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HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, 1947-1960

by

MAHMOUD M. JWAIED

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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Abstract

HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, 1947-1960

by

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Advisor: Richard W. Bulliet

This thesis examines the historic and diplomatic ties between the United States and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, and the roles played by Statesmen Dwight D. Eisenhower and King Hussein in the preservation of the Jordanian state despite domestic upheaval, regional turmoil, and continuous shifting alliances and counter-alliances in the volatile Middle East.

Based on a thorough examination of the diplomatic correspondence and documentary record of this period, this dissertation illustrates the impartial approach espoused by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the conduct of American foreign relations in the Middle East. It also demonstrates the rise of King Hussein Ibn Talal as a

refined statesman within the framework of successive crises, from the assassination of his grandfather King Abdullah in 1951 through the continuous deterioration of Jordanian-Israeli border relations between 1953 and 1954, to the Baghdad Pact of 1955, the Suez crisis of 1956, and the dismissal of John Bagot Glubb as the head of the Arab Legion. It reveals how the Hashimite master handled the critical year of 1958 when his uncle, King Feisal II of Iraq was dethroned and how King Hussein survived the threats emanated from Nasserists and Arab nationalists.

It concludes that a special relationship existed between the Jordanian Kingdom and the United States during the Eisenhower presidency when Washington supplanted the United Kingdom as Jordan's most reliable partner. Furthermore, it shows how this solid relationship diverged significantly from both the previous bilateral experience under President Harry S. Truman and from later experiences under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. It rejects the contention of continuity in American foreign policy in the Middle East and establishes how American-Israeli relations suffered significantly while American ties to Jordan improved remarkably during the Eisenhower administration.

This study also questions the contention that the

Eisenhower Doctrine alienated all the Arab states and shattered all the gains made by the administration during the Suez crisis. It demonstrates how King Hussein strove earnestly to secure an American commitment to the defence of the Jordanian Kingdom under the Eisenhower Doctrine. It explores how the undeclared alliance between the two states diminished the chances for a possible Soviet takeover in Jordan. It substantiates the assertion that the relationship between the two countries is firmly anchored despite the lack of impartiality of Eisenhower's successors in the conduct of American diplomacy in the Middle East.

To the sons and daughters of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan; the soldiers who discharged their duties without fear; the mothers who endured the dictates of daily life and the anguish of war; the fathers who planted the land with seeds of wheat and olive trees.

To my immortal cousin, Abd al-Hadi H. Jwaied, who perished one month before he graduated from the medical school in Sarajevo; to all the victims of war in Bosnia Hertzegovina and the Fertile Crescent.

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Mahmoud M. Jwaied

Manhattan, New York City,

10 January 1996

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Prologue

When a great power over-extends itself, its capacity to withstand internal constraints and external pressure diminishes as time passes on. This has been the lamentable fate of all nations which expanded not out of necessity, but out of the primitive desire to rule the other. A nation's failure to understand its own limits in search for glory inevitably leads to a major calamity. Britain was not an exception to this rule. The dwindling of the United Kingdom's imperial position in the Near East was a certainty as the United States of America began to assume the difficult task of preserving the balance of power in a region that contained all the essential elements for revolutionary movements. Britain's ceaseless struggle to maintain the last remnants of a vanishing empire in that region was defeated by its own weakness and further frustrated by two competing great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, the end of the British imperium was succeeded by a Soviet-American contest. The creation of a buffer zone to curtail Soviet expansionism was regarded as a matter of vital geopolitical importance to the United States. The Soviet Union's ideological strides in the Mediterranean, combined with its historic ambitions in the Near East, particularly in Turkey and Iran, produced a sense of

consternation and trepidation in the United States.

I

American Containment in the Near East

Triumphant in its war against the Axis powers the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, which had acted in concert and fought side by side with the United States to defeat Germany, found itself in a bitter contest with its former partner after the Second World War. The quest for ideological supremacy and economic dominance in the world constituted the primordial factors behind American-Soviet rivalry.

One of the most eloquent diplomatists who attempted to enlighten American thinking about Soviet-Russia was George F. Kennan. A faithful servant of the United States, he undertook an important function in formulating American policy in the aftermath of World War II. He understood the legacy of suspicions and fears which was grounded in the old order of tzarist autocracy and reinforced by Soviet communist ideology. He also understood the geopolitical imperatives driving Soviet policy and the needs of the Soviet state to establish a defensible frontier along the boundaries of the empire. Thus, Kennan concluded that any attempt by the United

States of America to dislodge the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe would be futile. Kennan maintained that Soviet diplomacy tends to be "rational in logic" and therefore it "can not be easily defeated or discouraged" by a few diplomatic victories of the Western powers. He called upon his countrymen to be patient and persistent when dealing with international communism. In his final analysis, Kennan wrote: "...the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient and firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."¹ At the same time, Kennan warned against what he called the "emotionalism and subjectivity" of American public responses to foreign policy issues.²

Kennan's call upon the new Administration of Harry Truman to exercise restraint came to no avail. Unlike the quintessential statesman Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Truman displayed strong ideological sentiments about Soviet communism. In response to what the president termed as Soviet advances into the Mediterranean, he stressed the importance of furnishing military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. On January 8, 1947,

¹George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (New York: The University of Chicago Press, A Mentor Book, 1951), pg. 113.

²Kennan, pg. 92

Ambassador Smith in Moscow telegraphed the Department of State a "top secret" letter urging Secretary James Byrnes to commit the United States to a regional pact to contain what he called the "menace" of the "Kremlin's predatory policy." Smith warned that the Soviet Union was determined to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean, the Arab world and the Suez canal. Smith wrote:

To the Kremlin, Turkey represents both a corridor for attack on the USSR and an obstacle to achievement of Soviet objectives. USSR will therefore not feel that it has either achieved security for its Southwestern frontiers or made a solid advance on its course of Near Eastern aggression until it dominates Turkey.³

This view was shared by Major Beamish, a prominent member of Britain's House of Commons. He wrote: "The role of Turkey is of exceptional importance, because strategically Turkey is placed on the left flank of a possible Soviet advance into Europe, and on the right

³A telegram from Ambassador Smith in Moscow to United States Secretary James Byrnes, January 8, 1947. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1947, vol. V (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), pg. 2.

flank of a possible Soviet advance into the Middle East."⁴

It was these security considerations which prompted the Administration to act swiftly. The Truman Doctrine linked the balance of power in the Near East to the equilibrium of forces in Europe. At the signing ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, President Truman stressed the necessity of promoting American security interests by furnishing military assistance to foreign nations. Thus the Mutual Security Act of 1949 was approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate in October of that year.⁵ Britain, exhausted by the ravages of the war, was no longer capable of sustaining its assistance to Greece and Turkey. The inclusion of those two countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reflected a gradual and drastic shift in geostrategic considerations; the policy of containment as outlined by George Kennan, intended to preserve the status quo in Europe, expanded now into the Middle East. Truman was exceedingly suspicious of what he called the

⁴U.K. Major Beamish. Comments on the Middle East Command and the rise of Communism, 19 November 1951. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 494, 40 Parl. 1 session, pg. 167.

⁵Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. XI, edited by R. Bennet and R. K. Turner (Princeton: published for World Peace Foundation, Princeton University Press, 1950), pg. 612.

"designs of communist imperialism." After the announcement of the Tripartite Declaration⁶ in May 1950, President Truman devised a new program of economic aid to halt communist advances in South-East Asia, particularly in Korea. United States National Security Council meeting 68 was formulated to build up American forces, foster military assistance to its allies, and to intensify American clandestine operations overseas.⁷ In June, 1950, he requested the congress to authorize \$1,222,500,000 for the continuation of the MA program. He prided himself on his policy toward Greece and Turkey, arguing that their territorial boundaries and integrity were secured due to United States economic and military aid.⁸ If one were to accept the contention that Soviet

⁶The Tripartite Declaration promulgated by Britain, France and the United States, was orchestrated to advance regional stability in the Near East by pressing on the major actors in the area to avoid the instruments of war unless as an act of self-defence, a right recognized by all signatories to this resolution. Foreign Office, "Middle East: Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East by Great Britain, France and the United States, 25 May 1951," British and Foreign State Papers, 1952, vol. 159:204-205.

⁷A memorandum of conversation by the Executive Secretary of the NSC (James S. Lay, Jr.), May 8, 12, 1950. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), pgs. 312-313, 306-311.

⁸U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, A Message from the President of the United States on the Mutual Defence Security Program transmitting a recommendation that the U.S. continue to provide military assistance to "free" nations during the fiscal year 1951,

diplomacy since the Bolshevik revolt of 1917 was a continuation of a classic pattern of old imperial Russia, it follows from this that America's concerns were well-measured. Soviet historical interests in the Turkish Straits, Dardanelles and Bosphorus were longstanding.⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski summarizes the nature of the Soviet system: "The distinctive character of the Russian imperial drive is derived from interconnection between militaristic organization of Russian society and the territorial imperative which defines its instinct for survival."¹⁰ Helmut Schmidt, Former Chancellor of West Germany (1974-1982) and an opponent of the Brzezinski school of geopolitical determinism, described the "historical continuity" of Russian imperialism as an offspring of a "political-cultural tradition that has always seen itself to have a mission, originally in the Russian Orthodox church and consequently adopted and continued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."¹¹

S Congress, 2nd sess., 1949-1950, 455, 555-528.

⁹George Vernadsky, Political & Diplomatic History of Russia (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936), pg. 6.

¹⁰Robin F. Laird, Erik P. Hoffmann, editors, Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1986), pgs. 3-4.

¹¹Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: a Political Perspective, Ruth Hein, trans. (New York: Random House, 1989), pg. 17.

If the Soviet Union suffered from "territorial insecurity" as Brzezinski claims, does it not follow that Truman's firm stand against communism was an ideological form of expansionism? Was it also not true that the United States was a product of territorial expansion from the first settlements along Virginia's James River in 1607 to the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, the Mexican cession in 1847, and the acquisition of Spanish Cuba in 1898?

President Truman's economic and military policy enjoyed uncontested support in the legislative branch of government. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (MDACA) of 1951, known as the Battle Act, Congress assumed the responsibility of protecting "strategic" items which might be purchased from the United States by its adversaries (North Korea and China), thereby threatening its security.¹² In response to American military arrangements in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Soviet government protested United States MDACA of October 1951 as an "aggressive act toward the Soviet Union and a rude violation by the United States of obligations contained

¹²U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, foreign policy and the East-West confrontation, Committee and Subcommittee Hearings and Briefings on Foreign Policy and East-West Confrontation, Historical series, U.S. Congressional Hearings Supplement 82 (Hf0-2) vol. XIV, February 1951, 5.

in the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement of November 16, 1933." The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics demanded that the United States revoke this law. Ernest A. Gross, an American official, invited the Soviets to an open discussion on the subject. He accused the Soviet government of "distorting" American intentions behind the MDACA, assuring his opponents that the act was not "aggressive" and that his government was not "interfering" in Russia's domestic affairs."¹³ Britain, America's most enduring ally, held the Soviets accountable for all the troubles in the Middle East. England, in an act of despair, appealed to the Arab world to remain on the side of the West. The British government was hoping to "restore" the historical friendship between Britain and the Moslem world. Major Beamish rejected Arab charges about the perpetual designs of England in the East and noted that the policy of divide and conquer was no longer Britain's guiding principle. He warned the Arab people against the "threat" of communism because the Arab East was militarily vulnerable and economically weak. He argued that Jordan's Arab Legion lacked the necessary equipment-such as a royal airforce-to act as a deterrent against foreign intervention. The underlying causes

¹³Soviet charges against efforts of "free nations" to achieve collective security, January 7, 1952. Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXVI, no. 684, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office), pgs. 28-30.

behind England's failure to influence the course of events in the area were aggravated by the problem of refugees and the mistrust between the Arabs and the Jews. Surprisingly, Beamish affirmed that British policy in the area for the last six years had been "vacillating and weak."¹⁴

Britain and the United States persisted in attempts to bring about a new order in the Middle East, providing for individual and/or collective defence. In October, 1951, King Talal assured the American Mission in Amman that Jordan's participation in the Middle East Command (an American proposal for regional security) was certain.¹⁵ But Britain insisted that the security of the Near East was not conceivable nor was it attainable without maintaining some naval presence in the Suez Canal zone¹⁶. In January 1952, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, accompanied by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and President Harry S. Truman, reaffirmed their

¹⁴U.K. 1951. Major Beamish on the Middle East Command and Communism, 19 November 1951. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., 40 parl. 1 session, vol. 494 (1951), pgs. 130, 170-175.

¹⁵FRUS, 1951, The Near East and Africa, 1951, vol. V (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), pg. 990. See Editorial Note.

¹⁶U.K. Discussion in the House of Commons on a Mid-East security organization, 19 November 1951. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series, vol. 494 (1951), 40 Parl. I session, pg. 144.

commitment to a European defence community. In a joint statement following the discussions between the Prime Minister and the President, the two leaders emphasized their determination to establish security in the Middle East. "Our two governments are resolved to promote the stability, peaceful development, and prosperity of the countries of the Middle East. We have found a complete identity in aims between us in this part of the world...we think it essential for the furtherance of our common purposes that an Allied Middle East Command should be setup as soon as possible."¹⁷

American diplomats worked vigorously on all fronts, employing the United Nations to counter what they considered Soviet "propaganda." In his testimony before the House's Committee on Foreign Affairs, John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, appealed to his country's leaders to bolster the American International Information Program in the Near East. Lebanon was designated as gathering place for clandestine operations discussions. He outlined United States objectives as follows:

¹⁷U.S. President, "Joint statement following discussions with Prime Minister Churchill, January 9, 1952." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Registrar, National Archives and Records Service, 1952-1953), Dwight Eisenhower, 1953, 18.

To expose the vicious phony reactionary nature of Soviet Communist imperialism and its propaganda; second, to build up a spirit of unity and determination in the free world; third, to establish confidence in U.S. leadership not only by exposing Soviet lies but showing ours to be honest, strong, and resolute in our determination to maintain peace with freedom; fourth, to build especially behind the Iron Curtain psychological obstacles to Kremlin aggression.¹⁸

Thus, the United States undertook the task of "enhancing" international security, particularly in the region of the Near East. The American policy of military build up focused on one central aim, the formation of an effective defence structure to serve as a block to communist advances in the world. The Truman administration emphasized that the mutual security program of military and economic assistance was aimed at helping nations which had common interests with the United States, such as Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. United States technical and financial assistance to certain Arab countries (as well as Iran and Israel), where poverty, disease, illiteracy and economic

¹⁸U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Interior and Public Affairs, report by John D. Hickerson on United States Information Program in the Near East, Hearings Supplement 82 (Hf0-2), 20 February 1952, 303.

stagnation were prevalent, was critical for the success of American policy objectives in that area, the containment of the "fires of communist agitation."¹⁹ Churchill's anxieties about communism, especially after the loss of the British imperial army in India, prompted him to foster a special relationship with the United States. The Anglo-American discussions on the Middle East called for a security umbrella in accordance with the Atlantic Pact whereby the United States, Britain, France and Turkey would act as the custodians of the Middle East.²⁰ However the Four Powers came to the conclusion that the defence of the Middle East was impractical without Egypt's participation. The debate over the role of Egypt in Middle East defence policy caused a serious embarrassment for the Foreign Office.²¹ George Wigg, a member of the House of Commons, spoke directly to Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, about the failure of British diplomacy to resolve the dispute between Cairo and London over the Suez Canal. He wrote:

¹⁹U.S. President. "Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1953, January 21, 1952." Public Papers of the Presidents: (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1952), 1952-1953.

²⁰U.K. Winston Churchill. Comments to the House of Commons on British position in the Near East, 30 January 1952. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 495 (1952), pgs. 203-204.

²¹U.K. Winston Churchill, 5 May 1952. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 495 (1952), pg. 802.

The great tragedy of Anglo-Egyptian relations, right from the days of Cromer and, I regret to say, up to the present day-history looks like repeating itself-is that we have backed the wrong horse. When we had time, when we could have built democracy in Egypt, when we could have built up their social and political institutions to give a decent standard of life and a sense of responsibility to the Fallaheen [peasants] of Egypt, what we did was to back the old corrupt pashas, and the mouth we have to feed has turned round and bitten us, for the very simple reason that for them there is no political escape.²²

Wigg concluded that British policy of "vacillation" was destabilizing the Egyptian monarchy under King Farouk. His fears were to be realized in the coming months when General Muhammad Najib and Colonel Jamal Abd al-Nasser uprooted Farouk from power in July, 1952. The British parliamentarian candidly expressed his hope that Britain would convince the Egyptian people that his country had good intentions toward Egypt. He admonished his colleagues about the rapid decline of Britain's standing in the area to the "lowest" point possible. Arab distrust of England, Wigg argued was a product of England's failure to act decisively at the United Nations

²²U.K. George Wigg questions Anthony Eden on Anglo-Egyptian relations, 5 May 1952. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series vol. 495 (1952), pg. 914.

, particularly over the question of refugees who were living under miserable conditions. Turkey too was mistrusted by the Arabs, and Israel was seen as a "dangerous" neighbour.²³

On July 27, 1952, the two governments of the United States and Israel established an agreement on a mutual defence program under which Tel Aviv was entitled to its "legitimate self-defence," the right to participate in the security of the Middle East.²⁴ In October, 1952, at the Nineteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of the USSR, the Secretary of the Central Committee (Malenkov) charged that the United States of America was methodically "dislodging" Britain from its colonial possessions in the Middle East, particularly in the Suez Canal and the Arabian Gulf. He denounced what he called the "bellicose American circles" in painting a distorted view of a Soviet threat which did not exist.²⁵ Soviet

²³George Wigg questions Anthony Eden, 5 May 1952. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 495 (1952), pgs. 914-917.

²⁴U.K. Foreign Office, "Israel: Exchange of notes between the U.S. and Israel concerning an agreement on mutual defence arrangements, Tel Aviv, 23 July, 1952," British and Foreign State Papers 1952, vol. 159, pgs. 496.

²⁵Nineteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., held in Moscow, October, 1952. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952, edited by R. P. Stebbins and C. W. Baliller (New York: Harper & Brothers, published for Council on Foreign Relations,

allegations were not without basis; American defence policy in the Middle was, by Truman's own admission, primarily orchestrated to curtail Soviet expansion in that region.

The demise of the Egyptian monarchy was a turning point in the history of the Near East; it marked a major step in England's decline as a great power and signified the failure of British diplomacy to cope with a discontented Egyptian populace which had no desire to see British troops stationed in the Suez Canal. To be sure, England's diplomacy was "empirical, practical, based on a clear view of British interests, of which the most important is the preservation of peace. It tends to be conservative because all challenges in the status quo and the present balance of forces in the world seem likely to be for the worse for British interests."²⁶ But in the case of Egypt, as Wigg noted, British policy was misguided, impractical, vacillating and uncompromising. England's failure to accept its declining role as a great power, and its inability to make significant concessions to Nasser proved to be a major diplomatic blunder.

1953), pgs. 124-129.

²⁶Sir William Hayter, The Diplomacy of Great Powers (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1961), pg. 48.

Similarly, the Truman cabinet lacked the wisdom to cope with the new political imperatives in the Middle East. Truman's policy, not the Department of State diplomacy, culminated in a perfect fiasco. His "distrust" of diplomats, and his uncompromising support of the Israel undermined any chances for a settlement with the Arab countries. What Truman failed to understand is this: the loss of Egypt defeated the last hope for Arab participation in a new security arrangement in the Middle East. His successor, Dwight D. President Eisenhower, would wrestle relentlessly to separate the image of the White House from the Truman legacy which stifled Arab aspirations for American fairness over the Palestine issue. Nevertheless, President Truman was committed to the preservation of Jordan's Western orientation and its territorial integrity to avert a regional war, particularly during the critical month of July of 1951 following King Abdullah's assassination.

As this dissertation will show, the preservation of the Hashimite Dynasty continued as an essential component of American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East throughout the 1950's. But unlike his predecessor, President Eisenhower was quite careful in cultivating a friendship with the Arab countries to expedite their entry into the Baghdad alliance, an Anglo-American Near

Eastern military scheme fashioned to deflect possible communist progress in the Middle East. From the onset of January, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary John Foster Dulles labored persistently to manage the border disputes on the Jordanian-Israeli frontier. The Eisenhower-Dulles diplomacy provided a security shield against Israeli reprisals at a time when Jordan was in its most vulnerable stages. Moreover, Eric Johnston's mission promoted the Jordan Valley-Yarmuk water developmental scheme, and the Alpha Operation (a Department of State code) was formed to narrow the differences between Jordan, Israel and Egypt, all in an effort to provide the regional states with incentives to settle their disputes permanently.

The persistence of Britain's colonial attitude was evidently manifested in its desire to establish a regional security arrangement to preserve its former position in the Near East. By contrast, the Eisenhower administration approached Jordan and Egypt with caution and temperance. But Nasser declined. The Jordanian Kingdom, too weak to cope with domestic restraints, was not in a position to challenge Egyptian supremacy in the Arab world. Furthermore, President Eisenhower inherited the ills of the previous administration and the reputation which left millions of Arabs embittered,

betrayed and frustrated. Nevertheless, Eisenhower acted decisively to remedy the region's predicaments, as was manifested in the Suez crisis. His ultimatum to Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from the Canal Zone was an obvious indication of the President's determination to abide by United Nations principles, as was the May 25 Declaration espoused by London and Paris and Washington not to use force in the Near East. Eisenhower's firmness during the Suez crisis of 1956 established the principle of fairness in the conduct of American policy toward all the countries in the Middle East. Although the Suez Crisis created domestic unrest in Amman, it served King Hussein well as Eisenhower admonished the Israeli government to cease its attacks against the Jordanian Kingdom or face undesirable consequences.

The tragedy of American-Arab relations lies in both the failure of the United States to appreciate the nature and strength of Arab nationalism and the failure of the Arab states to differentiate between Truman and his successor. The grievous history of the Middle East was partially tarnished by its ironies. Some Arab leaders mistakingly believed that the Eisenhower policy was an extension of that of the previous administration of President Truman. The Israelis also fiercely defended their policy of reprisal based on a misguided view of

righteousness, protesting American diplomacy of friendly impartiality as an alarming menace to Israeli interests. In short, the inability of the Arab states and Israel to recognize the fluctuating rhythms of American policy from one administration to another created misunderstanding and discord between the United States and its Middle Eastern partners. The Eisenhower Doctrine alienated many Arab states, but it would be a gross exaggeration to argue that the success of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East was entirely attributable to the failure of the Eisenhower administration in coping with Arab nationalism. Nasser's revolutionary sentiments in the Arab East were primarily aimed at the two conservative colonial powers, Britain and France.

Nothing would have more pleased the Hashimite ruling family than an American pledge to defend the Kingdom under what is also known as the American Doctrine of 1957. Furthermore, communist advancement in the region started long before Eisenhower assumed the Presidency and heightened when Colonel Nasser purchased arms from Czechoslovakia two years earlier. Eisenhower saved Jordan from a possible communist domination. Regardless of Jordan's size and the strength of its economy, Eisenhower esteemed the judgment of American diplomats in the Middle East who tied the Kingdom's security to the

defence of American and Western interests in the whole of the Middle East. The events of July 1958 and the succeeding months in the aftermath of Iraqi King Faisal's II assassination in Baghdad offer uncontestable illustration of the President's resolve in safeguarding a Jordanian nation which was under siege by its ambitious neighbors. American intervention in Lebanon was an entirely different matter. What is certainly clear is that Eisenhower was the finest American statesman the Arab countries could ever hope to conduct negotiations with. Was not he the man who fostered a policy of even-handedness toward the antagonists in the region despite its domestic implications for the Republican Presidency and its adverse effects on American-Israeli relations? He was ardently forceful in respecting the rules of international conduct. King Hussein was swift in recognizing Eisenhower's impartiality and resolve, and took the risk of continuing close ties with England while gradually advancing his country's diplomatic, technical, financial and military ties with the United States of America. The Eisenhower administration provided for Jordan's essential economic and military requirements without committing itself to a treaty of defence with the Jordanian Kingdom. This is the history of an uneasy association between a great power and a small kingdom, largely molded by circumstances, but also partly shaped

by men who excelled in the art of statcraft and
diplomacy.

Chapter I

The Formative Years:

Truman and the Hashimites, 1947-1953

In the initial phases of American advances in the Middle East, American policy was conciliatory and compromising, ostensibly content with an intermediary role between Britain and its former colonies. However, with the rise of Soviet communism, America assumed its fitting function as a great power, checking communist expansionism, while increasing its commercial operations overseas. However, Harry Truman coarsely magnified the threat of communism in the Near East and failed to rally Arab support behind the United States. He never understood the fears, territorial and political in nature and scope, of the Arab countries. Palestine's displaced refugees and border frictions between the Arab countries and Israel occupied the immediate concerns of what may be described as the perpetual divide between the Arab states and Israel. Truman's mission aimed at forming close diplomatic, commercial and military ties with the Arab East in an effort to contain the impending communist threat to American vital economic interests without giving careful consideration to the passions of the Arab people. His heir would pay the price for the misdirected

course of this administration. Nevertheless, the Truman administration took an exception in the treatment of Jordan. His decision to preserve the Jordanian Kingdom in the 1940's was fundamentally driven by ideological considerations, the preservation of Jordan's Western orientation. Moreover, the maintainance of the security of Jordan following Abdullah's assassination in 1951 immensely reduced the chances for a military showdown among its ambitious neighbors.

**Early Encounters: King
Abdullah, Britain, and the United States**

King Abdullah's fortunes after the Second World War rested on his capacity to continue charming Britain and on his resiliency in dealing with a shadowy President in Washington whose views on the Middle East were tarnished by a fervent ambition to retain the Democratic Presidency at any cost. Truman accomplished all his objectives; he won the Jewish vote, the presidency and Abdullah's understanding in exchange for diplomatic recognition.

Truman was born in 1884 in Missouri. Some of his defenders described him as a student of government and an

"uncritical" reader of history. Nonetheless, Truman presumably relied on historical precedent to guide him in the conduct of foreign policy.¹ Like most of his countrymen, he shared the American traditions of pragmatism and idealism of the late 1940's.² Former Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter believed that Truman was "one of the best" if not the "greatest President of the twentieth century." Carter emphasized the role of Truman in eradicating racial intolerance in the Navy and promoting "democracy, freedom and respect for human rights." President Bill Clinton hailed Truman's leadership in building the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the implementation of the Truman Doctrine to resist communism in the Mediterranean and the Near East. He also complimented Truman's decision on recognizing the state of Israel.³ Dean Acheson portrayed his boss as a man possessing two personalities; on one hand, Truman was "peppery, sometimes biligerent, often didactic." Other times, the President was a "patient, modest, considerate, and appreciative boss, helpful and understanding in all official matters, affectionate and

¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Double Day & Company, Inc., 1956), pg.1

²Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1984), pgs. 12-13.

³50th Anniversary of Truman Presidency, Sponsored by Donald Dawson, President of the Truman Library, National Building Museum, Missouri, November 23, 1995.

sympathetic in any private worry or sorrow." Acheson firmly believed that the "greatest little man" he "knew and loved" was perhaps the "most popular in our history."⁴ But the President was hardly an idealist. His foreign policy was closer to that of Alexander Hamilton, who was anything but a sentimentalist, and based on "tough-minded realism."⁵ As an unwitting adherent of the Hamiltonian tradition of realism, the stalwart democratic, fervently anti-communist president, perhaps better suited to have been a republican politician, was committed to the security of the Middle East but did not himself participate in the process of negotiations. He had "not been an enthusiastic summitter or a confirmed traveler. He was quite content to deal with the Soviet Union by remote control."⁶ Truman's conduct in foreign affairs contrasted substantially with Franklin Delano Roosevelt's well-measured pragmatism and refined idealism.

Truman's interest in the Hashimite Kingdom stemmed

⁴Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), pgs. 729-730.

⁵Paul A. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books INC., 1972), pg. 145.

⁶Abba Eban, The New Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 1983), pg. 33.

from Jordan's longstanding leanings toward the West. Although Arab suspicions of the Truman administration were obvious deterrent to Jordan's continued flirtations with the West, King Abdullah was too daring a man, too ambitious a leader to be stifled by regional politics. Truman saw in King Abdullah a man who could assist him in his attempts to reconcile Arab nationalism with Jewish Zionism. However, the ongoing disputes between the regional states in the Middle East acted as a major obstacle to the implementation of American policy. Consequently, the Department of State embarked on a program to settle territorial and political conflicts between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia and Britain.

In January of 1947, Arabia's King Abd al-Aziz Saud invited the United States to act as a mediator between Britain, which had a treaty of friendship with Jordan, and the Saudi Kingdom. King Abdullah's scheme for Greater Syria (espousing the unity of the entire area of the Fertile Crescent) had become a disconcerting issue for the Saudis. The new rulers of Arabia had been "obliged to drive out" the Hashimites from the peninsula because they were seemingly "naturally hostile" to the Saudi family. Abd al-Aziz was convinced that the Hashimites were "plotting" to regain power and reclaim their rights in the land of their ancestors. Saudi fears emanated from

the historic and spiritual link connecting King Abdullah with his forefathers in Hijaz and Mecca. Furthermore, Saudi allegations about King Abdullah's scheme for Greater Syria forced Crown prince Saud and Ambassador Fuad Hamzah in Washington to appeal to the United States for diplomatic support. The American-Saudi discussions on January 17, 1947, produced a satisfactory understanding between the two countries. Secretary James Byrnes and Under Secretary Dean Acheson, in charge of conducting American-Saudi discussions promised America's "full active support" in the event the of the formation of an anti-Saudi coalition. America pledged to defend the territorial and political integrity of Saudi Arabia and emphasized the significance of abiding by United Nations principles.⁷

Byrnes, the Charleston-born son of an Irish immigrant "minor city employee" had little legal training. He took oath as the United States Secretary of State, in July, 1945. In the conduct of foreign policy, Byrnes was "slow" and his work was "strenuous" "frustrating" and "incomplete." His cordial relationship

⁷A Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Loy W. Henderson) concerning interest of the United States in proposal by Transjordan for Greater Syria, January 17, 1947. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pgs. 738-742.

with Truman was not without complications.⁸ Much of the toil of diplomacy was left to Byrnes's Under Secretary and successor, Dean Gooderham Acheson.

On February 11, King Abd al-Aziz voiced his concern about an alleged British scheme to make Abdullah the ruler of Syria. However, Minister J. Rives Childs stationed in Jidda informed Yussef Yasin, Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister, that American missions in the Near East discovered no such undertaking. Childs took the liberty to reaffirm the American policy of opposing any changes in the region through the use of force.⁹ Secretary Byrnes instructed the Embassy in London to hold consultations with Charles W. Baxter, England's Head of the Eastern Department at the Foreign Office, concerning wide rumors that "plans are afoot to overthrow or menace by force" some governments in the Near East. British agents were accused of "secretly encouraging Hashimite

⁸Robert H. Ferrel, Samuel Flagg Bemis, editors, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, E.R. Stettinius, Jr. by Richard L. Walker, James F. Byrnes by George Curry (New York: Cooper Square, Publishers, Inc., 1972), pg. 87-88, 316.

⁹Childs to DOS, Jidda, February 11, 1947. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pg. 742. See footnote.

groups" to cause disturbances in the Middle East.¹⁰ Baxter expressed his doubt as to how the reinstatement of the British policy of neutrality would quell the rumor. He also attested to Syrian and Lebanese confidence in British policy.¹¹ Acheson hoped that American inquiries were of what he called "beneficial influence" to Saudi rulers, and reasserted his country's commitment to the January 17 talks with the Crown Prince.¹² King Abd al-Aziz was pleased, and hoped that the United States government would continue its diplomatic quest to influence Britain to announce its intentions in the House of Commons to soothe what the King called the "agitated spirits" in his Kingdom.¹³

On May 9, American diplomats reported from London that King Abdullah had issued a White Paper proposing the creation of Greater Syria, which would include Trans-jordan, Syria, and Palestine, to be worked out with the

¹⁰Marshall to Gallman in the U.K., Washington, March 31, 1947. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 743-744.

¹¹Gallman to Secretary of State, London, March 13, 1947. FURS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pgs. 744-745.

¹²Acting Secretary Acheson to Legation in Saudi Arabia, Washington, April 19, 1947. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pg. 745.

¹³J. Rives Childs to DOS, April 23, 1947. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 745. See footnote.

Arab League. Abdullah articulated his plan of Syrian Unity as a "natural concomitant of Arab unity, that political federation is not precluded by different forms of government and that Trans-jordan in this sacred struggle is guided not by private ambition but Arab aspirations." Cairo reacted by issuing a White Book which denounced Abdullah's scheme and accused the King of promoting his own interests.¹⁴ Minister Childs in Jidda communicated Abd al-Aziz's firm belief that the British were the real agitators and attributed London's conduct to the resentment by its leaders of the close economic ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia.¹⁵

American diplomacy prompted Britain's House of Commons to declare "unequivocally" that Her Majesty's Government was not in favor of the Greater Syria plan. Britain's declared position was one of "strict neutrality." Secretary Byrnes in Washington believed that the barriers facing Abdullah's plan were "too great" for the scheme to be materialized.¹⁶ After several consultations with British officials in the Foreign

¹⁴FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pgs. 746. See Editorial Note.

¹⁵Childs to Secretary of State, June 20, 1947. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pgs. 750-752.

¹⁶Secretary of State to Legation in Saudi Arabia, Washington, July 26, 1947. FRUS, pg. 752.

Office, the United States was assured that England was neither "for or against" Abdullah's plans. Britain's proclaimed "neutrality" was clearly a sign of respect for the United States, more accurately an indication that colonial England was no longer the ultimate arbiter in Middle Eastern Affairs. Moreover, Baxter repudiated Abd al-Aziz Saud's charges and expressed his country's good intentions toward Saudi Arabia. In an effort to pacify the Saudi government, Baxter stressed that the Anglo-Jordanian treaty was not a political or a military alliance between the states.¹⁷ Fearful of Trans-jordan's schemes, Saudi Arabia publicly disapproved of Abdullah's manifesto and pledged to defend Syrian autonomy.¹⁸ The United States Secretary of State directed the legation in Arabia to inform Saudi officials that "competent observers" in the Near East postulated that the likelihood of a military action by Abdullah was remote. Moreover, the Syrian government expressed no alarm to the United States, indicating that the situation in the Middle East was apparently in place.¹⁹ On September 29,

¹⁷United States Charge in the United Kingdom, Waldemar J. Gallman to Secretary of State, London, 11 June 1947. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pg. 747.

¹⁸FRUS, 1947, vo. V, The Near East and Africa, pg. 756. See footnote.

¹⁹Secretary of State to Legation in Saudi Arabia, Washington, September 18, 1947. FRUS, pg. 758.

Charge Dorsz reported from Baghdad that the Iraqi Regent, Abd al-Ilah, declared Iraq's neutrality on the Syria scheme. This episode was of particular historic importance because it was the first time the Iraqi Regent had the audacity to publicly counter his uncle, Abdullah of Trans-jordan. The Syrians were satisfied with what they believed to be the work of Prime Minister Saleh Jabur, of Iraq. On the same day, the Consulate General in Jerusalem reported that the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Trans-jordan asserted that Abdullah promised not to take any further action.²⁰

It is to be borne in mind that Jordan's treaty of "friendship and alliance" with Britain had been signed in 1946 committing the two kingdoms to prior "consultations" and "collective defence" in compliance with article four and five, and in accordance with article 12 to settle disputes in the International Court if and when disagreements between the two countries arose. The treaty also ended the Mandate system in Transjordan, and Emir Abdullah was proclaimed as its King.²¹ This treaty had

²⁰FRUS, 1947, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pgs. 758-759. See Editorial Note.

²¹Al-Mu'ahadat wal-ittifaqiat al-Urdunnieh, "Jordan's International Agreements and Treaties" 1923-1973, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Education and Communication, 1975), pgs. 96,99. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nasher, Jordan Press Foundation,

been revised in 1948 affirming the principle of "complete equality in rights and obligations" between the two countries and reaffirming the principle of "collective" defence between the two states.²² Thus, Baxter's allegation that the Anglo-Jordanian alliance did not constitute a military treaty was a misleading tactical move to subdue Saudi rulers. Meanwhile, American diplomacy in narrowing some of the differences between Britain and Saudi Arabia was gaining momentum.

Indeed, the United States of America had already been collaborating with Saudi Arabia. The broad policy objective of the United States was to encourage more American companies to participate in the development and the production of oil resources in the Arabian Peninsula. The Department of State had pursued an Open Door policy to ensure that American investors would obtain oil concessions in the Middle East, as was revealed in the Department's "intervention" in the Iraqi Oil company after World War One. In the second half of the 1940's, the United States obtained significant oil concessions in

1993), pg. 32.

²²Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh Al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993, pg. 34.

the Near East.²³ Moreover, the Department of State was "considering acquiring a concession" in Transjordan.²⁴ But United States security interests in Saudi Arabia were far greater and more vital to its needs as a major industrial and military power than those of Jordan. When the two Hashimite Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq pressed King Abd al-Aziz Saud to "cancel" the oil concessions in his country, American diplomats and the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded immediately. Having come to the realization that the American navy was dependent on foreign supplies for forty percent of its oil needs and was expected to fuel the Marshall Plan, United States military planners sought to rehabilitate Arabia's Dhahran Airbase as a strategic facility to protect the oil reserves in the Peninsula.²⁵ It served American purposes well during the latest military engagement between the United States and Iraq.

²³Memorandum by the Assistant Chief in the Petroleum Division (Edwin G. Moline, Attache of the Embassy in the U.K.), Washington, August 6, 1949. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part I, The Near East, South Asia and Africa (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), pg. 29.

²⁴FRUS, pg. 29.

²⁵A note from the Chief of the Division of the Near Eastern of the Near Eastern Affairs (Merrian) to Edward Ramsey of the Bureau of Budget, Washington, 25 February 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part I, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington D.C.: United States Government Pringting Office, 1976), pg. 225.

It was these economic and security considerations which caused the Truman Administration to calm the misgivings of Abd al-Aziz Saud. One American official attributed the monarch's "perpetual apprehensions" to what he termed the Saudi misgivings about the alleged "Hashimite designs against his kingdom."²⁶ The Office of Near Eastern Affairs reported the rising tide of anti-British sentiment in the Middle East, and Britain's endeavors to revise its treaties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq were "bogged down" despite its successful efforts in the Jordanian Kingdom.²⁷ Consequently, American diplomats worked relentlessly to bring Britain and Saudi Arabia into a state of accomodation.²⁸ Abd al-Aziz Saud was hoping to achieve a collective security pact with Britain similar to the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of alliance.²⁹ On November 8, Secretary of Defence James Forrestal agreed to the rehabilitation of the Dhahran base in Eastern Saudi Arabia. He called for immediate

²⁶FRUS, pg. 225.

²⁷Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of the Near Eastern Affairs (Merrian) to the Director of the Office of the Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), Washington, 13 April 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part I, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pg. 229.

²⁸FRUS, pg. 232.

²⁹A note from the American Minister (Childs) to Saudi Arabia to Secretary of State, Jidda, 17 April 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part I, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pgs. 232-233.

diplomatic negotiations to facilitate the establishment of an American military facility in Arabia.³⁰ Minister Childs in Jidda notified the Department of State that the Saudis needed defence assurances like Transjordan in the event of outside pressure from the Soviet Union and elsewhere.³¹ Saudi apprehensions of King Abdullah's schemes and their lack of confidence in Britain forced Saudi Arabia to turn to the United States, which was rapidly assuming a greater role in Near Eastern Affairs. The grounds for an American-Saudi friendship were well constructed. Only after the murder of King Abdullah would Jordan and Saudi Arabia reconcile their differences under the direction of the United States.

President Truman was not only eager to resolve the disputes between England and Saudi Arabia, but also determined to settle the differences between the Hashimite Dynasty and the Jewish state. In 1948, the struggle for Palestine occupied an unprecedented role in American domestic politics. Truman was selective in calling for the enforcement of the Balfour Declaration,

³⁰From the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, to the Secretary of State, Washington, 8 November 1948. FRUS, 1948, vo. V, Part I, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pg. 252.

³¹American Minister in Saudi Arabia to Secretary of State, Jidda, 10 November 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part I, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pg. 253.

which promised a home land for the Jews in Palestine, but never defending the civil and political rights of the Palestinian people. He believed that "The Balfour Declaration, promising the Jews the opportunity to re-establish a homeland in Palestine, had always seemed to [him] to go hand in hand with the noble policies of Woodrow Wilson, especially the principle of self-determination."³² However, United States Chiefs of Staffs had reservations about Truman's policy, fearing Arab "hostility" and consequent danger to the security of the oil fields in the Arabian Gulf. Truman's own advisers at the Department of State with "no exception" were "unfriendly" to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. Department of State officials forcefully argued that any approach to the Palestine question which contradicted Arab hopes would be an invitation to the Soviet Union to ease their entry into the Middle East. However, President Truman, unyielding in his sympathy for the Jews, was skeptical and "unconvinced" by diplomats³³ to espouse a policy which would violate the hopes of his political supporters at home. Secretary Acheson challenged British

³²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope vol. II (New York: DoubleDay and Company, Inc., 1956), pg. 133.

³³Truman, pg. 162. Also see Urabi S. Mustafa, The United States and Jordan with Special Reference to the Palestine Question, the American University, Ph.D. 1964, Political Science, International Law and Relation, pgs. 30,55.

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's assertions about Truman's opportunism on the question of Palestine. The contention that Truman's Zionism stemmed from a "deep conviction"³⁴ is not entirely persuasive. Despite Acheson's pleasure in taking the liberty to defend "President Truman's State Department" the obdurate president rarely showed any consideration for the noteworthy men who toiled tirelessly during what his former Secretary called the crucial and precarious years of the Truman presidency.

American interest in the Palestine question was also based on geopolitical considerations. The security of Palestine was linked to that of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, an essential trading route for obtaining oil supplies from the Middle East. It provided a vital link between the Nile Valley, North Africa and the Asian portion of the Middle East land mass. Ideological factors were also taken into account, particularly the fear of Soviet "infiltration" into Palestine.³⁵ The British

³⁴Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), pgs. 737.

³⁵Report by the Policy Planning Staff on the position of the United States with respect to Palestine, Washington, 19 January 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part II, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), pgs. 546-547. Also see Security and the Middle East, the Problem and its Solution, proposals, submitted to the

Embassy in Washington reported that Arab response to American policy position on Palestine was severe, accusing the United States of planning a "conspiracy" to keep the Arab nations dismembered. The British Embassy in Washington informed the Department of State that the general reaction of the Arab states to the recommendations of the United Nations was "worse" than Britain had anticipated. The Foreign Office warned the President about Soviet "exploitation" of the American and British position in the Middle East.³⁶ Arab "bitterness" against England rose from her "neutral position" at United Nations meeting in New York in 1947, and their animosity toward the United States sprang from its "support" of the partition Plan.³⁷ State Department policy planners cautioned the president against any action which might "strain" Anglo-American relations. American officials concluded that the protection of England's interests in the Middle East was advantageous to the United States. They affirmed that the underlying objective of American diplomatic and military efforts

President of the United States, April, 1954, pg. 148.

³⁶A Memorandum from the British Embassy in the U.S. to the Department of State, Washington, January 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pg. 533.

³⁷FRUS, pg. 534.

must be to curtail Soviet adventures in the Near East.³⁸

However, British defences in the region of the Middle East were too fragile to be sustained. England santonionously claimed to be protecting Arab interests by stifling Arab striving for national unification. The yoke of British colonialism was too vivid in the minds of Arab youth to be quenched. Arab loss of confidence in Britain forced London to rely on the King who had been almost abandoned by Her Majesty's Government. Although King Abdullah was a man of resilient temperament and sanguine hopes, his close association with the West undermined his standing in the Arab East. On May 8, 1948, the Secretary of the United States informed Britain's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, of the rumor that John Glubb, head of the Arab Legion, allegedly had plotted against the fate of the Palestinians by making a secret deal with the Jews prior to the war of 1948.³⁹ Moreover, Abdullah's conciliatory attitude towards the Zionists was

³⁸Report of the Policy Planning Staff "Review of Current Trends" Washington, February 24, 1948. FURS, 1948, Vo. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, Pg. 657.

³⁹The Secretary of State to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Bevin), Washington, 8 May, 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pg. 940. Mustafa, Urabi S. The United States and Jordan with Special reference to the Palestine Question, the American University, Ph.D. 1964, pg. 70.

"damaging" to his reputation among his fellow Arabs.⁴⁰

A careful analysis of King Abdullah's policy reveals a clearer portrait of this man. Abdullah was an enigmatic man; King Hussein depicted his grandfather as a "soldier" "experienced diplomat" "poet" and a tribal chief of an admirable attributes. He was also "sharp in nature and autocratic most of the time."⁴¹ To fully grasp the reasons and the motives behind Abdullah's policy in Palestine, one has to avoid the common error of historical reductionism, taking into account all the actors involved, including the circumstances under which they were operating. Since 1916, the Hashimite experience had created uncertainties in the King's mind: the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence promising an Arab "kingdom" in Syria, Trans-jordan, and Palestine dissipated quickly with England's Balfour Declaration, and reinforced his belief that the tides of history were moving in the opposite direction. The Balfour Declaration stipulated that a homeland for the Jews should be established in Palestine, but the rights of the

⁴⁰Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pg. 19.

⁴¹King Hussein Ibn Talal Mihnati ka-Malik, translated from French by Ghalib A. Douqan (Amman: National Printing Press, 1986), pg. 25.

Palestinian people were never respected. The Sykes-Picot⁴², and the San-Remo agreements⁴³, dividing the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence, confirmed his belief that the Hashimite domain in Palestine and Syria was in serious jeopardy. King Faisal I was forced to leave his kingdom in Damascus. What was even more alarming to Abdullah was the enforcement of the Mandate system in the Middle East, leaving the Hashimites with a feeling of uncertainty and bewilderment, a small share in Iraq, and another on the Eastern Bank of the River Jordan. On March 20, 1921, Churchill, Minister of Colonies, and Abdullah held a meeting which resulted in the placement of East of Jordan under the British Mandate. Emir Abdullah in the years to come would grow impatient with what he called the "verbal blustering of Arab policy" in the face of Jewish solidarity and

⁴²King Abdullah was "grieved" after the partition of Syria. He struggled to restore Syria's integrity. King Abdullah of Jordan, Harold W. Glidden, translator, foreword by King Hussein My memoirs Completed "Al Takmilah" (Amman: Published by an anonymous publication committee, 1951), pg. vii.

⁴³Under the San-Remo agreement, Palestine and Eastern Jordan were placed under Britain's Mandate, Syria (and Lebanon) were incorporated into the French domain. King Faisal I was ousted from Damascus in July, 1920 after a military engagement with the French forces. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pgs. 6-7.

cooperation.⁴⁴ It was these conditions, including his policy of "realism" which drove him to collaborate with the great powers, and to engage in political and military alliances which were disagreeable to the Arab League. Thus, the Hashimite mission as formulated by Abdullah was to hold onto the last remnants of an imaginary and vanished kingdom his father was hoping to create. It is in this context that Abdullah's actions must be understood.

Abdullah also developed a clear notion of the principle of the balance of power; his experience with the tribes in Arabia and those of the East bank of the Jordan River prepared him to rule his domain effectively. Ruling a country of variegated tribal and kinship loyalties demanded exceptional political wisdom and compromise. Indeed, he realized that his kingdom would be endangered unless he cooperated with countries which stood against Arab interests. His alleged conciliatory remarks on the United Nations partition resolution, his secret negotiations with the Jewish Agency, combined with his emphasis on the importance of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948, and his friendly attitude toward the

⁴⁴King Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein, My Memoirs Completed "Al Takmilah" translated from Arabic by Harold W. Glidden (Amman: published by an anonymous publication committee in Amman, 1951), pg. 9.

United States,⁴⁵ stood in conflict with Arab feelings toward Britain and the Jews. But in practical terms, his strategy proved to be effective; his kingdom continued to exist as an autonomous entity after the departure of British troops from Palestine. In analyzing the Palestine issue, two points must be understood: Churchill and Truman were determined to establish a homeland for the Jews in Palestine regardless what Abdullah did or believed; and nothing would have thwarted Jewish settlers from seizing the land to the east of the Jordan River if Abdullah failed to comply with British directives or chose to challenge the United States. The events following the formation of the state of Israel confirm this conclusion. Abdullah could have done better, but he could also have done worse. History may never be altered, but its shapers have the potential to influence its course. Has not the Hashimite Revolution been steadfast in its mission to meet the expectations of its worthy citizens? Has not the Jordanian Kingdom served as a safe-haven for destitute refugees who yearned for a dwelling

⁴⁵Khalef H. M. Khreisheh, Al-Malik Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein wal-Ghadieh al-Filistinieh: Watha'iq "King Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein and the Palestinian Issue: A Documentary Record" (Amman: Qudsieh Lil-Nashr Wa-Towzieh, 1991), pg. 49. Although King Abdullah had some reservations about American "hostility" for helping the aims of zionism to the detriment of the Arabs, he nevertheless did not view the U.S. as his rival. Soon after, Abdullah addressed the American people in an open letter charging the United States with hypocrisy in so far as the Palestine issue was concerned. pg. 51.

place?

The life and times of Abdullah remain to be investigated. What is clear, however is that the Anglo-American commitment to the first principle of the Balfour Declaration, and their methodical policy of permitting an incessant Jewish exodus to Palestine, combined with Truman's competition with the Soviet Union, and their vehement disregard for Arab nationalists, paved the way for the establishment of a homeland for European Jews without giving any thought to justice in so far as the Palestinians were concerned. Right or wrong, British and American policy pursued the doctrine of classical European politics, upholding the balance of power by any means and at any cost. The Arabs were no less responsible for the Palestine fiasco than the British and Americans or the French. Abdullah partly failed to understand the fears and concerns of his fellow Arabs. And the Arab League failed to comprehend Abdullah's restless mind in his search for a secured kingdom. Abdullah was not without mistakes, but he was chosen as an easy target for the amateurs of diplomacy and politics. While the distance between the Arab states and the European powers was widening increasingly, the monarch of the Jordanian Kingdom kept his eyes fixed on the West and the United

States of America.⁴⁶

Whereas Abdullah's standing in the Arab East was discredited, his reputation in the United States of America was soaring. However, the injuries of Palestine were too deep to be suppressed or concealed. Excruciating as the defeat of 1948 was for agonized Palestinians, President Truman moved quickly to grant Transjordan a de facto recognition. On September 19, Ambassador Lewis W. Douglass in London reported that Britain was fearful that an American recognition of Transjordan before Arab "acquiescence" to a United Nations' intermediary role would dramatically undermine the security of the new Kingdom. He informed the administration that the British were hoping to avoid any apprehensions in view of the widespread rumor that Abdullah had made a secret deal with the United States.⁴⁷ The intemperate actions of the President were followed by an American de facto recognition to the Jewish state which three days later was succeeded by a Soviet de jure recognition of what would become an independent State of Israel. The Kremlin

⁴⁶George Palmer, The Arab Attitude Toward the Palestine Issue, 1945-1950 , MA Dissertation, Political Science, Columbia University, 1952, Pg. 50.

⁴⁷American Ambassador (Douglass) in the UK to the Secretary of State, London, 19 September 1948. FRUS, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pg. 1383.

would soon commit itself to the eradication of British presence and the curtailment of a potential American influence in Palestine.⁴⁸

On January 3, 1949, Acting Secretary of State Wells Sabler expressed his desire to help establish an armistice agreement between the Jordanian Kingdom and Israel. Sabler was hopeful he would see a final political settlement between the contesting states in the Middle East. He regarded the incorporation of Arab Palestine into the Hashimite domain as desirable.⁴⁹ To the pleasure of American officials, Israel and Jordan in 1949 negotiated a new settlement at the Greek Island of the Rhodes.⁵⁰ On April 3, 1949 the two sovereign states of Jordan and Israel signed an armistice agreement under which the two countries obligated themselves to help "restore permanent peace in Palestine" and refrain from any military action in accordance with a United Nation resolution of 16 November 1948. Article 4 also stipulated that civilians on both sides were "prohibited" from

⁴⁸J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), pgs. 323-324.

⁴⁹The Acting Secretary of State Wells Sabler in Amman, Washington, January 3, 1949. FRUS, 1949, vol. V, Part II, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1978).

⁵⁰John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), Pg. 227.

crossing the borders of either country. It was further agreed under article 6 that the Arab legion would supplant Iraqi forces stationed in Palestine.⁵¹ Iraqi forces withdrew from central Palestine, and King Abdullah established a "military administration" over the evacuated area. At the same time, the Western powers (Britain, France, and the United States) called for the preservation of the existing boundaries and warned that the West would "not tolerate any renewal of the Arab-Israel war or any punitive action against Jordan."⁵² The signing of the truce between the Hashimites and Israelis represented a tacit recognition of each other's sovereign rights to exist as independent states.⁵³ Furthermore, the truce signified a preliminary measure in facilitating a final settlement between two neighbours who eyed each other with hope and suspicion. Nevertheless, relations between the two countries remained "uneasy;" the recent hostilities over Palestine continued to agitate the peoples on both sides. Around the same time, the

⁵¹Al-Mu'ahadat wal-Ittifaqiat al-Urdunniyah "Jordan's International Agreements and Treaties" 1923-1973, vol. 1 (Amman: published by the Ministry of Education and Communication, 1975), pgs. 347-349.

⁵²J.C. Hurewitz, editor, Documents on Near East Diplomatic History, Near and Middle East Studies, School of International Affairs (New York: Columbia University, 1951).

⁵³Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pgs. 430-431.

Jordanian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i, concluded an agreement with the United Nations to settle displaced Palestinians in Jordan. The money which was contributed by the member states of the United Nations was to be utilized for the maximum benefit of the Palestinian refugees.⁵⁴

The displacement of the Palestinians continued to undermine the security and integrity of Jordan. Many Palestinians in the West Bank were quick to display their displeasure with Truman's policy. They held the United States responsible for the failure of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine. The Palestinians believed that America's unwavering support for the new Jewish entity in the Middle East acted as a hindrance to international security.⁵⁵ Their sharp reaction to the unfolding events was understandable, a feeling which was augmented by the rumor that the Jordanian Kingdom was embarking on a separate peace with the Jewish state. Consequently, Jordan's prime Minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda denied any allegations about the making of a Jordanian-Israeli settlement. However, the refugees feared abandonment as

⁵⁴Al-Mu'ahadat wal-Ittifaqiat al-Urdunnieh "Jordan's International Treaties and Agreements, 1923-1973" (Amman: Ministry of Education and Communication, 1975), pgs. 366-367.

⁵⁵Al-Difa', Daily News Paper, Jerusalem, Palestine, January 9, 1950. No. 4205, vol. XVI, pg. 1.

they began to participate in Jordan's parliamentary elections in April 1950, despite the government's assurances that it was dedicated to return them to their homeland.⁵⁶ At the same time, King Abdullah moved quickly to consolidate his rule over his Kingdom. Acting with the tacit consent of the United States, Abdullah would soon issue the historic decree calling for the unification of the Eastern bank with the Western bank, merging the two into one state, providing equal rights for all the citizens of his kingdom.⁵⁷ The West Bank would remain under Jordanian jurisdiction for twenty-seven years until its occupation by the Israeli forces in 1967.

Having secured well-defended boundaries and gained international recognition as a sovereign state, the Israeli government, confident of its army, refused to negotiate along the lines of the 1947 United Nations partition resolution. Nonetheless, one of the primordial aims of Israel's foreign policy was to foster cordial ties with neighbouring Arab states on Israeli terms.

⁵⁶Al-Difa', January 11, 1950. No. 4207 vol. XVI, pg.1.; Al Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1193 (Amman: Da'irat Al-Matbu'at wal-Nasher, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993).

⁵⁷King Abdullah of Jordan, My Memoirs Completed "Al Takmilah" translated from Arabic by Harold Glidden (Amman: published by an anonymous publication committee in Amman, 1951), pg. 16.

David Ben Gurion, one of the founders of the Jewish state and an architect of Israel's Defence Forces, appealed for "friendship" with the Arab states. He promised them "independence" and economic "self-sufficiency."⁵⁸ Ben Gurion believed that the cessation of the state of belligerency between Tel Aviv and its immediate neighbors was vital to Israel's survival. This was central to David Ben Gurion's thinking. Ben Gurion was born on October 16, 1886, in Plonsk, a market town in Poland's northern frontier which was still under the rule of tsarist Russia. As a "child of the Polish ghetto" in Eastern Europe, he became primarily a reader of Jewish and Russian history and a strong supporter of Theodore Herzl's brand of political Zionism. His father was a lawyer and an acclaimed member of the Jewish community. Ben Gurion emigrated to Palestine in 1906, to become a laborer in central Palestine's Jewish settlements. In 1910, he became a member of the Workers of Zion Party. Between 1927 and 1930, he helped establish the MAPAI (Workers' United Party). In the 1940's, he called for challenging England's immigration embargo, and he actively fought against Britain and the Arabs as an Irgun member. His role in forging Israel Defence Forces was monumental. He rose to become one of Israel's most

⁵⁸David Ben-Gurion, compiled by Thomas R. Branstein, Memoirs (New York and Cleveland: the World Publishing Company, 1970), pgs. 66-69.

influential statesmen, instrumental in founding the Jewish state in 1948. He would become the first Prime Minister, and Chaim Weizman Israel's first President.⁵⁹ Ben Gurion's appeals for diplomatic settlement with the Arab countries were senseless given his unwavering commitment to Zionism. His failure to extricate himself from the mantle of Zion further convinced the Arab states not to consider any movement for reconciliation. For the vast majority of Arab youth, Zionism and imperialism were inseparable. Conversely, the Israelis were too intransigent to give any concessions to the Arab countries.⁶⁰

Israel's military triumph on the battlefield gave her an illusion of security which often collided with her fear of annihilation based on the Jews' experiences in Europe. Thus, Israeli foreign policy fluctuated between its determination to secure an occupied frontier and the hope for a lasting agreement. What was even more significant was the inherent conflict between Jewish Zionism and Arab nationalism, diminishing any chances for

⁵⁹David Ben-Gurion, compiled by Thomas R. Branstein, Memoirs David Ben Gurion (New York, Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1970), pgs. 9, 34, 45, 183-202.

⁶⁰Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pg. 621.

reconciliation between the disputing states.⁶¹ From January to April of 1949, the United Nations Conciliation Commission would seek to bring about a compromise between Israel and the Arab states. Israel (represented by Walter Eytan), Jordan (headed by Defence Minister, Fawzi al-mulqi), Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria were invited to an international conference at Lausanne.⁶² The hopes of the United Nations were crushed by the excutioners of peace, and the armistice between Israel and the Arab states was shortlived. In January, 1950, as the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel was coming to an end, American embassy officials in Cairo were hoping to reach a permanent settlement between the two assailants. Egypt's Foreign Ministry dispatched an alarming note informing the American Embassy that the Israelis refused to extend the duration of the armistice agreement. Israel threatened to attack Egyptian forces stationed in the Gaza Strip in the event of Cairo's unwillingness to consent to a permanent settlement with Tel Aviv.⁶³

⁶¹Bernard Reich, Israel's Foreign policy: A Case Study of Small State Diplomacy, University of Virginia, Ph.D., political science, International law and relations, 1964, pgs. 29-32.

⁶²H. C. Hurewitz, The struggle for Palestine (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), pgs. 324-325.

⁶³Al-Difa', January 11, 1950. No. 4207. vol. XVI, pg.1.

America's efforts to narrow the disparities between the two countries came to nothing. Its reputation in the Arab world was deteriorating, and its standing as an impartial actor in Near Eastern affairs was receding significantly. Arab memories of American-Jewish collaboration at the expense of the Palestinians were still vivid in the minds of many people. Moreover, the Arab states favored an extension to the armistice agreement between the Arabs and the Jews. Similarly, Britain was encountering vast obstacles and anxiously seeking to revise the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. Al-Difa' a Jerusalem newspaper, described Britain's nightmare as follows: "if England were to lose its colonial heritage and possessions in times of peace, it could lose its position in the region forever."⁶⁴ This prophecy was self-fulfilling with one exception; England lost Egypt in times of war during the Suez fiasco in 1956. The failure of Britain and the Truman administration to forge an agreement between the contesting states in the Middle East limited Anglo-American alternatives. Nonetheless, neither King Abdullah nor President Truman would surrender hopes of achieving a bilateral agreement between Jordan and Israel. Thus, American technical assistance to Jordan was employed as

⁶⁴al-Difa', no. 4210, vol. XVI, January 15, 1950, pg.1.

a diplomatic method to encourage Jordan's participation in any future settlement with Israel.

Point IV Program

United States technical cooperation with friendly countries served to strengthen American security interests around the world. In many cases, the adoption of an anti-communist attitude was sufficient reason to receive American attention. But King Abdullah was more than a resourceful politician. He shared Truman's ideological anti-communist orientation and responded well to American and British overtures. Abdullah firmly believed that "Communism is a transient creed, a blinding flash which dazzles men's eyes until it's true nature and the evil and immorality that lie behind it become known and are rejected."⁶⁵

In his inaugural address, President Truman noted that the United States of America had "imponderable" resources in technical expertise. His administration advocated economic aid to impoverished countries

⁶⁵King Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein, My Memoirs Completed, translated by Harold W. Glidden, "Al Takmillah" (Amman: published by anonymous committee, 1951), pg. 62.

everywhere.⁶⁶ Of particular significance was the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, known as the Point IV Program, which was aimed at furnishing underdeveloped countries with technical assistance to improve their economic conditions. Hence, the diplomacy of American economic aid called for the promotion of the flow of capital investment and "sharing" of technical knowledge and skills with nations which have common interests with the United States.⁶⁷ This program also emphasized the importance of employing private organizations (profit or non-profit) to accomplish United States goals overseas. The Point IV programme was a vital component of American economic foreign policy, an instrument of diplomacy to safeguard United States interests beyond the American Hemisphere. American policy was driven by economic purposes, the search for new markets, raw materials, the promotion of capital investment.⁶⁸ However, expansionism

⁶⁶Inaugural address of President Truman, January 20, 1949. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. XI, edited by Raymond Bennett and Robert K. Turner (Princeton: Published for World Peace Foundation, Princeton University Press, 1950), pg. 10.

⁶⁷Point Four (IV) Program, memorandum, prepared in the Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1950. FRUS, vol. I, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, pg. 846.

⁶⁸Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, London : Modern Reader Paper Books, 1969), pg. 155. Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pgs. 73-78.

is not particular to capitalism as many scholars have suggested. It is "always inequality of power that is the primary condition and ultimate source of imperialism." The existence of what one historian called a "soft frontier in a vacuum of power" drives one great power to dominate a country of a lesser strength.⁶⁹ The Soviet Union and the United States were equally expansionists in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Truman's policy toward Jordan was induced by ideological and political factors, at least before the assassination of King Abdullah.

In recognition of Jordan's "great" significance to the security interests of the United States in the Near East, the Department of State in 1950 stressed the necessity of preserving the Hashimite Kingdom's Western orientation. American policy also called for minimizing the differences between Amman and Tel Aviv, providing maximum guidance to Jordan⁷⁰, while seeking to maintain the long-standing Anglo-American rapprochement which had existed since the second half of the nineteenth century. Department of State officials stressed that Jordan's pragmatic and "favorable" approach to the Arab-Israeli

⁶⁹Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pgs. 155.

⁷⁰Policy Statement in the Department of State, Washington, April 17, 1950. FRUS, 1950, vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pg. 1094.

tension and Palestinian refugees, pleased American leaders.⁷¹ However, Jordan lacked the economic resources to cope with the plight of the Palestinians. Thus, the resettlement of the refugees and the improvement of trade between Jordan and its neighbouring states was regarded by American officials as a critical step in the improvement of that country's political stability.⁷² On April 17, the Department of State noted the problems of homelessness and unemployment representing an unstable factor in the kingdom and serving as a "fertile" ground for communism. The task of surmounting this obstacle, including the historical antagonism between the Saudis and the Hashimites, the Iraqi-Jordanian differences over the question of Jordanian-Syrian unity, and the alleged fear Lebanese christians had of King Abdullah's White Paper for Greater Syria, created serious concerns for the United States. What was even more disturbing to the United States was Egypt's designs on Jordan's sovereignty. Despite the strong opposition of many Palestinians in the Jordanian legislature to any political settlement, American officials were willing to take a "risk" to reach a compromise between Jordan and

⁷¹FRUS, 1950, vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, April 17, 1950. pg. 1095.

⁷²FRUS, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pg. 1097.

Israel.⁷³

American policy toward Jordan was also partially dictated by the international conditions in 1950, particularly the Sino-Soviet involvement in Korea. The new administration sought to implement Point Four (IV) of American economic assistance to Yugoslavia, the Middle East and South-East Asia to contain international communism.⁷⁴ The most significant document underlying American geostrategic thinking during this period was National Security Council meeting Sixty Eight. It called for the dramatic buildup of American armed forces, substantial increase in economic assistance to American allies, and the enhancement and "intensification" of intelligence activities overseas.⁷⁵ The Truman cabinet acted in concert with the traditional European powers which had ruled the Near East for many decades. On 25 May 1950, The United Kingdom, France and the United States made a joint declaration in an attempt to stabilize the situation in the Middle East. The Tripartite Declaration

⁷³FRUS, vo. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, April 17, 1950, pg. 1099.

⁷⁴Memorandum of conversation, by the executive secretary of the of the National Security Council (James S. Lay, Jr.), Washington, May 2, 1950. FRUS, 1950, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, pg. 295.

⁷⁵FRUS, vol. 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, pg. 298.

sought to advance the political stability of the region by reducing the arms race in that area. The three governments, while recognizing the legitimate right of all countries to self-defence, declared their "unalterable opposition to the use of force between any of the states in that area."⁷⁶

At the same time, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution in 1950 calling for the creation of a Mixed Armistice Commission to resolve further acts of "hostilities" between Israel and its Arab neighbors.⁷⁷ Britain and the United States strove desperately to enforce armistice agreement between Jordan and Israel. However, the situation worsened rapidly as border violations and incidents occurred with an alarming frequency. Tel Aviv reacted by expelling thousands of refugees despite Israeli frequent incursions into

⁷⁶Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. XII, January 1-December 31, 1950 (Princeton: Published for World Peace Foundation, Princeton University Press, 1951) pg. 659. Also see U.K. Foreign Office. "Middle East: Tripartite Declaration by Britain, France, and the United States, 25th May, 1950," British and Foreign State papers 1952, vol. 159, pgs. 204-295.

⁷⁷Resolution on the Palestine Question, Adopted by the Security Council on November 17, 1950. Documents on American foreign Relations, Vo. XII (Princeton: published for World Peace Foundation, Princeton University Press, 1950), pg. 662.

Jordanian territory.⁷⁸

The inability of the United Nations to safeguard the security of a long frontier on the Jordanian-Israeli borders was accompanied by a campaign of military retribution against Jordanian villages, leading sometimes to international incidents. John Nixon, a British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent was killed by an Israeli soldier while flying as a passenger in a Jordanian civil aircraft. The United Nations held Israel responsible and the British government sought compensation for the death of one of its subjects.⁷⁹ Some members of Britain's House of Commons became increasingly disenchanted with England's diplomacy in the Middle East. On November 30, 1950, a British parliamentarian proposed to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Davies, a tripartite scheme under which England, Israel and Jordan would forge a three-way treaty. This proposal called for the formation of an Anglo-Jordanian treaty, Jordanian-Israeli agreement, and an Anglo-Israeli rapprochement.

⁷⁸U.K. Discussion in the House of Commons on the problem of infiltration on the Jordanian-Israeli borders, December 1950. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 2nd session, vol. 481 (1950), Parl. 39, pg. 790.

⁷⁹U.K. Questions on Jordanian-Israeli relations, 11 December 1950. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 2nd session, Parl. 39, vol. 481 (1950), pg. 1137.

Accordingly, England would coercively force the Jordanian Kingdom to accept this arrangement by cutting economic aid to Jordan. This approach might have acted as an effective instrument of pressure since "the kingdom of Jordan is entirely dependent for its existence upon the subvention it gets from the British treasury."⁸⁰ The opponents of this proposition, however, stressed that the United Kingdom should help to convince Israel to control its troops on its frontier with Jordan to stop what one called the wanton "atrocities" initiated by Israel against Jordanians since the signing of the truce at Rhodes. Some parliamentarian neutralists protested either method by noting that questions of violations lay within the jurisdiction of the United Nations.⁸¹ Ernest Davies' response to the tripartite plan was unequivocal; he forcefully argued that Britain was not in a position to impose a settlement on the Israelis and Jordanians. Jordan was a sovereign state, ruled by a constitutional monarch who was dependent on a council of ministers. Davies believed that despite Abdullah's "unwavering" loyalty to England, the Hashimite monarch could not act

⁸⁰U.K. Questions to Ernest Davies on Jordanian-Israeli border disputes, 30 November 1950. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., 2nd session, Parl. 39, vol. 481 (1959), pg. 1255.

⁸¹U.K. Jordanian-Israeli border relations, 30 November 1950. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 481 (1950), pgs. 1255-1256.

freely without previous consultations with his cabinet members who were not always in agreement with him. Britain's Foreign Secretary dismissed the proposal which entailed the use of aid as a tool to force Jordan to come to accomodation with Israel as being counter productive.⁸²

The Foreign Office in England under the statesmanship of Ernest Davies pursued a policy of active neutrality advising both sides when necessary to act with restraint. England's capacity as broker in Near Eastern regional politics diminished significantly. One explanation is that England was aging rapidly, leading to the loss of her mastery of diplomatic elasticity. The stentorian voice of Great Britain had been strained by restless decades of imperial ambition and expansion. And the armistice agreement between Jordan and Israel was no longer Britain's primary responsibility. It stands to reason that in the absence of an effectual negotiator to act as an intermediary or the means to establish military equality between Jordan and Israel, border infiltrations on the frontiers of the two states would be a constant menace to regional security. Israeli border raids on

⁸²U.K. Ernest Davies comments on a "tripartite proposal" to settle Jordanian-Israeli border disputes, 14 December 1950. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 481 (1950), pg. 1356.

adjoining Jordanian towns and villages continued to rankle many members of the British House of Commons. The United Kingdom and the Hashimite state had a treaty of collective defence. Nevertheless, Davies was careful not to get his country involved in a dispute which the United Nations Armistice Commission was nominally assigned to monitor. He argued that the Anglo-Jordanian treaty did not obligate Britain to act whenever there was an incident involving Jordan with her neighboring countries. He advised the governments of Jordan and Israel to encourage the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of their respective countries to discuss ways to prevent further violations. However, some critics remained anxious of the lurking impressions of Britain's weakening in its adherence to the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. Britain's dilemma was further aggravated by the prevailing belief that the Mixed Armistice Commission was powerless.⁸³ Davies' insistence on keeping his country neutral and his broad interpretation of Anglo-Jordanian agreement show how England was gradually abandoning its treaty obligations toward Jordan and relinquishing its role as a mediator between the major contestants in the Near East.

The Jordanian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission was

⁸³U.K. Ernest Davies on border disputes, 26 February 1951. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., 2nd session, Parl. 39, vol. 484 (1951), pgs. 1746-1747.

rendered useless as the friction between the two countries increased in frequency and magnitude. To be sure, England remained the principal supplier of arms to Jordan's Arab Legion. However, Glubb's Legionnaires were presumably active in safeguarding the Kingdom, but rarely mobilized their forces for the defence of the frontier. Moreover, the United States was to assume a greater role in reducing border tensions between the two countries. At times England appeared to be a paralyzed spectator in Arab-Israeli politics. This assertion refutes the contention that the United States of America played a "secondary" role in deciding the fate of Jordan between 1950 and 1957.⁸⁴ Truman's indispensable role in the formation of a Jewish state and his unconditional commitment to the defence of Israel negates this conclusion. Jordan's security was tied to the survival of the Jewish state. But Truman's lack of impartiality impeded American striving for a negotiated agreement between the Arabs and Israelis. George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, attributed the absence of a settlement among the conflicting countries in the Middle East to three obstacles: the economic embargo led by the Arab

⁸⁴Urabi S. Mustafa, "The United States and Jordan with Reference to the Palestine Question" American University, Ph.D. 1966, pg. 1.

states against Israel⁸⁵, the border disputes particularly on the Jordanian-Israeli frontier, and Arab fears that peace with Israel would have destabilizing effects on their countries.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, McGhee's hopes remained high.

Just as Jordan was concluding a treaty of "friendship" with general Franco of Spain⁸⁷ the United States was embarking on an economic program to lessen the tension between the warring countries and factions in the Middle East. The Truman administration regarded the Point IV program as an instrument to enhance Jordan's capacity to act independently. On February 20, 1951, the United States signed a general agreement for technical cooperation with Israel.⁸⁸ Shortly after, A. David

⁸⁵U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on Africa and the Near East, George G. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, testifies on the conditions in the Near East after his recent trip to that region, hearing supplement (82)HFO-4, vol. XVI, Washington, Tuesday, 10 April 1951, 33.

⁸⁶U.S. Congress, House, Henry A. Byroad's testimony before Committee on Foreign Relations, 1951, pg. 120.

⁸⁷Al-Mu'ahadat wal-Ittifaqiat al-Urdunnieh, 1923-1973, "Jordan's International Agreements and Treaties" 1923-1973, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Education and Communication, 1975), pg. 361.

⁸⁸Point Four General Agreement for Technical Cooperation Between the United States and Israel, Tel Aviv, February 20, 1951. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vo. 2, Part 1, 1951, Pg. 379.

Fritzlan, Charge d'Affaires and interim Charge of the United States in Amman, and Samir al-Rifa'i, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashimite Kingdom, signed a Treaty of Technical Cooperation between Jordan and the United States.⁸⁹ This treaty came about precisely at the time when England was settling its financial matters with the Kingdom of Jordan. Several bilateral agreements for Technical Co-operation under the Point IV program were concluded between the United States and Middle Eastern nations, including Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.⁹⁰ Although Britain was supportive of Truman's economic foreign policy in the Middle East, some members of the House of Commons suggested that it would have been wiser to adopt that the Point IV aid program through the United Nations, fearing the Soviet Union's exploitation of this issue.⁹¹

⁸⁹U.S. Department of State. 1951. "Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the United States and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan," 27 February 1951. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. II, part 1, 1951, pg. 812. Also see U.K. Foreign Office "Jordan," British and Foreign State papers 1951, vol. 158, pg. 623. Also see Al-Mu'ahadat wal-Ittifaqiat al-Urdunnieh 1923-1973, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Education and Communication, 1975), pg. 361.

⁹⁰U.K. Foreign Office. "Jordan: Point IV program, February 1951." British and Foreign State papers, 1951, vol. 158, pg. 623.

⁹¹U.K. Questions on the Point IV program to Jordan, 19 November 1951. Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 5th ser., vol. 494 (1951), 40 Parl. 1 Session. pg. 70.

But American economic foreign policy toward the Arab East (Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon) was motivated by ideological and geo-political considerations. The Truman administration believed that the "democratic way" not the "nursery of communism" was the only hope to realize the aspirations of the people in the Middle East.⁹² Truman's concerns echoed through the walls of Britain's House of Commons as early as 1951. Fearful of Soviet exploitation of the "slightest antagonism" between the United Kingdom and the United States, Anthony Barber accentuated, that the "unity of purpose" between the United Kingdom and the United States was fundamental to deflecting communist propaganda.⁹³ Indeed, the United States and Britain found King Abdullah to be a reliable partner.

The Hashimite ruler was ostentatious in supporting American policy in Korea. King Abdullah committed his country to repel what he called all "aggressors" in the Middle East, and expressed his regret over not sending Arab Legionnaires to East Asia. He ascribed the Arab

⁹²Guidelines for Point Four: Recommendations of the International Development Advisory Board, June 5, 1952. Documents on American Foreign Relations (New York: published for the Council on Foreign relations, Harper and Brothers, 1953), pg. 55.

⁹³U.K. Anthony Barber. Comments on the need to be united in the face of communism, 6 November 1951. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 493 (1951), 40 Parl. 1 session.

predicament to a lack of unity and cohesion hampering their capacity to resist foreign invasion. Impressed by the King's alacrity, Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee agreed with Abdullah's assertion that self-determination is a natural right applicable to all anguished sections of humanity. At the same time, McGhee cautioned the Jordanian monarchy against the use of force or the taking of a "unilateral action" by any country to disturb the status quo. He reasserted the "intention" of the Truman administration to enforce the principles of the Tripartite Declaration. But Jordan's Prime Minister, Samir al-Rifa'i, reaffirmed Abdullah's efforts toward the inevitable unification of the entire area of the Fertile Crescent. Rifa'i implored the government of the United States to continue its aid program to Jordan, and requested American assistance in influencing Tel Aviv to reconcile some of her territorial and boundary disputes with Jordan.⁹⁴

For the Hashimites, the month of January was a difficult one indeed. Jordan faced a serious economic crisis, the failure of the wheat crop in January of 1952 created severe hardships and wide shortages of food.

⁹⁴The Charge in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State, Adman, March 29, 1951. FRUS, 1951, vol. V, The Near East and Africa (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), pgs. 977-981.

Under the Point IV program, Jordan received economic aid from the United States immediately. The United States provided urgent relief, supplying 9,650 tons of wheat at a cost of \$1,400,000. American assistance to Jordan was financed under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and the General Agreement of Technical Cooperation between the two nations. The agreement stipulated that the wheat would be sold under the guidance of the Jordanian government through various commercial channels, and the money generated from the sale of wheat would be utilized to share the expenditures under the Point IV program. The Point IV project was concocted to aid countries such as Jordan in improving their agricultural, health and commercial sectors. This scheme also called for the development of small-scale industries and the water resources of the Jordanian Kingdom.⁹⁵ Although American support to Jordan helped to bring about an economic recovery, the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel continued to consume the energies of both nations.

Hence, the tumultuous month of January witnessed diligent diplomatic activities by the United States to alleviate the border frictions between Jordan and Israel. Dean G. Acheson, United States Secretary of State, was

⁹⁵Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXVI, January 7-17, 1952, pg. 48.

directly absorbed in harmonizing the differences between the two states. Dean was born on April 11, 1895, in Middletown, Connecticut. He assumed the office of the Secretary of State in 1949. During the Truman years, he was the "principle author and manager of American foreign policy." As an "ideal" statesman, he believed that career officers in the Foreign Service were an "extraordinarily competent group." He "listened to their advice and gave them responsibility." Moreover, he was a "persuasive" "efficient" "sensitive and patient negotiator." And "everything he did was done in order to increase power and prevent its loss."⁹⁶ This Secretary of State was far more neutral and crafty than President Truman in the conduct of foreign relations toward the Middle East. Acheson regarded Israel's military policy in coping with infiltrations into Israeli borders as "extremely grave violations" of the truce between the two states. He reproached the Israeli government for conduct that could never be justified under any conditions. The cultivated Secretary instructed the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to inform the Israeli government that the "brutal tactics" of shooting Jordanian villagers and destroying their property was detrimental to the stability of the region

⁹⁶Robert H. Ferrel, Samuel Flagg Bemis, editors, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, Dean Acheson by Gaddis Smith, vol. XVI (New York: Cooper Square, Publishers, Inc., 1972), pgs. xi, xiii, 355, 395, 399.

and the security interests of the United States. His sharp warning was based on his conviction that Tel Aviv's policy of "terror" could have easily affected Arab attitudes toward Jewish minorities in Arab countries and undermined the West's capacity to form good ties with the Arab East.⁹⁷

On January 19, Ambassador Monnett B. Davis in Tel Aviv reported that Israel's "deliberate" incursions into Jordanian territory and the Gaza Strip constituted a total negation of Abba Eban's declared ambition of seeking to establish cordial relations with the Arab States. Davis portrayed three groups competing for power in Israel: one expounded the idea that the possession of a sufficient military power was critical for the survival of Israel; the second, a "moderate" group willing to compromise with the Jordanians; and the third group, "extremists" promulgating a hard line policy against the Arab states. The American ambassador surmised that the leverage of the center was eroding startlingly since the latest clashes between Jordan and Israel sustained some

⁹⁷The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, January 15, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1955, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Press, 1986), pgs. 877-878.

Israeli casualties.⁹⁸ On January 21, Minister Gerald A. Drew in Amman confirmed Ambassador Davis's conclusions that the most militant members of the Israeli cabinet were driving the country into a possible collision with the Jordanians. Prime Minister Abu al-Huda articulated his concern about the gravity of the situation and informed the American minister about the recent raids by "uniformed Israeli soldiers against innocent Jordanians." He voiced his intention to bring forth a formal protest to the Security Council, the signatories to the Tripartite Declaration, and the member states of Arab league, about what he characterized as the shocking behaviour of Israeli soldiers who were crossing the armistice line and were "gunning down civilians" at "point blank range."⁹⁹

On January 28, the American Charge in Jerusalem reported that Jordan and Israel agreed informally to discuss the handling of the problem of infiltration and border incidents along the boundaries of the two states. Both sides promised the American Charge Parker to take extraordinary measures in patrolling in selected areas

⁹⁸Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to DOS, Tel Aviv, January 19, 1952. FRUS, Pg. 879

⁹⁹Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State, Amman, January 21, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pg. 881.

held in dispute. Despite the two countries' pledges to refrain from shooting at unarmed civilians and their promise to settle minor incidents on a local level, American officials remained concerned about Israeli officials who continued to hold Jordanians responsible for the success or failure of this agreement.¹⁰⁰ Secretary Acheson communicated the exceeding displeasure of the Jordanian government with the ongoing incidents along the borders of the two states. Jordan's Minister to the United States, Yusuf Haikal, expressed to the American Secretary of State the "grave concern" of his government over what he called the "aggressive and deliberate nature" of Israeli violations of Jordan's territory and its sovereignty. Acheson considered the implications of Israeli conduct: the arousal of public opinion in Jordan and the concern of other Arab countries that Jordan's inability to react decisively to Israeli military behaviour adversely affected the Kingdom's standing as a member of the Arab League and as an autonomous state.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰A telegram from American Charge at Jerusalem (Parker) to the Department of State, Jerusalem, January 28, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, Part 1, pg. 888.

¹⁰¹A telegram from the Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan, Washington, January 31, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 889.

Secretary Acheson informed the Foreign Office in Israel that Israeli encroachment on Jordanian territory and the bombings of its villages was indefensible. He believed that America's fear of the possibility of a Jordanian reprisal would have ultimately postponed all efforts to bring about a diplomatic resolution to the crisis of rage and hatred, politics and occupation between the two nations. Consequently, American diplomats were forceful with Shual Ramali, the Head of the Israeli Delegation of the Mixed Commission for Jordan and Israel. Acheson counseled the Israeli authorities to act with wisdom and restraint.¹⁰² On February 4, Jordan's Prime Minister Abu al-Huda expressed his gratitude for America's role in pressuring the Israeli military to stop what he regarded as the "brutal" treatment of infiltrators of Israeli boundaries. The Prime Minister emphasized that the Jordanians were simply seeking American impartiality. Jordanians were deeply disturbed by Israel's disregard for the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The Jordanian government was also hopeful that the United States would help strengthen Israel's civilian and moderate elements in an attempt to contain what Drew called the influence of the "more ruthless faction" which leaned toward the adoption

¹⁰²Secretary of State to Legation of Jordan, Washington, January 31, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 890.

of a predatory policy on the borders. Drew reported that the growing influence of the Israeli military in dictating the policies on the frontier dismayed Amman's government. Equally worrisome to the American Minister was the growing communist propoganda that Jordan was "soft" on Israel.¹⁰³

At the same time, the United states was considering the McDonald report of March 1951 which detailed the Kingdom's irrigation plans to establish "self-sustaining" farms in Jordan. Secretary Acheson voiced his willingness to work with the United Nations Work Agency Relief (UNWRA) to help narrow the political disparities among the warring countries.¹⁰⁴ Acheson's fear of Soviet communism playing on Arab nationalism and emotionalism was one of the underlying reasons behind United States interest in the Yarmuk project. Hence, the persistence of raids on Jordanian towns by the Israeli military necessitated American perseverance and intervention.

On February 13, Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv

¹⁰³A telegram from the Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State, Amman, February 4, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 891.

¹⁰⁴The Secretary of States to the Legation in Lebanon, Washington, February 8, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and the Middle East, pgs. 893-894.

reported that Walter Eytan, the Director General of Israel's Foreign Office, assured American officials that his country was taking all the steps necessary to guarantee a modus vivendi with Jordan. Eytan interpreted the end of infiltrations into Israel as evidence that the Arab Legionnaires were capable of maintaining order on the borders. However, American diplomats informed the Israeli government that the state policy of censorship kept the populace in Israel ignorant about their own infiltrations into Jordanian land. Davis was unsettled by Israeli antipathy to Jordanian complaints about the unlawful conduct of the Israeli military which could have easily had a damaging impact on its reputation at the United Nations and elsewhere.¹⁰⁵ Following Ambassador Davis's consultations with Israel's foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, the governments of Jordan and Israel showed their desire to negotiate their differences. Michael Comay, Acting Director General of the Foreign Office, confidentially told the American Ambassador that Ahmed Touqan, Jordan's representative of the MAC and Foreign Minister met secretly with S. Divon, Acting Director of Middle Eastern Division of the Israeli Foreign Office. Jordan's Prime Minister, Abu al-Huda

¹⁰⁵A telegram from the Ambassador (Davis) to Israel to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, February 13, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 896.

expressed the "possibility" of change in Arab League attitude toward Israel on the basis of recent Egyptian pronouncements concerning the likelihood of a settlement which received no condemnation from the press and the public in Jordan.¹⁰⁶ On February 29, American Charge Andrew D. Fritzlan notified the Department of State that Ahmed Touqan recognized Israel's "legitimate grievances" against refugee incursions on Israeli territory. However, the Foreign Minister maintained that Israeli reprisals were unwarranted. Moreover, Touqan indicated that he had attempted to influence Prime Minister Abu al-Huda in seeking a settlement with the Israelis without Arab participation. Jordan's Prime Minister, however, was too cautious to antagonize Arab public opinion. His only hope of considering a limited arrangement with Israel was dependent on the progress in Anglo-Egyptian talks to decide the status of the Suez Canal.¹⁰⁷ Israel's Acting Director of Foreign Office, Michael Comay reported that the meeting with Arab representatives had "substantial results." Israel established an agreement with Syria regarding ships facing an imminent danger, and Lebanon

¹⁰⁶American Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, February 27, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and the Middle East, pgs. 898-899.

¹⁰⁷Charge in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State, Amman, February 29, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and the Middle East, pgs. 899-900.

reached a compromise concerning the status of some Jews who wished to resettle in Israel.¹⁰⁸ On March 3, American envoy Cavendish Cannon in Damascus transmitted a note from Syria's Foreign Minister, Jamal E.D. Farra, which called on the United States, the United Kingdom and France to work on a plan of reparations for the displaced Palestinians.¹⁰⁹

Tougan's scheme for the re-establishment of the borders in the Latrun area remained under the study of the cautious Prime Minister who was planning to take the issue before the Arab League. Charge Fritzman characterized the latest events in the Middle East as "procedural rather than substantive" in significance. He also reported that al-Difa' newspaper denounced vehemently any attempt aimed at the normalization of relations with Israel. He believed that Israel's willingness to search for a formal understanding with the Arab states was driven by economic considerations because the Arab embargo against Israel was adversely affecting Tel Aviv. Fritzman ascribed the recent peace activities to what he called American and Egyptian influence linked

¹⁰⁸The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, February 29, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 901.

¹⁰⁹Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State, Damascus, March 3, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and the Middle East.

to Middle East defence arrangements.¹¹⁰ Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv reported that Israeli officials were "cautious" and "suspicious" of Arab intent since everything was dependent on the Arab League. Davis believed that it was "too early to judge" the real significance of the recent developments in Middle East. Despite the absence of encouraging prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough, the American Charge asserted that it was "noteworthy" to stress that any small change in the political atmosphere kindled his hopes for a better future.¹¹¹ United States aspirations for a political settlement in the Near East remained the underlying reason behind Truman's interest in Jordan's economic development.

During the month of March, the Jordanian Kingdom and the United States signed another agreement under which the two countries decided to open a "joint fund" for the operation of the Point IV program. This "supplementary" agreement became an extension of the Treaty of Technical Cooperation ratified in early February of the previous year. American Minister to Jordan, Gerald A. Drew, and

¹¹⁰Charge in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State, Amman, March 7, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part I, pg. 905.

¹¹¹Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, March 7, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954, pg. 906.

Jordan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda agreed that the United States would contribute \$2,780,000 and that Jordan would contribute \$1,000,0000 in dinars. The two parties pledged to assist in the building and improvement of Jordan's infrastructure, its agricultural schools to increase production, educational institutions, primary schools, teacher training and vocational training; health clinics to reduce malaria and tuberculosis, the development of water resources requiring the restoration of ancient reservoirs, and the transportation system to facilitate communication among different parts of the Kingdom. The agreement also provided for the establishment of "cooperative departments" to help administer and implement United States technical cooperation with the government of Jordan.¹¹² On March 26, 1952, Tracy R. Welling was appointed as the Director of Technical Cooperation in Jordan.¹¹³

In the succeeding days, Acheson seriously would consider the development of the Jordan River Valley as a "desirable" project for the settlement of refugees in

¹¹²Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXVI, No. 654, 3 March 1953, pg. 335.

¹¹³Department of State Bulletin, 14 April 1952, Pg. 603.

the Jordanian Kingdom. This scheme was contingent on a detailed examination of legal and technical matters involving water rights. The United States government requested UNWAR to appoint a special envoy to contact the companies committed to this venture to prepare their studies.¹¹⁴ Ambassador Eric Johnston would continue this project under the aegis of the next administration. Meanwhile, the Israeli government was undertaking measures to establish "absolute control" over the Syrian-Israeli demilitarized zone (West bank of Jordan) and achieve a similar program in a demilitarized zone east of Jordan. The Israeli military employed force and intimidating maneuvers to force Arab villagers to leave the designated areas. This came about after the Syrian government made a formal request to Colonel Samuel G. Taxis, Chairman of the Israel-Syria MAC, to inform the Israelis of Damascus's desire to establish new demarcation lines. Minister Cavendish Cannon urged the Department of State to persuade the Israelis not to use force and to give consideration to Syrian proposals.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, Acheson was quick to recognize the shift in Arab attitude toward the refugee problem. In 1950, the

¹¹⁴The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon, April 22, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part I, pgs. 920-921.

¹¹⁵The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State, Damascus, May 5, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 924-925.

Arab states unanimously declared their determination to return all refugees to their homes. Practical and "responsible" Arab leaders by May, 1952, were willing to resettle "substantial" numbers of refugees in Arab countries. The Secretary attributed this accomplishment to the "patient diplomatic efforts" of American Missions and those of "friendly" governments in the Near East. The diplomatic contacts between John B. Blanfford, Director with a rank of Minister of UNWAR, and Colonel Fawzi Selo, Syria's Chief of State, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, achieved a significant objective which called for the integration of fifty thousand more refugees in Syria.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, Ambassador Eban's counsel to his government to release the frozen account of Arab refugees and to turn to the United Nations¹¹⁷ as an arbitration body augmented American hopes for a lasting agreement. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, characterized Israel's policy of vengeance as "self-defeating" because there was no evidence of a single Arab country preparing a war against Israel. Foreign Minister Sharett personally

¹¹⁶The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Washington, May 8, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 927-928.

¹¹⁷The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Washington, may 15, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 931.

advised "restraint" and "regretted" the absence of normal ties between his country and the Arab states.¹¹⁸

However, American hopes for a peaceful settlement between Amman and Tel Aviv were completely shattered: On July 20, 1952, the Jordanian Cabinet refused to approve the Touqan-Ramati agreement on the Latrun area despite its "unquestioned benefits" to both countries. Ambassador Davis reported that none of the Arab states were prepared to engage in serious talks with the Israelis. Jordan's Prime Minister was determined not to have any negotiations with Israel, leading Foreign Minister Touqan to resign from his post. Consequently, border incidents escalated on the Jordanian-Israeli frontiers. The United States government regarded the latest development as a "definite setback." Ambassador Davis resigned himself to the disturbing conclusion that none of the Western powers could achieve an acceptable settlement in the Middle East. The Ambassador ascertained that the failure of American diplomacy in achieving an agreement among the Arabs and Jews constituted the "chief obstacle" to American interests, necessitating "constructive" measures

¹¹⁸Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs (Fred Waller), Washington, June 20, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 950-951.

to realize that goal.¹¹⁹ Ambassador Eban interpreted the Jordanian parliament's refusal to ratify the recent agreement between the two states as a demonstration of Jordan's "inability" to concede to terms which he believed were in the Kingdom's national interest. He grieved at the defeat of an arrangement which would have culminated in the readjustment of armistice lines and led to a reunion between separated Palestinian families.¹²⁰

But the Israeli government failed to realize that Jordan's strategic vulnerability was dictated by her geographical position, and further aggravated by her economic weakness, requiring careful conduct of her foreign relations with the Arab states and constraining her relationship with Israel. Thus, Jordan, having become an abiding member of the Arab League during the short reign of King Talal, was compelled to meet its regional function as an Arab country. Nonetheless, some American officials lingered on past hopes, on recent diplomatic exchange between some Arab countries (presumably Egypt and Jordan) and Israel which had resulted in a

¹¹⁹Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, July 20, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 964-965.

¹²⁰Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs (Fred E. Waller), Washington, July 23, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and the Middle East, pgs. 965-966.

significant shift in Arab-Israeli attitudes toward each other. David K.E. Bruce, Acting Secretary of State, pledged that the United States would continue its endeavor to normalize the ties between the belligerents in the Middle East. He reaffirmed American commitment to the principles of the Tripartite Declaration.¹²¹ However, the Israeli government was fearful of Arab intentions, particularly after Britain had military collaborations with Colonel Shishakli of Syria, and the resistance of Arab leaders to initiate diplomatic talks with Israel. Britain reportedly sold jet fighters to Damascus and trained Syrian pilots on its fields. But Ambassador Davis was keen in reminding the Acting Secretary that Israel's excessive anxiety and its total commitment to defend its boundaries at any cost, aggravated the political climate in the Middle East. The American Ambassador criticized Britain's self-proclaimed policy of military aid for "self-defence" as bootless without serious diplomatic undertakings to reach a compromise among the disputants in the region. Davis strongly believed that the Western powers "endangered"

¹²¹The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, November 11, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1049-1050.

American plans for regional tranquility.¹²² Davis communicated to the Department of State the Israeli Foreign Ministry's anxiety about the military balance of power in the Near East, and its concern about a possible Arab military preponderance in the region which would threaten chances for peace and discourage Arab desire for negotiations.¹²³

As the month of December closed, Sharett's patience rapidly dissipated. He admonished the Western powers for what he called their apparent abandonment of the May Declaration of 1950 and protested American proposals for military aid to Egypt.¹²⁴ Israel's suspicions were further augmented by a widely spread rumor that the governments of Jordan and Syria had signed an agreement pertaining to the Yarmuk project. Israel's Foreign Minister demanded to be informed and consulted about this plan to build a storage dam. He affirmed that the water resources of the Yarmuk were essential to his country's

¹²²The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, November 11, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1952, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1050-1051.

¹²³The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, November 13, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1054.

¹²⁴The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, December 29, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1086.

interest and warned of the consequence of any "unilateral" action which threatened Israeli security.¹²⁵ Ambassador Eban and Colonel Chaim Herzog, Defence Attache of the Israeli Embassy, reiterated Sharett's apprehensions on the implications of arming the Arab countries with Western weapons. Eban and Herzog were disappointed by American refusal to block British arms sales to some Arab countries. They viewed Prime Minister Najib's earlier revolutionary government in Cairo with apprehension since Egypt continued to espouse hostility toward Israel.¹²⁶ But Secretary Acheson communicated his government's "considerable enthusiasm" for the Yarmuk project. Syria and Jordan entered into negotiations on crucial issues related to the water scheme. But President Truman still considered the "feasibility" of the project pending further analysis and investigation.¹²⁷

Acheson's skillful diplomacy proved to be

¹²⁵The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, December 31, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1087-1088. Also see editorial notes below.

¹²⁶Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs (Walker), Washington, January 5, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1088-1093.

¹²⁷The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, January 9, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1094-1095.

instrumental in times of crisis, encouraging Amman and Tel Aviv to foster a policy of uneasy accommodation and guarded co-existence. United States economic diplomacy toward Jordan strengthened that country's capacity for resiliency and survival during a period marked by revolutionary sentiments and violent breaks. The Point IV program of 1951 was particularly important: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and India were among some of the chief beneficiaries of United States Technical Assistance programs. Irrigation projects transformed thousands of acres into arable land in these countries. President Truman believed that his policy of economic aid pacified anti-American sentiments and thwarted the rise of communism and hyper-nationalism in the Near East. Whether the Point IV program served as a powerful "antidote" to communist propaganda is debatable. One thing, however, is clear: the United States expected to reap economic benefit from countries where demand for American goods and services was rising. This is a clear confirmation by Truman that the policy of economic aid was not without attached threads. The Congress of the United States originally appropriated \$34,500,000, expanding it from \$147,900,000 in 1952 to 155,66,000 in 1953. President Truman formulated this program to meet American economic needs in its search for markets and friendly environments

for capital investment for the next century.¹²⁸

Truman's economic foreign policy proved to be quite rewarding. However, the ultimate beneficiary of American diplomacy and economic assistance to the Arab countries was the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan had neither a sizable market nor a lucrative place for vast commercial ventures. The United States received a psychological and political benefit from a small country in a volatile region in return for its leaders continued disavowal of international communism. When Jordan faced its first succession crisis, the Truman administration regarded the preservation of Jordan's stability as crucial to maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East.

American Response to the Assassination of King Abdullah

On the eve of King Abdullah's last departure to Jerusalem, Minister Drew in Amman warned the Hashimite ruler about a possible "conspiracy" to assail him.¹²⁹ King Abdullah exhibited not fear, but, instead,

¹²⁸Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Years of Trial and Hope, vol. II (New York: Double Day & Company, Inc., 1965), pgs. 236-239.

¹²⁹King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati Ka-Malik "My Career as a King" translated from French to Arabic by Ahmed Douqan, (Amman: National Printing Press, 1986), pg.36. Al Ahram, Cairo, No. 23624, 22 Sunday 1951.

determination to set out on his ominous trip to Jerusalem. He was apparently a dauntless man, resolute in his ways, more accurately a venturer who had complete faith in his God even when he was in imminent peril. His assassin was linked to an underground revolutionary organization calling itself The Holy War. This group was allegedly financed by Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem.¹³⁰ The murder of King Abdullah stunned the peoples of Jordan and Lebanon. The city of Jerusalem, a dwelling place for the King, was overwhelmed with agony and "sadness."¹³¹ An agitated crowd in Lebanon demonstrated and protested the murder of Abdullah. Tehran's parliament lamented the death of a King and denounced the assassination. British officials at the Foreign Office in London were thunderstruck.¹³² The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom vigilantly followed the course of events. The American Office of Near Eastern Affairs beseeched the congress to continue its policy of economic and military assistance to the countries of the Middle East. Its message was aimed at the containment of Jordan's anti-monarchical and

¹³⁰Al Ahram, Cairo, no. 22635, 23 July 1951.

¹³¹Al-Difa', Jerusalem, No. 4079, vol. XVIII, Monday, 23 July 1951, pg. 1

¹³²Al Ahram Cairo, No. 23624, 22 July 1951, pg. 8.

Western opposition.¹³³

The identity of the assassins is still uncertain; however one thing is definite: Abdullah had many rivals in the Arab East, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Some members of the Hashimite family believe that Egypt was "partially" responsible for the plot against the aging King which aimed at the dismemberment of the Hashimite Kingdom.¹³⁴ However, American intelligence speculated that the conspiracy was aroused by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem who considered himself the only genuine representative of the Palestinian people. Whether the Mufti had a personal "vendetta" against Abdullah or the plot was sponsored by a Soviet client, as some American officials contend,¹³⁵ substantial evidence is lacking to establish either assertion. Whatever the underlying motives behind his murder and whoever the real instigators were, the assassination of King Abdullah created a political and constitutional crisis for the Hashimites. It also served to expand the American role in Jordanian affairs.

¹³³al-Difa' Jerusalem, No. 4079, vol. XVIII, Monday, 23 July 1951, pg. 1.

¹³⁴Al-Difa', pg. 34.

¹³⁵Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State, Washington, July 20, 1951. FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 984.

King Abdullah's assassination caused serious repercussions in the Jordanian Kingdom and the regional countries. Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i resigned from his Office at the end of July. Emir Naif, the regent of the Kingdom, temporarily assumed royal functions.¹³⁶ The traditional statesman, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, formed a new administration to become the new Prime Minister of the country.¹³⁷ Al-Ahram wrote that the eradication of Abdullah could set Jordan's historical development on a new course with the impending possibility of throwing the encircled Kingdom into a "field of struggle among nations."¹³⁸ Jordan and Iraq, represented by Midhat Jum'ah, Jordan's Charge d'Affaires in Cairo, and Najib al-Rawi, Iraqi Minister, protested to Muhammad Salah al-Din, Egypt's Foreign Minister, about the disturbing commentaries in Egyptian newspapers about the deterioration of the domestic situation in Jordan.¹³⁹ Egypt, long foe of the Jordanian ruler, displayed an opportunism which disturbed the Western powers and the United States.

¹³⁶Al-Difa' Jerusalem, No. 4681, vol. XVIII, Wednesday, 25 July 1951, pg. 1.

¹³⁷Al-Difa' Jerusalem, No. 4682, vol. XVIII, Wednesday, 25 July 1951, pg. 1.

¹³⁸Al-Ahram, Cairo, No. 23624, 22 July 1951, pg. 8.

¹³⁹Al-Difa' Jerusalem, No. 4687, vol. VXIII, 1 August 1951.

American fear of foreign intervention invited the attention of American officials at the Department of State. It is to be borne in mind that as early as 1950 the preservation of Jordan's integrity had already been established as one of the cornerstones of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Jordan's moderating influence in the region was essential for the stability of the entire area. George McGhee, an early proponent of American-Jordanian relations, surmised that the Arab Legion had the will and the necessary tools to maintain internal control and believed that Britain's treaty obligations toward Jordan acted as a hindrance to any military action by the neighbouring states. Nonetheless, the constitutional crisis triggered by Abdullah's death and aggravated by Prince Talal's "questionable sanity,"¹⁴⁰ unsettled American officials. Minister Drew in Amman reported that Jordan's predicament worsened as some members of the Hashimite family grappled for power.¹⁴¹ More significant, the territorial ambitions of the Kingdom's neighboring states escalated the tension

¹⁴⁰A memorandum prepared by George McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to Secretary of state, Washington, 20 July 1951. FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 983

¹⁴¹A despatch from the Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State, Amman, 20 September 1951. FRUS, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pg. 995. Also see King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati Ka-Malik (Amman: Ministry of Education and Communication, 1986), pg. 29.

between the regional powers and forced the United States to take precautions to thwart any potential adversary from jeopardizing Jordan's national security.

The potential for a large scale war in the Middle East over the Hashimite Kingdom became a disturbing reality. Minister Drew in Adman reported that martial law was at once enforced, police activities increased and security measures around the American Embassy instantly taken. Nevertheless, the American Minister considered the possibility of political agitation by what he termed "irresponsible elements" among refugees in the Jordanian Kingdom.¹⁴² Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, George McGhee, presented Secretary Acheson with a "strictly tentative estimate" of the impact of Abdullah's murder on Jordan's future and the adjacent countries. McGhee expected Talal's reign to be shortlived and believed that the question of "securing the popular acceptance of a successor will be difficult particularly in view of the low reputation in the Arab world of all eligible members of the Jordan royal family." He anticipated no military action from Syria unless Israel attacked. He also surmised that Iraq would push for its "long standing" unification plans but if warned by the

¹⁴²Minister Drew in Jordan to DOS, Adman, July 20, 1951. FRUS, pg. 982.

United States, would vacillate over intervention in Jordan's affairs unless Israel invaded Jordan. McGhee thought that Israel might use this event as a "pretext for rectifying its frontiers and realizing its ambition for full control of all of Palestine." Egypt, however, a country which had been striving to establish itself as the dominant power in the region, was not in a geographical position to intervene in Jordan. Nevertheless, he foresaw the possibility of increasing pressure by the Arab countries on Jordan to establish a "larger Arab territorial unity" with either Iraq or Egypt as the dominant power. Israel would be the only regional power expected to oppose any movement in that direction.¹⁴³

Military action by any power would have definitely invited a counter-reaction by another. Moreover, Jordan's strategic vulnerability in the 1950's also acted as a source of strength. The presence of major rivals around Jordan's frontiers was a decisive factor in saving the country from a major catastrophe. During the month of July of 1951, neither Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia nor Israel was in a position to strike against the Hashimite

¹⁴³Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 1951. FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near and Far East, pgs. 983-984.

domain. Nonetheless, Jordan's ambitious neighbours kept their eyes wide open for any opportunity to annex the Hashimite domain.¹⁴⁴

In defining American foreign policy objectives toward Jordan, McGhee seized the opportunity to shape American-Jordanian relations. He considered the preservation of Jordan's stability an act of political urgency. Consequently, the Department of State dispatched a circular telegram to the Arab countries and Israel instructing American missions to counsel "restraint and moderation."¹⁴⁵ However, the long term policy objective of the Truman administration was aimed at upholding Britain's strategic position in Jordan. The murder of Abdullah might lead to the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful incorporation of the Kingdom into a more "viable territorial unit."¹⁴⁶

The discussions around the merging of Jordan into a large territorial entity were initiated in the United Kingdom. As of 1951, American interests in Jordan were

¹⁴⁴FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 984.

¹⁴⁵FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 984.

¹⁴⁶FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 984.

compatible with those of England. Indeed, the Office of Near Eastern Affairs was keenly interested in finding a satisfactory solution to the Jordan question. On July 24, the Policy Planning Staff at the Office of the Near Eastern Affairs prepared a paper to examine American options. The first alternative stressed the preservation of the Hashimite monarchy under Talal, Hussein or Naif. This status quo option appeared favorable since none of the major contestants for the annexation of Jordan was in a position to initiate a military action without invoking a serious response by another.¹⁴⁷ The second alternative called for the possibility of establishing some kind of federation or union between the two Hashimite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. This plan was not without merit; financially strong Iraq would have supplanted England in subsidizing Jordan; and the United Kingdom's influence in Jordan would not have been adversely affected. No serious geographical barriers prevented the two countries from achieving a political unification or a federation. This scheme was also entertained by American officials because it would give the "lie" to Arab "nihilists," that charge the European powers and the United States were opposed

¹⁴⁷A paper prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs for Discussion by the Policy Planning Staff, Washington, 24 July 1951. FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 985.

to an Arab union.¹⁴⁸ The third plan advocated an "attachment" between Jordan and Syria. The Department of State had some powerful reasons to explore this option; from a geopolitical point of view, this plan was quite workable. If implemented, it might have given Britain a stronger role in Syria and would have improved the capability of the Syrian army so long as it remained under British control.¹⁴⁹

The second scheme was disregarded; the absence of an armistice agreement between Iraq and Israel, combined with the potential for the incorporation of Lebanon into Syria, created significant concerns for American policy makers. Israel, Saudi Arabia and Syria would have bitterly opposed this plan. Iraq's position as a regional power would have increased. The fear of creating a mighty Arab state under Iraqi rule would have jeopardized the Western position in the Middle East.¹⁵⁰ The third plan was also discarded. The political divisions in Syria, together with Syria's "republican" rather than monarchical leanings, defeated any chances for a union

¹⁴⁸FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 985.

¹⁴⁹FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 987.

¹⁵⁰FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 986.

with the Hashimites. Syria was also "bitterly" opposed to British and American presence in the Near East. Thus, a merger between Jordan and Syria would have undermined Britain's position there. Syria's financial standing was weak. Moreover, a British gain in influence in Syria would have ultimately caused a "clash" between the United Kingdom and France, which occupied a "special" footing in Damascus.¹⁵¹ Other options and possibilities were explored; the partition of Arab Palestine and/or Jordan among some of the neighbouring States was carefully considered by the Policy Planning Staff. The annexation of Old Palestine by Israel, while keeping Jordan's Eastern bank as an independent state, without abandoning the possibility of a future merger with Iraq, remained uncertain. The establishment of a British "military protectorate" over Jordan and the preservation of the Old Palestine under the ex-Mufti (al-Husseini) now in Gaza was not taken seriously. The Arab states would not have accepted Israeli control of Old Palestine, and the scheme which envisioned the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem as a potential ruler in Old Palestine was too abhorrent to the United States to be accepted.¹⁵² Al-Husseini was not particularly friendly to the United States. Thus, the

¹⁵¹FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 987.

¹⁵²FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pgs. 987-988.

Policy Planning Staff concluded that the maintainance of the status quo was the only natural and rational alternative. Iraq's government and the majority party dominated by the "populists" in Syria were expected to continue to exert their influence for the incorporation Jordan into their respective domains. American officials at the Department of State insisted that Jordan's stability was the least problematic option for the United States. They emphasized that the future of genuine Arab movement for national unification was contingent upon reaction of the United States and Britain. Some American officials attributed the decline of Western influence in the Middle East to what they termed Arab "nihilism... defeatism and frustration."¹⁵³

Jordan's succession issue was settled temporarily. However, the United States never completely discounted the possibility of promoting a merger between Jordan and Iraq. The United States position on this delicate matter depended on the course of future events and Jordan's continued committments to its international obligations toward the United Kingdom and the Armistice Agreement with Israel. The United States was not opposed to a plan entailing concessions from the Arab states as long as the

¹⁵³FRUS, vol. V, 1951, the Near East and Africa, pg. 988.

dominant regional powers respected the territorial integrity of all neighboring states. This scheme would require intensive diplomatic consultations with the Israeli government. Tel Aviv would interpret any movement in this direction as a violation of the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. A guarantee assuring Israeli leaders of Iraq's abiding by the Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel was essential.¹⁵⁴ For better or worse, the final step taken by the United States was to sustain Jordan's political stability and guard the safety of the Hashimite dynasty. This objective remained unaltered, valiantly defended by President Dwight D. Eisenhower throughout the 1950's.

The struggle for Jordan increased as United States officials began to suspect the ex-Mufti's possible alignment with the "commies" who allegedly had the strength to create the seeds of instability within the Kingdom. On July 31, Prime Minister Abu al-Huda assured Minister Drew that rumors about the "reign of terror" in Palestine in the aftermath of King Abdullah's assassination were "exaggerated." The methodical approach of the Prime Minister also committed the Jordanian government to a "strict" enforcement of the truce

¹⁵⁴FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 989.

agreement, but without the continuation of Abdullah's policy of establishing "bilateral agreements" with Israel. He accentuated his desire to abide by the principles of the Tripartite Declaration, and declared his intention to abandon the Greater Syria plan which he personally found to be "distasteful." The American Minister in Amman depicted the Jordanian Prime Minister as a man of "serene and statesmanlike attitude." Drew reported that Abu al-Huda showed his commitment to the maintenance of Jordan's sovereignty and his solid determination to "break with (the) personal policies" of Abdullah, while extricating his country from the legacy of the King's antagonistic attitude toward Egypt and the Arab League.¹⁵⁵ For a short period of time, it seemed as if the future of the Hashimite dynasty was hanging in the balance. Jordan's continued existence may be attributed to its forceful Prime Minister who wielded complete control and maintained a firm grip over the Kingdom.¹⁵⁶ Abu al-Huda reaffirmed his government's position in preserving Jordan's Western orientation and promised to keep the special triangular relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom. Hence, Minister Drew in

¹⁵⁵A telegram from the Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State, Amman, 31 July 1951. FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 990.

¹⁵⁶Robert Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pgs. 58-59.

Amman counseled the Truman cabinet to bolster Jordan's standing and assist the new government with economic and military aid.¹⁵⁷

The Jordanian dilemma had profound implications for the regional states. When King Abdullah was alive, Saudi Arabia had trepidations about his Greater Syria Plan. Abdullah was no more. But the Saudi family became apprehensive about reports of Iraqi and Syrian attempts to incorporate the territory of Jordan's into their domains. Secretary Acheson assured Saudi Arabia that the United States was in "disfavor" of any use of force to alter the territorial and political arrangements in the Near East. The right to self-determination remained a "cardinal principle" of American foreign policy. The careful Secretary stressed that the Jordanians should be "permitted to work out whatever destiny they may choose in calm, deliberative atmosphere."¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Iraqi endeavor for unification with Jordan never abated.

The Iraqi government was apparently responsive to

¹⁵⁷Drew to DOS, Amman, July 31, 1951. FRUS, 1951, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pg. 991.

¹⁵⁸A telegram from Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, Washington, 7 August, 1951. FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 991.

the idea of a union with the Jordanian Kingdom. Shagr al-Wadi, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured American Officials that King Faisal II was seeking to enhance the political stability of the region. Iraq's scheme for federation with Jordan had dramatic implications for the regional powers. Palestinian and Israeli resistance to the strategic ramifications of this union acted as significant deterrents to "hasty" actions by the Iraqi government. United States Ambassador in Baghdad, Edward S. Crocker, was "impressed by the strength and convictions" of the two Hashimite Kingdoms about the feasibility of unification. However, Ambassador Crocker was still skeptical of what he labeled "Arab nature" allowing the achievement of a federation between Amman and Baghdad. At the same time, the Ambassador took seriously al-Wadi's intimation of a rapid waning of British influence in Jordan and Iraq. Crocker reported that while Nuri al-Said was pushing for a union with Jordan, the Egyptian legation was presumably active in "agitating for [the] independence of West Jordan" under the auspices of the Arab League, while the Syrian Legation was striving for "partition" to incorporate the north into its domain and Saudi Arabia displayed territorial ambitions in the South.¹⁵⁹ The most alarming

¹⁵⁹Drew to DOS, August 10, 1951. FRUS, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pgs. 993-994.

development to the United States was the persistence of efforts by the regional states to bring about a dismantlement of the Jordanian Kingdom. The fear of foreign intervention in Jordan's internal affairs was rising daily. Drew viewed the Tripartite Declaration as an effective instrument of policy to help maintain the status quo in Jordan.¹⁶⁰

In the weeks to come, the United States would become increasingly confident as the Crown Prince began to assume his royal duties. On September 5, 1951, Talal was proclaimed King of Jordan. He took the oath to uphold the constitution before the Jordanian Parliament on the following day. Thereafter, King Talal received delegations from the Arab countries of Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. The American Ambassador was relieved to see Talal "seemingly completely happy." Drew's commentaries about the sanity of the King contradicted his early observations that the King was mentally "unstable."¹⁶¹ But King Talal faced a potential contender for the throne when a plot was detected involving his brother Prince Naif, who might have

¹⁶⁰Drew to DOS, Amman, August 10, 1951. FRUS, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pg. 993.

¹⁶¹American Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the State Department, 20 July 1951. FRUS, vol. V, 1951, The Near East and Africa, pg. 195.

collaborated with two of his Turkish cousins to capture the seat of power. But Queen Zain and Princess Sultana, Naif's wife, reconciled the two brothers. Subsequently, Talal appointed Naif as a Major-General in the Arab Legion. The new King assumed all his royal functions with dignity. He displayed a strong desire to rule the country as a constitutional monarch, refraining as much as he could from interfering in internal political matters. Perhaps the most crucial step undertaken by King Talal was the proclamation of a royal decree appointing his son Hussein as a Crown Prince and heir to the throne. Talal's decision was designed to permanently end the succession crisis. In the event of the King's death or his incapacity to rule, the throne was secure. Indeed, the succession problem which followed the death of Abdullah was resolved. Two other issues continued to trouble the American Minister in Amman: Jordan's severe economic crisis, and the fear of what Drew called "irresponsible" parliamentary nationalists who persisted in agitation for the nullification of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, aiming ultimately at the "ejection" of British colonial officers from the Arab legion. Nevertheless, American confidence in Talal was restored. In his reflections on the viability of the Jordanian monarchy, Drew enthusiastically wrote: "...there are reasonable grounds to hope that Jordan may carry on under Talal pretty much

as in the past, remaining a friend of Great Britain and other Western democracies and a useful area of resistance to Communist expansion in the Near East."¹⁶²

American hopes in King Talal were shared by some members of the British government. A British parliamentarian, Major Beamish, reflected: "I predict he (Talal) will prove to be a worthy son of a worthy father."¹⁶³ King Talal enjoyed an unrivaled popularity in the Kingdom because he was "deeply loved" by his people.¹⁶⁴ Upon his arrival in Amman from Europe, a Jerusalem newspaper, al-Difa' wrote: "Amman never witnessed in its history a day more dear than this pleasant immortal day."¹⁶⁵

When King Talal assumed the throne in 1951, American

¹⁶²FRUS, 1951, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pg. 996.

¹⁶³U.K. Major Beamish comments in the House of Commons upon the assumption of King Tala to the throne, 19th November, 1951. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., 40 Parl. 1 sess., pg. 170.

¹⁶⁴John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Houdar and Stoughton, 1957), pg. 295. Also see King Hussein Ibn Talal Mihnati ka-Malik, translated from French by Ghalib A. Douqan (Amman: National Printing Press, 1986), pg. 25. King Hussein described his father as a "magical and attractive" man exceeding most people in gentleness and kindness.

¹⁶⁵Al-Difa' Jerusalem, No. 4719, vol. XVIII, Friday, 7 September 1951, pg. 1. Also see Glubb's Soldier with the Arabs, pg. 295.

officials acted with jubilation and their expectations rose beyond measure. Drew's exhilaration about the restoration of Jordan's political stability would soon be splintered. King Talal's health deteriorated speedily. On August 11, 1952, the Jordanian Parliament decreed that the ailing King was not able to exercise his sovereign rights and constitutional duties as a ruler. Talal's abdication of his throne was accomplished with an unrivaled dignity. All royal privileges and prerogatives were delegated to his son as the new monarch of the Jordanian Kingdom.¹⁶⁶ The anguished months of King Talal's reign were over. But Prince Hussein was only seventeen years old. Hence, a Council of Regency was established to safeguard the country until the young regent reached the age dictated by the constitution.¹⁶⁷

American uneasiness about Jordan's political future surfaced once again. However, this time with Hussein as a successor. The young Prince's understanding of political life expanded after his presence at the assassination of his grandfather. Hussein reflected on what he termed "human deception" and was stunned by the

¹⁶⁶Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunniyah al-Wazarat al-Urdunniyah, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nasher, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pg. 46.

¹⁶⁷King Hussein Ibn Talal, translated from French by Ghalib Aref Touqan, Mihnati Ka-Malik (Amman: National Printing Press, 1978), pg. 52.

detestable reaction of opportunistic men who had professed their friendship to King Abdullah and then ran from the sight of his ghastly murder and subsequently vied for power. Hussein's sadness would not be quelled even by the great happiness at the news of his father's ephemeral ascent to power.¹⁶⁸ The innocent yearnings of Hussein the child were never to be realized. Witnessing the assassination would have a "profound impact" and leave an indelible impression on the young Prince. He would come to the existential conclusion that opportunism, ambition and politics are inextricably entwined. This disconcerting lesson would serve him well throughout his career as a king, but Hussein's hopes of experiencing the delights of his teenaged years would be crushed under the dictates of monarchical authority. Nevertheless, he would emerge as a bold ruler.

His father, Talal, who was forty one years old had to relinquish his duties as a King. He gave his country all he could, a constitution which ensured a smooth transition to the throne. The critics of the new constitution, banning discrimination, expounding equal opportunity, and promulgating freedom of press and speech, argue that the new provisions were "lofty"

¹⁶⁸King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati ka-Malik translated from French by Ghalib A. Touqan (Amman: National Printing Press, 1978), pgs. 31-32.

clauses which the Jordanian Prime Minister failed to respect. The new constitutional reforms undermined royal authority and prerogatives.¹⁶⁹ He also improved Jordan's ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But King Talal willingly chose to ratify a new constitutional order which limited the power of the king. Much credit is given to Prime Minister Abu al-Huda in preserving the Jordanian monarchy.

Three other important factors contributed to the preservation of the Hashimite dynasty: Talal's popularity in the Kingdom, British colonial officers, and United States diplomatic and economic aid during the last three years of the Truman presidency. What was even more evident about the Truman years was the obvious discrepancy between Truman's unwavering support for the state of Israel and the Department's commitment to the support of the Jordanian Kingdom. The President's own cabinet members and advisers, such as Dean Acheson, demonstrated an unusual degree of objectivity and wisdom in the conduct of American diplomacy. The security of the Jordanian Kingdom required American commitment in its pledge to maintain Jordan's stability and its Western orientation. The preservation of Jordan's security

¹⁶⁹Robert Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein (New York, Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1994), pg. 44.

precluded wide scale war in the Middle East which the United States was not fully equipped to handle.

Chapter II

The Survival of the Kingdom: 1953-1955

The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the White House in 1952 symbolized a gradual and dramatic departure from the previous president in the administration of American foreign relations in the Middle East. Eisenhower's pursuit of the principle of even-handedness in the management of Jordanian-Israeli border relations represented an act of discontinuity in American foreign policy. His appeals to the Jordanian Kingdom to continue its association with the Western powers during a period when Arab nationalism and Egyptian endeavors for regional supremacy were gaining momentum, collided with Israel's hopes to maintain its most favored status in Washington's strategic considerations, and frustrated Tel Aviv's quests to establish a separate agreement with Jordan. Hence, the administration's firm policy toward Israel was aimed at safeguarding the Hashimite estate amid Israel's relentless reprisals against Jordan's soft frontier. Eisenhower's role in the survival of the Jordanian Kingdom was manifested through Washington's diplomatic support and technical aid.

America's calming of Jordanian fears while

counseling David Ben Gurion and Moshe Sharett to pursue a policy of restraint rather than one of military retribution in coping with border incursions, were key factors in the preservation of the Jordanian Kingdom. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took keen interest in overseeing Jordanian-Israeli border relations, often clashing with the Tel Aviv government over Israeli policy toward Jordan. He withheld arms and economic aid from Israel as a tool in modifying Israeli policy toward the Arab countries. Dulles's concern about the escalation of tension in the Middle East and its implications for Soviet-American rivalry in that area culminated in his first diplomatic initiative--advising both sides to seek conciliation while pressuring them to abide by the rules of both the Armistice Agreements (AA) and the Tripartite Declaration. Dulles was not always successful in placating Israeli apprehensions as our discussion of the Qibya Affair and the conflict over Article XII of the truce arrangement will clearly illustrate. Nevertheless, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were effectual in restoring the Local Commanders Agreement between Jordan and Israel to settle frontier disputes. Moreover, the Three Powers Proposal known as the Trieste Scheme, devised to establish an agreement between Jordan and Israel, was another indication of Eisenhower's relentless efforts to settle permanently the differences between the

two countries.

Contrary to the prevailing belief that it was solely Britain which protected the Jordanian Kingdom, the documentary record clearly reveals that the United States played an indispensable part in molding the history of Jordan as early as 1947 when President Truman was in the White House. However, President Eisenhower differed significantly from Truman in the conduct of foreign policy. The differences between the two leaders' handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict are incalculable. While Truman displayed no courtesy to his advisers at the Department of State, Eisenhower was far more congenial and responsive to diplomats. Truman had complete "faith" in Israel, Eisenhower pursued an even-handed policy toward the two major contestants in that region. Despite Eisenhower's practical proclivity, his interest in legalism and idealism is comparable in some ways to that of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The two most influential architects of the new American nation, Madison and Jefferson fostered a "moralistic approach" to foreign relations. Their idealism sprang from what they believed to be "right and justifiable;"¹ they were rarely driven by the arbitrary principles of eighteenth

¹Paul V. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books INC., 1972), pg. 146.

century politics. Eisenhower's impartial conduct of foreign relations was quite evident throughout the 1950's. His emphasis on order and respect for the rules of international engagement are expected from a disciplined warrior, assertive General and Commander-in-Chief. In the process of selecting American partners and friends in the Near East, he displayed a distinct element of Jeffersonian moralism. The Truman legacy which favored Jew over Arab was almost obliterated, often causing serious strains in American-Israeli relations. In the administration of American foreign relations in the Near East, impartiality and discontinuity marked the Eisenhower years. He invited Jordan's association with the West without any reservations. Jordan emerged as the chief beneficiary of the Eisenhower-Dulles diplomacy; its preservation became a matter of critical importance for the United States.

Managing Jordanian-Israeli Borders

As January 1953 began, the old enmities between Israel and its Arab neighbors were aroused, fuming the air with the scent of gun-powder. Border incursions on the Jordanian-Israeli periphery increased significantly and the reverberations of Arab nationalism and Jewish Zionism could be heard across the Jordan River, Lake Tiberias and

the Nile. Abortive American attempts at a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East during the murky years of the Truman administration, the secret negotiations between Ahmed Bey Touqan, Senior Jordanian Representative for the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and Shual Ramati, Chief of the Israeli Delegation to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, ended in a debacle and were supplanted by renewed efforts to settle the issues permanently during the presidency of Eisenhower. This was one of the chief points of friction between Jordan and Israel and a matter of paramount sensitivity to the United States. The president believed that the principle of impartiality would serve the interests of the regional countries and the United States. His diplomacy oscillated between the dread of failure and the hope for regional reconciliation. In the event of American failure, Soviet expansion and the likelihood of its triumph in the Near East was a scenario with far-reaching consequences for the United States, a nightmare Washington could not tolerate. American interests in the area were simply too high to be trifled with; the need for American participation in this endless conflict necessitated patience, persistence and active diplomacy to be directed by men of prodigious skill, talent and wisdom.

The first month of the new year witnessed substantial escalation in border disputes. On January 21, 1953, United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC), Major General Bennet L. de Ridder, notified the United Nations of his apprehension about Israel's plan to revoke the Local Commanders Agreement (LCA) effective January 22, based on the contention that Jordan had refused to abide by its obligations under that arrangement. The Belgian commander, who had disagreements with General Nutuv, Israel's representative for the MAC, was convinced that the Israeli government was "staging a series of incidents" on Jordanian and Arab borders. Ridder's assertions were well enough substantiated to convince Dulles of Israeli misconduct.² However, some Foreign Ministry officials in Tel Aviv interpreted the deterioration in Jordanian-Israeli relations as an integral part of what they considered to be a "new Jordanian policy."³

The Israeli government was coping with what Ambassador Monnet B. Davis called a "series of

²The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, January 22, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. I, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1101.

³Telegram 1167 from Tel Aviv, January 21, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1100-1101. (editor). Also see Telegram 1167 from Tel Aviv, January 21. (editor, same page).

shocks...affect[ing] profoundly public thinking and morale." The Western powers's policy of arming the Arab states, combined with the so called Pargue Trials aimed at suspecting Jews working against Russian interests, caused a sudden shift in Soviet bloc policy toward Israel. Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv cautioned the administration that the latest development in the Middle East could produce what he called "far reaching effects and that continued deterioration in Arab-Israeli relations could bring about what would be precisely to Russia's advantage, namely renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities with serious consequences to [the] Western powers in general and the tripartite countries in particular." Israel's existence as a sovereign state was threatened, and its financial status was even more precarious, bordering on the verge of financial collapse. Davis regarded the adoption of a new "constructive" method to counter what he considered Soviet propaganda's anti-colonial rhetoric as an essential measure for the triumph of American diplomacy in the Near East.⁴

Similarly, Amman's trepidation about the possibility of an Israeli offensive continued to be an irritating matter for the citizens of Jordan. The Israeli policy of

⁴Ambassador Davis to DOS, Tel Aviv, January 23, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1854, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1102-1103.

intimidation was devised to express what Ambassador Joseph C. Green in Amman called its discontent with the new Western military policy of arming the Arabs. The chief objective of the Israeli military policy was to hold Jordan accountable for all incidents on the borders. Israel's decision to revoke the Local Commanders Agreement (LCA) forced the Jordanian representative at the MAC to declare that his country would not enter into any future talks with a state that failed to honor its own treaty obligations.⁵ On the other hand, Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, Chief of the Jewish Agency Political Department in the earlier years, ascribed the deterioration in Jordanian-Israeli border relations partially to what he called the negligence of the Arab Legion, uncontrollable border raids and, allegedly, some apathy of Palestinian officials in Amman's government. Sharett refrained from any charges that Jordan was intentionally bent on violating the truce. However, Israel's *old school of thought* (still in existence), Davis alarmingly pointed out, provided the hardliners with an ideal setting to dictate the national agenda, something which he feared could have profound

⁵The Ambassador in Jordan (Green) to DOS, Amman, January 24, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1103-1104.

implications for that country.⁶ The Ambassador's admonition to the Department of State about the danger of suddenly withdrawing American aid from Israel was followed by a similar warning that American diplomacy of conditional economic assistance to the Arab states in the face of Soviet threat would be impractical and self-negating.⁷

On January 28, the Department of State advised Jordan's Minister in Washington, Yusuf Haikal, and Israel's Minister Goitein to apprise their respective governments to take prompt measures to manage the problem of infiltration and to avoid similar acts of military retribution.⁸ Jordan's Minister of Defence, Anwar Nusseibeh, and Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ihsan Hashem, protested to the United States their discontent with Israel's recent policy of reprisal. Nusseibeh appealed to Washington as a signatory to the Tripartite Declaration to pressure the Israeli government to cease what he considered Tel Aviv's policy of

⁶The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to DOS, Tel Aviv, January 27, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1106-1107.

⁷Ambassador Davis to DOS, Tel Aviv, January 28, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1107-1109.

⁸The Acting Secretary of State, H. Freeman Matthews to DOS, Washington, January 30, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1110.

belligerency against Jordan. The Jordanian government made similar representation to Malcolm T. Walker, First Secretary and Consul of the British Embassy in Amman. Jordanian officials threatened to invoke the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, and called upon the British Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East to visit Amman to hold joint defence meetings in order to discuss the possible deployment of more British troops to the Jordanian Kingdom.⁹

Ambassador Davis described the Israeli policy of neutralizing Palestinian intruders as an outcome of a new "major policy decision" based on Tel Aviv's conviction that Arab incursions on Israeli occupied territory were becoming increasingly intolerable.¹⁰ Prime Minister David Ben Gurion held the Arab countries accountable for all the problems of infiltrations and accused the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization of prejudicial conduct. The impatient Ben Gurion justified Israel's military reprisals against what he believed was an organized attempt by Palestinians to infringe on Israeli

⁹The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to DOS, Tel Aviv, February 2, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1110-1112.

¹⁰Ambassador Davis to DOS, Tel Aviv, February 2, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1112-1113.

sovereignty.¹¹ But Jordan's Prime Minister Abu al-Huda discredited Israeli charges, and Ambassador Green and his British associate in Amman believed that Jordan was "acting in good faith and neither encouraging or conniving infiltration." Abu al-Huda threatened to invoke the Tripartite Declaration if Israel failed to cease its attacks within one week; he also implored the United States government to use its leverage to check aggressive Israeli behavior.¹²

Still, the two rivals in the Middle East were not fully prepared to dismiss past grievances. On February 5, Israel's Foreign Minister charged the Jordanian government with misconduct and threatened to use force as an act of self-defence.¹³ But the Department of State was resolute in rebuffing what one American official called Tel Aviv's "irresponsible statements" in making

¹¹Translated from Hebrew by Aryeh Rubinstein and Misha Louvish, David Ben Gurion, My Talks with the Arab Leaders (New York: The Third Press, Joseph Okpaku Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), pgs. 268-270.

¹²The Ambassador in Jordan (Green) to DOS, Amman, February 5, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1116-1117.

¹³The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to DOS, Tel Aviv, February 5, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 117.

accusations against Amman.¹⁴ Ambassador Davis warned that Israel's "intemperate" reaction and her "highly subjective" approach to foreign policy threatened her national interests. He attributed the irritation of the Israeli government to the appointment of a Palestinian whom the Israeli authorities believed to be a member of the former government of the ex-Mufti of Gaza as a new chairman of the Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission. Moreover, Tel Aviv interpreted the reported denunciation of the Rhodes agreement by the Jordanian Parliament as a joint Arab coalition emerging out of the November meetings of Arab MAC delegates in Amman, presumably to keep Israel vulnerable and isolated. Ambassador Davis counseled the administration to prepare a diplomatic scheme to be undertaken by a man of "proven ability and considerable prestige" to explore the options for a Near Eastern settlement.¹⁵

The political atmosphere in the Middle East in the first days of February was further aggravated by the recent bombing of the Soviet Embassy by an Israeli zealot who was expressing his discontent with Soviet foreign

¹⁴A Telegram from DOS to Tel Aviv, Washington, February 6, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1118. (editor's footnote).

¹⁵The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the DOS, Tel Aviv, February 9, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 123-125.

policy. The Soviet government blamed Tel Aviv; the bombing was believed only an outcome of what Moscow called the "complicity of the representatives of the Israeli government in stirring up hatred and enmity towards the Soviet Union and inciting hostile acts against it."¹⁶ Although the Knesset denounced the atrocious act against the Soviet Legation, Moscow recalled the entire staff of its Mission in Tel Aviv. The government of Israel was stunned by Moscow's reaction. The Netherlands continued to represent Tel Aviv in Moscow, and Portugal represented the latter in Israel.¹⁷ This episode was the final rupture in Soviet-Israeli relations. However "moderate" the relationship between the Jewish state and the Communist bloc had been hitherto, Soviet foreign policy in the days to come would aim at fortifying its connections with vulnerable Arab states. To the dismay of the United States, the wedge between the Arab countries and the Western powers was accelerating beyond control.

On February 6, Ambassador Joseph Green, former

¹⁶Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reiherz, editors. Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, 1948-Present (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press), pgs. 76-77.

¹⁷Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1953 (Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pg. 196.

Minister in Amman, admonished American officials in Washington that the quest for a satisfactory resolution based on the status quo was pointless and futile. His telegram from Amman bore the cachet of the Ambassador. Green lamented:

Let's us face the hard and bitter fact that the Arab world will not consent to a permanent settlement with Israel except on the basis of certain conditions which will...require a change in the status quo. Any attempt at settlement which ignores these conditions is destined to failure at the start. Nothing has occurred [since 1949] to soften this attitude and there is no prospect that anything will. On the contrary, Jordan's position vis-a-vis Israel has stiffened considerably in the last several weeks as a result of the cold-blooded Israeli attacks on Arab border villages as well as Israeli attempts [to] place the blame on the Arabs. So deeply are what they consider [the] wrongs of Palestine embedded in the psychology of the Arabs [living] on Israel's periphery that there are absolutely no prospects of an Arab-Israeli peace in our time except along lines which entail concessions by Israel.¹⁸

¹⁸Ambassador Green to DOS, Amman, February 6, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1119. Green served as Ambassador to Jordan on September 23, 1952 until July 31, 1952. pg. XX.

Green proposed two alternatives: continuing a meaningless policy which invited certain eclipse if not catastrophe, or forcing Israel to pursue a policy of negotiations with its Arab neighbors. The latter would entail the "internationalization" of Jerusalem, recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to return to their birth place, and compensation to those who failed to establish that right. He stressed the urgency of the revitalization of the Israeli economy through American aid and the adjustment of the existing boundaries, particularly in the villages which were affected by the Armistice agreement of 1949. Green postulated that the success of this proposal was an eminent possibility given the willingness of Jordan's officials' to "reason" with their neighbouring countries. At stake was nothing less than America's strategic and financial interests and, indeed, the preservation of her status as a great power. The Ambassador's impassioned plea to the administration was grounded on his conviction that "time was running out" and the "extreme urgency" of this question necessitated a swift action.¹⁹ However, the Israeli government was not eager to determine the status of Jerusalem nor was it particularly willing to entertain the recent proposal concerning the

¹⁹Davis to DOS, February 6, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1119-120.

internationalization of the Old City.²⁰

Foreign Minister Sharett protested the United States intent to provide Egypt with military and economic aid and criticized the Eisenhower administration for abandoning Israel as a partner by withholding military assistance from Tel Aviv as a catalyst for Arab reciprocity.²¹ However, Egypt's Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, notified Ambassador Jefferson Caffery that Cairo was considering the possibility of an eventual agreement with Israel to resolve the issue of Palestinian refugees and border rectifications.²² Secretary John Foster Dulles, fearless of Israeli propaganda, charged Ben Gurion's government with a "considerable responsibility" for fomenting trouble on the Jordanian borders.²³ And United States Consul in Jerusalem, Roger S. Tyler, Jr., disapproved of Israel's impatience, excessive sense of righteousness and persistence in

²⁰A letter from the Embassy of Israel to the United States Government (Abe), Washington, D.C., February 8, 1953, Records of C.D. Jackson, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, (6 pages).

²¹Davis to DOS, Tel Aviv, February 6, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, pgs. 1120-1121.

²²Caffery to DOS, Cairo, February 7, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, pg. 1121.

²³Dulles to UN Mission at the United Nations, Washington, February 11, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, pgs. 1128-1129.

making violent attacks on the frontiers.²⁴

As the Jordanian-Israeli rivalry increased in magnitude, Secretary Dulles grew impatient with the Mixed Armistice Commission for its lack of resolute action. He foresaw the United States assuming a greater role in the implementation of the armistice agreements. Dulles believed that Israel's policy of reprisal was a violation of its treaty obligations under the Tripartite Declaration, constituting a "grave danger to the security and stability of the area." His stern February twelfth note to the Israeli government was one of condemnation since Tel Aviv was not "fit to accept friendly counsel." He threatened to take further actions if necessary because this was a matter of fundamental importance for the United States.²⁵ Dulles's forceful remarks to the Israeli government were hardly rhetorical as some authors have asserted in their writing on American-Israeli

²⁴Tyler to DOS, Jerusalem, February 12, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, pgs. 1130-1131.

²⁵Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, February 12, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1131-1133. In his instructions to the American Embassy in Amman, Dulles informed Davis that the "information contained in paragraphs six and seven may be conveyed orally to [the Jordanian] Foreign Minister after completion acti[ng] contained [in] preceding paragraph. No written record of these two paragraphs are to be left with *HKJ* Government."

relation. The argument for "continuity"²⁶ in the conduct of American foreign relations toward Israel from the days of Truman is baseless. The continuation of the American commitment to the defense of Israel was only an extension of the administration's overall geostrategic considerations in the Middle East. The American pledge to defend Israel was no more compelling than its commitment to defend Lebanon, nor it was at times any greater than its efforts to preserve the status quo in Jordan. As a great power, the United States fostered a policy of evenhandedness to meet the minimum needs of all the regional states in the Middle East without giving special concern to Israel, which had enjoyed an uncontested popularity during the Truman presidency. United States condemnation of Israeli military policy, its refusal to sign a defence agreement with Tel Aviv and its withholding military and economic aid to Israel were real and not imaginary actions. Dulles and Department of State officials publicly disregarded Israeli "needs and predicament."²⁷ This attitude was also privately held by American diplomats.

Jordan's Acting Foreign Minister, Said Mufti, was

²⁶Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993), pg. 22.

²⁷Alteras, pgs. 316-317.

assured because the new position of the United States "served to clear the atmosphere, promote understanding and improve relations" between Jordan and the United States. Moreover, Ambassador Green took the liberty to change the wording of Dulles's harsh message to the Jordanian government concerning the National Guard to avoid what he believed would be an embarrassing response from Jordan, a country which highly esteemed the defenders of its homeland. Jordan expected the United States to exercise its will and vigor to force the Israeli government to modify its military conduct on the frontiers.²⁸

At the same time, several Arab states worked diligently to discuss with American officials the latest Soviet-Israeli debacle and its ramifications for the regional countries. Egypt's Ambassador, Muhammad Kamil Abd al-Rahim, and Yusuf Haikal of Jordan voiced their concern about the potential rise of pro-Israeli influence in the United States. Abd al-Rahim cautioned against the growth of what he called Soviet anti-zionism in its apparent support for radical Arab nationalism, particularly if Washington showed a propensity toward supporting Israeli policy or adopted an anti-Soviet

²⁸Green to DOS, Amman, February 14, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1134-1135.

stand. The Arab delegates expressed their concern about the persistence of the leanings of the Truman administration. Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, assured the Arab delegates that the Soviet Union would not permit large scale emigration to Israel.²⁹ American officials were also encouraged by reports about alleged secret Israeli negotiations with "influential Egyptians" who had close ties to General Muhammad Najib, Egyptian Prime Minister and Military Governor of Egypt since the overthrow of King Farouq in July of 1952. The Israeli Charge d'Affaires in Paris, Shmuel Divon, First Secretary of the Israeli Legation in France, informed the American Embassy in France about the recent developments in the area. Similar remarks were attributed to Anwar Nusseibeh, Jordan's Minister of Defence, about his country's stance on the subject of peace with Israel. Nonetheless, Nusseibeh firmly emphasized Arab solidarity on this issue and noted that no separate agreement between Israel and any other Arab state was conceivable.

²⁹Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Parker T. Hart, Washington, February 27, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1136-1138. The Arab delegates who met with American officials included; Yusuf Haikal, Minister of the HKJ, Abdullah Ibrahim Bakr, Plenipotentiary, charge d'Affaires ad interim of Iraq, Sayed abu-Rahman Ibn Abdu al-samed Abu-Taleb, Charge d'Affaires, Legation of Yemen, Hassan Saab, First Secretary, Legation of Lebanon, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, and Sheikh Mohammed Muhtasib, Second Secretary, Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Charge d'Affaires ad interim. Assistant Secretary Henry A. Byroade, NEA, acted as one of American representatives.

Ambassador Green characterized Jordan's dilemma as the "vanquished begging peace of the victor."³⁰

Prime Minister Ben Gurion commented on his country's need for military aid and foresaw no grounds for postponing arms shipments to Israel until peace with the Arab countries was achieved. He asserted that the Eisenhower administration tended to exempt Jordan from responsibility for border incursions, as an alleged recent mining of a railway illustrated.³¹ However, the actions of the Israeli government hardly promoted peace; Israel's determination to transfer its Foreign Office to Jerusalem was met with complete discouragement from the Department of State. Ambassador Davis was instructed to ask the Israeli government not to move its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem until the future status of that city was determined and a settlement with the Arab states was secured. Furthermore, President Eisenhower called upon the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Ankara, Sweden, Bern, and Brazil to inform their respective governments of the

³⁰Green to DOS, Amman, February 20, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1139.

³¹Davis to DOS, Tel Aviv, February 20, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, pgs. 1140-1142. Also see David Ben Gurion, My Talks with Arab Leaders (New York: The Third Press, Joseph Okpaku Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), pgs. 268-269.

United States decision.³²

However, Foreign Minister Sharett was discouraged as the Israeli Cabinet did not seem inclined to accede to America's request to maintain the status of Jerusalem.³³ Sharett's expressed desire to transfer Israel's Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem dismayed American diplomats in the Middle East. Henry A. Byroade, former Director of German Affairs at the Department of State, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, criticized the assertions of the Israeli Foreign Minister. The Assistant Secretary rejected Tel Aviv's decision, which was allegedly grounded on Israel's need to facilitate the conduct of her foreign relations and establish Jerusalem as her rightful capital.³⁴

³²Dulles to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Washington, February 27, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1144-1145.

³³Davis to DOS, Tel Aviv, march 4, 1953. FRUS, vol. IX, Part I, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1147.

³⁴Memorandum of Conversation by the Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs (Fred E. Waller), Washington, April 8, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, pgs. 1169-1170. This meeting between American Officials (Byroade, Waller) and Israeli Representatives (Sharett, Eban) focused on three questions: the status of the Suez Canal which Sharett believed that the removal of Egypt's "restrictions and prohibitions on Canal traffic to and from Israel [was] no longer considered by the Israeli government as an act of grace on the part of Egypt but a matter of right;" the prospects for peace, and the status of Jerusalem. pg. 1164.

Byroade grew impatient with the conflicting states in the Middle East and suggested to the Israeli government that the Eisenhower administration might take independent action to cope with the border crisis without necessarily conferring with the regional countries.³⁵

The United Kingdom delineated the obstacles which acted as deterrents to the plans of the Western powers: Israel's sense of profound insecurity and increasing isolation, and Jordan's unstable economy which precluded any independent action. The promise of Britain's continued economic assistance (together with the Point IV program and United Nations relief) served to stabilize the Jordanian Kingdom.³⁶ Britain's Minister of State, Selwyn Lloyd, proposed the building of Jordan's infrastructure, including a railway project, airport, and an irrigation system. Some assaulted the government's misdirected policy of military aid for a country with a population of 1.5 million of whom a third were expatriates. Others conceded that the economic and social conditions in Jordan were worse in 1953 than in 1951. To be sure, the refugee issue had a damaging effect on

³⁵Memorandum of Conversation, Waller, Washington, April 8, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, pg. 1167.

³⁶U.K. Comments in the House of Commons on aid to Jordan, March 1953. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 518 (1953), pgs. 90-91.

Jordan's economy, partly because England's economic assistance allocated to the Arab Legion accounted for 9 million pounds in comparison to 1.5 million pounds annually for economic development. Britain's government was displeased with the expansion in communist activities in the Jordanian Kingdom; some contended that while in 1951 not a single communist was to be found in Jordan, the country was slipping in that direction in 1953.³⁷ Lloyd expressed his feelings of "friendship" and "goodwill" toward Jordan. Many British officials arrived at the realization that Jordan was the most reputable country in the Arab world. In the words of R. H. S. Crossman:

In the whole Arab East, Jordan is the only area--and it is quite a small area--where we can ever pretend that there is a population friendly to this country, there is no other part of the Arab world where one can feel that the country is pro-British. Therefore, whether it is possible to keep our foot-hold there is a matter of major importance.³⁸

³⁷U.K. A discussion on "Jordan and Yugoslavia Assistance, 18 March 1953." Parliamentary Debates (Commons). vol. 513 (1953), pgs. 83-97.

³⁸U.K. Parliamentary Debates (Commons). vol. 513 (1953), pg. 86.

This view was shared by responsible officials in the Eisenhower administration. The new administration's policy seemed to be a viable safeguard against Russian infringement on the new American frontier in the Near East. A recent administration visitor to the Middle East cautioned against clandestine Soviet operations among Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon whose plight was allegedly a product of American policy in the Middle East. Lowell Wadmond reported to the President that the communists were also gaining ground among the Greek Orthodox communities in Damascus while Jordan was turning into a military garrison, both signifying a cold war atmosphere bordering on the edge of active belligerency. Particularly troubling was his gloomy portrait of the fate of the Jordanian Kingdom, a country which he believed could not continue to exist without British economic subsidies and technical aid. He appealed to the White House to recognize the grievances of the Palestinians and to respect the sovereignty of the Arab states in an attempt to forge a regional defence pact to curtail communist propoganda in the region.³⁹

However difficult the process and prospects for

³⁹Excerpts of Memorandum concerning current conditions in the Middle East by Lowell Wadmond, March 31, 1953. IX Collection: Central Files: O.F. 116-R, the White House, Washington. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (4 pages).

peace were, American diplomatic pressure on the Israeli government appears to have had some effects on Tel Aviv's military conduct on the Jordanian frontier. Israeli pronouncements also encouraged optimism.⁴⁰ Theodore Kollek, the Secretary General of Israel's Office of the Prime Minister, Theodore Kollek, conveyed a message to the Department of State that his government had contrived a state policy to compensate Arab refugees.⁴¹ Francis H. Russell, former Director of the Office of Public Affairs at the Department of State, and now Counselor of the embassy in Tel Aviv, advised cabinet officials to urge the Jordanian government to be aware of the modification in Israel's policy of retribution, and to press the Jordanians to undertake greater steps to block infiltration. This development occurred in view of the likelihood of Germany's endorsement of the German-Israel Restitution Agreement.⁴² But the Jordanian government was disenchanted with Tel Aviv's unfounded accusations about the deterioration in border relations. Andrew G. Lynch, Counselor of the American Embassy in Amman, was

⁴⁰Davis to DOS, Tel Aviv, February 27, 1953. FRUS, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1145-1146.

⁴¹Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, February 28, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1146.

⁴²Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, April 11, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1170-1171, XXXI.

convinced that Israel was "exaggerating and falsifying specific cases of Arab infiltration for some ulterior motive." He affirmed that the situation on the borders was "quieter" than at any other period since Israel's nullification of the Local Commanders Agreement (LCA) the previous January. Indeed, the evidence confirming Lynch's assertions was overwhelming; the Embassy considered the possibility that the Israelis were seeking to discourage the United States from its intent on arming Egypt.⁴³

Despite Israel's successive attempts to bolster its position in the eyes of American officials⁴⁴, Ambassador Green in Amman wasted no time in informing his government about what he described as the "unpleasantly familiar pattern of exaggeration and the distortion by Israeli press of recent border incidents" leading Jordanian officials to be apprehensive of Israel's military motives. On April 22, Israeli forces fired at Arab Legionnaires--Jordan's Security Forces--from multiple positions in Jerusalem; the result was the death of several civilians and uniformed soldiers. Jordan appealed to the United States, as a party to the Tripartite

⁴³Lynch to DOS, Tel Aviv, April 11, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1171-1172.

⁴⁴Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs, Fred E. Waller, Washington, April 22, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1177.

Declaration, to adopt the necessary steps to contain what it considered Israel's "treacherous" acts of violence against the people of Jordan.⁴⁵ On the occasion of a reception for the Diplomatic Corps at the Royal Palace in Amman, King Hussein, who was only eighteen years old, expressed his deepest regrets to Ambassador Green about Israel's recent attacks in Jerusalem. King Hussein suggested that his nation could not patiently endure more denigration and travail. Jordan's Prime Minister, Fawzi al-Mulqi, was equally forceful in declaring that the Arab Legion was fully prepared to use force immediately, thereby risking the possibility of a serious military confrontation with Israel. Al-Mulqi was prepared to invoke the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance to curb Israeli hostility. Ambassador Green's hopes of a temperate Jordanian response clashed with an impatient populace and a nervous administration in Amman.⁴⁶

The American Consul in Jerusalem, Roger S. Tyler, Jr., regarded the recent border incidents as the "most grimly serious threat to peace" in the Middle East since

⁴⁵Green to the DOS, Amman, April 23, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, pg. 1178.

⁴⁶Green to DOS, Amman, April 23, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1179-1180. The Jordanian government informed Ambassador Green that it might approach the French Charge in Amman. Green and his British colleague acknowledged the sensitivity of this matter.

the signing of the truce agreement at the Rhodes in 1949.⁴⁷ The governments of the United States and Britain displayed grave concern about Israel's unresponsive attitude toward the United Nations and its negligence in the control of its armed forces. Britain informed Washington that Jordan was acting with restraint and was seeking a future agreement with Israel. And the two governments of Amman and Tel Aviv were encouraged to pursue high level talks. France was not ready to invoke the Tripartite Declaration; the United States awaited further clarification from the United Nations before passing any judgement establishing the guilt or innocence of either party in this incident. Nonetheless, Britain challenged what it considered Israel's uncooperative attitude and questioned its professed sincerity. And the Eisenhower administration recommended the augmentation of the MAC to enhance the United Nations's capacity to supervise frontier violations more effectively.⁴⁸

On May 2, 1953, Hussein Ibn Talal was crowned King of Jordan. John F. Simmons, Chief of Protocol at the Department of State, suggested the dispatch of a "congratulatory message" from President Eisenhower to the

⁴⁷Tyler to DOS, Jerusalem, April 24, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, pgs. 1180-1181.

⁴⁸Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, April 28, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1181-1182.

Jordanian ruler in an effort to introduce the American Ambassador to his Hashimite Royal Majesty.⁴⁹ President Eisenhower expressed his deep hope that Hussein's rule would be long and prosperous and conveyed his warmest feelings that the King's reign would be one of the "milestones along our common path towards a freer world and the betterment of mankind." The King reciprocated with a similar message wishing the president and the "great American nation perpetual prosperity and success in serving right and humanity."⁵⁰ Eisenhower's note to the Jordanian sovereign was one of the first contacts between the two rulers. Time and diplomacy would bring the two statesmen closer and offer them the opportunity to respect each other.

For a short period of time, it appeared as if United States diplomacy was beginning to register appreciable marks in Amman's and Tel Aviv's Ministries for Foreign

⁴⁹A Memorandum by John F. Simmons to Thomas E. Stephens, Washington, May 14, 1953. State Department, (1 page) Stephens was the appointed Secretary to General Eisenhower until January 20, 1953; thereafter, Secretary to the President. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

⁵⁰Exchange of Messages between King Hussein and President Eisenhower on the latter's accession to the throne, DOS, Washington, 1953, Pg. 2. Ambassador Joseph C. Green transmitted Hussein's reply to the DOS. And the Jordanian Ambassador in Washington transmitted the King's message to the President. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

Affairs. Israel's General Director of the Foreign Office, Walter Eytan, received with enthusiasm United States proposals for high level negotiations over the border crisis. Eytan's only reservations touched on Eisenhower's suggestions concerning the improvement of the MAC's machinery.⁵¹ Ambassador Green believed the establishment of three MAC's would be counter-productive, leaving much room for mismanagement based on decisions taken by different organizations. He pointed out that the difficulty of finding three able Jordanians to assume "distasteful and unpopular" functions for Jordan would be a painstaking task. The Ambassador concluded that the improvement in the competence of UN observers, the publication of all violations and the implementation of the LCA demanded diligence and understanding on both sides.⁵²

American hopes to cement the fragmented pieces of an unachievable peace appeared to be coming apart. On May 5, Counselor Francis C. Russell in Tel Aviv transmitted to

⁵¹Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, May 1, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1182.

⁵²Green to DOS, Amman, May 5, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1183. On May 2, Counselor Tyler informed the DOS that the United Nations had no legal rights to amend the truce agreement between The HKJ and Israel. The establishment of new MACs required the consent of the two parties concerned. Tyler to DOS (telegram number 684A-.85/5-253, editor's footnote, same page).

the Department of State a message about Israel's "unnecessary ruthlessness in case[s] of relatively harmless and inevitable infiltration." Russell expressed his disappointment with Israel's decision to repudiate the LCA and criticized Tel Aviv's inflammatory style of exaggeration in reporting specific incidents as an attempt to defame the impartiality of the MAC. Nonetheless, the Counselor remained hopeful in view of the Secretary Dulles's planned visit to the Near East.⁵³

Dulles's Diplomatic Initiative in the Near East

Before Dulles's departure to the Near East, the Department of State prepared a "position paper" for the Secretary in which it expressed "high hopes" for the Jordan-Yarmuk scheme, known as the Unified Development Plan. The Eisenhower administration regarded the Yarmuk scheme as a vital resettlement project for Palestine's refugees. President Eisenhower directed Secretary Dulles to inform the Jordanians that the irrigation of the Jordan Valley was compatible with the interest of the United States government and hoped that the Jordan Kingdom would pass legislation to ensure that this scheme

⁵³Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, May 5, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1184-1185.

would benefit the poor refugees in the East Bank.⁵⁴

As the Secretary scheduled his visit to the Middle East in May,⁵⁵ he included land of the pharaohs as a target of his first diplomatic initiative in North Africa and the Middle East. American-Egyptian discussions centered on the fate of the Suez Canal and the future of British presence in the Canal Zone. His insistence that American policy in that region was based on the "enlightened self-interests" of the United States and other nations did not contradict his inclination to favor the British position: the internationalization of the Suez in accordance with United Nations resolutions.⁵⁶ Dulles assured Prime Minister Najib that the Department of State and the National Security Council resolved that

⁵⁴Department of State Position Paper, Washington, May 4, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1185-1188. Jordan's "optimum plan for the development of its territories in the Valley would require the use of all waters available from the Yarmuk River, and a substantial volume of fresh water from the Jordan itself which can only reach a Jordanian destination in the southern section of the valley if Israel curtails its plans to divert waters flowing into Tiberias from the North." The U.S. government planned to suggest a proposition to Israel press her "renounce" some of her claims to the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers. See pgs. 1186, 1188.

⁵⁵Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Washington, February 27, 1953. United States Foreign Relations, Diplomatic Papers, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954, Vo. 9, Part 1, Pg. 2.

⁵⁶Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Cairo, May 11, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 4-8. Fawzi Mahmoud, Egypt's Foreign Minister.

"Egypt is the country in the Middle East which, under the leadership and guidance of the Prime Minister, contains the promise of a great future." As "General to General" President Eisenhower was gravely concerned about the security of the Suez and was "seeking a balanced view of the Middle East directed against neither the Arabs nor the Jews," contrary to past policies which "perhaps centered too much of its interest on Israel as a result of pressure groups" in the United States.⁵⁷ However, Colonel Jamal abd al-Nasser would only welcome movement for the creation of an Arab League Security Pact if it were completely unconnected to the scheme proposed by the United Kingdom.⁵⁸ Ambassador Caffery in Cairo attributed the Anglo-Egyptian fiasco to what he considered a "complete lack of trust and confidence" in each other. He hoped that Dulles's talks with Nasser and Najib could restore the faith between the two countries.⁵⁹

However, the Secretary's task of repairing Arab-Israeli relations was a enormous one. Foreign Minister

⁵⁷Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Cairo, May 11, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 9,13,14.

⁵⁸Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Cairo, May 12, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, pgs. 20-25.

⁵⁹Ambassador in Egypt Caffery to DOS, Cairo, May 13, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 25-26.

Sharett was only amenable to a diplomatic resolution based on the status quo with the possibility of some insignificant territorial modifications along the disputed boundaries. He considered the status of Jerusalem a regional matter to be resolved by Jordan and Israel in collaboration with the United Nations. Secretary Dulles displayed some reservations about Sharett's assertions that the plight of the refugees was a regional matter to be settled by the Arab states.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the Secretary reaffirmed United States support for Israel in view of what he termed as the "fanatical emotionalism" of the Arabs.⁶¹ The naive secretary would soon learn an unforgettable lesson about Israeli dogmatism. His visit to Jerusalem received immense publicity in Jordan because he declined to visit Palestinian refugee camps in the surrounding areas.⁶²

On May 15, Secretary Dulles, accompanied by Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Mutual Security Administration, met with Jordanian government officials in Amman. In his personal letter to King Hussein,

⁶⁰Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Israel, Tel Aviv, May 13, 1953. FRUS, vol. IX, pgs. 29-35.

⁶¹Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in Embassy in Israel, Tel Aviv, May 14, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 37-38.

⁶²Consul General in Jerusalem (Tyler) to DOS Jerusalem, May 15, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 40-41

President Eisenhower expressed his desire to forge a peaceful settlement between Jordan and Israel because it was a question of critical importance for what he called all nations of the Free World.⁶³ Jordanian officials complained about the unresolved question of Palestinian refugees, the persistence of Israeli border raids and Israeli refusal to establish a Local Commanders Agreement. Dulles confessed to Jordanian officials that Sharett showed "great concern [about] the marauding of Jordanian infiltrators in Israel." He advised the Jordanians to create a "joint patrol of Armistice lines" as a crucial measure for the improvement of border relations between the two states. In an effort to impress American officials, Jordan's Prime Minister, Fawzi al-Mulqi, accentuated the importance of maintaining the solid ties between the United Kingdom and Jordan because they were based on "mutual interest and understanding." However, al-Mulqi also spoke about American postponement of the Yarmuk Project until after the issue of "riparian rights" was settled with Israel. The extent of the success of the Point IV program turned into a contest between Prime Minister al-Mulqi, who discredited its actual achievement, and Ambassador Green, who was quick

⁶³A letter from President Eisenhower to King Hussein of Jordan, The White House, Washington, D.C., May 8, 1953, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (1 page).

to remind his host of the work which had been accomplished under that plan.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the Prime Minister emphasized the worth of the American-Jordanian "friendship" and prided his administration on the inclusion of five youthful and energetic graduates from the American University in Beirut. His appeal for financial assistance from the United States for the development of the Yarmuk project was devoid of any political compromise; his government was not prepared to establish a peaceful settlement with Israel nor was it predisposed to share water resources with its adversarial neighbor. The Jordanian government utterly deplored American diplomacy which proposed to grant economic aid on condition of a new territorial arrangement with Israel.⁶⁵

Jordan's Foreign Minister, Hussein Khalidi, portrayed the plight of the Palestinians from an historical point of view, priding his country on taking a firm stand against communism, an ideology which was legally accepted by Israel's Communist Party. Khalidi's admonition to American officials that the Arab people

⁶⁴Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Jordan, Amman, 15 May, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 41-43.

⁶⁵Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in Embassy in Jordan, Amman, 15 May 1953. FRUS, pgs. 43-45.

were "losing faith" in the United States and Britain was met with a reminder from Stassen that the Secretary's fact finding mission was formulated to achieve a well measured and "enlightened" foreign policy.⁶⁶ However, the Secretary's striving for a diplomatic settlement was not based on the 1947 United Nations resolution, for he believed this to be "impractical and impossible of achievement." Dulles assured Jordan that his visit to Jerusalem was void of political implications, and that the Eisenhower administration was opposed both to the internationalization of Jerusalem and the transfer of the Israeli Foreign Office from Tel Aviv to the Old City. Acting in good faith, Secretary Dulles appealed to the Jordanian government to use its good offices in London and in Cairo to "help effect a reasonable and satisfactory settlement" to the Anglo-Egyptian controversy over the Canal zone. In actuality, Dulles deprecated what he regarded as the "intransigent" manner of Egyptian Officials and emphasized that the security of the Canal was a "matter of vital importance with broad ramifications" for all the Western powers in the face of Soviet expansionism.⁶⁷ In the months to come, Nasser, with alarming connections to the Soviet Union, would

⁶⁶Memorandum of Conversation, prepared in the Embassy, in Amman, May 15, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 46-48.

⁶⁷Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in Embassy in Jordan, Amman, May 15, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 48-50.

emerge as the leader of the Arab world and with sufficient strength to frustrate United States schemes in the Middle East.

However, the Arab East was neither absorbed by the impending threat from the outside nor was it primarily concerned about American-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East. Arab "bitterness" flowed from what Ambassador James L. Berry in Baghdad depicted as Arab "skepticism" toward Western intentions. Berry, who was a former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, believed that American good-will seemed to offer the only chance to remedy past Arab grievances and present concerns.⁶⁸ At least the young royal master of the Jordanian Kingdom still believed that the diplomatic negotiations between American and Jordanian officials were being conducted in an atmosphere of "friendliness and mutual understanding."⁶⁹

At the conclusion of the Amman talks, Dulles dispatched a message to Prime Minister Ben Gurion to

⁶⁸A Top Secret Telegram from Ambassador Berry to DOS, Baghdad, May 17, 1953. FRUS, pg. 88.

⁶⁹A reply by King Hussein of Jordan to the President's letter of May 8, Amman, May 24, 1953, Pg. 1. For a copy of the message of May 26, 1953, to the President from King Hussein, see the files of the president #289. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

inform him that King Hussein was deeply irritated by the precarious situation along the armistice lines. The ambitious Secretary thought that Jordan's domestic constraints, which prevented her from high level discussion with Israel, were not unsurmountable; he surmised that the prospects for the reactivation of the Local Commanders Agreement (LCA) were favorable.⁷⁰ The psychology of Tel Aviv's government was acutely affected by exaggerated press reports and right wing extremists championing a policy of military reprisal. Nonetheless, American diplomats displeased with Sharett's militant language suggested the implementation of the Three Powers Declaration in response to Israeli non-compliance with the wishes of the signatory powers.⁷¹

The findings of the Department of State and those of the President and his assistants were intertwined. On May 25, Acting Secretary of State, Walter B. Smith, in agreement with General Riley's recent findings, saw no factual basis to Tel Aviv's April accusations of

⁷⁰Dulles to Ben Gurion, Tel Aviv, May 18, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1223-1224.

⁷¹Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, May 22, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1225-1226. Also see Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, May 22, 1953. See pgs. 1244-1225.

incessant Jordanian violations of the truce agreement.⁷² As the pressure on the Israeli government increased, Prime Minister Ben Gurion seemed more sensitive to American diplomatic undertakings to restore the LCA.⁷³ However, the Prime Minister's message remained vague, and Sharett's attitude was one of vacillation.⁷⁴ Indeed, some Israeli officials persisted in believing that the diplomatic impasse stemmed from Jordan's apathy and reluctance to engage in high level discussions. They analyzed Jordan's attitude as integral to what they believed was a "coordinated Arab strategy to weaken and eventually destroy" Israel through a systematic policy of infiltrations and without directly getting entangled in warfare which could bring with it far reaching outcomes for Jordan.⁷⁵

Nonetheless, the Israeli government appeared to be in agreement with the American initiative to revive the LCA; the United States Department of State reacted

⁷²Smith to Abba S. Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. and Chairman of the Israeli Delegation at the U.N., Washington, May 25, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1226-1227.

⁷³Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, May 25, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1227-1228.

⁷⁴Russell to DOS, May 25, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1228-1229.

⁷⁵Russell to DOS, Washington, May 26, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1229-1231.

favorably. At the same time, the Eisenhower cabinet was forceful in displaying disapproval of recent Israeli comments about the importance of conquering a few "spots" for security considerations. Smith instructed the American Embassy in Amman to urge Jordan to agree to Israel's request for high level talks; at the same time he asked the British Ambassador in Amman to convey an identical message to the Jordanian government. Part of this strategy was to bolster the United Nations Supervisory Organization assuming support from France and the United Kingdom.⁷⁶

The United States Secretary's trip to the region of the Near East affirmed America's commitment to the Tripartite Declaration. Contrary to the belief circulating in some Israeli government circles, Dulles's appeals to the Arab states was not based on "rhetoric"⁷⁷ but on his firm belief in the right of all the regional states to have an equal chance to enhance their ties with the United States. His journey to the Middle East was designed to "show friendliness and to develop understanding" among the peoples of the region. In his plea to the Arab nations, the Secretary stressed that

⁷⁶Smith to Embassy in Israel, Washington, May 27, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1231-1232.

⁷⁷Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993), pgs. 79-80.

America could not "afford to be distrust[ed] by millions who could be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further swell the ranks of communist dictators." Dulles's discussions with the "charming and able" king of the Hashimite Dynasty were reassuring to the Jordanians, particularly America's expressed desire to help build irrigation facilities in Jordan.⁷⁸ A few days later, Jordan and Syria signed an agreement to exploit the Yarmuk's water resources, and to use them to generate electricity on the Southern Bank of the Yarmuk River.⁷⁹

But Dulles's remarks invoked sharp indignation from Ambassador Abba Eban of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Chairman of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations. The Ambassador completely disavowed Dulles's reference to Arab criticism of Israeli "expansion" and the occupied territory. However, the Israeli representative failed to appreciate what Henry A. Byroade called the delicate position of the Western powers in the Middle East. Byroade was entirely convinced that Arab ingratitude was a product of Western sympathy

⁷⁸Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXVIII, No. 727, Report on the Middle East by J.F. Dulles, Washington, June 1, 1953, pg. 83.

⁷⁹Al-Alaqat wal-Ittifaqiat al-Urdunnieh, June 4, 1953. "Jordan's International Relations and Agreements," 1923-1973, vol. I, edited by Ghalib Abu-Jaber (Amman: Ministry of Communication and Education, 1975), pgs. 532-533.

for Israel. He counseled the Israeli government to recognize that the interests of the Jewish state would be best served if the United States were to uphold its leverage in the Near East.⁸⁰

On June 11, Secretary Dulles dispatched two messages to congratulate Prime Ministers al-Mulqi in Amman and Ben Gurion in Tel Aviv on the restoration of the Local Commanders Agreement. John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, gave careful consideration to the handling of publicity on the latest development because of its potential risks for Jordan and the Arab States. Jernegan's fear of Arabs associating the Secretary's visit with the signing of the LCA was a real threat which invited some perils to the United States.⁸¹ On the same day, President Eisenhower delineated the main element of

⁸⁰Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Fred E. Waller, Washington, June 9, 1953. FRUS, vol. IX, Part I, 1952-1954, pgs. 1233-1235, XXXV.

⁸¹Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (John D. Jernegan) to the Secretary of State's Assistant (Roderic L. O'Connor), Washington, June 11, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1239-1240. On June 11, the Secretary sent messages of "congratulations" to the Prime Ministers of Jordan and Israel. See editor's footnote, pg. 1240. On June 10, the Israeli press publicized an incident at Tiryat Yahuda on June 9, which took place a few hours after the signing of the LCA. Tel Aviv to DOS, June 10, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1241.

American foreign relations: to "strengthen and secure friendship and cooperation among all nations loving freedom and resisting tyranny." He described Dulles's recent "pilgrimage" to the Near East as an expression of what he called the United States' "enduring responsibilities." He also considered the continuation of the policy of economic and military aid to be an "indispensable" part of American security arrangements in the Middle East.⁸²

Israel's insistence on moving its Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem remained a point of discord between the Eisenhower administration and Ben Gurion's government; Israeli ambitions stood in opposition to United Nations Resolutions.⁸³ Harold B. Minor, United States Ambassador in Beirut, wrote that in the event of Israel's decision to transfer its Foreign Office to Jerusalem the Arabs would turn from "eastward prayers to Mecca and look inquiringly and hopefully westward" to see the Western powers' reaction to that development. Minor cautioned his

⁸²U.S. President. "Eisenhower Address at the Annual Convention of the National Young Republican Organization, Mount Rushmore National Movement, South Dakota, June 11, 1953." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Registrar, National Archives and Records Service, 1953), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, 402.

⁸³Department of State Press Release, Washington, July 11, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, Part I, pg. 1254.

government that American credibility was dangling in the balance.⁸⁴ His colleagues and other Embassy officials in the Near East were also disturbed by and "deeply resentful" of Israeli conduct.⁸⁵ Although American diplomats were acclimated to the sudden shifts in the daily conduct of the regional powers, they were not prepared to pay tribute to any nation which challenged American supremacy in the Middle East. This further disputes the contention of continuity in American-Israeli relations.

The rumor of resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the state of Israel necessitated reevaluation of American foreign policy in the area. Counselor Russell believed that this shift would enhance Israel's "bargaining" position and widen alternatives vis-a-vis the United States. Nevertheless, the Counselor concluded that Soviet options were limited given Moscow's emerging role in the Middle East and the extension of its diplomatic offices to the Arab

⁸⁴Minor to DOS, Beirut, July 11, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1254-1255.

⁸⁵Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, July 11, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1255-1256. On July 10, the Embassy received a note from the Director General of the Foreign Ministry about Tel Aviv's intent on transferring its FO to Jerusalem on July 12. Telegram to DOS, July 10, 1953. (editor's note, pg. 1255).

countries.⁸⁶ Surprisingly, Israel, a nation which could not subsist without American assistance, advanced its commitment to the principle of neutrality and promised that the Jewish state "would not join any aggressive alliance" against the Soviet Union.⁸⁷ The Arab states reacted strongly; there were immediate consultations between Arab representatives and American Officials in Washington. Ambassador Charles Malik acted as the spokesman for the Arab delegates. But Jordan's Minister Haikal was reported to have said he had nothing to do with that meeting.⁸⁸ Ambassador Malik served as the Chairman of the Lebanese Delegation to the 7th, 8th, and

⁸⁶Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, July 21, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1258-1259. As a practical matter, Israel's decision to transfer its Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem invoked sharp responses from the Arab countries and the United States. On July 28, Dulles postulated that the Israeli action would cause embarrassment to the United Nations, favoring the internationalization of Jerusalem. On September 2, the UN Conciliation Commission, in response to the letter of July 16 from Israel's Foreign Office (based on the UN position on March 30, 1949) advised the Israeli government to maintain the status quo in Jerusalem. The Israeli decision was "incompatible" with paragraph eight of the General Agreement Resolution of 11 December 1948, which said that the city ought to be given a "special and separate treatment" leaving it under the aegis of the UN. Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXX, No. 766, March 1, 1953. pg. 329.

⁸⁷Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), pg. 145.

⁸⁸Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (John D. Jernegan), Washington, August 4, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1265-1268. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen were represented.

9th Regular Sessions of the UNGA between 1952 and 1954 and served as the President of the Security Council from February 1953 to January 1954, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education from November 19, 1956. Ambassador Malik assumed a prominent function in the conduct of Arab-American relations in the 1950's.

American triangular diplomatic efforts to foster peaceful co-existence between the Jordanians and the Israelis continued unabated by the endless cycle of armistice line violations. The United States Department of State assured Jordan's Minister Haikal in Washington that the United States policy of even-handedness remained unaltered. On August 25, the American Charge in Amman attested to Jordan's "extraordinary effort" to avert frontier crossings. In return, the Jordanian government gave its pledge that the placement of its armed forces on alert was designed to meet certain security concerns, and the Legionnaires were instructed to avoid retribution and never leave Jordan's territory.⁸⁹ But the Department of State persisted in worrying about the military deployments on both sides.⁹⁰ Secretary Dulles was particularly aggravated by what he termed Israel's

⁸⁹Lynch to DOS, Amman, August 25, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1292-1293.

⁹⁰DOS to Charge in Amman, August 28, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1293. (see editor's footnote).

reckless actions and its decision to transfer its Foreign Office to the Old city of Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Sharett and Ambassador Eban reacted with displeasure and criticism at the United States government decision to keep its embassies from visiting Jerusalem.⁹¹

As the last days of summer ended, American aspirations for a regional plan for the development of the Jordan Valley dissipated quickly. The proposed American economic panacea for the region's convoluted political issues failed to subdue the agitators of war and the foes of peace. Jordan's internal conditions hampered any possibility for its consent to American schemes without acquiescence by all the Arab states. Reason of state dictated that political considerations must override economic benefits. Thus, the American diplomatic approach, which Counselor Russell called "step-by-step," to narrowing the disparities between the belligerent states as manifested by the Jordan Valley Plan, was destined to fail without substantial territorial concessions by Israel.⁹² Meanwhile, the United States and Jordan forged an agreement to upgrade to embassy level the legations at Amman and Washington.

⁹¹Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, August 25, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1293-1294.

⁹²Lynch to DOS, Amman, September 2, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1319-1320.

Secretary Dulles acceded to the appointment of Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i as Jordan's representative to the United States. Abd Munim al-Rifa'i was born in Palestine in 1915. A graduate from the American University, he occupied many influential positions in the Jordanian government during the reign of King Abdullah in the 1930's and 1940's, including the position of Consul in Damascus and Cairo. In 1946, he accompanied Amir (prince) Abdullah to London for the signing of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. From 1946 to 1947, he served as Jordan's Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1949, he was appointed as a Counselor to the Jordanian Legation in Washington, while serving as the Kingdom's "Observer" at the fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.⁹³ Al-Rifa'i would play a critical role in the management of Jordan's foreign relations with the United States in the second half of the 1950's. The appointment of al-Rifa'i as Jordan's Ambassador to Washington signified the growing closeness between the two countries during the first months of the Eisenhower administration. On the other hand, the relationship between Israel and the United States lacked a certain degree of mutual trust

⁹³Dulles to the President, September 12, 1953, pg. 1 See box #289 of Eisenhower's files. Munim al-Rifa'i's last post before assuming his role as an Ambassador to the United States was as Jordan's Minister to Iran. See enclosure on pg. 2 of Dulles's message to the President, box #289. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

and confidence during Eisenhower's presidency. Israel's policy of diverting the waters of the Jordan River remained a point of disagreement with the United States.⁹⁴

On October 11, Eric Johnston, Chairman of the Advisory Board for International Development, was appointed with the rank of Ambassador as Eisenhower's Personal Representative to undertake a mission to Britain, France, and the Near East. His trip to the Near East offered a new opportunity for a regional agreement. President Eisenhower instructed Ambassador Johnston to undertake two primary tasks: securing an agreement between Israel and the Arab states (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) to divide the utilization of the Jordan river basin; and establishing an agreement between Amman and Tel Aviv for the international control of Jerusalem. Johnston's mission had the "full backing" of the President.⁹⁵ Eisenhower's scheme was presumably formulated to the "benefit of all the people" in the

⁹⁴Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Parker T. Hart. Washington, October 8, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1344.

⁹⁵Acting Secretary of State (Donald B. Lourie) to United Kingdom, Washington, October 11, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, pgs. 1345-1346.

Middle East.⁹⁶

But Jordan's domestic conditions were not conducive to carry on American economic programs. In his coronation address to the Jordanian Parliament, King Hussein affirmed his commitment to the Palestine question, noting Jordan's role in the Arab League's Political Committee's latest meeting in Amman which called for the mobilization of the national energies to meet the Kingdom's duties and responsibilities toward the occupied land until its final liberation.⁹⁷ Talcott W. Seelye, Third Secretary and Vice Consul of the American Embassy in Amman, depicted the Kingdom's attitude on the eve of Johnston's mission to the Near East as one of "disillusionment." The American Charge foresaw the rapidly growing "signs of anti-Americanism." He counseled administration officials against publicizing the Johnston proposal, fearing its adverse effect on American-Jordanian relations, particularly in a country with a sizable discontented

⁹⁶U.S. President. "Statement by the President on Eric Johnston's Mission to the Near East, October 16, 1953." Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1953), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pg. 678.

⁹⁷Hussein's coronation Speech before the Jordanian Parliament, Amman, October 1, 1953. Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah Li-khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, Part I (Amman: Ministry of Communication and Education, 1985), pgs. 29-30.

Palestinian citizenry. Seelye believed that an American quest for implementation of the Jordan Valley scheme would be purposeless without a political settlement and advised the President to approach Jordan quietly and carefully.⁹⁸

The Department of State's Response to the Qibya Affair

Jordan's political climate in the fall of 1953 was agitated by Israel's endless military assaults on Jordanian Villages. The Israeli organized raid on Qibya left 45 civilians, mostly women and children, dead or injured. Fifteen were wounded; thirty-nine houses were demolished; shops were looted. Prime Minister Fawzi al-Mulqi of Jordan reacted to the attacks with "utmost gravity," taking into consideration the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. Foreign Minister Hussein F. Khalidi was beginning to lose his patience as the Kingdom's level of endurance and its capacity to pursue a policy of restraint rapidly diminished. Khalidi threatened immediate reprisal if one shot crossed the Jordanian frontier. Jordan's vulnerability to domestic pressure was intense and its government was in a susceptible position. Seelye remarked that the Jordanians were never so disturbed as by the

⁹⁸Seelye to DOS, Amman, October 13, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1353-1355.

Israeli "massacre" (his characterization), which stood in "sharp contrast" to Jordanian actions. He thought that the timing of this operation was bad, coming as it did during the embryonic stages of Johnston's mission. Moreover, Israel's decision to transfer its Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem, combined with its policy of diverting Jordan's water resources, and its occupation of the demilitarized zone of Auja, infuriated American policy architects. Seelye summed up the impact of this episode on American diplomatic initiatives in the Near East as having severe implications for the proposed Jordanian-Israeli discussions. American hopes were all "dashed to smithereens."⁹⁹

The political repercussions on Jordan were acute. Demonstrations by schoolboys erupted in Amman as well as in Palestinian towns including Jerusalem and Ramallah. They chanted anti-American and anti-British slogans and accused the Arab Legionnaires of collaborating with the

⁹⁹Seelye to DOS, Amman, October 15, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1358-1359. When the Israelis broke into the Village of Qibya, they fired "indiscriminately" at anything or "anybody who attempted to leave his house...The village was also completely wrecked. When a great part of the village had been reduced to heaps of rubble, with the inhabitants buried beneath the ruins, the Israelis withdrew, after throwing incendiary bombs." It was a "major massacre." Sixty-six people were killed, mostly women and children, and forty-two houses were destroyed. Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1958), pgs. 309-310.

Jews against the Palestinians. Conditions in Jordan were so inflamed and the people were so sensitive that Glubb's friends and editors in local newspapers were unwilling to publish anything which contradicted the prevailing mood. Dubious reports circulated that King Abd al-Aziz Saud was financing Palestinian operations in Damascus to launch attacks on Israel, an action which (if proven) might have invited Israeli reprisal and led to internal turmoil in Jordan. Moreover, the Arab League Political Committee held an emergency meeting after this incident to discuss the deteriorating situation.¹⁰⁰

American reaction to the Qibya affair was decisive. James J. Wadsworth, Deputy Representative to the UN's Security Council (SC), urged the President of the SC to consider the recent attacks in accordance with the General Armistice Agreement. The United Kingdom and France also requested deliberations on this matter.¹⁰¹ Israel's Foreign Minister Sharett, while displaying interest in high level talks to discuss the situation,

¹⁰⁰John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pgs. 313-316.

¹⁰¹Acting US Representative at the UN (Wadsworth) to the President of the Security Council, New York, October, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1361. Also see editor's footnote on same page. U.K. Britain's reaction to the Qibya Affairs, 5 November 1953. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Sess., vol. 520 (1953), pg. 318.

defended his country's military conduct in the light of what he regarded as the rapid currents of "lawlessness" on the borders. Counselor Russell was convinced that the raid would lead to further escalation and friction among the conflicting states.¹⁰² On October 18, American officials at the State Department communicated their anger at what they termed the "shocking reports" and expressed their profound compassion for the families of the victims.¹⁰³ Similarly, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Anthony Eden, "deplored" what he considered the "outrageous" events at the Arab Village of Qibya. This incident was of particular concern to England because the tension in the region had escalated into a precarious situation. England's desire to preserve the political stability of the Middle East, her obligations as a party to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and her commitment to Jordan under the Treaty of Alliance all put the Foreign Office on high alert. However, Eden maintained that the long frontier between Jordan and Israel, together with the imprecise lines of demarcation separating villagers from their land, homes from their gardens, paved the way for many destitute Palestinian refugees, some with "innocent purposes" and a few with

¹⁰²Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, October 17, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1364-1367.

¹⁰³Department of State Press Release, Washington, October 18, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1367.

intent on "armed robberies," to cross the frontier.¹⁰⁴

Israel justified its policy of retribution under the pretext that there were insufficient deterrent or preventive measures against Palestinian infiltrators. Israel's assertions about its national security necessitated the adoption of decisive measures to curtail what Walter Eytan considered the "constant menace" to the frontier towns in Israel. Eytan, a graduate in philology from Oxford University, had previously served as the spokesman for the Jewish Agency and the Provisional Government of 1948 during the siege of Jerusalem. He was instrumental in drafting the structural framework for Israel's Foreign Office. The smiling official explained Israel's assault on Qibya as a product of concerted efforts by the Arab states to disquiet Israel's sense of security. From Tel Aviv's point of view, Israel's "punitive rather than retaliatory" action was a counter-response to what Eytan regarded as a "series of

¹⁰⁴U.K. Parliamentary Debates, 5 November 1953. 5th session, vol. 520 (Commons). Eden was convinced that Jordan was neither "conniving" nor "encouraging" incursions. He stressed that Jordan took substantial measures to stop it. However, the Secretary called for a "sustained, extensive and systematic attempt to deal with these refugees," without which, the hope for peace would be futile. Pg. 322. Eden served as British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. FRUS, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, Part I, pg. XVIII.

exceptionally destructive raids" on the frontiers.¹⁰⁵ However, neither Eytan's vindications of his country's ruthlessness nor American sympathy for the victims were compelling enough to contain the rising current of Arab anxiety and frustration. Jordan's Prime Minister was under tremendous pressure from the Arab states not to appeal to the Tripartite powers, a Western coalition which was viewed with apprehension and disdain. The Arab countries collectively called for a "positive action." Fawzi al-Mulqi promised not to initiate any reprisal, but characterized American pressure on the Jewish state as being entirely purposeless. He demanded that American aid to Israel be halted and warned that Johnston's mission would have no significance without demonstration of American resolve and disapproval of Israel's recent attacks.¹⁰⁶ The Arab states and the Western powers believed that Israel's excessive use of force was disproportional to the actions of a few infiltrators who mistakenly or deliberately crossed the armistice lines in search of their flocks or in defiance of a state which unjustifiably occupied their land. The representatives of the United States, Britain, and France drafted a note

¹⁰⁵Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), Pgs. 106-108. Also see New York Times, April 27, 1958, pg. 32.

¹⁰⁶Lynch to DOS, Amman, October 8, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1367-1369.

recommending immediate steps to minimize the tension in the area and urged the Security Council to denounce Israel for the Qibya incident.¹⁰⁷ On October 20, Secretary Dulles held a press conference to discuss the American position on deferred economic aid to Israel. For Dulles, Israel's reaction to General Bennike's decision, combined with her recent action "seemed to provide a greater reason for taking seriously that refusal" in complying with wishes of the United Nations.¹⁰⁸ American representatives were instructed to inform the Arab States of the American response concerning Qibya and withholding of aid from Israel.¹⁰⁹

Some members of the Carl H. Anderson Subcommittee of the House of Appropriations Committee telegraphed the President from the American Embassy in New Delhi a note expressing their "unanimous" decision to protest American economic aid to Israel because of Tel Aviv's unilateral determination to divert the waters of the Jordan River in the demilitarized area of Banat Yaacov. Israel's breach of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization's

¹⁰⁷Lynch to DOS, October 18, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1369. (see editor's footnote).

¹⁰⁸Verbatim Record of the Press and Radio News Conference of the Secretary of State, Washington, October 20, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1369-1371.

¹⁰⁹DOS to Embassies, October 20, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1371. (see editor's footnote).

ruling on this question, combined with her violent actions on the borders, constituted a compelling explanation for the withholding of American funds from the Jewish state. Moreover, Israel's aggressive policy was causing strains in American relations with Arabs and the Moslem world.¹¹⁰ However, Secretary Dulles, ostensibly operating under immense domestic pressure, appears to have been in favor of the continuation of economic aid to Israel.¹¹¹ The Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC), which represented approximately four hundred and sixty congregations throughout the United States, was disconcerted by the administration's charges against what UAHC called the "young democracy of Israel which has gallantly and unswervingly upheld the highest traditions of civilization and humanity."¹¹²

¹¹⁰Smith to President, Washington, October 21, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1371-1372. Also see editor's note, telegram from New Delhi, October 18, 1953. pg. 1372.

¹¹¹A telephone call from President Eisenhower to Secretary Dulles concerning Jordan River Project, Tuesday October 27, 1953. Ann Whitman F160, DDE Diary Series, pg. 7. II Collection: DDE, Papers as Presidents of the United States, 1953-1961. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

¹¹²The UAHC text can be found along with a letter for Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, to Mr. S.S. Hollander, Washington, November 3, 1953. IX. Collection: Central Files, box 587, File: 116-K Near East. See enclosures. In his suggested letter to Hollander, Sherman Adams asserted that the Israel-Jordan MAC voted that the attack on Qibya was orchestrated by Israel Defence Forces, leading to the actual destruction of the entire village. Accordingly, the U.S. issued a statement expressing its worry about that episode. And the funds to

Although the Secretary was still willing to furnish Israel with its primary requirements for survival, his policy of firmness toward the Jewish state remained unchanged. Neither the Eisenhower administration nor the Jordanian government were impressed by Israel's protestations of virtue and innocence.

Although Jordan's Prime Minister was "favorably impressed" by the Johnston proposal,¹¹³ the political atmosphere in Amman was speedily deteriorating and the Arab League was expected to repudiate altogether the American proposals. Jordan's Foreign Minister began the discussion by "insulting references" to Johnston's alleged "Zionist" tendencies. The cabinet of al-Mulqi refused any discussions with the Israelis based on Jordanian conviction that the United States was planning to build the Yarmuk project regardless of Jordan's position. Americans could only hope that the Jordanian government would carefully consider United States development schemes in the Middle East.¹¹⁴ Jordan's resentment against the United States was reaching a high

Israel would be released when Israel complied with the SC. See O.F. 116-K. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

¹¹³Lynch to DOS, Amman, October 22, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1381-1382.

¹¹⁴Lynch to DOS, Amman, October 25, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1383-1384.

intensity. Counselor Lynch was alarmed by the rapid dwindling of American standing in Jordan, never so low since 1948. Evidence against United States complacency in the enforcement of United Nations resolutions on Palestine was irrefutable. Counselor Lynch attributed the rise of the "anti-American" sentiment to Washington's disregard for Arab grievances. He exhorted American officials against what he called this "extremely unfortunate stage" which had arisen from a "seriously dangerous lack of realism." He believed that United States coercion of Jordan to conduct negotiations with Israel would be dangerous and reckless. Thus, Lynch concluded, the diplomacy of withholding economic aid from Amman would seriously undermine American objectives and facilitate the rise of communism and nationalism in Jordan.¹¹⁵

This view was shared by the young King of Jordan who estimated the growth of communism among the refugees as prevalent to the "most disturbing degree." The ruler of Jordan was "desperately anxious to prevent a blow up and to hold his people back," in the light of recent Israeli actions. Lynch remarked that the issue of refugees was one of immense exigency for Jordanians and

¹¹⁵Lynch to DOS, Amman, November 4, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1404-1405.

the pretense of any collaboration with Israel would have severe repercussions on Hussein's Kingdom. Lynch noted that if the "door in Jordan was ever open it is now shut tight."¹¹⁶ The volatility in Jordan's political atmosphere was accompanied by the Arab states' striving for what Russell called American "objectivity and even-handedness" on critical questions, particularly Israel's transfer of its Foreign Office to Jerusalem, and Eisenhower's backing of United Nations resolutions on Israeli border assaults. Russell was emphatic in his warning that what he regarded as Israeli "aggressiveness and disregard of rights" would sabotage American diplomatic endeavors.¹¹⁷ Indeed, Israel's campaign to persuade the American public of her righteous cause, together with her supercilious and "obtrusive" stance with the UN, and her vexing style with the Arabs were all portrayed as inimical to the American quest for regional stability.¹¹⁸

Meanwhile, Ambassador Johnston counseled the Eisenhower administration to make the Jordan Valley

¹¹⁶Lynch to DOS, Amman, November 11, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1410-1412,

¹¹⁷Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, November 15, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1414-1415.

¹¹⁸Paper prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Washington, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1407-1409.

scheme a "central element" of United States policy in the Middle East. The Johnston mission, which aimed at a political settlement in the region, acknowledged the limits of American diplomacy and "assured" the Arab states that their consent to the plan was not linked to "direct" talks or agreements with Israel. Britain and France showed prodigious interest in the scheme.¹¹⁹ But Israeli officials became very critical of the United Nations resolution's leniency toward Jordan and noted the "language virtually approves Jordan's failure to control its borders and does not provide any warning note from the Jordanian point of view." Israel's disappointment with the U.N. was compounded by American discouragement of Ambassador Eban over Israel's readiness to negotiate with the Arab states outside the MAC.¹²⁰ Contrary to the assertion that the Department of State "would go out of its way to blame [Israel for] whatever incidents might occur, without equal attention to Arab hostility"¹²¹, evidence of Israeli misconduct was unchallenged. On November 24, the Security Council found Israel's military

¹¹⁹Report by the President's Special Representative (Johnston) to the President, [Washington ?] November 17, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1418-1423.

¹²⁰Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs, Waller, [Washington], November 20, 1953. FRUS pgs. 1430-1431.

¹²¹Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel 1953-1960 (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993), pgs. 80-81.

action in Qibya to be in "violation of the cease fire provisions of Security Council resolution 54(1948) and in contradiction with the terms of GAA between the two states and the United Nations Charter."¹²²

The United Nations resolution concerning Qibya was a major disappointment for Israeli diplomats. The chief diplomat of the Israeli Embassy in Washington worked diligently to extricate his country from the stigma of careless military retribution and impropriety. Ambassador Eban's skillful protestation to the United States about Amman's alleged lack of cooperation placed Jordan in an embarrassing situation. Eban nearly turned Israel's setback into a small diplomatic victory. On November 23, Ambassador Eban protested to the Secretary General about Jordan's failure to comply with article XII of the Jordan-Israel general agreement which required both sides to hold consultations and confer in accordance with that arrangement. Under the armistice agreement it was "obligatory for the parties to participate in such

¹²²Resolution 101 (1953) adopted by the United Nations Security Council on November 24, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1436. The resolution requested General Bennik to report within 3 months to the SC on the question of Compliance and the implementation of the GAA and in accordance with article XII requiring both states to confer under that agreement. pg. 1437.

conferences."¹²³ Eban played effectively on Jordan's vulnerabilities. Israel's decision to invoke article XII was taken without previous consultations with the Eisenhower administration. Dulles agreed with the Israeli Ambassador and warned that it would be a "serious mistake" for Jordan not to conform with its obligations under the General Armistice Agreement. The Secretary warned that Jordanian defiance of American pressure could severely injure its international standing and American backing would stand in question if Amman refused to cooperate. At the same time, Dulles directed the embassy in Amman to transmit the following message to the Israeli government: "It would be unwise for Israel to exert pressure which would embarrass [the] Government of Jordan with its people and force it into [an] intransigent position. We believe Israel's best course is to strive for limited, and therefore possibly attainable, objectives."¹²⁴ Dulles believed that any other course of action would be destined to failure.

Israel's excessive maneuvering and negativism threatened what Lynch described as Jordan's "extremely favorable position" and reputation in the world. But the

¹²³Eban to Secretary General, November 23, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1437. (see editor's footnote).

¹²⁴Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, November 24, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1437-1438.

American Counselor in Amman was careful to omit Dulles's severe comments to Jordan's Prime Minister about the possible decline of American sympathy for the Jordanians in the event of his government's continued resistance to United States appeals.¹²⁵ Only a cultivated diplomat would recognize the detrimental impact of the Secretary's careless language on American-Jordanian relations. Prime Minister Fawzi al-Mulqi was sympathetic to the idea of conforming with Article XII. However, many members of the Jordanian government, fearful for their lives, and "extremely apprehensive of [domestic] political implications of any action which might be construed by opponents as cooperation with Israel," firmly objected the concept of holding discussions on ministerial level with Israeli delegates. Nonetheless, the United States and the United Kingdom urged the government of Jordan to agree to the proposed discussions before consulting with the Arab countries.¹²⁶

But the fears of the Western powers were soon realized. On December 2, the Jordanian government informed Arab diplomatic representatives (through Syria) that the Secretary General's proposal for a meeting was

¹²⁵Lynch to DOS, Amman, November 28, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1446.

¹²⁶Lynch to DOS, Amman, November 30, 1953. FRUS, pgs. 1448-1449.

unrealistic under the current circumstances. Jordan declared its willingness to consider Israel's request under article II of the Armistice Agreement of the Mixed Armistice Commission on measures needed by Tel Aviv to illuminate any obscurities. Ambassador Mallory characterized this decision as an act of arrogance engineered by Foreign Minister Khalidi. He anticipated the ruling would be revoked by what he called the more "responsible Jordanians" of the Mulqi ministry. However, the climate of fear and pride appeared to be shadowing both the capital and the outskirts of the Kingdom despite repeated American and British representations to Amman's government.¹²⁷

Arab diplomatic pressure on Amman stiffened the Jordanian position on the controversial issue over article XII and the delicate question of Jerusalem. Jordan's opposition to the internationalization of that city now became complete. Prime Minister al-Mulqi's recent discussions with the Political Committee meeting in Cairo confirmed his country's unwavering stand on this matter. It is to be recalled that former Prime Minister Abu al-Huda held the position that Jordan's final decision on Jerusalem was conditional, contingent on

¹²⁷Mallory to DOS, Amman, December 2, 1953. FRUS, pg. 1449.

previous consultations with the Arab states. Moreover, the bulk of the Palestine Political Committee, headed by Izzat Tannous in Beirut, was not in favor either, nor was Colonel Eddy, Former American Minister to Saudi Arabia, supposedly an "espouser of [the] Arab cause". And the Islamic Congress for the Palestine Question which convened in Jerusalem regarded any step moving toward conciliation as connivance against the world of Islam. Consul Roger Tyler, Jr., noted that this attitude reflected Muslim apprehension of the possibility of Jewish dominance, possibly reinforced by the insistence of the Jordanian delegation on taking hard line on this matter. Tyler endorsed the scheme which called for the demilitarization of the city to safeguard the Holy sites and establish a what he deemed a "sense of security among Christians." Surprisingly, Brigadier General Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff, Israel Defence Forces, appeared to be in favor of the question of demilitarization.¹²⁸

On December 10, the newly appointed Jordanian envoy to the United States, Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Hashimite Kingdom, assumed his ambassadorial functions in

¹²⁸Consul Tyler to DOS, Jerusalem, January 11, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1472-1475, XVII.

Washington.¹²⁹ On the occasion of presenting his Letter of Credential to President Eisenhower, Ambassador Rifa'i remarked:

We in Jordan fully understand the goals and ideals which the United States of America is seeking for the people of the world. The efforts that are being made under your illustrious leadership for the cause of freedom, justice, and world peace. Therefore, in cooperation with our sister Arab states, we are determined to take our part in this great human task. We are confident that we shall be able to surmount our own difficulties, and we look forward to the assistance of our friends for the attainment of our just national aspirations, so that we may be able to contribute more in the service of mankind.¹³⁰

Al-Rifa'i would become one of Hussein's most loyal servants. In the following days, Dr. Yusuf Haikal,

¹²⁹R.D. Muir (Acting Chief of Protocol) to Thomas E. Stephens (Secretary to the President at the White House), December 10, 1953. Box # 289, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pg. 1.

¹³⁰Letter from R.D. Muir, Acting Chief of Protocol, President Secretary, Thomas Stephens, concerning Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i. The translated remarks of Ambassador Rifa'i on the occasion of his presentation to President Eisenhower, December 10, 1953. Department of State, File: O.F. 289, pg. 2. See enclosure. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

Minister of the Hashimite Embassy in Washington until December 14, was recalled by King Hussein to Jordan. In his letter to President Eisenhower, King Hussein stressed the "invariable friendship" between the two leaders. Hussein esteemed Eisenhower as a "loyal friend" and regarded himself as such.¹³¹ But the cheering communiqué from the ruler of the Hashimite Dynasty and his new Ambassador to the United States and the majestic language of international diplomacy could not stifle the longstanding grievances of the Jordanian people. Despite inexhaustible American endeavors to counsel the Jordanian government to accept the Israeli proposition for direct negotiations, the month of January 1954 was eclipsed by historical circumstances (Arab League opposition to any unilateral discussions with the Jewish state, combined with the Kingdom's excited political climate, and Israel's repeated military retaliation) antithetic to American ambitions, rendering the exponents of peace powerless, at least temporarily.

However, The Department of State, which assumed the primary function on Jordanian-Israeli border affairs, was

¹³¹Memorandum for Mr. Hopkins from John Simmons, Chief of Protocol, Department of State, Regarding Yusuf Haikal. Enclosed is a letter of recall from King Hussein to President Eisenhower, December 8, 1953, Royal Palace, Amman, pg. 1. See XI Collection, Central Files: Official File, Washington, O.F. #289, December 24, 1953. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

still bent on reaching an agreement. President Eisenhower charged the Department of State with the responsibility of administering foreign relations, a dramatic departure from the previous administration. The Foreign Service Officer Corps would be tripled over the next three years, expanding from twelve hundred to approximately thirty-five hundred participants.¹³² John Foster Dulles, having established his dominance over this institution, was not prepared to accede to the latest diplomatic impasse. Secretary Dulles advised the government of Israel to explore other options rather than engaging the Jordanians in legal debates over Article XII of the MAC. American officials considered the Arab states' guarded reply to the Secretary General's communique as a sign of hope. Rueven Shiloah, former Special Adviser to Israel's Foreign Office and a Liaison Officer with the Ministry of Defense until 1953, and now Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, suggested that the Secretary General convene a meeting under his authority without giving any regard to Jordan's reaction to the Secretary's first request. He disclosed the possibility his country's likely consent to the Jordanian position, but requested that the United States government keep this possibility

¹³²Andrew L. Steigman, The Foreign Service of the United States (Boulder and London: Westview Press 1985), pg. 26.

unknown to the Arab countries.¹³³ Ambassador Eban was frustrated and Byroade was "inclined to share the Ambassador's dim view" of the latest development in the area, but he was not entirely dispirited by the recent diplomatic stalemate. The two men essentially agreed that Jordan should abide by its treaty obligations under Article XII of the Armistice Agreement.¹³⁴

Jordan's uncompromising position was also triggered by reports of a sizable package, presumably accounting for eighty million dollars in economic aid, from the United States to Israel. Moreover, the distressing events

¹³³Dulles to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, January 2, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1469-1470. Also see pg. XXXII.

¹³⁴Memorandum of Conversation by Waller, Washington, January 15, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1479-1481. Minister Reuven Shiloah of the Israeli Embassy accompanied Eban. In his comments on Arab-Israeli relations, Eban admitted that the Egyptian Blockade of the "Suez Canal transit facilities is costing Israel annually an amount equivalent to US aid." The Ambassador expressed his hopes to appeal to the SC to abolish restrictions on Israeli shipping in the Canal. He believed that America's supplying of arms to the Arab states would increase the "intransigence" of the Arab Countries, particularly Saudi Arabia (its King abd al-Aziz Saud reported to have called for the destruction of Israel) and Iraq which Eban regarded as one of the "spearheads of anti-Israeli activity." Bryroade promised the Israeli representatives that the US government would take the matter to its Embassy in Jidda, and if alleged Saudi remarks were confirmed to be true, the Ambassador would regard such a statement as "deplorable." Byroade also assured the Israeli representatives that American arms supplies to the Arab states would not constitute a threat to Israeli security. FRUS, pgs. 1479-1480.

in Egypt and the reported military coup in Syria received much of Hussein's attention. Mallory reported that many strange things were occurring in the Middle East, particularly the King's contention that Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been active in securing Russian help to the Arab states on three different occasions that year. The American Ambassador in Amman cautioned that American financial assistance to Israel was facilitating communist progress in the Middle East.¹³⁵ The Eisenhower administration was quick to assure Jordan that American aid to Israel only accounted for \$39,375,000 for the first three quarters of the fiscal year 1954, and that existing plan only allocated \$13,125,000 for the fourth quarter. United States officials assured the Jordanian government that the prospects for continued economic aid to Israel were expected to diminish in the succeeding years.¹³⁶

¹³⁵Mallory to DOS, Amman, February 25, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1485. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, served as Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs until March 1953; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the United Nations from March 1953 to November 1954; Representative on the Security Council and Chairman of the Soviet Delegations to the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Refugee Sessions of the GA until November 22, 1954. pg. XXXV.

¹³⁶DOS to Embassy in Amman, February 26, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, the Near and Middle East, Part I, pg. 1485. (editors note). American aid to Israel for the fiscal year 1953 totalled \$70,228,000. See document on same page.

At the same time, American officials labored vigorously to repulse rumors of a recent military build-up on the Syro-Israeli borders.¹³⁷ Jordan's Foreign Minister communicated to Ambassador Mallory in Amman his anxiety about the recent remarks made by Israeli Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan. Mallory believed that Jordan's recognition of Israel's military preponderance was an adequate deterrent to that country undertaking an action against its neighbor. Moreover, John Glubb's "moderating influence" over the Arab Legion rendered Israeli pretensions and misgivings bootless.¹³⁸ The American Charge in Tel Aviv attested to Mallory's assertions but described the chain of current Arab-Israeli provocative incidents during this period as a "divided" responsibility. Russell suggested the enforcement of the Three Powers Declaration to goad Jordan to abide by Article XII of the MAC, a measure necessary to prevent a possible military engagement

¹³⁷Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, March 17, 1954. FRUS, pg. 1487.

¹³⁸Mallory to DOS, Amman, March 18, 1954. FRUS, pg. 1488. On March 18, an Israeli bus-passenger was presumably killed in an ambush at Scorpion Pass, near Beersheba, from which Jordan feared an Israeli retribution. Embassy in Amman to DOS, March 18, 1954. pg. 1488.

between the two sides.¹³⁹ Alfred Naccache, Lebanese Foreign Minister, urged the United Kingdom to impress upon the Israeli government wise and moderate action, refraining from making inflammatory remarks about Dayan's comments that a war with the Arabs was unavoidable.¹⁴⁰ Arab misgivings about Israeli retaliatory raids into Arab territory were complicated by Israel's domestic considerations. The government of Israel was torn between Sharett's call for moderation and the proponents of a forceful military policy (such as Lavon and Dayan) was as

¹³⁹Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, March 18, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1489-1490. The month of March witnessed a significant rise in border violations on both sides. Syria's "occasional" firing of missiles upon Israeli boats in Lake Tiberias, combined with the recent Syrian-Lebanese troop movements toward the border was countered by Israel's conduct in demilitarized zones. Moreover, the "unnecessarily harsh ambushing" of Arabs infiltrators with "non-aggressive intent" and Israeli firing of "land-based" artillery on Syrian villages on the eastern shore of Tiberias, including reported murder of Jordanian shepherds at Yruod, agitated Russell. The Israelis were also concerned about the US policy of military aid to the Arabs, and American likely support of Egypt in its Suez case caused Israel's fear of Arab "overconfidence." This was together with Jordan's resistance of Jordan (with support of Arab league) to comply with Article XII of the AA. Pg. 1489.

¹⁴⁰Ambassador Raymond A. Hare in Lebanon to DOS, Beirut, March 19, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1490-1491. Hare assumed an Ambassadorial post to Saudi Arabia until July 8, 1953; Ambassador to Lebanon, 29 September 1953 to 1 October 1954; Director General of the Foreign Service, DOS, from 19 October 1954. pg. XXX.

a demonstration Israeli of strength and resoluteness.¹⁴¹

Secretary Dulles directed American missions in the Middle East to advise temperance, cautioning against the potential for a large scale war.¹⁴² On March 23, Stephen P. Dorsey, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, confirmed that Tel Aviv's delegation to the MAC abruptly terminated their discussions with the Jordanian representatives under the pretext that the MAC failed to agree on a decision to denounce Jordan's alleged ambush of an Israeli bus at the Scorpion Pass. Ambassador Rifa'i in Washington depicted the Israeli representatives as "violent in their expressions" and the situation as being

¹⁴¹Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, March 19, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, the Near and Middle East, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, pgs. 1491-1492.

¹⁴²Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, March 19, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1493-1494. Syrian deployment of its troops on the Syro-Israeli borders, in the Embassy's view, was designed to bolster its "defensive" forces in the light of domestic strife in Damascus and Cairo, particularly after the improvement of ties between Iraq and Syria. Embassy in Tel Aviv to DOS, March 15. FRUS, pg. 1493. The Embassy in Damascus confirmed that the decision taken by Syria's government to reinforce its forces was in response to Israel's attack on Lake Tiberias and a reported Israeli mobilization to its armed forces. Moreover, the "paralysis" of the Syrian regime due to domestic unrest starting on February 25 was a clear evidence that Syria's troop movement was a reaction to Israeli movements on February 27, and therefore, it was "defensive" in character. The Embassy concluded that there was no evidence that Damascus and/or Baghdad were seeking to undermine the 1949 truce agreement. Embassy in Damascus to DOS, March 18. FRUS, pg. 1493.

gravely perilous. Byroade's assurances hardly satisfied the Jordanian Ambassador that the Eisenhower administration was watching the developments closely.¹⁴³

However, Ambassador Charles Malik of Lebanon questioned the authenticity of the professed American policy of impartiality in the face of Israeli defiance to United Nations decisions. He threatened to invoke the Arab Collective Security Pact to deflect any foreseeable Israeli onslaught on Jordanian territory. Assistant Secretary Byroade, being a defender of the Administration's policy in the Near East, insisted that the apprehensions were mutual, for Israel viewed the American policy of arming the Arabs as its chief security concern. He warned both sides to be tolerant and assured the Arab delegates that the United States would invoke the Tripartite Declaration in the event of an Israeli offensive.¹⁴⁴ Similar talks were held between American

¹⁴³Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, March 23, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1494. Stephen P. Dorsey was the Officer in charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, DOS, January 4 to December 8, 1952; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, December 8, 1952 to February 1, 1953. FRUS, pg. XVII.

¹⁴⁴Memonradum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria Affairs, Francis O. Allen. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1495-1497. Allen worked in the Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, DOS, until

and Israeli Embassy officials in Washington. Ambassador Eban formally requested the United States to bring the issue of Jordanian refusal to abide by Article XII of the Armistice Agreement before the Security Council. However, Dulles rejected Israeli assertions; United States accounts showed only expansion in Israeli policing activities and the loss of many Jordanian lives.¹⁴⁵

America's cautionary message of restraint to the Israeli government dissipated fleetingly under the stress of regional upheaval and politics. On March 30, Jordan's Foreign Minister, Hussein Fahkri al-Khalidi, cabled the United Nations Secretary-General, charging that Israel's military forces had on 28 March raided the village of Nahlin. Nine people were killed, and fourteen civilians

March 1954. FRUS, pg. XI. The Chief diplomats of the Arab delegation included: Ambassador Moussa al-Shabandar of Iraq, Ambassador to the U.S. from 26 September 1953; Foreign Minister, 8 March to 29 April 1954, held the same position from 4 August, 1954. FRUS, pg. XXXII. Ambassador Sheik Asad al-Faqih of Saudi Arabia; Charge d'Affaires Al-ssayed Ahmed Ali Zabarah, First Secretary of the Yemeni Embassy in the United States; Charge d'Affaires Abd al-Shafi al-Labban, First Secretary of the Egyptian Embassy in the United States from January 1952 to April 1953; Counselor from April 1953 to February 1954. FRUS, pg. XXIV. Ambassador Zein al-din of Syria and Ambassador Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i of Jordan.

¹⁴⁵Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert L. Burnes of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, march 25, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1497-1499. Burnes was the Acting Political Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary of State in the Near East for Economic and Technical Assistance at Beirut, 1952, pg. XV.

were injured.¹⁴⁶ Ambassador Rifa'i of Jordan was swift to remind American officials that the Arabs' worst fears were realized at Nahlin. Rifa'i protested American inactivity as a signatory to the Three-Power Declaration and charged the administration with the failure of its responsibility for preventing this incident or any future developments. However, the Eisenhower administration was not amenable to Rifa'i suggestion of bringing the issue before the Security Council. American officials believed that the United States was acting in good faith toward both sides, viewing the conflict in the Middle East as an extension of the East-West world contest. But the Jordanian Ambassador noted the Arab states "may feel compelled to take action which would force the West to rectify the unsatisfactory state of affairs." Byroade's non-committal response prompted Ambassador Rifa'i to caution the Assistant Secretary that the Arab countries were beginning to perceive the Soviet Union as a new partner.¹⁴⁷ Although "No Arab government could possibly survive a Communist revolution," practically every Arab state "flirted" with the Soviet Union in an effort to drive Britain out of the Middle East and to punish Israel

¹⁴⁶U.N. doc. S/31/92. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 784.

¹⁴⁷Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert L. Burns of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, March 31, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1500-1502.

while improving Arab standing in the world.¹⁴⁸ On April 1, Lebanon's representative in Washington requested on behalf of Jordan the inclusion of an item on the Security Council's agenda for "urgent considerations." In the succeeding days, the Israeli government would ask for a similar consideration regarding Jordan's unwillingness to meet its obligations under the terms of the Armistice Agreement.¹⁴⁹

In response to Jordanian protestations, Byroade urged Secretary Dulles to take swift measures to avoid the possibility of a general war prior to the anticipated Security Council deliberations. American intelligence gathered that Israel was intentionally inciting border violations in what appeared to be a preparatory phase for military confrontation with the Arab states. Israel's military objective was to revise the Armistice Agreements and establish a final settlement with its neighbours. Robert Burns, a Political Adviser at the Office of Near Eastern Affairs believed that "substantial guilt for the critical state of affairs was attributable to Israel" and

¹⁴⁸Security and the Middle East the Problem and its Solution, proposals, submitted to the President of the United States, April, 1954, Pg. 109.

¹⁴⁹Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert L. Burns of the Office of the Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, March 31, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, the Near and Middle East, vol. IX, Part I, pg. 1500.

placed "heavy responsibility" on Tel Aviv. Burns warned that Israel's insistence on military retribution would be harmful to American-Israeli relations, possibly forcing the United States, together with Britain and France, to oppose that country openly.¹⁵⁰

The border crisis created a sense of solidarity among the Arab states. On April 9, Ambassador Berry in Baghdad reported that Iraq's Prime Minister, President of

¹⁵⁰Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Secretary of State. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1502-1503. Attached to Byroade's letter, a memorandum prepared by Burns in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, April 8, 1954. On October 27th, General Bennik reported to the SC and on November 9 he replied to SC members about their inquiries regarding Arab-Israeli border relations. In his report to the SC on March 1, he said that Israel "failed" to meet its commitments to peaceful border relations. On March 29, Ambassador Eban severely criticized Bennik's report of March 1. England was also informed that Israel's Cabinet on March 28 supported a policy of reprisal. United States intelligence received a report about the ambushing of a bus that "Bedouin brigands from Egyptian territory committed the bus murders." Eban was not to be informed. On April 6 and 7, it was reported that Israel orchestrated attacks on the Jordanian Village of Husan. The American Ambassador urged his government to adopt immediate measures to thwart hostile Israeli actions in an effort to promote Israeli cooperation with the MAC and the LCA. Furthermore, Eban was involved in a public press campaign to persuade Americans that the Arab states were preparing a military action against Israel. His assertions, however, were not persuasive since no evidence was in existence to reinforce his allegations. If anything, Burns's report concluded, Jordan had undertaken "energetic measures to curb infiltration" whereas the Israeli government was conducting a conscious policy of retaliation against the Arabs. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1503-1505.

the Chamber of Deputies, Mohammed Fadil al-Jamali, expressed his country's anxiety over Israel's escalated attacks on Jordan's borders. He recalled the Arab League meeting in Cairo in which all the Arab countries collectively had implored the United States to withhold military aid from Israel and praised the Egyptian position that no Arab state would unilaterally become a member of the Turkish-Pakistan Pact. Moreover, al-Jamali persuaded the Jordanian government that its request for military assistance from the United States was untimely under the present circumstances.¹⁵¹

In the days to come, the Department of State would continue to act as a centripetal force in a region which was engulfed with centrifugal tendencies, revolutionary nationalist sentiments with the power to disperse any coherent movement toward compromise and reconciliation. On April 9, Counselor Russell reported that Israeli officials in the strongest terms indicated their desire

¹⁵¹Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the DOS, Baghdad, April 9, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1505-1507. Prime Minister al-Jamali was the Permanent Representative at the United Nations; Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from July 1952 to January 1953; Prime Minister and President of the Chamber of Deputies from September 1953 to April 1954; and again Foreign Minister from April to August 1954. FRUS, pg. XXII. Burton Y. Berry, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until June 25, 1952; Ambassador to Iraq from August 11, 1952 to May 3, 1954. FRUS, pg. XIII.

to meet clandestinely with senior Egyptian military officials.¹⁵² Israel's proposal for negotiations with the Egyptians was endorsed by the Department of State, and Tel Aviv's Ministry for Foreign Affairs gave its consent and expressed appreciation for American goodwill.¹⁵³ Thus, Dulles's disapproval of Byroade's earlier recommendations to deliver an ultimatum to Israel was unavoidable because the timing was inimical to American hopes. Moreover, Dulles this time did not blame the Israelis for what he called Israel's reasoning that the prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nothing but "wishful thinking." Meanwhile, Churchill's United Kingdom dispatched a note to Israel's Foreign Minister, advising moderation and counsel.¹⁵⁴ The British Ambassador in

¹⁵²Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, April 9, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1507. Parker T. Hart, National War College until June, 1952; Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from June 18, 1952. FRUS, pg. XXI. Mahmoud Riad (Colonel until 1954), Expert of the Egyptian Delegation of the UN, 1953; Director, Department of Arab Affairs, Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and Alternate Representative to the 9th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1954. FRUS, pg. XXX.

¹⁵³Telegrams from DOS to Missions and visa versa. FRUS, 1952-1954, the Near and Middle East, vol. IX, Part I, pg. 1507.

¹⁵⁴Dulles to Byroade, Washington, April 10, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1508-1509. Roderic L. O'Connor, Assistant to the Secretary from January 21, 1953 to February 21, 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. FRUS, pg. XXIX. General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence until February 8, 1953; Under

Amman called for the reinstatement of the Local Commanders Agreement, and Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State, introduced an "impressive case" to the Israeli government of the significance of restoring that agreement. Moshe Dayan showed some flexibility and hoped to bring about bilateral discussions, short of full settlement, with the Jordanians.¹⁵⁵

But Jordan's King Hussein was disturbed by Secretary Eden's recent remarks to the House of Commons. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden acknowledged to Secretary Dulles in London that Churchill's government was unable to get the Jordanians to hold a dialogue with the Israelis, and confessed that the Soviet challenge with their veto power at the United Nations would hinder any movement for diplomatic talks. Sir Roger Allen, British Assistant Under Secretary of State of the African, Eastern, and Levant Department, and Foreign Secretary Eden outlined two alternatives: pressuring both sides to start discussions under the auspices of the UN; or, if this were to fail, conducting separate discussions with each

Secretary of State from February 9, 1953 to October 1, 1954. FRUS, pg. XXXII.

¹⁵⁵Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, April 10, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1510-1511.

side to narrow the differences between the two parties, whereby the French would communicate with one, and the British and Americans with the other. In as much as the two positions were very much similar, Dulles refused to limit his country to any specific policy. In the end, Secretary Eden declared that the United Kingdom was prepared to proceed with Dulles's recommendations on the border crisis and that the British Embassy would be instructed about any future discussions with the Department of State.¹⁵⁶

However, the antagonism between Egypt and Israel seemed to be widening; the Egyptians were "deeply and universally disturbed" by Tel Aviv's maneuvers and Washington's stand on Arab-Israeli rivalry. The Egyptian press characterized United Nations Security Council plans to discuss the Palestinian problem as a "western plot to force the Arabs into a peace treaty with Israel" through the use of force.¹⁵⁷ Cairo's irascible mood was excited by an earlier telegram from Amman to the Egyptian Capital about a report that the Jordanian Ambassador in Beirut had delivered a message from Prime Minister Malek of

¹⁵⁶Dulles to DOS, London, April 13, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1513-1514.

¹⁵⁷Ambassador Caffery to DOS, Cairo, April 14, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1514-1515.

Lebanon regarding an alleged plot by the European powers at the Security Council. The report reportedly said that Israel was preparing for a major confrontation with the Arab states to expand the scope of the Security Council debate. The American Embassy in Amman disputed the credibility of the report, while maintaining that the Jordanian Kingdom was gravely concerned.¹⁵⁸ Acting Secretary General Bedell Smith described the Dulles-Eden meeting in London to the United States Embassy in the Jordanian capital as a diplomatic undertaking to splinter the political impasse in the Near East.¹⁵⁹

On April 17, the American Charge in Tel Aviv reported that the Israeli Foreign Ministry was prepared to meet with the Egyptians to hold informal discussions over the border issue.¹⁶⁰ Israel's great expectations for the proposed talks with Egypt clashed with Counselor Russell's moderate and realistic hopes for the first

¹⁵⁸A Telegram from Amman to Cairo, April 12, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1515. (editor's note).

¹⁵⁹Smith to Embassy in Amman, Washington, April 15, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1515-1516.

¹⁶⁰Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, April 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1517.

meeting.¹⁶¹ But Amman's refusal to comply with article XII, which was based on what Consul Tyler regarded as a "fancied point of honor" devoid of any pragmatic considerations, was also complicated by Tel Aviv's contempt for the United Nations machinery. This was coupled with escalation in Soviet diplomatic activities in the region making Israel's "game extremely dangerous," Israel seemingly not understanding the serious implications of her conduct for the world and the United Nations. Tyler recalled the various acts of ferocity carried out by the Israelis from the destruction of the King David Hotel and regarded the "qualities which led to Maccabaeon and Bar Kochba revolts two thousand and more years ago which finished in destruction of Israel, still exist in Jews today..." He warned that the continuation of Israeli intransigence and her "terrible subjectivity" could lead her to "perish and not impossibly the world with her."¹⁶² The American Charge in Tel Aviv shared Tyler's views on what he called the "folly" of Israel's frontier policy. He also advised the Jordanian government to consider the horrors of war, its expected hardships to the inhabitants of the Kingdom and the political

¹⁶¹Tel Aviv to DOS, April 15, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1517. (editor's note).

¹⁶²Tyler to DOS, Jerusalem, April 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1518-1520.

implications of an impending crisis for the Western world. Tyler welcomed the Three Powers approach as a practical alternative as opposed to a Security Council initiative. The Three Powers option would equip the contestants with a higher degree of resiliency, and a diminished level of publicity.¹⁶³

American recognition of the receding Western influence in Jordan necessitated Anglo-American cooperation to successfully forestall Soviet progress in the Arab East. The rise in the number of what Ambassador Mallory called "xenophobic nationalists" in Jordan who exhibited "communist" inclinations, and Ba'thists who were roaming the land at will, promoted Soviet ventures in the region. The Ambassador noted that Jordan must be persuaded that any future negotiations would be short of a full settlement with Israel.¹⁶⁴ However, the Israeli military was fomenting trouble on the Lebanese borders. Ambassador Hare in Beirut admonished the Eisenhower administration not to "postulate the unrealistic nor ask the impossible," and called upon the Western powers to have the courage to face what he described as the "near

¹⁶³Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, April 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1520-1522.

¹⁶⁴Mallory to DOS, Amman, April 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1522-1523.

Eastern cold war."¹⁶⁵ Ambassador Berry in Baghdad reported that the Iraqi government regarded the proposed high level talks at the UN as a "Zionist" design.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, Ambassador James S. Moose in Syria anticipated no quick breakthrough. He cautioned against the danger of publicity and its harmful implications for the participating countries. Moose warned that failure of the United States to undertake the necessary steps to find a workable remedy for the ailments of the Near East could leave the communists with a perfect opportunity to be the only beneficiaries.¹⁶⁷

The dreary contest in the ancient land for ideological preeminence stood in the ways of movement for regional reconciliation. This Western failure to reconcile ideology with diplomacy frustrated all outside attempts to reach a satisfactory settlement for the regional states in the Middle East. United Nations attempts to compromise without applying its enforcing powers in a land which had been grossly and unevenly

¹⁶⁵Hare to DOS, Beirut, April 18, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1524-1525.

¹⁶⁶Berry to DOS, Baghdad, April 18, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, the Near and Middle East, vol. IX, Part I, pg. 1526.

¹⁶⁷Moose to DOS, Damascus April 19, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1526-1527.

divided by Europe's colonial powers were bound to fail. However, President Eisenhower adopted a clear policy of even-handedness to restore the suppressed hopes and aspirations of the people in the Middle East. The Trieste Proposal was fashioned to forge a diplomatic settlement between Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

The Three Powers Proposal

President Eisenhower was not always the champion of peace, as one scholar noted in his Cycles of American History. The critics of the Eisenhower era are many: Writing critically on the Eisenhower Presidency, one historian portrayed him as a man with a "genius for self-presentation and self-preservation." During his presidency, "public purpose receded, private motives predominated." He dodged the issue of racial animosities and the abuse of power by the Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy. Eisenhower's doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction left only the alternatives of massive reprisal against a foreign foe or isolation from world affairs. Often, he chose the second.¹⁶⁸ The doctrine of massive retaliation was an inexpensive instrument to deal with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Eisenhower used the United

¹⁶⁸Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), Pgs. 32, 41, 390, 394.

States Information Agency as a tool to suppress revolutionists in developing countries. Driven by "cheapness, secrecy, speed" and a desire to avert congressional oversight, Eisenhower worked closely with Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁶⁹ Another group of historians saw admirable attributes in Eisenhower. Despite Eisenhower's indifference to the intricate processes of historical development, he was a man of "inexhaustible" energy--skillful, responsible and persistent in his endeavors. He graduated from West Point, the most distinguished military Academy in the United States. In the Second World War he became Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe.¹⁷² Eisenhower possessed qualities many statesmen lacked in the conduct of foreign relations in the Middle East. The White House and the Department of State worked closely to cope with the Middle East's most pressing issues. The Three Powers Proposal also known as the Trieste scheme reveals another facet of Eisenhower's personality and signifies his impartiality in the administration of foreign policy.

¹⁶⁹Walter LaFeber, The American Age, second edition, vol. II (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), pgs. 544-548.

¹⁷²Peter Lyon, Eisenhower, Portrait of a Hero (Boston, Tronto: Little Brown and Company, 1974), pgs. 40-41.

In April, President Eisenhower directed Secretary Dulles to continue the United States policy of impartiality in the Middle East notwithstanding the foreseeable Zionist pressure and its domestic implications for the Republican presidency.¹⁷³ American striving for influence in the Near East was assisted by British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden who expressed his desire to discuss the Jordanian-Israeli friction with John Foster Dulles and George Bidault, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. This triangular approach was rooted in Britain's increasing lack of confidence in the Security Council. The three representatives agreed that Jordan would be approached first and Israel second.¹⁷⁴ Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith anticipated no desirable outcomes from Security Council deliberations in the face of what he called "Soviet obstructionism and Arab opposition."¹⁷⁵ On April 28,

¹⁷³Memorandum of Conversation, by John Foster Dulles, [Washington?], April 21, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1528-1529.

¹⁷⁴Aldrich to DOS, London, April 21, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1529-1530. Winthrop Aldrich was appointed as an Ambassador to the United Kingdom from February 20, 1953. FRUS, pg. XI. Georges Bidault was the French Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence until March 8, 1952; thereafter, Minister of Foreign Affairs. FRUS, pg. XII.

¹⁷⁵Smith to Dulles, Washington, April 23, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1530.

Smith instructed American Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices in the Middle East to provide commentaries on the British paper. Three options were presented; the first called for a Security Council sponsored initiative; if that failed, the second option was the promotion of direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel; and if these two approaches both proved to be unsuccessful, the Tripartite method of obtaining separate agreements with Amman and Tel Aviv would remain the only sensible option. Smith reiterated United States concern about Jordan's vulnerability to Arab (Syrian, Egyptian, Lebanese) pressures because Arabs in a group allegedly became uncontrollable. He indicated the willingness of the United Nations and the Western powers to assume responsibility for the defence of the borders, necessitating the possible deployment of troops and, if necessary, the actual enforcement of the Tripartite Declaration. Smith instructed the Missions to consider the bolstering of United Nations machinery: supplying observers, translators, political and legal advisers, and the selection of a new Chief of Staff without facing the possible risk of damaging Arab ties with the United States. It widely believed that the replacement of General Bennike who was presumably an Arab confidant would adversely affect the American position in the Arab world. This task would necessitate the improvement of

United Nations logistical capabilities to patrol the frontiers, the restoration of the LCA, and the employment of local police to maintain order. It would also entail the issuance of passes for Arabs who wished to move from Gaza to Jordan under United Nations supervision and the forming of clear demarcations by the United Nations without giving them a permanent status.¹⁷⁶

Incessant United States incessant efforts to alleviate Israeli fears of the administration's policy of arming Arab countries¹⁷⁷would soon be shattered. On May 1, Henry A. Byroade, delivered a speech before the American Council for Judaism at Philadelphia in which he alluded to the delicate issue of limiting Jewish immigration to Israel.¹⁷⁸ Ambassador Eban articulated the profound apprehension of his government over the speche's "most fundamental and far-reaching implications since it struck at the very basis of Israel's philosophy

¹⁷⁶Smith to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Washington, April 28, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1532-1536. General of Army Omar N. Bradley, United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Representative to the NATO Standing Group and Military Committee until August 14, 1953. FRUS, pg. XIV.

¹⁷⁷Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, April 29, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1538-1539.

¹⁷⁸Department of State Bulletin, May 10, 1954, Pg. 708.

of existence."¹⁷⁹ Central to Israel foreign policy was its emphasis on the importance of facilitating the "return" of all Jews to the they term the "promised land." Commenting on the misinterpretation of his Dayton address before the World Affairs Council on April 9, Byroade wrote:

My own speeches have caused...a minor sensation in the Middle East out of all proportion to my rank and significance. These speeches have been debated by Parliaments and Cabinets of almost every country amid great publicity. I should like to think about it some more but it may be that the traffic would not bear another speech in the immediate future regardless of its contents.¹⁸⁰

On May 7, Britain's Foreign Office instructed its Missions in Paris and Washington to convey to the French and United States governments its approval of the

¹⁷⁹Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Parker T. Hart), Washington, May 5, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1542-1545. Minister Reuven Shiloah also attended the meeting.

¹⁸⁰Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to Secretary of State, Washington, May 5, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1546-1547. Byroade noted that the Vice President indicated to him that the speech was good. (editor's note), pg. 1547.

proposal for approaching Jordan as soon as the new British Ambassador arrived in Amman. France was expected to voice its opposition to this plan. The British paper stipulated that neither Israel nor the United Nations would be informed and, if the discussions were to be successful in Amman, the Three powers would contact Tel Aviv thereafter.¹⁸¹ However, United States Charge d'affaires in Tel Aviv, Ivan B. White, cautioned the Department of State about Israeli suspicions, given Britain's prestige in Jordan, and the consequent straining of American-Israeli relations. White believed that Israel's sophisticated network of intelligence operations in the Arab world was bound to detect the proposed demarche to Amman.¹⁸² The commentaries of American Missions and Consular offices on the Three Powers proposal were carefully handled. The Acting Consul at Jerusalem, Philip P. Williams, postulated that the replacement of General Bennike (who had assumed his post only in August of 1953), would be considered by the Arab

¹⁸¹American Charge in the UK (Walton W. Butterworth) to DOS, London, May 7, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. I, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1547-1548. W. Walton Butterworth, Ambassador to Sweden until December 9, 1953; thereafter Minister of Embassy in the U.K. FRUS, pg. XV.

¹⁸²White to DOS, Tel Aviv, May 8, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1548-1549. White was Consular of the Embassy in Spain until September 17, 1953; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Israel. FRUS, pg. XXXV.

States as manifestation of the rising Jewish influence in the United States, a diplomatic triumph for Israel. The Consulate General also noted that the presence of British technicians in Jordan would be an issue of a sensitive nature to Israel since Amman had a treaty of alliance with the United Kingdom.¹⁸³ Similarly, the American Charge in Amman, Paul F. Geren, cautioned the administration about the removal of Bennike because the Arabs would be enticed to recall what they characterized as General William E. Riley's "favoritism" to the Israelis. General Riley would serve as the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO until June of 1953. He also advised the Department of State to inform the Jordanian government that United Nations' sponsored boundary demarcations would not reflect a final territorial adjustments.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³Williams to DOS, Jerusalem, May 10, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1549-1550. Williams was appointed as the First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Costa Rica until October 26, 1953; thereafter First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Israel. FRUS, pg. XXXV.

¹⁸⁴Geren to DOS, Amman, May 10, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1550-1553. Geren favored the UN publicity of all incidents to give the world access to what actually happened and suggested that Jordan and Israel meet their duties under the MAC. He also believed that the Chief of UNTSO should be given the power to introduce resolutions and investigations to enhance the level of discussions among the parties concerned. He also gave his consent to the restoration of LCA and accepted the proposition which entailed issuing of passes from Gaza to Jordan. FRUS, pgs. 1552-1553.

Nevertheless, American policy appeared to many American Jews to be disadvantageous. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee believed that the President's even-handed policy went a "little far" in arming the Arab countries.¹⁸⁵ Ambassador Eban charged Byroade of displaying a "certain lack of scholarship and of sensitivity." However, Secretary Dulles responded by reminding the Ambassador of the strength and enduring "historic friendship" between the two nations. Eban enunciated his government's willingness to engage in the establishment of an "interim and partial settlement" with the Arab countries. American pressure on the Israeli government was so tremendous that Ambassador Eban implored the Director of Near Eastern Affairs, as he was departing Dulles's Office to the Reception Room, to inform the impatient and intruding media that it would be inaccurate to assume that there was any deterioration in American-Israeli friendship. Eban promised Parker T. Hart

¹⁸⁵Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Parker T. Hart), Washington, May 12, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1555-1556. Bluanstine was also the chairman of Amoco oil company. Dulles told Blaustein that Byroade was on a mission in Istanbul to discuss the Middle East defence program with American Chiefs of Mission as the next step after the reduction of conflict between the disputing countries in the region. pg. 1556.

not elaborate on his intended remarks to the press.¹⁸⁶ Eban's yearning for American sympathy was characteristic of Israeli conduct throughout the first term of the Eisenhower administration.

Shortly after Britain's approval of the substance of the Dulles-Eden London meeting, Dulles conveyed to the American Consulate in Istanbul his consent to the proposed measures to initiate discussions with the Jordanian government. The British Ambassador was delegated to articulate the position of the Three Powers, while keeping in mind the usefulness of reviewing the propositions with John Glubb, who was serving as the head of the Arab Legion in Jordan.¹⁸⁷

On May 14, the Chiefs of United States Missions completed their conference at Istanbul, Turkey. They concluded that while the Soviet Union was advancing notably its operations in the Near East, the United States was making significant progress of its own in all countries except Syria and Jordan. American diplomats

¹⁸⁶Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart), Washington, May 13, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1557-1560, 1561.

¹⁸⁷Dulles to Consulate General at Istanbul, Washington, May 11, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1553-1555.

cautioned against the potential for a dramatic change in Soviet standing in the area should Moscow espouse Arab concerns in the event of further escalation of tension between the Arabs and Israelis. American diplomats communicated their trepidation about the growing influence of "extreme elements" and the likelihood of their to ascending power in Israel. American strategic, economic and political interests would stand in jeopardy in the event of their triumph. Thus, the participants in Istanbul's conference advised the Eisenhower administration to search for a *modus vivendi* as a practical issue, and counseled the administration that the quest for a settlement should remain the final objective of the United States. They believed that the "irreconcilable attitudes" of the conflicting powers constituted the foremost obstacle to a negotiated settlement. Accordingly, they stressed the importance of bolstering the UN machinery and enforcing the Tripartite Declaration. They also recognized the indispensable role of the United Kingdom in effecting an agreement, acknowledged the limits of American diplomacy, and underscored the role of the United States to act in unison with other countries to undertake the task for contriving solutions and implementing them. In the final analysis, American diplomats reinforced the administration's policy of "impartial friendship" as a

guiding principle and the adoption of measured responses to pacify what they regarded as Israel's "unfounded fears" and its proclivity to act frantically.¹⁸⁸

Jordan's King Hussein became more vigilant in the defence of the Palestine question which he depicted as the "most just story in history;" he chided the occupying power for what he considered to be the irreconcilability between Israel's peaceful assertions and its constant violations of international principles, its infringement upon secured communities, and its continuous threats of expansionism even while priding itself on the use of force. King Hussein committed himself to the protection of what he called the "force of right" with all his vigor and power.¹⁸⁹ On the same day, President Eisenhower dispatched a telegram to the King of Jordan to congratulate him on the sixth anniversary of the Kingdom's independence.¹⁹⁰ Thereafter, the Secretary instructed the Embassy in Israel to undertake preliminary

¹⁸⁸Paper Approved by the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 11 to 14, 1954, Istanbul, May 14, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1561-1564.

¹⁸⁹Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah Li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, May 25, 1954, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Education, 1985), pgs. 39-40.

¹⁹⁰A telegram from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan on Independence Day, The White House, Washington, May 24, 1954, Pg. 1. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

steps to create a "working relationship" between American diplomats and Israel's Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. The Chiefs of Missions would also be at liberty to get in touch with Sharett through "courtesy calls [to the] Prime Ministry and subsequent informal social contact" at Jerusalem.¹⁹¹ The importance of maintaining secrecy when approaching Amman and fear of offending the Jordanian government forced the Department of State to reconsider its position and inform the Embassy to await further instructions.¹⁹² Dulles expressed his hope that France would agree to Amman's *demarch* according to which Ambassador Mallory would initiate the process of negotiations upon his return from the Istanbul conference.¹⁹³ On May 22, the British Ambassador to Jordan, Charles B. Duke, approached Jordan's Foreign

¹⁹¹Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, May 14, 1954, Washington, May 14, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1564-1565.

¹⁹²DOS to Embassy in Tel Aviv, Washington, May 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1565. On June 16, the Embassy was authorized to form a "working" connection with Israel's Foreign Office. Russell was first directed to give a courtesy call to the Prime Minister to facilitate an informal social contact with Ben Gurion. Russell was directed not attend social functions at Jerusalem, only officials of lower position would be allowed to attend. FRUS, pg. 1565. (editor's notes).

¹⁹³Dulles to the Embassy in France, May 15, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1565-1566. The Department and England's Foreign Office agreed that Jordan would be given every incentive and opportunity to advance its own recommendations. pg. 1566. (editor's note).

Minister, Jamal Doughan, and Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda. In response to the Anglo-American demarche, the Jordanian government needed what Mallory described as a "breathing space" to effectively cope with the legacy of a hardened public attitude.¹⁹⁴

On May 27, France decided to endorse the Anglo-American demarche to Amman and Tel Aviv. The French government, however, pressed for two conditions: that Israel be told about the demarche to Amman while a similar method be utilized when approaching Israel on this matter, and that the Secretary General of the United Nations be given the power of enforcement. Britain's Foreign Office yielded to France's recommendations and informed its Missions in Tel Aviv and New York to act accordingly. Secretary Dulles, endorsing the Anglo-French approach, proposed that the UN be notified, and advised Israel to keep the issue confidential.¹⁹⁵

Meanwhile, Israel was seeking military assistance from the United States. But Assistant Secretary Byroade

¹⁹⁴Mallory to DOS, Amman, May 24, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1566. The United States formally associated itself with Britain's *demarch* which consisted of eleven points. pg. 1566. (editor's note).

¹⁹⁵Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, May 27, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1567.

reported to Dulles that the Istanbul conference "confirmed that the real danger today lies in some foolish move on the part of Israel. The Ambassadors saw no evidence whatsoever that an Arab move was in the cards." Furthermore, the Pentagon was evidently concerned about the implications of arms sales to Israel in view of the United States search for facilities in Saudi Arabia and Libya. This attitude was consistent with the administration's policy of impartiality in the Near East. Assistant Secretary Byroade displayed similar concerns and requested an authorization from Secretary Dulles to apprise the Israeli Embassy that Israeli request was on hold.¹⁹⁶ Subsequently, Byroade assured Ambassador Eban that arms assistance to the Arab states would be selective. He also informed the Israeli Ambassador that the Three Powers had already approached Jordan and that Israel would be contacted shortly.¹⁹⁷ On June 14, the

¹⁹⁶Memorandum from Byroade to Dulles, Washington, June 3, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1952, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1572-1573. Dulles gave his consent to this request. (editor's note on same page).

¹⁹⁷Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade), Washington, June 8, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX. Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1573-1575. Eban was rather disappointed over what he called the "low level of our illustrative aid presented to congress for the next fiscal year." Byroade noted that aid to Israel was based on economic considerations not political calculation. Shiloah also inquired about new assurance on the Suez Canal. Byroade was against any move to add anything to the present agreement between Egypt and Britain. pg. 1575.

Foreign Office and the French Embassy in London notified United States Ambassador Aldrich in London about the Jordanian response; Jordan's Foreign Minister, Jamal Doughan, orally informed Ambassador Charles B. Duke of the United Kingdom of the cabinet consent to five points of the proposed scheme. Three were not repudiated but viewed to be within the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and two were completely rejected. Jordan refused to accept the items relating to the demarcation of boundaries and the issuance of passes for Arabs crossing from the Gaza Strip to the territories of Jordan. Thereafter, the British Foreign Office instructed its Embassies in Paris and Washington to approach the Israeli government concerning the measures which were accepted by the Hashimite Kingdom. The United Kingdom preferred that Israel not be told about the two items rejected by the Jordanians. The British delegation in New York was also expected to approach the UN to discuss the three points which Jordan believed were within the sphere of that organization.¹⁹⁸ The substance of this diplomatic undertaking was discussed earlier by the American missions at the Istanbul conference.

Secretary Dulles believed that it would be best if

¹⁹⁸Aldrich to DOS, London, June 13, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1576.

the Three Powers approached Israel with all the steps proposed to Amman since all the issues would be debated by the UN Secretary General. However, the fear of Israeli criticism, once informed about the nature and extent of discussions with the Jordanian government, forced the Secretary to reevaluate his plan. Israel was to be contacted first before making a *demarch* to the UN.¹⁹⁹ On June 17, Britain agreed with Dulles's recommendations.²⁰⁰ The American Embassy was instructed not to disclose which measures were ratified or rejected by Jordan and to hold consultations with the French and British Missions in Israel. Among other things, the United States advised the government of Moshe Sharett to reinstate the Local Commanders Agreement, to reinforce the machinery of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organizations and to establish territorial demarcations between the two countries without prejudicing claims or rights of either state.²⁰¹ The United States Secretary

¹⁹⁹Dulles to the Embassy in the UK, Washington, June 15, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1577.

²⁰⁰Aldrich to DOS, London, June 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1577. (editor's note).

²⁰¹Russell to Sharett, Jerusalem, June 19, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1583-1584. Also see the editor's note, pg. 1583. On June 20, Charge Russell reported to the DOS about Sharett's contention that the killing of two Israeli patrol guards and fatally wounding of another was a result of what he characterized as the "reckless and

of State authorized the Embassy to notify Prime Minister Sharett that American officials would exert their influence on Jordan. At the same time, Dulles rejected Israel's accusations against Jordan since Tel Aviv's attitude toward the UNTSO during the month of November was uncompromising.²⁰²

But the security of the Middle East was unpredictable. On July 1, the United States government was notified of an outbreak of massive shootings in Jerusalem; this continued intermittently, even after the Jordan-Israeli MAC reached an agreement on the same day. The United States denounced the outbreak of violence and urged Jordan and Israel to take measures to bring the situation to a close.²⁰³ Prime Minister Abu al-Huda of Jordan reaffirmed his country's respect for the authority

provocative firings" by Jordanian patrols on Israelis in the last few weeks. Israel's Prime Minister appealed to the United States to place pressure on Jordan to put an end to these attacks. FRUS, editor's note, pg. 1584.

²⁰²Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, June 22, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1584-1585. On June 25, the essence of the Department's telegram was orally communicated to the Foreign Office, but questioned the parallel between Qibya and the latest incidents. (editor's note), pg. 1585.

²⁰³Dulles to Embassy in Israel, July 1, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1586. On July 1, the State Department received various telegrams from Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Amman, about the outbreak of hostilities in Jerusalem. (see editor's note).

of the UNTSO, and denied the possibility that Jordan's Arab Legion was involved in this operation since it was under the aegis of British officers. To eliminate any doubt, he instructed Glubb to avoid any provocative actions and observe the cease-fire. Jordan's Prime Minister appealed to the Three Powers to act resolutely. Abu al-Huda gave similar assurances to Ambassador Duke of Britain about Jordan's good intentions and criticized Israeli verbosity which stood parallel to that country's actual conduct.²⁰⁴ On July 6, Jamal Doughan, Jordan's Foreign Minister, voiced his concern about the impending threat to his country's security and accused Israel of designs to attack the west of Jordan. Doughan's communiqué to the American Embassy in Amman called on the United States, as a participant of the Three Powers Proposal, to undertake bold and adequate steps to compel Israel to meet its obligations under the articles of the Armistice Agreements and the Tripartite Declaration.²⁰⁵

Acting Secretary Bedell Smith was quick to placate Jordan's apprehensions. He instructed the embassy in Amman to notify the Jordanian government that neither

²⁰⁴Mallory to DOS, Amman, July 3, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1587.

²⁰⁵American Embassy to DOS, July 6, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, (editor's note), pg. 1587.

side was staging an offensive against the other and that any maneuvers to transgress the truce lines would be met with collective action by France, Britain, and the United States in accordance with the Tripartite Declaration.²⁰⁶ However, General Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, criticized America's policy of arming Iraq and the pursuit of the Jordan River Development Plan. He intimated that the Qibya incident had coerced the Jordanian government to take stronger measures, with the implication that a forceful policy toward Jordan was effective to curb infiltration. Furthermore, Britain's insistence on the defence of the Jordanian Kingdom forced fearful Israeli officials to request similar assurances from the United States in the event of outside intervention.²⁰⁷ The charismatic

²⁰⁶Smith to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, July 13, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1587-1588. Smith directed the Embassy to convey the substance of the telegram to King Abd al-Aziz Saud through the American Embassy in that Kingdom. pg. 1588. Only July 9, Ambassador Wadsworth reported that King Abd al-Aziz was irritated and that the Saudi government was planning to announce on Mecca radio that it would furnish Jordan with any assistance it requested. The note also said that the Saudi King instructed Ambassador Asad in Washington to express to the US government and the UN about his country's displeasure of what he termed as Israeli "barbarism." FRUS, (editor's note), pg. 1588.

²⁰⁷Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, William C. Burdett, Jr., Washington, July 16, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1588-1590. Burdett was the First Secretary of the Embassy in Iran until January 15, 1953; thereafter he assumed his

Israeli General would rise to an unrivaled eminence in his country's military and diplomatic history.

Tel Aviv's apparent defiance of the United Nations on the question of Banat Ya'acov (a demilitarized zone awaiting Johnston's hopes for successful negotiations) remained a disturbing matter for the Eisenhower administration. Dulles threatened to bring the issue publicly to the Security Council if Israel challenged the authority of the United Nations and resume its operations in the disputed area.²⁰⁸ Counselor Russell suggested that if Israeli policy continued to be one of "obstruction" in the face of Soviet expansion American-Israeli relations would deteriorate quickly, and if they showed sensitivity, Washington's ties with Tel Aviv would remain "close and firm" (keeping in mind that the Eisenhower administration intention of cultivating ties with Arab States would continue without jeopardizing Israeli security).²⁰⁹ Russell's recommendations were upheld by the Secretary with a few reservations. The West's policy of military aid to the Near East might

current post at the DOS from March 2, 1953. FRUS, pg. XV.

²⁰⁸Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, July 23, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1590-1591.

²⁰⁹Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, July 26, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1592-1593.

lessen Israel's military preponderance in the area, but American arms shipments to the Arab East would never reach the point of endangering Israeli security. The Israeli government was advised to appreciate American generosity and show more reciprocity.²¹⁰

However, Israeli officials persisted in criticizing Jordan's policy for what they called its "selective implementation" and its adverse effects on the power of the armistice truce machinery. The Israeli government was not completely satisfied with all the proposals because some were "preventive in character," and objected to those which bequeathed to the UN staff an "independent authority." Nonetheless, Tel Aviv acquiesced in the erection of physical barriers along the Jordanian-Israeli frontiers while taking into account that the final settlement would be reached directly by the concerned countries. In addition, Israel agreed to the idea that Palestinian Arabs could travel to Jordan if and only if they were to settle in the Jordanian Kingdom permanently, for Israel declined to open its territory to so-called outsiders on grounds that the permits would be granted by Arab countries. Sharett's cabinet resolved that only a complete enforcement of the Armistice Agreements would be

²¹⁰Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, July 28, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX. Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1593.

an effective step in coping with the region's predicament. Israel also appealed to the United States government to apply pressure on Jordan to respect the Armistice Agreement and act in good faith.²¹¹

By the end of July, it became apparent that American confidence in Israel seemed to be resting on thin air. Israel's apprehensions about American association, as the leader of the "free world" with the Arab countries, while allegedly dealing with Israel on a different basis, were disquieting. Prime Minister Sharett complained about what he termed Israel's "gloomy and unrelieved isolation," linking his country's irritated public mood to American policy.²¹² The Israeli government was astonished by Russell's strong tone on the subject of water diversion and Dulles considered any unilateral action taken by the

²¹¹Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, July 30, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1594-1596. On July 30, Russell communicated the Department's message to the Israeli government about the Banat Ya'acov affair. Sharett informed Russell that the American view was alarming. The Prime Minister noted that Johnston asked the Israeli Government to defer construction during his trip to the region. He also expressed his country's right to begin its work at its pleasure. Russell informed Sharett that it would be disconcerting for the U.S. to resume the construction in Banat Ya'acov in lieu of Johnston's expected visit to Jordan within the next two to three months. FRUS (editor's note), pg. 1596.

²¹²Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, July 30, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1596.

Israelis without UN authorization and Jordanian cooperation as a matter of grave political consequences for the Jewish state. Eban was persuaded, but the Ambassador insisted that the Prime Minister of Israel held a different position.²¹³ In an attempt to pacify Israeli fears, Dulles reasserted the that unbroken knot between the United States and the State of Israel remained perpetual and that American arms in the Arab states would not alter the balance of the power in the Middle East.²¹⁴ In the end, Counselor Russell's repeated representations persuaded Prime Minister Sharett that the American intention was only to halt the water project temporarily.²¹⁵

American-Israel negotiations during August ended on a calming note reinforced by encouraging remarks from Israel's top military commander, Moshe Dayan. Dayan affirmed his readiness to restore the LCA and suggested

²¹³Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, August 4, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1599-1600.

²¹⁴Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, August 4, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1602.

²¹⁵Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, August 6, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1603. Also see editor's note.

contacts with Jordan and Egypt.²¹⁶ The weight of American diplomacy and the dread of isolation forced Ambassador Eban (with an authorization from Prime Minister Sharett) to communicate to American officials that it would be erroneous to assume that there was a military parity between the Arab states and the Jewish state. The Ambassador confessed that Israeli strategy (an issue of utmost confidentiality) was designed to project the image of its military supremacy over the Arabs. He contended that the military capabilities of Egypt alone were greater than those of Israel, particularly if American arms were to be delivered to the largest North African Arab country. The American policy of arming the Arab states produced what Eban called a "politico-psychological crisis" at home. His government simply needed solid pledges from the United States.²¹⁷ Eban's confessions were revealing in view of Israel's economic weakness, but one can not disregard the possibility that the Ambassador's plea to the United States was an extension of his diplomatic maneuvering to enhance his country's standing vis-a-vis the Arab states. On August 10, Jordan was prepared to resume the Local Commanders

²¹⁶Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, August 6, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX. Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1603.

²¹⁷Dulles to Embassy in Israel, August 8, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1605-1606.

meetings (notwithstanding Defence Minister Lavon's unpalatable remarks about the UNTSO and MAC to the Israel media). From Mallory's perspective, the value of the Local Commanders meetings was completely contingent on Israeli cooperation.²¹⁸

Ambassador Raymond A. Hare in Beirut, who had previously held an Ambassadorial position in Saudi Arabia, characterized American foreign relations with the countries of the Near East to be at a "critical point" necessitating the formulation of a policy of adequate strength to lessen the discord between the Arab countries and Israel. In his telegram to the Department of State, Hare wrote:

For reasons which need not be re-debated, the pendulum of American policy was originally drawn toward Israel, with a resultant deterioration of our relations with the Arab states. Now for a period of a year and a half we have been trying to get the pendulum back to [the] center by an announced policy of impartiality. Step by step and by painstaking efforts this policy has been producing results. Final success is still in the future but we have been on the road.

²¹⁸Mallory to DOS, Amman, August 10, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1607-1608.

Now, just as this policy is beginning to show the desired results, vigorous protest is heard from Israel, whose officials do not hesitate to assert that our policy of impartiality is not that at all, but rather a policy of prejudice against Israel. We know that this is not true; quite to the contrary, we realize that any policy which should swing the pendulum too far the other way and give the Arabs the idea that they had the upper hand would be disastrous for all concerned.²¹⁹

Hare's message received immediate attention from Secretary Dulles. In his top secret letter to the diplomatic Missions in the Near East, London and France, Dulles stressed the necessity of advancing American presence in the Middle East notwithstanding its detrimental affect on Israel. American security requirements mandated the formation of close military ties with the Arab states in an attempt to establish a Middle East command. The Secretary also directed the delegates at the Istanbul conference to give meticulous consideration to the subject of exchanging notes with Israel and other Arab states, or creating a treaty with Tel Aviv to safeguard its security. The second option,

²¹⁹Hare to DOS, Beirut, August 21, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1618. Also see pg. XXI.

which called for the establishment of treaties with the regional states, was expected to encounter congressional and Arab opposition.²²⁰

The American Embassy in Amman deduced that Israel was speaking of a "preventive" war. The forging of a treaty between the United States and Jordan was questionable, and the forming of an accord with Israel would create a clash between Britain and the United States. Ambassador Mallory advised his government to counsel the United Kingdom to provide security guarantees to Israel or to participate in a joint Anglo-American declaration to meet that goal. He concluded that the exchange of notes or the forging of a treaty of friendship (particularly at this stage) between the United States and the belligerent in the Middle East would have severe repercussions, and perhaps catastrophic results for this country.²²¹ Russell agreed

²²⁰Dulles to certain Diplomatic Missions, Washington, August 21, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1619-1620.

²²¹Mallory to DOS, Amman, August 25, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1626-1627. Ambassador Hare continued to press for a policy of impartiality and voiced his opposition to any changes in American policy in the short term. pg. 1624. Moreover, United States Charge in Syria (Robert C. Strong) cautioned the DOS against what he termed the Soviet "threat" where communist activities appear to have been increasing in magnitude. The establishment of a treaty with Israel would have adverse effects on the American position in the region and endow the Soviet

with Mallory's thoughts on the implication of exchanging notes between Washington and Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, Israel still hoping for a treaty with the United States, persevered in pressuring the Eisenhower administration to terminate all of its aid to the Arab countries.²²²

However, the Eisenhower administration disclosed its discontentment with Eban's rebuttal. Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith confirmed that Ambassador Eban's counsel seemed to suggest that Israel was taking "little heed of United States advice regarding timing and tactics toward our common objectives of peace and stability in the Near East." He implored the Israeli Ambassador to exert influence on his government to convince the skeptics of American candor, that United States interests were indeed connected to those of Israel. Smith hoped that Israel would not impede American efforts to coax

Union with an opportunity to enhance its standing in Syria. Counselor Strong advised his government not to commit to Israel and to prepare a similar note of exchange with the Arab states to reaffirm American impartiality. Strong to the DOS, Damascus, August 30, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, the Near and Middle East, vol. IX, Part I, pg. 1634-1635. Strong was the Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, DOS, until 4 January 1954; Member of the Policy Planning Staff, 4 January 1953-2 August 1954; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Syria, 2-3 August 1954; thereafter Counselor. FRUS, pg. XXXIII.

²²²Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, August 25, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1628-1629.

some countries in the Near East to associate themselves with the "free world."²²³ The harvest of American shuttle diplomacy in the summer of 1954 ended on a pleasant event. On August 26, Bedell Smith notified the Embassy in Israel that Amman and Cairo were prepared to hold a meeting on the commanders level. The United States proposed that informal discussions be limited to the border crisis.²²⁴ Dayan was satisfied and the Israeli government was willing to respond to those suggestions.²²⁵

However, the Israeli government, under Labor Party Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, who headed a coalition of four parties, appeared divided over American-Israeli relations. Sharett seems to have had a "sharp cleavage" with Defence Minister Lavon over this question.²²⁶ Similarly, Jordan continued to restrain itself amid the growing fear of public discontent and its inevitable

²²³Smith to Embassy in Israel, Washington, August 26, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1629-1630.

²²⁴Smith to Embassy in Israel, Washington, August 26, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1630.

²²⁵Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, August 27, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1631.

²²⁶Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, August 30, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1636.

impact on that country's domestic stability. On September 2, King Hussein issued a warning against Israel's armed and repeated incursions into Jordanian territory. The king cautioned that his country's long policy of patience was standing on a precipice, particularly so if the Israelis were to renew their military operations on the borders. His direct statement of Jordan's readiness to create discord if Israelis continued their policy of aggression was the first of its kind. Jordan's commander of the Arab Legion, Glubb, and his Legionnaires, including the largely Palestinian National Guard, were losing their equanimity. Israel's conduct in the eyes of American diplomats was "damaging" to United States interests.²²⁷ Mallory, although theoretically supportive of exchanging notes with Israel, expressed his reservations about any American plan which would entail arming the Israelis since it would have deleterious effects on American-Arab relations. The fear of communism was too powerful a consideration to be disregarded.²²⁸

²²⁷Mallory to DOS, Amman, September 2, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1642-1643.

²²⁸Mallory to DOS, Amman, September 3, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1643. On September 1, Smith requested a commentary from American Missions about the text drafted by the DOS concerning the security of Israel. The note reaffirmed close American relationship with Israel and many Arab states, the need to promote conciliation, and the elimination of Arab-Israeli tension in the area to curtail Soviet pressure. It also considered the

Nevertheless, at the beginning of September, the American main anxiety centered on calming Israeli apprehensions, a task which appeared to have been enormously difficult to manage.²²⁹ Prime Minister Sharett clearly insinuated that Israel's firm military policy was devised to deflect the growing pro-Herut sympathy after the recent assaults on two Herut communities.²³⁰

The tumultuous atmosphere in the Near East frustrated Britain and France in pursuing the Three Powers proposal. The French government proposed that the delegations of the Big Three hold discussions with the Secretary General of the United Nations. The French Plan proposed London or Paris or Washington, and not Amman and Tel Aviv, as the meeting place for any future Tripartite debates. Churchill's government agreed with reservations about an Anglo-American demarche without French

possibility of arming Israel, keeping in mind that American weapons may not be "misused." The U.S. reasserted its commitment to principles of Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The statement was made to alleviate Israeli insecurity. Smith to Certain Diplomatic Missions, September 1, 1954. FRUS, pgs. 1640-1641.

²²⁹Smith to Embassy in Israel, Washington, September 4, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1649. Smith noted that he was not planning to convey the message to the media. Amman and other Arab states could be informed if necessary.

²³⁰Russell to DOS, Tel Aviv, September 10, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1651-1652.

participation (keeping in mind that Britain was prepared to support a solely American undertaking). Stephen P. Dorsey, Deputy Director of the NEA, suggested that the *eleven point* proposal discussed earlier at the Istanbul conference be placed on hold until a new and more tangible demarche was completed. He also rejected Israel's protest that the strengthening of MAC was an infringement on her autonomy, characterizing her attitude as "hollow" given Israel's position that the MAC lacked the strength to deal with border incursions.²³¹

As the Autumn of 1954 was approaching, Britain's Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, was seeking to revive the Trieste Proposal as a means of forging a new ground for Arab-Israeli conciliation while Assistant Secretary of State, Charles Arthur E. Shuckburgh, was touring the Near East to gain new insights about its political climate. Secretary Dulles also was enthused about Eden's scheme, particularly so after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement over the Suez Canal on October 19.²³²

²³¹Dorsey to Jernegan, Washington, September 20, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, the Near and Middle East, pgs. 1656-1657.

²³²Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1683-1684. Merchant was appointed as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for MSA until March 24, 1954; Deputy to the Special Representative in Europe at Paris, March 24, 1952-March

Nonetheless, the British government was unsettled by the predominant feeling of uncertainty and economic stagnation in the Middle East. Egypt considered itself at war with Israel, and the refugee situation was getting worse. Prime Minister Eden felt the situation posed a formidable challenge to what he labeled Anglo-American "statesmanship and diplomatic skill." Because many of the countries involved had some crucial interests at stake, Eden wavered. He extended an invitation to Dulles to send American specialists to London after the return of Under Secretary Schuckburgh from the Middle East. Eden notified Dulles that it was important to keep France familiarized even while agreeing that Paris be excluded from any extensive discussions.²³³

On November 17, the Department of State answered to the British proposal. Eden's message was received by the Eisenhower administration with a heightened sense of enthusiasm, emphasizing the importance of joint Anglo-American cooperation. Washington and London agreed to

11, 1953. FRUS, pg. XXVII. The British delegation was represented by UK Ambassador, and Sir Robert H. Scott (Assistant Under Secretary of State, BFO, until July 15, 1974; thereafter Minister of the British Embassy in the United States, and Charge d'Affaires, 1954. FRUS, pg. XXXII.

²³³Aide-Memoire from the British Embassy to the DOS, Washington, November 5, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1684-1685.

keep Paris and Istanbul informed, while maintaining secrecy in the days to come. The date for the proposed London based discussions was set around the New Year.²³⁴ Central to the administration's thinking was the determination of American officials to help resolve the Palestinian question. Henry A. Byroade was cautiously optimistic about the relative calmness of the political atmosphere on the Jordanian-Israeli borders. Moreover, Israel, embarrassed by its anti-administration campaign during the re-election of President Eisenhower, made its populace realize that American relations with their country were not always decided by Israeli factors. Raids on the frontiers declined, and Jordan and Israel appear to have arrived at the recognition that the preliminary proposals concerning the Unified Development Plan for the division of the waters of the Jordan was the only sensible conclusion. King Hussein appeared to have softened his challenges to a renewed diplomatic arrangement, and Jordan's Prime Minister, Abu al-Huda, seemed responsive to unified scheme as long as Egypt took the initiative. One significant obstacle stood in the way--Israel's ceaseless and scathing criticism of

²³⁴Aide-Memoire from the DOS to the British Embassy, Washington, November 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1693-1694.

American policy.²³⁵ This water scheme would become an essential element of the Eisenhower's policy in the months to come.

In the formulation of American policy, Dulles accentuated the urgency of moving from the current truce agreements to a major diplomatic settlement without endangering American security interests. Dulles hoped that the United States would not be required to deploy its armed forces or use an economic embargo against opposing states. His scheme called for: one, securing a port at Haifa for the Jordanian Kingdom and "free routes" through Israel connecting Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon; and two, initiating a settlement of the Unified Plan also known as the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley scheme. His "step-by-step" diplomatic method was based on the Trieste Plan to establish an Israeli-Jordanian agreement. He also recognized Egypt's leading role in the Arab League and the necessity of Egyptian support and participation.²³⁶

²³⁵Memorandum by Byroade to Dulles, Washington, November 22, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1694-1695.

²³⁶Dulles to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Washington, November 22, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1695-1698. On April 1, 1950, the Arab League Council agreed to forbid any Arab country to establish any independent contacts with Israel. The resolution was partially a response to Jordan's annexation of the West Bank. The resolution dictated that any Arab state which violated this agreement would be expelled from the League. pg. 1698.

Ambassador Caffery agreed to the Three Powers Proposal, and counseled the administration to consider the establishment of what he called a "Palestinian Government" to build solidarity and help eradicate the authority of the Mufti of Jerusalem.²³⁷ Remarkably, Eliahu Elath, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, was authorized to say that Israel would be willing to yield to Dulles's suggestion of providing a "free port" at Haifa for Jordan in exchange for the abating of the Arab blockade. Ambassador Eban notified the Department of State that the government of Israel would be sympathetic to the question of refugee property compensation if the Egyptian embargo in the Suez were lifted.²³⁸ On December 17, Harold Beeley, Counselor and Acting Charge d'Affaires of the British Embassy in Washington, informed John D. Jernagan that Prime Minister Eden favored Washington (more "plausible cover story") as the site for Anglo-American diplomatic negotiations to be held in the middle of the coming January.²³⁹

²³⁷Caffery to DOS, Cairo, December 11, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1716-1717.

²³⁸Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (John D. Jernegan), Washington, December 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 1722.

²³⁹Memorandum of Conversation, by Jernegan, Washington, December 17, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1724-1725.

Preparatory work for the proposed Anglo-American discussions seems to have been strengthened by Johnston's shuttle diplomacy in the Near East. Arab interest in the Jordan Valley Plan remained promising, and Jordan's desire for a settlement was enhanced by Israel's water diversions from the lower Jordan. Jordan's Foreign Minister wanted the Yarmuk plan set in motion, and the Israeli government was sympathetic to the idea, providing its water schemes could be sustained. Ambassador Johnston was scheduled make a January visit to the Middle East, including Amman, in an attempt to reach a final settlement.²⁴⁰ Francis H. Russell, who was expected to be designated as a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, assumed the role of devising new plans to be discussed with Schuckburgh in London's Foreign Office. George Allen, the newly appointed Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, African Affairs would lead the American team. This diplomatic undertaking was to be conducted in "absolute secrecy."²⁴¹ Jordan's firmness was now clearly understood as arising from a wish for Israel's sincere striving for reconciliation. For Jordan, Israel's

²⁴⁰Memorandum prepared in the DOS, Washington, December 20, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1730.

²⁴¹Russell to American Charge (Butterworth) in UK, Washington, December 21, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1732-1734.

agreeing to the principle of repatriation and compensation for Palestinian refugees was prerequisite to Amman's consideration of any scheme for a diplomatic arrangement. In his "Top Secret" despatch to the Department of State, Ambassador Mallory recognized the importance of Egypt's participation in the proposed talks, invited the President to encourage Britain to join in the planned discussions and discouraged France's role in Anglo-American consultations. He discounted any hope of Jordan's adherence to the principle of internationalization for the Old City of Jerusalem since the city was under the sovereignty of that Kingdom, and cautioned that the exercise of "carrot-stick" policy to force the Hashimites into compliance with American plans would be impractical and senseless. The unrelenting Ambassador believed that "there [were] indications that some of the principle leaders of Jordanian political life [were] becoming weary of the present situation and ha[d] expressed privately the realization that some end or settlement must eventually ensue" so long as legitimate concerns of the refugees were recognized.²⁴² Mallory's counsel was fully accepted by the White House. Eisenhower's diplomacy of impartiality and resoluteness

²⁴²Mallory to DOS, Amman, December 23, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 1734-1739. Mallory suggested that Israel make the first move, to be followed by Egypt and succeeded by Jordan.

prevailed and the survival of the Jordanian Kingdom was ensured. 1954 ended on a promising note. And in the future, the young King of Jordan would rise to assume full control of his Kingdom.

Chapter III

The Ascent of a Talented

Master in Basman Royal Palace, 1955-1957

The survival of the Jordanian Kingdom in the boisterous region of the Middle East was an extraordinary phenomenon. Jordan's endurance was not an historic accident; it was King Abdullah's guidance, combined with Britain's military and economic assistance, during the developmental years of the Kingdom that helped ensure its continued existence. From the point of its inception, United States active diplomacy, especially during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration, was a critical factor in the defence of the Hashimite Monarchy. The rise and the maturing of King Hussein would lead to the redirection of his country on a different path, at times appearing perilous, but always emerging with his throne intact. In the summer of 1953, King Hussein was too inexperienced a ruler to bear the immense responsibilities of royal power, particularly in a country troubled by civil disturbance and in a region seized by political turmoil. As a young boy, he acquired a charismatic character, gaining approval of his friends

because he was sensitive and respectful of their needs.¹ When Hussein was crowned King of Jordan, he was still in the prime of youth. In the years to come, he would become the most cultivated statesman in the modern history of the Middle East. Although of a different generation from King Abdullah, he shared his grandfather's strong Western bent and suspicion of communism. Thus, King Hussein provided a component of continuity in Jordan's foreign relations.

In this chapter, I will examine the role of the statesmen, King Hussein and President Eisenhower, in the molding of American-Jordanian relations, and the historical circumstances (the escalation in Soviet-American rivalry in the Near East) which culminated in a special relationship between the two countries. Operation Alpha, a joint Anglo-American endeavor to promote the regional stability of the Middle East, aimed at creating a workable relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv in an attempt to pave the way for a Jordanian-Israeli settlement. "Alpha" was the designated Department of State code word for data related to American-British diplomatic undertakings in November of 1954 to establish the grounds for a comprehensive settlement between Arabs

¹James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (New York: William Morrow and company, Inc., 1989), pg. 10.

and Israelis.² Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman, in Baghdad, urged the Department to keep American defence plans separate from the administration's quest for a comprehensive agreement in the region.³ Jordan's endeavor for reconciliation with the Jewish state was largely dependent on Egypt's good-will. Eric Johnston's Near Eastern mission, another important focus of diplomacy, centered on the development of the Jordan Valley to help bring about a regional agreement with Jordan and Israel at the center. However, the rise of Arab nationalism and the emergence of Soviet communism in the region would force King Hussein to postpone these American plans, including Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. The Alpha Operation and Johnston's Mission failed when President Nasser struck an arms deal with the Soviet Union. American economic development programs and regional security schemes would face stiff opposition from the Arab populace in Amman-Cairo-Damascus and an Israeli resistance in Tel Aviv. Any hope for a triumphant American diplomatic undertaking crashed over the cold

²Department of State, Central Files. "Top Secret" project. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, pg.2.

³Telegram from Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman in Iraq to DOS, Baghdad, January 5, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, pg. 2. Gallman advised the Department to give priority to American security schemes in the area while taking into consideration the importance of Iraq as a major contestant and rival of Egypt. Same page.

waters of the Nile during the Suez war of 1956. Jordan's position necessitated an alignment with Egypt and the Arab countries. King Hussein seized the opportunity to redefine his relationship with Britain on his own terms, while at the same time consolidating his ties with the United States. The dismissal of Sir John Glubb in 1957 would become an inescapable conclusion marking the rise of a young monarch as the supreme player in determining the concerns of his Kingdom. President Eisenhower showed a substantial degree of openness and patience in facilitating King Hussein's quest, never pressuring the Jordanian ruler to move in a direction the monarch perceived to be precarious. Critics who appear to rejoice or feel saddened at his failures⁴ or are simply critical for his calculated silence to escape public pressure, are advised to examine his record on the Middle East. The contention that Eisenhower was "more a hawk than a prince of peace"⁵ as some scholars have suggested lately is not entirely valid. Eisenhower's personal collection and his State papers clearly show a president who was willing to invest considerable trust in the United States diplomatic

⁴George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962). Also see Harry B. Ellis Challenge in the Middle East: Communist Influences and American Policy (New York: Ronald Press, 1960).

⁵Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pg. 404.

corps.

**The Alpha Operation,
and Johnston's Near Eastern Mission**

On January 7, 1955, Dulles appointed Counselor Francis H. Russell, an experienced diplomat in Near Eastern affairs, Special Assistant Secretary of State to help devise a diplomatic method of working with Britain's Foreign Office. This episode marked the beginning of Anglo-American cooperation, signifying President Eisenhower's determination to assist in forging a settlement among the adversaries in the region of the Middle East. Britain's Under Secretary of State, Charles E. Shuckburgh, who was scheduled to arrive to Washington in late January to meet with Eric Johnston, cautioned the two parties to maintain confidentiality and to deny completely that there was any effort by the United Kingdom and the United States to formulate a collective resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵ The political atmosphere in the Middle East appeared inviting; Israel's Prime Minister Sharett and Defence Minister Lavon seemed responsive to Anglo-American overtures, based on their conviction that the signing of an agreement with Egypt

⁵A Letter from Shuckburgh in Foreign Office to Francis H. Russell, London, January 7, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 3-4.

was a necessary requirement for any comprehensive arrangement to succeed. Ivan B. White, Counselor of the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, also believed the United Kingdom could undertake a greater role in the management and direction of Jordanian affairs so long as Egypt was willing to negotiate with Israel. However, two obstacles stood in Tel Aviv's way: Nasser's celebrated position and monumental role in Arab politics and the coming Israeli elections in February which would coincide with the proposed Washington talks and thus complicate Tel Aviv's endeavors in the face of domestic opposition. White advised his government to secure pledges from the concerned states to act with restraint and to approach Egypt and Tel Aviv individually and simultaneously. He also cautioned against the exclusion of France from the proposed Anglo-American negotiations, fearing its adverse effects on American-French relations.⁶

Hence, the prospects for a Near Eastern settlement appeared to be promising. The Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs concluded that a sizable portion of the Arab population had improved its perception of the West, and particularly of the United States. Egypt pledged to undertake measures to establish

⁶Despatch from the Embassy in Israel to the DOS, Tel Aviv, January 7, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab Israel dispute 1955, pgs. 5-7.

an agreement with Israel after the completion of the Suez base discussions, and Israel's rising anxiety about its security and its aspiration for a treaty of friendship with a European power facilitated this diplomatic enterprise. The main components of a settlement called for small territorial rectifications of the truce lines between Jordan and Israel to enable Palestinian villagers to reclaim lands they once owned in return for Israel's control over the Latrun salient and the fixing of the old Jerusalem road, which was still in Israeli hands. This scheme was also devised to resolve the issues of repatriation, resettlement and compensation of Palestinian refugees. The goal was to create permanently "recognized boundaries" between the contestants in the Middle East. Of special significance was the Bureau's emphasis on the significance of forging an agreement on the Unified Development of the Jordan Valley, and the recognition of Jordan's need for a "free port at Haifa...and a free route across Israel linking Egypt with Jordan."⁷

American policy makers believed that the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East stood

⁷Memorandum, prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Washington, January 14, 1955. FRUS, 1955, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, pgs. 9-16.

contrary to Jordan's economic and security needs. Jordan's sluggish economy and her semi-isolation in the absence of a territorial settlement of the Palestine question invited risks and threatened the Kingdom's stability. Thus, the forming of a federation between Jordan and one of her Arab neighbours was still an open option for the Department to explore. The persistence of sporadic hostilities on the Jordanian-Israeli frontiers disrupted trade activities and degraded Jordan's infrastructure. American officials affirmed that Jordan's association with the Arab League initiatives was a "fruitless and dangerous course." Only the United States of America and the United Kingdom were in a position to persuade the Jordanian government to move in the desired direction. The Bureau counseled the administration to declare its readiness to participate in Amman's quest for economic stability without any specified pledges of continuing assistance. President Eisenhower would assure Jordan of full American support, and her portion of the waters of the of the Yarmuk scheme would be protected. Israel would be advised to keep a low profile on the borders.⁸

Ambassador Johnston's chances of achieving a

⁸Memorandum by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, January 14, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 17-18.

regional agreement were "fairly good."⁹ On January 21, the British delegation met their American counterpart in Washington to hold joint discussions on the Middle East. The United States government agreed with the estimate of the engineers of the Baker-Harza company, and Evelyn Shuckburgh promised to advise his government and notify England's diplomatic Missions of Johnston's arrival.¹⁰

⁹A Memorandum prepared by Colonel Goodpaster on the Conference between Johnston and the President, Washington, January 17, 1955. DDE Papers (ACW Diary), Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pgs. 1-2. Also see the same Memorandum of a conversation with President Eisenhower, White House, Washington, January 17, 1955. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pg. 20. On January 23, Ambassador Johnston and his group left to the Middle East to recommence his discussions with the Arab countries and Israel over the Unified Development of the Jordan River Valley. See editor's note on the same page.

¹⁰Memorandum of Conversation, DOS, Washington, January 21, 1955. FRUS, 1952-1955, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 21-23. The Baker-Herza firm reached an estimate that Jordan needed 760 Meter of Cubic Milliard (MCM) to irrigate 513,000 dunums (with each dunum accounting for 1000 square meter). Charles T. Main report estimated that the Kingdom's water requirements accounted for 829 MCM yearly, while the Arab Plan demanded over 900 MCM for Jordan. The Baker-Harza firm allocated 132 MCM for Syria, 35 MCM for Lebanon, and 454 MCM for Israel annually. The riparian states and Israel gave their initial approval to this plan. Johnston suggested the establishment of some kind of international jurisdiction for the partition of the waters. Thereafter it was believed that Israel could commence in the construction of the diversion plan at Jiser Banat Ya'acov. The Arab states raised strong objections, warning that any future negotiations demanded no less than a sense of guarded optimism. FRUS, pgs. 21-22. The British delegation, included G.G. Arthur Shuckburgh of the Foreign Office, and Ronald Bailey, First Secretary of the British Embassy. For the United States, George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, from January 25, 1955

The Russell-Shuckburgh talks on Operation Alpha resolved that Britain and the United States should capitalize on every favorable development. Anglo-American negotiations were headed by Herbert Hoover, Jr., United States Under Secretary of State, and Charles Arthur Evelyn Shuckburgh, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Britain. The two governments decided to approach Cairo first and provide the government of Egypt with incentives to help maintain Nasser's Revolutionary Command Council in power. They agreed on an active "Support for Egypt as a focal point of power in the Middle East to enable her to play her rightful role in the area and in the world." Accordingly, the sponsors of this operation would provide Egypt with military aid within the framework of a negotiated settlement and help in building that country's Aswan High Dam.

Operation Alpha also stipulated that most of the Latrun demilitarized area would be under Jordanian sovereignty except the old Jerusalem road which would be designated to Israel. The status of Jerusalem would

to July 26, 1956; Ambassador to Greece from October 12, 1956 to November 13, 1957; thereafter, Director of United States Information Agency, from November 17, 1957. Ibid FRUS, vol. XIV, 1955, pg. XVII. George Barnes and Wayne Criddle from the Foreign Operations Administration were present at the meeting. Donald C. Bergus, Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, DOS. FRUS, vol. XIV, 1955, pg. XVIII.

remain unchanged. What was particularly significant was Egypt's request that Israel relinquish part of the Negev to Jordan, and the possible construction of a communication route across Sinai connecting Amman to Cairo. Furthermore, the British proposal provided that Israel surrender all the land east of Lake Tiberias and of the Jordan River. Russell believed that conditions were encouraging for immediate action despite Shuckburgh's preference to undertake an initiative after Johnston's return from the Near East. Britain's Under Secretary of State was in agreement with Counselor Russell's assertion that it would be quite perilous for the West to concoct a plan which would place Israeli interest above that of the Arab states. The organizers of this enterprise were also mindful of the Egyptian-Israeli rivalry over the question of Tel Aviv's proclaimed navigational rights in the Suez canal. Moreover, Britain's Under Secretary of State recalled Prime Minister Sharett's desire to approach Jordan first, it being the most vulnerable Arab country in the Middle East. Israeli hopes of reaching a compromise with Jordan were never extinguished.¹¹

¹¹Memorandum of Conversation, DOS, Washington, January 27, 1955. FRUS, 1952-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israel Dispute 1955, pgs. 24-28. Herber Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State until February 21, 1957. FRUS, pg. XX. Participants: John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; William C. Burdett, Officer in Charge of

American and British planners agreed that the newly appointed Ambassador to Egypt, Henry A. Byroade, would first approach President Nasser followed by a demarche to Prime Minister Sharett, and then King Hussein would be contacted. Dulles was determined that the president of Egypt "should not be allowed to feel that he can say no and that matters would then stand until he was ready to say yes." He hoped that the "continued power of American Jewry," which had acquired the means to shift the balance in Israel's favor, would arouse the Arab countries to abandon their resistance to this operation. Shuckburgh postulated that securing a definite peace accord was not feasible and that the quest for forging an agreement short of a lasting accord was only fifty-one to forty-nine percent. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles gave his consent to the Alpha Operation without necessarily

Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of NEA, DOS, until 9 October 1955; Deputy Director, Office of NEA, from 9 October 1955 until 7 October 1956; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for NE, SA, and AA, from 7 October 1956 to 11 August 1957; Acting Deputy Director, Office of NEA, from 11 August to 3 November, 1957; thereafter First Secretary of the Embassy in the UK. FRUS, pg. XVIII. Sir Robert Scott, Minister of the British Embassy attended the meeting. In his briefing, Russell listed Israel's demands; active negotiations with the Arab states; a treaty of friendship with a Western power; an involvement in a Mid-East defence; and blocking of arms deliveries to the Arab countries. The Counselor noted that Israel desired no one to establish a peace plan. See pg. 27.

absolutely committing his country.¹² Sir Anthony Eden decided to approach President Nasser, and his cabinet was eager to communicate the American plans to Jordan since Amman and London enjoyed a special friendship. The United States and Britain would provide financial and military aid to participating countries.¹³

On February 3, Ambassador Eric Johnston notified the administration of Israel's rejection of key United States assumptions about the principles and particulars of water estimations. Prime Minister Sharett was facing what Johnston called a "cabinet crisis" triggered by budgetary issues and allegedly aggravated by the defeat of his foreign policy. The Israelis believed that the United States was indulging the Arabs without giving any regard to Israeli rights and concerns.¹⁴ Indeed, the United States was exceedingly accommodating to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. President Eisenhower was banking on Jordan's adherence to the defence agreement between Turkey and Iraq, and Jordan's government was apparently

¹²Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 27, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 28-32.

¹³From Russell to Hoover, Washington, February 2, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 34-36, 42.

¹⁴A telegram from Ambassador Johnston to DOS, Cairo, February 3, 1955. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 43-25.

in favor of that arrangement. Moreover, Jordan, despite its weakness, continued to display a western orientation and a balanced foreign policy. Prime Minister Abu al-Huda suspected an Egyptian withdrawal from the Arab League Collective Security Pact. This development would signal the splintering of the Arab League and the reordering of the concerned countries, thereby expediting their likely adherence to the Northern Tier agreement and closer ties with the West. Despite the Prime Minister's cautionary attitude, he was complimentary and resolute. The future of events would depend partially on King Hussein's anticipated visit to Baghdad, and Eric Johnston's meeting with the Hashimite ruler.¹⁵ On February 8, Ambassador Johnston met an Arab committee represented by Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan in Cairo to vote on the Jordan Valley scheme. The idea of the unified plan approach appears to have been approved by the governments of the Cairo meeting. But the consent of all the participants was a necessary condition for the United States to proceed with this plan.¹⁶

¹⁵A telegram from Mallory in Jordan to DOS, Amman, February 7, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. III, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 1-2.

¹⁶Memorandum containing the proposals in reference to the Jordan Valley Scheme from Ambassador Johnston, February 8, 1955. Collection of Wasfi Mirza Basha MW15/M in Arabic and English. Jordan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman, Jordan, pgs. 1-6 in Arabic, 1-4 in English. The final proposal by the United States advanced two solutions; one, the final distribution (including the

At the Cairo talks, the Arab representatives acknowledged in principle the importance of utilizing the waters of Tiberias provided that a high level of water safety storage on the Yarmuk would be established. American diplomats predicted that the final decisions by the concerned countries would be driven by political considerations under which both sides would be inclined to agree with Ambassador Johnston despite expected

waters of Valley's and reservoirs) designated for Jordan 760 MCM or 52% annually; Syria 132 MCM or 9.1%; Lebanon 35 or 2.4%; "occupied territory" 525% or 36.2%. The second called for a temporary solution, under which Jordan and the "occupied territories" reserve the right to utilize the waters of valleys and reservoirs, and the distribution of common waters temporarily. Jordan 375 MCM or 42%; Syria 132 MCM or 12%; Lebanon 35 MCM or 3%; "occupied territory 350 MCM or 38%. The Arab Committee decreed that the proposed quantity in the final distribution was smaller than its share of Johnston's first proposal. The temporary distribution was less than what Jordan could get from the Yarmuk alone. The Arab Committee recommended the adoption of the first option (complete storage) for the Yarmuk in its own valley, refusing to divert Yarmuk's waters to Lake Tiberias, and the emphasis on the specification of Jordan's share from Tiberias no less than 200 MCM not to mention the waters of Yarmuk, Valleys, and reservoirs. In the event of American refusal of these recommendations the Committee suggested to proceed with the Yarmuk project for the interest of Jordan and Syria, while demanding the shares of those two countries from the common waters of the River Jordan. The "Report of the Arab Committee on the Conclusions of its discussions with Mr. Johnston Concerning the Utilization of the Jordan River" Cairo, February 2-8, 1955. Collections of Wasfi Mirza Basha. Mirza Collection, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Amman, Jordan, pgs. 1-8.

negative impacts in the Arab East and Israel.¹⁷ On February 10, Jordan's Minister of Economy, Khalousi al-Khairy, notified Jordanian officials and Foreign Minister Wali Salah, of Johnston's anticipated arrival.¹⁸ Johnston's informal discussions with Minister Wasfi Mirza revealed Jordan's misgivings sprang from what Mirza termed "Zionist pressure and influence" in the United States which could inhibit the Ambassador's capacity to be impartial and honorable. Johnston pledged to be fair in his conduct and stressed that Jordan would be dealing with the United States directly, never having to be concerned about any direct contacts with its chief adversary in the region. He asserted that American

¹⁷Telegram from Counselor Jones of American Embassy in Egypt to DOS, Cairo, February 10, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 48-49. Jones served as the Counselor of the Embassy in Cairo until June 27, 1955; Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, June 27-November 9, 1955; From November 9 1955-to July 27, 1956, he became the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy; from October 4, 1956, he was the Ambassador to Tunisia. pg. XXI. The Arab representatives at the Cairo Talks included; Jordan-Minister of Economy Khalous Khairy; Deputy Minister of Economy Hamad Farhan, Deputy Minister of Agriculture Nasouh Taher, and Mr. Izz al-din Yunis of the Irrigation Department. pg. 49. Also see the "Report of the Arab Committee about the Conclusions of its Discussions with Mr. Johnston Concerning the Utilization of the Jordan River and its Sources" Cairo, February 2-8, 1955. Collections of Wasfi Mirza Basha MW15/M. Mirza Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman, Jordan, Pg. 1. Egypt, Syria and Lebanon had their own representatives at the meeting.

¹⁸From Minister Khairy to Prime Minister Abu al-Huda, Amman, February 10, 1955. Collections of Wasfi Mirza Basha, Series number MW15/M. Obtained from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Amman, Jordan, pg.1.

economic diplomacy was designed to "secure stability and prevent warfare" in the Middle East; the Unified Development Plan would be advantageous to all the countries in the area, providing the Jordanian Kingdom with an unsurpassed opportunity to water all of its irrigable lands. After all, the Ambassador contended, the "United States wants by this scheme to prevent the Jews from taking all the water by diverting the course of the Jordan north of Lake Tiberias."¹⁹

Meanwhile, Secretary Dulles worked laboriously to consider an Israeli demand for security guarantees. He directed Ambassador Lawson at Tel Aviv to convey a verbal communiqué to Prime Minister Sharett in an effort to ease Israeli apprehensions about the proposed American policy of arming the Arabs. Arab receptiveness to Soviet influences on the question of Palestine propelled Dulles to suggest that Sir Anthony Eden inform Nasser that American military aid to Egypt would be limited.²⁰

¹⁹An informal conversation between Minister Mirza and Ambassador Johnston, Amman, Friday, February 11, 1955. Collections of Wasfi Mirza, Serial number MW15/M. Mirza Collection, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Amman, Jordan, pgs. 1-2 in English, 1-3 in Arabic. Johnston said that the United States was committed to spending \$198 Million on the Unified Development project (\$105 million would be spent in Jordan), pg. 1.

²⁰Memorandum of Conversation, DOS, Washinton, February 11, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 49-51. It was estimated that the Alpha operation would cost over one Billion Dollars.

Nevertheless, the United States Ambassador in Tel Aviv notified Johnston (who was conducting negotiations in Amman) that the Israeli government appeared unwilling to relinquish a considerable amount of the Jordan waters to the Hashimite Kingdom. Edward B. Lawson, deduced that Israel's domestic opposition would regard the proposal as an unacceptable major concession. His uncertain prediction was that the chances for securing Israeli approval to the entire (rather than partial) distribution scheme was negligible.²¹

On the other side, Jordan which had exclusive sovereignty over the Jordan River was surprisingly more lenient on the question of the settlement of the Jordan waters than the Israelis. Ambassador Johnston's reception in Amman was "most cordial," standing in contrast to the events in October of 1953. King Hussein organized a luncheon for his guest with notable cabinet ministers and undertook the task of leading a cabinet meeting where the proposals were thoroughly debated. Johnston believed that King Hussein was "definitely favorable to a settlement and his leadership ha[d] led wavering members of [the] cabinet to take [a] constructive stand." Johnston's discussions with ministry members were congenial and

²¹Telegram from Lawson in Tel Aviv to Johnston in Amman, Tel Aviv, February 12, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 52-53.

effective. Furthermore, the Jordanian press was careful to report his accomplishments and saluted the idea behind his mission. Johnston's optimism led him to believe that Jordan might accede to the Cairo talks. But the Iraqi-Turkey treaty of friendship might have made it more difficult for the Jordanian government to carry on with the Jordan Valley scheme without Arab support.²²

The American search for consensus in the Middle East required persistence and patience. Secretary Dulles persevered in urging Prime Minister Sharett to continue his policy of restraint as an indispensable prerequisite for the success of the Unified Development Project.²³ Sharett's reply was one of appreciation and continued concern; he affirmed that his country's policy of moderation was strained under the pressure of armistice line violations, particularly on the Syro-Israeli border, which he believed Syria was deliberately instigating. The Prime Minister expressed his dissatisfaction with the latest developments surrounding the Unified Development Plan because the new scheme was allegedly detrimental to

²²Telegram from Ambassador James S. Moose, Jr. in Syria to DOS, Damascus, February 14, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israel Dispute 1955, pgs. 54-55. Moose reported that the Jordanian's press careful reporting may have been the outcome of an organized government campaign to influence public opinion.

²³Dulles to Lawson in Israel, Washington, February 14, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 55-56.

Israel's interest. Sharett charged that Jordan's water was adequate, given that country's access to underground water and the Litani River in Lebanon.²⁴

On February 20, Eisenhower's special representative, Eric Johnston, reported a "tentative agreement" with the Arab delegates of the concerned countries on the Jordan Valley scheme. Johnston's proposal for the distribution of water resources was preliminarily accepted, pending further consideration by the governments of the Arab countries.²⁵ However, Johnston revealed in his discussions with President Eisenhower that the Israeli government adopted an uncompromising position on this matter. Ambassador Johnston recalled how he felt before his departure to the Near East; he had assumed that his

²⁴Lawson to DOS, Tel Aviv, February 17, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 63-65. Major General E.L.M. Burnes, Canadian Army Officer; Chief of Staff of UNTSO until November 1956; thereafter Commander of UN Emergency Force. pg. XVIII.

²⁵Johnston to DOS, Beirut, February 20, 1955. Ibid FRUS, pgs. 65-66. On the same day, Johnston telegraphed the text of the agreement to the DOS; the republic of Syria and Jordan acknowledged the significance of completing the utilization of the Yarmuk through the building of a supply dam on the Yarmuk establishing a storage with a capacity of 300 MCM. Jordan's needs would account for 537 MCM yearly; Syria 132 MCM; Lebanon 35 MCM annually. Supervision and neutrality were also recognized. The "control of the waters shall in no way alter existing territorial rights and claims" of participating countries. FRUS, pgs. 66-68. On February 24, Johnston admitted that his talks with the Israelis were "frankly disappointing" and their attitude indicated a sense of "rigidity." Johnston to DOS, Rome, February 24, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 68-69.

diplomatic endeavors in Israel would be successful, while those with the Arab countries would face major challenges. But his mission in the Arab capitals proved to be contrary to his expectations. His discussions with Israeli leaders were "frankly disappointing."²⁶ Meanwhile, Secretary Dulles and Sir Anthony Eden were weighing the latest developments on the Arab-Israeli dispute. President Nasser disapproved of any arrangement limited only to the resolution of the Jordanian border, and asserted that the quest for a settlement must be comprehensive in scope.²⁷ The Eden-Nasser talks in Cairo reaffirmed the importance of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement (ratified October 1954) over the Suez Canal. However, Secretary Eden's insistence on Egyptian participation in the Iraqi-Turkish collective security pact was futile. Prime Minister Eden considered Nasser's rejection of the British proposal a result of Iraq's initiative in taking the lead in this regional security arrangement.²⁸ Eden later recalled his conversation with Colonel Nasser who

²⁶Memorandum of Conference (prepared by A. J. Goodpaster, Colonel, CE US Army) with the President, March 5, 1955. ACW Diary, Dwight D. Eisenhower collection, pg. 1. Johnston's revised plan accounted for 40% for Israel. Israel later would press for 50% and no less than 43%. Pg.1. See footnote #25. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

²⁷Dulles to DOS, Bangkok, February 24, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israel Dispute, pg. 70.

²⁸Dulles to DOS, Bangkok, February 24, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 71-72.

voiced his opposition to the Turco-Iraqi Pact because of its "bad timing and unfortunate content." Eden's repeated reasoning to Nasser, who was a "fine man physically," left little impression on the Egyptian colonel.²⁹ American and British emphasis on linking their security considerations to their economic and political proposals for the Middle East was an irreparable blunder. England had sewn the seeds of failure for Anglo-American diplomatic endeavors.

The month of February ended with mixed results: Jordan was disposed to accept the Johnston scheme, Israel still displayed strong reservations about the details of the project, leaving Egypt's resistance to the Eden proposal as a disquieting matter for British officials. On March 1, Ambassador Byroade in Cairo reported to the Department of State that the Israeli military violated the demarcation lines east of Gaza and assaulted Egyptian forces there. The United Kingdom, the United States, and France submitted two resolutions to the Security Council which led to the condemnation of Israel's military

²⁹Eden, Anthony, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), pgs. 244-245. Talks held in Cairo and Baghdad. Eden was on his way to and from SEATO Conference in Bangkok.

attacks.³⁰ This episode had detrimental effects on the Alpha Operation. Ambassador Byroade could only press for caution³¹ and hope for reconciliation. American officials questioned Sharett's proclaimed policy of "restraint and moderation." Dulles demanded the "full cooperation" of the Israeli government to face the communist threat or risk the consequences of her intemperate actions.³² However, Arab-Israeli border relations deteriorated alarmingly: Syro-Israeli border relations worsened, Egypt's attitude hardened, and reports that the Arab legion might have crossed the truce lines established between Israel and Jordan contributed to the unfolding crisis.³³

As the Jordanian Kingdom was preparing to celebrate

³⁰Ambassador Byroade in Egypt to DOS, Cairo, March 1, 1955. FRUS, pg. 73. 37 Egyptian soldiers and two civilians were killed; 30 soldiers and two civilians injured. On March 28 and March 30, France, UK, and US submitted to the SC two resolutions. Twice Israel was condemned for the 28 of February attacks. See editorial note on pgs. 76-77.

³¹Byroade to DOS, Cairo, March 4, 1955. FRUS, pg. 82.

³²Dulles to Embassy in Israel, Washington, March 9, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 92-93. Lawson related the message to Sharett who reiterated that the Israeli policy of "moderation" would continue. He defended Israel's use of force as an act of self defence. See Lawson's response on pg. 93.

³³Lawson to DOS, Tel Aviv, March 30, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 125-126.

Independence and Army Day,³⁴ Counselor Russell urged the administration to acknowledge the latest Gaza episode and stressed the importance of reminding President Nasser of the anticipated economic gains from a diplomatic settlement. Russell encouraged the administration to contact the Jordanian government because the latter had the most to gain from a territorial agreement with Israel. If the first two options were to fail, the United States and United Kingdom would make a public announcement concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁵

On May 29, King Hussein accepted for the last time the resignation of Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and requested former Prime Minister Said al-Mufti to

³⁴Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah li-khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pg. 59.

³⁵Memorandum from Francis H. Russell to Dulles, Washington, May 24, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 205-206. Russell also drafted a letter in the name of the President to the ruler of Egypt. He wrote: "...I detect a weariness at the existing impasse, a rejection of the negativism, and an eagerness to find a positive policy. The record of your Government in espousing social and economic development and in solving troublesome international questions such as the Suez Base controversy leads to the thought that Egypt might wish to assert area leadership by example and undertake the task of resolving the Arab-Israeli problem." Russell implored Nasser to take the initiative and to employ his "statesmanship" to help the Anglo-American quest for a Near Eastern diplomatic reconciliation. It is not clear if this letter was ever approved by Eisenhower and/or delivered to Nasser. Draft Letter from Eisenhower to Nasser, May 24, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 207-208.

establish a new Cabinet.³⁶ In the weeks to come, the Eisenhower administration would learn of a Soviet proposal to deliver military equipment to Cairo. The Soviet Union's Ambassador, Danni S. Solod, offered military and economic aid to Egypt, including financing for the Aswan Dam. At Soviet behest, Czechoslovakia proposed an instant shipment of weapons in exchange for Egyptian cotton.³⁷

On July 12, the Department of State instructed its embassy in Lebanon to inform the Foreign Offices of the interested countries of Johnston's proposed visit. Ambassador Johnston expressed his hope to visit Amman first to familiarize the new Jordanian cabinet with the latest events and seek continued Jordanian backing. Jordan's Prime Minister al-Mufti welcomed Johnston's contemplated trip to the region.³⁸ A few days later, Francis H. Russell dispatched a Circular Letter to specific American Ambassadors in the Near East. He

³⁶Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh, al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993, December, 1993, pg. 52. Also see FRUS, 1955, vol. XIV, pg. 218.

³⁷Memorandum from Jernegan to Murphy, Washington, June 21, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israel Dispute 1955, pgs. 261-262.

³⁸Telegram from the DOS to the Embassy in Lebanon, Washington, July 12, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israel Dispute 1955, pg. 291. Also see footnote number 3 on same page.

instructed the Missions to review a memorandum which was approved by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan pertaining to a future announcement on the Middle East. The Anglo-American proposals advanced the urgent need to make a "balanced statement" in an attempt to achieve a "Palestine settlement." This comprehensive arrangement stipulated the creation of a road in the Negev connecting Egypt with Jordan under either Arab or Israeli sovereignty. The status of Jerusalem would be based on the 1950 Swedish proposal would called for the internationalization of the city. The Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping would be removed, and the Arab states would not discourage third parties from establishing ties with Tel Aviv nor would the two sponsors of the proposal request the Arab countries to directly trade with Israel at any time in the present or the future. MacMillan's cabinet and Her Majesty's Government were expected to be consulted on this matter. The Dulles draft stressed the significance of coping with the plight of the refugees, the rectifications of Armistice lines, and the obliteration of Arab and Israeli apprehension of one another.³⁹ However, the

³⁹Circular Letter from Russell to Certain American Ambassadors, Washington, July 22, 1955. See Enclosures, "Palestine Settlement" on July 14, and "Draft of Possible Public Statement by Mr. Dulles on an Israeli-Arab Settlement," on July 15. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, pgs. 310-318.

representatives of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon soon notified Johnston of their wish that he delay his tour of the Middle East until late September. Johnston insisted that his travel be postponed no later than August 24, making Amman his first stop, Beirut second, and Cairo third, with Damascus in early September.⁴⁰

On August 9, the Chiefs of Mission in the Middle East and Paris returned their comments on Russell's earlier recommendations pertaining to the content of the Alpha operation and its strategy. The Missions advised the Department of State to inform the interested states one day in advance about the suggested Dulles-MacMillan announcement. This was to be followed by a British statement, while at the same time approaching the interested countries through Britain's Missions overseas. In addition, United States Ambassador to France, Douglas C. Dillon, counseled the administration to notify Paris two weeks in advance to avert any possible damaging effects on Franco-American relations. Ambassador Donald D. Heath in Lebanon suggested that the Soviet Union be given an earlier notice. The Missions counseled the administration to anticipate a cautionary stand from the

⁴⁰Telegram from Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, August 2, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 334-335. Syrian elections may have created problems for the first scheduled visit of Johnston to the Middle East. See pg. 335.

governments of Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, abstaining from any commitments until after they conducted consultations with the other Arab states. They also expected Syria and Egypt to take an opposing view, and the Arab public to repudiate the propositions instantly, possibly causing demonstrations in the Arab countries and Israel. But they all agreed that secrecy was to be maintained, and that verified texts in Arabic, English and French, with illustrations, be readily available for prompt circulation. Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman in Baghdad recommended that a statement be ready to discredit any assertion that the statement was an extension of the Iraqi-Turkish Pact. Little commentary from the Arab states on the content of the statement was received, but all indicated "consensus" that a partial repatriation of the refugees be included. The Chiefs also presumed that the announcement would have negative effects on the Johnston Mission.⁴¹

On August 20, Secretary Dulles instructed the American Ambassador to Jordan to seek audience with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mufti or King Hussein following the British Ambassador's intended

⁴¹From Allen (Assistant Secretary of State for NE, SA, AA to Dulles, Washington, August 9, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 341-343. Also see Tab A, pgs. 342-343.

representation to the Jordanian government. He directed Mallory to advise Jordanian officials that the Eisenhower administration was planning to make an announcement on matters related to the Arab-Israeli friction. Dulles's telegram about the proposed statement carefully examined the issues, and he hoped that the Jordanian government would give it close consideration since it was supposedly in that Kingdom's interest.⁴² On August 24, United States Charge, Paul Geren, in Amman, learned that Prime Minister Mufti showed no committment, whereas King Hussein was inclined to note that his country's response was contingent upon the substance of the Secretary's announcement.⁴³ On the following day, Ambassador Lawson in Tel Aviv communicated Dulles's proposed statement to the Israeli Prime Minister. Sharett expressed misgivings about any settlement that would entail unfeasible Israeli concessions and might lead to harmful effects on American-Israeli relations and American ties to the Arab

⁴²Telegram from Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, August 20, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 378-379. The State Department was planning to notify the French Foreign Office about American intentions in general terms hoping for their approval. The Secretary told the Ambassador that he could inform his French colleague along the same lines. The content of the statement was not to be disclosed pg. 379.

⁴³See editor's note. Embassy in Jordan to DOS, Amman, August 24, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pg. 379.

countries.⁴⁴

The increasing activities of Soviet diplomats in the Near East was equally unsettling to American officials in Washington. United States Acting Director of Central Intelligence, C.P. Cabell, confirmed Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod's May talks in Cairo with Egyptian officials about proposed technical and economic aid to Egypt: The CIA also discovered a Soviet approach to Saudi Arabia and Syria. Cabell warned of a Soviet proclivity to plant the "seeds of discord"⁴⁵ in the tumultuous region of the Middle East. Within the next twenty-four hours, Egyptian-Israeli border relations would worsen rapidly. Ambassador Byroade surmised that the Egyptian forces were arrayed for a "heavy attack" on Israeli positions.⁴⁶ On the same day, Prime Minister Sharett communicated his concern about Egyptian attacks in the Gaza area and cautioned that American pressure on Israel was serving as a practical and efficient tool in

⁴⁴Telegram from Lawson to DOS, Tel Aviv, August 25, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israel Dispute 1955, pgs. 391-392.

⁴⁵Cabell to Dulles, Washington, August 25, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 395-396.

⁴⁶From Byroade to Allen, Cairo, August 26, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pg. 223. First reported by Willy Morris of the British Embassy to Russell at the State Department. Ibid, Pg. 397. This message was not transmitted through DOS lines.

Nasser's hands. Lawson interpreted the Israeli position as one of warning and a basis for a more forceful Israeli policy on the frontier.⁴⁷

What was even more disturbing to American negotiators was that the rumors of a planned Egyptian military offensive came precisely one day before the Secretary's statement on the Near East. The "crucial struggle" between the "caretaker" government of Sharett and the "impetuous decisions" of Ben Gurion, who was invited by President Itzhak Ben Zvi to establish a new cabinet, invited more trouble for the United States. Ambassador Lawson surmised that the "tripartite formula" to be advanced by the Western powers might receive criticisms from different parties. The British Ambassador and some of his colleagues also were reported to have voiced their concerns about "effectively performing their duties" if the formula were to be applied.⁴⁸ Nasser's reaction was one of protest; he raised the issue of

⁴⁷Lawson to DOS, Tel Aviv, August 26, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 400-401.

⁴⁸Lawson to DOS, Tel Aviv, August, August 26, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pg. 399. On August 15, the Sharett administration resigned before the elections in the Knesset. Ben Gurion was invited by President Itzhak Ben Zvi to establish a new cabinet, while the Knesset recessed for 8 weeks to advance his quest. In the interim period, the Sharett government was the "caretaker." See editor's footnote, pg. 399.

refugees, and questioned Ben Gurion's scheme to settle two million Jews by developing the Negev area. Byroade's pledges to President Nasser on the expected benefits from the settlement of the Unified Valley project received little consideration from the Egyptian ruler. Nonetheless, Egypt's Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, appeared more satisfied with the statement.⁴⁹ Contrary to the Egyptian position, Johnston's consultations with Jordan's Ministerial Committee were conducted in an atmosphere of "complete frankness." The negotiations with Amman's officials were highly "cordial" and, amazingly, proceeded with little desire to renegotiate Jordan's decreased share in the Valley water supply. Nevertheless, the dialogue between Ambassador Johnston and the Jordanian representatives was not conclusive. Indeed, the American Charge in Amman advised the Department of State to consider the Jordan Valley project separately from the issue of "political accommodation" as used by Dulles, or else face rejection. Geren insinuated that Dulles's statement on the Palestine settlement might have been used by the opponents of American plans to remain noncommittal despite the substance and worthiness of the

⁴⁹Byroade to DOS, Cairo, August 27, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israel Dispute 1955, pgs. 402-403.

Secretary's announcement.⁵⁰ To be certain, Johnston's consultations in Amman remained promising, particularly after he held private talks with King Hussein who acknowledged the importance of the Valley scheme for his country. Nevertheless, the Jordanian Cabinet, despite its favorable attitude, remained indecisive.⁵¹

The Saudi response to American initiatives was one of certain disapproval. Ambassador George Wadsworth in Jidda reported that Prince Faisal reprimanded the United States for its entanglement in the Palestine issue, and warned that the Eisenhower administration's conduct could only impair American-Saudi relations.⁵² From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the sovereignty of Palestine was inalienable and indivisible. However, Jordan's delicate position as the Arab country with the longest frontier with Israel and the weakest economy dictated compromise and reconciliation. On August 31, the American Charge in Amman notified Prime Minister Mufti that the Johnston

⁵⁰Geren to DOS, Amman, August 28, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 410-411. Johnston noted that he was "lunching" with King Hussein, the Jordanian cabinet and Ambassador Abd al-Munim al-Rifai to Washington. pg. 411.

⁵¹Embassy in Amman to DOS, August 29, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pg. 411. See editor's note.

⁵²Telegram from Ambassador George Wadsworth to DOS, Jidda, August 30, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 422-423.

Mission was driven by economic rather than political considerations. The Eisenhower administration discouraged the Jordanian government from holding deliberations on the Jordan Valley scheme at formal meetings of the Arab League.⁵³ On September 2, Charge Geren communicated to the Department of State of Johnston's extraordinary accomplishment in persuading "Jordanian unbelievers" to regard the water scheme negotiations as a distinct economic matter. Geren hailed Prime Minister Mufti's courage, but made a note of the Kingdom's habitual and fluctuating stand when conferring with other Arab countries.⁵⁴ On September 16, the Department of State learned that Jordan was shifting its position from one of assertiveness to one of hesitation, as demonstrated by the disquieting news that influential Jordanian government officials including Prime Minister Mufti seemed vacillating in their support of the Valley scheme. Ambassador Byroade reported that Jordan's decision was

⁵³See editor's footnote. DOS to Geren, Washington, August 31, 1955. FRUS, pg. 442.

⁵⁴Telegram from Geren to DOS, Amman, September 2, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 442-443. On the same day, Johnston reported from the Embassy in Lebanon that Jordan was "seriously interested" in the project because it was the "primary beneficiary" of the valley scheme. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi of Egypt acknowledged the significance of the plan to HKJ and recommended its approval as long as the proposal was fair to Jordan. A telegram From Ambassador Heath to DOS, Beirut, September 2, 1955. FRUS, vol. XIV, pg. 444.

ostensibly influenced by Egypt's expanding influence and by political factors in the Arab world. Johnston counseled the administration to utilize its strong British backing to coax the Jordanian government to proceed with the Unified Development Plan.⁵⁵

However, Egypt's chief of state and head of the Revolutionary Council had high ambitions and regional designs. President Jamal Abd al-Nasser, who had recently ousted General Najib from power was a dynamic believer in the concept of what he called "united struggle" against the West to bring about Arab unity and independence. Nasser, born on January 5, 1918, came from a modest background. His father was a post-office clerk in Alexandria, and his mother was the daughter of a businessman. He attended the Renaissance Secondary School in Cairo and subsequently studied law. But his eyes were fixed on the army to which he devoted his life. His revolutionary leanings were molded during his experience in the Palestine war and Britain's attack on King Farouk's royal palace in 1942. Despite his loathing of the monarchy, he was deeply injured at the humiliation of

⁵⁵A telegram from Byroade to DOS, Cairo, September 16, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 473-474. Johnson met with Ambassador Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i who depicted the current changing mood in Jordan and the political risks involved for the Prime Minister. See editor's footnote, pg. 474.

Egypt by Britain's occupying forces. Nasser detested Farouk who "tampered" with the "sacred traditions" of the Egyptian people. Politically, he sought to spark a revolution from what believed to be the "heart of the people." Lieutenant Colonel Nasser was determined to bring about a "political" revolution to emancipate his country from foreign rule and a "social" one against the existing order to achieve "justice" for his countrymen.⁵⁶ Nasser's struggles to realize his country's economic and political autonomy forced him to collaborate with the Soviet Union. His military collaboration with America's major rival invited substantial risks for the United States. On September 19, the Department of State determined that Egypt's acceptance of the proposed Soviet arms shipment was plausible.⁵⁷ Secretary Dulles postulated that Egypt was bent on isolating Iraq or forcing that country to retreat from the Anglo-American security arrangement known as the Northern Tier. The Secretary emphasized the significance of proceeding with Near East defence arrangements and communicated his hope that the Egyptian government would

⁵⁶Jamal abd al-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes & Marshall Publishers, 1959), pgs. 36, 53, 61, 70, 93.

⁵⁷Hoover to Dulles, Washington, September 19, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, pgs. 481.

cooperate with the Alpha Operation.⁵⁸ Dulles's ambitions would never be realized. Neither Nasser nor Dulles would make an attempt to understand one another. Dulles's disillusionment would be shared by Ambassador Byroade who was deeply disappointed with the irresolute American policy toward Egypt. The American Ambassador in Cairo disapproved of the Department's mishandling of the Egyptian question, reproaching his colleagues for their wavering and failure to provide Egypt with financial aid notwithstanding his continuous and pressing recommendations. He warned that the Department of State's unwillingness to be responsive to his counsel would prove to be deleterious, perhaps defeating American policy objectives. He believed the continuation of the American policy would lead to the triumph of Soviet diplomacy. Byroade was convinced that Egyptian-Soviet cooperation was motivated by Nasser's need for arms despite the prevailing view of its connection to the Gaza attacks in February.⁵⁹ To his utter dismay, Byroade learned that Cairo's deal with Moscow would be depicted in the Egyptian press as a reflection of a national desire to

⁵⁸Dulles to Embassy in Egypt, Washington, September 20, 1955. FRUS, pg.482.

⁵⁹Telegram from Byroade to DOS, Cairo, September 20, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 483-484.

eliminate Egypt's dependence on the West.⁶⁰ Two days later, W. Park Armstrong, Jr., the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence, informed Dulles that Egypt had signed a five year agreement with the Soviet Union. Ambassador Byroade advised the Department of State to proceed with the Alpha Project, an essential step for the Eisenhower administration to hinder Soviet efforts in the Middle East.⁶¹ Dulles would not make an attempt to understand the Egyptian leader. The Colonel was forever tainted with the stigma of revolutionary nationalism and atheistic communism. Dulles's inability to separate Nasser's romanticism from his flirtations with communism stands at the root of the American-Egyptian debacle. The Secretary was not the kind of statesman who believed that experience and time can transform men. It would take a generation of Americans to come to the realization that Nasser was banking on the Soviet Union to enhance his country's standing vis-a-vis the Western powers. Nasser was not an Islamist, neither was he a communist or a Fascist ruler as Anglo-Franco colonialists believe; he was a romantic nationalist Egyptian reformer who assumed power in Cairo at a time when the Arab East needed a

⁶⁰Telegram from Byroade to DOS, Cairo, September 21, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 290-293.

⁶¹Memorandum from Armstrong to Dulles, Washington, September 23, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 507-508. Also see telegram from Byroade to DOS, Cairo, September 23, 1955, pgs. 508-509.

earnest man to lead his people after the departure of Britain and France from the Near East. Indeed, the erratic conduct of the Western powers expedited Soviet success in the Middle East.

The triumph of Soviet diplomacy in Egypt produced a distinct reaction in the United States; the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation might induce Israel to launch a surprise attack on Egyptian territory. The Agency anticipated an escalation in Egyptian activity to discourage American policy makers from establishing a comprehensive Near Eastern settlement and thwart American aims of forming a defence pact. Moreover, Israel regarded the Soviet Arms deal as a "severe psychological blow."⁶² Nevertheless, President Nasser notified Ambassador Byroade in Cairo that Egypt would support the Unified Development Plan Technical Committee and join Jordan and other Arab states in seeking the Arab league's approval.⁶³ Nasser's latest response elevated Anglo-American hopes for Jordan's participation in a diplomatic

⁶²"Special National intelligence Estimate" Washington, October 12, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 577-586. The report estimated that in the event of an Israeli attack on Jordan, Britain would intervene given its treaty obligations to the Hashimite Kingdom. pg. 583.

⁶³Byroade to DOS, Cairo, September 26, 1955. FRUS, pg. 514.

settlement. During his Geneva discussions with Secretary John Foster Dulles, Britain's Foreign Secretary Harold M. Macmillan voiced his desire to see Jordan moving in the Iraqi direction. Macmillan, former British Minister of Defence and First Lord of the Treasury, and future Prime Minister, surmised that the Kingdom of Jordan could be goaded into a settlement with Israel provided that Iraq would give its consent to Jordanian wishes.⁶⁴ However, Jordan was not receptive to an agreement with Israel, and Macmillan would be forced to relinquish his post as a Minister for Foreign Affairs. The British Secretary left the Foreign Office with "great sorrow;" he thoroughly savored what he called the "baffling" and "fascinating" work of diplomacy with his competent advisers and engaging friends. Unlike the "rough and tumble of the House of Commons," his work as a Secretary for Foreign Affairs offered him the chance of meeting companions in Europe and the United States.⁶⁵ History would offer him another opportunity to be Chief of State in the succeeding years. Macmillan would then discover how strenuous it was to undertake a diplomatic initiative to fashion a limited settlement between the Jordanians and Israelis.

⁶⁴Memorandum of Conversation, Geneva, October 23, 1955. FRUS, pg. 671.

⁶⁵Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm (London: MacMillan, 1971), pg. 1.

On November 1, King Hussein delivered a speech before the Jordanian Parliament; he depicted what he called the "critical phase" in the Kingdom's political life, warned against the threat by the enemy on the long frontier, and portrayed his country's striving for national regeneration and recovery. King Hussein asserted that forming of a "first line of defence against the Zionist threat" in concert with the Arab states was a political imperative of immeasurable benefit. He also repudiated what he termed "direct or indirect talks" on the Palestine refugees outside an Arab framework.⁶⁶ Jordan's commitment to the principle of collective Arab action was manifested in King Hussein's speech before one of the divisions of the Jordanian armed forces, with Egypt's Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Minister of War and Marine, General Abd al-Hakim Amer in his company. The King emphasized the importance of maintaining "Arab dignity" and expressed pride in the ardor and allegiance of "her sons in her big land."⁶⁷

⁶⁶"King Hussein's Speech during the Opening Session of the Jordanian Parliament," December 11, 1955. Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 65-67.

⁶⁷"King Hussein's Speech during his visit to one of the Divisions of the Jordanian Armed Forces in the company of General Abd al-Hakim Amer," December 3, 1955. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, pg. 73. General Amer also served as chief Commander of the Egyptian-Syrian Joint Command from October 23, 1956.

Hussein time and again assured the citizens of Jordan that the Arab states were "one homeland" serving "one nation." He underscored the notion that the "lines of armistice are nothing but one Arab line of defence" and that Jordan would act in unison with the other Arab countries.⁶⁸ King Hussein's association with Egypt was fashioned to meet the yearning of Nasser's supporters in his Kingdom and to refine if not placate the Colonel's anti-monarchical propensity. His strategy might have also been designed to employ Nasser as a bargaining instrument vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.

Jordan's unwillingness to negotiate independently complicated American diplomatic ventures. The refusal of Egypt to entertain the Dulles-Eden proposal for a regional settlement, and Nasser's rejection of American defence schemes in the Near East, combined with the latest Soviet diplomatic coup in Cairo, diminished American capabilities of maneuvering in the Middle East. Ironically, as the rift between the United States and the Arab countries widened, Israeli apprehensions escalated and its desire for a political settlement with the Arab states grew speedily. On December 6, the government of Israel responded to Dulles' November proposal which

⁶⁸"Hussein's Speech to the Jordanian Nation" December 17, 1955. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Mallik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, pg. 75.

called on both sides to make concessions; Israel advanced what it called the principle of "equality and reciprocity" as a precondition for a diplomatic reconciliation. The Israeli Embassy dispatched an aide-memoire to the Department of State, under which a basic outline for a settlement was conceived. Israel revealed its willingness to facilitate better communications between all countries in the Near East based on existing boundaries. It foresaw "Port facilities in Haifa for the Kingdom of Jordan, including transit rights to and from the port" and a "transit arrangement to be agreed to by Israel for communication between Egypt and the Kingdom of Jordan, it being clearly understood that Israel will not cede territory, whether populated or unpopulated, in the Negev." In exchange, Jordan should be ready to grant Israel admittance to the Wailing Wall, Mount of Olives, and Mount Scopus. The right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba was also a question of vital importance for Israel's overall geostrategic considerations in the area.⁶⁹ The Israelis would splinter the Egyptian stronghold and monopoly on the right of navigating the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba in the months ahead. However, Ambassador Ivan B. White in Tel Aviv appeared less than enthusiastic about Israel's recent revisions of the Alpha

⁶⁹An aide-memoire from the Israeli Embassy to the DOS, Washington, December 6, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, pgs. 823-825.

Operation because his experience taught him that Israel moved slowly. Israeli apprehensions about the Arabs were linked to Tel Aviv's refusal to accept Britain as an arbitrator. Its domestic opposition, particularly the conservative Mapai and the military, created serious problems for American schemes. Only a settlement dictated by the United States, incorporating certain adjustments to satisfy Israeli demands, appeared as a possibly viable alternative to a definite eclipse of the Alpha Operation.⁷⁰ Ambassador White was confident that the chances of achieving a diplomatic breakthrough were negligible without conducting previous consultations with Prime Minister Ben Gurion, Foreign Minister Sharett, and Defence Minister Eshkol. He doubted that the United Kingdom could alleviate Israel's suspicions because Britain was allegedly planning to establish a base in the Negev and perhaps a line of communication from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Suez Canal. Prime Minister Eden's latest speech on this sensitive question convinced Foreign Minister Sharett and Israeli leaders that Britain's interests in the Arab east predisposed her to be on the Arab side.⁷¹ In the days to come, Prime Minister Eden would visit Washington to hold discussions with American

⁷⁰Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the DOS, Tel Aviv, December 21, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 878-880.

⁷¹White to DOS, Tel Aviv, December 22, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, pgs. 880-881.

leaders on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and help search for a new security order in the Near East.⁷²

Jordan's Resistance to the Baghdad Alliance

American fear of communist strides in the Middle East was heightening imperceptibly during the first months of the Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower, who was deeply interested in defence policy issues, was eager to forge a new order in the Near East based on a collective security alliance by the regional powers. On April 24, 1952, the National Security Council outlined American aims toward the Arab countries and the state of Israel: the improvement of the stability of the area to defend Western interests; the promotion of Western influence while preventing the so-called Soviet menace; the strengthening of the ability of the regional states to resist Soviet advances in the area; the establishment of a new relationship among the states in the Middle East to achieve recognition of their "sovereign equality;" and insuring that "the resources of the area are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world." Thus,

⁷²Memorandum from Russell (Special Assistant to the Secretary of State) to Dulles, Washington, December 28, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 888-889. Russell made plans to visit the Middle East but he would return in time for Eden's visit.

the formation of defensive barriers, such as the establishment of military bases and transportation routes in the Middle East, became a matter of vital strategic necessity for the United States.⁷³ From the nationalists' perspective in the Arab east, the Baghdad Pact was an instrument created by the Western powers to keep the Middle East subservient to Euro-American interests.⁷⁴ This conclusion was later confirmed by Prime Minister Anthony Eden's assertion that British policy was fashioned to defend England's interests in Iraq and the Arabian Gulf. The Baghdad alliance, he wrote, was to serve as a vehicle to uphold the British position in the Middle East and contain the threat from Nasser, who was drawing closer to communist Russia.⁷⁵ The Pact was also a product of great power rivalry over a land mass which was regarded as vital for establishing and preserving the hierarchy of dominance between two competing empires.

Some American officials warned against the creation

⁷³Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, Washington, April 24, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pg. 222.

⁷⁴Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pg. 679.

⁷⁵Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pgs. 393-394.

of a Middle East Command Organization without the participation of the Arab States. Indeed, the prevailing mood of suspicion in the region was aggravated by the emergence of a new brand of Arab revolutionary nationalism, and reinforced by the vivid legacy of Western colonialism and imperialism. Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, admonished the administration to hold consultations with the Arab countries or risk the possibility of a major calamity. Nitze cautioned that the Arab states might be inclined to believe the Four Powers, which included the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, were plotting against the Arab East.⁷⁶ However, United States Ambassador to Turkey, George McGhee, reported that the Arab states were reluctant to join in American security plans in the Middle East. Therefore, the Turkish government advised Britain to approach Jordan, the United States to contact Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to advance a proposal to Lebanon.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Memorandum of Conversation, by Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Alexander B. Daspit), Washington, April 24, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 219-220.

⁷⁷McGhee to DOS, Ankara, October 24, 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pg. 301. Initially, the Turkish Foreign Minister stressed that the British position must be implemented without the participation of the Arab states. But later adopted the new Turkish position that they should join. pg. 301.

On April 30, 1953, President Eisenhower transmitted a "special message" to the Congress of the United States:

Today we live in a perilous period of international affairs. Soviet Russia and her allies have it within their power to join with us in the establishment of truce peace or plunge the world into global war. To date, they have chosen to conduct themselves in such a way that these years neither of total war nor total peace.⁷⁸

Thus, the security of Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia was recognized as important by John Foster Dulles and King Abd al-Aziz during the Secretary's last visit to that country in the May of 1953.⁷⁹ Dulles envisioned a "collective security organization" under which Britain and the United States would be "associate" members.⁸⁰ Mohamed Ali, Pakistan's Prime Minister, "welcomed" any

⁷⁸U.S. President. "Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 6 of 1953 Concerning the Department of Defense, April 30, 1953." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Records Service, 1953), Dwight D. Eisenhower, January-December 31, 1953, pg. 226.

⁷⁹Memorandum, Embassy in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, May 18, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, Part I, pg. 97.

⁸⁰Memorandum, by the secretary, New Delhi, May 22, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pg. 119.

measure to enhance the strength of the Near East, for Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan "stood as obstructions to Soviet ambitions in this area."⁸¹

To the pleasure of Secretary Dulles, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey denounced what he called the "Soviet menace" because he was "convinced that the United Kingdom [was] acting as guardian of an outpost of one of the key positions of the free world..." linking the security of the Mediterranean to the safety of the Suez Canal. Acting in his country's national interest, Menderes counseled American officials to abandon their hopes of Arabs joining the proposed security organization in the near future. He asserted that Turkey must constitute the "backbone" for any defence schemes pertaining to the Near East.⁸² Moreover, Libya's Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud Muntasser, was "aware of the communist threat and found

⁸¹Memorandum of Conversation, Embassy in Pakistan, Karachi, May 23, 1953. FRUS, vol. IX, 1952-1955, The Near and Middle East, pg. 124.

⁸²Memorandum, Counselor of the Embassy in Turkey (Willim M. Rountree), Ankara, May 26, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1955, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pg. 139. Rountree served as the Former Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs at the DOS. McGhee was the American Ambassador in Turkey.

it necessary to deport a number of Italian communists."⁸³ In the end, Dulles's tour in the Near East established the political and ideological ground for a collective security shield. On July 9, President Eisenhower held a top secret meeting of the National Security Council with the most influential members of his cabinet, Vice President Richard Nixon, Secretary Dulles, Secretary of Defense, Director of Mutual Security, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and many others. Dulles's scheme conceived a "less grandiose" Middle East Defence Organization than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under which separate bilateral agreements on a state-to-state basis would be founded. Dulles gave up his hopes of foreseeing Egypt as the chief operator in American security arrangements in that region. However, President Eisenhower favored what he called a "multilateral defense arrangement" to give the United States some degree of flexibility. Dulles proposed "greater independence and greater responsibility" vis-a-vis the United Kingdom in the Near East. But NSC One Fifty Five as amended and approved by the President stressed the significance of exploiting Britain's strong points in the Middle East by promoting the posture of the United Kingdom in accordance with American standards and

⁸³Memorandum, political officer at Legation in Libya, Tripoli, May 28, 1953. FRUS, vol. IX, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, pg. 164.

policy aims. For this operation to succeed, the President "pointed out frankly that under no circumstances would the United States favor the Israelis above the Arabs or vice versa."⁸⁴

On March 20, 1954, the Soviet Union protested the forging of a Turko-Pakistani Agreement to promote friendly cooperation and consultation which entailed economic, technical, and cultural collaboration between Istanbul and Islamabad.⁸⁵ British apprehension about the Soviet Union's historical interests in Iran (as the treaty of 1921 demonstrated) were revealed during the lengthily discussions of Ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich with Foreign Office officials in London over England's desire to commit forces to Iran.⁸⁶ In an attempt to clarify the American position on the concept of a Collective Security Pact, as well as to pacify the

⁸⁴Memorandum of Discussion of the 153 meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 9, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pgs. 394-398. American aims and policies in the Near East (Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Sudan, Gulf States except Iran) were the subject of discussion in NSC 136/1. See Statement of policy by the NSC, Washington, July 14, 1953. pg. 399.

⁸⁵Ambassador in the Soviet Union to DOS, Moscow, March 20, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol., Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 440.

⁸⁶Ambassador Aldrich in England to DOS, London, November 16, 1954. FURS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 561.

misapprehensions of President Nasser, Dulles offered the Northern Tier defense scheme as the "best prospect" for generating vitality in the Arab world. He rebuffed the rumor that the United States was planning to exclude the Arabs from this arrangement.⁸⁷ Indeed, the United States very much wanted Jordanian and Arab participation in American security affairs in the Middle East.

On February 18, 1955, King Hussein returned from his recent visit to Iraq. The Baghdad talks eliminated the misgivings between the two countries but offered little to counterbalance the anticipated Egyptian influences on Jordan's King Hussein, who was scheduled to visit Cairo in the coming days. Ambassador Mallory surmised that Iraq's lack of understanding and its apparent unwillingness to assist Jordan might explain the sudden alterations in that country's position. Evidently, King Hussein was annoyed with British officials in London for their refusal the previous December to build his air force. Subsequently, the American Ambassador was notified by an informant that the King was planning to request Egyptian aid to compensate for England's meager military backing. But Ambassador Mallory was quick to point out that Jordan's alignment with Egypt against the Turko-

⁸⁷Dulles to Embassy in Egypt, Washington, December 31, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part I, The Near and Middle East, pg. 565.

Pakistani pact would be disagreeable to the United States.⁸⁸ Within a few days, King Faisal II of Iraq (accompanied by Prime Minister al-Farid Nuri as-Said) signed a pact of mutual cooperation with President Celal Bayar of Turkey (and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes). The alliance was devised to promote the "security and defence" of the two countries against outside intervention. Article V stipulated that the association would be open to any participant of the Arab League or any other country concerned about the security of the Near East with approval of the two contracting states of Iraq and Turkey.⁸⁹ The Baghdad Pact "alienated" the "neutralists, nationalists, and pan-Arab opinion." It also represented a challenge to Iraq's communist party. The participants maintained undesirable ties with Britain, and the treaty divided the Arab states along

⁸⁸Ambassador Mallory to DOS, Amman, February 18, 1955. FRUS, 1955, 1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 2-3. Mallory noted in his telegram that King Hussein was in a "quandary on providing adequate gift to Faisal, which may have to be his favorite English sports car. King Hussein was also hoping that Britain would give him some assistance to build his air force. The Ambassador admitted that Britain obviously managed the London visit "poorly." pgs. 2-3. There was also rumor that Abu al-Huda's cabinet was hanging in the balance. See editor's footnote, pg. 3.

⁸⁹U.K. Parliament. "Baghdad Pact, February 1955," State Papers General and International (Commons), sessional papers, 1955/1956), pgs. 1-3 in English, 6-13 in Arabic.

variegated ideological lines.⁹⁰

On March 16, King Hussein summoned Ambassador Mallory to the Royal Palace. Hussein assured Mallory that Jordan's integrity was not open to compromise at the Cairo Meeting nor was Amman obligated to meet Egypt's schemes of regional integration. If anything, Hussein showed interest in considering any American request to participate in America's defense plans. Indeed, the Ambassador was "surprised at his acceptance and appreciation" of American security concerns. What's more, Britian's Ambassador held similar discussions with Jordan government officials, including the question of arms shipment to Jordan.⁹¹ Whether American arms deliveries to Jordan were forthcoming in exchange for the Kingdom's adherence to the Baghdad Pact is a debatable issue. However, Prime Minister Abu al-Huda was articulate in conveying his country's desire to revise its treaty of friendship with the United Kingdom.⁹² On March 19, King Hussein and Prime Minister Abu al-Huda revealed that

⁹⁰Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pg. 679.

⁹¹Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, March 16, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 4-5.

⁹²Geren to DOS, Amman, March 9, 1955. FRUS, pg. 4. See editor's note.

their country's desire to acquire American arms was their overriding concern.⁹³ There is some certainty that Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact was contingent upon American willingness to meet that country's military requirements.

On April 1, 1955, George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, conveyed his views to Secretary Dulles about Jordan's (and the Arabs') participation in the Baghdad pact. In his recent conversations with the Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, Allen learned that Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact might foster Lebanese and Syrian interest. However, Allen believed that such events might complicate American diplomatic operations, perhaps affecting an Egyptian-Israeli arrangement by keeping Egypt isolated and Nasser vulnerable, and amplifying Israeli excitement and concern.⁹⁴ In the hours to come, Shuckburgh would assure American officials that Britain was not urging Jordan or any other Arab country to participate in the Turki-Iraqi pact. However. Britain's Assistant Secretary of State

⁹³Mallory to DOS, Amman, March 19, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 5. See editor's footnote.

⁹⁴A Memorandum from Allen to Dulles, Washington, April 1, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 5.

maintained that in the event of Jordanian adhesion to that defence pact, Britain would consider revising the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948. He believed that it would be very precarious for either the United Kingdom or the United States to hinder Jordanian participation.⁹⁵ Prime Minister Anthony Eden proposed that neither London nor Washington should counsel the Jordanians against participating in the Baghdad Pact.⁹⁶ However, the Parliamentary Debates in April show that Britain was eager to encourage Arab joining of that Anglo-American sponsored Near Eastern security organization. Anthony Nutting regarded this security system as a reliable tool to sustain regional stability in the whole of the Middle East. Several members of the Commons stressed the necessity of promoting the idea in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to ensure the defence of the area against so called "communist imperialism."⁹⁷

On October 6, Ambassador Mallory notified Prime Minister Mufti of Jordan that President Nasser was

⁹⁵Telegram from Embassy in London to DOS, April 1, 1955. FRUS, pgs. 5-6. See editorial note.

⁹⁶Aldrich to DOS, London, April 4, 1955. FRUS, pg. 6.

⁹⁷U.K. Parliament. "Turco-Iraqi Pact (United Kingdom Accession), Monday, 4 April 1955." Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 539 (1955), no. 67, pgs. 831-882. Britain's obligations under the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 would not be affected.

prepared to support the Hashimite Kingdom in the Valley Scheme, and that other Arab states would join in future League meetings. Egypt's apparent backing of Jordan's regional plan impressed Prime Minister Mufti who believed that Nasser's support would eliminate Syrian and Lebanese opposition. Mufti was consoled and animated by the latest news.⁹⁸ But the Czech arms deal put the Alpha Operation on hold, and gave Egypt a monumental role in inter-Arab politics and international affairs. Jordan's response to the unfolding events was forceful and immediate. Ambassador Mallory reported the rise in what he called the "universal popular Jordanian enthusiasm for flame of Arab political liberation ignited by Nasser's deal with Soviet bloc." He depicted the feeling of solidarity among Jordanians with their fellow Arabs and cautioned against the broad and powerful implications of possible Soviet arms shipments to Jordan's National Guard. The escalation of domestic opposition paralyzed the already frail Jordanian government and precluded Jordan's independent action the face of mounting Arab coalition. Additionally, "British influence, long a stabilizing force in Jordan,

⁹⁸Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, October 6, 1955. FRUS, 1955, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 564-565. On October 7, Prime Minister Mufti assured Ambassador Duke of Britain that his administration would work diligently on the scheme, and if an impasse arose, Jordan would make an effort to avert any decision by pressing for further study. See editor's footnote, pg. 565.

[was] steadily declining and if tested [it] might be found insufficient. The throne formerly [a] source of real strength, [had] become virtually impotent. The center of mass power [had] moved from east bank Bedouins to Palestinian Arabs who [were] bitter over existence of Israel and implacably opposed [to] any settlement with Israel." Furthermore, the resentment and suspicions against the United States resurfaced once again despite the gains made during the Eisenhower-Dulles years. In his advice to the Eisenhower administration, Mallory counseled against the utilization of economic aid as an instrument to alter Jordan's political climate. Jordan's hesitation to welcome the proposed two hundred million dollars for the Valley Scheme were clear manifestations of Mallory's assertions. The Ambassador warned that the new Russian policy in the region revealed its intentions of filling the vacuum in the area. He believed that American and Jordanian joining of the Baghdad pact, together with the revival of the federation scheme with Iraq, would be an essential step to overcome Jordan's economic weakness. Mallory advised his government to limit its ties with Israel in an attempt to enhance America's ties with Jordan and the Arab countries. His urgent message to the Eisenhower administration was triggered by the rising tide of anti-Western nationalism mixed with a new trend toward communism. Jordan's

volatile political climate necessitated decisive action to alter the situation in what was once a "former strong point" in a region which could become a seed of weakness to the West.⁹⁹ The United States and the United Kingdom agreed that the improvement of Jordanian-Iraqi cooperation would enhance their stability and advance the prospects for a regional defense organization. But the struggle was intense and the road was ominous.

Nevertheless, the United States never relinquished its hopes of seeing Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. Mallory's alarming message must be examined objectively and historically. To simply suggest that the Eisenhower administration lost all hopes for Jordan's participation based on the Ambassador's "gloomy" report¹⁰⁰ would be both an exaggeration and misleading. The Czech arms deal generated "wild enthusiasm" not only in Jordan, but also in Cairo, Damascus and Beirut. From the Arabs' perspective, Soviet weaponry was regarded as a "magic solution to all their troubles."¹⁰¹ The Arab populace felt assured, and Jordan's political atmosphere

⁹⁹Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, October 22, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 6-7.

¹⁰⁰Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pg. 112.

¹⁰¹John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hedder and Stoughton, 1957), pg. 380.

was filled with a feeling of excitement never experienced before. Thus, the natural response for Jordanians, particularly those of the West Bank, was to be exalted at the news of the arms deal. That false sense of security not only inflamed popular sentiments but also began to gradually drift toward Egypt and its revolutionary leader. Hence, the Baghdad Pact was now perceived as a threat to Arab sovereignty and independence, a link with the vivid legacy of British imperialism. Nevertheless, neither King Hussein nor President Eisenhower would give up so quickly. The United States and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan would continue to search for any opportunity for Jordan's participation. During the month of November, Turkey's President Visited Amman in an attempt to effect Jordanian joining of the Baghdad Pact.¹⁰²

On December 6, the Chief of the British Imperial Staff, Sir Gerald Templer, and the Head of the Levant Department of the Foreign Office arrived in Amman to meet with King Hussein and cabinet officials. Prime Minister Eden authorized Templer to extend to the Hashimite Kingdom an invitation to review the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and consider supplementary assistance of arms as

¹⁰²Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunniyah al-Wazarat al-Urdunniyah 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pg. 52.

a catalyst for Jordanian participation.¹⁰³ But Ambassador Mallory warned that mere pledges of economic aid (useful as the British Embassy officials might think) would be worthless without substantiated promises of American backing for Jordan's participation in American Near Eastern defence plans. Mallory stressed that only pledges of military assistance would be sufficient to cause the Jordanians to change their standing on the Iraqi-Turki pact. However, Willi Morris's report from the British Embassy showed that Templer's long telegram from Amman concerning his early discussions with Jordanian officials was promising. Templer attributed the possible shift in the Jordanian position to British assurances of additional assistance to the Arab Legion and a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of alliance. Indeed, Fraser Wilkins, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, affirmed that American diplomacy toward Jordan was grounded on the premise that military assistance to that country would remain a British responsibility. Wilkins neither questioned Britain's current "monopoly" on arms deliveries to Jordan nor challenged Morris's "optimism"

¹⁰³Circular Telegram from Embassy in Jordan to DOS, Amman, December 6, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 9. Also see al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993). Also see Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pgs. 381-382.

about Templer's negotiations in Amman.¹⁰⁴

Jordan's dilemma over the Baghdad Pact sprang from the domestic pressure organized by West Bank cabinet ministers who demanded the Jordanian government confer with Egypt before arriving at a final decision. The cabinet of Prime Minister Mufti, which was split by strife between West Bank ministers and those of the East Bank, was coerced to quit.¹⁰⁵ On the same day, Jordan was admitted as a member of the United Nations.¹⁰⁶ On December 14, King Hussein charged Haza al-Majali, former Minister of Interior and Vice Premier, with the responsibility of forming a new cabinet. On the succeeding day, Ambassador Mallory informed the Department of State that al-Majali was facing extensive opposition from West Bank cabinet members who accused him of betraying his countrymen to Britain over the Turko-Iraqi Pact. The Ambassador witnessed an escalation in the divisions between the inhabitants of the West Bank and those of the East Bank. The seeds of internal strife were

¹⁰⁴Memorandum from Wilkins to Allen, Washington, December 9, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 8.

¹⁰⁵Embassies in Amman and London to DOS, December 14 and 16, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 9. See editorial note.

¹⁰⁶Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pg. 53.

in the making, at least in the opinion of Ambassador Mallory.¹⁰⁷ On December 15, al-Majali formed a new cabinet while acting as Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Economy. This administration was charged with the task of conducting negotiations with Britain and presenting the results of these discussions to the Jordanian Parliament for deliberation. However, massive demonstration erupted all over the Kingdom against the idea of Jordan's participation in the Baghdad Pact. The cabinet resigned within six days of its inception, the shortest cabinet term in the history of the country.¹⁰⁸ It is to be borne in mind that a continuous shift in cabinet ministries was one of the essential features of the 1950's. As a general rule, King Hussein dismissed an administration or asked it to resign if it lost public confidence, committed grave errors or when its existence was incompatible with the circumstances of the time, particularly if its policy was in conflict with another Arab state or foreign country.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷Telegram from Embassy in Amman to DOS, December 15, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 9.

¹⁰⁸Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunniyah al-Wazarat al-Urdunniyah 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pg. 54.

¹⁰⁹Hazem Zaki Nusseibeh, Tarikh al-Urdun al-Siyasi al-Mu'asir ma-bain amai 1952-1967 (Amman: al-Majma al-Malaki li-Bohuth al-Hadhara al-Islamiya, 1990), pg. 72.

Jordan's political agitators continued their protests against the proponents of the Kingdom's adherence to the Baghdad alliance. The American Embassy reported fierce demonstrations in Jericho which led to the disruption of road communications between the two banks of the Jordan River. The capital of Amman was filled with Arab Legionnaires and students actively engaged in demonstrations, tossing stones at pedestrians and vehicles, occasionally interrupted by shootings. The communication lines leading to the nucleus of the town became increasingly unreliable, and traffic movement from one side of the city to another was severely hampered. Students in towns were not immune from the disturbing atmosphere and excitement; they chanted slogans against Sir John Glubb, King Hussein, Prime Minister Majali and his wife, and the so-called "dealers in Hashish". American and British citizens were instructed to remain inside. The American car of a military attache was rocked and three windows were broken, with no casualties. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister seemed to be bent on fastening his belt, establishing control and maintaining order, while still determined to force his country to become a member of the Baghdad Pact.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰Telegram from Embassy in Jordan to DOS, Amman, December 18, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 10. Mallory reported that the Legion was ordered to shoot below knees at protesters. No casualties were reported, however the Legionnaires might

On December 19, Walworth Barbour, Minister and Counselor of the American Mission in the United Kingdom, conveyed Glubb's assurances to the British Foreign Office that the political conditions in Jordan were not unmanageable. The British government falsely believed that the agitation in Jordan was not directed against the Turki-Iraqi Pact, blaming the communists, Saudis and Egyptians for organizing and financing an anti-Western movement in the Jordanian Kingdom.¹¹¹ Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Minister Macmillan were convinced that Egypt was fomenting the Jordanians into a "civil war and attacks on her British ally."¹¹² Glubb agreed. In Jerusalem, the mob assailed the American, British, French

have run out of patience as they were subjected to stoning themselves. pg. 10.

¹¹¹Telegram from Embassy in London, December 19, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 10. See footnote on same page. Sir John Glubb Basha asserted that the Egyptian and Saudi Embassies were striving to influence Jordanian officials and incite riots in the country. He reported that some Jordanians were threatened with assassination, particularly from the proponents of the West Bank movement. Not only was Cairo's military attache vigorous in fomenting riots, but also communists and extreme nationalists joined the ranks of opponents. School children (boys and girls) allegedly "initiated" every riot in the country. The schoolmaster organized and directed every movement in schools. See John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With The Arabs (London: Hedder and Stoughton, 1957), pgs. 396-399. Also see Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pgs. 385-387.

¹¹²Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pg. 387. Also see Harold MacMillan, Riding the Storm (London: MacMillan), pgs. 90-91.

and Turkish Consulates. Writing later, Glubb contended that the Egyptian Consul in Jerusalem managed the protests while the Saudi Consul financed the operations to promote disorder. The unrelenting chants of anti-imperialism and monarchism in Jerusalem, combined with the rising cleavage between East and West Bank ministers, brought the cabinet of al-Majali to a halt. His resignation was inevitable.¹¹³ Whoever was fomenting trouble in the Hashimite Kingdom, and whatever the underlying reasons were, King Hussein (a young sovereign who had already gained a substantial degree of political maturity) came to the realization that the al-Majali administration was not esteemed by a significant portion of the Jordanian populace. Indeed, King Hussein was swift to dissolve the Jordanian Parliament. The Majali cabinet was asked to resign and two days later a guardian government administered by Ibrahim Hashim, President of the Senate and former Prime Minister, was established. However, this cabinet too would be dissolved in less than three weeks and the Prime Minister would subsequently submit his resignation.¹¹⁴

¹¹³John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hedder and Stoughton, 1957), pg. 400.

¹¹⁴Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pgs. 54-55. The official explanation reads: "This administration lasted but 17 days, because the previous cabinet received a royal decree to dissolve the Senate on December 1, thus Mr.

On December 27, the Jordanian government denied the rumor that there was an Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi financial offer to Amman. However, on the following day an Arab news agency confirmed the offer. The American officials in Amman voiced their opinion that there was no conclusive evidence to substantiate that contention. Jordanian officials expressed their concern about the possibility of receiving an offer from the Arab states.¹¹⁵ King Hussein informed the American Embassy in Amman that the Arab offer would supplant Britain's anticipated financial assistance. Jordan's delicate position propelled King Hussein to yield to public pressure for Arab assistance, and it was expected that he would respond in the affirmative to the Syrian Prime Minister's request for an authorization to visit Amman. The King also advised the Ambassador that the Soviet Union had made a similar proposition, presumably advanced by Moscow's Ambassador to Egypt. However doubtful Mallory

Abraham Hashim formed a new cabinet to oversee new senatorial elections. However, it was soon revealed that the interior minister did not sign the proclamation of termination in accordance with the dictates of the constitution. The High Majlis for the interpretation of the laws issued its decision that the disassembling of al-Majlis did not meet the constitutional requirements, and that al-Majlis is considered to be upright. The Prime Minister initiated his resignation on January 7, 1956." pg. 55.

¹¹⁵Telegram from Embassy in Amman to DOS, December 27, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 11. See footnote on same page.

may have been, he admitted that "strange things" were occurring in Jordan. The Ambassador cautioned that the "consequences of valid-appearing offer[s] forcing Jordan's hand would be far reaching and deleterious." He counseled the Eisenhower administration to act without delay, accentuating the significance of assured American economic and military aid to Jordan. Nevertheless, the Ambassador maintained that he was not certain that American and British pledges would influence Jordan's political mood in the desired direction.¹¹⁶

Mallory's communique to the Department of State received Dulles's attention. In his instructions to the American Embassy in Amman, Dulles instructed Ambassador Mallory (after consultations with British Ambassador Charles Duke) to seek audience with King Hussein and Jordanian cabinet officials. Dulles expressed his gratitude for King Hussein's genuine attempts to improve the conditions of his country. He believed that the "historic ties" between Jordan and the United Kingdom were of vital significance in preserving that country's sovereignty and autonomy. Dulles disapproved of Egypt's recent attempts to play on Jordan's popular sentiments and sabotage Jordan's quest for security. He also

¹¹⁶Telegram from Embassy in Jordan to DOS, Amman, December 27, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 11.

questioned the purpose behind the new efforts to provide Jordan with financial and economic assistance. He questioned the sincerity of Jordan's regional opponents, and distrusted the competence of "those who make grandiose promises" to bolster Jordan's economy.¹¹⁷

On December 30, the British Ambassador admitted the defeat of Britain's diplomacy when he noted that he was incapable of suggesting other options to meet the Egypt's challenge.¹¹⁸ On December 31, King Hussein delivered a speech on the occasion of Jordan's receipt of a delivery of British fighter planes. He expressed his gratitude for the "gift" which symbolized the friendship between the two countries, particularly at a time when the Kingdom was in difficult circumstances. He affirmed that Jordan desired a strong army to "defend and restore the violated right and the establishment of peace in the land of peace, since the only audible language during this age [was] but the language of force."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Telegram from Dulles to Embassy, Washington, December 29, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 12.

¹¹⁸Telegram from Mallory to the DOS, Amman, December 30, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 12.

¹¹⁹"King Hussein's Speech on the occasion of the receipt of the first gift of a delivery of British air fighters," Al-Majma al-Kamila l-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I, December 21, 1955 (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pg. 77.

The critics of King Hussein's wisdom on the question of Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact contend that the King's indefinite standing on the issue, and his "blithely accepting" Egyptian assurances constituted a serious miscalculation on his part.¹²⁰ Others insist that Jordan's adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact would have ensured her national security. If Jordan had participated, she would have been immune from Israeli onslaughts given her alliances with the Arab League Security Pact and with Britain. The participation of Persia, Pakistan, and Turkey in this arrangement would have made the Kingdom's position impregnable.¹²¹ King Hussein's "refusal" to commit his country to the Baghdad pact may be attributed to domestic and regional constraints.¹²² Others argue that Jordan's decision was influenced by Egyptian and Saudi influences, in the process "abandoning its interest and its national security in order to preserve national solidarity." The defenders of this school note that if Jordan had adhered to the Pact, its military capabilities would have been

¹²⁰Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pg. 124.

¹²¹John B. Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pg. 394.

¹²²Khalid Ibrahim al-Armuti "Tahlil Manhajat al-Qiyadeh al-Siassiya al-Urdunnieh fi al-Alaqat al-Dawliya, 1952-1991" MA Thesis, Jordan University, Department of Political Science, pg. 90.

increased significantly, and the Islamic countries would have stood against Israeli expansionism. The supporters of Prime Minister al-Majali's stand also assert that Jordan's obligations under the Baghdad Pact would have been no more than the commitment entailed by Jordan's treaty with Britain. The United Kingdom failed to meet its financial commitments to the Jordan army when the treaty was terminated.¹²³ Indeed, critics fail to appreciate the circumstances under which the Hashimite ruler was operating. In a country engulfed by internal strife and a populace displaying strong anti-British, anti-Israeli, and anti American feelings, as well as pro-Nasser sentiments, King Hussein was not in a position to act against the public will. Should the Hashimite Dynasty have acted contrary to popular will? Simply put, the historical circumstances were moving in a direction which evidently stood contrary to what King Hussein might have wished for and to what Britain and the United States were striving to accomplish. His close association with England, and his increasing reliance on the United States placed him in a delicate position. Thus, King Hussein's decision of indecision was a product of internal upheaval and external pressures as well as a practical tool of

¹²³Hazem Zaki Nusseibeh, Tarikh al-Urdun al-Siyasi al-Mu'asir "The Modern Political History of Jordan" (Amman: al-Majma al-Malaki l-Buhuth al-Hadara al-Islamiya, 1990), pgs. 40-42.

political flexibility which was efficiently utilized in times of crisis. It was a delaying tactic to pacify a powerful opposition at home, accommodate the regional powers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and keep alive Anglo-American hopes of Jordan's joining the pact which was never to be. Needless to say, the turmoil triggered by the Baghdad Pact constituted, as some contend, one of the "most important and dangerous battles"¹²⁴ in the history of the Kingdom. It was certainly not the most decisive dispute nor was it the most threatening to the security of the state. The future history of the Hashimite Kingdom proves that Jordan's diplomacy of limited entanglement was an essential feature of the Kingdom's foreign relations as the critical years of the 1950's.

The December events of the previous year complicated United States diplomatic ties with the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. The triumph of domestic politics and the mounting regional pressure limited Jordan's participation in the proposed Anglo-American security arrangements. Jordan survived the crisis. The security of a nation may not always be attained from without, particularly when a sizable portion of a discontented population stands firm

¹²⁴Hazem Zaki Nusseibeh, Tarikh al-Urdun al-Siasi al-Mu'asser ma-baen a'mi, 1952-1967 (Amman: al-Majma al-Malaki l-Bohuth al-Hadhara al-Islamiya, 1990), pg. 43.

in its conviction (or delusion) that the current state of affairs is contrary to the national interest. It is in this context that the Baghdad Pact must be analyzed, for history has no friends or foes. It corresponds to no reason nor does it follow a rational model of thinking; it seldom meets the expectations of world leaders. Hence, diplomacy is the ability to cope and survive in a sphere of perpetual eruptions, revolutions and counter-revolutions, failures and conquests, war and peace.

**The Department of State Reaction to
the December Uprising and its Aftermath**

The December uprisings in the Jordanian Kingdom brought American plans to a standstill, and resulted in the reconsideration of the Eisenhower policy in the Middle East. Reflecting on the tumultuous weeks of the preceding month, Ambassador Mallory emphasized the need to review American policy toward the Hashimite Kingdom. The strength and stature of the crown dwindled as the force of the "nationalist, extremist and subversive elements" grew in vigor. The American position in January of 1956 remained assailable despite Eisenhower's proclaimed policy of even-handedness, Johnston's liberal offers or any other kind of assistance. Palestine refugees continued to feel bitter and resentful.

Moreover, Britain's standing decreased substantially. Indeed "Never so great as popularly supposed, their power atrophied from lack of exercise." On the other hand, Egyptian influence in the Kingdom was significantly elevated and approved by "public acceptance." Mallory argued that the settlement of the Arab-Israeli question must take precedence over recent American proposals on the Jordan Valley Scheme, the Baghdad Pact or the refugee crisis. American Embassy officials also recognized the rising influence of Nasser and the inability of Jordan to proceed with its foreign policy agenda without Egyptian consent. Thus, Mallory warned that the future of the Hashimite Kingdom stood in question if the United States were to fail in its diplomatic striving for regional agreement. What would be even more calamitous to the United States would be a growth of communist influence in a region which contained oil supplies vital to the West. In conducting any future negotiations, the Ambassador advised the Department to take into account the Egyptian factor, and cautioned the administration to counsel the United Kingdom not to press Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact.¹²⁵ Egypt needed United States assistance in restricting the membership of the Baghdad alliance to its current Arab membership. The United States government had

¹²⁵Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, January 5, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 12-15.

a bargaining edge vis-a-vis Egypt on this issue; whether Washington should "destroy or help" Egypt's cotton market and assist in constructing Aswan's High Dam were carefully weighed by the Eisenhower administration. Neither Jordan nor Syria or Lebanon would be inclined to achieve a settlement (particularly for the refugees) with the Israelis without Egyptian participation. Consequently, Robert B. Anderson, former Secretary of Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defence, was appointed as a Special Emissary to the Middle East to explore many possibilities with Colonel Nasser.¹²⁶ Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Sharett was absorbed with Soviet arming of Egypt and Israel's urgent appeals for President Eisenhower for additional weapons.¹²⁷ Jordan's Palestinian refugees were also not prepared to accept unreasonable concessions.

The rise of "separatist" tendencies among West

¹²⁶Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 11, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israel Dispute, January 1 to July, 1956, pgs. 20-22. See Pg. 7.

¹²⁷Memorandum of Conversation, White House, Washington, January 11, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israel Dispute, January 1 to July 26, 1956, pgs. 20-22. Also see Message from Anderson to DOS, Jerusalem, January 24, 1956. FRUS, pg. 59. Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, January 25, 1956. FURS, pg. 74.

Bankers invoked sharp responses by American officials.¹²⁸ Indeed, the month of January witnessed some of the most unsettling events in the history of the Kingdom. On January 7, 1956, a crowd of three hundred protesters assaulted the American Consulate General in Jerusalem. On the following day, the American Embassy in Amman telegraphed to the Department of State a meticulous report about the uproar in the Jordanian Capital and the West Bank. The extent of disorder was greater than all the preceding ones, targeting Western establishments and their emblems. Ambassador Mallory described the situation as reaching a "critical point," and noted the possibility of British evacuation. Although he discounted the likelihood of what he called ultra-nationalist domination, he anticipated a continuation of tension and possible unrest provoked by elements outside the country.¹²⁹

On January 8, George Allen notified Secretary Dulles of the unfolding events in the Jordanian Kingdom. Allen recapitulated to the Secretary what the American Missions reported from Amman and Jerusalem, particularly the

¹²⁸A telegram from DOS to Embassy in Amman, January 14, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 15. See editor's footnote.

¹²⁹Three telegrams from Jerusalem and Amman to DOS, January 7-8, 1956. FURS, 1956-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 15. See editor's footnotes.

decline in the effectiveness of the Arab Legion, and the importance of singling out the American Consulate as a target for attack, leading him to believe that communist entanglement in this incident was a plausible possibility.¹³⁰ The Department of State notified the Embassy in Amman that it had issued a statement for publication in which the Secretary voiced his concern to the Jordanian Charge about the escalation in crowd fury in the Jordanian capital and Jerusalem which had led to the destruction of United States property and endangered American lives. Dulles believed that the steps taken by the Jordanian government were not sufficient to protect American lives, and directed the American Consul in Jerusalem to make comparable representations.¹³¹

Granted that diplomacy can pacify fears and distrust among nations, does it follow that diplomats have the

¹³⁰Memorandum of a telephone conversation between Allen and Dulles, Washington, January 8, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 15-16. Allen told Dulles that he would get in touch with the Jordanian Charge for an appointment. Allen noted that the Marines used "tear gas ejectors" despite the fact that it was "sensitive" to use but was forced to do so to avoid the destruction of American files and the possibility of setting the entire building on fire. The Secretary said that he would speak to Carl W. McCardle to prepare a public statement. See pg. 16. McCardle was the Assistant Secretary of State for public Affairs until March 1, 1957. FURS, vol. XIII, 1955-1957, pg. XXIV.

¹³¹Telegram from DOS to Embassy in Amman, January 8, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 16. See editor's note.

strength to influence the domestic atmosphere in a foreign land? Perhaps, but not always. Dulles's stern representation to the Jordanian Charge in Washington was understandable (but not impressive given the circumstances). The situation in Jordan was worsening; "law and order extended [only] within the range of [a] Legionnaire's rifle," and the conditions facilitated the rise in communist influences. Palestinians enjoyed the "sport of twisting British lion's tail" openly. The new Prime Minister, Samir al-Rifa'i, was seen as a British agent and his cabinet was powerless. The future of the Kingdom was floating between "leftist politicians" and the Legionaries, and the Ambassador was ready to "confess [that the] future of Western influences in Jordan and security of American community now giving serious concern."¹³²

On January 10, Ivone A. Kirkpatrick, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, directed Sir Roger M. Makins, British Ambassador to the

¹³²Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, January 10, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 16-17. On January 8, "massive demonstrations swept the land" and King Hussein responded by charging Samir al-Rifa'i with the task of forming a new cabinet to maintain "law and order." Dr. Hussein Fakhri Khalidi was appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Abraham Hashim served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, January 1993), pg. 56.

United States, to inform the Department of State that King Hussein of Jordan had asked the United Kingdom to query to the Iraqi government about the availability of an Iraqi division to serve during Jordan's domestic crisis. The British cabinet agreed to the Jordanian proposition and decided to bolster their defences in the Middle East. The deployment of one British Brigade to Cyprus became imminent. King Hussein was considerably irritated by the turn of events at home and was aware of the enormity of calling for help from Western Europe. The Foreign Office viewed Egyptian broadcasting with apprehension and advised the Department of State to make a representation to President Nasser. The evacuation of British forces was not contemplated since Britain had sufficient forces stationed in the Kingdom to cope with the crisis.¹³³

On January 12, at the Two Hundred Seventy Second (272) meeting of the National Security Council, President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and George Allen reviewed British foreign policy in the Jordanian Kingdom. Some American officials contended that the British had "suffered their most diplomatic defeat in modern

¹³³Telegram from Minister Walworth Barbour (Chief of Mission in the U.K.) to DOS, London, January 10, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 18.

history." Whether communism was accountable for Jordan's internal turmoil was open to question; Allen believed there was "always a tendency to blame the communists for everything that happened."¹³⁴ The arrival of Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in Washington in January signified the importance of Anglo-American cooperation at a period when Britain's position in the Near East (including Jordan) was nearly eradicated. Lloyd recalled that Templer's visit to Amman had exposed the force of domestic opposition and uncovered Egyptian and Saudi designs. British officials concluded that the Jordanian government was "extremely weak" because it lacked the vigor to exercise the power of the Arab Legion in keeping order. Nevertheless, Lloyd held the position that there were "elements sympathetic and hopeful" that the Hashimite Kingdom would join the Baghdad Pact since King Hussein was allegedly still responsive to the idea and cordial to Britain. Lloyd ascribed Palestinian discontent to communist agitation and emphasized the need to reestablish harmony and enhance the stature of the crown while affirming the Anglo-Jordanian alliance able to handle what he called Saudi "bribery and intrigue." Dulles maintained that Arab fears of establishing close associations with the West

¹³⁴272 Meeting of the National Security Council, January 12, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 19. See editorial note.

complicated America's task in coping with the communist threat.¹³⁵

Jordan's new Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i (and his brother the Ambassador abd al-Munim in the United States) believed that the political climate in the Kingdom had been altered significantly. Al-Rifa'i criticized what he called the "traditionalist thinking" of Britain, and stressed the importance of adjusting to current conditions. Whether Britain was a "scapegoat" was not a central question. The British Embassy was paralyzed and the idea of Britain subduing the public through the use of force was regarded as a precarious undertaking. Mallory warned that any movement at this stage to pressure the Jordanian government's participation in the Baghdad Pact or to press the Kingdom's acceptance of the Valley Scheme would be unavailing.¹³⁶ Egypt's Prime Minister and President Nasser too voiced concerns to Emissary Anderson, arguing "forcibly against what he consider[ed] the aggressive actions of Great Britain" to build a security alliance in order to keep Egypt isolated. Nasser informed the British Ambassador that

¹³⁵Memorandum of Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 20-21.

¹³⁶Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, January 26, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 21-23.

Templer's visit to Amman could only cause "trouble" in Jordan. He believed that the rest of the Arab countries would disapprove of the Pact as the Jordanian case recently illustrated. Nasser's prediction that the alliance would cause "serious deterioration" in Egypt's ties with the Western powers¹³⁷ would soon be realized in a way that also forced Jordan into a delicate position of neutrality.

Shortly after his arrival to Washington, Ambassador Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i held a meeting with George Allen. Munim al-Rifa'i expressed his regrets about the damage wreaked on American property and stressed that his government had adopted measures of restraint in the employment of force to avoid grievous consequences, including the unnecessary loss of life. The Ambassador assured Allen that Jordanian public property was also destroyed, and that the government uncovered a conspiracy to burn the center of the Kingdom's capital. Rifa'i admitted the possibility that American interests was the primary target. He largely blamed the communists for the riots, and spoke of the resentment of Palestinian refugees who held the United States accountable for their affliction. Nevertheless, he assured Allen that the

¹³⁷Anderson to DOS, Cairo, January 19, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1 to July 26, 1956, pgs. 28-33.

government of Jordan highly esteemed American "friendship" and cooperation, and conveyed his country's desire to work with the United States. Furthermore, Rifa'i rebutted the British contention that Saudi Arabia and Egypt had bought off officials in Amman. "Not a single revolver had been distributed by Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Not a single Saudi dollar or Egyptian dinar had been distributed to mob elements in Jordan. King Abd al-Aziz Saud's generosity (oftentimes giving gifts to Jordanian officials lavishly) had been misinterpreted by Britain officials; since the British had a tradition of dispensing money in Jordan, why couldn't they have brought about calm in Jordan. Rifa'i complained bitterly about Britain's behavior and maintained that it was still "living in the past." Allen was apparently in agreement with the Ambassador. British insistence that Jordan adhere to the Baghdad Pact, and their exhortation to King Hussein to enforce military rule in the Kingdom continued to irritate the Jordanian government. Jordan's policy of restraint in the employment of force sprang from what Rifa'i called a strong "sense of duty to the country and the throne." The Jordanian representative complained to Allen of Britain's creating creation of misgivings about the King through distorted reports about Saudi troops which were stationed in the South of Aqaba. The presence of Saudi troops in Jordan was a response to Ben Gurion's

threats to attack the Strait of Tiran. British radio broadcasts against Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia ran contrary to Jordan's wishes to maintain good ties with those countries. Thus, Britain was seen as a destabilizing force in the Kingdom and Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i threatened to resign. The government of Rifa'i declined to accept British forces in the country. Surprisingly, Ambassador Munim al-Rifa'i recounted to Allen that certain "elements in the northern part of Jordan declared their accession to Syria," and recalled the wide-spread of rumor in the country of establishing an autonomous state in the West Bank. He asserted that Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Israel were ready to dismantle the Kingdom, but exempted the United States from taking any part in this scheme. The Jordanian government appealed to the United States to act as a mediator between Jordan and her most important ally in the region, Britain. Amman needed a breathing space, and hoped to put everything on hold. Allen assured Rifa'i that the United States would cooperate in every way ease Jordan's concerns. Allen informed Shuckburgh and briefed the President. Rifa'i was pleased.¹³⁸ But American intelligence ascertained that

¹³⁸Memorandum of a conversation between Allen and the Jordanian Ambassador, Munim al-Rifa'i, DOS, Washington, January 28, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 23-26. George Allen alluded to the question whether the riots in Jordan were induced by the force of Arab nationalism. Rifa'i elaborated on this point in detail ascribing it to British misconduct and

the situation in the Middle East was deteriorating and the prospects for the restarting the Anderson mission while preserving the same level of security were "dim."¹³⁹ On February 4, Secretary Dulles instructed Ambassador Mallory in Amman (in consultation with British Ambassador Duke) to ask the Jordanian government to make a public statement accepting the Jordan Valley scheme.¹⁴⁰ Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i, who often averted commitment by a "flood of rhetoric," showed "brevity and directness" in enunciating his apprehensions of Israeli intentions and informed Ambassador Mallory that any military engagement involving Egypt and/or Syria would definitely include Jordan.¹⁴¹

On February 10, President Eisenhower was notified that the Jordan River Valley Plan had been set aside for political considerations. Johnston remarked that the

the bitterness of the Palestinians, and assured the Assistant Secretary for NEA that Saudi forces in Jordan came in response to Ben Gurion's threat to attack the Strait of Tiran.

¹³⁹Message from Allen Dulles, Director of Intelligence, Washington, January 26, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israel Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, pgs. 92-94.

¹⁴⁰Telegram from Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, February 4, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israel Dispute, January 1 to July 26, 1956, pgs. 140-141.

¹⁴¹Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, February 8, 1956. Ibid FRUS, Pgs. 151-152.

political climate was infertile for American plans and noted that in "one country the officials said that they were all likely to be assassinated" if they acceded to American schemes. Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Sharett also voiced some forceful reservations for domestic reasons. President Nasser requested several months for its adoption. However, an Israeli assault on Syria the past December had aroused Arab opinion, making the situation more difficult for Eisenhower's emissary in the Near East. Nonetheless, Ambassador Johnston maintained that American diplomatic pressure if continued would eventually bring results because the economic benefits of the Valley Scheme were expected to be great.¹⁴² Prime Minister Riafa'i directed the Jordanian Charge in Cairo to suggest to Nasser that Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon meet at the level of Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers to establish a "four-power subcommittee council." The Jordanian proposition entailed that the Arab representatives receive approval from their governments to decide on Johnston's proposal.¹⁴³ Despite Prime Minister Rifa'i's hopes for a favorable Arab

¹⁴²Memorandum of Conference by A.J. Goodpaster, Johnston with the President, February 10, 1956. Eisenhower Library Records, Ann Whitman File, DDE, Diary Series, Abilene, Kansas, pg. 1.

¹⁴³Mallory to DOS, Amman, March 1, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vo. XV, Arab-Israel Dispute, January 1 to July 26, 1956, Pgs. 272-273.

response, he remained non-committal. Upon the return of Robert Anderson from the Middle East, President Eisenhower wrote in his diary:

[Anderson] made no progress whatsoever in our basic purpose of arranging some kind of meeting between Egyptian officials and the Israelites. Nasser proved to be a complete stumbling block. He is apparently seeking to be acknowledged as the political leader of the Arab World.

On the other side, the Israel officials are anxious to talk with Egypt, but they are completely adamant in their attitude of making no concessions whatsoever in order to obtain peace.

...Even the Jordan River Plan, which would be of tremendous economic advantages to both sides in this quarrel, has really been rejected by both because of their tensions. It is a very sorry situation.¹⁴⁴

United States Reaction to the Removal of Sir John Glubb

¹⁴⁴Diary Entry by President Eisenhower, Washington, March 13, 1956, conversation with the Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. and Robert B. Anderson (March 12, 1956). FRUS, pgs. 342-343.

On March 1, King Hussein dismissed Sir John Bagot Glubb as the commander of the Arab Legion. The Western states were astounded by the news. Some charged that King Hussein was deliberate in humiliating Glubb, others felt that he was forced by regional stresses and pressures from the Arab countries. However, for the Hashimite ruler, the removal of a British subject as the head of the Arab region was "completely a Jordanian matter."¹⁴⁵

The American Embassy in Amman telegraphed the Department of State that King Hussein had directed the dismissal of General Glubb and other British officers. The underlying reasons were not immediately revealed to the Embassy.¹⁴⁶ On the same day, King Hussein held a meeting at al-Diwan al-Malaki (Royal Court) at which he delivered a speech to Jordan's Armed Forces justifying the significance of the "necessary measures in army positions" to serve the nation.¹⁴⁷ Ambassador Duke was notified by the Prime Minister who offered no

¹⁴⁵King Hussein Ibn Talal, translated from French to Arabic by Aref Toughan, Mihnati ka-Malik (Amman: National Printing Press, 1978), pg. 107.

¹⁴⁶Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to DOS, Amman, March 1, 1956. FRUS, 1956-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 26. See editor's footnote.

¹⁴⁷Hussein Speech During a Meeting Held at Al-Diwan al-Malaki on the Day of the Arabization of the Army, March 1, 1956. Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, Vo. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pg. 81.

explanation, but an "ultimatum." Glubb received the orders in a "soldiery fashion" and departed Amman the following morning. The British Ambassador received this explanation from King Hussein: Glubb was negligent in providing adequate supplies of ammunition, he lacked organization in assigning legionnaires, and as the Chief of the Legion he failed to assist the Hashimite ruler against Cairo. Ambassador Charles B. Duke's telegram to the Foreign Office informing his government of Glubb's consent to removal came precisely at the same time that Prime Minister Eden dispatched a message to King Hussein advising him not to hasten his decision prior to formal consultations with Her Majesty's Government. Three British officers, three Jordanian loyalists of Glubb, and eight officers of the elite Beduin troops were relieved from their duties. Mallory surmised this was an attempt to "control" the Legion by the King or Arab officer circle." The King's decision was followed by a speech asking the army for allegiance and an order to Brigadier Radi Anab to act as the temporary Chief of Legion. Duke rejected the King's assertion about the shortage of ammunition as a major factor affecting Hussein's decision. Moreover, the General's coverage in British press was allegedly annoying to King Hussein. The Egyptians were exalted, and planned demonstrations in

Amman to cheer King Hussein and President Nasser.¹⁴⁸ On March 2, the United States Embassy in London notified the State Department that the removal of Glubb had astounded the United Kingdom.¹⁴⁹ Prime Minister Eden and his Ambassador in Amman regarded Hussein's action as a blow. Eden believed that the Jordanian Monarch had "no excuse for dismissing him suddenly like a pilfering servant." The irritated Prime Minister explained Hussein's action as an act of "jealousy of a younger man for an older one long established in a position of authority in the country. Whether it was a "personal dislike which had grown to something of a phobia"¹⁵⁰ is not the question. King Hussein was the sovereign of the land and Glubb was subject to his rule. The American Army Attache in Amman, Lieutenant Colonel James L. Sweeney, reported that the future of events in the Kingdom was likely to depend on the King's effectiveness vis-a-vis the Free Officers Movement (FOM) fashioned on the Egyptian model, Nasser's influence over the FOM, Britain's response, and the

¹⁴⁸Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, March 2, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 26-28.

¹⁴⁹Telegram from Embassy in London to DOS, London, March 2, 1956. FRUS, 1956-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 27. See editor's footnote.

¹⁵⁰Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pgs. 388-389.

reaction of British legionnaires in Jordan.¹⁵¹

The British government carefully weighed the importance of Glubb's dismissal and its implications for the United Kingdom and Jordan. On March 5, Ambassador Aldrich was notified by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick of the plans of the Prime Minister in dealing with the situation in Jordan. Eden, planning to reprimand the Jordanian government for his so-called mistreatment of Glubb after many years of "faithful service," devised a scheme to withdraw British officers from the Jordanian Kingdom since they now were burdened with the "responsibility without authority," and considered the withdrawal of subsidies to the Arab Legion. British officials believed that the Legion would disintegrate because the Beduins were not yet under the command of the Hashimites. And Kirkpatrick suspected the dismantlement of the Hashimite Kingdom by the Israelis, Saudis and Egyptians.¹⁵² Undisciplined beduins still displayed strong tribal loyalty. Glubb and Duke disputed the King's contention concerning the causes of the Chief's removal and agreed that the depiction of Glubb as the master of the

¹⁵¹American Attache in Jordan to DOS, Amman, March 4, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 27.

¹⁵²Telegram from Aldrich to DOS, London, March 5, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 28-29.

Jordanian Kingdom threatened Hussein because it implied that the King had no prestige in Amman. Glubb insisted that King Hussein's decision was designed to pacify Egypt and Jordanian nationalists in order to enhance his popularity at home. He also contended that the "King's mind and imagination had been genuinely fired by Arab Nationalism, precisely at the age when young men are most susceptible to the appeal of what appear to be idealistic causes."¹⁵³

Perhaps General Glubb (and Prime Minister Eden) were the idealists who, like many British colonial officers, falsely believed that they were fulfilling a mission based on the assumption that the mandatory power (Britain) was the rightful guardian of smaller nations which could not govern themselves. This outmoded ideology in the post-war era constituted the essence of the philosophy of the colonizer. Indeed, Britain's shallow vision and denial of the bitter harvest it had created after long years of misdirected management in the colonies, particularly during the waning age of imperialism, was the prime factor behind its diplomatic bankruptcy in the 1950's. Was it not true that Glubb was one of the devoted sons of England toiling for Her

¹⁵³John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pgs. 424-426.

Majesty's Government in a foreign land to promote the interest of the Crown? Furthermore, whatever the underlying factors behind King Hussein's decision, the sovereign of the Kingdom owed no explanation or apologies to a colonial power.

Indeed, Glubb's and Eden's assertions that King Hussein's decision was seriously influenced by Egyptian propaganda were exaggerated. On March 9, the American Embassy in London communicated to the Department of State that British Foreign Office officials had failed to detect any confirmation that either Egypt or Saudi Arabia were entangled in inciting Glubb's removal. The British government was inclined to believe that King Hussein's action was driven by domestic considerations, especially his yearning for greater authority in the country. Although the Foreign Office believed that Egypt may have played some role in King Hussein's undertaking, they asserted that the Jordanian government was convinced that the dismissal of Glubb would not have adverse effects on Anglo-Jordanian treaty obligations. But Britain was concerned about the recent developments in Jordan and their impact on her status in the Gulf region.¹⁵⁴ Britain should have been a little concerned about the

¹⁵⁴Embassy in London to DOS, March 9, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 29. See footnote.

position of King Hussein in his own backyard.

On March 6, United States Acting Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., was given a summary by William M. Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs of the scheduled meeting with Ambassador Munim Rifa'i of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. Rountree indicated that Ambassador Rifa'i might attempt to downplay the removal of General Glubb under the contention that Jordan was functioning within her rights as an independent state. This did not imply that Jordan was planning to sever its ties with the United Kingdom. Rountree also suspected Rifa'i would reveal Arab diplomatic pressure to replace with British subsidies the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian offer and the possibility of facing Soviet influences in the Kingdom. The Eisenhower Administration expected to receive a request from Rifa'i to help goad Britain to continue her economic aid to Jordan and persist in furnishing military guidance to the Arab Legion with it being absolutely under King Hussein's authority.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵Memorandum from Rountree to Hoover, March 6, 1956. FRUS, 1956-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 30. See editor's footnote. William M. Rountree served as the Counselor of the Embassy in Iran with the status of a Minister until October 9, 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State until July 26, 1956; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State. pg. XXVI.

Acting upon the directives of King Hussein, Ambassador Rifa'i conveyed to Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. that King Hussein's decision was entirely influenced by "administrative reasons and was taken against General Glubb as a person." Rifa'i accentuated Jordan's aspiration for the continuation of the "friendliest" ties between his country and Britain and the United States. He expressed the hope of the Jordanian government that the Eisenhower administration would use its offices in the United Kingdom to persuade the Eden cabinet to maintain its ties with that country. Hoover emphasized that the enduring relationship between Amman and London was quite beneficial to the Kingdom's security and independence. Nonetheless, Hoover reminded the Jordanian representative that the dismissal of Glubb was bound to create angry responses from the British public as recently manifested in the House of Commons. Thus, the reconsideration of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty was an unavoidable conclusion. One more thing was also certain, that the recent changes in the Arab Legion would not affect Jordan's obligations toward the Armistice Agreement. At least Rifa'i pledged to Hoover that much.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Rifa'i and Under Secretary Hoover, Department of State, Washington, March 6, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 21-31.

King Hussein's writings' confirm of Ambassador Rifa'i's assertions as to the reasons behind Glubb's removal. The Hashimite ruler insists that the primary justification for Glubb's dismissal was the absence of understanding between the two men on two fundamental matters--the role of Arab officers in the army and Jordan's strategy of defence. King Hussein asserts that he had profound disagreements with the General about the King's desire to promote Jordanian Officers to higher positions in the army under which they would eventually assume its command according to a practical scheme. Hussein's earnest ambition to implant in the Jordanian mind what he calls the "spirit of national dignity and pride to bolster their persuasion in the future of Jordan and its role toward the great Arab homeland" is the only sound conclusion. What else could anyone discern about Glubb, who possessed wide authority and responsibilities in the Jordanian Kingdom, but never relinquished his "allegiance and loyalty to England?" And what else could be said about Britain's callousness in its complete disregard for King Hussein's desire to reconsider the treaty between the two countries? Hussein's characterization of Glubb's military philosophy as being somehow "outmoded," an "obstacle" in the King's way, supports the notion that the General's removal was an act of political necessity, the self-affirmation of a new

royal chief. Moreover, all of this occurred when communism was stretching its wings widely, and Egypt was organizing a campaign to discredit the Hashimite royal family.¹⁵⁷

On March 9, the American Embassy in London briefed the Department of State about Glubb's letter which appeared in the London Times. General Glubb counseled his country to pursue a policy of moderation and cautioned Britain against termination of the yearly subsidy to Jordan's Arab Legion. The General also admitted that his removal was stemmed from personal disagreements with King Hussein coupled with what he claimed to be Saudi and Egyptian coercion.¹⁵⁸ On March 10, Under Secretary of State Hoover dispatched a message to the American Embassy in Amman that King Hussein refused to accede to the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi (ESS) offer since it was contingent on repudiating British subsidies. Hoover instructed Ambassador Mallory to seek audience with the Hashimite ruler and notify him of American satisfaction with the Jordanian decision. Hoover continued to believe that the enduring relationship between Britain and the Hashimite

¹⁵⁷King Hussein Ibn Talal, translated from French by Ghalib Doughan, Mihnati ka-Malik (Amman: National Press, 1978), pgs. 107-115.

¹⁵⁸Telegram from American Embassy in London to DOS, March 9, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 31. See editor's footnote.

Kingdom strengthened Jordan's independence. He expressed his hope that Amman and London and would strive to narrow their differences and emphasized the importance of abiding by the truce agreements to avert violent clashes.¹⁵⁹

While recognizing the obstacles his country was facing, England's Under Secretary, Ivon A. Kirkpatrick, hoped that the United Kingdom would strive to maintain its interests in Jordan. Aldrich reported that Eden's government was unlikely to cease its subsidies for the Arab Legion. Indeed, Ambassador Kirkbride was returning to Amman to hold discussions with King Hussein and counsel his government on this matter. Prime Minister Eden indicated the possibility of preserving the Legion as a viable force in the Middle East.¹⁶⁰

American role as a conciliatory power was firmly established in Britain's Foreign Office and Jordan's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. American diplomacy acted as a corrective mechanism to modify Britain's ambitions in the Jordanian Kingdom. Without American assistance,

¹⁵⁹Telegram from Hoover to Mallory, Washington, March 10, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 31-32.

¹⁶⁰Aldrich to DOS, London, March 12 and March 13, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 32. See editor's note.

England's standing in Jordan would have been completely eradicated. Indeed, Mallory was gratified to report the controversy over Glubb's removal was receding quickly in Amman. The Jordanian government was gradually seeking compromise, and King Hussein's desire to maintain close ties with Britain and the West was well received in the Foreign Office. The fate of the British officers serving in the Legion would soon be settled. Yet the controversy over the ousting of Glubb persisted. Mallory (though uncertain) attributed the General's discharge to his unpopularity among some Hashimites, to Egypt's anti-British campaign over the control of the Legion, to increasing displeasure among Arab Legionnaires who fashioned themselves on the Free Officers Movement, to King Hussein yearning for popularity in the Kingdom, and, perhaps, to Hussein's contention of Glubb's lack of military preparedness in the event of a war with Israel. Mallory was steadfast in repudiating the Ambassador of Egypt's claim of Cairo's triumph in the expulsion of the General and rejected the British assertion that it was an Egyptian conspiracy. From the Ambassador's perspective, it was essentially a decision which was taken by King Hussein to consolidate his royal authority, without discounting some significant provocations and prodding in the final determination of this question. Mallory expressed rising concern about the growth of Arab

nationalism, the escalation in the level of anti-Anglo-American sentiment, and growing fears of the Catholic Christian minority over what he regarded as "Moslem xenophobia." Indeed, Glubb's removal enhanced Jordan's standing in the Arab East, elevated King Hussein's reputation, and furnished the Kingdom (as Prime Minister Rifa'i affirmed) with the power to seek better relations with England. Syrian and Egyptians accusations lost credibility (temporarily extricating the King from the stigma of subordination to the Western powers) thereby giving Jordan an opportunity to play a greater role in inter-Arab politics, perhaps over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Mallory, however, cautioned against what he called the "natural Arab tendency" to be impulsive and self-assured. He believed that future events would depend on King Hussein's capacity to exercise his authority among a people who displayed what he termed as "divided loyalties."¹⁶¹

If anything changed in the Hashimite Kingdom, it was King Hussein's active role in administering the domestic affairs of the state as was illustrated in his skillful dethroning of the *ancien regime*. Prime Minister Abu al-Huda was gone, Glubb was dismissed, Egyptian and Saudi

¹⁶¹Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman, March 16, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 34.

pressure was noticeably subsided, his relationship with Britain was preserved, and his connections to the United States became clearer and more definite. The King was in charge. On March 20, he met with the American Press in Amman and spoke to his guests about the circumstances and dreadful tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. King Hussein reproached the United Nations and the West for their continued disregard for the Palestinian setback and the persistence of what termed "Israeli parasitism" on a land that belonged to others. King Hussein deplored the calamity of Palestine in historical terms: "The catastrophe which was inflicted on Arab Palestinians has no analogy in history. The Germans and the Italians lost the war; however they still live in their homelands, and the Arab refugees entered and lost no war. Nevertheless, they lost their dwelling places and homeland." The King expressed his hope that they would convey to the American public what they had observed in the Kingdom, and invited more Americans to visit and learn the truth of Jordan's protestations.¹⁶²

On March 28, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State, Fraser

¹⁶²King Hussein's Speech before an American Press Delegation, March 20, 1956. Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, Vo. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 87-88.

Wilkins, notified Assistant Secretary George Allen about his latest meeting with Ronald Bailey of the British Embassy. Bailey had been directed by the British Ambassador in Washington to keep in contact with Wilkins to furnish him with important British data on the current developments in the Middle East. Wilkins confirmed that Jordan's Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i conveyed (through the Ambassador in Amman) that Ali Hiyari who had acted as the Chief of Staff since Glubb's dismissal, had assumed the command of an Arab Legion division, and Ali Abu Nuwar became the new Chief of Staff. The report indicated that King Hussein was not aware of that replacement, and that a group of Free Officers had distributed a booklet encouraging the emancipation of the Arab Legion from the leverage of British officers. Subsequently, Britain's Foreign Office telegraphed Ambassador Sir Alec Kirkbride in the Jordanian capital that the unfolding events seemed to be quite threatening to the monarch and to England's standing in the Jordanian Kingdom. The British Ambassador was instructed to speak to King Hussein along the following lines: the negotiations over the affiliation of British officers with the Arab Legion appear to be proceeding fairly with a possible compromise in sight; Britain is concerned over the Legion's growing influence and the threat to the throne from a military coup d'état. Thus, the British government suggested the replacement of

some young officers who had participated in the last attempt to overthrow the monarch and advised the King to appoint some competent senior Arab officers to take command. The communique declared that Britain would assist the King, and the circulation of the names of the British officers could be temporarily delayed. However, King Hussein's consent to British suggestions could not be accomplished while Rifa'i stayed in office. Moreover, the British Ambassador in Baghdad was instructed by his government to inform Crown Prince Hassan, of Britain's gratification at his vigorous support for the continuation of Nuri al-Said as Prime Minister of Iraq. The Iraqi government was notified that there was a "real danger in Jordan of a civil war or a pro-Egyptian Government through a coup d'état." Admitting its own favoritism toward Jordan, the British government sought to foster a united scheme with Iraq to safeguard the monarchy in the event of political unrest in Jordan.¹⁶³

Some of Britain's concerns would soon be realized. Jordan's political orientation was shifting gradually from its Western affiliation into one of non-partisanship. Ambassador Mallory ascribed the changes in the Kingdom's foreign relations to outside influences. He

¹⁶³Memorandum from Wilkins to Allen, Washington, March 28, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 34-35.

painted a gloomy picture of Jordan's domestic atmosphere, which was darkened by the continuation of communist and Egyptian "subversive" activities. Although the Palestine issue was a key annoyance, the call for the eradication of British presence in the Kingdom was particularly inspired by the growing current of Arab nationalism. Mallory cautioned against the likely loss of American position in Jordan and the triumph of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria in that country, with its potential impact on Lebanon and Iraq (the latter being the only Arab country in the Baghdad Pact). Mallory warned; "Thus, for the present what happens to the insignificant national entity of Jordan is likely to affect critically the Western position in [the] entire Middle East."¹⁶⁴

By the end of March, Jordan's delicate position had been carefully reconsidered by the Eisenhower Administration, which now saw the Kingdom's drift toward the center as the culmination of domestic factors, regional stresses, and Western influences. Precarious as King Hussein's stance might have been perceived, Jordan's policy of active neutralism was a vital step for the survival of the state. The Hashimite monarchy neither refused American assistance nor repudiated its uneasy

¹⁶⁴Telegram from Mallory to DOS, Amman March 30, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 36.

alliance with Britain or sever its relations with the regional countries.

On April 19, 1956, the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, reviewed the Jordan situation. The Bureau noted the rise in communist agitation among Palestinian refugees, the growing pressure from the Arab states (Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) to accept their subsidies, the escalation in tension between West Bankers and East Bankers, the rise in Christian-Moslem friction, and the weakening of the British position there. The partitioning of the Jordan Kingdom remained an a disquieting possibility for American policy makers. The United States government would be willing to support Jordan's "association" with another country. The Bureau also advised the continuation of "friendly cooperative relations" between the two countries so long as Jordan desired it. Technical and developmental aid would continue. The preservation of Jordan's Western orientation would require the "most subtle propaganda" in an effort to contain Soviet schemes in the Kingdom.¹⁶⁵ Shortly thereafter, Secretary Dulles instructed the American Embassy in Amman to seek audience

¹⁶⁵Paper prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Washington, April 19, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 37-39.

with King Hussein. Dulles's communiqué stressed that the "right path lies in strengthening ties with Jordan's trusted friends" rather than being driven into a entanglement with countries which aimed at wrecking that country's integrity.¹⁶⁶ Dulles's message to the King was followed by another warning that the aim of the Soviet Union was to establish a "beachhead in Jordan" to subvert the Hashimites' endeavor for domestic stability.¹⁶⁷

In an effort to help steer Jordan into the "right path," Dulles sought to upgrade Iraqi-Jordanian cooperation. The strengthening of economic and military ties between the two countries was regarded as a "vital" measure of tremendous "psychological" benefit to the Jordanians in their struggle to contain the influence of the Arab states.¹⁶⁸ However, United States representations to Jordan about its good intentions were not well received by King Hussein. The Hashimite

¹⁶⁶Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, April 27, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 49-41.

¹⁶⁷Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, May 12, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 41-42. On May 11, the American embassy reported that Jordan might receive Soviet arms through Egypt—a report which Ambassador Mallory disputed. See editor's note, pg. 42.

¹⁶⁸Dulles to Gallman in Iraq, Washington, May 12, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 43-44. Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq was optimistic. He believed that the threat emanated from the ESS states. See editor's note, pg. 44. Also see DOS to Embassy in Iraq, May 16, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 44-45.

sovereign affirmed that his country was determined to "stay in [the] middle of Arab extremes and draw factions together." Mallory believed that Hussein's "heart was still in the right place," but the Ambassador was not quite certain what direction he might take. One thing, however, was certain: King Hussein could not pursue the same path indefinitely.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, on May 20, Prime Minister al-Rifa'i resigned, and former Prime Minister al-Mufti formed a new cabinet.¹⁷⁰ Four days later, Major General Radi Innab who had become the Commander of the Arab Legion the previous March, was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar who rose in rank quickly.¹⁷¹ The appointment of Nuwar to this position was particularly significant; Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq believed that Nuwar had Egyptian and Soviet inclination.¹⁷² What was worrisome to Dulles was the so-called "extremely dangerous individual" Nasser.¹⁷³ Thus, the United States considered the arming of Jordan,

¹⁶⁹Mallory to DOS, Amman, May 18, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 45-47.

¹⁷⁰Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, National Press, 1993), pg. 58.

¹⁷¹FRUS, editorial note, pg. 47.

¹⁷²Embassy in Iraq to DOS, May 29, 1956. FRUS, pg. 48. See editors footnote.

¹⁷³FURS, Memorandum of a Conversation between Dulles and Mallory, DOS, Washington, September 10, 1956, pg. 49.

however the Anglo-Jordanian treaty stipulated that the weapons and equipments of the two allies should be comparable to each other.¹⁷⁴ This article in the treaty between Amman and London might have been devised to ensure Jordan's dependency on British armaments. When Jordan found Iraq to be willing to provide Jordan with military assistance, Secretary Dulles vacillated because the border crisis was worsening and Israel might be tempted to seek reprisal. Iraq's entry into Jordanian territory could also invoke responses from the Cairo, Damascus and Riyadh.¹⁷⁵ But Iraq's obligation to the Jordanian government remained intact notwithstanding American counsel and the likelihood of Israeli retribution. Nuri's determination to "keep Jordan out of the Communist camp" was a matter of special significance for the Prime Minister. He assured Ambassador Gallman that in the event of an Israel offensive, his government would not mobilize its armed forces into Jordanian territory without prior consultations with Britain and the United States.¹⁷⁶ Prime Minister Ben Gurion was

¹⁷⁴Hoover to Embassy in Iraq, September 20, 1956. FRUS, pg. 51.

¹⁷⁵DOS to Embassy in Iraq, Washington, September, 27, 1956. FRUS, pg. 52.

¹⁷⁶Gallman to DOS, Baghdad, September 29, 1956. FRUS, pg. 53-54. Britain too gave its assurances to Jordan's Foreign Minister, Awni Abd al-Hadi, that the United Kingdom would help Jordan if Israel attacked that country. See editor's footnote, pg. 54.

suspicious of Iraqi intentions since the latter had no truce agreement with Israel.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, by the beginning of October, Dulles softened his position on Iraq's wish to provide Jordan with weapons (under the condition that Iraqi aid would not be labeled as a substitute for British assistance to Jordan).¹⁷⁸ American-Iraqi negotiations were interrupted by the rising crisis over Egypt's Canal Zone. The Suez conflict temporarily destabilized the Jordanian Kingdom.

The Impending Suez Crisis Suez: 1956

The Suez crisis in the summer and the Fall of 1956 was partly triggered by Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, on July 26, 1956. The Canal was operated by British and French technical supervisors. Egypt's action represented an act of defiance to the Western powers and Israel; Tel Aviv needed access to Sharm al-Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba, still controlled by Egyptian forces, and France believed that Nasser's actions would endanger the French position in North Africa. Conservative Britain viewed the Colonel's uncompromising attitude with uneasiness and apprehension. Britain gave the impression

¹⁷⁷Lawson to DOS, September 27, 1956. FURS, pgs. 55-56.

¹⁷⁸DOS to Embassy in Iraq, October 1, 1956. FRUS, pg. 56.

that Nasser had blocked the Suez to international shipping. Nasser's goal to achieve his country's independence collide with Eden's ambition was to preserve British presence in the Middle East by obliterating anti-Western regimes by covert actions. British investments in Egypt were too valuable to be neglected.¹⁷⁹ However, the Anglo-Franco-Israelite assault on Egypt took no account of the implications of their actions for the United States, regional stability and the security of the Jordanian Kingdom.

President Eisenhower recalls in his White House memoirs that the world community was anticipating the inevitable dissolution of the Hashimite Kingdom. His impression was that the "recent savage blows of the Israeli armies against the strong points within Jordanian territory" were strong indications of its disintegration. Eisenhower's misgivings about Israel's regional plans to take advantage of the Suez crisis induced him to direct Secretary Dulles to inform Ben Gurion's cabinet that "no considerations of partisan politics will keep this government from pursuing a course dictated by justice and international decency in the circumstances, and that it will remain true to its pledges under the United

¹⁷⁹W.M. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, editors, Suez 1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1989).

Nations." The president's warning to Ben Gurion impressed upon the Israeli government the seriousness of this issue.¹⁸⁰ The Tripartite aggression on Egypt had broad ramifications: it frustrated the American sponsored Alpha Operation, defeated any prospect for the Valley scheme and kept Jordan in a vacillating position for months to come.

On October 29, 1956, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a Statement to justify its campaign in the Sinai Peninsula. The Ministry accused Colonel Nasser of what it called the "illegal blockade" of the Canal to smother the Israeli economy. The Syro-Jordanian-Egyptian military control under Cairo's command, combined with what it considered Nasser's disrespect of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 affirming the right of passage as reinforced the United Nation's Charter, constituted what Israeli officials considered a violation

¹⁸⁰Top Secret Memorandum by President Eisenhower, October 15, 1956. DDE Papers, Diary Series, box no. 9, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pas. 1-3. President Eisenhower also considered the possibility of coping with the actual dissolution of the Jordanian Kingdom. Moreover, Eisenhower also believed that American "Opportunities" in the region would be enlarged if an "economic union" between Jordan and Israel could be achieved, and an Iraqi-Israeli agreement secured. See "U.S. Opportunities in the Middle East" October 1956. DDS Papers, Eisenhower Library Records, pg. 1.

of their country's sovereignty.¹⁸¹ On October 30, Prime Minister Eden reiterated the Israeli position and promised to honor the Anglo-Jordan Treaty. He affirmed, as reported by the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, that Israel would not attack Jordanian territory. France and Britain called on Egypt and Israel to cease all hostilities within twelve hours and requested Cairo to permit British and French forces to occupy "key positions" at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez or face an Anglo-French intervention. Prime Minister Guy Mollet of France delivered a statement to the French National Assembly in which he described what he called the "courage" of the Israelis in the defence of their territory. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi of Egypt submitted to the President of the Security Council a note to consider the Anglo-French ultimatum and their violation of Egyptian sovereignty.¹⁸² The ultimatum was

¹⁸¹Statement Issued by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 29, 1956. United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957, Documents (Washington: Department of State, 1957), pas. 135-137. Collection of Jordan's Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁸²White House News Statement, October 29, 1956. Also see Letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council from United States Representative, October 29, 1956. See Statement in British House of Commons by Prime Minister Eden, October 30, 1956, and Statement in the French National Assembly by Premier Mollet (January 31, 1956-June 11, 1957), on October 30, 1956. See Letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council from the Egyptian Representative, October 30, 1956. United States policy in the Middle East, pas. 137-143.

rejected by Egypt, and Nasser refused to surrender to the demands of the Western powers, the termination of hostilities for Egyptian withdrawal from the Canal. Consequently, French and British forces started to attack Egyptian positions. This was followed by an Israeli expedition led by General Moshe Dayan occupying the entire Sinai Peninsula.¹⁸³ Seven thousand Egyptians were killed and Three Thousand more captured as prisoners. Dayan's strategy left the Israeli forces in the possession of Sharm al-Sheik.

Tel Aviv's denunciation termed Egyptian "imperialist expansion" was not well received by the administration in Washington. The White House issued a statement and recalled how the Eisenhower cabinet "pledged itself to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East." The United States promised to abide by that pledge. Henry Cabot Lodge, Permanent Representative of the United States of America at the United Nations, informed the President of the Security Council that Israel had violated the Armistice Agreement between Tel Aviv and Cairo by invading the Peninsula. The United States government had neither been consulted nor informed about the plans of the Western powers. On October 31, President

¹⁸³S. Z. Freiburger, Dawn Over Suez, (Chicago: I.R., 1992), pgs. 187-188.

Eisenhower spoke to the American people of American reasons for its "right" to "dissent" holding the Tripartite powers responsible for the crisis. Eisenhower judged the actions of France, Britain and Israel to be flawed because of their decision to use force as a tool to resolve world conflicts. Moreover, the attack on Egypt was contrary to international law and United Nations principles.¹⁸⁴ Soviet Premier Nikolai Aleandrovich Bulganin believed that the aim of the Western powers in the Middle East was concocted to revive the "colonial order in the East." He called upon the United States to assist the Soviet Union in defending Egypt. President Eisenhower rejected Moscow's proposal to use force. Bulganin's firm messages to the Western powers and Israel alluded to "rocket weapons"¹⁸⁵ to intimidate Britain and France. But the Western powers received sufficient threats from the United States.

Whether Israel had the right of passage in the Suez under the Convention of Constantinople of 1888, affirming

¹⁸⁴Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, October 31, 1956. Public Papers of the Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower 1965, pgs. 1063-1065.

¹⁸⁵Letter to President Eisenhower From Soviet Premier Marshal Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, November 5, 1956. pgs. 180-181. Also see Message to Prime Minister Eden from Soviet Premier Bulganin, November 5, 1956. pgs. 183-185.

that the Canal shall be open to all vessels regardless of their origin¹⁸⁶, is debatable. At the Cairo Meeting in February of 1957, King Abd al-Aziz, King Hussein, President Shukri al-Quwatly of Syria and President Nasser, affirmed their solidarity and stressed the importance of Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. Ben Gurion's description of the "glorious military operation" said it was partially designed to ensure Israeli's right of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. On March 1, 1957, Golda Meir, Israel's Foreign Minister announced the readiness of Israeli forces to withdraw from Egyptian territory.¹⁸⁷ However, President Eisenhower refuted Israeli assertions; he believed that Israeli military operations constituted a violation of the May 25, 1950 Tripartite Declaration which prohibited the use of force in the Middle East. Eisenhower's motives are susceptible to challenge. Some have argued that the United States, in the first half of the 1950's, had come to the conclusion that Britain's imperial actions were antithetic to American hopes. President Eisenhower was

¹⁸⁶Nathan Feiberg, The Arab-Israel Conflict in International Law (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1970), pgs. 85-86.

¹⁸⁷Communique Issued at Cairo by the Heads of Four Arab States, February 27, 1957. United States Policy in the Middle East, Documents, DOS, Washington: Department of State, 1957), pgs. 321-322. Also see Statement in the United Nations General Assembly by Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir, March 1, 1957. pgs. 328-332.

disappointed with British policy. Eisenhower, it is argued firmly believed that the attack on Egypt gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to advance in the Middle East, and frustrated American plans to uproot Syria's regime and that of Nasser. Eisenhower's "anti-colonialist policy" was only a "mask" to supplant British presence and contain Soviet expansionism.¹⁸⁸ To be sure, Eisenhower was not defending Nasser nor were his actions devoid of ambitions to protect United States interests in the Middle East. While Eisenhower differentiated between the canal issue and American attitude toward Nasser, Eden firmly believed that the Suez crisis could not be separated from the rising power of Arab nationalism and Egyptian designs.¹⁸⁹ The President opposed the use of force. To his credit, Eisenhower was a man who adhered to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the policy of fairness. The Western powers and Israel were forced to withdraw from the Canal Zone after an intense diplomatic campaign. The Soviet Union's pressure on the Western powers facilitated the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Canal. Moreover, the president's impartial approach to foreign policy pleased the

¹⁸⁸S. Z. Freiburger, Dawn over Suez, the Rise of American Power in the Middle East 1919-1957 (Chicago: I.R., 1992), pgs. 11, 88.

¹⁸⁹Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pg. 518.

Jordanian government. However, this episode invited domestic disturbance in the Jordanian capital and elsewhere.

Jordan's October parliamentary elections were deeply disappointing. Civil disorder produced unwanted outcomes and the jailing of riot organizers. Ambassador Mallory reported that three Communists (running under the banner of National Front), and four "extremists" were elected. of forty members elected, nineteen displayed anti-Western tendencies, nine were "neutrals" and twelve Western oriented. The weakening of the Western position, and the election of "communists" for the "second time in the history of an Arab Parliament" was a distressing development for American leaders.¹⁹⁰ Others contend that the elections were "impartial" because the army refrained from influencing the course of events. The Socialist National Party secured 12 seats; the Constitutional Arab Party, 9 seats; the Moslem Brethren; 3 seats, the National Front, 3 seats; the Islamic Liberation Party, 1 seat. The nationalists received approximately 65 percent

¹⁹⁰Memorandum from the Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs (Donald C. Bergus) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins), Washington, October 25, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, pgs. 57-58.

of all votes.¹⁹¹ The new parliament's anti-Western sentiment, coupled with Abu Nuwar's inviting the United States to furnish Jordan with military assistance as a substitute for Britain or risk the emergence of communist influence in the Kingdom, received keen attention from Ambassador Mallory.¹⁹² The urgency of the situation in Jordan prompted the American Ambassador to neglect the Department's view that the Hashimites should seek aid from countries with which they had treaty obligations. Mallory's diplomatic sensibility recognized the implications of his government's attitude, a position which he believed could have easily alienated Jordan's officials.¹⁹³ Herbert Hoover, Jr., United States Assistant Secretary of State, continued to pacify Jordanian fears and cautioned the King against hasty actions. Mallory was instructed to assure Hussein that the Eisenhower administration was laboring to bring about the withdrawal of British, French, Israel; troops from

¹⁹¹Hani Hourani, Tarikh al-Niyabi fi al-Urdun 1929-1957 (Nicosia: Cyprus), pgs. 77-78.

¹⁹²Mallory to DOS, Amman, November 9, 1956. FURS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 59. Abu Nuwar proclaimed himself to be "anti-communist" but threatened to be in the "first rank of those waving the red flag" in the event of American refusal to provide Jordan with military and economic assistance.

¹⁹³Ambassador Mallory to DOS, November 14, 1954. FRUS, pg. 61.

the Canal Zone.¹⁹⁴ The Suez crisis provoked an internal upheaval in the Jordanian Kingdom. Hussein's sharp reproach of the Western powers after the Triple Aggression on Egypt was imperative and understandable. The "peace which the West pretends to defend is threatened by the exponents of culture and civilization who in their deeds violated the most sublime principle of humanity." The King emphasized that the quest for the liberation of the Suez was not only that of Egypt, but that of the whole of Arab nation.¹⁹⁵ But King Hussein had confidence in the one man whom he believed could safeguard the world community from the impending calamity. President Eisenhower was "greatly heartened" by the King's message advancing American attempts through the United Nations to achieve a cessation of belligerency in the Near East.¹⁹⁶ United States pledges to adhere to international rules of conduct as a signatory to the May 25 Declaration of 1951 were quite evident in the

¹⁹⁴Hoover to Mallory, November 18, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 61-62.

¹⁹⁵King Hussein's Speech on the Occasion of the Triple Aggression on Egypt, Amman, November 2, 1956. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 117-118.

¹⁹⁶King Hussein's message to Eisenhower, Royal Palace, Amman, November 2, 1956. DDE papers, box 594, Eisenhower Library records, pgs.2-3. Also see Eisenhower's telegram to King Hussein, Department of State, November 4, 1956. DDE Papers, box 594, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pg. 1.

President's forceful directions to the occupiers of the Suez to depart the area instantly. Eisenhower was the epitome of a ruler who respected United Nations principles and well-founded rules of international conduct.

At the same time, the domestic pressure on King Hussein to terminate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty was not shared by Abu Nuwar or "most" of Amman's government officials. And the Eisenhower administration was still uncommitted to Jordan's appeals.¹⁹⁷ King Hussein (notwithstanding the "unanimous vote" of the Parliament in favor) decided to withhold recognition of the Soviet Union and Communist China. Jordanians still held some admiration for the United States because they "despise[d] the French, hate[d] English, somewhat fear[ed] unknown Russians, dislike[d] Iraqis and hero worship[ed] Nasser."¹⁹⁸ Hoover's reaction to the King's position was one of appreciation for the Kingdom's stance against communism and its decision to postpone the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordan treaty. A Jordanian role in maintaining

¹⁹⁷Embassy in London to DOS, November 19, 1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 62. See editor's footnote.

¹⁹⁸Mallory to DOS, Amman, November 22, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 64-66.

regional stability now became a distinct possibility.¹⁹⁹ But Jordan's position was similar to that of 1951 in the aftermath of King Abdullah's assassination. In considering the Jordan situation, William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, viewed United States aid to that country within the framework of Iraqi-Jordanian cooperation in an effort to preclude a communist take over. The United States would assure Saudi Arabia and Israel of American good intentions, lessening the possibility of communist ascendancy on Saudi Arabia's Northern border, and ameliorating American-Israeli relations. It was made clear that the United States was not seeking military facilities in Jordan.²⁰⁰ Jordan's Prime Minister, Suleiman al-Nabulsi, voiced his desire to terminate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty on "friendly" terms. The Eisenhower administration was still facing the question of the Jordanian request for American assistance.²⁰¹ Selwyn Lloyd clarified his government's

¹⁹⁹Hoover to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, November 23, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 66-67.

²⁰⁰Memorandum from Rountree to Acting Secretary of State, Washington, November 26, 1956. FRUS, pg. 67-71. According to this scheme, the United States would assume the responsibility of providing Jordan with aid (approximately \$30 million annually) without jeopardizing the British position there. pg. 70.

²⁰¹Mallory to DOS, Amman, December 2, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 72-73. Mallory reported that King Abd al-Aziz Saud offered to help in getting American aid to Jordan, a move which could evoke Egyptian, Syrian and Russian blockages. pg. 73.

position on Jordan to Secretary Dulles; he contended that Britain was "wasting" its financial assistance on that country, and acknowledged that the Jordanian government had requested that the treaty between the two countries be terminated. Nonetheless, Lloyd remarked that he would not like to see Jordan become a Soviet client state.²⁰² Indeed, American technical assistance to Jordan was based on the contention that the Hashimite Kingdom was determined to uphold the independence of that country as a "member of the free world" and to thwart communist dominance.²⁰³ Moreover, Secretary Dulles conveyed his appreciation for King Abd al-Aziz's remarks concerning possible assistance to the Jordanian Kingdom.²⁰⁴ He made strong representations to King Hussein in the hope that Jordan would not rush to abrogate its treaty with Britain under the current circumstances since that would be indicative of Jordan's distancing itself from the West.²⁰⁵ By the end of December of 1956, it became apparent that American commitment to Jordan was only a matter of time. King Hussein's patience and resiliency in

²⁰²Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, December 10, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 73-74.

²⁰³Hoover to Embassy in Jordan, December 12, 1956. FRUS, pgs. 74-75.

²⁰⁴Dulles to Embassy in Saudi Arabia, Washington, December 24, 1956. FRUS, pg. 76-77.

²⁰⁵Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, December 24, 1956. FRUS, pg. 79.

the face of domestic pressure and regional unrest, together with American diplomatic undertakings to hold the line of defence, yielded the desired results. For now, King Hussein reigned unchallenged, and the prediction which envisioned the dismantlement of Jordan was submerged under the feet of the royal master.

Chapter IV

In Defence of the Monarchy: 1957-1960

The waning of British influence in the Hashimite Kingdom was not entirely surprising. For a great power to continue exercising its authority over vast distances, it must possess sustainable economic strength, and the tools (competent administrators and experienced diplomats) to bear the colossal responsibilities of ruling the other. England in the second half of the 1950's neither owned a reliable currency nor had insightful agents to carry on her "mission" in the former colonies. Moreover, the rise of the United States as an vigorous power in the Middle East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower completely eclipsed the chances for Britain to retain its influence over its former colonies. The assassination of Iraq's King Faisal II and the emergence of a revolutionary movement in Lebanon destabilized the Jordanian Kingdom. American financial, military, and diplomatic support to King Hussein during and following the critical months of June and July of 1958 was crucial for the preservation of the Hashimite family and the territorial integrity of Jordan. In particular, the deployment of American troops to Lebanon (in concurrence with the Eisenhower Doctrine) in June contributed to the

survival of the Hashimite Dynasty. Moreover, the maturing of the young monarch of the Jordanian Kingdom, and his increasing determination to rule his Kingdom actively, frustrated England's quest for maintaining its leverage over that country. Despite Britain's landing of its forces in Amman in 1958, the removal of British presence from Jordan was inevitable. By the end of 1960, American-Jordanian relations stood on a stable footing, and Hussein's challenge to Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism had become an open event for the entire world to witness.

The End of the British Imperium

January 1957 was a turning point in Jordanian-British relations because of the emergence of the United States as substitute supplier of financial and military assistance to Jordan. American dread of the communist threat to United States interests in the Near East, combined with Egyptian and Syrian schemes to undermine the independence and integrity of Jordan, heightened the Eisenhower administration's resolve to keep the Hashimites within the Western realm. Fraser Wilkins, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, expressed his aspiration that once the stability of the Near East was revived, the United States, the United Kingdom, and

possibly Saudi Arabia and Iraq, would shoulder the responsibility of meeting Jordan's needs.¹ On January 18, British Ambassador Johnson notified Ambassador Mallory that the United Kingdom would discontinue its financial assistance to Jordan by March 31. Johnson indicated that the Foreign Office was not opposed to the United States bearing that financial onus.² At the same time, Jordan signed an Arab Solidarity Agreement with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.³ Selwyn Lloyd, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reported to the House of Commons that on January 19, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt had agreed to furnish Jordan with financial aid for the next ten years.⁴ This may have contributed to the modification of Her Majesty's position on the Jordan Question. The British communiqué to Dulles was driven by the growing Arab headway in swaying Jordan to the Soviet side. To be sure, Jordan's geostrategic significance for

¹Memorandum from Fraser Wilkins (Director of the Office of NEA, DOS) to William M. Rountree (Assistant Secretary of State for NE, SA, and AA), Washington, January 3, 1957. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 80-81.

²Mallory to DOS, January 18, 1957. FRUS, pg. 81. See editor's footnote.

³Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993, December 19, 1957 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, December, 1993).

⁴Lloyd on Subsidy to Jordan, and Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, 23 January 1957. Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates. 5th Series, vol. 563, pgs. 55-56.

the United Kingdom had receded mightily. However, the British government understood that it was "not in the common interest of the Western Alliance that Jordan should be left to her own devices or at the sole mercy of Syria or even Saudi Arabia." Thus, England hoped that the United States would carry on her past obligations to Jordan.⁵

The threat of communism to Middle Eastern security was a sufficient reason for the United States to take on Britain's role in subsidizing role to Jordan. Indeed, President Eisenhower regarded Mecca and Jerusalem as symbols of "religions which teach that the spirit has supremacy over matter" and felt that the historic sights of the ancient lands should never be dominated by a power that celebrates "atheistic materialism." Eisenhower proposed that Congress authorize assistance to nations in the Middle East in their economic development to ensure their autonomy, provide military aid to such countries to enhance their defence capabilities, and "authorize the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such

⁵Memorandum of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Sir Roger M. Makins), DOS, Washington, January 17, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 81-82. See Attachment pgs. 82-83.

aid, against overt aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."⁶ On January 5, Thomas S. Gordon from Illinois, Chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced to the House of Representatives a Joint Resolution for approval. On March 9, the Congress jointly approved the President's proposal under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, calling for the "strengthening and defense" of the Middle East against communist expansionism.⁷ The Eisenhower Doctrine, as it came to be called, was driven by ideological and economic imperatives. The Middle East was known to contain seventy-five percent of the world's oil resources. Any interruption in the flow of petroleum to the industrialized powers of the West would have exposed their vulnerability to the Soviet Union. Geopolitical concerns also influenced the administration's decision, primarily the geographical links the Middle East provided between Asia, a continent with vast natural resources,

⁶Message to Congress by president Eisenhower, January 5, 1957. United States Policy in the Middle East, Department of State, pgs. 17, 20. Documents cover the period between September 1956 to June, 1957; Collection of Jordan's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Amman, Jordan.

⁷Joint Resolution Introduced in the Congress, January 5, 1957. United States Policy in the Middle East, pgs.23-24. Also see footnote on same page. Also see Joint Resolution of the Congress, March 9, 1957. Statement by President Eisenhower upon Signing the Joint Resolution on the Middle East, March 9, 1957. See pgs. 44-46. The Congress authorized \$200,000,000 for military and economic assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended.

and Western Europe, the principle supplier of manufactured goods to that region. It also served as a bridge to Africa, a huge land with stupendous mineral resources. Thus, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, counseled the administration to act with what he called a "high degree of responsibility and friendly impartiality" toward the major contestants in Near East. Moreover, Murphy believed that Jordan could not flourish without securing an Arab-Israeli settlement. The first step toward achieving that goal was the curtailment of Soviet Communism.⁸ President Eisenhower made reference to the Middle East Resolution and the Tripartite Declaration in the event Jordan was threatened by communism.⁹

On February 2, King Hussein issued a public directive to Prime Minister Nabulsi pertaining to what he considered the communist threat to Arab nationalism, and instructed the new government to police communist

⁸Address by Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, Georgetown University, March 14, 1957. United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957, Documents (Washington: Department of State, 1957), pgs. 51-64.

⁹News Conference Statement by President Eisenhower, April 17, 1957. United States policy in the Middle East, pgs. 64-65.

activities in the Kingdom.¹⁰ This bold deed by the young ruler of the Jordan pleased Secretary Dulles, who was drained by what he called the "communist menace." Dulles anticipated a favorable congressional response to Hussein's anti-communist stand.¹¹ Moreover, the Anglo-Jordanian discussions concerning the abrogation of the Treaty of Alliance signed between the two countries in 1948 continued.¹² Hussein's desire to extricate his country from British domination was a precarious undertaking given the mounting pressure of communism and Nablusi's lack of disposition to assist the King in his endeavor. Hussein was alone. Although the Jordanian ruler was on the side of the West, the United States was still uncommitted to him. Mallory concluded that the Jordanian army held the key to the future of the monarchy. He advised his government to grant Hussein assistance if requested along the lines of the Eisenhower Doctrine and so long as the King emerged triumphant in his battle against the internal opposition.¹³

¹⁰Mallory to DOS, Amman, February 2 and 4, 1957. FRUS, pg. 83. See editor's footnote.

¹¹Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, February 6, 1957. FRUS, pg. 83.

¹²U.K. "Questions to Selwyn Lloyd on the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, Monday, 11 February 1957." Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 564 (1957), pg. 111.

¹³Mallory to DOS, Amman, February 13, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 84-86.

As the struggle to maintain Hussein's rule in Amman escalated, and the wedge between Britain and Jordan widened, the Eisenhower administration was earnestly contemplating a small increase in American aid to Jordan. Ostensibly, Britain was "not sorry" about the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. American officials promised R. W. Bailey of the British Embassy to keep this matter confidential until Anglo-Jordan talks were completed. Bailey admitted that his government was employing the issue of continued assistance to the Hashimite Kingdom as a bargaining instrument in the discussions between the two countries.¹⁴ On March 13, the governments of Jordan and Britain terminated the treaty of alliance between the two states. This agreement called for the withdrawal of British forces from Jordanian territory, and the discarding of British stores within six months.¹⁵ But Jordan's most imminent threat rose from within; Prime Minister Nabulsi, the previous Leader of the National Socialist Party, was presumably instigating discord in the country. Mallory surmised that

¹⁴Memorandum of Conversation, DOS, Washington, February 18, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 86-88. British aid to the Arab Legion between 1948 and 1956 accounted for 60 million pounds. Bailey said that the termination of the treaty would save Britain 10 million pounds annually.

¹⁵Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, December, 1993). Also See FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pg. 87.

Nabulsi was "intent on destroying Jordan as presently constituted and throwing out [the] King in favor of still undefined federation with Syria." The cheerfulness of Sharif Nasser, Hussein's uncle, and Mallory's informant about the end of past unrest was not shared by the American Ambassador who foresaw a military coup d'état against the Hashimites.¹⁶ Hence, the dismissal of Prime Minister Nabulsi was an inescapable conclusion. Mallory's assertion about the Prime Minister contradicted later writers who maintain that Nabulsi was "anything but a communist sympathizer, and his overtures in that direction, never very significant, were partly a gesture toward his partners in the National Front and partly what was then considered obligatory in those Arab nationalist circles in which he wanted to be accepted."¹⁷ Indeed, Nabulsi as the leader of the Nationalist Socialist Party was interested in bringing about a Jordanian-Iraqi unification. The name of this party was nothing but an attempt to get along with the "socialist slogans" which dominated Egypt and many other Arab countries after the

¹⁶Mallory to DOS, Amman, March 29, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 88-89.

¹⁷Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, Jordan: 1955-1967 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pg. 48.

revolution.¹⁸

King Hussein charged Dr. Fakhri Khalidi with forming a new cabinet, and Nabulsi continued to function as the Kingdom's Foreign Minister. As reserved as Secretary Dulles might have been about the newly appointed "old-fashioned conservative" Prime Minister, he rejoiced at Hussein's latest political maneuvers.¹⁹ But the Ba'thists in Jordan accused the United States government and Ambassador Mallory of taking a role in ousting the Nabulsi government. General Ma'en Abu Nuwar, Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion, as desirous as he might have been of remaining with the King, was entirely supportive of Nabulsi's crowd.²⁰ Mallory's prediction of a *coup de palais* was realized when General Abu Nuwar attempted to eliminate the Hashimites from power, only to be stopped by the King. Hussein summoned the general to the Royal Palace and asked him to withdraw his armed supporters

¹⁸Hazem Zakhi Nusseibeh, Tariq al-Urdun al-Siyasi al-Mu'asser ma-bain amai 1952-1967 (Amman: al-Majma al-Malaki li-Buhuth al-Hadara al-Islamiya, 1990), pg. 82.

¹⁹Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, December 1993), pgs. 60-61. See editorial note. The Khalidi ministry was dissolved within nine days later. Also see the excerpts from the 319th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 11, 1957. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 89-90.

²⁰Mallory to DOS, Amman, April 13, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 90-91.

from its positions in and around Amman. Abu Nuwar was dismissed and exiled. Thereafter, Selwyn Lloyd instructed the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, to hold discussions on the recent events in the Near East, and to consider the possibility of deploying British troops to Jordan if King Hussein agreed.²¹ Major General Ali Hiyari was appointed as the Acting Chief of Staff of the Arab Army. Brigadier General Richard Collins, American Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, reported that the regular armed forces were still devoted to the defence of the throne, and a sizable number of Bedouins marched to Amman to declare their devotion to the King.²² Hussein blamed the communists for the latest crisis in the Kingdom, and called upon his nation to keep its allegiance.²³ Meanwhile, Under Secretary of State Herter directed the Missions in the

²¹Memorandum of a Conversation, Acting Secretary Herter's Residence, Washington, April 14, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 92-94. Christian Herter acted as consultant to Dulles between January 14 and February 21, 1957. Then he became Under Secretary of State. See pg. XXIII. Also see "King Hussein Speech on the Occasion of Zarqa Incidents" April 14, 1957. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Jordan's Ministry of Communications, 1985), pg. 141.

²²Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff (Brigadier General Richard Collins) to the Assistant of Secretary of Defence (Erskine), Washington, April 15, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 94-95.

²³Hussein's Speech About the Events of April, 1957, April 25, 1957. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Hussein, 1952-1985 vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 147-151.

Near East to applaud Hussein's staunch stand to preserve his Kingdom; facilitate the James Richards Mission to Amman in an attempt to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine to Jordanian officials; promote Jordanian-Saudi-Iraqi cooperation; and keep Israel's leaders calm about recent Iraq's military maneuvers and their possible intervention to maintain the status quo in Jordan.²⁴ Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, reported that Hussein's position had strengthened significantly, and the opponents of order were losing their impetus to wreak havoc on the Hashimite domain.²⁵ But Hiyari's resignation and his request for political asylum in Syria presented the Jordanian government with new challenges. He charged King Hussein with collaborating with foreign powers against the people of Jordan, and repudiated the assertion that Abu Nuwar had ever been involved in plotting to smash the Hashimite throne. The evidence available to American intelligence sources revealed, however, that Hiyari's group was establishing an oppositional regime in Damascus.²⁶ Jordan's diplomacy after the dismissal of Prime Minister Nabulsi

²⁴Herter to Missions in the Near East, Washington, April 15, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 95-97.

²⁵A telephone call from Dulles to Allen Dulles, April 17, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 98-99. See Editorial Note.

²⁶Mallory to DOS, Amman, April 21, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 100-102.

concentrated on securing American assistance to preserve the ruling family in power and help establish defensible frontiers around the Jordanian Kingdom.

The Implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine

Many scholars contend that the Eisenhower Doctrine shattered the diplomatic gains achieved by the Administration during the Suez crisis.²⁷ Syria and Egypt denounced it, and other Arab countries hesitated to request United States assistance²⁸ or associate themselves with Washington. But did the policy of the President facilitate Soviet entry into the Middle East? And were the failures of the United States in Egypt and elsewhere always followed by a Soviet success? The documentary record in the Jordanian case reveals that communist advances in the region started long before Eisenhower committed his country to the defence of that area. Is it also historically and morally valid to assume that the American model, desirable as it might be, was more compelling than that of the Soviet Union in the 1950's? The success of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle

²⁷Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: A Survey (N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1977).

²⁸Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1980), pg. 845.

East during this period is largely attributable to Britain's inflexibility in coping with national liberation movements, and the association of the United States in the minds of many Arab countries with the British colonial past. Nasser chose the Soviet side because it served him well. Communist strides in Egypt were quite successful long before the advent of the Suez debacle. Thus, it was not simply the policy of Eisenhower, but also the conduct of Nasser in associating himself with Britain's rivals, that contributed to Soviet triumph in the region. And even then, Soviet diplomacy did not always emerge triumphant after 1956 as the Saudi and most certainly the Jordanian situation clearly demonstrate. Eisenhower extended his generous purse to the countries of the Near East by invitation and not by force.

When the presumed communist menace to Jordan became noticeable, the idea of the American Doctrine was set in motion. President Eisenhower affirmed that the Middle East Resolution would be exercised if a country in that region were threatened with communist aggression and requested American assistance.²⁹ In an attempt to

²⁹President's News Conference of April 17, 1957. U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Registrar, National Archives and Records Service, 1957), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, 289.

promote the Eisenhower Doctrine to the Arab East, the President dispatched James P. Richards to the Middle East. The Democratic Representative from South Carolina, former Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was advised by Secretary Dulles not to visit Jordan since the Prime Minister of that country was not ready to receive him. The Richards Mission was conceived within the "spirit and purpose of the American [Eisenhower] Doctrine" in order to persuade the inhabitants of the Middle East of American "sincerity." Fifteen countries seemed in favor and most hailed the Doctrine publicly.³⁰ Secretary Dulles saluted King Hussein's endeavors to preserve the independence of his country, and expressed his "desire to hold up the hands of the King in these matters" so long as Hussein acceded to such an arrangement.³¹ Indeed, Eisenhower directed his secretary to "do whatever he wants"³² because the preservation of

³⁰Radio and Television Address by Ambassador Richards, May 9, 1957. United States policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957, documents (Washington: Department of State, 1957), pgs. 68-69, 69-73.

³¹News Conference Statement by the Secretary of State Dulles, April 23, 1957. Documents on American Foreign Relations, edited by Paul Zimmel, Published for Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pg. 231. Also see United States Policy in the Middle East September 1956-June 1957, Documents (Washington: Department of State), 1957, pgs. 68-69.

³²A Returned Telephone call from Eisenhower to Dulles, Augusta, Wednesday, April 24, 1957. Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pg. 1.

Jordan had become a matter of "vital" importance for the United States.³³ Secretary Dulles desired to "give Hussein a fair chance," which necessitated diplomatic consultations with Ambassador Eban in Washington who "hoped that the public would not be given the impression that Israel had been warned by the United States" to act judiciously.³⁴

As the last days of April wore on, American commitment to the defense of Jordan seemed complete notwithstanding the absence of a formal agreement between the two countries. The Eisenhower administration applauded Hussein's anti-Egyptian-Syrian stance despite the King's determination to impose "martial law" in the West Bank. Furthermore, President Eisenhower and Dulles promised Sir Harold Caccia of the British Embassy in Washington to exercise American might to halt any Israeli advance or deflect a potential Soviet threat to Jordan.³⁵ The extent to which the Eisenhower Doctrine

³³Press Secretary James C. Hagerty (Press Secretary to the President) authorization to note that Jordan's integrity was "vital" to the United States, Washington, April 24, 1957. United States Policy in the Middle East, Documents, DOS, pg. 69. See footnote.

³⁴Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, April 24, 1957. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 104-5.

³⁵Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, April 24, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 106-107.

influential was in molding King Hussein's decision to adopt an anti-communist attitude in an attempt to befriend the Eisenhower administration³⁶ is debatable. Was it not true that President Eisenhower had already pursued a firm policy to ensure Jordan's survival when threatened by its neighboring countries? Was it not also true that Jordan had fostered an anti-communist stand long before the Middle East Resolution was established? The troubled atmosphere of Jordan's political climate necessitated domestic changes. On April 24, Prime Minister Khalidi resigned, and Ibrahim Hashim became Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. This administration dictated the exercise of martial law to restore order, and ordered the dismantlement of all political parties in the country.³⁷ A preponderance of Soviet influence in Jordan would have been viewed as a blow to the United States. Thus, the Sixth Fleet was ordered to sail to the Eastern Mediterranean and its Amphibious Task Group to Beirut. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also deliberated on the probable deployment of certain air and ground units from Europe to Turkey or

³⁶Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pg.47.

³⁷Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunniyah al-Wazarat al-Urdunniyah, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, December, 1993), pgs. 62-63.

Lebanon.³⁸ The President showed willingness to form a "temporary pact" with the King providing Jordan with technical support and some military aid. And the possibility of inviting the Jordanian ruler to the White House was seriously considered by the administration.³⁹

Throughout the month of April American diplomacy tended to focus on enhancing Jordanian-Iraqi-Saudi cooperation, particularly after Secretary Dulles was given a conclusive evidence of an Egyptian-endorsed conspiracy to "assassinate" King Hussein. King Abd al-Aziz Saud's assurances to United States officials that his troops in Jordan had been placed under Jordanian command⁴⁰ was an indication of Saudi response to American pressure. On April 29, the representatives of the governments of the United States and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan agreed to exchange notes by which the Eisenhower administration acquiesced to a Jordanian request for economic assistance. Ten million dollars were

³⁸Telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Unified and Specified Commanders, Washington, April 24, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 107-108. Saudi forces and Syrian troops were stationed in Jordan.

³⁹Telephone Call to the President, Thursday, April 25, 1957. Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (1 page).

⁴⁰Dulles to Embassy in Saudi Arabia, Washington, April 25, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 111. Also see footnote, pg. 112.

authorized under the Mutual Security aid funds.⁴¹ The urgency of aid to Jordan was prompted by the detection of a plot, presumably arranged by Egypt, Syria, and the communists to depose the King. Samir al-Rifa'i, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, assured Mallory that his government was bent on striking at communist maneuvers because the Kingdom's survival as an autonomous entity was threatened. Rifa'i emphasized the importance of dislodging Syrian troops from Jordan by asking for Iraqi forces as a substitute in accordance with the 1947 treaty between the two Hashimite Kingdoms. Mallory believed that the preservation of a Western presence in the Near East would depend on American actions in Jordan. The Ambassador never relinquished hope for Jordan's eventual adherence to the Baghdad alliance, and he urgently communicated his recommendation to the administration to invite King Hussein to the United States.⁴² Mallory's telegram was considered carefully given America's delicate position; the United States was still resistant to the idea of becoming the only supplier of aid to Jordan. Hence, Under Secretary Herter continued to call on Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Kingdom to

⁴¹FURS, see editorial note, pg. 118.

⁴²Mallory to DOS, Amman, May 3, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 122-125. The American Embassy in Beirut reported that the removal of the Hashimites from power in Jordan would be calamitous for the United States. See footnote on same page.

assist the United States guests in helping resolve Jordan's financial predicament.⁴³

The Jordanian ruler conveyed his warmest appreciation for President Eisenhower. Hussein narrated how his government had been forced to "strike against the hands of propagandists of evil a blow that would preserve our beloved land for us and permit us to march forward with it against those among us who are opposed to our inherited traditions and our noble Islamic faith."⁴⁴ On May 21, Eisenhower delivered a speech to the American people. The President affirmed that Jordan's security would mean the "strength for all the forces of freedom in the Middle East." Reflecting on the Jordan situation, Eisenhower remarked:

"The Kingdom of Jordan came under the sway of a succession of cabinets, each one seemingly more tolerant of communist infiltration and subversion.

Yet this victory would surely be lost without

⁴³Christian A. Herter to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, May 7, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 129-130.

⁴⁴Letter from King Hussein to President Eisenhower, Amman, May 12, 1957. Eisenhower Library Records, Ann Whitman File, International File, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas. Also see FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pgs. 130-131.

economic aid from outside Jordan. Jordan's armed forces must be paid. The nation's utilities must function. And, above all, the people must have hope."⁴⁵

Jordan's request for American military assistance was not entirely rejected. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Rountree, detailed the obstacles facing the administration, including congressional oversight and the likely adverse responses from other countries in the Middle East. Rountree proposed that Jordan receive aid from friendly Arab countries and continue its traditional military ties with Britain. He emphasized the importance of securing pledges from Jordan not to use arms for aggressive purposes or to transfer them without American consent.⁴⁶ On June 12, Dulles endorsed to Herter's suggestions authorizing a small program of military assistance to Jordan. He hoped that Israel would not make a similar request for military

⁴⁵U.S. President. "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Need for Mutual Security in Waging Peace, May 21, 1957." Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1958), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pgs. 394-395.

⁴⁶Memorandum from William Rountree to Dulles, Washington, June 7, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 134-139. Rountree was the Counselor of the Embassy in Iran until October 9, 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 9, 1955-July 26, 1956.

aid from the United States.⁴⁷ Although a special report from Amman concluded that the financial situation in Jordan was "desperate," necessitating an increase in American assistance, Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al-Said was not so responsive to American pressure to assist the Jordanians meet their financial requirements.⁴⁸ As a consequence, Rountree agreed to increase American aid to Jordan.

On June 13, at the Three Hundred and Twenty Sixth Meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles informed President Eisenhower that Nasser's standing in the Arab East had diminished considerably, particularly since King Hussein had severed diplomatic relations with Cairo and expelled two Egyptian diplomats. Allen cautioned against what he labeled Nasser's conniving to eradicate King Hussein and King abd al-Aziz Saud, who had

⁴⁷Dulles to Rountree, Washington, June 12, 1957. FRUS, pg. 139. See footnotes.

⁴⁸Herter to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, June 7, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 140-141. Cedric Seager was the Deputy Regional Director for NE, SA, and AA Operations, Foreign Operations Administration, until May 1, 1955. On May 1, he became the Regional Director of the International Cooperation Administration, as served until October 8, 1956. From October 8 to August 15, 1957, he was the Regional Director for NE and SA Operations; thereafter Director of the US Operations Mission in Morocco. FRUS, pgs. XXVI-XXVII. Also see Telegram from Ambassador Gallman in Iraq to DOS, Baghdad, June 10, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 141-143.

visited Amman recently.⁴⁹ On June 24, Eisenhower authorized \$10 million in military aid to Jordan as a "one-shot operation." Hussein was very satisfied.⁵⁰ The administration regarded the preservation of Jordan as a matter of "highest importance to Anglo-American policy" and to their collaboration in Arab East.⁵¹ However, Secretary Dulles was still concerned about the implications of committing his country indefinitely to Jordan.⁵² American diplomatic representation to Britain yielded the desired objective; Britain agreed to provide

⁴⁹NSC Meeting No. 326 with President Eisenhower as chairman, June 13, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 145-146. See editorial note. Also see Whitman File, NSC Records, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

⁵⁰Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, June 24, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 148-149. Also see footnote on pg. 149. Also See "Department of State Announcement of Military Assistance to Jordan, June 29, 1957. American total aid was ten million dollars; "Department of State Announcement of Economic Aid to Jordan" July 1, 1957. This was an "additional" ten million dollars. Documents on American Foreign Relations (New York: Harper & Brothers, published for Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pg. 232.

⁵¹Mallory to DOS, June 25, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 150-152. There was significant agreement on papers between U.S. and U.K. See footnote, pg. 152.

⁵²Memorandum of Conversation between Suhrawardy and Dulles, Washington, July 12, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 152-154. See Editorial note. Dulles told Prime Minister Suhrawardy about his concerns. The Pakistani Prime Minister who was visiting Washington agreed to relate to King Hussein the American views. Suhrawardy suggested a federation with Iraq.

Jordan with an interest free loan.⁵³ Despite American hesitation to be completely obligated to Jordan, President Eisenhower's actions appeared to be leading his country in that direction. On August 7, Eisenhower accepted Mallory's counsel to furnish Jordan with modern weapons notwithstanding a Department of State note of August 6 which warned of certain disapproval from the Israeli government. Although Eisenhower refused to "blame King Hussein for wanting some modern tanks and dismissed the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons," he respected the wishes of his Secretary of state, who persuaded him that Jordan's possession of heavy arms would definitely provoke serious Israeli reaction. Ambassador Mallory communicated to the Department his concerns about the United States position and its impact on the "morale and professional pride" of Jordan's armed forces. He cautioned the administration to be cautious not to precipitate a change in the political direction of the Arab states by constraints on specific types of weapons. He anticipated a severe response from the Jordanian government in the event of American refusal to furnish that country with modern arms.⁵⁴

⁵³DOS to Embassy in UK, Washington, July 31, 1957. FRUS, pg. 154. Also see footnote. Loan accounted for 1,130,000 pounds.

⁵⁴Letter from Eisenhower to Dulles, Washington, August 7, 1957. FRUS, pg. 155. Also see footnotes, pgs. 155-156.

As Egyptian and Syrian schemes to exploit Jordan's volatile political climate expanded, Secretary Dulles instructed the Embassy in Turkey to notify King Hussein that the Eisenhower administration had approved of a regiment of M47 tanks in Jordan.⁵⁵ Dulles became exceedingly concerned about Egyptian propaganda, and appeared to be ready to be called upon "militarily" by Jordan.⁵⁶ Similarly, Selwyn Lloyd was "highly disturbed" over Egyptian activities in Jordan. He considered the possible mobilization of Anglo-American air-power to support Jordan's ground forces in the event of outside intervention.⁵⁷ Secretary Dulles was equally perturbed by Cairo, Damascus and Moscow radio inciting a coup against the King, with Cairo clearly encouraging the assassination of Hussein. Dulles regarded the possible overthrow of the monarchy as a "serious blow to Western

⁵⁵Mallory to Dulles, Amman, August 12, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 156-158. Mallory reported that the "communists are moving" and the contest over Jordan was not over. Also see Telegram from DOS to Embassy in Turkey, Washington, August 24, 1957, pgs. 158-159.

⁵⁶Telephone Call from Dulles to Rountree, November 5, 1957. Papers of John Foster Dulles Telephone Calls, Series 927, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

⁵⁷Whitney in the Embassy in UK to DOS, London, November 12, 1957. FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), pg. 159.

interests" in the Middle East.⁵⁸ But Hussein believed himself to be winning the war against communism. He only needed assurances from the United States about future assistance to his Kingdom, and a pledge that Israel would not conduct itself aggressively on the borders.⁵⁹ Dulles' answer was straightforward and unequivocal: "King Hussein can be certain we would take action designed [to] bring about [the] cessation of Israel aggression against Jordan should it occur" as the Suez crisis demonstrated. Admittedly, the Secretary was aware of the constitutional issues involved in assuring King Hussein of continued support, but Dulles promised that Jordan's military and economic requirements would receive warm American attention.⁶⁰ He remained true to his promises until his last day in Office as a functionary of the United States government. Dulles's role in promoting the stability of Jordan under Hussein's rule during the Eisenhower years was invaluable.

Eisenhower, the Arab Union, and the

⁵⁸DOS to Embassy in France, Washington, November 15, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 161-162. Also see DOS to Embassy in Saudi Arabia, Washington, November 16, 1957. FRUS, pg. 163.

⁵⁹Mallory to DOS, Amman, November 25, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 164-166.

⁶⁰Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, November 28, 1957. FRUS, pgs. 167-168.

Assassination of King Faisal II: 1958

King Hussein depicted 1958 as a year of bitter ordeals that preyed on his mind.⁶¹ It was a year of relentless domestic turmoil in the Kingdom, largely induced by the Nasserites' contest with the Hashimites for supremacy in that country; of regional rivalries between the Arab states and Israel in the event of Jordan's collapse; and of American-Soviet antagonism over the future of the Jordanian Kingdom. If Jordan's survival after the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 had been a remarkable achievement, the continuing existence of the monarchy during the great struggle in 1958 was a intriguing tale.

In January of 1958, King Hussein implored the Eisenhower administration to assist Jordan in persuading King Faisal of Iraq and King Abd al-Aziz of Arabia to forge what Foreign Minister Rifa'i called a "common front" with the Jordanians.⁶² American response was

⁶¹King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati ka-Malik translated from French by Ghalib A. Douqan (Amman: National Printing Press, 1978), pg. 165.

⁶²Charge d'Affaires Thomas K. Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, January, 1958. FRUS, vol. XI, 1958-1960, Jordan and Lebanon (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pgs. 268-269.

favorable.⁶³ On February 2, King Hussein proclaimed the Arab Hashimite Union between Iraq and Jordan. King Faisal acted as the Chief of State and King Hussein as his Deputy. The Jordanian-Iraqi Agreement stipulated that each ruler would exercise his own constitutional privileges in his own domain, with Baghdad and Amman rotating every six months as a federal capital. The two rulers also agreed to establish a federal legislation, while maintaining two councils to deal with non-federal matters.⁶⁴ The federation between Amman and Baghdad was based on what King Hussein called "absolute equality." King Hussein ascribed Nasser's decision not to congratulate the King on the new federation to the failure of the Egyptian leaders to recognize that the two contracting states were "free and equal partners." The President of Egypt also "expected Iraq to dominate

⁶³See Footnote DOS to Amman, January 25, 1958. FRUS, pg. 270.

⁶⁴"King Hussein's Speech on the Occasion of Forming the Hashimite Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan," February 2, 1958. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pg. 209. It was agreed that the agreement within three months in accordance with the constitution. Also see FRUS, vol. XI, 1958-1960, Jordan-Lebanon. See footnote, pg. 278. The union between Amman and Baghdad was based on what King Hussein called "absolute equality" aimed at creating greater Arab unity.

Jordan."⁶⁵ The Jordanian-Iraqi federation came about as a response to regional coalition declared in early February to forge an Egyptian-Syrian unity known as the United Arab Republic. This action "consolidated relations" between the Egyptian nationalists and Syrian Ba'thists who aspired to "complete unity" in the Arab East.⁶⁶ The latest agreement between Amman and Baghdad signified the realization of one of America's long aspirations in the region, and the calming of its concerns about the future of Jordan, at least temporarily.

Despite King Abd al-Aziz's resistance to Hussein's scheme, Foreign Minister Rifa'i persuaded the Saudi ruler that the proposed union between Egypt and Syria would be a threat to all monarchies in the Middle East. Jordan also hoped that the United States would support the Jordanian idea, and not stand in Iraq's way if Baghdad wished to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact.⁶⁷ However, Secretary Dulles was apprehensive of promoting the King's

⁶⁵King Hussein Ibn Talal, translated from French to Arabic by Aref Doughan, Mihnati ka-Malik (Amman: National Printing Press, Jordan, 1978), pg. 153.

⁶⁶Jamal Al-Sha'er, A Politician Remembers Commentary on my Political Experience (London: Riad al-Rayyes Books, 1987), pg. 153.

⁶⁷Wright to DOS, Amman, February 3, 1958. FRUS, vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, pg. 270-272. King Hussein requested that American aid should amount to \$60 million.

scheme publicly, and insisted that the Middle East Pact would contribute to the security of the area. But he gave his pledge that Jordanian needs would continue to receive the sympathy of the Eisenhower cabinet.⁶⁸ Rifa'i was pleased. And King Abd al-Aziz acceded to Hussein's request to hold a meeting to discuss the proposed plan for the Arab Union.⁶⁹ The United States too was gratified by the thought of establishing what Charge Thomas K. Wright termed a "Western-oriented federation."⁷⁰ The federation between Amman and Baghdad satisfied American officials.

The Union between the two Hashimite Kingdoms was "potentially significant" in advancing regional stability and economic development, while keeping Soviet expansionism in check. Douglass C. Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, regarded American financial assistance to Jordan as a necessary measure to substantiate the notion that the Eisenhower

⁶⁸Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, February 6, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 273-174.

⁶⁹FRUS, pg. 274. See footnote for February 7, 1958.

⁷⁰Wright to DOS, Amman, February 14, 1958. FRUS, pg. 276. Wright reported that despite favorable Jordanian reaction in the East Bank, it was too soon to assess the situation. The Jordan military viewed that plan with "studied caution." See pg. 278.

administration was not breaching the faith. He also believed that American aid to Amman would preclude an Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.⁷¹ But Nuri al-Said was not satisfied by the volume of American aid, and King Hussein, despite his appreciation for the administration's "generosity," was in agreement with the Iraqi Prime Minister. Although Nuri threatened to resign, the United Kingdom refused to meet his demands, thereby leaving the Iraqi Minister with no alternative but to withdraw his resignation.⁷²

The challenge of facing Nuri's protestations was minor in comparison with Lebanon's raging rebellion. The civil strife in Lebanon during the month of June had a damaging impact on Jordan's security, and the violent death of King Hussein or Prime Minister Rifa'i became, in the words of Charge Wright, a "definite possibility."⁷³ On June 30, Rifa'i confirmed that a clique of army

⁷¹Memorandum from Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Douglass C. Dillon) to Director of the International Cooperation Administration (James H. Smith), Washington, March 7, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 279-280.

⁷²Exchange of telegram between DOS and Embassy in Amman, June 13, June 14, June 19, 1958. FRUS, see editor's note, pg. 291. United States aid was supposed to be channeled through the Arab Union. Contrary to American practice, the Secretary's estimate accounted for \$18.75 million, United Kingdom's \$4 million through July 1, 1958-March 31, 1959.

⁷³Wright to DOS, Amman, June 28, 1958. FRUS, pg. 292.

officers had organized a plot to assassinate King Hussein and his Prime Minister. The failure of the United Nations Secretary General to effect the deployment of a UN police force in Lebanon a "heavy blow" for the Jordanian government. Hussein believed that the triumph of the Lebanese rebellion would have broad ramifications for the West.⁷⁴ The Jordanian authorities detected the first signs of a conspiracy when it learned that Royal Adviser Radi Abdullah was working with Syria's Minister of Interior, Colonel Sarraj, to unseat the Hashimite dynasty from power.⁷⁵ The organizers of the movement belonged to the so-called Ba'ath Party of Jordan whose chief goal was "personal advancement." Contempt for Habis al-Majali -- "not brilliant" a baduin, but "faithful" to the King as the Commander of General Security (CGS)--created resentment among his rivals. It was King Hussein's "physical courage," described as his "most salient character" that saved the monarchy from a definite collapse. Thus, Charge Wright in Amman concluded continued American economic assistance to Jordan on a "spot basis" to alleviate drought was a crucial step for the preservation of the Hashimite dynasty.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Wright to DOS, June 30, 1958. FRUS, pg. 294-296.

⁷⁵Embassy to DOS, July 9, 1958. FRUS, See footnote, pg. 297.

⁷⁶Wright to DOS, Amman, July 11, 1958. FRUS, pg. 298.

King Hussein's appeal to the United States government for public support received the approval of the American Charge in Amman. Wright implored his government to comply with the Jordanian request or risk the loss of Western influence in the Middle East. Similarly, Prime Minister Macmillan of the United Kingdom counseled President Eisenhower to meet Hussein's plea promptly.⁷⁷ On July 14, 10:00 a.m. Jordan time, the Hashimite Kingdom was awoken by the news from Baghdad of a *coup d'état* against King Faisal of Iraq. Land communications between the two countries were cut off.⁷⁸ King Hussein portrayed the assassination of King Faisal as one of the "most shocking" episodes in his life as a monarch.⁷⁹ Allen Dulles believed that Hussein's future was "hang[ing] in the balance." The King proclaimed himself to be the head of the Arab Union, and the Supreme Commander of the forces of the two countries, in accordance with the constitution. In addition, King Abd

⁷⁷Wright to DOS, Amman, July 14, 1958. FRUS, pg. 299. King Hussein requested emergency petroleum for the country's armed forces. Also see Harold Macmillan to Eisenhower, London, July 14, 1958. FRUS, pg. 301.

⁷⁸Embassy to DOS, Amman, July 14, 1958. FRUS, pg. 299.

⁷⁹King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati Ka-Malik, translated from French by Ghalib Aref Doughan (Amman: National Printing Press, 1978), pg. 156. King Hussein warned his cousin on different occasions about the impending threat, but to no avail. Hussein was also aware of the plot to assassinate him and his Uncle Abd al-Sharif Nasser. See pgs. 153-155.

al-Aziz requested the United States and the United Kingdom to send troops to Jordan. In the event of their failure to save Iraq and Jordan, he would go along with policies of the United Arab Republic (Syria and Egypt). Abd al-Aziz believed that the Western position would collapse if the United States failed to act immediately. And the success of Nasser's supporters in Jordan would invite an Israeli intervention. The Soviet Union would welcome the fall of the Hashimite family, and Lebanon and Saudi Arabia would be swallowed up. Dulles believed that the failure of the United States to act would contribute to Soviet advances in the Middle East. He concluded that the United States should invoke the Middle East Doctrine if Jordan or Saudi Arabia fell.⁸⁰

Eisenhower's hesitation to use force sprang from concern about the responses of the people in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the President believed that the loss of the region by "inaction would be far worse than the loss of China" given the area's strategic and economic

⁸⁰Briefing Notes by Allen W. Dulles, Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders, July 14, 1958. International Series, Middle East Lebanon C17, Box 11, Eisenhower Library, pgs. 1-8. Also see Memorandum of Conference with the President, Congressional Leaders, and others, July 14, 1958. Whitman Staff Secretary, Box 3, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pg. 1-7.

importance to West.⁸¹ Hussein described Abd al-Karim Kasim's military coup in Iraq as an attempt to threaten the "independence, liberty, and security" of the Arab countries. He condemned what he called the "traders in the honor and integrity" of the Arab people.⁸² Hussein blamed "Moscow's collaborators" for the discord in Baghdad. He urged the Iraqi Army to close all the doors for communists and forestall any movement which could lead to a general civil war.⁸³ But to no avail.

The bodies of the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Nuri were mutilated by angry crowds, dragged across the streets of Baghdad, and burnt. "Appalling!" One historian remarked. Perhaps. But "Nuri and the Prince were never

⁸¹Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 14, 1958. Eisenhower Library, Whitman Staff Secretary, pgs. 1-5. Dulles believed that Iraq was a British "responsibility." Vice president Nixon anticipated an "adverse reaction" around the globe whereas Dulles thought that the world be divided on this with Western Europe (not so much the Scandinavians) being on the American side.

⁸²"King Hussein's Speech to the two Jordanian and Iraqi nations and the Arab Community on the Accession of Aba al-Carom Caesium's coup in Iraq," July 14, 1958. Al-Magma al-Kamila li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1958, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 229-230.

⁸³King Hussein's Speech to the Iraqi Nation and its Army, July 16, 1958. See pgs. 231-232. Also see King Hussein's Speech to the Jordanian Nation, July 17, 1958. See pgs. 233-235. The King blamed what he termed as the "agents of international communism" for the latest events in Iraq.

tender with the lives of their people."⁸⁴ Or was the demise of the Hashimite Monarchy in Baghdad which had "served the people so well and so courageously since the end of the First World War" so brutal an act as Prime Minister Macmillan described it?⁸⁵ Was Prime Minister Nuri to Macmillan, a "distinguished and loyal friend, the same to his people? Did the British Prime Minister care about the Iraqi people as much he was concerned about the oil installations in Kirkuk and Basra? Regardless whether Britain considered the agonies of the Iraqi people, the gravity of the situation in Jordan prompted the White House to approve an "airlift" of fuel from Bahrain to Jordan, and a tanker supply through the Gulf of Aqaba courtesy of Department of Defence.⁸⁶ Secretary Dulles directed the Embassy in Amman to notify King Hussein that the United States Government "stands by its previous pledges" to help Jordan in safeguarding its

⁸⁴Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pg. 802.

⁸⁵Harold Macmillan, Riding the High Storm (Boston: Macmillan, 1971), pg. 510.

⁸⁶DOS to Embassy, July 15, July 16, Washington. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pg. 302. Prime Minister Rifa'i had a "stormy dispute" with British Charge Major over the U.K. position concerning the Iraqi revolt. Rifa'i wanted Turkey and Iran to crush the rebellion. And King Hussein requested the United States to freeze the deposits of the Arab Union. See pg. 303.

independence.⁸⁷ Similarly, some regional states (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) regarded the implementation of the American Doctrine as a matter of "vital importance" and vowed their support for the Arab Union.⁸⁸

But conditions in Jordan became "extremely dangerous," particularly with the detection of a scheme to assault King Hussein. Allen Dulles and General Nathan F. Twining (Chief of Staff of United States Airforce) suggested the deployment of a plane to evacuate the Jordanian ruler. On July 16, at 11:05 p.m., Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, cabled the commander of the Sixth Fleet to "stand by to evacuate King Hussein from Amman with two COD planes and appropriate air cover."⁸⁹ Dulles described the skillful execution of the coup in Iraq by the organizers as being both "remarkable and frightening." Thus, when American intelligence detected a comparable plot to obliterate the Hashimite dynasty in Jordan, King Hussein was informed, and the

⁸⁷Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, July 15, 1958. FRUS, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pg. 305.

⁸⁸Ambassador Hall in Turkey to DOS, Ankara, July 16, 1958. FRUS, pg. 307.

⁸⁹Admiral Burke to Commander of Sixth Fleet, July 16, 1958. FRUS, pg. 310. See footnote.

orchestrators of the coup were arrested.⁹⁰ The Secretary's decision to dispatch military airplanes to fly over Jordanian territory was welcomed by Jordan's sovereign. American airplanes were granted permission to fly freely over the skies of the Kingdom.⁹¹ On July 17, the British Government acceded to Jordan's request for military intervention. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan conveyed the substance of King Hussein's message to the House of Commons; the King requested British intervention because "Jordan was faced with an imminent attempt by the United Arab Republic to create internal disorder and overthrow the present regime on the pattern of recent events in Iraq." Macmillan justified the deployment of British troops on moral and legal grounds, and with the "full support and approval of the United States Government." The Prime Minister stressed the significance of preserving Jordan's territorial and political integrity, preventing the establishment of what he called a "dictatorship" in the "name of Arab nationalism." The deployment of British forces to the Middle East was also devised to assure the other Arab countries in the region

⁹⁰John Foster Dulles' Remarks at Cabinet, Friday, July 18, 1958. Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pgs. 1-4. Some of the leaders of the plot were "men highly placed in King Hussein's Household."

⁹¹Dulles to Embassy, Washington, July 17, 1958. FRUS, pg. 315. See footnote.

of British credibility.⁹² But Macmillan's assertions were challenged by many parliamentarians, including the leader of the opposition party, Hugh Gaitskell. Gaitskell, refused to "dismiss the activities of the revolutionaries as a kind of artificial intervention in the affairs of the Arab states." Rather, he "recognize[d] the desire of the Arab peoples for unity with each other." He also raised his concern over reported Soviet maneuvers and military movements on the Iranian frontier, and their its implications for Soviet-Western rivalry. Others rejected the contention that Nasser's Pan-Arab movement was more valid than that of King Hussein.⁹³ On that morning, the British Sixteenth Parachute Brigade began arriving at Amman. However, the remainder turned back to Cyprus after Israeli fighters fired on a British transport for crossing Israel's airspace without authorization. Five hours later, the United States, which arbitrated between the two states at British request, secured a permission for overflight.⁹⁴ President Eisenhower gave his consent to the deployment of British troops to Jordan. Dulles also praised the "courageous"

⁹²U.K. Parliamentary Debates, July 17, 1958. 5th Series, vol. 591 (Commons), Part 1, session 4113, pgs. 1438, 1506-1510.

⁹³FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Near East: Jordan-Lebanon, pgs. 1517-1522.

⁹⁴FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Near East: Jordan-Lebanon. See editorial's note, pgs. 316-317.

King for striving to maintain his country's independence, and stressed that his government was carefully watching the developments in that Kingdom to determine if additional actions were deemed essential.⁹⁵

However, Dulles's remarks infuriated Prime Minister Rifa'i of Jordan because the government of the United States failed to meet its commitments to that country. In response, Charge Wright of the American Embassy in Amman reminded Rifa'i of the "heavy concentration" of American military power in Lebanon and the surrounding countries, which to practically guaranteed Jordan's security from an any outside attack. Despite Rifa'i's assertions that American troops would serve as a "psychological" tool to offset British Presence, Wright counseled his government to focus on humanitarian aid or risk the damaging of American standing in the region in the event of United States troop deployment to Jordan.⁹⁶ Harold Macmillan, Britain's Prime Minister, was equally concerned about Jordan's stability. He urged President Eisenhower to act in unison with the United Kingdom to protect the

⁹⁵Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, July 17, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 321-322.

⁹⁶Telegram from Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, July 18, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 323-325. Rifa'i reflected on the concerns of many Jordanians and the "fear once [the] British get back they will never depart."

independence of Jordan and Lebanon.⁹⁷ The President of the United States reacted swiftly and favorably, and understood the significance of "bolster[ing] up both loyalties and the military and economic strength of Lebanon and Jordan" to ensure Western supremacy in the Gulf region. Eisenhower called for the expansion of American propaganda to discredit what he termed "extreme Pan Arabism and anti-Israelism," while emphasizing Arab "nationalism" which the Soviet Union was seeking to decimate.⁹⁸

Contrary to American hopes, Ambassador Robert A. McClintok, in Beirut, noted that United States intervention in Lebanon had had a "sobering effect throughout the area." McClintok arrived at the "primitive conclusion that the Nasser element must be either destroyed or an accomodation with it developed. I know that this conclusion does not add to you fund of knowledge."⁹⁹ United States operation in Lebanon created some embarrassment for President Eisenhower who had forced the Western powers out of the Canal Zone in 1956.

⁹⁷A Message from Harold Macmillan to Eisenhower, London, July 18, 1958. FRUS, pg. 326.

⁹⁸A Letter from President Eisenhower to Macmillan, Washington, July 18, 1958. FRUS, pg. 330.

⁹⁹Telegram from Ambassador McClintock in Lebanon to DOS, Beirut, July 19, 1958. FRUS, pg. 19.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan lamented the "new American policy which could hardly be reconciled with the Administration's almost hysterical outbursts over the Suez."¹⁰⁰ Eisenhower justified the deployment of American forces to Beirut based on President Camille Chamoun's invitation. But American power was limited, for Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR, dispatched a message to President Eisenhower through the American Embassy in Moscow, warning that the Anglo-American mission in Lebanon and Jordan could lead to a "catastrophe." He proposed a summit meeting among the leaders of the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, France, and India to hold discussions on this matter.¹⁰¹ On July 22, President Eisenhower rejected what he called the "extravagantly expressed [Soviet] fear of the danger of general war" in the Middle East. The President defended United States military operation in the Middle East as an attempt to maintain the integrity of Jordan and Lebanon as two small countries exposed to foreign threats. He expressed his "sympathies with the yearning of the Arab peoples for a greater nationalistic unity." American involvement in Lebanon was compatible with American promise to comply

¹⁰⁰Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm (London: Macmillan, 1971), pg. 511.

¹⁰¹Message from Khrushchev to Eisenhower, Moscow, July 19, 1958. FRUS, pg. 339. Editorial note.

with the UN Declaration of January 1, 1942, repudiating any endeavor for self-aggrandizement, while promoting harmony in the world.¹⁰² Perhaps it was these considerations which drove William Hayter of the British Foreign Office to suggest that King Hussein's request for the suppression of the Iraqi rebellion "not to be taken seriously." Similarly, the Eisenhower administration was unwilling to comply with Jordan's appeals for assistance in Baghdad.¹⁰³ Thus, when King Hussein held a press conference which was attended by more than one hundred foreign correspondents, Charge Wright in Amman disapproved of Jordan's attempt to "blackmail us into sending troops" to that country. Wright believed that the deployment of American troops to Jordan would serve the interest of Nasserites and the communists.¹⁰⁴

The King of Jordan was "disappointed" and Prime Minister Macmillan continued to urge President Eisenhower to meet Hussein's request, for he believed that it would

¹⁰²A Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Nikita Khrushchev, July 22, 1958. DDE Papers, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pgs. 14.

¹⁰³Memorandum of Conversation, British Embassy, Washington, July 19, 1958. FRUS, pg. 342. Also see Dulles to Embassy to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, July 19, 1958. See pgs. 344-345.

¹⁰⁴Telegram to DOS, Amman, July 21, 1958. FRUS, pg. 361-363. King Hussein requested from 2500-3000 American troops to be sent to Jordan for domestic reasons.

have an "extremely favorable political effect" on Jordan. He deduced that the situation in Jordan was reaching a "turning point," requiring a firm settlement for the Jordan question before the departure of British troops or else face a calamity.¹⁰⁵

President Eisenhower pledged to help Britain logistically with facilities to enhance the lines of communications between Amman and Aqaba. However, the President expressed his reservations about the Prime Minister's request because the American public and Congress would be "extremely adverse" to the sending of United States forces to Jordan. Eisenhower believed that the British forces were sufficient to stabilize the situation in Jordan. The United States would watch the events closely (while keeping its options open) until the UN took measures to safeguard the Kingdom's security.¹⁰⁶ Charge Wright in Amman repeated his counsel against the deployment of American troops to Jordan because there was "wide spread resentment" of British presence in Jordan.¹⁰⁷ At the Three Hundred and Seventy-Third

¹⁰⁵A letter from Prime Minister Mcmillan to Eisenhower, London, July 22, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 366-367.

¹⁰⁶Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan, Washington, July 23, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 222-223.

¹⁰⁷Telegram from Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, July 24, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 381-382.

Meeting of the National Security Council, Secretary Dulles reported that King Hussein acknowledged that there was "no real need" for American forces, but only desired the presence of American troops as a "symbol" of American interest.¹⁰⁸

As the days of July wore on, King Hussein began to recognize the ramifications of his decision to request American and British troops, and the "unfavorable repercussions" it had had on the political stability of his Kingdom. Hussein and Prime Minister Rifa'i reported increasing resentment against Britain as Egypt and Syria accused King Hussein of needing British protection from his own people. They also noted the Jordanian army's uneasiness about the presence of foreign troops in a country whose major fighting force was unable to defend its own monarch. Moreover, Hussein requested financial assistance from the United States to create two additional brigades from Beduin tribes loyal to the monarchy. He also proposed the establishment of an Anglo-American "mutual defense agreement" to help equip Jordan's armed forces with new weapons. Furthermore, he called for the forging of a "regional defense organization" comprising Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan,

¹⁰⁸Memorandum of Discussion at the 373rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 24, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 382-383.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Britain, France, Greece, Libya, Italy, West Germany, and the United States to be known as METO. This Middle East Treaty Organization would replace the Baghdad Pact, which was regarded by the Jordanian government as outmoded.¹⁰⁹ In his response to the Jordanian government, Dulles rebuffed the Jordanian assertion that the Baghdad Pact was obsolete. The Secretary asserted that the latest meeting of London by the members of this organization provided the United States with a new impetus to enlarge its ties and expand its support for that alliance. Dulles questioned whether the regional states would be willing to entertain Hussein's suggestion of forming a Middle East Treaty Organization to supplant the existing one.¹¹⁰ King Hussein prediction about the end of the Anglo-American sponsored regional alliance was accurate. The Baghdad pact was neither effective in curtailing Soviet communism nor useful in coping with regional upheaval and domestic unrest.

King Hussein was grateful for the arrival of American and British forces in the Middle East, for he

¹⁰⁹Telegram from Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, July 25, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 397-398. Hussein also proposed the creation of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) presumably consisting of British and American advisers.

¹¹⁰Telegram from Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, August 3, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 427-428.

sincerely believed that the fate of Jordan would have been similar to that of Iraq without Western assistance. Hussein denied the rumor of his abdication, and made scornful references to Nasser, whom he described as a "bluffer" who was destined to "fail ignominiously." Wright recalled how the gossip "evoked indignant denial and repeated references to loyalty [of] troops." The King also expressed his hope that the new regime in Iraq would not be recognized by the Eisenhower administration because that would be what Prime Minister Rifa'i called a "reminder for [the] Bolshevik brand of brutality." What was more significant was that the situation in Amman remained "fragile and unpredictable."¹¹¹

Two more issues distressed the Eisenhower administration: Ben Gurion's objection to the continuation of American overflights over Israeli territory, and Nikita Khrushchev's protest of American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. Israel's complaints sprang from the American airlift of a "large

¹¹¹Telegram from Ambassador Lawson in Israel to DOS, Tel Aviv, July 31, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 413-415. The content of the telegram was originally sent by Robert D. Murphy to Wright. Murphy was the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August to December, 1959. FRUS, pg. XVI. Murphy was on a trip to Jordan. He and Wright met King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifa'i at the Royal Palace.

quantity of supplies to Amman."¹¹² The Israeli action was partially driven by a Soviet "protest" concerning Anglo-American overflights to Jordan. Ambassador Eban and Minister Yaacov Herzog notified Secretary Dulles that the Israeli decision to rescind American overflight rights sprang from their fear of Soviet power. Dulles was "shocked" because the United States was not consulted, yet Israel was protected under the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹¹³ President Eisenhower wrote to Khrushchev that Western actions in Lebanon and Jordan were an outcome of an "indirect aggression" against small countries which requested American and British assistance.¹¹⁴ On August 5, Khrushchev addressed a final letter to President Eisenhower, calling for an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon and British forces from Jordan. Mindful of Khrushchev's accusations, the President at last acceded to the Soviet

¹¹²A letter from Dulles to Macmillan, Washington, August 1, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 419-420.

¹¹³Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, August 3, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 426-427. On August 5, the Israeli government reversed its decision and granted the United States government the right to resume the American airlift to Jordan. Eban promised that in replying to the Soviet Union, Israel would reject the Soviet contention that Anglo-American actions were of an "aggressive" nature. FRUS, pg. 427. See footnote on same page.

¹¹⁴Eisenhower to Nikita Khrushchev, in response to the July 28 third letter from the Soviet Chairman. FRUS, pg. 422.

request for a meeting of the Security Council.¹¹⁵

The American-Soviet contest over the fate of Jordan during the month of August received much attention from the government of Prime Minister Rifa'i. The pro-Soviet coup in Syria, and the consequent Soviet arms shipments to Damascus¹¹⁶ alarmed the Jordanian government. Moreover, the Jordanian Prime Minister (knowing that the United States had recognized the regime in Iraq) appealed to the Eisenhower administration to prove its commitment to Jordan and live up to its promises. Rifa'i warned that the failure of the United States to furnish Jordan with "massive military aid sufficient [to] insure [the] expansion [of] Jordan armed forces to [the] point [where] foreign troops [were] no longer required would mean not only [the] loss of Jordan to [the] free world but [the]

¹¹⁵Khrushchev to Eisenhower, August 5, 1958. Ibid, FRUS, pg. 429. See editorial note on same page. It must be noted that the Soviet Premier initially called for a summit meeting of the heads of the governments of the five permanent members of the SC. The President refused. Eisenhower called for a discussion on the Middle East, not only Jordan and Lebanon. He proposed that the UN Permanent Representatives exchange views to decide whether a meeting is acceptable, and to discuss the conditions for such a gathering. See Eisenhower's Letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R., July 25, 1958. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1958).

¹¹⁶Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1980), pg. 845.

entire Middle East as well." The American Charge in Amman reported that Rifa'i "desperately need some tangible evidence" to demonstrate United States willingness to stand by Jordan.¹¹⁷ Allen Dulles, in his briefing to the National Security Council, described the situation in Jordan as being grave, particularly after Syria closed its borders, thereby cutting the Kingdom off from the outside world.¹¹⁸ President Nasser denied that the United Arab Republic was inciting trouble in Jordan, for he believed that the ruling family in Amman could not survive with ninety percent of the population opposed to it. Nasser "felt sorry for Hussein who was a nice young man in an impossible situation."¹¹⁹

King Hussein raised his objection to the reports about American intention to depart Lebanon because he had no confidence in the United Nations.¹²⁰ However, some American officials anticipated a "dramatic appearance" of King Hussein at the Special SC session to present his

¹¹⁷Telegram from Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, August 6, 1958. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VI, Jordan and Lebanon, pg. 434.

¹¹⁸Allen Dulles Briefing the NSC, August 7, 1958. See editorial note. FRUS, pg. 436.

¹¹⁹Telegram from Ambassador Bliss in Ethiopia to DOS, Addis Ababa, August 8, 1958. FRUS, pg. 442.

¹²⁰Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, August 8, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 447-448.

case for a substantial UN presence in Jordan to defend the integrity of his country.¹²¹ Similarly, Secretary Lloyd cautioned against the possibility of Jordan joining the UAR in the event of British withdrawal. The British Secretary considered any movement in that direction a "terrific blow" and an "absolute disaster" for the West. He advised the Eisenhower administration to make some preparations and give the appearance that the United States and the United Kingdom would be willing to remain for ten additional years if necessary. Consequently, Lloyd promised to look favorably at Hussein's request to build two additional brigades from loyal Beduin tribes.¹²²

Charge Wright in Amman observed some apprehension by King Hussein and Rifa'i that the great powers might sacrifice Jordan. Thus, Wright "hardly blame[d]" the Jordanian government for opposing the UN proposal to

¹²¹Memorandum from Gerald C. Smith to C.D. Jackson regarding the possible appearance of King Hussein at the Special UNGA, DOS, Policy Planning Staff, August 9, 1958. Papers of C.D. Jackson, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas. Smith wrote that Hussein's objective was to defend his people against foreign forces and internal strife. And "If the outcome might be the end of the monarchy in Jordan, he is quite willing to step aside for the benefit of his people." Some in the DOS were in favor of Hussein's appearance, but many were not.

¹²²Telegram from Ambassador Whitney in the UK to DOS, London, August 11, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 451-453.

provide protection for that country.¹²³ Secretary Lloyd pressed for a resolution on the Jordan and Lebanon crisis to place the United States and the United Kingdom in the "best tactical position before the [General] Assembly and allow for a compromise between our and the Soviet Union's resolutions more nearly to our liking."¹²⁴ But Andre Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics insisted on American and British withdrawal from the area. He asserted that the Jordanians should "solve their own problems." In response, Secretary Dulles noted that the departure of the Western troops from the Middle East was likely to spark an Arab-Israeli war. For this, Gromyko proposed a joint American-Soviet statement to respect Jordan's territorial integrity.¹²⁵ Comparable to the Soviet position, Mahmoud Fawzi, Egypt's Foreign Minister, challenged Britain's intervention in Jordan to impose the King on the people of that country. While Fawzi recognized Jordan's right to decide its own future, he "could not promise" Secretary Dulles that the United Arab

¹²³Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, August 12, 1958. FRUS, Pgs. 453-455.

¹²⁴Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958. FRUS, Pg. 456.

¹²⁵Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 462-463, 467. In reaction to Eisenhower's speech at the UN, Soviets accused the US/UK of violating the peace in the Middle East. See footnote on same page.

Republic would welcome Jordan into its camp.¹²⁶

During the critical month of August, it became evident that the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic were using the General Assembly as a vehicle to promote their interests in that region. Fearful of the Soviet-Egyptian connection, Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i, head of the Jordanian delegation to the UN, invited the UN to ensure Jordan's "safety and independence." However, he contested any proposal for the dispatch of UN forces or observers to protect his country's borders. His speech before the GA "shook things badly," and for Dulles it was a "saber rattling performance."¹²⁷ At the same time Dulles and Gromyko continued to work on a satisfactory resolution to the Jordanian question. The Soviet Foreign Minister favored the UN proposal of sending observers to Jordan, and the United States Secretary needed pledges from Moscow and its proxies that Jordan and Lebanon could live independently after Anglo-American departure.¹²⁸

¹²⁶Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 14, 1958. FRUS, pg. 47.

¹²⁷Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between the Secretary of State in New York and the Under Secretary of State (Herter) in Washington, August 15, 1958. FRUS, pg. 476. Dulles said that the U.S. should put some "heat" on Jordan to modify its position.

¹²⁸Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 18, 1958. FRUS, pg. 498. Dulles felt that sending a few UN observers to Amman would not solve Jordan's problem.

On August 19, Prime Minister Rifa'i surprised the American Charge in Amman with his decision regarding the withdrawal of British troops no later than October 1. He warned that if the United States failed to react favorably to King Hussein's request for military assistance, he would conclude that the West could no longer serve Jordan's national interest. Not only did Rifa'i say that he would resign, but he threatened to come into an "accomodation" with the United Arab Republic. Charge Wright described how the Jordanian Prime Minister, with "tears in his eyes," declared his failure to rescue his country from encirclement. He implored the Eisenhower administration to sign a "mutual defense treaty" with Jordan as a last resort to salvage what otherwise would be a "hopeless" situation.¹²⁹ King Hussein undoubtedly assumed that only an "American miracle can save Jordan."¹³⁰ Secretary Dulles took Rifa'i's admonition very seriously. In his telegram to the Jordanian government, Dulles expressed his "greatest admiration for [the] courage and leadership" of the King and his Prime Minister and his confidence that their

¹²⁹Telegram from Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, August 19, 1958. FRUS, pg. 503. Wright wrote that he knew Rifa'i to be "honest and straightforward." He also advised his administration to decide whether the U.S. would be willing to accept Nasserism in the event of Jordan's demise.

¹³⁰Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, August 20, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 503-504.

endeavors to maintain the stability of the Kingdom would persist. Nevertheless, he felt that the signing of a Mutual Defence Treaty with Jordan would run into constitutional issues and Congressional opposition. Therefore, the Secretary counseled the Jordanian government not to hasten into a decision for British withdrawal.¹³¹ On August 21, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution, which was advanced by ten Arab countries, calling on the Secretary General to take the necessary measures to secure an early withdrawal of American and British forces from the Middle East.¹³² King Hussein and Rifa'i were "generally pleased" with the resolution. However, they remained distrustful of Nasser and skeptical of the UN capacity to defend Jordan. Hussein perceived the resolution to be a "victory" for Nasser because Jordan and Lebanon were forced back into the Arab League where Egypt exercised tremendous power. Apprehensive of Soviet-Egyptian collaboration, the King once more requested a treaty of friendship with the

¹³¹Telegram from the Delegation at the United Nations to the Embassy in Jordan, New York, August 20, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 505-506.

¹³²August 21, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 510-511. See editorial note. The sponsoring states, included Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and United Arab Republic. It is to be noted that the Eisenhower administration was happy with the Arab Resolution. Also see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pg. 1044-1047.

United States.¹³³

Without informing the Jordanian government, Under Secretary Herter pointed out the forging of an American-Jordanian treaty, entailing massive military and financial aid, was "out of the question." Herter, however, insisted that the abrupt departure of King Hussein would be "most undesirable."¹³⁴ In his discussions with Under Secretary Herter, Dulles was "doubtful" whether Jordan was "worth the money it would take to concentrate on this one spot."¹³⁵ Secretary Lloyd's reply was incisive; although he admitted that the United Kingdom and the United States could not bear the Jordanian burden indefinitely, he cautioned Secretary Dulles that the collapse of Jordan would constitute a "major diplomatic and actual defeat" for the West and a "great blow" to Anglo-American stature in the Middle

¹³³Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, August 21, 1958. FRUS, pg. 512-513. Also see Telegram from Wright to DOS, August 23, 1958. See pgs. 516-517. Wright reported to his government that American assurances would induce Rifa'i to continue his "splendid fight" against communism. Somehow Rifa'i assumed that Britain "decided" that the King "must eventually go" as a price for Jordan's flirtations with its neighboring adversaries. See Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, August 22, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 513-515.

¹³⁴Telegram from DOS to Embassy in the UK, Washington, August 23, 1958. FRUS, pg. 521.

¹³⁵Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, August 23, 1958. Papers of Christian Herter, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas.

East. Lloyd offered to provide five million dollars in aid to Jordan in addition to one million for building a new Jordanian brigade.¹³⁶

Despite Britain's repeated representations to the Eisenhower cabinet to meet the Jordanian request, Assistant Secretary of State Rountree was still unwilling to commit the United States to any economic or military program to Jordan, fearing its effects on the General Assembly Resolution espoused by the Arab states on August 21. But Dulles could not disregard Jordan's plea any longer. Dulles agreed to furnish Jordan with \$42 million for the Jordanian Fiscal Year of 1959. He also hoped that the Jordanians would "not lose confidence in [President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles] ...who have proven themselves willing to assist [King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifa'i]...and that they will continue their staunch and heroic efforts based upon high order of statesmanship."¹³⁷ It is ironic that Dulles' remarks on

¹³⁶Letter from Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles, London, August 25, 1958. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 523-525. Jordan's financial needs were estimated around \$50 million. Lloyd advised Dulles to come up with the rest of the money before the Arab League meeting scheduled for September 6. He suggested that Secretary General of the UN, Hammarskjold should convey this message to Jordan during his visit there.

¹³⁷Telegram from Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, August 27, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 432-534. Jordan's request for help to build two additional brigades was

Jordan always contradicted his actions. When the Jordanian Monarchy faced a major challenge, the staunch Secretary was swift to meet Hussein's minimum needs. Two explanations illuminate this contradictory behavior: Dulles's admiration for a young King who strove valiantly to defend his Kingdom, and his fear of the eminent possibility of a Soviet dominance in Jordan posing risks for the Western powers in the whole of the Middle East.

The American message was well received. Rifa'i's faith in the United States was restored.¹³⁸ King Hussein and his Prime Minister vowed to continue to "wage [a] relentless fight against [the] enemies of the free world." Moreover, Rifa'i promised to make Jordan what he called the "freedom fortress" of the Middle East. In return for American reciprocity, the American Charge in Amman secured a pledge from Jordan that the withdrawal of British troops from the Kingdom would not occur without prior consultations with the United States.¹³⁹ At the same time, Rifa'i and Secretary General Hammarskjold agreed that no UN force or observers would be allowed in

still under consideration by the U.S.

¹³⁸Telegram from Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, August 28, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 535-536. Wright hoped that Rifa'i would not resign. He also felt that Jordan's future was still uncertain.

¹³⁹Telegram from Wright in Jordan to DOS, Amman, August 28, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 536-537.

Jordan. Only a United Nations office in Amman, headed by a UN official with the rank of an ambassador, would be permitted. Britain would depart Jordan by September 30 so long as the Arab states were willing to fulfill their promises of respecting Jordan's sovereignty.¹⁴⁰ But Hammaskjold's discussions with Nasser revealed that the Egyptian government was engaged in what he called "vicious anti-Hashemite radio broadcasts" calling for the eradication of the ruling family in Amman. His lack of confidence in Nasser prompted the Secretary General to note that he would not recommend troop withdrawal to the General Assembly. Hussein and Rifa'i were pleased.¹⁴¹ Cognizant of Jordan's malleability, Under Secretary Herter advised Rifa'i that the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon need not correspond to Britain's departure from Jordan if it were not in Jordan's "best interest."¹⁴² But the British Ambassador in Amman postulated that Britain's withdrawal would create a dangerous situation in Amman. Thus, the British government pressed the United States to agree to

¹⁴⁰Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, August 30, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 544-546. The UN was supposed to establish similar, but subordinate offices in Cairo, Baghdad and Beirut.

¹⁴¹Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, September 9, 1958. FRUS, pg. 559.

¹⁴²Telegram from Herter to Embassy in Jordan, September 5, 1958. FRUS, pg. 566. U.S. praised Rifa'i for his stand.

Hussein's request for the creation of two additional brigades.¹⁴³

The survival of the Hashimite Dynasty was also contingent on its treatment of political dissidents and its attitude toward the neighboring states. During his recent visit to Amman, Hammarskjold had been critical of a regime referring to "good men against whom police-state tactics [of the] lowest order had been used." The Secretary General surmised that Jordan could not continue without popular support.¹⁴⁴ Hammarskjold's mission to Adman was not successful either. General Charles B. Cabell, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, reported to the National Security Council that the Secretary General failed to enforce the United Nations Resolution pertaining to Jordan and Lebanon.¹⁴⁵ And in his personal letter to Stuart W. Rockwell, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Wright concluded that Jordan under

¹⁴³FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Near East: Jordan-Lebanon, pgs. 578-579. Also see Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 25, 1958, pg. 580. On september 12, some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against Hussein's request, but favored the modernization of the current forces in that country. See Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the DOS, Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, September 12, 1958, pg. 565.

¹⁴⁴Telegram from Wright to DOS, Adman, August 28, 1958. FRUS, pg. 538.

¹⁴⁵Meeting of NSC, Washington, September 18, 1958. FRUS, pg. 572. See footnote on same page.

Rifa'i's unpopular government was still a non-viable country, needing an urgent accommodation with its hostile neighbors. He counseled the administration to modify American policy toward Jordan, including the Point IV, program or face the imminent possibility of a Jordanian drift toward the United Arab Republic.¹⁴⁶ The volatility in Jordan's political climate was also inflamed by the divergence in opinions between Rifa'i's government and the Jordanian Parliament. Wright described how the Parliament was presumably getting "out of hand" and recounted how "Several disaffected people delight[ed] in telling [the] Embassy Officer [that the] struggle over Jordan is now between British imperialism and American imperialism." He reported that some Jordanians accused the United Kingdom of supporting former Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali (the principle defender of the Baghdad Pact) and the United States backing Prime Minister Rifa'i,¹⁴⁷ one of the last bastions of the Hashimite dynasty.

Whether the United Kingdom and the United States were competing over Jordan is a debatable question.

¹⁴⁶Letter from Wright to Rockwell, Adman, October 10, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 603-604.

¹⁴⁷Telegram from Wright in Jordan to Dulles, October 10, 1958. Presidential Subseries, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pgs. 1-2.

However, one thing is absolutely certain: the preservation of the Hashimite Dynasty was of critical significance for both countries, particularly in a region which occupied a special position in their strategic calculations, and during an era which was distinguished by a rapid tide of fervent nationalism and political agitation against the European powers. This is to be contrasted with the earlier British position during the course of Anglo-Jordanian negotiations to abrogate the treaty of alliance between the two states. The "worthless" entity of the Jordanian Kingdom had become a nightmare Britain and the United States could not live without. Nevertheless, the United States was not always receptive to Jordanian overtures. Thus, when King Hussein requested enormous military assistance from the United States,¹⁴⁸ the Eisenhower administration dispatched a Military Mission to Amman to avoid any long range commitment toward Jordan. Brigadier General Richard A. Ridsen acted as the Chief of the Military Survey Mission. Hussein and Prime Minister Rifa'i appreciated the American effort as "tangible evidence" of American

¹⁴⁸Telegram from Wright to DOS, Adman August 30, 1958. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 544-546. King Hussein wanted to expand and modernize the army. He estimated the cost around \$500 million over a period of six years.

interest in the Modernization of Jordan's armed forces.¹⁴⁹ Ambassador Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i (the brother of the Prime Minister), who served as the Chief Delegate at the UN, expressed the confidence of his government in the Eisenhower cabinet as a reliable friend in the future. The Jordanian Ambassador in Washington informed Dulles that Jordan had emerged from of the latest crisis "very successfully." The Secretary voiced his country's admiration for the Jordanian monarchy. At the same time, Dulles "observed that it would not be sound or practical for the United States to continue financial support to Jordan at the present level indefinitely." Dulles defined Jordan as "essentially an artificial state carved out of the old Palestine by the British to serve as a strategic base in the area" that no longer served the same purpose. He advised the Jordanian government to reach what he called an "honorable understanding" with its neighbors.¹⁵⁰ However, Ambassador Munim al-Rifa'i pointed out that Nasser was not acting in good faith because the Syrian blockade of the Jordanian borders had not been lifted, despite promises to the United Nations Secretary General. The Ambassador considered Syria the "only source of trouble"

¹⁴⁹Telegram from Wright to DOS, Adman, October, 1958. FRUS, pg. 608.

¹⁵⁰Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, October 15, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 609-611.

for the Jordanians. He hoped that Jordan in the long run would become a "stabilizing influence" in the Middle East.¹⁵¹ By the end of October, American forces had been withdrawn from Lebanon, and the last British paratroopers were airlifted from Adman on October 25, 1958.¹⁵² Prime Minister Macmillan was not unhappy with the Anglo-American mission in the Middle East. Jordan and Lebanon were able to preserve domestic tranquility until the fateful year of 1967. American and British concerns for the near future were closely connected. However, the adoption of a long term strategy in the Middle East by Eisenhower and Macmillan was not accomplished despite Britain's successive presentations to the White House on this matter.¹⁵³

The end of Anglo-American intervention in Jordan and Lebanon did not go unquestioned.¹⁵⁴ In its analysis of the developments in the Middle East, the United States Central Intelligence Agency predicted that the political

¹⁵¹Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, October 15, 1958. FRUS, pg. 611-612.

¹⁵²From Admiral Holloway to Naval Operations, October, 1958. FRUS, pg. 615. See editorial note.

¹⁵³Harold Macmillan, Riding the High Storm (Boston: MacMillan, 1971), pg. 536.

¹⁵⁴Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates. October 28, 1958. 5th Series. Parliament 41, vol. 594, Hugh Gaitskill, Leader of the opposition party challenged the British mission in Jordan.

trends in both countries would "continue in the direction of neutralism and accommodations with Pan-Arab Nationalism." Analysts concluded that the political atmosphere in Jordan would remain "shaky" and the possibility of an overthrow of the Hashimites would persist, particularly during King Hussein's vacation in Europe in November. But Prime Minister Rifa'i told the American Charge in Adman that King Hussein was definitely planning to return from Europe after a one month vacation. United States intelligence also predicted the ousting of the ruling family within two months if the Rifa'i administration remained in power. Furthermore, the likelihood of an Arab-Israeli confrontation over Jordan would continue to be a major concern for the United States.¹⁵⁵ Indeed, Secretary Dulles dispatched a

¹⁵⁵Special National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, October 28, 1958, "Developments in the Aftermath of US and UK Troop Withdrawal from Lebanon and Jordan," October 28, 1958. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pgs. 617-619. USIA estimated the ousting of the ruling family within two months if the Rifa'i administration continued in power. And although it was a remote possibility, it was postulated that Hussein might not return from his European vacation. Also Jordanian Pan-Arab Nationalists were perceived to be a threat to the status quo. Also see Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 31, 1958. See pg. 623. Dulles expressed his anxiety about the rumor that King Hussein might stay in Europe after his vacation. In his discussions with Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador, Dulles agreed that the two countries should act in concert in deciding questions related to Jordan. In response to the Secretary's concerns, Prime Minister Rifa'i told Wright that the King was "definitely"

"Circular Telegram" to many Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices in Europe and the Middle East counseling the United Arab Republic and Israel about American views on the use of force in the Middle East since the Suez Crisis.¹⁵⁶ Reporting on political developments in Cairo, the American Embassy confirmed that United Arab Republic forces were on a "full alert status," possibly in connection with the departure of British troops from Jordan.¹⁵⁷

As the last days of October approached, it seemed as if the Jordanian crisis was over. Britain's forces were gone, and King Hussein's confidence was significantly revitalized. His tour to Europe remained as scheduled. On November 10, King Hussein, accompanied by his uncle Sharif Nasser, and two other pilots, flying en route to Europe, were commanded to land by Syrian authorities while in that country's airspace. In a spectacular performance and prodigious demonstration of the will to survive, King Hussein outmaneuvered two MIGs with United

planning to return from Europe after one month vacation. See footnote from Wright to DOS, Adman, October 31, 1958, pg. 624.

¹⁵⁶Circular Telegram from the DOS to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices in Europe and the Middle East, Washington, October 29, 1958. FRUS, pg. 622.

¹⁵⁷Embassy in Egypt to DOS, Cairo, October 29, 1958. Ibid, FRUS, Pg. 622. See footnote on same page.

Arab Republic markings and returned to Adman's airport safely.¹⁵⁸ Hussein protested strongly the Syrian action because he believed that his flight over Syrian airspace was an expression of his "confidence" that the Arab countries were acting in "good faith," as they had recently pledged before the world community.¹⁵⁹ Some units of Jordan's armed forces were mobilized on the northern borders, but the King swiftly intervened to stop an offensive against Syria. He directed the Jordanian army to remain in a state of preparedness on Syria's borders, and cancelled his vacation in Europe.¹⁶⁰ Hussein's decision to act with restraint was partially influenced by American persuasion. Under Secretary Herter advised the King to report the incident to Pier P. Spinelli (Ambassador and Special Representative of the Secretary General in Amman)¹⁶¹ as a "flagrant

¹⁵⁸King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati ka-Malik, translated from French by Ghalib Aref Doughan (Amman: National Press, 1978), pgs. 170-177.

¹⁵⁹"Hussein's Speech before the Press held in the Royal Palace whereby his Majesty spoke about the incident involving the attack on his airplane, November 17, 1958." Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn-Talal, 1952-1985 vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 295-296.

¹⁶⁰See footnote, November 10, 1958. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pg. 382.

¹⁶¹Spinelli was the UN Under-Secretary in charge of the European Office at the UN in Geneva, appointed by the UN Secretary General as Ambassador and Special Representative of the SG in Jordan. See Telegram from

contravention" of the principle agreed upon in the Arab Resolution of August 25. Herter counseled Hussein against retaliation, fearing the retribution of the United Arab Republic.¹⁶² Spinelli advised Rifa'i to act with wisdom. The Prime Minister, minimizing the likelihood of using force, indicated some desire to submit a request for the Security Council to deliberate on this matter.¹⁶³

Upon the return of General Ridsen from his military mission to Amman, American officials obtained new insights about Jordan's military capabilities and requirements. Ridsen's recommendations to King Hussein entailed the improvement of Jordan's armed forces. He disagreed with Britain's unfavorable opinion of the capabilities of that country's military personnel. Ridsen was "very favorably impressed by the officers and men with whom he had come in contact" particularly General Shara', Deputy Chief of Staff, who was an "excellent man." Ridsen believed that the maintenance standards of Jordan's army were "comparable to that of West European

Dulles to Embassy in Jordan, October 2, 1958. FRUS, pg. 592. Also see footnote on same page.

¹⁶²Telegram from Herter to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, November 10, 1958. FRUS, pg. 663. Herter believed that a Jordanian moderate response would enhance Amman's "prestige" and standing in the world.

¹⁶³Wright from Amman to DOS, November 12, 1958. FRUS, pg. 663. See footnote on same page.

armies."¹⁶⁴ Surprisingly, the Jordanian army was highly esteemed by the British government before King Hussein's dismissal of Sir John Glubb. Britain's subjective view was contrastable to American impartiality. American-Jordanian consultations extended beyond the norms of foreign relations between two countries. King Hussein held discussions with Charge Wright about the psychological implications of lifting martial law in an effort to relieve the army from "police duties" which were "destroying its effectiveness as a fighting force" and as a tool to maintain order in times of domestic unrest. From a practical perspective, Hussein and Wright agreed that would not alter the situation.¹⁶⁵ Right or wrong, King Hussein lifted martial law on November 11. In his sentimental speech to the Jordanian people, King Hussein explained how the rules of martial law had been justified to "defend the security of the state and the safety of the nation against outside plots and conspiracies." Having recognized the loyalty of his

¹⁶⁴Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 19, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 664-666. Ridsen thought that General Shara' was "willing to serve whoever was in power and therefore could be classified an opportunist. This was not necessarily a bad thing." Chief of Staff, General Majali, was "not the real brain of the army."

¹⁶⁵Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, November 30, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 666-667. Hussein attacked Nasser and Spinelli. He believed that Spinelli was "most disappointing" because he failed to secure a permission for a Jordanian oil truck to pass through Syria.

subjects, the new awakening of the nation, and its solid principles in the face of threats, he declared martial law to be over.¹⁶⁶

On December 10, William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, met with Jordanian officials, including Prime Minister Rifa'i, during his visit to Amman. Rifa'i recalled what he termed the "historical" role of Nasser in fostering regional instability. The Prime Minister explored the alternative of forging a union between Jordan and Syria. Despite Rountree's assertion that the United States was striving for improved ties with Egypt, he was persuaded that Nasser should not be assisted in any way in the short run. Rountree supported Rifa'i's proposal for a Jordanian-Syrian Union since the United States in "principle" was not opposed to the "changing of colors on the map" so long as it was a direct expression of the will of the people in the region. However, he discouraged Jordan from taking military action against Syria to achieve that goal. Rifa'i emphasized the importance of establishing a Jordanian foothold on the Mediterranean to extricate Jordan from the "mercy of hostile Syria"

¹⁶⁶Hussein's Speech to his Nation in Regard to the Lifting of Martial Law in the Land, November 11, 1958. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 297-298.

because Damascus was presumably a "colony of Egypt."¹⁶⁷ In his summary to the National Security Council on December 11, Allen Dulles informed the President of a scheme in the works by Beduin tribes to separate Syria from the United Arab Republic and unite Syria with Jordan.¹⁶⁸

Throughout the month of December, American-Jordanian negotiations centered on future commitments by the

¹⁶⁷Memorandum of a Conversation, Amman, December 10, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 667-670. Prime Minister Rifa'i noted that the "only natural expression of unity would be a union that included present-day Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Israel. this would be a viable geographical entity, but it...not feasible to contemplate a union that would include Iraq and Israel." He also believed that Syria is a "colony of Egypt." See pg. 668. Moreover, the Prime Minister requested additional aid (\$10 million) for budgetary support, however Rountree gave him "no encouragement" to make up for the Jordanian deficit. On December 11, Rifa'i brought the issue once more with Rountree, and requested that plans be made for a visit by the king to The United States. Pg. 670. Also see footnote on same page. To resolve the Jordanian budget crisis, the DOS suggested the utilization of Jordan reserves. The Embassy in consultation with Rountree reviewed the issue in view of political considerations. Wright suggested the use of \$5.6 reserves, and the rest (\$4.4 million) would be provided by US. Fear that reduction in Jordan forces would have "demoralizing effect" on armed forces. This, however, should not act as precedent. See telegram from Wright to Dos, Amman, December 11, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 671-673.

¹⁶⁸Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC records). Also see FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 670-671. See editorial note. Eisenhower suspected something strange going on in the area, and Dulles said that the French might be behind something. Fear that action by Jordan would cause another by Israel and visa versa.

United States to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. The Eisenhower administration appeared unwilling to agree to any definite pledges toward Jordan, even as little as \$10 million to help the Kingdom meet a budgetary deficit. Prime Minister Rifa'i believed that Hussein would be "bitterly disappointed" because American policy ran contrary to the King's expectations of making Jordan the Freedom Fortress of the Middle East. The American Charge in Amman depicted Rifa'i as a "realist" who operated in accordance with the principle of maximizing his country's gains. Wright anticipated Hussein noticing the change in the degree of American commitment to Jordan, but Hussein had no alternatives.¹⁶⁹ The King warned that the demise of Jordan would result in the loss of the whole Middle East to the West. Thus, he requested urgent reconsideration by the United States Government and asked Britain to persuade Eisenhower to increase support beyond what was already allocated for the Jordanian Fiscal Year.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, December 20, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 673-674. Rifa'i told Wright that Jordan could not live \$40.00 of the JFY 1960. The US agreed to provide Jordan with the balance (\$4.4 million) for FY 59.

¹⁷⁰Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, December 21, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 675-677. King requested between \$50 to \$55 million for JFY 1960. U.S. allocated around \$40 million for the same year.

**Reconsidering American-
Jordanian Relations: 1959-1960**

In April of 1957, President Eisenhower regarded the autonomy of Jordan as an indispensable ingredient of American security concerns in the Middle East. The deployment of American and British troops to Amman and Beirut helped ensure Jordan's existence as a sovereign state. By December of 1958, the United States Government had reevaluated its ties with the Jordanian Kingdom. Many American officials questioned Jordan's viability as a territorial unit in a land which had meager economic resources, and in an area which had become increasingly hostile to Jordan's very existence. The Eisenhower administration was unable to extend a treaty of friendship to Jordan despite Hussein's ceaseless appeals. The President was not in a position to challenge congressional authority over appropriations nor was he prepared to tackle the difficult constitutional issues surrounding presidential authorization of aid to a foreign country. Eisenhower would also have faced fierce domestic opposition from pro-Israel lobbyists in the States. Nevertheless, President Eisenhower remained true to UN principles and the rules of international law. His personal commitment to the defense of small countries against external aggression was incontrovertible. And the

relationship he cultivated with the Jordanian monarch extended beyond warm greetings to mutual respect, reinforced by continued American military and financial assistance to Hussein's Kingdom.

In January of 1959, Secretary Dulles notified President Eisenhower of Hussein's intention to come to the States on a private visit. Having recognized the solid relationship between Jordan and the United States, and the "courageous and praiseworthy manner" in which the King had conducted himself since the Baghdad revolt, Dulles advised Eisenhower to receive the King on an informal basis in Washington.¹⁷¹ On February 4, 1959, Douglas C. Dillon, Under Secretary of State, instructed Charge Wright in Amman to apprise the Jordanian government not to expect significant aid increase on a guaranteed basis from the United States. Dillon cautioned that American-Jordanian relations could suffer "irreparable damage" if King Hussein and his Prime Minister were to deliver an "unacceptable ultimatum" to the United States concerning the issue of economic

¹⁷¹Memorandum from Dulles to the President, January 30, 1959. DDE Papers, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (2 pages). Dulles advised the King not visit the US at that time because of the volatile climate in the Middle East, and in Jordan. Hussein planned a private visit. Dulles counseled the President to entertain the King at a luncheon or dinner and receive him to exchange views.

assistance. The assertive assistant Secretary advised the King and his Prime Minister not to make any references to countries whom they disapproved of in order to avoid any embarrassment to the United States. Dillon, who had "high admiration" for the Jordanian Sovereign, wanted to be "frank" with the King in an attempt to eliminate any "false hopes" that the United States could ever fulfill what he termed Hussein's "grandiose ideas."¹⁷² In communicating Dillon's message to the Jordanian government, Wright left "no illusion" about the amount of American assistance to Jordan.¹⁷³

American resistance to obligating itself indefinitely to the defense of Jordan may be attributed to its lack of confidence in Jordan's capacity to survive as a functioning territorial entity. The National

¹⁷²Telegram from Dillon to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, February 4, 1959. FRUS, pgs. 679-681. Dillon was the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until June, 1958; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from July, 1958-June, 1959; thereafter, Under Secretary of State. See pg. XXIV. Hussein was on an informal visit to the US. During February, Jordan experienced a drought in the Jordan Valley and contiguous territories which resulted in substantial losses in crops and livestock, leading to high level of unemployment. Her Majesty's Government promised 500,000 pounds (subject to parliamentary approval) to Jordan through some charitable organization. U.K. Parliamentary Debates, 2 February, 1959. 5th Series, vol. 599 (Commons), Parl. 41, Session 4, pgs. 15-16.

¹⁷³Wright to DOS, Amman, February 9, 1959. FRUS, pg. 681. See footnote on same page.

Intelligence Estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in collaboration with other intelligence agencies had "little confidence in Hussein's abilities to hold his throne or, indeed, in the viability of Jordan as a state." The monarchy and the Prime Minister were exceedingly unpopular among "most" Jordanians of Palestinian descent, not to mention the refugees in the West Bank. Jordan's Communist party, "illegal and severely harassed," was active among Palestinian refugees. "Between Jordan's disparate elements there are virtually irreconcilable antagonisms and there is little loyalty to the idea of Jordan as a state." Only half a million residing in the east part of Jordan, and the army, appeared loyal to the King. Prime Minister Rifa'i maintained domestic order through "repression and intimidation, including the case of martial law, the jailing of opposition figures, and rigid controls over the parliament." Not only did the regional threats undermine Jordan's sovereignty, but Britain's lack of enthusiasm in restoring its traditional ties with Jordan loaded another burden on that country. The NIE concluded that in the short run, an accommodation with Nasser might prove sufficient to ensure the endurance of the Kingdom. But in the long range, the future of the King seemed entirely uncertain to many American

officials.¹⁷⁴

King Hussein's expected trip to Washington offered some hope. Assistant Secretary Rountree predicted that Hussein's visit to the United States would have a "crucial effect" on the relations between the two countries. He declared his readiness to implement the Ridsen Report which was devised to help modernize Jordan's armed forces. But in the final analysis, Rountree believed that Jordan should seek rapprochement with Nasser.¹⁷⁵ Acting Secretary Herter refused to make any long term commitments to Jordan. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Rifa'i hoped that Jordan's geographic setting and its "special" political role in the Arab world would have particular significance for the United States.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴National Intelligence Estimate "The Outlook for Jordan" Washington, March 10, 1959. Submitted by the head of the CIA, prepared by the CIA and Intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, Airforce, and Joint Staff. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 681-687.

¹⁷⁵Memorandum from Rountree to Acting Secretary of State, Washington, March 14, 1959. FRUS, pgs. 687-689. In discussing the relationship between the two states, Rountree suggested that Jordan be reminded of the "special and unique exception to established USG practice" of telling Jordan in advance about American aid to that country before congressional authorization. Ridsen Report recommended \$12.8 million in military aid, largely in the form of new military equipment to be procured mainly in the U.K.

¹⁷⁶Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, March 24, 1959. FRUS, pgs. 691-692. The Jordanian delegation, included; Midhat Juma, Jordan Ambassador,

Moreover, King Hussein acknowledged the role of the United States in preserving Jordan's integrity, and stressed that his country's struggle against communism was grounded on firm national ideological beliefs. Hussein questioned the policy of "neutrality" as being impractical, and warned that if Nasser were to emerge triumphant in Iraq, the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan would be threatened. The King counseled American cabinet officials to help countries like Jordan in their battle against Nasserism and communism. Furthermore, Rifa'i stressed the "non-Arab nature of Egypt" and the fear of Egyptian domination in the Middle East. Rountree admitted that a Nasserist victory in Iraq would be "more dangerous" than a communist take over. However, he maintained that Nasser's failures in Lebanon, Jordan, and Sudan constituted a

born of Kurdish parents in Tafilah, Transjordan, in 1920. Between 1944-1949, he obtained a B.A. degree in Arab literature and in Journalism from the University of Cairo. He served as Minister for Pakistan, Counselor of Legation at London, and before that in Cairo. From 1956, he was Under Secretary for Press, Broadcasting and Tourism. He was also a member of Jordan's delegation to Special Session of the UNGA in August 1958, and a member of Jordan delegation to 13th Regular Session of the GA of the UN. He spoke Arab and English "fluently" and some Turkish. See Memorandum from Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., Chief of Protocol to Thomas E. Stephens Secretary to President Regarding Ambassador Midhat Jum'a, DOS, November 7, 1958. Eisenhower Library, O.F. #289. Also Hazza' al-Majali, Court Minister, Bahjat Talhouni, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i, Chief of Mutual Guidance, accompanied the King and the Prime Minister.

"notable improvement in the Free World position, except in Iraq."¹⁷⁷

American and Jordanian negotiators reached what Rountree called "substantial agreement" concerning common objectives. But Prime Minister Rifa'i needed some sort of "assurance" of America's continued assistance, and a demonstration of the size and range of economic and military aid. The Prime Minister and General Shara' were particularly concerned about reducing the size of Jordan's army without providing economic programs to furnish employment for the inactive soldiers. Rifa'i requested that American budget support for Jordan Fiscal Year of 1960 be, at minimum, at the level of the military budget in JFY 1959, which amounted to \$46.2. But Rountree was unable to obligate the administration for long term programs to Jordan. At the same time, he reminded Jordanian officials that American intentions had been well demonstrated in defending the independence of states in the Near East and in promoting their economic development.¹⁷⁸ Eisenhower stressed the "similarity of

¹⁷⁷Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, March 24, 1958. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Near East: Jordan-Lebanon, pgs. 692-694.

¹⁷⁸Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, March 24, 1959. FRUS, pgs. 695-699. On the basis of Ridsen's recommendations, Rountree noted that the United States was willing to "initiate a modest program of military aid to Jordan." See footnote, pg. 699.

views" between Jordan and the United States. However he reiterated what Rountree communicated to the King earlier, that the United States could not make solid promises to the Jordanians about the re-equipment of Jordan's armed forces. Privately, Eisenhower mentioned to Rountree the possibility of furnishing Jordan with some M-47 Tanks. The Eisenhower-Hussein talks focused on the threat of international communism and the importance of combating it.¹⁷⁹ In addition, the two leaders held discussions on the latest scientific innovations in the United States, and the meeting of the Arab League in Baghdad to narrow the differences between Iraq and Egypt. Eisenhower showed keen interest in Jordan's social progress, the level of literacy in that country, and the instrumental role medical doctors could play in affecting the communities they served. He stressed that the

¹⁷⁹Memorandum of Conversation, White House, Washington, March 25, 1958. DDE Papers, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pgs. 1-5. Also FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 700-704. Privately, Eisenhower mentioned to Rountree the likelihood of providing M-47 tanks to Jordan. Rountree noted that the Department of Defence had prepared a list of military items, including 12 M-47 tanks, to be given to Jordan over a period of 3 years. For exchange of greetings between the King and the President upon the departure of Hussein from the US, see the above Memorandum. Douglas Dillon advised the President that the U.S. should be ready to provide Jordan with modest military assistance amounting to \$12 million over the three fiscal year 1960, 1961, 1962. But King should not be told about amount of money. See Memorandum to the President from Dillon and Herter, March 21, 1959. Eisenhower Library, pgs. 1-2. Also see attachments on background and assistance to Jordan.

"freedom of Jordan has an effect on the freedom" of the United States. Prime Minister Rifa'i hoped to make Jordan a "show window of freedom" in the Middle East. In the end, the President only promised the Jordanians to do his "best," and indicated his willingness to assist the Arab countries in a regional plan for economic development.¹⁸⁰ The United States decided that Jordan's isolation was detrimental to that country's prosperity and security.

Assistant Secretary Rountree indicated the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to assist Jordan in improving its ties with the United Arab Republic. However, Prime Minister Rifa'i was quick in recalling the recent attack on King Hussein by Syrian fighter planes, and Egypt's lack of remorse. Rifa'i pointed out that Egypt was a sanctuary for Jordanian political dissidents.¹⁸¹ In his speech before the National Press Club in Washington, Hussein took the opportunity to explain the meaning and merits of Arab

¹⁸⁰Top Secret Memorandum of Conference with President, March 25, 1959. Prepared by Major Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, pgs. 1-8.

¹⁸¹Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, March 26, 1959. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 404-707. Murphy discussed the meaning of Arab Nationalism with Rifa'i during the meeting. As usual, Rifa'i blamed Nasser for exploiting that phenomenon to advance his own interest.

Nationalism. He portrayed the struggle of his family and the whole of the Arab world for national independence. He declared that Arab Nationalism entailed the "freedom," "unity" and "improvement" of the Arab East, and depicted an Arab world acting in concert whereby no one power would establish its dominance over the other. The King condemned communism and some Arab leaders for the perpetuation of regional instability and territorial rivalry. Hussein's "dignity, honor, and pride" precluded any possibility of allowing the United Arab Republic and its supporters to direct Jordan's national mission. He hoped to revive the Arab League, and criticized Arab leaders who used it for political motives. What was even more important was his emphasis on the "mutual friendship and understanding" between the Jordanians and the Americans, specifying his country's special role in regional stability.¹⁸²

Hussein depicted "true Arab nationalism" as that which did "not permit outside currents in directing the policy of one Arab country against another Arab country for the purpose of serving its evil interests. Arab nationalism as he understood called for love,

¹⁸²"Hussein's Speech before the American National Press Club in Washington," March 26, 1959. Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn-Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 313-317.

forgiveness, and understanding among all Arabs as if they were members of one family." He sincerely believed that communism and Arab Nationalism were essentially antithetical to each other, ascribing the expansion of communism in the region to the specific tactics and practices by some Arab leaders.¹⁸³ Hussein prided his country on achieving "two victories," one against communism and the other against "artificial nationalism," more accurately Nasserism. The Jordanian ruler shifted dramatically his country's vacillating position between 1955 and 1957 into a more definite "stand on the side of freedom" rejecting all forms of neutrality.¹⁸⁴ His speech in Arabic before Jordanian officers and students in London centered around similar themes: the preservation of Jordan's integrity, and his country's special role in the Arab East. Viewing himself as a possible rival to Nasser, Hussein denounced what he called the incompetent leadership in some Arab countries which facilitated the mixing of Arab Nationalism with

¹⁸³Hussein's Speech During a Luncheon organized by the Committee For the Friends of the Middle East for his Majesty at Waldorf Astoria in New York, April 15, 1958. pgs. 321-322.

¹⁸⁴"Hussein's Speech organized by Readers Digest Magazine in New York for his Majesty," April 16, 1959. pgs. 323-324.

communism. Only a man of cultivated "principles"¹⁸⁵ could withstand the pressures of regional unrest and unceasing plots against his kingdom.

The Washington talks in April between Jordanian and American officials went smoothly. To be sure, there was "virtually nothing new" in terms of American assistance to Jordan. Nonetheless, the Jordanians were pleased with American receptiveness to Ridsen's recommendations, and American acquiescence in a proposal to help the modernization of Jordan's army over the next three years. Administration officials believed that Hussein "conducted himself extremely well" before the National Press Club despite his occasional references to certain Arab states who received Soviet aid happily. Obviously Under Secretary Dillon, who had advised the Jordanian government to be careful in making disagreeable references to other states, was not in position to tell the Chief of State of foreign land how to conduct himself. The overwhelming receptivity of the American populace to the Jordanian sovereign testify to that effect. The King wanted to distance himself from the

¹⁸⁵Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. XI (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 323-330. His speech was informal, but very important. Much of what Hussein said focused on the danger of Nasserism (without ever referring to him personally) and the threat of communism.

proponents of communism in the Arab East. Hussein's visit received much publicity with the American press giving him a "remarkable amount of space." Rockwell ascribed the unusual coverage to the "fact that Americans are generally attracted by a youthful monarch." American fascination with Hussein emanated from his "great courage" during the July crisis. They showed "considerable interest" in him as a likely contender to Nasser in the Arab world. Although the Eisenhower cabinet was uncommitted to providing Jordan with additional financial aid, the King and his Prime Minister appeared "very happy," and his visit was regarded by American officials as a "success." Subsequently, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs advised Wright to bolster the Jordanian mood by emphasizing that the King's trip to the States had been worthwhile.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, Eisenhower himself assured Hussein that the ties between the two countries had been "strengthened" by the King's visit.¹⁸⁷

On May 6, King Hussein asked former Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali to establish a new cabinet after Prime

¹⁸⁶Letter from Rockwell to Wright, Washington, April 2, 1959. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 707-709.

¹⁸⁷Message from Eisenhower to King Hussein, Washington, April 29, 1959. DDE Papers, Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (5 pages).

Minister Rifa'i submitted his resignation in a conflict with his adversaries over whether it was necessary to remove the Chief of Staff of the Army. The American Embassy anticipated a quick collapse for the new Majali cabinet.¹⁸⁸ Soon after Majali assumed his office, he refuted the prevailing charges that he was "strongly pro-British." The new Prime Minister recognized the United States to be the uncontestable leader of the Free World with England America's most important ally. Al-Majali confessed to leaning more toward Washington because of the special American role in rescuing Jordan after the removal of Glubb in 1957. Nevertheless, he maintained that his loyalty was primarily directed toward Jordan. He delivered what Charge Wright called an "impassioned speech extolling [the] virtues" of King Hussein and the "destiny" of the Jordanian monarch as the "future leader of Arab anti-communist world." Al-Majali assured American officials that Jordan's foreign policy would continue without any changes, and that King Hussein continued to exercise his royal authority effectively.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pg. 66. Also see Telegram from Embassy in Amman, April 29, May, May 6, 1959. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pg. 710. See footnote.

¹⁸⁹Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, May 7, 1957. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 710-713. Also see footnote at bottom of page.

King Hussein held the previous administration in high esteem. Under Rifa'i the political stability of the Kingdom had been renewed, permitting Jordan a greater degree of flexibility in international relations. However, Hussein was critical of Rifa'i for his "lack [of] imagination" and "foresight" in international affairs, leaving Jordan no chance of becoming the leader of the "free" Arab countries. Hence, the King chose a new cabinet that was based on "personal and professional integrity, loyalty." The King portrayed Nasser as an opportunist who, having failed to sway General Qasim of Iraq to his side, suddenly became a fighter against the Red Menace. He vowed that Jordan would "never accept Nasser whether he poses as anti-Communist or reveals himself in his true light as a dictator bent on creating an Arab empire." However, Charge Wright communicated his anxiety about Jordan without Rifa'i. He cautioned the Department of State that the King may "inadvertently place Jordan beyond [the] point [of no] return with catastrophic results for [the] free world in the Middle East." The American Charge was exceedingly concerned about what he called the "Beduin hot heads" in the Jordanian army and the possibility of their over-extending themselves.¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰Telegram from Wright to DOS, Amman, May 7, 1959. FRUS, pgs. 713-714.

On September 5, Sheldon T. Mills, newly appointed Ambassador to Jordan, reviewed the goals of the United States in Jordan and suggested ways to implement them. Mills' analysis was that Jordan's existence as a sovereign state could not endure under the current circumstances without American financial assistance. The economic situation in the Kingdom remained "miserable and hopeless." Although he recognized the possibility of a Soviet menace to Jordan's integrity, he regarded Israel as a direct threat to the Jordanian Kingdom. In the absence of a diplomatic settlement with Israel, Mills thought that the United States had "little choice but to continue [a] paying peace insurance premium to Jordan for an indefinite period." He expressed his worry about unemployed but educated Jordanians and suggested the creation of a Civilian Corps to cope with the problems of unemployment. In the last analysis, the Ambassador counseled the administration to maintain the current level of economic assistance to Jordan, amounting to \$40.5 million in budgetary support (a promise contingent on congressional approval), and \$10 million annually in economic development aid. Mills did not "share the pessimism" about Jordan's uncertain future that was prevalent in certain quarters in Washington. He fundamentally believed that American assistance to preserve stability was not in any way a guarantee of

peace any more than enormous expenditures on defense programs could ensure American security. Yet the continuation of aid to Jordan would certainly minimize the prospects for a military confrontation in the region.¹⁹¹ The cost of securing the Jordanian frontiers would be much less of a burden than facing the inevitable ordeal of having to check the territorial ambitions of the Kingdom's neighbors in the event of its disintegration. Mills' analysis is comparable to the conclusions of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State in the aftermath of Abdullah's assassination. But Jordan in 1959 was ruled by an amiable sovereign who had captivated the White House and the American public.

¹⁹¹Dispatch from Ambassador Mills to DOS, Amman, September 5, 1958. FRUS, pgs. 718-729. Britain was the only country which provided Jordan with supplemental aid. The Federal Republic of Germany was also involved in some technical aid programs in Jordan, providing a vocational school in Irbid and supplying technical advisers to that school. An Italian firm was supposed to build Jordan's petroleum refinery. Ibid, Pg. 728. During the month of May, Britain's government approved a grant-in-aid in the amount of 2 million pounds to support Jordan's budget for the financial year ending 31 March, 1960; and 500,000 for building a Desert Road, all subject to Parliamentary approval. U.K. Parliamentary Debates, 14 May 1959. 5th ser. vol. 605 (Commons), Parl. 41, Session. 4, pgs. 179-180. Also see Debates on 15 April 1959, vol. 603, pgs. 1017. Aid to Jordan by Britain from 1945 as follows; subsidy= 72,144, 966 pounds, 61,022,018 paid from Foreign Office Vote, 11,122,948, War Office Vote; Palestine Question up to 1958= 1,805,749 pounds; grant-in-aid= 1 million pounds from 1958-1959, development 8,650,000 made available sine 1949. pg. 1017.

On October 20, Musa Nasser, Jordan's Foreign Minister, met with Secretary Herter in Washington. Musa Nasser communicated the apprehensions of King Hussein about what he considered the communist menace to the Arab countries, particularly in Iraq, and the interests of the Western powers. He voiced his government's deep uneasiness about the possibility of American acceptance of a "Nasserist solution" to the Iraqi question. Hussein called upon President Eisenhower to send to Jordan a "high level emissary" to discuss judiciously this sensitive matter. The Jordanian Foreign Minister differentiated between the role of Egypt's President Nasser (admitting his popularity and importance in the region) and the danger of Egyptian ascendancy in the Arab East. Musa Nasser viewed any movement in that direction as "unpalatable" to the Jordanians and Iraqis. Despite his recognition of Jordan's misgivings about President Nasser's regional ambitions, Under Secretary Herter revealed his reservations about Hussein's request, fearing its broad implications for the United States as a possible collaborator with the Jordanians against Iraq.¹⁹² As the last days of 1959 came to an end, the

¹⁹²Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, October 20, 1959. Parker T. Hart, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and William C. Lakeland, Officer in Charge of Iraq and Jordan Affairs. FRUS, pgs. 730-731. Foreign Minister Nasser was also appointed on September 20 as the head of the Jordanian Delegation to the General Assembly. During his visit to New York, he requested a meeting with

American quest for a final resolution of the Jordanian question grew stronger.

But the new American Ambassador in Amman foresaw no room for the termination or reduction of the American aid program in Jordan between 1960-1965. Mills outlined the goals of the Mutual Security Plan as seen by the country team as follows: assisting the Jordanian government to further its economic development programs in an effort to increase that country's financial independence, and promoting a higher standard of living for Jordanians; preserving Jordan's stability until the United Nations or

Secretary Herter. The Secretary also discussed the proposed FY 1960 assistance with Nasser, and indicated to him that the US would be in a position to furnish Jordan with \$6.5 million in development aid, including the \$40.5 million in budget support previously discussed between the two countries. Also see footnotes on same pages. On August 28, Nasser was designated as Jordan's Foreign Minister with a Royal Decree. See Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993. See pg. 66. Dr. Yusuf Haikal was appointed Ambassador to the US in early september. Haikal was born in Jaffa on August 15, 1912. He was a Palestinian Arab who became a citizen of Jordan. He studied law in France and continued his education in England. He published some works on French Government and served with the Palestine Government from 1937-1948. In 1945, he became the Mayor of Jaffa. From 1954-1955, he served as Jordan's Ambassador to London. Then, he served as Ambassador to paris from January to December 1956. He was previously Ambassador to the US from August 1957 to October 1958. In early 1959, he was "reinstated" as an Ambassador in Jordan's Foreign Ministry by Royal Decree. Haikal was married to a French woman, with one daughter. He spoke Arabic, English, and French. See Memorandum from Acting Secretary Douglas Dillon to the President, September 4, 1959. O.F. 289. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (2 page).

the West took measures to maintain the Kingdom's stability; finding some way to resolve the Palestine question in order to help the refugees cope with their plight. Mills suggested the reduction in American grant assistance to Jordan if and only if other Western European states such as Germany, Italy, and Britain were persuaded to increase their aid to Jordan. This would be accomplished if the Western powers in conjunction with international lending organizations should loan Jordan money for economic development.¹⁹³ To achieve that objective, Acting Secretary Dillon (who was in Paris to participate in the Ministerial Conference on the reconstitution of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation) proposed to Heathcoat-Amory, British Chancellor of Exchequer, that Britain expand its contribution to Jordan's budget. Amory acknowledged that the current distribution of aid to Jordan (United States 85%, United Kingdom 15%) was unfair, but made no pledges until the coming September. Therefore, Dillon suggested an equal distribution of aid to Jordan. At minimum he noted that Britain could contribute 40% to the Jordanian

¹⁹³Airgram from Mills to DOS, Amman, February 8, 1960. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 731-733. The Ambassador noted that the Jordanians were sensitive to their standard of living (per capita GNP of \$84) and that of Israel (\$722).

budget.¹⁹⁴ But American aspirations for a practical remedy to the Jordanian dilemma were almost dashed when an explosion blasted the Prime Minister Office.

On August 28, a bomb exploded in al-Majali's Office in Amman. The Prime Minister and two foreign Ministry officials were killed. King Hussein escaped injury when a second blast occurred in another part of the building while he was rushing to the scene of the incident.¹⁹⁵ Hussein described the killing of the Prime Minister as a "painful criminal event" perpetrated by wicked enemies.¹⁹⁶ President Eisenhower dispatched a personal message to King Hussein upon receiving the news, and expressed his "profound regret and sorrow" at the loss of Prime Minister Majali. Eisenhower denounced what he called the "wanton criminal act" against Majali and

¹⁹⁴Telegram from the Embassy (Houghton) in France, Paris, July 23, 1960. Dillon and Heathcoat-Amory met in Paris on July 22-23 to participate in the Ministerial Conference on the reconstitution of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 733-734. Also see footnote.

¹⁹⁵Telegram from Embassy in Amman to DOS, August 29, 1960. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Near East: Jordan and Lebanon, see editorial note, pg. 734. Also see Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunniyah al-Wazarat al-Urdunniyah, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pg. 66.

¹⁹⁶"King Hussein gives his Condolences to the Jordan people upon the Killing of Majali," Amman, August 29, 1960. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Education, 1985), pg. 490.

others.¹⁹⁷ Hussein notified the newly appointed Charge Eric Kocher that the evidence showed that the bombs were planted by two "custodial employees" who fled to Syria on the same day. Kocher reported to the Department of State that the Ambassador of United Arab Republic and his Counselor had departed Amman several days earlier, leaving the third secretary as Charge. King Hussein noted that the "proof of Syrian complicity in the matter would awaken the world to the fact that an amicable relationship" between Jordan and the authoritarian state of United Arab Republic was "impossible."¹⁹⁸

On the following day, King Hussein appointed a new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Bahjat al-Talhouni, who had served as the chief of the Royal Court. Musa Nasser remained as Jordan's Foreign Minister.¹⁹⁹ The American Embassy in Amman felt that Jordan's foreign policy would remain mostly unaltered. However, the Embassy communicated its concern about Hussein's "conviction" that the United Arab Republic was behind the

¹⁹⁷A Personal Message from President Eisenhower to King Hussein, Washington, August 29, 1960. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas, (1 page).

¹⁹⁸Telegram from Embassy in Amman to DOS, August 29, 1960. FRUS, pgs. 734-735. See Editorial Note.

¹⁹⁹Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pg. 67.

assassination of Majali, and its possible impact on Jordanian-Egyptian relations.²⁰⁰ Accordingly, Secretary Herter instructed Ambassador Mills to make a forceful representation to Amman's government against a possible Jordanian intervention in Syria. Herter firmly believed that the air superiority of the UAR would have calamitous consequences for Jordan, not to mention the likely Israeli reaction, leading to general war in the Middle East. He warned that in the event Jordan chose to use force, the United States and world opinion would view Jordan as the aggressor. Hence, the Eisenhower administration would not assist Jordan in this endeavor. The Secretary counseled the King to adopt a policy of restraint, and praised Hussein's "statesmanship" in coping with the Majali assassination through the Arab League and the United Nations. United States officials believed that Hussein's moderate course and "wisest statesmanship" were the only safeguards to preserve Jordan's integrity and independence.²⁰¹ The American Charge in Amman could not blame the Jordanians for being

²⁰⁰Telegram from Embassy in Amman, August 30, 1960. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pg. 735. See Editorial Note on same page.

²⁰¹Telegram from Secretary Herter to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, September 9, 1960. FRUS, pgs. 735-736. Similar representations were made to Jordanian Ambassador Haikal by Acting Secretary G. Lewis Jones and Ambassador Mills (who was in Washington on home leave), voicing their concern about military movements in Jordan. pg. 736. See footnote.

furious, but cautioned against what he surmised could be a "blow-up of disastrous proportions ahead." Amenable as always to sound diplomatic counsel, King Hussein gave his assurances to Charge Kocher that Jordan would not take any action without previous consultations with the United States and Britain. Jordan held consultations with representative Spinelli of the United Nations. Kocher obviously appreciated the "strain and tension" the King was experiencing and his "highly emotional" condition over the latest incident which had aroused public opinion and called for retribution.²⁰²

Kocher reported that the ruler of Jordan was under pressure domestically from Jordanians "crying for vengeance." Hussein sanctioned military exercises on the Syrian border as a "safety valve" notwithstanding the risks. Kocher hoped that the King, being what he called a "leader of the Arab World with considerable international stature," would use his authority to contain the proponents of a military solution. What was particularly worrisome to the American Charge was the possible provocation of the United Arab Republic by the Jordanian note demanding the extradition of those responsible for Majali's assassination. He emphasized

²⁰²Telegram from Charge Kocher to DOS, Amman, September 9, 1960. FRUS, pgs. 736-737.

that the worst outcome would be Jordan seeking immediate reprisal against United Arab Republic.²⁰³ Responding to American diplomatic representations, and cognizant of the ramifications of a military confrontation with Syria and Egypt, King Hussein decided to head the Jordanian delegation to New York to present the issue to General Assembly. At the same time, Charge Kocher reported that Jordan's military maneuvers on the Syrian borders continued as an attempt to cope with the growing intensity of domestic pressure and the need to maintain Hussein's reputation in eyes of his army.²⁰⁴

²⁰³Telegram from Kocher to DOS, Amman, September 10, 1960. FRUS, pgs. 738-739. President Eisenhower approved a message which was drafted by Mills advising the King to act with moderation. He cautioned against the use of force fearing the global consequences of such action. Kocher kept the message in reserve since the President's message would add little to the many demarches by US. In "Clean Up" files, note that message was not delivered. Clean Up was a project by DOS with limited access on Jordan. Also see Ongoing Telegram Secretary Herter to Embassy in Jordan, DOS, September 9, 1960. Records of Eisenhower Library, Kansas (2 pages). Eisenhower appraised Hussein's statesmanship, but said that "any aggressive action by either Jordan acting as a state or by individual Jordanians cannot but start a chain reaction in the Middle East the final repercussions of which could easily be disastrous not only for Jordan but the area as a whole and indeed the world."

²⁰⁴Telegram from Kocher to DOS, Amman, September 18, 1960. FRUS, pgs. 740-741. Kocher reported that Hussein decided to head the Jordanian delegation to UN. He felt that was implying that the King had decided on conciliation as opposed to a military solution. See footnote on page 740. Dillon met Lloyd at the end of September to discuss possible increase in UK aid to Jordan. Lloyd remained uncertain and spoke of possible German assistance. UK aid was restrained by UK balance of payments, increasing requirements the of Commonwealth and

Before his departure for the States, the Jordanian ruler delivered a speech to the nation in which he recalled Jordan's ceaseless battle against "oppression and tyranny" and his determination to defend what was right. Hussein appealed to his people to retain their allegiance.²⁰⁵ On September 28, Hussein arrived to New York. In his report to the President, Acting Secretary Dillon applauded the twenty-five-year old King for striving so "courageously in the Near East against considerable odds for free world principles." Dillon, who had instructed the American Charge in Amman to advise the King to be sensitive to the delicate American position, portrayed Hussein as a man of a "great deal of boyish charm...courteous and considerate to people of all ranks of life."²⁰⁶ When Hussein addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations, he forcefully illustrated the Jordanian position. His impassioned speech stressed

new independent countries. See Telegram from Herter to Embassy in Jordan, Washington, September 30, 1960. FRUS, pg. 741. Lloyd was in Washington as a participant in the yearly meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See footnote on pg. 740.

²⁰⁵Hussein's Speech to the Nation on the Occasion of the Departure of his Majesty to Attend the Session of the UN General Assembly, September 26, 1960. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1993), pgs. 503-504.

²⁰⁶Memorandum to the President from Acting Secretary Dillon, DOS, October 6, 1960. Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (5 pages).

uncompromising enthusiasm for the right of all small nations to be free. In explaining why his country chose freedom over Communism, Hussein traced the historic struggle of nations for liberation, and recalled all forms of oppression inflicted by some Western European countries against weak nations. However, he deeply believed that the "new communist imperialism" was more "brutal" "oppressive" and "dangerous" than anything the world had ever witnessed. Hussein connected the origins of the Jordanian-Egyptian conflict with the day when he reproved the style of communist leaders. His implied references were tied to Nasserism an ideology which had embraced Arab nationalism, but also tarnished it with excerpts from communist theology. He also appealed to France to relinquish its territorial claims in Algeria, and beseeched the world to recognize the plight of Palestinian refugees.²⁰⁷

While between 1955 and 1957 King Hussein had adopted a conciliatory attitude toward Jordan's adversaries, his style in regional politics and international affairs after 1958 was more assertive and resolute. The years of humbling compromise during the age of Egyptian Nasserism

²⁰⁷"Hussein's Speech at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the UN," October 110, 1960. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 505-511.

were now surmounted by a dauntless King who captivated many admirers by his charismatic youth and statecraft. He attacked Nasser publicly and denounced communism at every occasion. On October 7, King Hussein and President Eisenhower met at the White House. Eisenhower expressed his appreciation for Hussein's speech at the General Assembly in defence of what he called "Free World principles." Hussein described how the Jordanians were "greatly shocked" by the Majali assassination. President Eisenhower took the opportunity to summarize the content of his discussions with President Nasser. He reported that Nasser denied any role in the assassination plot, and noted with emphasis that he was "not one of those who insisted that Israel be eliminated and the Israelis pushed to the sea." At the first comment Hussein "smiled faintly" and his "face brightened into a broad grin and he, his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Ambassador, all exchanged amused smiles for some moments," presumably astonished by what they heard. The President also expressed his pleasure at the improvement of relations between Jordan and Iraq. For his part, Hussein reiterated his views on communism and the decision Jordan had made between "slavery and freedom." Eisenhower was very pleased. Hussein stressed that the "Hashimites were a people ready to die for Arab causes and demanded nothing

for themselves."²⁰⁸ Upon his return to Jordan, the King made sarcastic remarks about what he called "beloved Syria" which failed to meet its promises during his trip to Europe. He reprimanded Nasser for his dictatorial conduct and described him as a "blood-thirsty" man.²⁰⁹ Hussein's audacity in attacking Nasserism at the United

²⁰⁸Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, October 7, 1960. FRUS, pgs. 742-745. Eisenhower mentioned that Nasser no longer had any interest in the Johnston Plan (which called for "equitable regional distribution of the waters of the Jordan River"). He noted that technicians of participating countries approved the plan, and Hussein said the scheme was good. On the subject of neutrality, Hussein appeared critical of Nkrumah, President of Ghana, for taking an undecided position in international affairs. Pg. 744. In his discussions with King Hussein, the President said that Khrushchev wanted to "destroy" the UN. President could not understand how some nations could be "neutral as between being free and not being free, or between right or wrong." The President felt the UN was devised as the "best forum for calm analysis and resolution." See Memorandum of Conference by General Goodpaster, King Hussein with the President, October 7, 1960. President quoted Nasser for saying that he would permit free passage of Israel through Suez in return of all the return of refugees to Israel. He told the King that would be "impossible." Eisenhower also praised King for defending the "Free World" at UN. Records of Eisenhower Library Records, Abilene, Kansas (4 pages). Also see Ongoing Telegram from (Dillon) DOS to Embassy in Amman, September 12, 1960. Eisenhower Library, Kansas (6 pages). Also see Memorandum from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (Director of Executive Secretariat) to General Goodpaster, White House, October 17, 1960. (4 page).

²⁰⁹"Hussein's Speech to his Nation on the Occasion of his Majesty's Return to his Homeland after attending the Sessions of the General Assembly of the UN," October 21, 1960. Al-Majmu'ah al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein, pgs. 513-520. Hussein specifically thanked his brother (Crown Prince Hassan) at the end of the speech for his role in managing the affairs of the state during the King's absence.

Nations reflected on Nasser's diminishing influence over the course of events in Jordan, and signified the expanding sphere in American-Jordanian relations.

On December 6, the subject of American aid to Jordan was resumed once more. Moreover, the likelihood of Soviet assistance to that country was considered, at least by some Jordanians. Ambassador Mills informed General Izzat Hassan Gandour, Chief of Staff of the Jordanian army, that if Jordan welcomed Soviet assistance, the United States would still continue to help Jordan build its infrastructure and agricultural sector. However, the Ambassador expressed with certainty that American budgetary support to Jordan would cease, causing serious repercussions between the two countries. Indeed, the Ambassador recalled Prime Minister Talhouni once saying to him that the refusal of Jordan to accept Soviet budgetary assistance through Syria and Cairo was one of the decisive factors marking the start in the deterioration between Jordan and Egypt. Furthermore, Mills emphasized that the Jordanian Army was not in any way as a "satellite army of the United States" in its over-all strategic planning. The army was designed to maintain order and to protect the frontier. Mills had the "highest regard for the Jordanian soldier; he made a fine appearance." The Ambassador in Amman "had no doubt that

man to man, properly equipped, he would be the equal of any soldier in the world." Hussein accepted the inevitable conclusion that the Jordanian army must be reduced, although Mills reported that he "loves his Army as it loves him." King Hussein, recognizing the limits of American assistance, was in a "mood of depression."²¹⁰ Nevertheless, Hussein's determination to rule his Kingdom independently expanded as his desire to continue closer ties with the United States increased. King Hussein's duty as a royal sovereign toward his nation and "beloved homeland"²¹¹ was firmly grounded.

Neither the Nasserites nor the United Kingdom nor the Central intelligence Agency accurately estimated the fate of the Jordanian Kingdom. The concerted effort between two world leaders, the president of a republican democracy and the ruler of an enlightened monarchy, achieved what Eden, Dulles, and Nasser once considered a worthless endeavor. The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan survived a thousands blows. It withstood the tide of

²¹⁰Letter from Ambassador Mills in Jordan to Armin Meyer, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Amman, December 6, 1960. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, Jordan and Lebanon, pgs. 745-748.

²¹¹"Hussein's Talk to the Jordanian Nation from Jordan Radio," Amman, December 15, 1960. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985 (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 535-538.

Nasserism, communism and the expansionism of Jordan's adjacent neighbors. A nation's history is not only molded by circumstances, but also shaped by the skillful conduct of a sovereign who mastered the artistry of statecraft.

Epilogue

The end of 1960 represented the passing of an era. Eisenhower was no longer the president of the United States. The Republican President who had grown up in the South and was representative of a conservative generation had been succeeded by a Massachusetts Democrat who appeared to be an embodiment of 1960's American liberalism. One witnessed and participated in the great ordeals of the 1930's and 1940's, and the other was a product of the North-of-Bostonian culture and politics. The two leaders were exemplary of the two sides of the American tradition of idealism and realism. They understood the importance of the Middle East and its resources to the flourishing of Western Civilization. Eisenhower defended the Jordanian Kingdom fervently and Kennedy appeared to have inherited the same policy. On the eve of John Fitzgerald Kennedy's election, American-Jordanian relations were on a stable footing. However, President Kennedy would soon be assassinated and his successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, was not prepared to defend Jordan's integrity as enthusiastically as Eisenhower had done. Johnson's presidency constituted a vast departure from Eisenhower's policy of impartiality. The resumption of Israel's traditional policy of military retribution against Jordanian infiltrators was the

natural outcome of the ensuing American attitude which only loosely censored Israel's conduct. In the absence of a resolute president to restrain Jordan's rivals in the Middle East, the temptations to exploit Jordan's vulnerabilities were too powerful to be quelled, as the 1967 War revealed. The American-Jordanian relationship suffered significantly forcing King Hussein to mend his ties with the Arab countries. The 1967 war undermined United States credibility and drove the Arab states (both revolutionary and conservative) into one camp while giving the Israelis the perfect opportunity to revive the special relationship once established by President Truman. Nonetheless, and however horrific the outcome of the conflict was for Jordan, the Kingdom continued to exist as an independent country despite repeated predictions of its demise. The Six Day War placed all of Palestine under Israeli control and forced thousands of refugees to flee to the East Bank. Many joined the Palestinian Liberation Organization under the command of Abu Amar, Yasser Arafat. In 1970, some ambitious Palestinians engaged the Jordanian army in a futile war which culminated in a national calamity. But King Hussein's resoluteness in confronting the dissenters and facing the Kingdom's ambitious neighbors would save his country from what could have been a disastrous end. Moreover, Eisenhower's former Vice President, Richard

Nixon, would mobilize the power of the White House in defending the Hashimites and in restoring the special friendship between the Jordanian Kingdom and the United States.

Hussein's role in Inter-Arab Relations

Whereas Jordan throughout the 1950's was relatively isolated, its energetic King assumed a greater role in inter-Arab politics in the 1960's. It must also be recalled that it was the wish of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles to see Jordan establish some sort of accomodation with her neighbors. Moreover, King Hussein, still young and with great expectations, began to regard himself as the new leader of the Arab world.

King Hussein cultivated special dynastic friendships with Arab countries (and Islamic states) which retained a strong monarchical tradition. He consolidated ties with King Muhammad V of Morocco¹ and the Shah of Iran whom he valued as a leader from a country which shared with the Arabs what he called an "eternal Islamic mission" in the spread of culture and civilization to all mankind. He

¹"Hussein's Speech during a Dinner party held by the King for Muhammad al-Khamis (V) at Basman Palace," January 1, 1960. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, Vo. I (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 413-414.

praised Muhammad Reza Shah for his "heroic stand" against the forces of "destruction and communism."² Hussein's independent acts were a sign of his political maturity as a fearless man willing to face Jordan's opponents. He scolded President Nasser for his ceaseless attacks against the Hashimite family, and warned the Egyptian ruler that as history shows, the fate of all dictators is one of certain defeat. As a confident sovereign of his Kingdom, he believed himself a man with a mission to achieve a more worthy and upright life for his countrymen.³

More significant was Hussein's triumph in steering King Abd al-Aziz, who had been his grandfather's rival, to his side. During an August 1961 visit to Saudi Arabia in 1961, the two monarchs accentuated the importance of resolving Arab differences within an Arab framework and the need to promote solidarity among all Islamic

²"Hussein's Speech Welcoming His Majesty the Shah of Iran During his visit to Jordan," February 11, 1960. See pgs. 417-419.

³"Hussein's Talk to his Nation about the Oppressive Campaigns which the Egyptian leadership used to launch against Jordan," June 26, 1960. See pgs. 467-468. Hussein's Speech on the Occasion of the Holy Eid, Independence, Army Day, and Occasion of his Royal Wedding to his first wife, May 23, 1961.

countries.⁴ Hussein and Abd al-Aziz forged a special relationship between the two Kingdoms. The two leaders called for the adoption of all measures necessary to achieve "complete military unity" between the two countries and the establishment of a "common leadership" for the armed forces of the two states as a basis for a real and solid Arab power to meet national duties. The proposals called for political, cultural and economic cooperation between the two states. They appealed to the Arab rulers to settle border disputes in to search for "freedom, unity, and better life."⁵ Jordanian-Saudi cooperation, which Eisenhower had promoted, would continue until the end of the 1980's. Hussein's diplomacy achieved its fundamental objective: Jordan received wide recognition from Arab and Moslem countries as a sovereign state.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy: 1961-1963

During the Kennedy presidency the Middle East

⁴"Joint Declaration issued in both Amman and Riyadh after Hussein's visit to Arabia," Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, August 1, 1961. Al-Bayanat al-Rasmiyah al-Mushtarakah, 1952-1977 (Amman: Ministry of Communication, Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, 1977), pg. 17.

⁵"Joint Declaration from Amman and Riyadh after Hussein's visit to Arabia," August 29, 1962. See pgs. 18-19.

remained relatively calm. The president of the United States expressed his readiness to resolve the question of Palestinian refugees based on what Kennedy called the "the principle of repatriation and compensation for property." He also stressed his willingness to help bring about an equitable distribution of the water resources of the Jordan River. Kennedy believed that American ties with the Arab countries were grounded on "sincere friendship and mutual respect for the others' point of view, mutual and active concern for the betterment of mankind and mutual striving to eliminate the causes of international tensions."⁶ Like his predecessor, President Kennedy affirmed American opposition to the use of force in the Near East and his commitment to the containment of communism. He also encouraged "social and economic and political progress in the Middle East" and emphasized the importance of respecting the "security of both Israel and her neighbors."⁷ Assassin's rifle ended Kennedy's hopes forever.

⁶United States policy in the Middle East: Letter from President Kennedy to King Hussein of Jordan, May 11, 1961. Documents on American Foreign Relations, edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam (New York: Harper & Brothers, published for Council on Foreign Relations, 1962), pg. 284.

⁷The President's News Conference, May 8, 1963. U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1964), John F. Kennedy, 1964, pg. 169.

Lyndon Baines Johnson: 1963-1969

The presidency of Lyndon Johnson is often identified with America's excruciating experience in Vietnam. Often forgotten is Johnson's role in the tragedy of the Arab-Israel Six Day War which resulted in the displacement of millions of Palestinians. Ironically, the President who had shown much resolve in escalating the conflict in South-east Asia, expressed little inclination to force the Israelis to withdraw from the land seized militarily from the Arab countries.

As soon as Johnson assumed the office of the presidency, he extended an invitation to many of the regional leaders of the Middle East. On April 14, 1964, he welcomed King Hussein to the White House. Hussein's visit to Washington "added strength to the old cordial ties" between the two states. Indeed, Johnson described how "proud" he was that the United States was in a position to assist in Jordan's development, and he stood prepared to continue along the same road. In his welcoming remarks to King Hussein, Johnson said: "While the world knows you as a courageous soldier, your friends in America know you as a wise and effective leader for peace, and we welcome that leadership, particularly in

these times."⁸ The president in the White House depicted Hussein's visit as "another memorable milestone" in the ties between Amman and Washington. Johnson admired Hussein's "imaginative leadership" because he represented a "new generation" of Arab leaders. Johnson complimented the King on his bold style in the direction of the Jordanian Kingdom and applauded the young monarch use of disguise to drive a taxi cab in the capital in order to be in touch with his subjects. King Hussein himself "treasured" the friendship between the two nations.⁹ The president voiced his desire to continue assisting Jordanian attempts to achieve self-reliance in its search for a self-sustaining economy.¹⁰

American-Jordanian friendship did not hinder the

⁸U.S. President. "Remarks of Welcome of the White House to Hussein I, King of Jordan, April 14, 1964." U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington D.C.; Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1964), Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1964, 461.

⁹U.S. President. "Toasts of the President and King Hussein, April 14, 1964", pg. 462.

¹⁰U.S. President. "Joint Statement following Discussions with King Hussein, April 15, 1964," pg. 466. The United States committed \$3.5 billion for military and economic aid for American friends and allies in Fiscal Year 1965 which accounted for 3.5 percent of the Federal Budget and 1.5 percent of American Gross Domestic Product. Four countries, Vietnam, Laos, Korea, and Jordan accounted for 80% of AID supporting assistance during that year. Message to the Congress Transmitting Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1965, January 7, 1966. See, p. 23.

enhancement of American-Israeli relations. On the contrary, Johnson displayed a strong Zionist bent. He praised the Israelis for their relentless effort to make called "their ancient land a highly developed and most modern nation." He was also "proud to have assisted in this high enterprise" because he had "great admiration and affection" for the Israelis.¹¹ Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Johnson affirmed the right of all nations in the Middle East to self-determination, and related their opposition to the use of force to tackle regional matters. This was a reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration signed by Britain, France, and the United States on May 25, 1950. Johnson also promised to help make Israel economically independent.¹² His ascent to the White House constituted a notable departure in American foreign policy toward Israel and the Arab states. Eisenhower's legacy of evenhandedness was splintered by American conduct in the next Arab-Israeli war.

Johnson's pledges to promote the political stability

¹¹U.S. President. "Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, June 1, 1964," pg. 732. Also see "Remarks of Welcome at the White House to Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel, June 1, 1964," pg. 731.

¹²U.S. President. "Joint Statement Following Discussions with the Prime Minister of Israel, June 2, 1964," pg. 740.

of the Middle East were questioned as Arab-Israel border relations deteriorated. On April 7, 1967, the Israeli and Syrian air forces engaged in a military confrontation which was followed by Israeli threats to launch a massive attack against Damascus. This was succeeded by an a general mobilization of Egyptian forces. On May 16, Egypt requested the withdrawal of all international forces from Sinai. Subsequently, Jordan ordered all of its armed forces to be put on alert. The Jordanian declaration noted that "as a first principle the policy of this country springs from the [idea] that the lines of armistice between the enemy and the Arab states are considered to be one line. And that any attack on any one part is regarded as an attack on all."¹³ Hussein's declaration was an act of solidarity with the Egyptian people, not President Nasser.

On May 23, 1967, Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran to

¹³King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati ka-Malik, translated from French by Ghalib A. Douqan (Amman: National Printing Press, July, 1978), pg. 214. Also see Declaration from Sa'id Jum'a, Prime Minister, about placing Jordan Armed Forces on alert, Amman, May 17, 1967, Jerusalem, May 18, 1967, pg. 9. The Senate unanimously approved Juma's declaration, and decided to abide by the principle of collective defence. See Announcement by Qasim Rimawi, President of the Senate, with the Support of the Senate concerning the governmental measures about the status quo, Amman, May 20, 1967, Jerusalem, May 21, 1967, pg. 10. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh, 1967 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbua'at wal-Nashr, Ministry of Education and Communication, 1973), pg. 11.

Israeli shipping. King Hussein recalls how he was "startled" by what he termed Nasser's reckless action because the Arab countries were "not prepared for war" nor did they have prior arrangements or a common plan to face a formidable enemy. Hussein's decision to get his country entangled in this conflict was based on his belief that he could not stand silent in the face of an Israeli offensive. Moreover, domestic considerations played a factor in Hussein's decision. His uncle, Zeid Ibn Shakir, warned him that Jordan would go through civil strife if it failed to participate. Hussein also felt compelled to abide by the Collective Military Pact signed in Cairo in 1964. Geopolitical factors also influenced Hussein's stand since much of Palestine was under Jordanian jurisdiction.¹⁴ On May 24, 1967, Jordan's Prime Minister Sa'id Juma announced that the Jordanian government "supports completely" Egypt's action to "restore its regional sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba and ban Israeli maritime operations it."¹⁵ At the same time, the Jordanian Prime Minister advised the United

¹⁴King Hussein Ibn Talal, Mihnati ka-Malik, translated from French to Arabic by Ghalib A. Douqan (Amman: National Printing Press, 1978), pgs. 210-211.

¹⁵Declaration by Sa'id Juma, Prime Minister, concerning the support of the Jordanian government to U.A.R. in the restoration of her regional sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba, Amman, May, 24, 1967, Al-Doustur, May 25, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Ministry of Education and Communication, 1973), pg. 11.

States to consider the consequences of American support for Israel and its impact on Arab-American relations.¹⁶ But Johnson's partiality was too well entrenched to be swayed by Arab appeals or threats.

Hussein's most stunning action in May of 1967 was his secret travel to Cairo in his private airplane (without security guards) to meet with President Nasser. On May 30, King Hussein shocked the world when he signed a collective defence agreement with Nasser stipulating that if one country were menaced by a foreign power, Jordan and Egypt would act in unison.¹⁷ President Nasser, who had labored relentlessly to undermine the Jordanian monarchy in the 1950's, described King Hussein as "dear brother" who understood the "challenge of facing Israel, America and Britain." Egypt's ruler appealed to Hussein to overlook their differences and act in concert

¹⁶Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967, Declaration of Sa'ed Jum'a, Prime Minister, concerning the attitude of the United States of American from the current crisis in the Middle East, Amman, May 25, 1967, Jerusalem, May 28, 1967. See pg. 17.

¹⁷Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt: Joint Declaration in both Amman and Cairo following King Hussein's visit to Egypt, May 30, 1967. Al-Bayanat al-Rasmiya al-Mushtaraka, 1952-1977 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Ministry Communication, 1977), pgs. 63-65. Also see al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Ministry of Education and Communication, 173), pgs. 19-24.

to serve the Arabs.¹⁸ This unexpected and unusual meeting between Hussein and Nasser must have provided Jordan with a false feeling of security. The Jordanian Senate celebrated the "historic meeting" between the two Arab leaders and congratulated the Jordanian sovereign on his achievement in Cairo.¹⁹ In 1964, King Hussein described himself as an "Arab revolutionary." In 1967, he believed himself to be a warrior in the name of nationalism to achieve the hopes of the Arab people.²⁰ Jordan's King Hussein appeared less concerned about the continuation of American military support for Jordan than about the United States stand toward Israel. Hussein stressed that Jordan's attitude stemmed from its "national belief" that the Arab countries should act in unity. He also appreciated the Soviet Union for

¹⁸Al-Watha'iq al-urdunnieh 1967, pg. 25-26.

¹⁹Speech of Prime Minister in the House of Deputies concerning the Jordanian-Egyptian Agreement on common defence, Amman, May 31, 1967, al-Doustur, June 1, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967. See pgs. 27-28. Also see The House of Deputies Congratulates His Majesty King Hussein on the Occasion of Signing the Agreement on Common Defence, Amman, May 31, 1967, Al-Doustur, June 1, 1967. See pg. 29.

²⁰Hussein's Speech to Jordanians on the Occasion of Signing the Agreement on Common Defense with the United Arab republic, Amman, June 2, 1967. See pgs. 32-33. Hussein regarded himself as an Arab revolutionary in 1964. See Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, Vo. II (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Ministry of Communication, 1985).

supporting the Arabs during the current crisis.²¹

On May 5, 1967, Israeli forces commanded by Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, attacked with "full fury" the Jordanian forces stationed in Jerusalem. Jordan was never an aggressive state nor was it planning a military offensive against a neighboring country. Jordan reacted immediately to defend its territory on the entire Jordanian-Israeli front.²² Thus, Jordan became an reluctant participant in a war which she was not fully equipped to fight. Hussein called upon the Jordanian army to defend the "right," "land" and "honor" of their country.²³ President Johnson seemed "deeply distressed" by the outbreak of hostilities and called upon the conflicting states to respect a United Nations ceasefire resolution.²⁴ But because Johnson

²¹Press meeting held by King Hussein, Amman, June 4, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Ministry of Education and Communication, 1978), pgs. 34-36.

²²Military Pronouncements during the War, pronouncement number (1), June 5, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967, pg. 37.

²³Hussein's message to the Jordanian Nation Declaring the beginning of the Israeli Aggression, Amman, June 5, 1967, al-Doustur, June 6, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh, 1967, pgs. 41-42.

²⁴Outbreak of Hostilities in the Middle East: White House Statement, June 5, 1967. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1961, edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam (New York: published for Council on Foreign Relations, Harper

lacked the impartiality and resoluteness of Eisenhower, he was unable to force the Israelis into a ceasefire. Consequently, the Arab countries became quite apprehensive of the passive American role. On June 6, 1967, the United Arab Leadership in Amman announced that the intensity of the fighting strongly indicated that there was a "foreign power" standing behind the enemy. Israel was known not to have such fighting capabilities. The report also concluded that there was a "conspiracy" to divide the Arab countries and that the Arabs were engaging in a battle against Israel and the Imperial Powers of the West.²⁵ Johnson's complacency and Tel Aviv's actions are revealing: the Israelis attacked Jordan's Royal Palace and King Hussein's Office at the

&Brothers, 1962), pgs. 125-126. The UN ceasefire called for taking "all measures for an immediate ceasefire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area." See Cease-Fire Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, June 6, 1967. See pg. 126. The Second Cease-Fire Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, June 7, 1967, reaffirmed the June 6 Resolution. See pg. 126. Cease-Fire Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, June 9, 1967, aimed at Syria and Israel. It said that the two states declared their "acceptance" to abide by UN declarations. See pg. 130. See Fourth Cease-Fire Resolution of the UNSC, June 12, 1967. See pg. 130.

²⁵Announcement from the United Arab Leadership regarding the Fighting on the Jordanian Front, Amman, June 6, 1967, Al-Doustur, June 7, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Ministry of Education and Communication, 1973), pg. 44.

Court.²⁶ Jordan faced three alternatives: a ceasefire supported by either the United States or the Soviet Union or the United Nations; the immediate withdrawal of Jordanian forces from the West Bank; or the inevitability of the army's complete destruction if it continued to fight one more day.²⁷

Nasser told Hussein that "history shall remember your daring and courage" and will not forget the Jordanians who fought a battle which was "imposed" on them. President Nasser believed that the second option, which called for the evacuation of the West Bank while considering the first option of letting the UN declare a cease fire, was the most rational one. He also advised the King to use Britain's offices to pressure Israel to agree to a ceasefire. Believing that the first alternative was the "only way," the Egyptian ruler affirmed that there was "no need for Jordan to sever its ties with America and Britain."²⁸ Jordan was the first

²⁶Military Announcements on the Second Day of the War, Amman, June 6, 1967. Announcement Number (22), pg. 45.

²⁷From al-Fariq Abd al-Munim Riyad (Head of the United Arab Forces) to President Jamal Abd al-Nasser upon Hussein's request to discuss the options with Egypt's ruler; June 6, 1967. See pg. 51.

²⁸From President Nasser to His Majesty King Hussein, June 6, 1967. See pg. 54. From President Jamal Abd al-Nasser to al-Fariq Abd al-Munim Riyad, June 7, 1967, pg. 55.

country to agree to a ceasefire. On June 6, Jerusalem was still in Jordanian hands, but Israel continued its war against Jordan.²⁹ The perseverance of the Israeli army in its military advance proved to be a devastating lesson to the Arab countries: Jordan lost the West Bank and Egypt lost the Gaza Strip. The Israelis also occupied Syria's Golan Heights. President Nasser resigned, but massive demonstrations erupted in Egypt forcing him to withdraw his resignation.³⁰

The United Command of the Arab Leadership stationed in Amman attributed the military fiasco in the West Bank to the absence of military preparedness and coordination among the Arab countries. The Arab States fought a technological war with the Israelis without sufficient air cover, an essential ingredient of a modern warfare. The battle was dominated by the Israeli airforce which destroyed Egyptian and Syrian planes in the first hours while still on the ground. Moreover, the frequent disruptions in lines of communications during the battle, and the inadequate reserves from the engineers and artillery sections of the army to help fighting units in

²⁹Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967, pg. 74. See footnote.

³⁰Telegram from al-Hussein to President Jamal Abd al-Nasser, June 10, 1967. See pg. 76. Hussein urged Nasser not to resign to face "great responsibilities in the coming stages." Also see footnote.

imminent danger, facilitated Israel's military advances.³¹

In his reflection on the causes of the Six Day War, President Johnson seemed to hold Nasser responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. Johnson wrote:

If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other, I think it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent passage must be preserved for all nations.³²

Indeed, the government of the United States rejected the Soviet proposal which chastised Israel for starting

³¹Top Secret Memorandum, by Fariq Abd al-Munim Muhammad Riyad, Chief Commander, United Leadership, Amman, June 19, 1967. "An Objective Discussion on the Course of Operations on the Jordanian Front and the Results and Lessons to be Learned from it". See pas. 84-87.

³²Address at the State Department's Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, June 19, 1967. U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service), Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1967, pg. 633. Johnson proposed a settlement based on five principles: resolving the refugee issue; the right of maritime passage; recognizing the right to be as independent states; respecting the sovereignty of all nations in the area; and reducing the arms race. See pg. 634.

the conflict in the Middle East.³³ Although Hussein recognized the risks involved in the closing of the Tiran strait, he nevertheless held Israel accountable for initiating the war. Speaking on behalf of the Arab countries before the UNGA, King Hussein reminded the delegates that world sympathy for the Jews "should not be a reason to bless the aggressive actions of those who were in one of those days victims of aggression." Hussein admonished the members of the UN to take note of the lessons of the Arab-Israel war: when the disturbing conclusion of the conflict revealed that victory is only certain when an expansionist power strikes first, it became what Hussein called a "dangerous and ironical lesson." Hussein asked the member nation-states to think about the implication of Jordan's compliance and Israel's refusal to abide by UN ceasefire resolutions. Only after the Israeli military "achieved its goals" did Tel Aviv agree to observe a cease-fire. He also made allusions to Israel's use of napalm bombs on a large scale and its "immoral and brutal treatment of prisoners of war," which

³³Statement by United States Representative, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, Before the First Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and Draft Resolution, June 20, 1967. Documents on American Foreign Relations, edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adams (New York: published by Simmon and Shuster, 1968), pg. 146. Goldberg affirmed Johnson's five principles as a basis for peace.

he said exceeded the norms of ethical conduct.³⁴

The critics who blame Jordan for its participation in the Six Day War are always tempted to ignore the historic circumstances surrounding the Kingdom. The domestic and regional considerations were too strong to be overlooked. If Jordan had adopted a policy of neutrality, the outcome would have been shattering for the Jordanian monarchy. Whatever Israel's security reasons might have been, she initiated the fighting, and President Johnson's prejudicial disposition invited Tel Aviv to attack Jordan's soft frontiers.

Israeli righteousness and ambition extended beyond the halls of the GA to the ancient walls of Jerusalem. On July 4, 1967, the Israeli authorities incorporated the Arab side of Jerusalem into its administrative structure. When the sovereignty of the Jewish state was tied to Jerusalem, the UNGA called upon the Israeli government to rescind all measures taken to alter the status of the Old City.³⁵ Tel Aviv defied the opinion of the world

³⁴Speech of His Majesty King Hussein at the United Nations, June 26, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-urdunnieh 1967, pgs. 103-109.

³⁵Decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations Number 2253 Concerning Jerusalem, New York, July 4, 1967. Ibid, Pg. 117. Pakistan introduced this issue to the GA, 99 countries approved, 20 abstained. Also see Decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations

community. Its intransigence was evident in its determination to occupy a land whose Palestinian inhabitants were its authentic dwellers centuries before the Jewish state was conceived. Consequently, the Arab states collectively decided to challenge Israeli military policy. On September 1, 1967, the Arabs leaders held their fourth Summit at Khartoum, Sudan. They stressed Arab solidarity to restore Arab land. They also emphasized the three principle of "no peace, no recognition, no negotiation" as a basis for dealing with the occupying power. Their invitation to the Arab countries which granted military facilities to foreign powers to think³⁶ about the broad ramifications of their actions on Arab unity was an evident manifestation of their dismay with the West.

Jordan's diplomatic activities in the aftermath of

Number 2254 Concerning Jerusalem. 99 countries approved it, 18 abstained.

³⁶Announcement Concerning the Fourth Arab Summit Meeting, Khartoum, September, 1967. Ibid, Pas. 213-216. Participants: Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. King Hussein delivered a speech at the Summit in which he called for the assumption of "dangerous historical responsibilities" in an attempt to "face ourselves with all the facts and errors with sincerity and manhood" concerning the last war. See Hussein's Speech at the Four Arab Summit in Khartoum, August 30, 1967. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, Vo. II (Amman: Ministry of Communications, 1985), pas. 633-635.

the 1967 setback increased noticeably. King Hussein sought to expand his country's ties with the Soviet Union. During his visit to Moscow, he depicted the monumental achievements of the Soviet Union under the banner of the historical revolution of October, 1917. Hussein acknowledged the special role of Moscow in mobilizing world opinion to pressure Israel to withdraw from Arab lands. He believed that the greatest threat to Israel's future lies in "Israel herself, her reality, her constitution."³⁷ In response to Hussein's remarks, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council recalled how the Soviet Union "forcefully and firmly" stood by the Arab countries. He regarded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab land occupied after April 5 as a precondition for a settlement in the region. He also called for compensating the Arab states for damages. He blamed the West and the United States for encouraging Israeli expansionism and expressed his confidence that Hussein's visit to Moscow would enhance "cooperation and friendship" with the Arab countries.³⁸ Amman and Moscow supported the right of Vietnam in deciding its own future

³⁷"Speech of His Majesty King Hussein at a Dinner reception for the Jordanian ruler at the Kremlin, "Amman, October 2, 1967. Al-Wathe'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967, pg. 206.

³⁸The Response of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council (Nikolai Podgorny), to Hussein's Speech, Moscow, October 2, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1967, pgs. 263-265.

based on the 1954 Geneva Convention. The two countries affirmed that their relationship was based on "complete equality and mutual respect and friendship."³⁹

The 1967 setback gave the Jordanian ruler the opportunity to strengthen his ties with the Socialist countries while preserving his special relationship with the West. A visit to France was devised to present the Arab view to General Charles De Gaulle whom he considered an advocate of "justice and liberty." Hussein believed that Arab "self-criticism" in the aftermath of the war created sensible views in the Arab East comparable to those of the West⁴⁰ to undertake a new diplomatic initiative in the region. His shuttle diplomacy in Paris and London and the European capitals was fashioned to mobilize world opinion in favor of the Arab countries and to help formulate a consensus to tackle the crisis of occupation in the Middle East.

King Hussein affirmed that the Arab-Israeli confrontation would continue unless the Arab countries surrendered to Israel or the latter faced its own

³⁹Joint Jordanian-Soviet Announcement, published in Amman by WAA, October 10, 1967. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh, 1967, pgs. 226-270.

⁴⁰His Majesty's Press Conference, Paris, October 26, 1967. Ibid, Pg. 290.

destruction. He chose the moderate path of seeking to resolve the differences between the antagonists by peaceful methods. He called upon the Israelis to become less European and more Eastern. The Jordanian ruler believed that Israel must either continue its policy of what he called "racial Zionism" or endure a complete isolation. She must either continue her policy of discrimination against the Arabs or espouse a policy of "assimilation of the Jews in a strong oriental society as free citizens."⁴¹ Hussein warned that Israel's refusal to adopt a policy of coexistence toward the Arab East would eventually cause her demise faster than the fate of the Crusaders in Palestine.⁴² Hussein's efforts (combined with the assistance of other Arab countries) culminated in Security Council Resolution 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands occupied in the war. The resolution also stressed the significance of respecting the sovereign rights of all countries in the Middle East.⁴³ But Israel was not prepared to withdraw from land it occupied by the force of arms. On the

⁴¹Hussein's Message at the National Press Club, Washington, November 7, 1967. See pgs. 304-310.

⁴²Hussein's Speech at Georgetown University, Washington, November 11, 1967, published by Jordan News Agency, November 11, 1967. See pg. 310-311.

⁴³Complete Statement of Security Council Decision number 242, issued on November 22, 1967. See pgs. 328-329.

contrary, the Israeli military seemed to be more inclined to engage in occasional skirmishes with its Arab neighbors. On March 21, 1968, the Israeli forces launched a massive attack on Jordanian forces at al-Karama and al-Ghour beyond the Jordan River.⁴⁴

King Hussein's struggle to reinforce Arab cohesiveness was accompanied by his continued attempts to maintain his special ties with the United States. On April 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon received Hussein warmly. The Jordanian ruler praised Eisenhower as one of the "greatest men" of our time and believed that American-Jordanian relations reached their zenith during his presidency.⁴⁵ President Nixon valued Hussein's qualities of "courage" "wisdom" and "moderation." The two statesmen supported the provisions of the SC Resolution 242 and reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of respecting the sovereign rights of all nations. Nixon

⁴⁴"Hussein's Message to the Presidents and Kings of the Arab Countries on the Day of Karamah Battle," March 3, 1968. Hussein for an immediate meeting for the heads of State. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. III (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 31-32.

⁴⁵Hussein's Message during Nixon's reception for him in Washington, April 8, 1969. U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1969), Richard Nixon, 1969, pg. 77.

supported Secretary William P. Rogers's strategy⁴⁶ to forge a Near Eastern settlement. On December 9, Secretary Rogers stressed the importance of encouraging the Arab countries to "accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territories when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council Resolution." The United States took an active role in collaboration with the Soviet Union, Britain, and France to achieve a territorial arrangement in the region. The Rogers plan envisioned an agreement based on the active participation of the regional states, recognizing the "legitimate" needs of all parties, and complying with UNSC resolution. The Roger's report ascertained that the preservation of the status quo in the region was not in any country's interest.⁴⁷

Jordan and the Arab countries protested Israeli demands for direct negotiations. Hussein described the Israeli attitude as "strange and oppressive" since

⁴⁶Joint Statement following Discussion with King Hussein of Jordan, April 10, 1969. Ibid, Pg. 268.

⁴⁷A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: an American View, Address by Secretary Rogers (1969) pg. 8. Department of State Bulletin, vol. LVI, No. 1461. Also see United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970 A report of the Secretary of State, Department of State Publication, Washington, march 26, 1971, pgs. 71-73. I obtained the report from Jordan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 33 of the UN accord mentions the use of arbitration as a way to resolve disputes. Hussein (with Nasser's consent) insisted on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for the cessation of the state of belligerency between the two sides with the recognition of the legitimate rights of all countries to live in peace and within secured boundaries. He also sanctioned the right of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez and emphasized the need to settle the issue of the Palestine refugees. Hussein recalled Eisenhower's resolve in 1956 and described his own visit to Washington as one of the "most important" episodes in his life.⁴⁸ Prime Minister Abd al-Munim al-Rifa'i (former Ambassador in Washington) gave his consent to the Rogers Plan. But the disparities in views between the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with the escalation in Egyptian-Israeli rivalry, reduced the chances for a regional settlement.

The regional stresses in the Middle East precluded a political settlement. Jordan confronted two threats: Syrian infringement on its territory, and the impending danger of domestic turmoil. Prime Minister abd al-Munim

⁴⁸Hussein's Speech at the National Press Club in Washington, April 10, 1969. Al-Majmu'a al-Kamilah li-Khutab Jalalat al-Malik al-Hussein Ibn Talal, 1952-1985, vol. III (Amman: Ministry of Communication, 1985), pgs. 79-86.

al-Rifa'i voiced his hope that the Palestinian "resistance" would pursue a conciliatory attitude toward the Jordanian army.⁴⁹ On September 1, 1970, a group of armed men fired at King Hussein. Thought he escaped assassination,⁵⁰ the seeds of domestic strife were sown. On September 14, Hussein charged al-Za'im Muhammad Daud with the task of forming a military cabinet to restore order in the Kingdom. Daud assumed the positions of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister of Justice. This administration appointed the Chief Commander of the army as the Military Governor in the entire country. The Jordanian army seized its positions in the Capital, but Palestinian Fida'yin resisted. Conflict ensued.⁵¹ The Jordanian Parliament urged the Jordanian government and the Resistance to eliminate the sources of friction between the two sides.⁵² But a predicament that can not be resolved by diplomatic methods results in the

⁴⁹Prime Minister Munim al-Rifa'i's Press Conference concerning Jordan's acceptance of Rogers' proposals, July 27, 1970. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1970 (Amman: Ministry of Communication, Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, 1970), pgs. 141-142.

⁵⁰Official Jordanian Announcement Concerning the Attack on King Hussein, September 1, 1970. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh, 1970, pg. 160.

⁵¹Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh al-Wazarat al-Urdunnieh, 1921-1993 (Amman: Da'irat al-Matbu'at wal-Nashr, Jordan Press Foundation, 1993), pgs. 97-98.

⁵²The Call of the Jordanian Parliament on the Government and Resistance to Destroy al-Fitna, September 15, 1970. See pg. 173.

shattering ordeal of a fierce civil war. One hopes that time and experience will cause men to be mature and responsible.

However, domestic tranquility does not entirely guarantee the security of a country. When a strong power discovers a sign of weakness in a neighboring territory, its primeval desire for expansion becomes uncontrollable. On September 20, 1970, Syria invaded Jordan from the North. King Hussein accused the "rulers of Damascus" of orchestrating "new conspiracies" to create a cleavage in the entire Arab community. He denounced Syria for collaborating with Israel to facilitate the implementation of what he called the "imperialist zionist plan" to dismember the Arab world.⁵³ The United States government condemned what he labeled the "irresponsible and imprudent intervention" of Syrian forces into Jordan's northern territory.⁵⁴

On September 27, the Jordanian government and the Resistance reached an agreement at Cairo. It called for

⁵³"Telegram from His Majesty King Hussein to His Brothers, the Arab Kings and Presidents Concerning the Intervention of Syrian Armed Forces in Jordan," September 20, 1967. Ibid, Pg. 206. Also see the second Telegram. Ibid, Pg. 207.

⁵⁴U.S. Condemns Intervention from Syria into Jordan, Statement by Secretary Rogers September 20, 1970. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. LVI, No. 63, pg. 412.

an end to all military operations conducted by both sides and the release of prisoners by both sides.⁵⁵ But Nasser's hopes of narrowing the differences between the rebels and the Jordanian army were buried with him in October of 1970. King Hussein described Nasser's death as an "awesome loss"⁵⁶ to the Arab East. Nasser's departure, however, provided Jordan with a breathing space to act independently. On October 28, Wasfi al-Tal, a populist Northerner was appointed as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. King Hussein charged this administration with the task of restoring "security and order" in the besieged Kingdom.⁵⁷ Prime Minister al-Tal promised to abide by the latest Cairo agreement and stressed the "supremacy of the law."⁵⁸ On December 5,

⁵⁵Cairo Agreement between the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian Resistance, September 27, 1970. Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh 1970, pgs. 237-239. The signatories of the Cairo Agreement also called for the establishment of a committee to coordinate relations between Jordan and the Resistance. It recommended support for the Palestinians until the liberation of their land from its occupiers. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Yasser Arafat were present, with.

⁵⁶His Majesty Talk at a Press Conference held by Jordanian Television, October 14, 1970. Ibid, Pg. 203-206.

⁵⁷Al-Watha'iq al-Urdunnieh, 1970, October 28, 1970. See pgs. 100-101.

⁵⁸Announcement of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal Concerning the Status Quo, November 7, 1970. see pgs. 278-280. Al-Tal rebuffed the accusation that he was behind the latest crisis in the Kingdom. He noted that he would welcome "positive criticism" but would "strike with an iron hand at anyone who tries to hunt in the polluted

1970, al-Fida'iyin occupied the Roman city of Jerash in the North. Prime Minister al-Tal regarded this event as an assault on the "sovereignty" of the Jordanian Kingdom.⁵⁹ Jordan's national tragedy entered a new phase; a proud nation reluctantly paid tribute in blood for the deeds of an uncultivated few. Order was restored. Innocent youth perished. No one escaped the afflictions of the war, not even the Prime Minister, who was later assassinated in Cairo and eulogized by the sons of the Kingdom he loved to serve. Generations would remember and reflect.

water." See Prime Minister Al-Tal's Press Conference, November 7, 1970.

⁵⁹Official Jordanian Declaration about al-Fida'iyin Operation, December 12, 1970. See pgs. 320-321.

Conclusions

"Royal authority is a noble thing and enjoyable position" wrote Ibn Khaldun in his *al-Muqaddimah*.¹ It is founded through a "group feeling" which may be resisted at the start until people become familiar with it. As soon as sovereignty is solidly anchored in a member of the family competent to execute royal power, and once it has been established over a long period of time, the beginnings are ignored and the reigning members of the family are implicitly accepted as rulers. Nevertheless, Ibn Khaldun maintains that "as a rule no dynasty lasts beyond the life span of three generations." Each generation accounts for forty years. The first generation is accustomed to deprivation or "desert attitude," the second to lavishness and abundance as known in "sedentary life," the third depends on the dynasty under which the state passes through the critical state of "senility" and its final demise becomes inevitable.

Ibn Khaldun's cyclical interpretation of royal power

¹Translated from Arabic by N.J. Dawood, Franz Rosenthal, *Ibn Khaldun The Muqaddimah* (Princeton: Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press, 1967), pgs. 123-263. Ibn Khaldun was a fourteenth century Muslim historian and sociologist known as the first scholar to write an introduction to the history of the world.

is worth examining since Jordan had already experienced the first stage of desert life during the reign of King Abdullah, the founder of the Kingdom. From the sharifian revolt of 1916 to King Abdullah's assassination in 1951 and the end of Glubb's Legionnaires in 1957, the Hashimite Kingdom experienced the hardship of desert life. The ascent of King Hussein to power has symbolized the second stage of sedentary life consisting of the forty-two years of His Majesty's rule. But Hussein's rule has not been distinguished by "contentment and peacefulness," nor has it been characterized by "waste and squandering." Indeed, Ibn Khaldun himself attributed the longevity of one dynasty over another to what he called the "concomitant of good rulership" and "kindness" towards one's subjects. He wrote:

The true meaning of royal authority is realized when the ruler defends his subjects. To be kind and beneficent toward them is part of being mild to them and showing an interest in the way they live. These things are important for the ruler in gaining the love of his subjects.

Indeed, King Hussein's style in governing his nation is anything but extreme. His forgiveness when dealing with ungrateful political opponents is a clear manifestation of his success as a monarch in an age when

royal authority has been questioned. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun's theory about the cyclical aspects of history and the futility of time leaves the firmly established rule of monarchical powers subject to sudden collapse. Jordan's capacity in coping with the third stage of "senility" will depend on the resiliency and statesmanship of its rulers. It will also hinge on the agility of its ruler in the conduct of foreign relations.

Jordan's existence might not have been feasible without aligning itself with the Western powers, particularly during the critical years of the 1950's. President Truman granted Jordan international recognition and his diplomatic and technical support to the Kingdom facilitated its rise as a sovereign state. Only after the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 did the United States consider the significance of Jordan as an independent territorial entity in the Near East. Despite its lack of natural resources, the Truman administration safeguarded the kingdom's security to prevent its partition by ambitious neighbors. The overriding objective of United States policy was to avoid a large-scale war in the Arab East in the event of Jordan's dismantlement. However, Truman was not impartial in the conduct of his foreign policy despite the accurate reporting of American diplomatists in the Near East about the Israeli military

policy of retribution against Jordanian infiltrators. Jordan was left exposed to the fierce campaigns of reprisal by the Israeli forces until the election of President Eisenhower to the White House in 1953. The Eisenhower period constituted the transition point in Jordan's foreign relations from aligning itself with Britain to affiliating itself with the United States.

Eisenhower fostered a foreign policy that sought to ease the Arab-Israeli struggle in the Middle East without siding with the foes of the Arabs. His impartial approach toward the conflicting states in the region was manifested in his firmness in coping with Tel Aviv's aggressive actions on the Jordanian frontier. He entrusted Secretary Dulles with the task of subduing the Israelis and withholding economic and military aid from them when necessary. The President also supported United Nations resolutions to castigate Israel when Tel Aviv's actions became reckless and dangerous. Eisenhower's policy was driven by ideological imperatives, containment of communism, economic considerations, Arab oil and markets, and geopolitical concerns around maintaining the balance of power to avoid a destructive war among the major contestants in the Middle East. But Eisenhower's policy was also motivated by clear principles, as was manifested in his support for Jordan's right to be non-

committal to the Baghdad Pact, as well as his support of King Hussein's decision to dismiss Glubb, as act which was within the sovereign rights of Jordan as an independent state. Eisenhower also respected United Nations principles by backing King Hussein's position that the occupiers of the Suez in 1956 violated the Tripartite Declaration. Operation Alpha, a diplomatic scheme for regional settlement, was defeated by one of the countries which fostered it, Britain and by Israel, which favored it. Moreover, when Britain no longer was in a position to meet Jordan's military and economic requirements, Eisenhower was quick to assume that function despite the reservations of some cabinet officials. And when Jordan's sovereignty was threatened in July of 1958, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles swiftly provided Jordan with an emergency airlift. The return of British paratroopers to Amman during the July crisis destabilized the Kingdom but helped save the monarchy. The British presence was also shortlived. American military and economic aid to Jordan between 1958 and 1959 was vital for the survival of the Jordanian monarchy. But Jordan's association with the West increased its isolation as the thrust for Nasserism and Arab nationalism escalated. King Hussein was determined to fight for the Kingdom's continued existence. He would never rest until the foundations of his country were

firmly grounded.

Throughout the 1960's, King Hussein strove vigorously to lessen his country's isolation in the Arab East. When Hussein's political rivals requested his assistance, he was willing to forget and forgive the plots and their instigators. In May of 1967, Jordan made a crucial decision to enter a war which wreaked havoc on Hussein's kingdom, particularly after the loss of the West Bank to Israel. President Lyndon Banes Johnson was neither resolute in warning the Israelis nor supportive of Hussein's policy to force an Israeli withdrawal from the land occupied by Israeli forces. Johnson's indecisiveness condoned Israel's expansionism to Arab territory. Only the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency would offer some hope of restoring the special relationship Jordan enjoyed during the Eisenhower years. However, the threats to Jordan's survival never ceased. Jordan's civil strife in 1970 again jeopardized the integrity of the Jordanian Kingdom.

In the years to come, Jordan would face its rivals with an open eye. Its neutrality during the October War of 1973 was a illustration of Hussein's resoluteness in opposing any perceived movement which invited risks to his domain. And when Iran's Islamic revolution threatened

the independence of Jordan, he rallied his country behind Iraq from 1979 until 1988. But soon Jordan found itself in a predicament which threatened its very existence as the United States began deploying its naval power to the Arabian Gulf after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Jordan's official position of neutrality irritated American leaders, but King Hussein understood the risks involved in standing behind his traditional partner, the United States. To the dismay of many critics, American-Jordanian relations withstood one of the most difficult tests in the diplomatic history of the two countries. Jordan's signing of the Washington Declaration in 1994 marked the beginning of a new relationship with the United States. Its recognition of its most awesome foe in the Middle East was a milestone in the history of the Kingdom. "If we are willing to have peace in the world," wrote Helmut Schmidt, "we must be willing to give something up."² President Sadat gave up his life, but the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt. King Hussein conferred upon the Palestinians the right to represent themselves in return for domestic tranquility. He recognized Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state in return for increased stability in the Near East and world wide approval. It was the wish of President

²Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: a Political Perspective, Ruth Hein, trans. (New York: Random House, 1989), pg. 17.

Eisenhower to see the young monarch of the Jordanian Kingdom assume his fitting role in international affairs. If one were to accept Jean-Jacques Rousseau's assertion that the chief end of the state is the "preservation and prosperity of its members,"³ King Hussein's statesmanship and diplomacy did much to achieve those goals.

³Translated from French by Lowell Bair, The Essential Rousseau: The Social Contract (New York: A Mentor Book, New American Library, Times Mirror, 1972).

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