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THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF POWER: AN ESSAY ON THE METAPSYCHOLOGY OF INEQUALITY

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THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF POWER:
An Essay on the Metapsychology of Inequality

by

Larry William Fuchser

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
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Abstract

THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF POWER
An Essay on the Metapsychology of Inequality

by

Larry William Fuchser

Adviser: Professor Laurence Gould

This theoretical dissertation attempts to view psychoanalytic theory and traditional Western political thought in dialectic interrelationship using a concept of power as the central organizing principle. It is argued that the concept of power has been the traditional organizing concept of Western political thought, and ought to be regarded as a technical concept in psychoanalysis as well. In this study, we develop both a psychoanalytic view of politics and a political view of psychoanalysis.

For the purposes of this study, power is defined as an actualized state of inequality having no necessary relation to the phenomena of perception. Inequality is understood as a material concept referring to objective differences among individuals along such dimensions as economic resources, physical strength and access to critical information. Thus power can be understood as both a universal aspect of intrapsychic functioning, (both normal and abnormal), as well as a characteristic of all interpersonal relationships.

In reviewing the literature of psychoanalysis from

Freud to the present, it is quite clear that power is not, by in large used as a technical concept. Yet paradoxically, psychoanalysts including Freud have used the concept of power again and again as if its meaning were self evident. On the other hand, Western empirical political science has largely ignored the unconscious, focusing almost exclusively on rational behavior.

It is argued that the effort to distill from Freud's writings a particular theory of politics has not led to a consensus in the literature. For purposes of this study, power is seen as a drive related phenomenon, a familiar concept in 19th century German social thought and one which can usefully be employed to illucidate a variety of clinical phenomena.

Power as a technical concept, is viewed as necessary for the understanding of the dynamics of transference. Power and powerlessness are discussed as essential features of transference in the analytic setting. Furthermore, it is argued that psychoanalysis is the only existing treatment modality which is fully capable of liberating individuals from the effects of power without simply replacing one form of dominance with another. The traditional nosological categories of obsessive and hysterical neuroses are understood as disorders in power relations. Finally, power is discussed as an essential concept for explicating the etiology and dynamics of the perversions.

PREFACE

The following is a theoretical dissertation. There are, of course, widely varied notions concerning the nature of theory and its proper role in the social sciences. Many, perhaps most, theorists believe that the only legitimate function of theory is that of explanation; that for a theory to be scientifically useful it must offer an explanation which unites a range of seemingly disperate phenomena under a single overarching conceptual scheme. Another, and perhaps extreme position is represented by Albert Einstein, (Holton, 1971) who said that:

> Man seeks to form for himself, in whatever manner is suitable for him, a simplified and lucid image of the world and so to overcome the world of experience by striving to replace it to some extent by this image. This is what the painter does, and the poet, the speculative philosopher, the natural scientist, each in his own way....

In this sense the task of theory is not so much to explain but to offer up, for the theorist is for no one else, a simple and unified image that gives shape to personal experience. Theory is thus in part a form of autobiography.

This notion of theory, it seems to me, is both more humble and more grandiose than a more conventional view. It is more humble because the first task is merely to make some kind of sense out of personal experience. It is more grandiose in that one necessarily postulates that there is

something universal in one's experience of the particular. The theologian Abraham Heschel, (Vol. II, p. xii, 1962) said that "explanation when regarded as the only goal of inquiry, becomes a substitute for understanding. Imperceptibly it becomes the beginning rather than the end of perception." It seems that Heschel's warning is all too often an apt description of theorizing in the social sciences where theoretical discussion, with its endless debate and academic posturing, tends to become the end rather than the beginning of understanding.

At the beginning of my academic training and research, it seemed to me important to attempt to understand something of the complex questions of peace and war. With what now seems to have been an all too childlike wonder I asked myself why there were wars. In the light of the Holocaust that seemed a particularly appropriate question for an ethnic German born into a Christian culture to ask. With my training as a political scientist I attempted to understand the complexities of the Second World War using the traditional categories of political science, (Fuchser, 1982).

In the years that followed, it seemed to me that the conventional political theories of war and peace that I had studied were precisely as Heschel described them; a substitute for understanding. As a student of politics, it seemed to me that the vacuous empiricism of social science offered pathetically little in the way of answers to the questions I thought most important to answer. Why war?

Two experiences in particular seem to me to highlight the dilemma. The first occured during a highly theoretical and abstract seminar on arms control led by a senior political scientist who later occupied a high position in the Carter Administration. For over an hour we had been discussing mathematical models for simulating nuclear war and questions of arms control. The professor apparently sensed a lack of enthusiasm among the students and as a result allowed himself to digress into what seemed like a kind of reverie concerning his own personal experiences with the "horrors of war." He became increasingly animated and passionate in his discourse but ended by blandly affirming that the terrible experiences in the Second World War had led him to pursue a career devoted to trying to understand and meliorate the causes of war. This statement of high moral purpose struck me as a little flat and somewhat anticlimactic in the light of the passion and high drama of his previous discussion. I was puzzled. As the seminar broke up, books and papers were being packed away and as we rose to leave I noticed, to my embarassment, that the professor had an erection. I noted the truth of Hume's dictum that reason is always the slave of the passions.

The second experience came later when I was part of the faculty of a prestigious undergraduate college. There I came to know a colleague who had acheived a national reputation for his studies of political tolerance. He had been extraordinarily successful in garnering massive foundation support

and had achieved widespread professional recognition for his ideas. All of this would have been quite admirable were it not for the fact that my colleague had a well-earned reputation, in his relations with students and colleagues alike, for absolute and dogmatic intolerance of almost any opinion or attitude that differed even minimally from his own. Here, too, it seemed that reason had its secret passions.

It seemed therefore that psychoanalysis, with its elaborate theories of the unconscious, offered a useful counter to the unselfcritical empiricism of contemporary political science. Yet as I undertook a second round of graduate training and I began to see patients and understand something about clinical practice, I noted an opposite and equally puzzling phenomenon. It seemed as if many people, within the broadly psychoanalytic community, assumed that all forms of social discontent were ultimately to be traced to unanalyzed material from the past. It was as if all rage at injustice, all forms of social protest are but varient forms of "acting out" or unspecified "problems with authority." It seemed to me as if all too often the inevitable result of analytic training and dydactic analysis was a kind of complacency in the face of manifest injustice, a complacency which seemed at least on one level to be inappropriate. It seemed as if clinical psychologists and other "mental health professionals" were all too willing to turn inward and to analyze away almost any political or social issue.

Therefore it seemed to me important to develop a point

of view which would be capable of using both psychoanalytic and political theory to good advantage but which would not reduce psychoanalysis to politics or politics to psychoanalysis. What follows is my response to this dilemma.

In preparing this version of what will undoubtedly become an ongoing study of the psychodynamics of power, I would like to thank a number of colleagues for their interest, tolerance, collaboration and criticism. First among these are the members of my committee; Professor Laurence Gould, Professor Paul Wachtel and Professor Irving Paul, for allowing me to undertake such a notoriously problematic and speculative dissertation and for unusually helpful mentoring during every step of the process. Professor W.T.R. Fox of Columbia University, the late Professor Harold D. Lasswell of Yale, Professor Kurt P. Tauber of Williams College, Professor Robert Cox of York University in Ontario, and Dr. Arno Gruen of Losone Switzerland, each made particular contributions during the initial stages of the work. Dr. Steve Cohen and Professor David Halle have consistently provided encouragement, support and criticism over the more than ten years that I have been engaged in trying to think theoretically about issues of power. My thanks also to Dr. Stephen A. Mitchell for his critical reading of the chapter on transference. And finally, my unending gratitude to M. Margaret Marble for twelve years of constant if turbulent collaboration in an ongoing dialectic of power and love.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The general purpose of this dissertation is to provide the theoretical basis for a consistent psychoanalytic understanding of politics on the one hand and a political understanding of psychoanalysis on the other. The specific purpose is to assert that the concept of power, which is a central concern of classic political theory, is also a concept both necessary and useful to psychoanalytic practice. In the pages that follow, I will argue that the concept of power can be understood as a unifying concept of psychoanalysis and politics. In taking such a position I am making the assumption that if political behavior is an aspect of human relatedness and mental life and if psychoanalysis is to advance claims to anything approaching a complete theory of psychic functioning, it follows that psychoanalysis must include a theory of power and therefore of politics.

However as one reviews the literature it becomes immediately clear that within the psychoanalytic tradition the concept of power has had a decidedly ambiguous history. On the one hand, a careful survey of the literature reveals that power is not a concept with any specific meaning in a psychoanalytic context, or at least not within what might be regarded

as the mainstream of the psychoanalytic movement. On the other hand, it seems as if some notion of power, however ambiguously defined, has been indispensable to those writing within the tradition.

If one approaches psychoanalysis with an ear attuned to issues of power, then it appears at times as if psychoanalytic discourse is preoccupied, sometimes even obsessed, with power, whether in scholarly journals or in casual talk about patients. Thus, on the surface at least, it appears as if there is a contradiction between the manifest content of psychoanalysis where power has no status as a technical concept and its latent content where the discourse of power appears to be all but indispensable.

The specific task of this dissertation is to develop a psychoanalytic theory of power and power relations. No attempt will be made to "prove" that the theory is correct; to do so would be a task well beyond the scope of a single dissertation and would require careful elaboration of the concept using comprehensive case material. My interest is simply in developing a definition of power which is consistent with both its conventional meanings in political theory on the one hand and with psychoanalytic theory and practice on the other. Furthermore, I intend to propose not merely a definition of power but a theory of power and power relations which will potentially unify a variety of empirical observations ranging from international politics and history to more purely intrapsychic phenomena and individual pathology.

Since this is primarily a dissertation in clinical psychology, my goal is merely to suggest in the most general way some of the possible political implications of the work. In developing my clinical propositions, it is important to state as emphatically as possible those issues with which this dissertation does not concern itself. Above all it should not be supposed that this effort to integrate psychoanalytic and political theory is a contribution to the literature which seeks to find a place for ethical values in the conduct of psychotherapy. Nothing is further from my intention. My position is that analysis and the understanding it promotes is a value in and of itself, a value requiring no further reference to moral principal. In fact, I believe that analytic selfreflexive uncovering of truth is in itself the supreme moral value before which all other ethical considerations must take second place.

Either psychoanalysis describes psychic functioning or it does not and nothing is to be gained, and a great deal might be lost in naively supposing that "values", (in the sense of the analyst's personal concern with social and moral issues) have a valid place in the consulting room. On the other hand, I do not naively suppose that personal values find no expression in treatment, but believe that these phenomena are better understood and analyzed as subjects for self-analysis and phenomena of countertransference. I would argue, moreover, that the explicit introduction of political and social content into the therapeutic encounter can have nothing but disasterous consequences.

While I believe that one result of the present research might well be a consistent psychoanalytic theory of politics, it is not my intention, either explicitly or implicitly, to attempt to identify psychoanalysis with any existing ideological position whether supportive, critical or indifferent to the existing political order. In fact, I believe that identifications of left, right and center as well as ideological labels such as communism, liberalism, and fascism are primarily group identifications and that to analyze political processes solely in these terms is to discuss politics at its most regressive level with the result that issues of "who gets what, when, and how", to quote Harold Lasswell's (1936) famous definition of politics, are further obscured rather than clarified.

From a methodological point of view, the present work is an attempt to view psychoanalysis and political theory in their dialectic interrelationship. Essentially, the study finds its justification in a basic epistemological problem created by the fact that both psychoanalysis and political science are bodies of theory claiming to understand human behavior. Contemporary practice not withstanding, the boundary between the psychological and the political is not handed down to us chiseled on tablets of stone, but is a boundary which, in my view, must be constantly renegotiated on the basis of interest. If we simply assume, as much social science research tends to do, that the realm of the political and the realm of the psyche are self-evident

categories then we commit a fundamental error of reification by which the data of behavior are attributed to psychological causes when in reality that data might possible be better explained by a political analysis or vice versa.* To avoid the reductionism which has characterized so much of the literature of psychology and politics, it is necessary to preserve within theoretical writing both the psychological and the political "moments" (Adorno, 1966) of inquiry such that the resulting theory is both a psychology of politics and a politics of psychology.

The idea that psychoanalysis provides political and social scientists with useful conceptual tools for understanding political processes is, of course nothing new and there are literally hundreds of works which seek to advance such claims. There is in addition, a smaller but nevertheless significant literature in which psychoanalytic practitioners have commented on a variety of political and social issues, (e.g. Waelder, 1951, 1967). The literature of applied psychoanalysis ranges from psychohistorical studies of individual leaders (e.g. Erikson, 1958, 1969, 1975) to attempts at conceptualizing larger political systems in psychoanalytic terms (e.g. Marcuse, 1955). While it is clearly beyond the scope

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*This I would argue has been a fundamental error in virtually all of the "culturalist" literature where psychopathological phenomena are reduced to political and social causality so that psychological truth becomes implicitly epiphenomenological. Such reductionism has also characterized much of the literature of psychology and politics where the attempt has been made to reduce political behavior to its intrapsychic determinants.

of this dissertation to critically evaluate even a small portion of this vast and growing literature, several general comments are perhaps useful in order to distinguish the purposes of the present research from the broader literature.

In recent years, Freud's thought has provided the conceptual basis for an enormously broad range of scholarly analyses of culture including history, anthropology, literature, religion, and politics. In fact there is virtually no area of academic research and social criticism which has not been in some way influenced by psychoanalytic ideas. At the same time psychoanalytic practice itself has been widely attacked for its alleged lack of self-criticism; for being a closed intellectual system without reference to external social processes and has as a result been accused of merely replicating repressive social arrangements and promoting narcissistic self involvement, (Jacoby, 1975; Lasch, 1978; and Kovel, 1981). Within the psychoanalytic tradition there has been, in the works of Adler, Horney, Fromm and others an explicit attempt to provide a cultural referent for psychoanalytic practice. This so-called "culturalist" school of psychoanalysis has been widely criticized and by and large rejected by the mainstream of psychoanalytic practice.

In general, I accept as valid the major criticisms leveled against the culturalist point of view and believe that even if one is sympathetic to their political and social concerns, the theoretical propositions of the culturalist

school find little verification in clinical practice and in any case have not proven to be bodies of theory which have led to further developments and elaboration. Yet whatever objections may be launched against the work of Erich Fromm, for example, his understanding of social processes is certainly more sophisticated than the so-called "biopsychosocial" model of contemporary psychiatry. In any event, one unfortunate result of the culturalist debate has been that any attempt to understand the interrelationship between psychoanalysis and politics has come to be regarded with much justifiable scepticism within the psychoanalytic community.

Viewed from a clinical perspective, much of the literature by political scientists using psychoanalytic concepts is impoverished by the lack of intimate acquaintance with the kind of information which can only be obtained from the clinical situation itself. Psychoanalytic theory deprived of its verification in clinical material is like a tree without a sufficiently developed root system--no matter how impressive the foliage, further growth is threatened by a lack of nourishment from below. Much of psychoanalytically informed political theory suffers from this difficulty; elaborate theoretical generalizations springing largely from Freud's later works on social issues, but nevertheless theories which lack adequate verification in the clinical situation itself (Kovel, 1981).

On the opposite side of the disciplinary boundary which

separates psychoanalysis from social science, one repeatedly finds psychoanalytic practitioners using politics as a dismissive term. In otherwise astute works of clinical theory one finds a particular series of otherwise unexplained phenomena being dismissed as "just politics" (See for example Kernberg, 1980, Part 3). Analysts, with all of their clinical sophistication, sometimes write as if the term "politics" is a concept of self-evident meaning requiring no further discussion. One consequence of what can only be described as a lack of political sophistication and training is that those analysts who have written on political subjects often appear to be at best merely recapitulating conventional liberal platitudes and at worst naive and uninformed. One result is that psychoanalytic insight has had significantly less impact on the shaping of public policy than I believe it is potentially capable of providing.

There have, of course, been any number of attempts to glean from Freud's writings the rudiments of a political theory. However, the mere fact that Freud has been seen alternatively as a conservative moralist, (Rieff, 1959), a classic Viennese liberal, (Roazen, 1968), an incipient revolutionary, (Marcuse, 1955), and a Jewish mystic, (Bakan, 1958), ought to be taken as evidence that a single unified view of politics and society cannot be easily extracted from Freud's writings. It would therefore seem that the effort to locate in his writings the kernel of what Freud "really

believed" about politics is no longer a particularly useful task.

If, moreover, the recent French experience with psychoanalytic politics, (Turkle, 1978), has taught us nothing else, we ought to have learned that psychoanalysis, as it is expressed in Freud's writings, is a body of theory which can be bent to the service of many and diverse causes. It is no denegration of the founder's genius to claim that what is currently regarded as the essential principles of Freud's work is as much a social creation of our time as it is an accurate reflection of what Freud actually intended. Thus it seems that an adequate psychoanalytic understanding of politics can never be derived simply from a careful collation of the scattered references to politics in Freud's collected works. We should therefore take it as axiomatic that any reading of Freud for social and political content will inevitably reflect the problems, contradictions and concerns of a particular society at a particular point in history. (Ricoeur, 1970; Hughes, 1958, and Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Our effort therefore is to make explicit what will in any case remain implicit; to acknowledge that any interpretation of Freud will always remain just that, an interpretation, and that its truth value as well as its scientific status are matters which are in large measure socially determined.

One of the very few theoreticians who was able to write about these matters without either reducing psychoanalysis

to politics or politics to psychoanalysis was the late Harold D. Lasswell. Lasswell, a contemporary of many of the early analysts in Freud's circle and himself a trained analyst, was for a number of years associated with the group who founded the William Allenson White Institute. Lasswell's contributions although rich in theoretical insight were primarily policy oriented studies, seeking meliorative solutions to practical political problems. In a sense this dissertation is a dialogue with Lasswell's work even when no explicit reference is made to his concepts.

Other than Freud, no other theoretician is more important to the present research than Lasswell. However, despite his impressive range of research and theorizing, there are fundamental problems with Lasswell's work which we will address in some detail. While Lasswell undoubtedly believed that he had incorporated the most useful psychoanalytic concepts into his broader theories of politics and society, he did not attempt to connect his theoretical formulations to a systematic psychoanalytic point of view--in terms of either the structural, topographic or energic points of view. One consequence of this failure was that for Lasswell, "personality", a term which Freud deplored, (Abraham & E.L. Freud, eds., 1965 p. 12), became a pervasive analytic category. I will argue that in emphasizing personality as an irreducible theoretical concept, Lasswell precluded a deeper, more systematic, more truely psychoanalytic, understanding of politics.

Secondly, Lasswell's emphasis on meliorative solutions to practical problems was, I would argue, based on an unanalyzed assumption from 19th century liberal thought; a belief in a potentially harmonious solution to all basic political problems. Fundamental and irreducible conflict is not essential to his theoretical position and Lasswell's understanding of politics is not therefore, I think, consistent with psychoanalysis. To put it differently, Lasswell's unanalyzed liberalism was, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the psychoanalytic demand for neutrality. In the course of this dissertation I will discuss these and other issues in some detail.

My goal is a systematic attempt to view psychoanalysis and political theory in their dialectic interrelationship; to accept as esential both psychoanalytic and political theory without either accepting one and dismissing the other or reducing one to the other. In an age of increasing academic specialization the exclusive concentration in one narrow area of expertise tends to imply, often unconsciously, a kind of reductionism which, in the present work I am struggling to avoid. Even though the exclusively clinical practice of psychoanalysis does not necessarily imply the dismissal of political and social modes of explication it has often had that effect. While within political science a rationalistic and empiricistic emphasis on public policy options does not necessarily imply the dismissal of the irrational and the

unconscious it too has often had that practical effect.

In this dissertation I hope to avoid these problems by first providing a definition of the concept of power which is both consistent with its usage in classical political theory and clinically useful in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. I hope to demonstrate the clinical utility of the concept of power first by an elaboration of the concept in metapsychological terms in accordance with Freud's (1923) structural theory and then by a discussion of the subject of power relations and transference. I will argue that if my concept of power has clinical utility then it must be shown to operate in the most fundamental of psychoanalytic phenomena; those of transference and countertransference. Finally, in a concluding chapter, I will attempt to elucidate some of the broader implications of my position for both clinical psychoanalytic practice and for political theory.

Chapter II

THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

In the last chapter I asserted that the concept of power has been the traditional organizing principle in virtually all Western political thought. In the present chapter I will briefly summarize what I take to be the distinguishing features of modern Western notions of political power. In doing so it becomes immediately apparent that in the classic works of, for example, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, power is a central concept, but not one which these writers took to be so problematic as to require careful definition and explication. To them the meaning of power was self-evident and referred primarily to the military and economic force available to the sovereign. However to contemporary political scientists, power is no longer a concept with self-evident meaning and has become the subject of major theoretical controversy. It is important to account for this change since changes in the problems which theorists deem significant can tell us much about the changing nature of society itself.

In contemporary social science the meaning attached to the concept of power is by no means self-evident, and there have been any number of attempts at an empirically operational definition. Power it seems, has become a highly contested

notion and, in spite of seemingly endless polemics, there is no agreement on the basic issue of what is and is not to be regarded as power. However, the dominant tendency in the social sciences has been to postulate a definition of power which can be rigorously applied to social and political phenomena and which will provide a quantitative measure of power. In this chapter I will argue that the attempt to quantify and measure power, in spite of increasing methodological sophistication, is inevitably inadequate. It is inadequate not because we do not, in the West, share some common notion of power, no matter how ill-defined and vague, but because conscious intentions and calculations of instrumental reason can provide us with only a small part of what we need to know in order to understand something of the functioning of power at all levels, from international politics, to the politics of the family and small group processes, to the more purely intrapsychic relations of power which exist within the psyche of a single individual.

My basic premise is that politics is power and power is ubiquitous. Therefore any discussion of power which limits the study of politics merely to the study of government and its institutions will necessarily fall far short of providing anything like an adequate understanding of the dynamics of power.

It is my purpose to argue that power relations are, in large part unconscious, that political processes consist

largely of internalized object relations which are in their most important aspects repressed such that they become "second nature" (Jacoby, 1971) and operate for the most part outside the limited sphere of consciousness. If we are to understand the dynamics of power relations what is required is, in sum, a psychoanalytic theory of politics and a political theory of psychoanalysis.

A. Power as a Political Concept.

Even within the classic tradition of Western political theory accounts of power relations are profoundly enigmatic. On the one hand to fully explicate Western notions of political power would be to rewrite the history of Western political thought itself. Yet on the other hand the concept itself is at best ill-defined and at worst seems to be of such broad applicability that it is by no means certain that one can find an essential common element in all or even most of the widely divergent uses of the term. Perhaps the most that can be said is that power is an "essentially contested" (Gallie, 1955-56) concept the meaning of which varies among cultures and throughout history and changes according to the interests served. Even though I will eventually advance a definition of power as if it were universally applicable, it must be understood that in doing so I am merely advancing a notion which seems to be useful in explicating the vicissitudes of power for a particular time, a particular culture, and a particular set of interests. It should not be supposed that

such a definition has the status of positive truth in the sense of the natural sciences, but rather a definition which will be useful in uniting under a single frame of discussion the seemingly diverse data of politics and psychoanalysis.

While it is by and large true that no writer in the classic tradition of Western political and social thought found it necessary to advance an exhaustive definition of the concept of power, there has been, it would seem, a kind of diffuse consensus as to the meaning to be attached to the term. More recent debates in contemporary social science not withstanding, the historical meaning of the notion of power was that it was a term applied to the military might of men at arms. In political terms, it was, and to a large extent still is, a term applied as a comparative measure of military and also of economic strength. In this classic sense power is not a problematic term and to the ancients, whichever side emerged victorious in a clash of armed might, that side had the greater power.

Pondering the causes of the Athenian defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian war of the 5th century B.C.E., the Greek historian Thucydides undertook one of the first systematic analysis of the causes and consequences of the struggle for power and hegemony among nations. For Thucydides understanding the Athenian defeat was all the more important because he believed that Athens had led the Hellenic world in the development of civilized political life and public

virtue and had been resoundingly defeated by the barbarous and militaristic Spartans. Near the middle of his narrative, Thucydides states the Athenian case against Melos, a colony of Sparta:

> ...we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us--a great mass of words that nobody would believe. And we ask you on your side not to imagine that you will influence us by saying that you, though a colony of Sparta, have not joined Sparta in the war, or that you have never done us any harm. Instead we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compell and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.
>
> Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book V.

Thucydides' justly famous notion that in politics, the powerful exact what they can, the weak grant what they must and justice counts not at all, is I believe one of the first systematic formulations of the principles of power politics. From Thucydides through Machiavelli and Hobbes to such contemporaries as Henry Kissinger and Hans Morgenthau there is an unbroken tradition of realpolitik in which proper political behavior is seen as a calculus of power by which the national interests of states are maximized and their deficits minimized. It is a calculation of instrumental reason, a zero-sum calculus in which gains for any one party

are necessarily losses for another.

Thucydides work is important in part because he refuses to moralize or to offer an explanation of how from the Athenian point of view justice did not triumph over adversity. His task was to describe matters as he saw them as dispassionately as possible without unnecessary sentiment or partisan purpose. In doing so he makes a clear distinction between justice on the one hand and the vicissitudes of power on the other and he does so without recourse to the ineffable will of the Gods. By and large, this perspective was not widely shared even among his contemporaries and it has not been a popular point of view in much of the subsequent Western tradition which has been preoccupied with issues of abstract justice and the obsessive Christian concern with universal moral principles. For Thucydides, when one wishes to speak of power, issues of justice and injustice are simply not relevant.

This perspective distinguishes him from much of the subsequent tradition where the first concern is with notions of what constitutes the just society and how, given some basic assumptions as to the unchanging nature of man, political institutions might be perfected. It is important to note that discussions of power divorced from issues of justice have in the West been almost exclusively limited to the field of international relations and almost never in terms of domestic politics.

In domestic society, power becomes an issue insofar as it is recognized that some measure of individual freedom must be abdicated and given over to a central sovereign authority; but always this transfer of power is rationalized in terms of some notion of a higher good. In The Republic, Plato, for example, could argue for a concentration of power in the hands of an elite in part because he believed that a higher form of civilized life would result. Montesquieu (1748), to take another example, believed that justice could be served by dispersal of power among competing elites thus prefiguring the Madisonian notion of countervailing power enshrined in the American constitution. For Rousseau (1762), on the other hand, the just society could only be secured through an expression of the general will of all citizens being exercized all of the time in a radical form of participatory democracy. In each of these classic examples, the common theme is how power can best be placed in the service of justice and state power is justified only in so far as it serves some higher end.

Perhaps the most pervasive device for reconciling the demands of power and justice in Western political thought has been the notion of a social contract. It was argued that government arose out of an act of collective abdication of certain primordial individual freedoms in return for the security and well being provided by government. The social contract was believed by many to be an historical fact and by

most to be a juridical principle by which individual rights and the rights of the state could be defined and kept separate. It is worth noting that Freud himself articulated a version of the social contract in his later writings, (1912-13, 1921, and 1930). For Freud the social contract was little more than an historical fiction, a heuristic device, useful in explaining the origins of civil society but not in his view a principle insuring a just society in any absolute sense. The social contract is for Freud at most an anthropological postulate. In this sense, Freud's social thought is more akin to the tradition of realpolitik than it is to those whose primary concern was with ethical and moral issues.

It was Machiavelli (1513) who perhaps more than any other writer maintained the clear separation of power and justice that Thucydides had been among the first to articulate. For him the central problem was not how to create a just society but in discovering the principles by which state power could be maintained and increased; how the levers of government could be manipulated in the service of power. To many people, there has always been something distasteful about Machiavelli's enterprize perhaps because we would prefer to deny the existence of power as an imutable force in human affairs: we would prefer to see the world as a very nice place in which all conflict is the result of misperception. Aside from the tradition of realpolik, there has been relatively little in Western political thought which directly addresses the issue

of the causes and consequences of power in domestic society. Yet there has been a wide range of attitudes toward the issue of power. For descriptive purposes we can identify two extreme positions (Niebuhr, 1943).

On the one hand there have been those who have maintained that power and justice are antithetical principles and that therefore power must be eliminated in order that justice might triumph. This was more or less the position of St. Augustine (410 A.D.) and other figures of the early Christian Church. Among the early Christians there was the notion that the abolition of earthly power would usher in the millenia and the second coming of Christ. Augustine himself took a more conservative view believing that pure justice was an attribute only of God's kingdom which was not of this earth, and that therefore earthly existence was inevitably unjust. Thus Augustine advocated the doctrine of the two cities; God's city where justice would ultimately triumph and the earthly city where power was a necessary principle (Deane, 1963).

Perhaps paradoxically, it has been the revolutionary Marxist tradition which, in our own time, has most clearly articulated this apocalyptic notion of power and justice as eternal opposites. In spite of a thoroughgoing materialism which rejected any notion of God and his intentions for mankind, Marx believed that through an historical and material dialectic process a new communist millenia would be ushered in in which the power of the state would "wither

away" and dominance and submission would cease to be the determinants of daily life. To be sure, Marx was much more interested in describing the internal contradictions of the existing order and of showing how they would eventually lead to the overthrow of capitalism than he was in describing the form and substance of the new order which would take its place. But there was nevertheless, in Marx's writing, a millenial view in which power politics would ultimately be replaced by harmonious, truely human relationships.

In contemporary political life the negation of power is characteristic of various pacifist movements a common feature of which has been the rejection of power as a supreme moral evil. The elevation of nonviolent resistence to an end in itself was not however the position of Mahatma Gandhi who saw nonviolence as being merely the most instrumentally efficacious technique by which the powerless majority could wrest power from the Imperial British minority. Its utility existed only insofar as British Imperial institutions were subject to moral principles of civility and decency. Thus one might say that powerlessness as a political tactic was effective only through the indulgence of the powerful and that power was nevertheless the governing principle of political life.*

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*There is here an interesting example of the recapitulation of individual psychological processes on the social level. It is common to speak of the power, indeed sometimes the tyranny, exerted by children over their parents. But it is a kind of power which exists only at the indulgence of the powerful since ultimately children are powerless in the face of the parental will. On the social level, it is therefore

At the oposite extreme there has been an attitude which seeks to exhault power sometimes, as in German Fascist ideology, as a supreme value in itself, sometimes as in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as a theoretical postulate explaining nothing less than the origin of all values including justice itself.* In this latter view, the will to power is beyond good and evil and at the same time the source of all moral values. In the following chapter we will pursue in greater detail Nietzsche's concept of the will to power and in particular its relationship to Freud's libido theory.

The exhaltation of power as a supreme value in itself is by no means confined to so called fascist or totalitarian ideologies but is present in virtually all contemporary forms of nationalism and statism. In his monumental history of militarism, Alfred Vagts (1937) made the distinction between militarism proper and what he called "the military way." In his view, the military way necessitated the promotion of certain martial values useful for advancing the fighting capability of men at war. Militarism on the other hand, is an attempt to elevate military values into ends in themselves having no necessary relation to the capacity to win wars.

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no accident that nonviolent political movements have taken names such as "the children of God" or "flower children."

*It must be clearly stated that here I am not making the equation of Nietzsche's philosophy and fascist ideology, an equation which was once common (e.g. Bertram, 1918) and has now, largely through the work of Walter Kaufmann (1951) been, one hopes, definitively refuted.

Similarly, it is possible to make a distinction between a kind of instrumental nationalism and nationalism in its more malignant form. Thus we might distinguish between an instrumental nationalism which is an exhaltation of power useful in helping the powerless to become empowered and a more malignant nationalism which is an aggrandizing ideology of the already powerful. It is important to make such distinctions in order to preserve the absolute antithesis between power and justice on the one hand and to avoid the categorical moral condemnation of power and politics on the other.

Between the extremes of the negation of power and its exhaltation lies the mainstream of political liberalism in which the distinction between power as an instrumental goal and power as a supreme value in itself has been repeatedly and consistently confused (cf. Arendt, 1970). It would seem that the inability to make this distinction has become a recurrent problem in contemporary political discourse; a problem which a psychoanalytic understanding of politics might do much to clarify. From this perspective it appears unlikely that power can be abolished from any form of human organization and that, on the other hand, the exhaltation of power in the form of nationalism has become one of the principle evils of modern political life.

B. The Problem of Power in Contemporary Social Science.

At some point in the relatively recent history of Western

social thought the traditional notion of political power as the force available to the state in exercizing the collective will, came to be seen as inadequate. At that time, within the literature of social science the concept of power became an increasingly contested issue. While it may not be possible to fully explain why or when this change occurred, it is certainly possible to describe historically how the change came about.

In traditional 19th century diplomacy the power of a state was understood, (although not precisely measured), as a particular combination of population, natural resources, capital, degree of social organization and state of technological development. As in classic economic theory, each of these factors allowed of a certain measure of substitutability. For example, a larger population of potential soldiers could to some degree compensate for a lack of sophistication in weapons technology; natural resources could to some extent substitute for a deficiency in human resources and so forth. Even though this notion of power was never amenable to precise measure, and even though the vicissitudes of war could never be predicted, there was nevertheless widespread agreement as to the constituents of state power.

In international politics, absolute power was traditionally regarded as an attribute of sovereignty. The sovereign was seen as a juridical person even if absolute power no longer belonged to the person of the monarch. To a great extent

this concept of sovereignty, as the locus of the absolute power of the state recognizing no higher authority and no limitations on that power, is still an adequate concept in international politics. Sovereignty is an attribute of states and power is an attribute of sovereignty. It is only when one considers internal domestic political arrangements that power becomes problematic. It became so at that point in Western history when the absolute power of the crowned head of state came to be questioned. Certainly, the French Revolution marked an important milestone in this process. Among other things the revolution marked an end to the notion that sovereignty was an attribute of an individual and became instead a property of the collectivity. While in international politics, the nation continued to be viewed as a juridical person with absolute power, in domestic politics power was now believed to belong to the people and was exercized on their behalf by delegated officials according to widely varied notions of representation.

At the same time that the absolute power of the sovereign was being brought into question, technological developments led to an absolute increase in the power of the state. The trend towards greater concentration of power which continues today at what often seems to be an exponential rate (Jouvenel, 1945) was paradoxically accompanied by an ideological commitment to greater dispersal of power. It is thus a profound paradox that in the West the trends toward ever greater in-

creases in the absolute power of the state should be accompanied by a manifest commintment to the increasing dispersal of power in political terms. While the existence of these two parallel and countervailing trends is not seriously disputed, the resolution of the apparent contradiction has been achieved to no one's satisfaction.

In the United States, the prevailing theoretical point of view has been that of pluralism; a doctrine which seeks to preserve diversity in the face of centripetal trends in material culture. Thus pluralist theorists would argue that the diversity of interests and cultures can be and is preserved in the face of rapidly advancing developments in the technology of mass communication and control, and that an adequate system of representative democracy is preserved in the process. It is therefore not surprising that the definition of the concept of power should become increasingly problematic.

According to the prevailing view in early twentieth century continental political and social thought, particularly in the work of Max Weber (Gerth & Mills, 1946), the increasing power of the state could be made consistent with the demands for justice only through the mechanism of a rationalized bureaucracy which would impersonally administer the laws with impartiality. But even in the work of Weber, the question of what is and is not power was not regarded as particularly problematic.

It was in the United States, where the movement towards

quantification and empirical verification in the social sciences found its most enthusiastic adherents, that the issue of power was first raised as a major theoretical issue. Among the theorists of democratic pluralism no one has been more influential than Robert Dahl (1957, 1958, 1961). His work began in part as a critique of the then widely held view that in spite of a juridical commitment to equality, the so-called democratic societies of the West tended toward government by what C. Wright Mills had called a "power elite," (Mills, 1956). Mills and others had observed, in Western developed countries, a tendency towards increasingly hierarchical political arrangements accompanied by a tendency towards the concentration of political and economic power. In an attempt to defend the pluralist point of view Dahl set out to measure on a large scale the actual dispersal or concentration of political power within a small American community. This pioneering effort at precise quantitative measurement of power marked the beginning of an enthusiastically pursued and highly contested line of investigation and research.

Dahl's definition of power was formulated on the basis of who actually made political decisions on issues over which there was observable conflicts of interest. In this manner, he attempted to show that, in spite of what seemed to be a ruling elite within the community he was studying, there was in fact a much broader sharing of political power than had been previously assumed. Soon there was a flurry of equally

empirical studies claiming to demonstrate the errors in Dahl's methodology and the error of his conclusions (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). These studies led in turn to more empirical work by Dahl and his followers all of it asserting the validity of the pluralist point of view.

A British political philosopher, Steven Lukes (1974) has summarized the major issues in this debate in terms of the competing definitions of power advanced by various authors. Lukes believes that a definition of power satisfactory to all is unlikely to emerge from this controversy and he suggests that power must be defined in such a way as to include not just observable conflict over subjective interests but also issues of control over the political agenda in which there is observable and real conflict over both subjective and real interests. Perhaps the most sympathetic thing that can be said by way of summarizing this increasingly voluminous research and debate is that a concerted effort has been made towards increasing definitional sophistication and that as a result there has been some advance in the ability of social science to measure the phenomena of political power with increasing precision.

Theoretical research on the problem of defining power in political theory has been accompanied by an effort among behavioral psychologists (e.g. Winter, 1973; McClelland 1975). The general tendency of this research has been an attempt to specify those individual attributes which seem to be most

highly correlated to high needs for power. Using large samples, primarily of college students, Winter and McClelland have been able to specify certain personality characteristics such as a preference for competitive sports which seem to be correlated with what they call high "N power", the need for power. Veroff (1958), Uleman (1972) and others have adapted the technique of the Thematic Apperception Test in an effort to measure the need for power. They claim that their instrument is able to identify with a fairly high degree of reliability those individuals with a high need for power.

Yet even the most sympathetic reading of empirical research designed to measure power needs of individuals will conclude that the results to date have been disappointing. It is moreover, difficult to avoid the conclusion that a great deal of elaborate theoretical machinery has been employed with very limited concrete results. One such effort (Stogdil, 1974) attempted to summarize all empirical research on the phenomena of leadership and concluded that the most solid research finding in all disciplines was that compliance tended to increase with the amount of coercive force utilized. That is not, one would think a particularly profound return on such massive scholarly investment!

C. Power as a Material Concept.

Yet on an intuitive level most of us believe that we understand something of the meaning of power. On the level

of day to day functioning one knows, or believes one knows, when one is in the presence of power or is the object of power oriented behavior. The concept feels as unproblematic as it was assumed to be by the authors of classic Western political theory (and by contemporary psychoanalytic theorists). In this sense, power is akin to terms like coercion and force: the experience if not the abstraction appears real and unmistakable. The debate in the behavioral literature, one senses, is not over the essential meaning of the concept but over how broadly it should be applied. The actions of an invading army are, everyone would agree, the manifestations of power but the complex processes by which collegial group decisions are made appear to be more problematic. It is the ambiguous area between absolute coercion on the one hand and apparent freedom on the other that is the subject of contending attempts at definitional clarity.

Whatever the respective merits of empirical social science and its widely varied attempts at precise definition, it is inevitably true that the more specific the definition the greater the danger that something fundamental will be omitted. It seems that greater methodological sophistication has done little to promote a more generalized understanding of the dynamics of power. In fact the whole trend towards greater specificity in definition and measurement necessarily sacrifices the potential gains to be achieved by a broader more inclusive approach. In any case, my broad purpose of studying psycho-

analytic and political theory in their dialectic interrelationship clearly seems to fly in the face of the dominant research trends in both behavioral psychology and contemporary political theory. Indeed, psychoanalytic theory itself appears to be constantly in danger of becoming an insular and esoteric discipline bearing no conscious relationship to larger social issues and processes.

Recognizing that any definition of power which seeks to encompass such disperate phenomena as international politics and intrapsychic conflict, will always be open to criticism by those whose interest lies in precise quantitative measurement, it nevertheless seems necessary to attempt such a definition if the insights of both psychoanalysis and political theory are to be usefully brought to bear on each other. Again, my interest is in avoiding the twin dangers of reducing psychoanalytic phenomena to politics on the one hand or reducing politics to its intrapsychic determinants on the other.

It therefore seems reasonable that power should be defined in material terms; that a definition of power cannot begin with the surface phenomena of perception. We cannot, in sum, define the existence of power relations according to whether or not they are consciously perceived as such by the participants. To do so would at the very least be inconsistent with psychoanalysis and its emphasis on unconscious processes. Nor on the other hand can we simply assume that power is a manifestation of instinctual energic stimulation since to do so would seem to lead to the conclusion that power is not a socially created phenomenon but one which is part of the

genetic endowment of the species. Indeed, as I will argue in the following chapter, both in the history and prehistory of psychoanalysis, power has been viewed in precisely these terms. Rather, I have assumed that whatever role perception may be said to play in determining the existence of power relations, the determinants of power itself must necessarily be located in the material world.

To study power from the point of view of perception, as almost all empirical political science tends to do, suggests that whether one is in a position of power or one of powerlessness is purely a matter of perception. In the hands of the empricists, this proposition is translated into the notion that power and powerlessness are matters of belief, i.e. one's ideas about one's position in the world. In this manner, empirical observations about politics seem almost inevitably to become testiments to the idealism which has always been a pervasive feature of American political thought.

In contrast, defining power as a material concept makes the issue of perception a secondary issue: whether or not one is powerful or powerless in any given situation is to some extent independent of issues of belief and perception. Thus the ultimate basis of power relations, I would argue, can be located in the material world of nature. It is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be understood as a materialist psychology (Reich, 1934). To stress the material basis of power relations is necessarily to emphasize Freudian meta-

psychology as opposed to the view (Klein et. al., 1976) that psychoanalysis is and ought to be a so-called "pure psychology" of meaning.

I believe that stressing the material determinants of power strengthens the scientific claims of psychoanalysis while at the same time maintaining that psychoanalysis is not an empirical science but a science of meaning. In other words, it preserves the dialectic tension between metapsychology and meaning, of Naturwissenschaft versus Geisteswissenschaft, that was one of the major characteristics of Freud's work.

From this perspective, it appears that power relations are always predicated on the existence of material inequality among the parties to a relationship. My ultimate concern is of course with power relations in a human context but it does seem as if inequality as a precondition for power is a part of what we mean when we speak of power in purely physical terms. The power of a volcano, for example, can be described in terms of the inequality of pressure inside the earth's core in relation to the external world. Or if we speak of one engine being more powerful than the other we are speaking of the inequality in their capacity to perform a particular task. In terms of natural phenomena, power is always a relational term and it always denotes the existence of some material inequality.

In terms of the widely disperate notions of political power I have been discussing, it can be seen that inequality

is always a precondition for power relations. If we speak in military terms, it is clear that power denotes inequality in armaments or in terms of the degree of organization and training of troops. When we speak of economic power there is always the implication of inequality of resources. Political power likewise finds its basis in some dimension of inequality --and the very term inequality implies relation. Power, whether in physical terms, or in terms of human organization can not be spoken of as an attribute of one entity alone and always implies the existence of an other by which power can be measured.

In human terms, we do not use the term power unless there is not only a relationship of inequality between or among peoples but also an attempt to actualize that inequality to one person's advantage. There may, for example, be massive material inequalities between any two people but we do not normally describe their relationship as being one of power unless the two people stand in some relationship to each other and there is an attempt, either consciously or unconsciously to actualize the existing inequalities. I have therefore chosen to define power as an actualized state of inequality. In political terms when we talk of national power or the power of a particular group in domestic society, we are talking about the attempt to exploit some dimension of inequality to the advantage of the party said to exert power. All of this seems obvious enough--except of course

when we attempt to quantify and measure comparative political or personal power.

In defining power as an actualized state of inequality my intention has been to emphasize the fact that political processes extend far beyond the merely governmental and that power is an aspect of virtually all human relations. Moreover, power can also be seen as an intrapsychic phenomena as well, referring to the inequality among the components of psychic structure. Thus we can describe the relationship between for example ego and super-ego (in Freud's structural theory) as a fundamentally political relationship (Gear, Hill, and Liendo, 1982, p. 11).

To fully develop these notions, however, it is first necessary to review the history and prehistory of psychoanalysis in order to more fully understand how it happened that the concept of power came to occupy such an ambiguous position in psychoanalytic theory. In a subsequent chapter, I will argue that Freud's structural theory is also a political theory, which describes both the politics of intrapsychic functioning and the dynamics of group life. I believe that this explicitly political understanding of psychoanalysis can add something of importance to the clinical practice of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy.

Chapter III

POWER IN THE HISTORY AND PREHISTORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Within the psychoanalytic movement, the concept of power has had a decidedly ambiguous history. On the one hand it is obviously not, at present, a concept with any specific meaning in a psychoanalytic context, or at least not within what might be regarded as the mainstream of the psychoanalytic movement. Yet on the other hand it seems as if some notion of power, however ambiguously defined, has been indispensable to those writing within the tradition. For a political scientist, by training attuned to issues of power, psychoanalytic discourse, whether in the scholarly journals or in casual talk about patients, appears at times to be preoccupied, sometimes even obsessed, with the issue of power. It would seem therefore that there is a contradiction between the manifest content of psychoanalysis, where power has no status as a technical concept and its latent content where the discourse of power appears to be all but indispensable.

This paradox seems to apply not only to the contemporary literature but in fact appears to have been a persistent theme throughout the history of the psychoanalytic

movement. In fact, it can be demonstrated historically that the issue of power was one major area of controversy leading to the early ruptures and splits within the movement. There is moreover an additional paradox in the fact that psychoanalysis, which has no concept of power, developed out of a 19th century tradition of German idealism in which power was a familiar concept with particular philosophical meanings generally known and understood by members of the German cultural elite. This paradox is heightened by the fact that Freud's intellectual debt to that tradition in general and to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in particular is well known and well documented (see for example, Gay 1978; Shorske, 1980). Yet within Freud's writing there is no specific reference to power (Macht) as a theoretical concept except in a few dismissive references to Adler. While on the other hand, Freud uses the term over and over again as if its meaning were self-evident--as it may well have been for him.*

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*If we take as an arbitrarily chosen example, Freud's 1924 essay, (SE, Vol. XIX, p. 155-70) "The Economic Problem of Masochism," we find that in this brief eleven page work, Freud uses the term repeatedly but with at least five different meanings. On page 163, he says that power is identical to the death instinct; on page 165, he identifies power with the impersonal social forces operating in moral masochism; on page 167, he says that power is an attribute of the super ego as it embodies parental imagos; on page 168, power is an attribute of parents in their relations to children. Now it may well be that there is some way that all these meanings, (and many more in other parts of his writings) can be reconciled under a common definition but the point remains that Freud appears not to have had a need to find such a definition nor did he express any interest in doing so.

With respect to the issue of power, there is yet another paradox in the history of the psychoanalytic movement. If we think of psychoanalysis as springing from a common fin de siècle German culture of commonly shared assumptions, then we need to explain not only why Freud did not choose to adopt some variant of the widely shared assumption of a vitalistic "will to power" but also why virtually every important revisionist critic gave the concept an important place in their theoretical writing. That this is true for Alfred Adler is well known but the concept of power occupied an important place in the thought of Carl Jung, Wilhelm Reich and Karen Horney as well. Thus for Freud and the contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream, power is not a theoretical concept whereas for virtually every important revisionist it was. Why this should be the case is something which needs to be explained.

In the present chapter I do not propose to undertake an exhaustive exploration of either the prehistory* or the history of the psychoanalytic movement with respect to the issue of power--to do so adequately would require a separate work. I have chosen rather to address the issue from the perspective of a few select authors particularly noted for their concern with issues of power. I will begin with a brief discussion of Nietzsche's notion of the will to power

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*In the present chapter we are following the usual historian's convention using the term "history" to describe the work of Freud and his contemporaries who invented psychoanalysis and the term "prehistory" to refer to all of the various influences on Freud's thought and that of his followers.

in order to suggest that in spite of the obvious similarities in their writing, that Nietzsche's specific use of the will to power adds an important dimension to Freud's thought. In the sections that follow, I will examine the notion of power in two representative revisionists--Adler and Horney in an effort to understand what if anything these theories explain which mainstream psychoanalytic thinking did not.

A. Power in the Prehistory of Psychoanalysis.

In recent years there has been a renewed emphasis on the origins of Freud's thought in 19th century science, (for example Sulloway, 1982). Undoubtedly Freud himself believed that psychoanalysis could ultimately be grounded in natural science and could be divorced from intuition and philosophic speculation of which he and his followers were not only suspicious but often even contemptuous, (see Federn & Nunberg, I, pp. 355-56). Yet to many students of 19th century German thought there is an unmistakable family resemblance between the works of Freud and Nietzsche and both of them to their great predecessor Hegel.

For all three men, the human mind is conceived of as animated by an energic force springing from the unconscious depths of the psyche. For Hegel it was Geist or spirit, for Nietzsche it was the will to power and for Freud; libido. Each of them used their respective energic concept to explain both individual development and the movement of the human

species through history. Each body of thought was thoroughly dialectic; based on a conceptualization of psychic conflict resolved through some notion of transcendence (aufheben). In each case the unitary vitalizing principle was in some sense an a priori assumption from which, by a process of dialectic unfolding, many and diverse conclusions were reached. For Freud (1933, SE, Vol. XXII, p. 70) the unconscious libido was such a force which he himself regarded as but a useful assumption. In the German tradition of Geisteswissenschaft, each understood his work as scientific but science of a particular sort in which scientific truths were not conceived of as "out there" waiting to be unconvered but rather as the product of the deep and inextricable involvement of mind with the objects of its contemplation. This notion is I believe essential for understanding Freud's concept of science which is by no means identical with that of contemporary research in the natural sciences.

Indeed, this dialectic tradition is very far indeed from the empiricism of contemporary social science with its rigid compartmentalization of knowledge into ever more discrete disciplines. For us, one abiding attraction of 19th century German social and political thought is that, existing as it did in the shadow of Hegel's great philosophic system, thinkers like Nietzsche and Freud could believe implicitly in the possibility of something like a unified theory of science and the humanities. Whether or not that belief was

a result of either a combination of naiveté and arrogance or was an admirable and relentless search for consistency is of course a matter of much disagreement. Nevertheless, it was Nietzsche who was the first to announce the final collapse of the Hegelian synthesis and to proclaim himself the first prophet of the post-philosophic era. In his early work Nietzsche is very much an Isaiah bitterly denouncing the decadence of empiricist methodology.

> What is the mark of every literary decadence? That life no longer resides in the whole. The word becomes sovereign and leaps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches out and obscures the meaning of the page, and the page comes to life at the expense of the whole--the whole is no longer a whole. This, however, is the simile of every style of decadence: every time there is an anarchy of atoms. (The Case of Wagner, 7)

But in his later work, Nietzsche rejected his own earlier dualistic tendencies and proclaimed the will to power as not only the sole psychological drive but also the single unitary force of the cosmos. It was not however a philosophic position which could be in any meaningful sense assimilated by the positivism and empiricism which were then rapidly becoming the dominant ideology of the Anglo-French world. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the fact that the mature thought of Nietzsche should rest on a philosophic monism is a paradox given his scathing attack on all philosophic systematizers. Of course, to contemporary social science such grandeosity seems hopelessly unscientific, and "merely" speculative. Yet regardless of what one thinks of this tradition, it is important to

note that for Freud and his generation such theorizing on the grand scale was an accepted tradition and one which they would have found no need to question.*

As Ellenberger, (1970, p. 277) and others have argued, it was unnecessary for Freud to study Nietzsche systematically to have been deeply influenced by their thought since Nietzsche's ideas were very much "in the air," the subject of endless discussion in the high culture of the German bourgeoisie. The same could as easily be said of Hegel. There was, moreover a direct link between Nietzsche and Freud in the person of Andreas Salome who was Nietzsche's lover (in thought if not in reality) and also a very close confidant of Freud in his later years (Binion, 1968).

Freud's highly ambivalent attitude toward Nietzsche is well known and has received much comment in the literature. On the one hand he claimed that Nietzsche "had no influence whatsoever on his work" and that when he had attempted to read Nietzsche he was "smothered by an excess of interest." (Nunberg & Federn, Vol. I, p. 359). On the other hand, Freud often expressed his profound and abiding admiration for Nietzsche. Ernest Jones (1953-55, Vol. II, p. 344), for example says that Freud "several times said of Nietzsche that he had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any man

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*That such all encompasing philosophic "speculation" coincided with the zenith of German political and military might was of course no accident--a "coincidence" which the Germans themselves were the first to develop the conceptual tools for analyzing in the work of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim among others.

who ever lived, or was likely to live." Coming from Freud, this was no small praise. And, in a letter to the playwrite, Arnold Zweig, Freud wrote that "In my youth /Nietzsche/ was a remote and noble figure to me" (E. Freud, ed., p. 78; cf. Jones Vol. III, p. 460). In his Autobiographical Study (1925, SE, Vol. XX, p. 60), Freud called Nietzsche "another philosopher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psychoanalysis, /and who/ was for a long time avoided by me on that very account...".

Many Freud scholars have commented on the intellectual debt of Freud to Nietzsche. In most cases they have pointed out the various ways in which Nietzsche's thought anticipated the more systematic formulations of Freud. Mitchell Ginsberg, (Solomon, ed., 1970, pp. 293-215) was one of the first to systematically compare the writings of the two men. He formulated no less than ten specific ideas first suggested by Nietzsche and later developed by Freud:

> (1) the unconscious and its relation to Unlust-bearing /unpleasant and stronger/ material, (2) repression, (3) internalization, (4) sublimation, (5) projection, (6) the ego, (7) overdetermination, as well as to (8) the notion of society as in conflict with and domesticator of the individual, (9) the contrast between a quantum of (psychic) energy and the particular manner of its discharge, and to (10) dreams as manifestations of the person.

Ginsberg wishes to demonstrate not merely that Nietzsche anticipated Freud but rather that Nietzsche had important ideas on the therapeutic process in his own right, ideas which were

not subsequently developed by Freud.

B. Nietzsche's Will to Power*

I am concerned with the possibility that such may be the case with that most difficult and controversial of all Nietzsche's ideas: the will to power. That Nietzsche regarded the will to power as his most important discovery is well known, however its most complete presentation is (in the book by that title), by any reckoning fundamentally incomprehensible. This is true in part because the work was never finished and was compiled posthumously from existing manuscripts. In addition, there is the problem of Nietzsche's style which is paradoxically one of his most brilliant assets but also a style which raised hyperbole to new extremes for purposes of assaulting the reader out of his assumed complacency. A coherent understanding of Nietzsche's will to power is made even more difficult, perhaps even impossible, by the fact of Nietzsche's growing insanity when he wrote it and the fact that his sister deliberately edited the work so as to make it seem to support the ideology of Aryan racist supremacy. It was this work, more than any other, that allowed for the creation of the notorious legend of Nietzsche

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*All citations to Nietzsche's work in the pages which follow are from Walter Kaufmann's translations unless otherwise indicated. The work will be cited by year of publication followed by a Roman numeral indicating a section number (or aphorism number where appropriate). Page numbers are used only where a section number is inappropriate or insufficient.

as the racist proponent of "blond beasts" and "Ubermenschen" --a distortion from which Nietzsche's reputation is only beginning to recover. There is, in sum, every reason for dismissing Nietzsche as having little or no relevance to contemporary issues of psychoanalysis--every reason except for the fact that he may just possibly with all of his outrageous hyperbole, have been correct.

For all these reasons any attempt to extract from Nietzsche's work a coherent theory of power must by necessity remain speculative and we can never be sure that such a reconstruction adequately reflects Nietzsche's intentions. In what follows, I am relying rather heavily on Walter Kaufmann's (1950) comprehensive study, recognizing that it too is but an interpretation the utility of which will ultimately rest on whether or not that interpretation tells us something about the phenomena of power which we did not otherwise know.

According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche in his search for the basic animating force of all human behavior was first inclined toward a sexual libido theory but rejected this formulation because "sexuality is that very aspect of the basic drive which is cancelled in sublimation and cannot for that reason be considered the essence of the drive."* There is much

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*Freud, in Three Essays on Sexuality, had, of course, a very different formulation in which only "excessively strong excitations" of sexual energy were subject to sublimation leaving some of the unneutralized energy available for genital sexuality. Nietzsche's position is based on a concept of sublimation which is given far more importance than it had in Freud's later writings (Kaufmann, 1950, pp. 211-256).

that can be said of Nietzsche's emphasis on sublimation and its relationship to Freud's use of the same term. However, for our purposes it is sufficient merely to emphasize the fact that Nietzsche saw the will to power as a more fundamental energic force than the sexual libido and that the basis of this claim lay in Nietzsche's more comprehensive view of sublimation (Kaufmann, 1950, pp. 211-256).

What then did Nietzsche mean by the will to power? In the first place, he believed that "our drives /Trieb/ are reducible to the will to power," (Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 24, p. 287). By this he meant that all of the basic drives are reducible to the will to power in the same sense that the early Freud reduced a diverse array of drive related phenomena to primitive erotic libido. Moreover, for Nietzsche the will to power is, at one and the same time, a psychological drive by which all affects can be understood and a theory of politics and history. Everything from war and peace to intrapsychic conflict is for him a manifestation of the will to power. It must be emphasized that for Nietzsche the concept of will did not refer to a conscious volitional aspect of behavior but was an almost wholly unconscious striving which thrust itself upward into consciousness.

Paralleling Nietzsche's belief that sexuality was but one aspect of the broader will was his contention that the feeling of pleasure is but an epiphenomenon of the possession of power. In the most simple terms, Nietzsche believed that man strives not for pleasure, as Freud originally believed,

but for power. Pleasure is one subjective experience of the possession of power. Every other affect can similarly be reduced to the presence or absence of power. For Nietzsche power is an empirical concept and differences among various affective states in spite of their manifest dissimilarity are in reality quantitative differences in the amount of power subjectively experienced (cf. Freud's position in the 1895, Project For A Scientific Psychology, SE, Vol. VII, pp. 283-387). Moreover, Nietzsche equates the possession of power with health and attaches the greatest positive moral significance to the presence of the greatest amounts of power.

The result would seem to be that Nietzsche exhaults the powerful and denigrates the weak. This is in fact his position but with a most unlikely conclusion. While it might seem that Nietzsche approved of brute force and felt nothing but contempt for the physically weak--this is merely a caricature of his position and on analysis it turns out that the exact opposite is the case. Nietzsche believed that all expressions of power in physical terms whether in "blond beasts" roaming the primeval German forests or the power of the modern German Reich were essentially manifestations of the absence of power. According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche believed that "political power" was "essentially a form of barbarism." (Kaufmann, 1950, p. 197). In a braoder sense, all forms of political power are the object of Nietzsche's contempt, none more so than the Germans under the Reich and he says explicitly that the "Aryan influence has corrupted the world." (The Will to

Power, p. 142). Kaufmann says (1950, p. 180) that in the early drafts o The Birth of Tragedy, (Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II, p. 282), Nietzsche speaks of worldly "power which is always evil." It was in this sense that Nietzsche described the rise of the German Reich under Bismark as marking the decline not the triumph of German culture:

> One pays heavily for coming to power: Power makes stupid. The Germans, once called the people of thinkers--do they still think at all today? The Germans are now bored with the spirit, the Germans now mistrust the spirit.... Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles, I fear that was the end of German philosophy. (Twilight of the Idols, Hollingdale trs., VII)

Thus did Nietzsche express his contempt for the world's notion of power as defined by industrial and military strength--for him this is not power but the ultimate weakness.

If worldly power is in fact a manifestation of the lack of power as Nietzsche proclaimed then one might naively assume that he approved of Christianity as the religion of the meek and powerless. This as it turns out was profoundly incorrect and Nietzsche never tires of heaping scorn on the early Christians who he called "impertinent rabble" (Anti-Christ, p. 24) and he has nothing but contempt for the later Church and its unholy alliance with political power. Democracy in general, no less than Prussian militarism is for him a manifestation of the herd instinct in which "Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse" (Zarathustra,

p. 46). It would seem therefore that Nietzsche's position is essentially misanthropic--despising in equal measure the state in all its forms and the pius Christian abdication of power.

In fact what he is rejecting is both the exhaltation and the denial of power and in this sense he believes that power is an ontological condition of existence. What he is working towards in virtually all of his later works is nothing less than the revaluation of all existing values. He wishes to claim that what is conventionally thought of as powerful is in fact the very opposite of power and moreover that the exhaltation of powerlessness is in reality a scarcely disguised wish for power. In this context, he rewrote Luke 18:14 to read "He that humbleth himself wills to be exhaulted." (Human All Too Human, I, p. 87). Nietzsche believed that the analysis of what seem on the surface to be virtuous impulses such as humility and pity, invariably reveals nothing so much as the wish to dominate. In these as in other respects as well, Nietzsche exhibits what in another context would be called astute clinical judgment. One can imagine for example in an hysteric, how the preconscious wish by the patient to arouse pity in the analyst could on further analysis reveal a deeply unconscious wish to dominate. Or one thinks of patients whose humble compliance with the analyst's every instruction, the eager deference to every interpretation, could be understood as a not so subtle form of resistance--an

assertion of power.

Given the alternatives of a naked expression of impulse as in the case of the Teutonic barbarians (including, for Nietzsche, the contemporary enthusiasts of German state power) or the seemingly virtuous abdication of power as in the early Christians, Nietzsche leaves no doubt as to where he stood: on the side of naked impulse. Why? Because in the barbarian there was at least an implicit recognition of animal nature and therefore the possibility of transcendence. "What is great in man," he says, "is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a going-across and a down going /Übergang and Untergang/" (Zarathustra, p. 44). As for the politicians: "You have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still a worm. Once you were apes, and even now man is more of an ape than any ape." Yet in the ape, there is for Nietzsche, always the possibility of growth, development and overcoming.* But for the meekly pius Christian even that is impossible, they are the emasculated ones who at best do no evil out of an inhibition towards doing evil. In psychoanalytic terms, one might say that a person who is prevented from doing evil because of the crushing burden of a powerful and punitive super-ego does not thereby choose the good.

If striving after worldly power merely betrays one's

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*Paradoxically, Nietzsche's position comes here very close to that of St. Augustine in the injunction to sin boldly that Grace may the more abound.

own powerlessness and the seemingly pius abnegation of power, one's wish for power then there seems to be no possibility of escape. For Nietzsche the only valid alternative to these extreme positions is not an alternative at all but transcendence (aufheben). The ability to overcome ones self; ones own deepest psychic conflicts is for him the only real virtue, the only true measure of power and the only really positive expression of will. The extent to which an individual has overcome himself, or a nation has overcome itself, is for Nietzsche an empirical measure of its power and its health as well as an index to its ultimate moral worth.

In this, Nietzsche's position, it seems, is very close to Freud and a modern psychoanalytic conception of health--that the movement from neurosis to something like health involves the bringing into consciousness of the formerly disowned parts of self. In fact, it has been said that Freud derived his famous definition of health from Goethe's Die Geheimnisse:

> All force strives forward to work far and wide
> To live and grow and ever to expand;
> Yet we are checked and thwarted on each side
> By the world's flux and swept along like sand:
> In this internal storm and outward tide
> We hear a promise hard to understand;
> From the compulsion that all creatures binds,
> Who overcomes himself, his freedom finds.

It is worth noting that the second line in its original

German reads: "Zu leben and zu wirken hier und dort" an alternative translation of which is Freud's "to love and to work." Thus one might say that in Goethe both Nietzsche and Freud found inspiration for their very similar world views. It is a poetic if not literal truth.

Nietzsche's ideal of the healthy individual is the truly powerful person who has no need for power over other people having achieved power over self. Yet he is by no means optimistic that any more than a tiny minority of people are ever able to achieve a significant measure of self overcoming. While Nietzsche is profoundly pessimistic about the possibilities of achieving individual health, he is completely without hope for the society as a whole. He says that:

> Every smallest step in the field of free thinking and of the personally formed life, has ever been fought for at the cost of spiritual and physical tortures...change has required its innumerable martyrs.... Nothing has been bought more dearly than that little bit of human reason and sense of freedom that is now the basis of our pride.
> Die Morgenrote, 18.

Those who can overcome themselves are Nietzsche's ascetic ideal, the very few people who properly deserve the title übermenschen.*

Nietzsche's profound pessimism concerning the possibilities of genuine human progress and his equally profound con-

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*Compare this view with the opening lines of Civilization and its Discontents where Freud writes:

> It is impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement--that they seek power, success and wealth for themselves and admire them in others, and that they underestimate what is of true value in life. (SE, Vol. XXI, p. 64)

tempt for the possibility of a rationally organized political community is, it seems to me, very similar to that of Freud. Leaving aside Nietzsche's sarcasm and his characteristically hyperbolic style, it seems that the two men had a strikingly similar view of politics and society. Both of them placed the highest value on reason--not the sort of reason which hides behind abstract formulas and puerile intellectual constructions but reason acted on out of full awareness of the passions. In Kaufmann's words (1950, p. 233): "Nietzsche considers both the man who acts on impulse and the man who deliberately counteracts his impulses as inferior to the man who acts rationally on instinct." Both men believed that this was an ideal to be achieved only in small measure by the rational few and never by the collectivity. Late in life (1932, SE Vol. XXII, p. 172) Freud wrote that:

> The ordinary man only knows one kind of truth, in the ordinary sense of the word. He cannot imagine what a higher or a highest truth may be. Truth seems to him no more capable of comparative degrees than death; and he cannot join in the leap from the beautiful to the true.

Both men were profoundly suspicious of mass political participation in any of its characteristic modern forms--fascism, communism and democracy; and neither had anything but contempt for the much touted virtues of the common man.

In summary, what might we argue is Nietzsche's distinctive contribution to the understanding of the psychoanalysis of power? One of the abiding virtues of Nietzsche's philosophy of power is that it is both an individual psych-

ology and a political philosophy, in a way that contemporary psychoanalysis most definitely is not. However, for the purposes of the present study, that conclusion alone is necessary but insufficient. What is necessary is a concise theoretical statement of the psychology of power relations; a theory which describes behavior within the larger political context. I believe that Nietzsche has provides us with one.

My reading of Nietzsche suggests that he believed that the will to dominate, to have power over other people, is not only a kind of weakness but reveals itself as a failure to overcome basic intra-psychic conflict. And that there is moreover an inverse relationship between the need for power over others and the achievement of power over self. Thus the will to worldly power, is for Nietzsche, a perversion in so far as the achievement of power in this sense is not self-limiting and leads to the neurotic striving for greater external control in direct proportion to the failure in overcoming internal powerlessness.

I will argue in subsequent chapters that the will to power over others describes precisely the phenomena Freud and others refer to under the category of perversion. I wish to establish that power and sexuality are inextricably related phenomena. Robert Stoller (1975) in his studies of sexual perversion has concluded that there is no expression of the sexual impulse without some expression of the wish to harm. Similarly, I will argue that at least in Western culture, there

is no sexuality without at least some derivative of the wish to dominate and the wish to submit--that erotism can never be completely separated from the dynamics of power. I believe that such conclusions follow logically from Nietzsche's philosophy as I understand it and allow for the integration into psychoanalytic theory of a variety of phenomena which have been insufficiently described. This relationship will be more fully developed in the chapter that follows. Finally, I believe that at least potentially, such an analysis can add a political dimension to contemporary psychoanalysis; a theme which I will take up in the concluding chapter.

C. The Concept of Power in the Revisionism of Adler and Horney

The fact that Freud did not explicitly identify himself with Nietzsche's philosophy is overdetermined by a number of factors some theoretical, some personal, and some political. In the first place Freud wanted to consolidate his views on sexuality and see them accepted by the medical and scientific establishments of his time. As a result he was convinced, and subsequent history has proven him correct, that resistance to his ideas could take many forms including the attempt to identify libido theory with nonsexual drives and thereby dilute its radical significance. In addition, as Freud himself admitted, he wished to create the impression that psychoanalysis was created ex nihilo, out of his own creative paternity. In addition, there was the wish that psychoanalysis

would achieve the prestige of science with all of the material advantage that that implied. And finally, there were the issues of Nietzsche's insanity, his reputation as a brilliant stylist but hopelessly unsystematic thinker and his alleged romanticism. Even during Freud's early career, Nietzsche had, thanks in part to his sister, already been identified with the causes of racism and Aryan supremacy. Under these circumstances the fact that Freud did not openly identify himself with Nietzsche's ideas requires no further comment.

The multitude of tactical and strategic reasons that led Freud to repudiate an explicit identification with Nietzsche were not for whatever reasons operative in the case of Alfred Adler. In his writings, Adler explicitly stated that his use of the will to power was taken from Nietzsche. This of course does not imply that he understood Nietzsche in the same way I have outlined above. In fact, it seems that Adler's understanding of power relations preserves very little of Nietzsche's explicit distinction between the will to power as self-overcoming and worldly power. If anything Adler's view of power was closer to the conventional meaning i.e. worldly power.

In his early writing Adler adopted a view which equated the "striving for power" with a constitutional predisposition. Striving for power, according to Adler was the result of what he termed organ inferiority. By 1912 (Kurt Adler, 1972, p. 54), he had revised his position so that:

> The constitutional inferiority and similarly effective childhood situations give rise to a feeling of inferiority, which demands a compensation in the sense of an enhancement of self-esteem. Here the fictional, final purpose of striving for power gains enormous influence and draws all psychological forces in its direction...

The Nietzschean will to power came to be understood by Adler as "a special compensatory force...which wants to put an end to the general human inner insecurity," (Ibid.). Thus even in Adler's early work the will to power is compensatory not a primary force in itself. Freud and other members of the early psychoanalytic movement rejected Adler's views because they believed that he did not sufficiently address the issue of instinct and the vicissitudes of libido. In fact, as is apparent from the above quotation, Adler based his view of power on affect and perception, a view which tended to denigrate the importance of unconscious conflict.

In response to criticism, Adler wrote "The Aggressive Drives in Life and in the Neurosis," (1908) in which he postulated the existence and the primacy of an aggressive instinct of self preservation (Ibid.). In at least one sense Adler's notion of a primary aggressive instinct anticipated Freud's later formulation of the death instinct, although Freud could not bring himself to credit Adler with the discovery. In a 1923 footnote added to his case study of "Little Hans" (SE, Vol. X, p. 140), Freud wrote that even though he had been obliged to accept the idea of an aggressive instinct he could not accept Adler's formulation because he

believed that Adler's view "results in a universal characteristic of instincts being reduced to be the propensity of a single one of them..." In his 1909 paper, Freud explained why he objected to Adler's view: "It appears to me," he wrote, "that Adler has mistakenly promoted into a special and self subsisting instinct what is in reality a universal and indispensable attribute of all instincts--their instinctual [triebhaft] and 'pressing' character, what might be described as their capacity for initiating movement" (SE, Vol. X, p. 141).

In point of fact, Adler's conversion to some notion of instinct was short lived and he quickly abandoned the idea of an aggressive instinct because, as he later wrote:

> ...I realized that it was not at all an instinct but a partially conscious, partially not understood attitude toward the tasks of life, and in this way I arrived at an understanding of the social influences on the personality, the degree of which is always determined by the individual's opinion about the facts and difficulties of life. (Adler, 1931, quoted by Kurt Adler, p. 55)

From his 1908 paper onward, Adler discussed the will to power as a purely social as opposed to endogenously produced phenomena. But even before he abandoned instinct theory, Adler had posited the existence of an innate "social feeling" which he saw as a counterforce to the aggressive feeling and the will to power.

In fact, Adler's explanations of what he saw as the ubiquity of power relations alternate between intrapsychic and cultural hypotheses. At times he speaks of the origins of

power in the terror the young child experiences in the absence of the mothering object; at others he speaks of power as a purely social phenomena arising out of class divisions and repressive social arrangements. There is never an effort to relate these two levels of explanation systematically. As a result, it is impossible to say whether or not Adler has a theory of power relations--although he clearly has a position with respect to the issue of power which he sees as a neurotic, if perhaps ineradicable, aspect of relatedness.

While it is true that in his later writings Adler preserved something of Nietzsche's distinction between power over and self overcoming* his use of Nietzsche is greatly diluted by the shift in emphasis from power as an endogenous energic concept to power as a social phenomena. It needs to be pointed out that even Adler's minimal use of Nietzsche led to the accusation that he, like Nietzsche had glorified the will to power not simply described it. My point, however is that in the move from locating the will to power internally to seeing it as an exclusively social phenomenon, Adler parts company with both Nietzsche and Freud and is not truely psychoanalytic in the sense that Freud understood psychoanalysis.

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*For example, Adler wrote that:

> The striving of each actively moving individual is towards overcoming, not towards power. Striving for power, for personal power, represents only one of a thousand types, all of which seek perfection a security giving plus situation. (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, p. 114.

Beyond his preservation of something of the content of Nietzsche's will to power, what might we ask is Adler's distinctive contribution to our understanding of power relations? This is a difficult question to answer because in part, as Ansbacher and Ansbacher (1956) point out, Adler was not a systematic thinker in the same sense as was Freud. Adler was a socialist, one senses, out of moral cmmitment and not because of a particular affinity for Marxist methodology. In this respect, Adler's socialism seems to have more in common with the utopian socialism of Feurbach than it does with the dialectical materialism of Marx.

From the standpoint of the present study, this leads to serious difficulties with his theory. If the striving for power is not innate but arises out of a social matrix then we need to know precisely how this comes about if we are to understand its variability among individuals and between societies. But nowhere in Adler is their a systematic theoretical exploration of the social origins of power. As a result, even a sympathetic reading of Adler leads at best to the acceptance of a collection of truisms which one intuitively finds unobjectionable but which are never linked to a systematic epistemology. This, it is important to note, is an unresolved problem in the writing of all of the so-called culturalist psychoanalysts from Adler to Erich Fromm.

Such an approach becomes problematic once one admits of the possibility that attributing "cultural" causality to any

psychological phenomenon can be a defense against taking seriously, for example, Freud's views on sexuality or the importance of unconscious processes. Culturalist hypotheses, if they are not linked to an ontological view of human nature, tend to become banal in the extreme and lead inextricably to a belief in the almost infinite maleability of human institutions, an overvaluation of the limits of the possible, and an altogether too optimistic view of human behavior which flies in the face of the manifest data of history.

One brief example sheds light on the difference between Freud and Adler in this regard. In the index to the Standard Edition of Freud's works one finds only four scant references to the term personality and one immediately understands that this is not a concept with epistemological significance for Freud. On the other hand it is used again and again not only in Adler but in contemporary academic psychology as if its meaning were selfevident. Personality is like most of Adler's concepts, for example the "feeling of inferiority," the "masculine protest," "social feeling" and any number of other vague concepts. Freud himself said that the concept of personality:

> ...is a loosely defined term from surface psychology that does nothing particular to increase understanding of the real processes, that is to say, meta-psychologically it says nothing. But it is easy to believe that one is saying something meaningful in using it. (Abraham and E.L. Freud, 1965, p. 12)

The same criticism could be leveled at the whole range of

Adlerian concepts. Because of these methodological difficulties with Adler's idealism, and indeed with that of virtually all of ego and self psychology, one is, in my view, forced to take seriously some version of a metapsychological point of view.

As I have argued in the last chapter, it is Freud's metapsychology which allows for the equation of psychoanalysis and materialism. Thus causality in the understanding of things of the psyche is attributed neither to ideas nor to the surface phenomena of perception but to objective conditions in the natural world as they find expression in the drives and through the drives to their psychic representations in the form either of ideas or affects. This understanding of drives does not assume that adaptation is the only evolutionary aim of a drive and in fact assumes no more than the ontological immutability of psychic conflict.

Some of the same criticisms which have been made of Adler's views on power can be applied to the work of Karen Horney even though she herself (1937, p. 11) said that "Adler is in fact a good example of how even a productive insight into psychological processes can become sterile if pursued onesidedly without foundation in the basic discoveries of Freud." While she credits Adler with having understood the importance of strivings for power she criticizes him for assuming these strivings "to be the foremost trend in human nature, not in themselves requiring any explanation" (1937,

p. 158).

For Horney the quest for power, like that for prestige and possessions, was basically a defense against anxiety. The wish for power is she said a defense against the anxiety of helplessness. She argued that Freud considered the striving for power and possessions "derivatives of the 'anal-sadistic stage'" and later as an expression of the death instinct and she accused both Adler and Freud of failing to recognize "the role that anxiety plays in bringing about such drives" and "the cultural implications in the forms in which they are expressed." (1937, p. 159). She believed that hostile impulses are the source of what she called "basic anxiety" (as distinct from normal anxiety) and that "in our culture" there are "four principal ways in which a person tries to protect himself against basic anxiety: affection, submissiveness, power and withdrawal."

According to Horney, the quest for power, prestige and possessions "all have something in common which distinguishes them from the need for affection."

> Winning affection means obtaining reassurance through intensified contact with others, while striving for power, prestige and possessions means obtaining reassurance through loosening of the contact with others and through fortifying ones own position. (1937, p. 138)

Horney preserves, although in a highly attenuated form, something of the distinction which we found in Nietzsche and in a limited sense in Adler; namely the distinction between power over and self overcoming. In Horney there is a

normal striving for power which may take the form of a realization of superior strength, or a striving for wisdom or through an identification with a larger cause including "the family, political or professional group, native land, a religious or scientific idea,"* (Ibid., p. 139). In contrast to the normal, "the neurotic striving for power is born out of anxiety, hatred and feelings of inferiority. To put it categorically, the normal striving for power is born of strength, the neurotic of weakness," (Ibid.). Kelman, (1972, p. 76) interprets this to mean that, for Horney, the neurotic striving for power "occurs when the attempt to find reassurance from anxiety through affection has failed." Thus while she does not develop it in any great detail, Horney believed that the neurotic quest for power is on some level antithetical to the attainment of intimacy and mutuality, and she divorces both of these needs from any notion of

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*One of the many difficulties with her distinction between the normal and pathological strivings for power is that she provides us with no specific criteria for distinguishing the two phenomena. In this passage she includes identification with one's native land under the category of normal striving for power and apparently sees nothing problematic in doing so. That she could take this position in 1937, with Nazi German rapidly nearing the height of its furror, betrays not only a lack of theoretical rigor but an incredible naiveté with respect to issues of power and pathological nationalism. The fact that Horney was a gentile then living in the United States only slightly diminishes this criticism.

To be sure, one can read Horney as having distinguished between identification with another primarily by compensatory efforts to avoid anxiety and anxiety and identification not primarily produced in this way. Yet, in my reading of Horney, it is simply not clear that she made such a distinction.

drive. The idea of a fundamental antithesis between power and intimacy is a theme which I will pursue in the following chapter.

In her later work, Horney did not pursue systematically her ideas on the nature of power relations. In Self Analysis (1942) she lists the neurotic need for power as but one among twelve basic neurotic trends. In Our Inner Conflicts, (1945) Horney delineates three characteristic methods adopted in the attempt to solve what she called "basic conflicts": moving toward, away from, or against others. What she had previously discussed as the striving for power is now subsumed under the "move against" or aggressive type. And finally, in Neuroses and Human Growth, (1950), what had previously been described as the "aggressive type" has now become the "expansive solution" with three subtypes: narcissism, perfectionism, and arrogant vindictiveness. Nowhere in her later writings did she return to an explicit discussion of the dynamics of power.

Horney's position on the issue of power is suggestive; her ideas seem both eminently plausible and intuitively unobjectionable but, as in the case of Adler, her views are profoundly inadequate from a metapsychological point of view --the inadequacy of her position arises from its lack of theoretical rigor. It is in a sense, obviously true that individual characteristics and pathologies are in some way influenced by the larger culture. It is also, for that

matter obviously true that much of what is today widely taken to be the universal characteristics of human nature is in reality merely a particular historical form which, like Minerva's owl, can only be observed with the setting of the sun. But what Horney, Adler, and others in the "culturalist" school do not and cannot provide is a consistent epistemological understanding of psychic processes and structure. They provide us with no criteria for distinguishing the innate from the culturally determined; the historical from the transhistorical.

In the preceeding analysis, I have argued that Freud's thought can only be fully understood in the context of 19th century German dialectical thought and that one of the chief characteristics of that thought was a notion of the will to power in which the concept of will was seen not merely as a volitional aspect of individual consciousness but a deeply unconscious striving. For both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, will was believed to operate on both an ontogenetic and a philogenetic level. In his writings, Freud both preserved and departed from important aspects of that tradition--in spite of enormous gains in theoretical rigor, there was a price to pay in terms of the theory of power relations. I would argue that in order to establish psychoanalysis as an acceptable form of treatment for the mentally distressed, it was a necessary but none the less costly price to pay. In the departure from the "speculative" philosophic tradition, psychoanalysis was left without a theory of power relations

one consequence of which was the fact that the theory was no longer a theory of politics and the individual, (as it clearly had been for Nietzsche), but became merely a theory of individual psychic functioning. Therefore in his later essays on culture and society, Freud brilliantly projected his theory of individual functioning to a social level linked to a theory of group behavior but without an explicit link to politics.

In retrospect, it seems clear that Freud's debt to the German philosophic tradition in general and to Nietzsche in particular was enormous. In the departure from Nietzsche and the tradition which he represented the sacrifice which Freud made was not only a sacrifice in theoretical breadth but a personal sacrifice as well and we suspect that the lack of an explicit concept of power was directly related to the ruptures within the movement which led to the expulsion of Adler, Jung, Reich and others and to the intensely debated factionalism of the early years. The history of psychoanalysis is frought with the themes of orthodoxy and heresy, claims of plagiarism and assertions of primacy, as well as petty intrigues and slavish identifications. Paul Roazen (1971, p. 167) has catalogued many of the more lurid episodes and argued that "give-and-take between two partners entails an egalitarianism which Freud's concept of analysis had foreclosed." I agree with Roazen's comment but would argue that the many episodes of oedipal rivalry in the guise of theoret-

ical difference within the psychoanalytic movement are not exclusively due to quirks of Freud's character but are in part the result of the absence of an explicit theory of power. This is a subject which I will pursue in greater detail in a subsequent chapter on transference.

Chapter IV

TOWARDS A PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPT OF POWER

In the two preceeding chapters, I have discussed the concept of power first as the central concept in classic Western political theory and secondly as an energic concept in German dialectic thought--a tradition out of which psychoanalysis arose. The distinction I wished to establish was not just that between political and psychoanalytic concepts of power but between two very different intellectual and philosophic traditions; the empericist methodology of contemporary social science and the dialectic tradition of psychoanalysis. In part, this distinction is geographic as well as historical. The methodology of contemporary American social science in general and behavioral psychology and political science in particular are, primarily British in origin whereas psychoanalysis has its roots in the German dialectic tradition. The fundamental antithesis between these two traditions explains in part why Freud (SE, Vol. XXI, 1930) despaired of the future of psychoanalysis in America and why Lacan (Turkle, 1978) believed that Americans were almost congenitally incapable of understanding his own interpretation of Freud.

In the present chapter, my task is first of all to distinguish as clearly as possible the differences between empiricist and dialectic methodologies on the subject of power.

Among other things, this distinction helps to clarify what it is that I believe psychoanalysis is capable of contributing to our understanding of political processes. Moreover, the distinction is, I believe, important in helping clinical practitioners of psychoanalysis understand more clearly the unique contribution of their distinctive point of view towards the self-understanding of human activity.

In subsequent sections of this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate that my definition of power as an actualized state of inequality is not only consistent with but implicit in Freud's structural theory. Thus I will offer a theory of power relations which I hope will clarify the meaning Freud attached to Oedipal dynamics, to his entire concept of sexuality, and the meaning of masculinity and feminity. Furthermore, I believe that the concept of power helps clarify the psychoanalytic concept of perversion which I regard as a fundamentally important concept not just for the clinical practice of psychoanalysis but a concept which can provide a normative critique of political behavior.

Finally, I will suggest that not only is the drive towards power an energic concept; a libidinous drive, but that it involves a profound paradox in the psychic lives of individuals. A certain level of power, a certain energic investment in the accumulation of power is, I believe part of the normal instinctual endowment of the species. Without a certain measure of power normal psychic functioning is grossly

impaired but if the drive towards power is pursued, for whatever reasons beyond a normative limit it becomes properly speaking a perversion. Not only do individuals require power for normal psychic functioning but they also require the ability to experience their own powerlessness in loving relationships with others experienced as equals. Thus I will argue that power and love are at some level antithetic drive related phenomena; that one cannot love either out of absolute power at one extreme or absolute powerlessness at the other. Power and love should be understood as dialectic opposites in the vicissitudes of instinctual development.

A. Freud and Methodology.

Behind the often pretentious pseudo-science of behavioral research on the subject of power, there are important methodological assumptions which typically go unexamined and often unarticulated. Chief among them is the view that power is a thing "out there" in the culture, a thing which through careful and precise definition we can distinguish from all other related phenomena and which ultimately we will be able to measure with precision. The task of science is, in this view, the uncovering of heretofore unknown laws of nature. A further assumption is that behind the apparent uniqueness of each individual action there lies a uniformity of behavior which if we will but utilize the correct theoretical concepts we can uncover. In this view, the task of

behavioral research on the subject of power is exactly the same as that of medical researchers attempting to understand a particular pathological syndrome. In such research the first task is presumably to determine if the clinical phenomena constitute a single pathological entity or a series of closely related pathologies. If a single disease can be isolated the search for causes and cures can properly begin. So too with the subject of power. We see a variety of behaviors which popular usage refers to as power and the first task of scientific research is therefore to isolate the essential components of the concept.

These empirical research techniques, while they may be compatible with certain aspects of Freudian metapsychology, are by no means adequate for investigating the full range of phenomena with which psychoanalytic theory and practice concerns itself. In fact the empirical approach is in many ways the least interesting aspect of Freud's method. When Freud developed his initial insights into psychic functioning he was not primarily interested in uncovering laws but in analyzing unconscious psychic conflict. He did not proceed by surveying the patient population available to him in an attempt to formulate a definition of hysteria which would hold true for all patients bearing that particular diagnostic label.

In fact, nosology was apparently not a subject which held much interest for Freud. Rather his work started with an analysis of the verbal productions of patients; associative

chains which were invariably found to exhibit psychic conflict. Manifest verbal content was found to contain, for example, inconsistencies which could only be reconciled by the assumption of unconscious psychological processes. A patient whose manifest repulsion towards things sexual, for example, was found to have a profound unconscious attraction to the very things which were consciously repellent. It was this process of analysis, which proceeds from the manifest downward into the unconscious depths of the psyche, coupled with the revolutionary discovery that the psychoanalytic observer, through the mechanism of transference, was inextricably involved with the objects of contemplation, that constituted the central feature of Freud's methodology. It is necessary to remind ourselves of these things in order to affirm that psychoanalysis is first last and foremost a theory for the interpretation of psychic conflict.

Freud found that in order to more fully understand his patient's psychic lives it was useful to adopt certain assumptions which he found to be clinically useful. Among these assumptions two were of fundamental importance; the unconscious and libido. Both of these assumptions have since proven to be essential to the methodology of psychoanalysis. The libido theory is essentially an assumption that the individual is animated by an endogenous, largely unconscious energic force. While within broadly psychoanalytic circles libido theory has been roundly criticized and rejected by

large segments of the psychoanalytic community there is nevertheless some agreement that the assumption of an endogenous source of energic stimulation constitutes a fundamental assumption of Freudian psychoanalysis. Therefore a psychoanalytic theory of power must begin by assuming that the phenomena which we conventionally think of as power-oriented behavior are manifestations of drive.*

A psychoanalytic theory of power, and thus a psychoanalytic theory of politics, is concerned with the analysis of conflict whether that conflict be among competing armies on the international level or of contradictions within the psychic life of a single individual--all forms of conflict are viewed ultimately as manifestations of an energic force springing from the depths of the unconscious. While it might seem as if these disparate forms of conflict have no necessary relationship to each other, I intend to argue that large group behavior can be understood and analyzed using the same categories and concepts which clinical practice uses for the analysis of individual intrapsychic conflict. In fact, Freud himself had a profound understanding of the ways in which individual psychopathology is recapitulated on a social level. Yet in such works as his 1915 essay on war (SE, Vol. XIV,

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*Whether or not the phenomena of power belong to one or the other classes of drives; libidinous, aggressive or death seeking, is a question which I do not intend to pursue in the present study. The whole issue of aggressive drives is such a contested and difficult issue in the psychoanalytic literature that I do not intend to take it up in this context. Yet some notion of endogenously produced drive is essential to the present study and power is viewed as a manifestation of undifferentiated instinctual energy.

pp. 273-302) it seems as if Freud himself did not fully understand the possibilities inherent in psychoanalysis for the analysis of large group processes. This line of inquiry was pursued only recently in the work of Alfred Bion (1961) and his colleagues at the Tavistock Clinic.

There is, in my view, much to be gained by basing a theory of politics on the psychoanalysis of power as it operatest in large groups. The automatic separation of political and economic power is, for example, a basic distinction made by almost all theorists in the tradition of Western liberalism. It is a distinction which, as many critics have pointed out (e.g., Lichtheim, 1974), has tended to obscure far more than it clarifies. The same can be said for the traditional distinction between domestic and international politics (e.g., Deutsch, 1968). It is my intention to use a theory of power relations to cut across these distinctions in order to undertake an analysis of underlying dynamic processes.

Psychoanalysis does not assume that all conflicts are capable of resolution but that the act of interpretation is useful in making the unconscious conscious and thereby increasing the possibility of choice. To interpret is not necessarily to resolve an apparent contradiction in favor of one or other of its elements but to seek an understanding which transcends the original contradiction, and thereby mitigates the intensity of the conflict. Nor does psychoanalysis begin with the premise that all conflict is poten-

tially resolvable into a fundamental harmony as does for example the utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill. The primacy of psychic conflict is not simply a dogma of psychoanalysis or an aesthetic preference but springs from the dialectic tradition of German social thought. It is a tradition distinguished among other things by the belief that conflict rather than harmony is the more fundamental characteristic of human existence.

A truely psychoanalytic political theory and a thoroughly political theory of psychoanalysis would operate on the premise that conflict is an ontological fact of existence. It would rigorously negate the tendency, particularly characteristic of American social thought, which views group conflict, issues of peace and war, as primarily attributable to "mis perceptions" such that if only reason were to be allowed its due an underlying harmony of interests could be uncovered.

Moreover if we are to view manifestations of power in interpersonal relations as being manifestations of libido it becomes necessary to advance some explanation of why on a manifest level individuals display such widely differing needs to amass power. Logically, we can do this in two ways; by claiming that individuals differ quantitatively in their genetic or environmentally determined endowment of instinctual energy or that the vicissitudes of instinctual development lead to manifest differences in the need for personal power. In either case, power can be seen as an ultimately

libidinous phenomenon. But beyond that, to be consistent with Freud's own point of view, we must be able to account for the existence of power in material terms. At many points in his theoretical writings, Freud (e.g. 1895, 1937) took great pains to identify psychoanalysis as a materialist psychology. He did this in order to distinguish psychoanalysis as sharply as possible from the various idealist psychologies prevalent in his day including that of Carl Jung (McGuire, ed., 1974). Idealism when applied to psychological theory was always for Freud a term of contempt.

To claim with Freud that psychoanalysis is a materialist psychology means among other things that causality must, in the final analysis, be traced not to the existence of particular ideas, but to material existence itself. By material existence is meant something objective, not objective in the sense of what everybody can agree on, but objective in the sense of proceeding from the world of objects--real material objects in the natural world. Thus hunger, for example, is an objective material drive of all living organisms.

Sexuality, with its biological function of procreation is also at least in part a material drive as Marx recognized when he said that from the sexual relationship "one can... judge man's whole level of development..the relationship of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man's behavior has become human," (1844, p. 101). Similarly,

it can be argued that the drive for power is based in material reality and that power arrangements on both an individual and collective level reveal the degree of ontogenetic and philogenetic development of the species*

There is another aspect of Freud's method which sharply distinguishes it from the research techniques of contemporary social science and this I take to be by far and away Freud's most important contribution to scientific methodology. It was what Lacan (1964) called a "new mode of reflexivity," and was at least for Western thought an entirely new and revolutionary mode of cognition. If I am reading Lacan correctly, and on such matters there can be no certainty, what he meant is that Freud inaugurated a new method of seeing and of understanding in which one necessarily recognizes the participation of the self in the constitution of the other. The revolutionary importance of Freud's discovery is not always readily apparent from his writings where it is all too possible to read Freud as the natural scientist struggling to uncover heretofore unknown laws of nature. And this, to be sure, he was, but the psychoanalytic enterprize was also something more--a great deal more, something which can only really be understood from the standpoint of clinical practice.

When an analyst sits with a patient and listens to

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*I recognize that Freud's understanding of materialism as a philosophic concept differed fundamentally from that of Marx. However, in this context, I wish merely to suggest that both versions of materialism include the notion that individual processes can be used to shed light on the social macrocosm.

what the patient has to say, only part of the task, and not a very important part at that, is the effort to diagnose the malaise, to assign the patient to one or more nosological categories. To be sure this is part of the work and presumably one learns something about the patient by recognizing that this patient's malaise belongs to a particular category of pathological phenomena and that as a result one can begin to understand something of the etiology and causes of the illness. On some level, this proceedure was probably part of the way Freud understood his patients but it was not the most important part of what I take to be contemporary analytic practice.

Rather, Freud discovered that the analyst himself made a contribution to the phenomena he was witnessing in the consulting room; that the patients communications derived their meaning, in part, from the fact that they were communicated to the analyst. As a result, analysts must always ask themselves questions such as: "What is my contribution to this particular state of affairs?", "What wishes am I attempting to gratify through the patient and he/she through me?". These one assumes, perhaps naively, are the everyday questions of psychoanalytic practice, and it is easy to forget just how revolutionary was Freud's discovery of the twin phenomena of transference and countertransference.*

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*I recognize that this is perhaps a wishful view of contemporary psychoanalytic practice, and on this issue I subscribe to the position of Merton Gill (1982).

It is a psychoanalytic cliche that every communication by the analysand to the analyst must be understood as reflecting the conscious and unconscious wishes of both persons. Its revolutionary methodological importance becomes fully apparent only by comparison with, for example, the survey research techniques of contemporary social science, where the phenomena one is investigating are exclusively "out there" in the environment. That such techniques fly in the face of virtually all modern research on the phenomena of perception seems to be irrelevant (see, e.g., Carlson, 1981, p. 570-71).

The self-reflexivity which I believe is essential to Freud's method, and which is so central to analytic practice, provides a badly needed corrective to the usual methodology of political science. If we are to understand the dynamics of power in a political context I believe that one must begin with intrapsychic relations of power, expanding outward to interpsychic phenomena and only then proceeding to an analysis of power relations in large groups. Only the self-reflexive methodology of psychoanalysis is, I believe fully capable of encompassing all three levels of analysis.

B. The Concept of Power in Freud's Structural Theory.

In 1923, nearing the end of the most creative period of his life, Freud wrote what the editor of the Standard Edition called his last major theoretical work. The Ego and the Id introduced what has come to be known as the structural theory

which replaced, in part at least, the older topographic and dynamic perspectives. In it Freud, for the first time, elaborates his notion of the tripartite structure of the mind in which the psyche is viewed as comprising three separate but interdependent entities: id, ego, and superego. It is important to emphasize, what Freud explicitly stated in the preface to his essay namely "that it does not go beyond the roughest outline and that with that limitation /he was/ perfectly content" (SE, Vol. XIX, p. 12). While there is much that can and has been said of this complex and difficult essay, my main interest here lies in explicating the notion of the superego.

From his earliest work, (i.e., 1894), Freud had been interested in what he called the self-critical faculty of the ego. If the ego was to be regarded as the sole repository of consciousness, reality testing, and rational processes, then Freud needed to explain how it was possible for a single structure to be both the seat of consciousness and at the same time conscious of itself i.e., the self-critical faculty seemed to imply processes that were beyond the ego itself. In his (1914) paper on narcissism, Freud proposed that there was "a special psychical agency" whose task it was to watch over the ego. In "Morning and Melancholia" (1917) and Group Psychology (1921) Freud further developed this notion so that what he first referred to as the ego-ideal or the ideal ego how became the superego (das Über-Ich).

In The Ego and the Id, Freud claimed that the superego is derived from a transformation of the child's earliest object-cathexes into identifications and the subsequent introjection of the former object. In this view, the superego takes the place of the Oedipus complex which is subsequently repressed. Thus the child's earliest object cathexes are transformed and internalized in the superego which Freud identifies as being in the adult the source of an "unconscious sense of guilt" as well as of all moral and cultural values.

Now Freud's claim that the superego is the heir to the Oedipus complex is in many ways problematic. In the first place the dissolution of the Oedipus complex is accompanied by a solidification in gender identity as a result of the repression by the little boy of his feminine identifications and the little girl her masculine identifications. But the repression of opposite sex identifications apparently plays no part in the formation of the superego rather it is the repression of former object cathexes which he sees as important. The superego is in part the residue of the earliest object choices of the id--for the little boy, these are the mother in the positive Oedipus Complex and the father in the negative Oedipus complex. What part these residues play in the formation of the superego is by no means clear. But, says Freud, the superego also represents "an energic reaction formation" (SE, Vol. XIV, p. 34, 1914b) against the original object choices. In the little boy, the energy required to

repress his early mother object cathexis was borrowed from the father. It is as if libidinous energy from the father rushes in to fill a vacume left by the abandoned object choices.*

Thus according to Freud "the superego retains the character of the father while the more powerful the Oedipus complex was the more rapidly it succombed to repression (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the stricter will be the domination of the superego over the ego..." (SE, Vol. XIV, pp. 34-5, 1914b). Thus far Freud is explaining the origins of the superego solely in terms of the energic reaction against the original object choice--the cathexis by the little boy of his mother, It is difficult to understand why this must necessarily be the case. One can imagine for example instances in which the original cathexis was preserved in a relatively unproblematic manner in terms of the child's adult life. Why must the reaction formation against the boy's cathexis of the mother necessarily lead to the internalization of the father? All this is confusing to say the least.

At an earlier point in the essay, Freud had said that behind the formation of the ego ideal "there lies hidden an

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*It seems moreover that the logical consequence of this aspect of Freud's position would be that the little girl would necessarily have a diminished superego as compared with the little boy, and that adult women would therefore on some level have to be regarded as less moral than men. But this is another issue entirely.

individual's first and most important identification, his identification with his father in his own personal prehistory" (SE, Vol. XIV, p. 31, 1914a). This was a point which Freud returned to later in the essay when he said that the super-ego owes its special position in relation to the ego both because it is heir to the Oedipus complex and because "it was the first identification and one which took place while the ego was still feeble..." (Ibid., p. 48). It is clear that in both lines of argument Freud gives special importance to the role of the father in the formation of the superego. In the first instance he argues that the father is internalized as a reaction formation to the original cathexis of the mother now he is arguing on quite different grounds that the special place of the father is due to the early identification at the time in which the child's ego was still quite weak and un-developed. This second line of argument, to my mind, makes more sense even though Freud still, at this point in the essay, has not provided us with an explanation of why the child's "first and most important" identification should be with the father. In fact this assertion seems most puzzling particularly in the light of so much subsequent psychoanalytic research (e.g., Mahler, 1975) which emphasizes the pre-eminant importance of the child's identification with the mother.

It is at this point that I think the concept of power is useful in helping to shed light on Freud's meaning. In

fact, I will argue that without a concept of power it is difficult if not impossible to make sense of Freud's account of the origins of the superego.

My argument hinges on the interpretation of Freud's assertion that the individual's "first and most important" identification is with the father. Why should this be the case given all that we have come to accept concerning the primary importance of the child's relationship to the mother. I would suggest that what Freud meant here was the child's early experience of the father as the one who has the power.

According to my reading of Freud, the pre-oedipal child (of both sexes) typically internalizes a certain experience of the father, in some important respect, as remote, punitive, and as the wielder of authority. Or perhaps, another way of saying this is that in contrast to the child's experience of the mother, its experience of the father is its first and most important experience of "the other". This experience is not, we might imagine, an altogether sanguine experience and that it disturbs the quiet peace of the child's symbiotic attachment to the mother. Because the child's initial experience of the mother is not one of her being entirely other but as part of the self, she comes to be viewed in some sense as the powerless servant of the child's infantile narcissism. Therefore from its earliest experiences, the child comes to identify the father with power and the mother with powerlessness and these early experiences form the prototype out

of which are formed the adult notions of masculinity and femininity.

The Oedipus complex becomes significant in the formation of the superego because it marks the first onset of a biologically determined increase of sexual libido; a marked increase in the quantity of endogenous stimulation. This new development therefore has the effect of forcing on the child a choice between either an identification with power or with powerlessness and with that choice, in normal (i.e. normative) development, the opposite sex parent is rejected as being "not me." A second opportunity for reworking the initial identification and object choice is presented by the onset of the second of the diphasic increases in libido which occurs at puberty. The initial Oedipal crisis is of course more primary not just in the sense of its having occured earlier but in the sense of its representing the first opportunity for the solidification of the categories of self and other. This reading of Freud implies, I think, that the establishment of primary gender identity is not exclusively a function of the Oedipus complex but rather begins earlier with what Freud called "the first and most important identification" and which I am referring to as the infantile experience of the father as the archetypical "other" the one with the power.

Such an interpretation, I believe, helps to explain not only Freud's emphasis on the father in the formation of the

superego but also the particular attributes Freud assigned to the agency. In his discussion of the superego, not only in The Ego and The Id, but also in Group Psychology and particularly in Civilization and its Discontents, he repeatedly identifies the superego as the agency for the transmission of cultural values, of morality and the philogenetic inheritance of the species. What seems to me to be significant is that the superego is never presented as a benevolent teacher of that which is good and positive in the culture but always as a stern and punitive enforcer of prohibitions. It is a negative agency and it is never benevolent! While Freud may have arrived at this position by a different route, the family resemblance to Nietzsche's ideas on the subject is striking.

In On The Genealogy of Morals, (1887) Nietzsche set out to explain the origin of morality. Like Freud, his is an historical explanation. Nietzsche boldly denies the existence of any kind of categorical apriori as in the Judeo-Christian tradition and proclaims that force, brute, unthinking physical force, to be the true source of all values. Nietzsche forcefully restates Heraclitus' notion that war is the father of all things. He sets out to explain how each and every aspect of our so-called civilized morality is no more than the internalization of ideas which were originally established by force. It is in every respect perfectly consistent with Freud's description of the formation of the

superego. Freud in another context said that "every internal compusion which has been of service to the development of human beings was originally, that is, in the evolution of the human race nothing but an external one" (SE, Vol. XIV, p. 283, 1915d).

Freud's superego stands in relation to the ego as an eternally bad object, always punitive, always painful in its effects. But for Freud force is not the only reason for its internalization: the child internalizes the bad object because it is as a child powerless and needs the powerful if it is to survive. Or alternatively, in the language of Melanie Klein, (1964) it identifies with the aggressor. Perhaps this explains why Freud said that the superego "...is a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego" (SE, Vol. XIV, p. 48, 1914a). Fairbairn (1952, pp. 67-68) provides the following explanation for the internalization of bad objects. The child, he says:

> ...is accordingly compelled to internalize them in an effort to control them. But in attempting to control them in this way, he is internalizing objects which have wielded power over him in the external world' and these objects retain their prestige for power over him in the inner world. In a word, he is "possessed" by them, as if by evil spirits.* This is not all, however. The child not only internalizes his bad objects because they force themselves upon

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*It is in this respect interesting to note that Freud's next published work after The Ego and the Id was an account of "A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis," (SE, Vol. XIX, pp. 83-92, 1923b) in which he discussed the devil as a father substitute.

> him and he seeks to control them, but also, and above all, because he needs them. If a child's parents are bad objects, he cannot reject them, even if they neglect him, his need for them is increased.
>
> It is above all the need of the child for his parents, however bad they may appear to him, that compels him to internalize bad objects; and it is because this need remains attached to them in the unconscious that he cannot bring himself to part with them. It is also his need for them that confers upon them their actual power over him.

It is thus power, and the internalization of the powerful which accounts for the formation of the superego and in so doing an intra-psychic political regime is established.

This reading of Freud not only serves my purpose of introducing politics into the realm of the psyche but it is also I think a less rigidly biological understanding of the Oedipus complex and its role in the formation of the superego. Thus the Oedipal complex is both a biological and political event. This being the case, it is possible to understand how it is possible that Oedipal dynamics might be a less profound part of the psychic lives of individuals in cultures other than our own. If the dichotomy between men as powerful and women as powerless were less intense, that is if the discrepancy in power between the sexes were less, then we might expect that the intensity, and indeed the violence, of Oedipal dynamics would be less developmentally significant. Moreover, we might also expect that intergenerational conflict would likewise be less intense with the result that the continuity of a culture and its values would be more harmoniously

preserved.

C. Power, Love and Perversion.

It is now time to specify as clearly as possible how I think the concept of power relates to the larger context of Freud's work and to psychoanalysis in general. I certainly do not regard the drive towards power as a separate instinctual drive nor do I believe that the power drive should be regarded as an alternative to the death instinct in Freud's dual instinct theory. Although I agree with those who have claimed that psychoanalysis has yet to produce an adequate account of the phenomena of aggression and while I think it might be useful to examine the dual instinct theory in the light of these ideas on power, I have not chosen to do so in this dissertation.

By and large, I have chosen to elaborate the concept of power within the context of a drive theory conceived of as a unitary energic force although its manifestations might be profoundly diverse. For purposes of this study it does not seem to serve a useful purpose to claim that the drive for power is a separate drive from that of libido. Still, there seems to me something instinctive if not instinctive then at least drive related, in the concept of power. In fact I believe that power is ontological in the sense that it is an irreducible and persistent aspect of psychic functioning. By this I mean that one simply cannot act in the world without actualizing some dimension of the inequality which is as

pervasive as human difference itself. Moreover, I believe that some measure of the drive for power ought to be regarded as both normal and normative. Without the ability and the will to utilize ones innate capacities (i.e., constitutional inequalities) for purposes of securing a certain minimum level of material comfort and security, normal psychic functioning is impossible. But at the opposite extreme, if a perso comes to lead his life in such a way that the drive for power becomes a unitary all encompassing passion then clearly pathology becomes an issue--a pathology which I think can be most usefully thought of as belonging to the perversions.

Before taking up the issue of psychopathology of power, it is perhaps useful to reinterate the relationship I have previously hinted at; the importance of power in the formation of basic gender identity. My thoughts on this issue are a result of a long-standing interest in the ideas of the contemporary French feminist movement in general and the work of Juliet Mitchell (1973) in particular. As a feminist, Mitchell defends a fairly orthodox reading of Freud against against criticisms from the feminist movement. Among many other things she claims that Freud offered an analysis of patriarchy not a defense of it and that such notorious concepts as penis envy* represented the material reality of

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*Mitchell does not mean that these concepts should be read as merely "symbolic" truths but indeed that there literal truth derives from their status as a locus of meaning within our society. Thus the penis, for example, denotes an entire range of literal and metaphoric significance.

ideas within a particular culture and should not be taken as prescriptions for normality. It is in this spirit that I wish to advance the notion of power as a primary determinant of gender.

If, as Mitchell claims, psychoanalysis is primarily about the material reality of ideas, then when we speak of the penis we are referring not primarily to a reproductive organ but to the ideas about it that people live by within an historical culture. In fact if we assume an objectivity which by rights we are not entitled to, it seems quite absurd that so much cultural significance should be attached to an appendage of male anatomy. In reality the significance of the penis derives not only from its function in reproduction, which is no more, really, than an anatomical guide for the proper delivery of semen, but rather from its symbolic function as a locus of significations among which none is more important than that of power.

The possession of a penis denotes among other things the power which defines masculinity and the absence of a penis denotes the powerlesness which defines femininity. The primordial power of man derives historically from the superior physical strength which, in spite of vast changes in material culture, continues to define masculinity as having a penis and therefore power and feminity as being without a penis and therefore powerless. Thus, to return to an earlier point, the historical task of the little boy in the Oedipus complex

is to come to terms with his phallic power and that of a little girl to fully accept her powerlessness.

It therefore seems natural, in the historic culture of the West, for a man to seek sexual gratification through domination and a woman through submission to male power. But, as Freud noted, matters are not as simple as that and in both sexes there is both a positive and a negative Oedipus complex. This can be taken to mean that while dominance is the most important aspect of male sexuality and submission the characteristic mode of the woman, there is also in each an admixture of the other--that in men there is normatively a typically repressed wish to submit and in woman the wish to dominate. Thus we can see that power and powerlesness as characteristic modes of seeking sexual gratification are unevenly distributed across the sexes but are by no means the monopoly of a single gender.

And what of perversity? In the light of the above, it seems to me most useful to think of perversity not as an abnormal object choice but as a pathology in the aim of the sexual drive. M. Masud Khan (1979, p. 197) says:

> There are those that fuck from desire and those that fuck from intent. The latter are the perverts. Because intent by definition, implies the exercize of will and power to achieve its ends, whereas desire entails mutuality and reciprocity for its gratification.

It is not my intention to offer anything like a complete analysis of the etiology of the perversions but rather to discuss the role of power in the constitution of the perverse.

Khan's distinction goes well beyond the notion that perversion is essentially a disorder in object choice, and further distinguishes, according to my reading, among sexual aims which are perverse and those that are not or more accurately between sexual aims which are not primarily perverse and those that are. Sadism and masochism constitute two polar extremes in the classification of perversions. In sadism, the intent is to achieve sexual gratification through power--an act of total domination. At the opposite extreme, masochism can be thought of as the intent to achieve sexual gratification through an act of total submission. These forms of sexual expression are regarded as perverse because the intent is not primarily sexual but political.

What then might we think of as normal sexuality? When we speak of normality in matters sexual it is clear that we cannot be referring to a statistical concept but a normative one. Robert Stoller, (1975) has argued that there is no mature adult sexuality without the, often unconscious, wish to harm. Similarly, I would argue that in pure culture there is no expression of the sexual impulse which is untainted by power--either the wish to dominate or the wish to submit and probably both wishes are activated and expressed by both partners in every act of sexual union. That there are aspects of perversity in all of us, is of course, no secret at least not in psychoanalytic circles.

What then does Khan mean when he speaks of sex from

desire as the only nonperverse expression of sexuality. He talks of desire as entailing "mutuality and reciprocity" for its gratification. This I interpret to mean that desire for another entails the recognition of the other as other--that the other be perceived of as an equal. It is in this sense that I believe equality can be understood to be the antithesis of power. Thus equality means not that the other is perceived of as being in every respect the same as self but that the other is recognized as being fully other, the object of desire and not an extension of self. If all that is intended in the choice of an object is to find one's self in the other then the object choice is at best narcissistic and at worst totally perverse. But if one finds the other so to speak in the other then one finds ones self through a fuller recognition of that which is not self. In this sense, it seems that equality is a precondition for genuine object relatedness and that object relatedness is in turn a precondition for love.

Finally then I come to a distinction which I first encountered in the work of Ronald Sampson (1968). Sampson claims that there is an essential antithesis between love and power: that power implies inequality and love implies equality. While his work is cast in the absolute language of natural law, it nevertheless seems to reflect an important psychological truth. Every individual, it seem, both is and ought to be an admixture of both of these impulses. Yet I believe that

Sampson is essentially correct in his argument that the two impulses are at some level antithetical and that as one develops the capacity to relate to others on the basis of power one necessarily looses the ability to realte on the basis of love and vice versa. But since both forces are ontological givens of human existence the best that can be expected is perhaps that one should know when one is fucking out of desire and when one is fucking out of intent.

The ordinary usage of the verb "to fuck" reveals this distinction with graphic clarity encompassing both meanings of the term. To fuck implies both erotic sexual pleasure out of desire for the other and the desire to dominate with the aim of forcing submission on an unwilling partner. One often hears, for example, of a person being "fucked over" in a business deal. In this sense power defines a particular kind of explicitly political perversion which can take either a sadistic or a masochistic form. To repeat an earlier point, when the pursuit of power takes on the character of a life dominating drive it is properly speaking a perversion.

Thus in the vicissitudes of ordinary life, power and love constitute an eternal paradox. It was this paradox to which I believe Freud was referring when he wrote:

> A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love. (SE, Vol. XIV, p. 85, 1914a)

To rephrase Freud's argument one might say that we need power

in order to avoid falling neurotically ill but that we are bound to fall ill if in consequence of our power we are unable to love. And a corollary to this proposition might be that we can love another neither out of absolute domination or out of total submission. The fact that our cultural stereotypes have so often highlighted masculinity as dominance and femininity as submission reflects nothing so much as the internal contradictions of those traditional concepts.

Chapter V

THE POWER OF TRANSFERENCE AND THE TRANSFERENCE OF POWER

In a previous chapter I suggested that some notion of power has been the traditional organizing concept of classical political theory. As such, the tradition has been concerned with, among other things, the optimum concentration or dispersion of power among and between nations. If power relations define the realm of what is normally thought of as the political then politics is a much broader concept than merely the study of government. In fact I will argue that power is an aspect of all human organization from the level of the nuclear family to that of international and global politics. Politics is power and power is universal.

In the last chapter I set forth a particular theory of power relations in which power was defined as an actualized state of inequality within an interpersonal context, and posited that power and love occupy opposite ends of a continuum of relatedness such that at some level to act in a power oriented manner is antithetical to and yet at the same time essential to the gratification of erotic wishes to love and be loved. Alternately, I argued that the realm of love and intimacy is at some level antithetical to the wish for dominance and the wish to submit. In this sense I have defined

power as both a political and a psychological/psychoanalytic concept. Power relations are thus one way to conceptualize the dialectic interrelationship of psychoanalysis and politics.

From this point of view it would then follow that just as there is an essentially political aspect to what seem to be purely intrapsychic and interpsychic processes, so too is there a psychological aspect to what might seem to be purely political phenomena. Such a point of view is important in the first instance because it refuses to participate in the growing tendency towards reification in the social sciences; a tendency to study both politics and psychology as discrete and essentially unrelated aspects of behavior. In opposition to the dominant methodology of empiricism, I would argue in favor of a synthetic approach, one which would not artificially separate the realm of the political from the realm of the psyche. From this perspective, we ought to be able to demonstrate political aspects of psychoanalytic technique just as we can and have demonstrated the validity of studying political phenomena from a psychoanalytic point of view. If this is true then we also ought to be able to locate power relations in the very heart of the analytic relationship--within the transference itself.

In doing so, it is important to restate as emphatically as possible that this conceptualization does not imply that correct psychoanalytic practice necessarily involves the application of a particular political perspective to the

treatment situation. Indeed I would argue that to speak of a politically revolutionary or politically conservative or politically liberal form of therapeutic practice is to discuss the politics of therapy in its most regressive aspect; that identifications of left, right, and center are all equally regressive in that they are categories of group identification without any necessarily objective content. Nothing could be further from my intention than to promote a form of therapeutic practice which springs from a particular political stance or moral position, either for, against, or indifferent to the existing political order.

In the present chapter I will argue that power is inherent in the analytic relationship; that the analytic situation is a political situation involving dimensions of inequality and dimensions of power as well as dimensions of equality and love all of which serve to define the conditions under which the transference develops. Even though traditional psychoanalytic practice has for the most part ignored the issue of power, a notion of power relations has been, I will argue, implicit in psychoanalytic practice from the very beginning. Furthermore, dimensions of power within the analytic situation constitute, I believe, for the most part an unanalyzed assumption in the theoretical literature of psychoanalytic technique. It seems moreover that the analysis of power relations as they determine and define the transference, strengthens the position of psychoanalysis in the face of the competing claims of alter-

nate treatment modalities. Indeed, I will argue that correct psychoanalytic practice, (see for example, Mitchell, 1981), in theory if not always in reality, constitutes the only form of treatment practiced today which is fully capable of using power for the purposes of liberating people from the effects of power without simply substituting one form of dominance for another.

A. The Concept of Transference.

In the psychoanalytic literature, no subject has been more widely discussed than that of transference. That this should be the case is not surprising given the fact that Freud himself considered the analysis of transference and the resistances as being the distinguishing features of psychoanalysis as a method of treatment (Freud, SE, Vol. XIV, p. 16, 1914b). However, as Bird (1972) notes, the psychoanalytic literature following Freud has tended to focus more on technical considerations such as when and how to interpret and less on the more basic issue of "what is transference?".

However, there is, I think, a consensus within the analytic community that transference is a particular category of experience with certain defining characteristics. In this as in other aspects of psychoanalytic theory, the basic parameters of discourse were laid down by Freud who in a postscript to the analysis of Dora (SE, Vol. VII, p. 116, 1905a) said that the transferences:

> ...are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician.

Bird, (op. cit.), argues that Freud was led to this formulation of transference not so much from the analysis of Dora itself but from the self-analysis of his transference-like relationship with Wilhelm Fliess.

In any event, Freud at this early stage in his thinking about transference had already established that transference is a "new edition" of an older relationship with significant figures in the patient's childhood--that transference is the particular version of the repetition compulsion as it unfolds within the analytic relationship. The patient transfers characteristic early impulses and affects onto the person of the analyst until at some point there is both a quantitative and perhaps also a qualitative intensification of the relationship to which the term "transference neurosis" was conventionally applied.

In the present chapter I am concerned not with the technical issues of transference interpretation but with establishing both the unique features of transference as it occurs within the analytic relationship and with identifying those features which psychoanalytic transferences share with other transference-like states in the culture at large. In this respect many writers have noted, (for example, Klein,

1951; Orr, 1954; Greenacre, 1954; and Langs & Stone, 1980) that transference and transference like states are both universal and ubiquitous. In this, contemporary writers follow Freud who said repeatedly that "transference arises spontaneously in all human relationships" (Freud, SE, Vol. XI, p. 51, 1910b. See also SE vol. XII, pp. 101 & 106, 1912a). Thus, within the psychoanalytic tradition there is almost unanimous agreement that transference is not confined to the analytic relationship alone but is a universal feature of human existence. In fact, it is no exageration to claim that we live our daily lives in an interconnecting web of transference involving an endless variety of individual and group fantacies--a ubiquitous distortion of reality from which no one is exempt.

I would assume therefore that most writers would agree that the relationship between for example, a political leader and his followers or between a prophet and his disciples, exhibit transference or at least transference-like qualities. How then, we might ask, does transference in the psychoanalytic relationship differ from other forms of transference? At first glance it might seem that one essential difference lies in psychoanalysis' claims to the therapeutic. However such claims tend to become less critical when we recognize that the stated ideology of virtually every mass movement in history lays claim to some aspect of the therapeutic in so far as they hold forth the promise of liberation whether from the shackles

of economic exploitation or the fetters of worldly existence and desire. Nor can psychoanalysis base its claims exclusively as a medical specialization for the cure of the mentally ill since an increasingly large part of the psychoanalytic patient population meet any criteria of "normality" one would care to propose. In fact, as many writers have noted, (for example, Levenson, 1972), psychoanalytic practice has in recent years tended to deal less with patients exhibiting classic neurotic "symptoms" and more with patients who seek treatment because of vague and ill defined complaints such as a lack of meaning or focus in their lives.

Nor could we claim that transference in psychoanalysis is distinguished from other transference-like states by the intensity of the phenomena since the manifest behavior of devotees of any of the twentieth century's social, political and religious movements have clearly displayed an intensity of involvement and commitment at least as strong as that of the analytic patient towards his/her analyst. While it is not our intention to make a systematic comparison between psychoanalytic manifestations of transference and other transference-like states in the larger culture, it seems likely that there is an essential unity among all transference manifestations and that no useful purpose is served by such distinctions.

Freud and virtually every subsequent writer in the analytic tradition have claimed that indeed there is no

essential difference between the transference as it unfolds in the analytic setting and other transference-like states.. If therefore one wishes to make special claims for the uniqueness of psychoanalytic therapy, it must be done on grounds other than the existence and intensity of the transference. Traditionally, this was done by arguing that it is not the phenomena of transference which are different in psychoanalysis but the management of the transference, the technical rules of interpretation. This is a point which I will return to again but for the present it is sufficient to note the essential continuity of transference phenomena in psychoanalysis and in life and to suggest that this is perhaps one reason why questions of technique have occupied such an important place in the analytic literature.

In "The Dynamics of Transference," (SE, Vol. XII, pp. 99-100, 1912a) Freud said that each individual acquires through the combined influence of innate disposition and chance, "a specific method of his own in his conduct of his erotic life --that is, in the preconditions to falling in love which he lays down, in the instincts he satisfies and the aims he sets himself in the course of it." This produces, he said, "what might be described as a stereotype plate (or several such), which is constantly repeated--constantly reprinted afresh-- in the course of the person's life..."

Freud repeatedly stressed the importance of understanding transference as an aspect of the repetition compulsion. He

said, (Ibid., p. 99) that in the course of development only a part of the erotic impulse passes through the full process of development. That part was in the adult, directed toward reality and was conscious. Another part of the erotic impulse was held up in the course of development and finds its expression only in fantasy or is totally unconscious. Thus:

> If someone's need for love is not entirely satisfied in reality, he is bound to approach every new person whom he meets with libidinal anticipatory ideas; and it is highly probable that both portions of his libido, the portion that is capable of becoming conscious as well as the unconscious one, have a share in forming that attitude. (Ibid., p. 100)

What is activated in the transference is therefore, among other things, an old erotic wish which is characteristic for the individual, and determined by experiences of the distant past.

This hypothesis was at least in part an attempt to explain why hysterical patients (mostly women) began to express in the course of free association, strong erotic wishes toward the person of the physician; feelings which were manifestly not a response to the objective qualities of the analyst. As is well known, the prototype for this experience was Breur's abortive attempt at treating Anna O (Freud, 1893; Freeman, 1972). Freud's definition of the tranference, it should be pointed out was formulated at a time well before he introduced the notion of the dual instinct theory and therefore transference had to be explained as a vicissitude of a single erotic instinct. When Freud later posited a second

primordial instinct, the death instinct, an innate aggressive impulse, the theory of transference was left unchanged. Nowhere, in his later writings, did Freud mention the specific transference manifestations of the death instinct.

Even to the uninitiated, it is relatively easy to understand that the ungratified erotic wishes of a female patient toward a male analyst could be manifested in a positive transference relationship; that the patient had for example an active wish to seduce the analyst just as she had wished to seduce her father. It is also possible to understand how, following the rule of abstinence, the analyst's refusal to gratify the patient's erotic wishes could lead to the unleashing of hostile impulses derivative of an original refusal by the father to gratify the infantile wish. Indeed, analysts repeatedly report that the objective qualities of the analyst, i.e., gender or physical attributes, are relatively unimportant in determining the particular transference reactions activated in treatment such that a female analyst can come to represent the phallic father and a male analyst the nurturing mother or any series of combinations and permutations thereof. It is this "unreal" aspect of the transference which is so unendingly useful in helping the analyst reconstruct the nature of the patient's earliest object relations. In any event, some such considerations led Freud to the conclusion that since the transference reproduces the patient's relation with his parents it takes over the ambivalence of that relation as well, so that "it almost inevitably

happens that one day his positive attitude toward the analyst changes over into the negative hostile one" (SE, Vol. XXIII, p. 176, 1940). Thus Freud recognized that the psychoanalytic transference contains affects of both positive and negative valence, all of which represent characteristic vicissitudes of the unitary erotic instinct.

In general, Freud tended to view the positive transference as being useful to the treatment and a major source of influence whereas the negative transference, although inevitable, was a source of danger to the analysis such that if it were to gain the upper hand, previous gains could be "blown away like chaff before the wind" (Ibid.) Freud said that while the analyst might be tempted to use the positive transference in order to exert the influence of "teacher, model and ideal" that this kind of influence "is not his task in the analytic relationship, and indeed that he will be disloyal to his task if he allows himself to be led on by his inclinations." This kind of acting-in-the-transference, Freud repeatedly stated, is subject to the rule of abstinence and should optimally never be part of the analytic relationship.

B. Power Relations in the Transference.

The foregoing, I believe, are major features of the transference relationship as Freud understood it. Because the analyst becomes, in effect, a parental figure (or other significant object) for the analysand, his voice is intern-

alized and in part replaces the authority of the parent in the patient's super ego (cf. Bird, 1972). Thus the analyst's power over the patient rivals that of the original parent over the child. Freud himself said (Ibid., p. 175) that if "the patient puts the analyst in the place of his father (or mother), he is also giving him the power which the super-ego exercizes over his ego." From this point of view, transference is a power relationship par excellence where power is derived not only from the objective conditions of the analytic relationship but from the unconscious material inequality of the parent child relationship as it is activated in the transference.

I will argue that the origins of power relations within the analytic relationship preceed the transference even though I recognize that aspects of transference begin to unfold from the very beginning of the relationship. Power is, I think, implicit in the structure of the relationship itself. Patient's seek treatment at least in part because they believe that the therapist can be of use to them in helping them to understand and hopefully resolve, internal conflicts or because they have "symptoms" which interfere with their ability to work, to love, or to experience pleasure in living. Simply by virtue of the fact that a person seeks help from another person there is a presumption of inequality, and that inequality is actualized implicitly in a power relationship. In fact, a basic presupposition of treatment is that the patient needs the analyst more than the analyst needs him. Inequality is

therefore implicit in the treatment setting itself.

Of course both patients and therapists bring to the analytic relationship a variety of authoritarian wishes which, although they are so common as to be regarded as ubiquitous, are not essential to the treatment process, but nevertheless wishes which can and should be the subject of the analysis. Most of us for example have powerful wishes for certainty, needs for heirarchy, and wishes to "escape from freedom" (Fromm, 1941) and to avoid existential loneliness. Also in this category is the child's need to make "the compassionate sacrifice" (Singer, 1965; Feiner & Levinson, 1968; and Searles, 1975) of its own identity to meet the needs of parents a need which is then reactivated in the transference. Therapists, on the other hand, both as an aspect of their training and private needs for certainty and control, needs to feel kind and benevolent, needs to feel useful and productive and many other similar needs (Hirsch, 1980-81) often bring an authoritarian attitude to the analytic encounter. Each of these needs, I would argue, is material for the analysis but not an essential aspect of treatment and that, beyond these transference and countertransference wishes, there is an irreducible aspect of power and powerlessness which is essential to analytic treatment.

The patient entering the consulting room for the first time, typically finds himself or herself confronted with various symbolic representations of the inequality inherent

in the relationship. On the walls there are perhaps various diplomas signifying the attainment of specialized expertise and knowledge: knowledge and expertise which the patient does not possess and the analyst does. Perhaps there is also a license denoting the official imprimature of the state and all of the power that that implies: a sign that the state has authorized this particular individual to conduct treatment. In fact all of the furnishings of a typical consulting room from the booklined walls to the furnishings themselves are far from neutral and tend to convey, if unconsciously, a sense that the patient is in the presence of power.

The very fact that the initial meeting occurs not at the patient's place of work or residence, not even on "neutral ground" but in the analyst's office, signifies an act of submission familiar to anyone who has worked in corporate or government settings. The fact that the analytic hour is a service for which one is expected to pay, and often pay quite dearly, signifies that one party to this relationship has something which the other party does not. The fact that the time and dates of meetings are arranged with a view to the analyst's workday schedule (and not that of the patient's) is yet another aspect of power in the analytic setting. And finally, as if the preceeding were insufficient to define the dynamics of dominance and submission, the analysand may eventually be asked to lie on a couch, while the analyst sits upright and out of the patient's range of vision. The act of lying prone, with

belly exposed before another is a universally recognized act of submission which anyone who has ever observed the behavior of a domestic dog toward his master can recognize. All of the above serve to illustrate that the analytic setting is far from neutral and in fact one could argue that the setting itself serves to heighten the aspects of power inherent in the doctor-patient relationship (cf. Stone, 1961).

Thus the transference relationship unfolds in a setting of power, power which is communicated to the patient by symbols conventionally if unconsciously understood by all me members of the culture. By convention, the analyst is permitted to use this power in the service of interest in one and only one way, i.e. in the extraction of a fee which allows the analyst to continue to practice his/her trade. In every other respect, the analyst is forbidden from using power for purposes other than analyzing the patient's verbal productions.

Before discussing the further manifestations of power in the transference it is important to point out that the initial manifestations of transference do not always follow the paradigm of a patient experiencing himself as powerless in relation to the powerful analyst. In fact, it is my impression that most psychoanalytic practitioners have encountered patients who initially regard the analyst with the same degree of entitlement that one would expect from any other provider of services for which one pays a fee. This phenomenon, I would suggest, should be regarded not only as resistence to the transference (as opposed to transference resistence) but

also as an important clue to the nature of the patient's difficulties. Therefore it seems useful to regard the initial experience of transference as powerlessness as normative and any departures from this norm as both diagnostically and prognostically significant.

In sum, I would argue that there are authoritarian transference and countertransference needs which are symptomatic and therefore constitute the work of the treatment (see p. 101 supra). And there are aspects of power and powerlessness which are essential to the therapeutic process and should be regarded as part of the "real" relationship between analyst and patient and should not be analyzed in the name of mutuality or the therapeutic alliance. Within this well defined and institutionalized structure the transference begins to unfold and it is at this point where a second aspect of power makes its appearance.

When Freud was first beginning to define the concept of transference (SE, Vol. XII, pp. 99-100, 1912a) he emphasized, as we have seen, the revival of erotic impulses from the past and noted that they were subject to the compulsion to repeat in the present reality of the analytic relationship. But he also said that what was relived was "a whole series of psychological experiences..." by this I take him to mean that all of the transference was not strictly speaking erotic, nor simply derivative of the erotic impulse and that in fact he also could have meant a particular experience of power and power-

lessness. It is not departing, I believe, from Freud's original position to argue that in the course of development an individual also acquires a particular method for dealing with powerlessness (e.g. Feiner & Levinson, 1968-69) for which the original relationship of a child with its parents is the prototype. The point is not that manifestations of power and love in the transferenoe are conceptually distinct entities but that they are inextricably bound together (Racker, 1968). In the transference as in life there is no love without power, and no power without at least some aspect of love.*

I would suggest that the vicissitudes of the child's attempts at dealing with his/her original powerlessness in the face of an all-powerful parent are at least as diverse as the vicissitudes of the erotic instinct. In this respect, Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov provides a wealth of illustrative material. The novel is a story of parracide in which a tyrannical and authoritarian father is eventually murdered by one of his four sons. It is, among many other things, a novel about the life-historical attempts of each son to come to terms with patriarchal power and the resultingly diverse character structures of each. Freud (SE, Vol. XX, p. 189, 1928) who was fascinated with Dostoyevsky and his novels,** characterized the three eldest brothers as "the

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*I believe that this is a similar notion to Stoller's (1975) finding that sexuality is inseparable from the hostile wishes which determine its particularity.

**Freud, (1928, P. 177) described The Brother's Karamazov,

impulsive sensualist, the sceptical cynic and the epileptic criminal." The youngest son, Alyosha, became an ascetic monk notable for his renunciation of worldly desire. The characters represent not only variations on an Oedipal theme understood in terms of genital sexuality but also variations on the theme of power; from Alyosha's saintly renunciation of the world of power in favor of the spiritual to Dimitry's repudiation of the "higher" realms of inteilectual sublimation for a life devoted to the openly acknoqledged gratifications of power and sensuality. Each strategy is in some ways successful and each in some ways fails so that in the final result all of the brothers (with the possible exception of Alyosha) are equally guilty of the crime of parracide.*

Part of every child's experience of parents is a sense of its own absolute powerlessness in the face of parents perceived of as at least in physical terms as all-powerful. The original powerlessness of the child in the face of the all-powerful parent is, I believe, the obverse of the child's erotic union with the mother and subsequent erotic wishes toward both parents. Therefore the adult patient's transference reflects not simply the erotic impulse but also a

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as "the most magnificient novel ever written..." and, in fact, wrote an introductory essay for its 1928 republication.

*The novel also contains, in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, a parable which describes in all its essentials the dynamics of psychoanalytic treatment including the transference itself. Moreover, in terms of my theme of the essential continuity between the political and the psychological, it is important to note that Dostoyevsky conceived of his profoundly psychological novel as a social and political portrait of a disintegrating Russian society.

particular strategy for dealing with power; a strategy designed to gain some measure of safety in the face of that which threatens to obliterate.

In describing the negative transference, Freud (1940, p. 176), said that this like the positive transference was a repetition of the past and that "his obedience to his father ...his courting of his father's favor, had its roots in an erotic wish toward him." In this as in his own self-analysis, Freud did not shrink from acknowledging the existence of homosexual wishes of a young boy for his father. Why, we might ask, did he not mention specifically that the obverse of the homosexual wish was perhaps a fear of the overwhelmingly powerful father? That Freud did not mention power in this context, as an aspect of transference, is even more surprising in the light of Freud's development of the Oedipal theme in both the ontogenesis of the individual and the philogenesis of the species. Clearly, the somewhat cryptic closing line of "The Dynamics of Transference", (1912a): "For when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie", is a reference to Oedipal dynamics as they unfold in the transference and is meant to suggest that the resolution of the transference involves, symbolic parracide of the historic parent in the present person of the analyst.

There seems to be no compelling reason why Freud did not specify power as an aspect of the transference, nor does it seem that my emphasis on the concept contradicts any major

tenate of psychoanalytic theory. On the contrary, I have argued that the psychoanalysis of power is an important and heretofore neglected aspect of that theory. I would however point out that Freud's seeming indifference to issues of power in the transference parallels a certain insensitivity to issues of power in his personal relations with colleagues such as Adler and Jung (see Ch. III, supra.). The fact that Adler had attempted to make the so-called "will to power" a major psychoanalytic concept may, in part, explain why Freud himself did not. In fact the strategic necessities of forming and sustaining the psychoanalytic movement made it tactically important to distinguish psychoanalysis as Freud understood it from the revisionist tendencies of both Reich and Adler. Both of these men would have made psychoanalysis an explicitly political movement. My view, and on such matters there can be no right or wrong, is that Freud's position was both tactically and strategically correct. It was correct in the 1930's and it remains so today.

To return then to the theme of power as an aspect of the transference, let me restate as emphatically as possible my position as it has been developed thus far: power is an intrinsic precondition for a transference relationship, a characteristic which the psychoanalytic relationship shares with every other transference-like state which occurs "naturally" in politics and society. What distinguishes transference in psychoanalysis from all other forms of transference

is not the phenomenon itself, which is always defined by the dynamics of dominance and submission, but the uses to which it is put.

Under optimal circumstances, and of course in pure culture thre are never optimal circumstances, the transference in psychoanalysis is utilized for one purpose and one purpose only that of analyzing the patient's verbal productions. The analyst's task is to analyze: anything else is acting in the transference and such actions are strictly enjoined according to the rule of abstinence. Accordingly, the analyst is compelled by the theory itself to maintain strict neutrality with respect to all of the patient's wishes including the wish to remain neurotically ill.

On this issue, Racker (1968, p. 132) took sharp issue with what he believed to be a widely held view that analysis is an interaction between a sick person and a healthy one. He asserted that:

> The truth is that it is an interaction between two personalities, in both of which the ego is under pressure from the id, the superego, and the external world; each personality has its internal and external dependencies, anxieties and pathological defences, each is a child with his internal parents; and each of these whole personalities--that of the analysand and that of the analyst--responds to every event of the analytic situation.

In a footnote to this passage, Racker said that "it is important to be aware of this 'equality' because there is otherwise great danger that certain remnants of the 'patriarchal order' will contaminate the analytic situation." He sug-

gests that the fact that countertransference had received so little systematic investigation is an expression of the "social inequality" in the larger society. In other words, relatively little attention had been given to the phenomena of countertransference becawse of the unanalyzed inequalities existing in the larger society.

One example of what Racker may have meant by this remark is that the medical emphasis on diagnosis and nosology, in the precise classification of mental disorders believed to be "out there" in the larger society, is a reflection of real material inequalities between doctor and patient. Because medical training, tends to be extremely rationalistic and empiricistic rather than introspective and selfreflexive, the medical approach to treatment tends to proceed as if social inequality is irrelevant to the progress of science. Thus mental health practitioners can remain blissfully unconscious of their own participation in the creation of the objects they claim to be investigating. What Racker does not say, and because he is writing within the psychoanalytic tradition he does not need to state explicitly, is that his own stress on analyst/analysand "equality" comes not from a particular moral belief or political position but is a function of psychoanalytic methodology itself.

The extent to which psychoanalytic neutrality can be maintained in the face of countervailing tendencies, is a function of the unique form of reflexivity, (Lacan, 1973), which made Freud's self-analysis an inaugural event in Western

culture. According to Lacan, the Copernican revolution was another such inaugural event by which men came to understand that the earth was not the center of the universe. In his view the psychoanalytic revolution consisted in the discovery that the ego is not master in its own house; (Freud, SE, Vol. XVI, p. 285, 1916) that instrumental reason is always at the service of primordial passion, that the mastery of animal impulse is minimally and tentatively achieved even in the most civilized of human communities (Freud, SE, Vol. XXI, pp. 64-133, 1930).

In terms of the analytic relationship, this discovery meant among other things, that the phenomena of madness can never be located with confidence in the Other but that the analyst is always a participant in the objects of contemplation and that madness can never be understood as a thing in itself, but is socially constituted in the very act of perception itself, (Foucault, 1965). With this understanding, Freud discovered, or more importantly, rediscovered the unconscious, and with it the phenomena of transference.

Without delving too deeply into the meaning of Lacan's difficult and at times almost incomprehensible formulations it is possible to understand that Lacan has rediscovered the profoundly revolutionary importance of Freud's contribution, not simply as the discoverer of the unconscious but in demonstrating the importance of a new form of reflexivity. It was through a consistent application of this reflexivity that

Racker was able to understand the social significance of the relative neglect of the subject of countertransference and to his concluding statement in the footnote (Racker, 1968, p. 132) cited earlier:

> ...as long as we repress, for instance our wish to dominate the analysand neurotically (and we do wish this in one part of our personality), we cannot free him from his neurotic dependence, and as long as we repress our neurotic dependence upon him (and we do in part depend upon him) we cannot free him from the need to dominate us neurotically.

It is an obvious but important point to note that Racker says that the analyst should not repress his wish to dominate the patient but he does not say that the analyst is permitted to act on that wish. I would further suggest that the converse of Racker's position is equally true: that the failure to recognize that power (inequality) is implicit in the analytic relationship may lead at best to leaving unanalyzed a fundamental component of the transference in both its positive and negative aspects and at worst, a premature termination of the relationship without significant therapeutic gains in either self-understanding or symptomatic relief.

A final point with respect to the issue of "equality" in the analytic relationship: the issue of the therapeutic alliance (Zetzel, 1965). Without entering into a discussion of this very complex issue, I would simply suggest that while some notion of a working alliance may be perhaps necessary for the felicitous progress of the analytic work, that such an alliance ought to be viewed as epiphenomenal to the more

fundamental dynamics of transference. I would suggest that the therapeutic alliance is epiphenomenal in precisely the same sense as Erikson's notion (1959) that stages in the life cycle are epigenetic phenomena of the genetic stages which Freud first discovered as being part of the adult repetition compulsion.

C. A Case Study of Power Relations in the Transference.

In the preceeding sections of this chapter I have asserted that failure to adequately understand the vicissitudes of power relations within the transference can have significant negative consequences on the course and outcome of analytic treatment. This is a similar view to that of Gadpaille (1972, p. 173) who asserted that "if the power bases inherent in both the analyst's and the patient's roles are not thoroughly understood, and if the analyst is not comfortable in the exercize of his own sometimes considerable power, such an impasse may not be therapeutically resolved." It is clearly beyond my capability to catalogue all of the possible negative therapeutic consequences of a therapist's abdication of the power inherent in the analytic situation but I would suggest that such failures are particularly acute for student's and candidates in the beginning stages of learning how to conduct a successful therapy or analysis.

This was precisely the case in the treatment of a patient (who I will refer to as Mr. T.) who was one of my first

cases as part of my training as a doctoral student in clinical psychology. Mr. T. was a graduate student in another part of the same university system. Thus from the very beginning of the treatment one of the salient aspects of the treatment situation was the fact that he and I were alike in at least one important respect. This was discussed repeatedly in the early phases of the treatment in an effort to forestall later difficulties surrounding this issue.

Mr. T. came to treatment because of certain vaguely defined problems having to do with his relations with the various women in his life. In particular he found himself caught in a triangular relationship with two women; his relations with neither of whom were particularly gratifying and yet he was unable to break away from either. Instead a repetitive pattern had developed in which a movement away from one would invariably lead to a movement toward the other in a series of delicately orchestrated maneuvers. Mr. T. devoted enormous energy to maintaining a balance but found himself quite powerless to alter this state of affairs. Throughout these relationships there was the often expressed feeling of inadequacy which was expressed, among other ways in a tendency towards premature ejaculation.

Mr. T. was scrupulous in keeping of appointments, in the payment of fees, and he invariably presented a picture of eager compliance, courtly manners, and willingness to cooperate. Our sessions were almost invariably filled with descriptions

of his behavior towards the two most significant women and several "casual" affairs in his life. After a brief introductory period in the treatment, Mr. T's sessions began to take on a montonous sameness in which he would typically report his carefully orchestrated maneuvers among the various women in his life.

Other than a certain idealizing and deferential attitude, the dynamics of the transference seemed obscure. For the first year and a half of treatment it seemed as if things were very much on the surface. The deeper reasons for his having sought treatment were unclear. Any attempt to probe the immediate reality of our relationship met with resistance and a slightly paranoid suspicion of my motives for enquiry. As a result, I began to feel increasingly frustrated and ineffectual until in about the middle of the second year of treatment, I made a significant mistake, the analysis of which led to a breaking of the impass that had developed between us.

Near the end of an hour in which I had been presented with a monologue of Mr. T's experiences in a particular academic area, in a closing comment I casually informed Mr. T. that I also had done graduate work in that area. During the next session Mr. T. appeared visibly upset and informed me that whereas in the past year he had often found therapy to be quite useful that such was no longer the case and that in view of his heavy academic schedule he had decided to stop treatment.

In this and subsequent sessions we analyzed this state of affairs. Eventually, Mr. T. altered his decision to leave treatment and the therapy proceeded felicitously, in that there was a visible intensification of the relationship, a closer working alliance was established and Mr. T. in fact began to make progress in understanding and ultimately in changing his relations with women.

In supervision and in my own self-analysis it became clear to me that the mistake as well as the state of affairs leading up to it were principally a result of my inexperience in managing the issue of power in the treatment and of my own ambivalence about taking up the role of therapist--the one who is empowered to conduct treatment and to analyze.

What was at issue was far more than my having disclosed personal information in technical violation of the rule of neutrality, but the complex countertransferential reasons which led me to make this technical error. At the time, it seemed as if my statement might be useful to Mr. T. in helping him to accept that in fact I could understand something of his experience. It seemed like a friendly jesture. It later became clear to me that behind the friendly jesture was a certain hostility at having been "lectured to" on a subject of which I knew a considerable amount. Thus on the surface of things there was an admixture of friendly and hostile countertransferential impulses.

Behind those impulses lay more complex wishes. On the

one hand, my conduct up until that point had been more or less neutral; or more accurately, a kind of pseudo-neutrality, in that I saw myself as determined to act with the neutrality I intelectually believed the role required. Mr. T. perceived this part of my behavior towards him as "oracular", a kind of minimal participation in an artificially attenuated social dialogue but nevertheless something which he could for the most part tolerate. In order to allay my own and the patient's anxiety, I had begun to be a bit freer with my enquiry until at length I became in part "the one who asks questions." In this manner the therapy limped along without either glaring mistakes or much in the way of useful insight on either side.

On the other hand, I had developed a largely unconscious wish that in spite of a certain unpleasantness and artificiality required by the therapeutic relationship that in reality we were really "just friends." In fact there were many qualities about Mr. T. which fueled this wish. He was intelligent, interesting, introspective, and held a whole range of political and social opinions with which I was quite sympathetic. Together with my active wish that he should behave appropriately in the therapy to gratify my own need for competence, I genuinely wished him well and sympathized with his dilemma.

Thus the technical breach of neutrality reflected my own ambivalence with respect to the issue of power. On the one hand, I recognized that our relationship was and ought to have been unequal (in all of the senses described earlier) and on the other I wished to see the relationship as one of

equality; we were "just friends." Mr. T's perception of my inconsistency was on the one hand quite correct and on the other was perceived by him as a repetition of the inconsistency of his mother toward him as a child.

Once this was interpreted his associations led him to a better understanding of why inconsistency in interpersonal relations was to him as intolerable as his own mother had been and eventually why such inconsistency evoked in him feelings of persecution; why it literally made him crazy. In part, the success of the therapy, of which these interpretations were a part, helped Mr. T. find the courage to break the pattern of obsessive maneuvering which was one important reason for his coming to treatment.

While we could certainly not attribute whatever therapeutic gains were achieved to a "correct" understanding of the dynamics of power in the transference and countertransference, it does seem that the analysis of power relations was a significant part of this therapeutic interaction. Moreover, I would argue that in other treatment modalities where the wish to be helpful, to be "just friends", is not subject to strict application of the rule of abstinence, that this potentially important piece of the transference might have been overlooked. I believe that this is particularly true in the more florid manifestations of the so-called helping professions.

In summary, I have argued that without power relations there can be no transference, either in the context of therapy

and analysis or in the larger culture. Where there is power, the relationship is necessarily one of dominance and submission, even though it may not be consciously experienced as such. The analytic relationship requires, for its effectiveness an act of submission on the part of the patient and a full awareness on the part of the analyst of his/her own power position.

These dynamics of power, of dominance and submission, are characteristic of all forms of therapeutic relationships; from doctor-patient, to teacher student, to political leaders and their followers, to gurus and their disciples. What distinguishes psychoanalysis from all other Western therapeutic models is its categorical prohibition against using power in the service of interest. Of course actual psychoanalytic practice often falls short of the ideal and analysts are certainly not immune from using their patients for purposes of gratification and the prohibition against acting in the transference is certainly not universally honored. However I would argue that the self-reflexive quality of psychoanalytic theory together with the rule of abstinence requires that transference as an exercize in power be used only for the purpose of liberating patients from the effects of power and for no further purpose whatsoever. Herein lies the political moment of psychoanalytic praxis. Its concrete manifestations are as diverse as patients and therapists themselves and psychoanalysis can offer only the possibility of choice where before there was none. In optimal circumstances, psychoanalysis requires its practitioners to be, to use Nietzsche's words, "in ones quest for knowledge

full of a strong consuming fire...ever offering oneself as the first sacrifice to the truth one recognizes..."

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

In attempting to knit together the varied and diverse strands of argument presented in the preceeding chapters, one thing seems clear; namely that this attempt to understand the dialectic interrelationship of political and psychoanalytic theory cannot in any sense be regarded as "proven." I do however believe that I have sketched in broad outline the rudiments of what is at least a consistent point of view. Yet as Emerson said, consistency is the hobgoblin of petty minds. In my dogged quest for that ambivalent virtue I have tried not to sacrifice any more than necessary the diversity and subtlety which characterizes all human action and motivation.

In the remaining pages I will first summarize the major ideas presented in the previous chapters and then put forth a number of speculations as to the possible implications of this point of view. These speculations might be usefully thought of under two headings: possible implications for clinical psychology and implications for political theory. In addition, I will attempt to delineate those areas in which the preceeding analysis seems to be inadequate or at least incomplete.

I. Summary.

In the literature of contemporary political science there has been considerable debate over the question of how the concept of power should best be defined. While on a manifest level this debate appears to be mainly one of methodology; alternative ways of defining the concept so that it can be made subject to quantitative analysis. On a deeper level clearly what is at stake is the validity of pluralistic ideology itself since behind the pretense to dispassionate science lies the passionate concern with the preservation of the mythological rectitude of participatory democracy in the face of almost universal experience to the contrary. I have argued that the issue is not so much one of not being able to recognize the phenomena of power but over how broadly the concept is to be applied and that, in the classic tradition of Western political thought, power was not a particularly problematic term but one which referred primarily to the military and economic resources available to the sovereign. I then argued that, in the Anglo-French tradition, the notion of power became problematic partly as a consequence of the advent of varied notions of popular sovereignty, notions which were in turn a reflection of 18th century republican ideas.

The 19th century German tradition, on the other hand stands in marked contrast to Anglo-French (and also American) ideas about the state. In the latter, the emphasis has always

been on plebiscitory and contractual notions of the origins of the state and the methodology for studying social phenomena has characteristically emphasized instrumental reason and empiricism. By contrast, the German dialectic tradition has typically utilized primarily energic as opposed to mechanistic models for understanding political processes (Holborn, 1951). Simply stated, the Anglo-French tradition has tended to view the machine as the dominant metaphor for describing the state whereas the Germans have always preferred to see the state by analogy with a living organism.

Not surprisingly, Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition have much more in common with the German dialectic tradition than they have with Anglo-French empiricism. In particular I wished to demonstrate the continuity between Freud's thought and that of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, power is among other things, both an energic psychological concept and also the basis for his notions about politics and the state. Freud preserves Nietzsche's basic energic position (in the libido theory) but divorces it from both a theory of the state on the one hand and an explicit concept of power as a psychological concept on the other. Moreover, I have argued that Nietzsche's notion of the will to power and Freud'c concept of libido are substantially similar concepts. A corollary of this position is my argument that Freud's structural theory reintroduced the concept of power into psychoanalytic theory particularly in the notion of the superego.

Within the history of the psychoanalytic movement there are a number of paradoxes which it has been my task to explicate. One is that while Freud had no explicit concept of power or theory of power relations, virtually all of the important revisionists who either broke with Freud or were repudiated by the movement gave the concept of power an important place in their writings. A second important paradox lies in the fact that contemporary psychoanalytic practice has for the most part no notion of power as a technical concept yet in the literature, (as well as in Freud's own writings) and in casual talk about patients the concept is used again and again without any attempt at definition or a sense that the term is problematical.

Partly in response to these apparent paradoxes, I have offered a definition of power as a concept arising out of a state of material inequality. I have defined power as actualized inequality, and have argued that power relations are both intrapsychic and interpsychic phenomena. The intrapsychic manifestation of power, following from Freud's structural theory, lies primarily in relations among the id, ego, and superego. The interpsychic manifestations of power, I have argued are the most significant determinants of gender identity such that to be a man refers not only to the possession of a penis but that the significance of the penis itself lies in the fact that to possess a penis is to be "the one who has the power." Alternatively, femininity in traditional

culture, is defined not just by the absence of a penis but by the state of being powerless. These phenomena, I have repeatedly stated are not to be regarded necessarily as a prescription for psychic health but as an analysis of the material reality of ideas in a patriarchal society.

Furthermore, I have argued that power is an energic, drive related force and that its gratification, at least at some minimal level, is necessary for health. Normal psychic functioning necessitates a certain level of gratification of a basic need for power; an ability to actualize innate and acquired inequalities for self advantage. The experience is one of being empowered; of being entitled as if by natural law to one's place in the world. Yet the need for power stands, at some level, in opposition to an equally important need for love which requires for its gratification the experience of powerlessness. Powerlessness in the experience of love refers not to the experience of self as the helpless object of someone elses power but to the "oceanic" feeling of having lost ones self in another; a loss of ego boundaries which frequently approaches psychotic dimensions in its intensity. A fundamental life task is therefore not simply steering a course midway between the Scylla of power and the Charybdis of love but of doing so while partaking fully of both experiences. It is as if one can never love through power but without power one cannot love.

Finally, I have argued that power is an important concept for psychoanalytic technique--that it is a significant deter-

minant of transference and countertransference and that the felicitous conduct of an analysis or psychoanalytic therapy requires a proper understanding of the dynamics of power within the treatment. The normative experience of the therapist in the transference should be one of being empowered and the normative experience of the analysand in the transference contains aspects of powerlessness. Departures from this norm are I believe both prognostically and diagnostically significant for both analyst and analysand. Finally, I have argued that the abiding virtue of psychoanalytic treatment is that, if properly conducted, it is the only treatment modality available which is fully capable of using power for the purpose of liberating the patient from the effects of power without simply replacing one form of dominance with another. This is certainly true for the medical model where neurotic dominance is typically replaced (or perhaps merely obscured) by medication. It is also true for other versions of the talking cure in which a thin veil of neutrality typically obscures an underlying ideology of health. It of course goes without saying that no analysis is ever complete and there always remains not only unanalyzed material but a residue of the power that created the transference and lives on in a newly reconstituted superego.

B. Possible Implications For Psychoanalysis.

As I understand the preceeding analysis, what has been presented is only the beginning point for further research and

inquiry. As is to be expected, it is an analysis which raises far more questions than it answers. However, I believe that I have utilized the concept of power in such a way as to allow for an essential continuity between psychological and political categories of analysis. Power is also, I believe, employed in such a way as to utilize both an energic and object relational point of view without viewing the two as necessarily antithetical. It is nevertheless only a beginning.

It has always seemed to me that Freud's method and theoretical framework were uniquely capable of offering up an understanding of what seem to be among the leading social issues of our time namely the movement towards the emancipation of women and the apparent rise of homosexual object choices and sexual orientations. Conversely, it seemed that if psychoanalytic theory did not boldly address these issues, leading rather than following manifest social trends and debate, then something was wrong either with psychoanalytic theory or practice or perhaps both. It seemed moreover that these issues, in addition to the current preoccupation with narcissism ought to constitute the leading edge of psychoanalytic debate and theorizing.

Understanding the concept of power as both a political and a psychoanalytic concept is, I believe, an appropriate first step. If my argument is correct, then it would seem to follow that the greater sharing of political power among the sexes would necessarily lead to changes in basic gender iden-

tity such that phallic power is no longer normatively regarded as the exclusive domain of those who possess a penis. Conversely, it would seem that changes in the material order have led to a growing feminization of men and an accomodation to aspects of powerlessness.

However it might appear that a logical consequence of this position could be that men and women might be able to regard each other with greater equality and therefore the possibilities of greater intimacy between the sexes would accordingly be enhanced. If this is true it is certainly not manifestly so. On the contrary it appears as if men and women today are more alienated from each other than ever before. One response to this apparent paradox might be simply the argument that successful accomodation to basic material change requires time. While that might well be true, it seems a wholly inadequate explanation.

I would argue that the traditional patriarchal equation of masculinity with power and feminity with powerlessness provided a stable complementarity in which one sought in the other that which one did not have. That men sought in women the qualities and experience which could only be gained as a consequence of powerlessness and that women sought in men the power that they did not have. Yet it appears as if the dominant experience of women's liberation has been that women were and are struggling to gain something which men were required to give up, namely phallic power. What therefore

needs to be explained is why there appears to be so little reciprocity in this process, why male experience has been predominantly giving up and not the acquiring of positively valued femininity and why women's experience and struggle has emphasized the attaining and not the giving up.

If as I have argued power and love are both necessary and antithetical needs then the experience I have described must be explained on the basis of a prior over-valuation of power in the culture. One can point to historic cultures where the sharing of power and powerlessness has been more felicitous and one can think of individuals for whom the experience has been more or less harmonious and apparently gratifying to both the phallic woman and the feminine man. But this is not I believe the dominate experience of our time and our culture.

Thus, I have argued that the attempt to achieve love through power is properly speaking a perversion and that perversion itself ought to be defined not by the nature of the object but by the unconscious wishes a person is attempting to gratify. I take it as axiomatic that all sexuality is in some way tinged with the perverse but would argue that ultimately gratifying sexuality involves a strong measure of object love for which equality and therefore object relatedness is a precondition. Sado-masochism consists in the abortive attempt at achieving gratification through absolute power or absolute powerlessness. Thus power when it becomes the sole criteria of object choice and sexual release is necessarily

perverse.

While to some this argument might seem to promote the social legitimization of homosexual object choices this is only in part the case since the quality of object relatedness not the choice of object is the sole criteria utilized in distinguishing between perverse and nonperverse forms of sexuality. If the historic meaning of masculinity lies in the possession of power then it would seem that for purely historic reasons, if for no other, that men are unlikely to find in each other gratifying sexual object choices and that the more likely result would be a sadistic, masochistic, or narcissitic object choice. More simply stated, the historic relationship between men is that they are to each other enemies in a relentless quest for power; that gains for one necessarily involve losses for the other and that as a result genuine mutuality, at least at the level of genital sexuality, is highly unlikely or at the very least extremely difficult. On the other hand it should not be assumed as a consequence that what passes for normal sexuality in our culture is necessarily unproblematic.

The implications of my emphasis on power as a psychoanalytic concept are not confined to a discussion of the perversions. In fact I believe that the concept of power is potentially useful in explicating the full range of psychopathological phenomena. For example one might be able to understand the phenomena of hysteria as a typical pathological response to powerlessness such that one characteristically

seeks solutions in the other for basic conflicts which properly belong to the self. This would explain among other things the historic association of women with hysteria. Conversely, one might describe obsessionalism as the characteristic pathology of the powerful; the pathological attempt to apply to the solution of internal psychic conflict the solutions characteristically applied to conflicts in the external world. If for example one experiences an unacceptable unconscious wish for debasement one might attempt to cleanse oneself of the unwanted impulse by, for example, the ritualized washing of the hands. Or we might imagine an obsessional who neurotically defends himself against a sense of internal chaos by precise and meticulous attention to detail in the external world. The neurotic use of power over aspects of the external world in an attempt to resolve internal conflicts might be thought of as defining the pathology of the obsessions. In this sense, my discussion of power provides, I believe, a broader context for Schimmel's (1972) work on the power theme in obsessionals.

While I think that through an analysis of power much could be added to our understanding of virtually all types of psychopathology, the theory of power relations as I have developed it thus far is inadequate in at least one important respect namely the fact that it does not provide an adequate account of the phenomena of aggression. In the preceeding analysis I have scrupulously avoided any discussion of the problems raised by Freud's dual instinct theory and of the problem of aggression

in general. While in this study I do not attempt to offer any solution to this problem in psychoanalytic terms, I think that it is possible to regard the aggressive impulse as but one among several quasibiological drives including those of sex and power. If a solution to the problem of aggression is to be found it seems to me important to separate a number of related phenomena which Freud grouped together under the single heading of the death instinct. Aggression, it seems, is not the same thing as entropy on the one hand or nonerotic sadism on the other, and that both of these are distinguishable from the characteristic response of the organism to a fight-flight situation. In sum, I would approach the problem of aggression by attempting to separate it from related phenomena and using the notion of an innate aggressive drive as an argument of last resort in the analysis of social issues.

III. Possible Political Implications.

If nothing else, the psychoanalytic study of politics succeeds in challenging the complacent and self-satisfied empiricism and instrumental reason of contemporary political science then it will have made a noble contribution to Western culture. If psychoanalytically informed theory can specify and analyze the unconscious wishes being gratified through political processes then perhaps psychoanalysis will yet make a practical contribution to the understanding of political processes as well.

This was certainly the intent of Lasswell's (1930) famous statement that the politician is one who projects private affects onto public objects and then rationalizes them in terms of the public good. Yet even the most devoted student of Lasswell's political and psychoanalytic thought would have to admit that its impact on public policy has been less than one would have hoped. Without entering into a detailed discussion of Lasswell's work, I think I have at at least demonstrated that psychoanalysis cannot be understood and applied to an analysis of political processes without understanding the dialectic tradition out of which it arose. And that as a consequence psychoanalytic concepts can never be usefully applied in a mechanistic fashion for purposes of social engineering. Furthermore, it seems that the ultimate value of psychoanalytically informed political analysis must always lie in its utilization of the theory of unconscious conflict for purposes of analysis and not by the employment of nonpsychoanalytic categories like personality.

It is in this context that I have developed my ideas on power and power relations. In doing so it is clear that I have failed to develop at least one fundamentally important aspect of Freud's thought, namely his theory of group psychology. I have not done so partly because to have fully integrated Freud's thought on the particular psychology of groups into this discussion of power would have required an analysis well beyond the scope of the present work, but also because

I wished to argue that power relations are, on some level, epistemologically more fundamental. Clearly one can not speak of group processes without a concept of power but one can also understand group processes as encompassing the group life of a single monadic individual, that is to say that Freud's structural theory allows us to speak of a group of one in which the group is constituted by the interplay of internalized objects and the political relationship existing among id, ego, and superego. It is in this sense that I believe that power relations are more ontologically fundamental than group psychology as Freud understood it (1922). Nevertheless I believe that any potentially complete psychoanalytic theory of politics must include the psychoanalytic theory of group processes along the lines of the work of Alfred Bion (1961). Yet I believe there is no fundamental difficulty in integrating these ideas on power with the psychoanalytic theory of groups. My ultimate goal would be an understanding of the psychoanalysis of power which begins at the intra-psychic level and expands outward to include interpsychic and ultimately large group processes.

Without attempting to specify the content of such a theory and certainly not to formulate precise conclusions, it is possible to offer a few preliminary impressions. If one thinks seriously, for example, about the meaning of ordinary social conversation on political issues, it seems as if political discussion in our culture at least is almost inevit-

ably regressive; a discourse in which even the most psychoanalytically sophisticated persons indulge in rampantly regressive processes such as the splitting of the social world into "us" and "them"; the good guys and the bad guys. Regressive processes in which political leaders are all too easily made into the repository of "madness" thus preserving a view of ourselves as "all good," or alternatively, an implicit idealization of political figures betraying an unconscious identification with the powerful. This is not to say that contemporary political life may not in fact be uniquely impoverished of capable political leadership but merely to point to our own implication in the process. Perhaps this is why psychoanalytic theorists have typically relegated to the category of the "merely political" all that which does not fit conveniently into their own particular psychoanalytic theory.

Moreover, it seems as if the larger the group the stronger the regressive pulls such that at the level of international politics we are all regressed to the level of behavior which Mahler (1975) talks about as being typical of two year olds. While that comparison may seem hyperbolic, it is not unreasonable to compare the difficulties in separation and individuation of the normal two year old to the typical processes of international politics. It is possible, for example, to see nationalism and xenophobia as analagous to the egocentricity, possessiveness and inability to share of normal two year olds.

If for example one examines the role of the United States in the world from the very beginning of the Republic one finds an oscillation between the extremes of isolationism and global grandeosity which bears comparison with infantile darting behavior.

These parallels could perhaps be developed into a consistent thesis but my purpose is merely to suggest that the mega-group life of international politics is so profoundly regressive as to almost completely invalidate the use of instrumental reason as an analytic tool. In Bion's terms, the international system is a typical fight-flight group seldom if ever oriented towards the performance of concrete tasks. The content of political debate becomes almost exclusively a kind of infantile babble of threats and counter threats; choices are formulated in the regressed language of "us" or "them"; "freedom" versus "communism" and otherwise intelligent people talk as if there were some inherent positive content to terms like "totalitarianism". Without an understanding of regressive processes in groups, scholarly attempts at locating the essential meaning of nationalism (Smith, 1979) or totalitarianism (Friedrich, ed., 1954) are at best pretentious and at worst a kind of specious propaganda.

Meanwhile the concrete and pressing tasks of the group are not only left unaccomplished but the intelligent discussion of options seldom takes place. Issues of nuclear war are merely the most obvious example. It is for example well

known that global population is rapidly outdistancing the food producing capacity of the planet, and the natural environment is being so rapidly depleted as to jeopardize the viability of the global ecosystem. All of these issues are well known and the subject of thousands of alarming reports, yet there is almost no discussion, even on a domestic level, of instituting a serious population policy. Instead we seem preoccupied with issues like the supposedly moral conflict over whether or not God wants us to use birth control. It is a truely "maddening" state of affairs.

There is however another level on which the psychoanalysis of power is potentially capable of providing useful insight. As I noted earlier, classic political theory has alternated between two extremes with respect to the issue of power: the pius moral abnegation of power and the aggrandizing exhaultation of power in militaristic statism. In terms of my previous discussion of the antithesis of love and power, and the assertion of the ontological status of power relations, it seems that we cannot specify the ideal concentration or dispersal of power within a political system but we can hope to specify the psychological consequences of power and of powerlessness. It is for example obvious that there is a correlation between economic and clinical depression; that the tendency to turn aggression inward onto the self is greatly enhanced in a society of massive economic deprivation and powerlessness. On the other hand the use of power for

purposes of achieving equality is also not unproblematic. In fact massive programs of social entitlement seem to have done little to enhance the level of social harmony in our society. This might suggest not that such programs should be abandoned but that power can at best create the preconditions for justice; that no amount of tinkering with legislative machinery can be expected to serve the cause of justice unless it addresses the sources of material inequality in society. As Thucydides reminds us "the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel." If it is true that justice is a function of equality then no amount of legislative initiative can promote justice in the presence of massive structural inequality.

In this sense a psychoanalytic theory of politics would not rely on any existing ideological distinctions. It would recognize that power all too often creates the conditions of its own distruction and that without power pius assertions of moral principle are without practical effect. Psychoanalytic politics might be thought of as a kind of realism unfettered by ideological labeling but also without the melioristic optimism which assumes an underlying harmony of interest. In this view the task of psychoanalytically informed political analysis is to interpret contradiction and the task of politics is to act in the face of fully articulated contradiction.

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