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A

COGNITIVE AND MORAL EVALUATIONS OF LIES AND DECEPTION

by

PHYLLIS GREENFIELD

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York

2002

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
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Abstract

COGNITIVE AND MORAL EVALUATIONS OF LIES AND DECEPTION

By

Phyllis Greenfield

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This research explores how lies and deception are comprehended and evaluated. To that end, the statements and interpretations of 57 male and 54 female Brooklyn College students of diverse cultural and religious backgrounds were analyzed. They read eight short stories and open-ended questions that involved various forms of deceit. Carol Gilligan (1993), in response to the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, has asserted that two modes of moral reasoning exist. These are care, seen as the primary focus for women, and justice seen as the primary focus for men. The variables of care and justice were embedded in the rationales given for the deceit of the protagonists in the stories presented to the participants. Care and justice, as well as gender, were variables of particular interest. Through a series of questionnaires the following variables were addressed: cultural orientation (individualism and

collectivism), religion, level of religious observance, high and low Machiavellianism and feminine and masculine orientations. These variables were explored in order to obtain judgments about lies in general as well as judgments of omission versus commission lies. Within the context of the presented vignettes, deception was seen as generally more wrong than right. A significant disparity was found between males and females with males judging deception as more right and females judging deception as more wrong. A main effect was evidenced for omission versus commission. However, when asked specific open-ended questions, most participants reported that it was "OK to lie" and that the truth need not always be told. There was support for distinctive forms of care versus justice reasoning but there was no support for the claim that the justice/care paradigm is gender based or based on the sex roles of masculinity and femininity. The use of either care or justice as a rationale for moral reasoning was equally distributed across gender and across sex-role orientation. Participants were, overall, more care oriented.

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Introduction:

This research explores how lies and deception are comprehended and evaluated. To that end, the statements and interpretations of individuals reading short stories that involve various forms of deceit are studied. Carol Gilligan (1993), in response to the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, has pointed out that both of these psychologists accepted the behavior of males as the basis for a single standard of cognitive and moral development. She states that in Piaget's account of the moral judgment of the child, he barely mentions girls at all, while for Kohlberg, when formulating his theory, "females simply do not exist" (p.18). She believes that there is more than one framework available for making moral evaluations and talks about distinct differences between men and women's thought processes with respect to morality. This can be viewed as part of a broader movement in cultural psychology that considers the possibility of distinctive, culturally based forms of cognition. Gilligan sees development as proceeding along two different but intersecting paths, where women's morality is based on a system of relationships, compassion and "care," while men's morality stresses individual rights and "justice." This approach provides the basis for

distinguishing between distinctive, gender based evaluations of deception.

The cognitive and moral evaluation of lies and deception is studied as an extension of the perspectives of Piaget, Kohlberg and Gilligan. The variable of gender is a major focus. It is expected that males and/or those high on masculinity will reflect a justice driven rationale for understanding and evaluating lying. Females and/or those measuring high on femininity will reflect a care orientation for understanding and evaluating lying. These unique orientations may yield different cognitive assessments and moral evaluations of lies presented within the context of stories.

This study is about lying, recognized as a common occurrence by all. Parents teach their children that lying is bad and that the truth must be told (at least to them). Spouses and lovers feel it is their due. Conversely, social psychologists often see deception as necessary for the greater good of their research. Politicians are never believed, yet we are offended when they are caught in a lie! Résumé's are enhanced. Confessions are considered foolish and self-destructive. Quick and "creative" thinking is admired even when it strays far from the truth. The hold this subject has on individuals, be they aware of it or not,

is worthy of greater study and attention from psychology.

One of the primary reasons we lie is to exercise control and survive in a social world. Ekman (1989) talks about the need to exercise power over others by controlling the information the person being lied to has. DePaulo and Kashy (1998) in a study of everyday lies found that most lies were told for psychological reasons. That is, people lied about their feelings so they could control the esteem and affection of other people. Because people are social beings, survival in a social world can amount to ultimate survival. People need to make their way through an obstacle course of opinions and attitudes that result in a balance of control. We can control others by altering their opinions, attitudes and behavior. If we present ourselves in the desired light (truthfully or deceptively), we have an easier time shifting the balance, giving ourselves greater control and greater chances of survival. Langer (1983) also postulates that people are motivated to control their environment. Some of the explanations social scientists have given for the need to be in control are: a need for competence, an instinct to master one's environment, a striving for superiority or a striving for personal causation.

In this study, the focus of attention is on the cognitive perception and moral evaluation of lying. This

aspect has been relatively ignored in academic psychology. The most prominent mass of research in contemporary psychological literature on lying is concerned with lie detection. This is explored from many perspectives: The effect of experience at lie detection in recognizing the liar (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986); profession of the detector (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991); detection of leakage of true affect from the liar (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979); nonverbal leakage: clues to deception through body movements or facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1974b; Ekman, Friesen & O'Sullivan, 1988); vocal cues to deception (Scherer, Feldstein, Bond & Rosenthal, 1985); reading cue leakage from both prepared and spontaneous lies and between emotional concealment lies and lies about factual information (Greene, O'Hair, Cody & Yen, 1985); the adeptness of nonverbally sensitive people at detecting deception (Littlepage, Maddox & Pineault, 1985); verbal, facial, and paralinguistic cues to detection of deception (Littlepage & Pineault, 1984); the recognition and effects of deception through inhibition of truthful behavior and its results in physiological response (Pennebaker & Chew, 1985). Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi & Buslig (1999) postulate that a highly reliable and stable set of deception clues may not exist. As circumstances become more interactive, the deceiver adapts to the receiver's style and expectations and is more likely to be

believed. This is only a small sampling of the research on lie detection. Emphasis on recognition and detection makes sense in light of our behaviorist heritage, because we then have something concrete to measure and control. However, cognitive psychology is our current standard. It allows us to delve more deeply into the internal working of the mind. Research from this perspective rarely addresses the subject of lying.

In this study, not only gender is addressed. Other factors get consideration as well. These include level of religious observance, cultural background, and Machiavellianism. In addition to these subject variables, lies and deceptions that are acts of omission versus commission are manipulated to see if this distinction makes a difference in people's evaluations. Our subject pool comes from a variety of religious backgrounds that adhere to the scriptures of their religions more and less strictly. A difference in the approach to deception between more observant and less observant individuals is expected. It is predicted that those who practice their religion more strictly will condemn falsehoods to a greater degree than those who do not, and that more religious subjects approach lying and deception as breaches of justice rather than care. Country of origin separates groups of people to a great extent. These separations are expected to lead to different

outlooks regarding justice and care as bases for moral evaluation. Specifically, the concepts of individualism and collectivism, as they relate to these cultures, are observed. Individualist cultures stress autonomy, emotional independence, individual initiative, a right to privacy and primacy of personal goals over in-group goals. Collectivist cultures emphasize emotional dependence, in-group solidarity, harmony, duties and obligations. Western countries, such as the United States, England and Australia are primarily individualistic. Eastern countries like China and Japan are collectivistic (Uleman, Lee & Roman, 1995). It is expected that people from individualistic cultures will display a stronger justice orientation in their evaluation of deception. Those from collectivistic cultures should display a stronger care orientation.

Reber (1985) defines Machiavellianism as "...a pattern of behaviors including manipulation of others through guile, deviousness, deception and opportunism with the increase of power and control as the central motive." In line with the notion that the lie is motivated by a desire to control, those high in this trait are expected to be more comfortable using deception and see it as justified in many situations, using a justice rather than a care orientation.

Wilson, Near & Miller (1996) cite Humphrey, who sees Machiavellianism as a type of social intelligence that is

not entirely selfish and that helps hold society together. (Machiavellianism is not correlated with intelligence as measured by IQ scores, grade point averages, etc.) Humphrey believes, Machiavellianism is used, from an evolutionary perspective, by one partner to identify with the needs and goals of the other and make them one's own. It is tempered with sympathy. Wilson, Near & Miller reject this approach, finding that the definition of Machiavellianism becomes too broad. Should Humphrey's definition be accepted, Machiavellianism would also fit into the care perspective discussed in this paper. However, I am in agreement with Wilson et. al. (1996) and see Machiavellianism, measured by the Mach Scale, as basically following a justice orientation. Wilson et. al. (1996) see high-Machs as less empathic and less likely to help in an emergency unless they can benefit in some way. Low-Machs will lie and cheat as well, but usually do so at the urging of a partner. They are more motivated by the emotional aspects of the relationship, evidencing a more care-oriented outlook.

Christie and Geis find that those rated high Machs have a "cool detachment" that makes them less emotionally attached to others and to emotional issues. Wilson et. al. (1996), cite the literature which indicates that the construct of Machiavellianism is more appropriate for males than for females. This does not mean that women are not

manipulative, but differ in their style of manipulation.

The nature of lying

Lying forms part of the larger category of deception. For Hartshorne & May (1928), in their classic study of school children and deceit, the essential factor in deception is circumventing the will of another by misleading the other. Bok (1978), in her book, *Lying: Moral choice in public and private life*, stated that when deception is intentional, we communicate messages meant to mislead and make others believe what we ourselves do not believe. This can be done through gesture, disguise, action, inaction and even through silence. Ekman (1989) does not appear to make a sharp distinction between lying and deception. He feels that concealing the truth is a lie because it is an attempt to mislead. He considers cheating to be a lie as well. This broad definition is not shared by everyone. Bok (1979) defines a lie as "...any intentionally deceptive method which is stated." It can be verbal, written, sign language or even smoke signals, but it must be explicitly expressed. Hartshorne & May (1928) find difficulty with the word *intent*. They write, "If lying is defined as misstatement of fact with intent to deceive, it becomes at once very difficult to test because intentions are not directly known. But if lying is regarded only as making a false statement

instead of a true statement when the truth is known to the one making the statement, it is not so difficult to measure" (p.94). What they describe is something workable in what was the beginning of the behaviorist tradition, but is a relatively bare bones definition, devoid of the richness available in the cognitive, motivational and emotional/affective paradigms.

Intention is either suggested or directly included in definitions of more modern researchers. Knapp & Comadena (1979) report that many studies of deception operationalize a lie as "the conscious alteration of information a person believes to be true in order to significantly change another's perceptions from what the deceiver thought they would be without the alteration" (p.271). However, they feel deceptive acts are relative and should be defined according to the context in which they appear. They do not necessarily consider put-ons, false praise, or euphemisms and exaggerations to be lies. Ford, King and Hollender (1988) who speak from a psychodynamic perspective say that the essential element of a lie is its conscious falsity (distinguishing the liar from the misinformed), its intent to deceive and a preconceived goal or purpose. I believe that the last part of this definition may be debatable. Lies can be spontaneous, as in a sudden confrontation. Preconception may be questionable and not necessarily a

function of all lies. They speak about self-deception, as well as about pathological liars whose lies are easily verified and used where they serve no overt purpose.

Lies appear necessary for the smooth and efficient operation of the community. But, in addition, they may serve an even more important purpose, control by the individual in order to gain desired ends with a minimum of resistance. Overt lies are those that fit Bok's definition and can be considered lies of commission. They are clearly stated in some way and are meant to make others believe untruths. Deception, however, can occur in other ways. Information may be hidden or withheld. The truth may not be stated directly, giving others false impressions. These are acts of omission. Although not technically considered lies, their effects are the same, with others believing intended untruths. For this study, both acts of commission and omission are explored. Of the eight scenarios presented, four feature deceptive acts involving omission and four feature lies of commission. Do lies of commission elicit different reaction from lies of omission? What is the moral judgment of different groups regarding these different forms of deception? Of special interest, because of the lack of prior research, the interaction of individuals with the reasons that are provided as a rationale for the deception, like protecting oneself, for personal gain, etc. will be

studied with the variables care, justice, collectivism and individualism in mind. 11

The moral and practical justifications for lying

Although our society, as a whole, views lies negatively, they are quite commonplace and often considered viable and even desired options. Physicians may rationalize the ineffectiveness of truth, saying that in medicine, because the whole truth can never be known, it does not matter if we lie when there is a good reason for doing so (Bok '78; DePaulo & Rosenthal '79). Placebos are used to placate patients. Severity of illness may not be revealed, lest the patient gets worse after hearing the news. In politics, we see a long history of deception. Machiavelli in The Prince, written in 1513 (1952), earnestly spoke of the need for deception by rulers who require power and control. He said that treaties must be broken when it benefits the ruler. But, we must disguise this breach of faith. One must be a "great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived" (p.25). Individuals in certain social settings not only accept the telling of lies, but derogate those who tell the truth. Skill at lying is valued. Those in "tough" neighborhoods feel justified when

lying to parole officers, as do captives in a military setting (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Ford, King & Hollender, 1988). Often these lies take on life and death importance. Those in "ivy covered towers" are also embroiled in the controversy over deception, with researchers asking if social science experimentation should be more honest (Bok, 1978; Elms, 1982; Kelman, 1982; Milgram, 1974).

Despite specific instances where lying is rationalized, in this society, it is generally considered to be wrong. Bok (1978) says that, if you could not count on what was said or intimated, all information exchanged would be worthless. Action and choice would be subverted. Some trust must exist for communication to occur. When lied to about specific things, we no longer know when we are told the truth by others and become wary of all communication. Lies also do harm to the liars themselves undermining their integrity, looking at those who are lied to with a new caution. If found out, one's credibility and respect are damaged. Once the lie is discovered, the power of the liar is decreased. Major life decisions can be made on false information. This can be emotionally devastating. Ford, King & Hollender (1988) quote Moustakas (1962), "When we are not honest we are not there." Hartshorne & May (1928) also wrote about the alienation of the deceiver, saying "... the person who is deceiving others is cut off from them

psychically rather than physically and even while going about his daily occupations may be far more removed from genuine personal contact with those whom he is deceiving than the captured thief from his captors. This double life hampers the development of an organized self more than does antisocial behavior which is kept in the open" (p.24). Ekman (1989) simply says we need truth and the trust it brings because life is too complicated otherwise. We would always have to verify and never know what to expect. Solomon (1993) considers trust, not as a moral principle, but as being very personal in nature. The undermining of this trust is the reason for not lying. Breach of trust is a *betrayal*.

How and why children lie

In *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1964), Piaget asserts that young children (generally around seven) take no account of intentions when making verbal appraisals of other's wrong doing. (He stresses that in these theoretical stories, *verbal judgments*, rather than behavior, were required. However, when children relate their personal experiences, they may indeed show that intentions are fully taken into consideration.) He found that younger children measure the gravity of a lie in terms of the falseness of statements, by how far it strays from the truth. In one

study children of 6-7 were told 2 stories. 1) A child is frightened by a dog and tells his mother it was as big as a cow. 2) A child tells his mother good grades were gotten when, in fact, no grades were gotten at all. The youngsters felt lie #1 was naughtiest because it was most unrealistic.

The 10-year-old reports that lie #2 is worse because it is understood that the dog as big as a cow is an exaggeration, joke or error. Around the age of seven, objective responsibility is in play: acts are judged both in terms of their exact conformity with rules established by authority and in terms of their material results. By the age of nine, reasoning has progressed and children consider the motives of the act: subjective responsibility. For example, Piaget told two stories. In one, a boy purposely gives a man the wrong directions, but the man does not get lost. In the other story, the boy believes he knows the way and shares this with the man. The man follows the directions and gets lost. The younger children believed the mistaken boy in the second story was more wrong because of the negative material results. Older children took intention into account and stated that the boy who purposely misled the man was more wrong, even though no physical harm came of it. Up to age 10, the two types of answers can exist side-by-side or even within the same child. Piaget did not use data from children under 6 because of their perceived intellectual

limitations.

Often, when it comes to judging lies, the child surpasses the adult in his condemnation of the act. Piaget reasons that adults scold according to the extent of damage caused by a material act, but may not judge the act a moral fault. The child does not seem to differentiate the "legal" or "police" aspect from the moral. What happens is that the rules imposed by the adult, whether explicitly stated or implied through anger, for example, constitute categorical obligations for the child. "They thus acquire the value of ritual necessities, and the forbidden things take on the significance of taboos. Moral realism would thus seem to be the fruit of constraint and of the primitive forms of unilateral respect" (p.135). Piaget states that there is a lag between theoretical judgments (verbal, abstract thought) and concrete (practical) evaluations because the former has to reconstruct symbolically operations that have taken place on the preceding level. Because the child first learns objective responsibility, it becomes his or her foundation and reappears on each fresh occasion. In other words, previous issues which have been resolved through experience and maturity may reappear on the verbal plane when the child is being questioned. Even adults, if not given sufficient opportunity to think through the situation, will regress and judge a neighbor's actions more harshly than their own.

For Piaget, the tendency to "lie" (i.e., depart from reality) is natural in the child insofar as it is an essential part of his egocentric thought and his or her representation of reality. A problem is presented due to the clash between the child's egocentric thought and the moral constraint of the adult. Many very young children (around 6) define a lie as a "naughty word." The child is also aware that certain untruths are lies, but seems to be unable to distinguish between naughty words and expressions of deceit. And although aware of the difference between intentional versus unintentional statements, the child puts no stress on it. Piaget concludes that for the child, "to tell a lie is to commit a moral fault by means of language. And using naughty words also constitutes a fault committed by means of language" (p.142). Parents react similarly when the child tells untruths and when s/he brings in naughty words from the street. The child connects the two. Wimmer, Gruber & Perner (1984) found that young children (4-6) included mistakenly false messages (where a speaker has been intentionally misinformed by a third party who erroneously passes this information on to someone else) in their definition of lying, supporting Piaget's claims that lies are equated by children with all false assertions. Piaget (1965) believes that in practice, children (6-10) can more or less distinguish between an intentional act and an

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involuntary error. At around the age of 3 the idea of intention appears (with the first "whys"). Yet for the next few years the child does not distinguish between intentional actions and others as clearly as we do. He or she "fails to dissociate involuntary, unconscious and mechanical movements from conscious psychological action" (p. 144). Piaget doubts the child of 6-7 can distinguish an involuntary error from an intentional lie. At this age, the distinction is, at best, in the process of forming. Around the age of 8, the equivalence of mistakes and lies disappears. At the age of 10-11 they find what they consider to be the correct definition of a lie: any statement that is intentionally false. Older children (10-12) regard lying as wrong because truthfulness is necessary to reciprocity and mutual agreement. While younger children regard a lie as worse when it is beyond belief, older ones regard it as worse when it is believed. It can be seen that Piaget has taken his stage theory of cognitive development and applied it to moral development as well. Other research later amplified on the development of an appreciation for intentionality.

Kohlberg's extension of Piaget's theory of moral development

While Piaget concentrated his efforts on the values of younger children, Kohlberg (1969) extended and revised these theories, applying them to those who have reached

adolescence and beyond. He found that moral development did not stop at age 12. While Piaget saw two kinds of morality - the heteronomous morality of obedience and the morality of justice and cooperation, Kohlberg saw moral thinking as progressing through a sequence of three moral levels, each of which was composed of two stages (Turiel, 1983).

In the first level (preconventional), morality is external. The individual follows rules imposed by authority. Obedience to these rules imposed is based on fear and caution (Turiel, 1983). Kohlberg (1969) says that in Stage I, the individual is interested in avoiding punishment. Consequences are important. The seriousness of an act is determined by material damage, physical form of the act (e.g. size of the lie), or by degree of punishment. In Stage II of the first level, rules are followed if they are in one's personal interest. Reciprocity is determined by how one will benefit in the end. An action is right if it satisfies the self's needs or occasionally the needs of another. In this stage, *intent* becomes a determination of the seriousness of an act.

In the second level (conventional), performing good and right roles, following rules and expectations of others is valued. In Stage III, one's orientation is to gain approval, to help and to please others. The seriousness of a lie is determined by the motives of the individual. It is

not bad if there was an altruistic reason for it. It is not good if there was a selfish reason. In Stage IV of this level, there is a regard for social order and the desire to preserve it. A lie is bad if it violates rules and does calculable harm to others. Authority is important.

In the third level (postconventional), values are internalized and one is committed to a set of principles. The lie is seen as bad if it causes one to lose the respect of the community or to lose self-respect. In Stage V, the social contract is important. The majority will and welfare is stressed. In Stage VI, universal ethical principles are important. The belief is in conscience, mutual respect and trust. An act that causes one to go against general, self-chosen principles is wrong.

The degree of obedience or betrayal of values within each stage is seen as a measure of morality. Intent is likewise measured by its adherence to or departure from the rules within each stage. Like Piaget, Kohlberg used hypothetical stories and asked subjects to make moral decisions. However, it was not the actual decision that interested him, but the cognitive processes used to come to those decisions. Kohlberg did not claim that these stories had predictive value. They were used, primarily, to describe judgments. Turiel (1983), states that Kohlberg, through his stages, has attempted to elaborate a system that

takes into account relations between components believed to be relevant to the structure of moral judgments. These components are "law, conscience and decision, affectional relations, authority and civic order roles, civil rights, contract-promise-trust, punishment, life property rights and rules, truth and sexual roles" (p.154). In addition, Kohlberg (1969) saw these stages as universal and applicable to people regardless of culture and gender.

Gilligan's extension of Kohlberg's theory of moral development

Carol Gilligan (1983) addresses the different views of morality by men and women. She criticizes Piaget, who saw morality as a system of rules and the respect one has in following them. She also takes exception to Kohlberg's views. Gilligan states that Kohlberg sees the highest form of morality in terms of justice in the form of equality in a democratic society, a rights-based moral system. It is *situation* independent. Gilligan et. al. (1990), on the other hand, sees the *situation* as crucial. Moral reasoning cannot rely on logic alone. There is a difference between hypothetical problem solving and actual life choices. Gilligan believes that Kohlberg's reasoning did not adequately measure the care ethic which she sees women possessing to a greater extent than men, whom she sees as

primarily following a justice ethic (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). Gilligan suggests that there is a gender bias in these findings, rather than interpreting the data as indicating that men are more morally mature than women. For Gilligan, men and women follow different orientations, different voices. Men's relationships tend to follow a hierarchical order. They subscribe to a morality of rights.

Women value interpersonal connections, care, sensitivity and responsibility towards others (Muuss, 1988). Gilligan (1993) gives an illustration to contrast Kohlberg's approach, that morality is learned through role-taking which arises in the course of resolving disputes in rule-bound games, with a study by Janet Lever (1976) reporting that girl's games do not allow for this. Traditional girl's games like jump rope and hopscotch are turn-taking games that usually do not lead to disputes requiring judgments of right and wrong. In Lever's study, girls reported that if a quarrel broke out, they ended the game. The girls subordinated the continuation of the game in favor of continuing the relationship. Boys, on the other hand, may continue the conflict, with the conflict itself becoming the game.

While Kohlberg's theory has been criticized by many (Helwig, 1997) for not fully capturing the moral reasoning of women and for downgrading it to a lower stage (III) than

that of men (IV), Helwig (1997) also cites studies that refute Gilligan's assertions of gender differences in Kohlberg's moral states. Gender differences have been confounded with variables like education, occupation and social class. Context played a role in judgments by gender. Gilligan (1993) acknowledges that gender alone is not sufficient to explain differences between the male and female orientation of justice and care. She states that "these differences arise in social context where factors of social status and power combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males and females" (p.2). Sex differences were reported to disappear when occupation and education were controlled. In the present study, these confounds were controlled because those participating are all college students. Also, we use the Bem Sex Role Inventory to see if gender alone is a sufficient indicator of the "care" or "Justice" perspective, or if a feminine or a masculine orientation is also a predictor of the 'care" and "justice" outlook. In order to change context, lies of omission and lies of commission are varied.

Both Piaget and Kohlberg accepted the behavior of males as their standard. Gilligan sees inherent differences between the male and female thought processes and sees moral development as proceeding along two different but intersecting paths, with different implications for an

understanding of the motivational bases for lying. Generally, for a woman, the more hurtful a lie is the more wrong it is. She sees woman's morality as based on a system of human relationships, compassion, care and empathy. Men's morality stresses rights and justice. Gilligan et. al. (1990), from empirical observations, have seen that life experiences change perspective for both men and women. "Everyone by virtue of being human, is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment and the moral injunctions of justice and care - not to act unfairly toward others and not to turn away from someone in need" (p.218).

How and why adults lie

Many theorists distinguish between a number of motivations for lying. People lie in order to test or challenge authority, or to show that they can (the power lie), to maintain privacy and to increase their status. Self-aggrandizement is an example, showing you are an expert in the field, "helping" and "protecting," in order to make one more powerful than one really is. Those with more information are more powerful and in control. One wants to look good to oneself and/or to others and to gain status, respect and admiration (Ekman, 1989). Saarni & Lewis (1993) state that lies serve as illusions that make us feel good about ourselves.

Ford, King & Hollender (1988) see lies as a way to devalue another person in an effort to assert one's superiority. One lies to get something that could not be gotten otherwise or that would take too much effort to get otherwise. The liar is motivated to gain something. Bok (1978) states the liar trusts s/he can make good use of the lie and the power it brings. Cognitively, (Ekman, 1989) the liar reserves the choice to lie for him or herself, while insisting others be honest. Or, people may rationalize that others lie to them, so they can feel free to lie in turn. People lie to protect themselves or others in trouble and to keep them from harm. They lie to avoid creating awkward situations and to avoid embarrassment. They lie to keep from doing something unpleasant. Specific personality types lie for different reasons. Ford, King & Hollender (1988) report that someone who operates with a hysteric cognitive style is dominated by intuition, immediacy, suggestibility and emotionality; details are unimportant. Lies occur because the person pays little attention to accuracy. The truth is defined by what feels right at the moment. The obsessive-compulsive style involves emotional constriction and a preoccupation with minutiae. Secrecy is the form of untruth used here. Goleman, in *Vital Lies, Simple Truths* (1985) states that we lie to avoid feelings of anxiety. People lie for the protection of the self, and to cope with

difficult situations (Solomon, 1993). Someone is more motivated to succeed in a lie if the consequences of getting caught are great and if they are very involved in the belief (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979). Bok (1978) points out that lies obscure alternatives. People are unable to make choices for themselves using the most adequate information available. They add power to the liar and take it from the one lied to.

This gives further credence to the hypothesis that lies aid greatly in the individual's ability to control his or her environment. Often, deceivers and deceived collaborate in order to meet their own needs and values. Knapp & Comadena (1979) give the example of the hostess who knows her guest is lying about enjoying her dinner party. She recognizes that the intent is to avoid unpleasantness and shares in the desires of her guest.

Bok (1978) makes a distinction between the *moral domain* and the domain of *truth and falsity in general*. The moral domain involves the *intention* to mislead. She feels that not all lies are prohibited. But, in any situation when a lie is a possible choice, one must seek truthful alternatives. If a lie or the truth appear to achieve the same result or are as desirable to the person contemplating the lie, go with the truth. Only when a lie is a last resort can one consider whether or not it is morally justified. Although this is a simple solution, it will

eliminate many lies told out of carelessness, habit or unexamined good intentions.

Gender and deception

Previous studies of lying and deception have uncovered differences in attitude and behavior between the sexes. For example, Ward & Beck (1990) report sex differences in dishonest behavior. They claim that women have been socialized to be more honest than men. However, women do cheat when confronted with temptation. They refer to the "techniques of neutralization," part of a Sykes and Matza study of delinquency (1957) to explain why the women were able to violate norms in which they believe. They see these techniques as excuses which free one to commit deviant acts: 1) denying responsibility for one's actions, 2) denial that anyone was hurt by the actions, 3) claiming the victim deserved what has happened, 4) focusing attention on those who are critical of the actions, and 5) pointing out the greater good of the actions. Ward & Beck tested college students by having them grade their own midterms. A questionnaire was previously administered to them that incorporated a techniques of neutralization scale for these subjects. They found that for men, there was no difference in cheating between those rated high and those rated low on the scale. The women who rated low on the scale were found

to have cheated less than those rated high, demonstrating that cheating for women is more highly correlated with the need to provide a rationale. Men, who are not as socialized to obey rules, do not need excuses provided by the techniques of neutralization.

Are women more truthful than men? DePaulo, Epstein & Wyer (1993) illustrate how women are more adept than men in making relationships more intimate and meaningful. Deceit, on the other hand, builds barriers to intimacy and can erode the closeness and affection that women value. In their review of a study on gender and lying (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Epstein, Wyer, & Hairfield, 1991), they found that after requesting that their participants keep a diary of all the lies told during social interactions, both men and women reported that they told about 2 lies a day, demonstrating that women do not deal with the dilemma of deception by simply refraining from lying. They reviewed two other studies (Bell, 1991; DePaulo & Bell, 1992) in which actual behavior was studied when participants talked to an artist about her work. First the participants told the experimenters which paintings they liked the least and the most. The art student (a confederate) they spoke to then "revealed" that one of the paintings was hers. The experimenters created a number of difficult interpersonal situations to see if the subjects would stray from the

truth. When urged not to hurt the artists' feelings, the women in the study exaggerated their liking for the painting they originally did not like, demonstrating their current insincerity. Observers did see the women as less sincere than the men. They also described themselves as less sincere in certain situations than the men did. In these two studies, it appears that women do stretch the truth. Women's lies appear to be of a more supportive and relational nature than men's, corroborating Gilligan's contention that women are more concerned than men about how their behavior will affect the feelings of others.

However, when not invested emotionally, there is no evidence that in contextualizing the moral dimension of their action women's lies are more obvious than men's although, after the lie, they report that they continue to feel uncomfortable, whereas men reported feeling less distressed than when actively telling the lie. In a survey of serious lies that were told by them and to them (DePaulo et. al. 1993) women appeared more engaged (perhaps embittered) by these experiences and more upset by them than men. Women tended to plan lies to close friends more carefully than to strangers, while men did the opposite. Females tended to accept the behavior of others, even when these others were lying, more so than men. DePaulo, Epstein & Wyer (1993) feel that there is a greater need for women to

be accommodating to their own perceptions than to be correct. If, for example, someone wants to be viewed negatively, that is how a woman will view him or her! It was found that women are better than men at judging someone if the truth is being told, but no better, or even worse, if the person is lying. Women attend more to facial expressions (easiest to control when lying) than do men, again evidencing this accommodating pattern. DePaulo, Epstein & Wyer (1993) report studies in which girls, as young as 3, have learned to alter their emotional expression in order to be accommodating and telegraph desired feelings. These studies appear to support Gilligan's contention that women remain aware of and care about how their behavior will influence others. The need to maintain a connection ("care" orientation) seems to extend beyond the boundaries of truth. Men, on the other hand, value a more "justice" driven, objective and goal oriented reality, taking less account of the interpersonal factors.

Culture and Lying

Caughey (1984) defines culture as a conceptual system of rules, beliefs, and values that influence the way people behave. Do people of different cultures share the same concept of moral behavior? Kohlberg's theory purports cross-cultural universality in the development of moral

reasoning. Snarey (1985), in a review of Kohlbergian research reported that forty-five studies of moral development, carried out in 27 countries was sufficient for him to consider with acceptable confidence the validity of Kohlberg's claim for the cultural universality of his model and method. He found Kohlberg's stories relatively culture fair when they were creatively adapted and translated in the participant's native language. He did find studies citing cultural differences in the choices of different ethnic groups when judging Kohlberg's stories, but saw that reasoning behind these choices was generally universal. He found that stage skipping and stage regression was rare. Gender was analyzed as a subculture. When applicable studies were considered, very few researchers found significant differences in the way males and females viewed and evaluated moral dilemmas. For example, seventeen cross-cultural studies covering fifteen countries included both males and females. In fourteen of these studies there was no significant difference. Of the three that showed a significant sex difference, only in one case (England) was there a clear sex difference favoring males. Snarey states that a less reliable scoring system may have contributed to the significant results of these three studies. In those where differences were found, men almost always reached a "higher" stage using Kohlberg's rationale than did women.

Phinney (1996), Triandis (1966) and others find a theme running through stereotypic descriptions of ethnic (cultural) groups. It is the difference between individualism and collectivism that distinguishes the values of North Americans and Western Europeans from the cultures of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Western groups emphasize the importance of the individual over the group and they value independence and autonomy. Individuals give priority to personal goals regardless of their compatibility to goals of the group. Many Non-Western countries give emphasis to the group over the individual and view persons as interdependent and connected. Individual goals are fine if they are compatible with the goals of the group. Triandis (1996) is attempting to find a place for contemporary psychology within the various cultures. In order to do this, he speaks about *cultural syndromes*. He defines a cultural syndrome as "a pattern of shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, self-definitions, norms, role definitions and values that is organized around a theme that can be identified among those who speak a particular language, during a specific historic period, and in a definable geographic region" (p.408). Some examples of these syndromes include:

a. *Collectivism*, which stresses the self as part of a

collective. Personal goals are subordinated to those of the group. Duties and obligations to others are stressed.

- b. *Individualism* defines the self as independent and autonomous. Personal goals are a priority. Enjoyable consequences of one's actions are valued. If a relationship is too costly, it is dropped.

Vertical and Horizontal Relationships define the importance of hierarchy. The vertical dimension represents power and achievement. The horizontal dimension represents benevolence and universalism. These are considered, by Triandis, to be the two most important aspects of individualism and collectivism. Individualist can measure high or low on either the vertical or horizontal dimension, as can collectivists. Vertical and Horizontal relationships will only be observed informally in the present study.

Solomon (1996) questions the absolute value of truth over deception, pointing out that in some alternative cultural settings (reminiscent of Gilligan's distinction between men and woman regarding their justice and care orientation) social harmony is given more import than simple truth telling. Telling people what they want to hear rather than stating the "truth," is not only permitted, but expected. Honesty is considered to be just one virtue among

many. In China, the "self" is social and interdependent. Showing respect for others, playing one's role and getting along are all more important than telling the truth. Various forms of deception are so important in helping to maintain satisfactory working and social relationships "that blanket condemnation of interpersonal dishonesty is morally naïve" (p.12). Solomon also points out that the truth can be used as a weapon. Children may call out names using the truth to hurt and humiliate. Although lying is currently considered to be wrong by both laymen and philosophers, Westerners are more apt to use deception in spite of their theoretical abhorrence of it. Solomon believes that Westerners, despite their belief in independence and autonomy, share more interdependent traits with cultures like the Chinese than they would like to believe.

Znakov (1997) reports that in the former Soviet Union there was a lack of scientific interest in the subject of truthfulness among Russians because work on this subject could not get published. Now that there is considerably more access to Western psychological literature, the difference between Russians and Westerners in the area of deception is apparent. He talks about the Russian "splitting of the psyche into three parts: We think one thing; we say another; and we do a third" (p.80). He blames the Russian revolution's destruction of the aristocracy and

of religion for destroying the ideas that lying and dishonesty were against a code of honor and/or were sinful. Lying and deception became necessary for survival. What constituted a lie was also changed. For example, statements of allegiance to communist ideals became routine, despite citizen's real feelings. Deceptions became mindless actions. Znakov states that in the United States, the Constitution guarantees civil rights. There was no such guarantee in the Soviet Union, as there is no concept of having one's rights violated by deception. Also, for the Russians, if a lie was seen as morally correct, that is, one that is used in order to save someone or a lie for a good reason, it has a positive value. The idea that a citizen had a basic right to the truth did not exist and government lies were seen, by most Russians, as a way of shielding the populace from harm, and of serving a higher good. Znakov says this last concept, the serving of a higher good, is key to understanding how Russians understand truth and lies. For example, if one does not trust the system, it is right to lie if it leads to a just outcome. Russians acknowledge that telling of lies is common in their society. Even with the fall of the Soviet Union, the legacy of lies still exists. Znakov states that we cannot make universal statements about truth and lies because the cultures are so different.

Variables Examined:

Male - Female: While "common-sense" tells us that men and women are inherently different, this distinction is not as clear for psychologists. In behaviorism, it was believed that all individuals have the same potential, with only outside reinforcers causing variations. As behaviorism began to wane, studies on gender differences became more popular, and it was reported by some that the sexes differed in many ways. Eagly (1995) reports that a statistical analysis of psychological studies found that stereotypes of males and females have proven true, in that women have been found to be more socially sensitive, friendly and concerned with the welfare of others, while men tend to behave in a more dominant, controlling and independent manner. In addition, she cites research by Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) that responded to this flourishing of research about sex differences. They found differences in intellectual potential, with males and females differing in verbal, quantitative and spatial abilities. Archer (1996) cites Ruben (1985), stating that in North America, compared with women, men tended to have fewer close friends and avoided speaking about personal matters in order to appear less vulnerable. Most of these men could not name a best friend. Women formed closer, more intimate friendships that were based on sharing feelings and experiences. Most of the

women were able to name a best friend. Others disputed the results of studies that found gender differences. Eagly (1995) saw these findings as controversial. She reports "psychologists who have conducted most of these syntheses of sex-related differences in social behavior and personality are in general agreement that their meta-analytic findings yield evidence of differences" (p.148).

Eagly (1995) states that the women's right's movement has sought to downplay the differences between men and women in order to elevate the status of women. Because of this, Eagly cautions that psychologists consider the role of their research and the harm or benefit it may have for women. Various theories have attempted to explain these differences. Status theorists explain that males have a higher social status than females and that gender studies are reporting differences in status rather than in sex (Eagly, 1995). Others report that males and females live in separate cultures, each learning different rules of behavior. Caughey (1984) states that cultural knowledge is relative. People of different subgroups live in different worlds because their "systems of knowledge are fundamentally different (p.10)." Evolutionary psychology reports that instead of being concerned with immediate causes of a person's developmental history, one would ask how a particular type of social behavior originated in terms of

its applicability in perpetuating the genes of the organism displaying it. Groups of people learn what works for them to adapt and survive. Darwin spoke of sexual selection with competition for access to preferred mates among males and choice between available mates by females (Archer, 1996). Biological and developmental theories report that inherent differences between the sexes are built into the person, whereas social psychologists see sex differences as arising "as a byproduct of social interaction" (p.148). Costa, Terracciano & McCrae (2001) found, in their cross-cultural investigation of personality gender differences that "gender differences are modest in magnitude, consistent with gender stereotypes, and replicable across cultures" (p.328). A surprising finding in their study was that self-reported gender differences was greater in Western, individualistic countries than in more traditional cultures where clear sex role differences are prescribed. Gender difference has become a political issue, with woman and men divided about whether differences between the sexes are real and if so whether it is a help or a hindrance (Eagly, 1995).

In this investigation, sex related differences in deception are expected. As discussed above, theory and investigations reveal that in many cases there are recognizable differences between the sexes, some large, some small. DePaulo, Epstein & Wyer (1993) expressed qualitative

differences between the lies of men and women. They showed that women tended to lie in order to spare the feelings of others. They also showed that women tended to feel ill at ease long after they told a lie. Men felt more comfortable than women and needed less preparation when lying to friends than to strangers. Gilligan (1993) spoke about the need to connect in women and the need for more independence in men. In this study, it is expected that males will feel lies are more justified and necessary than females, if they make matters fairer or more expedient. They may more easily see themselves lying in this situation. They may be less comfortable when lied to than will females, suffering more from the loss of control that being lied to brings them. Females will feel lies are more fitting and necessary if they smooth interpersonal situations. They may see themselves as more likely to lie in this situation. Gender will be designated through self-report.

Masculinity - Femininity: Within the last generation, sex-roles have been redefined. Women have become increasingly established in the work place and have been encouraged to make full use of their potential, much as men had in the past. Involvement with home and family has been stressed for men. They have been encouraged to get in touch with their feelings, a characteristic associated with women. It

appears that there is no longer a strong social desirability to portray oneself as a purely feminine female or as a strictly masculine male. However, in this study, it is expected that a significant difference will be found between individuals that score high in masculinity and those that score high in femininity regardless of interaction with sex. That is, men and women who have a high masculinity score on the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (explained below) will score more similarly to each other, endorsing a justice orientation, than to men and women who have a high femininity score on this inventory. Conversely, men and women who have a high femininity score on the Bem Sex-Role Inventory will have scores that are closer to each other, endorsing a care orientation, than to men and women scoring higher on masculinity.

An instrument designed to differentiate between those high and low on the traits of masculinity and femininity is the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI). The assumption behind the BSRI is that masculinity and femininity "are conceptually and empirically distinct" (Lippa, 1985). The BSRI was based on the traditionally sex-typed person being highly attuned to cultural definitions of sex-appropriate behavior and using these definitions to compare him or herself to an ideal standard in order to evaluate his or her own behavior. The goal of this individual is to remain

consistent with the idealized image of what he or she constitutes as masculine or feminine behavior. The mores of the American society were the culture chosen by Bem.

The Bem Sex-Role Inventory was designed to aid research on psychological androgyny, a trait that denotes the integration of masculinity and femininity within one person. "The concept of psychological androgyny implies that it is possible for an individual to be both compassionate and assertive, both expressive and instrumental, both feminine and masculine, depending upon the situational appropriateness of these various modalities. And it further implies that an individual may even blend these complementary modalities in a single act, such as the ability to fire an employee, if the circumstances warrant it, but with sensitivity for the human emotion that such an act inevitably produces (Bem, 1981, p.4)." Masculinity and femininity were seen as two separate dimensions, not two ends of a single dimension.

Bem originally selected approximately 200 personality traits that were positive in value and masculine or feminine in tone. She then asked a sample of college students to rate the desirability of these characteristics in American society for either a man or a woman. Items that were judged more desirable for a woman than for a man became an item eligible for inclusion in the "Femininity" scale. The

reverse was true for the "Masculinity" scale (Payne, 1985). The BSRI appears to be a very popular research instrument. Lippa (1985), in a computer search to January 1984, found 432 studies done utilizing this tool. The short form of the Bem Sex-Role Inventory will be used as a measure of masculinity and femininity. It has been found by Payne (1985) to be more factorially pure than the original long form. It contains thirty items, ten masculine, ten feminine and ten filler items (See Appendix C). It is expected that patterns of responses should be the same as those for males and females, with subjects high on masculinity getting the same results as males (overall) and those high on femininity getting the same predicted results as females. Lippa (1995) found that the BSRI items "masculine" and "feminine" correlated very strongly with sex of subject. Although the BSRI was also designed as an assessment of Psychological Androgyny, predictions will not be made for subjects who are high on both measures of masculinity and femininity or low on both measures of masculinity and femininity.

Ethnicity: Although Kohlberg designed his moral theory to encompass all cultures, this is not fully accepted. Kohlberg depended heavily on the Western philosophers like Rawls and Kant for defining his highest stage, VI. It is felt by many (Helwig, 1997) that concepts like individual or

natural rights, social contract and respect for human dignity are culturally biased and ethnocentric. Helwig talks about China where filial piety and respect for elders and authority (Stage IV) are taught as being more important than duty to contract (Stage V). While the higher order reasoning evidenced in official and sociological documents and the writing of the elite found in stages 5 & 6 is interesting philosophically, empirical evidence shows that, for the average person in the U.S., Stage IV (Law and order) perspective is most prevalent as well. He suggests, "individuals in Western cultures interpret and construe cultural ideologies and messages in accordance with their existing cognitive structure. There is no reason to believe the same would not be true for individuals in non-Western cultures" (Helwig, 1997, p.3). Triandis (1996) also warns that we must take each culture into account when formulating psychological theories. The weight we give to each variable shifts within the context of its use, and culture is a very important context. Snarey (1985), found that Kohlberg's theories held up cross-culturally. While not culture free, they were culture fair. He found that Stage 5 reasoning, despite being considered the most culturally biased, was found in both Western countries like the U.S. and England and in non-Western countries like Taiwan, Pakistan and Iran.

Brooklyn College is highly diverse culturally and ethnically. By the time people reach college (our research population), have their cultural differences weakened to the extent that they identify with popular U.S. stereotypes? Or, will there be a distinctive difference among cultures? Phinney (1996) states that sociologists generally agree that ethnic categories are imprecise and arbitrary, quoting Waters & Eisenbach (1995, p.421) who state that these categories are "social constructions rather than natural entities that are simply 'out there' in the world." Many have pointed out that there is a greater variation within than between groups. Phinney states that because of this within-group variation, ethnic group membership alone cannot predict behaviors or attitudes in any psychologically meaningful way. While she discusses accepted stereotypes of each cultural group, (for example, Hispanics are said to show greater interdependence and more clearly defined gender roles than the U.S. population as a whole) she presents the problems with finding set variables within ethnic groups. Cultures are not static, but are evolving and changing. Those purporting to belong to specific ethnic groups may be mixed ethnically, culturally blended, and changing and therefore may not represent the group they are thought to represent. Phinney cites one study that showed that American born children of Chinese immigrants showed more

similarity to, than differences from, Euro-American adolescents. Rowe, Vazsonyi & Flannery (1994) report that through intermarriage, genetic isolation of ethnic and racial groups has been relaxed. For example, approximately 25% of the autosomal genes in African Americans originate from intermarriage with the white population. However, despite these similarities, Rowe et. al (1994) believe that racial and ethnic classifications carry important information that indicates differences between groups. Triandis (1996) in attempting to find a place for contemporary psychology within the various cultures speaks of *cultural syndromes*. As noted earlier, these constructs, for Triandis, "indicate how a phenomenon found in contemporary psychology is modified in indigenous psychologies" (p. 407).

In this study, I hope to find that the data confirms cultural differences through the empirical measure of individualism and collectivism. These differences may interact with results obtained from males and females across various cultures. For example, males from collectivist cultures (like Korea, see Rhee, Uleman & Lee, 1996) stressing interdependence may show a more care-oriented outlook. Participants' self-report are used to learn their ethnic backgrounds, as well as the ethnic backgrounds of

parents. They are asked if English is their first language, their country of origin and the countries of origin of their mother and father. A set of scenarios (See appendix B) created by Harry Triandis (personal correspondence, 1998) is used as a measure of individualism and collectivism. Refinements of these scenarios have subsequently appeared in Triandis, Chen & Chan (1998) in the *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology* and have been integrated into this study.

Religiosity: Little information is available in the psychological literature linking level of orthodoxy with adherence to moral principles regarding deception. It is expected that religious orthodoxy will yield a more clear-cut view of right and wrong when one is more orthodox. That is, when scoring, more extreme answers in the direction of wrong will be obtained on questions that ask about how right or wrong a dishonest act is. Jensen and Jensen (1993) found that a higher level of religiosity was correlated with a greater value of the family and the traditional female role by both men and women. This indicates a smaller gender difference in areas measured by Gilligan's ethic of care for those higher in religiosity. Gender differences were believed to be greater for those low on religiosity. In the present study, it is expected that gender differences will

be less significant for those scoring higher in religiosity than those with lower scores. Level of orthodoxy is judged by self-report. Participants check a scale of 1 - 4 labeled from "extremely" to "not at all," asking how strictly they practice the rules of their religion.

Machiavellianism: Wilson, Near & Miller (1996) define Machiavellianism "as a strategy of social conduct that involves manipulating others for personal gain, often against the other's self-interest" (p.285). In laboratory situations people high in this trait are more likely to use exploitative tactics. It is measurable. Everyone is capable of manipulative behavior, but some possess this trait to a greater extent than others. Studies show that high-Machs are more believable when lying in face-to-face interactions. For example, Ford (1996) describes a 1970 study by Braginsky in which fifth grade children were paid to get their peers to eat bitter tasting crackers. Children whose personalities were more manipulative, as measured on the Mach Scale, were more successful in getting their peers to eat the crackers. Some tactics used, in order to reach their goals, were lies of omission, lies of commission and bribery. Evaluators, hearing these children on tape reported that they sounded more innocent, calmer and more comfortable than the less manipulative children. Gender

differences were also found between manipulative children. Girls tended to use more lies of omission, while boys used lies of commission. This type of lie appeared to work well for each gender. Ford (1996) found that similar gender differences have been reported for adults.

In the present study, subject's level of Machiavellianism is measured by using a Mach Scale. It is designed to measure a person's general strategy for dealing with people, and specifically, the degree to which he or she feels that people are able to be manipulated in interpersonal situations (Christie & Geis, 1991). Christie and Geis, its originators, drew from the writings of Machiavelli to form this scale in the 1960s. They chose 71 items that fell into three general areas: 1) the nature of interpersonal tactics, 2) views of human nature, and 3) abstract or generalized morality. They found 60 items significantly correlated with a total "Mach" score based on the sum of all items. For the version used in this study, Mach IV (see Appendix D), the ten highest-related of those worded in the Machiavellianism direction and the ten highest-related items worded in the opposite direction were chosen. The balancing of items in both directions was done to minimize the effects of indiscriminant agreement or disagreement. This scale is especially appropriate for the study of deception, because of its strong moral (or immoral)

orientation and because a number of its statements deal with truth and deception. On the Mach IV, questions 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, & 15 are duplicity items. For example, item 7 states, "There is no excuse for lying to someone else."

In this study, it is expected that males and both men and women who score higher on masculinity are expected to get higher Mach scores and to show a stronger justice orientation. In addition, they will show less disapproval of lies overall. The reverse pattern will hold for females and those who score higher on femininity on the BSRI. Studies find (Wilson, et. al., 1996) that Machiavellianism increases with age up to adolescence and then decreases.

Omission/Commission: Two basic forms that lies or deceptions take are those of omission and commission (Tate, Warren and Hess, 1992). When one practices omission, one fails to convey information and behaves as though something that did occur did not. In an act of commission, one actively generates and conveys false information. Another example of an act of omission (Ekman, 1989) is of unspoken lies where one chooses not to answer a question or deliberately chooses not to disclose information that s/he believes must be disclosed. In this situation, one is attempting to mislead. From the definitions given at the beginning of this paper, untruthful acts of omission fall under the general category

of deception, while deceptive acts of commission are defined as lies. As was seen in the aforementioned 1970 Braginsky study cited by Ford (1996), where children manipulated peers to get them to eat bitter tasting crackers, a variety of lies and deceptions were attempted. Gender differences were found, with girls using deceptive acts of omission, while boys used lies of commission to get what they wanted. In this study, it is expected that all subjects will regard lies of commission as more wrong or serious than deceptive acts of omission. From Ford's findings it is predicted that women will be more comfortable with deceptions involving omission, finding them more acceptable, than those involving commission. Men will show the opposite results.

Method:

Participants in this study consisted of 120 students, 60 men and 60 women, in Brooklyn College's introductory psychology courses. These students participated in two hours of experimentation at the college as part of the course requirement. They were, however, able to choose which studies they would be part of by reading descriptions put up on a bulletin board outside of the psychology office.

This study has grown out of the works on moral reasoning by Piaget, Kohlberg and Gilligan. From Piaget's study of the child as he develops morally, to Kohlberg's

follow-up investigations of adolescent's moral stages, to Gilligan's inclusion of women, the study of moral reasoning has evolved. Piaget observed and presented specific moral dilemmas to young children for his stage theory. Kohlberg interviewed and used vignettes, like the familiar one about Heinz who needed to get medicine for his wife, in order to ascertain the stage in which his subjects were functioning. Gilligan used interviews about life experience and developed a complex coding system to get her data. This involved the differences between men and women as they relate to the constructs of justice and care. While the qualitative analyses of open-ended responses to vignettes or stories have proven invaluable and useful, they can be time consuming and cumbersome. Many hours of interviewing are required for each study, leading to possible subjective bias and also limiting number of research participants. Ford & Lowery (1986), in reporting the results of the only study to date (Gilligan et al., 1982) in which she and her colleagues directly compared men and women, questioned Gilligan's open format, saying that confounds might be present because of the moral dilemmas males and females chose to discuss. It did not address whether in any given situation women will primarily focus on "care" and men will focus on "justice." In order to get a clearer picture of predicted differences, Ford and Lowery propose that a standardized format is

needed. After many preliminary studies, another, more efficient, way to gather data using forced choice was developed for the present study. It is hoped that this will lead to better standardization and interpretation of results.

The primary data in this study consists of responses to a number of standardized questionnaires and a set of scenarios written by me. Following these scenarios, that were designed to be neutral with respect to care versus justice orientation, participants were offered choices designed to reflect either care or justice orientations, as well as either collectivist or individualistic orientations. The entire protocol, in order of presentation, included the following:

- 1) The above mentioned scenarios elicit a justice/care and collectivist/individualist orientation. These protocols also asked the participant how right or wrong s/he finds the actions of the protagonist in each story to be. Eight scenarios were developed (See Appendix A). In each, a specific deception takes place. Four of the stories contain deceptions that involve omission of the truth. For example, a high school student leads a college boy to believe, without specifically stating, that she is older and also a college student. Four involve a specifically stated lie -

commission. An example of this is a story about a politician who denies that there is any trouble in his background when there is. The order of the stories is counterbalanced by omission and commission. In addition, each story varies by the gender of protagonists across subjects. The scenarios for each subject include four male and four female protagonists. The protagonists in the stories who practiced deception by omission were John, Michelle, Nancy and Pam. The protagonists in the stories who practiced deception by commission were Marla, Joe, Brandon and Brett.

The types of deceptions vary, but are all real-life situations. Topics include health, the law, people's livelihoods, family and friendship. After each vignette, participants were asked to answer several questions each of which represent the two primary dependent variables. They were first asked, on a scale of one to six, to mark how right or wrong they believed the action of the protagonist was. Then they were given four different reasons for this act of deception. And they were asked to rank from one to six, the level of acceptability to them, of each of the protagonist's reasons for the deceptive behavior. Finally, participants were asked to indicate which of the four reasons that follow each story is the best reason for them. The response to this question constituted the second primary

dependent measure.

Within the four choices that follow each scenario and explains possible reasons for the protagonist's actions, are imbedded concepts of either justice or care and collectivism or individualism. For example, one story is about a politician who strikes a deal with a reporter to keep damaging information from his background secret in order to be elected. The politician goes on to deny this problem when full disclosure is required. A justice and individualist rationale for this is a) He believed he deserved his shot at glory. A care and collectivist rationale is d) He did not want to disappoint his family. Participants then rate the four reasons on a 6-point scale from very good reason to very bad reason for engaging in deception. They are then asked to choose what they believe is the best reason from their own point of view for the deception. The sum of each these best reasons will tell us if the participant tends to follow a care perspective or a justice perspective.

2) A scale by Triandis that measures individualism and collectivism (Appendix B). Triandis, Chen & Chan (1998) chose a final 16 from 30 scenarios that they believed captured the differences between vertical, horizontal collectivist and individualist outlooks. Various groups of

students from the University of Illinois in the United States and from schools in Hong Kong judged these scenarios. For the present study, twelve of the final 16 scenarios were chosen because they gave a better overall indication of the collectivist and individualist orientations without confounding from the vertical and horizontal outlooks that are not being judged in this study. Each scenario has four options following it. Participants were instructed to imagine themselves in the situations and rank the options by placing a 1 next to the option they considered best or the most right or appropriate for them and a 2 next to the next best option. They were not to rank 3 and 4. In scoring for collectivism and individualism, it was decided to simplify the scoring by using only their first choice. Scores were summed for all scenarios and a median split procedure was used dividing the total in two, with the lower scores considered more collectivist and higher scores more individualist. The Triandis scale was used as a general way to capture culture, mitigating the need to analyze the many countries of origins and languages of our students.

3) The Bem Sex-role Inventory (BSRI) which gets a measure of masculinity and femininity (Appendix C). The short form of this inventory consists of 30 items and takes about 10

minutes to complete. Participants are instructed not to skip any items. One third of the items measure masculinity, one third femininity and one third are neutral and not scored. First the femininity ("a") scores and masculinity ("b") raw scores are calculated. These are the averages of the participants' ratings of the feminine and masculine adjectives on the BSRI. A table for T-scores for femininity and masculinity (Table 1 of the BSRI, 1981) is in the BSRI manual that converts these raw scores to standard scores (SS). One then obtains the difference score by subtracting the "b" SS from the "a" SS. High scores in either direction indicate a tendency to be strongly sex-typed (or sex-reversed), with positive scores indicating femininity and negative scores indicating masculinity. After obtaining the a-b score, Table 2 is consulted to find the Standard score for the difference. These are the T-scores for the femininity minus masculinity difference. Then each participant is classified as masculine or feminine on the basis of a median split, with those below the median considered masculine and those above the median considered feminine.

4) A scale measuring Machiavellianism - Mach IV Scale, (Appendix D). There are 20 multiple-choice questions. A Likert format was used with "agree strongly" being scored 7,

no answer scored 4, and "disagree strongly" being scored 1. A constant of 20 was added to make the lowest Mach score 40, the highest 160 and the midpoint 100. Each participant is classified as high or low mach on the basis of a median split of the sum of all Mach scores, with those below the 50th percentile considered low in the trait of Machiavellianism and those above the 50th percentile being high on this trait.

5) There is a series of open-ended questions asking about the participants' views of deception (Appendix E). The answers to these questions are used to clarify and further explain the orientations of the subjects as regards to omission/commission, justice/care and deceptive practices in general.

6) A page asking for biographical data (Appendix F). The demographic data includes gender, age, first language spoken, student's and parent's countries of origin, religion and degree of religious practice, and school major. Ages are generally from 18 to 21, yet can go up after older adults return to school. Religiosity, as a measure of religious practice was measured by using the above mentioned median split procedure. It was measured by comparing those who are more with those who are less religious.

Preliminary analyses were performed on these data evaluating the correlations among various factors used to classify subjects. We would expect, for example, that gender would correlate with Mach scores and with t-scores on the BSRI. We do not expect a correlation between gender, religiosity and Triandis scores measuring collectivism and individualism. The primary dependent measure used in the analysis of these data was participant's responses to the question "How right or wrong you believe" the action was, for each of the eight scenarios.

The primary analyses used were multi-factorial repeated-measures ANOVAS to determine whether participant's evaluations of deception varied as a function of these factors. Six of the eight factors were between-subjects variable, each with two levels, including; sex (male and female), Machiavellianism (high and low), sex role orientation (masculine and feminine), religiosity (high and low), cultural orientation (individualist and collectivist) and care versus justice orientation (care and justice). The other two factors were within-subjects variable. The first, story, had eight levels, each referring to one of the eight scenarios that each participant responded to. The second within-subjects factor, type, had two levels (omission and commission) with four scenarios of each and was nested

within the first within subject's factor.

A pilot study was done to test out the stories and make sure that they are not biased to elicit a primarily care or a justice response from subjects. They must be ambiguous enough to elicit opinions that project the orientation of the subject reading the material. For this check, after biographical data were collected, subjects read a short paragraph explaining the care perspective and a short paragraph explaining the justice perspective to familiarize themselves with these data. After this, some of the stories were eliminated. These consisted of stories that did not make sense to the subjects as regards to the justice/care concepts and those that elicited primarily care or justice answers from most subjects.

In a second pilot study, short vignettes involving lies and deceptions were presented. Following these stories were a series of reasons for actions taken by the characters in the stories. The subjects were asked to indicate whether the reason reflected justice, care or was unclear. They were also asked if the protagonists were right or wrong in their actions. A brief explanation, justifying the reasons for their answers, was requested as well. This helped to further refine the current protocol.

Results:

Data from nine of the 120 initial participants were eliminated because the data in these protocols were incomplete and unscorable. This resulted in data from 111 participants including 57 men and 54 women. Age in the sample ranged from 17 to 46 with a mean age of 20.5 ($SD=4.18$).

Sixty four percent ($N=71$) of the participants noted English as their first language while 36% ($N=40$) indicated that they were not native English speakers. Language differences between genders were not significant, $t(109)=1.49$, $p>.05$. (See Table 1 for the distribution of participants by gender and language of origin.)

Fifty seven percent ($N=63$) of participants were born in the U.S. while 43% ($N=48$) were born outside the U.S. Differences in country of origin between genders were not significant, $t(109)=1.33$ $p>.05$. (See table 2 for the distribution of participants by country of origin and gender.) Table 3 shows participant's religion broken down by gender. An analysis indicated no significant differences in religion across the factors of gender, English as a first language or whether the participant was born in the United States or not.

Table 1

Distribution of participants by gender and language of origin

First Language	Male	Female	Total
English	32	39	71
Spanish	3	1	4
Hebrew		1	1
Korean	1		1
Chinese	2	3	5
Russian	9	5	14
French Creole	5		5
Other	5	5	10
Total	57	54	111

Table 2

Participants by country of origin and gender

Birth country	Male	Female	
United States	32	31	63
Russia & Ukraine	8	5	13
Israel	1		1
Spanish speaking West Indies	2		2
English speaking West Indies	7	7	14
South America	1	3	4
Western Europe		2	2
Canada	1		1
Eastern Europe	1		1
India & Pakistan	2	1	3
China	1	3	4
Africa		2	2
Korea	1		1
Total	57	54	111


Table 3

Participants' religion and gender

		Male	Female	
Religion	Jewish	16	15	31
	Catholic	11	19	30
	Protestant	13	10	23
	Muslim	2	2	4
	Buddhist	2	3	5
	Hindu		2	2
	Atheist	3		3
	Greek & Russian Orthodox	1		1
	agnostic	1		1
	other	2	2	4
	no religion	5	1	6
Total		56	54	110

Religiosity was measured on a four-point scale, with lower numbers indicating greater strictness in the practice of religion. Participant's scores ranged across the scale ($M=2.69$, $SD=.93$). Religiosity scores did not differ by gender, country of origin, first language and religion. (See figure 1 for distribution of religiosity scores by gender.)

Figure 1



Distribution of religiosity scores by gender

All these data aimed to characterize cultural differences among participants. However, as noted earlier,

the Triandis Scale of Individualism - Collectivism aimed to capture these differences more concisely. As noted below that scale was used to do this. For the Triandis scale of Individualism - Collectivism, participants were asked to indicate their first two choices of action in response to each of the 12 scenarios. Their first choices for each of the 12 scenarios were summed to yield a single score with higher scores indicating greater individualism and lower scores indicating greater collectivism. Scores on this scale ranged from 16 to 66 ($M=28.70$, $SD=5.55$). Men scored as more individualistic ($M=29.75$, $SD=6.49$) than women ($M=27.65$, $SD=4.23$), $t(102)=1.95$, $p<.06$. Scores on the Triandis Scales of Individualism - Collectivism did not differ by language of origin, country of origin, religion, religiosity or any other participant variables subsequently mentioned in this section. We assume that Individualism - Collectivism scores on the Triandis Scale is a distinct measure of cultural differences that have 'input' from all of these factors.

The Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI) yielded scores on both Masculinity and Femininity. However, as Bem (1981) notes these scores are combined to yield a single "t-score" for each participant with higher numbers indicating greater femininity and lower numbers indicating greater masculinity. These scores ranged from 24 to 77 ($M=50.26$, $SD=11.82$). As

might be expected, men ($M=58.07$, $SD=11.41$) and women ($M=52.57$, $SD=11.92$) differed on t -scores, $t(109)=2.03$ ($p<.05$). Men did indeed score as more masculine and women as more feminine. However, differences by all other previously specified variables were not significant.

For the Mach Scale, higher scores indicated greater Machiavellianism. Scores ranged from 60 to 138 ($M=97.02$, $SD=12.96$). As might be expected, men ($M=100.49$, $SD=14.36$) scored significantly higher than women ($M=93.35$, $SD=10.22$) on this scale, $t(109)=3.004$, $p<.005$. A median split of BSRI t -scores also revealed that those scoring as more masculine ($M=99.81$, $SD=12.24$), scored significantly higher than those scoring as more feminine ($M=94.47$, $SD=13.18$), $t(109)=2.21$, $p<.05$. Scores on the Mach Scale were not related to country of origin, language of origin, cultural differences as measured by the Triandis Scale, religion, religiosity and care and justice which is described next.

Participant's orientation with respect to care or justice reasoning was assessed through a portion of their responses to each of the eight vignettes that dealt with deception. For each vignette, four reasons were provided as justification for the deception, two of which reflected a care orientation and two of which involved a justice orientation. For each vignette, participants were asked to

choose the best reason for the deception, from their point of view. If participants chose either of the two justice reasons they were given a score of "1" and for either of the two care reasons, they were given a score of "2." When these scores were summed, for each participant, across the eight vignettes, this would yield a theoretical range of 8 to 16. A score of 8 would reflect a "pure" justice orientation across all eight vignettes while a score of 16 would reflect a "pure" care orientation. In fact scores ranged from 10 to 16, among participants ($M=12.53$, $SD=1.39$). (See figure 2 for a distribution of these scores.) A median split of care and justice scores revealed that men were almost identical in their care/justice orientations, and while not significant, women can be seen as coming from a greater care perspective. (See figure 3.) Men and women did not differ significantly on these care/justice scores, nor did any of the following grouping measures yield significance on care/justice: median split for the BSRI t -scores, the Mach Scale, the Triandis Scale, birth country, religion, religiosity or for age. There was a significant finding for first language: $t(107)=2.307$, $p<.03$, with a mean of 12.75 ($SD=1.33$) for English as the first language and a mean of 12.13 ($SD=1.44$) when English is not the first language. English-as-a-first language speakers seem to be more caring. This appears to be of no practical

significance.

Aside from certain expected relationships (e.g., gender with Mach Score and t-score), each of the participants "demographic" variables seem to be independent factors measuring distinct parameters of participants. The key questions of this study involved how these variables are related to participants' perception of the morality of deception. These questions are, in turn, addressed in the following section.

Figure 2





Figure 3**Median Split of sum of justice and care reasons by gender**

Participants' perception of the morality of deception, the major dependent measure, was assessed by their response to the question "How right or wrong" that appeared immediately after the presentation of each of the eight vignettes. Responses could range from one to six, with one indicating "very right" and six indicating "very wrong." These responses were utilized in three distinct ways, for

the analyses. First, for each subject, there was a single sum yielded for participants' responses to this question across all eight vignettes. This yielded a General perception of morality score for each participant (range, in theory, = 8 to 48). In practice, the range of participants' evaluations was from 15 to 48. Second, for each subject, responses were separately summed for vignettes depicting deception by omission and deception by commission. These two summed scores yielded, within-subject evaluations of the morality of, respectively, deception by Omission and deception by Commission. The range, in theory, for each of these two was 4 to 24 and scores of Omission and Commission comprised a repeated measure within subjects. The range in practice for omission was 8 to 24, while the range in practice for commission was 4 to 24. Third, responses were analyzed for each vignette individually. This yielded eight separate perceptions of morality, within subject, for each of the eight vignettes (i.e., John, Marla, Michelle, Joe, Fred and Nancy, Brandon, Pam and Brett). The range for each of the eight scores was 1 to 6, as was the case in practice.

Gender: The General mean for evaluations of deception by all participants was 33.66 ($SD=6.71$). The theoretical arithmetic midpoint of the General perception of morality score for each participant is 28. As can be seen, the

average is balanced on the side of greater disapproval. An analysis of variance was performed to see whether gender yielded different General perceptions of the morality of deceptions. This analysis indicated a significant difference with men rating, Generally, the deceptions as more right ($M=31.79$, $SD=7.15$) than women ($M=35.63$, $SD=5.64$), $F(1,109) = 9.800$, $p < .002$.

Another ANOVA was performed using Gender as a between subjects factor and Omission and Commission as within subjects factors and as a repeated measure. This analysis yielded three significant findings. First, there was a main effect for gender as indicated above. Second, there was a main effect for Omission versus Commission, with all participants indicating that lies of omission were more wrong ($M=17.16$, $SD=3.48$) than lies of commission ($M=16.50$, $SD=4.07$), $F(1,109) = 4.07$, $p < .05$. Third, there was an interaction effect between gender and omission versus commission, $F(1,109)=12.570$, $p < .001$. The difference between omission and commission was greater for men (respectively, $M_o=16.77$, $SD=3.15$ vs. $M_c=15.02$, $SD=4.41$) than for women ($M_o=17.57$, $SD=3.15$ vs. $M_c=18.06$, $SD=2.99$). Furthermore, there is a shift in direction of the scores for men and women.

In the main, men viewed lying more favorably than did

women. And when looked at as a group, all subjects apparently viewed lies of omission more unfavorably than lies of commission. This pattern held when looking at men alone. But when looking at women alone, women viewed lies of commission more unfavorably than lies of omission (See Table 4).

If we look at individual vignettes for patterns of response by gender we see that four of them had highly significant results and may be the source of the observed effects, with women judging them all as more wrong than men judged them. Differences between men and women in three of the commission stories (Marla: $t(109)=-4.301$, $p<.001$; Joe: $t(109)=-3.030$, $p<.003$; Brett: $t(109)=-3.124$, $p<.002$) were significant as was one of the omission stories (Michelle: $t(109)=-2.316$, $p<.022$). Women judged all the stories, save one, as more wrong. In the Pam story, where a woman deceives a man, the mean for men was 4.877 ($SD=1.428$). For women it was 4.796 ($SD=1.156$). See Table 5 for the breakdown of how right and wrong men and women judged vignettes.

Table 4

Gender and omission, commission and cumulative lies

Gender		How right or wrong are omission lies?	How right or wrong are commission lies?	Cumulative right and wrong
Male	Mean	16.7719	15.0175	31.7895
	N	57	57	57
	Std. Deviation	3.7465	4.4098	7.1458
Female	Mean	17.5741	18.0556	35.6296
	N	54	54	54
	Std. Deviation	3.1539	2.9869	5.6445
Total	Mean	17.1622	16.4955	33.6577
	N	111	111	111
	Std. Deviation	3.4786	4.0651	6.7129

Higher numbers are "more wrong."

Table 5

Judgment by gender for right and wrong in vignettes

	Gender	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
John: How right or wrong	Male	57	3.2807	1.6877
	Female	54	3.4444	1.3127
Marla: How right or wrong	Male	57	3.7544	1.6933
	Female	54	4.9259	1.0963
Michelle: How right or wrong	Male	57	3.8246	1.5015
	Female	54	4.4630	1.3969
Joe: How right or wrong	Male	57	3.5263	1.7638
	Female	54	4.4444	1.3963
Fred and Nancy: How right or wrong	Male	57	4.7895	1.3982
	Female	54	4.8704	1.2139
Brandon: How right or wrong	Male	57	3.8070	1.4447
	Female	54	3.8889	1.4098
Pam: How right or wrong	Male	57	4.8772	1.4277
	Female	54	4.7963	1.1555
Brett: How right or wrong	Male	57	3.9298	1.7203
	Female	54	4.7963	1.1223

English as a first language: An analysis of variance was performed to see if English as a first language yielded different General perceptions of the morality of deception.

It did not yield significant differences between those who spoke English as a first language ($M=33.634$, $SD=6.519$) and

those who did not ($M=33.700$, $SD=7.130$, $F(1,109)=.002$, $p>.05$).

An ANOVA performed using English as first language (between-subjects factor) with omission and commission (within-subjects repeated factor) yielded no significant results. There were no significant results when individual vignettes were looked at as well.

Born in the USA? An ANOVA was performed to see if those born in the United States differed in their perception of morality from those born abroad. Significant differences were found, with those born in the United States rating, Generally, the deceptions as more right ($M=31.984$, $SD=6.29$) than those born abroad ($M=35.854$, $SD=6.678$), $F(1,109)=9.777$, $p<.01$).

Another ANOVA was performed to see if those born in the United States differed from those born abroad in their perception of lies of commission versus lies of omission. The results were not significant for the interaction effect but showed a very strong trend for the main effect of omission versus commission ($F(1,109)=3.795$, $p<.06$). To further explore this trend, a t-test was performed. Results were highly significant with lies of commission seen as more wrong by those born abroad ($M=17.646$, $SD=4.330$) than those born in the United States ($M=15.619$, $SD=3.648$, $t(109)=$

2.674, $p < .01$). Those born abroad also saw lies of omission as more wrong ($M=18.208$, $SD=3.280$) than those born in the United States ($M=16.365$, $SD=3.438$, $t(109)=-2.854$, $p < .01$ (See table 6 for US birth and its relationship to omission and commission lies).

Looking at the individual vignettes for patterns of response by US versus foreign born, we see three with significant results and one with a trend. In all four, foreign born participants see deception as more wrong. The three significant vignettes are Michelle ($t(109)=-2.591$, $p < .05$), Joe ($t(109)=-2.402$, $p < .05$) and Brett ($t(109)=-2.336$, $p < .05$). Fred and Nancy show a strong trend ($t(109)=-1.810$, $p < .10$). The four vignettes were evenly divided between lies of commission and lies of omission.

Table 6

United States birth and relationship to omission/commission

	Is participant born in US?	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
How wrong: omission?	Yes	16.3651	3.4375	63
	No	18.2083	3.2809	48
	Total	17.1622	3.4786	111
How wrong: commission?	Yes	15.6190	3.6475	63
	No	17.6458	4.3295	48
	Total	16.4955	4.0651	111

Higher numbers indicate "more wrong."

Religion: An analysis of variance revealed a significant difference in the evaluation of deception between the eleven religions the participants practiced. The General mean for evaluations of deception for the 110 participants who stated their religion was 33.69(SD=6.73). The two Hindu and four Muslim participants viewed deceptions as most wrong. The single Greek Orthodox and the single agnostic participant saw the deceptions as more right than the rest. Table 7 shows the means obtained through religious breakdown. The higher the mean, the more wrong the deception was rated.

The ANOVA performed using religion as a between subjects factor and Omission/Commission as a within-subjects factor repeated measure, showed no significant differences. Religious affiliation was not a factor in opinions whether lies were told directly or indirectly. When individual vignettes were studied, the only one that was significant was that of Fred and Nancy, with those in the "other" group ($M=5.750$, $SD=.500$) seeing them as most wrong and Greek orthodox ($M=3.000$) and agnostic ($M=3.000$) seeing them as most right, $F(10,109)=2.102$, $p<.05$. John's story approached significance, $F(10,109)=1.741$, $p<.10$, with atheists ($M=2.000$) seeing it as most right and Muslims ($M=5.000$) seeing it as most wrong. An alternative analysis with trimmed data indicated still no difference as a

function of religion.

Table 7

General right and wrong by religion

Religion	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Jewish	31.7742	7.4731	31
Catholic	34.2000	5.3781	30
Protestant	34.5652	5.9835	23
Muslim	39.7500	6.7020	4
Buddhist	36.8000	4.4944	5
Hindu	43.5000	.7071	2
Atheist	30.6667	13.5769	3
Greek & Russian Orthodox	23.0000	.	1
Agnostic	26.0000	.	1
Other	37.2500	4.3493	4
No religion	30.0000	5.2915	6
Total	33.6909	6.7345	110

Higher numbers indicate "more wrong."

Religiosity: The General mean for evaluations of deception was 33.734 (SD=6.734). The analysis of variance performed to see whether religiosity yielded different General perceptions of deception yielded significant results. The analysis indicated a significant difference when using a median split, with those who rated themselves as more

religious ($N=45$) seeing deception as more wrong ($M=35.311$, $SD=7.051$) than those who rated themselves as less religious ($N=64$) ($M=32.625$, $SD=6.323$), $F(1,107)=4.334$, $p<.05$.

An ANOVA performed using religiosity as a between subjects factor and Omission/Commission as a within-subjects factor revealed a significant interaction effect between Omission/Commission and Religiosity ($F(1,107)=4.632$, $p<.04$). While those who rated themselves as more religious saw both omission and commission lies as equally wrong, those who rated themselves as less religious saw lies of omission as more wrong than lies of commission. The main effect for Omission/Commission was not significant ($F(1,107)=2.429$, $p>.05$) See table 8 for the means of Omission/Commission lies for the level of religiosity.

The t-test performed to further explore the differences in perceptions of deception between omission and commission lies revealed a significant difference for lies of commission with those who rate themselves as more religious finding them more wrong ($M=17.756$, $SD=3.749$) than those who rated themselves as less religious ($M=15.688$, $SD=4.113$), $t(107)=2.680$, $p<.01$. The more religious rated lies of omission as more wrong ($M=17.556$, $SD=3.900$), but not significantly so than those who were less religious ($M=16.938$, $SD=3.192$), $t(107)=.908$, $p>.05$.

Table 8

Omission/Commission lies and level of religiosity

	High or low religiosity	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Right or wrong: omission	High	17.5556	3.8996	45
	Low	16.9375	3.1916	64
	Total	17.1927	3.4973	109
Right or wrong: commission	High	17.7556	3.7487	45
	Low	15.6875	4.1130	64
	Total	16.5413	4.0792	109

Higher numbers indicate "more wrong."

Looking at individual vignettes for pattern of response by piety we see that Joe and Brandon's stories which demonstrate lies of commission reveal significant differences between the more (Joe: $M=4.489$, $SD=1.471$; Brandon: $M=4.222$, $SD=1.428$) and less (Joe: $M=3.641$, $SD=1.703$, $t(107)=2.705$, $p<.01$; Brandon: $M=3.594$, $SD=1.388$, $t(107)=2.299$, $p<.05$) pious, with those rated as more religious being more disapproving of them than those rated as less religious.

Triandis Scale of Individualism and collectivism: A median split of survey results was used to differentiate individualists from collectivists. Their General mean for the evaluation of deception was 33.654 ($SD=6.825$). An

analysis of variance was performed to see whether cultural orientation (individualism versus collectivism) yielded different General perceptions of the morality of deception.

This analysis indicated a significant difference with collectivists rating deceptions, Generally, as more wrong ($M=35.298$, $SD=6.756$) than individualists ($M=32.298$, $SD=6.636$), $F(1,102) = 5.178$, $p < .05$.

The ANOVA performed using cultural orientation as a between subjects factor and Omission/Commission as within-subjects factors, as a repeated measure, yielded a significant interaction effect, with collectivists finding deception equally wrong for omission lies ($M_o=17.511$, $SD=3.501$) and commission lies ($M_c=17.787$, $SD=3.895$), $F(1,102)=5.825$, $p < .02$. Individualists ($M_o=16.807$, $SD=3.409$ vs. $M_c=15.491$, $SD=4.102$) showed a difference in their perception of Omission/Commission lies, finding omission lies more wrong than commission lies. There was no main effect ($F(1,102)=5.825$, $p > .05$) for Omission/Commission. A t-test revealed a significant difference between individualist and collectivists, with collectivists finding commission lies as more wrong than omission lies ($t(102)=2.906$, $p < .005$). Collectivists found lies overall as more wrong than individualists did ($t(102)=2.276$, $p < .03$). There difference between collectivists and individualists

for omission lies was not significant. See table 9 for means and standard deviations for judgments of lies for collectivists and individualists.

Looking at individual vignettes for patterns of response by culture, we see that two are highly significant (Marla: $t(102)=2.660$, $p<.01$ and Joe: $t(102)=2.520$, $p<.02$) and one shows a strong trend (Brandon: $t(102)1.858=$, $p<.07$).

All are lies of commission. In all three, collectivists rate deceptions as more wrong than individualists do. Only the Fred and Nancy story shows that individualists are slightly less approving.

Table 9

Judgments of lies for collectivists and individualists

	Triandis first choice	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Right or wrong: omission lies	Collectivist	47	17.5106	3.5008
	Individualist	57	16.8070	3.4092
Right or wrong: commission lies	Collectivist	47	17.7872	3.8950
	Individualist	57	15.4912	4.1019
Cumulative right and wrong	Collectivist	47	35.2979	6.7564
	Individualist	57	32.2982	6.6358

Higher numbers indicate "more wrong."

The Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI): The analysis of variance performed to see if masculine or feminine orientations

yielded different General perceptions of the morality of deceptions yielded no significant difference between those who are more masculine ($M=32.538$, $SD=6.405$) and those who are more feminine ($M=34.690$, $SD=6.875$). However, there was a trend, $F(1,109)=2.921$, $p<.10$, with those who are more feminine disapproving of deceptions overall more than those who are more masculine.

An ANOVA was performed using masculinity vs. femininity as a between subjects factor and Omission and Commission as within-subjects factors. There was a main effect for Omission/Commission but no interaction effect. However, a t-test was performed to analyze the strong trend noted in the ANOVA. Lies of Omission showed a trend with those who are feminine ($M=17.724$, $SD=3.488$) being more disapproving than those who score masculine ($M=16.547$, $SD=3.394$, $t(109)=-1.799$, $p<.08$). Results for lies of Commission did not approach significance.

If we look at individual patterns of response by masculinity and femininity, John's story is significant ($t(109)=-2.590$, $p<.02$). Those who are more feminine ($M=3.707$, $SD=1.499$) were more disapproving than those who are more masculine ($M=2.981$, $SD=1.448$). Michelle and Brett's stories showed strong trends, with those who are more feminine being more disapproving.

The Mach Scale: The General mean for evaluations of deception by all participants was 33.658 ($SD=6.713$). A median split was used with 53 participants scoring as low Mach and 58 scoring as high Mach. The analysis of variance performed to see if high and low Machiavellians, as defined by the Mach Scale, yielded different General perceptions of morality did not show significant results. There were no differences between those who were high on this trait ($M=33.707$, $SD=7.051$) and those who were low ($M=33.604$, $SD=6.389$), $F(1,109)=.006$, $P>.05$.

The ANOVA performed using high and low Mach as a between-subjects factor with Omission and Commission (within-subjects repeated factor) yielded no main effect for Machiavellianism. However, there was a trend for the main effect of omission versus commission ($M_o=17.162$, $SD=3.479$; $M_c=16.500$, $SD=4.065$, $F(1,109)=3.830$, $p<.06$). An interaction effect was not observed. There were no significant results when individual vignettes were looked at. The Pam story did show a trend, with high Machs being more disapproving.

Justice and Care Orientation: The General mean for the evaluations of deceptions by all participants was 33.734 ($SD=6.63$). The analysis of variance performed to see if justice or care orientation yielded different General perceptions of the morality of deceptions did not reveal a significant difference between those who were primarily

justice driven ($M=33.327$, $SD=7.031$) and those whose orientation was primarily care ($M=34.105$, $SD=6.273$, $F(1,107)=.373$, $p>.05$). A median split (of the preferences for best reason, summed across the 8 vignettes, as outlined earlier) was used for this analysis with 52 participants falling in the justice category and 57 falling in the care category.

Another ANOVA performed using justice and care as a between subjects factor and Omission and Commission as within-subjects factors and as a repeated measure, revealed a significant main effect with all participants agreeing that lies of omission ($M=17.220$, $SD=3.441$) are more wrong than lies of commission ($M=16.514$, $SD=4.031$, $F(1,107)=4.712$, $p<.04$). There was no interaction effect

Looking at individual vignettes for patterns of response by justice versus care orientation (as measured by the median split of preferences summed across the 8 vignettes) reveals no significant differences in any of the eight stories when the median split of participants' preferences for justice and care rationales was taken into account. However, in analyzing participants' responses to each individual vignette, one could also determine participants care versus justice orientation for that story by the nature of the "best reason" (care vs. justice) that

they chose for just that story. Thus any participant might change their status as "care" or "justice" from vignette to vignette, depending upon what they specified as best reason for that particular vignette. This also introduces the possibility of unequal Ns in each cell. A univariate analysis for how right or wrong the participants found the protagonist's deception in each vignette was computed. Using participants' preferences for that specific vignette and taking their gender into account, meaningful findings and trends were discovered.

There was a main effect for gender in both the Marla ($F(3,106)=20.654, p<.001$) and Brett ($F(3,106)=9.455, p<.004$) stories, with women ($M=4.962, SD=1.074$ for the Marla story and $M=4.849, SD=1.063$ for the Brett story) seeing them as more wrong than men ($M=3.714, SD=1.681$ for the Marla story and $M=3.930, SD=1.720$ for the Brett story) saw them.

Michelle's story showed close to a main effect for gender ($F(3,107)=3.789, p<.06$), a main effect for justice and care orientation ($F(3,107)=12.569, p<.002$) and an interaction effect ($F(3,107)=3.981, p<.05$). Both high justice men ($M=4.727, SD=1.352$) and high justice women ($M=4.714, SD=1.454$) saw Michelle's behavior as equally wrong. High care women ($M=4.303, SD=1.357$) saw the behavior as more wrong than high care men ($M=3.257, SD=1.314$). Women

as a group ($M=4.463$, $SD=1.397$) saw the behavior as more wrong than men as a group ($M=3.825$, $SD=1.502$).

Joe's story showed a main effect for justice and care orientation, with those who are more justice oriented ($M=4.636$, $SD=1.270$) seeing his deception as more wrong than those who are care oriented ($M=3.692$, $SD=1.723$, $F(3,107)=7.511$, $p<.008$). Strong trends were seen for gender and for the interaction between gender and justice and care orientation. Males ($M=3.526$, $SD=1.764$) saw the deception as more acceptable than did females ($M=4.444$, $SD=1.396$, $F(3,107)=3.280$, $p<.08$). High justice males and females made similar judgments for how right or wrong they believed the deception was, but high care females saw the deception as more wrong than high care males ($F(3,107)=3.408$, $p<.07$).

Brandon's story showed a trend towards the main effect for justice and care orientations with care participants ($M=4.048$, $SD=1.349$) seeing the deception as more wrong than did justice participants ($M=3.583$, $SD=1.485$, $F(3,107)=3.149$, $p<.08$). No effects were seen for the John, Fred & Nancy and Pam stories.

In order to get a clearer picture of what approach the individual vignettes elicited when disallowing for gender, a binomial test was computed to see if expected frequencies and actual numbers of care/justice responses corresponded.

Table 10

Care and justice responses to best reason for deception for each vignette

	Category	N	Observed Prop.	Test Prop.	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
John's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (An omission story)	Care	24	.22	.50	.000
	Justice	87	.78		
	Total	111	1.00		
Maria's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (A commission story)	Care	83	.75	.50	.000
	Justice	27	.25		
	Total	110	1.00		
Michelle's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (An omission story)	Care	68	.61	.50	.023
	Justice	43	.39		
	Total	111	1.00		
Joe's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (A commission story)	Care	78	.70	.50	.000
	Justice	33	.30		
	Total	111	1.00		
Nancy's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (An omission story)	Care	71	.64	.50	.004
	Justice	40	.36		
	Total	111	1.00		
Brandon's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (A commission story)	Care	63	.57	.50	.184
	Justice	48	.43		
	Total	111	1.00		
Pam's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (An omission story)	Care	49	.44	.50	.255
	Justice	62	.56		
	Total	111	1.00		
Brett's best reason: Is it Justice or Care? (A commission story)	Care	65	.59	.50	.070
	Justice	45	.41		
	Total	110	1.00		

a Based on Z Approximation.

From table 10, it appears that different vignettes elicit different moral frameworks. In one case, as seen above in Michelle's story, there was an interaction effect

with gender. In most there were no gender effects. Five stories showed significance: four in care (Marla, Michele, Joe and Fred & Nancy) and one in justice (John). Looking at absolute numbers, six stories elicited care responses and two elicited justice responses.

Results of Qualitative Data Analysis: Open ended questions in Appendix E, with the exception of question 2 (When do you think it is OK to lie?), were quantified. These questions asked directly for the participants' opinions about deception. In addition, explanations were requested and used to aid in the interpretations of these opinions. These questions were: 1. "Is it OK to lie?" An OK was scored as 1 and a not OK scored 2. 3. Which is more acceptable reason for a lie or deception? a) saving the feelings of another&/or maintaining the solidarity of the group or: b) being fair to all and respecting the rights of each person involved. A 1 represented part a (care perspective) and a 2 represented part b (justice perspective). 4. Which is more right or wrong? a) a lie where you do not say anything directly, but act as if you know nothing about what is going on. B) a lie where you give false information directly. C) or, are both lies the same to you? A 1 represented an omission lie. A 2 represented a commission lie. Part c was not scored. 5. Is it always right to tell the truth? Yes

was scored as 1. No was scored as 2. All answers not able to be scored as described above were omitted from the calculations.

The chi-square test was calculated for the open ended questions. When asking if it was OK to lie, significant results showed that participants reported that it was OK ($\chi^2 = (1, N=109)=41.183, p<.001$). The expected Ns in each cell were 54.5. In actuality, 88 reported that it was OK and 21 stated that it was not OK to lie. T-tests were performed on specific variables to see how different groups answered this question. There was a significant difference between high ($M=1.088, SD=.285$), and low Machs ($M=1.308, SD=.466$), with high Machs more likely to state that it was OK to lie ($t(107)=3.000, p<.004$). A significant difference for this question was also found between those who scored as masculine ($M=1.113, SD=.320$) and feminine ($M=1.268, SD=.447$) on the BSRI, with the more masculine participants being more accepting of deception $t(107)=-2.067, p<.05$. There was no significant difference between genders, religiosity, individualist and collectivists, and those who were more justice or care oriented.

When asking for which reason was more wrong, Omission or Commission, participants significantly reported that lies of commission were more wrong ($\chi^2 = (1, N=53)=20.547, p<.001$).

The expected Ns in each cell were 26.5. In actuality, 10 stated that lies of omission were more wrong and 43 stated that lies of commission were more wrong.

When asking if it was always right to tell the truth, significantly more participants reported that it was not always right to tell the truth ($\chi^2 = (1, N=109) = 20.266, p < .001$). The expected Ns in each cell were 54.5. In actuality, 31 said it was always right to tell the truth. 78 said it was not always right to tell the truth. There were significant differences between men ($M=1.821, SD=.387$) and women ($M=1.604, SD=.494$) in their opinions about the rightness of always telling the truth ($t(107) = 2.571, p < .02$), with men reporting more than women that it is not always right to tell the truth. High Machs ($M=1.821, SD=.397$) and low Machs ($M=1.604, SD=.494$) also showed a significant disparity with high Machs, more than low Machs, saying that it is not always right to tell the truth ($t(107) = 2.571, p < .02$).

When looking at the acceptable reason to lie, care or justice, results were not significant ($\chi^2 = (1, N=107) = 1.131, p > .05$). The expected Ns in each cell were 53.5. However, 59 preferred the care reasons and 48 preferred the justice reasons.

Discussion:

The focus of this study is on how individuals judge and evaluate lies and deceptions. Participants' assessments of lies were obtained both indirectly (from their forced choice responses to each of the eight scenarios found in Appendix A) and directly (from quantification of open ended questions that originally yielded qualitative data, See Appendix E).

For the open ended question asking if it "was OK to lie" our participants clearly felt that it was definitely OK. Some reasons the participants gave were, "It depends on what you're lying about. Like lying to a sick person to tell them they look better." Or, "It's OK to lie for certain situations, where the lie can only do good and not harm."

When asked "Is it always right to tell the truth regardless of what the effect of it might be?" more than two thirds of the participants said no. Examples of their explanations were, "White lies can be beneficial." "Sometimes lying doesn't hurt people, it just makes them sleep better at night." One student was adamant, saying "No. Really it is impossible to always tell the truth unless you are G-d. One has to lie a little in life in order to get by. The truth is sometimes worse than a lie."

However, when looking at the evaluations of right and wrong in the eight scenarios, a chi-square analysis of the median split between very right and very wrong ($\chi^2 =$

(1,N=2)=101.36), $p<.01$) showed that significantly more participants believed that the deceptive actions of the protagonists were wrong. The number 444 was expected in each cell, but there were 294 judgments of the protagonists' actions as right and 594 judgments that these actions were wrong. Only in one story, where John did not tell of an illness in order to get a desired acting part, did the participants judge that the action was more right than wrong. Fifty eight percent of the respondents found the justice individualist reason (John "deserved this last attempt to keep his memory alive.") as most acceptable. Some participants mentioned that John's condition was his business alone. One reason for the difference in results between the open ended question which asked generally if truth must be told and when asking for a specific judgment as part of a story might be that people look at lies and deception as relative to the situation. They cannot say that lies are absolutely wrong, because they usually see a situation where, in their opinion, it might be necessary. When asked if it was OK to lie, one participant said "no," but followed it with, "unless you're hurting someone's feelings." Also, when asked directly about lying, our participants may put themselves into the equation and rationalized why it is OK for them to lie. But in the stories they looked outside of themselves and were

uncomfortable seeing the lie, and perhaps, themselves being lied to.

A major interest of this study has been on gender. Do men and women differ in their moral assessment of lies? When looking at the evaluation of lies and deceptions as a whole, significant findings, as predicted, were seen for gender. Men did see lies and deceptions as more right than women did. In the vignettes, women judged all deceptive actions except Pam's (where a young lady uses deception to get the attentions of a young man) as more wrong. It was predicted that all participants would regard lies of commission more unfavorably than lies of omission. Men saw lies of omission as more wrong, showing a greater divergence between lies of commission and omission than women did. Women looked at lies of commission more unfavorably than did men. This interesting interaction effect may indicate that males prefer the direct approach. In future studies it may be interesting to change the gender of the protagonist in the vignette to see if this changes the participant's views of deception.

When looking at the results by gender, there was no confounding from variables of first language, country of origin, religion, religiosity and culture, with each considered an independent factor. BSRI did correlate with gender as expected. Mach scores also correlated with gender

as predicted, with men scoring high on this trait and women scoring lower.

Participants who were not born in the United States judged deceptions, as a whole, as more wrong than those born in the United States. Of the two types of lies studied, the foreign born saw commission lies as more wrong. The participants' scores from the Triandis Scale corresponds with these findings, with collectivists rating both omission and commission deceptions as more wrong than individualists, and commission lies as more wrong than omission lies. Perhaps, those born in the United States (considered an individualistic culture) approve of the pragmatic nature of deception when necessary. One US born participant stated for the question "Is it OK to lie?" "Yes, when it is convenient for you, but only when the lie will not cause irreparable damage." But a foreign born participant was not comfortable with lies, saying it was not OK, but if a lie must be told, it should be "When you face a situation [where you] don't have any options." Data from the vignettes is consistent with all stories that are significant showing collectivists and foreign born being more disapproving.

There was a significant difference in the evaluation of deception between the eleven religious groups (See table 4) that participated. The Hindu and Muslim students viewed deception as more wrong. The Greek Orthodox and Agnostic

students saw it as most right. The more prevalent religions at the college (see table 3) did not view lies and deceptions as different from each other. Although significant results were gotten, the numbers of the groups who practiced the Hindu, Muslim and Greek Orthodox religions were small. It would be helpful if larger populations of each religion were used to see if the results can be replicated. Religious affiliation did not make a difference in judgment of omission versus commission lies. Only the Fred and Nancy vignette showed significant results. The group labeled "other" saw it as most wrong and the Greek Orthodox saw it as most right.

Level of religious observance (religiosity) did make a difference in evaluation of deception in the expected direction, with those who said they were more religious seeing deception as a whole as more wrong than those who labeled themselves as less religious. However, those who rated themselves as less religious did not see lies of commission as being quite as wrong as lies of omission. Joe and Brandon's stories, which demonstrate lies of commission, were disapproved of more by the more religious participants. Joe's story was one of life and death and of his going against the rules of the hospital. Brett, it was stated, was brought up strictly and went against the rules of his family. Perhaps breaking the rules of a higher authority

led to the disapproval of those who are more religious. In the remaining stories (except Fred and Nancy's where the opinions of the more and less religious were essentially the same) the more religious disapproved of deception more than the less religious.

While there was not a significant difference in the general perception of lies and deception between students who scored high on femininity and students who scored high on masculinity, results were solidly in the same direction as gender with the more feminine participants being more disapproving of lies and deceptions overall. The more feminine participant disapproved of lies of omission more than the more masculine. This is the reverse of the gender results where women looked at lies of commission as more wrong. Results from the vignettes were not significant, but did show strong trends in the expected direction, with the more feminine being more disapproving in six of the eight stories. In the open ended questions, when asked if it was OK to lie, there was a significant difference, with the more masculine participants seeing it as more OK than the more feminine participants.

When looking at participants' levels of Machiavellianism, significant results are found in the open ended questions, with high Machs saying yes, it is OK to lie and no, it is not always right to tell the truth.

Surprisingly, data from the responses to how right and wrong the characters' behaviors in the vignettes were show the general evaluations of lies and deceptions did not differ between the high and low Machs. There was also no difference between in their evaluations of omission and commission lies. Individual analysis of the vignettes did not yield significant results. However, when two questions from the Mach Scale that directly asked about lies and honesty were analyzed, there was a difference in the expected direction with low Machs disapproving of lies and deceptions more than high Machs. Apparently, when judging others high and low Machs agree, but when it is their own behavior, standards differ.

In this study we hoped to add evidence to Gilligan's assertion that men and women viewed and evaluated moral dilemmas from two different perspectives. While both genders were capable of considering both perspectives, Gilligan & Attanucci (1988) claim that women focus primarily on care and men focus primarily on justice. Evidence supporting their position did not appear in this study. There were no clear distinctions among care and justice and gender. From the participants' open ended reports, as well as from the frequency of care versus justice responses from the scenarios, we see that, in this study, care is a more pervasively used orientation. Participants overwhelmingly

report that not hurting others is of utmost importance. Men and women equally employ care and justice perspectives.

It was thought that perhaps with changing sex roles, a primarily care or justice orientation would no longer fall along strictly biological lines and would show up in people who were more masculine or feminine (as measured by the Bem Sex Role Inventory) regardless of gender. However, the care/justice orientation did not materialize here either.

Since Gilligan published In a Different Voice in 1982 psychology has been fascinated with her distinctions between men and women's moral frameworks: justice vs. care. However, empirical evidence has not consistently found this distinction to be present between genders. Jaffe and Hyde (2000) have undertaken a meta-analysis of 113 articles from PsycLIT, ERIC and Dissertation Abstracts from 1966 to 1998 which met the criteria of being empirical studies. These criteria included studies that had at least five males and five females, did not report data that had been done elsewhere and were not confounded by age and gender. They discovered very little support for Gilligan's assertion that men and women had distinct moral orientations. This is consistent with findings of this study. They have suggested that Gilligan may have oversimplified Kohlbergian moral reasoning when addressing the justice orientation. Perhaps "justice and rights exist in the context of social

responsibilities and obligations (P.706)."

Most of Gilligan's work was done with women. In her 1993 edition of *A Different Voice* she states that the voices she traces are those of women ". . . it is primarily through women's voices that I trace its development (p.2)." This imbalance is ironic because Gilligan chastised Kohlberg for working primarily with males and leaving women out. She complains that men's experiences stand for human experiences. They leave women out. Worse yet, she says, women leave themselves out. Gilligan's work, despite her protestations to the contrary, essentially leaves out males. In her preface to the 1993 edition of *In a Different Voice*, Gilligan stated that she does not want the meaning of her work to be seen as portraying women as better than men or vice versa. However, there is a real spirit of portraying women's care perspective as a real strength and keeping justice on the sidelines. She defends the care perspective and its connection to women. She gives it much more space and emphasis in her writing. This emphasis may have skewed her results.

The students in this current study, while showing both the care perspective and the justice perspective, demonstrated care to a greater degree. This held true for men and women. In the open ended question, asking which is a more acceptable reason for a lie, 34 men stated that the

care response: saving feelings and maintaining the solidarity of the group was more important than the justice response: being fair to all and respecting the rights of each person involved. Only 21 men saw the justice rationale as being better. Women were more even in their response to this question with 25 choosing the care reason and 27 choosing justice reason. In the analysis of the vignettes we saw that men showed care and justice evenly and women leaned a bit more toward care. Gilligan made an important contribution by introducing two separate perspectives in moral reasoning: care and justice. However, these views are shared by both genders to a greater extent than she believes. In conclusion, while Gilligan's argument is compelling, it does not hold up empirically. Piaget and Kohlberg's work may also result in quite different responses if done today.

Appendix A

Directions

1. Here are eight stories in which the main character acts deceptively. After each story, you will see a six part scale on which to record your beliefs about how right or wrong you think the main character's actions are. Put a check in one of the six boxes of this scale that most corresponds to your feelings.
2. In addition, each story is followed by four statements explaining the character's behavior. Imagine that you are in the main character's position. What would be your reasons for this person's actions? Each of the four statements is followed by a six part scale from: 1 "very good reason" to 6 "very bad reason." Use a number from this scale to reflect whether you consider that statement to be a good or bad reason for you. Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the main character's rationale by circling a number following each statement. Give your opinion on every statement. There are no right or wrong answers. If you find the numbers to be used in answering do not adequately indicate our own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.
3. Finally, after each story there is a sixth question. For this question you should indicate which of the four reasons following each story is the best reason for you. Again, if none are representative of your opinion, please choose the one which is closest to the way you feel.

John was an actor. One day he got his big break and was given the lead in a big budget movie. He and a cast of other actors were to go on location. John had not felt well and was undergoing tests. He learned from his doctor, on the same day, that he had inoperable cancer and only a short time to live. Although he did not know if he would live to complete the movie, he took the job anyway, without telling anyone of his condition.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe saying this to the interviewer was.

Very right | | | | | | | Very wrong

John believed it was OK to keep the information from the studio because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good reason	good reason	acceptable reason	weak reason	bad reason	very bad reason

1. He deserved this last attempt to keep his memory alive through film after he passed away.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. As one of a society of actors, he knew of the unwritten rule that the show must go on. Any actor worth his salt would do whatever he could to make this happen.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. His priority was making other people happy through his acting under any circumstances.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. His family would be hurt and disappointed if he quit now.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Marla is the parent of a high school student. The family lives in a tough neighborhood. Marla's child belonged to a gang for many years. While this gang was warring with another gang, an unaffiliated student was killed in the cross fire. After this incident, Marla learned that her child had a gun and secretly carried it to school despite laws against it. Marla told the police that there were no guns in her household.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe Marla's action was.

Very right |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| Very wrong

Marla felt it was OK to behave deceptively because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good	good	acceptable	weak	bad	very bad
reason	reason	reason	reason	reason	reason

1. The code of the family take priority over the laws of the state.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. She believed justice would be served better if she handled this problem on her own, without outside interference.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. Marla felt that it was in this child's best interest to be left alone because the behavior was for the purpose of self-preservation.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. Marla could not bear the thought of her child being hurt.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Michelle's 16-year-old friend Brittany was always in trouble with her parents. She had difficulty following their rules and felt they were too strict. Brittany went to a party in Michelle's house without permission. Brittany's parents suspected that she was at the party and called Michelle. Michelle, knowing that the parents were looking for Brittany, attempted to divert their attention by engaging them in conversation. She then asked how Brittany was doing, giving the parents the impression that Brittany was not there.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe this action was.

Very right |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| Very wrong

Michelle believed it was OK to keep Brittany's presence hidden because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good	good	acceptable	weak	bad	very bad
reason	reason	reason	reason	reason	reason

1. People who are in your group, like friends, should be protected.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. Brittany had the right to go where she wanted.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. Michelle believed that she was helping Brittany by allowing her to maintain her independence.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. Michelle believed that if coming to her party was fair for other teenagers, it was fair for Brittany.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Joe is a physician in a prominent hospital. He is treating a middle-aged patient with advanced heart disease. The patient is in a great deal of pain. Specialists have been called in, and there is nothing more to do. The patient could live from a few days to a few weeks. Joe knows that he can start a morphine drip (an accepted medical practice) that will alleviate the patient's pain. Because of the side effects of this drip, the patient will die within hours. Joe is aware of this, but because of the euthanasia laws, he cannot say anything to anyone and, so, secretly begins the morphine drip. The patient died. The death was presumed to be of natural causes. There was no autopsy. After the death, Joe is asked at the medical inquiry if he had done everything in his power to preserve life. He said he had.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe this response to the medical inquiry was.

Very right |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| Very wrong

Joe believed it was OK to lie to the Board because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good reason	good reason	acceptable reason	weak reason	bad reason	very bad reason

1. Joe did not want the reputation of the hospital to be tarnished should the news of his actions be made public.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. Joe knew he acted out of care and compassion.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. Joe did not want to get caught breaking the law.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. This was an accepted medical practice. He was only doing what most of his colleagues did.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Fred and Nancy were a married couple. Nancy later learned from her parents that she had a 50% chance of having inherited a life threatening disease. If she had it, the disease would manifest itself within the next five years and she would die at that time. There was no cure and no drugs to help relieve the symptoms. A genetic test had just been developed that would tell if Nancy had the gene for this disease. She chose not to avail herself of this test. She also chose not to say anything to Fred about what she had learned from her parents.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe not telling Fred was.

Very right |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| Very wrong

Nancy believed it was OK to keep this from Fred because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good reason	good reason	acceptable reason	weak reason	bad reason	very bad reason

1. She was concerned about his well-being and did not want him to look at her everyday, suffering with worry.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. She worried that he would no longer care about her or want to be married to her.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. She believed that sharing the knowledge of her potential disease might place her marriage at a disadvantage.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. She saw adversity as a challenge to be met, by herself, on her own terms.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Brandon, who is 16 years old, was invited to go to his close friend's birthday party. His parents believe in a firm and strict upbringing, fearing that children will go astray if not watched closely. Brandon goes to the party without permission, knowing that they would disapprove strongly and say no if asked. The parents learn of the party and ask Brandon if he had been there. He said no.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe this action was.

Very right |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| Very wrong

Brandon does not tell his parents because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good reason	good reason	acceptable reason	weak reason	bad reason	very bad reason

1. He did not want to disappoint his parents because he cared about them and believed his family wanted what was good for him.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. By not telling them this time, he could continue doing what he believed he should, while keeping peace in the family and not arousing future suspicion.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. He saw no reason to worry them, now that he had already done it.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. He did not want to be punished.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Pam is a beautiful, personable 16-year-old high school student, working on a science project at the local college. She meets very handsome Mark who is 21. While they talk and grow closer, he mistakenly comes to believe from some of the things she says, that she is also 21 and will soon be graduating from college. She does not correct this impression.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe this action was.

Very right |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| Very wrong

Pam felt it was OK to keep this from Mark because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good reason	good reason	acceptable reason	weak reason	bad reason	very bad reason

1. She wanted to make him and her parents happy by making a good match.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. She saw it as her opportunity to find a loving relationship.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. It is unfair that society disapproves of this age discrepancy.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. She believed that each dating situation should be unique and considered on its own merits.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Brett was a politician, who came from a long line of public servants (politicians). His goal was to become President of the United States. While lobbying for this position, he learned that a journalist had discovered some damaging information in his background. If found out, he would definitely be impeached after winning the office. Brett struck a bargain with the reporter to keep it quiet. At the time that full disclosure was required, Brett denied any trouble in his background, and went on to run for the office of President.

On a scale of one to six, check how right or wrong you believe this denial was.

Very right |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| |__| Very wrong

Brett believed it was OK to cover this up because:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very good	good	acceptable	weak	bad	very bad
reason	reason	reason	reason	reason	reason

1. He believed he deserved his shot at glory.

1 2 3 4 5 6

2. He really wanted to stand out and make a difference by getting this chance to be of help.

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. If this problem was not revealed, he would have the same chance to win as everyone else in his family before him.

1 2 3 4 5 6

4. He did not want to disappoint his family.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Of the four reasons provided above, circle the one best reason for the deception, from your point of view.

reason #1 reason #2 reason #3 reason #4

Appendix B

We now have a set of scenarios. Each scenario is followed by four options. Please imagine yourself in those situations and rank these options, by placing a 1 next to the option you consider the best, or the most “right” or “appropriate for you.” Place a 2 next to the next best option. Do not bother to rank 3 and 4. Remember there are no “correct” answers; just your opinion of what is best.

1. You and your friends decided spontaneously to go out to dinner at a restaurant. What do you think is the best way to handle the bill?

- A. Split it equally, without regard to who ordered what ____
- B. Split it according to how much each person makes ____
- C. The group leader pays the bill or decides how to split it ____
- D. Compute each person’s change, according to what that person ordered ____

2. You are buying a piece of art for your office. Which one factor is most important in deciding whether to buy it?

- A. It is a good investment ____
- B. Your coworkers will like it ____
- C. You just like it ____
- D. Your supervisor will approve of it ____

3. Happiness is attained by

- A. gaining a lot of status in the community ____
- B. linking with a lot of friendly people ____
- C. keeping one’s privacy ____
- D. winning in competition ____

4. You are planning to take a major trip that is likely to inconvenience a lot of people at your place of work, during your absence. With whom will you discuss it, before deciding whether or not to take it?
- A. No one___
 - B. My parents___
 - C. My spouse or close friend___
 - D. Experts about the place I plan to travel to so I can decide if I want to go___
5. Which one of these four books appears to you to be the most interesting?
- A. How to make friends___
 - B. How to succeed in business___
 - C. How to enjoy yourself inexpensively___
 - D. How to make sure you are meeting your obligations___
6. Which is the most important factor in an employee's promotion, assuming that all other factors such as tenure and performance are equal? Employee is or has
- A. loyal to the company___
 - B. obedient to the instructions from management___
 - C. able to think for him-or herself___
 - D. contributed to the corporation much in the past___
7. In your opinion, in an ideal society, national budgets will be determined so that
- A. all people have adequate incomes to meet basic needs___
 - B. some people will be rewarded for making brilliant contributions___
 - C. there will be maximum stability, law and order___
 - D. people can feel unique and self-actualized___

8. When people ask me about myself, I
- A. talk about my ancestors and their traditions___
 - B. talk about my friends and what we like to do___
 - C. talk about my accomplishments___
 - D. talk about what makes me unique___
9. Suppose your fiancé(e) and your parents do not get along very well. What would you do?
- A. Nothing___
 - B. Tell my fiancé that I need my parent's financial support and that he or she should learn to handle the politics___
 - C. Tell my fiancé(e) that he or she should make a greater effort to "fit in with the family"___
 - D. Remind my fiancé that my parents and family are very important to me and he or she should submit to their wishes___
10. Teams of five people entered a science project contest. Your team won first prize and a prize of \$100. You and another person did 95% of the work on the project. How should the money be distributed?
- A. Split it equally, without regard to who did what___
 - B. The other person and I get 95% of the money and the rest goes to the group___
 - C. The group leader decides how to split the money___
 - D. Divide the money the way that gives the most satisfaction___

11. Imagine you are selecting a band for a fundraising event given by our organization. Which are the most important factors in making you decision?

- A. I really like the band___**
- B. My friends approve of this band___**
- C. The administration of my organization approves of the band___**
- D. The band that will draw a large crowd___**

12. Which candidate will you vote for in the election for president of the student government?

- A. The one your friends are voting for___**
- B. The one I like best___**
- C. The one who will reward me personally___**
- D. The one who is a member of an organization important to me. The status of the organization will improve if that candidate is elected___**

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**Appendix C
Pages 114-115**

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Appendix D

Listed below are a number of statements. Each represents a commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion.

Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by circling the number in front of each statement. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below:

If you *agree strongly*, circle +3
 If you *agree somewhat*, circle +2
 If you *agree slightly*, circle +1
 If you *disagree slightly*, circle -1
 If you *disagree somewhat*, circle -2
 If you *disagree strongly*, circle -3

First impressions are usually best in such matters. Read each statement, decide if you agree or disagree and the strength of your opinion, and then circle the appropriate number in front of the statement. Give your opinion on every statement.

If you find the numbers to be used in answering do not adequately indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.

1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.

+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3
AGREE	AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT	SLIGHTLY	SLIGHTLY	SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.

+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3
----	----	----	----	----	----

3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.

+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3
----	----	----	----	----	----

4. Most people are basically good and kind.

+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3
----	----	----	----	----	----

5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.

+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3
----	----	----	----	----	----

6. **Honesty is the best policy in all cases.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
7. **There is no excuse for lying to someone else.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
8. **Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
9. **All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
10. **When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
11. **Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
12. **Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
13. **The biggest difference between most criminal and other people is that the criminals are stupid enough to get caught.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
14. **Most men are brave.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
15. **It is wise to flatter important people.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
16. **It is possible to be good in all respects.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
17. **Barnum was wrong when he said that there's a sucker born every minute.**
 +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of property.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

Appendix E

Answer each of the following questions. Brief explanations will be needed for some. If you can, give examples.

1. Is it OK to lie? Why?

2. When do you think it is OK to lie? Explain.

3. Which is a more acceptable reason for a lie or a deception?

- a) saving the feelings of another &/or maintaining the cohesion of the group or:
- b) being fair to all and respecting the rights of each individual involved. Explain.

4. Which is more right or wrong?

- a) a lie where you do not say anything directly, but act as if you know nothing about what is going on.
- b) a lie where you give false information directly.
- c) Or, are both lies the same to you? Explain.

5. Is it always right to tell the truth regardless of what the effect of it might be? Explain.

Appendix F

Subject # _____

Please provide the following information:

1. Gender (circle): Male Female 2. Age: _____
3. Is your first language English? _____
4. If not, what is your first language? (please check one)

Spanish _____	Hebrew _____
Korean _____	Chinese _____
Russian _____	Other (please specify) _____
5. In what country were you born? _____
6. Where was your mother born? _____
7. Where was your father born? _____
8. What is your religion? (please check one)

Protestant/Christian _____	Catholic _____
Jewish _____	Buddhist _____
Muslim _____	Other (please specify) _____
9. How religious are you? (How strictly do you practice the rules of your religion?)
Please check one.

a) Extremely _____ b) Moderately _____ c) Somewhat _____ d) Not at all _____
10. What games or sports do you play (if any)? _____
11. What is the extent of your participation? Please check one.

a) A great deal _____ b) An average amount _____ c) A little _____ d) I hardly play _____
12. What is your major? _____

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