more particularly utilizes the holistic concept of socio-political opportunity structures, while adopting the distinction Koopmans et al (2005) draw between *discursive* and purely *legal-institutional* notions. The cultural understandings may affect legal structures, and vice versa: they are interactive. These structural factors also interact with processes and agency (Giddens 1989, McAdam 1999). This distinction and the typology are crucial in the matter of citizenship and nationhood.

Koopmans et al. (2005)'s conceptualization of *institutional* and *discursive* opportunity structures is able to combine the historical institutionalist focus on legal institutions with sociological institutionalism's focus on ideas, norms, and discourses. Koopmans et al. (2005: 6) argue that:

Variation in [ethnic relations] depends primarily on different conceptions of national identity and . . . nation-specific integration and citizenship policies. On the institutional side, they determine the rights of immigrants and the . . . institutional channels open to them . . . On the discursive side, cultural notions of citizenship and national identity determine which points of view on the relation between immigrants and the majority are considered sensible . . .

Institutional opportunity structures, as scholars of historical and other types of institutionalism (Pierson and Skocpol 2002) have shown convincingly, are historically rooted, path-dependent, sticky constraints on actors' behavior, political agendas, and policy-making. These crucial factors have been especially pertinent in the areas of citizenship, immigration, and immigrant integration. Institutional and policy-making inertia perpetuate powerful, historically grounded, widely accepted—even hegemonic—structures and constraints.

The second major component of the socio-political opportunity structure is the *discursive* opportunity structure found in a given society. This refers to the dominant ideational, communicative constraints on the behavior and attitudes of social and political actors imposed by the particular political and public mainstream and dominant culture (norms, ideologies, politics, discourses, cognitive scripts, frames) of a given society of settlement. They either enhance or block opportunities for immigrant minorities to participate. These are deeply rooted institutions as well, albeit of a less tangible sort: sociological, discursive, cultural, norm-based institutions, rather legal obligation-based, more ephemeral and dynamic ones; but institutions nonetheless. Indeed, Schmidt (2008) details what she calls “discursive institutionalism.”

This dissertation uses these concepts as guides in analyzing the many components of “socio-political opportunity structures,” which are the independent variables influencing the attitudes and behavior of my respondents. In doing this, I pay special attention to **national citizenship regimes (laws and conceptions of citizenship)**, which deeply influence the political assimilation of immigrants and their self-identification, i.e., whether they feel that they belong to the political community and nation.

#### **IV. Contributions to the Literature**

This dissertation crosses disciplinary boundaries and directly engages the literatures on pluralism, immigration/assimilation, citizenship, nationalism, transnationalism, globalization, and postnationalism. It analyzes little-studied members of disadvantaged groups: the adult Dominican and Turkish professional and university-educated vanguard.

The evolving meaning of citizenship and identity in diverse societies remains to be analyzed fully with an emphasis on the (adult) second generation in a transatlantic or otherwise comparative setting. The adult second generation offers us a glimpse of the futures of these

societies, and more academic studies, as well as more public intellectual commentary, must concentrate on them.

This dissertation fills another gap in the literature. The growing debate on the second generation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008) has so far largely focused on the trajectories of different groups *as a whole* compared to those of other groups, their parents and their native-born peers.

Dominicans are largely treated as a uniformly underachieving group by some analysts and the public (or at least the sizeable exceptions—about a third of Dominican Americans have attended some college—that undermine the concept of general disadvantage among Dominicans are not given enough attention). The community is the “poster child” of segmented, or downward, assimilation, of second-generation decline, and of solid members of the rainbow underclass (Portes and Rumbaut 2001 and Itzigsohn 2009 do not quite go that far, but the group is treated as a *likely* candidate for the above-listed calamities).

Finally, it must be mentioned that the research and most European government policies have often been weighted towards the cultural aspects of immigrant accommodation or assimilation (as in Bauböck 1996 and, in a different way, Huntington 2004). This study privileges a more holistic, multifaceted, and tangible approach encompassing social, political, and economic factors (Kasinitz et al. 2008). This is a more socio-economically (Alba & Nee 2003, Kasinitz et al. 2008, Joppke 2009, Schain 2009) and politically (Mollenkopf 1999, Bloemraad 2006, Yurdakul 2006) driven conception of immigrant assimilation. The concern of the media, political elites, and some scholars with the cultural assimilation of immigrants does not go to the heart of current realities of de facto multiculturalism, nor does this concern shed light on the central role that upward mobility and political inclusion play in the building of

cohesive societies in an age where Western states are seriously constrained by liberal democratic norms of state-ethnic minority relations (Joppke 2001, 2004). Assimilation is a complex, two-way process that rests largely on pragmatic empirical indicators of socio-economic mobility, identificational (civic) assimilation, or political incorporation, rather than culture (i.e., whether it is crucial to debate the introduction of *halal* food at school cafeterias in a toxic climate for immigrants is questionable—Erlanger 2011, Tagliabue 2011).

In sum, my approach will fill the gaps in the literature—performing qualitative research to trace the histories and mechanisms of upward mobility and identity construction for a unique section of the population—in five ways: first by undertaking a transatlantic (and urban) comparison that explores the interplay between local institutions and national ones, an emphasis which is generally largely ignored; second, by questioning rigid national *models* and anti-national post-nationalist theories and discourses to examine the transition from university education to professional employment, multi-faceted assimilation, and citizenship in a number of urban (and indirectly *national*) settings;<sup>17</sup> third, by studying *college-educated* members of comparably disadvantaged second-generation ethnic groups across comparable settings (there are few, if any, studies that address this segment); fourth, by privileging institutional and political rather than cultural considerations as primary in the study of assimilation; and fifth, by investigating the national (rather than merely ethnic or transnational) identification and sense of citizenship among second-generation immigrants from disadvantaged backgrounds through in-depth interviews and analysis of their subjective perspective of their socio-economic status and of host-society institutions on their self-identification.

## V. The Argument in Brief

This dissertation will argue simply that contexts matter and that they vary *within* nation-states as well as across them. When one compares two groups in two contexts that are similar in certain respects, one can unpack crucial structural influences in terms of the ways these contexts differ. My basic conclusion is that the historically-influenced "socio-political opportunity structure" in New York City and the United States makes for a more favorable context of belonging and equal citizenship for college-educated second-generation immigrants from disadvantaged groups than that found in Berlin and Germany. If inclusive, such structures may provide the children of immigrants with political and discursive opportunities for claiming/practicing membership. I argue that these structures have been shaped differently, in varying contexts, by:

- The specific *path-dependent* notions of *national membership* (for Germany see Brubaker 1992, Bade 1994, Faist 1994, Minkenberg 2003, Preuss 2003, Green 2004, and Mandel 2008; for the U.S., see Fuchs 1990, Walzer 1990, Ueda 1997, Salins 1997, Hollinger 1998, Aleinikoff 2001, Etzioni 2004).
- The status of *civil rights and diversity* within each political culture and legal/political institutional structure (this follows from the first variable just listed above; Skrentny 2002; Alba & Nee 2003; Kasinitz 2008; Alba & Foner 2009; for Germany see: Panayi 2004; Joppke 2007; Triadafilopoulos 2009; Human Rights Watch 2010; Keskin 2011; Zick et al. [Ebert Stiftung] 2011).
- The extant legal and cultural *citizenship regimes* (Green 2001 and 2004; Minkenberg 2003, Pickus 2005; for a comparison of the two countries, see Neuman 1997, Bade and Weiner 1997; also see Miera 2009 [The European Commission], Goodman 2010).
- The urban and national institutions and cultures of *civic and political assimilation and*

*incorporation*; as well as the policies resulting from them (for New York City and the U.S., see (Waldinger 1996; Mollenkopf 1999; Foner 2000, Kasinitz et al. 2004 and 2008, Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein 2009; for Germany and its cities, see Koopmans 1999, Green 2004, Koopmans et al. 2005; for a comparison of the U.S. and Germany in the political incorporation of minorities, see Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009, Alba and Foner 2009).

These differing *socio-political opportunity structures* make for different processes of identity and citizenship construction.<sup>18</sup> I argue that they facilitate a heightened sense of national belonging and a stronger sense of equal citizenship if they approximate or attempt to approximate openness and pluralism. Alternative scenarios were certainly possible. If middle-class status attainment in Germany is sufficient to make German Turks feel included in the mainstream, in possible contrast to the U.S., the supposed German national membership effect does not in fact exist. This remained to be researched and analyzed, but I have not found evidence for them in my research so far, hence my tentative hypothesis.

## **VI. A Brief Outline of the Study**

Having laid out the background and the questions that animate this research, introducing the relevant debates, and presenting arguments in a brief fashion in this introductory chapter, the dissertation proceeds next to explain the design, methods, and case study choices utilized to explore those questions in Chapter 2. This chapter also sketches profiles of the locales, groups, and respondents in order to contextualize the study.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 the dissertation analyzes the generalized findings from interviews held with second-generation individuals and civic/political actors. These chapters are the core of the dissertation in that they describe and analyze the behavior and attitudes of the respondents on the contextual factors outlined in Chapter 1. In Chapter 3 the focus is on the academic and

professional, as well as daily, lives of the interviewees. In Chapter 4 the findings from the interviews on the topic areas of *citizenship and political incorporation* will be presented. In Chapter 5 national membership, identity, belonging (and civic assimilation) will be the foci. At each step, a link will be established between the contextual factors analyzed and their effect on the second generation's behavior, attitudes, perceptions, and *Weltanschauungen*. These two chapters serve as the empirical evidence for the arguments that will be made in conclusion. Chapter 6, the final chapter, discusses the nature and implications of the findings, draws comparative lessons, and concludes.

## **Chapter 2. Design, Methods, Contexts**

### **I. Introduction**

This chapter provides an account of the design and methods of the study in order to demonstrate how the research questions posed by the study will be answered. The chapter also lays out, in particular, the rationale behind the design of a comparative project, the benefits of such a comparison, and the choice of locales and groups to compare. The chapter ends with profiles of the groups, locations, and the respondents, in order to contextualize the wider study.

### **II. The Research Design**

#### **Choice of Cases: Why Berlin and New York?**

These questions were explored in the two most prominent urban areas of the United States and Germany, namely New York and Berlin. The United States and Germany are similarly situated advanced Western countries with rapidly diversifying populations. Large portions of the population in both countries are made up of the foreign-born and their children. They are also among the most prominent (hence consequential) polities of the Western world. In addition, Berlin and New York are the most culturally prominent, most diverse, and biggest cities in these countries. These study sites were chosen so as to combine local and national analysis, as well as to further transatlantic comparison (as noted, the literature in these new fields is slowly emerging).

In selecting empirical cases to compare, it is essential “to pick out countries with sufficient and relevant commonalities but also with significant and telling differences” because

“this [brings] to the surface the whole set of complexities and difficulties of the issue” (Rubio-Marín 2000: 10).

The sites are sufficiently similar for comparison. These countries are both rich Western democracies that have experienced mass immigration in the postwar era. In 2010, about 13% of the population was foreign born in both Germany (OECD 2012: 233) as well as in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).<sup>19</sup> As noted above, between a fifth and fourth of the populations of both countries similarly have a recent migration background.

Both countries are wrestling with the problem of maintaining/constructing a cohesive social, economic, and political community given their great diversity. Furthermore, within these countries, Berlin and New York are very similar, nationally central, very large, diverse, and “global” cities (Sassen 1991; Berlin is much less so, but it arguably is a “dual city,” see Mollenkopf and Castells 1992). Yet, notwithstanding the similarities between the two polities and metropolises, the differences between these contexts regarding historical legacies, political cultures, and institutions are considerable. It is indeed precisely the aim of this dissertation to highlight such differences and gauge their impact.

Despite being similar and comparable nation-states (prosperous, diverse, large, influential in world affairs, federal, etc.), the U.S. and Germany also exhibit wide variation in historical background, concepts of national identity, integration policies, citizenship laws, socio-economic structures, political contexts, and outcomes (see Rubio-Marín’s very similar logic for comparing the two countries in Rubio-Marín 2000: 10-11).

Indeed, the principal motive for comparison is to analyze differences while keeping similarities constant, thus isolating the differences between the compared contexts. The United States and Germany also exhibit polar opposite tendencies in many of the independent variables

to be studied (refer to the above-listed components of the “institutional package” found in the two locations). Outcomes in assimilation are expected to differ as well. Thus, we will be able to observe variation in the dependent variable, and institutions (as independent variables) will vary enough for one to identify them as factors which influence different outcomes. Finally, there will be enough similarity in the socio-economic structures of the societies to control for a variety of factors. If assimilation outcomes do not differ in the two contexts, that will be an exciting and counterintuitive finding.

The German population in 2010 included 2,485,000 Turkish-origin individuals (of whom relatively few are citizens: 32% in 2010; see *Statistisches Bundesamt* 2011; as well as Green 2003, Sen 2003, Diehl and Blohm 2003, Worbs 2003 and Diehl and Schnell 2006 for similar figures). In fact, as of 2010, there were 616,000 second- and third-generation Turkish citizens (*Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung* 2012), “native foreigners,” as Koopmans (1999) called them.

The 2010 German *Mikrozensus* also shows 15.7 million people with *Migrationshintergrund* out of a total population of 81.7 million, amounting to 19.2%. In turn, 7.1 million of that total (or, 8.7% of all residents in Germany) are *Ausländer*. Leading all German residents with *Migrationshintergrund* are those with origins in Turkey (15.8%), followed by Poland (6.7%), as well as Italy and Kazakhstan (both 4.7%), due to favorable German policies for ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union (*Statistisches Bundesamt* 2011).

The U.S. was home to 50,477,594 Hispanics (16.3% of the total) and to 1,414,703 Dominicans in 2010. From 2000 to 2010, the Hispanic population grew by 43%; the Dominican population doubled to 1,414,703 (Ennis et al. 2011: 3).

Numerous scholars of immigrant integration have called for a shift to an *urban* focus (Waldinger 1996, Mollenkopf 1999, Favell 2001, Garbaya 2003, Ireland 2004, Koopmans 2004, Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008, Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein 2009) in the study of assimilation/integration. Urban and metropolitan areas are, after all, where immigrants are primarily settled.

While national differences of course matter (as much of the literature has demonstrated), that is no reason to ignore the city-based differences. Particular urban distinctions will be duly and extensively analyzed below at the *intra-* and *inter-*national levels. Moreover, these two countries are federal polities. In federalism, local politics is necessarily crucial.

For example, Waldinger (1996) as well as Mollenkopf (1999) and Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein (2009) all point out the deeply entrenched differences regarding inter-group relations, political culture, institutions, labor markets, unionization rates, and modes of political incorporation between New York and L.A. (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008). Zincone and Caponio (2005) and Borkert et al. (2007) are all examples of such work as well. Foner (2007) stresses structures and cultures unique to New York (see White 1997, Soysal 2001, and Mandel 2008 on Berlin).

Likewise, Favell (2001: 390) argues for city-level approaches that allow “both contextual specificity and structural comparison, allowing for the fact that immigrant incorporation might be simultaneously influenced by local, national, and transnational factors.” This project heeds that call for a shift in focus to analyze the urban context as well as the national context, while studying the interactions between the multiple levels (see also Favell 2008). As Green (2003) points out, the German federal system (as well as the American one, in other ways) means that

the conservative-governed *Länder* have more stringent naturalization practices and integration policies.

Lastly, Kasinitz et al (2008) remind us that city-level identification (in their case as “New Yorkers”) can be a form of identificational assimilation; the same can be said of Berlin, thus providing a possible subversion of the expectation of national identity (which remains to be researched fully).

This project heeds that call for a shift in focus and analyzes the urban context as well as the national context, all while studying the interactions between multiple levels (see also Favell 2008). This emphasis means that local institutions, national institutions, and even the local manifestation of national institutions will be analyzed. The individual level will also be addressed since face-to-face interviews were conducted at that level. Individuals were asked for their opinions on the structural contexts and how these specific contexts have in part led to their current attitudes and behavior. Of course, a story about migration is incomplete unless it also analyzes the global, *supranational*—the EU in Germany's case being a very explicit example—and *transnational* levels, thus going beyond the city and the nation-state, which are never isolated from the global.

### **Choice of Study Groups: Why Dominicans and Turks?**

I gathered snowball samples of college-educated second-generation Turkish immigrants in Berlin and Dominican immigrants in New York. The choice of these two large groups brings national/local contexts into clearer focus and improves validity, since the analyzed second generation will have risen from relatively disadvantaged socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, after overcoming considerable obstacles to their success.

The offspring of Dominican and Turkish immigrants will be starting from a similarly stigmatized position in the social hierarchy given their perceived socio-cultural “otherness” (on a racial basis in the U.S. and a religious one in Germany) as well as a generally low socio-economic background. I have decided to study Dominicans rather than a Muslim ethnic group in New York because Dominicans’ socio-economic background, their large numbers, and their perceived place in the social hierarchy are more similar to that of European Muslim groups such as German Turks. Dominicans, the biggest immigrant group in New York, reside near the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy in terms of their group's negative social image, educational attainment, and income (although the second generation is making important strides, Hernandez-Batista 2003, Hernandez 2004), much as the Turks in Germany (Worbs 2003). Muslim groups in the U.S. are relatively well-to-do and well-assimilated, and as such, they do not make for good comparison without selection bias.

Analogously to race and Hispanidad in the U.S. context, concerns over the place of Islam in a secular/Christian Europe often mark Turks as outsiders (Fetzer and Soper 2000, 2005, Alba 2005, Klausen 2008). The United States context, in contrast, is quite favorable to religious pluralism due to historical and constitutional reasons but has a history of racial discrimination and segregation (Zolberg and Woon 1999, Cesari 2004, Foner & Alba 2008).<sup>20</sup>

Thus, important social boundaries between each group and the host mainstream/majority exist similarly in each case. The boundaries stem from race-ethnicity and language in the American context and from religion and ethnicity in the German one (Alba 2005).

In sum, the racial background of Dominicans (partial African ancestry in the light of a long history of anti-black racism in the United States) as well as the fact that Dominicans are the largest and just about the most socio-economically disadvantaged immigrant group in New York

makes them more comparable to German Turks, since they are similarly placed in the social and economic hierarchies of each country. I also have in mind anti-Hispanic nativism: Zolberg and Woon (1999) argue that Hispanic immigrant background poses a threat for many non-immigrant Americans' self-conception as a country bounded by language, just as the Islamic background of European immigrants poses a similar threat to the cohesion of that continent in the eyes of many Europeans, given their secular/Christian background.

In addition, both groups are similarly highly transnational groups (Østergard Nielsen 2000, Kastoryano 2001, Avci and Kirisci 2007 for Turks; and see Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Guarnizo 1994, Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Levitt 2001, Louie 2006 a and b, Morawska 2007 for Dominicans). Their national orientations, loyalty, and “will to integrate” are disputed by many and discounted even in the academic literature since transnationalism is often thought to be incompatible with assimilation, settlement, and a national host-society orientation. By examining these two similarly transnational groups, one sets up controls for a good comparative research design while also getting a chance to examine whether transnationalism exists to the extent touted and what its impact on assimilation, citizenship, and national membership is.

### **Data Collection**

My primary means of data collection were a total of 61 (38 in Berlin and 23 in New York—an appropriate number; see Weiss 1994) face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews, which aimed to analyze how respondents' processes of identity construction and citizenship practice operate in conjunction with the host context. I also analyze each context through secondary literature and a comparative analysis of the mainstream public/political discourses on diversity, citizenship, and nationhood in each context by conducting a scan of the media in each context. The implications of my data may be limited in generalizability by the fact that my interviews do

not amount to a representative sample. However, in-depth interviews reveal the micro-processes at work in subjects' minds and can relate those to macro theories in ways that more rigid large-n surveys cannot. In sum, subjective viewpoints of respondents on their thinking processes and their perceptions of social mechanisms can be analyzed best through in-depth interviews (Marshall and Rossman 2006).

### **III. A Demographic, Socio-political, and Institutional Profile of the Locales, Groups, and Individuals**

Since about 1965, a new wave of mass immigration to the United States has occurred, chiefly from Latin America and Asia. Consequently, the foreign-born have once again become a significant demographic group in the U.S. after a long lull: in fact, the foreign-born figure in 2010 was 13% (U.S. Census Bureau 2012, 2011), which was by no means a historical peak. It was merely much higher than it had been in decades.

Unlike most European countries, the United States has gone through several destabilizing, nation-building, and transformative mass waves of migration before. After all, the foreign-born made up an even higher 15% of the population in 1910. In fact, by the 1920s America had (*avant la lettre*) become a majority-minority nation, given the fact that the new immigrants weren't quite white, and definitely were non-Nordic.

But the latest immigration wave has differed from earlier ones in one crucial manner: while in 1960 Europeans made up 74.5% of immigrants, by 2010 they amounted to only 12.1%. By contrast, the Asian and Latin American share went from 14.3% to 81.3% during the same period. Much of the nativism towards these "new" immigrants and the widespread doubts about their assimilability in fact stem precisely from most new immigrants' non-white racial

background in contrast to the white, European immigrants of yesteryear, who—it is presumed—assimilated naturally because they were not oppressed racial minorities (Portes and Zhou 1993). However, the fact that “old” immigrants, once also considered racial, national, and social outsiders, have today inarguably become mainstream Americans points to the dynamic nature of social boundaries in the American context. This often goes unnoticed, since the public considers concepts such as assimilation, race, and social/ethnic boundaries to be static and unchanging, despite evidence to the contrary (Alba 2009).

In the United States, in addition to the cyclical apparition and the noise anti-immigrant forces make in both the political and civil society, there also exists (and has historically existed) a deeply entrenched and traditional (and since the 1960s, powerful) structure of support for immigrants, for ethnic-Americans, and for relatively liberal immigration policies, in addition to the rather pluralistic intellectual climate of the American mainstream (Freeman 1996, Gerstle 2001, Pickus 2008, Schuck 2009), especially when compared to German (pro-) immigrant/minority activism (Koopmans 2004, Yurdakul 2009). Nativism may have been awakened recently, but the prospects of its dominance, victory, and a drastically restrictive legal U.S. immigration policy are rather dubious at best in the face of strong countervailing organized and entrenched forces in and out of government.

Like the United States, Germany has also continuously absorbed millions of immigrants (ethnically German and non-German) in the postwar era, notably during the forties and a large post-Cold War wave (Bade 1994 a and b; Hansen 2003, Chin 2007). Starting in the fifties Germany signed a succession of guest worker agreements to fill the plentiful jobs created during its postwar economic miracle, until the 1973 oil shock was followed by an *Anwerbestopp* (cessation of worker recruitment) (Sen 2003, Chin 2007). Turkey, along with other

Mediterranean countries, signed its agreement in 1961, and promptly the Turkish population in Germany (along with foreigners in general) increased rapidly from 7,116 in 1961 to 2,220,223—its peak—in 1998 (Sen 2003:208-209).

Nonetheless, despite its postwar and also imperial (1871-1918) history of mass immigration (Lucassen 2005), Germany has arguably had even more of a moral panic about the immigrants in its midst than the United States (Der Spiegel August 29, 2007 and August 28, 2007, Faist 1994), perhaps precisely because immigrant settlement—as opposed to temporary worker populations—was not expected by the public (Bade 1994). It has especially been the Turks who have been perceived as the most *Fremd* (foreign, other) and socially threatening of all the *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign workers) (Bade & Brown 2003: 243, Lucassen 2005: 144-45, Chin 2007). Guest workers have been an anomaly in German postwar society, and eccentric terms like “foreigners with German passports” or “foreign natives” have been used to refer to their offspring, because “paradoxical definitions reveal a paradoxical situation—in this case an immigration situation without an immigration country,” in Klaus Bade’s words (1994b:10; also see Faist 1994). For example, 37% of all Turkish citizens in Germany, that is, 746,000 people, were “native-born foreigners.”

In brief, speaking in the general terms of “ideal types” (Weber 1968) without much nuance but with descriptive clarity, Germany has historically constructed itself not as a nation of immigrants, but as an ethnic German nation, through the numerous and vastly distinct reincarnations of the modern German polity. This deeply rooted political and popular culture of nationhood and the laws they have spawned have proved resilient and path dependent. Even the democratic postwar West German Federal Republic—and its political culture—held for decades that Germany merely recruited temporary foreign guest workers who would not later settle and

lay down roots (Brubaker 1992, Minkenberg 1999, Rubio-Marin 2000, Martin 2004, Green 2004, Mandel 2008). German citizenship law, as a result, relied until 2000 on the template of the 1913 citizenship law of the Wilhelmine Empire; German immigration policy (officially, *Ausländerpolitik*, or, foreigners policy) therefore exhibited continuities with pertinent Nazi-era laws (Green 2004).

Germany can even be considered one of the “late-comers to immigration,” along with countries such as Italy, Spain, Japan, and South Korea (Cornelius et al. 2004), not in the sense that it is new to immigration per se, but in that Germany has been late with the public recognition and frank acknowledgment of immigration and immigrants.

Germany was always a “reluctant country of immigration” (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004; Martin 2004): foreign workers were recruited as temporary guests and only qua workers, without their families (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1992; Bade 1994a; Martin 2004). Historically, Germany has emphatically been not a “country of immigration,” as the 1977 German federal naturalization guidelines stated clearly: “The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not strive to increase the number of German citizens by way of naturalization” (Brubaker 1992: 147). In fact, the labor migration and its effects have until recently been considered by the German public and German historians as peripheral to West German history and society (Chin: 2007:13), in contrast to the way the United States mythologizes itself as a nation of immigrants (Kennedy 1964).

Guest workers and their families, along with successive generations born as foreigners in Germany, stayed, proliferated, and made Germany a de facto multicultural country. This was largely due to the powerful German courts’ interventions holding governments to the liberal spirit of the Federal Constitution (forbidding the coercive rotation of employees and allowing

family reunification; see Joppke 1996, 1999, Hansen 2003). One may posit that Germany thus acquired its diversity in a fit of absent-mindedness, as Churchill once put it in the context of Britain and its Empire, while the German public and governments both believed for decades that immigration was temporary. To paraphrase oft-quoted Swiss writer Max Frisch, Europe (and especially Germany) asked for workers but got people instead.

As seen above, many authors and commentators find fault with Germany's alleged "ethnic nationhood" tradition as the country struggles to integrate its migrant-origin population. Yet some have argued that defining Germany as an ethnic nation and touting its "supposed" image as a non-immigration country is no longer appropriate, due to the recent changes in German citizenship law from ancestry-based citizenship to birth-based citizenship, finally removing the German exception to the *jus soli*. Perhaps Germany has finally come to terms with its immigrants (Joppke 1999 a and b). Moreover, since the storming of the citadel in 1997 by the Red (SPD/Social Democratic Party)-Green Party coalition, which was staffed with now-matured former New-Left veterans of the battles of the cultural revolution of the sixties and seventies, Germany is supposed to have become a predominately liberal and pluralistic country: a post-'68, "New Germany" (Hockenos 2008).

Thus, some have argued that, particularly after the much-hailed citizenship reforms of 2000, Germany is not an ethnic nation any longer and is converging with the rest of the liberal world (Hansen and Weil 2001).

Berlin and New York both have very large numbers of first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants; and they both arguably have the most inclusive social contexts in each of their countries. The two countries which contain these metropolises are analogously rich and prominent Western democracies that have experienced mass immigration in the postwar era.

They are both wrestling with the tumultuous problem of maintaining and/or (re-)constructing a cohesive social, economic, and political community, given their potentially destabilizing, great, and increasing diversity.

New York is of course still the gateway for much of U.S. immigration (Foner 2000, 2007; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008). In Germany, Berlin continues to be a Mecca for immigrants both in terms of the sheer size of the immigrant-origin population—owing to its status as Germany’s biggest city by far—and in terms of destination trends for immigrants to Germany. Berlin has attracted more “net” immigrants since 2000 than any other German city in both absolute and proportional terms (Focus Migration 2008:2), and is at the forefront of more pluralistic immigrant (integration) policy experiments in Germany (Interview, Ulrich Raiser 2010; Berlin Senat 2007). Koopmans (2004) also ranks it at the top in Germany in terms of an inclusive structure, while pointing out that the most “pluralist/progressive” city in Germany is much less so than Dutch or British cities.

Berlin may lag behind Frankfurt and a few other cities in its foreign population ratio (Zeitschrift für Amtliche Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2011: 56), but it makes up for this in its age-old traditions of diversity and cosmopolitanism. It has always been home to immigrants, whether they were French Huguenots—whose descendants include the religiously intolerant critic Thilo Sarrazin—or Eastern Jews during Weimar (Richie 1998; Mandel 2008); also consider its sheer mass of its people with *Migrationshintergrund* (the Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office reports 859,253 people, making up about a quarter of the city; Bömmermann 2011).

In 2009, 13.7% (460,187) of Berlin's inhabitants were foreign citizens, in addition to many immigrant-background Berliners who are German citizens. While this lags behind

approximately 24% of Munich and Stuttgart's population who are foreign, there has been a shift of immigration flows to Berlin: “Of all the cities between the years 2000 and 2005, Berlin exhibits the highest net immigration figures from abroad both in absolute terms and in relation to the population” (Focus Migration Policy 2008).

Moreover, the sheer number of people of an immigrant background, 859,253 out of a total of 3,369,672 in 2009 (Bömmermann 2011), is twice the number in Hamburg. Notwithstanding the total population differences, Berlin’s mass of residents with an immigrant background is very large and makes Berlin an immigrant center and a multicultural city. 25.5 % of the city has a *Migrationshintergrund*, above the national average of 20%. Furthermore, an oft-ignored fact is that Turks and other immigrant-origin Berliners are actually long-time residents only of West Berlin (still a city within a city with its own past and character in many ways). Berlin’s Mitte (for Turks’ purposes, largely the Wedding area) and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, in combination, contain about the same percentage of people of migration background (252,000 out of 598,000) as does Frankfurt am Main, the leader among German cities (around 42%) (Amts für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2011).

When one adds the so-called *westliche Bezirke*/western districts (including Neukoelln and Charlottenburg-Schoeneberg), which have 1,714,000 residents, thereby completing a contiguous “West Berlin,” 30% have a migration background, putting it on par with top five cities like Munich, Stuttgart, and Düsseldorf (*Zeitschrift für amtliche Statistik Berlin Brandenburg* 2011).

The penultimate Turkish neighborhood in Berlin is Kreuzberg, which used to literally stop at the wall until the unification. It is a neighborhood that was blighted in the postwar years and its center was the victim of the same urban removal/revitalization projects that prevailed throughout the West at the time (Mandel 2008.). Kreuzberg is today fast gentrifying (although it

has always had a mixture of Bohemians and immigrants), and its neighbor Neukoelln remains a much more predominately Turkish enclave (although, neither neighborhood matches Washington Heights and Dominicans in that respect: Turks make up only about 15% of the total in the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg; see *Zeitschrift für amtliche Statistik Berlin Brandenburg* 2010).

Turks are the leading migrant group in Berlin (along with Poles), as they are in Germany overall. Among Berliners with *Migratonshintergründ*, those of Turkish ancestry make up a dominant 22.8% (185,000 people) of the total population of over 3 million people. Problematically only 68,697 of these individuals have German citizenship. Poles follow with 93,109 Polish Berliners, a majority of whom had German citizenship (*Zeitschrift für amtliche Statistik Berlin Brandenburg* 2011). Turks are the biggest immigrant group in their “home turf” (Mitte and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg), but they amount to only about 13% of the population, lacking the Dominicans’ demographic domination of their neighborhood, Washington Heights (Nauenburg 2010: 26).

New York City is much like the United States in that it sees itself first and foremost as a place of constant immigration and great ethnic diversity. The city’s very personality is shaped by large waves of immigration (Foner 2000). Even its “white” plurality mostly traces itself only a few generations back to the mass migration at the turn of the last century (in contrast to Los Angeles, for example—see Foner 2013, 2007 and Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein 2009). The institutions and the social, political, and economic culture that New Yorkers’ largely Italian and Jewish ancestors set up back then welcome new immigrants from the Caribbean and Asia, among other places, today (Foner 2000; Kasinitz et al 2008). On the other hand, pessimists argue that assimilation into the mainstream is either blocked or unlikely for many Latino- and African-Americans of immigrant background (Portes and Zhou 1993) due to the American realities of

nativism, racial inequality, a past and present that is less pluralistic than mythologized (Smith 1997), and intensifying government crackdowns (i.e. Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Arizona, Finnegan 2009; and the increasing number of deportations under Obama; Shear 2013).

In New York City, immigrants, as ever, dominate the demographic make-up of the public. The 2010 Census reported that this percentage had risen steadily in recent decades to 36.8%. Thus immigration is once again the dominant demographic phenomenon in this city of immigrants. Furthermore, more than 50% of the people in the city are either first or second-generation immigrants (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008), making New York an immigrant city par excellence, much as it has been for centuries (Foner 2000; Kasinitz et al. 2008). Hispanics in general have grown rapidly to make up 29.4% of the city (The U.S. Census 2010)

Although Dominicans make up a paltry 2.8% of all Hispanics in the United States (*ibid.*), New York City is ground zero for the Dominican-American community. The Dominican-born in the United States are heavily concentrated in the Northeast (82% of all Dominicans in 2004), and especially in the New York City area (NYCDCP 2004: 11).

New York City was home, according to the 2010 census, to 588,865 people of Dominican ancestry, 365,585 of whom were foreign-born (Bergad 2011), making such Dominicans the city's largest foreign-born ethnic group. While Puerto Ricans remain the largest single Hispanic ethnic group in the city, their population is decreasing and they seem destined to be taken over by Dominicans soon. The number of Puerto Ricans has declined 8% since the 2000 census, while the Dominican population, the second biggest Hispanic group, grew by 42% over the same period. (For comparative purposes, people of Italian ancestry—long identified as a

dominant group in the city—numbered 676,425 in 2000.) Meanwhile, in 2000 the larger metropolitan New York conurbation was home to 800,460 people of Dominican ancestry.

The Dominican enclave in New York City is the neighborhood of Washington Heights. It is dominated by the community demographically: 112,632 Dominicans make up 53% of the total population of 211,884 (Bergad 2008). Dominicans have a long history of political and community organizing in the neighborhood and across the city, beginning with the fight for inclusion in school boards led by Guillermo Linares in the 1980s (Hoffnung-Sarskoff 2008), followed by the creation of a majority-Dominican district and the election of Linares to the New York City Council (the first Dominican-American elected official, succeeded today by Ydanis Rodriguez, a bilingual education teacher, a few of whose community meetings I have attended) and growing today to a state where Dominicans have many elected officials (Espaillat and Linares in the New York State Legislature, the mayor of Providence, the former Bronx Borough President Carrion, etc.), community organizations, grass root organizations (Young Dominicans) and professional/machine political organization (Marwell 2004, 2007), as well as a U.S. Secretary of Labor (Tomas Perez).

In Kreuzberg and other Turkish enclaves, as well as nationwide, German Turks do not possess much political clout due to their low numbers of voters, the lack of an ethnic political organizing tradition in Germany, and the lack of any government or public interest in increasing diversity in politics through some sort of affirmative action (Miera 2009 [EU Commission]). However, Cem Özdemir (former member of the European Parliament) and the current co-chair of the Green Party is a shining example of the community's increasing political stature.

### **The Assimilation Profile of the Groups**

Turks and Dominicans are described—correctly—as the most socio-economically disadvantaged immigrant groups in their respective cities and countries (Hernandez-Batista 2003, Kasinitz et al. 2008, Elger et al. 2009, Ataman and Ruess 2009, Itzigsohn 2009). However, especially in the case of Dominicans, there are reasons for hope as well as grim news.

Nativists today often contend that Hispanic immigrants and their descendants are refusing to learn English and are creating a bilingual or even bi-national future for the United States. Nonetheless, the United States is often called the “graveyard of languages,” as each new generation moves further away from the mother tongue and towards English. Richard Alba's research based on the 2000 Census shows that “Among Asian groups, 96 percent [of the second generation] are proficient in English.” Almost 80% of second-generation Filipinos are actually English-monolingual. Alba adds: “English-only is the predominant pattern by the third generation.” A full 93% of third-generation Asians speaks only English. As regards Hispanics, the group that causes the greatest alarm for many, evidence shows that among second-generation immigrants 92% speak English well or very well. Bilingualism remains a common pattern, however, and into the third generation many Hispanics retain self-professed knowledge of Spanish. However, this retention of Spanish does not take away from the fact that even among second-generation Hispanics proficiency in English is near universal. Moreover, Ruben Rumbaut notes that “even among Mexicans [the most populous group and one that is heavily concentrated along the Mexican border], by the third generation 96% prefer to speak English at home.” Portes and Rumbaut's research (2001) also shows that among the Mexican second generation in Southern California, only 6.5 % prefers Spanish.

For Dominicans, fluency in English is not a problem either, even though they tend to speak more Spanish and be less monolingual in English than other Hispanics: almost half of the third generation Dominican children (6-15 year olds) speak only English, while only 9.7% of the second generation does. However, 85% of second-generation Dominican children do speak English well (Alba 2004: 6).

This is in contrast to the comparative numbers found among Turkish-Germans: there, proficiency in German hovers around the 70% range (Diehl and Blohm 2003).

As far as educational attainment, Turkish-origin children fare the worst among groups with a migration background (Wöllert et al. 2009), as they are the least integrated group in Germany by all indicators of assimilation (ibid.; Wöllert et al., 2009:49). 15.3% of those with *Migrationshintergrund* lack the equivalent of a secondary school/high school degree (*Schulabschluss*), compared to only 2% of Germans without a *Migrationshintergrund*. While 45% of the former lack even a “job-qualifying” school degree, or a vocational, lesser high school degree (*Berufsausbildungsabschluss*), only 19.2% of the latter do (*Statistisches Bundesamt* 2011). In all of Germany, Turkish men and women had the highest percentages of those without any *Schulabschluss* (*Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung* 2012: 44).

In Berlin, young people of Turkish origin fare much worse: 40% lack a basic *Schulabschluss* (a figure which is 2% for German youth without *Migrationshintergrund* and 12% of non-Turkish youth with *Migrationshintergrund*; compare this with roughly 16% of the Dominican second generation; Lopez and Limonic, 18). An astronomical 72% lack a *Berufsausbildungsabschluss* (12% for Germans, 26% for other immigrant-origin youth); a mere 5% have a professional college/university degree, (*Fach-)Hochschulabschluss*, compared to 20% of German youth and 32% of those with *Migrationshintergrund* (Nauenberg 2010: 27, compared to

24% of U.S.-born Dominicans 25 years of age and older who had achieved a B.A. degree or higher in 2008, including 34% of female Dominicans; see Lopez and Limonic 2010: 21, Kasinitz et al. 2008).

As for other measures of higher education, Dominicans again surpass German Turks, even though they are the worst off among major immigrant groups in the U.S. in that respect (Kasinitz et al. 2008), though they do match the U.S. average in general: “In 2000, close to 60 percent of all Dominicans born in the United States with 25 years of age or older had received some college education, with 21.9 percent completing a college education . . .” (Hernandez 2004). The City University of New York is a big reason for this educational attainment, showing the effect that a host polity can make by creating opportunities for its huge second-generation population through supporting a public university like CUNY: “At the City University of New York (CUNY), Dominican students have since 1998 represented the single largest ethnic/national group among all students” (Hernandez 2004).

In 2005, the unemployment rate for Dominicans above 16 in the New York Metro Area was 7% and the labor force participation rate was 64.4% (Limonic 2006: 6). After the recession, these numbers worsened, and in 2012 12% of all Dominicans in New York City were unemployed and the median household income among them was the lowest of all Latino groups, at 32,000 USD per annum, compared to 52,000 for Colombians (Mexican unemployment was as low as 7%; see Jan Vink and Blakely-Armitage 2012). Still, Dominicans are weathering this current recession better than the last major one: these recent unemployment rates, and even those from the 2000s, are down from 15.7% and 18.4% in 1990 for males and females respectively (Hernandez and Batista 2003).

Nonetheless, the unemployment rates among Dominicans, the poorest Latino and immigrant-origin group in New York (ibid.; Kasinitz et al. 2008) pale beside Turkish unemployment in Berlin.

Labor force participation rates for male and female Dominicans were respectively 61% and 64% in 2005 (Lopez and Limonic 2008: 17). Compare this to their Berlin counterparts, who fare much worse in the job market: only 35% of Turks (resident and citizen) in Berlin were gainfully employed in 2008, and were thus participating in the labor market, nearly half the rate for Dominicans in New York. The figure was 50% for Germans without *Migrationshintergrund*. 31% of Turks used Harz IV (a form of welfare, vs., 21% of others with a *Migrationshintergrund*). Almost 20% of New York Latinos were middle class in 2006 (Jimenez 2009: 25).

More pessimistic scenarios concerning the fate of the second generation often point to the Mexican experience in the United States, due to their low parental human capital, high levels of undocumented status and discrimination, and low levels of educational attainment. More optimistic scholars point out the slow but unmistakable upward mobility of many descendants of poorer low-skilled migrants. For these scholars, their very high rates of labor force participation, their mobility relative to their parents, as well as their average years of schooling place the Mexican second generation generally in the stable working class or the lower middle class, not the underclass.

Second generation Dominicans, a similarly disadvantaged group, have high indicators of poverty and welfare use (Hernandez-Batista 2003; Levitt 2007), but they have also been making some strides in educational and socio-economic assimilation, performing much better than native minorities like African Americans and Puerto Ricans. Yet, there remain many obstacles to the

socio-economic assimilation of Hispanic Americans: a large share of the descendants of Hispanic immigrants remains at-risk, especially given the undocumented status of many of their parents, which makes assimilation very difficult for a family even if the second-generation child in the household is a native-born American citizen.

In the arena of political empowerment, 68% of Dominicans in Washington Heights are native-born or naturalized citizens. Of the foreign-born, while only 28% were naturalized in 1990, by 2008 49% were (Bergad 2008:18; also see Upegui n.d. and Taylor et al. 2012 on the significance of the Latino vote). In 2009, of the 176,000 Berliners with a Turkish migration background, 68,697 were German citizens and 108,006 were Turkish citizens. Eight percent of all Germans had been settled in Germany for more than 8 years but only 32% of them had citizenship. That is so even though about 52% of all Turkish-Germans were born in Germany (Wöllert et al. 2009).

### **A Brief Profile of the Respondents**

The pool of respondents was as representative of and diverse within each group as possible. I sought respondents partly through professional contacts, using university officials, professors, colleagues, and ethnic or political organizations as informants about relevant students who would then lead me to potential respondents. A limited form of “snowball sampling” (Heckathorn 2006) enabled me to ask appropriate respondents where to find other appropriate respondents. In “Respondent-Driven Sampling” (Heckathorn 2006), a type of snowball sampling which was approximated here, generalizability is further improved by establishing referral chains that are sufficiently long and numerous: respondents recruit peers, who recruit friends that qualify, and so on. A recruitment quota is set so that a few respondents cannot do all the recruiting

(Heckathorn 2006). My sample included no more than only one or two referrals from each respondent. My efforts to solicit respondents from a variety of sources widened the net.

In addition to setting up formal contacts, networks, and relationships, a certain amount of “soaking and poking” in the field yielded an appropriate sample and insightful observations: two consecutive summer stays in Berlin in 2008 and 2009 were immensely helpful. In New York, as noted, my own diverse CUNY students as well as the Dominican Studies Center at City College were huge resources. I also have lived in “the field” for 7 years, that is, in a heavily Dominican New York City neighborhood. Our lives are immersed in Dominican American life: we chat with Dominican neighbors, shop at their bodegas (buying pastelitos and befriending them), and attend community or district political events dominated by Dominican-American politicians; and most importantly, teaching Dominican students is a big part of our careers. These ties to the spaces where immigrant/second generation lives are lived in both Berlin and New York add an ethnographic dimension to the research method.

In each case, the general class (working class origins, upwardly mobile) and gender backgrounds (a small majority of the respondents were female) of the respondents interviewed for the study were comparable across countries, and the average respondent’s parents’ class background was comparable as well (most parents had roughly an elementary-school level education). Each group from each country, in the aggregate, came from low socio-economic backgrounds; the class mix among the sampled respondents’ parents across locales was appropriately distributed and in tune with the general statistical data concerning the immigrant community in the country. Many respondents were, as is the norm, the first college graduates in their immediate family. Most of them had, again as is the norm, parents who typically had only a few years of education in their home countries, who worked working-class/menial jobs after

emigrating, and who had limited language skills and cultural capital appropriate to the new country. Most parents were of rural backgrounds.

There were some exceptions to the rule, but they remained exceptions and a small proportion of all respondents. Turkish-German respondents who are ethnically half-German and who came from well-to-do backgrounds, or Dominican-Americans who are white, half-Cuban or Colombian, and of middle-class background had more positive views of their respective countries. Their stories deserve to be told at length, but they do not represent the average second generation Turkish German or Dominican American.

My respondents ranged from 20 to 53 years in age; but most were between 25 and 35. The public service sector and the non-profit sector accounted for a plurality of jobs of the respondents in both cities. But in both sites there were businessmen, architects, lawyers, academics, political staff, as well as a few doctors in Berlin. In New York six who worked in social work-related fields were balanced out by four businesspeople and five political staff. In Berlin, eight social workers were accompanied by three lawyers, three doctors, four academics, and even one artist. Both sets of samples in the two contexts were about 60% female, a disparity to be expected given the differential educational attainment rates between the male and female second generation (Lopez 2004, Lopez And Limonic 2008:21, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2012).

While a plurality of the Dominican respondents were born in and grew up in Washington Heights, Brooklyn neighborhoods like Williamsburg, Bushwick, or Bedford-Stuyvesant were home to many as well. A sizeable minority lived either in (old) white ethnic areas like Bensonhurst, or predominately white areas like suburbs or Park Slope, Brooklyn. Many more German respondents were migrants from other German states, since Turks are much more

dispersed. Many came from the western industrial heartlands like Nordrhein Westphalen, Hesse, or, specifically, the Ruhrgebiet (Essen, Bochum, etc.). A small majority, however, grew up in Turkish neighborhoods like Kreuzberg, Neukoelln, Wedding, or Schoeneberg. A few grew up in predominately German suburbs like Zehlendorf and Stieglitz (and they were greatly outnumbered, to their frequent discomfort there, by ethnic-Germans without a migration background).

#### **IV. Conclusion**

This chapter laid out the road map by which the dissertation will answer the questions it poses. It also accounted for the appropriateness and necessity of the choices made in selecting the cases and groups. The chapter sketched the profiles of the locales, groups, and the respondents as well, in order to give context to the following chapters wherein the respondents speak for themselves. The dissertation now turns to those opportunity structures in each field and respondents' personal accounts.

## **Chapter 3. Civil Rights, Diversity, and Discrimination:**

### **Political Culture, Institutions, and Policies**

#### **I. Introduction**

This chapter analyzes how the respondents in each distinct context perceive and experience the laws, policies, institutions, cultures, and norms regarding civil rights, discrimination, and diversity. In other words, in the parlance of this study, “What kind of ‘discursive and institutional opportunity structures’ do the respondents face as they attempt to break into the mainstream on equal terms?” Such structural and cultural—but ever-changing—phenomena are integral in any discussion of assimilation, (national) identity, and citizenship, since they constitute some of the major independent variables of the study (i.e., the social forces that influence the observed outcomes).

According to Alba and Nee's theory of neo-assimilation (2003), anti-discrimination measures must be taken by the polity—aimed at enabling integration by empowering minorities and increasing social equality—because assimilation is a two-way street that involves not just the immigrant but also the host society. These legal-institutional steps and the public influence of relatively liberal elite opinions often lead to changing social norms (Carmines and Stimson 1989, Zaller 1992; the youngest birth cohorts in the U.S. hold immeasurably more liberal views on race, immigration, gay rights, and other socio-cultural issues than their grandparents: see Clark et al. 2010).

By enacting civil rights measures the state makes a powerful symbolic and legal gesture as it puts its police powers at the service of equality for minorities; this then fosters the

mainstream valorization of civil rights, racial equality, diversity, and an anti-discrimination ethic. (Skrentny 2002, Alba & Nee 2003, Kasinitz et al. 2008, Lieberman 2011).<sup>21</sup>

Of course, state support will not and cannot end discrimination and bring about full racial equality; but the threat of sanctions by the government and the shunning by the public of discriminatory discourse make discrimination highly inappropriate, not to mention illegal. Such civil rights measures help make the process of integration/assimilation a true two-way street, rather than one where immigrants alone must bear the bane of integration while the host society and polity do not share the load.

In assessing macro sociopolitical forces and their impact, I will present the process by which my respondents eventually achieved socio-economic assimilation (educational and occupational attainment) by following their “march through the institutions” (from school to professional workplaces) and by examining their day-to-day interactions.

This analysis helps one better understand respondents’ backgrounds and the institutional and contingent mechanisms that contributed to or obstructed their upward mobility. Their experiences of mobility will range from having experienced no discrimination to persevering despite discrimination and othering, and to eventual inclusion and mobility (aided by accommodation and acceptance at school, life, and work). Early life experiences especially have a bearing on adults’ feelings of inclusion and national belonging. The qualitative interview data on socio-economic background will also highlight how upward mobility by the children of immigrants affects their feelings of national belonging and citizenship.

The chapter will first compare the sociopolitical and institutional differences in the two contexts regarding the issues of civil rights and discrimination. In Section III, the chapter will descend from structural factors to the individual level by giving voice to the second generation in

Berlin, in relaying their personal, often emotional experiences with discrimination and alienation; or, conversely, their more positive moments of perceived inclusion. Section IV will do the same for New York City. Finally, the chapter will conclude with reflections on the comparison of the contexts and the differences in outcomes.

## **II. Comparing the Two Distinct Civil Rights Contexts: The Varying Socio-political Opportunity Structures of Civil Rights in Berlin and New York City**

### **The Legal-Institutional and Discursive Opportunity Structures of Civil Rights, Discrimination, and Diversity in Two Contexts**

On the legal-institutional side of the civil rights ledger, the United States led the way among today's advanced industrial and multicultural countries of immigration when it implemented civil rights and anti-discrimination laws and created a relatively more permeable and pluralistic public culture of civil rights, diversity, and anti-discrimination between 1965-1975 (Skrentny 2002; also see Alba and Nee 2003). This was followed by Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, an effort largely modeled on the American framework (Hansen 2000), and by France—to much lesser degree, that is, providing much less protection to minorities—in 1972 as well as later, in 2001 (Joppke 2007).

Differences in anti-discrimination laws, for example, are crucial variables in terms of the subject matter of this study. In brief, these are strict and penalizing in the United States (Lieberman 2011), whereas relatively inconsequential in Germany.<sup>22</sup>

As for Europe, only in 2000 did the EU belatedly issue its “race directive,” which “require[d] that by July 2003 member states pass laws against ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ discrimination on the grounds of ‘racial or ethnic origin.’” It sought to compel EU laggards to move forward on anti-discrimination. Germany only signed on belatedly and passed its own anti-discrimination

legislation (*AGG*) in 2006 (*Ibid.*; Simon Green and Turner, ed.s, 2008). Germany has been, as in other areas of coming to terms with its diversity, a laggard in its laws and political culture in the area of anti-discrimination. Germany only belatedly passed a law under EU pressure and over domestic opposition, and does not have a state-sponsored office that deals with discrimination issues, in contrast to Britain and the U.S. (Koopmans et al. 2005, Ch. 2; Joppke 2007). Consequently, Germany does not fare well in the area of anti-discrimination, even when compared to other homogeneous-minded, relatively ethnic European countries.

According to one measure of Islamophobia developed by the eminent Ebert Foundation of Germany, Germany does worse in that regard than her neighbors Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands (on the above-average Islamophobia in Germany, see Zick et al. [Friedrich Ebert Stiftung] 2011 and Human Rights Watch 2009).<sup>23</sup>

It especially matters if there is a government office responsible for anti-discrimination and equal opportunity (Commission for Racial Equality in the U.K., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the civil rights division of the Department of Justice in the U.S.) or if there is not (as in Germany). For instance, the Civil Rights Office of the Department of Justice actually sued an Oklahoma school district for not allowing a Muslim girl to attend class wearing a headscarf on First Amendment, religious liberty grounds, alleging violation of the “equal protection clause” of the Constitution.

In Germany, the fact that a newspaper headline can still announce, “Member of jury discharged by the judge due to her Muslim headscarf,” shows plainly that fundamental issues remain, especially in employment discrimination, on the basis of religious, ethnic, or national origin.

In this particular case mentioned above, “The judge at the Regional Court Dortmund discharged a member of the jury, a German woman with a Turkish background, from her jury duty because she refused to take off her Muslim headscarf. The judge argued that the headscarf expresses a certain ‘belief’ and thus contravenes the objectivity required to fulfil [sic] the duty of a juror. The vice-chairman of the judges’ association of North Rhine-Westphalia, *Richterbund NRW*, stated that he would like higher courts to clarify the issues in question” (Human Rights Watch 2009).

About half a century prior to the passage of Germany’s anti-discrimination law, during the tumultuous historical juncture of the 1960s and the 1970s, the United States was home to many civil rights groups in its civil society (Branch 1988, 1998, 2006); it implemented wide-ranging civil rights and anti-discrimination laws; and finally a corresponding public culture of civil rights, diversity, and anti-discrimination was born, all processes that were initiated between about 1965-1975 (Skrentny 2002; also see Alba & Nee 2003).

Since then, this minority rights framework and the attendant civil rights culture have not eradicated discrimination but have nonetheless helped many non-white children of immigrants, such as Dominicans, who suffered less from discrimination than they would have in the absence of these laws and their cultural context. The Berlin accounts analyzed above demonstrate a counterfactual context, where the relative absence of a holistic civil rights framework is evident.

In the U.S., a major change has occurred in the postwar era in the legal treatment of minorities.<sup>24</sup> These were followed by more race-conscious policies such as affirmative action, school busing, bilingual education, and race-based electoral redistricting, resulting in a government-sanctioned classification of Americans into what Hollinger calls the “ethno-racial pentagon.”<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to the Western European (including German) handling of frequent “headscarf affairs,” headscarves have not been an issue in the United States. As Kwame Appiah argues, “from the perspective of an American jurist . . . headscarf cases are not terribly vexing. The First Amendment . . . requires that reasonable accommodations be made to ensure the ‘free exercise’ of religion, while also prohibiting the ‘establishment,’ or official endorsement, of any religion” (Appiah 2005). In addition to the case of the Department of Justice suing the Oklahoma school district mentioned above, in another case, a girl wearing a headscarf sued a school district (with help from the left wing-civil libertarian ACLU; compare to left-republican attitudes) because the school did not stop some students from harassing her.

In addition, a government—presumably only one with a declared mission of increasing diversity and enforcing civil rights laws—can choose to enact affirmative action programs/preference programs, which ease minority recruitment and hiring and consequently minorities’ entrance into the social and economic mainstream. Alternatively, in other contexts, affirmative action (and other diversity-promoting measures), as well as civil rights/anti-discrimination, are shunned altogether or are belatedly debated. Even when introduced such laws tend to lack much teeth.

For instance, affirmative action practices in the U.S. improve minority recruitment, valorize diversity, help rectify inequality, and thus show the importance of national institutional settings (Holzer and Neumark 2000). The federal government also demands standards of diversity from its contractors.<sup>26</sup> In the opinion upholding the fundamentals of affirmative action in the 2003 *Grutter v. Bollinger* case, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor set the precedent that diversity is a public interest that the U.S. federal government is constitutionally compelled to further. Such programs provide second-generation immigrants with more open recruitment

systems. Without these institutional safeguards in place, upward mobility might be difficult for the second generation (Kasinitz 2008).

My New York respondents—along with other minorities—benefited especially from one civil rights policy in particular: affirmative action. This policy's consequences, such as its positive impacts on the integration of second-generation immigrants, may be unintended but are much-needed (see Skrentny 2002; Alba & Nee 2003, Holzer and Neumark 2000 and 2005; Kasinitz 2008, Alba & Foner 2009).

Germany in general does not have an equivalent program and debates over encouraging naturalization, civil rights, and diversity have only recently entered the German mainstream. Berlin seems to stand out with its “*Berlin braucht dich!* [Berlin needs you]” recruitment campaign for apprenticeships in its civil service jobs such as its police department. Nonetheless, this is a lukewarm affirmative action-lite campaign that only recently began; moreover, it is one that aims to elevate the Berlin police department and other city agencies from a flat baseline—i.e. almost completely homogeneous levels: “Only an estimated 150 persons of the 16,000 police officers in Berlin have a migrant background. However, the Berlin police aim at increasing the quote of migrant police officers to 10 per cent” (FRA/EUMC 2007:67). By comparison to the 1% figure in Berlin, New York City’s police department is majority-minority. Also, federal courts are pushing cities to increase the share of minorities in fire departments, for example—indicating the state’s keen interest in diversity, which was the fundamental reason the Supreme Court gave to uphold the University of Michigan’s affirmative action program. Thus, even if Berlin is better than most German cities in its pro-diversity policies (ibid.; Koopmans 2004, Berlin Senat 2007),<sup>27</sup> compared to North American metropolises the affirmative state action is minimal.

New York City's own city government, in addition to enforcing federal and state anti-discrimination laws, has its own supplemental and pro-immigrant policies regarding immigrants' and minorities' civil rights, in addition to its long tradition of being a city of immigrants and its long-standing institutions accustomed to dealing with newcomers (Interview, G. Linares).

New York's public university system (City University of New York) is an immense system that channels thousands of students every year—most of immigrant origin—into middle class employment and aids in their assimilation, as a college education is required for the second generation to move into the local and national middle-class mainstream (Attewell et al. 2009; also see Mollenkopf 1999 and Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2002).<sup>28</sup>

In addition, the hiring and recruitment policies (including but not limited to affirmative action) of the City University of New York and other public institutions, especially the civil service departments of the New York City government, have created a big minority middle class directly as a result of the government's express desire to further diversity (New York Times 2011). Kasinitz (2008) even paradoxically argues that being classified as minority in New York actually may often improve upward mobility because of this post-civil rights era framework. New York's strong labor movement also still disproportionately serves immigrant-origin and minority members and keeps them out of poverty (Waldinger 1996).

II. A. iii. The Discursive Opportunity Structures: Civil Rights and Diversity. As far as discursive norms and opportunities and the less tangible, more verbal structures governing entitlement to protection from discrimination, the SPD-Green government tellingly argued in its 2004 anti-discrimination law proposal (one implementing the EU Race Directive requiring member states to pass such laws), "In Germany there is as yet no culture of antidiscrimination" (ibid. 265), meaning there is very little awareness of the issue both among the general public (as is often

rightly emphasized) and even among those of migrant-origin. German minorities, for example, are the least likely to know whatever rights they have, to complain about discrimination, and to litigate on grounds of discrimination (Marsh and Sahin Dikmen 2002 [Eurobarometer]).<sup>29</sup>

In the United States, a societal and governmental shunning and prohibition of overt racism and racial discrimination occurred decades before the (West) German government even acknowledged being home to immigrants and started debating diversity (Schain 2009).

A relatively hostile mainstream German political debate over such a basic civil rights bill for minorities reflects the fact that “Germany’s postwar migrants were received as mere guest workers who had no claim to legitimate membership in society” (Joppke 2007; see also Bade 1994, Faist 1994, Chin 2008, and Mandel 2008). As a result, policies aimed at diversifying universities, other public institutions, and private entities like corporations have been belated, insufficient, or absent altogether. Logic dictates that if there is a lack of awareness of the host society’s responsibilities for the assimilation of immigrants, as well as of the existence of discrimination and even the need for anti-discrimination legislation, this results in a delay in passing a law on the matter, as it did Germany. Consequently, “integration,” as in “Why are these immigrants not integrating, incorporating?” becomes a salient, politicized, and abused issue that blames immigrants for doing what is needed to integrate/assimilate, i.e., there is something the immigrants are lacking which makes them incompatible with “us.”

As a paper by the German research institute EFMS<sup>30</sup> very astutely puts it:

The awareness of the extent and impact of (ethnic) discrimination – direct and indirect, individual and institutional – appears weak in broad parts of the German society. Whereas in some European countries, such as France or the UK, a broad public debate on ethnic discrimination has been taking place, in German politics as well as in German society the disadvantaged position of migrants or minorities is hardly perceived as a result of direct discrimination, but primarily as caused by a lack of qualification or “human capital” of the migrants. As a consequence, anti-discrimination provisions are

not viewed as a possible solution to the “integration problems” of migrants. (Bosch et al. 2008: 1)

These issues manifest themselves most readily in the media. Often, the effect of the media is one of defining and representing the nation in restrictive terms; for example, by stoking fear of immigrants and insinuating that immigrants and their children do not even want to integrate. Self-segregation and socio-economic disadvantages are often ascribed to the immigrants’ culture/religion, rather than overtly to “race.” Thus, the media can create a perceived public policy crisis and mass moral panic (Poole and Richardson 2009, Chavez 2009). Alternatively, the media and public/political culture in a host society can be relatively pluralistic, diversity-aware, and diverse itself. Public discourse and media coverage both shape and are shaped by the political culture, institutions, policies, and traditions of diversity and immigrant integration.

In accordance with the long-standing ideology and related policies of West German governments that migrants were going to go home with their children (Brubaker 1992, Chin 2009), some respondents were put in so-called *Türken Klassen* or *Ausländer* [foreigner] *Klassen* where they were segregated and even sometimes taught by teachers sent from Turkey by the Turkish ministry of education (Koopmans et al 2005; segregationist model, Germany). This dissimilationist ideology reinforced the "myth of return" among the parents of almost all respondents, whereby families felt like guests, were treated as guests, and accordingly planned to go home as soon as they saved enough money.

Instead of acknowledging the permanence of the foreign workers/immigrants and their entitlement to equality, the Federal Republic was for much of its postwar history a country of guest workers [*Gastarbeiter*] in its laws, policies, and political/public culture (Mandel 2008,

Chin 2009). The very semantics of the word *Ausländer* of course connote alienness (alterity) and inequality, not equal membership with entitlement to equal treatment. These guest workers were never perceived as permanent, at least not until the 1990s. The precise appeal of the term *Ausländer* in West Germany was that—unlike the words *immigrant* or *minority*—it did not connote any settlement; thus state and social responsibility towards *Ausländer* was kept minimal (Mandel 2008).

Sensationalist accounts of the headscarf issue, domestic violence, rare fundamentalist and violent acts like honor killings, arranged marriages, and juvenile delinquency, are constantly present in the media, and Turks are often identified explicitly as the culprits. This causes even my assimilated and secular respondents to feel alienated, as they recount the same prominent cases independently. Integration is thought to be a one-way street where immigrants alone become “Germans” by crossing a bright boundary and leaving behind Turkishness. In this dominant view, the host society and governments do not need to modify themselves. This is akin to the early 20th century studies of assimilation in the United States, rather than to public policy and social scientific theory of assimilation in recent decades (Alba and Nee 2003).

The general tenor of the media in the U.S. and New York alluded to above can be contrasted with the German media’s dominant—until recently much more pronounced—discourse branding even third-generation immigrant minorities “foreigners” or guests (Interview, Safer Cinar, 2009), sometimes including even famous national politicians such as Cem Özdemir (Interview, 2009).

In contrast to Germany, in the contemporary United States immigration and diversity—despite ever-present xenophobia and nativism—have in tandem become keystones of America’s

self-conception. However, immigration and efforts on behalf of diversity have also been contested and destabilizing forces have created recurrent backlashes.

Such civil rights policies as listed above—whether formal or informal, public or private, mandated by law or merely encouraged—have had cultural consequences of decreasing the amount of othering my Dominican respondents have experienced, as well as increasing their chances of professional success and making workplaces more diverse.

The public discourse by the media and politicians, the restrictive laws (Faist 1994, Green 2004, Martin 2004), politicians' stated policy preferences, and the general “logic of appropriateness” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), which precluded a liberal pluralist rhetoric in the public sphere, have been offensive and exclusionary enough; but they have also trickled down to the cognitive scripts of my respondents' teachers, colleagues, and the general public. These factors all combined to retard the spread of a civic/liberal pluralist rhetoric in the public sphere and prevented harmonious immigrant-state/host society relations.

But ultimately, civil rights laws have helped create a post-civil-rights culture/ideology, norms of diversity and ethnic equality, as well as an anti-discrimination ethic and a widespread sense of entitlement to rights among the public in the United States (Alba and Nee 2003, Jacoby 2004). While Skrentny (2002) describes a post-civil rights era minority rights revolution with his focus on ethnicity, Mark Tushnet (2008) makes a larger point by pointing to a “rights revolution” in the U.S. during the same era, describing citizens' sense of entitlement to rights; even political discussions about guns revolving around the issue of rights; and the growing pursuit of civil rights through courts that became more activist in interpreting rights into the constitution.

Several countries (Canada, Australia, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands) adopted official policies of multiculturalism and, usually in largely symbolic ways, went further in

recognizing diversity and group rights; but that approach seems to be retreating everywhere, except perhaps in Canada (Joppke 2004). While the United States does not have such an avowed and cohesive official policy of multiculturalism (with group rights and so on; see Kymlicka 1996), its laissez faire non-policy (benign negligence, perhaps) towards “integration,” and the polity’s framework of constitutional liberties limiting government intervention, have spillover effects of political and social tolerance; and these factors combined allow the multicultural civil society to flourish in the broad public sphere provided by a relatively weak state such as the United States (Skowronek 1982). American policies may thus best be considered “soft multiculturalism,” in Peter Schuck’s words (Schuck 2009; also see Schain 2009), rather than the more separatist notion that Horace Kallen or multiculturalists like Taylor (1994) visualized (Walzer 1990). This concept, in addition to referring to the laissez faire integration “system” of the U.S., involves a public and private sector valorization of diversity, and an acceptance of the “minority rights” culture.

### **The Culture of “Diversity” at School**

Since the 1970s, and accelerating rapidly in the 1980s with the wave of multicultural pedagogy, American public schools have undergone a tremendous transformation in the way they address the nation’s diversity. The multicultural ethos at school manifests itself in textbooks incorporating Black and Chicano historical contributions; in bilingual classes; in symbolic public events valorizing ethnic diversity; in murals filled with children or American heroes who are people of color; and in the public schools’ celebration of Black or Latino History Month.

In addition, especially in New York City, the teaching body is much more diverse and people of color are found much more often in positions of authority than is the case in Berlin and Germany in general. These Puerto Rican (often in bilingual education), African-American, and,

increasingly, Dominican teachers act as role models and mentors for my respondents, and these teachers also ease the transition to the American mainstream. In addition, they demonstrate to students that “the system” consists of people close to their backgrounds who can help validate their origins, empower them to find themselves, and not brand themselves as outsiders, as happens far too often in the Berlin case. Another consequence of this diversity, as my respondents and others move from education into the workplace, is that it provides them with a wider social/professional network to draw on when seeking employment.

This context makes my respondents very much aware of their rights and it causes them to feel entitled to equal protection under the laws and expect discrimination to be punished by their school, company, and ultimately by the government. The government in this case increases the political and economic costs of discrimination, while the major institutions of mainstream culture (media, intellectuals, other elites) increase the social costs of it. As Thomas Faist (2007) notes, diversity itself can be a tool of integration, as also evidenced by the example of countries such as Australia and Canada.

Furthermore, the integration debate as it exists in Germany does not exist in the U.S. mainstream, certainly not in New York. The political and cultural mainstream in the United States and especially New York City is relatively more inclusive, owing to long-standing—but only recently ascendant and hegemonic—civic-liberal socio-political opportunity structures. The language of the media in such a context as the U.S. can, in its dominant mode of discourse and rhetoric, encourage the discursive ability of immigrants and minorities to claim membership. Examples include the media’s and other public figures’ branding of even foreign-born first-generation immigrants as hyphenated Americans (e.g., a Vietnamese-born immigrant is an Asian- or Vietnamese-American).

### **Respondents in Berlin (Institutional and Discursive Opportunity Structures)**

Dr. Ulrich Raiser, the Commissioner of Integration Affairs for Berlin, who rightly touts the progress Berlin and the rest of Germany have made in adopting pluralistic and progressive policies regarding immigrant integration and multiculturalism, still admits that countries such as the Netherlands, France, and the U.K. recognized their status as countries of immigration twenty or thirty years earlier, thus providing relatively more hospitable contexts.

Serkan, a graduate student who works in an NGO, alludes to this fact, that is, that Germany was relatively tardy and resistant to adopting civil rights/anti-discrimination measures and thus today lacks a political culture of anti-discrimination. When I asked if the state is interested in preventing discrimination, he argued, “They’re belatedly getting interested in the issue, slowly, [only] because they are pushed by NGOs . . . But you can’t separate the word integration from discrimination . . . They [the German government] never saw it that way. [The anti-discrimination law came so late] because ‘there was [supposedly] no discrimination,’ or because the constitution already had equality in it . . . It was imposed by the EU anyway; and Germany did this very late, despite EU directives ...”

Ismail, a school counselor, goes on: “Standards in this country are different from France, Holland, UK. [These countries] tried for years to integrate [their immigrants]. They [Germany] said, ‘We’re not an immigration country,’ until three years ago . . . They said ‘The immigrants will go back home.’”

When asked if the new generations are finally being considered native minorities or perpetual guests (Canefe 1998 considers Turkish Germans permanent guests in the German imagination), Meral, a nurse, said:

The trend is towards more like a native minority. It wasn't like that when I started college in [as recently as!] 2004. Most of my friends were from the East [German *Länder*]. We had a project at school, opening a nursing home for people with foreign [note her internalization of the word foreign for immigrants] backgrounds . . . I tried to persuade my friends that we weren't guest workers . . . I said "That's not us. We were born here." They didn't believe us; they said that's what it says in the textbook . . . I said, "Well, maybe the textbook is wrong." I mean they saw us as guests. But I guess now, we're also seen as Germany's native minority.

Ever-present accounts in the mainstream also feed stereotypes of oppressed Turkish women and violent Turkish men and present their integration as impossible (Yurdakul and Korteweg 2006). Meral the nurse puts it in the same terms as almost all of my respondents: "Positive things are never emphasized in the media . . . Whenever there is something negative going on . . . *Ehrenmord* [Honor killings], violence . . . I mean the image is that of a problematic community . . ." Indeed, the rhetoric of even some social democrats, such as former interior minister Otto Schily, or, Thilo Sarrazin—the former SPD Minister of Finance for the Berlin government and a member of the *Bundesbank* board—demonstrates that a "liberal" from a "liberal" city is able to pronounce that many Turkish and Arab immigrants live on welfare, are uninterested in the education of their children, and "constantly produce little girls in headscarves." And many Germans apparently agree with him. In his recent book, Sarrazin even went further and accused Muslims of dumbing down Germany due to their genetically deficient IQs, presumably in toto as entire "races" (Sarrazin 2010). This context points to a lack of a culture and policies of civil rights or diversity—in other words political correctness—in the German mainstream.

As is the case with the late arrival of anti-discrimination and citizenship reform laws, public debates on multiculturalism and diversity in public life, especially in schools, are very

recent due to the decades-long legacy of negligence towards immigrants and immigration on the part of the Federal Republic. Nalan, for example, points out that:

These [multicultural] debates [on citizenship, diversity, civil rights] have been imposed on Germany . . . These are movements from the EU, the U.S. . . . I mean, consider the demographic developments: 20% of the country is of migration-background. They say it'll be 40% in 2050 . . . And they only accepted they were a country of immigration 4 years ago with the *Zuwanderungsgesetz* [the otherwise largely restrictive Immigration Law].

Yener, a college senior, student leader, active FDP member, and a business intern, explains the conceptions of integration in the German mainstream and points out these conceptions' coercive, monocultural, 'one-way' assimilationist shortcomings and how they take away from the equality and liberty of Turkish Germans and others like them:

They call the "good ones" German-Turks and they call the "bad Turks" the "other." For example, the Germans see *not* wearing a headscarf as normal; they ask those who wear them "Why are you wearing this?" These guys [Germans] decide all by themselves whether what a Turk does is normal or not. That's more than integration, that's assimilation . . . *They* [Germans] determine what constitutes integration, *they* determine what constitutes normal . . . For example, the issue of Turks living in Germany marrying people from Turkey . . . these guys [Germans] tell you that's not normal. But, you can't decide that! Germans see marrying someone from Turkey as 'forced marriage.' Like, you are this brute, you go to the bazaar, and buy a woman . . . That's the conception they have in their mind. In fact, that's not how it is at all [i.e., these are not forced marriages] You could get married here with someone from here and the man will turn about to be an abusive husband, you can never know.

Kamil says Kohl or others did nothing to integrate:

Integration happens in a whole society. A society welcomes people [that's how integration occurs]. These people [Turkish guest-workers] came here and worked hard. These things, the contributions are never talked about . . . [Take] Sotomayor. Why did Barack Obama appoint her to that high position? Latinos elected him. He thanked them. You [Germany] open up as a society too. Take a Turk and help him reach a high position, then Turks will be attached too . . . They [Germans] haven't accepted us for 40 years; they've been waiting for us to leave ever since.

The headscarf issue has been especially politicized in Germany as well, with women with headscarves often discriminated against in both the private and public spheres. Yener (m) compares Germany to the U.S. on the headscarf issue:

I went to the U.S. once, to Michigan . . . I was at the airport [and] a woman was working at the Starbucks, not even with a headscarf but with like a full-on veil/chador . . . Now, what I wonder is, this is a country that just had the greatest terror attack by Muslims . . . This woman works at Starbucks . . . It's impossible for someone with a even a headscarf, forget Chador, to work in a Starbucks here . . . Women wearing headscarves can't find jobs in a big [non-ethnic] company . . . I mean my dad told me to always be twice as good as a German, so you can be treated the same . . . So, you grow up with a sense of discouragement.

Aydan, a secular young woman whose German is immeasurably better than her Turkish, says in exasperation:

[Germans always say “In Turkish culture,] Women have no rights.” My friends would say stuff like “Does your older brother beat you up? Where's your headscarf . . . ?”

Q. Would anyone say these to your face?

A. Yeah, overtly . . . Real prejudice.

Q. Do you see educated, acculturated, German-born, German-speaking Turks like yourself in the media?

A. No, never. It's always about the negative cases.

Q. Is Islam often talked about?

A. Yes. They always ask me why my mother doesn't take off her headscarf. I mean, she's sixty years old, why would she? They all ask, “Why doesn't she integrate to this country and take it off?”

Q. Does one have to take it off to be integrated?

A. Yes . . . Women with headscarves can't work at a bank, for example . . . I have relatives who are college graduates who wear headscarves. They can't find work. One has to take off the headscarf and adapt to the situation to be integrated.

This is a common theme among my respondents. The fact that these secular, assimilated, successful Turkish Germans are constantly faced with essentializing, patronizing, and humiliating questions and comments, points to the worth of analyzing university-educated individuals. The respondents, despite their visibly certifiable “non-otherness” (i.e., their acculturation and secularism), are confronted with stereotypes—symptoms of widespread

assumptions about diversity and pluralism in the German public sphere. They are offended by this just as much as a working-class Turkish German would be. Despite having “made it,” the bright boundaries operate for these educated, acculturated individuals in much the same ways as they operate for the less acculturated and successful members of the Turkish-German community, since the whole community is under the same cloud of suspicion: namely, that (often nominal) Muslims (secular or not, and regardless of their level of assimilation) are widely considered incompatible with German society unless they cross the boundary individually and repudiate any sign of their Turkishness and, even more so, any hint of Islam.

My respondents are, in sum, just as alienated by the widespread German public norms of diversity as downwardly assimilating Turks would be. In Germany then, not only do socio-economically and culturally marginal Turkish second-generation individuals display reactive ethnicity (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), but so does the demographic examined here.

The media and other social and political institutions do not often feature ethnic minorities and thus the mainstream is not penetrated easily by Turkish Germans, a fact not unnoticed by my respondents. Seeing role models from one's ethnic background on TV in positions of authority (or in major symbolic national institutions) presumably provides a sense of optimism and belonging to immigrant-origin minority youth (Koopmans 1999, Calmes 2012).

The public culture this environment creates causes my successful, assimilated, and largely secular respondents to be treated as exceptions. This frustrates them since they know many cases just like them. But they feel Germans do not ever notice those Turks, because they only ever notice the ‘bad’ Turks. Yasemin, a social worker, says: “You’re always seen as a special case. They say ‘Wow [as a Turk], how did you get into Gymnasium?’ I mean I was born

here like everyone else . . . What does anything have to do with me being Turkish? Or, ‘Well Turkish girls don’t go to school, they usually get married early.’ I mean . . . [trails off, sighs]”

German Turks often feel humiliated by the implication that all Turks, except for them individually, are subpar and lacking. Yener, the student and activist, complains: “This is the most disrespectful thing . . . ‘Oh, you’re different from them [other Turks] . . .’ Well, no I’m not different from them . . . They’re trying to use you for their politics . . . You’re supposed to say ‘the other Turks are bad, I’m good . . .’ What they think is ‘You’re the exception . . . My prejudice remains!’”

A very common theme is that my respondents are seen as exceptions for speaking German as well as they do. The author himself had a first-hand experience of how this perception of the German mainstream manifests itself openly when opening a bank account, speaking barely sufficient, intermediate German. The seemingly liberal bourgeois bank worker complimented him on his German, saying: ‘You speak German much better than most Turks born here!’ Surely, she meant this improbable comment as a compliment. Kemal notes in frustration, as does almost every respondent: “[They tell me I speak German very well] all the time! I always say ‘You too!’ The thing is there are so many [Turkish] people just like me. Lawyers, businessmen. How much we contribute to this economy. You [Germans] just don’t see it!”

Whether true or not, Bahri recalls the following anecdote:

Cem Özdemir has a story. Once, the police stopped him, when he was in the Bundestag. They asked for an *Ausweis* [ID, residence card]. They asked him (contemptuously): “What do you do?” Cem Özdemir replied: “It says right there: Bundestag member!” The police was dumbfounded. Of course they expect a Turk to be a poor guest worker.

Yener perhaps sums it up best when he says the following of the German discursive context: He recalls an occasion when he was told “All you Turks are . . .” When I asked Yener how, because he naturally did not speak German with a foreign accent, this stranger had known that Yener was Turkish, he responded: “If anyone with black hair ever does something wrong, it's a Turk who did it.” This demonstrates both the othering of Turks by the German mainstream discourse but it also establishes the Turk as the archetypal “*Ausländer*,” the foreigner, and the national other (Schneider 2001).

The OECD's PISA studies have found that the German education system is one of the major offenders in terms of not providing equality between the children of immigrants and natives (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009:7-8, OECD 2009). A big culprit is the tracking system employed by Germany, which creates large ethnic inequalities in that Turkish students and other students of migration-background are tracked into lesser schools and suffer enormous disparities in educational attainment (Alba et al. 1994, Crul and Vermeulen 2006, Kristen and Granato 2007). As early as age 10 (12 in Berlin), children are separated into a *Hauptschule* track (the lowest level), a *Realschule* track (a medium-quality level education that may lead to university and mid-level professional work), and a *Gymnasium* track (the elite level where children are directed towards a university education).

The recommendations [*Empfehlung*] of teachers play a key role, although a determined and informed parent can make a difference. For most students of guest-worker stock, this constitutes a big hurdle to upward mobility, as teachers often assume Turkish children cannot make it in a *Gymnasium* and since many Turkish children do not have parents who know the system. Some students tracked into vocational *Realschule* schools may eventually reach

university (often the technical, lesser *Fachhochschueler*), but many do not. This clearly affects respondents' sense of stigmatization and decreases their sense of belonging.

Yasemin, a social worker and now a PhD student, experienced tracking as a discriminatory experience:

I wanted to go to *Gymnasium*. . . That's the best one . . . The teacher recommended *Realschule*, which is one level lower . . . . But my [German] friend's grades were the same and he got a different recommendation. I said "I don't want that. No! Why? It's unfair." My parents insisted that I go to gymnasium, even though they were not well-educated. The teacher said, "Her grades are fine now but in 3-4 years, they'll get worse, she won't be able to go to university . . . She should go straight to *Realschule*, so she isn't upset later . . ." They were watching out for me, you know . . . [laughs sarcastically] . . . I was sad. Everyone's going, why can't I go [to *Gymnasium*]? My parents still say "As a Turk, you always have to be better, you have to work harder, you have to know more . . . Only then will you be at the same level as a German" . . . I sometimes still think that way [laughs].

When asked why she thinks she got tracked lower, she answered: "Well, good question. If you ask my parents, it's because I'm Turkish and not German. I didn't want to believe them but now that I think about it, they made it difficult for me . . . Teachers would tell me 'If you go to *Realschule*, you can get better grades . . . Why do you want to go to *Gymnasium*? Will you be able to pull it off? It'll be difficult for you . . .'"

Serhat even mentioned that in fact he willingly went to *Realschule* because he did not think that he was good enough for gymnasium and that he was afraid to try it, no doubt influenced by his teachers.

Nalan, a researcher who studies diversity in teaching, points out: "Germany's definitely got an education problem with foreign [again, note the use of the term foreign] kids. These *Hauptschules* have all turned into foreigners' schools. And you look at gymnasiums, very few foreigners. And Turkish kids do the worst."

The lack of diversity among teachers may be one reason why many respondents experienced overtly racist, often incredible exchanges that have been rare in U.S. schools since the late twentieth century, after the implementation of civil rights laws, affirmative action, multicultural education, and a general public culture of ethnic tolerance that is the fruit of the civil rights movement and the “minority rights revolution” (Glazer 1997; Skrentny 2002). Germany's lack of policy action on diversity and civil rights may also be contrasted with the U.S. practice of affirmative action, which is often recognized as an effective tool of integration for the children of immigrants (Kasinitz 2008, Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008, Schuck 2009).

Ismail teaches, or in his opinion tries to teach, cultural sensitivity to teachers at his kindergarten. “There's no consciousness of what racism really is here in Germany,” he says. He thinks even many well-meaning, liberal teachers (veterans of the progressive activism of the 1960s and 1970s) constantly make inappropriate or ethnically demeaning comments and often feign disbelief as to why they are being chided by him. But he asserts that, “When you feel it is racism, it is racism.” Ismail believes that teachers are not sensitive to diversity, “especially back when I went to school. Some are even flat-out racist . . . One of my teachers told me once, 'You speak really good [sic] German.' I said, 'You too!' [laughs] She said 'Well, I'm German.' I said, 'Well, me too!'”

Like the other Turkish respondents who made it to *Gymnasium*—and felt completely alienated by the homogeneous upper-class ethnic German nature of these schools—Aydan, the college senior and activist, recounts moments of discrimination and othering she felt:

[The *Gymnasium* teachers] were also the same, overtly. “Turks are all on welfare. They're ignorant. They're parasites.” [In politics courses] the teachers always bring up Harz IV [welfare]. There was a leftist student in class. He was saying “This is a social problem.

It's not the Turks' fault. It's because of the three-track educational system.” The teacher said: “Do you wanna go to school with *Pruegel Türken* [uncouth Turks]? . . . Turks will throw the garbage bins down the windows . . . You won't be able to bring cell phones to school [if the three track system ends].”

Berna, a family therapist, was once branded an ignorant Turk in front of her whole class in primary school: “I guess one time, we didn't watch German news on Sunday night. There was terrible air pollution in Berlin. They had announced that school would open at 10 on Monday. I went to school early and there was no class. At 10 a.m., in class, the teacher asked why I had come in early that day; he had seen me earlier . . . I said, 'Well, I didn't know . . . I guess we didn't watch the news.' He told me, 'You Turks are first in line wherever there is anything cheap . . . when it comes to the news, you don't know anything. You're ignorant.' I felt so bad I started crying . . . [Then] he told me not to whine . . .”

Murat, who earned a graduate degree in the U.K. on the sociology of race, argued:

The main issue that I had at school was basically that my experience as a Turkish German was silenced. That created a feeling of alienation. Being out of place . . . I was demotivated. I transferred to Birkbeck [London]. People of color would be teaching. It was completely different . . . The level of criticism [permitted there,] I was able to express myself. The British said what I told them about Germany reminded them of the UK in the '80s. I wrote an essay once about the continuity between the image of Muslims in German literature in the middle ages and now. When I turned in that essay in Germany, the teacher said, 'You have issues with Germans.' In the UK, I turned in the same essay and I got distinction . . . The UK is 20 years advanced. There's more public space to talk about these issues there. There is ethnic monitoring, positive action. BBC has black anchors. The stuff that you see on British TV would be scandalous in Germany . . . In Germany, people think of Neo-Nazis and the holocaust when you mention racism . . . But racism is also institutional racism, symbolic racism.

As has been noted above, the conservative CDU-led Kohl administration came into office in 1982, promising to decrease the number of resident foreigners, limit immigration, and pay immigrants to go back home. For Kamil, a luxury car salesman, the trickling down of this rhetoric to the population at large caused a painful interaction with a teacher when he was a

child: “We were on a field trip in 6th grade . . . Kohl had just got elected . . . The teacher came up to me and said ‘*Endlich* [Finally], Kohl will send your kind back, you know.’<sup>31</sup> I felt very unwanted!”

The traumatic interactions of school years carried over into professional lives through workplaces without diversity or a sense of political correctness, stemming from pre-existing German structures mentioned above. Meral, a nurse, recalls an East Berlin patient asking her "Hey, where did you come from? Are you an *Ausländer* [foreigner]?" in what she felt was a negative, insulting manner. "As if she was saying, you're not like us . . . I was very upset, shocked. I was born here, I have no accent, I am a qualified nurse, and I want to help this woman." Another patient yelled at her and said to her German colleague, "What do you expect from Turkish women? They don't know anything." She said she was shocked: "He attacked my personality . . . I cried . . . I felt so humiliated."

My respondents' colleagues were often politically incorrect and swayed by a generalized culture of stereotyping. Berna, a family therapist, works for a Catholic charity: "I was the first professional there of migration background, the only one who wasn't a janitor . . . My colleagues were very closed minded. I had a tough time for three or four years . . . They would ask offensive questions [like] 'Aren't the Turks like this or that?' Whenever there was anything sensationalist in the news about honor killings, forced marriage, or whatever, [Germans would say] ‘Are they forcing you to marry your husband?’”<sup>32</sup>

Outrageous examples of treatment by customers of Turkish second-generation individuals at work abound among my respondents. When Kamil was working at a luxury car dealership, he recalls, “This customer wrote a letter to the management. I had tried to help that guy when he came here. He complained 'I'm here to buy a luxury vehicle. Not Doner! [the

Turkish (and now Turkish-German) street snack, aka gyros]’ [My boss just said,] ‘Don’t worry about it.’”

A similar incident occurred to Sureyya, a recent university graduate and long-time bank worker. Her services were also refused by a customer, explicitly because of her ethnic origin. But her boss was more sympathetic:

A customer was next in line. She asked me if Frau X was there [a co-worker]. I said ‘No. I’m here though. Can I help you?’ She stared and said: “Do you speak our language?” I said, “Of course,” but she wouldn’t come to my station . . . She turned to my co-worker and said: “*Scheiss Ausländer!* [Goddamn foreigners!]” . . . But the boss stood up for me. He said, “I’m sorry. Don’t let it get to you.” . . . The same thing happened to my sister [also a banker].

The lack of a culture of political correctness or sensitivity to pluralism/ethnic difference also manifests itself in the respondents' daily lives. As even Nuray, who feels in general very accepted and has relatively few complaints about Germany and Germans, puts it: “Rather than at work, I experience Germans' xenophobia elsewhere [in daily life].”

It is important to note, though, that given the two spheres of society in which they were brought up (the German-Turkish and German ones), many respondents are “boundary-crossers,” i.e., those who have had to “act” and “feel” German, in a manner exclusive of Turkishness. This leads them to answer questions regarding discrimination with an initial “No.” However, as they dig deeper into their consciousness, many egregious examples of discrimination abound. This stems from a situation where what would be considered crossing the line in the United States is considered normal in mainstream German society. Primarily, in addition to the instances discussed above, these circumstances arise when searching for housing, when socializing with friends, and when faced with German officials.

Most respondents agree that they are treated as Turks/foreigners by civil servants. Kamil notes, for example, referring to the police: “Let's say you got into an accident. The cop'll call you 'Du! [the familiar, informal, in this case disrespectful form of you].' I say: 'Well, do we know each other?’” The lack of a culture of diversity manifests itself in social situations as well. Serhat notes he is tired of having to talk about “integration,” the headscarf issue, gender inequality in Turkish culture, and Islam in the least likely situations, such as when he is socializing with friends and drinking beer at a bar. He says he is tired of answering the same old questions and talking about the same old issues, instead of doing what three or four “normal” guys do, such as talking about the girls at the bar. This is indeed very common among the respondents. Housing discrimination is another arena where the experiences of my respondents have colored their perception of their places in German society in a negative manner. Feriye recalls this incident:

A respondent applied for housing from a private landlord when she was a university student; was—upon the first meeting—refused the apartment; and was told: “It's the instructions from the higher-ups. We had a lot of problems before with foreigners. They're usually dirty.” This caused not only consternation but rage and a short-lived depression in the respondent.

Many respondents recall that they had ethnic-German acquaintances call owners to inquire about housing to get around these unpleasant situations. For instance, Yasemin's father had a family friend call property owners; they could not find a house for four years because they were foreign, she recounts. Prospective landlords would openly tell them that they did not rent to Turks. The family was reduced to asking was an ethnic-German acquaintance, a judge, to make calls of inquiry for housing. This is how they finally found a place. Yasemin notes the toll this took on the family, and the sense of exclusion: “My parents were thinking, ‘Should we not have come here [to Germany]?’”

Similarly, Pelin, who is native-born; of course has no accent; is liberal, secular, and is dressed in the latest Williamsburg/Kreuzberg fashions, says, “When I look for an apartment, I have to have my [ethnic-German] friends call. My name is [a really Turkish name]. Landlords would find foreign...My parents always had trouble finding a place too, [even when] they started a business.” I asked her, “Does that make you sad, that you have to have your friends call?” to which she responded: “Yeah, of course it does.” Pelin is talking about her current troubles in finding housing, a situation which, as will be seen, is quite unfathomable (having white friends call for housing inquiries) for the middle-class Dominican second generation in New York City, where the state has implemented tough sanctions against such discrimination since the forties (originally aimed at anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic discrimination).

In the U.S., the Civil Rights laws of the past half century—from laws banning not only direct but also indirect/institutional discrimination to affirmative action policies, which alike are described by Skrentny as parts of a “minority rights revolution”—have alleviated, but of course not solved, the many problems facing minorities from low socio-economic status and underrepresented backgrounds. These laws have been influential in decreasing overt/direct and not-so-overt/indirect discrimination; they have diversified workplaces; and they have created a culture where politically incorrect speech or actions at school, work, and daily life have become largely taboo, certainly when compared to the situation in Germany.

Civil Rights law and the ensuing pluralist, pro-diversity mainstream culture of the post civil rights era have provided larger professional and academic networks that encourage incorporation of the second generation into the economy and mainstream middle class culture. Most respondents in fact assert that affirmative action and other diversity-related policies have

helped make their upward mobility possible. Xiomara asserts: “It helped me...As a Latina, as a woman.”

Diego is a phenotypically black paralegal at a Wall Street law firm. He notes that while there are not enough Latinos at the top of his law firm, he does not feel discriminated against at work. Diego asserts that even if he were discriminated against, he would have recourse to Civil Rights laws—dating to 1964, but extended considerably since then—which prohibit discrimination. He also displays an example of the culture of diversity (whether legally mandated as in the prohibition of racial discrimination; or not legally mandated but certainly established as a cultural norm subsequent to government practices, such as affirmative action policies). The following is the pertinent portion of our conversation:

Q. Do you feel discriminated against at work?

A. It's a law firm, they're careful.

Q. About civil rights laws [anti-discrimination laws]?

A. Yeah, they're careful, conscientious about it. Things that fly over at other corporations don't fly over here. [At our firm] you see [cases] discrimination at other firms, when you look at their lawsuits.”

Q. Do you think there's a system of laws that provide recourse against discrimination, if you were discriminated against?

A. Yeah, I think so.

My respondents acknowledge having benefited from these actions taken by American government, corporations, as well as by the affirmative action policies adopted by universities (Holzer and Neumark 2005; Kasinitz 2008; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008 for second generation and college and for how affirmative action policies designed originally to address the problems of African Americans have greatly enhanced the life chances of the second generation of groups such as Dominicans). For example, Tina, presents her Puerto Rican father (now a major civil servant) as an immigrant success story: “My dad loved [IVYCOLLEGE]. It was his first experience in the US. It opened his mind. Dad's [IVYCOLLEGE] education got

paid for. Need-based, but it probably helped that he was an immigrant.” One may contrast this with the likelihood of a Berlin respondent currently arguing that her father benefited from being an immigrant in the 1970s or with the likelihood of a father of a Berlin respondent having benefited from being an immigrant in his quest for higher education.

In addition to fairly direct policies such as affirmative action, one would be loath to omit the many examples of diversity scholarships from colleges, resources such as tutoring for minority students offered by public schools or by private foundations and corporations, which show the spillover effect of the diversity/civil rights/anti-discrimination ethos into the private and non-profit sectors from the government sector. One respondent, for example, says of his college: “They *wanted* people of color.”

CUNY is especially active in diversifying its student body as well as its faculty. 32.3% of its faculty is made up of minorities today, up 50% from 1990.<sup>33</sup> It also seeks to ensure the success of low income and minority students through practices such as the SEEK Program, or CUNY Black Male Initiative. CUNY schools provide a “second chance” route to upward mobility by providing mass, non-selective, targeted public higher education to, largely, children of immigrants and other minorities (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008).

Many corporations may not be subject to the government’s affirmative action policies, but even if many private businesses are not compelled to practice those policies, they partake in them by trying to increase diversity in their ranks or in their communities, because in today’s mainstream American culture it is good business to do.

For example, Sean, a working class Dominican who grew up in Washington Heights, whose parents had little education, notes that a program called “A Better Chance” targeting inner

city kids enabled him to go to a boarding school in a small, white town in Massachusetts. He eventually finished college and attained a professional career.

Frankie later participated in a program called INROADS, which provided internships for minorities at private companies such as, in his case, Accenture. After benefiting from the program himself, Frankie, when he was president of a Dominican student organization at a CUNY campus, also provided a connection between Dominican students and the INROADS program: “I got 80 students in to internships. We were first in school. I had for three years. Over the summer. Accenture paid me extremely well... Summer but also part time throughout the year. The money was really good. They were paying me as a full time...”

Arguably, the biggest impact of both direct/informal and indirect/informal versions of affirmative action is felt in the labor market: the be-all and end-all in a capitalist economy. Legally binding affirmative action policies by the government, as well as the non-mandated affirmative action and diversity practices of NGOs (including colleges) and private businesses give people of my respondents’ background a chance to break into the middle class mainstream:

Xiomara’s story at her religiously-oriented non-profit social work agency is instructive: “[At first] I was the only Latina here.” She then went on to assert that she thinks that her being a Latina was a factor in her hiring: “Yeah, it was a positive factor... I felt lucky. I felt privileged. There’s no one else here like me, I can represent my community. [Playfully,] Affirmative action? Bring it on! [Proudly,] Now we have two more Latinos.” She also notes, like many other respondents, that her organization has been actively, deliberately trying to increase the number Latinos in the company, which demonstrates the ideology and policies of affirmative action and diversity in the U.S./New York context:

Q. Is affirmative action still necessary?

A. I benefit from it. ....

Q. How have you benefited?

A. [Without affirmative action], the private sector wouldn't do it [hire minorities].

However, many respondents, while grateful for affirmative action, also share the concern voiced by many middle class individuals (Obama included), that as a result of the policy, people might see them as less deserving of their current status or that many might underestimate their intelligence and talents. For example, Diego, who just displayed a positive view of affirmative action and who asserted that he benefited from it, also argued: “But, some people say, ‘[because of affirmative action,] people doubt your skills.’” Furthermore, many of my respondents voice skepticism—a slight one, to be sure—on the basis of very American, mainstream, individualistic, “color-blind,” and meritocratic ideals.

Since the 1960s a post-civil rights culture, diversity, and multiculturalism have become the norm at school, work, and in the public culture at large. It became increasingly fashionable in the 1960s to speak of an ethnic revival, not only on the part of the racial minorities, but also on the part of the so-called white ethnics, the descendants of the once-despised turn-of-the-century immigrants. Assimilation and the adoption of an American identity are paradoxically eased by a more multicultural mainstream. In such a mainstream, hybrid identities have been legitimized.

In short, since about 1970, America has had a very different mainstream from the anti-ethnic mainstream of pre-World War II America. This public culture, accompanied by a legal-institutional “minority rights revolution” (Skrentny 2002), has led to a more pluralist political/public culture of diversity, citizenship, and nationhood than the German one.

Diego, the paralegal, for example, mentions an essay contest in school, during the Hispanic Heritage Month, in answer to the question “Who is your Latino role model?” He continues: “I wrote an essay about Chichi Rodriguez...Essays like about the most influential

Latino are useful. They [kids] do see Obama on TV, speaking standard, mainstream English... [After Obama's election]... Kids are visualizing him as a role model..."

Fernando similarly remembers multicultural activities sponsored by his public school. His school commemorated the Dominican Independence Day. No doubt as a result of the civil rights revolution and the ensuing prevalence of multiculturalism in the school system, Fernando also recalls learning "... a lot of African-American history... Latino and immigration a little bit. We talked about New York. Italians and Jews... Heard more about that [though], the earlier immigration..."

Although perceptions of slights and low expectations and veiled prejudice are fairly common, most respondents reveal a culture of diversity at schools that stands in contrast to the German case. Tina below professes an attitude of relative interest on the part of the largely Irish-American teachers, in the largely Dominican student body's ancestral culture and their current identities, often showing them compassion and respect. Outright contempt and condemnation of immigrants and their backgrounds, seen above in the stories of my German respondents, is not quite the case in New York City's K-12 (elementary and secondary) educational system.

Tina went to Catholic school. The teachers were mostly Irish Catholic. she utters a phrase that would be the nigh impossible for one of her Turkish-German peers: "They [teachers] all spoke Spanish" However, Tina also reports hearing some comments from teachers about "hood stereotypes," references to "ghetto dress," and occasional negative connotations attached by teachers to the "neighborhood". Other respondents have also recounted experiences of hearing teachers imply that their neighborhoods were "bad neighborhoods," the "ghetto." But, Tina adds, ultimately/essentially, her teachers' underlying hope was that the students would "make it" out of the neighborhood. She thinks her teachers tried. They were supportive of her because she was

part of the “brainiacs crew.” But ultimately, Tina responds to the question of whether the teachers were ever “hostile about Dominicans, Dominican culture” by saying, “No, not hostile. They tried to learn [Spanish and Dominican culture]. We had events at school, like ‘Sponsor a [minority] child. Bake sales for neighborhood kid. We had Dominican food. They [the teachers] liked the food.’”

Another example of the relative pluralism of American schools is the optimistic nation-of-immigrants-type attitude and multicultural education at schools. However, most kids admit that the Italian and Jewish immigrations (which form the backgrounds of perhaps most NYC teachers), is emphasized more than the new immigration when immigration is a subject at school. Nonetheless, the mere existence of a “nation of immigrants” trope helps students fit in to a certain extent. They feel less threatened by “the system” on the basis of their identities than they would otherwise have in the days before multicultural education swept the country and took over the education establishment (especially in the 1980s), integrating the contributions of people of color to the narrative of America’s multiracial nation of immigrants history.

For instance, Xiomara recounts that her teachers at her largely Dominican Catholic school talked about the history of immigration: “They did talk about the similarities between old groups and new groups ... The Irish and the Dominicans. They [both] came here. They were poor. It was a niche community. Soon they integrated. It can happen to Dominicans. Not often though... We [also] had days where you would bring your native foods. You would do folk dances.”

Tina similarly says her classes also talked about immigration and multiculturalism. The notion of the “nation of immigrants” was a weapon that she could use in class against her white-ethnic peers who were anti-immigrant, with the aid of her teacher, who was also an immigrant

woman of color: “Once, we had the worst debate about immigration. Teacher was an immigrant too, from Jamaica; she got very upset. I was the only one in class for immigrants. I said ‘We're all immigrants!’”

This is not to say that instances of discrimination, perceived “low expectations,” or suspected slights do not happen to my respondents. If respondents attended largely middle class, majority-white schools, problems and culture clashes with white peers often did occur.

But this is a comparative study and the cases in question, Berlin and New York City, do differ, sometimes substantially, in terms of their inclusiveness of ethnic diversity. The ubiquity of racist othering talk by a non-diverse body of teachers flourished in Germany and Berlin in the long-term absence of civil rights/diversity policies and culture. The threshold of tolerance for racist comments there is much lower than it is for Dom-Americans. In Germany, these offensive comments are unfortunately but apparently much more common, often amounting to cases that would be deemed scandalous in the US.

College entry was often perceived as relatively easy, provided certain trailblazer peers or role models were there in high school. This is to be expected in New York City and State with their widely available public institutions (especially the University of New York whose stated mission and historical tradition is to serve disadvantaged and immigrant-origin populations). As has been stated, CUNY is an important engine of assimilation and upward mobility for the second generation (Kasinitz 2008). Evidence of the inclusiveness of CUNY may be seen in the enrollment figures of City College, one of the top colleges in the CUNY system, and indeed, in the state. In 2008, 38% of the student body was Hispanic, making them the biggest ethnic group on campus. The same pattern applies to the graduate level as well. Academically, a transition from lower to higher standards was often disorienting. Some respondents floundered for a few

years before recovering academically and socially. A few of my respondents mentioned how they envied the intense involvement of middle class white families in their children's education. My respondents felt that they did not have the cultural capital (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) required to participate on equal footing in the academic and social life of the colleges, at least initially. But all of them displayed resilience in adapting. Smith (2008) mentions "socially neutral identities" as a coping strategy in explaining how striving second generation immigrants from barrios can move between several social worlds while adapting and feeling at home in all of them. My respondents may be said to possess those multiple adaptive identities.

It is important to note that in most instances, college also acted as the first instance of mingling with whites and non-New Yorkers. In that way, one can point out that perhaps colleges are the premier institution of integration into the heterogeneous mainstream where co-ethnics do not dominate, just as the public schools were during the last great wave of migration 100 years ago. Federico, who went to NYU, pointed out that it was a tough adjustment to make, coming from the Bronx and a largely black and Latino milieu. The demanding academic environment also made it difficult. "I loved it [NYU]. High standards, great professors...A world apart from the Bronx... [At first], it [being surrounded by so many different people] made me feel self-conscious...Over time, I integrated and felt like part of it...It was interesting to share experiences... [It was] a diverse American experience, [in the end] I felt integrated..." He noted how a professor took him to dinner parties and introduced him to a white upper middle class world, which made him feel included.

When I asked Tina if there are many Latinos at [IVYCOLLEGE], and whether [IVYCOLLEGE] fosters of a multicultural, diverse atmosphere, she replied: "Yes [there a lot of Latinos at [IVYCOLLEGE]]. We have a lot of Latino clubs. I joined the *Grupo Quisqueyana*.

There are also Latino fraternities and sororities. [IVYCOLLEGE] does a lot of work during the Latino Heritage month and stuff.” Indeed, the author was personally present at an outdoor showing of the Dominican-American movie “Raising Victor Vargas” as part of a [IVYCOLLEGE] celebration of the Latino Heritage Month. Tina continues: “...I should be more involved....But, yeah, [IVYCOLLEGE] supports Latinos... Yeah [IVYCOLLEGE] respects my identity]...I work for a mentorship program run by [IVYCOLLEGE] to help Hispanic immigrants. They're sponsored by [IVYCOLLEGE] under their “community impact” program. [[IVYCOLLEGE] also] supports ESL programs [in the community] etc.”

Celia demonstrates the existence of the diversified post-civil rights-era mainstream culture:

After this crisis [the financial panic of 2009] and now that Obama is president, yeah, I think it's gonna be different. I'm actually seeing now commercials with more black families, more Asian families, I really have noticed that... I'm beginning to see that...

This is different from how Celia's Italian and Jewish counterparts in the mainstream of the 1930s had to hide their Italian and Jewish origins in order to make it (one thinks of Edward G. Robinson or Lauren Bacall, who like countless others anglicized their names. Celia gives the example of the Tyra Banks reality show Top Model:

I watched [Top Model] in college a lot. That show is good because it does have a lot of multi-racial people. And she [Tyra Banks] is good about showing what is beauty like what is the image of beauty...like when I was growing up all the images of what is beauty that I saw on TV were like blonde and blue eyed. Now there is push towards like showing racially ambiguous people...

Again, the specificity of New York City in terms of its culture of diversity needs to be stressed. Irma notes for example: “In New York, there is more diversity and more acceptance. *[But,] Nationally... [in the] Midwest... There aren't many nonwhite people there. I haven't been too many places without nonwhite people. [So,] I don't know*” [emphasis mine].

The one theme that emerges from discussions of discrimination at school and work with my respondents is that—while racial privilege may exist and while they report occasions of racially prejudicial or discriminatory behavior—it is almost never experienced as overt. But respondents often suspect slights and feel insecure about their position in the larger receiving society, a perennial second generation immigrant concern (Child 1945). Nonetheless, they usually refrain from claiming overt ethnic discrimination as they often suspect that the reactions they get from middle class whites in positions of authority in high school, in college, or at work may just as possibly be related to age, inexperience, or gender, rather than ethnicity or race. But they do also fear that others may see them as less able or simply “different.” Thus, there is a desire to be perceived as a “regular person.”

Experiences with discrimination during K-12 education are a mixed bag. All share the commonalities of: diverse, but also heavily white ethnic, teaching bodies, mentoring and moral support and pedagogy of care received from many Puerto Rican, African-American, or Dominican—but also white—teachers who rarely overtly insult students on ethnic bases but who instead mostly try to encourage a culture of diversity and anti-discrimination.

Many who went to public schools in upper Manhattan or the Bronx report overwhelmingly minority student bodies, sub-par educational facilities, and a lack of overt racism. Many who go to Catholic schools receive a better, top-notch education with more diverse but balanced student bodies. They report some slights from largely Irish Catholic teachers but mainly experience respect for diversity and a pedagogy of caring aimed at providing upward mobility. In public schools in areas like Park Slope, or in largely white and affluent private or Catholic schools, clashes with peers based on racial prejudice and class-based, thus cultural, incompatibilities occur; but in most cases, overt racism on the scale of German schools

perpetrated by teachers and recounted above do not exist, while offensive remarks, low expectations and harsh disciplinary treatment occur daily in inner city schools.

Even within the same category of schooling contexts—below see the cases of two white New England private schools—or in fact, even within one and the same person a multiplicity of sometimes conflicting accounts, experiences, and attitudes can be found. However, one can summarize the aggregate of experiences as overall leaning towards positive.

Sean grew up in East New York, Brooklyn, one of the roughest parts of the city. He went to a —preppy, all-white—private school in Massachusetts on a football scholarship. At first he had trouble academically and socially; he felt unprepared, which is common in cases of transition from an inner city environment to more advantaged schools or universities. Later, he says, he started feeling “OK.” He goes on: “[the people at the school] were inclusive. I always tested them. [But] I didn't really experience any discrimination...They saw me as one of them.”

Sean also attended a school that was “95% white” in a typical small town. His experience was less positive. It was his “First taste of being out of element... No minorities... Only white people were teachers. I stood out. [There was a] Color blind racism feel to it. People treat you differently based on your race, but no acknowledgement.” Once he asked a teacher for a recommendation. She said ‘this is a school for gifted people. You’re not gifted.’ [They had] low expectations.” Once, he tried out for the baseball team. The coach told him to “keep your grades up unlike Dominicans and Venezuelans... I was angry about it. ...” However, ultimately, by the end, after his attendance at a more diverse public college, Sean became, not hostile to whites, or with a “reactive ethnicity” in opposition to the mainstream, but instead more of a universalist, considering both class and race.

None of this is to say, of course, that urban high schools in the United States are not often sub-par, which they are, or that they do not racialize and stigmatize youth of color, especially males, thus curtailing opportunities for upward mobility for a large section of society, which they do (Lopez 2004).

Irma, for example, is typical in that while she acknowledges she has “made it” as a result of a variety of factors—including a few allusions to the opportunities that the U.S. and New York provide—she also stresses and analyzes Latinos’ disadvantaged social, economic, and racialized position in American society perfectly lucidly and correctly, and in a manner consistent with the research (Lopez 2004, Hernandez 2004, Itzigsohn 2009):

Huge numbers of Latinos not getting to college. [Think about] the drop-out rate. It’s a complex issue. Not just about culture, economics, family, where you live, it’s all of it. Sad for me to think Latinos are going to school and feeling discouraged. They get bad jobs. Not proper education=not having someone pushing you. I felt pushed. I had the precedent of my sister.

Students that went to magnet schools or specialized smaller public schools often reported no discrimination from [the mostly white] teachers. The ones that went to inner city high schools presented the teachers as good, in some cases helpful and interested, teachers who were also exhausted by the discipline problems at schools. It seems that because my respondents were well-behaved and promising students they were able to get help from their teachers. Sometimes slights or low expectations are perceived from African Americans in positions of power, as well as from whites, as in the case of one high school counselor who insisted one of my respondents apply to CUNY or SUNY (the State University of New York) instead of a private liberal arts college.

Alternatively, “discrimination” may refer to conflicts among several Latino groups as well. One banker who works with many Latinos pointed out that Argentines often disdained

Dominicans. In college, some teachers made insensitive remarks that made my respondents feel that people thought of them as less capable because of their origins. However, overall, high school teachers (who were especially accustomed to dealing with minority-dominant environments) as well as college administrators and professors (to a lesser degree than high school teachers) were seen as non-discriminatory.

Many respondents went to inner city elementary and middle schools but either went on to specialized public schools (smaller public schools dedicated at least nominally to art, leadership, public service, etc.; one went to one of the city's three specialized magnet science high schools) or transferred to suburban or middle class urban schools. A few graduated from regular, and deficient, inner city high schools as well, thus making their mobility even more surprising. These special schools (also majority-minority) provided an atmosphere where expectations were higher and mutual peer support was present. The student body was mostly non-white in these schools and the schools were in minority neighborhoods. Respondents were often referred to them through teachers who saw their potential in middle school. Federico, who went from the Bronx to NYU by way of a small specialized school said: "My motivation skyrocketed [at the new High School]...Kids were motivated." However, even a respondent that went to a bad inner city high school pointed out that she was not stigmatized for being successful, contrary to widespread expectations in the literature that minority students are often accused of 'acting white' if they do well (Fordham & Ogbu 1986; a theory less widely supported in the past than now).

This was corroborated by the experiences of other respondents once they revisited their old ethnic neighborhoods after having some success at school. They reported that they were sometimes teased playfully but usually in good humor. Mentors—teachers, older siblings, or

those who volunteer for non-profits as mentors, who showed respondents the ropes in terms of navigating requirements for college entry and high school graduation—also emerge as a very important factor in upward mobility (Suarez-Orozco 2001, Smith 2008). Some specialized schools put students in touch with professionals or college students to encourage them to have relationships and to expose students to savvy role models. In cases where respondents went to bad inner city schools, either a teacher who acted as a mentor or an outside local non-profit organization provided tutoring and help with college applications (they even took students to see different campuses). Beatrice, who graduated from a bad Bronx high school said: “I must say, my Spanish teacher, he inspired me [to be a better person]. All teachers encouraged me to go to college. Also a friend of mine had gone to college. I was inspired by her too. I realized my way out was education.”

As has been noted, parents may have encouraged the respondents, but they were not able to assist with homework or college preparation due to their lack of human capital. But many encouraged their children in an abstract way.

My respondents also attended a diverse array of higher education institutions. But SUNY and especially CUNY colleges were the most prominent alma maters. Discrimination in these settings was less frequent than in K-12 education. These collegiate settings, and especially the immigrant-/minority-heavy campuses of CUNY, have gone even further than K-12 institutions in providing a diversity-friendly and multicultural context replete with ethnic studies courses, symbolic college-wide ethnic events, and ethnic clubs sanctioned and encouraged by colleges.

Diego says that his professors [at a respected private northeastern liberal arts college] treated him well. “... By then [college], I had the polish from [attending a rigorous, largely white] high school. I was pretty self-assured.”

For Fernando, going to college was an experience that was quite different from what had come before: “I’m glad I went to SUNY...Not too many Dominicans. Started to realize 'Not everyone is like me.' The world isn't Washington Heights...There were a lot more white people. I became aware [of my difference]. I hadn't experienced discrimination until SUNY...” Fernando confidently “pronounced my name in Spanish...So they knew.” I did not come across such cases of widely socially acceptable cases of ethnic pride, assertion, and self-confidence among the Berlin respondents. There, being hyphenated is not advertised too overtly for fear of offending the majority. But Fernando’s experience is not unambiguously positive either: I asked him if he had a lot of white friends throughout secondary and higher education and he replied: “... [It was a] divided experience. Some token minority friends, some that generally wanted to know me.”

While most college experiences were on the whole positive as far as the treatment of my respondents’ ethnicity, Irma brings up an important caveat and explores the nature of covert words of offense spoken by professors with lower expectations of Latino students and their academic preparedness:

One professor said: “How did you make it to NYU from East New York [a very poor section of Brooklyn]?” Maybe she was saying that because of the bad schools there...Dept. not so overt. Not personally. I just had that sense. The expectation they had was “You’re Hispanic, you probably speak a certain way.” I had to speak to them differently from how I speak to my friends and family. I’m glad I didn’t have a Spanish accent. I know people are judged. They would want you to not have an accent. Especially the old school professors (diction, things must be done the right way). Judgment. Maybe it was my sensitivity. I thought “I need right diction”... As a person of color, “if you’re among white people in an academic setting, I need to pay attention to how I’m coming off.” I was self-conscious. After a while, you say, well screw it.

Respondents certainly perceived their jobs as diverse and inclusive, notwithstanding a few remarks on some discomfort that comes with diversity. By and large, they did not perceive discrimination at work (and noted that they would be able to seek remedies if discriminated

against). Diana, who works for the city government, noted: “No, I don’t feel discriminated against. I mean even if I did, we have an EEO (equal employment opportunity) officer here. I’d just go to her.” Evelyn, another city government worker noted: “Oh, no, [even if I was discriminated against, I’d complain]. HR doesn’t play around.” This can be seen as evidence that the institutional structures built in the aftermath of the civil rights revolution (the anti-discrimination legal structure and affirmative action) and the historically conditioned and ethnically inclusive (and always immigrant-heavy) civil service jobs in New York City make a difference in determining feelings of inclusion. Diversity is perceived especially at public service jobs or in education and health sectors, but also even in private businesses. Moreover, ethnic background and language abilities are often seen as a plus by co-workers and employers: when asked if being Dominican plays a role in her job, a speech therapist who works at a school (Irma) pointed out: “It matters because I speak Spanish. I’m a serious resource...I get the sense I’m well-respected by [the mostly white] staff...my experience and knowledge has helped me...” A business professional, Leandro, said “It opens up avenues...I do a lot of business with Latin American companies and Latino non-profits. I know the language and the culture...” When asked “Are there a lot of Dominicans at your job?” Evelyn, who works for the mayor’s office, likewise claimed:

Yes. [She works for the city]. A lot of Dominicans in high places. [but]I don’t even notice anyone’s ethnicity. it’s very diverse and everyone has a very different skill. It’s a very inclusive environment. I don’t notice it [ethnicity]...It’s very diverse and everyone has a different skill. It’s a very inclusive environment.

However, all respondents pointed out that Latinos occupied the lower spots in the workplace hierarchy, which is to be expected to a certain degree, given the recent immigration and low parental SES of the Latino population. This may be expected to change as college-

educated Latinos like my respondents increase in number and the white baby boomer professionals exit the stage (Alba 2009).

Yessica is a social worker (MSW) grew up in the heavily Dominican New York suburb of Haverstraw. She has professional ties to the civil service system in NYC. She thoroughly describes the hyperdiversity and the culture of civil rights, as well as the problems of prejudice she faces occasionally, at her workplace in the social work field. She is worth quoting at length:

The director is Caucasian and the assistant director that deals with me is black. The social workers are black, white, Hispanic. The secretarial workers are Asian, black, Russian. It's pretty diverse.

Q. What role does being Dominican play in your job?

A. My supervisor gave me this case because he couldn't communicate with the Hispanic family. He thought I could communicate better with them. A lot of times, clients are mad when you supervise their relationship with children. I am like a cousin or aunt. On the flip side, I wonder if people think I'm their nanny.

Q. How do the white clients treat you?

A. They find it awkward if their friends or the kids know they're in court so they introduce me as a babysitter. How do you feel about that? I feel empowered coming in as a professional. The parents understand that. I wonder how they feel about that. Usually social workers used to be white, serving people of color. Now it can be the other way around.

Q. So you think social work is getting diverse?

A. Definitely. At my graduation ceremony, it was very diverse. Any discrimination? No thankfully no. Nowadays, speaking another language is a plus. it's the opposite of discrimination. My culture has helped me. I'm not someone who denies racism. But now with all this immigration, it's a plus to speak Spanish. My Caucasian friend who referred me to this job learned Spanish and she is more in demand now. All these Caucasian people at my school were saying, 'damn, I can't get a job because I don't speak Spanish.' It's interesting now that tables have turned. You have to speak Spanish to get ahead.

The pro-diversity culture and policies go beyond just the public sector in New York, Yelinda, who came to New York at age 8 and grew up in Bedford-Stuyvesant—a predominately African-American, poor Brooklyn neighborhood in the process of gentrification—went on to graduate from Hunter College of CUNY, has worked in the Human Resources department of a private non-ethnic firm for a decade. She found her job initially through a program at Hunter

College. She notes that there are a lot of minorities at the company [i.e., in white-collar/administrative jobs], but also adds like many of her fellow respondents that few minorities occupy leadership positions. She is, however, content and she believes that if discrimination to occur on the job, she would have recourse to justice. She also gregariously noted that she has a big mouth and she is an empowered woman who is well equipped to defend herself by taking such an issue to a court. This remark indicates a type of assimilation into the post-“rights revolution” American mainstream, that is, Americans have increasingly felt entitled to rights against government and have for the past few decades had no qualms about legal litigation. Of course such an environment is fostered by a government that legislates and executes civil rights and anti-discrimination law.

Leonardo is a forty-something businessman in a midtown firm, who is a graduate of [IVYCOLLEGE] University. As many other Dominican respondents in New York, when asked “What role does being Dominican play at your place of work?” Leandro did not take this to be a question about discrimination at all. Rather, he went on to say: “Being Dominican opens up avenues and [business opportunities with] Latin America.” Knowledge of Spanish and familiarity with Latin America gives him a professional advantage at a New York firm eager to expand to the markets of Latinos and Latin America. As the author/interviewer pushes him by becoming more specific about discrimination, Leandro says that he is not discriminated against. He is self-confident and can seek recourse against discrimination; and that he is in any case treated equally by colleagues.

Ernesto responds to questions about discrimination at his finance firm by giving a typically New York answer, by equating discrimination not necessarily with the receding white plurality, but with intra-minority and even intra-Latino discrimination. He notes: “[It’s the]

Argentines [who] discriminate against Dominicans. [It happens in Latin America, and ] that carries over into here. Argentines blend in here, because they are whites. They have feelings of superiority... They sneer at Washington Heights..." This intra-minority discrimination is actually as big a complaint by second generation New Yorkers, as is discrimination by dominant whites (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, Holdaway 2008).

Like virtually every other Dominican respondent, Ernesto argues he has not felt discriminated against at work. Nonetheless, he answers the question, "If you were to be discriminated against, do you feel you would be able to seek legal remedies, or remedies within your workplace?" by responding: "I have never really experienced that. But I wouldn't be able to seek remedy. Hard to prove anything. Not at all. Hard to go to court or to your bosses."

However, in social life outside of work and school, it is hard not to be branded negatively (often not overtly) by society, especially if one's skin is black. A black Dominicana, Beatrice, reported no discrimination at work or school but she complained that "if you're on the Upper East Side, they look at you like you're hired help." But the same woman answered the question "Does being Dominican or person of color play any role at work?" by saying: "My boss is African American. She tries to uphold standards of diversity." Irma, who grew up in the largely white ethnic middle-class South Brooklyn districts, however, provides the caveat that second generation Latinos still feel precarious, uncertain, and suspicious of racism and discrimination, because the norms of the mainstream still remain based on Euro-American standards:

I still feel like that, in certain neighborhoods, neighborhood's going bad if it's got too much color. I have seen that. I haven't experienced racism in housing myself. But people don't see Latinos positively in general. People stereotype. They need to get over that. You meet one person and you treat the whole group as one....I still feel like an immigrant. and I am. even though I have achieved so much there is a part of that feels like an outsider. I also feel like an insider a lot. Do I feel like part of society?.....Yeah, [but] it's still like, the society is majority white. What white people do is the way it

should be. The mainstream is white. But it's not like I need to watch George Lopez to feel included. It's not like that. As far as feeling like a part of the fiber of society. I don't. I don't know if other Latinos feel that way. I feel like the minority. not just in numbers, but the mainstream is [still mostly] white...

In contrast with Irma's relative pessimism, however, one might mention Ernesto, who grew up in the largely Italian Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn. Ernesto, who is olive-skinned and is whiter than Irma, recounts his memories in the following manner:

In Bensonhurst... They eventually found out we weren't Italian. We were verbally harassed a little... People were surprised to find out I was Dominican. There were some taunts when growing up a little, because my family didn't speak English. People thought we were Italian. When people found out we were Dominican, they would tease us... Ignorance was there...But ... I never experienced the feelings of being an outsider. Never experienced, "he's not one of us."

For the most part, however, almost all respondents pointed out that any real or perceived discrimination did not ultimately present obstacles to their progress. This may be due to a combination of the so-called immigrant bargain and the "minority culture of mobility" (Neckerman et al. 1999, Smith 2008, Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008). To wit, the second generation are often aware of discrimination and expect discrimination, but are often full of immigrant motivation and also feel that if discriminated against, they can pick themselves up, redouble efforts, and prove those who judge them unfairly to be wrong. Federico, the social worker from the Bronx who went to NYU, put it this way: "I don't play the race card. I figure if you try hard, you can make it...I'm proud, I know I can move on..."

### **III. Conclusion**

As noted above, the present study argues that the historically influenced "socio-political opportunity structures" found in New York City and the United States make for a more favorable context of belonging and equal citizenship. Such an outcome is in large part because the

respondents' sense of citizenship is heavily influenced by their early formative experiences at school, at work, and in the daily public lives they lead. These experiences range on a spectrum from discrimination all the way to a feeling of equality; they range from daily civil rights violations and offenses caused by the mainstream and acquaintances alike to mainstream public affirmations of an anti-discrimination, pro-diversity ethic. This study's findings suggest that the Turkish-origin college-educated second generation place their daily lived experiences in the German educational, professional, popular mainstreams on the more negative side of the spectrum than is the case for Dominican-Americans. In fact, there is quite a contrast between the two contexts in the way civil rights laws and cultures impact the formative experiences of otherwise similar respondents.

The Turkish second generation in Germany, even including the socio-economically assimilated individuals reported here, are "othered" because their presence and their parents' presence in the country have been seen as the temporary residence of "foreigners" for too long by German society, media, and politicians. Consequently, these young adults have often felt excluded by the mainstream in their academic, professional, and social lives, and have throughout their lives received many messages indicating that they are foreigners.

These social experiences in the public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*, Habermas 1992), which simultaneously are influenced by the historically-generated conceptions of citizenship, immigration, and nationhood and in turn influence them in a vicious cycle, have subsequently led in my respondents to some feelings of exclusion from the national community, which in liberal theory should ideally be composed of equally worthy citizens who can be made to feel a sense of belonging to the polity and nation regardless of their ethnic backgrounds.

German Turks that have been interviewed for this study did not feel in general that they were considered bona-fide Germans like all others by the general public and the professional/academic/political authorities and friends that they have been regularly interacting with in the German mainstream, despite their birth and/or socialization in the country, their citizenship status, and their cultural and socio-economic assimilation. They thus lack the "discursive opportunity structures" (Koopmans et al. 2005) needed to credibly claim equal membership, due to the particular German public culture of diversity, citizenship, and nationhood. Moreover, the concrete "institutional opportunity structures" in Berlin and Germany largely prevent German Turks from being adequately represented adequately in politics, work, and culture.

Due to German immigration history as well as to a historically ancestry-based *ius sanguinis* tradition of German nationhood, Germanness in the public culture has been constructed as an ethnic concept. In an age where nation-states still survive, prosper, and matter, while they may recede a bit before globalization. This translates into a rhetorical exclusion from the demos. Germanness in German society is described by my respondents as depending on one's genes, hair color, and ancestry, proving the staying power of an ethnic conception of German nationhood. Even when a Turkish German has German citizenship, most respondents feel, she is not treated as a "real" German, a "real" citizen, who is indigenous to Germany. But most respondents nonetheless see themselves as German Turks. Hyphenated identities may not yet be the norm in Germany. But my respondents say they want to stake that claim in the German mainstream.

The remarkable salience of the integration issue in the mainstream public debate, often couched in terms of Turks' failure to integrate themselves, increase the alienation felt even by well-educated secular Turkish-Germans, such as my respondents.

For instance, a recent Tagesspiegel headline read: "*Türkische Immigranten: Integration nicht abgeschlossen* [Turkish immigrants: not 'completely' integrated]" (Ataman and Ruess 2009). Even terms like *Deutschfeindlichkeit* [Germanophobia on the part of immigrants] or "integration refusers" have common currency among the ruling German conservatives. Andreas Petzold, editor the respected magazine Stern notes: "The discourse about Muslims in Germany is gradually taking on hysterical forms..It's very off-putting to watch this cascade of debates..." (Heneghan 2012).

The reflection of this rather exclusive public culture (Bauböck 2003) in the belated and EU-imposed civil rights laws of the country has meant that a "minority rights revolution," such as that described by Skrentny (2002) for the United States between 1965-1975, has not yet occurred in Germany; and this situation has made for "bright" rather than "blurred" boundaries between the ethnic German majority and German Turks (Alba 2005). In fact, my respondents constantly compared countries with more pluralist political cultures of diversity, immigration, and citizenship, such as the U.K. or the U.S., with Germany. This adds to their sense of rejection. Nonetheless, my respondents recognize a slowly changing Germany; and in any case they self-confidently claim German identities and citizenship. They are not apolitical; instead, their embattlement and bitterness push them to try and change Germany, their country.

## **CHAPTER 4. POLITICAL INCORPORATION & CITIZENSHIP:**

### ***CIVIS AMERICANUS/GERMANUS SUM?***

#### **I. Introduction:**

The subject matter of this empirical chapter is twofold: first, the degree to which the individual respondents and the wider Dominican and Turkish communities have been incorporated (as per the perceptions of the respondents) into the political mainstream—that is, gained some political power and a seat at the table. Secondly, the chapter explores the processes by which respondents practice and construct their sense of citizenship. In addition, the impact mainstream debates on citizenship and immigration law on their sense and practice of citizenship will be described.

Chapter 4 of this study will analyze these two important components of the socio-political opportunity structures model: political incorporation and citizenship regimes in Berlin and New York City, as well as those found in the two cities' national governments. This portion of the study will compare the legal-institutional and discursive opportunity structures for inclusion in political and citizenship arenas of assimilation and belonging: first by providing an empirical comparison of the structures involved in the two locales; and secondly, by providing results of qualitative interviews conducted with second generation individuals and community leaders.

Election of members of a group to high office is a crucial indicator of political and overall incorporation (see Browning et al. 1984, Shefter 1994, Mollenkopf and Logan 2004, Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009, Minnite 2009, Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein 2009). Political incorporation refers to the increase in numbers of voters from heretofore underrepresented immigrant origin minorities; the increase in elected officials of such background who will

presumably empathize with and represent co-ethnic constituents better; and finally, the recognition of the growing power of the ethnic voting bloc by mainstream politicians, incentivizing them to cater to and get the votes of said community (See Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein 2009: 78; also see Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984, Shefter 1994, Minnite 2009).

In this process of political incorporation by ethnic groups, the aim is towards equal citizenship in all its meanings: of participation, belonging, legal, political, and civil rights (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Joppke 2008; Alba and Nee 2003). Thus, the two concepts of political incorporation and citizenship are inextricably linked. Political incorporation is made possible by citizenship rights; citizenship rights are difficult to attain if immigrant-origin groups are weakly politically incorporated and lack political heft. Often as a result of widespread political incorporation, when ethnic voters and citizens reach a critical mass of a voting bloc, mainstream politicians find it too risky to lose these voters and cater to their interests—the most consequential and indirect example of this being the existence of less rigid and more inclusive citizenship/naturalization laws, due partly to pressure from immigrant constituencies that are increasing in political importance (or, less dramatically, due to more ethnically-sensitive and responsive constituency services; Interview, Linares, 2010).

## **II. A Comparison of the Two Contexts' Socio-political Opportunity Structures**

This study proposes that varying *institutional*, *socio-cultural*, and *historical* patterns lead to varying degrees of political inclusion for immigrants and minorities, whereas the degree of inclusion manifests itself in restrictive or inclusive immigration, naturalization, and citizenship policy (Brubaker 1992) in distinct contexts (distinct national, urban, and local political communities; Foner 2007).<sup>34</sup> Apart from the legal-institutional or policy realm, such distinct

patterns also manifest themselves in cultural and discursive structures of political incorporation and citizenship in the mainstream, where ethnic politics and group incorporation (if not ethnic succession) may or may not be seen as legitimate “rights” to be demanded by “communities.” In addition, these varying structures may or may not allow those with migration backgrounds to claim and practice equal citizenship within a context where they are accepted as legitimate stakeholders and co-citizens. Ease of naturalization, citizenship, and immigration policy determine the nature of the legal-institutional citizenship regime, whereas, public acceptance of minorities as co-citizens constitutes the discursive opportunity structure.

The primary (not the only) legal-institutional opportunity structure that influences the assimilation process is the history and present state of naturalization and citizenship policy in a polity.<sup>35</sup> As a “country of immigration” (Schain 2009), the United States has used immigration and naturalization as a nation-building tool to increase the number of its inhabitants and citizens by recruiting or allowing immigrants in, and by giving them access to citizenship and politics (Zolberg 2007, Schain 2009). After the civil war, all persons born in the United States would henceforth be American citizens due to the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment, regardless of their parents’ situation (an automatic *ius soli* entitlement that goes much further than the many European and German partial *ius soli* law) (See Brubaker 1992, Holohan 2010, Vink and deGroot 2010).<sup>36</sup> However, naturalization and immigration policies for immigrants were never completely civic-republican and liberal, since they were applied until recently with ethno-racial bias. Even though increasing the number of U.S. citizens through naturalization and immigration tended to remain American policy regarding European immigrants, and later, theoretically, African immigrants, (until the 1920s, resuming after 1965), Asian emigration was halted and naturalization prohibited for them after 1882 (until 1952; Gerstle 2001, King 2001, ; Zolberg 2007, Schain 2009: 191). However, even then, automatic *ius soli* provided citizenship to native-born Asian Americans.

Indeed automatic *ius soli*—that is, anyone born on U.S. territory under any circumstance is an American (citizen)—is the very “foundation of American citizenship”... “Unlike many Western states, there are no ‘second generation’ immigrants in the United States, cut off from political participation and ineligible for social benefits. Children born in the US to immigrant parents are citizens at birth. Birthright citizenship is thus a crucial element in the effective integration of newcomers and their families into the United States.” (Aleinikoff 2001: 5)

Since 1965, relative easy naturalization and immigration policies have been made ethnically universally applicable. Elite, political, and mainstream consensus has become generally opposed to ever reducing legal immigration; it has had to pledge to reduce illegal immigration and to increase border enforcement; and the majority elite has even occasionally granted amnesty to the undocumented immigrants in the country (the 1986 IRCA law,<sup>37</sup> and the recent 2013 Senate bill; Schain 2009). Currently, one needs to be a resident for 3.5 years if married to an American to be entitled to American citizenship (5 years if not married; compare to 8 years in Germany after 2000, down from 15) (Vink and deGroot 2010). President Obama, blocked by the House from passing a so-called DREAM Act, recently issued instead an executive order legalizing about 350,000 qualified undocumented youth (Preston and Cushman 2012).

Germany’s citizenship, naturalization, immigration, family-reunification, civil rights and antidiscrimination laws have historically been stringent, reflecting the political culture. Asylum, immigration, and citizenship have been a constant at the top of the public agenda almost without fail in every election campaign since the 1980s.

The current German immigration policy is predicated on an almost “zero immigration policy;” current German citizenship policy is a partial *ius soli* law grants citizenship at birth conditionally; prohibits dual citizenship in principle; and imposes residency period and permit

requirements on the native-born second generation's parents (Howard 2009, Vink and deGroot 2010, Green 2003). In fact only 40% of Turks born in Germany after the 2000 citizenship reform were entitled to German citizenship at birth if they renounced Turkish citizenship between ages 18-23, due to the precariousness of their parents' residence permits (Green 2003). Even though 67 % of non-naturalized Turks have lived in Germany for more than 10 years, and 43% have lived in the country for more than 20 years, only 55% of them have the requisite, secure, unlimited residency permits (ibid., Sen 2003, Goodman 2010). Thus, Holohan (2010) classifies Germany a 'weak *ius soli*' country (Howard 2009).<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, even after liberalizing its citizenship code from the Wilhelmine-era 1913 citizenship law, Germany's notoriously low naturalization rates—relative to the U.S., U.K., France, and the Netherlands, for instance—have not budged. Until the reforms of 1990 and 1993 naturalization rates averaged about 0.3-0.4% of the foreign population (Green 2001:36). The 0.3% figure in 1987 amounted to 37,810 people (*Statistisches Bundesamt* 2007). Even after that the rates ranged from 0.5-0.9 in the 1990s, peaking in 1995 at 313, 606 individuals (0.9%). Since 1995, that number has steadily declined every year to 113, 030 naturalizations in 2007.<sup>39</sup> In 2004, while 4.5 million people in Germany qualified for naturalization, only 127,150 did (Hakki Keskin, M.P., Press release 03/21/2006). In the U.S., the rates have been increasing for immigrants here less than 10 years (Baker 2007 [USCIS]); and about half of all Dominican immigrants are naturalized in both Washington Heights (Bergad 2008) and the U.S. (Brown and Patten 2013 [Pew Hispanic Center]).

Another example of the different institutional opportunity structures is the established tradition of *ethnic and pluralistic politics*, creating incentives for the system to vie for the votes of immigrant-origin residents and for the election of their co-ethnics to office, as well as a system of political ethnic patronage in New York City (Shefter 1994, Foner 2007, Mollenkopf

and Sonnenshein 2009, Waldinger 1996). This system also operated throughout the big cities of the U.S. (Correa 2008). This tradition, though fallen from its nineteenth century apex personified by Boss Tweed, still makes for a system porous enough for immigrant/ethnic political incorporation, civic assimilation, and ultimately, more attachment to the polity and national community. Even though the old pattern of ethnic politics and party strength have atrophied considerably, the New York and national Democratic Party treats immigrant-origin groups as ethnic voting blocs who are sympathetic to them and they seek immigrants'/minorities, as well as provide some patronage perks. In New York City, where unions are still powerful and serve large immigrant constituencies, unions and social service agencies have taken on some of the old characteristics of the urban political machine of ethnic politics. These nonetheless also are examples of political incorporation (Malanga 2003, Marwell 2007).

Moreover, in the U.S. and especially in New York, ethnic and civil rights interest groups have a big say in immigration policy making, a product partly of historical patterns of U.S. ethnic political pluralism (Dahl 1964). While imperfect, this pluralist regime, as opposed to German corporatism and ethnic exclusion, has enabled ethnic politics and group-based hyphenated political incorporation into a relatively porous system. These are deeply rooted traditions; they legitimize group claims to political power, immigrant groups and allow individuals to partake and belong in the “system.” The election twice of a young, inexperienced, but charismatic African-American president, who—as a dark horse—bypassed established white party figures during an extensive and open primary selection system provides a national example of this permeability of the system.

Furthermore, ethnic politics and group-based, hyphenated political incorporation into a relatively porous system exist as deep-rooted traditions and they legitimize group claims to political power. In New York, ethnic politics—though a far cry from the Boss Tweed-era—is

still alive and well; this is so thanks to a diverse political class still drawing support from small, homogeneous ethnic wards and dispensing rewards to co-ethnics in return. The Dominican-controlled and court-mandated District 10 in New York, whose councilman addressed a meeting that the author was part of in both English and Spanish, all the while appealing to American political values, is a concrete example. After District 10 was created to satisfy the growing Dominican population, the city council seat went from an Irish-American to a Dominican-American, Guillermo Linares, for the first time, as political power reflected the changing demographics.

Owing much to easier naturalization policies and automatic *ius soli* citizenship for the second generation, the political incorporation of immigrant-origin minorities is gathering steam in the United States and in New York City. The 2008 elections recorded the lowest share of the total vote ever by non-Hispanic whites, while 7.4% of the electorate was Latino. In 2012 it is projected that 12,237,000 Latino voters will make up a larger 8.7% of the total vote. In states like New Mexico (35%), California (26.3%), Texas (21.3%), and New York (11%), Latinos are projected to constitute an even larger share of the total electorate. In New York City's 2013 mayoral primary election, about one in five voters was Hispanic. The influence that comes with numbers is especially prominent in California, where nativist policies and politics reared its head in the nineties only to be swept away by the growing political power and numbers of Hispanics (both as voters and politicians) in the 2000s (Medina 2013). In the 2013 New York mayoral race, candidates have taken to issuing bilingual ads and stressing their immigrant heritage (actions that would probably cost a Berlin candidate more votes than she would gain, due to the lack of ethnic power immigrant communities suffer from).

Such structures of ethnic politics and ethnic political incorporation, and comparable rates of elected office-holding by immigrant groups, do not exist in Germany and in Berlin (Alba and

Foner 2009, Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009), where most of my respondents make much of their perception that a politician like Cem Özdemir cannot be very Turkish at all in his public role, lest he be castigated as a particularist/separatist, as too Turkish. Stressing ethnicity and making co-ethnic appeals remain generally controversial in Europe, Germany, and Berlin.

Political and civic incorporation patterns in turn owe much to another historically-grounded institutional and discursive opportunity structure: citizenship. The question of whether a group attains political incorporation, and arguably cultural power and representation, depends on whether members of that group are citizens in large numbers based on the ease of access to citizenship in a given country.

Citizens are privileged with many rights that non-citizen residents lack, the most important of which is voting in national elections. In addition, in Germany, only citizens can apply for civil service jobs. This keeps the ranks of the government (including police and fire services) very homogeneous, due to the dearth of citizenship among those of *Migrationshintergrund*. Many Berlin respondents told me anecdotes of how contemptibly ethnic-German civil servants treated Turks, especially their parents and the 1st generation, at government offices, as cross-cultural communication often proved elusive. As opposed to citizens, large numbers of resident foreigners are condemned to the margins of political power and culture.

In sum, these institutional factors clearly play a vital role in shaping outcomes of belonging and incorporation for immigrant-origin groups and their individual members. These institutional and cultural patterns of political incorporation lead to the relative political inclusion of immigrant minorities in comparison to other contexts.

Another issue on the *legal institutional* side of the ledger is the immigration policy of the host polity, which are in turn directly related to the matters of citizenship and national

membership, US immigration laws have become steadily more expansive and racially inclusive since 1952, and especially since 1965 (Schain 2009), in contrast to Germany's official zero immigration policy since 1973. Despite calls for an end to undocumented immigration, the huge number of legal immigrants annually entering the United States remains untouchable and any calls to reduce legal immigration will go unheeded. Ethnic pluralism in the form of immigrant-origin politicians representing immigrant voters and very influential pro-immigration (including the business lobby) and civil rights organizations sustain large legal immigration inflows year after year. The politics of immigration, the level of vocal concern about the assimilation or assimilability of immigrants, and the general tone of the immigration debate greatly impact the assimilation process and constitute part of the discursive opportunity structures available to the second generation. The laws and the political culture of immigration, national identity, citizenship, and political incorporation are intimately linked issues.

This is a clear example of the way structures, institutional or discursive, constrain the “realm of the possible” in social action and discourse. Juxtapose this with the vehement and ultimately successful opposition to the very modest SPD-Green proposal to pass, for the first time, an immigration bill recognizing the reality of immigration and increasing immigration by giving closed-ended guest -worker H1-B-like work permits to up-to about 20,000 highly qualified technical professionals per annum, starting in 2000, which never attracted much attention from workers (Kolb 2005.) In 2013, a total of 25,000 such professionals were in the country (Chaloff and Liebig 2013; and between 2000 and 2003, only 14,876 permits were awarded (Kolb 2005). But the policy still drew ire for actually setting a quota for immigrants, thus committing Germany to finally receive immigrants through a standard network of laws (Martin 2004, Green 2004). In the U.S., there is an annual cap of 85,000 for H1-B highly skilled

workers; although, exemptions and temporary increases mean that the actual yearly number of visas was 117,828 in 2010, and even more in the preceding years.<sup>40</sup>

No politician in Germany would presumably propose to, let alone consent to regularize millions of undocumented immigrants, as was implemented by the U.S. Congress in 1986 with IRCA and as was endorsed by a majority of the U.S. Senate in 2006 and 2013 (The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, CIRA). Given the German political culture of immigration and citizenship up until only a few years ago, CDU could propose to limit family reunification rights (forced on Germany in the first place only by fiat of the courts; Joppke 1998, 2001) only to children younger than merely six years of age (Green 2004). The U.S. law, on the other hand, explicitly emphasizes expansive family reunification rights, granting them to citizens and residents both; and extends entry not just to nuclear families on this basis, but to a wide array of relations. While family reunification makes up a majority of new immigrants in the U.S., in Germany, strict limits of eligibility have been combined with decades of conservative proposals to further erode family reunification rights. A recent law requires foreign spouses of Germans to learn German before they are allowed to come to Germany (However, this applies only to certain countries, making it an ethnically selective policy; see Der Spiegel July 12, 2007 and note 55 below).

The politicization of *citizenship laws*, fraught with opposition to any liberalization of longstanding restrictive laws in Germany, is largely absent in the U.S. political mainstream. In Germany, until 2000, the waiting period for naturalization (awarded on the basis of discretion until the 1990s, not as an entitlement) was 15 years; then it was reduced to a lengthy eight (an outlier among Western societies). In the U.S., that period has remained five years for centuries (Zolberg 2007, Pickus 2008). Automatic birthright citizenship with no requirements has not been questioned seriously since courts settled the issue by favoring automatic *ius soli* provision to all,

even to the Chinese who were ineligible for emigration and citizenship, unless they were born on U.S. soil. This interpretation of the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment became *stare decisis* in 1898, in the U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark (169 U.S. 649) case. Recent calls from a few Republican senators were not seriously discussed, since amending the constitution is a very arduous and improbable process in the US, especially on such an issue where strong opposition exists.

As for another example of the discursive and political aspects of minority politics, citizenship, and immigration issues *may* be depoliticized at the elite mainstream level of politics (As in pre-1979 Britain; see Katznelson 1973; Messina 1989). In this manner, immigration as an important issue for the electorate has been near bottom in Presidential U.S. elections (rather than more extreme local House), far below the issues of war and the economy that the American electorate has cared more about in the past decade (CBS News Poll, July 9-12, 2010). Large and growing numbers of all minority and especially Hispanic voters compel the rather populist and porous U.S. political system to pay attention to the needs and sensibilities of immigrants in immigrant-heavy urban areas, larger and more diverse political constituencies as in the Senate, and national arenas of politics.

While Republican presidential contenders have been forced in recent years to shift to anti-immigrant positions during primaries, their failure to pivot to the center and woo Latino has led to a crop of Republican luminaries (Marco Rubio, Rand Paul, Jeb Bush, Ari Fleischer, Lindsay Graham) promoting reform (including legalization of the undocumented), while speaking of the importance of winning the Latino vote for the Republican Party (see the ‘Fleischer Report,’ Wheaton and Shear 2013), with many Republicans voting for immigration reform. In the end, while the bill will probably not pass the current House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate (including 14 Republicans—both Republican senators in such states as Arizona and Tennessee voted for the bill that gave eventual legalization to 11 million undocumented

immigrants; see Parker and Martin 2003). It is probably fair to say, based on current policy and historical record (Green 2004), that the Bundestag would never consider a bill expanding immigration on this scale. This is an indicator of the growing political power and political incorporation in especially national races and in heavily Latino areas.

When compared to the salience of immigration as an electoral issue and the offensiveness of the rhetoric employed by German politicians regarding immigrants in German political culture, there does not seem to be a nativist-leaning *mainstream* or a politically powerful nativist majority in the United States (notwithstanding the recent Tea Party victories in certain localized races). Moreover, as has been noted, a serious countervailing political force and consciousness exist in institutions, public opinion, interest groups and civil rights politics in the US, in contrast to Germany (Mudde 2010: 18).<sup>41</sup>

A Gallup poll during 2012 (including during the election season) and 2013 indicated that only 3% of the public considered illegal immigration (not legal) the most important problem facing the country behind issues like “moral decline” (4%), and ranking with issues like “The Judicial System/Courts” (2%), as against “Economy in General,” (25%), “Unemployment,” (16%), and “Debt/Deficit” (9%) (Gallup.com).

By contrast, in Germany, to put it briefly, “there is no doubt that immigration has been an urgent concern in post-war politics,” as pluralities of German voters wanted the “guest-workers” to be sent back “home,” rather than be integrated, as recently as the 1980s (68% in 1982). In 1981, a decisive 79% of West Germans polled thought there were too many foreigners in the country. In this climate, Kohl was elected Chancellor in 1983, as he promised to reduce the number of foreigners by one million (Chapin 1997: 56-57). The fact that the foreigners settling in Germany were not expected by German society to become immigrants or potential Germans stems from this political *Weltanschauung* that ruled German politics until very recently.

The way each country conceives of herself (one a “nation of immigrants,” and the other as “not a country of immigration”) has an impact on determining these dominant mainstream discourses and the predominance of one narrative over another (the nativist and the civic-pluralist ones). The threshold of tolerance for what is acceptable to say about immigrants and minorities for a German politician is much lower than that for an American politician, and certainly for a New York politician. Moreover, New York City politicians, almost all of whom are first, second, and third generation immigrants (be they white, Asian, Latino, or African-American), actively take a pro-immigrant stance due to the cultural and political-institutional traditions and electoral necessity (For an account agreeing with all of the above political distinctions in terms of immigration’s salience as an issue, see Schain 2009).

These distinctions, I argue, impact the political and civic attachments and identities of second-generation immigrants; they thus determine what kinds of cities Berlin and New York are, as well as what kinds of nations the US and Germany will become, as these countries rapidly diversify. The discursive opportunity structures may offer the capacity for equal membership if they are conducive in a given locale.

New York City provides an immigrant-friendly and diversity-centric political culture. The specific institutional structures of New York City, such as its immigrant past and its history of immigrant-incorporating machine politics and labor unions, make belonging easier for second generation immigrants (Shefter 1994, Waldinger 1996, Mollenkopf 1999, Foner 2000, Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2004, Foner 2007, Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein 2009). New York’s ethnicity-based machine politics history makes incorporation easier for immigrants than would be otherwise (Waldinger 1996, Mollenkopf 1999, Foner 2000, Jones-Correa 2007, Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008). Moreover, public schools such as CUNY provide especially rich “second chance mechanisms” to otherwise disadvantaged second

generation immigrants in New York City (Trillo 2004, Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008). In short, “city-as-context” clearly matters (Foner 2007).

Immigration is seldom politicized in New York politics (for example, Mayor Bloomberg often repeats his English announcements to the public in heavily gringo-accented but proficient Spanish). In New York City, nativists do not have a voice. In national politics, a neo-nativist movement has certainly emerged recently, in the tradition of all past great waves of immigration. The issue is politicized in certain locales especially, usually in the Mid, Southwestern, and Southern sections of the country, and during Republican primary seasons. Public opinion towards immigration is often negative, as it is in all other countries of immigration (Fetzer and Soper 2000). However, the existence or pervasiveness of immigration as an issue does not necessarily mean that the issue will be politically salient, especially at the national level. In the United States (and to a lesser extent in Germany as in the case of liberal-pluralist German courts), domestic institutions and constitutions, as well as mainstream political culture, often harness and reverse populist xenophobic initiatives (in Arizona recently and in California in the 1990s, etc; Joppke 1998, 2001).

In sum, the relatively inclusive *institutional* and *discursive* patterns of political incorporation and citizenship in New York City and the U.S. in general lead to a greater ease of claiming membership and being accepted as a member of the national political community.

### **III. Respondents in Berlin**

A majority of my German-Turkish respondents deplore the German, and to a lesser extent Berlin, political mainstream, especially when it comes to the treatment, incorporation, and empowerment of Turks and other minorities (a supermajority is dissatisfied). Yet, most still do not stay away from politics. They are not apathetic or apolitical, as might have been expected,

due to my respondents' sense of exclusion and swimming against the tide of the dominant German political culture. But, it seems that their education, the resulting class status and self-confidence, as well as their heightened bourgeois/progressive sense of citizenship and entitlement to equal rights lead to such politically engaged attitudes and behavior. Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway (2008) make a similar point that lower-SES second generation minority groups in New York exhibit more political behavior than the Russian and Chinese-Americans, who seem to require less positive government action on their behalf.

My respondents deride an “*Opfer Mentalitaet*” (victim mentality). They follow political and civic events in Berlin and Germany, sometimes even their neighborhoods (the new *Quartiersmanagement* offices providing services in inner-city neighborhoods are often staffed by well-educated second-generation Turks. By and large, they vote and feel passionate about debates about German politics (Only a few were not German citizens, all others having naturalized). They have a higher sense of entitlement and a corresponding sense of assertiveness, in contrast to their parents' generation whom they see as having been overly passive in the face of discrimination, a shortcoming stemming of course from their parents' lack of human and cultural capital, as well as—for the majority—a lack of citizenship status.

This is so, despite their anger at the tone of the mainstream political rhetoric concerning immigrants' issues; despite their anger at citizenship, immigration and integration legislation, which they perceive as either inadequate or anti-immigrant; and despite their empirically verifiable observation that Germans of Turkish descent are woefully underrepresented and hence unincorporated into the political and bureaucratic institutions; despite their loathing of especially the ethno-nationalist CDU and their suspicion of supposedly pro-immigrant and pluralistic SPD and even some Greens. Of course there are a good many who are, like most citizens, uninterested

in and apathetic towards politics of any kind—German or Turkish.

As noted, all my respondents disapprovingly stress the vast underrepresentation of Turkish-Germans in the teaching, civil service, law enforcement, and political professions, while expressing an often faint and long-term hope of a slow evolution in German political culture as demographic realities of increasing *Migrationshintergründ* voters.

Aydan notes and most respondents concur that: “[There are] Not enough [politicians of Turkish descent in Germany] at all. Özdemir showed that this could be done. But there aren't enough qualified Turks either.” When I asked my respondents whether they expect a German Obama, a Turkish or *Kanzler* (Chancellor) of *Migrationshintergründ*, many sounded resigned and pessimistic: they often gave responses such as “Not in my lifetime!” or “Not for another 50 years!” or even “Never!”

Most point to a situation where parties do not have to attend to immigrants' issues, whose share of the voting public stays relatively low due to years of citizenship and other policies limiting political incorporation in Germany (Miera 2009 [EU Commission]). All my respondents point out that a tradition of ethnic politics or a culture and laws of diversity that dictate or foster the incorporation of minorities do not exist in Germany. One's ethnic background cannot and in German political culture should not, respondents report, be emphasized or even referred to in public, lest it alienate Germans. Burcu observes like many of my respondents that not only is there no tradition of ethnic politics and ethnic political incorporation in Germany, but Turkish German politicians are in a position to downplay their Turkishness and their differences:

Q. Are Turks represented in public offices?

A. Yes, [some] but not as Turks. Like Cem Özdemir ...His Turkishness is in the background. I've never seen him speak Turkish once.

Cem Özdemir himself argues in favor of downplaying one's ethnic background. His belief

in civic republicanism dictates that all citizens must be equal as individuals and regardless of their ethnic backgrounds; they must rise or fall only on merit as public servants, not as ethnic politicians. But it is also probable that the lack of a tradition of ethnic political incorporation and of ethnic/religious pluralism in Germany, as well as the possible backlash sure to turn against any minority politician emphasizing her ethnic background, all contribute to his statements. In any event, the perception of the second generation is that Cem Özdemir and others will not/cannot dwell too much on their ethnic difference from the majority.

Bekir Yilmaz, of the TGD (*Türkische Gemeinde* [Community] *Deutschland*), argues that Turkish Germans have not been politically incorporated as a group; they do not have enough co-ethnics in political office; and hence, the German political system and parties can ignore their interests and direct hostile rhetoric at them. Mr. Yilmaz illustrates this perception by echoing a point made by most respondents, namely that Turkish political incorporation is at the tokenism stage as of yet; there is no concept of ethnic politics in Germany; and that a Turkish-German ethnic lobby does not exist:

There are eight Land MP s in Berlin [state parliament]... often it can be for show, as tokens. [If Turks are not more politically incorporated,] it's impossible for parties to go outside the limits of their current rhetoric. We don't have an ethnic lobby here. Think about the Armenian ethnic lobby in France. We don't have that in Germany.

Q. Do you think Turkish German citizens are seen/treated as equals?

A. Maybe for the 10-15% of the population that is liberal. For the most part, Germany is nationalistic, conservative...

However, as a caveat and in guarded praise of good trends in German government, Mr.

Yilmaz adds:

Q. How do they [the government] treat you [as an organization, an interest group]?

A. We don't have any complaints. They come to our events; the [chancellor??] pays attention. The chief of police is warm. Once you set up a certain infrastructure, the matter of acceptance is less of a problem.

Again, Bekir Yilmaz of TGD, like most of my respondents, expects Germany to slowly and gradually change and start to take seriously/incorporate Turks, simply because the demographic trends so heavily favor the rapid growth of minorities in Germany.

Zeynep argues, typically, that the German and Berlin governments have recently begun to engage with minorities and have even begun to slowly and pithily encourage naturalization. However, according to statistics, these efforts have not prevented naturalization rates in Germany from declining and lagging behind those of its peers, even since the 2000 reform:

[They're doing some information campaigns] "But, not enough. Plus, even if people are informed, [the German government says] 'Take all these tests, do this do that' People don't wanna do it then [naturalize]...I've talked to people [about naturalizing]. [They say:] 'What for?' Well, so you can vote!' [These Turks say] 'Well, I go vote in Turkey.' [She's exasperated]. If Turks voted here, they'd start to take foreigners seriously here.

Q. Is the foreigner vote not important now?

A. For SPD, for the Greens. Now, we even have Cem Özdemir .

My German-Turkish respondents for the most part do not care about or follow Turkish politics too closely; and they criticize Turkish-German associations for concentrating more on homeland issues than issue concerning German Turks.

Sureyya and many others can offer objective assessments of Turkey's own shortcomings: "[In Turkey] we don't accept Kurds as Turks [equal Turkish citizens either!]" Sureyya then goes on to confess to a lack of interest in Turkish politics:

Q. Do you have any interest in Turkish media or Turkish politics?

A. Nope. I don't understand it [the (political) culture; what goes on in Turkey].

Zeynep , a fierce critic of German pluralism and also an assimilated scholar, describes her identity by placing a civic, political notion of German nationality front and center and makes clear that her political concerns in Germany make her a German and a German citizen first. Her disconnect from Turkey, which she has visited many times, and her orientation towards the

politics of the locales and nation-state of her birth. However, her feelings of Germanness are not often reciprocated by the German mainstream and she is dumbfounded because she sees herself as a member of the German political community:

*I'd say [I'm a] German, because of political reasons. That's the best way I think. For me and for Germany...I love Turkey too, I speak Turkish. [But] my reaction is 'Well, it's time you accept [us, as Germans] I have a German passport...If they ask, I say proudly that my parents are German...It depends on context [too].*

Q. Do people see you as a German?

A. Not, not really...Some people keep asking, 'Where are you from?'

Q. What do you have to do/be to be German?

A. You need blond hair, lighter skin....Turks have this too: 'You're Turkish, they won't accept you.' But I say, can there be a better German than me? My German is better than my Turkish. *I don't have anything to do with Turkey* [emphases mine].

In terms of both empirical reality and my respondents' perceptions, Germany lacks a strong party with a majority-potential that is unambiguously for pluralism, diversity, and immigrant issues, such as is arguably the case for the Democratic Party in the United States.

The mainstream is much further to the right in its politic and political rhetoric of immigration in Germany, as tends to be the case in Europe in general. While Germany does not really have a nationally powerful radical right party, it has cyclically had relatively small, but attention-grabbing and growing, locally successful, anti-immigrant radical right parties. Germany also has one of the most significant—yet numerically still small—levels of radical right political activism and thuggery (Minkenberg 2009). The radical right-wing NPD (*National Partei Deutschlands*) is currently powerful in and holds parliamentary seats in especially Eastern Germany. Moreover, CDU, and especially its more nativist and conservative Bavarian partner CSU (Christian Social Union), have consistently pulled the mainstream German political culture right towards anti-immigrant stances—always egged on and supported by Germany's best-selling newspaper *Bild* (Pfanner 2011, 2013). Left parties (especially the Greens, to a lesser extent SPD,

and now to a certain extent *Linke*)<sup>42</sup> have been relatively pluralist and inclusive of minorities.

However, SPD has not always backed away from immigrant baiting itself, as my respondents stress. Moreover, SPD's and the Greens' impact has often been limited (even during the 2000 citizenship reform process) to persuading CDU to agree to policies that are a little less strict on immigration and citizenship than CDU's own policies (Green 2004).

Berlin's political context once again reminds one of the specificity of immigrant metropolises vis-à-vis the national mainstreams. Berlin's immigration and integration politics are more inclusive, pluralistic, and pro-immigrant than is the norm in Germany. However, as Koopmans has observed even if Berlin is more open to political incorporation of ethnic minorities than other German cities, its location and its fundamental political connectedness to the German nation-state render even Berlin less than adequately pluralist relative to the comparable cities of more minority-friendly polities.

Aydan thinks that the mainstream of German political culture is fairly to the right, when it comes to ethnic relations and she argues, like many, that the differences between the left and the right—and the alleged progressiveness of the German left—are exaggerated:

Q. Are there differences between parties in Germany in terms of pluralism?

A. No. That's what people claim. SPD says CDU is terrible. But SPD's done nothing [for immigrants]. Even CDU's done more. She says CDU reaches out to Turkish associations and groups.

Q. So in general, what do you think about the average policies and rhetoric in German politics in terms of ethnic pluralism?

A. Not positive enough. Not like in other countries, like the U.S.

Aydan has also worked on civic initiatives aiming to learn from the diversity practices of U.S. corporations and government. She compares Germany unfavorably on that score. Bekir Yilmaz, the head of the TGD, pointed out—as did National MP Hakki Keskin and many other respondents—that even Otto Schily (the former SPD interior minister of the SPD-Green

government) once said 'the best integration is [coercive, one-way, monocultural] assimilation!!!'

Pelin too, like most of my respondents, believes that there is not that much difference along the German political spectrum, when it comes to immigration s issues and pluralism.

Q. Are the Greens more pluralistic?

A. That's what the politicians say, but...[She is involved in politics] Since I started this type of work, I have seen that what the Greens say and what they do are different. What they do is often not that pluralistic....

She then went on to cite a racist outburst by a Green politician she has heard from a friend who witnessed it. This is a rather common refrain: that the left parties—especially SPD—often are as conservative as CDU/CSU, which many respondents say is clearly anti-immigrant but at least admits as much. Moreover, some respondents, including Cem Özdemir , point out that there is a new generation coming to power that is more willing to engage immigrant-origin groups. They cite her Islamic dialog summit and her integration summits. Although, they largely see these as insincere or ineffective gimmicks, given Angela Merkel's frequent tough love outbursts such as her latest one when she declared multiculturalism in Germany an utter failure (Der Spiegel, October 18, 2010). Cem Özdemir 's election as co-leader has nonetheless made the Greens an even more attractive party, despite its faults and because of the far worse alternatives.

While conceding that Germany and CDU have officially acknowledged that Germany is “a country of immigration” (*ein Einwanderungsland*), Ilke goes on to assert that:

You get it [xenophobia] when you talk to people who are close to CDU. For them, Turks are second or third class citizens. I did my legal internship with a judge who was a CDU supporter. She was like, 'Are your parents really Turkish? I can't believe it. How come you speak German so well; how come you're so integrated?' [...] When she [the judge] edited my briefs, she would always obsessively correct all the tiny grammar mistakes that every German would make...a comma! She just couldn't accept that I could be successful as a Turk. I am still scared I'll make a mistake. It'll be like, 'You're Turkish, that's why!'

Q. You feel like the standards are different with you.

A. Yep.

Ilike then adds that while there are positive changes in government policies towards minorities, and while the Greens can be counted on, the general tenor of the German mainstream is not likely to turn Green soon:

Q. Does the government encourage naturalization? Parties? The state?

A. It's changing. Greens get it. With them, I've never felt excluded.

Q. Do they support *Verfassungspatriotismus* (civic, constitutional rather than ethnic patriotism) ?

A. Yes [...]

Q. Do the Greens try to recruit politicians of Turkish origin?

A. Yes. That's how it is at the *Heinrich Böll Stiftung* (a Green party foundation). 50% are foreigners. 25% are women....

Q. Can this happen for the government of Germany in general?

A. Nope. I would like that, but it's really unlikely...

### **Discursive Political Incorporation in a New Germany?**

Despite their displeasure with Germany in general, my respondents in Berlin have assimilated into the milieu of urban, middle-class, younger, left-liberal, somewhat more multicultural Germans (mostly Berliners) that they associate with. For example, Pelin explains that she votes Green because it is "lifestyle appropriate." They mostly vote Green or feel sympathy towards them for their progressive and pro-immigrant politics, as well as their efforts to incorporate minority individuals like two of my interviewees Cem Özdemir and Berlin MP Özcan Mutlu. Some continue to vote for the traditional party of their parents (of the few that could/can vote), SPD. A few have gravitated towards far-left *Linke*. None confessed to any pro-CDU sympathies. However, CDU has a few Turkish-German politicians in its ranks in the Berlin and national parliaments.

Özcan Mutlu complains and then concedes slightly that a New Germany may yet be arising: "The glass is half full. I haven't given up on Germans."

My respondents also see an opening in the post-modern German culture of pluralism, diversity, and republicanism, trends started by the West German '68-ers like student leader, "Red Danny:" Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Hockenos 2008). There is, thus, a large enough space in German political culture where the dominant conception of German nationhood is more multi-ethnic, more pluralist, and more based on civic ideals rather than cultural criteria. Many of the highly educated and progressive German Turks are politically and culturally Green and multiculturalist. Ismail (m) is aware of the intellectual history of racism and pluralism in Germany. He says, like the majority, that this does not make him apolitical. He says there are forces like the Greens, the party he and most other respondents vote for, pushing against the German mainstream's status-quo.

The dominant view in the slice of the German electorate that corresponds to these kinds of German Turkish progressives--and into which many of these Turkish second generation immigrants have assimilated--is also highly post-national, anti-German nationalism, suspicious of any kind of nationalism and patriotism, and pan-Europeanist. An acute awareness of past German atrocities, the most callous of which was the holocaust, came about in post-1960s West Germany; and it grounds the consciousness of this upper-middle class, post-nationalist, pacifist, environmentalist, multiculturalist demographic, e.g., Gerhard Schröder, Joschka Fisher, and their latter day equivalents, the youth flowing into Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain, and Kreuzberg in Berlin.

There is also clearly a perceived generational divide among ethnic-Germans, according to most of my respondents. They find social spheres they are comfortable in, socializing with urban, young, educated Berliners like themselves (many of whom are ethnic-Germans). They note that older Germans are more resistant to this new Germany than ethnic-Germans of their own

generation. When asked, “Do people here see you as a German?” Yasemin responds, typically in a pessimistic tone at first: “I mean, [they see me] as someone who's come and moved here from somewhere else...When I speak German well, they always go: 'Oh, wow, your German is great!’” But she also goes on to explain: “But people my age don't quite see me that way...Those people, people my age, have a different idea...They have different experiences. They go abroad, they know the immigrants here better. They have more contact. There's a more intensive rapprochement. The middle-aged don't have those experiences.”

To reiterate, there is a space in German political culture today, where the dominant conception of German nationhood is more multi-ethnic, more pluralist, and more based on civic, even post-national ideals, rather than on cultural criteria. However, whether this space is adequate is another matter altogether. In any case, this space is occupied in large part by the Greens, who enjoyed particular success in the mid-to-late nineties and recently. My respondents quite like the Greens. They also allow that a portion of *SPD* and *Linke* are pluralists who conceive of Germany as a diverse nation of citizens. It remains to be seen whether they can capture the majority and move German nationhood to its probably inevitable civic destination—but only in the very long term and against fierce resistance. Serhat, a civil rights activist, puts it this way: “We're behind but we're not dominated [smiles].”

Even if my respondents cannot enjoy the sort of mainstream they require, they nonetheless possess their own social and political networks located within the artsy, hip, diverse, middle class “*Szene*”s, found especially in Berlin (see Ch 5, “Home” section), and especially among their “Green” peers, significant others, and friends, many (perhaps most) of whom are from the ethnic German majority.

Even after the reforms, however, the division by the mainstream (especially the center-

right mainstream) of Germany into: “us” Germans vs. “them” (i.e., *Ausländer/Gastarbeiter/Migrationshintergründ* individuals) persists. Therefore, a new Germany does not quite exist as of yet, especially given the backlash against the 2000 reforms and the continuing “othering” sort of politicization of “integration” make clear. This is true not just for the CDU but even the liberal helpers of the CDU narrative found in FDP and SPD, or even *Linke*. The Turkish-German community, already bothered by the exclusion of “dual citizenship” from the 2000 reforms, is also disturbed by the restrictive immigration and integration policies that followed (under SPD/Green and SPD/CDU governments. Bundestag MP (Linke, retired 2009) Hakki Keskin illustrates:

Q. What do you think about the new spousal reunification policies?<sup>43</sup>

A. The purpose behind the policy is to prevent more immigrants from coming. We are not opposed to the principle [that immigrants have to learn German]. But it’s difficult...how is someone from a rural town in eastern Turkey going to take German courses?

...

The Turkish community in Germany always lobbies against things. Immigration is restricted; citizenship policies are exclusive; there’s little right to participate [for Turkey-rooted persons] .

Q. How does this situation--what you called ‘30 years of Germany dragging its foot on the immigration issue’—affect people’s ability to say, ‘I’m a German, I’m a part of this country?’

A. People can’t say that. Their parents have always been told they’re foreigners. Even with the new citizenship law, you don’t get automatic citizenship at birth; but only if your parents have a certain type of *permanent* residence permit!

Q. Can Germany make up for the time lost? Can it change?

A. It has to change. There are many who see the need for change. Not all of them [Germans] ... I’ve been putting a lot of effort into this for 30 years. I have done all I could do... Thousands of conferences, and so on. It’s like leading a stubborn donkey, you push it and you push it and it drags its feet...I am not happy with the point we’ve reached [after all these years]....

I wrote a book [about all this]: ‘*Who am I?*’ [Keskin 2011]... I am a privileged person, a professor, a Bundestag member. But think of all these people being excluded, alienated. This affects me too! It creates a reaction in me, even though no one directly discriminates against me...Just the fact that this many people are treated as foreigners, not being given equal civil rights

Zeynep likewise argues that the “New Germany”—heralded or implied by the Greens and

the hip *Szenes* in some hip Berlin neighborhoods—has not quite arrived yet:

Q. Is the CDU [ethno-nationalist] view or the idea that anyone born here is a German more dominant?

A. No, the latter is a minority. The majority is like CDU. But there is a change. It's slow.

One can nonetheless point to the self-confidence of Turkish Germans within the context of a slowly liberalizing Germany, which is perhaps not quite there yet. For example, owing to such a perception of changes in German political culture, *however slow they may be*, Cem Özdemir thinks that the debate over citizenship reform will return and the law will eventually be liberalized. Kamil (m.), and others say: “I don’t wanna surrender...” They vote. Kamil also self-confidently claims: “[I became a German citizen] not to become [ethnically or culturally] a German [but] in order to become a part of [and participate in] society... I want respect. I don't want to be humiliated...And, if you don't talk back to them, they'll humiliate you....I don't wanna surrender, give up. I keep my self-confidence up. I heard what they say [about Turks] a million times. I explain, I make them think.”

### **Citizenship: The Institutional and Discursive Opportunity Structures**

After a history of exclusive citizenship laws and piecemeal reforms in the 1990s, the Green-SPD government finally passed a partial jus soli law, allowing for birth-based, territorial citizenship but prohibiting dual citizenship, without any conservative *CDU/CSU* votes. Many of the original aims of the left parties were nonetheless blocked by populist/*CDU* opposition and the flipping of the *Bundesrat*<sup>44</sup> to *CDU* control. Moreover, dual citizenship was not allowed. (Howard 2009).

Özcan Mutlu, a Green member of the Berlin State Parliament, recalls the process thus:

This law changed during our government. Our [Greens'] demands went much further; we always wanted dual citizenship...We wanted unconditional jus soli too, we wanted equal citizenship for all children born here...But we couldn't get what we wanted because of the conjuncture in German politics at the time. First, we couldn't convince our coalition partners[ *SPD*]<sup>45</sup>. Secondly, even when we could, then we couldn't

convince the CDU majority in the *Bundesrat*...Consequently, we could only manage option *jus soli* instead of unconditional *jus soli*, that is, the law gives German citizenship at birth if the parents fulfill residency requirements but the kid has to pick one citizenship over the other between the ages of 18-23. You get five years to choose. We didn't like this but we accepted it; if we hadn't the citizenship law from 1913 would still not have changed...We still think this law violates the equality principle in the constitution. Some citizens born in Germany have to choose, some don't. But at least we changed the old law. Back then you only had discretionary naturalization, now you have a right to naturalization if you fulfill criteria... The new government after us required more criteria...Tests, etc...There's still a lot left to do.

I asked Cem Özdemir, who broke barriers by becoming the first minority leader of a party (the Greens), whether a civic republican conception of nationality consistent with a civic, inclusive, non-ethnic, *Habermasian*, “constitutional patriotism” (1992) has overtaken a blood-based ethnic conception of nationhood. His response was:

Not exactly, because we lost the state elections, the law was really diluted. Interior secretary Schily gave too many concessions during the negotiations, unfortunately. We gave up a lot of the principles in the original. Like dual citizenship. *Jus soli* citizenship was going to be a great revolution for Germany, and it was to a certain extent, but you have to choose a citizenship when you're 18...Naturalization rates are falling every year as well.<sup>46</sup> No one is rushing to naturalize. Just the opposite. From the Turkish perspective, they think the law is inadequate and that naturalization is getting more difficult every year, rightly or wrongly--they're partly correct...And for Germans, naturalization is the easiest thing in the world. To them, the stupid Red-Green government is handing out German citizenship on the streets...I mean they're diametrically opposed to Turks. People are confused...There is no consensus among parties as to whether we should make naturalization easier and encourage it. There's no consensus on whether to discuss and solve our problems among citizens, or whether we should debate our issues as foreigners and citizens. It's very simple, to me. It's better to do it among citizens...Citizenship gives one an automatic sense of belonging to your country...No consensus there either...When citizenship is difficult, people, and even the younger generations say, 'If you don't want to give me citizenship then don't. I don't want it anyways.' This makes anti-immigrant Germans very happy, of course.

The displeasure with the citizenship law that Cem Özdemir was speaking of is clearly visible in the words of my respondents who are all well-versed in the controversies over immigration and citizenship policy, as these are much politicized issues in German political culture. This discontent is real despite misplaced optimism among scholars and commentators

about how the recent German citizenship reform has ended German ethnic-nation exceptionalism and caused convergence between Germany and so-called civic nations. The shortcomings of the reform according to the Turkish German community and civic-liberal standards set by *ius soli*<sup>47</sup> countries, the fact that political cultures of citizenship and nationhood do not change automatically along with legal reforms (and inadequate reforms at that, according to the proponents of civic liberalization of citizenship laws; see Minkenberg 1999, contra Joppke 1999 and 2009), all paint a different picture: disappointment and bitterness not elation was the reaction of minority politicians and my respondents alike.

Despite protests that while banned by law, many exceptions to attaining dual citizenship exists (which is true), it is also clear that this is not true for Turkish-Germans: Only 15.6% of Turkish-Germans who naturalized kept their dual citizenship, as against 86.2% of EU citizens, and 80% of Ukrainian citizens. Turks also wait longer to naturalize: citizens of the former Soviet Union lived in Germany for on average 10 years before naturalizing, but Turks were at the top with on average 20 years of residence prior to naturalization.<sup>48</sup> Their fears of losing their Turkish citizenship certainly contribute to this (Anil 2004).

Murat, a diversity consultant and graduate student, points out that he was "so disappointed by that [the citizenship law]. We were at such a crucial point, moving away from the blood understanding of who is a German, understanding that Germanness can be hybrid...Like, Turkishness will be part of Germany...Then there was this signature campaign opposed to reform [organized by CDU/CSU]...They didn't allow dual citizenship." In fact, much of the displeasure is directed at the prohibition of dual citizenship, where Germany is an outlier in its ardent opposition. For one, Aydan, the activist and student, complains: "Why they don't allow dual citizenship, I just don't get. Several countries have it. For the sake of our grandparents'

labor, it must be given to them.” Hakki Keskin, a now-retired Bundestag member (*Linke*), also points to the dual citizenship issue as an expression of ill will on the part of policy makers and the public towards immigrants and their children. Murat went on to say "Yes, I was naturalized in 2001. I had to give up my Turkish passport." When I asked him how that made him feel, his answer was simply "It made me feel like crap..." The Turkish-German community leaders' ardent pleas for a law allowing dual citizenship instead of the current so-called German *Optionsmodell* illustrate this latter point. Hakki Keskin's Bundestag office argues for more multiculturalism and criticizes the compelling of young people to choose one of their two citizenships: “[Most Turkish young adults] consider this [requirement of renouncing Turkish citizenship to naturalize] as an act of personally ripping out a part of their identity and throwing it away.” Keskin also points out that dual citizenship would encourage integration (Hakki Keskin, M.P., Press Release 8/28/2008).

Kamil is also incensed about the issue of dual citizenship: “5 million signatures were collected [in a petition opposing it]. For any other issue, you couldn't collect 5 million signatures. (For nativist symbolic politics, see Bade 1994b, Faist 1994, Thränhardt 1995, Schain 1994, Minkenberg 2009).

There is a very plausible link between a largely but subtly and latently ethnic conception of nationhood and the fervent opposition to allowing dual citizenship. Like many others, Bundestag MP Dr. Hakki Keskin (*Linke*, retired) links the discursive resistance to hyphenation, pluralism, and hybridity in Germany to the institutional opposition to the legalization of dual citizenship.

You're either a “German” or a foreigner for people like CSU. They reject dual citizenship. This is a reality on the ground in Germany. 20% of the people in this country have a migration background. Why can't you be both German and Turkish [always

equating citizenship with national identity, liberal nationalism, belonging, proves the link]? Of course you can. You can be loyal to two countries at the same time!

Dr. Keskin continues by lamenting that the mainstream--both the German public and German parties across the political spectrum--rejects out of hand the idea and legalization of dual citizenship:

Q. How much is dual citizenship accepted in the general public?

A. It's different from the UK, from France ... People's minds are murky, confused on this subject... [Germans say:] 'Pick one or the other, decide... They have a serious problem with this [idea of: dual citizenship, hybrid national identities, plural nationhood] The France and the UK say it's fine [to have dual citizenship]. Germans see that they have to change. But it doesn't reflect on daily politics. Immigrants have a problem with that. They are not accepted as who they are, with their identity. [They say:] 'Become a German!' But this [identity] is a phenomenon that has to do with one's very being... It's just ridiculous that Germany debated until the 2000s whether they were a country of immigration or not. Of course, if they accept this [notion of being a country of immigration] that has sanctions, consequences [responsibilities]. Some new laws are indirectly addressing these issues [i.e., presumably the 2000 reform]. Are you mono-cultural or multicultural? Will you accept multiculturalism?

...

Q. Is it only the CDU that is resisting ?

A. Even the SPD does. They didn't stand up for dual citizenship when they made the deal in 2000 [citizenship reform]. Liberals, same thing. They're not real liberals! Greens are OK, what they really think, I don't know, but they can't really say what they think publicly.

Hakki Keskin especially drew attention to how few Turkish-Germans are German citizens, and how naturalization rates. These were low to begin with, in comparison to other groups among Turks and relative to naturalization rates in similar countries; and how they have recently begun to further decline, after 2000 (see Anil 2004, Koopmans et al. 2005, Ch 2, Avci and Kirisci 2007).

Dr. Keskin also insists, with the pent-up exasperation of years, that many barriers remain to easy naturalization, in addition to the prohibition on dual citizenship: For example, "...Income requirements for naturalization [are very high] ..."

He provides a prime example of the limited effect the 2000 citizenship had on the public opinion and political incorporation chances of the Turkish-German community:

Q. Did the citizenship reform change things?

A. Once, we were at a conference. There was an American there. He said, people should be able to naturalize easily. When they are citizens, they...have more of a sense of belonging. I agree. How is integration going to happen? People are still [seen as, referred to as] foreigners, *Ausländer*! There is a lack of equal rights. How are people supposed to “integrate?” Citizenship and easy naturalization are the prerequisites of integration. But [here] there is no dual citizenship; the bar is high [to naturalization]. [I mean, look at] the US, Britain. Moreover, these high requirements for German language proficiency in naturalization tests and so on...You didn’t even teach these people German. They had free courses for ethnic-Germans from Russia. In the naturalization test, it’s just enough to get a long in daily German conversation [to pass]. They want higher proficiency; they give people tough newspaper articles to read. The fees.... Income requirements ... So [it’s no surprise when] people say ‘I don’t wanna become a citizen!’ Naturalization rates are down since the 2000 reforms...Here let me show you these statistics.....All of this [negative feelings among immigrants, lack of ‘integration,’ unemployment] is because of the history of [and current] immigration policy...But people blame the immigrants. These people haven’t been able to vote for 30-40 years. You exclude them, then you ask why people don’t see themselves as Germans? And you say ‘First integration then citizenship’

Community leaders concur in criticizing the ideology of citizenship in Germany. In Germany, the way the citizenship issue was politicized, especially by the right, was through advocating the notion that the conferral of citizenship must be a prize for having achieved integration. Cem Özdemir referred to this as the crown at the end of a long tunnel. This is most un-Lockean perspective in that “natural rights” are seen by the government (and has been for decades when the “awarding” of naturalization was completely discretionary on the part of the state) as not innate in birth (in the territory of Germany)—thus inalienable—but as rights that the state rewards good behavior with. Moreover, the “first integration, then citizenship” mantra betrays a completely apolitical, mostly ethno-cultural, non-inclusive tradition. The interviews revealed that many German Turks, including politicians, community leaders, and second generation respondents are embittered by this attitude. Safer Cinar, the head of TBB (*Türkische*

*Bund Brandenburg*) recounts a conference on the immigrant issues in Bern, Switzerland and recalls with approval and a touch of wistfulness that the New York Deputy mayor, one of the participants pointed out that a person cannot reasonably be expected to “integrate” without possessing citizenship. Safter noted this as a juxtaposition of the US and German ideologies of citizenship and the persistence of ethnic or exclusive attitudes even with the citizenship reform in Germany.

As a civil society leader, (now former *Bundestag* MP) Hakki Keskin once talked to FDP in 1999 about the citizenship reform and the dual citizenship issue. The exchange he recalls, especially when seen in the light of Cem Özdemir and Özcan Mutlu’s—as well as Turkish-German civil society leaders’—corroborating accounts shows that while positive trends are unmistakable, the liberal *ius soli*-based constitutional patriotism (a civic republican conception of citizenship and nationhood) is not dominant in the German mainstream (even among liberals); it is certainly not even close to established conventional wisdom:

The FDP Interior Affairs Commission Integration Spokesperson in the Parliament openly confessed to us, ‘Germany will never tolerate/accept more Turks’ becoming citizens in Germany.’ Openly... Our jaws dropped to the floor! CDU/CSU will always oppose these things and tilt the balance in the other direction. That’s still how it is.

Likewise, Nalan, an education researcher, does not see the reform in 2000 as an example of great progress:

I don't see it as adequate. It's the *Optionsmodell* [one has to choose one citizenship over the other between the ages of 18-23]. This has been a source of great discontent....They're trying to make Germanness measurable...You must have seen these integration and citizenship tests. Even professors can't answer those questions...They should take German citizenship away from half the Germans in that case...Like the weird questions they ask *Aussiedlers*<sup>49</sup> to see how German they are. 'What color do you paint Easter eggs?', etc....Same with these tests. There are 300 possible questions: 'In such and such painting by Caspar Friedrich, which region did he paint?' or 'What would you do if your son were gay as a Turkish dad?'...There are questions about Islam. There is a suspicion against people, Islamophobia... They are trying to see if you're disloyal to this system. It's

ridiculous to try to fit the nation-state into a certain mold.

Serhat, the lawyer, chimes in: "In Germany, it is really easy to mobilize millions of people over the question of integration. That's the way Germans look at foreigners, you know. Parties always use this. If you look at the latest laws, there's no progress or anything. 'Let's close the doors, let's drive back the immigrants here. For example, if a bride is going to come over, she has to already know German before coming. They were trying to sell it as 'If you're gonna come here, you should speak German so that integration is easier.' But the goal is to prevent foreigners from coming in...I don't see myself as included in this. I'm a German citizen."

Serpil demonstrates the link between a potential unwillingness to naturalize in Germany given the prohibition of dual citizenship, which forces one to renounce her prior ancestral citizenship. While pointing out the precariousness of being a foreigner in a foreigner-averse society, she contrasts the difficulties she has in getting naturalized to the ethnic advantage that Russian-German *Aussiedler* have:

...I just recently applied for German citizenship. I thought 'I'm gonna lose my Turkishness' ...But I wanted to have a voice in what happened in Berlin...It's a disadvantage to be a foreigner, for example when looking for a job....*You have to put your nationality on your CV* [emphasis mine]...Russian immigrants here have many more rights...Plus, they arrest foreigners [easier], for terrorism or whatever. A lot of Turkish children [many born here] have been deported [because they were Turkish citizens].

It is fitting to end this section on the political culture of citizenship in Germany with Burcu's reprimand of it: "If they wanted us to integrate they would give us citizenship."

Despite their grievances over the perceived dismissive and exclusionary rebuff they are getting from the German mainstream and elites, my respondents nonetheless see themselves as vanguards who should struggle to bring about a multicultural, civic, non-"ethnic" Germany that

expands the meaning of Germanness. They realize this vision is shared by a minority of Germans, as of yet. But they see that as no reason to give up. They are aware of their entitlements as native-born citizens of a liberal democracy. My respondents also can observe a slowly liberalizing Germany that has started to finally talk about diversity.

Yener is politically aware and active. He's a business student who just finished his thesis; is an active part of a Europe-wide network of Turkish young professionals?; is pious (unlike most respondents) but a liberal democrat; and he is also a member of the FDP (the only pro-FDP respondent interviewed). He contrasts his assertiveness with that of his parents:

My mom, when something happens [xenophobia, discrimination], she's like 'I won't get involved in this; I won't do anything.' She has a passivity complex. Me, I don't worry about stuff like that. For example I called the police about that woman [someone who berated him and insulted his ethnicity]. Of course, I'll take advantage of my rights [as a German citizen].

Aydan notes that her negative feelings about German society's resistance to pluralism did not make her an opponent of the German state or apathetic. On the contrary she possesses a high level of political efficacy:

Q. Did these experiences [the exclusion, not being seen/treated as German enough] sour you on German politics?

A. No, just the opposite. It got me involved. To explain ourselves [to Germans]. Turkish organizations, that's how it is with them too.

Serpil used to feel in-between homeless when she was a kid but now she feels like she doesn't feel inadequate; 'Now I can say like I am [identify as] this and that and that...It's better than [being like] you [ethnic-, "bio-"Germans]....I feel better [about myself, my identity] now.....'

However, they are aware of nascent pluralistic policies emanating from places such as Berlin. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that decades of denial, exclusion, and malign neglect

have left their mark, making a transformation slow and gradual. Moreover, my respondents argue in the main that a majority of Germans, the mainstream political culture in general remain heavily assimilationist, exclusionary, and many are xenophobic. Thus, there is a long way to go.

Zeynep's answer to the question, "Do you feel like an equal German citizen?" is:

Legally, yes. Culturally, for example, no; there's discrimination. Say you're looking for a housing. [When I was studying in Osnabrück, I found a WG (shared student apartment). The roommate was a blonde German, conservative, asking me all this questions. She wasn't *Sympatisch*, asking me where I was from... For spite, I said Osnabrück. She was like, 'oh, really though, where are you from?' I would again say where exactly I was born.... She was like, you know what I mean, and stuff... See, on the phone, because I don't have an accent, she didn't know [I was Turkish]. She was taken aback. I said, my parents are Turkish and I am German. I just felt this thing. I was really angry. How I wish I had said something!

#### **IV. Respondents in New York**

In the main, my respondents were quite satisfied with the amount of political power attained by Dominicans in New York City, and by Latinos on the national stage. They expressed optimism, though they also expressed some alarm at the recent rise of new nativism in the US and some state and local laws that have accompanied it, notably in Arizona. But they do not perceive a hostile environment themselves; they do not experience such nativism in New York and they do not believe their group for the most part does; and they still maintain that the growing number of Latinos and their increased entry into the middle class has already begun to occur widely, and will continue to increasingly do so in the future. They feel empowered by the New York context as they remain worried about the relative poverty of Dominicans and the fates of Latinos outside of New York, such as Mexicans in Nebraska or Arizona, for example.

This can be contrasted with Germany, where historically and currently low citizen/to resident ratios in the Turkish German community has led to low numbers of Turkish-German

voters, which in turn has led to paltry levels of political incorporation, of electing co-ethnics to office, and a relative scarcity of chances to practice and proclaim equal citizenship. Consequently, as one would expect, Turkish-German issues are addressed less often in the German political system, which has little tradition of dealing with immigration and ethnic politics. This also bears on the relatively benign view of the political systems and discourses of New York City and even the U.S. at large among Dominican-Americans, compared to Turkish Germans, even if Dominicans too have complaints and grievances. Dominican-Americans also possess a much more politically influential network of non-profits, ethnic and community organizations than is the case in Berlin for Turkish organizations. As the interviews will show, the Dominican elite (current and upcoming; layperson or professional politician) believe that “Dominicans have earned a place at the table” in Guillermo Linares’ words (see below). In general, they have faith in the political system.

All of my respondents pointed out that Latinos/Dominicans are not represented as much as they should be, especially at the federal level; but in certain localities they are and increasingly so at the national stage.

Regarding the pace of the political incorporation of Dominican-Americans, Leandro said: “It’s going in the right direction...It will take some time.” When I asked if she feels that Latinos have power in politics, Tina—who works for the mayor’s office of immigrant affairs and who said that she felt completely included but did not identify as American, said emphatically: “Oh, yeah. Especially in the Bronx. In the borough presidential elections, it was all Dominicans. And Carrion [the former borough president] just left to work for the White House. [Guillermo Linares—the first elected Dominican official] opened the way, but it would have been someone else, if not him....[it makes me feel] very well. I was so proud [of Linares and Carrion].” She

emphasized the power that immigrants have in New York, which she witnesses at her work in government.

In addition to the *future* political leaders of Dominican America, I also interviewed Dr. Guillermo Linares, who is current and long-time the doyen of Dominican-American politics in New York City. A veteran of the several school board battles of the eighties, aimed at increasing Dominican-American parents' influence over their neglected public schools in Washington Heights (Hoffnung-Sarskoff 2008). He then continued on to become the first Dominican-American elected official in the country and the city, when he was elected to the New York City Council in 1990, after the creation of District 10. The council today has 3 Dominican-Americans and 11 Latinos out of 51 members. The New York City Council Black, Latino and Asian Caucus counts 27 members (that is all the minority members) within its ranks and makes up a majority of the council. Linares is today a member of the New York State Assembly. He was also the New York City Commissioner of Immigrant Affairs under the first Bloomberg administration.

Linares is quite upbeat about Dominican-Americans' accomplishments to date in the New York political arena. He is also hopeful their future prospects, as numbers of residents overall and numbers of citizens/voters in the Dominican community continue to increase (They make take over Puerto Ricans as the biggest Latino group in the near future); as the second and third generations increasingly penetrate the professions, politics, and the mainstream in general. All these processes further the political incorporation and empowerment of Dominican-Americans. Linares professes a faith in the historical and current openness of the political institutions, especially in New York. He also believes that while nativist attempts may recur in the "heartland" of the country, or in Border States like Arizona, the country, and (again) especially the city, ultimately predominately and fundamentally respect and accommodate ethnic diversity

and immigrants' pride in their heritages. He provides in what follows a deep insider's account of national and local ethnic politics:

Q. Has there been progress over time as far as the political incorporation of Dominicans here?

A. Recently... There has been good progress [but there is still a long way to go...The first generation had the most difficult time they had to sacrifice the most...But the collective efforts [is now] paying off. There is a huge [coming] wave of 2nd and 3rd generation professionals emerging and penetrating the mainstream.

Linares then goes on to showcase the growing political power of Dominican-Americans:

“In the political arena I was the first [elected Dominican-American]. The door opened wide after me. There are now 40 elected Dominican American elected officials. In the judicial system as well. *We play a critical role in policy making* ... [provide] services not just to Dominicans but to the entire constituency... [In] the private sector [as well]. There are professionals in key positions. [There are Dominican] police organizations, Wall Street organizations, associations of [Dominican] educators...Professional organizations, non-profit institutions...We are beginning to see the fruits [of our earlier work]. There isn't much at the federal level... [But] we'll continue [our progress] as our numbers increase. As more of the second and third generation attain more higher education...*Dominicans have earned a place at the table* [by] working hard, being part of the integration process, [being] valued by validated by [society] *We have arrived in that sense*...When I was elected, I had to show pride In being Dominican... This country respects it [immigrants' pride in their origins].” [Emphases mine].

A culture and policies aimed at improving (not necessarily eradicating of course) civil rights help along the process of political incorporation and has the effect of encouraging citizenship: helping produce relatively optimistic, confident, less cynical behavior and attitudes on the part of respondents. Dominicans are entrenched in the Democratic Party, one the two major parties of the U.S. and currently in possession of the White House and Senate, which also happens to have complete hegemony in New York. In contrast, in Berlin, the patron party of the Turkish German community is increasingly the Green Party, which has nowhere near the influence that Democrats in the U.S. have. This makes for a variation in political incorporation and a sense of citizenship across socio-political contexts.

Thus, the respondents for the most part share Linares' largely optimistic analysis of Dominican-American political incorporation in New York and Latino political incorporation at the national level. The respondents display not complete but substantial satisfaction with the trends in the political incorporation of Dominican-Americans.

My respondents also exhibited an interest in Latino political incorporation in general at the national stage. It is often noted by respondents that as demographic forces make the country more Hispanic, more and more politicians will have to start paying attention. Carrion and Ferrer—another borough president who is Puerto Rican—were often mentioned: “Things are becoming a little more inclusive, look at Carrion...I’m like, this is great it will change things.” Latino elected officials from other parts of the nation, such as Antonio Villaraigosa, the then-mayor of Los Angeles, also came up in conversations. His status as a Mexican-American who led a large city was approvingly cited (He has since been replaced by Eric Garcetti, who also has Mexican-American ancestry and is Jewish).

When asked, “Will there be a Latino President one day?” many respondents, like the following, answers confidently: “For sure... [Because,] I feel like it has to happen. Progress and change takes time. But something that has to happen... The fact that you go to any elementary school, it’s 90% Spanish. When I went it was all white. There are so many Latinos goin to school, college, they will become professional. I definitely believe I know for a fact that there will be a Latino or a Latina president.

Linares also shares this faith in the assimilatory capabilities of the New York/American socio-political opportunity structures:

Q. Do Dominicans have faith in [ideals of] American dream, progress [for immigrants?]

A. Without question...

...

Q. Do you see a socio-economic progress from generation to generation?

A. Immigrants arrive. They work hard, they sacrifice everything for their children's education. The parents don't speak English, they don't know the system but ] they have entrepreneurial skills. Their kids [later] take on leadership roles not just in the community but in other places. They become an asset to their community and nation... This is the case for all immigrants... The Italians, the Irish, Caribbeans, Latinos. This is a history that has brought strength to this country to New York City... Dominicans aren't different from the other waves [of immigrants]. They bring a unique perspective [as well].

In addition, my respondents acknowledge, approve of, and appreciate certain civil rights laws that have aimed specifically to increase minority political incorporation. For example, in 1990, courts ruled that a District 10 be carved specifically to facilitate representation by Dominican politicians in an area where six in ten residents were of Dominican descent and be politically incorporated to the New York City ethnic political system by the mandates of a federal court, based on Congressional statutes and Supreme Court precedents. This is how Linares got elected. During my conversation with him, the politically active and savvy Fernando mentioned the carving of District 10 for Dominicans. I then asked him what he thought about that. He replied: "The population is growing. It is being recognized. Not fully, not enough to organize ourselves." He ended on a confident note: "But the numbers are on our side."

This belief, namely, that growing numbers will gradually and inevitable lead to increased political power has important consequences for both the political incorporation of Dominicans, and for their perception of the "system" and its inclusiveness. This ethnically pluralist political system, especially and essentially in New York City, is a product of "sticky" traditions and newer structures such as the relatively recent Civil Rights laws. Frankie, savvy in local politics, brings up this very fact, himself:

The population is growing. It is being recognized... The numbers are on our side... Latinos are about to flood the ballot box in this country, especially in New York. They have already elected a lot of people in New York

Frankie says:

Latino citizens are the object of attention due to their numbers. It's [about] demography. The inevitable impact will soon be seen with the [Latino] youth growing up. In 40 years, there'll be a Latino, probably Mexican-American president.

Nonetheless, our respondents don't see the road ahead as easy, though they perceive the incorporation of Dominicans into U.S politics as inevitable. Frankie continues:

The political incorporation of Latinos and Dominicans is not where it should be [...] We need improvements. It's still the first generation who is in office now. But I see improvements [...] There's a gap between registered voters and the general [Dominican] population. But it will close. It's still a young population.

However, Frankie still shows faith in an inevitability of demographic change in the New York structures of ethnic politics and ethnic succession. This is of course not to say that all my respondents think Latinos and Dominicans have made it and no more activism is necessary, or that racism does not exist anymore. Of course, as liberal ethnic-American New Yorkers from immigrant, often-single-mother-headed, working class households, my respondents know that Latinos continue to be victims of racism and reside near the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy.

Tina too presents a Janus-faced, glass is half full, half-empty but gradually filling” perspective:

Q. Do you think your future children will be incorporated as equal Americans?

A. Yeah. The trend is forward. We [Dominicans, Latinos] are getting out there. There are still extremes, though [poor vs. rich]. There's the bottom and there's Sotomayor.

Indeed many of my respondents—like their academic peers— are further to the left than the majority who are mainstream liberals. Several, exclusively those with a graduate education in the humanities, were radicals, anti-imperialists, anti-racists, and/or leftists. Such respondents do

draw attention to persistent Latino disadvantage. However, most respondents also have assimilated to the individualist, left-liberal, middle class attitudes of their New York professional peers. Most maintain that success can be had and that despite, hardships, prejudices, obstacles, Dominican-Americans, especially the second generation, have made large strides in the traditions of the huddled masses of yore and the post-civil rights generations of African-Americans, Borricuas, and Chicanos.

The second generation immigrants are uniformly interested in US local and national politics and not Dominican politics.<sup>51</sup> As Evelyn revealed: “No, I don’t pay too much attention [to Dominican politics.]” They are thus politically 100% American.

However, Dominicans are thought to be highly involved in homeland politics.<sup>52</sup> Dominicans running for office in the Dominican Republic regularly campaign in the United States seeking not only to raise large amounts of funding but also to secure votes among Dominicans. It has been argued that U.S. Dominicans influence politics in the Dominican Republic in two ways: Directly, by participating in electoral processes, either by voting here in the U.S. or by going to vote in the Dominican Republic; and indirectly, by convincing family members in the Dominican Republic to vote for candidates U.S. Dominicans support. As Pedraza notes, “In the last Dominican elections (1996 at the time), many Dominicans residing in New York quickly flew to the island to vote. In future elections, the trip will be unnecessary because electoral reforms ensure that they can vote while remaining in New York. This gives the Diaspora (whether Haitian, Dominican, soon Mexican) a role in homeland politics that is much larger than ever before” (Pedraza 1999: 380). Similarly, U.S. politicians running for office tend to visit the Dominican Republic hoping to secure U.S. Dominican votes.

Given all the lay and academic assertions of pervasive and permanent Dominican

political transnationalism, it may come as a surprise to some that my respondents exhibited a consistent general lack of interest in and knowledge of Dominican politics. Instead, the second-generation Dominicans showed to be largely interested in U.S. or New York politics and not necessarily in that of their parents' homeland. In general, the respondents were focused on U.S. political institutions and on the political incorporation of the Dominican people in the U.S.

When questioned about involvement with Dominican politics specifically, Irma, an educator, says:

I don't follow Dominican politics. This [the U.S.] is the country, I guess, I pledge allegiance to. It is this country's issues I am concerned about. I worry about this country, wanna improve it. Politically, I guess, it is my country. I also wanna learn more about my Dominican history. I feel like I'm not Dominican enough. I can't feel too American [Laughs.] I have to make sure I'm recognizing my Dominican identity. If I'm so aware of American politics, why am I not paying enough attention to Dominican politics? That stuff affects my family too. My parents pay some attention to DR politics.

Diana concurs:

But I'm *not Dominican in the political sense*. You would only make changes here. I can't tell Dominicans what to do about *their* country [...]"

In political matters, a comparison with the Dominican Republic was especially favorable for my respondents' views of the United States. Beatrice, a city worker who is phenotypically black, claimed, "You have a voice here, you can sue [people or the government]. Being a woman and having dark skin, how much voice would you have in the Dominican Republic?"

There is one genuine transnational, as opposed to ethnically and nationally oriented, quality about second generation Dominicans in New York regarding Dominican politics in that they tend to argue they have inherited their political and civic awareness from their generally highly politically-aware and involved Dominican parents. For example, when asked "are Dominicans political?," Andrés, a black, U.S.-born Dominican who is heavily involved in New

York City politics, answered:

Absolutely! Yeah. It comes from DR. It's a political country. Dominican political institutions know they can use the influence of Dominicans here [...] The remittances [...] [etc]. Dominicans here have realized they are growing and they make changes. They are thinking about how to form a cohesive voice. That's where it's at. I know a bunch of people who are trying to run for office. At this rate, you'll have so many [Dominicans] just flooding into positions. It'll be like out of the blue [...] There are a lot of intelligent Dominican personalities in office [...] We have learned a lot about politics from DR [...].

My respondents engage in a form of ethnic retention through their interest and participation in New York City and national ethnic politics. Simultaneously, my respondents can be said to be assimilated (Alba and Nee 2003) and “Americanized” (in its twenty-first century, multi-racial, hyphenated sense), in an ethnically pluralist context, which does not require the relinquishing of their ethnic identities (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008 for a thorough account of the New York City context). In Alba’s terms (2005; see also Woon and Zolberg 1999), the context in New York does not require boundary crossing, as it did as late as the 1950s for white ethnics; but instead it fosters a relatively more hyphen-, more multiple choice-friendly situation approximating boundary blurring.

This “Americanism” is compatible with ethnic retention (Gans 1997). They participate in local politics through ethnic/racial lenses that combine the Dominicanness with their ethno-racial understanding of themselves and their class/social position in American society. Of course, New York’s ethnicity-based machine politics history makes this easier for them than would be otherwise (Mollenkopf 1999; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008; Jones-Correa 2008; Foner 2000; Waldinger 1996). Dominicans build New York ethnic-American style political machines bounded together by co-ethnic interest, but this activity is mostly focused on the country where they live, and not in the Dominican Republic. This approach is taken because, local and US politics of course impacts New York Dominicans' life-chances in their immediate

surroundings much more directly.

Many respondents get inducted into this ethnic-American system of politics during their stints at multicultural U.S. (and especially CUNY) colleges, when they experience what some have called an “awakening” to their U.S. Latino identity and to the realization that they also share their colleges with diverse Americans with whom my Dominican-American respondents need to collaborate with. Some of them go on to city-wide political campaign work or activism. They are usually aware of the ethnic politics practiced in New York; and they do relate that to the issue of Dominican-Americans’ political incorporation as well.

Andres, who was active in a Dominican student organization while in college and is now involved in a Dominican national advocacy organization, speaks of Dominican involvement in politics in the Bronx (New York) in the following way:

There is an old Puerto Rican machine in the Bronx. And everyone remembers the Dominican- Puerto Rican divisions in the 1960s. They're [Puerto Ricans] losing their numbers though. It used to be you had to pay respects to the Puerto Rican leaders in the Bronx [...] Now, the Dominican numbers are growing; Puerto Ricans might have to partner up with Dominicans. Behind the scenes, this is what I'm hearing [...].

Andres’ explanation concerning the replacement of Puerto Ricans by Dominicans in the political scenario has been referred to as ethnic succession politics in the literature of migration and ethnic politics (Shefter 1994, Jones-Correa 2007). Along these lines, Andres suggests that the Civil Rights movement and, to a lesser extent, the earlier immigrant groups’ experiences with political incorporation, shaped the current pace of Dominicans’ incorporation into U.S. politics (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008).

In brief, many respondents in New York believe that there are a lot of Latinos in NY politics. They also believe that the demographic make-up of a certain area matches its

representatives in the city. In that attitude towards the relative openness of the New York socio-political context, he is joined by Guillermo Linares:

Q. Does New York embrace immigrants? Does the notion of a nation of immigrants help?

A. "There is a legacy that if you work hard and strive, you can contribute. New York [has been] way ahead of the country in terms of whether immigration is good for the country or not..."

When asked about New York City government and agencies such as the police, my respondents felt that Latinos and Dominicans were included at fairly reasonable rates. Irma, the educator, said this about diversity in the police force: "I have seen a lot more police officers of color. I saw this poster one time, recruitment poster. A lot of the people on the poster were Latinos! I thought that there was an effort. New York City wanting to recruit more."

Diego, the phenotypically black Wall Street paralegal believes that the city government and civil service employment are open to Latinos: "Yeah, they have a lot of blacks and Latinos. They don't even need recruitment. They have a lot of Latinos already...For the last 10-15 years [NYPD has also been recruiting Latinos]. They try. When I was a kid, no, not much. Now much more."

Yessica is a social worker (MSW) grew up in the heavily Dominican New York suburb of Haverstraw. She has professional ties to the civil service system in NYC. Yessica exhibits a faith in system and in the availability of opportunities for minorities in New York City. When I asked her "Do you feel that you and Dominicans and Latinos, or African Americans, are included in the political process," She responded affirmatively: "Living in New York City, I can see people of color in positions of power. I grew up in the suburbs... The governor is black [Patterson]...City officials, principals, and professionals. You see a lot of people of color..."

When the conversation turns to whether Yessica sees Latinos in the police force and

throughout the city government sector, she responds: “Not growing up in the suburbs. Now in the city yes. Small towns are different. Cities are so diverse now. Living in the city has opened up my eyes to the opportunities. I have spoken at New York Academy of Medicine. I’m speaking to judges about Latin American culture. There are so many opportunities in the city... [Much of all this is] thanks to the [white, social worker] dean who is my mentor has opened up so many opportunities.

### **Citizenship in the U.S.**

In the political arena in the United States, citizenship and naturalization law, having been settled through the centuries and especially with the 14th amendment, are not salient topics of discussion; are as such not very politicized and thus have little effect on my respondents. My New York respondents are not as up-to-date on the specifics of citizenship and naturalization policies as my Berlin respondents, who were veritable experts on citizenship and immigration law by comparison. This is to be expected because my respondents in New York are either natural-born American citizens, or they naturalized easily thanks to family ties. Moreover, they are allowed dual citizenship (again not a salient issue in public), although many do not even know for sure or particularly care if they still have Dominican citizenship. Thus, this section will concentrate less on such issues than on the issues of the practice of citizenship and political efficacy.

All of my respondents vote, except for the undocumented one. All except that same person also feel they have equal rights as American citizens despite some ethnic disadvantages associated with American identity’s past limitation to whites and current instances of ethnic discrimination that exists for Latinos as a whole. They thus possess and exercise full political membership and American citizenship. They feel that their vote counts and makes a difference

and that it is a duty to vote. *Moreover, my respondents' political efficacy has increased greatly following President Obama's election to office.*

Respondents on the whole claim equal rights as U.S. citizens: "I have equal rights...just as any other American...I vote, I follow American politics..." Federico, the social worker says: "I feel like I'm American. I have equal rights." Furthermore, ultimately, when it comes to whether my respondents feel sufficiently incorporated, whether they feel that they are equal citizens, most argue that they do currently feel so, in varying degrees.

But my respondents do not feel that they have had it easy either; that there is not complete de facto ethnic equality in the U.S.; and they certainly know that they did not possess the equality of opportunity they were entitled to as Americans throughout their lives. One respondent, who has faced his share of obstacles and discrimination, puts his sense of equal citizenship with more caveats than most: "You move past and acknowledge obstacles. It doesn't happen naturally. You try hard and choose right things." This attitude of empowerment and "not allowing oneself to be a victim," finds echoes in the attitudes of Berlin respondents who rail similarly against an *Opfer* [victim] mentality.

On May 23, 2012, The New York Times published the image of a small African-American boy curiously touching the hair of a graciously bowed African-American president in the Oval Office. The boy in the story, Jacob, tells the President: "I want to know if my hair is just like yours." After he touches Obama's hair, Jacob concludes with glee: "Yes, it does feel the same." Such a moment could not occur, of course, before 2008 (Calmes 2012). This seemingly trivial incident signifies in fact that the closer the link between minorities and their government is the greater their loyalty to and identification with the polity will be. This will often translate into a more powerful, confident sense of citizenship and political efficacy.

The election of Barack Obama, who of course is not Latino, but a person of color and the child of an immigrant, caused my respondents to feel that one of their own has made it to the White House (thus, he acted as a symbol of the political incorporation of minorities and immigrants and as a symbol of the way American institutions, while often racist, can be inclusive as well). Obama's election often made my respondents feel that the mainstream was opening up and becoming diverse, something that would bode well for their and their children's future. But, of course all respondents agreed that they were not living in a post-racial America without racism as a result of the election. Thanks to the multicultural school curricula respondents always made a point of mentioning the history of racism (but often along with a history of civil rights) in America, especially if they were social science graduate students (as two of them were),.

One respondent who is particularly in favor of a unifying Latino identity and consciousness, nonetheless ties African-American Obama to Latino political incorporation and the gradual opening of the American political system and mainstream to the political incorporation of minorities. She also refers to the need for Latinos to follow the tactics of African American civil rights organizations in organizing and mobilizing Latinos for political action:

Obama won! Isn't that crazy? I was so happy for him. I was originally for Hillary... You know, they [Clintons] have done a lot for Latinos. [But, with Obama, there is] this sense of change. [Now], the world can see, it's not just WASP males [who become president]. His heritage is Kenyan...I'm hoping for a Latino in there...I hope. I'm hopeful a Latino get in to office... Even for winning the presidency, you have to pay attention to Latinos. It's about demographics. We're growing. Hopeful that we can reach a place where we're middle America Maybe [it'll take] more than 40 years. There's no central force uniting us [Latinos]...No NAACP.

I also asked my respondents if they felt more American as a result of the election and all said something along the lines of yes. Leandro, the business executive, answered: "Yes, yes.

Thrilled to have a person of another color or ethnicity up there.” Even one respondent who identified more with a Latino politics of empowerment rather than with a more universalist notion of American politics argued that after Obama, she feels more of a dedication to the common issues that face all Americans, because she now feels part of a bigger political community, inspired and perhaps persuaded by Obama’s brand of multicultural, liberal, one America, civic nationalism.

It is apparent after these interviews that the respondents—whatever their liberal and minority backgrounds tell them about continuing inequalities—ultimately side with the idea that American nationality and citizenship are civically oriented in general, even though they were not always so. They see the meaning of American identity, nationality, and citizenship as a dynamic one that reacts to the diversifying demography of the nation, as well as to the now-dominant (but still contested) notions of a multicultural and multiracial nation. It seems that President Obama’s election has only strengthened that tendency.

Obama’s election figures into this section about citizenship and political efficacy particularly well. The election made people of color feel politically empowered; increased their interest in politics; mobilized and politically activated them; and it gave them a sense of political efficacy, a sense that the system was penetrable and that their voices too counted for something.

Respondents included the following exuberant one:

It was a momentous occasion. He mobilized a country... You had a culture that was disenfranchised; they didn't feel an ownership of their government. Now they get to. Before, African-Americans and Latinos didn't go out of their ways to vote. Now, they wait in line. Great!

For some, the election both as a factor unifying Americans of all colors and she also notes the excitement the election spurred in her hitherto-apolitical immigrant family and how this election affected their sense of belonging:

It was the first time that we were all sitting around anticipating. I was driving to NY. I heard about the results and my parents were so happy and they were in their sixties, and the person they voted for won. I was more happy for my parents. After waiting for so many years. It meant so much to them. People of color all over the world and also Caucasians were so happy. The fact that an African-American man became president. I was ecstatic the next day.

This respondent then continues to explain how she thinks the election increased her and others' sense of political efficacy, of whether their votes count:

Q.[After Obama's election] Do you think your vote, Latinos' votes change things?

A.I think so, I think this was the first time in history where such a large number of Latinos and African Americans came out to vote.

Q. How did that make you feel?

A. It is like we don't have to be rebels. Change is happening. Definitely hopeful.

The election signified to many that some racial barriers are gradually falling in politics and this increases their political efficacy, their sense and practice of citizenship, and their hopeful and faithful outlook on the future of multi-racial democracy in the U.S.:

[The election signified to me that] It's like any person of color can become president. Even Hillary. It was the first woman. Either way, overall, I was ecstatic about this. It was the first time I felt excited about politics. *He's bicultural, his father was an immigrant, so I could relate to all of that* [emphasis mine]."

Yvette, on her part, a social worker, believes that President Obama motivated her family to be interested in American politics:

"Specially now with an African American president; It was my parents' first vote. It was my first time voting too. We're [our family] Dominicans, minorities in general, more political now; more pro-politics; more engaged."

Obama's election has excited many of my respondents about the possibility of the political incorporation of minorities and children of immigrants of color. Irma explains:

"Oh my God, I cried [When Obama was elected]. I felt proud about being American because I felt like we are opening up [...] But that doesn't mean everything will be better for people of color [...] But, it's like we can change our perspective [...] I don't like the ugly [racist] side [of U.S. history and politics]. I wanna be proud of the decisions we make; and this is a good decision. Some stuff we do is wrong but some stuff shows openness. Yeah, I was certainly proud [...] I felt like "the door is open." [...] Yeah but that doesn't mean everything will be better for people color. Why can't people who come from another country feel included? I don't want or like the exclusion. I don't wanna like talk about a fairy tale. But it's possible that people become more open, we can change our perspective. Obama has this energy. "Let's go beyond this bullshit, race and all that, let's recognize its importance in our life but move on; everyone: White, black, Latino. A lot of greatness can come out of it [...]"

Respondents also mentioned often that Obama's appointment of Sotomayor, a New York City Latina, to the nation's highest court both validated their expectations of more minority political incorporation as a consequence of Obama's election, as well as making them feel incorporated as Latinos, proud, hopeful and faithful.

They do of course simultaneously protest those that insist Obama's election means the end of racism and racial inequality. Neither do they believe that minorities have enough power or that the Promised Land has been spotted. As noted, my respondents are all liberals who are minorities from underprivileged backgrounds and who have been socialized to be critical and to believe fervently in the existence of a long history of American racism and they recognize the current preponderance of racial inequality. This socialization is aided by liberal or leftist media that respondents follow, as well as by the American school system and universities as a result of their multicultural efforts.

A fitting summary of this section on citizenship and political incorporation in New York City and the U.S. is, perhaps surprisingly, a quote by a Berlin respondent Kamil, who lays bare the comparison between the two countries in terms of minority political incorporation:

[Take] Sotomayor. Why did Barack Obama appoint her to that high position? Latinos elected him. He thanked them. You [Germany] open up as a society too. Take a Turk and help him reach a high position, then Turks will be attached too...

Indeed, in addition to Sotomayor, President Obama has appointed a much larger percentage of women, Latinos, and African-Americans to judicial posts than his predecessors (Tobias 2012),<sup>53</sup> demonstrating that political incorporation begets political incorporation in a post-civil rights, diversity-conscious political context. This is not perceived neither by my respondents nor by scholars to be the case just yet in Berlin and Germany, where a miniscule portion of the police, judges, civil servants, elected officials is of Turkish and other minority descent (Koopmans 1999, Alba and Foner 2009, Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009; interviews with Safer Cinar, Ulrich Raiser, Bekir Yilmaz, et al. in July/August 2010).

## V. Conclusion

The findings that this chapter detailed above tend to support the expectations of scholars who argue against the notion of a meaningful convergence between (to put it rather simplistically, in *Weberian* ideal-type terms) “ethnic” and “civic” nations. The data point to the institutional and discursive differences in structures of nationhood, citizenship, immigration, and integration across national borders and in diverse cities divided and bounded by national borders. The qualitative interview data, as well as the analysis of the secondary research conducted thus far on a) political incorporation (e.g. Alba 2005, Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009 a and b; Foner and Alba 2009); and on b) citizenship regimes (Green 2004, Mandel 2008, Howard 2009), all point to the conclusion that German Turks in Berlin have a much less favorable “sociopolitical

opportunity structure” relative to their Dominican-American counterparts in New York City, when it comes to legal, discursive, and self-perceived inclusion in the political system of the host polity as equal or equalizing co-citizens of the national body politic, i.e., the national political community in what is their country of birth (in most cases).

The respondents in Berlin are, if not completely alienated, offended by the legacy of past German immigration, integration, and citizenship policies and mainstream rhetoric. Surprisingly to many convergence theorists, perhaps, they are also offended by, or at the very least dissatisfied with, the current, post-2000-reform context concerning political incorporation and citizenship in terms of both policies and political rhetoric. The liberalization and the approximation of a *ius soli* principle of citizenship brought about by the 2000 citizenship reforms have been overshadowed for the respondents by lingering resentment of past policies and rhetoric on immigration, the merely partially *ius soli* nature of new German citizenship law, the institution of tougher mandatory integration requirements, limitations on family reunification for Turks but not some other nationalities, and above all, the prohibition of dual citizenship in the new law. Moreover, the vitriolic debate over the issue of dual citizenship in 1999-2000 replete with insinuations of dual loyalty and the endorsement of 100% Germanism (to adapt Theodore Roosevelt to Germany) and accompanied by a 5 million signature campaign opposing dual citizenship have also left my respondents feeling resentful and less than fully German. The laudatory commentary on German’s citizenship reform of 2000, accompanied by predictions and current observations of a momentous break with Germany’s traditions of ethnic nationhood and citizenship (Palmowski 2008; Hansen and Weil 2009), need to be tempered by the reality that a merely partial *ius soli* law banning dual citizenship was passed over the objections of conservative parties representing nearly half the nation after very acrimonious and vitriolic debate (Green 2004, Howard 2009).

This was followed by a host of restrictive immigration laws, one of which imposed burdens specifically on Turks and other groups but not on spouses from other countries, such as the U.S. or Japan (Der Spiegel, July 12, 2007; see note 55).

Nonetheless, despite all this, my respondents are very political and not in the very least apathetic or alienated from the political process. They vote and are politically active at many levels. This of course befits their socio-economic status (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1994), their level of integration into the mainstream, and also their resentment-turned-political enthusiasm stemming from their group's perceived maltreatment (On the latter issue, see the political activities of lower-SES but highly political groups in New York City in Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters 2008).

## **CHAPTER 5. National Membership & Belonging: Transnationalism, Civic Assimilation, & “Home”**

I mined in your mines and I gathered in your corn  
I been working, mister, since the day I was born  
Now I worry all the time like I never did before  
'Cause I ain't got no home in this world anymore  
*Woody Guthrie*  
*“I Ain't Got No Home.”*

### **I. Introduction:**

The discussion in this chapter will treat the concept of national belonging and a sense of acceptance and inclusion in-depth. This will include exploration of the perspectives of second-generation respondents, specifically the nature and degree of their national (or urban) identification with the “host society,” which is really the *native* country of most of my respondents. The chapter also describes respondents’ belonging in an extra-national, transnational manner, their adoption of identities alternative to national ones, as well as the extent and nature of respondents’ transnational ties with and orientation towards their ancestral home countries.

In a related discussion, the chapter also addresses the question of where “home” is, and what it means for the respondents, in addition to the extent to which the respondents feel like they are treated by the mainstream as residents of a common home. Lastly, the study explores whether and to what extent the respondents as well as the community leaders profess/demonstrate “civic assimilation,” that is, acculturation into the host society’s civic-political values, political culture, and ideologies. This dimension highlights the legitimacy of the polity and host society in the eyes of respondents, their general sense of inclusion as individuals and as part of a group (willingly or unwillingly, individuals have an either self-professed or socially-assigned membership), as well as their loyalty to the political community.

## II. A Comparison of the Socio-political Opportunity Structures in the Two Contexts:

Out of the many components of “socio-political opportunity structures,” I pay special attention to national citizenship regimes (laws and conceptions of citizenship), which deeply influence the political assimilation of immigrants and their self-identification, i.e., whether they feel that they belong to the political community and nation.

As Joppke argues (1999: 629): “national citizenship remains indispensable for integrating immigrants...lasting exclusion from the national [political] community makes them vulnerable and stigmatized minorities...” (Also see Aleinikoff 2001). Koopmans et al. (2005: 6) insist that distinct institutional and discursive citizenship regimes influence assimilation outcomes greatly.

Assimilation is inherently tied to popular conceptions of the boundaries of national identity, which requires at least some—mainly political and civic—unity within nations (Walzer 1990, Miller 1993, Pickus 2008, Schuck 2009). When large waves of immigration occur, a nation debates whom exactly the nation consists of. Whether a more-or-less cohesive, single, and dominant national model of peoplehood (Smith 2001) exists for each country of immigration is thus highly consequential. Germany has historically constructed itself not as a nation of immigrants, but as an ethnic German nation, that gave special rights of emigration, abode, and citizenship (Richter 2001, Anil 2007; Anil 2004: 445 points out that 15,327,148 *Aussiedler*, or ethnic Germans from Central/Eastern Europe, emigrated to Germany proper from 1945 to 2000). Even the democratic post-war West German Federal Republic—and its political culture—held for decades that Germany merely recruited temporary foreign guest workers who would not later settle and lay down roots (Rubio-Marin 2000; Martin 2004, Green 2004, Mandel 2008, Minkenberg 2003, Brubaker 1992). Despite recent liberalization, this culture has deep roots that will not be uprooted easily or quickly (Minkenberg 2003, Green 2010).

It historically has been primarily an “ethnic nation” in its self-conception, emphatically *not* a “country of immigration,” as the 1977 naturalization guidelines stated clearly. It arguably still remains so (Brubaker 1992, Green 2012). Germany’s citizenship, naturalization, immigration, family-reunification, civil rights and anti-discrimination laws have historically been stringent, reflecting the political culture. Asylum, immigration, and citizenship have been consistently at the top of the public agenda almost without fail in every election campaign since the 1980s.

As far as *discursive notions of citizenship and national membership*, the United States is seen as the prototypical example of “*banal*” *civic nationalism*. For example, every day at schools, in politics, and in the media, the idea of a politically-based and multi-ethnic American nation and a sense of togetherness are constantly and pervasively maintained as hegemony (Billig 1995). The national myth tries to project the ideal of diversity within unity, *e pluribus Unum* (Schuck 2009; also see Foner 2000, Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001).

It is also true that since at least World War II, the Statue of Liberty and the public image of America as a nation of immigrants have become the primary symbols of American national identity (Kennedy 1964, Kasinitz 2004, Jacobson 2006). Germany has, in contrast to the United States, had *ius sanguinis* (or blood/ethnicity-based and restrictive) citizenship for centuries; and immigrants were labeled *foreigners* incapable of being *really* German, because Germany was never “a country of immigration” (Faist 1994, Neuman 1997, Martin 2004). Differences persist even after the liberalization of German citizenship laws in 2000 (naturalization rates are low, requirements are still stringent, too few ethnic non-Germans have citizenship, and political culture does not immediately and radically change after underlying laws change: Minkenberg 2003, Anil 2004, Koopmans et al. 2005).

For example, *the national myths* of the United States conceive of the country as a “*nation of immigrants*,” which affects policies and politics; its current mainstream post-civil rights discourses/political culture (e.g. diversity as a virtue, ethnic pluralism, a relative expansive notion of who is an American, political correctness born of a civil rights culture, etc.) grew in tandem with the enacting of civil rights laws. These stand in contrast to Germany's historical conception of itself as “not a country of immigration,” whose relatively anti-pluralistic political culture and mainstream discourses have until recently characterized even the grandchildren of immigrants as “foreigners.” These were all accompanied by restrictive immigration and citizenship laws, a lack of civil rights laws, and very little political incorporation, until very recently. Legally, the United States has easy-to-attain *jus soli* citizenship (territorially-based citizenship afforded to all who are born there): “birthright citizenship is thus a crucial element in the effective integration of newcomers and their families in the United States” (Aleinikoff 2001; see also Pickus 2005). However, it is clear that multiple traditions of citizenship and nationhood have always co-existed in America, despite the nation's dominant self-understanding as a liberal polity progressively expanding the boundaries of its citizenship. One tradition has been the inclusive civic-republican ideal offering refuge and citizenship to all regardless of origin, which has arguably been the dominant ideology (but not always, or until recently, the practice). On the other hand, white-supremacist ideals and laws that reject certain groups at certain times as racially, religiously, or ideologically unsuited for membership in the American nation, have been a much stronger rival to civic-minded *and* liberal pluralism than has been acknowledged.

These traditions have struggled for primacy throughout American history. Cyclically, an “assimilation anxiety” and “crisis of nationality,” come to the fore when large waves of immigration arrive ashore, and the two traditions battle for supremacy. In the United States, I

argue, the civic-pluralist-liberal conceptions of nationhood and citizenship have predominated in this contest—if you will--buttressed by relatively open immigration laws for centuries, political traditions, and a *jus soli* citizenship law and culture. In the post-civil rights, hyphenated, multicultural era of official, hegemonic, mainstream discourse on race, ethnicity, and national identity, the liberal tradition in the U.S. has been legally and culturally strengthened.

Germany is also home to multiple traditions of citizenship and national membership. However, in Germany, ethnic, exclusionary, and anti-pluralist/anti-immigrant traditions, which have led to restrictive immigration and citizenship laws in practice, have predominated over the very recent pluralistic, civic-liberal tradition. The exclusionary tradition in Germany prevailed for the most part in such a contest of traditions, lending a more ethnic, ascriptive cast to German conceptions and laws of citizenship and nationhood (Brubaker 1992).

Historically-generated conditions present today in the popularly and politically conceived national self-understanding and political culture of Germany have influenced German Turks to believe that even if they assimilate and play by the rules, they are having trouble being considered "real" Germans, *even in Berlin*. Their experiences have taught them this lesson. However, a competing post-68 West German pluralist, civic republican tradition, represented by the Greens, some SPD members, intellectuals, and self-confident upwardly mobile Turks, the Berlin government, and even some moderate CDU members is also present (see Hockenos 2008).

Thus, my German respondents, though disaffected, bitter and angry, are not apathetic, resigned, and passive; partly because they see a slowly but surely changing Germany. They do not give up; they hold some hope for the future, putting much stock in demographic trends: the rapidly increasing share of the *Migrationshintergrund* population—zero immigration policy or

not—and the perceived relative liberalism and pluralism of urbane younger cohorts. They are also driven by their own political activism based on civic-liberal pluralist principles. They struggle to create a new hyphenated Germany, often in concert with like-minded ethnic-Germans, often of my respondents' generation.

## **II. Respondents in Berlin**

Due to German immigration history as well as to a historically ancestry-based *ius sanguinis*<sup>54</sup> tradition of German nationhood, Germanness in the public culture has been constructed as an ethnic concept. The current era is an age where nation-states doggedly survive, prosper, and matter, while they may recede a bit before globalization. Thus, this exclusion from the mainstream conception of Germanness is consequential in daily life for individuals at its receiving end. Such exclusion from Germanness by the mainstream German society (in a legal manner for most, in a rhetorical manner for almost all Turks in Germany) amounts also to a rhetorical exclusion from the *demos*. Consequently, it also fosters an exclusion from the *demoskratos* as well. This is a grave situation for Germany, as is the similar situation of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. for that country. However, one difference between Germany and the U.S. is that the children of the undocumented immigrants are natural-born U.S. citizens, and their increasing political activism coupled with their citizenship status under *jus soli* terms will give them some support in their struggle for inclusion.

**Who is German?** Germanness is described by my respondents as depending on one's genes, hair color, and ancestry, proving the staying power of an ethnic conception of German nationhood. This is also true for other Muslim and non-EU Germans. In fact, my respondents point out while it is "cool" to be Spanish or even Latin American, it is obviously not so cool to be Turkish. Even

when a Turkish German has German citizenship, most respondents feel, she is not treated as a “real” German, a “real” citizen, who is indigenous to Germany.

Nonetheless, most respondents nevertheless see themselves as German Turks.

Hyphenated identities may not yet be the norm in Germany. But my respondents say they want to stake that claim in the German mainstream.

A telling example of the context in which German Turks operate is provided by a story in the popular, mainstream magazine Der Spiegel. Leading German-Turkish organizations boycotted Merkel’s Integration Summit in 2007 to protest the new tougher family reunification laws for some nationalities (including Turks) but not others (noted above). Regarding the matter, the respectable and mainstream center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung editorialized in the following manner constructing Turkish-German organizations as foreign entities that did not have a say over German legislation:

*"The refusal of four Turkish federations to participate in the chancellor's second integration summit is like a thunderstorm which clears the air. Now it is obvious that the various discussion partners have no common conception of what integration is actually supposed to mean. For foreigners to question a law which has just been passed -- for good reasons -- and to make changing it a pre-condition for further talks ... shows the exact opposite of willingness to integrate. Integrating into Germany's political system also means respecting the will of the democratic majority as shown in elections and parliament. ... Some foreigners come here in order to maintain a self-centered and self-sufficient way of life under more generous circumstances than in their homeland -- in other words, to live with their own kind in ghettos and parallel societies. ... Because Germany is not a country of immigration, but a country of integration"<sup>55</sup> [emphases mine]*

This sort of rhetoric in the mainstream leads many Turkish Germans like Nalan to argue that Germanness is constructed on an ethno-racial basis:

*There are black people who have lived in Germany for a hundred years...They aren't accepted as Germans because they're black....That's how these things are debated...Whatever you do, you'll be labeled a foreigner. Turks, blacks, visible minorities. If you physically don't fit the German mold, you'll be branded a foreigner. What do they*

expect from us? Should we dye our hair blond, wear blue lenses? I don't know. The second and third generations speak German really well. We have a lot of successful people, professionals. But still there's a debate over 'Are they integrating?' Plus, Germanness and being Muslim are seen as two incompatible opposites. There's always a state of "othering."

Examples abound among respondents of their very own treatment by the majority, as "permanent non-Germans" and "foreigners" in the public sphere. For instance, Isik is a Berlin-born cosmopolitan social worker. In high school, she went to Iowa through an exchange program. Her host parents were assimilated German-Americans, who were very excited to have an exchange student from Germany. They treated Isik with hospitality and recognized her as a German. The host father's mother was a German-born immigrant. The elderly woman also was eagerly awaiting the German exchange student. Isik says, however, the first thing that the German-born woman said when she walked in the door was: "*She's not German!*"

Even Cem Özdemir, the leader of the Green Party is not exempt from being treated as a Turk and not a German. He told me that he has been called (even, occasionally, in the media) *ein Türke mit Deutschem Pass* [A Turk with a German Passport]. Özdemir also recounted an instance when he was at a public discussion forum with an official from the Interior Ministry who was a member of the conservative CDU. The interior ministry official turned to him and referred to Turks as Özdemir's co-citizen. An offended Özdemir asked the official what he meant by his co-citizens since he was a German-born German politician from a German party. The official gave the following answer: "You know what I mean." Özdemir pointed out in our interview that the official was from the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of upholding and protecting the constitution, which obviously defines anyone with a German passport as a German.

Likewise, Berlin MP Özcan Mutlu reports, “They [co-MPs] see you as a Turk. They ask: 'Are you going home [referring to Turkey]?' ... But my *vatan* [homeland] is here!!!”

The concept of “home” is especially important in this context and in the dissertation’s analysis, because, the words for 'home' in Turkish and German (*vatan* and *Heimat*, respectively) are much more profound, mythical, and evocative than they are in English.

If even prominent German politicians of Turkish-ancestry cannot escape being treated as not-really-German foreigners, or as Turks, one can hardly expect ordinary second generation Turkish immigrants—even if they are formally educated and acculturated—not to be branded *Turks* or “*almost German, but...*”s. They clearly are unlike the “bio-Germans,” as Isik wittily calls ethnic-Germans. What may be termed the “foreignerization” (or othering, if you will) of my respondents and their brushes with discriminatory and exclusionary incidents start early, at school, as was shown above (Ch. 3).

The word *foreigner* (*Ausländer*) has a long history in German politics (Faist 1994; Mandel 2008). Respondents in fact even report still hearing the now-out-of-fashion term used to describe second or third generations. In fact, they often use it themselves to refer to Germans of migrant extraction, including themselves. Almost all respondents also report that people sometimes are surprised by how well they speak German, or how they amazingly don’t have a foreign accent, even in professional or academic elite settings. They also report constantly being asked where they are really from.

Burcu, who received a Ph.D in the US, even started a club called *Woher kommst du wirklich?* [Where are you really from?] at her German college, where “foreigners” (even Italians, etc.) would get together and trade stories. The name of the club stemmed from the same question they all were often asked. Serkan, a lawyer, said he was always harassed by the police when he

was a teenager in Koeln. On one occasion, the policeman told him “we wish you a nice *stay* in Germany,” as he left. The policeman was of course implying Serkan and his friends were foreigners, or guests.

Asked the question, “Do you feel German?” Aydan, (activist and college student) responds without hesitation, “Yes.” That is a common assertion. Respondents feel that they of course feel German to some extent or another, in one way or another. In my respondents' reasoning, being well-adjusted, democratic, industrious, skilled, educated, and integrated citizens of Germany, where most were born and the rest have spent almost all of their lives, qualifies them to be German. Given their predominately civic-republican, liberal pluralist conception of Germanness, this is to be expected. According to my respondents and in concurrence with most research (Koopmans et al. 2005, Koopmans and Ersanilli 2011; also refer back to Chapters 1 and 2). What is less commonplace is, the acknowledgement and legitimization of this feeling of Germanness by the host society mainstream. My respondents still feel that their claims of membership are not reciprocated by a still-ethnic conception of Germanness in the mainstream political culture (Schneider 2001, Mandel 2008).

In other words, my respondents do not have the “discursive opportunity structures” to claim membership credibly in the eyes of a majority of the German public; not that this stops my respondents from stubbornly doing so. In any case, my respondents in Berlin cannot then enter the mainstream in this sense. The boundary is bright. “Turk” is incompatible with “German.”

Hyphens are not of much use. One must individually “switch teams” and cross boundaries to belong. The risk to that route of course is to be shunned both by one’s own minority community and by the host society mainstream, leaving one in limbo (see Child 1945, Alba 2005). My respondents’ lives are of course far from that dire. They are annoyed and

offended but they still feel largely comfortable enough. Nonetheless, ultimately, they lack in this matter as they do in most other spheres of social life, they lack the “second generation advantage” that Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway (2008) found in their study of the New York second generation.

School years proved to be fertile ground for the othering of my Turkish-German respondents and their discursive exclusion from the national community, by not only their peers—as is the case also in many New York cases—but in addition, shockingly, by their teachers, professional co-workers, and public servants as well. Many teachers used very overt and offensive language, owing in part to the lack of a civil rights revolution and a standard of “politically correct” non-offensive language. Several respondents report occasions when teachers would use them to shame “bio-German” students in German class, pointing to my respondents and saying, roughly, “Even little X [who is a Turk, not a German] knows German grammar better than you [the real Germans] do...Shame on you!” As a result, as Koopmans and Ersanilli (2011) note, identification and attachment to Germany on the part of minorities is clearly at a much lower level than countries with more civic-liberal citizenship regimes.

Ilke, a lawyer, once went to her eight year old niece’s school to talk to her teacher. The teacher tried to assuage her by claiming “She [your niece] reads Germany really well for a Turkish girl.” Ilke, insulted, protested: “She’s the third generation! Of course it’s normal for her to read German well!”

Ilke continues exasperated: “[Turkish] Kids are being bullied constantly. Other kids them ‘You’re a Turk. You stink...You smell like Turkey...You believe in another God!’ The kids told my niece the latter, because my niece told the class there was no Santa Claus.” The teacher heard these taunts and did nothing, says Ilke; instead, the teacher told Ilke's niece “Of course

there is a Santa Claus;’ and moved on. Likewise, Isik, recalling her school years, says: “I was confused. Where is home? I was called a foreigner for the longest time.”

Aydan—trying to cope with an anti-Turkish school culture—even tried to pass as Italian for a while during her early school years (actually, a common strategy). This was well before she cultivated the self-assurance that she has today as a successful student and social entrepreneur. She is involved in promoting a confident Turkish-German identity for her peers and promoting diversity in the German mainstream. As noted above, Aydan had claimed without hesitation that she personally felt German. However, her unambiguous certainty in terms of her self-consciousness does not carry over to how she thinks other Germans perceive her:

Q. Do you think people see you as a German?

A. Slowly. But it's not like the US. People easily call themselves Turkish-American, etc.”

Aydan continues: “It's the Turks' fault too. They see themselves as victims. Both sides were unprepared [for immigration and settlement]...”

The mere fact of their German citizenship did not preclude my respondents’ public and general exclusion from Germanness. In the public mind, the meaning of Germanness is still constructed not so much based on one’s citizenship status or place of birth, but on one’s ethnic descent. Meral, the Berlin-born nurse, answers the question “Do people see any German citizen as a German?” by feigning incredulity at the interviewer’s naiveté:

No absolutely not! [It's about] the way you look. Politically, I have rights. I don't need visas to travel. Some things, I'm better off as a citizen; but when I talk to someone, I'm seen as a foreigner...Germanness doesn't have anything to do with being a German citizen. Like I said, I'm a German citizen, but I'm still treated the same way. I mean my passport could've been Turkish. Nothing would be different. You know, like, you have two wings, and I felt like I was missing one, like I lacked something. But, now, I feel like I've got three, four wings...I mean now I have self-confidence...Having three cultures, German, Turkish, Kurdish, is better than having just a German side.

Kamil answers the question, “Is everyone born here a German?” by sarcastically protesting:

On paper yeah [with the new law, conditionally, as one citizenship is to be picked between ages 18-23]. If you're born in America, you're American. Here it's about blood. *Blodrechts* [blood law]. Unless your blood is German, you can't be German. I tell people, 'I'm German too.' They say 'C'mon! Your passport is German.' They say this stuff openly. We're Turks in Germany, Germans in Turkey... You meet someone, it comes to race [ethnic origin, ancestry, not race in the American sense of color, but in the European sense of “different races of Europe,” etc.]. 'Where are you from?'... pages... I did not stick out in Italy. But I do here... Here, I say 'I'm German' and they laugh: 'Oh, but your hair is really dark, you should dye it... ha ha! If I were a blond Pole, they wouldn't say stuff like that...' 'Turk' is a dirty word: '*Ey, du Türke!*' A bad thing.

Ruth Mandel's 2008 book on Berliner Turks makes the same point about mainstream German discursive norms, when she notes that the words Turk and *Ausländer* have been treated as synonymous; both words connote otherness and distance from German society, an integration problem. I asked Serhat whether the new citizenship reforms expanded the meaning of Germanness and made it more pluralistic, say like Australianness. He did not answer in the affirmative in the least, arguing that the political culture does not change with formal, legal-institutional changes (see Minkenberg 2003):

Look, even if you change the formalities, the laws, if the mentality doesn't change; if a German sees you as a Turk even if you're a German citizen... I talk to a guy, speaking regular German, the guy sees me as a Turk, even if he doesn't know what my citizenship is. The ideology does not change with the new law. I don't know how long it'll take. It'll take 50, 100 years for Germany to be like France or America. The ideology will only change over many generations.

Q. You were born here, if you have a kid with someone else born in Germany, will your kid be a German?

A. No! You're a Turk. Here, the third, fourth, fifth generations, they're always Turks, never Germans.

Further proving the dissertation's point that even if one makes it, they are not considered real Germans due to the ethnic definitions of Germanness in the public domain, Özcan Mutlu, the Berlin MP answers the question “Are successful Turks seen as Germans here?” by saying:

A little bit, partially. Turkish academicians [understood in German as highly literate professionals of many kinds] go to Turkey, or far away, to the United States. They're welcomed like kings. Here these diamonds are not noticed. This is brain-drain ... Germany is not a welcoming country. The U.S. accepts diversity. Here, too, there's a process, a slow one but it is proceeding...

Many respondents are often explicitly aware of international comparisons due to their intra-EU and transatlantic transnational lives. They readily describe the differences in what Koopmans et al. (2005) call discursive opportunity structures. These comparisons may sound like idealizations of America by uninformed observers. The views of America or the UK may be too rosy. But of course they are comparing it with an outsider's perspective to what they experience in Germany. Plus, almost all respondents who make comparative claims have actually been to the places they are comparing Germany too, often for long stretches, like exchange programs. They are "Euro-stars" (Favell 2008) after all]. Murat (m), the diversity consultant, has lived for the past few years in London. He compares Britain favorably to Germany: "What I get from them is that it is easier to be British than German They claim their country for themselves. They're not foreigners...They're British...British-Asian, black British...The young people in Germany have to start doing that...Let's claim this country for ourselves."

Isik went to a Midwestern state in the US for an exchange year in high school:

One night, my host father asked me how my father would react if I married a black boy. I said, well that has nothing to do with my situation.....I understood that race and ethnicity are meaningful only in certain contexts... All of a sudden, I was white. But, we were the blacks in Germany....

Q. How do you compare the ideas of being German and being American?

A. ...German is by blood. [You have to be] blue eyed. In America, it's clear. You're born there you're American.... [When I was] 16 years old, I was in New York..They wouldn't believe I wasn't American. So inclusive. I wasn't used to it.

Serhat, the lawyer, claims that "*Stigmatisierung* [Stigmatization] is a feeling every foreigner living here has. If you compare to other countries, I think, this is the case most often in

Germany. I mean look at France, the US. For anyone's identity, it's normal there to say 'I'm American' or 'I'm French.' But according to the German ideology [of nationhood], this is impossible. According to that perspective, it is impossible for someone of foreign origins, I mean for someone who is not of German blood [smiles], to claim he is German, whatever his passport is....."

When asked to pick one identity that describes him best, Ismail (m), the diversity counselor at a primary school, ponders and then responds: "Everyone asks me that question. It's difficult. I'd say *Weltbuerger*...[Citizen of the world]." This answer betrays a common post-national attitude, which is perhaps a sort of assimilation to the discomfort of many upper-class Germans in general towards national identities. Still, as to whether he feels German, Ismail, who is deeply critical of German society's stances towards minorities, replies: "Yes. Turkish-German. Both are in my heart." It is, in one way of looking at it, unexpected that he should feel German so effortlessly, and be attached to Germany as one of his two special *Heimats*. However, when the conversation turns to whether "bio-Germans" reciprocate by considering him German, his demeanor takes a negative turn:

Q: Do people see you as German?

A: No, No.... This is important. We have American friends. We had [frank, critical] discussions with them. About Afro-Germans...African Americans. But, Germans, they say, 'There's no racism in Germany!' But I see Turks who go over there to live in the US. They say 'I'm an American' with pride!...Here you have no Turks who'll say, even after 30 years, 'I'm German.' It's not because of Turks. It's because the majority tells you 'You're a foreigner,' everyday." Here, in the U-Bahn, people see a Turkish woman wearing a headscarf...Everyone's watching her...Like in a zoo! [laughs ironically]<sup>56</sup>....My uncle is married to an American woman in the military...They asked to go to an American military base with them...I said 'Everyone will look at us...' [But,] Americans didn't care. You don't feel free here [in Germany]. I went to the Netherlands with my Afro-German girlfriend...In Amsterdam, no one cares. There are binational couples. No one stares [at bi-racial couples, or at Afro-Europeans]. Black people there are so self-confident. With my black girlfriend, everyone stared [at us] in Ku'damm [the main shopping street of West Berlin...].

Likewise, all of my respondents feel that Germanness is defined in German society on an ethnic or ancestral basis. It is not something that can be attained by birth in Germany alone, in other words, on a purely *jus soli* basis. When prompted to define just what qualifies one to be German, according to the German mainstream, Sureyya says (as is typical of almost all the respondents): “[A German is] someone whose parents are [ethnically] German.” To the follow-up question “Are other people born in Germany not German?” She responded, “No, no, not everyone.” In this view, Germanness is not attainable merely by naturalization or birth in Germany.

Kamil explains:

Q. Is everyone who is born here a German?

A. On paper yeah [with the new law, conditionally, as one country’s citizenship is to be picked between ages 18-23, applying to certain individuals born in Germany whose immigrant parents fulfill certain criteria]... If you're born in America, you're American. Here, it's about blood. *Blodrechts* [Blood law]... Unless your blood is German, you can't be German. I tell people, 'I'm German too.' They say 'C'mon! [It's just] your passport [that] is German.’ They say this stuff openly. We're Turks in Germany, Germans in Turkey... You meet someone; it comes to race [ethnic origin, ancestry, 'blood;' not race in the American sense of color, but in the European sense of 'different races of Europe,' etc.]... [I'm always asked, 'Where are you from?'... I did not stick out in Italy. But I do here... Here, I say 'I'm German' and they laugh: 'Oh, but your hair is really dark, you should dye it... ha ha! If I were a blond Pole, they wouldn't say stuff like that...']

The racial nature of Germanness in the German national self-consciousness, as perceived by the respondents, may best be exemplified by Teoman’s blunt statement, humorously uttered: “I’m *not genetically able* to be German.”

The decades-long of discourse of constructing post-war Germany as not a country of immigration has left its indelible marks on German mainstream political culture and hence the life worlds of my respondents. This discourse, which deems immigration a historical, regrettable

anomaly, leaves little room for my respondents to claim membership in a predominately ethnic discursive opportunity structure. These deeply held perceptions are hardly displaced as of yet despite the recent reluctant admissions of Germany's being a country of immigration, albeit not a classic country of immigration on the part of mainstream, even CDU, figures, and the statutory acknowledgement with the 2005 *Zuwanderungsgesetz* (The immigration law, in which the German state finally recognized the reality of immigration) that did little if anything to increase immigration levels.

Yasemin, a social worker, says:

Ok, we said this one line [we're a country of immigration]. Super, but you have to do more than that. There are new laws for example. There are citizenship tests. Go ask a German all those questions, they wouldn't get half the questions right. They don't want to make naturalization easier...They said we're a country of immigration, but things are always getting difficult...They finally said 'Wir sind ein Einwanderungsland [we're a country of immigration]' but some things are always just getting worse. If I wanted to marry someone from Turkey, he has to already know German...So, he has to take courses there and pass a test...And then, when he comes here, more tests, and more courses...What is with these tests??? Well, it seems they don't want more of us to come here...

Pelin points out the lingering bitterness towards Germany's rhetorical exclusion of immigrants and says, typically, that a 40 year policy of indifferent neglect—discursive and institutional—of immigrants has already accrued Germany considerable costs. This then constitutes an example of the impact of political culture and discursive opportunity structures on the attitudes and behavior of Turkish Germans and other individual citizens:

I mean, Germany was never [officially] a country of immigration until three years ago...Now, they're suffering the consequences.

While, as will be seen below, the notion of a country of immigrants provides a discursive opportunity structure to Dominicans in New York, the same cannot be said of Germany:

Q. Is Germany a country of immigration?

A. They have to be...It's a demographic necessity [aging population, the migrants already here]. Politicians have accepted it. But the people haven't. Maybe they will/are...

Q. Is there a lot of nativist anti-immigrant politics?

A. They're still in the beginning [of this process]. In due time, they will accept [immigration]. They have to.

Q. Is German national identity inclusive of immigrants and their children?

A. Not right now. Slowly. They only realized their mistakes 4-5 years ago...

Nurten is quite embittered by what she considers a political culture that has for so long been and still to a certain extent remains, in denial of the immigrants in its midst.

I mean consider the demographic developments: 20% of the country is of migration-background. They say it'll be 40% in 2050...And they only accepted they were a country of immigration 4 years ago with the *Zuwanderungsgesetz* [the otherwise largely restrictive Immigration Law].

This view is supported by ample past quotes from mainstream German public figures and today, there is no shortage of politicians ignoring Germany's need to acknowledge, come to terms with and absorb the immigrants and their civic, hyphenated, dynamic ways of being German. Just recently, however, the German interior minister continued the barrage against the *Bundespräsident's* ordinary, reasonable, and civic view that Islam and Muslims were a part of Germany, just as Jews and Christians were.

For example, the Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich has argued: "That Islam is part of Germany is a fact that cannot be proven by history."<sup>57</sup> This, despite the fact that some 4,300,000 Muslims reside and have permanently settled in Germany (about 5.2% of the total; *Die Welt* 2009)—millions of whom are German citizens; or the fact that Germany's pride and glory, its national soccer team, is a multi-ethnic mix including a beloved, talented Turk: Mesut Özil as well as his Arab-German teammate from Real Madrid Sami Khedira; not to mention the countless other Turkish-Germans who are at the forefront of contemporary German culture, such as Fatih Akin, the famous German director.

**Is a hyphenated Germanness possible?** In each location, my respondents were all asked to pick one identity above all; and then asked to pick two if they wished, at each step asking them why they chose the identity they did. This permitted getting a more nuanced and clearer picture of identity choices and the extent of identificational transnationalism than many quantitative large-n surveys can provide.

Whatever others may see them as, most respondents still feel they are Germans, albeit hyphenated Germans. They are all at ease with mainstream German culture, which is for most their main reference point. My respondents also report feeling foreign in Turkey. In brief, they combine a sort of Germanness with a sense of identity inherited from Turkey then adapted and kept alive in Germany. They revere Turkey as an idea, as a myth, as the homeland but quite likely, never their abode in the present and future.

Yasemin, the social worker describes herself as "*eine Deutsch Türkin mit Arabische Wurzeln* [A German Turk with Arabic roots]." <sup>58</sup> She concedes that a hybrid identity is difficult for most people (read: bio-Germans, but also even many German Turks) to acknowledge as a legitimate, authentic, "normal" identity. But she's claiming her hyphens anyway: "It's not easy for most people [to accept a hybrid identity]...They always ask, 'Well, are you Turkish or German?' I mean a little of both! But lately this is talked about more, in the media..." She says she used to feel forced to choose one or the other. But she is comfortable with the way she is and she wants to dictate the terms of her identity to the German public, because, as Yasemin puts it: "I have more self-worth now..."

Despite the tenuous optimism that this implies, a majority of the respondents agreed with Yasemin about the basic assumption that the German mainstream did not accept and was even flummoxed by the possibility of being both German and a certain type of Turkish. Germany's

perceived lack of tolerance for hybrid identities and a more diverse conception of nationhood are seen by many respondents as the underlying cause for the extraordinarily mainstream politicization and the ultimate rejection of dual citizenship.

Kamil (the luxury car salesman and small business owner) also suggests that his identity is too complex (but essentially Germany-based); and that it cannot be boiled down to a simple one-word choice between the dichotomy of German or Turk. Kamil sees it in the following way:

Q. How do you feel about being Turkish and German [a hybrid identity, which the respondent applied to himself].

A. I love the European way of life. I love Turkish culture. [This is ] integration...to be a German with Turkish roots. But Germans don't accept this. I say 'I'm Turkish-German...They say 'What? Which one are you?' Black and white... That's why they don't accept dual citizenship...[At the time of the citizenship reform] Schroeder wanted dual citizenship. CDU organized a campaign against it...On no other issue would you be able to collect 5 million signatures in opposition... [So], at the time, most *foreigners* [note again the term used] were saying "Fucking Germans!!!

This difficulty in asserting one's hyphenated identity, in claiming membership, causes a dissonance between the German Turks' self-identification and their exclusion from Germanness by the public. In other words, many second generation Turks feel that one has to become a German and leave Turkishness behind. Few, if any, would be in favor of such a thing in a conscious way. But my respondents feel that they are held to such impossible standards by the majority. As noted, this expectation is one of one-way assimilation, in which an individual has to engage in boundary crossing, changing teams, if you will.

Serpil is from a working-class, strongly and consciously ethnic (Turkish) background who went to a *Fachhochschule* [a less-prestigious technical/professional college] and is currently lower middle class, completely acculturated, fluently bilingual and thus able to operate in both societies.. However, while work remains a majority German sphere, the private more intimate social spheres remain mostly Turkish-German. As the boundaries

cannot blur, she ultimately has to “boundary-cross,” not at home and monocultural in each separate world (Woon and Zolberg 1997; Alba 2009). I asked her about the contradictions that arise from this sort of uncertain straddling of two worlds, which is far from the confident, dexterous, flexible, “second generation advantage”-fusion that the New York second generation is more apt to experience (Kasinitz et al. 2008):

Q. So if you became “too German,” you’d distance yourself from the Turkish community.

Aye.

Q. Can’t you be both [German and Turkish]?

A. Nah.

Q. Don’t you have a German side at all?

A. At work, definitely...German values, work ethic, working hard, punctuality... [...]

Q. What does it mean to be German [according to mainstream conception]?

A. To be a German is to assimilate/*absorb* all that is [culturally] German ... I can’t do that...I thought about it and realized I can’t move to any other city [than Berlin]...

Yusuf complains about othering as well, even if he is a mainstream FDP liberal. He is a business student civically active on European student and liberal issues, is moderately pious (but not an extreme Turkish nationalist or a fundamentalist). He ultimately rejects Germanness because he has been generally addressed as a Turk and negatively so, while also often being excluded by society from the bounds of Germanness. He responded to these situations by coming to the following conclusions on identity, doubtless also drawing on Turkey’s similarly ethnic, assimilationist, anti-hyphen official nationalism (Kadioglu 2006, Clark 2009):

I don’t like that whole thing anyways: ‘German Turk,’ ‘Turkish German,’ whatever. If you’re a Turk, you’re Turk. If you’re a German, you’re a German. What they do is they [the native German mainstream] call the ‘good ones’ Turkish-German [e.g. Fatih Akin] and they call the bad ones Turks.

To sum up, one may speak of the following ways in which the respondents identify themselves: 1-) hyphenated-/hybrid-German; 2-) Berliner; 3-Turk by blood and thus, by

“necessarily” always a Turk. All agree however, that the public knows what being German is not, even if they may have difficulty defining what exactly a German is (Schneider 2001) In other words, whatever they may identify themselves as, my respondents know that the German mainstream, the public, does not consider them German. On the contrary, this public nurtures a culture where German national identity has even been constructed in opposition to the “others:” *Ausländer* and the ideal typical *Ausländer*, Turks.

Hyphenation is one instance where an individual can honor multiple sides of a complex identity if a society's mainstream allows it. Hyphenation asks relatively little of immigrants to grant them Americanness or Canadianness. While pluralistic, hyphenation nonetheless still emphasizes the national. By honoring diversity, assimilation and unity survive.

Hammar (1985:449) observes that there is not a fixed amount of “identity” that individuals must literally divide among their two homelands; it is not a zero-sum situation. People—especially when allowed to keep their ethnic identity while taking on a host society identity (through hyphenation or situational identities, for example)—do not subtract increased devotion to one country from their devotion and attachment to another country. They can simultaneously be Germans, Turkish-Germans, and Turks. This freedom would actually increase their devotion to the pluralistic host society, which has a low threshold for accepting people into its circle of membership. Conversely, being forced to give up Turkishness and being prevented from legitimately claiming hyphenation creates alienation and resentment, which is confirmed by my respondents (see Hammar 1985).

However this hyphenated Germanness remains far from mainstream legitimacy in the cases of my respondents in Berlin, who feel hyphenated but their discursive claims are not reciprocated by the majority or mainstream.

Moreover, the Turkish national identity is also based on blood-, or ancestry-related criteria, like the German one. Consequently, many Turks do not consider themselves or feel that they should even be addressed as Germans because one can be only one of two incompatible things: Turk or German. This attitude is not common among my respondents but one suspects that it is in the larger Turkish German community, especially among the socially disadvantaged Turkish second generation youth.

### **A Berliner/in Identity.**

Since national membership cannot be easily claimed in Berlin by the respondents, ethnic Turkish—reactive ethnicity or transnational Turkish nationalism, or primarily urban identities may be expected to be the alternatives. Berlin, with its relative hip openness or benign indifference to diversity, in terms of its policies and culture, is much easier to claim as home than Germany. A *Berliner/in* identity is readily available to my respondents who claim it in varying degrees of gusto and sometimes as a direct substitute for the unavailable national membership identity. But whether it is a sufficient basis for equal citizenship is doubtful, according to my analysis. Even Berlin remains within the powerful reach of Germany's national socio-political opportunity structures. Serpil, mentioned above in regards to her working class background and her straddling the Turkish and the German, picked her primary identity with ease:

A. *Berlinerin!*

Q. Why?

A. Because I can't say I'm German.

Q. Why not?

A. Because I'm a Turk!

Neighborhoods and attachment to them often surpass even a Berlin identity. Many respondents argued that at Kreuzberg or Neukoelln, or Wedding, they felt home. They felt accepted by the German hipsters and the German Turks; they enjoyed to cultural amenities of

their Turk-heavy neighborhoods: the Turkish art, entertainment, and food found in their corners of Berlin.

For Serpil, Berlin also offers the anonymity that she as a mature German-born and German-socialized woman desires. However, her troubles in crisscrossing boundaries between the Turkish and the German worlds continue (again, see Childs 1945 for an analogy):

Like, Hanover is too small. All Turks know each other. In Berlin I can be free... But still, [Even in Berlin], you can't really go beyond the Turkish *Gesellschaft* [a separate society]...I can't just go to a club, meet a guy, and take him home. I'll have a bad reputation [among Turks]...I can't cross certain boundaries. I know [Turkish] gays for example. He lives outside of society. This is the solution I have come up with, in order not to be alone. On the other hand, you're close to your family and your community is useful to you.

### **Transnationalism and Linguistic/Cultural Assimilation.**

This brings to the fore interesting insights into the way 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Dominican immigrants experience transnationalism, which is often seen as an obstacle to national identification and assimilation of immigrants, as immigrants are more able today to travel back and forth and to communicate with the homelands they left behind. But in fact, visits and other ties become less frequent for most immigrants as time goes by and the nation-state begins to act as a container of social life (Waldinger 2008). This is especially true for the second generation (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2006). However, the Dominican community in the US, including the second generation, is known as an especially transnational one (Levitt 2001, Louie 2006a and b). Nonetheless, ironically, my preliminary findings hint that transnationalism among the Dominican second generation may in fact act as an agent of Americanization.

Transnationalism aids Americanization in that contact with a Dominican world makes the Dominican Republic the *frame of reference* when evaluating life and identity in the United

States; they compare the U.S. to the Dominican Republic, which makes for a positive evaluation of an American identity and the United States in general (see also Louie 2006a, 2006b).

My respondents experience foreignness in the Dominican Republic and they feel and are treated as Americans in the Dominican Republic, which made them realize (often to their surprise) how American they in fact were. Evelyn, a civil servant and one of the two respondents that had difficulty identifying as American, nonetheless confessed that when she goes to the Dominican Republic, “They call me gringo there. They say I speak Spanish like a white girl, with an accent.” And they all feel like coming home when arriving in New York. Despite relatively frequent visits that become less and less frequent as the adulthood sets in, my respondents felt that they felt like outsiders in the Dominican Republic and would never actually settle there. This happened despite their intense emotional ties and devotion to the island, and to their roots; as well as their continued professed treatment of the Dominican Republic as a “cultural home,” a space where they get in touch with their cultural identity. Thus, in matters of politics, an American-orientation was most clear.

The transnational characteristics of my Turkish-German respondents were in large measure similar to those of my Dominican-American ones, as will be seen and which is to be expected, given the fact that both groups (in general and on average) are known to engage heavily in transnational activities of one sort or another (Østergard Nielsen 2000, Kastoryano 2001, Levitt 2001); and given the fact that individuals from both the groups interviewed are of similarly disadvantaged backgrounds, while they all currently possess high SES.

In brief, my research clearly shows that my Turkish-German respondents are not very transnational in ways that indicate a tangible, frequent, and continuous link to their parents' homeland that defines transnationalism (Guarnizo et al. 2003, Itzigsohn et al 1999, Waldinger

2007). This is perhaps unexpected, given the immense popularity among lay persons as well as scholars of the notion that contemporary immigrants—especially Turks and Dominicans—are almost uniformly oriented towards transnationalism rather than primarily their host society. Nonetheless, befitting Turks' reputedly high transnationalism activity levels as a group, my respondents maintained active links with some family in Turkey through frequent—sometimes annual—visits. They also exhibited immense affection for Turkey and its cultures. Turkishness, or Kurdishness, or Alawite religious background forms the bedrock of their identity, albeit most often in a hyphenated and Germanized manner. That they are not German has been taught to them since childhood, after all. Germany, most respondents feel, has pushed them away, an unrequited love affair although Germany is often the only suitor my respondents know.

However, as expected from second-generation immigrants (Waldinger 2007; Kasinitz et al. 2006) and especially from highly successful groups (Kim 2004), a vast majority of my respondents were permanently oriented more towards German society and politics than towards Turkish society and politics. Their lives are settled in the locales of their birth and/or their socialization: that is, in Germany, and specifically and significantly in Berlin. Most could not envision a future in Turkey for good. In some cases they had even tried living in Turkey for a few years, which only left them underwhelmed, disappointed, and feeling like foreigners. Their lives, careers, and families are now irreversibly established in Germany, whatever its faults, and not in Turkey, whatever its emotional pull.

Most of the Turks that I interviewed in Germany—or, to be politically correct: *Türkeistämmige Personen* [Persons with roots in Turkey], since many of my respondents were from Turkey but identified as Kurds, Arabs, Alawites, not as ethnic-Turks—visit Turkey regularly, albeit usually with decreasing frequency; and most speak Turkish at least adequately,

often fluently. However, perhaps needless to say, German is their better and native language since they are university-educated professionals placed primarily within mainstream social networks. Their Turkish is often accented and colloquial, as is the case for Dominican-Americans and Spanish. Indeed, many Berlin interviews were conducted in English (often American accented). Many respondents also indicated, as did my Dominican respondents with regards to English, that they often speak German to their siblings.

Many also follow the Turkish media often. Although, the frequency of their doing so varies wildly. In fact, most respondents confess that they follow the German media more closely than they do the Turkish media. Most follow the German media almost exclusively. The prevailing notion of Turkish masses in Western Europe uniformly glued to the Turkish media, accessed by ubiquitous satellite dishes (Avci and Kirisci 2007), does not hold water for this demographic. This may be the case for their parents or their poorer co-ethnic peers; but satellite dishes are a minor factor in my respondents' lives, due their particular life trajectories and current class status, as well as their potential class mobility. Although,, they do follow foreign language media much more than their Dominican counterparts.

An intense, deeply emotional, affection for Turkey—enhanced by childhood summers spent on the Turkish coast, in rustic Anatolian villages, or in Istanbul—exists for almost all respondents. Some respondents continue to visit every year or every few years. But the more common pattern at later life stages is that visits dwindle as the years pass: as careers are furthered; as families are started; and as the busy pace of settled life in middle-class mainstream Germany/Berlin takes over. While almost all respondents retain an often proud sense of Turkishness/Kurdishness etc. (of the hyphenated, or modified, Germanized sort), they also report feeling foreign in Turkey when they visit, due to their accents and styles, their halting Turkish,

and due to their different (German) mentalities (their different culturally determined cognitive scripts).

Some respondents even used to dream of “returning” to Turkey to settle (no return is possible by definition for German-born Turks, of course). This had been reinforced by “the myth of return” long propagated by the German government and internalized by Turkish families, a consequence of the temporary “guest-worker” recruitment nature of the initial migration process. However, these dreams and plans recede further down one's life path. Virtually no respondent can now imagine living in Turkey permanently, which would mean giving up the advantages and familiarities of middle class German life for the uncertainty, instability, and relative foreignness of life in Turkey. They often report frustration with the inefficiency, quality of democracy, and the relative poverty they find in Turkey. Like Korean-American second generation immigrants analyzed by Kim (2004), they find that going back to the homeland to live and work—if they ever tried living in Turkey for a few years, as some of them did—or working exclusively with Turks in Germany creates frustration and confusion.

A good example of these phenomena is provided by the testimony of Elif, a psychologist. She is a thirty-something native-born, assertive, assimilated (in the Alba and Nee sense, 2003), confident, secular, well-adjusted second-generation woman. She is successful and comfortable in Berlin, and to a lesser extent Germany; but she has also had the hard life of growing up othered and feeling out of place in, and resentful towards, Germany. This is so even though she feels herself to be a German, while acknowledging her Turkishness and difference, which she has of course always and often been reminded of all her life. However, neither does she feel at home in Turkey. She does not exhibit much transnational behavior either. She is “in-between.”

Elif had problems with her family in her late adolescence (a common story with my female respondents, usually resolved by adulthood through a cycle of: conflict, departure from home at age 18, estrangement, dialog, and eventually reconciliation and compromise after one is in her late twenties). She picked up and move to Turkey, following a boyfriend from Istanbul. In 1987, she stayed in Istanbul for six months, with the intent or dream of settling. Her boyfriend's family didn't approve of her because she was a German Turk (hence the common refrain '*Almanya'da yabancı, Türkiye'de Alamancı*' [Foreigner in Germany, *Alamancı*—pejorative term for German Turks—in Turkey]). Her relationship eventually ended due to several socio-cultural incompatibilities. This left her feeling unwanted in a foreign city and foreign country:

It [going to Turkey] created a crisis for me, an identity crisis. 'Where do I belong? Can't they accept me for who I am anywhere?' I felt alienated from Turkey. I felt like a foreigner. I didn't see a future there...I felt rootless homeless... I came back to Germany, determined never to go back to Turkey...I related to refugees [when I came back, and worked with them]. They accepted me for who I was. The [progressive] Germans [at the refugee aid organization where she worked] also accepted me as I was, not as a victim" I gained self-confidence. I had been soul-searching...[After a while] I could answer the 'Who am I?' question better.

She also associated with anti-racist, leftist, *antifa* (anti-fascist) groups; eventually returned to university; and became a child psychologist who often deals with second generation immigrants going through the same things that she once went through.

### **Civic Assimilation, Attachment to Host Society, and Feeling at “Home”**

The German mainstream media and political culture are ripe with dominant discourses consisting of insinuations or even assertions that “Turks and Turkish associations in Germany do not want to integrate;” that they are “too transnational,” too “*Deutschfeindlich* [Germanophobic, a term that is probably an innovative, original contribution of Germany’s to the immigration debate]; too oriented towards Turkey and Islam, which in German political culture seems to my

respondents and many other observers to be nearly incompatible with two-way Alba and Nee-type assimilation, or a sense of hyphenated/holistic/ethnic-Germanness (see for example Sarrazin's book and its success, as well as many xenophobic statements from CDU/CSU leaders like Kohl, Stoiber, Roland Koch, as well as SPD figures such as Sarrazin himself and Otto Schily).

It does not help matters when what is meant by integration in mainstream German discourse is described by my respondents as “assimilation,” meaning coercive, cultural, ethno-nationalist, one-way assimilationism. Community leaders, Turkish-German politicians, and my respondents alike point out that the term integration must refer to successful participation and inclusion in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres in the host society, and speaking German, accompanied by loyalty to and respect for the German constitution. Cem Özdemir argues: “People are confused about what the word means.” Instead of the highly demanding form of one-way deeply cultural assimilation accomplished by taking on a static Germanness and by casting off Turkishness, my interviewees demanded a less demanding two-way conception. They resent German mainstream society and politics for demanding too much from immigrants.

Many, including Bekir Yilmaz, head of the *Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland* umbrella organization (see Yurdakul 2006 and 2009), related the quote by SPD interior minister Otto Schily: “The best kind of integration is assimilation.” Yasemin explains this ideology of assimilationism and its effect:

Q. Who is a German? How can one be/become a German?

A. You have to assimilate [in the lay-German sense of the word; one-way, culturally Germanizing assimilation]...

Despite the harsh demands and misconceptions of the German mainstream perceived by most respondents, and despite their disappointment with the way they feel they are treated in

Germany (in both discursive and more tangible ways) Mr. Yilmaz's association (TGD), which is known to be a conservative, religious, but democratic association, provides an example of a widespread will on the part of the Turkish-German community to “integrate,” properly understood.

Mr. Yilmaz provides self-criticism of the Turkish community; argues forcefully that Turkish-Germans should orient themselves politically and socially to Germany and not transnationally towards Turkey; and asserts that Turks in Germany see Germany as their once and future home:

Turkish families should motivate their children [to excel in school]...No one should make such a mistake [of not encouraging education]. If a group has prestige in the wider society, no one can push them around and keep them down....Take [the phenomenon of watching] Turkish television channels. Fine, we'll watch them but we shouldn't concern ourselves with Turkey 24/7. Instead of showing interest in politics here, we shouldn't be paying attention to Turkish politics all the time. [Nonetheless], According to a study by the Mannesmann Foundation, 69% of Turks in Germany see their future here...

Q. Do people still think they'll go back to Turkey?<sup>59</sup>

A. There is a phenomenon of return. Especially because of the developments in the past few years. There are some who give their German passports back. The first generation wants to go back. But our children don't feel that longing, they are not that interested [in Turkey, settling in Turkey].”

This is despite the fact that most of my respondents were well-adjusted but embittered towards Germans and German mainstream culture and institutions. They feel more comfortable in Germany—but notably more in Berlin--despite its manifest shortcomings; because, they have been socialized and ultimately “nationalized” within the confines of the nation-state of Germany and its particular political culture; notwithstanding the global and Turkish influences they have assimilated, and the permeability of the German mainstream to especially European influences). Often, respondents did not feel a special connection to Germany as “home,” but they did consider Berlin home. Thus, attachment to Berlin exceeded attachment to Germany by far, due to

the fact that these individuals have been spurned and excluded from that political and national community throughout their lives.

Perhaps, Serpil expresses this best and in the most ideal-typical way:

Q. Do you see this country as home?

A. No. [But] Berlin feels good. Like if a building burnt down in Berlin, I'd be sad. I care about its economy, social problems, etc....But Germany. If you leave Berlin, it doesn't feel the same as Turkey, it doesn't feel like my homeland (*memleket*).

Melike gives a very logically straightforward—and common—analysis of the connection between feeling and being treated as a foreigner and a lack of attachment to the national community and country as “home.”

Q. Why can't you see Germany as a homeland?

A. Actually, it feels like on the one hand, I'm integrated and on the other hand, I'm not. Legally, I'm very integrated. I'm a professional, I went to college...I make money. I mean, actually everything just great [super]...But I feel like I'm not seen as a part of Germany. The German majority doesn't give me the feeling of 'You're one of us.' So, that's why I can't really say this is my homeland, as long as they don't give me that feeling [of belonging]. It's still like 'You're not part of this society, community.' You're still kind of a foreigner. I had that feeling much more in the past, I still have it. Still, if a German treats me badly, I wonder if it's because I'm a foreigner or because they've had a bad day. Because I still ask myself that question, I can't say it [Germany] is home...

The respondents feel reasonably comfortable with their lives in Germany, and especially in Berlin among their multicultural progressive young friends. But that does not signify contentment or attachment to Germany as one's home, one's political and national community. My respondents, in the main, feel that while Berlin may be home, Germany often is not; while they are content and comfortable, they do not in the least have a guttural, *sui generis* or otherwise attachment to Germany or the German polity/society.

Ilke, like all correspondents, views the ever-present and salient “integration debates” in the German public sphere as incriminating and essentializing of Turks and Muslims. “I just turn

the news off now [when they yet again debate integration of Muslims and Turks],” or “It [the integration debate] is getting really old... It makes me mad!” are common expressions among the respondents. Ilke considers these debates (or more often, a process of sustained incrimination of Turks for their “failure to integrate” rather than an open debate) in the public sphere “one-sided;” is put off by the exclusionary rhetoric; and this demanding, assimilationist, xenophobic, and assimilationist has an impact on Ilke's—and most other respondents'—feelings of inclusion, belonging, and socio-political attachment to her host society. She continues to say that [the discourse over integration in the media and culture is such that] “It's always the foreigners who have to do something [for integration to happen]. What the state or the society here should do is never talked about. I have taken all the steps that can possibly be taken [to integrate] [...] I want the next step to be taken towards me. My parents have too!”

This is a peculiar case of reactive ethnicity on the part of a successful second-generation immigrant who has a high SES and is assimilated. Ilke, highly educated, assimilated, speaks German, a good citizen. She's a lawyer as well. But, as Portes and Rumbaut noted (2001), context is the crucial factor. If it is not hospitable, attachment cannot develop, in material and emotional matters alike. The context of “one-way, transformative assimilationism” in the German political culture, the lack of pluralism in discursive and institutional structures, leads to alienation on the part of my respondents. This is not the case in New York, where a high SES seems to bring with it more attachment. In the Berlin case, *Parallel Gesellschaften*<sup>60</sup> might be appearing indeed, but not in the way imagined by anti-immigrant discourse. Highly assimilated and educated Turkish-Germans are alienated by the German mainstream and withdraw into urban enclaves of left-liberal, young, multicultural, professional, more accepting but very small social networks. For instance, Ilke says: “I stay away from certain environments, social spheres. I don't

go places where I won't be accepted.

Hakki Keskin, the Bundestag MP from *Die Linke*, makes an identical argument:

All of this [negative feelings among immigrants, lack of 'integration,' unemployment] is because of the history of [and current] immigration policy...But people blame the immigrants. These people haven't been able to vote for 30-40 years. You exclude them, then you ask why people don't see themselves as Germans? And you say 'First integration then citizenship'

Ilke, the lawyer who interned with a CDU judge whom Ilke felt was dismissive of her, relates that such negative interactions with mainstream Germans exhausts and repels even the most "culturally German," assimilated, successful, secular of Turkish-Germans:

Q. Were you not a German for that judge?

A. No. I don't even wanna be German anymore anyways. A friend of mine asked me if I felt responsible for the holocaust [as a German]. I said no. If I were asked when I was 16, I would have said yes. I was trying so hard to be a German then. I was even ready to accept the responsibility for the holocaust! But I've decided if this society

Q. Is one a German only by blood though, or can one be German if one's born in Germany?

A. There are both kinds. But the blood link tradition [ius sanguinis] is more dominant.

Q. Does this provoke a reaction in you?

A. Yeah. If Germans don't accept me why should I say I'm German? But I'm not Turkish either. I don't fit in there [in Germany] either. For, example, I'm punctual! I'm both. Both. I can be a bridge, a go-between."

They could perhaps just as easily go live elsewhere in the West and be nearly as content. They compare the laws and traditions of other countries—i.e., the Netherlands, UK, France, and most often, the United States--unfavorably with Germany when it comes to diversity, discrimination, civil rights, nationality, and citizenship. Moreover, as has been noted, my respondents are very critical of and distrustful of German politics and society. This simply means that my respondents are oriented more towards Germany—their place of birth and/or socialization—than they are towards Turkey. This, combined with the increasing realization that living and working in Turkey permanently is impossible, orient them towards Germany, German citizenship, and German

socio-cultural-political mainstream. They still feel spurned by that mainstream as Turks; but the alternative of establishing a new life as a “foreigner” in Turkey does not sound alluring to my respondents.

Serpil, as mentioned above and like several other respondents, is a working class Berliner who went to a *Fachhochschule*; and is thus expected to be different from her peers in the study who attended more elite institutions, who are lawyers or doctors, and who may even be inter-married or inter-dating. She has more Turkish friends than respondents of a higher current class status. Even though she is thoroughly assimilated in terms of her fluent bilingualism, and despite her substantial sense of a social and cultural connection to a section of the German mainstream, she and her peers may be expected to be more transnational in their identity, their social networks, orientation, and belonging.

Serpil, who works in the offices of a smaller business, is even given the “Turkish portfolio” at her job, thus missing out on more lucrative business relations. She speaks more Turkish than many of the other respondents and she goes to Turkey every year. After explaining that while Berlin is her home, and that she is a *Berlinerin* first and foremost, she asserts that she can never say she is German and that Germany is definitely not home. But even Serpil feels like an alien in her ancestral land; and thus, for her and most other respondents, neither is Turkey home. While their counterparts in New York synthesize both worlds and enjoy a “second generation advantage” (Kasinitz et al. 2008, Moore 1983), German Turks are more prone to feel “in-between,” as if they belong nowhere:

Q: Do you feel foreign there [in Turkey] at all?

A. Yes, I feel like I lack something there as well... I feel like I'm missing something there, like a foreigner.

Consequently, as noted above, most of my respondents do not consider themselves just as Turks or Kurds from Turkey, but as hyphenated *Deutsch-Türke*, *Deutsch Türkin mit Arabische Wurzeln*, or as *Deutscher mit Türkeistämmige*. They do not prefer the new, liberal, pluralistic term *Migrationshintergrund* because it does not imply belonging to and birth in Germany, and hence precludes full inclusion in the German national political community on an equal basis. They of course detest terms such as *Ausländer*, or *Ausländische Mitbürger*, or for citizen Turks, *Türke mit Deutschem pass*, which were in use until too recently. They usually feel at home in Berlin, with less frequency and to a lesser extent in Germany. They are ready to claim it as their own country, while maintaining their “Turkishness/Kurdishness.” But they are also exasperated by their lengthy and burdensome struggle for inclusion against vehement opposition.

However, their grievances about Germany are their concerns as German citizens and hyphenated Germans who are concerned about building an inclusive Germany. However bad things might be for them or for their group sometimes in Germany, my respondents for the most part still do not feel completely at home in Turkey either. Thus they are more “in-between,” more adrift at sea than their Dominican counterparts, as will be shown. The boundaries that face these German Turks are brighter. Their feelings of Germanness are discounted by the German mainstream; their assertions of Germanness are not taken seriously; and even their personal level of assimilation and upward mobility do not yet shield them from being typecast and othered in this manner.

### **III. Respondents in New York**

Who is an American? How do my respondents define being American? If they see the American nation as a “nation of immigrants” or, in Rogers Brubaker’s words (2004), “a joinable nation,”

then there is an argument to be made that the popular understanding of American national membership or the cultural notions of American citizenship provide a “discursive opportunity structure” (Koopmans et al. 2005), which enables claims of being American on the part of second generation immigrants just as the “political [or institutional] opportunity structure” (Tarrow 1998; see also Merton 1996) provides objective inclusion of immigrants in the educational systems, labor markets, and political systems of the United States through many programs enacted in the post-civil rights era, as well the relative historic openness of the pluralist political system (especially of local systems, and in addition, boosted by court mandates derived from civil rights laws) to penetration by immigrants.

A hyphenated identity is acceptable as an American identity within the context of this discursive opportunity structure. Diane’s (a civil servant) definition of identity is also clearly informed by the principle of *ius-soli*: “Being American is...spending time here. If it’s home (which it is for me), you’re American...If you’re born here, you’re American.” That is a direct illustration of the idea of America as a civic, non-ethnic “joinable nation,” a notion that is aided by a long history of easy naturalization and birthright citizenship. Douglas argues that “American” evokes “Picket-fence...House, kids... That’s American...” (He adds, that this is usually accompanied by the image of a white family; but that might be changing). However, he excludes himself from that identity because, uniquely among my respondents, he is undocumented and of course feels excluded.

Nonetheless, New York's immigrant-friendly structures are indicated by the fact that he received financial aid from a CUNY school even though he was undocumented. Leandro, the business executive, gives us the text-book definition of the American creed (Etzioni 2004) as well as the classic notion of Ernest Renan’s plebiscitary/civic notion of nationhood (see Smith

1999), which is often contrasted with a German understanding of national membership as hereditary and blood-based: “By choice...Somebody can choose to be American. If you self-identify as American, you’re American...and if you have certain values: democracy, and judging people by what they can do, not who they are or where they’re from.” From another angle, identificational assimilation (Gordon 1964) can be ascertained by a question such as “Do you say we when you talk about US history and government?”

Diane, a civil servant answered: “[Laughs] I guess it’s we, like we have a complicated history.”

When I ask Diego to define who is an American, he gestures with his arm, sweeping the street in Lower Manhattan where we were having lunch. He then says: “Look around [They are all Americans]. It's based on living here.”

The ones who have inter-married, or are inter-dating (i.e. those who have non-Latino partners) are the most comfortable saying “I’m American.” Ernesto, the banker (who is married to a white American) said: “This is my country. I’m American-American. I like American things, culture... I would never return to the Dominican Republic.<sup>61</sup> I don’t know anything about it. My life is here.”

Another important component of American self-understanding and American national membership is the idea that America is a nation of immigrants, a notion that constitutes an integral part of American political culture, as noted above.<sup>62</sup> This sentiment, if it is indeed truly widespread, provides immigrants (even though they know that many Americans use the notion to disparage current immigrants) with a discursive opportunity structure where they can legitimately claim membership in the American nation. This can be compared to Germany, which

has for long denied that it was a country of immigration, where immigrants and their descendants are routinely called “foreigners.”

When asked “Is American identity open to children of immigrants?” most respondents said something along the lines of what Diane, a civil servant said: “Yes, if you’re born here. Dominicans, three generations from now, they’ll just say I’m American. ”

When asked, “Is America a nation of immigrants?” respondents uniformly declare that it is, thus claiming membership in the American nation themselves, as children of immigrants. Respondents point to the long history of initial hardships suffered by previous groups of immigrant groups, betraying a belief that in a nation of immigrants, Dominicans too will one day become part of the mainstream. However, most differentiate between what they see as the substantial racial differences between earlier European immigrants and today’s non-white immigrants. Some even think that U.S. immigration laws are more restrictive than they ever were for these Europeans, whom my respondents consider to have been welcomed into the country since they were white. The long history of discrimination these groups faced and the fact that in 1924 a very restrictive immigration law was passed explicitly to keep Italians and Jews out, while entries from Latin America were left uncapped. Nonetheless, in general respondents recognize the obstacles faced by earlier European and earlier Latino immigrants such as Cubans and Mexican-Americans whom they consider to be well-established in the mainstream today; and they add that they feel that Dominicans will also enter the mainstream in time given the nation’s history of eventually assimilating immigrants. My respondent feel this way, even if they are fully aware that a substantial minority or plurality of Americans (themselves the descendants of past immigrants) deny America’s heritage as a nation of immigrants and try to exclude Latinos from the nation for the time being.

My respondents note that these anti-immigrant Americans privilege their own immigrant ancestors over the contemporary non-white immigrants.<sup>63</sup> Federico, the social worker, put it in this manner: “Yes, that’s something I always remind myself, whenever I sense discrimination. This country was founded on difference. Immigrants are the fabric of this society. It makes me feel like I belong so much more... When the Irish came here, they were viewed differently, now look at them. Through generations, groups move up...” Leandro, the business executive, pointed out in turn: “Yes, in spite of itself, in a way...People come here, then they wanna close the door. It remains open despite their best efforts. It’s too ingrained in the ethos of the country. Immigrants come, make their presence felt, people take note. Then, the immigrants’ children are citizens, they become part of society, it’s a matter of numbers. Society [eventually] changes.” Chabely says: “It’s like in that song you know....This land is your land, this land is my land.”

Many points which arise as common themes in the data—and which illustrate the main arguments of this dissertation—are being demonstrated by the following interview; namely, 1-) The US is a nation of immigrants; 2-) the US soccer team shows that Latinos play a prominent role in American culture; 3-) the interviewee feels a sense of belonging; and 4-) hyphenated identities are an integral part of American society.

Diego, a black paralegal, explicitly links the notion that the U.S. is a nation of immigrants to his own ability to claim membership:

Q. Is the U.S. a nation of immigrants?

A. Absolutely!

Q. How does that affect you?

A. *It legitimizes my claim to be an American...*[Again, points to passersby] No one around here had ancestors on the Mayflower...In Germany, if your name is German, then you're German...Turks, no [they're not German]. Here, *we* have had huge waves of immigration...There's Italian food, Dominican food. We're used to it. [emphases mine]

...

Q. Do you feel a sense of belonging like this is your country?

Yeah. I don't get that feeling in DR.

Q. Would you say you're Dominican-American, or, American [in addition to New Yorker]?

A. Dominican-American, just for accuracy's sake.

Q. Is a hyphenated ID accepted in society?

A. You have Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans too. But in the South, maybe they have a different idea.

Diego was proud of all the Latinos in the U.S. national soccer team representing the American nation, without in the least concealing their ethnic identities but coming together with others as the member of a multiracial American team: "I mean look at Bocanegra, with a name like that...He's going out there carrying the colors." This can be contrasted to the long-absence of Turks in the German national team (except for one recent addition).

Q. Do you think Dominicans will repeat the experience of Italians?

A. Yeah, totally. Look at the US soccer team. The captain is Frankie Bocanegra...Can't get more Latino than that [name.] He speaks perfect English, carrying the [U.S.] colors.

The idea of a multicultural nation of immigrants has, in contrast to Germany, been reinforced often by public figures and institutions, such as schools, throughout my respondents' lives (refer to Chapters 3 and 4 for more on these contextual factors). The hegemony and the unquestioned legitimacy of the notion that the United States is a nation of immigrants has even given respondents the tools to fight nativism occasionally directed at them or at the "new immigrants" by their white New Yorker peers who are themselves mostly third generation Eastern European, Italian, and Irish and who can easily be reminded of that fact by any assertive debater.

It is also significant to emphasize the fact that New York teachers, or other institutional authority figures, many of whom are Latinos and other minorities, do not display the kind of overt and often biting nativism and racism towards an individual or a group that their counterparts in Germany are said by my respondents to display. The post civil rights culture,

policies, and institutions of the United States, coupled with the even more diversity-friendly and diverse New York authorities, help explain the differences between the two contexts.

Historian Gary Jacobson notes: "In the 1910s, 'hyphenated Americanism' amounted to un-Americanism as far as some were concerned...But two generations later...the Americanism performed by the hyphen is beyond reproach. Ethnic hyphenation...has become...a natural idiom of belonging in this nation of immigrants" (Jacobson 2006).

Thus, there exists a context in New York and to a lesser extent in the United States (though to a greater extent than in Germany), where pluralism and immigration are seen by the elites, mainstream, and my respondents as components of an ideal, true-to-its-traditions vision of American identity. Within such a context, most of my respondents in New York do not feel excluded from the community of Americans, in contrast to the Berlin Turks' relationship to the community of Germans.

Most respondents felt most comfortable identifying as Dominican-Americans and New Yorkers. However, they also answered in the affirmative when asked: "Do you feel American?" They find it easy to say they are American, but they also experience feelings of in-betweenness and duality, even ambivalence at times about what being American means or whether they feel fully like American or are indeed seen as full-fledged Americans by others (as in Child 1945).

Leandro, a business executive, typically expresses this duality: "I feel both Dominican and American. Back when I was little I thought I had to be either or. Now, I know I can be both. I'm equally at home with Americans and Dominicans." Irma the educator: "I can say and identify as an American. But more often than not, I feel like a hyphenated American. It's a duality I feel...Relative to other countries, yeah I'm American... [And] there are times I feel I'm not Dominican enough...[laughs] I feel guilty." Diana, a civil servant claimed: "I feel just as

American as anybody else. *I just get extra add-ons....I don't feel I have to choose*" [Emphasis mine].

Almost all respondents pick a Dominican-American identity when forced to choose one option among many, while Latino and New Yorker identities (which are U.S.-based identities) are also common. This is because it best represents their situation of on the one hand being Dominican, having been socialized in a culturally Dominican household and neighborhood, and having a deep and intense emotional attachment to the Dominican Republic; and on the other, being American to some degree, having been born and/or socialized in the US, having gone through many years of formal schooling in the US, and having experienced the building of their own personal and ethnic legacy in the U.S. As professionals, they also work in diverse workplaces. Moreover, they feel less than "100% Dominican" when in the Dominican Republic, and feel rather more American when abroad.

In short, it is not so difficult for second generation Dominicans to admit to being (a certain type of) American, in one way or another. They feel that they are treated as such by the majority, especially of course in New York City and among those in their social and professional circles. Simultaneously, they experience feelings of in-betweenness and duality, at times even ambivalence about what being American means; or whether they feel fully American; or whether they are indeed seen as full-fledged Americans by others.

Thus, one could say that they were culturally Dominican (at least at an emotional level, if not always at the level of actual practice of culture) and politically (and of course legally) American, while being on-balance Dominican-American.

Irma, an educator, puts it this way: "I can say and identify as an American. But more often than not, I feel like a hyphenated American. It's a duality I feel...Relative to other

countries, yeah I'm American... [And] there are times I feel I'm not Dominican enough... [laughs] I feel guilty."

This ambivalence is typical of second generation groups in general, historically and currently; but it is so to a much lesser extent than the ambivalence and insecurity of claims of Germanness by Berlin Turks both in their own minds and in terms of how they feel they are perceived by others.

There are multiple, overlapping identities practiced by our respondents, usually depending on the situation. There is a diversity of identities throughout the socio-economic spectrum of second generation Dominican society. Still, predominately, there is definitely a high level of comfort with the hyphenated identity. Leandro, a business executive, typically expresses this world of the hyphen:

I feel both Dominican and American. Back when I was little I thought I had to be either or. Now, I know I can be both. I'm equally at home with Americans and Dominicans.

Diana, a civil servant claimed:

I feel just as American as anybody else. I just get extra add-ons... I don't feel I have to choose. But I'm not Dominican in the political sense. You would only make changes here. I can't tell Dominicans what to do about their country... Leandro, Irma, and Diana's responses and their sense of a hyphenated identity are in

agreement with a pluralist but nonetheless somewhat unifying political and civic understanding of nationhood a la Walzer (1990) who noted that the hyphen is in fact a plus sign in his analysis of American national identity. In other words, despite what Theodore Roosevelt would have argued, Walzer tells us that the hyphen is by now--given the post-sixties, multiculturalism-infused, diversity-friendly American mainstream culture--quintessentially American. My college-educated respondents mix and fuse both cultures and identities (U.S./DR); they retain a certain

kind of Dominican identity, pride, and culture, and the Spanish language; while also becoming integrated into the US politically, socio-economically, and identificationally. In this new-but-traditional environment, a hyphenated identity is acceptable as an American identity within the context of this discursive opportunity structure.

Federico identifies as Dominican-American, explaining that he chose that identity in answering the interviewer's question because:

[I'm] not just Dominican. Not just American. I am both. My parents brought their culture here [and gave it to me. I have it]...And, I've also had a very American experience ...I also like Dominican things. It's not one or the other. I strive for both things, Dominican and American: Dominican food, American TV, American music. I identify both as a Dominican and American.

Thus, respondents identify as both Dominican and a certain kind of American (the ethnic, 2<sup>nd</sup> generation, Latino, non-white kind). They still feel different from fifth generation Irish-Americans, or whites in general. But by now, they are also very different from Dominicans in DR). They think their kids will be recognized as and become more American; but they also all want to teach their kids Dominican culture and Spanish. Spanish is very important to them, as it was very important for their parents to teach it to them.

Fernando explains the process of his identity construction, from confusion to eventual comfort with multiple identities and a hyphenated Americanness upon entry to college, where such identities were fostered:

I had not really given it [identity] thought [before college]. Hodge podge. I was from the Bronx, but I wasn't very proud of that. I was very much an outlier [there]. A Latino that looked black but did not have an accent ... very poor, but from a rich part. I wasn't at a public school. Catholic school. I was in honors, I ran track. I had a great relationship with my family. I didn't feel Dominican. I didn't really know what that was... I was from New York. It's just a fact... That's who I am. All these odd realities meant I didn't feel I had an identity. I felt purposeless... Going to Baruch, hearing people's stories, [I came to realize] 'I'm Frankie, from Bronx, I'm Dominican, Latino, American Dominican, I'm Dominican-American.' It's not good or bad, it's just who I am. I don't feel that one

identity defines me. I'm in the center. It doesn't bother me. There's a lot of us in the center.

When asked “Are you an American?” Diego, an Afro-Dominican, ivy-league-educated paralegal who spent much of his life as one of the few non-whites in any given context, responds affirmatively:

Yeah. It took me a while to get there. [B]ut when I went to DR, I was American. I was accustomed to certain liberties, comforts....More so now as I get older [I feel more American]. I have a lot of difficulties with Dominican culture ...It's hierarchical, it's a pigmentocracy. You have some of that here too. But there's no dialog there. No Black Power movement...Socially [America is] less [rigidly?] hierarchical. Having a sense of entitlement, comforts, rights.

As noted, many respondents co-habit with non-Dominican or even non-Latino partners or with white Americans. They are already mixing and it may be hard for their family in the future to sustain transnational ties or the nexus with Dominican culture as it exists for the first generation or even as experienced by the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation. Moreover, even if both spouses/partners are 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Dominicans or other Latinos, they often speak English to each other. It is clear that my respondents are a certain kind of Dominican, not the kind one finds in DR. This context for the educated Dominican second generation middle class raises important questions.

Just like the Jews of yesteryear—who demographically dominated and congregated in New York and made it their own and became Americans by becoming New Yorkers first (Moore 1981)—Dominicans are becoming Americans through becoming New Yorkers first (Foner 2000, Moore 1981).

Diego, although he identifies as a Dominican-American as well, primarily identifies himself as a New Yorker: “It's my home, my experience... [New York to me] is multi-ethnic, multi-class...People [constantly] move in and out.” New York City is a place that my respondents felt clearly more American, as compared to other parts of the country, underscoring

the importance of the particular urban context and how “The City” enables a sense of Americanness, even if New York is distinct from the rest of the country. As much as the respondents feel American to a degree, when they go, or imagine going, to “the heartland,” or to rural areas they feel more ambivalent about whether they are seen as American enough by others, even though they themselves may feel like they are.

A New Yorker identity is of course the easiest identity to claim out of choices available to them. All the respondents feel that they belong to New York City and feel included there. For example, Evelyn, a city worker, one of the two who felt uncomfortable identifying as American, said: “I feel very included here. It doesn’t matter where you’re from in New York. Without a doubt I’m a New Yorker. This is home. I lived here all my life. There are opportunities here, jobs are easy [to find]” She also felt included in her job and felt that the institutions of the city made a special effort to include immigrants. She worked for a Dominican official for the city and she had first-hand experience of that.

Diego, as noted above, has a very expansive conception of who qualifies as American. However, when our conversation delves deeper into whether American identity is open to immigrants and their children, he expands on his earlier comments by stressing the uniqueness of New York City and highlighting the way New York makes Americanization much easier:

A. Yeah [American identity is open to the children of immigrants]. But Mexicans in Nebraska are not accepted.

Q. Do you feel accepted as an American [here in New York then]?

A. Yes. New York makes you feel included.

One of the few respondents who felt uncomfortable identifying as American in any way, was Douglas, an undocumented man with a college degree who owned a business, who felt that as he was never accepted by American political institutions, he should not claim an American

identity (undocumented immigrants, especially 2<sup>nd</sup> or 1.5 generation immigrants—those who moved to the US as children—are relatively rare in New York). However, he had a college degree; felt like a New Yorker, was English dominant and middle class. Nonetheless, this example proves the crucial significance of citizenship status, which makes a huge difference in feelings of inclusion and national belonging.

My respondents are continuing the ethnic patterns of earlier second generations in the U.S. (Glazer and Moynihan 1964, Child 1945, Dash Moore 1983, Shefter 1994). The hyphen is even more acceptable in this historical city of immigrants used to duality and diversity, than it is in the United States, where it is also popular; and of course, more acceptable than it is in Berlin and Germany.

The ones who have inter-married, or are inter-dating (i.e. those who have non-Latino partners) are the most comfortable saying “I’m American.” Ernesto, the banker (who is married to a white American) said: “This is my country. I’m American-American. I like American things, culture... I would never return to DR. I don’t know anything about it. My life is here.”

The election of Barack Obama, as seen above, made my respondents feel that the mainstream was opening up and becoming diverse, something that would bode well for their and their children’s future. I asked them if they feel more American as a result of the election and all said something along the lines of yes. Leandro, the business executive, answered: “Yes, yes. Thrilled to have a person of another color or ethnicity up there.” One respondent who identified more with a Latino politics of empowerment rather than a more universalist notion of American politics argued that after Obama, she feels more of a dedication to the common issues that face all Americans, because she now feels part of a bigger political community, inspired and perhaps persuaded by Obama’s brand of multicultural, liberal, one America, civic nationalism.

It is apparent after these interviews that the respondents side with the idea that American nationality and citizenship are civically oriented in general, even though they were not always so. However, they see the meaning of American identity, nationality, and citizenship as a dynamic one that reacts to the diversifying demography of the nation, as well as to the now-dominant (but still contested) notions of a multicultural and multiracial nation. It seems that President Obama's election has only strengthened that tendency.

At the same time, second and 1.5 generations Dominican feel that they are not fully American, experiencing an in-betweenness feeling, which they think may be connected to discrimination reflected in mainstream America's reluctance to recognize them as "regular Americans," on the one hand, and in Dominican society's insistence in perceiving them as other than "regular Dominicans," on the other hand. Indeed, some pointed out that when they visit the Dominican Republic, they realize they feel American after all and are treated as such by Dominicans. In fact, many are called gringos and some people often make fun of their strange Spanish language or bizarre habits, such as standing in line instinctively as soon as they enter a place where other people may be waiting. Despite a feeling of duality, ultimately, these respondents feel somewhat foreign in the Dominican Republic.

Beyond the Dominican Republic, on trips abroad to Latin America or Europe, many of my respondents felt that they were perceived as or they felt themselves to be Americans. Travelling makes them realize (often to their surprise) how American they in fact are in subtle ways. Evelyn, a civil servant and one of the few college-educated respondents that had difficulty identifying as American, a self-professed Dominican and a New Yorker, pointed out that when she goes to the Dominican Republic, "They call me gringa there. They say I speak Spanish like a white girl, with an accent."

This is similar to the *Alamanzi* [visiting guest worker from Germany, a derogatory term] phenomenon for the Berlin respondents. But the difference is that, in the New Yorkers' case a home may be found in the United States which allows them to transport and carry within them a piece of the Dominican Republic. In sociological terms, this is a case of "boundary blurring," allowing a hyphenated existence. In the Berlin case, too many respondents are faced with a Germany they view guardedly with intense suspicion and an ancestral homeland in Turkey that is too foreign to settle in. Many, who are/descended from Turkish minorities (e.g. Kurdish, Alawite), or political dissidents are permanently exiled. They do not even have the ties of affection and connections to Turkey that others have. This is more a case of "in-betweenness," an intense and confusing duality, a more biting sense of homelessness. The only way out is "boundary crossing."

It seems that the concept of situational identity (Renn 2000) fits second and 1.5 generation Dominicans situation best: They feel most American when abroad, at least some kind of American; and when in the Dominican Republic, with family members, and with other Dominicans, they feel Dominican, at least some kind of Dominican.

Similarly, Yvette identifies as Dominican-American, refers to DR as home below, and explains:

I always thought of myself as Dominican and that's it. [But] When I go back home to DR, I'm not so Dominican. I'm American. I'm like I'm Dominican. So sometimes I feel like I'm not Dominican enough. Sometimes, I'm not American enough.

Or, as Federico puts it,

But it's all relative. I'm not as American as 5th generation Americans who don't speak another language [...] Depends on who I'm around [...] When I go to family parties or to DR, I'm definitely American [...].

Beatrice argued:

When I go there [to the Dominican Republic] I don't feel like I'm Dominican Dominicana; that's when my Americanness comes in. There are things that people there don't understand: My American parts.

Likewise, almost all respondents argue along this line:

Whether I am Dominican or American depends [on the situation]: I'm American abroad or with others.

Diego notes that “When I went to Cuba; there, we were definitely Americans.” Diego was also an exchange student in Brazil; and he was treated as and felt like an American in that context.

While my respondents have natal, civic, political, social, economic ties to the United States, all my respondents also feel a deep and intense attachment to the DR and Dominicaness. Their US-orientation and level of assimilation does not take away from the way Dominican Republic, the Dominican community in the US, their families, and Dominican culture tugs at their heart strings, in an emotional manner.

Evelyn answers the question, “Do you feel American?” by reacting: “Good question. Born in DR, raised here [she came to the US when she was 3 months old]. I will always say I'm Dominican even if I have a US passport. I learned English watching Sesame Street. I spoke Spanish at home... [I'm] legally [American]. [But at the] naturalization ceremony, you leave all allegiance behind; it hurt.”

Most respondents experience a reconnection with being Dominican and/or Latino in college. They join ethnic clubs and take Latino Studies/Dominican Studies courses. Andres was active in a Dominican student organization. But that of course is also a sort of assimilation into the American political mainstream: taking part in civic associations structured around post-60s American multicultural norms and organizing around U.S.-based Latino/Dominican-American

identities, conducting English meetings among members of different countries of birth, the native-born teaching English to the foreign-born, but also learning Spanish from them, a place for Spanglish. These organizations are located within the U.S. pluralist system, in which people are often identified with a given group, whether ethnic, religious, racial, or sexual, etc., such as Italians or Puerto Ricans, Jews or Catholics, blacks or whites, or gays and lesbians, instead of political parties, ideologies, or social class.

Frankie also notes the reluctance on the part of many Dominicans to identify as “just Americans,” and their insistence on retaining a certain kind of Dominicaness: “People born here in the 80s 90s, they say I'm Dominican, not American. But they don't wanna be seen as traitors. They'll say 'I'm American' too. But, they very acculturated. 'I'm Dominican but I like apple-pie!'”

Irma chimes in, noting her discomfort with not being Dominican enough and expressing the multiple facets of her identities. She also has enough confidence in her hyphenated identities, her being both American and Dominican that she can assert her identity and resist offensive people who do not want to recognize her complex identity construction process and who try to “other” her:

I wanna feel good about being Dominican, I wanna feel good about being American, I wanna feel good about being a white Latina....Compared to others from DR, I'm fair skinned. All these things play into your identity. A lot of that has to do with the people around me. I wanna feel good about identities. I balance it out by not putting so much emphasis on it. A lot of bad experiences come from backwards people; historically this country has had bad experiences with racism, I don't even wanna validate that... I kind of push people. If they make a joke about Latinos, I want to check them on it.....

[...]

But in the big picture, 'Do I feel like I'm keeping/valuing both or all of the identities that I have?' Yeah I think so. There are times, I will tell you, when I feel like I'm not feeling Dominican enough. There are times I feel that. I'm trying to think “what makes me Dominican?” Personally, there are a lot of things I criticize about my culture too..but I love the energy we have, the music the food. a lot of things feel good to me as a Dominican. The things I don't like, I don't accept it and I don't take it. Some [Dominican] things are bad. There are times when I feel like I'm not as Dominican as my

sister. She knows all this history. She wants to like move there.... My sister has passion about this stuff (history, culture...I don't know any of the history)...

[...]

But also, because you're here and you are seen like an outsider sometimes, or you feel like an outsider sometimes, so you also welcome the Dominican identity too. You feel that duality. I feel good about my culture, my Dom. identity, and the parts that I accept.

Fernando displayed little transnationalism but a strong ethnic identity. He has political ambitions to further the cause of the Dominican community. He has political ambitions to further the cause of the Dominican community: "We've got to do something. Organize ourselves. Provide a positive presentation of ourselves. Pride, combating stereotypes...We need to do better [in terms of economic inequality, education]."

Many respondents—almost all respondents come from very working class background despite their successes—are considered by their community and consider themselves to be on a mission to represent and make their Dominican families and the Dominican community in the US proud. This is a sign of their continuing Dominicaness. Federico notes:

To my family I'm always successful. My dad talks to all his Dominican friends [about me], and they say [to me] 'good job!' My dad was a pioneer, he came here, his parents were illiterate. I met his friends, I'm modest, but these guys talk about my accomplishments. They feel proud, "One of my Dominican community [succeeded] ! I feel respected by the Dominican community. They value education more than salary, my dad taught me this. As long as you have education.... I even worked as a cashier. I had to work hard, I got it from my dad, he was very intelligent and hard working. They assumed I was going to college. It was the only choice. Supported my studies. Did not help with details but emotional support. Not very tangible, what can you tell me about financial aid? They knew very little. "Poor immigrant parents know only three professions: doctors, engineer, lawyer." People expected success, didn't know the details. That resulted in intimidation. I gotta do well, but I never grew up with a parent who had succeeded, so there was pressure. How was I gonna do it?...My name is always a reminder about how Dominican I am. It can't change. People are curious. What? It generates conclusions? You're Dominican aren't you? They want to know. My name is a very common name... I'm all dressed up. Clients see me as an authority. If I speak Spanish, they [the largely Hispanic clients] see me as my dad see me, one of us and an official. Person of authority, official of the state, They get proud. 'He's representing us.'

Andres was active in a Dominican student organization. He also notes the reluctance on the part of many Dominicans to identify as “just Americans,” and their insistence on retaining a certain kind of Dominicanness:

People born here in the 80s 90s, they say I'm Dominican, not American. But they don't wanna be seen as traitors. They'll say 'I'm American' too. They are very acculturated. 'I'm Dominican but I like apple-pie!'

Evelyn, when asked, “Do you feel American?” responded:

Good question. I was born in DR, raised here (3 months old). I will always say I'm Dominican even if I have a U.S. passport. Mom traveled a lot until I was 5. I learned English watching Sesame Street. I spoke Spanish at home [...] [I'm] legally [American]. [But at the] naturalization ceremony, you leave all allegiance behind; it hurts.

Frankie, for his part, says:

I pronounced my name as in Spanish [...] So they knew. We've got to do something. Organize ourselves. Provide a positive presentation of ourselves. Pride, combating stereotypes [...] We need to do better economically, on education.

Many respondents—almost all respondents come from very working class background despite their successes—are considered by their community and consider themselves to be on a mission to represent and make their Dominican families and the Dominican community in the United States proud.

This social commitment towards the well-being of the Dominican people in the U.S. seems to unite most of our respondents. Social solidarity seems to be at the root of their shared identity, of their link with the Dominican Republic. On this respect Federico further notes:

My name is always a reminder about how Dominican I am. It can't change. People are curious. What? It generates conclusions? You're Dominican aren't you? They want to know. My name is a very common name... I'm all dressed up. Clients see me as an authority. If I speak Spanish, they [the largely Hispanic clients] see me as my dad see me, one of us and an official, a person of authority, official of the state, They get proud. He's representing us.

### **Transnationalism and Linguistic/Cultural Assimilation**

Transnationalism is often seen as an obstacle to *national* identification and assimilation of immigrants, as immigrants are more able today to travel back and forth and to communicate with the homelands they left behind. But in fact, visits and other ties become less frequent for most immigrants as time goes by and the nation-state begins to act as a container of social life (Waldinger 2008). This is especially true for the second generation (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2006).

Nonetheless, the Dominican community in the US, including the second generation, is known as an especially transnational one (Levitt 2001, Louie 2006 a, b). Nonetheless, ironically, my preliminary findings hint that transnationalism among the Dominican second generation may in fact act as an agent of Americanization. Transnationalism aids Americanization in that contact with a Dominican world makes the Dominican Republic the frame of reference when evaluating life and identity in the United States; they compare the U.S. to the Dominican Republic, which makes for a positive evaluation of an American identity and the United States in general (see also Louie 2006a, 2006b). In political matters, a comparison with the Dominican Republic was especially favorable for my respondents' views of the United States. Beatrice, a city worker who is phenotypically black, claimed, "You have a voice here, you can sue [people or the government]. Being a woman and having dark skin, how much voice would you have in the Dominican Republic?"

Especially for women, gender dynamics in the U.S. are highly preferable. Irma "...The fact that I'm removed from there....I can be critical. I have my Dominican counterparts there. Five female cousins in DR, five sisters here. So you can compare the two sets of girls. They

married early. Homemakers. Stuff like that [All five girls in the U.S. are now professionals]. Ok, wow... Things would have been different here..." For everyone, the opportunities in the U.S. are always compared to the perceived poverty in the Dominican Republic, thus making a preference for the United States stronger. When asked, "What do you miss about the US when you're there?" Beatrice answered: "The luxuries... They have like blackouts there all the time."

My respondents', that is, my sampling of college-educated second generation Dominicans' association with transnational practices is restricted to a few activities that take nothing significant away from an orientation towards the United States, the society of their birth. They are so-called broad transnational activities. Some activities, such as transnational business or permanent return to country of origin are *narrow* transnational practices deeply supportive of active ties to the homeland, as opposed to *broad* transnational practices that are vague, irregular, or relatively insignificant in terms of affecting societal orientation. (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). Their transnational practices are very distinct from common transnational practices traditionally associated with immigrants. They are likely to identify less with transnational practices and more with mainstream U.S. society as compared to second generation Dominicans of lower socioeconomic status. Moreover, a vast majority of my respondents exhibit only what can be described as "broad" transnational practices (such as travel, cultural retention) rather than the "narrow" transnational practices of the deep, sustained sort—such as cross-border entrepreneurship—that describes transnational immigrants (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). These findings are echoed by recent studies that have been skeptical of the staying power of transnationalism and how widespread and significant a phenomenon it is (Waldinger 2007). Many authors have argued that this decline and broadening of transnational practices is especially true for the second generation (Kasinitz et al. 2002).

For the most part, the college-educated second-generation Dominican-Americans feel at home in both places. Yet, it is clear that they feel less at home in their parents' country, which they consider a more symbolic and emotional home. All of our respondents indisputably expressed an attachment to the Dominican Republic, while mostly conceded at the same time that they wouldn't settle there. They may be perceived as bi-cultural due to their considerable ethnic retention, including their trips back to their parents' home country. But their main life orientation, especially when it comes to politics and daily life, remains in the U.S. and more specifically in New York.

As noted, they are second-generation Dominicans who are ethnic-Americans; minority-Americans; Latinos and Dominicans in the U.S. Their selection of Dominican or Dominican-American as an identity is not necessarily connected to their orientation to the Dominican Republic and an understanding of themselves as being part of that society. My respondents by no means perceive themselves as temporarily living in the U.S. and as people who envision one day living permanently in the Dominican Republic. This situation does not necessarily clash with the fact that they maintain a deep emotional attachment with the Dominican Republic and Dominican culture (as an ethnic culture recreated in and influenced by the U.S. context). Many frequently visit Dominican Republic, but many do not. As noted, they pay no attention to politics in the Dominican Republic and they showed to be more concerned about political incorporation through ethnic politics in the U.S. or NYC, or about plain non-ethnic national party politics. Obama especially made them excited about U.S. politics. But then again, they reacted to local politics as millions of Americans did, particularly the young who were energized by Obama's message of change.

All respondents indicated that they want to take their children to visit their ancestral homeland and keep them in touch with their families. The retention of Spanish for the highly educated second and 1.5 generations then is a pragmatic decision to maintain family relationships with the Dominican Republic and which may not be possible otherwise.

Undoubtedly, a portion of the second and 1.5 generations will succeed in keeping and transmitting the Spanish language. But for the many respondents who out-married, especially with whites, this will probably result in a tenuously Dominican-American or Spanish speaking third generation. For example, Ernesto, who is married to an ethnic-white American, says he definitely speaks English much more in his daily life. He doesn't really eat Dominican food and rarely listens to Dominican music. He will teach his children Spanish because it is useful. For Sean, however, teaching his children to speak Spanish is more of a social reality and the right thing to do in a diverse world:

My kids are gonna learn Spanish [...]. Most important thing at the end of the day [is the] actual person [that I'll marry, wherever she's from]. [But, the] kids are gonna learn Spanish. Instilling the idea of relating to different people is important too. They should be socially aware, not victims. Your job as parent is to make them aware. Society is changing; they would live in a more diverse place. That will be a topic of conversation [...].

This is a typical sentiment in that while Sean wants to instill Spanish language skills and Dominican values in his kids, he also realizes that his children will grow up in a diverse world and that they will have to relate to others, non-Dominicans, especially if they are upwardly mobile, which is likely given their parents, college degrees. Thus, they will have to be able to operate not only as ethnic-Dominicans but also in the context of a diverse mainstream.

For example, Diana talks about transnational activities in the following manner, also emphasizing the generational differences in transnationalism: She puts it in this way:

My father sends money. I used to go every summer. Now, I go every 3-4 years. My grandma is still there. My father is building a house there. [So] I still have ties [...] I would love to maybe live there [...] I would send my kids there. [But] most of my ties are here now though. It's difficult [to visit, live in DR] now [...] Once you have kids, you settle down [...].

Diego has been to the Dominican Republic only twice even though he says he is proudly Dominican and is actively working for Dominican/Latino political incorporation, having also led a Dominican student organization in college: "Last time I went I was 12. I'm overdue to go back." He says he has not been back more because of:

Hesitation. So much family I haven't seen. It's awkward. [It's like] 'We're family [but] I don't know exactly who you are.' [...] I feel confident in my Spanish. But I can't communicate 100%. I have to go back with my family. Second reason, life is so busy, working [...] My life has been non-stop [...] Rush, rush' [...].

The literature tends to show that the longer one lives in the US the lower and broader the transnational activity becomes (Waldinger 2007). As this literature expects, this is even more so the case for the second generation (Kasinitz et al. 2002). This fraying of transnational activities and orientation, is not the deliberate choice of individuals; rather, it happens to them as they progress through their life-cycles as upwardly mobile individuals who in many cases work in diverse workplaces and may even have intermarried.

### **Civic Assimilation, Attachment to Host Society, and Feeling at "Home"**

When Diana was asked: "Do you feel a sense of belonging, like the U.S. is your country?" She responded: "Yeah. I don't get that feeling in the Dominican Republic." Irma answered the same question by saying: "Yes! Yes [...] [laughs...] I feel guilty. I don't feel Dominican enough."

But for many D.R. is a very special, dear home, perhaps a second, a more idealized but less than pragmatic, thus distant, home. As far as whether the U.S. or the Dominican Republic is home, Yvette comments:

Interesting question. I feel torn. When I went to DR in the spring, I felt so at home. I felt I can even see myself moving here. On the other hand, I'm so used to NY. I can feel at home in both.

Many are reluctant to settle in the Dominican Republic citing more opportunities in New York and a more comfortable life; not to mention a more culturally familiar terrain for these university-educated professionals who have been socialized in American institutions and mores, in addition to Dominican culture and norms. This is despite their intense emotional ties and devotion to the island, and to their Dominican roots; as well as their continued professed treatment of the Dominican Republic as a "cultural home," a space where they get in touch with their cultural identity. Sean says:

I'm home where I'm happy. The U.S. is a base where I formulated my life. I'd have to be in a very specific place to move to DR. Maybe if I'm older, for retirement...

Federico, a NYU-graduate who identified as Dominican-American, feels that (American) society treats him "as one of them, as a regular American." He goes on to say:

I do feel at home [here, in the U.S.] [...] Always knowing that I have another home [DR]. I have visited DR a lot. There is always a duality in what I call home ... [DR] that's always part of my identity [...] That makes me feel that I don't feel completely that I belong here [in the U.S.]. I have this duality [...] [When I go to DR to visit] they relate to me in a peculiar way. They know I'm from NY; they don't consider me very Dominican. The people there felt that we were too good for them [...] We were made to feel that way. They pointed the things out that were not Dominican [about me]. I felt like a stranger when I came back to NYC too. But I also felt like coming home. Leaving DR was difficult too. I romanticize DR, my dad's roots [...] my dad was illegal, going back to DR connects me to my dad. When he went there he was himself. He would change, be happier, he was home. He had left it behind. I grew up with the same feeling. I felt like I was leaving a part of me behind. I always put DR on a romantic pedestal. I respect DR's food, culture.

It is almost paradoxical, but a feeling of distance from the Dominican Republic and level of assimilation/acculturation can coexist with a real emotional attachment to the homeland,

Dominicanness, and “the island.” But scholars have found that ethnic retention and assimilation are not mutually exclusive (Gans 1997), and neither are transnationalism and assimilation (Lucassen 2006, Morawska 2007). Indeed, assimilation and transnationalism/ethnic retention are not incompatible, especially given the current definition of assimilation which incorporates hyphenated identities, cultural retention, ethnic identities, and considers assimilation a two-way street (Gans 1997, Alba and Nee 2003). On the contrary, various types of both can coexist at the same time. Dominicans’ ethnic retention and “narrow” transnationalism, co-exists with their high levels of political incorporation (Morawska 2007), and (for the educated second generation Dominicans) their socio-economic assimilation and acculturation.

On a rare occasion, one respondent, who is very successful, noted that she feels at home in neither country. She is different enough from Dominicans in the Dominican Republic not to fit in, but as a deeply critical, left-wing child of immigrants of color, she feels that she will never be really, truly American either. As noted, the fear or suspicion that our respondents are not considered Americans by many white Americans (due to their skin color, immigrant-background, hybrid loyalties and emotions) is common among respondents. Most, however, find a way to belong in the United States: not as 100% Americans but as second-generation immigrants, and as Dominican-Americans who still have ethnic loyalties, habits, and emotions that may be different from mainstream America.

Respondents provided fairly typical narratives of upward mobility in that they displayed attitudes of immigrant strivers (trying to keep up with the immigrant bargain they implicitly struck with their parents: the parents work hard and the children succeed). They often recounted how proud they and their parents were that they could rise from disadvantaged backgrounds to become professionals (they are also often the first in their families to go to college). While they

recognized obstacles in the way of minorities and immigrants, they often expressed optimism and resilience through a mixture of the immigrant bargain and the minority culture of mobility. Federico also pointed out the connection between socio-economic mobility and integration into and identification with the larger society: he felt that his contributions to society (his work, his degrees) have helped him feel included and integrated.

They expressed optimism about the how inclusive the country is likely to be in the future by often utilizing a narrative of progressive improvement in their daily lives and in the history of the country in general, while also predicting that things are likely to keep getting better for their children in the future (in that their children will be socio-economically and politically included and seen as “regular Americans.”). Federico even drew a comparison between Dominicans and past European immigrant groups, in a way that Alba and Nee (2003) would agree with: “It’s a matter of time, as they stay here, generations change, children and grandchildren take on the values of American society; there’d be difference but respect [for Dominicans] would be greater; there’d be a greater presence in white collar, academic professions...It’s about quantity [number of Dominicans] and time... When the Irish came here, they were viewed differently, now look at them.” When asked, “Do you feel that the society at large treats you as one of them, as a regular American?” Leandro, the business executive, answered: “More so now than when I was growing up. Now you see more people like me in positions of power, authority. People see us as a valuable asset, whether they like us or not.” When asked if he thinks American identity and society will be more open for his children, Leandro went on to say, “Already, yes [it is more open]. For me, I see it from when I was little. It’s more inclusive. A lot of faces on TV, in music [that look like us].” This was an attitude that was typical. Almost all respondents said something along the lines of “things are getting better and the country is becoming more inclusive.”

Even the sole undocumented person among my respondents (who was college educated and a business owner in the process of becoming regularized after a long struggle) gave the following answer to the question “Do you see immigrants moving up in this country easily?”: “I’m resilient. I’m passionate, because of obstacles. It made me want to work harder...I’m optimistic; wherever there are obstacles, there are triumphs; immigrant families will struggle; they will overcome. My hope is that things will get easier.” When asked if the move to the United States worked out for their families, or whether this country has provided opportunities to their families, all respondents mention the national myth of the “American dream,” of America as a land of opportunity, which is integral to American national self-understanding. This can of course be seen as political assimilation, as the internalization of American belief systems. Ernesto, a banker who is the son of poor parents, proclaimed: “Yes, [I’m glad my family came here]. Even with obstacles, they were met with the sense that there was the opportunity to make something of it. The children would be able to branch out on their own, get ahead. That’s what happened. Her [my mother’s] dreams worked out.” Irma, the educator, said: “My family decided to come to this country. You’re in a land where you’re supposed to be free, have a lot of opportunities. You need to take advantage of that. Has my family done that? Yes.” It’s interesting to note that even the mere two respondents who had difficulty saying they are American noted that they had opportunities in the United States. Once again, the fact that the Dominican Republic acted as a frame of reference, due to the transnationalism experienced by my respondents, brought out the positives in the United States and allowed for the idea of the “American dream” to take root.

However, as educated, liberal, urban, minority, and middle class Americans, my respondents were all aware of inequalities and injustices present in the United States. Irma

pointed out: “There are a lot of opportunities; but...with an asterisk. If people don’t have the resources to take advantage...” Leandro, the business executive said that it was all about schools; he argued that if individuals can get education, they can make something of themselves and take advantage of opportunities. Likewise, Anna said that when she went to college she felt unprepared because her high school was so bad: “I was not as prepared as others. Now I look back and see it’s unfair.” Especially leftist, radical, or progressive respondents who often possessed graduate degrees in the social sciences, displayed a very critical attitude of the U.S. racial history and imperialism in Latin America. But these views are of course fully in tune with their worldviews formed in a U.S. academic mainstream in the aftermath of the post-civil rights era multicultural intellectual revolutions.

## **Chapter 6. Discussion, Conclusions, & Findings**

### **I. Summary of Primary Arguments**

This dissertation finds that the United States and New York, in combination and interaction, provide sociopolitical opportunity structures more conducive to eliciting attitudes of attachment, belonging, and some measure of inclusion from these socioeconomically assimilated second generation immigrants than those provided by Berlin and Germany. The contexts in which these similarly situated upwardly mobile individuals from similarly situated backgrounds in stigmatized immigrant groups find themselves differ from each other in crucial structural ways. This variation is in turn reflected in the distinct nationally and locally coherent patterns found in the respondents' statements in the interviews.

The dissertation sought to impose another control on the comparison by picking as its urban cases two cities that are reputedly the most inclusive (in legal-institutional and discursive terms) in their respective countries. If out of two groups located in relatively similar cities differed, national differences could be identified to distinguish each context.

The Berlin context provides distinct national and local institutions, prevalent norms, socio-political culture, traditions, laws, and policies from those in New York City, just as Germany and the United States do. These independent variables influence the divergent views, practices, and attitudes of respondents in each context. This is in contrast to the relatively inclusive state of American national membership in legal and discursive/cultural terms, and the relative openness of the American and New York political systems.

The study analyzed legal-institutional and discursive opportunity structures in each context in the areas of: a) Civil Rights and Diversity; b) Citizenship and Political Incorporation; c) National or Local Belonging and a sense of Inclusion. It considered both local and national

institutions. The study provided an account of these institutional structures based on secondary research as well as on the perceptions provided by the respondents. The components of these socio-political opportunity structures in each of the areas listed above acted as the independent variables influence the outcome, the dependent variable: the construction, nature, and manifestations of citizenship on the part of my respondents (See figure 2 in Appendix II).

The dissertation found that the opportunity structures that seem to make the biggest difference for respondents' attitudes and behavior were predominately more national than local in nature (not exclusively and not in every case). It was the national cultural mainstream, rather than an isolated local mainstream, that primarily identified the host society's laws, policies, traditions, and norms regarding civil rights, diversity, national identity, citizenship, and political incorporation to my respondents.

It was primarily the anti-discrimination, diversity, immigration, citizenship, and integration policies, institutions, and laws put into place by the national government, steeped in national traditions, that seeped most into my respondents' consciousness, while also more tangibly affecting their daily lives. It was the rhetoric in the national political mainstream which affected the respondents, rather than quotes by local politicians. The national laws and elites' consensus ideologies trickle down to mass public opinion, affecting national culture in all localities (Zaller 1983). These national institutions and norms regarding nationality, citizenship, civil rights prevail in the minds of German Turkish respondents when compared to Berlin's policies, which are liberal relative to other German cities, but not relative to the Dutch, British, or American cities known well to my respondents (Koopmans 2004). Thus, the socio-political opportunity structures available to immigrant origin individuals in order for them to be heard and included differ more between countries than within countries and national differences are

embedded in the structures of even urban, cosmopolitan contexts. Moreover, the issue areas, and independent variables investigated by the study are inherently national in nature: citizenship and nationality. Even if Berlin's policies are quite inclusive, Berlin's respondents feel less included than their New York counterparts a) because national structures—which differ between Germany and the U.S.—prevail over urban structures in respondents' perceptions; and b) because New York's urban structure, along with the national institutions and norms embedded in that urban context, are in the end more inclusive both according to secondary research and according to respondents (Recall that many German Turks compared Germany unfavorably with the U.S.). New York's ethnic politics, history, institutions, people, laws, policies are all well-adapted to dealing with immigration (Mollenkopf 1999, Foner 2007).

The city context of course matters tremendously. Berlin's Turkishness (Marlen 2013) and its cosmopolitanism, along with its relatively inclusive government, lead to a majority of my respondents feeling more like Berliners than Germans, due to their disappointment with and a sense of a degree of exclusion Germany's national structures. They also feel that Berliner is a much more socially attainable identity. Some even identify as *Kreuzbergers*, reaching down to the very hospitable neighborhood context. However, these local identities are strong in Germany precisely because the national structures are found wanting.

Differences between the two groups can certainly contribute to the divergent outcomes. The scope of the study does not allow one to compare the specific cultures and characteristics of the two groups; but does allow for considering the distinct ways in which these groups are considered by the host society. This notion closely parallels the concept of social boundaries between the minority and the majority groups. Contextual differences are at play here as well. Germany's integration debate has both been much more negative and salient than in New York

and the U.S.; and it has focused much more exclusively on the culture (i.e. religion) of the immigrant origin group. Islam has been widely presented in German mainstream culture and politics as an obstacle to integration. Even the notion that Islam is a part of Germany has been opposed vociferously by large parts of the public and elite class. Thus, religion in Europe in general and in Germany in particular is a boundary that is much less porous than the boundaries in the U.S. that are racial and linguistic rather than religious in nature. Especially in New York City, a city full of people of Hispanic and African ancestry that is by now used to multi-racial co-existence, this boundary is much more blurred for Dominican-Americans than is Islam for even my secular German Turkish respondents (Alba 2005, Alba and Foner 2007, Yurdakul and Korteweg 2009).

## **II. Summary of Primary Findings**

The second generation Dominicans interviewed for this study of course displayed all the ambivalence, insecurities, suspicions, and discontent that is to be expected from all immigrant groups at one time or another to varying degrees; this is especially true for a poor Latino group such as Dominicans in the U.S., a group most of whose members are at least partly of African descent (for a historical example of such second generation angst see Child 1945).

Social racial discrimination of course exists in the United States in ample proportions just as it does in many other diverse Western societies. Dominicans, as a poor immigrant minority concentrated in the inner city--often mistaken for African Americans by many middle-class whites--experience such social racism and discrimination too. However, that discrimination is usually *mild* in comparison to the German case and it is almost always *covert*—especially in comparison with Germany, as will be shown. Most respondents say they harbor suspicions/perceptions of various forms and degrees of racism and discrimination, inflicted by

various ethnic groups in New York by the way. On the other hand, American society and politics have made considerable headway in alleviating the problems of discrimination and racism in the wake of the civil rights movement and the other multiculturalist/pluralist intellectual revolutions of the sixties. During this “minority rights revolution,” the federal government visited a second reconstruction on the southern states by passing and implementing aggressive civil rights, affirmative action, and anti-discrimination policies. The legal shift in civil rights has been accompanied by a cultural revolution in attitudes among the general public regarding race relations (Clark et al. 2010). In fact, the younger the birth cohort is, the more liberal racial attitudes are among the American public. This American mainstream, which had reluctantly diversified twice more in its history in response to massive inflows of culturally alien immigrants, is suffused in the post-civil rights-era with discourses of pluralism of one sort or another (be it soft or hard multicultural, and/or civic-liberal-republican ones) that are backed up by the power and laws of the United States and local governments as well as by the party system.

Accordingly, as expected, my Dominican respondents report experiences of racism in social settings and even in public settings such as schools. But these are usually, by self-admission, hunches or intuitions in reaction to what are perceived as *covertly* racist or offensive gestures by whites, but often also by other non-white groups. This is in contrast to the much more overt racism and non-PC, offensive discourses in Germany. Respondents are also aware of anti-discrimination laws and affirmative action, whose positive contributions to their mobility they acknowledge readily.

Thus, the Dominican respondents are overall positive. Almost all respondents feel sufficiently included in the general society even if they may harbor certain grievances: they have the stake of a citizen, of an American, and most importantly of a New Yorker, in it. Almost all

respondents identify themselves as Dominican-Americans first (or, at the very least, second or third), when given multiple identity options. They take for granted the idea that their birth in the United States entitles them to treatment as Americans, as co-citizens. They feel that they are not seen as, and nor do they feel themselves to be, as American as a sixth-generation Irish-American who does not speak another language than English. But they make the claim that, in any case, they *are* American; to a certain extent, and often, of a certain kind: ethnic-American, hyphenated American, Dominican-American, Latino-American, minority-American, but American nonetheless. As citizens in a rights-obsessed society, they feel *entitled* to equal treatment as members of what should be, and purports to be: a civic-republican nation of immigrants, open to all, based on liberal Enlightenment conceptions of popular will and individual liberty, equality, liberty, pluralism, and birthright-based, civic-liberal republican citizenship.

By and large, my Dominican respondents feel that their particular ethnic backgrounds and hyphenated identities are recognized by the public as a result of NY/US traditions and laws. Their on-going yet advanced struggle is to have these affirmed by the state and the public as “*true* American” identities. My respondents, in the main, agree with the first African-American president, who is also of non-white immigrant origins, that there is a progressive trajectory (albeit slow and gradual, definitely not yet finished) in American race relations. Incidentally, Obama’s election made my respondents feel more attached to the system, increasing their *political efficacy*. They feel that events have taken progressively liberalizing turns, especially since the civil rights-era. They feel confident that their children, who might easily out-marry from the Dominican group, will definitely be seen as “regular” Americans by the public, by virtue of a progressively liberalizing, relatively inclusive New York and America; due to their children's prospective third generation and middle-class status.

My respondents, while conceding that Latino representation in national politics is not where it should be, believe that a rapidly-expanding Hispanic population coupled with *ius soli* citizenship, which is creating ever-larger pools of Hispanic-American voters, has begun to weigh heavily on politicians' minds. Strong Latino/Dominican/civil rights organizations exist and have considerable lobbying power, especially at the level of New York politics—an important component of which is ethnic politics buttressed by more recent civil rights initiatives such as ethno-racial districting to ensure minority representation as manifested in New York City by the creation in 1990 of District 10, where Dominican-American Democratic politicians have a virtual monopoly on power and patronage, somewhat like the old days.

My respondents believe in the notion of ethnic succession (Shefter 1994). To my respondents, the abundance of Dominican-American political power and representation in New York City politics is clear. Just as clear is the fact that this enhances their attachment to the polity, the national political/civic community, and ultimately the system itself. In New York city politics, at the rhetorical level, immigrants enjoy recognition and are given a stake as New York conceives its identity as a perpetual city of immigrants and ethnic diversity (see Mollenkopf 1999a). As the *New York Times* puts it, “Supporting immigrant causes is virtually a job requirement for any New York mayor, but many immigrants and their supporters say that Mr. Bloomberg has gone well beyond the expected” (Dolnick 2011).

By contrast, in the German and Berlin context, the upwardly mobile second-generation Turks (or people with roots in Turkey, including Kurds (an estimated 500,000 of the 2.8 million Turkish-origin German residents; Green 2003: 1), Alawites and other Turkish minorities) report and fiercely criticize Germany's lack of a public culture and institutional framework regarding civil rights, discrimination, diversity, and pluralism. They report on their experiences with a

highly discriminatory education system, where the educational bureaucracy often insults them due to their ethnic origins; labels them foreigners; and stereotypes their group, if not them personally, as problematic, alien, and inept. The educational structure also, as perceived by my respondents and objective studies (PISA; see OECD 2009), disproportionately places students of *Migrationshintergrund* into dead-end occupational tracks in a three-tiered system where students' fates get decided at age 10 in most of Germany (12 in Berlin, which just adopted a two-tiered system: a *Gesamtschule* and the more academic *Gymnasium*, another instance of Berlin's relatively progressive policies towards immigrants and their children). In addition, at work and in social situations, my respondents in Berlin also felt themselves othered as foreigners or Germanized *exceptions* who are expected to pick sides, German or Turkish; as exceptions that prove the rule of a Turkish *Parallel Gesellschaft*, which does not "want to integrate." These negative experiences are almost universal among my Berlin respondents, despite their citizenship status, nativity, secularism, level of socioeconomic assimilation, and linguistic abilities.

These life-forming experiences and political socialization in a host country as "guests" or "foreigners" have consequences later in life for the political and other identities of second-generation immigrants, as well as for how they place themselves in the host national political community and polity. Thus, it is no surprise that my Turkish-German respondents feel generally much more negative, angry, and bitter towards, and dismayed with, German society and politics than is the case with the Dominican-American respondents. However, it is also no surprise or paradox that they feel they are settled in Germany; that they are valuable to Germany; that they are sufficiently integrated/assimilated, and are sufficiently German despite their social origins in the impoverished and isolated Turkish communities of Germany. The respondents form small niches of like-minded, urbane, enlightened and pluralist German and Turkish-German friends

who accept them for what they are and profess to be: Turkish-Germans, or some variety of that kind of a bi-dimensional, hybrid, hyphenated identity. This is similar enough in terms of subjective professed identities to the case of the Dominican New Yorkers. The trouble is, my respondents in Berlin have been politically socialized to expect othering by many Germans and much of the German mainstream as a result of the above mentioned life experiences, which are confirmed for most respondents by daily events to this day. Therefore, they do not expect to be considered nor do they perceive themselves to be considered as Germans by the majority “*bio-Germans*”—as one wittily called ethnically German native, German citizens.

My respondents believe that Germanness has been historically constructed by Germany society and politics as determined by ethnicity and blood/ancestry/descent. This vision, most of my respondents argue, is still maintained to a great extent and it continues to exclude immigrants (as well as their offspring) from the bounds of the nation. This political culture and its conception of national identity have historically made dominant a discourse that referred to immigrants as foreigners or guest-workers, not as settlers or stake-holders. My respondents feel that they have not experienced diversity awareness, recognition and respect as German *citizens* and *Germans* of immigrant-descent; nor have they met with co-equal acceptance into the German national (political) mainstream institutions. On the contrary they have been made to feel foreign in the country of their birth. This, according to most of my respondents, is still a recurring phenomenon which sours them on the German mainstream and its capacity to change. It often puts them in a position where they are offended by their colleagues, teachers, and even friends, not to mention strangers.

Nonetheless, my respondents themselves believe that they are Germans and citizens; as they remind anyone who questions their equality. They feel that they are Germans (of one kind

or another, including most prominently: Turkish-Germans); that they do not feel at home in Turkey—even if they go there often; and that they are culturally/socially assimilated into/adapted to/comfortable in the middle class German mainstream as university-educated professionals. However, as noted, they do not believe that they are perceived as such by German society and politicians. They compare unfavorably—and often unprompted by the interviewer—the difficulty of being recognized as Germans, albeit of a certain distinct ethnic background, who are equal German citizens, to the perceived ease and civic, *ius soli*, liberal nature of American, French, British, Canadian, Dutch citizenship regimes and their conceptions of national identity where minorities can belong. The politics of integration in Germany has similar effects that exclude the second generation rhetorically and discursively, while lessening their attachment to the host community.

The predominately ethnic conception of German national membership—characterized/butressed by anti-immigrant and anti-immigration laws, and a heavily *ius-sanguinis* (not *ius soli*) regime—ensured onerous citizenship and naturalization requirements that kept the number/proportion of German citizens with immigrant-origins very low relative to comparable Western societies. However, this finally seemed to come to a halt with the Green-SPD government's conditional *ius soli* citizenship reform in 2000. Despite what may have been expected, the immigrant-origin residents of Germany and the left were ultimately left embittered and disappointed by the concessions exacted by the resolute, demagogic, and forceful opposition of CDU/CSU; and they were put off by the fierce resistance of much of the public to dual citizenship and unconditional *ius soli*. Since the reform, naturalization rates have begun to sharply decline, after first having gone up due to pent-up backlogs; they continue to lag behind naturalization rates in other countries of immigration. In addition, restrictive family reunification

laws (integration from abroad for spouses from certain countries but not others), compulsory integration courses, and culturally biased or otherwise onerous naturalization requirements in many states—all instituted or made more draconian after 2000—have undone the little headway made by the citizenship reform. The belated recognition of Germany as a country of immigration (but not a *classic* country of immigration) has not yet assuaged or ensured the attachment of neither upwardly mobile second generation Turks nor the other minority groups in Germany.

### **III. Discussion and Conclusions**

My main finding is emphatically *not* that Germany is and will stay an ethnically stratified nation. Nor is it that the United States has always been, is, and will remain a civic nation inclusive of all immigrants at all times. The inferences to be drawn from my findings are more nuanced.

Historically-generated conditions now present in the popularly and politically conceived national self-understanding and political culture of Germany have influenced too many German Turks to believe that even if they play by the rules, they will have trouble being considered "real" Germans. They have difficulty making claims and being recognized as equal German citizens. The German Turkish second generation has access only to relatively restrictive discursive and opportunity structures, stemming from the distinct context in which they are embedded.

Nonetheless, empirical findings are never conclusive and free of nuance and outliers. While the overwhelming generality of the respondents in each context think, act, and behave in ways summarized and generalized in this conclusion, it behooves the researcher to list caveats that complicate the general picture. In New York, especially two academics provide support for the view that multicultural education has created a class of successful, self-confident, group-proud/-conscious individuals, it has also bred among intellectuals who are minorities a sense of victimhood and has painted an essentialist picture of the United States as a historically

oppressive, racist country at complete variance with its founding ideals and myths that is only slightly becoming more egalitarian and only in the very last few years (see the liberal, universalist, progressive critiques of such views by Schlesinger Jr. 1994; Gitlin 1995).

Nonetheless, the racially-charged multiculturalism battles lasting from the 1960s to 1990s have considerably calmed down and a softer approach to multiculturalism celebrating diversity (Schuck 2009) has taken preponderance over more separatist multiculturalism (Taylor 1994).

However, this study also credits the same multiculturalism for in a way ironically strengthening American identification and assimilation in general by recognizing, accommodating, and legitimizing the plural backgrounds of its diverse people. Lastly, an undocumented Dominican-American male that I interviewed and a couple of the “black” Dominican respondents reported more negative views of U.S. society, its ethno-racial hierarchy, and their place in it.

On the other hand, in Germany, some secularist Turkish Berliners already possessed the orientalist view of Islam and headscarves prevalent in the German mainstream. These values were inculcated also by the Turkish republic over decades (Kadioglu 2008; Göle 1997). The attitudes of my mostly secular, especially female, respondents in the main perceived the issue through the lens of German xenophobia; but a couple were visibly disgusted by women who passed by wearing headscarves, in effect accusing them of making Turks look bad. These are the boundary-crossers. In the terms of Zolberg and Woon 1997 and Alba 2005's, regarding social boundaries, they have to pass (recall Aydan above, passing as Italian at school); they have to cross over to the other side; become the “German” they are expected to become by the mainstream, meanwhile distancing themselves from their community and adopting the majority's stereotypes of it. These few individuals also said they perceived no discrimination, while

providing with ample anecdotes of it, which meant that they had adopted the conceptions of the majority (which has a much higher threshold of tolerance for discrimination). Lastly, in Berlin, the two half-German half-Turkish 2.5 generation respondents—who looked typically Nordic—did not share the majority’s perception of discrimination and alienation, although they still could relate to slights suffered by their parents.

The main vocation of this study and the social scientist is to generalize based on a clear majority of the sample’s views and to also present Weberian ideal type pictures (internally-cohesive, largely valid excepting a few outliers) of the average case indicated by the commonalities that emerge from social science research. In each case, the findings summarized and generalized here underemphasize only a few outliers out of 23 interviews in New York and 38 in Berlin.

As closely as these general findings can attempt to describe reality (a less hospitable context in Berlin than in New York), and despite the fact that this thesis generally confirms the long standing account of restrictive structures in Germany and Berlin (notwithstanding convergence theorists; Hansen and Weil 2001, Joppke 2007, Jankowski 2011), there also exists also a competing post-68 West German pluralist, civic republican tradition that is represented by the Greens, some SPD members, intellectuals, self-confident upwardly mobile Turks, much of the Berlin government,<sup>64</sup> and even some moderate CDU members is also present in the Berlin case. My German respondents thus perceive a slowly but surely changing Germany, which is certainly the case in empirical terms as well, evidenced by the successes of Greens between 1997 and 2005 as well as in 2011; or the Greens’ election of the Turkish-German Cem Özdemir as co-chair of an important German party.

Nonetheless, despite such sightings of slow progressive improvement (the “march

through the institutions” of the current generation), this study insists that the transformation that is inevitably taking place in most Western societies of immigration towards a diverse national membership seems to be more fraught with obstacles in Germany than in the United States. This is largely due to the lingering burden of Germany's past national citizenship and immigration cultures and policies. It is due as well to the deficiencies (in the eyes of respondents) of continuing policies and in the mainstream political discourse. Those macro forces, the *national* and *local* policies and discourses, eventually but surely trickle down to, or rather rain down on, the consciousness and material conditions of respondents, even though they live their lives in relatively pluralistic Berlin.

Germany's citizenship regime, though liberalized recently, is still perceived as restrictive by its German-born and/or German-raised Turkish minority. And, Germany's particular political culture of citizenship and nationhood, as well as its historically-generated and path-dependent but slowly changing civil rights culture and legal structures, limit the inclusion of Turkish immigrants. Thus, it follows that a more inclusive citizenship regime—defined in terms of both a discursive and political opportunity structure—is crucial for these young adults in Berlin and elsewhere to develop political and social inclusion and belonging.

In sum, the optimistic yet critical, as well as ethnically *and* nationally-moored citizenship practiced by my college-educated Dominican-American respondents strengthens a version of what Pickus and others call civic (or, liberal) nationalism (2005), which refers to a conception of national membership that is based on liberal, universalist, and republican ideals, one which reveres pluralism and transracial ties while also insisting on a sense of national political and cultural community. These types of civic nationalisms can also accommodate sub-national attachments, especially in America, where the history of nation-building is associated with ethnic

pluralism; and hyphenation is no longer un-American but the very definition of being American (Jacobson 2006; see also Walzer 1990). In the post-civil rights era, these images of the American nation are increasingly discursively inclusive of non-white immigrants, who are fast identifying with the nation (Pearson et al. 2006, Citrin et al. 2007, Waldinger 2007).

Moreover, many studies have documented that southern and Eastern Europeans were considered non-white and beyond the pale in terms of American nationhood a hundred years ago; but these bright boundaries between them and the mainstream have certainly changed as the American mainstream and the American nation have transformed itself many times over in response to immigrant influxes. The boundaries are already blurring and are likely to blur more in the future for the new “new immigrants” through mechanisms of assimilation such as intermarriage and socio-economic mobility on the part of large enough numbers from each group (Foner 2000; Alba and Nee 2003; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Alba 2009). Germany lags behind in this sphere, as it has not used its 60 year history of migration in a realistic, constructive, and civic-liberal manner.

The crucial challenge for the United States and Germany is to understand that immigrant and minority-friendly measures and ideologies such as civil rights laws, what Schuck (2009) calls a “soft” multiculturalism (basically a liberal pluralism), the relatively wide-spread reverence of diversity and a multi-racial and multi-cultural nation, as well as the acceptance of dual citizenship and hyphenated identities, actually help rather than hinder the assimilation of immigrants and their children. Moreover, the U.S. must prevent the further racialization and stigmatization of its Latino immigrants by moving ahead with comprehensive immigration reform thus removing the stigma and extreme disadvantage of undocumented status, which fuels nativism.

Unfortunately, though, it seems that even as Germany liberalizes its citizenship regime, the idea of an ethnic German nation is kept alive by the length of time needed for newly-born Turkish Germans to become adult German citizens, by stringent legal requirements, as well as by the ongoing difficulties that the German political culture is having formulating a more inclusive notion of national membership.

By contrast, in the US and especially in New York City,<sup>65</sup> rapidly diversifying colleges, workplaces, and the civil rights laws that aid those processes, all combine and reinforce each other to help provide a *qualified, relative, but in the end satisfactory* sense of inclusion and belonging to most of my respondents. They are of course aware that being a person of color in a society where the color line continues to divide is a disadvantage for them. Nonetheless, the blurring of boundaries and color lines (Alba 2005, 2009; Bean and Lee 2007, Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008), as well as relative political incorporation (Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein 2009, Alba and Foner 2009) and hyperdiversity, in addition to the wide-spread long-standing conceptions of American national identity as a pluralist, relatively undemanding, and civic identity are strong counter forces to the problem of the color line (DuBois 1903). They provide immigrants and their children with both institutional and discursive opportunity structures that make it relatively legitimate for them to claim and practice membership, compared to the German case. The mainstream conception of American national identity, according to most respondents and the mainstream liberals, accepts cultural diversity but only demands a thin version of political and ideological commonality. My respondents and other observers perceive the U.S. legal regime of immigration and citizenship as relatively inclusionary as well, despite recognition of all its deficiencies, such as the power of nativist sheriff Joe Arpaio in Arizona and the system's failure to relieve undocumented immigrants.

The ideology of "America is a nation of immigrants," (shared not only by liberals, but even by conservative nationalists such as Ronald Reagan, George W Bush, or William Kristol), an optimistic ideology of "the American dream," as well as a somewhat civic and non-ethnic ideology of the "American creed" aid tremendously in this process. Especially in the case of a city like New York, an acceptance of biracial families and individuals, as well as the importance of white candidates' wooing of the diverse electorate by emphasizing a black wife and a biracial child can be very advantageous. Commentators agree that the Democratic mayoral primary winner, Bill de Blasio, benefitted largely from just such a strategy, winning a majority of black and Latino votes (in a race against black and Latino candidates).

The results also should not be interpreted as particularly rosy for Dominicans and New York City. Dark skin, Afro-Hispanic ancestry, high dropout rates, a socio-economic status that trails all other immigrant and Hispanic groups in the city on average, blighted neighborhoods, and inadequate schools all make Dominican-Americans a community at risk; and many of its members are mired in disadvantage. Nonetheless, one must also always keep in mind improvements by the second generation (Hernandez-Batista 2003, Hernandez 2004, Kasinitz et al. 2008); the much brighter situation of girls (Lopez 2004); and how the Dominican second generation overall does better than its Turkish-German and New York native-minority counterparts, as well as their parents (Kasinitz et al. 2008).

All Dominican respondents were fully aware of racial inequalities, poor and unequal K-12 education systems, and nativism. They all felt less than certain about whether everyone saw them as Americans or whether they were fully accepted by this society. They were all nonetheless engaged in a struggle for inclusion and recognition as equal members of this society and they all felt that they and their groups were making some progress to that end. Lastly, my

study stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from arguments like that of Huntington (2004) that we are (once again!) faced with an influx of “uniquely unassimilable” immigrants. My study, I think, will contribute to a growing body of literature that argues that today’s immigrants are making not only steady socio-economic progress but are also identifying with their host society, *provided that* the host society allows them to do this, by maintaining open educational and labor institutions as well as a pluralist national identity.

Berlin’s, and especially New York’s, particular city-level institutions, policies and traditions of education, welfare, civil rights, and political incorporation must of course be mentioned as especially important in creating feelings of inclusion relative to the rest of their respective countries. As such, my study analyzed city-level structures and processes, and their interactions with national structures, as well.

New York is of course globally recognized as especially liberal on immigration and diversity issues. Likewise, Berlin is also more inclusive socially and politically, relative to the rest of Germany. Thus, the dissertation compared *the most hospitable city-level-contexts* for the college-educated persons from *the most disadvantaged immigrant groups in both countries*. Yet, *even so*, the dissertation's findings indicate that *national* structural, contextual distinctions predominate in an exploration of variation between the global *cities* of Berlin and New York. In addition, New York City’s even more inclusive laws and political culture than the U.S. mainstream contribute further to the distinctions between it and Berlin. While Berlin, despite its relative progressiveness, is weighed down by her nation, New York City’s particular local opportunity structures surpass the relatively inclusive U.S. national context (as compared to the German national context).

New York’s particular education, welfare, civil rights, and political incorporation policies

and traditions must be mentioned as especially important in creating feelings of inclusion. All respondents betrayed a sense of suspicion about how included they would be outside of New York City and some other cities in the country. Even those few who felt uncomfortable identifying as Americans felt completely accepted by society by virtue of going to New York colleges (especially welcoming is of course CUNY), working in New York labor markets, living under New York laws, and living in a multicultural and culturally laissez-faire urbane society.

It is also true that, as Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway (2008) note, a New Yorker identity is very popular among the second generation, while considerable skepticism exists about the hospitality of the rest of the country. Moreover, in their study, many report thinking of only white Americans as bona fide Americans. Although, this is a distinction that past groups of ethnic New Yorkers also made through centuries: between their own multi-ethnic minority networks and the larger then-WASP, now-"white" world of "real Americans" (See Dash-Moore 1983, Child 1945, Howe 1974; and witness the anti-Semitism of Hemingway's 1920s WASPs in The Sun Also Rises, as well as the anti-Semitism depicted in the 1947 movie *Gentleman's Agreement*).

Like Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway (2008), I have similarly found that a New Yorker identity is very popular with all respondents. The mainstream public also generally accepts this identity as appropriate and authentic for Dominican New Yorkers. These second generation immigrants feel their Americanness would be and has been questioned more freely outside of the city. However, while a New Yorker identity is popular and legitimate, the same can be said about a hyphenated American identity as well. The greater acceptability of immigrants as citizens and hyphenated members of the nation *in New York and the United States* allow them to identify in almost every case as Dominican-Americans, which is after all an

American (as such a national) identity. Indeed, most respondents say that the adjective Dominican-American captures their personal and social synthesis of feeling American *while also* feeling Dominican.

Such a hyphenated Germanness option is less readily available to Turks in Germany. The respondents there report that one must choose one or the other identity in the eyes of most Germans). My Turkish-German respondents do cling more tightly, often exclusively, to a Berlin identity as opposed to any sort of German identity. Or, they feel they can become Berliners, but never "real Germans" in the eyes of the general urban and national publics. Nonetheless, they *are* trying to adopt and claim that hybrid-but-national identity themselves, since, naturally, it describes them best on many occasions.

Most individuals, my respondents in both locales included, are capable of maintaining a few identities simultaneously. People often even switch from one identity to another, depending on the situation (Smith 2008). But, I have found that this flexibility is more acceptable to the mainstream in one context (New York) than the other. Moreover, New Yorkers say that since the civil rights revolutions, laws, as well as hearts and minds, have changed considerably. To them and to many other Americans, American identity and nationality have slowly, painfully, gradually, but eventually been transformed to increasingly accommodate people of color—in age of deep reverence for the concept of diversity

The New York respondents often pointed to the likes of Obama and Sotomayor (or even the US soccer team's Bocanegra!), or people on TV who look like them, to point out this social, ethno-racial evolution, while simultaneously protesting that more Latinos and other minorities should be in the media. Yet, in bright contrast, most Turkish Berliners are far less confident about and satisfied with the much slower trends towards openness in their country.

Koopmans (2004) notes that cities, while unique and significant, are immersed in national cultures, ideologies, institutions, and political systems. While cities differ within a nation, what makes New York different from Berlin is that, *first and foremost*, one city is in the United States and the other is in Germany. Of course, Boise, ID is not New York; and Bayreuth, Bayern is not Berlin. However, Koopmans indeed finds that even though Berlin allows for more migrant activism than the more conservative German cities, *all* German cities lag behind British and Dutch cities in the political incorporation of immigrants/minorities (see also Favell 2008). Thus, while New York is different from the rest of the United States and Berlin is likewise different from most of the rest of Germany, many more American cities other than New York would presumably top most German cities on Koopmans' index. Ultimately, the national contexts, especially in the jurisdiction of nationally promulgated citizenship and immigration laws take precedence over strictly city-related variables.

In sum, my study thus stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from arguments like that of Huntington (2004) that the United States is (once again!) faced with an influx of "uniquely unassimilable" immigrants. My study, I think, will contribute to a growing body of literature that argues that today's immigrants are making not only steady socio-economic progress but are also identifying with their host society, *provided that* the host society allows them to do this, by maintaining open educational and labor institutions as well as a pluralist national identity. The optimistic yet critical, as well as ethnically *and* nationally-moored citizenship practiced by my college-educated Dominican-American respondents strengthens a version of what Pickus calls civic nationalism (2005), which refers to a conception of national membership that is based on liberal, universalist, and republican ideals, one which reveres pluralism and transracial ties while also insisting on a sense of national political and cultural community. These types of civic

nationalisms, when coupled with “soft multiculturalism” and a public veneration of diversity, can also accommodate sub-national attachments, especially in America, where the history of nation-building is associated with ethnic pluralism; and hyphenation is no longer un-American but the very definition of being American (Jacobson 2006; see also Walzer 1990). In the post-civil rights era, these images of the American nation are increasingly discursively inclusive of non-white immigrants, who are fast identifying with the nation (Pearson et al. 2006, Citrin et al. 2007, Waldinger 2007).

Many studies have already exhaustively documented that southern and Eastern Europeans were considered non-white and beyond the pale in terms of American nationhood a hundred years ago; but these bright boundaries between them and the mainstream have certainly changed as the American mainstream and the American nation have transformed itself many times over in response to immigrant influxes. The boundaries are already blurring and are likely to blur more in the future for the new “new immigrants” through mechanisms of assimilation such as intermarriage and socio-economic mobility on the part of large enough numbers from each group (Foner 2000, Alba and Nee 2003, Kasinitz et al. 2008, Alba 2009). Germany lags behind in this sphere, as it has not used its 60 year history of migration in a realistic, constructive, and civic-liberal manner.

The crucial challenge for the United States and Germany is to understand that immigrant and minority-friendly measures and ideologies such as: civil rights laws; what Schuck (2009) calls a “soft” multiculturalism (basically a liberal pluralism); a relatively wide-spread reverence of diversity and a multi-racial and multi-cultural nation; as well as the acceptance of dual citizenship and hyphenated identities, actually help rather than hinder the assimilation of immigrants and their children. Another similar counterintuitive finding (though not unnoticed

before implicitly; see Louie 2006 a, b) is that widespread transnationalism also aids assimilation by inviting unflattering comparison of the old country with the host societies the second generation comes from and was socialized in. The locals in the home country also perceive the visitors as mostly foreign. As respondents age, number of visits tend to progressively decline (Waldinger 2007).

These precepts are more readily accepted, legitimized, and implemented in the New York City and the United States contexts than in Berlin and Germany (among both the majority publics and second-generation respondents). Nonetheless, to improve, the U.S. must prevent the further racialization and stigmatization of its Latino immigrants by moving ahead with comprehensive immigration reform thus removing the stigma and extreme disadvantage of undocumented status, which fuels nativism.

The conclusions about the relative inclusiveness of American and New York City contexts do not require one to discount the irrefutable poverty, discrimination, and stigmatization faced by many immigrants and their children. The cases of many second generation Mexicans and Dominicans, when compared to other groups, are especially worrisome. As noted, the problem of undocumented status, as well as the stigmatization this causes and a resurgent anti-Latino nativism, are all quite troublesome as well (Chavez 2009). As Itzigsohn (2009) notes, the burdens of racialization and socio-economic subordination for Dominicans continue well into the second generation and beyond (although there are increasing signs of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation mobility among Dominicans).<sup>66</sup>

Nonetheless, this study is a comparative study. All assessments in this paper, which may be construed as too optimistic or complacent, are relative to the German situation, since the effect of differences between those two contexts is what this study analyzes. My findings are that

college-educated Dominican-Americans feel more accepted and confident *than their Turkish-German counterparts*, who cannot even use the term “Turkish-German” in their daily lives because the political culture of hyphenation and diversity, as well as the acceptance of multiple identities along with a political national identity, are lacking in Germany. Neither am I comparing Dominican-Americans to other (more successful) groups in the U.S., which would have made the Dominican-American situation seem more negative.

Again, all New York respondents were fully aware of racial inequalities, poor and unequal K-12 education systems, and nativism. They all felt less than certain about whether everyone saw them as Americans or whether they were fully accepted by this society. They were all nonetheless engaged in a struggle for inclusion and recognition as equal members of this society and they all felt that they and their groups were making some progress to that end.

My findings in New York suggest that mentors play a large role in upward mobility there. The kindness of a few dedicated individuals often paid great dividends to some students. This points to the effect of contingency in a field dominated by structuralism. Secondly, rapidly diversifying colleges, workplaces, and civil rights laws that aid those processes, provide a sense of inclusion to most of my respondents. Thirdly, widely held general notions and traditions of American national identity as a pluralist and relatively undemanding, civic national identity (which accepts cultural diversity but only demands a thin version of political and ideological commonality) provides immigrants and their children a “discursive opportunity structure” that makes it legitimate for them to claim membership.

The ideology of “America is a nation of immigrants,” (shared not only by liberals, but even by conservative nationalists such as Ronald Reagan and George W Bush), an optimistic ideology of “the American dream,” as well as a civic and non-ethnic ideology of the “American

creed” (Etzioni 2004) also aid in this process. Moreover, the old theory of pluralism (Dahl 1961), which has rightly fallen into disrepute for some of its naïveté about the openness of the American system to marginalized groups, is nonetheless helpful in reminding us of the channels of relative openness and multiple entry points that exist in the American political system(s) with numerous veto points and a decentralized authority structure, at least in the eyes of my respondents. While my respondents recognized the under-representation of Latinos and the inequalities faced by them in the American socio-political and economic arena, they also displayed a sense of efficacy which would be expected given their new found middle class socio-economic status (Verba et al. 1995).

In contrast, German Turks that have been interviewed for this study did not feel in general that they were considered *bona-fide* Germans like all others by the general public and opinion-makers, despite their birth and/or socialization in the country, their citizenship status, and their cultural and socio-economic assimilation. They thus lack the "discursive opportunity structures" (Koopmans et al. 2005) needed to credibly claim equal membership, due to the particular German public culture of diversity, citizenship, and nationhood. Moreover, the concrete "institutional opportunity structures" in Berlin and Germany largely prevent German Turks from being adequately represented adequately in politics, work, and culture.

This study's finding indicate that the neo-assimilation school's conceptualization and agrees that it is taking place today for the most part, however gradually and unevenly, but *only where* "the mainstream" (the socio-political structure in my terms) is dynamic, adaptive to immigration, and hospitable. I argue that this has not been the case in Germany, where the integration discourse has stressed *cultural* assimilation (according to my respondents; see also

Ehrkamp 2006, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2009) or boundary crossing by individuals as they stop being Muslim or Turkish and become secular/culturally Christian Germans (Alba 2005).<sup>67</sup>

Alternative scenarios were certainly possible. Dominicans in the United States (even those who are upwardly mobile) might have proved to be even more systematically alienated than Turks in Germany. This could well be due to the larger (presumably helpful and inclusive) welfare state in Germany. Moreover, there could be a greater perception of discrimination in the United States against Dominicans, given their African ancestry. Or, it might well have been the case that the United States has a more hourglass-shaped economy (which has decreasing numbers of middle class jobs and reduced opportunities for upward mobility) than Germany, which provides Dominican-Americans with limited opportunities.

It was also possible that highly educated minorities may actually choose ethnic identification over national identification, perhaps given their negative experiences with the mainstream, or in order to avoid downward assimilation which results from assimilating too fast (Waters 1999). They might also feel more bitter and alienated than lower income members of their groups because they may face the sting of condescension and discrimination more frequently in their daily interactions with the white mainstream (Hochschild 1995). Finally, it was quite possible that middle class status attainment in Germany is today sufficient to make German Turks feel included in the mainstream; and that thus, the supposed German national membership effect does not in fact exist. Before I started my project, the above-listed propositions, often asserted at abstract levels, remained to be tested in sufficient depth, in a comparative manner, and with attention to my target demographic groups. All these possibilities remained to be researched and analyzed. But I have not found evidence for these alternative

results, assertions, and arguments in my research, hence my own argument; one that is based on empirical research and is presented in this dissertation.

## **ENDNOTES:**

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1. See also Solms-Laubach's alarmist reporting on a "shock study" about Turkish youth refusing to integrate, 2012, which puts the refuseniks at 20% of all German Muslims.

2. Anti-immigrant and xenophobic demagoguery is also induced partly by such fruits of globalization as localized deindustrialization, an alienated working class open to nativist appeals, the internationalization of finance and the ensuing 2008 financial crisis, the growing influence of supranational institutions such as the EU, WTO, IMF, and NAFTA over sovereign nations (e.g. Greece).

3. The flourishing careers of Pat Buchanan, Rush Limbaugh, Joe Arpaio, Tom Tancredo, Lou Dobbs, Thilo Sarrazin, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Edmund Stoiber, Ronald Koch, Thilo Sarrazin, Geert Wilders, and NPD leaders in, say, Saxony demonstrate the lucrative nature of xenophobic demagoguery.

4. For example, 25% of the second-generation Dominicans in New York City have college degrees (Kasinitz et al. 2008), but Dominicans are largely treated as a uniformly lagging group by most.

5. U.S. Census Bureau, "The Foreign Born Population of the United States," 2012, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf>; U.S. Census Bureau, "The Newly Arrived Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 2010 American Community Survey Briefs," Nov. 2011, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-16.pdf>, accessed Jan. 2012.

6. The dip was caused by the 1924 immigration restriction law (Johnson-Reed; National Origins Act); for statistics, see: Migration Policy Institute, Data Hub, "Foreign-Born Population and Foreign Born as Percentage of the Total US Population, 1850 to 2007," <http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub/charts/final.fb.shtml>, accessed February 12, 2010.

7. U.S. Census Bureau Newsroom, News Release, "Nation's Foreign-Born Population Nears 37 Million: More Than One in Five People in the U.S. are First or Second Generation," Oct. 19, 2010, [http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/foreignborn\\_population/cb10-159.html](http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/foreignborn_population/cb10-159.html), accessed Jan. 1, 2012.

8. For the 20% (or, more precisely, 19.5%) figure and a thorough empirical analysis of this population group, see: *Statistisches Bundesamt*, "Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund—Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2010," Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2. See Tabelle "Ausgewählten Merkmalen und räumlicher Verteilung," p. 35; for other statistics and a discussion of the term "Migrationshintergrund," see Anna Myunghee Kim, "Foreign Labour Migration and the Economic Crisis in the EU: Ongoing and Remaining Issues of the Migrant Workforce in Germany," IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor, IZA Discussion Papers, IZA DP No. 5134, August 2010, <http://ftp.iza.org/dp5134.pdf>.

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9. See Brubaker 1992, Soysal 1994, Freeman 1996 for a general account of distinct national models. For specific examples see Bleich 1998, Favell 2001. The Francophone literature especially often sets up an ideal unified republican France against a ghettoized America—see Schnapper 1991, Todd 1994, Kepel 1997, Jennings 2000.

10. The segmented assimilation perspective, in contrast to neo-assimilation, argues that non-white immigrants in a post-industrial economy are more likely to join the underclass and develop reactive oppositional identities (Portes & Rumbaut 2001), which my results show is more likely in a less diverse mainstream such as the German one (see Diehl & Schnell 2006 for the debate).

11. See for example the “Leitkultur” debate in Germany, where conservatives identified the maintenance of monoculturalism and the adoption by immigrants of “German” values, including its Christian heritage, as key to social cohesion (Pautz 2005). See also *Der Spiegel*, “How Blunt Can One Be about Integration?”

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,654921,00.html>, accessed Oct. 16, 2009; or see *Der Spiegel*, “How Much Allah Can the Old Continent Bear?”

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,666448,00.html>, accessed Dec. 12, 2009.

12. On segregation of blacks and whites versus other minorities, see Massey 1985, Alba et al. 1997; also see Portes and Rumbaut 2001 on Haitians, Itzigsohn 2009 on Dominicans, and Waters 1999 on West Indians.

13. For the particularities of historical and sociological institutionalism, please see immediately below. As for the third of the three new institutionalisms, “rational choice institutionalists employ a characteristic set of behavioral assumptions. In general, they posit that the relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes . . . behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation” (Hall and Taylor 1996).

14. However, path dependency resulting from early policy decisions and norms is not deterministic. One must remember the place afforded to the notion of “unintended consequences” in this literature. Since policymakers are not optimally rational, and since institutions are not always functional, certain actions bring about unintended consequences (Hall and Taylor 1996: 952; consider the 14th Amendment passed for former slaves and not intended for immigrants, similar to affirmative action; in Germany, immigration was conceived of as a rotation-based temporary guest worker system). In short, history does not rest on an efficient equilibrium and institutions do not have functional or instrumental beginnings in reality. Institutions develop and change (see Thelen 1999 for change in institutionalism), owing much to contingency and chance; hence the need for a complex and nuanced historical analysis (Immergut 1999:19).

15. Elsewhere, Hansen quotes Stephen Krasner as clarifying the logic of path dependence thus: “The basic characteristic of an institutional argument is that prior institutional choices limit available future options” (Hansen 2000: 31).

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16. Cultures and their norms, called “memes” by evolutionary scientists, are slowly evolving but nonetheless foundational and socially influential entities. These memes provide structural context to human action, while interacting with multiple other social factors, in a self-reinforcing process.

17. Favell 2008 suggests that while global European cities are seen often as cosmopolitan and rootless spaces, these cities in fact preserve much of their “national character,” aided by national political and economic institutions, which they impose on newcomers accordingly.

18. I do not, however, argue for a deterministic and structuralist view of socio-political reality in these cases. I subscribe more to a "structuration" viewpoint. Structures (which include culture) exist that provide a script to individuals socialized within them, while one must recognize the importance of agency and the mutability of structures through human action (Giddens 1986).

19. U.S. Census Bureau, “The Foreign Born Population of the United States,” 2012, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf>; also see Bloemraad et al. 2008: 2.

20. I chose to study Dominicans in the U.S.—rather than say, another Muslim group like Pakistanis—to compare to Turks in Germany. The study becomes a better comparison when the two groups are at similar levels of their respective societies’ socio-economic hierarchy, rather than when a comparison group is chosen on a loose independent variable, such as similarity in religion, divorced of contextual nuance. Jocelyn Cesari's *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States* (2004) and Jytte Klausen's *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (2008) argue that the pluralist/laissez faire/1st amendment way of dealing with religion in the United States tamps down the politicization of Islam and other minority religions (like Mormonism or Hinduism). By contrast, in Europe and Germany, the issue of socio-economic integration has lately receded, arguably to the point of being overshadowed by religion-related issues. The authors both make the point that the lack of a strict institutional separation of church and state in most European countries requires the formal and difficult incorporation of Islam just as other religions have historically been integrated into the state, which creates tense situations related to state recognition, headscarves in the public sphere, state aid to schools/communities, mosque construction, religious instruction, cemetery issues, halal food, etc. (See also Foner and Alba 2008, which argues that religion is a bigger barrier in Europe than it is in the U.S.) As a result, the Pew survey on Muslim Americans shows that although many Muslims are relative newcomers to the U.S. they are highly assimilated into American society. By nearly two-to-one (63%-32%) Muslim Americans do not see a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society. On balance, the report argues that Muslims coming to the U.S. should try to adopt American customs, rather than trying to remain distinct from the larger society.

21. These legal-institutional steps and the public influence of relatively liberal elite opinions often lead to changing social norms (Zaller 1992; Skrentny 2002). As noted in the text, younger birth cohorts in the U.S. demonstrably hold much more liberal opinions on race and other social

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issues than the generations that came of age before the civil rights ethic became mainstream (Clark et al. 2010).

22. In particular, the two contexts (two countries and inevitably the two cities under their national jurisdiction) differ on many disparate questions such as whether litigation against discrimination is easy and consequential, and whether the government strictly enforces civil rights law and is even directly supportive of plaintiffs—suing companies on behalf of employees, for instance (policy areas where most laws are made at the federal, not state or municipal level).

23. In addition, in a “European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index” developed by the British Council’s Brussels Foreign Policy Centre and Migration Policy Group in 2004, Germany ranked at the bottom of the European Union with a score of 1.71—tying for rank with Greece and Austria—surpassed by France (2.18), Ireland (2.47), Italy (2.06), Spain (2.32), and Portugal, not to mention relatively pluralist countries such as the U.K (2.15), Sweden (2.59), and the Netherlands (2.65). The EU-15 average score in the index was 2.16.

24. In 1954, the powerful U.S. Supreme Court’s *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, which prohibited the de jure segregation of schools, exemplified the activist support of federal law and institutions in favor of civil rights, again in stark contrast to the German political system, which did not start even trying to close the civil rights gap until the late 1990s. In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (along with other subsequent acts of Congress) extended voting rights for minority groups and prohibited segregation and discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

25. I.e., four official minority groups were identified (alongside non-Hispanic whites): African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asian Americans, who were all regarded as in need of affirmative state action to remedy the effects of ethno-racial subordination. Thus, while original efforts were arguably targeted primarily at African Americans, civil rights policies have gradually come to benefit other groups designated as disadvantaged ethno-racial minorities that were deemed analogous to African Americans (see Hollinger 1995).

26. Hispanics today own 15% of all U.S. businesses (U.S. Census 2010)—their share of the population; Turkish Germans often tout having 60,000 Turkish businesses in the country (Sen 2003).

27. For example, claims-making by migrants in Berlin top the list in Germany but pale in comparison to Dutch and British cities with more permeable political opportunity structures (Koopmans 2004:Table5).

28. The student body is overwhelmingly made up of second-generation immigrants, many of them Dominicans and other new immigrants’ children such as Jamaicans and Colombians, who have benefitted from diversity and affirmative action policies created in the sixties mainly for African Americans.

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29. Sixty-three percent in Germany would complain about discrimination at a social setting, as against 80% of British minorities. Of those who would complain at all, only 14% of Germans would consider going to court, versus 50% of the French (Marsh and Sahin-Dikmen 2002).

30. The European Forum for Migration Studies, which is a research institute at the University of Bamberg, Germany, can be reached at: [www.efms.uni-bamberg.de](http://www.efms.uni-bamberg.de).

31. Kohl had promised to reduce the number of foreigners by a million (Green 2004).

32. Sureyya recounts another typical story from her work, as most of my respondents would have told it: “Once, my boss at an internship asked me: ‘Do you wear a headscarf?’ I said, ‘No.’ [Then he asked all these questions:] ‘Do you wear one when you leave work? Do you decide these things or your older brother?’ I said, ‘You can’t ask me these questions! Of course I decide what I wear, what I do!’”

33. See the CUNY Diversity Action plan on: [http://www.cuny.edu/about/administration/offices/ohrm/diversity/DiversityActionPlan/DiversityActionPlan\\_Revised.pdf](http://www.cuny.edu/about/administration/offices/ohrm/diversity/DiversityActionPlan/DiversityActionPlan_Revised.pdf); accessed in December 2012.

34. For Germany, see the report on The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees website about various local integration projects; url: <http://www.bamf.de/EN/Willkommen/Integrationsprojekte/integrationsprojekte-node.html>, accessed May 2013

35. These long-standing, path-dependent structures and traditions of citizenship and nationhood of course do not *determine* policies, as seen in Germany’s liberalization of its citizenship laws in 2000.

36. *Ius soli* is the legal tradition in which citizenship is awarded on the basis of political, civic, and territorial—rather than ancestry-based—criteria.

37. Immigration Reform and control Act (IRCA) legalized undocumented immigrants and strengthened border and identity controls in 1986 (see Martin 2004, Schain 2009).

38. According to the CPI scale of the different national citizenship, in the 1980s, Germany scored a full 0.0 on a scale where 0 was the most restrictive citizenship regime and 6 the most liberal. Britain had the best score: 5.42. By 2008, Germany had improved: but only to 2.04, even after the much-touted 2000 reforms. Belgium headed the pack this time with 5.50. Germany’s deficiencies were judged to be its less than full *jus soli* system; its restrictive naturalization requirements, and its no-dual citizenship policy. In sum, there has been relative convergence among Western democracies in these matters; but there has not been an absolute convergence: Germany is still far from the liberal pack on top of the citizenship index

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39. In this paragraph, the absolute numbers come from the Statistisches Bundesamt 2007 and the percentage figures come from Green 2011.

40. The State Department, Fiscal Years 2006-2010:  
[http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY10AnnualReport-TableXVI\\_B.pdf](http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY10AnnualReport-TableXVI_B.pdf)

41. “[The current spate of local anti-immigrant laws, e.g. Arizona,] have also generated protest from both the left and the right, with lawmakers even reconsidering the measures’ effects both on business and the states’ image...there are also countless examples of successful pro-immigration mobilization, particularly at the local level.<sup>86</sup> For example, since the 1980s, a growing group of cities has banned city employees and police officers from asking people about their immigration status. Although the number of cities involved is not impressive (ca. 30), it does include practically all major cities in the United States (e.g. Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, Washington DC).” (Mudde 2010: 18).

42. *Die Linke*, the Left Party, is an agglomeration of old East German communists from the state party SED, and the leftist disaffected members who defected from SPD when it veered to the center under Chancellor Schroeder.

43. Der Spiegel, July 12, 2007.

44. The Federal German Parliament’s upper chamber, which represents the states.

45. The storied center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany.

46. That is indeed true. See Koopmans et al. 2005, Anil 2004.

47. *Ius soli* denotes a birth, territory, and political allegiance-based notion of relatively inclusive citizenship regime.

48. Focus Migration Policy Brief, “Dual citizenship: The discourse on ethnic and political boundary-making in Germany,” No. 14, November 2009, p.5.

49. An *Aussiedler* is a person of ethnic German origin from Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics who benefitted from ethnicity-based and automatically awarded German citizenship. A large wave of them arrived in the 1990s (Anil 2004).

50. The New York City Council Black, Latino and Asian Caucus:  
<http://council.nyc.gov/html/about/caucus.shtml>., accessed June 1, 2011

51. Portions of this section—and several other sections in Chapters 3, 4, and 5—have appeared in Hernandez and Sezgin 2010; and they correspond to the sections I originally wrote myself and did the research for in the journal article.

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52. See Hernandez and Sezgin 2010 for a more nuanced, expanded version of this section, and a more thorough analysis of the transnationalism of the Dominican second generation in New York.

53. “His [Obama’s] 181 [judicial] nominees include 32 African Americans, 20 Latinos, 12 Asian Americans, 75 women, and 4 LGBT individuals.” (Tobias 2011).

54. As opposed to an “*ius soli*” type of regime (see above).

55. See Der Spiegel, “Immigration Law Hits Turks Below the Belt,” July 12, 2007.

56. This is akin to what a progressive Berliner colleague of the author called “the German stare [at ‘*Ausländer*’].”

57. Der Spiegel, “A Slap in the Face for Muslims’: New German Interior Minister Reopens Integration Debate,” March 7, 2011.  
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749477,00.html>, accessed March 8, 2011.

58. Turkey is a de-facto, but officially (largely) unrecognized, diverse and multicultural nation itself.

59. Der Spiegel, “Turkish-German Professionals Young, Qualified and Unwanted:”  
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,554612,00.html>

60. “Parallel Societies,” is a widely used term in German culture referring to the anxiety that Turks are not integrating but self-segregating.

61. Henceforth, “DR.”

62. Portions of this section have appeared in Hernandez and Sezgin 2011; and they correspond to the sections I originally wrote myself and did the research for in the journal article.

63. One must remember, however, that many Irish- and German-Americans, thoroughly assimilated by the 1920s, thought that the “new immigrants” of the time, Jews and Southern Italians were less worthy than their ancestors who had “wanted to assimilate.” Many thus supported the restrictive laws of the 1920s (King 2001).

65. See the Berlin *Senat*’s new conception of immigrant integration which is very liberal and pluralistic: [http://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lb-integration-migration/publikationen/berichte/integration\\_policy\\_in\\_berlin\\_2007\\_2011\\_bf.pdf?start&ts=1250585274](http://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lb-integration-migration/publikationen/berichte/integration_policy_in_berlin_2007_2011_bf.pdf?start&ts=1250585274).

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66. The word, “especially” must inevitably precede any mention of New York City, in light of the city's progressive traditions of immigration, and its far surpassing the rest of the United States in these matters.

67. See Ramona Hernandez and Francisco Rivera-Batiz, “Dominicans in the United States: A Socioeconomic Profile, 2000 [Executive Summary],” [http://www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/advising/documents/rivera\\_batiz.pdf](http://www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/advising/documents/rivera_batiz.pdf), accessed January 2009.

68. See for example the “leitkultur” debate in Germany, where conservatives identified the maintenance of monoculturalism and the adaptation by immigrants of “German” values, including its Christian heritage, as key to social cohesion (Pautz 2005). See also Der Spiegel, “How Blunt Can One Be about Integration?” <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,654921,00.html>, accessed 10/16/09; or see Der Spiegel, “How Much Allah Can the Old Continent Bear?” <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,666448,00.html>, accessed 12/12/09.

**APPENDIX:****APPENDIX I. List and Characteristics of Respondents****Table 1.**

<b>"NAME" (ALIASES)</b>	<b>AGE, approx.</b>	<b>SEX</b>	<b>JOB</b>
<b><i>BERLIN=38 INTERVIEWS</i></b>			
Aydan	20	F	College Senior
Aygul	28	F	Public/Private Non-Profit Manager
Bahri	22	M	College Senior
BEKIR YILMAZ (Capitalized names are non-anonymous interviews with community leaders and other elites)		M	Head of the <i>Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland</i> [Turkish Community of Germany] ethnic association
Berna	30	F	Lawyer
Birgul	30	F	Retail Worker, Mid-Level
Burak	30	M	College Senior, Business
Burcu	35	F	Ph.D/Academic
Cakil	23	F	Civil Servant/State Level
CEM OZDEMIR		M	Green Party Co- Chairman, Former MEP
Defne	27	F	Turkish Ethnic Association, Managerial Position
Elif		F	Doctor
Feriye	27	F	High Level Political Staff in National Politics
Gul	25	F	College Senior

HAKKI KESKIN		M	Retired <i>Die Linke</i> Federal MP
Hayriye	45	F	Doctor
Huelya	30	F	Doctor
Ilgın	28	F	Social Worker
Isik	30	F	Social Worker
Ilke	30	F	Lawyer
Ismail	43	M	School Counselor
Kamil	45	M	Luxury Car Salesman/Small Business Owner
Meral	30	F	Nurse
Murat	30	M	Graduate Student/Activist
OZCAN MUTLU		M	Berlin MP, Greens
Nalan	35	F	Academic Researcher
Nermin	53	F	Managerial Position
Pelin	30	F	Public/Provate Non-Profit Staff
SAFTER INAN		M	Head of Tuerkische Bund- Brandenburg Ethnic Association
Serpil	28	F	Teacher
Serhat	25	M	Graduate Student/Ethnic Association Managerial Staff
Serkan	30	M	Lawyer
Sureyya	24	F	Bank Teller, New College Graduate
Taylan	22	M	Technical College Junior
Ugur	24	M	Artist, Graduate Student
ULRICH RAISER			Berlin Integration commissioner's Office Executive
Yasemin	27	F	Social Worker, PhD Student

Yener	22	M	Liberal Activist (FDP), College Senior, Business
Zuhal	25	F	Ph.D Candidate, Academic
<b><u>NEW YORK CITY=</u></b> <b><u>23</u></b> <b><u>INTERVIEWS</u></b>			
Andres	25	M	Business Mid-Level Professional
Anna	25	F	PhD Candidate
Beatrice	27	F	Civil Servant
Christina	30	F	Social Worker
Celia	25	F	Social Worker
Diana	27	F	Political Staff
Diego	27	M	Paralegal-Wall St
Douglas	25	M	Small Business Owner
Ernesto	30	M	Finance Professional
Evelyn	25	F	Political Staff
Federico	28	M	Social Worker
Fernando	25	M	Political Staff
Irma	28	F	School Language Counselor

GUILLERMO LINARES		M	First Ever Elected Dominican-American Official, NY State Assembly Member
Leandro	45	M	Business Executive
Miriam	28	F	Administrative, Managerial Position at University
Marilyn	25	F	Political Staff
OFF THE RECORD	28	M	High Level Political Staff to Important NY Politician
Sean	27	M	Business Mid-Level Professional
Sierra	30	F	PhD., Academic
Tina	20	F	Ivy League Junior
Yessica	27	F	Social Worker
Yolanda	27	F	Administrative Professional

## APPENDIX II.

### The Methods and Design Appendix:

#### II.A. Data Analysis (Collection, Coding, Organizing, Analyzing of Interview Data):

61 interviews were conducted, of these almost all were face-to-face, about a seventh were over the phone. On average, the interviews lasted 1.5-2 hours. While interview with officials and a few respondents lasted for about 30-40 minutes, the author also very often had 3-4 hour conversations with second generation respondents. I conducted some of these interviews on the phone due to limitations of time and circumstance. However, an overwhelming majority of the interviews were in-person, face-to-face, social interaction that took place mostly in cafes (in

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Berlin, often outside and accompanied by much tobacco and Turkish coffee), while I visited many interviewees at their work, home, or in their routine, everyday hang-out spots, where they simultaneously entertained—and I interacted with—their family and friends. Sometimes, respondents invited me to their homes or to cafes/bars after our interviews, as we continued to fraternize outside the strict interview format, where I could apply observational field research techniques and understand the respondents better.

These sessions were informal, friendly conversations (guided by me and the research interests of this study nonetheless) rather than strictly question and answer sessions. The need then arose to balance the specificity of a detailed interview questionnaire and the extra comprehension of a respondent's thinking process that comes with subtly guiding a seemingly free-flowing, interactive conversation centered around the themes of the dissertation, but one where the respondents' voices flourished as I listened and gently prodded, while they talked about themselves in detail and with frankness. I balanced these needs as well as I could, but leaned towards the latter option of a strategy of allowing respondents to talk freely, as they avoided feeling as if they were being asked yes/no questions as part of an examination.

The author taped all the conversations, after receiving permission from the respondent to do so. At the same time, I took nearly verbatim, extensive, and comprehensive notes of questions and answers. During this process, I marked the time elapsed on the digital recorder in the margin of what I considered important quotes, for easy access later. While I was taking notes, I made sure to make eye contact and other interactive behavior so that respondents knew I was giving them my full attention and that I was engaged in a two-way dialog with them. Ultimately, these

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notes filled 10-11 notebooks, which formed the reference point and backbone of my strategy of data analysis afterwards.

After the collection of data, I meticulously read the notes multiple times, listened to the voice recordings several times, cross-checked the accuracy of my notes, and then finally coded the many selected quotes, which had already been underlined and highlighted with a color scheme. These quotes were ones that were revealing, pertinent, and that formed the essence of each person's story. The codes were organized into subjects studied in the dissertation: arenas of civil rights, discrimination, and diversity awareness; citizenship and political incorporation; national/local identity and belonging. I then organized the coded material into emerging general patterns and analyzed these quotes (in conjunction with the totality of each conversation) in order to reach conclusions, findings, and arguments stemming from general patterns (and exceptions) in the process of exploring the questions this dissertation asks.

This coded material, which I re-read, was organized into many (around 10-15) quotes by each individual that I then transcribed, listening once more to the interviews. After coding and analysis, I picked out and used in my dissertation the quotes that best represented the most typical, common patterns that emerged from interviews, while also including the few exceptions to these patterns. One must emphasize that, in each context, important similarities and a distinct and general pattern emerged after only a few interviews that remained even after I conducted tens of additional interviews.

I then listed all interviewees, their characteristics, their answers to important topical questions, and their general sense of discrimination and/or belonging/inclusion. I formed this

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document into an excel sheet that enabled me to aggregate data and discover patterns as I put together the data from all 61 interviewees in one place.

II.B. Data Collection: Methods, Sampling, Recruitment. My primary means of data collection were a total of 61 face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews in the two contexts, which is an appropriate number (see Weiss 1994). 38 interviews were in Berlin, 23 were in New York City. I interviewed 32 mostly second generation individuals (some were 1.5, or 2.5 generation) of Turkish descent (2 of whom were half-ethnically German), in addition to 6 community leaders and/or politicians in Berlin. In New York, I interviewed 21 mostly second generation individuals (again, some were 1.5, or 2.5 generation) of Dominican descent (several of whom were also ethnically mixed, of pan-Latino parentage) and 2 community elites/political actors. The children of immigrants whom I interviewed were mostly college-educated professionals; or less frequently, they were on their way up: some were college-graduates on the verge of entering a middle-class profession. Some, fewer, were in the last stages of completing undergraduate or postgraduate degrees. They were all between the ages of 20-40 (except for one in each context, who was older, but still socialized in host context). These interviews aimed to analyze how respondents' processes of identity construction and citizenship practice operate in conjunction with the host context and their individual biographies.

I solicited my respondents from many social networks, mindful of the dangers of utilizing too few networks or overusing snowball sampling. The method also reduces non-response bias, because referrals from trusted sources are involved.

The interviews aimed to: a) understand the experiences of respondents in terms of socio-economic and political assimilation and the effects of host society institutions on their

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assimilation; b) understand how the interviewees perceive their host society and host institutions, vis-à-vis their personal history of upward mobility; c) trace the biographies and life histories of the respondents to analyze the mechanisms by which these individuals came to be college educated and employed; d) analyze how they subsequently construct their sense of citizenship and national membership given host society conditions. Comparative lessons on socio-economic assimilation, as well as on the nature of national citizenship and political community in diverse societies will thus be drawn from the responses (See Appendix III: The Detailed Interview Guide).

This method promises several advantages in the study of citizenship, identity, and assimilation. Surveys cannot penetrate the experiences of subjects deeply, while interviews help to effectively capture the life-histories of respondents. Interviews also help study phenomena whose meanings are not sufficiently understood. After all, national belonging (like other identities) is an abstract phenomenon. A simple yes or no in a large quantitative survey does not yield results that are as clear, or full of meaning; moreover, the causal mechanism between the historical conceptions of nationhood—and other institutions—and an immigrant-origin individual's proclivity to belong to the nation can be ascertained best through such interviews. Such a method generates rich and detailed data and can accommodate responses flexibly and interactively. In sum, subjective viewpoints of respondents on their thinking processes and their perceptions of social mechanisms can be analyzed best through interviews (Marshall & Rossman 2006).

Another extremely important caveat when analyzing the scope and findings of this dissertation is that the approach taken in reporting conclusions is the Weberian ideal type

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approach. It takes the general and most common attributes of a phenomenon in order to simplify an analysis and to provide concise, precise, specific typologies (Weber 1968). Thus, the findings reported below are the median memes, narratives, experiences of the respondents, the ideal types constructed represent generalized conclusions based on the fact that an absolute majority of respondents spoke in the dominant paradigm described in each context. Some individuals of course reported opinions contrary to those of the overwhelming majority. However, in order to more simply demonstrate the difference between the two case studies (which should have a “sense of story [in their] presentation; see Creswell 2007: 218); and in order to present the views of the average respondent speaking in the given context’s hegemonic discourse, only the “ideal types” are presented (see the Appendix for a nuanced and complete breakdown of each respondent’s details).

II. C. Recruitment of Respondents. A certain amount of “soaking and poking” yielded an appropriate sample. “Snowball sampling” enabled me to ask appropriate respondents where to find other appropriate respondents. This method has the added advantage of being culturally-sensitive, as minority/immigrant respondents are often more difficult to come across and less willing to speak to interviewers. It also makes it easier to tap into social networks and reach otherwise unreachable populations. It also reduces non-response bias; because referrals from trusted sources are involved. In “Respondent-Driven Sampling,” a type of snowball sampling which was also used here, generalizability is further improved by establishing referral chains that are sufficiently long: respondents recruit peers, who recruit friends that qualify, and so on and so forth. A recruitment quota is set so that a few respondents cannot do all the recruiting (Heckathorn 2006). I combined these two approaches by receiving referrals directly from only about a plurality of the sample; and no more than 2 referrals by the same source were ever used.

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Thus, the dissertation sampled its respondents from as wide an array of networks as possible by limiting the number of referrals by each respondent, receiving referrals from only some of the respondents, and by varying the networks that were tapped into (as respondents were recruited from different social milieus).

My efforts to solicit respondents from a variety of sources widened the net. The pool of respondents was as diverse and as representative within each group as possible. I sought respondents partly through professional contacts, using university officials, professors, colleagues, and ethnic or political organizations as informants about relevant students who would then lead me to potential respondents. In the case of New York City, my own second generation undergraduate students at CUNY, as well as my work at the Dominican Studies Institute, allowed me into both young second generation Dominican and Dominican-American civil/political networks. I also inquired at local ethnic/professional associations. These normally tend to oversample the more fortunate or engaged members of a population (Heckathorn 2006), which is a problem for most studies; but not for mine, as this study seeks to reach the college-educated.

In sum, my contacts, the networks I entered into, chance personal encounters enabled by being in the field, college student associations, university and civic organization newsletters and email *listservs*, professional ethnic *listservs*, Facebook connections with ethnically active civic society actors, walk-ins to stores and associations, and ethnic-business phone directories all helped me recruit respondents from a wide net.


The author is a native Turkish speaker and a college-educated immigrant; this put my subjects at ease and facilitated communication in both cases, but especially in Berlin. In Berlin, in addition to my ease with my co-ethnics and their networks, and the hospitality of Turkish-

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German associations and politicians, I also profited from my many friends from Berlin, met through my study abroad at Humboldt University, and through my Berlin colleagues' stays in New York City at the Graduate Center. Moreover, living in a Turkish neighborhood in Berlin (NeuKölln), my observations on community life, my interactions with my local co-ethnics, as well as the use of a Turkish business phone book covering Berlin were all valuable sources of data. In addition my field observations as I lived with (in the Dominican second generation case taught and worked with) the two groups during my research: of course, I spent eight years in a Dominican neighborhood, while I was able to spend two summers in Kreuzberg/Neu Koelln, Berlin. I attended events, was immersed in community life, and had social networks of Turkish Germans and Dominican-Americans to draw from.

The respondents' class and gender backgrounds were comparable across countries and the variation in parents' class background was comparable as well. Each group from each country, in the aggregate, came from low socio-economic backgrounds; the class mix within the sample group in a given country was evenly distributed and in tune with the general statistical data concerning the immigrant community in the country. Many respondents were, as is the norm, the first college graduates in their immediate family. Most of them had, again as is the norm, parents who typically had only a few years of education in their home countries; worked working-class/menial jobs after emigrating; and had limited language skills and cultural capital appropriate to the new country.


Figure 1.



The Business Card that I used to solicit referrals from respondents, organizations, universities, and businesses. I left many copies at places where many Turkish-Germans, professionals, and college students pass through daily.

II.D. The Independent Variables and the Dependent Variable in the Study.

Figure 2.



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## APPENDIX III. THE DETAILED INTERVIEW GUIDE:

### Interview Guide/Questions

#### **Demographic Questionnaire:**

Where were you born?

When did you come to this country, if born abroad?

Where were your parents born?

When did they come to the US?

Where did you grow up?

What is your citizenship? Are you naturalized, or a citizen from birth? Dominican citizenship?

Did your parents have a college degree?

What jobs do/did your parents have?

Where did you get your college degree and in what field?

Where do you work? Full time?

How old are you?

Where do you live?

Are you married/dating? [To] A Dominican?

Would you say you are....?

- Working class
- Lower-middle class.
- Middle class .
- Upper-middle class
- Upper class

#### **INTERVIEW GUIDE**

**High School:** [Tell me about high school...] What was your high school education like?  
[Positive, negative, ok?...] ]

**Issues:** Discrimination, encouragement for college (teachers/parents/peers), fitting in socially, special programs for immigrants/multiculturalism? How did you get in, if a nice high school?

Teachers?

Any discrimination or high/low expectations?

What about academics? Did they have low expectations, or help you with college?

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**College:** What was your experience of getting into college like? What were your college years like?

How was your experience there?

Did you have non-Latino friends? Were they American born?

Identity before college?

Discrimination?

**Issues:** difficulty in getting in?, who helped with app.s?, making progress and graduating, discrimination, other Dominicans in college?, role models, social/ethnic life, interethnic social life, Can immigrants go to college and move up in society? Can they move up if they go to college?

**Job:** What role does being Dominican play in your job? [Does it hinder you? Is it an advantage?] How did you get your job? Was it difficult?

**Issues:** discrimination, accepted as equal by colleagues?, possible to move up?

Discrimination?

Recourse if discrimination perceived?

Diverse Workplace?

**D. National Identity: Do you feel that society at large treats you with respect and as one of them, as a regular American? Do you feel American? How do you feel about being American?**

**Issues:** National/Ethnic/Panethnic/Census/Racial Identity. Transnational Ties.

**PICK ONE IDENTITY THAT BEST DESCRIBES YOU:**

**Dominican/Dominican-American/Latino/American/New Yorker/Other**

**PICK TWO:**

**Why?**

-How are Dominicans perceived by Americans? Would it change if they were more prosperous as a group, or as time passes?

-Is American national identity open to immigrants or their children?

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- Do you go back to DR often/at all? How important/extensive are your ties to that country? (Phone contact, visits, sending money, etc.)
  - What do you think about America's general/historical attitude to immigrants?
  - Do you feel like this country has provided for you, helped you and your family?
  - How do you feel about America in general?
  - Do you feel that this is your country?
  - What does being American mean? Does it depend on the situation? How? When are you likely to feel, when not?
  - How do you identify yourself?
  - Do you feel like saying "We" when talking about Americans/America/American history?
  - Is this home?
  - Is America a nation of immigrants?

**Political Culture:**

Does the political culture of this society (explain) make you feel as if you belong? (*LOCAL and NATIONAL* political cultures). How do you feel a) the media, b) NY politicians, c) national politicians treat/talk about Dominicans/Latinos?

**Issues:** Government, media, politicians, different parties. City/Federal.

- Do you think diversity and multiculturalism are valued here in NY and the US?

**Political Incorporation:** Do you feel that you and Dominicans and Latinos are included in the political process?

- How much influence do you think Latinos and Dominicans have on politics? (On the city and national stage).
- Are you involved as a citizen?
- What does being an American citizen mean to you?
- Do you think citizens have any duties [to participate]?
- Do you think you have the same political or legal rights as the majority of your society? Are your interests represented in politics?
- Are there representatives of your ethnic group in government positions (including public service jobs like the police)? Can a Dominican, or a Latino, possibly become President one day?
- Are parties interested in increasing immigrant participation in politics? Is there a party that makes the effort to reach out to and provide services to immigrants? City/Federal.
- Do you vote? Belong to an organization?
- Do you feel strongly about political issues in this city/country? DR? [What issues, do you get involved?]
- Do you feel that you have the opportunity/power to make a difference in politics?

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-Do you feel equal to other citizens? [rights...] Why/Why not?

**Social and Cultural Incorporation:**

-Do you keep Dominican traditions?

-Which American traditions or aspects of culture do you practice?

-Do you speak Spanish? Do you prefer English or Spanish in your daily life? Which do you use more?

-How important do you think it is for everyone in this country to learn English?

-Do you eat Dominican food? Listen to Dominican music? Or do you eat American food or listen to American music?

-Do your values, habits, culture differ from those of your parents'? How?

-Will you take your children, if you're thinking of having children, to DR?

-Teach them Spanish?

-Eat Dominican food with them?

-How important is it for immigrants and their children to blend into mainstream society, culturally, linguistically? How important is it for them to maintain their distinct separate culture?

-Are you married/dating? What ethnic background is this person from? Do you think it's acceptable for you, your family, and society for you to intermarry? Do people in your family/your friends intermarry (with non-Dominicans, non-Latinos)? Does it matter to you?

-What neighborhood do you live in? Is it an ethnic neighborhood? If it's a mainstream/non-ethnic neighborhood, are there others of your background that live there? Do you feel that your neighbors accept you?

-What ethnic background are your closest friends from?

**The City as Context:**

Is there anything special about this city that affects whether you feel included or whether you belong?

**Overall, how integrated do you feel that you are? (Integrated means that you do not feel like, or you are not treated like, an outsider; you function very well in the social, economic, and cultural life of this society; you feel at home).**

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#### **APPENDIX IV: THE LOGIC OF HOW FINDINGS WERE REACHED AFTER ANALYSIS OF DATA**

In terms of answers they gave to my questions, there was little diversity of thought in kind (although differences of slight degrees existed). In each occasion, on each topic, there were only a few starkly different answers in each context out of tens of interviews. Therefore, when the text refers to respondents' opinions by using phrases such as "Most respondents think that...;" "My/The respondents in Berlin argue that...," or "Almost all respondents conceptualize Germanness as...," the study wishes to convey that the opinions described are the generalized, majority/super-majority, even consensus views that are shared by the greater part of the sample. These opinions are in a way so-called "median views." When the study makes such generalizations, it refers to the clearly dominant perspective in a context.

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