MILITARY INTERROGATIONS: BEST PRACTICES & BELIEFS

By

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ABSTRACT

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This study was designed to address some of the gaps in knowledge about interrogations conducted by military interrogators and provide information about methods from their perspectives, based on their experiences. Kassin et al. (2007) conducted the first self-report survey of best interrogation practices and beliefs of law enforcement officers and this study followed that model, using a different population from which to obtain the sample: military interrogators. Like that study, this survey asked participants to address and self-report on a number of issues, some in common with law enforcement and others that apply specifically to military interrogations. Participants were asked to estimate, rate and self-report on seven facets of their work: (1) their ability to detect truth or deception; (2) their own opinions and practices with regard to 13 of the general approach techniques authorized by the U.S. Army Interrogations and Intelligence Field Manual; (3) the importance of rapport building to extract information from a subject; (4) the applicability of law enforcement techniques to interrogations of terrorists; (5) the frequency, length and timing of interrogations; (6) training, and (7) their observations, if any, of others using torture or unapproved techniques during interrogations and, if so, with what frequency. Like the law enforcement study, the goal here was to obtain common practices, observations, and beliefs about interrogations directly from military interrogators. Subsequent research can test the interrogation methods that the subjects of this study believe are the most

effective and focus on practices and beliefs unique to the military context. This study begins to shed light on interrogation practices currently in use by the United States military. This study empirically supports, for the first time, the hypothesis that experienced interrogators favor rapport-building approaches over all other available techniques.

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CHAPTER 1 – STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Introduction

This study asked military interrogators what techniques they believe would likely produce timely, actionable intelligence from suspected terrorists or their supporters. It also asked military interrogators to rate their abilities to detect deception. Current interrogation techniques formally endorsed by the U.S. Army in its Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) have never been openly studied or tested. This demonstrates the need for this research project, which will fill substantial gaps in the literature.

In the United States and among some of its most important allies, debate has raged about the use of torture and its effectiveness, and this debate has obscured more important empirical questions about counterterrorism interrogations. What do military interrogators believe are the best practices when questioning suspected or confirmed terrorists? Do the current methods put in place by the Army succeed in extracting accurate and truthful information? Do these methods work quickly? Do military interrogators operate with some of the same misconceptions held by law enforcement interrogators? The literature on law enforcement interrogations has established, for example, that police interrogators are overly confident in their ability to detect deception but are correct at rates slightly better than chance (e.g. Kassin and Fong, 1999). Training appears to have a negligible effect on detecting deception (DePaulo, et. al., 2003) but increases confidence in the ability to do so (Kassin & Fong, 1999). Do military interrogators also overestimate their ability to determine if a subject is lying or engaging in deceit?

Participants were asked to estimate, rate and self-report on six facets of their work: (1) how they rate their ability to detect truth or deception; (2) their practices with regard to 21 of the

general approach techniques authorized by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Interrogation Handbook, including the frequency of use of rapport building to extract information from a subject; (3) the frequency, length and timing of interrogations; (4) training, and (5) their observations, if any, of others using techniques during interrogations not approved for use by the Army Field Manual and, (6) if so, with what frequency. Participants were also asked to name the three interrogation techniques that they believe work best to obtain cooperation from a subject. The goal here was to obtain common practices, observations, and beliefs about interrogations directly from military interrogators.

While a great deal of information is known about law enforcement interrogations, little data exists about interrogations conducted by the United States military. A search of the relevant literature reveals that no published survey of military interrogators exists nor has there been published research on the dynamics of an interrogation in this setting since the 1970s (Intelligence Science Board, 2006).

Methods employed by the United States to procure intelligence from human subjects have undergone increasing focus since September 11, 2001. The process of obtaining intelligence from captured subjects is known in the military as human intelligence collection or HUMINT and the practice has undergone unprecedented attention and review (Sappenfield, 2005). While there are self-reported, official, and anecdotal evidence of practices and procedures approved for use and allegations about techniques actually used, it is difficult to separate fact from fiction. What is clear, however, is that there appears to be little or no empirical support for any of the interrogation practices officially approved by the United States military for personnel who interrogate prisoners of war or suspected insurgents and terrorists.

Social scientists have studied law enforcement techniques for a number of years and a large body of literature exists on this subject. The law enforcement literature has dispelled many myths about police interrogation techniques and highlighted more reliable and efficacious practices. The goal of military interrogations differs from those in law enforcement. Military interrogators generally look to gather information about future events or to plan future military operations; law enforcement interrogators usually seek to elicit a confession from a suspect about a past crime and to gather evidence about this crime. However, military interrogation techniques are based in part on a law enforcement model and personnel may be subject to the same myths that affect police interrogators.

Despite the differences, there is some overlap in techniques. Three methods currently endorsed by the military as effective share themes with law enforcement practices: isolation, fear, and rapport.

Both military interrogators and law enforcement interrogators sometimes advance the idea that some form of isolation can induce a subject to cooperate. Police officers generally seek to isolate a suspect from family, friends, and lawyers in the belief that outside parties may tell the suspect not to talk. Military interrogators may use more extreme forms of isolation, such as limited human contact (often combined with sensory deprivation), so that the interrogator becomes an outlet for the subject's desire for human contact. Isolation and sensory deprivation can also disorient a subject, practices some interrogators believe will induce cooperation in subject (Alexander, 2008).

Law enforcement officers can generate fear in a suspect by implying they know more about a case than they actually do or by overstating the quantity and quality of the evidence

gathered. A POW's fear of the unknown, based on his ignorance about his captors or worry about his treatment, might lead to his cooperation, especially if he believes he might be transferred to another country for questioning. Military interrogators may also deceive a subject into believing that the interrogator knows more about the subject than she or he does. Along with these beliefs, many police and military interrogations accept the idea, even if in differing degrees, that connecting with a subject in some way and building rapport make for a successful result.

Kassin et al. (2007) conducted the first self-report survey of best interrogation practices and beliefs of law enforcement officers. This study followed a similar model, using a different population from which to obtain a sample: military interrogators. Like that study, the survey here asked participants to address and self-report on a number of issues related to interrogation techniques, some in common with law enforcement and others that apply specifically in the military context.

Data from the current study was analyzed to determine, on a whole, if military interrogators believe some of the myths about deception detection and questioning methods that the law enforcement research has refuted. Subsequent research can test the interrogation methods that the subjects of this study believe are the most effective and focus on practices and beliefs unique to the military context.

Today the United States faces a foe that does not observe the laws of war and regularly targets civilians and civilian infrastructure. In such a war, human intelligence is more important than ever and science can point the way to the best interrogation techniques possible. Science can also help prevent the use of practices that produce information of little or no value and

possibly put the interrogator, civilians and U.S. personnel at risk.

This study begins to shed light on practices currently in use by the U. S. military. Future research can begin to provide empirical support for those practices that were deemed efficacious by the subjects of this study. This study also highlights those techniques that may be of little value, particularly when compared with the law enforcement literature, and help dispel myths under which these interrogators may operate. In addition, data gleaned from this study can be used to design a more effective survey instrument, created specifically for military interrogators.

First, this dissertation highlights common themes in the literature. It then discusses existing research about the behavior of American prisoners of war during World War II and the Korean War and its relevance to interrogations. It surveys existing literature about military techniques, first by providing an overview of empirical research conducted by or under the auspices of the CIA and then by focusing on available descriptive evidence. A similar review then discusses extant available literature, both empirical and descriptive, about interrogations in the military context. The literature review concludes with a short discussion of some of the prominent, current research about law enforcement interrogations.

After this review, this dissertation discusses the recruitment of subjects for the study, some of the theories and suppositions upon which this study is based, and the method of analysis. It will then provide an analysis of the data collected and discuss the shortcomings of the study. Finally, this dissertation will discuss fruitful avenues for future research and this study's potential contribution to the literature about military interrogations.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

Most of the existing literature about interrogations in a military context supports five overall principles: the stresses of war and capture generally have a negative effect on a prisoner's ability to provide truthful and accurate statements to his/her interlocutor; both the conditions of confinement and the application of psychological pressures, such as isolation or sensory deprivation, negatively affect a prisoner's ability to provide accurate and actionable intelligence; rapport building, while often time consuming, is the best technique for extracting accurate intelligence from a prisoner; historically, many individual interrogators, including the subjects of this study, generally claim that rapport building is the best approach for eliciting accurate intelligence from a prisoner if a direct approach fails. Most military interrogators assert that there is no "magic bullet" that quickly induces compliance and cooperation in every interrogation subject.

Investigators, police officers and/or detectives routinely interrogate people suspected of committing crimes. There is a large body of literature examining procedures used by law enforcement, the perspectives of investigators conducting an interrogation, (for example confidence that the person they are interrogating is the perpetrator, (Kassin, Goldstein and Avistsky, 2003), experienced police officers' inability to detect truth from non-truth (Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Meissner and Kassin, 2004; DePaulo et al., 2003), the fact that training increases confidence but not ability to detect deception (Kassin & Fong, 1999) and the psychology and state of mind of the person under interrogation (Gudjonsson, 2003). A great body of literature also exists on the impact of "confession" evidence on prosecutors, judges, and juries (e.g. Kassin and Neumann, 1997). It has been further shown that as the coerciveness of an

interrogation increases, there is a greater likelihood of inducing a false confession (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; Leo, 2008; Leo, Costanzo, & Shaked, 2009). Sources for studying police interrogation techniques and confessions have included both archival or real-life material and experiments. (See for example Leo, 1996 and Kassin, Meissner & Norwick, 2005.)

A body of descriptive literature exists chronicling the experiences of military interrogators and some of the techniques they have employed over the course of a number of conflicts. In addition, official manuals used by military intelligence officers are widely available both from on-line booksellers and general sites on the Internet. Journalists have also reported extensively about military interrogations and have described practices sanctioned by the military as well as methods that the U.S. military has not officially approved. This does not mean that all official techniques are known or are available from open sources and official policy may allow the military's special forces to employ techniques that have not been publically exposed.

Some researchers have examined the behavior of American prisoners of war (POWs) during their internment and have sought to understand under what circumstances POWs break or become compliant and provide their captors with information. This early empirical work, designed to develop defensive interrogation strategies, or the ability to resist interrogations, ceased after the Korean War but still represents some of the most significant research to date about interrogations in the military context. In addition, individual interrogators, from World War II through the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have described their activities.

Official information about the policies and practices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which regularly interrogates confirmed and suspected terrorists, are more difficult to find. Reports generally consist of historical documents and books that use declassified material

(McCoy, 2006; Otterman, 2007; Weiner, 2007). Some declassified historical documents from the CIA are accessible via the Internet (e.g. Pribbenow, no date). Retired agents have written accounts of their service but these are subject to approval by the CIA (e.g. Scheuer, 2004). Active or retired agents speak to the media or writers, often without attribution (e.g. Shane, 2008). Most significantly, the CIA sponsored much of the early scientific research about offensive and defensive interrogation strategies until alarm over the research caused the agency to cease its sponsorship, effectively shutting down all research (McCoy). While this study focuses on how the military conducts intelligence interrogations, the literature about CIA research is relevant to intelligence interrogations in general.

American Prisoners of War During Internment

World War II, Korea & The Cold War

Accounts of the treatment of United States POWs in World War II and the Korean War illustrate the challenges of successful interrogations as well as the ability to resist a determined interrogator. In general, this literature supports the contention that the stresses of war and capture can make a prisoner compliant but have a negative effect on a prisoner's ability to provide accurate and actionable intelligence (Biderman, 1957; Biderman and Zimmer, 1961; Wolff, 1960). Isolation, sensory deprivation, and poor living conditions in prison camps were also negatively correlated with a prisoner's ability to provide accurate intelligence and sometimes induced false confessions (Biderman and Zimmer; Wolff).

The most well known German interrogator during World War II, Hanns Joachim Scharff, was famed for his charm and his ability to extract information without torture (Toliver, 1997), one small piece at a time. Scharff, who almost exclusively interrogated downed fighter pilots,

learned as much as he could about the backgrounds of his subjects, including detailed personal information, before he started questioning.

With the advent of the Cold War, communist regimes frequently used interrogations to elicit false confessions or other propagandistic statements from captured United States military personnel. (See for example Margulies, 2006). As a result, Americans began to develop what McCoy (2006) describes as a "general hysteria over Communist mind control." For example, in the Korean War, thirty-six American airmen confessed to "a plot to bomb civilian targets" after undergoing what was then called "touch-less torture" (Margulies). High value prisoners were isolated from all human contact, but for their interrogators, and at least one airman was held in solitary confinement for 10 months. The North Koreans and the Chinese subjected these prisoners to stress positions, such as standing at attention for hours, and prolonged interrogation sessions during which questions were repeated over and over to disorient the subject. Guards threw food at the prisoners and forced them to defecate in public (Margulies). According to Margulies, after being "exhausted and demoralized," the airmen's resistance was frequently overcome and they eventually "confessed." All the confessions elicited under these conditions were false. Farber, Harlow, and West (1957) and Carlson (2002) also document and examine techniques used to elicit false confessions during the Korean War, all of which involved techniques that would be categorized as physical and psychological torture.

Farber, Harlow, and West (1957) examined techniques to elicit false confessions, self-denunciations, or propagandistic statements in support of their captors used on American prisoners of war captured during the Korean conflict. During their captivity, American military personnel were subjected to extreme conditions including sleep deprivation, malnutrition,

"noxious stimulation," isolation, poor medical care, and continual threats of death or bodily harm. Farber et al. postulated that the prisoners' confinement included three overall elements, debility, dependency, and dread (DDD) that, while differentiated, interacted to produce an overall, psychologically weakened effect on the prisoners. Debility was produced because prisoners were deprived of sleep, were denied consistent meals, and suffered from fatigue. In addition, prisoners were often in chronic pain resulting from untreated wounds and other medical problems that were ignored. As a result, captured personnel could not resist even minor physical abuse. Dependency was induced by the captives' weakened physical state and the fact that they were incapable of fulfilling their most basic needs. Dread resulted because prisoners were subjected to violence and continual threats of violence, loss of control, and even their inability to satisfy the demands of their interrogators.

Farber argued that these prisoners presented behavior akin to individuals who suffered from brain damage or schizophrenia. Farber noted that DDD did not produce the desired behavior but reinforced certain modes of response desired by the captors. DDD would be increased or decreased depending upon the level of cooperation by the prisoner. Farber also found that prisoners desired social interaction to alleviate some of the conditions of capture and the interrogators provided this. Prisoners with more anti-social personalities were better able to resist intense interrogations.

In the Vietnam War North Vietnamese interrogators obtained similar types of false confessions under similar conditions from American prisoners of war (Sherer, 2006) as did Iraqis during the 1991 Gulf War (*Los Angeles Times*, 1991). This evidence suggests that torture is not effective if the goal of the interrogation is to produce truthful statements.

(During the Gulf War in 1991, Iraqi television broadcast interviews of a number of captured American soldiers, several of whom spoke against the United States' decision to go to war. One, Lieutenant Jeffrey Zaun of the Navy stated, "I think our leaders and our people have wrongly attacked the peaceful people of Iraq," prompting some in the Pentagon to question if he and the others violated the Code of Conduct. (Barron, 1991) The current Code of Conduct requires that American POWS provide their captors with no more than name rank and serial number. The Code specifically states that a soldier will not make "oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to its cause" when captured. (See the Code of Conduct, http://www.enlisted.info/about/code-of-conduct.shtml.)

The Central Intelligence Agency and Interrogations

Empirical Evidence

The Central Intelligence Agency directly or indirectly sponsored most research on offensive interrogation techniques until the 1970s (McCoy, 2006; Otterman, 2007). Offensive interrogations are those designed to elicit information from a subject. The CIA research corroborated the results of the POW studies and reinforced the idea that sensory deprivation and isolation, even for short periods, can seriously debilitate a prisoner and is not conducive to intelligence gathering. No drugs proved effective for interrogation purposes and sensory deprivation could quickly induce psychosis (Biderman and Zimmer 1961; McCoy; Otterman, 2007).

In 1960, Wolff, a human ecologist based at Cornell University and a leading CIA researcher at this time (McCoy, 2006; Otterman, 2007), published a study that examined the behavior of American POWs in the Korean War. Wolff's (1960) research was triggered in part

by the number of U.S. prisoners who appeared to voluntarily make statements denouncing the United States and U.S. policy, a phenomenon discussed earlier. Wolff sampled approximately 6,654 army personnel held in Korean prison camps, although neither his methodology nor the basis of his data is clearly stated.

According to Wolff (1960), soldiers noted (it is unclear if this information comes from reports and/or surveys) that conditions at the camps themselves were designed to break down an individual's identity and "feelings of guilt were common." Interrogators employed threats and exploited the American's ignorance of their captors' culture, "values, and attitudes." Such ignorance increased the prisoners' level of anxiety because they did not know what techniques might eventually be used against them, including torture and murder, and "brainwashing" (Wolff). With the rise of the Soviet Union and communist China, there had been a number of published accounts that falsely described the communists' ability to manipulate the brains of prisoners and force them to submit to their captors' will (Wolff). McCoy describes this concern as a "general hysteria over Communist mind control." In his review of all data to date, however, Wolf concludes that by "far the most effective way of gaining information from persons or modifying their point of view is talk under friendly circumstances, when the brain is neither damaged nor impaired in any way…"

The main focus of Wolff's (1960) research question was does every man have "a breaking point" when experiencing non-physical stressors. He acknowledged that the prolonged violence of combat could cause soldiers to break down to "the point they are no longer effective or capable of integrated action in battle." Wolff defined breaking point as "the disorganization of human behavior that follows stressful experiences" and he asserts that this "breaking point"

was not universal among the POWs. Wolff found, however, that a breaking point can arise from non-physical stressors, and, that it was generally "impossible" for anyone to resist a "determined interrogator." Wolff's research was triggered in part by the number of U.S. prisoners who appeared to voluntarily make statements denouncing the United States and U.S. policy.

In reviewing the records of the prisoners of war, Wolff (1960) tried to create a paradigm of conditions that lead prisoners of war to cooperate with their interrogators. "Ignorance" and "fear of the unknown" created anxiety in the POWs. Many were unfamiliar with Korean, Chinese, and Asian culture. Soldiers had heard of "atrocities" committed by the Koreans and Chinese, further elevating anxiety. Many of the prisoners were unsure how to behave once captured and there was reportedly little leadership in the camps. Once soldiers were captured, the Koreans immediately eliminated all distinctions based on rank and the strong preyed on the weak. Living conditions were unsanitary and prisoners were forced to go on "death" marches. Food was meager. Distraught soldiers disobeyed ranking officers who tried to gain some control. Wolff described the general atmosphere as "the chaos of social collapse." In some cases, collaborators did receive more lenient treatment than other POWs, an incentive for some to cooperate. The more difficult task for Wolff, however, was to try and determine the exact breaking point when resistance ultimately acceded to cooperation.

Based on these prisoner reports, Wolff (1960) recommended a number of strategies to help prevent prisoners from giving information to the enemy. "Courage and resistance of the average man are reinforced by high group morale" (Wolff). Ranking officers needed to establish authority as best as possible to thwart disorder among captured soldiers (Wolff). In addition, military personnel must be cognizant of the meaning of and punishment for collaboration and

efforts must be made on the home front to show POWs they were not alone and had the support of the country. "Defense against Communist Interrogation," from the CIA internal *Studies in Intelligence* journal, also posited the idea that strong feelings for country, family, and friends can help one withstand brutal conditions of captivity and interrogation. These personal characteristics, plus little fear of death, seem to be consistent with those of some members of al Qaeda and other well-trained Islamic groups (Gunaratna, 2003). Gunaratna writes that Al Qaeda places "stringent emphasis on training and retraining" and it "puts great stress on the fact that its members should be psychologically trained for war…including the willingness to die" for the cause.

Communist "Mind Control"

American soldiers were not the only subjects who had been reportedly "brainwashed" by the communists. Others, including a Hungarian cardinal, an ITT executive, and several journalists offered public admissions to espionage charges after being seemingly "brainwashed" (Otterman, 2007). A 1954 story in the New York Times posed this lurid headline: Pavlov's Dog and Communist Brainwashers…totalitarians seek to enslave the human mind" (Meerloo, 1954). In the article, Meerloo described in detail the techniques used by the Soviet Union to elicit confessions during interrogations. In the first stage, the prisoner is dulled by rapid, continual questioning, forced to stand, denied access to showers, and exposed to cold, among other things (Meerloo). During this stage, as questioning continues, new interrogators inform the subject of errors in his statements. During stage two, "reconditioning" begins. For each act of compliance, his captors award the prisoner a small privilege, such as a shower, a warm cell, or a restful sleep (Meerloo). At this point, according to Meerloo, the victim entered a "hypnotic state" and was

"ready to confess." Meerloo, a lecturer at Columbia University, published a book, *The Rape of the Mind*, in 1956 that reviewed mind control techniques and explored why people falsely confess (Meerloo, 1956).

Biderman (1957), partly under the auspices of the C.I.A., conducted a comprehensive examination of the false confession cases on behalf of the United States Air Force and the CIA and he focused on one major question: what happened to U.S. personnel captured in Korea that caused them to "confess" to non-existent war crimes? In accordance with the findings of the Hinkle and Wolff (1956) and Wolff (1960), as well as his own work, Biderman recognized that human behavior can be "manipulated" in a "controlled" environment, similar to one in which a prisoner of war may find himself. According to Biderman, the nation that holds prisoners of war had two major goals: to establish compliance and, in cases where prisoners may be used for propaganda purposes, to manipulate this compliance. The North Koreans and the Chinese, like their Soviet counterparts, gained compliance by undermining the prisoner's resistance, usually with "touch-less torture." Biderman organized the Chinese methods for gaining compliance into eight categories and those eight categories include the techniques, their "effects" and "variants;" all are described in the chart below.

CHART I.—COMMUNIST COERCIVE METHODS FOR ELICITING INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE

General Method	*Effects (Purposes?)*	*Variants*
1. Isolation	Deprives Victim of all Social Support of his Ability to Resist Develops an Intense Concern with Self Makes Victim Dependent on Interrogator	Complete Solitary Confinement Complete Isolation Semi-Isolation Group Isolation
2. Monopolization of Perception	Fixes Attention upon Immediate Predicament; Fosters Introspection Eliminates Stimuli Competing with those Controlled by Captor Frustrates all Actions not Consistent with Compliance	Physical Isolation Darkness or Bright Light Barren Environment Restricted Movement Monotonous Food
3. Induced Debilitation; Exhaustion	Weakens Mental and Physical Ability to Resist	Semi-Starvation Exposure Exploitation of Wounds; Induced Illness Sleep Deprivation Prolonged Constraint Prolonged Interrogation or Forced Writing Over Exertion
4. Threats	Cultivates Anxiety and Despair	Threats of Death Threats of Non-repatriation Threats of Endless Isolation and Interrogation Vague Threats Threats Against Family Mysterious Changes of Treatment
5. Occasional Indulgences	Provides Positive Motivation for Compliance Hinders Adjustment to Deprivation	Occasional Favors Fluctuations of Interrogators' Attitudes Promises Rewards for Partial Compliance Tantalizing
6. Demonstrating "Omnipotence" and "Omniscience"	Suggests Futility of Resistance	Confrontations Pretending Cooperation Taken for Granted Demonstrating Complete Control over Victim's Fate
7. Degradation	Makes Costs of Resistance Appear More Damaging to Self-Esteem than Capitulation Reduces Prisoner to "Animal Level" Concerns	Personal Hygiene Prevented Filthy, Infested Surroundings Demeaning Punishments Insults and Taunts Denial of Privacy
8. Enforcing Trivial Demands	Develops Habit of Compliance	Forced Writing Enforcement of Minute Rules

Biderman (1957) contended that of all possible techniques, isolation worked best to break down resistance in prisoners. Severe isolation achieved the same results as other methods, such as starvation and sleep deprivation and achieved those results in a shorter period of time. When prisoners were subjected to complete or near complete isolation, their psychological well being rapidly began to deteriorate. Long-term solitary confinement could eventually induce psychosis and a complete mental breakdown. Isolation leaves no marks on its victims (Biderman), an advantage to those who want to avoid the visible damage caused by physical torture. Biderman's findings suggested, however, that if isolation was used at all, its use must be measured and monitored. Too much isolation will not produce accurate intelligence from a subject, a finding relevant to today's interrogators.

Biderman (1957) found that two other specific techniques also worked well to establish compliance: threats of physical violence and the use of stress positions. Stress positions, such as sitting at attention or standing for long periods of time, were particularly effective for compliance because the prisoner, not the interrogator or guard, is the source of his own pain (Biderman). Stress positions caused the prisoner to “exaggerate” the power of the interrogator and convince a prisoner that his captor had the ability “to do something worse to him” (Biderman). Stress positions also allowed the interrogator to assert that physical violence never entered the interrogation room.

Regardless of the interrogation techniques used, Biderman (1957) believed that no subject could resist a determined interrogator and he supported this assertion with a review of intelligence gathering during World War II and the Korean War. The greater problem for an interrogator, according to Biderman, was evasion by a subject after he began to talk, a problem

that confronts military and law enforcement interrogators today. As a result of his findings, Biderman supported a change in the Military Code of Conduct, which would have allowed American prisoners of war to speak to interrogators instead of simply supplying name, rank and serial number. Biderman reasoned that most subjects will eventually talk and the military is wiser to train troops to evade their interlocutors, who were generally poor at detecting evasion or deception. Biderman's assertions about deception detection are still true today and supported by law enforcement research on this subject (e.g. Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Kassin, Meissner & Norwick).

Hinkle and Wolff (1956) conducted research that became part of a 1956 classified report prepared by the CIA entitled "Communist Control Techniques." The report included a discussion of some of the methods used prior to and during interrogations by the Soviet Union's secret police, the KGB, although they were not cited in the declassified document (McCoy, 2006; Otterman, 2007). According to the report, upon arrest, a prisoner was isolated from most social contact and this isolation began to weaken the prisoner, both physically and psychologically (Communist Control Techniques, 1956). Isolation, which could last up to six weeks, combined with anxiety over what might come during imprisonment, often resulted in a total breakdown. "Guards say that such prisoners are 'reduced to animals'" and the individual prisoner may hallucinate or "confabulate the details of any story suggested to him" (Communist Control Techniques). This again demonstrates the dangers of using isolation and to break a subject and to gather accurate intelligence.

The CIA version of the study goes on to describe the interrogation itself. The interrogation techniques used by the KGB followed a police model and were what the report

calls the "tricks of the trade." The interrogator and his "superiors" prepared an interrogation plan specific to the subject, a method used by American military interrogators today, but circumstances during the interrogation could alter the original plan. Once an interrogation started, usually at night, it generally continued until all or most of the goals of the plan had been met. Interrogators sometimes worked together and employed the "Mutt and Jeff" or "Good Cop, Bad Cop" routine, a tactic used by American law enforcement today and included in the U.S. Army Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006).

Other approaches were also suggested depending upon the characteristics of the individual subject. If the interrogation failed to produce the desired result, the interrogator might begin to apply "pressure" to the subject using a variety of strategies, although physically attacking the subject is said to be "rare" and not "officially" condoned. Hinkle and Wolff (1956) wrote "that some period of intense pressure will be applied to every prisoner, no matter how cooperative he tries to be" and "eventually," even if cooperative, "they find themselves put through the same routine of repetitive torture which more recalcitrant prisoners encounter."

Hinkle and Wolff (1956) found that a deep personal bond developed between prisoner and interrogator, similar to "the relationship that grows between a psychiatrist and his patient." As a result of the conditions of his confinement and relationship to the interrogator, Hinkle and Wolff discovered that the prisoner ultimately accepted the "way out" offered by the interrogator and confessed, the goal of most KGB interrogations.

Stress positions, such as standing or sitting hunched over a chair for long periods of time, were used, as was "continuous and repetitive" questioning. Rapid fire questioning could confuse the subject, already weakened, and lead to an admission. The interrogation was generally

conducted at night and once confessions" were procured, there was usually a show trial where the prisoner offered a public "confession" of his crimes."

The goal of this interrogation, however, was akin to a police interrogation, not questioning to obtain intelligence. The KGB interrogators worked to extract a confession from the subject about crimes against the state. Hinkle and Wolff (1956) saw some applicability of these techniques to prisoners of war held by the United States. They noted that "the individual man is a living system entirely dependent on maintaining a satisfactory relationship with his environment," thinking rooted in Wolff's discipline, Human Ecology. The practices used by the KGB and, to some extent communist China, were designed to upset this balance to the point of desperation. When a prisoner was isolated in a small, cold cell, which was constantly lit, with little human contact, meager food, limited sanitation, and anxiety over what might happen, he would eventually "breakdown." The process combined "pressure upon pressure" with "discomfort upon discomfort" until the prisoner is "emotionally bankrupt." This bankruptcy led to a desire to talk and the interrogator became the person to whom the prisoner unburdened himself. Hinkle and Wolff did not discuss the use of these techniques to obtain intelligence information, the typical goal of a military interrogation.

The CIA & Offensive Interrogation Techniques

The CIA also began to study "offensive" interrogation techniques and to develop defenses against communist practices (McCoy, 2006; Otterman, 2007). The agency studied, among other things, the effects of LSD, sensory deprivation, and hypnosis on interrogation sources and ultimately spent millions of dollars exploring these offensive interrogation techniques.

The agency studied practices used by Nazi researchers as well as those of the various communist intelligence and security agencies (McCoy, 2006). Sensory deprivation is a "generic term for a variety of complex experimental conditions…aimed at drastically reducing the level and variability of a person's normal stimulation from, and commerce with, his environment for a relatively prolonged period of time" (Goldberger and Breznitz, 1982). The results of some of the studies were documented in the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual. According to Thomas (1977), as a result of the research, all avenues of human behavior control were explored, from interrogation techniques to knock out drugs, from LSD to germ warfare. For example, the agency kept nine federal inmates high for 77 days on LSD (Weiner, 2007) to test the drug's effects (Thomas, 1977). At its height, the research involved 80 institutions, 44 of them colleges or universities (Horrock, 1977).

In 1964, the CIA arrested an agent named Yuri Nosenko who had allegedly defected from the KGB. He was kept in solitary confinement "with scanty meals of weak tea and gruel, a single bare light burning twenty-four hours a day, [and] no human companionship," in an unheated cell (Weiner, 2007). The conditions of his confinement lasted for three and a half years while the agency tried to determine if Nosenko had truly defected from the KGB. When 500 days had gone by without a confession, Nosenko was placed in a specially constructed "bank vault" where he eventually suffered a "breakdown" (Otterman, 2007). Still, Nosenko did not "confess," even when barraged by music blaring through headphones strapped to his head (Otterman). After being questioned for 292 days over the course of his confinement, Nosenko was finally released and given a job with the CIA as well as a cash settlement (Sniffen, 2007). He never admitted guilt.

KUBARK was declassified in 1996 but a second, similar volume, The Human Resource Exploitation Manual, was used in the early and mid 1990s for training purposes in Latin America, a central front in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Subsequent to the time of its issue and partly in response to Congressional hearings on alleged atrocities by Central American allies, the Human Resource Exploitation manual was edited by hand to remove passages that seemed to advocate stress techniques and coercion (Blanton, T. & Kornbluh P., 2007), techniques in contravention of the Army's own field manual on intelligence and interrogation. The agency also added a new prologue stating the "use of force, mental torture, threats, insults or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation is prohibited by law, both international and domestic; it is neither authorized nor condoned." Earlier, Spanish language versions of similar manuals were flagged for practices that government officials thought might violate applicable laws and regulations. According to Blanton and Kornbluh (2007), "thousands" of the Spanish language manuals were distributed to Central American allies of the United States and used for training, primarily at the notorious School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia (Gill, 2004).

Apart from the KUBARK manual and the Human Resource Exploitation Manual, much of the internal documentation describing the agency's research was destroyed (Weiner, 2007; McCoy, 2006). Seven boxes of records, containing approximately 10,000 documents, were discovered in the midst of Congressional hearings about the project in 1977. The subsequent fall-out from the hearings shut down any further efforts to empirically test interrogation techniques of any kind (Thomas, 1977; McCoy).

McCoy (2006) and Games (2007) have both described the interrogation practices of the

CIA. McCoy, whose view of the agency's practices is critical, describes experiments and interrogation techniques from the 1950s up until some of the events publicized after September 11. A number of the experiments went awry, particularly those involving LSD and the agency eventually discontinued this area of its research (McCoy). With the help of American psychologists, the CIA continued to explore the use of sensory deprivation to break the will of recalcitrant subjects. Experiments showed that in a short period of time, sensory deprivation could have debilitating effects on a subject to the point of mental breakdown (McCoy). Some of the techniques reportedly used by both the CIA and the United States military today, such as hooding and blackened goggles, have their roots in these early attempts to disorient a subject he slipped and provided information (McCoy).

"The Manipulation of Human Behavior"

The KUBARK manual, referenced above, contained a specific section, IX, entitled "The Coercive Counterintelligence Interrogation of Resistant Sources," which suggested that some practices that could help break a subject when non-coercive techniques fail. The manual cautioned that inclusion of these methods does not signify approval of their use and such tactics remain a matter of "field discretion." The research into these techniques and the methods discussed were taken from a collection of articles published in book form called *The Manipulation of Human Behavior* (Biderman and Zimmer, 1961), a project partially funded by the United States Air Force. The book remains one of the few publications available today that discusses CIA-related research on what McCoy (2006) calls "psychological torture."

While the editors of the book dismissed physical torture as ineffective, they wrote in their introduction that "the interest here is in any method through which these bases of resistance [to

interrogation] may be changed, outweighed, neutralized, or circumvented so that the person comes to behave in the manner he was originally strongly motivated to avoid" (Biderman and Zimmer, 1961). The contributors of the book "were asked to consider as their primary model interrogations where the interrogator's objectives consisted of obtaining simple, objective information regarding the physical world," not confessions (Biderman and Zimmer).

Hinkle (1961) first discussed the effect of "disturbed bodily functions" on the brain. He cited some references but did not explain his methodology. He noted that historically, many interrogation techniques used to make subjects more compliant have been shown to adversely affect the workings of the brain, a condition not conducive to extracting accurate and complete information. Hinkle advised that poor body circulation prevented the brain from obtaining the oxygen it needed to function and noted that the use of stress positions, such as standing for hours, negatively affected circulation. Combat and other stressful conditions depleted brain function even if the individual showed no symptoms of its effects and memory could falter. Hinkle wrote that, generally, a subject was interrogated soon after his capture when information was fresh and could be acted upon. Unfortunately, the effects of battle, injury, or other hardships of war could impair brain function. As a result, interrogating a subject right away may not produce complete and accurate information.

Procedures used historically to loosen a subject for interrogation, such as isolation in "places that are cold, damp, hot, unventilated, unsanitary, and uncomfortable, [deprivation] of food, fluids, sleep, and rest and medical care" will likely result in information that is unreliable. Also, "to beat torture, harry, overwork and threaten [subjects], as well as to question them interminably with leading questions is also counterproductive for gaining accurate information.

The brain, Hinkle wrote, required nourishment and rest. Without these things, function started to deteriorate, even if no signs of a breakdown were visibly apparent.

Hinkle (1961) discussed experiments done by Hebb, another some-time CIA funded researcher (McCoy, 2007), on sensory deprivation, another common tactic used to loosen a subject. Even if all other "bodily needs were taken care of," within a few hours, sensory deprivation began to exact a toll on brain function, similar to the effects of beatings, starvation, or lack of sleep (Hinkle). Fatigue, even "mental" fatigue, also debilitated. Hinkle noted that "pain, hunger, and threats," which can affect body organs, alone may not impair brain function and individuals reacted differently to these conditions. However, when "combined with the effects of isolation, loss of sleep, or starvation, they lead to rapid deterioration and sometimes death." This collection of practices may make a subject "more willing to talk" but the willingness to talk was a result of the adverse conditions. The "ability" to give accurate and truthful information, however, was challenged and any information beyond that which was basic or fictitious was not likely to be offered. Individuals often differed in their responses to the conditions of captivity. However, "from a theoretical point of view, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a man is best able to give accurate information when he is in optimal state of health, rest, comfort, and alertness, and when he is under no threat" (Hinkle, 1961).

In the same volume, Kubzansky (1961) reviewed the literature that considered the effects of the absence of "sensory or perceptual stimulation." Also referred to generally as "sensory deprivation, sensory isolation, and perceptual isolation," he described "methodological and conceptual" problems with the literature, including "diversity of variables." All sensual stimuli cannot be eliminated and ethical concerns limit how far researchers can go when testing the

effects of sensory deprivation on human subjects. In early studies, methodology was less than ideal and measurements were not always precise. However, according to Kubzansky, whatever one may call it and despite some shortcomings in the research, "these conditions have been observed to produce marked changes in the behavior of subjects exposed to them.

Kubzansky (1961) also argued that two different functions were being tested although they tend to be both described as sensory deprivation. "Sensory deprivation" is operationalized as "absolute reduction in variety and intensity sensory input. "Perceptual deprivation" is "reduced patterning, imposed structuring and homogeneous stimulation" (Kubzansky, 1961).

There are a variety of ways researchers can conduct empirical studies in this area. They can limit a subject's movement or remove all human contact. Unlike a prisoner of war or someone arrested by the KGB, subjects in these experiments know they are being monitored and the experiment will end with the threat of any permanent or excessive effects. The subject can also end the experiment at any time. (Kubzansky, 1961)

Anecdotal evidence from people who have experienced some level of sensory deprivation, such as prisoners, explorers, and the victims of ship wrecks, uniformly described a craving for sensual stimuli as well as "unusual changes in thinking, feeling, and perception" that can be accompanied by "hallucination-like" visions (Kubzansky, 1961).

In experiments where researchers reduced levels of perceptual sensation, primarily by restricting "visual modality," subjects experienced a "generally disorganizing effect." The periods of "exposure to reduced sensory input" across the studies were three minutes to six days. Even with variations in experimental conditions, most researchers reported "breakdown in visual-motor coordination, an increase in…movement phenomena, increase in color saturation,

decline in size and shape constancies, loss of accuracy in tactual perception and spatial orientation, increase in persistence of autokinetic, large figural aftereffects, difficulty in focusing, fluctuating curvature of lines and surfaces and general decrease in the efficiency of perceiving relevant stimuli" (Kubzansky, 1961).

According to Kubzansky (1961), Bexton et al. studied the effects of three days of "isolation and perceptual deprivation" on 22 subjects. Bexton found no statistically significant changes in the subjects' abilities in handling a number of mathematical exercises and word tests but "deterioration due to experimental conditions was consistent." Overall study results found that "performance on intelligence tests" was inversely related to the length of time in isolation. Vernon and Hoffman found no such deterioration in a similar set of experiments with a smaller sample as did a number of other studies that tried to repeat Bexton et al.'s findings (Kubzansky, 1961). Other studies also showed no deterioration and even some improved performance on "simple recall tests" and "rote learning." Kubzansky concluded "despite the more tenuous nature of the findings in the area of cognitive skills, …it seems that in addition to the decline in internal norms or standards for perceiving reality, under conditions of deprivation and isolation, there is a lessened ability to reason closely and solve complex problems." Suggestibility had been raised as possible effect of perceptual isolation (Kubzansky, 1961) but empirical literature remained sparse at the time this review was conducted. Some showed increased suggestibility and this was consistent with findings related to prisoners. However, multiple variables other than perceptual isolation may have caused the change.

(Suggestibility is a persistent problem in law enforcement interrogations today (Gudjonsson, 2003), particularly for the young and those with cognitive disabilities, accentuated

by stress and fatigue. Kassin (1997) has identified what he calls coerced internalized false confessions, where innocent suspects are subjected to highly suggestive methods of interrogation by police and come to believe that they committed the crime. This is also likely an issue in military interrogations.)

Kubzansky (1961) considered the effects of isolation on "feeling states" as reported by the literature. Across studies, "reduced environmental input" negatively affects "subjects' ability to concentrate, think clearly, and solve mental problems." Some found that "irritability" gradually rose over time along with minor ailments such as dizziness and headaches. Bexton et al., as cited by Kubzansky, found that even after the experiment concluded, some subjects experienced confusion (Kubzansky). Lilly reported that subjects initially felt relaxed and peaceful but these feelings dissipated over time. Lilly also indicated that some subjects felt "a sense of refreshment" after the experiment was over (Kubzansky). In contrast, Camberari's subjects ended with feelings of "fatigue" (Kubzansky). Hebb et al. indicated subjects were "irritable" and "experienced personality disturbances" after conducting their lives for three days with earplugs. Overall, the predominant sensations after isolation were fatigue, "drowsiness, confusion, loss of time orientation, and a need to reorient one's self to the familiar aspects of reality" (Kubzansky). Kubzansky commented that depending on the relationship between interrogator and subject, the interrogator, in a case of isolation, might become "associated with" a relief from "cumulative discomfort." As a result, a subject may be more willing to cooperate with the interrogator even though the ability to provide accurate information was reduced.

Some researchers focused on "imagery" induced by isolation, under a number of conditions and lengths of time, a phenomenon reportedly experienced by artists, mystics,

alcoholics, and religious individuals. According to Kubzansky (1961), imagery included "hallucinations, illusions, fantasies, daydreams, dreams, and hypnagogic states" and the imagery itself ranged from "simple geometric forms and patterns" to "complexly integrated scenes" "lasting from twenty minutes to seventy hours." In some cases, having subjects wear opaque goggles augmented isolation. Others were blindfolded, and some were placed in "tank-type respirators" used at the time by polio patients. Some were inserted into "dark acoustical chambers." The variety of methodologies and experimental conditions make it difficult to summarize the results and the experiences of subjects were recorded after they were released from isolation. Kubzansky suggested that imagery could be a positive adaptive response to the conditions of the experiments. Data on the effect of "the imagery phenomenon" on cognitive ability were not collected.

Kubzansky (1961) next examined the research on lengths of stay and time perception. Suspension in water could not be sustained for more than three hours and tank-respirators had a limit of thirty-six hours. Darkened cubicles increased the possible time of isolation up to seven days. Under these conditions, researchers tested orientation to time and perception of the length of time in isolation. Kubzansky wrote that good time orientation is directly correlated with successful responses to isolation but he noted that in most cases, isolation and deprivation generally disrupt time orientation. One major issue at this time, however, was the fact that none of the experimental data had a direct application to interrogations. The studies did not attempt to measure the "relationship of isolation and deprivation…on "the amount and accuracy of information which can be attained when under interrogation" (Kubzansky) and this appears to be the case today as well.

Small sample sizes, artificial conditions, ethical considerations, and time restrictions made the application of this research to an interrogation difficult to estimate but some of the overall conclusions drawn by Kubzansky should be further explored despite the limitations of the data. In the experimental environment as well as in life, human beings need some internal standards by which to frame their reality (Kubzansky, 1961). For general well being and health, people also must "validate" their "ideas against an objective reality" (Kubzansky). Sensory and perceptual deprivation, over time, makes these tasks more difficult and may account in part for the deterioration in some of the subjects. Subjects who were prepped for their isolation or those who had experienced it more than others may have been better prepared for the experimental conditions. If subjects were trained to understand what occurs during "isolation and deprivation" and understand that, in most cases the effects are reversible, they may be better prepared to cope with the conditions (Kubzansky). Imagery and hallucinations could create panic, which in turn caused further deterioration in a subject (Kubzansky). Kubzansky suggested that "knowledge of the importance of retaining spatial and time orientation, and self-stimulation in concrete tasks" would perhaps allow subjects to better cope with the deprivations and result in less suffering as a result. And one cannot forget that "prisoners, soldiers, and explorers" were often forced to withstand long periods of time with substantial deprivations yet were able to emerge from these challenges successfully (Kubzansky).

Gottschalk (1961) reviewed the extant literature on the use of drugs for psychotherapy because open research testing the use of drugs to "obtain factual information" was "sparse." No research had determined that a "truth serum" existed. An initial problem, Gottschalk noted, was to determine if a subject's willingness to talk was in response to the drug (or drugs) or some

other variable in the interrogation setting. An individual's physiological make-up could also influence how he or she responds as could awareness that the drug has been administered. The "conscious or unconscious desires" of the person who administered the drug may also affect the outcome, as could incentives to subjects in an experimental setting. Researchers should establish a baseline for a subject's speech patterns so pre and post test patterns can be compared and a number of other variables must be accounted for to insure that the experiment was both reliable and had applications in other settings. The anxiety provoked by the administration of drugs could outweigh any benefits. Finally, ethical considerations limited the extent to which drugs can be administered during an experiment (Gottschalk).

Gottschalk cited a series of events in 1921 that led people to believe the drug scopolamine acted as a "truth serum." A Texas obstetrician administered scopolamine to some women in labor and found that some of the women became more "talkative" and spoke about personal matters that they may not have normally revealed. Josef Mengele, the notorious Nazi doctor, experimented with the drug, as did the CIA (McCoy, 2007). Other researchers experimented with additional "truth serums," including sodium amytal, amobarbital, and mescaline. The studies, all with small samples, produced mixed results. Gottschalk (1961) wrote "that although a person's resistance to communicating consciously withheld information can be broken down," it is difficult for the interrogator to discern if he or she obtained accurate and valid information. An assessment of the statement's veracity would require the interrogator to consider a number of other factors, including setting, personality, and "other sources of evidence" that may not be possible under the pressures of an interrogation.

Gottschalk (1961) also cited research into the use of other categories of pharmaceuticals.

While hallucinogenic or psychotimimetic drugs, including LSD and mescaline, could generate psychosis, it was thought that they might have some value in an interrogation. Stimulants and anti-depressives produced varying and sometimes unpredictable results but could increase a subject's desire to communicate, particularly methamphetamines. Research involving tranquilizers was too limited to generate any hypotheses. If an agitated subject were administered a tranquilizer prior to an interrogation, the calming effect could help the interrogator extract information but calm subjects might "harden their resolve" (Gottschalk). In general, the use or threatened use of drugs could cause a subject to talk in order to avoid an injection and placebos may have a similar effect (Gottschalk). However, "even under the most favorable circumstances…information obtained through the use of pharmaceuticals [during an interrogation] could be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth…" (Gottschalk).

Gottschalk concluded his review by admitting that, even with the use of drugs, subjects could thwart their interrogators from gathering truthful information. He suggested that military personnel be trained to develop strategies for overcoming any verbosity that the drugs might produce. This training should also include a discussion of the various drugs, their properties, and their effects in order to demystify the substances and to reduce anxiety and other possible reactions when they are administered.

Davis (1961) discussed research that suggested the body's response to external stimuli may telegraph if a person was lying or telling the truth. Historically, a number of different functions have been used to determine if someone is telling the truth including blood pressure, changes in breathing, and "galvanic skin response," (GSR). GSR measures the conductivity of the skin, which is thought to change when one experiences stress, anxiety, or other states of

arousal. Recent studies have shown that a type of brain scanning technology called real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging may be able to determine if one is telling the truth by measuring brain activity (Pontin, 2007). As to the state of the research in 1961, Davis wrote that "psychological methods of detection in criminal interrogation" settings "do provide information" but the value of this information "is uncertain." More recent research into law enforcement interrogations has helped to clarify some of these issues and will be discussed later. The applicability of law enforcement studies to the military or intelligence interrogation also remains subject to empirical review.

Davis (1961) divided his review into three sections: (a) instruments that have both field and laboratory use; (b) those that have been used in the laboratory; and (c) those that might have promise but have not been tested. Respiration was discussed as both one of the earliest measures tested as well as one of the "better measures." The prevailing hypothesis was that significant changes in breathing signal deception. Two aspects of breathing were measured, amplitude and breathing cycle time. Amplitude is the range of respiration and breathing cycle time refers to the amount of time that passes between inhaling and exhaling once. Breathing cycle time tended to rise in response to questions, both when one is telling the truth and lying. However, the rise in time was greater if the subject was lying. Amplitude also increased under these circumstances but the increase was smaller if the subject was answering deceitfully. Despite the fact that changes in breathing may indicate deceit, a subject who was aware of this may alter his breathing patterns to create ambiguity when his responses are measured.

Blood pressure, which refers to the pressure exerted to artery walls when blood is pumped through the body, was also a traditional method of detecting deceit, according to Davis

(1961). One's blood pressure can change in response to external stimuli such as fear, anxiety, and anger, or, as a result of diet or health, among other things. There are two types of blood pressure, systolic and diastolic. Systolic blood pressure, the type of blood pressure commonly used as a measure of deception, is the pressure exerted when the heart contracts and pushes blood forward to maintain circulation. Some research had determined that systolic blood pressure will generally rise when one was questioned and that it will rise even further when one lied. Davis wrote that the instrument for measuring pressure, a variation of the cuff used in a doctor's office, has been criticized because it does not measure exactly what it purports to measure. It may also obstruct circulation, which can become "painful." Other instruments for measuring blood pressure show promise, according to Davis, but had not been used "in a detection situation" at the time of Davis' review.

Pulse measurements have also been the focus of some deception detection research, according to Davis (1961), but the results were somewhat confounding. The heart rate seemed to decrease when a subject was lying but the same effect can be produced by "loud noises or threats of shock" (Davis). Volume pulse measures determined pulse rates from parts of the body such as the finger and stimuli tended to cause a "decrease in the amplitude of the pulse wave," reflecting constriction of the arterioles in the region" (Davis). According to Davis, questions during an interrogation produced a reaction and the reaction appears to be greater when a subject is lying.

Changes in muscular tension might be another indicator of deception. An electromyogram or EMG can measure changes in muscular tension electronically. Ocular movements have also been the subject of research. The eyes may unconsciously move in

response to questions and preliminary studies at this time showed promise. Other variables that had not been the subject of empirical studies at this time include velocity of pulse wave, gastrointestinal reactions, and the use of the electroencephalogram.

Deception detection remains a fundamental challenge in the interrogation setting and is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future (Constanzo & Gerrity, 2009). Technological methods of determining deception have not shown high degrees of accuracy (Fiedler, Schmid & Stahl, 2002; Rosenfeld, 2005; Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben, 2005) and are prone to false positives (Constanzo & Gerrity).

The British Experience

The CIA also continued the use of stress positions, or what it described as "self-inflicted pain" (McCoy, 2006), a practice used by the British primarily in the fight against the Irish Republican Army. The use of stress positions gained notoriety in 2002 after the release of a Defense Department memo to then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In that memo, the Department's general counsel advised against authorizing prolonged standing for detainees as a way to break them down. (Haynes, 2002) The declassified memo shows the Secretary's handwritten comment at the bottom, which read, "…I stand for 8-10 hours A [sic] day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours" (Haynes).

The CIA was aware of the methods the British were using in the 1970s against captured and suspected members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), including stress positions. As the British Empire began to crumble and Britain found itself in protracted guerilla wars across the world, British intelligence began to experiment with techniques that would not run afoul of the Geneva Conventions (McCoy, 2006). Rejali (2007) calls these practices "clean torture" because

they leave no marks.

Over time, the British learned that this practice, what McCoy (2006) calls "psychological torture," left no marks but could be just as devastating to the subject as beatings, cattle prods, and other more conventional instruments of torture (Rejali, 2007). However, despite the lengthy use and experimentation with both physical and psychological methods of interrogation, some of which are undoubtedly torture, there was no empirical or anecdotal evidence that these methods led to accurate and actionable intelligence. The CIA was not interested in using techniques that caused subjects to "confess" (McCoy, 2006; Otterman, 2007).

Descriptive Evidence of CIA Practices Before 9/11

Little descriptive evidence exists of CIA practices before the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some early literature supported a rapport building approach to interrogations (e.g. Compos, 1956; Pribbenow, no date) but both McCoy (2006) and Otterman (2007) described the extensive use of torture by the agency throughout its history.

In 1956, in the CIA's internal journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, someone writing under the name "Don Compos" published an article entitled "The Interrogation of Suspects Under Arrest," which purported to inform the reader about some proven techniques used in the "art" of interrogation (Compos, 1956). (It is likely that the author used a pseudonym.) According to Compos, the goal of an interrogation was to turn the subject from adversary to ally, which will only come when the subject accepts the "futility" of his resistance. Compos wrote that there are several "phases" to an interrogation: "(a) breaking the cover story; (b) convincing the subject that resistance is pointless and acquiescence the better part of valor; and (c) getting active cooperation." Torture was dismissed as a poor practice for eliciting truthful information, "short

sighted as whipping a horse to his knees before a thirty-mile ride." Compos provided no empirical support for the methods he recommends nor does he cite research of any kind.

Compos (1956) directed interrogators to gain psychological control of all aspects of the subject's life, beginning with arrest, which should occur in the early morning. A "preliminary interview" allowed the interrogator to assess his subject and observe the prisoner's reactions to arrest and detention, particularly because all practices do not work on all interrogatees. The interrogator might have to tailor his approach to the personality of the subject. "Psychological superiority must be maintained at all times and the subject must be made uncomfortable, physically and emotionally. According to Compos, isolating the prisoner was the usual practice but for those who refuse to talk, isolation tended to harden their resolve.

The interrogation should be designed to "probe for an opening," wrote Compos (1956) and, when that moment arrived, "every effort is concentrated on enlarging it and increasing the subject's discomposure." As a result, the interrogation must continue unabated until the subject was "fully broken and his resistance" was "at an end." The interrogator was to demand that the story was continually repeated in order to exploit inconsistencies. The inquisitor may need to confront the subject with fabricated evidence or informers who do not exist. Once broken, the subject should receive better treatment, which can help alleviate "suicidal impulses."

While Compos advised against physical torture, he accepts the fact that some subjects will require a more aggressive approach that could include "threats, insults, and sarcasm," similar to the Army's "Fear Up Harsh" approach. However, Compos never recommended assaulting or physically touching the subject in any way.

The CIA's *Studies in Intelligence*, much of which was declassified in the 1990s

(Westerfield, 1995), also published an article entitled Defense Against Communist Interrogation, in the fall of 1969. The unnamed author suggested that agents prepare themselves physically, mentally, and emotionally, both for the possibility of arrest and its consequences. Agents were advised that those who were "ideologically motivated" or held "strong religious beliefs" were more likely to withstand harsh interrogations and the deprivations of confinement. The author also recommended strategies for disrupting the interrogation process itself including vomiting on the interrogator or losing control of one's bowels. It was advised without irony that no interrogator enjoys being in the same room with a subject that has lost control of his bodily functions.

Games (2007) covered the activities of an agency member in Vietnam during the war years. This agent acknowledged again and again that building rapport and treating subjects with care produced the best intelligence and agency members worked to dissuade their South Vietnamese counterparts from employing harsh techniques or torture.

Pribbenow (no date) also contrasted interrogation methods in Vietnam used by the CIA with those of the South Vietnamese. After arresting a suspected high ranking North Vietnamese officer, South Vietnamese security personnel subjected the man to beatings, stress positions, starvation, and other abuses, all of which yielded nothing but the man's true identity (Pribbenow). After eliciting little information of value, the prisoner was transferred to CIA custody and interrogated without torture or other harsh practices. Eventually, the prisoner provided his interrogators with useful information. Pribbenow, a retired CIA operations officer, concluded "…it was the skillful questions and psychological ploys, and not any physical infliction of pain, that produced the only useful (albeit limited) information that the [subject]

ever provided."

The CIA and the "War on Terrorism"

A mounting body of descriptive evidence describes some of the CIA's current practices when interrogating suspected or confirmed terrorists. This literature describes both rapport building and torture, with anecdotal support for each. Grey (2006) described the CIA's rendition program in which it outsourced torture to U.S. allies such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. Priest (2004) and Ross and Esposito (2005) detailed the use of torture within the agency. Shane (2008) recounted success with rapport-building techniques.

A number of anecdotal reports described the interrogations of Al Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zabaydah and these suggested that more humane efforts used by the FBI to extract information yielded results while more aggressive questioning by CIA operatives did not. Posner (2003) and Eban (2007) recounted some of the details of the Zabaydah interrogation, which included the use of sodium pentathol, the "truth serum" of yore discussed earlier. (The tapes of the interrogation and their destruction are the subject of investigations by Congress and a federal prosecutor.)

Eban (2007) wrote that when Zabaydah was captured after a "firefight," he was a "mess" after being shot in the groin. According to Eban, once Zabaydah was stabilized, FBI agents began their rapport building approach with the prisoner and were beginning to gather information until the CIA took custody. CIA agents instituted the use of the "harsh" techniques authorized by then President George W. Bush and Zabaydah allegedly shut down. (See also Eggen and Pincus, 2007; Johnston, 2008.) Zabaydah and his importance within Al Qaeda continue to be the subject of a dispute between the FBI and the CIA (Johnston).

Bowden (2003) discussed the interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the alleged

mastermind of September 11th and another of Al Qaeda's key members, again by the CIA. According to Bowden, Mohammed was subjected to waterboarding, isolation, environmental manipulation, loud noises, continual light, stress positions, drugs, sleep deprivation, hooding, and starvation, among other methods. At one point he was told that his family was in custody and their status and fate depended upon his cooperation. Some say Mohammed began to talk after 90 seconds (or less) of waterboarding, (Mayer, 2008), and provided actionable intelligence. Others doubt the value of the information he may have provided (Mayer). Mohammed is currently awaiting trial for his role in the September 11th attacks.

Shane (2008) recounted how a little trained, novice interrogator from the CIA extracted important information from Mohammed by building rapport with the prisoner. This same CIA operative also had success with Zabaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged intermediary between the September 11th hijackers and Al Qaeda's leadership, who all provided important intelligence as a result of this rapport-building approach (Shane).

Military Interrogation Techniques

Empirical Evidence about Military Interrogation Techniques

A review of open source literature reveals no empirical studies about military interrogation techniques apart from studies the United States military conducted together with the CIA and referred to earlier in this review. Two studies, however, are relevant to military interrogations. Motluck (2004) tested the effect of aggressive interrogation tactics on memory and the results suggested that highly stressful situations have a negative impact on recall. Over 500 soldiers, sailors, and pilots attending the United States military's survival school were subjected to interrogators who threatened violence and deprived the subjects of food and sleep.

Twenty-four hours after release from the mock prison camp the subjects were asked to identify their interrogators. Their recall was abysmal. Only 30 per cent could find the right person in a line-up, 34 per cent from a photo-spread and 49 per cent from sequential photos, even though many of the interrogators were wearing the same clothes they wore during questioning. A clothing cue boosted correct identification to 66 per cent. Motluck's work suggests that highly stressful situations have a negative impact on recall and law enforcement research has made similar findings (Gudjonsson, 2003). Blagrove (1996) found that sleep deprivation increased susceptibility to suggestion in interrogation subjects.

Descriptive Evidence from World War II through Afghanistan and Iraq

Since World War II, the United States military has generated less attention than the CIA over its interrogation techniques but there have been periods of controversy. Some of the criticism resulted from the Army's complicity in programs created or supported by the CIA. (The United States Navy, not considered in this review, participated in and funded some of the controversial work of the CIA, especially during the Cold War.) In other periods, the army was criticized for its role in training the military and security forces of allies of the United States, particularly in Latin America. And, like the CIA, some of the practices that garnered the greatest attention and controversy were products of the cold war struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. And, again, like the techniques used by the CIA, there appears to be no empirical support for practices used by the U.S. military, past or present.

A body of descriptive literature exists chronicling the experiences of military interrogators and some of the techniques they have employed over the course of a number of conflicts. In addition, as discussed earlier, official manuals used by military intelligence officers

are widely available both from on-line booksellers and general sites on the Internet. Journalists have also widely reported about military interrogations and have described practices sanctioned by the army as well as methods that the U.S. military has not officially approved. This does not mean that all official techniques are known or are available from open sources. In addition, official policy may allow the military's special forces to employ techniques that have not been publically exposed.

Accounts of interrogations conducted in World War II generally endorse the rapport-building approach (Overy, 2001; Tolliver, 2007) but there is a dearth of descriptive evidence about offensive interrogation techniques used by the United States military in the Korean conflict. The extant literature about Vietnam presents both the use of torture (Valentine, 1990) and rapport building techniques (Herrington, 1982). Some individual interrogators endorse rapport building as the best way to elicit accurate actionable intelligence (e.g. Herrington). Journalists, prisoners and interrogators have described current interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many recounted torture (Beeg, 2006; Kurnaz, 2008; Lagouranis, 2007; McKelvey, 2007; Saar & Novak, 2005). Mackey and Miller (2005) described techniques that push the limits of U.S. and international law. Alexander (2008), Maddox (2008), Shaffer (2010) and Skowera (2010) endorsed a rapport-building approach that was sometimes resisted by other interrogators in Iraq and Afghanistan. Saccone (2008) advocated the use of psychological pressure, when necessary, to extract intelligence.

World War II

As a result of some of the methods exposed by the media since 2001, some journalists have sought out World War military intelligence veterans for comment. For example, Dvorak

(2007) reported that World War II veterans who interrogated Nazi prisoners at Fort Hunt describe the interrogations as a "battle of wits" and one former interrogator says he gained more information from "playing ping pong" with his subject "than they do today with torture." Albrecht (2008) wrote that cells were bugged and, although some of the interrogators were German-speaking Jews who had fled Germany or lost family members, questioning took place without threats or violence.

Overy (2001) recounted interrogations Allied forces conducted with high-ranking Nazi party members at the end of World War II in preparation for the War Crimes trials at Nuremberg. The text also contained excerpted transcripts from the interrogations themselves and several of the subjects, Rudolf Hess, Albert Speers, and Hermann Goering, were among the most notorious members of the Third Reich. The practices were a hybrid of some of the methods used commonly by the military and law enforcement, even today.

According to Overy (2001), the subjects were housed in "spartan" conditions, stripped of rank, and although not generally subject to physical abuse, interrogators applied "psychological pressure" during interrogations. One such ploy was to tell an uncooperative subject that he would be transferred to the Russians unless he told all he knew, a process that today is called extraordinary rendition. Unlike the tactics used by the CIA and, later the military, subjects were not isolated at first and were permitted to speak with other prisoners when not being interrogated. Later, when the prisoners were moved to a prison at Nuremberg, silence was imposed.

Overy (2001) went on to describe the interrogation process, which was akin to law enforcement interrogations because the material collected would, if possible, be used later at a trial as evidence of guilt. Interrogators were not gathering intelligence and many were not

members of the military. Consistent with practices today, each interrogator learned as much as possible about the subject he was going to question. Interrogations occurred in a small room and some lasted hours. Stenographers were present and subjects were sworn in before questioning began. Depending on the subject, some interrogations were vigorous while others were more sedate and friendly.

Strauss (2003) documented interrogations of Japanese prisoners of war as recorded by "Army Captain John Burden, one of the first graduates of the Fourth Army Intelligence School" who was fluent in Japanese. Burden observed interrogations of prisoners at Guadalcanal. According to Strauss, senior officers were averse to taking Japanese prisoners alive because they did not believe the Japanese would give up any valuable information. As a result there were a small number of Japanese POWs to question. Most of those who were questioned cooperated (Strauss). Strauss noted that Japanese prisoners were generally unfamiliar with U.S. methods and culture and were not trained to withstand questioning. The Americans, for the most part, did not use force but, as reported by Strauss, sometimes threatened to send prisoners back to Japan if they did not cooperate. Interrogators reasoned that the shame of returning to Japan defeated would provide the leverage needed to acquire intelligence. The "soft" approach appeared to work best. Perhaps most importantly, according to Strauss:

Almost invariable, POWs reacted favorably to the good medical treatment and ample food they received. Americans realized that interrogating an enemy with a different cultural background had to be learned through trial and error. Preconceptions had to be abandoned along the way for new ideas that showed greater promise. (p. 132)

The effect of culture on interrogations has never been tested and represents a fertile area

for research. It has been shown, however, that the ability to determine whether a person is being deceptive is worse when the person comes from a different culture (Bond, Omar, Mahmoud & Bonser, 1999) and that differing cultures vary in verbal and non-verbal cues (Matsumoto, 2009). In a similar vein, the possible effect of an interpreter on an interrogation has also not been subject to empirical review.

Initially, some prisoners believed that when they entered the interrogation room, they would be executed but a greater source of discomfort was the shame of capture. In addition, when Japanese Americans were used as interpreters or interrogators, their familiarity with Japanese customs made it possible to exploit the prisoners' "cultural values" to gain information (Strauss, 2001). This point has great application today for military interrogators who question Arab and Muslim prisoners of war, particularly if the interrogator is not of Arab or Muslim heritage.

Moran (1943), a Japanese interpreter with the United States Marine Corps, offered similar advice to interpreters and interrogators. He wrote, "a prisoner is out of the war, out of the picture, ...not an enemy." He spoke to prisoners "human being to human being." He emphasized that knowledge of the prisoner's culture and social mores are important and suggests that interrogators will obtain more information by treating prisoners with respect and kindness.

Kleinman (2002) provided similar positions taken by Sanford Griffith, a retired Army major, in a series of lectures given to the Third Army School in San Antonio Texas in 1942. According to Kleinman, Griffith based his remarks on his experience in World War I, and, although the Second World War was technologically more sophisticated, Griffith believed his insights had value for that conflict. As cited by Kleinman, Griffith offered a number of

guidelines including “'try to see the conflict from the prisoner's point of view,'“ take an “'individual'“ approach to each prisoner, and develop full knowledge of the enemy. He did not discuss using physical force on POWs but suggested different approaches, some psychologically based, depending on the prisoner. He also advised an approach that is familiar to law enforcement officers and military interrogators today:

A POW who is hungry and uncertain about his fate can be easily caught off guard. He is also more susceptible to persuasion by means of simple favors, such as offers of chocolate, coffee, or tobacco. This kind of inducement, however, should appear incidental to the interrogation process, presented in a natural and friendly manner, and not offered as an obvious bribe for information. The degree of previous privation is a fair measure of the potential effectiveness of such inducements. (62-63)

The Korean Conflict

There is a dearth of descriptive evidence about offensive interrogation techniques used by the United States military in the Korean conflict. The U.S. Army, which maintains its own web site devoted to the history of the American armed forces, U.S. Center of Military History, http://www.history.army.mil//index.html, discusses various aspects of that war. A monograph entitled “Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems During the Korean Conflict,” http://www.history.army.mil/documents/Korea/intkor/intkor.htm, described some of the intelligence challenges and successes faced by the United States, including a shortage of Korean interpreters, poor environmental conditions, and the relatively cooperative nature of most POWs. It did not describe specific interrogations techniques.

The Vietnam War

In contrast, there were many anecdotal and descriptive sources about U.S intelligence gathering during the Vietnam War. These predominately personal histories fell into two camps: those that recounted brutality on the part of American military interrogators (and the CIA) and those that did not.

During the Vietnam War, the CIA, in conjunction with American Special Forces and the United States military, crafted a plan to root out Viet Cong infrastructure believed to be deeply embedded in South Vietnamese society. Historical accountings of the plan, known as the Phoenix Program, reflected differing opinions about not only the program's successes but also its tactics for collecting human intelligence. For example, Valentine (2000) contended that innocent civilians and Communist sympathizers were tortured and executed in a campaign of terror waged throughout South Vietnam. Crowell (2006), an Army intelligence officer and part of the Phoenix Program, did not recount specific interrogation tactics used but described the program as traumatic for all participants. He also decried the fact that, according to him, the program was a model for fighting terrorism since September 11. McCoy (2007), Rejali (2007), and Otterman (2006) present similar views.

Herrington (1982) asserted a contrasting position. Herrington, an American military intelligence officer who participated in Phoenix, claimed that torture and assassination were not the norm but the work of rogue Americans and the South Vietnamese, who were prone to torture during the interrogations they conducted. According to Herrington “the difference in value systems was one of the most frustrating problems faced by all of us who worked closely with the Vietnamese.” He ascribed to the view that treating prisoners with respect and learning as much

as possible about a subject before questioning were some of the keys to a successful interrogation. Herrington has been an outspoken critic of the use of harsh interrogation techniques in the Global War on Terror.

In 1971, a House of Representatives subcommittee reviewing U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam heard testimony about the Phoenix Program, including some from William Colby, future director of the CIA. Colby, who served as CIA station chief in Saigon and oversaw the Phoenix Program (Valentine, 2000), testified that the program did not use terror to fight what he called terror by the Viet Cong. At one point in his testimony, Colby specifically addresses interrogation techniques:

If you want to get bad intelligence you use bad interrogation methods. If you want to get good intelligence you had better use good interrogation methods. You will get what the fellow thinks you want to hear if you use the wrong methods. This is the lesson we have been trying to put over with the people with whom we work. (Testimony, 7/19/71, Lines 726-729.)

In contrast, the committee also heard from someone identified as K. Barton Osborn, who described himself as someone associated with both military intelligence and the CIA (hearing transcript, 8/2/71, lines 1123-1124). Barton claimed to have witnessed and participated in interrogations and intelligence operations that did not comply with the Geneva Conventions and which he described as "strictly illegal." (Line 1160) For example Osborn explained to the committee about what he called an "airborne interrogation" conducted by a contingent of Marines. Osborn, the marines, and two bound prisoners boarded a helicopter that took off and flew over a flat area. One of the prisoners, who was not the focus of the operation, was dragged to the door of the helicopter four times and told if he did not talk, he would be dumped over the

side. The prisoner was eventually thrown out of the helicopter in an effort to make the second man talk (hearing transcript, lines 1256-1268). Osborn testified that other techniques used during interrogations included starvation, the use of "electronic gear" and "the insertion of a dowel...into the canal of one of my detainee's ears." Osborn did not indicate if these techniques produced accurate information.

Iraq and Afghanistan

Since 2001, a number of journalists, former detainees and military personnel have written about techniques used by the military when conducting interrogations. For example, McKelvey's (2007) book, "Monstering," took its name from a technique used by military interrogators to "break" or induce cooperation in an uncooperative subject and Mackey (2005) described the practice in detail. He and other interrogators believed that if interrogator and prisoner were subject to the same conditions, including sleep deprivation, a marathon interrogation session would not run afoul of army regulations, U.S., or international law. The practice was used sparingly, according to Mackey (2005), and required interrogator and subject to remain awake in the interrogation booth until the subject began to cooperate, with one session lasting 29 hours. McKelvey found monstering, as practiced in Iraq, a form of torture that used teams of interrogators, loud noises, and environmental controls, among other things. While interrogators needed to formally request the ability to use these "harsh" techniques, she quotes one soldier who said, "'I never saw a sheet unsigned'" (McKelvey). Mackey claimed success with the 29-hour session of a Bin Laden confederate, but McKelvey described methods that are generally products born of frustration (or worse) and ineffective. Phillips (2010) asserted that the practice of monstering started many interrogators on a downward spiral that ended in the torture of

interrogation subjects.

Mackey (2005) indicated that during his training at Fort Huachuca, the site of the Army's intelligence school, instructors continually emphasized adherence to U.S. and international law, including the Geneva Conventions. Later, while in Afghanistan, experience on the ground gave him new insights on how to interrogate prisoners. He and his colleagues employed the approaches outlined in the Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006), and improvised, with varying degrees of success. There were moments of kindness and respect between interrogator and subject, but he also recounted acts of violence and death. In at least one case, a female interrogator was used in order to exploit some of the Afghans' disdain or discomfort with women in such a role. At one point, the military team placed a cooperative prisoner in a group cell to see what he information he could gather from other inmates, a strategy used by law enforcement today. This tactic produced mixed results.

In contrast, Alexander (2008) reports great success with a rapport building approach after other methods that emphasized domination and control failed. Alexander employed a rapport building approach when questioning a lieutenant of Abu Musab a-Zarqawi, the late leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The information Alexander gathered from this subject led to the location and eventual killing of Zarqawi by United States forces. Maddox (2008) used similar techniques to gather intelligence that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein.

Saccone (2008), a retired United States Air Force counterintelligence and counterespionage officer, devoted an important part of his book to interrogation techniques, torture and coercion in the HUMINT context. Saccone drew an important distinction between coercion and torture and argued that coercion is a necessary tool when interrogating hardened

terrorists who have been trained to resist rapport-building and other non-coercive techniques. Saccone also believed that under supervision and with reasonable guidelines and limitations, coercion would not violate U.S. or international law. In the chapter entitled Interrogation, Saccone offered an anecdote about using non-rapport building techniques to successfully elicit information from a subject.

According to Saccone (2008), a "suspect" was resisting "conventional means of interrogation" and interrogators needed to try alternative methods. They hooded the subject and told him he was being transported to an interrogation setting that would be less-than-friendly. When the suspect arrived at a makeshift interrogation booth, the interrogator excused himself and went to a room next door. In this room, the interrogator and an Arabic interpreter staged a mock interrogation. The interrogator connected two live wires from time to time and the interpreter simultaneously screamed in Arabic to stop. The prisoner could hear the crackling of the live wires when they were placed together. The interrogator even arranged for the lights to dim when the wires were connected. After the interpreter pretended to confess, the interrogator returned to the room with the suspect, who now appeared "sufficiently frightened" (Saccone). The interrogator told the suspect that he did not want to use these methods but he would, if the suspect did not cooperate. At this point the prisoner began to reveal valuable intelligence.

Saccone's (2008) anecdote illustrates a divide among some interrogators about the use of non-physical coercion during an interrogation. While many abhor any type of coercion and advise against an approach that emphasizes dominance and control (see e.g. Alexander, 2008), Saccone, among others, believes that this view belies the realities of operations in the field.

Pryer (2009) conducted, to date, one of the only investigations into interrogation

techniques used by American military personnel in Iraq that systematically interviewed front-line interrogators. Pryer's investigation covered May 2003 until April 2004 and his goal was to understand the atmosphere in which some U.S. interrogators resorted to questioning methods that violated U.S. and international law. It is unclear how many interrogators Pryer interviewed but his purpose differed from that of this study. He did not specifically survey interrogators about what kinds of techniques they were using in the field. He interviewed interrogators to understand their perspectives about what were appropriate techniques in the face of "mounting casualty rates." He also sought to determine the interrogators' understanding of Army doctrines and regulations with regard to interrogation techniques, in light of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Pryer concluded that most of the interrogators he spoke with believed in a rapport building approach and shunned the extreme methods that shocked many Americans in 2003 when photographs from Abu Ghraib were shown on the CBS news program *60 Minutes*. Pryer also found that the most successful interrogators eschewed harsh techniques, even in the face of directives allowing such techniques.

Pryer highlighted the activities of a military intelligence unit in Iraq that conducted countless interrogations and cited the case of Chief Warrant Officer 3 John Groseclose, the Defense Department's HUMINT collector of the year in 2003, who served in Iraq. Groseclose led an elite interrogation team there. He described Groseclose's response to government directives that enhanced techniques could be used on unlawful combatants: "For an interrogator to resort to techniques like that is for that interrogator to admit that they don't know how to interrogate " (Pryer).

Finally, the National Defense Intelligence College (2008) produced its own investigation

into interrogation techniques employed by the United States in World War II, Vietnam and the second Iraq war. The study was prompted in part by the Abu Ghraib scandal and the reports of harsh interrogation techniques used at other detention facilities. The study discussed many of the historical themes previously raised in this literature review. The section about Iraq included information culled from some interrogators who served there as well as analysis of the personal accounts written by former interrogators such as Mackey (2004).

According to the National Defense Intelligence College (2008), in Iraq, interrogators recognized the importance of the fear caused by capture and consistently looked for ways to exploit it. Interrogators also sought to recreate this emotional state in prisoners that they referred to as the "shock of capture" (National Defense Intelligence College). When a prisoner was captured, interrogators believed he was most vulnerable to questioning because he was frightened and uncertain about his fate. The report described uncertainty as an interrogator's greatest tool and one in which he or she can convince a prisoner that the interrogator is in total control and "holds the key to the prisoner's future" (National Defense Intelligence College). The study noted:

The bottom line is that fear works. The best way to use this fear is when it is genuine and originates with the source. Fear that is not introduced artificially, but originates solely in the mind of the prisoner, is the most effective. However, it is when an interrogator tries to re-create the fear that can only accompany the shock of capture that he runs the risk of crossing the line into abuse (202).

Official United States Policy

Information about official United States military policy and practice is readily available

from historical records and open sources, including all media. For example, the newest edition of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007) was openly published and is widely available in bookstores and on-line retailers. The newest edition of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Interrogation Handbook: The Official Guide on Prisoner Interrogation (2005) contains the current guidelines military personnel must obey when conducting interrogations. The manual also includes relevant articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the criminal code applicable to all personnel serving in the United States military. It makes reference to all international conventions to which the United States is a party, as well as previous Army field manuals. The U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006), another important interrogation manual, is available at Amazon, the on-line bookseller, Army Knowledge Online, www.us.army.mil, which requires a log-in, and at Enlisted Info, www.enlisted.info, a site that provides access to all declassified army manuals. The U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual contains practices and protocols to be used when military personnel and contractors question subjects for intelligence and overlaps somewhat with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Interrogation Handbook (2005), with some important exceptions. It is the U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual that reflects Army doctrine, not the Handbook.

Of all the official military sources for interrogation and human intelligence collection techniques, the current U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) is probably one of the most important. It is this volume that sets U.S. Army doctrine. The manual has undergone changes over the years. The Vietnam era manual, FM 30-15, released in 1969, offered a variety of recommendations that included the necessary qualities of an

interrogator, how to prepare for an interrogation and conducting the interrogation itself. This manual, like the later additions, advocated a variety of "approaches" an interrogator can use, depending upon the individual subject, with thirteen overall choices with which to approach a subject. For example, there was the "Pride and Ego" technique, which was designed to "trick the subject into revealing desired information by goading or flattering him," (Army Field Manual). The "Harassment" approach advised that a subject "who is hostile, but lacks will-power and has shown a fondness for physical comfort and convenience, is more likely to be susceptible to harassment" (Army Field Manual). In a section entitled the "Questioning Phase" the manual recommended how to form questions and what types of questions to avoid, with suggestions that would be familiar to any trial lawyer. The manual also described "psychological factors and mechanisms" that can affect a subject and be used by an interrogator. The manual stated that the use of force was illegal and was neither an appropriate nor effective means of getting information. It noted that the use of force "is not to be confused with the application of psychological techniques to assist the interrogator in the interrogation of difficult subjects" (Army Field Manual, 1969). An interrogator could, for example, use fear to manipulate a subject and gain his cooperation, a strategy still popular today (National Defense Intelligence College, 2008).

Like its predecessors, the new edition discusses approach techniques (U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual, 2006). The first task is to "build rapport," which may include the use of "ruses." The interrogator, however, is not permitted to pose as "a medical doctor, a journalist, a member of the Red Cross, or a member of the U.S. Congress," all of which would violate international law (U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations

Field Manual). The interrogator must choose the rapport approach appropriate for the subject he or she is questioning.

The manual also offers a number of questioning approaches from which to choose. For example, in the "emotional love approach" the interrogator "focuses on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds himself, his isolation from those he loves, and his feeling of helplessness" (U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual, 2006). In the "emotional hate approach," the questioner "focuses on any genuine hate or possibly revenge" the source may feel toward his country or organization" (U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual). This technique "may be effective on members of racial or religious minorities who have or feel that they have faced discrimination in military and civilian life" (U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual). When choosing an approach strategy, the manual advises that interrogation "does not mean a hostile relationship between the [interrogator] and the source." The manual states, without citing any data or references, that "most interrogation sources (90 percent or more) cooperate in response to the direct approach" and it notes that those trained in counter-interrogation techniques, including "terrorists," will have a "high degree of security awareness" and will be more difficult to question successfully (U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual).

The most controversial section of the current U.S. Army Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) is Appendix M. Section M outlines what it calls the Restricted Interrogation Technique – Separation, a tool that the manual indicates is necessary in the Global War on Terrorism. Separation may be employed in narrow circumstances, under special protocols and only with unlawful enemy combatants. Separation, which does not include

sensory deprivation, can be used for up to 30 days, with breaks and possible extensions, and is designed to prolong the shock of capture and prevent a detainee from interacting with other prisoners. The manual indicates that if physical separation is not possible, earmuffs, goggles or blindfolds may be used.

Some, including Alexander (2010) have criticized Appendix M and argued that it should be excised from the manual. Alexander also asserted that other sections of the manual, as well as some of its omissions, are rife for abuse. For example, the manual does not explicitly prohibit stress positions or environmental manipulation. It allows interrogators to limit a detainee's sleep to four hours out of every twenty-four hour period. Alexander argued that these aspects of the manual do not constitute humane treatment and present a danger to American troops upon capture. These provisions and omissions also seem counterproductive in the face of the historical record and existing research about interrogation techniques.

As previously stated, official manuals used by military intelligence officers are widely available both from on-line booksellers and general sites on the Internet. Journalists and former interrogators have also reported about military interrogations and have described practices sanctioned by the army as well as methods that the U.S. military has not officially approved. This does not mean that all official techniques are known or are available from open sources and official policy may allow the military's special forces to employ techniques that have not been publically exposed. Other than research conducted together with the CIA, there is no open source or declassified empirical literature about military interrogation techniques.

SERE School - Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape and Its Re-Engineering

In response to the conduct of some POWs described earlier, particularly during the

Korean conflict, the United States Air Force developed a specific course for survival training, SERE, (an acronym for Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) that included strategies for withstanding torture, both physical and psychological. SERE training acknowledged that isolation, a common interrogation tool, is a "severe survival stressor" but suggested that it can be "controlled and overcome by knowledge, understanding, deliberate counter-measures and a will to resist." (Department of the Air Force, 1985). The declassified SERE handbook offered some specific tactics for overcoming the privations of capture. It recommended that captured soldiers organize based on rank and that the highest ranking officer command the prisoners and act as a spokesman in order to preserve *esprit de corps*. It noted that religious values, love of country and love for comrades and family could motivate a prisoner of war to stand strong in the face of harsh treatment and interrogations by the enemy. SERE training also advised that proper motivation is a key survival skill, particularly for prisoners of war, and motivating factors can include "to deny the enemy a source of military information" and "to deny the enemy a source of propaganda" (Department of the Air Force).

Specific counter-measures to combat the hardships faced by prisoners of war were not described in the handbook and, presumably, remain classified. The Army subsequently adopted a similar training regime and that training included strategies for surviving capture by terrorists (Department of the Army, 1985). According to Otterman (2007), soldiers and Air Force personnel were subjected to conditions they would likely face if captured, including "abusive treatment in a controlled setting." The training was designed to inoculate troops against the effects of torture and introduce them to some of the tactics they might face if captured and interrogated.

The SERE training program is relevant because at some point after 2001, government officials began considering its application to the interrogation of unlawful combatants and possibly other detainees. Mayer (2005) reported that the defense techniques offered in the training formed the basis of offensive interrogation strategies to be used when handling captured terrorists. Those practices designed to help soldiers resist torture were used, according to Mayer, to create interrogation techniques immune to resistance.

Over the past 50 years or so, fragmentary details about how SERE prepared service-people for the rigors of capture and potential torture have leaked to the media. Williams and Kasindorf (1976) reported that two Naval trainees did not survive the program in 1961 and 1967. They also discussed the case of Wendell Richard Young, a naval pilot who broke his back while participating in the 5-week SERE school and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Navy. According to Williams and Kasindorf, Young was hooded, placed in a "fetid tiger cage" and witnessed waterboarding of other trainees while a Naval doctor was present, all within the confines of a simulated prisoner of war camp. "Prisoners" were tortured into defecating on the American flag and forced to masturbate along with other forms of sexual humiliation before and after "interrogations" (Williams and Kasindorf).

In 1985, a Navy petty officer aboard a hi-jacked TWA aircraft was held captive in Beirut for 17 days, under harsh conditions (Molotsky, 1985). Although not interrogated, the officer, Stuart Dahl, credited his training in the Navy for helping him withstand his capture. Specifically Dahl said his faith in the United States, himself, his unit and G-d sustained him during captivity (Molotsky), all practices advocated by SERE school.

Priest (1991) revealed that two of the SERE schools were located, at that time, in

Brunswick, Maine. Priest wrote that, according to a Naval spokesperson then, SERE: field exercises are designed to prepare students for a wide variety of actual real world situations...with realism in mind so that students can gain valuable insight into some of the stresses and dilemmas they might be exposed to if ever thrust into a prisoner of war situation.

According to Priest, in 1977 a *Washington Post* reporter visited a mock prisoner of war camp located at Fort Belvoir in Virginia and part of the SERE program. There "uncooperative POWS" were hooded and placed "in 21/2 by 6 foot lockers and buried in the ground" for 10 minutes or "dragged into mud holes and ordered to do push-ups" (Priest, 1991).

In 1995, military survival training again became the subject of public scrutiny. Air Force Academy cadets, Elizabeth Saum and Christian Palintan, participated in a summer SERE School, and both discussed the training on the ABC News Program 20/20 (Carlson, 1995; Charles, 2004). The two were subjected to various forms of sexual humiliation, including simulated rapes. Saum described two days without food or sleep and threats to beat another "POW" if Saum did not cooperate with her interrogators (Charles). In April of 1995, the Air Force Academy suspended the use of resistance and escape aspects of the training, saying most Academy graduates did not require these skills (AP, 1995). In 2001, it was suggested that the Academy would begin anew to offer resistance and escape training (Diedrich, 2001).

Benjamin (2006) provided the most details about SERE training after interviewing an Army Ranger who passed the course almost 25 years ago. According to Benjamin, trainees spend a week "on the run" from simulated enemy forces. They were ultimately captured and then subjected to interrogation techniques designed to produce "humiliation and shame." Soldiers were placed in small pens that provide little room to move, stand up or recline and were

hooded when moved from one place to another (Benjamin). With hoods in place, instructors sometimes poured water over the heads of the trainees after ordering them to remove their clothes. Soldiers were forced to remain in stress periods for long periods of time, defecate on and kick American flags and Bibles and interrogators attacked and mocked the trainees' knowledge of the Constitution and U.S, history. According to the former Ranger, "they begin to preach propaganda and attack your institutional base. Everything about SERE school is a mind fuck" (Benjamin).

The techniques used at SERE school and those allegedly in use in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib bear striking similarities, as Benjamin (2006) noted and Mayer (2005) drew the same conclusion. Mayer reported that in fact SERE techniques were "reverse engineered" by military officials and contract psychologists to create an interrogation regimen that was used in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

For military trainees, SERE school ended in several weeks; to date some of those imprisoned at Guantanamo have been incarcerated for months and years and potentially exposed to these techniques for long periods of time. There is no indication from any sources that if and when trainees at SERE school "broke" they offered statements that were true or of any value nor is there evidence to suggest that the re-engineering of SERE tactics produced valuable intelligence for the United States. Descriptive evidence from the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam War suggest these techniques will not elicit truthful and accurate information.

Law Enforcement Interrogations

As noted in the beginning of this dissertation, social scientists have studied law enforcement techniques for a number of years and the law enforcement literature has dispelled

many myths about police interrogation practices. The research has also helped to highlight more reliable and efficacious practices. And while the goal of military interrogations differ from those in law enforcement, military techniques and those of other agencies are based in part on a law enforcement model and personnel may be subject to the same myths that affect police interrogators.

Investigators, police officers and/or detectives routinely interrogate people suspected of committing crimes. Research has examined procedures used by law enforcement, the perspectives of investigators conducting an interrogation, (for example confidence that the person they are interrogating is the perpetrator), police officers' ability to detect truth from non-truth, and the psychology and state of mind of the person under interrogation. Literature also exists about the impact of "confession" evidence on prosecutors, judges, and juries (Kassin & Neumann, 1997). Sources for studying police interrogation techniques have included both archival or real-life material and experiments. There are also training manuals, including Criminal Interrogations and Confessions (Inbau, Reid, Buckley and Jayne, 2004), which feature the Reid Technique. Hundreds of thousands of police officers have trained in the Reid Technique (www.reid.com).

Research into the psychology of interrogations shows that seasoned investigators assume deception in the target of an investigation, disbelieve people who assert their innocence, are prone to false positives, and yet, are highly confident in their assessments of guilt or innocence. They also tend to believe that the focus of their investigation is "guilty" despite protestations to the contrary. (See, for example, Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky, 2003.) Police investigators often isolate a suspect, confront him or her with evidence of guilt, try to build rapport, and

highlight contradictions in a suspect's statements (Kassin, Leo, and Meissner et al, 2007).

American criminal law permits use of the ruse, to which teenagers and the mentally disabled are especially susceptible. These law enforcement strategies can push vulnerable and impressionable suspects to internalize belief in their culpability and cause them to "confess" to crimes they did not commit. (See, for example, Smith, 2002, who discussed the case of the "Central Park jogger," a case which resulted in 5 false confessions.) There is also significant anecdotal evidence, drawn from well-known and sometimes sensational cases, where graphic, detailed "confessions" were later proved false. Approximately one quarter of the wrongful convictions uncovered by the Innocence Project were based on or included false confessions (The Innocence Project, 2010).

Legal procedures put in place to protect suspects from confessing, falsely or otherwise, can have minimal impact. Literature suggests that safeguards, such as the Miranda warnings, have little effect in protecting innocent suspects because many lack the ability to understand those rights and exercise them. Investigators are also skilled at obtaining waivers of Miranda rights, especially from those who are innocent and believe they can assert their innocence and be released from custody and/or cleared. A judge at a pre-trial hearing then considers the Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of a suspect's statement. At the end of the trial process, a jury also considers the voluntariness of the confession, evaluates its truthfulness and sometimes considers a defense argument that the defendant made no such statement.

Confession evidence has a great influence on prosecutors, judges, and juries, even in the face of coercion, partly because of the unsupported belief that people can distinguish false confessions from those that are true. During a trial when a prosecutor introduces a defendant's

"confession," the result can be dramatic and devastating to the defense and that drama is reinforced by popular culture. Without expert testimony, jurors (and sometimes judges) find it difficult to believe that an innocent person would confess to a crime she did not commit. And although most states prohibit convictions based on a confession alone, there is no doubt that juries heavily rely on such evidence when it is offered at a trial.

Finally, in relation to recent findings from the area of psychology and law, the characteristics of a good interrogation are explored. MacQueen and MacDonald (2007) reported that Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigators interrogating suspected serial killers endorsed rapport building. In an Issue of the FBI Bulletin, McIlwaine (1994) described effective strategies for agents to use when interviewing suspected child sexual predators. Investigators must first identify the offender typology within which the suspect falls. The bulletin advised investigators to be fully familiar with the case and to use specific themes to extract confessions, including offering the suspect possible "excuses" for committing the offense (McIlwaine). Investigators should also confront suspects with evidence, pay attention to non-verbal behavior, and select the appropriate time and location for interview. The bulletin also recommended building rapport.

Kassin has long researched why suspects confess to crimes they did not commit. Kassin has also demonstrated that even well trained law enforcement investigators are unreliable in judging the truth or falsity of suspects' statements (e.g. Granhag and Stromwall, 2004). Gordon, Fleisher and Weinberg (2002) authored a training manual for investigators that purports to teach skills for identifying true or false statements as well as techniques for extracting confessions from criminal suspects. Much of the cited research does not support many of their principles.

CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

There were a number of theoretical foundations that informed the inception of this study. These theoretical foundations included the narrative and historical writings about military interrogations cited in the Literature Review, existing research about this topic and the body of research about law enforcement interrogations. This empirical and narrative literature also influenced the modifications done to the survey instrument which was itself modelled after one used by Kassin, et al. (2007).

The most significant supposition was that military interrogators favored rapport building and other non-coercive approaches over all other types of interrogation techniques. The idea that forming a relationship with an interrogation subject is the best way to induce cooperation is a theme that is repeated again and again in the historical literature. It is also supported by the existing research on this topic and was reinforced by interrogators the principal investigator interviewed before the study commenced and data were collected. In the Kassin study, (Kassin, et al., 2007), almost one-third of the law enforcement investigators who participated in that study indicated that they always used rapport building during an interrogation.

Another theme in the literature about military interrogations is that one technique or approach may not work with all subjects. While rapport building was favored, the individual interrogatee and his or her determination not to cooperate could influence the length and breadth of an interrogation. One early study cited in the Literature Review suggested that detainees or prisoners of war with personality disorders were less susceptible to the emotional upheaval caused by capture and imprisonment and, as a result, less likely to break when interrogated.

Additional theories were adopted directly from the law enforcement literature. For

example, that research supports the idea that police investigators are overconfident in their ability to discern truth from falsehood and perform little better than chance. This supposition also influenced this study; it was assumed here that military interrogators are also overconfident in their ability to detect deception. The law enforcement literature has also established that police investigators tend to believe the suspect they are questioning is guilty, even in spite of protestations to the contrary. It was hypothesized here that military interrogators possessed a similar point of view. Many of the other questions on the survey, including Question 18, which asked interrogators to self-rate approaches, were drawn directly from the survey used by Kassin et al. (2007). That survey instrument was itself based on years of research and this study attempted to build on that research but with a different population.

Moreover, because of the lack of research literature about military interrogations, this study was also simply an attempt to gather data about a little studied subject. Towards that end, the survey here sought to collect information about military interrogations themselves and other qualitative data about this subject.

CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY

The survey instrument here is designed to address some of the gaps in knowledge about interrogations conducted by military interrogators in the United States and provide information about methods from their perspectives and based on their experiences. A copy of the survey instrument, which was posted on Survey Monkey, a commercial web-based survey service, is attached in the Appendix . A password was required to enter the survey.

The Survey Instrument

The survey instrument used here was adapted from the one used by Kassin et al. (2007) for their national investigators' study. Some of the questions were taken directly from that survey instrument with slight modifications and others were redesigned to meet the needs of this study's sample. Like that survey, the initial three questions here collected demographic information.

The next series of questions, four through seven, asked interrogators to provide information about admissions from interrogation subjects. These questions were modelled after questions on the national investigators' study but the phrase "suspects who were guilty" was replaced by the phrase "subjects who were involved with terrorist activities." These questions were constructed to provide a context for the question about deception detection. In addition, the questions sought to measure the degree to which military interrogators assume that the subject of an interrogation was actually involved in terrorist activities. The law enforcement literature about interrogations has shown that investigators often assume that the person they are interrogating is in fact guilty. This study hypothesized that military interrogators make similar assumptions about an interrogation subject.

Questions eight through eleven sought to elicit basic information about interrogations in the military context. There is little open-source empirical data about military interrogations and this series of questions was designed to develop the knowledge base about interrogations in this context. For example, Question nine asked about the average number of times a particular interrogation subject is interrogated. Question ten asked interrogators to estimate the average length of an interrogation in hours. These questions were taken directly from the national investigators' survey.

Question thirteen asked interrogators to self-rate their ability to detect deception and is similar to a question asked on the national investigators' survey. The law enforcement literature has established that law enforcement officers are overconfident in the ability to detect deception in an interrogation subject. This overconfidence can affect the tenor of an interrogation and imperil suspects who are actually innocent. This study hypothesized that military interrogators are also overconfident in their ability to detect deception and question thirteen was included to measure the confidence levels of this study's subjects.

Questions fourteen through seventeen were again included to expand the empirical knowledge base about military interrogations. For example, question seventeen asked military interrogators if their units regularly record interrogations. Gudjonsson (2003) and Kassin (2004) have long advocated that, in the interest of justice for all parties, law enforcement interrogations, in their entirety, should be videotaped. At the time of the survey's creation, it was unknown whether or not military interrogators regularly videotaped the interrogations that they conducted.

Question eighteen was a multi-part question modelled after question twenty-two on the national investigators study survey but adjusted to fit the military context. This question sought

to elicit answers about interrogation approaches and, for the most part, tracked the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006). Section 8-20 of the Field Manual lists specific approaches that military interrogators should use when attempting to induce cooperation in an interrogation subject. Question eighteen asked interrogators to self-rate these interrogation approaches as well as others commonly used by law enforcement. One of the central hypotheses of this study was that military interrogators believe building rapport with an interrogation subject is the best way to gather accurate intelligence. Question 18P addressed this hypothesis.

The structure of Question eighteen was adapted from the national investigator's survey. For example, Question 22O on that survey asked law enforcement officers if they regularly showed suspects photographs of the crime scene and/or the victim. Kassin et a. (2007) found that only 3% of that study's subjects always used this interrogation technique and it was rated fourteenth out of sixteen techniques. However, Question 18R here was also prompted in part by news reports that suggested intelligence interrogators in the GWOT sometimes showed their subjects pictures of the planes as they crashed into the World Trade Center and/or victims from that attack. See for example, Anonymous (2005).

Other parts of Question eighteen were also created based on information reported by journalists. For example, Q18U asked study subjects if they limited the sight of the people they questioned. This part of question eighteen reflected widespread news reports that intelligence interrogators regularly limited the senses of interrogation subjects. See for example Benjamin (2007). Photos have also depicted this practice. See for example in the few short years (*USA Today*, 2006).

Input on the Survey Instrument

After data collection had commenced, a number of military interrogators began to contact the principal investigator to offer their thoughts about the study and to provide input about the survey instrument. Source G, a retired Marine Corps interrogator who served in Vietnam, reviewed the survey line by line and provided one of the most detailed critiques. Source L, another retired Marine Corps interrogator who served in Vietnam, also gave the principal investigator extensive feedback about the interrogation process, the study and the survey.

Source G indicated that the principal investigator needed to modify the survey instrument to fit the needs of Marine Corps Interrogators. For example, Source G suggested that survey include a question asking how long a subject had served as an interrogator; the survey only asked subjects how long they had served in the military. Source G recounted that, to serve as a Marine Corps interrogator, one must be on his/her second or subsequent enlistment. This means that a Marine Corps interrogator must have a minimum of four years experience in the Marines before he or she can become an interrogator.

As noted earlier, questions five through eight ask questions related to "terrorism" and "terrorist activities." Source G suggested, as did many other study subjects, that the words "terrorism" and 'terrorist activities" be replaced with "insurgency" and "insurgent activities." This issue is further considered in the discussion section of this paper. Source G added that defining who is a "terrorist" is somewhat subjective and that individuals with knowledge of "terrorist activities" may in fact not be terrorists themselves. According to Source G "[p]ersons who have knowledge of terrorism…can be nothing more than an innocent civilian who has witnessed some neighborhood activities – are these included in the count?"

Source L indicated that the interrogation process has five steps or phases. Step I includes planning and preparation. Step II is the approach phase, the part of the interrogation process covered primarily in question eighteen. Step III is the questioning phase. Step IV is the termination phase and Step V is the report-writing phase. According to Source L, all of these steps in the interrogation process deserved their own series of questions.

Source L, who has trained interrogators, indicated that first, and perhaps most importantly, the survey did not include questions about planning and preparation for an interrogation, which he described as "Step or Phase I." According to Source L, this is the first and one of the most critical parts of the interrogation process; the interrogation plan may determine whether the interrogation is a success or a failure. Source L described this phase as including "Observation, Research, Review, Preparation/Planning."

This source also noted that the survey did not contain any questions about the third, fourth and fifth steps of the interrogation process. Including a series of questions for every step of the interrogation process may have made the survey instrument too long and time consuming to complete but these are important considerations for any subsequent survey research on this topic.

Securing A Sample

The original research plan called for samples from two separate populations, military interrogators and counterterrorism agents. All efforts to recruit non-military counterterrorism interrogators failed. [1]

[1] The counterterrorism agents were to consist of 50 detectives from a large city who are

At this point, the principal investigator turned to Source A, with the goal of recruiting subjects from a federal agency who regularly interrogate suspected terrorists. These efforts also hit a dead-end.[2]

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members of a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). In June of 2009, the chief of the city's Counterterrorism Bureau informally agreed to administer the surveys to the city's detectives under his command. The mechanics of participation were not finalized. Subsequent to this agreement, the chief requested that permission for participation be obtained from the head of the city's police department. In the fall of 2009, the head of the city's police department decided not to allow the city's detectives to participate in the study.

[2] Rather than file a research request with the federal agency and submit an application to its Institutional Review Board (IRB), Source A suggested that we target retired federal agents to participate in the study. This would alleviate the need to request the agency's formal participation in the study and avoid a lengthy IRB application process. Source A stated that many retired agents might have been part of the agency's counter intelligence program, a controversial covert operation designed to root out so-called subversive elements in the United States. According to Source A, some agents who participated in this program interrogated members of domestic terrorist organizations, such as the Black Panthers and the Weather Underground.

As a result of the conversations with Source A, the principal investigator prepared a new survey instrument tailored for subjects who were former federal agents. The new

Recruitment of Subjects

Military interrogators are difficult to recruit for research purposes and they may be especially hesitant to discuss interrogation techniques because of the current political climate in the United States. They are also uncomfortable openly discussing interrogation techniques, some of which may remain classified. Military interrogators believe they are being asked to protect the country yet are subject to heightened scrutiny by civilian leaders unfamiliar with the circumstances under which they are forced to operate. Informal conversations with military interrogators reveal that they are concerned about being exposed to criminal liability for some of the practices used during interrogations, now or in the future. It is also impossible to determine the population of military interrogators, active and retired, from which to draw a sample. The initial plan was to gather military subjects for the study using snowball sampling, based on a number of contacts established by the principal investigator. Initial contacts were to recruit respondents who would, in turn, direct additional respondents to the survey instrument.

Sample Number 1

In the course of seeking military interrogator respondents for the study, the principal investigator utilized a number of different strategies. An Internet blog was created, entitled

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survey required minor adjustments and was subsequently approved by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice IRB. Like the survey instrument for military interrogators, the survey for federal agents was posted on SurveyMonkey. A password was required to enter the survey.

HUMINT, http://humanintel.blogspot.com/, devoted to military interrogations. The blog featured articles about military interrogations and from time to time posted a solicitation for the study asking for military interrogators to participate in the research and contact the principal investigator for the password. The blog generated one subject for the study.

Next, the principal investigator placed two separate advertisements for the study in the Fort Huachuca Scout, a weekly newspaper that serves the community in Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Fort Huachuca is the home of the Army Intelligence School and the place where many interrogators go for initial and advanced training. The advertisements ran for consecutive weeks in the paper and, unlike the blog solicitations, the second ad provided the link and password for the survey. It appears that the ads recruited a small but ultimately unknown number of subjects for the study.

A number of current and retired interrogators have written books and articles about their experiences, both in Iraq and Afghanistan and other, earlier conflicts involving the United States. Source B was a captain in the United States Air Force and served in Iraq as the leader of an interrogation team. He wrote a book about interrogations and has been outspoken in the national debate about the use of harsh techniques and torture during interrogations. The principal investigator contacted Source B via e-mail and described the study to him. Source B provided a link to the HUMINT blog on his web site and passed along study contact information to a number of colleagues. Source B ultimately provided approximately two dozen subjects for the survey.

The principal investigator also reached out to other authors. Source C, at the time of contact an active duty Army interrogator and author of a book about her experiences,

participated in the survey. Source D, a retired Air Force intelligence officer and author of a book about military intelligence in the war in Iraq completed a survey and spoke at length to the principal investigator about the survey and his experiences conducting interrogations in Iraq. Source E, who served in Afghanistan after September 11, participated in the study and sought out colleagues as additional subjects. Source E was unsuccessful in convincing other interrogators to become part of the research project. This strategy was repeated with several other authors and achieved mixed success.

Source F is a highly experienced Air Force interrogator who testified before Congress when the torture debate was raging throughout the United States and the world. Source B gave the principal investigator contact information for Source F. After a phone conversation, Source F completed the survey tried to pitch the study to officials at the Army Intelligence School in Fort Huachuca and in other military forums.[3]

The blogosphere has created the opportunity for many active duty and retired military personnel to write publicly about their experiences as soldiers, including interrogators. The principal investigator searched military blogs in the hope of contacting interrogators. This tactic also resulted in mixed success. About a dozen interrogators were discovered in this way and some did agree to participate in the study and pass along information about the study to

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[3] Source F hoped to win official approval for the study, which would have allowed the principal investigator to administer the surveys en masse to a large group of interrogators at one time. Despite Source F's best efforts, official access to interrogators was never granted and, ultimately, he was never able to generate any subjects for the study.

colleagues. It is not clear how many subjects were netted using this approach.

In addition to searching the blogosphere, the principal investigator searched dozens of pages of links generated by a Google search using the words "military interrogator," "interrogator," and "humint collector." Each reference to an individual interrogator was further explored to determine if contact information for the interrogator was available on the Internet and if the individual was, in fact, an active duty or retired military interrogator. In a number of cases contact information was available and the person's authenticity seemed genuine. Ten to fifteen subjects were obtained through this type of Internet search.

As the result of a separate Internet search, the principal investigator found a website for a group called the Marine Corps. Interrogator Translator Teams Association (MCITTA), http://www.mcitta.org. The Marine Corps. Interrogator Translator Teams, which no longer exist, were self-contained units of interrogators and translators that conducted interrogations in various conflicts until 2002. The principal investigator contacted an officer at the Association and described the study to him in the summer of 2009. At one point, the officer, Source G, explained that the Association was having its annual meeting at the end of the summer and he would raise the idea of providing the principal investigator with the group's mailing list. Ultimately the membership of the MCITTA voted against releasing their mailing list. As an alternative, the group agreed to publish the link and password for the study in the summer edition of its newsletter, The Spot Report. This resulted in a probably small but unknown number of subjects for the study.

The principal investigator again consulted Source B for help in securing subjects or official access to interrogators. Source B provided the principal investigator contact information

for Source H. Source H, an army major and counterintelligence expert, is author of a review of interrogation operations in Iraq from May of 2003 until April 2004. Source H commanded a Military Intelligence Battalion in Iraq that included Army interrogators. Source H forwarded the survey link and password to interrogators who had been under his command. He also consulted a number of sources within the United States Army in an effort to gain the Army's imprimatur for the study. These efforts failed but Source H did succeed in garnering a small number of subjects for the study.

At this point, the principal investigator sought advice from Source A of the federal agency. Source A had recently visited Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and had established some contacts there, including some with interrogators. Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) is a detention facility that houses what the Bush administration termed "unlawful combatants" captured in Afghanistan and Iraq. At one time the facility held approximately 800 prisoners; today there are less than 200. Source A suggested that the principal investigator contact Source I, an interrogation unit chief at Guantanamo Bay. After some discussion, Source I went to his commander and requested permission for interrogators at GTMO to participate in the study. Officials there would not allow the principal investigator to formally administer the survey to all interrogators at GTMO. Source I did indicate that he would send the link and password to a few dozen interrogators at GTMO but could not require that interrogators would participate or guarantee that they would do so. This effort resulted in approximately twenty subjects for the study.

In the course of Internet searches for interrogators, the principal investigator discovered LinkedIn, http://www.linkedin.com/home?trk=hb_home, a social networking Internet site for

business professionals. According to the site, it has over 90 million registered members from across the globe. LinkedIn members post profiles of themselves in the hopes of making business connections or in order to search for a job. Members can contact each other through an internal mail system. Individuals can create a profile without charge but then only have the ability to contact people in their own network. Paid members can contact anyone on the site who accepts messages from its internal mail system, called Inmail.

A number of interrogators directly contacted by the principal investigator had profiles on LinkedIn. As a result, the principal investigator joined LinkedIn and began to pay the monthly fee. A subsequent search of LinkedIn membership revealed that several hundred military interrogators, both retired and active duty, maintained profiles on the site. As a result of this finding, the principal investigator contacted almost every military interrogator he could find on the site. Contacts were, for the most part, restricted to interrogators who indicated that they served in the military from 2001 forward or specifically listed service in Iraq or Afghanistan. Then a general solicitation letter was sent to the individual interrogator profiled on LinkedIn. The letter included the link and password to enter the survey and advised each recipient that the survey could be completed without contacting its author. Several dozen subjects were obtained using this strategy.

Some of the interrogators solicited from LinkedIn chose to respond to the principal investigator, including Source J, an Army interrogator who had been twice deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and worked in detention centers in both countries. Source J wrote to this researcher and offered to send the survey link and password to some of her colleagues. Through her efforts the study gained six more subjects. Several volunteered to be interviewed further about their

experiences.

As a result of the foregoing, 142 military interrogators completed all or part of the survey; 34 completed the entire survey instrument, 21 subjects omitted Question 21 only, a catch-all question and various other subjects skipped only one or two questions. Thirty-two subjects reached Question 5 and then failed to answer any other questions. The issue of missing data will be addressed subsequently.

Sample Number 2

As stated earlier, a second sample was collected from the population of retired federal agents. The sample was abandoned for several reasons, the most prominent being a lack of sufficient participants.[4]

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[4] Source A placed an advertisement about the study in a magazine aimed at retired federal agents. The ad included the link and password for the survey, which alleviated the need to contact the principal investigator for this information. Thirty retired federal agents entered the survey; only ten completed it. After a review the data and a discussion about the survey responses, a decision was made to exclude this data set from analysis.

In one last attempt to secure a larger sample of non-military counterterrorism agents, the principal investigator contacted federal agent Source K. Source A provided Source K's contact information. Source K is a member of a team of interrogators that is on stand-by at all times and travels the world interrogating high value targets captured as a result of the War on Terrorism. Source K reviewed the survey and discussed the study with the principal investigator. He was highly critical of the survey. After initial

Population and Sample

The participants in this study came from one distinct population: United States military interrogators, primarily from the Army, Air Force and Marines. One hundred and thirty-two interrogators participated in the study. The breakdown based on branch of service is as follows: one hundred and nine Army interrogators, accounting for 78.1% of those who answered this question; five or 6.4% came from the Air Force; nineteen subjects, 11.7% of the total, were Marine interrogators. [5] Twenty-three subjects refused to indicate their affiliation.

The sample was overwhelmingly male. One hundred and nine of the respondents were male, constituting 79.6% of the sample; nineteen respondents identified their gender as female, 13.9% of the sample. Eight respondents did not reveal their gender.

Respondents were also asked to describe their current status in the military. Twenty-eight subjects were on active duty, or 20.4% of those who answered this question. Twenty-two members of the sample, 16.1%, described themselves as in the reserves. Fifty-five respondents, 40.1%, were retired from service. Six subjects, 5.6%, stated they were members of a Joint Terrorism Task Force. Twenty-three people skipped this question. Frequencies and percentages

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discussions, Source K subsequently failed to follow-up.

[5] Military interrogators from all the branches of the U.S. military use the approaches and techniques described by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Interrogation Handbook (2005) and the Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) when questioning prisoners of war and suspected members of terrorist groups.

for the demographic variables are described in Table 1.

Most of the study participants had five or more years of experience in the military. One interrogator served for thirty-four years, the most of anyone who answered this question. One interrogator had one year of service, the least amount of time among the 116 subjects who answered the question. The mean length of service was 12.77 years (*SD* = 8.37). Six respondents skipped this question.

Descriptive Statistics for Interrogation Methods

The descriptive statistics for the various interrogation methods are displayed in Table 2. Respondents performed between zero and 5,000 interrogations; the mean number of interrogations was 301.19 (*SD* = 672.5). Respondents reported that they elicited between zero and ninety-five full admissions; the mean number of full admissions was 16.05 (*SD* = 23.29). Respondents further indicated that they elicited between zero and 175 partial admissions; the mean number of partial admissions was 34.49 (*SD* = 32.18). Participants reported that they elicited between zero and 200 non-admissions; the mean number of non-admissions was 43.85 (*SD* = 36.09).

Table 1

Frequencies and Percentages for Demographic Variables (N=132)

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Male	104	84.6
Female	19	15.4
Status		
Active duty	27	25.2
Reserve	19	17.8
Retired	55	51.4
JTTF	6	5.6
Branch		
Army	103	83.1
Air Force	5	4.0
Marines	16	12.9

The number of times that an individual suspect was interrogated ranged from one to ten: the mean number of times that a suspect was interrogated was 5.44 (SD = 2.87). The number of hours an individual suspect was interrogated ranged from zero to twelve; the mean number of hours was 2.22 (*SD* = 1.63). Respondents indicated that the longest interrogation they conducted (in hours) ranged from zero to seventy-two hours; the longest interrogation on average was 10.63 hours (SD = 14.16).

The percentage of correct identifications of a suspect who was actually a terrorist ranged from zero to one hundred. The mean percentage of correct identification was 66.66 (*SD* = 23.10).

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for Interrogation Measures

Variable	N	Range	Mean	SD
Number of interrogations	88	0 to 5000	300.13	691.24
Percentage of all subjects who:				
Admitted full involvement	76	0 to 95	16.39	23.88
Admitted partial involvement	76	0 to 175	34.93	32.95
Did not admit any involvement	76	0 to 200	42.68	36.57
Percentage of subjects involved in terrorist activities who:				
Admitted full involvement	48	0 to 90	16.00	25.57
Admitted partial involvement	48	0 to 95	29.92	31.25
Did not admit any involvement	48	0 to 100	38.02	34.58
Percentage of subjects not involved in terrorist activities who:				
Admitted full involvement	47	0 to 100	4.79	18.69
Admitted partial involvement	46	0 to 100	14.17	25.29
Did not admit any involvement	47	0 to 100	51.43	42.56
Interrogations per suspect	82	1 to 10	5.40	2.82
Hours per suspect	59	0 to 12	2.22	1.68
Longest interrogation (hours)	57	0 to 72	9.56	12.69
Percentage correctly identified truth or lie	56	0 to 100	67.16	22.62

Threats to External Validity Posed By The Sample

As was discussed, it was extremely difficult to recruit military interrogators to be a part of this research. As a result, the methods used to secure a sample, as well as the answers of some of the study participants themselves may pose a significant threat to the external validity of the

data obtained. In general, interrogators chose to participate in this study; random sampling was not used. There may be something different about those who chose to participate when compared to the population of military interrogators. In addition, many of the participants who contacted the principal investigator advocated forcefully for a rapport-based approach to interrogations and this is supported by the data collected. This may not be the prevailing view but simply reflects this particular sample of interrogators.

Some of the interrogators contacted, both on the Internet and LinkedIn, may not in fact be interrogators. While the principal investigator made every effort to insure that only bona fide interrogators participated in the study, it is possible that imposters may have contaminated the data. The anonymity of most of the participants, which may have allowed them the freedom to answer questions honestly, prevented the principal investigator from verifying their credentials.

In all survey research there is a danger that participants may answer questions according to how they believe the researcher wants them to answer. There is less danger of that here because most participants knew little about the principal investigator. It is, however, still possible that respondents believed the principal investigator had some sort of political agenda and answered the questions accordingly. Participants could also have been reluctant to endorse coercive interrogation techniques out of fear of being identified or worse, even if they believed these methods were effective.

The Survey Instrument

As noted, Kassin et al. (2007) conducted the first self-report survey of best interrogation practices and beliefs of law enforcement officers and this study followed that model, using

different populations to obtain the sample. Like that study, the survey instrument here (Appendix) asked participants to address and self-report on a number of issues, some in common with law enforcement and others that apply specifically to military interrogations. Participants were asked to estimate, rate and self-report on six facets of their work: (1) how they rate their ability to detect truth or deception; (2) their practices with regard to 21 of the general approach techniques authorized by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Interrogation Handbook, including the frequency of use of rapport building to extract information from a subject; (3) the frequency, length and timing of interrogations; (4) training, and (5) their observations, if any, of others using techniques during interrogations not approved for use by the Army Field Manual and, if so, (6) with what frequency. Participants were also asked to name the three interrogation techniques that they believed work best to obtain cooperation from a subject. The goal here was to obtain common practices, observations, and beliefs about interrogations directly from military interrogators.

No personal identifying information was collected from subjects other than gender, length of service and whether the respondent was in the reserves, was on active duty or retired. Participants completed an on-line survey instrument, posted on SurveyMonkey, a commercial, on-line survey tool that allows users to create and post survey instruments on the Internet. The survey itself was specifically designed for military interrogators; therefore no other identifying affiliation was collected, primarily because it is not necessary. Only United States military interrogators, on active duty, in the reserves or retired, as determined by the principal investigator, were directed to the questionnaire, which took approximately fifteen minutes to complete. Entering the survey required a password, which was provided by the principal

investigator or a vetted contact.

A secure server (SSL) allowed respondents to complete the survey without fear of others decoding the data they entered onto the survey. In the event an outside server intercepted the data, a secure server prevented third parties from decoding the data. Server authentification also prevented an outside server from redirecting data entered onto the survey instrument to a third party. SurveyMonkey offers a secure server for its members, with server authentification. Initially, it was envisioned that at least some of the surveys would be administered and completed in paper form. Because of the way the sample was obtained and the locations of the subjects, it was easier and more convenient to use only an on-line version of the survey.

It was originally proposed that the results of this study would be compared to those from the Kassin study, as well as the empirical research to date on law enforcement interrogations, in order to determine if military interrogators and counterterrorism agents ascribe to the same or similar beliefs as their law enforcement counterparts. It was also proposed that data from the current study would be analyzed to determine if military and counterterrorism interrogators believe some of the myths about deception detection and questioning methods that the law enforcement research has refuted. At the end of data collection, the focus of the data analysis was the subject of a discussion. As a result of this discussion, it was decided that data analysis would be limited to the data set collected from the sample of military interrogators.

Approximately twenty interrogators contacted the principal investigator and provided feedback about the survey and interrogations in general. This feedback highlighted some deficiencies in the survey instrument that can be remedied in subsequent research in this area. Much of the feedback centered around two main themes: the survey's emphasis on terrorism and

the lack of questions about preparation for an interrogation.

When the survey was initially designed, terrorism preoccupied the nation. News reports about interrogations focused on the use of harsh interrogation techniques and torture on suspected terrorists such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11th attacks. News commentators and military experts repeatedly discussed in public the challenges and difficulties of interrogating "hardened" terrorists, who, it was sometimes argued, were not susceptible to traditional rapport building techniques. As a result, the survey instrument for this study focused on the interrogation of suspected terrorists.

Military interrogators have likely questioned thousands since the hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq began. Most of these interrogation subjects should be more accurately classified as insurgents, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or irregular forces, not terrorists. (The term terrorism, with over 100 different definitions, is itself problematic.) While some front-line interrogators may have interrogated high-value or mid-ranking terrorists, most interrogation subjects could not be definitively labeled terrorists.

Question 21

The final question on the survey, Question 21, provided study participants with an opportunity to comment in narrative form about interrogations approaches and their effectiveness. Question 21 reads, " What three interrogation techniques do you believe are most effective at acquiring accurate actionable intelligence from an interrogation subject." Most of the study participants who answered this question chose to answer the question directly without commentary. A number of subjects used this question (and Question 20) to point out deficiencies in the survey or to offer more expansive answers to issues related to interrogations.

The subjects who answered this question often listed more than one interrogation techniques as effective. In all, the 89 subjects who answered this question recommended 223 approaches or techniques. Most respondents suggested more than one approach, sometimes in combination. Three of the 89 answered "none."

In order to more closely scrutinize the answers to Question 21, a content analysis was performed. After a review of the answers to Question 21, fifteen different interrogation strategies were identified. A sixteenth category was reserved for recommended techniques or comments that did not fit into a specific category. (See Table 4.)

The fifteen categories were as follows: (1) appeal to the subject's emotions; (2) ask the subject direct questions; (3) empathize with the subject; (4) provide the subject with some incentive; (5) trade something the subject wants for information; (6) convince the subject that resistance is futile; (7) establish a relationship with the subject; (8) create fear in the subject; (9) mitigate the subject's fear; (10) confront the subject with inconsistencies or incriminating evidence (11) separate or isolate the subject from others; (12) deprive the subject of sleep; trick the subject into cooperating; (14) flatter the subject; and, (15) attack the subject's self image. (See Table 4.) Category 16 was uncategorized.

Subsequently, the principal investigator and a second researcher categorized all the answers to Question 21 using the 16 categories created. Subjects who answered Question 21 recommended a total of 223 (n = 223) different interrogations and each of these recommendations was examined to determine the appropriate category in which to place it. The second researcher randomly selected 16 answers to Question 21 and rated them as well to establish inter-rater reliability.

CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

The first series of questions collected demographic data and was previously described in the section that discussed the sample. The next set of questions, 5, 6, 7 and 8, asked for specific information about the interrogation of terrorists. As discussed earlier, these questions pose threats to the survey's external validity, primarily because of the use of the term terrorism. Question 5 asked, over the course of your career in the military about how many subjects involved in terrorism or who have knowledge about terrorist activities have you conducted, alone or with other interrogators. Answers ranged from zero to one thousand. It is unlikely that one interrogator questioned one thousand people who were involved in terrorism or had knowledge of terrorist activities. It is more likely that this respondent was referring to the number of interrogation subjects in general he interrogated during his twenty-two year military career.

For those eleven survey respondents that answered zero in response to Question 5, this answer is deceptive. It is likely that these respondents interrogated subjects who might be characterized as insurgents, detainees, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), irregular forces or members of a foreign military force even if they did not interrogate anyone they believed to be a terrorist. In future surveys, the focus on terrorism should be eliminated.

Questions 9 through 12 and 14 and 15 collected data about the characteristics of the interrogation process. For example, Question 9 asked, in your own experience what would you say is the average number of times an individual subject is interrogated. Almost 32% of the survey respondents said the average number of interrogations of one individual was three. Almost 24% answered that individual subjects were interrogated an average of ten or more

times, the next biggest group. Fifty subjects skipped this question. Question 11 asked what is the longest interrogation you were involved and answers ranged from one month to two hours.

Question 10 asked what is the average length of an interrogation. Of the 73 respondents who answered this question, most put the length of the interrogation between two and three hours. The time ranged from a half hour to five hours.

Question 13 sought to measure confidence in deception detection. Unfortunately a follow-up question was omitted from the survey when it was posted on-line. The follow-up question asked what percentage of the time was the interrogator correct in his/her judgment about the truth or falsehood of the interrogatee's statements. This question, had it been included, would have provided some measure of the interrogator's actual accuracy in assessing deception. Despite this omission, Question 13 still holds value as a measure of how individual interrogators self-rate their ability to detect deception.

Question 13 reads how skilled are you at knowing if a subject who denies involvement in, or knowledge of, terrorist activities during an interrogation is telling the truth or lying. Sixteen respondents out of the seventy-two who answered said they had a deception detection rate of 85% or better. The most frequent answer was an 80% confidence rate; twelve respondents provided this answer. The lowest rate of confidence was 10% and one respondent wrote that truth or lying cannot be "judged;" the highest level of confidence was 100%. Fifty-five of the seventy-two respondents who answered this question rated their confidence level at above 50%. The mean score was 70.98% and the standard deviation was 19.841. About 60% of the respondents reported that they knew a "subject who denies involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities during an interrogation is telling the truth or lying" 75% or more of the time.

Question 14 asked the subjects if they had received special training about how to conduct interrogations. Twenty-eight of the sixty-eight people who responded in the affirmative had taken the Reid course on interrogations and interviewing. As discussed in the literature review, thousands of law enforcement officers have trained in the Reid Technique despite the doubts experts have about its value. Two respondents had done some interrogation training with the Israelis and several had participated in a British interrogation course. Seven or 9.3% of the sixty-eight respondents said they had not received special training but this may reflect the ambiguity of the question. The question refers to special training. It is possible that those who answered no did not consider the basic interrogator's course that they took at the Army Intelligence School in Fort Huachuca, Arizona as special training. It is also possible that any subsequent routine courses that were part regular interrogation training may not have been considered "special."

Question 15 asked the subjects' units videotaped interrogations. Experts in the United States have long advocated that law enforcement interrogations should be recorded. Among the seventy respondents who answered this question, there was almost an even split: 54.3% reported that interrogations were videotaped and 50% said they were not. In some cases the written responses were contradictory. For example, one subject reported that as of 2009, there was no army-wide videotaping. This subject, a male with twenty-seven years of service remarked that no "good" interrogators would avoid having the interrogation taped. Another respondent, a twenty-five year Army veteran, said that interrogations were taped for a number of purposes, including training and in case of claims of abuse. In most cases, when interrogations were taped, the tapes were destroyed after a short period of time. One person answered that this information was classified.

Question 16 asked if the interrogators are fluent in a language other than English. Of the seventy-six respondents who answered this question, fifty-three or 69.7% answered in the affirmative. Languages included Arabic, Serbo-Croatian, German, Tagalog, Russian, Spanish, French and Vietnamese. Fourteen subjects described themselves as fluent in Arabic. A retired four-year Army veteran noted that at one time interrogators were required to attend the Defense Language Institute in Monterey California for language training but this requirement had been dropped. Another subject indicated that he could conduct a screening in Arabic but relied on his interpreter "95%" for interrogations. When asked in Question 17 about the use of an interpreter, thirty-six subjects, 50% of the sample who answered this question, stated that they always used an interpreter during an interrogation.

Question 18 was a multi-part question that asked interrogators to self-rate different approach techniques that are described in the Army Field Manual on interrogations. The question lists twenty-one approach techniques: those methods designed to encourage an interrogatee to speak to his or her interlocutor. Seventy study participants answered at least part of this question. The top three methods for getting an interrogation subject to talk were rapport building, Q18P, identifying contradictions in an interogatee's story, Q18D, and appealing to the interrogatee's self interest, Q18K. Fifty-two interrogators, 75.4% of the study participants who answered this question, indicated that they always tried to build rapport with the subject of an interrogation and gain his or her trust. The range of scores for rapport building was two to four and the mean score was 3.80. The standard deviation was .443. Of all the respondents who answered this question, 98% used the technique of building rapport and gaining trust often or always.

The emotional love approach, advocated in the Army Field Manual on interrogations, also garnered support in Question 18M. Forty-one interrogators, 59.4% of those that answered this question, use this approach often. This approach was also discussed by interrogators in Questions 20 and 21 and will be addressed further below. Ten interrogators always use this approach during an interrogation. This means that 73.9% of the subjects who answered this question use this approach often or always. Scores ranged from two to four and the mean score for this question was 2.97. The standard deviation was .610.

A number of practices that are used in fictionalized accounts of interrogations were disfavored by a majority of the interrogators who answered this question. For example, forty-eight subjects, 70.6% of the total, said they never physically intimidate a subject. Fifty-four interrogators, 78.3%, said they never limited the interrogation subject's sense of sight. Forty-seven interrogators said they never throw objects in the interrogation booth or room, 67.1% of the total who answered this question. On the question's five-point scale, the technique with the highest average score was building rapport, with a mean score of 4.74. Ten interrogators said that they always used this approach.

Question 19 asked if interrogators had ever observed interrogators using techniques prohibited by the Army Field Manual. Of the seventy-one subjects who answered this question, fifty-seven or 69.5% said they had never observed this. Seventeen or 20.7% of those who answered said that they had seen this on "rare occasions". Seven respondents, 8.5% said they observed interrogators using prohibited techniques sometimes. One respondent said that he observed interrogators often use techniques prohibited by the Field Manual. No one answered always.

Questions 20 and 21 were opened ended questions designed to allow interrogators to comment in a more expansive way about techniques. Question 20 generated the lowest response rate of all the questions in the survey. Only fifty study subjects answered this question. Question 20 asked interrogators to describe any effective interrogation techniques that were not included in Question 18. This question was somewhat ambiguous and this is reflected in some of the comments. This survey gathered data about approach techniques: those methods that induce an interrogation subject to cooperate. The interrogation, or interview as described by some, itself comes after using a successful approach technique or techniques. As a result of the ambiguity of the question, answers varied. One subject number responded that he had seen interrogators crossing the line but "that was steadily and effectively fixed in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandals, at least within the military."

In answering Question 20, almost all the respondents took the opportunity to list approach techniques that they believed were the most efficacious and answers varied widely. For example, several subjects emphasized that rapport building is an essential approach technique. Others credited the Reid technique. One subject, (number 28), commented that the "Reid Techniques are paramount in effective interrogating." This subject, an active duty female with more than five years experience added that while "they are not legitimately allowed to be written down as part of an interrogation plan per the Army, they can be incorporated into all Army interrogation techniques and should be." Another subject, (number 65), a retired male with six years in the Army, also endorsed the Reid Technique. As noted in the literature review,

the value of the Reid Technique has been questioned by a number of scholars including Kassin. [6]

A number of subjects advocated the direct approach, or asking an interrogatee straightforward questions. One respondent said that this works "95% of the time. Another subject argued, "The most effective technique has always been direct questioning." This subject, number 73, a retired Army male with over four years experience added, "if the interrogator, interpreter (sic) and subject are all laughing together information is generally more reliable." Another subject, a retired Marine with twenty eight years of experience, (number 8), stated, "During the Vietnam War, the most effective means of obtaining information was through the Direct Approach." A male, twenty-seven year veteran of the Army, endorsed the direct approach for enemy prisoners of war. This subject added that "for Islamic terrorists, trickery and ruse. Absolutely the best and quickest way to get information from a genuine high-value target." Many of the respondents specifically decried torture.

An active duty Army male with nineteen years of experience emphasized that information, not a confession, was the goal of the interrogation. This subject noted "If the bad guy does not want to admit he is bad but wants to share reliable information in order to try and convince me he is a good guy then it would be foolish of me to focus on his guilt."

One subject, (number 110), a male Army veteran who retired after four years, listed sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, the "control slap," stress positions and shackling as effective techniques. This respondent acknowledged that with an "inexperienced" and

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[6] While the Army interrogation Field Manual does not officially endorse the Reid Technique, interrogators have received advanced training in this method.

"uneducated" interrogator these techniques could quickly "get out of hand," but further commented that it was "bull shit" that these methods are "prohibited army wide." He stated that these approaches "have their time and place and should be allowed by experienced, well-trained, skilled collectors." This was the only subject who advocated techniques specifically prohibited by the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006).

Question 21 generated similar types of responses. It asked what three techniques do you believe are the most effective to gather actionable intelligence. Again, subject number 110 was the only subject, out of the sixty-nine who answered this question, to advocate techniques forbidden by the Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual (2006). This subject wrote that "limiting the approaches an interrogator can use in the name of humanity or any other PC consideration is complete horseshit. I'm not saying we should beat every detainee, but what I am saying is sometimes the only breaking point for a detainee is a restricted approach."

One subject recommended sleep deprivation as an effective tool to break an interrogatee and win his compliance. This subject, number 97, was an Army reservist with just over fourteen years of experience. The answer was given without any further elaboration about the use of sleep deprivation. It should be noted that the Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual (2006) allows for limiting detainees' sleep to four hours in a twenty-four hour period, a practice that some prominent interrogators believe constitutes inhumane treatment, if not torture.

Twenty-one subjects, out of seventy-nine, recommended a specific approach contained in the Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual (2006): the emotional love approach. The Field Manual states that to be successful with this approach, the interrogator must "focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds himself" (Army Human

Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual, 2006). The interrogator further works to exploit the love that the interrogatee feels for family, country or comrades. One subject however, a seven year Army reservist, dismissed the emotional love approach as worthless and only practiced by what he described as "poor" interrogators.

Twenty-six subjects advocated a rapport-building approach to interrogations, sometimes in combination with other strategies. An Army reservist with seven years of experience, (number 1), wrote, "Rapport building, which takes a lot of time, will work with most any subject." A twenty-six year Air Force reservist, (number 16), recommended "establishing trust and rapport through displays of cultural finesses and the appearance of genuine concern for the detainee' interests." An active duty male with nineteen years of experience, (number 115), wrote, "[B]asic rapport building is the most effective. This is in part because many of the 'hardened terrorists' we capture expect physical and verbal abuse. When we offer a cup of tea instead it takes them out of their comfort zone."

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics for Interrogation Methods

Variable	N	Range	Mean	SD
Isolating subject from family and friends	75	1 to 5	3.77	1.36
Isolating subject from other prisoners	78	1 to 5	3.35	1.19
Confronting subject with evidence of involvement in terrorist acts	76	1 to 5	3.64	.92
Identifying contradictions in subject's story	78	1 to 5	4.31	.80
Interrupting subject's denials and objections	76	1 to 5	3.53	1.01
Physically intimidating the subject	77	1 to 4	1.44	.80
Conducting the interrogation with more than one interrogator	77	1 to 5	2.83	.89
Pretending to have independent evidence of terrorist involvement	75	1 to 5	2.95	.99
Yelling at subject	78	1 to 5	2.14	.86
Throwing physical objects in interrogation room	79	1 to 5	1.46	.75
Appealing to subject's self-interests	79	1 to 5	4.04	.79
Appealing to subject's religion or conscience	78	1 to 5	3.41	.92
Appealing to subject's love of family, comrades, or homeland	78	1 to 5	3.87	.73
Appealing to subject's negative feelings toward his group/leaders	78	1 to 5	3.27	.88
Convincing subject he has nothing to fear by cooperating	79	1 to 5	3.80	.97
Establishing rapport and gaining subject's trust	78	1 to 5	4.72	.48
Expressing impatience, anger, or frustration at subject	77	1 to 5	2.51	.82
Showing subject photographs of victims of terrorist attacks	75	1 to 5	1.91	.98
Convincing subject that resistance to questioning is futile	78	1 to 5	2.78	1.19
Promising subject something of value in return for cooperation	78	1 to 5	2.78	1.18
Limiting subject's sense of sight	78	1 to 3	1.32	.63

Note. Higher scores indicate more frequent use of method.

Question 21

The principal investigator examined each of the eighty-four answers to Question 21. The principal investigator then rated each of the responses according to the rating system previously discussed. Some study subjects, as indicated, described more than one approach that they recommended as effective. Several respondents named four or five specific approaches that they believed were the most efficacious.

As discussed earlier, a second researcher randomly selected and rated sixteen of the eighty-four answers. Agreement between the two raters was 87.5%; 14 of the second rater's ratings were correctly categorized. As a result, inter-rater reliability was high.

In their answers to Question 21, some subjects used military jargon. For example, Subject Number One answered this question, in part, with the following: love of family/compassion and we know all. These are approaches specifically recommended in the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual. The manual suggests a number of interrogation approaches based on what it calls "Emotional Love," and it further describes specific types of "Emotional Love," including love of family, comradeship or patriotism. The manual explains how this approach may be used to gain the cooperation of an interrogation subject and it cites examples. The manual states that the interrogator must perform "an action that can realistically evoke" an emotion "that can be tied to the source's cooperation" (Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual, 2006). In essence, the love a prisoner may feel for his friends or family can be used as an incentive to induce cooperation. The field manual states, " if the source cooperates, he can see his family sooner, end the war, protect his comrades, help his country or help his ethnic group" (Army Human Intelligence Collector

Operations Field Manual).

Another recommended approach was what the interrogators called "fear up." This is also an approach described in the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual. The field manual describes the fear up approach as follows: "the interrogator "identifies a pre-existing fear or creates a fear within the source (Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual, 2006). The manual continues that to effectively use this approach, the interrogator must link "the elimination or reduction of the fear to cooperation on the part of the source" (Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Operations). For the purposes of the content analysis this was Category 8, create fear in the subject.

A companion approach to fear up is called "fear down." According to the manual, with this approach, "the HUMINT collector mitigates existing fear in exchange for cooperation on the part of the source (Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual, 2006). For the purposes of the content analysis, this was Category 9, mitigate the subject's fear.

Category 4, provide the subject with some incentive, and Category 5, trade something the subject wants for information, were distinct in the interrogation context. Some respondents indicated that they would, on their own initiative, offer tea, cigarettes or even English lessons to interrogation subjects with the hope that the subject would then cooperate. Category 5 included situations in which the interrogation subject expressed a desire or need for something and the interrogator offered to fulfill this desire or need in exchange for information. In essence, strategies included in Category 4 were initiated by the interrogator's quest for information; Category 5 approaches included situations where the interrogator sought to act based on seemingly innocuous information or need provided by the interrogation subject.

The three most utilized interrogation approaches were Category 1, appeal to the interrogation subject's emotions, (*f = 32),*[7] Category 7, establish a relationship with the interrogation subject, (*f* = 32), and Category 4, provide the interrogation subject with some incentive (*f* = 29). The least recommended approach was Category 15, attack the interrogation subject's self image (*f* = 3). Nineteen recommended approaches could not be categorized, representing 8.5% of the total number of recommendations. For example, study subject 49 suggested "coercion of a personal nature" as an interrogation approach and this was deemed to be uncategorized. Study subject 50 offered, "Control questions from a dossier of know facts." This part of study subject 50's answer was also deemed uncategorized. (See Table 4.)

Category 1 and Category 7 each accounted for 14.3% of the recommended approaches. Category 9, provide the interrogation subject with an incentive, represented 13% of the total *n*, 223. Surprisingly, Category 10, confront the interrogation subject with inconsistencies or incrimination evidence, a law common enforcement technique, was recommended 15 times, representing 6.7% of all the recommendations. Category 11, separate or isolate the subject from others, was recommended 4 times, 1.7% of the total n. This was also somewhat unexpected in light of countless media accounts early on in the GWOT decrying the reported widespread use of isolation. (See Table 4.)

[7] *f* = frequency of use.

Table 4

Frequencies and Percentages of Interrogation Strategies (N = 223)

Strategy	Frequency	Percentage
Appeal to the subject's emotions	32	14.34
Ask the subject direct questions	17	7.62
Empathize with the subject	9	4.04
Provide the subject with an incentive	29	13.00
Trade something the subject wants for information	6	2.69
Convince the subject that resistance is futile	10	4.48
Establish a relationship with the subject	32	14.35
Create fear in the subject	13	5.83
Mitigate the subject's fear	11	4.93
Confront the subject with inconsistencies/incriminating evidence	15	6.73
Separate/isolate the subject from others	4	1.79
Deprive the subject of sleep	5	2.24
Trick the subject into cooperating	7	3.14
Flatter the subject	11	4.93
Attack the subject's self-image	3	1.35
Other	19	8.52

Missing Data

As previously discussed, the survey contained twenty-two questions, several of which had multiple parts, and response rates varied. No question had a 100% response rate. Five people entered the survey and answered no questions. The first four questions on the questionnaire, which collected demographic information, generated the highest response rates and over one hundred study subjects answered this series of questions. Surprisingly, question

three, which asked subjects to state their current status, saw a significant decline in answers when compared to the other three demographic questions. Current status seems fairly innocuous; responses to this question reveal nothing that could be considered classified or a "trade secret" of military interrogators that subjects might be loathe to give up. Three females skipped this question.

The most dramatic drop-off occurred when respondents reached the first series of questions about the interrogation of terrorists or terrorist suspects, questions five through eight inclusive. Thirty-two respondents reached Question 5, declined to answer it and then failed to answer any subsequent questions.

Based on conversations with individual interrogators who chose to contact the principal investigator, the term "terrorist" was both inappropriate and far removed from the experiences of most of the interrogators who participated in this study. The term terrorist was not just conceptually incorrect; its use also caused the survey to lose credibility in the eyes of some interrogators. Again this is based on conversations with individual interrogators. There were individual interrogators were also disillusioned by the use of this term but decided to continue the survey in spite of the problems in nomenclature.

In order to more closely examine if there were significant differences between subjects who completed the study and subjects who did not, cross-tabulation procedures were conducted between the demographic variables (i.e., gender, active/inactive and military branch) and response status. A logistic regression procedure was conducted between the demographic variable measured on an interval scale (for example, number of years of service) and response status.

Response status did not vary significantly across males and females, X^2 (1) = 2.28, p = .132. Similarly, response status did not vary significantly across active/inactive status groups, X^2 (13) = 1.68, p = .641. Response rates also did not change as a result of branch of service, X^2 (3) = .79, p = .851. Finally, years of service did not meaningfully predict response status, X^2 (1) = 2.30, p = .129.

A review and comparison of differences between "completers" and "non-completers" did not reveal any meaningful patterns or trends. The sample was overwhelmingly male and this was reflected in the comparison between completers and non-completers. Thirty-four males completed the survey and accounted for 91.9% of all completers. Females represented 8.1% of the study's completers; 18 females, 18.8% of the non-completers, did not finish the survey. (See Table 5.)

Completers and non-completers were then compared based on status. Five reservists completed the survey, 13.5% of all completers. Thirteen reservists, 17.1 of the total, did not answer all the questions on the survey. Twenty-two subjects, who described themselves as retired, completed the survey, representing 59.5% of all completers. Thirty-eight retirees did not answer all questions, accounting for 50% of this group. Ten study participants who identified themselves as on active duty completed the survey, 27% of all completers. Twenty-three active duty subjects were non-completers and represented 30.3% of this group. Finally, as somewhat of an anomaly, two subjects who identified themselves as members of a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) did not answer all of the questions on the survey. JTTF members consisted of 2.6% of all non-completers.

Next, completers and non-completers were compared based on the branches of the armed

forces in which they served. Twenty-nine members of the United States Army completed the survey and this represented 78.4% of all completers based on service branch. Eighty-one Army interrogators did not finish the survey. Five Marines answered all question, 13.5% of the total, while eleven Marines did not answer all questions, 11.3% of the total. Two members of the Air Force answered all survey questions, 5.4% of the total. Four members of the Air Force did not complete the questionnaire, 4.1% of the total.

The differences in completion rates based on these different demographic characteristics was not statistically significant. As was discussed a number of times previously, it is likely that some respondents were dissuaded from completing the survey by questions five through eight and others simply soldiered on. The survey did not collect enough data to provide an answer of statistical significance. There is, however, a clear pattern of behavior by study participants: if a study subject reached Question 5 and did not answer it, there was a strong likelihood that this subject would answer no subsequent questions. Thirty-two study participants reached Question 5, failed to answer it and then abandoned the survey altogether.

Table 5

Comparisons Between Completers & Non-Completers

Variable	Completers		Non-Completers	
	N	(%)	*N*	(%)
Gender				
Male	34	(91.9)	78	(81.3)
Female	3	(8.1)	18	(18.8)
Active/Inactive status				
Reserve	5	(13.5)	13	(17.1)
Retired	22	(59.5)	38	(50.0)
Active	10	(27.0)	23	(30.3)
JTTF	0	(.0)	2	(2.6)
Armed Forces branch				
Army	29	(78.4)	81	(83.5)
Marines	5	(13.5)	11	(11.3)
Air Force	2	(5.4)	4	(4.1)
Other	1	(2.7)	1	(1.0)

Comparisons to Kassin Study

As stated above, this studied was modeled after one conducted by Kassin and his associates (Kassin, et. al., 2007). This researcher used Kassin's survey instrument and modified it to fit the military interrogation context. In his study, Kassin identified sixteen interrogation strategies used by police investigators and asked that sample of investigators to self-rate these sixteen techniques. (See Table 6) Like that study, military interrogators here were asked to self-rate twenty-one different interrogation approaches or techniques. (See Table 6.) Several of the

twenty-one approaches self-rated in this study were unique to intelligence interrogations but many of the techniques that were to be self-rated were the same in both studies. Eleven techniques or approaches from the two studies were compared using a two-sample t-test. (See Table 6.) The self-rated approaches or techniques compared were identical or similar in terms of the types of data they were designed to collect.

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for Interrogation Methods

Variable	Study Sample			Kassin Sample			*t*	
	N	*M*	*SD*	*N*	*M*	*SD*		
Isolating subject from family and friends	75	3.77	1.36	631	4.49	.86	-4.47	***
Confronting subject with evidence of involvement in terrorist acts	76	3.64	.92	631	3.90	.77	-2.37	*
Identifying contradictions in subject's story	78	4.31	.8	631	4.23	.82	.83	
Interrupting subject's denials and objections	76	3.53	1.01	631	3.22	1.09	2.51	*
Physically intimidating the subject	77	1.44	.8	631	1.43	.80	.10	
Pretending to have independent evidence of terrorist involvement	75	2.95	.99	631	3.11	1.01	-1.32	
Appealing to subject's self-interests	79	4.04	.79	631	3.46	.94	6.01	***
Appealing to subject's religion or conscience	78	3.41	.92	631	2.70	1.17	6.22	***
Establishing rapport and gaining subject's trust	78	4.72	.48	631	4.08	.83	10.06	***
Expressing impatience, anger, or frustration at subject	77	2.51	.82	631	2.04	.88	4.71	***
Showing subject photographs of victims of terrorist attacks	75	1.91	.98	631	2.27	1.08	-2.97	**

$p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Eleven interrogation approaches or techniques were identical or similar in both surveys and these were used for comparison purposes. The approaches or techniques that were the same or similar are described in Table 6. Comparisons of similar techniques may not offer statistically sound results but were compared none-the-less. In addition, Kassin's sample was much larger than the sample size used in this study as demonstrated on Table 6.

The findings are as follows. The respondents from the Kassin study used these interrogation techniques more often than the respondents in the current study sample: isolating the subject from family and friends; confronting the subject with evidence of involvement in the crime (terrorist activities); and, showing the subject photographs of victims of crimes (terrorist acts). This finding makes intuitive sense because of the ambiguity of the term terrorist as used in this study and because military interrogators did not likely possess pictures of terrorist attacks with which to confront interrogatees. Military interrogators are also not concerned will building a case that will ultimately be settled by some legal procedure, such as a trial or plea bargain.

The Kassin study sample used a number of techniques or approaches less often that the respondents in the current study. These included interrupting a subject's denials and objections, appealing to a subject's self interests, appealing to a subject's religion or conscience, establishing rapport and gaining the subjects trust and expressing impatience, anger or frustration with the subject. These findings also seem logical based on the nature of military interrogations. For example, the self-interest of an interrogation subject informs many of the recommended approaches in the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006). In a criminal setting, it would be difficult to argue or suggest that confessing to a crime is in a suspect's self interest, particularly at the investigation stage of a criminal case or prior to a bail hearing.

Finally, respondents from both studies used several techniques or approaches about the same number of times. These included identifying conflicts in the subject's story, physically intimidating the subject and pretending to have independent evidence of criminal (terrorist) involvement. It is important to note, however, that according to Question 21, physically

intimidating a subject and pretending to have independent evidence of terrorist activities were not among the most favored approaches. In addition, when respondents here were asked to self-rate approaches, physically intimidating an interrogation subject and other more coercive and aggressive techniques were among the least popular.

This finding conforms with all other aspects of the study's results. Despite news accounts and government reports indicating United States interrogators used extremely coercive techniques and worse, the study subjects here were overwhelmingly opposed to the use of such tactics.

This is somewhat consistent with Kassin's results. In the Kassin study, physically intimidating an interrogation subject was the least utilized practice among police investigators. Pretending to have independent evidence of guilt was ninth out of sixteen possible techniques and used always by 7% of the Kassin sample.

CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Discussion

The genesis of this research project was triggered by seemingly unrelated events: the publication of the results of a study by Kassin, et al. (2006) and the controversy surrounding the use of harsh interrogation techniques by the United States in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In 2004 the Abu Ghraib scandal had rocked the nation and generated increased attention about how the U.S. was gathering intelligence from human sources, a process known as HUMINT, in this global war. After the events of September 11th, some political leaders insisted that the U.S. faced a new kind of foe who was resistant to traditional forms of intelligence gathering. Prominent among these was then vice-president Richard Cheney who argued that if the United States were to win this war it would have to work on "the dark side." This new enemy, it was suggested, was impervious to rapport-based interrogation techniques and necessitated harsher approaches to human intelligence gathering. Others argued that the rapport-building approach to interrogations was as vital as ever and should not be abandoned.

Missing from this national discussion were some important questions. Do torture and harsh interrogation techniques work? Do they work better and more quickly than rapport-building techniques? Is the potential efficacy of these techniques worth the international opprobrium the United States would face if these practices were instituted? Where do military interrogators stand in this debate? This last question seemed particularly important in light of the fact that policy makers appeared to have excluded these experts from the national debate until after the events at Abu Ghraib.

As 2006 reached its end, the United States Intelligence Science Board weighed in on this

debate. It released Educing Information (2006), a review of the literature to date about intelligence interrogations. The report concluded that there was little empirical research about the efficacy of human intelligence gathering techniques employed by the United States military and that the time was right for this research to begin in earnest. (A review of literature about intelligence interrogations confirmed this finding, although this is now beginning to change.) The report included an overview of the social science research about law enforcement interrogations and recommended that a similar program of research about intelligence interrogations should be instituted.

Within the context of this national discussion about how to conduct intelligence interrogations, the publication Kassin's 2006 study seemed especially prescient. In that study Kassin, a long-time researcher of law enforcement interrogations, for the first time asked a sample of law enforcement investigators to self-rate various techniques they employed during interrogations and their ability to detect deception. Viewed together with Educing Information (2006), Kassin's work provided a template for initializing research about intelligence interrogations. Kassin's survey instrument and methodology could be adapted to address military interrogation techniques. In this way, a research project could start at the source by asking military and counterterrorism interrogators what they do and how they rate various interrogation techniques and their ability to detect deception.

Survey Instrument

While Kassin's study provided a model for empirically approaching military interrogators, his survey instrument and methodology were not necessarily appropriate in the intelligence interrogation context. Intelligence interrogators borrow techniques from their law

enforcement colleagues but their goals differ and this effects how they do their work. Law enforcement interrogators seek to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. Towards this end, law enforcement interrogators try to elicit a confession or inculpatory admissions from a criminal suspect. Law enforcement interrogators must also work within the restraints placed on them by the United States Constitution.

In contrast, intelligence interrogators, particularly on or near the battlefield, gather information about future events; they do not seek to extract a confession. As one interrogator noted in response to a question on this study's survey instrument, "Military intelligence interrogations are not and should not be concerned with the guilt or innocence of the subject…"[G]uilty" people never admitted their involvement but were happy to tattle on their compatriots. It is the information we are after, not the confession. If the bad guy does not want to admit he is bad but wants to share reliable information in order to try and convince me that he is a good guy then it would be foolish of me to focus on his guilt."

In addition, while intelligence interrogators are required to comply with military doctrine and U.S. and international law, they generally are not concerned with the admissibility at trial of the information they extract. Moreover, intelligence interrogators do employ techniques that are unique to the intelligence context.

The differences in the law enforcement and intelligence approaches to interrogations required a redesign of Kassin's survey instrument. Rather than ask subjects to self rate the techniques described in that instrument, a new survey needed to conform to the realities of the intelligence interrogation. The Army field manual on interrogations, Human Intelligence Collections Operations (2006) provides military interrogators with approaches to use when

trying to gain the cooperation of an interrogation subject. (Military interrogators use the term "approach" to describe the methods they use to induce an interrogation subject to cooperate. Strictly speaking, the interrogation begins after an interrogatee agrees to cooperate and one or more of the approaches have been used.) These approaches provided the guidelines for the techniques that respondents in this study would self-rate and are reflected in Question 18 of the survey.[8] The survey substituted the word "techniques" for "approaches" and the study itself was described as a study about counterterrorism interrogation "techniques." This substitution proved somewhat problematic once the collecting of data began.

Once the survey was posted on-line and respondents began participating in the study it became apparent that language was important. Many respondents were eager to speak directly with the principal investigator both to offer personal insights about interrogations and critiques of the survey. Study respondents were critical of the decision to substitute "techniques" for "approaches." They uniformly commented that this study was primarily about approach strategies not interrogation techniques. As indicated above and elsewhere, approaches are methods used to encourage an interrogation subject to cooperate. Once cooperation is gained, the interrogation or, perhaps more precisely, the interview begins. This disconnect in the nomenclature of intelligence interrogations lessoned the study's credibility in the minds of some interrogators. In addition, the survey instrument ignored what is known as the "direct approach," that is asking the interrogation subject directly about the information the interrogator seeks.

According to the Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006),

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[8] The field manual is not classified, thus removing a potential barrier to participation.

historically the direct approach worked ninety percent of the time, negating the need for the use of other approaches to gain an interrogation subject's cooperation. This position is supported by the qualitative data collected by this study. A majority of interrogators endorsed the direct approach as the most successful way to gather intelligence. As one subject stated, "The most effective and economical approach for prisoners of war is the direct approach." Another wrote, "Direct questioning works 95% of the time."

The survey suffered from a second deficiency. It failed to consider or gather data about what interrogators call the collection plan. Prior to conducting an interrogation, intelligence interrogators develop a collection plan or a strategy for gathering intelligence from a particular subject. Like their law enforcement counterparts, intelligence interrogators prepare for an interrogation before entering the interrogation booth and to many interrogators the interrogation/interview itself is only as good as the collection plan that proceeded it. In response to Question 21 on the survey, one interrogator wrote, "There is only one technique – to have a focused collection plan prior to starting the interrogation…" This sentiment was repeated by a number of interrogators who chose to directly contact the principal investigator. It is possible that this perspective does not reflect that of all interrogators but the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) does place a premium on preparation. When collecting data, subsequent studies should recognize that preparing for the interrogation is probably of equal or greater importance to the interrogation itself and critical for its potential success.

Terminology affected other aspects of the survey instrument. As noted earlier, after the survey collected demographic information, it asked a series of questions related to the

interrogation of terrorists. At the time the survey was drafted, terrorism and the GWOT were topics of concern amongst policy makers, academics and the general public; in essence, terrorism was the flavor of the month. The focus on terrorism was a mistake for a number of reasons and diminished the credibility of the survey among some respondents. It also likely affected the validity of some of the data collected by these early questions.

In addition, a review of the individual survey responses reveal that thirty-four study participants reached this series of questions, failed to answer them and then deserted the survey altogether. Post survey interviews with study subjects might have provided a definitive answer to why these participants exited the survey. Demographic characteristics collected by the survey do not shed any light on this issue. Based on anecdotal evidence, the most logical explanation for this phenomenon was the use of the terms "terrorist" and "terrorism."

The word "terrorism" is notoriously difficult to operationalize. Schmid and Youngman (1988) cited 109 separate definitions of this term in their seminal work. This study included the term "terrorism." The term "terrorist," which was also used in the survey instrument, is equally fraught with difficulty and the survey offered no guidance as to how this term was defined within the study. As a result, study respondents could consider any of their interrogation subjects a terrorist, even in those situations where an interrogation subject had no known connection to a terrorist group. The term also had little relevance to study subjects who served as interrogators in World War II and the wars in Korea and Vietnam. As one interrogator wrote in response to Question 20, "The emphasis on 'terrorism' in this survey does not apply to my experience or the atmospherics of the sessions I conducted as principal debriefer/interviewer or supporting interpreter." Other interrogators echoed this position.

In their responses to Question 20 and 21, which called for narrative answers, interrogators used a number of different terms for the individuals they interrogated, including detainees, insurgents, terrorists and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). The Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) uses the terms EPW and detainee to describe an interrogation subject. The survey instrument should have followed the example of the field manual and used the terms EPW and detainee together when referring to interrogation subjects. The field manual operationalizes both terms and they would have been familiar to most military interrogators.

Perhaps more importantly, the use of the term terrorist likely created a threat to the study's external validity, as discussed earlier, at least for questions that used this phrasing. This was reflected, for example, in the answers to Survey Question 5, which asked, "Over the course of your career in the military about how many interrogations of subjects involved in terrorism or who have knowledge of terrorist activities have you conducted alone or with other interrogators?" Ninety respondents answered this question and the answers ranged from 0 to 5,000. Some respondents specifically noted that they did not interrogate terrorists but did interrogate "foreign military" or "EPWs." It is likely that some respondents answered the question literally and indicated they had interrogated none or very few actual "subjects involved in terrorism or who have knowledge of terrorist activities." It is also possible that those who claimed to have interrogated hundreds or thousands of "subjects involved in terrorism or who have knowledge of terrorist activities" took a more expansive view of this question and the term "terrorism." These same concerns also affected Questions 6, 7 and 8.

The demographic make-up of the sample was also not ideal. More than one third of the

study participants were retired and some had been retired since World War II and the Vietnam War. There may be important differences between those who are active today and those who are retired, both in training and practice. The study also suffered from a dearth of female subjects; nineteen respondents or 15.2% of the sample were female. These nineteen respondents may not reflect the practices of female interrogators as a whole. While there is an unknown population of active female military interrogators today, these women may approach the job differently from their male counterparts. However, the armed services in the United States are predominantly male and it is likely that this fact holds true for those who serve as military interrogators

Only one female participant specifically referred to her gender when answering Question 20 on the survey, which asked, "What other techniques do you use that you find effective?" This respondent wrote that she uses her "femininity to get their [interrogatees] attention." She did not further explain this comment. Further research should examine gender differences both in approaches to interrogations and in deception detection.

The survey did not address cultural issues implicated by the interrogations of non-western interrogation subjects. A number of survey respondents addressed cultural issues in their responses to Questions 20 and 21. For example, one interrogator wrote, "With Arab subjects, screaming and yelling is expected by indoctrinated detainees, doing so rarely works and causes the interrogator to lose credibility and the opportunity to gain intelligence information." Another wrote, "I was an interrogator in Iraq. There were language and cultural barriers, which prevented a pure exchange of information. It was difficult at first changing my western view of things and adapting a Middle East approach to things." A third respondent wrote that the survey questions did not "have in consideration cultural aspects of these individuals being interrogated." One

interrogator discussed cultural issues specific to Iraq. "In this part of the country [it] is normal for people to lie, especially living under Saddam for so long. Imagine us under that regime."

Future surveys should seek to collect data about cultural issues and interrogations. In addition, subsequent research should examine the effect of an interpreter on the tenor of an interrogation. Sixty of the eighty-seven respondents who answered this question, 69%, indicated that they were fluent in another language. However, forty-six out of eighty-three study subjects, 55.4%, indicated that they always use an interpreter during an interrogation and the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of using an interpreter during an interrogation. This points to the need for further research to explore these issues, particularly because there is a dearth of soldiers who are fluent in Arabic and the variety of languages spoken in Afghanistan.

Because of the limited empirical knowledge about military interrogations, some of the survey questions were designed to collect basic information about the process of interrogating. Survey Questions 9, 10, 11 and 12 all sought to identify characteristics of interrogations such as length and the time of day when an interrogation was most likely to take place. Question 12, which attempted to determine the most common time period when interrogations were conducted, generated no definitive answers; responses were spread almost evenly across five four-hour time periods.

Question 11 tried to gauge the longest interrogation respondents conducted and the range varied widely from zero to seventy-two hours. The mean for longest interrogation was 9.56 hours. Again this question offered no definitive answers but does contribute to the growing body of knowledge about the interrogation process.

Finally, in general terms, the survey would have benefited from the input of an expert or experts in intelligence interrogations. Several respondents who chose to contact the principal investigator provided line-by-line critiques of the survey. All of this information will help to design a better survey instrument for future studies.

Sample

The greatest challenge faced by the principal investigator was securing an adequate sample.[9] Recruiting enough subjects to make the study viable took more than a year. A succession of efforts to win official Army approval for the study never materialized and the sample never snowballed. As a result, subjects were gathered one at a time or in small groups and never reached a critical mass. While the American military is known for self-reflection about its successes and failures, one interrogator with more than twenty years of experience told the principal investigator that he believed the military was somewhat ossified when it came to the subject of human intelligence collection. This interrogator, who is well connected in this world, was simultaneously facing his own challenges with a similar study that he was mounting.

The nature and size of this self-selected sample places some qualifications on the study's results and poses some threat to its external validity. It is far from clear that the study sample is representative of military interrogators as a whole. It should be noted, however, that this is the first known attempt to access this difficult to reach population. Military interrogators are guarded about what they do and are understandably reluctant to reveal information that might

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[9] Attempts to secure a sample of counterterrorism interrogators were abandoned. See footnote numbers 1 and 2.

help enemies of the United States to resist giving up intelligence. The fact that the subjects of this study agreed to participate to the extent that they did is noteworthy and future research can build on the data gathered here.

The interrogators who chose to contact the principal investigator were decidedly in favor of a rapport building approach to gathering intelligence. Only one person who wrote directly to the principal investigator did not. This was also reflected in the answers to Questions 20 and 21 on the survey. As noted earlier, only one participant advocated in favor of techniques forbidden by the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006), military and U.S. law. This subject indicated that such methods should be reserved for high value detainees who may have been trained to resist approaches used by the United States. This subject argued that under limited circumstances and with the appropriate supervision, such approaches should be allowed.

Although subjects participated anonymously in the study, it is still possible that individual respondents were reluctant to show support for techniques that are both in violation of the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) and U.S. and military law. This type of problem is endemic of survey research and not unique to this project. The risks, however, attached to admitting to offenses criminalized under federal, state and military law is great. Study subjects have an incentive to lie about practices they might otherwise endorse as viable when faced with potential detection and prosecution. Subjects were assured that IP addresses were not saved when they completed the survey but this may not have been enough for some who participated.

Deception Detection and Presumptions of Guilt

A number of researchers have found that law enforcement officers are overconfident in the ability to detect deception in an interrogation suspect. (See for example Kassin, Meissner & Norwick, 2005). When attempting to detect deception, experienced law enforcement officers perform at rates slightly better than chance, even with training. As a result, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that military interrogators display a similar overconfidence. This general hypothesis was supported by the data.

Given what is known about law enforcement officers and their ability to detect deception, this is a potentially troubling finding. More research is needed to further examine this issue. It is possible that military interrogators are better at detecting deception than their law enforcement colleagues. If this is the case, military training and field experience may have positive effects on an interrogator's ability to detect deception. It is also possible that there is something characteristically different about people who choose to become interrogators in the military that accounts for higher than average abilities to tell the truth from falsehood, if these abilities even exist. This is fertile ground for experimental research that would be of great benefit to the United States military.

In a related issue, research has suggested that law enforcement officers tend to believe that the person they are interrogating is in fact the perpetrator of the crime, even in cases where the suspect asserts his or her innocence. False confessions, in part, have been attributed to this presumption of guilt. In the military context, it is possible interrogators may detain or question an interrogation subject over long periods of time based on similar presumptions. Therefore it would be reasonable to hypothesize that military interrogators make the same or similar

assumptions about their interrogation subjects. Surprisingly, this general hypothesis was not supported by the findings. One of the assumptions going into this study was that military interrogators generally believe that the person they are interrogating is in fact a terrorist and questions 5, 6, 7 and 8 were designed to gather data about this idea. All of these questions used the terms terrorist or terrorism and this finding may reflect confusion and discomfort over the use of these terms, as was discussed earlier. It is also possible that military interrogators may approach an interrogation with more of an open mind than their law enforcement counterparts. Further experimental research would likely offer a clearer picture about this particular issue.

Rapport-Building

One of the central premises of this study was that military interrogators believe building rapport with a subject is the best way to induce cooperation and gather accurate intelligence from an interrogation subject and this was supported by the data. This may have been a self-fulfilling prophecy driven by this particular sample but the overwhelming support for rapport building suggests otherwise. When recruiting a sample, the principal investigator contacted a number of interrogators who were outspoken in their support of rapport building as a primary interrogation technique. A number of these contacts helped recruit subjects for the study. It is possible that these contacts associated themselves with like-minded interrogators who tended to eschew more coercive interrogation techniques. The sample is not large or diverse enough to generalize this finding to all military interrogators but there is reason to be cautiously optimistic. The fact is that this sample used rapport building more than any other technique or approach, with perhaps the exception of the direct approach, which is also non-coercive.

In light of the controversy over the use of coercive interrogation techniques, this finding is perhaps the most important in the study. One of the striking things about the national discussion about this issue after September 11th was the fact that interrogators themselves appeared to be shut out of the conversation. According to news reports, the Bush Administration's internal debates did not include experienced interrogators; support for coercive techniques came from officials with little knowledge of the day-to-day challenges faced by interrogators in the field. This study does provide empirical support for the idea that, among experienced interrogators, rapport building is best for generating cooperation from an interrogatee and the gathering of accurate information. All but one of the respondents in this study rejected coercive techniques and those prohibited by the Army's Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006).

Law Enforcement Techniques in the Intelligence Context

Two techniques that law enforcement officers use during interrogations, isolating suspects and confronting them with contradictions, were somewhat favored by military interrogators. A variety of media reports and anecdotal evidence suggested that isolating interrogation suspects was a common practice. Knowledge about law enforcement interrogations informed the idea that confronting subjects with contradictions in their stories was also a common approach technique. Both assumptions appear to be supported by the data. Kassin (2006) found that isolating a suspect from family and friends was the most favored interrogation strategy used by law enforcement officers. Confronting suspects with contradictions was the third most utilized technique, according to Kassin. Military interrogators to some extent follow a law enforcement model and it follows that they would borrow techniques from their law

enforcement colleagues. The Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual (2006) does not specifically authorize either of these approaches and both fall in the category of more coercive techniques. As has been noted, isolation, in its more extreme forms, can quickly cause a psychological break and is not conducive to producing accurate information from a potential intelligence source. Further research should identify the types and extent of isolation used by military interrogators to avoid the negative effects associated with this practice.

Another theory, which informed this study, was that military interrogators regularly confront interrogation subjects with false information to "break" them. Law enforcement interrogators also use this tactic and Kassin (2007) described this practice as implying or pretending to have independent evidence of guilt. That study found that this technique was rated 9th out of the 16 techniques rated. Here, surprisingly, the data did not support this general supposition. In the law enforcement context, implying or pretending to have independent evidence of guilt is one of the more controversial tactics police officers use.

An additional theory upon which this study was based held the following: military interrogators believe that disorienting a subject through sensory deprivation will break a subject and lead to accurate and actionable intelligence. This general hypothesis was prompted by news reports that showed goggled and hooded detainees being transported to and from detention facilities. Sensory deprivation was also an interrogation technique advocated by the Bush Administration. One of the most notorious cases of sensory deprivation in the GWOT involved Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber." A great deal of research has shown that even short periods of sensory deprivation can produce psychosis and a psychotic interrogation subject is not likely to offer his interlocutors accurate information. In spite of the seemingly widespread use of

at least limited forms of sensory deprivation in some detention facilities, this practice was not favored by the sample here.

This study postulated that military interrogators regularly promise some benefit to an interrogation subject in return for actionable intelligence. This was not supported by the data. This technique was not specifically considered by Kassin (2006) and is, in fact, fraught with danger for law enforcement officers. While police can offer to speak to a prosecutor or parole officer on a suspect's behalf, they generally cannot promise a suspect anything in return for cooperation. In the military context, individual interrogators may have more control over the fortunes of a detainee but they still must answer to individuals higher in the chain of command. In their narrative answers to Questions 20 and 21 interrogators did discuss offering benefits to interrogation subjects. For example, in response to Question 20 on the survey, one interrogator wrote, "Often times an interrogator can speak on a detainee's behalf at a hearing that will help provide the detainee with a speedier release." In response to Question 21 one study subject wrote, "I had one guy who was willing to cooperate for the promise his jail time would be in an American prison (a promise I did not make, but was made by others)." Other interrogators described offering small comforts to interrogation subjects such as cigarettes, soda, candy, cups of tea and even English lessons. These are things that can clearly qualify as "benefits" and it is somewhat surprising that this idea was not supported. It is likely that the subjects of this study saw benefits as more substantial and might include things that they cannot deliver.

Finally, a surprising number of study subjects endorsed the Reid Technique, the interrogation program taught by John Reid & Associates and a long-time advanced training program for law enforcement officers that is apparently utilized by the military. In response to

Question 14 on the survey, which asked about advanced training, over 90% of the subjects who had advance training trained in the Reid Technique (N = 79). In their responses to Questions 20 and 21, four study subjects specifically recommended the Reid Technique as a successful, if not officially sanctioned, approach to interrogations. One interrogator wrote, "The Reid Techniques are paramount in effectively interrogating." Another stated, "I have had success…with the Reid strategy of developing 'themes' and making whatever activity they are accused of understandable."

The Reid Technique is an interviewing and interrogation strategy developed by John E. Reid and his associates in the 1940s and 1950s (Inbau et al., 2004) and, since that time, tens of thousands of law enforcement officers have been trained in the program (Kassin and Gudjonsson, 2005). The program advocates a nine-step process for use when interrogating a criminal suspect (Inbau et al.). This process is "designed to get suspects to incriminate themselves by increasing the anxiety associated with denial" (Kassin and Gudjonsson) and then "minimizing the perceived consequences of confession" (Kassin and Gudjonsson). Gudjonsson (2003) has argued that Reid's recommended tactics employ "trickery and deceit" and empirical research has shown that the techniques are "inherently coercive" (Kassin and McNall, 1991). While the Reid technique spurns the use of "threats" or "physically abusive tactics" (Inbau et al.), Gudjonsson has described the program as employing "considerable psychological manipulation" designed to "break down resistance" and its application undoubtedly leads to false confessions in some interrogation subjects (Gudjonsson). Gudjonsson characterized the Reid manual as "full of assertions and generalizations about [the] technique without supporting empirical evidence" (Gudjonsson).

In other empirical studies the Reid Technique has been found to boost confidence in detecting deception while failing to improve judgment accuracy. (See for example Kassin & Fong, 1999; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Given the apparent ineffectiveness of the Reid Technique and its propensity to produce false confessions in innocent criminal suspects, it is troubling that some in the military appear to rely on this program for advanced training.

No "Silver Bullets"

Many experienced interrogators have argued that the subject being questioned can influence the tenor of an interrogation. The study sample here believed that when it comes to interrogations, "one size does not fit all." This idea was also supported by some of the narrative data. For example, one interrogator wrote in response to Question 20, "There is no 'silver bullet,' the reason why we have an array of approaches is because everyone's breaking point is different." Another offered, "Each interrogation is different. That's why there are different techniques employed." In response to Question 21, an interrogator stated that the techniques used depended on the "individual detainee."

Gender Differences in Interrogation Measures and Techniques

As previously indicated, nineteen respondents or 15.1% of the sample was female. In general the demographic characteristics of the female members of the sample were similar to that of the male respondents. In terms of experience, female sample members ranged from one year to fourteen and a half years and there was a mixture of active duty, reserves and retired among the female respondents. Some attempt was made to spotlight significant gender differences in interrogation practices. When an independent t-test was conducted to determine if there were differences across gender groups, three findings were revealed: female interrogators yielded

more partial admissions than their male counterparts and they also had a greater percentage of correct identifications than the men. In addition it was discovered that female interrogators used confrontational interrogation techniques at slightly higher rates than their male colleagues.[10]

It is difficult to determine what accounts for these differences. In a male dominated milieu, perhaps female interrogators feel pressure to be more confrontational with interrogation subjects. Although it is unknown how many female sample members worked in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is possible that female interrogators are compelled to interrogate more aggressively to overcome gender stereotypes held in these highly patriarchal societies and, perhaps, within the military. As noted earlier, further research is needed that can more closely examine gender differences in interrogation practices and strategies.

Contribution to the Literature and Future Research

All research on intelligence gathering interrogations ceased in the 1970s as a result of objections to research conducted by the CIA during the Cold War. In addition, social scientists have been reluctant to engage in research on behalf of the United States government that could be used in a way harmful to human beings. The extant research fails to consider the body of knowledge about law enforcement interrogations as well as advancements in understanding human behavior. As a result, this project fills a substantial gap in the interrogation research

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[10] Confrontational techniques included confronting the subject with evidence of involvement in terrorist activities, identifying contradictions in a subject's story, interrupting a subject's denials and objections and expressing impatience, anger or frustration with a subject.

literature. Of equal importance, this study has begun to shed light on practices currently in use by the United States military. The study provides empirical support for the idea that experienced interrogators favor rapport building and the direct approach when conducting interrogations. It also suggests that military interrogators are overconfident in their ability to detect deception, much like their law enforcement counterparts. Experimental research is further necessary to more deeply examine this potentially troubling finding. In fact, a research program could pattern itself after the extensive body of research about law enforcement interrogations.

One area in need of research relates to private contractors who conduct interrogations. It is unknown how many interrogators operating under the military's auspices are private contractors, hired to make up deficiencies in personnel. Military interrogators who chose to contact the principal investigator discussed the use of contract interrogators[11]. These conversations revealed that contract interrogators, who work for large security companies and are often retired army veterans, are also involved in the training of military interrogators. Research is needed to learn more about civilian contractors.

Gender and status differences are also worth exploring through experimental research. The subtle differences revealed here between male and female interrogators and active duty versus inactive interrogators might prove to be fallacious. A larger sample could help to buttress or refute the findings here. It would be particularly fruitful to compare interrogators who have served in different armed conflicts.

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[11] It has been reported that contract interrogators were responsible for some of the abuses at Abu Ghraib.

Finally, as revealed by this study, military interrogations are sometimes videotaped. Individual interrogators told the principal investigator that the Department of Defense requires that under certain circumstances interrogations by military personnel must be recorded. The survey showed that 53.1% of study subjects (N = 81) reported that their unit videotapes interrogations. Analysis of these tapes, if access were granted, could provide rich data about the interrogation process and would be a boon for researchers.

There is so little current empirical knowledge about intelligence interrogations that the very existence of this study is a contribution to the literature. As stated earlier, it appears that this study is the first of its kind. It is notable that the subjects of this study, as guarded and suspicious of outsiders as they may be, provided valuable and important data about a subject of great importance to the security of the United States. Great efforts were made to secure a viable sample and the subjects who chose to participate in this study revealed rich details about the art and science of intelligence interrogations. This research project represents an important first step in a process that can lead to improvements in interrogation approaches. It is this researcher's hope that projects such as this will allow the men and women who collect human intelligence to use science as a catalyst for the most effective interrogation approaches possible. In this way, social scientists and the United States military can work together for the benefit of the intelligence community, soldiers in the field of battle and the safety of the country itself.

APPENDIX

Informed Consent – Military & Counterterrorism Interrogation Techniques Study

My name is Matt Semel and I am a PhD student at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and the principal investigator of this project entitled "Counterterrorism Interrogation Techniques." The purpose of this research is to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the interrogation techniques interrogators believe are most effective in the military and counterterrorism context. The study will require that you anonymously complete an 8-page survey. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to rate interrogation techniques based on effectiveness and to rate your ability to detect deception. Participation should take about 15 minutes.

The foreseeable risks of participation are no more than encountered in everyday life. The possible benefit to you is a better understanding of what interrogation techniques experts in the field believe work best. The potential benefit to society is that these techniques can be tested in an experimental setting and compared to the substantial research in the law enforcement context. The study can also help dispel myths about specific practices that may impair intelligence gathering. There will be approximately 300 participants taking part in this study.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have a right to refuse to participate without consequences. If you decide to participate, you may discontinue participation at any time. You may refuse to answer any specific questions or refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study. Withdrawal or refusing to answer specific questions or engage in specific tasks will not result in any consequences to you and will not affect your relationship with your agency or your military service. Your individual responses to questions on the survey will be used for research purposes only and you will complete the survey anonymously. In you participate in the on-line version of the survey, consent forms and the survey will be stored on a secure file server where others cannot access them. Once completed, the surveys will be printed out and remain under lock and key, accessible only to the principal investigator, as will paper surveys. The principal investigator will not save, store or record information related to your I.S.P. address if you participate in the survey on-line. The results of this study may be published in a professional journal.

If you begin the survey, it means that you have read this consent form, that you fully understand the nature and consequences of participation and that you have had all questions regarding participation in this study answered satisfactorily. If you have further questions about this research please contact the principal investigator, Matt Semel, at 203-249-8661 or mds417@optonline.net or my adviser, Joshua Freilich, (212) 237-8668, jfreilich@jjay.cuny.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant please feel free to contact Dr. Thomas Kucharski, IRB Chairperson, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu, (212) 237-8961.

Counterterrorism Interrogators Survey

Gender: M F (circle/highlight one)

1. **How long have you/did you serve in the military or reserves or JTTF?**

   _____ years, _____ months

2. **Current Status**

   Active Duty Reserves RetiredJTTF (circle/highlight)

3. **If applicable, with what branch of the United States Military did you/do you serve?**

   _____ Army

   _____ Navy

   _____ Marines

   _____ Air force

4. **Over the course of your career in the military or JTTF about how many interrogations of subjects involved in terrorism or who have knowledge of terrorist activities have you conducted alone or with other interrogators? Please estimate as best you can.**

   _____

5. **Considering all the interrogations in which you have been involved, approximately (please estimate as best you can) what percentage of *all* subjects:**

   Admitted partial involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities _____

   Admitted full involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities _____

   Did not admit or concede anything _____

   100%

6. **Considering all the interrogations in which you have been involved, approximately what percentage of subjects who were involved in terrorist activities:**

Admitted partial involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities_____

Admitted full involvement in terrorist activities _____

Did not admit or concede anything _____

100%

7. **Considering all the interrogations in which you have been involved, approximately what percentage of subjects who turned out to be uninvolved in terrorist activities:**

Admitted partial involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activitie _____

Admitted full involvement in terrorist activities _____

Did not admit or concede anything _____

100%

8. **In your own experience, what would you say is the average *number of times* an individual subject is interrogated?**

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 or more

9. **In your own experience, what would you say is the average *length* of an interrogation?**

_____ (hours)

10. **What is the *longest* interrogation you were ever involved in?**

_____ (hours)

11. **As best you can, try to estimate the percentage of subject interrogations you were involved in that took place within each of the following time intervals"**

0800 to 1200 _____

1200 to 1600 _____

1600 to 2000 _____

2000 to 2400 _____

2400 to 0400 _____

0400 to 0800 _____

100%

12. **How skilled are you at knowing if a subject who denies involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities during an interrogation is telling the truth or lying?**

_____ % correct

13. **About how often does your impression turn out to be right?**

_____ % correct

14. **Have you ever received special training (seminars, workshops, etc.) on how to conduct interrogations?**

_____ No

_____ Yes (please describe)

_____

_____

_____

15. **Does your unit/organization videotape interrogations?**

_____ No

_____ Yes _____ % of all interrogations are videotaped

16. **Are you fluent in a language other than English?**

_____ No

_____ Yes (please describe) _____

17. **Please estimate how often *you* use an interpreter during an interrogation. Circle a number on a 5-point scale (1= never, 2 = on rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always).**

1 2 3 4 5

18. **Listed below are a number of interrogation techniques that are recommended and/or used interrogations. Please estimate how often *you* have used each technique. For each circle a number on a 5-point scale.**

(1 = never, 2 = rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always).

A. Isolating the subject from family and friends.

1 2 3 4 5

B. Isolating the subject from other prisoners.

1 2 3 4 5

C. Confronting the subject with evidence of involvement in terrorist activities.

1 2 3 4 5

D. Indentifying contradictions in the subject's story

1 2 3 4 5

E. Interrupting the subject's denials and objections

1 2 3 4 5

F. Physically intimidating the subject

1 2 3 4 5

G. Conducting the interrogation with more than one interrogator

1 2 3 4 5

H. Implying or pretending to have independent evidence of terrorist involvement

1 2 3 4 5

I. Yelling at the subject

1 2 3 4 5

J. Throwing physical objects in the interrogation booth/room

1 2 3 4 5

K. Appealing to the subject's self-interests

1 2 3 4 5

L. Appealing to the subject's religion or conscience

1 2 3 4 5

M. Appealing to the subject's love of his family, comrades or homeland

1 2 3 4 5

N. Appealing to the subject's negative feelings toward his group, soldiers or leaders

1 2 3 4 5

O. Convincing the subject he has nothing to fear by cooperating

1 2 3 4 5

P. Establishing rapport and gaining the subject's trust

1 2 3 4 5

Q. Expressing impatience, anger, or frustration at the subject

1 2 3 4 5

R. Showing the subject photographs of victims of terrorist attacks

1 2 3 4 5

S. Convincing the subject that resistance to questioning is futile

1 2 3 4 5

T. Promising the subject something of value in return for cooperation

1 2 3 4 5

U. Limiting the subject's sense of sight

1 2 3 4 5

19. **Have you observed interrogators use techniques prohibited by the Army Field Manual or your agency?**

_____ No

_____ Yes

If yes, with what frequency?
(1 = never, 2 = rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always).

1 2 3 4 5

20. **If there are other techniques that you use and find effective that are not described in the previous question please describe these in the space below.**

21. **What three techniques do *you* believe are most effective at acquiring accurate actionable intelligence from an interrogation subject?**

22. **Did you ever use techniques during an interrogation that you later regretted using?**

_____ No.

_____ Yes. If yes, please describe below.

Thank you!

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