

**POLICING POLITICS: CRIME AND CONFLICT IN BRITISH**

**MANDATE PALESTINE (1920-1948)**

**by**

**ELIZABETH BARTELS**

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty  
in Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
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
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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**Abstract****POLICING POLITICS: CRIME AND CONFLICT IN BRITISH  
MANDATE PALESTINE (1920-1948)**

by

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The objective of this study is to provide a theoretically grounded explanation of the British reaction towards crime perpetrated by the Arab and Jewish Underground movements in Mandate Palestine (1920-1948). This thesis is based on an historical analysis of archival sources.

From a conflict and critical theory perspective, this work aims first to explain British criminal justice policy decisions during the Mandate towards the following five crimes of the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds: Political Assassinations, Weapons Smuggling, Robbery and Extortion, Illegal Immigration, and Bombs and Sabotage. The concept of vigilantism is also employed to examine the development of the private policing roles taken on by the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds.

These three conceptual frameworks are used as a guide in an exploration of the power shifts of Mandate Palestine. This thesis proposes that private police forces in Mandate Palestine were established in reaction to growing dissatisfaction of disenfranchised community groups. This dissertation outlines how these police forces developed into competing power bases to the established rule of law.

This study used mainly qualitative methods. There is a small segment of the thesis which includes quantitative data. The qualitative data analysis was based on a

content analysis design. The quantitative data were analyzed using simple descriptive statistics.

The quantitative analyses of this work includes a macro- and micro-level analysis. The macro-level analysis consisted of the tracking of crime over the length of the Mandate Period. This analysis was based on published Palestine Police Force crime figures and official demographic reports. The micro-level component of the quantitative analysis was the examination of Jewish “terror” suspect files of the Palestine Police Criminal Investigation Division.

The British Mandate of Palestine was a period of extreme ethnic, social, and political conflict. This thesis provides a lesson for contemporary police forces of divided societies. The conflicting community demands placed on the Palestine Police during the Mandate Period are reflective of modern-day policing dilemmas. The lesson learned from the British experience in Palestine is that the balancing of community interests is paramount for any police force attempting peace and security.

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## INTRODUCTION

### Statement of the Problem

The establishment of the British Mandate in 1922 created a dramatic political division among the inhabitants of Palestine. In particular, ethnic conflict erupted among the Arab and Jewish Palestinian populations. In the span of only a few decades, the world witnessed a complicated power struggle develop between the Arabs and the Jews.

The British colonial authorities, while a common target of resentment, held the responsibility of maintaining security for all. This dissertation attempts to explain how British criminal justice policy failed during the Mandate. In developing an understanding of British policy, this thesis analyzes the official response towards five politically motivated crimes.

The five crimes chosen for analysis in this work are: political assassinations, weapons smuggling, robbery and extortion, illegal immigration, and bombs and sabotage. These five crimes were selected for both their seriousness and the availability of pertinent primary source material. The contemporary interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict has caused the preservation of material relevant to political concerns, including information on political crime. In contrast, information on “common criminals” in Mandate Palestine was largely not preserved. John Foster, a representative of the Palestine Police Old Comrades Association, confirmed that “all of the old Palestine Police records have either been lost or destroyed” (Personal Communication, 2002).

From the critical and conflict theory perspectives, this work discusses the consequences of British criminal justice policy decisions. The danger posed by the formation of private police groups is highlighted. The current crisis between Arabs and

Jews in modern-day Israel is argued to be traceable to British failures in maintaining justice during the Mandate.

### Review of the Literature

A clear gap exists in the literature concerning an analysis of the British reaction to politically motivated crime in Mandate Palestine. The dearth of this analysis appears, despite an apparent research interest.

There is an abundance of published material on a multitude of topics concerning British rule in Palestine. Past works on the Mandate are largely political analyses and special interest pieces.

The political examinations of Mandate Palestine can be divided into three categories: 1) the policies of the Palestine Mandate administration, 2) the inner-workings of the War of 1948, and 3) the Palestinian Arab and Zionist nationalist movements.

Most texts on the political policies of Mandate Palestine are comprehensive chronologies based on archival materials and personal interviews; for example, *The High Walls of Jerusalem: a history of the Balfour Declaration and the birth of the British Mandate for Palestine* (Sanders, 1984), *Colonialism, Zionism, and Law in Early Mandate Palestine* (Shamir, 2000), *The Palestine Triangle: the struggle between Arabs and Jews* (Bethell, 1980), and *Palestine: a study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies* (ESCO Foundation for Palestine, 1947).

On the other hand, a more colorful depiction of Mandate Palestine was written by Israeli journalist, Tom Segev, in *One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate* (Segev, 2000). A number of books also exist which discuss Mandate Palestine within the context of the origins of the current Arab-Israeli conflict. Among these works are *The Transformation of Palestine* (Abu-Lughod, 1987) and *A Concise*

*History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002). Despite the aforementioned political examinations, none discuss crime trends and criminal justice decision-making in length.

There exist a handful of invaluable memoirs of British, Jewish, and Arab residents of Mandate Palestine. These works provide insight into the mores of the time. Jewish Palestinian memoirs include *Daughter of the Waves: Memories of Growing up in Pre-War Palestine* (Jordan, 1983), *Memoirs and Poetry by a Native Israeli* (Dor, 1994), and *Rebel with a Cause: a Memoir* (Silmon-Cheong, 2001). Palestinian Arab memoirs include *A Bedouin Boyhood* (Diqs, 1983), *The First Well: a Bethlehem Boyhood* (Ibrahim, 1995) and *Children of Bethany* (Aburish, 1988). There are additionally a handful of chronicles written by British civil servants or their family members: including, Edwin Samuel (1970), son of first High Commissioner of Palestine Herbert Samuel, in *A Lifetime in Jerusalem*; Eunice Holliday (1997), wife of a British civil engineer, in *Letters from Jerusalem during the Mandate*; and British statesman Edward Keith-Roach (1994), in *Pasha of Jerusalem: memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*.

An exception to the lack of criminal justice attention displayed by past researchers, are the works which exclusively focus on the events surrounding the 1936-1939 Arab Riots. Most notable of the riot texts is Martin Kolinsky's (1993) work, *Law, Order, and Riots in Mandatory Palestine: 1928 -1935*.

The second category of political texts concerning Mandate Palestine, are those pieces dedicated to discussions of the 1948 War. These texts include Benny Morris's (2001) controversial investigation of the war and Haim Levenberg's (1993) historical

examination of Arab war-time strategies. Both authors concluded that the neighboring Arab militias underestimated the Jewish forces, and that the Palestinian Arabs overly relied on their assistance. There are also a couple of articles in scholarly journals on the subject: “The Debate about 1948” (Shalim, 1995) and “The Haifa Turning Point: The British Administration and the Civil War in Palestine, December 1947-May 1948” (Golani, 2001).

There is an abundance of texts on the budding Palestinian Arab and Zionist movements of the Mandate years. Palestinian Arab Underground movements were detailed in Yehoshua Porath’s two volume work: *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement* (1974) and *The Palestinian Arab National Movement: from riots to rebellion* (1977). Porath’s (1977) work includes a listing, derived from past published works and archival sources, of the leaders of the nationalist movement.

Academics Rashid Khalidi (1997) in *Palestinian Identity: the construction of modern national consciousness*, and Anne Lesch (1979) in *Arab politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: the frustration of a nationalist movement*, both wrote historic chronologies of a Palestinian Arab nationalist movement riddled by factionalism. Also pertinent to Arab nationalism during the Mandate were scholarly articles by Baruch Kimmerling (2000), “The Formation of Palestinian Collective Identities” and Arieh Kochavi (1998), “The Struggle against Jewish Immigration to Palestine.” From a different methodological perspective, Ted Swedenburg (1995) described the politics behind the Arab Great Rebellion based on the author’s field research in the Palestinian territories.

There are a number of similar political works detailing the Zionist movement. Essential among them are *The Struggle for Palestine* (Hurewitz, 1968), *Zion and State:*

*nations, class, and the shaping of Modern Israel* (Cohen, 1987), and Walter Laqueur's (1972) classic, *A History of Zionism*. There are also published collections of historical essays and personal diaries essential to an understanding of Zionism. These works include *The Zionist Idea* (Hertzberg, 1959), *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl* (Lowenthal, 1958), and *The Making of Modern Zionism: the intellectual origins of the Jewish State* (Avineri, 1981). Scholarly works offering a critique in opposition to Zionism include *The Tragedy of Zionism: revolution and democracy in the land of Israel* (Avishai, 1985) and *The Founding Myths of Israel: nationalism, socialism, and the making of the Jewish State* (Sternhell, 2001).

Additionally, there are texts which provide an in-depth examination of the Zionist Underground. These works focus on the politics of the revolutionary groups, but none chronicle the groups' criminal schemes. Joseph Heller (1995) wrote an intensive discussion of the Stern Group's activities and ideology in *The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics, and Terror*. Heller's work, derived from personal interviews with ex-Stern members and archival material, argued that the Stern Group was not simply a splinter faction of the Irgun Zvi Leumi. Instead, Heller envisioned the Sternists as a unique society of Zionist revisionists with strong Bolshevik, pro-Soviet sympathies.

On the other hand, the exploits of the Haganah are recounted in autobiographies by former members, such as Gershon Rivlin (1994) in *Haganah Highlights* and Benjamin Edelman (1965) in *Adventures at the wheel: memoirs of a native-born Jerusalemite*. In a twist on the subject, Yitzhak Gil-Har (2003) chronicled the use of Jewish informants by the Palestine Police in helping to control the activities of the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds.

The second set of texts on the Mandate are special interest pieces dedicated to special interest concerns: for example, the influence of foreign and religious leaders on British policy (Youseff, 2002), changes in the Arab-Jewish labor market (Bernstein, 2000), Jewish agricultural development (Kamen, 1991), Palestine-TransJordan geographical boundary shifts (Biger, 1994), and Arab-Jewish land sales (Averni, 1984; Stein, 1984). None exist on criminal justice administration during the Mandate.

Of most relevance to this thesis are the special interest works which discuss the areas of law, police, and a few specific crimes (assassinations, illegal immigration, and arms policy).

Two especially in-depth examinations of the Islamic influence on law are: Robert Eisenman's (1978) study, *Islamic law in Palestine and Israel : a history of the survival of Tanzimat and Shar' i'a in the British Mandate and the Jewish state* and Frederic Goadby's (1924) work, *Commentary on Egyptian criminal law and the related criminal law of Palestine, Cyprus, and Iraq*.

Most relevant to police research is the work of Joshua Caspi (1991), *Policing the Holy Land, 1918-1957: The transition from a colonial to a national model of policing and changing conceptions of police accountability analyzing the transition of the British Palestine Police Force to an Israeli national one*. Caspi utilized a great number of primary source documents regarding British and Israeli police organization and accountability methods. Other valuable sources of Palestine Police history are the personal memoirs of several officers. These memoirs include *Policeman in Palestine: Memories of the early years* (Imray, 1995), *Palestine Policeman: an account of eighteen dramatic months in the Palestine police force during the great Jew-Arab troubles*

(Courtney, 1939), *A Job Well Done: a History of the Palestine Police Force* (Horne, 1982), and *Palestine Unveiled* (Duff, 1938). There are also memoirs by Jewish supernumerary police officers: *Crime and Criminals in Palestine* (Tidhar, 1924) and *A Special Constable in Palestine: some personal experiences of a South African* (Kluk, 1938). Useful in the study of arms smuggling were the memoirs of British military investigator, Norman Phillips (1954), in *Guns, Drugs, and Deserters: the special investigation branch in the Middle East*. Although Phillips' official investigations spanned the entire Middle East, a discussion of Palestine was included.

In the area of crime, there were complete works published on three of the five crimes studied in this text: assassinations, illegal immigration, and arms policy.

A thorough investigation of political assassinations by Jewish underground members was written by Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1993) in *Political Assassinations by Jews: a rhetorical device for justice*. Ben-Yehuda relied on Israeli archives, personal interviews, and memoirs to publish a work which attempted to list every planned and foiled Jewish assassination. His work spanned assassinations which occurred between biblical times and 1988 (in modern day Israel). On "illegal" immigration, the texts mainly consist of autobiographical memoirs written by former Jewish Underground members. These works include the following: J. Kimche and D. Kimche's (1954) *The Secret Roads: the "illegal" migration of a people (1938-1948)* and Y. Ben-Ami's (1966) *Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memories from the Irgun*. There are also historical narratives which describe illegal immigration operations (Edelheit, 1996). There was one work published concerning British arms policy, *The Failure of the British Military Arms Strategy Within Palestine 1939-1947* (Hoffman, 1983).

Yet no one researcher has focused, extensively and exclusively, on British criminal justice administration in Mandate Palestine.

#### Statement of Research Question

The objective of this study is to provide a theoretically grounded explanation of the British reaction towards crime perpetrated by the Underground movements in Mandate Palestine. This thesis is based on an historical analysis of archival sources. Within the framework of critical and conflict theories, the development of private policing measures is argued to have been the inevitable result of community frustration with the criminal justice system.

Political violence, as discussed in this work, is sometimes referred to as *terrorism*. In these occurrences, the term terrorism is based on the neutral definition posited by Martha Crenshaw (1983) in *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power*. Crenshaw's definition, while not condoning political violence, rejects a normative approach which carries the assumption of a lack of legitimacy. Crenshaw's definition of terrorism is as follows:

[T]he systematic use of unorthodox political violence by small conspiratorial groups with the purpose of manipulating political attitudes rather than physically defeating the enemy. The intent of terrorism is psychological and symbolic, not material. Terrorism is premeditated and purposeful violence, employed in a struggle for political power. (Crenshaw, 1983, p. 2)

The Jewish Underground studied in this work consists of the following three Jewish groups: the Haganah, the Stern Group, and the Irgun Zvai Leumi. The Arab Underground studied are those organizations which aligned themselves with the Haj Amin el Husayni. The criminal activity of these parties were selected for analysis

because the author found them as most prominent among political criminals of Mandate Palestine.

On a similar note, this thesis avoids the use of the terms “gangs” and “bandits.” Only in discussions of the Great Rebellion is the label “rebel” used to describe the participants. The use of the label “terrorists” is also only used when quoting a British source. The reason for these word choices is because these terms imply judgments regarding the motivations of the discussed crime perpetrators. The terms “underground,” “groups,” “parties,” and “associates” are the preferred terms in this thesis because of their apolitical implications.

### Theoretical Background

From a conflict and critical theory perspective, this work aims first to explain British criminal justice policy decisions during the Mandate. Secondly, the concept of *vigilantism* is employed to examine the criminal activity of the Arab and Jewish Underground movements. These three conceptual frameworks are used as a guide in an exploration of the power shifts of Mandate Palestine.

Conflict theory developed in the mid-twentieth century. At this time in history, sociologists began to seriously question whether consensual norms can exist in a culturally and politically diverse society. Conflict theorists posited, that in order to better understand society, it is necessary to examine the power relations between groups with competing normative definitions of behavior (Foucault, 1994). Conflict theory is employed in this work as a means to understand the challenges which faced Mandate Palestine criminal justice administrators. The normative definition of certain behaviors as criminal was offensive to some community group members, while demanded by

others. This policing dilemma of Mandate Palestine is common in any culturally diverse society.

Critical theory, complimentary to conflict theory, is a second theoretical prism used in this piece. Critical theorists contend that any given society's ruling power utilizes the criminal justice system as an instrument of power maintenance. According to critical theorists, threatening individuals are strategically assigned criminal status by the power elite and receive a disproportionate amount of official attention (Quinney, 2001; Turk, 1969). Turk (1982) further insisted that "conventional crime laws have been used politically wherever subjects have struggled against the terms of their subjection – economic, racial, or political, as these appear in various complex blends" (pp. 40-41).

In Mandate Palestine, it is argued that the British practiced selective law enforcement in an effort to maintain the status quo. The results of short-term politically advantageous decisions of the Authorities proved fatal to their long-term colonial goals. The British authorities' ultimate abdication of their authority is explained as an inevitable consequence of their lack of evenhandedness in criminal justice policy.

The second focus of this work is the consequential development of Arab and Jewish private policing organizations during Mandate Palestine. It is argued that Arab and Jewish private policing measures took on a spirit of *vigilantism*. The term "vigilantism" was broadly defined by Andrew Karmen (2001) as "a 'do-it-yourself' approach" to criminal justice (p. 331). In a discussion of American vigilantism, Karmen (2001) remarked:

Over the course of American history, vigilantism has often arisen as a response to victimization. Vigilantes called for action whenever 'honest, upright citizens'

became enraged and terrified about what they considered to be an upsurge of criminality and a breakdown of law and order. Pointing to the plight of victims, vigilantes feared that they would be next if they didn't take drastic measures. (p. 331)

A vigilante organization is different from a terrorist group because terrorists have different goals than vigilantes. Terrorists aim to seize power through manipulation of political attitudes rather than the physical defeat of the enemy (Crenshaw, 1983, p. 2). On the other hand, vigilantes are not attempting to alter the power structure of society. Vigilantism does not even require public knowledge of their retaliatory behavior, an essential feature of symbolic acts of terrorism. This distinction between vigilantism and terrorism does not exclude the possibility that vigilantism can become terrorism, as it is argued occurred in Mandate Palestine.

This thesis proposes that private police forces in Mandate Palestine were established in reaction to growing dissatisfaction with the official criminal justice system. On a similar note, Shotland and Goodstein (1984) theorized that vigilantism is likely to develop in a community where there is frustration with the formal justice system and individuals identify strongly with victims. The Underground groups fulfilled the private police needs of frustrated community groups. The Underground provided a ready-made organization of young nationalists – armed, well-funded, and eager to serve and protect. This work likens Mandate Underground members to Eric Hobsbawm's (1969) *bandit heroes*. Hobsbawm argued that bandit heroes are "peasant outlaws whom the lord and the state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society...considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of

liberation...men to be admired, helped, and supported” (p. 13). Jewish and Arab “terrorists” during the Mandate became both heroes and objects of scorn to their kinsmen, depending on whom they victimized, when, and how. This thesis exposes the relevance of community support to an Underground organization’s ability to withstand official counter-terrorist measures.

This dissertation outlines how Underground groups developed into competing power bases to the established rule of law. This state of affairs ultimately culminated in Great Britain’s abdication of authority, due to her failure to maintain control.

### Scope and Limitations

#### *Scope*

The scope of this dissertation is to study crime based on official reports, personal memoirs, press clippings, and British government correspondence and intelligence files. The majority of these documents are located in the Haganah Archives (Tel Aviv), the National Archives, Kew Gardens (London), the New York Public Library Jewish Division (New York), and the Library of Congress (Washington, DC).

The primary source material utilized in this work has not been analyzed by other researchers. The reason for this lack of attention is most likely due to the past inaccessibility of the material. The primary source documents used in this thesis have only become public within the past decade. For example, the British Criminal Investigation Department files in the Haganah archives were discovered only ten years ago (O. Levi, personal communication, 2002). In the case of the National Archive files, many of the files were declassified in recent years, upon the deaths of parties named in the documents.

### *Limitations*

There are three major limitations to this work: external validity, internal validity, and gaps in available data.

A common flaw of studies based on official data is that only crimes known to the police are included in the study. Unreported crime and criminal behavior which did not result in an arrest are excluded from analysis. This situation creates an external validity threat as to whether official police arrests accurately depict a given society's total amount of crime. In an effort to address this limitation, personal memoirs and secondary sources were used by the author as cross-reference sources.

A second limitation of this study is that certain years of original source documents were missing from the longitudinal analysis. This is a common problem of historical studies where original source documents are rarely uniformly preserved. However, there was enough documentation available to provide a substantial base level of crime data for every year of the Mandate Period. Additional crime data were employed to enhance this base level whenever possible.

A final limitation to this study is that the source materials were limited to those in English. This was not an issue for the archival material of the British government. On the other hand, archive material concerning the Underground, written in Arabic or Hebrew, were omitted from analysis.

### *Research Design*

This study used mainly qualitative methods. There was a small segment of the thesis which included quantitative data. The qualitative data analysis was based on a

content analysis design. The quantitative data were analyzed using simple descriptive statistics.

### *Qualitative Analysis*

The qualitative analysis was based on the grounded theory research technique. Grounded theory involves the inductive derivation of theory “discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 23). According to Ryan and Bernard (2000), categories and classifications of a study are developed inductively and linked to formal theories in the field.

Therefore, the present study did not begin with a theory, and then attempt to prove it. Instead the study began with a general area of study - the criminal activity of the Underground in Mandate Palestine. The emergence of critical and conflict theoretical explanations of British criminal justice policy emerged from the studied texts.

An open coding technique was used to develop a grounded theory of the data. The open coding technique involved the researcher’s analysis of text and the underlining of key phrases. The researcher identified potential themes from the extraction of text examples. These themes were linked together in view of competing theoretical models. This comparison process, a.k.a. the “constant comparative method,” involved four stages: 1) the comparison of incidents applicable to each category, 2) the integration of categories and their properties, 3) the delimitation of theory, and 4) the writing of theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 105).

A limitation to the grounded theory technique is that the data can become skewed and biased by the investigator. According to Charmaz (2000), the author has the potential

to “choose evidence selectively” and “adopt value laden metaphors” (p. 521). In response to this concern, the author used memoirs and quantitative official data as much as possible to test the congruency of the findings. Additionally, the author adopted a constructivist grounded theory approach. There was no positivistic assumption that there exists an external world which can be “described, analyzed, explained, and predicted” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 524).

### *Quantitative Analyses*

The quantitative analyses of this work included a macro and micro-level analysis. The macro-level analysis consisted of the tracking of crime over the length of the Mandate Period. This analysis was based on published Palestine Police Force crime figures and official demographic reports.

The micro-level component of the quantitative analysis was the examination of the Jewish “terror” suspects of the Mandate. The universal set of suspects who had CID intelligence files (N=608) was entered into an SPSS database. Demographic information (age, trade, birthplace, current residence) on each suspect was coded into the database. Descriptive statistics were performed to provide a prosopographical portrait.

### *Design of Thesis*

In addition to the present introduction chapter, this thesis is divided into the following seven chapters:

*Chapter I: The Historical Background of Mandate Palestine: a Political History and Profile of the Arab and Jewish Political Undergrounds*

This chapter describes the unique history of Palestine, extending back to ancient biblical times. Historic points of contention in Palestine’s history are highlighted, with

the aim of creating a greater understanding of the roots of ethnic conflict. The second section of the chapter focuses on acquainting the reader with the Underground organizations of Mandate Palestine. A brief history of each organization is provided, as well as original descriptive quantitative research on the Jewish Underground.

*Chapter II: Political Assassinations of Mandate Palestine: Inter-ethnic, Intra-Ethnic, and Anti-British Cases*

This chapter details politically inspired murders in Mandate Palestine. The analysis examines why inter-ethnic assassinations were sparse, while intra-ethnic assassinations were common. British indifference to inter and intra-ethnic assassinations is tracked. The futility of the dramatic policy responses of the British Administration to anti-British assassinations was examined.

*Chapter III: Weapons Smuggling: the Involvement of the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds during the Pre-Great Rebellion, Great Rebellion, World War II, and Post World War II Stages of the Mandate*

This chapter details the British reaction to the involvement of the Arab and Jewish Underground in weapons smuggling schemes. Major cases of trafficking are detailed and the patterns of trafficking methods are described. The post-WWII advantage of the Jewish Underground in arms capacity is explained as a natural result of British policy decisions.

*Chapter IV: Robbery and Extortion "for the cause": Highway Robberies, Bank Robberies, Diamond Heists, and "Taxes"*

This chapter describes the overwhelming British attention towards Arab perpetrated robbery and extortion, as compared to the same crimes perpetrated by the

Jews. This imbalance of law enforcement was linked to the greater economic threat posed by the Arabs. The analysis details the creation of community support for the Jewish Underground by Jewish robbery and extortion victims.

*Chapter V: Illegal Immigration: Illicit Entry of Arabs and Jews in Pre-World War II, World War II, and Post-World War II Palestine*

This chapter examines the most controversial of crimes during Mandate Palestine - illegal immigration. The motivations behind Arab and Jewish illegal immigration to Palestine are discussed. Jewish immigration restrictions, imposed by the British during World War II, are presented and analyzed. The Jewish Underground's championing of illegal immigration operations is detailed, as is their consequent increase of Jewish community support.

*Chapter VI: Bombs and Sabotage: Inter-Ethnic, Intra-Ethnic, and Anti-British Cases*

This chapter details the politically motivated incidents of bombs and sabotage. The glaring pattern of British appeasement of Arab and Jewish saboteurs is illustrated. It is argued that the British capitulation to terrorist bombings ultimately led to their surrender of the Mandate.

Contribution to Knowledge

The British Mandate of Palestine was a period of extreme ethnic, social, and political conflict. The origin of the current Arab-Israeli conflict is timely for our security needs as Americans. As our world becomes smaller, the contemporary nationalist conflicts abroad become a more global reality. In light of the growing threat of international terrorist networks, criminologists are already beginning to focus their research on the behavior of diverse communities (Crawford, 2002; Hanser, 2002; Lee,

Martinez, & Rosenfeld, 2001). This thesis contributes to this growing body of research, by identifying the criminal patterns and policy responses, of one of our most conflicted nations during one of her most conflicted times.

*CHAPTER I: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MANDATE PALESTINE: A  
POLITICAL HISTORY AND PROFILE OF THE ARAB AND JEWISH POLITICAL  
UNDERGROUNDS*

This chapter's aim is to provide a historical context for the Mandate Period. This chapter is divided into the following three sections: 1) a brief chronology of Palestine, from biblical times to the Mandate; 2) a history of the Underground organizations of Mandate Palestine; and 3) a micro-level quantitative analysis of Jewish terror suspects in Mandate Palestine.

*A Brief Background of Mandate Palestine: Ancient History, Ottoman Period,  
World War I, Between the Wars, World War II, and Post World War II*

*Ancient History*

Palestine has fallen subject to a number of conquests over the millennia. The earliest known inhabitants of Palestine were the Canaanites, around 3000 BC. The Canaanites ruled the land until about 1200 BC, when conquered by the Israelites. The Israelites created the first Jewish kingdom in Palestine. The Israelites controlled Palestine until the Babylonian conquest in 586 BC. The Jews were sent to Babylonia in exile (Dimont, 1994). In 539 BC, the Persians conquered Babylonia and established rule. Jews were allowed to return to Palestine; most settled in Jerusalem and surrounding areas.

Persian rule existed in Palestine until 332 BC, when Alexander the Great of Macedonia conquered the land. Around 141 BC the Jews rebelled against their Greco-Roman rulers, and created the second Jewish state under the Maccabees. The Maccabean state fell to the Romans in 63 AD.

Around 1 AD Jesus of Nazareth was born in Bethlehem, Palestine. Jesus was crucified around 28 AD. In 313 AD, the Roman Emperor Constantine I legalized Christianity. The Romans were defeated by the Byzantine (Christian Empire) in 324 AD. A brief period of Persian rule replaced the Byzantine Kingdom in 614 but fell shortly to Muslim Arab rule around 622 AD (Vilnay, R. & Vilnay, O., 2000).

Under Muslim rule, Palestine underwent cultural Arabization. For example, Arabic replaced Aramaic as the official language. Arabization was due to the revelations of the Prophet Mohammad in 632 AD. Mohammad envisioned an Arab kingdom, unified by nationhood and religion. By 700 AD, Muslim warriors had conquered the entire Arabic Peninsula, and all of North Africa.

Muslim rule dominated Palestine until the Crusaders conquered the land in 1099 AD. Greek Orthodox rule existed for the next two hundred years. The Crusaders fell to the Egyptian Mamelukes in 1250 AD. The Ottoman Empire conquered the Mamelukes in 1516 AD and controlled Palestine until their defeat in World War I. British military occupation commenced in 1917 AD and the Mandate Administration was established in 1920 AD (Tessler, 1994).

#### *Ottoman Period*

Prior to the Mandate, the area of land named *Palestine* by the British was known to the Jews as Israel and to the Arabs as Southern Syria (Bentwich, 1952, p. 1). Under the Ottomans, Palestine was divided into a number of territorial areas called *vilayets*. Until the Ottoman-Egyptian War of 1841, the majority of Palestine was part of the Syrian vilayet. After 1841, a northern portion of Palestine was placed in the vilayet of Beirut, a southern portion in the vilayet of Jerusalem, and the remainder in the vilayet of Syria.

### *The Palestinian Arabs*

During the Mandate Period, the population of Palestine was majority Arab. The Palestinian Arab population of the Mandate was a mix of ethnic heredity; descendants of the ancient Canaanite, Aramaic, and Hebrew peoples.

It is difficult to speak of Palestinian Arabs without noting the strong cultural distinction between the rural and urban populations. The rural population was composed of the *Bedouin* (nomad) and the *Fellahin* (farmer). The urban population consisted of the *Effendi* (Master) and the Christian Arabs.

The Palestinian Bedouin were nomadic sheep and goat herders. They often moved abodes seasonally in search of more fertile land and better grass for their flocks. The Fellahin were also rural Arabs. The fellahin were impoverished farmers who spent their lifetimes indebted to Effendi landlords and Ottoman taxation authorities. (Nafi, 1998)

In contrast, the urban Effendi were the social and political elites of Palestine. Many owned second homes in cities across the Arabian Peninsula and continental Europe. The Effendi class was composed of the most powerful families of the Arab world; descendants of the earliest Arab warriors of the land. The Effendi were usually highly educated and affluent. They maintained their wealth through business and real estate investments.

The Palestinian urban population also consisted of the Arab Christians. They held little political power, as compared to the Effendi elite. The Christians were often well-educated people and lived comfortable middle-class lives. Many of them were engaged in the liberal professions (ESCO Foundation for Palestine [ESCO], 1947).

### *The Palestinian Jews*

The majority of the Jews living in Palestine prior to the first *Aliyah*, or mass immigration, were of ancient Palestinian, Sephardic (Mediterranean), or Eastern/Western European descent. The ancient Palestinian Jews dated their ancestors back to biblical times. The Sephardic Jews were those who had arrived in Palestine after their expulsion from Spain in 1492. In contrast, the Eastern/Western European Jews held a centuries-long tradition of immigration to Palestine to pursue religious study. Under the Ottomans, Jews (as with other non-Muslims) were tolerated but treated as legally inferior subjects (ESCO, 1947).

The first *Aliyah* to Palestine was in 1882. These Jews were young *Zionists*, emigrating from religious persecution in Russia and Rumania. Zionism was a political ideology that called for a return of the Jewish people to their biblical homeland in *Israel*. *Israel* is the name in the *Torah*, Jewish holy book, for the geographical area which roughly matches the boundaries of Palestine and Transjordan. Zionism was originally conceived by of by a German Jew, Moses Hess, a follower of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Hess published a *Plan for the Colonization of the Holy Land* in 1867 which envisioned Palestine as a refuge for all religiously persecuted Jews (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).

The first *Aliyah* lasted until 1903 and brought the Jewish population in Palestine up to 25,000 – approximately double the number of Jews before 1882. The immigrants lived on land bought for them by wealthy French Jewish entrepreneur Edmund de Rothschild. Agricultural life and spoken Hebrew became the two main tenets of the settlers.

Agricultural work was important to the Zionists because it was a profession traditionally denied Jews. The first agricultural societies were cooperative settlements, based on the utopian ideals of nineteenth-century Socialism. Although most European Jews spoke Yiddish Hebrew was chosen as the language of the Zionists. Yiddish was perceived as a symbol of the European ghetto. In contrast, Hebrew was the language of the proud biblical Jews (Eban, 1968).

It wasn't until the efforts of a Hungarian Jew thirty years later, Theodor Herzl, that the world became aware of Zionism. Herzl was a well-respected political journalist, residing in Vienna, who had grown disturbed by European anti-Semitism. He reasoned that anti-Semitism was a pathological disease of the Gentile (non-Jewish) world. Herzl proposed that the only cure for Anti-Semitism was for Jews to have an independent state (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002; Tessler, 1994). The influential World Zionist Organization [WZO] was established in 1897 in Basle, Switzerland. The WZO created strategies to realize a modern Jewish state in Palestine.

The majority of the WZO did not believe an inherent conflict existed between Zionism and Palestinian Arab nationalism. Instead, they contended that most Arabs were indifferent toward Zionism, perhaps even supporters of it, once aware of the economic benefits of Jewish settlement.

Similar to the first Aliyah, the second Aliyah (1904-1914) was composed of young immigrants from Eastern Europe, mainly Russia. The second Aliyah brought 35,000 more committed Zionist Jews to Palestine. Many of the immigrants were ex-Communist members of the revolutionary parties of Tzarist Russia and had been active in the Russian Revolution of 1905-1906 (Nafi, 1998; Tessler, 1994).

Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism was first evidenced in the 1890s, after the arrival of the first Aliyah. Local papers began warning of its dangers, causing some Arab notables to unsuccessfully lobby the Ottomans to halt Jewish land sales. Zionist opposition greatly intensified after the second Aliyah which made the Zionists in Palestine a sizable political entity (Nafi, 1998).

### *World War I*

During World War I, the British made three contradictory, but politically expedient, agreements: 1) the Hussein-McMahon Agreement, 2) the Balfour Declaration, and 3) the Sykes-Picot Agreement

#### *Hussein-McMahon Agreement*

When Great Britain decided to advance through Mesopotamia and Palestine, the British called on the support of Al-Husayn Ibn'Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. In return for staging an Arab uprising against the Turks, the British granted the Sharif the Hussein-McMahon Agreement (Quandt, Jabber, & Lesch, 1973). The Agreement was composed through a series of letters. The then British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, promised that, in return for the Sharif's assistance, Great Britain would re-establish an Arab Kingdom under his rule. It is debatable whether McMahon meant to include Palestine as part of Sharif's kingdom.

#### *Balfour Declaration*

Israeli statesman Abba Eban, called the Balfour Declaration, "the decisive diplomatic victory of the Jewish people in modern history" (Eban, 1968, p. 359). The Declaration was in the form of a letter written by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour (see Figure 1). The Balfour Declaration's wording was vague as to whether it

called for a Jewish state, or rather a refuge for persecuted Jews (Hurewitz, 1968). British public opinion generally understood that the Declaration envisioned a Jewish state established eventually, but not in the immediate future, in Palestine (ESCO, 1947). Historians contend that the Balfour Declaration was a political measure to increase Jewish international support of the British Empire during the War. Within Palestine, a Jewish spy ring, *Netzach Yisrael Lo Y'Shaker*, became a strategic asset to the British (Bickerton & Klausner, 2001).

*Figure 1. The Balfour Declaration*

<p><i>Foreign Office November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1917</i></p>
<p><i>Dear Lord Rothschild,</i></p> <p><i>I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.</i></p> <p><i>"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."</i></p> <p><i>I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Yours Sincerely, ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR</i></p>

#### *Sykes-Picot Agreement*

At the same time as the other two agreements were in the works, the British were strategizing with the French. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a complete contradiction of the Hussein-McMahon agreement. It divided control of the Middle East only between the two world powers of France and Great Britain. Palestine, west of the Jordan River

(including Jerusalem but excluding the Negev), would be placed under international control (Bickerton & Klausner, 2001).

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was the most truthful of the three agreements. Syria and Lebanon were awarded to the French, and Iraq and Palestine to the British. The Sharif was left empty-handed, and the Jews with only promises.

*Figure 2. A Brief Historical Chronology of Mandate Palestine*

<b>1516</b>	<b>Ottoman rule over Palestine.</b>
<b>1882</b>	<b>First Aliyah of Eastern European Jews to Palestine.</b>
<b>1897</b>	<b>Establishment of the World Zionist Organization.</b>
<b>1914</b>	<b>World War I begins.</b>
<b>1917</b>	<b>Balfour Declaration (British commitment to establish Jewish homeland in Palestine).</b>
<b>1918</b>	<b>WWI ends.</b>
<b>1921</b>	<b>Haganah (Jewish self-defense organization) formed in Palestine.</b>
<b>1922</b>	<b>First White Paper (restricts Jewish immigration).</b>
<b>1922</b>	<b>British Mandate of Palestine (and Balfour Declaration) ratified by League of Nations.</b>
<b>1931</b>	<b>McDonald letter negates the First White Paper.</b>
<b>1933</b>	<b>Hitler assumes power in Germany.</b>
<b>1936</b>	<b>Arab Higher Committee established.</b>
<b>1936 - 1939</b>	<b>Arab Great Rebellion</b>
<b>1939</b>	<b>Second White Paper (restricts Jewish land sales and immigration into Palestine).</b>
<b>1939</b>	<b>WWII begins.</b>
<b>1945</b>	<b>WWII ends.</b>
<b>1946</b>	<b>U.S. support of partition of Israel into Jewish and Arab states.</b>
<b>1947</b>	<b>Great Britain refers "Palestine Question" to the newly-created United Nations.</b>
<b>1948</b>	<b>Establishment of the state of Israel.</b>

Source: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. I.J. Bickerton & C.L. Klaus, 2002, Upper Saddle River (NJ): Prentice Hall.

*Mandate Palestine: Between the Wars*

After the Allied victory, the territories of the Ottoman Empire went before the Council of Ten at the Paris Conference of 1919. In 1920, the Mandate of Palestine was approved by the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo (Italy). The Mandate was defined by the League of Nations as entities to be administered as trusts by the British and the French, supervised by the League. The Mandate would exist until such time as the inhabitants were believed (by the League) to be ready for independence and self-government (Bickerton & Klausner, 2001). The Mandate was of strategic importance to the British; Palestine was a military buffer for her prize colony of India, via the Suez Canal.

In 1920, the Palestine Arab Congress [PAC] lobbied aggressively for the British to nullify the Balfour Declaration and declare self-rule by a majority in Palestine. The British agreed to allow more Arab representation in the Mandate Administration, but refused to void the Balfour Declaration. In signs of protest against the Balfour Declaration, the PAC refused the offer of political representation. The Effendi orchestrated deadly riots in protest in 1920 and again in 1921.

The Haycraft Commission was formed by the British authorities to investigate the cause of the riots. The Commission found that the Arabs responsible for the violence were fearful of the political and economic dangers of Zionism. A further result of the Commission's findings was the publication of the Churchill White Paper published in June of 1922.

The Churchill White Paper decreased the intensity of the Balfour Declaration. It affirmed the establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, but insisted that Palestine

would not become “as Jewish as England is English” (as cited in Laqueur, 1969, p. 46). Jewish immigration was to be conditional on “the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new immigrants” (as cited in Laqueur, 1969, p. 47). The White Paper also announced that steps would be taken to initiate Palestinian Arab self-representation. The Zionists accepted the White Paper doctrine because it did not prohibit a Jewish state in Palestine. The Arabs rejected the Doctrine for the same reason.

Despite the controversy, the terms of the British Mandate of Palestine were ratified by the League of Nations in July 1922. The Mandate terms included in its preamble an endorsement of a Jewish national home: “recognition thereby was given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in the country” (as cited in Laqueur, 1969, p. 34).

In 1925, British war hero Field Marshal Lord Plumer replaced the first High Commissioner of Palestine Herbert Samuel. Plumer was committed to maintaining the status quo and successfully avoided controversy. Plumer was succeeded by another military figure in 1928, Sir John Chancellor. Unlike his predecessor, Plumer revived politically sensitive discussions in Palestine, including the establishment of a Legislative Council with Arab representation (Edelman, 1965).

There was relative outward calm in Palestine until the Hebron Riots of 1929. The Authorities in London had even reduced military expenditures in for the colony in 1925 (“The Report,” 1925). The Hebron Riots waged by the Arabs, resulted in another British commission of investigation - the Shaw Commission. The Shaw Commission published the Passfield White Paper in October 1930. The White Paper called for a halt to Jewish immigration to Palestine, and that the EAC principle should be based on both Arab and

Jewish unemployment. The Jews protested strongly against the statement. Chaim Weizmann and Felix Warburg, of the Jewish Agency, resigned in protest. Due to the political fall-out, British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald negated the Passfield White Paper in February 1931.

In 1931, Arthur Wauchope replaced Chancellor in the High Commissioner post. Two years later, the *quasi-riots* riddled Palestine. Unlike the past Arab riots, the quasi-riots were aimed exclusively against the Authorities (Rivlin, 1994). The impetus for the quasi-riots was an aggressive Arabic press campaign launched in 1933. The press claimed that the British were allowing Jewish immigration, regardless of EAC, with the goal of the creation of a Jewish majority ("Report," 1933).

The quasi-rebellion was quelled after the 1935 announcement by High Commissioner Wauchope that there was a plan to establish a Legislative Council (with Arab representation). This news was, according to the British, "received unfavorably by the Jews," but "satisfaction by Arabs and exercised a tranquilizing effect" ("Report," 1935, p. 5). The Arabs had demanded the need for the Council. In the same announcement, the High Commissioner also granted clemency to Arabs still serving sentences for the 1929 disturbances - even those with life sentences.

From 1936 to 1939, the longest and deadliest of the Arab riots of Mandate Palestine occurred, the *Great Rebellion*. The chief aim of the Great Rebellion was British renunciation of the Balfour Declaration. Jews, British officials and politically moderate Arabs were targeted by the rioters (Zionist Organization of Great Britain [ZOGB], 1939).

By the summer of 1939, the Authorities had suppressed the uprising. The expulsion of the Great Rebellion's leadership led to the Arab community's willingness to

assist the Authorities (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry [AACI], 1945/1946). The British announcement of the White Paper published in May 1939, can also not be ignored as a factor leading to the Great Rebellion's end. The White Paper addressed a number of Arab concerns, mainly a repudiation of the Balfour Deceleration. In order to guarantee a non-Jewish majority, the British limited the number of Jews allowed to immigrate to Palestine over the next five years to 75,000. After this point, Arab approval would be needed for any further Jewish immigration to Palestine (Laqueur, 1969).

After the publication of the White Paper, anti-British sentiment among the Jews rose to new heights. Upon the White Paper's announcement, the Jewish Underground took center stage in terrorist attacks against the British (Keith-Roach, 1994).

### *World War II*

After Great Britain joined WWII in September 1939, the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds agreed on a temporary ceasefire. The Underground Stern Group was the only group who refused to accept the war-time truce. The *Yishuv*, Jewish community in Palestine, overwhelmingly rallied behind the Allied war effort. In contrast, Haj Amin al Husayni, the recognized leader of the Arab Palestinian population, allied himself with the Hitler Administration (Morris, 2001; Timmerman, 2003).

### *Post World War II*

After the war, the control of illegal immigration was cited by the British as the principal cause of the steady increase in Jewish terror attacks. When the British reiterated their allegiance to the White Paper in September 1945, "armed cooperation" was established between all three of the Jewish Underground groups (Heller, 1995, p. 152).

After the War, the British became more aggressive in counter-terrorism measures. For example, the Authorities launched “Operation Agatha” in June 1946; more than 3,000 Jews were arrested and the Jewish Agency headquarters seized. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2001; Segev, 2000).

The Jewish anti-British sabotage attacks continued, the most dramatic of which was the Irgun bombing of the King David Hotel on July 22, 1946. The hotel wing bombed housed the British military officers in Palestine; approximately ninety persons were killed.

In January 1947, the British cabinet agreed to turn the question of Palestine's future over to the newly formed United Nations. In September 1947, the British agreed to end the Mandate by May 1948. At the end of November 1947, the Civil War between the Palestinian Arabs and the Palestinian Jews commenced. The Civil War continued until British withdrawal on May 14, 1948, the same day as the creation of the state of Israel.

#### A Brief Background of the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds

##### *The Arab Underground*

The Arab illegal organizations discussed in this thesis focus on those organizations associated with the Haj Amin al-Husayni, including, the Qassamites and the Al-Najjada organization.

##### *The Qassamites*

The arguably first “martyr” for the Palestinian Arab cause was the Sheikh Izzel Din al Qassam (1882-1935). Qassam was a Syrian born, Egyptian educated preacher. In 1920 he fled to Palestine after having received a death sentence in Syria (for rebel

guerilla activities). Qassam became an influential spiritual leader in Haifa, where he was a religious teacher and preacher at a new mosque. Qassam was orthodox in his religious preaching, advocating a strict interpretation of the Koran, Muslim holy book. Qassam's rigidity reduced his mass popularity, but he claimed an ardent group of young followers.

By 1925, Qassam had begun to mix revolutionary politics into his sermons. He prophesized that Palestine would be won by the Arabs, only if they engaged in armed resistance. Small revolutionary bands, inspired by Qassam, cropped up around Haifa at this time; the organizations established military drills and maintained arms stockpiles in the villages. Qassam's followers, the *Qassamites*, were responsible for a number of settlement shootings and attempted murders of officials.

The vast majority of the Qassamites were rural peasants, the majority of whom still lived in their villages (Porath, 1977). Qassam was more popular among the fellahin than the Effendi leadership (Khalidi, 1997).

Qassam was rumored to have forged an alliance with Haj Amin after his election as President of the Haifa branch of the Young Men's Muslim Association in 1934. Haj Amin reportedly supplied Qassam with strategic advice; it is a matter of historical debate whether he also supplied Qassam with money and arms.

The Qassamites did not attract the full attention of the Authorities until their murder of a British (Jewish) police sergeant in November 1935. Shortly after the police shooting, Qassam was killed by the Palestine Police in a dramatic shoot-out. Qassam's funeral was made an occasion for an anti-British demonstration. Rumors spread throughout the following year that officials would suffer more attacks by the Qassamites, or other political-religious extremist groups ("Report," 1935).

The Qassamites became active participants in the Great Rebellion (Palestine Police Force [PPF], 1936; Porath, 1977). There was also Qassamite involvement in the post-WWII Arab Scout Movement. British intelligence expressed concern over the March 1946 appointment of a Qassamite as a troop leader, considering him “unsuited to the leadership of Youth” (FO 371/52608).

*The Haj Amin al-Husayni*

After the establishment of the Mandate, Palestinian Arab politics revolved around two influential Effendi families: the Husaynis and the Nashashibis-Dajanis. The Nashashibis-Dajani family held the reputation as the more moderate of the two. Although both families were hardly cooperative with the Authorities, similar to the Husaynis, the Nashashibi-Dajanis repudiated the Balfour Declaration and refused to accept any proposal which equated them legally with the “alien Jew” (ESCO, 1947, p. 482).

When the Mandate officially commenced in 1920, the brother of Haj Amin al-Husayni, Musa Kazem al-Husayni, held the high-profile position of Mayor of Jerusalem. In 1920, the British Governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs, removed Kazem as Mayor, due to his involvement in recent demonstrations. The more moderate Ragheb Bey Nashashibi was appointed in his place.

Due to the intervention of High Commissioner Samuel in 1921, the Husayni family regained the position of Mayor in 1921. Haj Amin, who had recently been pardoned for his role in organizing the 1920 riots, was appointed to the position of Mufti in the newly formed Supreme Muslim Council (ESCO, 1947). The Supreme Muslim Council [SMC] was established in 1921 and was the official organization recognized by

the British to handle Muslim affairs. The SMC controlled all of the Muslim religious property and religious courts of Palestine (ESCO, 1947, pp. 484-486).

In April 1936, the first Arab Higher Committee [AHC] was formed to coordinate the activities of the nationalist committee in the different towns. Haj Amin was appointed chairman of the AHC and was widely recognized as the “virtually unopposed leader of the Palestinian Arabs” (AACI, 1945/1946, p. 422).

During the Great Rebellion, the Authorities reported that Haj Amin was a major force behind the mayhem. After Lewis Andrews’ assassination in September 1937, the AHC was immediately declared an illegal organization. Many AHC leaders took refuge in neighboring Arab states; Haj Amin set up headquarters in Lebanon (Hurewitz, 1968). Haj Amin attempted to orchestrate rebel activity from his new base of operations (HA 47/82/12). Nonetheless, Haj Amin never regained his command of the Great Rebellion.

During WWII, Haj Amin fled to Berlin, after the British entered Syrian territory. He had been forging an alliance with the Hitler Administration since 1933. Haj Amin became the director of a Berlin organization designed to encourage Muslim support of the Nazis (Timmerman, 2003, chap. 5). After Germany’s defeat in 1945, Haj Amin fled again, this time to Egypt. Haj Amin assumed control of the newly re-established AHC and was appointed Chairman (in absentia) in March 1946. He subsequently directed Palestinian affairs from Cairo.

During the Civil War of 1947, Haj Amin led an unsuccessful Palestinian Arab coalition, the Arab Youth Organization [AYO]. Haj Amin led none of the later regional military commands, but other members of the Husayni family were represented in leadership ranks (Morris, 2001).

### *The Al-Najjada Organization*

In Post-WWII Palestine, the Palestinian Arab nationalist organization *Al-Najjada* (the helpers) rose to prominence. The Najjada was established in 1944 by native Palestinians, as an affiliate organization of the Lebanese group bearing the same name. The group possessed light arms and ammunition, smuggled to Palestine from Syria. Constant financial difficulties prevented the organization from stockpiling meaningful quantities of weapons. In August 1946, British intelligence estimated that the group was composed of 8,000 members, about ten percent of whom were Arab ex-Servicemen (FO 371/52608).

Members trained in remote areas of Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, often times with the assistance of German and Polish ex-servicemen. The British likened the Najjada to an “Arab Haganah” aimed at the encouragement of Arab nationalism, the training of youths in firearms, and the inclusion of Palestine in a pan-Arab revolt (FO 371/52608).

The British believed that the Qassamites and the Arab National Fund financially supported the Najjada. During the Civil War, Haj Amin formed his Arab Youth Organization by forcing the consolidation of Najjada with the Husayni-led *Futuwa* organization (Morris, 2001). The British did not believe that the Najjaadeh, or any other of the other Arab nationalist organizations formed in post-WWII Palestine, held “any real power” (FO 371/52608).

## *The Jewish Underground*

### *The Haganah*

Although the Jewish Agency insisted otherwise, the Haganah “was in effect the army of the Jewish Agency” (KV 3/41). The Haganah was the largest of the Jewish Underground associations, composed of a reported 60,000 to 80,000 members (AACI, 1945/1946, p. 600). Adding to its manpower was the assumption that “every able-bodied Jew in Palestine could be counted upon to assist [the Haganah] in some combatant or non-combatant role” (KV 3/41). The Haganah was considered the most well-armed and well-trained Underground organization; the Authorities cited past police and military experience of most members as the reason (AACI, 1946/1946).

The Haganah was officially established in 1921 as an extension of the Jewish *Hashomer* (watchmen) society. The Hashomer had guarded Jewish property against Arab attack during the Ottoman Empire. The need for a more organized Jewish defense force intensified in Palestine after the dismal Palestine Police protection afforded the Jews in the Arab Riots of 1920 and 1921 (Segev, 2000).

The Haganah practiced the policy of *havlagah*, or restraint, from retaliatory acts of violence. One former Haganah member recounted that *havlagah* was a bit of a misnomer. He stated that retaliatory acts were committed by the Haganah, but not indiscriminate violence “against an Arab because he happens to be an Arab” (Rivlin, 1994).

The Haganah improved its security capabilities after the Haganah’s failure to protect the Jews of Hebron in the riots of 1929. A new higher command was established, and weapons accumulation stepped up in intensity. Clandestine weapon factories were

established across Palestine and members established international smuggling contacts (Rivlin, 1994).

During the Great Rebellion, the Haganah was relatively successful in protecting Jewish settlements. Through the medium of the Jewish Agency, select Haganah units were trained by the British forces in defense protocol. As soon as the Great Rebellion ended, the British offered the Haganah the opportunity to hand over their arms in return for legal protection. The offer was refused. Since the Haganah would not disarm voluntarily, the Haganah became an illegal organization.

After the establishment of other Jewish Underground organizations, Haganah members took on a new role as private security guards. Jewish individuals and businesses hired Haganah members to ward off their victimization by other Jewish Underground groups. During the Saison, the Haganah was also instrumental in effectuating the arrests of scores of Irgun and Stern Group members.

The Haganah did not engage in large scale violence until after the end of World War II. These acts consisted mainly of government property sabotage (AACI, 1945/1946). The Haganah joined the other two Jewish Underground organizations to create the Israeli Defense Forces [IDF] on May 31, 1948.

### *The Irgun*

The *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (a.k.a. Etzel), the National Military Organization, was a splinter group of the Haganah. The Irgun was formed in 1935 by Russian émigré Vladimir Jabotinsky, the leader of the Revisionist political party. The organization splintered from the Haganah during the Great Rebellion, due to their disagreement with

the organization's policy of restraint. The Irgun vowed to liberate Palestine and Transjordan through armed national resistance.

The group was composed of approximately 1,000 members; with a reserve force of 4,000 men. According to British intelligence, the Irgun's specialty was property sabotage (AACI, 1945/1946, p. 603). The British considered the Irgun's arms capabilities, inferior to that of the Haganah, but "adequate for its purposes" (AACI, 1945/1946, p. 75). During the Great Rebellion, the Irgun was responsible for a series of bombs planted in Arab cafes and marketplaces between 1938 and 1939.

The Irgun was also behind many assassinations of suspected Jewish informants and anti-Zionist officials (ESCO, 1947). The Irgun orchestrated the most infamous assassination in Mandate history, the kidnapping and hanging of two British officers on July 31, 1947. The hangings were in revenge of a death sentence imposed on three of their fellow members.

Like the other Jewish Underground groups, the Irgun was highly organized and clandestine. A thwarted Irgun bomber stated in her police confession, "I only know members of my 'group,' its Commander, [name deletion] and his [illegible] friend, ...I do not know any members of other groups nor the superior officers of [my commander]. Similarly I am unknown to other members outside my own 'Group' (HA 47/59/007).

The functions of the Irgun were divided among specialized cells of three to five persons (see Figure 3). For example, the following command chart was sketched by an Irgun commander in an undated interrogation [ca.1940]. The five cells depicted in the chart each had unique duties: 1) a cell to distribute propaganda, 2) a cell to infiltrate the Palestinian Arab communities, 3) a cell to infiltrate the Haganah, 4) a cell of engineers

and technicians to facilitate terror attacks, and 5) an operational cell to carry out terror attacks (HA 03/357).

Leader

Chief Executive Body, General Staff & War Cabinet.

0 1 2 3 4 5

District Commanders

6 7 8 9 10 11

Group #1

Force with HAGANA  
Composed of cells  
(variable from 4 to 5  
members)

Group #2

Force for action  
against Arabs in  
Palestine and the  
Middle East.

Probably similar cell formation  
for each district. Cell formation  
varies with district and require-  
ment usually does not exceed 4  
members.

Group #3

Propaganda,  
Comes under district  
commanders 6 to 11,  
i.e. District Commander.

0 0 0 0 0

varies from 5 to less than 5.

### *The Stern Group*

During WWII, the Irgun agreed to a temporary Underground ceasefire. This agreement led to a split within their ranks and the formation of the third major Jewish underground force - the Stern Group. The Sternists argued against any form of collaboration with the British. This Stern Group was also known as the Stern Gang, or *Lehi*, a Hebrew acronym for *Lohamei Herut Israel*, Fighters for the Freedom of Israel.

The leader of the Stern Group was a Polish immigrant to Palestine, Abraham Stern. Stern was killed in a police shoot-out in 1942. The organization was largely inactive until 1943, when at least two dozen Stern members escaped from Mandate prisons (HA 7/16/264).

The British regarded Stern members as “extremely dangerous fanatics;” there were an estimated 800 Sternists in 1946 (AACI, 1945/1946, p. 76). Political assassinations were the Stern group’s specialty, one of their most notorious being Lord Moyne’s murder in November 1944.

The Sternists were extremely secretive in their associations and went under aliases in large cities; even their family members were unaware of their activities (ESCO, 1947). The Criminal Investigation Division believed that the hub of Stern activity was in Haifa and Jerusalem and that the organization was composed primarily of Polish Jewish immigrants (HA 003/116).

In May 1945, the Stern Group and the Irgun agreed to limited cooperation on “war” activities. This agreement allowed information sharing, but not for the two groups’ sharing of propaganda, funding, and arms. When the British reiterated their allegiance to the White Paper in September 1945, the Haganah decided to meet with

Stern leaders as well. Soon “armed cooperation” was in existence between all three major Jewish Underground groups (Heller, 1995, p. 152).

### The CID Intelligence Files Quantitative Analysis

#### *Methods*

This analysis utilized SPSS to analyze the demographic data of suspected Jewish Underground members (N=607). The information was extracted from the complete set of intelligence files of the Palestine Police Criminal Investigation Division [CID] located in the Haganah Archives, Tel Aviv. Cases were excluded from the analysis in which more than two of the four variables were missing, or were duplicates on all four variables, in the source documents.

Descriptive statistics were employed to examine the birthplace, age, profession, and current residence variables of the suspected terrorists. The Age variable was produced by approximation; the birth-date of each individual was subtracted from the year 1945. The Age variable categories were designed to duplicate those of the comparison Jewish Agency data. A prosopographical portrait, a profile of the typical Mandate Palestine terror suspect, emerged from the data.

The results of the SPSS analysis were examined in comparison to the Citizenship, Age, and Occupations Abroad variables of the *Summary of Immigration (1919-1945)* statistics collected by the Jewish Agency for Palestine (Gurevich, 1947). The Current Residence variable of the CID statistics was compared to the official census tables on the Jewish Settled Populations variable provided in the *Vital Statistics Table (1947)* published by the Palestine Department of Statistics.

A limitation to the findings of this study is the non-random nature of the sample. The sample consisted of 607 subjects, but this figure is only a small percentage of Underground members. For example, the Haganah alone had approximately 60,000 to 80,000 members by 1947; the Irgun had 1,000 to 5,000 and the Stern Group an estimated 200 to 600 members (KV 3/41; AACI, 1945/1946, pp. 72, 75, 77). Most of the subjects in this study were members of the Irgun or Stern groups, and not the Haganah. The reason why these 607 files were left behind by the British when they evacuated Palestine remains unknown.

## Results

### *Birthplace*

The lowest percentage of Jewish terror suspects (1.6%; N=10) were from Germany. The highest percentage of terror suspects were native-born Palestinian (35.1%; N=213) and from Poland (26.9%; N=163). When the birthplace data were analyzed in terms of the Area variable then Eastern Europe (46.6%, N=213) was the birthplace of the majority of terror suspects (35.1%; N=213).

Polish Jews composed the highest number of immigrants to Palestine (40.3%; N=144, 808) in the Jewish Agency statistics. German Jews composed 12.6% of the total immigrants to Palestine between 1919-1945 (12.6%; N=45,419).

Table I.

*Birthplace of Jewish Terror Suspects*

Birthplace	N	%
Afghanistan	2	.3
Algeria	1	.2
Australia	1	.2
Austria	8	1.3
Bulgaria	21	3.5
Czechoslovakia	16	2.6
Egypt	3	.5
Eritrea	1	.2
France	1	.2
Germany	10	1.6
Greece	6	1.0
Hungary	6	1.0
Iran	7	1.2
Iraq	11	1.8
Latvia	12	2.0
Libya	1	.2
Lithuania	5	.8
Palestine	213	35.1
Poland	163	26.9

(Table I Cont.)


Russia	27	4.4
Romania	27	4.4
Switzerland	1	.2
Syria	9	1.5
Turkey	13	2.1
Ukraine	5	.8
Yemen	21	3.5
Yugoslavia	1	.2
Missing	15	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Note.* The Eastern Europe variable consisted of the following nations: Poland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Latvia, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia. The Middle East variable consisted of the following nations: Iran, Yemen, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Eritrea, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Afghanistan. The Western Europe variable consisted of the following nations: Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and France. The one individual from Australia was included in the "Western European" category for purposes of this analysis.

### *Age*

The vast majority of the terror suspects were young. The highest number of suspects were 21-30 year olds (46.1%; N=280). The second most prevalent age group in the CID data were the 17-20 year olds (35.1%; N=205). There were similar numbers of 31-40 year olds (8.9%; N=54) and 10-16 year olds (7.5%; N=44) who were considered terror suspects. There was only one terror suspect above the age of 40.

Figure 4. Age Groups of Jewish Terror Suspects



The age group which immigrated in the highest numbers, according to the Jewish Agency data, were the 21-30 year olds (31.5%; N=79,882). The second highest number of immigrants were the 17-20 year olds (11.8%; N=29,841), followed by the 10-16 year olds (11.5%; N=29,028). The Jewish Agency recorded that 20% (N=50,958) of the immigrants were above the age of 40.

Table II.

*Jewish Agency Summary of Immigration – Ages (1928-1945)*

Age	N	%
0-9.9	28,059	11.1
10-16	29,028	11.5
17-20	29,841	11.8
21-30	79,882	31.5
31-40	35,683	14.1
41-50	19,378	7.6
51-60	17,572	6.9
61+	14,008	5.5

*Note.* The data is from *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine 1947* (p. 97), by D. Gurevich, 1947, Jerusalem: the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

*Profession*

Most of the terror suspects were either Clerks (26.9%; N=163) or Laborers (18.8%; N=114). Members of the Industry and Handicrafts were also represented in the intelligence files (17%; N=97) as well as those in the Diamond Industry (10.7%; N=61). There was only one terror suspect in the Liberal Professions.

The Jewish Agency figures recorded that half of the immigrants were in either the Industry and Handicrafts (33.4%; N=47,714) or the Building Construction and Unskilled Labor (20.2%; N= 25,184) professions. Two-thousand and three of the immigrants (1.6%) to Palestine were of the Liberal Professions. Only 5,284 (4.2%) of immigrants were Clerks, according to the Jewish Agency figures. It is noted that the Jewish Agency

Occupation figures, unlike the CID figures, represent the occupations the immigrants held in their countries of origin. The CID Occupation figures represent the occupations the immigrants held once living in Palestine.

Table III.

*Professions of Jewish Terror Suspects*

Profession	N	%
Industry & Handicrafts	97	17.0
Transport	44	7.7
Commerce	10	1.8
Liberal Professions	1	.2
Clerks	163	28.6
Misc.	10	1.8
Labor	114	20.0
Civil Service	9	1.6
Unemployed	27	4.7
Student	22	3.9
Diamond Industry	61	10.7
Law Enforcement & Military	10	1.8
Domestic	2	.4
Total	570	100.0

Table IV.

*Jewish Agency Summary of Immigration - Occupations Abroad (1919-1945)*

Occupation Abroad	N	%
Agriculture	19,491	15.6
Industry & Handicrafts	47,714	33.4
Bldg. Construction & Unskilled Labor	25,184	20.2
Transport	1,449	1.2
Commerce	16,693	13.3
Liberal Professions	2,003	1.6
Clerks	5,284	4.2
Misc.	657	.5
<b>Total Earners</b>	<b>125,019</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Note.* The data is from *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine 1947* (p. 97), by D. Gurevich, 1947, Jerusalem: the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

*Current Residence*


The CID analysis showed that 60.3% of the terror suspects were from Palestine's cities (Tel Aviv N=138; Haifa N=102; Jerusalem N=92). The Palestine Department of Statistics data indicates that the majority of Jewish immigrants settled in urban areas of Palestine (see Table 5).

Table V.

*Jewish Settled Population, Palestine*

Settled Population	1922	1931	1944
Rural	15,172	29,276	138,220
Urban	68,622	145,334	415,380

*Note.* The data is from *Vital Statistics Tables 1947*, Department of Statistics, Palestine. Jerusalem: Government Printer.

*Figure 5. Current Residence – Jewish Terror Suspects*

### *Conclusion*

An urban clerk from Poland between the ages of 21 and 30 was the prosopographical portrait produced from the CID qualitative data of Jewish suspected Underground members. When compared to the CID data, this portrait displays the absence of German Jews, those engaged in the liberal professions, and those above the age of forty.

Table VI.

*Comparison: Criminal Investigation Division and Jewish Agency Data*

Data	German Descent	Liberal Professions	Persons Over 40
CID	1.6% (N=10)	.2 % (N=1)	.2% (N=1)
JA	12.6% (N=45,419)	10.0% (N=12,544)	34.1% (N=86,641)

*Note.* The data is from *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine 1947* (p. 97), by D. Gurevich, 1947, Jerusalem: the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

It is argued that the German Jews' higher socio-economic status [SES] explains their absence from the CID data. This finding is similar to past research of political rebellions which typically finds that the poorer segments of the population are more likely to engage in them (Collier, 2000; Hirshleifer, 1991). This phenomenon in Mandate Palestine was most likely due to one of the following: 1) the higher SES level of Jews in Germany caused the German Jews to be less inclined to Zionism, or 2) the higher SES level of German Jews was useful to the Underground as "covers" for undetected assistance.

The lack of Zionist inclinations of the German Jews is assumed from their immigration statistics that portray a population hesitant to emigrate until desperate for a place of refuge. The German Jewish immigrants did not arrive in notable numbers until 1932, after Hitler's Administration rose to power. According to Jewish Agency statistics, 35,980 German Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine between 1932 and 1939, as compared to 660 immigrants who arrived between 1924 and 1931, and only 469 immigrants who arrived between 1919 and 1923 (Gurevich, 1947, p. 90).

According to many accounts, the German Jewish immigrants were middle or upper middle class members of German society. For example, when the German Jews were compared to the non-Jewish German population in 1933, more Jews were engaged in the "trade and commerce" professions than were non-Jewish Germans (61.3% as compared to 19.4%). Furthermore, there were fewer Jews (32.1%), compared to non-Jews (40.4%) engaged in the lower SES "industry and crafts" professions (Strauss, 1980, p. 324). A Palestine Police Officer, Roger Courtney, remarked in 1939 on the sophistication and "culture" of the German Jewish immigrants:

The non-Kabutz settlements were far more attractive. There were so many interesting people among them – people in general of a vastly superior type to those of the communal colonies. Particularly this was so of the German Jews...only here due to persecution in their native land. Doctors, lawyers, philosophers, university professors, and scientists were numerous among them, as well as men who had once been extremely wealthy. There was one who had been one of the biggest property owners in Berlin...Now he was only a poor grower of tomatoes (Courtney, 1939, p. 49).

It is argued that the German Jewish community's assimilation and prominence in Germany did not encourage their desire to support revolutionary Zionism. In contrast, the immigrants from Eastern Europe arrived in Palestine as young idealists who had been socially and economically isolated in their countries of origin (Segev, 2000). Unlike the German Jews, the Jews arriving before 1932 were largely from lower middle class families (Lockman, 1996). In the face of economic and religious persecution, Zionism was the answer for many youths in search of a better life. The Zionists sought in Palestine "a new type of Jew...a proud Hebrew generation...a healthy soul in a healthy body...brave, handsome...free in his movements, devoted to his people and its patrimony" (Segev, 2000, p. 258).

The sizable number of native Palestinian Jews who were suspected Underground members was likely due to their status as the descendents of the original Eastern European Zionist pioneers. Jewish Agency statistics showed that the highest number of individuals immigrating to Palestine (in all the recorded time periods of the Mandate), were children under sixteen. By the 1930s, the second and third generation of Palestinian Jews had formed a "new social elite" in Palestine of Zionist Laborers (Hurewitz, 1968, p. 35).

The Yeminite Jews, the poorest of the immigrants in Palestine, existed in the CID files in close proximity to their population representation in the country; 3.5% and 4.2% respectively. The Yemenites in Palestine had arrived in Palestine illiterate, were socially rejected by the German and Eastern European Jews, and were confined to the urban slums of Palestine (Hurewitz, 1968). The low SES of the Yeminites would explain a propensity for membership in any rebellion. The Yemenites were especially pronounced

in the Stern ranks, the most radical of the Underground groups. British intelligence called Sternists, "desperate men and women who counted their own lives cheap" (KV 3/41/1a).

Other, more minor, findings which emerged from the data were the high proportion of young people in the CID files and the low proportion of members in the liberal professions. The higher amount of young people is typical of past research of ideological movements (Turk, 1982). The low number of professionals in the CID data is further evidence of the non-German background of suspected Underground members. The Jewish Agency recorded that the highest number of immigrants in the Liberal Professions came to Palestine between 1932 and 1939. This was precisely when the highest number of German Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine (Gurevich, 1947, p. 91).

It can be argued that the German Jewish immigrants who arrived in the 1930s would be expected to be more Zionist, due to their persecution under the Hitler regime. An explanation for this contradiction is the second explanation for the German Jews' absence in the CID statistics: a lack of detection by the Authorities. For example, there was at least one incident of a money laundering scheme recorded by the Palestine Police where "money collected by terrorists" was deposited into the accounts of those with "high social standing" where "increased transactions do not arouse suspicion" (HA 47/38/16). One such example was a wealthy industrialist who was a "strong sympathizer," but not a member of the Revisionist party (HA 47/38/16).

As was the case for wealthier Arabs during the Great Rebellion, wealthier members of the Yishuv might have arguably been active in the Underground movement

but in a different capacity - as a non-member. The significant contribution of non-members of revolutionary groups in the Great Rebellion was noted by Yehoshua Porath (1977) in his study of 282 Arab nationalists. Porath (1977) made the following statement based on his work:

[The] Revolt was carried out mainly by Muslim villagers of the lower strata, the participation of the urban, educated or notable families being rather slight...but one should add that the townsmen lent their support to the Revolt in other forms, either as policemen or as civil servants, most of whom were townsmen, and their support was very important, mainly in the intelligence field. (pp. 264-265).

Based on the CID analysis, Jewish Underground members were idealistic socialist-minded workers from Eastern Europe or the progeny of such. The apparent non-involvement of the higher SES status German Jews was either due to their lack of Zionist ideology or, conversely, their lack of detection by the Authorities.

CHAPTER II: POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS OF MANDATE PALESTINE:  
INTER-ETHNIC, INTRA-ETHNIC, AND ANTI-BRITISH CASES

The most common type of assassination of Mandate Palestine was intra-ethnic in nature. The Jews and Arabs equally, and overwhelmingly, assassinated their own. The usual motive for these killings was suspected collaboration with the Authorities. On the rare occasions, the British were targeted for assassination; those responsible were swiftly apprehended.

An *assassination* is defined, for purposes of this chapter, as a premeditated killing of a specific individual for some political reason.

Inter-Ethnic Assassinations

Inter-ethnic assassinations occurred the least during the Mandate. These assassinations only strengthened the bonds between ethnic group members. Inter-ethnic crimes, where victims are chosen due to their status in an ethnic group, only triggered vigilante instincts (Shotland & Goodstein, 1984). When inter-ethnic assassinations did occur, the perpetrators were known to publicly state that their victims were chosen for their actions - and not their ethnic status. For example, the Irgun distributed a communiqué after five male members of one Palestinian Arab family were assassinated. The communiqué explained that the men were killed solely for collaborating with the British, and not because they were Palestinian Arabs. As further evidence of their motives, the Irgun provided a list in the communiqué of Jewish and British informants similarly killed (Nachman, 1993).

The number of Jewish assassinations of Arabs was very low. Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1993) compiled a list of all the assassinations by Jews in Palestine from biblical

days to modern day Israel. He found 55 total assassinations which occurred during the Mandate period; six of these were of Arabs. Five of these six assassinations were the murders of members of the aforementioned Palestinian Arab family. Of the 20 total attempted Jewish assassinations during the Mandate, only one was of an Arab, an influential anti-Zionist preacher.

Not recorded by Ben-Yehuda were retaliation killings by Haganah members. For example, one former member recalled in his memoirs, a drive-by shooting which was a Haganah "mission." The victim was an Arab Underground member who had personally victimized Jews (Edelman, 1965, p. 71).

Table VII.

*Jewish Perpetrated Assassinations*

Ethnicity	Assassinations	Attempted Assassinations
British	4	13
Jewish	42	5
Arab	6	1
Other	3	1
Total	55	20

*Note.* The data is from *Political Assassinations by Jews: a rhetorical device for justice*, by N. Ben-Yehuda, 1993, Albany: State University of New York Press.

The only known cases of Arab perpetrated assassinations of Jews, were the work of the "Safad Gang." The members of the Safad Gang were escaped Arab and Druze criminals and "desperadoes" from Syrian territory (CO 733/190/22). The group was

formed by a sizable number of disaffected Arab politicians who fled to Syria and Transjordan after the Hebron Riots of 1929. Members were given arms and told to intimidate Jewish witnesses in the riot trials.

By the end of 1930, most members of the Safad Gang were arrested. The Palestine Police made the capture of the Safad Gang a departmental priority. Officials were concerned, not for the Jewish victims, but by the group's precedent; they had received word that the Safad Gang was "organized with the object of ascertaining what measure of success would attend the operations of such body, so that, if successful, a number of bands might be formed" (CO 733/190/22).

#### *Intra-Ethnic Assassinations*

Both Arabs and Jews sought to avoid collaboration with the British among their respective community groups. The rashes of Arab and Jewish assassinations were consecutive, but not simultaneous. The Arab assassinations ended around the time of the White Paper in 1939, precisely when Jewish assassinations increased dramatically. The Jewish Underground learned an important lesson from the Arab experience - to avoid the possibility of community assistance to the police.

#### *Arab-Arab Assassinations*

The majority of intra-ethnic Arab assassinations occurred during the Great Rebellion. Before the Rebellion, the occasional targets of intra-ethnic assassination were Arabs who did business with Zionists.

The Arab Strike was declared in April 1936 by the Arab Higher Committee [AHC]. Haj Amin, as leader of the AHC, announced that a general strike would be in effect until the British responded to their demands to stop Jewish immigration, to halt

Jewish land sales, and to establish an Arab representative government (ESCO Foundation for Palestine [ESCO], 1947). The Arab Strike was accompanied by the Great Rebellion. The Great Rebellion (1936-1939) was organized largely by Haj Amin, in an effort to intimidate the British into renunciation of the Balfour Declaration. In addition to the indiscriminate killings of Jews, Haj Amin instructed his rebel bands to assassinate any Palestinian Arab deemed cooperative with the British. Palestinian Arabs targeted by rebels included police officers and elected officials, village mukhtars, civilian loyalists, and Defense Party members.

A number of Arab civil servants were assassinated during the Rebellion, with the motive of intimidating other Arabs in civil service to leave their jobs (Palestine Police Force [PPF], 1937). In 1937 alone, there were the assassinations of two Arab police constables, the Arab Vice Mayor of Tiberias, and the Arab Assistant Superintendent of Police. In 1938, the Arab Mayor of Hebron was murdered due to his desire to not continue the General Strike (PPF, 1936).

Village *mukhtars* also became assassins' targets. The mukhtars were village leaders, similar in title and responsibility to an urban mayor. The mukhtars, indigenous to their villages, were essential liaisons between the police and the Palestinian Arab rural population. Despite a new system of the payment of salaries to mukhtars instituted shortly before the Rebellion, there was an abrupt end to police assistance during the Rebellion (PPF, 1931-1936).

One estimate found that 13 mukhtars were killed between 1936 and 1939 (Zionist Organization of Great Britain [ZOGB], 1939). Arab mukhtars were threatened with death, or the opportunity to flee Palestine, if they signed "loyalty notices" (HA 47/82/14).

The following pamphlet, posted in Hebron in April 1939, is an example of the threats the mukhtars received:

Warning: To the Mukhtars and Elders of Hebron town and its Sub-District and to the Mukhtar of Halhoul. We send you this notice having heard that Government has requested you to sign Loyalty notices sent to you. We inform [illegible] that if you concurred with Government wishes you will run the risk of being shot with bullets of the year 1939; and from the mouths of very recently manufactured machine guns. We are determined to enforce every order we issue in case you sign the Declaration, The only alternative if you are afraid from the Government is that you should leave the country before signing it. (HA 47/82/004)

Civilian members of the Arab community were also threatened with death, if suspected as British loyalists. For example, there were rebel threats against *tarbush* wearers. The Authorities approved of the wearing of the *tarbush*, a Turkish style head piece, but not the *agal*. The *agal*, the traditional Palestinian headwear, was declared illegal. It posed a security threat because it covered the face of the wearer almost completely. One Arab band who called themselves "The Higher Leadership of the Arab Revolt in Palestine" announced their intention in May 1939 to shoot dead any Arab who "wears the *tarbush*, and incites the people to obey the order of the government" (HA 47/82/10; HA 47/82/4). In many cases, the Arab villagers had the difficult choice of either arrest by the British, or death by the rebels. Most Arabs chose the former over the latter. British intelligence lamented that Palestine "has reached a stage at which rebel leaders are more feared and respected than we are" (AIR 2/3312/39b).

Despite the aforementioned assassinations, the majority of the intra-ethnic assassinations during the Rebellion were of Haj Amin's political foes, members of the National Defense Party of Palestine, also known as the Opposition Party. The Defense Party was composed of Dajani-Nashashibi members; long-standing family rivals of the Husaynis. In reaction to their potential victimization, many Defense Party members went into self-imposed exile until the end of the Rebellion. One exception was Fakhri Bey Nashashibi, who chose to remain in Palestine. His open declarations against the revolt led to many attempts on his life (Lesch, 1979).

The Defense Party organized self-defense forces in 1938, in the Jerusalem-Ramallah area known as the *Peace Bands*. They received funds for the Peace Bands from the Jewish Agency and the Mandate authorities. By the winter of 1939, the Arab terror had turned into a feud between Haj Amin's men and Nashashibi's bands (Porath, 1977).

The British civil authorities were cautiously supportive of the Peace Bands. The government feared the whole-hearted support of Nashashibi would jeopardize a reconciliation with Haj Amin supporters. The British military, on the other hand, welcomed the invaluable local support. Once the revolt was declared over in May 1939, the British dissolved the Peace Bands and confiscated their arms.

By the summer of 1939, the British had suppressed the Rebellion. It is debatable as to what caused the Rebellion's end. Many historians cite Haj Amin's expulsion, but this thesis argues that it was instead the police assistance of the community.

The exile of Haj Amin and his leadership is often cited as the major reason for the collapse of the Rebellion. Rashid Khalidi (1997) wrote that the net result of the British

exile of the AHC in 1937 was that the “Palestinians entered World War II in effect headless – without even the semblance of a unified leadership” (p. 190). Many of the local leaders ignored the commands of the AHC members abroad, despite their large financial support from Haj Amin’s strike-relief funds.

On the other hand, the British reported that Haj Amin was still “the directing genius of present rebel activity popularly regarded. Not only do bandit leaders regard him as their leader but individual persons take the precaution of obtaining his acquiescence before accepting or continuing in office” (AIR 2/3312/48). In 1938, the High Commissioner noted that Haj Amin’s continued influence was drawn from the villagers’ desires to avoid personal danger and their belief that sooner or later Haj Amin would return to power (AIR 2/3312/48). There was even talk of British forces removing Haj Amin from Lebanon, in an effort to reduce his proximity to Palestine. These plans never came to fruition (AIR 2/3312/216; AIR 2/3312/48).

It is argued that Haj Amin’s loss of influence was not due to his removal from Palestine. Instead, this thesis argues that his overuse of violence alienated the Palestinian Arab community from his command, allowing them to turn to the British for assistance. Haj Amin’s associates did not become “bandit heroes,” because their violence could not readily be considered heroic to their countrymen (Hobsbawm, 1969, p. 13). Arab neighbors pleaded for the assassinations to end. For example, the following appeared in an Egyptian newspaper *Al Mokattam*, “the cause of the Palestine Arabs is a noble and guileless one; it should not be disgraced by political assassination...but we believe that internal disputes should be settled later, when the country is safe from the danger threatening it” (“Refugees want Fakhri,” p. 2).

The killing of informants by rebels only brought about more assistance to the British by the families of the informant-victims (Porath, 1977). The targeted assassinations of Arab political moderates, and their consequential fleeing of Palestine, only fueled British self-interest in the prevention of Arab-Arab assassinations. Fakhri Nashashibi claimed that 292 of his supporters were murdered by the rebels between 1936 and 1939 (ZOGB, 1939, p. 6).

During World War II, there was concern about a revival of Arab rebel activity in the villages in the North of Palestine. Haj Amin called for a continuation of the Rebellion in Palestine and terror activity against members of the Opposition Party (HA 47/115/004; HA 47/82/002). Despite the “Mufti inspired” propaganda, there were no assassinations during WWII perpetrated by Palestinian Arabs (HA 09/224).

After the war, there were small revolutionary movements with ties to Haj Amin, who encouraged a revival of assassinations. In 1947, for example, the National Resistance Movement called for the killing of Arabs who do business with Zionists and their middlemen (HA 47/69/02). The last known Arab-Arab assassination in Mandate Palestine was the 1945 murder of a Palestinian Arab land broker in Jaffa (PPF, 1945/1994).

#### *Jewish-Jewish Assassinations*

In contrast to the Palestinian Arabs, Jews did not kill Jewish political moderates (with two early exceptions, the De Hahn and Arlosoroff cases) or those Jews who did business with Arabs. The latter did become subject to labor party violence, strikes, and economic devastation - but never assassination. Instead, Jewish intra-ethnic assassinations were based on suspicions of collaboration.

There were two assassinations of Jewish politicians during the early years of the Mandate. One was in June 1924 of a Dutch Jewish émigré to Palestine, Ya'acov Israel De Hahn. De Hahn came to Palestine in 1919 out of Zionist ideals, but soon became disillusioned. He became a well-known ultra-orthodox anti-Zionist. He was the political spokesman for the Agudath Israel movement which, as a matter of religious principle, vehemently opposed political Zionism.

Two Haganah Revisionists were arrested for De Hahn's assassination, but were eventually acquitted due to lack of evidence. The assassination did not damage the Haganah's popularity, despite a certain level of embarrassment on behalf of the *Yishuv*, the Jewish community in Palestine. Jewish Agency leaders suggested that the murder was not an assassination, but rather the result of a bizarre love affair. A Palestinian Jew recalled that the *Yishuv* never spoke openly of the incident, "When I was a small child, I had heard about an ultra-Orthodox Jew named DeHan who had been shot because of his fanatic anti-Zionist stand, but no one ever spoke about that episode" (Ben-Ami, 1996, p. 315). On the other hand, another Palestinian Jew recalled that the *Yishuv* largely "rejoiced in the murder [of De Hahn] and acclaimed the unknown heroes or heroines who had so neatly vanished" (Samuel, 1930, p. 124).

A very different reaction occurred after the murder of Haim Arlosoroff in 1933. Arlosoroff was the chief of the Jewish Agency's Political Department. Golda Meir later called him a symbol of "moderation, caution, a balanced approach to world problems" (Cohen, 1987, p. 158). Two Revisionist members were again arrested, and ultimately acquitted due to lack of evidence. Jabotinsky insisted that the Revisionists were set up for the murder by the rival Jewish Agency (Mitchell, 1987; Avishai, 1985). A former

Irgun member (Ben-Ami, 1996) recalled that after the Arlosoroff murder, "Funds were never available to the Jabotinsky movement for any purpose at any time" (p. 317).

In contrast to when British officials were assassinated, the British never resolved the investigation of either the De Hahn or Arlosoroff homicides. Instead the open investigations, perhaps not accidentally, resulted in deep divisions within the Yishuv.

Jewish-Jewish assassinations in Palestine were rare in Mandate Palestine until after the Great Rebellion. In a lesson learned from the Arabs, the Underground knew that any Yishuv assistance to the police threatened their survival. In an effort to discourage such assistance, the Jewish Underground used the following tactics: the publication of official communiqués which denounced victims as "traitors" and the assassinations of informants, as a means of physical intimidation.

It was rare that the Yishuv reacted strongly against these assassinations. The Underground's communiqués worked to convince the Yishuv that those killed had somehow threatened the Zionist cause. For example, the following public proclamation by the Irgun denounced Jewish police officers who investigated the Underground: "The rifle in your hand should not be aimed against us; You should not guard our prisoners in the prison; You should not convey our heroes to the gallows; Jewish policeman, stand for our right" (HA 47/77/8). One source told police that Jewish officers were expected by the Irgun "to behave in a manner like the Arab Officers during the disturbances viz: - to open a case file for each offense and close it unknown" (HA 003/048). Assassination victims who were police informants were similarly accused in Underground literature of threatening "the defence of the Yishuv and its homeland" and that they "undermined the Jewish security forces in the Homeland" (HA 09/238-239). The intimidation was

effective. During one arms trial in 1943, a Jewish police witness testified that he was too afraid to cooperate, due to the possibility of Irgun assassination (“Two in Jerusalem,” 1943).

When an assassination proved unpopular, the Underground group responsible usually denied all involvement. For example, the Jewish press abhorred the 1942 landmine trap assassination of one British and two Jewish police officers. The late officers were portrayed in the media, as hard-working family men. Their death became an occasion for the Yishuv to rally against the Underground. The Jewish Agency wrote the following pledge of assistance: “The Jewish Agency will whole-heartedly support whatever effective measures may be taken in order to break down the murderous gang and free Palestine and the Yishuv from the nightmare of hold-ups and assassinations” (“The Late Mr. S. Schiff D.S.P.,” 1942, p. 3).

In response, the Stern Group denied any involvement in the killings. They renounced all connection with the pamphlets which took responsibility for the killings. The pamphlets were claimed to have been forgeries by either the Irgun, or the Haganah, in an effort to turn public opinion against them. The Stern group pointed to the fact that “no broadcast took place as advertised, that the word Irgun is used by itself, a practice never before followed by Stern or the Irgun, and that the last two lines of the pamphlet are contrary to Stern's policy” (HA 9/307).

The British were skeptical of these claims (HA 003/193). It was a well-known fact to the police that the Underground whitewashed their activities. For example, an Irgun assassination of a British Inspector, in 1939, was publicly declared to be the result of the Inspector's torture of Jewish prisoners. An informant told that police that the true

reason for the Inspector's assassination was that he was taking bribes from the Histadrut. The Histadrut was a labor organization which had mainstream political policies antithetical to the Irgun (HA 47/59/896; HA 47/59/441).

The second method used by the Underground to discourage community assistance to the Authorities, was through physical intimidation. There was only one Jewish informer assassination in 1937 and one attempt in 1938. The numbers skyrocketed after 1939, lending support for the effect the Arab experience had on the Jewish Underground (see Table 9; Ben-Yehuda, 1993). Perhaps the British would have yielded more cooperation from Jewish civilians if they had made an effort to protect these informants. The Authorities were adept at official protection, as illustrated in the following discussion of anti-British assassinations.

Table VIII.

*Jewish Victims of Jewish Perpetrated Assassinations*

Reason for Victimization	Actual Assassinations	Attempted Assassinations
Anti-Zionist	1	0
Zionist Political Rivalries	3	0
Police Officers	11	5 <sup>a</sup>
Informants to the British	27	0
Total	42	5

*Note.* <sup>a</sup> This Figure includes one Jewish underground counter-spy in official police service.

The data is from *Political Assassinations by Jews: a rhetorical device for justice*, by N. Ben-Yehuda, 1993, Albany: State University of New York Press.

### Assassinations of the British

The assassinations which yielded the most action by the British were, unsurprisingly, the assassinations of the British. Both the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds engaged in these attacks.

#### *Arab-British Assassinations*

Arab assassinations of British officials first came to the Authorities' attention in the early 1930s, in the form of death threat letters. The letters were from members of an Underground organization of Palestinian Arabs, the Black Hand Secret Society. The letters were intended to intimidate British officials into appeasing their stated demands. Instead of instilling fear, the letters became a source of concerned amusement. Roger Courtney, a former Palestine Police Officer, mused that he did not feel like one of the *Old Sweats*, a veteran officer, until he received a Black Hand death threat (Courtney, 1939, p. 230).

In most cases, the Black Hand threats only resulted in increased protection of the official threatened (Courtney, 1939). Although, in one controversial case, the British appeased a Black Hand demand to not allow a Jewish tax collector to "continue his official errands in the Arab quarter" ("Black Hand in Safad," 1937, p. 5). Much to the disappointment of the Yishuv, the British ordered the Jewish tax collector to limit his duties to the Jewish quarter only ("Black Hand in Safad," 1937). Some members of the Black Hand Society joined forces during the Rebellion with Haj Amin's rebel bands.

During the Rebellion, Haj Amin's bands attempted a handful of assassinations of British officials. A successful rebel assassination happened only once, the murder in September 1937 of Lewis Andrews. Andrews was the District Commissioner of the

Galilee. Andrews' assassination catapulted the British into action. Haj Amin was exiled, and the AHC was declared an illegal organization. Much to the dismay of Haj Amin, Nashashibi avoided exile because he had withdrawn from the AHC before the Andrews assassination. A reason the British officially stated, to the League of Nations, for Nashashibi's departure from the AHC was his interest in "taking steps to prevent the growing evil of political assassination ("Annual Report," 1945/1994).

The British feared renewed attacks by rebels during, and after, the Second World War. Despite the tightened censorship of the war, Haj Amin was able to launch an anti-British propaganda campaign from abroad (HA 47/92/898). In his literature, Haj Amin stressed the following complaints: the ill treatment by the British of Arabs during the disturbances; the British insistence on the payment of taxes during Ramadan; and the disproportionate size of agricultural loans to the Jews of Palestine, as compared to those offered the Palestinian Arabs. These attacks never materialized.

#### *Jewish-British Assassinations*

Of the fifty-five Jewish assassinations recorded by Ben-Yehuda, only four were of the British. The British who were killed were all police officers; two were accused of torture, one of being a dangerously aggressive investigator, and the fourth was a Jewish Underground counter-spy (Ben-Yehuda, 1993). The attempted assassinations told a different story. More than half (N=6) of the attempted assassinations targeted high-ranking anti-Zionist British officials. The British were relatively impressive in their ability to protect themselves.

The Jewish assassinations did not commence until after the Great Rebellion. The publication of the White Paper of 1939 was a major reason for this phenomenon.

The Jewish Agency called the White Paper a “breach of faith and surrender to Arab terrorism” (Eban, 1968, p. 384). The assassinations of British officials became part of a larger Jewish Underground campaign of terror.

In reaction to the assassinations, the Authorities became suspect of any Jew within their borders (HA 4/003/372). Jews with a Middle East background were granted visas to enter British territory only after the approval of local law enforcement. United Kingdom passport and customs officials logged the names of Jewish entrants and cross-checked them with British military records. Authorities were advised to “guard against persons who sympathize with Jewish aspirations and who – though completely trustworthy in every other respect – may on this particular subject have divided loyalties” [KV 3/41]. The concern over Jewish terror grew so strong that British authorities believed in 1946 that “virtually every Jew to-day [*sic*] is to some extent in sympathy with Zionist aspirations” [KV 3/41].

The most highly publicized case of Jewish-British assassination was the Stern Group’s assassination of Lord Moyne in January 1944. Moyne had recently been appointed as Minister Resident in the Middle East. Moyne was a well-known anti-Zionist, infamous in Jewish circles for a notorious remark he made at the House of Lords about the “the purity of the Arab race” and his open discouragement of the “mixed Jewish race to establish control of Palestine” (Heller, 1995, p. 123).

Immediately following the Moyne assassination, the then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a threat to nullify the Balfour Declaration, “If our dream’s for Zionism are to end in the smoke of an assassin’s pistol and our labors for the future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, then many like myself would

have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past" (Daniel, p. 8).

The Jewish Agency took Churchill's warnings seriously and participated fully with the British in the crackdown on the Jewish Underground, following the Moyne assassination. This period later became known as the *Saison*, or hunting season. The *Saison* resulted in the Haganah's kidnapping of dozens of Stern and Irgun Members at the Jewish Agency's behest. One report noted that 279 Irgun and Sternist members were arrested by Authorities, but that 1,000 were delivered to the police for interrogation (Avishai, 1985, p. 167).

Despite the Stern group's responsibility for the Moyne incident, more Irgunists than Sternists were rounded up by the Haganah. The reasons for the Irgun crackdown are a matter of historic debate. On the one hand, the Irgun was a larger and more powerful security threat than the smaller Stern Group. On the other hand, there was a rumored agreement between the Jewish Agency and Stern leaders made at the start of the *Saison*. The agreement contained the Stern Group's promise not to perpetrate any more assassinations until after the Moyne trial, including any attempts on Churchill's life (Heller, 1995).

Although the *Saison* temporarily impaired the Underground, it did not lead to a total organizational crackdown comparable to that of the Arab Underground. The reason for this was three-fold. First, there was a lack of information given to the police by interrogated Underground members. Irgun members, as a rule, never knew of members outside their own cells. The second reason, for the ability of the Underground to withstand the *Saison*, was the very real threat of assassination for those who cooperated

with the police. And thirdly was the fact that the Saison repulsed many members of the Yishuv. Former Haganah member, and current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon recalled, "I hated it [the Saison]. I could control my envy of the militants and I did not mind the steps the Jewish Agency took to prevent anti-British activity. But turning them over to the British? How could Jews turn over other Jews? It seemed criminal, a shameful thing to be associated with" (Sharon, 2001, p. 33).

Unlike for the Arabs, the British offered no political reward or protection in return for Jewish assistance during the Saison. In 1945, the Authorities reiterated their pledge to the White Paper's immigration restrictions. The indifference of the British toward the needs of the European Jews during the Holocaust served to make the notion of Yishuv counter-terrorism assistance inconceivable.

#### Conclusion

The role of the Palestinian Arab community in bringing down Haj Amin's rebels was not lost on the Jewish Underground. The Jewish Underground was successful in not allowing the Yishuv to do the same. They achieved this through aggressive public relation and physical intimidation campaigns. The lack of British protection afforded Jewish informants, coupled with a lack of British reward for their assistance, stifled potential Yishuv support.

*CHAPTER III: WEAPONS SMUGGLING: THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARAB AND  
JEWISH UNDERGROUNDS DURING THE PRE-GREAT REBELLION, GREAT  
REBELLION, WORLD WAR II, AND POST WORLD WAR II STAGES OF THE  
MANDATE*

Official Mandate arms policy is best understood in light of British security interests. The Authorities ignored the arms capabilities of private para-military organizations in Palestine, granted that the organizations might possibly become of assistance to the Authorities.

*Pre-Great Rebellion Years*

Many of the arms possessed by Arabs during the pre-Great Rebellion years were those acquired for reasons outside of politics. Weapons were a traditional instrument of the Bedouin in carrying out looting, robbery, and other forms of "banditry," an ancient means of livelihood for this nomadic segment of the population. Aside from banditry, the arms were valued for: 1) sale in the arms market, 2) the prestige attached to their acquisition, and 3) the use of explosives in legitimate trades (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry [AACI], 1945/1946).

Many of the arms in Palestinian Arab hands were of German or Turkish origin. The arms had been sold to the Arabs from Syrians, who had collected the weapons from the WWI battlefields. A great number of the Palestinian Arabs later sold or lent these arms back to the Syrians during the Druze Rebellion in 1925-1926.

Arms recovery was not a priority of the Authorities until the Hebron Riots of 1929. Despite Haganah efforts, several isolated Jewish colonies were "savagely wiped out" by the rioters (Samuel, 1970, p. 108). Hebron was a surprise target for the Haganah.

Hebron residents were religious non-Zionist Jews, who had lived in Palestine for centuries. They were not the “the new Jews,” the settlers who were the usual victims of Arab aggression (Holliday, 1997, p. 105). The Arabs took advantage of the hole in Haganah security.

Following nearly eight years of relative tranquility, the Authorities were also unprepared for the riots. London had ordered a major reduction in British military and police capabilities in 1925 (Segev, 2000). In addition to the lack of manpower, many of the Arab members of the police force proved unreliable (Segev, 2000, p. 323). Edwin Samuel, the son of the first High Commissioner of Palestine, remarked that the Arab officers were afraid to take action, “Most of the Arabs refused to open fire on the crowds, among whom might be some of their own relatives or friends. If someone of another Arab family is killed by an Arab, a blood feud results” (p. 108). Some of the Arab policemen were even active participants in the violence. Raymond Cafferata reported to the Palestine Commission on the Disturbances (as cited in Segev, 2000) the following account, “Behind him was a Jewish woman smothered in blood with a man I recognized as a police constable...He was standing over the woman with a dagger in his hand. He saw me and bolted into another room, shouting in Arabic, ‘Your honor, I am a policeman.’ I got into the room and shot him” (p. 323).

In reaction to the crisis, the British called upon military units from surrounding colonies to aid in quelling the disorders. The Authorities also ordered a remarkable call-up of all male British civil servants in Palestine. These civilian men were suddenly “Special Constables” and placed in uniform and handed a gun. Due to the outcry of Arab

leaders who had gotten word that the British were arming Jews, the British ordered all Jewish British civil servants to hand back their weapons (Samuel, 1970).

Following the riots, the Authorities engaged in arms searches in heavily Arab districts (Palestine Police and Prisons Authority [PPF], 1932 - 1934). The British also directed the Transjordan Frontier Force, posted at the Eastern frontier, to be on the lookout for arms traffic (PPF, 1933). Unlike Palestine, arms possession was legal in Transjordan (PPF, 1933, pp. 32-33). There were also police posts established at the border of Palestine and Syria; the Arabs were seeking to re-acquire the arms they had lent or re-sold to Syrian fighters.

Informants were essential for the police in their efforts. One Palestine Police Sergeant (Courtney, 1939) recalled, "We were always getting information from informers. Just outside the post was the main Palestine-Syria road, and beside the road was a cafe, in the garden of which I used to sit in an evening. There informers would come and whisper the news that So-and-so was possessed of a firearm of this or that description. They were not professional spies or anything of that kind. They were merely gentlemen anxious to work off a grudge on a neighbor" (p. 191). In 1935 the Mukhtars, Arab village leaders, received a £P.2 reward for any information which led to a firearms seizure (PPAR, 1935).

The Haganah also became more active in weapons smuggling activities after the Riots. After the events of 1929, the need for more Jewish armed protection was clear. One British woman observed, "The trouble is that the Arabs are armed, and the Jews are not" (Holliday, 1997, 103). A Jewish settler similarly availed, "the maddening thing is that we [the Jews] must stand quietly by and see our fellow-countrymen being butchered,

and our girls outraged by Arabs. I tell you that Jewish tempers will not stand the strain forever...But someday, unless the Government does something effective, we shall be forced to defend ourselves" (Duff, 1936, p. 198).

Table IX.

*Weapons Seized*

Year	Rifles & Revolvers	Pistols	Shotguns	Bombs & Grenades	Machine & Sub-Machine Guns
1932	263	335	221	27	-
1933	225	269	155	66	-
1934	301	321	235	31	-
1935 <sup>a</sup>	171	251	95	45	-
1936	317	307	73	420	-
1937	1,239	1,461	144	105	-
1938	530	356	52	212	1
1939	2,133	628	207	292	2
1940	1,669	579	125	82	5
1941	495	335	60	17	1
1944	128	299	46	335	12
1945	137	249	24	25	9
1946	572	689	53	18,817	104

*Note.* Dashes indicate that the appropriate data was missing.

<sup>a</sup> The 1935 figure excludes a high profile weapons seizure at Jaffa Port that year. Over 300 firearms, 500 bayonets, and 400,000 rounds were discovered in this seizure. The data was from *Annual Administrative Report*, by the Palestine Police Force, 1932-1941, 1944-1946, Jerusalem: Government Printer.

There was a sharp drop in weapons recovery for the year 1935 (see Table 9). As Arab nationalist movements gained momentum, the villagers leads became less forthcoming (PPF, 1935; "Report," 1935).

Also as a result of the Arab nationalist agenda, Palestinian Arabs pressured the police to act more aggressively against Jewish illegal immigration. The Port and Marine Section of the Palestine Police was inaugurated in 1935. The new unit had the main task of monitoring illegal immigration, but the prevention of weapons also fell under their domain. Until this time, the ports were largely unguarded by the Authorities. The sudden manning of the ports led to a large discovery of arms shipments disguised in cement drums shipped from Belgium to a Jewish resident of Tel Aviv. The incident "caused much alarm and agitation" in the Arabic press ("Report," 1935)

The Arabs protested that the Jews were allowed to arm themselves, while the Arabs were not. In reaction to the accusations of inaction, the British attempted to persuade the Jewish Agency to admonish those responsible, but the Agency refused. A *Palestine Post* editorial claimed hypocrisy on the part of the Arab community, "If the gun-runner is a Jew, vigorous and searching enquiries will discover him and he will receive his punishment. If there is one crime with which Jews cannot be charged...it is the crime of armed attack upon their neighbours. Let these zealous defenders look inside their hearts and see if they can say as much for themselves and their followers" ("Arms and the Politician," 1935, p. 4)!

In apparent agreement with the Jews, British efforts to find Jewish weapons were half-hearted. Despite the 1935 find, the British did not have the Port & Marine Section engage in any more weapons searches the following year. The Jews were simply not a

threat to the British. The British were confident that Jewish arms were for defensive measures only.

#### Great Rebellion Years

The mainstay of the armed activity during the Great Rebellion consisted of the work of small territorial groups under the loose control of Haj Amin. The British police and military engaged in proactive searches of several Arab villages. In the fall of 1938 alone, approximately 4,000 to 5,000 Palestinian Arabs were interrogated by the police. An additional 450 person were arrested for links to rebel activities (PPF, 1938, p. 29). Palestine Police Officers were awarded bonuses if they were successful in the recovery of firearms. There were 149 officers rewarded in 1936; the aggregate amount was £P.142 rewarded (PPF, 1936, p. 19).

After the Andrews assassination in 1937, the Authorities imposed the death penalty for illegal weapons possession. The death penalty was not an effective deterrent, as indicated by the number of shooting deaths which only increased after the announcement (see Table 10).

Table X.

#### *Annual Number of Reported Murder/Attempted Murder Cases and Weapon Type*

Year	Murder		Attempted Murder	
	Shooting	Stabbing	Shooting	Stabbing
1931	49	49	-	-
1932	46	31	-	-
1933	37	27	-	-
1934	30	46	35	67

(Table XI. Cont.)

1935	37	41	31	73
1936	146	49	353	86
1937	128	24	166	53
1938	502	33	409	39
1939	-	-	-	-
1940	-	-	-	-
1941	73	19	88	44
1942	63	16	61	25
1943	88	23	89	35
1944	77	27	91	30
1945	70	25	112	50
1946	118	25	117	45

*Note.* Dashes indicate that the appropriate data was missing. The data was from *Annual Administrative Report*, by the Palestine Police Force, 1931-1938, 1946. Jerusalem: Government Printer; *Annual Administrative Report*, by the Palestine Police Force, 1945. In R.L. Jarman, (1994). *Palestine and Transjordan administration reports 1918-1948*. (pp. 723-795). Slough (UK): Archive editions.

The Mandate Administration and the Jewish Agency also helped fund and arm a Nashashibi self-defense forces, dubbed the *Peace Bands*. Nashashibi was the political rival of Haj Amin; his followers were frequent targets of rebel violence.

Most of the arms seized during the Great Rebellion resembled those used by the Germans and Turks during WWI or were of the homemade variety. The British received intelligence that arms from German and Italian sources were shipped to the Palestinian Arabs via Greece (CO 926/1/9/502). But the homemade variety were the bombs most

frequently employed by the rioters. These bombs usually resulted in little property damage or casualties (PPF, 1936). The police noted the following five types of popular home-made explosives (PPF, 1936):

- 1) a tin can filled with a mixture of sugar and potassium chlorate, 2) a side of a petrol tin rolled into a tube, filled with blasting powder and hammed flat at the ends, 3) odd bits of iron piping filled with crude explosive mixture and "sealed" at the ends with pieces of wood held in place by copper wire, 4) glass bottles filled with explosive mixture and with a length of fuse protruding through a hole in the stopper, and 5) paper bags and pieces of rag filled with blasting powder and potassium chlorate. (p. 24)

Rarely used by the Arabs were the more sophisticated and deadly time-bombs. On one occasion, one of the bombs was discovered before the 'zero hour' by a thirteen year old boy. The bomb had been planted in the sand on the beach between Tel Aviv and Jaffa. It was supposed to detonate when the beach was usually crowded with Jews ("Bomb Buried in Sand," 1936).

Due to intimidation of the villagers by the rebels, informant tips were "well nigh impossible to come by" during the Great Rebellion (PPF, 1936). On the other hand, Jews in Palestine and abroad, were at the ready to inform of possible Arab gun-running activities (CO 733/304/7). One board member of the New Zionist Organization of London wrote the following letter to the Authorities:

A friend of mine had a conversation with a naval officer of the Italian destroyer "San Giorgio," during which he learned incidentally that, when passing Beyrouth, arms were secretly disembarked on an isolated part of the coast, with a view to

forwarding them to Arabs in Palestine. The above mentioned destroyer is now being employed as a training-ship and is cruising in the Mediterranean. (CO 926/1/9/502)

More aggressive Jewish assistance materialized in the form of an Irgun bombing of an Arab marketplace. The Irgun attributed the bombing to the failure of the British to interdict Arab weapons themselves. Former Irgun member Yirshaq Ben-Ami (1996) insisted that the Arabs were using vegetable trucks to smuggle weapons into the villages, “We knew what villages sheltered Arab terrorists and yet the British and Arab policemen made no serious attempt to block roads and paths or to verify the contents of crates and sacks that came in from the country every morning. We had no choice but to uproot the weapons ourselves” (p. 231). Nonetheless, the bombing was unanimously condemned by the official Jewish bodies.

Despite determined British and Jewish efforts, effective weapons recovery did not occur until Arab citizen assistance was renewed in 1939. Assistance to the British became a means of revenge against the rebels by those scorned. Once the revolt was declared in May 1939, the Nahashibi Peace Bands dissolved and agreed to confiscation of their arms (“Strike in Nablus,” 1939).

In contrast to the police crackdown on the Arabs, the Haganah started to be armed and trained by the British forces in 1936. Haganah members enlisted in Jewish Settlement Police units. Although the units implied “policing” in its name, it was privately recognized by the British to be a military force. The expenses of the Jewish Settlement Police were born by both the Jewish Agency and the British government, the

former more than the latter. The Jewish Agency resented having to pay for their protection.

Through the medium of the Jewish Agency, select Haganah units were also trained by the British forces in defense protocol. There were "Special Night Squads" created and trained by the British, under the supervision of Captain Orde Wingate. The Squads were used to protect the Jewish settlements and assist in the protection of vital pipelines. Settlements were also given arms, under lock and key, by the British to use in case of attack. Unlike past riots, the Haganah successfully guarded Jewish settlements against attack (Rivlin, 1994).

Not unlike the Arabs, the Haganah was also building up their weapons caches during the Great Rebellion. The British were not blind regarding these activities. One Jewish police officer (Kluk, 1938) recalled that "every British officer in the force is convinced that every Jew in Palestine has an arsenal in his bedroom" (p. 15). Any form of Jewish self-protection was appreciated by the Authorities; it saved British expenditure and lives.

Most of the weapons were received from Central and Western European sources. Agents in Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Germany reportedly sent arms to the Jews. The shipments were sometimes hidden in straw mats, wine barrels, and "abandoned" suitcases left on trains (HA 47/76/23).

More creative were the Haganah smuggling schemes. It was reported that the Haganah placed one or two suitcases stocked with weapons on board all passenger boats arriving in Palestine during the 1930s. At night, a Haganah member would swim the suitcases ashore (Rivlin, 1994). Jewish customs and harbor officials aided these

operations (HA 47/76/5-6). There was another scheme where agents disguised themselves as Spanish freedom fighters, in order to obtain weapons from a factory in Czechoslovakia during the Spanish Civil War (Rivlin, 1994, p. 81). The Haganah also built up their armory through simple “ties of friendship” with British officials (Edelman, 1965, pp. 69-70).

Training camps were set up by the Haganah and the Irgun in the orange groves of outlying communities, beaches, and athletic fields (Ben-Ami, 1996). A teenager recalled a camp in Mount Carmel she attended during the summer of 1937. The experience was organized by a Jewish school for teenagers to have their “first training in the art of self-defense.” She “learned to take aim, shoot, throw dud hand grenades, scale a wall, seek cover among the rocks, crawl in the open, and carry mock wounded in stretchers.” If a non-Jew stumbled upon the site, the campers pretended to be reading books (Jordan, 1983, p. 192).

The Jewish settlements provided a ready-made network for hidden arms caches. One Palestine Police Officer (Courtney, 1939) believed he was removed from duty at a settlement because he had learned about them, “I was taken off the settlement work. I had no difficulty in guessing the reason. It was just as illegal for Jews to import or possess arms and ammunition as it was for the Arabs, but the Jews were acquiring great quantities of them none-the-less. In my work as a policeman I had found out more about this than was good for me. Certain highly influential Jewish influence was employed behind the scenes, and almost without knowing what was happening I found myself removed to a none-Jewish area” (p. 64).

Table XI.

*Weapons Seized, Arab/Jewish Ethnicity*

Year	Arab		Jewish	
	Rifles/Guns	Bombs/Grenades	Rifles/Guns	Bombs/Grenades
1937	2,680	107	87	8
1938	925	178	34	1
1939	3,427	323	68	31
1940	5,324	602	95	117
1941	899	17	71	1
1942	705	78	34	2
1943	707	22	35	74
1944	531	18	36	309
1945	375	31	39	114

*Note.* The *Rifles/Guns* category was composed of the “rifles,” “pistols & revolvers,” “shotguns,” “machine & sub-machine gun” categories in the original source. The *Bombs/Grenades* category remained the same as appeared in the original source. The data was from *A Survey of Palestine Vol. II*, by the American – Anglo Committee of Inquiry, 1945/1946, Palestine: Government Printer.

With the publication of the White Paper in May 1939, the British announced a cessation of cooperation between the Haganah and the Authorities. The reason behind the change of policy was two-fold. There was a lack of need for Jewish defensive aid now that the Great Rebellion was crushed and there was the British fear that the arming of Jews displayed a pro-Zionist bias. The Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote in a War Cabinet memorandum that “any suspicion of such discrimination would arouse

strong Arab feeling in Palestine with grave consequences to our relations with the Middle Eastern countries and with the Moslem countries further afield" (FO 371/23251).

The Authorities offered the Yishuv the opportunity to relinquish their arms, in return for legal protection. Unlike the Nashashibi Peace Groups, the Yishuv refused. The settlers announced that they have "unofficial permission" for the arms and threatened physical retaliation if the British staged arms searches. The British took the threat seriously. In light of war demands at home, the British nixed an additional battle (Hoffman, 1983, p. 12).

### World War II

During World War II, the Jewish Underground became the new threat to British maintenance of power. Unlike the Palestinian Arabs' efforts, Jewish trafficking was done on a large-scale and was centrally commanded by one of the three Underground forces.

During the Second World War, a fresh supply of arms became available to both the Palestinian Arabs and Jews. When Syria was turned over to the British in 1941, the villagers began selling pillaged arms. A Scotland Yard official (Phillips, 1954) estimated that "every Bedouin in the desert was in the arms market. They combed the battlefields and it was the only time you saw their wives walk anywhere but behind an Arab. As a precaution against mines, the chivalrous Bedouins sent their women ahead" (pp. 91-92). Unlike the situation after WWI, the Jews managed to buy arms from the Syrians faster than the Arabs (HA 47/09/281).

The issue of Jewish arms build-up did not receive wide-spread attention until a high profile smuggling trial, which implicated the Jewish Agency, occurred in the late summer of 1943. There were many foreign correspondents invited to the trial by the

Palestine Administration, in the vain hope that international condemnation would decrease Jewish arms missions. Louis Lipsky, a leader of the World Zionist Organization in New York, condemned the obvious welcome of publicity, "Gun running in a war zone is an everyday occurrence. Arabs have engaged in it in Palestine since long before the war and their intentions were hostile to democracy and the United Nations. But the Palestine Administration has seen fit to convert a routine trial involving two Jews into a cause celebre" ("Two in Jerusalem," 1943).

The case involved two British deserters who testified that they were approached by two representatives of the Jewish Agency (the Jewish Agency categorically denied this claim) and were offered up to \$3600 for their cooperation in a smuggling scheme. The scheme involved the theft of guns and ammunition from military dumps in Egypt and Palestine. Army vehicles would then be used to transport the stolen goods to settlements in Palestine. The two Jewish men were sentenced to seven and ten years each; the two British deserters received ten years each for their alleged roles.

The convicted deserters were only two of many British deserters recruited by the Jewish Underground during World War II. Haganah intelligence kept track of soldiers who frequented cabarets too much, drank and talked too much, and had Jewish wives or girlfriends, for this purpose (Phillips, 1954).

After the trial, Arab notables demanded British arms searches of Jewish settlements (HA 09/425-428). This pressure led to a renewed decision of the Authorities to search Jewish settlements, despite the ongoing war. The resistance feared was encountered immediately, in a disastrous search at the Ramot Ha-Kovesh settlement. One Settler was killed when the police were "compelled to fire one round from a

revolver.” There was incredible resistance displayed from the Settlement’s inhabitants and their neighbors (HA 47/147/3). The British halted arms searches after Ramot Ha-Kovesh (Hoffman, 1983).

Another strong reason for British inaction was the Haganah’s assistance in the war effort. For example, the Haganah formed the Advance Guard into Syria, when Arab soldiers could not be trusted to fight their brethren. The Haganah were also sent on parachute missions into Nazi Europe to orchestrate sabotage operations and encourage partisan warfare (Rivlin, 1994). Interestingly, use of the Haganah haunted the Authorities after the war. In a 1946 memorandum, the Colonial Office expressed concern of “the possibility that Zionist circles might embarrass us by publicizing the use of the Haganah by SOE and British escape organizations during the war” (CO 537/1817).

When an Allied victory appeared likely in February 1944, the Irgun broke its war-time truce. In reaction to the renewed terror, the British re-introduced the death penalty in March 1944 for arms violations (in June 1940, the maximum penalty had been reduced to life imprisonment; “Curfew Follows Outrages,” 1944). Capital punishment once again showed little effect on arms possession, if shooting deaths are used as an indication (see Table 10).

The Arab Underground was also active in arms endeavors during the war. In November of 1944, the British discovered an attempted arms smuggling ring orchestrated by Haj Amin with the assistance of the German S.S. regime. At this time the Mufti was residing in Berlin, where he had fled after the British entered Syria in 1941.

Three German officers, of Palestinian descent, were dropped by parachute into the Jordan Valley. Two of the officers were German Christians and one was Arab Muslim.

The Arab Palestinian parachutist, who was captured was Hassan Salame, a former rebel leader of the Arab Revolt and future commander in the 1948 war. The two German men were from one of the several German Christian communities in Palestine's larger cities (Levenberg, 1993, p. 163). The older generations of Germans living in Mandate Palestine purportedly held no strong anti-Semitic feelings, but the younger generation was a different story. A Palestine Police Officer remarked in the mid-1930s that "the younger ones [Germans] were mostly of the swastika-wearing young Nazi kind, as bitter against the Jews as the Arabs themselves" (Courtney, 1939, pp. 50-51).

The captured soldiers insisted that Haj Amin wanted them to use the arms against the Jews only. It was claimed that Haj Amin spoke highly of the British and did not want to be a "burden" on the British during the war, as were the "Jewish terrorists" (KV 2/400-402). The case received little attention in the press and no strong reaction from the British. The war-time threat stifled British response, but so had the insistence of those captured that they meant no harm to the British – just to the Jews.

### Post World War II

In post-WWII Palestine, the Arab and Jewish Undergrounds concentrated on arms acquisition; both movements sensed a civil war in the near future.

As a result of the stepped up post-war Jewish Underground attacks against British installments, the British waged *Operation Agatha*. The Jewish Agency offices were seized and many members arrested. The British were convinced that the Jewish Agency held operational control over the three Jewish underground groups, especially of the Haganah (KV 3/41). The Jewish settlements in the countryside were also searched for weapons, despite some severe retaliation by settlers. One settlement, the Mesheq Yegur

yielded 26 caches over the course of six days. The British, in an instructional police pamphlet “of value in future arms searches,” divided the types of hidden arms caches discovered in Mesheq Yeger into the following five categories:

- Type A-Drums or barrels buried in places chosen for ease of concealment and access.
- Type B, Small cavities between two walls or floors of a building forming part of the design, and in most cases obviously constructed when the house was built.
- Type C-Specially constructed underground chambers with air vents, and, in the case of the larger ones, fitted with electric light.
- Type D-Small caches concealed in the normal fittings of houses, such as in false window sills, or cupboards with false bottoms, or beneath any moveable material such as grain.
- Type E-Barrels or drums, with sealed lids deeply buried. Inaccessible except after extensive digging, and having no air vents.



from Tel Aviv. The Operation lasted four days. Fifteen-thousand troops cordoned off Tel Aviv. British officers literally checked each apartment block-by-block for arms. The city was placed under absolute curfew with sporadic breaks. As a result of the operation, there were 102,000 persons interviewed by the British and 787 arrests.

Overall there was little resistance encountered by the Authorities, although four Jews were killed (Hoffman, 1983, p. 23). The Jewish press reported instances of residents stating that they were assaulted by the troops. Other articles wrote of finer moments of the Operation: an Officer who made a special effort to get bread for an old lady during curfew or the "house-bound citizens [who] handed cold grapes and drinks to the perspiring soldiers outside" (Brilliant, 1946, p. 2). Similar to Operation Agatha, the operation had very little effect on the capabilities of the Jewish Underground.

In January 1947, facing increased Jewish terror attacks and renewed inter-ethnic violence, the British turned the question of Palestine over to the newly formed United Nations. The main British interest at this point was to keep the peace until their eventual evacuation. British military intelligence stressed that the Authorities needed "to induce the Jewish Agency to cooperate against the terrorists. Co-operation with individual sections of the Jewish community may be effective in isolated instances, but the Agency alone has sufficient information and personnel trained in counter-terrorism to deal effectively and speedily with terrorist organizations" (KV 3/41). The Jewish Agency would not cooperate with the Authorities, due to the British unwillingness to relax Jewish immigration restrictions in return for their assistance.

In July 1947, after the Irgun's kidnapping and hanging of three random British soldiers, the morale of British troops in Palestine (a Middle East Reserve remained in

Palestine) hit a new low. Some soldiers took out their frustration by raiding Jewish settlements and beating occupants (Morris, 2001). It was soon after this incident, in November 1947 that the British announced they would evacuate Palestine on May 15, 1948. The British reported feeling "relief" with the announcement, "it seemed that there would shortly cease to be a reason for Great Britain continuing to be a target for terrorist activities" (KV 3/41).

The need for Arab arms became suddenly more urgent, as the Civil War drew closer. One-hundred Arab supernumerary police officers deserted the forces with their weapons. There was a raid, one month later, by the Arab ex-officers on their former police training centers. Four hundred rifles from a police depot were also stolen at Ramleh (Phillips, 1954). In response, the British decided to disarm all Arab supernumerary forces (Hoffman, 1983).

The Arab Youth Organization [AYO], composed of 11,000-12,000 men, had established weapons training camps in the remote Bedouin areas of Beersheba. Haj Amin planned arms purchases for the AYO. In 1938, there were reports that Haj Amin had received considerable sums of money from Arab Higher Committee associates scattered around the globe, including those residing in India, Germany, and Italy. It was also reported that the then Prime Minister of Iraq, Jamil al-Madfai, "sent to the Mufti £2,000 from the secret funds at his disposal" (AIR 2/3312). Iraq had also agreed to hand over 1,000 Tommy guns purchased from the United States in April 1947 to Haj Amin (FO 371/52608; Levenberg, 1993). In December 1947, the AYO disintegrated after Haj Amin ordered their leader to flee Palestine after a political fall-out.

In the AYO's place, there was the re-establishment of National Committees in local Arab districts. There was a clear lack of regional coordination between the Committees. Each village had its own militia of 300-500 men, lightly armed with respective village stockpiles. The Arabs were mainly dependent on neighboring Arab states for their victory in a civil war against the Jews. This was not an unrealistic expectation, considering that British Intelligence also predicted Zionist defeat by the Arabs, "the Arab states possess armies which are by no means negligible as fighting forces and which in the cases of Egypt and Iraq include small but respectable air components, with which the Jewish Haganah force would be in no position to compete for long. Even if the Arab states, through disagreement among themselves or for any other reason, do not declare official warfare upon the Jews, the latter seem likely in any event to be threatened with determined attack by uncoordinated Arab guerillas, whose fighting qualities were well shown...and will derive further solidarity and unity of purpose from the inspiration and presence in Syria of their leader, Haj amin el Husseini"(KV 3/41).

In the spring of 1948, the Arab states (Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon) sent in expeditionary battalions from their regular armies to fight in Palestine. The countries were reluctant to commit substantial troops; most were still in the building stages of their own post-colonial armies (Farsoun & Zacharia, 1997).

In May 1948, the United Nations Arms Embargo of May 1948 was enacted by the United Nations. The Embargo made it against international law to sell arms to the Middle East combatants. The Jews still managed to make secret weapons deals with the government of Czechoslovakia and private Western European dealers. Earlier that year,

Jewish Agency representative Golda Meir had raised \$100 million on a whirlwind tour of the United States, for this purpose. The Palestinian Arabs lacked the necessary funds to tempt foreign arms dealers (Morris, 2001).

As the second half of the War of Independence approached, Jews were organizationally in a superior position compared with the Arab Liberation Army. The three Jewish underground forces had combined their arms and manpower for a united effort on May 31, 1948, the *Israeli Defense Forces* [IDF] (Morris, 2001, p. 193). The IDF also included foreign volunteers from America, Great Britain, Canada, and Czechoslovakia. IDF strength amounted to 42,000 men and women (Morris, 2001, p. 215).

In May 1948, the Arab national armies officially joined a war for which they had never bothered to prepare, assuming victory would be certain. The separate national armies of the Arab states lacked coordination and possessed a profound hesitancy to send in their best. In contrast, it was the moment the Jewish Underground forces had prepared for during the entire Mandate. The organizations had combined forces to stand as one unified national command - self-sufficient, well-organized, and more than ready to finally defend herself (Morris, 2001; Shalim, 2001).

#### Conclusion

Until the end of WWII, it was in the interest of the British to arm the Jewish Underground. The old saying, "the enemy of my enemy, is my friend," could not have been truer for the Arab-Jewish-British triangular relationship. Once the British no longer needed the assistance of the Underground, there were efforts to disarm them. Unlike the

Nashashibi Peace Groups, the yishuv was hesitant to give up their ability to defend themselves. British security had let them down too many times before.

The Arabs became less of a threat to the British following the Second World War, but the Jews more of a threat as they felt slighted by the British in light of anti-Zionist policy decisions. The British, having suffered losses from the war, were hesitant to engage in full-scale costly counter-terrorist operations. Jewish cooperation with Authorities was sought instead, and when it was not forthcoming, the British announced defeat.

## CHAPTER IV: ROBBERY AND EXTORTION "FOR THE CAUSE": HIGHWAY ROBBERIES, BANK ROBBERIES, DIAMOND HEISTS, AND "TAXES"

The bulk of the robberies and extortions of the Mandate were perpetrated by members of the Arab and Jewish Underground. These crimes were major revenue sources for their operations.

### Highway Robbery

When the British first arrived in Palestine, highway robbery was the main concern of the Palestine Police. The British had an economic interest in its prevention. Highway robbery threatened the economy of the fledgling colony, due to its ability to threaten vital roadways to commercial traffic. The police softened this economic effect with increased patrols of major roadways and escorts of essential commercial vehicles (Palestine Police Force [PPF], 1936). Reflective of the Authorities' pecuniary interests, the police felt a measure of success if they were able to contain the highway robberies to the roads leading to colonies and villages, not the cities (PPF, 1935).

Also disturbing to the British was the highway robbers' preference to victimize the non-Arab Palestinian population. This preference was reflective of the mores of the rural Arab village society where locals who stole from "outsiders," and never bothered the rich or the poor, were admired and feared (Swedenburg, 1995, p. 95). The typical villager had contact with only outsiders in Palestine's city centers. The cities themselves were unfamiliar terrain for the villager, but the roads getting there were not. Of most concern to the Authorities were victimizations of British officials. One Palestine Police Officer called a highway robber's murder of an officer, "a touch line beyond which it is not permissible to go" (Tidhar, 1924, p. 29).

Highway robbery was exclusively perpetrated by the Palestinian Arabs. This was due to their ability to commit the crime undetected by the Authorities. The natives were in an ideal position to carry off the robberies with relative ease and lack of detection. Their comparative familiarity with rural Palestine allowed them to make safe and speedy getaways. That is how one group of highway robbers was dubbed the “Mercurys of Crime” by the police. The group had the ability to travel extraordinarily quickly during daylight hours between Jerusalem and Jaffa. The robbers constantly evaded arrest by committing a new crime in a different spot each night (Tidhar, 1924).

There was a major debate in Mandate Palestine over the true motivations of highway robbers. The Authorities’ view was depoliticized; viewing them as nothing more than common criminals, “bandits” and “gangsters” (Swedenburg, p. 94). Economic motivations of their crimes were regularly highlighted by the police in their annual administrative reports (PPF, 1933, 1934, & 1937). The Palestinian Arab community believed otherwise, insisting instead that the highway robbers were misunderstood revolutionaries. Some community members even claimed that the British “trump[ed] up charges of robbery” against the highwaymen, in an effort to discredit their cause (Swedenburg, 1995, pp. 94-95).

The trial of the most infamous highway robber of the Mandate, Abu Jilda, focused on Jilda’s questionable revolutionary motives. Jilda had formed a group of three highwaymen, after fleeing his home village in Nablus in 1932. The group became responsible for nine serious crimes, including the murder of a Palestine Police Officer. The officer’s death was highlighted in the press for its apparent callousness:

May 22, 1933, was market day. Villagers who passed Wadi Khandaq were ordered by bandits to go into a pit where they were robbed... While the robbery was going on, Constables Assali and Mahmour Ismail passed the Wadi while on patrol. They were surprised by the gang, disarmed of their Rifles and taken to the pit to give up their money. Assali replied, "search me." Abu Jilda, however, shot him dead and ordered the other constable to search his dead companion and hand him his money. Doleh [Jilda associate] said he protested against the murder of the policeman and saved the life of the other policeman. ("Abu Jilda Loses Appeal," 1934, pp. 1,8)

The trial charged Jilda with willful murder in order to facilitate the offense of theft and highway robbery. His attorney claimed that the murder of the police officer was not due to Jilda's desire for his money. Instead, the attorney insisted that the police officer's murder was based on nationalist principles. As further evidence of his point, the attorney pointed out that the second officer at the scene was not killed because he had promised to leave government service. The Judge never decided the truth of the facts of the case, but he did decide that Jilda should be sentenced to death.

Jilda was "exalted in the Arab press" (Levy, 1936, p. E4). One publication, *Al Jamia Al Arabia*, published that the "whole Arab nation sympathizes with Abu Jilda and regards the government's prosecution of Abu Jilda as an outstanding example of the British treatment of Arabs" ("A National Hero," 1934, p. 1). As an example of his popularity, an enterprising Nablus woman produced popular portraits of "King Abu Jilda" after his trial ("Bandits' Autographed Portraits," 1934, p. 5).

The annual rates of highway robbery tend to support a combination of both economic and revolutionary motives for the crime (see Table 12). The annual figures of highway robbery through 1937 illustrate a relatively high level of the crime until 1924. The 1924 rate held steady in Palestine until it decreased again in 1929. The highway robberies remained at this low rate until their dramatic increase in 1936 and 1937. No figures for highway robbery were reported by the Palestine Police after 1937.

In support of an economic interpretation of the crime, there was an economic depression in Palestine until 1924. In 1924 the colony experienced the arrival of Polish Jews with manufacturing experience and capital funds ("Report," 1924). This was precisely the same time that highway robberies decreased considerably. On the other hand, the colony's short-lived period of prosperity came to an end in 1926, when the economy suffered an economic downturn. The following year, the Authorities admitted to the League of Nations that Palestine was experiencing an "economic depression." ("Report," 1927, p. 4) The depression was reported to have been caused by a loss of Jewish capital investment, coupled with a series of natural disasters: an earthquake, a drought, a locust invasion, and a cattle plague ("Report," 1927, 1928). Despite Palestine's financial condition, the number of highway robbery reports maintained their low levels during these years.

Palestine's economy continued to suffer until the outbreak of World War II. The colony was not immune to the effects of the Great Depression ("Report," 1931-1935). In opposition to an economic interpretation, the number of highway robberies continued to decline during the Great Depression. It was only during the Great Rebellion that highway robberies showed a substantial increase.

The police attributed this outbreak of highway robbery to the increased economic burden caused by the Great Rebellion, including the effects of the General Strike. The Authorities also reasoned that men who had had quit their legitimate jobs to organize “armies” during the Great Rebellion were using the robberies as a means to make ends meet (PPF, 1936, p. 20). The economy of Palestine did suffer terribly during the Great Rebellion, so there was probably some truth in these speculations (“Report,” 1936-1939).

In contrast, a revolutionary interpretation of highway robbery would argue that the Palestine Police may not have felt the need to label nationalist attacks as highway robberies during times of obvious rebellion. The outwardly peaceful years of Palestine came to an abrupt end with the Hebron Riots of 1929. The officials were well aware of small revolutionary groups active in Palestine following the Hebron Riots (CO 733/190/001-018). However, this theory does not account for why the Palestine Police reported that the number of highway robberies multiplied during the Great Rebellion.

A combination of the revolutionary and the aforementioned economic motivation theories best explains the increase in the official estimates of highway robberies during the Great Rebellion. During the Great Rebellion, the Palestine Police probably considered many crimes “highway robbery” which were actually associated with the General Strike. For example the rioters were reported to have shot upon Arab and Jewish transports, ambushed commercial vehicles, and killed animals on their way to the market (PPF, 1936, 1937; “Report,” 1936-1938).

The highways also provided convenient avenues of anti-Zionist expression during the Great Rebellion. There were reports of highway robbers asking victims if they were Jewish, before deciding whether or not to harm them (“Daring Highway Robbery,”

1937). There were also cases of Arabs shooting at cars on the highways which contained only Jewish passengers (PPF, 1936).

Table XII.

*Annual Number of Highway Robberies and Per Capita Rates (10,000)*

Year	Highway Robberies	Per Capita
1921	135	-
1922	180	2.4
1923	177	2.3
1924	93	1.2
1925	71	.8
1926	94	1.0
1927	95	1.0
1928	70	.7
1929	34	.4
1930	28	.3
1931	98 (42) <sup>a</sup>	.9
1932	57 (28) <sup>a</sup>	.5
1933	34	.3
1934	32	.2
1935	32	.2

(Table XII. Cont.)

1936	122	.9
1937	221	1.6

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*Note.* After 1935, the Palestine Police stopped publishing the annual figures for “highway robbery.” In 1936, the Palestine Police instead published the annual figures for “robbery,” with highway robbery included under this classification along with all other acts of theft involving the use of force. Dashes indicate missing data.

<sup>a</sup> The definition of robbery became more inclusive in 1931, the old figure is shown in the bracketed areas for the years 1931 and 1932 only. The data is from *Annual Administrative Report*, by the Palestine Police Force, 1931-1937, Jerusalem: Government Printer; *Report*, by His Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the administration of Palestine and Transjordan (1924-1930), London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office.

By the outset of World War II, highway robberies dropped dramatically in Palestine. The Authorities attributed this drop to the flooding of the country with war-time militia and to increases in commercial traffic (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945/1946). The police had found that, in the past, greater traffic led to less robberies; the 1934 *Annual Administrative Report* noted that traffic increases on the highways “renders bandits who stage a hold-up embarrassed by the arrival in a short space of time of more people than they can cope with” (PPF, 1934, p. 22).

In two police reports issued during the war, and one after the war, there was no mention of highway robbery as a police concern (PPF, 1945/1994, 1947; “Report,” 1939/1994) In support of both the economic and revolutionary interpretations, the economy in Palestine improved during the war, coupled with a lull in Palestinian Arab revolutionary activities. After the war, the only known occurrence of highway robbery

was in 1947 when the police uncovered a stolen car ring. Palestinian Arabs were stealing cars at gun-point on Palestine's major highways, for re-sale in Egypt. There were no reported revolutionary aims of this car ring ("Stolen Cars," 1948).

#### Diamond Heists and Bank Robberies

Similar to the Arabs and highway robberies, diamond robberies were perpetrated exclusively by the Jewish Underground. The Irgun and the Stern groups were responsible for the robberies. Diamond robberies were unheard of in Palestine prior to World War II. During the war, Palestine's diamond industry experienced a boom when Germany occupied the traditional diamond centers of Brussels and Amsterdam. There was also the immigration to Palestine of Belgium and Dutch (Jewish) former diamond industry leaders (Szenberg, 1970). Robbery targets were usually after-hour burglaries of Jewish owned diamond factories and day-time hold-ups of Jewish diamond merchants in Tel Aviv; civilians were never killed during these crimes. In the vast majority, the assailants were Jewish males operating in armed groups of three to five persons. The Irgun even boasted members who were trained diamond cutters, to properly dispose of the stolen gems (HA 4/003/348, 351).

The lack of British police attention to these diamond robberies frustrated the Yishuv. The diamond robberies became so intense that in 1937 Lloyd's of London refused to accept any more insurance risks for Palestine gems ("Reflections," 1937). One *Palestine Post* op-ed piece declared, "The criminals were hardly ever detected by the police. Except in a few instances where passers-by or watchmen caught them, they invariably got away...Rarely was a thief responsible for robbery ever brought to justice" ("Tel Aviv's Crime Record," 1946, p. 8).

The British had political reason to not be vigilant in investigating the robberies (Waterbury, 1989). The British did not want to encourage a rival diamond industry, due to promises made to their long-time allies of Belgium and Holland. The British were more interested in rebuilding the pre-WWII European diamond business than the protection of a rival one. To this end, the British had enacted a law during the war which forbade the issuance of manufacturing licenses or the addition of new shareholders to existing diamond factories. The official reason for the law was the fear that the diamonds would be smuggled at high profit to Germany (Szenberg, 1970), but a Foreign Office document mentioned other concerns, "So far as the Foreign Office is concerned our only direct interest is I think to see that the proposals now put forward are not likely to upset the Belgians or the Dutch who may have had a finger in this market before the war" (CO 852/527/1).

There was also the more minor concern of the British during the war that Palestine diamonds might fall into Axis hands. Diamonds were traditionally sought after war-time commodity. International diamond smuggling rings, with sources in Belgium, Italy, Brazil, and the United States, were exposed during the war (Szenberg, 1970).

Similar to the diamond heists, bank robberies by the Jewish Underground first started to appear during World War II. There was a need to replenish lost funds due to limited contributions from European Jewry. The Irgun claimed that "not a single penny [of the robberies] was acquired by the members for their personal use" (HA 4/003/348, 351). Instead the proceeds from these robberies reportedly went toward the support of unemployed members and arms purchases (HA 47/46/003).

Unlike the diamond thefts, homicides oftentimes accompanied the bank robberies. The homicides did not occur during the commission of the robbery, but rather when the perpetrators were making their escape. The robbers sometimes shot into the air to avoid a chase by police or passers-by, sometimes on very crowded city streets (HA 003/157; "Two Dead in T.A.," 1942). These shoot-outs invariably "produced a genuine wave of revulsion amongst the Palestinian Jewry" (HA 09/307). The following is a proclamation published by the Irgun after a bank robbery which left two bystanders slain:

The Irgun Zvi Leumi be Eretz Israel (the national military organization in Palestine) deems it necessary to inform the public of the following facts: - The Irgun Zvi Leumi has no connection with the recent robberies and murders in the country... The Irgun Zvi Leumi be Eretz Israel draws the attention of the public to the fact that a group without moral right or public backing is using a similar name to that of our organization, i.e. "Irgun Tzvai Leumi be Eretz" or "Eretz be Israel" with the intention of deceiving the general public. (HA 09/307)

This lack of British police attention led to the Yishuv's reliance on the protection services of the Haganah. The Haganah intervened on several occasions to foil Irgun and Stern bank and diamond robberies in Tel Aviv. Members volunteered, or were hired by local businesses, to prevent victimization ("Gems Guarded," 1948, "Haganah Foil," 1948; "LP.195,000 Robbery," 1948).

Not only did the British have a political interest in not protecting Jewish robbery victims, there was also an economic interest as well. It was to the Mandate Administration's financial benefit to welcome the willingness of the Yishuv to protect themselves.

### Extortion "for the cause"

The system of extortion "for the cause" was practiced by both the Arab and Jewish Underground groups. Victims were those believed to have not contributed enough money to these organizations.

#### *Arab Extortion Plots*

Extortion by the Palestinian Arab Underground did not commence until the 1930s, when an infamous blackmail-writing group called "the black hand secret society" appeared in Haifa. The group members wrote blackmail letters to various urban wealthy and middle-class Arab residents of Haifa. Toward the end of the decade, wealthy Jewish residents of Haifa were targeted as well. The death threat letters were decorated with hand-drawn pictures of demons, skulls, revolvers, and black hands. Their threats were firm and to the point. One letter threatened that the unfortunate recipient would "be killed openly or secretly, even if you hide in a steel case, or even if you stand before the High Commissioner" ("In the Courts, 1933, p. 4).

During the Great Rebellion, the Black Hand threats continued while Haj Amin's associates began visiting the homes of those believed to have made inadequate contributions to the Arab Higher Committee ("Highway robbery," 1936). Fakhri Bey Nashashibi wrote a declaration in protest to the High Commissioner against these extortion practices. Nashashibi declared that the extorted funds were being used by Haj Amin to buy arms and ammunition to further his own political objectives (ZOGB, 1939).

In addition to the blackmail of the urban Arabs, there were kidnappings of poverty-stricken peasant villagers during the Great Rebellion ("Abducted Villagers," 1938; "Death Sentence," 1939; "Toll of Weekend," 1938). The aim of the abductions

was either for money or for the villagers' sons to join the Underground. The following is an extract of a letter reportedly seized by British troops, written by one Arab village leader in November 1938:

Complaints are being received from the villagers of the Jerusalem district as a result of pillaging, looting, killing, and torturing committed by some of the vile people who are wearing the clothing of holy warriors. Many people who have been unfortunate enough to live in this area are sending in their complaints. I admit that there are among the murdered people some who have been sentenced to death but what are the faults of the innocent whose money is stolen, whose cattle are looted. Whose women are violated. Whose jewels are pillaged, and suffer in other ways in which you have undoubtedly heard? Our rebellion has become one against the villages and not against the Government or the Jews. (ZOGB, 1939, p. II).

In efforts to escape the extortion threats, many Arabs fled Palestine during the Great Rebellion (see Table 13). Even when these individuals fled the country, they were not necessarily forgotten. One Haifa landowner was shot dead by rebels, after returning from Lebanon where he had fled years before receiving extortion attempts ("Arab Notable Murdered," 1938).

Table XIII.

*Palestinian Residents Annual Emigration*

Year	Arabs
1935	57,434
1936	54,576
1938	117,521
1939	62,551
1941	84,182
1942	104,267

*Note.* Data is from *Annual Report*, Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1935, 1936, 1938, 1939, 1941, 1942, Jerusalem: Government printer.

The extortion activities of the Black Hand Secret Society and Haj Amin's associates ceased with the Great Rebellion.

*Jewish Extortion Plots*

The Underground's extortion was mainly in the form of community taxes levied by the Jewish Agency. The Stern group was also known to extort Jewish merchants and business owners under threat of assaults, economic boycotts, and property sabotage, but not death (HA 09/287; HA 03/077-80).

The Jewish Agency was responsible for a "voluntary" tax on members of the Yishuv, the *Kofer Hayishuv*. Much of the funds from the *Kofer* went to the Haganah, the Underground group associated with the Jewish Agency. In 1940, the *Kofer* had lost

much of its former income due to the war. In special efforts to collect more money the Jewish Agency imposed additional "taxes" on bicycles, radios, and promissory notes.

Jewish Agency funds were still diminishing, so the Jewish Agency resorted to "strong arm methods" to achieve more contributions. The Palestine Police had reports in 1940 of five cases of property damage and assault upon persons who avoided payment. Action was taken by police against two Kofer collectors who accompanied their demands for payment with threats (HA 2/09/101; HA 2/09/117).

The Revisionists, the political affiliation of most Irgunists, resented the Kofer fund, mainly because they had no control over its usage. The three Underground groups were known to compete with each other for leadership of the Yishuv (HA 003/002-003). The Revisionists wanted the British to either declare the fund illegal or assure that the Revisionists obtained a percentage of it. The British were unwilling to offer their assistance to the Revisionists, a more extreme organization than the politically moderate Jewish Agency (AACI 1945/1946). The Revisionists soon thereafter commenced attacks on Kofer collectors, including acts of robbery and assault against the Kofer collectors. The cars of the collectors were even set on fire. The Palestine Police suspected that the Irgun were behind these attacks (HA 2/09/101; HA 2/09/117).

The Jewish Agency denounced these acts of "hooliganism." The Agency denied that there was any "foundation for the Revisionist charge that they are discriminated against by the various activities conducted through the Funds" (Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs [ECZA], 1940, p. 31). The Jewish Agency insisted that the funds were used to assist any Jew in Palestine without regard to their political association (ECZA, 1940). Nonetheless, the Kofer continued throughout the length of the Mandate.

The Jewish Underground also obtained funds from voluntary contributions from Jews outside of Palestine. One method of solicitation of Underground funds was through affiliate organizations abroad that delivered funds to the Underground. In 1947, a New York City Public Solicitation Division employee complained to the British Authorities that Jewish organizations affiliated with the Underground in Palestine received an inordinate amount of funding licenses from the city. The Authorities took great notice of this woman's concerns. The United Kingdom mission in New York pleaded with the U.S. State Department to put an end to U.S. press advertisements for the Palestine Resistance Committee (see Figure 7). The Authorities had information that these funds were actually going to the Irgun. The U.S. reaction to the British was curt, officially stating that "no legal means existed for stopping these appeals" (CO 967/103).



### Conclusion

In conclusion, the British protection of Arab victims was a mixed blessing for the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement. Both Arabs and Jews engaged in robbery and extortion to help fund their Underground activities. The difference between the two groups was in their choice of victims. Unlike the Jewish robbers and extortionists, the Arab motivations for their victimization were largely political. In contrast, the Jewish Underground chose their victims more or less for economic reasons alone. The Kofar was collected from the entire Yishuv, the merchants were robbed only if they possessed gems, and Jewish businessmen were threatened for no other reason than their wealth. These differences in victimization motivations led to more British self-interest in protecting the Palestinian Arabs. The end was an ironic one for the Palestinian Arabs; in receiving police protection from the state, their independence was stifled.

CHAPTER V: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: ILLICIT ENTRY OF ARABS AND JEWS  
IN PRE-WORLD WAR II, WORLD WAR II, AND POST-WORLD WAR II

PALESTINE

Introduction

Palestine immigration policy was politically troublesome for the Mandate Administration. Both the Arab and Jewish communities followed British immigration policies very closely, unfortunately for opposite reasons. The Jews demanded increased Jewish immigration to Palestine, while the Arabs insisted on less. The issue began as a local issue of contention, but grew into a global one.

Jewish Immigration

*Pre-World War II*

“The unlawful entry into, or residence in, Palestine of a person not born there and lacking an immigrant certificate” was considered “illegal immigration” by the Mandate Administration (Edelheit, 1996, p. 92). On the other hand, the Zionists had a number of alternative terms for Jews who matched the aforementioned definition, among them, *ha'apala* (climbing upwards), *aliyah bet* (*bet* is the letter *b* in Hebrew), *independent aliyah*, *clandestine immigration*, *illegal rescue work*, and *unregistered immigration*.

According to one estimate, approximately a quarter of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine between 1914 and 1945 were illegal ones (Edeleheit, 1996, p. 93). Illegal immigration commenced after the White Paper of 1922 which limited the number of visas allowed for Jewish immigration to Palestine for the first time. The White Paper called for the issuance of immigration visas only in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity [EAC] of the colony. The EAC of Palestine equaled the number of

jobs available for Jewish immigrants in Palestine, as calculated for each six month period. Each quarter, the Jewish Agency was expected to devise the EAC in consultation with the Manufacturer's Association, the Federation of Farmers, and the Labor Federation. In practice the Authorities were known to reduce the Jewish estimate" (Golub, 1937).

Jewish illegal immigration first occurred via land routes at the Northern border of Palestine. The Jewish Underground was more often than not behind these endeavors. Aside from a humanitarian interest in saving Jews, the Underground believed that the immigrants would help build a Jewish majority in Palestine. A portion of the immigrants also strengthened the ranks of the Revisionist Irgun and Betar (Revisionist youth group) ranks. Haganah members also were involved in smuggling schemes, but not on any large scale until 1939.

The White Paper worked to successfully prevent Arab disturbances after the terms of the Palestine Mandate (with the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration) were ratified by the League of Nations in 1922, three weeks after the White Paper's announcement. The Palestinian Arabs had waged deadly riots in 1920 and 1921 against the possibility of the Balfour Declaration's inclusion (Gilbert, 1998; Keith-Roach, 1994). The White Paper was only the first of many examples of British policy motivated by Arab appeasement.

The first smuggling schemes of the Revisionists consisted of sending agents to Beirut's cheap hotels to search for Polish Jews. The majority of the earliest immigrants to Palestine, legal and otherwise, were Jews from Poland (see Table 14). The immigrants were fleeing violent pogroms and wide-spread economic boycotts in their home countries (Heller, 1980). Bribed officials and substantially rewarded local Arabs assisted the

Revisionists in smuggling the immigrants from Beirut to Palestine. One Palestine Police Officer thought that the Arabs rationalized their behavior with the belief that there were already so many Jews in the country, what difference would a few more make, or that the smuggled immigrants would get killed (by Arabs) anyway (Courtney, 1939).

Table XIV.

*Legal Immigration to Palestine*

Year	Christian	Moslem	Jewish	Total
1921	-	-	9,149	-
1922	224	60	7,844	8,128
1923	402	168	7,421	7,991
1924	510	187	12,856	13,553
1925	741	99	33,801	34,641
1926	611	218	13,081	13,910
1927	758	124	2,713	3,595
1928	710	198	2,178	3,086
1929	1,117	200	5,249	6,566
1930	1,296	193	4,944	6,433
1931	1,245	213	4,075	5,533
1932	1,524	212	9,553	11,289
1933	963 (344)	276 (63)	30,327	29,101
1934	679	104	38,244	-
1935	-	-	61,854	-

(Table XIV. Cont.)

1936	-	-	29,727	-
1937	-	-	-	-
1938	-	357	11,441	-
1939	-	290 <sup>a</sup>	13,914	-
1940	-	363	4,524	-
1941	-	251 <sup>a</sup>	3,630	4,185
1942	-	414	2,178	-
1943	-	485	8,474	-
1944	-	525	14,162	-

*Note.* Missing or inapplicable data indicated by a dash.

<sup>a</sup> During these years, the classification *Arab* was utilized in official immigration data instead of the *Muslim* and *Christian* classifications. Data is from *Annual Migration Reports*, by the Department of Migration, 1934, 1938-1944, Jerusalem: Government Printer; *Report*, by His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the administration of Palestine and Transjordan (1921-1936). London: His Majesty's Stationary.

The British were unconcerned with the early Revisionist smugglers until the Hebron Riots of 1929. The Shaw Commission, which was appointed to investigate the riots, found that the riots were caused by Arab concerns over Jewish immigration. The Passfield White Paper of 1930, based on the findings of the Shaw Commission, severely limited Jewish immigration and slowed down Jewish development. A year later, the Passfield White Paper was repudiated due to aggressive lobbying efforts of Jewish officials (ESCO Foundation for Palestine [ESCO], 1947).

When Hitler took office in Germany in 1933, the British noted an immediate increase in illicit immigration into Palestine (Palestine Police Force [PPF], 1933). The British found that many of the German Jews illegally immigrating were those who did not meet the *selective* requirements of the Jewish Agency. The practice of *selectivity* was defined by the Jewish Agency as preferring to facilitate the immigration of Jews who were young and had been trained in Europe for life in Palestine, especially in agriculture or industry (Ben-Ami, 1996). There were also health and minimum capital requirements imposed by the Jewish Agency on the legal immigrants. Even when Hitler's power was on the rise in Germany, Sir Arthur Wauchope reported in 1934 that Moshe Shertok, Head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, told him confidentially that they "had to be very careful in their selection of these refugees [from Germany] as by no means all would be suitable as settlers in Palestine" (CO 733/255).

The British were not the only ones who took notice of the increase of illegal immigrants from Germany. Viewing these immigrants as a threat to the existence of a future Arab state, the Arabs became more vocal in their opposition. The Arab Press was subject to British Censorship Laws in 1933, after a series of political demonstrations followed published allegations against the Authorities. The press claimed that the Authorities were ignoring the EAC principle and "flooding the country with Jews" to create a Jewish majority in Palestine ("Report," 1933, p. 5).

The final impetus for British action prior to World War II was the Arab threat of vigilante action. The threat first appeared in a petition letter from the Arab Notables of Nablus to the Administrating Officer of Palestine, the League of Nations, and the

Secretary of State of the Colonies. The petition warned of Arabs taking illegal immigration prevention into their own hands, as an act of “self defense”:

The Arabs, who observe the continual undermining of their national existence through the admission of tens of thousands of Jews into Palestine, without giving any consideration to Arab opinion, consider themselves to be acting in self-defense should they themselves adopt any means in order to prevent the flow of Jewish immigration and any act which may be taken in opposition to their so doing will be unjust...It will not be an exaggeration to say that the anxiety which is now overwhelming the Arabs in the country in view of the increased Jewish immigration has reached a degree where any Arab seriously feels the necessity of resistance in order to protect his existence. (CO 733/248/9-10)

In their official response to the notables, the British insisted that the Mandate Administration followed a strict Jewish immigration policy based on the EAC principle. On the other hand, the British admitted that the Authorities faced an illegal immigration problem. The Authorities announced that the following steps would be taken to prevent illegal immigration: 1) written notice to travelers that they incur prosecution and deportation if they overstay, 2) the requirement of non-first class travelers to leave a security deposit redeemable upon their departure, and 3) the calculation of the official Labor Schedule with the inclusion of past estimations of Jewish illegal immigration in mind (CO 733/248/5-7). In addition to these actions, the British stepped up police patrols in Northern Palestine, to intercept immigrants arriving from Syria (PPF, 1933-1934)

All of the above measures to combat illegal immigration proved shortly to be failures. One year later, the police noted that there was “a considerable increase in illicit

immigration...the determination to enter Palestine [by both Arabs and Jews] was unprecedented” (PPF, 1934, p. 35). In 1935, the *Palestine Police Annual Administrative Report* further reported that the security fee measure did not work. The fees were regularly forfeited by travelers wishing to stay in Palestine permanently. Others managed to avoid the security fees completely by receiving first class classification, even if they were not (PPF, 1935). On the other hand, the increased frontier patrols resulted in decreased land-based immigration, but this traffic was only to be replaced with sea-bound routes. Foreign ship owners, especially the Greeks, began to charter their cargo ships to the Jewish Underground for illegal immigration purposes (Noar, 1987).

In light of the glaring failures of the British in curbing illegal immigration, the threatened vigilante response of the Arabs began to take shape. The first incident of vigilantism occurred on August 16, 1934 with the formation of self-proclaimed illegal immigrant patrols. The patrols were composed of teams of Arab boy scouts from Tulkarm. On their first night of patrol, the scouts marched through the Jewish town of Nathanya, but never reached the coastline. A large number of Jewish settlers from the area followed the scouts and violently attacked them; one teenager was seriously injured. The Palestine Police reported that “A dangerous situation was averted by the rapid improvement in the boy’s condition” (PPF, 1934, p. 33).

The Authorities took the Tulkarm incident very seriously. The High Commissioner issued a stern communiqué which stated that private law enforcement measures “however well intentioned” were “a positive hindrance and embarrassment”:

The High Commissioner is consering [*sic*] with the Secretary of State the necessary measure for securing the frontiers of Palestine against all illegal

immigration. Special measures will shortly be introduced which, it is anticipated, will effectively check illegal immigration whether by land or sea. Under the law of Palestine private persons and unofficial bodies have no right to arrest illegal immigrants, and the High Commissioner wishes it to be clearly understood that the activities of such organizations however well intentioned so far from assisting the police in their task are a positive hindrance and embarrassment as tending to promote breaches of the peace ("Private Persons May Not Arrest," 1934, p. 1).

The Authorities were true to their word and took large-scale illegal immigration prevention measures following the Tulkarm incident. At the operational level, the Palestine Police enlisted a supernumerary police force of 188 men "to patrol the coast and frontiers" and established a Port and Marine Section. Prior to this time, the ports were largely unmanned by the Authorities, although some police officers were regularly assigned to the Immigration Department for this purpose (PPF, 1935). The Authorities also announced the appointment of a commission of inquiry into "vital issues" such as immigration. The announcement was coupled with the High Commissioner's decision to extend a generous amount of clemency to Arabs still serving sentences for the 1929 disturbances. At the same time, the High Commissioner remitted the whole of the outstanding amount of collective fines imposed on some Arab villages on account of the 1929 disturbances ("Report", 1935).

Emboldened from the 1935 concessions, the Palestinian Arabs launched the Great Rebellion only a year later. The Authorities falsely predicted that the disturbances would cause a considerable drop in Jewish immigration. The Authorities were wrong; immigration only intensified. The British did not realize that to the Jewish immigrants,

the fear of the Nazis outweighed that of the Palestinian Arabs (PPF, 1936). The Rebellion is further discussed in other sections of this thesis.

As part of the resolution of the Rebellion, the British published the White Paper of 1939. The White Paper included the removal of a future Jewish majority threat. In order to guarantee a non-Jewish majority to the Arabs, the British limited the amount of Jews allowed to immigrate to Palestine over the next five years to 75,000. After this five year period, Arab approval would be needed for further Jewish immigration (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002). In July 1939, the Authorities further restricted immigration to Palestine with the announcement that, due to an excess of Jewish illegal immigration in the past six months, there would be no Jewish immigration allowed for six months starting in October of that year ("Immigration of Jews to Stop," 1939, p. 8).

Despite the White Paper's restrictions, illegal immigrants continued to arrive in droves in Palestine's ports. In some cases, the ships were deported back to their original destination. One such example was the *Assimi*, a ship of 261 refugees from Eastern Europe and Germany. The *Assimi*'s refugees were ultimately deported back to Nazi occupied land. This deportation occurred despite the collection of clothes and medicine for the *Assimi* passengers by the Yishuv and the aggressive lobbying efforts of their leaders. The Yishuv held violent demonstrations when hearing of the *Assimi*'s deportation, as the British had expected (HA 47/87/697-700). The following is an excerpt from an August 1939 plea from the *Assimi* refugees printed in the *Palestine Post* before their fate became known:

We, the human cargo of the s.s. *Assimi*, who have been saved from German concentration camps and persecution, appeal to the British Government, to all

who know of our plight, and to all who are not without pity, to save our lives...

We believe that it is intended to send us back to sea with little food or water, without boats or life belts, and without a destination...Where are we to go? Why are we condemned to this slow and cruel death? Why must we wander over the empty seas until our end comes, at the order of Great Britain and in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century? We appeal to our fellow Jews in Palestine, to the British people, and to the Government of this country: Save us! ("Save Us!" 1939, pp. 1-2)

The third White Paper of 1939, and the subsequent deportations of Jews, caused the Yishuv to finally revolt against the British. The first signs of Jewish rebellion occurred within months of the White Paper's announcement and included the fierce resistance of the settlers to any British attempts to search the settlements for immigrants. These acts were followed by several incidents of sabotage of Palestine Police coastguard stations and police and military ships. Jewish maritime sabotage became so commonplace after 1939, that the Authorities regularly called on the Royal Navy to provide them loaner ships (PPF, 1945/1994, 1946).

### *World War II*

The number of Jewish illegal immigrants continued to soar after the start of the war. The British were fearful of these increases in illegal immigration. The Authorities believed that "the only probable cause of major Arab disturbances in Palestine would be some change of policy by HMG which threatened to create a Jewish majority and/or to place large numbers of Arabs under Jewish rule, e.g. cancellation of the White Paper and resumption of unrestricted Jewish immigration" (FO 371/52608/14).

The immigrants were mainly European Jews, but there were also mentionable increases in Turkish and Iraqi Jewish immigration (see Table 15). In 1943, the Turkish Jews arrived in Palestine after the implementation of the *Varlik Vergisi*. The *Varlik Vergisi* was a hefty property tax waged on Turkey's minority status communities (Jews, Greeks, and Armenians). This tax was dropped in 1944 due to Allied pressure. There was also an increase in Iraqi Jewish immigration after a brief pro-Nazi Administration took command in May 1941. When the British removed these leaders, Iraqi Axis supporters engaged in violent attacks on the Jews (Sachar, 1985).

Table XV.

*Citizenship of Immigrants to Palestine*

Year	Jewish	Christian	Moslem
1922	Poland/Ukraine	Other/Germany	Turkey/Egypt
1923	Poland/Russia	Turkey/Germany	Egypt/Syria
1924	Poland/Russia	Syria/Germany	Egypt/Turkey
1925	Poland/Russia	Syria/UK	Egypt/Syria
1926	Poland/Russia	Syria/UK	Egypt/Syria
1927	Poland/Russia	Syria/UK	Egypt & Sudan/UK
1929	Poland//Yemen	UK/Syria	Syria/Egypt & Sudan
1930	Poland/Russia	UK/Syria	Syria/Egypt
1931	Poland/Russia	UK/Syria	Syria/Egypt
1932	Poland/Iraq	UK/Syria	Syria/Egypt
1933	Poland/Germany	UK/Egypt	Egypt/Syria & Leb.
1934	Poland/Germany	UK/Syria & Leb.	Syria & Leb./Egypt

(Table XV. Cont.)

1938	Germany/Poland	Palestine/Syria& Leb. <sup>a</sup>	-
1939	Germany/Poland	Palestine/Syria & Leb. <sup>a</sup>	-
1940	Poland/Germany	Syria & Leb./Palestine <sup>a</sup>	-
1941	Rumania/Lithuania	Syria & Leb./Transjordan <sup>a</sup>	-
1942	Iraq/Poland	Syria & Leb./Palestine <sup>a</sup>	-
1943	Poland/Turkey	Syria & Leb./Transjordan <sup>a</sup>	-
1944	Rumania/Yemen	Syria & Leb./Palestine <sup>a</sup>	-

*Note.* Missing data indicated by a dash. Leb. is abbreviation for Lebanon.

<sup>a</sup> During these years, the classification *Arab* was utilized in official immigration data instead of the *Muslim* and *Christian* classifications. From *Annual Migration Reports*, by the Department of Migration, 1934, 1938-1944, Jerusalem: Government Printer; *Report*, by His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the administration of Palestine and Transjordan (1922-1927, 1929-1933). London: His Majesty's Stationary.

After the horrors of the Nazi Regime reached the wartime press, sympathetic Jews across the globe increased financial assistance to illegal immigration efforts. This flow of funds created a rift between the Jewish Agency's newly established *Mossad l'Aliyah Bet* (established in 1939 for purposes of illegal immigration) and the pre-existing Revisionist networks.

The Jewish Agency published the following harsh claims against the Revisionist illegal immigration networks: 1) the Revisionists were only interested in bringing prostitutes and criminals to Palestine, 2) the immigrants were ill-treated and forced to live in deplorable conditions during the Revisionist voyages, and 3) most of the Revisionist

funds did not go toward immigration, but instead toward the organization's terrorist activities (Ben-Ami, 1996).

The Revisionists countered that the Mossad Aliyah Bet was too selective in saving Jews. One Irgun member admitted that the conditions were nearly "unlivable" on board their ships, but that nearly all of the passengers survived (Ben-Ami, 1996, p. 319). Another former Irgun member, based on Foreign Office archives research, claimed that the Jewish Agency actually alerted the British about an Irgun illegal immigrant ship from Czechoslovakia and Germany in 1939 (Ben-Ami, 1996).

Despite the aforementioned increases in illegal immigration, arrests for illegal immigration decreased during the war years (see Table 16). The low numbers of arrests were actuated by the Jewish Underground through the support and assistance of the Yishuv. The responsibility to aid the immigrants during the war "became a duty as morally unassailable as the Ten Commandments" (Jordan, 1983, p. 197). A second reason for the low number of arrests was the lack of British personnel available to target illegal immigration during the war. But despite the war effort, the British took some measures to counter the illegal immigration increases, including changes in existing law and physical attacks on the immigrant ships.

Table XVI.

*Jewish Illegal Immigrants recorded since April, 1939*

Period	Arrests	Net Total <sup>a</sup>
April 1939-March 1940	108	25,988
April 1940-March 1941	52	34,755
April 1941-March 1942	55	36,983
April 1942-March 1943	46	39,399
April 1943-March 1944	21	39,908
April 1944 –December 1944 <sup>b</sup>	25	79,896

*Note.* <sup>a</sup> The figure is based on the total of illegal immigrants recorded as: 1) enumeration in ships, 2) inferred from reliable evidence, 3) individuals arrested, 4) less enumerated illegals subsequently registered as immigrants, and 4) balance of travelers remaining illegally.

<sup>b</sup> Note this figure is for April 1944-December 1944 only. Data is from *Annual Migration Reports*, by the Department of Migration, 1939-1944, Jerusalem: Government Printer

The Palestinian Citizenship Law Amendment in 1940 was designed to end the immigration law's marriage loophole. This loophole permitted the wife of an immigrant to enter Palestine (HA 47/58/2-3; Edelheit, 1996). It was known to the British that young women were wed on board the ships to Palestine, only to be divorced a short time later, once safely inside Palestine. The number of divorces did decrease substantially after the 1940 Amendment (see Table 17).

Table XVII.

*Divorces in Palestine*

Year	Muslim	Jewish	Christian	Others
1935	1,183	1,755	0	0
1936	900	2,261	6	0
1937	1,105	2,781	1	4
1938	739	1,119	5	0
1939	826	2,115	3	0
1940	1,128	1,932	1	0
1941	1,353	1,597	1	0
1942	1,561	1,493	2	7
1943	1,990	1,321	3	6
1944	1,859	1,228	12	10
1945	1,696	1,364	4	11

*Note.* Data is from *Vital Statistics Tables 1922-1945*, by the Palestine Department of Statistics, 1947, Jerusalem: Government Printer.

The British operationally combated illegal immigration by attempting to tail illegal immigrant ships across international waters. Once the ships entered British territory, military destroyers were free to ride alongside the ships and utilize tear gas and small arms against the occupants (Neikind, 1946; Naor, 1987). The British stated that this practice was done in lieu of British embarkation on ships, which was believed “extremely hazardous” to personnel (PPF, 1946). In response to these attacks, the

Mossad (intelligence wing of the Haganah) advised the immigrants to throw canned goods and metal parts at the Authorities (Naor, 1987).

There were two incidents of explosions that resulted in the sinking of illegal immigrant ships, but they were not believed to have been perpetrated by the British. The first was the *Struma* episode in early 1942. The Turkish government had enquired of the British authorities whether or not the *Struma*, a ship of Romanian Jews, would be allowed to dock in Palestine. At the time, there was a security ban on the admission of persons from Axis-controlled areas. The Jewish Agency convinced the Authorities to at least allow the children between the ages of 11 and 16 to dock in Palestine. Before the arrangements were completed, the ship was sent back to Turkey; on the way it sank after a mysterious explosion. There were 760 Jewish casualties. The cause of the explosion was never determined; the Germans, British, and the Turks all blamed each other (Anglo American Committee of Inquiry [AACI], 1945/1946, p. 64; Ben-Ami, 1996).

The second incident happened after the British announced in November 1940 that all Jewish illegal immigrants would be deported from Palestine to “an alternative place of refuge” within the British Empire. The two official reasons given for the deportation were economic necessity and the possibility of spies among the immigrants. Three ships of immigrants were scheduled to board the *Patria* docked in Haifa harbor, to be deported to the British colony of Mauritius. The Haganah attempted to damage the *Patria*, in order to render it impossible for use to deport the Jews. The damage caused by the Haganah’s explosion was reportedly more than expected; the *Patria* sank with 252 casualties, mainly Jewish immigrants and members of the Palestine Police Force. The

Authorities decided not to deport the survivors of the *Patria* to Mauritius (AACI, 1945/1946, p. 67).

The aforementioned damage of illegal immigration ships, combined with the threat of new British conspiracy sanctions, resulted in ship owners' hesitance to continue chartering their fleets to the Underground. In consequence, the Underground began purchasing their ships. American and British World War II surplus were sources for the Haganah and cover "shipping companies" were created to effectuate the sales (Naor, 1987). After the Authorities became aware of this scheme, the British imposed a security check on buyers of vessels in UK and the dominions (KV 3/41).

#### *Post-World War II*

World War II had created tens of thousands of Jewish displaced persons [DP]. The DPs were the Jewish refugees of the liberated countries (ESCO, 1947). The DPs lived in temporary international camps in Allied controlled territory. They had nowhere to call home, their property having been confiscated and/or destroyed by the Nazis. A number of the DPs were smuggled into Palestine by the Haganah or the Irgun, often times with the collusion of foreign government officials.

Great Britain was receiving pressure from liberated nations anxious to send refugees to Palestine. Highly publicized deportations of illegal DP immigrant ships, such as the *Exodus* in 1947, vilified the British in the American and European communities (Kurzman, 1970). Palestine seemed the "natural home" for the Holocaust survivors. James G. McDonald, Chairman of President Roosevelt's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, stated that Palestine offers "incontestably the primary hope for the

solution of the problem of Jewish refugee” because only in Palestine “will most of them feel that they have returned home” (“Vote Plans to Aid,” 1944, p. 5).

An American journalist found that the majority of refugees, interviewed on board an illegal immigrant ship bound for Palestine, agreed with Mr. MacDonald. When the immigrants were asked why they preferred to immigrate to Palestine, the reply was often that they believed that they would only be safe from anti-Semitism in a Jewish state. One Polish woman interviewed, who had served in the Polish Underground Army (pretending to be a Christian), explained that after watching fellow partisans kill Jewish partisans for the Germans, she felt that she had “done enough fighting for someone else’s country. Now I want to fight for my own” (Neikind, 1946, p. 8).

The Underground played an integral role in bringing the DPs to Palestine. The Haganah clandestinely raised money to aid the operations; for example, the American Jewish Welfare Organization contributed £P.40 for every Jew taken to Palestine from a DP camp in Europe (Naor, 1987, p. 55). The British believed that both the Irgun and the Jewish Agency were involved in recruiting campaigns in Europe for illegal immigrants (HA 47/36). The British had information that 600 Irgun recruits, with European underground experience, had arrived in Palestine after the end of WWII. British intelligence believed that the Underground staged diversionary terrorist activities when their illegal immigrant ships were due to arrive (KV 3/41).

In March 1947, British Military Intelligence noted the following four large-scale Jewish illegal immigration routes:

- Escape routes from Russian controlled zones where Jewish Agency officials work in collusion with Soviet services.

- Concentration of DPs in Italy, Austria, and Western Zones of Germany. Transfer from larger inland camps to South of Italy, Marseilles, and Antwerp areas. The French and Belgium governments have agreed with Jewish refugee organizations to transit quotas of DPs, Italian government considering same.
- Charter illegal immigration agents throughout Europe, particularly Greece and Sweden.
- Ships en route to Palestine usually leave European ports with papers for some South American port. They rendezvous in Marseilles and their passengers are embarked in Southern Italy where smaller vessels operate a ferry service to the larger vessel standing off the coast outside of territorial waters. (KV 3/41)

The consuls of South and Central American countries were especially helpful in assisting Jewish illegal immigration to Palestine. The Consuls would agree, for a substantial fee, to issue collective immigration visas for thousands of Jews heading toward Palestine, or to give their flags as cover for the illegal immigrant ships (Naor, 1987). In one account, for 1,000 Deutsche Marks, a Mexican Consul official wrote a collective visa for Jews destined for Palestine. In handing over the visa, the Mexican official reportedly told his Mossad contact that “the Honourable Consul General wants you to know that if the prospective holders of the visa should by any chance find themselves one day in Mexico, he will murder you and expect your heirs to pay him a monthly stipend until his last living day” (Avriel, 1975, p. 47).

The concern of the British regarding the DP crisis had very much to do with delaying an inevitable ethnic conflict in Palestine. In December 1947, the Authorities noted that the arrival of more Jewish immigrants “cannot fail to add to the already

increasing tension between Arabs, Jews, and British in Palestine, especially in the frontier regions, where Arab armies have lately been reported to be massing” (KV 3/41/5a).

The British concentrated more on intelligence, and less on operational responses, to post-WWII illegal immigration. Intelligence information was usually leaked from indiscrete lower-level Mossad members. For example, some of the Mossad would speak in public (and on the telephone) in Hebrew about secret activities, mistakenly assuming that no one who was non-Jewish would understand them (Kimche, 1954).

The British also relied on intelligence from foreign agencies. The aim was to intercept illegal immigration ships in Europe to “avoid the political repercussions incidental to interception in Palestine waters” (KV 3/41). This was done through diplomatic, rather than forced means. For example, the Home Office nixed legislation, proposed by the official Committee on Illegal Immigration to Palestine, which would force foreign cooperation with British interests. London Officials believed that such interference might set a “bad precedent in that it might encourage foreign governments to interfere with for purposes of their own” with British ships in their ports (HO 213/1799).

The Arab community joined the British in rallying cooperation from European Authorities. One Palestinian Arab organization, the “Defenders of Arab Palestine” wrote threatening letters to foreign officials. For example, the closing of a June 1947 letter to the Italian Minister in London read, “The Italian Government has had ample opportunity to put an end to this traffic. Because they have failed we must now take action.” The threatening letters seemingly had little impact on foreign leaders; the only action taken by them was to report the incident to the British authorities (FO 371/61935).

The British tried unsuccessfully to approach the Jewish Agency for intelligence sharing. In the past, the Agency had on occasion cooperated with the British, for example, during the *saison* which followed the Moyne assassination in January 1944. The British believed that “the Agency alone has sufficient information and personnel trained in counter-terrorism to deal effectively and speedily with terrorist organizations.” (KV 3/41) Unlike the Agency’s willingness to comply with the Moyne investigation three years prior, the Jewish Agency behaved differently when approached in 1947. This time the Agency put a condition on their assistance - to allow more DPs immigration to Palestine. Perhaps the ultimatum was due to the British refusal to repudiate the terms of the White Paper of 1939 in 1945, or perhaps it was due to the dissipating support of the Jewish Agency by a frustrated Yishuv. Whatever the intentions, the ultimatum failed. The British would agree only on a “a face-saving token increase in the quota,” in order to gain the desired intelligence (KV/341).

#### Arab Immigration

Prior to World War II, economics was the key factor driving Arab immigration to Palestine. After the war, the immigrants were mainly Arab fighters from neighboring countries. The pre-WW II Arab immigrants posed much less of a threat to the Authorities, compared with the Jewish immigrants. The Arab illegal immigrants totaled much fewer in number than the Jews.

The legal and illegal Arab immigrants to Palestine were mainly from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Transjordan. Arab immigrants were attracted to the colony due to the “economic and social progress of the Arab population in Palestine” which exceeded “by far” any comparable development in neighboring states (Jewish Agency, 1946, p. 7).

Palestine was thriving with new industry, aided by an influx of Jewish capital and enterprise during the Mandate years. For example, the infant mortality rate of the Palestinian Muslim Population (per 1,000 births) had dropped from 201 in 1925, to 164 in 1932, and to 121 in 1939 (Gottheil, 1979, p. 319).

The Arab illegal immigrants were hired by both Arabs and Jews due to the low wages they were willing to accept. The low wages earned by the illegal workers were resented on all sides. The Jewish Agency protested the indiscriminate admittance of Arabs from Transjordan and Syria in 1936, claiming the immigrants posed economic and security dangers. Palestine had experienced a large influx of illegal Arabs in 1935, due to Palestine's prosperity ("Cheap Arab Labor," 1936). The British did respond to the Jewish Agency's request and took more aggressive action. The Authorities established supernumerary frontier forces along the Transjordan border and introduced a new system of identity documents for those wishing to travel between Transjordan and Palestine (ESCO Foundation for Palestine [ESCO], 1947). The Authorities' decision to address Jewish concerns was compounded by British self-interest in eradicating Arab security threats during the Rebellion.

The British had an easier time arresting illegal Arabs than Jewish ones (see Table 18). They generally lived in known settlements of non-Palestinian Arabs, located on the outskirts of Jaffa & Haifa (PPF, 1935). In contrast, the Jewish illegal immigrants were indistinguishably mixed into the established Jewish settlements.

Table XVIII.

*Palestine Magistrate Court – Annual Number of Muslims, Jews, and Christians arrested on Illegal Immigration Charges and Per Capita Rates (10,000)*

Year	Muslim	Per Capita	Jewish	Per Capita	Christian	Per Capita
1937	1,260	14.3	873	22.0	259	23.3
1938	423	4.7	61	1.5	32	2.9
1940	1,439	15.2	348	7.5	137	11.4
1941	1,274	13.0	229	4.8	239	19.0
1942	1,318	13.2	95	2.0	137	10.8

*Note.* The vast majority of the immigration offenses/entering Palestine without Permission cases were heard in the Magistrate Court. In the years available for review (1937, 1941, 1942, 1945) the District Courts also had Muslims charged the most for immigration related offenses. Data is from *Palestine Judicial Statistics*, by the Palestine Office of Statistics, 1937, 1938, 1940-1942, Jerusalem: Government Printer.

Of special interest to the British during the Riots was the interception of Haj Amin associates traveling between Palestine and Syria. The British rightly suspected that Haj Amin was planning an escape to Syria from his detention in Jerusalem. There was concern that emissaries from Syria were carrying messages between Syria and Jerusalem concerning his escape. The Palestine Police had orders to stop any person suspected of being involved in Haj Amin's affairs. Although frequently stopped by the Authorities, Haj Amin's associates never spoke to the police under fear of retaliation. The Mufti did eventually flee by sea to Syria in 1937, in the dead of night and dressed as a woman (Courtney, 1939).

The British were unconcerned with Arab immigration after the Riots dissipated in 1939. During WWII, there was some official concern that Haj Amin was sending recruiters into Palestine from Syria, in order to enlist villagers into rebel bands (HA 47/92/898). The Authorities were not too concerned with this threat, because British intelligence believed that Palestinian Arabs would not be receptive to Haj Amin's recruiters (HA 09/224).

After World War II, there was a renewed fear of the Authorities, that Arab extremists, based outside of Palestine, aimed to revive the Great Rebellion in Palestine. One such group, based in Cairo, was the *El Ikhwan el Muslimin*, the Muslim Way of Life. The Ikhwan emphasized Muslim unity on religious grounds. The leaders promised Palestinian Arabs arms and trained Egyptian volunteers "to cross the frontier and shed their blood" in case of Arab-Jewish disturbances. The group also proposed arming Arab villages in case of Jewish attack (FO 371/52608).

The British interest in preventing Arab volunteers from coming to Palestine was largely a political one after the outbreak of the 1948 War. There was the concern that volunteers were entering Palestine from territories still under British rule. Although the British turned back many volunteers from entering Palestine, there was the embarrassment that they had not turned back more all along. For example, in June 1948, the British had received word that 610 volunteers were heading to Palestine from Libya via Egypt. In an attempt by the Authorities to "avoid political repercussions" during the first truce of the war, the Authorities closed the border at Egypt. Over a 1,000 North Africans were sent back to their homes. In light of this situation, the Foreign Office requested the Colonial Office to not ask the French to cover repatriation costs for the

North Africans, because “the less fuss we make about this the better, since we do not wish to publicise [sic] the fact that it has been quite a considerable traffic in volunteers through Arab territory under our administration.” On the other hand, the Authorities did not mind if clandestine immigration of the volunteers continued, but “at least prevent them from doing so with bands playing and flags flying” (FO 371/69426A).

#### Communist Threat

Another issue of concern to the British during the Mandate was the growing Communist threat. Although most of the Communists in Palestine were Jewish, there was also the presence of Arab Communists. The Palestine Communist Party [PCP] was outlawed by the British in 1924, due to its anti-British platform. The PCP attempted to obstruct Zionist efforts in Palestine and enlighten the Arab peasant masses to revolt against the Effendi and British-Zionist colonial powers. The British kept a close watch on the Communists and tried to prevent their entrance, or force their deportation, whenever possible.

The PCP received its directions from the Comintern, the world Communist organization formed in 1919, which aimed for an international Soviet republic. In 1929, the Comintern ordered the PCP to "Arabize" themselves; more specifically, the PCP was ordered to create a 3:2 Arab-to-Jewish ratio and to embrace Palestinian Arab nationalism. The Soviets considered the Jews a minority community on the world stage; the Arabs were a more viable strategic partner (Laquer, 1959). There were some Arab recruits to the PCP, but their numbers remained small. British intelligence believed Communism was difficult to spread to the Arabs, because the ideology runs counter to “their culture and the injunctions of the Koran” (CO 733/141/20). During World War II, the PCP

leadership was taken over by the Jewish opposition group. In response, the Arabs established their own Communist league in September 1943, the National Liberation League [LNL]. The LNL was not openly Communist until 1945. Although committed to Palestinian Arab nationalism, the LNL was perceived as too lenient (towards Jews) for the mainstream of Arab society (Kaufman, 1997).

The majority of the Jewish members of the PCP still supported the Comintern's Arabist positions, even after the organization's declaration that the Great Rebellion was the result of British and Zionist imperialism. The Comintern strongly opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine, even after Hitler's rise to power (Laqueur, 1959).

Compounded by Arab concerns with Jewish immigration and the infiltration of Jewish communists, the British encouraged Soviet Jews to settle in the Soviet Province of Biro-Bejdani in the early 1930s. The province had been established in 1928 by the Soviets and was governed by independent Jewish rule. In 1932, the British offered loans and a fifty-percent shipping cost discount to Soviet Jews willing to settle in Biro-Bejdani. The Authorities noted that, "with few exceptions," most of those emigrating to Biro-Bejdani were members of the Communist Party ("Report," 1932, p. 28).

During the war, the Palestinian Communists posed a major security threat. After Stalin's Treaty of Friendship with the Nazis in August 1939, the Authorities were concerned about Soviet spies entering Palestine as Jewish illegal immigrants. British intelligence sources in Warsaw reported that Russian military intelligence and propaganda agents had arrived in Palestine, in this manner, from Polish territory then under Russian control (KV 3/41).

After the War, the British became even more concerned about an impending Communist threat. The British were concerned that the increased Arab literacy rates of the Arabs had resulted in more openness to Communist propaganda. The British Criminal Investigation Division noted in 1947 that, “[B]ehind the immediate menace of the Arab and Jewish problems, there is the still greater threat of Communist penetration...there has grown an increased possibility of exploiting the hitherto voiceless working classes which, if worked upon by skillful propaganda may prove a powerful weapon of disruption in an area vital to our strategic interests” (KV 3/41).

The Communist threat was a unique one to Palestine, due to its purely political (anti-British) threat. Despite their anti-Zionist platform, the movement triggered anti-Jewish immigration responses from the Authorities.

#### Conclusion

By the time the British realized that immigration was “the sore spot of the Zionist,” it was too late (KV3/41). The question of Palestine immigration was the issue which ultimately led to the unraveling of the Mandate awarded Great Britain. After World War II, terror was imminent from either the Jews, or the Arabs, no matter what action on illegal immigration was taken. With the DP crises looming, the Arab-Jewish conflict was no longer a colonial one. Great Britain’s position on the world stage stood threatened as antithetical diplomatic pressures bore down from the Arab and non-Arab worlds. It was no small wonder that Great Britain surrendered her Mandate in May 1947 and let the fledgling United Nations bear the political brunt of Palestine’s fate.

## CHAPTER VI: BOMBS AND SABOTAGE: INTER-ETHNIC, INTRA-ETHNIC, AND ANTI-BRITISH CASES

This section discusses acts of bombings and sabotage incurred during the Mandate Period. Any destruction of property, or any damage to property or persons by explosive means, is analyzed.

### Inter-Ethnic Bombs & Sabotage

Inter-Ethnic sabotage during the Mandate is divided into three periods: 1) the Riots, 2) Between the riots, and 3) the Civil War.

#### *The Riots*

The riots occurred at three different points during the Mandate: 1) the 1920 and 1921 riots, 2) the 1929 riots, and 3) the 1936-1939 riots. A "riot" is defined as a period of mass inter-ethnic violence.

Inter-ethnic sabotage began in the late nineteenth century. At this time Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism was first evidenced on a large-scale, local Arabic papers expressed fear of the Zionist agenda after the arrival of the first Aliyah in 1882. Arab notables began an unsuccessful lobbying effort of Ottoman officials to stop Jewish land purchases. The Haganah traces its inception to the *Hashomer*, watchmen, society of Jews who guarded Jewish Zionist property during this time (Rivlin, 1994).

Arab interest in the Zionist Agenda intensified at the start of the Mandate; protests were staged against the Balfour Declaration. The 1920 riots were touched off at the Nebi Musa (Muslim holiday) festivities in Jerusalem. An anti-Zionist march became violent and Jewish quarters of Jerusalem were attacked; raiding, looting, and arson occurred. Some of the more unfortunate occupants of the homes in the Jewish quarter were

bludgeoned to death. Order was not restored by the British until two days later. Five Jews and four Arabs were killed in the chaos (Segev, 2000, p. 138).

A year later there was another serious riot, in Jaffa on Labor Day. The Immigration House in Jaffa was bombed by the Arabs; thirteen Jews were killed. The mayhem began when Jewish labor groups marched legally in a Labor Day parade in Jaffa. They were met by an illegal procession of Communist Jews and a clash between the groups ensued. Palestinian Arabs soon joined in the mayhem and attacked all the Jewish labor groups. The following day the Jews of Jaffa took revenge on the Arabs by raiding, looting, and killing the occupants of local Arab homes. A full-blown riot ensued and there were Arab attacks on Jewish colonies throughout Palestine (Keith-Roach, 1994; Gilbert, 1998). The British had to bomb Arab rioters from the air in order to quell the disturbances. In total, there were 47 Jews and 48 Arabs murdered (Segev, 2000, p. 183).

The British response to the 1920 and 1921 riots was unsatisfactory to the Yishuv. There were reports of Arab police officers taking part in the violence and British officers who stood by complacently (Segev, 2000). The Yishuv learned that the British could not be relied on for their security. In response, the Haganah stepped up their weapons acquisition and training exercises. At the same time, the British agreed to the installation of sealed armories on the premises of settlements.

The settlement defense scheme put in place by the British limited the involvement of British officers; settlers were expected to gather in a bullet proof house if an attack occurred. The house would contain a sealed armory and an alarm signal. The nearest police formation would be dispatched to the scene, under order to open the armory and

hand out the arms to trained settlers (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945/1946; CO 733/182; Palestine Police Force [PPF], 1929; Rivlin, 1994).

There was an outwardly tranquil period until the Hebron Riots of 1929, but both Arabs and Jews were secretly preparing for further violence. The Hebron Riots actually date back to a 1928 dispute over Jewish versus Muslim claims to control of the Wailing Wall. The Wailing Wall had become a symbol in the Arabic press of the encroachment of Zionism in Muslim-dominated Palestine. In August 1929, Palestinian Arabs grew perturbed when a Jewish youth group marched at the Wailing Wall singing the Zionist national anthem. The next day, pandemonium ensued when Muslims commenced attacks on Jewish residents of Hebron (Segev, 2000).

Many residents were surprised by the victimization of the religious Jews in Hebron, since “they [were] not European Jews, but the old religious ones who have lived there for centuries, unharmed” (Holliday, 1997, p.103). The religious Jews were chosen by the Arabs for the very reason that it was a surprise to others. There was a lack of protection in the religious quarters, due to the defense preference accorded the settlements. The settlements had traditionally been the most obvious targets of Arab attack (Edelman, 1965). The security vacuum of the isolated Jewish quarters of the cities and the religious settlements was seized upon by the rioters.

After the 1929 riots, the Haganah revamped its scope of operations drastically. What was considered adequate security previous to the Riots, proved a false assumption. New security operations were immediately put in place; a new higher command was established and there was the introduction of new security measures, including watchtowers built on all settlements (Rivlin, 1944).

The Arabs benefited from the Riots as well, with political concessions. With each riot, the British presented a new reward. After the 1920 and 1921 riots, there was the first White Paper which limited Jewish immigration to the Economic Absorptive Capacity [EAC] of the country. After the Hebron Riots, the Arabs were presented with the Hope-Simpson Report, the result of the Shaw Commission which was formed to investigate the Riots. The Shaw Commission found that the Authorities should clearly specify the meaning of safeguarding the rights of the non-Jewish communities, and make explicit statements of plans for vital issues such as immigration.

The Arabs now turned their attention to a quasi-riot against the British between 1933 and 1935 (discussed in a later section of this chapter). The quasi-riots resulted in the British reward of a Legislative Council proposal which would include official Arab representation in the legislative process. The Arabs then swiftly turned their attention back toward the Jews in the Great Rebellion (1936-1939).

The Rebellion was preceded by a series of hold-ups by highway robbers of Jews traveling on the Tulkarm-Nablus road between Tel Aviv and Haifa. The attacks culminated in a bloody hold-up on April 15, 1936, when the passengers of ten automobiles were robbed, but the three Jews among the victims were selected to be shot dead. There was a reprisal killing of Arabs the following evening and, within days, anti-Arab demonstrations and random killings between the two ethnic groups transpired. A General Strike was declared by the Arab Higher Committee later that month. The Arabs rejected the aforementioned Legislative Council proposal gained the previous year, and demanded a renunciation of the Balfour Declaration. The strike, accompanied by mass

looting and violence, quickly spread to other cities and towns across Palestine (ESCO Foundation for Palestine [ESCO], 1947).

During the Rebellion, there was sabotage orchestrated by Arabs against Jewish owned property, including farms, stone quarries, settlements, private residences, and transport. In the cities, bomb throwing by Arabs occurred almost daily (PPF, 1936-1938). In previous riots, the Arabs and Jews were mainly limited to the use of swords, knives, and rifles. It was only during the Great Rebellion that both groups were becoming novice bomb makers.

The Palestinian Arabs started traveling to Europe for weapons training by German and Italian instructors of the rising Fascist regimes. Among the Arabs trained by Nazis was Haj Amin's future chief bomb-maker in the Civil War, Fawzi el-Kuttub. Kuttub was a young blond blue-eyed Arab sent to Nazi Germany and Amsterdam to study sabotage during the Nazi regime. Some of the Nazi instructors also traveled to Palestine for this purpose (Milstein, 1998).

In reaction to the events of 1936, the Jewish Underground was receiving arms and training by the British military. The British agreed to the formation of a new force of Jewish supernumeraries specifically for the protection of the Jewish settlements – the Jewish Settlement Police. The British were wary of losing more money and men in the protection of Jews, and the Yishuv found the means to bear the costs of a private police force. The result was a semi-private police force, the expenses borne mainly by Jewish Agency funds.

In the year 1938, towards the end of the Great Rebellion, the Yishuv transformed themselves from the victims to the aggressors, a state of affairs which continued through

the remainder of the Mandate. This was in part due to the break from the Haganah of more radical members. The splinter group formed the *Irgun Zvai Leumi*, National Military Organization, in 1935, led by Revisionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky. The aim of the Irgun was to make Palestine and Transjordan a united Jewish state, through armed national struggle. The Irgun disagreed with the Haganah policy of restraint and believed reprisal violence was necessary during the Rebellion.

The first signs of Irgun retaliation were an astonishing round of bombings of Arab civilians between 1938 and 1939. The Irgun placed inconspicuous time-bombs in Arab marketplaces and cafes (HA 003/013). This spat of Irgun bombings shocked both the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine. The bombings commenced in June 1938 and culminated in a June 20, 1939, time-bomb near an Arab café in Haifa.

The Arab reaction to the bombings was passionate. The Arab press decried the victimization of innocent civilians, and chastened the British for not taking more “drastic measures” (“24 Arab casualties,” 1939). The Arabs called for the Jewish supernumerary forces to be disbanded and for all Jewish Palestine Police Officers to be replaced by Arabs. The Arab community suspected that Jewish officers were in conspiracy with the bombers (HA 47/77/614-615).

In light of Arab frustration with the British police response, guards were hired at the expense of Arab merchants in the Old City. The guards, composed of young Arab men (and women), began in August 1938 (“On guard in Old City,” 1939). The Guards were not known to be organized, nor armed, in any fashion comparable to that of the Haganah or Jewish supernumerary forces. Considering the bombings which followed their appointment, neither were the guards as effective.

The Arab outrage at the Irgun bombing campaign also extended to neighboring Arab nations. For example, the Arab students at the American University in Beirut demonstrated and forced the Jewish pupils to leave their classes. In Transjordan, fifty prominent residents sent the following threatening telegram to the Colonial Secretary and the Prime Minister of Transjordan:

[The] passive attitude of the troops towards armed Jews, and their confinement of repressive measures solely against Arabs has again led to whole sale murder of Arabs at the hands of criminal Jews. Leniency of authorities with such dangerous elements impel Transjordanians to retaliate in solidarity with their Palestine brethren unless thorough and impartial search of Jewish centers and settlements is conducted immediately. (HA 47/77/614-615)

The official public Jewish reaction to Irgun bombings was one of reserved outrage, calling the acts atrocities while coolly citing the political fruits the Arabs gained through similar acts. For example, after the June 1939 Irgun bombing, the *Palestine Post* reported that a delegation of prominent members of the Jewish community “expressed the distress of the Jewish community at the bomb outrage which had occurred in the vegetable market...It was pointed out by them, however that the policy of the British Government, as expressed in the White Paper, was such as to encourage belief that its decision could be influenced by acts of terrorism” (“49 Arab casualties,” 1939, p. 2). The British considered these lukewarm condemnations passive approval of the terror.

The British were hesitant to treat the Jewish terrorists as they had the Arab rebels, for political reasons. Up to this point in time, the Jews were the friends of the British and

the Arabs were the common foe. Jewish supernumeraries even helped protect vital government property against Arab sabotage, including the Haifa oil refineries.

After the White Paper was announced in May 1939, the British were surprised by the wave of anti-British Irgun terror which followed, aimed exclusively at them. As the war loomed, the British could not afford the money and troops to track down violent Irgunists. A cease-fire was shortly agreed upon by the Irgun, in a show of support for the war effort.

#### *Between the Riots*

Most of the sabotage between the riots was in the form of agrarian crime and property sabotage. Between the riots, inter-ethnic tensions arose mainly due to land sales transactions.

Until the early 1930s, agrarian crime was largely limited to intra-ethnic Arab family or village feuds. The situation changed in the early 1930s when land sales to Jews were denounced in the Arabic press. Similar to the Arabic press campaign, a simultaneous anti-Arab campaign appeared in the Jewish press. Yishuv leaders called for a boycott of Arab produce, claiming that the profits were used to support anti-Zionist terrorism. One Palestine Police Officer recalled that it was not uncommon, at this time, to have "patriotic Jewish youths" destroy the vegetables of Arabs selling their wares in the streets (Kluk, 1938, p. 11).

Table XIX.

*Agrarian Offenses: Annual Number of Offenses and Per Capita Rates (10,000)*

Year	Cases	Per Capita Rates
1931	1,043	10.0
1932	1,403	13.1
1933	845	7.4
1934	429	3.5
1935	443	3.4
1936	688	5.0
1937	439	3.1
1938	314	2.2
1941	330	2.1
1942	264	1.6
1943	257	1.5
1944	436	2.5
1945	447	2.5
1946	613	-

*Note.* Dash indicates unavailable data.

Data from *Annual Administrative Report*, by the Palestine Police Force, 1931-1937, Jerusalem:

Government Printer; *Annual Administrative Report*, by the Palestine Police Force, 1945, Jerusalem:

Government Printer. In R.L. Jarman, (1994). *Palestine and Transjordan administration reports*

1918-1948. (pp. 723-795). Slough (UK): Archive editions.

The first high profile inter-ethnic bombing case (outside of the riots) occurred in December 1932, in the Jewish colony of Nahalal. A bomb was thrown into the family home of a Jewish settler, killing the settler and his young son. Fragments of the locally made bomb were traced back to the workshop of an Arab blacksmith in Haifa. The trial resulted in three death sentences for those complicit in the bombings; one of the accused men had his sentence commuted to fifteen years in 1934 ("Nahalal bomb outrage," 1934; "Nahalal bomb suspects," 1933).

After the Great Rebellion, the number of agrarian crimes in Palestine remained low until 1946 (see Table 19). This sudden decrease was in part due to the publication of the Land Transfers Regulations in February 1940. The British addressed the Arab's chief concern in the Regulations, that the British were not implementing the White Paper in full.

Under the new regulations, paragraphs 16 and 17 of the White Paper were put into effect. Certain areas of land were prescribed, in which the transfer of land except to a Palestinian Arab was prohibited except in certain stated circumstances (Anglo American Committee of Inquiry, AACI, 1945/1946). In March 1940, British intelligence noted that the Arab reaction to the Land Transfers Regulation was "one of great satisfaction" and a sign that the "British Government apparently intends to implement the White Paper in full" (HA 9/2/144-146). An Arab intelligence source, sent to sense Arab villagers' reactions to the Regulations, noted that 90% of the Arabs did not understand the law. He reported that the villagers assumed the law prevented all sale of land in Palestine, and were hence "very flattered." The other ten percent of the population, was reportedly divided into two categories: 1) moderates who were fearful to take a stand, and 2)

extremists who de facto didn't approve of the White Paper (HA 9/2/144-146). One extremist gave the following telling opinion:

What a law! Typically English! In the hands of the English this law is like a rein controlling two horses, the Arabs and the Jews. When England is angry with the Arabs, His Excellency may approve any sale he likes. Nothing is definite in the law. The public did not grasp the meaning of the law, and those of us who understand it found nothing in it at all, but who dares voice his criticism freely?  
(HA 9/2/144-146)

In contrast, the Jewish community was disheartened by the Land Sales regulation. There was a theory in Jewish circles that the Regulations were designed to bring about the partition of Palestine and the facilitation of a pan-Arab federation of Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan (HA 09/2/159).

After the publication of the Regulations, the gross number of dunams bought by Jews remained about the same, but the net balance of purchases over sales decreased. A further break down of the sales revealed that sales were increasing from Jews to Jews and Jews to Arabs, but not from Arabs to Jews (ESCO, 1947). Overall, the anxiety of the Arabs over land sales decreased after the publication of the Land Regulations and land sales become less of a political issue, or at least one that triggered inter-ethnic violence.

#### *The Civil War*

Inter-ethnic bombings did not reappear in Palestine until after the Jewish terror campaign against Great Britain had proved a fait accompli. By the end of November 1947, the Civil War between Arabs and Jews commenced.

Most of the Jewish bombs during the Civil War were perpetrated by the Irgun and Stern groups; the Haganah preferred more traditional warfare. The Irgun and Stern groups used the same “hit and run” bombing tactics that had worked successfully against the British (Milstein, 1998). Most of the Civil War warfare did not revolve around civilian bombings, but it was an important characteristic of the war. The bombs mentioned in this section are considered civilian in this piece, but the targets were not necessarily civilian in reality. Many Underground members claimed that military targets were hidden in locations containing numerous civilians.

The bombings began in late December, 1947. The first organized Arab armed attack had occurred in Tel Aviv, when Arabs had opened fire on the Hatikvah quarter and attempted to storm a few houses. The Haganah, in turn, blew up a suspect's home in response. The following day, hundreds of Arab irregulars returned to Hatikvah, looting and torching Jewish homes. There were also similar Arab attacks on the Jewish quarters of Jerusalem and on the rural settlements (Morris, 2001).

Later that same month, there was a thwarted attempt by a Stern unit to bomb the Jaffa harbor; the aim was disruption of the Arab citrus export season (Milstein, 1998). The next attempt, also in December, went as operationally planned. On December 30, 1947, Irgunists threw a bomb out of a car window aimed at a crowded bus stop outside the Haifa Oil Refinery. Six Arabs died outright. In response, Arab workers impulsively killed 39 of their Jewish co-workers (Morris, 2001, p. 198).

In January 1948, the Sternists disguised a fruit truck packed with explosives and operated by fluent Arabic (Sternist) drivers. The *Saraya*, an Arab administrative building in Jaffa, was targeted in the attack. Twenty-eight Arabs were killed in the

bombing and the offices were left destroyed (Milstein, 1998, p. 86). The next day, the Haganah bombed the Hotel Semiramis. Three small vehicles of Haganah men in British uniforms stormed the hotel. Twenty-eight Arabs were killed outright in the bombing (Milstein, 1998, p. 86). The Haganah command claimed that the bombing was not aimed at Arab civilians but rather at the hotel which was the known headquarters of Haj Amin's Arab Youth Organization [AYO] (the AYO denied this claim) (Milstein, 1998).

On January 4, 1948, Sternists planted a truck full of explosives outside the Jaffa city hall, where the headquarters of the Arab National Committee offices were located. Twenty-six people were killed (Morris, 2001, p. 198).

The last major civilian bombing of the Civil War was orchestrated by the Haganah. It was of a garage in Haifa reputedly storing an Arab ambulance packed with bombs. Haganah intelligence believed that the "ambulance" was expected to be detonated in large crowds of Jews near a cinema. Three Arabs died and seven were wounded in the bombing (Milstein, 1998, p. 101).

A month later, the Arab Underground instigated a number of counter bombings of civilians. Previously, the Arab reprisals consisted only of torching Jewish homes and shooting upon Jewish motorists (Morris, 2001). The Arab Underground's bombings, unlike their past acts of violence, were surprisingly not of civilian targets. Instead the Arab Underground preferred targeting Zionist headquarters buildings.

On February 1, 1948, the aforementioned Kuttub, aided by two British deserters and an Arab, used an army truck in the bombing of the *Palestine Post's* Jerusalem offices during after-hours. One Jew died in the attack; more than twenty were injured (Morris, 2001, p. 201). Unlike the Jewish Underground, the Arabs enlisted the ready aid of

British deserters during the Civil War. It was not uncommon for the deserters, who chose to aid the Arabs, to have had family members who had died in Jewish anti-British sabotage (Milstein, 1998).

The next Arab bombing was on Ben Yehuda street on February 22, 1948, at a location which was known by Arab intelligence as a launching pad for *Palmach* (Haganah army unit) convoys. At least six British deserters were also known to have aided the Arabs in this attack. The deserters contributed another army vehicle for the operation. Four buildings were destroyed, fifty-two people were killed, and thirty-eight people were injured in the bombing (Milstein, 1998, p. 111).

The third bombing was on March 11, 1948, when a Haj Amin agent drove an American consulate car rigged with a bomb into the courtyard of the Yishuv's National Institutions compound in Jerusalem. The compound housed the headquarters of the Jewish Agency, the Jerusalem Haganah, and the Jewish National Fund. There were twelve people killed and ten seriously wounded in the attack (Morris, 2001, p. 201).

After the National Institutions bombing, the Haganah switched to a more offensive strategy. This was a turning point in the Civil War that resulted in more favorable conditions for the Jewish effort. On April 4, 1948, the headquarters near Ramle of Hassan Salame, the commander of a band of Arab irregulars (and former parachutist for the Nazis and Haj Amin during WWII) was destroyed. Salame survived, but at least seventeen of his men were killed (Morris, 2001, p. 206).

The most bloody and infamous Jewish destruction of civilian homes, and subsequent murder of occupants, was the joint attack by the Irgun and Stern groups on the Arab village *Dier Yassin* on April 9, 1948. There were between 100 to 254 Arabs

killed in the attack, many of whom were civilians (Morris, 2001, p 209). Four days later, Arab militiamen sought revenge when they attacked a ten vehicle convey of civilian lecturers, mostly doctors and nurses, heading toward Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus, Jerusalem. The buses were doused with gasoline and set on fire; there were 70 deaths (Morris, 2001, 209).

The Civil War ended with a turn-around benefiting the Haganah. The rest of the fighting included more civilian bomb attacks on both sides, albeit less dramatic. The British pulled out in May 14, 1948, as a pan-Arab invasion pushed in.

#### Intra-Ethnic

Arab-Arab and Jewish-Jewish intra-ethnic sabotage differed significantly in motivation. Arab-Arab sabotage had a long tradition as a method of retaliation. In contrast, Jewish-Jewish sabotage revolved solely around labor union disputes. A common element of both community groups was that those members suspected of aiding the “other” were often victimized.

#### *Arab-Arab*

Through out the Mandate period, sabotage between Arabs was a “favorite means of revenge” (PPF, 1931, p. 13). Honor and tribal feuds had resulted in sabotage in the Middle East long before the arrival of the British. Sabotage often consisted in the form of the destruction of olive trees, the uprooting of vines, or the setting of fire to barley and wheat crops (PPF, 1931). The slaying of another’s animals was also considered a popular means of sabotage. Horses were a favorite target of saboteurs. It was a well-known fact in Palestine that the Arab farmer “placed all his pride in his horse” (Tidhar, 1924, p. 91).

An example of an early 1920s sabotage episode was recalled by a Palestine Police Officer (Tidhar, 1924):

A Transjordan Beduin had come on a visit to a certain Palestinian village to sell four cows. At the height of haggling...one man let himself go to such an extent as to wound a competitor. He inflicted several light injuries, but the crime was judged serious and he was sentenced to two years' penal servitude.

He returned to his demesne two years later. The spirit of vendetta burned vengefully within his breast. Passing the house of the man he had wounded, he heard the lowing of cows. His anger and his jealousy flared up...he bided his time until the evening. Then he stole from his house, the fever of his lust still with him, and placed poison in the water-through [sic]. In the morning the cows were dead. (pp. 90-91)

In 1932, the Authorities admitted that agrarian crime was on the rise (PPF, 1932). The Authorities attempted to prevent sabotage during this time through the employment of the Collective Punishment Ordinance. This ordinance was aimed to prevent "retaliation and the carrying on of village and family feuds, which found vent in tree cutting, and animal maiming" (PPF, 1933 p. 20). In addition to the Jewish settlers who were targeted by saboteurs, the properties (and persons) of Arab land sellers were also victimized. There was even the use of religious injunctions against land sales in 1934 and 1935, regarding sellers as infidels who did not deserve the rights of burial in a Muslim cemetery (Stein, 1984).

Aside from racial antipathy attacks on Jews, the crimes still stemmed from "customary forms of revenge for real or supposed injury" (PPF, 1934, p. 23). Much of

the sabotage was due to the link made known in the press between Jewish land sales and the Zionist agenda. Any benefits accruing from Jewish land development were labeled in the press "as unwelcome gifts from foreign intruders," thus rationalizing the destruction of Jewish agricultural improvement schemes (Hurewitz, 1968, p. 25).

Kenneth W. Stein (1984) refuted the belief that only absentee non-Palestinian Arab landlords sold land to Zionists during the Mandate. Stein found that approximately one-quarter of the eighty-nine members elected to the Arab Executive, between 1920 and 1928, directly participated in land sales to Jews (p. 67). Stein contended that a "fading" Arab elite sold their land out of a desperate effort to regain lost social privilege and capital, "the Jewish demand for land answered an Arab need for cash" (Stein, 1984, p. 69). In the 1930s, as Arab Nationalist leaders risked increasing public humiliation (and assassination) over land sale deals, Arab peasants became the primary sellers. The peasants' economic survival was their primary motivation, regardless of Arab nationalist sentiment.

Despite the physical and religious threats posed to land-sellers, land sales continued until the end of the mandate period (but at a lower rate than their 1934/1935 peaks). Various schemes were employed by the buyers and sellers, in order to shield their identity and save them from negative communal consequences of their actions. One scheme was the employment of a middleman. Another scheme was to camouflage the sales as "confiscations." The Jewish National fund would "loan" money on a mortgage to a complicit Arab vendor who would default and "force" the courts to transfer the land (Averni, 1984; Stein, 1984).

Table XX.

*Jewish Land Purchases and Sales 1934-1943*

Year	Bought	Sold	Net Balance Amount
1934	110,970	48,856	62,114
1935	137,618	64,713	72,905
1936	50,808	32,663	18,145
1937	72,430	43,063	29,367
1938	47,443	20,163	27,280
1939	56,357	28,383	27,974
1940	49,735	27,251	22,484
1941	42,681	28,148	14,533
1942	62,582	43,771	18,811
1943 <sup>a</sup>	48,052	35,361	12,691

*Note.* <sup>a</sup> The 1943 annual figures are for January 1943 through June 1943 only. From *Palestine: a study of Jewish, Arab, and British policies* (p. 941), by the ESCO Foundation for Palestine, 1947, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Table XXI.

*Land Purchased by Jews from Arabs 1940-1943*

Year	Total	From Arabs – Dunams	From Arabs – Percent
1940	49,735	23,410	47.0
1941	42,681	15,813	37.0
1942	62,582	19,655	31.4
1943 <sup>a</sup>	48,052	13,493	28.1

*Note.* <sup>a</sup> The 1943 annual figures are for January 1943 through June 1943 only. From *Palestine: a study of Jewish, Arab, and British policies* (pp. 941-942), by the ESCO Foundation for Palestine, 1947, New Haven: Yale University Press.

During the Great Rebellion, agrarian crime not only targeted land-sellers but also the political rivals of Haj Amin, mainly, members of the moderate Nashashibi-dominated Defense Party. In 1937, the Palestine Police reported that 96 Arab homes were fired upon by other Arabs. Most notably, there were higher numbers of Arab bombings of Arab homes than of Arab bombings of Jewish or British homes (see Table 22).

Table XXII.

*1937 – Bombs & Firearms Used*

Type of Attack	Arab- by Arabs	Arab- by Jews	Jews- by Arabs	British- by Arabs
Civil Transport	13	4	38	0
Police & Military Transport in Transit	0	0	0	20
General Sniping-Jewish Settlements	0	0	143	0
Firing at Houses	96	0	3	2
Use of Bombs against Houses	13	0	2	1

*Note.* From *Annual Administrative Report 1937* (p. 22), by the Palestine Police Force, 1937, Jerusalem: Government Printer.

There was a paradoxical drop in the number of agrarian crime offenses in 1933, but this drop was likely due to the quasi-riots and the Great Rebellion (see Table 19). During these times of rebellion, villager collaboration with the Authorities was discouraged. In 1938, the Palestine Police noted that the number of agrarian crime cases in annual figures was deceptive; there was “a much larger number of cases than were reported to the police...in many instances gangsters from the hills made raids on village flocks and stole animals for food, threatening the villagers with death if they reported the presence of the gang in the vicinity” (PPF, 1938, p. 21).

With the demise of the Rebellion in 1939, the Authorities noted an improvement in the cases of “Arabs who offered their services to an increasing extent in the suppression of lawlessness and the capture of law breakers” (“Report,” 1939/1994). The numbers of agrarian crime continued to remain low, likely due to the aforementioned Land Transfers Regulations.

After the start of World War II, British intelligence noted in a February 1940 intelligence summary, that the economic depression, coupled with the improved political atmosphere, was leading many big Arab land-owners to sell land to the Jews. There were also reports that in the villages, the Fellahin were offering small parcels of land for sale to the Jews at comparatively low prices (HA 1/09/098). Although, the Arab press had condemned the latest round of sellers, there was “no hint” of renewed campaigns of intimidation (HA 1/09/098).

By the close of the war, protests against land sales were prominent in Arab politics. This publicity campaign resulted in the only politically inspired murder of Arabs in 1945, the murder of an Arab land broker in Jaffa (PPF, 1945/1994). In 1945, the British attributed a slight rise in agrarian offenses not to the political agitations, but instead to traditional village feuds (PPF, 1945).

#### *Jewish-Jewish*

Jewish-Jewish sabotage was due solely to the employment by Palestinian Jews of Arabs and other non-union *Histadruth* (apolitical Jewish federation of labor and trade unions) workers. This practice was despised in the Yishuv, due to the threat it posed to Zionism and the wage rates of unionized Jews. The result was the Jewish picketing and sabotage of suspected Jewish farms and enterprises (HA 1/09/087-090).

The employment of Arabs threatened Zionist goals, due to the British announcement of the EAC principle in the White Paper of 1922. The EAC principle only allowed Jewish immigration equal to the number of jobs available in Palestine for each six month period. Under this scenario, the employment of an Arab simply replaced a potential Jewish immigrant (Golub, 1947). Despite these concerns, it was believed by

saboteurs that some Jews continued to employ Arabs out of greed. In this sense, the employment of Arabs by Jews was comparable to the selling of land by Arabs. Both acts were viewed by their respective community groups as indirect acts of treason fueled by selfish concerns.

The Arabs allegedly had a lower standard of living, which led to their acceptance of lower wages. In addition, many of the migrant Arab workers were foreign undocumented workers, thus rendering their union organization and potential bargaining power impossible (Lockman, 1996). Interestingly, the same was true of the undocumented Jewish immigrants in Palestine. The Authorities became aware in 1940 that there existed a ring of Jewish exploiters of refugees who made “them work in exchange for their keep, thereby throwing workers who demand a decent wage into unemployment” (HA/1/09/087-090).

The labor clashes between the Histadruth and farmers employing non-union workers fluctuated with the prosperity of the agricultural market of the year in question. For example, the Authorities reported in 1941 that a decline in incidents of labor violence was attributed to that year’s higher wage rates and an “abundance of employment” (“Report,” 1941/1994, p. 386). In only the following year, the police noted that the “situation [of labor disputes] worsened with the ensuing economic uncertainties.”

There was a persuasive argument made by those Jews who employed Arab workers despite the Yishuv’s outcry; they were merely keeping the peace. For example, one Jewish quarry owner insisted that five (out of 25) of his employees were Arab as part of a lease agreement made with his Arab landowner. After the Histadruth threatened to take away his commercial license, the quarry owner “fired” his Arab workers but still

paid them their salary in full. The business owner suspected that the intentions of the Histadruth were “a matter of commercial competition” because other businessmen, on better terms with the organization, were ignored when employing Arabs (Edelman, 1965, pp. 94-95).

Adding weight to the “keeping the peace” argument, Palestine Police came across a startling realization in their 1936 *Annual Administrative Report*. The only police sub-district to not report inter-ethnic violence during 1936, the year of the outbreak of the Great Rebellion, was the Beersheba Sub-District, where the Potash Company was located. The Potash Company employed 60 Jewish and 100 Arab laborers. The police noted in their report that the “presence of Jews in this purely Arab area is always a likely source of inter-racial dispute, but the high wages paid by the company have at present won over the local bedu and a good relationship exists between the two parties” (PPF, 1936, p. 58). Despite the potential model of peace provided by the Potash Company, the British never considered alteration of the EAC principle, or incentives for the Jewish employment of Arabs.

#### Anti-British Sabotage

Sabotage against the Authorities occurred in two finite stages, first the Arab and then the Jewish. The reason for this phenomenon was not accidental. The Jews learned from the Arab experience – terror yields results.

#### *Arab Sabotage*

Sabotage of the British by the Arab Underground did not commence on a large-scale until the “quasi-riots,” which were aimed solely against the British (Rivlin, 1994). Until this point, Arab sabotage was largely limited to attacks against the Palestinian Jews.

The quasi-rebellion was triggered by an Arab press campaign, which commenced in 1933. The British were accused in the press as the true culprits of Zionism, due to their lax approach towards the EAC principle as stated in the White Paper Doctrine. The press went further to claim that the Authorities' immigration goal was to make the Jews a numerical majority in Palestine when a Legislative Council is finally introduced. Although the British sent out aggressive military and police campaigns to quash the rebels, the true end of the rebellion came in the form of Arab political appeasement. The announcement was made in 1935 that the Authorities would establish a Legislative Council. This news was, according to the British, "received unfavorably by the Jews," but with "satisfaction by Arabs" and "exercised a tranquilizing effect" (Report, 1935, p. 5).

Having been exonerated for their past victimizations, the Arabs renewed a campaign of terror for more concessions in the Great Rebellion, in chief, a renunciation of the Balfour Declaration. During the Rebellion, Arab saboteurs attacked both Jewish and, less so, British targets. Although the sabotage of British civilian property was rare (only three incidents) during the Great Rebellion; official British property sabotage was commonplace (see Table 23). The Arab Underground targeted the vital arteries of Palestine, the transportation and communication systems. The British called in the military to assume command of the rail and transport system of the country in 1938 ("Report," 1938).

Table XXIII.

*Sabotage - Government Property 1937*

Property Type	Number of Incidents
Railway Lines	5
Telegraph Lines	82
Water Pipe Lines	0
Roads	2
Other Government Property	4

*Note.* From Annual Administrative Report (p. 23), by the Palestine Police Force, 1937, Jerusalem: Government Printer.

The British police also responded to the Arab rioting through a series of counter-terrorism measures: deportation, application of the Collective Punishments Ordinance, death sentences, and destruction of terrorists' homes. In 1937, the Palestine Police took punitive action against the harborers of terrorists in the form of collective fines and the establishment of specifically enlisted supernumerary policemen in the localities concerned ("Report," 1937, p. 2).

The Great Rebellion was crushed through aggressive British policing (at least 1,000 members of the Arab bands were killed by government forces in 1938 alone), Arab community cooperation, and the announcement in May 1939 of yet another reward for Arab terrorism - the White Paper of 1939 (PPF, 1938, p. 20). The White Paper announced that within ten years Palestine would become an independent state, allied to the British Empire. The nation was understood to be an Arab one, since Jewish

immigration was limited to 75,000 over the next five years, with Arab consent being necessary after this point (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p. 56).

### *Jewish Sabotage*

After the White Paper's publication in 1939, there was a dramatic shift in the perpetrators of sabotage against the Authorities. The Jews took the lead in the renewed attacks. Unlike the Jewish reprisal bombings at the end of the Rebellion; Jewish Underground bombs never again targeted Arabs until the Civil War. The Authorities reported that the Arabs "held aloof and did not actively intervene" during the times of Jewish anti-British sabotage, "basing their attitude apparently on the principle that, so long as the aggression was not directed at them, the greater the violence of the Jews the better for the Arab cause" (AACI, 1945/1946, p. 78).

The three Jewish Underground groups were behind virtually all of the incidents of anti-British sabotage during the Mandate, but the British considered the Irgun to be the organization whose specialty was sabotage (AACI, 1945/1946). The Irgun deployed a special Sabotage Group (composed of professional engineers and technicians) for this purpose (HA 003/349).

The first round of Underground bombings occurred immediately after the White Paper was announced. There were Irgun perpetrated bombings of government installations in Jerusalem and attempts to set fire to the law courts in Haifa (Keith-Roach, 1994). The immediate reaction of the British to the Jewish bombing extravaganza was appeasement. The Colonial Secretary made a public statement, immediately following the Irgun bombings, that the White Paper's proposals were only "tentative." These statements angered some keen officials, who prophesized that, "this declaration was

made as a direct result of the outrages committed by Jews and that the official declaration of the British proposals was averted only by the commission of these outrages. There is no doubt that the Jewish public now believes that their case has been assisted by these outrages and the hands of the perpetrators have been strengthened thereby" (HA 47/77/618-619).

The terrorist attacks continued unabated during WWII (the Stern Group splintered from the Irgun, in order to break the war-time truce) and in post-war Palestine. The property of the government targeted by Jewish sabotage was identical to that previously targeted by the Arabs (communication, transportation). In addition, the Jews attempted attacks on the British oil refineries in Haifa (the same ones they had helped protect during the Great Rebellion). There were also bombings of police launches at Haifa and Jaffa, several police and military installations, and more unsuccessful attempts to bomb the oil refineries in Haifa (AACI, 1945/1946). The Authorities responded with increases in temporary additional police employed to protect key interests (PPF, 1946).

There were a series of serious railway incidents in the fall of 1946, the most serious of which was a mine planted beneath a railway trolley conveying a police patrol, causing six police casualties. The train attacks were finally halted in November 1946, when the Farmers Association was able to persuade, for an "unnamed sum," representatives of the Irgun and the Stern Group not to interfere with the railways until after the citrus season" (HA 47/24/414, HA 5/003/416).

In January 1947, the British cabinet agreed to turn the question of Palestine's future over to the newly formed League of Nations. Upon turning over the responsibility of the fate of Palestine to the UN, the British believed that they would "now no longer be

bearing the sole brunt of Zionist opprobrium, and will therefore cease to be the terrorists' principal target" (KV 3/41). Despite British hopes, there were continued Jewish attacks after their January announcement. The most dramatic of these was the Irgun's kidnapping and hanging of two random British soldiers on July 30, 1947, in retaliation for the hanging of three Irgun members by the British.

On November 30, 1947, the British announced that the Authorities would withdraw their presence in Palestine on May 15, 1948. Upon making this announcement, the Authorities admitted defeat, "Since the War 338 British subjects had been killed in Palestine, while the military forces there had cost the British taxpayer £100 million. The renewal of Arab violence on the announcement of the United Nations decision to partition Palestine and the declared intentions of Jewish extremists showed that the loss of further British lives was inevitable" ("Supplementary Memorandum," 1947, p. 10).

#### Conclusion

The pattern of British capitulation to terror proved true once again. The British were predictably self-interested in their withdrawal confession; the Arab-Jew troubles were simply not worth British blood.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the Mandate Period, the British were the Authorities in Palestine. Despite their status as the Authorities, this thesis argues that the British did not hold "power" during their Mandate. This argument employs Austin Turk's (1982) definition of political power as the party "whose arguments, promises, threats, or other manipulative actions disproportionately influence the eventual decision" of the Authorities. This work tracked the Arab Underground's power in Palestine until the Jewish ascendance to power after World War II.

It must be borne in mind in any discussion of political violence during the Mandate, that Palestine was not a democracy, but rather a colonial form of government. The political administrators of Palestine were British civil servants, appointed at will by Parliament. Although legislative representation was proposed several times by the Palestinian Arab community, a Royal Commission appointed to study the proposals continuously declared that democracy would not work within a society as divided as Palestine, "Unless there is common ground enough between its groups or classes to enable the minority to acquiesce in the rule of the majority and to make it possible for the balance of power to readjust itself from time to time, the working basis of a parliamentary government or democracy as we understand it is not there" (ESCO Foundation for Palestine [ESCO], 1947, p. 831. An exception to this rule occurred in 1923, when the Authorities offered the Palestinian Arabs representation in a Legislative Council; the Arabs refused because the Council would require them to sit in parity with the Jews ("Report," 1923).

While not condoning the violence of the Mandate, the opportunities in a non-democratic government for political expression were severely limited.

### Conflict Theory

Conflict theory rests on the notion that society is "characterized by conflicts (often more implicit than explicit) among different individuals or groups of people trying to improve their life chances - that is, the likelihood that they, at least, will have the means and opportunities to realize their respective visions of a good life" (Turk, 1982, p. 12).

A unique combination of power variables, introduced by Austin Turk in two of his past works, *Criminality and Legal Order* (1969) and *Political Criminality* (1982) were relied on heavily in this analysis. The reason for the combination of Turk's variables was due to this thesis' examination of the common crime of political actors. Therefore, the common crime variables of organization and sophistication, introduced by Turk (1969) in *Criminality and Legal Order*, and the legitimation and power variables Turk (1982) proposed in *Political Criminality* are all related to this work.


Organization was defined by Turk as the principle that "an individual who has group support for his behavior is going to be more stubborn in the face of efforts to make him change than is someone who has only himself as an ally" (Turk, 1969, p. 58).

Sophistication was defined as "knowledge of patterns in the behavior of others which is used in attempts to manipulate them. Sophisticated norm resisters are more accurate in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their position relative to Authorities, and consequently better able to avoid open warfare with the superior enemy without making significant concessions" (Turk, 1969, pp. 58-59). Legitimation was defined by

Turk (1982) as when "people accept the power structure in which they live, but also that it is right for them to do so" (p. 30). In order for legitimation to occur, Turk reasoned that there must be "some basis of mutual gratification" between subject and ruler, and that "no social relationship is likely to persist unless the parties involved are getting something out of it" (Turk, 1982, p. 33).

This thesis proposes that there must be both organization and sophistication for a successful revolution to occur. A revolution is defined as a transition of authority in society. Furthermore, there must be legitimation for there to be organization, and power in order to have sophistication. One without the other would result in common crime or annihilation, respectively (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Elements of a Revolution



According to Turk (1982), authorities define challenges to their authority as *political crimes* when they feel threatened by them. It is proposed that the Authorities decide that criminal behavior is political when the perpetrators hold power.

It is argued that prior to Haj Amin's exile in 1938, the Qassamites and Haj Amin held the power in Palestine. This was evident in the series of political capitulations of the British following each of the Arab riots.

Typical of "higher class political resisters," Haj Amin did not engage in overt violence himself. Instead, he allegedly incited others to violence, beginning with the first Riots of the Mandate in 1920. Turk (1982) noted that higher class dissenters are known for "promoting minor into major grievances and by orchestrating what may for the participants be spontaneous protests" (p. 101). This was, in fact, Haj Amin's forte.

Prior to the 1936 Riots, the political crimes of Arabs were publicly defined as common, and not political, by the Authorities. Ted Swedenburg (1995) found in his field interviews of Palestinian Arabs that they believed the British "trumped up charges of robbery" to discredit the highway robbers' revolutionary motivations" (pp. 94-95.). Accordingly, the first high profile murder trial of a highway robber, Abu Jilda, was in 1932 and revolved around his alleged nationalism. Jilda, hailed a hero in the Arab press, was sentenced to death for the killing of a police officer. Jilda claimed that he killed the policeman because he represented the Government, while the British insisted Jilda merely wanted to rob him ("Abu Jilda Loses Appeal," 1934; "A National Hero," 1934).

The first "martyr" for the Palestinian cause, Sheik Izzel Din el Qassam, had shot and killed a Jewish police sergeant in 1935. The Qassamites differed from past groups in that they believed in selective organized armed resistance against the British. Qassam, a Haifa preacher, and his followers were popular among the villagers who sheltered group members and were tight-lipped to the Authorities. Part of the popularity of the Qassamites was their exclusive targeting of the other (British and Jews) for criminal victimization. Haj Amin became involved with Qassam, providing "strategic advice" in 1934, after Qassam was elected President of the Haifa branch of the Muslim Young Men's Association.

It is argued that the Arabs, under the influence of the Qassamites and Haj Amin were organized and sophisticated going into the Great Rebellion. Qassam and Haj Amin had won the support of the majority peasant Arab population through an adroit sense of media manipulation and inflammatory religious sermons.

The Arab population was not solely manipulated into believing that the Zionist presence was increasing; they could surely sense the rise in the Jewish presence in Palestine themselves. Due to the German Jews fleeing to Palestine, Jewish immigration jumped from a mere 9,553 in 1933 to 30,327 in 1934, and to an all-time high of 42,359 immigrants in 1935 ("Report," 1933-1935).

The organization and sophistication of Haj Amin and the Qassamites, gained through mass violence and general strikes, or the threat thereof, allowed them to manipulate numerous political concessions from the British, culminating in the White Paper of 1939. On the other hand, the Great Rebellion could have ultimately ended in revolution. The reason for the Arab Underground's annihilation by the Authorities was their loss of legitimation.

The Arabs lost their organization during the Great Rebellion. The break of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi in July 1937 from the Haj Amin-led Arab Higher Committee created factional party politics, which redirected violence from the "other" to Palestinian Arab politically moderate Nashashibi supporters. Nashashibi offended Haj Amin by accepting a British proposed partition plan in 1937, and by calling for an end to the economically devastating General Strike declared by the Arab Higher Committee a year prior.

The Arab assassination in September 1937 of Lewis Andrews, Acting District Commissioner for the Galilee region, caused Haj Amin and the Higher Arab Committee to be declared an illegal organization. Haj Amin and his associates went into exile. Without Haj Amin's presence, the rebel groups became fractionalized and their campaigns of extortion and assassinations of the Arab population became increasingly intolerable. One village leader purportedly wrote the following observation in a November 1938 letter to a fellow villager, "Our rebellion has become one against the villages and not against the Government or the Jews" (Zionist Organization of Great Britain [ZOGB], 1939, p. 11).

Amidst the intra-ethnic turmoil, the British stepped in to fund and train the Nashashibi Peace Bands (with Jewish Agency support). The Peace Bands aimed to protect the villagers against the Haj Amin's associates. The bands shortly formed a formidable defense (Morris, 2001). Within a year, the Great Rebellion was annihilated by the British. After the White Paper of 1939 was issued, the Peace Bands agreed to British disarmament. Although Nashashibi had the potential to create organized resistance against the British through the Peace Bands, he did not choose this course of action. After the publication of the 1939 White Paper, the Palestinian Arabs were feeling legitimation toward the British government. Perhaps the community would not have whole-heartedly supported a Nashashibi-led revolution attempt at this time.

It is argued that once the White Paper of 1939 was announced, the Jews began a campaign to replace the Arabs as the power actors in Palestine. Before the White Paper, the Yishuv was highly organized but unsophisticated. Until the White Paper, the Yishuv felt at times disappointed but still felt legitimation for the Authorities. The Balfour

Declaration and the consistent refusal of the British to negate the doctrine was not lost on the Yishuv. Israeli statesman Abba Eban (1969) had called the Balfour Declaration “the decisive diplomatic victory of the Jewish people in modern history” (p. 359).

It should be noted that the Yishuv had won some political victories through non-violent negotiation, including, the negation of the Passfield White Paper (1930), which had called for an immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land sales. The other British concession was the approval of private Jewish armed defense groups.

The British considered the crimes of the Haganah, under the command of the Jewish Agency, to be considered common, and not political crimes. The British did not believe that the Haganah would ever pose a political threat to their authority. For example, in 1935 a large arms shipment was discovered by Palestine Police at the Haifa Port, en route to a Jewish man in Tel Aviv. While the Arab press insisted it was part of a Zionist strategy, the Authorities treated it as an isolated criminal act (HA 47/145/4-5; “Arms and the Politician,” 1935). In contrast, when there was a large arms shipment discovered in 1943 by the British, long after the British considered the Haganah a political threat, the Jewish Agency was accused in a conspiracy arms trial (“Two in Jerusalem Guilty,” 1943).

After the publication of the White Paper, the Irgun and, later, Stern groups began a revolutionary campaign based on armed resistance against the British, instead of the defensive policy advanced by the Haganah. The British were concerned about the activities of the two Underground organizations, but considered their meager memberships unthreatening.

The larger Yishuv, although not running to join the Irgun/Stern ranks, were also

questioning the effectiveness of the Haganah's policy of restraint. One group of prominent Yishuv representatives accordingly "expressed the distress of the Jewish community at the [Irgun] bomb outrage which had occurred in the vegetable market...It was pointed out by them, however that the policy of the British Government, as expressed in the White Paper, was such as to encourage belief that its decision could be influenced by acts of terrorism" ("49 Arab casualties," 1939, p. 2).

Over the coming years, the Yishuv wrestled with the question of whether there was a double or single standard for power in Palestine. Did overt resistance bring the Arabs power but serve to hinder the Jews? The Irgun and Stern groups believed that there was a single standard, while the Jewish Agency disagreed. Lacking the Jewish Agency/Haganah support (by far the largest Underground organization) though, the Irgun and Stern groups lacked the essential organization variable necessary for a full blown revolution. Not only did the Irgun and Stern lack Haganah support, the three groups competed against each other for Yishuv support. For example, the Haganah garnered popular support when they protected Jewish businesses from Irgun and Stern extortionists.

A moment of truth came when Lloyd Moyne was assassinated by Sternists in January 1944. The Authorities called on the Haganah to aid in annihilation of the Irgun and Sternists. Churchill threatened the Yishuv with ending the Zionist plan in Palestine if no assistance was rendered, "If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of an assassin's piston and our labors for the future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, then many like myself would have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past" (Daniel, p. 8). The Haganah capitulated to the threats and aided the Authorities in arresting hundreds of Irgun and

Sternists during the Saison.

Despite the Saison, the Irgun and Stern groups' violence continued relatively unhampered for the next year and a half. The Jewish Agency finally lent tacit support to the two groups when the British refused to alter the White Paper restrictions in 1945. The frustration felt by the Jewish Agency in their inability to manipulate the British through political means, caused them to refuse any further counter-terrorism assistance.

It is argued that if the British had conceded to some of the Jewish Agency's political demands, and had not ceded to Arab violence in the past, Jewish revolution would have ended in annihilation of the Jewish forces. The organization factor would be missing from the revolution. The Yishuv would have still felt a sense of legitimation under the British, and felt that revolution was unnecessary for a better life.

#### Critical Theory


Critical theory assumes that the law is enforced in a manner which protects the power maintenance of the Authorities. Accordingly, a former Judge in early Mandate Palestine, Horace Samuel, remarked in his memoirs of the political nature of colonial justice (1930):

It must be confessed that the policy of Sir Herbert Samuel was but such as to foster the ideal of an objective and impersonal administration. It was summed up in the words already quoted with which he once scandalized a hard-bitten colonial official: "Before you do anything you must first consider the effect on the political situation." The political situation thus became a little tin god superior both to justice and to departmental regulations. (p. 105)

Critical theorist, Richard Quinney (2001) believed that there are six restrictions placed on criminal justice administrators which hamper their full enforcement of the law: 1) procedural, 2) interpretational latitude, 3) technical, 4) organizational, 5) ideological, and 6) societal pressures (Quinney, 2001). This thesis focuses on the sixth restriction proposed by Quinney, societal pressures. Quinney (2001) posited that societal pressures on the police result from "harmful social consequences that might follow the enforcement of certain laws" (p. 105).

The societal pressures on the Palestine criminal justice authorities were three-fold: 1) maintain Palestine with a minimum of British expenditures, 2) preserve international diplomatic relations, and 3) divide and conquer the native populations whenever possible. These societal interests dictated criminal justice policy in each of the five politically motivated crimes (see Figure 9).

*Figure 9. Societal Pressures on Mandate Authorities*



*Critical Analysis of Studied Crimes*

*Political Assassinations*

Assassinations usually were not a major concern to the Authorities, unless the victims were British. The two instances of assassinations, one Arab and one Jewish perpetrated, of high ranking British officials caused severe policy responses. The first was the assassination of Acting District Commissioner Lewis Andrews in 1938, which led to the exile of Haj Amin and the Arab Higher Committee leadership. The other was the Stern assassination of the Minister Resident in the Middle East, Lloyd Moyne, in

1944, which led to the Saison. Interestingly, assassinations of lower level British officials (e.g. police officers) never produced such drastic responses.

Inter- and intra-ethnic assassinations were largely ignored by the British and even left uninvestigated. These assassinations only served to divide the native populations. For example, both the De Hahn and Arlosoroff assassinations were never solved by the Palestine Police, leaving long-standing suspicions and cleavages within the Yishuv. In terms of the Arabs, the British arming of the Peace Bands served to turn the Great Rebellion into a civil war.

### *Weapons Smuggling*

In dealing with arms smugglers, the British largely ignored the trade of both Undergrounds until 1933 when the quasi-rebellion aimed exclusively against the British broke out. Until this time, the arms were mainly used as a means of solely inter-ethnic conflict.

The Jewish arms still went ignored until Irgun violence erupted against the British in 1939. Previous to 1939, the British considered armed Jews economically beneficial, in that they spared the British police expenses (and lives). The British aided the Jewish Underground by training the Jewish Settlement Police and Special Night Squads, composed mainly of Haganah members during the Great Rebellion.

The Authorities made the crucial decision in the White Paper of 1939 that they would no longer arm the Jewish supernumerary forces and requested their immediate disarmament. The British believed that the continued arming of Jews would fuel "pro-Zionist suspicions" which would cause "grave consequences to our relations with the

Middle Eastern countries and the Muslim countries further afield" (FO 371/23251 E7479/31).

Since the Jews refused to disarm in 1939, and threatened physical retaliation, the British did not pursue weapons searches. The war-time concerns trumped the need for British expenditure in Jewish arms pursuits. The Jewish Agency insisted that the arms were for defensive uses and the British did not believe that the majority of the Yishuv supported Irgun and Sternist attacks (Hoffman, 1983). Furthermore, the Yishuv ultimately supported an Allied victory in the approaching war. The Haganah even aided British troops in the Syrian war effort. In contrast, the British were distrustful of the Arab troops, especially in light of Haj Amin's open support of Hitler (Rivlin, 1994).

#### *Robbery and Extortion*

In handling the crimes of robbery and extortion, the British were not interested unless the crimes impacted the economy of the colony or the lives of British personnel. The pre-1936 Arab highway robbers and Qassamites were heavily targeted by British law enforcement because they shut down the colony's roadways. They were furthermore known to victimize British officials. Economic interest in the eradication of these crimes was illustrated by the British decision to concentrate their patrols on the highways which led to the major cities, and to escort commercial transportation only (Palestine Police Force [PPF], 1935).

The Jewish Underground never extorted the British, mainly because of the apolitical nature of their motivations. The Jewish robbers and extortionists concentrated only on where the most cash was to be found in Palestine – not on the British civil servants. Not only were British not victimized in these crimes, but the Jews were willing

to pay for their own protection (in the form of Haganah guards). In the area of diamond merchant hold-ups, the British were especially ignorant of the crime due to their campaign to discourage the Palestine Diamond industry. The British had diplomatic reasons for discouraging this industry, based on promises to Belgium and Holland to help rebuild their pre-war prominence (Szenberg, 1970; Waterbury, 1989).

### *Illegal Immigration*

In the area of illegal immigration, the British had open policies until 1922, the year that the EAC principle was first introduced. It is debatable why the EAC principle was created. On the one hand, it was a concession to the Arabs who demanded less Jewish immigration. On the other hand, one former migration official claimed that it was the Authorities' response to the Jewish Agency's first request for welfare assistance (Samuel, 1970). In either case, the EAC principle segregated the Jewish and Arab economies. The Arabs believed that Jewish agricultural and enterprise successes in Palestine benefited only the Jews. Despite the social and economic divisions which resulted from the EAC, the British kept the policy firmly in place. A divide and conquer agenda is suspected behind the EAC principle, especially after police officials recognized the harmony in Beersheba during the Great Rebellion. Peace was created by the employment of Arabs and Jews at the Jewish owned Potash Company (PPF, 1936).

The British were aware that immigration was important to the Arabs and Jews, but made a crucial policy decision to limit Jewish immigration. Not only did a rising Jewish presence inflame the majority Arab population, but many of the arriving immigrants to Palestine were without meaningful capital.

In comparison, the Authorities were disinterested in stopping foreign Arab fighters illegally entering Palestine in 1947 to join the Civil War effort against Jews. Great Britain only prevented their entrance "to avoid political repercussions" from the international community. Clandestine immigration of fighters was overlooked by the Authorities, as long as they arrived without "bands playing and flags flying" (FO 371/69426A).

Due to conflicting diplomatic expectations, coupled with Jewish terrorist attacks, it was in Britain's best interest to turn the issue over to the newly formed United Nations in January 1947.

### *Bombs and Sabotage*

The British turned a blind eye to inter- and intra-ethnic sabotage and bombing activities. The protection of Jewish settlements was left mainly to the privately funded Jewish supernumerary police. The Irgun bombings against Palestinian Arabs toward the end of the Great Rebellion went similarly ignored by the British. The bombings served to stir civil strife, and worked to distract the Arabs from anti-British sentiment. The British similarly left it up to the Arabs to guard themselves against such violence. For example, the Arab shopkeepers of the Old City hired young Arab men (and women) to guard against future Irgun and Stern attacks. These guards were apparently neither organized nor very effective ("On guard in Old City," 1939).

The bombing of the British by both Arabs and Jews was not ignored though. In fact, the British appeared to find these acts quite intimidating. The years preceding the British surrender of Palestine were marked by such attacks, which inflicted heavy British casualties. When the British announced in November 1947, that they would withdraw

from Palestine on May 15, 1948, they displayed the power of terror through their reluctance to lose more British lives, "The renewal of Arab violence on the announcement of the United Nations decision to partition Palestine and the declared intentions of Jewish extremists showed that the loss of further British lives was inevitable" ("Supplementary Memorandum," p. 10).

### Private Policing

The dangers of the privatization of police were illustrated in the Mandate Palestine example. The Arab and Jewish communities had armed themselves with the approval of the Authorities. The British helped to fund, train, and arm these private police forces. The Arab experiment, the Peace Bands, dutifully agreed to disarm when requested by the British. The Jewish police forces, on the other hand, did not, causing them to become an instant power threat. The Jewish Settlement Police will therefore be examined in this section as a negative role model for agencies considering privatization.

This analysis is based on a review of past research on police privatization in the United States and England. The following three views of private policing are drawn from past work in the area: 1) the private police as police partner, 2) the private police as a privilege of the wealthy, and 3) the private police as a police failure.

The first view perceives the private police as a partner with the police in protection of the community. This view does not believe that privatization threatens the power of the state, because the state has operational control over the private police (Shearing, 2004). The private police forces would not completely be private according to this view, because the organization would always be answerable to a state supervisory agency. An ironic twist to the private policing-as-police partner proposition was raised

by Michael McManus (1995) who asserted that the police had the potential to lose valuable intelligence through privatization. The public police forces become intimate with the community, while the state police force becomes physically isolated. This state of affairs becomes harmful to police work, which is greatly aided by community information sharing and support.

In Mandate Palestine, the Mandate authorities were the supreme rulers over the Jewish police forces. Shearing did not consider what happens if the private forces ignore the orders of the state. This is precisely what happened in Palestine when the Haganah refused to disarm. On another note, the Palestine Police became socially isolated from the Yishuv because they were replaced physically in the community by members of the private police forces. This social isolation allowed for less community cooperation with the Authorities, an essential ingredient in any counter-terror effort.

The second view of private policing provides a radical perspective of police privatization. This perspective sees private policing as an overextension of state power and an exacerbation of gross inequities between classes (Turk, 1987). Michael McManus (1995) came to a similar conclusion from his research, when he found that privatization could lead to "double standards...[t]he inequity of social control...effective protection would become increasingly available only to those who had the means to pay" (McManus, 1995, p. 131).

In Palestine, the Jewish ability to pay for police services did provide gross inequities in protection, but not in the direction the radical theorists predicted. Unconsidered in past research was the *decrease* in official protection provided communities who were once willing to pay for themselves. When the Jewish Agency

attempted to stop footing so much of their policing costs, the Palestine Police simply told them that they would receive less police protection.

McManus (1995) thirdly raised the “police as failure” argument in his work. He claimed that the creation of public security is dependent on a segment of the public which feels that it is receiving inadequate state protection. This assertion was wholly true in Mandate Palestine. The Haganah was strengthened in reaction to each riot; the frustration felt by the community regarding the Palestine Police’s performance propelled the Haganah to increase their policing capabilities. When the British made sizable Jewish immigration a crime during WWII, the Yishuv experienced increased dissatisfaction with the official criminal justice system.

In Mandate Palestine, the Yishuv frustration with the police blurred the distinction between police privatization and vigilantism. The Jewish Settlement Police, many members of which were in the Haganah, did match the following six elements of vigilantism proposed by Les Johnston (1996):

1. Premeditation, Organization
2. Private, Voluntary
3. Non-Profit
4. Use/Threatened Use of Force
5. Reaction to Crime/Social Deviance
6. Guarantee of Personal/Collective Security

Although the aforementioned definitions were applicable to the Irgun and Stern groups, the two groups were not appropriate for a study of private policing as they were never officially recognized as a private police force by the British.

This study found that privatization will lead to vigilantism only when a community feels a lack of legitimation towards the official criminal justice system. For this reason, an Authority needs to be careful in allowing the police privatization of disenchanting community groups.

The simple physical attainment of weapons ultimately facilitates the political power of any group in society. Turk referred to this power truism as "military dominance," a "most elementary form of the struggle for survival and control...Who shall occupy the land, who has sole or prior claim to its resources - these are the questions answered by a demonstration of military superiority" (Turk, 1982, p. 18).

The British received no protests when requesting the disarmament of the Peace Bands by the Arabs, because the White Paper of 1939 had just been published. It was fool-hearty of the Authorities to arm the Jews and then stab them in the back politically with the White Paper of 1939. Legitimation decreased in the Yishuv after the publication of the White Paper, while the support and organization of the Jewish Underground only intensified.

### Conclusion

The British Mandate experience in Palestine provides a valuable lesson for contemporary police forces attempting to maintain law in a divided society. The conflicting community demands made on the Palestine Police during the Mandate Period are reflective of a modern policing dilemma. This thesis illustrates how modern police agencies should not react to this problem.

It is argued that the British approach was not to choose the Arab side or the British side in their criminal justice policies. Instead, the Authorities chose whichever

side most closely mirrored their interests. This imbalanced, self-interested approach to police power only led to frustrated community groups who ultimately revolted against them.

The lesson learned from the British experience in Palestine is the following: police need to maintain a delicate balance of the interests of all communities in a given society. This task is not a simple one, and it only becomes more difficult as communities become more global and diverse, but a democratic police force demands nothing less.

**APPENDIX****Abbreviations**

AIR	Air Ministry - Great Britain
CO	Colonial Office - Great Britain
FO	Foreign Office - Great Britain
HA	Haganah Archives - Israel
KV	Security Service - Great Britain

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